THE ROOTS OF SIN

The New Testament View of

Responsibility for the Origin of Moral Evil

A thesis presented to the Faculty of Divinity of the University of Glasgow

in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

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Summary of the Thesis

Beliefs concerning the origin of evil can be traced through primitive stages in the Old Testament, in which the "woes" of life were attributed directly to the hand of God, through later stages in which developing moral sensitivity made Old Testament man uneasy about finding the origin of what was morally wrong in God, and finally through the struggles of the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha with the question of the origin of moral evil. In the latter, the pressures of Hellenism added to the complexity of the problem, since, whether consciously or not, these later Jewish thinkers were caught up in streams of influence which shaped the form of their thought, and to some extent its content as well. The rise of angelology and demonology in the inter-Testament period can be seen both as evidence for the influence of foreign religious thought, and as an attempt to come to grips with the question of where moral evil had its point of origin.

We find efforts to cope with the problem of evil not only in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, but also in the thought of Philo, of Qumran, of the Gnostics, and of Rabbinic Judaism, all of which take up positions on the matter, thus pointing out directions in which the New Testament declined to move, which may be regarded as significant.

Within the New Testament no unified approach to the problem of evil can be discovered, though there is a large fund of common assumptions, and in general the thought does not stray from this area of consent. The basic position can be described as being in agreement with the Old Testament view in placing the blame for sin on man himself; this is contrary to the direction in which some of the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha are

moving, for the latter sometimes seek an outlet for the problem by placing the burden of blame on demonic powers. Although the New Testament knows of demonic forces, and particularly of the leader of the demons, Satan, the teaching about these demonic powers never obscures the more fundamental responsibility that man bears for his own sinfulness. In the end, the position is not really far from the Old Testament, where the demons play a very small role indeed; the larger place they have in the New Testament does not seem to include a large share of responsibility for the origin of moral evil. The New Testament brings to clearer expression the Old Testament hesitation to attribute evil to God, and in the main denies outright that moral evil is in any respect God's responsibility.

The Synoptic Gospels and Acts display a good deal of agreement on who is responsible for sinful behavior: man is seen as bringing evil into being by his choice of the wrong rather than the right in a series of ethical and moral decisions. But Matthew and Luke have obviously given much more thought to the problem of ethical and moral behavior than has Mark; the latter is not so much interested in sin as the former two. Demonic forces bear a larger role in the Synoptic Gospels than anywhere else in the New Testament. Yet, their role is not so large as to make it possible to attribute evil directly to them. The company of demons does not seem to have anything to do with causing moral evil, being limited to the infliction of physical woes; Satan alone influences moral behavior, and he seems to be dependent for his success in temptation upon two factors: the permission of God, and the consent of man. Man brings evil into being by choosing what is contrary to the will of God; this choice of the wrong way may please Satan, but he cannot bring it about apart from human consent.

Although Paul is in basic agreement with the Synoptic Gospels on the

subject of human responsibility for the origin of moral evil, he approaches the problem of sin from a completely different angle. For him, sin is a force, a power; it is something rising from within and corrupting everything it touches - the Law, the institutions of secular life, and the moral behavior of man. Paul does not explain what initiated this drive toward wrong-doing, though it seems probable that the transgression of Adam enters into the picture. Paul's real interest is in the present fact of sin, and more particularly in Christ's victory over the powers of sin and over death, the "wages" of sin. There is frequent mention of "principalities and powers," and it is argued in this thesis that these may plausibly be explained as being the spiritual forces behind God's providential design for governing the world, forces which are not evil in their essential nature, but which have been corrupted by human sin. Paul shows practically no interest in demons which can be compared with those of the Synoptics; he speaks more often of Satan, but Satan is not really central to his pattern of thought. In essence, moral evil for Paul rises in the clash of will between God and man, and sin is man's choice to seek powers and prerogatives which are properly the sole possession of God. Jesus shows the way of renunciation of power and self-will as being the only means of victory over sin, and in turn the way to genuine power, by God's gift, and not by seizure.

John stylizes the whole problem of sin, abstracting from individual choices of right and wrong, and causing everything to hinge on one great Choice: whether to be a follower of God, or to be a follower of the devil. Ethical choice is still in view, but it is in the background. Predestination is a constantly recurring theme. The stress on God's absolute power in determining the affairs of men seems to move John to the brink of attributing the origin of moral evil to God - yet John draws back from this position, and an examination of his more basic assumptions shows

that whatever John says about God's sovereignty, he intends to convey the impression that God is seeking the good, the salvation, the redemption of the world, and that man's refusal of his proffered salvation is what brings about moral evil and intensifies the moral evil which already exists. The devil bears a larger role than elsewhere in the New Testament; yet, John does not seem to believe that the devil can initiate moral evil among men, but rather that he simply encourages man in sinful behavior.

The rest of the New Testament cannot be briefly summarized; each author seems to have some peculiar slant on the origin of sinful behavior. Particular mention might be made of the Book of Revelation, which has a good deal to say about demonic powers, and gives Satan a very important role. But Revelation is not discussing sin and its source, but rather the destruction of sinful powers at the end of the Age. This makes it difficult to come to any conclusions as to what thought the author may have entertained on the beginnings of moral evil.

INTRODUCTION

A good deal of interest has been displayed recently in the demonic and in the problem of sin. Books by Ling, Kallas, Schlier, Caird, Berkhof and others have explored various aspects of the demonic; Best and Baumbach have published important studies on temptation and sin in the Synoptic Gospels, and Satan fills an unexpectedly pivotal role in Conzelmann's study of Luke's theology. There seems to have been a substantial response to James S. Stewart's call of a number of years ago for renewed study of the neglected demonology of the New Testament.

This study is an effort to draw some of these investigations together and to apply them to the question of responsibility for the origin of moral evil. It has purposely been kept descriptive rather than dogmatic, in the hope that a clear understanding of what the New Testament is saying may help remove some hindrances from the path of systematic theology. For example, one of the results of this investigation is to show that as far as moral evil is concerned, the demons do not occupy a central position: "The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves..." If it is indeed the case that responsibility for sin and evil is not at root demonic, but human, then the task of explaining the New Testament attitude toward sin is simplified considerably. The demons have their place - but it is not as crucial as it might otherwise appear.

A word about translations may be in order. Only those translations which have actually been quoted appear in the bibliography, and no attempt has been made to list all the ancient authors which have been referred to more or less in passing. Irenaeus, Hippolytus and Philo appear in the bibliography under their own names. Zoroastrian scriptures have been cited from the translation found in Moulton's Early Zoroastrianism. The

Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha are quoted from the translation edited by R. H. Charles. Rabbinic works are quoted from Montefiore and Loewe's Rabbinic Anthology. The Dead Sea Scrolls are cited from several translations: Leaney's Rule of Qumran and its Meaning, Mansoor's Thanksgiving Hymns, Yadin's Scroll of the Wars, and Rabin's Zadokite Documents.

Abbreviations of book titles have been used regularly throughout the footnotes rather than resorting to the repeated use of "op. cit.," which is often more cryptic than helpful. I think most of the abbreviations will be quite simply understood, and the exceptions are listed separately.

My sincere thanks are due to Professor Bo Reicke of the University of Basel, and to Principal John Mauchline of Trinity College, Glasgow, each of whom read parts of this paper and offered helpful suggestions. My chief debt, of course, is to Professor William Barclay, whose warmth of personal concern follows his students far beyond classroom doors, and whose penetrating criticism has always left room for disagreement - but has always provided food for thought. And finally, a word of thanks to my mother, who has been of such help and encouragement, and to my wife, Lois, who in ways not formally theological has taught me much about the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ.

ABBREVIATIONS

ANET *Ancient Near Eastern Texts*: cf. Pritchard, James B.

A&P *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*: cf. Charles, R. H.

CanJournTheol *Canadian Journal of Theology*

ERE *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*: cf. Hastings, James.

ET *The Expository Times*

FSAC *From the Stone Age to Christianity*: cf. Albright, William F.

HDB *A Dictionary of the Bible*: cf. Hastings, James.

IB *The Interpreter's Bible*: cf. Buttrick, George A.

IDB *The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible*: cf. Buttrick, George A.

ICC International Critical Commentary

JBL *The Journal of Biblical Literature*

JES *The Journal of Ecumenical Studies*

JTS *The Journal of Theological Studies*

NovTest *Novum Testamentum*

NTS New Testament Studies

PRJ *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*: cf. Davies, W. D.

RGG *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*: cf. Galling, Kurt.

S.-B. Kommentar *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch*: cf. Strack, Hermann L. and Billerbeck, Paul.

TheolZeit *Theologische Zeitschrift*

TWNT *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*: cf. Kittel, G.

ZAW *Zeitschrift für Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*

ZNW *Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*

ZTK *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*

CHAPTER ONE

An investigation of the origin of evil poses a question which the OT is ill-equipped to answer. The pre-logical, mythical and dynamic character of OT thought makes it difficult to phrase the question in a way which the OT can answer. Primitive man did not think in logical or philosophical terms, but rather in terms of "goodness," "truth," "purity," "tabu," "holiness/abomination," "mana," and so forth.[1] The general notion of sin is activist - behavior that displeases the deity.[2] It was the end of the fifth century BC before philosophy began to come to grips with theoretical problems such as the origin of evil,[3] and little of this philosophical effort is to be discerned even in the NT, where the roots of thought remain deeply sunk in the Hebrew tradition. It is perfectly true, as Welch observes,[4] that

> The Jew did not even develop the abstract terms which are needed to formulate a system of thought. He thought seriously and reverently of the nature of his God, but he always conceived of the divine nature in terms of the divine purpose, as something which was not concerned with the world of ideas, but which passed over at once into the world of action.

Because of this resolutely activist understanding of the deep questions of life, we may not expect to find frequent reference to "evil" as such, "evil" as it corresponds to our modern notion, but rather to its active counterpart, "sin."

Two attitudes toward sin can be found in the OT; these may be characterized as the priestly and the prophetic, corresponding to the two main

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1. Albright, FSAC, 130. It should be noted that the OT Weltanschauung was at nearly as great a remove from Hellenistic religion as it is from our own.
2. Irwin, in Frankfort, Intellectual Adventure, 262. A Sumero-Akkadian prayer for forgiveness, ANET, 391, illustrates the idea of sin as something done. Lods, Israel, 468: "The Israelites had not wholly emerged from the point of view of primitive peoples who only recognize crimes of fact."
3. Grant, Roman Hellenism, 12; Albright, op. cit., 84.
4. Prophet and Priest, 69-70.

strands of Hebrew religious thought, i.e., ritual and morals.[1] The priestly side of religion, concerned as it was with the cult, was based on foundations common to all ancient cultures, and was therefore in a sense the more ancient form of worship. In the ancient world, sin was regarded as something quasi-material, a pollution of the worshiper having little to do with moral transgression.[2] Robinson observes, with particular reference to ancient Israel:[3]

> The religion of the ancient agricultural world is a signal illustration of this divorce of morality from religion. An act might be universally recognized as a vice or a crime; it did not follow that it was a sin. Except in so far as religion insisted on the observance of certain primitive taboos, it was indifferent to the treatment accorded by a man to his neighbours, and left the vindication of moral and social right either to the individual wronged or to the civil heads of the community.

Granted such a divorce between "sin" and morality, a very real question arises as to whether ethical categories apply to this kind of religion.[4] A negative conclusion was drawn by a number of scholars; Wellhausen

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1. "The two main elements in Hebrew religion were morals and ritual. These two were never congenial partners." Smith, Moral Life, 319-320.
2. F. C. Grant notes that such a conception of sin, i.e., as a pollution which must be removed by a ritual act, belongs to the sub-stratum of thought shared by both the Greek and Hebrew religions (Roman Hellenism, 116-117). The same view in cultures with which the Hebrews were in contact is illustrated in an Egyptian hymn of thanksgiving for relief from a sickness inflicted by a goddess for unknown reasons (ANET, 381); in a Hittite omen, investigating the anger of the gods, a tortuous process in which the god is repeatedly given the chance to answer "yes" or "no," and inquiring after each affirmative answer, "Is that all, or is there more?" (there usually is!) (ANET 497-498); and in Jastrow's comments on the Babylonian penitential psalms (Religions, 313-314). For Judaism, "sin is in fact a religious, not primarily a moral, conception." (Moore, Judaism I, 461; cf. also 463, 497).
   The notion of sin as resembling a polluting material emerges with particular force in the examples cited by Hooke, Religion, 43-44, 51-52, 58, where sin can be transferred quite literally from the sick to the scapegoat (cf. Lev 16:21) and where, in one case, defilement is wiped off the walls and door of a shrine with the carcass of a sheep. Cf. Lev 17:10-14; 22:3; 11:24ff; 15:1-15, where the discharge demands atonement by a sin offering, v. 15.
3. Oesterley and Robinson, Hebrew Religion, 166. Cf. Smith, Semites, 256: "All antique morality is an affair of social custom and customary law."
4. For example, can we speak meaningfully about expiation? Cf. Thompson, Penitence, 17.

was inclined to regard the moral content of cultic religion as something superimposed, brought in from a later age and attached to a primitive form.[1] The original cultic worship would therefore be fundamentally a-moral, and the later morality could be seen as the effect of prophetic preaching.[2]

Something of the sort no doubt did happen,[3] but the fact that it happened as it did robs the opposition of priest and prophet in later days of its absolute character. Priestly religion was at least in part the product of prophetic reform.[4] It is an oversimplification to speak of an absolute opposition between priest and prophet, as though the former were invariably representatives of a second-rate religion, and the latter of a higher.[5] Prophetic attacks were just as often as not directed against other, "false" prophets,[6] and the prophets themselves could draw inspiration

1. Prolegomena, 55-59, 72; the "joy" of a primitive faith was supposed to have been quenched by the "solemnity" of priestly religion (78, 81, 486). For a criticism of the latter view, cf. Thompson, Penitence.
2. Pfeiffer, Religion in the OT, 191. W. R. Smith, on the other hand, would trace the beginnings of morality to the beginnings of the tribal system itself, though the two views are not necessarily irreconcilable (Semites, 54).
3. Although, as Thompson observes (op. cit., 138), it becomes increasingly difficult in light of more recent study to trace confidently an evolution from cult to a more "spiritual" form of worship. Cf. Smith, Moral Life, 29, where it is suggested that there was moral content in Israel's religion from the earliest times and in the oldest sources; von Rad, Theology, 260.
4. Pfeiffer, loc. cit.; Herbert, Worship, 48, remarks, "The most penetrating criticism of Israel's cultus came from within the worshipping community." The great prophetic passages critical of cultic religion are: Is 1:11-15; Jer 7:21-22; Hos 6:6; Amos 5:21-25; Mic 6:6-8. On the continuation of this controversy into the inter-Testament period, cf. Bousset, Religion, 101ff.
5. Thus Robinson can represent the cultic and the prophetic as "spheres between which there was no point of contact..." and suggest that apart from the influence of the prophets there would have been for Israel no alternative but "to choose between religion and goodness...." (Oesterley and Robinson, Hebrew Religion, 202, 194). Cf. a somewhat more moderate opinion from Oesterley, ibid., 276. R. H. Charles surely over-states the case: "This worship consisted in ritual and sacrifice, and to its due discharge the morality of the worshipper was a thing indifferent." (Eschatology, 87).
6. Jer 6:13-15; 14:18; 23:26ff; Ezek 13:1ff; Hos 4:5; Mic 3:11. Cf. Herbert, op. cit., 41; Bright, History, 247; Pedersen, Israel III-IV, 137.

from the worship of the Temple.[1] Nor did the prophets advocate the abolition of the cult, but rather its purification.[2] Priestly and prophetic elements of religion seem constantly to have intertwined and interpenetrated one another,[3] representing two different approaches to the same religious truth. As Moore says,[4]

> Primitive morality consisted in habitual conformity to all the obligatory customs (mores) of the community, however we may classify them. What we call ceremonial observances are in this sense of moral obligation, and conversely the morals of the community in our sense are to its apprehension religious observances. Again, piety expresses itself in scrupulous conformity to the observances of religion as well as to what we call its moral injunctions and prohibitions. Nor is this interlacing of observance, morals, and piety by any means confined to an elementary stage of development; it persists through the entire history of religion.

But even on the assumption of a close and ancient relationship between the priestly and the prophetic, it will be the latter that is more to the point of our inquiry, since the prophetic view of sin is the more important by far in understanding the NT. Despite cultic similarities, the religion of Babylon remained void of ethical content;[5] the prophetic view of sin, however, was one that could be rationalized.[6] Welch stresses the way in which the old rituals and festivals were care-

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1. E.g., Is 6:1ff. Pedersen, Israel, III-IV, 115, comments: "The intimate connection of Isaiah's experience with the sanctuary is no chance feature, it is, on the contrary, characteristic of the activities of prophets. The holiness created by them was, as we saw, to be found precisely in the sanctuary." Cf. Herbert, Worship, 48.
2. Bright, History, 246; Thompson, Penitence, 162, who further cites Oesterley's observation that of the eighteen prophets, only five are claimed to have opposed the cult, and of these five only Jeremiah is unalterably opposed to it. Cf. D. R. Ap-Thomas in JBL 85 (1966), 319; Zimmerli, Law and Prophets, 61.
3. Thompson, op. cit., 138, 243; Welch, Prophet and Priest, 76.
4. Judaism II, 4. Cf. also Moore's further remarks on the intelligent handling of ceremonial vs. moral law in later Judaism: ibid., 79, 82.
5. Gray, OT World, 47; Jastrow, Religion, 290-291, mentions the introduction of ethical ideas into magical texts, but in the context of magic and sorcery it seems strange to speak of ethics; the proper sphere of ethics is the legal documents (op. cit., 695). Cf. Hooke, Religion, 102.
6. Smith, Moral Life, speaks of the moral consciousness of early Israel as "susceptible of education. It had not attained, but it was pressing forward to higher levels." (29). Cf. Thompson, op. cit., 10-11.

fully given a raison d'etre,[1] and Zimmerli speaks of "revising the older view of Israel's history in a new theological construction."[2] The prophetic understanding of sin was open to a future in which the cultus would disappear entirely, and sin would become purely ethical.[3]

Man in the OT is viewed primarily from the standpoint of his relationship with other men; the stress is on his community with the tribe or family.[4] The OT view has been designated "corporate personality;" the references in the OT have been exhaustively surveyed by de Fraine,[5] and it is not proposed here to consider them in detail. But it is important to understand sin in the OT from the perspective of group relationships. Because of the corporative character of the view of man, sin was understood as something that could not be participated in without affecting others as well. Men were all involved in sin together. Von Rad says:[6]

> As we commonly understand it today, not only is the consequence of sin narrowed down to fall only on the individual and his spiritual life, but the evil that accompanies the sin is also confined to the evil act itself....In contrast, for the people of antiquity sin was something much wider in its effects. The evil deed was only one side of the matter, for through it an evil had been set in motion which sooner or later would inevitably turn against the sinner or the community to which he belonged.

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1. Prophet and Priest, 86-87, 122.
2. Law and Prophets, 92. Though the doctrine of revelation held in Judaism theoretically entertained no possibility of development, Judaism itself was one of the most important developments in Jewish history; cf. Macgregor and Purdy, Jew and Greek, 76.
3. Moore, Judaism I, 117, says regarding the primitive expiations and purifications, "Judaism, as we have seen, made repentance the condition sine qua non of them all, and eventually the substitute for them all." Cf. ibid., 94, for the instructive conversation between two rabbis on the study of the Law as a surrogate for the cultus.
4. According to W. R. Smith, Semites, 255, the family was "a single animated mass of blood, flesh and bones, of which no member could be touched without all the members suffering." This family-oriented concept is capable of extension to include the tribe and nation; as de Fraine says (Adam, 23), "The Israelite mind is so convinced that the community grows out of the expansion of an individual that it tends to conceive each group - the family, the clan, the nation - as the participating extension of an initial concrete personality....In every way the community acts like an individual person...."
5. Ibid., 49-122.
6. Theology, 264-265.

This is why the notion of sin is most clearly seen against the background of the more fundamental concept of covenant.[1]

Covenant seems to have had its beginnings in the man-to-man relationship typical of the tribe;[2] in the early stories there may even be the feeling that man can be on such terms of equality with God.[3] But as theological thought deepened, the inappropriateness of regarding God as an equal came to be felt, and the covenant with God is almost invariably referred to as one between non-equals, as a gracious gift of God in which man's part is simply to receive with gratitude and obey with love.[4]

Man's solemn responsibility in covenant was to keep faith with his fellows and with God. To fail to live up to his community obligation was to destroy the fabric of society from which human beings draw their strength.[5] The covenant-breaker put himself beyond the support of society, and was considered to be weak, rootless, empty.[6]

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1. Eichrodt sees covenant as the organizing principle of his whole first volume: Theology I. Pederson says, "That which upholds all life is the covenant; through that the totalities and organisms are formed in which life acts, and righteousness is the maintenance of the covenant. Sin, the essence of which is unrighteousness, consists in transgressing it, in acting outside its laws." (Israel I-II, 414-415). Against the view that covenant as a religious idea is not an ancient concept in Israel, cf. Eichrodt, op. cit., 36ff; Rowley, The Faith of Israel, 68, fn. 3.
2. W. R. Smith, Semites, 314ff. S. A. Cooke says of צדק that it "looks for a social or tribal origin of the fundamental idea, and suggests that it grew up out of alliances....It is proper, therefore, to see in new social alliances, indeed in all new unifying efforts and their immediate results, the more explicit recognition of principles which, though they may have become conspicuously absent, are those upon which all social and religious systems must, as systems, necessarily be founded." (Ibid., 665). Proksch, Theologie, 513, finds the root of the word ברת in a sacrificial meal; Koehler remarks (Theology, 60-61) the importance of understanding the secular meaning of ברת before we proceed to an exposition of its theological usage.
3. Jacob in Gn 28:20-22 feels free to bargain with God; Koehler, op. cit., 71, can speak of Jahweh and Israel as "equal partners," but cf. his references to the inequality in covenant between God and man, ibid., 62.
4. Pedersen, op. cit., 294; Koehler, loc. cit.; Proksch, op. cit., 515-516; Eichrodt, op. cit., 44, 457, stresses the fact that the gracious gift might correspondingly at any time be withdrawn. Cf. Zimmerli, Law and Prophets, 54.
5. Pedersen, op. cit., 411-415.
6. Ibid., 412-413, 428-430, esp. 429: "How then was a sinner to maintain

The locus of sin, then, is squarely in the human situation.[1] But, arguing from what was considered to be binding upon men in their inter-relationship, OT thinkers applied the same principle a fortiori to man's relationship with God.[2] It is against this background that the twofold character of the Great Commandment is most plainly seen: "Thou shalt love the Lord...and thy neighbor."[3] But the priority of the Lord's name is not accidental; sin came more and more to center in the conception of disobedience to God.[4]

The effect of sin is to exclude the sinner from the realm over which the covenant holds sway; if the sin is against the covenant of God, the sinner can almost be said to have removed himself from the society which God supports and maintains.[5] Hence the references to sin as "chaos" or "emptiness."[6]

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himself? He lacks all the presuppositions. It is righteousness which forms the frame-work of blessing and peace, but it is this very righteousness which the sinner lacks, righteousness and wisdom."

1. Pederson, Israel, 415: "Sin is thus determined by the relation between men." Proksch, TWNT I, 273, says that the ethical has its roots in the human sphere rather than in the divine.
2. Proksch, Theologie, 514-515: "Ist jeder Bund ein religiöser Akt, sofern Gott als Zeuge und Hüter darin angerufen wird, so entsteht nun ein ganz neuer Begriff des Gottesbundes, wenn Gott nicht nur Zeuge und Hüter, sondern selbst Kontrahent des Bundes ist, den er mit Israel schliesst. Das ist der spezifische Inhalt des Sinaibundes, der das ganze Gebäude der Geschichte Israels trägt."
3. Mt 22:37-40; Mk 12:29-31. Cf. Deut 6:5; Lev 19:18.
4. Pederson, op. cit., 435; Koehler, Theology, 168-169; Snaith, Distinctive Ideas, 60ff.
5. Pederson, op. cit., 432: "The sinner does not belong to the righteous community. He counteracts the positive forces which uphold community and have their roots in God." For this reason, in cases of gross offence, the sinner as an outcast from the community may have to suffer death as the most extreme sign of separation and casting out: ibid., 427, "Of the soul committing such a sin it is said that it is 'exterminated from its kinsmen' because it has broken the covenant. It is a diseased member, which no more cooperates in the organism of the totality; it must be removed completely in order that the community of kinsmen may keep its health and blessing." Koehler, op. cit., 65, says in italics: "The individual can live before God only as a member of the community."
6. Pederson, op. cit., 412-413. Similarly, on 411, P writes, "A sinful act is, properly speaking, no action, but a caricature. Sin is the negative, that which preys upon the positive forces of life. One cannot sin with a whole heart, for sin is the very dissolution of the totality. If a soul is throughout sinful, then it means that it is entirely dissolved, decayed, and then it is no more to be reckoned a human soul."

This is not the place to attempt a full-dress review of the OT terminology for sin; indeed, the subject is altogether too complex for a satisfactory brief review.[1] But it may be useful to indicate here the three main words by which the OT describes sin. The most general and most frequently used is חטא, which corresponds to the NT ἁμαρτία.[2] Like ἁμαρτία its root meaning is "to miss the mark," "to fail."[3] It can be used of sins against man,[4] or of sins against God.[5] The second most frequent expression is עון, a more specifically theological word, which refers to iniquity and guilt.[6] It may occur in poetic parallel with חטא, and in this usage seems to imply a heightening and intensification of the evil represented in the latter.[7]

The third word, though in less frequent use than the first two, nevertheless reveals "the true profundity of the OT sin concept."[8] פשע means "rebellion," transgression involving revolt, whether against

1. Cf. the excellent treatment of Quell, TWNT I, 267ff.
2. Koehler, Theology, 169.
3. Brown, Driver and Briggs, Lexicon, 306-307; Koehler, loc. cit.; Koehler-Baumgartner, Lexicon, 288-289.
4. The sins of the brothers against Jacob, Gn 42:22; the fault of the Egyptians in not providing straw for bricks, Ex 5:16; of sin both against man and God, ISam 2:25; of Saul's sins against David, ISam 19:4-5; 26:21; of a man's sin against his neighbor, IKi 8:31.
5. The sin of Achan, Jos 7:11; of an anointed priest, Lev 4:3; it may be applied either to sins known (Lev 5:11) or unknown (Lev 5:17); of the sin which Jereboam caused Israel to sin, IKi 14:16; 15:26,30,34; 16:2,19,26; and often in IIKi; the secret sins of Job's children (Job 1:5) or of Job himself (Job 1:22); it is employed in the remark, "Surely there is not a righteous man on earth who does good and never sins." (Eccl 7:20). It may refer to the sins of Israel (Jer 2:35), of the fathers (Lam 5:7), of Jerusalem (Ezek 16:51), of Ephraim (Hos 8:11).
6. Brown, Driver and Briggs, op. cit., 730-731; Koehler, Theology, 169-170, says that it "designates a sin that originates in wrong intention." Cf. Gen 15:16, the iniquity of the Amorites; Num 15:31, the iniquity of a man who sins "with a high hand;" the "stain" of Israel's guilt, Jer 2:22; 11:10, the iniquity of the forefathers; the iniquity of Jerusalem, Lam 2:14; in Ezek 4:4 the guilt of the house of Israel is "laid" upon the prostrate Ezekiel; in Ezek 7:13 it is the cause of God's wrathful visitation. Of the use of this term in Is 59:2 Koehler says, "that is perhaps the clearest statement the Old Testament makes on the nature of sin." (Theology, 175). Cf. Koehler-Baumgartner, Lexicon, 689.
7. Isa 1:4; 43:24; Hos 4:8; 13:12.
8. Koehler, Theology, 170.

man or God.[1] From this term and its usage emerges the idea that "sin is revolt of the human will against the divine will."[2]

But all of these words for sin, in company with the many other less frequently used terms, have a peculiarity that is not immediately obvious to the Western mind: in addition to their theological meaning, they have a secular use as well.[3] As Quell has observed,[4] this fact posed difficulties for the LXX translators, and it is likely to be even more of a stumbling block to men of the twentieth century. It reflects the fact that in ancient Israel the dividing line between secular and sacred was by no means as clear-cut as it is with us today.[5]

Turning now to consider the more abstract terminology for "evil," as contrasted with the action-linked concept of "sin," we find the predictable limitation in language corresponding to the activist Hebrew world-view. There is a word for evil,[6] but it is an omnibus term, hardly as specific as the English adjective "bad." It is used in

1. Koehler, OT Theology, 170; cf. Brown, Driver and Briggs, Lexicon, 833; Koehler-Baumgartner, Lexicon, 785. The word is frequently used in synonymous parallel with חטא, cf. Gn 31:36, of Jacob's alleged sins against Laban; Gn 50:17, the "transgression" of the brothers against Joseph; ISam 24:11, the alleged sin of David against Saul; Job 8:4; Ps 51:5, the "iniquity" in which the Psalmist was brought forth is paralleled to the "sin" in which he was conceived; Is 58:1, the sin of God's people; Amos 5:12; Mic 1:5,13; 3:8. The significance of this yoking of terms is probably best illuminated by Job 34:37, where פשע is added to חטא; i.e., apparently, the former is a more specific and heinous form of חטא. It may also be used in parallel with עון (Job 31:33; Ezek 18:30); it is found in Isa 59:12 in parallel with both חטא and עון; and it may stand alone (Prov 28:24, of the man who robs father or mother; Isa 57:4, of children of transgression; Amos 1:3,6,9,11,13, etc., of the transgressions of the nations). Brown, Driver and Briggs suggest that in Job 8:4 the intention is to personify evil (op. cit., 833).
2. Koehler, OT Theology, 170.
3. Quell, TWNT I, 269.
4. Loc. cit.
5. "It must be remembered that all antique morality is an affair of social custom and customary law, and that in the more primitive forms of ancient life the force of custom is so strong that there is hardly any middle course between living well up to the standard of social duty which it prescribes, and falling altogether outside the pale of the civil and religious community." Smith, Semites, 256.
6. רעה, רע; cf. Koehler-Baumgartner, Lexicon, 896-897; Brown, Driver and Briggs, op. cit., 948-949.

an ethical context,[1] but it must also do double duty for such diverse meanings as describing the disagreeable wives of Esau,[2] the sour expressions on the faces of Pharaoh's imprisoned officials,[3] the gaunt cows that came up out of the river in Pharaoh's dream,[4] something that might prove objectionable to the Philistine lords,[5] misfortune upon Job or disaster upon Israel,[6] and bad merchandise[7] or figs.[8] The terminology reflects the pattern of thought: in language as in life, Israel lacked the capacity for abstraction. There really was no abstract term to use in describing evil, apart from the evil reality or the evil deed.[9]

1. Cf. Gn 24:50 (Laban says to Abraham's servant, "We cannot speak to you bad or good"); 31:24 (Laban warned not to say "either bad or good" to Jacob); 39:9 (the "wickedness" of lying with Potiphar's wife); Dt 1:39 (children having no knowledge of "good or evil"); 30:15 (Moses, setting "good and evil" before Israel); ISam 12:17,19 (Israel's "wickedness" in seeking a king); 26:18 (David's alleged "guilt" relative to Saul); IISam 14:17 (David like God's angels knows "good and evil"); IKi 3:9 (Solomon asks for wisdom to know "good and evil"); IIChr 12:14 (the "evil" done by Rehoboam); 33:9 (cf. IIKi 21:9) (the "evil" done under Manasseh); Job 1:1 (Job turned away from "evil"); Ps 34:14 ("depart from evil and do good"); 97:10 ("The Lord loves those who hate evil"); Prov 8:13 ("the fear of the Lord is hatred of evil"); Is 47:10,11 (Babylon, "secure in wickedness"); Jer 2:19 (the "wickedness" of Israel); Amos 5:14,15 ("seek good and not evil"); Mic 7:3 ("their hands are upon what is evil").

It is obvious, from the examples cited below, that רע also has a non-ethical meaning. Arguing from this fact, the view has been presented that in the Garden of Eden story (Gn 2:9,17; 3:5,22) the phrase "good and evil" corresponds simply to "knowledge" - the knowledge of all there is to know. This view is of course possible; cf. von Rad, Theology, 155, who further cites H. J. Stoebe, ZAW (1953) 188ff on the subject. But as von Rad further observes, there is an element of hubris in this desire to know all things, and in this consists the sin of man. No matter what the original form of the myth may have been intended to convey, the story in its J setting is clearly concerned with sin and its origin (cf. below, 22-23). For this reason, it seems quite probable that in addition to the secular meaning it bears we are intended here to hear the ethical overtones as well, as, e.g., in Dt 30:15; Ps 34:14; Amos 5:14,15, where an ethically colorless understanding seems impossible. Cf. Koehler-Baumgartner, Lexicon, 897; Brown, Driver and Briggs, Lexicon, 949, both of which list the Gn 2 usage as among the occurrences of רע carrying an ethical content.

2. Gn 28:8.
3. Gn 40:7.
4. 4. Gn 41:3.
5. ISam 29:7.
6. Job 2:10; Is 31:2.
7. Prov 20:14.
8. Jer 24:2.
9. On the subject of sin and evil, cf. further Pedersen, Israel I-II, 411ff; Koehler, Theology, 166ff; Quell in TWNT I, 267-288.

With these brief preliminary remarks in mind, we turn now to the concepts that could be formed within the limits of these tools of thought. There seem to be three possible sources from which evil could spring: God, the demons, and man. Because of the commanding influence of the OT doctrine of God, we consider first the possibility that God himself is to be regarded as the source of evil, and the limitations that the OT doctrine of God imposes on other possible explanations for the origin of evil.

A common view in Oriental religions was that bad just as much as good emanated from God (or, more accurately, from the gods).[1] Hence, the presence of the idea in Hebrew thought need cause no surprise; what may at first glance seem remarkable is the fact that the tendency to regard God as the source of evil seems to have been intensified by the Israelite view of God. The pagan religions could explain evil as demonic in origin, or as rising from conflicts between the gods, or in the character of the gods themselves - there was nothing offensive to the pagans in this idea.[2] But for the monotheistic Jews, intramural disputes among

1. Among the Egyptians, a goddess sends sickness on her follower for a sin he is not conscious of having committed (Pritchard, ANET, 381); in the Sumero-Akkadian prayer to Ishtar the suppliant assumes that his woes are the will of the goddess (ibid., 384-385); the Sumero-Akkadian "Prayer to Every God" assumes that troubles come in punishment for unknown transgressions (ibid., 391); the "babylonian Ecclesiastes" asserts that the god repays evil for good (ibid., 439-440). The Hittite Plague Prayer indicates that a god, apparently without reason, has sent plague for the previous twenty years (ibid., 394-396); cf. also the Hittite investigation of the anger of the gods (ibid., 497-498).

2. E.g., in the legend of Utnapishtim (Akkadian) it is Enlil against the remaining gods in causing the flood (ibid., 95; cf. the Sumerian legend of the deluge and the controversy of the gods that evidently lies behind this story, ibid., 43-44); Anath (Ugaritic) engages in incredible carnage, presumably over some controversy or other (though not necessarily among the gods; ibid., 136); similarly Anath engages in controversy with El before getting permission to do away with Aqhat (ibid., 152). This is analogous with Greek (e.g., Homeric) accounts of disputes among the gods reflected in the wars of man. On the demonic origin of evil, to be discussed further below, cf. ANET 328 (Egyptian); 436 (Akkadian); ERE IV, 571; 741; 757; Frankfort, Intellectual Adventure, 206; Jastrow, Religion, 263ff; Gray, Archaeology, 44-45.

the gods offered no solution;[1] even the demonology of the OT was severely curtailed by the understanding of God as absolute and omnipotent.[2] All the more, then, might God be considered the dispenser of evil.[3]

As a corollary to Jewish monotheism, the sovereignty of God appears as one of the fundamental assumptions of later OT thought about God. It is repeatedly expressed in various forms and contexts;[4] its remarkable tenacity is demonstrated in its survival of the downfall of Judah, the people over whom Jahweh reigned.[5] It seems quite certain that apart from the truth apprehended by the Jews, that Jahweh was not a god bound to the land or to the destiny of his people,[6] but was rather supreme over all the nations and capable of rejecting as well as choosing a people for himself,[7] Judaism would have perished with the other Near Eastern religions.

1. Even though the possibility of the existence of other gods is admitted in some of the OT documents (cf. Jud 11:24; IIKi 3:27; ISam 26:19; Eichrodt, Theology I, 221), and though idols seem to have been regarded as real entities (cf. Gn 31:19ff; 35:2; Lev 18:21; 20:1-5; Num 25:1-9; Deut 4:3; IIKi 3:27; 5:18; 10:18-28; 11:17-20; 17:10,16; 21:3,7; 23:4-15,24; IIChr 15:8,16; 24:7; 31:1; 33:19; 34:4,7), still their existence and power are expressly denied by later OT thought (cf., e.g., Is 44:9-20; Jer 10:3-5; Hos 4:12; 13:2; Mic 1:7; Zech 10:2; Albright, FSAC, 251; Whitehouse, HDB I, 591); the ridicule poured out upon idolatry seems to be a corollary, not only of the monotheism of the authors, but of their doctrine of God's omnipotence as well.
2. Cf. below, 17-18.
3. Smith, Moral Life, 7-8.
4. Thus, e.g., God ordained the downfall of Ahaziah at the hands of Jehu (IIChr 22:7ff); it was he who made the Egyptians hate Israel (Ps 105:25); all the Psalmist's ways are known before his birth (Ps 139:16); the lots fall according to the Lord's disposal (Prov 16:33); God gives victory in war (Prov 21:31); rewards follow the choice of God, not the efforts of man (Eccl 2:26); God's plans are "formed from of old" (Is 25:1); God is the potter, man is clay (Is 29:16; 45:9; 64:8; Jer 18:1-11); God controls Assyria (Is 37:26,28-29); Cyrus is, all unknown to himself, girded by God (Is 45:1-13); Jeremiah is a chosen prophet before his birth (Jer 1:5); God planned retribution on Jerusalem from of old (Lam 2:17). Cf. Manson's sketch of this doctrine as it developed in the OT, in Teaching, 142ff.
5. By contrast, cf. the assumption that the gods of Ur perish with the city unless they restore it ("Lament Over the Destruction of Ur" in ANET 455-463), especially the revealing words (461), "After thy city had been destroyed, now how dost thou exist! ...Thy city has become a strange city; now how dost thou exist!"
6. Koehler, Theology, 73-74.
7. Manson, op. cit., 144-145; Ringgren, Religion, 290, 297.

The heavy stress laid on God's omnipotence was bound, like monotheism itself, to suggest that God dispensed evil as well as good, and the conclusion was indeed drawn. Sometimes the evil attributed to God has the malicious quality that seems almost "demonic;"[1] however, the inappropriateness of attributing such motives and actions to Jahweh seems to have been felt from fairly early times.[2] The more common view is that the "bad" of life, in measure as it is under God's control, is intended for a constructive purpose.[3] And thus understood, something of the sting is drawn from the untoward happenings of life; the woes of life, if indeed administered by a just God, lose their malicious character, and do not cry out quite so loudly for explanation.

For God was not regarded as simple omnipotence, unregulated in his behavior by anything except temper or whim.[4] Instead, his character is marked by righteousness, faithfulness and justice.[5] And with all the

1. Cf. Ex 4:24-26, where God attacks Moses with intent to kill; IISam 24:1, where God incites David to sin.
2. Cf. IChr 21:1, where the malicious intent of IISam 24:1 is attributed instead to Satan; in the apocryphal literature, cf. Jub 48:2-3, where the offensive passage in Ex 4:24-26 is expurgated.
3. E.g., God's use of the nations to prove and discipline Israel: the Canaanites (Jud 3:1-2); the Babylonians (IIChr 32:31); Assyria (Is 10:5); and many other references. Evil and lying spirits likewise serve a constructive purpose in being the punishment for folly: Saul's is sent only after he has departed from the Lord (ISam 16:15,16,23; 18:10; 19:9; contrast 19:20,23); the spirit in the mouths of the prophets is sent to punish Ahab (IKi 22:19-23; IIChr 18:18-22). God has brought his people into a net (Ps 66:11), but only in order that he might test them. Even the wicked have a useful purpose, created as they are for the day of trouble (Prov 16:4).
4. Contrast ANET 126, where in the Telepinus Myth the god, in furious anger, tries to put his right shoe on his left foot and vice versa; such frenzy would be unthinkable in Jahweh, from the OT standpoint. On the character of God, cf. Rowley, Faith of Israel, 60-70.
5. Three great OT words: צדק, משפט, אמונה. צדק is "righteousness:" "does God pervert justice (Job 8:3)?" "I will ascribe righteousness to my Maker (Job 36:3);" "God of my right (Ps 4:1);" "righteousness will look down from the sky (Ps 85:10,11,13;cf. 96:13);" "the right hand of my righteousness (Is 41:10; AV seems superior here to RSV);" "I the Lord declare what is right (Is 45:19);" "O Lord of hosts, who judgest righteously (Jer 11:20)." On צדק, cf. Snaith, Distinctive Ideas, 69-70. משפט is "justice:" "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do

consistency thus implied, he shows kindness and love to his people.[1] This in itself places a fairly strict limitation on the kind of motive and action which can be considered appropriate to him. And when to these attributes is added a holiness before which sin could not stand,[2] we dis-

right? (Gn 18:25)" "just and right is he (Dt 32:4);" "does the Almighty pervert the right? (Job 8:3)" "the Almighty will not pervert justice (Job 34:12);" "God loves righteousness and justice (Ps 33:5);" "For the Lord loves justice (Ps 37:28);" "the works of God's hands are faithful and just (Ps 111:7);" "O Lord, in thy justice preserve my life (Ps 119:149);" "I will betroth you to me in righteousness (Hos 2:19)." On the above two words, cf. Quell in TWNT II, 178, who observes that not only is God as a lawgiver in the OT bound by his own law as a just God, but also that the very terminology employed of the legal relationship between God and man applies equally to man's relationships with other men and God's attitude toward himself.

אמונה is "faithfulness;" "a God of faithfulness and without iniquity, just and right is he (Dt 32:4);" "Thy steadfast love, O Lord, extends to the heavens, thy faithfulness to the clouds (Ps 36:5);" "Lord, where is thy steadfast love of old, which by thy faithfulness thou didst swear (Ps 89:49);" "to declare thy steadfast love in the morning, and thy faithfulness by night (Ps 92:2);" "He has remembered his steadfast love and faithfulness (Ps 98:3);" "His steadfast love endures for ever, his faithfulness to all generations (Ps 100:5);" "Thy faithfulness endures to all generations (Ps 119:90);" "Righteousness shall be the girdle of his waist, and faithfulness the girdle of his loins (Is 11:5);" "plans formed from of old, faithful and sure (Is 25:1)." On אמונה, cf. Rowley, Faith of Israel, 66-67.

On the overall implication of the three words, cf. Pederson, Israel I-II, 336ff; Ringgren, Religion, 83-86; 132-133; Snaith, Distinctive Ideas, 68ff.

1. Another great word, חסד, closely allied to the three above: "you have shown me steadfast love" says Jacob (Gn 32:10); "But the Lord was with Joseph and showed him steadfast love" (Gn 39:21); "God will not take steadfast love" from David as from Saul (IISam 7:15); "O Lord...showing steadfast love to thy servants," prays Solomon (IICh 6:14); "O Lord God... who keeps covenant and steadfast love," prays Nehimiah (Neh 1:5); "Whether for correction, or for his land, or for love, he causes it to happen (Job 37:13);" in Psalms, cf. the references in the previous footnote, where חסד is represented by the translation "steadfast love;" "with everlasting love I will have compassion on you (Is 54:8);" "I will recount the steadfast love of the Lord (Is 63:7)." On חסד cf. Snaith, op. cit., 94ff; Bright, Kingdom of God, 28, fn. 18: "It refers to the favor of God which summoned Israel into covenant and the steadfast love which he shows them even in spite of unworthiness." Cf. also Rowley, op. cit., 62, fn. 2; Ringgren, op. cit., 85.

2. A very common OT word, but cf. in particular Is 6:1-7; though in early days and in the priestly tradition this "holiness" (קדוש) may have been crudely and materialistically conceived (e.g., the "holiness" of temple prostitutes - cf. Snaith, op. cit., 44), it became a vital concept when to the primitive dread was added a more spiritual content (though not necessarily an ethical one - cf. Ringgren, op. cit., 74-75). On the development of this term, cf. Pederson, op. cit., III-IV, 264ff; Snaith, op. cit., 21ff.

cover the real boundaries beyond which theologically enlightened Israel, and likewise developing Judaism, refused to stray. Whatever the ultimate source of evil, it is unthinkable that such a God as this could be considered its author.[1]

It is on the basis of God's loving and just omnipotence, wedded to the notion of his constructive use of evil for a good purpose, that the typical OT doctrine of retributive justice is grounded.[2] God is understood to repay, almost automatically, good for good and evil for evil, and all within the limits of a man's earthly life.[3] Again, on this

1. The men of Qumran, in attributing the creation of the Evil Spirit directly to God, were outside the mainstream of orthodoxy; cf. below, 59-60. The rabbis, in their discussions of the evil yetzer, were not really dealing with something radically or fundamentally evil; cf. Moore, Judaism I, 482-483; Davies, PRJ, 22-23.

2. Retributive justice is taught all through the OT, especially in the Psalms, over half of which contain references to the doctrine. Elsewhere in the OT, cf., e.g.: he who sheds blood, his own blood will be shed (Gn 9:4-6); the midwives spare the children of others, hence are given children of their own (Ex 1:20-21); Nadab and Abihu offer unholy fire, and must therefore perish by fire themselves (Num 3:4); an Amalekite kills Saul, hence must himself die (IISam 1:14-16); David allows Shimei to live in hopes of obtaining a reward himself (IISam 16:12); the lengthy interpretation of Israelite history since the monarchy is entirely postulated on the principle of retributive justice (IIKi 17:7-18); Nehimiah prays that Sanballat and Tobiah will receive their own words back upon themselves (Neh 4:4-5), but that he will be remembered for his good deeds (Neh 5:19; 13:14,22,31); tit for tat is particularly neat in Esther, where Haman is forced to honor the very man he hated, is hanged on the very gallows he had built for his enemy, and where the Jews are permitted to kill the very people who had planned to kill them (Est 6:11; 7:10; 9:5-10,16,25). The list could be extended almost indefinitely through the prophets, e.g., Is 5:8-10; 59:18; Jer 5:19; 28:16-17; 32:23-24; Dan 6:24; Zeph 3:18-19; Mal 3:6-12.

3. Some notion of the grim vacuity of the after-life in Hebrew thought is gained from glancing at the following passages: Sheol is a place of weakness and darkness (Prov 2:18-19; Eccl 6:4-6); a place of forgetfulness (Ps 6:5; Eccl 1:11; 9:1-6,10; Is 38:10-11); its dwellers might almost be described as non-existent (Ps 39:13; 90:5-10; Prov 24:14, 20; Is 26:14); it is characteristically a place deep within the dust of the earth (Ps 86:13; 88:3-12; 146:4; Prov 2:18-19; 5:5; 7:27; 9:18; 15:24; Eccl 3:19-22; 12:7-8; Is 14:9-11,15,18,19; 29:4; Dan 12:2-3; Amos 9:2; Jonah 2:2,6). Hopeful passages (e.g. Prov 23:18; Is 25:8; 26:19; Dan 12:2-3; Job 19:25-26) are buried under the avalanche of despair. The fact that Sheol seems to have been considered beyond the reach of Jahweh's sway and worship (Ps 6:5; 88:3-12; 94:17; 115:17-18; Is 38:17-19) may show why retribution had necessarily to be limited to

assumption, something of the evilness of evil is vitiated, and without ever regarding good and evil as identical, after the fashion of the Stoics, OT man was able to affirm that God is both good and at the same time controls the forces of evil.

As far as God is concerned, then, the OT does not seem to assert his responsibility for evil in the sense that we understand the word. The "woes" that come upon mankind are understood in a constructive or disciplinary fashion; and where there may be a hint in older sources, or in popular reaction against the prophets,[1] that God was popularly, or at one time, regarded as the originator of moral evil, nevertheless Judaism refused to draw this conclusion, maintaining at the same time both God's omnipotence and his goodness.[2]

The second suggested source of evil in the OT is the demonic; however, Satan, no more than God, can be regarded as the originator of evil in the OT. The name "Satan" appears in only two contexts in the whole OT,[3] and is a late development. More typical of the OT are references to demons, references which seem sometimes veiled and hidden by attempts at expurgation.[4] Perhaps what is most noteworthy about these

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the present life; cf. Ringgren, Religion, 244-245; Mowinckel, He That Cometh, 86; Lods, Israel, 476, though it cannot be held, in light of the Ras Shamra texts, that the gloomy Hebrew view of after-life is a Jahwistic reaction against paganism. Indeed, it is precisely paganism that gives us the most express parallels to the Hebrew conceptions: ANET 87; 98-99; 107; S. Langton, ERE IV, 444; Gray, Legacy, 79; 188; Jastrow, Religion, 511.

1. Isaiah and Jeremiah in particular, by their denials that God is the source of evil, may show that this was an idea popularly held: Is 5:20; 63:17; 64:5 ct. 65:1ff; Jer 2:4ff, esp. v. 21; 25:3-7. Cf. Ringgren, op. cit., 47.

2. On the idea of God's permitting evil without sanctioning it, cf. Manson, Teaching, 151-152.

3. IChr 21:1; Job, chh. 1 and 2; in Zech 3:1, the word is used with the article, and hence is impersonal (cf. Oesterley and Robinson, Hebrew Religion, 280.

4. As examples may be mentioned: the Azazel of Lev 16, not mentioned elsewhere until we reach the apocryphal literature (cf. IEn 6:7; 9:16;

references even to the lesser demons is the infrequency of their appearance, which is in contrast to the luxuriant demonology of Babylonian religion.[1] Indeed, expurgation by Jahwists of the older sources is inadequate to explain the phenomenon; we seem to be dealing here with something that is native to the Hebrew religion, a simple lack of interest in the demonic.[2] A more probable explanation for the lack of demonic

10:4-6; ApocAbr 13 and 14); Lods says (Israel, 239), "It may be that originally Azazel himself was driven out in the form of the goat." To Azazel Albright attributes a Canaanite origin (FSAC 262). Cf. Driver in HDB I, 207. On demons as animals (Is 13:21-22; 30:6; 34:14; Jer 50:39; 51:37), cf. Doughty, Arabia Deserta, 190, 194; Lods, op. cit., 238-241; Langton, Essentials, 43, 52. The hairy satyrs are represented (Dt 32:17; Ps 106:37); cf. Langton, op. cit., 17-18; W. R. Smith, Semites, 120, 441; in the midrash on Ruth 3:9 quoted by S.-B. Kommentar II, 300, spirits have no hair, and among the demons only Lilith has a luxuriant growth of hair. Lilith the night-hag is found in Is 34:14 and Ps 19:5; cf. Lods, op. cit., 239, 247; W. R. Smith, loc. cit.; Langton, op. cit., 47-49; Hooke, Religion, 28. There are references to the mysterious "rephaim," (e.g. Job 26:5; Ps 88:11; Prov 9:18; 21:16; Is 14:9; 26:14, 19), the assembly of the dead; cf. Samuel's reappearance from Sheol (ISam 28:8ff) and Ezekiel's description of the underworld (Ezek 32:17ff). For further veiled references to demons and magic, cf. T. H. Gaster, IDB I, 819ff; e.g., G finds matical practices reflected in the clothing of the priests (Ex 28:35; Lev 16:12-13; Num 15:38).

1. Cf. Jastrow, Religion, 183; 263-265; 657; 692; Gray, Archaeology, 44-45; Jacobsen, in Frankfort, Intellectual Adventure, 206; Bousset, Religion, 334, quotes a Babylonian magical text as saying, "Sie decken die Erde wie das Gras."

2. The theory of Jahwistic expurgation of demonic references is often entertained, particularly in connection with the cult of the dead (cf. Langton, Good and Evil Spirits, 95; 178-181; 292). But as far as the cult of the dead is concerned, the Ras Shamra evidence shows that the Hebrews entertained a view of the after-life expressly similar to that of their Canaanite neighbors; no expurgation or reform must be postulated to explain this. Moreover, H. Duhm (Die bösen Geister) offers weighty objections to this theory of Jahwistic expurgation of popular beliefs. He sees no evidence of such activity, e.g., in the Elijah-Elisha cycle of stories (30); nor is the attack on Moses attributed to a sickness-demon (31); nor was the being who wrestled with Jacob a night-demon whose power waned with the dawn, for when it departed it blessed Jacob, which a demon could not have done (31). Amos is able to assume (Amos 3:6) that the answer to his question will be affirmative, that his hearers will agree that Jahweh does all evil as well as good. Nor do references to Babylonian myths of cosmic evil spirits (Is 51:9f; Ps 74:13-17; 89:11; Job 7:12; 26:12-13, etc.) reflect the beliefs of the common man: "Es erscheint mir von Wichtigkeit, noch einmal hervorzuheben, dass der gesamte bisher behandelte kosmologische Stoff ausschliesslich in den Schriften israelitischer Dichter (und dichterischer Propheten) sich vorgefunden, also vor allem solche Männer angezogen und

references is that the stress on Jahweh's complete sovereignty, encompassing both good and evil, made a demonic explanation of evil unnecessary.[1]

What seems most significant from the standpoint of our inquiry is the subordinate position occupied by such evil spirits as do appear. Satan is represented in Job as a member of God's retinue, operating submissively and only by permission. He performs the necessary, though odious, function of testing and proving the faithfulness of Job, and in this role may be regarded as doing good.[2] Likewise the "evil spirits from the Lord"[3] bring richly-deserved retribution on erring leaders of Israel, and thus fulfil a "good" purpose. Beings that operate in such obvious dependence upon the divine mandate are hardly to be regarded as initiating anything of themselves. To attribute to them the origin of evil would be tantamount to attributing it to God.[4]

One demonological passage deserves mention more at length, not only

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angeregt hat, die die erforderliche Phantasie und Bildung besassen, sich auch um Dinge zu bekümmern, die dem Interesse des gewöhnlichen Menschen fern liegen." (44). Paradoxically, the Deuteronomic reform may have led the way to more demonology by degrading foreign gods in the interest of monotheism, leaving them no place to go but into the ranks of the demons (35-36). An expurgation theory does not seem adequate to explain fully the paucity of demonic references in the OT, much of which must apparently be attributed to the native beliefs of the people, rather than to reforms initiated from above by professional religionists.

1. Ringgren, Religion, 103: "A popular belief in demons alongside a belief in gods is quite conceivable; the one does not exclude the other. But the conviction that everything, both good and bad, comes from Yahweh actually made belief in demons superfluous."

2. The word "Satan" simply means, "adversary." It appears in this sense in Num 22:22ff; ISam 29:4; IISam 19:22; IKi 5:4; 11:14,23; Ps 109:6. Cf. Brown, Driver and Briggs, Lexicon, 966.

3. Jud 9:23; ISam 16:14; 18:10; 19:9; IKi 22:19-23.

4. With reference to IKi 22:19-23, Barton (ERE IV, 595) writes: "Jahwe is thought of as surrounded by a host of spirits. These spirits were as yet undifferentiated. They had no moral character; they were neither angels nor demons, but took on their character from the nature of the tasks which they were given to perform. Jahwe Himself was responsible for whatever was done. He lured Ahab to his death; it was at His bidding that one of the spirits became a lying spirit in the mouths of Ahab's prophets to accomplish this end."

for its intrinsic importance, but even more for the extensive use made of it by later thinkers in the Jewish tradition. The story of the fall of the angels in Genesis 6 has "a peculiarly deep mythological tinge;"[1] it seems to have its roots, like the remainder of Genesis 1 - 11 in Mesopotamian sources,[2] and it can be paralleled in much ancient Near Eastern thought.[3] But the signs of editing are clear, and in its present form the purpose of the story's inclusion in the J account becomes evident; as von Rad says,[4]

> ...no matter how clearly distinguishable this derivation of the giants from angel marriages may be in the original form of our narrative, it still is not mentioned at all in the present text. Our narrator cut the old intellectual context....It is clear that the special aetiological concern of the ancient myth cannot move forward after that "demythologization." The Yahwist wanted to show man's general corruption. He wanted to represent the mixing of superhuman spiritual powers with man, a kind of "demonic" invasion and thus point out a further disturbance caused by sin; and what is more, a profound disturbance, for these were not only evidences of dissolution within the human community (Cain, Lamech); but in the rise of a super humanity, overlapping decrees were broken, decrees by which God had separated the upper realm of the heavenly spiritual world from that of man. There had occurred a deterioration of all creation, which cannot be more frightfully conceived.

In the same vein, Richardson suggests that "like the story of Cain, this is in fact another version of the Fall story, bringing out still a further aspect of the matter."[5] While the event here narrated is regarded as an

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1. Delitzsch, Genesis, 225; to this variety of story seems to belong Is 14:12-15, but its citation there is so brief as to elude identification as to source. Cf. Jastrow, Religion, 520-523, on the hubris which caused the downfall of Etana, who mounted to the home of the gods on an eagle.
2. Albright, FSAC, 181, who further cites JBL 58 (1939), 184-211.
3. Albright, op. cit., who further cites on p. 226 the article by J. Morgenstern, Hebrew Union College Annual 14 (1939), 76-126, and his own comments in JBL 59 (1940), 300. The Canaanite El fathers children on earthly women: cf. Gray, Legacy, 117-118. On the similar idea of in Greek thought, cf. Rohde, Psyche, 141, fn. 2. Cf. also R. Campbell Thompson in ERE IV, 571, particularly for the Rabbinic parallels. Interesting modern parallels are cited by Cook and Smith in W. R. Smith, Semites, 50, 514; Doughty, Arabia Deserta, 191-193.
4. Genesis, 111-112.
5. Genesis, 93-94.

unmixed evil, still its place in the continuum is sharply defined: it is a further consequence of a process already begun. It is a part of the cumulative series building up to the cataclysm which breaks in the Flood. The descent of the "sons of God" is in the middle of the series, and that by design.[1] Later writers mistook the intention of their source when they found here the beginning of evil in the world;[2] rather, it was in Eden that J located the Fall.[3]

The last word has not been said on the subject of the "sons of God" of Gn 6:1ff, and their demonic offspring, as becomes evident when we read the A&P and the Rabbis; but for the moment we turn from the demons to the real locus of sin's origin in the intention of J, and in the assumption of most of the OT, that is, to the human situation. Sin is to be found, not in a breakdown in God's governance or provision, but in man's breaking of God's covenant. Sin begins in the Garden of Eden.

The wonderful stories of Genesis 1 - 11 seem to have had little immediate effect on the developing Jewish faith, despite their antiquity; it remained for post-Exilic thought to discover their treasures and to develop the themes suggested.[4] It seems likely that these "beginnings" stories had wide circulation, but not always in the same form.[5] Similar

1. It is important to assess properly J's artistry as an editor and compiler (Bewer, Literature of the OT, 76-77), and to see the first eleven chapters of Gn as progressive, not fortuitous, in arrangement.
2. Jub 5:1-11; 7:21-25; 1En 6:1 - 8:4; 86:1 - 87:2; below, 89ff.
3. The offspring of the "sons of God" are called "nephilim," with the Hebrew root נפל. The etymology of this word seems much in doubt; in any event, Skinner (Genesis, 145-146) is sure it is unlikely to be connected with a "fall," but rather with an "abortive birth;" cf. Albright, FSAC, 226, who says the connection is with "meteors," which do, however, fall.
4. Cf. Lods, Israel, 487-488; as Bousset observes (Religion, 295-297), the importance of God as creator is late in the development of OT religion, beginning really with II Isaiah and coming into its own between the Testaments. Sir 25:24 seems the first theological interpretation of the Garden of Eden story; cf. Pfeiffer, History, 394.
5. Cf. the First Man stories reflected in Job 15:7-9; Is 14:12-14; Ezek 28:11-19; 31:1-9. For a summary view of the parallels, cf. Gunkel, Genesis, 29ff. Cf. also Ringgren, Religion, 111; Bousset, op. cit., 461ff.

myths of life and death, human beginnings, and the fall of man circulated in the cultures surrounding the Jews.[1] Compared with the J account the pagan stories show similarities which are striking, but dissimilarities just as noteworthy.[2] More important than the differences in detail are the differences in basic assumptions: the Mesopotamians assumed that the reason for death and disease was the jealousy of the gods directed against man,[3] and that the original purpose of human creation was to relieve the gods of menial labor by the slavery of man.[4] The contrasting OT view is that so far from being jealous of his creation, God from the first gave him free access to the food of life,[5] and at the beginning set man in a garden already planted and prepared;[6] moreover, God was always concerned for man's personal welfare.[7] Death results from man's own transgression.[8] Besides the different concept of God, we

1. "The bulk of this material is known to us from copies written at the end of the third and the early part of the second millenniums B.C. But the myths themselves are undoubtedly much older." Jacobsen, in Frankfort, Intellectual Adventure, 168.
2. Similarities: references to the food of life (Gilgamesh, ANET, 96; cf. Jastrow, Religion, 510; Adapa, ANET, 102; cf. Jastrow, op. cit., 552, 554), sins of eating food (Enki and Ninhursag, ANET, 40), a paradise in a garden (Gilgamesh, ANET, 89; cf. Jastrow, op. cit., 490, 506), the discovery of sex (the Rabbinic interpretation of the Garden of Eden story) as the end of innocence (Gilgamesh, ANET 75,77; cf. Jastrow, op. cit., 476-477), the idea of human rebellion against God (Re against Hat-Hor, ANET, 11). Differences are too numerous and obvious to need mention; as Ringgren says (Religion, 111), the Sumerian paradise myth "differs in all its details from the Hebrew narrative, and, at least in the form preserved to us, has a completely different Sitz im Leben...."
3. Hooke, Religion, 73, 101.
4. Jacobsen, in Frankfort, op. cit., 182.
5. Gn 2:9; cf. 2:16-17, where the Tree of Life is obviously not forbidden (cf. von Rad, Genesis, 79-80); apparently the "food of life" is here thought of as a continuing sustenance (as in the Gilgamesh legend, ANET, 96; otherwise, would not Gilgamesh have eaten it immediately and lived for ever instead of trying to bring it back to his own world?) and not a once-for-all food which being once eaten would guarantee eternal life (as in the Adapa legend, ANET, 102). Gn 3:22 does not seem entirely consistent with this view, perhaps because of a combining of traditions (cf. von Rad, op. cit., 76).
6. Gn 2:9,15.
7. Gn 2:18-23.
8. Gn 3:11ff, esp. v. 19.

have in Genesis a different attitude toward history and its progress.[1] This is the first effort at writing interpretive history: it is more than a listing of events after the style of a court scribe - it is a coherent effort to ground the present in the past and to explain how event follows upon event.[2]

Although the original aetiological intent of the story seems likely to have been to explain the origin of death,[3] its place in the narrative shows that it is intended by J to describe the beginning of sin in the world as well, how sin achieved its foothold in the human situation, a base-camp from which the invasion was to spread more widely.[4] But the responsibility for the beginning of sin rests squarely on the human pair, as over against the serpent. As has been widely observed, the serpent is not the devil,[5] or, at least, is not yet the devil. Adam

1. This is the beginning of Heilsgeschichte. "A survey of the primal history (Gn 1 - 11) makes one important point stand out: mythological material has here been placed in an historical framework. The creation is the beginning of history; the deluge is an event in the history of mankind." (Ringgren, Religion, 112).
2. Cf. von Rad, Genesis, 22-23, on the unique wedding by J of primeval history to sacred history.
3. Cf. Oesterley, in Oesterley and Robinson, Hebrew Religion, 320. Koehler, Theology, 175, believes that the explanation of death is only one of a number of aetiological themes, which are undifferentiated in importance here, and that the origin of sin is definitely not in view.
4. Sin begins with the transgression of Adam and Eve (3:1ff); continues with murder and fratricide (Cain and Abel, 4:8ff); develops into retribution beyond reason (Lamech avenges himself seventy-seven fold, 4:23-24); spreads beyond humanity with the angel marriages (6:1-4), and culminates in the pre-flood statement (6:5-6) of man's utter corruption. A new series begins with Noah's post-flood lapse (9:20ff) and culminates in the Tower of Babel story (11:1-9). Von Rad is able to refer to Gn 3 - 11 as "the Jahwist's great hamartiology" (Theology, 154). Cf. Lods, Israel, 485: "The distinctive contribution of the Israelite narrators seems to be the significant and delicate conciseness of the description of the gradual stages of the disobedience from the moment of the woman's succumbing to the tempter up to the excuses with which the guilty pair endeavour to throw the blame upon each other. The stress laid upon the moral aspect of the story foreshadows and, one might almost say, justifies the dogmatic interpretation which sees nothing in the story but the original sin of our primordial ancestors...."
5. E.g., Ringgren, op. cit., 110.

and Eve make their choice, but under no compulsion or irresistable pressure from without; it is from within that the real forces of sin respond to what is at most an external stimulus.[1] Nor is the genesis of this evil to be traced to the corruptibility of matter, after the fashion of the later Gnostics, so that the frailty of the flesh is responsible for the fall of the spirit; not only is it implied by man's changed environment after the Fall that prior to the Fall the physical world was "very good,"[2] but any dichotomy between man's flesh and his spirit is foreign to early Jewish thought, where man is regarded as a unified whole, a flesh-spirit totality.[3] It was the whole being of Adam and Eve that rose up against God in rebellion. And thus there is an analogy between the sin of the first pair and that of all their offspring:[4]

> This is not merely a description of the first man's sin, but is also a diagnosis of every man's sin. The responsibility for sin is placed not upon the flesh in contradistinction from the spirit, but is traced back to its native lair, the will of man. This is fundamental in Hebrew ethics. Never is there any effort to shield the sinner from the punishment due him on the ground that he is not morally responsible or that he is bound by influences beyond his control. The attitude toward the transgressor throughout the Old Testament presupposes that it is in the sinner's power to turn from his evil way, if he but wills to do so. The responsibility for not doing so is his own.

So there is indeed an analogy between the sin of Adam and that of his children at many removes from him. The question Western man proceeds

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1. Irwin, in Frankfort, Intellectual Adventure, 268, writes: "Hence it was that through the course of centuries Israel's thinkers were impelled to a more profound understanding of the problems of human conduct. More and more they realized that it rises from the deep springs of the personality, not out of some casual circumstance. The generous man does generous things, while the churl will be churlish (Is 32:6-8). In Old Testament phrase it is a question of the human 'heart.'"
2. Gn 1:31 (P). Ringgren (Religion, 109) accepts the suggestion that "Eden" was interpreted by the Hebrews as meaning "luxury."
3. "But while it is thus the mind that devises evil and wills it, the body is not a mere involuntary instrument in its accomplishment. Sin, however it may be analyzed, is the sin of the man, not of either half of his nature." Moore, Judaism I, 486-487; cf. Irwin, op. cit., 258.
4. Smith, Moral Life, 48. Regarding the novelty of J's approach to sin and its interpretation, cf. von Rad, Theology, 268.

immediately to ask is, whether there is more than an analogy - whether there is a causative relationship between the sin of our first father and our own sins, whether Adam has made us sinful. But two considerations, both mentioned above, blunt the edge of this question. First, the Genesis stories were not apparently influential in shaping the early doctrine of Israel.[1] The connection between the sin of Adam and the sin of mankind seems not to have had the same fascination for the majority of the OT authors[2] as it does for the Rabbis and for the Western world since the dawn of Christianity.[3] We seem to be asking of the OT a question that never really confronted the OT at all.

Second, the sense of individual responsibility that is so axiomatic with us is a novelty to the OT world.[4] True, there was a sense of individual responsibility as well as a group responsibility for the OT; the individual was not always forcibly engulfed in the mass.[5] But the legal

1. Cf. above, 20, fn. 4.
2. On von Rad's assumptions, which are shared here, J would be an exception to this generalization. R speaks of how Israel "refused to dissolve her concept of guilt into subjectivity," and continues, "Only when the peculiarity and the grandeur of this ancient Israelite concept of guilt have been recognised will it also be apparent what a revolution the Jahwist's story of the Fall implies. Not that it makes guilt dissolve into subjectivity - that would be a complete misunderstanding of the Jahwist - but with his picture of the complicated operations within the soul when guilt is incurred, he opened up access to completely new territory." (Theology, 268).
3. For the inter-Testament period in its handling of the Adam story, cf. below, 113ff; it appears most obviously in the NT in the writings of Paul. For rabbinic references, cf. S.-B. Kommentar III, 227-229.
4. Albright, FSAC, 84, finds the beginnings of individualism as paralleling the shift from pre-logical thought to empirical and logical thinking that began with the Greeks in the fifth century BC; cf. ibid., 273, regarding the different view of the Pharisees from Ben Sira on the subject of the individual. On group identity, cf. further F. C. Grant, Roman Hellenism, 57; Smith, Moral Life, 14; Oesterley and Robinson, Hebrew Religion, 219-220; Lods, Israel, 474.
5. Cf. Ex 32:33; Num 27:3; IIKi 14:6=IIChr 25:4, cf. Dt 24:16; Jer 31:29-30. True individualism emerges with Ezekiel, following out, perhaps, the implications of the reference from Jeremiah; e.g., Ezekiel has his personal responsibility to fulfil, to which corresponds a like responsibility of the hearers to obey (Ezek 3:16-21); those who are to be saved are personally marked for that destiny by the angel (Ezek 9:4);

codes of the ancient Orient are all based on a collective concept of responsibility, a concept which OT law shares with other ancient law.[1] It may seem monstrous to modern man to suggest that children are held responsible for the deeds of their parents, but such was the conception that was uncritically held throughout most of the OT.[2]

For J and his contemporaries, the answer to our question would probably have been that as a matter of course, the deeds of the father of humanity affected his offspring.[3] The difficulty regarding the

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there is no such thing as a "treasury of merits" (Ezek 14:12-20); nor can righteousness be stored up for the future against sins yet to be committed, but the moment-by-moment attitude of the individual soul determines its destiny (Ezek 33:1-20). For individualism within the context of OT corporative responsibility, cf. de Fraine, Adam, and particularly 71ff; he says (73), "The presence in the Old Testament of this emphasis on community justice along the lines of "corporate personality" does not at all indicate the absence of individual culpability or individual responsibility in the biblical texts. Rather, the 'modern' attitude develops as Israelite law evolves." Cf. further on the rise of individualism Charles, Eschatology, 51ff; 102; Smith, Moral Life, 324-325.

1. De Fraine, op. cit., 71-72, citing J. Harvey, SciEccl 10 (1958) 167-202, says: "Whereas 'responsibility (in the modern sense of individual responsibility) is one of the fundamental postulates of justice for us,' the Semitic codes (we now know of at least six which predate the Old Testament; they date from 2050 to 1350 BC) have no qualms about collective retribution. The Old Testament has not escaped this characteristic of ancient Oriental law."

2. Because of the solidarity of family and tribe it is perfectly legitimate that the sins of an iniquitous parent be visited on his offspring (Ex 20:5-6; 34:7; Deut 5:9-10; Is 14:20-21; 65:6-7; Lam 5:7). The oft-quoted "be sure your sin will find you out" is addressed, not to individuals, but collectively to tribes (Num 32:23). The "personal" sin of Achan is treated as a sin of the whole people (Josh 7:1-26; cf. 22:20). Instead of punishing the individual offenders, Benjamin would prefer to stand by them and fight a war in their behalf (Jud 20:12ff). The individual lapse of Jonathan brings its consequences in the Lord's treatment of the whole people as the Lord refuses to answer the king's question because of it (ISam 14:37-38). David's "personal" sin is visited upon the innocent people, because he is their king (IISam 24:10-16; IChr 21:7-17). Because Ahab humbles himself, judgment will be visited upon his sons, and not upon him (IKi 21:29); along similar lines, the fall of Judah is blamed not so much on contemporary evil as on the sins of the departed Manasseh (IIKi 23:26-27; 24:3-4), and the reason for God's patience with the wicked Jehoram is alleged to be because of David (IIChr 21:6-7). It is legitimate to pray that there will be some punishment left over unfulfilled upon one's enemy, so that at his death his children may likewise share in it (Ps 17:14). Cf. Moore, Judaism I, 475-476.

3. As a matter of course, the patriarch was thought to influence his tribe; cf. the interpretation of the Melchizedek incident, Heb 7:4ff.

transmission of this guilt, whether through natural generation or not, simply would not have arisen in the ancient world-view.

And so we are left with a rather anomalous result. On the basis of our assumptions, it can neither be said that the transgression in the Garden of Eden was, nor that it was not the cause of sin in later generations. There is a relationship between the two, an analogy; but to trace any real causation here would be going too far, just as to deny any causative element would be falling short. As Loewe observes,[1]

> Traces of the conception of "original sin" crop up now and then: thus, "there is no generation that has not an ounce of sin from the Golden Calf" (Jer Taanith iv.7, 68c, top and elsewhere). But perhaps the Rabbis saw the danger in the logical consequences of the idea, and dropped it. It is remarkable how Jewish theology, owing to its lack of system, was able, as it were, to dabble in ideas without getting into trouble. So original sin is not quite unknown, but it is not allowed to upset the Jewish scheme of salvation by man's own efforts, helped by the divine mercy and grace.

This remark, of course, applies to the much later time of the Rabbis; but the same unsystematic character permeates the structure of the whole OT, and is indeed the basis for the same feature of Rabbinic thought.

One other set of Scripture passages deserves mention, more for its later significance as interpreted by the Rabbis than for its intrinsic value for the explanation of sin. The Rabbinic doctrine of the two yetzers, two spirits at war within man, one good and the other evil, was fathered variously on OT texts by doubtful exegetical exercises.[2] But

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1. Montefiore, Rabbinic Literature, 24-25. Cf. a similar quotation, op. cit., 19.
2. The texts principally in question are Gn 6:5; 8:21; Dt 31:21; IChr 28:9; 29:18. On the doctrine of the yetzers, cf. below, 70ff; 107ff, and Moore, Judaism I, 479ff; Montefiore, op. cit., 165ff; Montefiore and Loewe, Rabbinic Anthology, 295ff. Moore says, with reference to this rather perverse exegetical tradition, "It attaches itself exegetically...to the anomalous spelling of the verb וַיִּיצֶר יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים הָאָדָם, Gn 2:7, with two yods, which signify the two yesers, יֵצֶר טוֹב and יֵצֶר הָרָע, or to the use of לְבָב, 'heart,' whose two bets indicate doublemindedness, while לֵב is single-minded." Op. cit., 484-485.

as Moore says in this connection, "These associations with the letter of Scripture, it need hardly be repeated, are not the origin of the distinction."[1] It would seem rather to be under the influence of Persian dualistic thought that this doctrine was brought to birth. At the same time, however, its basic compatibility with the main stream of OT thought should be stressed: this dualism has to do with the will, and it is the will which is regarded as the locus of sin in the OT. As Irwin says,[2]

> The directness and simplicity of Israel's thought insured that for most of the Old Testament period conversion and salvation alike were matters of volition. If one were a sinner, then the rational thing was to change his conduct. "Cease to do evil; learn to do well," Isaiah had demanded (Isa 1:16-17). "Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; why will ye die?" was a later formulation of the same idea (Ezek 33:11). Apparently it was as simple and easy as that.

Inasmuch as it dealt with the will of man instead of dabbling in demonic speculations, the efforts to explain evil as springing from a choice to serve the evil rather than the good yetzer came closer to the heart of OT thought about sin than did demonological interpretations of the Genesis 6 passage.

By way of summary then, it seems safe to say that the OT view of sin is that it rises in the human situation, and is essentially a matter of man's will in rebellion against God's. At least in later OT thought, God is such that evil cannot appropriately be attributed to him, though he is regarded as controlling and using it for constructive purposes. Similarly, the view of God limits the influence that can be allowed to demons and to Satan, whose place in the OT is severely restricted, though occasional traces of their passing may be seen. Man alone is thought to be responsible for sin, and thus evil would be seen as rising from within the human heart. Whether this in turn implies a prior responsibility on

1. Moore, Judaism I, 485.
2. Frankfort, Intellectual Adventure, 268.

the part of God is a problem left to the troublesome logic of later generations.

CHAPTER TWO

The period between the Testaments was one of crucial significance for Judaism and Christianity alike. Our understanding of Christianity would be robbed of much of its depth if we could not investigate the intellectual world in which it participates, which was largely a product of the stirring events set in motion by Alexander the Great, but whose roots reach far back into the cultures of the Mediterranean and Near Eastern worlds.

It is quite impossible to do more than survey this vast subject, indicating a few of the inter-Testament developments that have a bearing on the problem of evil and its origin as it is later set forth in the NT. Several historical events will be discussed first, to provide a general frame of reference. We will then turn our attention to a survey of developments in thought during this portenteous time. Finally there will be brief notes on the origin of evil in four particular traditions of thought: Philo, Qumran, Gnosticism, and Rabbinic Judaism. The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha will be surveyed in the chapter following, in somewhat greater detail.

The first historical factor which deserves mention is the Diaspora and its influence, antedating the conquests of Alexander, but participating in the world that produced him.[1] For Jews had served as early as 600 B.C. as mercenaries in foreign armies,[2] and considerable colonies of them had

1. For the importance of the Diaspora, cf. Macgregor & Purdy, Jew and Greek, 144-145; Wilson, Gnostic Problem, 2-4; Pfeiffer, History, 166ff, and particularly his listing of relevant literature in the footnote to 167; Nock, Conversion, 61-64. Some references in contemporary literature are found in Philo, in Flacc. 7,46; Leg. ad Caium, 281; Josephus, Ant. 14:7, 2; B. J. 7:3,3.
2. Wilson, op. cit., 2.

settled here and there throughout the ancient world since that time.[1] The non-Babylonian Diaspora was open to a rather different set of circumstances from those faced by the Babylonian Jews - a different set of religions around them, intellectual leadership probably at first inferior to that of the Babylonian Jews,[2] and a language problem consequent upon being less in touch with the home country and its language, as well as being much longer away from Palestine. It was for these Diaspora Jews who had forgotten their mother tongue that the OT had to be translated into Greek,[3] and through the LXX that many non-Jewish concepts crept into both the Jewish and the Christian religions.[4]

The most important historical event during the period we have chosen was, of course, the rise and fall of Alexander the Great (334-323 B.C.), the empire he created during his brief years of conquest and left to his quarrelling generals,[5] and the Hellenism which was his real and permanent bequest to the world.[6] Alexander, with his policy of spreading the benefits of Greek culture wherever his influence held sway, and with his openness of mind regarding the value of other cultures and religions,

1. Particularly important was the Egyptian branch of the Diaspora, beginning in the days of Jeremiah or before (Jer 42 - 44) and supplemented by further emigration ca. 300 B.C.; cf. Albright, PSAC, 268. Oesterley feels that there were three communities of Jews in Egypt prior to the Exile (History of Israel II, 40, 159). On the contrast between the doctrines of Alexandrian and Palestinian Judaism, cf. Charles, Eschatology, 304-305.
2. Keeping in mind the fact that it was the cream of the crop that was apparently taken away to Babylon: Jer 24:1, the princes, craftsmen, and smiths were taken away in the first deportation (cf. IIKi 24:14-16); Jer 39:10, the "poor" remained after the second deportation (cf. IIKi 25:12); Jer 52:28-30, the total number taken being 4,600. For further evidence of deportation, cf. Joel 3:6.
3. The Pentateuch ca. 250 B.C.; the translation, however, was spread over a number of years. Cf. Tarn, Hellenistic Civilization, 178.
4. Dodd, Bible and Greeks, xi. Macgregor and Purdy, Jew and Greek, 150-151, support the view that the LXX "is surely the most significant translation in the history of our western civilization."
5. IMacc 1:5-9; Dan 8:8; 11:3ff. Tarn, op. cit., 8ff.
6. For studies of Hellenism, cf. Pfeiffer, History, 93ff; Bury (and others), The Hellenistic Age; Tarn, op. cit.; Tarn, Alexander the Great; Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, 94-100; Macgregor and Purdy, op. cit., 11-40; Nock, Conversion, 33-65.

opened the door to a syncretism that is perhaps the most typical intellectual mark of the centuries that followed him.[1]

1. At this point something should be said regarding the nature of Hellenistic syncretism and its limit or extent as an intellectual factor affecting inter-Testament thought. It is always tempting to identify sources for the thoughts expressed in Scripture, but the identification is often highly conjectural and can sometimes be quite arbitrary. The pan-Babylonian theory of Delitzsch, Winkler, and Jeremias, for example, attributed too much value to one possible OT source, and has been largely abandoned. Speaking of Weber, Schürer, Bousset, Gressmann, Reitzenstein, et al, J. Coert Rylaarsdam says (in The Study of the Bible, 37), "These men were completely under the spell of the Orient as a single cultural area. In their efforts to explain the varied aspects of Judaism and Christianity they were wedded to the comparative-religion method and perhaps over-looked the inner meaning and psychology of Israel's religion."

The picture sketched by C. H. Gordon in his book Before the Bible may overemphasize the mingling that took place between the years 1500 and 1000 B.C., but it is hard to discredit the general thesis that during these years there were in the Mediterranean cultures areas of life in which much was shared in common - legislation, literature and military organization as well as specifically religious belief. Cf. similarly Nilsson, Greek Piety, 189-190. Indeed, it is impossible to read such a study as James, Myth and Ritual, without being impressed with the fundamental similarities that appear among the various religious sources considered. Even in this early period the positive identification of intellectual origins would appear beset with a great many hazards.

If such a condition of fluidity prevailed in pre-Hellenistic times, the forces of syncretism must have been greatly heightened when a conscious effort was made at the exchange of ideas across cultural lines under Alexander. There was much in common to begin with among all these Mediterranean nations, as Gordon has shown; the influence of Greece had been extending itself through the Mediterranean world between the terminal point of Gordon's study and the beginning of the Hellenistic period, as Albright (FSAC, 259-260) points out. And then when actual pressure is exerted, as by Antiochus Epiphanes, to merge cultures, the "mix" of ideas becomes so thorough that their separation and distinction as to point of origin may well become sheer impossibility. Thus, we may characterize dualism as being typically Zoroastrian, but we must also take into account various forms of it in other religion, for traces of it seem to appear in Hebrew (below, 39, fn. 2), Zoroastrian (Zaehner, Dawn and Twilight, 122-123) and Greek (Rohde, Psyche, 297ff; 534) religions. Apocalyptic seems to have been heightened in Zoroastrian religion, but its parallels are found in the Hebrew prophets, and some non-systematic roots of apocalyptic ideas have been discerned in Egyptian religion (James, op. cit., 216-217) in the themes of judgment and of life after death. Cf. below, 42, fn. 1.

When elements such as these, with such close affinity at root, have been forcibly combined over the course of two hundred years, it is simply impossible to unravel the varying strands and to trace them to the point of manufacture. The chief lesson to be learned from the History of Religions school is that we must realize the existence of such influence between the religions as both possible and probable. But while all religions affected each other and borrowed each other's language and concepts, still, each religion put a distinctive stamp on what it borrowed.

It is hardly surprising that Hellenism should have had its impact upon Judaism, and that its influence should be felt in turn by the young Church.[1] It was the reaction of Palestinian conservatives against the excessive Hellenizing zeal of Antiochus IV that brought the beginnings of the Maccabean Wars (175-142 B.C.) and established the Hasmoneans on the throne of David.[2]

The Maccabean Wars had a profound effect on the intellectual climate of the contemporary Jewish world. The freedom gained was cause for tremendous national pride; on the other hand, the confidence felt by some during the halcyon days of early Maccabean rule very soon met its check, and those who had vainly hoped that their rulers were in fact the Messiahs retreated from their false optimism.[3] Still, there was deep significance in the fact that the nation could resist the torrent of Hellenism, and

"Borrowings in religion...are usually in the nature of the appropriation of things in the possession of another which the borrower recognizes in all good faith as belonging to himself, ideas which, when once they become known to him, are seen to be the necessary implications or complements of his own." (Moore, Judaism II, 394-395).

Our efforts at describing sources for some of the religious ideas discussed in this chapter will therefore be undertaken without any spirit of dogmatism as to the specific source, but according to what seems most likely and most characteristic of the thought under discussion; the hope will be that when direct influence cannot be proven, the general conception in circulation will suggest the way in which an idea, however intended in its original form, will be understood by the popular mind.

1. On the complex relationship between Hellenism and Judaism, cf. Davies' comment (in Scrolls, 157): "It has become clear that the traditional convenient dichotomy between Judaism and Hellenism was largely false. In the fusions of the first century the boundaries between these are now seen to have been very fluid." Cf. also Davies, PRJ, ch. 1, and his additional note on 345. However, that there were some distinctions between Hellenistic and non-Hellenistic within Judaism seems quite certain: cf. Macgregor & Purdy, Jew and Greek, 43; Dodd, Bible and Greeks, xi-xii; Wilson, Gnostic Problem, 5-8; Black, in Peake Commentary, 693-698; Acts 6:1. Barr, Old and New, 37, 51, denies the validity of the convenient Greek/Hebrew antithesis often presupposed as axiomatic; cf. likewise Daube, Rabbinic Judaism, viii.

2. IMacc 1:15; IIMacc 4:11; Antiochus Epiphanes seems to be in view in SibOr III 611-615; cf. Tarn, Hellenistic Civilization, 170-172. It was probably out of this beginning that the Pharisees arose (Pfeiffer, History, 11). Cf. Bevan, Jerusalem under the High-Priests, 31-48; 77-84.

3. Charles, A&P II, 1; 282. Jub 32:1; TLev 18; IMacc 14:41. Contrast Charles, op. cit., II, 411, regarding the AssMos, an argument from silence; ibid., 630, regarding PsSol 2:9-15; 8:12-14,25-26, where a wealthy ruling class, probably the Hasmoneans, are castigated for their wickedness.

could even achieve independence; the successes of the Maccabean Wars and the reestablishment of an independent Jewish kingdom lie in the background of much of what was written by Jewish authors during the inter-Testament period.

The inglorious end of Hasmonean rule and the appearance of Rome on the Palestinian scene (63 B.C.) marked another epoch,[1] but there was hardly any observable change in the intellectual current at the beginning of Roman domination. The Jews clung jealously to their rights and privileges, maintained their religion, and continued to cherish messianic hopes. It was not until the catastrophic events of 66-70 A.D. had run their course that the Jews began to realize in full the meaning of defeat at the hands of the Romans; indeed it was not until the end of the Bar Cocheba revolt (132-135 A.D.) that the political hopes of Jewish ascendancy were finally crushed, and the nation compelled to seek its further destiny in the study of the Law and the worship of the synagogue.[2]

One further development of some significance remains to be mentioned, this time one purely of intramural Jewish affairs: the rise of a variety of sects and parties within the Jewish faith.[3] The New Testament witnesses to a number of these;[4] Rabbinic literature is the product of

1. Reactions to Roman invasion and attempts at historical (or apocalyptic) interpretation of the event are found in SibOr III, 350-362; V,408-413; cf. the footnotes in Charles, A&P II, 405. Cf. also PsSol 2:20ff; 8:16-24; apparently these are references to Pompey and his invasion of Palestine in 63 B.C. IVEz 11:1ff, the fifth vision, is an apocalyptic setting of the coming fall of the Roman Empire; likewise is IIBar 39:5-7 to be interpreted.
2. Cf. Moore, Judaism I, 505f; III, 155. This development had been anticipated by Qumran; cf. Vermes, Dead Sea Scrolls, 46. On the significance of the synagogue, cf. Guignebert, Jewish World, 73ff.
3. Hastings, ERE V, 139-145; 267f; Guignebert, op. cit., 191ff; Schürer, Jewish People II, ii, 3ff.
4. Scribes: Mk 2:6 & par. Pharisees: Mk 2:18-22 & par.; Acts 23:6ff; cf. Josephus, Ant. 13:10, 5-6; B.J. 1:5, 2. Sadducees: Mk 12:18-27 & par.; Acts 23:6ff; cf. Josephus, Ant. 13:5,9; 13:10,6; 18:1,4; 20:9,1; B.J.2:8,14. Assassins: Acts 21:38; cf. Josephus, Ant., 20:8,5; B.J. 2:13,3. Herodians: Mt 22:16; Mk 3:6; 12:13. Zealots: Lk 6:15; Acts 1:13. Cf. A. F. J. Kilijn, "Scribes, Pharisees, Highpriests, and Elders in the New Testament," NovTest 3 (1959) 259-267.

Pharisaic thought, and casts an interesting light back across the history of the NT;[1] and certainly uniquely we find one of these sects represented by the DSS.[2] These sects and parties, with all their variety and controversy among themselves, demonstrate the vitality and excitement of intellectual life during the inter-Testament period. This was anything but an age of orthodoxy: it was a time when a great variety of intellectual garb was being tried on for size, and the literature of the period mirrors the discomfort of many men who found traditional explanations to be badly fitted indeed.

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Within this historical framework, an intellectual ferment of far greater scope was also taking place. Jewish thinkers were not alone in trying to accomodate themselves to a new age, and under the scourge of Hellenism, the Jews were brought into confrontation with intellectual traditions diverse from their own. We consider a few of the themes that Jewish and pagan thought pondered, relative to the origin of evil.

It should be remarked, to begin with, that the question of the origin of evil was one that began to present itself as an intellectual challenge during the inter-Testament period.[3] The Greeks had already

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1. Although these sources must be used with all the caution urged by Davies, PRJ, 3.
2. On the Essenes, who are generally presumed to have written these documents, cf. Josephus, Ant., 13:5,9; 15:10,4-5; 18:1,5; B.J. 2:8,2-13; Pliny, Natural History, 5:17; Philo, Quod om., 12-13.
3. It had not been a problem for OT thought: "(The Psalmists) never forget that nature is beyond man's control, and that man is nothing in the sight of God. To this extent suffering and death present no problem, and sickness or natural disasters never evoke questions which might lead to the working out of a theodicy or throw doubt on the existence of God." (Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, 26). Even for Job there is no real effort at theodicy, but simply acquiescence in the incomprehensible will of God (op. cit., 29). "Nowhere in the prophetic writings of pre-exilic times is there any hint of cosmic speculation. The prophets were not interested, so far as we can tell, in how the world had come into existence or how the forces of nature operated; it was quite enough for them to know that God controlled them." (Albright, FSAC, 251).

made some efforts at its solution before the Hellenistic surge to the East under Alexander,[1] and were to continue with such speculations. As respect for the Greek intellectual methods and a dim understanding of the Greek mental process began to spread into the Near Eastern world, Jewish thinkers began to employ the tools and face the tasks of their Greek counterparts.[2] Speculative thought begins for the Jews during the inter-Testament period, and is seen for the first time in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha.[3]

Among the novel ideas which made their appeal to the Jewish mind was the concept of human survival of death. This seems to have been dimly apprehended by the Jews, but they shared the grim understanding of after-life common to neighboring nations.[4] But the Greeks and Persians alike took a different slant on life after death, one that made its appeal to the Jewish thinker. The noble death of Socrates expresses the Platonic view in its highest form - the belief that man passes without pain or peril into a condition of bodiless immortality, life purely in the realm

1. Plato had attributed to the resistance of matter the origin of evil: Tim. 48 A; 56 C; cf. Aristotle, Metaph. I:6. The later Stoic explanation tended to see evil as a necessary complement of the good (Chrysippus in Plutarch, Sto. Rep. 35,3; C. Not. 13,2; 14,1; Marcus Aurelius VI:42) and to suggest that from the divine standpoint even the evil is good (Cleanthes, Hymn, 18).
2. Knox, Judaism and Christianity, ii, 74, makes the suggestion that Judaism was forced into a consideration of pagan philosophy by apologetic necessities; in order to reach pagan minds, Stoicism and Platonism were pressed into service. For the popularity of Judaism in the pagan world, cf. Josephus, C. Ap., II, 39. Cf. also Pfeiffer's comments on the purpose of Greek philosophy in WisdSol, History, 342. But this kind of contact between Judaism and Greek philosophy seems not to have been on a fundamental enough level to change the basic Jewishness of Palestinian Judaism (Oesterley and Robinson, History of Israel II, 39). Philo does not belong in the same class with most of the A&P.
3. Davies, PRJ, 8, cites Pirke Aboth 2:18 and other secondary sources as proof that Epicureanism made inroads among the Jews. Dodd, Bible and Greeks, 230, sees Ecclesiastes as basically Epicurean, particularly in its rejection of "wisdom," which it regards as a waste of time. Pfeiffer, op. cit., 328-329, finds the influence of Greek philosophical terms in WisdSol 7:22,24; 11:7; 14:3; 16:21; 17:2; 19:18. Cf. also IVMacc 1:2-4, 18; 5:23ff.
4. Cf. above, 15, fn. 3.

of spirit.[1] But the Jews of Palestine seem to have found it impossible to cope with the idea of human life apart from the body; their minds reeled back from the notion of purely spiritual existence.[2] More to their liking were Magian teachings which took an approach less spiritual and more corporeal: that man survived death in a physical existence, and was judged by God at the end of his days. Reward and punishment was then meted out according to what he had deserved.[3]

There seems to be no doubt that Zoroastrian influence affected the

1. Phaedo 81 B; 106 E; 114 C; Rep. 608 D. Not only so, but the soul had also existed apart from and prior to the existence of the body; Tim. 34 B, C. This was of course not the Aristotelian view - cf. Barr, Old and New, 54. On the Greek view of the body, cf. Schweizer, Church as Body, 9-16.
2. The doctrine of the soul's immortality was part of Alexandrian tradition (Schürer, Jewish People II, ii, 179) and not of the Pharisees. Pl, with his Pharisaic background, found it impossible to speak of life after death, apart from the body; cf. Charles, Eschatology, 453-454; and, for the contrast between Pl and Philo, op. cit., 473. It is significant that the sect which clearly denied the resurrection of the body (i.e., the Sadducees; Mk 12:18; Mt 22:23; Lk 20:27; Acts 23:8; cf. Josephus, B.J. II:8, 14) found it necessary also to deny the continued life of the spirit apart from the body. Josephus also says of the Essenes that they taught immortality rather than the resurrection (Ant. XVIII; 1,5); but on his trustworthiness at this point, and on the Qumran evidence, cf. Burrows, More Light, 346. As Moore says, "Whether Greek ideas of the immortality of the soul and retribution after death - popular or philosophical - were widely entertained, or not, in the first century before the Christian era in a centre of Hellenic culture like Alexandria, it is certain that the development of conceptions of the hereafter in authentic Judaism went its own way unaffected by the alien influence. The premises were totally different; on the one side the dualism of the soul and body, on the other the unity of man, soul and body. To the one the final liberation of the soul from the body, its prison house or sepulchre, was the very meaning and worth of immortality; to the other the reunion of soul and body to live again in the completeness of man's nature. What to Philo would have seemed the greatest imaginable evil was to the Pharisees the highest conceivable good. The resurrection of the body, or in their own phrase, the revivification of the dead, thus became a cardinal doctrine of Judaism." (Judaism II, 295).
3. On the corporeality of the post-resurrection state, cf. Yas. 30:7; also, Moulton, Early Zoroastrianism, 163-164; 350, fn. 4. On judgment, cf. Yas. 31:2; 33:1; here Zoroaster himself appears to be the judge. A different and perhaps more ancient form of judgment is the bridge across which the righteous alone may pass with safety, Yas. 46:11. Heaven is called the "best" existence (Yas. 44:2), and Hell the "worst" (Yas. 30:4); they are the "house of the worst" (Yas. 32:13) or of "the best" (Yas. 32:15) mind. Hell will be misery and torment, Heaven will be blessedness (Yas. 30:11; 31:20; 45:7).

rise of this belief in Judaism.[1] The significance of this development for our subject is that it provided an "open end" for the Jewish doctrine of retributive justice; if, as even some of the OT thinkers were beginning to believe, the full measure of rewards and punishments was not evenly distributed here on earth, then the redress of all wrongs could be deferred to a later existence, and the principle of retributive justice preserved.[2] The Zoroastrian ideas were not, of course, adopted uncritically by all of the inter-Testament writers, any more than by the NT. Many of the inter-Testament authors still preferred to attempt the justification of the classic OT view that all justice was worked out within the limits of this earthly life; some, however, turned to the idea of human survival of death with the evident relief of religious men who have discovered a way of preserving the honor of their God.[3]

A second circle of ideas which made its mark on the inter-Testament writers has to do with the nature of matter and the world.[4] Dualism presented itself to the Jewish mind in two different forms: Greek and Persian. The Greeks had developed a view of material substance as being inherently evil;[5] the things of the earth might be made on a model of

1. On the primitive OT belief, cf. above, 15. That this is a case of genuine influencing of Judaism by Zoroastrianism, cf. Zaehner, Dawn and Twilight, 57, who despite his conclusion that the doctrine of rewards and punishments has affected Judaism considers influence in "purely eschatological thinking" to be "quite different and not at all convincing."
2. "The transfer of the sphere of final retribution to another existence not only put theodicy beyond the reach of refutation because beyond experience, but - what was of far greater religious consequence - reversed the whole interpretation of the experiences of this life. The afflictions of the upright are no longer punishments, but chastisements of love, evidence of God's favor, not of his displeasure." (Moore, Judaism I, 120).
3. Cf. esp. IVMacc 4:21; 9:9,32; 10:11,21, etc., and also IIMacc 7:9,11, 14,23,29; WisdSol 3:4-8; IEn 22:1-14; IIEn 9:1; IIBar 48:48-50; IVEz 7:31ff.
4. On the contrast between Greek and Jewish views of creation and on God as a τεχνίτης, cf. Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, 96.
5. Cf. Plato, Tim. 29 E; 46 C; 47 E; 51 B - 52 A; Aristotle, Ethics, 1243 B; Laws VIII, 835 E. But dualism of this sort was of more ancient origin than Plato; cf. Stacey, Pauline View, 72-73.

heavenly verities,[1] but their composition out of physical substance made it impossible for them to participate in heavenly perfection.[2] By contrast, the human soul was entirely spiritual, and (as we have seen) capable of surviving death without the support of the physical body.[3] Thus the body was understood to be the tomb in which the soul was incarcerated,[4] and material substance was blamed for the imperfections of the world in which man found himself.[5] If this view had been adopted by Judaism, as it was by later Gnosticism, it would have produced an explanation of evil as resulting from the substantial nature of the world; however, once again, the majority of the Jews found it impossible to believe

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As a matter of fact, as Gordon suggests (Before the Bible, 190), such dualism was very ancient indeed in the Mediterranean world. There are hints of metaphysical dualism in the Old Babylonian texts relating the story of how man was created out of clay mixed with the blood of a god (ANET, 100; cf. Jacobsen, Intellectual Adventure, 182); cf. also the myth of the creation of man out of the Titans as told by the Orphic religion (Guthrie, Orpheus and Greek Religion, 82-83; Zielinski, Religion of Ancient Greece, 152-153; James, Myth and Ritual, 175; Nilsson, History of Greek Religion, 217), according to which man was created out of the smoking ashes of the Titans who had eaten the infant Dionysos; the Titanic element was interpreted as productive of evil, the Dionysiac as productive of good. There may well be dualistic assumptions behind the story of Gn 1 (cf. below, 39, fn. 2). All that was needed to kindle the fire of explicit dualism on such materials as these was the spark of interpretation. It is no wonder that Zoroastrian thought met with an affirmative response among people whose tradition included such legends as these.

It should, however, be noted that this dualism is not Stoic, but Platonic; for Stoicism is monistic, and the soul is not a stranger to the body any more than it is a spark of the divine. Cf. Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, 142. The Stoic theodicy proceeds on the assumption that evil is only apparent (cf. above, 35, fn. 1) and a necessary part of the greater good (Bultmann, op. cit., 136; 141; Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, 155; 187ff); good and evil alike flow from the single fountainhead of God (Zeller, op. cit., 143ff).

1. Zeller, Plato and the Older Academy, 263ff; cf. Phaedo 100 D; 101 C.
2. Cf. above, 35, fn. 1.
3. Cf. above, 36, fn. 1.
4. Plato, Phaedo 82 E; Crat. 400 C; the belief is attributed to the Orphics that to the soul the body is a "περίβολον, δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα." A similar belief is attributed to Pythagoras by Phaedo 62 B. Cf. Stacey, Pauline View, 62-64.
5. Whereas Zarathushtra taught a matter/spirit dualism, he did not go as far as the Greeks in attributing to material substance any necessary evil because of its materiality: Moulton, Early Zoroastrianism, 147.

that body and soul were separable.[1] Besides, the consistent view of the OT was that matter was good and not evil: had not God beheld everything that he had made as being very good?[2] More attractive to the Jew was the Zoroastrian type of dualism which taught the existence of two opposing forces, both spiritual, one supporting the good (Ahura Mazda) and the other the evil (Angra Mainyu).[3] According to Zoroastrian thought,

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1. Cf. above, 36, fn. 2. By contrast, Philo held with the Greeks that matter and the body are evil (De Migr. Abr. II), and quoted with approval the Orphic equation, σῶμα=σῆμα (Leg. All. 1,33). In some of the inter-Testament literature we have a resurrection apart from the body (Jub, Ass Mos, WisdSol, IVMacc - cf. Charles, Eschatology, 299-300), but an Orphic loathing of the body is not a common theme. In this connection, account should be taken of the valuable study of F. C. Porter in Biblical and Semitic Studies, "The Yetzer Hara," in which he combats the idea that a Hellenistic metaphysical dualism underlies the flesh/spirit dualism of Pl and inter-Testament thought, and insists on the indigenous character of this trait in Judaism. Cf. Davies, Christian Origins, 145ff; Stacey, Pauline View, 96, 106.

2. Gn ch. 1. But against the idea that a matter/spirit dualism is impossible to the OT, cf. Irwin, Intellectual Adventure, who suggests that there is every possibility that "matter was not created but was pre-existent." (259; cf. James, Myth and Ritual, 164ff, 168). Cf. also the Akkadian creation epic of the struggle of Marduk and Tiamat (ANET, 63), and the evil disposition of Tiamat: do we not discern here an almost Gnostic spirit of hostility between the gods and the elements (the latter being the body of the slain Tiamat)? The difference between Zoroastrian-Jewish views on the one hand, and the Greek-Gnostic on the other, would appear to be one of interpretation more than of ancient mythological sources - on the basis of the myths, the matter/spirit type of dualism might well appear possible for the Jews. In fact, Plato (Tim. 30 A, B) would have agreed that the world was created good, but saw material substance as a check upon the ultimacy and completeness of such goodness.

3. Finegan, Archaeology of the World Religions, 90. Cf. a visual representation of this doctrine in the rock carving at Naqsh-i-Rustam, ibid., 112, 114. That Jewish dualism actually is from Zoroastrian sources, cf. Oesterley and Robinson, Hebrew Religion, 347 (Oesterley's section); cf. T. W. Manson, Teaching, 154. A warning against over-stressing the supposedly absolute sense of this dualism is found in Moulton, Early Zoroastrianism, 155: Moulton believes that Zarathushtra himself wasted little time on metaphysics (ibid., 113-114), and was not basically dualistic in his doctrine of the origin of evil (ibid., 126). But he concedes that in the Magian form in which the Jews would encounter it, Zoroastrianism may well have been genuinely dualistic (ibid., 201-202). While conceding the heightening of dualism by "Iranian back-influence," (Before the Bible, 190-191), Gordon points out the antiquity of dualistic thought in the whole Near East, and its natural compatibility with native Jewish thought. Cf. similarly Nilsson's comparison of Greek and Zoroastrian dualism, Greek Piety, 136-138. Zaehner, Dawn and Twilight, 52, would agree that dualism is part of Zarathushtra's Indo-Iranian heritage, but stresses the unique use Zoroaster makes of the concept. For a convenient summary of Zoroastrian teaching, cf. Zaehner, op. cit., 60. On the influence of Zarathushtra and Iranian religion on the DSS, cf. Kuhn, ZTK 47 (1950), 211; ZTK 49 (1952), 296-316.

these two forces were locked in a conflict that would last throughout the life of the world, and be brought to an end by the victory of the good at the time of the final cataclysm.[1] The idea of a demonic opponent resisting the work of the good God was bound to present difficulties to Judaism; however, the attractive solution it offered to the problem of evil outweighed the difficulties it presented, at least for some of the inter-Testament writers.[2] It permitted the responsibility for evil to be fobbed off on a non-human agent, and at least set the origin of evil at a remove from the embarrassingly human point at which the OT had left responsibility for sin and its beginnings.[3]

A third Greek conception offered its challenge to Jewish thinkers (keeping always in mind the fact that Greek thought reaches Judaism through the more or less debased medium of Hellenism) in the form of a novel understanding of history as cyclical and repetitive.[4] In the Stoic world-view, all that is, has been previously, and will once again recur, in a form identical with the form in which it appears to the viewer: history repeats itself quite literally and in complete detail, and one world perishes in the flames of destruction only to be reborn out of those flames and pursue a course corresponding in every detail with the world which it succeeds.[5] The Phoenix is the symbol of such a

1. Yas. 30:3-4.
2. Among the A&P, cf. esp. Jub, TestXIIPat, I and IIEn, and the books of Adam and Eve (below, 89ff). Among the sectaries of Qumran, cf. below, 59-60. Moulton, Early Zoroastrianism, 325-326, feels that the idea of Satan is no more then a hint developed by the Jews "in a wholly original and characteristic way."
3. Cf. above, 22-23.
4. Keeping in mind Barr's strictures against facile generalizations, it should be observed that this was not the Greek view of time, but a Greek view of history, in particular that of the Stoics; cf. Biblical Words for Time, 142.
5. "What had happened once could happen again. And beyond the period of unification in the Divine Fire Zeno forecast the beginning of another world-process which would follow exactly the same course as the present one and end, like it, in the one Fire. And so on for ever..." (Bevan, Stoics and Sceptics, 51). Cf. Zeller, Outlines of Greek Philosophy, 241. On the ultimate Orphic origin of this thought, cf. Rohde, Psyche, 356, fn. 47, who traces it through the Pythagoreans to the Stoics.

notion.

Probably the Jews were incapable of such abstractions prior to the Babylonian Captivity; indeed, the Stoic doctrine (though much older than Stoicism) was not widely popular throughout the Hellenistic world until long after the Captivity.[1] But the Jewish understanding of history, less abstract and more common-sense, had always been progressive and linear - history came from somewhere and proceeded toward some goal.[2] There is a cyclical aspect to it, but it might better be described by a spiral than a circle. And as the Babylonian and inter-Testament Jews reflected on the meaning of their history, they came to conclusions that made their adoption of the Greek understanding impossible. Much more compatible with their tradition and understanding was the Persian concept of the final judgment,[3] to which might be wedded the Hebrew view of history, for which the final judgment might constitute the goal. Both this idea and the Persian apocalyptic doctrine of world-ages found

1. Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, which popularized the view, died ca. 270 B.C.

2. On the differences in the fundamental world-views of OT Judaism and classical Greek thought, and the different meaning of history that developed from them, cf. Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, 103, 131; Edwyn Bevan, cited by T. W. Manson, Paul and John, 15-16. The moving force in all history for the Jews was, quite simply, God, who brought things to pass according to his good purpose; Moore, Judaism I, 384f, 432. On the contrasting significance of "history" and "space" for Greek and Hebrew, cf. Boman, Current Issues, 21; cf. Barr, Biblical Words for Time, 140, who on the subject of history (vs. time) finds himself in rare agreement with Boman. Cf. a review of Cullmann, Barr and Boman on "time" in Russell, Method and Message, 205-213.

3. Cf. above, 36, fn. 3. Bultmann, op. cit., discusses the developing sense of history in the context of Judaism alone, without reference to Zoroastrian thought at all, and indeed a case can be made for this method of treatment. The curious suspension of a sense of God's continuing personal dealing with his people, coupled with the veneration of the nation's past (vs. present) as the locus of revelation can be regarded as sufficient basis for the hiatus which was filled by apocalyptic thought (op. cit., 44-45; 60-61). But the fact that Zoroastrianism had, even if entirely independently, arrived at a similar apocalyptic view of final judgment, suggests that two ideas so similar must surely have interacted upon one another, if ever they came into the contact that must have come about in the Hellenistic world. Cf. Russell, op. cit., 224-229; 267-269.

their way into Judaism and made a deep impression on succeeding Jewish thought. According to the doctrine of world-ages, the whole of history was divided into great time periods, marked by certain characteristics, beginning with the creation and terminating with the final judgment.[1] The effect of such an idea on Judaism is to be seen in some of the inter-Testament apocalyptic writing, where various ages (different, of course, from the details of the Persian scheme) have a great part in the world's progress toward its end;[2] and the thought of God as sitting in judgment upon the deeds of man takes up a secure and permanent place in Jewish doctrine.[3] The idea that God is a judge is, of course, much older in Judaism than the Captivity. What is novel after the Captivity is the idea of judgment as removed to the end of the world, of justice deferred until the time of one great assize at which all wrongs will be righted.[4]

1. We learn of this doctrine of the world-ages from Plutarch, Isis and Osiris, 47. Moulton comments on the almost exclusively Magian sources used by Plutarch, and the excessive dualism, and concludes that this does not go back to Zoroaster (Early Zoroastrianism, 406); however, it is probably a reasonably accurate picture of the popular understanding of Persian religion by NT times. Glasson (Greek Influence, 2-3) shows with some degree of probability that the conception of world-ages was a projection into eschatology of the seasonal battles of nature religions. Cf. James, Myth and Ritual, 223; 228. This tracing of influence to three distinct sources (Persian, Greek, and Canaanite) is quite typical of the problems involved in sorting out origins for Hellenistic ideas. Cf. also Finegan, Archaeology of World Religions, 79; Oesterley and Robinson (Oesterley), Hebrew Religion, 344-345. For a succinct statement of the NT doctrine of world-ages in Pl, cf. T. W. Manson, Paul and John, 22ff.
2. There is an affinity here with the "Day of Jahweh" idea in the prophets of Israel; cf. also in the OT Ezek 38 - 39; Dan 9:24ff. In the inter-Testament literature cf., e.g., IVEz 7:50: "For this cause the Most High has made not one Age but two." Cf. also IEn 93:1ff; IIBar 39:1ff; and particularly chh. 56-74, the dark and bright waters. In the NT cf. Mk 13 and par., esp. Mt 24:3, "the close of the age."
3. Dan 7:13-14; WisdSol 12:26-27; IEn 16:1; 45:3; TBenj 10:6-11; IIEn 7:1; 40:12; IIBar 24:1; 40:1-4; IVEz 7:33; Mt 25:31ff; IICor 5:10; Rev 20:11.
4. This development of a doctrine of judgment postponed to the end of the world has a natural course within Judaism itself; cf. Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, 61, 79; Charles, Eschatology, 159; Moore, Judaism II, 332. But Persian ideas, so closely in parallel with Jewish ideas at some points, were bound to make their mark.

It should be noted before we leave this point that both the Greek and Persian views of history just described have strongly deterministic elements. In the Stoic view, the determinism is ironclad;[1] there is no room for genuine personal initiative, but only for a passive receiving of the events of history, and happiness is to be found solely in the mental attitude of the man who undergoes historical existence.[2] For the Persians, there is an element of free choice, even for the evil principle;[3] however, certain things are fixed and determined by God, with definite dates appointed. Here again we have a concept which is foreign to OT religion. God is seen in the OT as fulfilling his purposes, but that on the basis of sovereign power, not according to a pattern rigidly pre-determined.[4] But some inter-Testament writings are sufficiently impressed with predestinarian thought to venture an attempt at wedding it to Judaism;[5] we will have occasion to note the effect of this line of thought in the NT as well.

A fourth challenge to Jewish thought is closely aligned with this

1. "The divine power which rules the world could not be the absolute uniting cause of all things, if there existed anything in any sense independent of it, and unless one unchanging causal connection governed everything." (Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, 176; cf. 170ff on εἱμαρμένη.) For the quite obvious difficulties of reconciling this determinism with the idea of a good god, and for the Stoic solution, cf. ibid., 189-190: "The real solution which they gave to the difficulty was partly by asserting that even the deity is not able to keep human nature free from faults, and partly by the consideration that the existence of evil is necessary, and a counterpart and supplement to good, and that, in the long run, evil would be turned by the deity into good."
2. Epictetus, Diss. I:12,17.
3. Zaehner, Dawn and Twilight, 41, says: "Zoroastrianism is the religion of free will par excellence." For human freedom to choose good or evil, cf. Yas. 30:2; 31:11-12. For the original freedom of choice attributed to even the evil spirit, cf. Yas. 30:3ff.
4. Cf. above, 12-14.
5. E.g., IIMacc 4:21; Judith 9:6; Sir 33:10-15; WisdSol 19:1; IEn 9:11; 39:11; IIEn 23:4-5; 53:2-3; IIBar 69:2; IVEz 4:35-36,43; 6:1-6. In the DSS, cf., e.g., 1QS 3:15ff; 4:17; 1QH 1:14ff; on the Essenes and Pharisees as deterministic, cf. Josephus, Ant., 13:5,9; 15:10,4; 18:1,3; B.J. 2:8,14.

conception of history, and yet quite different in details. It is the notion of certain Greek thinkers, notably Epicurus, that the form of history is dictated by the form of the universe itself - that all observable events stem with unvarying regularity from previous events, the first of which was an irregular movement among the steadily falling atoms.[1] From this single movement resulted all that we see and know, and our very existence itself, and latent within it was the possibility of all which could, and indeed must, be. A view quite different in origin, but at the same time very similar in effect, is the astral determinism of the Babylonians, whose ancient order of priests had carried to an astonishing refinement the study of the stars.[2] This study had been undertaken for the purpose of predicting the future, the thought being that Fate (εἱμαρμένη) gave previous warning in the heavens of what was about to happen. Respect for the Babylonian sages and their arts was high in the ancient world, and whereas the abstract Greek form of this deterministic line of thought did not seem to appeal to Jews, the more practical and observable nature of the Babylonian approach made an exceedingly deep impression.[3] Some Jews became deeply interested in astral phenomena, and set forth

1. This theory is expressed by Leucippus, Democritus, and taken up by Epicurus in a slightly modified form. Zeller says the Stoics did not hold to a mechanical theory of nature, but one gets the impression that the popular exposition and understanding of Stoicism might miss the subtleties of its purer doctrine and come close to a mechanical theory; cf. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, 126ff; Barclay, ET 72 (1961), 102-103.

2. Jastrow, Religion, 454ff; for the connection the priests assumed between the stars and everyday life, cf. ibid., 369-370; James, Myth and Ritual, 224-225.

3. For the popularity of astral religion in pre-Christian times and following, cf. Angus, Religious Quest, 257-258; Reitzenstein, Poimandres, 69ff; Pfeiffer, History, 133-135; Tarn, Hellenistic Civilization, 285ff; Cumont, Oriental Religions, 162ff; 199; Rawlinson, Doctrine of Christ, 63-69; Nilsson, Greek Piety, 98-99, who insists, however, that in its deterministic form astrology has been shaped by Greek, not Oriental, thought (114).

systems to explain their behavior;[1] it is not without reason that one recent study of the DSS begins with a careful description of astronomy and the calendar as necessary background to the subjects to be taken up.[2]

Still another trend of thought in the inter-Testament age was toward the exaltation of God nearly to the point of separating him from the created world altogether. This line of thought is inimical to at least one branch of Greek philosophy: the Stoics, in their system, stressed rather the immanence of God.[3] It would appear to be more Oriental in genius; Cumont finds it particularly strong in the Syrian cults.[4] Tendencies in this direction can be traced in the pages of the OT.[5] In the inter-Testament period the trend continued in Judaism, with a new richness of imagery provided by contact with Persian thought. Whether or not it took place as a natural development within Zoroastrianism, or under outside influence, there seems to have been a progressive exaltation of the Supreme God in that religion as well, for we discover that the role of passion and concern is taken by the Spirit of Good, rather than by the Creator, who seems to have little directly to do with

1. Cf. IIEn., chh. 11-16. For astrology in Judaism, cf. Reitzenstein, Poimandres, 76-77. On "the Seven" and their baleful influence, cf. Bevan, Hellenism and Christianity, 97-98.
2. Leaney, Rule, 17-28, 80ff. Greek influence was present, but the sectaries were not conscious of it; cf. Leaney, NTS 10 (1964), 475-476.
3. "In point of essence, God and the world are therefore the same; indeed, the two conceptions are declared by the Stoics to be absolutely identical." (Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, 157. Cf. also Barclay, ET 72 (1961), 229-230, who reminds us that the Stoics could also distinguish between the world and God, despite their monism. Platonism, of course, was better adapted to use as setting forth the transcendence of God over his creation.
4. Oriental Religions, 127ff. Cf. James, Myth and Ritual, 170; Moore, Judaism I, 430.
5. Cf., e.g., Ringgren, Israelite Religion, 95-96, for the process that subjugated other "gods" to the domination of Jahweh, demoting them to members of the heavenly court, or describing them as mere "sons" of Jahweh. In course of time, during the inter-Testament period, these heavenly figures were described, rather, as angels (or demons).

life.[1] For the Jews, God was not yet out of reach;[2] however, this growing sense of the greatness and exaltation of God had its effect upon Judaism in opening it to a further idea, largely Zoroastrian in its inspiration: the doctrine of angels and demons as filling the growing gap between God and men.[3]

Babylonian religion, as already observed, was demon-infested.[4] Indeed, the Babylonian religion at this point was too gross to appeal to the Jews; more compatible was the belief of the Zoroastrians, who saw angels and demons as filling the growing gap between a transcendent God and humble men.[5] The Zoroastrians had personified the evil and good principles in their two warring spirits;[6] the Jews found it a reasonable thing to apply this personification of evil to the Adversary mentioned in some of their Scriptures, and to develop this thought into the full-fledged Satan that we find mentioned prominently in inter-Testament

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1. At least, the one supreme God as creator of the twin spirits of good and evil seems to be assumed in the earliest strains of Zoroastrianism; cf. Zaehner, Dawn and Twilight, 50-52. But the identification between the Wise Father and the Spirit of Good was soon made, and it would probably be in this more dualistic form that the Jews would have encountered Zoroastrianism. The rather amorphous form of Zoroastrian belief in the Hellenistic period must be kept constantly in mind; no orthodoxy had developed prior to Alexander's conquest (ibid., 25).
2. Moore, Judaism I, 442: "The exaltation of God was not his exile."
3. For the developing doctrine of angels, cf. Guigenbert, Jewish World, 96-99; Russell, Method and Message, 235ff.
4. Cf. above, 17, fn. 1; Jastrow, Religion, 265.
5. Moulton (Early Zoroastrianism, 127) has observed the fact that alone among the ancient religions Zoroastrianism and Judaism taught that rather than being placated, the demons should be resisted. References to angels and demons in the A&P are particularly frequent in Jub, I and IIEn, Test XIIPat; demonology is particularly quaint and antique in Tobit. That angelology is typically associated with Diaspora vs. Palestinian Judaism, and hence in part a result of Persian influence, cf. Zeitlin, JBL 82 (1964), 70-71.

Although there may well have been ancient ties between Greece and the Orient in their doctrines of demons, as Glasson (Greek Influence, 58-60) suggests, the first century view of demons was different in Greece and in the Near East. For the Stoic view of demons, and its contrasts with popular belief, cf. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, 351-354.
6. Cf. above, 39, fn. 3.

writings.[1] Satan's opposite came to be the leader of the angelic host; indeed, Satan had once been a leader of the angels himself, but had fallen from his high position and had become an evil rather than a good power.[2] But Satan's opposite, the chief angel, never assumed for Judaism the same importance that the Good Spirit had in Zoroastrianism.[3] Instead, God himself remained the chief moving spirit for good.[4] It was in the doctrine of Satan that Judaism owed its larger debt to Zoroastrian thought, though the amount of the debt can easily be exaggerated; Jewish amplifications and modifications of the basic Zoroastrian theme suggest that this teaching of personified evil provided simply a mold into which Jewish concepts could be poured, or a catalyst which would crystallize native Jewish thought.

A final characteristic of the inter-Testament world remains to be mentioned: its feeling of uprootedness, detachment, lostness, and (partly in consequence of these) its growing individualism.[5]

Mention has already been made of the Jewish Diaspora; the Jews, however, were not the only ancient people who were in dispersion. After the advent of Alexander and his world-wide conquests, the Greeks too were introduced to the problems of living in the wide world of empire, and

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1. Cf., e.g., Jub 1:20 (Beliar); 11:5 (Mastema); 23:29 (Satan; ApMos 2:4; MartIs 1:8-9 (Sammael Malchira); 2:4 (Beliar); 5:3 (Mechembechus); IEn 6:1ff (Semjaza); 9:6-7 (Azazel); 10:1-16; TReub 4:8,11 (Beliar); AssMos 10:1; IIEn 18:3 (Satanail); IIIBar 4:8 (Sammael); and in the DSS where Satan is consistently called Beliar, cf., e.g., 1QS 1:17,23-24; 2:4-5,19; 10:21; 1QH 2:16 and Mansoor's note, ad loc; Mansoor further cites CD 4:4-16 and 5:18. Cf. also Mansoor's lengthy note on 1QH 2:22 ad loc on the use of Beliar in the DSS. In DSW, cf. 1:5,15; 11:8; 13: 2,4,11, etc.
2. E.g., IEn 6:1ff.
3. He tends to become a mere guide (I and IIEn), a foil in Ezra's argument with God (IVEz), or an object of God's judgment (Rev 12:7ff; 20: 1-2).
4. The effect may have been quite similar in Zoroastrian religion, owing to its identification of the Good Spirit with God; cf. above, 46, fn. 1.
5. Cf. the series of articles by Barclay in ET 72 (1960), 207-209; 246-248; 280-284; also, Nock, Gentile Christianity, 12.

caught a feeling of being "pilgrims and strangers" in the world.[1] Prior to this time, the tiny city-state had been their world, as well as their unit of government. But after Alexander, the city-state was no more; it was swallowed up in larger units of government.[2] And the home provided by the city-state was likewise swept out of the way as Greeks travelled afar with Alexander's armies and settled in Oriental countries as permanent residents.[3] The inter-Testament world was a world adrift, cut loose from the moorings of land and language and local familiarity that had provided the security of human society for centuries before.[4]

A corresponding development was the rise of pessimism as one of the characteristics of the Hellenistic world.[5] Tragedy was inherent in

1. The Stoics were the first to see man as supre-national, as a citizen of the world; cf. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, 326-327. It is perhaps significant that Zeno, the founder of the school, was a Hellenized Semite, himself a "displaced person." Zeno "introduced the idea of cosmopolitanism, transcending patriotism; of the whole world, the oecumene, as a man's true fatherland; of a community embracing all rational beings, without regard to the distinction of Greek and barbarian, or of freemen and slave." (Bury, Hellenistic Age, 26). Cf. Schweizer, Lordship, 104.
2. Tarn, Hellenistic Civilization, 24. On the significance of this development, cf. Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, 147: "The political upheavals which had destroyed the ancient city states as well as the Roman Republic left the individual utterly bewildered and helpless. Everything was now on such a large scale that he could no longer understand what it was all about or see any law at work behind it." Cf. also Angus (Religious Quests, 14): "Politically the collapse of the Greek city-state (polis) formed a crisis of the first magnitude in the Mediterranean world, accompanied by the shifting of the moral centre of gravity from rigorous collectivism to perplexed individualism." But that this emphasis can be over-stressed, cf. Hock, Gentile Christianity, xi.
3. On Alexander's policy of establishing Greek residents in conquered areas, cf. Tarn, Alexander the Great I, 132ff: "That Asia was not more Hellenized than it was arose simply from there not being enough Greeks in the world." Cf. also Bevan, Hellenistic Age, 80.
4. Bultmann, op. cit., 147. Bultmann further observes, ibid., 157, that the mystery religions themselves are the product of a world adrift: national or tribal cults universalized by divorce from the local situation.
5. Murray, Five Stages of Greek Religion, whose reference to the Hellenistic world's "failure of nerve" is often quoted. Angus says (op. cit., 17), "It was a serious, brooding, emotional, even sentimental, introspective age, but not an age of darkness and despair as it is too often depicted; it was sad and disillusioned, but not hopeless."

the events we have just described - separation, loss, death, anonymity; "the times were out of joint." The view began to be expressed that this was a worse world than it once had been thought - that mankind was more wicked than had formerly been supposed, that the world was less friendly than it had been imagined to be, and that "whatever gods there be" were more remote and less concerned with human welfare.[1] It was not a time in which men could readily believe in "the best of all possible worlds;" the Stoic efforts to persuade us seem tinged with the sad awareness that this best of possible worlds is not a particularly good one.[2]

It is against this double background of disruption and pessimism that the rise of individualism in the inter-Testament world must be seen. For the first time, in the new and larger society and cut off from the old securities, men were beginning to look at themselves apart from the

1. This feeling was implicit in one possible interpretation of astral religion. We see this interpretation in the world-view of Gnosticism, through which man sought reunion, across fearful separations, with the unknown god (cf. Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, 152; 167). But that astralism could inspire in its devotees a feeling other than terror may be seen in Seneca, Ad Helv., 8:5. It should be noted that the transcendence of God is very much a Jewish thought, evidenced in this period largely by the Apocryphal and Pseudepigraphal literature. The affinity which Bultmann notes (op. cit., 194) between Gnosticism and Christianity at this point of God's transcendence is best explained by a common dependence on Jewish presuppositions - certainly far better explained thus than by positing a Christian dependence on Gnostic source material. It seems likely that Seneca's view is produced by the wedding of astralism to Stoicism, and Gnosticism's on the other hand by a similar wedding of astralism to Judaism.

2. "According to the Stoic standard, by far the majority, indeed, almost the whole of mankind, belong to the class of the foolish; were all foolish people equally and altogether bad, mankind must have seemed to them to be a sea of corruption and vice, from which, at best, but a few swimmers emerge at spots widely apart. A man passes his life - such had already been the complaint of Cleanthes - in wickedness. Only here and there does one, in the evening of life, after many wanderings, attain to virtue. And that this was the common opinion among the successors of Cleanthes, is witnessed by their constant complaints of the depravity of the foolish, and of the rare occurrence of a wise man." (Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, 272-273). That there was substance to these complaints of viciousness in life-habits, cf. Barclay, ET 71 (1960), 208-209. But cf. Deissmann's warning (Light, 3-4, 282) against concluding too much from purely literary records.

society which surrounded them.[1] Up until this time, the sense of tribal identity had been perhaps as strong as that of individual identity. But now the individual could feel but little sense of identity with the vast society in which he lived, and in consequence people began to distinguish themselves from society, and to think of themselves as individuals, as separate entities. Paradoxically, the institution of slavery could even foster the idea of freedom: the fact that a man was deprived of freedom in society might lead him to regard that society with a lordly disdain, and to consider himself, within the kingdom of his own mind, entirely superior to the web of circumstance that entangled him.[2] And for the first time, on the basis of a dim sense of personal identity and value, men in general began to question the nature of a world in which so much evil could so readily be found, and to reflect on the sense of injury that follows upon being punished much more severely than has been deserved; for many of these men felt that they had been ill-treated by the events of their times.[3] Men

1. In a sense, individualism can be represented as originating with Socrates, who "may be said to be the discoverer of Conscience," in contrast with his philosophical predecessors, who were primarily physicists (Macgregor and Purdy, Jew and Greek, 239). But practically speaking, Zeno popularized the idea of an οἰκουμένη in which all human beings were citizens (Bury, Hellenistic Age, 26). Thus regarding himself as an individual, self-respecting and worthy of respect, common men began to feel with new sharpness the age-long injustice of wealth vs. poverty, power vs. justice, etc. Cf. Nilsson, Greek Piety, 70-72, on the rise of individualism.

2. Thus, Epictetus describes the Stoic in his relationship with God, and continues (Discourses I, ix, 6-7): "Why should not such a man call himself a citizen of the universe? Why should he not call himself a son of God? And why shall he fear anything that happens among men? What! Shall kinship with Caesar or any other of them that have great power at Rome be sufficient to enable men to live securely, proof against contempt, and in fear of nothing whatsoever, but to have God as our maker, and father, and guardian, - shall this not suffice to deliver us from griefs and fears?" On philosophy as a cure of souls, cf. Nilsson, op. cit., 87.

3. E.g., IEn 46:4-8 takes notice of the persecution of the righteous by the unrighteous; cf. 48:4-7; IIEn 9:1; 50:4; Baruch is represented as complaining before the Lord that he cannot bear the sufferings of his mother, Jerusalem: IIBar 3:1-9; cf. 5:1; 67:1-8 treats of the sufferings of Zion in captivity; cf. IVEz 3:2; 4:23-25; 5:28-30.

were beginning to see themselves as distinct from other men, and as distinct from a world-system in which they were coming to view themselves as disparate and oppressed elements.

Perhaps this trend had less impact on Judaism than on other cultural groups of the ancient world, for there were two factors unique to Judaism that tended to shield it from pessimistic influence. For one thing, there was what Moore calls the essential "healthy-mindedness" of Judaism, which prevented an unbridled plunge into the prevalent pessimism.[1] For another, there was the stubborn cohesiveness shown by the Jews deported from Judea. Unlike the Jews deported from Israel, who seem rapidly to have lost their national identity and merged with surrounding nations, the Jews from Judea clung to their national beliefs and practices and refused to be assimilated.[2] As a result, the tribal and corporative understanding of man endured for longer with them than with many of the other peoples of inter-Testament times; we find patterns of thought in the A&P and the NT alike which demonstrate clearly that the individual as a part of the larger unit is still in view.[3] But intermingled with this corporative view there are clear indications that the individualistic bent of the Hellenistic world has not gone unremarked by inter-Testament Judaism.[4] There is much to show a new view coming into prominence, and

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1. Moore, Judaism I, 502.
2. "...anything Jews took from Hellenism was only outward forms; few learnt anything of its spirit. Whether a Jew adopted or rejected Greek forms he remained a Jew, a man whose ideals were not those of the Greek, even if expressed in the same words." (Tarn, Hellenistic Civilization, 180).
3. In IIIMacc, the Jews (with the exception of the 300 apostates contrasted with the innumerable host of the faithful) are treated entirely as a unit; 7:15. Cf. Tobit 3:4-5; IBar 3:8. IVMacc 6:28-29 suggests the possibility of expiatory suffering of one in behalf of the many. In the NT the concept is perhaps best seen in Pl's doctrine of the Christian solidarity with Christ as being "ἐν χριστῷ" - cf., e.g., IICor 5:17.
4. For example, it is true as Bousset remarks (Religion, 367) that "Die Frage, wie der Fromme gerecht vor Gott wird, oder wie er die Gerechtigkeit Gottes erlangt, ist daher die Kardinalfrage der jüdischen Frömmigkeit." But the raising of a problem thus involving personal piety would

there are signs of a conflict between the old and the new.

All of this general disorientation, coupled with the growing sense of the individual's importance, was bound to make the Hellenistic world open and receptive to religious thought. The national religion had lost some of its crucial importance for the individual man; he was more willing to experiment and to sample the fruits of other religious systems. He was also seeking, in the loneliness of his new individual identity, for a sense of security and belonging. The cry of the inter-Testament world was for salvation,[1] and much of its literature gives voice to the cry, or responds to it. The question of the Philippian jailer[2] is entirely typical of the world between the Testaments.

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Against the background of this very brief sketch of Hellenistic thought, several thought-patterns stand out as significant for the NT. Those found in the OT apocryphal and pseudepigraphal writings, both

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have been impossible apart from a radically new understanding of the significance of the individual. Pfeiffer says (History, 52), "The individualistic trend does not merely add eschatology to national apocalyptic hopes, but is apparent in every aspect of Judaism after 400 B.C. Sin, retribution, and repentance were collective notions, national in scope, as late as the Deuteronomic Code of 621 B.C., but they were individualized by Ezekiel. As amply shown in the Psalter, religion tended to become personal piety, either an almost mystical relation of the individual to his God, or a passionate eagerness to do God's will as revealed in his Law. Prayer, rather than sacrifice, becomes the true worship. The Wisdom literature and the schools were concerned with the individual rather than with the nation. Fiction writing deals with personal matters (Tobit) as well as with national affairs (Judith)." Cf. the personal freedom and responsibility implicit in Sir 15:14-17; TAsh 1:3-9; IIBar 54:15; IVEz 3:36.

1. Angus, Religious Quests, 19. Of course, the Orphic religion, pre-Socratic, was individualistic and salvationist (Macgregor and Purdy, Jew and Greek, 225); but individualism was taught to the popular mind under the lash of current events, which made it appear the only soul-refuge to a troubled mind. "The emergence of this brooding sense of failure, the consciousness of sin and its ineluctable moral issues, the bewilderment of individualism, were the moral counterparts of the great social upheavals." (Angus, op. cit., 44). On the pagan sense of sin, cf. Nock, Gentile Christianity, 17-18; 23.
2. Acts 16:30.

because of their bulk and because of the closer ties that some of them have to the NT, will be discussed in a separate chapter. But first it will prove helpful to characterize four other crystallizations of Hellenistic-Jewish religious thought in the positions they adopt on evil and its origin. In each of the four cases, direct influence on the NT is difficult to assess and probably impossible to demonstrate; their significance for our subject is in their demonstration of how some degree of system could be imposed on the flux of Hellenistic thought. In each of the four cases, the differences from the NT will probably be more important than the similarities, since they will show a direction in which the NT authors might have moved, but did not.

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There are various estimates of Philo and his significance. Deissmann styles Philo "a great mind;"[1] Wolfson argues that he was a systematic genius, a veritable wellspring of philosophical thought, whose great achievement was to marshal the philosophy of his time into a unified presentation under the aegis of Moses.[2] There has been, however, an utterly different evaluation. The editors of the Loeb series characterize Philo as "entirely devoid of creative genius;"[3] G. F. Moore regards him as being a pure eclectic ("a Stoicizing Platonism with a penchant for Pythagorean number-jugglery");[4] Drummond regards him as simply a chronicler of the philosophical tendencies of his age,[5] and E. R. Goodenough holds that he is definitely <u>not</u> a creative genius.[6] Yet W. D. Davies speaks of Philo as "not merely an eclectic but an original philosophical thinker...."[7] One thing seems clear: aside from the Letter to the

1. <u>Paul</u>, 102.
2. <u>Philo</u>.
3. Colson and Whitaker, <u>Philo</u> I, xvi.
4. <u>Judaism</u> I, 211-212.
5. <u>Philo Judaeus</u> I, 12-13.
6. <u>Introduction to Philo Judaeus</u>, 16ff.
7. <u>Peake's Commentary</u>, 691, col. 1.

Hebrews, the Alexandrian form of Diaspora Judaism, of which Philo speaks as a representative, does not seem to exercise much influence on the NT. Yet Philo's thought on the origin of evil (he addresses himself directly to the problem) illustrates what can be done with the materials of Hellenism that were at the disposal of NT thinkers.

Beginning with Platonic presuppositions, Philo postulates a God who is too exalted in goodness to have anything to do directly with the creation of anything susceptible to wrong-doing of any sort.[1] God was not utterly removed from the human scene, being immanent as well as transcendent;[2] nevertheless, "with God are the treasuries of good things only."[3] How then was man, who was to be created capable of evil as well as good, to be brought into being?

The answer is phrased in terms of angelic intermediaries;[4] it is not important for our purpose to draw the Philonic distinction between their orders,[5] but simply to note that it is they who bring into being the imperfect things.[6] As Philo puts it,[7]

1. "To make things of mixed nature was in one respect proper to Him, in another not so; proper, so far as the better principle which forms an ingredient in them is concerned, alien, in virtue of the contrary and worse principle." (Opif. Mund. 24,75). Cf. also Quod Deter. 32,122; Conf. Ling. 36,182; De Fug. 13,70; 14,74; 15,79; Spec. Leg. I,60,329.
2. Colson and Whitaker, op. cit., I, xix.
3. De Fug. 15,79.
4. These are quite differently conceived from the demons of the Synoptic Gospels; such an angel is a τεχνίτης in a Platonic sense. Cf., e.g., De Gig. 2,6; 4,16; De Plant. 4,14; De Conf. 34,174.
5. Cf. Goodenough, Introduction, 109-110.
6. "Thus it was meet and right that when man was formed, God should assign a share in the work to His lieutenants, as He does with the words 'let us make man,' that so man's right actions might be attributable to God, but his sins to others. For it seemed to be unfitting to God the All-ruler that the road to wickedness within the reasonable soul should be of his making, and therefore He delegated the forming of this part to His inferiors." (Conf. Ling. 35,179). Cf. also Conf. Ling. 34,175; De Fug. 13,67-69; Spec. Leg. I,60,329; Quaest. Gen. 4,8 (on Gn 18:6-7).
7. Opif. Mund. 24,75.

> It is to the end that, when man orders his course aright, when his thoughts and deeds are blameless, God the universal Ruler may be owned as their Source; while others from the number of His subordinates are held responsible for thoughts and deeds of a contrary sort: for it could not be that the Father should be the cause of an evil thing to His offspring: and vice and vicious activities are an evil thing.

These angelic intermediaries are also the agents of punishment,[1] this likewise being thought inappropriate for God to dispense.[2]

The angelic intermediaries set to work to copy the divine original, which was good in every respect -- a Platonic archetype. But the material in which they have to make the copy is imperfect matter. Concerning the character of this matter there is divergence of opinion among Philo's interpreters. Schürer traces evil directly to matter, and in the case of man, to his material body.[3] On the other hand, Drummond refuses to regard the body of man as an absolute source of evil, insisting (probably rightly) that the locus of evil must be elsewhere, and that the evil of the body is only in terms of its improper use, though the body is admittedly not "neutral," but a dead weight on the soul.[4] Wolfson feels that since God did not create any evil according to Philo's own statement,[5] i.e., did not create any "Ideals" that were evil, considerable doubt is cast on the

1. Conf. Ling. 34,171; De Fug. 13,66; 14,74.
2. Cf. Colson and Whitaker's note to Conf. Ling. 36,182 (Philo IV, 110), which also attributes punishment to angelic intermediaries. They say, "Here the 'angels' have the whole province of evil assigned to them, whether to save from it, as with Jacob, or to inflict it." But sometimes Philo does attribute punishment directly to the hand of God himself; cf. De Provid. 2,41, and Wolfson, Philo I, 274, 382.
3. History of the Jewish People II, iii, 387: "The body as the animal part of man is the source of all evil, it is the prison to which the spirit is banished (De Ebr. 1,372; Leg. All. 1,95; De Migr. 1,437), the corpse which the soul drags about with it (Leg. All. 1,100; De Gig. 1,264; De Agric. 1,305), the coffin or the grave, from which it will first awake to true life (De Migr. 1,438; Leg. All. 1,65). Sense as such being evil, sin is innate in man (Vit. Mos. 2,157). No one can keep himself free from it, even if he were to live but a day (De Mut. Nom. 1,585)."
4. Philo Judaeus, 299-300.
5. De Provid. 2,82.

reality of evil in Philo, and upon the ultimate reality of the evil produced by the material body.[1]

In any event, the body is regarded by Philo as a drag on man's best impulses; human souls,[2]

> descending into the body as though into a stream have sometimes been caught in the swirl of its rushing torrent and swallowed up thereby, at other times have been able to stem the current, have risen to the surface and then soared upwards back to the place from whence they came.

The former are the fools, subject to the body and its passions; the latter are the philosophers.[3] Life in the body is characterized as imprisonment "in that dwelling-place of endless calamaties - the body."[4]

Within this body, man has a real opportunity to decide for himself whether to follow his higher nature and soar free from the body, or to be "caught in the swirl of its rushing torrent." As Wolfson says,[5]

> The continuous conflict that goes on within man between good and evil is usually described by him in philosophic language as a conflict between the irrational soul and the rational soul (Spec. IV,23,123-124, 125; Opif. 46,134; Leg. All. I,12,31) or between emotion and reason. But it is also between the evil yetzer and the good yetzer.

Whatever the language in which he clothes his thought, it seems evident that for Philo man is responsible for his own sin;[6] he says,[7]

> Man is practically the only being who having knowledge of good and evil often chooses the worst, and shuns what should be the object of his efforts, and thus he stands apart as convicted of sin deliberate and aforethought.

So wickedness, for Philo, derives from two sources: first that of hostile or uncooperative matter, in which man is imprisoned, and

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1. Philo I, 213.
2. De Gig. 3,13.
3. On this doctrine cf. further De Gig. 13,61; De Plant. 4,14; Quod Deus Immut. 10,46.
4. Conf. Ling. 35,177.
5. Philo II, 288.
6. Cf. Opif. Mund. 24,73; Quod Det. 32,122; De Fug. 15,79; Quod Deus Immut. 10,47; 10,49.
7. Conf. Ling. 35,178.

second, from the fact that he is created not directly by God but through angelic intermediaries. Evil is thus not to be attributed in any sense to God, who is doubly shielded from any responsibility for it. But it is to be attributed to man in the sense that he is free to choose between the divine leading to good which is given to every man, the light of reason,[1] and on the other hand the ways prompted by the "passions," or the way of the "flesh," to borrow a Pauline expression.[2] As Drummond says, referring to man's subjection to the passions,[3]

> I think then, we shall not misrepresent his opinion if we say that pleasure, regarded simply as the involuntary accompaniment of innocent sensation, lies outside the moral field, and that it enters it only through the attention and desire which are directed towards it with the sanction of the will. But, though this may be true, the passions enter so largely into our life, and so imperiously attract the attention, that they must be ranked among things morally evil.

Thus, while there is a staggering <u>probability</u> that man will fall into sin, the <u>actualization</u> of sin is brought about by the exercise of human freedom.[4]

Philo is thus in the general Jewish frame of reference. The Platonic superstructure does not completely obscure the fundamental Jewishness of Philo's attitude toward man as responsible for his own sin. But the introduction of angelic mediators in the creative act, and the view of matter as a limiting and potentially evil factor, concepts foreign to the NT and Rabbinic Judaism, casts a rather different light on the subject, and leads us to suspect an effort to alleviate the burden of human

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1. This, of course, is to be attributed to God: cf. <u>Opif. Mund.</u> 24,75; <u>Quod Deus Immut.</u> 10,47.
2. Philo's own word for somatic matter would be ὕλη; cf. <u>Leg. All.</u> 1,83.
3. <u>Philo Judaeus</u>, 302.
4. This is individually conceived. "For Philo Adam's fall is not the tragic episode 'wherewith the Face of Man is blacken'd,' but a type of the enslavement of the senses by desire and of mind by the senses (<u>Q. Gen.</u> 1,47f), and 'evil angels' receive a moralistic interpretation (<u>Gig.</u> 17). Might one not say that for Philo there were temptations but no supernatural Tempter?" (Hook, <u>HTR</u> 57 (1964), 263).

responsibility for the appearance of evil. This Judaism, and the NT, are not willing to do, though Gnosticism was quick to seize upon this solution.

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A second point of view is represented by the community of Qumran. Although there is still not complete unanimity on the matter, the vast majority of scholarship unites in attributing the Scrolls to a community of Essenes, living in the Qumran monastery prior to and during the life of Jesus.[1] Their view on the subject of evil is clear-cut and very much to the point of our investigation, owing to their geographic and temporal proximity to Christian beginnings, although scholars seem generally hesitant to trace too direct a connection between Qumran and the NT.[2]

Qumran is unique in Judaism in possessing in the 1QS a systematic

1. A notable exception is G. R. Driver, Judean Scrolls. But the majority of the scholarly community, including such names as Cross, Brownlee, Kuhn, Stendahl, Brown, Dupont-Sommer, Cullmann, Burrows, Black, Reicke, and Davies believe these are pre-Christian writings; their views seem to be confirmed by the results of the recent excavations at Masada. On the Essenic origin of the sect, cf. the oft-cited witness of Josephus (Ant. 13:5,9; 15:10,4-5; 18:1,5; B. J. 2:8,2-13) and Philo (Quod Om. 12-13); particularly on the evidence of Josephus most scholars identify the Qumran monks as Essenes, or a branch of Essenism (cf. e.g., Kuhn in Scrolls and NT, 65; Vermes, DSS in English, 13; Leaney, Rule, 33, who says, "It seems not only reasonable but demanded by the evidence to conclude that the men of Qumran were some kind of Essenes. Scholars have tended on the whole to accept this view, frankly acknowledging the difficulty of squaring all the external evidence with the documents found in the caves.").
2. On the NT in general, cf. the dictum of Filson (NT History, 56): "The early church showed similarities to the Essenes, but the differences were far more significant, and the early Christian worship, thought, and way of life were not essentially shaped by the Essene pattern." That Pl was not directly influenced by the DSS, cf. Davies in Scrolls, 158; Braun, ZTK 56 (1959), 16-17; Becker, Das Heil Gottes, 242-243. On the other hand, DSS influences are more readily traced in Jn; cf. Cullmann in Scrolls, 22, who cites further the article by Kuhn in ZTK 47 (1950), 193ff; Brownlee in Scrolls, 47, who goes so far as almost to say "that in John's portrayal of Jesus we have the Essene Christ;" Kuhn, RGG V, col 754; Kuhn, NTS 7 (1961), 339. And regarding DSS connection with I and IITim, cf. Kosmala, Annual of the Swedish Theological Institute IV, 98, who cites in further support the index of his own Hebräer-Essener-Christen, Leiden, 1959.

statement of belief:[1]

> Other statements of ancient Jewish thought are either short unconnected sayings or poetic elaborations, a description which applies equally to Biblical, Apocryphal, Talmudic, and even early Christian thought. This treatise alone offers a continuous and logically constructed argument, combining several notions and ideas into a single chain of reasoning.

Within this doctrinal statement is contained the clear setting forth of a doctrine of evil and its origin,[2] in light of which it is possible to interpret the remainder of the writings.

God, it appears, is the origin of evil, as he is also the origin of all things. It is he who in the beginning created two spirits, the evil and the good,[3] loving the good spirit and loathing the evil spirit,[4] and decreeing everlasting warfare between the two until the end of the age.[5]

This remarkable clarity of exposition makes it possible for us to proceed confidently in tracing a unified doctrine of the evil spirits in Qumran.[6] There is one chief evil spirit, whose name is Belial;[7] though Mastema appears from time to time, Belial seems to be the proper name of the spirit of evil which God created at the beginning.[8] Beneath Belial ranges an army of spiritual beings, who display very little individual character,[9] and also the human company of the "sons of darkness."[10]

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1. Licht, Scripta Hierosolymitana IV, 88.
2. 1QS 3:13 - 4:26.
3. 1QS 3:18ff.
4. 1QS 3:26 - 4:1; cf. Burrows, More Light, 280.
5. 1QS 4:14-20.
6. This contrasts with the unsystematic character of the demonic in the NT; cf. below, 155, fn. 2; 187.
7. Belial as a proper name appears in 1QS 1:18,24; 2:5,19; CD 4:13,15; 5:18; 8:2; 12:2; 19:14; DSW 1:1,5,13; 4:2; 11:8; 13:2,4,11; 14:9; 15:3; 18:1,3. Cf. Kuhn, Konkordanz, ad loc.; Yadin, Scroll of War, 232.
8. "In the book of Jubilees the evil one is called Mastema. As a proper name this word does not occur in the DSS, but as a common noun meaning 'enmity' it appears several times." (Burrows, op. cit., 288). Burrows (loc. cit.) cites 1QS 3:23; 13:4,11; CD 16:5; DSW 14:9 as occurrences of "mastema."
9. CD 2:17-21 (reference to the fall of the "Watchers"); 12:2; DSW 1:15; 13:12; 14:10,14. The "angels of destruction" of 1QS 4:12 and CD 2:6 do not seem to be subject to Belial.
10. 1QS 1:10; 3:19,21; 4:12-13; 11:9; 1QH 2:16,22; 6:17; CD 2:7-9; DSW 1:5,6,10,14,15,16; 3:6,9; 4:1; 11:8; 13:1,4,5,16; 14:17; 15:2; 16:9; 17:16; 18:1,3.

Against this evil spirit is set the spirit of Good, or of God;[1] this spirit is more colorless than Belial, being very nearly a surrogate for God himself. Allied with him are his followers, the "sons of light."[2] The present age is the age of Belial and his "sons,"[3] but at the end of this age, God will intervene directly to destroy Belial and his servants.[4] Meanwhile, Belial is powerless against those who keep the Law,[5] i.e., the members of the Qumran community.

These two spirits in opposition, with their respective followers, constitute the basis for the dualism of the DSS. This dualism is variously expressed: in terms of Two Spirits in opposition, or of the sons of light vs. the sons of darkness, or of God vs. Belial, and so forth.[6] References to the Two Ages are also heard occasionally.[7] But it is to be noted that this dualism, probably influenced by the Persians, is not

1. 1QS 3:18,20,24-25; 4:15-18,23,25-26; 1QH 7:6; 14:11,25; 16:11; 17:17; CD 5:18; DSW 13:10. The lack of characterization of this spirit of Good corresponds to the contemporary absorption with the spirit of Evil, by contrast with a lesser interest in the spirit of Good; the Rabbis mention the evil yetzer more frequently than the good (cf. below, 71), and the A&P, on which both the Rabbis and Qumran build, are likewise more interested in Satan than in the spirit of holiness. On the latter group of writings, cf. Burrows, More Light, 288.
2. 1QS 3:13,19,20,24,25; 4:6; 1QH 3:22; CD 2:11-13; DSW 1:5,9,10,13,14; 13:5,16; 14:17; 17:16.
3. Mansoor, Thanksgiving Hymns, 90: "The Qumranites believed that Evil, having been decreed by God, holds sway over the present world." Yadin, Scroll of War, 232: "The period of our texts is the 'dominion of Belial' ....During this period Belial reigns, spreading terror...." Cf. 1QS 1:17; 2:19; 4:19-20,23-24; CD 4:12-13; 14:18; DSW 14:9.
4. Yadin, loc. cit.: "At the imminent end of days, this Evil will be blotted out and the Good (i.e. Righteousness) will emerge." Cf. Burrows, loc. cit., and in 1QS 4:18ff; 1QH 1:17-18; DSW 1:4-5,10,14-15; 17:5; 18:1,3. Cf. Brown in Scrolls, 188.
5. DSW 14:8-10.
6. Cf., e.g., 1QS 2:19; 3:18ff; 4:1-11,16-17,23,26; 1QH 9:26-27; 14:11; DSW 1:9-11; 13:16; 14:16-17; 17:16. Brown notes (op. cit., 188) that the evil spirit clearly has his sway only by the sufferance of God.
7. Cf., e.g., Brownlee in Scrolls, 42. Dupont-Sommer, Jewish Sect, 127: "If Judaism as a whole is indebted to Mazdaism for certain of its basic conceptions, the Jewish Sect of the Covenant was still more profoundly and strongly influenced by that powerful religion." Cf. Kuhn, RGG V, col 747.

metaphysical but ethical at root.[1] Like NT dualism, it has to do with right and wrong. As Matthew Black says,[2]

> The basic conception is that of an ethical dualism, similar to that of the New Testament and with special affinities with the Johannine writings...The author does not hesitate to attribute evil as well as good to God ('He created the spirits of light... and darkness'), but is not further interested in the metaphysical problem, but in the realities of good and evil which his doctrine is intended to illumine. In this respect he stands in the Hebrew and Biblical, not the Greek tradition, though in comparison with the New Testament his speculative interest is slightly more pronounced: but it is in no way comparable to the later speculations and mythological systems of Gnosticism.

Thus the real concern of Qumran seems to be for moral behavior, conceived in terms of keeping the Law. And man seems to have a real choice between right and wrong, at least in 1QH; according to Mansoor,[3]

> The idea is affirmed constantly in the Book of Hymns that every man is endowed at birth with the charisma of knowledge and discernment and that any sinfulness which he incurs is due only to his individual neglect of these gifts and to his individual submission to, or entrapment by, the domination of the evil impulse (Belial). Moreover, because sin is individual and not the inherited lot of man, and because it is incurred by his own personal disposition, it can be removed also by his own individual experience.

The references to the wickedness or stubbornness or hardness of the heart, encountered frequently,[4] do not seem to regard the heart as necessarily corrupt, for just as frequently as not the heart is considered to be the arena of enlightenment, a sphere of good.[5] Similarly, references to the "flesh" do not always connote sin, but often mere

1. Widely observed; cf., e.g., Brown, in Scrolls, 186; Burrows, More Light, 281: "The dualism of the Qumran theology is thus primarily ethical but with a cosmic dimension." Cf. also Kuhn, NTS 7 (1961), 339.
2. Scrolls and Christian Origins, 134.
3. Thanksgiving Hymns, 159.
4. Cf. in 1QS 1:6; 2:13-14,26; 3:3; 4:9,11; 5:4,26; 7:19,24; 9:10; 11:9. The term "heart" (לב) is found frequently throughout the DSS: 24 times in 1QS, 51 in 1QH, 16 in CD, 13 in DSW, and 15 in the various fragments; cf. Kuhn, Konkordanz, ad loc. Throughout the DSS this double usage, i.e., the heart as either bad or good, is evident as it is in 1QS.
5. Cf. in 1QS 2:3,11; 4:2,23; 5:9; 10:21,24; 11:2,3,5,16.

creatureliness.[1] Thus the corruption of heart or flesh is secondary to the influence of the spirit of wickedness, which causes their corruption.

All of this is despite the rigid doctrine of predestination held by Qumran. For not only had God created the Two Spirits, but he had also decreed beforehand which of mankind would follow the Spirit of Good and which the Spirit of Evil, foreordaining even the thoughts of man, not to mention their final end.[2] As Burrows puts it,[3]

> The realm to which each man belongs has been determined by an eternal divine decree. The division of all mankind into two lots no doubt seemed to the members of the sect a simple matter of observed fact, and the assumption that they were themselves the sons of light and all others were sons of darkness obviated any difficulty in drawing the line between the two divisions....The whole conception is a corollary of God's absolute sovereignty and man's complete dependence upon him.

Yet such was the form of Qumran thought that for it, as for the NT, the thought of God's absolute sovereignty does not seem to have carried with it any corresponding alleviation of human responsibility. Perhaps the problem implicit in their view simply did not occur to them; more probably, they attributed such deep things to the mysteries of God

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1. Cf. the excellent study of Kuhn in Scrolls, 101ff; in the same volume, cf. the chapter by Davies, republished more recently in Christian Origins, 145-177; the pages relevant to the DSS concept of "flesh" are op. cit., 150-152. A more pessimistic attitude toward the "flesh" is displayed in 1QH than in 1QS; cf. Hyatt, NTS 2 (1956), 283; Burrows quotes from Licht a reference to "an almost pathological abhorrence of human nature" in 1QH (More Light, 240).
2. Repeated references to God's predestining activity are found in 1QS 3:13 - 4:26; elsewhere in 1QS, cf. 11:10-11,17. In 1QH predestination is also rife, though less systematic; cf. Hyatt, NTS 2 (1956), 280, who says, "If we inquire now as to the origin of man's frailty and sinfulness, the answer of the Hodayot is clear: God has created man, and has predestined every man for evil or for good, for destruction or for salvation...." Cf. 1QH 1:14,19,28; 3:22; 4:31; 15:13-19; 17:21. Cf. also CD 2:9-10; DSW 17:4. Hyatt, op. cit., 283, characterizes the view of man in 1QH as more pessimistic than that of Hebrew-Jewish writings in general, and observes the strong determinism and the "deep sense of man's weakness and sinfulness in the 'natural' state before he experiences God's mercy and hesed." Cf. Mansoor, Thanksgiving Hymns, 90; Dupont-Sommer, Dead Sea Scrolls, 74, fn. 3-4.
3. More Light, 292.

that were never intended for human understanding to grasp.[1]

Qumran expressly stated what the OT may have implied,[2] but nevertheless hesitated to state directly, i.e., that God as omnipotent must have created evil as well as good. It is very much to the point to note the fact that the NT refused to draw the same conclusion, despite its community with Qumran in many general assumptions.[3] In attributing evil to the creative act of God, Qumran carried the process of ratiocination a long step further than the NT before laying down the tools of logic at the feet of Mystery. A very significant element in the religion of the NT lies in its unwillingness to take that step.

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A third standpoint on the origin of evil is that of the Gnostics. But the problem in dealing with Gnosticism is, as is widely observed, that of definition.[4] In the first two views we have surveyed, there

1. Licht, Scripta Hierosolymitana IV, 96 (on the subject of 1QS): "Why did God establish the Rule of Evil in the first place? And when will it cease? At this point the theologian of our sect has to admit his ignorance, to take refuge in the infathomability of the Divine Will, and to hint to his pupils, that Divine Wisdom must not be questioned. Therefore in our treatise we find that 'the Mysteries of His Wisdom' are mentioned exactly at this point where the establishment of the Wicked Rule and its future destruction are taught." Licht observes further (loc. cit.) that the "Book of Mysteries" of which fragments have been discovered probably dealt with this subject.
2. Cf. above, 13.
3. Cf. below, 166-167; 174; 233; 261.
4. Cf., e.g., Munck, in Current Issues, 224, who says, "Anyone intending to deal with 'Gnosticism' or 'gnostic' ideas must begin by realizing that he is using a scientific term that has no generally accepted scientific definition. Unless he begins by defining clearly what it is he is talking about when he uses the words 'Gnosticism' and 'gnostic,' he may find that his investigation does not help to classify the subject." Among numerous attempted definitions cf. the following: Dodd, Fourth Gospel, 97: "a label for a large and somewhat amorphous group of religious systems described by Irenaeus and Hippolytus in their works against Heresy...and similar systems known from other sources;" Jonas, Gnostic Religion, 36: "The combination of the practical, salvational concept of knowledge with its theoretical satisfaction in quasi-rational systems of thought - the rationalization of the supernatural...;" Cullmann, Hibbert Journal 60 (1962), 118: "Gnosticism was an attempt to draw Christianity into a speculative philosophical synthesis of religion,

is a clear unifying principle of some sort to which appeal can be made; with Gnosticism, however, there is bewildering variety stemming from obscure origins.

By all definitions, Gnosticism is seen as a syncretistic phenomenon.[1] But the elements combined, and their proportion, are not a subject of accord. Harnack saw the elements as Hellenism and Christianity;[2] Bousset,[3] followed by Bultmann,[4] finds its essence in Oriental sources; discovery of the DSS has buttressed the view of Cullmann that Gnosticism had its rise in pre-Christian Judaism.[5] Scholars are likewise divided on the dates of Gnostic beginnings; some would regard it as pre-Christian,[6] others as rising contemporaneously with Christianity.[7]

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philosophy, ascetic ethics and all manner of mystic rites, in the process of which the Bible was tortuously reinterpreted and the specifically Christian features were sacrificed to that synthesis." Cf. further R. M. Grant, Gnosticism and Early Christianity, 6ff; Wilson (in NTS 6 (1959), 32-44) offers a survey of opinion on Gnosticism.

1. Munck, Current Issues, 236, proposes to define Gnosticism purely in terms of syncretism; cf. also Wilson, Gnostic Problem, 69. This definition alone is probably too broad to be useful.

2. Harnack, History of Dogma I, 226, "the acute Hellenization of Christianity." For a contemporary criticism, cf. Jonas, Gnostic Religion, 36.

3. For a discussion of the difference between Harnack and Bousset, and those who took up the matter in succession after them, cf. R. P. Casey, in Background of the NT, 52-53.

4. Bultmann, Theology I, 109, who says Gnosticism has its roots "in a dualistic redemption-religion which invaded Hellenism from the orient."

5. Cullmann, in Scrolls, 19, who cites his own work of 1930 on the Pseudo-Clementine literature. Cf. also Reicke, NTS 1 (1954), 141: "The new scrolls facilitate the assumption that the evolution of Jewish and Christian Gnosticism was also an internal process. They contribute to filling up the gap between Jewish Apocalyptic and Gnosticism."

6. Bultmann, loc. cit., assumes a pagan Gnosticism prior to the preaching of the Gospel, against which early Christian preachers had to contend. Cf. also the presuppositions of Schmithals in Die Gnosis in Korinth, and in Paulus und die Gnostiker. For a critique of Schmithals' position, cf. Robinson in Interpretation 16 (1962), 79-80.

7. This school of thought seems to be a growing consensus. Cf., e.g., Richardson, Theology, 41: "The objection to speaking of Gnosticism in the first century A.D. is that we are in danger of hypostatizing certain rather ill-defined tendencies of thought and then speaking as if there were a religion or religious philosophy, called Gnosticism, which could be contrasted with Judaism or Christianity. There was, of course, no such thing." Cf. also Quispel, in Jung Codex, 78; Nock, HTR 57 (1964), 271, 278; Schweizer, Lordship, 127; Goodenough, Introduction, x.

Apart from specific conclusions as to origins, dates and influences, Gnosticism must be mentioned in such a study as this because of the clearly-articulated attempt to explain the origin of evil which appears in its developed forms, elements of which may also have been present in its primitive stages as well. For the primitive stages of Gnosticism undoubtedly shared the thought-world of the NT, no matter whose dates are adopted, and it is with what was "in the air" that we are primarily concerned in these preliminary remarks. Without any spirit of dogmatism about what did or did not influence the NT,[1] we would proceed then to a discussion of Gnostic speculations on the origin of evil.

The question of the origin of evil was one of the chief preoccupations of the Gnostic sages. As Doresse says,[2]

> The point of departure for mystical thinking is, to a Gnostic adept, the sense of Evil that is persecuting him: 'Whence comes evil?' 'Why does it exist?'

This can be discerned in the regularity with which Gnostic thought returns to speculations involving the early chapters of Genesis.[3] Gnostic thought found appealing not only the cosmologies that could be found there, but also the theories on the origin of evil that could be spun from the materials of Genesis 3 and 6.

It is this fundamental curiosity that impels Gnostic investigations

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1. My own inclination is to regard primitive Gnosticism as heretical-Jewish in its most important elements (the Hellenistic traits having been picked up by syncretistic Judaism prior to the growth of what can be described as true Gnosticism). As to the time of its beginnings, the character of the manuscript evidence (cf. Dodd, Fourth Gospel, 98, who says that "there is no Gnostic document known to us which can with any show of probability be dated - at any rate in the form in which alone we have access to it - before the period of the New Testament.") seems to me to forbid any demonstrable claim to the existence of Gnosticism (properly so called) prior to the ministry of Jesus.
2. Secret Books, 112.
3. R. M. Grant, Gnosticism and Early Christianity, argues persuasively for the origin of Gnosticism in heretical Judaism, and hence pays considerable regard to the Gnostic use of Genesis; cf. his index, s.v. "Genesis."

into the character of matter, speculations on spiritual beings and angels, and the whole puzzling apparatus of Gnostic cosmology.[1] But the investigation is undertaken for a practical purpose: not in order to amass information for its own sake, but to inform one's self as to how to escape the persecuting Evil. "The Gnostics were not primarily moved by a speculative interest, but by an essentially practical one."[2]

It is to be noted that this preoccupation with evil as such is foreign to the NT, and to Jewish literature in general. Rather, the NT deals with sin and its mastery; this is the difference van Unnik finds between the "Gospel of Truth" and the NT:[3]

> It lies not so much in the particular character of this "knowledge" (Gnosis) or in the Christology, where it is easy to see points of contact. In my opinion the difference comes out most clearly in the teaching about evil. I purposely do not say in its "Hamartiology", since the word "sin" is not here mentioned. This is symptomatic. ....In the Bible the fundamental cleavage rests not on a loss of knowledge about the origin and destiny of man in relation to God, but on disobedience to God's command.

Hence the difference between the Gnostic and NT schemes of redemption. For the NT, the scheme must include a means of forgiveness; but for the Gnostic all that is required is knowledge, inasmuch as man has no guilt of which he must be forgiven. "No syncretism is possible between such opposites...."[4]

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1. Thus Ptolemy (the great pupil of Valentinus) refers in his letter to Flora (cf. van Unnik, Gnostic Writings, 41) to his student's "desire to know how, from one first principle of the universe...there come to exist also these other natures, the corruptible and the mean (middling), which are unlike the former, even though it is characteristic of the good to beget and bring forth what is like and is in essence at one with itself."
2. Bevan, Hellenism and Christianity, 77. Cf. Jonas, Gnostic Religion, 35.
3. Van Unnik, in Jung Codex, 126-127. Cf. similarly van Unnik, Gnostic Writings, 68: "Although one does find in the New Testament expressions such as 'ignorance,' 'error,' and the like to indicate a falling away from God, the primary cause of this falling away, from the New Testament standpoint, is 'sin' - and in this 'gospel' - or whatever you choose to call it - sin is not even mentioned!"
4. Richardson, Theology, 143; cf. also 247.

The redemption-bringing knowledge (really a reminding, after the Platonic notion of learning[1]) explains evil from two different angles, which are nevertheless facets of the same basic teaching. On the one hand, evil stems from a "fall" or transgression of some sort among spiritual beings subordinate to God "the One." Although they are quite differently conceived, these subordinate beings or "emanations" serve a function in Gnosticism similar to that of the "powers" or angels in Philo. A whole succession of them had proceeded from the Father;[2] and in the lowest of them arose an unlawful desire to create, which had as its abortive issue the world as we know it.[3] Thus the incorruptible God is shielded by spiritual beings from contact with, or responsibility for, the corruptible world.[4] And likewise, man is absolved of guilt by a system which places the blame for the "fall" on the misguided world-

1. The idea of "forgetting" is perhaps most clearly seen in the Hymn of the Pearl, where the prince in disguise in the far country says, "I forgot that I was a king's son and served their king. I forgot the Pearl for which my parents had sent me." But, through the letter from his parents (i.e., Gnostic revelation) the prince is enlightened: "Just as was written on my heart were the words of my letter to read. I remembered that I was a son of kings, and that my freeborn soul desired its own kind. I remembered the Pearl for which I had been sent...." Cf. the translation in Jonas, Gnostic Religion, 114. Other figures besides convey the same basic thought: numbness, sleep, intoxication, sinking, etc.; cf. op. cit., 62ff.
2. The number of emanations that lay between the Father and the Demiurge or world-creator was various, but the function served in separating the Father from sin was the same. Cf., e.g., the scheme of Cerinthus (Hippolytus, Refut. VII, 21); of Valentinus (ibid., VI, 25); of Apelles (ibid., VII, 26); and similarly, Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. I, 16,3.
3. Cf., e.g., Irenaeus, op. cit., I, 2,3: "They say that she" (i.e., Sophia, the lowest Aeon) "having engaged in an impossible and impracticable attempt, brought forth an amorphous substance, such as her female nature enabled her to produce. When she looked upon it, her first feeling was one of grief...and then of fear...next she lost, as it were, all command of herself...." Or similarly, op. cit., I, 16,3: the heretics "assert that the Maker of heaven and earth, the only God Almighty...was produced by means of a defect, which itself sprang from another defect, so that, according to them, He was the product of the third defect." Cf. further Irenaeus, op. cit., I, 5,4; I, 29,4; III, 12,12; Hippolytus, op. cit., VII, 20; VII, 26.
4. The patent fallacy of infinite regress seems not to have troubled the heretics; it is used against them with devastating effect by Irenaeus, op. cit., II, 3,2; II, 4,3; II, 17,7.

creator.

On the other hand, we have the assertion that evil is to be traced to matter itself - a metaphysical dualism. Describing the Sethian doctrine, Hippolytus writes,[1]

> The darkness, however, they say, is a horrible water, into which the light along with the spirit is absorbed, and thus translated into a nature of this description. The darkness being then endued with intelligence, and knowing that when the light has been removed from it the darkness continues desolate, devoid of radiance and splendor, power and efficiency, as well as impotent, therefore, by every effort of reflection and of reason, this makes an exertion to comprise in itself brilliancy, and a scintillation of light, along with the fragrance of the spirit.

This attitude toward matter as dreadful chaos, though it corresponds to the Platonic[2] and Philonic[3] views in some regards, is reminiscent also of the much older myths of the Near East.[4] The material is the enemy of the gods in the Marduk epic;[5] so also the Gnostic seer sets spirit and intractable matter in opposition.

As this thought applies to man, it emerges in a hatred of human corporeality: the σῶμα/σήμα antithesis is found,[6] or the body is described as a leather tunic[7] to be discarded without regrets. The very corporeality of man is a constant reminder of his bondage to the evil world-powers, by whose machinations the divine spark within him has been imprisoned.[8]

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1. Refut. X, 7.
2. Cf. above, 37-38.
3. Cf. above, 55-56.
4. R. M. Grant (Gnosticism and Early Christianity, 81ff.) has found a parallel to the Simonian doctrine of Helen's "fall" into the material in the Near Eastern legend of the descent of Ishtar into Sheol; cf. ANET, 52-57; 106-109.
5. ANET, 63. Cf. above, 37, fn. 5.
6. Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. I, 25,4, the teaching of Carpocrates.
7. This according to Valentinus; cf. Hippolytus, op. cit., X, 9.
8. This note is sounded in the Gospel of Thomas: "Jesus says: 'He who has known the world has fallen into the body, and he who has fallen into the body, the world is not worthy of him.'" (Gospel of Thomas 84, in Doresse, Secret Books.) Cf. also sayings 91 and 116, and Doresse's footnote on 374-375: "A being which comes from on high, from the world of images, and experiences the world, has by this very fact undergone a

Thus matter, as well as the intervening Archons, shields the supreme God from responsibility for sin. It likewise absolves man of guilt, for man is not thought to be responsible for the matter which imprisons him.

The contrast with NT doctrine need hardly be stressed. Whatever degree of Gnostic influence NT interpreters may profess to find in the terminology of the NT, they unite in their agreement that the spirit of Gnosticism and of the NT are utterly at odds. It may not be going too far to suggest that when the parallels are closest, the differences emerge most clearly. The "Gnostic" terminology of the Fourth Gospel, the most "Gnostic" of NT writings, is often the means of making the clearest distinctions between Gnosticism and Christianity. As C. H. Dodd says, after a one-sentence summary of Johannine doctrine,[1]

> The language used in this sentence is in every respect both Johannine and Gnostic, but the difference between Johannine Christianity and Gnosticism emerges the more clearly because the terminology is so largely similar.

Likewise, with the subject of evil and its correction, similarity in the terms employed need not lead us astray. The Gnostic solution was radically different from that of the NT, and in measure as Gnostic teaching on evil was contemporary with the NT, to precisely that extent is it significant that the NT did not take it up, but turned instead to sin,

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fall; it has entered a material body which is at once its prison, its corpse, its tomb (ideas familiar to Platonic philosophy): it has 'fallen into a corpse.' But he who did not refuse this fall, but accepted it and submitted to death (that is to say, Jesus), will escape from the corpse!" Cf. likewise the Apocryphon of John, according to the summary provided by Hennecke (NT Apocrypha I, 325). Jonas offers a convenient summary of this aspect of Gnostic doctrine (Gnostic Religion, 44): "Not only the body but also the 'soul' is a product of the cosmic powers....Through his body and his soul man is a part of the world and subjected to the heimarmene. Enclosed in the soul is the spirit, or 'pneuma' (called also the 'spark'), a portion of the divine substance from beyond which has fallen into the world; and the Archons created man for the express purpose of keeping it captive there. Thus, as in the macrocosm man is enclosed by the seven spheres, so in the human microcosm again the pneuma is enclosed by the seven soul-vestments originating from them."

1. Fourth Gospel, 112.

forgiveness and human responsibility as the proper categories for explaining evil and its origin.

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This concluding note on Rabbinic doctrine relative to the origin of evil involves some degree of duplication, since the subject will be touched upon again in discussing the same doctrine in the A&P;[1] however, it seemed advisable to say, even if briefly, something about the doctrine that evolved from Rabbinic thought, even though its precise stage of development at the time the NT literature was being written is not a matter of certainty.[2]

For the Rabbis, sin began with Adam.[3] But this is not at all the same thing as saying that as a result of his sin his children are foredoomed to sin. Rather, the continuing result of Adam's transgression appears to be death, a punishment visited upon his descendants as well as upon Adam.[4] So Adam is seen as introducing sin into the world, but in a temporal more than a causative fashion. The cause of sin is to be found elsewhere.

The causative factor in sin and evil is represented as being the

1. Cf. below, 107ff. Aside from the A&P, my treatment of the Rabbis is dependent on secondary sources which have been a vade mecum through the maze of rabbinic writings: in particular, G. F. Moore's Judaism, and Montefiore and Loewe's Rabbinic Anthology. Quotations are from the latter.
2. For general orientation in the Rabbinic writings and an evaluation of their significance, cf. Moore, Judaism I, 125ff, and especially on the dating of Rabbinic works and their significance for NT research, cf. ibid., 131ff.
3. Moore, op. cit., 474-478; cf. Sifre Deut. 323.
4. Tennant says (Sources, 176), "It must be concluded, then, that the only consequences of the Fall, for the human race, which were asserted in rabbinic teaching, are death and loss of the various supernatural adornments of Adam's life at its beginning. No diminished freedom of will, no permanent ascendancy of the yezer hara established for all generations, were ascribed to the first transgression." Cf. similarly Sanday and Headlam, Romans, 136-138, and the citations in S.-B. Kommentar III, 227ff.

evil inclination, or yetzer.[1] This inclination was a creation of God, and is found in the heart of every man;[2] it is counterbalanced by a corresponding good inclination, but as in Qumran the good spirit never commands quite the same interest and attention as the evil.[3] Against the evil inclination the typical opponent and antidote is the Torah, by the study of which man is able to subjugate the evil inclination,[4] even though it is never utterly cast out from the heart,[5] and will not be destroyed until the end of the age.[6]

And yet, it is not true to say that the evil inclination causes sin. Rather, sin inheres in the choice to follow the evil yetzer. So although the inclination is tremendously powerful its strength lies in man's decision to serve it, so that sin really derives its power from human choice.[7]

1. Moore, Judaism I, 479ff; cf. in particular Pes.R. f. 32b, in comment on Ps 35:10: "The poor is Israel: the spoiler is the Evil Inclination. How does the Good Inclination strive to do right, and then the Evil Inclination comes and causes loss! There is no brigand stronger than the Evil Inclination." Cf. similarly Kid. 30b.
The doctrine of the two yetzers was based on the earlier thought of the A&P, which in this discussion are being treated in the following chapter; cf. below, 107ff.
2. That God created the evil yetzer, cf. Bab.B. 16a; Kid. 30b; Tanh.B., Noah, 15b; Gen.R., Noah, 34:10; Tanh., Bereshit, 7, f. 10a. The doctrine was founded on the two yods in the spelling of the word in Gn 2:7; cf. Moore, op. cit., 483-485, and above, 26-27; this was interpreted as signifying two impulses, a good and a bad. On similar perversities of rabbinic exegesis, cf. Daube, NT and Rabbinic Judaism, 418ff.
3. "It was the evil impulse that first attracted the Rabbis and indeed it was with this that they were always chiefly concerned...." (Davies, PRJ, 21). References to the evil yetzer far outnumber references to the good yetzer.
4. This assertion is repeatedly made; cf. Kid. 30b; Bab.B. 16a; Kid. 81a; Ab.Zar. 17a. Cf. Schoeps, Paul, 195, on the relationship between Pl and the Rabbis at this point; Schoeps feels that Pl misunderstood rabbinic doctrine in his teaching on the purpose of the Law.
5. Cf. Tanh., Toledot, 7,f,46a; Montefiore and Loewe (Rabbinic Anthology, 302) comment, "Though the study of the Law is the sovereign remedy against the evil yetzer, yet the learned in the Law are specially subject to its attack," and go on to cite Suk. 52a; Ab.Zar. 17a.
6. Num.R., Beha'alotcka, 15:16; Pes.K. 165a.
7. This important fact is to be noted, e.g., in Tanh., Bereshit, 7, f. 10a: "Why does a child of five, six, seven, eight or nine years not sin, but only at ten years and upwards? He himself makes his yetzer big. You make your yetzer bad." Cf. also Sab. 105b: "This is the device of the evil yetzer: Today it says, 'Do this'; tomorrow 'Do that,' till at last it says, 'Worship an idol,' and the man goes and does it." Or again, Gen.R. Bereshit, 22:6, "The yetzer at first is

The evil yetzer may be regarded as fulfilling a good purpose.[1] But by and large, it is a regrettable entity; God is sometimes said to be sorry that he has brought it into being.[2] Although it is typically associated with sexual transgression,[3] it still extends its sway to the whole of life, and gains mastery over the unwary. It may be personified, and as such bear the name of Satan.[4]

For the Rabbis there is thus no recourse to metaphysical speculations after the Gnostic or even Philonic fashion. In this respect, Rabbinic thought is akin with the NT, which likewise refuses to become involved in a matter/spirit dualism of evil and good.[5] The Rabbis are similarly closer to the thought of Qumran than to the Gnostics or to Philo, but a clear distinction appears at the point of predestinarian doctrine which figures so largely in Qumran's teaching: for the Rabbis, man is free to choose

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weak as a woman, afterwards it becomes strong as a man. R. Akiba said: At first it is like a spider's thread and at last it is like a rope of a ship. R. Isaac said: At first it is a wayfarer and lodger, at last it becomes the master of the house." Such statements as these testify that the Rabbis believed that the yetzer was nurtured by decisions in its favor, and increasingly dominated the man who yielded to its seductions. Which is to say, the dominance of sin depends on the consent of the sinner.

1. Cf. in particular Gen.R., Bereshit, 9:7, commenting on Gn 1:31: R. Nahman b. Samuel said: "That is the evil inclination. But is the evil inclination very good? Yes, for if it were not for the evil inclination man would not build a house, or take a wife, or beget a child, or engage in business...." That is to say, man's natural impulses are not in themselves evil, but become so by the use he makes of them. Cf. Moore, Judaism I, 482-483.
2. Kid. 30b; Tanh.B., Noah, 15b; Suk. 52b; Gen.R. Noah, 34:10; Gen.R., Bereshit, 27:4.
3. This emerges in many references to the evil yetzer among the Rabbis; cf., e.g., Kid. 81a,b; Tanh.B., Hukkat, 66a; Suk 52a; cf. likewise the citations in S.-B. Kommentar IV, 466.
4. Cf. Moore, op. cit., 492; Montefiore and Loewe, Rabbinic Anthology, 298-299, who cite in this connection Kid. 81a; Tanh.B., Hukkat, 66a.
5. Cf. below, 125, fn. 1. Moore (op. cit., 485) writes: "This duality of impulses does not correspond to the duality of man's natural constitution, so that the evil impulse resides in the body while the good impulse proceeds from the soul. That the physical organism, as material, is evil per se, sense the origin of error, the appetites and passions the source of moral evil - these ideas, which through prevalent philosophies had gained wide currency in the Hellenistic world, have no counterpart in Palestinian Judaism."

between the inclinations, and it is his choice that determines his destiny, rather than his destiny that determines his choice.[1] Of course, the distinctions between the two are not as clear-cut as such a statement might seem to imply; however, it can safely be said that in general the Rabbis taught that man's free choice is the sphere within which sin is brought into being, whereas Qumran came close to teaching that God's predestinating decree declared in advance the choices that were to be made as well as the final issues of those choices.

The Rabbis have their closest NT parallels in the Synoptic Gospels. There, as we shall see, man is regarded as making a free choice between alternatives which are ethically conceived;[2] in this respect, we are reminded of the doctrine of Two Ways between which man chooses for good or for ill.[3] But there is a difference, and an important one. For the Rabbis, God's way of salvation had already appeared, and had been present from the very beginning. It was the Torah.[4] For the NT, God's way of salvation was Jesus Christ, and the Torah was inadequate for deliverance from the power of the evil yetzer.[5] The Law is seen by Pl as defining sin,

1. Montefiore (Rabbinic Literature, 271) sums up the position by saying: "The Rabbis do not, as we have seen, neglect God's help, or regard it as superfluous. Yet they do consider man's will as free, even though the Yetzer ha Ra, if man once begins to yield to its solicitations, can make that will a slave. If man tries, God aids. Man must and can try. That seems to be their simple doctrine in a nutshell."
2. Cf. below, 160ff.
3. The idea of two ways between which man chooses was a commonplace in the Hellenistic world; cf., e.g., the pagan sources cited by Barclay in Flesh and Spirit, 10. For the Two Ways in the A&P, cf. below, 107ff.
4. This emerges in the passages cited above, 71, in which Torah and its study appeared as deliverance from the evil yetzer. Torah, as Moore (Judaism I, 263) has well pointed out, was far more for the Jews than a mere catalogue of laws; it represented the whole of revelation, it was capable of personification as divine Wisdom, and the keeping of it was life itself.
5. This is true for Mt, who represents Jesus as the giver of a new Torah; cf. below, 120. But it is most typical of Pl and Heb with their doctrine of the Law's inadequacy; cf. below, 203-204; 245.

but not as showing a viable way to deliverance from sin.

This points further to a difference between the NT and the Rabbis on the nature and character of sin. For the NT, sin is altogether a more radical and drastic matter than for the Rabbis. The latter believed that man though created frail and incapable of perfection was nevertheless able in purpose and intent to please God with the aid of the Torah, and that whatever balance remained unpaid God would graciously forgive and restore, provided the intention of the man had been honorable;[1] the former, on the other hand, teaches the grace of God as the sole and complete saving factor, and ethical choice as a consequent rather than a complementary aspect of the salvation-process. Man for the NT is in drastic need of forgiveness, and sin looms as a problem more dreadful and compelling than it is for the Rabbis. But, as in Rabbinic thought, the locus of sin's beginnings and ultimately the responsibility for it, are set forth in human terms. Whatever the character of sin, and whatever the means of salvation, the NT and the Rabbis are at least in agreement in saying that the point at which sin comes into being is within the human sphere.

1. On God's forgiveness of the sinner, and his making up of the inadequate performance of a man whose righteousness has been lacking, cf. the opinion of the school of Hillel described by Moore, Judaism I, 495-496.

CHAPTER THREE

No apology need be made for spending a chapter in surveying the A&P on the subject of evil and its origin. In recent years, the exciting discoveries of Essene and Gnostic manuscripts have absorbed the attention of scholarship, but the value of what was already at hand prior to the Qumran finds has not been obscured. There is no doubt that the thought of the A&P is in the bloodstream of the NT, and that it likewise infiltrated other Hellenistic-Jewish thought contemporary with the NT. The A&P will therefore have considerable interest for us when our subject is touched upon.

No attempt will be made to deal in detail with the sometimes vexed question of dating these works;[1] in fact, precise dates are not essential to our purpose, except to note that the bulk of this literature was produced prior to and during the NT era, and was therefore available to NT authors, if not in literary form, at least in popular parlance.

It should also be observed that the analysis undertaken does not reflect the mode of thought encountered in the A&P. The authors of the A&P felt less the strain of logical necessity under which twentieth century man labors, and strange bedfellows are found among the ideas set before us by the same author, or gathered together in composite works attributed to one author. We must not be too Procrustean in an attempt "to apply strict logic to works whose writers were governed rather by

1. A fairly non-controversial dating would assign to the second century B.C. and slightly earlier: PirAb; SibOr, though elements appear to be as late as the first century A.D.; Tobit; IEsdr; Sir; EpJer; Judith; IBar; Jub; IMacc; IIMacc. In the first century B.C. we have IIIMacc; Test XII Pat; IEn; WisdSol; PsSol. To the first century A.D. belong AssMos; IIEn; IIIBar; the Adam and Eve literature; MartIs; IIEsdr; IVMacc; IVEz. On the question of dating this literature, cf. in particular Torrey, Apocryphal Literature; Pfeiffer, History; and in apocalyptic literature the footnotes of Rowley, Relevance, are up-to-date and offer a helpful guide to current schools of thought.

hope and enthusiasm than by reason and consistency."[1]

The A&P are so various as almost to defy organization, but an attempt will be made to deal with them under three headings. We will consider first the hints they give that God may be the source of evil; next we will turn to the suggestion that evil can be blamed on demonic powers. Finally the passages will be discussed in which man is blamed with the beginnings of sin.

We have already observed a general tendency in the Hellenistic world to stress the transcendence of God. Part of the support for this observation comes from the literature now before us, which raises God to a level of transcendence unknown to the OT. For example, IIMacc has as the object of God's visitation upon Heliodorus not only the protection of the sacred temple, but also that Heliodorus might recognize the sovereign might and majesty of God.[2] In the Books of Adam and Eve, God no longer deals personally with his fallen creatures, but always transacts his business with them through the hands of mediating angels, and appears attended by his angelic court, lest he be tainted by sin.[3] When IVEz had hard things to say to God, he did not presume to address them to God himself, but rather made his complaints through an angel.[4] And the angel in turn humiliated Ezra by contrasting his limited knowledge with God's great wisdom, so great that Ezra could not even understand God's questions, let alone their answers.[5]

1. Burkitt (Proceedings of the British Academy, XVII, 1931, 443), quoted in Rowley, Relevance, 140.
2. IIMacc 3:28, the prostrate Heliodorus is carried out "recognizing clearly the sovereign might of God." The visitation has been (IIMacc 3:34) "to publish abroad to all men the sovereign majesty of God."
3. Eve's prayers (because she sinned more greatly) are only heard through Adam's intercession, and then are answered by Michael's (rather than God's) coming (Vita 19:2; 20:2; 21:1-2). God appears to Adam surrounded by an angelic court (Vita 25:3).
4. E.g., IVEz 4:1.
5. E.g., IVEz 4:5-9. Cf. Oesterley, Books of the Apocrypha, 523-524.

This elevation of God far above man picks up a theme that is often touched upon in the OT. But there are two aspects of it that are new: first, the degree of stress placed on God's transcendence, and second, the heightened emphasis on God's court of angelic attendants.[1] There is noteworthy doctrinal development from the angel who figures so largely in Tobit to the elaborate angelology of the later apocalyptic books.[2] The effect of this increasing body of intermediate beings between God and man (including the demons as well[3]) was to insulate God from contact with the sinful world, and to isolate him in unapproachable purity.[4]

Corresponding to this exaltation of God above the intermediate beings was a growing stress on his sovereignty over all creation. This was bound to create tensions in the area of freedom and determinism, but most of Judaism did not seem to sense this as a severe problem.[5] In a number of the inter-Testament writings, freedom and predestination coexist side by side without attempt at harmonization; e.g., we read, "All is foreseen, and free-will is given, and the world is judged by goodness, and all is according to the amount of work."[6] Likewise Sirach voices predestinarian themes, in spite of his robust doctrine of free will. Despite his direct

1. On the burgeoning angelology of the A&P, cf. Russell, Method and Message, 235-244.
2. The combined books of Adam and Eve have more than fifty references to angels; IEn has over ninety; TestXIIPat has over thirty; IIEn over fifty; IVEz over fifty. The angels act as mediators between God and man, and sing God's praises in heaven; they perform a service in restraining the forces of evil and of the world. Like an Oriental potentate, God is now surrounded by his glorious retainers.
3. Cf. below, 89.
4. Cf. the effect of remoteness from God's solitary abode in the tenth heaven, as Enoch (IIEn 20:1ff) sees it from the seventh, far below.
5. "The Talmudic Rabbis attempted no solution of the philosophical problem; they were content to affirm the two truths and left the reconciliation of them a divine mystery." (Herford, in Charles, A&P II, 702). But cf. Schürer, History II, ii, 15.
6. PirAb 3:19. Cf. further PirAb 4:29, where birth, death and Judgment Day seem to be determined, but where the intervening time, about which nothing is said, seems to be left to man's responsible decision.

denial that God is the source of evil,[1] he comes close to asserting what he denies:[2]

> As the clay is in the power of the potter,
> To fashion it according to his good pleasure;
> So is man in the power of his creator,
> To make him according to his ordinance.

And again,[3]

> Unto eternity he declared the things that shall be,
> And hidden things before they came to pass.

Similarly, the TestXIIPat hold to both free will and predestination without any attempt at harmonization, coming down rather more heavily on the side of free will.[4] Yet we find a passage which seems a legitimate precursor of the rigidly deterministic doctrine of Qumran[5] in TNaph:[6]

> For as the potter knoweth the vessel, how much it is to contain, and bringeth clay accordingly, so also doth the Lord make the body after the likeness of the spirit, and according to the capacity of the body doth He implant the spirit....And as the potter knoweth the use of each vessel, what it is meet for, so also doth the Lord know the body, how far it will persist in goodness, and when it beginneth in evil....

And likewise IIEn, apart from one ringing statement of man's freewill,[7] seems to teach a doctrine of predestination;[8] the exception, however, is

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1. Sir 15:11-12
2. Sir 33:13.
3. Sir 48:25.
4. Cf. TLev 19:1; TJud 20:1-3; TAsh 1:3-9; 2:1-10.
5. Both because of the discovery of TestXIIPat manuscripts among the Qumran scrolls, and because of the obvious continuity in thought between them and the doctrine of 1QS, the TestXIIPat are generally conceded to lie in a single line of tradition with the Qumran community's thought. Cf. Cross, Ancient Library, 199.
6. TNaph 2:2-6. For a most curious and interesting application of this idea of a mixing of good and evil, cf. the cryptic document from Qumran published by Allegro and cited by Leaney, Rule, 155, where it appears that physical as well as spiritual characteristics are assigned, and are interpreted astrologically.
7. IIEn 30:13-16. It is difficult to fit this passage in with the deterministic framework; there seems to be some doubt in God's mind as to the outcome of his test of Adam - "whether he has love towards me, or hatred." Apparently Adam has a real choice.
8. Enoch speaks from having both read and himself written books in Heaven (IIEn 22:12; 40:1-2; 47:2), in which appear the names of all that are born, "and the places prepared for them to eternity; for all souls are prepared to eternity, before the formation of the world (IIEn 23:4-5)." Enoch is able to announce "all that is and was and all that is now, and all that will be till judgment-day (IIEn 39:2)," and has himself written "all works of every man, before his creation, all that is done amongst all men for all time...." (IIEn 53:2; cf. IIEn 49:2).

instructive, and reminds against expecting consistency and strict logic from the men of the inter-Testament period.

In addition to this group of authors who seem to teach predestination and freedom side by side, a second group seems to set forth what can be described as a doctrine of foreknowledge without clear predestinarian implications. For example, the Book of Jubilees holds to God's control over the nations, and his special care over Israel;[1] it seems safe to argue that if Isaac can foresee the future, so likewise can God:[2]

> And Israel blessed his sons before he died and told them everything that would befall them in the land of Egypt; and he made known to them what would come upon them in the last days....

WisdSol is more definite in its teaching of foreknowledge;[3] in fact, God must know the future, for it is said concerning Wisdom,[4]

> She knoweth the things of old, and divineth the things to come:
> She understandeth subtilties of speeches and interpretations of dark sayings:
> She forseeth signs and wonders, and the issues of seasons and times.

And equally explicit is the assertion of God's foreknowledge in IIBar, at least his knowledge of the duration of the world: "Thou alone knowest the duration of the generations...."[5] Or, again,[6]

> Thou rememberest the beginning which Thou hast made,
> And the destruction that is to be Thou forgettest not.

Foreknowledge likewise applies to the souls of men, at least to quite a

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1. Jub 15:31-32. Spirits are appointed over the nations to lead them astray, but God rules over Israel himself, and requires them at the hand of his angels. This doctrine of angelic rulers is of later significance; cf. below, 95.
2. Jub 45:14. The frequent references to what is written on heavenly tablets must be left largely out of account; cf. Charles, A&P II, 16, who points out the variety with which the term is used. But in two contexts (16:3; 32:21) the "tablets" do seem to imply foreknowledge.
3. Cf. the direct denial (WisdSol 2:21ff) of the idea that man is born by mere chance and hereafter "shall be as though we had never been" (2:2). Rather, God has knowledge and purpose in his work of creation.
4. WisdSol 8:8. Foreknowledge is directly asserted in the matter of the fate assigned to the Egyptians (WisdSol 19:1).
5. IIBar 48:3. 6. IIBar 48:7.

considerable extent.[1] But IIBar teaches foreknowledge in such a way as to leave wide latitude for personal initiative.[2] Although the future and the end of the world are foreseen and fixed, and the souls of men numbered, Israel must deserve God's help through its continued obedience to the Law;[3] and although there is something prepared for the righteous,[4] we are not told that the righteous are predestined to partake of what is prepared, the implication being rather that their bliss depends on their continuing in righteousness. In fact, the Garden of Eden is all about us, for "each of us has been the Adam of his own soul."[5] At the critical point, then, man is free: God exercises his prerogatives in such a fashion that man's liberty is not impaired. Men sin knowingly, and will be punished accordingly;[6] and although many have sinned, some have been righteous.[7]

But if in the works cited above there seems to be a mingling of predestination and freedom, a third group of writings seems more definitely deterministic in tone.[8] Judith says in her prayer,[9]

> Thou didst devise the things which are now, and the things which are to come: and the things which thou didst devise came to pass; yea, the things which thou didst determine stood before thee, and said, Lo, we are here: for all thy ways are prepared, and thy judgement is with foreknowledge.

In IIIMacc God frequently intervenes arbitrarily and directly in human

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1. IIBar 23:4-5.
2. The "books" referred to in IIBar 24:1 have no particular relevance to our topic - they deal with the past, being a ledger of former sins.
3. IIBar 48:17-24.
4. IIBar 54:4.
5. IIBar 54:19; cf. 54:15-19.
6. IIBar 15:6.
7. IIBar 21:11.
8. On this subject, cf. Russell, Method and Message, 230-234. He says (p. 230), "The apocalyptist believed not only that history had been systematically arranged, but also that this arrangement had been ordained by God from the very beginning, i.e. those vast eras of time into which history was divided had been predetermined by the will of God and must follow the pattern which had already been set for them. Their number and their duration were both fixed beforehand. There was therefore an inevitability about history; through travail and persecution it would move unerringly to its predetermined goal - the defeat of evil and the establishment of God's kingdom in the time of the End. The past was fixed; the future was fixed also."
9. Judith 9:5-6.

affairs;[1] admittedly, this is not predestination, but the cast of thought seems to be the same as in the truly deterministic authors.

The stress placed in IEn on the foreknowledge of God seems to move us to the very brink of predestination, though we should not expect to find a clear and unanimous teaching in this composite work. God does foresee and permit all that happens;[2] "He knows before the world was created what is for ever and what will be from generation unto generation."[3] Enoch finds that the names of the holy are written parabolically in the stars.[4] There seems to be a previously determined number of the righteous which must be fulfilled before the Judgment.[5]

Two terms employed by IEn deserve particular mention. The first is the frequent reference to "books" and "tablets" in Heaven.[6] We are told, for example, that the names of sinners, blasphemers and perverters, together with "the things that shall be," are "written and inscribed above in the heaven, in order that angels may read them and know that which shall befall the sinners."[7] This notion of a future written in advance certainly implies a predestinarian attitude. The second term is "the elect," recurring frequently, and apparently predestinarian.[8] Although it is difficult

1. God saves the Jews by decreeing a shortage of paper and pens (IIIMacc 4:21); by causing the king to fall asleep (5:12); by miraculously throwing the king into forgetfulness (5:28,30). Small wonder, then, that at the last moment God delivers the Jews from impending doom (6:18ff).
2. IEn 9:11.
3. IEn 39:11.
4. IEn 43:4. This cryptic remark is apparently intended to convey the impression of the righteous as fixed for ever before God just as the stars are; cf. IEn 104:2, where the righteous shine like the stars of heaven.
5. IEn 47:3-4; Enoch himself is apparently among the righteous, for his own security for the future is proclaimed in 65:12.
6. IEn 47:3-4; 81:1; 93:1-2; 103:2; 106:19; 107:1; 108:6-7. The ledger of 98:8 probably belongs in a different category from the books in which the future can be read.
7. IEn 108:6-7.
8. The references are given by Charles (A&P II, 188) in footnotes to IEn 1:1 and 1:3, with the following additions and corrections: in the note to 1:1 read 61:13 instead of 60:13, and likewise 62:12,13,15 instead of 63:12,13,15; and in the note to 1:3 add three references: 45:5; 62:7-8; 93:10.

to be sure how much weight this term will bear, it still seems clear enough that those who are so designated are, like Enoch, destined for eternal life.[1]

It is difficult to reconcile the bulk of Enoch's system with his statement,[2]

> I have sworn unto you, ye sinners, as a mountain has not become a slave,
> And a hill does not become the handmaid of a woman,
> Even so sin has not been sent upon the earth,
> But man of himself has created it,
> And under a great curse shall they fall who commit it.

It has previously been asserted that God has complete foreknowledge, even since before the world was created;[3] knowingly bringing this world into being, does that not make God responsible for sin? Enoch seems to be satisfied to fall back on the demons to explain evil,[4] but even the demonic solution does not harmonize with the passage quoted above.

The MartIs seems explicitly predestinarian: Hezekiah, devastated at the prospect of his son's sin, is told, "The counsel of Sammael against Manasseh is consummated: nought shall avail thee."[5] Nor can Isaiah's own destiny, i.e., to be sawn in two, be avoided.[6] The one statement found in PsSol on freedom and determinism seems definitely predestinarian:[7]

> For no man taketh spoil from a mighty man;
> Who, then, can take aught of all that Thou hast made, except Thou Thyself givest?
> For man and his portion (lie) before Thee in the balance;
> He cannot add to, so as to enlarge, what has been prescribed by Thee.

In summary, there seems to be a fairly wide consensus in the A&P in support of God's foreknowledge; but when an attempt is made to extend this into explicit predestination, the consensus evaporates.[8] The matter

1. Cf. IEn 65:12.
2. IEn 98:4-5.
3. IEn 39:11.
4. Cf. below, 93ff.
5. MartIs 1:11.
6. MartIs 1:12.
7. PsSol 5:4-6; cf. the discussion of PsSol 9:7 in Ryle and James, Psalms of Solomon, 95-96.
8. This should warn us against attaching too much weight to deterministic statements - e.g., MartIs 1:11-12; PsSol 5:4-6.

is clearly not settled for the inter-Testament period, and we will expect to find a similar juxtaposition of freedom and determinism in the NT.

We consider next the possibility that our authors may attribute evil directly to God.[1] But we discover that there is little to lead us to God as the originator of evil. Jub, for example, bears negative witness to the existence of the idea that God causes evil, by denying it.[2] Likewise the WisdSol twice denies the same notion.[3] A cursory reading of TAsh might create the impression that God creates evil,[4] but this statement must be understood in light of the evil yetzer doctrine, which modifies it.[5] Disaster is attributed to God in SibOr,[6] but this does not imply that moral evil emanates from him. PsSol petition God to withdraw his hand, "Lest through necessity we sin,"[7] which in light of the predestinarian tone of preceding verses suggests that God does set up situations in which sin becomes the only possible course of action. In IIEn there is a reference to God's "tempting" of men,[8] but it seems clear that here the intention is not to corrupt, but to prove man's obedience.

Sirach, on the one hand, explicitly denies that God is the author of evil,[9] but on the other comes close to doing what he warns against:[10]

> Some He blessed and exalted,
> And others He hallowed and brought nigh to Himself;
> Some he cursed and abased,
> And overthrew them from their place.
> As the clay is in the power of the potter,
> To fashion it according to his good pleasure;
> So is man in the power of his creator,
> To make him according to His ordinance.

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1. The view of the monks of Qumran; cf. above, 59ff, and also Porter, "The Yetzer Hara," 120-121.
2. Jub 6:35. Cf. also the offensive attribution of evil to God in the attack on Moses (Ex 4:24-26) expurgated by Jub (48:2-3).
3. WisdSol 1:13-14, God made nothing that is not good; 11:23-26, he would not have created or sustained anything abhorrent to himself.
4. TAsh 1:3-9.
5. Cf. below, 109-110.
6. Frag. i, 32-33.
7. PsSol 5:8.
8. IIEn 45:3.
9. Sir 15:11-12.
10. Sir 33:12-15.

Over against evil (stands) the good, and against death life;
Even thus look upon all the works of God,
Each different, one the opposite of the other.

Particularly in light of this doctrine of pairs and opposites in God's creation, we are interested to read in a later passage,[1]

The works of God are all good,
They supply every need in its season.
None may say: This is worse than that;
For everything availeth in its season.

This might imply, in Stoic fashion, that God regards all that he has created, including evil, as being good; evil would then be only a mistaken impression on the part of man, being in fact good from God's standpoint.

But the real weight of the inter-Testament literature seems to be behind the idea that God's relationship to evil is to be understood in terms of his using it for a good purpose. Already existing evil (assumed, rather than explained) is said to be turned by God to a good end. Thus, affliction is said by Sirach to be God's way of proving those acceptable to him.[2] In fact, God purposely brings trouble on those who seek him:[3]

But I (i.e., Wisdom) will walk with him in disguise,
And at first I will try him with temptations.
Fear and dread will I bring upon him,
And I will torment him with chastisements,
Until his heart is filled with me,
And I try him with my ordinances.

Judith, in the same tradition, encourages the people with the words, "The Lord doth scourge them that come near unto him, to admonish them."[4] In IIMacc, Antiochus sacks Jerusalem because the people have sinned; but when this disciplinary punishment has restored the people to righteousness, the city will once again be impregnable, so that punishment is for the people's long term good.[5] We read in WisdSol that even death can be a blessing from

1. Sir 39:33-34. 2. Sir 2:5; 32:14.
3. Sir 4:17. By contrast, the way of sinners, though apparently easy, is deceptive and perilous, Sir 21:10.
4. Judith 8:27; cf. similarly TJos 2:6.
5. IIMacc 5:17-20. Likewise, the historian explains in an aside to his readers how the calamaties which befell the Jews were signs of divine favor: the heathen nations were heaping up future suffering for themselves, which the Jews, having suffered in this life, would be spared in the life to come (IIMacc 6:12-17). Cf. also SibOr 5:384-385.

God;[1] in a later section of the same book, it is taught that evil is intended to reform both the righteous and the wicked, though in the case of the wicked it fails. Thus both Israel and Egypt suffer thirst; but Israel's sufferings in the desert were chastenings of mercy, and how much worse did the Egyptians suffer when drinking clotted blood![2] God's use of evil is regarded in PsSol as comparable to a father's use of chastisement on his children.[3] Safe in knowledge of this, when the righteous man "passes through rivers and the tossing of the seas, he shall not be dismayed."[4]

In IIEn God opens the possibility of evil to the angels, apparently to test their faithfulness;[5] it will be remembered that Satan is elsewhere said to have failed a similar test.[6] Suffering is not boundless for any man, but there is "a measure fixed how much it is intended that a man be tried in this world."[7] Evil is similarly under restraint in IIBar, where the purpose of chastening is,[8]

> ...that ye may justify His judgement which He has decreed against you that ye should be carried away captive - for what ye have suffered is disproportioned to what ye have done - in order that, at the last times, ye may be found worthy of your fathers. Therefore, if ye consider that ye have now suffered those things for your good, that ye may not finally be condemned and tormented, then ye will receive eternal hope....

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1. It is a rest, it may prevent a man's sinning in the future from which it cuts him off, it may come because God wants his beloved at his side; moreover, it is better to die young and perfected than old and unrighteous. Cf. WisdSol 4:7,11,14,16.
2. WisdSol 11:4-9. Along the same lines it is argued that God loves all he has made, and would gladly spare it (11:23-26); even the Egyptians had opportunity to repent, though God knew they would not take it (12:8-10). God judges Israel carefully (12:19-21), and will punish the Gentiles more by ten thousand times (12:22). There was mercy even in the plague of serpents which, though dreadful, was not long continued nor "wrath to the uttermost (16:5-6);" its purpose was to remind Israel of the oracles of God (16:11).
3. PsSol 13:8; 18:4-5.
4. PsSol 6:5. The Psalmist can say (10:1-3), "Happy is the man whom the Lord remembereth with reproving." The whole of Ps 13 deals with the meaning of suffering; likewise, cf. 16:10-15; 18:4-5.
5. IIEn 22:6-7.
6. Vita 24:3ff.
7. IIEn 49:2.
8. IIBar 78:5-6.

Up to this point, the meaning of evil as used by God has been interpreted in terms of discipline and human improvement in the life of the sufferer. But there are hints at other interpretations, going beyond the OT view, and verging on NT themes. Thus, suffering is interpreted in terms of expiation, in the last words of the last of the seven brothers.[1] IIBar likewise suggests that somehow the sufferings of Israel are linked with the welfare of the whole world - "that they may do good to the Gentiles,"[2] or to preserve the world from destruction (an apparent consequence of the corruption of the Jews, if this had continued unchecked).[3] A second suggestion is that suffering may be purgative, in preparation for life in heaven.[4] And a third is that the sufferings of Israel are in order to hasten the day of judgment.[5]

By and large, the Jewish inter-Testament writings interpret the misfortunes of life in terms of the OT doctrine of retributive justice. This may be limited to the events of this life;[6] however, progressively, the literature moves towards finding a solution to the problems of this life in terms of rewards and punishments deferred until an after-life in heaven

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1. IIMacc 7:37-38.
2. IIBar 1:4.
3. IIBar 4:1.
4. Vita 48:1-3; ApMos 37:3.
5. IIBar 20:1-2.
6. Sometimes the OT view is simply reasserted; cf. PirAb 5:11; 8:38; Tob 1:20-21; 4:6; 12:8-10; 13:1-6,9-10; 14:10; IEsdr 1:51-57; 8:86-87; Judith 5:17-21; 11:10; IBar 1:13,20; 2:2,3,7,9,26; 3:4-5,9-13; 4:2,6-8,12-13,18, 29,31-33; IIIMacc 2:21-23. Sirach likewise reasserts the OT view (1:13; 2:10; 3:26-28,31; 4:10,28; 5:3; 13:1; 16:12-14; 17:23; 20:18; 35:11; 38: 15; 45:19), and stresses the almost automatic aspect of OT retribution and reward: almost without God's supervision, wickedness and righteousness set in motion a train of events that inevitably rebounds upon the doer - "He that casteth a stone on high casteth it on his own head, and a deceitful blow apportions wounds to the deceiver. He that doeth evil things, they shall roll upon him....(27:25-29)." The automatic aspect of this retribution is further seen in 3:31; 8:10-11; 21:27-28, "When the fool curseth his adversary, he curseth his own soul." For these reasons, Sir holds that it is unwise to conclude prematurely that retributive justice has failed (9:11-12; 11:4-6,21; 21:5,10). Even at the very end of life God, by a single day of excruciating misery, can compensate for a whole life ill-spent (11:25-28).

or hell.[1] The fundamental solution is still terrestrial,[2] but there is a further realm of redress for unpaid balances.[3] Only with the Enoch literature and IVEz do we enter a realm of thought in which the importance of life after death comes to overshadow the importance of retributive justice on earth; here the afterlife becomes the sphere in which

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1. We cannot enter into the doctrines of heaven and hell in any detail, except to note that they became more popular with the passage of time; among the works dated as being from the second century BC or earlier (cf. above, 75, fn. 1) some have no doctrine of heaven at all (Tob, IEsdr, IBar) and the remainder (e.g., Sir 2:9; Judith 16:17) may have feeble hints, or a doctrine of heavenly rewards only vaguely taught and not at all emphasized (Jub, IIMacc). But from the first century B.C. and onward, the books which do not refer to heavenly rewards (PrAzar, PrManas, Mart Is, IIIMacc) are exceptions. From the first century B.C. onward it can be said generally that both retributive justice and a doctrine of heaven and hell are taught together in this literature, and that as emphasis of an individual author on one subject of the two increases, his stress on the other is likely to diminish; thus TestXIIPat stresses retributive justice almost to the exclusion of afterlife, while IVEz stresses heaven and hell almost to the exclusion of retributive justice on earth. On the whole subject, cf. Charles, Eschatology; cf. also Rowley, Relevance, 188-189; Russell, Method and Message, 370-373.

2. Cf. TSim 4:9; TLev 4:6; 7:1-4; 13:6; TJud 8:2-3; 13:8; TNaph 8:6; TGad 6:9-11; TAsh 6:4-5; TBenj 7:3-4; AssMos 12:10-11; IIBar 12:1-4; 19:6-8; 61:7; 67:1-8; 77:4,8-10; 82:2-9; 83:17-18; 85:4,5,10; IIIBar 15:2-3; 16:1-4; Vita 26:2; 30:1 - 31:3 (ApocMos 5:5); 35:2-3; 49:3; IVMacc 4:21; 9:9,32; 10:11,21; 11:23; 12:12-15,19; 18:5,22.

3. TJud 25:3; TZeb 10:2-3; TAsh 5:2; 6:4-5; TBen 9:2; 10:6-11; AssMos 10:3-10; IIBar 14:10-15; 15:6; 29:3 - 30:5; 42:7-8; 43:1-2; 44:11-13,15; 46:6; 48:6,39-40,48-50; 49:1 - 51:16; 52:5-7; 54:14; 46:6; 59:2; 64:7, 9-10; 70:1 - 74:4; 76:4; 78:5-6; 83:8; 85:4-15; IIIBar 4:3-5; 5:3; 10:1-5; 17:4; Vita 29:7-10; 42:1ff; 48:3; IVMacc 7:18-19; 9:9; 10:11,15; 12:12-15,19; 13:15,17; 16:25; 17:12,18; 18:3,5,17-19,23-24. Typical of these authors are WisdSol and PsSol in referring to heaven and hell, or approximations thereof (WisdSol 1:14-15; 2:22-24; 3:1,4-8,10,18; 5:1,4-5,15-16; 6:18-19; 8:17; 10:14; 12:26-27; 15:2-3; PsSol 3:16; 14:2-3,7) but in stressing with equal or perhaps greater force the inevitability of justice vindicated within the earthly sphere. Thus WisdSol shows (16:1 - 19:22; cf. also 4:18-19; 10:4,6,19; 11:5-16; 12:4-6,16,23-27) in an extended development how the Egyptians worshiped animals and were punished by the same, while Israel was benefited by animals, i.e., the quail; the Egyptians were plagued by darkness, while Israel enjoyed light; the Egyptians planned to kill the Israelites, but were themselves killed, and so forth. Likewise PsSol hold that judgment upon Pompey (cf. Gray's footnote in Charles, A&P II, 633; Ryle and James, Psalms, xl-xli) was in terms of strict retribution, his humiliation commensurate with his insolence (2:30-31); that the wicked will be spoiled as were the righteous (4:16-25); that whereas the righteous are chastened for good, the wicked suffer rather for evil and not for their benefit (13:1-11). Cf. further references to retributive justice in PsSol 2:7,17,24-41; 3:4-5,11-15; 4:26-28; 6:5-8; 8:38; 9:9; 12:4-7; 15:6-8; 17:6,10,17-21.

wrongs are set right and God is vindicated in his judgment. IEn almost entirely postpones retribution until the afterlife;[1] IIEn tells of retribution in this life, but in the same breath speaks of eternal dimensions of retribution as well,[2] showing us where he really expects to find the outworking of justice, in his doctrine of heaven and hell.[3] IVEz shares this stress on heaven and hell,[4] but with a difference: heaven, if attained, is a gift rather than an accomplishment,[5] for if it were a matter of just deserts all would be consigned to hell, as most shall in any event.[6] Retributive justice is scarcely mentioned by IVEz as a factor in earthly life; instead, punishments will be meted out in the resurrection.

By way of summary, then, it seems that although the inter-Testament writers stress the transcendence and power of God, attributing to him foreknowledge and sometimes the power of predestination, they nevertheless shrink back from asserting any causative connection between God and evil; indeed, the tendency is to emphasize God's transcendence partly in reaction against connecting the holy God with a sinful world. Instead, a

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1. Retribution is recognized to be the Law of God (IEn 95:3,7; 104:3), but there is considerably more interest shown in its outworking in heaven (IEn 22:1-14; 25:5-6; 26:1 - 27:3; 37:4; 39:4-9; 41:1-2; 45:3-6; 48:1; 50:1 - 51:5; 58:3-6; 60:23; 61:1-13; 62:13-16; 71:11; 81:7-9; 90:28-36; 91:16-17) and hell (entirely retributive in character, and mentioned approximately twice as often - IEn 5:5; 10:1-16; 12:5-6; 13:1-6,9; 14:4-14; 16:4; 18:9 - 19:3; 21:1-10; 26:1 - 27:3; 38:2-6; 41:1-2; 45:2,6; 46:6; 48:7-10; 50:1 - 51:5; 53:1 - 54:6; 55:3 - 56:4; 56:8; 62:11-12; 63:1,8,10,12; 64:1-2; 65:11; 67:4-13; 80:8; 81:7-9; 90:24-27; 91:7-9,11,19; 97:1-2; 100:9; 102:3; 103:5-8; 108:3-6,15). In the rather confusing passage about Sheol (IEn 22:1-14) it seems that only those who have not suffered sufficiently for their sins in the present life will be resurrected to suffer further in the next (22:11,13).
2. IIEn 60:1-5 - "and there is no cure for him for all time."
3. Heaven, IIEn 8:1-8; 9:1; 22:6-7; 23:4-5; 32:1; 42:3; 43:3; 48:8-9; 50:5; 52:16; 55:2; 56:2; 58:6; 61:2-3; 65:7-10; 66:6. Hell, IIEn 7:1-3; 10:1-6; 23:4-5; 40:12 - 42:2; 58:6; 60:3-4; 61:2-3; 63:3-4.
4. Heaven, IVEz 4:8,26-27; 6:25-28; 7:13,16,26-42,50,74-106,119-126; 8:52-54; 10:44,49-50,55-57; 13:12-13; 14:34-35. Hell, IVEz 4:8,41-43; 7:31-42,75-101,104-106,119-126; 9:1-12; 13:12-13,56.
5. In the case of Ezra himself, IVEz 8:47-49; for the nations, 3:35-36.
6. E.g., IVEz 8:1-3, and often elsewhere.

utilitarian connection is usually taught: God employs existing evil, however that evil may have been brought into being, for good purposes - to discipline the righteous, and to punish evildoers. Full justice will be done by God, and unrequited evils will be fully compensated, whether in this life or in the life to come.

Our second principal question is whether evil is considered by the A&P to be demonic in origin. And to begin with, we note the connection between the doctrine of God's transcendence and the rise of demonology; demons, like angels,[1] are to be understood as part of the movement to remove God to a trans-mundane world, and to fill the gap with lesser and intermediary beings. It is quite understandable that beings occupying this inferior position should be required to shoulder the blame for what the inter-Testamental writers were unwilling to attribute to God.

The A&P contain five extended treatments of demons and demonology. We will consider these first, and then move on to the miscellaneous statements that are found here and there, which are not supported by as elaborate a speculative framework.

Jub teaches that evil originates in the demonic sphere, and names the demonic leader as Mastema;[2] the teaching is deduced from an interpretation of Gen 6:1-4. The author, exercising his editorial judgment, adds nothing to the account of events in the Garden of Eden, and when he comes to the story of Cain and Abel he not only adds nothing new, but goes further and excises considerable detail from it.[3] The contrasting elaborateness of the additions to and deductions from Gen 6:1-4 should alert us to the quarter from which to expect an explanation for evil.

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1. Cf. above, 76-77. On demonology and its rise in the A&P, cf. Russell, Method and Message, 254ff; Danielou, Jewish Christianity, 187-192.
2. Jub 10:7,11; 11:5,51; 17:16; 18:9,12; 19:28; 48:2-4,9,12,15-16; 49:2. This leader also appears under the name Beliar (Jub 1:20; 15:33) and Satan (23:29; 40:9; 46:2), though positive identification of these variously named spirits as one cannot be considered certain.
3. Jub 4:2-6; cf. Gen 4:3-16.

The original authors of evil are the Watchers, who were angelic beings sent by God "that they should instruct the children of men, and that they should do judgment and uprightness on the earth."[1] But this high purpose did not long occupy the Watchers;[2] the full story is told in the fifth chapter.[3] The Watchers lusted after women, and took human wives, from whom were born giants;[4] progressively, "all flesh" became corrupt, including the animal kingdom, and "every imagination" of man became "evil continually."[5] Hence God's judgment was issued in wrath: he commanded the "binding" of the angels,[6] limited the length of human life to 120 years,[7] caused the giants to slay one another before their fathers' eyes,[8] and ordered the Watchers to be bound, awaiting judgment.[9]

The Watchers reappear in the eighth chapter, and the extent of their responsibility for evil becomes clearest here. Jub seems to teach that the effect of the Flood had been to cleanse humanity and the earth from sin in literal fact, and to restore its purity as it had been before the descent of the Watchers and the fall of Adam:[10]

> And (God) made for all his works a new and righteous nature, so that they should not sin in their whole nature for ever, but should be all righteous each in his kind alway.

When evil begins to creep back onto the human scene, Noah blames it on the demons.[11] But man is not really in deep moral trouble until after he

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1. Jub 4:15.
2. Jub 4:22.
3. The parallel account in Jub 7 adds little more than details: the names of three orders of the giants are given (7:22), and the Flood is added to the account as the penalty for human sin (7:25).
4. Jub 5:1.
5. Jub 5:2; cf. Gen 6:5.
6. Jub 5:6.
7. Jub 5:8.
8. Jub 5:7,9.
9. Jub 5:10.
10. Jub 5:12. Charles admittedly regards this as a corruption in tense (A&P II, 20), but offers little support for his contention except to suppose that it could not be the right tense, therefore was not - a rather arbitrary procedure. Littmann (in Kautzsch, A&P II, 49) allows this to pass without comment on a supposed corruption in tense. Cf. also a similar teaching in IEn 10:16ff; 106:13-17. Charles, more plausibly here, refers the references of 10:16ff to the messianic future; even so, the reference to the distant future does not seem certain.
11. Jub 4:26-27.

is put back in touch with the Watchers through a writing that even the Flood could not erase.[1] Despite the recorded jealousies and cursings that intervene,[2] this is the first time since the Flood that anybody is specifically said to have sinned.

So the Watchers are considered to be the originators of evil; its continuers, however, are the demons. One might conclude from the first two occasions on which they are mentioned that they were no longer to be a factor in human affairs after their destruction by the sword[3] and flood.[4] But, so far from this being the case, we almost immediately find Noah speaking of their continuing influence.[5] Their full story is contained in the prayer offered by Noah, and the response by God,[6] where we learn that the demons are children of the Watchers, that they exercise malignant sway over the living, and that they are under God's control. But when God commands that all of them should be bound, their leader, Mastema, alleges inability to exercise his rightful sway over humanity without their help, and God relents to the extent of allowing to him one tenth of their number, meanwhile sending angels to teach Noah and his children the proper magical formulae for controlling demons. The remaining references to demons[7] do nothing to alter this impression of them as the continuers of the evil originally set in motion by the Watchers.

Jub does not name a leader of the Watchers, nor does it find a "Satan" in the Garden of Eden; we have already observed that there is no elaboration of the Eden account, and we might add here that although the author knows the language of demonology[8] he specifically avoids it in

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1. Jub 8:3-4.
2. Jub 7:10-15,26-27.
3. Jub 5:9-10.
4. Jub 7:21-25.
5. Jub 7:27.
6. Jub 10:1-14.
7. Jub 15:31-32; 20:5; 22:17; 29:9-11. The last is a reference to the Rephaim, who, owing to their malignancy, their gigantic size, and their destruction by the Lord seem probably demonic. Cf. above, 16, fn. 4.
8. There are two references to the spirit of Beliar (Jub 1:20; 15:33) and three to "Satans," (Jub 23:29; 40:9; 46:2), in addition to the references cited above.

his retelling of the Eden narrative. The serpent is simply a serpent, and nothing more; once again, our attention is directed ahead, to the section dealing with Genesis 6.

The leader of the demonic forces is known as Mastema;[1] he is the prince of the demonic offspring of the Watchers,[2] and has a necessary function to perform in perverting mankind.[3] His activity seems to come to a peak with the Exodus. He (instead of Jahweh) seeks to slay Moses;[4] he withstands Moses and helps the Egyptian sorcerers;[5] he incites the Egyptians to pursue the Israelites.[6] But although he takes particular delight in opposing Israel, he is also the common enemy of all mankind, for it is by his power that the first-born of the Egyptians are slain.[7] He is subject to God's pleasure, and is in and out of bonds depending on whether his liberty will serve God's purposes.[8]

By contrast with Jub, our second extensive demonology, found in the TestXIIPat, while admittedly "vast,"[9] does not alleviate human responsibility for sin. The doctrine of the Watchers and their demonic descendants is known,[10] but it will be observed that even when they enter the discussion man is considered equally responsible with the Watchers for his actions. There are also passages in which references to the demonic host attendant upon and subservient to Beliar show acquaintance with some form of assumed demonology, not explicitly set forth.[11]

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1. The name means "enmity;" cf. Charles, A&P II, 28. In one place Mastema seems to be identified with Satan: Jub 10:11.
2. Jub 10:8.
3. Jub 10:7-9. We find him corrupting the builders of Ur (11:5); attempting to ruin Nahor's crops (11:11; cf. Mk 4:15 and par. where Satan, variously named, takes away the seed); inciting the Lord to permit Abraham's temptation (17:16). Abraham promises Jacob that "the spirits of Mastema shall not rule over thee....(19:28)."
4. Jub 48:2-3.
5. Jub 48:9.
6. Jub 48:12.
7. Jub 49:2.
8. Jub 48:15-18.
9. Charles, A&P II, 296.
10. T.Reub 5:5-7 (cf. IIBar 56:10-13; ICor 11:10), where women are blamed for alluring the Watchers; TNaph 3:5, where they are described as changing their natures contrary to God's will.
11. TLev 3:3; 18:12; TDan 1:7; 3:3,6; 5:5-6; 6:4-5.

The TestXIIPat have nearly forty references to the demonic leader, whose usual designation, though he is known by other names,[1] is Beliar.[2] But despite this frequent mention of Beliar, the Testaments stress and underscore human responsibility. The real battlefield on which the issues of good and evil are decided is the human heart, and though the spirits of good and evil are participants in the battle, the final responsibility is with man. This dualism of good and evil emerges with particular clarity in several passages;[3] it shows that, unlike our other works with a large demonology, TestXIIPat explains evil in terms of the evil yetzer.[4]

In the Enoch literature we find the most elaborately developed demonology of the A&P. In IEn there are five orders of demonic beings: the Watchers, or the fallen angels, which seem to be synonymous terms;[5] the Shepherds, who seem to be an angelic order corrupted by a different fall;[6] the Giants, or demons, the offspring of the illicit unions between the fallen Watchers and their human consorts;[7] the Satans, concerning which

1. The Prince of Deceit (TSim 2:7; TJud 19:4); the devil (TNaph 8:4,6); Satan (TDan 3:6; 5:6; 6:1-3; TAsh 6:4).
2. Cf., e.g., TReub 6:3 (over frequent meetings with women are "a destruction of Beliar,") but if a man does not succumb to fornication (TReub 4:11) Beliar cannot overcome him. Armies are prepared to take vengeance on him and his company (TLev 3:3); he will be banished from the Messianic Kingdom (TJud 25:3) and men will be delivered from him at that time (TZeb 9:8). A soul continually disturbed is the place of Beliar's rule (TDan 4:7), but Beliar flees from those who are obedient to the Lord (TDan 5:1) or helped by the Messiah (TDan 5:10-11). The heart that inclines to the evil yetzer is ruled by Beliar (TAsh 1:8), and the double-minded man pleases him (TAsh 3:2), inasmuch as Beliar's own works are twofold and without singleness (TBenj 6:7). Fear of God and love of one's neighbor are the best antidote against the spirits of Beliar (TBenj 3:3-4).
3. TLev 19:1; TNaph 2:6; 3:1; TAsh 1:8; 3:2; TBenj 6:1,7.
4. Cf. above, 71ff.
5. Referred to as Watchers in IEn 1:5; 10:7ff; 12:3-6; 13:10; 14:1-7; 15:2 - 16:4; as angels in 6:2ff; 10:7ff; 19:1-2; 56:5; 64:1-2; 65:6; 67:4, 6-7,11-12; 68:2-5; 84:4; 106:13-17. In addition, the same order seems to be referred to in 39:1 (cf. Charles' footnote ad loc.); as "the hosts of Azazel" in 54:5 and 55:4; under the guise of "stars" in 86:1 - 88:3; 90:21,24; and in 100:4.
6. IEn 89:59 - 90:5; 90:13-15.
7. IEn 7:3-6; 9:9; 10:7ff; 12:6; 14:6-7; 15:3,8-12; 16:1; 106:17; and under the guise of "elephants, camels and asses" in 86:4 - 88:3; 89:6. These beings are legitimate children of neither the earthly nor heavenly world, but partake of the worst of both (IEn 15:8-12).

too little is said to be certain that they are actually demonic;[1] and the Sirens, who are the human wives of the Watchers, transmuted into demonic form.[2] The leader of the forces of evil, in contrast with Jub, is set at the head of the fallen angels instead of the demons; he is referred to as either Semjaza[3] or Azazel.[4]

Part of this complexity is no doubt due to the conflation of various sources into one account;[5] in the composite picture as we have it, the story of the Watchers and their descendants emerges as an explanation for the origin of evil.[6] Two points deserve to be stressed here: first, the difference from Jub regarding the purpose of the Watchers' descent,[7] and second, the comprehensiveness of the catalogue of sins attributed to the demonic beings, encompassing war, fornication, the use of cosmetics, and murder, not to mention astrology and enchantments, which may be intended to direct our attention to the demons as the source of all evils.[8] Moreover, we are bidden to ascribe all sin to Azazel.[9]

The place of demons in this system is set forth in a summary which attributes to them all the woes of mankind.[10] This accords well with the viewpoint of Jub on the origin and function of the demonic; here again, as in Jub, the demons continue their activities after their destruction in the Flood,[11] while the Watchers are no longer on the human scene.[12] We

1. They may correspond to Satan in Job, as simple heavenly accusers; cf. IEn 40:7; 53:3; 54:6; 65:6, and Charles' note (A&P II, 211), identifying the Satans with the angels of punishment (IEn 56:1; 62:11; 63:1; 66:1) with more confidence than seems warranted, and also finding a list of the Satans in IEn 69:4ff. Cf. also his note, ibid., 439.
2. IEn 19:2; 96:2. Cf. SibOr 5:457.
3. IEn 6:3,7; 8:3; 9:7; 10:11; 69:2. On these names, cf. ibid., 191.
4. IEn 6:7; 8:1; 9:6; 10:4-6,8; 13:1; 54:5; 55:4; 69:2. In one other place (69:4) the name of this leader is given as "Jequon."
5. Ibid., 168-170.
6. The angels lust after women (IEn 6:2; 106:14) and two hundred of them (IEn 6:6-8) take the oath administered by their leader that they will sin together (IEn 6:3-4; 69:4). On earth, they take human wives and teach them magical arts (IEn 7:1-2; 86:3-4; 106:14; 69:5ff), and the gigantic children of these unions despoil mankind (IEn 7:3; 86:4-5; 106:17).
7. Jub 4:15; cf. Charles, ibid., 191.
8. IEn 8:1-4.
9. IEn 10:8.
10. IEn 15:2 - 16:4.
11. IEn 10:9-15; 15:10 - 16:1.
12. IEn 10:3-5; 10:12.

note again that in contrast with Jub, the named leader of the demonic host is over the Watchers instead of the demons.[1]

Very important for later times is the angelic order of the Shepherds, who were sent down for the guidance of the nations, but who perverted their ways and acted contrary to God's intentions.[2] The significance of this appears in the idea of angels who rule over the world with malign influence,[3] a notion important for the Gnostics, and one whose echoes are heard as well in Pl.

IIEn both resembles and differs from IEn in its demonology. In IIEn the demons seem to be identified with an angelic order imprisoned in the second heaven, whose prince is imprisoned in the fifth heaven.[4] The gigantic children born from the unions of three of the Watchers with women do not seem to be connected with the angelic order of the second heaven;[5] the latter are apparently supposed to be an inferior angelic order who followed Satanail and the Grigori into sin.[6] No particular consequence seems to follow upon the birth of the giants, and we note with surprise that no demonic spirits seem to be at large in this book: all are imprisoned.[7] This alerts us to the possibility that beings "imprisoned" in the

1. Cf. above, 89. 2. IEn 89 - 90.
3. On the angelic rulers of the nations, cf. Russell, Method and Message, 244-249; on the fall of angels and the origin of evil, cf. ibid., 249-254, and Reicke, Disobedient Spirits, 76.
4. IIEn 7:1-3. This prince is evidently to be identified with Satanail, who is also the prince of the Grigori (IIEn 18:3); the latter are apparently identical with the Watchers (IIEn 18:4).
5. IIEn 18:5.
6. Charles (A&P II, 440) considers this a more difficult view than his own, though he finds it "very attractive." But the identification he insists upon between the Watchers and the angels of the second heaven does not seem to me to be as clear as C supposes. Cf. also his note, ibid., 447. My own feeling is that the second angelic order may represent an effort to harmonize with the "Shepherds" of IEn 89:59 - 90:5; 90:13-25. The latter are evidently a different order from the Watchers, yet angelic.
The order of corruption would therefore seem to be first, the fall of Satanail (IIEn 18:3; 29:4-5); second, the fall of the Grigori (IIEn 18:3-5); third, and perhaps contemporaneously with the fall of the Grigori, the fall of the angels of the second heaven (IIEn 7:3; 18:6-7; 31:4-6).
7. IIEn 7; 18; 29:4-5.

heavenly spheres may at the same time exercise influence on men in spheres still lower.[1]

Comparing the two books of Enoch, we discover a growing stress on the importance of Satan: in IEn he is less significant in human affairs, since he is imprisoned,[2] and the real work done among men is by the demons.[3] In IIEn, while still regarded as imprisoned,[4] Satan at the same time takes personal part in the effort to corrupt mankind,[5] and is thought to have himself fallen before the creation of man.[6] The demonic motivation in both works is variously described as lust,[7] self-will[8] and envy.[9] The responsibility of man in relation to the demonic responsibility is not clearly marked out. Man's responsibility is once stressed in IEn, contrary to the general drift of the rest of the book.[10] In IIEn, demonic responsibility for human corruption receives strong emphasis,[11] but with a qualification: whereas humanity sins, Adam himself is not corrupted, but Eve alone;[12] moreover, God's curse applies not to man, but to the ignorance of man;[13] further, there is obviously an antidote to ignorance in the writings of Enoch, so that ignorance is no longer an excuse.[14]

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1. Satanail is in chains in IIEn 7:3; 18:3. In 29:4-5, he is said to be cast out of the height with his angels (cf. 31:4). But this imprisonment leaves him with enough liberty to attempt the corruption of man (IIEn 31:6; cf. IEn 56:5, where wicked angels are said to "return," and also Rev 20:7-8). On Satan's imprisonment in the air above the abyss, cf. Eph 2:2; 6:12. There are Greek parallels for this idea of the air as the home of the demons; cf. Langton, Demonology, 97ff.
2. IEn 10:4ff; 13:1ff; 14:4ff; 19:1-2.
3. IEn 15:8ff.
4. IIEn 7:3; 18:3; 29:4-5.
5. IIEn 31:5-6. The "fall" of the first pair in the Garden of Eden is not part of the IEn tradition.
6. His fall was on the first day of creation (IIEn 29:1-5); contrast Vita 13:1 - 16:1, and IEn 6:1ff, where angelic corruption depends on the prior existence of man.
7. IEn 6:2; 106:14; IIEn 18:4.
8. IEn 68:4-5; IIEn 7:3; 18:3; contrast IIEn 22:6-7.
9. IIEn 31:3; cf. WisdSol 2:24; Vita 16:3.
10. IEn 98:4-5; otherwise we could confidently blame all sin on the demons.
11. IIEn 31:4-6.
12. IIEn 31:6.
13. IIEn 31:7.
14. IIEn 53:1,4 - "And now, my children, do not say: 'Our father is standing before God, and is praying for our sins,' for there is there no helper of any man who has sinned....mark well all the words of your father, that I tell you, lest you regret, saying: 'Why did our father not tell us?'"

IIEn thus sets man free for choice between the Two Ways.[1]

The Books of Adam and Eve further the tendency to increase the importance of Satan. Satan does have a demonic following,[2] banished with him from the heights of heaven. But these are mere accessories to a Satan who in this literature really comes into his own. Having enjoyed his first success before the story is taken up, he is now proceeding to the further corruption of humankind.[3] In the Latin Vita Eve succumbs to his guiles,[4] and then falls weeping and groaning, asking the devil, "Why dost thou attack us for no cause?"[5] The devil responds at length with the story of his own fall. Adam was responsible for it,[6] for when he had first been made the angels had been bidden to worship him;[7] Satan and his angels, however, had refused on grounds that he was a younger and therefore an inferior being.[8] When pressed, Satan resolved to set his throne "above the stars of heaven and be like the Highest."[9] Thereupon the Lord banished Satan and his angels from heaven, hurling them down to the earth;[10] it was from envy of Adam's luxury in the Garden,[11] as well as from his initial hatred of him, that Satan attacked Adam through Eve, with success.[12] The devil vanishes when Adam prays.[13]

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1. IIEn 30:15; cf. TLev 19:11; TJud 20:1-3; TAsh 1:3-9; 2:1-10.
2. Vita 15:1; 16:1.
3. He prepares himself for this by transforming himself "into the brightness of angels," (Vita 9:1-5) and appears "shedding big teardrops;" (Slav Vita 23:1); his footprints are said to be visible (SlavVita 39:1).
4. Vita 10:1-4; Eve does not succumb in the SlavVita 39-40.
5. Vita 11:1-3.
6. Vita 12.
7. Vita 13:1-2.
8. Vita 14:1 - 15:1.
9. Vita 15:2-3.
10. Vita 16:1.
11. Vita 16:2-4.
12. Vita 17:2-3. As the whole story is re-told on Adam's deathbed, the temptation took place in the absence of both Adam and the guardian angels (Vita 33:1-3; ApocMos 7:2-3; 17:1). Against its better judgment, a male serpent agreed to be the vehicle of temptation (ApocMos 15:2 - 16:5), and assuming this form (or is it the form of an angel? cf. ApocMos 17:1) the devil represented God's motive in denying the forbidden fruit as being envy (ApocMos 18:1-6). After the devil had poured lust upon the fruit, Eve ate (ApocMos 19:1-3). The devil's eloquence tempted Adam through the mouth of Eve (ApocMos 21:3). When God confronts Eve, she blames her transgression on the serpent (ApocMos 23:5), who in turn is condemned, not for being the tempter, but for becoming "a thankless vessel." (ApocMos 26:1).

We are clearly in a different world from that of the literature thus far considered, except for a brief passage from IIEn. The elaborate attribution of motive, the descriptions of appearance, and the long conversations move us into contact with a Satan who is more like his rabbinic and mediaeval counterpart than the Satan of the rest of the A&P and of the NT. For our purpose, the important thing to note is the diminution of human responsibility, as Satan's is increased. Evil is really Satan's fault, from before the time when man was set on earth, indeed, before any time that man can recall.[1] Although man is responsible for his sin and must pay for it,[2] the greater share of the blame rests on the devil.

Before considering the more miscellaneous and less systematic references to demons in the A&P, one major work should be mentioned as exceptional in that it does not mention demons or Satan. IVEz knows of angels, of the fall of man, of visions, in short of the whole structure of thought predicated by the Enochic and to some extent the Adamic literature. The absence of references to demons and Satan is therefore surely significant. This accords well with IVEz's stress on human responsibility.[3]

A large volume of references to demons in the A&P, while unsystematic, helps fill out the picture to some extent. SibOr makes one reference to Sirens,[4] and uses the name Beliar in one passage.[5] The naive demonology of Tobit features the demon Asmodaeus.[6] Judith refers once to the "sons of the Titans."[7] IBar evidently has the sixth chapter of Genesis in mind in one passage.[8] WisdSol refers to the giants of old,[9] and in a passage

1. Vita 13:1-2.
2. Vita 34:1-2; ApMos 8:1-2.
3. Cf. below, 114-115.
4. SibOr 5:457; cf. IEn 19:2; 96:2.
5. SibOr 3:63-76; Beliar is a name appropriate to one who brings disaster and deceives many, perhaps Nero. Cf. Lancaster in Charles, A&P II, 380.
6. Bousset (Religion, 332, fn. 1) suggests parallels with the Persian Ashema Daeva. Asmodaeus has slain seven previous husbands of Tobias' bride-to-be (3:8), but Raphael comes to her aid (3:17), and by the magical properties of a great fish caught by young Tobias (6:8) drives out the demon (6:14-18; 8:2-3).
7. Judith 16:7.
8. IBar 3:26-28.
9. WisdSol 14:6.

already cited refers to the envy of the devil as the means by which death entered the world.[1] One reference to the serpent in PsSol may have Satan in view.[2] Taxo, in AssMos,[3] aspires to be the means by which the Messianic Kingdom is brought in when "Satan shall be no more...." IIBar has two references with demonic implications, the second of which is significant in attributing responsibility for the fall of the angels to human beings.[4] IIIBar, perhaps intentionally and perhaps through confusion, deals with the builders of the Tower of Babel in such a way as to remind us of the monstrous demonic offspring of the Watchers.[5] The devil in III Bar appears under the name of Sammael.[6]

The MartIs confronts us with a confusing array of demonic names. What emerges clearly is that Manasseh is possessed and controlled by demonic influence, specifically by "Beliar, whose name is Matanbuchus."[7] This short work constitutes a strong witness to the belief in Satanic possession found also in the NT.

On the strength of these statements about the demons, their origin and history, and their continuing work, it seems possible without forcing

1. WisdSol 2:24. Metzger (Introduction to the Apocrypha, 74) believes that this represents the beginning of sin as well as of death, and says, "This appears to be the first time in Jewish literature that such a conception is expressed."
2. PsSol 4:11; cf. Ryle and James, Psalms, 45.
3. AssMos 10:1.
4. The first mentions Sirens, Lilin and Shedim (IIBar 10:8). The second is IIBar 56:10-13; cf. TReub 5:6-7.
5. IIIBar 2:3,6-7; 3:3-5. Hughes suggests (Charles, A&P II, 534) that their appearance may indicate that they have been turned into demons. There is clear reference to the destruction of the gigantic children of the Watchers, but this is undoubtedly a Christian interpolation (IIIBar 4:10).
6. IIIBar 4:8,16-17; he carries out the temptation through motives of envy, and by means of the vine, which had previously been cursed by God. The waxing and waning of the moon is explained by its having watched while Sammael talked with the serpent (IIIBar 9:7).
7. MartIs 2:4; cf. a further reference to Mechembechus (=Matanbuchus) in 5:3. We also find the names of Sammael, abiding in Manasseh so that Manasseh served Satan and his powers (2:1-2; cf. an additional reference to Satan at 2:7); also, Sammael Malchira and Beliar (1:8-9; 3:11).

to come to some conclusions about the significance of the demonic for the A&P as an explanation of the origin of evil. First, it is evident that a real attempt is being made to deal with the origin of evil. Second, the systematic presentations of demonic teaching tend to stress either the third or the sixth chapter of Genesis as source material; a stress on the former accords well with a larger sense of human responsibility for evil, as well as greater importance assigned to the work of Satan, while stress on the latter may increase the responsibility of the demonic horde almost to the point of excluding human responsibility for the origin of evil. Third, as the demonic responsibility is thought to increase, the possibility of considering God as the origin of evil recedes further into the background. It would seem quite fair to the A&P to say that some of the inter-Testament writers definitely felt that evil originated with the demons.

We come, finally, to the view expressed with varying degrees of certitude that man is himself responsible for the origin of evil. But first, mention must be made of how the new individualism of the Hellenistic world confronts us in this literature as it applies to our subject. For the view taken of man will naturally have an effect upon the question of whether evil can appropriately be considered his responsibility.

Some of our authors show themselves to be true children of the OT in their view of man. Man in general, and often more particularly the Jews and groups within the Jewish nation, is regarded from a corporative standpoint that we have seen to be characteristic of OT thought.[1] But at

1. Cf. above, 24-25. In the A&P, Tobit (8:3-5) and IBar (3:5-8) both uncomplainingly regard themselves as victims of their fathers' sins; Jub (40:9) reports the sanctification of the whole of Egypt during Joseph's ascendancy; in TestXIIPat tribal destinies affect individual lives (e.g., TReub 6:5; TSim 5:4-6; TLev 10:3-4; TJud 17:2 - 18:1; TIss 6:1-2; TZeb ch. 9; TDan 5:4ff; TNaph ch. 4; TGad 8:2; TAsh 7:2-3; TBen 9:1-2); after forty days of registration nonstop conducted "in bitter haste," the roll of the

same time, this stress on humanity as bound by the group raises ethical problems for one who is beginning to think individualistically.[1] Some such struggles are seen in the authors of the A&P. Whatever the significance of group relationships, there must be room for personal responsibility: this is the teaching of Sirach.[2] Man's own initiative is underscored in the choice proposed by Levi:[3]

> And now, my children, ye have heard all; choose, therefore, for yourselves either the light or the darkness, either the law of the Lord or the works of Beliar.

IIBar asserts the righteousness of some, while admitting the apostasy of the many,[4] on the ground of free choice just as unfettered as Adam's:[5]

> For though Adam first sinned
> And brought untimely death upon all,

faithful Jews was still not completed (IIIMacc 4:15), whereas the defectors numbered only three hundred (IIIMacc 7:15); owing to the unbreakable solidarity of the nation, the innocent suffered with the guilty, the sins of Israelites in Assyrian and Babylonian captivity causing suffering for the Israelites in Jerusalem (IIBar 77:4-10).

With regard to this whole subject, we note a correspondence and a contrast here to the Greek habit of regarding men as "members" of their city, the incapacity of the Greeks to think nationally, and the collapse of the Greek city-state and the Hellenic world with the rise of Hellenistic empire. The Hebrew achievement of nationhood is allied to its abstraction from locality and political structure, and its identification with a religion of a type not bound up in local cultus; this is a very different basis for nationhood from the Greek city-state. The Hebrew concept of identity, whether corporate or individualistic, is therefore different from the Greek view. Part of Judaism's appeal to the lost individual in the fragmented Hellenistic world must have been its stance as a "nation" within the Empire, an identity amid impersonalism, transcending human barriers in a true internationalism. We observe, further, that the "Greek" philosophies of Stoicism and Epicureanism likewise have individualistic as well as corporative implications in their view of man, and that both of them are Hellenistic developments, rather than belonging to classical pre-Alexandrian Greece.

1. Of course, OT doctrine as well recognizes within the family and tribal unit the existence of the individual in his own right, and shouldering his own responsibility. Cf. Moses, Joshua, the prophets, etc. Solidarity must not be over-stressed at the expense of the individual in assessing the OT view of sin; however, this sense of group-oriented responsibility is strange to the Western mind, and hence is to be kept prominently in view. Because of the factor of group responsibility, the individual is seen from a different angle in their world than in ours; his moral posture is differently assessed.
2. Sir 15:14-17,20.
3. TLev 19:1; cf. also TSim 3:5-6; TNaph 3:1.
4. IIBar 18:2; 21:11. 5. IIBar 54:15,19.

> Yet of those who were born from him
> Each one of them has prepared for his own soul torment to come,
> And again each one of them has chosen for himself glories to come....
> Adam is therefore not the cause, save only of his own soul,
> But each of us has been the Adam of his own soul.

The individual in IVMacc is perfectly capable of mastering sin through the employment of divine Reason.[1] And individualism culminates in IVEz, with an eloquent argument against the idea that individual men seem to count for nothing in the divine scheme; IVEz cares very much about the individual soul, and objects to what seems to him a certain callousness on God's part, while insisting on the reality and meaningfulness of human choices:[2]

> Individual men of note indeed thou mayst find to have kept thy precepts; but nations thou shalt not find.
> O Lord my Lord, lo, thou hast ordained in thy Law that the righteous shall inherit these things, but that the ungodly shall perish. The righteous, therefore, can endure the narrow things because they hope for the wide; those, however, who have done wickedly endure the narrow things, but yet shall not see the wide.
> And I saw, and spared (some) with very great difficulty, and saved me a grape out of a cluster, and a plant out of a great forest. Perish, then, the multitude which has been born in vain; but let my grape be preserved, and my plant, which with much labour I have perfected!

This new view of the individual's importance found its clearest and most eloquent expression in the outcry against the suffering of the righteous. We have already seen something of the A&P view of the OT doctrine of retributive justice;[3] the difficulty many of our authors have with it is that it does not seem to work. It did not work on an individual basis; the OT pre-exilic world-view, limited by the tribe and by national boundaries, was part of an age long past. Moreover, the nation had likewise suf-

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1. E.g., IVMacc 2:18; 14:2.
2. IVEz 5:36; 7:17-18; 9:21-22. In the second passage cited, IVEz argues against the unfairness of requiring that a man go through the sorrows of this life if he is destined for hell, since God has alleged that the sorrows of this life are a portal of heaven for the elect, while, as Ezra observes, the non-elect must go through them too. In the third passage, God is speaking, and the apparent basis on which he has made selection of the elect has been individual rather than corporate or national.
3. Cf. above, 86-88.

fered disastrous reverses. It was all very well to say, "It is not in our hands to explain either the prosperity of the wicked or the chastisements of the righteous,"[1] but not all were content with this as a final solution. Despite his firm belief in retributive justice,[2] Sirach witnesses to the mental stress in contemporary minds:[3]

> Mock not the dress of the wretched,
> And scoff not at those whose day is bitter....
> For two things my heart is grieved,
> And for a third cometh wrath upon me:
> A man of war suffering on account of poverty,
> Men of understanding who suffer contempt,
> (And) one that turneth from righteousness to sin....

And many who followed Sirach felt a similar tension. Their typical solution appears in their doctrine of life after death; in this after-life, all unjust suffering could be recompensed, all unatoned sin fulsomely repaid.[4]

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1. PirAb 4:19.
2. Sir 1:13; 2:10; 3:26-28,31; 4:10,28; 5:3; 13:1; 16:12-14; 17:23; 20:18; 35:11; 38:15; 45:19.
3. Sir 11:4; 26:28.
4. IIMacc reverts with monotonous regularity to his doctrine of retributive justice (IIMacc 4:16,26,38,42; 5:9,17-18,20; 6:12-17; 7:18-19,31-38; 8:5-7,33-36; 9:5,18,28; 12:39-41; 13:4-8); his wretched villain is made to suffer appropriately before his death, from which there will be no resurrection (IIMacc 9:5ff; that there will be no resurrection for him, cf. 7:9). But for IIMacc, life is inadequate to reward his martyrs, and he permits them the hope of life everlasting to compensate their sufferings (IIMacc 7:9,11,14,23,29,36; cf. 12:43-45; 14:46). IEn postpones full retribution until the after-life, and in so doing complains eloquently in behalf of the righteous who suffer unrequited (22:6-7; 47:2; 53:7; 103:9-15, and often elsewhere). The righteous are delivered into the hand "of the lions...tigers...wild boars...to all the wild beasts" (89:63-68); they are mocked at by sinners (102:4-11). It is from this sad plight of the righteous that IEn turns to his doctrine of life after death, with the evident purpose of seeing justice done (cf. above, 88, fn. 1); even during the intermediate state the souls of men are sorted on the basis of the degree to which they have suffered or behaved meritoriously without receiving compensation due (22:8ff; cf. Charles' notes, A&P II, 203).

WisdSol gives up hope for the administration of justice here on earth, deferring until the afterlife the hopes of the righteous for vindication against those who "oppress the righteous poor," and "do not spare the widow," nor "reverence the hairs of the old man grey for length of years" (2:10; cf. also 2:11,17-20). The later section of WisdSol, however, picks up the theme of retributive justice again, and rehabilitates it in an earthly setting (10:4,6,14,19; 11:5-16; 12:4-6,15,23-27; 16:1 - 19:22). IIEn sees the righteous suffering unrecompensed (9:1), and bids them not to seek the justice which is their due, but to leave it to the Lord on the day of judgment (50:4). IIBar interprets suffering in a positive and disciplinary fashion (52:5), but admits to the Jews that "what ye have suffered is dis-

But even life after death offers no real consolation to IVEz, in whom we find a most anguished confrontation with the suffering of the righteous individual. His extended struggle with this problem can be summarized under four principal questions which he poses. He first asks the angel Uriel (a polite device for addressing to God things which could not be said to him directly) why God's chosen people should suffer while their enemies prosper;[1] only partly satisfied with the answer given, he presses on to ask why Israel, if she has deserved punishment, should have to suffer at the hands of her enemies rather than at the hand of God himself;[2] once again not entirely satisfied with the answer, Ezra presses the question of why God's people, suffering under their enemies, do not <u>now</u> inherit the world that was created for their sakes.[3] In reply to this question, the angel argues that owing to Adam's corruption of this world by sin, it is thenceforth simply the gate to the afterlife, and only those who suffer its rigors can inherit the blessings of heaven.[4]

Seizing upon this last point, Ezra justly observes that the unrighteous, too, go through the rigors of life, and yet for them this life is not a gateway to bliss but to punishment. Why then, he asks, having gone through this life, are they not saved as the righteous are?[5] And from this verse on we see that Ezra is almost equally concerned for the

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proportioned to what ye have done" (78:5). For him the answers will come at "the consummation of the times" (13:3-10; 41:4 - 42:2). The problem of the suffering righteous moved IIIBar to write his apocalypse (1:1-2).

1. IVEz 3:2,30; the angel replies that God's ways are inscrutable even when man can see them (4:1-11), and how much more are his secrets (4:12-21)! But, says Ezra, the suffering of Israel is not secret but visible (4:22-25; to which the angel responds that the solution of the problem lies in the next age, not in this (4:26-30), and that the benefits of the future far outweigh the woes of this life (4:30).
2. IVEz 5:23-30. The angel replies that Ezra should not represent himself as being more concerned over Israel than God is (5:33-34), and that God's ways are inscrutable (5:36-40). Ezra objects further the unfairness to the righteous who die without recompense, and the angel's reply reassures Ezra that they will be fully recompensed in the future life.
3. IVEz 6:59. IVEz 7:11-14.
5. IVEz 7:17-18.

suffering of the unrighteous as he is for that of the righteous. Against the arguments of the angel he keeps bewailing the loss of so many and the salvation of so few:[1]

> Nay, Lord God! but
> spare thy people,
> compassionate thine inheritance,
> for thou compassionatest thine own creation!

Here is a genuine concern for individual man which parallels that of the NT. No real answer to his problem is suggested by Ezra,[2] but the fact that he could feel as keenly as he did for the individual indicates a view of personality and personal responsibility distinct from OT thought. And man thus viewed may be held personally responsible for his sins.

In what sense, then, can man be held responsible for his own sin, and what part may he be said to have in the origin of evil? One suggestion tentatively put forward in the A&P is that evil may originate in the passions, or in a weakness of character - wine, women, lust, etc.[3] From a somewhat different slant than Sir, Jub admits the guilt of Reuben in uncovering his father's nakedness, but in excusing him on the ground of ignorance may be thought to suggest that ignorance itself is the origin of evil.[4] The TestXIIPat stress personal vices, tending to illustrate the moral from the lives of the Patriarchs themselves.[5] One passage in WisdSol

1. IVEz 8:45; cf. also 7:45-48,62-69,132-140; 8:4-19; 9:13-16.
2. W. D. Davies (PRJ, 63) says, "Far more human than the creed he professes, he agonizes over the fate of the majority of the human race, who on his theory are doomed to destruction (IVEz 7:62f.; cf. C. H. Dodd, 'The Mind of Paul,' in Ryl. Bull. vol. xvii, no 1, p. 36; G. H. Box, The Ezra-Apocalypse, p. xi). We feel that it was really cold comfort for him to know that it is fitting that, as in nature so in human affairs the many are lost and the few saved (IVEz 8:41f., 9:21)."
3. Sir 19:2-3.
4. Jub 33:16; cf. a similar excuse for Judah, Jub 41:25, and TJud 19:3.
5. Fornication is a favorite subject for denunciation (TReub 2:8; 3:3; 4:6 - 6:4; TSim 5:3; TLev 9:9; 14:5-8; TJud 14:1 - 15:3; 18:2-6); contrast the laudably utilitarian view of intercourse in TIss 2:3. There is also envy (TSim 2:7; 3:1-4; 4:8; TDan 1:3-6; 3:6; 4:6; 6:8), drunkenness (TJud 14:1 - 15:3; 16:1-5), love of money (TJud 18:2-6; 19:1-2), lying and anger (TDan 1:8; chh. 2 - 4; 5:1), and hatred (TGad 3:1 - 6:2).

might be taken to imply that sin originates with idolatry.[1] And the Apoc Mos suggests in Eve's account of the fall that lust may be regarded as the root of evils.[2]

A rather more concentrated effort seems to be made to link the origin of evil with man's ignorance.[3] Despite his discovery of the origin of evil in the doctrine of demons,[4] IIEn seems twice on the point of attributing its origin to ignorance.[5] IIBar appears in this connection as a negative witness - for he is concerned to deny that ignorance is any excuse, and to insist that every man sins knowingly and responsibly.[6] IVMacc finds divinely inspired Reason to be quite essential to the avoidance of sin,[7] and it would seem probable that for him ignorance would be a likely source of sin. But it would not be the original source; this would be, rather, the passions.[8]

Occasional attempts are made to concede human responsibility, but to avoid its full implications by transferring guilt from one person to another; this is suggested in one passage of Sirach,[9] and is found in profusion in the Adam literature, where Eve is blamed for the Fall.[10] There

1. WisdSol 14:12. The chapter continues with a listing of many sins which can be traced to the root-sin of idolatry, including murder, "frantic revels," adultery, theft, perjury, ingratitude, etc. (14:22-29).
2. ApMos 19:3. We have seen how the evil yetzer was closely identified with the sins of lust, the usual rabbinic interpretation of the Gen 3 account of the Fall; cf. above, 72.
3. Cf. Jub 33:16; 41:25; TJud 19:3.
4. Cf. above, 95-96.
5. IIEn 31:6; cf. also 30:16.
6. IIBar 15:3,5-6; cf. 48:40; 55:2.
7. Reason acts as arbiter of the passions (IVMacc 2:21-23); when reason is in control, the passions pose no problems (13:1; 2:18; 7:5; 11:21,25-27; 13:3,16; 15:11,23; 16:1,4; 18:1-2).
8. The passions are summed up in the two terms pleasure and pain; cf. IVMacc 1:20ff; 3:4-5.
9. Sir 25:24. This, as Pfeiffer remarks (History, 394), is the first doctrinal use of the Garden of Eden story. Cf. a similar dim view of women taken in TReub ch. 5.
10. Vita 3:2; 18:1; 33:2-3; 35:2-3; 44:2-5; ApMos 9:2; 14:2; 21:6; 23:4; SlavVit 28:2; 29:2; 35:1. A variation on the theme represents Eve as unfit because of her sin to offer prayer, and as receiving succor in her time of need only when the more righteous Adam prayed for her (Vita 19:2; 20:2; 21:2). But Adam too is unfit to pray (Vita 6:1) and sinful (Vita 8:2).

seems to be a hint that WisdSol may be trying to shift responsibility from Adam to Cain.[1] And there is one suggestion that the guilt of Adam is somehow shared with the tree from which he ate.[2] But these efforts at shifting the blame from one place to another do not seem to be taken very seriously even in these early times, so obviously are they involved in the fallacy of infinite regress.

The most coherent effort to explain the relationship between human responsibility and the fact of sin expressed in the A&P is phrased in the doctrine of the Two Ways, or of the good and evil yetzerim.[3] This idea looks back to OT statements like Jeremiah's: "Behold, I set before you the way of life and the way of death."[4] Acting on the suggestion implicit in these words, the writers of the A&P begin to evolve a theory of man's free choice between the two alternatives of good and evil. In parallel with this is the developing idea of two spirits which influence man in his choice: the evil yetzer is the earlier development,[5] but soon there is mention of a good yetzer as well.[6] The evil yetzer (imagination) finds its OT antecedent in the prologue to the Flood story:[7]

> The Lord saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually.

Its ultimate origin may well be in Jeremiah's teaching that "the heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately corrupt."[8] The Two Ways and the Two Spirits are complementary thoughts, signifying largely the same thing for human responsibility in the face of sin and evil.

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1. WisdSol 10:1-4.
2. IIIBar 4:8,16-17. Contrast ApMos 20:5, where instead of being the vine, the offending plant is the fig tree.
3. On this subject, cf. Porter, "The Yetzer Hara." For the substitution of yetzer for "heart" in Qumran, cf. Leaney, Rule, 167.
4. Jer 21:8; cf. Deut 30:15.
5. Sir 37:3.
6. TAsh 1:3.
7. Gen 6:5; cf. Gen 8:21. In these passages the yetzer is understood as being fundamentally evil; but that it could be taken in a good sense, cf. IChr 28:9; 29:18; Is 26:3. Moore feels (Judaism I, 480) that Deut 31:21 is to be understood as the evil yetzer because of the context.
8. Jer 17:9; cf. also Jer 5:23, and Pfeiffer, History, 393.

Sirach teaches a doctrine of an evil yetzer in the heart of man:[1]

> Say not: "From God is my transgression,"
> For that which He hateth made He not....
> God created man from the beginning,
> And placed him in the hand of his Yetzer.
> If thou (so) desirest, thou canst keep the commandment,
> And (it is) wisdom to do His good pleasure.
> Poured out before thee (are) fire and water,
> Stretch forth thine hand unto that which thou desirest.

The character of this yetzer emerges more clearly in a later verse:[2]

> O base nature! why then wast thou created,
> To fill the world's face with deceit!

The last reference taken seriously would seem to imply that God created the evil yetzer, a view from which later rabbis did not shrink;[3] Sir, however, repudiates the idea explicitly.[4] Apparently Sir has not thought through the problem of the origin of evil to its conclusions, and hence retains incompatibilities in his teaching.[5] One aspect of his solution seems to hold man responsible for evil, another to hold God responsible.

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1. Sir 15:11,14-16. Despite the view of Charles (A&P II, 371) that this reference is "neutral," the context seems to demand that this be the evil yetzer. Porter, in "The Yetzer Hara," 140, holds that the Torah and the evil yetzer are the fire and water between which man must choose. Pfeiffer, History, 394, finds identification of the evil yetzer with the devil in the Hebrew gloss on this verse: "Man's spoiler is probably Satan, rather than human robbers as in 4:19...."
2. Sir 37:3; cf. also Sir 3:24; 21:11.
3. Cf. above, 71-72.
4. Sir 15:11.
5. Ben Sira's teaching concerning the origin of Sin may, then, be summed up thus: he implies, though he hardly goes so far as to make the definite assertion, that the origin of Sin is due to God; yet in one important passage he strongly combats this. He teaches, further, that so far as the human race is concerned the origin of Sin is to be sought in the fall of Eve, but he does not attempt to trace its history further back; this was, however, from his point of view unnecessary if, in accordance with his third theory, sin originates in the individual; nevertheless, he involves himself in a contradiction here in saying that because of Eve's sin all men must die. In addition to this, however, there is a further inconsistency regarding the third theory, for while teaching that Sin originates in man, he sometimes speaks of it as something external to him. These contradictory thoughts bring into clear relief Ben-Sira's inability to formulate a consistent and logical doctrine as to the origin of Sin; and in this he but shows himself the forerunner of the Rabbis, from whose writings it can be seen that these later thinkers were involved in precisely the same inconsistencies as soon as they attempted to construct a working theory on the subject." (Oesterley, Books of the Apocrypha, 271.) For Eve's part in the origin of evil, cf. above, 106, and Sir 25:24.

The TestXIIPat state the doctrine of the Two Spirits and of the Two Ways in quite explicit form; the locus classicus is in the TAsh,[1] but the assumption runs throughout the work and emerges as a strongly held dualism of good and evil.[2] Charles identifies here the first references by name in Jewish literature to the good yetzer and to the Two Ways:[3]

> Two ways hath God given to the sons of men, and two inclinations, and two kinds of action, and two modes (of action), and two issues. Therefore all things are by twos, one over against the other. For there are two ways of good and evil, and with these are the two inclinations in our breasts discriminating them. Therefore if the soul take pleasure in the good (inclination), all its actions are in right-

1. TAsh 1:3ff.
2. There are references to the numbers of the spirits of deceit and evil as being seven (TReub 2:1ff; 3:2ff) or four (TJud 16:1ff). But by and large the spirits and angels are simply representative of the struggle between two forces, God and the devil. The "evil spirit" is set against the Lord (TSim 3:5); fornication "separates from God and brings near Beliar" (TSim 5:3); the angel of the Lord is opposed to "every evil spirit" (TLev 5:6); light vs. darkness (TLev 14:3-4); the "new priest" vs. "Beliar" (TLev 18:12); light vs. darkness, and the law of the Lord vs. the works of Beliar (TLev 19:1); the "imaginations of your thoughts" are set opposite "the commands of God" (TJud 13:1-2); the law of God vs. the inclination of the soul (TJud 18:3); man is warned against being a "slave to two contrary passions" (TJud 18:6; cf. Mt 6:24); the "spirit of truth" vs. the "spirit of deceit" (TJud 20:1-5); among the people of the Lord will be "no spirit of deceit of Beliar" (TJud 25:3); "spirits of deceit" have no power over "the single-minded man" (TIss 4:4; cf. 3:4; 4:2,6; 6:1); the "commandments of the Lord" vs. Beliar (TIss 6:1); the "spirit of Beliar" vs. "the God of heaven and earth" (TIss 7:7); the spirit of deceit and Beliar vs. the Lord (TZeb 9:8); when the Lord departs, Beliar enters to rule (TDan 4:7; 5:1); those who depart from the Lord walk in evil (TDan 5:10-11); the Lord's angel of intercession vs. "the enemy" (TDan 6:1-5); the law of the Lord vs. the law of Beliar (TNaph 2:6); the will of the Lord vs. the will of Beliar (TNaph 3:1); when God is glorified, the devil flees (TNaph 8:4); when God is dishonored, man is possessed by the devil (TNaph 8:6); the law of the Most High vs. the spirit of hatred (TGad 3:1-2); the spirit of hatred and Satan vs. the law of God (TGad 4:7); the dualism seems especially pronounced as hatred and lying and the devil are set opposite God in TGad 5:1-8; the evil yetzer is mentioned in TGad 5:3; there are two faces of goodness and wickedness, two works of good and evil (TAsh 3:1 - 4:3); singleness of face is urged (TAsh 6:1-2); the angels of the Lord vs. those of Satan (TAsh 6:4-6); where the Lord dwells, evil cannot (TJos 10:3); the Lord and light vs. Beliar and darkness (TJos 20:2); the "spirits of Beliar" vs. "the fear of God" (TBenj 3:3-5); unclean spirits flee from one who does well, and darkness from one who has light in his mind (TBenj 5:2-3); "The inclination of the good man is not in the power of the deceit of the spirit of Beliar, for the angel of peace guideth his soul" (TBenj 6:1; cf. 6:4); the good mind is single, not double (TBenj 6:5-6); defilement vs. the spirit of God (TBenj 8:2).
3. TAsh 1:3-8; cf. Charles, A&P II, 343.

> ecousness; and if it sin it straightway repenteth....But if it incline to the evil inclination, all its actions are in wickedness, and it driveth away the good, and cleaveth to the evil, and is ruled by Beliar....

The assumption throughout the book is that man is free to choose between the Two Ways and the Two Spirits, and that therefore, whatever the origin of evil, man is responsible for his choices. In one passage, the assumption seems to be that God created the evil inclination:[1]

> And as the potter knoweth the use of each vessel, what it is meet for, so also doth the Lord know the body, how far it will persist in goodness, and when it beginneth in evil. For there is no inclination or thought which the Lord knoweth not, for He created every man after His own image.

The teaching of the Two Ways is found in IIEn:[2]

> ...and I called his name Adam, and showed him the two ways, the light and the darkness, and I told him: "This is good, and that bad," that I should learn whether he has love towards me, or hatred, that it be clear which in his race love me.

Here man seems to be free to choose for himself whether to follow righteousness or evil; however, his freedom is qualified by his ignorance,[3] so that although free to choose he may with good intentions make the wrong choices and fall into sin.[4] The curse of God falls, not on Adam, but on the ignorance of Adam.[5] Thus man seems to be exonerated from some of the guilt for sin, though his responsibility still remains; more than in the other systems that feature the Two Ways, we have here an opportunity for blaming sin on Satan.[6] This is a step toward the pessimism of IVEz, but IIEn has by no means plumbed the depths of Ezra's gloom.

One passage in PsSol seems to support the Two Ways view:[7]

> Our works are subject to our own choice and power
> To do right or wrong in the works of our hands....

1. TMaph 2:4-5. Charles (A&P II, 336) understands πλάσμα to mean the evil yetzer.
2. IIEn 30:14-15.
3. IIEn 30:16-18. Cf. also IIEn 49:2, which seems to have a deterministic cast, though this may not be intended.
4. Cf. Charles' footnote (op. cit., 450), where he finds Platonic influence in this view of the soul in its ignorance; cf. also the later Gnostic attitude toward ignorance and its effects (e.g., Jonas, Gnostic Religion, 68-73).
5. IIEn 31:7.
6. IIEn 31:4-6; cf. above, 96-97.

But set against this is a passage of deterministic implication:[1]

> For man and his portion (lie) before Thee in the balance;
> He cannot add to, so as to enlarge, what has been prescribed...
> Cause not Thy hand to be heavy upon us,
> Lest through necessity we sin.

It would appear that here we have the familiar inconsistency within the thought of one man, or else the divergent viewpoints of two.

IVMacc features the Jewish doctrine of the two yetzerim in philosophical garb, under the names of "pleasure" and "pain."[2] These are regarded as aboriginal constituents of human personality, created by God, and hence at least potentially good:[3]

> For in the day when God created man, he implanted in him his passions and inclinations, and also, at the very same time, set the mind on a throne amidst the senses to be his sacred guide in all things; and to the mind he gave the Law, by the which if a man order himself, he shall reign over a kingdom that is temperate, and just, and virtuous, and brave.

All the passions are constituted of varying blends of pleasure and pain,[4] and Reason is the arbiter among the warring passions, charged with bringing them to an issue in righteous conduct.[5] On this view it is quite appropriate that we should be bidden by the Rabbis to "serve God with the evil yetzer."[6] The effect of such a view is to place the origin of evil in the human sphere, and to say that man brings evil into being through his wrong employment of the good God has created.

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1. PsSol 5:6,8.
2. IVMacc 1:20,28.
3. IVMacc 2:21-23. Cf. Koehler, Theology, 215: "For the rabbis the sensuous desire of the body (yetzer) is a tendency toward sin, but never a compulsion. The weakness of the flesh may cause a straying from the right path, but man can turn the desires of the flesh into the service of the good. He can always assert his divine power of freedom by opposing the evil inclination (yezer ha ra) with the good inclination (yezer ha tob) to overcome it. In fact, the rabbis are so far from acknowledging the existence of a compulsion of evil in the flesh, that they point to the history of great men as proof that the highest characters have the mightiest passions in their souls, and that their greatness consists in the will by which they have learned to control themselves."
4. IVMacc 1:20ff.
5. IVMacc 1:28ff; 2:9,16,20.
6. Porter, "The Yetzer Hara," 123ff. This was the effect of divine Reason in the lives of Joseph (IVMacc 2:1-6), of the greedy, drunken or miserly man reformed (IVMacc 2:7-9), and supremely in the lives of Eleazar and the Seven Brothers, whose malevolent dispositions were not extirpated but brought subject to the Law (IVMacc 3:4-5).

In full accord with this view is a passage in Pirke Aboth, dating from the end of the first century: "Who is mighty? He who controlleth his evil disposition...."[1]

A curious middle position is occupied by IIBar, who from certain passages might be thought to trace the origin of evil to Adam's first sin:[2]

> And I answered and said:
> "O Adam, what hast thou done to all those who are born from thee?
> And what will be said to the first Eve who hearkened to the serpent?
> For all this multitude are going to corruption,
> Nor is there any numbering of those whom the fire devours."
>
> For (man) became a danger to his own soul: even to the angels became he a danger.

This impression is amplified by the way in which IIBar, though aware of the story of the demonic forces,[3] passes lightly over it as though to focus attention on Adam's responsibility. But that this is a false impression emerges elsewhere:[4]

> For though Adam first sinned
> And brought untimely death upon all,
> Yet of those who were born from him
> Each one of them has prepared for his own soul torment to come,
> And again each one of them has chosen for himself glories to come.
>
> Adam is therefore not the cause, save only of his own soul,
> But each of us has been the Adam of his own soul.

It appears, therefore, that it is the doctrine of the Two Ways that is the true position of IIBar, and the assumption behind his OT citation, "Behold, I have placed before you life and death."[5] There seems to be a limit to the harmful effects of Adam's sin: it does not exceed "untimely death,"

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1. PirAb 4:1; cf. 2:15.
2. IIBar 48:42-43; 56:10. Cf. also 56:5-6, where various troubles and sorrows, including death, are attributed to Adam's deed; 4:3, where the vision of heavenly Jerusalem is removed because of Adam's sin; 23:4, where because of Adam's sin "death was decreed against those who should be born."
3. IIBar 56:10-15.
4. IIBar 54:15; 54:19. Cf. also 18:1-2, where "the light" is obviously the Law, and even the enlightened Jews are seen to have returned to Adam's darkness; this moves us near to IVEz's pessimistic estimate of the chances of being saved as desperately slender (IVEz 7:48; 8:4-19; 9:13-16).
5. IIBar 19:1.

or variegated troubles.[1] However, the stress on Adam's part in bringing trouble and sorrow upon his descendants, combined with the passing over of demonic influence, seems to bring us close to IVEz who likewise ignores the demons and who increases greatly the stress on Adamic responsibility.

The Adam and Eve literature does not really belong with the Two Ways type of explanation for the origin of sin; we have seen how it turns from the demonic horde in order to emphasize the importance of Satan,[2] and correspondingly it underscores the responsibility of Adam, and the effects of his sin on his posterity. Adam and Eve are considered to be responsible for a host of woes afflicting humanity;[3] their sin separates them from God and renders them unfit to offer prayer;[4] the brute creation is estranged from following after their former lords.[5] In fact, all evil stems from this root:[6]

> And Adam said to Eve: "What hast thou done? A great plague hast thou brought upon us, transgression and sin for all our generations: and this which thou hast done, tell thy children after my death, for those who arise from us shall toil and fail but they shall be wanting and curse us and say, All evils have our parents brought upon us, who were at the beginning.

The position seems to be, in this literature, that Adam and Eve share with Satan the responsibility for the beginning of evil - man's share being

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1. IIBar 54:15; 56:5-6. Torrey (Apocryphal Literature, 124) points up the difference here between IIBar and the earlier IVEz on which he depended; IIBar seems to attempt to correct IVEz's bleak estimate of the effects of Adam's sin.
2. Cf. above, 97.
3. Sickness, pain and death are traced to the first sin (Vita 30:1 - 35:3; cf. ApocMos 7:1 - 8:2) and are to be visited upon all of Adam's descendants (Vita 34:1-2). Judgment by water and fire also follows (Vita 49:3).
4. This is true of Eve in particular, who needs must pray through her husband as intermediary (Vita 19:2; 20:2; 21:2), but Adam is aware of his own sin (Vita 8:2) and is himself considered too sinful to offer verbal prayer owing to the uncleanness of his lips from having eaten the forbidden fruit (Vita 6:1).
5. Vita chh. 37 - 39; ApocMos ch. 10ff; cf. Vita 44:1-4.
6. Vita 44:2-4.

heavy enough, but mitigated somewhat by the part taken by Satan. But nothing is said directly about a choice between two ways, or about good or evil inclinations, that suggests a connection with the doctrine as we have traced it in the rest of the A&P.

With IVEz we move beyond the doctrine of a free choice between two equally accessible alternatives. Here the sorry condition of the world implies a fundamental perversion of the human heart, the cor malignum, unrelieved by a contending good principle. Adam's evil heart rules mankind:[1]

> ...and to him thou commandedst one only observance of thine, but he transgressed it. Forthwith thou appointedst death for him and for his generations, and from him were born nations and tribes, peoples and clans innumerable. And every nation walked after their own will, and behaved wickedly before thee, and were ungodly....
>
> And yet thou didst not take away from them the evil heart, that thy Law might bring forth fruit in them. For the first Adam, clothing himself with the evil heart, transgressed and was overcome; and likewise also all who were born of him. Thus the infirmity became inveterate; the Law indeed was in the heart of the people, but (in conjunction) with the evil germ; so what was good departed, and the evil remained.

In the second passage quoted, the Law does stand in opposition to the evil heart, but its effect for good seems to be minimal in light of the vast majority who will be damned:[2]

> ...who is there of those who have come (into the world) that has not sinned? Or who of the earth-born is there that has not transgressed thy covenant? And now I see that the coming Age shall bring delight to few, but torment unto many. For the evil heart has grown up in us
>
> which has estranged us from God
> and brought us into destruction;
> And has made known to us the ways of death,
> and showed us the paths of perdition,
> and removed us far from life;
> and that not a few only, but well nigh all that have been created!

1. IVEz 3:7-8; 3:20-22. The latter has obvious parallels with Romans 7. Cf. also IVEz 4:4. Gunkel observes (in Kautzsch, A&P II, 335) that whereas in older times sins were regarded individually and considered to be avoidable, IVEz was persuaded that "das ganze menschliche Geschlecht von jeher ganz in Sünde verstrickt und dass die letzte Ursache dieses allgemeinen Verderbnisses im tiefen Grunde des bösen menschlichen Herzens zu suchen sei."
2. IVEz 7:46-48.

Further, the transgression of Adam has subjected his children not simply to death, but to involvement in guilt and sin as well:[1]

> And I answered and said: This is my first and last word: better had it been that the earth had not produced Adam, or else, having produced him, (for thee) to have restrained him from sinning. For how does it profit us at all that in the present we must live in grief and after death look for punishment? O thou Adam, what hast thou done! For though it was thou that sinned, the fall was not thine alone, but ours also who are thy descendants!

This viewpoint seems to be the doctrine of the evil yetzer writ large, and carried out to its full implications. Granted the evil yetzer, and a clear vision of the corruption of the world, it is evident to IVEz that evil has by far the upper hand, and that to talk about an equal contest between good and evil in man's mind, after the fashion of IVMacc, is nonsense.[2] In fact, although IVEz does not draw the conclusion, the corruption of mankind is expressed in such an extreme form as almost to suggest that God must be the one responsible for it.

This concludes our review of the A&P on the subject of evil and its origin. We have seen that although the power of God and his transcendence is greatly stressed in this literature, still there is little ground for attributing to him the origin of evil; our authors shrink from this assertion, and often deny it explicitly. There is, in the second place, a very definite efflorescence of demonic belief, and with it an increasing tendency to place the blame for evil at the door either of Satan or of his demonic following; the tendency seems to be to choose one demonic stress or the other, and to hold to it fairly consistently. Belief in the importance

1. IVEz 7:116-118.
2. Box (in Charles, A&P II, 556) writes: "The corruption of the human race is regarded as due to a development of something inherent in man's nature (yeser ha-ra of Rabbinic theology); but by representing the Law as powerless to prevent the evil element in man's nature from gaining the entire mastery (3:22), our apocalyptist directly contradicts the orthodox Rabbinic view, according to which the evil yeser could be - and as a matter of fact has been by the pious in Israel generally - successfully resisted by the study of the Law and the practice of good works." Cf. Oesterley's remark (Books of the Apocrypha, 523): "There is no hope in this world."

of Satan follows upon a serious treatment of the third chapter of Genesis, and belief in the importance of the demonic horde implies dependence on the opening verses of the sixth chapter. Some of our authors practically exonerate human beings from responsibility for sin by the attitude they take toward the demons. And then, third, there is still a very strong tendency to support the OT view that man himself is responsible for sin and evil; this is re-interpreted in terms of the new individualism that was sweeping the whole Hellenistic world, heightening the role played by individual men and diminishing the importance of corporative guilt, but still leaving the responsibility with man, or with man's representative, Adam. We find the latter two views frequently held unreconciled by the same author, or expressed within the limits of the same composite work; it appears that the latent hostility of the two explanations was not felt as keenly by the writers of the inter-Testament period as it is by modern man, though some of them have evidently sensed the problem implicit here.

With a background such as this, we will not be surprised as we turn to the NT to find the same streams entering the NT current unmingled. This confused background helps explain some of the conflicting assumptions of NT authors on such subjects as the place of the demons and the precise assessment of the degree of human responsibility for the beginning of sin.

CHAPTER FOUR

Although our subject in this chapter is the Synoptic Gospels, this is hardly the place for a discussion of the Synoptic Problem; no novel contribution or theory will be set forth. The assumption will be the common one, i.e., that Mk is the first Gospel, and that in dependence on Mk the other two Synoptic authors wrote their Gospels, relying on a common "Q" source which they shared, and additional special material which each of them possessed separately.[1]

Within the framework of this assumption, interesting differences may be observed between the Gospels on the subject of sin and evil. Mk, for instance, tells a shorter version of the Temptation Story than the other two Gospels; Mt, differing from Lk, omits most references to the demonic witness to Jesus as reported by Mk; Lk alone reports a Satanic "fall from Heaven." Not all of this can be explained from the sources on which these authors relied: at least some of the differences must have been motivated by theological considerations. And when the viewpoint of the Synoptic Gospels considered together is contrasted with the viewpoint of the rest of the NT, differences are again in evidence. Our task here will be to survey the view of the Synoptic Gospels in its variety, and also in its unity. Distinctions will also be drawn between the view of the first three Gospels and that of the remainder of the NT.

First of all we must discuss the terminology in which the Gospels refer to sin and evil. Here the influence of the LXX in modifying and unifying OT concepts is quite clear. For example, Dodd writes:[2]

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1. Cf. B. H. Streeter, The Four Gospels; for a contrary opinion closely argued, cf. W. R. Farmer, The Synoptic Problem. William Barclay offers a convenient summary of the opposing views in The First Three Gospels, 228-244.

2. Bible and Greeks, 80. With particular reference to the Synoptic Gospels, Dodd further says, "In Mt, with its legalistic strain, ἄνομος is more freely used in this general sense, in contrast to the other three Gospels. It is almost unknown to the rest of the NT, apart from IJn 3:4. ....This explicit equation of sin and lawlessness is quite in the spirit of the LXX, and is exceptional in the NT." (loc. cit.).

> The LXX uses a notably poorer ethical vocabulary than the Hebrew. There is a strong tendency to reduce all manner of evil behaviour to the concepts of ἀδικία and ἀνομία, and particularly the latter. This is one more symptom of the growing legalism which we have noted in other connections. The LXX version tended to stereotype this legalistic notion of sin in Hellenistic Judaism.

Dodd writes with particular reference to ἀδικία and ἀνομία, but the same thing could be said with equal justice regarding πονηρός and κακός, the terms used to translate the various OT words for evil:[1] they unify considerably the variety of OT terminology.

It can hardly be doubted that as Hebrew became more and more a translation language for the Jews, its nuances would increasingly be swallowed up in generalities and abstractions. This trend can be traced in the LXX, and in measure as the NT employs the LXX the NT too is affected similarly.

A survey of the terminology used to describe evil in the Synoptic Gospels rewards us with some interesting results. We discover that Mk practically never refers to πονηρός,[2] while Mt and Lk use the word and

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1. The concept of evil in the Synoptic Gospels is the subject of a major study by G. Baumbach: Das Verständnis des Bösen in den synoptischen Evangelien. B's method is to discuss terminology first, with a particular stress on the terms πονηρός and κακός, and then to exegete passages referring to sin and sinners, to Satan and to the demons before coming to his conclusions. These conclusions are related to B's understanding of the church situations in which he believes the authors of these books found themselves, and B's views need not be accepted in their entirety in order to appreciate the great value of his work for our subject.
On κακός cf. Grundmann, TWNT III, 477ff. For particularly tendentious translations of κακός, cf. Prov 1:18; 2:16; 3:31 (ibid., 479); but, as G observes, "Was bei dem Prv-Uebersetzer sich als besondere Eigenart des hellenistischen Judentums gegenüber Mas abhebt, das gilt für den Leser der ganzen LXX. So oberflächlich und schematisch wie bei dem Uebersetzer der Prv ist das sittliche Urteil des Judentums jener Zeit überhaupt." (Ibid., 480). The essentially deed-centered and varied language of the OT was abstracted by this kind of treatment, and the way was prepared for thinking about evil as such. The use of πονηρός in the LXX tends to have a moral focus (thus employed 220 out of 360 times - Harder, TWNT VI, 551) and to be used less often to describe disaster and misfortune than is κακός. Both terms are used to translate the general Hebrew term רע (cf. above, 9-10), but varying preferences for κακός or πονηρός and their derivatives are to be noticed in the translators of different LXX books (ibid., 564).
2. Mk 7:22-23, for a total of three instances (πονηρία, πονηρός). Coming as they do in the midst of a lasterkatalog, it may be doubted if even this reference is native to the thought of Mk; very possibly the terms were simply taken over with the formula employed. Cf. Bultmann, History, 17; Lohmeyer, Markus, 142.

its derivatives frequently; even between the latter two, Mt uses the word more frequently than Lk.[1] Baumbach would seem to be justified in holding that evil as such does not hold a place of importance in Mk, while its significance for Mt and Lk is substantially greater.[2]

If we consider the references to κακός and its derivatives, we find it used much less frequently in the Synoptic Gospels. Mk uses κακός only three times, Lk and Mk each twice; among these occurrences we discover that one reference is repeated in identical form in all three Gospels: Pilate's words, "what evil has he done."[3] It appears four times in Acts, and interestingly enough, each time in connection with Paul, who in his own writings uses this word quite frequently.[4] The use of other compounds and derivatives is fairly limited, and the general impression received is that κακός is a term describing harm rather than wickedness.[5]

The results of comparing these two terms suggests that for Mk neither of them was very important, whereas for Mt and Lk πονηρός is a very important concept indeed. In particular, Mt's forceful and original

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1. πονηρός, Mt 5:11,37,39,45; 6:13,23; 7:11,17,18; 9:4; 12:34,35,39,45; 13:19,38,49; 15:19; 16:4; 18:32; 20:15; 22:10; 25:26; πονηρία, Mt 22:18. This total of 27 is to be compared with Lk's total of 23 for the much larger combined volume of Lk and Acts: πονηρός, Lk 3:19; 6:22,35,45; 7:21; 8:2; 11:13,26,29,34; 19:22; Acts 17:5; 18:14; 19:12,13,15,16; 25:18; 28:21; πονηρία, Lk 11:39; Acts 3:26.
2. Verständnis, 14, cf. 56. Whether this is a result of Mk's momentary expectation of apocalyptic deliverance must remain an inference rather than being regarded as an established fact, but it seems quite in keeping with Mk's general theological position to suggest this.
3. Mk 15:14=Mt 27:23=Lk 23:22; Mt 21:41; 24:48; Mk 7:21; Lk 16:25.
4. Acts 9:13; 16:28; 23:9; 28:5. For Pl's usage, cf. below, 170.
5. The adverb κακῶς is found in all three Synoptic Gospels and Acts, but more frequently in Mk and Mt than in Lk-Acts. In Mk it is used entirely in the "κακῶς ἔχοντες" formula to describe the sick; in Lk it is twice used of the sick, once employing the formula; in Mt it is once used without reference to the sick, but otherwise the usage parallels Mk closely (κακῶς ἔχοντες, Mk 1:32,34; 2:17; 6:55; Mt 4:24; 8:16; 9:12; 14:35; Lk 5:31. With reference to the sick, Mt 15:22; 17:15; Lk 7:2. In Mt 21:41 we have, "he will put those men to death κακῶς.").
Cf. also κακία, Mt 6:34; Acts 8:22; κακολογεῖν, Mt 15:4 (Ex 21:17); Mk 7:10; 9:39; Acts 19:9; κακοποιεῖν, Mk 3:4; Lk 6:9; κακοῦν, Acts 7:6, 19; 12:1; 14:2; 18:10; κακοῦργος, Lk 23:32,33,39; κάκωσις, Acts 7:34 (Ex 3:7). Mt customarily avoids κακός; cf. Baumbach, op. cit., 56.

employment of πονηρός shows clear signs of theological reflection on the place of evil in the divine plan.[1] Its predominantly ethical and moral connotation fits in well with Mt's emphasis on Jesus as the propounder of a New Torah[2] in distinction from Mk who lays a much smaller stress on ethical teaching and seems more inclined to emphasize eschatological hope.

The Synoptic Gospels display what seems, in contrast with Pauline and Johannine emphasis on the term, a curious lack of interest in ἁμαρτία.[3] The verb ἁμαρτάνειν is not frequently used in Mt and Lk,[4] and is not used at all in Mk. The noun appears only once in Mk and twice in Mt,[5] and Lk uses it only in Acts.[6] A good deal is said about the sinner (ἁμαρτωλός), but again we find the term relatively infrequent in Mk,[7] though it is a bit more frequent in Mt[8] and a great deal more frequent in Lk.[9] Here again the interest of Mk in ethical expressions is considerably weaker than that of the other two Evangelists, and the Evangelists all display a characteristically greater interest in the practical behavior of the sinner than they do in evil as such.

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1. Baumbach, Verständnis, 92-93. B's exegesis shows that Mt employed this term in contrast with, e.g., "the sons of the kingdom," and that for Mt good and evil are understood as existing in conflict within the Church. By contrast, Lk's mission-oriented outlook sees men as divided between the believers and non-believers, i.e., the members of the Church and those who are not yet members, on a personal and ethical basis (204-205).
2. Cf. W. D. Davies, Setting, 188.
3. On the effect of the LXX on the OT concept of sin, cf. Quell, TWNT I, 268-269.
4. Mt 18:15//Lk 17:3; Mt 18:21//Lk 17:4; Mt 27:4.
5. Mk 1:5-Mt 3:6; Mt 1:21.
6. Acts 3:19; 7:60; 22:16.
7. Mk 2:15-16//Mt 9:10-11//Lk 5:30; Mk 2:17//Mt 9:13//Lk 5:32; Mk 14:41//Mt 26:45//Lk 24:7; Mk 8:38.
8. In addition to citations in the previous note, cf. Mt 11:19//Lk 7:34.
9. In addition to citations in the previous two notes, cf. Lk 5:8; 6:32-34; 7:37,39; 13:2; 15:1,2,7; 18:13; 19:7.

Various words are used in referring to the powers of evil. The demons are described by δαιμόνιον[1] or πνεῦμα with various adjectives, especially ἀκάθαρτος.[2] In addition, we have Mt's characteristic use of the verb δαιμονίζεσθαι to describe those suffering from demonic posses-

1. Mk uses the word ten times (discounting the additions to ch. 16) (1:34,39; 3:15,22; 6:13; 7:26,29,30; 9:38), of which Mt eliminates or corrects eight instances (Mk 1:34//Mt 8:16; Mk 1:39//Mt 4:23; Mk 3:15//Mt 5:1; Mk 6:13, no// in Mt; Mk 7:26,29,30//Mt 15:22; Mk 9:38, no// in Mt). Mt retains only two uses of the word as they stand (Mk 3:22=Mt 9:34//Mt 12:24). In two contexts, this is explained by Mt's preference for the verb δαιμονίζεσθαι (Mk 1:34//Mt 8:16; Mk 7:26-30//Mt 15:22).

Mk fares slightly better at Lk's hands, but still his use of δαιμόνιον is retained in only three passages (Mk 1:34//Lk 4:41; Mk 3:22//Lk 11:15; Mk 9:38//Lk 9:49) and eliminated elsewhere (Mk 1:39//Lk 4:44; Mk 3:15//Lk 6:13; Mk 6:13//Lk 9:6; Mk 7:26-30, no// in Lk).

It would seem that Mk's summaries of Jesus' deeds and of the deeds of the disciples are particularly susceptible to correction (1:34,39; 6:13) and that generally speaking the usage of δαιμόνιον survived better in the context of specific events like the Beelzebul controversy (Mk 3:22=Mt 9:34//Mt 12:24//Lk 11:15), the appeal of the Syrophonecian mother (Mk 7:26-30//Mt 15:22 - Lk has perhaps eliminated this because offence might be taken at the uncomplimentary reference to the Gentiles) and the saying regarding the unauthorized disciple (Mk 9:38//Lk 9:49 - Mt may have left this out because of the loophole it might have provided for the entry of false teachers).

In addition, Mt and Lk share a number of common references to δαιμόνια (Mt 9:33//Lk 11:14; Mt 11:18//Lk 7:33; Mt 12:27-28//Lk 11:19-20). Mt and Lk both use the word without equivalent in the other two Gospels, but in contexts which are shared with them (Mt 10:8; Lk 11:18). Lk has three additional references to δαιμόνια in contexts otherwise unknown in the Synoptic Gospels (8:2; 10:17; 13:32). Mt uses the word δαιμόνιον a total of eleven times and at 8:31 he also uses the word δαίμων (the parallels in Mk 5:12 and Lk 8:29 apparently being added by textual assimilation); Lk uses it 22 times in the Gospel and only once in Acts.

2. Πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον is not a favorite expression of Mt, who uses it four times in three contexts, all of which have Synoptic parallels (Mt 8:16//Mk 1:33-34//Lk 4:40; Mt 10:1//Mk 6:7//Lk 9:1; Mt 12:43,45//Lk 11:24, 26). At Mt 8:16 this expression replaces τὰ δαιμόνια in Mk. Cf. McNeile, Matthew, 131.

Mk on the other hand uses it often (1:23,26,27; 3:11,30; 5:2,8,13; 6:7; 7:25; 9:17,20,25) followed by the other Gospels; Lk tends to replace the expression with δαιμόνιον (Mk 1:23,26//Lk 4:33,35; Mk 5:2//Lk 8:27; Mk 5:13//Lk 8:33; Mk 6:7//Lk 9:1; Mk 9:20//Lk 9:42), but on the other hand often retains the same phrasing (Mk 1:27//Lk 4:36; Mk 5:8//Lk 8:29; Mk 9:17//Lk 9:39; Mk 9:25//Lk 9:42), while Mt likewise replaces it with δαιμόνιον (Mk 9:25//Mt 17:18) or a form of δαιμονίζεσθαι (Mk 5:2//Mt 8:28; Mk 7:25//Mt 15:22), or else retains the expression (Mk 6:7//Mt 10:1). Two of Mk's usages are without clear parallel in the Synoptic Gospels (Mk 3:11,30).

In addition to his parallels with Mk and Mt, Lk has four Gospel incidents in which evil πνεύματα are mentioned (6:18; 8:2; 10:20; 13:11) and seven occasions in Acts (5:16; 8:7; 16:16,18; 19:12,13,16). A glance at a concordance reveals the overwhelming frequency of Lk's references to πνεῦμα as the Holy Spirit in Acts.

sion.[1] Some clear preferences for one expression or another can be seen in the use of πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτος,[2] but the differences between the three Gospels in the use of δαιμόνιον do not seem conclusive for anything.[3]

Satan (a term common to the three Synoptic Gospels) is referred to under a variety of names. Σατανᾶς is Mk's common designation for him, and he is followed in this usage by Mt and Lk to some extent.[4] Mk also refers to him under the name of Βεέλζεβουλ in one particular context, and Mk and Lk follow him in using the name only in connection with the charge brought against Jesus that he was demon-possessed.[5] But in addition, Mt

1. It is generally used as a participle in the Synoptic Gospels; Mt uses it seven times in a variety of contexts referring to the demon-possessed (Mt 4:24; 8:16,28,33; 9:32; 12:22; 15:22, the latter not as a participle), and sometimes as a substitute for another expression (Mt 8:28//Mk 5:2//Lk 8:27; Mt 9:32//Lk 11:14; Mt 15:22//Mk 7:25). By contrast Mk uses the expression four times in only two contexts (Mk 1:32; 5:15,16,18). Despite his fondness of the participial construction, Lk uses this favorite expression of Mt only once, at 8:36.
2. Cf. above, 121, fn. 2.
3. It is difficult to form a theory as to why, with their obvious acceptance of the concept of demons, Lk and Mt both (the latter in particular) were so ill-disposed toward carrying over the word δαιμόνιον from the Marcan material, though Mt's rejection of Mk's view of the Messianic Secret may have been a factor. Beyond this tentative suggestion, theological explanations for the data do not seem to be forthcoming.
4. Σατανᾶς appears in Mk 1:13; 3:23; 3:26; 4:15; 8:33. Of these six occurrences, Mt and Lk agree in omitting two (Mk 3:23) and in substituting other words for two more (Mk 1:13 replaced by ὁ διάβολος in //Mt 4:1// Lk 4:2; Mk 4:15 replaced by ὁ διάβολος in //Lk 8:12 and by ὁ πονηρός in //Mt 13:19).

   Mt retains the usage in two Marcan contexts (Mk 8:33=Mt 16:23; Mk 3:23//Mt 12:26 with Mt using σατανᾶς twice), and uses the Marcan phrase (Mk 8:33=Mt 16:23//Mt 4:10) in the narration of the Temptation story. Lest the conclusion be drawn that this name was not important for Mt it should be noted that it appears in very important contexts in Mt.

   Lk omits still another reference to Satan in Mk 8:33, the rebuke of Peter (perhaps for theological reasons - cf. Baumbach, Verständnis, 191). This leaves only the use of the name once in the Beelzebul controversy (Mk 3:23//Lk 11:18//Mt 12:26). But lest the impression be given that Lk has an animus against the word, cf. the four references to Satan in the "L" material (Lk 10:18; 13:16; 22:3,31; the reference in 4:8 is poorly attested, and seems to be a conflation from Mt 16:23//Mt 4:10), and two more in Acts (5:3; 26:18).
5. Mk 3:22//Mt 12:24//Mt 9:34//Lk 11:15. The charge and Jesus' handling of it seem particularly important to Mt, who refers to it three times: 9:33; 10:25; 12:24ff. In addition to Mk, Mt and Lk have an identically formulated reply of Jesus against the charge: Mt 12:27=Lk 11:19. At Lk 11:18 we find an additional use of the word in an explanatory phrase.

and Lk use the word διάβολος, which is foreign to Mk; the connections in which the word appears would seem to indicate its close association with the "Q" account of the Temptation.[1] It likewise appears in Mt's special material, and Lk seems to use it as a translation for Mk's term σατανᾶς.[2] Furthermore, Mt has two designations for Satan which are unique to his Gospel: ὁ πειράζων, used once,[3] and ὁ πονηρός, used a number of times but at least twice with clear reference to Satan.[4] This last pair of terms, considered in light of Mt's thoughtful use of the term πονηρός, gives us a clear glimpse of Satan in Mt's thought.[5]

Satan is not the subject of speculation in the Synoptic Gospels, as he was in much of the Inter-Testament literature.[6] No interest is shown in his origin, and only one reference shows us his end.[7] Satan is

1. Mt shares the general usage with Lk in the Temptation story: Mt uses the word διάβολος four times, Lk also four times (discounting the later addition to the text of Lk 4:5), but their usage does not correspond completely. At Mt 4:3//Lk 4:3, Mt has ὁ πειράζων instead of ὁ διάβολος; at Mt 4:8 Lk does not have a corresponding ὁ διάβολος at 4:5; at Lk 4:6 Mt does not have a corresponding ὁ διάβολος at Mt 4:9.
2. Mt uses the word twice without any parallel in the other Gospels: 13:39 (the parable of the tares, where "the enemy" is ὁ διάβολος) and 25:41 (the reference to fire prepared for the devil and his angels).
Lk uses the word twice in preference to Mk's σατανᾶς at Lk 8:12// Mk 4:15 (//Mt 13:19 has ὁ πονηρός); and at Lk 4:2//Mk 1:13 (//Mt 4:1 also substitutes τοῦ διαβόλου).
3. Mt 4:3. This seems particularly important as a description of Satan's function for Mt; cf. below, 138-139.
4. There is no parallel for Mt 5:37, where whatever exceeds yes or no is "ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ" and for Mt 13:38, where the tares are "υἱοὶ τοῦ πονηροῦ." In Mt 5:39, the parallel in Lk has no clause forbidding resistance of an evil one; in Mt 6:13 the parallel in Lk of the Lord's Prayer has no such clause as "deliver us ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ"; at Mt 13:19 the Markan parallel 4:15 has σατανᾶς and the Lukan parallel 8:12 has ὁ διάβολος.
The reference to Satan is quite obvious in Mt 13:19; in addition, despite lack of unanimity among commentators, the reference to Satan at Mt 13:38 seems practically certain (cf. Jeremias, Parables, 83). We would further be inclined to include Mt 6:13 as a reference to Satan; cf. below, 138.
5. This distinctive usage of πονηρός is quite convincingly presented in Baumbach, Verständnis, 56-58 and elsewhere.
6. Cf. above, 89ff. Foerster observs rightly (TWNT II, 17) that the NT authors simply did not have the same interest in the powers of darkness that the authors of the A&P display. Cf. Noack, Satanas, 125-126.
7. Mt 25:41.

almost always referred to in connection with his opposition to the Kingdom of Heaven and to the work of Christ,[1] and thus becomes a sort of dark backdrop helping to define the outline of Synoptic Christology.[2] The stress is on Satan's deeds, not on his person.[3]

One further term applied to Satan should be noted: under his name Βεέλζεβουλ he is referred to as the ἄρχων of the demons.[4] This term ἄρχων is elsewhere used in the NT of officials of high rank who are nevertheless under other authorities, a usage quite consistent with contemporary secular sources.[5] Its application to Satan would seem to indicate that for the Synoptic authors Satan, however great his power, is to be regarded as subject to a superior power as an ἄρχων is subject to his king or emperor.

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1. Opposition to Christ himself in connection with the Temptation, the rebuke of Peter, the Passion; the Beelzebul controversy does not apply so forcefully here since Satan appears not as the aggressor, but the defender of his own. Opposition to the Kingdom in Mt's parable of the tares, the demonic opposition to Christ, and in such passages as the Ananias and Sapphira story of Acts five.
2. "In primitive Christianity there is no christology without demonology. But the first word and the last belongs to theology." Stauffer, Theology, 67.
3. Snatching the seed (Mk 4:15//Mt 13:19//Lk 8:12), sowing the tares (Mt 13:39), seeking to lead Jesus astray through Peter (Mk 8:33//Mt 16:23), "sifting" the disciples (Lk 22:31), etc.
4. Mk 3:22//Mt 12:24//Mt 9:34//Lk 11:15. Note that Βεέλζεβουλ is the name used by Jesus' enemies, and that in reply the answer subtly shifts so as to include Satan in the same category with Beelzebul, and indeed, to identify the two. On the etymology of the name Beelzebul, cf. McNeile, Matthew, 143-144; 174; Taylor, Mark, 238-239; for a review of opinion and a conclusion that differs from both, cf. Gaston, TheolZeit 18 (1962), 247-255, who suggests on rabbinic evidence that instead of the usual interpretation of "Lord of Dung" or "Lord of the Flies" should be substituted "master of the house" (cf. Mt 10:25). Jesus' identification here of the two demonic lords as being one is a further unification and simplification of demonic terminology. It may be that two separate charges are combined here by the tradition (cf. Taylor, op. cit., 238); Beelzebul may have been considered only one among many demonic overlords, and the charge that Jesus was possessed by him may not have been identical with the charge that Satan was casting out Satan. For contemporary Judaism, the leader of the demons and Satan the Accuser were not yet united into a single concept (Foerster, TWNT I, 606).
5. Of earthly rulers, Mt 9:18,23; 20:25; Lk 12:58; 18:18; 23:13; 23:35; 24:20; and a number of further references in Acts. Of religious rulers, the Pharisees (Lk 14:1); the priests (Acts 13:27; 23:5(Ex 22:27)); perhaps also Acts 4:8. For secular usage, cf. Delling, TWNT I, 486-487.

Two more observations relative to terminology remain to be made. The first has to do with a mode of expression rather than particular words: it is the form in which Synoptic dualism appears.[1] There is of course no metaphysical dualism in the Synoptic Gospels, but there is in Mt and Lk (and to a lesser extent in Mk) a tendency to view life as a choice between good and evil, starkly conceived. Of course, everyone who believes there is a difference between right and wrong must use some such language to express himself on the subject, but in Mt and Lk the form of expression is repeated so often as to become a stock form. Men are seen as divided into two groups, the righteous and the unrighteous,[2]

1. The word "dualism" as applied to the NT is a rather slippery term, and must be treated carefully. Any system founded on two-fold-ness, according to dictionary standards, admits to being called "dualistic;" but it is usually metaphysical dualism that comes to mind when the term is employed. This type of dualism is not encountered in the NT. Whiteley's perspicacious note on the subject distinguishes four types of dualism: anthropological, metaphysical, cosmogonic and moral. It is the latter that we have in mind in using the term with reference to the Synoptic Gospels and in the NT in general: "the belief that sin matters, and that conduct is not unimportant." (Whiteley, Paul, 32).

2. Mt refers to the scribes and Pharisees in terms that are unvaryingly deprecatory; they constitute for him a sinful class by contrast with the disciples. For passages in which Mt divides sharply between the righteous and unrighteous, cf. Mt 5:19, least/greatest; 7:24-27, wise/foolish builders; 11:25-Lk 10:21-22, wise/babes; 12:35//Lk 6:45, good/wicked men and treasuries; 13:11//Mk 4:11//Lk 8:10, "you"/"others"; 13:24-30, good seed/tares; 13:47-50, good/bad fish; 20:25-26//Mk 10:42-44//Lk 22:25-26, the Gentiles/"you"; 21:31, tax collectors and harlots/chief priests and elders; 21:41//Mk 12:9-Lk 20:16, wicked tenants/"others"; 22:1-14//Lk 14:15-24, e.g., Mt 22:14, many called/few chosen; 23:1-12, scribes and Pharisees/"you"; 24:23-24//Mk 13:21-22, false prophets/the elect; 24:40-41//Lk 17:34-35, one taken/one left; 24:45-51//Lk 12:42-46, wise/foolish servant; 25:1-13, five wise/five foolish maidens; 25:14-30//Lk 19:11-27, diligent/slothful servants; 25:31-46, sheep/goats, righteous/unrighteous, left/right. In addition to the Lukan material already cited, cf. Lk 6:20-26, the dichotomy implicit in Lk's Beatitudes as opposed to the "woes;" 7:29-30, people and tax collectors/Pharisees and lawyers; 15:7, sinners/righteous; 15:11-32, prodigal son/elder brother; 16:8, sons of this age/sons of light; 16:19-31, rich man/Lazarus; 18:10-14, Pharisee/tax collector. By contrast with Mt, Lk's references to the Pharisees are not so uncompromisingly disparaging, and the two groups into which humanity is divided are ethically conceived. The relative infrequency with which Mk makes use of this "two groups" dichotomy is noteworthy.

or as following one of two ways.[1] In the case of Mt, as Baumbach has shown, the unrighteous and the righteous are seen as living side by side within the Christian community,[2] while in Lk the dichotomy is between the righteous Christian community on the one hand and the "sinners," i.e., the unconverted, on the other.[3] Mk, by contrast, does not divide men into two such camps, but regards Christians and non-Christians alike as sinners.[4] Nor does Mk often speak of a choice between two ways.[5] The language of Mt and Lk has its clearest parallel in the

1. Mt 6:22-23//Lk 11:34-36; Mt 6:24-Lk 16:13; Mt 7:13-14//Lk 13:23-24; Mt 7:16-17//Lk 6:43-44; Mt 8:21-22//Lk 9:59-60; cf. also Lk 9:61-62; Mt 10:32-33//Lk 12:8-9; Mt 10:37-38//Lk 14:26-27; Mt 12:30-Lk 11:23; Mt 12:33,35//Lk 6:43-45; cf. also Mk 8:36-37//Mt 16:26//Lk 9:25; Mk 9:40//Lk 9:50; Mt 21:28-31; Lk 16:15.
2. Verstndnis, 63, 93.
3. Ibid., 140, 199. A glance at the concordance shows the comparative frequency of Lk's references to ἁμαρτωλοί and also the πλούσιοι, who form a special class of sinners in Lk. On the latter, cf. Lk 6:24, "woe to you rich!" 6:20, blessed are the poor; 12:16, the rich fool who was not rich toward God; 14:12-13, do not invite your rich neighbors, but the poor; 16:1ff, the rich man and his dishonest steward (note the corruption caused here by wealth); 16:13, you cannot serve God and money; 16:14, the Pharisees are offended by this parable, φιλάργυροι ὑπάρχοντες, and money is implied to be a βδέλυγμα before God; 16:19,21, a rich man/a poor man (Lazarus); 18:23, the inquirer departs sorrowful for he was very rich; 19:2, Zacchaeus the rich tax collector is saved, but only by parting with his riches and giving them to the poor; 20:46, the scribes live luxuriously at the expense of the poor, and will be condemned. On Lk's attitude toward wealth, cf. the fact that in Lk 18:29//Mt 19:29//Mk 10:30, Lk characteristically omits "fields" from the list of what is to be recompensed in this world; and that in Lk 14:21 the poor are called to the wedding feast (more specifically than in Mt 22:1ff, Lk spells out the expensive purchases and acquisitions, e.g., a wife!, that keep the guests away from the celebration).

A second class of sinners is comprised by "the Jews," who in Acts are rather consistently the enemies of Pl in particular: Acts 9:22,23; 12:3,11; 13:6,45,50; 14:2,4-5,19; 17:5,13; 18:12; 20:3,19; 21:11,27; 23:12,20,27; 24:9,18; 25:2.
4. Baumbach, op. cit., 21. As B observes here, Mk's "dualism" is between the holy God and sinful men. Christians are not to be regarded as particularly holy, but are set apart by having been chosen by God. Symptomatic of this is the fact that Mk (followed by Lk) records Jesus' saying, "no one is good but one, God," (Mk 10:18-Lk 18:19) in such a way as to imply a distinction even between himself and God at this point, whereas Mt, influenced no doubt by larger doctrinal considerations, alters the setting in such a way as to remove this implied distinction between Jesus and God (Mt 19:17). Cf. ibid., 47.
5. Mk 8:36-37//Mt 16:26//Lk 9:25; Mk 9:40//Lk 9:50. Without comparison with the other two Gospels we would hardly suspect influence of the Two Ways doctrine here.

inter-Testament and Rabbinic authors;[1] it is clearly a rephrasing of the Two Ways doctrine so prominent in Judaism. It seems to have been imbedded in the "Q" material and in the "M" and "L" sources; the particular form it assumes in Mt's and Lk's respective gospels is the result of independent thought on the part of the author, but within the context of a firmly established tradition evidently unknown to Mk, a tradition which Mk and Lk inherited. There can be no real question of an independent creation of this Two Ways material on the part of Mt or Lk; their own creative participation was in the shaping the tradition received at their hands.

The second observation likewise has to do more with a thought form than with specific terms. All three of the Synoptic Gospels are agreed in teaching that God has a purpose which he is fulfilling in the world, but this concept of necessity is variously expressed. There are two principal means of stating it, the first being the simple use of a word like δεῖν or μέλλειν or ἀνάγκη, or the use of the future tense; thus, "I must (δεῖ) preach the good news of the Kingdom of God."[2] This expression

1. For the inter-Testament authors, cf. above, 59ff; 107ff; for Rabbinic references, cf. the collection in S.-B. Kommentar, I, 460-463.

It may be remarked that there has been no mention at this point of the DSS, with their frequent reference to Two Ways (e.g., 1QS 1:5-7,10; 3:13; 3:18-21, etc.). Two Groups are also occasionally set in sharp distinction (e.g. 1QH 5:12-19). But in fact, the DSS evidence does not seem to apply to the Synoptic Gospels. As Seitz has observed (NTS 6 (1959), 82-95), there is a difference between the Rabbinic and the Qumran interpretation of the human situation, and of the Two Ways doctrine as part of the situation: "Nevertheless, the two schools of interpretation pursued independent courses. Whereas rabbinic thought eventually developed from Gn 6:5 with 2:7 the doctrine that God formed man with two conflicting yetzerim, the community at Qumran affirmed that in creating man God appointed for him two antithetic spirits, one of light and one of darkness." (Ibid., 94). The distinction is a valid one. Though we find little of the evil yetzer in the Synoptic Gospels (except, perhaps, a hint - cf. below, 163-164), still we find nothing at all of two cosmic spirits of light and darkness. The latter is Johannine language. We might define the Synoptic Two Ways teaching as being the Rabbinic view without the evil yetzer. As in the Rabbis, the struggle seems to be confined to the human heart as its battlefield.

2. Lk 4:43.

of constraint or purpose is in connection with a plan of God, Heilsgeschichte, or with the leading of the Holy Spirit. Mk uses this means of expressing God's purpose particularly in connection with Jesus' predictions of his own passion and the fall of Jerusalem,[1] and Mt follows the same general line laid down by Mk.[2] Lk broadens the usage to some extent in the Gospel,[3] and even more in Acts.[4]

The second means by which God's purpose is expressed is in terms of prophecy and fulfilment. This is likewise found in Mk,[5] and on an expanded basis in Lk.[6] But this form of expression is typically that of Mt, for he strongly prefers to buttress his references to God's plan with references to the OT.[7] It is typical, e.g., that Mt should retain the phraseology of Mk, "the Son of Man goes as it is written of him," but that Lk should have, "the Son of Man goes as it has been de-

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1. Mk 8:31//Mt 16:21//Lk 9:22; Mk 9:31//Mt 17:22//Lk 9:44; Mk 10:33-34//Mt 20:18//Lk 18:31 (Lk introduces the idea of prophecy here); Mk 10:39-40//Mt 20:23; Mk 13:2//Mt 24:2//Lk 21:6; Mk 13:7 (Dan 2:28)//Mt 24:6//Lk 21:9; Mk 14:18//Mt 26:21; Mk 14:30//Mt 26:34//Lk 22:34.
2. In addition to the passages just cited, cf. Mt 18:7//Lk 17:1; Mt 26:2. It is noteworthy that all but one of these passages has a synoptic parallel; this is therefore by no means an original contribution of Mt.
3. Lk 1:76; 2:34-35,49; 4:43//Mk 1:38; 17:26//Mk 8:31; Lk 19:5 (cf. 19:9 for the connection with salvation-history); 22:22 (cf. below, 129, fn. 1); 23:29,43; 24:26.
4. Acts 2:23; 4:28; 13:11 (Elymas' punishment is for obstructing the purposes of God); 13:46,48 (cf. 2:47 and 16:14 - Lk believes that the growth of the Church is the work of the Holy Spirit, and part of God's plan); 17:31.
5. Lk 3:4 (Is 40:3)//Mt 3:3; cf. Mk 1:2-3 (Mal 3:1; Is 40:3); Mk 4:12 (Is 6:9-10)//Mt 13:13-14//Lk 8:10; Mk 7:6-7 (Is 29:13)//Mt 15:8,9; Mk 9:11-12 (Mal 4:5)//Mt 17:10-11; Mk 12:10 (Ps 118:22f)//Mt 21:42//Lk 20:17; Mk 12:36 (Ps 110:1)//Mt 22:43-44//Lk 20:42-43; Mk 14:21//Mt 26:24//Lk 22:22 (cf. below, 129, fn. 1); Mk 14:27 (Zech 13:7)//Mt 26:31.
6. Lk 3:5-6 (Is 40:5-6); Lk 4:18-19 (Is 61:1-2); Lk 7:27 (Mal 3:1)//Mt 11:10 (cf. Mk 1:2); Lk 18:31; Lk 22:37 (Is 53:12); Lk 24:25-27. It will be observed that Lk (and Mk as well) interpret the OT in a broader and more general sense, avoiding the detailed fulfilments favored in Mt's use of prophecy, e.g., the introduction of a colt into the Palm Sunday account in order to fulfil Zech 9:9 (cf. Mt 21:5).
7. Mt 1:23 (Is 7:14); 2:6 (Mic 5:2); 2:15 (Hos 11:1); 2:16ff (Jer 31:15); 2:23 (Is 11:1); 4:14-16 (Is 9:1-2); 8:17 (Is 53:4); 11:14 (Mal 4:5 - cf. Mt 17:10-13); 12:15-21 (Is 42:1-4); 12:40 (cf. also to this point Mt 16:4); 13:14-15 (Is 6:9-10); 13:35 (Ps 78:2); 21:5 (Is 62:11 and Zech 9:9); 26:15, while not labelled a fulfillment of prophecy, is certainly the fulfillment of Zech 11:12; Mt 26:54.

termined."[1] According to the Synoptic view of prophecy, the future now brought to fulfillment in Jesus can be read in the OT prophets, who predicted what would take place, thus indicating that God had long before planned what he had now brought to pass.[2]

A third means of speaking of the plans of God has to do with direct guidance given by an angel or by the Holy Spirit. This mode of expression is a favorite with Lk; in Acts, where he is freed from the Gospel tradition and able to express himself more naturally, we find visions and messages from the Holy Spirit and angel visitants;[3] typically, Lk is the only Evangelist to report a strengthening angel in the Garden of Gethsemane.[4]

We turn now to the question of what teaching regarding the forces of evil is found in the Synoptic Gospels. What did the early Church,

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1. Lk 22:22//Mk 14:21-Mt 26:24. Too much stress, however, should not be laid on this point, as Lk's gratuitous introduction of the prophetic witness shows, Lk 18:31//Mk 10:33-Mt 20:18. There is also an abundance of Scriptural reference in Acts, cf. 1:16 (Scripture); 1:20 (Ps 69:25; 109:8); 2:17-21 (Joel 2:28-32); 2:25ff. (Ps 16:8-11); 2:30-31 (David being a prophet); 2:34-35 (Ps 110:1); 3:18 (what God foretold); 3:21 (the time God spoke of by his prophet); 3:22-23 (Deut 18:15-16); 4:11-12 (Ps 118:22); 4:25-26 (Ps 2:1-2); 7:52 (a summary of Stephen's view on Jewish treatment of the prophets, including Jesus - the whole speech is really a commentary on Scripture); 8:32-33 (Is 53:7-8); 13:29-51 (Scripture adduced to show the purpose of God in the life of Jesus); 15:16-18 (Amos 9:11-12; Jer 12:15; Is 45:21); 17:3 (Pl argues from Scripture regarding the necessity of Christ's suffering); 28:25-27 (Is 6:9-10). The close association between Scripture citation and preaching in Acts is worth noting.
2. Cf. Conzelmann, Theology, 151ff.
3. Angels: Lk 1:11ff; 1:26ff; 2:8ff; 2:21; 22:43; 24:6-7; Acts 1:10-11; 5:19; 7:30; 8:26; 12:7ff; 27:23. Visions: Lk 2:26 (the Holy Spirit); Lk 12:12 (the Holy Spirit); Acts 9:3ff//22:6ff//26:12ff (Jesus to Saul); 9:10 (Jesus to Ananias); 10:3ff (an angel of God to Cornelius); 10:10ff (Peter's vision); 10:19 (the Holy Spirit to Peter); 13:2 (the Holy Spirit to the worshiping disciples); 16:7 (the Holy Spirit to Paul's company); 16:9 (Paul's vision of the Macedonian); 21:4 (the Holy Spirit through the disciples); 21:11 (the Holy Spirit through Agabus); 22:17-21 (Paul's vision of Jesus in the Temple); 23:11 (Jesus to Paul).
4. Lk 22:43. Even if this is an addition to the autograph, as the textual evidence might suggest, at least it is in harmony with Lk's view of angels. It will be noted that Scripture is adduced as normative for preaching, while guidance in everyday matters is the province of vision, and crises are more generally met with angelic help.

as represented in the Synoptic Gospels and Acts, believe and preach about evil, its agents, its defeat, and its origin? And in light of this, is there anything that can be said about Jesus' own views on the subject?

One of the agents of evil represented prominently in the Synoptics (and not nearly so prominently elsewhere in the NT[1]) is the company of the demons. These are regarded as an incorporeal host of spiritual beings who behave with virulent hostility toward men: they prey upon human beings, and this preying takes the form of "possession."[2] The closest inter-Testament analogy to this view is found in Tobit, for there demons are viewed as "entering" a person (though in Tobit the person afflicted with the demon does not herself become sick, but is a means of death to

1. δαιμονίζεσθαι, only in Jn 10:21; δαιμόνιον in Jn 7:20; 8:48,49,52; 10:20,21; Acts 17:18; ICor 10:20-21; ITim 4:1; Jas 2:19; Rev 9:20; 16:14; 18:2. This is not to suggest that there are no more demonic references than these; rather, different terminology is employed, as in IICor 12:7, where Pl speaks of an ἄγγελος σατανᾶ. It is particularly significant that the healing of the demon-possessed, such a characteristic act of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels, is totally absent from the Gospel of John. Jn knows of the idea of demonic possession, but speaks of it only in contexts that suggest the Beelzebul controversy reported in the Synoptic Gospels - i.e., Jesus is himself accused of being demon-possessed.

2. By contrast, Pl speaks typically of man's being in bondage or subject to demonic power, rather than of demonic power being "in" man; cf. ICor 5:5; 7:5; 10:10; IICor 2:11; Gal 4:3; Eph 2:2-3; man may also be "under" the Law or sin, which both come close to being demonic powers under certain circumstances; cf. below, 171, fn. 8. Lk uses similar expressions at Lk 13:11; Acts 10:38. On demonic "binding," cf. Deissmann, Light, 306-310.

It may be observed that in the story of the Gerasene demoniac the demons may also enter beasts, but this seems to have no particular significance; the Gospels conclude nothing from it. Cf. the note from Bartlet cited in Montefiore, Synoptic Gospels I, 112.

2. Demons are said to "enter" or "seize" man in Mk 9:18; Lk 8:30; 9:39. They are "cast out" in Mt 7:22; 8:16; 10:1,8; 12:24,26-28,43-45; 17:18; Mk 1:26,34,39; 3:15; 5:8,10,12-13; 6:13; 7:26,29-30; 9:18,25,38; Lk 4:35, 41; 8:2,29,31-33,35; 9:40,49; 11:15-20,24; 13:32; Acts 8:7; 16:18; 19:12. This heavy preponderance of texts referring to the exit (rather than entrance) of demons is revealing: the authors of the Synoptic Gospels were not interested in how men became possessed, but in how they were released. Foerster has observed that "im NT verhältnismässig selten von Dämonen die Rede ist, abgesehen von Besessenen." (TWNT II, 17). The clear focus in the NT is not on the demons, but on those whom they afflict, and Jesus' work in rescuing men from their grip.

her successive bridegrooms).[1] But we search the inter-Testament literature in vain for a precise parallel to the Synoptic demonology.[2]

The effect wrought by these demonic inhabitants is a particular form of sickness; though Mk never uses the verb θεραπεύειν or ἰᾶσθαι of the cure of demoniacs, Mt and Lk both do so.[3] In other words, Mk would seem to draw an even clearer distinction between general sickness and demonic possession than Mt or Lk do, the cure for the possession being always represented in Mk by the verb ἐκβάλλειν. But even allowing for this difference in detail, the first three Gospels agree in distinguishing between ordinary disease and disease of demonic origin.[4] There seems to be no disagreement on principle with the view which circulated in the ancient world that sin brought about death and sickness,[5] but Noack (and others similarly persuaded) seem to go too far in suggesting that all sickness is to be regarded as specifically demonic in origin.[6] It seems more probable

1. Cf. above, 98, fn. 6.
2. An interesting glimpse of contemporary Jewish demonology is given in Josephus, Ant. VI,8,2; VI,2,5.
3. Mt 4:24; 8:16; 15:28; Lk 6:18; 7:21; 9:42; Acts 5:16.
4. References to healings without mention of demonic influences are only slightly less numerous in the Synoptic Gospels than those attributed to demonic cause; and in Acts mention is made of an equal number of each.
5. Thus von Rad speaks about "an unexpressed though basic presupposition, the idea that there was a very close connexion between sin and physical disease." (Theology, 275). He further draws the theological parallel with Genesis 3. In the general view of the OT, such sickness is not so much demonically induced as it is caused by God, a form of retributive justice. "Every suffering takes on a religious aspect; there is no purely profane suffering. The physical suffering of sickness or the mental suffering of men's hostility go hand in hand with the anguish of being the object of divine anger and the fear of being rejected by him (Psalm 6; 88; 102)." (Dubarle, Original Sin, 15).
For the same idea in pagan thought, cf. the penitential hymn from Egypt cited by Wilson in ANET, 381; similarly, in an Akkadian hymn to Marduk, Marduk is seen as forgiving transgressions and subsequently banishing the demon which had caused sickness (ibid., 436). Similarly, the Hittite prayer against plague (ibid., 396).
6. With reference to Lk 13:11, and the opinion of some that this is not truly a case of demonic possession that was healed, Noack says, "Wir glauben jedoch, dass der Unterschied zwischen Dämonenaustreibung und (anderen) Heilungen ein Unterschied der literarischen Gattung ist, und dass man sehr wohl eine Krankheit, die 'geheilt' wird, einem bösen Geist hat zuschreiben können." (Satanas, 74). Cullmann similarly implies that all sickness is demon-induced (Salvation, 196). Cf. also Lake, in

to hold, with Foerster,[1] that while all sickness belongs to the general category of "devil's work," not all sickness is directly caused by demons. Foerster suggests that demonic sickness seems to have to do in particular with the destruction of God's image in man;[2] whether or not this be the case it is certainly true, as Braun noted, that sickness attributed to the demons is of unusual severity or strangeness.[3]

The difficulty involved in trying to interpret the Synoptic Gospels against the inter-Testament background at this point appears in the fact that demonic visitation or possession in the A&P is invariably associated with moral consequences.[4] But just as resolutely, the NT refuses to find

Beginnings V, 108. But the distinctions made between diseases in the Synoptic accounts seem to me to be more than merely literary. Bultmann (History, 226, fn.) considers it "a fair question" whether all Jesus' healings were originally thought to be exorcisms, but says, "It is not probable that they were...."

1. "Es ist nicht so, dass im NT alle Krankheiten auf Dämonen zurückgeführt werden." (TWNT II, 19). Similarly, Menzies, Earliest Gospel, 69: "It is not the case that the Jews with whom Jesus had to deal put down all maladies to the action of spirits, so that they had no other way but this to speak of ailments, bodily or mental. That is true of primitive therapeutics, and in the sacred texts of Egypt and of Assyria and Babylonia we may see how this view continued even in higher civilizations. Every malady was thought to be due to a spirit, and was to be treated by exorcism; there was a form of exorcism for the spirit of each ailment. The Jews of Christ's time are not at this stage of medical science. The Gospels report many cases of sickness which were not ascribed to demoniac action. Fever, palsy, blindness, deafness, lack of speech, are all spoken of in Mark in the terms we use ourselves... and we hear of physicians as well as of exorcists." In this outlook on disease and its demonic/natural cause the Synoptic Gospels parallel the similar view of the OT noted by Duhm, Die bösen Geister, 65.
2. Foerster, TWNT, loc. cit.
3. "Daraus ergibt sich, dass solche Krankheitserscheinungen, die etwas Unheimliches, etwas ganz Unerklärliches haben, für dämonisch gelten, weil sie nur als Wirkungen übernatürlichen, dem Betroffenen fremder Kräften verstanden werden können." ZTK 8 (1898), 507. "We are not going beyond the facts if we say that the cases in which possession was assumed were such as the medical knowledge of the day did not fully account for, and in which there was something mysterious." (Menzies, op. cit., 70).
4. This is invariably the case in TestXIIPat; cf., e.g., TReub 2:1-9; 3:1-8; TSim 4:9; TJud 23:1-2; TDan 1:7; 3:6; TAsh 6:5. Cf. also Jub 11:5, where sin and wrongdoing are attributed to demonic influence; IEn 19:1-2; 64:2; 65:6-8,10-11. In all the references from IEn demons likewise lead on to sin. The only exception is Tobit.

moral consequences in demonic possession.[1] By the same token, it is difficult to find any analogy to the demonically-induced sicknesses of the Synoptic Gospels in inter-Testament background literature, though we find parallels in Rabbinic writings and in Hellenistic pagan stories.[2] An influence, or combination of influences, seems to operate in the Synoptic interpretation of disease and its cause, and perhaps it will not be thought absurd to suggest that we may have here Jesus' own understanding of demonic power in relation to sin and sickness.[3]

But in spite of their power to make men wretched through sickness, the power of life and death does not seem to be in demonic control. Even Satan is only once mentioned in the NT as possessing this power;[4] it may be that this reticence to attribute the power of death to the demons or to Satan is simply due to the fact that in every case reported

1. As Braun observes (ZTK 8 (1898), demoniacs were admitted to the synagogue services (Mk 1:21-28//Lk 4:31-37) (508); they were not treated as unusually evil people (522); and they were never forgiven their sins: "Während Jesus anderen Kranken ernst ins Gewissen redet (Jn 5:14), oder die Vergebung ihrer Sünden ankündigt (Mt 9:2), thut er dies bei Dämonischen nie." (518). Cf. also Menzies, Earliest Gospel, 69. Best correctly observes (Temptation, 33), "At no point does Mark attribute moral evil, that is, sin, to demonic possession."
2. Cf. esp. Bultmann, History, 220ff, and the sources quoted there; cf. also Dibelius, Tradition to Gospel, 88-89; Cadbury, Luke-Acts, 143; for early Christian authors on the subject of demonology and exorcism, cf. Harnack, Expansion I, 162ff.
3. The A&P (excepting Tobit) generally associate demonic possession with sinfulness, but mention no magical practice as a means of expelling demons. On the other hand, two healing narratives in the DSS, in Genesis Apocryphon 20:28-29 and the Prayer of Nabonidus, do speak of sickness as resulting from demonic possession, and the healing of the latter is attributed to the forgiveness of sins by an exorcist; cf. Dupont-Sommer, Supplements to VT, 1959, 246-261. Like these DSS narratives, the Rabbinic sources join demonic possession with sickness, but generally do not seem to attach moral significance to this possession; cf. McNeile, Matthew, 175-176, for references to Jewish exorcistic formulas.
The Synoptic Gospels view sickness as demonically induced, but do not associate demoniacal possession with moral guilt and do not mention magical practice (to the astonishment of contemporaries - cf. Taylor, Mark, 175-176). In this respect, they occupy a curious middle ground, related to the A&P on the one hand and the DSS-Rabbinic view on the other, but with commitment to neither.
4. Heb 2:14. We are probably to think here of Satan as "the angel of death;" cf. S.-B. Kommentar I, 144ff.

in the Synoptic Gospels Jesus appears on the scene in time to prevent it. It seems more probable, though, that this reticence has a theological meaning, that in fact the demons were not thought to have this power, and that Satan's power was likewise limited in this respect, as he was also limited in Job.[1]

In addition to this limitation upon their power to inflict sickness, i.e., their inability to cause the death of their victims, we find the demonic horde limited by its subjection to Satan. The place in which the Synoptic Gospels teach this is in the passage concerning Beelzebul. In fact, apart from this reference there would hardly be ground in the first three Gospels for making a connection between Satan and the demons. But the idea of a demonic ruler, variously named, was common in the inter-Testament writings;[2] whether or not Beelzebul was originally considered to be identical with this ruler,[3] the setting given the story by Mt and Lk makes the identification, and in Mk Jesus' reply, focusing attention on Satan, has very nearly the same effect. So Satan is indeed the demons' overlord in the Synoptic Gospels.[4] If he wished (contrary to reason and fact) to drive out his own subject spirits, there is no question in anyone's mind that he possesses the authority to do so.[5]

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1. Job 2:6.
2. Cf. above, 92ff.
3. Cf. Taylor, Mark, 238, who believes that the charge of being demon-possessed (by Beelzebul) and that of casting out demons by their ruler (ἄρχων) are two separate matters that have been brought together by Mk. Foerster, TWNT I, 605, represents Beelzebul as the name "eines Dämonenfürsten," and thinks that though the distinction drawn by Taylor between two charges does not exist, still the net result is the same: Jesus' reply, identifying Beelzebul, Satan and the ἄρχων of the demons as one and the same settles the connection for the authors of the Synoptic Gospels.
4. This is not quite the same thing, it should be noted, as saying that men belong to the "Kingdom of Satan" as well. The nearest Synoptic approach to this idea is the "sons of the evil one" in Mt 13:38.
5. Mk 3:22; Mt 9:34; 12:24,27; Lk 11:15,18-19. The question of Mk 3:23 does not imply that the authority was lacking, but that the whole idea was unreasonable.

The demons are also abjectly subject to Jesus. In Mk's Gospel they are involuntary tools of Messianic revelation, pressed into service to identify Jesus as the Messiah.[1] Although in Mk and Lk they are occasionally permitted to resist him, this privilege is denied them by Mt,[2] and the outcome of the contest is for all three Evangelists a foregone conclusion. Not only so, but the demons are subject to the Twelve and to the Seventy,[3] and even to exorcists who did not follow Jesus.[4]

The demons are quite noticeably absent from the Passion account. The demonic part of this struggle is entirely between Jesus and Satan, as though the demons were foes unworthy of opposing the Messiah. They are likewise left out of account in the Temptation story. In fact, the power of demonic temptation is reserved for Satan even in the case of ordinary men, so that this power too is denied the demons.[5]

This brings us to another limitation upon demonic power, mentioned briefly above: the demons do not seem to have any moral sway over those

1. Mk 1:23-27,32-34; 3:10-11; 5:7. For Mt, of course, the idea of the Messianic Secret did not have the same significance, and in the one passage where it survives his editing (Mt 12:16) it is not linked with exorcisms, but with ordinary healings, and attached to Is 42:1-4 in such a way as to show Jesus' humility rather than his Messianic status; cf. Baumbach, Verständnis, 118-119. Lk, by contrast, preserves more of the Marcan understanding of the role of demons as witnesses to the Messiah (Mk 1:25=Lk 4:35; Mk 1:34//Lk 4:41; Mk 3:11, no Lukan parallel; Mk 5:1-20//Lk 8:26-39//Mt 8:28-34 (Mt 8:28-34 being very heavily edited and much of the demonic dialogue excised). Lk also records demonic testimony to the office of the apostles (Acts 16:16-18).
2. Mt excises the ὁρκίζω σε passage from the Gerasene Demoniac account (Mk 5:7, cf. Mt 8:29-30) and even Lk softens it (cf. Lk 8:28) to an appeal. Mt omits spiteful demonic behavior toward human victims after Jesus has bidden them depart (Mk 1:26, no parallel in Mt; Mk 9:26, cf. Mt 17:18). On the magical language addressed to Jesus by the demons, cf. Bauernfeind, Die Worte der Dämonen, particularly 16-17, 30. As B observes, this actually places Jesus in the position of the demon, and the demon is cast in the role of an exorcist. B believes that magical terminology, rather than a "Messianic Secret" lies behind the demonic ἐξέλθε σε of Mk.
3. Mk 6:7//Mt 10:1//Lk 9:1; Lk 10:17-20.
4. Mk 9:38-39//Lk 9:49-50; Mt 12:27//Lk 11:19; even Jesus' enemies might cast out demons, Mt 7:22. Such activity might, however, bring unexpected results, as in Acts 19:13-16. Cf. Filson, Matthew, 36.
5. The Temptation of Jesus: Mk 1:13//Mt 4:1-11//Lk 4:1-13; Mk 8:31-33//Mt 16:21-23. The temptation of ordinary men, Mk 4:15//Mt 13:19//Lk 8:12; Mk 14:10//Lk 22:3; Lk 22:31; Acts 5:3.

whom they afflict. The demoniacs are not described as being unusually sinful; sickness is once connected with sin, but it is noteworthy that the healing does not follow the forgiveness of sin as though sin had caused a consequent sickness.[1] Instead, both the forgiveness of sins and the healing of the sick are complementary signs of Jesus' Messianic status ("Who is this..." in Mk and Lk), and though the connection between them is quite possibly allowable, it is by no means necessary. Thus, though demons can make men miserable, they do not seem capable of making them sin.

One further limit is clearly placed on the power of the demons: in the purpose of God, demonic power will come to an end. The Messianic visitation of Jesus is a foretaste of their coming doom;[2] their defeat at his hands, conversely, is a sign that the Messianic kingdom is being set up.[3] When the Son of Man sits on his throne, the devil and his angels will be cast into eternal fire.[4]

The sum of our discussion of demonic power and its limits is to show that the Synoptic Gospels confine demonic influence to a very small

1. Mk 2:1-12//Mt 9:1-8//Lk 5:17-26. The connection between sin and consequent sickness is repudiated in Jn 9:2-3, but this is with particular reference to one case; it seems to be implied in Jn 5:14. Considering the frequency with which this connection is drawn elsewhere (cf. above, 131, fn. 5; 132, fn. 4; 133, fn. 3) it is surprising that it should be mentioned so rarely in the Gospels, with their frequent records of healing and their stress on the forgiveness of sins.
2. "Have you come here to torment us before the time?" (Mt 8:29), or as McNeile translates, "Surely Thou hast come too early!" (Matthew, 113). Cf. also the conclusion drawn by Jesus in the Beelzebul controversy, Mk 3:26//Mt 12:26//Lk 11:18.
3. All of Mk's and Lk's demonic confessions of Jesus' status have this effect. Cf. also the establishment of God's kingdom signalled by the fall of Satan's in the Beelzebul Controversy. The success of the disciples in casting out demons prompts Jesus' saying about the fall of Satan from heaven, Lk 10:18. The Messiah was expected to be the one to cast down Satan and the demons: TLev 18:12; TJud 25:3; TZeb 9:8; TDan 5:10-11; AssMos 10:1.
4. Mt 25:41.

area. Demons are causes of sickness, and nothing more.[1] While these sicknesses are unusually severe, and while they cause untold misery among the children of men, nevertheless the demons have no influence upon the eternal destiny of mankind. Their sphere is purely corporeal.

We have already noted that in the first three Gospels there is no speculation as to the origin of the demons; the problem involved in attributing their creation to God does not seem to have troubled our authors. There is a hint that Satan is a being of heavenly origin, but it is no more than a hint;[2] and there is not a word as to where his demons come from. But their reality is not to be doubted;[3] they are a fact of life and not to be dismissed lightly. Within their limited sphere they make their influence strongly felt.

But if we address our question as to the origin of evil to the demonic evidence in the Synoptic Gospels, we really find no answer. Res-

1. Noack, Satanas, 74: "Das Wirken der Dämonen ist durchaus physischer Art, sie sind sozusagen die naturwissenschaftliche Erklärung der Erscheinungen." It does not seem possible, however, to go all the way with N in making a simple identification between the function of Satan and of the demons, and to suggest that Satan's sway is likewise "rein körperlich" (loc. cit.). Satan as pictured in the Synoptic Gospels is altogether a more sinister figure than the demons, as we hope to show below. On the demons and their sphere, cf. further op. cit., 123.
This strict limitation of demonic influence to human sickness would of course eliminate from consideration some other possible references to demons, e.g. Mk 4:37-41//Mt 8:24-27//Lk 8:23-25, where it is suggested that a storm-demon is exorcised. This and similar supposed references to demons depend on a particular view of cosmic evil that will be discussed below, 155.
2. Lk 10:18.
3. "Was wir also bisher über das Wesen, den Charakter und die Wirkungen der δαιμόνια herausgestellt haben, ist nicht bloss volkstümliche Vorstellung oder pharisäische Theorie, sondern Jesus selbst übernimmt diese Anschauung in seine praktische Thätigkeit und nimmt auf sie gelegentlich auch Bezug in theoretischer Auseinandersetzung." (Braun, ZTK 8 (1898), 499-500. Harnack in the same vein regards the reality of the demons as being not "mere theory; it was a most vital conception of existence." (Expansion I, 161). More recently, James S. Stewart has criticised those who neglect the importance of evil powers, suggesting that they "have misunderstood as secondary and extraneous elements in the primitive Christian proclamation what in fact are integral and basic components of the Gospel." (SJT 4 (1951), 294). Cf. also Jackson & Lake, Beginnings IV, 121.

sponsibility for one form of physical evil, i.e., severe physical sickness, may be laid in part at their door; but the far more serious problem of moral evil is far beyond the capacity of the demons to cause or explain.

Turning now to the subject of Satan and his personal power (as distinct from the powers he exercises through his subject demons) we discover that we are dealing with an altogether more formidable figure, one whose powers are more broadly conceived and whose enmity is even more to be feared.

The function of Satan is to test and trouble mankind.[1] In this respect, he exceeds the powers of Job's Satan, for the latter seems to adopt a rather detached and experimental posture, much as a court prosecutor might;[2] the NT Satan, however, is regarded as being an enemy of God and of his people, and whatever access he may once have had to Heaven, he has no longer.[3] In this respect, Mt's designation of him as ὁ πονηρός is significant: Job's Satan seems a-moral, but Mt's Satan is the Evil One par excellence.[4] He is regarded as sharing in the guilt which he brings

1. This is by no means to ignore the connection between Satan and physical suffering - cf., e.g., Lk's expression, "bound by Satan" (Lk 13:16), or his reference to those "oppressed by the devil" (Acts 10:38). But both of these references are probably to demonic possession (cf. the πνεῦμα ἀσθενείας of Lk 13:11) and may be regarded as evidence of Satan's will executed through demonic underlings (cf. Paul's ἄγγελος Σατανᾶ in IICor 12:7), and the unique function of Satan is to lead men into moral error.

2. Σατανᾶς means "accuser" and is thus used in its occasional appearances in the OT; cf. above, 16; Noack, Satanas, 13-14; Foerster in TWNT VII, 154, cites with approval the suggestion of A. Lods that the concept may have originated in the Oriental travelling court official known as the "ear of the king."

3. On Satan as God's enemy, cf., e.g., Rom 16:20; Rev 20:1-10. This view of Satan had been shaped over the course of many years (cf. above, 92ff; it seems improbable (cf. Caird, Luke, 143) that the saying of Lk 10:18 intends us to understand that this "ecstatic vision" is of an event that took place during the mission of the seventy; rather, this is to be understood as part of the NT "already/not yet" (Cullmann, Salvation, 196); as Bornkamm observes, Jesus does not speak elsewhere as a visionary or an apocalyptic seer (Jesus, 68). The time at which Satan's fall took place was not a fixed matter in contemporary thought; cf. below, 156, fn 4.

4. In Mt 5:39, the reference is certainly to a wicked man; elsewhere the use of the term probably applies to Satan. It is clearly so in 13:19 and 13:38, and the two remaining references, 5:37 and 6:13 make excellent sense understood in this way. Cf. above, 123, fn. 4.

about by tempting man, and must therefore be punished for it.[1]

At the same time, it would be a mistake to conclude that for the authors of the first three Gospels Satan has in any way a monopoly on the work of temptation. A review of the use of two NT words, σκανδαλίζειν and πειράζειν underscores this multiplicity in the source of temptations. The former is generally speaking a more neutral term than πειράζειν; it is regarded as being the occasion of offence, which may or may not lead on to sin.[2] On the other hand, a πειρασμός is considerably more likely to be a leading toward evil.[3]

The word πειράζειν is used in connection with Satan's tempting of Jesus by all three Evangelists;[4] Mt further characterizes Satan here by calling him ὁ πειράζων, the Tempter,[5] and Mt and Lk further use the word in Jesus' reply to Satan: "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God."[6] So the activity described by the verb πειράζειν definitely belongs to Satan's sphere, particularly for Mt.

But otherwise the word is used in Mt, with one exception,[7] entirely

1. Mt 25:41.
2. The seed which falls in shallow soil σκανδαλίζεται when affliction and persecution comes (Mk 4:17//Mt 13:21//Lk 8:13 - Lk does not use this verb, but significantly substitutes πειρασμός for "afflictions"); σκάνδαλα are linked with τοὺς ποιοῦντας τὴν ἀνομίαν in Mt 13:41 (Arndt-Gingrich, Lexicon, 760, find here a reference to things rather than persons); Peter himself becomes a σκάνδαλον to Jesus, perhaps as an obstruction in his way to the Cross (Mt 16:23); the perils of the last days (Mt 24:10) will scandalize many; "woe to the world because of σκάνδαλα!" (Mt 18:7//Lk 17:1). Presumably, all the foregoing references are to σκάνδαλα that might be construed as producing sins. But there is at least one use of the word (Mt 17:27) that certainly seems morally neutral; and it is difficult to attribute to the organs of the body any moral culpability apart from the use to which they are put (Mk 9:42,43,45//Mt 18:6,8,9// Mt 5:29-30//Lk 17:2). And the chief reason for denying moral evil in a σκάνδαλον as such is the fact that Jesus himself is the person concerning whom the word is most frequently used (Mk 6:3//Mt 13:57; Mk 14:27,29//Mt 26:31,33; Mt 11:6//Lk 7:23; Mt 15:12).
3. Cf. Arndt-Gingrich, Lexicon, 646, where in the majority of instances, πειράζειν and πειρασμός are evil in meaning.
4. Mk 1:13//Mt 4:1//Lk 4:2.
5. Mt 4:3; cf. the similar characterization as ὁ πονηρός, above, 138, fn. 4.
6. Mt 4:7-Lk 4:12 (Deut 6:16); cf. Heb 3:8. Cf. below, 141, fn. 2.
7. Mt 26:41//Mk 14:38//Lk 22:46; it will be noted that as part of the general tradition this expression is not distinctively Matthean.

of the scribes and the Pharisees.[1] Considering the part played in Mt's Gospel by this stock group, it seems clear that they were working with evil intent to hinder Jesus, and indeed might be thought of as being in league with the devil;[2] but as to their being regarded as real men, there can be no doubt that they are, and that thus πειρασμός can have a human source.

Mk does not have such a distinctive usage of the word, though it is clear that he too thinks πειρασμός can have a human point of origin.[3] But Lk differs from Mt and Mk in broadening the application of this word to include a more general reference; not only may πειρασμός have a human origin,[4] but it may spring from circumstances which the other Synoptic authors describe more generally as θλῖψις or διωγμός which become for Lk

1. Mt 16:1//Mk 8:11//Lk 11:15; Mt 19:3//Mk 10:2; Mt 22:18//Mk 12:15//Lk 20:23-24 (note that Mk here ascribes to the Pharisees and Herodians ὑπόκρισιν; Mt strengthens the expression by attributing to them πονηρίαν as well; Lk weakens it by substituting πανουργίαν, and eliminating the reference to πειρασμός); Mt 22:35//Mk 12:28//Lk 10:25 (note that here Mk makes the questioner an earnest scribe, not far from the Kingdom; for Mt and Lk he becomes the Pharisees and Sadducees (Mt) or a lawyer (Lk), and the incident becomes an instance of πειρασμός).
2. Cf. his phrase υἱοὶ τοῦ πονηροῦ, Mt 13:38. If this is taken with Satanic reference, then surely for Mt the scribes and Pharisees would belong with this class. But a difference arises if Satan in Mk and Mt is thought of as trying to hinder Jesus' journey to the Cross (cf. Mt 16:23, the word σκάνδαλον, and above, 139, fn. 2. In this case, the scribes and Pharisees become peers of Satan in πειρασμός, but equally are a σκάνδαλον to Satan in his effort to keep Christ from the cross - a curious conception. The most probable solution is that Satan's effort is not so much to keep Jesus from arriving in Jerusalem to suffer, as it is to pervert the true Messianic intent of Jesus and thus achieve what he first attempted in the Wilderness Temptation (cf. Taylor, Mark, 379-380; McNeile, Matthew, 245).
3. All of Mk's references to πειράζειν - πειρασμός are shared with the other Evangelists. Those attributing πειρασμός to human origin are Mk 8:11; 10:2; 12:15.
4. Cf. the references cited on this page, fn. 1. Very probably, for Lk at least, the quotation of Deut 6:16 at Lk 4:12 would have a human reference, i.e., as in the original, the testing of God would originate with Jesus the man. Cf. below, 141, fn. 2, and Best, Temptation, 43: "...in the Passion Jesus has to meet evil which begins within himself.... The most terrible evil in the Gospel is not the demonic or sickness but the evil in the heart of man; it comes to its climax in the Passion and lays its hand even on the heart of the Christ himself." A similar thought may be in Lk's mind in the Temptation story through this reference to the OT.

a καιρός πειρασμοῦ.[1] This may also have a bearing on the way in which the Lord's Prayer is to be understood in Mt as compared with Lk.[2]

Lk may also have thought of πειρασμός as springing specifically from riches. His use of the rich as a stock group of sinners[3] shows that the possession of riches for him comes close to being actual sin. But the verb πειράζειν is not used in this immediate connection.

For Mk and Mt the occasion of a σκάνδαλον may also be the organs of the body;[4] it is possible to argue from this that Satan "possesses"

1. Lk 8:13//Mk 4:17//Mt 13:21. Cf. also the general and abstract reference to "my temptations" in Lk 22:28, and Lk's emphatic doublet of 22:40-22:46, which stresses the danger of πειρασμός from an undesignated source.

The multiplicity of the temptation sources seems a weighty objection to Conzelmann's theory of a halcyon period in Jesus' ministry, free from πειρασμός: "Between the 'Temptation' and the Passion (Satan) is absent, then he reappears (Lk 22:3) and the 'temptations' are back again...." (Theology, 156; cf. similarly 16, 50, 81, 200, 232). If temptations stemmed from Satan exclusively, then it might be possible to defend this view, though even that presents some problems. But if there are non-Satanic sources of temptation, then the supposed unconditional departure of Satan becomes an irrelevance.

Of course, C's view that where Satan is absent temptation does not take place would seem to imply that Satan is behind all temptation, that he works through various media but is responsible for temptation whenever it occurs. This view is possible, but if held, it drags Satan back in by the heels at 10:25 and 11:16. That Satan's temptations of Jesus were continuous, cf. Caird, Luke, 81: "Luke tells us that the devil departed from Jesus for the time being. Jesus had won an initial victory, but these same temptations were to recur throughout his ministry."

2. Lk has, of course, simply "and lead us not into πειρασμόν." On evidence of 8:13, this would appear likely to be θλῖψις. For a convenient summary of opinion on Lk's understanding of this phrase, cf. Houk, SJT 19 (1966), 217-218. But Mt's addition of "deliver us ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ" with πονηρός understood, in Mt's typical usage, as moral evil (cf. above, 118-119) seems to shift this temptation into the realm of the specifically Satanic. That ὁ πονηρός is here to be understood as "the evil one," cf. Schlatter, Matthäus, 216; Allen, Matthew, 60; Baumbach, Verständnis, 75-76; Kuhn, in Scrolls, 109. To the contrary, cf. Klostermann, Matthäusevangelium, 59; Schmidt, Matthäus, 133; McNeile, Matthew, 81-82.

3. Cf. above, 126, fn. 3. Cf. the proximity of riches, anxieties, and pleasures (by contrast with Mt and Mk) as a complementary trilogy following upon ὁ διάβολος and πειρασμός in the interpretation of the parable of the Soils (Lk 8:12-14). It is also to be noted that on the two occasions (cf. below, 142, fn. 3) when Satan is spoken of as "entering" people, Lk connects it directly with lust for money.

4. Mt 5:29-30//Mt 18:8-9//Mk 9:43-48. Less definitely, Mt 6:22-23//Lk 11:34-36 may also apply here.

the organs in question, on evidence from the inter-Testament literature.[1] On the other hand, if this direct involvement of Satan in "possession" of the organs is called in question, the body itself may be regarded as still another source of πειρασμός that may become a leading toward sin.

So although the three Synoptic Gospels attribute to Satan the power of πειρασμός, we must be cautious about identifying him as its exclusive source. This may be considered a limitation upon the extent of his sway.[2]

Satan is also represented in Lk as "entering" people. The effect of this is to lead them to sin or to perversion of the Kingdom of God, and the evidence of its occurrence bears none of the marks that would indicate ordinary Synoptic demon-possession.[3]

The importance of Satan in the life of Jesus is quite unmistakable for the three Evangelists, despite their varying estimates of its precise extent. And by analogy, as well as by instance, Satan is likewise represented as making his attack on the follower of Christ as well. Satan

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1. In the ancient world, the parts of the body were variously considered to have properties or characteristics that displayed themselves outwardly in behavior of a certain type if the organ in question were given the mastery; thus since hatred is associated with the liver, Gad's sin against Joseph is thought to proceed from his liver (TGad 5:9-11). Lust seems to be associated with the eye (1QS 1:5; Mt 5:27-29). Stubbornness is frequently called "stiffness of neck." It was considered possible for a spirit to possess the organs of the body (e.g., 1QH 1:28).
2. This is a point to remember in weighing the value of such generalizations as Bonsirven's in Theology, 53: "But the Son of God, who sees beyond the outward appearances, recognizes Satan as the primary source of sin...." Whatever may be the primary source of sin, it can be said with a fair degree of certainty that the NT does not regard it as being Satan. And that Satan is not the sole source of πειρασμός is convincingly shown by Best, Temptation, 33ff; cf. also Schlier, Principalities, 60 (with reference to Pl and the "powers"): "The opponent is not only, nor primarily, an outsider; it is not even an enemy separate from ourselves."
3. Lk 22:3; Acts 5:3. On Noack's view, cf. above, 137, fn. 1, attempting to limit Satan to the role of the chief disease-demon, this would seem to require that Judas and Ananias fall prey to a particularly virulent sickness; but their behavior is entirely different from that of the "demon"-possessed. This argues strongly that Satan's role has dimensions not found in that of the Synoptic demons: that he is different in kind from them.

(among others) is depicted as resisting God and his Kingdom, whose prophet and representative Jesus is, and whose members Christians are.

The first occasion of this opposition is in the Temptation. Its significance for Mk has been variously assessed,[1] but it remains clear that it occupies a portentous position even in Mk, coming as it does between the designation of Jesus as Son of God and the beginning of his ministry of preaching.[2] The differences between the accounts of Lk and Mt, par-

1. Lightfoot may be considered representative of those who see encapsulated in this verse (Mk 1:13) the whole of Jesus' struggle with Satan (History and Interpretation in the Gospel, 65). Best, going further, would view this verse as both the beginning and the end of Jesus' struggle with Satan (Temptation, 18, 61), holding that Satan takes no part in the events of the Passion. Best's view is rather extreme; cf. the critical review by Farrer (Theology 69 (1966), 123-124), and below, 146, fn. 4; cf. also Robinson, History, 30; Kümmel, Promise, 109, where K says, "There are no reasons for seeing the binding of Satan accomplished in Jesus' temptation (against Jeremias, Weltvollender, 59; Jeremias, Parables, 99; C. J. Cadoux, Mission, 65f.)"

Jeremias (TWNT I, 141) may be taken as representative of those who would see in the Temptation a reference to the Second Adam as the restorer of Adam's mastery over the beasts and served by the angels; cf. also E. Schweizer, Lordship, 35; Lengsfeld, Adam und Christus, 32-33. Contrary to this view, cf. H.-G. Leder (ZNW 54 (1963), 188-216, with which compare Jeremias' "Nachwort" on 278-279 of the same issue).

Many of the details mentioned in v. 13 remain obscure: is the desert the place where Israel tested God, or where God tested Israel, or where the demons have their abode? Do the forty days represent the wilderness wandering of the Israelites, or Elijah's forty days' journey, or Moses' forty days on the mountain? Does the reference to the wild beasts signify a return of Paradise wrought by the Second Adam, or are these the demons whom Jesus overcame? All of these views have been set forth, but none seems fully established. We can be sure, though, of the importance of this incident for Mk, standing as it does between the baptism and the beginning of preaching. We prefer to regard it as the first engagement in a running battle that was to end in Satan's defeat in the crucifixion, with victory understood in terms of the "already/not yet" that pervades NT thought - after both the Temptation and the Crucifixion Satan is regarded as defeated, though his sway continues until the Second Coming.

Kuhn (in Scrolls, 112) has suggested that the best understanding may be as an epitome of the whole redeeming work of Jesus.

2. Cf. H.-G. Leder, op. cit., 195: "Es geht in dem, was die Versuchungsgeschichte berichtet, ja eigentlich nur andeutet, nicht nur um ein Ausfüllen der Zeit zwischen Taufe und erster Verkündigung, sondern um ein inhaltsreiches Geschehen von höchster eschatologischer Bedeutung."

ticularly the order of the temptations, have occasioned much comment,[1] but to most the Messianic reference seems clear;[2] these are the struggles of the Messiah with an opponent who seeks to pervert his mission and turn him aside from methods appropriate to it. But Satan is represented as being soundly defeated in this encounter; some would even suggest that this, rather than the Crucifixion, was the locus of his ultimate defeat.[3]

Although we have indicated that we hold the view that these were Messianic temptations in essence, this should not be taken as an implication that only the Christ could be tempted by Satan. The plausibility of Bultmann's and Schlatter's position in this matter[4] arises from the fact that Christians were indeed thought to suffer under Satanic attack. Peter

1. The initial distinction from Mk will be observed: Mt places the actual temptation at the end of a long fast; Lk, following Mk, seems to regard the temptations as taking place continuously throughout the period of fasting, and adds the account of 4:3ff. as a further temptation.
For a convenient summary of opinion on the order of the temptations and which is to be preferred, cf. Feuillet, Biblica 40 (1959), 613-615; after listing exceptions (Violet, T. W. Manson, Charlier, Grimm, Resch, Knight and Spitta, 614), F continues, "La très grande majorité des exégètes pense au contraire que c'est l'ordre de Matthieu qui doit être regardé comme original." (615). Cf. also the relevant passages in Simpson's article in NTS 12 (1966), 273-284. Swanston has recently argued (JTS 17 (1966), 71) for Psalm 106 as the basis for the Lukan order.
For an excellent critical summary of the views of A. Meyer, Bultmann, Schlatter, Dibelius and Alberts on the meaning and text-history of the Temptation accounts, cf. Fascher, Jesus und der Satan, 15-25.
2. Bultmann, (History, 254, 256) and Schlatter (Matthäus, 95ff) maintain that there is no Messianic reference in the Temptation. It is conceived instead as an example of temptations in which Christians are exhorted to follow and imitate Christ. This would apply equally to the accounts of Mt and Lk, and particularly to the underlying "Q" document. Davies (Setting, 382-383), on the other hand, shows how close the theme of crisis and decision lies to the "Q" material, and within that context says, "It is difficult not to think that the temptations are Messianic; they are those of the Christ." (Ibid., 382). Against Bultmann and Schlatter, cf. also Schniewind, Matthäus, 28; Jeremias, Parables, 123; the British tradition has long considered the Temptations from a Messianic standpoint; for a review of opinion, cf. Doble, ET 72 (1960), 91.
3. Cf. above, 143, fn. 1. The defeat is explicit in Mt and Lk, and with reference to Mk 1:13 Kuhn says (in Scrolls, 112), "However one may care to interpret it in detail, this is a statement as to his heavenly dignity and includes implicitly the thought that he survived the temptation victoriously."
4. Cf. above this page, fn. 2.

comes most obviously to mind,[1] but the disciples as a group were at one with Jesus in suffering the onslaught of the devil,[2] and the rest of the NT confirms this view amply.[3] For Mt, at least, the prayer for deliverance from πειρασμός was one which should be on the lips of every disciple.[4]

The second reference to a struggle between Jesus and Satan is in the Beelzebub controversy, already touched upon.[5] Jesus[6] is represented as the opponent of Satan, the "stronger man" despoiling the house of the man who is merely strong, working his pleasure upon his possessions.[7]

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1. On the assumption that Peter is regarded as overcome by Satanic attack at Mk 8:33//Mt 16:23. Cf. also Peter's denial which, according to Lk's account, may be thought of as his particular portion of the collective "sifting" in Lk 22:31.
2. Mk 14:38//Mt 26:41//Lk 22:40; Lk 22:28, "you are those who have continued with me in my πειρασμοῖς;" Lk's wording of Lk 8:13 in comparison with //Mk 4:17//Mt 13:21.
3. E.g., Rom 16:20; ICor 2:11; IThes 2:18; Rev 12:10.
4. Cf. above, 141, fn. 2.
5. Cf. above, 134.
6. The view here adopted of the identity of the "stronger" seems the most probable, though commentators are divided in regarding the "stronger" as the Holy Spirit (Filson, NT History, 97, 106,108), the Father (Schniewind, Matthäus, 155), or Jesus (Schlatter, Matthäus, 406-407; Taylor, Mark, 241; Plummer, Luke, 303; Fenton, Matthew, 197; Cullmann, Salvation, 195).
7. Mk 3:27//Mt 12:29//Lk 11:21-22. It does not seem certain here precisely what the meaning of the σκεύα may be, though the majority of commentators unite in equating them with the men released from Satan's grip by the healing of demoniacs. Cf., e.g., Taylor, Mark, 241, who cites Swete, Bartlett, Turner, McNeile and Manson to this effect; cf. also Grob, Markus-Evang., 444; Meyer, Matthäus, 276, holds that the σκεύα are in the employment of the demons. On the other hand, Maurer (TWNT VII, 361) cites as examples of σκεῦος ApocMos 16, where the devil addresses the serpent as a σκεῦος which he may use to deceive Adam (cf. ApocMos 26, where God curses the serpent for agreeing to become such a σκεῦος). Likewise in 4QTest 25:16 those cursed by Belial are called instruments of atrocity (loc. cit.). On such considerations, the demons as Satan's instruments would seem the more probable reference to find in σκεύα; at least the reference is possible (cf. Gould, Mark, 64). Moreover, Lk seems to have distinguished between Satan's παντπλία (the demons) and his ὑπάρχοντα (the possessed) in his expansion upon σκεῦα (so Manson, Mission, 86: "His 'goods' and his 'spoils' are his human victims. His 'whole armour' represents the host of demons."

This identification of the σκεύα assumes some importance for us in attempting to assess the extent of Satan's "kingdom" mentioned here. On evidence of the Synoptic Gospels themselves it does not seem possible to portray Satan as ruling directly over men as his subjects; this is a Johannine rather than a Synoptic view. But even if the σκεύα are thought to be men (the possessed) rather than demons, it should be noted that

It would be a mistake to conclude too much from this group of sayings, since they are directly related to a charge brought against Jesus by his enemies, and Jesus' response to that charge;[1] Jesus, in other words, is arguing on his accusers' ground, and in the terminology they have themselves chosen.[2] In particular, it would seem questionable to base too elaborate a teaching about the "Kingdom of Satan" on the foundation provided by these sayings,[3] and also to regard this as an important Christological passage.[4] Whatever interpretation of the σκεῦα we may em-

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conceding a position to Satan as the ἄρχων over them by no means implies necessarily that all men are similarly the σκεῦα of Satan, since relatively few men in the Synoptic Gospels are said to be "possessed" by demons.

In any event, Schmid is correct in saying (Markus, 82-83) that the principal focus here is on Satan, not on his σκεῦα.

1. This with reference to its present form in the Gospels. Dibelius and Bultmann agree that the section Mk 3:22-27, cf. Mt 12:22-30//Lk 11:14-23, is a mosaic of sayings that once circulated apart from their present connections and have been brought together because of similarity of subject matter. Bultmann (History, 13-14) observes the fact that this coalescence had been separately accomplished in "Q" and in Mk. Dibelius likewise speaks of the metaphor of the strong man bound as being current in isolation, and continues, "If its relation to Jesus' healing work is original, it would represent Jesus as the victor over demonic powers, but would not meet directly the reproach of being in league with the devil." (Tradition, 220). Cf. Legasse, NovTest 5 (1962), 5-9. Its separate occurrence in the Gospel of Thomas (saying 40; cf. Doresse, Secret Books 39) would seem to support its original independence.

But the separate joining of these sayings into a unit in both "Q" and the sources available to Mk ("The only piece of Marcan editing is the beginning of v. 22" - Bultmann, op. cit., 13) argues for understanding the parable of the strong man in the context of healing and exorcism from early times. At least as far as the Gospel authors are concerned, we seem to be justified for arguing their understanding of the passage on the basis of the form in which it now appears before us, since it seems likely to be the same form in which it appeared before them. In particular, this verse separated from its present context would seem an uncertain foundation on which to base important Christological conclusions.

2. Note that the designation of Satan as "prince" of the demons is the statement of his enemies, not of Jesus; further, that even Jesus' enemies do not go so far as to suggest that any except perhaps the demon-possessed are in the master/servant relationship implied by the word ἄρχων.

3. Cf. below, 153ff.

4. Best's valuable contribution to the study of Mk (Temptation) is marred by lack of caution in handling this passage: it is going too far to read the Beelzebul controversy as an extended commentary on Mk 1:12-13. His interpretation is further hampered by the mistaken view that "binding" implies immobilization - but that this is not necessarily the case, cf. above, 96, fn. 1. In IIEn, the demonic prince (Satanail) is regarded as imprisoned (18:3; 7:3; presumably, this imprisonment in the fifth heaven

brace,[1] it will be quite clear that here too is a distinction to be noted: these are not the ordinary sinners whom Jesus came to save, but specifically, the demon-possessed (not all men, surely, are to be regarded as demoniacs). What seems clear and indisputable in this Beelzebul controversy is its final outcome. Jesus overcomes the "strong man" and works his pleasure with his possessions, whether human or demonic. The main thrust of the sayings drives toward this single point: mighty though Satan is, Jesus draws the limits of his power, and his coming signals Satan's overthrow.

It is also to be noted that, for Mt at least, the disciples have a share with Christ in the onus of the charge his enemies brought against him. The implication seems clear that the reason for the accusation is the same: the success of the Christians in driving out demons gives rise to the same charge brought against their Master.[2] Thus the disciples too become binders of the "strong man."

The third occasion of opposition presented by Satan, and perhaps the most important for defining Satan's role in the first two Gospels, is the pericope in which Peter is called Satan.[3] Here we have the specific

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is understood as identical with his casting down from the heights on the first day of creation, 24:5-9), and yet he is able to lead Eve into sin (31:3-8). Satan in the NT is similarly regarded both as bound and as simultaneously free, according to the typical already/not yet theme found throughout the NT. Cf. Reicke, Disobedient Spirits, 79; Cullmann, Salvation, 195: "The figure of the 'strong man bound' calls to mind that his apparent power continues and is still to disappear, even though the stress is not yet placed on the fact that he is only bound." The figure employed in this parable is not strictly logical, and we must be careful not to impose too much order on our source.

It may be of interest to note the use of the verb δέειν in Mt. Mk and Lk use it simply in reference to something tied, but Mt seems to give it a special shade of meaning by employing it not only in 12:29 (//Lk 11:22 does not use the verb), but also at 13:30 (tares bound in bundles for burning); 16:19//18:18 (whatever you bind on earth will be bound in heaven); and 22:13 (the man without a wedding garment is bound before being cast into outer darkness). The verb may thus have a special apocalyptic flavor as Mt employs it, a special reference to final judgment.

1. Cf. above, 145, fn. 7.
2. Mt 10:25; cf. the charge to cast out demons, 10:8.
3. Mk 8:33//Mt 16:23.

characterization of a "Satan" as one who does not understand the ways of God, but rather follows the counsel of man. It is thus possible to trace this theme of mistaken human prudence and Messianic misunderstanding throughout the Gospels, and to discover "Satans" in this sense, who are not thus named.[1] With this definition, and the awareness that even an apostle can be Satanically motivated and that Satan can sow his tares in the midst of the Church,[2] comes a broadening of the area which Satan is thought to control or influence. His work is not simply that of heading

1. In Mk 8:33//Mt 16:23 it does not seem necessary to decide whether Peter was regarded as being "possessed" by Satan as Judas and Ananias were in Lk-Acts; the probability of this is limited by the fact that Lk's ideas of such "possession" are not necessarily coincident with Mk's or Mt's, and by the further consideration that Peter's behavior resulting from the supposed "possession" does not correspond to that of Judas and Ananias in the seriousness of its consequences. Lk's omission of this pericope puts him out of touch with the other two Evangelists at this point, and it is risky to conclude too much by harmonization; this is part of the pattern that Noack (Satanas, 91-92) characterizes as setting Mk and Mt in irreconcilable opposition to Lk and Jn on the interpretation of the Passion. For the former, Satan tried to prevent the Passion; for the latter, he actually caused it.

But why is Peter called Satan here? Mt and Mk agree that it is because he does not "understand the things of God but those of men." And Mt adds that for this reason he is a σκάνδαλον. Hence it seems quite possible to argue that others similarly misguided may quite conceivably be motivated by Satan, though he is not named as specifically as he is here.

Furthermore, the controversy here represented is at root Messianic in character. This note is struck at the very first of Jesus' temptations in Mt; and we have already observed that, whatever its content, the Markan temptations seem to be Messianic in their setting (cf. above, 144, fn. 2). The oft-repeated request for a sign was likewise related to (false) Messianic expectations and hopes, and it recurs in all three Synoptic Gospels; the struggle in the Garden of Gethsemane is also Messianic in character, as Jesus steels his will to fulfil the destiny of the Messiah contrary to his own (Satanically influenced? - cf. Best, Temptation, 43) contrary wish; the mocking of Jesus on the cross by his enemies repeats the demand for Messianic signs. The correspondence in content of all these temptations should alert us to their connection with the first temptation by Satan: he is present, named or unnamed, in every effort to pervert the Messiahship of Jesus. Thus it seems hasty to conclude that in Mk and Mt Satan is absent from the Passion story; though Lk is the only Synoptic author to mention his name specifically, he may well have shared with the other two the assumption that Satan was present unnamed in the mockings of the enemies of Jesus and their demands for a sign (note the correspondence with Satan's own language in Mt and Lk: "if you are the Christ" (Mk 15:32; Mt 27:42-43; Lk 23:37,39), cf. "if you are the son of God" (Mt 4:1ff; Lk 4:1ff)).

2. Mk 8:33//Mt 16:23; Mt 13:25ff.

the demonic kingdom, but in a sense he can be regarded as the leader of all who are "worldly-" minded - indeed, as being very nearly what he claims in Mt to be: the power behind all the thrones of this world.[1] But how interesting, that this characterization of Satan should be in human terms! Satan is what he most typically is, the enemy of the Messiah, because he thinks like a man!

Jesus resists this indirect attack of Satan just as successfully as he did the direct attack of Satan in the Wilderness Temptation. And the same experience of temptation from human sources is obviously expected to be part of the disciples' life as Christians, too.[2] But God's power will sustain them as it did Jesus, and give them victory over the devil.

In light of Satan's appearance in human guise, the real possibility of Satanic involvement in a fourth and surpassingly important series of events is opened up: the events of the Passion. Only on the assumption that he is limited to working under his own name can we exclude Satan from Mk's and Mt's accounts; since we have seen how Peter himself becomes Σατανᾶς,[3] and how the Pharisees accost Christ πειράζοντες αὐτόν,[4]

1. Mt 4:9, underscored by Lk at 4:6 by the additional words, ὅτι ἐμοὶ παραδέδοται.
2. Cf. Mk 9:42//Mt 18:6-7//Lk 17:1-2; Mt 18:21-22//Lk 17:4; Acts 20:19; and elsewhere in the NT quite generally, e.g., ICor 16:9; IICor 11:25; IITim 4:14-15; Heb 10:32-34; 12:3.
3. Particularly clearly in Mt 16:23, where the words ὕπαγε ὀπίσω μου σατανᾶ are to be compared with those addressed to the πειράζων (4:3), ὕπαγε, σατανᾶ (4:10). This seems to me conclusive for Mt for admitting the presence of Satan in the Pharisees of the Passion story, who ask for the same kind of a sign (27:42) as they had during his ministry, when they were described as tempting him. Satan seems to have kept up his fight to the last moment of Jesus' life.
The case is not so clear-cut in Mk, owing to the lack of an extended Temptation account and the more limited reference to σατανᾶς; in addition to this verse (8:33) there are only two uses of the word (1:13; 4:15) aside from the Beelzebul controversy, where we have urged a measure of caution in interpretation (cf. above, 146, fn. 1); and Mk's lack of variety in the names used for Satan (contrast Mt - ὁ πονηρός, Mt 13:19; ὁ πειράζων, Mt 4:3) is a further limitation on a Markan definition of the character and work of Satan. But the strongly Messianic character of all the contexts in which Satan is referred to as the enemy of the Christ lead us to regard it as not improbable that in the supreme moment of Messianic revelation, i.e., the Crucifixion, those who oppose and resist the mission of Jesus are likewise in Mk to be regarded as Satanically motivated, whether or not his name is used, as was Peter who is specifically equated with Satan.
4. Mk 8:11//Mt 16:1//Lk 11:16; Mk 12:15//Mt 22:18; Mt 22:35//Lk 10:25.

we see no difficulty in finding a further presence of Satan in the person of Christ's enemies around the Cross. Certainly for Mt and Mk alike these were men who did not understand the things of God, but those of men.[1] These considerations argue strongly for the legitimacy of Lk's interpretation of the Passion, which introduces Satan by name into the proceedings.[2] It was possible for Lk to do so because it was in keeping with the traditions of the early Church to represent the Crucifixion as Christ's last battle with Satan, a battle whose ultimate result was the victorious resurrection.

The corresponding relationship between Satan and the believer is the encouraging message of two of Jesus' parables. In the parable of the soils, the devil is portrayed as snatching the seed from the hearts of the uncomprehending,[3] but Christians may draw comfort from the fact that some seed bears abundant fruit.[4] With all his hostility, Satan is unable to prevent the spread of the Gospel, or the salvation of some. And in the parable of the weeds in the field the scene is once again the world, but in this changed figure the seeds are either good or bad;[5]

1. Mk 8:33=Mt 16:23.
2. Lk 22:3.
3. Mk 4:4; cf. 4:15//Mt 13:4; 13:19//Lk 8:5; cf. 8:12. Aside from the difference of names (Satan in Mk, the evil one in Mt, the devil in Lk) there are some difficulties in the precise significance of the secondary interpretation, fitting it in with the parable that went before it. E.g., what particular meaning does Mt have in mind when he inserts the verb συνιέναι, and makes non-comprehension the prelude to Satanic attack, unlike the other Evangelists? Or again, what, if any, is the distinction between the devil's work and the effects of persecutions, tribulations, and riches? For an evaluation of the role played by the devil in this parable, cf. Noack, Satanas, 110-111.
4. Mk 4:20//Mt 13:23//Lk 8:15.
5. Mt 13:24-25; cf. 13:37-39. The division into two groups is characteristic of Mt as opposed to Mk; cf. above, 125-126. This parable, if taken in isolation, would surely imply after the fashion of Qumran that God and Beliar were actually responsible for the good and the evil respectively, the seeds having apparently little to do with their own character. But whatever the source of the story and its original interpretation may have been, Mt's general frame of reference does not seem to be shared with the Qumran line of thought. Yet the parable with its implications is in the Matthean tradition, and cannot be ignored because its implications appear inconvenient at points.

Satan has moved to corrupt God's field, but the end of the age will see the destruction of Satan's sowing.[1] The Synoptic Gospels do not, after the fashion of Pl,[2] say that because Christ died and rose Christians share his victory over death and the devil, but the conclusion is not far from being drawn. As the disciples participated with Jesus in his victories over Satan in this life, so they may well hope to join with him in victory over Satan at the end of the age.

All of this supports our view that Satan is far more than merely the prince of the demons. The deadly earnestness of Jesus' encounters with Satan contrast with his relatively easy mastery of the demons; Satan's appearance at crucial junctures in Jesus' ministry (the Temptation, the decisive announcement in Mt and Mk of his intention to suffer, the Crucifixion in Lk's account) shows him to occupy a place of unique importance in the minds of the Evangelists as the enemy of Christ and the Christians. But there are indications all along the way that Satan operates only by the permission of God,[3] and the disciples are given a clear indication as to God's power to give them victory, just as Jesus won victory over Satan.

We have discussed Satan's role as the tempter, and also some specific instances of temptation in the life of Jesus and his followers. We come now to a further indication, more tentatively given, of his power.

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1. Mt 13:30; cf. 13:41-42.
2. IThes 5:10; IICor 13:4.
3. At the Temptation, Lk 4:6 stresses the permission by which Satan has authority over the kingdoms; in the Beelzebul controversy, Jesus binds the strong man (Mt 12:28-29; Mk 3:26-27; Lk 11:21-22); at Lk 11:20, God need only lift a finger to cast down Satan; Jesus resists Satan's attack through Peter (Mk 8:33//Mt 16:23); Mt predicts the burning up of the devil's harvest at the end of the age (Mt 13:39-40) and speaks of the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels (Mt 25:41); Lk attributes to Jesus a vision of Satan falling from heaven (Lk 10:18) and when Satan (by permission, Lk 22:31) sifts the disciples, Jesus' prayer is efficacious in their behalf (Lk 22:32).

Satan is represented as being in unholy alliance with earthly rulers. This emerges in Lk rather more clearly than the other two Gospels in two places. First, Lk stresses Mt's tacit assumption that whatever Satan promises Jesus in the Temptation he must in fact possess, by adding the phrase, "ὅτι ἐμοὶ παραδέδοται ...."[1] Second, he specifically includes Satan among the powers that brought about the Crucifixion, doing so in such a way as to imply that apart from Satan's intervention the campaign against Jesus was at a standstill.[2]

E. Stauffer makes an observation, with particular reference to Lk and Jn, that also applies more largely to the Synoptic Gospels. He notes that in the Gospels people who are at odds make common cause against Jesus, and that a united front is formed thereby: Pilate is reconciled with Herod, the Pharisees and Sadducees form an alliance, one of Jesus' own disciples unites with the priests, etc. He then continues, "But where does the unanimity of this mortal enmity come from? It is the spirit of the adversary, answers the NT, which is active in them all."[3] And although this is demonstrably true in Lk and Jn, it is also true of Mt and Mk to a lesser degree. Satan's control over the kingdoms of the world is clearly implied by Mt,[4] and there is nothing contradictory to this view in Mk's Gospel. The idea of demonic control over the nations of the world through angelic rulers was a commonplace in Jewish religious thought of the time.[5]

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1. Lk 4:6.
2. Lk 22:1-3. The priests and scribes are casting about fearfully for some means to destroy Jesus, but nothing is forthcoming. Then to their joyful surprise (cf. 22:5, καὶ ἐχάρησαν) the means is suddenly in their hands, placed at their disposal by the unseen and unsuspected action of Satan.
3. Theology, 123; cf. to the same effect, 126.
4. Mt 4:9.
5. As early as Dan 10:13,20; cf. Berkhof, Powers, 10. Much more clearly in the A&P, particularly in IEn 89 and 90, the seventy angelic rulers and shepherds over the nations; cf. above, 95. On the whole subject, cf. Cullmann, Time, 192-193; Russell, Apocalyptic, 244-249.

But once again a cautionary note sounds, this time from a writing probably produced about the time of the first three Gospels: the Slavonic Life of Adam and Eve.[1] We read of how Adam was plowing in the field one day when he was accosted by Satan with a demand for the worship due the Lord of the earth; to which Adam replies, tongue in cheek, with the words, "Who is lord of the earth, to the same do I belong and my children," knowing at the same time that God would in the last days descend and trample the devil under foot.[2] This gives us an insight into how contemporaries might understand the claim of Satan in Mt's and Lk's Temptation narratives: that is to say, Satan might not really possess all the power he claimed.[3]

We come now to a consideration of Satan as the head of a supposed "Kingdom" set over against the Kingdom of God. The first thing to be noticed here is the considerable difference in terminology between the Synoptic Gospels and John at this point. John has a truly dualistic view of two worlds at war, two spheres of influence each with its proper head.[4] The frequency of his references to one κόσμος against the other is in stark contrast with the infrequency of such references in the Synoptic Gospels;[5]

1. Cf. Rowley, Apocalyptic, 113, on the date of this literature.
2. SlavVit 33:1 - 34:4.
3. It really makes no difference whether or not this passage in SlavVit is considered to be written under Christian influence; if Christian influence is suspected here, it simply shows how one Christian school of thought could cope with Satan's claim to world dominion.
4. A glance at the concordance suffices to show the frequent reference to κόσμος as an evil entity in Jn: over 100 occurrences of the word (including the Johannine letters), and almost invariably the κόσμος is regarded as being at enmity with God, as needing the salvation which Jesus came to offer, as rejecting the proffered light (Brown, John, 509, notes the difference between the first twelve chapters and the remainder of Jn, in that the κόσμος is earlier spoken of in terms of love and afterward in terms of judgment). The Synoptic term βασιλεία, βασιλεύς, is practically never found in Jn.
5. The locus classicus for connecting this type of teaching with the Synoptic Gospels is the Beelzebul controversy (cf. above, 145), though as we have suggested there are doubts as to the appropriateness of this connection. Aside from this context, Satan is spoken of as controlling the kingdoms of the earth (N.B., not as a king himself) in only one pas-

we are faced here with an idea that was clearly at the center of Jn's thinking, and which by contrast was of peripheral importance for the authors of the Synoptic Gospels. In point of fact, the greatest share of the weight of this idea in the Synoptics must be borne by the Temptation accounts as recorded by Mt and Lk, and by the Beelzebul controversy. Since the idea does occur there, it cannot be left out of account; however, as we have already suggested, there are reasons for doubting whether the Evangelists would willingly concede to Satan the imperial powers sometimes conferred upon him by modern interpreters.

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sage in the Synoptic Gospels, that of the Temptation (Mt 4:8-9//Lk 4:5-7); and in reading this, the caveat just given above must be heeded: Satan's claim to this power is not controverted by Jesus, nor is it conceded. In order to find the word βασιλεία represented as something unambiguously under the control of Satan, one must turn to the book of Revelation (e.g. 17:2,17,18). In the Synoptic Gospels, aside from the passages just noted, βασιλεία is always used either in reference to political kings and kingdoms, or to the Kingdom of God.

The situation is no different with regard to the word κόσμος. Though Mt uses the word more frequently than Mk or Lk, there is no basic distinction among the Synoptic authors in the meaning attributed to it - it is the world at large, or the political world, and control over it is never directly attributed to Satan. As Sasse observes (TWNT III, 891), the meaning in the Synoptic Gospels corresponds to the Jewish word עולם. There is no trace of such a statement as "all the κόσμος lies in the wicked one" (IJn 5:19). Instead, the κόσμος is basically a neutral arena in which a choice of ways is made - a field in which seeds are sown which in turn bear various kinds of fruit (Mt 13:38). Similarly, the word ἐξουσία is used by the Synoptic authors only once (Acts 26:18) with reference to Satan as controlling men. Or the word δύναμις, used of the powers of heaven (Mk 13:25//Mt 24:29//Lk 21:26; cf. Is 13:10; 34:4; also Mk 14:62//Mt 26:64//Lk 22:69; cf. Dan 7:13 + Ps 110:1) without a hint of Satanic control over them. The only way in which the idea of Satanic control over a βασιλεία or over the κόσμος can be discovered in the Synoptic Gospels is by reading into them a cosmic attitude similar to that expressed in Jn or Rev or Pl's letters; or else by distilling a supposedly uniform understanding of an apocalyptic world-ruler (vs. the coming Messiah) from the wild profusion of inter-Testament literature and finding this world-ruler present in the person of every foe and every situation in the life of Jesus.

It is not being argued here that the thought of Satan as a world-ruler is impossible for the authors of the Synoptic Gospels. Its frequent occurrence in the thought-world with which they were familiar should be sufficient warning against going too far in the opposite direction and denying its influence altogether. But it must be maintained that this idea was not central or determinative for the Synoptic setting forth of the Gospel, by contrast with its great importance for Jn.

In particular, it is necessary to object against the concession to Satan of power over the physical world. Even in Jn κόσμος is a spiritual rather than a material term;[1] to imply that in the Synoptic Gospels, which use the word so differently, we have Satan appearing as regent over the κόσμος of things as he is over the κόσμος of spirits in Jn, is certainly dubious procedure.[2] It is often assumed that a demonic spirit is master of the storm stilled by Jesus on the Sea of Galilee, and yet it is far from obvious that this was the intention of the Evangelists.[3] When speculation runs unchecked, assertions are sometimes found to the effect

1. Cf. below, 229.
2. The assumption of uniformity in terminology in NT demonology seems to me a weakness in Kallas' approach (Significance of the Synoptic Miracles) to the doctrine. K begins his study with a survey of the whole range of Jewish literature (38-57) and continues it with a similar survey of the whole NT (58-76); the full weight of these summaries is then applied to the Synoptic Gospels. This procedure, however, neglects the patent variety of demonic teachings in the A&P; my own impression would be that there is a similar variety in the NT, and that a demonic "orthodoxy" had by no means become established. Certain general lines of thought are held in common, but the details seem to defy harmonization.
3. Cf. Mk 4:37-41//Mt 8:24-27//Lk 8:23-25. The demonic element in the storm is assumed by Achtemeier (Interpretation 16 (1962), 169-176), Richardson (Theology, 100, 205), Lohmeyer (Markus, 91) and Bornkamm (in his essay in Tradition and Interpretation), to mention a few among many. The connection between the stilling of the sea and the story of the Gerasene demoniac, observed by all three Evangelists, is thought to indicate similar content in both stories, i.e., demonic content. Against this view may be urged 1) the fact already noted that nowhere else in the Synoptics do demons have control over physical things, aside from the bodies of men (though this is not the only place where Jesus addresses an inanimate thing - cf. Mk 11:14//Mt 21:19); 2) the parallels adduced from the OT and thought to connect the storm-stilling ultimately with the Marduk-Tiamat contest (cf. Achtemeier, op. cit., 171-174; Davies, Setting, 89) are really too remote for serious consideration (cf. Bultmann's explicit rejection in History, 230, of Ps 104:9; 107:23-31; 89:10 as source-passages for this miracle story). As Richardson himself concedes (op. cit., 100), even if the old ideas are present they are demythologized; in the process the demonic control over the storm seems quite as likely as other elements to have been rejected as well. 3) The word "rebuked" (ἐπιτιμᾶν) addressed to the demons on numerous occasions (Mt 12:16; Mk 1:25; 3:12; 9:25; Lk 4:35,41; 9:42) is hardly decisive, since it is addressed to human beings as well (Mt 16:20; 17:18; 19:13; 20:31; Mk 10:13,48; Lk 9:21,55; 17:3; 18:15,39; 19:39; 23:40), and once is used with reference to the fever suffered by Peter's mother-in-law (Lk 4:39 - though admittedly, on the assumption that all sickness is demonic this would become another address to the demons). Among those who support a natural understanding of the storm, cf. Stauffer, TWNT II, 623; Noack, Satanas, 67. On the supposed Tiamat parallel, the remarks of Farrer, Revelation, 53-54, apply equally here.

that the NT regards all natural forces as being in the devil's control.[1] Similarly, it seems improbable apart from assumptions such as these, that the demonic could be introduced into the colt of the Triumphal Entry.[2] In fact, control over the physical world seems always to be attributed to God directly, and it is by no means implied that when man sinned the creation was thereupon turned over to demonic control; rather, the universe turns against man because God so decrees, for the punishment of sin.[3]

One further note as to the origin of Satan. In Lk we see him portrayed as "falling from Heaven."[4] Here is an echo of the contemporary teaching that Satan was originally one of the angels, who through disobedience had been cast out of heaven. This is the only hint we have in the Synoptic Gospels as to Satanic origins.

So by way of summary: Satan is represented as king of the demons, but not necessarily king of mankind; he has the power to tempt and test men, including Jesus, and for that reason is much to be feared and is

1. God is almost invariably represented as being in complete control of the elements; the exceptions, in Rev 12:4 (the dragon casting one third of the stars from heaven with his tail) and 13:13 (the second beast who is able to make fire come down from heaven), are noted as exceptions, and the former is probably a picture of the fall of the angels, rather than an act of cosmic terrorism. Earthquakes, for example, are regarded in the NT as in the OT as being acts of God: cf. in addition to Mk 13:8//Mt 24:7// Lk 21:11, Mt 27:51,54; 28:2; Acts 16:26; Heb 12:26; Rev 6:12-13; 8:5; 11:13,19; 16:18. Kallas' "demons of the soil who shall produce earthquakes" (Significance, 70) are completely devoid of scriptural support.
2. Cf. Caird, Principalities, 71.
3. Gen 3:17-18. Caird correctly observes (op. cit., 66-67) that this idea is widespread in the OT; what he does not stress is the fact that control of these elements of punishment was securely in God's hands.
4. Lk 10:18. Some commentators attempt to set this "fall" in a temporal context, relative to the mission of the seventy (cf. above, 138, fn. 3). It seems questionable to me, however, whether this temporal aspect of the matter has any great significance for Lk. The fall of Satan is placed at various stages along the apocalyptic path: in the Enoch literature he fell on the first day of creation (IIEn 29:5); in the Adam and Eve literature on the sixth day of creation (Vita 16:1-4); in Lk he may be thought to fall during the lifetime of Jesus (Lk 10:18); in Rev he does not fall until after the Ascension (Rev 12:7ff). These variations on the same basic theme warn us that the temporal reference of the fall of Satan does not seem to have great significance, but the fact and the inevitability of it is what carries weight.
On the fall of Satan as part of the Jewish apocalyptic hope, cf. S.-B. Kommentar II, 167ff.

taken very seriously indeed; Jesus, however, resisted his assault successfully, and Christians are likewise warned to be on their guard against his attack and are shown the way to resist it successfully; Satan's "entering" of a person leads to consequences far more serious than those proceeding from demonic "possession;" it is possible to trace his influence throughout the Gospels from the Temptation to the Crucifixion, an influence exercised indirectly as a general rule, but directly enough in the Wilderness temptation. He is in alliance with the rulers of the earth, especially the rulers of the Jews. But at every turn this enemy is represented as being limited and confined.[1] His subject demons, as we have shown earlier, have limited powers. His efforts to turn Jesus away from the true Messianic path are unfruitful. Christians have access to a power that protects them against falling prey to him. His alliance with the earthly rulers to destroy Jesus is in the end a failure, as Jesus' Resurrection proves. Satan is strong - but he is bound by a stronger. He is a responsible agent in producing evil, and will be punished for it, but on the strength of the evidence before us, he cannot be regarded as the exclusive source of evil. He does his work by consent and permission. In every case he is dependent on two factors: the will of God and the will of man.

These cautionary remarks against over-estimating the extent of Satan's power permit us to go on to the subject of dualism as expressed in the Synoptic Gospels, and an evaluation of its nature and significance. The first thing to be remarked is once again its distinctiveness from dualism

1. Fascher (Jesus und der Satan, 29) seems to go too far in suggesting that just as little as the all-powerful God did prevent the Temptation of his Son, so little can the Lord protect his Church from the onslaught of Satan. Such a statement makes mockery of the prayer for deliverance from temptation in the Lord's Prayer, as well as such texts as Jn 17:15 and Heb 12:3ff.

as expressed in the Johannine literature.[1] In Jn, believing or non-believing is regarded as the watershed separating the Christians from the evil κόσμος;[2] this believing is further regarded as being, not primarily the act of man, but the act of God himself.[3] By contrast the verb πιστεύειν in the Synoptic Gospels is not used with such rigorous consistency;[4] although in the majority of instances the word is quite obviously more than mere belief, it still gives the impression of being man's action in response to God's overture.[5]

This is consistent with the greater ethical stress of the Synoptic Gospels, particularly Mt and Lk. The "work of God" is not simply believing,[6] but is also choosing the right course of action. This emerges with particular clarity in the "Q" material and in the special sources of Mt and Lk. Its relative infrequency in Mk is perhaps indicative of the

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1. It is not maintained that there are major doctrinal differences at this point between the Synoptic Gospels and Jn - rather, the difference is in the mode of expression. Both seem to employ a dualistic terminology related to the Two Ways doctrine of Judaism, but this terminology has reached the four Evangelists through different channels, with consequent differences in emphasis and content. The distinction here to be drawn is analogous with the supposed divergence between Pl and James on the subject of faith and works.
2. As Bultmann points out in TWNT VI, 225-226, the verb πιστεύειν in Jn signifies a turning away from the world.
3. Ibid., 226. B observes the word's consistently eschatological reference, and the fact that it represents an idea analogous to that of predestination.
4. E.g., the term is used as indicating mere mental assent in Mk 11:31// Mt 21:25//Lk 20:5; believing what John said would presumably not result in salvation. Cf. similarly Mk 13:21//Mt 24:23,26, and Lk 22:67. Lk also uses the word in the sense of "entrusting," cf. Lk 16:11.
5. "Believing" in the Synoptic Gospels is fraught with tremendous consequences: it produces quite definite practical results, and seems to be the human key unlocking the powers of God. Cf. Mk 5:36//Lk 8:50; Mk 9:23-24; Mk 11:23-24//Mt 21:21-22; Mt 8:13; 9:28; Lk 1:20,45. It is also used to indicate what we might term belief-unto-salvation, more nearly the idea that Jn has invariably in mind when he uses the word: Mk 1:15; Mk 9:42//Mt 18:6; Mk 15:32//Mt 27:42; Mt 21:32; Lk 8:12-13; 24:25. In Acts the usage is more frequent by far than in Lk, and tends to be more consistent; cf. the expression frequently found, "πιστεύειν εἰς," or "ἐπί," Acts 9:42; 10:43; 11:17; 14:23; 16:31; 19:4; 22:19.
6. "This is the work of God, that you believe..." (Jn 6:29). But that good works are not incompatible with this statement, cf. Brown, John, 513.

sources available to him, but is certainly also the result of his more emphatic stress on things apocalyptic, with a consequent weakening of ethical interest. We might say that for Jn the once-for-all choice is between Two Ways as they are epitomized in the apocalyptic figures of Christ and Satan; for Mt and Lk it is a continuing choice between the Way of Christ and the Way of Satan (or the world, or men) seen in the light of the everyday. In Jn, practical and ethical decisions are in the background and the apocalyptic once-for-all choice is to the fore; in the Synoptic Gospels, particularly Mt and Lk, it is rather the apocalyptic outlook that forms the background, while the stress is on a series of ethical decisions.

This emerges in the terminology by which Mt and Lk divide mankind into two groups on the basis of their behavior.[1] Echoes of a similar "two groups" mode of thought are likewise found in Mk.[2]

It emerges even more strongly in the choices that determine these two divisions, choices between two "Ways" or two modes of behavior. This is part of the common Synoptic material,[3] but it is even more typical of the "Q" sources,[4] the special material of Mt[5] and the special

1. Cf. above, 125-126.
2. Mk 2:21-22//Mt 9:16-17//Lk 5:36-37 new patch/old garment, new wine/old wineskins; Mk 4:11//Mt 13:11//Lk 8:10 "to <u>you</u>/to <u>them</u>"; Mk 4:25//Mt 13:12// Lk 8:12 he who has/he who has not; Mk 9:40//Lk 9:50 (cf. Mt 12:30//Lk 11:23) "whoever is not against us is for us."
3. Mk 3:4//Lk 6:9 do good/do ill, save life/destroy life; Mk 7:6-8//Mt 15: 3-4 leave the ways of God/hold to the commandments of men; Mk 8:36// Mt 16: 26//Lk 9:25 gain the world/lose one's soul; Mk 12:17// Mt 22:21// Lk 20:25 to Caesar the things of Caesar/to God the things of God.
4. Mt 6:22-23//Lk 11:34-36 single/"evil" eyes, light/darkness; Mt 6:24= Lk 16:13 no man can serve two masters; Mt 7:13-14//Lk 13:23-24 the way of burying the dead/the way of following Christ; Mt 10:32-33//Lk 12:8-9 deny/ confess Jesus before men; Mt 12:30=Lk 11:23 (cf. Mk 9:40//Lk 9:50) he who is not with me is against me; Mt 23:25-26//Lk 11:39-41 cleaning the inside/ the outside of the cup.
5. Mt 5:27-30 (cf. Mt 18:8-9, Mk 9:43-48) behavior that leads to "life" (Mk)/behavior that leads to Gehenna; Mt 13:37-39 (cf. Mt 15:13) some seed is good/some is bad; Mt 21:29-31 one son works/one son does not; Mt 25: 34-36 the ways of behavior that lead to eternal punishment/eternal life.

material of Lk.[1] When these choices between following Jesus and refusing to follow him are being discussed, they are starkly conceived and expressed; there is no middle ground.[2] The effects of this choice are every bit as decisive as they are in Jn. The first three Gospels, however, stress the responsibility of man to make the right choice. Jn writes, "No one can come to me unless the Father draw him,"[3] but Mt and Lk, while not neglecting God's part in leading to salvation, have a stronger emphasis on man's responsibility to make the choice of salvation as his own Way, a choice in which he is free and responsible, a choice which he has the capacity to make.[4]

In this respect, the Synoptic Gospels are more obviously influenced by conceptions of the OT and the A&P than is Jn, who moves in a circle of ideas shared by Qumran.[5] With the Wisdom Literature and the OT, the Synoptic Gospels hold that man is a free and moral agent.[6] Whatever may be said about the determining power of God in the shaping of human af-

1. Lk 9:61-62, putting one's hand to the plow/looking back; Lk 14:33, following one's own way/renouncing it to become a disciple; Lk 16:15, exalted among men/abomination before God; Lk 16:19-31, the story of Dives and Lazarus is told in such a way that their two diverse modes of existence explain their final judgment. Note that possessions and their proper disposition figure in all but the first of these examples; cf. above, 126, fn. 3.
2. Mt 12:30=Lk 11:23; Mk 9:40//Lk 9:50.
3. Jn 6:44.
4. This is entirely in keeping with the prophetic tradition (cf. above, 27, fn. 2) and less closely aligned with the apocalyptic (though apocalyptic authors were not necessarily predestinarian in outlook: cf. IIBar 15:19, "each of us has been the Adam of his own soul"). Both the prophetic and the apocalyptic views took human responsibility into account; their relative importance one against the other is what helps distinguish prophetic from apocalyptic literature, a difference of emphasis rather than content.
5. Cf. below, 230-231.
6. Cf. above, 27, 108. It is attractive to think of the "Q" material as lying closer to Christian origins, and therefore as representing more accurately the Dominical sayings than the Gospels in their present form. Whether or not this position is rejected, it must at least be conceded that the Two Ways form (aside from content and theological meaning) is too deeply imbedded in the "Q", "M" and "L" material to be there by accident. It seems quite probable that whatever interpretation the Gospel writers may have placed on it, Jesus' own preaching and teaching was couched in the language of the Two Ways.

fairs, at root the Synoptic authors represent man as being responsible for his own destiny within the arena of choice determined for him by God.[1]

Before turning to the view of God's sovereignty found in the Synoptic Gospels, one important group of sayings awaits evaluation: those dealing with evil as though it were something native to the human heart, analogous to the cor malignum of IVEz.[2] There is no concerted view of the human heart as evil;[3] but there are indications in the first three Gospels that something is fundamentally amiss within man. A hint to this effect is dropped in Jesus' unsupported assumption: "If you, being evil...."[4] Or again, his response to the earnest young questioner:

1. Possible exceptions that come to mind are: Mt 13:24-30, the good seed and the tares; Mt 13:47-50, the good and bad fish. But though the seeds in question seem to have been inherently bad or good (and likewise the fish) from the beginning, and denied the element of decision, it would be pressing parabolic detail to find predestination in these parables whose real focus is on the harvest and how men will be separated at the close of the age. Cf. Jeremias, Parables, 224-225.
2. Cf. above, 114-115. There is of course no question of direct influence, but IVEz does indicate that the idea of a corrupt and wicked heart was "in the air."
3. The heart is regarded rather as the place of choice and decision (Mt 13:19//Lk 8:12; Mt 24:48//Lk 12:45; Lk 21:34; 24:25,32), particularly in Lk, where it is the place of διαλογισμοὺς (Lk 2:35; 3:15; 5:22; 9:47; 24:38) usually understood as an undesirable thing, though the heart may also be a place of praiseworthy pondering and meditation (Lk 1:66; 2:19, 51; 21:14). Mk's sayings about "hardness" of heart (Mk 3:5; 6:52; 8:17; 10:5) indicate a generally less favorable estimate of the heart's capacities, but they are balanced by the fact that one can also love God with the whole heart (Mk 12:30,33; Deut 6:4; - is there a hint here of the Rabbinic admonition to love God with both the good and evil yetzers, Sifre 73a, cf. Montefiore, Rabbinic Literature, 190?) and that the heart is the seat of true belief (Mk 11:23). Of the three, Mt seems to have the most optimistic view of the heart's possibilities (Mt 5:8; 6:21; 11:29; 18:35; cf. also Mt 12:33-35//Lk 12:43,45; Lk 18:15.)
4. Mt 7:11//Lk 11:13. Jeremias, following Cadoux, finds here a polemical remark addressed originally to the Pharisees rather than the disciples, on the twofold ground that a) Jesus elsewhere does not address his disciples, but rather the Pharisees (Mt 12:34) as πονηροὶ ὄντες, and that b) the change from the second to the third person is an unexpected shift - one would expect, "If you give good gifts, the Father will give you good things;" as J points out, the effect is to draw a distinction between the disciples and those who are praying. This is resolved on the ground that the original setting of the remark would have contrasted the evil Pharisees with the good (praying) disciples, who receive the Holy Spirit from

"no one is good but God."[1] The presupposition would seem to be that the fundamental condition of humankind is sinful. It is not supported with the weighty argument of Rom 1-3, but is perhaps the more impressive for that very reason.

We have already seen how πειρασμός can originate in a human being;[2] perhaps the reason for this is the innate corruptness of humanity. This would not emerge as the inescapable conclusion of the sayings about good and evil trees and hearts, with their good and evil "fruits;"[3] it does not seem to be taught here that the heart is necessarily evil, though it is perfectly clear that when evil appears the root of the matter is within man. Nor would innate human corruption be indicated by the sayings attributing the origin of sin to various members of the human

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God, by whose power they drive out the demons, etc. (Jeremias, Parables, 144). But however this interesting question is decided, it still remains clear that both Mt and Lk record this remark as addressed to the disciples, and its present context implies that Lk, and especially Mt (with his characteristic use of πονηρός, cf. above, 119-120, were able to describe even the disciples in this fashion.

1. Mk 10:18//Lk 18:19. Mt 19:17, by a change of phrase, alters the implication slightly, "presumably because the author felt that the latter as given by Mk was liable to be interpreted as a disclaimer both of absolute goodness and of oneness with God." (Cranfield, Mark, 327). While this is probably not to be understood as a claim to deity (loc. cit.), it is noteworthy that Christ's sinlessness is held up as exceptional elsewhere in the NT (e.g. Acts 7:52; IICor 5:21; IPet 2:22-23) and that this remark might strike a responsive chord in the minds of Gospel readers. Whatever the estimate of human deeds and merits, ἀγαθός is an adjective properly applied only to God.

2. Cf. above, 139ff.

3. Mt 12:33-35//Lk 6:43-45; cf. Mt 7:16-20. The context of these sayings suggests that what is being taught here is the identity between a man's inner disposition of heart and his outward behavior of deed or word. Cf. the Rabbinic parallels cited by S.-B. Kommentar I, 638-639, where it becomes clear that the evil deed has its origin in the evil heart. The good intention, for the Gentiles, must be brought to practical fulfilment in order to please God, whereas the evil intention displeases God whether or not it is carried out; for the Jews the reverse is the case, inasmuch as God honors the Jewish good intention, without action, and condemns the Jewish evil intention only when it is brought into practice. In any event, a man's acts are a faithful mirror of the inner man (Manson, Sayings, 59-60). All sins, on this view, would thus appear to have a human responsibility connected with them in some way, whatever demonic element may have been thought to be involved - and no such influence is mentioned here by Jesus.

body;[1] after all, the apostles, while admittedly sinners, are not reported to have been amputees! Having eyes did not necessarily imply that these eyes would lead one to sin, but evil could be produced by the improper use of the body and its members.

Perhaps the clearest view of the Synoptic Gospels on this point is afforded by Jesus' words and the following interpretation of them: "Not what goes into a man, but what comes out of him, defiles."[2] This statement, in its setting of controversy over ritual cleanliness, is firmly aligned with the prophetic view of sin and defilement as being moral in essence.[3] It similarly stresses human responsibility for sinful behavior.

There is no implication here that temptation may not assail a man from the outside. The supposed defilement under discussion is unclean food which passes through the bowels and is evacuated, external moral influences not entering into the matter at all. But what Jesus does seem to say here is that when moral evil, as distinguished from ritual defilement, comes into existence, the sinful human heart is involved by complicity, and is seen as the source of sin par excellence.[4] This would agree well with the view of the heart sketched above, that the heart is the battlefield

1. Mk 9:43-48//Mt 18:8-9; Mt 5:27-30. As Cranfield points out (Mark, 313-314), this saying follows upon one referring to causing another to stumble, and by contrast deals with causing one's self to stumble. The same thing holds true of the Matthean parallel. In the Sermon on the Mount, this particular setting is lacking in this "New Torah" section, and we are reminded more directly of the doctrine that sin rises within the members of the body: cf. TAsh 2:8; TGad 5:10-11; PsSol 4:4, "his eyes are upon every woman without distinction."). But still, the "heart" was considered by the Rabbis to govern the eyes: S.-B. Kommentar I, 302.
2. Mk 7:14-15,18-23//Mt 15:10-11,17-20.
3. Cf. above, 2ff.
4. This brings us to the very brink of the Jewish doctrine of the good and evil impulses or yetzerim in man; cf. above, 71ff; 107ff, and Montefiore, Rabbinic Literature, 136-137, 180-181; Moore, Judaism I, 480-483; Pfeiffer, History, 394. This doctrine is almost invariably associated with the Two Ways doctrine in Rabbinic Judaism; yet it is not similarly associated with the doctrine of the Two Ways in the Synoptic Gospels. As Manson observes (Sayings, 175), the Two Ways background of Mt 7:13-14 seems to be the OT.

on which moral contests are fought. Whether or not all human hearts are regarded as evil, this at least can be said: no moral evil exists among men apart from a corrupt man. This rules out any purely demonic theory of the origin of evil. It is noteworthy that Satan is not mentioned in this most pessimistic of the Synoptic Gospels' evaluations of the human condition.

Three important aspects of our problem have now been touched upon, and it may be in order to attempt to set them in mutual perspective. We have seen how, within their limited sphere, the demons exercise baleful influence; while all disease is "devil's work" and no doubt related to human sin, only the more severe cases are specifically attributed to demonic "possession." We have seen how, in his more broadly conceived sphere, Satan is active for the moral corruption of men, and how Satan may actually "enter" or attempt to enter men in order to accomplish some particularly vicious design. And we have also seen how closely moral evil is bound up with human ethical behavior and the continuing daily choice of one Way or the other. It seems possible, on these considerations, that an analogy can be drawn between the work of the demons and that of their ἄρχων. As all sickness can be described as "devil's work" though all the sick are not spoken of as "possessed," so all sin can be regarded as "satanic," though all sinners have quite obviously not been "entered" by Satan. Unusually serious illness is described as directly induced by demons; unusually wicked behavior is described as directly induced by Satan. But in both cases, human sinfulness is the necessary prerequisite to demonic or Satanic success. Sickness and sin are two malignant fruits of a tree whose roots are deeply sunk in the human heart - and the work of the demons is to aggravate and intensify the sufferings of man, while the work of Satan, terrible though it be in its effects, is simply to stimulate the all-too-human choice-of-way that leads to destruction and

not to life.

But all of this action and interaction, human and demonic and Satanic, is viewed in the serene light of God's omnipotence, and to this subject we now turn.

It will have been observed that even among the authors of the first three Gospels there are slight differences in the estimate of the demonic role; in fact, it has been necessary to stress the variety of NT demonology against some who seem to over-systematize it. There is really no NT "orthodoxy" on the subject of demons, a fact that will become even clearer as we move deeper into the NT. But there is a fundamental unity within all this variety, afforded by the unanimous verdict of the NT that evil both demonic and human is subject to the sovereign God.

As noted above,[1] the Synoptic Gospels employ various means of expressing this truth. The fundamental thought, however, is the same. The life of Jesus is seen as part of a divine plan that must be carried through to completion;[2] and although the focus is quite naturally on Jesus, yet others are also caught up in it: John the Baptist in particular,[3] and the disciples as well.[4] Even the political world at large is caught up

1. Cf. above, 127ff.
2. The preparation for Jesus' ministry begins in OT prophecy (cf. above, 128, fn. 5, 6, 7). That ministry unfolds inevitably, fulfilling God's plan, and the frame of reference is particularly clear with the progression of events leading to the Crucifixion: Mk 8:31-32//Mt 16:21//Lk 9:22; Mk 9:31//Mt 17:22-23//Lk 9:43-44; Mk 10:33-34//Mt 20:18-19//Lk 18:31-32; Mk 14:21-Mt 26:24//Lk 22:22; Mk 14:36//Mt 26:39//Lk 22:42; Mt 17:12; 26:2; 26:54; Lk 17:25; 22:37; 24:25-27,44-49. On Lk 24:44-49 turns the shift to mission (cf. Mt 28:18-20) and a similar vein of necessity, the fulfillment of the plan of God that runs through Acts. As it applies to Jesus in particular, cf. Acts 1:7; 2:23; 3:18; 4:28; 13:29ff; 17:3.
3. Mk 1:2-3; Mk 9:11-13//Mt 17:10-13; Mt 3:3//Lk 3:4-6; Mt 11:9-13// Lk 7:26-28; Mt 11:14 (cf. Mt 17:10-13); Lk 1:15ff; 1:76ff.
4. E.g., James and John, Mk 10:39-40//Mt 20:22-23; Peter, Mk 14:27-30//Mt 26:31-34; Lk 22:31-34; Judas, Mk 14:21//Mt 26:24-25//Lk 22:22; cf. also Mt 18:7//Lk 17:1, Acts 1:16; Simeon, Lk 2:26; Zacchaeus, Lk 19:5, "I must stay at your house." The whole company of the disciples: Mk 14:27//Mt 26:31; Lk 12:12 (the Holy Spirit will teach the disciples what is necessary to say) //Mk 13:11//Mt 10:19; Lk 22:29//Mt 19:28. In Acts, cf. God's purposes in the life of Paul: Acts 9:15-16; 20:22-23; 21:4, 11-14; 22:17-21; 23:11; 27:21-25,31,34. The disciples in general in Acts: Acts 2:47 (those who are saved are saved by the sovereign power of God - cf. 13:48; 16:14); 5:39; 20:29.

in these plans of God in behalf of his own people.[1] The impression that emerges from these passages is that God will not be swayed by opposition to his plans, but will faithfully carry out his purposes. It is noteworthy that in Acts the individuals who oppose God's plans are rebuked and punished with unusual severity.[2]

This is the proper context for evaluating opposition to God, whether human, demonic or Satanic. Eventually, God's plans will be brought to their fulfillment, and evil will be rebuked, punished and stamped out. Even more categorically than the authors of the A&P,[3] the NT rejects any hint of God's responsibility for evil, though it attributes to him full responsibility for the ultimate overthrow of evil. Jesus is the executor of God's plans, and his complete victory over temptations and the devil is the first-fruit, enjoyed already by his followers through the Holy Spirit, of ultimate triumph at the close of the Age.

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1. Cf. especially the fall of Jerusalem, and political upheavals connected with it: Mk ch. 13//Mt ch. 24//Lk ch. 21; Lk 23:27-31. Cf. also Acts 17:26,31.

2. Judas: 1:18-19; Ananias and Sapphira: 5:1-11; the rulers of the Jews, through the words of Stephen: 7:51-53; Simon Magus: 8:20-23; Saul: 9:8-9, cf. 22:11; Herod: 12:20-23; Elymas: 13:10-11; the seven sons of Sceva: 19:14-16.

The plan of God and its inevitable fulfillment was a particularly important thought for Lk. Caird writes (Luke, 35): "We are not meant to think that Jesus was a fatalist, but that at every period in his life he responded with willing obedience to the necessity that was laid upon him by his vocation. God could not be held responsible for the perfidy of Judas or for any of the other sins which contributed to bring about the crucifixion, yet not even this happened outside the control of his determined plan." In a similar vein, O'Neill (Theology of Acts, 170) says that Lk "used this scheme of events to show that the fortunes of Jesus and the Church were governed at every turn by the hand of God. Everything that happened was inevitable and fore-ordained, and could be discovered, in the last resort, in the pages of the OT. It was no accident that Jesus died in Jerusalem or that the rejection of the gospel by Jerusalem led to Paul's arrival in Rome. Human decision was almost completely excluded at the crucial moments of the story, and Peter and Paul's movements were controlled by supernatural direction from the Holy Spirit and angels and visions whenever a decisive step had to be taken." On the other hand, Leaney (Rule, 248) holds that human decision is the controlling factor - choosing or refusing the plan of God - and contrasts it with what he considers the more complicated predestinarianism of Qumran and Pl.

3. Cf. above, 83ff.

The paradoxical character of this strong emphasis on the plan of God will immediately be evident, considering what has been said about the equally strong emphasis in the Synoptic Gospels on human freedom and responsibility.[1] There will be no attempt here to settle this age-old question, but it may be pointed out how clearly it emerges in the case of those who try to oppose the plan of God: Judas both fulfils and opposes the plan of God, and thus is both a tool of God's purpose and a fully responsible moral agent;[2] the scribes and Pharisees in Mt fill a quite similar role;[3] likewise in Acts do "the Jews" both resist the plan of God and fulfill prophecy in so doing.

The plan of God has its earthly focus in Jesus, and in the person of Jesus we find, strangely enough, our clearest light on the subject of evil: as Jn suggests, he is the light by which evil is discerned,[5] the light that penetrates the darkness of sin.[6] It is over against Jesus and his work that Satan, the demons, and human sin assume their proper proportions: Satan's strength is broken by "the stronger;" the demons seize their prey, but cannot resist the one who rescues men from their grip; sickness holds men in wretched bondage, but Jesus makes them whole again; the wickedness of human beings, in league with Satan, combines to

1. Cf. above, 158ff.
2. Cf. above, 166, fn. 2. For Lk, even Satanic motivation does not preclude guilt: Lk 22:3, cf. Acts 1:16ff.
3. Cf. above, 125, fn. 2. The guilt and responsibility of the Pharisees does not emerge quite so obviously as it does in the case of Judas. But Jesus equally stresses the necessity of his suffering and its foretelling in the prophets (cf. above, 128, fn. 7), and the wickedness and hypocrisy of the Jewish leaders who brought about the crucifixion, thus fulfilling the prophecy (e.g., Mt 23:35).
4. Cf. above, 126, fn. 3. Acts 28:25-28 stands like a summary on the dealings Pl has had with the Jews during the whole course of Acts. But even though they simply do what has been foretold of them, the Jews' blood is still upon their own heads (Acts 18:6).

   Cadbury (Luke-Acts, 308-315) and Conzelmann (Theology, 129ff) have observed the favorable attitude toward the Romans as compared with the Jews in Acts; when opposition to the Gospel is found, it comes from the Jews rather than the Romans.
5. Jn 3:19-21.
6. Jn 1:5.

destroy God's plan, but Jesus rises victorious over death. Sin, Satan and the demons are defeated at every turn, and their continuing power, while dreadful enough, is only a rear guard action. Their hosts are in rout, as will become clear to all at the Judgment. Evil in the NT is an important concept principally as it is the foil for Christ's redemptive achievement.

Surely it is because of this overwhelming preoccupation with Christ and his victory over sin that the Synoptic Gospels deal with the origin of sin as little as they do. Their apparatus and language for dealing with the subject are conventional and largely unoriginal, on the whole no more than a melange of Jewish ideas. The genius of Christianity lies elsewhere, in the thought that Christ had spurned evil and its powers beneath his feet, and had proved his victory by the Resurrection. It remained for a later age, less forcefully gripped by the vision of Christ triumphant, to dabble in speculations as to the origin of evil.[1]

The sum of the matter seems to be that the Synoptic Gospels have no "official" doctrine of the origin of sin. Different lines of Jewish thought on the subject can be traced, there are different concepts of the essence of evil, and there are different evaluations of its means of access to the human scene. But what is unanimous here is: 1) a full acceptance of human responsibility; 2) a full acceptance of the (secondary) role played by demonic and Satanic forces in implementing man's wickedness; 3) a firm conviction, variously expressed, that God is victorious over evil; and 4) a clear focus on Christ as the means of God's victory.

1. Already in the NT there are indications that men were indulging in this kind of speculation: cf., e.g., Col 2:8; ITim 6:20; Rev 2:24. But the full efflorescence of this kind of thought in Christian or semi-Christian circles did not come about until after NT times, with the rise of developed Gnosticism. According to Nock's analysis, the problem of the origin of evil was one of the three chief or characteristic elements of Gnostic thought (HTR 57 (1964), 256).

CHAPTER FIVE

St Paul's attitude toward the origin of evil is in one sense more difficult to encompass than that of the Synoptic Gospels. He is only one man, and yet diverse currents of thought mingle in his mind in a fashion that puzzles the exegete - a mingling such as could plausibly be explained in the Synoptic Gospels by recourse to sources and the evangelist's use of them. But in another sense the task is easier, for Pl is only one man, and we may expect some degree of consistency from him. Much more than in the Synoptic Gospels we may explain his writings by comparing them with one another, a procedure that is allowable in the Synoptic Gospels only in the case of Lk compared to Acts.

For purposes of this study, we consider all the letters that bear Pl's name as "Pauline," as produced at least under his influence or the influence of his memory. The vexed problems of the authorship of Eph and Col will not occupy us largely,[1] though mention will occasionally be made of the varying emphases found in them, in the Hauptbriefe, and in the Pastorals. The Pastorals make a relatively small contribution to the Pauline doctrine of sin and evil.

We look first at the terminology in which Pl expresses himself on the subject of evil. The two words πονηρός and κακός are present, but the latter is obviously the more typical of Pl. There are only three occasions when πονηρός appears in the Hauptbriefe,[2] the remainder being

1. For a survey of the problems involved in the authorship of Eph, cf. Cadbury, NTS 5 (1959), 91-102, who cites in favor of Pauline authorship Schmid and Percy, and against Pauline authorship Goodspeed and Mitton, but concludes that the evidence is fairly evenly balanced and that the letter corresponds 90 to 95 per cent with Pl's usual style (101). Schlier (Epheser, 22-27) surveys the evidence, and is more confident than Cadbury of the authenticity of the letter.
   Col is more generally conceded to be Pauline.
2. Rom 12:9; ICor 5:13; Gal 1:4. Cf. also πονηρία, Rom 1:29; ICor 5:8.

scattered through the rest of the Pauline literature.[1] The usage is fairly flexible, and πονηρός may be applied to a wicked man, to Satan, to the present evil age, or in a more general ethical sense.[2] By contrast, κακός is generally used, often with the article, to signify what we would probably call simply "evil."[3] It may also be used in an adjectival or adverbial sense, but here again in a way that connotes evil broadly defined.[4] It is important to note here that evil for Pl is seldom spoken of in an abstract sense;[5] rather, κακός is almost always something done, and therefore has a direct connection with ἁμαρτία, with the behavior of man.[6] It is a more positive notion than the Greek concept of evil; as Manson has succinctly observed, "The Hellenic explanation tends to be in terms of defect, the Hebraic in

1. Eph 5:16; 6:13,16; Col 1:21; ITh 5:22; IITh 3:2,3; ITim 6:4; IITim 3:13; 4:18; cf. also πονηρία, Eph 6:12.
2. Wicked men: ICor 5:13; IIThes 3:2,3; IITim 3:13. Satan, only in Eph 6:16; cf. πονηρία in Eph 6:12. The evil age: Gal 1:4; Eph 5:16; 6:13. In a more general sense of "evil": Rom 12:9; Col 1:21; IThes 5:22; ITim 6:4; IITim 4:18. The latter corresponds to what Pl more generally uses κακός to express. Similarly, πονηρία appears in a Lasterkatalog in Rom 1:29, and is made a synonym of κακία in ICor 5:8. The appearance of the word in a Lasterkatalog implies that it may well have been the creation of the Christian community, or taken over from a Hellenistic or Jewish tradition (cf. Wibbing, Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge im Neuen Testament, 1-13, for a review of the sources that have been suggested), and hence may not, strictly speaking, represent Pl's most natural usage. Cf. also Deissmann, Light, 319-322.
3. Rom 2:9; 3:8; 7:19,21; 12:17,21; 13:3,4,10; 16:19; ICor 13:6; IICor 13:7; Phil 3:2; IThes 5:15; ITim 6:10; IITim 4:14. Cf. also the word κακία: Rom 1:29; Col 3:8; Tit 3:3 (the foregoing appearing in Lasterkatalog settings); also ICor 5:8; 14:20; Eph 4:31.
4. Rom 1:30 (Lasterkatalog); 9:11; 13:3; 14:20; ICor 10:6; Col 3:5 (Lasterkatalog); two appearances in this sense are in quotations from pagan authors: ICor 15:33; Tit 1:12.
5. It might be thus understood in Rom 7:21; 16:19; ICor 13:5; Col 3:5; ITim 6:10; but even here it is doubtful if evil can be abstracted from the evil deed. More probable in this respect is the use of κακία, cf. above, fn. 3.
6. Rom 2:9; 3:8; 7:19; 9:11; 12:17,21; 13:3,4,10; ICor 10:6; IICor 13:7; Phil 3:2; IThes 5:15; IITim 4:14. Cf. Grundmann, TWNT III, 482: "Was ist aber für Paulus das κακόν? Es steht eng mit dem zusammen, was für ihn ἁμαρτία ist. Sünde ist ihm das Tun des von Gott gelösten Menschen, der sich gegenüber Gott behauptet, ein Selbst sein will vor Gott und ohne Gott."

terms of defection."[1] And (to the point of our investigation) the doer of τὸν κακόν is always a human being.

Pl has a fairly broad vocabulary treating the subject of sin. The most important word is certainly ἁμαρτία, with ἁμαρτάνειν and ἁμαρτωλός. The effect of the LXX in unifying and broadening the definition of evil in the OT has already been mentioned above.[2] The classical meaning of ἁμαρτάνειν is to fail, fall short, miss the mark,[3] though in the NT its basic meaning is simply to sin.[4] There is nothing particularly distinctive for our subject in Pl's use of the verb ἁμαρτάνειν or the noun ἁμαρτωλός[5] - these may be regarded as applied to individual men engaged in the act of sinning against God. But the noun ἁμαρτία does present some distinct usage that has a bearing on the origin of evil. It is sometimes spoken of in terms of the mere activity of sinning,[6] sometimes similarly as the sum of various sins.[7] But it may also be spoken of as though it were a power apart from man, exercising control over him. Men are thus under sin or in sin or slaves of sin or freed from sin.[8] This usage is spread throughout the Pauline corpus, though it

1. Paul and John, 16. Cf. similarly Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, 49, who remarks with reference to the OT pattern of thought a truth that equally applies to the NT: "Evil is positive opposition of the will to the Good, not just an inadequacy or deficiency in ethical education, a stage which it is both possible and necessary to get over. It is an offence which must be either punished or forgiven." Cf. also Sanday and Headlam, Romans, 144: "It is something more than a negation; it is a positive quality, calling forth a positive reaction."
2. Cf. above, 118ff. For ἁμαρτία in particular, cf. Sanday and Headlam, op. cit., 143-144, on the difference between ἁμαρτία in classical authors and in the LXX and the NT.
3. Arndt and Gingrich, Lexicon, 41.
4. Rom 2:12; 3:23; 5:12,14,16; 6:15; ICor 6:18; 7:28,36; 8:12; 15:34; Eph 4:26; ITim 5:20; Tit 3:11. Cf. the discussion of ἁμαρτία in the NT in Burton, Galatians, 439-443.
5. For ἁμαρτωλός, cf. Rom 3:7; 5:8,19; 7:13; Gal 2:15,17; ITim 1:9,15.
6. Rom 3:20; 4:7,8 (Ps 32:1); 14:23; ICor 15:3,17.
7. ICor 15:3; Gal 1:4; IThes 2:16; ITim 5:22,24; IITim 3:6. Pl can even speak of ἁμαρτία ironically in the sense of a mere fault, which he obviously does not regard as a "sin," strictly speaking (IICor 11:7).
8. Rom 3:9, under; 6:1-2, in; 6:6-7, enslaved to/freed from; 6:10-14, dead to, ruled over by, members of; 6:16-18, slaves of/freed from;

naturally is found most frequently where the topic of discussion is sin. But a second distinctive usage seems to be limited entirely to Rom, where Pl speaks of sin as an active force, possessed of its own initiative, seizing opportunities, entering the world, reigning over man.[1] This last usage approaches personification, and indeed attains it; it justifies such statements as C. A. A. Scott's:[2]

> Paul's treatment of the subject of Sin is largely governed by his conception of it as something external and objective.... To this personified external Force (which Paul seems almost to reckon among the spirit-forces of Evil) man has come to be in servitude....He came near to personifying it because he conceived it as something which reached him and other men from without, something which had existence and showed activity prior to and independent of his consent to it...."Sin" is not for him a synonym for a sinful status; it is a power invading, attacking, subjugating men from without, and using for this purpose the flesh or physical constitution as its instrument.

But it should not be forgotten that at the same time, man has a share in the control and abetment of the activities of ἁμαρτία as a "power:"[3]

> Sin is the power-sphere which comes about through the activity of man. Through this activity this Power rules over man in such a way that it drives him on to further sinning, as long as the man lives as its willing servant.

In addition to ἁμαρτία we find the word παράπτωμα.[4] It means, literally, a fall beside; its Pauline meaning is best expressed by "false step" or "trespass." It gives the impression of being a near-

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6:20,22, slaves of/freed from; 7:14, sold under; 7:23, captive to; 7:25, under the law of; 8:2, freed from; 8:10, dead on account of; ICor 15:17, in; 15:56, empowered by the law; Gal 2:17, servant of; 3:22, under; Eph 2:1, dead by; Col 1:14, redemption from. Cf. Arndt and Gingrich, Lexicon, 42-43, for a note on Pauline usage in this sense.

1. Rom 5:12-13, entering the world, bringing death; 5:20-21, abounding, reigning; 6:12-14, reigning, using tools; 7:8-9, seizing an opportunity, reviving; 7:11, seizing an opportunity; 7:13, bringing about death.

2. C. A. A. Scott, Christianity, 46-47. Cf. Harnack's similar view in History, 434-435. Sanday and Headlam (Romans, 145-146) believe this personification implies a real person at work through sin, i.e., the devil, but what seems to me a more probable solution is outlined below. Dibelius, Geisterwelt, 122, regards ἁμαρτία in Rom 6 and 7 as being a truly personal power, indeed as a demon, but concedes that Pl's reference to ἁμαρτία is generally a personification.

3. Becker, Das Heil Gottes, 243-244.

4. Rom 4:24; 5:15-20; 11:11-12; IICor 5:19; Gal 6:1; Eph 1:7; 2:1,5; Col 2:13.

synonym of ἁμαρτία.[1] There is also παράβασις, παραβάτης,[2] etymologically a "stepping across the line,"[3] always spoken of in connection with either the Mosaic law or the simple command of God that Adam broke in the Garden of Eden. Slightly more often than παράβασις, παραβάτης, Pl uses ἀδικία,[4] based on the root δίκη with the privative: the absence of conformity to a standard.[5] The term seems best defined by its typical Pauline antonym which is not, as we might expect, δικαιοσύνη, but ἀλήθεια, so that ἀδικία becomes the opposite of the truth.[6] Still another word for sin is ἀνομία, ἄνομος, literally "lawlessness," which is defined partly by its opposites[8] and partly by its immediate synonyms[9] in terms that suggest simply another word for sin.[10] Finally, ἀσέβεια, ἀσεβής,[11] referring to a condition of godlessness.[12] The remaining words which deal with sin do not occur frequently enough to be of much help in determining the outline of Pl's doctrine.[13]

So much for Pl's terminology for dealing with sin and evil. The question before us is, What did Pl regard as its point of origin? Is it originally the responsibility of God, of the demons, or of man?

There are two standpoints from which Pl's doctrine of divine

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1. Arndt and Gingrich, Lexicon, 627; cf. Michaelis, TWNT VI, 172-173.
2. Rom 2:23,25,27; 4:15; 5:14; Gal 2:18; 3:19; ITim 2:14.
3. Arndt and Gingrich, op. cit., 617; cf. Michaelis, loc. cit., who makes the point regarding the connection between παράβασις and the breaking of a law.
4. Rom 1:18,29; 2:8; 3:5; 6:13; 9:14; ICor 13:6; IICor 12:13; IIThes 2:10,12; IITim 2:19. Cf. also ἄδικος, Rom 3:5; ICor 6:1,9.
5. Arndt and Gingrich, op. cit., 17, list as meanings: wrongdoing, unrighteousness, wickedness, injustice.
6. Rom 1:18; 2:8; in Rom 3:5 the opposite is δικαιοσύνη, but ἀλήθεια appears in v. 7; Rom 6:13, δικαιοσύνη is the opposite; ICor 13:6; II Thes 2:10,12.
7. Rom 4:7 (Ps 32:1); 6:19; ICor 9:21; IICor 6:14; IIThes 2:3,7-8; ITim 1:9; Tit 2:14 (Ps 130:8).
8. δικαιοσύνη, Rom 6:19; IICor 6:14; ITim 1:9; φῶς, IICor 6:14; ἄνομος/ἔννομος, ICor 9:21.
9. Ἁμαρτία, Rom 4:7; ἀκαθαρσία, Rom 6:19; σκότος, IICor 6:14.
10. IJn 3:4: "sin is lawlessness." Interesting for this point is the evenly balanced textual evidence for ἀνομία/ἁμαρτία at IIThes 2:3, which supports Jn's definition.
11. Rom 1:18; 4:5; 5:6; 11:26; ITim 1:9; IITim 2:16; Tit 2:12.
12. Arndt and Gingrich, op. cit., 114.
13. παρακοή, Rom 5:19; IICor 10:6. πώρωσις, Rom 11:25; Eph 4:18.

responsibility can be observed; from one, God would seem expressly ruled out of consideration, and from the other expressly indicted, as the cause of evil. The fact that Pl himself touches directly upon this problem may indicate that he felt some uneasiness himself as to his own position. The view of Pl is conditioned by his acceptance of the OT doctrine, further developed during the IT period, of God's absolute sovereignty over the affairs of the world in which evil quite obviously exists.[1]

The first standpoint takes into account Pl's express declaration that God is not responsible for the sin of man. There were those who attributed injustice to God,[2] who asked why, when the glory of God was served by the sin of man, God should still find fault.[3] Admittedly, many have not been satisfied with Pl's explanation in terms of the potter and the clay;[4] his position, however, would seem clear as to God's responsibility. No matter how inadequate human analogies may be in explaining the things of God, God cannot by any means be regarded as being responsible for human sin.[5] This, at least, is what Pl intends to teach.

But from the second standpoint, it appears that so much power is attributed to God that the denial of his responsibility may go against the grain of Pl's more basic assumptions, whether Pl recognized the fact or not. In this connection, it will be useful to compare Pl's doctrine with that of Qumran in order to give us a control of sorts, for Qumran likewise attributed to God a sovereignty that was absolute and limitless.

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1. Cf. above, 13, 63, 77.
2. Rom 3:5; 9:14.
3. Rom 9:19.
4. Rom 9:20ff.
5. It was this attribution of evil to God that elicited from Pl some of his indignant uses of μὴ γένοιτο : cf. Rom 3:4,6; 6:2,15; 7:7,13.

In Qumran we find a predestinarian doctrine that attributes to God the determining of every human life before it comes into being, a truly "double" predestination.[1] The spirit of perversity is created by the hand of God;[2] God loathes or loves men prior to their birth, indeed for and from all eternity.[3] The Thanksgiving Psalms express the same doctrine:[4]

> Thou hast prescribed all Thy will for the spirit of man whom Thou didst form in the universe, unto all everlasting days, and eternal generations in their fixed times Thou hast apportioned their work in all their generations and judgment in its seasons unto their dominions for ever and ever. And the visitation of their retribution with all their afflictions and Thou hast apportioned all that come out of them unto a number of eternal generations and unto all everlasting years and by the skill of Thy knowledge Thou didst establish their destiny ere they came into being, and according to Thy will all hath come to pass, and without Thee it shall not be accomplished.

As Matthew Black says, "The author does not hesitate to attribute evil as well as good to God."[5]

Now although some of Pl's statements might lead us to conclude the same thing of him, there are other facets of his thought that deserve equal consideration. As we have already observed, Pl <u>does</u> hesitate to attribute evil as well as good to God. Furthermore, his doctrine of divine sovereignty vis-a-vis human responsibility has subtle currents that diverge in important respects from Qumran teaching. For one thing, the chief group of people whom God has "hardened", i.e., the Jews, are at the same time the very people most irrevocably destined for salvation: "God has not rejected his people whom he foreknew."[6] Then

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1. Cf. above, 59, 62.
2. 1QS 3:19,20,25.
3. 1QS 4:1.
4. 1QH 1:14-20.
5. in <u>Scrolls</u>, 134.
6. Rom 11:2. Richardson (<u>Theology</u>, 275-276) notes that predestination in the NT tends to be applied to groups, as in Rom 9 - 11; this fact needs to be weighed against the strongly individual stress of 1QS 3:15ff; admittedly, this individual predestination in 1QS is to membership in one of two great divisions of humanity, the "saved" and the "unsaved," but the basis of the division is individualistic, personal.

again, there are Pl's "all" passages to be considered (all Israel will be saved, Rom 11:26; God has consigned all men to disobedience, that he may have mercy upon all, Rom 11:32; every knee shall bow, and every tongue confess, Phil 2:11; God desires all men to be saved.... Jesus, who gave himself as a ransom for all, ITim 2:4,6).[1] Whatever may be concluded about a Pauline doctrine of universal salvation, the Pauline emphasis is at least utterly different from Qumran's. God's purpose and intent, whatever the outcome, is for the salvation of all, contrary to Qumran's attribution to God of the purpose of perdition for the sons of darkness. And third, it should be noted that in all the cases of "hardening," whether of groups or individuals, the hardening or rejection is seen as part of a larger scheme that tends to salvation: Esau is rejected as a part of the decree that defined the blood line leading to the Christ; Pharaoh is the opposition against which God's glory is shown by his deliverance of the people of salvation, the Jews; the Jews are themselves temporarily hardened in order that the Gentiles too may be saved.[2] All of this serves to modify the character of the analogous Qumran doctrine. God is still regarded as sovereign,

1. Cf. Whiteley, Theology, 97, who admits the naturalness of concluding from Rom 9 - 11 that all will be saved, but goes on to speak of "conditional damnation" on the basis of Rom 9:22-23; 11:25-26. He cites Barrett (Romans, 223) as holding that not all will be saved. Whiteley concludes (98), "Damnation, whatever form it may take, is not due to predestination by God, but to wilful sin on the part of man himself." To the contrary, M. E. Dahl (Resurrection, 76) holds that the totality of the human race will be saved in Christ, its universal Head.

2. Rom 9:13,17; 11:25-31. As Whiteley has pointed out (op. cit., 91), Pl's predestination is a predestination to service. C. K. Barrett (Romans, 188) comments on Rom 9:21: "It is not unimportant that Pharaoh is regarded as standing within God's purpose, which is a purpose of mercy. His place in it may be an ignoble one, but it is within and not outside it." F. C. Porter (Mind of Christ in Paul, 128) says, "It is not easy to adjust Paul's doctrine of election to his doctrine of the love of God. Paul does not make them harmonious, but he does give love the first place in the nature of God, and the final place in his purposes; he does look at the foreordaining and determining will of God as having chiefly the ends of love in mind, and the ends of universality."

but his glory is best seen not in his irresistable exercise of that sovereignty, but in his determination to save "some"[1] - or does Pl really mean "all"?

Perhaps the doctrine of God's sovereignty can be left here for the time being. When it comes up for consideration in other connections, it will be remarked that the facts observed above apply: God's sovereignty has purposed the salvation of man, and whatever else Pl may say about God's sovereignty, he does not intend to suggest that God is responsible for sin or its origin.[2]

The question then may be raised as to whether evil is demonic in its origin. First among the demonic powers named by Pl we discuss Satan and demonic associates who seem to be grouped with him.

Satan, in contrast with the "powers" later to be considered, seems to be definitely personal. He is referred to under the name σατανᾶς and also as ὁ διάβολος; the two terms seem to be practically synonymous, though the former is the term always used in the Hauptbriefe and the latter is preferred in Eph and the Pastorals. Σατανᾶς and ὁ διάβολος are at one in hindering and resisting the work of the Gospel;[3] temptation to sin seems to be one of Satan's characteristic forms of behavior.[4] In addition, Satan has powers over the bodies

1. ICor 9:22.
2. The contrast with Stoic determinism may well be noted here, as well as the Qumran contrasts. A result of the Stoic view that everything that exists has a material basis, and that God is the sum of all things (Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, 126ff), was to attribute absolutely everything in the κόσμος to God. "The Stoic doctrine of necessity was the direct consequence of the Stoic pantheism. The divine power which rules the world could not be the absolute uniting cause of all things, if there existed anything in any sense independent of it, and unless one unchanging causal connection governed everything." (Ibid., 176; cf. also 189-190; 204ff). Pl, because of his clear distinction between creation and creator, has room to maneuver that is not allowed by the Stoic monism. On the predestination of Qumran compared with that of Pl, cf. Leaney, Rule, 248.
3. IThes 2:18; IIThes 2:9; Eph 6:11; ITim 3:6; IITim 2:26.
4. ICor 7:5; IICor 2:11; 11:14; ITim 5:15. Eph 4:27 may likewise cast the devil in the role of the tempter.

of men, apparently to cause sickness;[1] but his powers may even in their malignancy serve a good purpose in restoring to repentance the spirits of men who are given into his hands.[2] It will be seen that Satan fills here approximately the same function as he does in the Synoptic Gospels, and even gathers up into himself the work of the demons as the cause of disease; for the δαιμόνια of Pl are a different thing from those of the Synoptic Gospels.[3] Beliar is mentioned once, though nothing in particular is said about him beyond the obvious assumption that he is the absolute opposite of Christ.[4] He is presumably Satan under another name.[5]

The "prince of the power of the air" is mentioned in Eph 2:2. As Schlier remarks,[6] he is probably identical with ὁ διάβολος of Eph 6:11. His connection with the Powers is defined in terms of his being their ἀρχων, which as noted above[7] does not imply an absolute, but a delegated authority, i.e., from God.

The man of ἀνομία also figures in IIThes; he is, however, evidently a man,[8] and as such does not belong among the supernatural powers who use him for their own ends.

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1. ICor 5:5; IICor 12:7.
2. The apparent meaning of ICor 5:5. In this same general sense, cf. ITim 1:20, though the beneficent effect does not seem to be in view here.
3. They are mentioned twice (ICor 10:20-21; ITim 4:1); the reference in ITim has no particular doctrinal significance for the demons themselves. In ICor Pl seems to be equating the δαιμόνια with the gods of the heathen. The demons do not seem to cause sickness as they do in the Synoptic Gospels.
4. IICor 6:15. Cf. Leaney, Rule, 127, who notes occurrences of the term in the OT and its use as the proper name of the chief evil spirit in the DSS. L doubts the Pauline origin of this passage in IICor. On Belial in the DSS, cf. Mansoor, Thanksgiving Hymns, 108, fn. to 1QH 2:22, and similarly cf. 80.
5. Bousset, however, would find in Beliar the "man of lawlessness" rather than Satan, demon or angel; cf. Antichrist, 101.
6. Epheser, 290.
7. Cf. above, 124.
8. IIThes 2:3ff. Cullmann has demonstrated that the reference is not to the State; cf. State, 64. A. M. Hunter suggests that Caligula might have been the person in mind, and remarks the absence of the man of lawlessness in later letters (Paul, 99).

As to the reality and personality of Satan, there seems to be no real doubt.[1] "It would seem that St Paul did believe in the 'real' existence of a 'personal' Satan and probably of other personal demons."[2] But as to the precise position of Satan, the picture does not seem to be as clear. Is he to be regarded as the supreme commander of all the forces of evil, or is he simply one of a number of evil powers which are not graded into a hierarchy? On the strength of the Synoptic tradition it seems that Pl would be likely to know of Satan's position as chief of the demons, but on Pauline evidence the only indication of that sort is his mention of an ἄγγελος of Satan sent to afflict with illness.[3] In every other case, Satan confronts the believer personally, and the demonic hordes are left entirely out of account.[4] The use of Beliar

1. Cf. Harnack, History I, 181-182; Weiss, History, 599-603.
2. Whiteley, Theology, 29. Whiteley, however, distinguishes between the "reality" of the demons and that of the "powers" (loc. cit.); indeed, he doubts whether Pl would himself have classified them together, and believes it possible that Pl was consciously using "mythological" language (op. cit., 20).
3. IICor 12:7. Deissmann wrote, "A small library could be gathered together all dealing with Paul's illness. It must, however, on the whole be said that so far as the writers come out to definite statement they depend upon inadmissible diagnosis from a distance which every honourable physician would refuse to credit." (Paul, 60; cf. also 223.) Nevertheless, many have continued to theorize about Paul's illness. T. Y. Mullins in JBL 76 (1957) 299-303 comes to the conclusion, arguing from similar usage in the LXX and the Church Fathers, that since ἄγγελος is invariably personal, disease cannot be in view here, but rather a false teacher. But he provides an impressive list of those who disagree with him and consider the σκόλοψ a disease: Bultmann, Theology I, 223; Deissmann, Paul, 62-63, 195; J. Knox, Chapters in a Life of Paul, Nashville, 1950, 91; Lightfoot, The Beginning of the Christian Church, N. Y., 1949, 113; Lightfoot, Galatians, 186-191; A. Schweitzer, Mysticism, 154. On the whole, the understanding of this passage in terms of a disease (brought, perhaps, by a demonic messenger) seems by far the most probable. Thierry, in NovTest 5 (1962), 301-310, has suggested with more ingenuity than probability that the σκόλοψ is the fact of Pl's history as a persecutor of the Church, constantly thrown up against him by his Judaizing opponents.
4. Cf. Braun, ZTK 8 (1898), who observes correctly that there is no such thing as "possession" in the Epistles, and continues: "Die δαιμόνια haben somit in den paulinischen Briefen eine ganz andere Bedeutung, als bei den Synoptikern und den Acta. Sie gewinnen nicht erst durch lokales Eingehen Herrschaft über den Menschen; sie haben es nicht abgesehen auf Störung des physischen und psychischen Lebens, sondern auf sittlich-

for a name of Satan argues a connection with Qumran, where Beliar was definitely known as the chief of the demons;[1] but nothing is said by Pl concerning Beliar's relationship to the demons. All in all, the idea of a demonic overlord is found frequently enough in contemporary religious thought to make it quite probable that Pl regarded Satan as head of the demons, though he never expressed himself directly on the subject. But this is a matter in which there is simply no evidence on which to base definite conclusions.

The typical posture of Satan is one of attack, and the posture of the Christian is to be one of resistance. Satan employs deception, disguising himself as an angel of light;[2] he casts his snare to entrap the unwary;[3] he leads those astray who are unwise enough to follow him;[4] he does everything within his power to make the work of the apostles difficult;[5]

religiöses Verderben; ihre Einwirkung sind durch das sittliche Verhalten des Menschen bestimmt." (501). His assumption is, of course, that these "demonic" forces are identical with the Powers, a view which seems to me to need qualification; cf. below, 187ff. B goes on to argue that the delivery to Satan for the destruction of the flesh (ICor 5:5) and Pl's σκόλοψ (IICor 12:7) are not really to the point here, since both are administered directly by Satan, not by demons (loc. cit). The σκόλοψ is the pain, the disease, the ἄγγελος. There is no intermediary "messenger."

Schlier, Principalities, 14ff, may be taken as representative of those who refuse to distinguish between the Pauline and Synoptic viewpoint on Satan and the demons.

1. Leaney, Rule, 127. As L observes, the name Beliar was part of a tradition of development in TestXIIPat, SibOr and Jub. L believes this reference to Beliar is definitely out of place (IICor 6:15) and of doubtful Pauline origin.
2. IICor 11:14. Cf. also Eph 6:11, the μεθοδεία of the devil.
3. A term employed in the Pastorals: ITim 3:7; 6:9; IITim 2:26. Cf. the article by Kosmala in Annual of the Swedish Theological Institute IV (1965), where K observes the closeness between I and IITim and Qumran (98), and refers to the index in his Hebräer-Essener-Christen, Leiden, 1959. K finds the term "net" and "snare" in DamascDoc 4:12-19; TDan 2:4; 1QH 3:26; 4:12; Is 24:17; Lk 21:35. Kuhn in NTS 7 (1961), 338, would find a further connection in TLev 14:5-8, and believes that the three sins of Eph 5:3, cf. 4:19, are also the three chief sins for the Essenic tradition, which therefore lies in the background of the author of Eph.
4. This particular terminology in IICor 2:11; in ITim 5:15, some have strayed after him. He blinds the minds of unbelievers, IICor 4:4.
5. IICor 12:7, the thorn in Pl's flesh; IThes 2:18, Satan hindered Pl's access to the Thessalonians.

he tempts and tests.[1] But against this wily adversary Christians are to set themselves fearlessly, for they are not ignorant of his intentions or methods.[2] Rather, they are well aware of the dangers of following him, and with God's help their resistance will be successful.[3]

And, curiously enough, Satan is even seen as doing some good. His work in punishing recalcitrant Christians may lead to their salvation, despite Satan's evil intentions.[4]

The only place where the demons seem to have significance for Pl is in his mention of them as being the gods of the heathen. Pl does not think that there are any such things as other gods, but does not hesitate

1. πειρασμός is certainly the function of Satan in Pl: ICor 7:5; ITim 3:6; and in particular, IThes 3:5: "I sent to know your faith, μή πως ἐπείρασεν ὑμᾶς ὁ πειράζων and our work had been rendered vain." But, as in the Synoptic Gospels, πειρασμός may have a human source - Christians are to test themselves (IICor 13:5), and some of the Jews tested God in the wilderness (ICor 10:9; cf. Houk, SJT 19 (1966), 216-225). The temptation spoken of in ICor 10:13, though described as ἀνθρώπινος, is probably to be thought of as Satanic in origin, for ἀνθρώπινος is not to be regarded as indicating human origin as much as something relating to the human condition, after the analogy of LXX Num 5:6 (cf. Arndt and Gingrich, Lexicon, 67). The πειρασμός in Pl's flesh which the Galatians bore well can possibly be regarded as identical with the σκόλοψ of IICor 12:7, and if this position is taken it will represent a Satanic temptation at second hand, so to speak. The temptation of ICor 7:5 is Satan's indirectly, through the σάρξ.
2. Christians know the wiles of Satan, IICor 2:11. They are to resist him in God's strength, Eph 4:27; 6:11. On the wiles of the devil, cf. further IICor 4:4; 11:14; Eph 6:11; IIThes 2:9.
3. Eph 6:11ff; Rom 16:20, God will cast down Satan underfoot. With reference to the latter, Whiteley notes its connection with Gen 3:15, and the fact that after WisdSol 2:24 Pl is among the earliest writers to connect Satan with the serpent that tempted Adam and Eve. (Theology, 23).
4. ICor 5:5; ITim 1:20. "Just as innumerable men of antiquity, whose leaden tablets inscribed with bann and curse are still preserved, 'delivered' their opponents over to the gods of the underworld, so he 'delivers' the blasphemers Hymenaeus and Alexander the coppersmith to Satan. Similarly he advises the Corinthians solemnly to 'deliver' an evil-doer to Satan. The parting scene at Miletus (Acts 20:32) may be taken as a counter part of this...." (Deissmann, Paul, 70. Cf. Deissmann, Light, 304-305, where D enlarges on how the congregation, in parallel with magical practice, "delivered" the erring one to Satan.). Noack (Satanas, 98) considers this to be the death sentence for a crime which would have been punishable by death in the OT; under Rome, however, such punishment was not an option, and the executioner must perforce be Satan, the angel of death.

to describe idols as being, in fact, demons.[1] This is because for Pl, as for the Jewish view in general, idols are utterly powerless; hence Pl sees behind whatever actual power the idols possess the hidden power of demonic forces.[2]

But how extensive is the power of "the god of this age" and of the demons? The answer for Pl is, not very extensive as compared with the power of God.[3] Satan carries on his operations under the supervision and control of God, and in the final analysis the activities of Satan

1. Note his description of Satan (presumably) in IICor 4:4 as "the god of this world." But of course, there is only one real God, and idols are non-existents (ICor 8:4). Whatever influence the idols have is therefore due to their employment by real powers, i.e., demonic ones. Cf. I Bar 4:7, which refers to Israel as sacrificing to demons, not to God, and also to Rev 9:20.

2. Pl's own view of idolatry is found particularly in ICor 8:1ff; 10:7, 14ff; 12:2, where the idols are referred to as "dumb," an indication of their impotence; IThes 1:9, where the contrast of idols with the "living" God implies that the idols are dead. A number of references to idols and idolatry (ICor 5:10,11; 6:9; Gal 5:20; Col 3:5) are found in Lasterkatalog settings which may reflect an early church tradition rather than Pl's own view. The tradition seems to have been that idolatry excluded its practitioner from the Kingdom of God (ICor 6:9; Eph 5:5), and a like tradition connected idolatry with covetousness (Eph 5:5; Col 3:5). Weiss (History I, 248, fn. 46) observes the effect of the LXX translation of Ps 95:4f in turning idols into demons.

3. Harnack's statement (History I, 181, fn.) that man's need for redemption was considered to be a result of demonic domination, and his further remark attributing to eschatological hopes "the conviction that the world's course...is determined by the devil, and that the dark one (Barnabas) has dominion," seems to need qualification, at least as it applies to the NT. Early believers admittedly attributed to Satan a dreadful degree of power, but their faith was supported by the conviction that ultimately the power of God was greater (IJn 5:19, which concedes the whole world to the power of the evil one, is balanced by the conviction expressed in IJn 4:4, that he who is in you is greater than he who is in the world), and that in this world as well as in the next God was mighty to save. Too much must not be granted to the power of Satan. On the other hand, Macquarrie seems to me to be oversimplifying in suggesting (ET 68 (1956), 3) that Pl can without too great difficulty be de-demonised: "It would not be quite so easy to eliminate the demonic from St. Paul's teaching, for there it enters into the texture of the theology. Yet the difficulty would still not be insuperable, for the concept of the demonic is not of first-class importance in Pauline thought." Pl would seem to be harder to demythologize than Macquarrie implies. The proper standard for measuring the power of Satan is by comparing it with the power of God. Compared to God's power, Satan's is negligible; compared to man's, however, it is terrifying. As Manson stresses (Paul and John, 22), Satan is the god of this world only.

tend to the glory of God; Satan's malignancy does not keep him from being used as God's tool.[1] Satan is seen as active in the first temptation of man,[2] but the ἁμαρτία which was brought into the world through Satan's success[3] is a much more powerful force than is Satan himself, as we shall see below; thus, whatever position is assigned to Satan in the work of temptation, the drive behind human sin is not Satan himself, but a power which he seeks to channel for his own purposes.[4]

Before we go on to the subject of the Powers in Pl, we must pause to spend a moment on the language of Pauline dualism. For Satan as the "god of this age" seems to function as lord of a broadly conceived sphere of influence. How much may be conceded to the power of Satan without being untrue to Pl?

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1. In Rom 16:20, God will cast down Satan under foot; the suffering endured by Pl from Satan is a part of God's plan, and can be borne by God's grace, IICor 12:9; in Eph 4:27, believers are bidden not to give "place" to the devil, as though a Christian by no means need be overcome by Satan's attack; the divine means available for turning back Satan's attack is set forth in Eph 6:11ff; if God grant, the erring may yet escape the snare of the devil, IITim 2:26. God's use of Satan as a means of chastening believers has already been noted above, 181. Satan is evidently God's creation; cf. Whiteley, Theology, 21.
2. Rom 16:20; cf. above, 181, fn. 3. Dibelius (Geisterwelt, 119) is able to show that Satan in Pl leads to sin, and accuses of sin, but this is hardly sufficient support for his statement, "Das Böse in der Welt stammt vom Satan." Rather, Satan is dependent for his success on the prior consent of man; thus, the consent of man becomes the wellspring of evil. Particularly damaging for Dibelius' case is the fact that Pl's most serious discussions of sin and its origins pass without the mention of Satan (Rom 1 - 7); to introduce Satan into these chapters by turning ἁμαρτία into a demon (op. cit., 122) seems improbable. Cf. the comment of Burton, Galatians, 439, fn.
3. As just noted, Pl's most serious discussion of human sin is devoid of Satanic and demonic reference: Rom 1 - 7. It would therefore appear that, whatever part Satan may have played in the beginnings of sin, his role is secondary even there. Ἁμαρτία is something that has to do with man and his relationship to God, and Satan's appearance is at most catalytic, as an assisting rather than as a controlling force.
4. Cf. Grundmann's statement (TWNT I, 315): "Mit dieser Gedankenführung durch Paulus ist etwas Wesentliches getan: Hatten wir oben gesehen, wie die Todesherrschaft aus der Wirklichkeit der Sünde heraus gesehen wurde, so erkennen wir jetzt wie alle Dämonologie und Satanologie des Paulus nicht dualistische Spekulation ist, sondern Ausdruksform der Tatsache Sünde. Alle dämonologischen und satanologischen Aussagen sind bestimmt durch die Sicht der Sünde."

It should be noted, with Schoeps, that the dialectical character of Pl's thought is one of its outstanding characteristics:[1]

> From the idea of life springs that of death, from death he passes again to life. This is because Paul's style of thinking is dialectic. In thinking of "a" he thinks at once of "non-a". If he says "life", he thinks immediately "not death." With this remarkable form of thought by contrasts, he proceeds from flesh to spirit, from the natural man to the spiritual man, etc.

As Schoeps suggests, this form of thought is entirely typical of Pl. It assumes importance for our investigation with the use of several terms.

Pl sets φῶς and σκοτία in opposition in such a way as to suggest the Qumran approach to the Two Ways doctrine, or the Johannine dualism of light and darkness.[2] Likewise, σάρξ and πνεῦμα are set in opposition,[3] and σάρξ in a sense with any theological import is an evil thing.[4] What is noteworthy here is the difference from the dualism of the Synoptic Gospels: the dualism of good and evil is not expressed in terms of

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1. Schoeps, Paul, 49; S cites as support for his view Leisegant, Paulus als Denker, Leipzig, 1923, 37.
2. Rom 13:12, the works of darkness and the armor of light; ICor 4:5, the Lord will bring to light the secret things of darkness; IICor 6:14, what fellowship have light and darkness, Christ and Beliar?; IICor 11:14, Satan transforms himself into an angel of light; Eph 4:18, the Gentiles are darkened in understanding and alienated from God; Eph 5:8-11, you were darkness and now are light, the fruit of light and the unfruitful works of darkness; Col 1:12-13, the inheritance of the saints in light, who have been rescued from darkness; IThes 5:4-5, Christians are not of the darkness or of the night, but of light and of day; IITim 1:10, Jesus Christ has abolished death and brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel. For the Qumran light/darkness dualism, cf. 1QS 3:3; 3:19ff; 1QH 9:26-27; DSW 1:9-11; 13:4,10-11; 17:16; cf. also Kuhn, NTS 7 (1961), 339; Yadin, Scroll of War, 232-233. Leaney (Rule, 43) says, "The opposition of light and darkness expresses that of the strife of order with disorder in the universe, a radical feature presented also as war between God and Belial."
3. Rom 7:5-6, the flesh produces death but the Spirit produces new life; 8:4, we walk not according to the flesh, but the Spirit; cf. similarly 8:5,6,9,13; ICor 5:5, the flesh destroyed so that the spirit may be saved; Gal 3:3, having begun with the Spirit, do you end with the flesh?; 4:29, the flesh-born persecutes the spirit-born; 5:16, walk by the Spirit and do not gratify the desires of the flesh; 5:17, flesh lusts against the Spirit; 5:19,22, the works of the flesh and of the Spirit; 6:8, sowing to the flesh and to the Spirit. Cf. also Davies, Christian Origins, 145ff.
4. Pl's attitude toward the flesh will be discussed in greater detail below.

practical ethical decisions between a good or a bad course of action.[1] Rather, Pl hypostatizes and abstracts, referring to "essences" rather than to instances. The Two Ways substructure is shared with the Synoptic Gospels, but the form of its expression is drawn from a different strain of development.

Similarly, there is a deep cleavage between the present (evil) age and the age to come, the former designated often as ὁ αἰὼν οὗτος, and in the Pastorals as ὁ νῦν αἰών.[2] The apocalyptic notion of two world-ages is thus assumed, woven into the fabric of thought as it was in Qumran.[3] This is what Pl implies in speaking of the present age contrasted with the age begun already in Christ which will come in fulness at the Parousia. The present age is thus always the present evil age from which the Christians are delivered. And often the word κόσμος too assumes a sinister aspect of separation from God.[4] In its general meaning, however, κόσμος is simply "the world," contrary to Johannine usage; for Jn, the κόσμος

1. Cf. above, 158ff. Pl's abstraction has not proceeded as far as Jn's, for Pl speaks of practical ethical decisions and devotes considerable space to exhortations to right conduct. In the Johannine presentation, choice is represented in terms of choosing one "kingdom" or the other - the abstraction from individual ethical choices is almost complete.
2. Rom 12:2; ICor 1:20; 2:6-8; 3:18; 10:11; IICor 4:4; Gal 1:4; Eph 1:21; 2:2,7; at Eph 6:12 there is some manuscript support for αἰῶνος instead of the Nestle text σκότους; ITim 6:17; IITim 4:10; Tit 2:12. In addition might be mentioned Eph 3:9 and Col 1:26, where the αἰών is susceptible of two meanings - either the evil age, or all eternity. That the former is possible, cf. Conzelmann, Epheser, 72.
3. For a note on the doctrine of world-ages in Hellenism, cf. above, 41-42; for its absorption into apocalyptic, cf. Russell, Method and Message, 266ff; on the New Age in Qumran, cf. Cross, Ancient Library, 216ff; for what Cullmann calls "the new division of time" in primitive Christianity, cf. his Time, 81ff.
4. ICor 1:20,21, the wisdom of the world vs. the wisdom of God; similarly, ICor 1:27-28; ICor 2:12, the spirit of the world, vs. the spirit from God; ICor 3:19, what is wisdom with the world is folly with God; Gal 6:14, the Cross of Christ crucifies the world for Pl; in addition, the κόσμος is the sphere of the στοιχεῖα in Gal 4:3; Col 2:8,20. Cf. also Pl's reference to the present "crooked generation" in Phil 2:15. It is in this sense that κόσμος becomes an eschatological concept, "the sphere of anti-godly power under whose sway the individual who is surrounded by it has fallen." (Bultmann, Theology I, 256).

is <u>always</u> a wicked entity, much as ὁ αἰὼν οὗτος is always evil for Pl.[1]

It seems evident that for Pl ὁ αἰὼν οὗτος is a term summing up all that is wrong with the world as we see it, and as God sees it. It is significant that Satan is seen as presiding over this consortium of wickedness.[2] But it is equally evident that for Pl the κόσμος was not <u>created</u> evil, but rather <u>became</u> evil at some stage or other.[3] This is the point of our investigation, to determine as narrowly as possible that point of beginning, and the present status of Satan may not have been achieved by his own unaided efforts. In fact, it will be argued, Satan has come in to his present kingdom on the strength of usurped powers. The fact that these powers are largely borrowed does not diminish their frightful character as employed by Satan, or modify the menacing aspect of the evil age, but it does suggest that Satan is not so much the originator of evil as its exploiter. He draws together the energies of evil under his own leadership, but the energies are not his own.

This is in keeping with the general attitude of the Synoptic Gospels with regard to Satan's "kingdom."[4] The details of the Satanic realm and its constituent parts will appear as our discussion progresses, but it will be kept in mind that Satan is viewed as "god of this world" in terms of his being a regent, not a sovereign. All evil is related to Satan, but its energy comes from elsewhere.

We come now to another "demonic" sphere of influence, that of the

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1. The Johannine uses of κόσμος will be discussed below. On κόσμος in its non-theological usage in Pl, cf. Bultmann, <u>Theology</u> I, 254.
2. IICor 4:4.
3. This both in light of Pl's unwillingness to attribute evil to God, noted above, 174-175, and in light of his use of κόσμος in a completely neutral sense, having no evil implications: cf. Rom 1:8,20; 11:12; ICor 14:10; IICor 1:12; Eph 1:4; Col 1:6. Perhaps paramount among such texts should be mentioned Rom 4:13, where God is said to have promised the κόσμος to Abraham. Cf. also Rom 5:12, where Pl says that sin <u>entered</u> the world, as though not originally one of its constituent elements.
4. Cf. above, 152ff.

"powers;"[1] but first, some justification should be given for partitioning the Powers off from the rest of the demonic. Schlier may be taken as representative of those who choose to regard the whole company of principalities, powers, Satan, spirits and demons as fundamentally a unit.[2] Perhaps in a brief survey of the whole NT on the subject, this is the only way to make the data manageable; however, it does not do complete justice to the evidence before us. Pl always speaks of Satan in terms that suggest personality; with the Powers, however, the issue of personality is much more in question. Instead, we are reminded of what we might today more probably call the "social structure;" as Markus Barth writes,[3]

> Readers of Paul are baffled by his frequent references to the submission of principalities and powers to the feet of Jesus Christ. Indeed, when the apostle discusses the relevance of Jesus' death and resurrection for man, he does not only mention the arch-enemies, sin and death and flesh, but he also speaks of a new order established in regard to the state and the economic or social situation, to sexual and educational problems, to the powers of fate, of tradition, of organized religion, etc. What he calls principalities and powers or by an abundance of other names corresponds not so much to queer ideas concerning angels and demons which populate the universe of ancient man (or, at least, to his mental picture of the universe in which he lives), but much more to these things that are called today, by sociologists and others, "structures" and "institutions."

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1. On the Powers in general, cf. Caird, Principalities; Berkhof, Powers; Schlier, Principalities; Cullmann, Time, 191ff. On their place in Rom 13, cf. Cullmann, State; Morrison, Powers; Cranfield, Romans 12 - 13.
2. Schlier writes (Principalities, 14-15), "Examination shows that the names given to the powers of evil are, to a large extent, interchangeable. Naturally, certain New Testament writers favour one name rather than another: we all know that the Synoptic Gospels usually speak of Satan, the devil, demons or spirits; St. Paul often uses the names of principalities, powers, or virtues, while the Gospel of St. John prefers to speak of the prince of this world. But these names are not mutually exclusive; they are freely interchangeable." This fluidity of terminology may be conceded within the two spheres of the Satanic-demonic on the one hand, and the Principalities and Powers on the other; indeed, it must be insisted upon. But in Pl the two realms do not seem necessarily to be coextensive. Their similarity is in the effect they have on man. It seems to me that the Principalities and Powers can be called demonic only by analogy. Whiteley (Theology, 29-30) correctly distinguishes between statements about "demonic forces" and those about "personal demons."
3. in JES 1 (1963), 67.

While it will be held that some form of "personality" is a probable attribute of these Powers, we are not inclined to think that they belong to the same general category as Satan and the demons.[1] Instead, it will be argued that they must be treated separately, judging from what Pl has to say about them.

First among the terms which are loosely gathered up by the phrase "principalities and powers" must be mentioned the word δύναμις itself,[2] though it is not by any means the typical term for "the powers;" instead, power is almost uniformly attributed to God,[3] Jesus[4] or the Holy Spirit.[5] This is sufficient caution against assigning too great importance to the Powers, since the ultimate dynamic is securely in God's hands. Δύναμις is the force that makes something go; a language has its own δύναμις,[6] but the power behind all things is God. Nevertheless, power is occasionally attributed to what opposes the purpose of God: sin has a δύναμις,[7] and Christ is now exalted far above all powers, which are presumably in some sense hostile; over these he has triumphed and been appointed Lord.[8]

With the fact of God's sovereignty clearly in mind, we are able now to turn to a considerable group of names sometimes mentioned in close proximity,[9] sometimes separately or in pairs. The lists of

1. Cf. below, 191ff.
2. Cf. the note on δύναμις in the word-list appended to Dahl, Resurrection, 109-110. D defines δύναμις as "a word describing the positive 'life of its own' of certain totalities," which may or may not be regarded as being in rebellion against God, but which all are called into existence by God's creative word and are given a status of reality over against him. D distinguishes between this usage and the application of the word to ἁμαρτία, which is "created," so to speak, by rebellion of men or powers.
3. Rom 1:16,20; 9:17; ICor 1:18,24; 2:5; 4:19,20; 6:14; IICor 4:7; 6:7; 13:4; Eph 1:19; 3:7,16,20; Col 1:11,29; IIThes 1:11; IITim 1:7-8; 3:5. Cf. also ICor 15:43; IICor 12:12; Gal 3:5, where the power mentioned is probably to be referred to God.
4. ICor 5:4; 15:24; IICor 12:9; Phil 3:10.
5. Rom 1:4; 15:13,19; ICor 2:4; 12:10,28-29; IThes 1:5.
6. ICor 14:11.
7. ICor 15:56.
8. Eph 1:21.
9. Lists of the Powers are found in Rom 8:38-39; ICor 15:24; Eph 1:21; 6:12; Col 1:16. Cf. similar lists in IEn 61:10; IIEn 20:1.

their names show that their sphere of influence is roughly the same: they can all be mentioned in the same breath, and there seems to be little distinction as to function.

The two terms used most frequently in this sense are ἐξουσία and ἀρχή, often appearing together, though they may also appear separately.[1] Each word of course has a separate life of its own; ἀρχή may mean simply "the beginning,"[2] and ἐξουσία is frequently the apostolic authority.[3] However, it does not seem improbable to find with Cullmann a spiritual authority standing behind the political ἐξουσία of Rom 13;[4] the case for regarding political ἐξουσίαι as spiritually supported at the same time seems to belong to the realm of the probable rather than to that of the demonstrable, but for our purpose it is not necessary to argue more than this.[5]

In addition we have the στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου mentioned in uniformly disparaging terms and hostile to Christ and the Christian.[6] There are

1. Together: ICor 15:24; Eph 1:21; 3:10; 6:12; Col 1:16; 2:10,15. This stock form of reference to the Powers is seen to be particularly congenial to the author of Eph and Col. That the reference is to spiritual powers, as well as to political, cf. Moule, Colossians and Philemon, 99-100; Cullmann, Time, 194-195.
   Separately: ἐξουσία, Eph 2:2; Col 1:13. ἀρχή, Rom 8:38. Cf. also Rom 13:1-3, and below, fn. 4.
2. Phil 4:15; cf. also Col 1:18, and ἀπ ἀρχῆς as a variant reading to Nestle's text at IIThes 2:13.
3. ICor 9:5-6,12,18; IICor 10:8; 13:10; IIThes 3:9.
4. Rom 13:1-3. Cullmann's point (Time, 194-195; State, 68, 74-75) is that when used in the plural in Pl, "authorities" are invisible angelic or spiritual powers.
5. The case for the double reference here seems to have been considerably strengthened by Morrison's contribution (Powers, 68ff), cited with approval by Cullmann in the revised edition of State, 85. Cf. Cullmann's own arguments against his critics, op. cit., 84ff.
6. Gal 4:3,9; Col 2:8,20. Concerning these verses it seems impossible to speak of a commonly accepted view. The fundamental treatment seems to be that of Dibelius, Kolosser, 27-29, who sees the στοιχεῖα as personal. Beyer and Althaus (Galater, 34-35) support the view that these were the spirits of the four elements worshipped by the pagans; Schlier (Galater, 134-136) holds them to be the spirits that governed the stars, on the basis of the Enoch literature; Lohmeyer (Kolosser, 104) holds that the στοιχεῖα were spiritual forces, the powers worshipped by the

also the ὕψωμα[1] and the βάθος,[2] astrological terms reminiscent of the prevalent star-worship of the age.[3]

Mention is twice made of κυριότης, a class of angelic powers,[4] in the lists of variously named spiritual forces.[5] And ἄρχοντες appear, set in positions of authority, with attitudes hostile to the Christian and his Lord.[6]

In the case of all these Powers we seem to be dealing with forces

heathen. Delling (TWNT VII, 685) thinks that the references in Gal and Col are to be considered independently; the former is in a setting that suggests bondage to the Torah or to pagan deities (ibid., 684), while in the latter the situation is quite different. But "elements" or "elemental spirits" still seems to him the most probable translation; he feels that the frame of reference is cosmological rather than astrological (ibid., 683). Cf. the discussion in Moule, Colossians and Philemon, 90-91.

On the other hand, there seem to be well-grounded reasons for not regarding the στοιχεῖα as belonging among spiritual powers at all. Cf. the careful argument of Burton (Galatians, 510-518) for regarding them (518) as "the rudimentary religious teachings possessed by the race." Likewise Lightfoot, Galatians, 167.

1. Rom 8:39; IICor 10:5. Probably an astrological reference as used in Rom; cf. Arndt and Gingrich, Lexicon, 858; Moulton and Milligan, Vocabulary, 662, for use of the term in papyrus horoscopes.
2. Rom 8:39, here probably in an astrological sense; cf. Moulton and Milligan, op. cit., 101; Arndt and Gingrich, op. cit., 129. But βάθος had a more basic meaning, simply, "deep," as at Rom 11:33; ICor 2:10; Eph 3:18, all of which refer to the deep things of God. On the astrological reference here, cf. Leitzmann, Römer, 88: "ὕψωμα (vgl. IICor 10:5) und ταπείνωμα sind die astrologischen Termini für die grösste annäherung resp. Entfernung einse Sternes vom Zenith, wodurch u. a. sein Einfluss bestimmt wird." Cf. Macgregor, NTS 1 (1954), 19-21.
3. For references in Plato, Plotinus, Cicero and Porphyry, cf. Angus, Religious Quests, 265. Angus regards it as curious that for Origen too, the stars should be living beings capable of salvation (ibid., 254): "He did not die on behalf of men only, but on behalf of all other rational beings....It would be absurd to affirm that it was only for human sins He tasted Death, and not also on behalf of every other creature beyond man who has been involved in sins, such as the stars." (Origen, In Joh. I. 35).
4. Arndt and Gingrich, op. cit., 461.
5. Eph 1:21; Col 1:16.
6. Rom 13:3; ICor 2:6,8; Eph 2:2. The reference may of course be to mere earthly rulers in the first three cases, but it seems preferable to regard all four as having spiritual reference of some sort; cf. Trevor Ling's argument (ET 68 (1956), 26) that on the basis of general NT usage the ἄρχοντες of ICor 2:8 must be human rulers only, and the reply of W. J. P. Boyd (ET 68 (1957), 158), insisting (probably correctly) that the reference is both to human rulers and to spiritual powers behind them.

which are close to the point of personification. As in the case of ἁμαρτία in Romans, men are described as being "under" these forces, or "enslaved" by them; the στοιχεῖα do not understand the wisdom of the Gospel.[1] Whether Pl regarded them as possessing a life of their own, or as mere "structures and institutions," in Barth's phrase, is not entirely clear.[2]

We are now prepared to list three apparent differences between Satan and the Powers, differences suggested more briefly above. The first is in the area of personality: there seems to be an invariably personal character to Satan, while as just observed the Powers can be regarded as personifications or perhaps only semi-personal entities.[3] The distinction is not unique in Pl. It is quite easily demonstrable that for the Rabbis,[4] for the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha,[5] and for

1. ICor 2:8.
2. "I personally believe that, whatever may be said about the demons of the Synoptics, St Paul, consciously or otherwise, was using mythological language. In other words, there are no principalities or powers, but St Paul employs this language to express something which is both true and important." (Whiteley, Theology, 20). Whiteley adds in a footnote, "On this point I am, I believe, fundamentally in agreement with G. B. Caird, Principalities and Powers, pp. 1-11." There seems to be no doubt of the importance for Pl of what he seeks to convey in terms of principalities and powers; the point of doubt comes on the question of whether it was mythological "consciously or otherwise."
3. This point is similarly made by Noack, Satanas, 52. Cf. also Berkhof, Powers, 18: "The personal aspect of the word "Powers" is likewise unaccented, while their influence upon events receives full emphasis...One can even doubt whether Paul conceived of the powers as personal beings."
4. Cf. S.-B. Kommentar I, 136, where it is remarked that the effect of dropping the OT article in references to Satan, the usual practice of the Talmud, is to turn the word into a name. The personal reference is clear in all the illustrations cited on 136-143.
5. E.g., WisdSol 2:24; 14:6; the Mastema references in Jub 10:7; 11:5,51; 17:16; 18:9,12,28; 48:2-4,9,12,15-16; 49:2; the personal reference is clear throughout the books of Adam and Eve; Beliar is a personal being in the TestXIIPat: TReub 4:8,11; 6:3; TSim 2:7; 5:3; TLev 3:3; 18:12; 19:1; TJud 19:4; 25:3; TIss 6:1; 7:7; TZeb 9:8; TDan 1:7,3-6; 4:7; 5:1,6,10-11; 6:1,3-4; TNaph 2:6; 3:1; 8:4,6; TAsh 1:8; 3:2; 6:4,6; TJos 7:4; 20:2; TBen 3:3,4,8; 6:1,7; 7:1-2; out of the many demonic references in the Enoch literature, cf. IEn 6:1 - 8:4, where Semjaza is the leader of the fallen angels; 9:6-7, referring to Semjaza and Azazel; 10:1ff, where Azazel and his angelic followers are judged and punished; 13:1; IIEn 29:4-5, the story of the fall of Satan; 31:3ff, the fall of Satan and the temptation of Adam.

Qumran,[1] Satan or Beliar or the head of the demons, by whatever name he was called, was an intensely personal being, with fully personal attributes. On the other hand, much less is said about the personality of the angelic powers, which tend to be portrayed rank on rank, in great masses;[2] when one of the angels does appear individually, his "personal" impression is generally strictly subordinate to the power of God that speaks through him.[3] To these hosts of heaven may be committed such responsibilities as the glorification of God, the governing of heavenly bodies in their courses, and the management or mis-management of earthly governments and kingdoms.[4] It is to this semi-personal category of spiritual beings that the Powers of Pl seem to belong.

1. Belial is the usual designation for Satan in Qumran, and he is usually a personal spirit: 1QS 1:18; 2:5; 10:20; 1QH 2:16; 3:29; 4:13; CD 4:13,15; 8:2; 12:2; DSW 1:5,13,15; 13:4,11; 14:9. Cf. the footnote to 1QH 2:22 in Mansoor, Hymns, 108, where M distinguishes two meanings: a personal entity outside of man to hinder him, and a spirit within man spoken of impersonally as a way of acting. M says, "Most references in 1QS to Belial have allusion to a spirit of a personal nature." Baumbach writes with particular reference to Qumran, "Belial nicht als eine unpersönliche Grösse aufgefasst werden kann, sondern durchaus als eine selbstständige Macht; denn Engel sind im Spätjudentum ganz persönlich getachte Geistwesen." (Qumran und das Johannes-Evangelium, 16.)
2. Cf. esp. IEn. E.g., IEn 20:1-8, the "angels who watch" with their names; 40:3ff, the archangels; 61:10-11; 69:1-15, the ranks and names of the fallen angels; 71:7-9, the ranks of angels beneath God; 81:5; 89:59 - 90:27, the seventy shepherds. Cf. also TLev 3:2-8, the ranks of angels in the three heavens; IIBar 59:11; IIIBar chh. 11-17. In none of these references is the personality of the angels much of a factor.
3. Particularly is this true in IVEz, where all the references to the angel who debates with the author give the impression that the angel is simply a mouthpiece of God - personal, but his personality obscured by his function. Likewise in the rest of the A&P, the guides on the tours of heaven, while personal beings, are quite colorless. Satan is out for himself, and has distinct personality and character; the self-effacing angels, however, stand for God and subordinate themselves to Him.
4. For references to angels as controllers of the elements, cf. IEn 43:1-4; 60:17-22; 66:1-3; 69:22-24; 72:1; 74:2; 75:3; 79:6; 80:1,6; 82:7,10-20; 102:2; IIBar 59:11; IIIBar 6:1ff; 9:1ff; ApMos 36:1-3. For Rabbinic references, cf. the index to S.-B. Kommentar, and particularly III, 819-820. S.-B. also have citations for the angels as the rulers of the nations; IEn 89:59 - 90:27, the seventy shepherds over Israel, has already been cited.

The second difference has to do with the attitude of Satan and of the Powers. Satan is unambiguously malignant in his attitude;[1] the Powers, on the other hand, are curiously ambiguous, sometimes being spoken of in terms that suggest their undying hostility to Christ and the Christian, and sometimes as though they had their legitimate place in the plans of God, and should be respected and obeyed.[2] Once again, the background material offers some enlightenment: Satan, as in Pl, is always malignant.[3] However, nothing corresponds exactly to the attitude of the Powers, unless it would be the theme of angelic misunderstanding encountered occasionally;[4] the angels, misunderstanding the purposes of God, could conceivably obstruct that purpose unintentionally.[5]

The third difference has to do with the ultimate destiny of Satan as compared with the Powers. Satan is never mentioned in Pl as having

1. Rom 16:20; ICor 7:5; IICor 2:11; 12:7; IThes 2:18; likewise the devil is malignant: Eph 6:11; IITim 2:26.
2. The Powers suggest hostility in the passages where Christ is spoken of as overcoming them, as though they offered resistance to him: cf. I Cor 15:24; Col 2:15. On the latter, cf. the illuminating discussion in Moule, Colossians and Philemon, 101-102. It is significant that the victory of Christ over the Powers is in both connections spoken of in contexts relating to death and the flesh. It seems to be as a man that Christ resists and overcomes the Powers, and as a man that they are regarded as being hostile to him.
   The Powers seem to have a rightful place of subjection to Christ in Eph 1:21; 3:10; Col 1:16; 2:10. They appear hostile to Christians in Rom 8:38-39; Gal 4:3,9; Eph 6:12; Col 1:13; 2:8,20. On the other hand, if the state be included among the Powers, Christians are bidden to be obedient to the authority of the state in Rom 13:1ff; Tit 3:1.
3. Cf. the references cited above, 191, fn. 3, 4; 192, fn. 1.
4. In IEn 68:1-3, Michael and Raphael are astonished at the severe judgment God has pronounced on the fallen angels; in ApMos 27:3-5, the angels stop driving out Adam from Eden, contrary to God's purpose, and are admonished. Cf. also a number of references to angelic disobedience, of which IEn 6:1ff is the prime example. On angels as privy to the counsel of God, cf. S.-B. Kommentar I, 961.
5. That this could be understood in Pl might be argued from the passages attributing inferiority to the Powers, e.g., Gal 4:3,9; Eph 1:21; Col 2:8,15. But it is even more probable on the basis of passages attributing ignorance to them: ICor 2:8; Eph 3:10. Cf. IPet 1:12, which specifically attributes ignorance to the angels, and Mt 24:36, where the angels are described as ignorant regarding the time of the Second Coming.

a portion in the Kingdom of God; no possibility of redemption seems to be extended to him. But by contrast, the Powers are mentioned in contexts that seem to suggest, not only their subjugation, but their subsequent loyalty to the authority of Christ on a permanent basis.[1] It is only by attaching him to the Powers that Satan could be included in the ranks of the redeemed, and this seems a dubious procedure; as in Pl, there is never a suggestion in the background literature that Satan will be redeemed. On the other hand, there are references to a world restored and redeemed at the coming of the Messiah,[2] and if Pl's Powers may be identified with the spiritual forces governing the inanimate world and the "institutions" of human life, then their Messianic redemption would accord well with Jewish thought of his age.

For Pl and his contemporaries, there was a tendency to think of everything, whether animate or inanimate, as governed by spiritual forces.[3]

1. Eph 1:21; 3:10; Col 1:16; 2:10. Cf. Caird, Principalities, 27-29, who holds that Pl's doctrine of the salvation of the Powers developed during the course of his ministry from teaching about their apocalyptic defeat to teaching of their ultimate reconciliation and redemption; Galloway, Cosmic Christ, 49-50; Schlier, Principalities, does not consider the redemption of the Powers to be possible: "They have no other expectation than the final breaking of their power and their eternal damnation." (48). "Their defeat will then be shown to be eternal rejection." (68). Morrison, Powers, believes that the Powers had no special relationship to Christ's rule from which to fall, hence are not "fallen," and cannot be redeemed; cf. his "negative consequences" on 138-139. Cullmann, Time, concludes his discussion of the Powers and the pagan state with the statement (209), "Nothing exists that stands outside of the redemptive history of Christ."

2. Of course, only those authors who hold to an earthly kingdom for the Messiah have anything to say about the restoration of terrestrial harmony. Consider, e.g., Is 11:1-9, the animal kingdom restored to harmony with one another and with man; the same theme appears in IIBar 73:6. This peaceful relationship is sometimes represented as having been destroyed by the fall of Adam: cf. ApMos 24:4, with which cf. ApMos 10:1-12:2//Vita 37:1-39:2. IEn 10:17 - 11:2 deals with the Messianic Kingdom. Cf. Russell, Method and Message, 286-290.

There are also suggestions that the Messianic Kingdom will bring renewed fruitfulness to the soil. Such themes as Joel 3:18 and Is 55:12-13 are developed by IIBar 29:5, with its incredible yields of wine, and the primeval monsters for food. Cf. Rowley, Apocalyptic, 120-121.

3. Cf. Morrison, Powers, 76: "Not only in general, but also in great detail the world was considered subject to the guardianship and authority of gods, spirits and daimones; formulas, symbols and special

The heavenly luminaries were governed by spiritual forces;[1] there were angel guardians over the storehouses of the hail and snow;[2] there were angelic rulers appointed to govern the affairs of the nations.[3] The Gnostics taught that man lived out his life under the malignant glare of hostile constellations and planets; sphere on sphere of these world-rulers separated him from his father in heaven.[4] The sectaries of

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objects were treasured for their actual ability to influence these 'world rulers' and 'elemental spirits' with regard to the health, prosperity, and social relationships of men who used them properly...." In greater detail, cf. Rawlinson, NT Doctrine of the Christ, 141-148, and esp. 142-143, who further cites Thackery, Bousset and Dibelius on the subject.

1. E.g., IEn 72:1; 74:2; 75:3; 79:6; the foregoing refer to Uriel as the angel in charge of the heavenly luminaries. The spirits who direct the stars are referred to in IEn 75:1; 80:6.

2. IEn 60:17-22 refers to angels who control the elements; 66:1-3 mentions the angels who control the waters; 69:22-24 speaks of the worshipping spirits of the elements. The dependence upon IEn for the support of this point, and in the preceding footnote, may seem unduly heavy; however, "I En. has had more influence on the New Testament than has any other apocryphal or pseudepigraphic work." (Charles, A&P II, 180.)

3. IEn 89:51 - 90:13, although here the "shepherds" are set over Israel. The doctrine, however, was considerably older than IEn. Dan 10:13,20 mentions the angelic ruler of the Persians; 10:20 further mentions the corresponding ruler of the Greeks; Michael, ruler of the Jews, is mentioned in 10:13,21; 12:1. Cf. Deut 32:8, where the LXX translates, "He set bounds for the nations according to the number of the angels of God;" Is 24:21, where the hosts of heaven are punished with the corresponding kings of earth; Ps 58:1-2; Ps 82 seems to refer to the judgment of angelic rulers. Cullmann further suggests (Time, 193) that Ps 110 and Is 45:22f. are subject to this interpretation, and notes that the doctrine of angelic rulers is found in the Talmud and Midrash.

Sir 17:17 refers to the ἡγούμενος appointed for each Gentile nation, but says Israel is the portion of the Lord; cf. likewise Jub 15:31,32. In IEn 89:51 - 90:27, the shepherds are appointed as a result of Israel's sins, and though appointed to protect Israel they themselves fall into sin, allowing Israel to be wasted by many enemies.

4. The Gnostics were of course indebted to many sources for their syncretistic system, and this in itself makes it more probable that they depended upon Pl than that he depended upon them, but Pl's background in Hellenistic Judaism included such Gnostic or pre-Gnostic themes as may have crept into the Diaspora religion. The developed Gnostic schemes were a witch's brew; Stoic philosophy, in which "a relapse into religious servitude to cosmic forces" may be observed, deified sun and moon; "the Seven Planets too, each ruling in its own sphere, increasingly compelled men's adoration...." (Macgregor and Purdy, Jew and Greek, 233-234). With this was combined the hostility of celestial powers, which Grant (Gnosticism, 56) remarks as neither orthodox Platonism nor Judaism, which stemmed rather from Zoroastrianism and sectarian Judaism. The result was to condemn the entire universe as evil: "The power which rules over the cosmos

Qumran likewise taught man's bondage under spiritual forces marshalled under the leadership of a single chief malignant spirit.[1] It would appear that Pl's Powers belong to this general category of divinely created spiritual forces originally ordained to direct the affairs of the universe. The question then becomes, How could these forces have become corrupted, if they were created good? For presumably, as indicated above, Pl would reject the attribution to God of anything originally evil in its nature. In the beginning, God saw everything that he had made as being very good.

Before we answer the question as to how the Powers became corrupted we must, however, inquire as to the character of Christ's Lordship over them, or his "redemption" of them. Concerning this two things need to be said. First, the object of Christ's mission is not the redemption of the Powers, but the redemption of man. Morrison has quite rightly distinguished between the locus of Christ's victory and the realm of

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is a god who is weak, ignorant, even perverse - a monstrous Prince of Darkness....In this base world, dominated by Fatality, where Fate is determined by great celestial figures and above all by the planets (the Archons), man is a slave, imprisoned and in chains." (Doresse, Secret Books, 111). The hostility of the world is seen in the Naassene Hymn cited by Hippolytus, V,5; V,10; as Jonas says, "It is to be understood even where it is not expressly stated that the role of these intervening forces is inimical and obstructive: with the spatial extent they symbolize at the same time the anti-divine and imprisoning power of this world." (Gnostic Religion, 52). Cf. above, 65ff.

1. "The whole of humanity has been handed over to guardian spirits. This is a basic point in Essene theology. One part of humanity has been confided to the 'angels of Light' and the other to the 'angels of Darkness.' This is the present situation and there is no questioning why or how it can be." (Barthelemy, Scripture 12 (1960), 121). Cf. further on mankind's bondage under one of the two spirits, Hyatt, NTS 4 (1956), 280; Dupont-Sommer, Jewish Sect, 127-128; Licht, Scripta Hierosolymitana IV, 96; Burrows, More Light, 290-291; and 280-281, where B says, "The spirits of light and darkness which struggle in man's soul and in the universe are sometimes called angels. Thus it is made clear that they are both God's creatures and subject to him, even though for the appointed period he allows the one whose way he abhors to be active. It is equally clear, however, that the two spirits or angels are powers outside of man, which not only help or hinder him but control his life in accordance with each individual's divinely assigned 'lot.'" Cf. also Black, Scrolls, 134.

his Lordship.[1] As Whiteley has put it,[2]

> It may be that St Paul is more concerned with the completeness of Christ's victory than with the fate of the powers. If he envisaged the redemption of demonic forces, he did so only out of the corner of his eye: the redemption of mankind held the centre of his field of vision.

If the Powers can be referred to as "redeemed," it is in connection with human redemption that the restoration of the Powers takes place. This may give a hint as to the original means of their corruption.

The second thing that must be said concerning Christ's Lordship over the Powers is that whatever their relationship to the pre-existent Christ, there is definitely a change in their status relative to him after his death and resurrection. This would seem to be the implication of a number of NT passages,[3] of which Phil 2:6-10 will be taken as most clearly representative.[4]

Phil 2:6-10 is not primarily concerned with speculation as to the Trinitarian status of the pre-incarnate Christ. Rather, it deals with powers and their distribution. The pre-incarnate Christ, unlike the first

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1. Powers, 116-118, 130. While the Lordship was universal, the locus of victory was among his followers. "Christ's victory did not have its locus among the powers but in the community of believers. Yet this did not mean that the sphere of Christ's lordship was limited to the Church..." (119). Cf. above, 193, fn. 2. Barbour has made the same point (SJT 20 (1967), 267): "This victory is always thought of as taking place visibly on earth....There is no conception of a cosmic victory won in the heavenly regions where the principalities and powers have their abode."
2. Theology, 31.
3. Here we have in mind the general group of texts cited by Cullmann (Earliest Christian Confessions, 59ff) as early summaries of the Christian faith, including ICor 15:25; Eph 1:21-22; Heb 10:13; IPet 3:22; Acts 2:34; Mt 22:44; Mk 12:36; Lk 20:42; Phil 2:5ff. Cullmann remarks the regularity with which the subjection of demonic powers recurs as a theme in these summaries, some of which, it has been suggested, antedate even the letters of Pl (cf. the fn. following). Cf. Hunter's pages (Paul and Predecessors, 128-130) on the early Christian catechisms; he notes the common inclusion (130) of resistance of the devil as a part of this tradition.
4. Hunter feels definitely that Phil 2:6-11 is a pre-Pauline Christian hymn; cf. his argumentation and review of various opinions on these verses (op. cit., 40ff). He likewise feels that Col 1:15-20, which resembles the hymn of Phil 2 in some of its elements, is pre-Pauline (ibid., 124ff). Moule, on the other hand (Colossians and Philemon, 60-62), is more dubious about these conclusions.

Adam,[1] did not snatch at the supreme power,[2] but instead divested himself of the high position he already held[3] and subjected himself under three tiers of powers: that of God, to which he was presumably already subject;[4]

1. Scroggs, Adam, 89-90, is probably correct in saying that it cannot be considered certain that there is a reference to Adam here. However, it seems probable to Cullmann, Christology, 174-181; Rawlinson, NT Doctrine of Christ, 134; Hunter, Paul and Predecessors, 43, 123; Davies, PRJ, 41; Stauffer, Theology, 284, believes that between Adam and Satan the latter is the more probable reference. Richardson (Theology, 245) says that "St. Paul thus conceives of Christ as 'Adam in reverse....'" Cf. also Martin, ET 70 (1959), 183-184.

2. For a good review of the exposition of Phil 2:6-11, cf. Taylor, Person of Christ, 64-73, in which various views are presented beginning with Lightfoot's "classic" exposition.

The view adopted here takes ἁρπαγμόν in the sense of snatching for something not already possessed (res rapienda). To mention only two of many who decline this in favor of the res rapta view, cf. Beare, Philippians, 80, who says, "Nothing could be higher than being in the form of God. Christ was already in possession of the divine estate to which Lucifer and Adam vainly aspired." Also, Barrett, First Adam, 70, who thinks that to interpret the ἁρπαγμόν as a snatching for what was not already possessed goes against the bulk of Pauline theology. But "booty" and "plunder" (Beare's words) seem peculiar ways of referring to what Christ had possessed from the beginning by right. The res rapienda sense claims the support of F. C. Grant, Roman Hellenism, 156 (who cites in support his own article in Anglican Theological Review 30 (1948), 227-230, and the fifth chapter in the volume Preaching the Christian Year, ed. Howard A. Johnson, 1957); Cullmann, Christology, 178. Cf. also Griffiths, ET 69 (1958), 237-239, who reviews the support for this understanding of the word and cites in addition Kennedy, Expositor's Greek Testament III, 436ff; Stauffer, Theology, 284; Michael, Philippians (Moffatt series), 88-89; Rawlinson, NT Doctrine of the Christ, 134f; G. S. Duncan, Jesus, Son of Man, 1947, 193f.

3. The difficulty sensed by the res rapta view is that for Christ, who was in the form of God, there seemed to be nothing higher for which to grasp; however, understood in terms of authority and power, there was indeed something to reach for. Being in the μορφή of God does not necessarily mean possessing the power of God. It is power, not position, for which Christ might have grasped, but in fact did not. There were surely differences between the Father and the Son. As Barclay writes (ET 70 (1958), 42), "We must note that that which is Jesus Christ's by right is expressed in Greek by τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ, not by τὸ εἶναι ἴσος θεῷ. What is the difference? To use the phrase ἴσος θεῷ would mean that Jesus Christ possessed an absolute personal equality with God; to use the phrase ἴσα θεῷ means that the existence which Jesus Christ had in His glory was an existence which possessed and enjoyed all the privilege and the glory of God." Father and Son were not identical; it was the difference between them that the Son did not choose to possess by seizure, and which the Father conferred after the Resurrection by gift.

4. This is implied by the fact that there was apparently something higher to which he might have aspired, something analogous to that which Satan and the first Adam attempted to seize. He might have tried to be equal with God. The subjection of the Son to the Father during his earthly life is one of the recurrent themes of the Gospels; cf. Dodd's comment (Fourth Gospel, 327, fn. 2) on Jn's subordination of the Son to the Father and the similarity to Phil 2:6.

that of the Powers, in becoming a man;[1] and that of human powers or authorities in suffering the death of the Cross.[2] For this humility, God gives to Christ what he had not presumed to seize for himself, the Name above Names,[3] and of course the authority that goes with the Name.[4]

1. Subjection to the Powers is the means of Christ's victory over them. Cf. ICor 2:8; by being born under the Law, God's Son released men from bondage to the Law, Gal 4:4-5, and bondage under the στοιχεῖα in Gal 4:3,8-10 is analogous to bondage under the Law; Eph 4:9-10, where the descent is the means of capturing the host Christ leads; the triumphing over the Powers and the cancelling of the Law is the effect of Christ's submission to them in Col 2:14-15. Cf. also the frequent similar references in Heb, esp. Heb 2:8-9,14-15; cf. above, 193, fn. 2. It might be suggested in light of Rom 13:1ff that Pl measures Jesus' obedience to the Powers by the fact that he submitted to the powers (of God) even as corrupted by sin; thus, Jesus obeyed the Jewish and the Roman law.
2. Assuming that angelic powers stand behind the human rulers. But there are two stages of the κένωσις: the being made a man itself, and the self-abnegation within the human state, even to the death on the Cross.
3. The ὑπερ- prefix to the verb ὑπερύψωσεν must be taken seriously. It implies that Christ's post-incarnate state was higher than his pre-incarnate state. The only thing further that God possessed which the Son did not share was his authority over all things. This transferral of authority to the Son is symbolized by the giving to him of the Name - Adonai, Κύριος, which was simply the OT and LXX euphemism for avoiding the necessity of pronouncing the sacred name of Yahweh. Kennedy (Expositor's Greek Testament, 1903) felt that the Name was indeed the name Yahweh. Schweizer, Lordship, 63, thinks that Rom 1:4 is another reference in Pl to the conferring of the New Name.
4. Cf. Rev 3:12, the "new name" of the Christ. The Name was often a symbol of the attributes of the person who possessed it - names were themselves symbols of authority. The NT elsewhere is more inclined to use other power-symbols, particularly that of the throne: Mt 19:28; 25:31; Acts 2:29-30; Heb 1:8; 4:16; 8:1; 12:2; Rev 3:21; 7:17; 12:5; 22:1,3. The throne of Satan is also a symbol of his power: Rev 2:13; 13:2; 16:10. Cf. also the phrase, "at the right hand of God." Grundmann's list in TWNT II, 37-39, includes Acts 2:33-34; 5:31; 7:56; Rom 8:34; Eph 1:20; Col 3:1; Heb 1:3,13; 8:1; 10:12; 12:2; IPet 3:22; to this may be added Mt 26:64; Mk 14:62; Lk 22:69. Or cf. the word ἐξουσία as applied to the Christ. In Mt 28:18, despite the authority attributed to him earlier in the Gospel, the risen Christ says, "all authority is given to me." In Jn 5:27; 17:2, God is said to give authority to the Son, both references in connection with giving life to the dead; Jn 19:11 asserts that Pilate's authority over Jesus is binding only because it is given from above. In addition to the Pauline uses, cf. also IPet 3:22; Rev 2:26-27; 12:10. In Rev, authority is shared by demons, angels, men and God, and is not the unique attribute of God and Christ. On thrones, cf. Schmitz, TWNT III, 160-167; he says (166), "am Ende der Tage der Herrschersitz Gottes zugleich der Thron des Lammes ist," and also speaks of "dieser zweifache Thron, der doch eine und dieselbe Herrschaft darstellt...." But this does not seem to have been the restoration of an original situation; rather, it is something new - a new authority conferred and shared. On thrones as power-symbols, cf. Dibelius, Geisterwelt, 128.

This means that the Powers to which he had once been subject are now subject to the Christ.[1] His sway is to all intents and purposes equivalent to the power of God. This is not represented as the original condition of the Christ, and there is a Pauline hint that this distribution of power is not regarded as a permanent arrangement.[2] But it prevails until the sway of the Powers comes to an end. And before the attribution of authority to the Christ, a second change in the original state of things has also taken place: the Christ has become a man, and presumably remains a man in his exercise of lordship.

One more fact deserves mention: the mode of Christ's "victory" over the Powers is spoken of in terms of death, a human activity. The struggle and the victory seem to have to do with Christ's humanity; they do not win lordship in and of themselves. Others too may overcome, as we read in Rev 3:21, but their elevation to the throne of Christ is by his gracious appointment - in the same way that he himself was elevated, after his victory, to the Father's side. Struggle with the Powers does not seem to be an attribute of Christ's lordship, but of his human state.

All of this makes good sense on the assumption that the Powers are

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1. No matter how it may be thought to have come about, the subjection of the Powers is universally asserted in every Pauline reference to them. As Whiteley puts it, "I have failed to find a single passage in St Paul's writings where 'demonic forces' as opposed to 'personal' demons are referred to which does not say either (1) that these forces have been overcome or (2) that they will be overcome or (3) that they are something which the Christian ought to have 'grown out of', apart from Col 1:16, which makes it clear that all these powers were created through Christ and for Him." (Theology, 29-30).

2. ICor 15:27-28. These verses are extremely difficult to interpret except on some assumption similar to ours, i.e., that in the normal course of affairs within the Trinity, the Son is subject to the Father, a distribution of power that does not obtain for the duration of the present age. During the present age, Father and Son share the same authority by the Father's gift. Though Barrett disagrees with our interpretation of Phil 2:6-10, he can be heartily seconded in his comment (First Adam, 102) on ICor 15:24,28: "They are difficult in the sense that it is not easy to accomodate them to the Trinitarian orthodoxy that developed in the following centuries. It should not be too quickly assumed that this orthodoxy is in all respects correct...."

In the preceding discussion of Phil 2:5-11, the very complete treatment of R. P. Martin, Carmen Christi, came into my hands too late to be used. Various views are treated there with great fullness.

the spirit-forces that govern the world of nature and the "institutions" of human life. Although Christ was active in the creation of the Powers and of all things,[1] Lordship over them is an attribute of the Father, conferred upon Jesus Christ as the Second Adam (recalling the fact that some degree of dominion over the world was also an attribute of the first Adam, of which he was despoiled by the Fall).[2] But the dominion of the Christ is universal, since it is equivalent not to that of the first Adam alone, but of the Father himself.

But how did these Powers become corrupted? The answer is suggested by the two considerations just presented. Human redemption results in "redemption" for the Powers - Christ's work in saving man restores the Powers to their proper condition, relative to redeemed humanity. The incarnation effects a real change in the status of the Powers as over against the Christ - after his subjection to them the Christ becomes their Lord, both as God and as man. The change does not take place in the Powers, but in man. For redeemed man, the Powers are a menacing force only in measure as they are corrupted by sin that menaces him from within, or by the sin of other sinful men in whom they are invested.

On this understanding, the Powers are simply God's original providential design, the spiritual forces standing behind the creation. The "fall" of the Powers is the fall of Adam - a change not in the Powers themselves, but in man over whom they now have sway, instead of

1. ICor 8:6; Col 1:16. Participation in the creative act does not necessarily imply Lordship; the subtle distinction between the office and position of Father and Son in ICor 8:6, while not entirely clear, seems intended to teach a difference in the character of their participation in the act of creation.
2. Cf. Jub 3:28-29; IVEz 8:44; 6:55-59; 7:11; 8:1; S.-B. Kommentar III, 247-248; Tennant, Fall, 238-239; Barrett writes (First Adam, 82), "Here is Man created as Lord over God's other creatures, but denying his relation to God, losing his lordship, and himself becoming subject to gods many and lords many...."

being his servants.[1] At the end of the Age, with the end of the world, the Powers will likewise come to an end with the end of the realm they govern.

As noted above,[2] it seems impossible to prove conclusively that the ἐξουσίαι of Rom 13 are identical with IEn's angelic world-rulers, and are therefore to be numbered among the Powers. But we are inclined to regard it as probable, and if this can be accepted it ties in well with what has been said about the double aspect of the Powers, for good and for ill. On such assumptions we would expect to find an ambivalent attitude toward the Roman state; and such is precisely the situation we find. Rome is regarded as both a demonic institution, and as an institution established by God for the good of humanity.[3] The difference is not in the institution as such; it has to do with the human element associated with it.[4] If angelic world-rulers stand behind the emperors of Rome, then the powers they mediate from God through human rulers may

1. Cf. Barrett, First Adam, 90, and in particular his view of the Powers on 155: "The rebellion of Adam led, as we have seen, to a double consequence: on the one hand, to a distortion of the make-up of human nature, and, on the other, to the subjugation of mankind, and of the cosmos itself to powers which should have been the servants of man. These powers, which seized upon man's will as their point of attack, and demonstrated their wickedness by making use even of the law, were overthrown by the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, and, though they did not immediately cease to exist, but rather continue to put up a resistance which can be highly dangerous, they are doomed." Cf. also Lampe, SJT 17 (1964), 461.
2. Cf. above, 189.
3. The state as demonic: IIThes 2:3ff. The state as the creature of God: Rom 13:1ff. This line of interpretation is Caird's, who says, commenting on IIThes 2:1-10, "Thus does Paul in a single passage delineate the ambiguous nature of Roman power. From one point of view the state was fulfilling its divinely appointed office of restraining the evildoer, but from another point of view its authority was so corrupt as to be constantly in danger of usurping the authority of God." (Principalities, 27). Cf. also Cullmann, State, 68-69; Morrison, Powers, 114ff; Stauffer, Theology, 84-85. Beyond the limits of Pauline thought the same idea can be illustrated throughout the NT.
4. Again, the interpretation of Caird, loc. cit. Even under particularly vicious leadership the state does not lose its character as God's appointee, nor under the best of leadership is it free from the possibility of corruption.

be perverted by the sin of the ruler. The Christian attitude toward the state would depend on the degree to which sin controlled its sovereigns.

The case for regarding the Powers as spiritual institutions created for good by God and rendered "demonic" through the sinfulness of man is furthered by examining Pl's references to the Law,[1] which can likewise be classed with "the powers" because of its effects on humanity. The Law is hardly to be regarded as "demonic;" and yet, it seems to have a devastating effect upon mankind over which it has dominion.

Νόμος is distinguished in some respects from the Powers;[2] for one thing, it was not part of the original scheme of things, and for another, it is abrogated by the new law given in Christ, unlike the Powers, whose sway to all appearances continues, and that by the divine plan.[3] But, like the Powers, the Law originates with God. The νόμος is sometimes simply the collected writings attributed to Moses,[4] and sometimes the distinguishing mark of the Jews, separating them from the Gentile ἄνομοι.[5] But often it is spoken of as a malignant force set against man, bringing him to his downfall, increasing his trespasses.[6] This is in spite of the fact that it is holy, just and good;[7] it becomes an evil thing,

1. Cf. below, 219ff.
2. Caird classifies the Law among the Powers, either in its own right or because of the angelic powers standing behind it (Principalities, 43-44. But he carefully qualifies on 45; cf. the quotation below, 205.
3. It was brought in 430 years after the Promise, Gal 3:17; cf. Rom 4:10,13. Hence it was not God's way of dealing with man from the beginning. Christ is the end of the Law, Rom 10:4; this assumption underlies statements to the effect that we who are in Christ are no longer under the Law, but under grace (Rom 6:14; cf. Gal 2:19-20; 3:23ff; 5:18,23).
4. E.g., ICor 9:8-9; 14:21,34.
5. E.g., ICor 9:20-21.
6. Particularly in Rom and Gal, but also in ICor and Eph: a man may be under the Law, e.g. Rom 2:12; 3:19; 6:14; Gal 4:21; 5:18. The Law is the power of sin, ICor 15:56 (note the close association with σάρξ in the preceding verses). Through the Law comes the knowledge of sin, Rom 3:20. Law "came in" to increase the trespass, Rom 5:20. It remains, however, a "force" and not a "person," as Gutbrod notes in TWNT IV, 1062, because of the definite article which keeps it in the realm of things rather than persons. Cf. also Eph 2:15.
7. Rom 7:12.

from the human standpoint, in the effect it has on a man. Owing to his inability to keep the Law, which is a result of sin, man's sin is amplified and defined;[1] man is brought under a death sentence by the Law which his own sin makes it impossible for him to keep.[2]

The Law is sometimes spoken of in terms of its inferiority.[3] It does not begin to measure up to the splendor of what God has revealed in Christ.[4] It is particularly interesting to observe in this connection the relationship between the στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in Galatians and the Law; the two seem to be set in express parallel, as though the στοιχεῖα might be the dispensations that govern pagan life, just as the Law governs the life of the Jews.[5] But whatever the precise character of the Law's inferiority, and however great this inferiority may have been thought to be, simple inferiority is no explanation for the

1. Rom 5:20; 7:7-13.
2. Rom 5:20-21; 7:21-25.
3. This inferiority is threefold. The Law is inferior in status (Gal 3:19-20, where there were two intervening entities, Moses and the angels from whom he received the Law; the contrast with the immediacy of Pl's own encounter with Christ was dazzling). It is difficult to see with Bultmann (Theology I, 268) the influence of a Gnostic myth in this passage, in light of the Rabbinic parallels advanced by S.-B. Kommentar III, 554ff. Second, the Law is inferior in time, recalling the fact that temporal priority was considered a sign of superiority; cf. Bartlett, Romans, 117. Christ was before the Law (his pre-existence assumed in Phil 2:6; Col 1:15ff); he brings it to an end (Rom 10:4; Eph 2:15); sin likewise preceded the Law (Rom 5:13; 7:8-11), and demonstrates its superiority to the Law by taking it captive (cf. especially Rom 7:13ff); the Law was "brought in" in response to the stimulus of sin (Gal 3:19; cf. also Rom 5:20) after sin had become well established. The promises were likewise prior to the Law (Rom 4:9-11; Gal 3:16-18). On the assumption that the Powers are the decrees of God governing creation, they too would precede the Law temporally. Finally, the Law is inferior in function, being given not to save, but to show the need of salvation by showing sin to be something which man could not master even with the help of the Law (Rom 3:20; 4:15; 5:13,20; 7:7); it is this clear understanding of sin that makes man despair at his own sinfulness until the way of salvation in Christ is revealed (Rom 7:14-24). Grundmann (TWNT I, 314) speaks of the Law as transforming the potential energy of the sinful condition between Adam and Moses into kinetic energy after Moses, or of the Law as waking "slumbering" sin. On this latter point, cf. Braun's observation (ZTK 56 (1959), 15-16) that by contrast with Qumran, where man was set free by grace to keep the Law, Pl's freedom by grace was from the Law.
4. IICor 3:7ff.
5. Gal 3:23 - 4:10.

near-"demonic" character it assumes in Pl. Caird suggests the answer:[1]

> The law is intrinsically good; it carries divine authority, and its purpose is to make men obedient to God's will. It becomes an evil power because sin uses it as a base of operations. The law, therefore, since it is of divine origin, can be regarded as one of the powers in a sense which does not apply to sin, and which does not apply in quite the same way even to death.

And so, the corruption of the Law is the responsibility of sin.[2] If it be asked how this good creation of God could become so corrupted by an action of man, this question is simply the more fundamental one of the origin of evil. There may be no direct answer to the question of how evil originated, at least in the writings of Pl, but if the question is where, Pl would definitely place the locus of the Law's corruption in the human sphere. The law was corrupted by the previous sin of man.

Consequently, in the measure that the Law is to be regarded as one of the Powers, its analogous relationship with the rest of the Powers argues in favor of attributing the corruption of the Powers to the sin of man, to the extent that the Powers can be called corrupt. The Law, too, without being itself corrupt, was displaced from its proper place in God's scheme by the sinfulness of man.

Some of the things said about ἁμαρτία at the beginning of this chapter might seem to argue that sin, too, is a "power." And in fact, it is - the δύναμις that lies behind all the rest of the powers. But since ἁμαρτία is quite obviously the responsibility of man, we reserve consideration of this term for our next section.

But before turning to the responsibility of man, we once again consider whether evil could have had its origin with the Pauline "demonic,"

1. Principalities, 45.
2. Rom 3:5; 7:13. Cf. Cullmann, Salvation, 265-266; Caird, Principalities, 41; on 42, Caird writes, with reference to Rom 7:9-12, "In this last passage Paul is careful to point out that the law in itself is good, and that it becomes a death-dealing force only when mishandled by sin."

including Satan and his demons, the Powers and the Law. The answer to this question must certainly be, No. It is ἁμαρτία, which Satan harnesses for his own purposes, which corrupts the powers and perverts the law. And ἁμαρτία is a human affair at root.

We are now ready to consider the question of human responsibility as it relates to the beginnings of sin. It will be obvious by this time that here is where we expect to find the proper point of origin for ἁμαρτία; and yet it will perhaps be recalled from the opening of the chapter that sin was there spoken of as being a separate force, standing over against man, existing without his consent, overcoming him. This is quite true. How then can sin be said to be both external to man, and his own personal responsibility?

The answer to this question is suggested by the Hebrew concept which has been labelled "corporate personality."[1] Evil and sin are entities surrounded by a structure of family and community;[2] they affect the corporate totality simply because they are human activities, and what concerns one in a sense concerns all.[3] Thus, just as in the

1. Cf. the oft-quoted article of H. Wheeler Robinson in ZAW 66 (1936), 49-61. For OT references to corporate personality and responsibility, cf. above, 24-25, and de Fraine, Adam.
2. This fact has an application that may seem trifling, and yet may be important to the question of demonic "redemption." It is simply that demons have no family ties and no fathers, nor were they intended for procreation; when they do attempt this, they fall into sin, and their offspring fathered on human mothers (on whom they are dependent for issue) are monstrous (1En 6:1 - 8:4). Hence the presuppositions that govern Christ's saving work among mankind for Pl are simply missing for the demons; it is difficult to see how Christ's "family" relationship with human beings can have any application to the demons, except as the state of the latter might be affected by the human state.
3. Cf. above, 6-7. For a careful review of the OT evidence, cf. de Fraine, Adam, ch. 2. Cf. further Dahl, Resurrection, 59-73, on "The Semitic Totality Concept;" Blackmann, CanJournTheol 11 (1965), 124-134, who observes the difficulty of interpreting Rom 9 - 11 apart from this view; Best, who says (One Body, 36), with particular reference to Rom 5:12-21, "This conception of racial solidarity was foreign neither to Paul nor to his age; it would be accepted as a matter of course, as part and parcel of everyday thinking, and as not requiring any special mention or explanation; that is why no particular mention

OT, the sin of one man can upset the equilibrium of the whole of society.[1]

Moreover, individuals within this corporate structure may occupy positions of particular significance. De Fraine has illustrated this copiously from the OT,[2] and he is able to cite instances from the NT as well of the representative individual as exercising beneficial[3] or harmful influence[4] on those of his group. The primary representative man of the NT is, of course, Jesus Christ.[5] His beneficial influence is clear on those who are "in" him - in a solidarity that brings about their salvation.[6]

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is made of the way in which the effects of Adam's and Christ's deeds are passed on to men." From a slightly different angle, Schweizer (Church as Body, 21) remarks that "the fact that the Hebrew did not need any word for 'body' shows that the distinction of his individual body from other human bodies was not of first importance for him....The Hebrew word adam means primarily mankind, and only secondarily individual man." Similarly, Manson (Paul and John, 44) refers to σάρξ as the "seat" of ἁμαρτία, and says that "in the case of Adam the ancestor of the whole race, sin got a footing in his flesh, and since all mankind is one flesh (homosarcic) with Adam, sin maintains this hold on the flesh from generation to generation."

1. Such assumptions as these underlie certain passages of the NT. Cf., e.g., Mt 23:30-32, Lk 11:48, the sins of the Pharisees linked with those of their fathers; Mt 23:35-36//Lk 11:50-51, all the shed blood of history to be required at the hands of this generation; Jn 9:2, the sins of the parents may be visited on the child; ICor 12:26, if one member of the body (i.e., a community of human beings) suffers, all suffer together; IICor 2:6, pain caused one is pain caused to all. Such assumptions as these lie behind the statement of Rom 5:19, that as by one man's disobedience many became sinners, so by one man's obedience many became righteous. Cf. Weiss, History I, 434, for a similar comment on ICor 15:22, and Rom 5:11; the representative principle in humanity can work for salvation as well as condemnation.

2. De Fraine, Adam, ch. 2.

3. Ibid., 237ff; 242.

4. Ibid., 240; 242.

5. It is necessary to stress with Barth the fact that the proper norm for understanding man in Pl is Jesus Christ; cf. K. Barth, Christ and Adam, 6, and also 43; Cullmann, Christology, 169-170; Nygren, Romans, 20-23; Scroggs, Last Adam, 60; Nelson, Interpretation 14 (1960), 14-27. It is the corporate experience of salvation in Christ experienced by Christians that lies behind Pl's reflexive reference to the corporate experience of mankind in Adam's downfall; cf. Rom 5:12-21; ICor 15:20-28,42-50. Cf. also N. A. Dahl, in Background, particularly 434-436.

6. This union with Christ has been the subject of recent study in such works as Robinson's Body, Best's One Body, and Reid's Our Life. The point of concentration is usually such a term as σῶμα, or such a phrase

Seen in the light of Christ's representative character, Adam likewise holds a place of corporative responsibility for Pl; he is the head and father of the human family.[1] It is not merely that he is an "everyman" figure, with whom sympathetic identification can be made. Rather, he *is* his children, and unredeemed man *is* Adam.[2] The old

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as ἐν Χριστῷ ; however, the terminology is quite varied, as Manson points out (Paul and John, 70-74): church, body of Christ, Kingdom of God, sonship are mentioned, as well as such general expressions as sharing Christ's suffering and sacrifice, sharing Christ's glory. This union is radically different from what is usually understood by the term "mysticism." Best (op. cit.) likewise stresses the variety of terminology as an antidote to the misunderstandings issuing from overemphasis on one term or set of terms, and adds (20) to Manson's list the term "building" as an expression of corporate unity with Christ. Cf. also Moule's discussion (Colossians and Philemon, 168-169) on πλήρωμα as a collective term. All these are terms which have to do mostly with salvation, and hence do not belong, strictly speaking, in our discussion of the beginnings of sin; however, we can never be "incorporate" in Satan in quite the same way we are in Christ, whatever the relationship between Satan and man may be thought to be. Satan is not "one of us;" he may rule us, or "possess" us, but when referring to our corporate experience of sin, Pl's thought turns to our fellow-man, Adam, and not to Satan. In this he differs from John, who calls the scribes and Pharisees "children of the devil," (Jn 8:44) and from Lk, who puts in Pl's own lips the phrase, "you son of the Devil" (Acts 13:10).

1. Adam was represented as the father of Israel in some of the Rabbinic writings; cf. Scroggs, Last Adam, 44-46, who cites among others Pesik.R. XL, 157 a-b; Num.R. XIII.2; B.B. 58a; B. M. 84a. Davies, however, credits the thought of Christ as the Second Adam to Pl's own theological reflection, rather than to any inherited tradition (PRJ, 41-44).

It should also be observed with Whiteley (who cites Richardson and Cullmann to the same effect) that Adam lies in the background of more passages in Pl than the three in which his name appears (Theology, 112-113). Hooker (NTS 6 (1960), 297-306) interprets Rom 1 as containing implicit reference to Adam; cf. also Lengsfeld, Adam und Christus, 30-33.

The axiomatic character of this thought for Pl has been observed by Nygren (Romans, 20). Pl does not demonstrate the parallel between Christ and Adam because "it is too basic to be capable of formal demonstration. One does not prove an axiom." On the wide circulation of this teaching in first century Judaism, cf. Schoeps, Paul, 190, fn. 1 and 2, especially his interesting suggestion that the two Adams were, for Pl and the Rabbis, created in the likeness of two different orders of angelic beings respectively.

2. Richardson (Theology, 248) rejects the interpretation of Adam as simply a figure to be compared with our present predicament. Rather, "Adam *is* mankind; Israel (or for that matter Isaac, e.g. Amos 7:9,16) is the name of the patriarch *and* that of the nation (cf. Esau, Mal 1:2f.; Rom 9:13)." To the same general effect, cf. Barclay (ET 70 (1959), 172-173), who rejects several alternatives in favor of "solidarity." But against carrying this identification to extremes, cf. K. Barth, Christ and Adam, 45: "Adam, as the one, can represent the many; he as man can

copybook exercise caught the NT spirit to a remarkable degree: "In Adam's fall, we sinned all."[1]

This fact is attested by the dispute of long standing over the identity of the "I" in Romans 7. Is it Pl himself, as some have held, recollecting autobiographically his pre-Christian state?[2] Or is this an "everyman" phrase?[3] It should be noted that on either interpretation it is still not easy to distinguish Pl from "everyman" in Rom 7. This is probably in keeping with Pl's assumption: Adam is in all of us, and we are all in Adam.[4] In such a relationship, direct lines of

represent humanity - but only as one among others. Thus he can represent all the others only in the same way that each of them can represent him."

On Adam and the sources of the Urmensch myth, with its rather differently conceived corporate notion, cf. Schweizer, Lordship, 119-125.

1. Adam is thus the beginning of sin, but not necessarily the cause of individual sins. Relative to Sir 25:24, Barclay comments (ET 70 (1959), 172), "It must be noted that the word which is used for beginning is techillah which means beginning not in the causative but in the temporal sense. This means that the act of Eve was 'the beginning of the history of sin as far as man is concerned.'" This type of description seems to fit Pl's doctrine of sin's origins better than such expressions as "hereditary" (cf. Stauffer, Theology, 68); rather, humanity participated in the sin of Adam. Commenting on Rom 5:12, Kümmel says (Man in the NT, 67), "The reference to Adam is not intended to explain the origin of sin or pardon man for his sinfulness, but only to emphasize, by referring to its historical beginnings, the universality of sin...."

2. E.g., Deissmann, Paul, 91-92; Davies, PRJ, 24-25; Dodd, Romans, 125; Manson, Paul and John, 40. Dodd, however, has said (op. cit., 123), "It is clear that, even if he is describing his own personal experience, he means to generalize from it...."

3. This is evidently the dominant view of the moment. Cf. Munck's footnote (Paul and Salvation, 11-12) on the interpretation of Rom 7 in an "everyman" sense, where it is stated that the matter has been settled since 1929 by Kümmel's Römer 7 und die Bekehrung des Paulus; also Grundmann's footnote (TWNT I, 315) to the same effect, and Kümmel, Man in the NT, 53. With particular reference to the DSS, cf. Kuhn, in Scrolls, 102.

4. It will be noted that this is as close as we propose to come to solving the problem of "original sin" in Adam and his descendants. To push the analysis further would seem to be untrue to Pl, who has left the doctrine in this rather amorphous state and in his extant writings has not traced the responsibility more carefully or strictly. Cf. Grundmann, TWNT I, 313, who observes a general connection between the deed of Adam, humanity, death and sin, and continues: "In alledem ist keine Erbsündenlehre entwickelt, sondern ein Urteil ausgesprochen über die Menschen in ihrem Menschensein...." Barrett (First Adam, 20) remarks that there is no evidence for a theory of seminal transmission: "Paul does not think

responsibility grow blurred and difficult to trace; if Adam is in a sense responsible for my sin, in what sense am I responsible for his? But it is not important to disentangle the web of sin in order to appreciate Pl's meaning, which is, simply, that all humanity is involved in sin together. Even in the Church, or perhaps <u>especially</u> in the Church, what affects one affects all. "If any one has caused pain, he has caused it not to me, but in some measure - not to put it too severely - to you all."[1]

All this goes to make up a picture of sin which is larger than the sinning individual. There is more to sin than just my own sin; there is a vast complex, a structure of evil that looms over humanity, independent of the individual sin, though related to it.[2] This is sin as a "power;" man has no control over it. It engulfs human society, perverts the Law,[3] and at last pays the wages of death[4] into the bosom of its wretched captive. Yet, at the same time, it is inseparable from the sinful <u>deed</u>. ἁμαρτία is a human affair;[5] κακία, or what can be described as κακός,

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of sin as a <u>thing</u> which, like an heirloom, may be handed down from father to son. Sin is a living, active, almost a personal agency...." Cf. similarly Scroggs, <u>Last Adam</u>, 79; Sanday and Headlam, <u>Romans</u>, 136-138, who compare Pl's theology to that of the Rabbis and conclude that for Pl, "Man inherits his nature; and yet he must not be allowed to shift responsibility from himself; there is that within him by virtue of which he is free to choose...."

1. IICor 2:5; cf. also ICor 8:12, where sinning against a brother is the same thing as sinning against Christ.
2. Men may be enslaved by sin (Rom 6:6,20; 7:14,23); sin reigns in the mortal bodies of men (6:12,14) whose members sin uses as instruments (6:13); man in the grip of sin seems to have no control over himself (7:15-20), hence his irrational behavior is to be attributed to his master, sin (7:20). Scripture has shut all up under sin (Gal 3:22; cf. similarly Rom 3:9; 11:32).
3. Throughout Rom 6 - 7 almost the same things are said about the Law and sin; the Law "binds" man (Rom 7:1-3), and is satisfied only by death (7:1-6); similarly sin binds and reigns (above, fn. 2) and demands the death penalty. Yet the Law and sin are not identical (7:7; cf. 3:31). Why then are they so readily interchangeable as terms? Because sin has "taken over" the Law, and works its pleasure through it (7:7-9,11,13-14).
4. Rom 6:23; cf. also Rom 5:12,14; 6:9,16,21; 7:5,13; 8:2; ICor 15:54.
5. Cf. above, 172, fn. 3.

usually is directly attributed to the action of man.[1]

This appears to be the best connection in which to explain the appearance of ἁμαρτία as something at once external to man, and yet his personal responsibility. It is true that Pl speaks of sin as though it were an enemy from without;[2] and yet this enemy without has been brought into being by man's own responsible action from within. For Pl never for a moment shrinks from attributing full responsibility to man, even at the very moment when he is insisting most vehemently on the reality of sin as an independent force, looming over the individual sinner.[3]

In fact, ἁμαρτία within is the origin of the objective force of ἁμαρτία that oppresses man from without.[4] If this gives the impres-

1. Cf. above, 172.
2. Cf. above, 172-173.
3. Dodd (Romans, 103) speaks of "that corporate wrongness which underlies individual transgression."
The connection has been urged between the Rabbinic doctrine of the evil yetzer (cf. above, 70ff) and Rom 7; the point is probably well taken. Cf. Davies, PRJ, 23-27; Barclay, ET 70 (1959), 134-135; Manson, Paul and John, 27; Schoeps, Paul, 184-185. Yet it is well to note with Burton (Galatians, 443) the difference between the evil yetzer and Pl's ἁμαρτία: "The Pauline ἁμαρτία differs from the yecer hara in that the latter designates not the doing of sin, but a force operative in the conscious life and impelling one to evil conduct, while with Paul ἁμαρτία is primarily the doing of sin...." As Manson says (op. cit., 40), "The Jewish notion that man himself stands neutral between the good and evil impulses and has only to choose which he will obey is now seen not to correspond with the facts. The grim fact is that Paul is not free to choose. He is the slave of sin and must do what sin tells him to do."
4. Bultmann (Theology I, 251) is correct in observing that in Rom 5:12ff and 7:7ff Pl does not permit himself to suggest that Adam's sin is "caused by something lying behind it, either by the matter of which Adam consists, or by Satan, or - following a rabbinic teaching - to 'the evil tendency.' Instead he holds to the idea that sin came into the world by sinning...." The effect is much the same in Cullmann's insistence (Salvation, 324) that for Pl the beginning of sin is an event, a specific act of sin. Barclay (Flesh and Spirit, 22) writes, "Man's sin, his own sin and the sin of mankind, has, as it were, made him vulnerable to sin." Bornkamm (RGG V, col 181) notes that Pl does not understand the fall of Adam "als tragisches Verhängnis; bezeichnenderweise führt er sie auf dem Teufel zurück und begründet die Universalität von Sünde und Tod mit der verantwortlichen sündhaften Tat aller. Gerade als Urstünde ist sie schuldhafte Tat...."

sion of being circular reasoning, it is at least a circle which Pl himself has drawn. It underscores the belief which Pl shares with the OT that man is fully responsible for bringing evil into being. According to Pl, man himself is the origin of sin; the devil stands to one side, dependent on human consent.

The dominance of this personified or generalized notion of ἁμαρτία in Pl's thought about sin can be seen in the influence Pl attributes to it with reference to three other terms, all of which have been described as belonging among the ranks of the Powers.[1] And indeed, there is good reason for placing them there; yet, as we have said, the Powers seem to be personal, or at least semi-personal, while σάρξ, θάνατος and νόμος are quite clearly personifications.[2] Pl uses these words from time to time to express his conviction that ἁμαρτία is a power that invades and influences all of human life, apart from Christ's saving help.

At first glance, it might seem appropriate to attribute the origin of sin to the influence of flesh, death and the Law; they exercise a baleful influence on the men whom they rule, and in terms purely statistical they together far outnumber the occurrences of ἁμαρτία in Pl's writings. But it must be kept in mind that all three of these terms have a double usage: one when they are being employed in connection with ἁμαρτία, in a theological sense, and another in their "natural" setting, when they may refer to something less malignant than their theological reference implies.

But to begin with, an important fact about σάρξ and θάνατος must be underscored: in their "natural" settings, they are associated, not with

1. E.g., Nygren, Romans, 216.
2. Regarding Pl's personification of σάρξ and ἁμαρτία, Bultmann (Theology I, 245), while insisting that Pl thus "expresses the fact that man has lost to them the capacity to be the subject of his own actions," nevertheless says that this is not "realistic mythology," but "figurative, rhetorical language."

power, but with weakness. The term "flesh" refers to man in his weakness;[1] death is, quite obviously, the final seal on the complete impotence of humanity. And something of the same thing is no doubt true as well of ἁμαρτία, with which they are so closely associated. In spite of Pl's statements about the power of sin, there is an aspect of it that is, paradoxically, curiously weak. Seen from God's side, ἁμαρτία gives the impression of being virtually a negligible quantity, no stronger than the arm of "flesh," and snuffed out by death.[2]

So the realm of the flesh and of death is human. Man's revolt against God's sovereign command never imperilled God; God's ultimate control was never in danger of being "taken over" by man's sin. Death, the end of life in the flesh, is the sign of God's sovereign power to subjugate his enemies, and of their ultimate weakness when compared with his power. The "power" of the flesh and of death is something which appears only from the human standpoint. Death threatens the flesh of man precisely because it is God's sentence on him.[3] The power of the flesh and death, vis-a-vis

1. As Kuhn points out (in Scrolls, 101), this thought of human weakness lies behind the use of "flesh" in the DSS, though for Qumran the emphasis soon shifts to the sin to which this "frail, withering flesh" is prone. Cf. similarly Meyer, TWNT VII, 113. Likewise for the NT the OT view of fleshly man as perishing lies close beneath the use of the word. Throughout the inter-Testament development of Judaism, as Fichtner points out (RGG II, col 975), the estimate of the flesh became progressively more negative. But underlying these negative evaluations was the OT view of "fleshly" man as helpless and weak.

2. Schlier observes this characteristic of Satan's sphere of influence (Epheser, 105): "Denn die Macht dieser Welt ist nur im eigenen Vorgehen Allmacht, in Wirklichkeit und in der Wahrheit ist sie Ohnmacht, ja ist sie Tod. Sie kann Allmacht vortäuschen, weil sie immer noch an der Schöpfung partizipiert und also an der Allmacht des Schöpfers." Cf. also Richardson (ET 75 (1964), 111): "The historic Christian faith involves the metaphysical assertion that good and evil are not of equal ontological status."

3. It is curious to observe how the aspect of death is changed for the Christian by baptism (Rom 6:4ff). The Christian actually seeks out death, and submits to it proleptically, by participating with Christ in his death. By the destruction and burial of the σάρξ, man eliminates the seat of sin, the hand-grip by which ἁμαρτία held him fast. At the moment of baptism, the Christian is seen as "giving the devil his due" and being rid of his

mankind, derives from the power of God who sentenced sinful man to this form of weakness because of his sin. It is thus with a borrowed energy that ἁμαρτία threatens mortal man.

Statistically speaking, there is more frequent reference to σάρξ than to ἁμαρτία; however, as noted above, there is a double reference. It not only means "sinful flesh," but also stands for "flesh" in general, a fact not often stressed in treatments of the subject.[1] According to H. Wheeler Robinson, σάρξ is used in the general sense fifty-six times, and in an ethical, i.e., "sinful flesh" sense, only thirty-five times.[2]

When σάρξ is used in this ethical sense, ἁμαρτία is always in the

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oppression thenceforward (though he may attempt it, Satan cannot accomplish the overthrow of a Christian). This is not mere theory, though Pl admits that in practice Christians do sin: the basis for redemption is elimination of the beachhead captured by sin. Cf. Barrett, Romans, 125; Nygren, Romans, 233-235. Nygren underscores the facticity of what is thought to happen here (ibid., 233): "For according to Paul, in baptism we have to do with realities, not merely with symbolic representations. That which baptism symbolizes also actually happens, and precisely through baptism."

Ἁμαρτία is seen as having a legal demand upon man, to which it is entitled. But when man opts for the privilege of dying-in-advance with Christ, ἁμαρτία as a power (cf. ibid., 242-244) no longer has dominion over him, any more than it does over Christ, with whom the believer has died. He has become, in his new solidarity with Christ, something of a supernatural person.

1. As Davies says (Christian Origins, 153), "It is noteworthy that the term 'flesh' with a moral connotation occurs far less frequently in the Pauline epistles than discussions of Pauline theology would lead us to expect."

2. Christian Doctrine of Man, 114; cf. Davies, PRJ, 19. Davies, Christian Origins, loc. cit. Kuhn admits that "flesh" in Pl can be completely neutral in sense, as it can in Qumran (cf. Scrolls, 106-107); he insists, however (107), that "both in Paul and at Qumran, the 'neutral' sense of 'flesh' is completely imbedded and overshadowed by the loaded meaning. 'Flesh' is the sphere, the realm where ungodliness and sin have effective power."

On the general definition of σάρξ, cf. Robinson's view, contrasting σάρξ and σῶμα, summarized on p. 31 of Body. It seems to me more probable that Manson (Paul and John, 37) has caught the right distinction when he says that σῶμα is the more particularizing term, while σάρξ is the more general; J. A. T. Robinson's view is that σάρξ stands for man in separation from God, while σῶμα refers to man in union with God.

background of thought.[1] As W. D. Davies has remarked, Pl hesitates to speak of the "flesh" of Jesus when he is using the term in a generally ethical context, apparently for fear that the reference might be understood as attributing sin to the Savior. But when the context is non-ethical, Pl refers quite naturally to the body of Jesus as composed of flesh.[2] Likewise, Pl's own life in a human body is not regarded as sinful because of that fact;[3] rather, the flesh is the handle by which sin lays hold on man. We can do no better than to quote Davies:[4]

> One conclusion only emerges; the term σάρξ denoted for Paul the material element in man which is morally indifferent; it has, however, become the basis from which sin attacks man; has, in short, passed under the dominion of sin; it was a corrupted not a corrupting element; the involuntary accomplice to the act of sin but not the criminal.

When dominated by sin, the flesh can be described as the deadly enemy of the spirit, and "very much more than the body;"[5] but sin is what makes

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1. This fact is what saves Pl from the type of matter/spirit dualism that Weiss (History II, 606) attributes to him; for Weiss, evil in Pl is cosmological, being connected with the material world. "The flesh is a part of the cosmos which has fallen away from God, and is inimical to him. By the flesh the individual is actually connected with this cosmos; the putting-off of the flesh signifies, at the same time, redemption from the world elements (Col 2:11,13 and 20)." Cf. similarly Montefiore, Pfleiderer, Holtzmann and Bousset, as cited by Davies, PRJ, 17. But that Pauline dualism is not thus conceived, cf. Robinson, as quoted by Davies, loc. cit.: "We are entitled to say that the ultimate enemy of the Spirit of God is not the flesh but the sin of which the flesh has become the weak and corrupted instrument." Cf. also Davies' "additional note" (ibid., 352-353) to the effect that the Qumran usage of "flesh" is similarly ethical. Bultmann (Theology I, 251) guards himself against attributing to Pl a Gnostic view of σάρξ as the origin of sin by saying that at this point Pl departs from the Gnostic and Rabbinic modes of thought and strikes out for himself. Cf. also Kümmel, Man in the NT, 42-43.
2. Davies, PRJ, 19. Cf. Dodd, Romans, 136, to the same effect.
3. E.g., in Phil 1:22,24, Pl's remaining in the flesh or departing from it does not seem to carry any implications at all as to Pl's own sinfulness; cf. also Col 2:1,5; Eph 5:29; Philem 16.
4. Loc. cit. Cf. Manson, Paul and John, 44.
5. Barclay, Flesh and Spirit, 18. B says further, "The flesh is what man has made himself in contrast with man as God made him. The flesh is man as he has allowed himself to become in contrast with man as God meant him to be. The flesh stands for the total effect upon man of his own sin and of the sin of his fathers and of the sin of all men who have gone before him. The flesh is human nature as it has become through sin. Man's sin, his own sin and the sin of mankind, has, as it were, made him vulnerable to sin." (22). Cf. similarly Manson, op. cit., 39.

the flesh the destructive "Power" that it is, the constitutive element in σάρξ as an evil thing.

The parallel with Qumran is instructive. There the flesh appears in much the same fashion as it does in Pl, showing that the two theological traditions shared common ground (though direct dependence of Pl upon Qumran seems improbable).[2] Flesh in Qumran is seen to be the enemy of mankind; it can, however, be used in a morally indifferent setting.[2] The usage of Qumran points up another facet of Pl's use of σάρξ not yet mentioned. Σάρξ is a term employed by Pl in his references to personal struggle within man; similarly, in the DSS, the flesh is to the fore in the "I" passages,[3] while in the systematic hamartiology of 1QS 3:13 - 4:26 it appears only at 4:21, in a setting that suggests that its corruption is consequent on the prior effects of sin. Likewise Pl, in his discussion of the sin of mankind in general (apart from the Jews) manages without frequent reference to the flesh.[4]

1. Cf. Braun, ZTK 56 (1959), 16ff; Davies, Christian Origins, 176-177; Becker, Das Heil Gottes, 242-243.
2. Kuhn (in Scrolls, 101) writes that for Qumran "man as 'flesh' is unworthy of God and prone to do evil, or rather, prone to succumb to the Evil One." It is noteworthy that this is a tendency, not an accomplished fact by virtue of fleshliness - man is "prone" to these things inasmuch as he is in the flesh. Leaney (Rule, 255) quotes Kuhn with approval, and continues, "It should be emphasized that throughout the Hebraic tradition flesh is not evil in itself but rather the morally and spiritually weak, mortal, this-worldly element in man, the element in which sin and indeed all kinds of evil can find a hold and dwelling-place."
3. Davies, op. cit., 153-154.
4. Davies suggests (ibid., 154) that this may show that neither for Qumran nor for Pl did σάρξ have a fundamental place in the structure of thought. When Pl is speculating on sin on a large scale, as in Rom 1, 2 and 5, references to the σάρξ are infrequent and not morally weighted (153). However, it seems just as probable that the usage is affected by the particular group of sinners under discussion. In Rom 1 - 2, Pl is dealing with Gentiles in the main (2:17ff deals with the Jews only as they are related to the Gentiles), and in Rom 5:12-19 both the Jews and the Gentiles, i.e., humanity as a totality, is in view. In these passages, references to σάρξ are infrequent. But when the sins of the Jews are in view (Rom 7 - 8) the reference to σάρξ in the moral sense becomes more frequent. Similarly, cf. Galatians, where the converts

So thoroughly is the flesh (in its ethical usage) dominated by ἁμαρτία that Pl uses σάρξ almost as a synonym for personified sin. This emerges with particular clarity in the first part of Rom 8; it would seem to be possible there to substitute ἁμαρτία for σάρξ from the fourth verse onward without substantially changing the meaning of the thought. Pl is drawn over to the use of σάρξ by the thought of the Holy Spirit (v. 2) that is to dominate the remainder of the chapter, which Pl characteristically sets in opposition to the flesh;[1] however, the distinction between σάρξ and ἁμαρτία in Romans 8 seems slender indeed.

The impression that emerges is that ἁμαρτία is the dominant concept in Pl's use of σάρξ as an ethical term. The causative stream does not flow from σάρξ to ἁμαρτία; rather, the flow is in the opposite direction.[2] It is sin that corrupts the flesh.

With θάνατος, as with σάρξ, a double reference is evident. The word

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have apparently been impressed by the claims of Judaizers, where σάρξ figures largely. A plausible reason for this connection between the Jews and the flesh might be the prominence given by the Jews to circumcision, whereas in Gentile contexts the reference to ἁμαρτία does not slip so naturally over into its association with σάρξ as a Jewish theological element. Cf. also the flesh/spirit antithesis suggested below as a factor affecting Pl's use of "flesh" in Rom 8.

1. On Pl's dualistic mode of thought, cf. above, 184; the two terms are directly contrasted in Rom 8:4,5,6,9 and 13. In Rom 8, the usage of σάρξ is governed by the fact that the chapter to come is dominated by the thought of the Holy Spirit, Pl preferring to speak of flesh as the opposite of spirit. This suggestion of one term by the other is seen earlier in Rom when πνεῦμα appears: Rom 1:4 (cf. 1:3, Christ's body of flesh); 2:29 (cf. 2:28, circumcision in the flesh); 7:6 (cf. 7:5, while we were in the flesh). There is only one other prior mention of "spirit" in Rom, at 5:5.

2. Commenting on Rom 5:12, Kümmel says (Man in the NT, 67), "Paul does not intend to derive man's common sinfulness and hence his liability to death from his life in the flesh, or from his descendance from a common father of the race, but rather, is merely concerned to establish this universality of sin and death as a historical fact." Schweizer summarizes Pl's attitude to the flesh as sinful by saying (TWNT VII, 135-136), "Fleisch ist demnach nicht ein von anderen irdischen Dingen abzugrenzender Bezirk, der an sich schlecht oder besonders gefährlich wäre. Böse wird es erst dadurch, dass der Mensch sein Leben darauf baut." That is to say, the sin of man makes the flesh sinful.

does not appear as frequently as does ἁμαρτία,[1] and the way in which it is used shows that it is the less fundamental term. In Rom, ἁμαρτία is invariably connected with death in a cause and effect relationship.[2] Just as Adam had been told, God has brought his word to pass that all who sin must die. "The wages of sin is death."[3] But at the same time, death can be spoken of as being simply the end of life, as is the case in four of the five times the word is used in Philippians.[4] However, the theological thought is probably always in the background, and it would appear that Pl, if called upon to explain the near-death of Epaphroditus, or his own death, would attribute it ultimately to the power of sin.[5]

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1. It is used forty-seven times in Pl, compared with sixty-four instances of ἁμαρτία. Of these occurrences, nearly half are found in Rom, as are well over two thirds of the instances of ἁμαρτία.
2. The relationship of cause and effect does not, however, permit the tracing of personal responsibility to Adam or to the individual sinner on an either/or basis, as Kümmel has pointed out clearly (Man in the NT, 65-67). He says Paul asserts that "each man merits his own death because of his own sin - death which since Adam has been the punishment for sin. This thought about each individual's responsibility for his own death cannot be described or dismissed as an unfortunate notion of secondary importance. On the contrary, for Paul it is most important, because only by retaining this idea of personal responsibility does man appear as guilty of his own death (cf. Rom 6:20-21,23). Moreover, Paul is only following Jewish tradition in placing side by side inherited death as a result of common sinfulness and man's own responsibility for his death as a result of his sin. From the fact that Paul has not tried to find any logical compromise between these two important claims about the universality of sin and therefore of death on the one hand and the individual's responsibility for his death by reason of his sin on the other hand, it can be concluded that in Romans 5:12 Paul speaks about the beginning of sin and hence of death, but is not particularly interested in this beginning; rather it is the universality of sin and death which interests him and which he wants to contrast with the universality of the life given in Christ." Cf. similarly Schoeps, Paul, 188-190.
3. Rom 6:23.
4. The word seems to have no theological overtones at Phil 1:20; 2:27; 2:30; the double usage of 2:8 does not seem to me to be theologically "loaded." Theological use appears at 3:10. On the difference between the use of death as a "power" in Jn and Pl, contrasted with the Synoptic Gospels, cf. Reicke, RGG VI, col 913.
5. As Bultmann says (TWNT III, 14), death is never regarded as a natural thing in the NT, nor susceptible of explanation, any more than is the Resurrection. Death is the result and punishment of sin. The fact of his own and Epaphroditus' sinfulness would be sufficient explanation to Pl for their own death, though Pl would presumably not class himself or Epaphroditus with "the sinners."

But death cannot at all be considered the cause of sin; it is precisely the other way around. Pl makes it abundantly plain that it is caused by sin, that it is the punishment for sin rather than its causative principle.

So much for the two terms which, when yoked with ἁμαρτία, hint that sin is strong only when seen from the human standpoint, that sin is limited by God's decree to the realm of what perishes and dies. We turn next to a further consideration of the Law, a gift of God to which Pl attributes a real power, but which turned out for man's destruction rather than his good.[1] What is the connection between Law and sin?

The word νόμος, again, appears considerably more frequently in Pl than does ἁμαρτία. But the double reference applies again; by no means all of the usage refers to the Law as "possessed" by sin.[2] This type of usage is concentrated in two places in particular, Rom and Gal.

In the early chapters of Romans, with only a relatively few exceptions,[3] νόμος refers to the Law of Moses. But with 5:20 a new attitude toward the Law appears: it is not simply the Mosaic Law, but is now a hostile force, threatening, oppressing, driving to condemnation.[4]

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1. Cf. above, 203ff. "The Law brings wrath," says Pl (Rom 4:15), and this wrath of God is presumably the power that sin brings to bear against men.
2. Rom 7:12 - "So the law is holy and just and good."
3. Rom 3:19,20; 4:15, might be considered exceptions, inasmuch as though the law of Moses is in view, it is spoken of in these contexts as bringing wrath or judgment, a hint of what is to come in Romans. But νόμος as simply the law of Moses appears at Rom 2:12,13,14,15,17,18,20,23,25,26,27; 3:21,28,31; 4:13,14,16; 5:13; in addition, there is the use of νόμος as simply "law," or "regulation:" Rom 3:27; 4:15 (the second use); 5:13 (again the second use). It is a bit uncertain whether the first reference to νόμος in Rom 3:27 means actually the law of Moses, or simply a "principle," as the RSV translates, though the former seems to me more likely.
4. Rom 5:20, increasing the trespass; 6:14-15, having dominion over man; 7:1, binding a man during his life; 7:5, rousing sinful passions; 7:6, holding man captive; 7:7, causing the sinner to "know" sin; 7:8, "finding opportunity in the commandment;" 7:8, apart from the Law, sin lies dead; 7:9, the commandment stirs up sin and causes death; 7:23, the "law of the members" wars against the "law of the mind;" 7:25, again, the law of God and the law of sin; 8:2, the Law is regarded as something from which Christ sets man free; 8:3, the Law is weakened by the flesh; 10:4, Christ is the end of the Law.

Though intended for good,[1] it has become an evil. The question that immediately rises is how this holy and just and good creation of God could thus be corrupted. And the answer, of course, is that the change has come about "in me," or because of something dwelling "in me."[2] What took place within man has altered his relationship to the Law in such a way that it becomes his enemy instead of his helper and support. The culprit is ἁμαρτία.

In Gal, the Law is referred to more often in terms of its inadequacy than its malignancy.[3] Yet the reason for giving the Law is said to be the same as it was in Rom: it came into being, in all its inadequacy, because of a previous transgression.[4]

Two different classifications of mankind confront the laws of God, the Jews and the Gentiles. The suggestion has been made that a reference

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1. In the very chapter where the most pessimistic estimate of the Law is offered, Pl insists most vehemently on the goodness of the Law: it promised life (7:10); it is holy, just and good (7:12); the Law itself did not bring death, but rather sin did (7:13); it is spiritual (7:14); it is good (7:16); it is the proper object of inner delight (7:22). It is only because of the weakness of the flesh (= sin) that the Law can be impugned at all - and this, of course, cannot be blamed on the Law.
2. Rom 2:5, (the Jew's) hardness of heart spoils the effect of God's kindness; 2:29, uncircumcision of heart is what causes the Jew who boasts of God's law to break it; the thought of bondate to sin and the flesh in Rom 6 is carried over into 7:1-6, and applied to bondage under the Law in such a way as to imply that the corruption of the flesh is responsible for the corruption of the Law; 7:8, sin corrupts the commandment; similarly, 7:11; 7:13, sin working death in me became exceedingly sinful by the commandment; 7:14, the Law is spiritual, I am carnal; and in 7:15-20 the picture is drawn of a man at war within himself: something within him paralyzes the will to do good. In 7:21-24, the same picture is given more pointedly, with the specific identification of the element that wars against the Law as being nothing else but the law of ἁμαρτία.
3. The Law of course can assume a malignant attitude: cf. Gal 3:10,13; 5:4. But in the main it is weak or second-rate by comparison with God's grace in Christ: Gal 2:16, man cannot be justified by keeping it; 3:2, the Spirit is not given by keeping it; 3:5, miracles are not given through it; 3:11, man cannot be justified by it; 3:17-19, it is temporally inferior to the previously ratified Promises; 3:21, it is, unlike the Promises, incapable of making alive; 3:23-24, it is only a παιδαγωγός taking us to the point of sonship; 4:1-5, νόμος, like the στοιχεῖα, is compared to a mere guardian or trustee; 4:21ff, the Law witnesses concerning itself (4:30) that the children of the promise are better than the children of the Law.
4. Gal 3:19.

to Adam and his loss of the divine image is found in the first chapter of Romans;[1] if, as seems possible, this is the case, then the sins discussed in 1:24-31 are to be considered not as a novelty in each new generation of man, but as traceable back to the primordial decree of God in Eden. The law under which the Gentiles would be judged then becomes the self-expression of God in the creation;[2] his will is evident enough for every Gentile to be held accountable for transgression. "Though they know God's decree that those who do such things deserve to die..," says Pl in Rom 1:32 - thus implying that the sin of Adam is at one with the sins of the Gentiles, in that it produces the same effect. The fact of death is a witness to the sinfulness of man, whether Gentile or Jew.

The Jews, on the other hand, confront an additional law as well, that given through Moses. This Law was a gracious gift, and was received

1. This suggestion by M. D. Hooker in NTS 6 (1960), 297-306. It has been taken up by C. K. Barrett, First Adam, 17-19. Miss Hooker has further amplified her thesis in NTS 13 (1967), 181-183. Cullmann (Salvation, 321, 334) defines the original sin in terms of Rom 1:21ff. - as being that of confusing creature and creator, putting the two on the same level.

2. Barrett (Romans, 111-112) distinguishes with Pl between those who sinned under the Law (the Jews from Moses onward) and sinners in the interval between Adam and Moses (cf. Rom 5:14). But rather than holding that there was no law for the Gentiles to sin against, and hence an anomaly, it would seem preferable to apply to Rom 5:14 Barrett's earlier suggestion (ibid., 52) that the notion of natural law applies to the Gentiles; this would be the law by which they may be judged, by contrast with the Jews who are judged by the Law of Moses.

To this general effect, cf. Bornkamm, RGG V, col 182, who holds that for Pl the Law is one, and hence applies to all - "nur in verschiedener Weise, hier auf Tafeln, dort ins Herz geschrieben...." - Adam, Jew and Gentile alike.

Barrett (loc. cit.) considers the fact that deaths occurred between Adam and Moses (Rom 5:14) to be an anomaly unexplained by Pl, since there was no law against which they could sin. This anomaly is softened considerably by the suggestion of Miss Hooker cited above, which Barrett has since adopted: the sin of the Gentiles and of man between Adam and Moses may indeed have been against law, and hence men may have merited their own deaths as well as sharing the guilt of Adam, although their sins were not against the direct command of God, as were the sins of Adam and of the Jews. The proper understanding of this passage seems to have been given by Sanday and Headlam, Romans, 134-135, holding that as well as individual guilt, solidarity with the guilty Adam is a factor here.

by the Jews as a promise of deliverance from sin,[1] yet its effect had been the opposite.[2] Not that God did not know that the Law would be corrupted by sin - it was only man's false optimism that saw in the Law an escape from sin.[3] It was not a viable solution to the problem because it depended partially on the cooperation of man, and thus the power of ἁμαρτία was given through man a grip on even the Law of God.[4] So even the good gift of God is overcome by ἁμαρτία, and the effect is twofold: the Jews are made even more guilty than the Gentiles, having sinned against greater light,[5] and sin, so far from being weakened by the Law, is actually strengthened by it.[6] The only solution to the dilemma of sinful man is a means of salvation that does not depend on man as already sinful, and thus the appearance of Jesus Christ, to take away sins. But this carries us over into the realm of soteriology, and need be pursued no further.

So far as νόμος is concerned, it cannot really be regarded as

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1. Rom 7:10.
2. Rom 7:11. Gutbrod (TWNT IV, 1065) says, "Die Sünde wird in ihrer Sündigkeit enthüllt und in ihrem Charakter als Auflehnung gegen Gott durch das Gesetz verschärft." Or as Bultmann (Theology I, 267) puts it, "sin kills man by means of the commandment by dangling before him the deceptive promise of procuring him life (Rom 7:11)."
3. Ibid., 263, "(Paul)...says not only that man can not achieve salvation by works of the Law, but also that he is not even intended to do so."
4. Gutbrod (op. cit., 1067), on the "weakness" of the Law: "Sie liegt wesentlich darin, dass es der Sünde nicht anders beikommt als mit Verbot und Verurteilung. Das Gesetz ist schwach διὰ τῆς σαρκός, Rom 8:3, durch die Tatsache der Sünde, die das Gesetz nicht überwinden kann."
5. Cf. Sanday and Headlam, Romans, 135, on Rom 5:13. "Jews before the time of Moses were only in the position of Gentiles. But the degree of their guilt could not be the same either as that of Adam, or as that of the Jews after Mosaic legislation."
6. As Bultmann says (op. cit., 265), "Thus, the Law brings to light that man is sinful....the Law leads into sin the man who has forsaken his creaturely relation to God and wants to procure life for and by himself; it does this in order thereby to bring him back again to the right relation to God." The apparently deliterious effect of the Law appears at Rom 5:20, Law increased the trespass; 7:5, it rouses sinful passions; 7:7-8, it is the means of knowing sin; 7:9-11, it revives sin and gives it opportunity.

an originative factor in describing the sin of man. It cannot do more than to amplify a previously existing evil.

And so we are left with ἁμαρτία itself. The word occurs sixty-four times in Pl, with Rom accounting for forty-eight of the occurrences. By far the predominant usage views ἁμαρτία as a force over against man, rather than as an individual transgression committed by a sinner.[1] In this usage, Pl differs from the rest of the NT, where ἁμαρτία is a word used to describe such a transgression or group of transgressions. But in Pl ἁμαρτία as the offence of a sinner is usually found in the plural, or in formulas taken over from traditional materials.[2] In the singular, sin is a "power."

We have noted above the close association between ἁμαρτία, σάρξ and θάνατος, and the apparent weakness that this seems to imply for ἁμαρτία.[3] But we have seen how ἁμαρτία is able to "take over" God's Law.[4] This is the real source of power for ἁμαρτία; it is parasitic, drawing its strength from institutions that have genuine power, dependent ultimately on the power of God. It is interesting in this connection to observe a fact which does not seem to have been specifically remarked by Pl, that the sin of our first parents was (for Pl) a reaching for a power which they did not possess; similarly, Christ might have reached for the power of the Father, but did not; similarly, in the rest of the NT, Satan aspired to a power not his own. Ἁμαρτία might thus be interpre-

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1. Bornkamm, RGG V, col 181: "Von der Sünde redet Paulus zumeist in der Einzahl und in einer fast mythologisch anmutenden Weise als einer Macht, unter der alle gefangen sind. Mit Adams Ungehorsam in die Welt gekommen, ist sie über alle zur Herrschaft gelangt...." Cf. also Stählin, TWNT I, 298.
2. "Paulus gebraucht ἁμαρτία von der einzelnen Sündentat fast nur in Zitaten (R. 4:7f = Ps 31:1f; 11:27 = Is 27:9) und übernommenen Formeln (ICor 15:3; Gal 1:4; Col 1:14). Ausnahmen sind: Rom 7:5; IICor 11:7; Eph 2:1; ausser Rom 4:8 (Zitat) und IICor 11:7, steht an allen diesen Stellen der Plural." (Stählin, op. cit., 297.)
3. Cf. above, 216ff.
4. Cf. above, 222.

ted rather consistently, not simply as "missing the mark," but as shooting at the wrong mark to begin with. It is a constant reaching forth after powers which are ultimately inaccessible to man, and is therefore in the last analysis doomed to fail. But along the way, sin draws its strength from its misuse of God's powers, and with infinite ingenuity and devastating effect uses these powers against man, at once its creator and its victim. It is not independently powerful; it draws its strength from real powers, and from the lust for them.

So sin is a human responsibility. The tragic irony of the human situation, for Pl, is that man is caught in a web of his own devising. The question of how sin is transmitted among succeeding generations, and whether sin can be fixed as the sole responsibility of Adam seems to be one that did not interest Pl. Adam does have his position of responsibility, but he has done nothing that Pl considers it unlikely that we in the same circumstances would have done.[1] Pl's concern is not to trace responsibility for sin to a particular man, but to insist on the responsibility of Man. In his view, we are all involved in sin together. This is why, for Pl, the solution to the problem of sin could not come from laws promulgated from without, even if they be the laws of God. The only answer must needs be redemption from within the human race. God's real answer to sin was not the Law, but the Second Adam.

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1. Weiss, History I, 435, says, "The whole representation of the Fall, in fact (Rom 7:7-11), sounds, even though Paul gives it in the 'I'-form, like a paraphrase of the story of Paradise, and one may assume that he (like Philo) interprets the narrative of Genesis not only as a once-occurring historical event, but as a universally human psychological fact."

CHAPTER SIX

The Johannine writings can be treated in smaller compass than can Pl because of the consistent and methodic approach of the author. There are few of the puzzles and obscurities of Pl to contend with; this can be said without denying the profundity of what Jn has to say about sin. The fact that we can more easily analyze what Jn is saying does not necessarily imply that his contribution is trivial or easily comprehended - it is simply clearer.

We discuss first the terms that describe evil and evildoing, noting the differences from the rest of the NT at several points. For one thing, κακός, which was so frequently used in Pl, appears only once in Jn, and at that it is on the lips of Jesus with reference to himself.[1] This can hardly be an important word for Jn. The term πειρασμός, frequently found in the Synoptic Gospels and in Mt in particular, is completely missing in Jn.[2] The term πονηρός, so frequent in the Synoptics, is found in three places in John's gospel, and eight times in the Epistles.[3] Here we have a more important word, but still one that is not central.

Jn's principal word for sin is ἁμαρτία. Together with its derivatives, there are nearly fifty occurrences of this word; it is evidently

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1. Jn 18:23 - "If I have spoken wrongly (κακῶς), bear witness to the wrong (περὶ τοῦ κακοῦ)." In addition, we have at IIIJn 11, "Beloved, do not imitate evil (κακόν)...he who does evil (ὁ κακοποιῶν) has not seen God."
2. We do have one occurrence of the verb πειράζειν, at Jn 6:6, but this is used with reference to Jesus' testing of Philip, and has nothing to do with a leading toward sin. In addition, there is the occurrence of the verb at 8:6, in the pericope concerning the woman taken in adultery.
3. In Jn 3:19 and 7:7, the term is used to describe behavior that is wicked; in Jn 17:15, it is used with the article to describe "the evil one." That this is the proper interpretation of the latter passage appears probable from the usage of IJn 2:13,14; 3:12; 5:18,19, where the term is similarly used with the article to denote "the evil one." There is also one use of the word (IJn 3:12b) to describe wicked behavior. In addition, cf. IIJn 11; IIIJn 10.

important for Jn. But it will be seen below that this is far from the only way in which Jn can describe sin and evil. His more typical method of referring to ἁμαρτία is in the consistently-maintained dualistic symbolism of which he is fond.

Jn gives us the clear teaching that the purpose of Jesus' coming was to deal with sin, particularly with its forgiveness.[1] But there is a reverse side to the coin: the coming of Jesus simultaneously deprives men of any excuse for sin,[2] as much as to say that ἁμαρτία cannot be seen or counted except in the light of Christ.[3] In this respect, Jesus' coming seems analogous to Pl's giving of the Law: it actually increases (or perhaps, even, makes possible) the very thing from which it proposes to rescue men.

Jn gives us as clear a definition of ἁμαρτία as we could desire: ἁμαρτία is ἀνομία,[4] or ἀδικία.[5] This double definition is important, in light of the general abstraction with which the term is elsewhere used. Its effect is to bind Jn's use of ἁμαρτία with the ethical, showing that behind the abstraction of "sin" in general lies a fundamental concern for Christian behavior and life. Thus antinomianism is a misreading of Jn's intentions; there is a clear connection between ἁμαρτία in general and behavior in particular.[6]

1. IJn 1:9; 2:12; 3:5; 4:10.
2. Cf. esp. Jn 15:22, "If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin." Also, Jn 8:24; 9:41; 15:24; 16:9.
3. No doubt this is a good part of what Jn intends by his use of φῶς to describe Jesus' ministry; cf. the φῶς/σκοτία opposition at Jn 1:5; 8:12; 12:35,46. Dodd's statement (Fourth Gospel, 210) sums up the matter well: "The purpose and intention of the coming of Christ are in no sense negative or destructive, but wholly positive and creative; but by an inevitable reaction the manifestation of the light brings into view the ultimate distinction between truth and falsehood, between good and evil."
4. IJn 3:4.
5. IJn 5:17.
6. The same general effect is produced by Jn's remark about how the doing of sin makes the man the slave of sin, as Barrett points out (John,

But more typical of Jn, especially in the Gospel, is a use of ἁμαρτία which lends itself more readily to his dualistic mode of speech. There, ἁμαρτία is refusing to believe Jesus, as emerges in several passages.[1] In other words, the locus of ἁμαρτία is in a choice between two alternatives, belief and disbelief, in which the lesser decisions of life are summed up and epitomized. And further, ἁμαρτία is seen to stand in the background of other statements involving choice between two alternatives, and becomes almost identical with darkness, blindness, falsehood, the flesh, the world and the Jews.

It is not intended here to discuss all of these terms, except to point out the way in which they relate, quite consistently, to the decision that leads to sin, or to its opposite, belief. There is considerable variety of terms, and the terms are frequently repeated, but the thought on sin is only one: either/or, the alternatives starkly conceived.

This is true of the term σκοτία; it is always contrasted directly with its opposite, φῶς, in such a way as to suggest decision between the two.[2] In the three cases where it seems to mean merely a natural darkness,

286) in his comment on Jn 8:34, with which he bids us compare IJn 3:4,8f; Jn 3:21; IJn 1:6. "The use of the verb ποιεῖν insists upon the actual performance of sinful acts, and the meaning is twofold. He who actually commits sin demonstrates thereby that he is already the slave of sin; also, by the very sin he commits he makes himself still further a slave." So although, as Barrett remarks later (loc. cit.), "sin is...an alien power which takes possession of the will," it still is dependent on the consent of the man it masters as that man exercises his will in a series of ethical choices. Barrett's citations from the Rabbinic literature on the evil yetzer and how it comes to exercise sway over a man are very much to the point.

1. The important Johannine verb πιστεύειν is regularly used with direct reference to Jesus (an exception is Jn 9:18, where it refers to the skeptical attitude of the Jews in the story of the man born blind). The immediate connection with ἁμαρτία is found at 16:9, and elsewhere the link is less obvious, though still assumed; e.g., 8:24, you will die in your sins unless you believe. Thus ἁμαρτία is defined as the opposite of believing in Jesus.

2. On the OT background of light/darkness dualism, cf. Achtemeier, Interpretation 17 (1963), 439-449; by contrast with the light, darkness is associated with chaos, is the place of evil, and Sheol is the place of darkness. But it is noted that God rules the darkness, uses it, and by it judges evildoers.

closer attention shows that there is intentional symbolism, and behind the "darkness" is the idea of separation from Jesus.[1] So sin is separation from Jesus, as darkness is separation from light. The same thought is patently behind the symbolic use of τυφλός in the ninth chapter of the Gospel.[2] In addition, there are the various words which refer to the Lie, or the Liar;[3] these are often directly contrasted with the truth, and invariably in a context which at least implicitly sets them over against God, and makes them refer to the person or behavior of a sinner.

The σάρξ/πνεῦμα dualism, so frequent in Pl, is of more limited use in Jn, for σάρξ is an attribute of Jesus,[4] and hence cannot be sinful in itself. Jn guards himself against using the term in such a fashion that it can cause him the embarrassment we have seen in Pl when referring to Jesus as a man in the flesh.[5] Hence, although σάρξ may be a synonym for the κόσμος,[6] it is not in itself necessarily an evil thing.[7] On the

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In Jn, the darkness/light dualism appears by direct contrast of the two terms in 1:5; 8:12; 12:35,46.

1. The three cases are: Jn 6:17, the storm-buffeted disciples in the dark, and Jesus not with them; 13:30, where the "night" (= darkness, presumably) is more than the natural darkness; 20:1, where the "darkness" is dispelled by the resurrection of Jesus and reunion with him. Cf. Brown, John I, 516.
2. Cf. the comments of Barrett, John, 304, on the ironic contrast between the well-instructed Jews who falsely supposed they saw and were actually separated from Christ, and the ignorant blind man who knew so little, but who nevertheless was united with Christ, despite his former blindness.

   The other appearances of the term in Jn (5:3; 10:21; 11:37) appear to have no particular symbolic reference; however, with Jn's subtle irony, the latter two could possibly reflect on the lack of understanding displayed by those who persisted in misunderstanding Jesus. Cf. also the verb τυφλοῦν, Jn 12:40 (quoted from Is 6:10); IJn 2:11.
3. In Jn 8:44, the devil is a liar (ψεύστης) and the father of lies (ψεῦδος); for further instances of the former, cf. Jn 8:55; IJn 1:10; 2:4,22; 4:20; 5:10. Further instances of ψεῦδος are found at IJn 2:21, 27. Cf. also ψεύδεσθαι, IJn 1:6.
4. Jn 1:14; 6:51-55; IJn 4:2; IIJn 7.
5. Cf. above, 215.
6. It appears to be nearly this at Jn 8:15; cf. also 6:63; in IJn 2:16, the lust of the flesh is of the world, not of the Father.
7. God has given Jesus authority over all flesh (Jn 17:2); cf. also the references given in fn. 4, above, and Barrett, John, 137.

other hand, it is at least not a good thing when contrasted with πνεῦμα,[1] and in the connections that identify it with the evil κόσμος. The word πνεῦμα, likewise, has a double usage, for it may be the spirit of a man as distinct from his body,[2] or it may be the Holy Spirit.[3] So this is language which may, but does not necessarily, carry the implication of dualistic thinking. Jn's most telling dualistic use of this terminology is perhaps in the Nicodemus story, where σάρξ and πνεῦμα "are two contrary orders of existence, and hence two contrasting orders of generation."[4]

With the word κόσμος, we have again a term consistently employed. For Jn, the world is an evil thing.[5] It is regarded in two ways: either as the object of God's loving plan of redemption in Christ (and hence sinful, else why the redemption?),[6] or as the object of God's judgment for having rejected his plan of redemption in Christ.[7] In addition,

1. Jn 3:6; 6:63; here σάρξ seems to stand for the sin-prone frailty of humanity much as it did in the LXX and in Qumran; cf. above, 216.
2. Jn 11:33; 13:21; 19:30; cf. also IJn 4:1-6, the tests for distinguishing between the Holy Spirit and the spirit of error. On the references from the Gospel, cf. Dodd, Fourth Gospel, 223, a "psychological use."
3. The reference to the Holy Spirit is predominant; cf., e.g., Jn 1:33; 3:5-8; 7:39; 14:17. God himself is defined in terms of πνεῦμα; cf. 4:24. Dodd, op. cit., would have us think of a power, rather than an aether/flesh contrast: the flesh is powerless, by contrast to the sovereign workings of the OT breath of Jahweh.
4. Cf. Barrett's note, John, 175, on Jn 3:6.
5. This statement should be qualified by the observation that the world for Jn is sometimes quite neutral, the place in which human life is lived: cf. 11:9, where the reference is to the sun; 12:19; 16:21; 21:25. Likewise, the κόσμος is spoken of as the creation of God, and hence presumably good: Jn 17:5,24; cf. Jn 1:3, where the Word participates with the Father in creation. On the usage of the word in Jn, cf. Westcott, John I, 64-65, who while laying emphasis on the neutral character of the κόσμος in some Johannine settings, concludes by saying, "It will be seen how naturally the original conception of an order apart from God passes into that of an order opposed to God...." Cf. also Manson, Paul and John, 120: "When Jesus speaks of the 'world' he means primarily what we mean when we use 'humanity' as a collective noun - blind, struggling, baffled, hopeless and helpless, travelling to destruction and unable to stop and turn. And the verdict upon it is that it is completely in the power of evil...."
6. Jn 1:29; 3:16-17; 4:42; 12:47; IJn 4:9,14. Cf. also Jn 6:33,51.
7. Jn 9:39; 12:31; 16:11. Brown, John I, 509, has observed with others the fact that in the earlier parts of the Gospel, Jn tends to speak in terms of mercy for the sinful world, whereas the later parts tend to shift emphasis to the judgment consequent upon having rejected mercy.

the κόσμος is bound together with a number of the terms already discussed: it is of darkness,[1] sin is one of its attributes,[2] it is hostile to Christ and the Christian,[3] it is the producer of lust in the flesh,[4] it is ruled over by an evil power.[5] It can be said quite confidently that for Jn, the term κόσμος sums up everything that is the opposite of saving faith in Jesus.

These terms, and Jn's use of them, show clearly how consistently Jn tends to represent good and evil as alternatives confronting every man, with no middle ground of deferred decision. His dualism is at root a dualism of choice, and Jn is for ever driving at the heart of the matter: lesser decisions depend on the great Decision, whether man will become a follower of Jesus, or of the devil.

This dualism has obvious parallels with Qumran, which likewise sees men divided into two great classes, the righteous and the unrighteous, and views the distinction between them as based on a decision to follow God or Beliar.[6] Commentators have been quick to point out the similarities, and yet there remain significant differences.[7] The differences warn against hasty enthusiasms and interpretations of the Johannine literature in light of Qumran. But it does seem quite safe to say that Jn and Qumran are close to one another in their stress on a choice-of-way

1. Jn 8:12; 12:46.
2. Jn 1:29; 16:8-9; IJn 2:2-3.
3. Jn 7:7; 8:23; 15:18; 16:20,33; 17:14; IJn 2:15-17; 3:13; 4:4-5; 5:4-5.
4. IJn 2:16.
5. Jn 12:31; 14:30; 16:11; IJn 5:19.
6. Cf. above, 59ff.
7. Among those who find considerable influence of Qumran upon Jn, cf., e.g., Kuhn, RGG V, col 754; Flusser, in Scripta Hierosolymitana IV, 265, who rather unguardedly asserts that a whole body of ideas came over from Qumran to Johannine Christianity through the medium of other groups, but still fairly directly; Jeremias, ET 70 (1958), 68. More cautious estimates of the Qumran-Johannine relationship are given by Teeple, NovTest 4 (1960), 6-25; Baumbach, Qumran und das Johannes-Evangelium, 53-54. For a survey of Johannine sources, cf. Smith, NTS 10 (1964), 336-351, and for bibliography on Johannine and Essenic dualism, cf. Becker, Das Heil Gottes, 221, fn.

as being the determining factor in deciding a man's destiny.[1] In Jn, as in Qumran, one may choose to follow God, or the devil - and everything is made to depend on that one fundamental choice.

Since moral evil arises in this arena of human choice, the question for us in determining its origin is one of tracing responsibility for that choice. Does God in Jn, as in Qumran, seem to predetermine the choice that men will make, and thus become responsible for the beginnings of sin? Is Satan or the devil the dynamic behind the choice man makes when he decides against following Jesus? Or is this something that man decides for himself in real freedom and full responsibility?

For Jn, God is all good. Everything that symbolizes good is an attribute of God;[2] every motivation that tends toward good is ultimately from him.[3] God's purpose is the salvation of the world, and to this

1. Kuhn (in Scrolls) has studied the progress of this choice-dualism from its origins in Zoroastrian religion, which he considers obviously to have been its source (ibid., 98), into the doctrine of Qumran. In Parsiism, both the spirits of good and evil were confronted with a primeval choice; likewise, every man is able to choose which spirit he will follow. "The determination of these two original spirits as good and evil comes from the fact that they themselves made the original choice. In the same way the determination of men as belonging to one of the two inimical groups is due to the fact that each individual has made the choice...." (Loc. cit.; cf. similarly Zaehner, Zoroastrianism, 51.) But through the influence of monotheism, Qumran was able to adopt only the idea of two spirits; the determining of their character was attributed to God apart from their free choice (loc. cit.). The problem of freedom and determinism is thus a product of wedding these two disparate conceptions (ibid., 99).

Qumran seems to have grasped the nettle, and asserted that God created evil (cf. above, 59). Jn, as we shall see, was unwilling to do this. Instead, he regarded God as setting man free from the effect of his unexplained prior choice to do evil, and in Jesus offering man an opportunity to choose the good again.

2. God is identified with φῶς, IJn 1:5; φῶς is also an attribute of Jesus, Jn 1:4; 8:12; 9:5; 12:46. God is πνεῦμα, Jn 4:24. God is ἀληθής, Jn 3:33; 8:26, or he is ἀληθινός, Jn 7:28; 17:3; IJn 5:20. God's word is ἀλήθεια, Jn 17:17. Jesus is ἀλήθεια, Jn 14:6. The Holy Spirit is the spirit of ἀλήθεια, Jn 14:17; 15:26; 16:13.

3. Jn 3:2, the power of God is behind the mighty works of Jesus; 3:16, God loves the world; 3:17, God intends, not judgment, but salvation; IJn 2:29, one born of God does righteousness; 3:9; one born of God does not sin, but (cf. 5:18) Jesus holds him back from it; 4:7, love is of God; 4:8, God is love; 4:19, human love is possible because of the prior love of God.

end Jesus is sent, to redeem a fallen creation.[1] Nothing is said about how that creation first fell;[2] perhaps knowledge of a primeval fall, so widespread among religious people of the Hellenistic world, was something Jn could assume. In any event, there is nothing about such a "fall" except for the references to the devil as being involved in sin "from the beginning."[3] This is, quite simply, the way it has been from the first - God on the one hand, and the devil on the other, with the darkened world between as the apparent realm of the latter.

As far as God's power is concerned, it seems to be boundless.[4] It was he who brought the κόσμος into being in the first place,[5] and it is he who at last will destroy the devil and his works.[6] But his compassion

1. Jn 1:29, the Lamb of God takes away the sin of the world; 3:15-17, God's purpose in sending the Son is to save the world; 5:34, so that you might be saved; 6:39-40, the Father's will is that none given to Jesus should be lost; 10:9, anyone entering by the Door will be saved; 12:47, Jesus came, not to judge, but to save the world; 12:50, God's command is eternal life; IJn 3:5, Jesus was manifested to take away our sin.
2. As Bultmann says (Theology II, 24), "Unlike Paul, John does not attribute the fact that all men in their essence are evil...to Adam's fall. Does he attribute that fact to the devil? Not necessarily." Rather, the universality of sin "is not attributed to a mythical cause but simply shows itself to be a fact...." (ibid., 25). Noack finds a reference to a fall in IJn 3:8, and believes this is more probably the fall of man than the fall of the devil (Satanas, 76-77). But the decision as to which fall is in mind is most uncertain, and in fact Bultmann (loc. cit.) would have us understand in light of the present tense that the devil is regarded simply as sinning "from the beginning on."
3. Jn 8:44, the devil is a murderer from the beginning, and the father of lies; IJn 3:8, he sins "from the beginning on" (cf. fn. above). In the reference from the Gospel, Westcott (John II, 19) finds a probable reference to the fall of man, and Bultmann (Evangelium, 242, fn. 4) concedes that the story of Paradise may have been in Jn's mind. Stauffer, on the other hand (Theology, 65), would seem to refer this to pre-history and the fall of the devil.
4. This emerges positively in Jesus' statement that the Father is greater than all (Jn 10:29); it emerges negatively in his reply to Pilate that the authority of the latter is given him from above (Jn 19:11). In addition, account is to be taken of the fact that Jesus' disciples are given him by the power of the Father (Jn 3:27; 6:37-39,65; 10:29; 17:6,9, 11,24; 18:9), and that Jesus' own authority stems from the Father (Jn 3:35; 5:22,27; 13:3; 17:2). Jesus' mighty works are given him by the Father (Jn 5:36; 17:4).
5. Jn 1:3; i.e., apparently, the power of God working through the Son brought everything into being.
6. Again, although this is the work of the Son (Jn 12:31-32; 14:30-31; 16:11; IJn 3:8), it is to be remembered that the Father works through the Son and gives him his authority (Jn 17:2).

seems to reach out toward his human creatures who have chosen to become followers of the devil, and thus in Christ he moves to redeem the world. He sends the Son into the world, and then "draws" men to him.[1] His purpose appears to be the salvation of all.[2]

In fact, the initiative of God is so strongly stressed that Jn approaches a predestinarianism which has sometimes been interpreted as sheer determinism, excluding human initiative. And admittedly, Jn does share predestinarian elements with Pl;[3] as Barrett says,[4]

> John does not employ Paul's predestinarian language, but that very vigour with which he thrusts the person of Christ back into eternity carries back also into the infinite depths of the divine mind the redemption of the Church.

But at the same time, Jn preserves with Pl an emphasis on human responsibility and freedom. He does not intend to suggest that God causes man to choose something contrary to the will of God. This is the point at which human initiative enters the picture, for although we do find the implication that the righteous must be righteous, and the filthy must be filthy still, yet as Barrett points out,[5]

> This language is crossed by the belief that Jesus took away the sin of the world, and that none who come to him will be rejected by Christ (6:37). This tension of predestination and choice is of course not peculiar to John but is characteristic of New Testament theology as a whole....

To quote Barrett yet again, "It should be noted that in some sense men 'predestinate' themselves by their confidence, or lack of confidence, in their own spiritual vision."[6] All of this has the effect of modifying

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1. The expression is found at Jn 6:44 and 12:32.
2. Bultmann says (Theology II, 23), "Inasmuch as the assertion that no one can come to Jesus whom the Father does not 'draw' (6:44) is followed by the statement, 'Every one who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me,' the πᾶς by itself ('every one') indicates that everyone has the possibility of letting himself be drawn by the Father (and also the possibility of resisting)."
3. Cf. above, 174ff.
4. John, 81.
5. Ibid., 68. Barrett continues on the same page, "Judgment is the obverse of salvation; it is the form salvation takes for men who will have none of it."
6. Ibid., 303; this in comment on Jn 9 and the story of the man born blind. Cf. Westcott's comment on Jn 9:39 (John II,45, "Those on the other

Jn's determinism, and indicates that his intention was not far from what we have described as the Pauline position.

But, as we have noted above, this initiative of God has a twofold effect. Not only are men set free to choose for God, and some thus saved, but by an inevitable reflex action those who refuse salvation are cast into deeper sin.[1] God's purpose is salvation, but an inevitable concomitant of the process of salvation is judgment.[2] To this extent, the Gospel

hand who had knowledge of the Old Covenant, who were so far 'wise and understanding,' and rested in what they knew, by this very wisdom became incapable of further progress and unable to retain what they had."

1. Cf. above, 226, fn. 2 and 3. This double effect of the appearance of Christ in the world runs throughout the Gospel, and is variously expressed. Positively speaking, the light enlightens every man in the world (1:9); Jesus appears to take away the sin of the world (1:29); similarly, we have God's love and his purpose for saving the world expressed in terms of "whosoever" (3:14-18). But what makes universalistic doctrine doubtful in Jn is such remarks as that to all who received him, power for salvation was given (1:12); that judgment as well as grace is involved in men's reaction to the light (3:19-20); that the Father's will is that Jesus should lose none of those given him (6:39; cf. 6:44,65; 10:29); that the Father blinds the eyes of unbelievers (12:40 - the quotation differs from the LXX and the MT alike, and seems to be altered purposefully, as suggested by Bultmann, Evangelium, 347, fn. 2); that the initiative in choice has not been from the disciples, but from Jesus (15:16,19). The peculiar difficulty of interpreting Jn appears perhaps most sharply in the case of Judas: Jesus has chosen the twelve, exercising the choice-prerogative of God, one which elsewhere seems decisive for the salvation of the one chosen; yet one of them is a devil (6:70)! But at 13:18, it would appear that Judas was not one of the chosen after all. Again, at 17:12, Judas appears to have been really one of those given Jesus by the Father, and nevertheless among the lost. Barrett says, "The only meaning John will allow to apostleship is a strictly theological meaning. If the apostle ceases to be in as completely obedient a subjection to Jesus as Jesus was to the Father, if his own personality rather than the Spirit of God assumes dominance, he at once forfeits his position and, like Judas, goes out into the night." (John, 80).

It seems to me that this oscillation between God's choice and non-choice probably reflects Jn's belief in the freedom of man vis-a-vis God, and that Jn may be suggesting that God indeed chooses to save all, but chooses in turn not to choose those who do not choose to receive the salvation he offers. Man seems to succeed in refusing God's proffered salvation, on evidence of the resurrection to judgment rather than life (5:29) or of the statement that those who do not believe die in their sins (8:24).

2. Here again, Jn both does and does not attribute judgment to the Father and the Son; the difference seems to be between intention and effect. Inasmuch as God's purpose is to save, Jesus is not sent to judge (3:17; 12:47), and himself judges no one (8:15); it is his word, rather

brings wrath, as a necessary corollary of salvation.

For in Jn, God's power, while completely sufficient, is not so exercised as to compel men to come into the Kingdom of God. The "drawing" can be resisted. This is human freedom, and human responsibility.

So Jn teaches that God cannot be regarded as the source of sin, and that despite the worsened plight of the unrepentant after salvation has appeared, God's purpose, like his creation, is all good.

On the other hand, if God is all good, the devil is all evil. He has been so from the beginning,[1] and continues so until his final overthrow, which is proleptically accomplished in the work of Jesus[2] and which awaits confirmation at the end of the Age.[3]

From the beginning, and continuing even into the Christian era, the devil appears to rule the world.[4] But we catch hints now and again that this apparent dominion of Satan may not be all that it claims. It is real enough from where the "worldly" man sits. Yet the Christian knows a power greater by far, the power of God.[5] The control over the world attributed to the devil does not really call in question God's control of the κόσμος;[6] the devil's claim to it is the claim of one who

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than Jesus himself, that judges (12:48). But on the other hand, man who does not believe is judged already (3:18-19); all judgment is committed to the Son (5:22,27), who has many things to judge (8:26), and whose judgment is right and true (5:30; 8:16).

1. Cf. above, 232, fn. 3.
2. The devil is judged when Jesus is "lifted up" (Jn 12:31-32), and though the whole world is still under his control (IJn 5:19) this is for Jn quite obviously evanescent, for faith conquers the world (IJn 5:4), the young men have overcome the evil one (IJn 2:13,14), and he who is in the Christian is greater than he who is in the world (IJn 4:4).
3. Jn does not have much to say about the end of the age, but his references to the return of Christ (Jn 14:3,18; 21:22; IJn 3:2) would lead us to expect that for him as for the remainder of the NT the final overthrow of the devil would enter into his purpose in returning.
4. Jn 12:31; 16:11; IJn 5:19.
5. Cf. above, fn. 2.
6. Stauffer (Theology, 67) has summed up the position for primitive Christianity in a way that applies here: "Satan's fall from heaven is the sign that God retains the upper hand, however powerful and crafty his creatures may be. In the meantime God does not destroy the adversary,

is known by all as a liar from the beginning, and the father of lies.[1] We must not minimize the power of the devil in the teaching of Jn; it is surely great enough, probably the greatest concession of power that we find in the entire NT. But at the same time, God remains in secure control, and when man decides for God rather than the devil, the hollowness of the devil's claim to dominion over the world is exposed.[2]

The devil's control over the world is really of a piece with his control over humanity. As Manson indicates,[3] Jn's interest in the κόσμος is not so much cosmological as human. The κόσμος is primarily the world of men;[4] it is within this human sphere that Satan has his seat of power. As the ruler of men, the devil is called their "father;"[5] he is at liberty to "enter" them, or to put thoughts into their hearts;[6] men are

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or thrust him out of creation into the void beyond, but assigns him to his place in the divine ordering of the world and appoints him to that office which he intended for him in his predestined plan for history. ....God has even anticipated the demonic opposition of the adversary and the determined seductiveness of the tempter, and has systematically integrated it into his own world order (Rev 2:10; 13:5ff). So really the devil is the power in God's world who always wills evil and yet always effects good."

1. Jn 8:44.
2. The unreality and nothingness of the devil's position, as viewed from God's side, is clear: "Now if truth is the reality of God as the only true reality, then the lie which denies this reality is not merely a false assertion. Rather, the 'liar' withdraws from reality and falls into the unreal, death. For if God is the sole reality, then life is simply openness to God and to him who makes God manifest.... In turning its back to the 'truth,' the world simultaneously turns away from 'life' and thereby turns itself into a specious reality, which, being a lie, is simultaneously death. This specious reality is the Nothing which professes to be something, and which cheats of his life him who takes it for truth; it is a murderer (8:44)." (Bultmann, Theology II, 19-20). For Bultmann, the devil as a murderer is such because he leads to no-life, i.e., death; likewise, Jn's enemies and the enemies of the Gospel are really the enemies of Jesus and ζωή; cf. Evangelium, 243.
3. Cf. above, 229, fn. 5.
4. This is confirmed by a glance through Arndt and Gingrich, Lexicon, 446-447. By far the majority of Jn's references to the κόσμος involve the human inhabitants of the world in the picture. It is not over the world as a planet, the world as mineral, that Satan has his control. Rather, his control is over a κόσμος which Jn typically regards as being made up of men.
5. Jn 8:44; IJn 3:10.
6. Jn 13:2,27.

said to be "of" him;[1] they relate themselves to him by following his behavior;[2] Judas may even be directly called "a devil."[3]

The question then becomes, How did the devil gain the control, or the apparent control, which he exercises over man and the world? Jn's reticence on the subject of what happened in "the beginning" makes it impossible to answer this question with certainty. Jn simply represents this dominion as continuing from the beginning;[4] but there was clearly a time before the beginning as well.[5] It seems clear that the devil controls the world because he controls mankind. This argument is supported with particular force by the means of the devil's overthrow: Jesus the man appeared to destroy the works of the devil,[6] and the decision of man (aided by the power of God) similarly defeats the evil one.[7] Man had a proper place at the head of creation, according to much thought contemporary with Jn;[8] it is not improbable that Jn might have answered this question much as Pl did the question about the power of sin,[9] in terms of the devil's usurpation of man's divinely appointed prerogatives, gaining real powers that were not originally the devil's own. But Jn's silence must be respected, and this suggestion must be regarded as at most tentative.

The company of demons in the Synoptic Gospels has practically nothing in common with the demons of the Fourth Gospel. In Jn, exorcism plays no part in Jesus' ministry. The only mention of demons is in connection with the charge that Jesus is insane;[10] the charge reminds us irresist-

1. IJn 3:8,12; cf. 5:19; Jesus says that the prince of this world "ἐν ἐμοὶ οὐκ ἔχει οὐδέν," Jn 14:30.
2. Jn 8:41,44; IJn 3:8,12.
3. Jn 6:70. This is of course reminiscent of the similar designation of Peter as Satan; cf. above, 148-149.
4. Cf. above, 232, fn. 2 and 3.
5. Jn 1:1; 17:24.
6. IJn 3:8.
7. IJn 2:13,14; cf. 5:4,18.
8. Cf. Scroggs, Adam, 21ff.
9. Cf. above, 224.
10. Jn 7:20; 8:48-49,52; 10:21. Bultmann believes that Jn 7:20

ably of the similar charge levelled against Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels, in a rather different context.[1] But in Jn there is no connection between this supposed insanity of Jesus and the exorcism of other demons by his own indwelling demon. Not that Jn did not believe in demons; rather, the meaning they had for him was not well adapted to use in expressing what he had to say.[2]

The Johannine epistles also mention Antichrist, and antichrists.[3] This is a rather obscure term, not in its general import, but in its specific application; Bultmann applies it quite confidently to the Gnostic heretics, while Stauffer confidently identifies it with an earthly power-structure of unparalleled might.[4] This term need not detain us long, except to note that Antichrist is definitely a human individual or institution, opposed to Christ and doing the work of the devil. Part of his guile is his imitation of the real Christ and of the ways of the Church.[5]

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was meant simply as, "he's crazy." "Du bist verrückt." (Evangelium, 209, fn. 1). But in 8:48 (ibid., 225, fn. 7) and 10:20-21 (ibid., 272, fn. 5) it is more strictly implied that Jesus is possessed by a demon. Bultmann (ibid., 225, fn. 7) bids us consider the difference from the Synoptic tradition here, for Jesus' mighty works are not attributed to an indwelling demon.

1. Cf. above, 145-146.

2. "St John, who records no exorcisms in his Gospel, nevertheless makes the point in his own way: 'The prince of this world hath been judged' (Jn 16:11; cf. 16:33)." (Richardson, Theology, 209). R continues (loc. cit.) in a footnote, "St John, of course, takes demon-possession at least as seriously as the Synoptists." This seems to me more probable than Bultmann's implication (Theology II, 17) that the devil and demons are not for Jn realities "in the mythical sense."

3. IJn 2:18,22; 4:3; IIJn 7.

4. Bultmann, Theology I, 171. Stauffer, Theology, 213ff. Stauffer links Antichrist with the mystery of lawlessness (IIThes 2:7,9) and the world-powers predicted in Dan 7:23; 8:5ff, and Rev 13. Cf. Westcott's note (Epistles of John, 92-93) on Antichrist, giving references in the OT and NT, Irenaeus, Origen and Tertullian. On the whole subject, cf. Bousset, Antichrist.

5. He has been associated with the Church, to all appearances, before going out from it (IJn 2:18ff); he is a deceiver, and the test of believing in Jesus' real humanity must be applied to distinguish him from genuine Christians (IIJn 7).

He would not seem to be the origin of evil, since he has quite recently appeared on the scene;[1] rather, he is part of humanity caught up in the sin which has continued since the beginning, whatever that beginning in sin may have been.

And so in Jn, we have two kingdoms: the kingdom of the world, over which the devil is the ἄρχων, and the kingdom of God. The two figures, God and the devil, sum up and epitomize everything that could be said about good and evil. The choice between the two leaders is the knife-edge that separates between man and man. And although both God and the devil seek to influence man's decision, the decision itself seems by all indications to be for Jn a choice freely made, and one for which man is fully responsible.

This brings us once again to the place of man in the "creation" of evil. More clearly than in any of the other NT writings, Jn attributes to the devil a role in bringing human sin to birth. The devil's connection with ἁμαρτία is made explicit by the statement that not only man, but the devil as well, is a sinner. But still, the power of the devil is limited and controlled by God, and man is left free to choose for himself whom he will serve.

There is a certain artificiality about the form this choice takes. As we have already seen, Jn does not stress particular decisions, but rather sums up all decisions in one Decision. But as to the practical reality that lies behind this rather stylized Choice, Jn leaves us in no doubt. The decision to follow God leads on to Life, Reality, Peace, Light, the true Way, and so forth, down the whole catalogue of terms that Jn employs to epitomize the everyday life and work of a Christian. The decision to follow the devil, on the other hand, produces the very opposite, and sinks man ever deeper in Death, Unreality, Darkness, and so forth, the world of illusion which is summed up in the term κόσμος,

1. IJn 4:3.

over which the devil exercises his control of the moment, and which is soon to pass away: the everyday life, in other words, of practising ἁμαρτία. The choice to follow God delivers from sin; the choice to follow the devil confirms the sin in which man already finds himself, and actually increases its burden.

So for Jn, man is, once again, heavily burdened with responsibility for sin. Satan is given a larger, or perhaps a more prominent place, in leading man toward sin; nevertheless, as in the rest of the NT, sin is, ultimately speaking, a matter of man's own choice. It is man who chooses to bring moral evil into being.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The remaining books of the NT do not display the same preoccupation with sin and its roots that we have found particularly in Jn and Pl, but in less systematic form in the Synoptic Gospels as well. The authors of the lesser NT books were well aware of the fact of evil in the world, but what they said about this evil does not lead us far down the road toward understanding the "whence" of the problem of sin.

The Letter to the Hebrews has a good deal to say about ἁμαρτία; this is the subject of an enlightening note in Westcott's commentary.[1] It appears that sin in Heb must be regarded from two different angles, both closely aligned with the OT tradition. First we have a generalized reference to sin that accords well with Pl's thought on sin as a "power;"[2] thus, deceitfulness is an attribute of sin,[3] or sin becomes something which clings to the Christian,[4] or against which he struggles,[5] or which Jesus appears to "put away."[6] This rather abstracted reference to ἁμαρτία is the backdrop against which appear "sins," individual transgressions which are also a part of the problem of sin.[7] When the matter under discussion is individual sins, the author almost invariably speaks of them in terms of forgiving them by an offering, thus cleansing the sinner. This is reminiscent of the OT view of sin as pollution.[8] However, there

1. Westcott, Hebrews, 31-32. W distinguishes between two general usages of ἁμαρτία as "sin," on the one hand, and "sins" on the other, sin as a "power" compared with individual sinful acts. He thinks that there is reference to the devil as having tempted Adam and Eve at the beginning in the reference (Heb 2:14) to him as possessing the power of death.
2. Cf. above, 171-172.
3. Heb 3:13.
4. Heb 12:1.
5. Heb 12:4.
6. Heb 9:26. Here, says Westcott (op. cit., 276), the use of the singular "brings out this general, abstract conception."
7. Heb 1:3; 2:17; 5:1; 7:27; 8:12; 9:28; 10:4,11,12,26.
8. Cf. above, 2. Robinson (Hebrews, 129) observes the necessity of keeping Heb's orientation towards the Covenant in mind as we read him on the subject of sin: "Atonement, in Israel, meant not simply the propitiation of an angry Deity, but the renewal of the ideal relationship implied and involved in the Covenant. If the people as a whole sinned,

is a deeper thought on sin indicated by the generalized reference to sin as a "power;" as Westcott says,[1]

> There is no direct statement in the Epistle as to the origin of sin or the universal sinfulness of men. It is however implied that all men are sinners....Sin then is treated as universal, and men are held justly responsible for its consequences.

As to what connection there may be between this generalized sin, this power for wickedness, and the individual sins which man commits, Heb simply does not enlighten us, except by indirection. But there are two general assumptions which may be of help. First, the union of the worshiper with Christ his priest suggests that for Heb sin and its forgiveness are bound up in obedient following and worshiping of one leader rather than another, after the fashion of Pauline union with Christ, rather differently expressed. The whole of Israel was bound up in their priest who offered atonement for their sins;[2] likewise, the whole family of God is bound together in the sacrifice offered by Jesus.[3] The union of priest and people for Israel is a bond of common (sinful) humanity;[4] likewise the bond between Jesus and his worshipers is a bond of flesh,[5] but a bond in which sinfulness does not inhere in the flesh of the priest.[6]

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there must be a general renewal. If an individual sinned, he remained outside the scope of the Covenant....We shall not properly understand some of the writer's references unless we keep this general fact in view." The whole of Heb's thought on sin is very directly related to the OT.

1. Hebrews, 31.
2. Robinson, Hebrews, 56: "As he faces God he carries the whole people with him, bearing, in a sense, their burden of spiritual impurity, making due confession, and performing that ritual which, if carried through in accordance with the expressed will of God, will secure the restoration of His favour."
3. Cf. the many passages in which the solidarity of Jesus in his experiences with the contemporary experiences of the Church is stressed: e.g., 2:18; 4:15; 5:7-8; 12:3; 13:12-13. It was quite essential for Heb that Jesus really suffer in order to be able to sympathize with his human followers, and to be their priest, their true representative.
4. Cf. esp. Heb 5:1-3. The same general thought is assumed throughout as the basis of the relationship between priest and people; they participate in the same humanity, therefore one can represent the other; cf. esp. with reference to Jesus, 2:17.
5. Heb 5:7; 10:20.
6. Heb 5:3; 7:27; the death which cut short the office of earthly priests (7:23) no doubt had something to do with sin and its effect. By contrast, Jesus is sinless (7:26-27), and his priesthood continues for ever, like Melchizedek (7:3; cf. 7:15-16).

σάρξ for Heb is not a term of reproach, though it is viewed as the sign of human weakness (even in Jesus), and may lead on to sin apart from the help of God.[1]

Second, the associations that cluster around the word "covenant" as it appears in Heb remind us of OT assumptions regarding the covenant between God and man and the part of man in upholding his end of the bargain.[2] The failure of OT man was in breaking the covenant (which did not even go back to the beginning of humanity, having been given in response to sin already in existence).[3] Hence, following the suggestion of Jeremiah, a new covenant is to be given, and appears in Christ.[4] There is also the possibility of breaking the new covenant - grace is not irresistable - and so Christians, although greatly blessed by the gift of the new covenant, are actually in a worse position than they previously were, if they permit themselves to fall back into sin.[5] This sets human responsibility in bold relief, for God's opportunity seems to knock but once. If a Christian turns back and breaks the new covenant, there is no opportunity for salvation for him any more than there was for Israel who broke the old covenant. It is man's choice that determines

1. Cf. the use of the word at 5:7; 9:10; 10:20; 12:9.
2. Cf. above, 6.
3. Heb 8:9; 9:15. The weakness of the old covenant, for Heb, is at least partly in the assumption made under it that sin would be a continuing thing (cf., e.g., 7:27-28; 9:6-10,25; 10:1-4,11). But by contrast, the new covenant assumes that sin will not continue, but will be utterly and completely forgiven - all past sins, that is to say (9:12,26; 10:14, 18).
4. Heb 8:8ff; 10:16-17; cf. Jer 31:31-34. The stress in Heb is on the better character of the new covenant (7:22), enacted on better promises (8:6), offering a more perfect redemption (9:15; 10:1), a more adequate sacrifice (9:12,14,23,26; 10:10,12,14), and an eternal solution to the problem of sin (10:12; 13:20).
5. Heb 6:4-8; 10:26-31; 12:17. This means (Davies, Hebrews, 58) that "if a Christian falls away he cannot start the Christian life again." The thought is really something like Pl's on the effect of the Law as increasing responsibility for one who sins, and of Jn's on the effect of Christ's coming as amplifying the guilt of those who refuse him. The

last end. The deep culpability of Christians who put their Lord to open shame by sinning after their conversion argues that all men are similarly, if to a lesser degree, responsible for the sins which they commit.

Nothing is said directly about God's power and human sin under that power which would suggest that God is thought to have caused the sin of man. Presumably, in light of his strong emphasis on human responsibility, Heb would deny emphatically that God can be regarded as responsible for evil.

The devil enters the discussion once, as the one who holds the power of death.[1] This is bound to suggest the OT connection between death and the sin for which it is a punishment;[2] it suggests more directly, however, the idea of Satan as the angel of death which circulated in Jewish circles of the time and was probably known to Heb.[3] At any rate, no causative connection is drawn in the material before us, and the exact relationship between the devil and sin must remain a matter for speculation, though it seems reasonable to expect that for Heb there would have been some kind of connection.

Heb has an interesting use of the word πειρασμός; it differs from the Matthean usage in referring a good deal less consistently to a leading toward sin,[4] and becomes instead a simple testing by one of another, a testing that may originate with man or with God,[5] but is never actually attributed to the devil. But temptation is a necessary part of human

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denial of a second opportunity for repentance is, in its effect, similar to Jn's teaching about a sin which is unforgivable.

1. Heb 2:14. 2. Cf. above, 22.
3. Cf. Heb 11:28, where Dibelius (Geisterwelt, 44-45) sees with considerable probability the figure of Satan behind the reference to the destroyer of the firstborn.
4. Cf. above, 139.
5. It originates with man at 3:8-9; apparently it originates with God at 11:17. On the latter, cf. Westcott, Hebrews, 365; Purdy, in IB XI, 728.

life, and apparently this is particularly true for the saints.[1] πειρασμός creates the opportunity for sin. When man seizes his sinful opportunity, one that may even stem from God, he then falls into real sin, but a sin which is his own responsibility and which cannot be blamed on the one who afforded him the opportunity. This viewpoint corresponds to that of James, next to be discussed.

A further difference, both from Pl and from Jas, is evident in Heb's handling of νόμος. Unlike Pl,[2] Heb plays down the Law as a power; rather, he stresses its weakness and inadequacy.[3] The law does not produce sin; rather, it is revealed as incapable of rescuing from sin.[4] The crux of the matter for Heb seems to be the sinfulness of those who administer the sacrificial system,[5] and the irrelevance of the animal sacrifices which are offered by the ministering priests.[6] But in point of fact, Heb and Pl are not making connections at all on the subject of the Law; for Pl, the Law is a code which demands an ethical standard too high for sinful man to maintain, but for Heb, the Law is a system of worship and sacrifice which is inadequate for the forgiveness of sins. The two authors use the word from completely different standpoints, and for a completely different purpose. For Jas, as we shall see below, the Law is still a respected institution, by contrast with its inferior position in the scheme of Heb.

But as far as determining an origin of evil in Heb, material for

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1. Heb 4:15, "as we are;" note also that Abraham too was tempted (11:17), as well as the many for the mention of whose names time fails (11:37 - the textual evidence at this point is confusing).
2. Cf. above, 203ff.
3. Heb 7:12,16,19,28; in 8:10, this would seem very evidently to Heb (and to Jeremiah) to be a better kind of law to have, one written on the heart; 10:1, the Law has only a "shadow" of the coming good; 10:8. This, of course, echoes one strain of Pl's thought; cf. above, 204, fn. 3.
4. Heb 7:18-19, the Law set aside as useless because it makes nothing perfect; 9:9, the sacrifices of the old covenant cannot make the conscience perfect; 10:1-2, the continual offerings leave the worshipers with the consciousness of sin.
5. Heb 5:2; 7:9-10,11-12,21,23,27-28; 9:7.
6. Heb 9:9-10,12-13,23; 10:1-4,5-6(Ps 40:6-8),8-9,11.

a conclusion is simply not forthcoming. It can only be remarked that the responsibility of man is strongly taught, and that the place of the devil is not a large one.

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James does touch upon the problem of evil, and does so in such a way as to reveal his thoroughly Jewish cast of thought.

Jas is able to speak of evil as such, and for this he uses the word κακός.[1] Likewise, Jas knows and uses the word πονηρός.[2] But both of these words, which in other authors might be taken to signify sin as an independent entity, are for Jas bound to sinful action by their contexts, which relate directly to sinful behavior. More typically, Jas speaks of ἁμαρτία,[3] and twice of the ἁμαρτωλός.[4] But again, unlike Pl's most characteristic use of the word, i.e., as an independent power, Jas' employment of it is directly bound by context to sinful behavior.

The explanation for the rise of sin given in Jas is a direct outgrowth of the Jewish doctrine of the evil yetzer.[5] We are told of how first of all the opportunity of sinning makes its appearance;[6] next, ἐπιθυμία, rising from within, lays hold upon the opportunity and considers it;[7] next, practical action which is ἁμαρτία ensues; finally, the

1. Jas 1:13, God cannot be tempted by evil; 3:8, the tongue is a restless evil. Cf. also κακία, 1:21, a superabundance of wickedness.
2. Jas 2:4, judges with evil thoughts; 4:16, such boasting is evil.
3. Jas 1:15; 2:9; 4:17; 5:14-16,20.
4. Jas 4:8; 5:20.
5. Jas 1:13-15. As Easton says (IDB XII, 27), "Here there may or may not be a polemic against a common Jewish teaching that God implants in every man two 'impulses,' one good and the other evil; however that may be, the author, writing as a practical moralist, is unconcerned with the ultimate origin of evil or the part it may play in God's larger plan." On the doctrine in rabbinic writings, cf. above, 70ff; in the A&P, cf. above, 107ff. Whether or not Easton is correct in suggesting polemic against the idea, the phrasing and terminology is certainly that of the Rabbis.
6. 1:13a; there is nothing said directly about the external source of this temptation, except that it is not from God. On this basis, it would seem that for Jas almost any external circumstance could become the occasion of temptation, provided it was met by upsurging desire from within.
7. 1:14-15. This term appears with disproportionate frequence in the General and Pastoral epistles. It is in Jas only at 1:14-15, but as used

punishment for sin, i.e., death, brings an end to the cycle.[1] This is of course in harmony with the teaching of Jesus on the origins of sin as given in the Synoptic Gospels,[2] as well as with some elements of contemporary Rabbinic thought.[3] It would seem to imply that the origins of sin are from within man; indeed, it comes as close as anything in the NT to teaching this directly. But Jas does not personify ἐπιθυμία in such a way as to suggest an independent spirit along the lines of the evil yetzer, so as to raise the question of who created the desire from within. And from his doctrine of God's goodness, it seems quite impossible that God should be regarded by Jas as the origin or creator of anything evil.

Jas also has a term unique to the NT, occurring elsewhere only in later literature,[4] in the word δίψυχος.[5] It would seem to be a perfect term to describe the man who is torn between the good and the evil yetzer; yet Jas does not employ it in quite that fashion, giving its distinctive coloration the cast of doubt rather than of potential sinfulness.[6] Yet, when the term is used for the second time, it is evident that sin is not far from the double-minded man,[7] and the larger context even of the first occurrence of the word seems to carry with it the implication that for Jas

here it recalls the doctrine of the TestXIIPat; cf. above, 109-110. As Ropes comments (James, 156), the word can be applied to any desire, but here is used in a sense that suggests sin to follow; Stoic usage, in which desire was one of the vices, may clarify the sense in which contemporaries might understand the verse (cf. Easton, IDB XII, 27-28).

1. 1:15b.
2. Cf. above, 163.
3. Cf. above, 71.
4. For the references in Patristic writings and a Philonic fragment (evidently an addition to the text) cf. Arndt and Gingrich, Lexicon, 200; Sidebottom, James, 12.
5. Jas 1:8; 4:8.
6. Jas 1:8. The word literally means "two-souled," and as such calls to mind the dictum of Kierkegaard, that purity of heart is to will one thing. Jas uses it of doubt or uncertainty here; cf. Moffatt, General Epistles, 12-13. It does not seem, or perhaps not yet seem, to be a matter of sin.
7. Jas 4:8.

sin is closely associated with double-mindedness. This reminds one of the Two Ways form of teaching about the origin of sin;[1] it would seem entirely possible that the word itself could be original with the author of Jas.[2]

Jas would find it quite impossible to trace the origin of sin to the Law, or indeed to find a close connection between one and the other, after the fashion of Pl. Nor does he speak of the Law as weak or passing away, as does Heb. Rather, the Law is a respected institution, to be honored and obeyed.[3] But at the same time, Jas may possibly imply a correction of the Law from the Christian standpoint in his references to the Law of "liberty,"[4] or the "royal" law.[5] As has been pointed out, these are expressions which could be used by an orthodox Jew,[6] but as used by Jas they might imply something like the Matthean thought of Jesus as a new law-giver. However, the difference between Jas, Heb and Pl in the use of the term makes comparisons among them quite risky, since each of them referred to the law with such disparate meanings in mind.

Jas has an important teaching on the origin of temptation, as well.

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1. Cf. above, 107ff. Sidebottom (James, 29) cites Tanh. 23b: "If you ask before God you must not have two hearts, one for God and one for something else."
2. This despite Ropes' statement to the contrary (James, 143). The word is quite a natural vehicle for expressing the thought in the mind of the author, and Ropes is able to show numerous compounds that approach the same construction.
3. Jas 1:25; 2:8-12; 4:11.
4. Jas 1:25; 2:12.
5. Jas 2:8.
6. Cf. Sidebottom, op. cit., 36; Ropes, op. cit., 177, says, "The epithet is not in distinction from some other, imperfect, law, but means simply (Spitta) such a law that a better one is inconceivable...." But that this must be more than simply the Mosaic law, cf. Easton, IDB XII, 32-33, who feels that it is impossible to determine precisely how the law is to be defined here. He thinks it unlikely that there is an implicit contrast between Jewish and Christian law; however, the fact that Easton considers the precepts of Jesus to be a part of what is included in the law as used here certainly would distinguish this usage from what would be in the mind of the Jewish reader. On the Law as liberty in Qumran, cf. above, 204, fn. 3.

More specifically than anywhere else in the NT, Jas teaches that can by no means originate with God.[1] But there is evidently a double meaning of the word as employed in the first chapter of Jas: one would hardly rejoice in something that was contrary to God's will. The RSV is correct in distinguishing between "trials"[2] and "temptations,"[3] for while the former seem to be disciplinary and upbuilding experiences, the latter seem to be solicitations to sin.[4] In this respect, Jas is like Heb, where the meaning of πειρασμός shifts with circumstances and is less narrowly defined than in Mt. For Jas, the goodness and power of God is beyond question;[5] πειρασμός as a solicitation to sin could not stem from God without diminishing the luster of his glory. Yet, conceived as discipline, that glory was enhanced by the faithfulness of Christians in bearing πειρασμός which God was pleased to lay upon them. Πειρασμός as a leading to sin could and should be resisted, to the glory of God;[6] πειρασμός as discipline should be gladly borne, likewise to God's glory.[7]

Mention should also be made of Jas' use of κόσμος in a Johannine-Pauline fashion, to epitomize evil. He writes, "friendship with the world is enmity with God."[8]

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1. Jas 1:12-14.
2. Jas 1:2,12.
3. Jas 1:13,14.
4. Cf. Easton, IDB XII, 27; Ropes, James, 153.
5. Jas 1:5,13,17,20. Cf. Sidebottom, James, 30-31; Moffatt, James, 19, who says, "James does not enter into the question, debated in contemporary rabbinic circles, as to how the evil desire or impulse in man arose, and how it could be connected with the creation of man in the likeness of God. As a practical religious teacher he is content to urge that temptations rise in our own nature, and that man, not God, is to blame for the presence of evil desire, sin, and death in the universe."
6. This would seem to be implied in the statement that the devil, when resisted, flees; cf. 4:7.
7. Jas 1:2,12.
8. Jas 4:4; cf. 1:27. The term is used in the ordinary, i.e., non-theological sense, in 2:5 and 3:6, though the latter usage may carry unwholesome implications.

Jas has a picturesque reference to demons; they are said to shudder because of what they believe about God.[1] The graphic character of the expression derives from the fact that demons, or some varieties of demons, were thought to be bristly, and the verb φρίσσειν can mean "to bristle" as well as to shudder.[2] Nothing is said about a relationship between these demons and sinning; the implication of the passage would seem to be that demons are unlikely to be saved or redeemed. Later, in a word which appears in this particular form only in Jas, mention is made of a wisdom that is demonic in origin;[3] we are reminded of the activities of the demons in teaching men the arts of magic and craftsmanship in the Enoch literature.[4] But the context, referring to ambition and self-seeking, leads more directly to some Rabbinic sayings about the evil yetzer.[5] Regarding the devil, Jas says simply that if resisted, the devil will flee.[6] Neither the devil nor the demons seem to be for Jas the kind of beings who could originate sin. Rather, Jas teaches quite explicitly that sin begins in the human soul, and much as the devil may be pleased by this, and may try to cause it to come about, he is still completely dependent on the consent of the man whom he seeks to corrupt, and when resisted must flee.

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The Letters of Peter and Jude are small in compass and not particularly weighty in thought, but they do contain some passages that deserve

1. Jas 2:19.
2. Cf. above, 16, fn. 4; also Langton, Essentials, 109, who adds, "The modern reader is inclined to regard such an expression as being merely a picturesque phrase, which never had any literal meaning even for those who first made use of it. There is, however, plentiful evidence available to the student of demonology which proves that among pagans, Jews, and Christians of earlier times demons were physically conceived, and were regarded as being capable both of inspiring terror and of being terrified and put to flight."
3. δαιμονιώδης, Jas 3:15.
4. IEn 8:1-4.
5. Cf. above, 71, fn. 7.
6. Jas 4:7.

mention. For one thing, there is in these letters a tendency to blame sin on ἐπιθυμία;[1] considering the size of the letters, the word is used with noteworthy frequency, and coupled with the disparaging references to the flesh[2] and to the world,[3] suggest that here might be material for constructing a theory as to the origin of evil. Ἁμαρτία is not a preoccupation, but it comes in for mention,[4] often in terms of its forgiveness. The noun πειρασμός also appears,[5] though there is ambiguity as to its source, and there is no suggestion that the Christian, with the help of God, need succumb to it; nor, indeed, is it clear that this is any more than a testing, or that the Christian might be led to sin by it.

Demonology in these three small letters appears to be taken over from apocryphal literature, in particular in the case of Jude and IIPet.[6]

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1. IPet 1:14; 2:11; 4:2; IIPet 1:4; 2:10,18; 3:3; Jude 16,18.
2. In IPet, σάρξ is generally used in the OT sense, without moralistic prejudice (1:24; 3:18,21; 4:1,6), but in connection with ἐπιθυμία it becomes something evil (4:2). In IIPet 2:10,18, as in Jude 7,8,23, the flesh is the object of revulsion and hatred; once again, it may be linked with ἐπιθυμία. Cf. also σαρκικός, IPet 2:11.
3. The word κόσμος is used without prejudice in IPet, but in IIPet 1:4; 2:5,20, it appears to be an evil thing. This meaning would not be hard to read into another occurrence of the word at IIPet 3:6 as well, since there the world is the object of God's wrath.
4. IPet 2:22, Jesus committed no sin; 2:24, he died bearing our sins, so that we too might die to sin; he died for sins once for all (3:18); and we are told (4:1) that whoever has suffered in the flesh has ceased from sin. IIPet mentions those who have forgotten being cleansed from their old sins (1:9), and those who are insatiable for sin (2:14).
   The verb ἁμαρτάνειν also appears at IPet 2:20, with reference to human sins, and at IIPet 2:4, with reference to the sins of angels.
   The sinner (ἁμαρτωλός) is mentioned at IPet 4:18.
5. IPet 1:6; 4:12; IIPet 2:9.
6. For the relationship between IIPet and Jude, cf. Leaney, Letters of Peter and Jude, 77-80; Sidebottom, James, Jude and 2 Peter, 72-73. For the relationship between the two works and the AssMos, cf. Leaney, op. cit., 90-91; Sidebottom, op. cit., 88. The devil, who appears in Jude 9 and is omitted in the parallel in IIPet, appears in conflict with Michael over the body of Moses. Here the devil seems to have made a claim to dominion over the physical world that went beyond the facts, which recalls his similar false claim to dominion over the world in the Adam and Eve literature; cf. above, 153, and Sidebottom, loc. cit.
   In IPet 5:8, the devil, as a roaring lion, prowls about seeking someone to devour. But when resisted, with the help of God, his attack can be borne. Here again his attack does not seem to solicit to sin, but rather seems to be an imposition of suffering which the Christian must bear. The

The devil is mentioned, but does not bear an important role in the work of temptation, from any evidence before us; he is mentioned as opposing and resisting God, and likewise the Christian. There is no mention of δαιμόνια, but other demonic beings, perhaps in the passage about the spirits in prison,[1] and certainly in the mention of the angels chained in darkness,[2] come into view. There is also mention of the subjection of angels, authorities and powers under the exalted Christ, who is seated at the right hand of God.[3]

There seems to be no basis in these letters on which we can confidently assign responsibility for sin, whether to God, to the demons or to man. The best basis for claiming human culpability would be the frequent reference to ἐπιθυμία, which after all is a human affair, and which does appear to lead on to sin.

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The book of Revelation, as compared with most of the rest of the NT, is quite obviously in a class by itself, being full-blown apocalyptic; the

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language, particularly the reference to humility and submission, is in parallel to Jas 4:6-7, but for Jas the passage seems to view the devil as tempting to sin, whereas Pet sees him afflicting with persecution.

1. IPet 3:19ff. On this puzzling passage, cf. Reicke, Disobedient Spirits; R concludes (59) that "it must be quite probable that πνεύματα in IPet 3:19 can be both Angels and souls of human beings at the same time without any distinction." Or again (69), "They are the transgressors from the time of the flood, with no very great difference between Angels and people, but with greater stress on the motif complex connected with the Angels' fall." Leaney (Rule, 51-52) decides that demons are in mind here, but thinks the spirits of departed men are in view as a parallel. For a review of opinion, cf. Cranfield, ET 69 (1958), 369-372.

2. Jude 6; particularly in light of Jude's express citation of IEn (at Jude 14), it is obvious that the reference is to IEn 6ff; cf. above, 93ff, and Leaney, Peter and Jude, 89; Sidebottom, James, Jude and 2 Peter, 85.

3. IPet 3:22. This is one of the supposed creedal summaries of the early church; one of its basic assumptions is discussed above, 197ff. Cf. also Leaney's comment: "In Rom 13:1ff Paul teaches that the earthly power, in the sense of a political authority, must be obeyed, no doubt because he believed the spiritual power behind it was subservient to God....The early Christians believed that this was how the universe was governed and that by his obedient death Christ had won a place over all and received the submission of angelic authorities and powers." (Op. cit., 56).

only parallels that we find in the NT are the "Little Apocalypse" passages of the Synoptic Gospels.[1] In common with most other apocalyptic writers, Rev has important things to say about the demonic, about judgment, and about the end of the age. But unlike some other apocalyptic works, it does not display any preoccupation with beginnings,[2] though there are allusions to beginnings; this book single-mindedly directs its gaze to the end, and what is believed about the origin of evil can only be guessed from the end to which evil is at last brought.

There is no great interest in sin in Rev,[3] nor do we find reference to the sinner. This corresponds to what we have found in Mk,[4] who seems to share elements of the apocalyptic world-view.

Nor is there any considerable interest in demons as such.[5] They are mentioned in only four passages,[6] the last of which is a quotation from the OT, and hence is not, strictly speaking, native to the thought of

1. Mk 13; Mt 24; Lk 21:5ff.
2. A fundamental belief of apocalyptic was the restoration at the end of the age of the world as it was at the beginning; Russell says, "The usurped creation will be restored; the corrupted universe will be cleansed; the created world will be re-created." (Method and Message, 280). This is the reason for much apocalyptic interest in Adam and his affairs before the Fall - the former world gives a clue as to the latter world's character. To a lesser degree than most other apocalyptic does Rev mention beginnings; cf. below, 262-263.
3. The verb ἁμαρτάνειν does not occur at all; the noun appears in two contexts (1:5; 18:4-5), the latter of which is a quotation from the OT. We must deduce the attitude toward sin from references to uncleanness, etc., which apparently continue to exist even after the coming down of New Jerusalem, but only outside the city gates (21:27; 22:11,15) and presumably in the Lake of Fire (21:8), if there is any difference between the two. If this is sin's penalty, then sin is obviously a serious matter.
4. Cf. above, 120.
5. Swete (Apocalypse, clxiv) notes the abundant angelology of Rev, but goes on to say (ibid., clxv), "The Apocalypse is comparatively silent as to fallen angels and evil spirits." The word δαιμόνιον appears only at Rev 9:20; 16:14; 18:2, though references to demonic beings may be made under other names.
6. Rev 9:1-11,16-19; 16:13-14; 18:2; cf. Ling, Significance, 54. The significance of the first two visions, in Ch. 9, is further reduced by the fact that they display no great difference one from another, almost seeming to be a doublet. Farrer suggests (Revelation, 121) that Rev "does not even wish to contrast them strongly."

Rev.[1] It is interesting to note that in the first of these passages the demons, after the fashion of the Synoptic Gospels, are seen as causing disease but not death; in the second, however, they have the power of death, and in the third they have become deceivers as well. In the third, they seem to perform the same function as the perverted Shepherds of IEn in leading the nations astray.[2] The references in the ninth chapter seem to accord well with the Synoptic view of demons as causing miseries, but not sins. These references in the ninth chapter are Rev's only mention of the demonic horde,[3] the other demonic references being to three particular demonic spirits, or to demons as inhabiting, after OT fashion, waste and desolate places. The demonic horde is kept under lock and key, and is released by angels at the command of God.[4] Nothing seems to correspond to Synoptic "possession" by individual demons from among the horde, nor do we find Satan set as head over the demons, unless he is to be identified with Apollyon.[5]

1. Rev 18:2; cf. Is 21:9; Jer 50:8; 51:9. Earlier references (9:1-11,16-19) are linked with Joel 2:4ff and "worked up" into their present form.
2. IEn 89:59 - 90:5; 90:13-25. In IIEn 18:4, only three of the Watchers are represented as descending to earth to begin the corruption of man, but aside from the correspondence in number the parallel to Rev is only in the corrupting character of the demonic spirits who deceive mankind.
3. There is mention of the angels who fell with Satan in Rev 12:9. But these are not necessarily demons; in fact, in Enochic tradition, these angels were rather the parents of the demons; cf. above, 93.
4. Rev 9:1-2,14-15. Charles (Studies, 130-131) considers it important to see in the "sealing" of 9:4 a guarantee of protection against demonic attack for Christians, though social and cosmic evils, as well as martyrdom, are to be their lot. If he is correct, the demons are bound by this "sealing," their power restrained, by the will of God. Cf. Rev 3:10.
5. The identification of Apollyon (i.e., the destroyer) does not seem entirely certain (cf. Rev 9:1-2,11). The star who fell from heaven in Rev 9:1 seems to be an angel; despite the fact that in apocalyptic language the stars often symbolize fallen angels (cf. Russell, Method and Message, 127) Rev is not consistent with this tradition at all times, for he refers to the angelic protectors of the seven churches (1:20) as "stars." So it seems impossible to be certain as to whether the being of 9:1-2 is demonic or angelic, though the latter seems more probable to me. Then at 9:11, it is again uncertain as to whether Apollyon is identical with the star of 9:1, and whether he is a leader among the demons, or the heavenly ruler of the sub-terrestrial demonic horde. Whether or not this being is regarded as demonic, he still appears to take orders directly from God. On the character of Apollyon, cf. Farrer, Revelation, 119; Swete, Apocalypse, 257; Charles, Revelation I, 246-247.

Satan in his own right occupies an important position. His name appears frequently,[1] and he is also known as the devil[2] and the dragon.[3] In one passage obviously intended to recall Gen 3, he is called "that ancient serpent."[4] In accordance with Synoptic and Johannine usage, Satan seems to "possess" men;[5] for it is certainly with men that we have to do, or at least with the world of men, when mention is made of the mysterious "beasts."[6] Men worship the dragon,[7] and are likewise said to worship demons and idols.[8] But again, as in the Synoptic Gospels, Satan does not seem to be represented as "possessing" the ordinary man, but only those whom he feels he can employ for a particularly wicked purpose.[9]

Satan's realm is not physical, but spiritual; his powers are not over nature, but are powers of persuasion exercised upon men. The cosmic signs of the end are not written on the stars by Satan's hand, but by

1. Rev 2:9; 3:9, which mention a "synagogue of Satan"; also, 2:13,24; 12:9; 20:2,7. On these references to the "synagogue" and to the "home" of Satan, cf. Glasson, Revelation, 9, 25-26. On the occasions when Satan's name appears in Rev, cf. Ling, South East Asia Journal of Theology 3 (1961), 41-51.
2. Rev 2:10; 12:9,12; 20:2,10.
3. Rev 12:3,4,7,9,13,16,17; 13:2,4,11; 16:13; 20:2.
4. Rev 12:9; cf. IICor 11:3; Rev 20:2.
5. Cf. above, 147ff, 236-237, and Rev 13:2ff.
6. According to a convention of apocalyptic, human beings are often represented by animals and angels represented by men; cf. particularly IEn Ch. 85ff, and Russell, Method and Message, 126-127.
7. Rev 13:4.
8. Rev 9:20; this recalls Pl's reference to the idols as demons in ICor 10:20-21; cf. above, 178, fn. 3.
9. There seems to be a close connection between Satan and the Jezebel of Rev 2:20ff, inasmuch as she is regarded as teaching "the deep things of Satan;" this may imply some form of Satanic possession. The reference is clearer in the case of the men and institutions of men represented by the "beasts;" the dragon gives authority to the beasts (13:2, 4,12-13); the second beast speaks like a dragon (13:11), or perhaps like the dragon (on Charles' assumption of a mistranslation of some sort from the Hebrew or Aramaic source, since the statement seems meaningless as it stands; cf. Charles, Revelation I, 358); the dragon and the first beast receive worship (13:4), while the second beast seems to act as their priest (13:14-15).

God's;[1] with the exception of the fire which came down from heaven,[2] the powers attributed to Satan are simply those of deception and cunning.[3] Even demonic disease in Rev 9 is inflicted in accordance with God's will, rather than Satan's.[4]

There are two characteristic patterns into which Satan's activity falls. In the first, he is found as leader of the nations of the world,[5] after his being cast down to the earth.[6] Here we have a connection with

1. For signs of the end inscribed on the features of nature by the hand of God, cf. 4:5; 6:5-6,12-17; 7:1-3; 8:5,7-12; 9:2; 10:3; 11:13,19; 12:15-16; 16:3-4,8-12,18-21; 20:11. In all these passages, the various powers of nature such as earthquake, lightning, flood, the light of the sun, etc., are under the direct control of God. It is difficult to decide how literally Rev intends this to be understood - whether he expected the sun actually to stop shining before the Parousia, for example - but his general view that God controlled the elements seems quite clear.

In addition, the symbol of the Sea is to be considered. This seems to be a symbol of the demonic, the ancient sea-monster of Babylonian mythology being perhaps in the background. To this point, cf. Farrer, Revelation, 151; Caird, in ET 74 (1963), 103-105. The latter argues persuasively that the sea in Rev is demonic, and finds support for its cosmological significance in the fact that the first reference to it is in a chapter referring to God as Creator (4:11). He notes that it stands between the saints and God (4:6), that in 13:1 the Monster rose out of the sea which is therefore "a kind of reservoir of evil," and that in 21:1 the new heaven and earth will contain no more sea.

2. Rev 13:13; cf., however, the way in which the true fire from heaven extirpates the enemies of God, 20:9, and how the beast and the false prophet who called down fire from heaven are themselves cast into eternal fire, 19:20.

3. Satan's deception is in view in Rev 12:9; 20:8. From one aspect, he seems to have the power which he confers on the beast and the second beast (or false prophet) in 13:2-4,7,12ff; from another, however, this is seen to be the power of the nations vested in the beasts according to the designs of God (17:17), so that even Satan's claims to power are seen as deceptions, at least to some degree, and under God's control and plan.

4. The demonic powers of sickness are released at God's command, not at Satan's (Rev 9:1ff); it is Satan's own priestess that God afflicts with physical sickness as punishment for her sins (Rev 2:22-23).

5. Rev 13 in particular; here the stress is not on individual nations, but on the whole world as subservient to the beasts, the representatives of the dragon (13:3-4,7-8,14,16-17). Elsewhere the nations are more prominently mentioned as the object of Satan's deception (16:13-14,16; 17:17; 19:19-21; 20:3,8-10). Likewise, if Babylon is to be identified with the first beast as being both figures for Rome, Satan's deceiving the nations may be implied in the lament of the kings over Babylon's fall (18:9-10).

6. It is interesting that, unlike Lk, Rev views the fall of Satan as coming after the Ascension (Rev 12:5; cf. Lk 10:18). There may be a hint here that for the author of Rev the explanation of the contemporary woes

the Synoptic doctrine of Satan as the supposed power behind the thrones of earth. In the second, Satan is typically the persecutor of the Church,[1] operating through the agencies of his subject beasts, i.e., his subject human beings and nations. Here we have a connection with the Synoptic teaching that Satan is a source of πειρασμός, but there is an important difference. In Rev, πειράζειν is used only in the sense of proving, or testing, and not in the sense of solicitation to sin. The Church tests and rejects false prophets;[2] the testing from which the Church will be preserved is evidently administered by God to prove the character of man who stands apart from the Church;[3] and although Satan is involved in the process of testing Christians, the successful resistance of Christians against the attack of the devil seems to be something which can be assumed, for Christians are expected to be faithful until death.[4] From the end of the third chapter onward, the possibility that Christians will fall into sin as a result of these testings does not really seem to be seriously entertained.[5] Satan's effort to pervert the Church gives the outward

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of the Church, so much worse than anything that had been known before, were to be explained on the basis of Satan's not having been personally present, or perhaps only momentarily present, on the earth until after Christ's ascension to the throne of God (cf. 12:12). On the birth-pangs of the Messiah and the woes preceding the Messianic visitation, cf. Russell, Method and Message, 272-276.

Martin Rist (IB XII, 455) doubts if the Ascension is in view here; this could be conceded if by the Ascension is meant the event of Acts 1:9. What seems to be in view here is the enthronement or appointment to majesty which we have seen to be typical of early Christology; cf. above, 197ff. That the ascension is in fact the view here, cf. Charles, Revelation I, 320.

1. Rev 2:9-10, the devil and the synagogue of Satan attack the Church; 2:13, the place where Satan dwells is a place of suffering; adding to these the references to Satan in 2:24 and 3:9, it will be observed that in Rev 2 - 3 Satan is mentioned only in references to the faithful churches; churches like Sardis and Laodicea, which were in deep spiritual trouble, were apparently not counted worthy of Satanic testing - or had, perhaps, succumbed under it already. On the persecution carried out by Satan and his minions against the Church, cf. further 11:7-8; 12:13-17; 13:7,17; 17:6; 18:24; 19:2; 20:4.
2. Rev 2:2.
3. Rev 2:10.
4. Rev 3:10.
5. In the practical sense, Rev seems to recognize difficulties within the Church visible, as emerges in his praise and criticism of the congre-

appearance of having succeeded, for there have been false prophets within the Church, and various apostasies.[1] But in reality, Rev comes close to teaching, "once in grace, always in grace." Ultimately speaking, God knows his own from all eternity, and will not let them be lost;[2] it is only humanly speaking that one can entertain the possibility of backsliding.

But Satan does have an indirect hold on the Christian through the secular institutions that he controls. This explains the negative attitude toward the Roman state in Rev, so different from Rom 13.[4] But the state is the same in both cases, and presumably the theory of the state is similar both for Pl and Rev. It is a question of whether or not Satan's

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gations to which he writes. But as soon as his gaze lifts to ultimates, the Church appears as a glorious whole; membership in this company destined for salvation depends on having one's name entered in the Book of Life (20:12,15; 21:27) which is written from the foundation of the world (17:8), or even before (13:8). Only in the "practical" section, Ch. 2 - 3, do we find the hint that a name can be expunged from that book (3:5; cf. 3:11). On "books in heaven," cf. Russell, Method and Message, 107ff, who perhaps does not stress sufficiently the significant fact that names are sometimes entered in these registers (cf. IEn 108:6-7, and above, 81), implying predestination of individuals as well as groups.

1. Rev 2:2,6,14,20-24.
2. Cf. Rev 7:3ff, and the references cited above, 257, fn. 5.
3. Ling (Significance, 57) expresses the view that "the life of the Christian fellowship is an area within the world which Satan no longer controls...." This seems to me doubtful in any absolute sense for the bulk of the NT, but it comes close to representing Rev accurately, particularly after the end of Ch. 3. Cf. also the opinion of Charles on the "sealing" of the elect, above, 254, fn. 4.
4. For Pl's attitude, cf. above, 202. Crucial for Rev's view is the interpretation of Ch. 13, in which Cullmann (State, 74-76) identifies the dragon as being Satan, the first beast as the Roman civil authority, and the second as the false prophet (cf. Rev 16:13; 19:20; 20:10), i.e., what Cullmann calls "the religio-ideological propaganda authority of the totalitarian state" (76). Farrer (Revelation, 155) makes a similar identification, observing how the dragon, the first and the second beast make up a triad which apes, not the Trinity, but "the triad of revelation: God, the Messiah, and his servant the prophet - 1:1, not 1:4-5." Cf. also Ling, South East Asia Journal of Theology 3 (1961), 47. Rev has nothing good to say about the state as it confronts him and the Church. But this is not necessarily to say that there never has been a state which was not possessed by the power of Satan - just that the contemporary state was.

grip on the state happens to be more secure at one time than another.[1] When Rev was written, Satan seems to have been altogether dominant over "the powers that be." It is well to keep in mind that Satan is distinct from the tools that he uses; the beast and the false prophet are destroyed, but Satan survives for separate judgment.[2] But as long as Satan's hold on the state continues unbroken, he uses the power of the state to oppress the Church.

With "nations," or with mankind outside the Church, it is a different matter altogether. In this realm, Satan is the "deceiver," as he was of old, and meets with great success. He apes God in receiving worship;[3] he sets up his own Antichrist;[4] he gives such a good imitation of God that many are persuaded to become his followers.

Rev comes close to saying that Satan is the origin of evil.[5] His realm is that within which evil is dominant. When Satan appears on earth,[6]

1. The state does not seem to be spoken of as inherently evil until after Satan is cast down from heaven; cf. the references above, 256, fn. 6. Barclay (ET 70 (1959), 260-264; 289-292) explains the attitude of hatred toward the state in Rev (contrary to the rest of the NT) in terms of the new situation under Domitian, which has caused the state to be regarded as demonically controlled.
2. Rev 19:20; 20:2-3; cf. Ling, Significance, 60: "That is to say, Satan is distinguishable from the secular power, and from its attendant religious cultus. Through these and in these Satan works, but he is not ultimately identified with them. He is conceived as having an existence which outlasts the existences of particular societies."
3. Rev 13:4.
4. This term does not actually appear in Rev, being limited in the NT to the Johannine epistles. But that it stands behind the thought of Rev Ch. 13 and 17, cf. the extended note in Charles, Revelation II, 76-87, and in particular 86-87. On Antichrist and the substitution of Manasseh for Dan at Rev 7:6, cf. Charles, op. cit. I, 206-207; Charles, Studies, 116-117.
5. It is difficult to correlate the degrees of responsibility assigned to Satan in Rev and in Jn (cf. above, 239), since though the responsibility assigned him by both is very considerable, Jn is directly concerned with the subject of ἁμαρτία, and Rev is not.
6. It is worth noting that the earth for Rev (he does not use the word κόσμος except at 11:15, preferring the more neutral term γῆ, which appears often) is not in itself a place of evil, but a place which has been made evil by the powers which hold sway over it. Presumably, it has been corrupted by sin already before the fall of Satan from heaven (cf. 9:20-21), but its woes and sins are amplified when Satan is cast down from heaven (12:12), and persecution of the Church follows upon this fall (12:13ff).

the works and woes of evil are intensified;[1] when he is removed for the millennium, evil disappears;[2] when he returns, he once again deceives the nations.[3] As in the Johannine scheme, we have a dualism of two kingdoms of men, utterly disparate, presided over on the one hand by Satan and his vice-regents, the beast and the false prophet, and on the other by God and his vice-regent, Jesus Christ (and, perhaps, the prophets who witness to the Christ).[4] Within Satan's realm, all is evil; within Christ's, all is good.

Little is said about how one becomes a member of one kingdom or the other, but what is said implies a strongly deterministic view. If God does indeed know his own from before the foundation of the world,[5] sealing them in time of trouble[6] and inscribing their names in a book by which they will be judged at the end of the world,[7] those who are not thus provided for are set at an impossible disadvantage in their confrontation with Satan. But enough is said in the second and third chapters of the book to imply that, humanly speaking at least, man's decision does enter in as a factor; seen from the human side, it is possible for man to mend his ways and repent.[8] The glorious Church into which nothing unclean may enter is, after all, a part of the heavenly perspective, and we are well advised not to conclude prematurely that Rev in the later part of his work, viewing human choices from the heavenly standpoint, is teaching what would be true determinism, after the fashion of Qumran, when

1. Rev 12:9ff.
2. Rev 20:1-6. Glasson (Revelation, 113) comments on 20:10, "With the final suppression of the devil, the way is open for an entirely righteous and blissful future."
3. Rev 20:7-9.
4. Cf. Farrer, Revelation, 155.
5. Rev 13:8; 17:8.
6. Rev 7:3-8; 9:4.
7. Rev 13:8; 17:8; 20:12,15; 21:27.
8. Rev 2:5,16,21-22; 3:3,19. But it is noteworthy that only in the first three chapters is repentance regarded as a possibility. In Ch. 2 - 3, the opportunity is open, but thenceforward the verb μετανοεῖν appears only in statements to the effect that men did not repent, despite the afflictions and inducements to do so (9:20-21; 16:9,11).

seen from the human standpoint. But still, there is little enough to go on here; the general impression remains that determinism in Rev is very much like that of Qumran, and in that respect more absolute than what we find in the rest of the NT.

Is God responsible for the beginnings of sin? Certainly not, from all that Rev intends to say.[1] His power is so absolute, though, that a more sophisticated thinker, perhaps one of the dabblers in the "deep things of Satan," might be led to make the assertion that God is responsible for bringing evil into being.[2] But we must respect Rev's intentions, while

1. It is impossible in a brief note to convey in any depth the absolute quality of the power, justice, holiness and faithfulness of God as represented in Rev; however, some idea can be gained by considering his attributes, if only in outline. As to his power, consider the number of times that the throne of God, the power-symbol of the Almighty is referred to in Rev; by contrast, a throne is conceded to Satanic power only at 2:13; 13:2; 16:10. Consider also the sword borne by the Christ (1:16; 2:12,16; 19:21) or conferred by him (6:4,8); the keys borne (1:18; 3:7) or conferred (9:1; 11:6; 20:1) by him; the victory-crown he wears or confers (2:10; 3:11; 4:4,10; 6:2; 12:1; 14:14) as well as his imperial diadem (19:12; the dragon and the beast have similar diadems, 12:3; 13:1, but at the end the diadem is on the Messiah's brow); the stars, symbolic of destiny and of heavenly powers, which he holds in his hands and which he controls (1:16,20; 2:1, 28; 3:1); and so forth. Nature is in every respect the servant of the Almighty. Power (δύναμις) is attributed to him (1:16; 3:8; 4:11; 5:12; 7:12; 11:17; 12:10; 15:8; 19:1). He is the παντοκράτωρ (1:8; 4:8; 11:17; 15:3; 16:7,14; 19:6,15; 21:22). But all of this power is administered for the sake of justice: cf. 15:3; 16:5,7; 19:2,11. God himself is holy (3:7; 4:8; 6:10), and his people are "the holy" (5:8; 8:3,4; 11:18; 13:7, 10; 14:12; 16:6; 17:6; 18:20,24; 19:8; 20:9). It seems quite unthinkable that Rev should have entertained the idea that absolute power should be impotent to crush evil, administered in the hand of him who is holy and true, and in the end of the day this is precisely what happens. But as to how evil crept into the realm of such holy Omnipotence to begin with - Rev simply does not explain the enigma.

A hint as to what is expected from man's side appears in the recurring admonition to "patient endurance" (ὑπομονή), found at 1:9; 2:2,3,19; 3:10; 13:10; 14:12. This seems to be the means by which Christians enter into and share Christ's victory, and can be described as themselves conquering (2:7,11,17,26; 3:5,12,21; 21:7) even as Christ himself conquered (3:21). Here again, human responsibility tends to be grouped toward the earlier chapters. Cf. also 12:11, where the way of victory is defined, both for Christ and the Christian, as being that of martyrdom and death.

2. The assertion of developed Gnosticism was that one of the lesser gods (e.g., Jahweh) made the world sinful; there may be gropings in this direction indicated here, though as Charles observes (Revelation I, 73-74) the greater probability is that the antinomian and libertine aspect of Gnosticism appears in Rev 2:24.

evaluating his implications. He is not, after all, discussing the origins of evil, but its final overthrow. What he might have said about the former is largely a matter for speculation.

As to the final defeat of evil, Rev sees it as effected through the struggles of Christ and the Christian. As Farrer says, in comment on Rev 20:2-3:[1]

> Satan did not appear as a warrior on the field of battle, for Satan is an incorporeal spirit. Why, then, is his binding by the angel a sequel to the victory over the beasts?....We observe that the description of the dragon as seized here is identical with the description of him as cast down in 12:9, and that both texts equally reflect the description of him as smitten by the Lord in Is 27:1. Now in 12:9-11 we were told that Michael's casting down of Satan was equivalent to, or due to, the saints' victory over him "through the blood of the Lamb and the word of their testimony - they loved their lives so little that they died." That is to say, that Christ and the saints having triumphed in the contest of martyrdom, the devil is thrown down by his angelic antagonist. The paragraph now before us shows a later phase of the same battle. The devil has brought earthly forces into play through the tyranny of Antichrist; and these forces having been defeated by the Lamb and his saints, the angel can carry the abasement of Satan a stage farther: not from heaven to earth, but from earth to the abyss.

Thus, as for the NT in general, the human sphere becomes the sphere of Satan's victory or defeat, and the place of his original triumph becomes the place of his final downfall.

That Rev knew something of our first parents' fall is evident in echoes faintly heard, now and again, of the third chapter of Genesis. His preoccupation with the end does not imply ignorance of the beginnings; the fruit trees on the river bank in New Jerusalem are obviously transplanted there from the soil of Eden,[2] the "old serpent" is the same one who deceived Eve,[3] and the seed of woman crushes the head of the serpent,

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1. Farrer, Revelation, 202.
2. Rev 2:7; 22:2,14,19. Swete (Apocalypse, 294) points out that the vision of 22:1 is a conflation of Gen 2:9ff with Ezek 47:1-12, in which the fruit trees which for Ezekiel grew on the banks of the Dead Sea now become the Tree of Life which grew in Paradise, and which line the banks of the river in the Holy City.
3. Rev 12:9,14-15; 20:2. Charles (Revelation I, 325-326) traces the origin and development of the identification in 12:9 between Satan and the serpent, the tempter in Eden; he feels, however, that the woman of 12:1ff

as had been prophesied.[1] But as to where the true responsibility for the events of Eden lies for Rev, there is simply not enough evidence for a conclusion. We must be content with the observation that Rev, more than the rest of the NT, approaches a view that would blame Satan for the beginnings of sin, though man is still considered responsible for having yielded to Satan's deceptions.

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is the Church, or the Church in the True Israel of the OT, rather than Eve. Yet, as he says (ibid., 315) the concept here is "very elastic," and there is probably room in it for Farrer's identification of her as Eve, the ultimate mother of humanity and thus of the Messiah, in a sense, as well. Cf. Farrer, Revelation, 142.

1. As Farrer observes (loc. cit.), the serpent-dragon does not at first attack the woman, but waits for the birth of her seed, with whom his real enmity is established by the prophecy of Gen 3:15.

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