The port securityscape

an ethnography

by

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Abstract

9/11 changed the face of maritime transport that is responsible for moving 80% of everything we consume. Ports are vital hubs in that maritime transport and any disruption there instantly affects global trade. To protect the global supply chain from crime and terrorism, both must be disrupted locally in the port by port police and security officers that are responsible for port security at operational level. Public and critical criminological attention to these key security actors, however, is virtually non-existent. This thesis therefore explores how their occupational realities and identities are (re)established in two major European ports, by providing an ethnographic account. To do so, the thesis builds on multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork in the ports of Rotterdam and Hamburg between 2011 and 2012, during which everyday policing and security work has been documented, followed by a thematic analysis. The key argument runs thus: the port is a local space for the global trade, which is underappreciated and underestimated by the public, and has its police and security professionals in place both aboard and on shore who protect and defend that vital trade site. The aggressive commercialist governmentality that goes on behind that vital global trade is unwillingly yielded to by these guardians but not without any bottom-up resistance. They condemn the volatile commercialist governmentality that is embodied in management, competitive and careerist colleagues and authoritarian multi-agency partners, as well as in port companies and shipping companies. The State and global market they protect, is simultaneously a threat to them. This contradiction influences their occupational identity, making it inherently conflicted and affecting their performance in the port securityscape to the extent it can create threatening situations that cause the very dangers they are supposed to prevent and eradicate.

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Author's declaration

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.

Signature:

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Abbreviations

ACM	Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets
AEO	Authorized Economic Operator
ALF	Animal Liberation Front
APM	A.P. Møller–Mærsk A/S
C-TPAT	Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism
CCTV	Closed-circuit television
CG	Contracting Government
CMA CGM	Compagnie Maritime d'Affrètement et Compagnie Générale Maritime
CSI	Container Security Initiative
CSO	Company Security Officer
DA	Designated Authority
DAPS	Designated Authority Port Security Hamburg
DoS	Declaration of Security
EU	European Union
FIOD	Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service
FOC	Flag(s) of Convenience
GISIS	Global Integrated Shipping Information System
GPS	Global Positioning System
HARC	Hit and Run Cargo Team Rotterdam
HPA	Hamburg Port Authority
HWP	Hamburg Waterways Police
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMDG Code	International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code
IMO	International Maritime Organization
ISM	International Safety Management Code
ISPS Code	International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
ISWG	Intersessional Working Group of the MSC
ITF	International Transport Workers' Federation
MARPOL	International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
MKC	Maritime Knowledge Centre of the IMO
MSC	Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO
MSC	Mediterranean Shipping Company

OFW	Overseas Filipino Workers
OM	Openbaar Ministerie (Rotterdam)
OTR	Odfjell Terminals Rotterdam
PFSA	Port Facility Security Assessment
PFSO	Port Facility Security Officer
PFSP	Port Facility Security Plan
PoH	Port of Hamburg
PoR	Port of Rotterdam
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PPP	Public-private partnership
PRA	Port of Rotterdam Authority
PSC	Port State Control
PSO	Port Security Officer
R&D	Research and development
RORO	Roll-on/Roll-off ships
RRSP	Rotterdam-Rijnmond Seaport Police
RSO	Recognized Security Organization
SAFE	Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Trade
SOLAS	International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
SSO	Ship Security Officer
SSP	Ship Security Plan
STCW	International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping and Certification for Seafarers
TEU	Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit
UASC	United Arab Shipping Company
UK	United Kingdom
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
USA	United States of America
VC	Vessel Carrier
WCO	World Customs Organisations
WTC	World Trade Center

It is impossible to shed light upon the deepest abysses of the human soul such as it is revealed in ports, if one shrinks from hard facts.

Hans Erasmus Fischer.[1]

Introduction

After 9/11, the world as we knew it changed drastically and has been in a state of exceptionally heightened security. Every time we go to a mall, train station or airport, we encounter CCTV systems, barricades, border control, anti-terrorist units, (weaponised) police, customs forces and security officers. All are there to stop people from their natural course, demanding an ID and enforcing their far-reaching powers onto "randomly" selected individuals whose carry-on luggage as well as themselves are thoroughly inspected. The same thing happens to ships, crews, transported cargo, truckers and dockers at the port, through which approximately 80% of everything we consume travels in and out, from anywhere to anywhere, every day (UNCTAD 2014). Ports are therefore vital to our global economy.

Although characterised by crowdedness, loudness and busyness, ports are havens to embark at, where ship crews can, if just for a little while, be safe from the dangers at sea (Rickman 1988: 265). Ships, cargo and those responsible for them must, like any flight passenger, endure intrusive inspections for security reasons, because any disruption in a port anywhere, on any given moment, instantly affects global trade. Whether it is a typhoon hitting a Japanese port (Bunkerworld 6th October 2014), Ebola in West-African ports (The Copenhagen Post 25th September 2014) or ongoing violent conflicts in Libyan ports (Mail Online 15th September 2014), this vitality and fragility of ports is challenged daily.

Ports have always been seen sites of moral vulnerability, with a reputation for debauchery; they are cast as 'centres of moral corruption and decadence' and 'cultural wastelands' (Van Hooydonk 2006: 4-6), suffering from numerous crimes and insecurities, ranging from occupational hazards to port strikes, cargo and metal theft, human trafficking, drug smuggling (Zaitch 2002), illegal weapons trade, corruption by 'high-ranking coast guard officers "turn[ing] a blind eye" to the smuggling operations' (Kostakos and Antonopoulos 2010: 51), piracy (Liss 2011) and last but not least terrorism (Chalk 2008; Christopher 2009; Woodward 2009). Any of those threats can easily lead to a port shutdown anywhere, affecting everyday life immediately and intensively. Just think about sudden price rises at local petrol stations or supermarkets.

The Twin Towers attacks amplified security awareness significantly in the maritime industry. No matter what, this industry must be kept terrorist-free, which is the main purpose of an ideal-typical post-9/11 international legislation within the maritime domain; namely, the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code:

Following the tragic events of 11th September 2001, the twenty-second session of the Assembly of the International Maritime Organization (the Organization), in November 2001, unanimously agreed to the development of new measures relating to the security of ships and of port facilities for adoption by a Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (known as the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security) in December 2002 (IMO 2003: 2).

This Code intensified cooperation between all kinds of authorities and control agencies working together through multi-agency partnerships, in the name of 'port security'. These partnerships, consisting predominantly of port police organisations and the security industry, protect the industrial port sites, where legitimate trade and illicit flows intersect. Equipped with intrusive authorities and cutting-edge control technologies, operational port police and security officers are tasked to keep the port secure at street-level against any threat to safeguard its hinterland and, eventually, the global trade. However, to do so, it is the port police and security officers themselves that interrupt the supply chain to keep it safe (Urciuoli, Sternberg and Ekwall 2010), because to inspect, for example, the *Mærsk Mc-Kinney Møller*, which is a 400m long ship that can carry over 18.000 containers with an unimaginable amount products in them, demands significantly more time, energy and agencies than checking a random flight passenger. At an average port, such ships come and go in hundreds. Daily.

Today's post-9/11 and post-Great Recession consumer societies, living in fear, are preoccupied with crime and terrorism and demand harsher security (Chancer and McLaughlin 2007; Furedi 2004, 2002; Elchardus 2003; Tunnell 1992), especially because of austerity-based anxiety (Gottschalk 2011). Yet, there has been no demonstrable public interest in ports whatsoever (Van Hooydonk 2006). Nor is there any curiosity about port-related crimes or insecurity that can inflate the economy, instantly feeding into further austerity(-based fear). Also, although ports are gateways for the global flow of goods to our insatiable consumer appetites (Bauman 2007), a public concern about the individuals who keep ports (and thus consumption) safe from high-impact harm is non-existent. Besides public curiosity, the extraordinary reality of ordinary people in the port securityscape has received no criminological attention, although those people deal with direct pressures of safeguarding around-the-clock transport against a kaleidoscope of insecurities. In fact, criminologists have been remarkably slow to develop theory and methodology on (trans)port security in general (Zedner 2007: 269). Or actually, criminology has ignored the port as a rich area for research the last three centuries. This is despite the fact that one of the 18th century founding fathers of criminology, Jeremy Bentham, was inspired by the port for his panopticon (1791). He travelled to Russia to visit his brother, Samuel Bentham, who designed a shipyard architecture to discipline its dockers—former English convicts— who were causing 'drunkenness, arson, theft, idleness, intrigue and sabotage' (Linebaugh 2003: 273).

This architecture paved the way for the inspection house. Around that same time, in 1798, the Marine Police Establishment was founded by Patrick Colquhoun and funded by the West India Company to 'establish a programme of surveillance, making it more difficult for workers to remove property from the docks without apprehension' (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 64). This Marine Police was grounded in Beccarian principles, such as certainty of punishment to deter future port theft, which 'fitted with the wider Peelian agenda of police reform' (ibid. 65). Indeed, the Marine Police securing the London port, was the backbone of the largest police reforms in UK history. The panopticon and Peelian Principles reveal how the histories of ports, security and criminology are interlinked, even if these links are neglected.

This thesis seeks to revive these links by painting the landscape of port security—the port securityscape—to distil critical criminological ideas on security. The port is a mixture of intrusive security and raw freedom. Of closedness and worldliness. Of trade velocity and human contiguity. Of global and local importance. Of neoliberal persistence and radical resistance (Mah 2014). How these opposites attract and collide 'at the docks' and with which effects on port security, is captured in the occupational identities of the port police officers and security officers at the forefront of it all. In providing an ethnography of the port securityscape and identity formation, this thesis delivers a critical understanding of attitudes and ambitions, dreams and wishes, fears and anxieties, and cultures and practices of an unexplored yet crucial sociotope on which we all depend. I bridge this knowledge gap by presenting this thesis as a written version of my critical and existentialist exploration of the everyday realities and identities of street-level port security professionals. This exploration has been guided by the following key, two-part research question:

> *How do operational port police officers and security officers in the port securityscape (re)establish*
> *a meaningful occupational identity and what are the effects on practised port security?*

In answering this question, this thesis builds on multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork in the ports of Rotterdam and Hamburg between 2011 and 2012, during which that everyday was captured and thematically analysed. The structure of the thesis is divided in eight chapters. Chapter 1 shall provide a criminological imagination of the port securityscape by asking what security is, describing concise histories of the Port of Hamburg (PoH) and Port of Rotterdam (PoR), and explaining how the port landscape became a post-9/11 port securityscape. The canteen cultures of police and security occupations will also be explored. Chapter 2 discusses the ethnographic approach I utilised to enter the port securityscape with and collected data with, aimed at a criminological verstehen, which is an empathetic and existentialist understanding. Moreover,

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field characteristics, ethical issues, practical complications and the analytical focus on identity formation and its complexities are reviewed. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 will explore how identity is (re)established by operational port police and security staff in interaction with people they encounter on a daily basis in the port securityscape. Chapter 3 is dedicated to how the participants interact with management, colleagues and multi-agency partners whom they construct port security with. They do so for the port business community that consists of port companies, dockers and truckers, as Chapter 4 shall show. Shipping companies, ships and crews are the last group of familiar organisations, places and people whom the participants police and secure the port for; they will be explored in Chapter 5. After the familiars, the unfamiliar and unwelcome, vis-à-vis the enemies of the port securityscape, will be considered and how the participants execute their tasks to keep these strangers out. Chapter 6 will show how port police and security are confronted with the risks of stowaways, port thieves and drug smugglers through which they form their identities as well. Chapter 7 focuses on how participants cope with the threat of terrorism and how this affects their identity formation. Finally, Chapter 8 will conclude this thesis and shall consider the wider scientific and societal impact of this study.

Chapter 1

Imagining the port securityscape

1.1 Introduction

Aristotle claimed in his *De Anima*: 'Nequaquam sine phantasmate intelligit anima' ('The soul does not know at all without a phantasm' (Pomponazzi 1948: 318)). Regarding the port securityscape, this means that in order to understand it, I must imagine it first. Criminologically. This chapter shall elucidate that criminological imagination of the port securityscape by focusing on interlocking dimensions, which are: security as an idea; the port; post-9/11 maritime legislation; and police and security occupational cultures. Firstly, I shall elaborate on what the criminological imagination is so as to, subsequently, evaluate the security concept and its socio-historical context critically. Secondly, a historical overview of how PoH and PoR have developed will be presented, and thirdly, the influence of the ISPS Code on the port shall be explained. Finally, the canteen cultures of police and security occupations shall be considered. These dimensions are the pillars of the criminological imagination I pre-formed to explore the port securityscape ethnographically.

1.2 The criminological imagination

> We've codified our existence to bring it down to human size. To make it comprehensible, we've created a scale so we can forget its unfathomable scale (Lucy, *Lucy*, 2014).

Lucy, the main protagonist in the sci-fi thriller *Lucy*, says this to a group of scientists who wanted to know how she gained access to her full brain capacity after she absorbed a synthetic drug into her blood system. Lucy explained our tendency to codify and simplify as something that is flawed. And so did 19th century philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, who argued we live in a 'fictitious world of subject, substance, 'reason' etc., [that] is needed: there is in us a power to order, simplify, falsify, artificially distinguish. "Truth" is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations—to classify phenomena into definite categories' (1968: 280). Truths 'are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions – they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force' (Nietzsche 2012: 10). Criminologists too try to master and create homogeneous criminological truths about crime and security by simplifying these phenomena into measurable variables for statistical analysis (Young 2011). However, our world

is one of heterogeneity, and so is the world of security. Several cultural and critical criminologists claim criminology has adopted a set of perspectives that distance criminology from the heterogeneous realities of crime and security, instead of bringing them closer. The crystallised perspectives push researchers to develop especially positivistic knowledge-criminology and applicative policy-criminology (Ferrell, Hayward, Morrison and Presdee 2004; Ferrell and Sanders 1995; Garland 1992; Young 2011). Such a criminology predominantly produces '[s]trong repetitive research reports about national matters prioritised by policymakers' [rather] than an actual accumulation of critical and theoretical knowledge about crime and security (Van Swaaningen 2007: 3). Consequently, those positivistic-based policies consist of and support 'tough on crime' rhetoric to be exploited politically (Simon 2007). Applying criminological knowledge in this manner is far more crucial for policymakers than learning from critical knowledge on crime and thoroughly assessed policy implementations. It is therefore doubtful whether politicians as crime-fighting entrepreneurs indeed truly (want to) understand crime and security at all (Ferrell et al. 2004).

In order to understand port security, I needed to develop a criminological imagination (Young 2011), which is a "criminologisation" of Mills' sociological imagination (1959) that it self can be considered a "sociologisation" of Nietzsche's claim about truths that are reflections of our will to power (2012). In this thesis, the criminological imagination of port security is therefore one that rejects statistical truths about security and must, somewhat genealogically, 'disturb what was previously considered immobile, it fragments what was thought unified, it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself' (Foucault 1984: 82). Port security is thus seen as a 'false' belief that is historically embedded and changes over time, changes with culture and changes through human understanding, as is in line with philosophy of the criminological imagination (Young 2011: 224). So, to feed my criminological imagination, I orientated myself through literature that would enable me to critically imagine (port) security in its moral, historical, socio-cultural and individual context to holistically understand port security. This criminological imagination, however, does not fixate (definitions of) the phenomena of (port) security. It instead is a collection of 'sensitising concepts' (Blumer 1954), based on key ideas, that gave reference and guidance for me to use I in the field.

Now, of all disciplines, criminology has been reluctant, or at least slow to theorise and develop methodology for thorough research on security (Loader and Walker 2007a; Loader and Walker 2007b; Shearing and Wood 2003; Zedner 2010, 2009, 2007). This is despite the fact that the security phenomenon is widely and comprehensively explored by many disciplines, such as international relations, war studies, political theory, legal philosophy and economics. The

criminological imagination is therefore based on several ideas and perspectives from critical fields within social sciences, in particular critical security studies, which has been a more keen developer of much critical theoretical, methodological and empirical work on security, drawing on post-structuralist and postmodernist points of view (Buzan 1991; Gariup; Neack 2007). These ideas have formed a mental framework through which I engaged with those responsible for port security in the Port of Hamburg (hereafter PoH) and the Port of Rotterdam (hereafter PoR). I remained open to new inspirations and imagination during fieldwork that would enrich my eventual understanding port security, described as doing research in a 'culture of openness' (Bottoms 2007: 82). Here, a detailed description of the criminological imagination of the port securityscape will follow, by firstly simply asking myself: what is security?

1.3 What is security? A critical consideration

1.3.1 Security: a concept by and for the State

Although an actual word for or widespread use of 'security' is hard to find in pre-modern societies (Lipschutz 1995), the question of what security means has existed throughout human history. If anything, security is an 'essentially contested concept' (Buzan 1991: 7) and exists by the very grace of several disciplines that exchange their ideas on it. Security is for that reason an interdisciplinary concept and therefore an overly disputed concept with all sorts of linguistic implementations (Gallie 1962). As any truth really is an illusion…

> …security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion. Less simply, that security is a dangerous illusion. Why 'dangerous'? Because it has come to act as a blockage on politics: the more we succumb to the discourse of security, the less we can say about exploitation and alienation; the more we talk about security, the less we talk about the material foundations of emancipation; the more we come to share in the fetish of security, the more we become alienated from one another and the more we become complicit in the exercise of police powers (Neocleous and Rigakos 2011: 15).

It is the very nature of security that causes a temptation for many disciplines to define security in their own terms (Gariup 2009; Zedner 2009). It is like light attracting moths; but as more moths hover around the light, it shines less brightly and clearly. So, the more disciplines it attracts to clarify through definition, the more unclear the definition of security becomes, and so *ad infinitum*.

> [I]t is dangerous to go on to the assumption that security actually exists, even as a fuzzy concept [...] all that we can know about security is what people do in its name, and that therefore our focus should be on practices of governance that in fact appeal to 'security' (Valverde 2011: 5).

To seek an answer to the question what security is, is itself a search for security never to be found as security is not a thing in itself, making it 'instead more useful to turn our attention to the myriad security projects and mechanisms that can in fact be empirically studied' (ibid.: 20). Exploring and understanding security therefore is not about…

> …establishing the concept's true meaning, but recognising and interrogating its profound multiplicity and contestability. Understanding in/security as that which is theorised on an everyday discursive terrain allows us to see that everyday security practitioners operate with multiple, and essentially complex, understandings of identity and in/security (Rowley and Weldes 2012: 521).

Security cannot be captured as "a thing in itself", since it is an age-old phenomenon (re)conceptualised by numerous disciplines and (sub)fields of research, and for retrieving sensitising concepts of it, it would be pretentious to conceptualise security. Given the indefiniteness of security and its many goals, which gives security a heterotelic nature, it has to be seen as a vessel to be used by those regarded as responsible for it. Security allows its providers to use it to achieve their own goals (Foucault 2007). It is then more relevant to review who is (considered) responsible for security and what their use of security is, and more importantly, what it reveals about the user.

In Ancient Greece, through the writings of Plato, it became clear, that, for Socrates for example, security was a prerequisite for the governance of a city state (*polis*) to let its citizens live their lives in virtue; citizens were able to develop and find happiness due to the presence of a secured environment (Mara 1997). Virtues could develop so long as security was guaranteed. Citizens could develop their virtues only in 'a condition of material security' (ibid. 118). Centuries later, security was explained as an essential precondition for the foundation of the sovereign State and the social contract, according to first modern political ideas (Neocleous 2008). Political philosopher Thomas Hobbes hypothesised in his famous work *Leviathan* (Hobbes and Gaskin 2009) that insecurity is one of the most recognisable facets of human nature (*status hominum naturalis*). Security then serves to perpetuate domestic peace to prevent a 'bellum omnium in omnes', or 'a condition of a war of every one against everyone' (Hobbes and Gaskin 2009: 87). From a Hobbesian perspective, it was the need for security that eventually justified the rise of the sovereign State (Zagorin 2009). Wars of everyone against everyone—civil wars—were never to recur under the reign of a sovereign State that granted security for its loyal subjects (Der Derian 1995). Security was explained as a common good and its aim was to effect social cohesion amongst those subject to the superior sovereign State. The idea of security as the means to prevent a war of everyone against everyone kept citizens in shock and awe, because

'fear of violent and premature death [...] compels men to seek the security found in solidarity' (ibid. 30). Such solidarity is needed to receive citizens' trust to reign as a Leviathan. Security is then the State's way to control people in (supposedly) the best interest of that people, but in reality, security served and serves the interests of the State (Neocleous 2003).

The lure of security and trust in the State to provide it, allows the State to 'manipulate this grant for their own purposes, sometimes to the point of the abuse of power' (Neack 2007: 35). In fact, the abuse of security via political discursive practices has always happened to exercise raw sovereign State power, both internationally and domestically (Lipschutz 1995). Security by the State kept the labour class herded together, making the State thrive by the 'elevation of the egoistic partiality to a metaphysical universality' (Der Derian 1995: 31). The most important method for the State to hide that egoistic partiality was by keeping the masses under control and maintaining social order, in the name of security for all through the criminal law, which later in history, has been enforced by a police force (Neocleous 2000). The introduction of the police was the State's response to social disorder and therefore its tool to control those who's 'social, economic and political condition appeared to undermine social order' (ibid. 3). The historical trajectory of the police reflects the changing political philosophies and attitudes of the State and the exercise of its powers through security. From protecting the 18th century bourgeois idea of (economic) liberty and the individual to forcing the poor to work during the 19th century Industrial Revolution, "security for all" policing to beget civil order and control citizens, in particular those who challenge the State's power, has always been in the interests of the powerful in society.

1.3.2 Security, the State and globalisation

In the 20th and 21st century clear national and ideological boundaries—boundaries that had existed for centuries for the State and citizen to define themselves and their enemies—are gone (Lipschutz 1995). We live pluralist lives in which all sorts of norms and values both co-exist and clash (Bauman 1998). Especially in these post-9/11 and post-financial crisis times, States (particularly of the global West) increase policing to secure against Islamic fundamentalist terrorism and want to provide financial security through economic growth. The State's interest in such a promise of a terrorist-free, blossoming economy though, is used to justify more intensive policing to keep citizens law-abiding and to prevent individuals from challenging powers (Neocleous and Rigakos 2011), such as the banking system that caused the financial crisis to begin with. The type of insecurity perceived by law-abiding, docile citizens comes forward from fears of flows of migration, globalising cultures through media and digitalised mass communication via the internet. The global melting pot may have produced understanding

and overcome deeply rooted boundaries, but it has also spawned new religious, cultural and social divides. In a way, today's global society consists of cultural inclusion and structural exclusion, occurring at once (Young 2007). It has become more difficult for the citizen to see *what* is to be made secure by the State, and 'against *whom or what* is anyone to be made secure' (Lipschutz 1995: 4, *emphasis added*). Meaning, security consists of 'only more or less tolerable and more or less intolerable degrees of insecurity... security is both elusive and illusive' (Neack 2007: 219). The State is therefore democratically entrusted to secure against an ontological insecurity of its citizens (Young 2007), which is an ongoing and welcome mission for the State; this way it has instant access to the unlimited source of insecurities to secure against to serve its own interests:

> [S]ecurity today operates as the supreme concept of bourgeois society. [Security] colonizes and de-radicalizes discourse: hunger to food security; imperialism to energy security; globalization to supply chain security; welfare to social security; personal safety to private security. Security makes bourgeois all that is inherently communal. It alienates us from solutions that are naturally social and forces us to speak the language of state rationality, corporate interest and individual egoism. Instead of sharing, we hoard. Instead of helping, we build dependencies. Instead of feeding others, we let them starve… All in the name of security (Neocleous and Rigakos 2011: 20).

To do everything in the name of security could even destroy our habitat. Everything seems to be justified in the name of security, '[h]owever, the effectiveness of the means used is unclear. The end may not justify the means. Indeed, the means could be a greater threat for society than the crimes they are trying to combat' (Van Calster and Schuilenburg 2010: 4). In this way, the State, Bauman prophesised, strips 'the free of their security and [offers] security in the form of unfreedom, mak[ing] catastrophe *inescapable* (Bauman, 2007:176–177, emphasis in original). Since the birth of neoliberalism, such stripping by the State has become less of a prophecy and more of a reality.

1.3.3 Neoliberalism and the security market

Neoliberalism is a type of governmentality that advocates that individuals and their economic activity should be governed from a distance by a minimalist State and more by markets that 'are associated with competition, economic efficiency and choice' (Larner 2000: 4–5). Marketisation, deregulation and privatisation are key aspects of neoliberalism, adopted by many governments halfway through the 20th century, which has restructured welfare states all over the world. Ever since, the State has progressively withdrawn from direct provision of public services to the citizen in favour of governing their provision (Leys 2003); a pattern also affecting the criminal justice system. Starting in the 1980s, police forces have begun to be run as businesses, in which aggressive managerialism demands financial accountability, pushing the police to promote its

services to the consuming citizen that pays taxes for public performance (Loader 1999). Police 'services' have been commercialised and citizens are their consuming clients. Problematic though is for the police to enforce more security onto society. This is what the State promises (to really serve itself) by legislating War on Terror-based punitive laws but cannot fulfil, because citizens do not get a sense of security (Ramsay 2009). The minimalist State then indirectly admits it cannot control and eliminate insecurities. Still, citizens who have been responsibilised because of the neoliberal ethos demand to consume security and will look for other ways to retrieve that (promise of) security. Enter the security market that can supply such security, which confronts the State as original and legitimate provider of security (Loader and Walker 2007). It is neoliberalism itself that brought forward the economic policies and ideologies that enabled 'the expansion of security services in both national and global markets', and 'informed and spurred the transformation of developing societies and states in ways that make them more open to, and in need of, private security provision' (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009: 13).

Contrary to popular critical criminological thought, the security market is not that new and dates back to early-mid-18th-century (Ayling and Shearing 2008). It is argued it is as old as the introduction of forms of security by the State in medieval times, as it was a time that contained the feudal 'hue and cry' conditions for a police apparatus to function, during which the often-homogeneous community took responsibility for enforcing law by means of providing unpaid services by deputies (Spitzer and Scull 1977). The homogeneous nature changed as communities industrialised and grew larger causing communal dispersal. Growing communities and growing dispersal, leading to less confident citizens, resulted in distrust towards the police deputies who, by that time, were thought of as being merely self-interested entrepreneurs instead of defenders of the community's public interest. Support for communal governance of security decreased and left a gap in the market for the privatisation of policing and security to fill in. A historical example of the security industry rooting into the maritime domain, were the uniformed private forces employed by the West India Company to secure the company's shipments with obtained goods (Johnston 1992). Since its origination, the security market had stable growth, however, gradually grew larger in the global West in especially in 20th and 21st century (Krahman 2008; Shearing and Stenning 1981; Van Steden and Sarre 2007; Zedner 2009).

Still, the defining and problematic characteristic of the security providers throughout time is that they exist 'essentially to serve the interests of those who employ them, rather than some more or less clearly defined "public interest" which purportedly lies at the heart of the public police mandate' (Shearing and Stenning 1981: 209). It is the commercial interest to make profit that drives the security market. Some observers problematise the loss of morality when crime

is approached by security companies, turning the offender-victim dyad into a void money relationship because crime is explained in terms of economic loss, on which specific sales management and advertisement techniques are developed to attract the economic interest of the customer (Zedner 2006). The security market is therefore not immediately concerned with 'debating what security is for, for whom it must be secured and by what means', but rather with 'the health and profitability of the industry' (ibid. 282). It makes 'the market for crime control... a highly competitive one, driven by price as much as quality, and in which profit is a more powerful motive than performance' (Zedner 2009: 90). However, it is argued though the security market has difficulties with being considered merely profit-driven:

> [Security providers] crave wider worth and credibility, long to be well-regarded and thought of as engaged in an activity which is socially valuable […]security providers may in some part share this social discomfort about selling security, or else may be cognizant of its presence and have learned to tailor their legitimation claims accordingly (Thumala, Goold and Loader 2011: 297-299).

Whether the security industry has identity issues or not, the fact it offers security at a price always leads to uneven distributions, making some 'cocooned in security bubbles and others largely outside protection' (Zedner 2009: 90). There is therefore a new type of social divide that exists in societies between those who can consume security and those who cannot, making the ability to consume security another category of 'division and tensions… which [exist] between rich and poor people throughout the world' (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 156). Security consumers can be individuals, organisations and the State, consuming all kinds of security goods to secure themselves. For example, the State consumes services delivered by the security market, such as security officers who guard the perimeters at police stations, border control areas, prisons and probation services (Pancake 1983; McCulloch and McNeill 2007).

Those who can consume security retrieve a false and partial sense of security at the expense of marginalised groups, such as the poor in global cities (Atkinson 2003; Sassen 2002). Citizens consume security more and more, because the State, as neoliberalism proscribes, responsibilises its citizens not to depend on the State as the main provider and to do more individually, including taking care of one's safety and security (Goold, Loader and Thumala 2010).

Such responsibilisation of the citizen, plus widespread fear of 'dangerous' people, prepared a 'fertile ground for expanding the depth and reach of private security 'solutions' [and] created a climate in which those with sufficient resources are more rather than less likely to turn to the private sector for protection' (ibid.: 16). Consuming security is not merely done to feel/be more secure, just as long the consumers 'are sufficiently satisfied by the security products they

consume whether crime [or insecurity] goes up or down may just be an irrelevance' (Zedner 2006: 282). There is therefore an aspect of meaning-giving involved when one consumes security (Loader 1999). Security as a good that can be bought brings pleasure in shopping for it, like any other item that can be purchased. Some items are more popular than others and purchase choices can be discussed and debated, by which security consumption becomes a way of socialising. Security then 'may be subject to fads and fashions, be considered cool or un-cool and have an aesthetics that may seduce or repel consumers. One has to think about whether and how other consumer goods are invested with the power to make one secure and whether they are purchased, at least in part, as such' (Goold, Loader and Thumala 2010: 6).

By contrast, those who cannot consume security are also responsibilised by the State for their own security, encounter inequality and frustration. While the rich live in CCTV'ed and highly secure gated communities, the poor struggle in the insecure areas (consuming insecurity) and are often employed by the rich to provide security. These security workers contribute to a space that will never be completely their own, yet for these workers they are their 'places of desire' that they daily (want to) escape to, away from their "insecurity cocoon", experiencing feelings of inequality and relative deprivation (Goldstein 2010a).

Security markets use this growing security consumption drift to make more profit, however, it is sustaining if not enlarging the new classification of rich and poor. The State should be taking its public responsibility to prevent such a division through security by regulating the security market, especially when it comes down to stopping excesses of security from happening, like the Blackwater Security Consulting staff that shot at Iraqi civilians in 2007 (Welch 2009). One might expect the State to regulate the security market to keep the State's interests secure, which is to maintain power within a small group of elites (Neocleous 2003). It is argued, however, that it is the State itself that makes it easier for the security market to expand, due to its neoliberal incentives to deregulate and marketise certain public services. Lack of regulation therefore reinforces legal preconditions for the security market to grow larger and larger (Dorn and Levi 2007; O'Reilly 2010). In other words, the State creates the competition that now threatens the State's power established by governance through security. As a matter of fact, given that contractual control over the security market is owned by large international security companies, the State loses its power not just to the security market established within its own national borders, but also to security markets based in other jurisdictions (Shearing and Stenning 1983; Zedner 2009).

Security has become a global phenomenon also because of border-crossing public-private partnerships (PPP's) that assemble and exchange security provisions on a transnational level to

deal with what is considered unsafe and insecure (Schuilenburg 2012). A 'global security bazaar' has formed itself where large (global) security companies and public policing agencies are its key actors, and together they form a 'state-corporate symbiosis', in which public actors have commercial means and objectives and private actors public interests that are in fact challenging the entire public/private divide (O'Reilly 2010; White 2014). We therefore need to speak of a liquid security (Zedner 2006), which is produced by and serves the interest of all kinds of 'new security institutions and practices that are simultaneously global and local, public and private, and that draw on a broad range of capacities and discourses for their empowerment' (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009: 15).

Now, given the critical considerations of security in the above, how should port security be imagined? The imagination of security is one that argues that security, from a Nietzschean perspective, is there for the powerful or the 'masters' who are…

> …active, relatively unreflective agents who live a life of immediate physical self-affirmation [...] They use the term 'good' to refer in an approving way to this life and to themselves as people who are capable of leading it. As an afterthought, they also sometimes employ the term 'bad' to refer to those people – most notably, the 'slaves' – who by virtue of their weakness are not capable of living the life of self-affirming physical exuberance. The terms 'good' and 'bad' then form the basis of a variety of different 'masters' moralities (Nietzsche, Ansell-Pearson and Diethe 2007: xxi).

Thus, port security is heterotelic and serves more purposes and goals than that of port security for port security's sake. Those who are in charge and responsible for port security, 'the masters', are part of a group of (inter)national public-private stakeholders. These stakeholders frame port security, 'the good', to achieve and safeguard their own interests, which is eventually to wield power and make profit. This can only be done by justifying and selling (more) port security (services) as a consumable items to port security consumers, 'the slaves', who believe they need it and purchase it out of their fear of risky groups and individuals, criminals and terrorists, or in short 'the bad'. These security consumers neglect, even punish, those who also believe they need to consume but cannot, as well as those who refuse to consume (more) port security; these are 'bad' people too. Port security as an attractive item is only sought after because of (the creation of) threats to and insecurities in the port environment, such as crime and terrorism. The participants of this research are the (human) port security drones deployed at operational level to protect and execute neoliberal governmentality. They are the ones who are directly confronted with each other; with the recipients of port security; and with those that (might) cause port insecurity. To understand the participants and the space they operate in, the port landscape shall be explored in the following section.

1.4 Concise histories of the ports of Rotterdam and Hamburg

1.4.1 What's in a name?

Before exploring how PoR and PoH originated and developed, it is important to wonder what is actually meant by the word 'port'? This is sometimes difficult, because one could interchangeably speak of a port, a harbour, or a haven, a dock or a marina. According to the Oxford Dictionary of English, the word 'port' is Old English and derived from the Latin word 'portus' which means 'haven' or 'harbour'. It describes a place that possesses 'a harbour which boats use for loading or unloading, or which forms the starting point or destination of a voyage […and a] place where charges may be levied under statute or by prescription on boats making use of the facilities' (*OED Online* 2014: "port no.1")[2]. Moreover, a port can be a 'harbour, airport, or border crossing through which people and goods may enter a country, especially under customs and immigration supervision' (ibid.). Accordingly, a port consists of both the landside and waterside area in which transport activity takes place from and to ships, through and on port facilities, such as container terminals, dry-bulk (e.g. coal), wet-bulk (e.g. oil) and break-bulk (e.g. metal) terminals, petrochemical sites etc., as well as the roads and waterways in between the port facilities (Nichols and Williams 2009). The port, like security, is a concept that has different meanings to different people and group. As will become clear, the participants of this research too have their own imaginations and explanations of the port.

The first documented port in history is the Port of Byblos, in Lebanon (Smith 2009). In 3000 BC it was the most important port in the Middle-East because it was perfectly positioned between several major cities in the region, where trade flourished and all sorts of products was transported such as 'glass, jewellery, perfumes, and papyrus' (ibid.: 47). The demand grew larger and supply had to adjust to it, which led to the construction of larger vessels to transport more cargo and 'the germs of a somewhat freewheeling maritime capitalism took shape' (Moore and Lewis 2009: 89). Gold and papyrus in particular became popular commodities. Millennia later, the location of important ports shifted to Ostia and Brindisi, and after another couple of millennia, the Port of Rotterdam was the biggest and most important port in the world, only to be overtaken by the Asian ports of Hong Kong, Shanghai and Singapore (Verhetsel and Sel 2009: 241). So, over the course of approximately 5000 years, locations of important ports

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[2] There are different definitions and origins of English words to describe the location where ships sail and embark, and transport industry takes place and can be quite puzzling. On the level of translating between Dutch, English and German one would expect even more definitional haziness to exist. Nevertheless, Dutch equivalents such as 'dok', 'haven' and 'scheepswerf' and German equivalents like 'Dock', 'Hafen' or 'Werft' do resemble the English terms, and bear the same linguistic overlaps and differences with regard to each other.

shifted from one part of the world to another and will continue to do so in the future. A port and its nature cannot be appreciated in isolation from its historical development (Rickman 1988), and therefore a concise history of both ports of this research will follow in the next subsection.

1.4.2 Origins and historical development of the Rotterdam and Hamburg ports

PoR and PoH are both classic European ports, with their origins dating back to medieval times when both ports started off as small settlements located at the mouths of the rivers Rotte in Rotterdam and Elbe in Hamburg. The 9th century Hammaburg (Hamma Fortress), located in-between the rivers Elbe and Alster, had a small harbour that was the starting point of PoH (Hamburg Port Authority (HPA) 2014a). It was an important, strategic point for Louis le Pieux who brought the archbishop's missions to eradicate Northern European paganism; however, Pieux's Christianisation backfired when Danish Vikings in 845 burnt down PoH, which in the centuries that followed, happened over and over again (Von Bremen 2002). After many destructions and reconstructions, Hamburg's citizens were granted the right to hold markets in 937 that attracted merchants. It eventually led to an agreement on the 7th of May 1189 that a city close to the old harbour at the Elbe river would be built, and so PoH was born (Thurow 2011). About a century later, PoR started to show its first developments (*see Figure 1.1*), when the local community of Rotterdam raised the banks of the river Maas (Meuse) and put a dam on the Rotte, hence Rotte(r)dam (Port of Rotterdam Authority (PRA) 2014).

Figure 1.1: Geohistorical overview of harbours in the Port of Rotterdam

(Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency 2014: http://www.heavyliftnews.com/shipping/offshore-projects--choose-port-of-rotterdam).

In 1321, the city of Hamburg joined the Hanseatic League, a confederation of merchants from several Northern European cities, such as London, Bruges and Deventer, and brought much economic prosperity to the Hamburg port and city. However, piracy tormented the port and

city, as Hamburg had no naval forces for its protection (Thurow 2011: 3), yet by the use of convoy ships the city port was protected and survived.

There is no clear documented history of piracy that affected PoR, therefore its fishery and trade could develop freely, spreading out in the region by the use of ships. For these ships, berths where necessary and from the 14th through to the 16th century, the first harbours were dug, such as the Leuvehaven (Leuveharbour), Oude Haven (Old Harbour) and Haringvliet (PRA 2014). At that point, PoH expanded due to a rapid population growth and, because of Columbus' discovery of the Americas in the 15th century, PoH's foreign trade really started to blossom. However, it was challenged by Altona Port from the 17th century till the mid-18th century. When PoH struggled with a local competitor, the Golden Age of the 17th century put the Netherlands (back then the Dutch Republic) on top of the list as a seafaring nation, with both the West and East India Company dominating the high seas (Prak 2002). The naval ambitions of the Republic changed the small collection of Rotterdam harbours at the Meus into a proper port, attracting many Scottish migrants to work in the fishery and tobacco trade (Catterall 2009).

Napoleon's occupation ended the Golden Age of the Dutch Republic, not only because he made a kingdom out of Holland for his brother Louis, but mostly because French armies 'interrupted the flow of commerce and severed communications with the East Indies' (Diem 1967: 19). Hamburg was hit as hard by the Napoleonic occupation from 1806 onwards, ending the city's previous neutral trade (Marzagalli 1996). After Napoleon's reign in the Kingdom, mid-19th century, a new waterway was dug in Rotterdam, which connected the Meus with the North Sea. Because ships became bigger and went deeper underneath the waterline, the river depth needed to increase; Rotterdam by then had become truly globally connected (Van Tol and De Gijt 2000). The post-Napoleonic PoH reconstructed itself back to its international stature, by expanding the old port and it prospered again after a long time of downfall (Palmer 1999). Speicherstadt (the largest single warehouse complex to this day) and Freeport were also built during that time in order to become Germany's 'gateway to the world' (HPA 2013).

The expansion was coupled with a mechanisation of handling cargo that caused major labour unrest at both ports and throughout many European ports generally (Jensen 1964). The dockers were confronted with 'the exceptional arduousness, danger, and variability of work'; 'the lack of an occupationally stratified hierarchy and mobility outlets'; 'the necessity of living near the docks'; 'and the belief shared by longshoremen that others in the society consider them a low-status group' (Miller 1969: 304–305). Due to the work conditions of dockworkers, and the potential conflict that can arise from it, specific dockworker subcultures and identities originated that have led to divisions between the port community and the general public, culturally and

socially (Hoekema 1973; Miller 1969; Kerr and Siegel 1954; Ter Hoeven 1964; Van Hooydonk 2006; Yeager and Miller 1997). These dockworker subcultures reveal a shared common understanding of norms and values and care about port-related affairs, developing 'their own codes, myths, heroes, and social standards' (Kerr and Siegel 1954: 191), and often nourishing a deep love for their port (Van Hooydonk 2006: 23). These subcultures are further characterised by solidarity, distrust towards authority and exclusion of strangers (Smit 2013: 42).

Dockers in Rotterdam were 'militant on a number of occasions', leading 'to widespread acceptance of anarchism, syndicalism and socialism as well as direct action in the form of strikes' (Jensen 1964: 220). Especially in Hamburg in the year of 1896, a major strike took place because of the 'reduction in size of gangs [of dockers], due to the installation of electric cranes' (ibid.). The (resistance to) loss of physical, manual port work is exemplary of technologisation processes that separate 'hand and head, technique and science, art and craft' (Sennett 2008: 20), as is typical of modernity.

1.4.3 Modernity, neoliberalism and globalisation

Modernity did not only change the nature of docker strikes, it also produced World Wars I and II, causing severe damage to ports throughout Europe. "Operation Gomorrah" during World War II almost completely vanquished PoH (Friedrich 2006). PoR too had to endure heavy aerial bombings, which followed by reconstruction that allowed for the building of optimal conditions for (international) shipment; the rubble symbolising the defeat of the city was used for that reconstruction (PRA 2014). Like the city of Rotterdam, the Hamburg community showed its spirit and reconstructed PoH to become economically vital again. That economic vitality of both ports was boosted by the shipping industry that…

> …has done its bit in opening almost everywhere to everything and along with modern communications the process of globalization has ensured that the capitalist structure has the opportunities to generate and dispose of capital in almost endless ways (Roe 2013: 422).

The disposal of capital through the global maritime industry was enhanced by the arrival of a…

> …soulless aluminium [sic] or steel box held together with welds and rivets, with a wooden floor and two enormous doors at one end: the standard container has all the romance of a tin can. The value of this utilitarian object lies not in what it is, but in how it is used. The container is at the core of a highly automated system [and] changed the shape of the world economy' (Levinson 2006: 1–2).

The first container reached Rotterdam in 1966 and Hamburg in 1967 (Buyst, Loyen and Devos 2002; HPA 2013). Next to the landslide effect of containerisation on the shipping industry, the introduction of the Flag of Convenience (FOC) system—an exploitative 'route to labour

regulation avoidance' (Alderton et al. 2004: 3)—changed the shipping industry. There are 34 fiscally convenient flags a ship can bear (International Transport Workers' Federation 2013). They allow for '[c]heap registration fees, low or no taxes, and freedom to employ cheap labour [that] are the motivating factors behind a ship owner's decision to 'flag out" (McConnell 2012: 404). Due to these major changes in shipping, the closed dockworker cultures were confronted with more shippers coming from an increasing number of places from all over the world. Globalisation joined with the rise of the modern welfare State, in both the Netherlands and Germany, as well as with technological developments in ports that solved the handling of increasing container volumes and larger ships. It meant an overall lowering of costs, increased regularity in work methods and handling processes, along with the demand for greater technical sophistication (Branch 2007).

Ports and their communities were once again confronted with their inadequate infrastructure. Cutting-edge technologies replaced people with more machines, machines that could only be operated by a small group of technological specialists instead of a large group of dockers. Much traditional port work disappeared to never come back again (Smit 2013). The extremely fast rise in container volumes, the building of larger models of ships and increasing specialisation of technical knowledge and sophistication led to fully automated berths in ports such as Rotterdam and Hamburg, where unmanned vehicles handle containers, operated entirely by computer (Van Hooydonk 2006).

Changes in demand affected port worker communities too. Growing global demand for oil meant the end for ports specialised in coal, for example (Pinder 2003). In response, small local port companies were taken over by large international corporate conglomerates that gained control of entire port clusters (Van Hooydonk 2006). These distant global corporations remain anonymous to the local port communities, and vice versa. Ports and port cities are still 'commonly portrayed as radical cities "on the edge": rebellious, anti-authoritarian, and fiercely independent', which 'relate to histories of casual dock labour, rooted in traditions of working-class solidarity and struggle' (Mah 2014: 177). However, due to neoliberalism and the financial collapse in 2008, more and more this anti-authoritarianism and docker solidarity are put to the test.

Until 2011 PoR was the world's busiest port, and today it remains to be the biggest port in Europe. With the Maasvlakte 2, PoR is directly located at (actually in!) the North Sea, from where it reaches into and beyond Rotterdam's city centre, covering 10,500 hectares of port and industrial sites and making the port 42 kilometres long with 65 kilometres of quayside (Smits 2014). There is 24/7 access to many port facilities and specialised companies for ships that most

of the times have their first and/or last port of call in Europe, as well as for handling of trains, inland ships, road transport and pipelines (Van Sluis et al. 2012). PoR is therefore itself multi-nodal as well as being an infrastructural node globally connected and of major importance to the regional and national economy; it contributes 3.3% of Dutch GDP and has created 150,000 jobs (PRA 2014b). Rotterdam port can be considered an Anyport (Bird 1980 – *see Figure 1.2*).

Figure 1.2: Bird's Anyport

(Rodrigue, Comtois and Slack 2014:
https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch4en/conc4en/img/portdev.png).

PoR used to be connected with its city, geographically and socio-economically, however, increasingly, it has untied itself from the urban community (Van Hooydonk 2006). Moreover, and although maritime transport is still responsible for the lion's share of global transport, shipping and therefore ports are not as central to trade as they used to be, due to the growing air freight industry, which means a global city does not have to be attached to a global port anymore (Verhetsel and Sel 2009). Despite the growing popularity of air freight transport, the expansion towards the North Sea and less port business activity in the old city centre harbours, PoR devotes…

> …attention to the relationship between the city and the port. Through various projects, we [PRA] are making the port visible in the centre of Rotterdam. These include the LED screen with images of the port in the entrance hall of Rotterdam Central Station (PRA 2013: 2).

In similar fashion to Rotterdam, PoH is connecting with the city via Hafen City, which was one of the largest urban planning projects in Europe that aimed to bring the maritime feel to corporate headquarters (HPA 2013). PoH never really moved towards the coastal zone of

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Germany, which would be in a North-West direction towards Cuxhaven. It is problematic though that PoH has remained a non-coastal port; because of the increasing size of vessels that require a certain river depth that PoH does not seem to have, it is continuously readjusting to receive such vessels. It is smaller than PoR, covering 7,216 hectares of port and industry sites, with 49 kilometres of quay walls of which 12% is used by container handling port facilities (Port of Hamburg Marketing 2014).

PoR and PoH both shape and are shaped by changes in the global market, international politics and technological advancement, turning into dehumanised local places; they, like any other port, reflect global neoliberalism (Hoyle 2000). Both ports have grown to become interdependent nodes that fulfil a vital position in the global supply chain of maritime transport, which seemed to be a growing trade industry, at least until 2008.

Since the financial crisis, the international seaborne trade has dealt with many dangers of global trade that kept freight rates low and unstable in a number of market segments (UNCTAD 2013: xi). During my fieldwork, the port throughput globally increased about 3.8% to 601.8 million 20-foot equivalent units (TEU), which was lower than the expected 7.3% of 2011. This was caused by several conflicts in the European Union (EU), as well as the slowdown of large developing countries like China and India (UNCTAD 2013). Especially the EU's import and export volumes grew slowly, compared to other regions in the world, which had a 'consequent ripple effect on global export volumes' (ibid. 6). When zooming in on containerised cargo, that accounts for half the value of the global seaborne trade, it turns out the world's 20 leading ports (PoR at 11 and PoH at 14) handled 47% of the world's container port throughput in 2012, showing 'a 3.2% increase in throughput in 2012, down from an 8.2 per cent increase in 2011' (ibid. 88). Compared with shipping in general, this indicates growth in the container port business. Europe therefore has a crucial role globally in the import/export of containerised goods, of which 20% passes through the ports of Rotterdam, Hamburg and Antwerp (ibid. 98 – *see Table 1.1 on the next page*). Thus, during my fieldwork, PoR and PoH were the two most important European ports in the global seaborne trade, including handling of ships and containerised goods. Port security mattered in PoR and PoH; since the very beginning of the 21st century port security started to matter everywhere, as the following section will elaborate on.

Table 1.1: Top 20 container ports in 2012 – volume of containers handled in (1000 TEUs)

Rank 2012	Port	*	2002 Total	2003 Total	2004 Total	2005 Total	2006 Total	2007 Total	2008 Total	2009 Total	2010 Total	2011 Total	2011 of which empty	2012 Total	2012 of which empty	Growth rate 2011-2012 (%) Total	Growth rate 2011-2012 (%) of which empty
1	Rotterdam (NL)	=	6 505	7 118	8 242	9 195	9 575	10 773	10 631	9 579	11 017	11 340	2 140	10 939	2 135	-3.5	-0.2
2	Hamburg (DE)	=	5 376	6 126	7 004	8 084	8 878	9 914	9 767	7 031	7 906	9 035	1 386	8 891	1 215	-1.6	-12.4
3	Antwerpen (BE) (2)	=	3 153	4 012	5 055	6 221	6 718	7 889	8 379	7 014	8 144	8 317	1 031	8 174	1 048	-1.7	+1.6
4	Bremerhaven (DE)	=	3 004	3 159	3 501	3 696	4 479	4 884	5 451	4 552	4 858	5 911	754	6 111	690	+3.4	-8.4
5	Valencia (ES) (3)	=	1 826	2 012	2 156	2 415	2 615	3 049	3 606	3 654	4 211	4 338	952	4 471	1 056	+3.0	+11.0
6	Algeciras (ES) (3)	=	1 732	2 024	970	3 184	3 262	3 420	3 298	2 953	2 777	3 584	769	4 099	808	+14.4	+5.0
7	Gioia Tauro (IT)	=	2 883	3 094	3 170	3 123	2 835	3 464	3 165	2 725	3 897	3 307	367	3 725	499	+12.6	+35.9
8	Felixstowe (GB)	=	2 682	2 482	2 717	2 760	3 030	3 342	3 131	3 021	3 415	3 249	829	3 368	856	+3.7	+3.2
9	Ambarli (TR)	=	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	2 464	2 625	:	3 024	663	+15.2	:
10	Piraeus (GR)	+2	1 395	1 606	1 551	1 401	1 413	1 384	437	667	850	1 681	290	2 815	537	+67.5	+85.5
11	Le Havre (FR) (4)	-1	1 754	2 015	2 158	2 144	2 119	2 685	2 512	2 257	2 369	2 222	353	2 115	336	-4.8	-4.7
12	Barcelona (ES) (3)	-1	1 122	1 765	2 084	2 071	2 315	2 606	2 565	1 846	1 928	2 006	518	1 745	450	-13.0	-13.1
13	Genova (IT)	+3	1 499	1 591	1 437	1 038	1 146	1 230	1 462	1 311	1 020	1 277	34	1 578	154	+23.5	+358.3
14	Southampton (GB)	-1	1 275	1 375	1 435	1 384	1 502	1 905	1 617	1 385	1 567	1 591	472	1 489	440	-6.4	-6.7
15	Mersin (TR)	+3	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	1 016	1 127	:	1 251	306	+11.0	:
16	Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (ES) (3)	-2	726	966	1 111	1 222	1 303	1 319	1 312	1 006	1 118	1 284	352	1 208	300	-5.9	-14.8
17	La Spezia (IT)	-1	780	836	879	916	1 086	1 130	1 186	840	1 181	1 205	203	1 181	233	-2.0	+14.7
18	Marseille (FR) (4)	+1	811	835	920	911	950	1 058	901	943	1 031	1 095	143	1 155	104	+5.5	-27.4
19	Gdansk (PL)	+4	18	20	18	63	76	95	183	233	510	685	183	933	275	+36.3	+50.0
20	Zeebrugge (BE)	-3	329	328	458	682	895	1 191	1 401	1 467	1 437	1 157	236	930	148	-19.6	-37.2
Total top 20 ports (5)		-	41 444	46 180	49 924	56 204	60 198	67 940	67 851	56 839	66 327	71 482	:	69 201	12 253	-3.2	:
EEA-IS+HR (main ports)		-	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	84 076	92 117	:	93 182	18 137	+1.2	:

* This column indicates the number of positions lost or gained compared to 2011
(1) TEU = Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (unit of volume equivalent to a 20 foot ISO container).
(2) Partial data up to 2nd quarter 2004.
(3) Data for 2004 are underestimated.
(4) 2012 data have been estimated by Eurostat based on partial data.
(5) Total figure for the ports being part of the top 20 ports during the reference year concerned.

(EuroStat 2012: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/File:Top-20_container_ports_in_2012_-_on_the_basis_of_volume_of_containers_handled_in_(1000_TEUs(1)).png).

1.5 Post-9/11 securitisation of the Rotterdam and Hamburg ports

1.5.1 Paving the way

In response to the sinking of the Titanic in 1912, a first version of what we now know as the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) was adopted and came into force in 1914. This international legislation was the first attempt to make life at sea safe(r) and ratified in 1974, rather long after the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) was founded by the United Nations in 1948. Numerous international conventions and regulations have followed, mainly focusing on ship safety and security[3]. The introduction of such conventions takes many years and their development is an ongoing process 'where new amendments, protocols and other developments are introduced in response to new ideas, new scientific

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[3] Other essential international conventions, regulations and frameworks for (trans)port safety and security include but are not limited to the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG) Code, 1965; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), 1973; MSC/Circ.443 on Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts against Passengers and Crews on-board Ships, 1986; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 1988; Measures to Prevent and Suppress Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, 1993; MSC/Circ.754 on Passenger ferry security, 1996; Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), 2002; Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Trade (SAFE), 2005; Regulation (EC) 648/2005 Authorized Economic Operator (AEO).

knowledge and the identification of new threats' (Eski and Carpenter 2013: 73–74). In comparison to ship safety and security, and given the centuries-long presence of ports, the existence of (international conventions on) port security is very new:

> Throughout the Twentieth Century, neither the government nor the public paid much attention to marine transportation security. There were few serious problems. Drug laws were enforced with greater or lesser vigour, but that was about the extent of our attention to such issues. The United States thought itself secure, with two large oceans between it and the world's trouble spots (Booth and Altenbrun 2002: 1).

Not only the public and the government, but also maritime industry leaders 'apparently perceive[d] the terrorist threat at USA ports as remote and the risk minimal' (Stephens 1989: 29). That perception on port security changed after 9/11, and given the location of the attacks—leading especially in the USA to radical change in their earlier laisser-faire maritime security attitude—the USA started to push for global maritime security measures for ships and ports through the IMO:

> Though the attacks were on land, the world began looking for the next *potential* environment susceptible to terrorist activities. Since it is no mystery that sea commerce has its grey areas, the United States pushed the ISPS code through the IMO in record time. There was no statistical pattern indicating that commercial ships were to be used for the next terrorist attack and since the notion of "conclusive evidence" has been rather abused as of late, the problem with the ISPS code is that it was pushed through too quickly. Had the newly established Maritime Security Committee (MSC) of the IMO more time for risk assessment, the implementation of the ISPS code would be more effective. With more time, the ISPS could have avoided over-bureaucratization and unnecessary overhead to those businesses involved in sea commerce all around the world (Von Hoesslin 2005, emphasis in original).

The US Coast Guard took up an aggressive leading role, using strong War on Terror and global security rhetoric to push ahead the development of the new maritime security legislation. So, largely motivated by the USA agenda of (media based) fear of severe economic consequences of terrorist attacks on cargo by (small) vessels or terrorist attacks in ports by ships, the IMO ordered its Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) to engage in the process of improving ship and port security (Schoenbaum and Langston 2003). The MSC established an Intersessional Working Group (ISWG) during the Twenty-Second Assembly of the IMO, to begin to review and revision existing IMO measures and procedures that cover terrorism. The ISWG considered:

> the installation of automatic identification systems on ships, the need for security plans for ships, port facilities and off-shore terminals, the need to verify the identity of seafarers and the question of a secure 'chain of custody' for containers from their port of origin to their destination (ibid. 1336).

Reports of the ISWG to the MSC followed, leading to the formation of a second ISWG that in September 2002 addressed a proposal for the ISPS Code that would be implemented through SOLAS (Chapter XI, ibid.). After having refined several measures, the ISPS Code was adopted in December 2002 by a Resolution of the Conference of the Contracting Governments (CG's) to SOLAS. Moreover, another Resolution was adopted by the Conference to amend SOLAS Chapters V on Safety of Navigation and XI, making compliance with the ISPS Code mandatory from 1 July 2004. Chapter XI of SOLAS changed into Chapter XI-1 focusing on maritime safety and a new chapter XI-2 on Special measures to enhance maritime security (Maritime Knowledge Centre (MKC) 2014).

1.5.2 The ISPS Code explained

The ISPS Code consists of a mandatory part A that lists security obligations to comply with and a recommendatory part B. However, although part B provisions may be codified as recommendations, these provisions must be referred to when port and ship security governance is established. Hence, part B is practically as mandatory as Part A is, since part A describes the main framework for security systems that refers to specified provisions in Part B (Kim and Lee 2013: 283).

In relation to this, and given the fact PoR and PoH are ports in European Union (EU) member states, it is necessary to point out the importance of the EU's implementation of the ISPS Code through EU Regulation No. 725/2004 of the European Parliament. This was drawn up to enhance ship and port facility security, aiming at port and ship security harmonisation between specifically the ports of EU member states. The Regulation states that EU member states *must* conform to certain paragraphs of Part B of the ISPS Code as if they were mandatory. Whereas part B of the ISPS Code seemingly leaves some flexibility in living up to its expectations (although in fact it does not), the EU's implementation cancels out any such discretion. For example, whereas drills and exercises are not obligatory in the ISPS Code, the EU Regulation makes them obligatory for European ports (2004: L 129/9).

The aim of the ISPS Code and its EU implementation is to standardise evaluations of risk, which makes it possible for governments 'to offset changes in threat with changes in vulnerability for ships and port facilities' (IMO 2014[4]). Or put differently, ports have 'to perceive and manage security threats through integrating local/domestic threat-levels into a global awareness-level' (Bichou 2004: 328). However, although security harmonisation and standardisation are the main aims, the ISPS Code acknowledges every port and port facility may

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[4] See: http://www.imo.org/ourwork/security/instruments/pages/ispscode.aspx.

vary. A port facility must comply with the ISPS Code to continue receiving all passenger ships and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and above that are engaged on international voyages, including mobile offshore drilling units. If they are non-compliant, port facilities that fall under ISPS Code Contracting Governments (CG) cannot receive those ships anymore and are forced to stop their activities. The ISPS Code instructs CG's to obtain and maintain ISPS compliance of their national ports and port facilities by fulfilling a various tasks. A CG sets the security levels, of which there are three[5], by which a port operates. The measures that come forward should cause minimum interference to daily port activities and the flow of transport. Moreover, Designated Authorities (DA) can be established by governments to fulfil their security duties under the ISPS Code. In PoR the Port of Rotterdam Authority (PRA) fulfils DA tasks, and in PoH the DA consists of delegates from the Hamburg Waterways Police (HWP) and the HPA, making up together the Designated Authority for Port Security (DAPS). Both the PRA and DAPS can be considered semi-public/semi-private organisations that manage, operate and develop the port area, as well as regulate and navigate shipping. They have public as well as corporate interests in investment and run their businesses in a market-orientated way (Hafen Hamburg 2014; PRA 2014c).

A CG also assesses a port facility by means of a Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA), which in some cases can be delegated to an authorised Recognised Security Organisation (RSO) that can assess port security. There are 11 RSOs in Germany, of which 6 are stationed in PoH, and in the Netherlands there are 6 RSOs that are all stationed in PoR. A CG can additionally appoint a Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO). According to the Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) (2014) there were 171 PFSOs in 2014 divided over 193 ISPS compliant port facilities in PoR (including Port of Dordrecht and Port of Moerdijk). In that same year, PoH had 50 PFSOs divided over 74 ISPS compliant port facilities (GISIS 2014). PFSOs fulfil the delegated security tasks of the CG, such as the development, implementation, revision and maintenance of the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP).

PFSAs and PFSPs must guarantee continuous development and upgrading of security, by identifying (threats to) critical infrastructure and any weaknesses, and by prioritising security measures. Given the differences in security threats and risks for each port facility, and given the different natures of ports and their facilities, PFSP's and PFSA's differ from port to port. A petrochemical port facility has a higher explosion risk than a dry bulk terminal where cat litter is stored. Moreover, insecurities change in nature due to port locations. For example, the Port of New Orleans has faced natural disaster (e.g. hurricane Katrina) and its consequences

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[5] Level 1 is always present, level 2 stands for heightened security, and level 3 is exceptional.

(Wenning et al. 2007), whereas the Port of Lagos deals with corruption and illegal crude oil transfers, also known as 'oil bunkering' (Guichaoua 2009). Next to continuous updating of the PFSP, the PFSO also has to take care of cooperation with the Ship Security Officer (SSO) and Company Security Officer (CSO); controls one or more port facilities; carries out frequent security inspections; updates a PFSP; provides adequate security exercises (once a year) and security drills (four times a year); communicates with authorities about security threats; and appoints security services. However, the CG stays in charge of determining the applicable security level; the approval for a PFSA and a PFSP; appointing a PFSO; governing Port State Control (PSC) and designing the Declaration of Security (DoS). A DoS is a document that assesses the potential threat a ship can pose to a port facility, which security requirements are needed between a port facility and a ship, and what responsibilities each party has. In short, the ISPS Code frames how port security has to be guaranteed and who is responsible for (delegation of) specific port facility and ship security governance and tasks.

1.5.3 Hidden agendas and the port securityscape

In section 1.3 I argued port security can be understood as heterotelic, with transnational state-corporate powers using security to exploit and serve their own interests (ultimately to wield power and make profit) rather than to secure. This is clearly reflected in the securitisation of the port through the ISPS Code and its EU implementation, which was not about establishing port security per se. In fact, pushing through the post-9/11 maritime security agenda produced a security regime that did not protect but affected the maritime trade. Especially at the outset, ship and port security was lacking in multiple areas (Metaparti 2010: 731-732). In the early stages of the implementation of the ISPS Code, many issues arose for port facilities and ships. There was no understanding of its philosophy and there was a lack of internalisation, which complicated a quick transition. Also, there existed substantial resistance to the ISPS Code; the Code seemed unrealistic (Von Hoesslin 2005; Yilmazel and Asyali 2005). For example the process of creating a DoS still had to be designed, which initially led to a complicated ship-port interface. Moreover, there were practical and logistical questions about which public authority had to perform what type of security control exactly, or how many CCTVs at port facilities were enough? Ports with highly advanced security systems already in place wondered how to control massive amounts of containers coming in and out every day (Liss 2011).

Given these issues, the ISPS Code has been pushed through so quickly primarily, to benefit USA trade interests and secondarily European trade interests (Kim and Lee 2013; Liss 2011: Metaparti 2010). Under the guise of an IMO that aimed to harmonise and standardise maritime security through regulation to *protect* the global (maritime) trade against terrorism, the global

West established a neoliberal *control* of the global (maritime) trade. The extremely rapid development of the ISPS Code reflects geopolitical ambitions achieved by, in particular, American(ising) security governance and criminal justice throughout the world (Landreville 2002; Newburn 2002). Clearly, 9/11 and the subsequent USA War on Terror policies and politics altered maritime security governance globally and impacted the maritime sector gravely. The cost of the hidden agendas behind the ISPS Code, demanding every port to be(come) ISPS compliant if they wanted to continue to trade with the USA, drastically changed the nature and outlook of ports. Since then, the port as it was known before has been fully securitised into a securityscape, a *port securityscape* to be exact (Eski 2012).

The port securityscape is a variation of the concept of the securityscape and implies a description of geographical locations (Gusterson 2004; Azaryahu 2000; Van Oenen 2004). The concept of the securityscape is a superposition of security onto a landscape where its communities live their ordinary daily lives in protected spaces, continuously awaiting threats. The securityscape consists of 'security [that] is done in spaces […] often ignore[d], or downplay[ed by security research]: the bedroom, the playground, the coffee shop, the cinema, the swimming pool, the construction site and the office are just some examples' (Rowley and Weldes 2012: 526). In the securityscape, there is continuous presence of the military, police and/or other types of security agencies where the mobility of subjects considered dangerous is controlled (Zilberg 2011). There, precautionary measures reign over social life, where 'security' is both highlighted and made concrete 'as a tenet of collective faith and a symptom of the [communities'] condition' (Azaryahu 2000: 103). To think in terms of securityscapes is to grasp 'ordinary and trivial examples […] for understanding the extent to which securityscapes indeed constitute an important aspect of ordinary life' and where 'rituals of security' are institutionalised (ibid.). These rituals consist of identity checks, where one's rights can be seriously violated and thus such rituals could be considered aggressive. However, one could also feel satisfied there are so many security measures taken, which provide a feeling of safety and protection. Therefore, the securityscape is not 'only "what we see" but also "how we see it". Securityscapes, like landscapes, represent a point of view' (ibid. 113).

In the port securityscape, a multi-agency of public and private organisations operates. The police, security, customs, harbour masters, environmental protection agencies, municipalities; they all control and inspect in the port. A more specific body of public and private partners (are forced to) secure and enforce together under the blanket term 'port security'. They share the same jurisdiction over ports and now cooperate together on international, regional, national and local level (Bichou 2004; Brewer 2014; Burmester 2005; Christopher 2009; Eski and Carpenter 2013;

Hoogenboom 2010; Malcolm 2011; Price 2007; Schoenbaum and Langston 2003; Wenning et al. 2007; Woodward 2009; Zaidi 2007). The CG, for example, is responsible to make sure its ships and ports comply with security regulations. Sovereign governments have to perform inspections through Port State Control (George and Whatford 2007), which in PoR and PoH are executed unannounced by the Rotterdam-Rijnmond Seaport Police (RRSP) and Hamburg Waterways Police (HWP) respectively. In case a port or a ship does not comply, it becomes extremely difficult to trade with the USA or Europe, which has put pressure on port officials and ship-owners, even if this did not lead to any significant security improvements but rather to more paperwork (Liss 2011: 148-149).

The CG's factually appoint watch-dogs that install fear into local ports and their labour communities; you will get bitten if security settings do not comply with the ISPS Code and the EU regulations. Moreover, the CG's have to keep the IMO informed on security issues and developments in their ports (Urciuoli, Sternberg and Ekwall 2010). So, the labour communities of the port securityscape have been made responsible for their own security, however, they are conscious of their limitations to actually make changes, which is typical for securityscapes (Chan 2007: 65). The port securityscape is a space in a constant 'state of exception' (Agamben and Attell 2005), consisting of a collection of port facilities that have become sealed-off security cocoons (cf. Zedner 2006), where the participants of this research work and form their occupational identity. The ISPS Code put them together in multi-agency partnerships between port police officers and security officers who are part of the very port community they have to police and secure for, against a range of terrorist, criminal and environmental threats and risks. They are the ones, for example, who ask members of the port business community such as crane operators 'to justify their presence at identity checkpoints', which is a type of securitized social interaction that threatens 'the already weak affinity between ports and the general public […such that it may yet…] disappear altogether' (Van Hooydonk 2006: 11).

The participants in this research are part of the port policing-security apparatus that checks entire backgrounds of the port business community members, ranging from 'spouses, parents, and spouses' parents to 'credit history, criminal history', even 'skin colour' and 'travel history'' (Cowen 2007: 33). They are the ones who treat employees as security risks rather than as employees:

> [T]he port workers' civil rights and their employment status threaten to become secondary to the logistical concerns of the ports. Not complying with the demands of logistics, which in this case became near synonymous with the demands of security and of economy, easily gets translated into something like a criminal act. Prevention of such 'criminal' acts in turn justifies

the kind of investigation into one's personal life that would normally befit only a criminal investigation (Van Oenen 2010: 89).

In the port securityscape, the participants of this research serve the neoliberal State and the commercialist markets. In fulfilling their operational professions to keep the (picture of the) port securityscape undamaged, they safeguard the interests of those wielding power and making profit. However, they are also targeted by the very same powers through port security governance; the participants are both hunters for and hunted by the neoliberal State and the markets.

1.6 Police and security occupational cultures

Generally, the police and security professions, and their cultures (and stereotypes) are in various important ways similar to each other, despite several differences (Loyens 2009). A common denominator between operational police and security are pressures originating from working in risky situations and encountering people who violate public order and the safety and security measures in place (Bartol and Bartol 2004; Button 2007; Desmond 2007; Fielding 1995; Rigakos 2002; Patterson et al. 2008; Sanne 2008). A police and security officer can therefore encounter unexpected, immediate turbulence and stress. Simultaneously, a substantial part of their work means dealing with the mundane, with boredom, bureaucracy and more importantly, feelings of job dissatisfaction and occupational insignificance as well. They have to be ceaselessly patient until a violent and unsafe situation arises (Duijnhoven 2010; Konopinski 2008; Loyens 2009; Reiner 2010).

The idea that police and security officers can experience of feelings of unimportance is in line with the broader observation that compared to times before, people in the (generally) peaceful Western world are (mostly) exempted from everyday lethal conflicts, and instead struggle with everyday boredom and insignificance (Prins 2007). In being bored with ourselves and confronted with constant meaninglessness, we need and define 'a role' for ourselves (ibid. 225). That role is our identity. Henceforth, without an identity, the intrinsic insignificance of life is experienced and pushes a person to find and maintain a meaningful identity (Barbalet 1999; Gardiner 2012). A meaningful identity and feelings of satisfaction and significance are sought at work, if anywhere, because, principally, '[l]abor is the self-expression of man, an expression of his individual physical and mental powers': meaning, an individual feels the necessity, an undeniable urge to develop an identity which makes work an end in itself next to, or rather instead of work as a means to an end (Fromm 2009: 33).

Nevertheless, that is an outdated understanding of what work means to someone, when global neoliberalism has changed the nature of work. It changed work as a secure and stable daily facet of life into its opposite; whereas before a worker could rely on solid 'collective labour contracts, workforce participation [and] safety standards', today, all those certainties 'are up for renegotiation, and will be relaxed or discarded', reflecting 'the neoliberal revolt [that] aims to cut the state back to a minimum, both nationally and internationally' (Beck 2000: 174). This revolt has been intensified by the increasingly rapid technologisation, automation and digitisation of the workplace, replacing people with machines and software. So, there seems to be less people demanded to do labour and it has become easier to get rid of employees. In a word, job uncertainty is the only job certainty there is.

Moreover, it is not only that getting and keeping a job is uncertain, the job itself has become highly unstable, demanding more and more flexibility from the employee (Bauman 2002; Burchell, Ladipo and Wilkinson 2002; Sennett 1998). This is to keep "overhead expenses" low by working with flexi-times and flexi-places (e.g. telecommuting) that blur the lines between when and where you work; the work sphere and the private sphere become one. This transience, or liquidity of work is neoliberalism's standard and achievement; hitting the lion's share of the global workforce, in high-income and especially in low-income countries, in virtually every sector.

Police forces and security industry too have been hit by neoliberalism. Particularly the security industry eagerly adopts exploitative tactics of aggressive managerialism, like the airport security industry (Lippert and O'Connor 2003). Security is more and more seen as a non-core service of organisations, leading to increased outsourcing of security by companies that motivate security company managers to employ non-standard workers only through zero hour contracts or as temps. This enlarges social exclusion of the working poor (ibid. 340–341). They have 'the least income security, [yet] make up a large proportion of the workforce providing public security. It is also the case that these workers are increasingly responsibilised for problems associated with failures of service delivery, including those that can lead to devastating events such as those of September 11, 2001' (ibid. 350). Put differently, those working in the police forces and especially security services at the lower ranks of their work organisations are themselves marginalised while having to secure against people who transgress and commit economic offences because of *their* own marginalised positions in society, especially in these times of austerity.

It is expected that port police officers and security officers of the port securityscape must deal with this type of job insecurity and the stress and anxiety that comes along with it, and also with feelings of insignificance due to the nature of their operational port security work. Here, in these work settings of job insecurity and insignificance, is where the participants are assigned to establish and maintain port security by being expected to keep a different set of insecurities in check, namely those of port related crime and (maritime) terrorism. The port securityscape is the stage shaped by the War on Terror-based ISPS Code, on which a décor of occupational insignificance and anxiety is set, where the participants are the 'self-staging authors of their own life and identity' (Beck 2000: 152), who "write" their meaningful identities, which has become the main analytical focus as Chapter 2 shall partially explore.

1.7 Subconclusion

This chapter provided a criminological imagination of the port securityscape. Through a critical criminological and historically contextualised imagination of security, I revealed that security is a not a thing in itself and goes beyond a public good and necessary evil. It is *heterotelic*, meaning, it is variously socially constructed by and for interested stakeholders along meaning structures which have underlying power components, serving multiple goals and agendas. In securitising something, the use of 'security' as a conceptual tool serves the interests of the powerful we generally consider responsible for our security, which is the State and, less obviously, the (security) market. Concise histories of PoR and PoH were explored, from which it became clear they are, like any other port, reflections of increasing global neoliberalism that erodes the traditionally rebellious, anti-authoritarian nature of the port (culture) and its working-class solidarity. Since 9/11 and the ISPS Code that came out of it, the maritime realm has been securitised which transformed the landscapes of PoR and PoH into port securityscapes, introducing all types of new safety and security regimes.

Given the erosion of its inside and the fortification of its outside, the port securityscape, especially since austerity politics, is a dehumanised and less sociable space that has lost its raw, anti-hegemonic culture. There, this research's participants, the operational port police officers and security officers, are authorised to enforce security measures on several groups of people.

However, my criminological imagination of the port securityscape will be scrutinised, corrected or simply rejected in light of the experiences of participants who, like any other everyday security practitioner, do not continuously theorise or act consistently in line with a specific set of theories or ideologies (Rowley and Weldes 2012: 524), even though they are 'far from the conventional centres of political power [they] appear to be situated' in (ibid. 526). To capture

their othering, I had to dive into the occupational everyday of the participants and I collected data ethnographically, to provide, eventually, an ethnography of the port securityscape. The next chapter will explore what the ethnographic approach entails.

Chapter 2

An ethnographic approach

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter elaborately described my criminological imagination of the port securityscape I used to prepare myself for the field and what to look out for in seeking to explore the port securityscape. In doing so, I have asked myself the following two-part research question:

> *How do operational port police officers and security officers in the port securityscape (re)establish*
> *a meaningful occupational identity and what are the effects on practised port security?*

This chapter will concentrate on the ethnographic approach I took to retrieve data for a criminological understanding of the participants. I will first describe what a criminological understanding is and how it is connected to ethnography. Then, I shall discuss the multi-sited field of the port securityscape, how I got in, the participants and how I gained insider-status. Moreover, I will look at the characteristics of fieldwork in the port securityscape, as well as examining the ethical issues raised in and practical limitations of my ethnographic approach. Lastly, I will reflect on the analysis and identity as emerging major theme.

2.2 Criminological understanding and ethnography

2.2.1 Qualitative criminology and port security

The dominant quantitative criminological approach to crime and security aims to categorise social life into measurable units to put through risk analyses and describe, even predict crime (Ferrell, Hayward and Young 2008). The idea that only that which is measurable is worth researching, leaves out research on many vital dimensions of our highly heterogeneous social life. Feelings of desire, of hate, love, all these human emotions and attitudes influence our normal and deviant behaviour as well, and require to be recorded and analysed (Murzi 2007). To fully and critically understand the people and their everyday occupations in the port securityscape, I had to dive into their worker realm to discover, see, hear, smell, and feel what it is like to be in the port securityscape. To achieve that, the choice was made to utilise qualitative criminological research and, more specifically, an ethnographic approach.

Stemming from anthropology and sociology, qualitative methods in criminological research have become accepted broadly now, yet, only started to fully develop in the 1970s (Meuser and Löschper 2002). A well-known qualitative study in the field of criminology is that of Clifford Shaw's *The Jack-Roller* (1966), which centres a man called 'Stanley' and was the first longitudinal study that wanted to understand criminal behaviour over decades, seen from the "deviant's" own perspective. Qualitative criminological research stresses the importance of collecting and analysing data by human understanding of the social worlds. It allows for the collection and analysis of data that provide understanding of social phenomena, human action, meaning-giving and norms and values surrounding ideas of what is normal, what is criminal and what is to be secured (Decorte and Zaitch 2010; Noaks and Wincup 2004). This type of understanding of social life is what is ideally sought after in social science generally, and we as social scientists are the best observers and framers of experiences and practices of others, because social beings are best equipped to understand social life (Weber 1980[1922]).

A growing number of criminologists are paying increasingly more attention to security (Aas, Gundhus and Lomell 2009; Goold, Loader and Thumala 2010; Loader 1999; Schuilenburg, Steden and Oude Breuil 2014; Zedner 2010, 2009, 2007, 2006, 2003), using qualitative methods and analyses to advance critical criminological conceptualisation of security (Goold, Loader and Thumala 2010; Schuilenburg 2012). However, port security as a branch of security has hardly been researched criminologically, let alone by anyone who has provided an *ethnographic* account. Overall, there are but a few qualitative criminological studies done on (the socio-cultural make-up of) specifically port crime and security.

Hoekema researched petty port theft in the Rotterdam port, to find out why it occurred (1973). He framed the port crime of cargo theft as a result of the semi-autonomous social fields existing amongst dockers. They have their own social structure and culture, their own field that operated partially by itself (semi-autonomous), and was not always in line with the law. That is why cargo theft by a docker was allowed and stimulated by other dockers, despite the fact it was a criminal offence according to criminal law. It even brought forward certain social control mechanisms; for example, reporting a theft by a colleague to your boss or port authorities was considered breaching the rules of the semi-autonomous social field of the dockers.

Almost unique in its kind is Zaitch's ethnographic study (2002) that focused on the cocaine trade between the Netherlands and Colombia, for which he undertook intensive fieldwork and interviewed mostly drug couriers and importers, but also a few officials who policed in PoR. It turned out, Colombian drug traffickers experience port security in PoR as an obstacle, due to 'the lack of structural corruption within Dutch Custom and police authorities' (ibid. 111).

Crime at ports, like drug smuggling, has been the preferred research for far too long though, according to Van Os (2003), and there should be paid more criminological attention to the security-side of the port, in particular security management and governance. An example of qualitative criminological work on port security governance is that of Hoogenboom (2010), who suggested that the RRSP is networked into multi-stakeholder governance that is confronted with several nodal limitations, such as bureaucracy, varying legal frameworks and conflicting interests.

Malcolm's study (2011) on UK's post-9/11 securitisation of the maritime structure consisted predominantly of a discourse analysis of port security policymaking, supported by interviews with several higher-up stakeholders. Thorough long-term fieldwork, however, was not undertaken.

Brewer (2014), who analysed security comparatively in the ports of Los Angeles and Melbourne, used predominantly the deep-interview method during site-visits and talked with government and maritime industry representatives in key positions. His collected material was used to improve theoretical understandings of social structures of private-public partnerships (PPPs) in the port environment, leading to the conclusion 'that social capital is […] a necessary requisite of collaborative modes of crime control' (ibid. 198). Based on his research, he recommends future research should focus how PPPs and strategies of co-production work in other community policing contexts, embedded in social capital theories (ibid.). He thus prefers to analyse the strategic level and its advantages for port security, yet does not recommend ethnographic fieldwork with individuals responsible for operational port security, which indicates a hesitation to discover bottom-up realities of port security that might deflect from top-down perspectives.

This ethnographic criminological study capitalised from crucial emic, bottom-up attitudes and practices that realise the everyday of port security. Top-down, State and market perspectives on port security have been documented as well. However, I mainly focused on the way security questions are integrated in the daily lives of ordinary people working in extraordinary environments at operational level 'even as it is informed by the "top-down" practices and discourses of state and global systems' (Goldstein 2010a: 128). Those ordinary people at operational level of the port police and security industry are the ones that had be criminologically understood.

2.2.2 Verstehen

18th century philosopher Immanuel Kant argued 'there is no representation, subjective and referring to something external to us, which could be called objective a priori' (1781: 48), which denotes that we experience everything and everyone around us and that we seek to interpret and understand them. The criminological understanding aimed for here originates from that Kantian directive and is one that, when phenomenologically explained, presupposes that (social) phenomena are experienced directly and instinctively by people, from which essential features of experiences and the essence of those experiences themselves can be derived (Husserl 1983). To this effect, reason and experience apart from each other do not provide solid (scientific) knowledge; to understand the world, is to let phenomena speak for themselves through human behaviour and narratives. You therefore aim 'to interpretively understand [*verstehen*] social action and thereby causally explain its course and its effects' (Weber 1980: 1)[6]. The criminological verstehen is therefore an empathetic and existentialist understanding, as it explores the consciousness of meaning people give to their interactive lives and their actions to deviate, conform and control (Crewe and Lippens 2009; Ferrell 1998; Wender 2004).

Acquiring a criminological verstehen of port security and its operational social actors, required that I had to 'remain critically aware of [the approach to port security and] its existential relation to the whole out of which its particular "objects of attention" have been abstracted' (Wender 2004: 59). This awareness allowed me to explore and understand phenomena that make up port security and 'the phenomena of [its] being-understood as such' (ibid.). A verstehen 'results from a dialectic between the researcher's pre-understandings and the research process, between the self-interpreted constructions of the researcher and those of the participant' (Finlay 2002: 534). Through this dialectic I gained the in-criminology-rooted-sociological understanding (Meuser and Löschper 2002) of processes of port security, its operational actors and their identity formation in these processes.

Studying the port securityscape through such a dialectic with participants, meant I aimed for catching empirical evidence from the participants' narratives (Riessman 2005). Narratives lay bare deep aspects of individual thinking and identity, but can also serve to conceal and misrepresent identity to ourselves and other. By having captured and analysed these narratives, I have retrieved knowledge to fathom the social phenomenon of port security and its connection with identities of participants. These narratives are not exact copies of histories experienced, but rather of refractions of the past that are constitutive of identity formation. To

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[6] Translated from German: 'soziales Handeln deutend verstehen und dadurch in seinem Ablauf und seinen Wirkungen ursächlich erklären will'.

have seen through the narrator's eyes, in other words, is to understand the research population of port security through their perspectives (whether "false" or "true"); this is an *emic perspective* (Druckman 2005), which has let me discover how participants (re)establish a meaningful identity.

Employing the emic perspective stresses 'the insider vantage point' by incurring the 'self-reported sense of meaning', and attaches less importance to 'linear causation' of behaviour (ibid.: 10). The participants 'choose to connect events and make them meaningful for others' (Riessman 2005: 6). Together with the criminological imagination of the port securityscape in the previous chapter, I went into the port securityscape to capture and understand the participants, their attitudes towards and interactions with others at work, of the port business community and those who are (considered) risky and dangerous. Their explanations and practices of port security were uncovered by the use of ethnographic fieldwork. The following section will elaborate on what ethnography is and its useful relevance for this research.

2.2.3 Why ethnography?

In order to record and document attitudes and practices of the participants, I had to situate myself as close to the immediate everyday in the port securityscape as possible through an ethnographic approach. But what is ethnography? Having its roots in the late 19th century anthropology and sociology, a concise definition of ethnography is hard to give, as 'for some it refers to a philosophical paradigm to which one makes a total commitment, for others it designates a method that one uses as and when appropriate [with] positions in-between these extremes' (Atkinson and Hammersly 1994: 248). Ethnography advocates researching social behaviour of people, their institutions, beliefs, customs and (sub)cultures without having fixed hypotheses about these dimensions (Adler and Adler 1998). The ethnographer aims to understand and explain how individuals interpret, give meaning to and (socially) construct their identity and world (views on) and within a multiplicity of social phenomena and realities. To execute ethnography also means to question power relations and criticise the powerful (Clifford and Marcus 1986: 113). Ethnography is therefore anti-hegemonic, which accompanies my critical imagination of the port securityscape and enables me to expose destructive neoliberal power structures of and through port security governance.

Paradoxically however, ethnographies, as critical as the ethnographer's approach might be, have the potential to benefit the powerful as well. This is because ethnographers publish their findings on, amongst others, adaptive and submissive behaviours of social actors. This is knowledge shared in the public domain over which ethnographers have limited control, which may very well increase the very capacity to control and manipulate that ethnographers try to criticise

(Murphy and Dingwall 2001: 341–342).

Developing an understanding of how the participants interpret, give meaning to and (socially) construct port security was the aim of this ethnographic approach. I do not intend to expose and exploit my research population. Therefore, to avoid any confusion, the type of ethnography of security applied here is not the kind that is used to understand and research cultures for military purposes and to "weaponise" the military with 'ethnographic intelligence' (González 2010). Such militaristic ethnographies to obtain security intelligence in support of war strategies, benefitting powerful warmongers, are the very opposite of what I wanted to achieve here. I aim to provide a bottom-up critique on perversions of (port) security (politics) within that hegemony, which is enabled by an ethnographic understanding of the port securityscape.

In this research, to think ethnographically about security is to seek to discover its 'contradictions, expanding our conceptions of what security entails and of the ways in which local ideas about security are informed by and yet also serve to challenge national and global understandings, discourses, and practices' (Goldstein 2010b: 499). This critical approach within ethnographies of security, in particular in occupational settings, is a growing field of research all over the world, creating its own expertise, knowledge and methods (Bajc and De Lint 2011; Dror 2007; Goldstein 2010a, 2010b; Konopinski 2009; Ochs 2010).

During my ethnographic fieldwork I thus focused on how the construction of port security 'plays out on the ground, deployed not only by states but by citizens and community groups as well', by which light is shed on 'the complex interconnections that exist between security and other global/local phenomena' (Goldstein 2010b: 489). I also paid attention to the socialising, cultivating and narrating component within security (Konopinski 2008), and tried to capture how security is lived and the way it has become 'a cultural practice and a communal experience that crafts social life and... an intimate experience that shapes individual subjectivity' (Ochs 2010: 4). Security is reflected in people, because it is an embodied phenomenon, moved around in physical bodies. Moreover, security involves 'perception, imagination, and intersubjective experience [and constitutes] gesture, movement... knowledge and power' (ibid. 14). During fieldwork I had to be aware of 'rhetoric, actors, and imaginaries... the ways security works in everyday life... through personal rationalization, through symbols, and through cynicism, as much as through walls and certainty' (ibid. 42).

So, this ethnography of the port securityscape did not merely scrutinise how security is established by port police and security officers, it especially exposed in which way sociality and identity are (re)established in everyday occupational settings, where security is the intended

result of a day's work. These processes of socialisation and identity formation through port security work, and their effects, were hidden in the narratives of othering by the participant, to which the earlier described verstehen was applied to, as well as has come forward from.

To capture those narratives, I walked and talked with the participants, and to do that, I had to dive into the field of the port securityscape for which I considered comparing the two ports of Rotterdam and Hamburg. A comparative analysis of security is recommended to understand how its language differentiates according to local (legal) cultures (Zedner 2003). Security's spread, dynamics and implications are different everywhere, which makes it hard to generalise in terms of a global security. Nevertheless, security should be subject to a broad-based theorisation yet specific empirical exploration (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009). That is where the power of a comparative criminological analysis of security would lie, namely in its capability of generalisation to a certain extent, but sensitivity to cultural diversity as well (Howard, Newman and Pridemore 2000). However, this research did not become a comparative analysis of the two ports' security realities due to opportunity based choices, bounded by the practical constraints of choosing and getting into ports. Instead, it became a multi-sited ethnography within each port, for which I have visited very different port facilities and sites. Some security companies were, for example, local ones, whereas others operated nationally or globally. Admittedly, I did pick up cultural differences and similarities between the Rotterdam and Hamburg port securityscapes. The comparative element is therefore an added bonus rather than a defining methodological choice, as identity of people in the port securityscape became the main theme, rather than a comparison of port security governance. Their identities are inherently dynamic and heterogeneous and captured through a multi-sited ethnographic account of the very different contours, sites and relationships (Marcus 1995), in this case of port security.

2.3 The multi-sited field

> As part of laying claim to the integrity and trustworthiness of qualitative research, it is vital for researchers to find ways to analyze how subjective and intersubjective elements influence their research. Reflexivity offers one such tool. Here, the researcher engages in an explicit, self-aware meta-analysis of the research process. Through the use of reflexivity, subjectivity in research can be transformed from a problem to an opportunity (Finlay 2002: 531).

This section will look reflexively at negotiating field access, the research population and becoming an insider, because I wanted to get as close as possible to 'the social' of port security, where I could interact face-to-face with people. It is sometimes argued that the ethnographer should be neutral while performing fieldwork. But that is impossible, as I, like everybody else,

has 'bias, dogma and mental baggage' (Alan 2003: 8) before, during and after fieldwork. As a matter of fact, 'anyone who spends his life studying society and publishing the results *is* acting morally and usually politically as well' (Mills 1959: 79, emphasis in original). No-one is a tabula rasa. Not me. Not the participants of this research. We all have irrational feelings and professional opinions about life. In fact, to be a person, and not a 'researcher', invites bias, as section 2.5 will explore further.

2.3.1 Entering the port securityscape

Before I started my PhD study in October 2010, I did a preliminary exploration to orientate myself on port security and write a research proposal. I used my everyday social skills to enter the port securityscape, difficult though that was. I approached organisations in 2009 to talk about port security and its complexities. I stayed in touch with some of the people I talked to back then. Later on some of them became participants. My actual fieldwork started in March 2011 and ended in August 2012, a total of one year and six months. Admittedly, there were months in between in which no fieldwork took place at all and months during which I would be at sites every day. The times I was not in the field, I was conceptualising theory and methodology, but also negotiating access which was, an adventure in itself.

The port securityscape accommodates a closed and hidden community that was hard to reach due to the physical boundaries there are with the outside world. You cannot just walk onto a port facility's territory; most of the time it is fenced, and on the fences you could read 'CCTV in operation' and 'Secured by Security Company XYZ' everywhere (*see figure 2.1 on the next page*). Although not a port facility as meant by the ISPS Code, the port police stations in both ports were highly secured as well, however, you could still walk into the stations. The fact there was CCTV everywhere, inside and outside, the fact I watched the watchers watching (me), plus the fact the participants' tasks consisted of mostly enforcing and securing, made me feel I was being watched continuously. Moreover, at almost every single port facility, police station and security company, I had to register myself, sometimes show my ID, give my signature and my check-in and check-out time. I was very aware of (the control of) my presence in the port securityscape, and became an *observed* observer.

Figure 2.1: ISPS Code iconography

(DK Brandteknik 2014: http://www.dkbrandteknik.dk/wp-content/themes/dkbrandteknik03/images/DK/Marine/pdf/warning-signs-isps-code-signs-0.pdf).

To enhance my recordings and field notes, I took pictures of several port sites. It is, however, forbidden to take them nearby and on territories of ISPS-compliant port facilities, emphasised by the 'No photography' warning signs (*see previous page*). I often wondered (anxiously) whether it was okay for me to shoot some photographs, especially when I was on ISPS territory and participants said they would not mind me taking them, whereas they were the very people who had to stop me. The anxiety came partially forward from my thoughts it may have looked like I was mapping a port area to find out its weak spots to break in or to plan a terrorist attack on a petrochemical site. I did realise it was a type of excitable (even paranoid) thinking that had to stop; it is a common mistake in criminological ethnographies though to do so (Zaitch 2002).

The port facilities, in addition to the ships berthed there, are virtually fully closed areas, which made it impossible for me to just go up to a terminal and 'collect' research participants to talk with. In order to get in touch with people, I made many phone calls with the port police forces and security companies, only to be told I should send an email to their public relation managers, who most of the time never responded. I have an Academia.edu account, which allows its (mostly academic) users to share papers and follow each other – it is a type of Facebook but for academics. What Academia.edu registers is the amount of Google hits when your name is used as a search term, and from which country (and sometimes city as well) the searches come. Whenever I sent an email or phoned a company, mostly within a half an hour but up to a day afterwards, I would receive a message through my Academia.edu, saying 'Someone just searched for you on Google and found your page on Academia.edu'. Indeed, it was mostly someone from Rotterdam or Hamburg from which one could guess it was most likely the person I contacted earlier. This indicates that my contact persons and participants were checking me out before responding, if they would respond at all.

Some organisations did respond positively and invited me to come over for initial interviews or discussions with members of the organisation who had a representative role. They tended to give a promotional talk about port security, something I could find on their websites as well. Although those meetings were not that useful, I did gain further contacts to get in touch with. Through an internship in the maritime security R&D sector, I managed to secure meetings with gatekeepers within (port) police forces and the security industry. With them, I also first had to arrange informal interviews to discuss if and how it would be possible for me to interview operational staff about their work experiences with port security. I sometimes had to put much effort into merely arranging these first informal interviews, without having the certainty an interview would actually take place. I went to a global security company, for instance, where I explained to the company's maritime security specialist my research intentions, which was to

critically analyse port security. The word 'critical' was frowned upon when mentioned, and I was told I should not make any assumptions too quickly. I explained that these 'assumptions' were research hypotheses and thus part of doing research. I realised that getting assistance from this interviewee, and therefore from his security company, was impossible from that point onward. After the meeting, he would email back about it as soon as possible, which he did a couple of weeks later:

> Dear Mister Eski, dear Yarin,
>
> With some delay, I want to inform you by these impersonal means that we will not cooperate in the research. Reasons for this are that we, and rightly so, have no influence on the results. Although we are convinced of our capabilities, there is always the possibility that negative publicity will rise (unfortunately based on experiences with earlier research) by the vision of the researcher.
> A second reason is that at this moment there is no priority to currently put time and energy at our disposal into external research.
>
> Of course, I wish you a lot of luck with the finishing of your promotion.
>
> Best regards,

Many more such disappointing replies followed – from public authorities as well. Such responses became normal at a certain point, which indicates how closed and secretive the port securityscape (intentionally) remains.

Not all first meetings were fruitless, but they did remain difficult, as there were specific fears that especially security companies had:

> If you want to interview people [security officers], it can be wherever, for all I care, without breaching the client's [interests]. In case you say, 'I want to experience [port security work] in real life', we have to inform the client. […] I don't have anything to say about [the client's terminal]. Eventually, it's their property. […] From your perspective, I get it, but when our [security officers] get enthusiastic, they're sometimes capable of saying things, as in 'That's not the smartest thing to say', haha. You know? They'll tell stuff, like 'Yeah, that's simply the way it works'. They should go ahead and say that, I don't object to that, but they need to realise we're always working for someone else, so some appropriate distance [is necessary], from us towards the client, which also counts for [the security officers]. But that's the only message we'll pass onto them. As for anything else, they should be able to answer your questions, to give you an idea of how it works (Ralph, Poseidon Security manager).

Basically, Ralph told me I was going to do fieldwork with pre-instructed security officers who were not allowed to talk about confidential information of clients they provided security services to (that I was not looking for). It took Ralph a long time to get back to me about cooperating with my research. Yet, it proved to be useful to have done an informal interview with him, as I was allowed to talk with their security officers operating in the port. Another way

of getting in touch with participants was through participants who turned out to be gatekeepers. This way, the more participants I interviewed and the more I was allowed to observe their activities, the broader my participant network became. Indeed, I mostly snowballed my way through the contact network.

I also got in touch with participants through my informal network, meaning, my family in Rotterdam, and friends and academic colleagues in Rotterdam and Hamburg who knew someone (who knew someone) working in the port securityscape. If anything, it showed how closely connected one is to someone working in the port. One of the hardest activities for me to participate in were port police water patrols. I asked several participants at operational level during fieldwork whether I could come along during such patrols, but everyone I asked reacted in similar fashion:

> Listen, people used to sail up. Colleagues would request, like 'Ey, can I come along?' We'd say 'No problem'. That's been stopped. Now it's only the very top [higher management] that decides whether you can sail up or not (Warner, operational port police officer).

Once I managed to negotiate and secure access to water patrols, I realised I was inside the port securityscape. Gaining access was only the beginning though of what would be a long road to acceptance and creating trust. However, before I explore those issues, I will describe the general characteristics of the participant group, the sites I have visited and how exactly I gathered data.

2.3.2 The participants, sites and fieldwork[7]

The participants group (N = 85) consisted of people who fulfilled operational tasks, of which some had lower level management tasks. Most of them were port police forces, customs agencies and security companies (N = 71). To get a more holistic understanding of port security, I also focused fieldwork on participants who were involved in port security indirectly, such as shipping agents, port authorities, boatmen, researchers and engineering and security technology providers (N = 14). Material that I gathered from fieldwork with those 14 participants as well as with those at customs agencies (N = 10) has been left out of the data analysis though[8]. That material has been used though to gain a deeper understanding when port police and security officers would refer to the different other groups of participants. Now, the reason why I left out customs officers specifically, who tackle illegal drug smuggling, has to do with two reasons.

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[7] See Appendix 1.
[8] Currently, I am working an article on customs operations in PoR, expected to be published summer 2015.

First, they have been excluded due to reasons for space. Second, and more importantly, customs officers did not consider themselves responsible for port security:

> We do have to register, ISPS, and that kind of preconditions. We have to comply with it. And we have to live up to protective equipment [regulations] that are in force at the quays. So, we have to wear [safety] goggles, put a helmet on, a safety vest and that stuff, we have to comply. You can't escape it (Lucas, operational customs officer).

As Lucas indicates, customs officers experience subjugation to the port security regime, to the extent it can hinder their tasks, whereas port police and security officers are tasked *to enforce* port security regimes. Therefore, the core group of participants (N = 61) are operational port police officers (N = 30) and security officers (N = 31),[9] who worked at different sites in the port and had different types of tasks that I will explore here briefly.

I performed fieldwork at four police stations in total, two in PoR and two in PoH. The port police officers at those stations worked within arenas of port policing. Some were responsible for port business community policing, doing daily water and car ("land") patrol, giving emergency assistance, and staying visible to the port community. These officers resolved conflicts and disputes, and have a prevention role through giving advice. They also check port traffic by conducting vehicle or vessel inspections. Moreover, they maintained close contact with the port facilities about security measures, prevention of environmental wrongdoings and possible criminal activity (e.g. drug transport and theft). They therefore delivered service and support rather than actuarial policing, and functioned as focal points for local law enforcement. Other port police officers did border control and immigration checks of crew members, investigations, intake of criminal offences and misdemeanours at the waterside, aggression on-board, and speeding of boats and drunken vessel owners. Furthermore, a few port police officers were assigned to do Port State Control (PSC) inspections on deck. PSC would look at how the Ship Security Officers (SSOs) established proper ship security measures in line with the ISPS Code, and if these were executed accordingly. There were also port police officers who had environmental policing tasks, based on the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). They would check management of crude oil and waste on deck of a ship. A small group of port police officers during my fieldwork were responsible for checking dangerous goods, and enforced related regulations, e.g. the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG) Code. Inspections with port police officers took place on deck of five container ships and one bulk carrier. One inspection was aimed at leaked goods in

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[9] Some of these core operational participants have management tasks; this is made explicit in-text.

a container that was placed on terminal territory. In fact, because of the different border control, pollution and dangerous goods inspections by police, I went to and through a couple of terminals where these ships were docked. For the other group of participants though, the security officers, I had to visit significantly more terminals.

Most security officers I encountered during fieldwork were responsible for securing the port facility perimeters. Together, they worked at nine different port facilities that I visited regularly, and even daily at a certain point – in fact, for one terminal I received my own access card. These were not all the same type of facilities, as some handled containers, ferries or mass dry bulk, and some were petrochemical sites. At many of the terminals, the security officers' tasks consisted, overall, of making sure terminal personnel and port visitors (mostly truckers and ship crews) would comply with the facility's security and safety regulations. They also took care of registration of visitors, and would instruct people to wear a safety vest and equipment when necessary. In case of occupational hazards and emergences, they would apply first-aid to employees. At some terminals where it was not allowed to walk across the container stacks, ship crews were picked up from the ships by security officers to get them to the terminal exit. This way they could go to city centres in Rotterdam and Hamburg. On return, they would be taxied back to their ship. Several security officers did car patrols on terminal territory to check for weak(ened) points, or to assist non-regular incoming and outgoing trucks with uncontainerised and exceptionally large break bulk cargo. CCTV monitoring of the terminal territory was an important task for almost every security officer I met. Some security officers were Port Facility Security Officers (PFSOs) and, in order to comply with the ISPS Code, they would have to pay ship visits to negotiate with the ships' SSOs whether a DoS had to be drawn up. In case of an ISPS level 2 situation[10], they would get more tasks and authorities to do drastic inspections at the terminal site, however, this never occurred when I was doing my fieldwork, and I understood they never actually got to a level 2 situation. At some terminals, security officers were made responsible for sanitary tasks such as cleaning toilets. Another group of security officers that did not (just) do port facility security, were tasked to do security car patrol and alarm response throughout the entire port area. I therefore also participated during such preventative mobile surveillances of terminals that needed to be locked up by the security officers, as these were non-24/7 terminals. The participation in security car patrols were interesting as it led to more focus on how the participant explained something or acted, while keeping track of the environment and the movement within it.

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[10] '…the level for which appropriate additional protective security measures shall be maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a security incident' (IMO 2003: 6).

Some of the participants who I arranged meetings with also assisted me with 'work visits'. When arranging such visits, I would make sure it always took place inside a port facility, port police station or a security company, in a car or on a boat. I would build in enough flexibility to move around and talk with people, as much as I could, so that I would not damage the dynamic nature of social life and work in the port securityscape. On an average fieldwork day, I therefore did not have a thoroughly structured plan, although I did know whom I was going to work with, and I did have a list of themes I wanted to hear about or pick up on. Occasionally I had a recorded meeting first and then afterwards, I was invited to have a look around at the terminal or go and participate during a security (car) patrol, which I never refused. The rare moments I could take pictures, I did so to enrich my ethnographic material and to imagine the spaces and places of the port securityscape during data analysis. When a long day of fieldwork was going to happen and thorough participant observation was applied, I sometimes found myself doing in-depth interviews with participants, if only because there was not that much to do (which reflects the inherently boring nature of the job). My fieldwork was about accompanying the participants in their familiar work environments, by either walking along, driving along, or sailing along. I was thus 'walked through' the participants' lived work experiences of the port securityscape, enabling me 'to study the participant's experiences, interpretations, and practices within this environment' and letting me obtain 'responses from participants while they actively inhabit specific contexts' (Carpiano 2009: 264). The ethnographic gathering of data was therefore not structured, simply because of the structureless, non-linear nature of social life in the port securityscape. The collection of data took place by using several, supposedly, separate qualitative research methods, like interviewing participants, observing them and participating during their job-related activities and practices. I write 'supposedly', because during my ethnographic fieldwork interviews led to observation or participation and vice versa. There are practically no clear boundaries between different ethnographic techniques but they are rather 'negotiated with subjects of study, invented or reinvented on the spot, and not infrequently discarded in the dangerous, ambiguous, interactive process of field research' (Ferrell 2009: 12–13). To negotiate, invent or reinvent such ethnographic techniques to subsequently retrieve the verstehen, I had to become an insider.

2.3.3 Becoming an insider

The ethnographer's social role in the research site qualifies the data and conclusions. The closer you get and familiarise yourself with the participants, the better the quality of your ethnographic material becomes (LeCompte and Goetz 1982). Hence, becoming an insider matters. However, besides being physically closed, the port securityscape is also socio-culturally closed, which made

it hard(er) to create a bond of trust and mutual understanding to be eventually let in as close as possible. So, why even try to become an insider?

> [E]xperiential camaraderie [is] essential to intensive interviewing and other aspects of long-term criminological fieldwork… we see the necessity of criminological verstehen in particular research situations, and also the positive secondary effects of shared or sympathetic understanding (Ferrell 1998: 32).

Although I did get accepted as an insider and gained the trust of participants so as to see lived realities come alive, it took time. You have to show real and not just research interest in your participants. You have a coffee and laugh about sometimes very inappropriate jokes. Basically, you do what you would do on any random day; you socialise. I started to feel accepted and trusted as an insider in the port securityscape through several informal gestures that seemed trivial but were crucial. Participants would give me things and direct me to other people. For example, when I received my own safety vest with 'Port Security' on it to move around on the outside territory. It was not just a matter of having to comply with safety and security regulation at the port facility; it also meant I was now one of the security officers. Some participants shared certain documents with me of which they thought would help me with my research or that were 'for my eyes only'. Port police manager Cornelius gave me a proposal that was just submitted for an EU call, after which he stressed I should let him know in case I wanted to get in touch with more potentially interesting participants. Many more participants offered to put me in touch with people they thought would be (more) interesting. Snowballing through participants is therefore not just a way of establishing a contact network; being enabled to do so is a reflection of trust of the researched in the researcher.

When participants started to express their frustration with management (to which a part of Chapter 3 is dedicated), I was allowed 'into the zone of trust'. I was told some participants' management never fully explained why they would be interviewed; they just had to cooperate with me. One security officer explained how I was introduced to him and his colleagues:

> That's, I think, not entirely clear what you do exactly, sadly. I heard from [another colleague], well, he told me that you've been around [the terminal] with him, started with him, right? […] You're doing research on ISPS etc. It's not really… clear… again… You're here, then everything is okay, haha! You're assisted by all of us. So, THAT is what we know. We show you around, as I said, full assistance. You're here to give away everything, haha!

He jokes about the fact I am there to betray them about what they tell me and I laughed along. I then explain there's a lot of research done about port security, but not the way I have done it.

I apologised to him and other participants about my research intentions not being made clear, but I was told it was not my fault they were not fully informed. Some received so little information, they thought I was from Scotland Yard (instead of the Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research) or Interpol, and I was there to inspect their security practices. Although it caused some laughter, the fact they thought I would inspect them was not a good start. They distrusted me more than if they would have received full information of their management on who I was and what my purposes were. I therefore explained to several participants once more my research, taking another risk they might not participate, whereas I expected they would already be fully informed. This again reveals how they distrust their management to such an extent that they expect they in fact would be inspected via their management. Shared distrust toward management reinforced their trust in me to the extent they considered me their colleague. Operational security officer Arnd, for example, referred to me as his colleague when he reported to another colleague over the portophone, he and I were arriving at a certain gate of the terminal. Later on though, when he and I were going to do a PFSO visit for a DoS, he jokingly called me the assistant of the assistant, as he was the PFSO assistant who I was assisting. A subtle reminder I am not as much as an insider as he is.

With some participants it became so easy to talk and share, that we shared personal matters and private life. Especially during coffee breaks, lunch breaks or dinner time, or during night shifts when there was not that much to do, we would talk about family and friends, advise each other where to go to at night to have a good time or difficulties we were experiencing. One participant trusted me to such a degree that he told me about severely traumatic events during his childhood, and how it has made him disciplined in life, a discipline he appreciates about doing port security. It was difficult for me to react to such an openhearted story. On top of this, he found and contacted me through social media, making me wonder whether I got too close to the participant. Some participants would let me know, delicately, I was a researcher and would never fully understand what port security really is all about. Instead of trust, there remained distrust. Operational port police officer Marcus, for example, picked me up at the reception desk of the police station, where he asked me why I as wearing a pair of shorts. He seemed to be annoyed by it. As we walked to his office, he was referring to a report of the local port authorities that he liked. He continued that he thinks so much is being researched and written about port security these days, implying my research may be redundant, revealing some his distrust towards my researcher position. For him and some other participants, I remained an outsider.

2.4 Practical and ethical issues

2.4.1 Commuting and exhaustion

Fieldwork usually started early in the morning, fuelling up my car and driving or taking public transport to the different sites in both ports:

> Got up at 6:30 today to get to the first meeting and start the visits to different terminals. The night before I got back late at my sister's, at 0:30am. She lives in Rotterdam city centre. I stayed over at her place 'cause I wanted to avoid traffic jams the next morning on my way to the different terminals. Must've been 1:30 when I fell asleep. When I got up, I was nervous. Shaved myself and took a shower. I felt the need to look shaven. I wore a V-neck pull over, with a white t-shirt underneath it. I expected I would talk with security officers, who were all working that day. I did not expect middle or higher management, otherwise I would have put on a suit. I took my GPS, went down and got into the car. It was chilly outside and inside the car. I turned on the GPS and entered 'Rotterdam', then 'XXXX', and then '##', after which the GPS said 'Unrecognised destination'. 'Well, crap', were my thoughts.

Due to the size of both ports, as well as the sizes of some container terminals, I thought it would be a good idea to use the GPS. However, it never recognised any of the port addresses I entered and sometimes it would say 'Application MobileNavigator.exe has performed an illegal operation and will be shut down'. Finding and getting to the exact location of a port facility was therefore hard sometimes, but by asking around at other port facilities' reception desks or security loges, I always got where I needed to be. What the excerpt in the above also indicates is that fieldwork days were long. Exhaustion became an issue. Especially when I had a couple of those days in a row, I sometimes lost focus and made mistakes. One morning I was supposed to be at a port police station at 7:30am, for which I was supposed to take the 7:07am ferry to get across the city river. However, I took an earlier ferry, the one at 6:55am, thinking it was the right one, but it was not. As I was on the river, wrongly thinking I would get at the fieldwork site ahead of time, I noticed the ferry was taking a different route than I thought it would. Eventually, I had to get out at a ferry stop quite far away from the police station, where I got almost two hours later. Although the participants had to laugh about my mistake, I did miss out on an early surprise cargo goods inspection – later that afternoon I could still come along to have a look, but I missed out on the element of surprise these inspections can have. I also made a mistake by having gone to the wrong port facility of the same company, located in a completely different harbour. When I got to another location of the same company, I saw two Poseidon Security officers at the reception desk, and I asked them how I could get to the specific port facility. 'By car, haha!', they replied. I was already too late and absolutely not in the mood for jokes. Another guy, not a security officer told me I had to go to entirely different harbour. I thought they were messing with me though. I just did not believe them, as they were laughing with it. I called my participant to cancel the appointment. When I got home, I checked all the

details, and indeed, the security officers were right. I felt so stupid and ashamed, and told my participant I was genuinely sorry and I hoped that he managed to do work, which he confirmed. He said to me not to worry and to schedule another interview next week, which we did. He was very easy going about it and said: 'At least you had a nice tour through the [other port] area, haha!'

2.4.2 Informed consent[11]

> Me: Maybe ehm… here is an informed consent form.
> Rupertus: Aaah!
> Wiglaf: To win the washing machine!
> Rupertus: Haha!
> Wiglaf: Haha, one that's from the UK, haha!

Wiglaf explained to Rupertus that signing the informed consent form is merely for my research and his own anonymity. Many participants made similar jokes or witty remarks when receiving and signing the informed consent form. Some wondered why it was necessary. I gave them the same explanation I offer here. Fieldwork involves talking and walking with people, or 'human subjects' as ethics forms prefer to call them. Due to direct involvement of people and their actions and statements, I had to ensure full anonymity to all participants. Their anonymity was and still is guaranteed as much as possible by a completed informed consent form on which participants needed to state they do or do not agree to take part in this research, as well as whether they were okay with being recorded or not. When someone with such a specialised task was recorded, it meant far-going anonymisation was applied, meaning, in this thesis as well as future publishable work certain traits of tasks, places and company names have been given an alternative name or simply left out. For example, in drafting this thesis, I initially included specific dates and locations. However, due to the strong guarantee I gave to participants that I would do anything possible to keep them and their statements anonymous, I have left dates and places out. The data excerpts therefore might miss out on specifics, but the participants did feel more comfortable in speaking freely thus enriching the collected data. Nevertheless, as much as I have tried and will continue to try to protect the participants' anonymity, it is possible participants will remain identifiable to themselves (Murphy and Dingwall 2001: 341-342).

Getting their signed informed consent and having them agreed to be recorded has been, throughout the entire fieldwork time, an exciting moment. Although all participants agreed with participating, two participants did not want to be recorded. One of them did not give any explanation why and I said it did not matter. I started to take notes but it was difficult to keep

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[11] Please see Appendix 6 for the email approach, information sheet and the informed consent form.

track of as much as possible, especially those small but crucial remarks that matter for quality of the data and its analysis. I did manage to get some quotes, although they were not as lengthy as the recorded ones. The other participant knew the exact problem of taking notes when you cannot record and spoke so fast and dropped so much information in merely one hour that I had to be selective in what I was hearing and what I asked. After we were done, he told me he talked fast on purpose because the information he shared was very delicate and only used to illustrate the general points he gave to me. Other participants were hesitant with signing the informed consent itself and wanted to hear once more what it is they were going to participate in and why they have to sign the form. When I introduced myself to two port police officers, Mischel and Giselbert, who were going to take me on immigration inspections that day, I explained what the informed consent form entails and why they needed to sign it, in order for me to continue my fieldwork. They were both a bit wary about it. Mischel started to read it and signed it but told me he did not want to be recorded, as well as Giselbert. This meant I had to take notes while walking and talking during an inspection. I had a notepad but I knew I was going to miss out on things. In the police car though, Giselbert told me he misunderstood and that in fact I could record him. I told both port police officers that that is impossible because his colleague Mischel did not want to be recorded. Mischel said he would just remain silent when I would talk with Giselbert. However, later on Mischel talked anyway even when he saw I was recording. There was one participant who wrote down a pseudonym due to the secret nature of his work, and a few participants told me they found it unnecessary to give their date of birth. It happened very often that I was recording and a third, fourth, fifth and sixth person would enter a setting, started talking and therefore would automatically be recorded without having given his or her consent. What I then did was intervene and notify the person concerned, like the following participant:

> No, it's not like it's an issue for me, but for me it's more about that when I'm filling out a questionnaire… I've experienced a lot, in terms of interview questionnaires. Experienced a lot, and at a certain point enough is enough.

I explained I had to obtain informed consent from him and everyone I was going to talk with, due to my university's ethics policies, which is partially to protect the participants themselves. However, the moment of intervention disrupted the entire natural way of talking with people, and basically, doing fieldwork itself. People were suddenly aware of being researched and were not behaving as natural as before the intervention. In a way, the ethical compliance I maintained sometimes damaged the very social fabric I was exploring critically more than it was safeguarding good and transparent research. There was therefore data gathered that was, simply

said, worse/less valid and reliable than it could have been. Now, is that ethical? This is a question that should make one wonder whether the governance of critical social research through increasingly disciplinary ethics is stimulating good research practices and ethical behaviours of social scientists or is it becoming more and more an attempt to minimise universities' liability while silencing critical social researchers? As Haggerty argues, '[t]he authority of the ethics structure risks becoming more coercive than moral' (2004: 410). For me, I continuously balanced, in fact, struggled with externally enforced university ethics of doing research and my personal ethics of doing research, in particular in regards to recording.

2.4.3 Recording

I attempted to record everyone who gave me their informed consent and agreed with being recorded. Recording allowed for the collection of highly detailed material. Moreover, I simply had to record, because the port securityscape hampered note-taking: I needed both of my hands to move around, getting on- and off-board ships, in and out of cars, walking around, paying attention to CCTV images, and operating computers and systems. Perhaps silly to say, but because having a coffee and dinner with participants were important moments of data gathering, my hands were filled with a cup or cutlery. I 'took notes' by recording myself during moments I was on my own or after fieldwork. When driving or travelling back home, I recorded what I said about important social interactions and site specifics. Another advantage of recording over taking notes, is that note taking can lead to participants being aware and distrustful of what is written down, possibly affecting the data quality (Geelhoed 2011: 40-41). Still, when I was at a site, sitting behind a computer, and participants had to go somewhere else for a short while, I did observe and took notes in Word, because a recorder does not record what I see and I could not talk to myself. That would have looked strange to the people around me.

There were some issues involved. For example, it was difficult to hear what the participants were saying, due to loud ship engines running in the background, people shouting, cranes moving, trucks passing by, carriers driving next to you, or music played too loudly. There were people who talked with a thick Rotterdam or Hamburg accent, or would mumble. Although their mumbling was recorded perfectly, the transcribing of their statements took longer. Next to typical technical issues, the presence of the recorder itself caused issues during fieldwork. The visibility and especially the switching on of the recorder often disrupted a natural conversation, as it took away the attention of the participant. Participants would make 'funny' remarks about being recorded, coming forward from their anxiety I could sense. They were anxious about the things they would share with me and what exactly I would do with the data. Some would state that what they were about to tell or just told could not be used for my research. A few would

tell me to stop recording, and would then elaborate on the secrets they shared. After fieldwork, participants would stress I cannot mention certain names or detailed information about other institutions, companies or person mentioned. A small number of participants were curious how much their colleagues shared and told, and to which extent the recorded material would be communicated with their management:

> Look, if what I've told gets exposed… you know what I mean? My manager would say 'That guy doesn't really like it here', or 'What use is that guy, who's only nit-picking' […] It doesn't bother me though. I tell what I want to tell. You asked your questions, and I've told you what I know.

Quite some participants did not tell everything because of presence of other colleagues. I was told in one instance to wait with my questions and ask them during car patrol, 'because' he said 'look how that colleague has ears like Spock!' He wanted to be away, in our own private space, without a colleague interrupting. They basically considered the interview as an opportunity to blow off some steam and express what they think of port security, their management, their colleagues, the port business community and 'enemies' of the port securityscape. On that note, due to the fact port police officers and security officers where dealing with employees, visitors, crew members and so on, often those third parties were recorded without them knowing it, which provided good data but also raised ethical concerns.

2.4.4 Personal safety and security

> The moment it's on [cargo handling] and that boat is at larboard, there'll be a pilot boat. That little piece of quay becomes the wild west, to call it that way, 'cause cranes are doing this [portraying back-and-forward crane movements] with cargo, with pallets, and forklifts are continuously like this [doing up-and-down forklift car movements]. There is constant movement. That's generally the case. Even today, I believe, it's quite a dangerous situation, meaning, when people are walking there. That just happens, you see it. Dangerous situations with bunkering [do] not really [exist], I think. That's on the other side, that's the waterside. I'm not really bothered by it. Crashes I did experience. Not that shocking. Yeah, accidents. Technical stuff that breaks. Pallets falling from a cage when the chains break. I did witness some heavy incidents. […] Often you had recklessness of personnel, dealing with materials. Driving too fast, too much risk. [They're] busy, and will say 'Well, that boat has to set sail in an hour'. That kind of silliness. That's when a dangerous situation develops and severe incidents happened then of course (Aaron, operational security officer).

Doing ethnographic fieldwork in the area of crime and security, especially participant observation, brings along dangers to researchers due to the concealed nature of crime and security itself (Ferrell and Hamm 1998; Zaitch 2000). Despite the fact I did not focus on grave harmful and spectacular crime per se but on the mundane practice of security, there were some serious dangers and industrial hazards at the port sites. In dealing with them, I always balanced the participants' safety, my own safety and full disclosure of harmful situations and criminal

behaviour, which I discussed with the participants and my supervisors. In terms of personal safety, port police and security officers are safety and security experts and took 'Safety First' very seriously. So, although I have been in the middle of unsafe situations, strangely enough, I never felt unsafe. In fact, he dangerous situations and the way participants and I dealt with them, generated very rich and relevant data.

Port facilities are multimodal transport nodes; they are assemblages of movements of people, bulk cargo, containers, cranes, carriers, cars, trucks, small boats, big ships and trains. This traffic was divided up in specific roads and spaces for specific modes of transport to take place. However, sometimes roads and spaces cross over. For example, especially at night, you have to be visible for container carriers so that they will see you and not hit you. All moving vehicles were equipped with safety lights on top of them to switch on once they were moving at the facility. Also, everyone at the cargo handling parts of port facilities must wear fluorescent safety vests, as well as safety shoes. Some participants asked me when a work visit was arranged, what my shoe size was so that they could reserve a pair of safety shoes for me or they would at least give me a strong reminder I needed to buy and bring some, just in case. When I told participants I already had them, they were impressed; my ownership of safety shoes created respect.

The same goes for picture taking. I had my camera with me and always said to the participants 'This could have been a nice photo', usually followed by them allowing me to take a picture. I would then say that I know it is a security breach and that established their trust in me as well. I only used those pictures for remembering sites and never for publication, but still, the participants trusted me to do the right thing. At a petrochemical site I was told taking pictures is not merely a security breach but a safety breach as well. All electronic equipment at that type of sites need to be sparkless tool equipment, because one spark can set the entire site on fire, I was told. I used that information at the next petrochemical site and, again, established a trust bond with the participants.

There was some danger during inspections involving environmental regulations and checking dangerous goods; those demanded high safety and security awareness. During one inspection of dangerous goods, I went to a site where a certain gummy liquid, 200 litres in total, got leaked out of a barrel that was inside a container. It led to me wearing even more personal protective equipment (PPE). I complied and showed a genuine interest in why such safety measures had to be taken, not only for my own personal safety, but also, perhaps more importantly, because of the respect I would get from complying with such governance, to build up trust. In a way, the symbolical value of complying with safety and security governance principally safeguarded the bond with the participants, and secondly, it safeguarded my physical health.

Next to (symbolic) personal safety against industrial hazards, the issue of personal security popped up during fieldwork. By that I mean, in contrast to industrial hazards, possible intended threats coming from people in the port securityscape. For example, I was warned by several port police officers to watch out for the smaller and the more 'dodgy' security companies in case they would want to meet me somewhere outside at night. These were mere warnings but I noticed it did become a little voice in the back of my head, saying to be careful about meeting with security officers. For example, I visited security officers at their homes and I was somewhat concerned about doing that as a direct result from that warning. I was perhaps too aware of possible threats; the meetings themselves went well and nothing happened. Nonetheless, it definitely influenced the questions asked and the way I paid attention to the participant on those occasions. During these instances no real insecurity was there; it was merely anticipated. During one border control, however, an actual insecure situation arose. The port police officers were done with their talk with the captain, shook hands, laughed and left the cabin. The captain wanted to shake hands with me as well, and as that happened, he held my hand whereas I wanted to let go. I could not leave the captain's cabin. He wondered whether I 'had everything', meaning, whether I recorded everything I needed to know. I tried to solve the situation by ignoring him and trying to get my hand loose. So I said goodbye once more:

> Me: Ciao.
> Captain: You finish?
> Me: I finish.
> Captain: You finish? Reeeaaally?
> Me: Yes.
> Captain: Haha! And you are [shipping] agent? No?
> Me: Sorry?
> Captain: You just... You just...
> Me: Ehm, intern.
> Captain: Oh okay.
> Me: Intern police.
> *One of the port police officers came back to check what was going on. He laughed at the captain, however, with an angry look.*
> Captain: Aaah! You training. Traineeeee! Haha, I seeee.
> Me: Haha [nervous]
> Captain: Okay I thought you were this… Coming as [an] agent, haha [nervous laughter too].
> Me: Ehm, no.
> Captain: Okay, bye.
> Operational port police officer: Bye.
> Me: ciao

Back in the car, I explained to the port police officers I thought the captain was a bit nervous about my presence and the recorder. He thought I was a member of the shipping agency that was doing some sort of secret inspection. They acknowledged this. The port police officer who returned noticed the captain was squeezing my hand, which was the reason why he came back. I was scared and felt threatened as I was by myself and the captain kept me in his cabin.

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2.5 Analysis of identity

2.5.1 Transcribing and thematic analysis

I transcribed over 200 hours of recorded material into a document. For the transcription, I used German audio transcription software *f4®*[12]. The recorded data-load was significant, but because I wanted to be as precise as possible, I transcribed not just the spoken, but also the pauses, the sighs, the little and loud noises in the environment to use the full potential of the data and its richness. The transcription stayed as close to what was said as was possible, meaning I retained incorrect grammar use, hesitations, pauses and interjections; where I could infer it I added the meaning of such hesitations and pauses in those situations. It is sometimes recommended that such moments should be excluded from transcription(s) (MacWhinney 2012), however, I noticed sometimes a pause said more than the spoken word. In this thesis though, those moments are taken out as their meanings are explained in the body of the text. In any case, together with descriptions of the pictures taken, the field notes, and the initial thematisation during fieldwork, I compiled 59 separate documents that together formed a document of 2,033 pages/906,880 words of raw data, ready for thorough qualitative thematic analysis.

To analyse the large body of data, I used another piece of German software, namely *MAXQDA®*[13]. It is professional qualitative data analysis software for qualitative text and content analysis. What MAXQDA allows its users to do is to structure and categorise major themes and subthemes, by creating your own codes and code systems. Within these code systems I marked important codes and valued them. What the software basically does, is that it organises your thoughts and conceptualisations. Moreover, it eases the process of searching for a coded segment and its related codes as well as other relating segments. Another helpful tool was the option to create tables of codes that overlapped with each other; this helped me to visualise the data analysis. I was able to create an overview of what participants said and which groups of participants said it. So, for example, I used such visualisation to discover what kind of codes were more associated with port police officers or security officers.

2.5.2 Understanding identity formation through othering

The results that will be explored in Chapters 3 to 7 are a fusion of the pre-formed criminological imagination and post-fieldwork analysis of data, out of which identity formation emerged as the main analytical focus on the everyday worker realities of the participants. To analytically scrutinise the (re)establishment of meaningful occupational identity led to that deeper *verstehen*

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[12] See http://www.audiotranskription.de/english for further information.
[13] See http://www.maxqda.com/ for further information.

of bottom-up port security, occupational insignificance and job insecurity-based anxiety.

A Self through the Other

One of way of understanding identity formation is to frame it as a continuous (re)establishment of the Self through the Other, also referred to as *othering* (Hegel 1977; Ricoeur 1994; Lacan 2007; Said 1979). The Self 'exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged' (Hegel 1977: 111). The Hegelian notion of the Self through the Other is the most basic understanding of it, reemphasised by Lacan (2007) who claimed the Other does not exist as a reality yet is needed, even longed for, because 'man's desire finds its meaning in the other's desire, not so much because the other holds the keys to the desired object, as because his first object(ive) is to be recognized by the other' (ibid.: 222).

The Other does not merely have to be a specific person or group of person, as Lacan's work implies. There is also such a phenomenon as the 'big Other', which consists of (ideas about) an anonymous and unwritten authoritative power and is part of all of us, always present, directing and controlling our acts but never to be experienced through any of our senses. This big Other is a symbolic Other that can be a set of moral rules or a measurement tool against which one's Self can be contrasted, meaning the big Other can be reified into a 'God', country, government, ruling class, religion, culture, ideology or lifestyle. Still, although having power over us and our Selfs, the big Other is frail while it only exists by the grace of our own thoughts and acts as if it exists; it is in the exchange of these thoughts and acts with each other this big Other is renegotiated and redefined, as much as it redefines us (Žižek, 2006: 7–11). Our othering of people is informed by this big Other, as much as our othering informs us about the big Other.

Ricoeur argues, like Lacan, 'the selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be thought of without the other' (1994: 3). We all need another (group of) people who need us too to mutually acknowledge each other's identity. However, who you are and knowing what your Self is, can never be scientifically confirmed; the Self exists only because of attestation of the Self. This means you have to 'trust in the power to say, in the power to do, in the power to recognize oneself as a character in a narrative, in the power, finally, to respond to accusation in the form of the accusative […] attestation can be defined as the assurance of being oneself acting and suffering' (ibid.: 22). Once you can trust the fact you can say, do and recognise, you can define and engage with the Other.

Ricoeur therefore seems to point out a 'narrative identity' that leads to the formulation of the Other (Papadopoulos 2002), which leads to 'competing or supplementary narratives that can

create an otherness of oneself' (ibid. 167). This implies the relationship between the Self and the Other could be considered complementary and complimentary, to the extent the Self admires the Other to the point the Other is elevated (ibid.). A Self can become a better Self by acknowledging similarities that can be found in the Other that is admired. What should become clear here is the gripping forte of the othering approach, that is, it lays bear a certain relational dialectic. It shows that the manner in which an individual defines the Other unveils how he characterizes himself and his morals and values, as much as a definition of his Self tells something about the Other; they are each other's flipsides (Baumann 2004; Said 1979). This means that the way participants consider the Other reveals (hidden) aspects of their Selfs. The main observation is that the participants define define their Selfs through specific categories of Others, which influences port security.

The familiar Other

For establishing an occupational Self during everyday port policing and security work this implies port police and security officers establish a Self through people at work, such as direct colleagues and managerial superiors. Collegiality in operational port security then matters, like in any other police or security occupational setting (Fielding 1995; Punch 1983; Reiner 2010; Waddington 1999; Wilson 1978). In police and security professions and their 'canteen cultures', collegiality means you (should be able to) rely on 'close interdependence [which] entails a sense of responsibility for each other's safety' (Sanne 2008: 625). The interdependence implies that as a member of a team you have to mind yourself and the team, 'irrespective of formal roles and responsibilities' (ibid.), so even if your higher-up commands you to do something unsafe, you should do what is safe and secure. As important is the role of management (Reuss-Ianni 1993), as resisting management is one of the reasons 'to form cliques, factions and fraternal associations […] to defend officers against what is to them arbitrary authority and "outside influence"' (Wilson 1978: 73).

To provide policing and security at street-level also means to cope with threats, dangers, joys and tensions together while making sense of security issues and their work (Duijnhoven 2010; Waddington 1999). Patterson et al. (2009) explored the everyday work lives of Canadian hospital security workers who were tasked with enforcing restrictive smoking policies but used common sense interpretation to keep people abiding by the policies. Team members required a great deal of self-control in order to secure on the clock, especially during events when people violated the formal hospital rules of the space of security. For security personnel, '[m]utual assistance [is] the behavioral norm among members... a common example of which was providing backup during confrontations... if someone has trouble, he or she can call for assistance by two-way

radio' (ibid.: 346).

Although specific sometimes negative aspects associated with police and security subcultures, such as isolation, solidarity, masculinity and cynicism, it is argued these dimensions have tempered down over the last few decades (Terpstra and Schaap 2013). However, they are not completely gone and still play a defining role in 21st century (private) policing (Atkinson 2013; Reiner 2010).

Next to direct operational colleagues and management, cooperation and partnerships with other security agencies form a venue to define one's Self through. Recent research on security network cultures and on cooperation of police with social workers suggests that such cooperation is considered effective and mutually benefitting, even enjoyable rather than conflicting (O'Neill and McCarthy 2014; Whelan 2015). This means that the Self of port police and security officers is constructed through the Other at work, by cooperation amongst and conflict with each other. How they define the Other at work shall reveal narratives about their Selfs.

As well as defining a Self through the Other at work, the workers define a Self through the Other who receives protection and security from port police and security officers, which is the port business community and shipping industry. This community and industry are, like colleagues and management at work, a specific category of port securityscape Others who are considered in need of their policing and security services. They dependent on the participants and might therefore be considered weak. Othering then creates and maintains a saviour, powerful Self through a helpless, subordinate Other. This way othering is (about gaining) power (Beauvoir 2007; Said 1979; Spivak 1985). One of the most familiar identity formations by defining the Self through the Other is that of the male Self that is defined through female Other. Beauvoir argued, for example, how 'humanity is male and man defines woman not in herself but as relative to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous being […] She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute – she is the Other' (2011 [1949]: 5-6).

The dependence of the port business community and shipping industry feeds the sense of duty of the participants, because that is the audience they police and secure for; they are entrusted to do so. They feel they have accomplished something when they establish a secure environment and retrieve occupational pride from it and therefore a meaningful occupational identity (Sanne 2008). Security staff in hospitals feel responsible for the audience they secure for, mostly being patients and hospital staff, despite the fact other hospital staff, in particular doctors, treat them

with disrespect (Patterson et al. 2008: 347). Being disrespected by some of the population you have to keep safe from danger does not matter though, because you do it for the whole of the group; that is your task. That is your calling and provides you with a meaningful occupational Self, thus keeping you safe from occupational insignificance. Othering of port business community and shipping industry members shall, like definitions of the Other(s) at work, expose the norms, values and cultures that participants like to categorise themselves and their Selfs in.

The unfamiliar Other

Another category of Others participants define their Self through, is that of the unfamiliar Other who is considered inferior, risky, dangerous and criminal to establish a superior Self. Said argued that through the Other and othering one is allowed to define a Self that is contrasting with the Other in its image, idea, personality and experience (1979: 2). For instance, in relation to European colonialism in Asia, or the Orient as he refers to it, Said argues that 'European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self' (ibid. 3). A sense of superiority of the subject comes out of one's comparison with other (groups of) people of another ethnicity, nationality, culture, belief system or religion, gender or sexual orientation.

Defining the Self as superior and just through the Other as inferior is also prevalent amongst police and security officers that have strong prejudices towards those seen as criminal and risky, of which '[t[he crucial source […] is societal racism, which places ethnic minorities disproportionately in those strata and situations from the police derive their "property"' (Reiner 2010: 131). These prejudices together with moral cynicism coming forward from daily encounters with lawbreakers and other individuals who disrupt public peace and order. These encounters provide '[n]ot only for the police but also among [security] guards […] the ideal breeding place for excessive suspicion and mistrust, which could in an excessive form result in witch hunts, inappropriate searches and needless display of power' (Loyens 2009: 474). It leads to an isolated 'we-versus-them' attitude of police and security personnel, including towards the very citizens they protect. Othering to feel superior over the othered social group is then about protecting the Self by construing the Other and his values and ideologies as less than your own (in-group's). Taken into Nietzschean consideration, this type of othering is a claim to truth that reveals the will to a meaningful and powerful Self. Especially in times of crisis that cause anxiety to the subject that feels weak(er), the establishment of a meaningful, powerful Self requires a more negative Other to contrast and certify one's own values and morals with that are unsure and under pressure:

> In periods where crisis is seen to loom on the horizon, when anxiety is raised, those associated with undesirable qualities move from being represented as mildly threatening, a challenge to the core values of the society, to being linked to the root of the crisis. Thus, while the [O]ther is defined in terms of difference and inferiority in relation to normative values in an ongoing sense, the representations that arise at times of crisis intensify this distinction. They reflect a powerful division between a decorous, righteous "us" and a disruptive, transgressive "them." […] The decorum and positive sense of identity of "us" is sustained by imbuing others with devalued properties. Such representations can lead to the desire for the removal of this polluting force. The prototypical act which aims to rid a community of impure elements is scapegoating, a ritual that transfers evil from inside to outside the community (Joffe 2012: 742).

Groups typically targeted in the global West by such crisis-based othering would be members who are part of marginalised and oppressed groups, illegal immigrants, the unemployed, the poor, non-whites, criminals and terrorists (Lupton 1999). These groups are strangers, in the sense it is not clear what their motivations are and their behaviours are unpredictable; these strangers are risky Others and have to be excluded from society because nobody knows how to prevent their unpredictable behaviour (Hudson 2009: 19). The unfamiliar Other is a risky Other that is feared; it is not necessarily an Other that is considered weak(er), like Said's 'Orient' Other (1979). The risky Other is an indicator of the presence of a widespread uncertainty about what or who to secure (against); an indicator which increases our fears and feelings of insecurity and is leaving us in the dark about who or what we are actually producing security for (Bauman 2006). Through processes of othering these groups as risky Others, the Self of the otherer is established; his behaviour is redefined as normal (Young 2007). That Self retrieves power and meaning from defining the risky and criminal Other, whereas the individual who is othered into a risky and criminal Other is disempowered and marginalised, by having his civil liberties violated and traded off against the security of those in power (Van Swaaningen 2009).

In our post-9/11, Islamophobic times, particularly members from Black and Asian immigrants, especially Muslim minorities are the perfect Others of the global West; they are the terrorist Other (Bouabid 2010; Eid and Karim 2014; Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008; Mythen and Khan 2009). They are the 'suitable enemies', targeted by zero-tolerance and xenophobic laws (e.g. The Patriot Act), mistreatment by the criminal justice system and security governance (e.g. torture), and disproportionately harsh punishments (three-strikes laws, detention without trial) (Ericson 2007).

The participants in this study are part of that criminal justice system and security governance, and I talked and walked with them in the aftermath of the global (and seemingly perpetual) financial crisis and its subsequent austerity policies. As just discussed, it is the type of crisis that amplifies negative othering, a type of othering that is already innate in to police and security

work (Loyens 2009). Such professional othering by the participants, amplified by the perpetual (financial) crisis, potentially leads to still more hostile divisions between insiders and outsider.

All in all, the participants' (re)establishment of their Selfs through their familiar and unfamiliar Other and what such othering narrates about the port securityscape is examined in the following chapters. But before that, for reasons of reflexivity, a word on my researching Self and the researched Others of this study is necessary.

2.5.3 My researching Self and the researched Other: an account of reflexivity

I went from full blown fieldwork lasting many weeks to suddenly no more fieldwork. At the end of it all, it had become very easy to gain access and it was very tempting to continue fieldwork. I had made some new friends and they would tell me more openly about anything that came up in discussion. Nevertheless, at that moment I felt I had achieved ethnographic saturation, meaning, I had gathered enough data and I did not encounter any new topics anymore. After trying to become an insider for a long time, in that moment of saturation, I had to become an outsider again to distance myself far enough to analyse and reflect the data (Ferrell 1998; Adler and Adler 1987; Elias 1956).

However, as much as I never became a true insider, I also never became a true outsider. There has merely been an 'appearance of a high level of detachment or of "objectivity" which those who use this method are in fact lacking […] it creates a facade of detachment masking a highly involved approach' (Elias 1956: 240). I never fully attached and detached because my researching Self has been (re)established through the participants—the researched Others—as much as the Selfs of the participants have been (re)established through me as the Other.

For example, only two out of the 85 participants were female, which is partially because of the port (security) domain being predominantly male but also because the women port police and security officers tended to avoid conversations with me when I tried to engage with them. From what I could sense, they probably thought I would be merely interested in those who represent the majority of the port securityscape: men. Also, some of the interactions with male participants could be extremely sexist and kept women at a distance:

> Male security officer: When we get women here [in the port], they're butt ugly. Actually, their looks make it hard to say whether they're a woman or a man
> Me [agitated]: So, you could be a woman then?
> *Other male colleagues started to laugh out loud.*
> Male security officer: Ouch!

This means the ethnography provided here is one reflects the masculine, limiting this research's findings.

Another issue around my Self involved my status as an expert—a powerful Other—who enjoyed a higher education than most of the participants. It led to some of them thinking I would already know about most of the aspects of port security, which formed a serious limitation to my data. A few even downplayed their educational and professional career, and told me 'I should have tried harder at school though. Seriously, I mean it. It's not what you'd call "the best job in the world"'. Next to downplaying, they presented their researched Selfs to me as the researching Other also by hiding certain aspects or lying to portray themselves in the best possible light, which is a common threat to internal validity of ethnographic research (LeCompte and Goetze 1982).

Participants, (re)establishing a socially desirable Self through me, would unintentionally distort fieldwork by simply responding spontaneously to my presence, as they provided me what they thought I would like to see (ibid. 46). It led to social desirability coming from my participants, especially those with minor management tasks; they acted as representatives of their organisations and port security more broadly. Although they genuinely tried to help me and were interested in my critical approach of port security, it led to situations in which port security practices were staged and socially desirable answers were (unconsciously) given.

For example, when I arrived at the different sites, participants would propose what I should do, see or hear about. This was sometimes done to indicate that, or at the very least make it look as if there were no secrets, despite the fact there were. Also, I was shown 'nice sites' that were photogenic, according to participants. A manager told his security officers to take me to certain places in the port, driving on the jetty to have a look at a specific—to him—interesting ship. I told the manager I am merely a fly on the wall and not there to interrupt. He understood that, however, other participants did persist in asking me what I needed, which sometimes led to disappointing the participant in case I was okay with just following them around. Management, as I have mentioned in section 2.3.1 and 2.3.3, made sure I talked with carefully preselected operational staff, all pre-instructed. Management considered—othered—them to talk in the best interest of the organisation. Participants revealed mixed feelings about being selected though. Some thought I should have been able to pick my own participants, others emphasised they were the right choice because their colleagues would not represent real port security. Others felt they had to talk with me because of management. They felt they were stuck with me:

> Well, you're lucky, that, and no offense, that it's me and not my [colleague]. Yeah, 'cause we had a discussion… Nothing personal! I didn't feel like it at all. I'm an easy going person; I talk with everybody, but a security officer is a private person. Eventually you become a bit of a loner, it seems, haha! My mate and I had a discussion, as in 'Who's going to take [Yarin] along, who's going to take him along?' Got a call this afternoon [from management]: 'Yes, you're taking someone with you' and I'm like 'Pffff…', you know? (Operational security officer).

His annoyance with me was not that clear, as he was chatty. He did get less formal and more critical about port security later on during the car patrol. Overall, participants all held up a certain Self, which was exactly what I was looking for as well. That is to say, how they established their Self through me as the Other, what image they thought was important for me to see in the port securityscape also became data on how they define their Self through the Other.

Next to social desirability, I noticed participants were highly interested in what I would do with all the data collected and the results that would be derived from it. I remained vague because it was vague at the time of fieldwork. However, I did emphasise to them I aimed to understand their work lives and provide bottom-up realities, which satisfied them, especially those who complained about their working conditions or the tiresome processes of their job; complying with the ISPS Code, doing paperwork or doing what management commands. Some hoped I would get a real sense of port security and how it really works behind the scenes and that I would try to change something about their job circumstances, while improving port security processes. In short, the othering by the participants and of the participants by me affected to an extent my data collection and therefore the internal validity of this research.

2.6 Subconclusion

The virtually non-existent criminological research done on ports paid attention to port crime and port security governance. An ethnographic understanding of port security, however, has not been done yet. To research the port securityscape ethnographically meant retrieving a criminological verstehen, which is an empathetic understanding, of the street-level port police officers and security officers. It was crucial to obtain an emic perspective, exploring how the participants consider port security. By entering the multi-sited field of the port securityscape, I expected to get such an emic perspective by, put simply, walking and talking with port police officers and security officers while they were doing their shifts. To get in physically and get accepted as an insider turned out to be complex though due to the nature of the port culture and field characteristics of the port securityscape. I was confronted with a wide range ethical issues and practical limitations while collecting data. Identity, or the (re)establishment of the Self through the (un)familiar Other in the port securityscape, arose as main theme from the analysis.

Chapter 3

Management, colleagues and partners

3.1 Introduction

As the previous chapter revealed, the participants (re)establish a Self through the familiar Other at work, by which is meant the Other who is generally accepted and engaged with, sometimes on a daily basis. This chapter will look more closely to how port police and security officers consider management and operational colleagues, as well as the partners in multi-agency cooperation, misunderstanding and rivalry with each other. What does the othering of these specific familiar Others reveal about the Self?

3.2 Against management

3.2.1 Lacking operational port security sense

Port police

Ferdinand, an operational port police officer, was reminiscing about policing back in the day:

> If you'd come to the captain, well, sometimes [you'd drink] a little dram. I took part in that. Still, that kind of stuff cannot take place anymore. But that was back then, you know? You'd join the port police as a young guy. I'll never forget my first workday, when I had to come to the former deputy, who said to me 'Do realise there are colleagues here who drink a little dram once and a while. Don't take part in that!' Next thing I know, I went along with my mentor and a couple of hours later I was nipping a glass of whisky, haha! Fun times! I do have to say it was a time when people worked really hard. You stood for something. They do now as well, but it has all become more corporate. […] As a good employer, you should take care of the well-being of your personnel. If you do that properly, you'll have personnel that make an effort.

Clearly, Ferdinand associates increased managerialism with decreased fun with crew members at work, as well as eroded relations between superiors and operational staff. The growing managerial influence also causes participants to think their operational professionalism is not taken seriously. On a Friday, Nicolas and I got back from a water patrol and went to his office. He took his yellow fluorescent coat off. He told me I should keep my PPE on, as we were about to move on. It annoyed me, because inside the office it was too warm to keep the safety vest

on. Anyway, I got a coffee and checked whether I had received any texts or missed any phone calls. Outside there were trucks with containers passing by and as I was waiting for Nicolas, I got a bit bored and took a brochure on the future of port security in this port. Uniformed port police officers who passed by Nicolas' office and saw me sitting there, would not come in to ask me what I was doing there. I realised I was alone in Nicolas' office where I had the possibility to nose through all his and his colleagues' stuff, but apparently, I was trusted not to do so. Then I heard a couple of other port police officers discussing what they were doing and where they heading to soon. I felt I was located at the operational level of the port police, an environment where it is about *doing* and not *managing* port police work.

Nicolas came back and told me he had to check his email quickly and whether he had received some important messages. Although he had a weekend shift, his contact persons at the port terminals have a Monday to Friday schedule. So, if there were any important messages in his inbox he had to reply to them immediately. As he was checking his email, I asked him whether he finds it annoying to work in the weekends:

> Annoying? Yes. Look, it brings in extra money when you work in the weekends. That's a plus. I think that's good. If you look at my actual job though, it's not that logical really, because many contacts [in port facility management] are not around on Saturdays and Sundays of course. It means your network… During weekdays, you actually have less time. Yeah, back then, it was a demand of [police] management that every other weekend a port community policing duo has to be present [at their office].

He finds it illogical to work in the weekends, because there are no port contacts for him to engage with as a port police officer. He criticises the management demand to have weekend manpower, which is pointless; the Other at management lacks operational sense and awareness. Still, Nicolas rationalises his obligated weekend work by claiming it is a good way to make an extra buck, although it does not benefit port security per se.

Nicolas' colleague, Lloyd, argued port police management lacks operational sense because they govern operational staff through target-based policies. It is a commercial burden that has become a necessary evil:

> We suffer from higher management of course. It starts at our Minister, we could say, who wants something. Back then for example, the whole target figures thing, turning you into some kind of commercial company! As in, 'You have to achieve targets'. […] Some have a certain interest in [target-based managerialism] and we actually suffer from it. You are ordered from above to do certain things and eventually [you do so] for the preservation of your job and stuff […]. Listen, sometimes, at the police things go too far. At a certain point we got the question [from management] about integrity: 'You cannot accept anything, so don't do it!' Imagine, you're meeting someone for the first time. You [as terminal representative] represent a company and you give something. You [as a port police officer] cannot accept that at all, it is not allowed. So,

it really goes too far, but factually, it's coming back. […] If someone is rescued and drops by at work to give a box of pastries, so what? What's wrong with that?!

Lloyd got quite aggravated about the target-based management that ignores his job of networking with port business community stakeholders. Also, he finds the managerial take of zero-tolerance on accepting gifts from citizens who are thankful ridiculous. His sense of a duty to be visible within his community and to accept gifts from this community is violated here by his management.

Security officers

Security management, like port police management, lacks operational sense or interest, security officers argued.

> It's a general thing, the way you treat people, not just in the security business. It's in any job. How do you treat people and how do you appreciate them? […] I had an interesting encounter before. Was this young lady from a security college, a new domain of study; just security. […] The young lady was doing an internship here and it happened to be I had to do CCTV monitoring. She sits next to me. Everything was okay. So, I ask her 'What do you think of [CCTV monitoring]?' [She responds] 'Mwah, pfff… it's nice I can see [live images] but I'll be your manager later on'. That's how she responded. That was fun! I said 'Well, you may become my manager but you won't be for long'. [She responds]: 'Why? I'll be your manager anyway'. I say 'Yes, but you have to earn it to become a manager. Just think about it for a while'. That was a minor incident, of which I thought 'Ha, funny' […] Let me put it this way, the higher [management is], the more distant (Gödeke, operational security officer).

Gödeke took the young intern's remarks with a grain of salt; the higher management is, the more negatively security officers talk about them. Security officers in this research othered their management as being extremely commercial but not practical. Still, they somehow depend on the commercial, business-is-business strategies of management, because the better their managers use the fear of clients to sell their security services, the more job security the officers can enjoy. They are therefore caught in between their sense of port security duty and their disdain for commercialist management that they must listen to, while not being listened to. It makes them feel that they are not taken seriously. James, who has managerial and operational tasks for example, clashes with his management occasionally about his efforts to secure the port facility perimeters:

> I do notice from the reaction of management, that they think I see ghosts. When I talk about a strike […] I have to deal with management here. I think 'Okay, [the strikers] are going to besiege the terminal'. That's what I thought: 300 men besieging the terminal, targeting management. 'Okay, how to avoid that?' I called the port authority, ships out of the way, management out. Gone. 'James, what do you think you're doing?!' [management reacted]. I said 'Wake up! It's okay you think that way [that he's overreacting], but I'm assessing the risks of what could happen to you and I'd like to have a full lock-down'. Well, later [the manager] did appreciate it.

James' management made him feel he was making a mountain out of the mole hill. In order to convince management, he used an assessment of risk to convince his management he could execute specific security operations to keep out the port workers on strike. In general, the security officers were very frustrated that they are managed by people who have no clue about port security, like operational security officer Wijerd:

> We… we are the ones who do it! You understand what I mean? Company security or territory security; it's being secured by US! It's not being secured by those blokes at the office. Those guys take information and… it's as easy as… You come [as a client] and I [the sales manager] ask you 'What do you need for your company, security-wise?' [That company will say] 'That and that and that', and I'll say 'I'll set it all up for you, put it on paper, and I'll direct the people below who will have to do it.' I don't need to know Jack Shit about security. As [a manager], I only need to listen to your story and communicate your story [to operational staff]. We [operational staff] are the ones who do it! The cop is the one who does it. Customs at the docks are the ones who do it. Not THEM [management]! But they're the ones who tell us what we have to do! Whereas they never in a lifetime go to that [port], but they do summon you and tell you 'Hey! That's not okay, because it costs too much!' Then we'll say 'Well, we need that flashlight' [To which management will respond]: 'Sure, but do you know how much it costs to put that thing on there? €500. Do you know how much that thing costs? €1000. That's a total of €1500. I need to back that up.' 'Yeah, but I need that thing, right?' [Wijerd would reply]. It's as simple as that. We're the ones doing it. We are security. Not them. We're not getting paid for it and they get the big money.

The managerial lack of a street-level sense of port security is rewarded by a higher income, whereas management is merely commercially interested, frustrating the security officers through which they reveal an anti-commercial Self. They are not in it for the money but for port security as a public good. The lack of operational sense is also demonised because of some austerity-based managerial decisions that threaten the personal safety of security officers. Piet and Dillon argued they are now performing tasks alone that used to be done with two people:

> You should go [alone] to the buildings we go to, like terminal T17, you know, at night? I'll give you the keys and tell you 'Go for a walk. See you later!' Then you'll get that feeling! You should include that [in your research]! Because there are [a number of] places where [metal thieves] can enter, but you are sent to check out the territory alone! Plus, as you saw on the picture, everything [scrap metal] is blown down there, you know? And that's where you have to walk. You can't say 'I'm not gonna walk', because then [management] says 'That's refusal of work'. So, you just have to do your work you get, but whether you're warned for [dangers]…

Piet implied in his facial expression his shared scepticism over whether there was any managerial appreciation of these dangers. The lack of operational port security sense is tied into their feelings of being betrayed and exploited by management.

3.2.2 Betrayal and exploitation

Port police

Police management was blamed for betrayal when they started to outsource traditional police tasks to local municipalities and the private security industry, as well as for not having done enough to prevent outsourcing. This heavily influenced the port police officers' position in the port securityscape:

> I do think, as police management, [they]'d had to limit [outsourcing to city watch] better […] but anyway, I speak for myself now, but I find it a disquieting development. And people do… and I'm talking about management specifically here [that argues] 'That way [by outsourcing to city watch], we can focus on our core business'. Well, I find [fining] truck drivers in the port area core business too! It's about safety, road safety in this case […] I think you're pushing off certain tasks that actually belong to the police […] I think too little was done from within the police […] It's very annoying when you [as a port police officer] came to an agreement with a company, whereas [city watch] didn't know about that agreement and bulldoze over it. That causes conflict. A company doesn't understand it; 'Hey! I made an agreement with you [not to fine] and this other authority [the city watch] does fine!', which happened already and disrupts. You have to watch out for your own credibility […] Look, city watch people… with all due respect, because I do think they have to endure a lot of shit, are somewhat lower educated people in general though. [Management] should do whatever they want, but [outsourcing bulk police tasks to them] says something about how to engage with companies in a [port] area (Ferdinand).

It becomes clear Ferdinand feared the ongoing outsourcing by port police management erodes port safety and security. The other parties that took over destroy the good connections they had established with port companies over the years. He does admit the officers themselves could have done more but were naïve and reluctant; the agreements between port police management and the local municipality won.

A similar narrative was picked up when I joined a water patrol, and the officers on deck and I passed a building under construction. The estate in development frustrated Kunibert. Apparently, the building constructor required more financial input from local government than was officially estimated before the project started. He said to me 'How to destroy a lot of money? Haha!' The half of billion spent on the building project will not be earned back via the entertainment venue being constructed, he argued. He continued to explain it is complete nonsense such huge amounts of tax-payer money were injected into the building, especially in times of austerity, because, he said, it 'also has consequences for us, right? Because for us things are reduced too.'

Marcus experienced a rather extreme case of managerial betrayal and exploitation. He conceptualised a public-private partnership (PPP) project between operational port police officers and security officers to share more information with each other to enhance port security

and prevention of specific port crimes, such as metal theft. When he proposed it to his management, they ignored it:

> So now I [am entrepreneurial] on a small scale. […] From different sides, [the project] received so much opposition that [management] didn't want to start it, and it died, sort of. What happens next? It [the idea] got stuck at [management]. So, at a certain point, they presented it to the outside world and they managed to succeed. The original idea belongs to [us]. It's a part of [my project], so it was designed here [at operational level]! […] What we wanted to do, is the same as what they are doing […] I don't know how [it works now]. We kinda dug our heels in but we didn't even get a log-on code. We weren't even allowed to have a look of what was being done. So, this week I received a code, but I can't even find the website.

Ever since, he blamed his management for presenting his operational knowledge and experience as their own, as 'those above him' stole his project ideas. It angered him back then and angered him even more when he was still excluded when it was launched. I told him which website it was, as it was shown to me by the very manager who was accused of stealing his ideas. He immediately walked to his computer and told me that when he looked for the website's name I gave him, there was no Google hit. We tried several search terms. I knew what it looked like and what name it had. Still, we could not find it. I promised him I send him an email with the link in it to which he emailed back:

> No bother man. I don't feel so much for [it]. Anyway, that [project] was one of our babies though. Yeah, we were NOT AMUSED when it got launched.

His attempt to create visibility for himself at the port police failed due to managerial betrayal and exploitation. For him, it was a warning that creativity and eagerness would not be rewarded. In fact, creative ideas will be stolen. He experienced rejection and punishment for being entrepreneurial at operational level, while such entrepreneurship takes him out of his routinised work. In other words, the Other in port police management limits your creative potential and uses it, leading to Marcus (re)establishing a less committed Self, avoiding creativity and practice-based innovation.

Security officers

Security officers also experienced austerity-based betrayal and exploitation by their management, even more so than port police officers. In particular management of large global security companies were seen as exploiters because they are only occupied with aggressive take-overs of small, local security companies. Thoralf and Hennig were talking with each other when I was sitting in the kitchen next door. Hennig had just finished his nightshift. I overheard the conversation about how a former Ares Security colleague of them both had been complaining recently about the long shift hours at Ares Security. They continued to explain they both left

Ares Security because of miserable time schedules and inhumane work shifts, where people almost worked 20 hours in a row. With much anger, they told me how an Ares Security take-over strategy works. First, it offers cheaper security prices to local potential clients. Then the smaller companies are forced to the brink because they cannot compete with those prices and at that point Ares Security buys them. If this would happen to their current security company they work for, which seemed unlikely they said, they will leave Apollo Security that is contracted by T1. They know how Ares Security treats its personnel and they said that company also knows them both. They would not 'mix well', Hennig chuckled.

Aaron, an operational security officer, felt betrayed after a company take-over:

> That was the purpose of the [security company] for which I work now, they tried to take us [in-house security] over. We weren't all too happy about it, in the beginning. It did feel as if the [terminal] wanted to get rid of us. Just gone […] Just security, really just security, that's what they wanted to outsource and not on the payroll of the [terminal] anymore. Outsourcing and then contracted again [via] Pontus Security, a company trying to get in there. It was about to be a done deal. They would… and not many people know this, but anyway… it's not like this will be useful for you, but they would be contracted for 5 years. Almost a done deal, the contract was ready. Pontus Security would take us six [security officers] over, one-to-one, keeping the same salary. I would instead get this [Pontus Security] uniform, different ID card from another [security] company. I was supposed to do my former job in the port. That's the only difference, the only one. Pontus Security would be able to get into the port, because it's not easy to get in the port [as a security company] because you got big players on the [port security] market.

Here, Aaron regrets the loss of his original employer due to the aggressive commercialist behaviour of another security company's management that wants to enter the port securityscape to gain new and more clients, while saving money and sticking to their 'core-business'.

A group of participants were hit very severely by an aggressive take-over. They used to work for Hermes Security, a non-profit company specialised in port security that was funded by a foundation in which port facilities cooperated and invested in together. Hermes Security was subject to a hostile takeover by for-profit Poseidon Security that offers a wide range of security services, but did not have port security services yet. The take-over changed everything:

> [At Hermes Security] you'd have different cars, just a bit more than what you're supposed to drive with now. If your car would break down at night, you'd go to the garage and you'd get another car immediately. Your shoes, for example, were way better than the stuff we get these days, [this matters] especially for someone with back problems. Your clothing was thicker, qualitatively just… just a bit better, to put it that way. It's not like this [Poseidon Security clothing] is bad, but it's just… just that little bit that's better. […] We used to have body warmers, you'd wear thicker trousers. You had… it was just different, not better, but different. If you'd ask for something, and it made sense, and you'd need it for a job, you would get it, without having to fill out 500 forms for it. That's what was different. And you'd represent… If you would represent Hermes Security, as it was stated on your clothing, you would enjoy a different kind of respect, compared to working for Poseidon Security. It's very sad (Manuel, operational security officer).

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Hephaestus Security officers Wesley and Dillon, and their security manager Dustin, who all worked for Hermes Security before, glorified their times at Hermes Security and how well management treated its operational staff back then:

> Things were good. If you screwed things up, things were bad. Then it was the world upside down. You wouldn't be employed if you didn't have your security [certificates]. There was a tight policy you had to comply with. If you didn't, you could leave. Very simple. If you didn't shave, you could leave […] Not everything was okay, but there was good security. It was well-recognised in [this port]. Anything that was port security related, was Hermes Security. There was just no foot that could come in the [port security market] door (Dillon, operational security officer).

Hermes Security management was punitive but fair, exemplifying for Dillon what good port security management should be. After the Poseidon Security take-over, it changed. Later on, during Wesley's car patrol, he started to reminisce as well about how his problems with management back then were nothing compared to his agitation with his new management:

> At Hermes Security, it was completely different. You'd patrol, and during one night you'd get 10, 12 reports. Here [at Hephaestus Security], if you get 2 reports, it's a lot. It's just a matter of [wondering] when it will be 8am [when your shift ends] […] Hermes Security was just… Okay, it sounds like heaven, you know. I do have to admit though, there was complaining too over there. Looking back on it dude, I complained a lot about Hermes Security, whereas things were so good. I received vaccination for my dog, dog food, dog training was paid for, practice-based training was taken care off. When it comes down to dog related stuff, everything was taken care of.

The security officers who stayed on after the take-over were very critical of Poseidon security:

> Look, when I drive around in this port, like this [part of the port] here. For me it actually is… The older [security officers] amongst us would say, 'Yes, that's our baby', you know? Because we know everything. We'd see or smell already from 100 meters ahead something is wrong. I mean, they don't really get that at Poseidon Security yet, haha! […]I personally believe that Poseidon Security [management] has made some mistakes when taking over Hermes Security. They thought, 'Done. We now have the port as well'. They forget about one thing: Hermes Security… it was SUCH a big name in the port. You'll never take that away. Also, basically, there are still two opposing parties [within Poseidon Security]: former Hermes Security and… Poseidon Security, haha! They [management] think eventually it will mix but that will never happen (Abraham, operational Poseidon Security officer)

They feel that Poseidon Security management eliminated the real value of port security work they used to do at Hermes Security, and created a gap between security and the port. A similar view was expressed by Poseidon Security officer Magister. He complained about a distance between management and operational staff that was not there before. He explained that if workers have a request for new equipment or there is an issue they want to discuss, there is no way to get in touch with management, but when he himself does something wrong according to management…

…you are destroyed. Then [management] does know where to find you. […] Poseidon Security is a big company. They don't even know your first name. You're a number. […] I think if I'd arrest someone now, my ass is whipped, 'Are you mental or what?!' [management would reply] (Magister, operational Poseidon Security officer).

While management distances, they have mortified workers into numbers. Workers become dutiless drones that are ordered to fulfil, meaningless, routinised port security work in which no real security work can be done anymore, like apprehending someone. And all of this is done for a low wage, while having nothing to do. Magister deeply regretted this:

Yeah, there are nights when it's busy, and there are those it's not. When I'm on night shift, I got nothing [to do], haha! […] Now, I'm doing nothing more but closing off or do another [car patrol] round.

He and his colleagues particularly regretted one aspect of the overall betrayal and exploitation by Poseidon Security; the selling of their dogs. Before a car patrol shift, I visited a security station where I was given a tasteless coffee in the kitchen area. As I glanced through the space, I saw a few security officers having a smoke outside, in front of some unused, large dog cages. The security officers sitting inside did not talk to me, apart from one of them who got curious and asked me what I was doing there, so I told him. He then told me about how their station used to be a Hermes Security station where security officers took care of their K9 dogs. Despite the fact they are now Poseidon Security, he said I should understand that it was still their Hermes Security turf. Those who used to work at Hermes Security still call the station The Shed, as they called it before the take-over, which Poseidon Security management disapproves of. For the security officers, however, The Shed is their safe haven where they worked with their canine colleagues. The dogs were their buddies, taken away and simply sold because of severe austerity cuts Poseidon Security management made. Therefore, The Shed has become a hide-out and resistance against management. It had an emotional impact on them when their dogs were sold, Magister explained:

It stirred loads of ill-feelings here, loads of ill-feelings. Our relation with Poseidon [management]… is put up with. Poseidon Security [management] comes and immediately tells us 'Let's see if those dogs are still cost-effective enough. If not, throw them out!' […] We still have difficulties dealing with the loss of those dogs. […] You establish a relation with [the dog]! I did work together with my dog for quite some years [...] Listen, my dog was ready to retire though, so I basically was supposed to get a new one, but yeah. It's because Poseidon Security [managment] lacks any sympathy for dogs […] One of the high managers [was] at a discussion when we were still Hermes Security, he told us the dogs wouldn't go, but they did [sell them]. We felt screwed over […] I don't want to portray things too negatively about Poseidon Security, but I'm gonna be totally honest; it's because there are almost no chances on the job market, otherwise I… we would have been gone by now.

Selling the dogs caused deep trust issues amongst Poseidon Security's operational staff, and in turn, made security officers re-establish a resistant Self towards management by glorifying the past and arguing that other Poseidon Security officers who did not work for Hermes Security are not as good as they are, as will be explored more in-depth in subsection 3.3.3.

However, Poseidon Security management complicated it for them to hold up the good name of Hermes Security, as Rock, who is operational but has managerial tasks as well, indicated to me when he explained what the practical relevance of their port security cars is. Those cars have, contrary to non-port security cars, an orange safety light on top of the car, which is there to create safety by increased visibility on terminal territory at night. Especially when it is dark and foggy, and you drive on port facility territories, the high container carriers need to see you otherwise they can lethally hit you. However, there is something more attached to the personal safety provided by the port security patrol cars:

> Poseidon Security kept the name 'Port Security' [on the patrol cars]. 'Hermes Security', the name, it's gone though, because of the take-over. Poseidon Security didn't want to use it anymore. So, they only kept 'Port Security', as you can read on certain patrol cars, it's still on them. Those are the only cars that have an orange flashlight on top, and spotlights. Those are really the only cars that drive in the port area.

The facts that 'Port Security' is stated on the car, that there are safety flashlights on top and that the cars are equipped with spotlights, are not mere safety measures for Rock; they are relics of the great Hermes Security bygone age, through which he maintains a meaningful Self.

Stories about managerial betrayal and exploitation were not just from the past. As I was doing my fieldwork, the Poseidon Security officers were once again betrayed and exploited for managerialist purposes. Some of them were involved in the PPP project, the project that was originally designed by port police officer Marcus but "stolen", as he indicated, by the police managers who eventually managed to realise the project. The security officers shared their thoughts on the project and their involvement:

> It's not like we have to come along with [the police] to do stuff. It's more a matter of… EYES, so that we've just become eyes (Wijerd, operational Poseidon Security officer).

The project is experienced by Wijerd as workers merely being used as talking cameras that record live footage for the port police. His colleague, Rock, explained to me there was no feedback given from Poseidon Security management about it at all. He criticised the "new" project and like his colleagues, he was sceptical of it: 'What [the managers] are planning, at least, what they're doing… Well, we'll just wait and see. [The project] is very recent, new. Can't say too much about

it.' The thing that made the security officers involved feel neglected in the PPP project, is that they got informed about it through media first and not through their management:

> Yeah, [heard it via] the news. Did I receive a letter about it at home? Officially, I know nothing about it. Somewhere up there [at managerial level] things got arranged, but officially I know nothing about it at all! We, operational staff, know the stuff you've heard from the news. That's what we know too. Nothing more. It's a bloody shame. That's that thing we mean when we talk about communication [between management and operational level]; it doesn't quite function well. Not trying to be negative, but it's a fact. You hear about things just too late sometimes (Manuel, operational Poseidon Security officer).

Besides bad communication, the PPP was criticised for its hidden goals, because information sharing between port police and security is not (merely) meant to improve port security but to enlarge Poseidon Security's customer database, they argued, because working together with the port police looks and thus sells better. The initiative that stimulates port security multi-agency partnership is a managerial gimmick to legitimate the security industry—which is intrinsically for-profit—by association with the non-profit port police (Thumala, Goold and Loader 2011). While security management sells, their security officers feel they have got something 'shoved through their throats.' So, port police officer Marcus and the Poseidon Security officers are therefore not united through the PPP, but rather through their discontent with their management that stole and enforced the PPP. They are united in their experience of powerlessness:

> Those who reside upstairs are the ones who need to fight it out with each other. We're simple pawns! We're on a chessboard! You do get what I mean? We're at the very bottom and what's up there, they're the ones who must figure it out. We're all collectable and just pawns. Without us though the companies wouldn't survive. If we'd all stop working… I don't need to explain that to you! (Rock, Poseidon Security management and operations).

Still, despite the solidarity at operational level with the port police, established through their idea of having a shared "slave-faith", most security officer remain afraid of their management and the power they have, as operational Zeus Security officer Gijs made clear to me:

> If I look at how much power our manager has over a group of people, I find that scary. Yes, I think it's scary […] because they sometimes push you to the limit. I notice it in society. You're not Yarin anymore. You're a number. […] Also within companies like Zeus Security, because they've become so big, it's almost… corrupted.

Now, of all the participants, including port police officers, Gijs had very negative experiences with commercialist managerialism that can be truly inhumane. Emotionally he told me about the time he was diagnosed with colon cancer:

[Security] work is not that important, however, it did bring me a lot of good things, because when you're sick and you're at home the entire day, and your wife is at work, you won't recover, right? The hard part is, when you finally… When everybody thought I was going to die, including myself, you start to think 'You have an incurable illness.' [Management] won't take you back anymore. I wanted to stay employed, even if it was for just 2 hours a day. Eventually, I had to fight hard to get back at Zeus Security, despite the fact I had been employed there for 10 years already back then. So, I've been through a lot […] I'm absolutely sure I owe [the recovery] completely to myself. At Zeus Security they haven't been good to me. […] They didn't show any compassion. Very cold! Ruthless. I do still blame them for it. That's something I cannot forgive them. No. I started off very poorly here because of it, with the new manager [at T15]. I had to have a talk with him immediately and [management] reads your file and see your sick leave, and immediately you're presented negatively. […] It costs money when you want to recover fully, but I was actually sick, but I didn't get one visit, no flowers. I've been hospitalised 3 times, because you'll get your chemotherapy there […] I had some hard talks about my situation. At a certain point, you're sick for too long and then [management] wants to put you through an exam and see for how much percent you'll be disqualified. I've always said to the companies though, 'I have a loving wife, I have 4 children and a grandchild, and that's what I'll fight for. I want to become old.'

Gijs wanted to work, not just for the money, but because he believed it would help him heal; a cure he was denied by his management. Moreover, in his experience, once you have been diagnosed with a "too costly illness", you will always be stigmatised as a non-profitable asset for any security management. Since then, to work under the reign of aggressive managerialism has become his resistance through which he (re)establishes a meaningful Self. Gijs' Self, like that of the other participants, reveals critique and resistance to commercialist managerialism that comes forward from the neoliberal governmentality of the State. Next to management as the familiar Other, their colleagues at work are another category of Others the participants create a Self through. The following section shall explore the colleague as the Other.

3.3 Inclusion and exclusion amongst colleagues

3.3.1 Teamwork and trust

Port police

On one afternoon, a couple of port police officers were chatting as one of their colleagues prepared a fast, small vessel for use. He said to the two chitchatting colleagues he had to use the bathroom before he would go to the small vessel. They told him to hurry up and 'show little John to the big, wide world already!' At operational level, port police officers communicated with each other very directly and with wit. Their humour was rather gloomy though. For instance, when I was waiting at reception for a port police officer to pick me up for the interview, a grey haired officer came in through the revolving door of PA1. A police officer at the desk who told me to sit in the waiting room to await the participant shouted to the grey haired officer 'Career criminal!' That career criminal turned out to be a two-faced person, as he can be very friendly

at one moment, but cranky at the other, I understood later. Port police humour, as police humour in general, 'is typically drawn from the darker side of human experience' (Barker 1999: 50). Interaction between colleagues at operational level consists of jokes, sarcasm, insults and directness. There is no cut-throat management-speak on operational level. Their language reflects their preoccupation with 'being equal' and not formal, as management tends to be according to them, as the following operational port police officers indicate:

> Of course, ranks have a certain influence, but for the work here, eventually, they don't matter. We have colleagues here from the mid-level, which is one level down [in the police hierarchy]. People work the same way with them as they do with higher levels. Meaning… in the end it's for your work! Whatever! The best is when people harmonise with each other. In that case a police rank doesn't matter that much. But obviously, there's always one of them who says 'This has to be done'. It's not always popular, but… haha! (Wiglaf).

> The nicest thing here [at the dangerous goods department], is that we are but a few. We look for our own work. So, there's no one who says 'You have to do this, you have to do that'. Of course, it happens when the boss says 'We need to do something'. That's often impossible during the shift, because people on patrol are always on the road. They're always occupied. At our department, there's always something to do of course, but we can pick out our own work (Rupertus).

Port police officers back each other up and they have to, because their everyday work demands they work closely with each other in duos and teams. Every time I would come along during everyday inspections on-board a ship, in particular for border control, I would do so with two port police officers. One of the main reasons to work in duos and teams, is because when you are alone you risk your personal safety will be violated; two police officers can handle aggressive crew members better than one. Maintaining your own safety at the terminals and on deck, demands collegial interaction. Therefore, you are in the same boat, literally.

Compared to security officers who work alone at port sites and during car patrolling, port police officers enjoy more safety and security through collegiality, as well as more collegiality through security and safety. Moreover, when you work together in a cop team, you see and can enforce more effectively than alone. For instance, Mischel and Giselbert took me along for a border control patrol on-board cargo ship S7. We arrived at the ship and walked up the gangway to get registered, where Mischel asked me for my surname, which he needed to write down due to the registration obligations of the ISPS Code, section 9.11. It was explained by them that during inspections, such as a border controls, or an ISPS related inspection, they board the ship in duos, because when something "off" is seen during an ISPS inspection that is relevant for an environmental or hazardous goods inspection, they can corroborate that it was legally appropriate to report issues that belong to another type of inspection. Why? They can argue

that one of the two police officers was checking for ISPS related matters and the other for environmental ones, although both were there initially to do ISPS control. When you are by yourself you cannot just switch between the types of inspection, so that is why there are mostly two police officers, according to Mischel.

Next to safety and enforcement benefits, they have to work in teams when on water patrol – a police ships demands a number of crew-members. Horstmar and Kunibert were about to go for a water patrol with police ship S2, but before they could leave the dock, Kunibert asked Horstmar if the ship's shaft lock had to be closed or not. Horstmar went downstairs to the engine room and checked it. Kunibert stayed on upper deck, checking documents of the ship and I stayed there with him. Horstmar came back rather quickly though and Kunibert said the shaft probably needs to stay open. He told me he thinks other colleagues do not really seem to care about the ships, which he finds a pity. You should actually feel responsible to take care of the ship, despite the fact it is a lot of work. Horstmar tells me that you have to be with a team of three people on deck when you are patrolling and not two, as was the case at that moment. One officer is sailing, the other two do the inspecting on deck or at the terminal. Also, one has to be a machinist, and the other one a navigator. On bigger vessels you have to have even more personnel, especially when it is a ship that carries an emergency boat on-board, like the ships S13 and the S8.

Later on, Kunibert and Horstmar were having a small talk, from which it became obvious they really seem to know each other very well, talking about what they have done last weekend, about home and mentioning each other's partners by their first names. Amongst themselves, they assume their colleagues do the right thing. There is trust in each other that the other one does his work correctly, as Inkmar showed when he talked about his colleague, Freimut:

> He is independent, meaning, I don't look into his logs anymore, I don't check that anymore. He has to do that entirely by himself. He can do it by himself. So, no need [for me] to worry about that anymore (Freimut, operational port police officer).

Later on, he was talking about being lenient towards captains sometimes, which is a way to gain respect, by being not too strict on enforcing the rules:

> That's the way it is. Many are… Yeah, Freimut is one of them, [saying] 'Oh well, that's a minor issue'. Sometimes you have to tolerate things, right? (Inkmar, operational port police officer).

The way Freimut deals with crew members, in a more relaxed way, is what connects him with Inkmar, because Inkmar recognises himself dealing with crew members leniently. You trust

your colleagues to do the right thing, the very same thing you would have done. Even when one of your colleagues might have done something wrong, you still back them up. For example, when the media portrays one of your colleagues as a "bad cop":

> Recently, in the media, [there was] a colleague who kicks a guy a couple of times. At a certain point, there's a story and eventually WE are the ones who have to deal with it. And if that "gentleman" has to come along, he has to come along [to the station]. Fortunately everything went well. He didn't cooperate, but he had to. In that case you can kick, punch, do whatever. It's allowed! […] I must say, in this [port] area, when stuff like that is on the news, when the police is put in a bad light, [people] sometimes refer to it. Again though, over here [in the port] we deal with rather normal and smart people, haha, and you sometimes see those reactions on social media and stuff. Sometimes people react differently, and say 'This needs to be looked into, it's probably a small bit of the video that's being showed'. That's what we have to deal with. But I haven't been bothered by it. There are 6000 people working here in Rotterdam Rijnmond and sometimes it goes wrong. And when it goes wrong, it goes very wrong, yeah. […] If it wasn't right, what the police officer did, it'll reveal itself. I think, as police, you need to be a reliable institution. It's too naïve to think there aren't any rotten apples here. They're there, stuff happens. […] They're only human and they can do the wrong things out of emotion (RRSP police officer).

This RRSP police officer trusts and rationalises the aggressive behaviour of the colleague in question ('they're only human'). All in all, port police officers define their meaningful Self through having trust, doing teamwork and always backing each other up; the colleague as Other is expected to do that as well.

Security officers

T1's contracted team of 30 Apollo Security officers was one of the biggest teams I did fieldwork at. There are two team leaders who rotate day and night shifts with each other and who lead four teams of seven security officers. Amongst them, different types of tasks are divided into reception work, handling incoming emails from ships or shipping agencies, CCTV monitoring, car patrols, providing First Aid, shuttle service to pick up and drop off crew members, and finally, PFSO visits on-board a ship, which may include getting a Declaration of Security (DOS) from the captain or first officer. Apollo Security officer Gödeke explained to me that he and his colleagues enjoy that every security officer can do all the different tasks. They change duties during the day, meaning they have quite some variety during their daily work, as I had to understand from operational security officer Sturmhard:

> The best thing is, you come to work in the morning and you don't know what's gonna happen. That's the best, that's without a doubt the best thing. […] Without diversity, it becomes boring.

During the day, no one will do the same task the entire day. Meaning for example, workers only do a couple of hours of terminal car patrol, which is experienced as being the most fun duty, but also no one will have to do CCTV monitoring for more than two hours. In particular CCTV

monitoring was a duty that no one wanted to do, because it is very boring. Plus, doing the CCTV duty a whole day would be dangerous as your attention slips away after two hours. It was explained to me that it is therefore only possible to have high quality CCTV monitoring on T1, in case a security officer can be replaced by colleagues during the day. Also, to monitor through CCTV requires knowledge of the terminal premises, operational security officer Heinrich argued. For example, when following a shuttle or a patrol car via CCTV, the person monitoring should be able to imagine how colleagues are driving and perhaps tell them to move a little to the left or right. A person can only know how to monitor through CCTV if they have been out there and have driven around, so they know how long it could take to move from A to B. Arnd told me he heard that before he started, his colleagues still had to do one particular duty the whole day, and said 'it was totally boring'. Indeed, workers need to do everything otherwise they cannot enjoy the diversity of tasks. For example, Gödeke explained to me he had an injury and could not do outside duties (e.g. car patrols or ship visits) for a whole month. He regretted that, because now he could only do reception work and CCTV monitoring; it also meant his colleagues had less security task variety.

Security officers interact professionally and in coded language when they need to guide a car patrol on the premises or send a colleague to a ship to pick up crew members. This interaction was filled with informal small talk and jokes though. They would ask each other about how their day or weekend has been, or they joke around, like Deiter and Heinrich who had to do reception at one point. Deiter was contacted by a crew member of S17 who requested if the shuttle service could come to the S17 to pick the crew up:

> Deiter: Yes! I'll send one, you're welcome. Ciao! [he said to the crewmember] A bus for S17 [he said to Heinrich]
> Heinrich: S17, looks like a bean.
> Deiter: Yes.
> *Heinrich makes a call over the portophone to the shuttle bus.*
> Heinrich: One bus for S seventeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeen.
> *No response…*
> Heinrich: Could someone… A bus for S seventeeeeeeen!
> Colleague on shuttle bus duty: Yeah, I have some time left for the S Seventeeeeeeeen!

They socialise throughout the day with each other, either over the portophone, at the reception desk, during coffee and smoke breaks, or in the kitchen when they have lunch or dinner. Although there are separate rooms, the doors of the reception area, kitchen and team leader's room remain open, so it is possible to hear people talking about or doing port security related work, while working or having a break. So, next to task variety, socialising with colleagues guarantees less insignificance and boredom.

However, sometimes it is the very team and colleagues that confront security officers with the job anxiety and insignificance they try to fight against. Operational Zeus Security officer Gijs was warning me I should not become a security officer, because of my academic training; port security would for me be 'way too simple. You'd want more', he said. He wanted to continue to warn me but suddenly we heard his colleague, Michelle, knocking on the door. She did not wait for a reply, stormed into the room Gijs and I were sitting in, and asked annoyed:

> Michelle: May I ask if this is still going to take LONG?
> Me: Well, we're about to stop, perhaps 5 minutes?
> Michelle: 'Cause I'm working my ass off over here and I'm by myself. […] The alarm is set off constantly, 'cause of those fences over there. I'm going completely mental!
> Gijs: Going crazy, yes.
> Me: Okay, if it's not working, we'll just stop now.
> Michelle: Yes?
> Me: I don't want to interrupt anything.
> Michelle: Well, officially I need to do checks and what more, so everything is falling apart right now, so…
> Me: Okay, no, I'll stop.
> Michelle: Yes? Okaaaay.

She got her way and rushed out again. I was seriously irritated and wanted to tell her to wait, however, I am not her colleague. I hoped Gijs would have said something to her but he remained silent and let it happen. He suggested to me to drop by his house in case I wanted to continue talking another time, in peace and quiet, which I did. At his house, a couple of weeks later, he explained to me why his colleague freaked out:

> Michelle, the colleague I worked with, took you away from me, more or less, or took me away from you and I thought… I discussed it [with my manager] though, telling him 'That it wasn't necessary', because you can divide your work in such a way, that the stuff that needs to be done can be done at night by me. It's busy [at T15] until 18:00 and then it becomes quieter. You can do the parking lot reservations and all other kinds of tasks at 18:00, but she thought 'It's a post where there have to be two security officers working and we just have to be here with the two of us'. Anyway, she was getting some small alarm-signals, nothing big. It's an [Intrusion Detection] system. Fences that set off an alarm when someone hits it with a forklift truck or when someone is jingling it, the alarm goes. Or a bird flies against it. Well, she had a few of those [false alarms], so, it wasn't the right time for the interview (Gijs).

Michelle relied on Gijs at that moment because she could not do all the work by herself and Gijs let her down. To her, Gijs was being uncollegial by letting his personal interest in the interview transcend the collegial interest in having a stress-free workplace. To Gijs, Michelle was being uncollegial because the work that needed to be done was rather easy to do alone, meaningless, whereas the interview with me was meaningful for him. She was being uncollegial by taking away the opportunity from him to be meaningful to me. Michelle embodied the occupational significance Gijs managed to escape for a few hours and due to that invasion he

went to his manager to complain. Their collegial Self was attacked by the uncollegial Other. Nevertheless, you are a team, so you accept each other.

3.3.2 Competition and distrust

Port police

Next to teamwork, trust and backing up, through which participants pursued equality and condemned exclusion, they excluded the excluders and therefore upheld the very inequality they despise. Such exclusion of the excluder is found especially when differences between the "normal" police, basically any police officers outside the port securityscape, and the port police popped up. For the port police, there are essential differences, to begin with the idea that the call of the sea(port)—maritimeness—is stronger than the call of police duty, as Ferdinand explained:

> You have to have something with that port. I've seen too many colleagues come in [at the port police], because they were obligated to come here. They just finished their degree and within half a year they were gone. It's because there was friction with [port policing] work [and normal police work]. […] It's a feeling. You need to feel it. You can have experience, you can be professional, but there has to be that bit of feeling. […] Maybe I'm an old fart, but I think that belongs to [port policing]. Of all of those 40 years now that I work at the port police, that [maritimeness] has been my biggest weapon, I mean, just because you can talk about [maritime affairs] with people [from the port].

Next to feeling the seduction of the big blue, what makes one a *port* police officer, is one's maritime experience and background. Most of the port police officers had a shipping career before. Inkmar and I were in his police car and arrived at T6's gates to inspect a ship. He opened his window, put his access card of the terminal in front of the card reader, and the barriers opened, and told me about the work he did on deck:

> I was born in 1959, haha! I grew up [on an island], and [it] is surrounded by water, right? So, it was already quite clear what I was going to do, haha. I would become a water rat. […] And then it got bad. The shipping [industry] got bad, because we only had foreign manning left. After that, waiting and watching it for half a year, I said [to myself] 'This is not my life anymore, here. This doesn't work. Mere idiocracy remains'. I couldn't sleep at ease anymore at night, because I couldn't trust my officer anymore whether he was sailing the right way. It was a catastrophe […] I slept with one eye open. I was quite broken (Inkmar, operational port police officer).

He was not the only one who left the shipping industry in the 1980s because of extreme job insecurity caused by the economic recession back then. Many more port police officers were motivated to leave the shipping industry, like Wiglaf. He studied to become a sailor for a shipping company and went through nautical training to obtain the position of ship officer,

intended to eventually become a captain. Nevertheless, the recession in the 1980s put him onto a different path:

> The economic situation in the shipping industry was so horrible back then, you did not get long-lasting contracts. The shipping companies said: 'Okay, you can work here for half a year.' It was nothing steady. The economic prospect, mid-80s, was not that great, and it looked like it wasn't going to change […] In the 80s, many people looked for jobs in this sector [police and army]. Well, then it was a coincidence I got into the [port police]. The police was the first one [of all the employers] who said 'You can start here [back then]'.

Wiglaf had to give something up, like Inkmar. They both had to leave the shipping business due to poor working conditions, which makes their career in the port securityscape a forced one from its beginning. The allure of the sea and the forced leave unites them, and additionally makes them different from non-port police. The port securityscape is the closest they will ever get to the sea. Their rough and raw experiences of life at sea is what connects these operational port police officers.

Having a nautical background used to be an absolute necessity to join the port police, however, in both ports it is no longer obligatory to have maritime experience; anyone who is interested can join. Port police manager Zachary explained to me that this is because no one with maritime experience would apply anymore and having to nautically train port police officers would be a significant financial investment for which there was and is no money anymore. Austerity has made things more difficult and high quality, nautical port police officers have become a luxury item. Tyler expressed to me, as he was instructing a port police trainee to handle the S13, a police ship, his concern about the new generation of port police officers lacking nautical education and experience. He yelled 'Why do I know so much about the port?! And why do colleagues these days not?!' He was angry and pitied this development in port policing education, as did Arnulf:

> For the things over here, you should actually have a maritime background. The problem is though, I'd say, you have to engage. That you really sense. […] You sail the right way, and you take an interest in the weather and and and… then you can be a good navigator, or seafarer too.

Why do the officers fear this? Because their nautical background is what made them different from the normal police; it is what made them unique. Now, that uniqueness is threatened by a new breed of port police which makes such a background no longer necessary. The increasing maritimelessness of port police officers is a direct threat to their fascination with the maritime.

Colleagues without such maritime experience or those outside the port police are therefore in turn othered and excluded. For example, Horstmar worked at sea for 10 years and before joining

the port police, he had to go to a psychologist who asked him the following:

> 'Well, Mr. Horstmar, if you aren't accepted here at the port police, could you imagine yourself starting at the normal police?' I answered 'No no no, then I will continue my master's studies'. Haha, I wouldn't have done that. The normal police? On the streets? No no!

To be(come) a "normal" police officer is something Horstmar feared, because that is a whole other type of cop culture that is formalistic, whereas in the port and on deck you greet each other with the informal you (jij in Dutch/Du in German). Moreover, people prefer port police over normal police, because the normal police catch people, whereas port police assist people:

> The port [community] and seafarers have a completely different opinion about the port police. They are considered nicer, the port police (Giselbert, operational port police officer).

The normal police is othered for their hostile, crime-fighting attitudes but also because they cannot do as much as the port police can do. Moreover, the normal police belittles the port police. Mischel, Giselbert and I were driving towards a ship to do border control. A "normal" police car passed us by, with sirens on. They both started to de-sensationalise the, in my opinion, rather spectacular aspect of the situation:

> Giselbert: We're not coming along, [he] can do it alone.
> Me: Trouble?
> Giselbert: Could be. Perhaps because of truck inspected in the tunnel.
> Mischel: Or an accident that hasn't been reported, and then they have to figure out if they can solve it. They will use the lane here next to us.
> Me: It happens a lot?
> Mischel: Yeah.
> Giselbert: People of the traffic police ONLY do that, right? They got nothing to do with the port police!
> …
> Me: Do the port police have an exceptional position within the entire [police force over here]?
> Mischel: We have a good reputation, actually, people say.
> Me: Also respect and stuff?
> Giselbert: Yeah! I don't always say so to colleagues because they call us the duck police. They ridicule us because we're responsible for animal protection [here]. It is seen as something that is not that important.
> Me: Not?
> Giselbert: Not necessarily.
> …
> Mischel: They [the normal police] are deployed a lot. Bodily harm, violence. Other things than we do. We are be educated to do all of that, right? But in these port areas, you have the industrial and the maritime, meaning, if [those types of offences] happen, it would be very exceptional in the port.
> …
> Giselbert: Economic crimes, right?
> Mischel: And because [the normal police] have to deal a lot with [those types of crime] they think of themselves as the REAL police, and we're just the duck police.
> …
> Me: You do more though, right?

Giselbert: Yeah, definitely. We have to have more knowhow. But that's not always acknowledged everywhere.

…

Giselbert: We of the port police, we are considered higher [in rank], people say. We are in higher esteem. […] For me, everybody is the same, in principle, because we have to deal with them. In contrast, the colleagues [at the normal police] they don't annoy us with it. Perhaps something stupid like the duck police.

Giselbert would later on explain to me it is mostly meant as a joke. Yet, the way they both talked about it revealed their frustration about being mere 'duck police.' They explained further that, next to animal protection, there are more specific port expertise areas that make them different from the normal police, such as environmental crime and container security. Also, compared to the work areas of their police colleagues outside the port securityscape, cases get solved and police interventions work:

The amount of reports at the port police is way less, which gives more time to investigate. I don't know if you've ever seen a busy [city police] office, but it's chaos all over the place. On Saturday nights their cells are probably full with all of the same career criminals […] a lot of easy [to solve] cases aren't even picked up [there] but we do pick them up. I think that's a major advantage and it makes you look good because of it (Marcus, operational port police officer).

Next to 'ordinary' police officers, colleagues who want to make a career from operational level to higher up within the port police or at another police force are not considered real colleagues anymore. Freimut talked about how careerist colleagues who went up the ladder became less friendly. After his colleague got promoted, Freimut was asked by him to address him with the formal instead of the informal you[14] in the future, which aggravated him and in turn, he distanced himself from the former colleague. When such colleagues climb the ladder and are authorised with more enforcement powers, they are therefore distrusted and condemned through which workers resist hierarchical differences. Or when someone simply leaves the port police to move out completely, into a different sector, they are 'out of sight, out of mind', as Tyler (who had over 30 of port policing experience) noted:

We had an investigations department. Couple of my old colleagues still work there, they're port police, my family. I was there for 32 years, it became my family. [These days] I don't know them, I don't see them. Never hear from them, I don't know what they're doing. They say, 'That's your fault, because you don't check the systems and how it works', you know? Then I think, 'Kiss my ass!' Why do I know what motivates my father and my mother? And my brothers and sisters, sisters-in-law, brother-in-law. Hey! I don't know what [my former colleagues] do, don't hear from anybody. Seriously don't know what they do, what motivates them. I never go there, I never hear anything about the briefings (Tyler, operational port police officer).

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[14] The Dutch 'jij' and German 'Du' are the informal 'you', and the Dutch 'U' and German 'Sie' are the formal 'You'; you use the formal You for the elderly, someone with authority or someone who you do not know.

Although careerism within the port police or outside of it is considered mutiny, to an extent at operational level it is tempting to climb the ladder. Rupertus and two of his colleagues were talking about promotion and what possibilities exist for them. At that moment, there were more financial means for port police officers to upgrade their position within the port police. I knew that one of the participants, a superintendent, was going to retire shortly, which meant his position was going to be available. This created career opportunities amongst officers of the port police where Rupertus works. The superintendent's role needed to be filled by someone, and that someone's position would become available to apply for as well, and so on. Rupertus had already been approached by his boss to see if he would like to consider a higher position, with more responsibilities.

The two colleagues at the table did not react to Rupertus' story about promotion. Although I noticed Rupertus was enthusiastically talking about career possibilities at that moment, he turned to me and explained how messed up their promotion system actually is. They have financial resources till 2020, but all the money has been spent in one year, meaning, anyone who moves up will not get the higher income that belongs to the position. Hence, more responsibilities, for the same kind of money, by which he tried to portray promotion as pointless. I could not tell if he did so because two other operational port police officers were there and therefore the topic of career-making was not the right topic to discuss, or perhaps he did so because he did not see the relevance of making a career. Both reasons though illustrate that at the operational level workers negate careerism, whether they are likely to get promoted or not.

The anti-careerist attitude is in line with port police officers despising those colleagues who are claiming authority because of their length of service, which is quite common in police forces in general (Lambert 2008). By wanting and claiming more authority one risks being demonised as careerist and/or authoritarian and therefore as uncollegial and untrustworthy. Ferdinand for example admitted that generational differences are problematic, although he does find that his younger colleagues as 'not quite there yet':

> There are lots of colleagues, especially those at the port police who have been around a bit longer, who are a bit older, more life experience. Definitely those in the port area. But you also notice, via your contacts at the companies [terminals], you sometimes talk with a doorman [and hear stuff]. Like last week there was little incident with a colleague… It's mainly the younger colleagues [that fail]. It's a matter of learning. I think I've been the same way [eager to enforce], when I started at the port police. And a lot has changed in this organisation, but that [generational differences], hasn't changed.

By gently excluding his younger colleagues into the category of being less experienced, he (re)established a more experienced Self that should be considered an authority. That type of

length of service exclusion by the elder is in return criticised by the younger generation. Ferdinand's colleague, Nicolas, explained such exclusion is wrongfully patronising and authoritarian as a group of retired port police officers alumni were visiting his office. I joked and asked whether those alumni were "the diplomats." He had to laugh and said, 'Well, I wouldn't go that far but ehm… haha! They are hosting and [talking] about endless shit of yesteryear.' By othering an older generation that appears authoritarian because it excludes and others the younger generation, he (re)establishes a Self that is inherently critical of authoritarianism and exclusion.

Security officers

Although some security officers worked in teams, most sat alone at a terminal or patrolled in a car by themselves. The only type of interaction they have is during the beginning or ending of their shifts, perhaps during breaks or over the (porto)phone. To escape from such isolation, they grab ever opportunity to interact with colleagues. So, if colleagues cannot be bothered to interact, they are considered wrongly motivated and they will be excluded:

> I don't like uncomfortable situations. When you're driving in a car together with someone, you have to do it with the two of you. I've seen security officers doing their job and I'm like 'I don't like you'. […] You get awkward moments. I'm not like that at all. I've had security officers I had to instruct [in car patrolling] and they just shut up. I can't deal with that very well. I'd rather kick him out of the car than having him in here with his sullen shit face, saying nothing. I can't handle it and there are those people, some of them are just not social […] Someone just staring, saying nothing (Wesley, operational security officer).

He othered colleagues who are silent as uncollegial because they confront him with his daily occupational meaninglessness and with the isolation he tries to avoid. The first type of exclusion of colleagues is therefore focused on wrongful motivation. Aaron had similar frustrations as Wesley—about how unprofessional some of his colleagues could be:

> Some were even sleeping! Of course that irritated me extremely […] Man, do you even realise what you're doing? You'll get a massive load of complaints if people would do that kind of shit [falling asleep], crossing all lines. Then you'll be like, 'I'm sorry, but I rather work alone. Don't need the guy'. 'Cause I didn't feel like thinking for the other person (Aaron, operational security officer).

Those who become security officer for the wrong reasons were also criticised. Those are the ones who mess things up:

> You got two kinds of people in [port] security. You got people who, you know, just normal, representative people. But you also got those guys who simply came into the industry because they had to. They're messing it up. Those guys messed up our connections with customs, police, everything. Those people ruined it for us, you get it? (Piet, operational security officer).

Especially security officers with military backgrounds did not fit in because they had too much authority before as a soldier that they have lost:

> It's possible you'll get a [former] commander on car patrol and when you tell him 'That's how it's done', he'll be like 'Do you know what I've seen in Iraq?' It never ends, you know? (Dillon, operational security officer).

The fact Dillon is othering a disciplinary, authoritarian and militaristic colleague here, reveals he does not want to be considered as such. In fact, most security officers despised trigger-happy, cowboy-like security officers. It was seen as the wrong motivation and needed to be controlled:

> At Poseidon, there's a certain pool of people that can be deployed anywhere. They don't have a fixed object, which is impossible anyway, because ad hoc you got much more work [for security officers]. Those people are bit easier to… young people. […] They're cowboys, sort of, the ones you have to keep an eye on (James, security management and operations).

It is exactly because of those cowboy security officers the participants hope that their governments will not change the laws that prohibit security officers from carrying a gun:

> I'll tell you this: I'm genuinely glad it's arranged like that, because I believe in security there are quite a few people who I've met that, if they would get that authority would firstly solve [matters] with a gun. They would simply exceed their powers (Hennig, team leader and operational security officer).

Many security officers used to work in the port with a dog (which is a weapon as well) and they treated the animal poorly. Workers argued that they definitely should not receive more authority. Wesley comments:

> …do you know how many idiots there are [in the security industry]? […] I had colleagues walking around with a dog. They knew it eats at the front and shits from the back, but that's all they knew.

Secondly, colleagues were excluded who started their security career outside the port, rather similar to port police officers' attitude towards colleagues without a nautical background or those outside the port securityscape. They would miss out on specific port certificates for example, or lack certain port security training. These security officers without a port or maritime background were seen as less knowledgeable:

> If you would have asked this kind of stuff [about port security] to people who know the port way shorter [than I do], you may have gotten totally different answers (Wijerd, operational security officer).

At the same time, having more certificates gives a feeling of superiority over the other security officers:

> [Port security] is so broad, with the whole ISPS and everything, which gave more obligations to port companies at the waterside to fulfil. I had to obtain a certificate for it: Port [Facility] Security Officer, so that you know which security levels there are at port companies. [...] It's… I don't know, you feel yourself being more important than [security officers] cruising around in the city that have to enable the alarm because the client forgot about it. […] Look, those guys [without certificates], manage to do a building in 15 minutes, like the [property] we just passed. Well, it takes us [certified security officers] 40 minutes, when we take our time. We say 'You can't do a building fast, because it is a locking-up patrol.' It needs to be done well. Those [clients who contracted you] pay for it. It's as simple as that. So, we see things completely different […] There's proof [non-certified colleagues do a bad job]. When those people have done their patrols, you shouldn't be surprised an alarm will go off there later at night. You do not only patrol for the client, you also do it for your colleagues. 'Cause what will it bring to the security officer [who will have to go the building where the alarm went off because the other colleague did not do a good job] when he gets an alarm, while his colleague has done his patrol there? You know, closing a door? They've never heard of it. Those are the kind of things that won't stick with those people. […] There are actually a lot of people in security who do not have [an] ISPS [training], who know SO little about it. It'll be one big disaster [in case of a terrorist attack] (Abraham, operational security officer).

Workers felt they stand out with a port security certificate, which paradoxically requires colleagues who do not (stand out).

Those without port certificates and background are also seen as less client orientated. Rock finds those kinds of colleagues simply untrustworthy:

> I can get along with everybody over here. Everybody. I can go out, have a beer with them. I don't drink [alcohol], but I could. Then again, it's my bacon [I bring back home] they're touching [when they screw up]. The [colleague] who's touching my bacon, is touching my family. His ass is mine. Other [colleagues] think the same way, almost everyone [who used to work at] Hermes Security, let's put it that way. I have blind trust in them. I trust the others [at Poseidon Security] too, but we [former Hermes Security officers] have been working together for so long, we know where we're coming from. I trust them. I'm sure, if I'm in an emergency situation, they'll be at my side immediately. I can't say that about the other people at Poseidon Security, because I haven't known them for that long. It'll come, but [trust in colleagues] is something that we [former Hermes Security officers] have established throughout all of those years. You know [about and from each other] what you've been through.

If you patrol poorly and leave a door open that should be locked, another colleague's performance will look bad. One's mistake affects the whole team. You have to have the right commercial attitude to keep the contract safe as it provides work and income not just for you, but for all of your colleagues – thinking commercially and being client-friendly in this way means being collegial. Those who are not are therefore uncollegial.

Another group of excluded colleagues were those who entered the port securityscape from specific security branches, namely "bouncers", event security, office security and especially mall

security. When bouncers were discussed, security officers would immediately start to use the professional term for a bouncer, namely 'host', for which you do not need a security certificate necessarily. They explained that those colleagues are security officers who may have their Certificate of Good Conduct, but can still have a criminal record. Event security was problematised as well:

> What they do, what that [event] security officer does, is different from what we do. That's just event security. It's a different branch of securing than what we do. Someone who did event… We had someone at ours who came from the event security [business]. Well, he was gone in a second (Magister, operational security officer).

The reason Magister used to be colleagues with that former event security officer, has to do with the nature of security contracts, particularly larger ones, under which it happens that security officers from non-port security branches are deployed in the port because they have to work their hours. James for example started in office security, which is a completely different world:

> You work for Poseidon Security […] that says 'You are employed by me and we have a hole to fill tomorrow at T5.' It's not that easy to do that over here [at T5], because I try to prevent that. But it could be the case someone from an office environment comes here […] meaning, you'll get someone who has worked as a receptionist and has only registered visitors, which can be one hell of a job, okay? Suddenly, that person is deployed in a port area. That's an issue, I think. Of course we all got our ISPS training and that person has got it as well, because that's how I started too [from office security]. I knew nothing about the port […] All of a sudden you're [working] in between 1500 truckers.

James wants to produce quality port security and security officers from the office space might have some difficulties with having to deal with a rougher crowd, such as truckers. Colleagues from the mall security branch were especially mocked:

> We used to get colleagues, in case we had manpower shortage because of busy times or inspections, we'd get people who never have seen a sea boat before from such a small distance. They didn't know at all what [this port] is all about. They'd work at big building or they secured [a certain supermarket chain]. They never worked in the port before [and then I'd say] 'What are we supposed to do with this guy?' Nothing personal, it's not his fault [...] 'You have to instruct him'. No way! I used to say 'I am NOT going tell that person, who'll be standing at the supermarket again tomorrow, about all the ins and outs of this company' […] I'd say to that [supermarket security officer] 'You know what? Why don't you take a seat over there [and do nothing]'. […] They would hear 'That vessel is berthing starboard.' He'd be like 'What's starboard? And how big is it? Where is it located?' […] Those things do matter and people might ridicule it, but at those moments you're stuck with it (Aaron, operational security officer).

Or as Wesley expressed more vividly:

> When I walk by myself down town, I think 'I'll never become a mall security officer'. MALL

SECURITY OFFICER! Who'd want that, WHO'D WANT THAT? The whole day, standing in a shop. Well, making a DICK out of yourself, really! I wonder 'Ooooh, GOD, what are doing to yourself?!' (Wesley, operational security officer).

Colleagues who work as in-house security officers were also excluded, mostly out of frustration and jealousy, because they make more money:

At security there are a couple of T13's [own in-house security] guys […] When they retire, it's done. No more [in-house] security officers will replace them. Why? They do the same kind of work, but they earn more per hour, 'cause they work for T13 (Bernard, operational security officer).

Bernard, a contracted Zeus Security officer, sees his direct colleagues who are in-house security officers on a daily basis, making more money than him. To cope with such inequality, contracted security officers criticised in-house security:

[At T6], their own people do [port security] […] those who cannot operate a crane, they are put at the front and do guarding, or drive a shuttle bus. They make more money of course. Twice as much as we do. That's why most companies try to get rid of their in-house security, outsourcing. They let security companies do it, because it's cheaper. You don't have to deal with illnesses anymore, or holidays. They don't have to pay for that anymore. […] Having your own people employed [as in-house security] is dangerous. When I have been working somewhere for 20 years, as a crane operator, I know 70% of the people. I become ill and can't do crane operating anymore. So I have to guard the gate and I know 70% of the people! They know me. Let's say I got five of those kind of [in-house security] people walking around who know each other and everyone. It then becomes easier to do something that's not okay [criminal] (Thoralf, team leader and operational security officer).

Finally, colleagues at other security companies were targeted by exclusionary othering. Yet, this is not for the obvious reason of company competition. In fact, when security officers were talking about colleagues at another security company, 'their brother from another mother' sort of speak, I did not pick up any competition at operational level; they got a long quite well. Rather, they suggested that it is actually mostly their management that compete with other security companies' management, as Wesley made clear to me when we were driving around and encountered patrol cars of other security companies on patrol:

You all see them. Every company. […] Don't come to us [for competition]. Then you need to go management of course. But look, you're all the same. You all wear a V on your sweater, but just from another company.

Magister also emphasised the 'brotherhood' amongst security officers from other companies at operational level:

Yeah, we do talk with those guys of Ares Security. It's not as if we do not talk with them. No, when I see a guy [from Ares Security], small talk. We're allowed to do that. There shouldn't be

any difference. That'd be something else, if we couldn't talk with each other! […] Our bosses [see competition], but we're just the same people. We simply do our work. We're the slaves, haha! […] At a certain point, you actually worked together with most of the people now working here for other security companies. […] It's a small world.

By presenting their Self as looking beyond the security brand, they are good colleagues and they expect the same from the colleague at the other company. As Magister implies, they have a sense of solidarity by being non-competitive, unlike their management, and feel united in being enslaved to deliver security services. If those colleagues from other security companies would, however, be exclusionary themselves, then they would be excluded from the intercompany brotherhood at street-level:

> We don't really contact Ares Security. We say hello, and sometimes talk, but not that intensive. […] They're very strange people. Those guys over there behave completely differently. When you arrive somewhere […] they see you as pure competition. They don't see you as a colleague. That's how some of those guys are, but I see all of them as colleagues. I don't make an exception from which company you are, despite the fact they work for another company. They are and will remain my colleagues, like before. As I said, you might need them one day when they pass you and see you're in trouble. They can always help out. […] Despite which company it is, I consider them a colleague. They simply wear different clothing, but they do the same job and have the same task. They are not more and not less (Rock, Poseidon Security officer with management tasks).

Ares Security officers are bound by their Employee Handbook that has extremely strict company regulation codified on disclosure of confidential information about their clients and business partners. During my fieldwork it became clear that these regulations penetrate daily life, as they prohibit Ares Security officers from having simple day to day interaction with security officers from other security companies; saying hello could lead to violation of the non-disclosure regulation. Such draconian regulation to safeguard business secrets and client's interests, is the very thing that damages operational cooperation between security officers of different companies. The competition at management has infiltrated the operational level as well, and officers affected by it is what is criticised othered by Rock. Hence, security officers from another company who exclude due to complying with company regulations are, in turn, excluded.

So, next to solidarity amongst security officers because of dangerous and unpredictable environments (Loyens 2009: 470-471), to maintain social interaction with each other at operational level, means resisting management and embracing brand-transcending brotherhood. If you do not, you are not loyal and fail to comply with the informal armistice between security officers from different companies.

Partially connected to such intercompany brotherhood, is the division that is overcome between security officers of different terminals (who can be of the same security contractor). Basically, if you have two competing port facilities next to one and another, you should not partake in such port company rivalry. Security officers I talked with were proud of such equality and put aside port company differences to work together on security and safety in the port. For example, T16 in-house security officer Meinart told me 'the moment we're suffering from immigrants, we'll bring T16 up to date. We certainly do that,' and vice versa. Or Dillon who showed me CCTV footage of a man who was crossing between his port facility's territory and that of the one next to him, T8:

> Then it becomes the problem of T8. They got CCTV as well, of course and will track him. I'm in touch with them though, by phone, saying 'He's entering your territory and we'll keep a close on eye it making sure he's not returning.' […] I do get feedback, as in 'This is what happened and the man is dealt with. Fully checked. Apparently, he belonged to one the boats anchored at our quay.' T8 are just neighbours, you know? They got ISPS as well, so that's good. Everything that comes from ours, you can discuss it with each other.

Overall, as much as inclusion is pursued and exclusion demonised, in the very pursuit of inclusion the participants condemn the excluders. By so doing, they become the very thing they aim to resist, which is, exclusionary. The fact they aim to (re)establish such an inclusive Self through an exclusionary Other though reveals their attitude is focused on (street-level) solidarity. Port police and security officers both suffer from management, both aim for collegial inclusion and both are exclusionary towards colleagues (who are exclusionary). Now let us see how those attitudes and practices workout between each other as multi-agency partners who ought to cooperate in the port securityscape.

3.4 Multi-agency cooperation, misunderstanding and rivalry

In these times of austerity, port facilities want to have the cheapest possible security provision yet without any loss of quality. Many security companies can provide cheap security officers to port facilities, meaning there is a lot of competition. The War on Terror is used to fight security price wars. During my fieldwork, PoR participants implied to me the established security companies have cartelised, because they fail to offer the dumping prices that smaller and unknown security companies can offer to port facilities. This suspicion is based on media attention to an inspection by the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) at three large private security companies in 2006: Trigion, Securitas and G4S. All three of them have a significant amount of contracts with PoR port facilities. An ACM spokeswoman explained the reason for the inspection:

> [There was] a suspicion that these companies have infringed the Competitive Trading Act. In that case, you're dealing with price fixing, agreements on the apportionment of the market, boycotting or abuse of an economic dominant position (ANP 17 November 2006).

The security industry is demonised like this by the port police as well. Simultaneously, port police officers are demonised by security officers. How the two groups act as multi-agency partners, born of necessity, assessing and othering each other, is what this section will elaborate on.

3.4.1 Port police vs. security

Although port police officers have traditionally worked together with security officers (for- or non-profit) in the port before, the ISPS Code has intensified their interaction due to the fact more security officers have been employed ever since. During a car patrol, port police officer Nicolas waved to a car with an Ares Security officer behind the wheel:

> Yeaaaah, haha, I always wave to them. Indeed, they become some sort of a colleague rather easily. [...] That's what's it about in this job, right? Because you catch crooks together!

Some sort of a colleague, but not really. Why? Later on, when Nicolas and I were still patrolling, suddenly, he saw a man nearby a specific part of the port, speeding to pass a truck on a road where the speed limit is 60km/h. The truck was driving faster than 60km/h, so there was no need for the car to pass the truck. It was also dangerous because a car in the opposite direction was approaching. Anyway, Nicolas went in pursuit. The car we were following was a tuned-up car, typical for youngsters, as Nicolas commented. The way Nicolas was sitting, and focused on the car, was predator-like, not keeping his attention away from his prey. We went really fast. Suddenly, the car we were chasing stopped decently at a stop sign. Nicolas was impressed and said it was actually a decent driver. Then the car drove into a neighbourhood, and Nicolas parked his car diagonally behind the car, in order to prevent the driver from driving away. The driver then noticed there was a cop sitting in the car who followed him. Nicolas got out of the car and approached the young man, probably younger than me. The man pulled down the window and they conversed. I overheard them, and Nicolas asked sarcastically if the driver was in a hurry. The driver explained to Nicolas he was indeed in a hurry because there was something wrong with his daughter. His partner was standing outside, wearing an Ares Security uniform and looking at Nicolas and the driver. Nicolas did not fine the young man, but warned him to watch out with speeding and passing traffic in front of him, if only for his own safety. The driver remained calm and accepted what he was being told. Then Nicolas came back and said the guy was being honest, the way Nicolas likes it. I pointed out the woman in the Ares Security uniform:

Me: There's a colleague there.
Nicolas: Yeah, a "colleague" of Ares Security… Well, I wouldn't go as far to say [a colleague] but anyway.

So, whereas earlier that day Nicolas considered Ares Security a partner, 'catching crooks together', he now distanced himself from the security officer of Ares Security. I asked him about the security and police cooperation more in depth, and he referred to a famous global security company:

> Yeah, that G4S is the biggest [security company], I believe? Of the world? But they still can't [secure] the Olympics [in 2012, London]. They thought it'd be a fish in barrel. That CEO said 'No, we'll arrange all of it'. Haha! 'We'll just recruit some people.'

G4S clearly failed to deliver enough security officers and the military had to be called in to provide enough security at the London Olympics 2012 (Travis and Gibson 2012). The G4S failure entertained him and reaffirms his own idea of public authorities being more professional and superior to security officers. This attitude of Nicolas is illustrative of the relation between port police and security officers, seen from a port police officer's perspective. In fact, police officers generally do not see security officers as real police but as wannabes (Rigakos 2002: 126–135). One operational port police officer explained that the RRSP works more closely with security companies than the HWP does, but stressed that the port police still has main control in his port:

> We share the information [with security officers] aiming to get more information back, you know? That's the sort of the strategy we carry out. […] We, the police, we are responsible for security here, right? I mean, a security officer shouldn't consider himself a police officer, to put it that way.

They have a condescending attitude towards (cooperation with) security officers and they distrust them (Van der Wal, Van Steden and Lasthuizen 2012). Some port police officers were in particular condescending towards in-house security officers, like the security officers themselves (see section 3.3.2):

> My feeling says that people who are contracted [through a security company] are a bit sharper. Why? At a certain point, the client [that hires contracted security officers] expects of course, like 'What have you been doing here as a security officer, what did you notice?' So, [contracted security officers] report quicker than an in-house security service. The more a security company can show reports have been made then and then, the more the [port] company [that hires the security company] will think 'Hey, they're there for a reason'. It costs a [port] company a lot to have in-house security, a lot of money. All kinds of wage costs. When someone is ill you need to take care of it. Now, [when you have a contracted security company providing security officers] you call them up 'Hey, I need an extra one', and he shows up. Another [port] company here, had its own port personnel trained into security officers, just because there is not enough [port] work

in [this port]. So, they said 'Well, okay, we're gonna take some guys from the work floor and educate them into security officers and put them at the gates'. So, they do it differently, but mostly, security is delivered by Ares Security, or that other big one, Poseidon Security. Does cost quite some money (Marcus, operational port police officer).

Port companies employing their own terminal personnel and making them a security officer is considered wrong and it is better to have contracted security services. The commercial drive behind contracted security in turn drives the alertness and awareness of security officers – if they report more, they have more visibility and therefore their customer will notice the benefits of paying for contracted security. Nevertheless, for Marcus it simply means security officers are alert, which is good, and it does not matter whether that is commercially sparked or not. Security company officers do a better job than in-house security.

This critique by port police officers of in-house security reveals their appreciation of security contractors and their officers; the fact they exist indicates for them the security industry has professionalised itself, as it has become harder to get a job as a security officer, especially as a security officer in the port. They do not seem to share the negative, stereotypical view that 'anyone can secure', as is acknowledged broadly in literature (Loyens 2009: 469–474), which is a stereotype some of the security officers still struggle with. The fact the security industry has professionalised itself means that their multi-agency partners are *professional(ised)* security officers, and not amateurs, which reflects positively on the port police itself.

There are still worries though, as the port police officers expressed their concerns about losing their port securityscape territory to security companies, which problematises PPPs between port police and security. They criminalised the fact that the security industry is commercialist, profit-seeking and a growing industry in their jurisdiction, aiming to take-over police work. However, port police officers rationalised the commercialisation of port security; the security market does what is supposed to do, making money out of security. It thrives though because of governmental regulations that demand tighter security at terminals, because…

> … I mean, if there's no pressure coming from the government, and there is no need at trade and industry, well, they [terminal owning companies] won't pay for [security] (Nicolas, operational port police officer).

Nicolas accuses the State of making port companies responsible to establish a safe and secure port, which generates the security market, and according to Bauman, 'to focus locally on the "safe environment"… is exactly what "market forces"… want the nation-state governments to do' (1998: 120). Port police officers also explained that it becomes easier for port companies to secure themselves due to the lowering of prices for security services, which is a result of austerity.

The one with the lowest offer gets the deal, in their opinion. Moreover, they think the security industry feeds off of threats and incidents to prove their security services and products are needed. They detest that the financial crisis affects port security, especially because the increase in competition in the port security industry market that does not necessarily benefit security at the port:

> These times are economically bad, also for those security companies. I do think that all of us… I think that we [the police] as a government play a part that you have to prevent [port security impairment]. I mean, you had… you have a certain level [of security] and you shouldn't let the economic crisis [influence it]. Or the competition amongst security companies shouldn't bring down the level of security (Ferdinand, operational port police officer).

Port police officers therefore fear both being taken over by the security industry and the erosion of port security that is accompanied by it in these times of austerity. Their worries about the Other in the security industry reflect their Self as authority that serves the public interest. In this regard, it is interesting what Tyler shared with me:

> I know of a few security companies who indicated 'We wouldn't mind starting to secure physically via the water', so patrolling with a boat in the port, constructing physical security. But it didn't happen yet, because there are costs involved of course and you'd have to pay a lot for it. I'm an instructor [at the port police], right. I also do some instructing on the side, so I've been approached by security companies to train there security officers to sail on a boat and secure the waterside (Tyler, former operational port police officer).

He indicated to me he understands he is an interesting employee for security companies, given his port policing knowledge, expertise and network. However, he has never started at any security company, because to do that would be to accede to commercial and market thinking, which is out of the question for port police officers. Next to othering security officers as commercially motivated, port police officers did admit they need security officers:

> It's good, yeah, good. There are always [security officers] of course you might have some issues with, more [than others], but I… It's about giving and taking. Understanding why those people are there. Don't enter [the security loge] as a cop, you know? Looking down on someone. No, you have to do it together, because I need them enormously! Tomorrow I'll need him [the security officer], as I would say like, 'Say, did you see that care there by any chance?' I think that cooperation game is very good momentarily, considering all the agreements that are being made. […] There are numerous cars driving around [by security officers], all of them are eyes, and ears. You have to make use of it gratefully. […] Those guys [security officers with a specific port security background], they are attached to the port! (Ferdinand, operational port police officer).

Ferdinand afterwards argued it is hard to ever have full, equal multi-agency cooperation between security officers and port police, because the police is tied to protocols about information sharing. Nevertheless, he does find you can tell a security officer who saw something, that he or she did a good job:

I think, we as a government, as police, we sometimes ignore it. Despite the fact it motivates that man or woman in security to give a little piece of information next time [...] I think we need to get rid of narrow-mindedness as police, meaning, you can give someone a compliment, without giving too much information [...] I can appreciate it as well when someone of Investigations tells me 'That case you started the investigation of, it's developing and we have a group of offenders', that kind of stuff. You don't say anything wrong, I think.

Many more port police officers recognise and pity the being-left-in-the-dark-feeling security officers' experience. They do want to share more, but security officers are not authorised to get more. Claiming security officers are the unauthorised Other in certain information sharing, is not the same as saying they are unworthy of it; it is regulation that forces port police officers to withhold. The Self that is communicated through the Other in security is one that is critical of laws and legislation on information sharing.

Security officers were also ridiculed by port police officers. Freimut and I were heading towards a ship inspection, and before we got onto T7, we had to wait before the gate. He did not have his T7 entry card with him to swipe along the card reader that would open the gate automatically, so we had to wait for the security officer to open the gate. Operational port police officer Freimut said to me the following, sarcastically:

Freimut: A typical gate. It happens to be the case that the barrier is here and the camera is up there. And there's this guy sitting there, who sees us now, in case he's not sleeping right now. No, that's a joke. We could of course go over there… or we could wait for a little while until he sees us, because then he will open the gate… all by himself… so that he has something to do. Or he waits.

Freimut pushes a button to get in touch with the security gate guard and we hear the ringing of the phone.

Security officer at T7: Yeah, good day.
Freimut: A good day! The port police for the S1.

The gate opened, for which Freimut thanked the security officer over the intercom, but the phone was already hung up, so Freimut was talking to himself. In this little interaction, not longer than a minute, the day to day interaction in the port between port police officers and security officers revealed itself. Freimut, considered this security officer a lazy worker, performing insignificant and boring work.

I experienced such ridiculing of security officers even more vividly with Horstmar and Kunibert. Before we got to S3, we had to get onto the terminal territory of T1. Once we arrived there, we saw Apollo Security officers in their security loge. I said to both of the police officers that I saw my colleagues sitting there, due to my fieldwork at T1. They replied and joked around that they should not be called Apollo Security but Idle Security, indicating those security officers are lazy. We moved onto terminal territory, passing the gate. We drove faster than is actually allowed on

T1 and both police officers were making fun of Apollo Security's officers and they also laughed about the security settings T1. I felt awkward as I have heard a lot of personal stories from the Apollo Security officers. Both Horstmar and Kunibert clearly had fun mocking security officers, as did former port police officer Tyler, who ridiculed airport security officers who pick him out of the line, even when the detector gate did not go off. He emphasised to me he is never 'randomly' chosen: 'Maybe it's a connection or something, you know? Looking at each other [as police and security]'. Tyler experiences the police/security nexus even in his free time. It shows that next to the unavoidable presence of and interaction with security officers in the port, port police officers are confronted with security officers in private life as well, and when they do, port police officers become the one policed by security officers.

All in all, port police officers have positive and negative experiences with security officers as multi-agency partners. Security companies and officers are a necessary evil they have to keep the port safe and secure with, and simultaneously, through the Other in security, they can establish a meaningful Self. Security officers (re)establish a Self through the port police as multi-agency partners in the port securityscape too, as we shall see in the next subsection.

3.4.2 Security vs. port police

> We happened to have had an evacuation. A good example [of cooperation] is that entire evacuation. Look, we had the whole circus of public services at the door, because that's the way it is. Let's call it that way for now. Yeah, that's how it's called by everyone: 'Here comes the whole circus'. Well, the fire brigade, police, anyway, the whole thing is on. And eventually, immediately after it, '[the area is] clear' is given by the [public services] (Meinart, in-house security coordinator and operational security officer).

Whereas for port police officers cooperation with multi-agency partners in the port is a given and benign part of their workday, security officers sometimes tended to glorify it, as I observed when Meinart enthusiastically told me the story above. Some security officers enjoyed talking about their ties with the port police and claimed they are not that different from the port police:

> Basically, we security officers, you are some sort of semi-cop. Not that much though, but there are younger security officers who move onto the police or the [port police]. They do extra courses, and have to have some more legal knowledge. I did that as well of course (Gijs, operational security officer).

To amplify the image of presented similarity and near-equality between port police and security, security officers argued cooperation with each other was perfect. James, for example, told me good communication and cooperation with the port police is essential in providing port security. He is proud of his cooperation with the port police:

> Irregularities, well, they are registered and you inform your network about it. I got contacts at the police, the secret intelligence agencies, customs, all the governmental authorities. […] If I'd call the community port police officer over here, he'll be here in one minute on our doorstep. He takes me seriously, and I take him seriously. When there are [police] operations, we need to level up [the security level]; he'll be there with the whole shebang, riot control in case of an emergency, right? That's the way he is, and that's how you deal with each other. That's how you work together over here. […] I must admit, working in the port area it's different than working in the office world. I've done all kinds of security work in offices for 25 years, and there is definitely a border [between security and police]. [In] port related [security work], there is much more "us". We know each other, okay? When something is going on, we have each other's phone numbers. We give each other information to make sure… because it [the port] is so huge, you have to work with each other (James, security management and operations).

James glorified his interaction with the port police to the extent he was afraid of austerity policies that would lead to 'less cops on the street' and that every police officer fired would get replaced by a security officer. He thus prefers having more port police officers than having gaps to fill for security officers and companies, including his company he works for. Like James, Rock referred to his elaborate phone list of port police officers as well, to show how well-connected he is. He told me how those contacts changed jobs at the time of the interview but that he is still in touch with them to get things arranged, if he wanted to. Giving an old pal a break, so to speak.

The cooperation with the port police is glorified because it brings joy, excitement, status and a sense of belonging to something bigger than themselves. The cooperation with the (more) powerful Other at port police provides a (deeper) meaning to their job to (feel they) work together. Especially when the port police gives you the feeling you are being taken seriously:

> [The police] drives along with you onto [terminal] territories and that kind of stuff. You're being listened to. That's very important, that you as a security officers are taken seriously. […] You drive [in the port] with so many different people. You greet each other constantly, when you're patrolling; police and customs too (Manuel, operational security officer).

The cooperation with port police also brings variety into security officers' daily routine; the port police thus provide a window to escape the tediousness of their everyday work. For example, Rock got very excited about this one instance where some of his colleagues and he had to assist in a secretive port police operation:

> We had to keep an eye on [criminal divers]. Customs was there [at a terminal], and port police. After it, we made an agreement with port police we wouldn't hang around there anymore [to do car patrols], because that would be suspicious [for the criminal divers]. So, we'd just do our normal tasks, just drive, pretend if we didn't see anything, and just drive off. That's what we had to do, pretend if nothing was wrong [keeping his hands in front of his eyes]. Because that's what stands out immediately that [criminal divers] were being kept an eye on [by us]. We were simply in the building, observing there. No one knew! That's also a way, a tactic. That way [the police] give you a hint, 'We're doing this, so if [security patrols] come, just drive on' (Rock, security management and operations).

Next to assistance in operations, security officers appreciated it when port police officers would share certain secret investigation information with them:

> The Police Data Act talks about a closed information supply policy. It means that [sharing information between port police and security officers] is actually not allowed unless the public prosecutor or the investigating magistrate gives explicit permission to do so, but generally they don't. Good thing happens [in this port] once and a while, you know, like… [we] get an email [from the police that states] 'Pay attention to this and that' (Rotterdam, operational security officer).

The security officer basically says the port police do not always obey the Police Data Act, which means he is being let in on something informally and illegally, and that is what he appreciates the most. A security officer knows he has really proven himself to a port police officer when he is "inside the secrecy" implied in bending and breaking of legal regulation to work together on and for port security. Basically, if a port police officer sticks his neck out as powerful Other, cooperation is real. Feelings of inclusion and belonging re-establish a meaningful Self for security officers that helps to survive the occupational anxiety and insignificance in the everyday of the port securityscape.

Ipso facto, if security officers do not receive certain information from that powerful Other, they experience the very meaninglessness they try to fight or avoid. Security officers could also often feel treated as less by the port police, as they depend on them and (really want to) cooperate with them in an equal manner. Asymmetries are experienced. Many security officers felt they only gave information but never received anything back. As mentioned before, the legal obstacles make it hard if not impossible for port police officers to share information about cases under investigation. Within the security industry, they are very well aware of these legal obstacles. As Meinart told me:

> We connected the [port police of this port] with the police in [a foreign port]. We connected them. They communicate very well with each other. […] They share information with each other… and there you go again! They have now found each other, get information from each other, and we get nothing anymore! I pity that! (Meinart, in-house security coordinator and operational security officer).

Initially, the cooperation with a foreign police organisation brought about joy, especially because Meinart felt he was a bridge-builder between port police in his port and port police of a foreign port. However, once the two port police forces started to work together, they excluded him from the cooperation, he explained. In fact, throughout his career, cooperation with port police has disappointed him due to their abstinence from information-sharing; it therefore became his personal and professional goal to retrieve more information from the port police…

> …and I'm trying to enforce that from the port police and the [military police], because they got an information centre. Every now and then I call the port community police officer, saying 'Hey, you got some information for me?' And they know, because that's the [informal] deal, that that [information] does not go beyond me. […] I sometimes wonder, you got those PFSOs working at the [terminals] for a reason, so the government should be informing them a bit. I miss that. The thing with the government is, you have to comply with all kinds of obligations. […] So, you do get the obligations, but you won't get a piece of information, saying 'There's a possible threat over there' […] In my opinion, we're always lagging behind events. […] In all of the eight years I've been working here, [only] once did I receive a phone call from the information centre of the military police, and the guy said, 'Meinart, thanks [to] your security guys…', he said, 'we got the right person who was dealing with the illegal [immigrants]'. So, that's nice to hear! But it depends on the person, who's stationed over there, not all the people over there do that (Meinart, in-house security coordinator and operational security officer).

To be acknowledged by the port police you have provided the right assistance and information, is the type of satisfaction Meinart seeks in his work life, as it takes away his attention to the asymmetry between him and port police. He established a meaningful occupational Self through that acknowledgement by port police. But this recognition is sporadic, as the port police are not that accessible and rather invisible, as operational Poseidon Security officer Magister experienced:

> It's a mere coincidence if you run into the cops. We got clients that call them in [in case of an alarm or crime taking place], but I don't see them that often to small talk or something. Definitely not. For years, they've been proclaiming 'We're gonna cooperate more with the police.' Perhaps [this new project] is a step in the right direction. I think both sides can benefit from it, not just security, but police too. Look, police can't be everywhere all the time and we, together with Ares Security and Zeus Security, are present pretty decently.

Security officers need the port police for their authority to arrest. It is a power that is greatly missed by the security officers and they deal with this lack whenever the port police has to show up to exercise their arresting powers:

> Look, when you're around the corner over here [near to Rotterdam city centre], it won't take so long for someone to get to you, but when I'm somewhere behind the Maasvlakte [approx. 45km from Rotterdam city], and I'm on lying on top of someone [to detain him], I have to stay on him for 20 minutes before anyone [of the police] arrives here! (Operational security officer, Rotterdam).

It is actually 50 minutes, but that is when you drive accordingly and do not speed. The port's size has direct influence on response times of the port police when the PoR security officers call-in an incident. The cited security officer is concerned when he is far away from his base, because then it takes longer for the police to arrive and exercise their authority to arrest, which security officers do not have. It means, the further away you are, the longer the struggle with an offender you will have, and the bigger the chances are the offender might get away. Some of the security officers admitted they really need the port police, like Wijerd who also told it is not the other way around:

The police have, yeah… We just need them. In turn, they [need] us less though, because to them we don't really matter, in regards to 'They're the police [and we're not]!' All of it doesn't really matter though, haha!

Wijerd awkwardly laughs away the feelings of inequality. Judging from his expression, however, it did matter to him though that police has more authority than he has. He is confronted with this asymmetry in what is supposed to be an equal public-private partnership but really is public-private asymmetry.

Security officers remain relatively powerless in most situations and must cooperate with the police. Cooperation is therefore not always glorified but rather realised for what it is; an asymmetry in power. In turn, this asymmetry is demonised because they think port police officers are not capable of policing, or they consider them arrogant because of their authority. Some security officers in fact despised the port police for their (claims to) power-based arrogance:

> For example, you got a burglary, and [an employee] is still inside, but the [burglar] is long gone, I say to that cop 'You're not allowed in', and they cannot enter the territory! It's the law, right?! But many of those [police officers] simply abuse the law. They know damn well what's in it, but they still [enter the premises]. […] The [owner] says 'I don't want to have any cop inside', which is understandable. Those [cops] walk through the mud, don't give a shit about anything, tear things apart and leave again. They don't give a damn, it's not their [territory]. They're above the law, apparently. They can do whatever. If the [owner] says [to me] 'Listen, they cannot enter', I shut the gate. They won't enter. […] The special police forces and the port police officers cannot even get a long […] because this agency has more authorities than the other. […] I bet 80% of the people in security are more honest and just than police officers, seriously. I am willing to stick my neck out, based on experience. From what I've seen I've created an image [of the port police] for myself (Piet, operational security officer).

Piet, together with his colleague Dillon, was on a roll when vilifying the port police and othered them into being cowards and unwilling to get their hands dirty:

> Piet: You go and tell a [port police] officer, 'Go walk onto that terminal [by yourself]', and then he'll tell you 'Are you out of your mind or what?', and he'll walk away!
> Dillon: 'I'm not showing up by myself, I'm not showing up by myself' [is what the port police officer would say to Piet and him].
> Piet: It's not that, yeah… but ehm, look…
> Dillon: I visit places man, you feel so shit. You may be tall, you can have huge arms and a big mouth, but that feeling [of being unsafe] stays.
> Piet: We get the waste of the police. That's what we get. The stuff they won't do, that's what we gotta sort out. I'm telling you, we're at the lowest level of security. Security is nothing anymore.

Piet and Dillon do the type of port security the port police refuses to do. They have become the human waste collectors, representing 'the thriving "security industry" [that] rapidly becomes one of the principal branches of waste production and the paramount factor in the waste

disposal' (Bauman 2004: 7). By 'waste', Bauman refers to as asylum seekers and immigrants for whom there is no place in the global West. The fact the Piet and Dillon feel like the port police delegated this task of collecting human waste, confronts them with their weaker position and occupational insignificance. To balance the asymmetry, security officers filter out what is negative about port police officers through which they (re)establish a meaningful Self, like Piet, Balthazar and Wesley:

> There are cops here… we… don't like each other. I HATE those cops. […] Don't want to do anything with any of them. […] But we do make more money than those bastards! Haha! That's most messed up thing about it, haha! (Piet, operational security officer).

> I, myself, have a lot of "respect" for the police [*sarcasm*], because it's work I wouldn't want to do myself, haha! […] Imagine standing there! You're always in the picture, you never do anything good enough. You either have punished the offender too hard or, according to the victim, not hard enough. Everything you do is weighed carefully. You're insulted, you're challenged and you're standing there in your white shirt, bringing back home the bacon for a low wage (Balthazar, Hades Security owner and operational security officer).

> Most of the times the older [cops] have more respect. Weird though, that those younger cops are a bit condescending. I don't give a shit though, doesn't matter to me. I mean, like I said, the average security officer makes more money than the average cop, so, you know 'Go figure it out by yourself' [he'd say to a condescending cop]. I don't hate [the police], but yeah, I just don't want to join it. First of all, they earn too little and [secondly] look at the stuff you have to deal with man! (Wesley, operational security officer).

It is not merely the (more) violent encounters, but in particular the lower income of port police that make security officers value themselves as being in a better position. Basically, whereas the port police has more power, security officers make more money, so they argue that monetary gain beats public authority. It makes them have a better status. So, as much as they despise some of the effects of aggressive commercialism of their management, when it comes down to maintaining a meaningful Self through the powerful Other at the port police, their own commercial worth is what is used to equalise power inequalities.

Also, next to more financial gain, security officers emphasised port police officers have a (more) meaningless and boring job:

> Those people [of the port police] do nothing AT ALL. […] They won't do ANYTHING. I sometimes approach them and I always say 'Can I see your ID?', you know? They show their ID and they won't even ask for my ID! I then start to think 'What kind of cop are you? You don't even want to know who I am! […] Sometimes they come over here [to the security loge] and they start asking about things. […] There was [port] police [one time] and those two officers boarded the ship and simply wanted to know what kind of goods [the ship] was transporting. [Those ships] need to register that, because some vessels signed up to be controlled by the police, to make sure that they're safe or something. Anyway, I think [the port police] didn't do anything

[in regards to an inspection], because I was walking along with them. We came aboard and one autograph, that's it, haha! How silly is that? Not even looking around or something. Just a sign and done. […] That's the weird part of the police, they don't look at what you've done before [career-wise]. All of the good people are placed somewhere below [in ranks], instead of given a better job right away. But that's police, can't say too much about it. […] If you know how corrupt people there are in the police force, you will be shocked. I think the most people who ehm… the big guys [e.g. company owners, politicians etc.], they'll have family members at the police, even though they'll claim 'I hate the police', they do have people they know or friends at the police. No doubt (Teun, operational security officer).

What is interesting about Teun's othering of the port police work as boring is that he told me this during his shift in the security loge, where he was alone and he had nothing to do really besides talking with me about his work experience. Although his own line of work looked tedious, he recreated a meaningful and pure Self by othering port police as boring, corrupted and merely there to uphold a façade that blurs the fact they protect the ruling elites.

3.5 Subconclusion

This chapter has explored participants' relationships with management, colleagues and multi-agency partners. They blamed the Other in management for lacking any sense of operational realities. Also, especially since global austerity, management is considered to be extremely market-orientated and power-hungry, leading to corporate perversities. These perversities consist of managers reigning by pushing through inhumane top-down target-based policies that cause increased job anxiety, meaninglessness and routinisation. Some participants felt betrayed as operational staff and (re)establish a powerless Self through the powerful Other in management.

It is not only port police officers who vilify their commercialised management for violating the philosophy of being a public service; security officers condemned their management for merely having commercial and no public interest in providing port security whatsoever. This shows that in the port securityscape public good and market rationalities are not necessarily supported by their corresponding agents but valued on their (harmful) aims and effects (White 2014: 1019), meaning, security officers can represent/harm the public as much as port police officers can represent/harm the market. The condemnation of management reveals a powerless Self that becomes a resistant Self, second-guessing managerial decisions, in line with the perhaps diminished but not fully disappeared port culture of anti-authoritarianism. It illustrates that operational port security actors, installed to protect global transport and the free market, simultaneously consists of protecting their Self against hegemonic, management in the market and at neoliberalised State organisations. It is a type of resistance that unites all the port police

and security officers of this research, both on a collegial level as well as on a multi-agency partnership level.

Unity amongst colleagues is considered essential by participants and they (re)establish their Self through colleagues who cannot be trusted. Untrustworthy colleagues are those who are authoritarian, careerist, competitive and exclusionary. These type of colleagues reflect the very characteristics aggressive managerialism embodies, which is condemned and resisted. At the same time though, participants are authoritarian and exclusionary themselves towards colleagues who have no maritime or port background. Colleagues outside the port securityscape, (the 'land police', 'mall security' or 'event security' staff) are lesser police and security officers. This othering of colleagues reveals an arraignment and sustainment of exclusion.

Next to management, multi-agency partners and cooperation is a breeding ground for othering, as on the one hand, such cooperation is wished for and glorified; here the workers use (rather than being used by) port crime and insecurity to assert their worth. In particular with partners at the same level in foreign countries or with those in the port with more legal authority, cooperation is sought after, but without the interference of management. The multi-agency partnership with the Other in another agency both elevates and diversifies their everyday job.

However, these multi-agency dreams and wishes are contrasted with multi-agency misunderstanding, distrust and rivalry, leading to conflicts. Port police officers distrust the aggressive commercialism that security officers embody (whereas those security officers are critical of such commercialism as well) and are offended when security officers act like they are police officers. However, this is a veiled frustration of port police officers with the fact their original port tasks are outsourced to the private sector due to managerialist austerity politics. Security officers, for their part, consider port police officers as too authoritarian: whilst they need port police to make an arrest, this confronts security officers with their powerlessness on the job, especially in dangerous situations. They therefore see port police as arrogant and think they use their authority for their own good, which in turn leaves feelings of dissatisfaction behind. Security staff counter this dependency and status degradation by consoling themselves that they make more money. The multi-agency misunderstanding and rivalry in which inequality and power asymmetries lead to frustration is reflected in othering the multi-agency partners and summing up their weaknesses, through which one's own strengths become clear and the asymmetry is neutralised.

Chapter 4

The port business community

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter dealt with how a meaningful Self is established through the Other at work. This chapter will provide insight into the participants' othering of members of the port business community on whose behalf they secure and police. Again, the central concern is with what the othering processes reveal about their Selfs. First, this chapter focuses on the port companies, followed by the othering of specific members of the port business community, namely the port company owners and management, operational staff—dockers—and truckers.

4.2 Port companies

4.2.1 Customer-friendliness

Port police

The sense of duty of the port police largely comes from and feeds into protecting vital global trade and the law abiding port business community – these are the familiar Others they protect and police, and through which they define their Selfs. An operational HWP police officer explained that as a cop you do not necessarily have to know that much about trade and port economics; however it is good to have a sense of what is going on:

> We exist by the grace [of transport and tourism in the port]. This [port police] has merely 600 people and the [normal] police has 6000. Despite that, the port police is so big, because [of] the PORT! Port, economy, Ministry of Economic Affairs… I don't know how many millions this port makes, and as a port police officer, we're important for it.

The fact they serve and protect global trade and the port community means they are confronted with specific maritime trade and port industry related issues, complaints and victimhood that generally differ from those the ordinary police is confronted with. Whereas citizens do not have a company name to protect when they report a crime, the port business community does. This influences their motivation to inform the port police about crime, because the company and its port facilities could be damaged by bad press; clients and shipping lines might not use your port facilities anymore (Hoekema 1973). So, to then serve and interact with your community, means you need to understand their unwillingness to report a crime and take the necessary steps to make reporting a crime as anonymous and customer-friendly as possible:

We got an employee [who takes crime reports] and is available on-call, intended to get the threshold for the [port] business community as low as possible, because if you tell someone from a company 'Go to the [police] station and report there', well… time is money and [they won't report]. We would like to have that information [from companies] though. The past has shown us you need to motivate [them] so that we get a clear image of what's going on in that port. […] The [port police profession] has to do with quality and service, and with [providing] that accessibility (Nicolas, operational port police officer).

Therefore, their enforcement depends on the cooperation of the port business community:

It depends on the agendas of [port facility management]. It used to be the case you'd walk easier into a working-class district, at a tobacconist, than at a multinational. Walking in now is not easy. They got their agendas and their days are filled, so, you need to become a bit more creative with the product 'police' and 'community officer', and with selling it to the outside world. Once you're in, you notice more companies will go to the police with their issue. […] It's a matter of talking. I always indicate that when something has happened or is happening, call us at the very least, so that we'll come. […] Like last week, we had to do two investigations to look at how many people are actually smuggling drugs in their car into [this country], because we have no understanding of it whatsoever. Is there any smuggling at all, you know? So we first want to check private cars and then, in a while, we want to do it with trucks, from here [to another port]. Those are the type of operations you can only plan when you have got good connections with the [port] company, because if they say 'We're not confident about it', it kinda stops. So, you often need the cooperation of the companies to do these things. If companies are not confident or you don't have a relation with the company, they'll most of the times say 'Well, we're not doing it', you know? 'It'll affect our name' or 'We don't need it' (Marcus, operational port police officer).

Next to keeping relations warm with the port business community, port police officers have to obey the terminal rules and regulations:

We respect the regulations as they are on the companies' territories. We'll always show our ID's. […] You should consider it… When you own a company and I want to enter your company, I mean… It's rude to simply storm in somewhere. […] A company does want to know who is on its premises in regards to the safety standards. They're obligated to, that's the reason why I register myself. If there's any reason to suspect 'Well, there are some weird things going on [at a terminal]', we'll say 'We're going in immediately [via the front landside gate]' or 'We'll enter via the quay' (Nicolas, operational port police officer).

Marcus and Nicolas reveal a rather commercial Self by seducing companies into giving information they and their colleagues can consume to start an investigation or build-up a case. Serving the Other means to have a 'customer is king' attitude that can include reaching out to their police 'customers' in the port business community to support their daily industry by speeding up certain inspections or negotiating fines:

The most interesting thing about this department is that you get a lot contacts with clients [terminal management]. I try to pass on information as quickly as possible, making sure the other party [terminal management] can react to minimize [their] costs that we cause at the end of the day. […] I often work outside, because you meet with people. I like to see what's going on out there, because it's only outside where you get to know people. I also like to go to [port] companies, because it's much better to talk with someone personally than to do everything over the phone. You have to see where something is at and who's there (Wiglaf, operational port police officer).

They support and safeguard the commercial interest of the port business community not merely by smoothing inspections and "fine reduction", but they feel they also benefit it by motivating port facilities to operate safely and securely, because eventually, to have a safe and a secure port is what will attract (foreign) companies to come to PoR and PoH to invest:

> When you ask the companies directly, every single one of them hold the environment to a high standard. They invest in it and there all kinds of fancy posters hanging outside of the [terminal] building, [saying] 'We work safely. The environment is a priority here', you know? Haha, but reality can be a bit more nuanced, so to speak. You got economic interests, often, to enhance the quality with the organisation that brings about investments. And yeah, there's no money, or the head office in [another country] says, 'There's no money. It's a crisis people. Find a solution, make something up'. […] Basically, it's all about making money over here. Creating employment is of course a nice target. […] Look at what's happening in the world? It's about profit maximisation. […] We as port police play a role when it's about a safe port. A safe port in return benefits that way to a favourable investment climate. […] I'm not here for profit maximization. I don't ask those question to myself during work. I do think though 'Well, perhaps you should prioritise differently', but I don't take the CEO's place [at the port companies]. I'm taking the place where I'm at [which is the port police]. My aim is nothing more but a safe port (An operational port police officer).

And by rationalising for himself the need to create a safe port as his duty, with the side-effect of commercial benefits for the port, he becomes customer-friendly and his customer pays back in intelligence. So, specific port security characteristics are used to influence all kinds of maritime and port businesses to decide to moor in the most appealing port; i.e. the most secure port (Eski 2011). Indeed, port police officers make sure their (future and foreign) port community members 'welcome, take comfort in and actively or unconsciously seek out, environments they consider to be safe, thereby rewarding organizations for the care taken in securing them on their behalf' (Goold et al. 2010: 15). Basically, customer-friendly policing in the port thus means to kneel to the just-in-time maritime transport mentality that reigns in the global trade and local port community, and even determines port police shift work and its necessity:

> The port community police officer is sort of free to choose his shift. He actually has to be there at the moments when there's a demand for it. In the port area you're mostly in touch with the companies of your network, who work during the day, between 8am and 5pm. I work morning shifts, from 6:30am till 4pm. […] Your main task is your network. Establishing contacts, bringing the information from the outside inside (Lloyd, operational port police officer).

Security officers

Whereas port police officers are customer-friendly to gain intelligence and achieve their targets, security officers are customer-friendly to sell their company's commercial services for one or more port terminals, either as in-house security or through a contracted security company. To do so they need to get to port companies' trust to get and stay contracted. Especially for security

companies it is essential to be trusted, which is tough due to the nature of securing contracts. In order for you to advertise your customer-specific security services and product, you will need to know about a port facility's weaknesses. No port facility likes to share such critical information with you:

> If the [client] across the table doesn't share anything about how his [port] security is, well, you can try as hard as you can, but it won't work. […] I think you need to speak the same language. I notice [in this port] that, in case you let your knowledge of ISPS filter through, and you know about security law and port security law, etc. you give some information and then someone else considers you a counterpart (Balthazar, Hades Security owner and operational security officer).

> You have to earn your respect, definitely in [this port]. […] One of the port companies [here] went about the old fashioned way, as in 'What do you want [from us]?' […] 'What the hell do you know about [port security]?' Only after you've shown what you know and are able to do, and really work your ass off, they'll start to treat you as normal. […] Don't arrive your first day [at customers] in your three piece suit with Italian shoes. For some orders you're at the table with a CEO, who's simply wearing his jeans and fleece vest. Look, I know I'm representing [Hephaestus Security], but I do know I shouldn't wear my suit. Why not? 'Little prick, wearing a suit? Look at my chair I'm sitting in, in my normal clothes and you look like that' [is how the CEO would react]. […] Understanding that the port runs 24/7, [forces you] as a service provider to run 24/7 as well, that can be the main difference [between getting contracted before other security companies do] (Dustin, security manager and consultant).

Both Balthazar and Dustin have done operational port security work, after which they became a security company owner and consultant. They both emphasise what it means to get customers in and provide quality customer service in the port securityscape. They have to be real with port companies; no fine talk and no flashy presentation of security. The more commercial they are, the lower their chances a potential customer will contract with them. Balthazar and Dustin are aware of this element, especially in these times of austerity. They need to be as straightforward as possible about their prices and services, and ready to negotiate:

> I actually expected that, because of the [financial] crisis, it would be all about the money. So, if you'd be cheaper than anyone else, you'd be offered a [contracted] assignment. However, what became clear to me in [this port], is that because of the crisis, people are staying together. You do get letters from your client, as in 'Hi, we're not allowing any price rises and we are asking you to think along with us, and take a few percentages off of the price instead of adding'. You do get that. But it's not like they'd say 'Ey, we're gonna get rid of you, because someone else is €0,50 cheaper'. People are very brand loyal (Balthazar).

> It's a shit time, I must admit. We feel it. The rates in security are very poor. More is done through tenders. […] [A customer would demand] 'We would like to get an offer for port security services, so here's our set of demands', 50 pages filled with knock-out criteria, quality demands, you name it. You need to write your [offer], how you're gonna tackle it. All your company information is disclosed and a pricelist. [The customer] will have a look at it and will decide, based on [security] companies bidding for it, 'You'll be the one' (Dustin).

The point of mentioning the sales tactics here, is because port companies are not necessarily interested in the cheapest security company; they are interested in the best deal. If companies provide quality port security, they will keep them contracted. From the moment they get contracted or secure a contract renewal, the customer is the king who consumes the security companies' frontline 'port security products', consisting of their security officers.

Security officers may have other opinions and experiences with that customer. During a car patrol, Wesley and I arrived at one of his customers, telling me 'This is our biggest customer. Half of the revenue, so, you need to be very careful with this one!' Port companies are their main source of income, I had to understand, which makes companies a powerful Other. Indeed, '[d]ue to a highly competitive market, the client who hires private guards has a major impact on the way the job is done' (Loyens 2011: 472). Unlike security managers and consultants though, security officers do not consider themselves products for the customer, but craftsman delivering a service. For example, Nikolaus was called to start with car patrolling the T1 perimeters, and he reacted: 'There's work to do! Producing security!' After that though, he told me security is actually not a product but 'a service. I can see a product. I can't see a service.' They are not passively consumed. No. They actively benefit port facilities by providing the best security possible, showing that for them port security is a craft they deliver to their customer. They care about their space and place in the port securityscape, whereas their security company management only cares about customer satisfaction to eventually make the most profit, they find. Therefore, security officers feel more connected with their customer than with their security company, particularly those contracted out to one port facility:

> Because we are mostly just here [at T1]. So, we got nothing to do at all with Apollo Security. They drop by once a year, look around and leave again. You barely hear anything from them. Then you do notice they are not seriously interested in the customer (Arnd, operational security officer).

Due to their stronger connections with the customer, they think for and along with the customer. Especially when they feel trusted by their customer, they make sure their customer is not overpaying for security services, as James, who has management and operational tasks, told me:

> Poseidon Security wants to make money of course […] I'm more than aware, but I'm not going to spend unnecessary money. The Poseidon culture is one of continuity. That's what matters. Not just an annual contract and then be like 'Hi, next [security company]!' That's how I feel it. I know from other [security companies], and I'm not going to give any names, but they're like 'Okay, we got the deal and we'll see about next year. We're gonna make as much money as possible during this one year' […] If something's going on, I determine whether extra security is necessary or not. Right across from here, [T5's] CEO is stationed and he agrees with everything.

James is included at T5, which motivates him to exclude, or at least, prevents his own security company from overcharging. Like James, the other security officers enjoyed it when they would get involved by port companies' management and board of directors during meetings to talk about port facility security regulations, costs and operational implications. If they are being heard and asked by the customer for input, they feel acknowledged, whereas their own security management does not give them that feeling.

Some security officers would feel honoured if they would meet the port company's CEO, as it is so sporadic and thus special and appreciated. However, the contact could be more frequent:

> We got [our CEO], one of the big bosses of the holding, the president so to speak. So, when he had a drink, he drops by at ours and he wants to have a cab or something or he simply doesn't know what he's doing anymore. Besides that, it's 'Good morning' and 'Good afternoon'. When shit really hits the fan […] you do get to hear like 'Good job guys', but that's about it. We barely have any real contact. […] On the one hand, it's understandable. On the other hand, it's a shame of course. You do certain tasks here and sometimes it would be nice to hear 'What do you think about us [board of directors]?' or all the stuff at [the CEO's] level. Then again, I understand it; [the CEO] has got completely different things going on to worry about. [The CEO] might be stationed here at this terminal, but could've been somewhere else as well. Not everything that happens reaches [the CEO]. […] There are many more terminals owned by the [CEO]. This is just one little one […] and we're just the small security that has been contracted in from outside (Gödeke, operational security officer).

As much as they would like to have more interaction with CEOs, the rare contact and the superficial nature of the interaction, as Gödeke implies, reveals the development of a rather modest perspective on his Self through the powerful Other; the CEO probably has better things to do than to be concerned with a group of outsourced security officers, or security at all. Former T9 security officer Aaron too has rather negative experiences with his CEO back when he was still employed there and experienced disrespect due to a (interest in) security compliance by his port company and other port companies:

> [Port] companies don't give a crap. Authorities who are supposed to control them, think 'Whatever'. The company where I worked, I can [still] enter the premises [there]. Just like that. Gates open automatically when entering and exiting. […] I thought 'That's easy! But you do have an ISPS sign standing outside that you're enforcing its rules.' I was dumbfounded. It says something about the [customer], of whom I said, who doesn't give a shit about the authorities. He [the CEO] just says 'I decide what I'm doing with my company, not the legislator of [this country]' (Aaron, former operational security officer).

Aaron stood powerless though when he worked there and eventually got fired because the port company needed to cut back on security, thus becoming even more non-compliant. Non-compliance of port companies was, however, exceptional in this research. All facilities I have been too were ISPS compliant. This did not mean port police and security officers fully agreed with the ISPS code and welcomed it.

4.2.2 Protecting against the ISPS Code

Port police

The ISPS Code is a hydra-headed beast, having its own peculiar harms, according to the participants. To serve and protect global trade and the local port business community does not always marry with the post-9/11 ISPS Code and other relevant maritime and port security measures the port police is expected to enforce upon that trade and community. If anything, the ISPS Code affected the maritime trade and port community heavily:

> [The relations with the port companies are] good, definitely as port police, we're doing a good job. That's because you kind of talk the language of the companies and you understand what kind of problems they're confronted with. Definitely after 2001, when that ISPS [Code] was dressed up. Yeah, it was shoved down the companies' throats! I may conclude that and there were companies that did nothing about security for years and suddenly they had to invest tons [of money] to get their certificates. It cost a lot of money of course for many companies (Ferdinand, operational port police officer).

For the port police officers, the ISPS Code has no sense of practical reality, like their management. Inkmar gave me a sort of workshop on why the ISPS Code was created and he quizzed me. Perhaps the most significant was how he started off, by saying 'This complete junk comes from SOLAS'. His colleague Freimut shared the same opinion about the ISPS Code, when he told me that 'at the IMO, they sit together, and [talk] blablablabla… and… there is a big lack of realism'. In line with Freimut's critique, is Arnulf's take on the ISPS Code:

> ISPS is… yeah, it's… unpractical. They codified these rules in writing. It used to be like that before. It always… Those big ships for example, there's a gangway, and there always was a sort of gangway watchman, so that no outsiders could board the ship. That's how it used to be. The problem was actually how the captain supervised it.

They all acknowledged 9/11 was the main cause of a rather sudden and extravagant increase in security governance of ships and ports. They told me they wonder if there really is any effect of the ISPS Code on port security as a whole:

> People felt like something had to be done very quickly, right? After 9/11, right? They [IMO's MSC] all rushed into meetings, talked a little about security that doesn't really result into actual security. That's how it is (Mischel, operational port police officer).

Moreover, when I inquired whether the ISPS Code is part of their day to day job reality, most port police officers shrugged their shoulders and told me:

> [I'm] not directly [concerned with] ISPS. Look, we got the security challenge [in this port] but actually everything we do has to do with security or public order (Lloyd, operational port police officer).

> No. If I see there are some fences damaged or not function, or gates that are open, I email it to [the PSO], telling him 'I saw this and that'. He has his people for it, apparently. If it's people [in my community], I call them myself, telling them 'Look, your gate's open'. It's those little things; another ship's anchored and there has to be a guard [which sometimes is not the case]. So, [PSC] supervises it quite okay, at a distance, I think. Those companies are visited often [by PSC] (Marcus, operational port police officer).

If they do any ISPS-related policing at all, it consists of petty breaches by crew members, as the following chapter will examine in more depth. If anything, Inkmar told me:

> We got an extra task. We have to do more work because of it and are therefore busier. We have to train our colleagues more, have to study legal material and apply legal material. We cannot make any mistakes.

It is difficult to enforce other people to comply with rules that the officers themselves consider ridiculous, especially when those who have to comply with the rules think so as well as. They believe the interaction with the port business community and ship crews has suffered from the securitisation drift since the ISPS Code. Especially on-board ships it has become more anonymous and harder to communicate with those they police for. They blame the USA for the exaggerated ISPS Code and other types of maritime safety and security that have detrimental effects on the global trade and port business community:

> About America, I must admit, the USA has very high standards compared to other countries. Very, very high. Then again, a lot of shit comes from the USA! Yes, haha! For example, the Americans demand that when a container goes onto the American railway [from an international ship] that the hazard label… Hold on… (Wiglaf, operational port police officer).

Wiglaf gets a form out of his bag to illustrate how USA authorities demand something ridiculous from non-American countries to import the container into the USA on the railway. Those authorities want to have the placard on a certain height on a specific side of the container. It frustrates Wiglaf. A RRSP police officer othered Americans as hyper-anxious:

> I think common sense plays the main role. I worked very closely with the American army here at the beginning of the [Iraq] War [in 2003], you know? Because the transport of troops took place [through PoR]. They saw a terrorist behind every street light. That's a bit paranoid (an operational RRSP police officer).

More generally, the USA is othered for its paranoia and for the wrongful War on Terror that resulted from it:

United Arab Shipping Company… when you see how friendly and kind those [Arabic crew members are]. Unbelievable, unbelievable! When you get to know them… People always have that… How do they call it, the Americans? Axis of Evil? Catastrophe! So unbelievably mean what they say to those [Arabic crew members]! […] You can hardly imagine [it]. Those stereotypes can be so deeply insulting (Arnulf, operational port police officer).

Did this port become more secure since we got ISPS here? Zero! […] What became more secure? We never did [a proper registration]. We never had any terrorist attack in [this country]. If you look at the ISPS Code, eventually, it's a result from the big global threat that came forward from the Cold War that really did take place back then. That's where it came from. International security is what [the USA] wanted. We had some terrorist attacks after… when was it? 2001 that those things [Twin Towers] collapsed? That's when [the USA] said: 'Now we're gonna tackle it worldwide'. Big Brother [the USA] said 'You all need to tackle it globally'. As if the USA isn't full of loopholes? They, supposedly, have it all under control, because over there, there aren't 100 Mexicans trespassing everyday [sarcasm]. Do you get my point? We're stuck with [the ISPS Code nonsense] (Tyler, former operational port police officer).

Like Tyler and Arnulf, many participants criticised the xenophobic populism that inspired post-9/11, War on Terror-based policies and politics, leading up to a useless ISPS Code that does not function, according to them. They are othering the USA, considering it a hegemonic power that exercises its global control by war and aggressively lobbied for international legislation. In being customer-friendly to benefit the port business community yet punitive on it when they need to be, and by othering the USA as xenophobic, power-hungry and hegemonic, port police officers establish a meaningful yet Janus-faced Self. They are conflicted by and simultaneously sustain 'the interests and objectives of state and market [that] have become progressively indistinct' (O'Reilly 2010: 203).

Security officers

All security officers acknowledged 9/11 to be the main cause for the ISPS Code and they disagreed with it. They, in fact, were highly critical of the USA and American foreign politics, even more than port police officers were:

It was a matter of money, all of it. From the beginning onward. Many people didn't see that. They saw 'That's horrible, those [Twin Tower] buildings going down', but do you know how many soldiers died for that? […] Many Afghan people, innocent people died for it too, don't forget about that. [The War in Afghanistan] just didn't help. […] It was about money, oil and the like (Teun, operational security officer).

As well as the capitalist motives behind the War on Terror (to invade oil-rich countries), the War on Terror was also criticised for not tackling terror and merely boosting the security industry:

> Klaus (management and operational security officer): The War on Terror [is] in reality not about terrorism but about making money, right? […] With the ISPS Code I contribute a small part to the defence against terrorism, but this small part is disproportionate to the costs, in my opinion. And then there are those who claim there's only terrorism aimed at the USA, and only from the outside. It can also come from within.
> Me: Personally, I think the whole anti-terrorism [agenda] since 9/11 has become terrorism itself.
> Klaus: Haha! That's what we've been saying here too, that that's the actual terrorism! […] Those Americans are so stupid, right? So stupid that they burn the Koran, publicly. So stupid.

Security officers clearly doubt the intentions behind the War on Terror and consider it to be a commercial enterprise, one that is costing their customers too much money. However, they also realise their customers had to become ISPS compliant and upgrade their port security:

> Everything you see here, at the waterfront, even those office buildings over there, is ISPS focused. So, let's say a company says 'I'm not participating in that [ISPS Code]', he won't get any work. No boat will anchor. Then you're gone [bankrupt] in no time (Abraham, operational security officer).

Whenever I raised the intended preventative effects of the ISPS Code against terrorism, they would have a rather short but concise answer ready: 'I don't notice anything', as Wesley said. In fact, the ISPS Code, aimed at improving port facility and ship security, leads to everyday conflicts in port and ship safety. This did not make any sense to security officers, like Bernard who worked at T13:

> The disadvantage of this line of work, is that ISPS dictates that everything needs to be closed [toward the ship], but in line with safety rules, if something happens [e.g. a fire], [crew members] need to get off [board]. So, we say, 'Alright, will make a smaller gangway', but they call it a 'goods scaffold' (Bernard, operational security officer).

Indeed, a small spark is much more significant risk at petrochemical port facility T13 than that of terrorism. For security officers, therefore, safety comes first, prevailing over ISPS Code-based security.

4.2.3 Keeping up appearances

Port police

Although their main objective is to smooth their police interventions in their port business community as much as possible, Lloyd and his colleague later on explained that policing the port should become less economically friendly and more about doing one's public duties again. It should not be about doing what is right for the economy, like the situation is in another European port, Lloyd said. In that other port, he claimed, the port police have to call local companies to ask if they can drop by; this is not the case in his port. Port police ought to have

more distance, because, after all, port companies do commit crimes as well. He wants to appear as independent.

At the time of my fieldwork, the Norwegian based chemical storage group Odfjell Terminals Rotterdam (OTR) had to pay a fine of €3 million as a series of environmental offences had been committed. They were fined because of benzene and butane leakages (to which personnel were exposed) and for having poor safety systems. Eventually, the OTR had to shut down (Howard 2014). Many of the port police used the incident to indicate how bad a port company can mess things up, which is actually part of the history of the port business community:

> At those port companies… Oh boy! They only have one goal—and you can talk crap as much as you like—which is to make profit. Yeah! Haha! Their aim is not [to take care of] your safety, my safety! They can't be bothered. […] In the past [1980s], if an installation exploded at [a petrochemical port facility] or went up in flames, you could be damn sure it wasn't the newest installation that caught fire. As matter of fact, it was the installation that needed replacement. Can be two things: overdue maintenance or… If you think evil of it, that someone just set an installation on fire [to claim insurance money]? 'Noooo, we don't do that'. They don't do that [sarcasm] (an operational RRSP police officer).

Indeed, crimes by port companies are anything but petty and can consist of severe environmental crimes (Bisschop 2012). Whenever a port company breaks the law, they need to be policed too and held accountable by a distant public service, because 'on the one hand you're an ambassador of the police [at the port business community], however, you also act as police, right?', one port police officer admitted. Port police officers are in a constant trade-off. By protecting the port, one feels he protects trade and the global market; to do so he must be customer-friendly but without betraying his duty as a public authority:

> It's not like you have a gentleman's agreement [with a company] and that they are always informed ahead [of a police operation]. Definitely not! I mean, let me be absolutely clear. We're the police and we have a task to fulfil, which also means you cannot be friends with everyone, or stay friends. You should expect that from the police. […] We're independent and impartial here. […] We're not sitting on the lap of those [companies]. When we enter, we enter and we look around, haha! […] It means we expect a high standard of professionalism of the companies. They can also expect that from us being the port police, you know? It's mutual respect. We like to treat them as a professional and companies that do not act professionally will have to deal with us (Nicolas, operational port police officer).

So, as much as they (want to) serve and protect the global trade and the port companies responsible for it, through which port police officers communicate a commercial Self, they keep (up the appearance of) independence and (re)establish a police duty-driven Self that fights corporate crime. It is a legitimacy that is not merely sought after and re-emphasised by the security industry (Thumala, Goold and Loader 2011), but also by public authorities who have

to benefit and protect, but also police and discipline the global market and trade. But the power of the companies makes them compromise:

> It's not like the biggest oil company is above the law, because that's why there's a [port] police. I'm arguing we can't change the whole world, but fortunately the police is independent and it takes a lot of effort to defend that independence. […] If you're an old hand at the game […] with oil companies, you need to know your place but never lose your independence! […] There's a white flow [upper world] and a black stream [underworld], but to bring that to light, is very difficult (Ronny, port police manager).

And Ronny's concern was followed by meaningful silence.

Security officers

Port companies can make security officers feel relatively powerless as well. The ISPS Code, as said in the above, created employment and gave security officers a (less monotonous) job. However, the reality at the forefront is that security officers feel they are at the port facility because of the port company's obligation to comply with the ISPS Code and other security laws and regulations:

> [The port facility's] perspective is: 'If only there wasn't [an] ISPS [Code], I would have needed less security officers'. In that case, [the CEO] would have just three or four men walking around here. Perhaps one to register people, one to minimise economic damage, one for cleaning and one to get people off board […] Security only costs money. That's the first thing you learn when [a customer] ends the contract or a new customer joins (Gödeke, operational security officer).

Many more security officers realised they do not generate profit for port companies. I was told sometimes they have the feeling they are, next to fulfilling the ISPS Code obligations, also there for port companies to oblige with insurance policies:

> Security is basically, that's what was told to me, just a matter of insurances. Pure prevention [by port companies]. The cops are there to catch the bad guys. Of course, if you [as port companies] got a guy with a dog, that'd be a big plus, but it's not like it will deter. […] It doesn't mean that, in case something's wrong, I won't act or my dog. [It's not I would] be like 'It's just for insurances' [when I need to act]. Absolutely not. Listen, of course I do this for security. Being there for prevention, even if you think you merely work for insurance. The fact is that it's all just for insurance (Wesley, operational security officer).

Port companies do not only have to look safe and secure, they also have to look clean, for which cleaning services are hired. Security officers feel solidarity with the cleaner as they too would be the first ones out when new austerity measures are implemented at port companies:

> [S]ecurity is like the cleaning services and catering. If cuts are made, those will be the first targets (Bernard, operational security officer).

During their daily work, they in fact interact a lot with other outsourced services at port facilities, in particular cleaning services. Together they generate a safe, secure and clean port environment but do not generate profit, which unites them in undesirability. The services are together and alone in their powerlessness, and share a defeatist fate in constructing the port companies' façade towards the outside world, making them all cannon fodder in outsourced (security) service pricing wars. However, although being or feeling united, there is also competition amongst outsourced services to take-over First Aid, as Bernard told me, and cleaning services are taken over as well, as Sturmhard told me. Sturmhard and I were doing registration tasks one day and a woman from cleaning services dropped off keys, which she needed to clean T1's office spaces. Sturmhard had to register at what time keys were handed out and received back, and whom from. He then said to me 'That's a job on the side, haha!', meaning, his colleagues and he clean as well for T1. They are in fact taking over cleaning services to make them more attractive and stay contracted:

> The market's being tough. Fighting, when it comes down to security. We are obviously, quasi… because of other [security companies] offering dumping prices, we have to ensure our place and we do things on the side. It then becomes hard for a new [security company] to get a foot in the door. […] The fact we're doing extra stuff is of course for an assured job security (Hennig, team leader and operational security officer).

Gödeke, Hennig's colleague, also agreed you have to advertise your capacities to do other services next to security:

> 'Look, don't get this the wrong way, but I [security] am only costing you [customer] money. However, what can we do to make it as attractive as possible for you?' For example, by saying 'We'll arrange a postal service for you' or 'We'll take over the switchboard for you at night', without it endangering our core [security] task, because all kinds of services can get the upper hand very easily. […] The moment you notice you got no more time, because my actual job… do I still have time to have people to secure the perimeters? To patrol or [are we] merely doing [other] services?' So as soon as you notice '[the security officer] isn't doing his original tasks for which he's hired', something is going wrong (Gödeke, operational security officer).

This illustrates how security officers struggle to obtain job security in port security. In order to do so, they must sell they can do other services that might pose a threat to their original task, while dealing with the threat of competitors in the security market. They have to prove themselves over and over again, and basically sell (out) their Selfs to customers, which creates frustration and anxiety.

However, sometimes it is possible to make the customer pay for his wrongdoing, literally. Although customer is king, he can be a fool as well and be punished for it. This became clear during a car patrol with Wesley who was called in to respond to an alarm that went off. We

arrived at the customer's premises and he told me to wait in the car, because 'I think the alarm is still set', he said. I asked him if we drove there for nothing then, to which he replied:

> It's costing him money though, his own fault. €60, if I'm correct. […] I go inside to switch the alarm back on and I earn €60! Easy money now and then!

In not complying with security measures, Wesley, like the other security officers, can punish the customer by making them pay money for extra service. Taking your time only increases the amount of money, so, by doing things slower than necessary, you can make your customer pay even more, which should discipline the customer to comply with security and safety rules. The following section will explore how port personnel and truckers comply with port security regimes and how the participants enforce them.

4.3 Dockers and truckers

4.3.1 Affiliation and laisser-faire attitudes towards dockers

Port police

Historically, dockers did their job under tough working conditions (Smit 2013). Interaction between port police and the operational port employees or 'dockers' is highly sporadic, nevertheless, but when such interaction takes place it is because of one particular event: strikes. Dockers are considered rough-edged and aggressive, and able to easily unite to go on strike, for which there is a sympathetic understanding:

> Back [in the 19th century] working conditions were very horrible in the port. It has improved but there is less employment as a consequence of all the automation. I mean, the average docker, if you're employed at a decent port company, you have a rather good income. If I hear about those salaries sometimes, I'm like 'Well, I'd like to show up for that as well!' I'm not able to though, haha! They deserve it though (Nicolas, operational port police officer).

Those conditions have changed in the 20th and 21st century, yet dockers are still continuously dealing with eroding pension terms, decreasing income rates and reduced holidays that lead to their discontent and aggression, as several port police officers explained to me:

> [The] port culture is a rough diamond, which is nice, somehow, but you should not get into an argument with those boys. I'm referring to of course... that has been over a year now, when I was standing in the middle of [a strike]. Pensions [of port workers] were being discussed [by the government] […] Young, old, tattoos; they were all there and everyone was worked up. They were treated unfairly of course, let's be real here. It was just robbery [from their pensions]! (Ronny, port police manager).

So, the unfairness is understood and the port police officers affiliate their jobs and livelihood with social issues of the working class, and therefore recognise the issues dockers face themselves. Such an understanding helps when you have to act as an authority in between dockers and those they strike against. You also need to differentiate in the type of docker crowd you are dealing with:

> At some companies you need to talk the language of the port. I'll give you an example of a certain strike, at certain companies. When at a certain company, a big chemical plant, a strike happens, you have to deal with process operators. In that case, you shouldn't talk the harsh port language. When you're dealing with lashers… There's nothing wrong with those people, don't get me wrong, but it's another category of people, you know? You shouldn't talk with arrogance, as in 'Dear sir, you shouldn't do that', because then you'll be wrestling around within 10 minutes. You can easily achieve what you want with them be simply saying 'Asshole, listen to me. We're here for your cause. You're here for your cause. I too for my cause. We're gonna solve this together'. That's important (Ferdinand, operational port police officer).

As long as you treat them with respect and engage with the dockers on strike in a natural way, and not in authoritative manner, the problems can be solved:

> If we got strikes at the docks, it's a different story entirely! In a normal manner though. People are behaving normally. […] If you simply respect those people and you cooperate with them decently, treat them normally then… I never had any issues, you know? Even if they're pissed off as hell, or drunk […] or whatever, it always ends okay. They simply got normal respect. Still, it is and remains a world of its own (Warner, operational port police officer).

Lloyd explained whenever a strike breaks out at a port company, they are aware of it beforehand and you need to take up your role as mediator between the dockers and the company, trade unions or the government:

> If [dockers] want to protest, sure, we can talk with them as in 'What do you want? Okay, you'll get your moment and afterwards it's done'. It needs to be agreed on beforehand, in cooperation with [a port company] for example, or with another company [of which we know] 'this and that is what they want. Can they? Is it feasible?' It's obviously a moment for them to be in the news, and they achieve that (Lloyd, operational port police officer).

The docker strikes are therefore not entirely spontaneous anymore, nor are they a last resort, but rather they are staged and controlled moments to shine in and request attention for their cause, in which they are being represented by and act as 'business unionists' (Smit 2013: 305-308). During these moments, the dockers include the port police as mediators into the organisation of the strike, and the port police officer can establish a Self as mediator.

Security officers

Security officers, especially those at port facilities, interacted on a daily basis with dockers who were subject of strict port facility security and safety regulations. Gödeke and I saw someone walking without a safety vest at T1, which meant it must have been a stranger having no legitimate reason to be there. PPEs that increase one's personal safety, serve as checkpoints for security officers to categorise them into outsiders and non-compliant dockers. Security officers warn them, report them, limit their movement or even forbid entry to their port facility. Essentially, dockers who transgress security and safety rules often encounter a security officer exercising his powers to constrain his or her movement. But security officers are legally not entitled to exercise more power than any other citizen. Dockers are aware of this, I had to understand, and they stereotype the security officers as…

> …a porter, who's there to 'open the gate and closing the gate', nothing more […] but it's not merely just a gate service. […] People say 'You failed in society and didn't learn anything, so you became a porter.' […] All of the [T1 dockers] think 'Everybody can become a [security officer]', right? That's not the case, you can't simply say 'Well, I'm gonna start in the security branch'. That's not how it works (Hennig, team leader and operational security officer).

Wesley acknowledged such stereotypes:

> Often people think 'You're only driving in circles', 'Only drink coffee' and 'Smoke.' It's a certain image of the security officer that I sometimes regret. I can't deny all of it though. Yeah, I do drive in circles. Yeah, it's not difficult work, let's be honest here. Right? Anyone can close a window. Anyone can close a door. Anyone can set an alarm (Wesley, operational security officer).

Or as Nikolaus described the stereotyping of security officers:

> The night watchmen with their lamp, who run through streets to see if there hasn't been a fire somewhere. […] Those people back then were slightly mentally challenged (Nikolaus, operational security officer).

Nikolaus had to laugh about this and other stereotypes that are insulting to his colleagues and him. It has to do with the nature of the job, he explained:

> When nothing happens [dockers think] 'Oh, [security officers] sleep the whole night and do nothing anyway. They only drink beer and play cards'. I always say to them 'But why? Only when it matters, then you expect everything will go the right way and you're being helped immediately'. That's when they'll stop believing that we're playing cards until we're done working.

Whereas the security officers are being othered by dockers, they othered the dockers as well, however not necessarily negatively. In similar fashion as port police officers, security officers would typify the docker as unmannered, rough, transgressive and strike-addicted:

> Strikes. Of course we've got that. [This port] and striking, it's the same thing, haha! […] There's one coming again soon. Heard stuff yesterday. Well, what are you going to do with [that information]? We'll have the entire front closed of course, and police will be there at that very moment. Those are the same people [dockers] you see on a daily basis. They'll try to intrude and do all sorts of weird things just to improve their collective agreement. The unions, the press; loads of interested parties will show up (James, security management and operations).

In a way, security officers are there to mediate the commercialised strikes in the port, together with the port police officers. This, while they are making sure things do not get out of hand and simultaneously keeping the bond with dockers peaceful enough, because they have to work with them again after the strike.

Strikes happen occasionally, but are not part of everyday interaction with dockers; giving warnings, however, is. During a car patrol late at night on T1's premises, Sören said dockers need to get to and from their cranes and VC's as fast as possible during shift change. They consequently drive too fast. They are allowed to drive 30km/h, yet almost all the time accelerate up to 60km/h:

> To be honest, I am… how to put this, not a babysitter of those guys. They're old enough. They know they're allowed to only drive 30km/h here (Sören, operational security officer).

Their speeding comes forward from the wish to enjoy their break for as long as possible, consequently meaning they must hurry up when going to and returning from the break. Rooney is a VC driver and provides new drivers with instruction. He explained to me a VC driver works for 2 hours, and then has a 45 minute break. Then 2 hours of driving again, and one more 45 minute break; it is crucial to enjoy a full break for relaxation in order to stay concentrated while driving. The concentration decreases during a shift and, especially at night-time, it is hard to stay concentrated. Sören and his colleagues, like Arnd, know this:

> I talked with a VC driver. They are allowed to only drive for 1.5, 2 hours, and then they have to take a break, for at least half an hour (Arnd, operational security officer).

Despite the fact security officers understand the reasons of dockers to speed on port facility premises, they asked for a speed camera to be installed. None was installed though, Sören said, while smirking. They installed a radar speed limit sign instead:

Dude! [Dockers] kept on trying to break [speed]records, yeah, how much that [radar] would display [and] the highest I have seen... well, it stopped working at 85km/h. […] To be honest, that's just mental! (Sören, operational security officer).

Mental perhaps, but Sören did enjoy telling about such rascality. Next to speeding, security officers mostly engaged with dockers when they got into an industrial accident and First Aid was needed. During my fieldwork only one minor industrial accident happened. A docker, a young man, was repairing a crane element but did not wear his protection goggles and leaked oil got in his eye. First Aid needed to be applied. The security officer who helped him out instructed the docker how to sit. The young guy looked like a tough man, wearing a sleeveless shirt, showing his tattoos on his arms, and wearing an earring, but he was in a vulnerable situation, whereas the security officer was more of a father figure at that moment. With precision, the security officer told the victim how to move his head, 90 degrees to the left, and that he was going to insert a neutralising fluid in his eye. After that, the docker was told to rub his eyes into the direction of the nose, to make sure the oil that got in his eyes came out. The docker took the advice seriously and immediately applied the rubbing technique. Then it was the moment for the security officer to make the docker aware of fluids and that he needs to wear his protection goggles, and for a good reason. The docker replied with 'Huh?' which annoyed the security officer who then, rather aggressively, asked him if he could pay some attention. He then was asked how it happened and the docker explained it was stupid of him not to wear the goggles. He was then told his colleague and he should have called security right away instead of trying it solve it themselves. After the docker left and everything was back to normal, the security officer told me he hoped he would never see another docker at First Aid again. However, it was clear to me he enjoyed himself applying aid, helping a docker in need and being authoritative and patronising afterwards. This kind of incident allowed him to be important and trusted.

4.3.2 Affiliation and conflict with truckers

Port police

Truckers find port police a nuisance in their daily routine, port police officers experience:

[Truckers] always think we are distracting them from their work, haha, yeah. […] Again and again they state 'I already have been checked twice', right? But yeah, that doesn't help [them,] haha! (Rupertus, operational port police officer).

And port police officers also find truckers a nuisance to deal with. They deal with truckers when they do not comply with the traffic regulations on public roads in the port or when they fail to

abide by terminal regulations, as well as during accidents or when impatient truckers get into fights (with each other). Due to the fact they only get in touch with these specific port business community members after an incident, they are othered into being rather careless towards safety and security regulations in the port. Right after we left the PA2 by car to start a patrol, and turned around the corner, Nicolas saw a trucker calling with the phone in his hand. He immediately turned the car around and followed the trucker, fast. Nicolas told me he saw him calling while he was in a bend in the road, which is dangerous. He was used to it; seeing people calling and quickly trying to put their phone away. In the meantime, the trucker entered the port facility territory. Nicolas suggested I should come along for the fining of the trucker, so we both got out of the car and approached the trucker. Nicolas explained why he was going to fine him. The trucker acted surprised and I could feel what he was going through at that point: feeling caught but trying to act surprised. He told Nicolas and me we saw it wrongly and that he was holding a portophone, which is allowed. Nicolas said he saw him phoning with a mobile phone; he held the device close to his ear and you do not hold a portophone to your ear. He fined the trucker, which upset the trucker who remained speechless. Apparently, it is a standard excuse of truckers to claim they were talking through their portophones but actually are phoning. 'Bullshit! Haha!' Nicolas summarised and said:

> [Truckers] agreed [it] amongst each other, I think. [...] 'Always deny [you're non-handsfree calling]', you know? [...] You don't want to KNOW how many [truckers] are calling while driving. You'd figure there would be some sort of awareness, like 'Let's not do this'. I'm not lying in wait to snatch €220 from someone! But yeah, it's just my job.

He gets angry whenever he sees a trucker swaying all over the road because he is calling non-handsfree and is not paying attention to his surroundings. It is a safety breach that could lead to severe accidents. Not that the severe accident is the issue though; it is the non-precautionary attitude of truckers that is being condemned and can make them punishable. Port police officers are keen on paying extra attention to Central or Eastern European truckers, due to their idea they are involved in transporting contraband and carry falsified trucker licences, or fake ID cards. Moreover, in particular Polish truckers were othered as drunks; a problem(atisation) that motivated port police officer Marcus to start an awareness initiative to warn Polish truckers about drinking and the related fines.

However, although truckers normally encounter port police when they are about to receive the enforcement stick, port police officers sometimes need them, Marcus explained. He went to truck stop diners to gather intelligence about what kind of insecurity truckers can experience overnight at truck stops, such as cargo theft or (armed) robbery.

Security officers

Security officers deal with truckers, as with dockers, on a daily basis but not like port police officers; truckers routinely interact with security officers when they need to get registered and permitted into port facility premises. Security officers mentioned they commonly had issues with Central and Eastern European truckers, as becomes clear in the following conversation between a security officer in Rotterdam and a foreign trucker. Originally, they spoke in German with each other:

> Security officer (operational): Hello [to the trucker].
> Me: Hello [to the trucker].
> Security officer: You have to load?
> Trucker: Yes.
> Security officer: You got an Ausweis?! A passport? PASSPORT??
> Trucker: Passport?
> Security officer: Yes??
> Trucker: Ooooh, sorry haha [nervous laughter].
> Security officer: Yes. You need passport, yes? [authoritative tone]
> Trucker: Okay [he goes back to get his passport].

I asked him if it happens a lot, and he looked back at me with an expression of exhaustion on his face, which made me laugh. He told me such interactions drive him nuts but he has to deal with it somehow:

> They arrive here, you know? [The sign outside with] huge letters says 'STOP'. Well, there are two stopping signs. Still, they continue driving. But most of the time it's the foreigners though, they do it, yeah, Polish. Bulgarians also tend to not listen. They don't know any English, no German. They know nothing at all! You're an international trucker, and it makes me wonder, like, 'You don't even know any English!' What are you doing here? Well, you manage it using sign language. I had one [Eastern European trucker] this afternoon, who also didn't have any safety shoes. Yeah, you won't get onto the port facility. Then you have a problem (Operational security officer PoR).

At that moment, a trucker comes in and the security officer points to a sign on which is stated you have to wear PPE. He starts talking to the trucker in Dutch:

> Security officer: Are you wearing those [pointing at the safety shoes on the sign]?
> Trucker: Haha!
> Security officer: This one is from Slovakia [he says to me, while processing the trucker's identity information into the digital registration system]. Firm? [He asks the trucker]
> Trucker: XXXX
> Security officer: [he repeats company name while typing it in] Number truck? [The truckers gives the information] XX XXX XX ... Card in the machine, open in the machine, open office.
> Trucker: Office?
> Security officer: Yes, there, office.
> Trucker: Okay [while pointing and estimating the office's location, and he leaves].
> Security officer: Yeah, yeah, haha! [annoyed] So, yeah, that's how it works [*sarcasm*].

I laughed and asked whether he thinks if the Slovakian trucker understands where he needs to go to. He was not really interested and explained the trucker will just have to see what is going to happen:

> You shouldn't spend too much time on it, because then you… you'll go crazy because of those people. Sometimes you ask 'You need glasses?' Sometimes it just cracks me up, really. They don't understand. You try to help them, but one time it goes well, the other time not. That other [person] doesn't get it, and will just stand there, and it becomes worse. You can repeat everything 10 times, but if they don't get it, it stops. I don't speak Bulgarian so yes, sometimes it gets quite tough.

Some security officers, like Magister, associated Central and Eastern European truckers with the increase in port crime: 'most crime… yeah… does come from Eastern Bloc. Most crime in the port, yeah, I find it silly to say, but all [of them are] from Poland, I hear, Bulgarians, Romanians'.

The trucker is defined as the Other who is hard to communicate with and does not obey the port facility regulations. Especially truckers with a Central and Eastern European ethnicity are demonised and associated with an influx of crime in the port. Abraham too othered the Central and Eastern European trucker as criminal. Relieved he could finally smoke his cigarette, Abraham and I were walking towards a ship moored at T4, a terminal where metal is stored and forwarded. The reason there are so many Central and Eastern truckers to begin with, is because they are cheap and flexible. It makes him, like many more security officers, both criminalise but also sympathise with them, because truckers may be cheap labour for transport companies who, like security officers, have to work impossible beat-the-clock-schedules. Gödeke used this shared fate to smooth trucker registration:

> You just know those people work for a low income too. They have to pick up so many containers within the hour. They also [just] want to do their job. [...] If you show a little understanding, as in 'I know your line of work, I know what you earn, you earn as bad as I do', then you'll get more cooperation. Things go smoother.

This simultaneous sympathy and antipathy they receive from security officers is a constant aspect of a trucker's day at work. However, sometimes antipathy takes over and security officers will use force to control and govern truckers:

> [As] security, we experience violence and when you have a certain amount of inflow of trucks on terminal territory… At this moment it's rather stable, totally fine, but very often we have about 1500 trucks arriving in one day. We can't process that, for which they have to go to a separate site. The gentlemen [*sarcasm*] of the trucks also try to make a living by transporting as much load as possible. And then sometimes they have to wait for two hours before they can be helped. We send them to a site, huge, where they all stand in a line, neatly. Once we can help them, they are brought back again. People who have been sent back to that site for the fourth

time, in one way or the other, they go mental, and they get a hammer out of the truck, and they go for it. […] I experienced it myself. Or they try to run you over. It happens. And that was one of those instances in which I called to get police assistance. This happens on a weekly basis. The thing is, as soon as you take on one trucker, there immediately will be ten of them who suddenly help that trucker out, because it's rather sensational. And because they think they have to wait [in the truck line before (un)loading] too long, as well. You always get a weird situation (James, security management and operational).

Through the encounters with rowdy, misbehaving truckers, especially violent encounters, a fierce and powerful Self of security officers is established, which can be done almost daily, as they deal with truckers every day in their everyday. At the same time, they affiliate with the truckers, like the port police.

4.4 Subconclusion

In this chapter, I showed how the participants (re)establish their Self by othering port companies, dockers and truckers. It became clear that port police officers as public service have (to have) a commercial outlook, as they have a 'customer is king' attitude by interrupting the port industrial activities as little as possible. Security officers, in particular contracted staff, have a 'customer is king' attitude as well. They feel more connection with the port company they work for than with their own security company, to the extent they prevent their customer from spending too much money on their security company. Still, they consider port company owners sometimes arrogant and elitist in the way they interact with security staff.

Both port police and security staff consider the ISPS Code to have adversely affected the port business community by making irrational demands and they despise the fact it was pushed forward by a fear-driven USA. In fact, they demonised USA foreign policy and its tendency to want to control the world (or more specifically world trade through maritime security). When port police officers talked about improving port security, it is to make their port appealing for foreign companies to start their businesses there. Port police officers though do not appreciate they must be commercially aware; they will enforce when necessary. Security officers in particular find themselves conflicted in case a port company is non-compliant with the ISPS Code and security regulations in general. They cannot do much about it. Moreover, security officers feel the ISPS Code has enforced port companies to have (more) security officers, not because they wanted to. Security officers feel undesirable as they do not generate any revenue and profit, like other outsourced services. To be as desirable as possible though, security officers do other non-security tasks, such as cleaning. Security officers still would let security tasks prevail over any non-security related service in case their security work is under threat, as much as the port police let their task to police prevail over their more commercial work.

When othering dockers, truckers and other outsourced services that used to be in-house, especially cleaning services, it became clear participants nonetheless affiliate with them. Although they need to police against and enforce security regulations upon them, they tend to soften their approach, revealing a security laisser-faire attitude (Foucault 2007: 68). They do not want to be authoritarian, but sometimes have to be; that said, security officers did enjoy targeting dockers with strict safety and security rules, through which an authoritative and patronising Self is (re)established. The affiliation with street-level port labour and its resulting laisser-faire security attitude towards dockers and truckers, comes from their shared fate of poor working situations. Their port labour affiliation reveals, once more, the bottom-up solidarity and anti-authoritarianism of the port culture against the capitalist rationalities in the port business community, while having to protect and serve it.

Chapter 5

The shipping industry

5.1 Introduction

> Brothels and colonies are two extreme types of heterotopia, and if we think, after all, that the boat is a floating piece of space, a place without a place, that exists by itself, that is closed in on itself and at the same time is given over to the infinity of the sea and that, from port to port, from tack to tack, from brothel to brothel, it goes as far as the colonies in search of the most precious treasures they conceal in their gardens, you will understand why the boat has not only been for our civilization, from the sixteenth century until the present, the great instrument of economic development (I have not been speaking of that today), but has been simultaneously the greatest reserve of the imagination. The ship is the heterotopia par excellence. In civilizations without boats, dreams dry up, espionage takes the place of adventure, and the police take the place of pirates (Foucault 1986: 27).

A romanticised version of the ship is being described here by Michel Foucault, as something exotic and liberating to think about; such as the ships and its crew members that sail out into the deep and dangerous seas, where they risk getting involved in a fight against capriciously lethality of nature. The ship is also a metaphor that allows one to imagine without strings, truly free spirited. However, the very vessel for our imagination, the vessel that brought treasures from all around the world, the backbone of global trade, has itself been subjected to harsh maritime marketisation and austerity. The ship has become a place where cheap crew members are exploited and confronted with the beast of bureaucracy that demands most of their time and energy. And of all the registration and documentation …

> …[s]ecurity documents are the most unwanted documents. Seafarers consider their existence meaningless and consider that they are developed to satisfy politicians. Port and vessels' security is not effectively enhanced by having ordinary seamen to prevent highly hypothetical situations like terrorist[s], bomb threats, biological weapons etc. […] [W]hy [do] we need all these [sic] documentation and all these meaningless papers for completion on-board? (Stamoudis 2014[15]).

> Whether everything is being checked [for a DoS] by the crew of a ship, whether it's ISPS classified, that's being stultified. Usually, they go ahead and say [to the other party the DoS needs to be negotiated with] 'Here, fill this shit out.' It happens. That's how it's done in reality, and that's how it should be! (Inkmar, operational port police officer).

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[15] Available at: http://www.safety4sea.com/the-burden-of-bureaucracy-on-ships/analysis-200-308.

Due to their environmental, dangerous goods, border control and ISPS Code related inspections and ship visits, port police officers and security officers are the bringers of unwanted security documents on deck, and they realise this. This chapter explores how participants interact with the shipping industry that is made up of shipping companies, ships and crew members.

5.2 Condemning Flags of Convenience and big brand shipping companies

Port police

Port police officers had difficulties with shipping companies that turn more and more to FOCs for their ships. Port police officers know and pity the exploitation of crew members by ship operators through the FOC system:

> When ships are going to Panama, or Liberia, they obviously get… There are reasons for it. Why do so many ships carry the Panamanian flag or Liberia[n]? Only because it's cheaper. […] These are pure economic reasons! That's just the way it is (Freimut, operational port police officer).

The Panamanian flag is the most convenient of them all and, together with the employment of seafarers from underdeveloped countries—mostly Filipino able seamen (UNCTAD 2009: 57)—shipping companies get the best deal. When port police officers described the FOC system, there was disappointment in their stories not just about the exploitation it feeds on and into, but also about how their own country lost many ships to FOCs. For them this means that Dutch or German shipping companies "sell out" or that the Netherlands or Germany become FOC nations, without their governments trying to prevent it…

> …you make yourself vulnerable [as a nation], you don't own [the shipping industry] anymore. As a kid… I'm a bit older of course, but when I went to ground school, you used to get those beautiful maps of [this country]. You could see all the things we used to produce. […] We had a massive fleet of merchant ships, very big, and we have lost all of it! Others do it for us (Neal, port police manager).

Although the rise of the FOCs in the maritime domain is regretted, the big shipping companies that use FOCs to the fullest extent are considered fully compliant with all types of security laws and regulations. During fieldwork, the world fleet consisted of almost 80,000 vessels that were operated by shipping companies, of which the top 3 consists of APM, MSC and CMA CGM (*see tables 5.1 and 5.2 on the next page*). They are responsible for the lion's share of the world merchant fleet and dominate in the shipping business. These and other big companies are taking over what used to be a more diverse sector and work together through global information systems, such as INTTRA. They compete in a culture of copying (Klingmann 2010), imitating one another in their operator services, as well as in high-quality safety and security standards on-board.

Table 5.1: Top 20 of shipping operators

Top 10 operated fleets as per 17 November 2014								
		Total		Owned		Chartered		
#	Operator	TEU	Ships	TEU	Ships	TEU	Ships	%
1	APM-Maersk	2,890,249	607	1,592,876	253	1,297,373	354	44.9%
2	Mediterranean Shg Co	2,530,961	497	1,055,341	192	1,475,620	305	58.3%
3	CMA CGM Group	1,647,060	448	545,625	84	1,101,435	364	66.9%
4	Evergreen Line	948,473	195	534,891	111	413,582	84	43.6%
5	COSCO Container L.	812,911	161	486,043	99	326,868	62	40.2%
6	Hapag-Lloyd	732,612	142	424,117	66	308,495	76	42.1%
7	CSCL	641,770	136	470,546	74	171,224	62	26.7%
8	Hanjin Shipping	600,486	97	272,800	37	327,686	60	54.6%
9	MOL	600,434	112	201,108	32	399,326	80	66.5%
10	APL	562,303	95	386,543	50	175,760	45	31.3%

(Based on data retrieved from Alphaliner 2014: http://www.alphaliner.com/top100/).

Table 5.2: The world merchant fleet 2010 – 2013

	2010		2011		2012		2013	
General Cargo Ships	18178	23.4%	17034	21.5%	16061	20.2%	16201	19.9%
Specialised Cargo Ships	247	0.3%	250	0.3%	259	0.3%	263	0.3%
Container Ships	4869	6.3%	4974	6.3%	4858	6.1%	4894	6.0%
Ro-Ro Cargo Ships	1556	2.0%	1537	1.9%	1470	1.8%	1455	1.8%
Bulk Carriers	8920	11.5%	9597	12.1%	9892	12.4%	10357	12.7%
Oil and Chemical Tankers	12014	15.4%	11828	15.0%	11730	14.8%	11996	14.7%
Gas Tankers	1552	2.0%	1574	2.0%	1578	2.0%	1617	2.0%
Other Tankers	156	0.2%	666	0.8%	726	90.0%	764	0.9%
Passenger Ships	6382	8.2%	6370	8.1%	6423	8.1%	6463	7.9%
Offshore Vessels	6283	8.1%	6692	8.5%	7002	8.8%	7440	9.1%
Service Ships	3854	5.0%	4442	5.6%	4494	5.7%	4613	5.7%
Tugs	13575	17.7%	14110	17.8%	14978	18.8%	15521	19.0%
TOTAL	77768	100.0%	79074	100.0%	79471	100.0%	81584	100.0%

(Based on data retrieved from Equasis Statistics 2013, 2012, 2011 and 2010: http://www.equasis.org/EquasisWeb/public/HomePage).

Shipping companies do not necessarily own all the ships they operate; sometimes they merely offer their services with a ship owned by another company (UNCTAD 2010: 32). Now, port police do not interact with shipping companies but with their crew members on deck of their ships. They do use ship company brands to qualify ships and their security:

> As said, CMA is a good ship operator, Hapag Lloyd […] Maersk! Everything proceeds without any problem (Rupertus, operational port police officer).

Rupertus' colleague, Wigflaf, indicated there are differences in shipping companies, as they have different quality policies and their own checking and control of, for example, cargo quality, he said.

[T]here are shipping lines that take along any [kind of cargo]. In the end, it's all about the money. They get money for it. However, since a few years, [there's] an information system of the big shipping companies, MSC, Hapag Lloyd, CMA CGM, UCL. They report to each other when there were issues with a product, somewhere in a port, or with a random exporter [of the good], to be informed better in the future in order to say 'No, we don't take anything of that sender anymore'. To exclude the black sheep (Wiglaf, operational port police officer).

Port police officers have a brand loyalty towards the big shipping companies, as these deliver high-quality ship security and they are, over-all, accepted and not targeted by port police. The opposite is true for ships operated by an unfamiliar brand of shipping companies, the excluded 'black sheep' as Wiglaf calls them. These are the smaller companies that offer their services to anyone who wants their cargo to be transported, even if it is dangerous, radioactive cargo. They are also subjected to more inspections, definitely when they dock for the first time in the port:

There are ships, a few of them, that haven't been [in this port] before, so we'd like to check them out. It comes down to wondering what type of crew it has and how long it will be here. (Kunibert, operational port police officer).

In the eyes of the port police officers, ships and crews of unfamiliar shipping companies have to withstand a port security *rite de passage*. During such rites, port police officers look, for example, for security and safety equipment that is missing on deck, which indicates shipping companies simply did not want to spend money on security. The ISPS Code made it easier for them to enforce such consumption of security by shipping companies:

When [the shipping company] says, 'I don't need VHF radio', you must say 'You need one' and he'll buy one. He doesn't buy it because he hasn't got a lot of money. That's always it! Those ships are now equipped the way they must be. When [the shipping company] earns money [with equipment] he might buy a fax or internet access. Why else would he need internet? For what? (Arnulf, operational port police officer).

I undertook such a security initiation with Freimut when we went 'picking on the new guy', the S1. On T7 territory, Freimut shifted down the gear and slowly drove next to the quay, along the waterside, with enough distance between car and ship to get a first impression of the S1. The crew on deck saw us but were unaware they were about to get an environmental inspection. Freimut explained sometimes ships have little holes, when they went through the Gulf of Aden and got shot by pirates but the S1 did not suffer from it. He continued by evaluating the gangway and judging the ship:

It all looks okay to me. He has a gangway, up there [on deck nearby the gangway]. One or two people are walking around. So, it all looks very okay to me. Let's turn around (Freimut, operational port police officer).

Freimut did some further checking and pointed out the captain should have pulled out the safety net to cover the space between quay and ship, to prevent people from falling of the gangway into the water. That was, however, a minor issue, he claimed. He then suggested getting out of the car and doing the inspection.

The environmental inspection did not work out as the captain and his chief engineer hoped it would; they did not keep a proper record of their waste management on deck and they incinerated waste, which is not allowed. However, Freimut issued a relatively low fine; 'a token fine', as he explained to the captain, to give him a warning and make him comply the next time he enters Freimut's port. Freimut pities the loyalty of the captain, because he is made responsible by the shipping company for everything that happens on-board. He is the boss of the ship and representative of the shipping company, so whenever something goes wrong, the captain has to face the consequences, which he disagrees with; shipping companies should be made (more) responsible. So, although Freimut gave him a token fine, he made clear that…

> …in this case, there's no need to inform the [ship] agency or your [shipping company] or someone else about this [fine]. I know it has something to do with reputation and so on. I know that. […] I know you have to do a lot of other things on-board of a ship like this one. This is more of a formal offence, because you didn't register. You undertook some incinerating operations but you didn't register it (Freimut, operational port police officer).

Freimut dislikes the fact he has to confront the captain and his crew with their understandable mistakes, seen from a practical point of view. It became clear he, and the other port police officer, wish shipping companies could be held responsible, instead of having to be tough on crews. However, they are not assigned to police and punish those shipping companies. Security officers can do even less against shipping companies.

Security officers

Gödeke and I were on shuttle service duty at T1. We passed a huge container ship, S15, operated by UASC. The sight of such huge vessels still overwhelmed him, even after his six years as a security officer at T1, he told me with pride. Most of the upper deck officers on UASC ships are Iraqi or Iranian and he stressed to me how friendly he thought people of Arabic shipping companies are. Other big brand shipping companies are also welcomed by him because…

> …with those big ships, [security] is much clearer. [It is] way more streamlined and clear who the Ship Security Officer is, and who does what. But with those little shipping [companies], it depends. Any officer [could be the SSO].

The UASC is part of a group of dominating shipping companies that own and/or operate most

of the world's (largest) vessels. For Gödeke, the shipping company brand is an indicator of a ship's safety and security regime. The more popular a brand, the bigger and shinier the ships will be, and therefore, more fully compliant with security regulations. The brand satisfies him and stimulates his laisser-faire security attitude towards such ships. Such an attitude is typical for most of the participants. At the same time, they condemn the big brand shipping companies.

Resembling the attitudes of the port police, security officers were also disappointed that the FOC system took Dutch and German shipping companies out of business, and replaced crews from one's own country with those of foreign countries. In particular lower ranked crew members (*see Figure 5.1 on the next page*) from one's own country, mostly expensive and qualitatively better trained Dutch or German crew members, I was told, were replaced with 'cheap Asians', they thought:

> Look, you know it yourself, there are only a few ships sailing under [this nation's] flag. Ships that sail under [this flag] look excellent. Still… the crew is Filipino, for the most part. [When sailing under an FOC], you don't have to pay taxes. When you sail under Panama of course […] it appears to be fiscally profitable when you anchor here (Manuel, operational security officer).

Next to cynical attitudes towards shipping companies and their (ab)use of FOCs and crew members, security officers disapproved of how shipping companies handle their ship registration. ISPS Code compliant ships must notify a port facility about their arrival 24 hours before they will dock, T1's security officer Sturmhard explained. Shipping companies can email or fax this and other information to T1's security department. Also, it needs to be communicated which visitors each ship is carrying, such as family members of crews; they all have to be registered. Then the shipping company itself has to get registered too, as well as the captain and his crew. Sturmhard told me that when he or his colleagues have to do a PFSO check on deck, explaining T1's safety and security rules, this has to be communicated via email, not via telephone:

> Unfortunately, it happens sometimes that there's no registration [of a visitor] and we can't reach someone at the [shipping] company. […] Then it'll take some time. We got ways to work around [a non-registration], but we don't like to use our last resorts.

He thinks the shipping companies should take care of visitors who are not registered; it is not his responsibility. Using last resorts sounds more threatening than it is: they can send out a PFSO, of which the captain needs to be informed. Only when the PFSO comes back with the captain's permission to receive the visitor, can the unregistered visitor go aboard, escorted by the PFSO.

Figure 5.1: Merchant navy ranking system overview

Captain			
Chief Engineer	**Chief Officer**		
Second Engineer	Second Officer	Bosun	Chief Cook
Third Engineer / Oiler	Third Officer	Pumpman	Trainee Cook
Fourth Engineer / Greaser	Deck Cadet	Able Seaman	Steward
Engineering Cadet / Junior Rating		Ordinary Seaman	

(Based on Wankhede 2013: http://www.marineinsight.com/careers-2/a-guide-to-merchant-navy-ranks/).

The thing is, Sturmhard said, the visitors, the captains and the ship suppliers all know registration is mandatory, but it is the shipping companies that forget it. This reflects the companies' indifference to registration and the security dimension of it, which Sturmhard condemns. His colleague, Sören, is frustrated about it as well. In particular when shipping companies do not provide mobile phones to crew members, it makes it impossible for crews to call T1's security officers to arrange a shuttle service to pick up crew members and let them go onshore for some leisure in the city. Sören thinks it shows shipping companies do not care about their crew members' well-being. To still get to the city though, those crew members start walking on T1's premises, which is not allowed, as Sören and his team instruct to crews. It is the disappearance of their flag in shipping industry, the indifference towards registration and the subsequent behaviour of crew members that angers port police and security officers, which frustrates inspections and visits on deck.

5.3 Coercion through controlling the trivial

Port police

> Port police officer: The [port police], starboard of the Seahorse.
> Captain of the Seahorse: Yes, the S8. Good afternoon. A question: do you have any qualms when we pass you by on starboard side?
> Port police officer: No, not at all. Do pass by. No problem.
> Captain of the Seahorse: Okay.

This was a short radio communication moment between the port police vessel S8 and the Seahorse. It was during a rather uneventful water patrol. During water patrols, police check everything 'ranging from unusual ship movements to and including what happens at the shores, so they really need to learn to observe broadly the moment you're on the water', Nicolas said. I joined several water patrols and observing and inspecting everything is simply impossible; if anything is inspected during water patrols and inspections on deck, it is the trivial. During another water patrol with the S8 on a sunny afternoon, slightly windy, causing wavy water for the S8 to sail through, I talked with the inspector that afternoon, Arnulf. He had his top two buttons of his spotless white police shirt unbuttoned, explaining to me what he looks out for when engaging with ship crew members during patrols. He began to complain:

> All of them are actually people and all of them are professional seafarers. They work here, want to work here and demand almost nothing. They simply don't… they are NO criminals! They're normal people. When you ask 'Put out that cigarette', they put it out.

Indeed, the port police officers do not consider crew members as criminal, as they just want to do their work, make their money and go about with their lives, like the port police officers themselves. Therefore, it is not about fighting crime but policing minor violations of all types of safety and security rules and regulations, like smoking on deck, which is done by almost every crew member but is not allowed, I was told. Policing the trivial is about...

> ...how people [crew members] approach you, whether they're dressed appropriately, are clean, wearing the right clothing. Most of them are really filthy. Also the doors on-board, they're in some cases not taken care of. That depends of course on the ship crew mentality whether to take care of equipment. That's like visiting someone's home. It's... a bit of an exhausting nuisance. This way you get an idea of how they treat their gear, all of the ship gear, fire extinguishers (Arnulf, operational port police officer).

He continued to explain that you can keep track of a ship's condition, because you see the same ship every 40 days or every two months, so it becomes clear rather quickly when a ship is not taken care of. An anchor got lost, or the main engine stopped at sea, or accidents have happened. If that is the case, it is another reason to inspect a ship. On another occasion, Dean, while instructing port police pupil Nash to navigate the S13, saw a vessel passing by and described to me what could be wrong with such a vessel and its direct surroundings:

> You see what that sea-going tugboat looks like. 'Did he not forget to take his towing masthead tow back down, after his last towing?' [is what you ask yourself] […] Look, [or] you can see little oil stains on the water surface, oil spills. Then you should be triggered into thinking 'Where do those spills come from? Could we stop it?' Stuff like that (Dean, operational port police officer).

I experienced such policing of cleanliness directly with Kunibert and Horstmar, who were responsible for environmental inspections. As we were on water patrol, they saw a boat moored next to a large cargo vessel, taking out the sludge oil from the larger vessel. We saw a shipper on deck of the boat and Kunibert suggested we go and talk with him about how to get the sludge from the bigger vessel into the sludge boat safely, without causing any spill over into the water. So we did. After that, we went off-board and the shipper gave us some detergent to wash our hands with. Being clean is essential, Kunibert finds. The shipper agrees, because you have oil residue and it bites into your skin and dries it out. During inspections, you have to check whether the shipper is clean; it tells Kunibert a lot about how sludge is being maintained. The detergent offered was therefore more than just a gesture to clean our hands. The nervous shipper was showing [off] to the authorities he was being clean to give Kunibert no reason to proceed into a formal inspection. Next to sanitary aspects, it is important to pay attention to (minor) violations, like those of the ISPS Code for example. During one occasion, he noticed a maritime pilot forgot to close a door on the side of the ship:

That [door] wasn't guarded at that point. So, we had to sail towards a boat. The maritime pilot was up in the air again, so we went to the bridge and then [said] 'Hi captain, what about ISPS?' right? Haha!

These are not criminal offences but breaches of safety and security regimes that are created by all types of international regulation, in particular MARPOL and the IMDG Code, and especially the ISPS Code. A breach, from small to big, can be used by the port police to exercise their authority, although they try not to. They would rather give warnings by handing out small fines to discipline crew members to mind their ship security accordingly, as became clear on several occasions.

Mischel and the S6 captain were in a discussion about the gangway security. Mischel asked whether the captain knows about the ISPS Code, as he wondered why the crew member who received us at the gangway as gangway guard walked with us to the captain's cabin (or office I had to say, Mischel warned). He said to the captain 'when we come on-board, [the gangway guard] is not allowed to leave his station, okay? So, he must always keep an eye on the gangway. […] Sooo, you have to call another person who guides us, okay?' The captain appreciated the advice, he said, but his body language clearly showed he did not mean it and did not care about the ISPS security breach whatsoever. So…

> Mischel (operational port police officer): …for the next time…
> Captain: Yeah yeah yeah yeah…
> Mischel: For the next time... For now, it doesn't matter, I told you. Next time please, keep an eye on [gangway security]…
> Captain: Thank you [*not*].
> Mischel: …because this is normally, an offence. Very expensive.
> Captain: Yeah, I know, I know [*awkward silence*].

A similar thing happened when Inkmar and I were doing an ISPS Code check on the S4. He and I walked slowly over the gangway. At the end of the gangway, we were not asked to show our IDs and we were not registered by the Asian crewmember that was standing there. Inkmar was checking quite intensively, looking at certain security details. Next to Asians, the crew consisted of Inkmar's country fellow men, so we could understand what the crew members were saying over the portophone, such as 'Port police on deck'. We continued our inspection. Eventually, Inkmar went to a crewmember from his country and pointed out that to comply with the ISPS code, next time they must ask for IDs of every visitor, even authorities. Inkmar acknowledged though that sometimes crew members are somewhat anxious because of the appearance of authorities, which leads to them not demanding an ID:

> That's the fault of my [police] uniform, you have to watch out for that. With [a specific shipping company], who employs a lot of Kiribati[16] seafarers, we currently have... ehm... [In Kiribati], uniform authority is still very strongly adhered to. So we often have the problem that we can easily pass through the gangway, without them addressing us. Because they think 'When I talk to [the port police] I will immediately get a roasting. So, rather not, and I will not intervene,' and that is inherently wrong according to the ISPS. […] It's tough to get that out, that [submissive] mentality of those nations. It is truly unbelievable.

Inkmar, an authority, thought that obeying the authorities blindly is wrong and threatens security on deck and leads to ISPS non-compliance, which is an authority Inkmar himself obeys as well. His colleague Freimut notices as well that crew members respond quite nervously to his uniform, 'whereas they actually have nothing to hide', he said.

All in all, port police officers police carelessness, dirtiness and poor security, guided by a sort of "broken cabin-windows theory". Their othering of crew members shows they do not want to criminalise and be punitive but make crews aware of how non-compliance with health, safety and security regulations can be potentially harmful to themselves. Then again, even when a ship looks perfectly fine, you can still find something to complain about, Inkmar told me. The main point is that you police politely, without losing sight of dangerous situations.

Security officers

When the port police go aboard, they police and inspect a ship and its crew, authorised with the disciplining tools of fining and even arresting; they do not have to assist. Security officers, on the other hand, are employed to cooperate with crews and must assist. They visit and those visits on deck mostly consisted of a security officer executing his task as a PFSO and I would be introduced as an (assistant) PFSO. The visits by security officers were primarily meant to instruct crew members what the port facility is and what they are (not) allowed to do on its premises, like walking or not wearing PPE, such as a safety vest. In other words, you deliver a service on the deck of a ship, a ship that is welcoming you. Indeed, when security officers go on deck, they stressed to me, they were in another country, literally, and you have to comply with security measures on-board; they cannot enforce port security regulations on deck. In fact, they have to obey the ship security regime and can only instruct crew members what happens once they leave their security regime and enter the port securityscape:

> There's a gangway guard that is responsible for who and what's boarding the ship, because it's a [foreign] territory of course, flying a different flag. To that effect, we don't have any authority. We can board it, and we used to board it in case of an emergency, but it was allowed in those cases. When it comes down to who's in charge, it's the people of the boat itself, the captain. If they'd say, 'You must get off the boat', we need to get off (Aaron, former operational security officer).

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[16]Kiribati is located in the Pacific Ocean, North-West from Australia.

Or as Nikolaus explained:

> You have to see it this way. There's a nice English saying, 'My home is my castle', and that's exactly how it is on-board (Nikolaus, operational security officer).

Eventually, it is the captain who decides which visitor comes on-board or not, including security officers, Nikolaus continued. You have to comply with the rules on deck; all you can do afterwards is contacting the ship company and tell them you were not allowed to get on-board. Besides instructing crew, security officers are tasked, as PFSOs, to negotiate a Declaration of Security (DoS) with the SSO. Arnd and I did that on the S18 flying the Danish flag. Arriving at the ship, he instructed me to wear my helmet and told me we were going to an assistant SSO, which is the ship version of his own role as an assistant PFSO. We were going to instruct the T1's premises information and security regulations, and we were going to request if it is okay to retrieve a DoS. Security officers cannot enforce a DoS:

> Most [SSOs] don't want to, because it is [ISPS] level 1 [and not obliged according to the ISPS Code to produce a DoS]. Once a year they have to do exactly that [as an ISPS exercise], so they have something to show for their [ISPS] audit, haha. I can ask if they're up for it (Arnd, operational security officer).

We went aboard via the gangway, on which I had to hold steady onto the railing. I noticed Arnd, like myself, grabbed oil on the railing. The captain was Danish, some crew members were Spanish, most were Filipino; one of them was approached by Arnd. Arnd introduced us as T1 port security and that we wanted to talk to the SSO. The Filipino crew member asked if we indeed represented T1, and Arnd reemphasised we were T1 *port security*, not just T1 representatives. The crew member registered our PFSO visit and handed the forms back to us. Arnd filled out my section of the form for me, as well as other sections, so that the SSO could use it as proof to show during an audit that the PFSO visit by Arnd has indeed happened and a DoS indeed has been done. After that, we had to show our IDs to the crew member, who checked them. The crew member already communicated that Arnd and I were on-board to do the PFSO visit. We went inside the ship on our way to the SSO, with our passes worn visibly on our jackets. Arnd kept on getting messages through his portophone. The loud voice of Arnd's team leader, Hennig, was heard through the portophone, asking in a commanding way what was going on at the front of T1. Hennig is therefore always present, either physically or through radio communication; just as the crew members are always in touch with their captain and officers. Arnd said the S18's crew is very thorough in their security settings, and mentioned that, normally, you would not be guided by a crew member to the SSO (which is ISPS Code mandatory), as we were at that moment, which he found funny. He thanked the crew member

for guiding us to the main operating room, where the assistant SSO was seated, in this case another Filipino crew member. Arnd introduced himself and me as his assistant, and asked for the list of S18 crew members that was brought to us. He then asked if it was possible to get a DoS, to which the assistant SSO nodded yes and asked us if we wanted to do so with the chief officer. Arnd wondered if that was possible, because he might be sleeping, but he was awake, the assistant SSO said. This is good for Arnd, because it is always a bit of a hassle to wake up chiefs or captains, especially for security-related matters they cannot be bothered with. The chief, Arnd said, is a Romanian, as he pointed out on the crew list. There were also Russians on-board, next to the many Filipinos. Arnd explained about what it is he instructs crews; for example, that there is a 24/7 shuttle service they can dial. Again, normally, crew members do not have a mobile phone, so the telephone communication is done via the chief officer. The chief officer, who is the SSO, came into the room:

> SSO/Chief Officer: Good afternoon.
> Arnd: Good afternoon.
> Me: Hello.
> Arnd: Chief, is it possible to make a Declaration of Security?
> SSO/Chief Officer: Yes, of course! [*Slight accent*]
> Arnd: Have you got a form or should you take ours?
> SSO/Chief Officer: Sorry? I have a form.
> Arnd: Oh, okay.

Arnd calls him 'chief', not 'officer'. He did not refer to the chief's SSO position and so did many more port police and security officers who went on deck. They let the original ship's rank prevail over the security rank crew members get to comply with the ISPS Code. The given security role is not as important as the crew member's rank on deck. In the meantime, the chief was getting a DoS form and Arnd tells me the following:

> Mostly, they've got one themselves. I got a blank form for the Declaration of Security. Most of them got one on deck as well. They got a form on which their parts are already filled out so we can move on straight away.

The DoS, intended to increase security standardisation in case a ship and/or a port facility has levelled up its security due to an imminent threat, is in the experience of the security officers nothing but a documented reality, one you need to provide whenever an audit is being done by the PSC at your facility or on deck of a ship. Security visits and the DoS are therefore staged.

Arnd and I left the S18. Our visit revealed how security officers and crews surrender to the documented reality of security between port and ship, in which they have a rather passive role of carrying forms and doing paperwork. When security officers see an opportunity to take on

a more authoritarian role by coercing crew members, they would take it. The authoritarian role is parasitical though, as it feeds off other authority through which they can enforce actions.

Wijerd told me what happens when a coaster is not unmooring on time and a large cargo ship is about to anchor at that very place:

> Waking up the captain! Oh yes! Sometimes you'd get a slanging-match thrown in your face. You need to take it. You have to strengthen your hand. You need to receive blows but also to land blows of course. […] You start off politely [with the captain] but at a certain point, when the conversation is changing, haha, you need to hit. It's a matter of simply saying 'Ey! You need to piss off.' Otherwise you call-in the port police that simply takes them away. How much do you think it costs if a huge sea-going vessel comes in and a small one is taking a nap in-between a jetty?

Whereas Wijerd used the port police to enforce rules upon the coaster's captain, in most cases, it is the captain's rank, or that of the chief officer, that is used to coerce crew members to cooperate with you as a security officer:

> Well, one of the two, the chief officer of the captain. No one else can sign [a DoS]. Sometimes [a lower ranked crew member would say] 'I'll sign it, 'cause the capt'n is sleeping', you know? They just moored […] at night, 2am, 3am you'd board and then they're looking at you like 'Yeah, what do you want?' [Aaron:] 'Well, I'm here to get some forms signed and drop off the phone' […] He'd reply 'Can't do it. Come back tomorrow morning, 'cause the capt'n is sleeping.' [Aaron:] 'Just wake him up.' [Crewmember:] 'Yeah, he'll get angry.' [Aaron:] 'That ain't my problem!' Haha, they're very afraid of the captain. He's their superior. So, I'd say 'Get your chief officer then. That'll work as well for me.' You could see the relief on their faces. […] In case [the chief officer] had to be woken up, I walked along with them. Some said I had to wait, but I didn't like to be fooled around with, so I walked behind them and then they would notice [not to mess around with Aaron]. They'd knock on the [chief's] door, 'Sir, morning sir', [they'd say] in a very humble way. 'Port security sir. Sir?' […] They sign [the DoS], and whether [the chief officer] reads it or not is not my problem (Aaron, former operational security officer).

So, if crew members did not (want to) work along with the security officers, the approach changed. Instead of offering a service by instructing on safety and security regulations, they would enforce their powers and use the captain's or chief officer's authority to make crew members listen. They would use the hierarchy on deck to their advantage by playing off the lower ranked against the higher ranked. Especially when crew members of or below the third rank would not comply, this would happen. James told me they usually do not have severe issues with crew members, however…

> …we do need to correct them, but it has to do with the fact they're not walking across [T5's] territory. For example, when the cab is taking too long, they start walking and walk into the wrong zone. It's not problematic but it's ignorance of people. Of course you need to go to the captain with it. Of course the capt'n will whip their asses so they won't do it the next time. They'll comply the following 5 times and the 6th time it'll go wrong again.

Or as Manuel told me:

> 90% of the people you encounter on the premises come from ships who just took the wrong turn and set off the alarm. [...] They don't really bother you because they know how much power you've got as a security officer. Look, if I don't let them off the territory and the cops are coming, they're stuck. They know it. Whether they're from Russia or the Philippines, they know it. You decide whether they go off the territory or not. If they do [get off], you make the captain responsible and he doesn't like that. At that moment, you decide what's happening on that territory, not them. They merely have to comply with what you're telling them.

Clearly, security officers anticipate that crew members will always, at a certain point, breach the safety and security regulations at the port facility. They can therefore always look forward to a moment to become coercive, which they indeed enjoy:

> When I'm ashore, I kind of like everything actually. It's not that I prefer something, but I inspected for drugs and alcohol aboard a ship. That's awesome! Haha! So, you'd find long rolling papers but no weed or hashish. In my opinion that's non-existent, so it's a matter of digging, digging, digging until you do find [the hashish]! […] When it comes down to that, there's always a little game going on between the bad guys and [the good guys] (Balthazar, Hades Security owner and operational security officer).

A little game was played when Teun and I went for a tour through the S16 that was moored at T3. The game actually was the thrill of anticipation we had beforehand:

> Teun (operational security officer): I thought I'd take you aboard so you can see stuff.
> Me: Yeah.
> Teun: Maybe you'll get some dirty looks once we're inside or something but…
> Me: Isn't that fun? To annoy?
> Teun: Yeah, of course!
> Me: Haha!
> Teun: That's what you do it for! Haha!

The realisation one's presence and coercion on deck can be experienced as irritating by crew members reveals a type of Schadenfreude security officers experience when visiting ships. It is seductive and enjoyable executing your powers.

Along with the seduction to coerce, comes othering of crew members as ignorant or dumb in the face of an all-knowing authority. Abraham and I just left T4, where a suspicious person was reported, however, there was no one; a false alarm, which Abraham hates. On our way to another port facility to patrol at, Abraham was called and told the alarm went off again at T4. He turned around the car to go back while phoning. Apparently, there were some crew members who wanted to leave T4 but could not get out. They were leaving via alarmed exits they should not have used; this caused the false alarms. When we arrived back at T4 and got onto its premises we saw the crew members and Abraham, very annoyed, told me it was going to be difficult to

make them realise they had to exit T4 via another route. We approached them and Abraham started to instruct them how to leave T4. The crew members were very thankful and humble. We walked behind them for a while to see if they would actually get out the right way to avoid another false alarm:

> Do you get this? I'm watching them, because they're leaving the ship. [The sign] says how you should walk. […] 'Exit on the side', do you see it? […] It'll set off some more alarms, I guess (Abraham, operational security officer).

As we were watching them trying to get out, we heard the other crew members on deck shouting at them. Both Abraham and I enjoyed the rather clumsy looking roaming around of the crew at T4. Abraham was right; the crew members went into the wrong direction again and he walks to them shouting:

> Abraham: HEY!
> *They react and he makes signs with his hands, pointing to the left to exit that way.*
> Abraham: Boy o boy o boy o boy [He whistles and coughs]. HELLO! EY!
> Crew member: No gate?!
> Abraham: The little gate, the little gate!
> Crew member: Aha!
> Abraham: Okay?
> Crewmember: Okay!
> Abraham: That side!
> Crewmember: Yeah!

He still thought they did not understand him; or even that they did not want to understand him. He thought they were stupid, being unable to find the gate:

> Filipinos, all of them. Malaysian. Simply the cheapest folk. […] They wanna go downtown, so that they can… haha! […] You got those seamen's centres and their vans drive around to pick these guys up and drop them off in the city where they pick them up again. Otherwise you can't [work at sea], sitting on a boat until your retirement.

What Abraham is hinting at is that specifically Filipino crew members are ignorant, as well as cheap, but he pities them. They have a tough seafarer life of social isolation and unsafe, life-threatening work conditions. So, as much as security officers can be coercive towards crew members, they simultaneously feel sorry for them and sympathise with them, much like the port police.

5.4 Protection and pity of crew members

Port police

> There's nothing that wouldn't be of interest to us. This is how we do it [in this port]: normally, customs would board the ship. Immigration and police, we're all one 'person', so that we have to go aboard the ship with as few people as possible and interrupt. Our purpose is to let business run. […] Things are arranged in a humane way [here] (Arnulf, operational port police officer).

Port police officers were aware of what their inspections and control meant for the shipping industry; delay, fines and bureaucracy. Mischel and Giselbert were on border control duty, which can take up 15 minutes per ship. When you have to check certificates and have to hand out visas, it can take up to an hour.

The control visit I went along with went very fast. They had to hurry up, because the S7 had to move on anytime soon. When we got to a cabin, we were received by the 2nd officer, who was acting SSO and clearly in a hurry. Mischel and Giselbert tried to be as helpful as possible by not being too tight on getting the documents straight away, which the SSO should have had at hand. Giselbert asked several times whether the ship has no visiting passengers. The SSO stayed calm and confirmed there were no visitors. Giselbert looked at him and the SSO looked back. There was no talking, but you could feel the tension was building up. However, it was all okay. As we walked back to the police car to go to another ship, they repeatedly told me they were authorised to do an ISPS Code check as well, if they wanted to. However, because the S7 had to leave within a few minutes, they did not want to be obstructive.

Giselbert told me the amount of ships they have to control during a shift has increased from 7 to sometimes 16 nowadays, coming down to a maximum of 32 ships subjected to a border control per 24 hours. Mostly on a Monday, Mischel told me, ships start to come in. Before though, ships would anchor on Fridays but weekend work got too expensive and those times are gone, which they regretted. They also regretted that shipping has become 'an Asian thing', as Giselbert argued when he showed me the pre-arrival information of the S7 on which the ports of call were mostly Asian ports. Since he left the shipping business as an able seaman, a lot changed. Still, he tries to do his fair share and helps out by not delaying ships businesses, or at least keep the delay to a bare minimum. They want to assist crews by keeping costs and fines as low as possible.

The same was true for Wiglaf, who considers his dangerous goods inspections economically problematic. He and his team break into the supply chain of transport that can cost up to €55

per container per day extra for a shipping company to handle and store a container at a place where Wiglaf and his colleagues can carry out an inspection.

> It's indeed the case police inspections and sanctions can result in a [shipping] company going bankrupt, because you can imagine, to some extent, these sanctions are very, very expensive. Smaller companies cannot pay off those sanctions. Once we had from CMACGM… how many containers were involved… I think 28 containers with wooden shoes. They were apprehended because the load was not secure and [the shoes] we're coated with a biotic that was prohibited. The whole thing led to costs of €180,000 [for CMACGM]. CMACGM, those French, they are very cooperative. Cooperation [with them] always works out very well, I have to admit. But yeah, there is the [consigner] dimension behind all of it. Eventually it's his trade that… because when he can't pay it, it becomes an issue also for shipping companies, every time. Shipping companies also want to get paid. Sometimes it leads to a consigner somewhere in another country, saying 'What those Europeans do, doesn't interest me whatsoever. They're bonkers! I won't pay [for the fine]. Keep your shit [cargo]!' That's reality.

Wiglaf's colleague Rupertus and I were doing an IMDG inspection on the S9. He was just done with talking with a French crew member, who gave him a list with containers carrying particularly dangerous goods. Something can go wrong rather easily, he said. For example, it is important that a container carrying a certain alkali is not placed next to a container with acid in it; if those chemicals mix, a powerful chemical reaction can lead to an explosion. In the background, as Rupertus was explaining the chemistry of it all to me, the French crew members were getting anxious, looking rather frightened in our direction. Rupertus took his time and at a certain point the crew members left us behind in the cabin. I asked if everything was okay, given the rather nervous reactions of the crew. He said on deck everything looks fine, although he could not rule out if there were any dangerous goods issues. I told him how I experienced an even more nervous crew during a MARPOL inspection than this IMDG Code based inspection:

> Yeah, but [this inspection] is not that expensive. When you got something going on with MARPOL or something like it, it's possible the fines could be €20,000, which needs to be paid in cash. It's seriously a lot of money. When it comes down to [dangerous goods fines], we're talking about €100 when a container needs to be pulled up. That's still doable. When we want 100 containers to be transhipped [off board], you got €2,000 of additional costs. It's a lot of money as well, but it's still reasonable.

Rupertus is glad he does not have to give such high fines like the MARPOL fines. He stressed though he represents the port police and must remain an independent party. Port police have to remind themselves though, when fining, that this is costly for the shipping company. Fining is a complete 'ultimum remedium' because…

> …maybe we want something from them and they want something from us. You somehow try to arrange things. When it's something that is unacceptable, so, when I need to take action, then I'll do it and I'll put my measures through. I won't deviate from my norm then (Maxl, operational port police officer).

They all want to negotiate first, because, to fine is the last thing (the larger part of) the seafarer population needs, because it will put them at risk of getting fired. They will lose their only source of income, and with it, they will put their families and themselves in danger, and this is regretted by the port police officers.

Most port police officers, especially those with a maritime background in shipping, know more than well enough how tough the seafarer's life can be, because…

> …most of us come from maritime shipping. We've been on ships, so we know how things are on-board. You do have an easier talk [with crews] (Rupertus, operational port police officer).

> You'd have to set sail to sea and then you'll know how bad it is when [you got] two kids, a wife, or whomever at home. [Crew members] can't go ashore here, nothing. Can't set foot on shore. Can't go the cinemas. They need the money. They send everything back home. It's… slaves… modern slaves though. That's why they're not that friendly. You have to look slightly beyond that (Arnulf, operational port police officer).

They respect crew members, especially the lower ranks who struggle against poverty. Their harsh job conditions are what makes them tough themselves, and when you know this as a port police officer on inspection shift, you can communicate with them:

> It's always about how you talk with [crew members]. When you're just normal to them, it'll work. You simply have to experience it. When [a crew member is fined] and it fully escalates, it could mean on certain ships that [the captain] throws him out (Kunibert, operational port police officer).

You need each other and need to understand each other's issues. The ISPS Code has the potential to destroy such mutual understanding, because it treats crew members as criminals, which is unnecessary according to some port police officers. Tyler argued the entire focus of the ISPS Code, is just plain wrong. It should not be targeting crew members, because 'They're all people. They're there to work. They don't have bad intentions!' According to him, this population is already victim of their own situation at work and back home. This image of victimisation leads port police manager Cornelius to have a glorified idea of the hard-working maltreated crew member. It motivated him, back in the days he was operational staff, to accept the sometimes rather cross behaviour of them when he said 'Oh well, they're blunt, but nothing more […] they're stubborn, but we don't have quarrels with them.' A specific category of pitied crew members are the Asian crew members from developing and underdeveloped regions. Nations in those regions have better employer benefits (i.e. lower costs) for shipping companies than developed European and North American countries (Alderton et al. 2004). Especially Filipinos are attractive employees for shipping companies, because they are the cheapest. Of all

seafarers, 30% is Filipino, which is a number expected to rise up to 50% in 2016. It makes them the biggest group of seafarers, as well as the poorest, because they predominantly fulfil marginally paid 'able seaman' functions and suffer frequently from the poorest working conditions (Jimenez 2012; UNCTAD 2010). When Mischel and Giselbert, and I arrived at the S6, Giselbert shouted enthusiastically 'Antiguaaaaa!' S6 sails under the Antiguan flag and most of its crew members were Filipino. With some pride, Giselbert told me he could say 'good morning' in Filipino, 'magandáng umaga', because to get cooperation from them…

> …you need to approach them in a friendly manner. […] Now, I sort of learn it [the Filipino language], yeah. By now, 70% of the seafarers are Filipino.

Although the true figure is 30%, Giselbert considers 70% of the seafarers are Filipino. The Philippines' economy benefits hugely from Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), $7 billion being the exact figure they contribute (Jimenez 2012). Culturally, Filipinos, especially men, are pushed to pursue a maritime career, to which maritime training and education in the Philippines has adapted, yet it remains qualitatively poor; there have been cases of examination corruption at Philippine maritime schools (Alderton et al. 2004). Nonetheless, it is claimed that at least '[t]he English of Filipinos […] is generally thought to be of a high enough standard for them to be placed with English-speaking senior officers of other nationalities' (ibid. 72). Nevertheless, this is not what port police officers experience with Filipinos as well as with members from other regions in the world:

> Maritime English is very specific English, with much technical terminology in it. Often it's the case, with Asian countries, with Chinese or something, it's hard [to communicate], but I must admit, that's with the older people the case, like the captain or chief engineer […] or with Eastern Europeans (Freimut, operational port police officer).

For this reason it is sometimes a relief to inspect 'your own ships', meaning ships that are flagged under one's own nation's flag and staffed by fellow countrymen. When such a ship moors, usually a lot of people come on- and off-board, like visiting family, ship services and customs. Horstmar and Kunibert do not like to do border control inspections on 'their own ships', because…

> …we then get to specific persons [of the crew], and want to burden them with three hours of MARPOL [checks], right? I don't feel comfortable with that. And actually, a lot [of us port police officers] go through that as well, but sometimes, you're not welcome at all there (Kunibert, operational port police officer).

Kunibert realises he and his inspections or not welcome, because he wants to be as helpful as

possible. Like the other port police officers, he wants to be compassionate in particular with the lower ranked crew members from his country and those from the Philippines. This is an inherent critique on the commercialisation of life on deck, which is an exploitation by the big brand shipping companies.

Security officers

Teun, the security officer who revealed some Schadenfreude before, admitted later on he does think crew members are exploited, enduring rough times at sea. He said most crew members are gone from home for an extended period of time. During conversations with them, he said, he occasionally was asked how much he earns, leading to crew members telling him how much (or little) they earn instead. Quite amazed, Teun told me:

> €14,000 [for] a half of year of work. It's nothing! […] Moreover, they get the money once they've returned back home […] but the weird thing is also, because I ask them, 'How are things arranged for you guys? Contract-wise?' I just asked that. Then they said 'Well, when we return back home we immediately get another contract.' So it could very well be the case they're home for a week, or, like [a crew member] said 'For a month back home, and then another month I managed to get another contract, and I'm off for 6 months.' Again [will they be] earning just 12 or €13,000. [...] They're never really at home, just working.

Like the port police officers, he pities lower-ranked crew members who endure the poorest working conditions. They depend on what the captain or first officer demands and have not that much to say. Especially 'Filipinos! Loads! Haha! Doesn't matter which shipping companies... most of them are Filipinos', as Sturmhard told me, while showing me a crew list with mostly Filipino nationals on there. Arnd explained why he thinks Filipinos are employed:

> It might sound stupid, but they're cheap, right? The money they get from here is a lot, but it's nothing for the ship operator. That's why… What's the name of that global union for seafarers? [The ITF] made a big effort the last ten years to make sure Filipinos would at least get the same wage like everyone else, because they used to be exploited, getting a very low income.

In the meantime the situation has changed for the Filipinos he said, and they gained more social security and a better health insurance. Nevertheless, their work conditions are still not as good as his, which he regrets. To deal with rough life of social isolation on deck, Filipino crew members gamble, organise cockfights and drink alcohol to kill time (Fajardo 2011: 169 – 171). They also try to go out in the cities nearby ports or seamen's houses to enjoy themselves and forget about their private issues.

Some of the security officers drove these crew members to seamen's houses, which was not the most favourite task to do. Sören had the shuttle service shift at night, and I joined him. He was

hyperactive and joked around continuously, commanding me to hurry up because 'I haven't got all night!', he said. I asked him in all seriousness I hope I would not take too much of his time, after which he said 'Nonsense!' I was told we were going to bring S19's crew members to the local seamen's house. We got to the bus heading for the seamen's house where we waited for the crew members. As we were listening to one of his favourite metal bands, I saw in the rear-view mirror three men approaching the bus and Sören asked his colleague over the portophone how many he has to collect. Before, on the topic of collecting crew members, I heard his colleagues saying 'Pokémon, gotta catch 'em all', referring to picking up and dropping off Filipino crew members, which I mentioned to Sören. 'Aha, you picked that up as well, haha', he said and told me sometimes they push themselves with 12 into the bus despite the fact there is space for a maximum of 6 people. He acknowledged the racist element in calling them Pokémon but suggested that I should not take it too seriously. He then slightly freaked out…

> Sören (operational security officer): Oh, here we go again! More are coming!
> Me: Yeah?
> Sören: Yeeeaaaaah! […] They have to return to the S19.

The Filipino crew members get into the car and Sören gets angry, because they were late getting back to the bus, which delayed the S19 in leaving T1. The crew members were not replying to Sören and talked in their own language with each other. Sören then sprayed the van, as the crew members smelt a little, both of sweat and alcohol. It was a bit of surreal setting, listening to loud metal music, while Sören was whistling and a smelly and intoxicated crew was laughing and talking in a language he and I both did not understand. Then he explained to me it is okay to have 'these Asian guys' like this, but sometimes they can get completely drunk, especially when they are celebrating a crew member's birthday. However, he understood why they party though, because they are not living the most exciting lives, he explained.

We were driving back in the meantime to drop the crew members off at S19, without having any interaction with them. Back at the S19, the last crew member to get out, could not open the door of the bus, which made Sören laugh out loud as it confirms for him the othered image of the Filipino seafarer as ignorant, stupid yet helpless and therefore genuinely to be pitied. Thoralf, Sören's team leader, who brought me back home after a late night shift, opened up about some of his frustrations with Asian crew members who drink:

> During the day, seafarers aren't inclined to drink too much alcohol, however, when it gets later at night, [the drinking] significantly increases and because seafarers, haha, have a certain amount of free time, they consume of course at the seamen's house or the [nightlife area]. They can't really deal with alcohol [from this country] so it's relatively hard when they return here [at T1]

half-drunk. There are those who can take it, and those who are quarrelsome, depending more or less on their attitude. I'd say, the majority of people are eventually Filipinos, Malaysians and Indians who can't take the alcohol very well. They're relatively harmless though.

He tries to understand their transgressive behaviour and keeps things going smoothly until the crews return on deck; then it becomes the captains' problem again. Security officers are not necessarily sympathetic just for sympathy's sake, Gödeke explained to me. He argued that by being sympathetic and showing some understanding to crew members you get much more result than by being authoritarian:

> Must I act like the bogeyman because I'm a security officer? I can also do my job by being true to myself in engaging with people. Look, if a crew member comes back from a seaman's house, after having a pint, I can politely say 'Good night. May I see your passport please?' or 'PASSPORT!' Those are two different approaches of course. The friendlier you treat people, treat them as a person, the more cooperation you'll get. And understanding.

The fact security officers need to show friendliness has to do with the fact that their authoritarianism does not always work and, in fact, they rely vicariously on the powers of other people. Sympathy is used to gain cooperation from crews that are not interested at all in security on deck or in the port, in its bureaucracy (as became clear from the cited at the beginning of this chapter) or in the security officers. That is why security officers try hard to socialise and sometimes bend the rules to achieve their ends.

Nikolaus and I were going to visit the S17 to check on a crew change. Going through the same ritual of registering ourselves at the ship's side of the gangway, we were directed to the chief officer who was acting SSO. Nikolaus requested the departure list and asked politely for how long a crew member might stay away if they leave the ship for leisure at the seamen's house. The chief officer responded 'Sail at 17:00', to which Nikolaus responded they cannot enjoy the seamen's house at all. As Nikolaus was doing the paper work, I talked a little with the chief officer who explained they were at the other port of this research the day before and I asked which exact port facility:

> Chief Officer: Aaah, I don't try to remember this!
> Me: Haha!
> Chief Officer: I remember only what I need! What I can take from the papers. Whenever. We were at the… ehm…

Nikolaus tells me in his own language the chief officer works the same way he does; he only knows what is important to his job. So in the chief officer's case, it means you do not necessarily have to know at which exact facility you are anchored at:

Chief Officer: It's immediately when enter[ing] the river, immediately at the corner…
Me: T16?
Chief Officer: T16, yeah! I wanted to go to [the city], but we were [too] far from [the city]. If I knew I was at [city centre] this is fine. Never mind. At each port I know all how it is: containers, that's all. Never mind which country, which port. Wherever. Being the chief mate, this is the fucking position [*inside all day*] the worst position.
Nikolaus: No.
Chief Officer: Yes.
Nikolaus: NO!
Chief Officer: Yes.
Nikolaus: You have much money at home! In a big bag.
Chief Officer: From where??
Nikolaus: Haha, from where?? Haha!
Chief Officer: Who will give me? Have you been on-board a [specific country's] older vessel? There they even have mice who will die after a few days, because you can't take nothing from this vessel, only this [*pointing to the paper work*].
Nikolaus: This is reality.
Chief Officer: Money from [a specific nationality] owner? Never.
Nikolaus: Never?
Chief Officer: You can take never. If I show my contract…
Nikolaus: No no no! I don't want to see you your contract!

Nikolaus explains what the chief officer wanted to make clear by showing his contract. The contracted hours do not comply with the reality of work that needs to be done. His overtime is more than 200 hours, which is not allowed, I had to understand. The chief officer continued…

Chief Officer: You know that today I started at 4 o'clock morning time and I will finish 20:00 throughout the rest. WHO WILL PAY ME FOR THIS??? I'm a stupid man to stay here. And when I open my mouth, [the shipping company] will kick me out of my spot, and the next one will come, understand? Where can I stay? […] That is the way. But believe me, we are not so sorry about having a short stay here. We like a long stay in Brazil.
Nikolaus: Haha!
Chief Officer: We sail to South America.
Nikolaus: South American women, right? Oh yeah!
Chief Officer: Believe me. Better. I have lots of stories that…
Nikolaus: Haha!
Chief Officer: I know [the prostitution district], I know [the prostitution district] very well […] Never mind, because Brazil is better, I tell you my friend: why do I have to pay 100 euros [for a prostitute]?
Nikolaus: It's not so expensive, right?
Chief Officer: I have computer, this means, I have virtual girls, I can have a wife until Brazil.
Nikolaus: Haha, you can have your stories?
Chief Officer: But of course haha!
Nikolaus: No problem, it's okay sir. I like it! Small talk on a day, it's worth it. I work and you can small talk, no problem.

I felt rather uncomfortable about the topic discussed and awkwardly laughed along to blend in. Nikolaus noticed that though, that I felt conflicted about the conversation and told me why he let it proceed. He said to me he likes to talk with people like that: 'It's about what he wants!', meaning, the chief officer's interest is what matters most because he has to cooperate and let

Nikolaus finish his work. So, by showing an interest in the chief officer's rough work circumstances and by playing into the chief's chauvinistic and sexist catharsis, Nikolaus gets the paper work done, while establishing good will and trust between ship and port security.

5.5 Subconclusion

The othering of shipping companies, their ships and their crew was the main focus in this chapter. The participants, although being appreciative of shipping companies being in line with ship safety and security standards, vilify those companies and their exploitation through the FOC system, as it results in less and less ships flying their national flags. Security officers criticise shipping companies for neglecting to properly register at the port facilities, leading to problems both for crews and for security officers.

When a ship of an unfamiliar ship operator docks in their port for the first time, it undergoes a port security rite of passage, during which port police officers are extra tough on security breaches and hand out token fines; these fines are warnings to respect the port security regime. So, during the first police inspections on deck, whether border control or dangerous cargo inspections, they scrutinise security in detail; however, they aim to make crews to comply. They do not criminalise them. Security officers have less authority and they have to comply with on-board security regimes and it is possible to be refused from entering deck. They only visit ships to register crews and clarify the port facility's safety and security regulations. The only time any sort of authority could be executed on deck would be when a DoS had to be made, which is nothing more but a pre-completed form used for ISPS Code audit purposes.

Similar to how the participants treat the port business community, they police and secure for the shipping industry, which means preventing delays and keeping costs as low as possible for crews. Not (just) because they want to support the global trade, but (also) because they affiliate with crews and the poor work circumstances on deck, as many participants have experienced such circumstances themselves when they worked as crew members and so they therefore understand the crews and their sometimes grumpy attitude. Security officers anticipate crew members can make a mistake now and then when they set foot on their port facility ground. Then, crews are subjugated to the port security regime, during which the security officers' rule counts. Overall though, crew members, especially Filipino able seamen are pitied as they are exploited most severely by shipping companies, so their transgressive behaviour (first and foremost excessive drinking to deal with the harsh life aboard) is tolerated.

Thus the Self that is established is one that is empathetic to crews and ipso facto critical of the heartless shipping owners, revealing a strong bottom-up solidarity and anti-authoritarianism that is embedded in the port culture; one that rages against the capitalist rationalities in the port securityscape, while having to protect and serve it.

Chapter 6

Stowaways, port thieves and drug smugglers

6.1 Introduction

> Nicolas (operational port police officer): When you're driving around, what do you pay attention to? You pay attention to the things that deviate from the normal image. Type of cars, people who work here generally have company cars, rather decent cars. If suddenly a wreck pops up, with four guys in it; that deviates from the [normal] image. That's a reason to start an investigation.
> Me: Sounds almost like paranoia or am I wrong? Haha!
> Nicolas: Haha! Well I just call it professionalism, to be able to detect deviations from the normal image. Normally there's [port] business going on and then such an image, that doesn't fit in at all, will make you think 'Wait, what's going on?' Nothing has to be going on at all, but it's IN ANY CASE a lead to start with some kind of investigation.

In the previous chapters I elaborated on how the Self of the participants is (re)established through the familiar Other whom the participants (ought to) provide port security with and for. The risky, unfamiliar Other is, unlike the familiar Other, generally an invisible Other who they secure *against*. These unfamiliar Others of the port securityscape are stowaways, thieves, drug smugglers and terrorists, some of whom they sporadically encounter but most of the time never see. Therefore, compared to othering through the familiar Other to (re)establish a meaningful Self, othering through these Others is based on shared stories, risk analyses and politicised media representations of immigration, crime and terrorism. These stories, analyses and representations provide the participants with pencils to draw out profiles of the unfamiliar Other. This chapter shall focus on how stowaways, thieves and drug smugglers, followed by Chapter 7 on the terrorist.

6.2 Stowaways: preventing a financial risk

Port police

After an inspection on the S1, Freimut and I walked to the outside deck. He showed me the police car that was going to pick me up to join a border control shift. I returned my S1 visitor's card back to him, to which he reacted jokingly I could stay on-board as a stowaway now, having

no legal permission to be there and he could make an example out of me to instruct the crew on stowaways. We both laughed about something painful. We realised that the life of stowaways is anything but funny and finding them on deck is truly problematic. Stowaways try to make a run for it from shore to ship, swim and board the ship, hiding in stuffy spaces:

> They mostly use the rudder stock [trunk], which is an open space above the rudder. When the ship is unloaded, you can swim into it [as it is above the water surface at that point]. When the ship is loaded, the ship sinks underwater, and usually you can still sit at the top, high and dry. "Dry", in brackets, because when that rudder starts to spin, occasionally wake water pops up [in the rudder stock trunk], making it a super moist, ice cold space. It's hilarious when people crawl in that whole in Somalia or Nigeria, with water temperatures of 35°C. When the cold current [Canary Current] hits on the Atlantic Ocean, then that rudder stock becomes only 15°C, or 10. Those people get soaking wet when they're there. They panic halfway through the journey, and they start to get jumpy and hit the manhole with a hammer or something. They want to get out, getting discovered after all (Lucas, operational customs officer).

They can also be put in containers by human smugglers, as Soliman, SSO at a shipping company, made clear to me. The stowaway is a complex issue:

> If you set sail with stowaways and you set course for the next country, and that stowaway suddenly appears on deck, you are responsible [as shipping company]. If you head for England for example, they have very high fines for it. It could very well be the case they'd say 'He is not allowed to go ashore here'. Well, then you're stuck with a stowaway. So, no matter what, you want to prevent that. Therefore we got exercises on how to take care of keeping a ship stowaway-free.

Soliman, who occasionally does SSO work, has never encountered a stowaway, but he explained why it is 'a pest for a crew' to find a stowaway, possibly leading to stowaways being thrown overboard. It is the cold, hard fact that, once they are discovered, stowaways form a legal and financial risk for captains, shipping companies, port authorities and other stakeholders, 'including those providing security services ashore' (IMO 2011: 4). It costs especially shipping companies a great deal of money to have a stowaway discovered on their ships by port authorities or security officers at the next port of call (Maccanico 2012; Walters 2008). The port police are more than aware of this:

> You can see a displacement of human smuggling heading this way. A few weeks ago, a couple of guys were arrested who were on their way to [another country], who were on a ship leaving [this port]. At T16, for example, all the containers put through are checked with dogs to find out if there are any people in them. If they get caught in [that other country], [the shipping company] gets a fine of €1300 [roughly] per person found in a trailer. Those [stowaways] can go back, so at [the shipping company] they're very strict on inspections, but [the area of T16] is the place where people often try to cross to [the other country]. You also got the stowaways who disembark [in this port] (Marcus, operational port police officer).

Dealing with stowaways is tough for port police officers. They need shipping companies to use their ports to benefit the port business community. So you need to prevent people from illegally (dis)embarking at your port, as companies have to pay high fines in the next port of call, which motivates them to use other ports where there is a lower stowaway risk. Basically, by keeping stowaway numbers low, ports stay attractive for shipping companies.

In Rotterdam, stowaways used to be a bigger problem for the port police than during my fieldwork. From 1998 until 2014 in PoR, the period with most stowaway cases dealt with by the RRSP was 1998—2000. The HWP, which in general has a much lower number of registered stowaway cases, dealt with most stowaways in 2012.[17] This was during my fieldwork yet none of the HWP police officers shared that information with me. To keep the threat of stowaways as low as possible, risk analyses are used to identify risky ships on which stowaways embark and at which risky port they do so:

> If there's a [high risk] analysis, a ship will be [checked for], for example […] human smuggling, and stowaways often. A ship is being awaited by us at [a certain point nearby the sea] and escorted to where he has to dock to ensure that nothing goes off-board or overboard. Then it is docked and at the quay border patrol, port police and customs are waiting with a dog brigade, drug dogs, you know? That whole ship is combed [based on] that risk analysis. […] The [ships] can have the same risk code, but why? Just because they come from Morocco, loads of stowaways (Warner, operational port police officer).

Morocco was considered a country where many people embark. In fact, the entire African continent is considered stowaway-rich:

> Stowaways, they come from Africa and yeah, they're here illegally and have no right to be in this country. When he wants asylum, he'll get sheltered and the whole case is scrutinised whether he really is allowed to be here or not (Maxl, operational port police officer).

During his shift at the reception desk, Maxl and I were staring out of the window seeing the big metal floating beasts in front of us. I asked him if stowaways try to embark or disembark in his port frequently:

> It's not as bad as it used to be, I believe. There were times when there were simply many more intruders and stowaways who made it to shore or [this city]. Now, because of the ISPS Code, I think fewer have tried. The port inspections and the ship inspections have made it much harder for those people to get on-board. Not just in [this country's] ports but also in other ports.

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[17] Based on data about registered stowaway incidents in PoR and PoH 1998-2014 (IMO GISIS Reports on stowaway incidents FAL.2/Circ.50/Rev.2). Source: https://gisis.imo.org/Public/Default.aspx.

The ISPS code has led to improvement in this respect, Maxl thinks. It is important to discover stowaways and report them, he explained:

> [We] ask them, firstly, about their reasons and write up our report and pass it on. I've done it once. […] Two Africans and one of them declared to be seeking asylum and the other didn't, who ended up in a detention centre, I believe. Yeah, that's how it went. The one seeking asylum was taken to a centre for asylum seekers, just for shelter, where they can register and from there get housing arranged. […] We write up our report that is being used by another agency that decides what's going to happen with him and whether he really is entitled to asylum, whether there really was political prosecution in [his home] country or which war situation there was. […] It begins with the police. We're the first, so to speak, who have contact with the stowaway. […] It can happen an asylum seeker has to return, like to the ship, because the ship is responsible to take him with them. In reality, these are poor people, coming from somewhere in Africa, facing nothing but trouble, who spent a lot of money on, for example, someone who got them here, and then they are being told here 'You need to GO again!' (Cornelis, port police manager).

Maxl thinks they are punished twice for risky but understandable behaviour. First, they give up all their savings to escape a lethal situation, and once they get to their (wished for) final destination, they are treated inhumanely by authorities, imprisoned in detention centres and most likely sent back. Maxl sympathises with them and is glad the number has decreased. What he did not mention was the journey in-between that is inhumane as well.

As discussed above, they hide in very cold and small, wet spaces on-board so as to avoid discovery, because once they are, they are treated like human waste:

> Nine of out ten times they are placed in a separate hut, locked-up, doors welded with a tiny hatch through which they may get food (Radcliff, shipping company PFSO).

Sometimes stowaways must do non-paid work and are dressed up as crew members, police officer Inkmar said. They have to get rid of their own clothing and probably have to wear the same clothing every day from then onwards. This, to blend in with the crew and to hopefully not get discovered until the ship can get rid of the stowaway in a port where it is easy to let stowaways disembark undetected, all to avoid high fines and crews' dismissal. As I have noted, another way is by throwing stowaways overboard, which explains the decrease in stowaway cases, Freimut worryingly told me. Still, despite the fact the stowaway is a "dying species", they are still there and as long there is poverty and war, it will never stop, he noted with sadness.

Neal was also happy about the decreasing numbers of stowaways in his port, because it means they are delivering good port security:

> If you execute port security the right way, it will have its impact on crime. A good example was the [shipping] company from [a port in this country] that dealt with many stowaways. When [the ISPS Code] was introduced, the number of stowaways tumbled down. So the seahouses, where those stowaways were taken right before they wanted to cross to [another country], started to get fully occupied by them. There were many issues not getting them placed. So, you could see the [positive effects of the ISPS Code] (Neal, port police manager).

The numbers significantly decreased after the introduction of the ISPS Code, according to many more port police officers, like Cornelius. He also admitted the amount of stowaways the port encounters annually has become smaller. With some disappointment though, he argued they used to have many more cases each year. Now, stowaways cases occur at port facilities where the ISPS Code is not well enough complied with. From those facilities it is easier to go on- and off-board ships illegally, he explained. I asked how he knew about the decline in numbers:

> You investigate it, where they come from. Mostly the same ports. Morocco, that direction. [In case of a stowaway], a team consisting of border control, customs and sometimes port community police do a full face-check of the crew. Customs does an extra investigation of the ship whether there are goods that shouldn't be there. Is it useful? 999 out of a 1000 times not really and that discourages us sometimes, as in 'What are we doing it for?' We are… the fact we do it that way, means we're an unappealing port to do that stuff [as a stowaway].

Cornelius, like the others, explained it is good that people attempt less and less to illegally board a ship, because they expose themselves to extremely dangerous circumstances. Still, he is confronted with pointlessness that threatens his meaningful occupational Self.

Security officers

According to security officers, they are, compared to the port police, more closely associated with the task of having to keep the number of (detected) stowaways low. It is a complex problem, because it is not illegally trafficked drugs, weapons, contraband or cigarettes they are dealing with. It is human beings:

> We had [stowaways] here as well […] matter for the port police. […] You can't just get rid of a stowaway. What I mean by that is you're responsible as soon as those people are on-board. It means you need to cover their costs and shelter them. That's where the money thing comes in, right? He can't enter this country and he can't go back. If they throw their passport overboard, it's still someone. You still need to take care of that human being. I heard some wild stories about it that they might get thrown overboard […] in the past. I assume that we're at a level now at which we say 'We won't do that', haha! (James, security management and operations).

Meinart experiences in particular a lot of stowaway cases, as he works at cruise terminal T16. He explained:

> It's fun for no [shipping or port] company. […] The disadvantage of having stowaways in a trailer, entering [another port], is that it'll be taken out by customs there. If you enter [another country], there's customs with tons of scans! Unbelievable! Every unit is checked, every day again. If 5 people are taken out then [this port company] has a rather big price tag to pay. […] I think the [government at the receiving end] thinks 'Listen up. It's not our issue. You over there need to pay better attention, so spend some more money on inspections so we won't be bothered by [stowaways]. If we do, you'll get fined'. In these cases, however, they can't fine [my government] so they fine the shipping company. Hence, we need to take action. That's why we got human detection dogs. In relation to ISPS, there's another risk, 'cause they don't necessarily cross to be in that [other country]. Could be people wearing an explosive belt, so… But yeah, it can get pretty expensive, definitely (Meinart, in-house security coordinator and operational security officer).

The port company they secure for will be directly punished by a shipping company when it moves its business to another port, avoiding high fines for stowaways. Therefore, Rock explained:

> We might say sometimes, 'I'm not seeing anything', but we've been through a lot back then [when there were weekly stowaway incidents]. It was at the side of [a certain part of this port], where he had to check for [stowaways]. We simply measured the oxygen levels under the canvas [over cargo]. We had a couple of stowaways, basically, who wanted to cross with that ship to [another country]. […] I've had 3 stowaway incidents to this point, in the port area, of which 2 in [this part] and 1 at T16. My colleague, Abraham, who you're going to interrogate, worked a lot with [human detection] dogs at T16. […] The stowaways were mostly Chinese (Rock, security management and operations).

The Chinese stowaways Rock was referring to, were the 58 who died tragically in Dover after having been smuggled into the UK in an airtight container (Guardian 5th April 2001). There were only two survivors and the lorry driver transporting the victimised Chinese was found guilty of manslaughter. Neither the criminal network behind it nor the shipping company was prosecuted.

The stowaway is, for many reasons, a sensitive and secretive issue for several security officers. They were wary about talking about stowaways because they did not want to damage the image of the port, its companies and the shipping companies. Some of them though did not mind sharing their views with me, like Abraham. He used to work with dogs to track down stowaways:

> I've been in [port security] for 25 years now, and until recently, I used to walk with an explosive and human [detection] dog. […] Working with human detection dogs really was my thing. It was great to do! If you see what those dogs can do. […] You built something up and you lost it. That was a blow (Abraham, operational security officer).

Due to the decrease in the numbers of stowaways, doing searches with sniffer dogs had become too costly and Poseidon Security stopped doing it. Abraham lost his dog over it. Denial of a problem with stowaways is profitable for port and shipping companies, so security companies

might do anything to serve their customer, even if it means helping out in keeping stowaways undiscovered by not using detection dogs anymore. Abraham remained vague about it. I was out of words for a moment, trying to realise what he implied.

Even more shocking was James' experience with stowaways. Security consultant Dustin, he and I were sitting in a meeting room. While you could hear modernity's soundtrack in background, consisting of vessel carriers' clitter-clatter and cranes swinging containers from ship-to-shore, he shared the following:

> Due to inspecting [containers], unfortunately, I have witnessed [stowaways], coming from a South-American country to here. Four dead were in [a container]. Thorough inspections couldn't find out if someone was in there. Only when it really began to smell. I was called in, because fluid escaped from below that didn't match the load, and because I unfortunately saw and smelt dead things before, I knew exactly what it was [blood]. The fact I saw dead people, that's not such a big drama, but the fact that the last thing I saw was diapers coming out of the container… I just had my daughter. I turned around. I received support for it. Still, when I smell coriander, I immediately have flashbacks. There was coriander in that container, haha [smiling uncomfortably]. […] The worst thing about it, I find; those people who were in there… It was a new [airtight] container. After I saw the container from the inside, and what those people… Can you imagine what those people must have tried to get out? Scratches of nails on the inside of the container. Unbelievable. […] Somewhere in Timbuktu there was a gentleman who said: 'Well, you're about to step to a brighter future, get into the container.' You pay for it. Then the container is locked. […] Instead of being loaded aboard a ship that sails out, it is placed in the hot sun. Coincidentally, because it's forgotten. You got coriander in it or whatever, and there are gasses there to kill bugs. There's a little hole in the above. It becomes one big casserole, having no more oxygen and you die. […] I know EVERYTHING about it. You try to get out, and you're standing there in a [container] stack. You can hit as much as you want to, but there's no one who hears you.

Somewhere in-between cruelty and tragi-comedy, he looked at me and grinned a bit. James, Dustin and I must have had the same horrific imagery of brutal powerlessness in our heads. James was the only participant who told me about a traumatising experience with stowaways. To cope with it, he told it with a smile and tried to make laughable what really is sombre (Nietzsche 1999[1895]). To remain in a state of denial towards stowaways and their inhumane conditions is therefore not just commercially necessary; it is done to proceed with work that sometimes involves dealing with inhumanity and being inhumane.

6.3 Fear of the professionalisation of port theft

Port police

Similar to stowaways, theft has always been part of the port. When thieves were discussed, in particular the metal thief was prioritised as a risky Other:

> A hot item here with us is metal theft. […] At the moment it's a number one point of attention! Yeah, it's a real issue. It causes a lot of nuisance, and it's a pest […] because of the [financial] crisis, also because of the price of metal, which is high. We have to deal with all of those, yeah, dimensions. It was actually always there [metal theft], only now a bit more (Lloyd, operational port police officer).

The financial crisis is considered the main reason why thieves do it these days and why there has been an increase. It is simple: metal prices have risen and attracted criminal entrepreneurs to steal and deal in metals. This provides a way of concretising what remains for the port police officers an invisible risky Other, while communicating it is not their fault they cannot control the sudden increase in metal theft. It is a way of neutralising one's own incapacity to tackle theft as a form of typical port crime that changed in nature. In fact, modern times have made the thief invisible and professional:

> All of it has become more mobile. Before, a criminal stayed in his own municipality. 'Well, that's Pete, it's the burglar!' Every cop would know you. But now, you think 'Bus. Foreign license plate. Maybe they're burglars'. […] Everything became more anonymous, bigger, mobility has increased (Nicolas, operational port police officer).

There is no familiarity anymore with who does it, how many do it and what kind of modus operandi they have. They have become invisible risky Others, more than stowaways are. They therefore demand more from port police officers' imagination to make the thief tangible. Still, you want to be or look tough on port theft, but to do so you have to locate the nail you want to hammer down. One way of doing so is by profiling their places, routines and targets. Indeed, the all too familiar criminological theory on routine activity (Cohen and Felson 1979) was being used to categorise the thief. Nicolas initiated a project to analyse crime reports on metal theft and typologised the metal thief:

> 1) the opportunity thief, 2) the employee and 3) the professional. Also something you see quite a lot: people who work as hired employees at a company, and then take stuff [metal] in their trunk.

In particular the metal stealing employee, or 'the inside job', was problematised:

> If a port worker committed a crime, he could choose: either he got fired and they [employer] would report him, or he could go voluntarily. Consequently, he started with another company again. Crime was covered and kept alive [this way]. So, that is the first thing we dealt with and this STILL is the case, even recently (Neal, port police manager).

This another example of how the thief is made tangible. In case it is someone from the inside, it means it can be a familiar person and someone they might have seen. Othering the thief this

way serves as a veil to hide the police officers' frustration about their incapacity to tackle the issue.

Some port police officers looked beyond popular police explanations of port theft and argued the employee gets involved due to port companies being 'bad bosses':

> I think that when you're a good employer, you should take care for the prosperity of your personnel. If you do that in a good way, then you'll get personnel that make an effort for the company. Then I get back to the point for which we're discussing this. Think about security and stuff. Someone who knows his boss is good to him will report things quicker than someone who doesn't [feel well cared for], because then the communal sense gets lost. […] Those are risk factors. Well, security related [it becomes] easier to approach someone within the [port] company who doesn't have a [communal] sense in that company. I think it [then] becomes easier to make someone say 'Well, I work at that company my normal wage', but if you get approached… I don't want to argue that's the case, but [a port worker can be requested with] 'You know what, you can make an easy €1000 extra, if you make sure I can take a container from a stack', or whatever. That's what I mean when I say risk factors […] especially at companies that work with computer operated [systems] and the like (Ferdinand, operational port police officer).

The possibility of having a lowered social cohesion at the port facility workplace, in particular between employer and employed, is what is defined here as risky. Hoekema (1973) wrote about how strong social cohesion at the workplace leads to specific semi-autonomous fields in which theft was accepted, but here Ferdinand argues the opposite; diminished social cohesion can be criminogenic at the workplace. Othering the employee into a thief and thus a risky Other, reveals Ferdinand's critique on employers treating their personnel badly. Port companies create the very criminogenic circumstances they deserve, revealing a hidden critique on the commercialist practices by his own management executed on operational staff. While humanising the thief, a critique on dehumanisation by his management surfaces.

Security officers

During a car patrol on the T1 premises, I saw stacks of containers passing me by. It was quiet in the car. Piles of bleakly coloured boxes with products that satisfy our consumer thirst, and like everything else, are unable to avoid the salting by the raw sea. 'This maritime realm has a way of dealing with things and people', I thought. Suddenly, Nikolaus pulled me out of my daydreaming, pointing out a 'Free Zone Border' sign:

> Here, a product costs 90% less than at the other side of the fence. Well, what is then obviously an aspect to take into account? It's smuggling of course. […] It's theft! Forcing a container open somewhere, taking products out of it (Nikolaus, operational security officer).

Stealing products inside the Free Zone and trafficking it outside is a lucrative business. For example, an Apple iMac is made in China. T1, where Nikolaus works, receives ships from China

and it is possible for crew members to take iMacs out of a container, and offer it for €300 to T1's dockers. The usual 'offender' used to be someone from within; a docker. His reasons to steal though have changed, participants explained, because the financial crisis is pushing dockers to steal products due to increased job anxiety and insecurity, while being afraid of getting fired – a contradiction:

> People are afraid of [not keeping] their job, absolutely. It leads to health problems, aggression, yes, you definitely notice it […] when you look at theft… yes. From the warehouse (James, security management and operations).

When discussing this type of petty port theft, the security officers became nostalgic and laughed. *That* type of thief disappeared, they would say in all seriousness, because…

> …ports [are] not the way they used to be before. They rearranged themselves. The types of goods have changed. There used to be loads of general cargo. Today there's hardly any general cargo! It changed. Today there are many containers. T1 has almost exclusively containers. With it, the dangers surrounding them are completely different compared to general cargo [dangers]. It also has become completely UNINTERESTING for a random thief to go into one of those [storage] halls here [in the port] to steal something, because everything is closed (Klaus, security management and operations).

The ever increasing amount of containers makes it hard for a thief to know where to look on T1's premises, Klaus explained. Perhaps where containers eventually have to go to get unloaded, there are theft prone places. Petty port theft as he knew it, is gone. Not just the container volume, but also the ISPS Code and the insurance-driven measures that demand containers to be hermetically sealed during transport (the same measures that cause horrific stowaway deaths), have driven the nostalgic petty port thief away. His disappearance symbolises today's port crime for the security officer. It is not fair anymore and has lost its innocence:

> Now, it's being done through other networks, I think, but the possibility is still there. The sector though, the "traders" in the port, sort of an endangered species, made loads of money out of it for a long time. […] They'd pick up old iron, copper, who knows what. The haggler type. They made bags full of money out of it. Yeah, and besides coming for that, they tried to steal inside our company! But that generation of whom I knew most of them, because I worked there for so long, they went through the entire port. […] Well, they're almost extinct! Now you got a whole new generation who are doing it [haggling and stealing] in a "slightly" different way, haha! (Aaron, former operational security officer).

By 'slightly', Aaron means, theft is now organised at large-scale, he finds. Thieves have adopted a bigger-is-better mentality. The characteristics have changed:

> Where they used to steal at [port] companies, is now shut, well, besides everything that's still outside on [port facility] territories. Like, iron ore, and copper and that kind of stuff [is still being stolen]. That stuff, but other than that, it's getting tougher you know! Look, we don't really deal with it […] but you hear about it once and a while (Wijerd, operational security officer).

Wijerd refers to the ISPS Code that has closed the port facility territories more effectively, and in turn pushes port thieves to become more professional. Poseidon Security officer Abraham, who used to do perimeter security at T17, 'where now people from another security company come' (namely Wesley, Dillon, Piet and other Hephaestus Security officers) explained the metal scrapyards and iron, lead and copper storages are problematic. It is because of their open waterfronts:

> What used to be the case? They've always entered via the waterfront. That's why they're risky, those companies. All those [port] companies at the waterfront […] that's where they arrive at a pier, carrying a ladder with them. A big ladder, put it against the wall. […] Metal theft. It's gigantic. It's worth so much money, unbelievable (Abraham, operational security officer).

Next to the waterfront, security officers explained metal thieves can disguise themselves as part of the port company or as a legitimate visitors:

> Metal theft in the ports, copper. […] It happens here, it does. Recently, we had an incident with a company that's temporarily stationed here. Those towers over there, that's what they're building. [Thieves] took away thousands of euros worth of steel there. It's not as if you pick it up just like that. That must have happened organised. Anything goes these days, because those guys enter the premises with a car, a trailer actually that looks like [a company-owned] truck. They're loading the material legally! Just like that! It's not conspicuous to anyone. No one inquires after it (Wilbert, security management and operations).

Via the waterfront and in disguise; they will outsmart you. Last but not least, thieves can use IT to their advantage:

> Those blokes, they keep on getting smarter and smarter. [You notice it] by the way they break in. You arrive somewhere at a burglar alarm, you walk around [the building], and you see nothing. Next day you hear stuff is missing. How do you get in then? Via the roof… they're very… also in that area, I think, with technology they get in as well! Because they already know how to steal cars that have an anti-hijack-system. Today every car will always have, not a key but a chip that is basically impossible to copy. They will stand close to [the car] with a laptop, and through that wavelength they read-out, and they'll just take that car (Magister, operational security officer).

Next to amazement about the ingenuity of some of the thieves, security officers worried about the changed nature and form of port theft, as it has become a violent crime:

> Thing is, it's an easy job. You can get to 80 with it […] you can simply age, in a good way and healthily. Well, you shouldn't run into a jerk in the dark, haha (Wijerd, operational security officer).

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By jerk, Wijerd meant metal thieves; security officers would rather avoid than tackle them. Hephaestus Security officers Dillon and Wesley, who are now securing the perimeters where Abraham used to operate, explained to me that whenever there is a theft or burglary reported, you have to consider that you might get confronted with "toughs". These are not the pilferers of yesteryear anymore, but criminal organisations 'and if they want something, they're just gonna pick it up. It's as simple as that', Dillon emphasised. 'It's just a matter of how much they can take and where they can stash it.' Later on, when Wesley and I were on night shift car patrol, he showed which port facilities are targeted frequently. It were mostly metal scrapyards, like T4 or T17, where copper was stolen via the waterfront, he explained. It has led to more property patrolling by foot on the gloomy premises of T17 by his colleagues and himself: 'three rounds a night!' he said. Safety first, your own safety; that is what you need to keep in mind when doing those patrols. You cannot do anything as a security officer. You cannot attack or hurt thieves because there is no monopoly of force available to you:

> Look, the big boys, the big criminals, they know that as a security officer you're not allowed to use your dog [to attack thieves]. That's generally known, they looked into that. […] If you steal a couple of hundred kilos of copper, you're allowed to… I think you're actually not a petty thief, let's be real (Wesley, operational security officer).

A couple of weeks later, when I was doing a night shift at the reception of T2, again Dillon, together with Piet, were stressing how dangerous T17 really is, in regards to metal theft:

> You walk in-between those [containers], but in the back of your head you realise burglary has been committed frequently there. They just pick up copper. Behind one of our colleagues' back, they hide. You start to think differently, like 'It's all fun and stuff, but I'm happy I went the other way instead of that direction [towards the thieves]'. [Theft] happens. Too bad I don't have that many pictures [on this computer], but I had some severe burglaries back in the day (Dillon, operational security officer).

Port thieves are considered professionals who can hurt, even kill you in case you catch them red-handed. It is therefore better to avoid them and report them to the port police, instead of taking action yourself. In case you do need to defend yourself, the only 'weapon' you have, is your Maglite Torch flashlight you need to find your way through the sometimes very dark, lonely and frightening freight terminals. It can be used as a club. I was told stories, shared amongst the participants, about Central and Eastern European gangs with machine guns, aggressively pillaging port facilities. These remained stories, revealing a xenophobia, like Magister's:

> Thefts! Seriously, trailers! If you read the headlines these days, there's your load of [foreigners]. We used to do apprehensions at premises. Well, there was almost no [fellow national] amongst them. All foreigners! Suddenly, they don't know how to speak English or German. They don't

remember it at all. I once apprehended one, who had noted in his diary [in this country's language]: 'If you're arrested, speak your own language'. Haha, I was going through his diary to look for information, and I bumped into it. I told the port police officer 'Look what it says! He does understand [our language] and speaks it too!' The person arrested kept on muttering in his own language, a Polak (Magister, operational security officer).

Their discontent with the nationality of the port thief, reveals their xenophobic Self that is regretting the foreignisation of port theft. It is another example of regret amongst the security officers that this risky Other in the port securityscape is an alien(ated) one; one they fear for two reasons—they can take the officer's life on the illegal market, and his job on the legal market.

6.4 Dealing with absent drug smugglers

Port police

The website of the Rotterdam Public Prosecution Services (OM) indicates that out of every five news stories, at least one will report on a drugs catch in PoR (Openbaar Ministerie (OM) 2014). A specialised team, the Hit and Run Container (HARC) Team, which is a cooperation between the RRSP, Customs and the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service (FIOD), is responsible for most of the catches that range from 50 to 3000 kilos. These drugs are discovered in containers, fruit boxes, false bottoms in ships, and bags carried out by personnel. Even classic cars are used to hide away drugs (OM 2013).

What is interesting is the main narrative on drug smugglers: they smuggle cocaine, originating from South America, and could be port employees. Nothing is said about which ship brought it in or which shipping company was involved. The specific port facility where it was found is not mentioned, only the port area. Notifications were made that further investigation has begun, people taken were in custody, and the suspects were going to be prosecuted. There is no clear mentioning of large drugs syndicates or assumed linkages with organised crime. It is noteworthy that when huge amounts are found, the news items are used for national news.

I discussed these mediatised stereotypes with Freimut. He agreed drugs are smuggled from South America, however, 'the authority for drugs, of course, is customs. It's customs' business.' The port police overall would emphasise the customs agency is responsible for that. Maybe if long-term police investigations were running they thought their investigators would be involved, but not necessarily themselves. Port police officers at street-level are there to pick up on signs from the port business community about any drug smuggling-related activity. With such an attitude towards drug smuggling, they portrayed a Self that is rather indifferent to, or at least, denying responsibility for eradicating one of the most important criminal functions of a port: as

a drug smuggling hub. The fact they consider drug smugglers an issue for their multi-agency partners, reveals a denial of responsibility, which is enlarged as they think drugs are impossible to prevent due to the everlasting nature of drug (ab)use:

> As long as there are drugs, transport [of them] will exist. I just think people can't prevent it any other way, because the people behind it, they also have new ideas about how to get [drugs] over. I also don't have any clue how to prevent it. I think it's a massive issue. Of course, drugs are bad, definitely the hard drugs (Maxl, operational port police officer).

Maybe it would be a good idea to legalise all of the drugs, Maxl argued, however…

> The thing with hard drugs, cocaine, crack, whatever, it's like… there's this addiction after the first or second time you use it. Maybe not that strongly with cocaine [or] what is on the market nowadays, I don't know, I don't know the names. Who cares, actually?

Indeed, that drugs are smuggled—no matter what in what volume—are almost unfathomable to him. There is an everlasting and high demand for it, so drug smugglers will always exist and will always find ways to get the drugs into the country via ports.

In fact, port police officers would relate the many and cunning modi operandi of drug smugglers to indicate how hard it is to catch them, like Tyler. He argued that the characteristics of certain small vessels like fishing boats or RHIBs, such as speed and manoeuvrability, making drug smugglers almost invisible, even during daytime. At night you solely depend on radar to detect smaller vessels, which can be difficult (McGovern 2010). It is the invisibility and obscurity that makes the vessels suitable and therefore a usual suspect, about which many stories circulate:

> [Port police] occasionally see a small boat coming in, but no follow-up whatsoever happens. Only a few times, have we been sent to check out a motorboat that enters the port. They're just not being inspected [...] because there are so many fast movements with fast motorboats, in and out […] but never does the question pop up 'Guys, could you check a boat for once?' Almost on a daily basis rubber boats sail out of [this port]. […] Dealers, who own such a boat as cross-over boat, [say] 'I'll just sail to [another country], with the boat, back and forth'. […] Myself, I sail on fast motorboats, commercially, and I have never ever been checked by authorities here (Tyler, former operational port police officer).

I asked Tyler why nothing is done with this information. 'How the hell should I know? […] I do tell those stories, but maybe it's not true at all what I'm telling,' he joked and started to laugh, indicating those stories are probably very true. At least, that is what he wanted to communicate. He problematises the lack of interest in drug smugglers, and it frustrates him. Although he did not say it out loud, he did give me the impression it was one of several reasons why he left the port police. Drug smugglers are unbeatable, confronting port police officers with their limited capacity.

Some port police officers argued drug smugglers have it relatively easy because port companies, in case of a drug smuggling related incident, do not want to report it because they fear, as with the stowaway, stigmatising effects:

> Drug trade is something completely different, you know? There're no directly disadvantaged [parties] in the port here. There are only accomplices, haha! Unless a company is disadvantaged. But there is no company that sells drugs. […] There is no company that files a complaint with us, like 'We're disadvantaged', or something. Well, they're being disadvantaged in the sense that, guys are entering their [terminal] territories and then break stuff to get to certain areas, and take stuff. They might get disadvantaged in their reputation, maybe damaging the company (Nicolas, operational port police officer).

Nicolas' explanation leads to the conclusion that, if port companies do not file a report, the port police cannot take action and therefore, again, there is a reason to justify why this risky Other is unstoppable, no matter what measures you take.

Security officers

For security officers, this risky Other is even further away than for the port police. When security officers discussed drug smugglers, many would use exaggerated news stories. For example, when I was having lunch with Sturmhard and Gödeke, Gödeke explained, in a low voice, as if I was about to hear about something highly classified, the following:

> The risk-countries for drugs… They know… Customs know it as well. Most containers [targeted for inspections] come from these risk-countries. That's how it is during inspection. South America. When you read a lot, like the [daily newspaper] here, or whatever, it's mostly those containers. If they find something, it comes from South America.

When he finished his story about drugs in their port, Sturmhard nodded his head, and laughed about my slightly performed surprised reaction to Gödeke's story. In fact, I pretended on several occasions I was unaware drugs was smuggled from those other(ed) ports into the ports of the participants. They would consequently react with surprise that I was unaware, would laugh and then make clear to me their port indeed is a significant hub in the global drug trade, like James:

> James: When you're talking about [this port], where stuff [drugs] is found, well, yeah. You're at the right place!
> Me: And where does that stuff come from, usually?
> James: Hmmm, countries from that direction [pointing out his finger], South American countries.

Portraying their port as a significant hub in something larger, may it be in a global flow of illegal drugs, their own line of work becomes more significant. Security officers transcend their office

spaced environment and their patrol. Simultaneously, by arguing it is a matter for customs, they do not feel the need to be responsible to fight against illegal drug trade:

> As a security officer, it's out of your hands, because you may ascertain stuff, where dealing takes places, or where you see certain cars. You inform about that immediately. But also the bigger flow, what's in the containers. As [car] patroller you can't do anything with it though. Perhaps [other security officers at terminals], but not patrollers, because you never know what's in a container or where it comes from. You see them, and they're on terminal territories, and [drug smuggling] certainly happens, but you can't do anything about it (Manuel, operational security officer).

They are there to prevent:

> The really big criminals, drugs and stuff, that's customs' business. Customs actually get to the port facilities and check out those ships. We are merely hired to do car patrols on their premises, for prevention (Wijerd, operational security officer).

Merely prevention. So, on the very sporadic occasions when they do get involved in tackling the drug smuggling issue together with customs, it would be an amazing opportunity to assist:

> Once a month [we would get] a ship from Casablanca, [with] fruit. So ehm, everyone was already operational, the port police, customs, investigations team. They were present [at T9] way early, with loads of people. Even with night vision goggles, oh yeah! The ship was monitored before it entered [this port]. […] Almost every single time… drugs. That [drugs] comes from [Morocco] of course, or *through it*, and then it comes off-board here. It can be [stored] in cargo, can be on-board, you can hand it to crew members. […] If it's not on-board, it's underneath the ship, underwater to be exact (Aaron, former operational security officer).

That is about it though. Security officers assist, while other agencies see and capture the drug smuggler. To be included within the multi-agency partnership that fights drug smuggling is to feel included, whether it is through sharing stories or in real operations. Even if it means the officers actually need to stay away from the premises that were under scrutiny by the customs and port police investigation units:

> When you were walking there at night, in the port area, to do a patrol round, you'd walk along the quay, then you'd see a boat, a suspicious boat, or a diver, or whatever. We also had that with T11 [shipbuilding and repairing]. What happened over there? Occasionally underneath a boat, drugs or something was attached, a diver dives and takes it off, and at our territory [he patrolled at] he would come out. […] A diver goes in somewhere, in the middle of the [river] and pops up in the secured area [at the waterside], he just gets on the T11 territory […] I don't know if it still happens, it'll probably happens here, but back then, the boat men also saw it. We had to keep an eye on it. Customs have been there, port police. After that, we agreed with the port police, we would stay away, because that'd be suspicious [for the hostile divers to see an increased number of security officers – YE]. So we just did our duties, just drove there, pretended nothing was going on and drove away. We had to pretend [*keeping his hands before his eyes*] as if nothing was going on, because it catches the eye [of the diver] they were being observed. So, we were just observing in a warehouse, and nobody knew! […] But the really big criminals, with drugs and stuff, that's customs work. Customs really… they enter port facilities, and they really go on-board, they inspect ships (Rock, security management and operations).

The only drugs related incident a security officer would get confronted with, is during a standard yet random drug test of port employees at work, for which urine samples need to be taken, as Hennig does at T1. Or they would be confronted with it in the way Hephaestus Security officer Wesley and I were. He and I were enjoying a typical nightly panoramic view at the waterside, while slowly moving forward with his patrol car, ridiculing the ISPS Code. Suddenly he said calmly but vigilantly 'What is this?' I looked in the direction he was looking. Right in front of us a car was passing us by from the front. There were four from what I could tell, Moroccan or Turkish guys in it, who looked frightened at us, like rabbits caught in headlights. Wesley did not let his suspicion get communicated through any body language and drove on, but looked back a couple of times, but not nervously, rather calm and aware:

> This is a bit off, obviously. It's of course… sometimes you think like 'That's weird, those guys.' Now, I must say, I did notice they were Moroccans. Moroccan descent. That's what I could see real quickly. […] What you see often is that those kind of guys drive around to smoke pot, you know? I've seen it many times. Besides that, what I told you just now, you're a security officer. There are many [security officers] who are like 'Why're you here?' Not that I'm like that. Those guys [like the Moroccans] will be like 'Ha, you're just a security officer. Why're you asking?' That's how it goes these days. Especially with those younger guys. […] When it comes down to [having] authorities, it's sometimes too bad you can't do that much.

He cannot be bothered by some youths smoking weed in secrecy. That is not what he feels he is employed for. Moreover, he would not be taken seriously; the general public knows security officers do not have the same authorities as the police, so why should he try.

6.5 Subconclusion

The stowaway, port thief and drug smuggler as unfamiliar, risky Others were explored in this chapter, through which the Self of participants is (re)established. These specific Others are near invisible Others who they police and secure against, as they have (almost) never encountered a stowaway, port thief or drug smuggler. Compared to othering through the familiar Other to establish and communicate a meaningful Self, the othering through these Others happens by referring to shared stories, to risk analyses and to politicised media representations of immigration, crime and terrorism. These shared stories, reports and mediatised images provide the participants with pencils to draw out profiles of the imagined stowaways and smuggled humans, port thieves and drug smugglers, and whilst drawing, the profiles of their Self appear.

Firstly, the stowaway was mostly talked about awkwardly as it is a taboo topic. Stereotyped as African refugees escaping from war torn areas, this risky Other poses a legal liability and therefore financial risk to shipping and port companies, which needs to be kept as low as

possible through risk analysis-based prevention and the ISPS Code measures. Their real task is to reduce the financial fearfulness of the shipping and port industry that have no interest in the stowaway's sometimes horrendous circumstances. The stowaway is therefore (unwillingly) dehumanised and reveals a conflicted commercial Self. However, participants simultaneously (re)establish a humane Self due to the compassion and understanding presented when explaining causes of stowing away: escaping lethal conflict zones, risking their lives on deck and facing inhumane treatment once they are discovered.

When othering the port thief as risky Other, participants reveal a rather powerless Self that regrets port thieves are no longer local, familiar and friendly but mostly foreign, IT-skilled, professional and, potentially, lethal. Port thieves could be anybody, including dockers, and are hard to catch. Port police officers blame port companies to create criminogenic dimensions as they treat their dockers as human waste and therefore it is understandable you would steal from a port company. Security officers are particularly worried about this criminal Other's lethality, which demotivates them from taking any action; personal safety first is their credo. This way port police and security officers cope with the obscurity, unpredictability and insolvability of the stealing stranger (cf. Hudson 2009), which is a denial of their powerless Self and their insecure feelings about the tougher nature of port crime and society generally. The port thief 'steals', if anything, the participants' occupational power, meaning and confidence.

Ports are hand in glove with drug smuggling to the outside world, and participants reaffirmed this public opinion by emphasising the importance of their ports as European hubs for specifically South American drug smugglers. But the second criminal Other, the drug smuggler, was never encountered and, strangely enough, hardly discussed. Participants considered drug smugglers not their responsibility but that of customs agencies; participants are only there to prevent, which is more than enough. Moreover, drug smuggling is an everlasting issue because drug demand and supply is simply too big, and smugglers will always find ways to get drugs in via their port, as this risky Other is extremely resourceful. The absent drug smuggler in the participants' daily lives, and having to deal with left-over, minor drug related incidents, reveals some of the more existential issues involved when defining a Self through the unfamiliar, risky Other. Such an insignificant Self is even more (re)established and fought against when being (not) confronted with terrorists, as the following chapter will examine.

Chapter 7
Terrorists

7.1 Introduction

> The risk of a little fire is bigger than terrorism. […] ISPS [created] more security-awareness, but not for preventing terrorism (Deacon, T14 in-house security).

> Port security is an illusion. I'm convinced of it. [...] It's definitely an illusion. Like Schiphol [Airport], like all of those airports that secure because of terrorism (PoR participant).

'Dulce bellum inexpertis', or 'Wars are sweet to them that know them not' (Erasmus 2005 [1536]: 399). So is the War on Terror and the role of port security, as the quotes above indicate. From 2002 to 2011, the leading belligerents in the War on Terror, being first and foremost 'North America and Western Europe, on average, experienced the lowest level of terrorism both in terms of fatalities and number of incidents' (The Institute for Economics & Peace 2012: 30). Aside from threats of terrorism, actual 9/11-like terrorist attacks have not taken place in the Netherlands or Germany since 2001. Meaning, the participants work in a terrorless port yet all have their thoughts and feelings about terrorists who remain imaginary but do inform their 'risk-crazed governance' (Carlen 2008), in this case in the port securityscape, and their Selfs. This chapter shall focus on those thoughts, feelings and (re)establishment of the Self through the terrorist Other.

7.2 Post-9/11 ghost hunting

Port police

'Did you ever catch a terrorist?' I asked my participants, usually followed by shrieking with laughter, looking at me thinking whether I was being serious. Several port police officers sensed the humoristic element and answered sarcastically:

> No, we have been looking for Osama Bin Laden, because we wouldn't mind getting that 30 million dollar [bounty], but we didn't find [him] here. Too bad! […] No, [just kidding]. [There was] a [port] company that called me [saying] 'Say, we got a guy from Pakistan or Indonesia, and according to our computers he…', because they can also see what [he does] in his free hours he's at the company. [He] check[ed] those kind of websites, you know, websites from the [Middle] East. […] Anyway, I said 'Just give me a listing of those websites he visited, I will register it, and I will send it in'. […] It's a hot topic of course, terror (Marcus, operational port police officer).

A hot topic, but the cold reality is one in which the terrorist has never been seen, let alone arrested by any of the port police officers. Lloyd indicated to me he caught a glimpse of the terrorist Other, and made it sound as if he was honoured by a royal visit. Such a visit would finally make him significant in the War on Terror. At the time of fieldwork, a couple of weeks before, he said, a kite was spotted, carrying a camera and flying around a cruise ship:

> Nothing of it turned out to be related with terrorism though. [...] We are vigilant against it. […] We still are focused on [terrorism]. We have agreed with many companies that if they see cars pulling over, [people] getting out, having a look around with binoculars, or taking pictures, all of it will be reported to us, and everything is registered. […] We have a port security training facility in the port, which educates security officers. We got a lead from them once: a guy arrived in a white robe, let his beard grow and yeah, stuff, paid in cash, lots of money. We get that lead, it is taken care of (Lloyd, operational port police officer).

Similar to the drug smuggler, the terrorist is invisible. Contrary to their attitude towards the drug smuggler, port police officers do feel responsible for tackling terrorism. They do not consider a specific agency or authority is exclusively responsible for fighting it. All of them have certain thoughts about terrorists, mostly based on depictions of the Twin Towers on fire, Osama Bin Laden in a cave, videos of terror threats or beheadings by Al-Qaeda and movies using terrorism as a form of entertainment (Pronk 2011). This risky, terrorist Other is thus created through media, as well as political rhetoric. First of all, a terrorist is radicalised:

> That higher purpose. That mind-set. A kind of brainwashing. Also people who enjoyed a good education, suddenly, they radicalise. […] They once, as you might know as well, that they… ehm… the suicide folk, mostly between 18 and 32 years old, that they are the actual… of which I'd say you're within an age range that is susceptible for that kind of [ideology]. I mean, there are loads of theories about it (Nicolas, operational port police officer).

Earlier on during fieldwork, Nicolas mentioned why he thinks young Muslim men are more susceptible to radicalisation than others. They are demonised in political debates and society in general, depriving them of the chance to establish and maintain social ties, and…

> …if you find such friendship and love only in a sort of sectarian [group], you'll look for kindred spirited, and you DO find it. You do find that home. Those terrorists, they're all between 16 and 30 years old, at the very most. That's the type of age your brains are sensitive. If you're being pushed into a certain direction at that point, and there will always be those who will stick around. […] You don't fight extremists, I think, by installing everything with… it can help to install camera's everywhere… But especially the police, not merely the police, but as a government in general, you should stay close to the people. Take care of good education, equal opportunities in society. Don't exclude people; it paves the way for extremism.

What is interesting about Nicolas' explanation, is how he considers the yearning to belong and pursue an ideology that could make someone a terrorist, part of a social issue that deserves a

society-wide and community-based salvation. He does not advocate a harsher, more draconian set of War on Terror security initiatives to strip more people of their freedom.

Security officers

Similar to port police officers, security officers were entertained when I asked how many terrorists they apprehended:

> Haha, no! Never, never, fortunately not. I'm happy I never encountered them. […] Otherwise I could not have recited it. We all have a family back at home, or not, but I do want to come home at the end of the shift. Look, I try to do my work as good as possible. When I notice something, I try to raise the alarm, like I'm supposed to do. But you never know if it is good [enough] or not (Rock, security management and operations).

Rock expressed his happiness because if he had encountered terrorists, he expects they would have killed him. Another security officer answered:

> The terrorist threat… A few years ago we had it at the [Botlek]tunnel [in PoR]. They were standing there with tanks. Something happened, in the time they… someone… but besides that, in the port, in terms of terrorism, no. […]. Me, personally, no. And by the way, no one actually. We got our thieves and stuff, gangs, that's what bothers us more.

Thing is, for some, if an actual terrorist would be caught…

> I'd be front page material, I think, haha. 'Security officer catches terrorist!' Noooo… If only… (Dillon, operational security officer).

It would be a glorious day for Dillon but he never had the honour, he explained. Wilbert and James did have one related experience. Wilbert, a PFSO at petrochemical terminal T13, was confronted with an unidentifiable piece of iron wire stuck in the terminal fence:

> No one really knew what it was. So you check it out. We're [classified as a certain high-risk infrastructure]. We're an ISPS-compliant company. On this side, is [T13] and on the other side is a lane of pipes, going underneath [a river] to the other side to [an island], and comes above ground there, heading for [a port area with mainly petrochemical industries]. That's a risk, you know! Because, well, what's stuck in [that fence]? No one recognised it, no one could tell us what it was, neither the government, nor port authorities, NO ONE! No one… What did we do next? We took it up as an ISPS Code matter with authorities. We said 'We do consider this an ISPS incident, combined with the fact we're a [high-risk infrastructure]'. Then things got moving! What happened next? Police brought in a diver team. River police from XXXX came here. It was arranged very quickly, within four hours! Everything was here! Well, divers went down, and what did they bring up? A huge case filled with sand. […] Besides that, there was nothing in it. […] So you see what kind of consequences [the threat of terrorism] can have.

It turned out, due to river dredging activities of other agencies, that cases were brought down to the river bed to measure the amounts of sand that were taken by currents into the river. One

of those cases was attached to T13's fences. Hence, the iron wire. Yet no one communicated this with Wilbert or anyone else at T13. To identify who put the iron wire there, the ISPS Code and a risk-analysis were used to turn the event into a possible terrorist threat, and level up to ISPS Security Level 2. Basically, Wilbert's concern about a 'stick in the mud,' can be translated into a possible terrorist threat.

James once found a suitcase and a poster saying 'Nirvana', which according to him meant 'involuntary manslaughter.'[18] It was in a car park in the beating heart of the port. He also found a map of the car park and explained that security was levelled up, the area was cleared and police picked it up from there, he said. Then…

> …a short while after that, I am confronted with the same situation. I find a small package in the car park again. Not me, but the team [of security officers]. It stands behind a pillar, you know, one of those typical briefcases. What are you going to do? You clear the area and in anticipation of the police, you let the dogs [that sniff out explosives] come in. Waiting for the police, because when [the bomb] goes off, your team and you will end up underneath [the demolished concrete] yourself. Well, I said 'Police are coming' and the only thing [his manager] did was [saying] '[The package is] probably nothing'. Well, at that moment I completely lost control over myself […] that's when I started to say 'This is NOT happening!' (James, security management and operations).

James got angry because in his view a possibly dangerous situation that threatened his colleagues and himself was not taken seriously enough by his superior. This confronted James with his position in the organisation as well as with the insignificance in the War of Terror. The non-existence of terrorism in the port securityscape leads to James' yearning for visible traces of terrorism. Once they are found, terrorism becomes less invisible, and James' Self is substantiated. Terrorist threats are thus taken seriously by officers not only for reasons of prevention of immediate danger. It is also about preventing the insignificance of the Self. So, if the smallest chance is offered to finally make this risky terrorist Other visible, everything is done to do so, because it is a chance to make your Self visible in the War on Terror.

Overall though, the only time they will get confronted with terrorism is when they read a newspaper, switch on their TV or go onto the web, or as T16 in-house security officer Meinart said: 'I don't notice anything, because everything you notice, you hear it, you see it in media.' Media is what informs them in their lack of actual experience with terrorism, leading to security officers, like the port police, considering the terrorist Other ideologically brainwashed. The Islamist fundamentalist conviction of the terrorist Other is what makes someone persistent in terrorising:

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[18] Nirvana means 'free from suffering'.

> When you for example see, Iran, the Muslims over there, [saying] 'Allah is powerful, Allah is big', then it obviously becomes important at a certain point, that people know to which extent it becomes dangerous? [...] When it's politically and religiously motivated, it becomes dangerous (Nikolaus, operational security officer).

Still, even if you have to deal with Islamic fundamentalists, whether "home-grown" or from certain Islamic regions of the world where terrorist bastions are thought to be stationed, it would not be a reason to panic about terrorism. Security officers would downplay a terrorist threat to their countries, let alone to their ports. This has to do with their idea that their governments played a small part in the War on Terror in the Middle East, such as the Iraq invasion or police training missions in Afghanistan:

> But hey, what did we do? In the very last stage, we sent a few marines in that direction [of the Middle East]. That's it. So, to which extent would it be attractive for a terrorist to take [this country] as a target? I'd firstly hit the Americans. Then the Brits. [...] The [Iraqi] population is favourable of us, so if you get something from that region, and it has bad intentions towards us, it's Al Qaeda or Taliban or something like it. In Iraq, we weren't responsible for countless deaths. Neither did we use lots of unnecessary violence. So, that mind-set [of people there] is not against us, but in favour of us. I think, when you're a terrorist, and you want to kill people, well, you do have to think through who those people are (Balthazar, Hades Security owner and operational security officer).

Balthazar, this way, believes that neither his country nor the port area he operates in will ever be hit because of the minor part his government played in the occupation of the Middle East. Moreover, he, as the others do, believes the port is not attractive enough for terrorists as a way of causing mayhem.

7.3 Lacking terrorist allure

Port police

A former federal minister of interior announced on 17 November, 2010, a 'terror-alarm' for Germany. The populist German Bild Newspaper stated Christmas markets were potential targets of Al Qaeda terrorists (Solms-Laubach and Spieker 2010). This is exactly what terrorists want: carnage and fear, port police officers think. A terrorist attack does not even have to lead to physical damage; as long as it causes society-wide hysteria through the media, it can affect people, port police manager Zachary argued. He considers a failed yet mediatised terrorist attack more dangerous for a port than a hidden but successful terrorist attack. I asked him and the other port police officers how it is possible (even to this point of writing up my thesis) their ports have remained terrorism-free. They argued that terrorists want to target the urban area for its dense population:

> The terrorist always wants to hit the population. A highly effective publicity stunt, and then it's mostly done in the city (Günter, port police manager).

Compared to other forms of terrorism, it is argued that:

> [m]any perceptions of maritime terrorism risks do not align with the reality of threat and vulnerabilities. […] [S]ome plausible forms of maritime terrorism (e.g., sinking a cargo ship in order to block a strategic lane of communication) actually present relatively low risk, in part because the targeting of such attacks is inconsistent with the primary motivation for most terrorist groups (i.e., achieving maximum public attention through inflicted loss of life). […] These perceived threats should not motivate maritime terrorism policy (Greenberg et al. 2006: 140).

The amount of maritime terrorist attacks has remained minimal; out of 40,126 recorded terrorist attacks, from 1968 until 2007, only 136 (0.34%) targeted the maritime industry (Nincic 2012). This is due to a number of reasons, of which the most important one is that maritime terrorism, indeed, has a limited media impact compared to the level of media impact of attacks on land (Guy 2002). Participants found it strange their port is lacking terrorist-allure, because it should be a bigger invitation to terror than any other site. They consider their port to have much more potential to cause havoc and an apocalypse, once attacked. Why? Their port is…

> …without a doubt an economic node in the whole of Europe. Why wouldn't there be an attack? To bring Europe economically on its knees, in one way or the other? (Ferdinand, operational port police officer).

Or as his colleague argued…

> Look, when [terrorists] figure out [an attack on a port has] economic consequences and what not, then it becomes another matter entirely. Until now though, all terrorist attacks are targeted on making victims. Metros, busy nodes, and this might be me thinking to strongly about it, but [terrorists not realising the impact they could have with an attack on the port] still has been, sort of our salvation (Lloyd, operational port police officer).

They consider an attack on an industrial and economically important node and critical infrastructure as more important than an attack on the population; trade over anything. When port police manager Zachary was showing a PowerPoint slide-show, as several more participants did, by the way, the oil tanker Limburg was shown, attacked just outside Yemen on October 6, 2002. He then started to talk about the attack on Ashdod port, Israel, on March 16, 2004 that resulted in sixteen deaths, including the terrorists'. This was followed by images of the attack on the SuperFerry 14 on February 27, 2004, which led to 120 deaths. On the Al Qaeda attack on July 28, 2010, in the Strait of Hormuz, on the Japanese tanker M Star, Zachary dwelled a bit, and how from a terrorist's point of view, it was a failed attack, as there was little damage brought

upon the ship:

> Because they wanted more damage of course. You have to imagine that such a sinking… or exploding tanker in the Strait of Hormuz. It's like that [film] *More Than 1000 Words*, [the area where recording of the film took place] where the entire ship transport has to go through, coming from and going into the Persian Gulf. Imagine how in a few hours later the oil and petrol prices went up, the economic infrastructures reacted to it, how the exchange rate would be affected. So, that would have definitely been a… smart attack, seen from the terrorists' [point of view]. Therefore, this… this attack scenario of sea ship transport is not that unrealistic, because huge international economic damage can be caused with it. In the case of SuperFerry 14, blood was involved, meaning, many people can die (Zachary, port police manager).

He primarily, perhaps only fears the politico-economic consequences of a terrorist attack due to a disruption in the international supply chain. Especially in financially uncertain times, such a loss results its devastating effects. Secondarily, he mentions a terrorist attack with more human casualties. This reflects the general attitude of participants in which appreciation of security of trade, economy and the market transcends security of people. It does not mean they do not care about human life. Rather it shows subtly how far the (re)establishment of a meaningful Self goes to avoid being confronted with their insignificance in the War on Terror. The real terrorist attack is the terrorist indifference towards their port and therefore their Selfs. It leaves them behind feeling insignificant, like security officers.

Security officers

Security officers were very keen on imagining terrorism, which is first and foremost set out to destroy and kill people to cause fear and anxiety in society. To do so, they need media attention, Gödeke argued:

> Sometimes you start to think 'If I'm a terrorist, what do I want to achieve?' As much publicity as there can possibly be of course! For him, it's merely about the publicity [he] can get. And if I want to damage, where do I damage the most?

Their port and its port facilities would not be interesting enough for terrorists, because they would not get that publicity:

> Be honest, if you'd be a terrorist, would you attack [this port], in a shit town? While there's a main office [somewhere else]? Central Station? Well, I know what I would do! […] The chance just isn't that big, that over here [something will happen] (Bob, security management).

Due to the terrorists' interest in publicity, their port remains safe, yet, if they would understand the havoc they could produce by an attack on the port, implying all types of devastation, then they would surely attack their port:

I don't know whether you know it, I think a lot of people don't know, except the people who have inside knowledge or ever saw those maps. But do you have ANY idea how many underground [oil]pipelines there are in [this port]? […] What goes through it, 24/7? When that gets out there, and you want an attack in [this port], it's easily arranged. I'm not saying people should do so, haha, but I think it's really dangerous (Aaron, former operational security officer).

Some even stressed their fears to make their story about the terrorist potential of their port more convincing:

That's the thing that scares me! Because when that happens, especially in that direction, [petrochemical terminal T14] etcetera. You'll get one big chain-reaction [of explosions]. All those pipes lying so close to each other. I'd not be amused. […] That's why I'm scared sometimes, that when it happens, how're we going to solve it? (Abraham, operational security officer).

Nikolaus started to explain in detail how he has been thinking about why his port has not been attacked yet, whereas there are numerous…

…key targets that could be possibly attack-prone […] petrochemical or normal industry too. Because you're responsible for security here, it's important to know which targets there are, terrorist attack targets. How to prevent those, in order to let the production continue and cargo handling companies go about their daily business?

For some security officers, the fact their port could have detrimental terrorist attack potential frustrates them. As it is considered so highly dangerous and vulnerable, they do not understand why the port is still relatively open according to them and not secure enough. They are in fact waiting for an attack to happen to upgrade port security:

That's the thing with [this government], I think! In this [country], something has to happen before action is finally taken. That's the mind-set of this entire society. […] As a little kid you're being raised, you're being taught to prevent risks, for a reason. Here, they just let risk run wild, until the point something happens, and only then they'll react (Meinart, operational security officer).

Why wouldn't you want to do it at the port? [This country] is famous for its ports. That's why I would do [a terrorist attack]. […] I was thinking about [terrorist scenarios]. It's not such a strange idea. That's how you can show, like [to T3], 'We should actually upgrade security here, look at how bad it is at [T3]'. You were able to drive in [T3], just like that. You may have a bomb carried with you. Why not? It could very well be the case you want to destroy [the company using T3]. You'd see on television, like, [that company] is doing very well at the moment. Makes more than 10 million a year, and you'd start to think 'Fuck [that company], I want to fuck it up. I'll simply put a bomb there, just park my car there, and let it go off, so they won't get that 10 million'. Crazy thoughts, you know what I mean? (Teun, operational security officer).

Their descriptions of these consequences of an attack by the terrorist Other on the port, reveal they find it remarkable their port has remained safe, and indirectly it indicates their longing to be included in the War on Terror, perhaps even through an attack. They want to let the world,

or at least the government know how big a disaster could unfold if they are attacked, because they feel excluded. They are excluded from terrorism by the terrorists which really frustrates them. One way of dealing with the exclusion is to script terrorist scenarios and dream about inclusion, as the following subsection will discuss.

7.4 Scripting the uncontrollable

Port police

Police officer Mischel tells me 9/11 was predictable, because before 9/11 people already speculated a terrorist could hijack an airplane and could fly into a building. And it happened. He wonders why no one has flown into a nuclear power plant yet and he laughed, because all those plants can be found on Google Maps. It is bound to happen. He is convinced of it, because:

> When someone wants [to commit a terrorist attack], he'll get through [the fences]. You won't notice it whatsoever. I always say, especially the evil ones, they won't abide to rules. They won't come in at the main gate [of a terminal]. They know what they do, right? Who wants to, can do it (Mischel, operational port police officer).

His colleague, Inkmar, answered to my question how to prevent a terrorist attack: 'Not against terrorism. What can you do?' Or as Nicolas argued that 'not a single unit of fencing here will stop a terrorist who decides to drive into it with a truck. You need not to be under the illusion about it.' Tyler shouted, 'if you're a terrorist, you can easily complete a terrorist attack [in this port]. DONE IN A JIFFY!' Some of the port police officers were amazed, given the easiness, that the terrorist Other has not attacked their port yet:

> You cannot prevent [terrorism], because the character [of the port] is too open. […] Well, it surprises me our turn hasn't come yet. Fortunately. There are enough locations of course where, if you think it through, you can paralyse [this port] if you want to. Explosives are sold easily on the market these days (Marcus, operational port police officer).

They consider the never-seen terrorist unstoppable and uncontrollable. The only you thing you can do, is too make it as hard as possible for them, but those who are really motivated, and they generally are, port police officers think, will succeed. The most spectacular and complex terrorist attack scenarios were described:

> If I enter [this port] with an inflatable boat, I'm a little spot [on the radar]. Maybe I won't even be visible, but before action is taken by authorities, I have launched my bazooka. That's [this port's] port security for ya! Fortunately, I'm not an advisor for a terrorist organisation. […] You see what I'm getting at? It's not just me who knows that! You think those guys live under a rock? (Tyler, former operational port police officer).

The champion of terrorist scenarios for ports was that of the ship being used as weapon. 'Not unthinkable,' I had to understand:

> Imagine; terrorists take over command of a ship, an oil tanker and sail up [the city river] and announce they want to jam this tanker somewhere in the city at full speed. That's the danger *of* a ship and we have to deal with that and fight it of course. No doubt. Whether you can actually do something effectively against it, that's a whole other story! (Günter, port police manager).

Some were very detailed:

> The threat of a ship is always fourfold: 1) the ship can be used as a weapon. You ram it into a chemical [power]plant or something; or 2) you take its passengers hostage, as happened before; 3) you can transport stuff with it, so goods from which you can build weapons, or persons through which you can make weapons; 4) the last story attached to it, you can use it to make money, and to finance terrorist actions with it, because [terrorism] simply costs loads of money. Considering that last factor, you're not covered by the ISPS Code [measures]. For that one you need to utilise existing legislation (Neal, port police manager).

To script these not-unthinkable maritime terrorist attacks on ports through the use of a ship is a way of dealing with the terrorist Other that is uninterested in their ports. To make your Self significant, is to imagine your role that is important through such scripting. During some scenarios relayed to me, I thought I was listening to already existing scripts, or at the very least, (altered) copies of a scene:

> In that case, they make a phone call to the authorities [saying] 'Listen, we got a truck on-board that ferry over there, and it's highly explosive, and we can control it'. Extortion of things (Tyler, former operational port police officer).

Compare Tyler's imagined terrorist attack with the following excerpt taken from Jonathan and Christopher Nolan's adaptation of Batman, *The Dark Knight* (2008: 145)[19]:

> *The Joker stares out over the harbour, at the ferries. Talking into a cell phone [and heard via the ferries inside speakers]. Holding a detonator, with two buttons.*
>
> The Joker: Each of you [a ferry with civilians, and a ferry with prisoners – YE] has a remote to blow up the other boat.
>
> *[Screenshot of] Interior passenger lounge prisoner ferry – night. The prisoners and corrections officers listen, appalled.*
>
> The Joker: At midnight, I blow you all up. If, however, one of you presses the button, I'll let that boat live. You choose. So, who's it going to be? Harvey Dent's most wanted scumbag collection… or the sweet innocent civilians? Oh, and you might want to decide quickly, because the people on the other boat may not be quite so noble.

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[19] http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=y3T_HvYlkoU#t=26.

Tyler's imaginative resemblance with the Nolan brothers scenario can be explained as follows; where participants use modi operandi of encountered risky others (e.g. drug smugglers) to imagine terrorist modus operandi, tangibility is given to terrorism as well by the use of existing film scenes, in which…

> …[t]he meaning of terrorism changes by the [audiences'] experiences through mass media; terrorism becomes a commodity, an element of entertainment in Western societies, and these films serve as a gateway for us to enjoy terrorism but not to deal with its consequences. […] In the post-9/11 era, through Hollywood films, we can buy the 'War on Terror', be good, fight evil, have popcorn and get rid of it as soon as the end credits set in (Pronk 2011: 116).

Tyler may or may not have tried to entertain me, at the very least, we can value the use of film scenes as an entertaining attempt in his search for a meaningful Self, despite the fact they do not (have to) deal with actual terrorism. Next to movies, some port police officers would compare terrorist actions at ports with other groups who actually have undertaken rather spectacular actions in their port. This, to concretise possible terrorist modus operandi. Neal explained how similar plans of the terrorist Other are to that those of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF):

> By itself, the contemporary form of terrorism, and this goes for those activists as well, whether it's about the Animal [Liberation] Front, it never involves a blind action, like, 'Come on, let's do it!', you know? 'Let's blow up [an import symbolic building in the port]'. There's no such thing. You must have a well-prepared action. They know. They study maps. They take pictures. They recon. So, if you got a real terrorist action, you won't stop it with a police boat (Neal, port police manager).

Greenpeace, which campaigns against bulk carriers transporting coal, is another activist group that would be mentioned when a terrorist attack on the port scenario was being imagined. A port police officer from PoR told me he was involved in tackling some Greenpeace members that planned to block a ship coming in. It was broadcasted, 'even on CNN', he explained. Also, ships transporting palm oil are subjected to Greenpeace action, 'or a ship with modified soy is a potential target,' according to port police manager Ronny, in his illustration of a terrorist scenario. Their scripting reveals a deeper desire to take part in the War on Terror. Like the "normal" police, port police need a terrorist attack to encourage the authorities to tackle terrorism and suppress the other risky Others of the port securityscape:

> I always think in terms of terror, but why do I do so? Not because I find it entertaining, not at all. That's not the issue. When you consider everything terrorism, you start cleaning the steps from above. If you got it set up rightly, you catch metal thieves, copper thieves, drug smugglers, port thieves and stuff (Ronny, port police manager).

I've started here five years ago. A reorganisation was going on because we were expanding and received lots of extra money. All because of 9/11 back then. Suddenly there was more attention for border control and we got an extra [amount of] staff (Cornelius, port police manager).

9/11 has been exploited enough now, they explained. A new terror attack would wake people up again, and more power could be given to the port police. It is something they ponder together. Because, if anything, terrorism provides a reason to interact with your colleagues:

You can plot all kinds of boy's book scenarios. You discuss it with your colleagues once and a while. Outside of here, at sea, we got an anchorage, twelve miles outside the port. The biggest mammoth tankers of the world are moored there. There's a crew of twelve members on it. Well, it's a boy's book scenario, you know? To board it with a small rubber boat, take over the ship, sail in, straight through the marshes of the [river], and let the thing explode [in the port] (Ferdinand, operational port police officer).

In the absence of a (mediatised) attack, they simply wait in their war on insignificance and boredom, as do the security officers.

Security officers

Port police are responsible for ensuring port security is in compliance with the ISPS Code that is focusing on preventing terrorism, and security officers are part of that prevention, living (up to) the ISPS Code requirements to keep a port facility safe and resilient. They consider prevention against terrorism is futile though, as Rock mumbled while using his Labello stick. He had cold sores that have been annoying him for two days in a row, but he could not figure out how he got them, as much as he could not figure out how to effectively stop a terrorist at the gates:

It's never ensured, I think. When they attack, they'll do it anyway! Everywhere it's the same. Like with us in the port area. Exactly the same.

Nevertheless, there is much money invested in such resilience:

The effort of [port] companies against terrorism, it's crazy. […] There are no effective measures against terrorism. […] The fact that special forces are trained, like [the counterterrorism and special operations unit] here, or MI6 [in Britain], or whatever their names might be. THAT is what I DO understand. But what [T1]'s doing here? Against terrorism? I don't know (Klaus, security management and operations).

They are captivated in a realm in which resilience against terrorism is everything and non-compliance is criminalised; you simply cannot sit back, relax and enjoy the War on Terror show. You have to do *something*, anything, slowing down terrorists. Even if that means undertaking futile security improvements:

> We got a fence here, which is 2.60 metres, and has to get to 2.90, everywhere! 30 centimetres. You'd wonder, 'What's 30 centimetres?' When you see it, it's quite a high. About that, we asked: 'Will we stop the terrorist with it?' Well, no. You won't stop him with it. When he wants to come in, he'll come in. And when he wants to attack, he'll do it completely different than by registering himself over here. The technology of those terrorists is adapted to these times. Let's be real here (Wilbert, security management and operations).

Arnd stressed the terrorist threat is here to stay but disagrees with how some of these attacks, as shown in media, have been executed; 'I would do it differently, haha. I wouldn't do it here [at T1].' Only if he wanted to target a specific ship company, like the one owning the S18, he would do it via T1. If he wanted to paralyse the national economy, he would shut down his port by going to an underwater tunnel and wait until a ship is right above him in the river, and would try something to make the ship explode. Or bring something on-board and then make it explode but he does not know how exactly. I told him many more participants scripted terrorist scenes of blowing up a ship in the port. It made him laugh. His version was better, even better than that of a terrorist himself, he told me. Balthazar too was portraying himself as having better plans than terrorists. He enriched his script with nuclear elements:

> Lots of Bin Laden's family members are into shipping in the Middle East. I believe his uncle has 10 or 12 docks. Ships disappear frequently off the radar in that region, and pop up somewhere else, with another, false name. Then you're dealing with the phantom ship phenomenon. Have you heard about it? […] The phantom ship phenomenon is when a ship is being hijacked. Crew is thrown overboard, or murdered. The ship sets sail to an allied port, lets itself be reflagged, so you actually get a new ship, right? It receives a different name and gets different certificates. With those ships they'll look for cargo, and as soon as they have expensive cargo, they fall off the radar [figuratively – YE]. Then they arrive in another country, they reflag the ship again, offer cargo once more, and then that cargo is gone. This way a ship can appear everywhere with a different name and accept cargo. Well, if you combine this with nuclear material, in particular waste material that disappeared in recent years. A lot of nuclear waste material from hospitals, or what else is there, from X-ray equipment, just disappeared. At that point you got all the right ingredients to successfully sail in a dirty bomb somewhere. Does it ring a bell, 'dirty bomb'? […] So you got a nuclear bomb, right? That's with the actual fission of atoms, radiating energy. But you also got the big bang with any type of explosive, and nuclear material wrapped around it. Your [explosive] effect might be way less, but you do cause a lot of radio-activity in the region, right? Well, you can enter New York, London, [this port]. If I were a terrorist… Airplanes. Okay, that's the ultimate terrorist attack, right? If you hijack a plane, you'll have more than enough publicity, but if that won't work, I'd take a step back, and I would try [the phantom ship method].

He enjoyed telling me about this and we in fact had some fun about how inventive you can get to terrorise the maritime realm.

This is a type of pleasure security officer Klaus had with a port police officer during lunch at T1. They scripted some viable terrorist scenarios, and Klaus gave an example. However, the cop wanted to outshine Klaus' story with another one about how a truck carrying explosives could easily drive onto port facility premises and detonate. This was one-upmanship; who had the

most spectacular terrorist script? The officer won eventually. This shows that security officers, like port police officers, enjoy scripting terrorist scenarios, imagining, even if it is just for a few moments, that they are in the War on Terror. Scripting terrorism bears also a functional use. Klaus used fictional terrorism for educational purposes:

> September 11 [2001]. It was the day, when… well, something exceptional happened [in the world]. I always have a film clip here… the… You know it? *Speed 2*? Haha! It's always very graphic for the employees who start here, to get an example shown, right? They use the ship as a weapon.

A short scene from *Speed 2: Cruise Control* was shown to me, in which the main protagonists had to prevent a terrorist from letting a cruise ship hit an oil tanker. Instead of the tanker, they diverted the ship to Marigot, Saint Martin. It rams a marina that brings it to a halt.[20] The ramming, the panic and its damage done to the small town, is what Klaus utilises to create port security awareness amongst port employees and security staff to become vigilant of the dangers of maritime terrorism. He uses cinematically thought-up terrorist scenarios to make terrorism real. Through these Hollywood depictions of terrorism, he disciplines his staff, sharing this risky, terrorist Other with each other and through each other's othering. This way they create meaningful Selfs together in the War on Terrorlessness.

Still, to perform their daily tasks, you cannot be *too* aware of (scripted) terrorism, as Bernard indicated:

> You shouldn't dwell on it when you drive here, you'll go insane. That's just the way it is. You just have to… Look, you choose for it. And well, everything has its pros and cons, in general. I'm here now for 12 years. I've experienced a couple of incidents, fires, leakages. Generally, it is secured to such an extent that things hardly go wrong (Bernard, operational security officer).

Othering of terrorists is balanced. On the one hand, scripting the uncontrollable terrorist Other would confront them with existential insignificance in the War on Terror; on the other hand, too much scripting would drive them crazy and dysfunctional in the daily routine, and might very well affect their security work.

7.5 Subconclusion

What does the risky, terrorist Other tell us about the participants' Self? If anything, the non-existence of this Other in the port securityscape confronts participants with their non-existent role in the War on Terror (cf. Bataille 1986[1957]), whereas the post-9/11 legislated ISPS Code

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[20] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f-Hk8gnvL_U.

changed everything in port securityscape. The global War on Terror is a veiled war on occupational insignificance, and the only thing you kill, is time. Participants who caught a glimpse of the terrorist Other, were offered an opportunity to fight in the War on Terror, however, they were not being taken seriously by their superiors, instantly reminding them of their War on Terror insignificance. Their (in)visibility is directly connected with that of the terrorist. Defining him is defining your Self. So, terrorism must be imagined, primarily through media images, leading to stereotypes of terrorists being brainwashed with Islamic fundamentalist ideology to bring about death and destruction for publicity. Such publicity is something the terrorist Other will not get in the port though, due to it lacking a Twin Tower-effect, despite the fact the port is a sitting duck with all its petrochemical sites. The low allure of the port to terrorise, is again a daily reminder of the War on Terror's insignificance and of their insignificance within it.

To (re)establish significance they argue it is exceptional and surprising that their ports have stayed victimless from terror, because they could be so easily attacked by the uncontrollable and unstoppable terrorist Other. It is their victimlessness that excludes them from 'a collective meaning of victimhood' (Garland 2002: 12). This non-existent victimhood is thus an existential exclusion: victimlessness is meaninglessness.

Their imagined terror scenarios stress the means through which a terrorist attack might be successful, showing that such events are 'not unthinkable'. In particular, a terrorist attack on and by a ship, is popular; it allows them to (re)establish a significant occupational Self. In fact, they enjoy scripting terrorist scenarios and socialise through this co-creativity with each other. But despite the social fun derived from scripting, they should not think too much about terrorist scenarios because it might affect their work.

They need the terrorist Other and (s)he is, therefore, metaphorically, a freedom fighter for the participants, as their Self is liberated out of daily war on occupational anxiety, boredom and insignificance coming forward from harsh neoliberal rationalities laid upon them. They want to belong to a group and fulfil a higher goal in life, which is the very same wish Islamic fundamentalists may have, as participants implied. They may therefore (unconsciously) understand the terrorist Other better than they will ever admit to.

Chapter 8
Conclusion

8.1 An ethnography of the Self in the port securityscape

This is the final chapter, in which I shall reconsider the previous chapters to answer my key research question. At the beginning of the thesis, I introduced why port security deserved critical criminological attention. First of all, there is a clear lack of public and criminological interest in port security, whereas ports are highly important, as they are vital nodes in and for the global trade and political economy. This study is the first attempt to comprehend bottom-up maritime and port security realities at a unique site that is a physically and socio-culturally closed off domain. At that crucial and vulnerable transport border, a minor disruption impacts significantly on the entire international supply chain and maritime shipping network. Street-level port police and security officers operate at the very forefront where the smallest local security breach can delay the global trade, but they have remained anonymous to this point. In aiming to understand their daily struggles at work by studying their occupational identity formation, some of the structural and cultural complexities surrounding port security reveal themselves, complexities that can cause real local dangers to instantly affect the entire global economy. By looking at the participants' identity formation as processes of (re)creating one's Self through the Other, it has become clear how global political-economic processes and socio-cultural forces work out at the local level—the very level where those processes and forces effectively depend on—and how, in this case, in shaping port security at quay-level, these social actors are influenced by those processes and forces. The following two-part key research question guided this study, providing focus when things were blurry:

> *How do operational port police officers and security officers in the port securityscape (re)establish a meaningful occupational identity and what are the effects on practised port security?*

I provided a criminological imagination of the port securityscape, to which Chapter 1 dedicated itself. Security was imagined as a heterotelic construct, meaning, it serves multiple goals and agendas. To an extent, the security market deregulation and the post-9/11, xenophobic maritime legislation of the ISPS Code have eroded the anti-authoritarian port culture and its working-class solidarity. This has turned ports, like PoR and PoH, into port securityscapes where the

participants of this research, the operational port police officers and security officers have to operate and act in police and security occupational cultures.

In that port securityscape, I collected ethnographic data from which to distil a criminological verstehen, explored in detail in Chapter 2. It proved to be very complicated to get into the closed-off multi-sited port securityscape and gain insider trust of a community that tends to be sceptic of outsiders. This to get a criminological verstehen, a sympathetic and inclusive understanding of the everyday of this exclusive group of social actors. Due to the nature of the port culture and field characteristics, several ethical, practical and data collection and analysis related limitations and issues were involved. Together, the criminological imagination of the port securityscape and the ethnographic approach for a criminological verstehen led to an analysis that focused on how port police and security officers (re)establish their Selfs through specific groups of Others. In applying othering as an analytical framework, the participants' narratives, attitudes, wishes, frustrations, cultures and practices were revealed. It led to an ethnography of identity formation that was thoroughly formulated and explored in Chapters 3 to 7 of which the subconclusions embody the key elements in answering the research question.

The key elements of each chapter showed how the occupational Self of the participants is (re)established through the Other and what their othering reveals about the port securityscape, its socio-cultural dimensions and the ethos of the neoliberal State and commercialist market that underlie it. There were two overall categories of people who are the Others of the port securityscape: the familiar Other and the unfamiliar (and hence risky) Other. Familiar Others are management, colleagues, multi-agency partners, port companies, dockers, truckers, shipping companies and ship crews; these others are regularly engaged with.

In Chapter 3, managers were blamed for lacking an operational sense of port security, being extremely market-orientated and power-hungry, especially since the advent of global austerity, leading to corporate perversities, as has been observed in the wider policing and security domain (Fielding 1995; Punch 1983; Reiner 2010; Wilson 1978), as well as in (air)transport security more particularly (Lippert and O'Connor 2003; Maguire 2014). By pushing through inhumane, target-based policies, such managerialism 'dissolves the bonds of sociality and reciprocity' and 'undermines in a very profound way the nature of social obligation itself' (Hall and Terry 1997: 47). It creates (more) job anxiety, meaninglessness and routinisation, leading some participants to (re)establish a powerless Self and experience the 'operational' as near 'slavery'. Moreover, commercialised police and security management violate the philosophy of port security as a public good, participants think, indicating that in the port securityscape public and market rationalities are not necessarily supported by their corresponding agents; rather they are

evaluated for their (harmful) aims and effects (White 2014). The participants consequently (re)establish a resistant Self, second-guessing managerial decisions and illuminating silhouettes of the fast-fading port culture of anti-authoritarianism. It reflects a (re)construction of "blue walls of silence" *amongst* 'street cops', *against* 'management cops'; a resistance recurring in police and security cultures more broadly (Reuss-Ianni 1993; Waddington 1999). The port culture and canteen culture of policing and security, paradoxically, require a (role of) management to create the very resistant, thus meaningful Self (Wilson 1978: 73). Expressed more abstractly; the oppressive managerial Other is the exact and needed flipside of the resistant operational Self (Baumann 2004; Said 1979).

As for colleagues, collegial unity and workshop floor equality are essential, illuminating the port culture characteristics of 'strong reciprocal solidarity' (Smit 2013: 42). Those colleagues who do not live up to these principles are authoritarian, careerist, competitive and exclusionary. They reflect the very characteristics aggressive managerialism embodies and for which they are condemned and resisted. Simultaneously, participants themselves are authoritarian and exclude colleagues who have no nautical background, or those operating outside the port securityscape. So, despite the participants' 'defensive solidarity' (Waddington 1999: 301–302) that is reconfigured at street-level and regardless of the sense of responsibility for each other (Sanne 2008: 625), the distinctive spirit of the port securityscape—that of maritimeness—divides colleagues in police and security organisations operational in the port. Such a salty (meaning exclusive and excluding) solidarity could therefore be (purely) characteristic of maritime-related policing and security, the way it is physically constructed and socially construed in the port securityscape.

As for multi-agency partnership in the port securityscape, one can conclude it is a managerial fantasy of equal cooperation yet a bitter operational reality of distrust and struggle. The multi-agency partnership ought to be one at operational level, having no managerial interference. But daily street-level reality consists of multi-agency misunderstanding, distrust and rivalry, leading to conflicts. It became clear that port police officers are frustrated their original port tasks are outsourced to the private sector due to managerialist austerity politics. Security officers, on the other end of this process, consider port police officers as too authoritarian, but they still need them practically to execute those very same outsourced tasks. The multi-agency struggles therefore result from neoliberal agendas of privatising public tasks and austerity-inspired public-private partnerships for efficiency and cost-reductive reasons. This, while recent arguments have been put forward, claiming that multi-agency cooperation through security networks develop a specific network culture that gives 'the network greater 'strength', enhancing a network's functioning by way of promoting a greater willingness among security nodes to cooperate and

collaborate' (Whelan 2015: 19), and that 'partnership working was not only regularly employed by police officers and Neighbourhood Policing Teams, but welcomed and valued [as well]' (O'Neill and McCarthy 2014: 147). In the port, however, only managers are considered by participants to benefit from these partnerships, while they themselves feel confronted with power asymmetries they would not have been confronted with otherwise, whilst they are expected to cooperatively construct port security together. This tainted quay-level multi-agency in the port securityscape is thus an antithesis, a critique of pure neoliberal (t)reason. They cope with their frustration by othering the multi-agency partners and summing up their weaknesses, through which one's own strengths become clear and the asymmetry neutralised; the Self through othering, once more, becomes a resistant Self.

In these multi-agency partnerships, the participants police and secure for the port companies and their dockers, truckers, and shipping companies and their ship crews. All of these are familiar Others through which the participants further (re)establish a Self, as Chapter 4 revealed. These Others revealed that port police officers have (to have) a forced commercial customer-friendly Self, feeling pressured into interrupting the port industrial activities as little as possible. Security officers, especially those placed within the port companies, feel more connection with the port companies they serve than with their own security company, to the extent they prevent their customer from spending too much money on their security company despite the fact they consider port company owners arrogant. The customer as Other in need, as incidental (Beauvoir 2007) in the port securityscape, allows the participants to (re)establish a saviour Self, but not in the way one would expect from policing and security actors, that is to say by protecting port companies against crime and insecurity, which is their original duty. Instead, it is established through delivering, primarily, commercial flexibility and secondarily (or instead of) actual security. *That* saviour Self is not necessarily safeguarding their meaningful Self.

All the participants argue the ISPS Code has affected the port business community and they demonise USA foreign policies of global control through maritime security. Still, the ISPS Code has improved their port security, which makes their port appealing for foreign companies to invest in, according to port police officers. The ISPS Code, according to security officers, has required port companies to have (more) security officers but not because they wanted to. Security officers feel they do not generate any profit and consider 'this [port] market as a realm of reticent consumers, who in the main spend reactively and reluctantly, place security concerns low among organizational priorities and in the organizational hierarchy and take price-sensitive, quality-insensitive purchasing decisions' (Goold et al 2010: 14); it leaves the security officers feeling insignificant and that their jobs is on the line. In reaction, to stay contracted, they provide

additional cleaning services, even though these might frustrate their security tasks. In other words, the securitisation has forced the participant's to become commercialist, an aspect they condemn.

Even in othering dockers and truckers it became clear that participants affiliate with them, though they are tasked to enforce port security regulations upon them, for example, when they strike. However, the frustration of dockers and truckers is well understood; the police and security officers share their fate of poor working situations and managerialist authoritarianism, illuminating bottom-up solidarity and even 'acceptance of anarchism […] in the form of strikes' (Jensen 1964: 220). Meaning, the Others the port police officers and security officers ought to police and control, to safeguard the big Other (Žižek 2006)—being the global trade and the port business community—is the audience they *want to* police and secure for, by, to a degree, policing and securing *against* that big Other. Through these Others a Self is (re)established that contains occupational pride, even if the truckers and dockers may transgress and disrespect them (cf. Sanne 2008; Patterson et al. 2008).

That divide between *having to* provide port security to benefit companies, which affects their sense of duty, and *wanting to* benefit those employed in operations of those companies to retrieve a sense of duty, became especially clear in the participants' othering of shipping companies, their ships and their crews, as Chapter 5 showed. The participants vilify big brand shipping companies for stealing their nation's flag from ships and their exploitation of lower ranked staff through the FOC system. When going aboard, inspections and visits are focused on trivial matters and their main aim is not to criminalise crew members and making it hard(er) for crews; they already are suffering from a rough life at sea, which many participants have experienced themselves when they worked as crew members. They therefore understood the crews and their sometimes grumpy attitude and transgressive behaviour. Their work is therefore mainly about preventing delays and keeping costs as low as possible for crews. In short, participants tolerate transgressions by dockers, truckers and lower-ranked (especially Filipino) crew members exploited by the maritime industry that exploits cheap labour. So, whereas maritimeness can cause a divide amongst colleagues (who do not have a maritime background), it leads in this case to strong solidarity with, in fact, compassion for the lower-ranked seafarer population. The mutually shared call of the sea the participants share with the seafarers transcends the call of policing and security related duty; a sector-related call that is most likely not to be found (as strongly present as) in many other police and security domains, such as, for example, airports (Lippert and O'Connor 2003; Maguire 2014), hospitals (Patterson et al. 2008) or shopping centres (Manzo 2004).

That maritimeness-based sympathy and solidarity with crews configures the port culture that rages against the capitalist market rationalities that they are supposed to protect. Still, this resistance can go only as far as trade allows them, because at the end of the day the global trade show must go on and they have to keep foreign investment coming in by offering a secure port where port and shipping companies are safe from financial risks of high fines and rising anchorage fees due to delay; as well as from the unfamiliar, risky Other.

The risky, unfamiliar Others are stowaways, port thieves, drug smugglers and terrorists. They are rarely if ever encountered; but this Other is 'real' in the participants' impressions from stories shared with their familiar Other, from risk analyses and from politicised media representations of immigration, crime and terrorism. These risky Others, most of the time the marginalised and oppressed groups, in particular illegal immigrants, the unemployed, the poor, non-whites, criminals and terrorists (Lupton 1999), are generally considered to bring forward a powerful Self (Said 1979). Especially in times of crisis (Joffe 2012), such as today's perpetual austerity, a negative othering is amplified; a type of other that already is prevalent police and security occupational cultures (Loyens 2009; Reiner 2010). However, othering in the port securityscape is more nuanced, resulting in a diverse, if not conflicted and powerless Self.

This conflicted Self is (re)established through the stowaway, the port thief and drug smuggler. These specific Others of the port securityscape are invisible Others who they police and secure against, as they have (almost) never encountered a stowaway, port thief or drug smuggler. Stowaways are a difficult issue and are mostly talked about in awkward conversations. Stereotyped as African refugees escaping from war torn areas, this risky Other poses, if anything, a financial risk to ship and port companies. Quantified—thus dehumanised—through risk-analyses, threat-assessments, ISPS Code measures and preventative policies, the stowaway risk needs to be kept as low as possible to reduce the financial costs for the shipping and port industry. This powerful industry has no interest in the stowaway's sometimes horrendous circumstances, but the participants do; because at quay-level, participants see the face of the defeated stowaway (families) and indirectly the situations they have fled in risking life-threatening sea journeys and inhumane treatment after being discovered. The deep regrets about these sufferings reveals a humanitarian Self. To cope with stowaway misery and proceed with their work though, they seem to let the financial risk for port and shipping companies overshadow the stowaway's horrific fate, making them agents of denial (Cohen 2001). This inherently meaningful yet conflicted Self contradicts that police and security actors hold strong (racist) prejudices towards those seen as criminal and risky (Reiner 2010: 128–131) and evidences that the port securityscape is anything but an 'ideal breeding place for excessive

suspicion and mistrust' (Loyens 2009: 474). In fact, whereas austerity ought to increase a powerful, hostile 'division between a decorous, righteous "us" and a disruptive, transgressive "them"' (Joffe 2012: 742), the participants do not imbue the stowaway Other with devalued properties, while, however, still (re)establishing a righteous Self but not necessarily a superior Self. This, while these participant do get—sporadically though—confronted with actual stowaway immigrants who are commonly outcast by the general public as criminal instead. It again illustrates the idiosyncratic nature of the port compared to other sites subjected to security and securitisation.

The port thief too allows for not the (re)establishment of a powerful, but instead of an inferior, powerless Self that regrets port thieves are not the (supposedly) once-familiar and friendly figure; now they are cast as mostly foreign, IT-skilled, professional and potentially lethal. Port thieves could be anybody, including dockers, and are hard to catch. This leaves police and security officers without options and powerless, causing especially security officers to not take any action; personal safety comes first. So goes for the drug smuggler as risky Other, through which, once again, a powerless Self is (re)established because, firstly, drug smugglers are not their responsibility but that of customs agencies and they are only there to prevent. Secondly, they see prevention as useless, because drugs will remain an everlasting issue due to global consumption and the cunning modi operandi of resourceful smugglers. Their sense of duty, which consists of preventing and fighting (transnational) crime, diminishes, as the thieving and drug smuggling Others have become faceless and powerful, reflecting the participants' uncertainty about what or who to secure (against), while increasing their fears and feelings of insecurity and making them wonder who or what they really produce port security for (Bauman 2006).

Altogether, the stowaway, port thief and drug smuggler are cast as unfamiliar, risky Others and as strangers that are obscure, unpredictable and insolvable (Hudson 2009). They reveal a Self that is in denial, powerless towards and defeatist about controlling and reducing those unfamiliar Others' activities. So, if anything, the stowaway enables them to see, even 'across the borders' of humanity, whereas the port thief 'steals' and the drug smuggler 'exports' the participants' occupational power, meaning and confidence.

Chapter 7 discusses what the unfamiliar, terrorist Other tells us about the participants' Self. These post-9/11, Islamophobic times have created the perfect Others of the global West. Therefore, expectedly, in the port securityscapes of Rotterdam and Hamburg, especially *because* they are at the (in)security forefront, the participants must 'fear or [feel] hatred of Islam and its followers', othering them as 'inferior to the West, barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist […]

violent, aggressive, threatening [and] supportive of terrorism' (Eid and Karim 2014: 107) that altogether would therefore lead—baring the othering's flipside-logic in mind here—to the participants' (re)establishment of a Western superior, civilised, rational, sophisticated, impartial, non-violent, peaceful and kind Self, or, if anything, a Self that is unsupportive of terrorism.

The complete absence of any terrorist related activity though leaves participants with only media representations, making them consider terrorists to be brainwashed with Islamic fundamentalist ideology seeking death and destruction for publicity. The terrorist Other reveals a Self of participants that feels excluded from the War on Terror, the very war that spawned the ISPS Code, yet is not fought in their port securityscapes. The port securityscape, in fact, remains rather boring and terrorless, which, together with the sporadically encountered stowaway, faceless port thief and omnipotent but invisible drug smuggler, makes this site different from policing and security realities in particularly the urban environment where, participants feel, crime and terror are (more) prevalent; there, the War on Terror makes (more) sense. The maritimeness that lures them and makes them proud of working in the port, is something that— they secretively hope—could or should lure terrorists as well. However, that very maritimeness is the exact reason why terrorist attacks on the maritime domain are almost non-existent, because there 'the level of media impact can often be much less than those committed on land where more people are aware of, or in close vicinity to, the target location' (Guy 2002: 2). The maritimeness that makes the participants feel meaningful, makes them simultaneously endure meaninglessness through terrorlessness, as it confronts the participants with their non-existent role in the War on Terror (cf. Bataille 1986[1957]); theirs is really an individual war on terrorlessness, on job anxiety, on boredom and on occupational insignificance. This unique maritime site of theirs can be uniquely boring for them.

Still, as they reason, the port could be an attractive site to attack (even more so than a city), as becomes clear in the scripted terrorist scenarios of the participants, allowing them to (re)establish a significant occupational Self; they enjoy scripting terrorist scenarios together. Especially the more sophisticated terrorist scenarios are construed with each other, revealing that the participants do not necessarily follow the popular opinion about, in particular, "Islamic" fundamentalist terrorism, being low-tech and merely brutal. In scripting these, they escape the port securityscape of job insecurity and routinised, uneventful daily work. They socialise and are unified with each other by their imaginary common (and thus communalising) enemy. They derived meaning from scripting successful terrorist scenarios they have not experienced; these scenarios include them and their port as an important site, the destruction of which could affect the global supply chain and economy. They seem to, in a remarkably paradoxical manner, *invite*

terrorism, reflecting a Self that is rather unconsciously supportive of terrorism, instead of fighting it.

Indeed, considered that way, and in the words of the ancient Greek philosopher Horace, *sapere aude* (Horace and Bailey 2013: 256), I dare to reason that the terrorist Other is as much as 'suitable enemy' as it is a freedom fighter for the participants; a risky Other who liberates the Self of port police and security officers out of their daily frontline war on occupational anxiety, exploitation, boredom and insignificance; this is a war on everlasting job tediousness and frustration, while serving neoliberal rationalities that are the real sources of harm for the participants. The terrorist's sense of belonging to a group and fulfilling a higher goal in life is mirrored in the belonging and purposefulness their Self seeks through securing against terror. Hence, we might carefully conclude that the guardians of the port securityscape have more in common with their never-encountered enemy than they might realise or will ever admit to.

All in all, the overall conclusion is that street-level port police and security officers in the port securityscape, protecting the neoliberal State and aggressively commercialist market at their frontline, are themselves victims of such neoliberalism and commercialism. They resist but yield to its power, enabling them to existentially wield power. They submissively serve yet resist global capitalism's excesses, polarising populist and xenophobic politics, the hypersecuritisation that 'exaggerate[s] threats […] to resort to excessive countermeasures' (Buzan 2004: 172), through which they (passively) cultivate and challenge exclusion and dehumanisation in the port securityscape. The street-level port security community and the identities shaped there, therefore reveal how *port security that must protect this vital glocal site of transport, is tainted instead of merely advanced by current tendencies of neoliberalism-inspired, marketised securitisation.*

These perversions of the post-9/11 neoliberal State and commercialist market have been worsened since the financial crisis in 2008, increasing occupational anxiety, boredom and meaningless. The participants' identities are therefore deeply challenged, armoured and robust, breeding and feeding their will to resist hegemonic state-corporate power they ought to serve. In their identity formation, they (re)establish a meaningful occupational Self that embodies a persistence of an age-old (if not quite revived) port culture of counter-managerialism and anti-authoritarianism; anti-careerism and egalitarianism; multi-agency rivalry and labour solidarity; anti-capitalism and humanitarianism; and, finally, a Self in search of group belonging and a higher purpose (Mah 2014: 177).

8.2 Impact

This final section will focus on the wider impact of this research by listing a number of contributions and implications of this thesis. The focus shall be put on the advances for (cultural) criminology, ethnography, (critical) security studies and maritime studies.

The first contribution is an epistemological critique on being critical and, because this thesis is inspired by and embedded in key cultural criminological ideas, specifically on (the culture of) cultural criminology. This, to make this field of criminological inquiry more robust. To do so, we have to return to page 13:

> It is impossible to shed light upon the deepest abysses of the human soul such as it is revealed in ports, if one shrinks from hard facts (Fischer 1927: 13 (cited in Van Hooydonk 2006: 4)).

The quote implies that in order to discover human nature, one must go to the port where the darkest, harshest sides of humanity are exposed. In so doing with this thesis, I gave a group of people a voice that is generally silenced by their superiors and ignored by outsider audiences in general, but also condemned by critical and especially cultural criminologists. This exposé denotes that cultural criminological research *is* possible in environments and amongst groups of people who execute power and who are usually merely criticised by critical and cultural criminologists for partaking in the oppressive state-corporate regimes.

Some of the key thinkers of cultural criminology seem to instead romanticise offenders as victims of the State (Tierney 2010) and tend to be (pre)occupied with subcultural deviance and crime analyses that reflect a rather 'gendered' focus by cultural criminology (Groombridge 2006; O'Neill and Seal 2012); a gendered focus this study, admittedly, has replicated to an extent due to difficulties surrounding male dominance in the port securityscapes and me being male. Moreover, cultural criminologists seem to fashion 'a knockabout style of satire and ridicule' of mainstream criminology (Garland 2012: 419) and do not necessarily foster an analytical but rather a political orientation towards the wider criminal justice system (O'Brien 2005). That suggests that critical, cultural criminology would rather side with the oppressed 'sheep' and condemn the oppressive neoliberal 'wolves'.

Any real attempt to empathetically and critically understand those who are 'in power' has been avoided. All of this is happening, while a type of champagne socialist cultural criminology thrives on its deviant knowledge that perhaps comes from the scripted streets and subcultural scenes (Ferrell, Hayward and Young 2008) but is mostly if not merely shared within the elitist academic environment of lecture halls, symposia and conferences. It is also a commodified deviant

knowledge, only accessible via expensive, jargonistic online journals and via costly books purchasable at E-commercial bookstores, which excludes the very street that cultural criminology uses for researching systematic exclusion (Young 1999).

Such a (hypo)critical criminology must be broken with for many reasons, and on many levels. Or, as Hallsworth so rightly pointed out:

> Cultural criminologists need to study the culture and edgework of the state and its workers with same diligence and verve they extend towards studying the edgework of those who engage in extreme sports (2006: 149).

If we are to problematise the everyday tyranny of the surveillance society, policing brutality and the capitalist security market, then we must also talk and walk with the everyday people made responsible for it; we must become the sheep in wolf's clothing and be amongst the wolves, in the immediacy of control and security—feeling what authoritarian power means for those who wield it. Here, we may discover neoliberalism has a face and behind that face is a person with a heart and with critical thoughts. As this thesis illuminates, worker realities within the hegemony are more nuanced than is often suggested by cultural criminology that thus far has been (ethnographically) preoccupied with the receiving end of neoliberal policing and security (cf. Ferrell 1996; Hamm 1992). In other words, we must wander around at street-level scripted scenes of security, instead of merely exploring the securitised realities of the exploited street. Here, an inherent critique of hegemonic oppression by the oppressors can be found, such as in the port securityscape, and then a real (not just hoped for) change can be made.

Then again, perhaps discovering such nuanced and diverse social realities inside the state-corporate realms is too controversial and too difficult to be confronted with, if it might prove not being in line with current cultural criminological philosophies and strategies. This is, however, an assumption. An assumption that has become less credible by this study, because this study embodies—like (and because of) the port police and security officers embodying a critique from within on (port) security—a critique from within on cultural criminology. Therefore, this study should be considered an attempt, *an invitation* if you like, to a (more) introspective, self-reflexive cultural criminology, aiming to advance itself and show its real strength.

If cultural criminology truly wants to revolutionise criminology, it need not to claim novelty—a claim that has been considered rather premature (Spencer 2011: 209-210)—but it should move beyond previous critical criminologies by initiating (self-reflexive) analyses of a wide range and

variety of those 'in power', and by understanding them to eventually facilitate that verstehen to enrich cultural criminological critique. This is possible, as this ethnography has testified to.

Second of all, this research contributes to the recent and rising methodological development of anthropology and (critical) security studies in the securityscape (Albro et al. 2012; Schuilenburg 2015, 2012). My use of ethnography enabled me to get up close and personal with those whose professions reconfigure a securityscape at the frontline, through which I gained very detailed and rich insights in the everyday banality of a securityscape. Given the global hypersecuritisation drift (Buzan 2004), such securityscapes will likely increase in size and in forms, and so will the demand for critical ethnographies in order to counter-balance the oppressive State and market rationalities behind them. This critical ethnography in a securityscape can be read alongside (a scarce number of) other critical ethnographies in securityscapes (e.g. Bajc and De Lint 2011; Dror 2007; Goldstein 2010a, 2010b; Konopinski 2009; Ochs 2011); university courses and modules could include these rich works to teach about the everyday in which more of life is securitised, as well as about how to gain research access to that everyday enacted security. Chapter 2 in particular reveals the practical and ethical issues revolving around securityscape agencies and social actors and the specific strategies required in order to reach into and be trusted by these hidden communities at the street-level securityscape. The physical and cultural boundaries of securityscapes can be overcome, to which my fieldwork attested and from which the necessary lessons should be drawn what to do, and what to not do. In line with being a securityscape ethnography, this thesis construed an ethnography of humans in the marine environment. Meaning, a field closely connected to ethnography, namely maritime anthropology, can learn from, firstly, the interaction between security actors and the waterfront, and, secondly, between the interaction between security actors and the global seafaring population.

Finally, next to the social scientific fields of (cultural) criminology, ethnography and critical security studies, there are relevant implications of this research for the field of maritime studies. Maritime studies is interdisciplinary by nature, consisting of a kaleidoscope of disciplines, being primarily oceanography, maritime archaeology, maritime history, transport logistics, navigation, maritime engineering, economics and law (Barnes and Parkins 2002; Lee and Song 2015). Criminology, however, has neither actively presented itself as relevant *for*, nor has it been paid attention to *by* maritime studies. Clearly, as this thesis demonstrates, criminology and maritime studies should have been in the same boat, but both missed it. Their intersection makes sense. This criminological thesis contributes to maritime studies by the lessons that can be drawn from the social realities of port security.

As has been revealed, port police officers and security officers deal with job-related pressures, anxieties and insecurity, while performing at key positions in global trade. Aggressive managerialism hits staff with austerity-based policies and working conditions that cause (further) occupational anxiety and meaninglessness, which they, in turn, attempt to resist. Ironically, that resistance though might become the very danger in ports for which they are employed to prevent from happening. Out of resistance against management they do not feel the need to work with a sense of duty and that might lead to carelessness on the job. In this case, it has the potential to let insecure and unsafe situations go too far (e.g. tolerating dockers' speeding in cars on terminals or not paying attention anymore to CCTV monitoring). Moreover, port police and security officers could break the law themselves by turning a blind eye to dockers who are involved in serious organised crime (OM 14th November 2014). Or, even worse, they might become the very risky Other they ought to secure the port against, such as getting involved in drugs trafficking (OM 13th June 2014 and 21st November 2012).

Such transgressions of law and creation of unsafe and insecure situations can affect and have affected the logistical chain of shipping immensely. Therefore, maritime studies could incorporate these findings to come to a better, holistic understanding of how socio-cultural aspects matter for maritime studies, especially when it comes down to the advancement of maritime related labour and logistics, navigation and maritime law.

Appendices

Appendix 1

Core participants

PORT POLICE Hamburg and Rotterdam (N = 28)		
Anonymised name	**Level at time of fieldwork**	**Position at time of fieldwork**
Arnulf	operational	Port police officer (water patrol)
Cornelius	management	Superintendent at port police (border control)
Dean	operational	Port police officer (community policing)
Ferdinand	operational	Port police officer (community policing)
Freimut	operational	Port police officer (environment)
Giselbert	operational	Port police officer (border patrol)
Günter	management	Superintendent at port police
Hendrick	operational	Former police detective inspector
Horstmar	operational	Port police officer (border patrol)
Inkmar	operational	Port police officer (ISPS Code/MARPOL)
Kunibert	operational	Port police officer (border patrol)
Laurens	operational	Port police officer
Lloyd	operational	Port police officer (community policing)
Marcus	operational	Port police officer (community policing)
Maxl	operational	Port police officer
Mischel	operational	Port police officer (border patrol)
Nash	operational	Port police officer pupil
Neal	management/operational	Port police officer (Port Security Officer)
Nicolas	operational	Port police officer (community policing)

Remy	management/operational	Superintendent at port police
Ronny	management	Project manager at port police
Rupertus	operational	Port police officer (dangerous goods)
Sebastian	operational	Port police officer (community policing)
Tyler	operational	Ex-port police officer (community policing)
Warner	operational	Port police officer (navigation)
Wiglaf	operational	Port police officer (dangerous goods)
Xavier	operational	Port police officer (ship engineer)
Zachary	management	Superintendent at port police

SECURITY Hamburg and Rotterdam (N = 32)		
Anonymised name	Level at time of fieldwork	Position at time of fieldwork
Aaron	operational	Former in-house security officer at T9
Abraham	operational	Poseidon Security officer
Arnd	operational	Apollo Security officer at T1
Balthazar	management/operational	Hades Security owner and officer
Bastiaan	management/operational	In-house security investigator and manager at T14
Bernard	operational	Zeus Security officer at T13
Bob	management/operational	Intern at T13
Deiter	operational	Apollo Security officer at T1
Dillon	operational	Hephaestus Security officer at T2
Dustin	management	Hephaestus Security management and consulting
Gijs	operational	Zeus Security officer at T15
Gödeke	operational	Apollo Security officer at T1
Heinrich	operational	Apollo Security officer at T1
Hennig	operational	Apollo Security team leader and officer at T1
James	management/operational	Poseidon Security team leader and officer

Klaus	management/operational	Security manager at T1 and Port Facility Security Officer
Magister	operational	Poseidon Security officer
Manuel	operational	Poseidon Security officer
Marie	operational	Apollo Security officer at T1
Meinart	operational	In-house security coordinator and officer T16
Nikolaus	operational	Apollo Security officer at T1
Piet	operational	Hephaestus Security officer car patrol
Ralph	management	Poseidon Security business manager
Rock	management/operational	Poseidon Security team leader and officer
Sören	operational	Apollo Security officer at T1
Steffie	management/operational	Claims manager at T1
Sturmhard	operational	Apollo Security officer at T1
Teun	operational	Hades Security officer at T3
Thoralf	operational	Apollo Security team leader and officer at T1
Wesley	operational	Hephaestus Security officer patrol
Wijerd	operational	Poseidon Security officer
Wilbert	management/operational	In-house site security coordinator at T13 and Port Facility Security Officer

Non-core participants

PORT POLICE Grangemouth and Glasgow (N = 3)		
Anonymised name	Level at time of fieldwork	Position at time of fieldwork
Sylvester	operational	Port police officer (community policing)
Jim	operational	Police officer (riverside)
Basil	operational	Police officer (riverside)

CUSTOMS Hamburg and Rotterdam (N = 10)		
Anonymised name	Level at time of fieldwork	Position at time of fieldwork
Blasius	management	Customs officer (head of container inspections)

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Claes	operational	Customs officer (diver)
Edward	operational	Customs officer (shipper)
Gerrit	operational	Customs officer (shipper)
Lioba	operational	Customs officer (control unit)
Louis	operational	Customs officer (team leader)
Lucas	operational	Customs officer (team leader)
Rainhardt	operational	Customs officer (control unit)
Sonny	operational	Customs officer (shipper)
Wedig	operational	Customs officer (container inspector)

| MISCELLANEOUS (N = 12)		
Anonymised name	Level at time of fieldwork	Position at time of fieldwork
Godfried	management	Boatmen Safety & Security expert
Henry	management/operational	Water taxi
Jake	management	Port legislation and law enforcement manager
Joris	management	Security R&D business consultant
Luthor	management	Academic researcher
Marius	management	Security R&D business consultant
Mitchel	management	Boatmen director
Nigel	management/operational	Academic researcher
Pankraz	management	Security R&D business consultant
Radcliff	management	Shipping agent at SC3
Richard	management	Port authorities security coordinator
Soliman	management/operational	Shipping agent at SC2

Visited places, ships, shipping companies and security companies

TERMINALS (N = 19)	
T1	Container
T2	Mixed
T3	Dry bulk
T4	Metal
T5	Container
T6	Container
T7	Dry bulk
T8	Container
T9	Fruit
T10	Mixed
T11	Shipbuilding and repair
T12	Dry bulk
T13	Petrochemical
T14	Petrochemical
T15	Petrochemical
T16	Cruise
T17	Metal
T18	Ferry
T19	Waste

PUBLIC AUTHORITY STATIONS (N = 10)	
PA1	Port police
PA2	Port police
PA3	Port police
PA4	Port police
PA5	Police
PA6	Port police
PA7	Customs
PA8	Customs
PA9	Customs
PA10	Port authorities

SHIPS (N = 19)		Length and type (see next page for different vessel sizes)
S1	Dry bulk	218m; Coastal Tanker
S2	Port police	30m; Patrol Vessel
S3	Cargo	335m; Post Panamax Plus
S4	Cargo	281m; Panamax Max
S5	Cargo	215m; Fully Cellular
S6	Cargo	366m; Post New Panamax
S7	Cargo	151m; Early Containerships
S8	Port police	20m; Search and Rescue
S9	Cargo	277m; Post Panamax
S10	Passenger	251m; n/a
S11	Customs	8m; RHIB
S12	Cargo	176m; Fully Cellular
S13	Port police	25m; Patrol Vessel
S14	Customs	20m; Search and Rescue
S15	Cargo	306m; Post Panamax Plus
S16	Dry bulk	97m; (unknown)
S17	Cargo	275m; Post Panamax
S18	Cargo	334; Post New Panamax
S19	Cargo	366; Post New Panamax

Figure 9.1: Containership sizes

(Ashar and Rodrigue 2012:
https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch3en/conc3en/img/containerships.png).

Figure 9.2: General Bulk carrier sizes

(Maritime Connector 2014: http://maritime-connector.com/images/tankersizes-16-wiki-18886.jpg).

SHIPPING COMPANIES (N = 5)	
SC1	Cargo
SC2	Undersea construction
SC3	Ro-Ro cargo
SC4	Cruise
SC5	Cargo

SECURITY COMPANIES (N = 15)	GEOGRAPHICAL COVERAGE
Apollo Security	Interlocal
Ares Security	Global
Artemis Security	Global
Athena Security	National
Dionysos Security	International
Hades Security	National
Hephaestus Security	National
Hera Security	National
Hercules Security	International
Hermes Security	Local
Hypnos Security	Local
Perseus Security	National
Pontus Security	National
Poseidon Security	National
Zeus Security	Global

Appendix 2

Email approach

Dear …

I'm writing to see if you'd be interested in participating with my research project. My name is Yarin Eski and I'm a PhD student at the University of Glasgow, more specifically at the Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research/SCCJR (http://sccjr.ac.uk/staff/Mr-Yarin-Eski/325). I'm writing my dissertation on port security in Glasgow (Scotland - UK), Hamburg (Germany) and Rotterdam (The Netherlands) and in which way port security personnel is dealing with insecurities in their daily work lives, and where best-practices and complexities can be located.

In the below I provide information about what I aim to do and my reasons for the expected research goals. I'd be grateful if you had a read, and considered being involved. If you have any questions, don't hesitate to ask, I'm happy to discuss the project further before you decide if you want to take part. My contact details are at the end of the information sheet below.

Thank you for your time and attention to read the information sheet.

Yarin Eski.

Information sheet

Harbouring Global Insecurities: Constructing Security in Transnational Spaces[21]

Personal information on and reasons for this research
I'm a 26 year old student living in Glasgow. I obtained my Masters of Science in Criminology at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, The Netherlands. During my studies, as I lived in Rotterdam, I developed a big interest in the Rotterdam port. I discovered during my studies, criminological research on port crime and port security is scare to non-existent. I felt the need to have a closer look on port life, criminologically, and thus initiated this research.

By analysing social realms of seaport security in Clydeport, Port of Rotterdam and Port of Hamburg I want to shed light on how workers control and eliminate transnational insecurities at national port borders. It will contribute to a critical engagement within the prioritised theorisation of the globalised security society and of security consumerism.

Your involvement in this research
I am hoping to interview approximately 50 people who are involved in the port security. If you agree to take part in the study, you will be asked to participate in an interview lasting about (half) an hour. This will take place in respectively at either your workplace, the SCCJR office in Glasgow, at Erasmus School of Law in Rotterdam or at the Institute for Criminological Research in Hamburg. The interview will take place at a convenient time for you. If you agree, I will use a digital recorder to record the interview.

I would like to talk to you about (some of) the following topics:
- Why you started to work in the port security/policing.

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[21] This was the official working title at the time of fieldwork and therefore presented as such to the participants.

- What your experiences are in the port security/policing; what has changed when you began.
- Your attitude towards crime and insecurity in general.
- How you appreciate your colleagues and teams involved in securing/policing the port.
- What the outside world thinks of ports (and their security).
- What you think a due, secure port should entail and where improvements should be made.

If we can manage to cover all these topics, that would be excellent. If not, I want you to know that the most important part for me is to learn about your motivation and experiences to secure the port in a daily basis.

It would be also of great help to see how your work and the activities in it, has influenced your attitude towards insecurity and changes have occurred or not.

Let me be clear on the matter that you don't have to answer any question you don't want to, and you can stop the interview any time. If there's anything you don't want me to include in my project, please do let me know and I'll remove it straight away.

Your answers and what will happen to them

First of all, you and all your answers will be anonymised in my dissertation. The raw data that consists of the notes I took and the possible digital recording of the interview, will be kept in a password protected folder on my computer, and only I can access it. All information will be treated as absolutely confidential unless you reveal details of harm to yourself or that you are causing harm to others. The final dissertation is only seen by my supervisor and a second marker at Glasgow University. If you would like to do so, I can offer you to have a look at the transcripts of your interview for review and correction of inaccuracies.

Any other questions or concerns

The study has been approved by the College of Social Sciences Ethics Committee at the University of Glasgow. If you have questions about the research, you can contact me at the details below:

Yarin Eski
Telephone: +44(0) 758 0413447
Email: y.eski.1@research.gla.ac.uk

If you have any concerns about the conduct of this research, you can contact my dissertation supervisor, Prof Fergus McNeill, as follows:

Telephone: +44 (0) 141 3305075
Email: F.McNeill@lbss.gla.ac.uk

Informed consent form (English format)

Harbouring Global Insecurities: Constructing Security in Transnational Spaces[22]

Researcher: Yarin Eski, 2011-2013, Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research; University of Glasgow (http://www.sccjr.ac.uk/staff/Mr-Yarin-Eski/325)

I confirm that I have read and understand the letter and information (sheet) about the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.

I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason.

I confirm that the information I give in the interview will be anonymised and reference to me as an individual will be removed. The data will only be used for the stated research purposes.

I agree to not to share any personal and other identifiable information of other participants in this research I am familiar with, with third parties.

At the time of participating in this research, I am aged 18 or older.

I agree/do not agree (delete as applicable) to take part in this research.

I agree/do not agree (delete as applicable) to my interview being recorded.

Name of participant: _____
Date of birth (dd-mm-yyyy): ____-____-_____
Date (dd-mm-yyyy): ____-____-_____
Signature: _____

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[22] This was the original working title at the time of fieldwork and therefore presented as such to the participants.

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