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Philosophical Textuality and Khoral Theology:

*Concursus* in the Providence of God of Charles Hodge

And Event in *Khora* of Jacques Derrida

By

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SUMMARY

Philosophical Textuality and Khoral Theology:
Concursus in the Providence of God of Charles Hodge
And Event in Khora of Jacques Derrida

Without self-knowledge, there is no way to know God. Self-knowledge as imago Dei (the image of God) has to be construed by concursus (occurring together) under His Providence, i.e., total presence, not by existentialist and authenticist ways of self-understanding. Even if God’s Providence works like Adam Smith’s invisible hand, as Charles Hodge recognised, it operates as a concursus of the first and second causes in His potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata. Since concursus is initiated by the transcendental power of God and happens spontaneously as an event, for our knowledge, it is indecidable in Jacques Derrida’s words, a paradox for Søren Kierkegaard and irony for Richard Rorty. Therefore, self as a second cause has to be understood in the context of the indecidability and spontaneity of an event. In this thesis, the self is embedded by the death of the I, which assumes responsibility, gift and faith in the Messianic event of possibility of the impossibility. When the death of the I is embedded in a self with the Holy Spirit, it assumes the humility of death happening on the Cross of Jesus Christ.

Khora is the space of juxtaposition of the death of the I and the Holy Spirit. Since they are juxtaposed, chains of supplemental events are occurring in this space for the pursuit of the true transcendental point between God and us. In Hodge’s words, ‘God’ is the first cause and ‘we’ are the second cause. However, khora does not cause something to happen in such ways of receiving and producing, but is the event (happening) itself between the two. Hence our knowledge of God is only possible as an event in this space. Because our knowledge of God should not be confined in static and metaphysical epistemology, but is faith, as John Calvin asserted, and the leap of faith, as Kierkegaard recognised, khora always signifies our faith and traces of God. Accordingly, in this thesis, we want to understand the theology of Hodge with the perspective of the event of faith in our life experiences. The understanding of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling in chapter V will show us how khora works in tracing of God as a means of faith with responsibility, gift and humility.

Hodge’s theology, as influenced by Scottish Common Sense Realism, is discussed with the philosophical textualities of Thomas Reid, Immanuel Kant, John Dewey, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty and Derrida, and with the literary textualities of Kierkegaard, Leo Tolstoy and Ralph Waldo Emerson. These textualities will achieve Khoral theology, in which we can practice theology without losing its own distinctive value, and conviction of faith while being context-sensitive to different faiths and cultures. In Hodge’s theology, his conviction is revealed in his explication of the inerrancy of the text of the Bible. The discussion of textuality is important in Hodge, because textuality does not injure the text itself, but makes it possible to trace the adaptability of the text to our life experiences. In this sense, this thesis begins with the argument that the responsibility of a self in sinning in Hodge’s doctrine of Providence should be extended to the moment of the death of the self, by believing that textuality will lead us to a true transcendental point, i.e., the event of concursus.
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis embodies the results of my own special work, that it has been composed by myself, and that it does not include work forming part of a thesis presented successfully for a degree in this or another university.

Signed:

Dated:
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This thesis is actually about my story of struggling to be a human being in this world: To be or not to be? What does it mean to live? When I was young, I believed in the saying, ‘Honesty is the best policy’, hoping for the world to be honest. However, I found out that I was the one who was not honest. Then, was Mark Twain right when he said, ‘Honesty is the best policy—when there is money in it’? Or should I be convinced by William Shakespeare, who said, ‘Though I am not naturally honest, I am so sometimes by chance.’ Throughout writing this thesis, I have thanked God that I had the opportunity to rethink who I am and what I am doing in this world, being in a space and time of Glasgow. After several years of my ministry in New Jersey, Glasgow was my shelter, struggle and hope.

I thank my mother, who gave birth to me in this world with the full respect of her life and of her unconditional love. She has been a teacher in my spiritual journey. Now I find that her being in this world itself is the encouragement and guidance of my life, which might have been lost in this world so many times. I dedicate this thesis to her.

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It is His Grace.
A. Jacques Derrida and the Theology of Charles Hodge

The effects of postmodernism on Christian religion have been extensively researched by many scholars, among whom, especially in the field of Christian hermeneutics in theology, Anthony Thiselton observes three distractions caused by so-called ‘postmodernity’: first, ‘a general distrust of rationality, traditions and universal truth-claims’; second, ‘an over-ready hospitality to radical pluralism, pragmatism’; and third, ‘the giving of privilege to the “local” criteria of “my” group.’ However, when we regard Christianity as a particular religion, concerning its distinctive truth-claim in comparison with other religions, the losses of postmodern Christian theology that Thiselton worries about may also be great gains, in thinking of the roles that Christian theology and hermeneutics can play in diverse and plural societies. Christians believe that their own particular faith and knowledge—what Thiselton calls ‘local criteria’—will eventually achieve the Messianic prophecy of Christianity in the parousia (παρουσία) for the complete fulfillment of the Kingdom of God. Thus the diversities and pluralities that postmodernity represents will not do harm, but rather give tremendous insights and challenges, to Christian hermeneutics in theology.

Jacques Derrida—like Francis Bacon, as Kevin J. Vanhoozer notes—was more concerned with particular criteria among pluralities than interested in general rules, laws and principles. However, these particulars do not simply, as Vanhoozer writes, ‘swallow up any attempt to unify them or to domesticate their sheer plurality’, but function as the very elemental sources for accomplishing true transcendental

2 Kevin Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?: The Bible, The Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge (Grand Rapids, M.I.: Zondervan, 1998), p. 39. Vanhoozer argues that Derrida is doing induction (not deduction) without end or conclusion, but Bacon does deduction with a finalised conclusion.
3 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
universality without any synthetic kind of unification. Also, we need to notice Thiselton’s argument, citing Vanhoozer, that ‘Derrida’s deconstruction of the author is a more or less direct consequence of Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of God.’ This argument is inadequate because what Derrida deconstructs is not the author, but the metaphysical epistemology of what is written. Theologically speaking, the object of the so-called ‘deconstruction’ of Derrida is not God, but the text. In Derridean writings, since God remains though paradoxically in his absence as the Transcendental Signified, God cannot and should not be ‘dead’ or relativised at all. Conversely, I argue that Derrida’s deconstruction is meaningful in search of the death of the self rather than ‘the death of God’. For this reason, Derrida is important in the discussion of the Calvinistic theology of Charles Hodge, in view of its belief in the total depravity of human beings, who are destined to die due to their sinful nature. Later in this chapter, I will discuss in detail the death of self that is, the subject, in terms of the death of the I in relationship to Derrida.

It is my clear contention that Derrida was a major theological figure drawing upon his Jewish tradition in the context of post-modernity. Although this clearly might be argued, there is no doubt that as his work progresses through the 1980s and 1990s, Derrida’s increasing preoccupation is with both biblical and theological themes and issues. Thus, although he begins his important essay ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ (in which he introduces the theme of khora, see p. 4), with a denial of his writing as ‘negative theology’ in the tradition of the Pseudo-Dionysus, nevertheless this is a continuing preoccupation, prompting in 1992 the publication of a book entitled Derrida and Negative Theology edited by Harold Coward and Toby Foshay, with a concluding essay by Derrida himself. Almost all of Derrida’s later writings are meditations or discussions of religious themes, especially after The Gift of Death (1995), and in 1998 he edited, with Gianni Vattimo, a volume entitled

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4 Derrida’s position is that while pursuing solidarity, he resists any movements that tend ‘toward a narcissism of minorities’ within such groups as feminists, homosexuals, colonized people, communitarianism, and so on. In Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow...: A Dialogue (Stanford: Stanford University, 2004) p. 21.
5 Thiselton, On Hermeneutics, p. 634.
Religion, establishing him in the main stream of radical religious thinking. Especially one of his last books, published in 2002, is entitled Acts of Religion, edited by Gil Anidjar. At the same time, it is possible to understand him as deconstructive of Western religious tradition and as representing therefore a form of secularism after Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. For example, Anthony Thiselton, George Steiner, Ann Jefferson and many others have seen him in this light.

This thesis describes how to understand the theology of Charles Hodge in the postmodern context. For this, in this space I want to define several key terms such as concursus, khora and the death of the I and link those concepts for our discussion.

Firstly, concursus is from the Latin meaning ‘running together’ or ‘concourse’, with the active implication of dynamic encounter or even collision. The origins of the verse concurso are of an energetic even violent meeting. The term then endorses not only a revealed religion but the event of divine encounter with human activities that becomes thereby secondary causes. Within the theology of the Protestant tradition, concursus expresses the encounter that ‘defines the continuing divine support of the operation of all secondary causes whether they are free, contingent, or necessary’.

Following the Westminster Confession of Faith, Turretin agrees that God concurs with secondary causes not only by a particular and simultaneous concursus, but also by a previous concursus. This Reformed idea, in Francis Turretin’s view one of the most difficult in theology, was passed along to many Reformed American theologians, including Hodge. After Turretin, Hodge

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12 This idea also affected the Southern Reformed theologian R. L. Dabney. Douglas F. Kelly argues that Dabney’s basic area of theological concern is the concursus between ‘God’s sovereign, primary control of all things, and the reality and validity of human and natural secondary causation… The way he believes is clearer than the expositions of Dick, Hodge, and McCosh.’ Kelly also argues that
understands concursus as the vital connection between God’s sovereign, primary control of all things, and the reality and validity of human and natural secondary causation. Especially Hodge’s concursus, whether in free, contingent, or necessary modes of the experience of first and second causes—which will capture the religious immediacy of Hodge’s theology—shows us that our sense of religious experience lies within the event of the encounter between the divine and humane.  

As a simple example, the characteristic bipolarity of God’s Word can be explained as ‘at the same time other-worldly and this-worldly’.  

Concursus is important, not only in understanding the dynamic hermeneutic processes of the Bible, but also in understanding the nature of faith and knowledge as encountered in a Providential space, as well as the human and Divine natures of the Christ of the Incarnation. The belief described here is that God deals with His people by His sovereign providential care experienced in the concursus between His divine nature and His people in society and culture. In Christian theology, this bipolarity can be understood in terms of kenosis. Kenosis is derived from the Greek word kenos (kenós), which means, of persons and things, being empty or fruitless. In Philippians 2:6-8, there is a primary example of kenosis as God divesting himself of his glory in the Incarnation:

> 6 Who being the very nature of God, did not consider equality with God something to be grasped, 7 But made himself nothing, taking the very nature of a servant, being made in human likeness. 8 And being found in appearance as a man, he humbled himself and became obedient to death—even death on a cross!

Kenotic theology is particularly developed by the Lutheran theologian Gottfried Thomasius in mid-nineteenth-century Germany. Kenotic theologians, wanting to

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15 By Providential space, I refer to the term khora. See below and Chapter VII.

overcome a dualistic view of the divine and human nature of Christ in the discussion of the Trinity, argue that Christ ‘emptied himself’ in his incarnation. That is, Christ agreed to ‘self-limitation’ and came down to us as a man only. Yet in thinking of kenotic theology, while affirming the idea of ‘Christ’s emptying himself’, we also have to recognise the very truth that the Trinitarian God cannot change and that even in the flesh—Christ remains God.

Secondly, *khora* is both the place and event of *concursus*, and it therefore functions as metaphor of which the characteristic is universality and at the same time particularity. *Khora* maybe understood as a providential space of the event between God and us that can be construed by an appropriate space (*topos*) in time (*kairos*). It is, we might say a space or moment in which a thing or a man ‘is’. According to the Greek lexicon, *kairos* stands for some point of importance of time, an exact or critical time, season or opportunity.\(^\text{17}\) *Tòpos* (literally ‘a place’) refers to a ‘region, position, place or part of the body, place or passage in an author, a room in a house, common place or element in rhetoric’.\(^\text{18}\) In section 52 of *The Timaeus*, Plato understands *khora* as ‘space’\(^\text{19}\) as one of the realities that was before the world came into existence. Eternal and indestructible, *khora*, ‘provides a position for everything that comes to be’, it is, says Plato, ‘hard to believe in’ as it is apprehended without the senses, as in a kind of dream.

Figuratively understood, *khora* is a space/event whereby values become established. Metaphorically understood, *khora* is ‘the place assigned to anyone in life, one’s situation, place and position’.\(^\text{20}\) In an argument connecting time and space, *khora* becomes place which is ‘appropriate’. That is, as a common place of argument, *khora* is not your or my specific place for criticising each other as a manner of being. Yet it looks like a place, it is *topos* in between ontic/ontological, good/evil, truth/lying, future/past, faith/reason, death/life and so forth. *Khora* is a value-oriented space: it seems to be invisible but functionally accommodates our knowledge and faith as visible by recognising the freedom in the encounter between

\(^\text{17}\) Ibid., p. 859-60.
\(^\text{18}\) Ibid., p. 1806.
\(^\text{20}\) Ibid., p. 1749.
ourselves and the Holy Spirit. Hence, our knowledge and faith yresiding in it makes it possible for us to live together in this visible world without losing our own particular identities.

Derrida’s view on khora comes from his critical reading of Plato’s Timaeus:

[Khora’s] ‘eternity’ is not that of the intelligible paradigms. At the moment, so to speak, when the demiurge organizes the cosmos by cutting, introducing, and impressing the images of the paradigms ‘into’ the khora, the latter must already have been there, as the ‘there’ itself, beyond time or in any case beyond becoming, in a beyond time without common measure with the eternity of the ideas and the becoming of sensible things.21

Khora in the Timaeus not only refuses to be integrated into God’s fabrication and solidifying of the cosmos but also is elusive to the discourse.22 And Augustine claims this space as ‘no time’ and also ultimate time beyond time; even Heaven and Earth in a sense did not exist before time:

If there was a “time” before you made heaven and earth, how can it be said that you were not at work then, you who are the initiator of all time? For of course you would have made that time too; there could not have been any passing times before you created times. If, therefore, there was no time before heaven and earth came to be, how can anyone ask what you were doing then? There was no such things as “then” when there was no time.23

Drawing further on Plato24 Derrida’s interest in khora lies in its quality as ‘outsides’ a hope of negativity which, apophatically is beyond metaphor as actual description. Although he wrote an independent essay titled ‘khora’ in On the Names (1995) edited by Thomas Dutoit, Derrida never completed a proposed sustained discussions of the subject.25

As Plato and Augustine imply, khora is such a thing that existed even before the Creation. Therefore khora is the ‘neither an intelligible extension, in the Cartesian

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21 Plato, Timaeus, 52b. cited in Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Budick and Iser, eds., Languages of the Unsayable, p. 35.
22 John Sallis, Chorology: On Beginning in Plato’s Timaeus (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN.: Indiana University Press, 1999), p.3.
23 Saint Augustine, The Confessions (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), XI, p. 255. ‘il ŋya debots la texte’—thus Derrida’s adage, ‘there is no outside text’ becomes an example of ‘khora’, a coming together in the text which is of once outside time and yet wholly within it.
sense, a receptive subject, in the Kantian sense of intuitus derivativus, nor a pure sensible space, as a form of receptivity’.

Khora goes beyond the category of Enlightenment ideas. Although khora is beyond Enlightenment epistemology and philosophy, such as Cartesian and Kantian categories, at the same time these categories are the vehicles to take us to the point at which we can study the theology of Hodge in the space of khora, since we are able to acknowledge khora only in that theology. I will discuss the meaning and function of space as khora in detail in relation to theology in section C, to human beings in chapter V, and to Hodge’s doctrine of Providence in chapter VII. Placing Hodge’s theology in the space and time of khora inevitably requires a new interpretation (a hermeneutic change). I hope this project will renew Hodge’s values, which have been neglected by many scholars and believers for so long.

Thirdly, the Death of the I. Only in the space where the modes of the death of the I are participating are we able to acknowledge the event of khora. The Death of the I is not a simple and actual death of subject or person, but is an historical event encompassing the responsibility and the experience of gift, faith and humility occurring between God and the self. We die to the self in order to find the self anew by ‘concursus’ in the space and event of khora, it is, we might almost say, a Sacramental event and therefore universal. In this thesis, at the same time the death of the I, in the shadow of post-Kantian epistemology, lays absolute stress upon subjectivity and its realization of itself in its very deconstruction. In comparison with the death of God, the death of the I is our experience of kenotic concursus. ‘Death’ in Derrida means ‘the movement of différance to the extent that that movement is necessarily finite’. Here, the différance of Derrida ‘makes the opposition of presence and absence possible’ and ‘produces what it forbids, makes possible the very thing that it makes impossible’. That is, the death of the I always moves between presence and absence and thus makes impossibility possible.

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26 Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Budick and Iser, eds., Languages of the Unsayable, p. 37. ‘Italics are from the original.’
28 Ibid.
29 Perhaps we might recall Aristotle’s connotations in The Poetics that also likely impossibility is always preferable to an unconvincing possibility. See, Raman Seldon, ed., The Theory of Criticism:
Derrida claims that ‘without expectation of death and of the other’, there would be no ‘act of faith, nor promise, nor future, nor expectancy’, ‘nor relation to the singularity of the other’.  

As a champion of Calvinist doctrine of Old Princeton in the 19th century, it is important to recognize that Charles Hodge was a critic of the theology of Friedrich Schleiermacher because of Schleiermacher's emphasis on our feeling toward God rather than interpreting God in the Bible as is. At the same time, despite his criticism of Schleiermacher in the *Systematic Theology*, paradoxically Hodge elsewhere acknowledges and employs Schleiermachean ‘feeling’ in his discussion of religious immediacy. It is clear that Hodge did not buy wholesale into rationalist critiques of biblical authority. However, during his research trip to Germany Hodge had the chance to attend services at Schleiermacher's church and had been impressed by Schleiermacher’s use of ‘feeling’ as effective when hymns sung spiritually filled him with praise and gratitude to Christ as a Savior. Hence when it comes to define the essential attributes of a spirit, Hodge adds ‘feeling’ to “thought’ and “will’, which is rejected or ignored by Calvin and Turretin. In feeling, the self or subject experiences the moment (or place) of simultaneously destabilizing which both negates and affirms the thinking subject before God. In Hodge, this ‘feeling’ thus becomes the vehicle to explain religious immediacy that designates a true transcendental point. In this thesis, our feeling that produces religious immediacy has close links variously with the function of Dewey’s idea of ‘process’, Gadamer’s ‘fusion of horizons’, Habermas’s ‘communicative action’ and Derrida’s ‘event’ in *khora*.

Although the thought of Derrida and Hodge might, at first glance, seem a strange connection to make, the link between them resides in the recognition of Schleiermacher’s emphasis on ‘feeling’ within religious thought and experience. This emphasis, with its acknowledgement of the immediacy of experience, is developed in this thesis in the sense of the moment of *concurus* and event in *khora*. It shall be also be emphasized that this immediacy of feeling is found in the tradition

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of Scottish Common Sense philosophy and this recognition is not unrelated to the theology of Schleiermacher.

Hodge’s theology is often regarded as a precursor of American Fundamentalism, or of Evangelicalism based on traditional Calvinism. Traditionally, since ‘-isms’ have operated in the name of ‘religions’—thus distorting the name of God—I want to distinguish between religion and ‘-isms’. Hence, no religion, including Christianity, should be confined to any ‘-isms’. Hodge’s theology is no exception. It should not be restricted to Calvinism, Fundamentalism or Evangelicalism. (By the same token, for example, Islam is not Islamism.)

These ‘-isms’ are statically summarised ideologies of theological movements that want to change the world into a shape which their adherents want. However, if we regard Christian faith as a particular one among others in the context of this time and space, one which achieves universality in its distinctive parousia, discussions about ‘-isms’ cannot but result in a prejudice of a group based on ideology or theology. Rather, the term ‘Reformed’ is desirable in thinking of Hodge’s theology because it is not a static term, but has the capacity to transcend a particular time and space. In this sense, the slogans of ‘Reformation’, Sola Fide, Sola Scriptura and Sola Gratia are still effective if they are catalysts for reform. With these values or convictions which always transcend a given time and space, I believe the theology of Hodge has the ability to reform by itself.

The importance of Derrida in the Reformed theology of Hodge lies in the implications that, first, particularity will enhance the purity of Christian faith and knowledge; second, the death of the I will simultaneously acknowledge and absolutely free from the subject from the Calvinistic doctrine of the total depravity of a human being; and third, endless reforming will enable context-sensitive adaptability in Hodge’s theology.

B. Thesis

A theology of Charles Hodge has a power of juxtaposition when he articulates a true transcendental point (*concursus*) by distinguishing the function of a human being’s self-determined liberty (freedom) from the work of the Holy Spirit. With this juxtaposition, Hodge wants to secure the purity of Christian Religion in the way that Christian belief of doctrinal universality achieves only at the moment when a true transcendental point happens. The distinctive belief of Christianity lies in the doctrine which presupposes that believers know that a true transcendental point is already-not-yet achieved. In Hodge, this point happens as a *concursus* of the first and second causes. Francis Turretin (1623-87) observed that *concursus* is contingent in God’s providence throughout the history of humanity.\(^{32}\)

Since *concursus* is contingent, it happens as a spontaneous event ‘in between’\(^{33}\) self-determined liberty and the work of the Holy Spirit. Then it has to capture the intersubjective modes of the transformation of a human being’s liberty into an absolute responsibility in the space and time (*khora*) that represent a passage of history of God’s providence. For Hodge, ‘responsibility’ of a human being plays a role in not assigning the authorship of sin to God. However, I argue that Christians taking responsibility for what they do in God’s providential space, where they are living, is possible by participating in a new freedom that can only be generated by the selfless humility. In order for the selfless humility to be observable at a true transcendental point in *concursus* in a given space and time, it should go beyond the realm of the responsibility that Hodge is assigning the sin that we commit.

In other words, in Christianity, the one who claims to have the knowledge of the true transcendental point has to assume selfless responsibility even at the moment of death, when his final result of sin is coming at the point of *concursus*, because he believes that the Kingdom of God is already here. Then the new freedom as a genuine source of truth will flow out of this responsibility, as if the death of Paul

\(^{32}\) Turretin, a scholastic Calvinist in Geneva a century after the death of John Calvin, is a key figure in the formation of Hodge’s theology. As a student of Archibald Alexander (1772-1851), Hodge studied Turretin’s *Institutio Theologiae Elencticae* (1679-85), and used it for 30 years until his own *Systematic Theology* was published in 1872-3. The three volumes of the *Institutio* were first translated into English and published in 1992-4. Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, ed. James T. Dennison Jr., and trans. George Musgrave Giger (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing, 1992-4). Hereafter, the *Institutes* will be footnoted as *ET*.

\(^{33}\) ‘In between’ implies that both sides are already embedded in ‘between’.
each day was the origin that set his heart free. The responsibility that engenders the new freedom will be seen as an event of *the death of the I* in the life experience of the one with the objective knowledge of a true transcendental point and with the subjective faith exercised by selfless humility. The true transcendental point will capture the moment of experiencing the responsibility of death.

Following this logic, in this thesis, I want to argue that the *concursus* in Hodge's theology should have the capacity to expound on this space of moment of which the significant function is to make possible hermeneutic universality where the irrational idea of new freedom recognises responsibility through the experience of death. That is, Hodge's theology has to be construed by a space which is comprehensive of our self-determined freedom and responsibility, and of the Holy Spirit. This space will not only trace a particular spontaneous moment of an event but also has a universal function to direct different identities to the true transcendental point by juxtaposing their bipolarity.

In order to examine Hodge’s nineteenth-century theology in view of the faith and knowledge of a believer who is living in the diverse and pluralistic societies of this era, I will raise questions on three important themes: first, an identity of a person as an image of God living in this space; second, a *khora* permeated by the condition of God; and third, the role of Hodge’s theology in this space. As vehicles to interpret the theology of Hodge, I will define *the death of the I* as a trace of the history of religion in conjunction with the image of God; *khora* as a universal living space of the providence of God; and Khoral Theology as a theology of responsibility. These themes will be dominant throughout this thesis.

The implications of this study are not confined to philosophical theology and philosophical hermeneutics. On the one hand, I hope it will be helpful to Christian circles struggling to understand theology in the space of diverse contexts while keeping Christianity’s distinctive values and convictions. On the other hand, for other disciplines and religions, I hope this can be a case study for those who are

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34 As we have seen, *the death of the I* does not mean a simple death of a subject. On p. 29, I call ‘a passage of history of religion’ *the death of the I* in comparison with ‘the autonomy of the “I”’. See section G below, ‘The Commonality of “I” as *the Death of the I*’ on pp. 24-30.
interested in a space where diverse identities are residing together. Especially for university departments of theology and religion, this study will give insights of how different religions can have a relationship with each other without compromising their religious convictions, reminding us that the idea of ‘religious pluralism’ does not necessarily require religious syncretism or synthesis of differences.

C. A Theology in Space and Time

In order that a theology may be influential in its synergetic impact in life, we must ask how one’s faith builds relationships within a space where God is working, rather than asking how one’s faith is directly related to God. Thinking of our faith within a space of God’s working is not about simply attributing everything to the knowledge of God in the Bible, but, to go further, about asking what would happen if one had faith in God.

This development is an event of faith and of knowledge of a believer under God’s providence. In other words, a theology in a providential space of God is not about Pharisaic law, not about theories of Jesus Christ and God, but about the facts of our faith and knowledge exercised here and now. An authentic theology is possible only if it obeys the events of one’s faith and knowledge happening in this providential space which God provides for one to live now.

In spite of the fact that Derrida describes *khora* as negativity or atheological, it can be theological if we think of theology as a space of events between God and us. Then theology as a chain of events is to be understood hermeneutically. In thinking of the theology of Charles Hodge, we cannot but encounter hermeneutical questions about how the truth of God is revealed and how we can perceive it. In other words, so that theology should not be any barrier to knowing the omniscient and omnipresent God, it definitely has to show the answers to the question of how to know the truth of God. Since God is not a spectator in this world but, as Hodge indicates, abides everywhere in ‘his essence, knowledge, and power’, we need to know how we have a relationship with God in His providence.

35 Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Sanford Budick and Wolfgang Iser, eds., *Languages of the Unsayable* trans. Ken Frieden, pp. 4-5; 37
Francis Turretin recognises that all things—‘small as well as great, contingent and free, natural and necessary’—are taken for granted or happen under the providence of God. He observes that all occurrences in a human being are ‘contingent and fortuitous’, and ‘not of something that is determined to one direction’. With these views on things and on human beings, Turretin maintains that the work of God (‘infallibility of the event from the hypothesis’) does not take away our ‘contingency from the condition of second causes’ and from our ‘mode of acting (in which there is always an intrinsic faculty and indifference to the opposite)’. Likewise, khora can be construed as a providential space of free and voluntary things which are in our power and executed by our purpose.

In Hodge’s theology, khora is the kenotic space of all creation and of God as a topos of ‘in between’ potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata. We will discuss these themes extensively when we deal with Hodge’s doctrine of providence in chapter VI. The two ideas, potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata, are used to explain the government of God. Hodge maintains that the Scriptures are the evidence of God’s governing of all His creatures and all their actions. This sense of government legitimizes the fact that khora is theological in God’s providential sense, and it is applicable to any culture, paradigm, time and space by means of contextualization. On the one hand, Hodge places providence as God’s operation of his grace in the supernatural category of potentia absoluta, along with prophecy and miracle. God works in human beings to produce acts of faith and repentance that are beyond the ability of men in their present sinful condition. In Christianity, such results that surpass the limit of human ability are due to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. In this case, the work of the Holy Spirit represents the potentia absoluta of God.

On the other hand, as Hodge puts it, the doctrine of potentia ordinata admits to the effective presence of second causes, both material and mental, but denies that

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40 Ibid.
they are independent of God. The providential agency of God in relation to these God-given capacities of man is called *potentia ordinata*, and is such that He exercises control over the ordinary acts of a human being, especially those of the wicked, very much like He exercises control over material causes. In neither case is anything accomplished which transcends the efficacy of second causes, either physical laws or a human being’s ability to perform. God guides the action, but the results are such that the person, with his natural abilities, is able to perform the work and is responsible for the results. At this point of discussion, following Hodge, we confirm that *khora*, as a providential space of God, is the space of our responsibility and of God’s grace, as well. This responsibility will be related to that of theology and of *khora* in our discussion.

Accordingly, in practising theology in *khora*, thinking of our responsibility, freedom (what Hodge calls ‘liberty’) and the grace of God is imperative. Freedom is always secured by our responsibility. The sanctity of our lives can be understood in the context of the human-Divine relationship, and only within this relationship is our moral responsibility fully intelligible. In this case, freedom and responsibility are two sides of the same coin. Since *khora* is not static, but the living space of our freedom and responsibility as well as of God’s grace, Derrida argues, we need to avoid speaking of *khora* as of ‘something’ that is or is not, that could be ‘present or absent, intelligible, sensible, or both at once, active or passive, the Good or the Evil, God or man, the living or the nonliving’. *Khora* is the place of ‘in between’ of two different sides, neither Being nor the Good, nor God, nor man, nor History, and so on. *Khora* will always resist being something. Therefore, the idea of ‘neither/nor’ may no longer be converted into that of ‘both’. *Khora* always has been and will be.

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have been ‘the very place of an infinite resistance, of infinitely impossible resistance, of an infinitely impassable persistence’, that is, ‘an utterly faceless other’.47

Following Derrida, if *khora* (place, space and receptacle) is neither sensible nor intelligible, and seems to participate in the intelligible in an enigmatic way,48 it definitely remains somewhere between *potentia absoluta* and *potentia ordinata*. Hence, we are not able to measure the distance from the two points in space, yet what is certain is that *khora*, as the providential space of God, is the very common ground of different signifiers (in Hodge’s words, ‘free agents’) of the universe in between the two theologically signified concepts.

In recent years, the study of *kenosis* between God and humanity has been undertaken by such scholars as Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, Mark. C. Taylor, Jean-Louis Chrétien, Ilse N. Bulhof, John Milbank and Slavoj Zizek. They have interpreted *kenosis* as ‘emptying’ in various ways: ‘exhausting’, ‘phenomenology’, ‘erring’, ‘onto-theology’, ‘secret lucid voice’, ‘the Being otherwise than being’, ‘Incarnation as language’, ‘friendship’, ‘hermeneutical-rhetorical ontology’, and so forth.49 However, I believe that these trials have not achieved a true transcendental point. Only a Derridean event can designate a true transcendental point between Divinity and humanity. The event of Incarnation in *kenosis* has to be construed by *potentia absoluta* and *concursus*, as Hodge and Francis Turretin maintain, and, in the theology of Hodge, *potentia absoluta* and

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potentia ordinata need to be understood as an event. That is, potentia absoluta (such as Incarnation, Resurrection and such Miracles of God), where a true transcendental point is taking place, has to be conceived of as the possibility of the impossibility in the space of khora.

Hodge’s idea of concursus discussed above can only be understood as an event in Derridean khora because only such an event can provide a true and genuine source of faith in and knowledge of God. Even though the space and time of an event is spontaneous and temporal, this event gives us the possibility of the honest ways of practising theology. Since nobody can be like God, we need to be careful when we use His name. John D. Caputo criticises the stance of strong (‘metaphysical’) theology, which regards its authority as having ‘historical determinacy and specificity’ in recognising that God is only ‘the highest being in the order of presence (overseeing and ensuring the presence of order), who presides over the order of being and manifestation’.  

Not thinking of God alone, but also of the khora of an event, will benefit us in practising theology because we can clearly perceive as Thiselton put it, ‘biblical insights into the deceitfulness of the human heart and the realities of human bondage to sin as self-centered criteria of value’ and ‘recognize the illusionary nature of value-neutral perception and value-neutral horizons’.

D. Universality and Particularity in Hermeneutics

As John Duns Scotus (1265/66-1308), a Franciscan and a founder of Scotism—a form of Scholasticism—noted, ‘each thing has the form of “this-ness” (haeceitas) which singularizes it and makes it individual.’ Duns Scotus means that commonality in universality is that every particular thing has a distinct identity. Following Duns Scotus, in the context of khora—as we have seen—since Christianity has to be construed as a particular religion among other religions, we

51 Thiselton, On Hermeneutics, p. 634.
need to recognise that Christianity should be reconciled with other religions in order to achieve universality while longing for the promise of concursus, a true transcendental point and meeting place. This reconciliation demands that we consider the relationship between universality and particularity.

One of the major tasks of this thesis in placing the theology of Charles Hodge in the space of khora is defining universality, particularity and their relationship. This task is closely related to examining Hodge’s inductive theological method and, building up a relevant method in khora for identifying the true transcendental point as Turretin and Hodge’s concursus. For understanding the function of universality, particularity and their relationship in theological, as well as philosophical, contexts, I want to discuss how universality is to be understood and how current philosophical hermeneutics have been developed.

In metaphysics, the noun ‘universal’ contrasts with individual, while the adjective ‘universal’ contrasts with particular. Then, universality is the claim that universal facts are in opposition to relativism of particularity. Then truth is considered to be universal if it is valid in all times and places. In Christianity, universality has to be understood in conjunction with the moment of parousia where the universality of truth has to be seen as eternal or as absolute. Accordingly, in this thesis, universality is seen where the whole is intended rather than actually in the whole. The last section of Gadamer’s Truth and Method is entitled ‘The Universal Aspect of Hermeneutics (Part III. c). This ‘universal aspect’ has been borrowed from Hegel’s idea of ‘concrete universality’ and can be difficult to grasp without understanding what Gadamer has called the ‘fusion of horizons’; we encounter an understanding that is not only social (shared) but also universal in nature (‘an I that is We and a We that is I’).

We can begin to grasp the idea of universality among particularities when Gadamer distinguishes ‘taste’ and ‘fashion (Mode)’. Gadamer writes that ‘the universality of taste has quite a different basis and is not the same as empirical

53 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 34.
universality'. Here, empirical universality is achieved by fashion (Mode) which implies ‘a changeable law (modus) within a constant whole of sociable demeanor’. Yet the universality of taste is achieved not only by recognizing this or that as ‘beautiful’, but also ‘having an eye to the whole.’ With this universality, ‘against the tyranny exercised by fashion, sure [good] taste preserves a specific freedom and superiority.’ Following Gadamer in his discussion of aesthetics, we affirm that the universality is possible ‘wherever a whole is intended but not given as a whole’.

Gadamer’s way of achieving universality can also be observed in John Dewey. In Dewey, the idea of ‘beautiful’ as good taste is seen as universality, with the vision that the foundations of aesthetic judgement are laid out in the four moments of the ‘analytic of the beautiful’: the moments of quality, quantity, relation and modality. Here we need to recognise that both Gadamer and Dewey are different to Immanuel Kant on taste and aesthetics. Kant sees that ‘the judgement of taste is subjective, i.e., non-cognitive in the sense that it is not based on definite concepts, but rather that its predicate is a feeling of pleasure.’ The difference for Kant is that aesthetic value is attached to the syntactic, not the semantic, dimension of meaning. Only in that way is the artist free to create something ‘purposive, [but] without purpose’.

In spite of the fact that Jacques Derrida dismisses Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics in light of the universality achieved through ‘fusion of horizons’, Derrida’s rhetoric of khora can still allow us to think of universality achieved through similar fusions of the universal (synchronic) and the particular or historical (diachronic) and is always more than either. Thus despite their differences, there is a close similarity between Gadamer and Derrida in our discussion of universality.

In Gadamer and Habermas, the universality in the process of understanding is observed through intersubjective modes. Intersubjectivity, as distinct from process, includes both object and subject in the process of operating between two distinct

54 Ibid., p. 33.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., p. 34.
58 Ibid.
realities. In this sense, it is a set of mechanisms of common understanding and behaviour constructed by people in their interactions with each other in their everyday social and cultural life. Intersubjectivity arises from an existentialist perspective evident in the thinkers as diverse as Heidegger and Martin Buber in his work *I and Thou* (1923) in which the subject is realized in the other and perhaps the most developed meditation can be found in Paul Ricouer’s late work, *Oneself as Another*.\(^{60}\)

Anthony Thiselton summarises four models of hermeneutics.\(^{61}\) Considering these models for understanding how universality is attained among particularities, we can presuppose that the field of hermeneutics is divided into two approaches: a context-relative approach, which abandons the idea of universal criteria for trans-communities, and a socio-critical approach, which still holds to the idea of universality.\(^{62}\)

The former approach can be seen in the contextual and cultural discipline that recognises differences of race, location, language, culture, and so on, as distinctive or prejudiced. Hans-Georg Gadamer (whom we will discuss in detail in chapter IV) uses this methodological approach with interdisciplinary hermeneutics. He criticises the preoccupation of post-Enlightenment rationalism and praises ‘method’ as the means of grasping truth.\(^{63}\) As we will see in chapter IV, Gadamer’s mode of understanding as the fusion of horizons always overcomes not only our own particularity, but also that of the other.\(^{64}\) With this argument, I affirm that Gadamer’s universality is meaningful and possible because it is achieved by overcoming the limits of both prejudiced sides. In the process of Gadamer’s fusion of horizons, hermeneutic universality can be seen linguistically. Since language has the capacity to keep value when it is expressed, it does not relativise or synthesise

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\(^{61}\) Anthony C. Thiselton, *New Horizons in Hermeneutics* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House, 1992), pp. 4-8. Thiselton’s four models are: Schleiermacher’s model; Paul Ricoeur’s model; Hans-Georg Gadamer’s multidisciplinary hermeneutic model; and the socio-critical hermeneutic model.

\(^{62}\) Ibid.


\(^{64}\) Ibid., p. 304.
the objects at all. Universality in the form of fusion is achieved by, as Gadamer puts it, language in which ‘we articulate the experience of the world as something we hold in common’. 65

In response to Jürgen Habermas’s critique that Gadamer’s idea is relative, Gadamer argues that since our experience of the world is that of language, language enables us to encounter reality. 66 Gadamer believes that the function of language is to break ‘political ideas’ that recognise ‘our capability’ of ‘domination and unfreedom’. 67 Here, he relates linguisticality to the idea of freedom. What underlies his thesis is that only in linguistics is the Enlightenment principle of freedom possible at all. Hence, in Gadamer, universality is possible through freedom, which comes from language.

In khora, universality is observed as an event in the hermeneutic textuality of its happening in space and time. Textuality as intersubjective modes and chains of events in khora shows the relationship between signifiers, and that the singular distinctiveness of one signifier is a particular form of relation to the other. In Derrida, the universality of khora in the providential space of God is achieved as a series of events among the intersubjectivity of distinctive particular signifiers. I will discuss textuality with the idea of ‘the supplement’ in more detail in chapter II.

The latter, socio-critical approach is to regard those differences coming from class conflict as in the universal criteria. This view acknowledges that the lack of understanding among particularities is caused by intellectual deficiency in perceiving universal criteria of a human society. A typical example is Jürgen Habermas. In Habermas, since human conscience and objectivity cannot be easily connected, the universality in the subjective-objective dichotomy is possible through dialectical modes of communication. These modes make objective understanding of a subjective intended meaning possible. From this stance, cultural differences can

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65 Ibid., p. 550.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
be seen as a diversity of voices that can be deciphered by intelligible, subjectively intended meaning. 68 We will discuss Habermas in detail later in chapter IV.

These different views on universality in contemporary philosophy have generated controversy between so-called ‘postmodernism’ and modernism. However, defining modernism and postmodernism, and drawing a clear line between the two, is not that simple. Who defines what? Should modernists define postmodernism, or should postmodernists define modernism? If postmodernists do, then, who are defined as postmodernists? Whatever the answers are, in general, current discussions on the universality of hermeneutics are set by two groups, as we have discussed: the ones who believe in a plurality of different times and spaces, and achieve a universality that encompasses a trans-community dialogue; and the others, who presuppose universal criteria to make trans-community dialogue possible. In fact, true universality as concursus can neither be perceived by the universal criteria for trans-particular human beings and creatures, nor be understood by the universal modes of transcendental understanding of the object/subject dichotomy.

E. Self-Assertive Will and Self-Destructive Will

In the modern paradigm, the will to freedom is antithetical to the will to truth. Friedrich Nietzsche thought the intrinsic problem of Christianity was caused by a self-destructive view of a human being in pursuing truth. For this reason, in On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche overturns ‘the will to truth’ and substitutes for it ‘the will to power (freedom)’. His vehicle for pursuing freedom (power) is what he means by ‘bad conscience’ that results in self-violation. Nietzsche argues that ‘only bad conscience, only the will to self-violation, not “cruelty” or “a self-contradictory concept” of “the selfless, self-denial, self-sacrifice,” provided the precondition for the value of the unegoistic.’ 69 Here, we need to notice that, according to Nietzsche,

the origin of bad conscience is not something gradual and voluntary, but ‘a broach, a leap, a compulsion, a fate which nothing could ward off, which occasioned no struggle, not even any resentment’.  

However, in the paradigm of khora, self-denial is not the phenomenon of self-contradiction. Rather, it is the very tool for the expression of freedom. In khora, the death of the subject becomes the source of power that makes the impossibility possible. Yet its function follows Nietzsche’s idea of ‘broaching’ that ‘bad conscience’ does. When the death of the I in khora is embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit—for example, Paul who set our heart free—the freedom functions as a broaching supplement. In khora, our freedom comes from the experience of death in the grace of God, as Paul could experience impossible freedom when he was confined to a cell by God’s grace. That is, in khora, our selflessness, self-denial and self-sacrifice rather enhance our freedom.

Likewise, khora presents the way to overcome the limit of the modern paradigm of thinking and rehabilitates both modern theology and philosophy, which are confined to their epistemology, by shifting their ground to khora. Yet the insights of Nietzsche’s questions in On the Genealogy of Morality are critical in thinking of khora: first, what is it in us that wants truth? (how can we know truth?); second, why do we wish not to be deceived?; third, to what extent is life bearable without the existence of an ideal?; and fourth, must religious beings always be ascetic?

So far, I have formed a set of foundations for the discussion of the theology of Charles Hodge. We have studied Derridean validity in Hodge’s theology; the importance of an event in providential space and time, or khora; universality, and how it is achieved among particularities; and selflessness as the source of Christian freedom. Considering these foundations, let us examine how an event in khora works, and how our freedom is obtained in its universality, in the context of John 8:1-11.

F. John 8:1-11: The Event of Faith and Knowledge

70 Ibid., p. 62.
According to the Gospel of John, the events of one’s faith and knowledge occur at the time (concurrence) of regeneration (redemption) and sanctification. Jesus obviously recognises that regeneration and sanctification should begin at the same time. In the narrative of John 8:1-11, when forgiving a woman who was seized in the act of adultery by the teachers of the regulation and the Pharisees, Jesus declares to those who gather around Him in the temple court, ‘[I]f anyone of you is without sin, let him be the first to throw a stone at her.’ However, nobody dares to, and all except the woman, an offender, leave without a sound. Thereafter, Jesus proclaims the forgiveness of sin to the woman, indicating that He will never condemn her, and at the same time declares, “Go now and leave your life of sin.”

This narrative, according to Jesus, clearly shows that sanctification while living in this world is not so much the condition as it is the clear evidence of regeneration. As a result of being forgiven by Jesus, the woman has faith in and knowledge of Him. In other words, the event of forgiveness of Jesus at the instant of redemption and sanctification initiated a sinner’s faith and knowledge. Faith and knowledge are not things that authority demands, but are gifts of the Trinitarian God in the life of a sinner that are seen as an experiential event between Jesus and her.71

At that moment, a sinner’s having faith and knowledge at the same time as redemption and sanctification is not the business of a human being, but the grace of God revealed by the redemptive atoning cross of Jesus Christ, the Son, and executed by the sanctifying illumination of the Holy Spirit. Likewise, for the one who is living in the universal space of this planet, one’s Christian (particular) faith and knowledge are observed as already not-yet-occurring events of the grace of the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit.72 Here, one’s particularity will interact

71 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?, p. 29. Vanhoozer answers the titular question by saying that the ethics of pursuing meaning has to be based on pneumatology and sanctification, so as to overcome a crisis of hermeneutics based on mere humanity.
72 On the opposition between universal and particular statements, Susan Handelmann cites Aristotle’s famous ‘square of opposition’ where Aristotle combines the distinction between the universal and the particular with that between the affirmative and the negative. The four classes of general statements are: first, the universal positive (‘every man is white’); second, the universal negative (‘no man is white’); third, the particular affirmative (‘some man is white’); and fourth, the particular negative (‘some man is not white’). See Susan Handelman, The Slayers of Moses: The Emergence of Rabbinic Interpretation in Modern Literary Thinking (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1982), p. 14.
with others in the universally created *khora* as a person with the Trinitarian personhood, which is derived from the idea of the God of both one and three, whose being is revealed in an intersubjective belongingness. The function of the Trinitarian relationship of Father, Son and Spirit will give hints on how the universality of faith and knowledge is to be achieved in a person with the Trinitarian personhood illuminated by the Spirit. However, I do not argue that the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit ‘ought to happen’, but ‘is happening’ as an event. Since the saving Spirit is the other, Christians can only recognise the work of the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit in the event of their life experiences in relationship with the intersubjective modes between the Holy Spirit and them.

We also need to recognise that, if we presuppose that those who are living together in this world of the providential space are forgiven and unforgiven sinners, the business of discerning the forgiven and the unforgiven is not ours, but God’s. Nobody but God has the knowledge to judge sin. For this reason, I want to argue that sinners—whether forgiven or not, living in a universal space of God—are to be understood, first of all, not in terms of the object of repentance, but are to be regarded as prospective ‘salt and light’ of this world. Since saving power is the other, we cannot deny that the killing and war of this era, especially among different religions, are caused by human judgements in discriminating sinners from the saved, or believers from non-believers. Yet *khora* is the place of living together.

Observing philosophically, the happenings of faith and knowledge are events in the intersubjective modes of a believer’s life experience, where independent objective knowledge of God, Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, and the subjective particular faith of a believer, are embedded. The reality of our experience is sometimes independent from our consciousness, which remembers what we ought to do. Our experience is always accompanied by the events happening between objectivity and subjectivity, and the process of that relation. Concerning the

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73 Donatists were clear about their status as a Chosen people without compromise with the ‘impure’ world. However, according to Peter Brown, Augustine criticised their self-discerning as being Elect as ‘the ominous contempt of a man’ who felt that ‘the ineluctable course of history was on his side’ as seen in Psalms 95:11. Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography* (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), pp. 219-21.
relationship between objectivity and subjectivity, I will also prove that theology has validity not only if it is actualised in the intersubjective modes of a believer’s life experiences, that is, between the universal mode or presence of the Holy Spirit and each believer’s particular faith and knowledge, but also has validity when it operates in the universal space where the particular Christian identity of ‘I’ is embedded in the universal identity (commonality) and participation in the death of the I.

Consequently, my argument is that, without exercising evidently particular faith and knowledge, achieving universality is meaningless. Conversely, the ones who cannot achieve universality are those who do not exercise what they know of their own faith and knowledge. Particular faith and knowledge should accomplish hermeneutic universality with others. Temporality or spontaneity of this intersubjective mode does not result in a mixture of synthesized entity, but shows vibrant movement of the object and subject. As a proton and a neutron are incessantly vibrating in a very stable atom, intersubjectivity is operating incessantly without losing its elemental identity.

G. Commonality of ‘I’ as the Death of the I

One of the important themes of this thesis is the concept of the death of the I. The perspective of this concept is the key to distinguishing ‘the autonomy of the “I”’. That is, it is not a simple kind of subject or person, but an historical event encompassing the responsibility, faith and gift occurring between God and the self. I will discuss this in relation to Derrida later in this section, with the hope that the death of the I will resolve complicated ongoing problems in hermeneutic plurality, whether they are generated from postmodern or modern disciplines.

Claus Westermann interprets the image of God (imago Dei) in terms of an event between God and us. He emphasizes it as a description of action, rather than a definition of the nature of man. Accordingly, ‘the image and likeness of God’

74 We reviewed on synthesis in the discussion of universality and particularity in section D.
based on our action requires our responsibility.\textsuperscript{76} The self as an image of God has to be understood in relationship with others and our individual responsibility before God. As an image of God, the self experiences the possibility of being oneself and losing oneself, ‘fallenness, guiltiness, resolve, temporality, death.’ Westermann surveys the image of God in Genesis 1:26-7 and concludes: ‘All exegetes from the fathers of the church to the present begin with the presupposition that the text is saying something about people, namely that people bear God’s image because they have been created in accordance with it.’ Therefore, while acknowledging the whole question centers around the image of God in the modes of actions of a person, Westermann concludes in the discussion of the image of God is that ‘there can be no question that the text is describing an action, and not the nature of human beings.’\textsuperscript{77} Following Westermann, John Macquarrie analyses that Westermann’s view is similar to Martin Heidegger’s constitutive structures of the being of man (\textit{Dasein}).\textsuperscript{78}

In Genesis 2:18 and 20, the original solitude of a man is involved in a woman helper ‘corresponding to him’. In this sense, the image of God has \textit{Dasein}’s spatiality: a man already has a relationship with a woman, since she was created by being taken out of a man (Genesis 2:23). But God did not create man as a solitary being, for from the beginning “male and female He created them.”\textsuperscript{79} (Genesis 1:27) Their companionship represents \textit{khora}, a space of being together. Without having a relationship with others in \textit{khora}, the self cannot fulfill what God intended to be His image.

By the same token, with respect to the identity of the self as an image of God, when we think of the relationship with non-Christians in Christian theology, we also have to consider ways to live with others without losing one’s own identity as a self with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit. Because the context of ‘I’ is a space where ‘We’ are living together, first of all, we need to find out the commonality of self identity in order to think of context-sensitivity in this space.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p. 604.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., p. 158 ff.
According to both modern and postmodern thinkers, the commonality of the self is based on the ‘responsibility’ of a universal human being. David Klemm has argued that the fundamental principles of ‘theological humanism’ are: ‘the autonomy of the “I”’; ‘the finality of the “you”’; ‘the universality of the “they”’; and the preciousness of the Earth and its creatures. Klemm concludes that the autonomous self should assume ‘the responsibility for the integrity of life’, arguing that no theology can be true without respecting and measuring itself by this.

My response to his argument is how ‘the autonomy of the “I”’ can assume responsibility for the integrity of life at the moment when it decides not to be responsible for what it has chosen in its life. It is true that sometimes and momentarily, ‘the autonomy of the “I”’ would be as unstable as in William Shakespeare’s dilemma: ‘To be, or not to be; That is the question.’ This instability, temporality or vulnerability of Klemm’s ‘the autonomy of the “I”’, caught in the inescapable providential time and space within which it is responsible, limits its autonomy and its judgement. Hence, David Jasper, in The Sacred Desert, asserts that a self (a poet, in Jasper’s words) must have the courage to die and not to be in order that the meaning of life can emerge at the moment when it is totally broken.

More serious problems come about when ‘the autonomy of the “I”’ decides not to be responsible. Where is the integrity in not assuming responsibility? In Klemm’s structure, the presupposed autonomous self cannot abandon responsibility because ‘I’ is already related to ‘you’, ‘they’, ‘earth’ and ‘creature’. With this structure, Klemm presupposes ‘I’ as already being autonomous. In the modern structure, like in Klemm, ‘I’ ‘should’ imperatively be responsible. However, Klemm’s ‘the autonomy of the “I”’ (modern self) never fulfils the responsibility of being a perfect autonomous self, which is exclusive to God Himself: ‘I am Who I am.’ ‘The autonomy of the “I”’, according to Colin Gunton, has an intrinsic

80 Ibid., p. 9.
81 Klemm uses ‘the autonomy of the “I”’ when talking about an autonomous self, a modern self.
problem because it regards the other as necessarily heteronomous, believing that the concept of the other as God of judgement and grace is a threat to independence and freedom. To be genuinely autonomous in daily life, we do not need the concept of autonomy at all to lead the way to autonomy.

In *The Gift of Death*, in comparison with ‘I’ assuming responsibility, Derrida argues that ‘religion is responsibility or it is nothing at all.’ Furthermore, he proceeds to say that ‘religion’s history derives its sense entirely from the idea of a *passage* to responsibility.’ That is, ‘a *passage* of history of religion’ assumes responsibility. Then the subject of responsibility becomes not ‘I’, but ‘a passage of history of religion’. ‘A passage of history of religion’ replaces ‘the autonomy of “I”’ because Klemm’s ‘autonomy of the “I”’ is already embedded in it. Heidegger was right in observing that ‘space is not in the subject, nor is the world in space,’ but the “subject” (*Dasein*), if well understood ontologically, is space and it shows itself “*a priori*.” Therefore, the subject, ‘a passage of history of religion’ does not designate an objective judgement of decision in exercising the integrity of life, but spatiality itself, where responsibility reveals. According to Heidegger, this space has an *a priori* nature, which stands for ‘the previousness with which space has been encountered (as a region) whenever the ready-to-hand is encountered environmentally.’

While with Heidegger, ‘a passage of history of religion’ has *Dasein’s* spatiality, it definitely overcomes his ontological level of understanding of the space of *Dasein*.

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85 Ibid.
86 Derrida’s idea of ‘passage’ traces back to the concept of *aporia*. In philosophy, an *aporia* is a philosophical puzzle or a seemingly insoluble impasse in an inquiry, often arising as a result of equally plausible yet inconsistent premises. In Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, *aporia* plays a role in his method of inquiry. In contrast to a rationalist inquiry that begins from *a priori* principles, or an empiricist inquiry that begins from a *tabula rasa*, Aristotle begins his inquiry in the *Metaphysics* by surveying the various *aporiai* that exist, drawing in particular on what puzzled his predecessors. Derrida discusses *aporia* in terms of ‘the space of the borders.’ Jacques Derrida, *Aporias* trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 1-8. Also, we need to define what Derrida means by ‘religion’. Religion, according to Derrida, presumes access to the responsibility of a free self by breaking the secrecy which is associated with the mystery of the sacred and the demonic. Derrida, *Gift of Death*, pp. 1-2.
88 Ibid.
Not only does it experience past history, but it also experiences the history to come, which is ontic. In this sense, while we understand that Heidegger’s *Dasein* is ontological, implying just being there, ‘a passage of history of religion’ has to be understood with the idea of khora between ontic and ontological. Yet we should not forget that as a way of understanding a human being’s particular state of being as an image of God, ‘a passage of history of religion’ has deep roots in existential *Dasein*.

Since Derrida views history as bound not only to responsibility but also to faith and to gift, history is not a simple history, but is a passage of history. So as to get the idea of passage, we need to listen to Derrida’s precise summary of what is happening in that passage in terms of the way in which history is bound to responsibility, faith and gift, as follows:

To responsibility in the exercise of absolute decisions made outside of knowledge or given norms, made therefore through the very ordeal of the undecidable; to religious faith through a form of involvement with the other that is a venture into absolute risk, beyond knowledge and certainty; to the gift and to the gift of death that puts me into relation with the transcendence of the order, with God as selfless goodness, and that gives me what it gives me through a new experience of death.

As we can see above, a passage, as a vehicle or a place in which the history of religion is embedded, is where ‘a passage of history of religion’ is, first, to pass through the very ordeal of the undecidable (paradoxical life experience); second, to venture into absolute risk; and third, to have a relationship with God with the transcendental selfless goodness through a new experience of death.

Hereafter, I will identify this replacement subject, ‘a passage of history of religion’, with the death of the I, in contrast with ‘the autonomy of the “I”’. ‘Death’ in Derrida means ‘the movement of différence to the extent that that movement is necessarily finite’. Here, the différence of Derrida ‘makes the opposition of

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90 Derrida, *The Gift of Death*, pp. 5-6. ‘Italics are from the original.’

presence and absence possible’ and ‘produces what it forbids, makes possible the very thing that it makes impossible’. That is, the death of the I as ‘a passage of history of religion’ always moves between presence and absence and makes impossibility possible. Derrida claims that ‘without expectation of death and of the other’, there would be no ‘act of faith, nor promise, nor future, nor expectancy’, ‘nor relation to the singularity of the other’.

When we try to understand Derrida’s philosophy on the opposition of presence and absence, we need to pay attention to the coincidentia oppositorum of Nicholas of Cusa (Cusanus). According to Cusa, coincidentia oppositorum is incomprehensible to human reason, i.e., our discursive, logical and dialectical thinking. For Cusa, God, named as maximum, is, by coincidentia oppositorum, also minimum. Therefore, the coincidence of bipolar opposition would be a mistake to think ‘positively’ since reason, using the principle of non-contradiction, actually cannot think in coincidentia oppositorum, which is supra omnem rationis discursum (i.e., ‘beyond the limits of thought’).

The death of the I, with the above three modes of the experiences of ‘a passage of history of religion’, traces responsibility, faith and gift, tied to the history of religion. Only the death of the I can allow for this because it has a passage. ‘The autonomy of the “I”’ cannot, because it does not have spatiality with the capacity of passage, as we have seen in Heidegger. Otherwise, ‘the autonomy of the “I”’ is already being embedded in the death of the I. That is, only the death of the I has the capacity for passage, a vehicle or a place in which the history of religion is revealed. ‘The autonomy of the “I”’ cannot trace because a passage is perceived neither by intelligibly extended knowledge nor by intuitively derived knowledge. A passage itself is a source of knowledge. It is an innate knowledge embedded in the death of the I.

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92 Ibid.
94 Yet the coincidentia is in an unthinkable, transcendent way present to our mind (mens, intellectus), namely by an intellectual intuition and a philosophical contemplation. ‘Maximum absolutum incomprehensibiliter intelligitur, cum quo minimum coincidit.’ Nicholas of Cusa, De docta ignorantia, book I, chapter 4.
95 Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Budick and Iser, eds., Languages of the Unsayable, p. 37.
Even before pointing out something with autonomous human reason, *the death of the I* is already committed in the past experience and the promise for the future. Therefore, the responsibility of *the death of the I* naturally surpasses the limit of ‘the autonomy of the “I”’. For this reason, Derrida counts history as responsibility, and this is possible only when ‘the autonomy of the “I”’ defers speaking.\(^96\) When ‘the autonomy of the “I”’ avoids inexact, erroneous, aberrant and improper speaking, it can be responsible for history. It is clear that the ‘I’ who can avoid speaking while expressing itself with commitment and promise is *the death of the I*, not ‘the autonomy of the “I”’.

*The death of the I* as a common identity of a space is a crucial supplement to a person with the Holy Spirit in theology. This figure can explain the characteristics and role of ‘the righteous’ living here and now. The righteous that God sought at Sodom and Gomorrah can be considered as the analogy of *the death of the I* embedded in a person with the Holy Spirit. The righteous person that does not lose his identity as a man of God, but is also a context-sensitive figure with his experience of death, is desperately needed for this world and for the world to come. Abraham in our discussion in chapter V will be a good example.

H. Universal Space of *Khora*

In this section, I want to clarify the meaning of *khora* in detail in relationship with the doctrine of predestination. In chapter V, I will discuss *khora* in view of its role among beings (‘the genius’ of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘the ironist’ of Richard Rorty, ‘Ivan Ilyich’ in Leo Tolstoy and ‘Abraham’ in Søren Kierkegaard) in this world.

Christian theology needs to identify a space where sinners, whether forgiven or not, are struggling in this world rather than directly informing what sinners are to do. Assuming that human beings are sinners before God, how can we actually perceive His redemptive or the providential space where we sinners are residing? This space cannot but be a providential space, which is prescribed as a universal space

\(^{96}\) Ibid., p. 16.
including this world, where human beings, forgiven and unforgiven sinners, are residing and the Creator, transcendental God, is working. For this reason, we are required to accept that a providential space of God in this world is not exclusively for Christians, but for every creation of God. Once again, when it comes to refer to a space, we need to recognise that a particular religion, such as Christianity, is to live together with other religions of this world. That is, the discontinuity between particular religions has to be understood within the continuity in a universally created space.

If we presuppose that the place where we are living is that of election and of reprobation, we conclude that the election and reprobation has nothing to do with our option to choose. Theology then needs to focus on the phenomenology of the space of sinners living in this world. Philosophers such as Heidegger, Gadamer, Habermas, Rorty and Derrida, with whom we are going to deal in the following chapters, have lots to contribute on this kind of space. However, the epistemology of theology tends not to extend its study further to the universal space in which sinners are residing. So in this era, when subjective, invisible spirituality is growing to be influential on all sorts of academic disciplines and values, we need to investigate this space both philosophically and theologically.

The particularity of Christian theology and the universality of a space for living together involve three things: a space where different identities reside without losing their own identities; a space of the providence of God that nevertheless allows for both the predestined to be elected and reprobated; and a space that takes precedence over every other particular identity, including Christianity. Given these three presuppositions, Christian theology needs to ponder hermeneutic universality by recognising the reality of plurality and diversity of created beings.

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97 In *Fear and Trembling*, Kierkegaard’s agony about election is well depicted: ‘Abraham became old, Sarah became a laughing stock in the land, and yet he was God’s elect and *interior* of the promise that in the seed all the races of the world would be blessed. So were it not better if he had not been God’s elect? What is it to be God’s elect? It is to be denied in youth the wishes of youth, as with great pains to get them fulfilled in old age.’ Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling and the Sickness unto Death* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 32.
I. Theology as a Reduced Form of the Death of the I: Khoral Theology

If theology is not to degenerate into theory and produce speculative theological jargon, it has to deal with the space/event of our faith and knowledge. There might be some theologians who are leading daily lives according to their faith and knowledge. However, theology has hardly been successful in its progress according to the space/event of our faith and knowledge here and now. Theology as the knowledge of God and as that of ourselves\textsuperscript{98} should act by itself, not only in our faith, but also in our lives. This is why I want to propose a khoral theology in action.

More than a half-century ago, John Macquarrie argued that ontological inquiry in theology is not external but intrinsic, ‘an inquiry into the idea of being which theology assumes’.\textsuperscript{99} Therefore, a theologian must be a philosopher in critical understanding even if not in creative power.\textsuperscript{100} Following Macquarrie’s insight, I propose that a Christian theology, as a different kind of a passage of history of religion, also passes through the narratives as the death of the I. I will show the possibility of ‘Khoral Christian Theology’ with the point of view that the death of the I is embedded in a person with the Holy Spirit. Eventually, this theology will accomplish a universality of hermeneutics not only by situating itself as one of beings in the world (signifiers of signifiers), but also at the time of parousia that I discussed at the beginning of this thesis. That is, in khora, traditional conceptually signified theologies change their roles as mere signifiers in khoral theology.

‘Khoral theology’ means a theology which is based on hermeneutic universality, with endless contextual sensitivity through temporal and spontaneous movements of faith acts. At the same time, it is distinctive in its particular conviction that God’s identity as God is never dependent on His creation. Here, we should notice that the space/event of faith and knowledge in khoral theology is not simply the result of a practical subsequent application of the theology, but of the very source of it.


\textsuperscript{100} Tillich, \textit{Systematic Theology}, v. I, p. 25.
Furthermore, the occurrence of faith and knowledge at the time of regeneration and sanctification cannot be achieved by any work of human beings, but are possible only through the incarnation and the intersection of the exact imprint of God’s very being, Jesus Christ, and the communicative work of the Holy Spirit. In this particular situation, the distinctive Christian experience of redemption can be perceived as a promise of ‘deliverance from all the cause-effect chains of forces which hold the self to its past, through the work of Christ and the agency of the Holy Spirit who opens new possibilities of futurity “from beyond” the situatedness of the self.” 101 Then the object and source of the theology become not only the text of the Bible itself, but also textuality, in which the Bible produces meaning through the death of the I.

I will examine Charles Hodge’s theology through the inquiry of what would happen if a Christian experienced faith and knowledge at the concurrence of regeneration and sanctification in a space of khora. This inquiry will be developed on the foundations of the three conditions of a space that I described before, 102 and will generate following four points in thinking about Hodge’s theology: the identity of a Christian ‘I’ as the death of the I embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit; the existence of a space as khora, where forgiven and unforgiven sinners live together; the fact that the death of the I, embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Spirit as the image of God, enables a distinctive Christian responsibility before God, residing in the universal space of khora; and a theology of Hodge as a reduced sample of the ‘history of religion’ in khora. With these foundations, we will review Hodge’s modern theology in his time and space that teaches ‘what ought to happen’ according both to the facts written in the Bible and the work of the Holy Spirit.

Then the task becomes how I can evaluate Hodge’s objectively written theology while keeping his subjectively intended meaning or belief. That is, what I want to

102 I proposed three conditions of khora as follows: a space where different identities reside without losing their own identities; a space permeated by the providence of God that nevertheless allows for both the predestined to be elected and reprobated; a space that takes precedence over every other particular identity, including Christianity. See, p. 31.
do is not to show objective understanding of subjectively intended meaning, but to show that Hodge’s objectively written theology is meaningful when it is understood in the context of a history of religion, i.e., the death of the I. I will discuss the relationship between the death of the I and Hodge’s theology in more detail in section K. Having grasped the theological place of the death of the I, we will then scrutinise the theology of Hodge.

J. The Journey of the Death of the I

In order to deepen the above understandings of the three core ideas on space and of the four points involved in scrutinising Hodge’s theology, philosophical and literary investigation is necessary. Philosophy’s importance in practising theology as a method can be found within Hodge’s theology. Hodge often uses the terms ‘philosophy’ and ‘philosopher’ in Systematic Theology. He comments that the theologian’s method of ‘ascertaining what the Bible teaches is the same as that which the natural philosopher adopts to ascertain what nature teaches’. In an article in the Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, he remarks that ‘every theology is in one sense a form of philosophy. To understand any theological system, therefore, we must understand the philosophy which underlies it, and gives it its peculiar form.’

As Hodge practised theology by using the philosophy of Scottish Common Sense Realism, we need to explore how the death of the I experiences the space/event of faith and knowledge in modern philosophies. From literature, we will trace paradoxical and temporal experiences of the death of the I’s ordeals, venturing into absolute risks and having a relationship with God in this world.

That is, theology is a reduced form of the death of the I in khora whose intersubjective identity can be traced by Enlightenment ideas. I want to trace back how Enlightenment ideas of ethics, aesthetics and faith have been developed. Such

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103 For the four points of the adaptation of a space in the theology of Hodge, see above.
Kierkegaardian questions include ‘Can the death of the I suspend ethics?’, ‘What is the death of the I’s responsibility to God?’ and ‘How can the death of the I execute its faith?’ This study will show us the footprints of the death of the I as a passage of the history of religion. We shall get the answers to these questions in chapters III, IV and V through studying the philosophies and literature of Plato, Kant, Kierkegaard, Tolstoy, Emerson, Dewey, Gadamer, Habermas and Rorty.

K. The Death of the I in the Hermeneutic Universality

The complexities of hermeneutics in the death of the I inevitably allow us to explore how Enlightenment ideas on reason have evolved. The study of Kant’s account of reason and practical reason, debates between Gadamer and Habermas, the relationship of ‘habit and reason’ in Dewey, and the comparison of the ‘genius’ of Emerson with the ‘ironist’ of Rorty will show us how the death of the I, embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, plays a role in a space where theology operates in action. The characteristics and relationships of ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘we’, and ‘they’ in a space of khora will be explored. I will especially focus on Paul Ricoeur, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jacques Derrida, who all owe debts to Heidegger. As Susan Handelman notes, these figures, among contemporary philosophers of hermeneutics, are distinctive figures who tried to sever their ties with the Western (Greco-Roman) tradition.¹⁰⁶

Throughout these philosophical exercises, such as ‘transcendental deduction’, ‘universality of hermeneutics’, ‘power reflection’, ‘fusion of horizon’, ‘anti-dualism’ and ‘pragmatism’, we will investigate how the transcendental God is revealed through a believer in a providential space of khora. This study will give us clues to follow the historical traces of khora and its validity as a space for the universality of hermeneutics in practising theology. In this way, the intersubjective mode in khora as a signifier of a signifier shows that the one (a signifier) is a particular form of relation to the other (a second signifier), and that universality is khora, the providential space of God.

¹⁰⁶ Handelman, The Slayers of Moses, p. 16.
L. The Role of Practical Reason in Hermeneutics

Hermeneutic activity is practically observed in the process of life experience. Gadamer argues that any kind of life experience happens in the hermeneutic community, because understanding and communication are modes of social coexistence as a community of dialogue. For this reason, ‘nothing exists outside the universal medium of practical reason.’ In our life experiences this practical reason operates independently of any particular desires and aims, especially when rational beings consider acting when they ought to do something.

The importance of life experience in hermeneutics can be seen through the conflict between the church and Copernican observation. The biblical view of Creation before the Copernican revolution in astronomy was totally distorted by a theoretically stereotyped interpretation by the church. What was considered to be Biblical truth according to the dogmatic theory of the church turned out to be fabrication. The ‘authoritative’ church paradoxically lost the authority of truth since it was not able to recognise the dimension of hermeneutic experience. So as to keep the truth in the Bible to be true (acknowledging that the Earth is a part of the universe and is moving), the church should have recognised hermeneutic experience rather than reside in the dogmatism of prejudiced human reason. This is why we need practical reason in doing theology.

Even if we think that something is definitely true, we need to have an open, practical mind. Claims of truth need to be deferred until we address the question of how we can get the truth. Therefore, when one who is prejudiced due to his limited insight speaks in the name of ‘reason’, he always contradicts himself. What the death of the I, embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, needs to do is not to claim what truth is, but to act upon what it believes to be

true. The one who acts upon what he believes to be true knows that his truth claim is only effective in his presupposition.

_The death of the I_ has the capacity to know particular faith and knowledge, and participates in modes of life experiences. Thus, _the death of the I_, which already knows that it is exposed to its particular presupposition, also activates ‘the mode of being of historicity’. In this way, the one who has the sense of ‘belonging’ to historicity rather than an ontic sense of ‘homogeneity’, recognises that a human being is a hermeneutic and finite being. _Khora_ is not such a unified society or other reality. It is not the place where multitudes of signifiers are homogenised, but where particular signifiers have relationships with others.

With this presupposition that the participants of _khora_ are not homogeneous but heterogeneous, _the death of the I_ experiences and at the same time presents the universality of hermeneutics, as Gadamer depicts it: the totality of understanding or interpretation even when it simply intends to know ‘what is there’ and to discover from its sources ‘how it really was’. Then hermeneutic experiences such as understanding and interpretation are to be construed as modes to know the truth.

1. Fusion of Horizons: Intersubjective Modes of Life Experience in the Universality of Hermeneutics

As we have seen, our understanding begins by recognising that our prejudice is historically and geographically established. Then we have questions of what happens when prejudices conditioned by different times and spaces collide in a space of now, and how we can know what the universality of hermeneutics achieves among the collision of different horizons.

Both Gadamer and Habermas seek a reconciliation of the subject-object dichotomy that is evident in modern rationality. However, because the

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111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Paul Ricoeur finds that the difference between Gadamer and Habermas is that the former has ‘a gesture of an avowal of the human finitude’, the latter has ‘a critical gesture’, although their differences are complementary and reconcilable. ‘Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology’, in _Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences_, John B. Thompson, ed. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge
relationship between subjectivity in the intention of human conscience and observable objectivity cannot be bridged immediately for Habermas, the subject-object dichotomy needs dialectical modes of investigation. That is, in Habermas, intersubjective modes are observed dialectically, so that ‘objective understanding of subjectively intended meaning’ is possible.\(^{114}\)

However, in Gadamer, the intersubjective mode as an integration of subject and object is not only a means of understanding, but also is an end of it. Theology should not remain an intellectual business of objective understanding of the Bible and the Trinity of God. Theology needs to have a capacity to talk about subjectively intended meanings of the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit. That is to say, intrinsically, theology has to be generous in harvesting all the costs it has invested, but it also has to be ready to pay all the costs of practising for the sake of the love of God and love of others.

I believe that the death of the I will do the job of investing its cost by allowing a theology to be context-sensitive, being embedded in the subjective working of the Holy Spirit in God’s creation. The process of context-sensitivity in devotion, generosity and humility actually belongs to the other, because a person with the Trinitarian personhood does not behave according to the promise of compensation, but for the other.

Here, we need to notice that Gadamer’s idea comes from Heidegger’s ‘temporality and historicity’ of Dasein and Husserl’s ‘radicality of the transcendental reduction’.\(^{115}\) Heidegger’s Dasein means spatiality as a mode, and it is essential to its basic state of being-in-the-world.\(^{116}\) We can follow that knowing activity with what is known, not just as a form of behaviour of a subject, but as definitely shown as intersubjective modes of Dasein.

Gadamer has a question one step further from Heidegger’s ‘ontology’, as to ‘how hermeneutics, once freed from ontological obstructions of the scientific concept of

\(^{114}\) Bleicher, *Contemporary Hermeneutics*, p. 159.
\(^{115}\) Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 264.
objectivity, can do justice to the historicity of understanding’.\textsuperscript{117} For Gadamer, the only ‘objectivity’ is a confirmation of fore-structures in their being worked out. Since the arbitrariness of inappropriate fore-structures cannot play a role in this work, understanding cannot achieve its full potential.\textsuperscript{118} Thus it is quite right for the interpreter not to approach the text directly, relying solely on the fore-meaning at once available to him, but rather to examine explicitly the legitimacy, i.e., the origin and validity, of the fore-meanings present within him.\textsuperscript{119}

Therefore, a person who tries to understand a text must be, from the start, preparing himself for a text to tell him something, sensitive to the text’s quality of newness. This kind of sensitivity, Gadamer says, is:

neither ‘neutrality’ in the matter of the object nor the extinction of one’s self, but the conscious assimilation of one’s own fore-meanings and prejudices. The important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text may present itself in all its newness and thus be able to assert its own truth against one’s own fore-meanings.\textsuperscript{120}

That is, the being of \textit{Dasein} is changed as it becomes an experience of the spectator, and the being of the spectator is changed by experiencing what is seen. Through this process, Gadamer wants to demonstrate a transcendental interpretation of understanding through ‘thrown projections’ of meaning where \textit{Dasein}’s ‘own potentiality-for-being has always already “been”’.\textsuperscript{121} These ‘thrown projections’ can also be understood as ‘transporting ourselves’, i.e., putting ourselves in others’ positions.\textsuperscript{122} This is what is happening in Gadamer’s intersubjective mode of understanding experience, called a ‘fusion of horizons’. This mode of understanding always participates in the universality of hermeneutics that ‘overcomes not only our own particularity but also that of the other’.\textsuperscript{123} In this way, ‘the superior breadth’ of one’s vision enlarges his horizon. That is, ‘one learns to look beyond what is close at hand—not in order to look away from it, but to see it

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{117} Gadamer, \textit{Truth and Method}, p. 268.
\item \textsuperscript{118} Ibid., p. 237.
\item \textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Ibid., p. 238.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Ibid., p. 254. Gadamer calls the structure of \textit{Dasein} a ‘thrown projection’: ‘This existential structure of \textit{Dasein} must be expressed in the understanding of historical tradition as well, and so we will start by following Heidegger.’
\item \textsuperscript{122} Ibid., p. 304.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
better, within a larger whole and in truer proportion.\textsuperscript{124} The horizon of now is incessantly progressing due to one’s testing his past prejudice and forming his present historical one. Therefore, ‘understanding is always the fusion of these horizons supposedly existing by themselves.’\textsuperscript{125} What happens at the moment of fusion, in such tradition, is an ongoing process of creating a living value of now, ‘without either being explicitly fore-grounded from the other’.\textsuperscript{126}

Understanding and language are inseparable. According to Gadamer, experiences of meaning as an event in understanding contain application.\textsuperscript{127} Thus, for Gadamer, the whole process of understanding is possible through the application of language, because only through human linguisticality can substantive understanding and agreement take place in a different way every time among parties of understanding.\textsuperscript{128} In this way, the method as an application of language plays a central role in Gadamer’s universality of hermeneutics.

So what does Gadamer mean by universality in hermeneutics? In order to know this, we need to understand Gadamer’s idea of ‘horizon’. A reader’s prejudice in a hermeneutical process represents his limits. The reader, who already knows that he is historically conditioned, will think of effective historical consciousness, because he knows that what he believes is his own critical thinking is already exposed to history and to its effects. At this moment, when he tries to understand a text or an historical event, according to Gadamer, there happens a universality of hermeneutics. This means that our historically conditioned prejudices are merged with the historicity of the text or the event in the text, and they both come to constitute a universal horizon that includes the historical depths of our self-consciousness.\textsuperscript{129}

2. Meaning and Application of Derridean Trace

The insights \textit{the death of the I} learned from Gadamer’s fusion of horizon are that: it wants to see something better in a space, rather than have a birds-eye view; it has

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Ibid., p. 305.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Ibid., p. 385.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Ibid., pp. 385-6.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Ibid., pp. 299-306.
\end{itemize}
an incessant concern with pre-understood prejudices of the other, whether residing in the space or out; and it sustains its openness in a process of understanding. Yet, in the Derridean *khora*, this intersubjective mode is nothing but a signifier of a signifier. That is, the events in a concurrent time and space can be perceived as facts of understanding. Furthermore, what is distinguishable is that these intersubjective modes trace the Transcendental Signified. This trace makes it possible for the intersubjective modes to have the capacity to manoeuvre the future in view of the past. This futurity makes the impossibility possible in Derrida.

At the moment, we need to recognise that, in Derrida, Gadamer’s intersubjective mode happens in ‘the supplement’. According to Derrida, ‘the supplement’ is that which appropriates deficiency caused by ‘an accident and a deviation from Nature’. As that deficiency is observed as in the immaturity of a human being in childhood, ‘the supplement’ can be seen in the immaturity of a human being living in a space and time. For example, such intersubjective modes of Dewey’s ‘habit or culture, cultivation’ and Gadamer’s ‘tradition, authority and prejudice’ are something to be supplemented to Nature. In this sense, while understanding the immaturity of self presupposes ‘prejudice’ for Gadamer, Derrida introduces ‘the supplement’ as a substitute for Gadamer’s intersubjective modes of understanding, i.e., the fusion of horizons.

The intersubjectivity of ‘the supplement’ is complex. This intersubjective mode has the power of substitution. Through progressive and regressive movements, and vicarious action in its representation, ‘the supplement’ moves and acts according to this power. According to Derrida, substitution appears as ‘the sign, the image or the representer’, and it becomes a driving force for the movement of the world. In this way, ‘the supplement’ is the image and representation of Nature.

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130 Here, ‘the supplement’ is a new logic of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ‘supplement’. The supplement is discussed in Derrida’s reading of Rousseau. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, pp. 7, 141-64.
132 Ibid., p. 147.
133 Ibid.
When we begin to talk about supplement and trace, we need to recognise that these terms are inconceivable to reason because they do not say what is, but trace a path. The traced path broaches the ‘methodological or logical intraorbitary assurances’ of the totality. According to Derrida, there is always exteriority beyond the totality of the age of logocentrism. This exteriority can only be accessible by empirical experience. Even in the history of Christianity, the totality of logocentrism could not recognise two-thirds of the world’s particular historical backgrounds. A distinguished evangelical missiologist at Westminster Theological Seminary, Harvie Conn, strongly argues that ‘even evangelical theology will have a different look when it is shaped in a context where Confucius, not Kant, is king’.

Hence, the death of the I cannot but be radically empirical. It proceeds like a wandering thought on the possibility of itinerary and of method. It is as affected by the absence of knowledge as by its future, and it ventures out deliberately. However, this empiricism destroys itself by its vulnerability and immediacy. This is why we need to consider ‘the supplement’ in theology. According to Derrida, the modern opposition of philosophy and nonphilosophy (empiricism) could not solve the very moment of temporality of truth when the value of truth is shattered, and could not solve the internal contradictions of scepticism. What Derrida argues is that the modern opposition of philosophy and empiricism does not allow empiricism to be simply empirical. In this sense, Derrida postulates that modern empiricism is abused and misunderstood.

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134 Ibid., p. 157.
135 Ibid., p. 162.
136 According to Paul Hiebert, it is interesting that, in a similar era—roughly from 1800 to 1950—most Protestant missionaries in Asia and Africa rejected the native cultures as pagan. Hiebert proposes three reasons for this rejection: the emergence of colonialism (the missionaries thought their task was transferring their superior culture to the natives); the emergence of the theory of cultural evolution (Westerners regarded other cultures as ‘primitive’ and yet to be developed); and the triumph of science (their theology, like science, was ‘totally objective and absolutely true’). ‘Critical Contextualization’, International Bulletin of Missionary Research 11 (January 1987): pp. 104-5.
138 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 162.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid., p. 161.
Having said this, ‘the supplement’ can be seen or embedded in the behaviour of the death of the I. Since the process of the death of the I is to suffer an ordeal, to venture risk and to transcend it to achieve selfless goodness, as discussed above, what is shown and expressed by it cannot represent itself. If one is to decide to suffer, to venture and to transcend oneself, one is definitely focused on the inner self, where all the life experiences before and to come are embedded, and one would mediate by tracing, rather than just beginning to speak of them.

What, then, is the characteristic of this trace? Before thinking of this, we need to recognise that there is an ontic/ontological (absence/presence) concurrence between the death of the I and the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, in this thesis, it is imperative to find the characteristics of the traces of intersubjectivity between these two.

It is common sense that there is no one who has seen and heard God physically and directly. Correctly speaking, those living here and now can only sense the traces between God and human beings. Therefore, when the death of the I, as that which enjoys total freedom and exercises voluntary responsibility, is embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, it will trace God. The trace of the death of the I, then, is not so much exclusively God’s as the condition of God. As a scientist pursues facts through research, we sense nothing but immediate experience of now as a moment of tracing. Accordingly, rather than the Transcendental Signified itself, the place of signifiers of signifiers as a happening place of trace, of writing and of inscription is a major concern in this thesis.\textsuperscript{141}

Theologically speaking, ‘trace’ in Derrida is the nearest evidence of what seems to be a human recognition between knowledge of the self and knowledge of God. In Calvinistic terminology, our faith as the knowledge of God is executed in the Derridean trace while thinking his doctrine of reprobation is the tool to make us think of being humble. What I want to do in this thesis, especially in the trace

\textsuperscript{141} According to Derrida, the concept of writing is going beyond the extension of language. Writing no longer indicates a particular derivative, auxiliary form of language, whether language is understood as communication, relation, expression, signification and constitution of meaning, or thought. It no longer designates the exterior surface, but the ‘signifier of the signifier’, which conceals and erases itself in its own production. For Derrida, the ‘signifier of signifiers’ is the origin of writing. Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 7.
between the death of the I and the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, is neither to interrupt all talk about God nor to merely assume a metaphysical Transcendental Signified. Derrida’s question of how depraved human language can even speak of God pushes me to do khoral theology, not focusing on the metaphysical Transcendental Signified, but on the now as the time and the here as the place in khora—“place, spacing, receptacle (hypodokhé)”\(^1\) which is an event or happening itself. For Derrida, khora remains ‘the place of waiting, awaiting the realization of the promise’. \(^2\)

M. In Sum: The Death of the I and the Theology of Charles Hodge

The death of the I does not simply represent human identity, but is a universal medium that allows us to experience a true transcendental point at the event of concursus. Since the death of the I is defined as ‘a passage of history of religion’ with responsibility, gift and faith from time to time, the participation of the death of the I in a particular faith or religion will enhance the zeal for a true transcendental point of each faith or religion. As a reduced form of the death of the I in khora of this space and time, I suggest that Charles Hodge’s theology come back as a textual theology among God, the Scriptures, the world and the self in the context of the twenty-first century, as it came about in the nineteenth-century United States.

In the theology of Hodge, a father of American Reformed theology, the discussion of textuality where the Bible itself produces meaning through the death of the I is somewhat awkward, because such a Princetonian as Hodge is regarded as a defender of the authority of the Bible. However, in the Reformed tradition, a theology such as Hodge’s, textuality where contextualisation occurs between context and text, will not enfeeble the doctrine of Sola Scriptura because ‘Calvinists believe in a comprehensive revelation of God in Scripture, the world, and the self.’\(^3\)

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1\(^\text{1}\) Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Budick and Iser, eds., Languages of the Unsayable, p. 35.
2\(^\text{2}\) Ibid., p. 49.
If this theology achieves the universality of hermeneutics with its context-sensitivity and without losing its distinctive identity, it will achieve its Kingdom to come. Since ‘now’ is a ‘messianic’ time, the context of ‘what is happening now’ within intersubjective modes of *concursus* in the theology of Hodge should expose the contingency and deconstructibility of the present Kingdom at hand. With the promise of the Kingdom of Heaven already not yet achieved, in which we are responsible for the entire history of humanity, forgiven and unforgiven sinners *shall know what is happening* in *khora*.

If we think of Hodge’s theology as a receptor of the space where the text of the Bible itself produces meaning, we can not only widen our eyes to see abundant threads of grace shed upon all parts of our life, but we can also trace our forefathers’ wisdom in church history that will eventually enlighten our urgent duty as ‘salts and lights’ of this world. With the experience of faith and knowledge, in the context of *the death of the I* embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, I want to trace the textuality where the Bible produces meaning in the theology of Hodge. That is, I want to examine how Hodge’s Biblical theology works in the intersubjective modes of religious experience, between the objective truth in God of the Bible and subjective faith.

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CHAPTER II
THE MEANING OF THE DEATH OF THE I EMBEDDED IN A PERSON AS THE PRESENCE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

As we saw in Chapter I, the participation of the death of the I in a human being as a passage of history of religion enables us to approach true universality with its distinctive sense of responsibility, gift and faith. This universal participation is observed in the event of khora in between the juxtaposition of presence/absence and ontic/ontological. In a particular Christian person, there are modes of life experience with others—as in the Trinitarian personhood of God, who is both one and three—in relationship to Gadamer’s ‘thrown projections’, derived from Heidegger’s ‘temporality and historicity’ of Dasein and Husserl’s ‘radicality of transcendental reduction’. A Christian with the Holy Spirit has been observed between presence and absence in khora and experiences impossibility (a true transcendental point) as possible with the Derridean universal sense of ‘death’.

While both the death of the I and the Holy Spirit are invisible, their bipolarity is clear: secular/Christian. Since we understand particularity as a Christian identity, we want to identify its particular characteristics in relationship with the universality, the death of the I. Keeping in mind that the particularity does not lose its identity in the discussion of the juxtaposition of the two, we will examine how the embedding of the death of the I in a person with the Holy Spirit manifests itself.

A. Identity of a Person With the Holy Spirit

Since the death of the I is a passage of history of religion, it does not have any personal identity, either static or relational. It is only sometimes able to be recognised as an event, spontaneously and temporally. Now I want to identify a Christian personhood in view of the embedding of the death of the I in a person with the Holy Spirit.

Kwame Anthony Appiah argues in The Ethics of Identity that the identity of the self can be recognised by modes of concepts and practices of contemporary people
living within their religious, societal, educational and regional distinctiveness.\textsuperscript{146} With this proposition, Appiah wants to build up the individual self in order to overcome the vision of authenticity that sprang from theories of Romanticism and Existentialism.

Before further discussing self-identity in detail, I want to present authenticity and existentialist ways of self-identification in relation to doing theology. According to Appiah, the discussion of authenticity in self-identity is a matter of being true or not to who I am as I am, or who I would be as I would be. That is, on the one hand, that an authentic self knows what is true by its careful reflective or reflexive recognition of what is already there. On the other hand, the existentialist view is that I create an identity of something out of nothing, and then decide what to do and what to be.\textsuperscript{147}

With the reflective and reflexive recognition of authenticity and the view of existentialists, existential theologies generally want to prove what is accessible to our own observations according to our daily-life experiences and relative knowledge as a means of knowing truth. These theologies are very successful in catching up to a rapidly changing and tremendously diverse world of different times, spaces and people. Rudolf Karl Bultmann (1884 – 1976) uses existentialism as a useful tool to express the intended meaning of the New Testament message itself. He utilises existentialism not only in ‘the basic manner of raising the question that the gospel message answers’, but also in ‘the system of basic concepts in which this answer must come’, that is, ‘the realm of human existence’.\textsuperscript{148} There is a dialectic relationship between authentic and inauthentic existence.

Bultmann follows Heidegger’s two modes of being: one is that people develop an authentic existence whenever they accept the challenge of being thrown into the world, and the other is that people develop an inauthentic existence whenever they lose the distinction between the self and the world.\textsuperscript{149} For Bultmann, inauthentic

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., p. 17.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., pp. 93-4.
existence is unbelief in oneself searching for the security and satisfaction in the tangible world apart from God, while authentic existence refuses to base one’s life in the world, but instead on intangible realities coupled with the ‘renunciation of self-centred security and openness to the future’. Authenticity for Bultmann is the very expression of faith, seeing the world as if it is not the world. Then the risen life in Christ becomes an existential possibility for which men are asked to decide.

As John Macquarrie (1919 – 2007) points out, we do not have to dismiss the importance of existentialism’s concern with the long-neglected phenomenon of a human being in fallenness, care, death and guilt, and its ‘quest for an authentic existence’ in rediscovery of the Biblical understanding of man.

As Macquarrie recognises, the real stumbling blocks of the existentialist approach of Bultmann are the objection to myth, the surrender of self-sufficiency and the acceptance of the cross. This is due to the intellectual or conceptual presentation of theology, which remains in the realm of ‘the autonomy of “I”’ in general. For this reason, I want to overcome this limit of authenticity and the existentialist approach, based on the viewpoint of the death of the I.

The identity of ‘I’ in practising existential and authentic theology—for example, in Bultmann—is confined to a pre-socially-conditioned identity of ‘the autonomy of the “I”’. That is, the religious life of a self is confined to the possibility of decision between the double agenda: to live with God, or to lose oneself in the world. Yet what Appiah wants to propose at this moment of existentialist theology, is that the identity of the self cannot be determined by ‘the autonomy of “I”’. According to Appiah, the identity of ‘I’ is not of a ‘pre-social thing—not some authentic inner essence independent of the human world into which we have grown—but rather the product of one interaction from our earliest years with others’. However, a modern existentialist understands the basic principle of existentialism as that

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150 Ibid., p. 94.
151 Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p. 45.
152 Ibid., pp. 225-6.
153 Ibid., pp. 230-1.
154 Ibid., p. 231.
155 Ibid., pp. 45-46.
156 Grenz and Olson, 20th Century Theology, p. 20.
existence that is prior to any essences. That is, the very existence of ‘I’ (the effect of
a cause) is the one that makes one’s life while living. When this existentialism is
applied to theology, we need to notice that the identity of God is apt to be reduced to
the viewpoint of a creature.

Clearly negating the authentic and existentialist view on ‘I’, what Appiah
proposes here is that ‘I’ cannot be identified as an ‘independent’ object and subject,
but by ‘interaction’ between ‘one’ and ‘others’. That is, identity should be
understood as a mode of relationship, and the mode of relationship is confined to the
interaction of the earliest years. As we saw in chapter I, ‘the autonomy of “I”’ does
not have any room for spatiality.

Modernity’s paradox lies in its endeavour to reduce the identity of God to the
viewpoint of humanity. It maintains the belief in the possibility of achieving an
objective understanding of ‘the autonomy of the “I”’ displaced from God above by
an immanent sphere below. Reducing the other to this-worldly reality for the
purpose of objective apprehension will result in critical damage to the concept of the
Creator, God. According to Colin Gunton, the displacement of the Creator with the
Creation is ‘damaging and sometimes demonic’.\textsuperscript{157} Gunton gets the contradiction of
modernity straight when he comes to evaluate modernity as

\begin{quote}
\textit{an era which has sought freedom, and bred totalitarianism; which has taught
us our insignificance in the vastness of the universe, and yet sought to play
god with that same universe; which has sought to control the world, and yet
to loose forces that may destroy the earth}.\textsuperscript{158}
\end{quote}

In Christian theological discussion, the contradiction is more serious when ‘the
autonomy of the “I”’ begins to think of the self not as a particular individual
involved in the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, but as a universal means
which pretends to have the capacity to understand the totality of the transcendental
God. The contradiction is twofold: that what the existentialists presume to be an
autonomous self reduces the true autonomy of God’s ‘I am Who I am’ for the sake
of praising its objective understanding; and that the existentialists actually lost God
by overlooking the intersubjective linguistic recognition of His work in their pursuit

\textsuperscript{157} Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., p. 13.
of conceptual totalitarian understanding of Him. As I have maintained, this thesis is not about how a modern self understands postmodern issues, but about how a postmodern self deals with the modern conception of bipolarity of the self and the world. That is, while the authentic existential ‘I’ has to see the world as if it is not, \textit{the death of the I} sees the world as the space of multiple signifiers’ intersubjective relationality.

Nowadays, many kinds of practical theological disciplines are based on reflective and reflexive recognition or experiences in life, and are called postmodern theologies. For example, Stanley Grenz regards the embedded subject as theology: ‘Culture: Theology’s Embedding Context’.\textsuperscript{159} In this case, due to the violence of theological epistemology, when theology becomes subject, theology cannot but diminish the purity of theology itself and the culture as well. The same is the case as in feminist theology. Feminists use theology as a tool to dismantle the power structure, and eventually use it to enhance their social and political status. These problems come from their stubborn presupposition that theology has to agree universally with their own reason.

As I have argued, particular Christianity, or a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, achieves universality in the space of \textit{khora} where \textit{the death of the I} ventures and experiences Derridean death. Again, neither Christianity nor any form of theologies should regard itself as having any sense of universality. Universality is always being accomplished by the invisible other, as in \textit{the death of the I} and the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit.

Both universality and particularity have a relationship with the intersubjective modes, because \textit{khora} is the place where belongingness or relationship is possible. In this sense, a particular person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit has to be understood in the ‘belongingness’, ‘thrown projections’ and ‘spontaneous event’ of the universal \textit{death of the I}. The recognition of particularity will not lead to subjectivism, relativism and pluralism in theology, but will play a role in the

intersubjective modes of the two, *the death of the I* and a person with the Holy Spirit, in a pluralistic world.

It is true that the universality of Charles Hodge’s theology is a God of providence, who can be known by the sources of the Bible. In this case, Hodge’s universality cannot but demand something we ought to do, since Hodge believes that universality has already been achieved in the Creation. Once it is achieved, then a theology of universality believes that the Creation is timeless and perfect. Therefore, universally understood Creation in Hodge’s theology intrinsically does not want any supplements.

Yet we need to notice that when Hodge understands evolution in terms of God’s providence and design, he recognises the process-orientation of a created being in the case of a germ developing into a human being. In this case, Hodge deals with evolution as a universal norm of the Creation. However, even in the doctrine of Creation, as Gunton argues, theology needs to recognise true plurality and the diversity of Creation. With these points in mind, I will discuss what would happen if *the death of the I* were embedded in the theology of Hodge, in the context of universality and particularity, in chapters VI (the Bible) and VII (the Providence of God).

B. The Necessity of ‘the Supplement’

In modernity, as we have seen, there is a clear opposition of empiricism and realism. This opposition, and that between reason and facts, create one-sided metaphysical hierarchies. Philosophy cannot alone resolve these hierarchies, but always opposes non-philosophy violently. Even though traditional philosophy tries to embrace empiricism, the violence of philosophy makes empiricism not simply empirical. Modern empiricism has always been abused and misunderstood by philosophy. For this reason, Derrida argues that this opposition or hierarchy has to be overturned, because it cannot explain the very moment of pure empiricism, the

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160 Gunton, *The One, the Three and the Many*, p. 2.
temporality of truth when the value of truth is shattered, and the internal contradictions of scepticism.\textsuperscript{162}

The violence of philosophy is seen in what Derrida calls \textit{logocentrism}. According to Derrida, \textit{logocentrism} means that the \textit{logos} (speech, thought, law or reason) is the central figure in language and philosophy. In this system, language comes from a process of thought which produces speech, and that speech then produces writing. However, Derrida argues that ‘phonetic writing, the medium of the great metaphysical, scientific, technical, and economic adventure of the West, is limited in space and time and limits itself even as it is in the process of imposing its laws upon the cultural areas that had escaped it.’\textsuperscript{163} As we have seen, Derrida introduces the idea of ‘the supplement’ to identify what has escaped as the result of the opposition of \textit{logocentric} philosophy and language, as well as non-philosophy and empiricism.

We now want to study more about the supplement that we discussed in chapter I. Derrida’s supplement is not something that is secondary or inferior. It is both extraneous and necessary. It is entirely superfluous, and yet it somehow plays a crucial role as broaching into the other, by standing in for the opposition that is supposed to be essential. The supplement acts and moves by the power of substitution, but it is one for which the value of the original—the thing for which it substitutes—is able to be recovered. However, the original cannot be seen, as in the sign or image, because it is inconceivable.

In Derrida’s \textit{Of Grammatology}, such things as writing are the supplement; writing is a substitute for the real presence of speech with speechless value. For while it turns out that even the most earnest and spontaneous speech is engaged in the gaps in between and therefore ambiguous, the most intimate relationship between the two is less a perfect communion than it is the mere contiguity, in space and time, of two sides. In this way, the supplement is the representation of the universality in particularity. It will appear temporally for the substitution of the deficiency of Nature in such activities as the ‘process’, ‘intersubjectivity’ and

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., p. 162.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., p. 10.
‘event’. In the theology of Charles Hodge, the supplement will direct us to focus on what is written in the heart of a person with the Holy Spirit. From this point on in this chapter, we will discuss the supplement and context-sensitivity in the Biblical narrative of Peter’s denial, in the work of John Calvin and Calvinism, and in that of Hodge.

C. Context-Sensitivity and Textuality in the Khoral Theology

Context-sensitivity in theology is not displacing text (God, the Bible) with the viewpoint of a context (human beings). Rather, it is the voluntary involvement of the text in the experience of the context. In the Bible, the context-sensitivity of Paul’s voluntary involvement in his life experience is seen in the intersubjective modes which happen in the relationship between God and him. God being with Paul is not caused by humanity. The God of sovereignty is involved voluntarily in the life experience of Paul through the Holy Spirit. As we can see, God just wills it. The God of sovereignty is involved voluntarily in the life experience of Paul through the Holy Spirit. God just wills it. However, it is Paul who lowers himself as a servant, not God. Paul does not simply try to understand the people on the road by standing on the balcony as an onlooker, but he lowers himself to the road. Paul is never a detached spectator who observes and interprets from afar; rather, he participates in the context of a diverse world.

As Paul’s life shows, the discussion of intersubjectivity and event is Biblical, while, at the same time, Calvinistic. The doctrine of predestination in Calvinism is about God’s voluntary involvement in our life experiences. Its teaching is that God has eternally decreed the election of some and the damnation of others, not in view of the good or evil deeds they will do or Paul does. God is not displaced by Paul, but God is with Paul. Paul’s dauntless preaching of the Gospel is event itself.

Modern philosophy, based on an existentialist and authentic picture, has the tendency to interpret ‘God’s being with us’ as a substitution or displacement. Charles Hodge’s inductive theological method, based on the modern philosophy of Francis Bacon and Thomas Reid, is no exception. Modernity, or theology in the
form of modern philosophical epistemology, has to bend down to be a vehicle loaded with the people experiencing now-happenings on the road, just as Paul makes himself a low servant to all in order to win more people (I Corinthians 9:19) and became all things to all men (9:22). Theology has to transform by itself in search of its deep adaptability to different contexts rather than gluttonously enlarging its superficial boundary with its onlooker’s perspective. The theological feature at stake is not its inclusiveness, but its adaptability. The adaptability involves intersubjectivity and event, and overcoming the violence of philosophical epistemology in theology with Biblical theology. As we have seen, the Biblical model of Paul will guide us in the way to practise theology: theology of the death of the I embedded in a person with the Holy Spirit. The facts of the Bible, especially the experience of the Biblical characters, will give us the sources for overturning the philosophical hierarchy in Hodge’s theological epistemology while maintaining his idea of Biblical theology.\footnote{ST, v. I, p. 1. According to Hodge, Biblical means that the Bible ‘contains the truths which the theologian has to collect, authenticate, arrange, and exhibit in their internal relation to each other’. In this way, human beings made in the image of God are imitating Him. That is to say, Hodge means that theology is the science of the facts of divine revelation, so far as those facts govern the nature of God and our relation to Him.} In general, this discussion will be a generic discussion of what theology is and how to practise it.

1. Contextualisation and Textuality

If the progress of theology is to be achieved by the intimate interaction between the text of the Bible and context, we need to show concern for humanity’s subjective situation, context, sociology, psychology and language in their historical and cultural backgrounds, as well as for the text of the Bible. In this sense, a theology has been and must be framed in terms of a particular time, space, culture and people. If a theology stubbornly adheres to its own doctrine and does not pay attention to the different people living in a certain culture, space and time, it is no longer relevant.

In order that theology be adaptable, i.e., sensitive to a certain time, space and context, we need to discuss it in textuality, which we discussed in the previous chapter. I want to recognise that contextualization and textuality have the common purpose of being context-sensitive in understanding different identities. In the
On contextualization, see the author’s Th.M. thesis. In that thesis, I argued that even though it is an unwelcome task for conservatives, it is an ‘inescapable responsibility’ whether we will or will not be self-critical about our theology, whether its contextualization will be deliberate and controlled, or whether it will be haphazard and unconscious. See Sung Shik Jang, *Contextualization in the Princeton Theology: Scottish Common Sense Realism and the Doctrine of Providence in the Theology of Charles Hodge*, Th.M. thesis, Westminster Theological Seminary, 1993, pp. 10-9. I recognised that the term ‘contextualization’ first arose at the Theological Education Fund meeting in Bromley, England, in 1972. Many different forms of contextualization are discussed. Here, I want to introduce some of them as follows. According to Hesselgrave and Romen, in order to have relevance, the communication of the Christian Gospel should be considered by the following seven-dimension paradigm of respondents: world views—ways of viewing the world; cognitive processes—ways of thinking; linguistic forms—ways of expressing ideas; behavioural patterns—ways of acting; communication media—ways of spreading the message; social structures—ways of interacting; motivational sources—ways of deciding. See David J. Hesselgrave and Edward Romen, *Contextualization: Meanings, Methods, and Models* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1989), p. 203. Stephen Bevans summarises contextualization in six models: the anthropological model, which has a particular relationship with a culture (Mercado, John Mbiti); the ‘transition’ model, which puts emphasis on the message of the Gospel and the preservation of church tradition (Charles Kraft, Daniel von Allmen, D. A. McGavran); the ‘praxis’ model, which ‘sees as a primary locus theologicus the phenomena of social change’ by struggle for justice; the ‘synthetic’ model, which mediates the previous three with ‘analogical imagination’; the ‘semiotic’ model, which analyses culture by semiotic cultural analysis; the ‘transcendental’ model, which neglects the theological context but focuses on subjective authenticity. ‘Models of Contextual Theology’, *Missiology: An International Review* 13 (April 1985), p. 186. Paul Hiebert proposes ‘critical contextualization’, so as to avoid syncretism. Critical contextualization can be possible with the assumptions of exegesis of the culture; exegesis of the Scriptures and the hermeneutical bridge; critical response; and new contextualized practices. ‘Critical Contextualization’, *International Bulletin of Missionary Research* 11, pp. 109-10.

The term ‘contextualization’ is different to ‘inculturation’. Compared to contextualization, inculturation is ‘never a completed process’ because the Gospel is always foreign to every culture. Therefore, David Bosch argues that we should not use the term ‘inculturated’, not only because ‘culture is not static, but also because the church may be led into previously unknown mysteries of the faith. Theology is always theology in the making, in the process of being contextualized and inculturated.’ ‘New Paradigm’, *International Bulletin of Missionary Research* 11, p. 150.
However, while confirming the importance of contextualization, I want to propose that textuality in hermeneutics will eventually take over the role of contextualization because it has the capacity of interpreting all sorts of occurrences in the past, present, and even future. If we regard contextualization as a dialogue between object and subject, textuality is an intersubjective dialogue of what is already embedded in the subject. For example, if contextualization were to apply the Scriptures to the experience of a particular culture to make its message better understood there, textuality would already be conceiving the differences of space, time, culture, world view, language, behaviour, ways of thinking, judgement and so on in its passage of history of religion, i.e., the death of the I. If we acknowledge that truth is contextualized in the culture in its history in the Bible, we must conclude that the Bible should be de-contextualized and re-contextualized. Textuality will do this work spontaneously, as an event at any time and at any place among intersubjective modes of life experience. Here, we need to notice that the work of textuality has the characteristic of intersubjectivity and event. For this reason, textuality is not relative, since we do not interpret God with our own perspective, but as a voluntary participant in and with us. Eventually, the condition of God is to be revealed in an event in the context of His providence.

2. Textuality and the Theology of Charles Hodge

A theology which has its own historical, philosophical and cultural background should be reconsidered in the context of our own lives. By this reasoning, we cannot but encounter the hermeneutical question of how the truth of God is revealed and how we can perceive it. That is, in order that theology should not be a barrier to knowing an omniscient and omnipresent God, it definitely has to show the answers to the question of how to know the truth. God is not a spectator in this world, but, as Charles Hodge indicates, abides everywhere in ‘his essence, knowledge, and power’. Even if the definition of science might change fundamentally at a certain point, a theology has to provide a clue to unravel the scientific problem. But so far, theology has sometimes been far behind science, and was put in a headstall. Theology has to be both scientific and divine.

According to Thomas Aquinas, theology is a sacred science. It is sacred because it is for ‘man’s salvation’, which is based on revelation:

The whole salvation of man, which lies in God, depends on the knowledge of this truth [knowledge of God]…. There is no reason, then, why the same things, which the philosophical sciences teach as they can be known by the light of natural reason, should not also be taught by another science as they are known through divine revelation. 168

Similarly, Hodge derives his understanding of theology and its nature from knowledge of the self and of God, as scientific knowledge of facts and ideas. 169

With scientific objectivism and rational scholasticism, Hodge understands knowledge as an intellectual apprehension of the self that comes from common facts, examined with the senses. Therefore, theology, he says, must be coherent with the internal relation, with the facts and with the Bible. 170 Hodge’s knowledge of self, according to the scientific facts of the Bible, is that

all men being sinners, justly chargeable with inexcusable impiety and immorality, they cannot be saved by any effort or resource of their own…. In others words, a man may be moral in his conduct, and by reason of inward evil passions, be in the sight of God the chief of sinners, as was the case with Paul himself. 171

Hodge’s Calvinistic character is clearly evident here. He comments on knowledge in The Way of Life:

To be renewed in knowledge, or rather unto knowledge, means to be renewed so as to know; and knowledge includes the perception, recognition, and application of what is true and good. This comprehensive sense of the word is not unusual in the scriptures; and hence it is said that to know God as Jesus Christ is eternal life. Such knowledge is the life of the soul; it is conformity to God in the perception and approbation of truth. 172

That is, God cannot be displaced by Paul, who cannot but be a sinner in the sight of God. A man may be righteous in the sight of man; however, Hodge demands that we not fail to notice the knowledge that a man’s heart is ‘the seat of pride, envy or

170 Ibid.
171 Ibid., p. 29.
malice’. Hodge argues for the knowledge of total deficiency of human reason and unlimited love and irresistible grace of God.

If we regard theology as being textuality where the Bible produces meaning through the death of the I, theology should be more dynamic than just studying (logos) of God (theos). Alister McGrath defines Christian theology as ‘talking about God’. What he means by ‘talking’ is a process of reflecting on the Bible and weaving together its ideas and themes, and developing certain ideas or doctrines as a result of this reflection. This process of reflection is a process of knowing God.

D. The Implication of ‘the Supplement’ in John Calvin

At this point of the argument on context-sensitivity in theology, I want to introduce the thoughts of John Calvin, since Hodge traces his theological origins to Calvin. Calvin’s teaching is distinctive in the sovereignty of God. The ‘total depravity of a human being’ presupposes that the only sovereign and perfect autonomous self is God, ‘I am Who I am.’ God does not need any help from us, and He does not even require our worship. Only He is sincere, and therefore, He is the only Being of integrity.

Calvin thinks that theology is the process of having true knowledge of God. For Calvin, the knowledge of God and of the Creator is obtained through our existential self-knowledge: ‘Without knowledge of the self there is no knowledge of God’, and ‘Without knowledge of God, there is no knowledge of the self.’ As we can see, our knowledge of God is secured by way of hermeneutics that dynamically involves knowledge of the self. Knowledge of God, for Calvin, means to know God the Creator, who created and sustains His creatures, rather than the Being or existence of God. Therefore, according to Calvin, our knowledge

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175 The editor of Calvin’s Institutes regards the idea of the ‘Creator’ as ‘subsuming the doctrines of Trinity, Creation, and Providence’, and this term ‘stresses God’s revealing work or acts rather than God in himself. The latter is more prominent in Scholastic doctrines of God, both medieval and later “Calvinist”’. Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 1.1.1. Here, 1.1.1. stands for book 1, chapter 1, section 1.
176 Ibid., 1.1.1-3.
should serve first to teach us fear and reverence; secondly, with it as our
guide and teacher, we should learn to seek every good from him, and, having
received it, to credit it to his account.\textsuperscript{177}

According to the editor of Calvin’s \textit{Institutes}, this knowledge is existential
apprehension. With this existential initiation, according to Calvin, we can have faith:

Here indeed is pure and real religion: faith so joined with an earnest fear of
God that this fear also embraces willing reverence, and carries with it such
legitimate worship as is prescribed in the law.\textsuperscript{178}

Thus, the knowledge of God is different to our knowledge of nature. It is not a
series of propositions about God, as if God were an object of academic knowledge,
but a knowledge which is implied in our faith. Christ is called the ‘Spirit of
Sanctification’ because He ‘not only quickens and nourishes us by a general power
that is visible both in the human race and in the rest of the living creatures, but he is
also the root and seed of heavenly life in us’.\textsuperscript{179}

Knowledge of self, for Calvin, is about the ‘miserable ruin, into which the
original sin of the first man cast us’.\textsuperscript{180} Therefore, this self-knowledge cannot but
compel us to look upon God. Thus, Calvin says, ‘not only will we, in fasting and
hungering, seek thence what we lack; but being aroused by fear, we shall learn
humility.’\textsuperscript{181} In Calvin, we can repeatedly discover the close relationship of
humility and self-knowledge. In sum, for Calvin, theology is about the knowledge
of ourselves as being nothing but dust or totally depraved human beings. Thus we
cannot but be humble, and the knowledge of God acquired by the knowledge of
ourselves is the product of our humility. In Calvin, humility is a distinct character of
‘I’ in the textuality between the knower and the known. It is imperative that the
study of textuality between God and us should be initiated through the knowledge of
ourselves as dying to ourselves (humility). That is, theology is not only the study of
God, but also of a human perspective on the events between ordinary power
\textit{(potentia ordinata)} and absolute power \textit{(potentia absoluta)}.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., 1.2.2. \\
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., 3.1.2. \\
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid., 1.1.1.
\end{flushright}
The process of getting knowledge of God and ourselves in Calvin is textuality. As Calvin shows, textuality between God and us requires our humility. We need to add ‘humility’, the character of the death of the I when it is embedded in a person with the Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{182} As we have seen in the previous chapter, the death of the I passes through the very ordeal of the paradoxical life experiences, ventures into absolute risk, and has a relationship with God with the transcendental selfless goodness through a new experience of death. In addition to these three characteristics, when the death of the I participates in a particular faith of Christianity, it humbles itself like Christ, as if it were to die to itself. Paul in I Corinthians 2:1-5 has these four characteristics:

\begin{quote}
And I, brethren, when I came to you, came not with excellency of speech or of wisdom, declaring unto you the testimony of God. For I determined not to know any thing among you, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified. And I was with you in weakness, and in fear, and in much trembling. And my speech and my preaching [was] not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power: That your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God.
\end{quote}

For Derrida, humility comes from the idea of what he calls X.\textsuperscript{184} While objecting to his idea of trace or of différance being assimilated to negative theology,\textsuperscript{185} he is fervent in saying of such things (X) as trace, the supplement or différance, “[It] “is” not [negative or affirmative theology] and does not say what [negative or affirmative theology] “is”. It is written completely otherwise.”\textsuperscript{186} Since X ‘situates itself beyond all affirmative and negative position’, it has a place beyond all position.\textsuperscript{187} Because the Transcendental Signified is written in him by X, as it is with Paul, Derrida humbles himself by deferring speaking:

\begin{quote}
The death of the I overcomes ‘the autonomy of “I”’. The freedom that comes from the humility of self-denial is antithetical to the freedom that comes from ‘the autonomy of “I”’. We need to differentiate freedom according to the death of the I to that according to ‘the autonomy of “I”’.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{182} The death of the I overcomes ‘the autonomy of “I”’. The freedom that comes from the humility of self-denial is antithetical to the freedom that comes from ‘the autonomy of “I”’. We need to differentiate freedom according to the death of the I to that according to ‘the autonomy of “I”’.

\textsuperscript{183} King James version.

\textsuperscript{184} Derrida interprets X as text, writing, the trace, difference, the hymen, the supplement, the pharmakon, the paragon, etc. He says that X is ‘neither a concept nor even a name: it does lend itself to a series of names, but calls for another syntax, and exceeds even the order and the structure of predicative discourse.’ ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{185} Derrida says that negative theology is imperative because every predicative language is inadequate to the essence, especially to the hyperessentiality (the Being beyond being) of God. He argues that only a negative (apophatic) attribution can claim to approach God and to prepare us for a silent intuition of God. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., p. 21.
One day I would have to stop deferring, one day I would have to try to explain myself directly on this subject and at last speak of ‘negative theology’ itself, assuming that some such thing exists.\textsuperscript{188}

Derrida’s deferring speaking means \textit{writing}. To write, according to Derrida, is the only way of keeping speech because ‘speech denies itself as it gives itself.’\textsuperscript{189} In order to speak what it means to speak as it is, Derrida’s \textit{writing} begins. Therefore, \textit{writing} is not something disguising and secondary, but is the very essence of an expression. It follows from this that in \textit{the death of the I} embedded in a person with the Holy Spirit, Derrida’s \textit{writing} is revealed as \textit{humility}.

Therefore, writing encompasses what Derrida calls \textit{logocentrism}, of which a form is historico-metaphysical theology. Accordingly, the work of \textit{writing} in theology is not controlled by ontology or epistemology, but reveals hidden premises of traditional theology. If so, \textit{writing} in theology cannot but be an invention in search of its value. Derrida would not need any theologies, whether affirmative or negative, because the function of the substituted \textit{writing} for speaking also ‘replaces presence by value’.\textsuperscript{190}

If there were a purely pure experience of prayer, would one need religion and affirmative or negative theologies? Would one need a supplement of prayer? But if there were no supplement, if quotation did not bend prayer, if prayer did not bend, if it did not submit to writing, would a theology be possible?\textsuperscript{191}

Theology is impossible? No. I mean theology is possible if it keeps the supplement of value, if such a thing as prayer bends and submits to \textit{writing—tracing}. \textit{Khora}, which will eventually be regarded as the object for theologising and contextualising, is the place where the \textit{writing or tracing} is happening. Again, theology is possible if preaching, prayer, evangelism, mission, and so on, submit to \textit{khora}, the place of now where the world is happening: this is ‘the’ supplement of theology. Therefore, what I mean by ‘invention of theology’ is the supplement of theology that I call Khoral theology, in which our faith signifies. Derrida is essential as the supplement to Hodge’s nineteenth-century Reformed theology.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 12.}
\footnote{Derrida, \textit{Of Grammatology}, p. 142.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Budick and Iser, eds., \textit{Languages of the Unsayable}, p. 62.}
\end{footnotes}
The supplement of theology as theology in action in the field of Christian missions is seen as ‘bold humility’. The editors of *Mission in Bold Humility* cite David Bosch’s *Transforming Mission* on the first page of their book:

> We regard our involvement in dialogue and mission as an adventure, are prepared to take risks, and are anticipating surprises as the Spirit guides us into fuller understanding. This is not opting for agnosticism, but for humility. It is, however, a bold humility—or a humble boldness…. [W]e do this, however, not as judges or lawyers, but as witnesses; not as soldiers, but as envoys of peace; not as high-pressure salespersons, but as ambassadors of the Servant Lord.

E. *The Death of the I* as the Supplement to Peter’s Denial and the Theology of Charles Hodge

In this section, I want to discuss how to overcome this contradiction in practising theology. For this, we need to know what supplement means in practising theology, and we will specify the supplements to Hodge’s theology. We can find the meaning of *the death of the I*, embedded in the Trinitarian personhood, through the very Biblical facts of the spontaneous moment of Peter’s denial, when his value of truth is shattered by his internal contradiction of scepticism at a temporal time and space. The narrative of Peter’s denial will guide us in dealing with Biblical theology, of which Hodge consistently maintains the distinct characteristics.

1. Peter’s Denial

As we saw in chapter I, a person with the Holy Spirit has the characteristic of intersubjective modes of Dasein. At the beginning of this chapter, in the discussion of Appiah, we also found that a person with the Holy Spirit is not just confined to past intersubjectivity, but manoeuvres from the past to the future since the promise is not yet established. Further, *the death of the I* as a universal commonality of ‘I’ is already embedding in Peter in a relationship with responsibility, gift, faith and humility. In this case, we need to notice the work of the universality of *the death of the I* as the supplement to a particular self of Christian religion. That is, a passage of

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history of religion, which is already embedded in Peter, from time to time substitutes
Peter’s original being with the Holy Spirit. Through chains of substitution in Peter’s
mind, the being of Peter is purified and eventually becomes the source to strengthen
his brothers (Luke 22:33) in the face of Satan’s sifting, as of wheat (22:31).

We need to recognise that this substitution is necessary not because of the
deficiency of the Holy Spirit, but because of the deficiency of a creation, Peter.
Accordingly, the death of the I is extraneously necessary to let the prayer of Jesus
strengthen Peter in the face of Satan’s sifting (22:31-34) and has to be answered at a
certain point of Peter’s life.

What happens to Peter with the Holy Spirit at the moment when Peter
spontaneously denies and is vulnerable, in spite of Jesus’s naming him a rock
(‘Cephas’ in Aramaic or ‘Peter’ in Greek)? When a female servant questions Peter
three times, he denies Jesus each time before the rooster crows. The Bible’s
narrative shows that Peter denies three times, with increasing intensity, that he has
ever known Jesus. Peter’s answer is negative, “No.” Peter denies. However, this
denial of Peter enables him to recognise how wretched he is.

We need to recognise that Peter’s denial is linked to a passage of his life which
was before and which is to come. There is necessarily a commitment or a promise
even before the event.¹⁹³ That is, the narrative about Peter being named as a ‘rock’
before and becoming a firm rock after shows that the chain of events of his three
denials, at the time when Jesus is on trial, is related to the enactment and promise of
Peter’s being in the presence of the Trinitarian God.¹⁹⁴

The Trinitarian God is with Peter. Then is Peter’s denial speech the work of the
Holy Spirit? Peter himself probably never thinks that it is Divine work. Yet it is the
work of the Trinitarian personhood (Jesus prophesises in Luke 22:23). At this point

¹⁹³ Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Budick and Iser, eds., Languages of the Unsayable,
p. 12.
¹⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 15. Derrida notes that ‘the promise of which I shall speak will have always escaped this
demand of presence’, and that ‘the promise is older than I am or than we are.’ Even if I decide to be
silent, even if I decide to promise nothing, not to commit myself to saying something that would
confirm once again the destination of speech and the approach towards speech, ‘this silence yet
remains a modality of speech: a memory of promise and a promise of memory’.
in the discussion, we should recognise a clear distinction between the death of the I and the Holy Spirit. Both of them are invisible spirits. However, the death of the I is the spirit that achieves universality in khora, while the Holy Spirit is exclusively a Saving Spirit. Only the death of the I’s embedding in Peter with Holy Spirit can explain that Peter’s denial is the work of the divine God.

By embedding itself in Peter, the death of the I as the supplement makes the impossibility (denial as the work of the Holy Spirit) possible (affirmation after turning back as the work of the Holy Spirit) by its temporal presence and absence. Knowledge of a ruined self after his denial turns on Peter’s responsibility (being with the Holy Spirit) as a disciple who has been with Jesus. The denial itself is agony and crisis, but has begun to bear the fruit of his responsibility.

Conversely, without the denial of God, how can I be responsible for my speech acts? Peter denies God even if he decides and intends not to deny him when he confesses before Jesus. Peter boasts that he would never deny Jesus, and proudly proclaims that even if all left Jesus, he would not (Matthew 26:33). It is an irresponsible speech act, because he intentionally denies Jesus before the maidservant. He denies what he has not intended to deny. It is an undeniable imperative. What Peter does is to deny Jesus, who is undeniable. How hypocritical Peter is! Clearly, it is a human situation. When it is time to die, Peter is scared. We all may at least have agony and paradox, such that Peter’s previous intention to follow has shifted into an internal contradiction of scepticism. At that moment, when he comes back to be a true self, Peter recognises that his speech act was not perfect, but defective. This is something to which we all can relate. What we have learned is that the defective Peter eventually becomes vindicated as a man with the Holy Spirit through the process of supplementary substitution of the death of the I.

Ironically, through his three denials, Peter begins to think about his responsibility for his denial speech. Eventually, as Jesus intends, Peter becomes the petra of the church. What if Peter had denied the first time, before Jesus? Would the situation have been different? For answering these questions, we need to notice that the point is not Peter’s affirmation or denial, but the khora where God is working. Even
before Peter’s previous affirmation of Jesus and later denial, the supplement was there as a trace of his speech act. This is how the death of the I functions.

Also, we need to understand the event of Peter’s denial (Matthew 26:69-75) in the context of the promise of God. His denial traces back to the moment of Jesus assigning him a leadership role (episcopacy, Matthew 16:18, John 21:15-16), holding keys to the Kingdom of Heaven (Matthew 16:19). The event of Peter’s denial needs to reconcile with and anticipate the promise of Jesus. Peter’s life is to make the promise desirable or to desire it. When we trace back the three denials of Peter, there is an older event or a ‘taking-place’ to come. If we think of the seemingly contradictory events of Peter (the earlier event of being named as the ‘rock’ and the following event of denial), neither of them is an alternative or a contradiction,195 because each is reconciled by the promise of God.

Theology needs to pay more attention to Peter’s affirmation, denial and re-affirmation, and to what Peter experiences, not just confirming and taking what God provides for granted. There is a tension between what God intends and Peter experiences. Likewise, we need to think of this tension between what God intends and what we experience in our lives. We know that Hodge’s theological stance is to let us know what we ought to do according to the facts (intention of God) of the Bible. However, if the exact knowledge of the Bible and our determined intention to follow it do not have any meaning at a certain point in our lives, what ought we to do?

2. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Émile and the Role of the Theology of Charles Hodge

Typical criticism of the dualistic and hypocritical nature of Christianity may be expressed as: ‘God is good, but the priest, church or theology is bad.’ Dualistic understanding of the Bible eventually resulted in a hypocritical Church. Let us take the preaching of a priest as an example. Criticism comes from the identification of the words of God with the preaching of a preacher. Even if the text of the message of a priest is taken from the Word of God, as soon as it is delivered through the

195 Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Budick and Iser, eds., Languages of the Unsayable, p. 28.
mouth of a priest, the priest as well as the congregation should recognise that it
cannot be the pure words of God any more. The history of religion has suffered
from contradictory understandings of institutional Christianity and an
institutionalised interpretation of the Bible, as well as of God Himself. This fact
shows that reading the Bible is not only a matter of the facts in the Bible signifying
‘what ought to happen’, but also the event, ‘what is happening’ or ‘what would
happen’ in the experience among the church, people and God, i.e., the experience of
the Trinitarian God.

In book VI of *Émile*, Rousseau regards priests who have pseudo-authority as
hypocritical and pretentious, and therefore as wicked. A priest’s will to knowledge
is dishonest and wicked because it is not naturally obtained. The authentic voice of
God cannot be obtained through the voices of men. Rousseau’s argument is that
God’s will is able to be known only through Nature in its original state.
Accordingly, he argues that the vain systems of human beings in knowing God
cannot successfully reveal God as He is. Rousseau concludes that, contrary to the
benefaction of God, the benefaction of a priest is wicked. He compares a priest’s
benefaction to that of a fisherman:

When the fisherman puts a lure in the water, the fish comes and stays around
it without distrust. But when caught by the hook hidden under the bait, it
feels the line being pulled back and tries to flee. Is the fisherman the
benefactor, and is the fish ungrateful?¹⁹⁶

 Compared to the gift of God, the bait of the fisherman cannot be a benefaction at
all, because the captured fish will not trust him any more and will therefore shy
away from the bait. If there is something other than Divine will that is hidden as
bait in the priest’s preaching of the words of God, it is a wicked manipulation. True
benefaction will never produce an ungrateful person. It is common sense that a
person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit cannot be ungrateful and
will not cause ungratitude.

This criticism comes from the lack of juxtaposition of human understanding of
the benefactor (philosophy, reason) and benefaction itself (non-philosophy and

facts) in theology. That is to say: that theology has never tried to distinguish the
religious self from the Holy Spirit; that theology lacks the capacity to think about the
empirical intersubjective modes of the object, the facts of the Bible and the subject,
our life experiences; and, finally, as a response to the above arguments, that
theology needs to accept the idea of ‘the supplement’ to accommodate the deviation
of the religious self from the work of the Holy Spirit.

For making this argument clearer in the discussion of Hodge’s theology, we need
to study the origin of Rousseau’s thought. Rousseau’s description of the ‘Noble
Savage’ begins with a warning about human manipulation from the very first
sentence of book I of Émile: ‘everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author
of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man.’ According to Rousseau, if
we remain at the very beginning state of Creation (‘Noble Savage’), a natural
condition, not conforming to habits and societal norms, rules and teachings, we will
not make errors at the same time. We will not reproach the ‘Author of things’ for
the evils we do to ourselves and the enemies we arm against ourselves.197

Rousseau also argues that we would easily remain masters of ourselves and of
our passions here and now if our habits were not yet acquired.198 His idea is that
nobody can be pure unless one is originally natural. In book IV, he challenges and
criticises priests, whose responsibility is to transfer the words of the supremacy of
God: ‘O nations, you and your errors are its ministers.’ Further, he argues that
one should not ask to receive anything from God. He maintains that one can sense
what God has already endowed throughout nature. Therefore, one does not have to
pray to God to get something done. According to Rousseau, one meditates

on the order of the universe, not in order to explain it by vain systems but
admire it constantly, to worship the wise Author who makes oneself felt in it.
I converse with Him. I fill all my faculties with His divine essence; I am
moved by His benefaction.200

What Rousseau means here is that God has already given everything to him, and
He will act according to the order established by His Divine decree. Because of this,

197 Ibid., p. 293.
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid., p. 284.
200 Ibid., p. 293.
there is a possibility of enjoying God’s benefaction through conversing with God. To Rousseau, the wicked man is the priest who pretends that he is the centre of all things. As a result, Rousseau distinguishes a good man from a wicked man, in the way that the good man orders himself in relation to the whole, and the wicked orders the whole in relation to himself:

The latter makes him the centre of all things and the former measures his radius and keeps to the circumference. Then he is ordered in relation to the common centre, which is God, and in relation to all concentric circles, which are the creatures.²⁰¹

At this point, agreeing that noble savagery can be recovered in conversing with God, we need to pay attention to how to converse with the common centre: whether having a relationship with Nature is by the concentric circles or the circumference, and whether Nature itself is understood as a perfect identity. We need to understand firmly that such a ‘concentric’ preaching is wicked, because both a preacher and an audience lack the idea of the supplement: neither of them discriminates between religious life and the Word of God, and neither understands the intersubjective modes between life experience and the Word of God.

The problem in Rousseau’s argument lies in the idea of ‘concentring’, not ‘decentring’, and ‘the perfection of Nature’, not ‘deficient elements of Nature’. In this sense, Rousseau’s argument that God can be perceived only by Nature, so ‘we are to live as noble savages’ has serious deficiencies. It is not just because of the fact that the other, the concept of God, is displaced by Rousseau’s Nature, but also because of the violence of his philosophical structure, which regards Nature as perfect. According to Derrida, the deficiency of Nature is caused by ‘an accident and a deviation’ from the first creation of God, the Transcendental Signified.²⁰²

Peter Hicks has observed that Charles Hodge’s key concept of Christian theism comes from Hodge’s belief that a ‘God who was not personal could not communicate or save or answer prayer nor could he be known or loved. Without a personal God Hodge’s religion would have been empty.’²⁰³ This is why Hodge is

²⁰¹ Ibid., p. 292.
²⁰³ Peter Hicks, The Philosophy of Charles Hodge: A 19th-Century Evangelical Approach to Reason,
against the Hegelian left, which denied the existence of an independently existing personal God. In the discussion of pantheism, Hicks concludes that ‘Hodge would not merge God in the world or the world in God. Though God is everywhere present in the world, “God is not the world.”’

With this implication, we want to recognise Hodge’s argument that pantheists deny all dualism. Concerning the nature of God, Hodge argues that pantheists deny that the Infinite and Absolute Being has either intelligence or conscience. We have to notice that Hodge’s consistent praise of dualism is due to wanting not to fall into pantheism, which has no distinctive dichotomy between God and Nature. However, the idea of juxtaposition will do the work of a clear dichotomy that will not fall into pantheism, but will clearly discriminate the distinctiveness of each side and accomplish universality at the temporal moments of chains of events through vibrant intersubjective modes between both of them.

This idea is found in the theological discussion of Creation. Colin Gunton criticises the dualistic and Platonic understanding of Creation, and argues that Nature as Creation is not perfectly static. Since Creation has to be understood as one and not dualistically, like the intellectual and material worlds, we need to grasp the once-for-allness of God’s Creation, not as timeless and unchanging, but as changing. This element of changing is well articulated by the ideas of ‘government’ and ‘preservation’ in Hodge’s doctrine of Providence.

The supplement to the deficient, created being naturally leads us to our hermeneutic experience. The idea of Rousseau’s ‘Noble Savage’ is as idealistic as the heavenly Kingdom of God. If such things exist, theology needs to show how to experience such noble savagery and the Kingdom of God, rather than describe them. The question of how will not deteriorate the ideal status of the ‘Noble Savage’ or the Kingdom of God, but is the very tool to understand them.

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204 Ibid., pp. 54-5.
207 Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, p. 2.
208 See, Chapter VII.
There are two hermeneutic questions that we can learn from Rousseau. One is how we can converse with the original voice, the other is how we can reach out to the concentric circles beyond our knowledge. Actually, these two relate to the question about how we can perceive the original text. If this question is applied to an institutional Church and the Bible, the question would be how both a preacher and the audience are able to perceive the original text of God. The answer, as we have studied, is to juxtapose the two, and to discover the supplement of the death of the I embedded in a person with the Holy Spirit. The supplement will provide incessant substitutions that will make it possible for us to perceive the original text.

As we have seen, the supplement of Derrida is that which appropriates the very deficiency of hermeneutics. Gadamer suggests that the deficiency is caused by Nature and the immaturity of a human being. This immaturity of the self can be understood by Gadamer’s concept of prejudice, which we will discuss in chapter IV. Because of the prejudice of a human being, Gadamer proposes intersubjective modes of the fusion of horizons. The function of Gadamer’s fusion of horizons is similar to the role that Derrida’s supplement plays in khora. In this space, such supplements as habit, tradition, culture and cultivation are to be observed in the intersubjective modes of life experiences. It would be definitely true that if ‘I’ is a perfect autonomous figure who has never been immature, then no supplement would appear. However, nobody will agree that such an immature baby does not need supplemental care by its parents.

The hermeneutic deficiency of Rousseau’s idea of Nature caused criticism of the wicked priest. However, through Gadamer’s intersubjectivity and Derrida’s supplement, we can prove that the wickedness is not caused by the revelation of God, but by a hermeneutic deficiency of Rousseau himself. Let us summarise our discussion of the deficiency of Nature: there is deficiency in Nature and in a human being, since both of them are nothing but created beings; the supplement presupposes this deficiency in Nature and human beings; the way in which the supplement makes up for the deficiency is through broaching or intersubjective relationships, i.e., loving each other unconditionally and incessantly—this is how the
death of the I behaves; a chain of supplements itself is hermeneutic, because of
temporal and spontaneous changes in its levels of relationships.

3. The Supplement and the Theology of Charles Hodge

With these things in mind, we want to rehabilitate Hodge’s theology, scrutinising
the empirical experience of intersubjective modes between the religious self and the
the Holy Spirit. As we have seen, the supplements of theology will accommodate
hermeneutic deficiency caused by the immature religious self with the Holy Spirit.
This will inevitably result in a hermeneutic change in Hodge’s theology.

Hodge’s theology is characterised by natural but revealed theology. His
theological method is rational, and the contents of his theology are revelatory.
Natural theology is demonstrated by reason, and revealed theology by particular
doctrines taught by potentia absoluta, the absolute power of God. With this said, we
want to compare Hodge with Rousseau and Derrida. In this comparison, Hodge’s
distinctiveness can be seen in several points: God can be perceived by the facts in
the Bible. For Rousseau, God can be perceived only by Nature. For Derrida, the
concept of God is the other. In Hodge, preaching, theology, and so on, are authentic
because of the work of the Holy Spirit. For Rousseau, such a thing as preaching is
wicked. For Derrida, is theology possible? Hodge will not agree that he himself
needs the supplement for accommodating the deficiency caused by ‘an accident and
a deviation’ from Nature and the original Creation of God. However, the reality is
that Hodge is not the Holy Spirit, his dogma in theology is not perfect. For
Rousseau, Nature is perfect. For Derrida, Nature is defective. Hodge’s theology
does not talk about the good and bad of something or someone due to their nature,
but by virtue of the grace of God which is revealed to them. Yet we need to
recognise Hodge’s theological method for dealing with force of Nature as a tool for
the induction of facts from the Bible is rational not revelatory.

We should pay attention to how Derrida deals with Nature. Rousseau’s Émile
shows that the essence of the humility of a human being is Nature writing on the
heart. Derrida deconstructs this writing. His argument is that Nature’s writing is
immediately tied to the voice and to the breath. Therefore, it is clear that Nature
writing on the heart is not something that a grammar in language can explain, but
that is spiritually perceived. What is written on our hearts as our profession of faith can be heard by retreating into oneself, Derrida argues, and is ‘the full and truthful presence of divine voice to our inner senses’:

The more I retreat into myself, the more I consult myself, the more plainly do I read these words written in my soul: be just and you will be happy…. I do not derive these rules from the principle of the higher philosophy, I find them in the depths of my heart written by nature in characters which nothing can efface.209

It is true that Christian theology takes its root from the proclamation, which is heralding (kerygma) a radical shift or change. The consequence is repentance (metanoia), which calls for a radical change of ways of thinking, rather than focusing on the natural writing on the heart. However, strictly speaking, repentance is not caused by a priest’s preaching, but by the work of the Holy Spirit. What if the Holy Spirit has already written on a believer’s heart as a person?

F. Translation and Derrida’s Des Tours de Babel

The endeavour to build up the tower of Babel for the objective achievement of translation was ultimately in vain because it was an improper aspiration for human beings to have an objective tool for reaching at Him. God did not want us to have a direct access to it, however, as a substitutable option, He gave us various linguistic systems to refer to the Kingdom. From this time on, our desire for the tower has generated the true moments of creation of language.

What we can learn in Derrida’s Des Tours de Babel210 is that inability for objectivity implies that the place of God is absence (the Transcendental Signified). Since God is absent, what we can do is to trace the presence of God’s absence by translation. However, even by translation, God is never able to be objectified because the character of the language is both fallen and creative. Since the human

210 Derrida, Acts of Religion, Anidjar, ed., p. 127. In Des Tours de Babel, Derrida shows four principles of translation as follows: the translator’s task is not dependent on any reception; translation does not have any essential aim to communicate; translation is neither an image nor a copy (neither representative nor reproductive); translation has no commitment to transport contents, but to re-mark the affinity among languages, and it must exhibit its own possibility.
mind cannot be determined all the time, objective understanding of God is impossible for us to ‘reach, touch and trod upon’, \(^{211}\) as Paul recognises in Romans 7:21: ‘Now if I do what I do not want to do, it is no longer I who do it, but it is sin living in me that does it.’ In order to understand the Kingdom which is always untouchable, Derrida argues that any translation or ‘the desire for translation’ is impossible without reference to the thought of God.\(^{212}\) The implication is that, even though He did not allow direct accessibility, God wants us to use our language properly. That is, without God’s guaranty, translation would be absolutely wrong.

If we think that the Kingdom cannot be touched objectively, it remains as a promise. Since it is only promised, the aim of translation is to look for the truth of spontaneity in the process of the reconciliation of languages:

This promise appeals to a language of truth (Sprache der Warheit), not a language that is true but to a true tongue, to a language whose truth would be referred only to itself. It would be a matter of truth as authenticity, truth of act or event which would belong to the original rather than to the translation, even if the original is already in a position of demand or debt.\(^{213}\)

As we can see, the truth of spontaneous act or event designates originality. With this stated, I want to think of what Derrida means by ‘the original is already in a position of demand or debt’, and its relationship with ‘truth as authenticity, truth of act or event which would belong to the original’ in the last sentence cited above, in relation to the sacred. According to Derrida, the sacred surrenders itself to translation, which devotes itself to the sacred. The sacred would be nothing without translation, and translation would not take place without the sacred; the one and the other are inseparable.\(^{214}\)

Even though the language of the sacred pursues the original language, the sacred is incapable of pointing out the exact language spoken by God because the only truth is that the language of God is referred only to God: Because truth is apparently ‘beyond every Übertragung (transference) and every possible Übersetzung

\(^{211}\) Ibid., p. 123.
\(^{212}\) Ibid., p. 116.
\(^{213}\) Ibid., p. 130.
\(^{214}\) Ibid., p. 133.
(translation)’, it would be rather the pure language in which the meaning and the letter no longer dissociate.215

With this in mind, we need to decipher what Derrida means by ‘original is in a position of demand or debt’. Regarding translation as that which is already promised, we can think that the original is promised as a contract in the translation as a form of debt. Then, since the only truth is that which is originally spoken by God, truth that we recognize is the ‘truth as authenticity, truth of act or event.’216 According to Derrida, truth only can be accessible through experience. That is, translation as an experience signifies that our experience of event is translation. Since translation is related with the thoughts of God, it is holy growth of language and it announces the messianic end but the tense of the sign of the end and of the growth is always present.217 At this moment, we need to pay attention to the fact that our recognition of truth (authenticity) does not belong to the translation, but to the original, even if the original is not yet evident in translation.

Since translation demands and desires the very structure of the original,218 the authenticity that we recognise in translation has to be considered as the very medium of the original. As opposed to such an idea that translation is supplementary only when the original does not have the quality of translatability, Derrida argues that the original always needs translation and, at the same time, believes that the structure of translation has life for sur-vival.

If the structure of the work is sur-vival, the debt does not engage in relation to a hypothetical subject-author of the original text—dead or mortal, the dead man, or ‘dummy,’ of the text—but to something else that represents the formal law in the immanence. 219

That is, the sacred translator is always engaged in the event of sur-vival at the moment of immanence. In this sense, as a promise, translation is already an event or an act of truth and becomes the decisive signature of a contract that happens here

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215 Ibid., p. 125.
216 Ibid., p. 132.
217 Ibid.
218 Ibid., p. 116.
219 Ibid.
and now. According to Derrida, since a translation is that which ‘manages to promise reconciliation, to talk about it, to desire it or make it desirable’, it is ‘a rare and notable event’ which would be the place and date of what is called an original, a work. So, we can conclude that the debt (translation) has to be the work of the sacred (hallowed) of the ‘thought of God’, and God can only be found in the work of a sur-vival translation event, not in the written text itself: ‘the king has indeed a body… but this body is only promised, announced and dissimulated by the translation.’

Even though Derrida does not recognise that the body is Jesus Christ, who came and is to come, and who has already-not-yet established the Kingdom of God, the implication of Derrida—that the translation as the promise of God is the sur-vival event of work of the sacred—is significant in Christian hermeneutics. I believe that Derrida’s idea of the sacred in the translation—that authenticity (‘truth of act or event’) is not human recognition alone, but belongs to the original—designates the true transcendental point, the concursus of Hodge and Francis Turretin, when both of them maintain that the Bible is written by the sacred in the concursus of translation. Also, the readers of the text of the Bible need to remember Derrida’s point that ‘the thought of God’ has to be conceived as the event of the true transcendental point if they are to get the truth when they are engaging in the text of the Bible. The sovereignty of God, who is untouchable, always reminds us to participate in the promise of translation by being reconciled at the point of concursus.

G. Translation and Incarnation

At this point, I want to discuss translation and incarnation in the bipolarity of the death of the I and the Holy Spirit. The importance of this juxtaposition can be found in the hermeneutic discussion of language and interpretation. Susan Handelman

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220 Ibid., p. 123.
221 Ibid., pp. 123-30.
222 Ibid., p. 116.
223 Ibid., p. 125.
observes that there is a transition from proper to figurative interpretation in history of hermeneutics. This is found in the ontological tradition that is based on the Platonic transfer of the soul from visible to the invisible world. Hermeneutic change from the ‘proper’ to the ‘figurative’ sense in Heidegger and Derrida is ‘based on a metaphysical transfer from the “sensible” to the “nonsensible” realm, a transfer crucial for Western thought’. The shift from the sensible to the nonsensible becomes the change from the literal to the figurative; and then, in Christian thought, from the letter to the spirit. This historically established distinction between the literal and the figurative, which becomes standard in the Western conception of language, also naturally leads to an allegorizing mode of interpretation, not only in theology, but in literature as well.

However, in the Jewish tradition, the reality in the interpretation lies in a linguistic process in understanding the true being of God who speaks, interprets and creates texts. For Jews, the text itself does not designate what something is but for interpretation from the very beginning. The sensible and nonsensible are not dualistic but they occur together in the process of interpretation. The distinctive characteristics of Jewish tradition can be found in its foundation ‘on the principles of multiple meaning and endless interpretability’ by maintaining that the interpretation and text are not only inseparable, but that interpretation—as opposed to incarnation—is ‘the central divine act’.

In the Jewish tradition, words and things are quite closely related to each other. That is to say, according to Handelmann, ‘for the Greeks, following Aristotle, things are not exhausted by discourse; for the Rabbis, discourse is not exhausted by things.’ The struggle between philosophy and rhetoric in Greece ended in philosophy’s conquest. However, Jewish translation never suffered the schism of philosophy and rhetoric. Jewish Rabbinic concepts of language and interpretation

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224 Handelman, Slayers of Moses, p. 16.
225 Ibid.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid., p. xiv.
228 Ibid., p. 10.
229 Ibid., p. 8.
not only preserve but exalt the innate logic of language, for which reason Rabbinic logic is branded as unscientific.

Handelmann explains Rabbinic tradition:

One of the most interesting aspects of Rabbinic thought is its development of a highly sophisticated system of interpretation based on uncovering and expanding the primary concrete meaning and yet drawing a variety of logical inferences from these meanings without the abstracting, idealizing movement of Western thought.\(^{230}\)

Derrida, in his critique of Aristotle and the entire tradition of Western metaphysics, argues that the liberalisation of metaphor is one of the most serious problems.\(^{231}\) Handelmann observes that Ricoeur and Gadamer will call for a restitution of metaphorical consciousness, of the pre-conceptual, spontaneous metaphorical conjunction of thoughts and images which is the primordial iconicity behind thought, but that Derrida will speak of ‘the primary concrete meaning’ anticipating the ‘possibility of restoring or reconstructing beneath the metaphor, which at once conceals and is concealed, what was originally represented’.\(^{232}\) There is the primary meaning which is always sensible, a kind of transparent figure which becomes metaphorical when put to philosophical use. In such cases, the primary sensible meaning is not noticed, and the displacement into abstract meaning then becomes taken as ‘proper’ meaning.\(^{233}\) However, Derrida is looking for the original language, the concrete meaning behind the abstract concept, or dream image, or narrative.\(^{234}\)

The incarnation of Jesus Christ is tantamount to the Jewish interpretation of the text. Although both of Christianity and Judaism use the same text, the difference between them is Christ’s incarnation. The meaning of incarnation is that the Word becomes flesh, a conversion from the linguistic order into the material realm, the flesh. By viewing incarnation as the core divine act, Christianity, especially the Princeton theology has a distinct, final and validating interpretation of the Scriptures

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\(^{230}\) Ibid., p. 19.

\(^{231}\) Ibid., p. 17.


\(^{233}\) Handelman, *Slayers of Moses*, p. 18.

\(^{234}\) Ibid., pp. 18-9.
with its redemptive historical view. As we know, Derrida has nothing to do with Jesus Christ. The evidence is seen in his belief that the ‘debt’ is the thing that translation owes to the original: the event in translation (‘truth of act’, ‘authenticity’) is always related to the original.

As a Christian with these Derridean notions of translation, confirming the doctrine of incarnation as a core source of the text, I want to see tremendous sources for Christian hermeneutics by adapting the Jewish method of interpretation of the text to the doctrine of the Bible. Especially, in studying Hodge’s view on interpretation of the Bible, I want to focus on, following Derrida, the overthrown oppositions between what is the proper meaning and what is not, between essence and accident, intuition and discourse, thought and language, intelligible and sensible. There is no non-metaphysical realm to which one can aspire, or from which one can speak or think. The ideal of language is then no longer to allow the ‘thing-itself’ to be known in its essential, proper truth. For Aristotle, the name can be a proper name when it has only one sense. Derrida would free language from this univocity and open it up to an infinite plurality of meaning in the place of khora. Then the idea of Gadamer’s ‘prejudice’ or ‘presupposition’ will help us to reconcile Derrida’s ‘truth of act’ and Hodge’s common sense ‘facts’ of the Bible in the work of interpretation, which I will discuss in chapter IV and VI.

H. The Death of Derrida

Derrida’s life is possible in his death at the spacing of khora, the meaning of which he struggled to define when he was here. I am quite sure that, there and now, eventually, the dead Derrida is speaking without reservation what was once written on his heart, because the time of the future fulfilment of the promise has already been accomplished in his death. Actually, here and now, in order to speak well, we sometimes need to stop or avoid speaking. Since we are beings in this world with limited language, it is impossible to speak of God as He is. From its origins, language has started without us, in us and before us. Because God is other than a

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235 Ibid., p. 48.
human being of limited reason, it is common sense that there is no longer any question of us not being willing to speak of God with inexact, erroneous, aberrant and improper words.

Although the world that we know is not our creation, nor merely a synopsis of our perspective, it cannot be known except from the point of view that is ours. All our attempts to break through the limits imposed by experience end in self-contradiction, and will not vindicate our intimations of a transcendental knowledge that can never be ours. That whereof we cannot speak, we must consign to silence. 236

Therefore, Derrida asked himself such questions when he was in this world as, “Will I do it?” and “Am I in Jerusalem?” Derrida in Jerusalem will not postpone his speaking there and now, where speaking is no longer possible to defer. However, when he was here, assuming responsibility and commitment only while deferring speaking, he responded with ‘unavoidable denial of the undeniable provocation’, 237 anticipating the true transcendental point. Deferment of something is not about whether something is right or wrong. What Derrida meant is that it is the action of responsibility and commitment. In *khora*, Christianity has to learn how to avoid speaking of the name of God so that the event of translation of the sacred happens in our lives. Derrida, in death, will review his life when he was in this world whether his life here before was a translation of a sacred father or not. Life does not deceive life.

I. In Sum

On the basis of the universality of hermeneutics that we discussed in chapter I and the juxtaposition of *the death of the I* and the Holy Spirit in this chapter, I have scrutinised postmodern philosophical backgrounds for understanding the theology of Charles Hodge. Examining the complexities of the hermeneutic conscience of *the

death of the I in comparison with ‘the autonomy of “I”’ in the previous chapter, I established a Derridean hermeneutic foundation in dealing with Hodge’s theological method, which we are going to study in the following chapter.

In khora, the death of the I, embedded in a person with the Holy Spirit, will not only rehabilitate Christian identity of faith and knowledge, but will also show itself to be sensitive to the distinctive identities living together in a providential space. We have found that the juxtaposition of the death of the I and the Holy Spirit enables us to use such ideas as textuality and ‘the supplement’ for finding the true transcendental point in practising theology. This juxtaposition is especially imperative when we think about the relationship between the first and second causes happening at the event of concursus.
CHAPTER III
SCOTTISH COMMON SENSE REALISM AND KANT
IN THE THEOLOGY OF CHARLES HODGE

In this chapter, I want to examine how such Enlightenment ideas as Scottish Common Sense Realism and those of Immanuel Kant function in the theology of Charles Hodge. We will then critically discuss Hodge’s theological method and question whether his nineteenth-century methodology is adaptable to the context of a diverse and plural society in the twenty-first century. First of all, I will investigate what Hodge means by the inductive method and how it is influenced by Scottish Common Sense Realism and Kant on an historical basis. Then I will suggest how Hodge’s theological method should be understood in khora, and will argue that the context of his theology should reside there, where the universality of hermeneutics is achieved. While respecting Hodge’s priority on ‘facts’ over ‘theories’ as important tools for a proper theologian, I want to argue that the concept of ‘facts’ should not be confined to the Bible alone, but extended to the realm where the death of the I is embedded in a theologian with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit.

Hodge is dogmatically and theologically clear in using the facts of the Bible as major sources of his theology. However, when we have to discuss his theology in the space of our experience of faith and knowledge, we cannot but think of the adaptability of a theology. I believe that if there is no adaptability in a given theology, it remains dead, no matter how brilliant its ideas. With this adaptability in mind, I want to scrutinise the inductive theological method that Hodge presents and discuss its adaptability in the context of khora. Even the dynamic discussion of theological adaptability will not distort the priority of Hodge’s values in his method. Then this study will inevitably show us how hermeneutic change of a theology in the space of khora, where we live together, is possible without losing the theology’s essential values and important functions.

Through a critical understanding of the inductive method in Hodge’s theology, I dream of Hodge revisiting us to help us trace faith in a providential space of now. If we are successful in reinterpreting Hodge’s theology and proposing a theology of
action, we give validity to the Christianity of the two-thirds of the world that is
tremendously influenced by thousands of Princetonian descendents of Hodge—
missionaries around the turn of the twentieth century—and to Western Christianity,
as well, and we enjoy and re-affirm their theologies of action here and now without
losing their Reformed confessionalism.

A. The Theology of Charles Hodge in the Context of the Death of the I

Hodge has a two-fold view of knowledge: on the one hand is innate knowledge,
which is based on our sentient, rational and moral constitution; on the other is that
knowledge founded on experience. Here, there is a juxtaposition between his
‘meta-narrative’, based on Kantian pure reason, and the observed facts in life
experience, based on practical reason. With this juxtaposition of rational and
experiential knowledge, we want to scrutinise the inductive method in Hodge’s
theology. First, he argues that the innate knowledge of pure reason was born with
us. We need to recall that, as Derrida and Appiah noted in chapter II, the
historicity of innate knowledge that traces back even before existence is what the
death of the I assumes. I therefore want to examine how knowledge of self in the
theology of Hodge, whether innate or experiential, plays a role in the space of khora.
Secondly, as W. Andrew Hoffecker proposes, we must understand Hodge not only
from his intellect, but from his whole person in his life experiences.

Hodge’s recognition of the modes of life experience can be seen in his views on
religious immediacy. This immediacy is nothing other than a strong driving force
in the occurrence of our genuine faith and knowledge here and now. In the event of
khora, this immediacy is derived when the death of the I defers to identify what
something is but traces with the function of ‘the supplement’ as we have seen in
chapter II. According to Derrida, only the death of the I can perceive the illusion ‘of

240 W. Andrew Hoffecker, Piety and the Princeton Theologians: Archibald Alexander, Charles
Hodge and Benjamin B. Warfield (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing,
241 Mark Noll, Charles Hodge: The Way of Life and Other Writings, (Mahwah, New Jersey: Paulist,
the thing itself, of immediate presence, of originary perception’, because ‘the
supplement’ works as an infinite chain of ineluctable multiplying events. Therefore, as we affirmed in chapter II, such a thing as an immediate event (religious immediacy) cannot be conceived by reason.

The task of this chapter in dealing with Hodge’s theology in view of the death of the I then becomes clear. If we are to understand Hodge’s theology with the perspective of religious immediacy, we should ask what would happen to Hodge’s reason-based inductive theological method when the God of potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata are working as we examined in the event of faith and knowledge from the narrative of John 8:1-11 in section F of chapter I. With this in mind, we will examine Hodge’s religious immediacy with the Derridean perspective of the event happening in ‘the chains of supplements’. In addition to his three-volume Systematic Theology, we can also find inexhaustible sources on religious immediacy, through which we can trace intersubjective modes of life experiences, especially in his writings on religious life and pietism.

Hodge’s view on knowledge of the self can be seen in the way that he deals with ‘facts’ and ‘theories’ in his inductive theological method and how these ideas are related to such philosophies as Scottish Common Sense Realism and those of Kant. It is clear that Hodge does not confuse philosophy (scientific method) with theology. While using philosophy in his theological method (induction), he argues that a theologian has a right to demand that the facts in the Bible should be verified beyond the possibility of doubt. Hodge would say that when a theologian is to research the Bible as a philosopher, he would still focus on the Bible, because Hodge believed that ‘the facts are all in the Bible.’ Hodge’s method of interpreting the Bible is based on the idea that ‘the Bible, and the Bible alone, is the religion of Protestants.’

\[242\] Derrida, Of Grammatology, pp. 152-7.
\[243\] Ibid., p. 157.
\[244\] Ibid.
Hodge believes that the duty of theology is to collect the facts in the Bible, to exhibit their internal coherence, and to show their harmony and consistency with cognate truths. His mission for theology clearly shows that the Scriptures are the only source of theology. Then he uses the philosophical language of his time and space to prove that the written narrative of the Scriptures has cognate truths for the readers in studying God (theology) and applying the teachings of God in their lives. In Hodge’s theology, whatever and however Hodge uses philosophy is subordinated to the ‘cognate truths’ found in the Bible.

If we understand Hodge’s theological stance properly, William M. Paxton and David Wells are right that Hodge does not confuse philosophy with the truth. Paxton, one of his students—who believed it very dangerous to mingle God’s truth with secularised philosophical theology—evaluated Hodge as the one who ‘did not teach a philosophy, but a theology’. Paxton’s argument is that neither the whole nor any part of Hodge’s theology is based upon philosophical principles apart from the Word of God. It is true that the way in which Hodge uses scientific method in understanding the Scriptures does not show that he is saturated by science or philosophy. Agreeing with Paxton, Wells puts it that Hodge’s ‘inductive method had little or nothing to do with natural theology, but was merely his way of describing, in the scientific language of his generation, the proper attitude of a biblical theologian’.

Hodge clearly distinguishes the role of philosophy in his theological methodology and system from what he calls the facts of the Bible. Even when Hodge speaks of philosophical methods and ideas, he explicitly means that the authority of the Bible is higher than that of philosophy: ‘philosophy must yield to revelation; man must yield to God.’ From this statement, we can conclude that Hodge holds to the facts of the Bible while using a philosophical method in his theology.

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In discussing Hodge’s theological methodology, it is meaningless to debate whether Hodge’s use of philosophy is antithetical to the way in which he prioritises the authority of the Bible, whether Hodge’s philosophy contradicts what he means by truth. Because simply studying the philosophy that Hodge uses and its function in relationship with the Bible cannot give us any proper clue to understanding what he wants to tell us in that space and time. Rather, it is a matter of why and how Hodge uses philosophy in his theological argument. That is, first, we need to study Hodge’s intention in using philosophy and how that philosophy is understood in his theology. And then we want to know how Hodge’s values and conviction will take a place in a new paradigm of the death of the I. Hence in the discussion of philosophy and Hodge’s Biblical priority, the question whether his ways of using philosophy in his theology is proper is outside the scope of our inquiry. The matter at stake is how his Biblical theology is possible in our space and time: how it has changed hermeneutically in the context of khora.

That is, I want to explore the adaptability of Hodge’s assumptions about universal morality and common-sense rationality by changing his hermeneutical foundations, assumptions which did not work among Presbyterians during the American Civil War, when Presbyterians split along Union and Confederate lines in 1860-1, and ended up murdering each other. 251 In this case, John Stewart determines that the inadaptability of Hodge’s theology is due to Hodge not being at all comfortable with the ‘process-oriented rather than static, more evolving than established’ paradigm that surrounded him. 252 However, we find that Hodge is not at all against the idea of ‘process’ when he distinguishes between Darwinism and evolution, and explicates Christian experience in terms of innate knowledge. Rather, the lack of the idea of khora in Hodge’s theology might have been the result of schism and war. I now want to begin investigating Hodge and his inductive method in view of Scholastic Humanism, Scottish Common Sense Realism and Kantian ideas.

252 Ibid., pp. 35-6.
B. Charles Hodge: A Theologian and Teacher

Hodge (1797-1878) was born in Philadelphia, and educated at Princeton (graduated 1815) and the Princeton Theological Seminary (graduated 1819). He became professor of Oriental and Biblical literature at Princeton Theological Seminary in 1822, and taught there for more than 50 years, except for two years of study in France and Germany between 1826 and 1828. In 1840, he became professor of exegetical and didactic theology. The semi-centennial celebration of his professorship at Princeton was held in 1872, around the time his *Systematic Theology* was published.

The contents and structure of the three volumes of *Systematic Theology* were the first comprehensive compilation of a distinctively American Reformed theology in the nineteenth century. Hodge’s approach to theology was described as characteristically American:

Hodge’s philosophical underpinnings, his attempts to place faith claims in America’s public arena, his ecclesiastical definitions and polemics, his designs for a substantial educational institution, and his linkage of piety and public faith expression are telltale signs of his deep roots in the soil of American culture and society.\(^{253}\)

In *Systematic Theology*, we find two distinctive heritages, the seventeenth-century Scholastic Calvinism of Francis Turretin, and the eighteenth-century Scottish Common Sense Realism of Thomas Reid. These are crucial to understanding Hodge’s philosophical and theological background. Through scrutinising the way in which Hodge was influenced by the philosophy of Reid and the theology of Turretin, we will get hints of why and how Hodge deals and corresponds with contemporary American cultural and historical contexts.

The first three professors at the Princeton Theological Seminary, Archibald Alexander, Samuel Miller and Charles Hodge, were all influenced by the Realism of the Scottish school of John Witherspoon (1723-94), a graduate of the University of Edinburgh from Gifford, who became the sixth president of the College of New

Jersey (later Princeton University) in 1766. Hoffecker specifically analyses how these Princetonians used Scottish Realism:

Alexander used it [Scottish Common Sense Realism] to certify Scripture, Hodge developed it to construct an inductive method in theology, and Warfield carefully refined it into a rational apologetic system.

However, Hodge himself does not identify Scottish Realism in his theology because it is tacitly accepted in America as a social, political, intellectual and cultural norm. Historians, following Sydney E. Ahlstrom, begin to agree that this Realism plays an important role in Princeton theology, as well as in American culture.

We also need to pay attention to the influence on Hodge of the Scholastic Humanism of Francis Turretin, a Calvinist in Geneva a century after the death of John Calvin. After being a revival preacher in Virginia, Archibald Alexander became the first professor at the Princeton Theological Seminary. From the beginning of his teaching, Alexander used the Turretin’s *Institutio Theologiae Elencticae* (1674). As a student of Alexander, Hodge studied this book and, after teaching exegesis and Biblical literature for 20 years, he began using the *Institutio* for the next 30, until his own *Systematic Theology* was published. Hodge’s theological approach was generally similar to that of Turretin.

256 Peter Hicks sees that it was the accepted philosophy in the Americas, and says that Hodge’s theology was the lingua franca. Hicks suggests that ‘Hodge used Scottish Common Sense terminology and ideas because they gave adequate expression to his theological and philosophical ideas, rather than because they controlled their ideas’. Hicks’s evaluation is true in the sense that the value of Hodge’s theology is not influenced by this philosophy. However, it did influence his theological epistemology. Hicks, *Philosophy of Charles Hodge*, p. 79.
258 As an example of their affinity, Ralph John Danhof says that the theologies of Turretin and Hodge are similar in not separating dogma and ethics: ‘Turretin discussed morality under the Law, and Hodge also included a discussion of the Decalogue in his *Systematic Theology.*’ Ralph John Danhof, *Charles Hodge as a Dogmatician* (Goes, the Netherlands: Oosterbaan & Le Cointre, 1929), p. 61.
We can infer from Turretin’s influence on Hodge that Scholastic Humanism is part of Hodge’s theology. His theological method, which is generally based on rationalism committed to the Bible as the source of theology, has been derived from the scholastic characteristics of post-Reformation Protestant Orthodoxy. Later, many twentieth-century evangelicals in the United States (e.g., Reformed Wesleyan, Baptist, dispensationalist, charismatic), as Stanley Grenz and John Franke observe, become followers of Hodge’s theological paradigm of Scholastic Rationalism.

Even though Scottish Common Sense Realism, along with Turretin’s Scholasticism, becomes a core element in Hodge’s theology, neither Turretin nor Hodge digresses from the Calvinistic Reformed tradition. We have a great deal of evidence of their keeping Calvinistic Reformed confessionalism by fighting heresies with the tools of both philosophies in the 17th and 18th centuries. As McAllister notes, by using Scottish Realism, Hodge is able to give his theology a broader philosophical and epistemological basis with which to defend it against scepticism and other secular challenges. Also, through the influence Turretin’s Scholasticism, Hodge’s theology naturally continues the tradition of science and reason. Hodge is not at all opposed to empirical findings and the objective analysis of data. The very fact that Hodge pays attention to geology, palaeontology and the theory of evolution in his theology shows that he has much concern for such disciplines. Accordingly, Hodge thinks that science, based on human reason, is never antithetical to the facts in the Bible.

C. Scottish Common Sense Realism


262 Mark Noll says that both Hodge and Alexander are followers of ‘John Calvin, the great lights of English Puritanism, the Westminster Confession of Faith, and the influential Calvinistic dogmatics of seventeenth-century Europe’. Charles Hodge: The Way of Life and Other Writings, p. 22.

Scottish Common Sense Realism, which has a tremendous impact on Hodge’s theological methodology, has to be understood in the context of the Scottish Enlightenment. Its essential features, according to Alexander Broadie, were freedom and tolerance. This is seen in that the Scots of that time thought for themselves, and did not allow themselves ‘to develop the intellectual vice of assenting to something’ merely because of a violent authority. What was distinctive in their society was that ‘people are able to put their ideas into the public domain without fear of retribution from political, religious or other such authorities that have the power to punish those whose ideas they disapprove of’.

The free and tolerant atmosphere of the Scottish Enlightenment motivated people to think innovatively on every aspect of life, and the period is regarded as one of the greatest moments in the history of European culture. The intellectual movement was, naturally, focused on the Scottish universities and developed as the philosophy called Scottish Common Sense Realism. Thomas Reid (1710-96), the son of a Church of Scotland minister, served as a preacher in his early career, and then taught at Aberdeen (1752-63) and later at the University of Glasgow, where he went on to be the champion of this philosophy. Adam Smith (1723-90), the founder professor of political economy at Glasgow; James Beattie (1735-1802), the poet; Alexander Campbell (1716-96), the author of Philosophy of Rhetoric; Dugald Stewart (1753-1828) of Edinburgh; and Sir William Hamilton (1791-1856), who tried to link the philosophy of Kant with Thomas Reid; all were powerful figures of Scottish Common Sense Realists.

Scottish Enlightenment thinkers were more accustomed to the doctrines of Protestant Reformers on the Continent than to the sceptical philosophy of John Locke and the subjective idealism of George Berkeley. Naturally, the teaching of Common Sense Realism, as opposed to scepticism and idealism, appealed to universal experience, through which human beings could realistically know true things about the world outside their minds. The applications of this philosophy to

265 Ibid.
266 Ibid., pp. 1-5.
267 Mark A. Noll, *A History of Christianity in the U. S. A. and Canada* (Grand Rapids, Michigan:
Scottish society were: belles-lettres, including history and literary criticism; revitalisation of university education; rethinking political problems in economic terms, rather than natural terms; and liberalising and naturalising religion.  

In 1786, John Witherspoon became president of the College of New Jersey in Princeton. With the advantage of not being of American origin and thus uncommitted to the New Side or the Old Side, he could provide the new energy of the Scottish Enlightenment to American Presbyterianism. At first, his career in Princeton was a disappointment to both Old and New sides. However, gradually, he became a figure who could encourage harmony among the Calvinists, indulging the German colonists and the Dutch Reformed, and thus propelled the project of unifying Presbyterianism in the United States. Bruce Kuklick observes that Princeton was the university most influenced by the Scottish philosophy through Witherspoon’s philosophical connections.

From Witherspoon’s time on, the Scottish Enlightenment philosophy began to function as a prevailing idea, not only for establishing the United States as a newly independent nation, but also for American Christianity, especially for Presbyterianism. As a sociological influence, says Mark Noll, the Scottish Common Sense philosophy was useful in the United States in the following three ways: for justifying the revolution against Britain, for establishing new principles of social order in place of British rule and for re-establishing the truths of Christianity. As an intellectual influence at American universities, this philosophy was dominant at Harvard and Yale, as well as at the College of New Jersey.

Yet its influence was ‘dominant’ in various ways for different people. Regarding its theological influence, John Woodbridge, Nathan Hatch and Mark Noll all agree

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269 Ibid., p. 232.
270 Kuklick shows that Scottish Common Sense Realism was taught for over 100 years in Princeton theology. *Churchmen and Philosophers: From Jonathan Edwards to John Dewey*, p. 68. Also, Noll comments that the philosophy flourished for over a century among Witherspoon and his successors. *History of Christianity*, p. 156.
that the contemporary theologians adopted ‘common sense’, but that their perspectives were different:

For Nathaniel Taylor, it was merely ‘common sense’ that human guilt arose from the individual who had sinned. For Charles Hodge, it was ‘common sense’ that true theology came into existence by taking individual pieces of scriptural revelation and building them into a common whole. For Alexander Campbell, it was ‘common sense’ to root Christian life in the New Testament era rather than in later church history.273

Ahlstrom, an American historian, argues that through the powerful advocacy of Archibald Alexander and Charles Hodge, ‘the Scottish philosophy was carried by Princeton graduates to academies, colleges, seminaries, and churches all over the country.’274 With an extensive study, Noll also argues that early Princetonians, such as William Graham, Archibald Alexander and Ashbel Green, were strongly committed to Scottish Realism, and that Hodge, who followed them, naturally might also have been influenced by it.275

So far, we have addressed how Scottish Common Sense Realism sprang out of the Scottish Enlightenment and influenced American society, as well as Princeton theologians. Princetonians, including Hodge, accepted Scottish Common Sense Realism with the progressive spirit of the time. What people thought of as common sense—‘the reality of the self, the law of non-contradiction, reliability of sense perception, and basic cause-and-effect connections’—allowed them to have a progressive and democratic knowledge about nature and human nature.276

275 ‘Among Witherspoon’s many students who themselves became teachers was William Graham (1746-1799) of Virginia, who was Archibald Alexander’s instructor in both general education and theological subjects. Alexander, who provided introductory lectures on the “Nature and Evidence of Truth” to incoming theological students for most of his tenure at Princeton Seminary, passed on in those lectures the principles of the Scottish Philosophy to Hodge and many students. Hodge’s pastor and college president, Ashbel Green, was just as strongly committed to these Scottish principles, for he had also been a devoted student of Witherspoon. When Green became president of Princeton College in 1812, his major change in the curriculum was to restore Witherspoon’s lectures on Moral Philosophy as the text for the senior course in epistemology, ethics, and politics. From these influences Hodge naturally accepted the basic tenets of the Scottish Philosophy.’ Noll, *Charles Hodge: The Way of Life and Other Writings*, pp. 26-7.
The effects of Scottish Common Sense Realism on the intellectual foundation of Hodge’s theology are distinctive in his defense of the authority of the Bible. In *The Way of Life*, for instance, Hodge uses common-sense principles for combating ‘sophistical objections against the doctrine of the Bible’. In Noll’s words, ‘to Hodge it was folly for supposedly intelligent people to deny the evidence supporting the divine character of Scripture, evidence which came from external proofs and internal intuitions.’

D. The Relationship between Reidean Common Sense Realism and Kant

Manfred Kuehn argues that such philosophical scholars as Hans Vaihinger, Wilhelm Windelband, Julius Janitsch and Benno Erdmann have shown that Kant is indebted to the Scottish Common Sense Realism of Reid and Beattie. Building on extensive evidence, Kuehn observes that common sense is a central guiding concept for all the German Enlightenment thinkers, and argues that Kant is influenced by ‘the Scots in much greater detail than most historians are willing to admit’. He points out that the only difference between Kant and Common Sense Realism is the perspective on the ‘ideas’. What distinguishes Scottish Common Sense Realism is that it regards representationalism as an untenable hypothesis.

The ‘reality’ of our life experience is a distinctive characteristic of Scottish Common Sense Realism. That means, for Reid, that we can know things as they really are. However, in Kant, what appears to us is not exactly what it really is. Since Kant teaches that facts are only determined by our own judgement or our opinions, our knowledge is apt to fall into scepticism. The Scots argue that the theory of ideas necessarily leads to scepticism concerning the reality of external objects, and thus to idealism. But the Germans, including Kant, want to save

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277 Noll, *Charles Hodge: The Way of Life and Other Writings*, p. 27.
279 Ibid., pp. 6-12.
280 Ibid., p. 10. Kuehn defines that representationalism as the view that we do not perceive objects directly or immediately, but only indirectly by means of certain mediating mental entities.
representationalism while developing the philosophy of the Scots in their own direction. When we refer to Alexander Broadie’s observation, Scottish Common Sense Realism is in some sense Kantian in its idea of freedom of reformation against despotism. We need to keep in mind that the priority of ‘facts’ to ‘theories’ in Scottish Common Sense Realism is not antithetical to a Kantian philosophy. At the same time, we want to examine how Hodge deals with such a concept of Kantian representationalism, or ideas.

In the American context, Witherspoon’s philosophy, spreading rapidly, replaced the idealistic metaphysical philosophy of Jonathan Edwards. The different theological stance of the Princetonians to Edwards was typically caused by Scottish Realism, introduced by Witherspoon’s trusting in the external senses rather than Lockean representationalism. Furthermore, Princetonians including Hodge, as followers of Witherspoon, emphasised exploring the evidence of Christianity, while Edwardseans perceived it with their ideal minds. Elwyn Smith provides a good comparison of the two schools:

Edwardseans had affirmed the intimate bond between the reality of the divine and its impression on man, but they did not elevate impressions to the rank of evidence for the existence of God. But at Princeton, impressions were precisely regarded as evidence of divine operations on the individual affected. Thus Princeton realism elevated experience to a role never contemplated by the Edwardsean awakening. For Edwards, God would exist in his own excellence—and the mind could know it—if the world contained

282 Ibid. While Reid and his followers insist that common sense neither needs justification nor can be justified and defended in any strict sense, the Germans feel that some form of defence or justification of common sense is both possible and desirable from a philosophical point of view.
283 See pp. 84-5, above.
284 Witherspoon, on the assumption of Scottish Realism, distrusted any philosophy that contrasted experience with reality. ‘To him, the soul of revival was its validity as experience. To Edwards, its dynamic arose from man’s rational vision of the perfections of God…. [W]e are here encountering philosophical positions that are clearly in conflict: the ‘idealist’ theory of revival and its source, man’s rational vision of the perfections of God; Witherspoon’s realism of conversion and other ‘spiritual experiences’. Smith, Presbyterian Ministry in American Culture, p. 88. Smith concludes that the issue that existed between Edwards and Witherspoon was complicated by ‘Hopkins, Taylor and Finney, who argue that man is capable of marshalling the forces necessary to say, “I will.”’ The reason is that the followers of Witherspoon understood Edwardseanism not so much as a movement of revival arising in man’s vision of God as a revision of orthodox anthropology in the direction of Arminianism.
285 Kuklick, Churchmen and Philosophers, pp. 139, 171.
not one shred of holiness. For the Scottish realist, such a circumstance would call into question the existence of God.286

Similarly, while Edwards made the free will issue the axiom of his theology, Witherspoon regarded this problem as a small matter. For Witherspoon, it was nothing but a metaphysical problem.

Following the Scots, Hodge also uses an evidential scientific approach instead of the metaphysical speculations in Edwards’s theological method. This scientific approach is effective as a basic ethos throughout Systematic Theology. The influence of Scottish Common Sense Realism on Hodge is conspicuous when he gives a basis for the rational and scientific structure of the truths of the Scriptures and for the religious life in his theologising, especially in the so-called Princeton theology.

E. Antirepresentationalism

According to Richard Rorty, antirepresentationalism is based on the adaptation of ideas to the environment, instead of being ‘quasi-pictures’ presupposed by the idea of ‘our minds’ or ‘our language’ as an ‘inside’ that is contrasted to something very different ‘outside’.287 Rorty argues that antirepresentationalism is distinctive in Charles Darwin, a contemporary of Hodge, by evaluating Darwin’s view on the aesthetic experience as a ‘component of cognitive and practical forms of experience’. That is, the continuity of aesthetic experience is relevant to the rest of life.288 An antirepresentationalist like John Dewey thinks of belief as a habit of acting, rather than as part of a ‘model’ of the world constructed by the organism to help it deal with the world.289 What antirepresentationalists argue is that ‘there is simply no way to give sense to the idea of our minds or our language as systematically out of phase with what lies beyond our skins.’290 In other words, subjectively intended ideas are incapable of being objectively understood, if they are not really expressed.

286 Smith, Presbyterian Ministry in American Culture, p. 146.
288 Ibid.
289 Ibid.
290 Ibid., p. 12.
How, then, does Rorty’s antirepresentationalism not fall into self-destructive relativism? Edward J. Grippe analyses well the answer of this question in Richard Rorty’s New Pragmatism. Grippe says that such an ethnocentric destiny (what Hans-Georg Gadamer calls prejudice) is not a limit due to its bias, but it is ‘the heart of Rortyan Pragmatism’. This logic is the very tool for defending the charges that Rorty’s idea is relative. Rorty’s objectivity can be seen when a biased agent is involved in life experiences by his own point of view, using a ‘conceptual system at hand when he is engaging in a practical activity (understood broadly).’ Grippe evaluates what Rorty thinks:

It is impossible to decide whether some descriptions of an object capture its ‘intrinsic features’ (how the thing is under all conditions), and others merely identify its description-relative ‘extrinsic qualities’ (i.e., how we depict it). Therefore Rorty encourages us to discard the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction altogether, along with any claim that beliefs do or do not represent what is real.

We need to keep in mind that the characteristic of antirepresentationalism is distinctive in the Scottish Common Sense Realism which influenced Hodge’s theology.

F. Thomas Reid and the Common-Sense Place Where We Are Living Together

What is common is universal. Therefore, what is common in our mind produces understanding among differences. Commonality among differences begins with understanding what is happening now. Thomas Reid praised common sense, citing Locke:

Five or six friends (says [Locke]) meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had for a while puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer to a resolution of those doubts that perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and that before we set ourselves upon enquiries of that nature, it was necessary to

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292 Ibid., p. 6.
293 Ibid.
294 Ibid.
examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were fitted or not fitted to deal with.295

Here, consensus comes from the common ground that there is no agreement in their conversation. What they readily assented to was found to be functionally agreed, and this agreement became the foundation of their new inquiries. This common foundation would lead to what Locke calls the ‘right course’. This course must be uncovered by trial and error, not by theories. Therefore, common sense among different people always assumes the responsibility of an ‘I’ to find out what is common with the immediacy of sense. Accordingly, ‘I’, as an empirical subject, needs to examine its own ability to see if its understanding is appropriate or not in a certain situation. Therefore, the existence of ‘I’ is the core principle of Common Sense Realism. So what is ‘sense’? How can we find the ‘right course’?

These questions assume the immediate sense of a man. ‘Sense’ means the immediacy of our knowledge, and quickens us to know what is present. This common sense knowledge is based on scientific facts and human beings’ experience with them. The presupposition of Scottish Common Sense philosophers is that God is omnipresent with the facts and happenings of the world. The reason that Thomas Reid’s philosophy was adopted by theologies is due to this Calvinistic world-view. What he sensed is that the world is embedded with the present Divinity and controlled by the providence of God. This is the place that we call *khora*, which we will study in detail in chapter V.

G. The Inductive Method of Charles Hodge

Induction was introduced as a scientific method by the seventeenth-century scientists and philosophers Galileo Galilei in Italy, Francis Bacon in England and Tycho Brahe in Denmark. It flourished in the eighteenth century among Scottish Common Sense Realists. Later, through the channel of the Scots, Hodge adopted this method. Induction is the opposite of deduction. While the deductive method wants to prove conclusions based on whether they logically follow from the known

facts (premises), the inductive method begins with observations of nature, with the goal of finding a law that can explain how nature works. Hodge affirms the inductive method by saying that it is fundamental to all sciences and theology, and that theories should be determined by facts, rather than facts by theories.

Hodge’s priority in theology is seen in several aspects of his use of the inductive method: the Bible is the source of truth; a theologian has to respect the authority of the Bible; Christian experience also has to be Biblical; and, finally, science and philosophy are nothing but tools to form a theology. In order to preserve these convictions, Hodge finds that the inductive method is suitable for building his theological structure.

In order to discuss Hodge’s theology, we want to understand why and how he uses the inductive method. As pointed out above, it is effective as a basic ethos throughout his Systematic Theology, as well as in the beginning part of it. His method is always related to the Bible. He distinguishes false methods from a true method:

If a man adopts a false method, he is like one who takes a wrong road which will never lead him to his destination. The two great comprehensive methods are the a priori and the a posteriori. The one argues from cause to effect, the other from effect to cause. The former was for ages applied even to the investigation of nature. Men sought to determine what the facts of nature must be from the laws of mind or assumed necessary laws. Even in our own day we have Rational Cosmogonies, which undertake to construct a theory of the universe from the nature of absolute being and its necessary modes of development. Everyone knows how much it cost to establish the method of induction on a firm basis, and to secure a general recognition of its authority. According to this method, we begin with collecting well-established facts, and from them infer the general laws which determine their occurrence. From the fact that bodies fall toward the centre of the earth, has been inferred the general law of gravitation, which we are authorized to apply for beyond the limit of actual experience.296

Hodge regards speculative and mystical methods as false: speculation is a process of thought and mysticism is matter of feeling.297 The one believes that the thinking faculty is that by which we attain knowledge of faith, and the other does not believe

\[\text{## Footnotes}##\]

in reason at all, but assumes that feelings alone are to be relied upon, at least in the
sphere of religion. According to Hodge, speculation assumes certain principles in
an *a priori* manner, and from them undertakes to determine what is and what must
be. He shows three representative forms in which the speculative method has
been applied to theology: the Deistic and Rationalistic form; the Dogmatic form; and
the Transcendentalist form. He also points out three problems with the speculative
method: first, nothing contrary to reason is true; second, nothing contrary to our
moral nature is true; and third, conscience is much less liable to err than reason.

The problems with the mystical method, according to Hodge, are: there are no
such things as revelation and inspiration; the Bible has no infallible authority in
matters of doctrine; and Christianity, therefore, neither consists of a system of
doctrine, nor does it contain any such system. Hodge argues that, according to this
method, there is no such thing as a revelation that is a supernatural objective
presentation or communication of truth to the mind from the Spirit of God.
Inspiration is the supernatural guidance of the Spirit, which renders its subjects
infallible in communicating truth to others. Based on these reasons, Hodge criticises
the principle (*Glaubenslehre*) of Friedrich Schleiermacher’s theology as mystical:

> the duty of a [mystical] theologian is not to interpret Scripture, but to
> interpret his own Christian consciousness; to ascertain and exhibit what
> truths concerning God are implied in his feelings toward God; what truths
> concerning Christ are involved in his feelings toward Christ; what the
> feelings teach concerning sin, redemption, eternal life, etc., etc.

1. The Method for Biblical Theology

Carl Raschke argues that theology and science are considered equivalent in
Hodge’s theology because “the external world,” like God himself, is revealed as
exactly what it is. Divine revelation is at the same time commensurate with
common sense. This means that the *potentia ordinata* and *potentia absoluta* are
to be explained by common sense in Hodge’s theology. According to Raschke,

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300 *ST*, v. I, pp. 4-6.
302 Carl Raschke, *The Next Reformation: Why Evangelicals Must Embrace Postmodernity* (Grand
‘Hodge held that sin had darkened the human intellect, he was convinced that the regenerate mind would invariably see things clearly—both natural phenomena and the supernatural realm laid bare through the proper reading of the biblical text.’

In the first part of Systematic Theology, Hodge accepts some philosophical tenets of Scottish Common Sense Realism when he draws a parallel between his theological method and scientific method. With reasonable scientific assumptions, he observes facts in the Bible and proves the facts based on evidence. Theology as science, according to Hodge, collects the facts in the Bible, exhibits the internal coherence of the facts, and shows their harmony and consistency with cognate truths. Therefore, in theology, he considers the inductive method superior to the speculative and mystical methods. Theology, he says, ‘agrees in everything essential with the inductive method as applied to the natural sciences’. As the natural philosopher adopts the teaching of nature with certain assumptions, a theologian ‘must assume the validity of those laws of belief which God has impressed upon our nature’. As we can see, Hodge uses an evidential scientific approach in his theological method, as opposed to the metaphysical speculations of Edwards. However, in spite of the fact that Hodge borrows scientific method, he believes that his theology is thoroughly Biblical. As George Marsden writes, Princetonians thought of themselves as champions of ‘impartiality’ in the careful examination of the facts.

2. Facts and Theories in Hodge’s Theological Method

It is fundamental to all sciences and theology that theories should be determined by facts, not facts by theories. The dynamic interplay between facts and theories can be observed in Hodge’s stance on use of the inductive method in the interpretation of the Bible. First of all, Hodge clearly distinguishes facts from theories early in Systematic Theology with the recognition that ‘in every science there are two

303 Ibid. Raschke cites a sermon of Hodge from 1866.
factors: facts and ideas.\textsuperscript{308} He adds that ‘there is a great distinction between theories and facts. Theories are of men. Facts are of God. The Bible often contradicts the former, never the latter.'\textsuperscript{309} Since facts, for Hodge, are the truths of the Bible, facts substantiated by science have a higher value than theological theories. Both categories of facts have ultimate authority. Therefore, to deny facts is to deny what God affirms to be true. The priority of facts over theories originated in the empirical tendency of Scottish Realism’s search for facts.

Since Hodge believes that God knows everything and is the truth, and is the author of both the Scriptures and Creation, he is convinced that the Bible, properly interpreted, cannot conflict with the facts of nature, properly understood. This truth is revealed in the form of facts in the scientific and philosophical field, as well as in the Bible. While we can imagine, and have found, that some scientific and philosophical theories have been wrong, the truth or facts are always right. In the same way, Hodge argues that ‘theologians are not infallible, in the interpretation of the Scriptures. It may, therefore, happen in the future, as it has in the past, that interpretations of the Bible, long confidently received, must be modified or abandoned, to bring revelation into harmony with what God teaches in his works.’\textsuperscript{310}

When we scrutinise Hodge, we find that the term ‘facts’ has two different connotations. One is that facts are found to be written in the Bible concerning God and Christ, ourselves and our relations to our Maker and Redeemer.\textsuperscript{311} For example, the facts concerning human beings are believed to be revealed vividly in the Bible as ignorant beings that still need to progress intellectually through their relationship with the omniscience of Christ.\textsuperscript{312} The other connotation of ‘facts’ is ‘deduced facts’, of which established facts of science and philosophy, such as the properties of matter and the laws of motion, of magnetism, of light, etc., are characteristic. These

\textsuperscript{308} ST, v. I, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{309} ST, v. I, p. 171.
\textsuperscript{310} ST, v. I, p. 59.
\textsuperscript{311} ST, v. I, 16.
\textsuperscript{312} ST, v. I, p. 12.
facts are not formulated by the mind and are not laws of thought, but are deductions of facts.\textsuperscript{313}

Accordingly, Hodge concludes that if a theology does not adopt this principle of induction, it is a jumble of human speculations.\textsuperscript{314} Hodge observes that facts are determined by the will of God, but theories, which have human origins, often conflict with each other and cannot be accepted as Biblical truth. However, Hodge maintains that if theories of philosophical speculation coincide with the Bible, then they are true, and so far as they do not agree with it, they are false.\textsuperscript{315}

With the above understanding, Hodge sets up rules to interpreting the Scriptures:

1. The words of Scripture are to be taken in their historical sense.\textsuperscript{316} 2. If the Scriptures be what they claim to be, the word of God, they are the work of one mind, and that mind divine.\textsuperscript{316} Hence Scripture must explain Scripture. 3. The Scriptures are to be interpreted under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, which guidance is to be humbly and earnestly sought.\textsuperscript{316}

In summarising what Hodge means by facts and theories, we need to pay attention to how he deals with the ‘speculative theories’ and ‘facts’ in determining whether they be true or false. Hodge’s tool is to check the evidence of ‘coinciding with the Bible’ by induction from it. We find that Hodge’s position is, on the one hand, that ‘facts’ are true because they are written in the Bible, and on the other hand, that ‘speculative theories’ may be true if they are ‘inducted facts’, being corroborated by the guidance of the Holy Spirit in the process of interpretation. The questions from Hodge’s position are: who decides that an interpretation is guided by the Holy Spirit, and who clarifies that ‘inducted facts’ are true? If it is nobody but the God of the Holy Spirit, we should pay attention to the identity of the death of the I embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, which I discussed in chapter II.

H. Christian Experience as the Effect of the Cause

\textsuperscript{313} ST v. I, p. 13.  
\textsuperscript{314} Ibid., pp. 14-5.  
\textsuperscript{315} Ibid., p. 58.  
\textsuperscript{316} Ibid., p. 187.
Hodge also believes that not only the sources of theology, but also Christian life experience, are objectively revealed in the facts of the Bible. When he digs up the facts of religious knowledge from the contents of the Bible itself, he also inducts norms and standards of daily religious life. For Hodge, all theological discussions, including the religious life of a believer, are inducted from the facts of the Bible. Since facts are from the Bible, as far as Hodge’s theology is concerned, facts are regarded as truth. He wants to show that the Bible has the only authority in practising theology and in proving the evidence of the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit in life experiences (pietistic ways to religious life), as well by using the modern concept of the relationship between objectivity and subjectivity.

As James L. McAllister argues, Hodge follows Thomas Reid’s philosophy on the duality of subject and object in the intellectual apprehension of truth, that every effect has an efficient cause. Hodge explains religious experience as the effect, with truth as the cause: ‘The Scriptures teach not only the truth, but what are the effects of the truth on the heart and conscience, when applied with saving power by the Holy Ghost.’ Hodge continues that all ‘the truths taught by the constitution of our nature or by religious experience, are recognized and authenticated in the Scriptures.’ In this way, religious experience is able to be described as the Word of God because Hodge believes that ‘the Bible records the legitimate effects of those truths on the minds of believers.’ Hodge strongly argues that our own feelings or inward experiences can be possible only when they agree with the experiences of holy men recorded in the Scriptures. Thus, he concludes that the true method of theology is ‘inductive’:

[The inductive method] assumes that the Bible contains all the facts or truths which form the contents of theology, just as the facts of nature are the contents of the natural sciences. It is also assumed that the relation of these Biblical facts to each other, the principles involved in them, the laws which

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318 ST, v. I, p. 11.
319 ST, p. 15.
320 ST, p. 16.
321 ST, p. 16.
determine them, are in the facts themselves, and are to be deduced from them, just as the laws of nature are deduced from the facts of nature. However, I believe that our experience can be the cause of the effect, interpretation of the Bible. As we have seen in F of chapter II, and as I will detail in chapter IV, interpretation has always been and has to be accompanied by the ‘process’, ‘intersubjectivity’, and the ‘event’. Hodge’s view that our experience should be the effect of the facts of the Bible, the cause, does not take hermeneutic process into account at all. The idea of cause and effect may well present proofs of the existence of God, however in khora, we pursue proofs of God “by His effects,” precisely as the proofs of the name of God ‘by effects without cause.”

I. Process and Intuition (Innate Knowledge) in Religious Feeling

Intuition in Scottish Common Sense Realism enables Hodge to rely on the role of the Holy Spirit for Christian life. The subjectivity of the intellect and morality, which is the basis of Christian life, is considered by Hodge as innate knowledge or intuitive truths. When he argues that the knowledge of God is innate, he is maintaining that innate knowledge is opposed to that acquired by a process of research and reasoning. By Hodge’s definition, intuition means immediate perceptions, such as primary truths, laws of belief, innate knowledge, or ideas. He argues that intuition comes from the constituted mind perceiving certain things to be true without proof and without instruction. That is, Hodge’s innate knowledge, as opposed to the knowledge obtained from experience, enables us to know directly all of the facts about ourselves and about our surroundings without any help from reason.

Hodge notes that these, intuitive truths (innate knowledge) belong to several departments, such as the senses, understanding and our moral nature:

In the first place, all our sense perceptions are intuitions…. In the second place, there are intuitions of the intellect…. In the third place, there are

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322 ST, p. 17.
325 ST, pp. 191-2.
moral truths which the mind intuitively recognizes as true…. The more that
nature is purified and exalted, the clearer is its vision, and the wider the
scope of its intuitions.\textsuperscript{326}

He goes on to teach that our intuitive knowledge involves the following processes:

Our senses give us immediate knowledge of their appropriate objects; the
understanding perceives intuitively primary truths; our moral and aesthetic
nature gives us the immediate cognition of things right or wrong, and
beautiful or deformed.\textsuperscript{327}

Through this process, a human being may have a clear and certain knowledge of the
operation of his own mind. Hodge tries to explain Christian experience in terms of
the marriage of scientific inductive method and intuition. However, scientific truths
are not without presuppositions. I want to introduce Hans-Georg Gadamer’s critique
of Enlightenment ideas on science. (I will discuss Gadamer in detail, in relationship
with Habermas, in chapter IV.)

Affirming the judgement of a human being as a holder of prejudices, Gadamer
says that the Enlightenment theories are without presupposition: they just want to be
\textit{the} concrete in the ideal of presuppositionless science.\textsuperscript{328} Rather than treating
scientific method as truth, Gadamer argues that we need to think of the common
sense of public opinion (presupposition) in practising science. That is, scientific
research needs to devise a scientific means of guiding the formation of opinions.\textsuperscript{329}

If we apply Gadamer’s critique to Hodge, Hodge’s inductive method can be
understood as ‘scientific means’ with the presuppositions of nineteenth-century
Princeton. Then, Hodge’s teaching of the process of intuitive knowledge cited
above becomes resonant with Gadamer’s argument that science exists and is
important because it is ‘beautiful’.\textsuperscript{330} For Gadamer, ‘the Beautiful’ is defined as
something that enjoys universal recognition and assent. Thus it belongs to
our natural sense of the beautiful that we cannot ask why it pleases us. We
cannot expect any advantage from the beautiful since it serves no purpose.

\textsuperscript{326} ST, pp. 192-193.
\textsuperscript{327} ST, p. 393.
\textsuperscript{328} Gadamer, \textit{Praise of Theory}, p. 45.
\textsuperscript{329} Ibid., p. 45
\textsuperscript{330} Ibid., p. 73.
The beautiful fulfils itself in a kind of self determination and enjoys its own self-representation.\textsuperscript{331}

In Hodge’s words, ‘the beautiful’ is a ‘fact’ that overcomes the boundary of ‘theories’. Since ‘the speculative theories’ that have to be determined by ‘facts’ in section G.2. of this chapter are not definitely true—due to the fact that human practice in science is still an ongoing process of opening up the capacity for dominating Nature, and inventing and making necessary and beautiful things—as Gadamer argues, ‘theories’ (\textit{theoria}) should no longer be seen as ‘above all of that’.\textsuperscript{332} Gadamer’s implication about Hodge is that the ‘method’ of a theology should deal with what is beautiful and hence serves no ends. That is, Hodge’s inductive method should not be regarded as the only right one that prevents the ‘facts’ of the Bible from being distorted by ‘theories’.

Gadamer means that hermeneutics has significance, as it is in the process of experience.\textsuperscript{333} For Gadamer, through hermeneutic reflection, prejudices (methods formed by a certain time and space) will be reformed by themselves. However, such a thing as tradition, a by-product of the prejudices of a certain era, plays an important role in knowing how we understand. This is why we have studied the historical and philosophical background of Hodge’s theology in this chapter.

I want to go back to Hodge’s process of intuitive truth. He extends intuitive truths of reason to the existence of God, to His providence and to the immortality of the soul.\textsuperscript{334} All of these: the intuitions of reason, the \textit{a priori} judgements of moral nature, and the immediate apprehensions of the religious consciousness are, Hodge affirms, ‘absolutely infallible and of paramount authority’.\textsuperscript{335} The Common Sense philosophy acts as a contribution to Hodge’s concept of intuition, rather than as a threat, because the philosophy’s concept of intuitive power helps to describe the work of the Holy Spirit in everyday Christian life. Using his concept of innate


\textsuperscript{332} Gadamer, \textit{Praise of Theory}, p. 41.

\textsuperscript{333} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{334} \textit{ST}, v. II, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{335} \textit{ST}, v. III, p. 697.
knowledge, Hodge explains faith as a commitment to God based on internal religious experiences.

Generally, Hodge has been criticised as being too rationalistic. Critics say that his theology is different to that of the Reformers because it is based on the propositions of external experiences. But as we have seen, his concept of intuition helps us to understand his explication of religious feeling. The distinctive element in Hodge’s view of a personhood is ‘feeling’. Hodge’s understanding of the self as the Image of God is Calvinistic:

‘… If we were not like God we could not know Him.’ Over and against the Greek theologians who made the image of God ‘consist exclusively in [our] rational nature’ and Lutherans who claimed that it was that which was lost by the fall and restored by redemption, Hodge followed the Calvinist tradition in holding that the image of God included both rational and moral elements. God is a spirit; as such he is capable of thought, feeling and will; he has made us in his image; we too are capable of thought, feeling and will.336

For Hodge, the essential attributes of a spirit, whether human or divine, are threefold: thought, will and feeling, the latter of which was either rejected or ignored by Calvin and Francis Turretin.337 The difference is probably due to Hodge’s Schleiermacherian connection and desiring to move away from a “Greek” concept of the philosopher’s God to a more dynamic one.338 Knowledge of God also involves our spiritual and religious nature that comes from our feeling. However, Hodge thinks that our own feelings or inward experiences are possible only when they agree with the experiences of holy men recorded in the Scriptures.339 That is, Hodge is rationalistic primarily in relation to Schleiermacher and the mystics, but when he confronts Rationalists, he emphasises and relies on faith in the Scriptures and on religious experiences with this intuitive knowledge. In this sense, Hodge’s emphasis on ‘feeling’ in the self as an image of God has to be understood in the category of an event in relation to others and our individual responsibility before God.

336 Hicks, The Philosophy of Charles Hodge, p. 77.
338 Hicks, Philosophy of Charles Hodge, p. 67.
For Hodge, the basic source of all religious knowledge is the Bible. Although he pursues the proofs for evidence and intuitions of what happens in this world, he finally clings to the facts (truth) in the Bible. In developing a doctrine, Hodge thinks the content of the whole Bible must be carefully considered, omitting nothing relevant to a given topic. Because Hodge believes that religious truth often goes against the consciences of men, there is a much greater temptation in theology than in science for a person to ignore or deny unwelcome data in order to avoid their implications. For this reason, Hodge argues that a theologian must, therefore, exercise special care to avoid such results by considering all the relevant data.\(^{340}\)

For Hodge, a theologian’s goal of knowledge should be the whole Bible.

In this way, Hodge argues that facts in the Bible (truth) are then the standard of Christian doctrine and individual life: the truth of holiness in life is objectively revealed in the Bible. It is common sense for Hodge to tell us more directly that the Bible is confirmed to be truth. Therefore, for him, the Bible is the most reliable source of religious knowledge because it cannot conflict with the facts of nature as they are properly understood according to the Bible. Hence Hodge argues that religious knowledge that comes from the Bible is essential in forming man’s character.\(^{341}\)

In Derridean *khora*, such an event of immediacy points to a true transcendental point. Such ideas as subjectivity and objectivity that Hodge understood have to be conceived by the idea of *gift*. Derrida said:

> There where there is subject and object, the *gift* would be excluded. A subject will never give an object to another subject. But the subject and the object are arrested effects of the *gift*, arrests of the *gift*. At the zero or infinite speed of the circle.\(^{342}\)

According to Derrida, the question of the *gift* is related to its space, *khora*, ‘before any relation to the subject, before any conscious or unconscious relation to self of the subject’, which is exactly what happens with Heidegger’s *Dasein*.\(^{343}\) As we saw


\(^{343}\) Ibid.
in chapters I and II, as a bearer of responsibility, gift, faith and humility, the death of the I will understand the subject/object dichotomy with the idea of juxtaposition of the bipolarity in the event.

The task of this thesis is clear. How can we overcome Hodge’s reason-based methodology and relate his perspective of religious immediacy to the event of khora? The Derridean view of ‘the chains of supplements’ that we studied in chapter II can explain the continuity of Hodge’s religious immediacy. In addition to Systematic Theology, we can find inexhaustible sources in Hodge’s religious life and pietism through which we can trace the intersubjective modes of life experiences. In chapters IV and V, we will discuss religious immediacy in more detail philosophically and theologically in terms of ‘process’, ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘the event’.

J. Kantian Epistemology in the Inductive Method of Charles Hodge

1. ‘Facts’ in Kant and Hodge

Immanuel Kant wants a clear, objective understanding, either in science or religion. In Kantian epistemology, religious knowledge is construed in the same way as that of science. Following Kant, Hodge uses equal epistemology in seeking the value of science and religion through his theological methodology. As we have seen, the Kantian concept of ‘facts’ plays an important role in Hodge’s account of cognate truths written in the Bible. As does Kant, Hodge wants ‘facts’ (facts of the Bible) to be clear objective ‘things’. To both Kant and Hodge, ‘a “fact” is objective’ means that there is neither controversy nor dispute, neither prejudice nor bias about it. Then a fact becomes a finalised truth. In science, a scientist is objective means that his research on the facts including experiment and observation, and reasoning has to be brought to effect by a verifiable scientific method. With this definition, Hodge’s theology can be called objective because Hodge’s objectivity on a fact has always been verified by inductive method which is based on scientific reasoning.

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344 Ibid., p. 157.
However, when they identify objectivity of facts and truth, we can find that their truth claims appear to be different, I believe, due to the way how they perceive what objectivity is. While Kantian *a priori* knowledge on the absolute is speculative, Hodge gets absolute knowledge from the representations of the Scriptures and from the constitution of man as the image of God.\(^{345}\) In the Kantian premise, since truth is determined by man’s consciousness, the very fact that there are differences in opinion means that we cannot claim truth without agreement. That is, in Kant, facts cannot be objectively true if there is no agreement, since truth requires that we are all prepared to accept an idea without argument. While not identifying facts as truth, Kant argues that even the most obvious fact is relegated to the status of a ‘best guess’. Also, Kant argues that we are not justified in assuming that what ‘it appears’ to us is identical to what ‘it is in itself’.\(^{346}\) That is, we cannot know reality ‘as it really is’, only as it ‘appears to us’, given the innate structure of our mind that is common to all human beings. In this way, we cannot have our theoretical knowledge enable us to reach conclusions about reality. However, there might be practical reasons for us to believe in God or immaterial souls.\(^{347}\) The facts of Hodge’s Christian experience, in this view, are socially subjective.

On the other hand, Hodge believes that ‘facts’ written in the Bible are undoubtedly true, he presupposes that they (the facts of the Bible) are objective truths, therefore we ought to believe them regardless of our viewpoints and opinions. In Hodge, ‘facts’, whether people agree with them or not, are true. Accordingly, in his theology, we ought to be prepared to accept what he believes to be true without any suspicion or argument. As Peter Hicks observes, Hodge is very clear that the contents of the Scriptures are not mere regulative truths: for Christians, the Bible is the Word of God.\(^{348}\) Without any self-evidencing hermeneutic process in knowing truth at all, in Hodge ‘facts’ are truths, and vice versa. Consequently, there is no distinction between truths and facts in Hodge’s theology, because he regards facts as those written in the Bible are already objective.

\(^{345}\) ST, v. I, p. 394.
\(^{346}\) Acton, *Kant’s Moral Philosophy*, p. 7.
\(^{347}\) Ibid.
\(^{348}\) Hicks, *Philosophy of Charles Hodge*, p. 79.
2. The Limit of Hodge’s Methodology

Hodge, while using Scottish Realism or Kantian ideas in his theological method of induction, comments that ‘theories are of men’, and ‘facts are of God’ and ‘the Bible often contradicts the former, never the latter.’ However, we need to confess that Hodge’s use of this philosophy as a fact in his Biblical theology contradicts his argument that it is based on the facts of the Bible. His Scottish Common Sense Realism in his theology seems to contradict his ambitious conclusions, that ‘philosophy must yield to revelation’ and ‘man must yield to God.’ He may not put off this charge because, as we have studied, his world-view has been Scottish Common Sense Realism, which participated in his theology as a norm of the society.

Speaking in different perspective, Hodge’s inductive theological method has limits, due to its use of Kantian epistemology, which deals with science and religion, i.e., reason and faith, equally in the way of identifying ‘facts’ happening in Christian life with truth. Hodge’s theological method of scientific induction is a way of understanding truth in the Bible, but his scope of interpretation of the Bible cannot encompass a total human experience of the world what Gadamer sets ‘transformation into structure.’ Hodge simply wants to prove how facts (truth) in the Bible are possible in theology itself and in Christian life, as well, through the inductive method by forcing to place facts of Christian experiences also concur with the facts of the text of the Bible.

Two other points are abstracted from above argument. First, Hodge regards the effect (religious life) of the cause (the facts in the Bible) as truth. Because of his understanding that religious experience is the effect of the cause, truth is due to the limit of a modern methodology that is ‘designed to determine the principles which should control scientific investigation’. Second, Hodge has no sense of discriminating truth (facts in the Bible) from his scientific inductive method. If he believes that facts are of God, logically, his inductive method as a fact in his

349 ST, I, 171. See, also, note 304.
350 Ibid.
352 ST, v. I, p. 3.
theology has to be of God, too. However, there is no indication or proof in Hodge’s work whether his method can be regarded as a fact of the Bible.

If Hodge’s theological method totally followed Kantian epistemology, the truth that Hodge really wants to keep would be lost. However, Hodge keeps truth by simply presupposing that the Bible is truth and the induction of it in Christian life is true. Then we can find that the Kantian concept of facts is used as a mere methodological tool in Hodge’s inductive theology. For Hodge, as a scientist pursues facts, a theologian has to research the facts written in the Bible. On the one hand, Hodge’s facts are unchangeable truths; on the other hand, Kantian facts are self-evident truths. Yet the problem is that while Hodge follows the logic of Kant in his methodology, he not only regards facts as truth, but also the effects of facts on a reader, with which Kant would not agree.

I do not want to argue about the truth of the Bible, yet I want to recognise a serious problem in Hodge’s use of Kantian epistemology with the question of how Hodge’s Bible can always be considered to be true for a reader. Is that just because ‘facts’ in the Bible are similar to the categorical imperative in that we ought to regard them as true, even though our inclinations and desires conflict with what our reason requires? Hodge’s answer would be clear. He would argue that, through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, the Bible becomes true to a reader. My next question is, can a reader dictate to or control the Holy Spirit to experience Biblical facts as true? Isn’t it blasphemous in Hodge’s theology for a reader to control the Holy Spirit? According to Kantian epistemology, as we have seen, truth is always self-evident truth. It is clear that what we know as truth cannot be tantamount to God himself.

3. New Paradigm: Event

I have many more questions on the way in which Hodge deals with ‘facts’. When Hodge says that religious experience—as well as the message of God—is prescribed in the facts of the Bible, the facts as truths in the Bible are normative factors that we have to review ourselves, according to the consequences of the facts in the Bible. If we follow Hodge’s logic, our daily experiences ought to be confirmed by the facts in the Bible. In other words, our experience ought to happen
according to the Bible. At this moment, I have a question about how Hodge deals with the possibility that our experience at a certain time is not led by the Bible. What if our sinful experience does not follow the consequences of the facts of the Bible in a time and a space? Conversely, how are the interrelated facts of the Bible as a teaching of our life meaningful to the life experiences of Judas or Peter? I have endless questions. How do the facts of the Bible function in determining whether I would follow Judas or Peter? Can the facts of the Bible judge my tears in prayer, whether for repentance or regret, whether regret becomes repentance or not? My question, in sum, is how are these questions related to the facts of the Bible?

The questions arising from the heart of human being have to be understood as facts happenings in the event. Hodge’s inductive theological method may not be guaranteed when we experience death, the time when the concept of truth is scattered, as in Peter’s experience. Then, is it possible for the theology of Hodge to deal with what would happen? The only possibility of impossibility is, I believe, to overturn philosophical hierarchies in Hodge’s theological method and get rid of the violence of philosophy, so as to let Biblical theology be Biblical. *The death of the I* will do the work by its ‘the supplement’ and the ‘tracing’ of God.

The facts of religious experience are the events themselves. The events can be checked by the facts in the Bible, but are not happening according to facts written in the Bible. If Hodge believes that ‘the Scriptures teach not only the truth, but also the effects of the truth on the heart and conscience, when applied with saving power by the Holy Ghost’, he should distinguish the effect of the Bible powered by the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, from the facts written in the Bible itself. How can a believer’s life experience be regarded as truth in the Bible when the Holy Spirit is not applied to a believer’s life? How do we know the moment when the Holy Spirit is being applied? How on Earth can created human beings assert that their life experiences are tantamount to the facts (truth) in the Bible? Hodge’s assertion that life experiences are the effects of the facts in the Bible is difficult to nail down. This is nothing but a ‘theory of man’ of the type that Hodge worried about the most. What he is doing here is to subordinate religious experience to the

353 Ibid, p. 11.
facts of the Bible in the name of the Holy Spirit. In this sense, Bruce Kuklick is right that Hodge lacks the ability to juxtapose the sacred texts of his tradition with his own life experience and the knowledge of his culture.  

In other words, contradictions in Hodge’s theology are observed in his inability to deal with intersubjective modes in believers’ faith and knowledge in their life experiences. In this mode, when the death of the I, embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, is understanding the Bible, Hodge’s ‘facts’ in the Bible are already interpreted by the spirituality working in the life experience of the death of the I. Without knowing this, as Mark Noll observes, Hodge is contradicting himself in practising theology—one hand, confining the work of the Holy Spirit exclusively to the narrative of the Bible, and, on the other hand, developing a theology led by Scottish Common Sense Realism, which is not the Holy Spirit. In this sense, Hodge’s theology may be subject to the criticism that his theology is not Biblical, but philosophically dogmatised.

Let us discuss the philosophical violence in Hodge’s theological method some more. As a Biblical theologian, it is proper for him to regard facts as written cognate truths. For example, the temporary denial of Peter and the permanent deviation of Judas can be sources for theology. But it is difficult for a reason-based philosophical method to theologise unreasonable spontaneous conflicts, agonies and contradictions of the Biblical narrative. Genuinely true Biblical narrative cannot be Biblically interpreted due to the misuse of philosophy. Because of this ignorance and misuse or abuse, Christianity sometimes has been under criticism for being dualistic and hypocritical. The contradiction between the life experience of a believer and the knowledge of a believer is caused by the violence of philosophy over the facts in the Bible.

We do not have to undervalue Hodge’s success in showing that the authority of the Bible comes from the facts of the Bible. However, in religious experience and

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Christian theology, as well, especially when using philosophy in practising theology, ‘facts’ should not only be confined to the truth in the Bible, but should be observed in the believers’ religious lives. That is, theology should deal with not only the text itself, but also textuality, where Christian believers are experiencing God, the world and revelation. As far as there are diversity and plurality in \textit{khora}, the \textit{responsibility}, \textit{gift}, \textit{faith} and \textit{humility of the death of the I} cannot function with objective scientific certainty, because we know that \textit{khora} cannot be perceived by the logic of reason. To put it another way, so long as there are differences with each other, there is no one universal, objective and scientific guide to resolve problems caused by them.

K. In Sum

The inductive theological method of Hodge is an example of the marriage of the Kantian categorical imperative (‘we ought to do…’) and Calvinism.\textsuperscript{356} It is categorical when Hodge maintains the authority of the Bible by placing our religious experience the effect of the cause, the Bible. He believes that the Holy Spirit illuminates and convinces such that the religious experiences are the effects of the Bible. Hodge’s belief as a Calvinist is that a human being’s will to knowledge is so totally depraved that we should not produce controversy or dispute over the truths written in the Bible.

If we are critical to the cause and effect relationship in Hodge’s methodology that presupposes the Bible is always the cause of everything, we need to think that theology has to put God as cause and the effect as our life experience as well as the Bible. This is what contextual theology does. The reality is that our religious experience happens in the intersubjective modes of our daily life for the pursuit of objectivity. Furthermore, even when we do not say anything and not pretend to know anything, God works through us as an event in His providence. Even if we say that we have the purely pure truth, the expression of it does not mean that we are

\textsuperscript{356} The five points of Calvinism are known as TULIP: Total depravity of human nature, Unconditional love, Limited atonement, Irresistible grace, and Perseverance of the saints.
truth, or that listeners to our speech are automatically to be involved in the truth, just because it is said to be truth.

However, truth remains as the object of knowledge in the epistemology of Hodge’s theology. In Hodge, all theological arguments are discussed following an objective inductive method, and are eventually resolved in the accounted facts of the Bible. What if we do not get any sense of truth after reading what he says about truth in his theology? Is it due to his lack of faith or knowledge? I believe it is not due to Hodge himself, but to the epistemological problem of his theology that he might not have recognised in his nineteenth-century philosophical context. Actually, this is not Hodge’s problem, but the metaphysical epistemology that cosigns a strong theology.

Here, the intention and purpose of dealing with Hodge’s theology is clear. He is a distinctive nineteenth-century theologian who is still tremendously influential on the so-called Reformed and Evangelical traditions of American theology. Even though his theological structure is limited in embracing a diverse and pluralistic society, Hodge’s theological confession as an uncompromising standard of the unique value of Christianity has to be shown. The task of the Reformed and Evangelical circle of this era is to show a theology that is context-sensitive at the same time that it is a unique Christian conviction of faith. For this reason, I want to show Evangelicals how we can practise theology in another way, without losing Evangelical value at all. Hodge’s value can be found in Fundamentalism and Calvinism.

So we want to keep the value of Hodge that came out of his religious freedom. The doctrinal value of Old Princeton Theology and Hodge are clear. First, the old Princetonians’ doctrinal basis, including that of Hodge, was here and there indicated in their theologies, in which certain doctrines such as the infallibility of the Bible, the Trinity, the Virgin birth, the bodily resurrection, the substitutionary atonement, and the coming again of Jesus Christ, were declared essential to Christianity. Second, their theologies were based on traditional Calvinism and the TULIP teachings.357

357 See note 325 above.
We can and have to practise a theology of universality as I have consistently argued in this thesis, to be together, to be in *khora*, to practise theology without losing Hodge’s particular religious conviction. This is not an ambiguous synthetic theology at all, but being together, at the same time, warns Christian circles with the message of what the priorities of our theology, faith and institutions are to be. In this theology, all kinds of doctrinal debates are possible, because it allows freedom to all, freedom to each of them, freedom to each signifier—a particular conviction of faith. Since the very foundation of truth is freedom, if you really believe what you believe is truth, you have to respect the freedom of others. Because you believe, the truth that you know to be true will eventually be fulfilled. We have been too impatient to be harmonised with others and are too negligent of others’ freedoms. If you think what you know is true, *khora* would be the only place to exercise what you believe to be true.
A. Preface

As we saw in the previous chapter, Kantian philosophy and Scottish Common Sense Realism give Charles Hodge the intellectual ammunition that enables him to claim that inductive (scientific) method will certify and verify the facts of the mystical revelations of the Bible. As far as theological method is concerned, Hodge believes in an equal epistemology for science and theology. What is distinctive in Hodge is that the Scientific method becomes the very tool to expound the revelation of God presupposing that all facts of the text are already interpreted by God as a means of a divine eternal plan.\(^{358}\) For Hodge, then the inductive method is the vehicle that makes possible the facts of the Bible to be truth. However, since we recognise the reality that the scientific method cannot be truth itself, but a passage for understanding truth, we have a pertinent inquiry of how we can discover the proper conditions for understanding the truth of ‘facts’ written in the Bible in Hodge's theology.

How Hodge's concept of objectivity has to be construed especially when what he believes to be an objective truth produces meaning? For the answer of this question, in this chapter, I want to observe how Hodge's reason-based scientific epistemology has been evolved in the context of Enlightenment ideas and what kind of tension it has with such methods as ‘process', ‘intersubjectivity' and ‘event' in knowing truth. I believe that these three context-sensitive modes in understanding will enable us to think of textuality\(^{359}\) where the facts in Hodge's theology proliferate meaning. For the discussion of ‘process' as an antidualism, we need John Dewey's ‘habit and reason'; for intersubjectivity as a substitution of objectivity, Habermas and Gadamer's debate on the ‘subject-object relationship'; and for the event as a truth of act, Derrida's *khora*.


\(^{359}\) See chapter V. B. 2.2.
With the results of this chapter, in chapter V, we will discuss universality in *khora* in comparison with the ‘genius’ of Ralph Waldo Emerson and the ‘ironist’ of Richard Rorty, and observe how *khora* works in Leo Tolstoy and Søren Kierkegaard, in search of the righteous in this era—the proper attitude in practising theology. These ideas will be the backbone for the reinterpretation of the theology of Hodge, a father of American Evangelicalism. I believe an event has the capacity to resolve all the hermeneutic problems caused by dualism, antidualism and intersubjectivity even though it captures a spontaneous moment. Ultimately, reminding that this spontaneous event has the passage of history of religion with *responsibility*, *gift*, *faith* and *humility*, we will have the ideas to reconstruct Hodge's nineteenth-century American Calvinist theological method.

B. In Search of the True Transcendental Point

If we regard hermeneutics as a communication between subject and object, transcendence and immanence, visible and invisible, and spoken and unspoken, we first need to understand the hermeneutic conscience of a human being in the context of universality and particularity. The implication of universality and particularity discussed in chapter I shows that Christian theology has to accomplish hermeneutic universality by recognising the reality of the plurality and diversity of created beings.

In this thesis, we have frequently discussed the transcendental inquiry in the context of the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit in the manner when it is applied to the intersubjective modes of a believer’s life experience, where independent objective knowledge of God, Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, and the particular faith of a believer, are occurring. Consequently, this transcendental inquiry comes from the question of how to resolve the dichotomy of faith and knowledge. In chapter II, after discussing the necessity of juxtaposition of the universality, *the death of the I*, and the particularity, ‘the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit’, we found that *the death of the I* embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit will achieve universality at the moment when the true transcendental point occurs. The supplemental *death of the I* is temporal, but necessary to a whole.
From this point on, it is imperative for us to begin with to know how the Enlightenment ideas of reason have evolved. First of all, we want to study how the Kantian ‘transcendental deduction’ deals with the dichotomy of the object and subject, and how it has developed for the true transcendental synthesis as a means to achieve the true transcendental point. Accordingly, we will follow up our prospect for universality by Kant’s transcendental deduction, and as a result we will discuss how real truth claims are possible.

However, as I have argued, the prospect for Kantian synthetic universality in Christianity or any religion cannot be true universality, because true universality cannot be achieved in a synthetic way, as we affirmed in chapter I that Jesus as the Son of Man and the Son of God cannot be understood in the idea of synthesis. A true transcendental point cannot be achieved by synthesis because God cannot be synthesised by any of His creatures. False teachings, heresies and false gods that claim that ‘I am God’ are good examples of synthetic understandings of universality. The hope for a transcendental synthesis in Kantian philosophy will result either in violence in philosophy or in a misbelief in a religious world. Synthetic understanding of universality as a matter of overcoming the subject/object duality cannot but produce a repercussion from each side.

We believe the impossible true universality may be possible only as an event in _khora_. As we have seen in chapter I, _khora_ as the third species (triton genos), neither sensible nor intelligible, is always participating everywhere and every time in an intelligible and enigmatic way. 360 ‘An intelligible and enigmatic way’ means that we need to understand _khora_ in view of the two types of being: immutable and intelligible/corruptible, in the process of becoming sensible. For this reason, I propose that Derridean _khora_ will facilitate a space where Hodge’s reason-based inductive theological method could not have articulated. Then _khora_ becomes the exact space where the value of Hodge’s theology is intended, but it is not the space of a given whole. An event in a chain of the context-sensitive modes in _khora_ will not lose universality, but remind us that we are nothing but a particular dust of temporal life.

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On the one hand, it is true that, without respecting and identifying a particular personhood, no true universality is possible because God is and works with every particular created being with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit. Every particular created child of God is a distinct individual human being whom God has created and blessed. Even an identical twin has a different shape and character. God has given a personal mandate to each of them, ‘Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and over every living creature that moves on the ground.’ (Genesis 1:28) A particular, a signifier, is the very source of the universality by living what God wants us to live.

On the other hand, the idea of temporal life does not simply refer to a short life, but a genuine expression of an event that implies a passage of life in the past, present and future. Peter equates a day with 1,000 years. II Peter 3:8-9 says:

8 But do not forget this one thing, dear friends: With the Lord a day is like a thousand years, and a thousand years are like a day. 9 The Lord is not slow in keeping his promise, as some understand slowness. Instead he is patient with you, not wanting anyone to perish, but everyone to come to repentance.

That is, even an event seems to be temporal, it has the power of revealing divine providential authority encompassing yesterday, today and tomorrow.

As we have seen in chapter II, we will not discuss the Trinity or the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit. We would rather focus on a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit and on the effect of the juxtaposition of them. The function of the juxtaposition should be observed in the image of God as we studied in chapter I and II. Such Biblical figures as Abraham, Paul and Peter are exemplars of an image of God where our discussion of juxtaposition happens.

As we will discuss in the next chapter about Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, the lesson that we can learn from the dilemma of Abraham’s faith is that our transcendental faith becomes a sort of universal medium through which the separate empirical selves are construed. If we regard a transcendental object as a real thing, we will definitely make mistakes in understanding it because of our own manipulations of judgement in knowing it, since our understanding is posited only as a point of view. Our judgement is a manipulation when we think that the
principles of pure understanding can apply only to objects of the senses, never to things in general, without regard to the mode.361

This universality happens at the space of khora to which the key is ‘textuality’. Universality of hermeneutics is possible when textuality, not the text itself, becomes a medium of understanding. Since khora is not an identity, we approach it with elusive and negative anticipation. However, in order to get at it as an impossibility of a possible a priori, we need to trace its historical and philosophical background from Kant.

C. The Significance of Enlightenment in Kantian Reason and Derridean Khora

Enlightenment, according to Kant, is a human being’s emergence from his self. If we regarded human consciousness as exclusively related to the awareness of God, we might still have been in confusion about the intrinsic attributes of human thought. The endeavour of René Descartes to discover self-evident knowledge by doubting everything initiated the study of critical thinking about self-consciousness. Following Descartes’s doubt, the Kantian motto of Enlightenment, ‘have the courage to make use of your own understanding (dare to be wise; i.e., sapere aude!)’,362 turns on our courage to be wise with taking risks in our thinking.

1. Practical Reason Is Based on Enlightenment Ethics

Kant believes that our practical reason363 will secure the freedom of self-consciousness with the awareness of our responsibility. Gadamer establishes the idea of universality of hermeneutics using practical reason because it is not technical reason, but universal.364 According to Gadamer:

reason always consists not in blindly insisting on what one believes is true, but in engaging critically with one’s belief. This is still what enlightenment does, but not in the dogmatic form of a new, absolute rationality that always

361 Ibid., p. 131.
363 Kant's The Critique of the Power of Judgement (1790) is considered by many the founding work of the modern tradition of autonomous aesthetics, as well as the magnum opus of Modernism.
364 Gadamer, Praise of Theory, p. 79.
knows better. Therefore, reason also needs to be grappled with in respect to itself and its own contingency in a process of constant self-enlightenment.\footnote{365}  

Gadamer also explains the role of practical knowledge, that we are living together in this world as a guiding light of reason in human action and behaviour:  

As a practical knowledge of practical reason, this knowledge teaches the conditions under which reason becomes practical. It points out the forces that derive from the very fact that we live together as people, without thereby limiting reason’s critical capacity for distinguishing the better from the worse. For this practical reason is certainly not, as Aristotle of course occasionally has it, limited to just the means of bringing about given ends.\footnote{366}

While Kant argues that a man’s reason must always be free, he sees that prejudices—like the ones that allow people, following a revolution, to become a great unthinking mass—will ultimately serve as a restraint on the freedom to think wisely.\footnote{367}  

However, Gadamer overturns this Kantian formula that reason is above prejudice, and eventually involves himself in an intense debate with Habermas.  

The hermeneutic process through practical reason presupposes the fact that we are living together in this world, and that one perspective is not better than the other, but each of them is prejudiced. With this presupposition, Gadamer’s understanding begins. As we have seen above, Human reason, already conditioned by prejudice, authority and the tradition of a certain time and space, cannot decide which is better or worse, but becomes a necessary source of our understanding. Therefore, according to Gadamer, we are always so prepossessed by prejudices that we desperately need Kantian courage to be wise:  

Here we recall another Kantian description of the Enlightenment: it is hardly as though there were still blind faith in authority or an over-dominant priesthood in modern industrial society. I think it is our prepossession with the technological dream and our obsession with emancipatory utopia that represent the prejudices of our time and from which reflection, as the courage to think, needs to free us.\footnote{368}

In Gadamer, hermeneutic universality—not in the manner of dominion, but of aesthetics—is possible through Enlightenment freedom. Gadamer’s tool of freedom
is language. In Derrida, *khora* is the place where the idea of freedom of self-consciousness concurs with the awareness of responsibility. The freedom of *khora* is beyond our logic of reason. However, we need to notice that such a ‘revolution against reason, from the moment it is articulated’ is able to be perceived only ‘within reason’ being observed in the ‘language of a department of internal affairs, a disturbance.’\(^{369}\) Despite the fact that *khora* is beyond reason, we need to adopt the language of Kantian reason and begin to study *khora* within it.

In the following section, we want to talk about the role of Kantian transcendental deduction in such ideas as ‘process’, ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘event’, in search of the philosophical background of *the death of the I* embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit. Then we will sketch out how Enlightenment ideas function in these concepts through Kant, and discuss each one of them in its philosophical context.

2. Kant’s Critical Thinking and ‘Process’

According to Kant, courageous wisdom is reforming by itself, not like a once-and-for-all revolution.\(^{370}\) A revolution may well put an end to autocratic despotism and to predatory or power-seeking oppression, but it will never produce a true reform in ways of thinking, because changing a human being’s mindset is more difficult than social revolution. That is, revolution may change the structure of a society dramatically, but it does not have the ability to reform a human being’s ways of thinking. A human mind tends not to be changed radically without reasonable agreement. The revolutionary ideology may suddenly haunt almost all the people, but it suppresses their courage and wisdom.

The public use of one’s reason has to be free, only with which true Enlightenment is possible.\(^{371}\) In Kant’s idea of practical reason, the autonomous self-consciousness rests on a sublime self-certainty about our moral freedom. Actually, our freedom tends to fall into self-indulgence due to its characteristic contingency. However, Kantian freedom does not involve self-indulgence or


\(^{371}\) Ibid.
leading a dissolute life because it is a purely formal intellectual principle detached from action, affection and dialogue with others. Kant writes that freedom is ‘a pure transcendental idea, which, in the first place, contains nothing borrowed from experience’.\footnote{Immanuel Kant, \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1965), p. 464.} Hence, freedom comes from thinking freely, and accordingly, it is contiguous with gradual process:

Thus when the nature has unwrapped, from under this hard shell, the seed for which she cares most tenderly, namely the propensity and calling to \textit{think} freely, the latter works back upon the mentality of the people.\footnote{Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?’, p. 22.}

The freely enlightened man with gradual process of critical thinking then, has ‘a well-disciplined and numerous army’ for public peace without afraid of anything.\footnote{Ibid.}

Also, \textit{khora} is recognised as a space where human beings dare to be wise, as Kantian Enlightenment teaches.

As we have seen, the Kantian idea of freedom in critical thinking and wisdom enables a gradual process of understanding.\footnote{Our common understanding is outlined in Kant’s ‘Third Critique’: to think for oneself; to think from the standpoint of everyone else; and always to think consistently.} This understanding is seen in the Copernican discovery of the phenomena of planetary astronomy. Copernicus argued that we can understand astronomy by considering the movement of the Earth. The movement of every perceiving subject must be reckoned with the movements observed, in order to discover the real motion of the object one is observing.\footnote{Lewis White Beck, ‘What Have We Learned From Kant?’, in Allen W. Wood, ed., \textit{Self and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy} (Ithaca, New York and London: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 19.}

This phenomenon is regarded as an endless experience of the understanding of an observer. In this way, an observer understands things and he gives meaning to them. Without understanding modes, the thing out there is meaningless.

3. \textit{A Priori} and Transcendental Deduction in Kant

According to Kant, ‘understanding derives its laws not from nature, but rather prescribes them to nature.’\footnote{Immanuel Kant, \textit{Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics: With Selections from ‘Critiques of Pure Reason’}, Gary Hatfield, ed. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 62.} Since understanding is the medium between our thought and the nature of a thing, the laws that understanding drives are \textit{a priori}

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\footnote{Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?’, p. 22.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Our common understanding is outlined in Kant’s ‘Third Critique’: to think for oneself; to think from the standpoint of everyone else; and always to think consistently.}
knowledge. A priori means that a past object is not merely past, but can ideally be present. It is abiding in a present consciousness, neither assuming that anything actually exists nor using any empirical premise.\textsuperscript{378} In Kant, knowledge is regarded as a priori if it is ‘independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses’.\textsuperscript{379} Kant’s a priori proof is well-adopted in proving the existence of God when Kant says, ‘[I]f it is possible that God exists, and it is possible, then God must exist.’\textsuperscript{380} Hodge, following Kant, also understands God as possible a priori. When Hodge argues that the knowledge of God is innate, as we saw in chapter III, he maintains that innate knowledge was opposed to that acquired through a process of research and reasoning.\textsuperscript{381}

According to Roger Scruton, synthetic a priori knowledge is possible through subjective and objective deduction.\textsuperscript{382} Here, deduction stands for ‘a proof that we have the right to something; the right to apply certain concepts or categories’.\textsuperscript{383} If understanding is possible as modes of knowledge in our life experience, then this is what Kant means by transcendental deduction. That is to say, an argument is transcendental ‘if it transcends the limits of empirical enquiry, so as to establish the a priori conditions of experience’.\textsuperscript{384} What Kant wants to do is to determine universally necessary transcendental deductions from purely formal first principles that determine the a priori possibility of natural science and moral law. Then understanding as the faculty of judgement is not about the origin of experience, but about what is embedded in it.

Therefore, according to Kant, we need to distinguish transcendental from empirical argument. A transcendental argument is different from an empirical one

\textsuperscript{378} Acton, Kant’s Moral Philosophy, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{379} Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{380} Acton, Kant’s Moral Philosophy, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{381} ST, v. I, p. 192.
\textsuperscript{382} According to Scruton, ‘objective deduction consists in a positive attempt to establish the content of a priori knowledge. What are the presuppositions of experience? What has to be true if we are to have even that bare point of view that the skeptics ascribe to us? If we can identify these presuppositions, then they will be established as true a priori—the truth of presuppositions follows, not from the fact that we have this and that experience, but from the fact that we have experience at all—by reasoning alone. I cannot conceive of their falsehood, since I cannot conceive of myself as part of a world that refutes them.’ Kant: A Very Short Introduction, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{383} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{384} Ibid.
in the sense that it leads us to ‘knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge in so far as this mode of knowledge is possible a priori’.

That is to say, a priori knowledge of Kant eliminates the metaphysical realm as an area of possible knowledge. In comparison with Kant’s transcendental deduction, as Kevin Hart points out, Derridean différance plays a role in enabling metaphysics, yet disables the tantalisation in knowing by metaphysics.

Hart explains that, in Derrida, the end of metaphysics (the true transcendental point) is seen as a ‘particular event, almost, it seems, as part of salvation history’.

4. Kant and the Derridean Event

So far we have seen that the Kantian reformation happens through intersubjective modes of transcendental deduction, which synthesise the dichotomy of objectivity and subjectivity as far as a priori understanding is possible. However, as it has nothing to do with Kantian reformation and revolution, such a thing as a sudden enlightenment can happen when our courage and wisdom is not suppressed, but freed. How can we explain this temporal moment of change? Does the Kantian a priori make our understanding possible?

The Kantian transcendental deduction has a limit when the a priori is to understand something secretive, like what happens at a certain spontaneous moment. In chapter one of Acts, the Holy Spirit comes to those waiting for the realisation of the promise at Mark’s attic. This event cannot be perceived by transcendental deduction because it is a secret to the a priori. As far as the promise is concerned, it is impossible for the a priori to understand this kind of event that is nonhuman, atheological and ahistorical, because nothing happens through it and nothing happens to it.

Due to the unpredictability and achronicity of the event, the very otherness of the third species (triton genos) occurs at the moment of thinking, speaking and acting.

385 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 25.
387 Ibid., p. 231.
388 Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Budick and Iser, eds., Languages of the Unsayable, p. 37.
Nobody knows the exact time and place of this event. *Khora*, then, is the place as event which remains the place of waiting, waiting for the realisation of the promise.\(^{389}\) When the time is fulfilled, then event will take place fully. But nothing guarantees the cause and effect of the event. According to John Caputo, an event is not something that has an essential quality:

An event is not an inner essence, like Hegelian *Wesen*, the essential being of a thing that is unfolding more or less inevitably in time, but it is the endless possibilities of linking of what the name is capable.\(^{390}\)

In this way, Caputo thinks of theology in the event of the *logos* of the name of God. That is, theology is the hermeneutics of the event or the ‘deconstruction of the name of God’, which releases an ‘unconditional event’ sheltered by the name of God.\(^{391}\)

5. The Meaning of Kant in Derridean *Khora*

Philosophy in metaphysics is not ready to answer the questions that fail to recognise the truth. For Derrida, the retreat, or *reAtrait*, from the truth itself, is but a word in which a certain formlessness or namelessness has left its mark, something which philosophy cannot philosophise, something that resists philosophy, that withdraws from philosophy’s view and grasp. In the space of *khora*, there is neither a being nor a non-being, but traces within which both are inscribed.

With Kant, Derrida exposes a reflecting faith that is non-dogmatic and independent of historical revelation: it does not depend essentially upon any historical revelation, and thus agrees with the rationality of pure practical reason, reflecting that faith favours good will beyond all knowledge. It is thus opposed to dogmatic faith and thereby ignores the difference between faith and knowledge.\(^{392}\) This idea is very much similar to that of John Calvin, when he explains faith as the knowledge of God. In Calvin, faith and knowledge are not antitheses, but faith itself is knowledge of God. Unlike Calvin, Derrida—as well as Kierkegaard—enters the realms of ethics and morality by following Kantian faith, which favours a good will.

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\(^{389}\) Ibid., p. 49.


\(^{391}\) Ibid., p. 6.

However, we should not dismiss the fact that Calvin’s doctrine of Providence places election under Christian life, i.e., the courage to persevere.

The idea of freedom of self-consciousness is related to Kantian ‘maxims of human understanding’ originated from ‘common sense’. Kant believes that our practical reason will enable the freedom of self-consciousness neither by being desired nor caused by our moral responsibility. Rather, an open-ended freedom (‘right to liberty’) perfects our responsibility to respect other’s right. With this concept of freedom with awareness of responsibility, I identified the death of the I in chapter I. Unlike Kant’s categorical imperative, the duty or responsibility of the death of the I binds us to the absolute other.

A faith act in khora is also beyond Kantian reason. As we shall see in chapter V, in the section on Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, it is impossible to work through Abraham’s dilemma simply by using Kant’s faculty of reason because God’s commandment moves beyond the borders of what can be cognitively understood. If one decides to think of what the commandment means, it might be too late. In faith, responding to the call of the other has to be an immediate event, without hesitation. This implies that a faith act in the perseverance of Christian life, i.e., sacrifice, is not only related to our aesthetic feeling of freedom and courage, which comes from innate knowledge, but directly to an event happens with it.

It is an event of a faith act because an actualised possibility of perseverance happens when the death of some other possibility. We are not able to respond to the call or to the love of another without having the sense of ‘perseverance’ and deciding to sacrifice ourselves to the other that requires a disruption of the horizon that Kantian ethics requires. There is no space for the Derridean ‘messianic’ within Kantian ideas, for messianicity has nothing to do with ‘how one would act’ in a reasonable and esthetical sense. Rather, it is the sudden disruption of any boundaries, thereby providing a secretive gap for the impossibility to appear.

395 Ibid., p. 191.
In sum, the role of Kantian reason in Derrida is a powerful vehicle to think of the Derridean X (trace, the supplement, *différance* and so on) that we discussed in chapter II. Here, too, reason is intrinsically constituted by the lack of power because the object of reason (X) is not perfect. That is, Kantian reason is incapable of thinking of X because it is ‘the irrational and the non-natural’.

With these things in mind, in the following sections, through an evaluation of Dewey’s idea of ‘process’ and Gadamer’s and Habermas’s ideas of ‘intersubjectivity’, we want to find out how the imperfect Derridean X functions in spontaneous and temporal happenings. The paradox here is that the inability of Kantian Enlightenment reason can be resolved by non-dualistic ways of critical thinking that the Enlightenment also provides. Through this study, we will know that first, Dewey’s reason and Gadamer’s practical reason are not antithetical to Enlightenment ideas, but that neither blindly insists on what one believes is true or not. Instead, they engage in the process of questioning how one would know truth by being critical of one’s belief. Therefore, second, both reasons are to be understood in the intersubjective mode. Third, spontaneity and temporality are observable because we understand them not in dualism, but an event happens in a certain point of an anti-dualistic mode. Later, in the next chapter, with these results, I will argue that these three ideas are the components of *the death of the I*, which is working as the supplements in *khora* and are to be major factors in interpreting the theology of Charles Hodge.

D. ‘Process’: Charles Hodge on Darwinism and John Dewey

Hodge’s theology has nothing to do with Dewey’s pragmatism. It is not true that Hodge’s theology is not process-oriented. He is not opposed to the evolving process observed in life experience. Especially when we study Hodge’s view on Darwinism, we can see that he recognises what is going on in the process of

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396 Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, p. 149.
397 Ibid.
evolution. When he understands evolution in terms of the providence of God and God’s design, he is open to the theory of evolution defined as ‘the assumption that all organic forms, vegetable and animal, have been evolved or developed from one, or a few, primordial living germs’. 399 With these things in mind, we want to study the pragmatism of Dewey (1859-1952), especially his view on reason and habit in comparison with Hodge.

In his lifelong philosophical research, Dewey tried to develop pragmatic views of William James (1842-1910) and aimed to overcome Hegelian idealism. In Dewey, supernaturalism is interpreted as ‘the religious phase of experience’. 400 Throughout his life, he wished to dispense with the metaphysical and anti-empirical category of religion, but to retain the potential of religious experience for nurturing ‘the sense of values which carry one through periods of darkness and despair’. 401 With Dewey’s point in mind, we want to study Hodge’s views on Darwinism. This study will also show how Hodge’s Biblical theology responds to the process modes of religious experience between the objective truth of God in the Bible and the subjective particular faith and knowledge in the nineteenth-century American context.

1. Hodge on Darwinism

On the issue of Darwinism, Hodge sees no conflict between science and religion because he feels that the facts in science cannot contradict the truth. Scientific facts are the result of God’s activity in every part of Creation. Hodge’s belief that God purposely designed the essence and the substance of materials and living things reminds us, on the one hand, that the idea of intelligent design is Kantian and on the other hand, Darwin’s theory of evolution is different to Kantian metaphysical epistemologies. What Hodge is doing is to reconcile Darwinian evolution with Kantian ideas of design. Believing that the process of evolution happens under God’s design in His providence, he wants to situate the process-oriented evolution in Kantian theological epistemology. For Hodge, since God is the originator of the

401 Ibid., pp. 14-5.
facts, the facts of evolution are God’s, thus, one can be a Christian and still endorse evolution.\(^{402}\)

Hodge is confident that science and religion will ultimately be in harmony if science is based on fact. What he rejects is ‘Darwinism’, a human theory that ‘natural selection is without design, being conducted by unintelligent physical causes.’\(^{403}\) Even though he does not show how it could be harmonised with the Scriptures, he anticipates that ‘others may see it, and be able to reconcile their allegiance to the Bible.’\(^{404}\) I believe that others may endorse it if they overcome Kantian epistemology.

On Hodge’s identification of scientific facts with the facts in the Bible, Ronald Numbers claims that the rule of engagement in theology and science is different: Interpreters of the Bible and interpreters of nature do no longer use common method in knowing facts; they now employed ‘different rules of evidence’ that inevitably led to ‘different conclusions’.\(^{405}\)

To make matters worse, Hodge noted bitterly, scientific men tended to denigrate metaphysicians and theologians. In such strained circumstances, Hodge felt disinclined to continue granting men of science the benefit of doubt in their encounters with religion. Though he desired peace, he feared it would prove elusive. Religion, he concluded, was in a “fight for its life against a large class of scientific men”.\(^{406}\)

By observing Numbers’s criticism, we have a question of how to understand what Hodge meant by the Bible is to theologian what nature is to the man of science. Where are the common grounds shared by science and religion? I believe that the contradictions of Hodge stem from his inductive theological method, which is oversimplified in regarding facts both written in the Bible and researched by scientists as of God. In order to resolve the origin of Hodge’s contradictions, we need to study the different understandings of reason of Kant and of Dewey.

2. Kant’s Reason vs. Dewey’s Reason

\(^{402}\) Ibid., p. 104.
\(^{403}\) Ibid., p. 48.
\(^{404}\) Ibid., p. 141.
\(^{406}\) Ibid. Numbers cites Hodge’s What is Darwinism?, pp. 126-8, 134-5, 140-2.
Like Gadamer, whom we will study later in this chapter, Dewey wants to overturn Kantian formulas of reason. Dewey understands Kant as follows:

[Kant] saw that the idea of reason could be self-consistent only by stripping it naked of these empirical accretions. He then provided, in his critiques, a somewhat cumbersome moving van for transferring the resultant pure or naked reason out of nature and the objective world, and for locating it in new quarters, with a new stock of goods and new customers. The new quarters were particular subjects, individuals; the stock of goods were the forms of perception and the functions of thought by which empirical flux is woven into durable fabrics; the new customers were a society of individuals in which all are ends in themselves.  

Dewey wants the primacy of empiricism. He views the Kantian marriage of freedom and authority as always putting ‘sentimental primacy to the former and practical control to the latter’.  

His argument is that there is not a single power and authority that can regulate our freedom, rather, that the freedom which comes from our courage to be has to break a singular power to be democratic. Authoritative power always suppresses our freedom only which we can access truth. Hence Dewey deconstructs authority saying that there is no ‘separate’ body of moral rules, system of motive powers or subject-matter of moral knowledge.  

As an alternative, he argues that freedom resides in such a space as poetry and art, which will shine as ‘humorous irony’ at the moment when ‘the most of the harsh’ glances of moral philosophy will turn towards ‘the idea of an experimental basis and career for morals’.  

In order to understand Dewey’s conception of reason, we need to begin with his notion of ‘habit’. According to Dewey, human beings have senses where there are habitual dispositions to know. Habit, then, is an undivided continuous transaction or interaction between living human beings and their natural and artificial environment, such as thought, feeling, doing, suffering, handling, perceiving and so on. That is to say, human beings are fundamentally and continually attached to their

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408 Ibid., p. 65.
409 Ibid., p. 69.
410 Ibid., p. 71.
environment, organically related to it, changing it even as it changes them.
Reasoning, as a mediation of obtaining knowledge, begins to become a habit.

Dewey attributes the nature of reason to habit by thinking that as habit is learned, acquired and cultivated, so, too, is reason. If Dewey’s reason is something to be learned, there is no original separate impulse behind it: it is antithetical to Kantian reason. That is, Kant’s formalism is incompatible with Dewey’s pragmatism and its process-orientation. Thus, Dewey defines reason differently to Kant. For Dewey, reason is

as effective as the quality or degree of cultivation it has undergone; it is never to be regarded as perfect or finished in its development. Second, as a habit, reason is itself projective and urgent; hence it is folly to consider reason the cool counter-balance to torrid impulse. If so, reason may be the most flexible of habits but it is not devoid of persistent self-assertion in the heat of conflict. As fragile as any other habit, reason is as vulnerable to excess or weakness as any other habit.  

Here, Dewey regards reason as the most flexible form of habits. Habit is regarded not only as the capacity for reason, but also as the material of reason itself. Dewey discusses habit in relation to reason and intelligence as a means of knowledge: ‘Concrete habits are the means of knowledge and thought’, and they ‘do all the perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving and reasoning’. If reason is a form of habit, Dewey’s reason is just a vehicle ‘to know “how” by means of our habits’.

Dewey’s reason can be summarised as follows: the ability to reason is itself an acquired habit, subject to the limitations of the nature of habit; the data on which reason works are the products of habits, hence shaped by the nature of habit; habits are the means by which we know how. The net effect of this influence is to render the power of reason for determining conduct subject to the conditions of habit.

Accordingly, Dewey thinks that knowledge is not absolute, immutable and eternal, but relational to the interaction of human beings with the world. By seeing

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412 Ibid., p. 186.
413 Ibid., p. 176.
414 Ibid., p. 171.
415 Ibid., p. 177.
knowledge as not absolute, Dewey has been allowed to be open-minded in a
democratic approach in problem solving. He believes that our cooperation and
rational tolerance for diverse views within a pluralistic society and culture will
enable mature development of our living in a space and time. In re-examining
Charles Hodge’s theology, we also need to recognise that our knowledge is not
perfect, but God is. As Hodge does and anticipates, theology needs to pay attention
to ‘humorous irony’ in the modes of our life experiences.

3. Anti-Dualism and Pragmatism in Dewey

The problem of dualism, according to Dewey, is that what is called ‘mind or
consciousness’ is disconnected from ‘the physical organs of activities’: the former is
purely intellectual and cognitive, and the latter is always considered to be an
irrelevant and intruding physical matter. This sort of dualism can never work in
Dewey’s thought. In Dewey, there is no independent objectivity and subjectivity
because both of them are integrated into the modes of process in their experience.
The examples of anti-dualistic modes for Dewey are ‘growth’, ‘thinking’, ‘habit’
and ‘experience’, where both mind as a subject matter and physical action as an
object are integrally working together as a kind of ‘process’.

In other words, the philosophical structure of Dewey is empirical, so
transcendence, like a subject’s mind, is already reduced to human behaviours such
as habit and experience. In Rorty’s terms, non-dualistic, Deweyian culture is a
‘culture without an ambition of transcendence’, similar to what Heidegger calls
‘onto-theological tradition’. The object of Dewey’s philosophical inquiry is
everyday life experience as a process. Since experience includes cognition to the
degree that it is cumulative or amounts to something, or has meaning, Dewey writes
that ‘an ounce of experience is better than a ton of theory simply because it is only
in experience that any theory has real and verifiable significance.’ He means that
experience can generate and carry out a tremendous number of theories. Richard

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417 Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth*, p. 13. Here, Rorty argues that Dewey interprets
objectivity as intersubjectivity.
418 Ibid., p. 12.
Rorty sees what Dewey means by theory as what ‘starts off by specifying which bits of language tie up with which bits of reality’. Rorty adds that Dewey’s paradigm of theory is just sense-datum empiricism.

As Gadamer praises method in *Truth and Method*, saying that such subject matter as theory is not alienated from method, the Deweyian subject’s mind is already seen in the process-oriented ‘habit’, ‘growth’, ‘thinking’ and ‘experience’. For Dewey, human conduct needs to be understood as ‘a juxtaposition of disconnected reactions to separated situations’. In his philosophical conception of human conduct, the juxtaposition of the two is necessarily accompanied by the idea of ‘will’. Conversely, he interprets ‘will’ as habit, which is determined by a process of experience, not a static idea.

For example, by habit, Dewey means a ‘special sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilections and aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts. It means will.’ This process-oriented phenomenon of habit is executed in the manner as ‘the act must come before the thought,’ and ‘a habit before an ability to evoke the thought at will’. More specifically speaking, an experience always precedes our thinking to do something, and a habit formed by the repeated experience will enable recall of that experience at will. For example, ‘only when a man can already perform an act of standing straight does he know what it is like to have a right posture and only then can he summon the idea required for proper execution.’

The modes as a process are the essence of pragmatism. But pragmatic ways of thinking do not belong to the category of relativism. Rorty interprets pragmatism as intersubjectivity, in that objectivity is reduced to solidarity. He defines pragmatism, citing William James’s idea of pragmatism:

> Pragmatists do not require either a metaphysics or an epistemology. They

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421 Ibid.
423 Ibid.
424 Ibid., p. 25.
425 Ibid., p. 30.
426 Ibid.
view truth as, in William James’ phrase, ‘what is good for us to believe’. So they do not need an account of a relation between beliefs and objects called ‘correspondence’, nor an account of human cognitive abilities which ensures that our species is capable of entering into that relation. They see the gap between truth and justification not as something to be bridged by isolating a natural and trans-cultural sort of rationality which can be used to criticize certain cultures and praise others, but simply as the gap between the actual good and the possible better. From a pragmatist point of view, to say that what is rational for us now to believe may not be true, is simply to say that somebody may come up with a better idea. It is to say that there is always room for improved belief, since new evidence, or new hypotheses, or a whole new vocabulary, may come along.\textsuperscript{427}

With this definition, Rorty argues that pragmatism is not relativism. The realist may argue that pragmatism is relativism claiming that the pragmatist regards ‘every belief is as good as every other’ or ‘true’ is not a definite term, having various meanings according to a specific justification.\textsuperscript{428} But Rorty defends the pragmatist by pointing the fact that neither truth nor rationalism of a given society can be justified for a universal claim.\textsuperscript{429} The pragmatist’s ethnocentric view is not relative to the pre-determined idea but a simple view that recognising the reality of different contexts is better than nothing.

E. Debate between Gadamer and Habermas on Intersubjectivity

According to Rorty, by 1900, the opposite of realism was still idealism, however:

\begin{quote}
[B]y now language has replaced mind as that which, supposedly, stands over and against ‘reality’. So discussion has shifted from whether material reality is ‘mind-dependent’ to questions about which sorts of true statements, if any, stand in representational relations to non-linguistic items. Discussion of realism now revolves around whether only the statements of physics can correspond to ‘facts of matter’ or whether those of mathematics and ethics might also. Nowadays the opposite of realism is called, simply, ‘antirealism’.\textsuperscript{430}
\end{quote}

When we listen to Rorty, and want to consider Scottish Common Sense Realism in the space of \textit{khora}, study of Gadamer’s linguisticality is imperative.

\textsuperscript{427} Rorty, \textit{Objectivity, Relativism and Truth}, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{428} Ibid., p. 23.
\textsuperscript{429} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{430} Ibid., p. 2.
As we can see in the debate between Habermas and Gadamer on intersubjectivity, Gadamer views a human being as finitude in its essence. Accordingly, Hodge’s human reason cannot but be historically and personally conditioned and prejudiced. With this viewpoint, we should understand that the limit and contradiction in Hodge’s theological method in dealing with the Bible is due to the prejudice of the nineteenth-century American (and Princetonian) context. We also want to examine Hodge’s theology with Gadamer’s linguisticality, hoping for overcoming its historically and philosophically confined contexts, so that his theology is adaptable not only for our context, but also for any particular time and space. For this reason, we want to see the limit of Hodge’s scientific inductive method in view of intersubjectivity that is related to the immanence of human beings’ hermeneutic plurality through the debate between Gadamer and Habermas.

The debate between Gadamer and Habermas starts with Habermas’s critique of Gadamer, titled ‘A Review of Gadamer’s Truth and Method’ and On the Logic of the Social Sciences. In response to Habermas’s critique, Gadamer wrote an article titled ‘On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection (1967)’, the theme of which is found in ‘Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem’. In turn, Habermas wrote ‘The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality’, which overturned Gadamer’s presupposition. This debate dealt with how philosophical hermeneutics addresses the issues of the power of reflection, critical reason, prejudice, tradition and authority in social and political disciplines, as well as in linguistics in achieving hermeneutic universality.

1. Gadamer’s Intersubjectivity

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435 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality’, in Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics, pp. 181-211.
In *Truth and Method*, Gadamer says that understanding and interpretation are not merely a method, but hermeneutics are a part of the total human experience of the world. Gadamer’s point is that, while wanting to overturn the Kantian hierarchy of reason, also retaining an Enlightenment idea, practical reason will resolve the problem of philosophical dualism in Enlightenment ideas. Hence, there is a possibility of not to be violent to either the subject or the object.

Gadamer does not subscribe Wilhelm Dilthey’s concept of ‘empathy’, for it does not explain the historical embeddedness of the knower. Gadamer wants to show that interpretation does not involve the reconstruction of psychic states, as in Dilthey and Schleiermacher, but is the process of integration of the object into a totality which contains the interpreter, as well as its application to the present. This idea of understanding as an integration of subject and object comes from Heidegger’s analyses of *Dasein* as ‘being-in-the-world’ and of ‘understanding’ as *Dasein*’s mode of being, the temporal analytics of human existence. *Dasein* shows that understanding is not just a form of behaviour of a subject, but the mode of being of There-being itself.

### 1.1 Prejudice, Tradition and Authority in Gadamer

While keeping the Enlightenment idea of freedom, Gadamer wants to overturn such stereotyped ideas as prejudice, tradition and authority. We should not deny that Hodge’s theology is influenced by such historical and contextual factors as prejudice, tradition and authority. With Gadamer, we need to examine how such prejudice, tradition and authority work in Hodge’s theology. Its contents, influenced by seventeenth-century Scholastic Calvinism and eighteenth-century Scottish Common Sense Realism, were exposed to a newly emerging nineteenth-century American context, as we studied in the previous chapter.

John Stewart summarises the particular American context in nineteenth-century Princeton in four dimensions: first, the prevalence of Scottish Common Sense

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437 Ibid., pp. 234-73.
438 Ibid., pp. 290-8.
439 Ibid., p. xxvii.
Realism and the rise of American pragmatism; second, the introduction of Darwin’s theory of evolution; third, the emerging diversity in American life and culture; and fourth, the rise of historical criticism of the Bible. Before examining Hodge with Gadamer, I want to show further how Gadamer deals with prejudice, tradition and authority. Actually, he points out that the problem of these three views is due to human authority and overhastiness based on the fundamental presupposition of the Enlightenment.

If we follow Gadamer, a man of reason with ‘sapere aude’ must avoid error due to prejudice, tradition and authority, conditioned or perceived by a pre-existing space and time. Likewise, using the practical reason of the Enlightenment, Gadamer reinstates prejudice, authority and tradition. Gadamer wants us to recognise that the process of interpretation of an idea by each individual inevitably produces biased ways of thinking, because we are historical entities who cannot but be conditioned by prejudice, authority and tradition. In this manner, first of all, Gadamer uses the three elements as the very tools for deciphering human understanding.

Gadamer also connects authority with tradition, and claims that authority is not based on dogmatic forces, but recognition, and that tradition is one form of authority. Since he tries to reconcile authority with reason, for him, the preservation of tradition is also an act of reason, as much a freely chosen action as revolution and renewal. Here, we can see that for Gadamer, prejudice, authority and tradition are all elements of the historicity of understanding, and that they are not antithetical to reason. Because his reason does not blindly insist that what one believes is true or not, but involves engaging critically with one’s belief.

Gadamer believes that this is still what the Enlightenment does, but not in the dogmatic form of a new, absolute rationality that always knows better. In this sense,

\[\text{Footnotes:}\]

443 Ibid., p. 282.
even though Dewey’s reason deviates from Kant’s reason, as we saw in the previous section, Dewey, along with Darwin, is also an Enlightenment thinker. While Dewey asserts the ‘process’ character in reason as a habit, Gadamer also argues that reason has to be grappled with in respect to itself and its own contingency in a ‘process’ of constant self-enlightenment. While these three figures are Enlightenment thinkers, they altogether reject Enlightenment dualism that creates a one-sided metaphysical hierarchy.

By the same token, Gadamer thinks that Romanticism should be criticised, too, because even though it discovers true prejudices seemingly distinct from Enlightenment reason, it only replaces Enlightenment reason with ‘the schema of the conquest of mythos by logos’. This shows that the historicity of Romanticism is also operating in the same dualistic way, therefore making violent presuppositions. Gadamer, while wanting to keep with Enlightenment tradition, argues that true prejudice must still finally be justified by rational knowledge through practical reason, even though the task is an ongoing process that may never be fully completed.

1.2. Prejudice, Tradition and Authority in the Interpretation of the Bible

Sometimes, a traditional interpretation of the Bible may have difficulty or even be in error when it meets with unexpected scientific achievements because interpretation of the Bible is a kind of theory tracing truth to its source, not truth itself. Often, a traditional interpretation of the Bible contradicts itself, however, in spite of what Hodge would imagine, and finds, that some scientific and philosophical theories have been wrong, we need to recognise that he consistently argues that the truth or facts are always right.

With this argument, Hodge writes that ‘theologians are not infallible, in the interpretation of Scriptures. [Fallible interpretation] may, therefore, happen in the future, as it has in the past, that interpretations of the Bible, long confidently received, must be modified or abandoned, to bring revelation into harmony with

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445 Ibid.
447 Ibid.
what God teaches in his works. For Hodge, ‘the Bible has received no injury’ because it is of God, and although ‘theologians have been taught an important lesson; that is, to let science take its course, assured that the Scriptures will accommodate themselves to all well-authenticated scientific facts in time to come, as they have in time past.’ Hodge seems to argue that the Bible is not prejudiced, but the interpretation can be. Therefore, he maintains that as long as a theologian refers to the Bible and believes it is the Word of God, a theologian is infallible. Yet, we find that Hodge has a clear dichotomy between theory and practice even if his logic is theoretically possible. Here, also, we find a deficiency of hermeneutic conscience.

As we have seen, Hodge argues authority of the Bible. Our question at the moment is that, while considering the modes of ‘process’, ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘event’, can we keep the authority of the Bible? Then what does ‘authority’ mean? The term ‘authority’ is no mere theoretical concept. According to Anthony Thiselton, ‘biblical authority always remains as that which is ontologically given, because its basis resides in the sovereignty and grace of God, but also its derivative currency resides in its appropriation as an effective communicative event or act whereby believing readers live out their response to this authority.’ That is to say, the term, ‘authority’ should not be used for authenticating the text as true alone but relates Christ’s Lordship in our life and thought. Thiselton goes on to say that:

The God of the wisdom literature transcends easily packaged ‘answers’ (especially in Job and Ecclesiastes), and regularly deploys exploration, dialogue and ‘polyphonic’ discourse. For example in the Book of Job, neither he himself, nor any of Job’s ‘friends’, offers a single, pre-packaged ‘answer’; for each adds to a multiform picture, the whole of which is set before us as interactive revelation.

With Gadamer, Thiselton argues that the authority of the Bible does not simply require “‘reading off” of a proposition, system, or instruction handed to us on a plate, but genuine wrestling, search and struggle, in expectancy of a divine event of

449 Ibid., p. 57.
450 Thiselton, On Hermeneutics, p. 632.
451 Ibid., p. 633.
“speaking” to a ready heart’.⁴⁵² That is, the Bible is not merely ‘a manipulative
device to confirm the wishes of the reader, as if “God” were a mere projection of the
reader’s will’.⁴⁵³ We will discuss more on Hodge’s Bible in chapter VI.

1.3 Theories of Galileo and Copernicus

The Copernican revolution in astronomy caused a serious transition of world-
views for theologians, as well as for the secular world. The theories of Galileo and
Copernicus eventually modified and abandoned traditional theologies by such
contemporary theologians as ‘Romanists and Protestants’.⁴⁵⁴ The Ptolemaic system,
that the Earth is the centre of the universe, orbited by the sun, moon and planets, was
the standard concept of the universe in the interpretation of the Bible before
Copernicus.

The Biblical view, based on the contemporary interpretation of the Creation, was
totally proved to be wrong when the Copernican revolution in astronomy occurred.
What was believed to be Biblical truth based on human reason turned out to be
fabrication. Even if we think something is definitely true, as Dewey argues, we
need to have an open-ended practical mind: claims of truth need to be deferred
before being authenticated. When one who is prejudiced due to his limited insight
speaks in the name of reason, he always contradicts himself.⁴⁵⁵

Theologians, prejudiced by the Ptolemaic system before Copernicus, were never
aware of basing their work on false theories. Accordingly, they interpreted the Bible
in a way that contradicted the truth of the universe. The lesson that we learn from
the Ptolemaic system is that interpretation of the Bible is conditioned by theoretical
prejudice and traditions that lie in the norms of the society or world-views.
However, Hodge’s concern with the interpretation of the Bible is not world-views,
but the facts of the Bible themselves. According to Hodge, the Bible has authority

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⁴⁵² Ibid.
⁴⁵³ Ibid., p. 635. With this argument, Thiselton cites Paul Ricoeur: ‘Ricoeur’s insistence that the
creative language of “figuration” characteristically functions at more than one level. Sometimes,
double meaning can be a manifestation, a revelation, of the sacred.’ Paul Ricoeur, Freud and
because its facts are not changed by the perspective (interpretation, world-views) of human beings. At the same time, it is fully in accord with scientific revelation:

It is impossible that our mode of understanding the Bible should not be determined by our views of the subjects of which it treats. So long as men believed that the earth was the centre of our system, the sun its satellite, and the stars its ornamentation, they of necessity understood the Bible in accordance with that hypothesis. But when it was discovered that the earth was only one of the smaller satellites of the sun, and that the stars were worlds, then, faith, although at first staggered, soon grew strong enough to take it all in, and rejoice to find that the Bible, and the Bible alone of all ancient books, was in full accord with these stupendous revelations of science.\textsuperscript{456}

Here, Hodge argues that the mode of understanding of interpreters is apt to be determined by their views of the subjects of the Bible. He seems to take the prejudice of an interpreter for granted, and concludes that interpretation should not be based on hypothetical theories, but on the facts of the Bible. The prejudice should be tested by the facts of the Bible. For Hodge, the Bible, accordingly, should be interpreted under the guidance of the facts of science, not theory.

Hodge has confidence that the Bible is of God and that there will be no conflict between the teachings of the Bible and the facts of science.\textsuperscript{457} According to Hodge, for proper interpretation, the church has to accept the facts of the science and read the Bible under its guidance.\textsuperscript{458} Through this process, he argues, even improper interpretation does not do violence to the Bible or diminish its authority.\textsuperscript{459} In sum, the issue for Hodge is not whether the interpretation of the Bible is proper, but whether the facts of the Bible are truths.

If the world-view—or ‘presupposition’, in Cornelius Van Til’s words—is quite different from that held by others, the interpretation will be different. However, Hodge would agree that proper interpretation happens when theories or world-views of philosophy and science coincide with deduced facts. Thus, those who have false world-views cannot but arrive at false conclusions. In this case, Hodge would argue

\textsuperscript{457} ST, v. I, p. 573.
\textsuperscript{459} ST, v. I, p. 573.
that those who have misread the Bible because of ignorance should admit their fault and that the text of the Bible has been misunderstood.\textsuperscript{460} This shows that he wants us to have an adequate viewpoint for the interpretation of the truth. What he means is that the theory should be based on the proper interpretation of our situation.\textsuperscript{461}

Harvie Conn argues that ‘the Bible and reason and societal relationships can all function as “canon” in the search for truth’ in cases when there are deep commitments.\textsuperscript{462} Theology is always possible when it is based on the facts and an adequate interpretation. Therefore, both theory and fact in the theologian’s mind should have one origin, God. Hodge is cautious not to commit misinterpretation. He seems to be always open to the discoveries of science, with confidence that eventually the facts found by science would not digress from the truth of the Bible. In this sense, we affirm that Hodge’s view on the truth of science is not static, because theory of it should always be substantiated by the facts of the Bible. In the case when he confuses theory and truth, he always goes back to the Bible. This point shows that Hodge also acknowledges prejudice of interpretation. Now, we want to study Habermas’s view on Gadamer.

2. Habermas’s Evaluation on Gadamer

Gadamer argues in \textit{Truth and Method} that truth cannot be explained by the scientific method, but by discovering proper conditions for understanding its meaning. Gadamer’s question becomes, ‘What makes truth possible?’, while that of Habermas, confirming hermeneutics as a science of methodically trained procedure, is, ‘What is truth?’ For Gadamer, a human being is finitude in its essence; therefore human reason cannot but be historically and personally conditioned and prejudiced. Gadamer wants to rehabilitate such ideas as tradition and authority, which have been discarded since the Enlightenment. On the other hand, for Habermas, charging that Gadamer’s linguistic hermeneutics lacks objectivity-in turn has fallen into relative

\textsuperscript{460} Hodge, \textit{What is Darwinism?}, p. 132.
idealism, reason functions to neutralise tradition, and concomitantly re-affirms authority.\textsuperscript{463}

At this point, we need to notice that their directions of doing philosophy are intrinsically different, even though they both spring from the Enlightenment. While Gadamer achieves universality in the mirror of language, where every historically situated reflexive thought is reflected, Habermas believes that reflexive knowledge, which is the progenitor of the ‘hermeneutic consciousness’, already makes it possible for a human being to recognise his ‘specific freedom from, and dependence on, language’.\textsuperscript{464} With this in mind, let us study Habermas’s critique of Gadamer and Gadamer’s response to Habermas for the purpose of knowing what the issues are in the discussion of intersubjectivity.

In \textit{On the Logic of the Social Sciences}, Habermas, defines Gadamer’s hermeneutics as a third stage of reflection: historical reflection affirms Gadamer’s position that conceives intersubjectivity between the subject, the interpreter and the object, the text.\textsuperscript{465} With Gadamer, Habermas says that hermeneutic insights should overcome Wittgenstein’s ‘language games’ and ‘empirical-analytical’ conceptions of the social sciences by agreeing with Gadamer that language becomes a contingent absolute at the level of objective spirit.\textsuperscript{466} Clearly, both are critical to the objectivist self-understanding of the human being. However, Habermas thinks that hermeneutics itself cannot solve the problem of human understanding. Accordingly, Habermas charges Gadamer’s hermeneutics as being relative idealistic by arguing that hermeneutics is always radically barred to a transcendental consciousness.\textsuperscript{467} Here we can see that Habermas has different interests to Gadamer’s concern when he says that ‘[l]anguage is also a medium of domination and social power’.\textsuperscript{468} However, what Habermas accepts from Gadamer is that Gadamer’s real hermeneutic accomplishment in perceiving the transcendental level by ‘the articulation of an

\textsuperscript{463} Bleicher, \textit{Contemporary Hermeneutics}, p. 155.
\textsuperscript{465} Habermas, \textit{On the Logic of the Social Sciences}, p. 171. Here, Habermas writes that first and second types comes from Wittgenstein; transcendental and sociological self-reflection, respectively.
\textsuperscript{466} Ibid., pp. 171-2.
\textsuperscript{467} Ibid., p. 172
\textsuperscript{468} Ibid.
action-orienting-self-understanding’. 469 That is, Habermas cosigns Gadamer’s ‘immanent connection between understanding and application’ that can also be seen in theology and jurisprudence. 470 Affirming Gadamer’s view that the connection between understanding and its real transformation is not confined to such a tradition as the canonical sacred texts, Habermas writes:

In a sermon, the interpretation of the Bible, like the interpretation of positive law in adjudication, serves at the same time as an interpretation of the application of the facts in a given situation. Their practical life-relationship to the self-understanding of those addressed, the congregation or the legal community, is not added to the interpretation afterward. Rather the interpretation is realised in its application.471

3. Different Views on the Relationship between Reflection and Pre-Understanding

Compared to Gadamer’s Heideggerian ontological method, Habermas has a socio-political scientific perspective. He believes that practical knowledge in hermeneutics is apt to be fallen into error in the case when it is initiated by false opinions which have ‘the habitual form of false consciousness.’472 In order to avoid error, Habermas thinks that hermeneutic understanding has to also consider a process of socialization so as the practical knowledge to be global in which social life form is represented in its communicative action.473 Confirming that hermeneutics is translation and that it has to transcend the limitations of rhetorical art, Habermas has concern on a structure sharing what he calls ‘one life-world’ that makes possible to use monological language for ‘the formal construction of theories’ and ‘for the organization of purposive rational action.’474

Like Max Weber, Habermas wants to bring explanatory and hermeneutic approaches ‘under one roof’ for grasping the objective interconnections of social actions.475 That is, Habermas wants objective understanding of the context not only

469 Ibid., p. 162.
470 Ibid., p. 162.
471 Ibid.
472 Ibid., p. 163
473 Ibid., p. 163-4.
474 Habermas, ‘The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality’, in Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics, p. 188.
475 Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, p. viii.
of language but of labour and dominion. Habermas does not acknowledge Gadamer’s Heideggerian ontological hermeneutics in that Gadamer avoids ‘the transition from the transcendental conditions of historicity to the universal history.’ While maintaining the formative process of hermeneutic understanding within science and arguing that the future of history can only be anticipated by the reflection from a point of view specific to a given situation, Habermas writes hermeneutic experience retains hypothetical moment. Habermas asserts that intersubjectivity is valid only within a social group.

In contrast, Gadamer understands that truth and method are not antithetical to each other. That is, hermeneutic experience is more fundamental than every exercise of scientific method for obtaining truth. Gadamer means that understanding can function within science, but understanding cannot be confined to the domain of science. He admits that hermeneutics affects scientific research, but it is not to be understood as a prescriptive methodology or epistemology, but rather as an existential ontology. It is clear that Gadamer defends his ontological understanding of hermeneutics against Habermas’s methodological understanding.

On the role of reflection in understanding, Habermas agrees with Gadamer that reflection is intrinsically contingent. However, Habermas criticises Gadamer through pointing more directly to Gadamer’s lack of the power of reflection in hermeneutics:

[The power of] reflection is no longer blinded by the illusion of an absolute, self-grounded autonomy, and it does not detach itself from the ground of the contingent on which it finds itself. But when reflection understands the genesis of the tradition from which it proceeds and to which it returns, the dogmatism of life-praxis is shaken.

That is, the power of reflection renews itself in the process of understanding, and it will eventually change the everyday life of the one who reflects. Accordingly,

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476 Ibid., p. 174.
477 Ibid.
478 Ibid., p. 189.
479 Ibid., p. 165.
481 Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, p. 168.
Habermas asserts that Gadamer’s prejudice validated by tradition is in conflict with the power of reflection that has the intrinsic ability—by breaking and confirming dogmatic forces—to reject the demands of tradition.\textsuperscript{482} In this sense, for Habermas, Gadamer’s argument that authority is based on recognition, not dogmatic force, only shows Gadamer’s conservatism. He acknowledges Gadamer’s point that knowledge is rooted in actual tradition and is bound to contingent conditions, but he also believes that ‘reflection does not wear itself out on the ‘facticity’ of traditional norms without leaving a trace’.\textsuperscript{483}

In conclusion, Habermas criticises Gadamer’s hermeneutics because it does not limit itself without having a system of reference that transcends the context of tradition as such.\textsuperscript{484} Habermas asserts that Gadamer’s hermeneutics, which follows the continuous mediation of social tradition through linguisticality, gets lost in the irrationalism and fails ‘to acknowledge the transcending force of reflection that is also at work in it.’\textsuperscript{485} Habermas concludes that Gadamer’s hermeneutic understanding cannot reach beyond to an absolute consciousness.\textsuperscript{486}

But Gadamer responds with the argument that hermeneutic reflection fulfils the function of bringing something that cannot be fully manifest in our modern knowledge (pre-understanding) and science by allowing him to perceive something that otherwise happens behind his back.\textsuperscript{487} This means that he has a concept of the third identity: there is something other which is neither pre-understanding nor reflection. For Gadamer, reflection produces something (third identity) like the power of rhetoric in comparison with the power of reflection for Habermas. The process of understanding, for Gadamer, is possible not by the controlled self-alienation of ‘the autonomy of “I”’ and not by explicit awareness of the rules that guide and govern it, but by such a hybrid as rhetoric by bridging distances with

\textsuperscript{482} Ibid., p. 170.
\textsuperscript{483} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{484} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{485} Ibid., p. 172.
\textsuperscript{486} Ibid.
temporality with the impact of immediate speaking. Gadamer explains the power of an orator’s rhetoric:

[T]he orator carries his listeners away with him; the convincing power of his arguments overwhelms the listener. While under the persuasive spell of speech, the listener for the moment cannot and ought not to indulge in critical examination.

This hermeneutics of an orator can be rapidly and easily absorbed to the common consciousness when it is regarded as common sense by the majority. However, Gadamer thinks that it is a problem when it immediately belongs to the central heritage, even to the realms of traditional disciplines, which are hard to change.

According to Gadamer, hermeneutics generally has to ‘aware of the temporal distance that separating us from antiquity and of the relativity of the life-worlds of different cultural traditions.’ Here, what Gadamer recognises is the aspects of freedom in hermeneutic reflection. So, Gadamer repudiates idealist-rationalism in Habermas’s concept of the power of reflection saying that Habermas is too much interested in epistemology (emancipating interest) which distinguishes such a true socialists like Habermas from technicians of social structure. Gadamer answers back to Habermas’s refutation—reflection’s ability to change one’s own relation to tradition demonstrates a dogmatic objectivism—saying that Habermas is ignorant on the function of hermeneutic reflection. Gadamer thinks Habermas’s pursue of scientific objectivism with constant operativeness in his own consciousness can never experience true event of concursus.

These different interpretations of the role of the power of reflection in understanding are due to their differing judgements on the effectiveness of Enlightenment ideas in their hermeneutics. I think over-emphasis on the power of reflection is very dangerous, no matter how effective the power of reflection. The issue at stake is whether reflection is dialectical or rhetorical.

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488 Ibid., pp. 22-3.
489 Ibid., p. 23.
490 Ibid., pp. 22-3.
491 Ibid., pp. 40.
492 Ibid., pp. 28.
493 Ibid.
Throughout this section, we find that practical reason will achieve universality of hermeneutics. Gadamer argues that universality should be achieved through rhetoric and hermeneutics, and can be applied to any discipline, including sociology. According to Gadamer, rhetoric is ‘not mere theory of forms of speech and persuasion; rather, it can develop out of a native talent for practical mastery, without any theoretical reflection about ways and means.’ Therefore, rhetorical and hermeneutical aspects of human linguistics ‘as a limitless medium that carries everything within it’, will achieve universality of understanding.

Gadamer establishes the idea of universality of hermeneutics by using practical reason because it is not technical reason, but universal. He defends the universality of the hermeneutic dimension by reaffirming the universal phenomenon of human linguisticality. For Gadamer, this linguisticality is not separated from other real, social dimensions, such as work and domination. That is why he can assert that the claims to universality made by both hermeneutics and sociology are equally legitimate and interpenetrating.

F. In Sum

The question of hermeneutic universality begins with the enquiry of the possibility of true transcendence. Asking, ‘Is a true transcendental point possible?’ implies ‘Can we achieve hermeneutic universality?’ Within the context of hermeneutic universality, we have the following accounts of ‘process’, ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘event’. Dewey observed ‘process’ working in a pragmatic and anti-dualistic way. ‘Intersubjectivity’ for Habermas and Gadamer showed us profound and diverse ways of being context-sensitive between one and the other.

In the discussion on universality, Habermas wants cognitive-ethical unity with critical-ethical reason, while Gadamer proposes a dialogical encounter with effective

495 Ibid., p. 24-5.
historical consciousness. Both Habermas’s ethical and Gadamer’s linguistic approaches have a limit in achieving true universality. However, Gadamer’s aesthetic vision towards a holistic and linguistic approach gives us great insights into the juxtaposition of the death of the I and the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit: universality/particularity, secular/religious, reason/faith and so on.

Even though the limit in Gadamer’s ‘fusion of horizon’ still remains in the immanent, historical or linguistic realm, and so it cannot be a real point of true transcendence, Gadamer was successful in using practical reason (the Aristotelian concept of phronesis) for achieving universality, as Gadamer puts it, ‘where the whole is intended’. Also, his zeal to achieve universality with the moral ideal of practical wisdom and freedom of Enlightenment guides us in the true direction to achieve universality. In Gadamer, language is the medium in which freedom is exercised. As we have seen, it is aesthetic universality which resists domination by a violent power. Gadamer’s universality is possible by the very source of our daily life experience.

‘Event’ in Derrida is something that cannot be understood by reason. However, it shows a true transcendental point spontaneously in a secretive and enigmatic way. It just happens as an event, rather than in the modes of process and intersubjectivity. In the event, such ideas as subjectivity and objectivity have to be understood by gift, along with responsibility and faith. I want to cite Derrida’s point here again: ‘The subject and the object are arrested affects of the gift, arrests of the gift. At the zero or infinite speed of the circle.’

While admitting the limit of both Gadamer’s and Habermas’s intersubjectivity for achieving universality, we want to move on to khora, where universality is achieved through the Derridean X. In Derrida, the true transcendental point is understood as the possibility of the impossibility. In the following chapter, we will study what Derridean universality is and how it achieves in the context of Emerson’s ‘genius’ and Rorty’s ‘ironist’, and we will examine what it means to be a human being living in the space of universality in the view of Kierkegaard’s Abraham.

A. Preface

‘Do you live as an individual or as a member of a society?’ This question is as complex as the most difficult question of my youth, ‘Do you live in order to eat or do you eat in order to live?’ A long time later, I found the answer that human life is more than simply living and eating. Likewise, the first question is no longer a question of individuality or solidarity because, for a human being embedded by the death of the I, life itself is neither to be or not to be, but a third species (triton genos) between life and death that I described in chapter I. Then, the question whether one lives in individuality or in solidarity becomes, ‘Do you recognise that you are participating in the death of the I?’ A more concrete question would be, ‘Do you think of marginalised people as “us” rather than “them”?’ To construe this question is urging us to create a more expansive sense of solidarity than we presently have. The wrong way is to think of it as urging us to recognise such a solidarity as something that exists before our recognition of it.498

The Commandments in the Bible are to love God and your neighbours. In these discourses, we cannot but inquire why I should love God. Even more, why I should love her and him. And how should we love? We can simply respond by answering that the Bible tells you to, however, this kind of answer is not what theology has to provide. Since these inquiries reside in the space between God and us, and theology is always reaffirming, reassigning, re"strengthening, renewing and reforming our knowledge of God, they should be investigated in the textuality of khora, where the Bible produces meaning.

A Christian way of knowing God involves the obedience of a human being to a command. However, even a serious Christian must confess that it is impossible to

fulfill the external command, as it is in his life experience due to his inability to follow the Commandments. If we are to fulfil the Commandments, we ought frankly to confess our limited ability to obey the command ‘love others’, and ought to respond, first of all, by asking God and ourselves why we should love others and how we can execute His order. That is, how can ‘I’ and ‘you’ establish solidarity? Is it possible to love others while keeping our distinctive self-creativity, self-sufficiency and self-reliance? In sum, our question is twofold: why I should and how I can love others, not as ‘the autonomy of the “I”’, which is limited in its reason, but as a person embedded by *the death of the I*, who foresees the possibility of the impossibility. These questions imply two important issues in this chapter. One is how the universality of hermeneutics is achieved and what the function of *khora* is in terms of loving others, i.e., what solidarity is; the other is who the persons are achieving universality in that space.

In the previous chapter, we studied such philosophers as Kant, Dewey, Habermas and Gadamer, in whom the ideas of ‘process’, ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘event’ are construed by reason, habit, the power of reflection and the fusion of horizon in the context of the universality of hermeneutics. We identified the ideas of ‘process’, ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘event’ with the modes that a being with the Holy Spirit experiences. With these understandings, we want to know how these modes of a being function in the event of *khora* in terms of solidarity and individuality.

In this chapter, we want to scrutinise how a being, for example, in Charles Hodge’s context, ‘a theologian of doing theology here and now’, resides in *khora*, i.e., how beings living in the context of *the death of the I* achieve solidarity and individuality when they are with the Holy Spirit. Residing in *khora* is not something like dwelling in an already established building but, as Heidegger recognises, the process to build is in itself already to dwell.499

I want to argue that a person embedded by *the death of the I* is the one who achieves solidarity by participating in hermeneutic universality. The universality of hermeneutics of *the death of the I* is never opposed to the different life-settings of ‘I’,

because each different subject already involves intersubjective modes of life experiences of ‘I’ and ‘you’. Therefore, the universal is reducible to its various and spontaneous instantiations. In this sense, the hermeneutic universality of the death of the I is always contextual. Thus, solidarity of the death of the I will be fulfilled in the space of khora.

In chapter I, we identified the death of the I. In chapter II, following Derrida, we studied the death of the I embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit as, first, responsibility that passes through the very ordeal of the paradox; second, faith that ventures into absolute risk; third, gift that enables the relationship with God as if God were, i.e., the transcendental selfless goodness through a new experience of death; and fourth, humility as to die to itself.

With the above viewpoint of the death of the I, in this chapter, I will discuss the universality of hermeneutics in khora in ‘a genius’ for Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‘an ironist’ for Richard Rorty, Tolstoy’s ‘Ivan Ilyich’, Kierkegaard’s ‘Abraham’ and ‘a theologian’ (Hodge). As beings in khora, all of them will be examined in the context of the death of the I: responsibility, gift, faith and humility. Out of the five figures, the study of the first four will give us hints to the role of Hodge as a ‘theologian’.

As we will study later, the sacrifice of Isaac will be seen as an event of the death of the I embedded in Abraham with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit. When Abraham was in the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah, God was to destroy these cities due to the depraved lives of their inhabitants. Due to Abraham’s supplication for saving these cities, God finally decided to search for ten righteous people. If there were ten, God would not destroy Sodom and Gomorrah. However, God could not find them. What kind of person was righteous in the way that God sought? The righteousness that God sought was probably such a figure as Abraham, since God credited him with being righteous (Genesis 15:6). This sort of belief is what the death of the I traces. I believe the ‘righteous’ whom God sought at Sodom and

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500 The Bible shows Abraham as a representative model of the righteous, as many apostles exalted him (see the chapters of Romans 4, Galatians 3, Hebrews 7 and James 2).
501 See chapter VI, p. 189-90.
Gomorrah are possible when the death of the I is embedded in a person with the Holy Spirit.

Why could God not find the righteous at Sodom and Gomorrah? The Reformers’ slogan, ‘righteous by faith alone’, means what? How should this kind of faith display itself in those cities? ‘To live’ to be righteous anywhere is already a question of how the death of the I functions in the space between life and death. Derrida notes that to live is not something that we can learn. It cannot be learned from oneself, it is not learned from one’s life, or taught by another’s life. Only from the other and by death. In any case from the other at the edge of life. At the internal border or the external border, it is heterodidactics between life and death.

Living as a righteous being, whether in solidarity or individuality, is not something that we can learn. It is possible only at the moment when the death of the I is embedding. With this understanding, a theologian’s being ‘righteous by faith alone’ will be discussed in the sections on Kierkegaard’s Abraham and on Hodge, ‘a theologian’. The importance of the study of the first three figures in this chapter, a genius, an ironist and Ivan Ilyich, is that they give us the idea of being righteous in everyday life. At the same time, as contemporaries of Hodge, the study of Emerson (1803-82), Kierkegaard (1813-55) and Tolstoy (1828-1910) have significant implications in how their ideas of different ‘living’ and ‘thinking’ spaces are compatible with the theology of the nineteenth-century Princetonian. Hoping that the study of this chapter will be a good guess about the righteous whom God sought at Sodom and Gomorrah, with the viewpoint of solidarity and individuality, or of universality and particularity, I want to begin with khora, the space where the events of these four individuals are occurring and are being construed.

B. Khora

Concerning khora, my questions are: how is a being in the world different from one in the monastery?; how is textuality different from sexuality?; what is the

difference between life and death?; what would be the relationship, difference and
similarity between Hodge’s ‘sense’ and Derrida’s ‘happening’? However, due to the
fact that what happens ‘here and now’ is intrinsically spontaneous and contingent,
even if ‘the happening’ is considered to be caused by a human being, we cannot but
think of the place (khora) where the *potentia absoluta* operates in a being in this
world.

Derrida specified a place of *khora*, citing Dionysius:

To gain access to this place is not yet to contemplate God. Even Moses must
retreat. Moses does not come to be with God Himself; he does not see
God—for God is unseen—but the place [*tópon*] where God is. This signifies
to me that the most divine and highest of what is seen and intelligible are
hypothetical *logoi* of what is subordinate to that beyond-having-all. The
Mystical Theology thus distinguishes between access to the contemplation of
God and access to the place where God resides. What is the place? He is not
even His most without Being and without place, without being His place.503

Recalling the introductory discussion of *khora* in chapter I, here we want to study its
function and application more in detail.

1. Plato’s ‘Beyond Being’ and ‘Dream’ in *Khora*

In order to study *khora*, we need to pay attention to Derrida’s analyses on two
movements of negativity in Plato. The one is *epekeina tes ousias*, ‘beyond being’504
of the *Republic*, and the *khora*505 of *Timaeus*. Firstly, on the negativity of ‘beyond
being’, Derrida says that it is such a thing that makes possible the *hyper*
movements to produce, attract or guide what is ‘being’. It first obeys the ‘logic of the *sur*, of the
hyper, over and beyond, which heralds all the hyperessentialisms’.506 In other words,
something is defined by that which is more than it is, i.e., ‘what is’ is always defined
by ‘what is not’ or ‘what is more than is’. ‘What is’ cannot be spoken of except by
that which is more than it is. Since ‘beyond being’ is not being or presence here, it

503 Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Budick and Iser, eds., *Languages of the Unsayable*, pp. 21-5.
504 Plato, *The Republic* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1999) 509b
[48E, 49A, 52A]
506 Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Budick and Iser, eds., *Languages of the Unsayable*,
p. 32.
can only be understood or articulated by that which is beyond it and beyond its articulation.

Derrida observes that, in the Republic, the idea of the Good has its place beyond being or essence because the Good is not its place.\textsuperscript{507} Since the Good is beyond being, it is inevitable for the ontological grammar to be negative. If we talk about the good in terms of ethics, ‘you are a good man’ always presupposes your ethical manner and behaviour. However, good as ‘beyond being’ is ultimately defined by something unsayable. It is good just because it is something that cannot be articulated. Its essence is beyond it. As a beyond being, \textit{khora} is that which acknowledges in terms of goodness and being, and could always be defined by that which is more than being. In \textit{khora}, being is not clearly circumscribable. Neither is the death of the \textit{I}.

In other words, \textit{khora} is not a place (topos) of a manner of being; it is an appropriate place where something is. As a topos of ‘in between’, according to Derrida, \textit{khora} cannot be defined by ‘the logic of noncontradiction of philosophers’ because it derives from ‘logic other than the logic of the logos’.\textsuperscript{508}

It looks like a dream that does not have any of the logic of everyday life. In \textit{Timaeus}, Plato depicts \textit{khora} as a dream:

This indeed is what we behold as in a dream and say that anything that is must of necessity be in some place and occupy some room, and that what is not somewhere on earth or in heaven is nothing. [C] Because of this dreaming state we prove unable to bestir ourselves and draw all these and other kindred distinctions (even in the case of the waking and truly existing nature), and thus to state the truth.\textsuperscript{509}

Actually, God spoke to Joseph and Daniel by showing His promise in their dreams. However, since the dreams are only promised, they are to be effective for the futures of the dreamers. No one, including the dreamer, can logically explain the dream. Likewise, \textit{khora} is that kind of space that has a different kind of logic.

\textsuperscript{507} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{508} Jacques Derrida, ‘\textit{Khora}’, in Werner Hamacher and David Wellbery, eds., \textit{On the Name} (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 89.
\textsuperscript{509} Plato, \textit{Timaeus}, p. 61. [52B, C] Plato depicts in 52B that a third type of being as “the receptacle of being.” “But itself apprehended without the senses by a kind of bastard reasoning, and scarcely an object of belief.”
2. Characteristics of Khora

2.1 Khora as a Third Species (Triton Genos)\textsuperscript{510}

Khora constitutes a third species (triton genos) in view of the two types of being which are, respectively, immutable and intelligible, and corruptible. Since it is something other than the two, the discourse on khora does not proceed from a natural and legitimate logos, but rather from a hybrid bastard, or even corrupted reasoning.\textsuperscript{511} As a third species in the process of becoming and sensibility, it has a spatial interval between two types of being that neither dies nor is born.\textsuperscript{512} In this interval, khora does not oscillate between the ni ceci, ni cela (the neither/nor), however, it ‘receives all’ and eventually makes possible the formation of the cosmos.\textsuperscript{513} Hence, khora is the place where neither/nor may no longer be reconverted into both.\textsuperscript{514} In this sense, khora is neither sensible nor intelligible.\textsuperscript{515}

2.2 Khoral Quality: Textuality

The meaning of textuality is more complex than simply ‘one of various meaning-structures of a text’, for ‘textuality is a differential notion and not a matter of identity’.\textsuperscript{516} According to Hugh Silverman, textuality is distinctly different from the text itself. Take autobiographical textuality as an example:

[A]utobiographical textuality operates throughout the text, along with many other textualities (such as philosophical textuality, religious textuality, literary textuality, etc.). What is meant here is that the question of an authorial self is written in the text as a possible reading of its textual interests.\textsuperscript{517}

Silverman means that textuality is a mutual residence that allows an authorial self and a reader to be spoken about. That is, since the mutual relationship does not

\textsuperscript{510} Plato, \textit{Timaeus}, pp. 53-5; 61. [48E, 49A, 52A]
\textsuperscript{511} Derrida, ‘Khora’, in Hamacher and Wellbury, eds., \textit{On the Name}, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{512} Plato, \textit{Timaeus}, p. 61. [52B]
\textsuperscript{513} Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Budick and Iser, eds., \textit{Languages of the Unsayable}, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{514} Derrida, ‘Khora’, in Hamacher and Wellbury, eds., \textit{On the Name}, p. 91.
\textsuperscript{515} Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Budick and Iser, eds., \textit{Languages of the Unsayable}, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{517} Ibid.
directly come from the other signifier (the authorial self or the reader) and is always related to the Other, through tracing of the Other, textuality can be a mutual space. When bipolarity is within textuality, textuality impels us to prompt such a question as, ‘What is the trace “in between” the authorial self and the reader?’ The tracing in mutual residence is what John Caputo means by khoral quality. According to Caputo, the quality of khoral is the system like ‘boxes inside boxes, containers containing containers’, which show ‘a feature of textuality itself’ where a receptacle is defined by what is in it. Therefore, it does not have a specific place, but only traces.

2.3 Khora Is Not Metaphor or Rhetoric, But the Space Where They Occur

In the place of khoral, metaphor and rhetoric happen, but the nature of khoral itself is not metaphor or rhetoric at all. It is a place of deconstruction of which the fundamental activity is reading, not interpreting the text—as in hermeneutics—nor analysing—as in semiology—by leaving aside all sorts of interpretations of artworks. As we can see, deconstruction is a way of reading texts. The text is not that which is interpreted, but rather, the domain in which the interpretation occurs. Therefore, in deconstruction in a space of khoral, the text becomes writing. This writing calls for another reading. As a result, writing is neither the act of producing a text nor that which is produced, but rather that which happens at the hinge between the two.

Derrida says that khoral receives everything not as a medium, a container nor even a receptacle, because the receptacle is yet a figure inscribed in it. With this recognition, he simply overturns the concept of receptacle in metaphor and rhetoric: ‘The receptacle is yet a figure inscribed in it’ means that it ‘is neither an intelligible

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518 John D. Caputo, ‘Khora: Being Serious With Plato’, in Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), p. 91. Here, Caputo says that ‘we are all like the Greeks whom the Egyptian priest scolds, children whose fathers have fled the family scene.’
519 Silverman, Textualities, p. 20.
520 Ibid.
521 Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Budick and Iser, eds., Languages of the Unsayable, p. 37.
extension, in the Cartesian sense, a receptive subject, in the Kantian sense of *intuitus* derivatives, nor a pure sensible space, as a form of receptivity.\(^{522}\)

In this sense, *khora* is rather ‘spacing’ than a space. The spacing of *khora*, according to Derrida, initiates ‘a dissociation or a difference’ in its proper meaning. Therefore it compels ‘tropic detours which are no longer rhetorical figures’.\(^{523}\) As we can see, *khora* gives places to rhetoric or to any tropics without giving anything. It gives no order and makes no promise in the sense that it neither creates nor produces anything, not even an event insofar as it takes place.\(^{524}\) *Khora* is the atemporality itself of the spacing: ‘it (a)temporalizes (anachronises), it calls forth atemporality, provokes it immutably from the pretemporal already that gives place to every inscription.’\(^{525}\) Confirming this, Derrida concludes that the so-called ‘metaphors’ are not inadequate, ‘in that they borrow figures from the sensible forms inscribed in the *khora*, without pertinence for designating the *khora* itself’.\(^{526}\)

Since Derrida believes that secret knowledge obviously cannot be determined and is nothing, and eventually has no secret, the alleged secret knowledge becomes false, mystification, or at best a politics of grammar.\(^{527}\) Just as God is beyond Being, but as such is more being than Being—‘no more being and being more than Being: being more’—God cannot be determined.\(^{528}\) It is common sense that what cannot be determined is not to be secret at all. It is just nothing, or ‘other’. Therefore, theologically speaking, *khora* is not God himself, but the providential space of the forgiven sinners and unforgiven sinners in this world, and as their relation to the universe.

With these understandings of *khora*, let us consider who would be a proper person residing in *khora*. *Khora* is a place of living together without losing one’s own identity. First, let us begin with Emersonian genius. The study of genius is important because it shows how American transcendentalists and the Unitarian

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\(^{522}\) Ibid.
\(^{523}\) Ibid.
\(^{524}\) Ibid.
\(^{525}\) Ibid.
\(^{526}\) Ibid., p. 36.
\(^{527}\) Ibid., p. 19.
\(^{528}\) Ibid., p. 20.
Church wanted to have a notion of the righteous self in nineteenth-century New England.

C. Emersonian Genius

Ralph Waldo Emerson, a writer, poet and speaker, was the leader of the Transcendentalist movement in the nineteenth-century United States. He was born in Boston to the Rev. William Emerson, a Unitarian minister. He himself was a Unitarian minister, but left the ministry to be far away from either advocates of or adversaries to his thinking. After resigning, Emerson went to Europe and met English Romantics, especially Walter Savage Landor, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, William Wordsworth and Thomas Carlyle, who ‘inspired and sustained’ Emerson for the recovery from his ‘crisis of renunciation’. After he returned from Europe with the sense of Romanticism in his heart, he formulated the philosophy of Transcendentalism in his 1836 essay ‘Nature’.

Transcendentalists believed in the direct relationship between the soul and God. They wanted to transcend not only the senses, but also churches, clergy and the Scriptures. Transcendentalists asserted that man has an intuitive capacity for grasping ultimate truth, and thus achieves a sure knowledge of a supernatural order, beyond the reach of the senses. This belief was in opposition to the traditional Puritan belief of New England.

Here, we want to juxtapose Calvinism and Transcendentalism, or total depravity and the divinity of human beings. New England’s religious culture was shaped by the Calvinism that Puritan settlers struggled to maintain and defend. Calvinist doctrine teaches the total depravity of human nature, predestination, election by irresistible grace, and sinners’ salvation by God’s limited atonement. However, dissatisfaction with Calvinism grew among Transcendentalist theologians when they began to have positive views of human nature and to stress the importance of individual piety and ethical practice in the process of salvation.

Because of the malicious force of the socially established traditional Calvinism, Emerson shied away from the church, and as a result became a leading American figure in Romanticism. He had a question about religion. In writing ‘Nature’, he asked, ‘Why should not we have poetry and philosophy of insight and not of tradition, and a religion by revelation to us, and not the history of theirs?’ This question naturally led Emerson to put nature first, with the argument that we all benefit from it. He believes that nature provided the first standard of beauty. Natural beauty is ‘the constitution of things, or such the plastic power of the human eye, that the primary forms, as the sky, the mountain, the tree, the animal, give us a delight in and for themselves’. Building on this insight, Emerson formulates his notion of genius in his essay ‘Self-Reliance’. I want to analyse the characteristics and implications of the Emersonian genius with respect to ‘self-reliance’, and how a genius achieves universality or solidarity.

1. The Meaning of Emersonian Genius

According to Gadamer, the concept of a genius validated by ‘Kantian aesthetics’ is distinctive in the ‘romantic hermeneutics and history’. Such a figure of American Romanticism as Emerson is no exception. An Emersonian genius is the one who uses radical individualistic language of self-reliance. Self-reliance is not simply trusting one’s own self, but rather relying on universal ideas that are already applicable to others, because a genius believes that what is true for him in his private heart is true for all human beings. What is common for every human being, for Emerson, is one’s pursuit of a transcendental power. Therefore, being together, i.e., universality, is possible if each human being pursues a human utopia in a transcendental realm through his intuitive and instinctive will to power with freedom that comes from integrity of mind, which Emerson believes sacred.

531 Ibid.
532 Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 36.
534 Ibid., pp. 21-2.
Emerson is not praising the external God, because he believes that a united identity is already established in the human mind. He argues that ‘[n]othing is at last sacred but the integrity of your own mind. Absolve you to yourself, and you shall have the suffrage of the world.’\footnote{Ibid., p. 21.} He says, ‘To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men—that is genius.’\footnote{Ibid., p. 19.} The external power can be taken as God; however, not as a transcendental God, but as an immanent source of a transcendental human creativity which is the only thought of genius that has never existed before. Even though Emerson seems to believe that the certainty or superiority of a genius is direct from God, the universality of a genius’s thought cannot but be subjective because it is already transcended. The subjective certainty of a genius, then, is no longer knowledge of God. An Emersonian genius is already autonomous in its integrity.

Here, we have a question of how the thought of a genius can be universal truth. A genius knows that the light comes from outside, yet he does not try to find the source of the light, but depends on the interpreted light which is already immanent in man. As colour and light concur in coloured light, God and the human mind concur, in Emersonian terms, in the form of ‘Instinct’ or ‘Intuition’. This is depicted well in Emerson’s view that prayer is vicious if it is for anything less than good.\footnote{Ibid., p. 33.} Prayer with a private end is never able to allow access to the light of God. This means that unless the will of God is not totally immanent in the human mind, i.e., if they do not coincide as in the coloured light, the prayer is hostile.

Emerson says that a genius is not truth themselves, but they just recognise truth. To such a question of ‘Where is the master who could have taught Shakspeare?’ Emerson answers that human beings can do nothing but allow a passage to the beams of truth.\footnote{Emerson, ‘Self-Reliance’, pp. 27, 35.} An Emersonian genius will, then, open up the possibility of universal solidarity by doing nothing but being a vehicle of the transcendental truth,
i.e., being a passage or being spiritualised by the transformation of genius from ‘intellect’ into the power of receiving ‘a new gift’.  

2. The Concept of Emersonian Loving Others

An Emersonian genius regards others (the object of loving) as ‘I’s (the plural of ‘I’, not ‘we’). According to Emerson, these ‘I’s are ‘a class of persons to whom by all spiritual affinity I am [he is] bought and sold’. This ‘spiritual affinity’ is a vehicle for a genius to communicate with others. That is, a genius was bought and sold for the people not as a group, but as an individual who is considered to enjoy the heavenly realm. Emerson seems to identify a genius with denying oneself vanity, malice, and the hatred of fathers, mothers and others. In this way, he regards others as different ‘I’s.

‘Equality’ is well-supported in the Emersonian genius’s view on ‘hate’. ‘Hating’ others becomes the source of the genius’s sense of equality. Emerson says that ‘thy love afar is spite at home.’ When we refer to Luke 14:26-7, the spite is quickly related to Jesus Christ’s command. Why hate and why love? In Luke, Jesus calls for hating others and bearing our cross. Emerson, citing the same passages, achieves equality in the universality of hermeneutics by situating a genius in the realm of hating each other for the sake of transcendental deduction: ‘The doctrine of hatred must be preached, as the counter action of the doctrine of love, when in pules [whimpers] and wines. I shun father and mother and wife and brother when my genius calls me.’

For this reason, Emerson evaluates such an activity as giving money to the poor is despising other ‘I’s. To give something to the poor means to have a relationship with malice and vanity. However, according to Emerson, when a genius directly perceives the existence of the malice and the vanity rather than the poor, they go away suddenly. Therefore, a genius is one who hates his neighbours living in a depraved society because a genius has nothing to do with depravity. The message of

540 Ibid., p. 22.
541 Ibid.
a genius to the poor is clear: ‘You, living with malice and vanity, just get out of the society of wrong doings and let’s have identical spirituality as geniuses.’

3. Evaluation of Emersonian Genius

Joel Porte interprets Emerson’s view on history, that of ‘enhancing our estimate of the present’, not as the ‘Hegelian dialectic or logic of events’ in which we are ‘totally controlled and circumscribed by descent or inheritance’. Like the death of the I, Emerson’s view on history is not what is chronologically interpreted. He writes, ‘Every mind must know the whole lesson for itself, must go over the whole ground. What it does not see, what it does not live, it will not know.’ Emerson means, echoing the death of the I, that we have to be responsible for the event of khora (the whole), even if our life is vulnerable, and so, cannot but be paradoxically undecidable. Emerson wanted the whole as universality to be achieved, and, like Gadamer’s ‘taste’, was against autocratic power of fashion and preserved a specific freedom and superiority. I want to cite Gadamer here: universality can only be achieved ‘wherever a whole is intended but not given as a whole’.

We can now see that while Emerson seems to participate in the death of the I, his formulated theory on self-reliance and genius does not seem to fit the category of the death of the I. Especially when Emerson’s transcendentalism is applied to theology, it is much worse. I will take Orestes Brownson (1803-76) as an example of transcendental theology. In seeking to justify ‘the divinity of man’ both metaphorically and historically, Brownson criticises Calvinism’s total depravity of human nature and asserts the most sublime dignity of man as purely natural. He does not deny the fact of man’s godlike state, but accepts the doctrine that, through incarnation, God has graciously elevated man to a sharing in the Divine life. Man, not Christ, is the center of Brownson’s plan of redemption.

543 Ibid., p. 4.
545 Ibid., p. 34.
However, the Transcendentalists’ intuition is similar in effect to the ‘supernatural sense’ of Jonathan Edwards: it leads to the immediate grasp of supernatural reality. But where Edwards has maintained that the supernatural sense comes only to the elect and is the fruit of God’s grace, the transcendentalists held the more democratic view that intuition, the ability to know Divine reality directly, is the birthright of every human being. Because of their common possession of the faculty of reaching God, all men have inalienable worth. All men are spiritually equal and of equal dignity in that all men are able to communicate with God. It is through this principle that transcendentalism deeply affected the development of democratic ideas in the United States.

Calvinism is not at all antithetical to human freedom. If Calvinism is misused by the dominant power of the church that teaches it, Calvinism may well be deviated from the teaching of Calvin. Actually, the core teaching of Calvinists’ total depravity of human being is the very source of the doctrine of the existential being’s true freedom. Emerson’s problem is that he is too possessed by the idea that human freedom comes from ‘the autonomy of “I”’. *The death of the I* will resolve his problem.

D. Rortyian Ironist

Rorty defines irony as recognition of the contingency of one’s ‘final vocabulary’, because it comes from the ‘past poetic and creative achievement’ that always renews space for the self-creation that no human authority can ratify.\(^{546}\) Hence, Rorty says irony comes from ‘a tension between the clarity of the old languages and the crudeness and roughness of new suggestions about how we might think’.\(^ {547}\) He argues that the ironist, with a new language of imagination that eliminates human cruelty, would lead to human solidarity:


\(^{547}\) Ibid., p. 72.
Kant’s idea of justifying human solidarity by reference to ‘pure ideas of reason’ was a good try. But I don’t believe it worked. It was no more plausible or implausible, no more useful or useless, than the attempt to justify human solidarity by saying that we are all children of the same divine father. This also didn’t work. Neither attempt contributed much to the elimination of the cruelty with which human communities treat one another.\footnote{Ibid., p. 74.}

According to Rorty, a liberal metaphysician is different from a liberal ironist in terms of loving others: the former will ask such questions as, ‘Why should I avoid humiliating?’ The latter will ask, ‘What humiliates?’\footnote{Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, p. 91.} An ironist will answer the first question, ‘You should avoid humiliating because loving others is a human virtue.’ A metaphysician will answer the second question, ‘You and they humiliate’, and therefore ‘I do not know why I have to love others.’ These different questions and answers are caused by a different understanding of solidarity. An ironist will think that recognition of a common susceptibility to humiliation is the only social bond that is needed. However, a metaphysician will think of ‘you’ in relationship to a shared power larger than ‘I’.\footnote{Ibid. Rorty regards a larger shared power as rationality, God, truth, or history.}

In Rorty, a liberal utopia is not something that explains human nature, the end of time or the \textit{parousia} of God, ‘but is simply the best idea people have had about the object for which they work’. Ironism, then, is similar to antifoundationalism.\footnote{Rorty, \textit{Take Care of Freedom and Truth Will Take Care of Itself}, p. 44.} Isn’t it a plausible utopia where you and I are one? Rorty, with the presupposition of every human being’s uniqueness, argues that every human being needs to have the zeal to participate in another’s destiny. That is, a human utopia can be achieved through the ironist’s self-creation by increasing sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of others who are unfamiliar.\footnote{Rorty, \textit{Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity}, p. xvi.} In this sense, tolerance and flexibility are important virtues for an ironist: ‘Tolerance has to do with people who are different. Flexibility has to do with the ability to redescribe oneself.’\footnote{Rorty, \textit{Take Care of Freedom and Truth Will Take Care of Itself}, p. 80.}
Rorty believes there are nothing out there to be transcended, but only different times and spontaneous chances in space. He characterizes a liberal ironist as someone who activates three presuppositions:

1. She has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered; 
2. she realizes that arguments phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts; 
3. insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that it is in touch with a power not herself. 

According to Rorty, an ironist tries to get to the point of true transcendence (Hodge’s concursus) only within her language, conscience and community as a product of time and chance. This self-creation of an ironist seems to enable us to reconcile ourselves to the death of the I and also enables us to reside in khora, where chance idiosyncrasy turns into distinctive originality. As we have studied, while the characteristic of Emersonian self-reliance, as an act of creation, is happening all at once, Rorty’s creation is something like an act of edification, which is an ongoing process in the way a metaphor proliferates various meanings.

Regarding the issue of loving others, even if both Emerson and Rorty emphasize loving others, their ways of loving through self-creations are different: Emerson responds to a metaphysical language, Rorty to a metaphoric language. Rorty says that:

- tossing a metaphor into a conversation is like a suddenly breaking off the conversation long enough to make a face, or pulling a photograph out of your pocket and displaying it, or pointing at a feature of the surroundings, or slapping your interlocutor’s face, or kissing him; tossing a metaphor into a text is like using italics, or illustrations, or odd production or formats.

For example, consider Jacques Lacan’s metaphor like, ‘Love is a pebble laughing in the sunlight.’ We can substitute one term or expression for another in this metaphoric language. Then, we have the question of how the metaphor functions in rhetorical language. The function has something to do with an event that is happening. It is not in terms of effect. It is not how it is read, experienced,

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554 Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, p. 73.
555 Ibid., p. 18.
understood and so forth. It is, in fact, what is functioning in these languages. So metaphorical structure is established not by facts, but by function. We substitute love for the pebbles’ laughing in the sunlight. Pebbles have nothing to do with love. Actually, pebbles, sunlight and laughing are only marginally connected with love. With this metaphor, we can cross the differences easily. This ability to cross differences is solidarity for Rorty, who says, ‘Such increased sensitivity makes it more difficult to marginalise people.’ The very vehicle for overcoming marginal differences is, for Rorty, increasing sensitivity to others’ destiny.

1. Rortyan Solidarity

Rorty’s solidarity is possible for ironists, who not only have their own particular lives, but also have a connection to the metaphysical spoken language, ‘Love your neighbor’. For the solidarity of ironists, this metaphysical language needs to be metaphorical and work through an individuality of an ironist. Self-creation is only promised as a hope to be fulfilled, as Abraham did. According to Rorty:

> The sort of autonomy which self-creating ironists like Nietzsche, Derrida or Foucault seek is not the sort of thing that could ever be embodied in social institutions. Autonomy is not something which all human beings have within them and which society can release by ceasing to repress them. It is something which certain particular human beings hope to attain by self-creation, and which a few actually do.

Rorty says ‘the desire for objectivity’ is not a desire to overcome the limit of a society, but a simple desire for as much intersubjective agreement as possible, ‘the desire to expand the reference of “us” as far as we can’. If so, then objectivity pursues agreement within a given community. What Rorty means by objectivity is intersubjectivity.

Rorty’s solidarity is not developed in the way that the irony of a genius is strengthened. Rather, solidarity is possible when ironism becomes universal. That is, solidarity can be achieved when an ironist begins to recognise his limit and

557 Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, p. xvi.
558 Ibid., p. 65.
inevitably starts to create new languages. This new language involves increasing sensitivity to others’ pain and humiliation. However, the term ‘sensitivity’ invokes many questions, such as: when do we have to be sensitive? How sensitive do we need to be? Who should take initiative in this sensitivity? What would be the final form of both sides’ being sensitive? Will both sides be satisfied, or will one strongly held opinion dominate another?

2. The concept of Rortyan Loving Others

Rorty says that moral progress is in the direction of greater human solidarity. But that solidarity is not thought of as recognition of a core self, the human essence, in all human beings. Rather, it is thought of as the ability to see more and more traditional differences (of tribe, religion, race, customs, and the like) as unimportant when compared with similarities with respect to pain and humiliation—the ability to think of people widely different from ourselves as included in the range of ‘us’.  

Rorty’s solidarity recognises that the pain of others is the common ground of ‘we’: ‘Simply by being human we do not have to have a common bond. For all we share with all other humans is the same thing we share with all other animals—the ability to feel pain.’ It is true that differences are unimportant when compared with similarities with respect to pain and humiliation. My question here is: why do we have to compare the differences of something with the similarities of pain? Rorty’s scheme may fall into the fallacy of disregarding differences in the pain and humiliation experienced by different tribes, races and customs. That is to say, Rorty’s ‘we’, whose common ground is human instinctive universal pain and humiliation, may severely neglect the private pain and humiliation of others.

3. Rortyan Solidarity and Its Limit

We are living in this world as individuals and as members of a society. How can an individual have a good relationship with the society? What should the relationship between an individual and a society be? How can we become one? We cannot avoid the solidarity problem. Modern ways of thinking show that altruism is

561 Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, p. 192.
562 Ibid., p. 177.
the best way to solidarity. On the one hand, the Emersonian genius is very much an individual, and what seems to be common to all human beings is the will to power, which is antisocial. On the other hand, Rorty wants to establish a free society which envisages a utopia with an endless process of ‘proliferating realization of Freedom’ rather than converging toward pre-existing Truth.\textsuperscript{563} With esthetic zeal, a liberal ironist achieves universality by being a sufficient historicist and post-metaphysical solidarity by believing that time and chance are out of human reach.\textsuperscript{564} An ironist wants to overcome a metaphysician or a theologian who finds out theoretical means to resolve moral dilemmas with the answer to the question of human existence and of a hierarchy of responsibilities.\textsuperscript{565}

Re-description of ‘I’ and his relation with others will suggest alternative experiential possibilities. We first closely examined the idea of the ‘I’ in Emerson and Rorty. Emersonian self-reliance, on the one hand, enables transcending the self to attain external truth with its will to power. On the other hand, Rorty’s self-creation is possible by increasing sensitivity to the humiliation of others, as Paul himself did, as we saw in chapter II.\textsuperscript{566} Compared with a genius, an ironist’s truth is more evidently experiential in a self. Here we can see differences in Emerson’s and Rorty’s ways of pursuing self-creation. Emerson creates the self by levelling up to enter the transcendental realm, and he therefore believes that what is out there is Divine truth, such that a genius needs to transcend itself. On the other hand, Rorty creates it with imaginative ability by increasing sensitivity to the humiliation of others, leveling down to other people.\textsuperscript{567} Rorty’s ironist would say that we should respect varieties and differences among human beings.

Rorty argues that even if there is innate knowledge, it should be understood by a self’s experience. Solidarity does not depend on the distinctiveness of a self alone. Rorty wants each self to have a conversation. However, we have a question of what would happen when one—who is on the margin also has one’s own particularity—

\textsuperscript{563} Ibid., p. xiv.
\textsuperscript{564} Ibid., p. xv.
\textsuperscript{565} Ibid., pp. xv-xvi.
\textsuperscript{566} See chapter II, section D, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{567} Rorty, \textit{Contingency, Irony and Solidarity}, p. xvi.
does not want to have conversation. In this case, can the marginal be thought of as us and included in us? Rorty's solidarity targets the marginal, assuming that the ability to feel pain is common ground to all people. In his view, the powerful or the rich need to exercise kindness, love and sensitivity. I have two more questions: who are the powerful? Are the marginal supposed to be open to others’ sensitivity just because they are regarded as feeble and weak? In terms of human dignity and equality, the situation of the marginal itself has a significant intrinsic meaning. I think, rather than increasing sensitivity on the part of powerful, increasing the weak’s differential ability and maximising it is a better way to achieve solidarity.

So far, we have studied Emersonian ‘self-reliance’ and Rorty’s ‘self-creation’, and sought to know how they play roles at *khora*. By comparing different views of solidarity of the Emersonian genius and Rorty’s ironist, we can see the reason why we need solidarity and the characteristic of *the death of the I*, as well. I want to argue that utopian solidarity is possible when an Emersonian transcendental self plays a role in Rorty’s language of imagination. That is, an autonomous human being (the ironist) of different expressions (languages), confined to a certain time and a space, would increase solidarity with others by beginning to exercise an Emersonian transcendental language without language.

E. Tolstoy's Ivan Ilyich

Gary Jahn observes that Leo Tolstoy's *The Death of Ivan Ilyich* is a remarkable example of realism and shows ‘Tolstoy’s postconversion philosophical concerns and revised understanding of the mission of art and of the artist’, representing the shift of Russian intellectual life from materialism towards a renewed emphasis on spiritual and religious values.\(^{568}\) In this novel, death appears as a presence evoking such questions as ‘what is and what ought to be, in a human life’.\(^{569}\) The answer would be that the nature of life is the experience of death in *khora*. In *khora*, what seems to be impossible (death) for those in this world is not secret at all, because in it, the

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possibility (presence) always reveals itself in relation to what we think to be impossible (absence, death).

After experiencing a long series of suffering, Ivan listens to the voice of his soul, the currents of thought arising within him: ‘What do you want?’ He answers to himself that he wants to ‘live and not to suffer’. As a patient, Ivan is desperate to what it means by ‘to live’. What would be the answer when his inner voice asks ‘As you lived before, well and pleasantly?’ What would happen to the answer if the inner voice of Ivan is given a place in him? This question is exactly what would happen in khora. What would happen if the entire life was nothing but the ‘display of the falseness, insincerity, insensitivity, and consequent spiritual inadequacy of that life’?570

What Ivan has achieved becomes meaningless when he gets ill: ‘I was going up in public opinion, but to the same extent life was ebbing away from me. And now it is all done and there is only death.’ Actually, the pleasure, joy and happiness have not last long. The longer it lasts, the more deadly it becomes. Ivan’s question, ‘what if my whole life, my conscious life, really was “not right”? ’571 inspires him to view his life in a quite new way. As a result, he begins to realise that it is not social organisation, family, or any other circumstance but the inner voice, which made him happy.

The final four chapters of The Death of Ivan Ilyich show the bipolarity of life and death, health and sickness. Especially, according to Jahn:

Chapters 7 and 8 present a juxtaposed account of these two ‘lives’ of Ivan Ilych: the nighttime life (with Gerasim) in chapter 7 and the daytime life (with family, doctors, visitors) in chapter 8. At the end of chapter 8, night has begun once again, and Ivan Ilych asks for Gerasim to be sent to him. This suggests that as we embark on the final chapters we may expect to find an emphasis on the new, nighttime life of Ivan Ilych and on the question of life and death associated with it.572

570 Jahn, ‘The Death of Ivan Ilyich’: An Interpretation, pp. 11-2.
571 Tolstoy, The Death of Ivan Ilyich and The Devil, p. 56.
Through the path to death, Ivan could learn how to live. To live for him is to listen to his inner voice. The inner voice enables him to think that the shadow of death for him is not the end, but the beginning of his new life. Even though ‘death’ is the extreme manifestation of human suffering of which he has been afraid, the inner voice is still working anytime, even when he is actually dead seen in the beginning of this novel. There is no fear because there is no death in his inner voice. What joy! The inner voice is still heard. Death is finished. It is no more. The inner voice makes impossibility possible.

The implication of this novel is that the death of Ivan Ilyich allows him to escape the bondage of flesh that is determined by a certain time and space. Accordingly, we can infer from this novel that genuine freedom, in true understanding of life, is possible when we experience the death of the I, which already surpasses time and space while, at the same time, enacting our responsibility, gift, faith and humility.

E. Abraham in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling

Søren Aabye Kierkegaard (1813-55) was born to a prosperous family with an intense and dominating father, Michael Pederson Kierkegaard. His works are focused on the individual’s existence. Echoing the death of the I, John Caputo determines that a major theme of Kierkegaard’s work is ‘the right to be an “exception to the universal”’, as well as a critique of metaphysical speculation by ‘substituting for it an acute and subtle description of concrete human experience, of what he liked to call the life of the “poor existing individual”’. For Kierkegaard, ‘to be a self’, Caputo writes, ‘means to live in the white light of eternity, where there is no deceiving God’.

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573 Y. J. Dayananda describes five stages of death and dying in his paper ‘The Death of Ivan Ilyich: A Psychological Study on Death and Dying’: denial and isolation—‘no, not me’; anger—‘why me?’; bargaining—‘yes, it is me, but...’; depression—‘yes, me’; and acceptance—‘Thy will be done’. In Leo Tolstoy, Tolstoy’s Short Fiction, Michael R. Katz, ed. (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1991), pp. 423-34.
575 Caputo, How to Read Kierkegaard, p. 2.
576 Ibid., p. 3.
As we recognised in chapter I, the death of the I as a passage of history of religion does not indicate ‘I’ alone: its responsibility is not like the moral self’s responsibility, but is combined with gift, faith and humility. This dynamic way of being needs to be reviewed by Kierkegaard’s notion of self (Abraham) in Fear and Trembling, in which Kierkegaard asks the meaning and purpose of living of Abraham before God and with fellow creatures. Kierkegaard shows that Abraham, as the image of God, should not be understood as a being comprised of fixed characteristics such as ethics, aesthetics and faith alone. Abraham has to be understood in relation to God and to the rest of the world.

Like the Enlightenment philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Jacques Derrida deals with the same philosophical language: responsibility, promise, faith, place and so on. However, there are differences in questions about truth between Kant and Derrida: the Kantian question is, ‘What is the truth?’ For Derrida, the question in différance is, ‘What happens to the answers if the voice of God is given a place (khora)?’ or, ‘What is a question in différance other than “what is the truth?”’ I believe the Providence of God also has to be construed by such questions as Derrida raises.

The story of Abraham in Fear and Trembling inspires us to think of the universality of hermeneutics, at least in terms of the thesis of this chapter. Universality in khora, of which the key is textuality (as we saw early in this chapter), not only happens in its space and time but also is achieved in the scope of hermeneutics. Gadamer’s task of demonstrating the ‘interpreter’s belonging to his object’ in universality of hermeneutics is possible when textuality, not the text itself, becomes a medium of understanding. Since khora is not an identity, we approached it with elusive and negative anticipation. However, in order to understand it as possibly a priori, we studied its historical and philosophical background in the section titled ‘Khora’.

Within the context of khora, a person with the Holy Spirit assumes responsibility for executing the Commandment of God. Without recognising the death of the I, the work of the Holy Spirit cannot be fully known, and is therefore always pseudo-true

577 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 252.
578 See section B. in this chapter pp. 151-6.
to a dust-like man of reason, because the space where the Holy Spirit functions is *the death of the I*. Knowledge or understanding of the subjectivity and objectivity of a human being living in this world is practically intersubjective. In *potentia absoluta*, the true transcendental point is possible at the moment of event, so the event is always beyond our reason and knowledge. We discussed *potentia ordinata* in terms of the event and *potentia absoluta* in terms of intersubjectivity in detail when we studied *concursus* in Charles Hodge's theology in chapter I. We can conclude that while *the death of the I* makes an event possible, the Holy Spirit makes our faith in and knowledge of God possible.

1. The Theological Implication of *the Death of the I* in *Fear and Trembling*

The traditional theological interpretation of the story of Abraham's sacrifice of his only son in Genesis 22 is clear: the Providence of God, i.e., God, provides the mountain Moriah. God gives an illustrated proof of His Providence in the salvation of Abraham and Isaac. The substitution of a ram for Isaac at the instigation of God is what the Lord provides, and the church claims this symbol as proper and peculiar to it. However, our study on Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling* 580 will help us know how the Providence of God is to be understood in the context of *khora*.

Obedience to God is the exercise of reason and the response to the call of God. Even if we know that Christians should obey the Commandments, in reality, we find that they are puzzled when they come across the contradictions between God’s Commandments (to love) and His Call (to kill). Christians have to exercise the Commandment of love. Why, then, should Abraham kill his son, Isaac? With this paradox in mind, in this section, I want to discuss this sort of irony occurring in our life experiences in the context of the providential space of *khora*: the sacrifice happens when the voice of God (the voice of God and God Himself are different) is given a place in *khora*.

In spite of the enigmatic characteristic of *khora*, its function and application to the theology of Charles Hodge are evident because the place of *khora* provides a

true transcendental point. An examination of Kierkegaard, also an Enlightenment philosopher, would be a good object of investigation of the functions of *khora* with the inquiry of how a transcendental point (*concursus in* Hodge) is achieved in terms of *responsibility, gift, faith* and *humility*: responsibility with critical decision, faith with absolute risk, gift with true transcendental death, and humility with the blood of Christ.

With the questions concerning the *death of the I’s* relationship to ethics, aesthetics and faith, I want to trace back how those Enlightenment ideas have been developed. Accordingly, we will pursue three relevant inquiries of Kierkegaard in *Fear and Trembling* that will allow us to understand the characteristics of temporality of the subject and object, in the intersubjective modes in terms of ethics, aesthetics and religion; Can we suspend ethics?; How can we know that there is such a thing as an absolute responsibility towards God?; Is Abraham’s keeping silent about his purpose to others ethical? 581 This study will show us the footprints of the *death of the I* as a passage of history of religion in relation to Kierkegaard’s understanding of self, which is conspicuous in its ‘dialectical and existential conception of self’. 582

These questions will also lead us on the journey from ‘the autonomy of I’ to the *death of the I*, and show us how the *death of the I* embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit exercises its undecidability (paradox or irony) without losing its identity. The intersubjective temporality of the *death of the I* acting in a person with the Holy Spirit, as a condition of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ—which will eventually be played out at the space of *khora*—can be observed by practical reason in our daily experiences in which faith is ethically and aesthetically embedded. The experience of our subjective faith and objective knowledge of God, Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, as intersubjective modes of Christian life here and now, should be practical and, therefore, acting by itself.

581 Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*. ‘Is there such a thing as a teleological suspension of the ethical?’, p. 64. ‘Is there such a thing as an absolute duty toward God?’, p. 78. ‘Was Abraham ethically defensible in keeping silent about his purpose before Sarah, before Eleazar, before Isaac?’, p. 91.

582 Caputo thinks that Kierkegaard’s *Sickness Unto Death* is a metaphor of the health of the soul, with the sickness as despair. *How to Read Kierkegaard*, p. 103.
2. Kierkegaard’s *Fear and Trembling*

In the event of Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac, the question is whether we live with the ethics of Kant, live in a paradox of Kierkegaard, or live in faith? As we study the monstrosity of Kierkegaard, we will also observe how Kantian wisdom with courage is working in Abraham in Genesis 22. Throughout our study in search of the answers to the three questions of *Fear and Trembling*, we will also get the insights into describing the functions of *khora* and its theological implications for studying Hodge’s Providence in chapter VI.

In the four dramatised stories in the prelude to Kierkegaard’s *Fear and Trembling*, based on the sacrifice of Isaac, we can see at least two parts of a paradox.\(^{583}\) One is that Abraham does not think it was wrong to offer voluntarily to God the best thing that he has: his son. The other part of the paradox is that Abraham gets Isaac back.\(^{584}\) It is really difficult to understand this paradox with our knowledge and reason, or with our highly developed immediate sensory system of conscience (i. e., Scottish Common Sense Realism). How can we understand God’s intention with our reason? Can we unravel this paradox by breaking the limit of our rational understanding with our utmost passion?

Abraham decides to offer his son and acts by himself, and does not tell anyone about what he is going to do. He does not even seem to assume any responsibility for being silent to his family and for his intention to kill his son. It is common sense that the individual behaves according to the universal principle of reason. However, what Abraham does is to destroy this universal criterion; he is captured by his own will. What happens to Abraham’s mind? He has the conscience to kill his son. Abraham is called the father of faith and obedience, but who on earth can have the kind of faith to kill his own son? What does it mean for a man to have faith? According to the full story of Abraham in Genesis 22, his acts of faith have nothing to do with trial and error, but everything to do with immediacy and consistency.

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\(^{584}\) Kierkegaard sees the paradox as ‘a paradox which is capable of transforming a murder into a holy act well-pleasing to God, a paradox which gives Isaac back to Abraham….’ *Fear and Trembling*, p. 64.
Abraham’s faith seems to be stronger and more consistent than a partisan’s die-hard conviction in his ideology.

According to Kierkegaard, there is no faith without risk:

Faith is the contradiction between the infinite passion of inwardness and the objective uncertainty. If I am able to comprehend God objectively, I do not have faith; but because I cannot do this, I must have faith. If I want to keep myself in faith, I must continually see it that I hold fast the objective uncertainty, see to it that in the objective uncertainty I am ‘out on 70,000 fathoms of water’ and still have faith.\(^{585}\)

A man of reason will say that even though one does not have Abraham’s faith, at least what one can do is care for and love others. He will ask whether we regard ourselves as having genuine faith, whether we do really have the absolute faith of Abraham and Noah. And he will say that he has never seen this kind of man, and therefore will ask that if there is such a thing as genuine faith, to let him know. The responsibility of a man of reason is to exercise his integrity of life based on his logical judgement. That is, ethically, we respond rationally, and we create universal truths that are given as a whole by means of philosophy, science and even theology.

Aesthetically, we act intuitively and immediately, on a case-by-case basis in our experience. That is, the responsibility of aesthetic judgement is to improvise methods to co-determine, supplement and correct an established logic based on one’s reflexive judgement.\(^{586}\) Such an Emersonian genius, then, has to be responsible for aesthetic judgement.

At the level of faith, we want to retain the universal level of ethics and respond, not at the purely intuitive level of the aesthetic, but in an infinite leap of faith, even a surge into the absurd and unintelligible Other. However, more correctly speaking, Christian faith is never certain, for we cannot be brought into the presence of the Absolute God. Since the truth of God cannot be perceived directly by us as it is, the act of faith for Kierkegaard cannot be construed as objective, but must be portrayed

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\(^{586}\) Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 34.
in an absurd way.\textsuperscript{587} Reasonable and aesthetic ways of determining such a direct relationship between us and God will result in vain.

This is the dilemma of Kierkegaard, caused by Kantian ethics and aesthetics that still hold on to universal criteria based on ‘the autonomy of “I”’ alone. There is no direct synthetic transcendental point, as we studied in chapter IV, even in the modes of process and intersubjectivity. This sort of transcendental point proves to be impossible in human capacity. Clearly recognising this fact, Kierkegaard regards Abraham as a monster.\textsuperscript{588} When a man has faith, he already resides beyond the ethical level of the rational universal\textsuperscript{589} and the aesthetic level of intuition. Kierkegaard calls this the paradox of faith,\textsuperscript{590} because he thinks that faith begins from the place where thinking leaves off.\textsuperscript{591} In this sense, the Emersonian genius’s ‘thought’ cannot be regarded as faith because his thinking is based totally on ‘self-reliance’.\textsuperscript{592} The paradox of faith that Abraham represents is, according to Kevin Hart, a monstrosity of an event of now, when Derrida’s future is revealed and presented.\textsuperscript{593}

Abraham’s infinite abdication on the basis of an individual relationship with God, and not on the basis of philosophy, science or theology, is the paradox of faith. This may result in paradoxical consequences because he has exposed himself to the dangers of being deceived and of deceiving himself. This is an absolute decision within the undecidability of the death of the I. The danger of the absolute subjectivity that he radically embraced eventually led him to disregard the universal common sense of this world. Suddenly, universal common sense has been substituted by the universality of the death of the I, and that temporal experience of Abraham makes him a monster. Because the ‘leap of faith’ is dangerous, we need to take a risk; because it is impossible, we need to endure its indecidablity. Because it

\textsuperscript{587} Kierkegaard writes that Abraham ‘acts by virtue of the absurd, for it is precisely absurd that he as the particular is higher than the universal’. \textit{Fear and Trembling}, p. 67.

\textsuperscript{588} ‘Abraham in a low voice said to himself, “O Lord in heaven, I thank Thee. After all it is better for him to believe that I am a monster, rather than that he[Isaac] should lose faith in Thee.”’ \textit{Ibid.}, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{589} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 64.

\textsuperscript{590} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 65.

\textsuperscript{591} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 64.

\textsuperscript{592} See this chapter, section B. 2, 3. p. 161-4.

is a total gift, we are to experience a new death, the death of Christ, His humility and our humility.

How could Abraham avoid this tremendous danger of being either deceived or self-deceiving? According to Kierkegaard, Abraham’s faith act could be possible only through fear and trembling, an awesome dread and fear of error, i.e., by an infinite leap of faith in God. However, I believe, it is more than by fear and trembling. As we can see in the Biblical narrative, this typical faith act of Abraham has nothing to do with the process of trial and error or intersubjective modes of understanding; it is shown as an event, unchangeable and as consistent as the once-and-for-all conviction of a partisan. However, it is not violent like a partisan’s mentality, but looks fragile, temporal, dangerous and impossible. If it is a leap of faith, then it should have been a pure trace, the tracing of God. We cannot be inconsistent if it is inscribed in our faith. This inscription has the history of a day of a thousand years in the death of the I. Indeed, the leap of faith is a monstrous and paradoxical event.

Now I want to discuss the relationship between Abraham as a man of responsibility and as a man of faith. As a man of faith, he should take responsibility for what he chooses to do to others. We can infer from the faith act of Abraham in that he surely decides to take responsibility for his absurd choices and the life that follows from them. His responsibility for his own choices is definitely due to his absurdity, that is to say, his faith in God. How, then, can we explain his irresponsibility in being silent about his purpose for Isaac’s life, in light of the concern of other members of his family for what is going to happen to Isaac? 594

What is his responsibility?

Abraham’s silence, keeping the will to kill Isaac to himself, is secret to the others, yet it is nothing but a trace of God because it presupposes the space of a promised

594 Kierkegaard’s view on silence is that ‘Abraham keeps silent—but he cannot speak. Therein lies the distress and anguish. For if, when I speak, I am unable to make myself intelligible, then I am not speaking—even though I were to talk uninterruptedly day and night. Such is the case with Abraham. He is able to utter everything, but one thing he cannot say, i.e., say in such a way that another may understand it, and so he is not speaking. The relief of speech is that it translates me into the universal.’ Fear and Trembling, p. 122.
Abraham assumes responsibility only while deferring speaking, but tracing of God. Abraham defers speaking because it is an event of the promise of a true transcendental point, not because it appears either to be avoidable or insignificant. Since Abraham’s silence is not secret at all, Abraham thinks he is responsible to other members of his family. Therefore, faith in God cannot nullify his responsibility to others. Unlike a man of reason, whose responsibility lies in a moral law of categorical imperatives, Abraham’s responsibility binds him to the Other. Thinking reasonably, irresponsible faith has to be done away with. On the contrary, Abraham’s silence confirms his responsibility as a trace in *khora*. This fact makes me think of the relationship between our faith and our responsibility, and how it may be possible to reconcile them.

In order to reconcile them, first of all, we need to analyse Abraham’s faith act. His act is to carry out ‘the death of Isaac’. What he is doing ‘now’ is realising what he thinks is impossible. When we say that the death of the I is responsibility, a person in *khora* functions as a medium to facilitate the possibility of such impossible actions as sacrificing, giving and forgiving someone or something. That is, the previous self has never been successful in exercising responsibility for his own ethical and aesthetic judgement. This impossible work can be possible at the last moment before death, when a self, in whom the previous ‘autonomy of “I”’ had faith without God, begins to speak of Him. The confession of the self becomes that ‘I’ am always raising the knife and having the knife raised, not over others, but over ‘I’.

What Abraham did and how we apply the story in our lives are inextricably related. How can we engage in his faith? As we have seen, his execution the death

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595 According to Derrida, the secret is nothing. A secret is what negative or deconstructive theologies have because what they are speaking about is ‘neither this, nor that, nor a third term, neither a concept nor a name, in short is not, and thus is nothing’. These theologies are not happening in *khora*. ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Budick and Iser, eds., *Languages of the Unsayable*, p. 19. They will finish by admitting, ‘The secret is that there is no secret, but there are at least two ways of thinking or proving this proposition.’ For Derrida, Christians and Talmudists are perverse enough to make their esotericism popular and fashionable. Therefore, for them, it is necessary to step aside, to find the place proper to the experience of the secret. Ibid., p. 20.

596 In Kant, there are three imperatives, the categorical (which is given), the constitutive and the regulative. The idea of God is in the categorical.

597 Derrida sees that the gift of death ‘would be the marriage of responsibility and faith’. He adds that ‘history depends on such an excessive beginning’. *Gift of Death*, p. 6.
of Isaac and Isaac’s salvation by the atoning sacrifice can be seen as ‘death’ that Ivan experienced in Tolstoy in the previous section. ‘Death’ is an event of a temporal moment between life and death. Actually, for Derrida, ‘death’ is not a physical matter, but something happening in between. That is, Isaac’s life and death is not a matter of ‘I’ and ‘you’, but of the ‘Other’. The commensurability of Abraham and Isaac in the one and same reality is only possible by tracing the other. The fact that neither of them has any communication shows that they do not trace each other. Life and death only traces the Other. The faith of Abraham is exactly the death of Abraham. The faith of Abraham is a passage of the life of Abraham, whose faith can be recognised in his experience. But who on Earth has this kind of faith that traces of God?

When the death of the I assumes responsibility as an intersubjective mode of a self, the faith of Abraham—a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit—is dynamically executed. In the death of the I, a self regards others’ situations as its situation, saying that ‘I’ am in the Other and the Other is in ‘I’. Therefore, raising the knife over Isaac is definitely raising the knife over Abraham himself. Death of ‘the Other’ becomes death of ‘I’. This is what I mean by faith: the possibility of the impossibility.

Yet how can Abraham assume responsibility for his action without having any idea whether Isaac will be spared or not? Can a man be responsible for his action without any specific anticipation of the result of his action? Does Abraham think that his willingness to kill his son will be stopped, or does he think that his intention to murder is God’s will, so that whatever follows from his action is in accordance with God? No, not at all. Abraham’s concern is not about his action, Isaac’s destiny, his family, or whether he will be stopped, but about the promise of God embedded in his conscience. Abraham should be responsible for what he chooses and the consequences of his choices. The promise he got at the event of 70 years before brought about 70 years of waiting for another event of God’s promise to be fulfilled. These chains of events always trace the one origin, God.

Again, Abraham’s deferral of speaking of God to others is not by fear and trembling, but through the tracing of God. This deferral causes him to assume
responsibility towards others and God as well. Therefore, we can conclude that Abraham’s faith is based on the promise that is to be fulfilled. Even though he is vulnerable when he recognises that his son is to be sacrificed, he overcomes his anxiety not by the certainty of a genius, but by the experience of ‘new death’, responsibility, faith, gift and humility of the death of the I embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{598} This ‘new death’ will console our fear, trembling, dread and awe. The promise that nobody knows when, where, what and how to be fulfilled causes Abraham to have responsibility through the tracing of God.\textsuperscript{599}

The promise embedded in the word ‘messianic’ seems to combine faith and responsibility. This messianic promise does not give any hints of when, where and how it will happen, but I am still waiting for the promise to be fulfilled. Surely, I do not know what is going to happen in the future. Even if our waiting for the promise to be fulfilled may possibly lead us to the wretchedness of our life, after all, the promise which is already embedded in us will renew the faith and responsibility of ‘I’ and ‘you’ because the death of the I is embedded in our faith and responsibility. The responsibility of the death of the I is not a simple duty, but is the wretched man’s tear and tracing of the blood-stained Cross. It is not the responsibility of ‘You’, but of ‘I’ for the abundant lives already inscribed in the death of the I. This inscription in which Abraham’s faith is revealed never ends, but traces God in the death of the I.

Without recognising whether ‘the seeming wretchedness’ is God’s trial, the messianic promise inscribed in Abraham is operating by itself, without attaching itself to Abraham, his family, others and us. It is just here, in this world, now. Who is the one that God is seeking? Who is the righteous?

\textsuperscript{598} On the death of the I’s responsibility, faith, gift and humility, see chapter I, section G, pp. 18-24.

\textsuperscript{599} Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Budick and Iser, eds., Languages of the Unsayable, p. 30. ‘There would be no responsibility without this prior coming of the trace, or if autonomy were first or absolute. Autonomy itself would not be possible, nor would respect for the law…in the strictly Kantian meaning of these words. In order to elude this responsibility, to deny it and try to efface it through an absolute regression, it is still and already necessary for me to endorse or counter-sign it. When Jeremiah curses the day he was born, he must yet—or already—affirm.’
Was the voice of God asking for the sacrifice of Isaac the trial of God? If yes, then the promise in the word ‘messianic’ will operate more dynamically and vividly in the faith of Abraham. If we regard the whole of life as a trial, our faith must last over the whole of that life, not at some particular moment. Our faith never remains in a confined whole, but manoeuvres to khora, where true universality signifies. Again, who is the righteous? Who can have this kind of faith? Even a man of ‘promise’ cannot have this faith as an end. It is impossible, but as a means to direct ends, it becomes a possible secret without secret.

We cannot deny that Derrida is very much an Enlightenment thinker, because he has nothing to do with secret knowledge. As he says, the only secret is that there is no secret. It is right that what is impossible is no secret at all. For us, what is impossible is nothing but the very boundary of what can appear as presence. Who experiences the true transcendental point of God? What is the evidence? You? They?

Kierkegaard knows all about faith, but he just cannot act upon it. But in the level of Derridean khora, what one knows is simply acting by itself. Actually, faith is always related to the other. However, in khora, if the knowledge of God is faith, faith acts by itself. Because being-with-the-Other—i.e., Emmanuel—is fully written to a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit in this khora, faith will work even at the moment of crying, prayer, mourning, ordeal, risk, death and even sinning. In the space of khora, there are limitless lines of communication of signifiers of signifiers, in which nothing but dust-like sinners are sharing love and eventually acting upon it.

G. A Theologian

Kantian wisdom with courage that as observed in Kierkegaard’s Abraham is expressed in the context of the death of the I embedded in a self with the Holy Spirit. We also assume that Calvin’s doctrine of the Providence of God is distinctive in the courage to persevere in Christian lives. That is, Calvin’s outline places election not under theology proper, but under the Christian life, the courage to persevere. In
Calvin, Providence is read from election that is accompanied by the perseverance of the saints, but in Charles Hodge, it is applied to theology.

The courage of a self’s perseverance in *khora* is exercised by: passing through paradoxical lives with *responsible*ity; absolute danger with *gift*: exercising selfless goodness with *faith*: and persevering without speaking with *humility*. These four characteristics of courage in *khora* are clear evidence of the possibility of practising theology in the context of a ‘leap of faith’. If a theologian’s priority is the transcendental point that is secret no more, and so, operative in our faith act, a theologian can suspend ethics only when he assumes absolute responsibility towards the Other with courage to persevere. Since the hypothesis of absolute responsibility is impossible to accomplish, a theologian has to learn how to avoid speaking transcendental languages so that his faith has to be strengthened. This statement may be the answer to Kierkegaard’s three questions on the suspension of ethics, absolute responsibility and keeping silent.

Indeed, *khora* is not a living place. It is neither a place where a perfect man exercises his autonomous strength nor a place to criticise another’s manner of being. It is not a place where a metaphysical theologian addresses his theoretical belief. However, it is a place where a theologian’s conviction of belief is to be exercised. That is, it is a place where a theologian can be inclusive without losing his belief. It is a space of context-sensitivity, where a particular faith is welcome. We now want to explore how Hodge views a theologian.

Hodge is a Biblical theologian of *Sola Scriptura*, who maintains that the authority of the Bible comes from the facts of the Bible. This is why he prioritises what he calls Biblical theology. As a Biblical theologian, he argues that a theologian’s knowledge comes from the whole Bible. Hodge’s ‘theologian’ has to research the whole contents of the Bible, omitting nothing relevant to a given theological topic. Hodge’s understanding of a theologian is the one who collects the facts in the Bible, exhibits the internal coherence of these facts, and shows their harmony and consistency with cognate truths, by arguing that he must always be as

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conscientious in collecting facts in the Bible as a scientist is in taking facts from nature. Hodge analyses the work of a scientist with three assumptions:

(1) He [the scientist] assumes the trustworthiness of his sense perceptions....
(2) He must also assume the trustworthiness of his mental operations....
(3) He must also rely on the certainty of those truths which are not learned from experience, but which are given in the constitution of our nature.

Hodge’s point is that a theology should agree ‘in everything essential with the inductive method as applied to the natural sciences’. The argument is that, as the natural philosopher adopts the teaching of nature with certain assumptions, a theologian ‘must assume the validity of those laws of belief which God has impressed upon our nature’.

Identifying the work of a scientist with the duty of a theologian, Hodge concludes that the responsibility of a theologian is ‘to ascertain, collect, and combine all the facts which God has revealed concerning Himself and our relation to Him’. Even when a theologian is researching the Bible as a philosopher does, he is still focusing on the Bible, because he believes that ‘the facts are all in the Bible.’ Hodge's method confirms that ‘the Bible, and the Bible alone, is the religion of Protestants.’ In this way, he believes that we can find the norm and standard of all genuine religious life in the Bible. Apparent discrepancies between scientific and religious truth arise only because scientists ‘are disposed to demand for their theories the authority due only to established facts’, while theologians, because they are at liberty to reject theories, are sometimes led to assert their independence from facts.

In Princetonian theology, including that of Hodge, the language of God has the power to enact. That is, in Hodge, ‘what God said’ plays a fundamental role in forging the doctrine of the knowledge of God—in Kant’s terms, constitutive knowledge. In Kant, as opposed to constitutive knowledge, regulative knowledge

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601 Ibid., p. 13.
602 Ibid., p. 9.
603 Ibid.
604 Ibid., p. 10.
605 Ibid., p. 9.
606 Ibid.
607 Ibid., p. 58.
means that I speak as if God is to exist, providing important guidelines for how knowledge should be used, yet not playing any fundamental role in creating that knowledge. However, in the death of the I, this knowledge is only observable at the moment of a true transcendental point, concursus. Hence, the event of a true transcendental point has nothing to do with knowledge, but happens naturally. In this sense, when practising theology, we need to focus on textuality.

As I have argued, the object and the source of a theologian in practising theology are not only the Bible itself, but also textuality, where the text produces meaning. Hodge has a strong conviction that without the principle of inductive method, ‘theology would be a jumble of human speculations, not worth a straw, if a theologian refuses to apply the same principle to the study of the Word of God.’ Yet we also have to think of the fact that a theology will also not be worth a straw when it is not sensitively adaptable to the diverse and plural context of this world. In khora, context-sensitivity is seen between the juxtaposition of a theologian’s particular theology and his universal life experiences. However, in Hodge’s theology, sensitivity is observed in a different perspective. If we refer to his view on the truths of Christian experience and the truths of the Bible that we discussed in chapter III, we can also recognise that Hodge’s vision is an ‘already-not-yet’ paradigm: we rejoice in the work of the Holy Spirit in our hearts—but that’s what creates greater sensitivity to our sin, also. In this case, so that the sensitivity to our sins should not fall into exclusivism, a theologian has to pay more attention to the textuality of khora since we believe that our responsibility should not remain in the realm of not sinning but to be assumed at the moment of death’s transcendental point.

608 Ibid., p. 15.
CHAPTER VI
CHARLES HODGE AND THE BIBLE

A. Preface

In chapter II, I argued that textuality is a powerful tool in the interpretation of the Word of God, because it makes possible that the revelation of God is preserved and that Christian life is fully operative at any time and in any place. That is, textuality enables a theology relevant to a changing and diverse world and people, while it remains faithful to the contents of the Bible. The question of textuality in the discussion of Hodge’s doctrine of the Bible is, then, how we can interpret the Bible without treating its text as merely relative. The process of interpretation in the context of textuality involves not only the application of Biblical doctrine, but translation of the text into a social, psychological and cultural structure.

According to Hodge’s doctrine of inspiration, since the Bible is inspired by God, it is the Word of God. Hodge believes that the Bible is a genuine product of human activity under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, in the way that God’s truth is contextualised in the inspiration of the Bible through the *concursus* between God and the human author. Here, too, we can locate the Providence of God in His dealing with a secular or totally depraved people and culture. Hodge’s point is that God fulfils His revelation and inspiration without error through His sovereign providential care for His people, who are necessarily fallible. Given Hodge’s view, in this chapter, I want to take note of how our predecessors have dealt with secularised creatures in practising theology. For example, Calvin teaches that human intellect is essential in perceiving more profoundly the wisdom of God, since God’s Providence shows His glory more clearly to the one who has a higher level of intellect. With this in mind, first, I want to discuss what Hodge’s doctrine of the Bible is, and secondly, I want to examine Hodge’s doctrine in view of *khora*, arguing that the authority of the text in the doctrine of the Bible does not only reside in the text itself, but depends on textuality.

B. Hodge’s Rules for the Interpretation of the Bible
In this section, I want to examine Hodge’s view on the proper interpretation of the Bible as follows: in the Bible, there is a clearer revelation of all that nature reveals. That is, the words written by sacred writers are meant to be understood; concerning consciousness and the laws of our nature, everything that can be legitimately learned can be found, recognised and authenticated in the Scriptures—Scripture must explain Scripture; in order that we should not attribute to the teaching of the Spirit the operation of our own natural affections, the Scriptures should be interpreted under the guidance of the Holy Spirit in finding in the Bible the norm and standard of all genuine religious experience.  

The foundation of this argument, according to Hodge, is that, first, the Spirit is promised as a guide and teacher, and second, the Scriptures teach that the unregenerate mind is naturally blind to spiritual truth (I Corinthians 2:14).

Hodge seems to take it for granted that all the people of God who are historically conditioned here and now (in every age and in every part of the church) will enjoy the Divine right of private judgement, either in faith or in practice, through proper interpretation of the Bible led by the Spirit.  Following Hodge, it is convincing that the historical sense of the Bible will allow a reader to have contextual and hermeneutical perspectives in the interpretation of the Word of God. However, in the interpretation of the Bible, what Hodge meant by ‘proper’ is very much limited. For example, he has no interest in the creative power of imagination in the process of reading or interpretation. When Hodge thought that Horace Bushnell misused metaphor, Anthony Thiselton notes, Hodge reacted without hesitation by claiming that the whole of the Bible was ‘propositional’, ‘cognitive’ and comprised of ‘facts’, ‘rather than debating the scope and function of metaphor’. The reality is, as we studied in chapter IV, that ‘facts’ of the Bible always produce meaning in the form of events among intersubjective modes of metaphorical and rhetorical textuality. That is, ‘meaning’ is always created by different readers in their spaces and times.

609 ST, v. I, p. 11.
610 Ibid., p. 187.
611 Ibid., p. 188.
612 Thiselton, Thiselton on Hermeneutics, p. 631.
We should also recognise that God’s words are not monolithically written language, but sets of linguisticality when they are illuminated by the Holy Spirit.

Thiselton thinks the dissonance between Hodge and Bushnell as consequences of a terminological misunderstanding caused a serious polarisation that has devastated ‘American theology and hermeneutics for about a century, and damage remains in terms of extremism here and there on both sides’. 613 This seemingly terminological misunderstanding was intrinsically caused by the lack of hermeneutic consciousness of textuality that teaches that the facts of the Bible are producing tremendous meanings when the death of the I is embedded in a reader with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit. With this in mind, we want to scrutinise Hodge’s ‘proper’ interpretation.

C. What does Hodge Mean by ‘Proper’ Interpretation?

As we saw in Hodge’s argument in the previous section, that the unrenewed mind is naturally blinded to spiritual truth does not mean that the Spirit is not working in that mind. This sort of mind happens to be dramatically changed by potentia absoluta. However, Hodge’s logic shows that the unrenewed mind is not able to get access to the truth of the Spirit because it is blinded. With this stated, ironically, Hodge seems to believe that the saving work of the Holy Spirit is possible only through proper interpretation of the Gospel, by presupposing that we are to receive the words of God as true whatever He has revealed in His Word. However, we need to recognise that the Holy Spirit is not confined to the text, but also works throughout the proliferated meanings of readers.

Hodge’s logic in defining proper interpretation is seen in his argument that ‘the wisdom of men is foolishness with God; and the wisdom of God is foolishness to the wise of the world.’ 614 Proper condition is that readers should make their choice between the wisdom of men and the wisdom of God. Hodge is convinced that the Bible, properly interpreted, could not conflict with the facts of nature due to the

613 Ibid.  
belief that God is the author of both the Scriptures and Creation, therefore God knows everything and is the truth. Consequently, Hodge argues that if a theology does not adopt this principle of induction from the facts of the Bible, it is nothing but a jumble of human speculations.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 14-5.} If the philosophical speculations coincide with the Bible, then they are true, and insofar as they do not agree with it, they are false.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 58.} In this way, his logic reaches the point of his argument that facts are determined by the will of God, but theories, which have human origin, often conflict with each other and cannot be accepted by Biblical truth. So Hodge’s proper interpretation means induction of the facts of the Bible.

As we discussed in chapter III, Hodge’s logic is a typical modern paradigm. We need to note that Hodge’s identification of the facts in his inductive method with the narrative of the Bible is a theory inherited from Thomas Reid and Francis Bacon. Theoretically understanding, what Hodge means by facts are not so much the events of truth as the contents of the Bible. At this point, we need to recognise that the wisdom of God is not an objective and static concept, but is to be understood differently by different readers. When Hodge interprets the facts of the Bible according to his methodological wisdom, how can we guarantee that what he means by true induction from the facts is the original voice of God, and not his own thinking? Since we are not God, we only can determine facts (events) of God by tracing of Him with \textit{responsibility, gift, faith} and \textit{humility}. The space where \textit{responsibility, gift, faith} and \textit{humility} are operating is textuality. Textuality never relativise the original voice of God but is an original condition of an effectiveness of our \textit{responsibility, gift, faith} and \textit{humility}.\footnote{Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, \textit{For What Tomorrow…?: A Dialogue}, p. 21.}

D. Infallibility and the Authority of the Bible

According to Hodge, the Bible is the infallible source of facts for theology because he believes that it is inspired by God. The infallibility and Divine authority of the Scriptures are due to the fact that the Scriptures are the Word of God, and they
are the Word of God because they were given by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Hodge’s point is that the authors of the Bible were infallible when they were acting as the spokesmen of God, and when they were endowed by the Holy Spirit with the organs of God for the infallible communication of His mind and will: ‘They were in such a sense the organs of God, that what they said God said.’ It is true that the inspiration of the Holy Spirit is a prerequisite for the Scriptures to be infallible. In this way, Hodge attests that the authority of the Bible is the work of the Holy Spirit.

At the same time, we can recognise that the inspiration of the Holy Spirit is not universal, because only certain selected human beings are inspired by the Holy Spirit. However, in Hodge, the effect of the inspiration is universal. He argues that the inspiration ‘is not confined to moral and religious truths, but extends to the statements of facts, whether scientific, historical, or geographical…. It extends to everything which any sacred writer asserts to be true.’ Hodge’s position is that while inspiration is limited to the select, the effect of it is universal.

This universal effect is found in Hodge’s doctrine of plenary inspiration. Here, ‘plenary’ does not mean to be partial: all parts of the Scriptures are equally inspired, therefore all alike are infallible, not only in what they teach, but also in becoming sources of facts for theology. If so, though, how can we explain the universality of the effect of the inspiration which is limited to the particular select few? Hodge answers that since the knowledge gained by the method of induction (his inductive theological method) from the facts of the Bible is truth, the effect of inspired facts will also achieve universality. However, Hodge’s position is ontologically improper because he does not have any conscience on the way in which plenary inspiration ‘extends to everything which any sacred writer asserts to be true’.

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618 Ibid., p. 153.
619 Ibid., p. 165.
620 Ibid., p. 154.
622 ST, v. I, p. 163.
623 Ibid., p. 165.
At this point, I want to refer to the debate on ontology between Habermas and Gadamer on truth and method. Habermas notes that the debate is about the difference between objective understanding and interpretative understanding. Habermas claims that Gadamer’s ontology does not allow his fundamental hermeneutic insight (the methodological task of making hermeneutic consciousness) to be effective within rationality. So, Habermas wants a pattern of rationality structure that would prevent us from falling into relativism or naively placing our own views as absolute. Tracing Gadamer’s academic background from Dilthey, Husserl and Heidegger, Habermas accuses Gadamer that he rather promotes the dualism between interpreter’s hermeneutic experience and knowledge embodied in the text, so Gadamer’s understanding model is one-sided twist. However, in *Truth and Method*, Gadamer clarifies that he has never intended to counterpose truth and method as mutually exclusive alternatives. He means only to show that the hermeneutic experience is more fundamental than every exercise of scientific method, and that while *Verstehen* could function within science, it cannot restrict itself to that domain. He admits that hermeneutics affects scientific research, but it is not to be understood as a prescriptive methodology or epistemology, but rather as ontology.

The limit of Hodge’s epistemological methodology in his argument that the effect of plenary inspiration is universal, cannot allow us to fully understand what is going on in the process of recognising truth by his inductive method. As we can see, his methodological understanding always fails to catch up with what is happening when the Holy Spirit works throughout our life experiences. This is why Gadamer defends his ontological understanding of hermeneutics against Habermas’s methodological understanding. The problem in Hodge is that his understanding on the work of the Holy Spirit restricts itself to inductive theological methodology.

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625 Ibid., p. 135.
626 Ibid.
627 Ibid., p. 134.
With this viewpoint, first of all, we need to study how Hodge wants to keep the authority of the Bible so as to revise what he means by authority. While considering the possibility of the fallacy in the hermeneutic process, he argues that even if the church can misread the Bible, the Bible itself is infallibly authoritative:

It is admitted that theologians are fallible in the interpretation of Scripture. It may therefore happen in the future as it has in the past that interpretations of the Bible long confidently received must be modified or abandoned to bring revelation into harmony with what God teaches in his works. This change of view as to the true meaning of the Bible may be a painful trial to the church but it does not in the least impair the authority of the Scriptures. They remain infallible; we are merely convicted of having mistaken their meaning. 629

As we can see, what Hodge means by authority comes from concursus of the first and second causes, the authors of the Bible.

In other words, Hodge’s point that the authority of the Bible would not be damaged even by the misinterpretation of the Bible signifies that the Bible is authoritative because it is inspired. At this moment, we note that Hodge’s discussion of authority is confined to the text itself, not extended to the level that the Bible is read or interpreted by the readership. Here we want to remember Thiselton’s argument, developed from Gadamer’s idea which I cited in chapter IV. Thiselton said that the authority of the Bible does not simply require “‘reading off” of a proposition, system, or instruction handed to us on a plate, but genuine wrestling, search and struggle, in expectancy of a divine event of “speaking” to a ready heart’. 630 This implies that the authority claim has to be extended to the point when the text is understood in hermeneutic textuality, as in the ‘process’, ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘event’ that we discussed in chapter IV. That is, the authority of the text is meaningful when it is observed at the realm of textuality, where the death of the I’s responsibility, gift, faith and humility establish universality, even to the event of Derridean death that we discussed in chapter I. Since only truth cannot conflict with itself, the authority has to extend to the limit even when truth claim may conflict with it. Then the authority should cover the practices of justification of

630 Thiselton, Thiselton on Hermeneutics, p. 633.
the truth: ‘that while “true” is an absolute term, its conditions of application will always be “relative”’. 631

However, in terms of proper interpretation, other than the inspiration of the Bible, I want to summarise my questions so far: on inspiration, how can we explain the universality of the effect of inspiration, which is limited to the particular select few?; on interpretation, how can we know that the interpretation of the Bible is led by the Spirit, and how can we discern whether the interpreted words of God are properly God’s Word or not? With these three questions, following Hodge’s procedure, we want to go into more detail on Hodge and Benjamin Warfield’s conception of inerrancy and the authority of the Bible.

E. The Doctrine of Inspiration in Hodge and Warfield

When we think about ‘inspiration’ in Hodge, we need to consider the Princetonian intellectual culture that focused on ‘the reality’ that common-sense human beings experience. Scottish Common Sense Realism enabled people to regard themselves as competent to reflect on the way they thought because it held that reality must be underlying the experience of human perception. With the Scottish philosophy, Hodge’s inductive method becomes a strong vehicle for the rational defense of orthodox Calvinism. George Marsden recognizes the role of Common Sense Realism:

Common Sense Philosophy had much in it that might support an emphasis on the humanity of Scripture…. A Common Sense premise was that we can understand other people, including those from other times and cultures, because the race is simply constituted with faculties that make such communication possible. 632

Accordingly, Princetonians indulged themselves in rational scientific study according to the Common Sense philosophy. Influenced by it, Warfield’s apology is also inductive and scientific in the way that he applies the scientific method of Scottish philosophy to religious truths, especially in his doctrine of the authority of

631 Calder, Rorty’s Politics of Redescription, p. 54.
the Bible. Thus, for Warfield, theology is the science of God, which makes possible the following three facts: God, religion and revelation. In Calvinistic terms, these three facts can be regarded as God, sinners and the Scriptures. On the one hand, since these facts rest on the Bible, Warfield naturally believes that all of Christianity is based on the authority of the Bible and the creeds as external standards. When Warfield approaches the Scriptures to ascertain the doctrine of inspiration, he proceeds by collecting the whole body of relevant facts. On the other hand, Hodge’s view of the Bible is common-sense: ‘The Bible is a plain book. It is intelligible by the people. And they have the right and are bound to read and interpret it for themselves; so that their faith may rest on the testimony of the Scriptures, and not that of the Church.’

For both Hodge and Warfield, it is needless to say that the teaching of the Spirit must be tested by the Scriptures because they are the norm and standard of all religious experience. It is evident that the Old Princetonians could keep up their consistent view of human nature by placing their theology under the Providence of God guided by the Holy Spirit: ‘theology proper’. However, as this thesis argues, human nature has to be juxtaposed with the Holy Spirit. We should not take it for granted that the inner evidence for the Bible’s authority is always found in the lives of human beings. As we have seen, the reality is that human beings are not always Spirit-filled. For if leading lives led by the true transcendental point (concursus) is to be possible in our life experiences (as Abraham experiences in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling—see chapter V), we have to assume the effective responsibility of the death of the I.

At this point, we need to recognise Hodge’s position that inspiration is nothing extraordinary; it is a simple instance of God’s Providence. God merely controls and causes the laws of nature to produce whatever effects He sees fit. Hodge

635 ST, v. I, p. 11.
636 Ibid., p. 609.
maintains that there is no ‘dictation’, no ‘suspension’ or ‘interruption’ of the individuality or intellectual powers of the authors involved. For Hodge, it is totally an event in khora. Inspiration is simply an occurrence of ‘a supernatural influence’. In this sense, he shows that Biblical writers ‘wrote out of the fullness of their own thoughts and feelings, and employed the language and modes of expression which to them were the most natural and appropriate. Nevertheless and nonetheless, they spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, and their words were his words.’

For Hodge, this was a once-and-for-all event under the potentia absoluta between God and His selected men in His Providence, nothing else. Yet it is naïve for Hodge to believe that the effects of the inspired of the Bible will lead to Christians’ lives being Spirit-filled.

F. Inerrancy Debate

1.1 Princetonians’ Definition of Inspiration

With the above points in mind, let us explore the theme of textuality in the inspiration between God and us in Princetonian theology. According to Warfield, inspiration happens exclusively in the text of the Bible, implying that the Scriptures are the direct result of God’s breathing out:

What it says of Scripture is, not that it is ‘breathed into by God’ or that it is the product of the Divine ‘inbreathing’ into its human authors, but that it is breathed out by God.… When Paul declares, then, that ‘every scripture,’ or ‘all the product of the divine breath,’ ‘is God-breathed,’ he asserts with as much energy as he could employ that Scripture is the product of a specifically Divine operation.

What Warfield means is that even though the Scripture is written by human authors, it is the product of Divine operation. In other words, God chooses to make use of human fallibility in inspiration. Whenever He uses human things, He shows His Providence and grace.

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637 Ibid., p. 157.
638 Ibid., p. 133.
Among the Princetonians, Warfield has been recognised as the greatest champion of Biblical inspiration, with the reputation of one of the most intellectually gifted professors. Warfield elaborated evangelical thinking on inspiration during his lifetime: the first subject of his published articles was ‘Inspiration and Criticism’, and the last was ‘Inspiration’. In his articles on inspiration, he consistently defines the term: ‘Inspiration is that extraordinary, supernatural influence (or, passively, the result of it) exerted by the Holy Ghost on the writers of our Sacred Books, by which their words were also rendered the words of God, and therefore, perfectly infallible.’ Here, we need to recognise that Warfield’s doctrine of inspiration starts with the assumption of the total depravity of human beings, who are finite in their understandings and capacities. Through its inspiration, Warfield insists that the Bible is in a true sense human, but still Divine:

The Scriptures, in other words, are conceived by the writers of the New Testament as through and through God’s book, in every part expressive of His mind, given through men after a fashion which does no violence to their nature as men, and constitutes the book also men’s book as well as God’s, in every part expressive of the mind of its human authors.

Whatever the instrument of inspiration might be, its end-product is the pure, infallible and authoritative Word of God. The Scriptures were given through men, but only through individuals speaking under the control of the Holy Spirit. Although all Scripture is given by the ‘inspiration of God’ (II Timothy 3:16), all Scripture is written by human beings and from Spirit-guided human points of view. With the Princetonians’ understanding of inspiration, from now on, we want to discuss the legacy of Princetonian inerrancy in conjunction with debates among various scholars.

1.2. Legacy of Inerrancy and Infallibility

The main dispute among later theologians about Hodge’s position of infallibility of the Bible has been whether his concept of plenary inspiration is faithful to the

641 Warfield, The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible, p. 420.
642 Ibid., p. 153.
Westminster Confession of Faith and the doctrine of Calvin (Presbyterian tradition), or whether it is an innovative view of the Bible as the source of propositional truths, a view which eventually influenced twentieth-century Fundamentalism. American theologians are especially disputatious about the doctrine of the Bible, the concepts of ‘inerrancy’ and ‘infallibility’, and whether their doctrine of the Bible has been influenced by Scottish Common Sense Realism.

First of all, let me explain how the doctrine of inerrancy has been formulated to know whether it is for the defence of faith or not. If not, what then is it for? As we have seen, Hodge’s use of common-sense principles has the purpose of combating Sophistical objections against the doctrine of the Bible. Carl Raschke—recognising that the doctrine of inerrancy has been shaped by the Common Sense Realism of Reid’s philosophy—observed that before the nineteenth century, there was only a triadic structure in the discussion of the authority of the Bible, based on three crucial terms: ‘dictation, inspiration, and infallibility’. It is true that such pillars of church history as Augustine, Luther and Calvin took the absolute truthfulness of the Bible for granted. They did not have to defend the Bible against charges that certain passages of the Bible were erroneous. Actually, for Paul, Augustine and Luther, what God said was true because God said it, and God meant what he said. For them, the words are simply God’s. With this sense, Raschke continues his argument that the Bible is God’s ‘promissory note’, and it is true because it has been spoken ineluctably and decisively as his ‘troth’, as his commitment to us as justified sinners. Hence, the ‘infallibility’ of God’s Word signifies his absolute trustworthiness.

But in the context of modernity around the mid-nineteenth century, the Bible had to be defended against charges of error. For this reason, I

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645 Ibid., p. 129.
646 Ibid.
want to present some of the scholarly debates about Hodge’s position on plenary inspiration.

1.3. Sandeen, Rogers and McKim’s View

In the evangelical world, generally, there are two divisions. Theologians such as Ernest Sandeen, Jack Rogers and Donald McKim argue that Common Sense Realism created a unique concept of Biblical inerrancy upheld by the Princetonians. Sandeen claims that the ‘unique apologetics’ of the Old Princetonians is comprised of three elements: first, the idea that Biblical inspiration extends to the very words of the Scriptures; second, that the Bible itself teaches its own inerrancy; finally, and for Sandeen the most innovative, that the idea of inerrancy extends only to the original autographs of the Scriptures, and not to copies or translations.

Also, Rogers and McKim, in order to prove that the doctrine of inerrancy is a peculiar innovation, criticise the scholastic tint in Hodge’s theology. In The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible, they argue that the post-Reformation scholastic tradition obscured awareness of the central teachings of Reformation tradition. Post-Reformation scholastic traditions were followed by contemporaries of Luther and Calvin, such as Phillipp Melanchthon and Peter Martyr Vermigli, some of Philipp Melanchthon and Pietro Martire Vermigli’s successors, such as Girolami Zanchi and Theodore Beza, and developed by Francis Turretin. Sandeen, Rogers and McKim together claim that Hodge and the later Old Princetonians’ doctrine of the Bible was innovative due to Scottish Common Sense Realism and Scholasticism.

1.4. The Role of Christian Scholasticism in Reformed Theology

647 Ernest Sandeen argues that Princetonians developed the doctrine of inerrancy in their original autographs: ‘most twentieth-century Fundamentalists and many twentieth-century historians have mistakenly assumed that Protestants possessed a strong, fully integrated theology of biblical authority which was attacked by advocates of the higher criticism… [N]o such theology existed before 1850.’ The Roots of Fundamentalism, p. 106. Jack Rogers and Donald McKim, following Sandeen’s argument, use it to criticise Evangelicals and Fundamentalists in The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible, pp. 282-92.

Orthodox thinkers like Peter Van Mastricht, Turretin and Benedict Pictet have been criticised in modern times for teaching a doctrine of Divine immutability, in which the explicit purpose in maintaining this doctrine was considered to underscore the constancy of God’s purpose, the changelessness of His saving will, and His faithfulness in all things toward His creations. But the Scholastic influence in the Reformed tradition was important because it was used as the very vehicle to defend and develop Reformation theology. According to Richard Muller’s thorough research, Protestant theology proved itself capable of combating Roman Catholics, Socinians and other opponents through a critical mastering of the technical language and logic of the Scholastic tradition. Therefore, for the following reasons, Muller cannot denounce Scholasticism in the Protestant Reformed tradition:

First, theology cannot be static. It must adapt to new historical and intellectual circumstances. This generalization applies to the Reformation itself, and it also explains the subsequent development of Protestant theology. Second, an embattled theology cannot simply stand upon its first formulation. Both Luther and Calvin altered, adapted and refined their positions, as did their less-brilliant successors, in answer to issues raised by their opponents. Third, no theology or piety can succeed in the intellectual struggle to survive unless it can deal with sophisticated logical philosophical questions. The last point will encounter some objections. But we must remember that Luther’s radical revitalization of theology was not accomplished in a vacuum: Luther had lectured on Lombard’s Sentences, had learned well the late medieval scholastic system, and had attacked the errors of that system only after having grasped its inner workings.

1.5. William Barker’s View

A doctrine of the Bible that confirms inerrancy is not original to Princeton theology, but stems from the Reformation. As John D. Woodbridge proved, the traces of inerrancy can be found in many documents before Princeton theology. If this is so, it is ridiculous to attack the Old Princetonians’ doctrine of the Bible simply because Princeton theology is influenced by Scottish Common Sense Realism. Because of Common Sense Realism and Scholasticism, Princetonians were successful in preserving the doctrine of the Bible as progressive and competent.

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in order to practise theology in a way that contextualised both of them. As David Wells has indicated, we must deny the assertion that Biblical inerrancy was a creation of the Princeton theology and that it caused an obsessive interest in the formulation of the inerrancy doctrine.  

Against the argument of Sandeen, Rogers and McKim, which criticises the Old Princetonians’ view of plenary verbal inspiration and the restriction of inerrancy to the original autographs, William S. Barker denies that plenary verbal inspiration is a unique doctrine.

Barker defends it by illustrating the role that Scholasticism played in late sixteenth- and seventeenth-century theology. Against Rogers and McKim’s negative view, Barker proposes that the Protestant Scholasticism of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was doing necessary work in overcoming the Catholic Counter-Reformation theology and new contemporary thought. Quoting John H. Leith, Barker says that the task that theology faced after 1560 was ‘a necessary stage in the development of any community or theology’. He argues, therefore, that the doctrine of inerrancy is not an innovation in substance. Randall H. Balmer also affirms that whether or not the Princetonians’ view of the Bible is correct, it is certain that they did not pioneer a new doctrine of Biblical inspiration and that they were not part of a ‘minority of Evangelicals’ who held peculiar views about the Scriptures.

1.6. D. A. Carson’s View

The second camp argues that the Princetonians were rarely influenced by Common Sense Realism. The representative of this side is D. A. Carson. While

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653 Ibid.
655 Carson is successful in defending the Biblical doctrine of infallibility, partly by critiquing Sandeen's argument: Sandeen presupposes a misunderstanding of the history of Biblical authority in the Reformed tradition; he presents misleading accounts of the development of Biblical doctrine; and he tends to separate the Princetonian teachings about the infallibility of the original autographs from
wanting to defend Sandeen’s belief that Princetonian doctrine is innovative, Carson argues that Hodge is not influenced by the Common Sense philosophy of Reid, William Hamilton and Dugald Stewart.\(^{656}\) Carson’s logic is that the influence of Common Sense Realism on Princeton theology should be ignored, so as to prove that the Princetonians’ doctrine of Biblical authority is not unique to Princeton. Yet on this point, we have to keep in mind that Hodge was a man living in the philosophical era of Scottish Common Sense Realism, which strengthens the doctrine of the Bible just as Scholasticism plays an important role in seventeenth-century Reformed thought.

1.7. Carl Raschke’s View

Carl Raschke is sensitive to the hermeneutic dimension of the inerrancy theory. Raschke, seeing Hodge’s theology as based on Gnosticism, argues that Hodge’s view on inerrancy is an innovation of a form of the doctrine of language, which displaces the doctrine of the Scriptures that Hodge and the Princetonians inherit from the past.\(^{657}\) While arguing that the truth of Christianity has to be a truth of ‘plain evidence’, Raschke does not subscribe to Paul Feinberg’s following view of inerrancy:

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\text{Inerrancy means that when all facts are known, the Scriptures in the original autographs and properly interpreted will be shown to be wholly true in everything that they affirm, whether that has to do with doctrine or morality or with the social, physical, or life sciences.}^{658}\]

Raschke refutes Feinberg’s view with the proposition that without the Spirit, the mind of a human being is blinkered.\(^{659}\) Raschke’s point is common-sense when it is applied to the process of the interpretation of the Bible. His position is quite right, in view of the fact that Hodge’s theology does not have any concerns with the gap

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\(^{658}\) Ibid., p. 127.

\(^{659}\) Ibid.
between a reader with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit and the death of the I. \[660\]

I now want to review the three questions that are the focus of this chapter. On interpretation, I had two questions: first, how can we know that the interpretation of the Bible is led by the Spirit? Second, how can we discern that the interpreted words of God are properly God’s Word? We can probably get the answers from Raschke:

> There can be no ‘correspondence’ at the spiritual level between word and thing unless the ‘thing’ is transparently glimpsed from the perspective of one who has received grace through faith. The ‘revealed’ Word can in no way be put into the same epistemological box as our consensual, or common sense, experience of the everyday world. \[661\]

Raschke means that there is no way that we are able to know that the interpretation of the Bible is led by the Holy Spirit, unless we are involved in the passage of the history of responsibility, gift, faith and humility given by the grace of God, the trace of a true transcendental point at the event of khora. This transcendental point is the event in khora where the death of the I is embedded in the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit. I call this impossible possibility our faith in God, such as that which Abraham had, as we discussed in chapter V. For the answer of the question of how we can discern whether the interpreted words of God are properly God’s Word, we need to follow ‘tracing of theology’ that we discussed in the beginning of chapter VI. If there are no chains of supplement as a tracing of God, there is no way that we can agree that the interpretation is proper.

However, I cannot accept Raschke’s argument that Hodge’s doctrine of inerrancy is innovative. Raschke argues that the doctrine of inerrancy does not originate in Reformation just because Reformation theology refutes the ‘correspondence theory’ of truth, as it has been transmitted in Anglo-American philosophy from the eighteenth century onwards. \[662\] Since Hodge confines the ‘correspondence theory’ to the Biblical level of inspiration and does not apply it to interpretation, I affirm

\[660\] I discussed the bipolarity of the two with the concept of the Derridean ‘supplement’ in the beginning of chapter II.


\[662\] Ibid.
that the doctrine of inerrancy in the Bible is not innovative at all, as Barker and Muller prove.

Thus, the answer to the question of how we can explain the universality of the effect of inspiration, which is limited to the selected few, is explained by *potentia absoluta* in its event of *concursus* in God’s Providence. The Bible is the breath of God and, as Luther repeatedly argues, only *the death of the I* embedded in the Holy Spirit can unveil and illuminate the text of the Bible. Having concluded the inerrancy debate, I want to study more on the doctrine of inspiration of Hodge in relationship to Warfield, as well as Hodge’s son A. A. Hodge in the context of *the death of the I*.

G. Inspiration as an Event of *Concursus* in *Khora*

Hodge and Warfield conclude that God superintends the authors as He providentially superintends all that happens. The discussion of the process of inspiration is meaningful here, since we have the evidence of the result of how God and a fallible man concur through the inspired text: the process whereby God infallibly achieves His revelation and inspiration through fallible and defective second causes. Here, second causes can be regarded as a particular person, society, culture and so on. If we thus follow Warfield’s reasoning, this special occasion of the once-and-for-all event leads us to conclude that the universality of the Transcendental Signified, God, is achieved in the particularity of a sinner, not in a synthetic way, but as a concurrence of the first to the second cause.

Especially, Warfield explains this care of God by commenting on how God uses the human author in revealing His Word:

As light passes through the colored glass through which it passes; so any Word of God which is passed through the mind and soul of a man must come out discolored by the personality through which it is given, and just to that degree ceases to be the pure Word of God. But what if this personality has itself been formed by God into precisely the personality it is, for the express purpose of communicating to the word given through it just the coloring which it gives it? What if the colors of the stained-glass window have been designed by the architect for the express purpose of giving to the light that floods the cathedral precisely the tone and quality it receives from them?
What if the word of God that comes to His people is framed by God into the Word of God it is, precisely by means of the qualities of the men formed by Him for the purpose, through which it is given? When we think of God the Lord giving by His Spirit a body of authoritative Scriptures to His people, we must remember that He is the God of providence and of grace as well as of revelation and inspiration, and that He holds all the lines of preparation as fully under His direction as He does the specific operation which we call technically, in the narrow sense, by the name of ‘inspiration’. 663

With the idea of concursus, Warfield can develop the doctrine of inspiration of the Bible without fear of explicating the human aspect of the Scriptures while retaining belief in their Divine origin and character. As we have seen, Warfield, a follower of Hodge, articulates inspiration through the example of the sunlight passing through coloured glass. The light remains as light even though it is coloured after passing through the glass. The light and colour occur together at a certain juncture (the glass) without losing their essences. Coloured glass in Hodge’s sense of inspiration can be regarded as the authors of the Bible.

H. In Sum: Second Causes and the Death of the I

Through concursus, as discussed in chapter VI, and its application in the doctrine of inspiration, as discussed in this chapter so far, human beings can exercise their full freedom (liberty) in expressing their own linguistic modes, thoughts and feelings without fearing the fallibility and sinfulness of human nature. Needless to say, these second causes function as free agency of the death of the I. When the death of the I is embedded in a particular free agent as ‘the supplement’ is, a second cause or a free agent traces God in its history with responsibility, gift, faith and humility. I mean that a free agent always reveals concealed characteristics of rays of light while keeping its nature, as do the wax, clay, wheat, barley and so on. That is, in the inspiration, we affirm that there are tremendous textualities between such free agents as wax, clay, barley, wheat and God. The signification of free agents and their functions in the textualities can be construed by Ferdinand de Saussure’s meaning of ‘signified’ and ‘signifier’ in linguistics.

In Saussure, the word ‘sign’ (signe) designates the whole in which the bipolar components the ‘signifier’ (signifié) and the ‘signified’ (signifiant) are working.\textsuperscript{664} These two terms, which replaced ‘sound-image’ and ‘concept’, respectively function independently, in the whole of which the two are parts.\textsuperscript{665} That is, a signifier is the actual sound that ‘something’ is called, and a signified is the concept of ‘something’. Eventually, what the sign points to is a referent that is an object of ‘something’. Therefore, the relationship between the signifier (sound, acoustic component) and its referent (object) is arbitrary, according to the context of language. That is to say, different sounds designate the same object, depending on the language that is being used. Paul J. Thibault, defining ‘value’ as that ‘language and all other social-semiological systems [which] are organized on the basis of the relations among the terms internal to the system itself’ observes that Saussure’s question is, ‘How do the value-producing relations which belong to the internal organization of the language system enable language users to construct and construe meaningful relations between language form and the world?’\textsuperscript{666}

However, for Derrida, the signified can neither orient nor stabilise the sign because it always already functions as a signifier through the process of chains of substitution.\textsuperscript{667} The signified can be grasped only differentially and relationally, through its différance from other signifieds, other concepts. The concept of God is considered the Transcendental Signified.

The différance between Hodge and Derrida lies in Hodge’s concursus and Derrida’s event in khora. In Hodge, concursus happens on the border of the first cause and the second causes. The causes occur together, as in Warfield’s articulation of inspiration, where the light and the colour occur together at a certain juncture (coloured glass) without losing their individual essences. At this point, Hodge would say that ‘the efficiency of the first cause is in the second, and not

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{665} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{667} Derrida, \textit{Of Grammatology}, p. 124.
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merely with it.⁶⁶⁸ Thus, in *concursus*, although the secondary cause acts according
to its nature, its efficiency is in the first cause.

In Derrida, the event in *khora* is the place as event, which remains the place of
waiting for the realisation of the promise.⁶⁶⁹ Accordingly, at the proper time, an
event, of which the cause and effect guarantee nothing, will take place fully.
Hodge’s process of cause and effect in *concursus* is observed in Derrida as *gift*. Due
to the unpredictability and anachronicity of the event, *gift* as the very otherness of
*triton genos* occurs at the moment of the thinking, speaking and acting of a free
agent. Nobody can foretell the exact time and the place it will happen.

Through this juxtaposition of *concursus* and event, I want to show how
Saussure’s signified and signifier function in the event of *concursus* in *khora* using
Warfield’s account of inspiration. Consider here that the signified is the sun and the
signifier is the stained glass, wax, clay, barley or wheat. When the signified sheds
rays of light and heat, the rays function to melt, harden and help to grow. They melt
wax and harden clay, and let some seeds to develop into wheat and some into barley,
not because of the light and heat of the sun alone, but because of each object’s
distinct particularity. These are good examples of the second causes operating
according to their own natures. The second causes are, then, the innate values of the
wax and the clay, or the wheat and the barley.

Through this process, we can understand that the ‘truth’ of the rays is focal and
marginal. According to their particular ‘understanding’, the free agent of wax
‘understands’ the rays of the sun as those which melt and that of clay ‘understands’
the rays as those which harden. Here, we can find that the line between the rays of
the sun and the wax or the clay is marginal.

The level of being of the signified is what Heidegger calls ‘ontic’, and that of the
signifier in Being (signified) of being (signifier) ‘ontological’. That is, at the level of
being (a signifier: wax, clay, barley or wheat), there are particular distinctions
(*Unterscheidung*), such as wax, clay, wheat or barley, and the relation to Being of

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 49.
beings is *différance* (*Differenz*). *The death of the I* already includes Heidegger’s *Dasein* (one of the beings, a free agent as a second cause) that involves ontic-ontological differences. In a Heideggerian diagram, *Being* (*Sein*) is signified, and a being or an entity (*Seinde*) constitutes the signifier.

In Derridean discourse, a signified (the light and heat of the sun) does not remain as a concept, but changes itself into a signifier, as the sun at night does not shed light and radiate heat in Seoul, even if it does in Glasgow and New York at the same time. Like this, in the event, something always escapes language. That is, there is a nothing that is not there and a nothing that is: all things are signifiers. Derridean *différance* is the origin or production of differences. Everything that is and is not, all that is known or is knowable, emerges in and through the restless play of *différance* in the event of *khora*. Yet the origin or production of *différance* is paradoxically almost nothing but a remnant. By the same logic, even though the Bible is written through human thoughts, feelings, language and expressions, it is nothing but God’s Word.

However, through the trace of the *différance*, we can have access to the textually of *the death of the I* in an event. The event as a remnant has been the focus of our practising theology. It is the possibility of the impossibility, but the God of *potentia absoluta* is always aware of the impossible remnant and allows us access to the remnant through tracing of Him. The nothing of the nothing that produces all things achieves true universality. The remnant can never but be known truly or properly at the ontic-ontological level, the true transcendental point.
A. Preface

Adam Smith, (1723-90) a professor of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow and one of the key figures of the Scottish Enlightenment, perceived the Providence of God with the aesthetic aspects of Calvin’s theology. Smith understands God’s providence as an invisible hand that sustains the order of the world even when God is not revealed as immediately evident. As Smith implies, the belief of Calvinists that God deals with His people by His sovereign providential care means that God can use a secular culture to speak His Word faithfully and accurately if He chooses to use it. By His sovereign providential care of His people, society and culture, God reveals Himself to this world. Following the Calvinists in this regard, the death of the I’s embedding in a passage of Hodge’s theology will be understood in the context of His Providence.

The incomprehensibility of God prevents human reason from trying to penetrate His thought. By the same token, we can conclude that this doctrine cannot be sought by scientific method. Therefore, the study of Hodge’s doctrine of the Providence, for which the theological method is scientific and inductive, allows me to investigate how Hodge’s method depicts the interplay between the incomprehensibility of God and human reason. Through scrutinising this interplay, I want to present that Hodge’s theology, in which Scottish Common Sense Realism is embedded, shows the possibility of theology of event in terms of what happens in the space of khora. We affirm that khora is exactly the space where something like Adam Smith’s invisible hand of God is dealing with His creatures in His Providence.

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670 Mark C. Taylor, Confidence Games: Money and Markets in a World without Redemption (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 4. Taylor sees aesthetic aspects of Calvin’s theology as influential in Smith’s modern theory of the market by bringing together religion, art and economics, e.g., to internal relations among individual human actors.
672 Ibid., p. 39.
That is, the Providence of God rules over the space and time of *khora* and events with His *potentia absoluta* and *potentia ordinata*.

The benefits of the doctrine of Providence, according to Francis Turretin:

> [T]he use of this doctrine is far more fruitful and excellent, both in asserting the glory of God [to whom is here ascribed the praise of the highest wisdom, power and goodness] and in cherishing our faith and increasing our confidence which, when involved in the storms of trial, the persuasion of providence strengthens, like a most sure anchor in the sea of this wicked world.673

As Turretin says, Providence plays the role of an anchor for a pious one to live in the wicked storms of trial by directing one’s eyes to God—who watches for one’s safety in dealing with all the circumstances, as well as for the security of other creatures—with the belief that nothing would happen by chance.674 Hence, it becomes our ‘duty’ to depend on God totally. If this is the case, then—as a being, not a robot, in this world—I have some questions: Are human beings able to manage their duty to be pious all the time? What about the despair of sinners? What about the tears and cries of sinners? What about those who fail to accomplish the duty of being pious? Almost all of the narratives of sinners’ suffering in the Psalms begin with tears and cries, and develop even into the negation of the existence of God, in spite of the fact that the narrative ends with sinners’ rejoicing in God.

Whatever happens, we eventually can perceive the outcome as the result of God’s Providence. However, how can we deal with the endless suffering of human beings? It is too harsh if we just take our suffering for granted in the name of Providence. This is the limit of strong theology in the form of metaphysics. Theology has to focus on the existential struggle of human beings in this world and show the phenomenological process of how such beings in this world have faith.

To answer my questions and confirm that the doctrine of Providence presupposes our existential struggle in this world, at this point of discussion, I want to examine how Turretin’s ‘first duty’ of the pious man has to be understood in the space of *khora*: A pious believer should ‘raise his eyes to God as the first and primary cause

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674 *ET*, v. I, p. 537.
and cherish the thought of the singular and special Providence of God’.\textsuperscript{675} If we regard piety as coming from the faith and knowledge of a sinner, the ‘singular and special providence of God’ should also provoke even the indulgence of seemingly impious sinners and take care of them since the Providence of God is an ongoing \textit{aporia} in the history of religion of a humankind and other creatures. Especially, in the discussion of Providence in this chapter, I want to argue that our first duty has to be observed as an event of \textit{concursus}, then, it will engender new freedom in its \textit{aporia}. My argument will be seen in the discussion of such themes as ‘\textit{potentia absoluta} and \textit{ordinata}’, ‘first and second causes in \textit{concursus}’, ‘Deism, Atheism and Theism’, ‘human sense and linguisticality’, ‘cognitive process in free agency’ in the context of Providence in Turretin and Hodge.

B. Event and Providence of God in Turretin and Hodge

Turretin extracts three types of Providence from the Biblical discourse: first (as we studied in chapter V, about Kierkegaard’s \textit{Fear and Trembling}), the event of \textit{Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac at Mount Moriah} for discussion of Providence in salvation and substitution; second, \textit{Jacob’s sitting upon the ladder} for governing/regulating, heavenly/earthly and visible/invisible; and third, \textit{the chariot of Ezekiel} for conservation and the dependence of second causes upon the first.\textsuperscript{676} Turretin understands that all things, ‘small as well as great, contingent and free, natural and necessary’ happen under His Providence:

[I]t will be evident that there is a providence in the world by which all things (even the smallest) are not only at the same time most wisely and powerfully directed, but also so connected with the divinity that it cannot be wholly denied without at the same time denying God.\textsuperscript{677}

What is conspicuous in Turretin is that he explicates Providence with the idea of temporality of an event: The Providence of God is a ‘temporal government of all things according to the decree’ and as ‘the transitive action out of God’.\textsuperscript{678} And this

\textsuperscript{675} ET, v. I, p. 537.
\textsuperscript{676} ET, v. I, p. 491.
\textsuperscript{677} ET, v. I, p. 489.
\textsuperscript{678} ET, v. I, p. 489.
spontaneity of an event is also related to the contingent and fortuitous characteristic of a human being. Turretin cites illustrations from the Bible:

Scripture in many places asserts that contingent and fortuitous events fall under providence. Nothing is more contingent than the killing of a man by a woodcutter contrary to his own intention, and yet this is ascribed to God, who is said to deliver him into the hand of the slayer. [Es 21:12, 13, Dt. 19:4f.] ‘The lot is cast into the lap; but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord[,]’ [Prov. 16:33] … The selling of Joseph and his incarceration and exaltation, yet Joseph himself testifies that these were all orders in the providence of God: ‘So now it was not you that sent me hither, but God[,]’ [Gen. 45:8]

Turretin affirms the contingency of a human being, saying that ‘it must not on this account be supposed that all contingency is removed from the world.’ He has clearly recognition on contingency of an event in between God and us. With the concept of ‘the condition of second causes’, he keeps free contingency for the world by understanding the modes of action ‘in which there is always an intrinsic faculty and indifference to the opposite’. At this moment, we need to notice that Turretin understands total free contingency of the world in terms of conservation:

Rather [God] keeps, conserves and permits them also to exercise and act out their own motions [As the prime mover may be considered so to hurl along the lower spheres that nevertheless their own proper and special motion remains to them and that does not cease to be considered contingent with respect to the second cause, from which the denomination and specification of the act is taken, whose mode of action is contingent and not determined to one direction, which still happens certainly and infallibly from the immutable disposition of divine providence].

Turretin discriminates eventual necessity from the hypothetical necessity of God. All the events in our life experience are eventually necessity in view of preservation in his doctrine of the Providence of God:

So it was necessary for Joseph to be sold by his brethren and to go down to Egypt because it had been so determined by God for the preservation of Jacob’s family. Yet, it was contingent with respect to the brothers of Joseph who might either have killed him or not have sold him. Therefore things

681 Ibid., p. 500.
682 I will discuss this concept in detail in the discussion of concursus later in this chapter.
which are absolutely and in every way necessary [both as to their fruition and as to the mode in which they are done and produced] differ from those which are of hypothetical necessity from the divine ordination.\textsuperscript{685}

Turretin wants us to believe that all the happenings of our lives are necessary whether they are eventual or hypothetical, however, he clearly recognises that the mode they are done are absolutely contingent.

Hodge’s understanding of Providence is more comprehensive than Turretin’s. While regarding Providence as the foundation of all practical religion, Hodge says that Providence shows the evidence that all the happenings of our lives are under the operation of God whenever and wherever we are.\textsuperscript{686} Hodge simply excludes both necessity and chance from the universe and substitutes for them ‘the intelligent and universal control’ of an infinite, omnipresent God. That is, the whole universe exhibits evidence of God’s omnipresent intelligence and control. Therefore, the general religious nature of man inevitably demands an instinctive and necessary belief when it comes to think of this universal Providence.\textsuperscript{687} Human intelligence and the fundamental convictions of the human mind have an important role in Hodge’s doctrine:

These religious feelings have a self-evidencing as well as an informing light. We know that they are right, and we know that the doctrine which accords with them and produces them, must be true. It is therefore, a valid argument for the doctrine of a universal providence that it meets the demands of our moral and religious nature.\textsuperscript{688}

For Hodge, the events of all creatures are understood as the ‘most holy, wise, powerful preserving and governing of all His creatures and all their actions’. With this understanding, Hodge includes preservation and government in his doctrine of Providence\textsuperscript{689} by which Hodge discriminates the function of Creation from that of

\textsuperscript{685} ET, v. 1, p. 500.
\textsuperscript{686} ST, v. 1, p. 584.
\textsuperscript{687} ST, v. 1, p. 584.
\textsuperscript{688} ST, v. 1, p. 585.
\textsuperscript{689} ST, v. 1, p. 575. Unlike Dutch Reformed theologians, most authoritative American Reformed theologians, including Hodge, explain the elements of Providence as preservation and government. Compared to Hodge’s two elements, Louis Berkhof (1873-1957) defines in his own Systematic Theology that Providence is the ‘continued exercise of the divine energy whereby the Creator preserves all His creatures, is operative in all that comes to pass in the world, and directs all things to their appointed end. This definition indicates that there are three elements in providence, namely, preservation (conservatio, sustentatio), concurrence or cooperation (concursus, co-operatio), and
Preservation and Government. Hodge wants to keep Creation as once-for-all event and explain Providence with the gradual process of government and preservation.

At the moment of discussion of Providence in Turretin and Hodge, I want to argue that what Turretin means by what is necessary and what Hodge means by the intelligent and universal control of God are only observable at the point when the event of concursus happens in the modes of our vulnerable life experiences. Since we are nothing but limited creatures, we have no way to confirm whether something is absolutely necessary or not, and how God’s intelligence is executed. Because event is the meeting point of the bipolar—divine and human—relationship and happens spontaneously with the freedom of truth as an act of truth, it should capture sudden transformation of a human being’s freedom into an absolute responsibility and conversely, that responsibility into total freedom.

In *khora*, the contingent event is neither absolutely necessary nor intelligible, but undecidable (neither/nor). However, it ‘receives all’, and eventually makes possible ‘the hypothetical necessity of divine ordination’.  

If we understand metaphysically, we can have *a priori* knowledge that the event might be necessary, but in the space of *khora*, if the necessity is necessary, then we need to understand that ‘free and voluntary things, which are in our power and are done with purpose, are governed by providence’. Since *khora* is not what can be understood by our knowledge, it is neither sensible nor intelligible.

According to Derrida, human beings tend to ‘believe, quite simply and literally, in absolute knowledge as the closure’. However, if it is not the end of history, we need to recognise that there is such a thing what is beyond absolute knowledge that is unheard-of thoughts, which requires being ‘sought for across the memory of old

government (*gubernatio*).’ Berkhof says that Calvin, the Heidelberg Catechism, and theologians such as Robert Lewis Dabney, Charles Hodge, Archibald A. Hodge, Philip K. Dick, William G. Shedd speak of only two elements. *Systematic Theology* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1949), p. 166. The ‘three elements’ theory was generally accepted by Peter Mastricht, Abraham Kuyper, Herman Bavinck and Geerhardus Vos.

Ibid.


Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Budick and Iser, eds., *Languages of the Unsayable*, p. 31.

signs’. 694 In Turretin, the ‘function’ and ‘mode’ of the life experiences of Joseph and his brothers are tracing ‘the memory of old signs’ of ‘hypothetical necessity of divine ordination’. Hence while acknowledging that Turretin is correct to distinguish human experience from the hypothetical necessity, we should remember that the ‘function’ and ‘mode’ of life experience are ‘vacillating terribly between chance and predestination’. 695 ‘The hypothetical necessity’, then, should happen as an event in our ‘tracing of God’. In khora, the necessity is not the object of our knowledge, but should be revealed as an event. The issue at stake in the discussion of the Providence of God in this chapter is what would happen in the event in His Providence.

C. Potentia Absoluta and Potentia Ordinata

God, as a Creator of the laws of nature, acts according to them with His ordinary power, but in certain cases He acts independently of them with His absolute power. These two powers are called Potentia Ordinata and Potentia absoluta. 696 In Hodge, there are strong opposition between the two, however, are reconciled in the event of concursus. While Potentia absoluta—which is the supernatural operation of God’s grace—is the efficiency of God as exercised without the use of the second causes, Potentia ordinata is natural and is called Providence, i.e, the ‘providential agency of God in the government of free agents’ towards the ordinary acts of men. 697 Hence, Potentia ordinata is the efficiency of God’s wisdom as exercised uniformly in the

694 Ibid.
696 According to Heiko Augustinus Oberman, these two terms are originally defined by Duns Scotus and later by William Occam and Gabriel Biel, though their use is slightly different. For example, Biel uses them to explain the context of ‘justification and infused grace’ and the context of ‘sacraments and its effects’. Biel regards potentia absoluta as the power to accept those who do not possess the habit of grace, and potentia ordinata as the order of God’s wisdom. Except for the events leading up to and connected with the ‘last things’, potentia ordinata is concerned with the ‘past events which shaped the present—creation, preservation, fall, and redemption’. See Heiko Augustinus Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Medieval Nominalism (Durham, North Carolina: Labyrinth Press, 1983), pp. 36-9 and G. F. Holmes, ‘Scotus, Duns’ in John McClintock and James Strong, eds., Cyclopedia of Theological Literature (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1880), v. 9, p. 459.
ordered operation of second causes. On the one hand, we see that *potentia ordinata* applies God’s providence to physical forces with His ‘design and control’ by supposing an end to be attained, and the disposition and direction of means for its accomplishment. Substances, forms, essences, qualities, properties, powers and acts of individual living creatures are operated by His ordinary power. On the other hand, by His gracious operation with *potentia absoluta*, God directly initiates supernatural events such as Creation, miracles, immediate revelation, prophecy, inspiration, acts of faith, holy affections and regeneration.

This juxtaposition is clear when Hodge does not want to synthesize human ability and God’s will by simply regarding a human being’s activity as the result of secondary causes. With this juxtaposition, Hodge prohibits us from falling into Arminianism, Pelagianism and Rationalism. Hodge explains the different function of these two powers:

1. In the ordinary operations [*potentia ordinata*], the ability to perform belongs to the agent and arises out of his nature as a rational creature… whereas the acts of faith, repentance, and other holy affections [*potentia absoluta*]… [arise] from a new principle of life supernaturally communicated and maintained.

2. The ordinary acts of men… are determined by their own natural inclinations and feelings…. On the other hand, all gracious or holy affections are thus infused or excited by the Spirit of God.

3. The providential government of God over free agents is exercised as much in accordance with the laws of mind, as his providential government over the material world is in accordance with the established laws of matter. Both belong to the *potentia ordinata*, or ordered efficiency of God.

The functional opposition of the two powers is conspicuous when Hodge discriminates Creation from Providence (Preservation and Government). For example, in the beginning, God created the substance of the world *ex nihilo*, an act which was neither metaphysically nor normally necessary but was done out of perfect freedom without any specific designed purpose. The world was not formed from any existent substance or out of the substance of God. It was created only according to the pleasure of His will. On the basis of Genesis chapter one, Hodge wants that theologians should make a distinction between this immediate

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instantaneous Creation *ex nihilo*, and the mediate gradual Creation in which ‘the power of God [works] in union with second causes’\(^701\) so as to use the previously created matter to bring the universe into the desired form. This concept implies that God continues to work in the preservation and government of what He created by means of His *potentia ordinata*.\(^702\) If the universe is not supported by *potentia ordinata*, it cannot continue to exist of itself and would cease to exist. This applies both to its substance and form, to its essence, qualities, properties and powers, and to all individual living creatures, for these are not held in existence by an inherent principle of life but by the will of God.\(^703\) Then, it might be clear that all the events in the universe cannot happen without reference of the thought of God, i.e., without tracing of God.

D. Trace and the Providence

Trace is that which is like a footprint of the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit. It may be a paradoxical or monstrous hint\(^704\) that has been there or might be there. The notion of the trace in the Providence of God, then, generates the idea of *khora*. The providential space where we are given the trace is not simply governed by physical and natural phenomena, but under God’s care. As we have seen, since Providence—as an ordinary power—is the efficiency or condition of God, it does not directly point God but the God named in the second cause of a person, a place, and a time. Since the second cause has a distinctive singularity, the place of the name of God is not like a community of ‘fusion’ but is ‘another gathering-together singularities’ or ‘another friendship’.\(^705\) A friendship, not made by this or that signified name, i.e., homogeneous ways of thinking, faith system or ideology, but by the trace of God as the *topos* of Providence. Providence is trace.

\(^701\) ST, v. I, p. 557.
\(^702\) ST, v. I, pp. 577-80.
\(^703\) ST, v. I, p. 574.
\(^704\) I identified paradox, absurdity, monstrosity, event and leap of faith in the discussion of Kierkegaard in chapter V.
\(^705\) Derrida, ‘*Sauf le nom*’, in Thomas Dutoit, ed., *On the Name*, p. 46.
The validity of *khora* in the discussion of God’s Providence is that secret knowledge of God is observable at the moment when we perceive that we are living in it. ‘The supplement’ and ‘tracing of God’ will reveal secrets of God not as the natural course of events, but the events of true transcendental point in its *concursus* in the space of *khora*. Since the nature of theology is trace and revelation, the object is not only facts of theology, but *khora*, which functionally inhabits it. So as to avoid an inexact, erroneous, aberrant and improper explanation of God and neither to rupture all talk about God nor to assume that the Transcendental Signified is metaphysical, we need to focuses on the event now as the time and here as the space in *khora* where the transcendental knowledge cannot be secret at all. Theologically speaking, ‘trace’ as Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ is human beings’ recognition of what is earned from experience between knowledge of the self and knowledge of God. In the terms of Calvinism, our faith as the knowledge of God is executed in this trace.

For example, the doctrine of divine election, reprobation and our destination is meaningful when we think of Divine Providence in the trace between God and us, because we ourselves are never able to affirm whether we are elected or not. If we are honest, as beings living in this trace, we cannot but ponder ourselves as limited creatures. As sinners living in the trace, the doctrine of reprobation begins to make us think of being humble as human beings living in the space and event of the Providence of God.

If it is so, the doctrine of Providence embedded with ‘the supplement’ will have a different function from a traditional (strong) theology based on metaphysics. We need to think of theology not simply as an object, but as that which also depends on the way in which we practise it. That is, we need to think of the functional value, not facts alone, in practising theology. Theology depends on how I promote myself in the context of the Providence of God. *The death of the I* makes us practise theology by denying the fact that metaphysical theology is possible. That is, the Providence of God allows me to practise theology in the context of *the death of the I*, not ‘the death of God’, since practising theology is not my will to be done, but His will to be done. In this sense, Providence of God has to be understood as an event.
E. First and Second Cause in \textit{Concursus}

As we have seen in Chapter I, the doctrine of \textit{concursus} is a core part of Reformed Confessionalism, found in the Westminster Confession of Faith.\textsuperscript{706} This Reformed idea, in Turretin’s view one of the most difficult in theology, was passed along to many Reformed American theologians, including Hodge.\textsuperscript{707} In this section, I will delineate not only what \textit{concursus} means, but also the relevance of \textit{concursus} to our discussion of the event in \textit{khora}. Our discussion of \textit{concursus} is important when we are engaged in a Kierkegaardian monstrous, wicked and paradoxical life experience, with such a vague vision between the confusion of a believer's objective knowledge and subjective faith in a space and time of \textit{khora}. Especially Hodge’s \textit{concursus},\textsuperscript{708} whether in free, contingent, or necessary modes of the experience of first and second causes—which captures the religious immediacy of Hodge’s theology in chapter III—shows us that intersubjective modes of religious experience are in operation.

According to Turretin, the Providence of God affirms the contingency of things that is totally indifferent with respect to the second cause, and the liberty of the will to exercise its own movement most freely, although inevitably.\textsuperscript{709} The first cause draws the second cause after itself since God decreed such an effect by the action of Providence.\textsuperscript{710} As the definition implies, \textit{concursus} is a particular and simultaneous occurrence of the first and second causes. Susan Handelman traces the idea of \textit{concursus} in the first and the second causes back to Aristotle:

    Although \textit{ousia}, primary being, the essential what of a thing, is the subject of discourse, the formations of discourse are not themselves what is (\textit{ousia}). [It should be noted that Aristotle makes a key distinction between ‘first being’,

\textsuperscript{706} Westminster Confession of Faith, V.ii.
\textsuperscript{707} This idea also affected the Southern Reformed theologian R. L. Dabney. Douglas F. Kelly argues that Dabney’s basic area of theological concern is the \textit{concursus} between ‘God’s sovereign, primary control of all things, and the reality and validity of human and natural secondary causation… The way he believes is clearer than the expositions of Dick, Hodge, and McCosh.’ Kelly also argues that Dabney was critically influenced by Turretin. ‘Robert Lewis Dabney’ in David F. Wells, ed., \textit{Southern Reformed Theology} (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1989), p. 53.
\textsuperscript{708} The definition of \textit{concursus} is the ‘continuing divine support of the operation of all secondary causes whether they are free, contingent, or necessary’. Muller, \textit{Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms}, p. 76.
\textsuperscript{709} ET, v. I, p. 492.
\textsuperscript{710} ET, v. I, p. 493.
the what which denotes *ousia*, and all other things, which are secondary being, and are said to be because they are either qualities or quantities, etc., of the first being.]\textsuperscript{711}

This order can be found in Duns Scotus’s concept of *de primo principio* as the order of eminence and the order of dependence:

[O]rder is a relation of mutual comparison predicted of the prior with regard to the posterior…. I say the first essential order seems to be divided by a primary division, as an equivocal term into its equivocates, namely, into the order of eminence and the order of dependence.\textsuperscript{712}

Following Aristotle and Duns Scotus, Turretin also wanted a specific and accurate discussion of *concursus* that explains how God concurs with second causes, not only in a particular and simultaneous way, but also in a previous *concursus*.\textsuperscript{713} However, predetermination of the second cause does not destroy, but preserves, the liberty of the will of the second cause:

By [predetermination], God does not compel rational creatures or make them act by a physical or brute necessity. Rather he only effects this—that they act both consistent with themselves and in accordance with their own nature, i.e., from preference and spontaneously (to wit, they are so determined by God that they also determine themselves).\textsuperscript{714}

According to Turretin, the first is caused by the Creator, as a universal and hyperphysical cause, and the second by the creature, as a particular and physical cause. Without the second cause, neither can exist nor be even imagined.\textsuperscript{715} Turretin articulates that God secures freedom of a human being in the contingent event of *concursus*:

That God on the one hand by his providence not only decreed but most certainly secures the event of all things, whether free or contingent; on the other hand, however, man is always free in acting and many effects are contingent. Although I[Turretin] cannot understand how these can be mutually connected together, yet (on account of the ignorance of the mode) the thing itself is (which is certain from another source, i.e., from the word) not either to be called in question or wholly denied.\textsuperscript{716}

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\textsuperscript{711} Handelman, *The Slayers of Moses*, p. 8. Bracketed comments are Handelman’s.


\textsuperscript{713} ET, v. I, p. 500.

\textsuperscript{714} ET, v. I, p. 508.

\textsuperscript{715} Ibid., p. 513.

\textsuperscript{716} ET, v. I, p. 512.
However, we also need to listen to Turretin’s warning of the danger of great reliance upon second causes:

By a too great reliance upon second causes; for as they who entirely neglect them tempt God, seeking whether he will even without means to conserve them, no less do they also sin against him who ascribe too much to them, placing their confidence in them and clinging to these certain means as if were to a spike, leave no room for divine providence on account of their distrust. (2 Ch 16:12). For although we ought to love and honor creatures, yet we are permitted to trust in God alone and to rest upon him as their most wise and provident Father.  

Turretin believes that, since the second cause is the effect of the first, the second cause cannot be thought of as independent from the first.

Hodge also talks about the efficiency in the interplay between the first and second causes saying that ‘the efficiency of the first cause is in the second, and not merely with it.’ Thus, the secondary cause acts according to its nature but upon by the efficacy in the first cause. In Hodge, the first cause is the will of God, God’s set purpose and foreknowledge (Acts 2:23). The secondary cause is self-actively-causing. Accordingly, even something such as matter itself has a powerful active cause whose effect is also influenced by God. Hodge argues that God has endowed matter with various properties or powers which are the proximate causes of physical evidence. This theory helps to explain the truth of God’s filling Heaven and Earth. We know, then, that God is everywhere present and everywhere perfectly active. To be more specific, God is immanent with every particle of matter, not only of being, but also of knowledge and power.

The second cause can be explained by diverse connotations either qualitatively or quantitatively. It sometimes stands for the mere occasion; the instrument by which something is accomplished; the efficiency to which the effect is due; the end for which a thing is done; the ground or reason why the effect or action of the efficient

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720 Generally among theologians, matter was regarded as passive before Darwinism, but a theologian such as Charles Hodge explains this evidence of science by the theory that matter itself has active powers.
cause is so rather than otherwise. Hodge secures the liberty of the second causes and their self-generating effects through the doctrine of *concursus*:

1. The effect produced or the fact performed is to be referred to the second, and not to the first cause. 2. The doctrine of *concursus* does not deny the efficiency of second causes. They are real causes, having a *principium agenda* in themselves. 3. The agency of God neither supersedes nor in any way interferes with the efficiency of second causes. 4. The efficiency or agency of God is not the same in relation to all kinds of events. 5. The divine *concursus* is not inconsistent with the liberty of free agents. 6. The great difficulty attending [the doctrine of *concursus*] is in relation to sin. So it is argued that the same divine efficiency sustains and animates all free agents.

As Hodge illustrates, the efficiency is a kind of transference or translation as seen in the rays of the sun which transfers its power to various objects with different results of translation. That is, the second causes translate what is transferred—for example, the same ray melts wax while it hardens clay—according to their own nature. As Hodge recognized above 1, the referent of the fact performed is the second cause. These secondary causes are related to the innate natures of the wax and clay, the free agents in this analogy. With this idea, Benjamin Warfield could study the Bible without fearing the human aspect of Scriptures, while retaining belief in its Divine origin and character.

As the above example shows, the concept of secondary causes provides a key to explaining the will of God to different peoples and cultures. God takes care of their second causes, even when their way of thinking and their cultural phenomena are quite different from ours. Then, we can affirm that God is the author of textuality, because God predetermined the direction and government of the second causes of the free agencies. Yet we should keep in mind that the effect performed is referred to as the second cause, since ‘when a man speaks, it is the man, and not God who utters the words.’ God gives to second causes the power of acting; preserves

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724 *ST*, v. 1, pp. 600-2.
725 *ST*, v. 1, p. 599. Another of Hodge’s examples is that some seeds develop into wheat and some into barley, because of their own distinctive nature and not because of the force of the sun.
726 *ST*, v. 1, p. 600.
them in being and vigor; excites and determines second causes to act; and directs and governs them to the predetermined end.\textsuperscript{727}

At the same time, we should recognise that God rules free agents such as matter or human beings in such a way that His efficiency does not supersede that of His creatures. To explain this, Hodge differentiates two classes of causes:

The one class consists of effects which do not, the other of those which do indicate design. In the latter we see evidence of a purpose, of foresight, of provision for the future, of adaptation, of choice, of spontaneity, as well as of power. In the former all these indications are absent.\textsuperscript{728}

Such cases as the flow of water from a higher to a lower level, vaporisation, heat producing expansion, cold contraction, and alkalis correcting acidity, are examples of effects having no evidence of purpose or design.\textsuperscript{729}

The concept of \textit{concursus} enables us to believe that God has made it possible to study the same phenomena from very different but coherent perspectives. If we agree with a critic that ‘the adequacy of an attempted contextualization must be measured by the degree to which it faithfully reflects the meaning of the biblical text’,\textsuperscript{730} the \textit{concursus} of God, which fully affirms the authority of the Bible, makes it possible to regard our discussion on textuality in \textit{khora} as Biblical. Such a theological argument, that the authority of the Bible is ‘neither given nor willed’\textsuperscript{731} can be fully criticised by this doctrine because \textit{concursus} acknowledges the Providence of God, which uses human ability for His purposes.\textsuperscript{732} Discussing this theme, Mark Noll explains \textit{concursus} in Warfield’s theology:

For Warfield the idea of \textit{concursus} meant the simultaneous activity of divine and natural agency, neither replacing the other, neither excluding the other.

\textsuperscript{727} ST, v. I, p. 600.  
\textsuperscript{728} ST, v. I, p. 280.  
\textsuperscript{729} ST, v. I, p. 280.  
\textsuperscript{730} Hesselgrave and Romen, \textit{Contextualization}, p. 201.  
\textsuperscript{731} Darrel Jordock argues that ‘the authority of the Bible is a by-product of participation in the life of the Christian community… Thus, because of the character of the authority, the topic of Biblical authority does not belong to theological prolegomena but to third-article considerations regarding the nature and function of the church.’ ‘The Impact of Cultural Change: Princeton Theology and Scriptural Authority Today’, \textit{Dialogue} 22 (Winter 1983), p. 27.  
\textsuperscript{732} Warfield develops Hodge’s idea of \textit{concursus} in his doctrine of inspiration. In the doctrine of the Scriptures, Warfield explains the Bible both as a Divine book and at the same time a human book when he explains ‘inspiration’. \textit{Revelation and Inspiration} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1927), p. 96.
Warfield himself used this idea to reconcile Scripture and evolution, by claiming that what happened in nature must in principle reflect the constant, overarching providence of God. But he made greatest use of the concept in his doctrine of the Scripture. The Bible was a thoroughly divine book; the Bible was a thoroughly human book. Christians, of all people, should be eager to do the research which illuminates the natural history of the Bible, its process of human composition. In principle nothing discovered in such inquiry can negate the divine inspiration of Scripture, because that inspiration works through human agency, rather than as a substitute for it.733

Sometimes, analyses of Warfield’s concursus are one-sided. Some argue that there is no consideration of a human contribution or initiative in Warfield’s exegetical analysis on the Scripture. But if we recognise the providential preparation of those whom God moved to write, we cannot say that Warfield’s concursus is one-sided. We can always see the manifestation of God’s sovereignty in the ordinary operation of the world. To Warfield, concursus was grounded in general considerations of both God’s immanence and his transcendence, and it was a conception that Warfield linked to doctrines of both Providence and grace. It was, in other words, a necessary device growing out of mature theological reflection.

Then, how can we understand transference when the two Powers compose together? How can we recognise the moment of event when the conceptual Powers are colliding? These questions lead us to inquire what Hodge means by the efficiency of the first is in the second cause. At least, what we can find is that the apparent opposition (studium/punctum, or ordinary/absolute) facilitates an efficient composition between the two sides.734 As soon as the two occur together—we are not able to discern between the two contents or things—the predicatively determined concept of the opposite two is scarcely graspable.735 At this moment, there is no clear distinction between life and death but ‘the haunting of the one by the other’.736 At this moment, clearly distinct and opposable identity representing one or the other can be recognised as that the absolute is in the ordinary or the punctum in the stadium. The efficiency of the first in the second can be seen as the “scansion” or

734 Derrida, The Work of Mourning, p. 41. Studium means the desire to explore the relationship between the meanings and our subjectivities. Punctum is more about sudden recognition of meaning.
736 Ibid.
“invasion” of ‘the *studium* by a *punctum* that is not opposed to it even though it remains completely other, a *punctum* that comes to stand in or double for it, link up to it, and compose with it’. 737 This “scansion” as a *concursus* will evoke limitless love for the other because it suspends all the conceptualised images (hypothetical necessities of God) whom I strongly want to get and know. A concept at one’s disposal is possible only by the presupposition of a closed system or guarantee sealed heritage. 738 However, the power of *punctum* functions like a metonymic force that ‘divides the referential trait, suspends the referent and leaves it to be desired, while still maintaining the reference’. 739 Then, the relationship between the “invasion” of the *punctum* seen as the metonymic power and the coded *studium* is ‘neither tautological nor oppositional, neither dialectical nor in any sense symmetrical, it is supplementary and musical (contrapuntal)’. 740 Likewise, the efficiency of the *potentia absoluta* functions as the structure of the metonymic power of *punctum* in *concursus*. The incessant substitution of metonymy will direct to the truth without knowing how far it is from Truth.

F. *Khora* and Providence

Unlike Turretin, in the discussion of the Providence of God, Hodge tends to link human minds directly to the control of God by taking our minds for granted as having a moral and religious nature. However, Hodge should have recognised the contingency of Joseph’s brothers—whether they will kill or sell Joseph—in his discussion of Providence. Our minds are not like mechanical robots that are ready to comply with the will of God. Rather than meeting and demanding of our moral and religious nature (what we ought to do), the universal Providence should allow everything to happen by human minds’ tracing of God under His preservation, because human minds can never predict how what God provides is to happen. The Providence of God does not demand that something happen, but is important and meaningful in signifying our faith to trace of Him in *khora*.

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737 Ibid., pp. 43, 57.
740 Ibid., p. 58.
There is only one preserved *khora* as the providential space of God, even if *khora* can be a pure multiplicity of places. As the Providence of God is not God, *khora* is neither God nor the Kingdom of God. The difference is that *khora* does not generate anything by force. It does not give any order or make any promise. It is a qualitative place that definitely remains as the place of waiting, awaiting the realisation of the promise. Even if *khora* is a waiting place—and therefore does not presuppose God, the Kingdom of God and the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit—it is the preserved space of universal Providence. *Khora* is not influenced by but is embedded in the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit. It is just the supplement. Yet it makes us wait for the promise to come true, whatever the promise is.

As we discussed in chapter I, *khora* is the event/place of the *death of the I*: the place of *responsibility* that passes through the very ordeal of seemingly monstrous life experiences; of *faith* that ventures into absolute risk; and of *gift* with the transcendental selfless goodness through a new experience of death. When the *death of the I* is embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, *khora* adds one more character: *humility* to die as Christ did. As D. Clair Davis shows, in Calvinism, the secularity of humanity—including the function of the *death of the I*—does not undermine God’s original plan for this world:

To take seriously humanity and its history does not take away from God’s direction of the course of history. The reality of human thoughts, emotions and decisions is never antithetical to the reality of God’s power and love in his communication with his people…. To be sure, the doctrine of providence is further subdivided to make clear that God deals in a special way with his people, and in an even more special way in his supernatural dealings with them. As far as we recognise God’s ‘supernatural dealings’ as what is transcendentally signified, God’s Providence includes everything, as far as God uses secular culture, language and mindset of sinners.

Let us think of *khora* in the context of the Upper Room of Mark, where God provides (Acts 2:1-13). The Holy Spirit comes to 120 people staying at the attic on

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the Pentecost. It is in this place that a true transcendental point fully occurs. The Holy Spirit is promised by Jesus, and the people wait and experience it. However, it occurs without being caused by the anticipation of any sensory mechanism—i.e., it is not caused by their expectation in the attic. ‘Human senses’ only recognise what is happening. ‘Human senses’ are not limited by anything but such experiences as the event of the Holy Spirit.

Then where is the place of khora in the event of the Holy Spirit? Is it the Upper Room of Mark? Is it the Holy Spirit? Is it the conscience or faith of the people in the room of attic? No. Khora is not the place of the Upper Room, not the place of the Holy Spirit, not the place of the conscience or the faith of people. It is the temporal place of the death of the I’s thousands years of waiting for the provided promise of God to be fulfilled.

Again, khora is not exclusively a place of the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit because it is not influenced by the power of the Holy Spirit alone. It is a third place between the people in the Upper Room and the Holy Spirit. In this sense, khora is a common ground of the universe insofar as it represents the universal textuality of the space and the time as the supplement. For Derrida, since khora remains alien to the order of presence and absence, it seems that one could invent it in its very otherness at the moment of the address.742 This is why we should distinguish the death of the I from the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit. The death of the I does not have any intended force, but the Holy Spirit has the power of saving.

The death of the I plays a supplemental enigmatic role for the people of responsibility making an absolute decision without knowledge, and those of faith venturing into absolute risk beyond knowledge and experiencing a new death, a true transcendental point. The Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, sent by Christ of the humiliating Cross, made the perseverance of the saints possible. Khora—which is nothing but a supplemental space, but makes possible what we think impossible—is also under His Providence.

742 Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ in Budick and Iser, eds., Languages of the Unsayable, p. 39.
Khora is radically nonhuman, ‘atheological’ and ‘ahistorical’ because nothing happens through it and nothing happens to it.\(^{743}\) Even if khora is neither God, Jesus and the Holy Spirit, nor evil spirits, it is the space of the Providence of God, which makes Christians think of or trace the promise that they have in mind. Then they will be where the promise is continuously fulfilled by participating in their ordeal of Kierkegaard’s monstrous (undecidable) lives. For 120 people in the Upper Room, whether the Holy Spirit will come is not the issue; it is, rather, that of the promise of the blood of Jesus Christ, the promise of His total and transcendental Messianic Providence.

However, Hodge acknowledges that the miraculous event in the Upper Room is not of any law, but totally spontaneous. Referring to the Bible, he asserts that ‘the providential agency of God is not only exercised over all the operations of nature’,\(^ {744}\) but also extends over the animal world, over nations and over individuals.\(^ {745}\) Affirming the Westminster Confession, Hodge also acknowledges miracles which occur without second causes. God works freely without, above or against means of pleasure.\(^ {746}\) The Bible also shows the miracle as evidence of the immediate power of God. It not only asserts ‘the absolute independence of God of all his works, and his absolute control over them, but is also filled with examples of the actual exercise of this control’\(^ {747}\). In this sense, Hodge is correct to object to the doctrine of higher laws because it is gratuitous, unsatisfactory and not supported by the Scriptures. A miracle like the work of the Holy Spirit in the Upper Room of Mark is the ‘material fact as coinciding with an express announcement or with express supernatural pretensions in the agent’.\(^ {748}\)

\(^{743}\) Ibid., p. 37.

\(^{744}\) ST, v. I, p. 586.

\(^{745}\) ST, v. I, pp. 586-8. Hodge says that ‘irrational animals are the objects of God’s providential care. He fashioned their bodies, He calls them into the world, sustains them in being, and supplies their wants. In His hand is the life of every living thing (Job xii. 10).’ Providence also extends over ‘nations and communities of men (Ps. lxvi. 7; Dan. iv. 35; Dan. ii. 21, etc.).’ Lastly, it extends over individuals. ‘The circumstances of every man’s birth, life and death, are ordered by God (1 Sam. ii. 6,7; Is. xlv. 5; Prov. xvi. 9, etc.).’

\(^{746}\) ST, v. I, pp. 617-8. Hodge expands the notion of miracles: ‘First, that they take place in the external world, i.e., in the sphere of the observation of the senses; and secondly, that they are produced or caused by the simple volition of God, without the intervention of any subordinate cause.’

\(^{747}\) ST, v. I, p. 621.

\(^{748}\) ST, v. I, p. 625.
G. Deism, Atheism and Theism

The concept of preservation comes from the idea that ‘all things out of God owe the continuance of their existence, with all their properties and powers, to the will of God.’ Thus, when Hodge explains preservation, he distinguishes it from Creation, because Creation is ‘the calling into existence what before did not exist’, while preservation is the ‘continuing, or causing to continue what already has a being’. In the course of Creation, ‘there is and can be no cooperation’, but in preservation, as distinct from creation, there is ‘a concursus of the first, with second causes’. This distinction between the first and second causes in the doctrine of preservation prevents us from attributing authorship of sin to God.

Thus, Hodge proposes as dangerous the doctrine of continuous Creation, because it would make God, rather than man, responsible for sin, or else eliminate altogether the concept of sin. In the same way that the problem of evil can be explained by such a doctrine, the phenomena of the material universe or the external world can be interpreted by the doctrine of Providence. For these reasons, Hodge distinguishes the efficiency of natural forces from Divine efficiency. In other words, he likes to explain natural forces and their efficiency by Providence, especially preservation, as we discriminated between the efficiency of the death of the I in khora and Divine efficiency.

Hodge develops his doctrine of God’s relation to natural laws in opposition to Deism. He wants to preserve God’s role as a guide to the processes of nature so as to preserve His role in answering prayer. Such a doctrine of Providence would provide a foundation for the Christian belief that God, who is concerned with man,

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749 ST, v. I, p. 578. Hodge says on the next page that ‘Creation is the production of something out of nothing. Preservation is the upholding in existence what already is.’
751 ST, v. I, p. 580. In detail, Hodge gives us more information on the benefits of this distinction as not falling into pantheism and idealism.
is also able to guide the laws of nature so that He can respond to man’s prayers for help. If prayer is to be more than subjectively efficacious, God must be able to control the forces of nature.⁷⁵⁵ On the other hand, in opposition to the doctrine of continued Creation, Hodge wishes to preserve the efficiency of natural forces as distinct from Divine efficiency. To fail to keep these distinct would, he fears, lead to idealism and pantheism, as well as involve God in responsibility for sin.⁷⁵⁶

For these reasons, Hodge emphasises the reality of the external world, the distinction between Creation and preservation, and the distinction between the efficiency of God and that of second causes.⁷⁵⁷ He defines the doctrine of God’s providential government as ‘the idea of design and control’.⁷⁵⁸ Therefore, God’s Providence is understood as universal (including all the creatures of God and all their actions), powerful, wise and holy.⁷⁵⁹ The Providence of God not only ‘necessarily flows from the Scriptural idea of God’, but also has ‘omnipresent and infinite intelligence, to comprehend and to direct all things however complicated, numerous, or minute’.⁷⁶⁰

The Deistic idea, that God determines all things according to the laws which He impressed upon them from the beginning without his continued intervention, is rejected by Hodge as doing violence to the Scriptural teaching that God is everywhere present in his essence, knowledge and power.⁷⁶¹ It denies ‘the instinctive religious convictions of all men’, whether they love and trust Him or fear Him because they recognise Him as active and present everywhere.⁷⁶² Not only does God preserve the world in existence but, according to Hodge, He also governs it for some great end and many subordinate ends. To achieve His purposes, God controls and governs the material world according to fixed laws, irrational animals according to instincts, and man according to his rational nature.⁷⁶³ So, Hodge rejects

⁷⁵⁹ ST, v. I, p. 582.
⁷⁶³ ST, v. I, p. 582.
both the theory of divine government, which sees the world as a machine operated by natural law, and the opposing theory of absolute dependence on God, which views God as the only cause.\textsuperscript{764} He also rejects the view that would eliminate all physical forces by giving to some mind, whether of God or of man, all power of producing effects.\textsuperscript{765} Hodge opposes the doctrine of pre-established harmony because it violates the facts of consciousness.\textsuperscript{766}

Hence, we also think of ironists’ virtues of ‘tolerance’ and ‘flexibility’ in relationship with others under God’s Providence.\textsuperscript{767} Since, as Rorty recognises, ‘tolerance’ and ‘flexibility’ operate in the intersubjective modes, and since objectivity is possible only in the contingency of these modes, they should be observed in the operation of second causes. G. Elijah Dann determines that Rorty’s view on religion is ‘anticlericalism’ rather than ‘atheism’, after analysing that Rorty speaks about religious belief without philosophical epistemology.\textsuperscript{768} The atheists’ argument that we do not have any tool to investigate whether God exists is meaningless, if we think of the secret of God as secret no more in a true transcendental point of \textit{concursus}. Our sensitive responsibility to be tolerant and flexible to differences for the sake of solidarity will guide us to the point of \textit{concursus} where the old dualism between theism and atheism is overthrown and placed aside.\textsuperscript{769}

H. Human Sense and Linguisticality

One of the distinctive characteristics of Hodge’s doctrine of the Providence of God is the recognition of human senses where the components of the linguisticality of hermeneutics function. This linguisticality can be found especially in the

\textsuperscript{764} ST, v. I, pp. 591-2.
\textsuperscript{765} ST, v. I, p. 595.
\textsuperscript{766} ST, v. I, p. 597.
\textsuperscript{767} We discussed these virtues in the section on Rorty in chapter V.
\textsuperscript{769} Ibid.
relationship between human senses and faith. Here my question is, what kind of authority is due to human senses in matters of faith?⁷⁷⁰

According to Hodge, the doctrine of transubstantiation of the Roman Catholic Church contradicts the testimony of our senses of sight, taste and touch. Therefore it is natural for Protestants to appeal to this contradiction as decisive evidence against Catholic doctrine. Protestants believe the following points regarding the human senses:

1) Confidence in the well-authenticated testimony of our senses, is one of those laws of belief which God has impressed upon our nature. 2) Confidence in our senses is, therefore, one form of confidence in God. It supposes him to have placed us under the necessity of error. 3) All ground of certainty in matters either of faith or knowledge, is destroyed, if confidence in the law of our nature be abandoned. Nothing is then possible but absolute skepticism. 4) All external supernatural revelation is addressed to the senses. Those who heard Christ had to trust their sense of hearing; those who read the Bible have to trust to their sense of sight; those who receive the testimony of the Church, receive it through their senses.⁷⁷¹

The first aspect above shows that the laws of belief function by our confidence in the testimony of our senses. That is, even before knowledge, there is human confidence caused by senses. This presupposition leads us to the conclusion in the fourth point above, that even supernatural revelation of God is not meaningful without the work of human senses.

Hodge clearly anticipates the ideas of Gadamer that hermeneutics as the science of interpretation is not a mere method of determining truth, but a process of perceiving the conditions (application) for a real fusion of horizon which make truth possible.⁷⁷² Human senses for Hodge are vehicles to perceive the knowledge of God. On the one hand, senses become the tools of universal linguisticality, and on the other hand, senses are to be trusted only within their legitimate sphere.⁷⁷³

Intuitive truths belong to the several departments of the senses, the understanding, and our moral nature. In the first place, all our perceptions are intuitions. We apprehend their objects immediately, and have an

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⁷⁷¹ ST, v. I, p. 60.
⁷⁷³ ST, v. I, p. 60.
irresistible conviction of their reality and truth. We may draw erroneous conclusions from our sensations; but our sensations, as far as they go, tell us the truth. When a man feels pain, he may refer it to the wrong place, or to a wrong cause; but he knows that it is pain. If he sees an object, he may be mistaken as to its nature; but he knows that he sees, and that what he sees is the cause of the sensation which he experiences. There are intuitions, because they are immediate perceptions of what is true. The conviction which attends our sensation is due not to instruction but to the constitution of our nature.\footnote{ST, v. I, p. 192.}

According to Hodge, we may draw erroneous conclusions from our senses, but our senses eventually guide us to the truth. Again, this sensation cannot be obtained by our knowledge or instruction, but by what constitutes us. Hodge believes that intuitions are immediate perceptions of what is true. As Hodge shows above, truth cannot be obtained by a particular technique or procedure of inquiry because it transcends the limits of methodological reasoning. In order to find the truth of spoken or written language, Hodge seeks the conditions for understanding its meaning with the recognition of human senses and intuition. What Hodge means by ‘proper’ and ‘legitimate’ is, therefore, definitely linguistic. However, the difference to Gadamer’s linguistics is that Hodge’s ‘human senses’ and ‘intuition’ are confined to the ‘conditions for understanding’ truth, i.e., the Holy Spirit.

As we studied in chapter IV, Gadamer believes that human linguisticality is the very tool for achieving hermeneutic universality. For Gadamer, this linguisticality is not separate from or exclusively confined to something, but abides in every dimension’s social diversities and pluralities, including such work and domination. While Gadamer’s universality is made by both hermeneutics and social lives which are equally legitimate and interpenetrating, Hodge’s understanding of the linguisticality of ‘human senses’ is always related to the domain of the Holy Spirit. Rather, Hodge wants to interpret the work of the \textit{potentia absoluta} through human senses.

In \textit{khora}, the One who comes from on high does not ‘simply wait on the horizon’ but never leaves us without doing anything inadvertently, because He precedes, swoops down upon and seizes us here and now without being noticed, yet, ‘in
actuality and not potentiality'. In Hodge’s concursus, the promise of the future is immanently working the One is working with incessant interception. *Concursus* reveals the regulative idea of the promise and makes it ‘the absolute and unconditional urgency of the here and now’.

This structure of promise is the key to understand how we can sense the undeniable real and sensible function of the interruption relationship of two causes: heterogeneous but inseparable function with ‘the infinite secret of the other’. As Hodge recognised in the last sentence of above citation, what seems to be impossible does not remain as an idea that should be learned but can be immediately sensible as a discourse of the happenings of the promise to come.

I. Liberty and Ability in Free Agency

Hodge speaks of the free agent as a tool to explain God’s absolute providential control over all events. God rules entirely over the free agents by acquiescing to their liberty: ‘[God] governs free agents with certainty, but without destroying their liberty, and material causes, without superseding their efficiency.’ Free agency in Hodge is governed by God; however, it enjoys its total freedom in its action. In Hodge’s epistemology based on Kant and Thomas Reid, the freedom in ‘free agency’ is that of the self-assertive will of ‘the autonomy of the “I”’. With this introductory insight on Hodge’s conception of freedom and free agency, I want to discuss Nietzsche’s idea of freedom, ‘the will to power’, in connection with Hodge.

The questions of Nietzsche that I raised in chapter I were all about freedom. Let me cite his questions from *On the Genealogy of Morality* again: how can we know truth?; why do we wish not to be deceived?; to what extent is life bearable without the existence of ideals?; must religious beings always be ascetic? Nietzsche’s questions can be construed with the concept of *de libero arbitrio*. Among Lutheran

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776 Ibid., p. 85.
777 Ibid., pp. 84; 88. Derrida acknowledges that the distinction of the two was first developed in his article *Force and Law* and further elaborated in his *Spectors of Marx*, Ibid., p. 88.
and Reformed theologies, the concept of *de libero arbitrio*\(^{779}\) means that the faculty of will, the *voluntas*, is free. We know that sin or the total depravity of a human being is the core element of the faculty of will. But when this concept refers to the theological issues of sin and the gift of grace, we cannot but think of the relation between nature and the necessary conditions of free agency.\(^{780}\)

Hodge defines the necessary conditions of free agency following Augustine. In the controversy between Augustine and Pelagius on ‘free will’, Augustine denies the free will of human beings because they are intrinsically fallen, while Pelagius affirms it. The Reformers in the sixteenth century, following Augustine, ‘ascribe free agency to man in the true sense of the words, but deny to him freedom of will’.\(^{781}\) In order not to confuse liberty and ability in the discussion of freedom and free agency, Hodge follows Augustine’s three-fold division of the states of man: The liberty of man before the fall, which was an ability either to sin or not to sin; The state of man since the fall, he has liberty to sin but not to do good; The state of man in heaven, he has liberty to do good but not to evil.\(^{782}\)

To Hodge, since the fall, the ability is lost but liberty remains, and the latter is understood as the power to decide for good or evil, holiness or sin.\(^{783}\) Hodge summarises the function of his theory of liberty for a human being:

> It teaches that a man is a free and responsible agent, because he is the author of his own acts, and because he is determined to act by nothing out of himself, but by his own views, convictions, inclinations, feelings and dispositions, so that his acts are the true products of the man, and really represent or reveal what he is. The profoundest of modern authors admit that this is the true theory of liberty.\(^{784}\)

For this reason, Hodge argues that human beings do not have the ability to change what and who they are, but have the liberty to act upon it. So free agency should be distinguished from ability, which was only possible before the fall, according to Hodge’s definition:

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\(^{779}\) This term means ‘free choice’, but is sometimes incorrectly used to mean ‘free will’.


\(^{781}\) Ibid., p. 116.

\(^{782}\) Ibid.

\(^{783}\) Ibid., p. 106.

\(^{784}\) Ibid., p. 134.
Free agency is the power to decide according to our character; ability is the power to change our character by a volition. The former, the Bible and consciousness affirm, belongs to man in every condition of his being; the latter, the Bible and consciousness teach with equal explicitness, does not belong to fallen man. 785

Here, we need to recognise that free agency is the basic characteristic of the death of the I. Since khora is the space where sinners, whether forgiven or not, are residing, like the free agency for Hodge, the death of the I cannot exercise its ability to do something, but just acts according to its own particular character or identity. In this sense, it cannot create something but only recognises something is there. Hence, as Hodge argues that the death of the I as a free agency belongs equally to every identity, to God, angels, saints in glory, fallen men and Satan. 786 It has a sense of belonging in every identity, including God and us, and the textuality between both in the space and time of khora. Following Hodge’s argument that God is the only free agent with ability, while every creature is a free agent with only liberty, khora recognises that God is the only Transcendental Signified with His voluntary will, and that all the creatures living in this world are free agents with liberty.

Hence, in Hodge, Nietzsche’s will to power (freedom) is liberty. In the paradigm of khora, since self-denial or recognition of the self as totally depraved comes from Hodge’s sense of liberty, it should not be perceived as a phenomenon of self-contradiction, as Nietzsche understands. Rather, it is the very tool for the expression of liberty. In khora, at its transcendental point of an event, the death of a subject (self-destructing will) becomes the source of power that makes the impossibility possible. Thus, Nietzsche’s four questions above become proper guidelines for Hodge’s free agency and the death of the I.

In khora, the freedom of sinners comes from the death of the subject in the grace of God, where our freedom rather enhances our selflessness, self-denial and self-sacrifice. The freedom in God has to be thought by the idea of ‘the event with the machine’, even though the event exceeds a programmable and calculable

785 Ibid., p. 118.
786 Ibid.
machine.\textsuperscript{787} As Derrida recognises, it is extremely difficult to understand the status of ‘the event with the machine’, however, it is necessary to track the effects of the calculation of a machine so as to grasp ‘where we are affected by the other’ with which nothing can render the encounter.\textsuperscript{788} Derrida believes that it is also a scientific responsibility not to deny or ignore unforeseeable and incalculable coming of the other by taking into account what ‘defies accounting’ and ‘inflects otherwise the principle of reason’.\textsuperscript{789} Hence the free agent’s selflessness can be observed by the event. As we have studied, \textit{khora} presents the way to overcome the limit of the modern paradigm of thinking and judgement, and thus rehabilitates modern theology and philosophy. At this point of discussion of free agency as \textit{the death of the I}, I want to return to Hodge’s conception of a free agent and its responsibility.

Hodge argues three truths regarding human beings’ nature: that they are free agents; that none but free agents can be accountable for their character or conduct; and that they do not possess the ability to change their moral states by the acts of their will.\textsuperscript{790} We can see that Hodge’s above view of human beings as free agents is inherited from Reid. Hodge cites Reid on free agency as follows:

Reid says that all that is involved in agency is that man is an agent, the author of his own acts, or that we are ‘efficient causes in our deliberate voluntary actions’….‘To say that man is a free agent, is no more than to say that, in some instances, he is truly an agent and a cause, and is not merely acted upon as a passive instrument.’\textsuperscript{791}

Human beings as free agents, according to Hodge and Reid, should assume responsibility for their character and conduct since they act upon their own liberty (freedom).

So Hodge criticises Jonathan Edwards for his confusion of the self-determination of an agent and the self-determination of the will. Edwards is ambiguous on the power of self-determination. According to Hodge, an agent is self-determined when,

\textsuperscript{787} Derrida and Roudinesco, \textit{What Tomorrow…: A Dialogue}, p. 49. Here, while calling freedom as that happens at the beginning moment when there is something incalculable, Derrida distinguishes between an incalculable that remains homogeneous with calculation and a noncalculable that no longer belongs to the order of calculation.

\textsuperscript{788} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{789} Ibid., p. 50.


\textsuperscript{791} Ibid., pp. 119-20.
first, ‘he is author or efficient cause of his own act,’ and second, when ‘the grounds or reasons of his determination are within himself.’ That is, in Hodge, the concept that ‘the will is self-determined’ denies that ‘it is determined by anything in the man’. Therefore, citing Reid, Hodge continues to confirm that the idea that ‘the will is self-determined’ separates the will from the other constituent parts of a man: 

‘Was there a cause of the action? Undoubtedly there was. Of every event there must be a cause that had power sufficient to produce it, and that exerted that power of the purpose. In the present case, either the man was the cause of the action, and then it was a free action, and is justly imputed to him; or it must have had another cause, and can not be justly imputed to the man. In this sense, therefore, it is granted that there was a sufficient reason of the action; but the question about liberty, is not in the least affected by this concession.’

Reid attributes the cause of free action to a human being (Kant might have had a Reidean understanding of cause and effect, since he followed Scottish Common Sense Realism, as we discussed in chapter III). Therefore, human beings are to be totally responsible for their actions:

Again [Reid] asks, ‘Why may not an efficient cause be denied to be, a being that had power and will to produce the effect? The production of an effect requires active power, and active power, being a quality, must be in a being no effect; but where these are conjoined, the effect must be produced.’

By examining the difference between an agent’s self-determination and that of the will, we can gain insight into an ‘event in khora’ in Hodge’s theology. As I proved throughout the first four chapters that the self-determined liberty of a sinner (a signifier, in Derridean terms) is happening as an event in khora, I follow Hodge’s distinction between the claim that ‘agents are self-determined’ and the claim that ‘the will is self-determined.’ Because khora also acknowledges that all people living in different times and cultural dimensions are free agents with liberty.

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792 Ibid., p. 120.
793 Ibid.
794 Ibid.
795 Ibid., pp. 132-3.
796 Ibid.
That these ‘agents are self-determined’, while ‘the will is not self-determined’ means two things for Hodge:

1st. That [an agent] is author or efficient cause of his own act. 2d. That the grounds or reasons of his determination are within himself. He is determined by what constitutes him at the moment, a particular individual, his feelings, principles, character, dispositions; and not by any *ab extra* or coercive influence.797

J. In Sum

Hodge’s idea that agents are self-determined and free in the Providence of God clearly shows the juxtaposition between the functions of free agency and of the Holy Spirit. This juxtaposition inevitably makes a free agent to be context-sensitive. With a clear understanding of this juxtaposition, George Newlands writes, ‘The humility of God should lead us to sensitivity about other religions in speaking of revelation.’798 In Newlands, ‘true concern for God’ and ‘true concern for humanity’ do not compete with each other, but are observed in our self-humbling *generosity* in our reconciliatory life experience of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.799 This *generosity* will also affirm Hodge’s function of free agency as the *death of the I*. Since, in *khora*, the autonomous self-determination of various agents is not the same and recognises the fact that the Providence of God encompasses each agent’s ‘proper’ ways of thinking, we need to break through incompatible belief systems and ideologies with such a non-violent generosity: ‘a force in nourishing authenticity in the other’.800

Actually, if Providence is meant by government and preservation, it does not designate the regulative ideal concept of God but is like a space of ‘archives’ where old documents and records are preserved. The relationship between the future-coming-of-God and preserved documents signify Providence of tension: A tension in the process of a concept is being formed.801 In the space of Providence, this

797 Hodge, ‘Free Agency’, *Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review* 29, p. 120.
799 Ibid., pp. 20-4.
800 Ibid., p. 8.
801 Jacques Derrida, *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression* (Chicago: The University of Chicago
tension always remains ‘inadequate relative to what it ought to be, divided, disjointed’ between the concept and the efficiency of the first cause (God). Since providence is the now-tense of the future promise and always happens here, the tension of the two has to be reconciled with ‘the movements of promise and of future’.

People of all life experiences in different times and spaces give different priority to these ways of thinking. With these differences understood, such a generosity—as a movement of promise and of future—will achieve a true transcendental point in cross-cultural communication. In God’s Providence, our responsibility, gift, faith, humility and generosity will always trace of Him as genuine sources of freedom. In His potentia ordinata, the humanity of a free agent will achieve Messianic universality not in creating something, but in preserving what is created. Hodge’s doctrine of conservation is possible only by our recognition of the work of the Holy Spirit in our life experiences of now.

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802 Ibid.
The relevance of the thought of Derrida to Hodge’s theology is to secure the space of *khora* as event and as true transcendental point. Such a strong theology as Hodge’s needs the space of *khora* to be truly Reformed, especially when it is to defend what it believes to be true at the same time as reforming, by enlarging its adaptability to the very limit of finitude, death and beyond. Metaphysical, strong theology in modern epistemology may well present truth according to the Bible. (See footnote below on ‘weak metaphysics’). However, it may be meaningless if the truth one believes is not at the same time context-sensitive. The event in *khora* shows how *potentia absoluta* works in *potentia ordinata* as a true transcendental point. The true transcendental point between God and a totally depraved human being, as in Calvin and Augustine’s view of man, happens at the very event of *concursus*. This event in Hodge’s theology is observed at the moment of Derridean ‘death’, when the impossible humility of death is realised and even welcomed. Still it must be acknowledged that there is a clear conflict of interest between Derrida’s agenda and a theology of Hodge due to their heterogeneous historical, philosophical and theological foundations.

The purpose of this thesis, however, has been to explore the profound linkages between these two very different thinkers, discovered in the theme of *concursus* and *khora* in the providential space of God. As a result, it is possible to anticipate genuine theological possibilities in a post-modern world, built upon, at one and the same time, a recognition of the nature of post-modernity and all its consequences, and also a deep conformity with the tradition of Reformed theology as seen in Hodge. As we observed at the very offset, the key linking these two is to be found in the common ground of Schleiermacher’s experiential theology.

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The *concursus* as a true transcendental point is only possible with the initiation of God’s *potentia absoluta*. Hence, the immediate, certain point that unreflective voices of strong theologians, politicians and military warriors target may well steer clear of *concursus*. David Jasper, in the postscript of *The Sacred Desert*, shows the role of a poet in the sacred desert: the one of ‘common sense left, who matters so little that they have been forgotten by the world, to the point that they are entirely other than all its concerns’, so that all kinds of ‘warring dualism of God and Satan’ will be reconciled in the pure *concursus* in His ‘Total Presence’. The mature silence of the one in the sacred desert will hear the voices of God’s speech. Since pure Gospel, written in a believer’s heart through the work of the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, has true life, it has to be demonstrated with the power of humility and selflessness.

This might have been the righteous one in total silence, sacrifice and humility before him whom God sought in Sodom and Gomorrah. So a theologian needs to cherish the doubts of agony in Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Emerson, so that a theology can be reflective and meaningful in our life experiences in the space between God and us. Without being humble in this space, there will be no true transcendental point.

In chapter I, we had four questions from Nietzsche in his *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887); what is it in us that wants truth? (how can we know truth?); why do we wish not to be deceived?; to what extent is life bearable without the existence of ideals?; must religious beings always be ascetic? In chapter IV, we considered Kierkegaard’s questions in *Fear and Trembling*: can we suspend ethics?; how can we know that there is such a thing as an absolute responsibility towards God?; is Abraham’s silence about his purpose to others ethical? In chapter V, we examined Emerson’s question about religion: ‘why should we not have poetry and a philosophy of insight rather than tradition, and a religion by revelation to us and not the history of theirs?’

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These questions do not simply represent such philosophical ideas as Nietzsche’s Nihilism, Kierkegaard’s Existentialism and Emerson’s Transcendentalism. These are the questions of human beings both in their daily life experience, between ‘what ought we to do’ and ‘what would happen’, and also in their religious experience, between their objective knowledge of God and their subjective faith. In the modern context, the answers to these questions have been formulated into existential theology, transcendental theology and the ‘death of God’ theology, in an effort to understand God in our turbulent life experiences. However, these theologies have not been successful in situating our faith and knowledge at a true transcendental point, due to, I believe, the limit of modern philosophical epistemology in these theologies.

As a result of distortion by the epistemology of modern theologies in keeping up with Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Emerson, conservative circles tend to dismiss their genuine struggles for the true meaning of life, and consider their doubts as too liberal and, sometimes, heretical. However, in this thesis, I tried to practise theology by raising the possibility of adapting these secular questions to the very sources and contents of theology and to theology itself.

These questions are also those of a philosopher and theologian who loves the values and conviction in the theology of Charles Hodge, which is considered to represent Evangelicalism, Calvinism and sometimes Fundamentalism in the American context, by its opponents. My question in this thesis was whether a theology is possible, particularly Hodge’s theology, in the space and time where we are now living together, without falling into any ‘–isms’—liberalism, humanism, relativism or heresy—while keeping true values and convictions of the knowledge of and faith in God.

In chapter V, we discussed such ideals for being in this world as Emerson’s ‘genius’, Rorty’s ‘ironist’, Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilyich, Kierkegaard’s Abraham and Hodge’s ‘theologian’. As beings in a space living together, all of them have been examined in the context of responsibility, faith, gift and humility. The sacrifice of Isaac in Fear and Trembling is particularly seen as an event of the death of the I embedded in Abraham with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit. Here, we
recognise that Abraham’s faith is related with the other, being-with the Other, i.e., Emmanuel. That is, faith is related to ‘promise’ as a means to direct the end, a true transcendental point. Then the responsibility of Abraham is seen in the endless tracing of God by deferring to speak about what he is doing with Isaac. While tracing of God, Abraham’s responsibility enables total gift, humility and sacrifice. Abraham’s silence is not secret, because it is open to the space of khora.

Since the space of khora regards Christianity as one particular religion among others, Christianity can secure its distinctive knowledge of a true transcendental point, yet khora makes it humble and selfless to the level of unconditional sacrifice, so its knowledge may be observed at that point. Only at this point of event, universality is achieved by the tracing of God. This ‘tracing’ appears to be nothing, but nothing yet produces all by being embedded in everything, and allows a human being to reach the true transcendental point. In this way, khora takes precedence over every other particular identity, including Christianity.

In the discussion of hermeneutic universality, we have to keep in mind that it is not achieved by religious syncretism or pluralism. In Christianity, hermeneutic universality will be accomplished by its distinctive belief that the Messianic prophecy of the Christian Kingdom of God will be fulfilled in the parousia (παρουσία). The way that universality is exercised in Christianity is its context-sensitivity, hoping for the realisation of the promise that the Kingdom is to come here. When we place Hodge’s theology in the space of khora and the time of now—since ‘now’ is a Messianic time as an opening to the future and to the fulfilment of the promise as the advent of justice—the context of ‘what is happening now’ within the event of concursus in Hodge’s theology will achieve universality, as will ‘the supplement’ of Derrida.

Thus, Charles Hodge’s theology will naturally expose the contingency and deconstructibility of the present Kingdom at hand. With the promise of the Kingdom of Heaven already-not-yet achieved, in which we are responsible for the entire history of humankind, forgiven and unforgiven sinners shall know what is happening in khora, in parousia. In order to place Hodge’s theology in khora, i.e., to think of Hodge’s theology in view of the diverse and plural society of this era, I
first defined such important terms as *the death of the I* as the identity of a being as an image of God who is tracing of God in this space, and ‘*khora*’ as a providential, universal space which the condition of God permeates.

We also recognised that when the character of a self, *the death of the I* embedded in a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, *the death of the I*: passes through the very ordeal of the paradoxical life experiences; ventures into absolute risk; has a relationship with God with the transcendental selfless goodness through a new experience of death; and humbles itself for the true transcendental point, *concursus*. When we place Hodge’s theology in the space and time of *khora*, ‘facts’ in the inductive method of his theology cannot be found only in the text of the Bible, but also in the textuality, where text itself produces meaning through *the death of the I*. Here we also affirm that, for Hodge, the inductive method is the vehicle that makes it possible for the Bible to be the source of truth. However, we find that the method itself cannot be truth, but a mere passage or vehicle for practising theology.

In the Derridean space of *khora*, the intersubjective modes of Gadamer and Habermas are replaced by the event of a signifier of a signifier. That is, the happenings of a concurrent time and space can be perceived as facts of understanding. Furthermore, what is distinguishable is that the event always traces the Transcendental Signified. This trace makes substitutions of the supplements, and has the capacity to manoeuvre the future in view of the past. This futurity makes the impossibility possible. In Hodge’s theology, *potentia absoluta* and *potentia ordinata* need to be understood as an event. That is, *potentia absoluta*—such as incarnation, resurrection and miracle works of God—where the true transcendental point is taking place, has to be observed in the space of *khora*, where impossibility is possible.

The embedding of *the death of the I* in a passage of Hodge’s theology will accomplish ‘Khoral Theology’. ‘Khoral theology’ means a theology that is based on hermeneutic universality with endless context-sensitivity through the temporal and spontaneous movements of faith acts, and at the same time, that is distinctive in its particular conviction where God’s identity as God is never dependent on His
creation. Here we should notice that the instances of faith and knowledge in khoral theology are not the simple result of a practical subsequent application of a theology, but are the very sources of theology. In this ‘Khoral theology’, all kinds of doctrinal debates are possible because it allows freedom (liberty, in Hodge’s words) to all, freedom to each of them, freedom to each signifier—a particular conviction of faith. Since the very foundation of truth is freedom, if you really believe that what you believe is the truth, you have to respect the freedom of others, because the truth that you know will eventually be fulfilled not by your own freedom, but by the potentia absoluta of God in the event of concursus. Concursus in events, whether in free, contingent or necessary modes of the experience of first and second causes, captures the religious immediacy of Hodge’s theology.

In chapter II, we focused on the juxtaposition of the death of the I and the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit. The bipolarity of the two is clearly seen in life/death, universality/particularity and event/intersubjectivity. While understanding the particularity of a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit, the death of the I achieves universality through the context-sensitivity of ‘tracing’ and ‘the supplements’. Context-sensitivity in theology is not displacing the text (God, the Bible) in favour of the viewpoint of a context (human beings). Rather, it is a voluntary involvement of the text in the experience of the context. This context-sensitivity is seen in the idea of textuality, which already involves the differences of space, time, culture, world-view, language, behaviour, ways of thinking and judgement, and so on in its passage of history of religion, i.e., the death of the I.

In chapter III, I examined how such Enlightenment ideas as Scottish Common Sense Realism and Kant function in Hodge’s theology. With context-sensitivity in mind, I scrutinized Hodge’s inductive theological method and discussed its adaptability in the context of khora. We can conclude that Hodge’s method has limits due to its following a Kantian epistemology that deals equally with science and religion, i.e., reason and faith. If Hodge’s theological method followed Kantian epistemology completely, then the truth that Hodge really wants to preserve would be lost. However, Hodge preserves truth by simply presupposing that the Bible is
truth. The Kantian concept of facts is used as a mere methodological tool in Hodge’s inductive theology. For Hodge, as a scientist pursues facts, a theologian has to research the facts written in the Bible. On the one hand, Hodge’s facts are unchangeable truths. On the other hand, Kantian facts are self-evident truths. Yet the problem is that while Hodge follows the logic of Kant in his methodology, he not only regards facts as truth, but also the effects of facts on a reader, a point with which Kant would not agree.

The problem for Hodge comes from the limit of his theological epistemology: he regards the effect (religious life) of the cause (the facts in the Bible) as truth. His understanding that religious experience is the effect of the cause, i.e., truth, is due to the limit of a modern methodology. Hodge also has no sense of understanding the relationship between truth (facts in the Bible) and the inductive method. If Hodge believes facts are of God, logically, his inductive method is also a fact in his theology of God. Hodge himself cannot recognise that facts as truth in the Bible are already embedded in his method.

In chapter IV, within the context of hermeneutic universality, I examined the concepts of ‘process’, ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘event’. ‘Process’ in John Dewey is observed as working in pragmatic and anti-dualistic ways. ‘Intersubjectivity’ in Habermas and Gadamer shows us profound and diverse ways of being context-sensitive. Yet ‘intersubjectivity’ in both of them has a limit in the discussion of the true transcendental point. Although ‘event’ in Derrida is something that cannot be understood by reason, it shows a true transcendental point spontaneously in a secretive and enigmatic way: it just happens as an event, rather than in the modes of process and intersubjectivity. In this event, such ideas as subjectivity and objectivity are understood by gift along with history and faith. While admitting the limit of both Gadamer’s and Habermas’s intersubjectivity for achieving universality, we find that in the Derridean X, the true transcendental point is understood as the possibility of the impossibility.

Such space of khora, where the Derridean X functions, is the space of death. Death does not mean suicide, or wasting one’s life or wasting time, but giving life by sharing it with others. According to Derrida, this space where death takes place
is the origin of happiness: ‘I cannot consider myself happy, or even believe myself to have been happy, before having crossed, passed and surpassed the last instance of my life.’

Throughout this thesis, we have recognised that this crossing, passing and surpassing have been possible by the concepts of ‘tracing’, ‘the supplement’ and so forth. Therefore, the space of death would be ‘more essential, more originary and more proper than those of any other territory in the world’. This space overcomes the belief of negativity that cannot pass through the borders or the limits of truth. Therefore, this space is the possibility of the impossibility:

Death as the possibility of the impossible *as such* is a figure of the aporia in which ‘death’ and death can replace—and this is a metonymy that carries the name beyond the name and beyond the name of name—all that is only possible as impossible, if there is such a thing: love, the gift, the other, testimony, and so forth.

In chapter VI, with the above implications of death, I discussed how the doctrine of the Providence of God works in the space and time of Derridean *khora*. As Francis Turretin maintains that the work of God does not take away our contingency from the condition of second causes and from our modes of action, *khora* proves to be a providential space of free and voluntary things which are in our power and executed by our purpose. That is, *khora* is a space of spaces or a *topos* of ‘in between’ *kairos* and *kronos*, or *potentia absoluta* and *potentia ordinata* in God’s Providence. In this chapter, I examined the doctrine of the Providence of God in the theology of Turretin and Hodge, and then how *khora* can be understood in their doctrines. In the doctrine of *concursus*, Hodge distinguishes the first from the second causes so as to avoid attributing authorship of sin to God and falling into pantheism and idealism. He confidently interprets the material universe and the external world through this oppositional distinction of the first and second causes. Although the second causes act according to their natures, their efficiency is in the first cause. The concept of second causes provides a key to explaining the *khora* of different spaces and times, and the possibility of the impossibility will be observed in the *concursus* of first and second causes.

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806 Ibid., p. 3.
807 Ibid., pp. 78-9.
In chapter VII, in the discussion of Hodge’s doctrine of the Bible, we found that the *differance* between Hodge and Derrida lies in Hodge’s idea of *concursus* and Derrida’s event in *khora*. In Hodge, *concursus* happens on the border between the first cause and the second causes. Accordingly, at a proper time, an event of which the cause and effect guarantee nothing will take place fully by His gracious Providence. Hodge’s process of cause and effect in *concursus* is observed in Derrida as *gift*. Due to the unpredictability and anachronicity of event, *gift* as the very otherness of *triton genos* occurs at the moment of the thinking, speaking and acting of a free agent. Nobody can foretell the exact time and place of what might happen.

As we have seen, through His Providence, God is ultimately in control of all things, superintending what happens in order to accomplish his own purposes. Hodge, then, is used as a free agent, endowed and operated by God’s wisdom. We can know that God designed and uses Hodge, who is accustomed to the contemporary culture of Common Sense Realism and Kant, to reveal His word. As Hodge’s case illustrates, textuality in event has been practised and understood within God’s Providence with His efficient operation in second causes. As Hodge’s doctrine of Providence implies, the event in Derridean *khora* is the work of God surpassing time and space under His Providence.

Before closing, with the universality of *khora* in mind, I want to discuss the schism between Princeton Theological Seminary and Westminster Theological Seminary in 1929. Nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century debates between Fundamentalism and Liberalism eventually split the mainstream Presbyterian Church of America. During the Old Princeton days (1812-1929), the Princeton seminary was influential in the foundation of the sentiment of the new American republic’s culture and society and in defending Calvinistic orthodoxy in the era of Darwinian evolution and Protestant Liberalism. Around the beginning of the twentieth century, the seminary itself, however, yielded to the pressure of Liberalism in the administrative reorganisation in 1929, which led to the founding of Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia. Westminster was formed largely under the leadership and funding of J. Gresham Machen, to follow the
theological tradition of Old Princetonians such as Archibald Alexander, Charles Hodge, A. A. Hodge and Benjamin B. Warfield.

While Westminster remained committed to orthodox Calvinism and regarded itself as a defender of the purity of doctrine, Princeton remained affiliated with the PCUSA and developed a neo-Barthian theology. The universality that Westminster wanted to maintain was the purity of Christian doctrine, while Princeton wanted to preserve the universality in life experiences. However, the result of the separation of Westminster from Princeton has been more of an affliction than a blessing to both sides. There has been a great deal of suffering that cannot be discussed here. However, it can at least be said that it was a loss that Hodge, the theological father of American Presbyterianism, has not been properly treated by either side. I believe the claims of universality—Westminster’s the purity of Christianity and Princeton’s Christian life experiences—of both sides will be achieved in khora. If both argue that each one’s universality is the only one, the universality each of them fought to keep to the bitter end remains nothing but conceptually signified. There was no harmony, but only militant prejudice, and disputes about different ways to claim truth. In Christianity, regarding oneself as a distinct particular does not mean that particularity is inferior to universality. Differences are the very tool for being together.

In sum, I have argued that the true transcendental point that Hodge means by concursus has to be observed as a contingent event of the objective knowledge and the subjective faith of a person with the Trinitarian personhood of the Holy Spirit in Derridean khora. Placing Hodge’s concursus in the space and time of khora requires a hermeneutic change in his inductive theological method. However, it sustains the values and convictions that Hodge embraces in theologising. The dualistic and metaphysical epistemology of his theology, influenced by Kant and Scottish Common Sense Realism, has been examined by ‘process’, ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘event’ with such social and political theories of Dewey, Gadamer and Habermas. I believe that these three ideas have the characteristic of context-sensitivity in daily life experience and in knowledge, as well. This examination has been imperative for pluralistic and diverse contexts, where the
criteria for knowledge and faith are in confusion, secularised, deflected and thrown into sectarian strife and civil unrest.

Indeed, the discussion of the space and time of *khora* is significant in the inter-faith movement in academic departments of theology, as well as in the religious field. Since I believe that synthetic inter-faith movements only result in religious syncretism and another form of metaphysical epistemology, it will never be possible for every religion to be understood in only one way. Rather, in *khora*, they can co-exist as they are in this world, without losing their distinctive religious convictions at all. In this sense, placing Hodge’s theology in *khora* in this thesis will be a model of how to co-exist meaningfully for every religion. For Christian circles, especially evangelical ones, I hope this thesis can be a challenge and source of insight for practising theology. And for me, being of Korean origin, this thesis will be a theological and philosophical foundation in the search for a methodology of coming together before and after the unification of South and North Korea, which have been separated for more than half a century. I believe this trial and their unification may also be the possibility of the impossibility under Adam Smith’s invisible hand.


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