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The Nature of War and its Impact on Society during the Barons’ War, 1264-67

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Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

This thesis examines the nature of war and its impact on society in the English civil war, known as the Barons’ War, which was waged from 1264-67 between King Henry III and a baronial opposition led by Simon de Montfort, earl of Leicester. This is the first dedicated major study of the civil war as a war rather than as a political or constitutional event. While several of the war’s important campaigns have received individual study, the broader issues of the war, like the state and use of castles and town defences, guerrilla warfare and the impact of these on society have not received the same attention. Military history in general has received comparatively little study from the early to mid-thirteenth century and this thesis seeks to examine potential military developments between the civil war of 1215-17; the wars of Edward I in the late-thirteenth century and the Barons’ War’s possible impact upon these. Chapter one contextualizes the military experience and the types of men engaged in the civil war; the methods of recruitment and the general ‘customs of war’. This discussion will inform the discussion in the rest of the thesis. While castles were a crucial aspect of medieval warfare their role in 1263-1267 remains little studied, despite a considerable body of surviving documentation relating to them. Chapter two will therefore focus on the role, state and struggle for control of castles, particularly royal castles on the eve of the war. Chapter three will examine their use and effectiveness in warfare, the techniques and problems of besieging them and, in particular, will utilize a number of illustrative case studies of major sieges in the conflict. The fourth chapter will examine the previously unexamined role of town defences in the war, particularly their state and effectiveness. In chapter five, the thesis will bring a fresh focus by discussing the use of the wilderness by both sides as a tool of resistance, with its principal focus on the war waged by the Disinherited after the battle of Evesham until 1267 and its impact and significance. The final chapter examines the nature of warfare at a very local level, exploring how the issues and events described in the former chapters impacted on communities and also more local participation in waging war as well as examining the blurred lines between warfare and crime. The appendices include a discussion of the involvement of Robert de Ferrers, earl of Derby in the largely unexplored events of the siege of Gloucester in 1264.
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I would like to also thank my parents, brother, sister, their other halves and the four recent arrivals for their unfailing encouragement and support, despite the odd look of blank eyed confusion I may have induced when describing what it is I study.
Author’s Declaration

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.

Signature ______________________________

Printed name ______________________________
Abbreviations


CIM, i  Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous 1219-1307, ed. H. C. Maxwell Lyte, 2 vols (H.M.S.O., 1916), i.

CIPM  Calendar of Inquisitions Post Mortem, (H.M.S.O., 1904-).

CLR  Calendar of Liberate Rolls (H.M.S.O., 1916-).

CPR  Calendar of Patent Rolls (H.M.S.O., 1906-).

CR  Close Rolls, Henry III (H.M.S.O., 1902-).


Dodsworth | Oxford, Bodleian Library M.S. Dodsworth. 40.


EHR | English Historical Review


Flores | Flores Historiarum, ed. H.R. Luard, 3 vols (Rolls ser., 1890).


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**NB:** All archival references refer to the National Archives in Kew unless otherwise stated.
Introduction

This thesis aims to provide the first dedicated study of the nature of warfare during the Barons’ War of 1263-1267, and its impact on society. While this will involve discussion of the military and political significance of the major battles of Lewes, 1264, and Evesham, 1265, I have chosen not to include specific analysis of the engagements themselves, as these have already been the subject of detailed scholarly study. Rather the focus will be on the wider aspects of the war which to date have attracted far less study.¹ The first chapter will contextualize the military experience and the types of men engaged in the civil war alongside methods of recruitment and the general ‘customs of war’. The castle was a key aspect of medieval warfare, but its role in the hostilities of 1263-1267 remains little studied, despite the survival of a considerable body of relevant documentation. Chapters two and three will therefore, utilising a number of illustrative case studies, examine the state of royal and seigneurial castles on the eve of the war, their use and effectiveness in warfare, together with the techniques and problems of besieging them.² The fourth chapter will examine the hitherto unexplored role of the towns and their defences during the war. In chapter five, the thesis will provide a fresh focus to the study by examining the waging of war without castles, particularly the use of the wilderness by both the royalists and Montfortians, with special focus on the war waged by the Disinherited after the battle of Evesham until 1267. The final chapter examines the nature of warfare at a very local level, exploring how the issues and events described in the former chapters impacted on communities and also more local participation in waging war as well as examining the blurred lines between warfare and crime. A case study examining the involvement of Robert de Ferrers, earl of Derby in the siege of Gloucester in 1264 is given as an appendix. The conclusion will bring the above discussions together and will also examine the wider questions surrounding the development of the war as a military conflict and its shape in comparison to preceding civil wars.

² I will use the term seigneurial in preference to comital or baronial during this thesis as this term encapsulates all levels noble society and many of the issues discussed here are general to the nobility unless otherwise stated.
The Barons’ War in Historiography

The war between Henry III and a powerful group of magnates demanding reform, traditionally known as the Barons’ War, has attracted an extensive historiography. From the pioneering work of Blaauw, to the detailed studies of Powicke, Jacob and Treharne, the primary focus was on the constitutional significance of the Provisions of Oxford in the development of representative institutions, while new generations of scholars such as Carpenter, Maddicott, Stacey, Ridgeway and Jobson have helped contextualise the conflict within a radically revised understanding of faction and the nature of political power in thirteenth-century England.  

Yet the nature of the war more broadly and its impact on society has received far less attention. In terms of military history, the Barons’ War finds only brief treatment in the major survey works of medieval warfare. Several individual campaigns have received more detailed attention.

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5 C.H. Knowles, ‘The Disinherited 1265-1280: A Political and Social Study of the Supporters of Simon de Montfort and the resettlement after the Barons’ War’, (unpublished Ph.D., University of Wales, 1959). Though containing a good general account of the war, however, Knowles’ focus was not military.

6 The focus of Sir C.W.C. Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, A.D. 378-1515, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1885) and Sir C.W.C. Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, 2 vols (London: Methuen, 1924 2nd ed.) was primarily on battle, and he concentrated on the battles of Lewes and Evesham themselves, rather than the war as a whole. Understandably, the war of 1263-1267 finds only brief mention in F. Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages:
particularly the crucial battles of Lewes and Evesham by Carpenter, the battle of Northampton by Treharne and the campaigns of Roger Leybourne by Lewis. 7 A similar treatment of the war as a whole is still lacking and many smaller, yet in many ways no less significant conflicts such as the sieges of Gloucester and Pevensey have gone without full study. In particular, the role of castles and their use in the war has largely gone unexamined. 8 This absence is perhaps most surprising as the amount of available material for the 1260s is far higher than it is for the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. R. A. Brown’s seminal analysis of Angevin royal castle building policy ends in 1217, and was continued by Eales up to 1224. 9 Wild’s article on the siege of Kenilworth in 1266 remains, however, the only dedicated study of the role of a castle and its garrison during the war. 10

The absence of such studies reflects the comparative neglect of English warfare from 1225 until the Welsh Wars of Edward I in 1270s-80s. For while the loss of Normandy in 1202-1204 and the invasion of Prince Louis and the war of 1215-17 have received detailed analysis, major studies

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of warfare in the thirteenth century tend to concentrate on the reign of Edward I.\textsuperscript{11} The principal exception, Walker’s study of the Welsh wars of Henry III, which provides an excellent overview of those campaigns and the organisation of English armies during Henry’s reign, remains unpublished. The 1260s have received no studies comparable to, for example, Watson or Cornell’s work on Edwardian castle garrisons in Scotland during the Scottish wars, or Simpkin’s examination of the role and recruitment of the aristocracy in Edwardian armies.\textsuperscript{12}

The study of town fortifications has undergone an important renewal over the past two decades, with the original pioneering work of Turner now revised and expanded by Palliser, Creighton and Higham, who have radically reshaped our understanding of the nature of town defences.\textsuperscript{13} In contrast, however, to continental scholarship on the role of cities and towns in warfare, English towns remain understudied.\textsuperscript{14}

Several aspects of the war have already attracted some discussion. Jacob’s detailed work on the legal records of the period of reform and rebellion provides important insights into the methods of waging war and its effects in localities. Although elderly, it has remained the foundation for further work in this field by Carpenter on the peasantry and King on clerical violence during the war.\textsuperscript{15} The one area in which the military dimension of Henry III’s reign has been well studied is in the terms

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\textsuperscript{14} M.Wolfe, Walled Towns and the shaping of France: From the Medieval to the Early Modern Era, (Chippenham and Eastbourne: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009).

of service and recruitment of forces, most particularly knights.\textsuperscript{16} Michael Powicke’s \textit{Military Obligation in Medieval England}, for example, devotes two chapters to knight service under Henry III as well as to the reissues and modifications of the Assize of Arms over the course of the reign.\textsuperscript{17} This subject is similarly explored by Critchley, Waugh and Jones while much recent work has been done on the recruitment of retinues by Simpkin and Spencer for the reign of Edward I.\textsuperscript{18}

A military study of the Barons’ War provides a valuable case study of mid-thirteenth century English warfare, building on the work of Walker and providing a link to research conducted on the Edwardian campaigns later in the century. The aim of this thesis therefore is to provide a dedicated look at the war through a holistic approach. Individual aspects of the conflict, such as castle garrisons and local violence could, with some justification, be treated as separate theses in their own right. The object of this study, however, is to examine how the different aspects of the civil war were inextricably intertwined, and studying these as a whole permits a much clearer view of their impact on society.

\textbf{Sources}

Sources for the period of the Barons’ War fall primarily into two categories, royal administrative sources and narrative accounts, usually contained in monastic chronicles. There is an abundance of English government material, of which a considerable amount has been published. The principal four series of greatest use are the \textit{Patent Rolls}, \textit{Close Rolls}, \textit{Liberate Rolls} and \textit{Fine Rolls}. The first two are the enrolled writs dispatched by the king’s government to its officials and as such are an invaluable source as to the activities of the crown and its perception of events. The \textit{Letters Close} were used for conveying more confidential information than the \textit{Letters Patent}. The \textit{Liberate Rolls} are a record of writs issued concerning the allocation of payments for wages of royal servants and works on castles, manors and supplies. The \textit{Fine Rolls} record the fines due and paid to the king by

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{16} Chapter 1, pp.51-56.
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individuals. A fifth major published record is the *Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous*, a compilation of different inquisitions held by crown officials which were then summarised. These range from court cases concerning homicide to a vital source for the war, the *Inquisitiones de Rebellibus*, a record of rebel lands seized in the aftermath of the battle of Evesham. These records contain many valuable details on the rebels themselves and their actions.\(^{19}\) Much record material, however, remains un-transcribed, unedited and untranslated in the National Archives in Kew. The Pipe Rolls, as yet only published up till 1223, record the payments made to the Exchequer from different counties as well as expenditure by royal officials such as castle constables.\(^{20}\) The *Chancery Miscellanea* series records expenditure by the royal government on a wide variety of subjects, and the *King’s Remembrancer Rolls* contain some surviving campaign expense accounts submitted by royalist generals. The surviving judicial eyres (JUST1) carried out after the war, which sought to punish the rebels in accordance with the Dictum of Kenilworth, are another vital source of information on rebel lands and activities.

The most pertinent points to remember with these sources are that their point of origin is the royal government and as such they are subject to the limitations such a position entails. While some local material does survive in the form of manorial court cases and monastic chronicles, these are vastly outweighed by the amount of surviving royal government records. For example, while we may enjoy a reasonable coverage of sources concerning royal castles, we have virtually nothing on their seigneurial equivalent. These royal records were, however, subject to disruption by the war, particularly in the period from the escape of the Lord Edward in May 1265 until after the battle of Evesham, when the king and Montfort were trapped in the March of Wales. Montfort’s control of the apparatus of royal government after the battle of Lewes also means that the voice we hear in the records from 15 May 1264 until after 4 August 1265 is that of Montfort and his advisers rather than that of the king in whose name they are issued. An act described as being against the peace in this period is therefore likely to be referring to those committed by a royalist, while a reference to that effect on either side of this time period will be likely referencing a Montfortian.


\(^{20}\) An edition of the 1258 Pipe Roll is currently in progress by R. Cassidy.
The principal narrative accounts of the civil war are the Pershore *Flores Historiarum*, the annals of Dunstable priory, the chronicle of Thomas Wykes, the Dover-Canterbury continuations of Gervase of Canterbury, the chronicle of the mayors and sheriffs of London and Robert of Gloucester’s chronicle. The Pershore *Flores Historiarum* is a continuation of Matthew Paris, which as Carpenter has demonstrated was composed for much of the war at the instigation of the abbot of Pershore, Eleurius a former royal servant. From some point in 1263 to December 1264, it was written prior to the defeat of Montfort at the battle of Evesham. The account from January 1265 onwards was then written retrospectively after the battle of Evesham prior to the chronicle’s transfer to Westminster. The *Flores*, while pro-reform and Montfortian, also expresses sympathy for the royal family. It provides a valuable contemporary voice and shows wide awareness of events, particularly in the West near the March. The Dunstable annals were largely interested in the internal affairs of the priory apart from during the Barons’ War. Pro-Montfortian, it particularly lauded of Montfort’s victory at the battle of Lewes and asserted that only the lands of aliens had been looted during the rebellion in 1263. Gransden judges the annals to be ‘on the whole…accurate’ and the author makes use of official documents, such as royal proclamations, to inform its account. The annalist does, however, have a tendency to fall into cliché when describing events of which he demonstrated only a limited knowledge, most particularly at the siege of Gloucester in 1264. Thomas Wykes’ chronicle is royalist in tone, although not uncritically so. Thomas became a pensioned canon at Osney abbey in the late 1270s and after 1272 he composed the section of his independent chronicle covering the Barons’ War while still serving as a secular clerk, probably based at London. He was an associate of Philip of Eye who would become the chancellor and had also served Richard of Cornwall, the king’s brother. He demonstrates his own experience and knowledge of the region of East-Anglia from whence he seems to have originated. Wykes’s royalist stance is particularly valuable as he reports events that other, more pro-

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24 Wykes.
Montfortian accounts tend to ignore or pass over swiftly, such as the siege of the Tower of London in 1267.\footnote{See Chapter 3, pp.107-111.} The Canterbury/Dover Chronicle is an independent source from the time of the war. The Dover manuscript is incomplete due to damage but it offers detailed knowledge of events in the South-East of England. Its account of the siege of Rochester in 1264 is particularly full, providing timings and even the ingredients used in Montfort’s fire ships.\footnote{Ger. Cant., ii, p.235; Gransden, Historical Writing, pp.422-23.} The chronicle composed by Arnald fitz Thedmar, an alderman of London, is contemporaneous to the war and demonstrates, due to fitz Thedmar’s situation and eye for detail, vivid descriptions of events in London. The text itself is extremely unusual in that fitz Thedmar was not a churchman and he represents a rare secular voice. Work by Ian Stone has demonstrated fitz Thedmar’s own ambiguous role and feelings towards the events of the war and there are strong indications of the alderman censoring his own writings, either in reflection of the changed political climate or simply changing his opinions on events. For example, his manuscript shows evidence of deletion regarding previously favourable remarks concerning the Oxford parliament in 1258.\footnote{Cron. Maior.; Mayors and Sheriffs; A new edition of which is being worked on by Ian Stone; I. Stone, ‘The Rebel Barons of 1264 and the Commune of London: An Oath of Mutual Aid’, EHR, 129 (2014), pp.1-18; My thanks to Ian Stone for this information from his work on the manuscript.} The final major source, Robert of Gloucester’s metrical chronicle, is unique in being the only vernacular account of the war and is one of the earliest surviving Middle-English texts. Robert’s narrative often appears to draw on first-hand knowledge of the events, particularly those at Gloucester, where he gives precise names and details of persons and places, He recounts, indeed, that he was sitting in Gloucester on 4 August 1265 when the storm that followed the battle of Evesham broke.\footnote{Robert of Gloucs., ii; Gransden, Historical Writing, pp.432-38.} He also demonstrates very good knowledge of events in Oxfordshire.

A number of other narrative accounts survive from the war, though these are usually considerably shorter than the above sources or are of varying reliability. The interrelated chronicles of Furness and Stanley are very brief but provide a very rare northern perspective on the war and contain many local details.\footnote{Newburgh, ii; Gransden, Historical Writing, p.421.} The Chronicle of Walter of Guisborough draws on a separate contemporary account of the war, Lawrence argues, which contains fresh details on the assault on
Northampton, the siege of Rochester and the battle of Lewes. The annals of Winchester and
Waverly and the Battle Chronicle both contain very short accounts of the war and are otherwise
principally focussed on events in their houses. All three though provide useful local details, such as
the Winchester annals’ account of Simon the Younger’s attack on Winchester in 1265. The annals
of St. Werburg’s abbey in Chester likewise focus mainly on local events but they include important
information as to the fighting in the region and the defensive preparations in the town. The
chronicle of William Rishanger, and another which was formerly attributed to him both draw
heavily on the Flores and were written in the early fourteenth century. The attributed chronicle in
particular displays some chronological confusion, though it contains interesting details on the
siege of Kenilworth not found elsewhere, which may indicate the use of another earlier source.
Pierre Langtoft’s chronicle is likewise later, but contains some unique snippets of information on
the fighting in the region of Lincolnshire and South Yorkshire in 1266. The accounts of the Bury
Chronicle and the Barnwell priory chronicle both provide a narrative of events in the Fens during
the Disinherited’s occupation of the Isle of Ely. The Bury Chronicle retains a broader interest in
events but its primary focus remains the abbey. In Scotland, the Gesta Annalia II provides a
useful, if brief account of events north of the border, and reveals some of Alexander III’s efforts to
assist his father-in-law, Henry III in the war. The Melrose Chronicle is a compilation of material
including the Opusculum of Simon de Montfort which seeks to portray the earl’s sanctity, probably
rendering it the most fervently pro-Montfortian of all the narrative sources. It contains, however,
useful accounts of a Scottish diplomatic mission to the Lord Edward during the war and the
presence of Anglo-Scottish lords at the battle of Lewes.

31 Guisborough; C.H. Lawrence, ‘The University of Oxford and the Chronicle of the Barons’ War’, EHR, 95
32 Ann. Wav.; Ann. Wint.; Battle Chronicle, pp.373-380; Grandsen, Historical Writing, pp.411-16;422; see
also the very brief Ann. Wigorn.
33 Ann. Cestr.; Grandsen, Historical Writing, pp.405-6, n.14
34 Rishanger, De Bellis; Cronica et annales; Lawrence, ‘University of Oxford’, pp.101-102.
35 Langtoft, ii; Grandsen, Historical Writing, pp.476-77.
36 Bury; Liber Memorandum; Grandsen, Historical Writing, pp.339-45; 380-403.
37 The Historians of Scotland John of Fordun’s Chronicle of the Scottish Nation, ed. by W. F. Skene, 2 vols
(Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1871-2); D. Broun, ‘A New Look at Gesta Annalia attributed to
John of Fordun’, in Church, Chronicle and Learning in Medieval and Early Renaissance Scotland, ed.
38 My thanks to John Davies for allowing me to see his work in progress on a new edition of the Chronicle;
Scottish History Society/Boydell), iii.
Most of these accounts are monastic in origin, written in Latin and are primarily pro-Montfortian in leaning, influenced by ‘contemporary propaganda disseminated especially by friars and clerks in minor orders’ who supported Montfort’s cause. Montfort’s favourable standing amongst the English Church pre-dated his death with his connections to Franciscans, including the theologian Adam Marsh, and to reformer bishops such as Robert Grossteste. His death at Evesham and the reputed miracles associated with his bodily remains indicate his continuing popularity in these circles, despite a vigorous royal clamp down on the nascent cult. The war in fact sparked in a number of chronicles a sudden surge in interest concerning wider events where previously internal community politics and relations with neighbouring settlements had been the primary preoccupation. These narrative sources have the advantage of often reporting otherwise unrecorded local events of the war and provide a glimmer of light on different parts of the country. Unfortunately this also means that a number of regions simply lack any chronicle coverage, most noticeably the north of England, and as a result we know a lot less about events in this region than we do in the south. Geographically restricted and weighted with a pro-Montfortian bias, the extant narrative sources are thus a valuable if constrained source of information for the period.

One of the major problems this thesis has faced is the highly diffuse nature of the material, with references to places and individuals scattered through the government record material and narrative accounts. Two databases were compiled as an attempt to address this issue, the principal and largest of these being a list of all those mentioned as being on the rebel side in the war, what events they were mentioned as being at, where their lands were and to whom they were connected. This also provided a list of references to the various record series both published and un-published for each individual. This method allowed the easy cross referencing of places and individuals in the war. This technique, however, yields comparatively fewer results for the royalists because the majority of material, principally the judicial sources on the war, focuses on the actions of the rebels. The exception to this is the period between the battles of Lewes and Evesham, discussed above, when royalist actions tend to be reported more frequently. The result is that while we know

a good deal about what the king did, we know less in some cases about the names, composition and actions of the royalists than we do the rebels. For prominent individuals and castles the entries from the different sources were tabulated chronologically to provide itineraries for the former and histories of expenditure and ownership for the latter.

This thesis will therefore bring together the above points with the intention to provide an important fresh look at the nature or war and its impact on society during the English civil war of 1264-67.
1 English Society and War

How were men who fought on both sides in the civil war raised and equipped and what did they know about fighting? In this chapter we shall examine the military organization of mid-thirteenth century England, the nature of contemporary warfare in Europe at this period, and the extent of actual military experience possessed by the participants in the civil war prior to its commencement. The latter discussion will explore the experience of war in Gascony and Wales as well as the place of the pitched battle in medieval warfare and the importance of tournaments in providing military training. Finally, we shall examine the ‘customs of war’ and their application in the thirteenth century. This will provide a framework for the further discussion of specific conventions of war, such as those relating to siege, discussed in the subsequent chapters. The analysis in this chapter will form the contextual backbone to the discussions throughout the rest of the thesis.

The Wars of Henry III

This section will examine the military conflicts of Henry III’s reign and their impact in shaping the understanding and experience of warfare amongst the participants in the civil war.

The principles of warfare in the mid-thirteenth century had changed little from that of the previous century. In Contamine’s words:

In its most usual form medieval warfare was made up of a succession of sieges accompanied by skirmishes and devastation, to which were added a few major battles or serious clashes whose relative rarity was made up for by their often sanguinary character.¹

This assessment can be applied confidently to warfare in both Gascony and Wales, the two principal theatres for military experience open to the opposing sides in the civil war prior to 1264.

Since his accession in the midst of the civil war of 1215-17, Henry III had been engaged in the perennial tasks of the kings of England of ensuring his borders with Scotland were secure, countering the ambitions of the princes of Gwynedd in the English controlled March, stamping ducal control over Gascony, as well as trying to restore the Angevin Empire in France lost by his father King John. By the time of the Barons’ War, Henry’s categorical failure to fulfill this last ambition had been confirmed in 1259 by the Treaty of Paris. Poitou had been lost in 1224, but

Henry had since then launched three campaigns in France. The first in 1225, nominally under the command of his then teenage brother Richard, had some success, but an expedition into Brittany in 1230 was, in Studd’s view ‘costly, wasteful and politically useless’. In 1242, Henry came to the aid of his father-in-law Hugh de Lusignan, count of La Marche in Poitou. According to Matthew Paris’ unimpressed account, Henry’s Poitevin allies abandoned him when the Anglo-Gascon force confronted the French royal host at the bridge at Taillebourg. Henry was forced to withdraw to Saintes and there a fierce skirmish erupted from which the Anglo-Gascon force, including Simon de Montfort, emerged with some credit. Henry’s army was then driven back to Gascony in a sorry state when threatened by a French encirclement at Saintes. Disease, however, eventually compelled the French army to retreat. The Taillebourg campaign’s failures further hardened English attitudes against supporting their king’s ventures on the continent and it ended Henry’s active attempts to win back the Angevin empire by force.

Efforts to bring the duchy of Gascony under firmer ducal control nevertheless continued. In 1248, Henry appointed Simon de Montfort as his seneschal in the province with a promised carte blanche to restore order and fifty knights to assist him in doing so. The considerable ferocity of Montfort’s campaign in the duchy resulted in the Gascon lords accusing Montfort of utilising excessive force, and eventually prompted his recall by Henry III. Henry led a new and successful expedition to the duchy in 1253 in order to address the growing threat posed by the influence of rival claimants to the duchy, including by Alphonso X of Castile. The Castilian threat was ended with the agreement in 1254 of a marriage alliance between Alphonso’s half-sister, Eleanor, and Henry’s eldest son the Lord Edward.

The nature of the warfare in the duchy was largely shaped by the diffusion of largely autonomous or independently minded local nobles and their plethora of local feuds. These factors, coupled with the nobles’ resentment at attempts to impose a centralised ducal authority, resulted in campaigns that were focussed upon the capture of seigneurial castles, such as that of Castillon in

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March 1251, and involved frequent raiding by both factions. In 1250, Simon Montfort’s summed up the nature of this warfare in a letter to Henry, complaining that the nobles ‘will do nothing but rob the lands, and burn and plunder, and put people to ransom, and ride by night like thieves by twenty or thirty or forty in different parts’. It is in this environment that Montfort acquired much of his military experience.

England itself had experienced warfare in the decades since 1217. Most rebellions, however, like that of the earl of Aumale in 1220-21, were small scale and swiftly crushed. The siege of Bedford in 1224 (a huge siege not rivalled until Kenilworth over 40 years later) and the Marshall Rebellion in the 1230s were more serious conflagrations. Unlike France, however, private war was prohibited in the kingdom and by 1263 England had been mainly at peace for 30 years. With the exception of local conflicts, life in England, therefore, provided little in the way of direct military experience for the vast majority of the participants in the Barons’ War.

Henry III had been involved in expeditions into Wales since the age of 15 or 16, launching campaigns against Welsh inroads into the March in 1223, 1228, 1231, 1245-7 and 1257. His campaigns, unlike his son’s were principally reactive, rather than intended at a permanent conquest of the country. Llywelyn ap Iorwerth of Gwynedd contested English control of the March and the campaigns fought up until his death in 1240 were aimed at regaining and defending territory from him. From 1246 onwards following the death of Dafydd ap Llywelyn, English military power in Wales waxed and lost territory was regained, but in 1256 Llewelyn ap Gruffudd of Gwynedd

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7 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, p.112.
11 An example of the local conflicts that sometimes wound up in front of the courts include the raid by William de Vescy and a large number of Alnwick men on William de Valence’s free wardship of Warkworth in Northumberland in 1253. As in this incident, actual armed conflict was not common, Northumberland Pleas from the Curia Regis and Assize Rolls 1198-1272, ed. J.C. Hodgson (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Newcastle-upon-Tyne Records Committee, 1922), p.182.
inflicted a series of reverses upon the English and reclaimed substantial tracts of Wales.\textsuperscript{12} Henry III’s response in 1257 was castigated as ineffective and tardy by Matthew Paris and did much to bring the grievances of the baronage to a head in 1258.\textsuperscript{13} The late 1250s and early 1260s crucially saw continuing warfare in the Marches, principally between the Marcher lords and the Welsh of Gwynedd. After his investiture with the lands of the earldom of Chester in 1254, the Lord Edward also began campaigning in Wales. The political turmoil of the years leading up to 1264, however, allowed Llewelyn freedom to continue his conquests largely unhindered. The brief English expeditions, such as the Lord Edward’s in 1263, were at best only able to shore up territory under threat rather than reclaim lost ground.\textsuperscript{14}

Conducting warfare in Wales presented a number of challenges. The wooded and mountainous terrain allowed Welsh light troops to strike swiftly and then retire before superior English heavy cavalry could arrive. Ambushes were common. The Marchers adapted to utilise light troops, particularly lightly armoured horsemen and archers who could rapidly respond to any incursion and who were also proficient at conducting raids into Welsh territory. These raids, however, tended to have less economic impact than their Welsh equivalents due to the less agrarian nature of Welsh society. The Marchers also made use of the fragmented political landscape of Wales to make alliances with local rulers while increasingly the crown focussed upon building castles to hold down territory.\textsuperscript{15} King Henry and Hubert de Burgh’s construction of the powerful fortress at Montgomery in 1223 demonstrated the emphasis by the English crown on the strategic use of castles in containing the Welsh, something taken to its logical conclusion during Edward I’s later campaigns of conquest.\textsuperscript{16} Yet, while these fortresses provided protection for those inside castles, they had little effect in deterring sudden Welsh raids.\textsuperscript{17} The Welsh too possessed castles but, as Walker comments, ‘they seldom or never attempted to hold them when the enemy appeared in


\textsuperscript{13} Paris, v, pp.613-4,639-40,645-9.

\textsuperscript{14} Lloyd, \textit{A History of Wales}, p.731.


\textsuperscript{16} Carpenter, \textit{The Minority of Henry III}, pp.311-13; Walker,‘The Welsh Wars’, p.15.

\textsuperscript{17} Suppe, \textit{Military Institutions}, pp.26-31.
strength’, preferring instead to melt into the surrounding countryside. The Welsh themselves, under the princes, possessed comparatively sophisticated siege technology that they could employ against Marcher castles. The result of the ongoing instability in Wales was that Marcher society remained highly militarized compared to England. By the 1260s, castle guard in the March, for example, remained due by service in contrast to the growing trend in England to commute it for money. In addition, many Marcher tenants held their land by service as muntatores, lightly armed horsemen. The March’s greater militarisation is further suggested by the large number of tenants that the Marchers could field on campaign. Thomas Corbet, for example, in 1263 received a letter of protection for himself, his son, brother and another twenty-three men, of whom at least sixteen are confirmed to have held land from him. Roger Mortimer similarly received protection for himself and thirty-four men, of whom at least half were his tenants in the March. In 1287, Edward I could order large numbers of men from Marcher lordships into the field at short notice, raising 400 infantry from the lordship of Clun and 200 from Oswestry. The greatest Marchers, like the earl of Gloucester, could raise ‘veritable personal armies’. The Marcher lords, who were to play such an important part of the Barons’ War, were thus able to call on significant numbers of experienced troops who were highly skilled in the lightening raid and use of rough terrain. They were equally aware of the limitations of castles.

To the north, Scotland and England were enjoying an unprecedented period of peace, despite coming close to blows in 1244 over Alexander II’s French marriage and again in 1258 over the seizure by the Comyn faction in Scotland of Alexander III and his wife Margaret, the daughter of Henry III. This peace, however, was more a product of successive dynastic marriages and Alexander II’s realisation of the limits of Scottish military power against the English following the war of 1215-1217 than any military action of Henry III. The English show of force at Newcastle in 1244, however, may have provided a useful reminder to the Scots.

21 See Chapter 5, pp.177-78.
Crusading, particularly the crusades of 1240 and 1248 provided a potential avenue for English knights to gain military experience. Much like the situation in Gascony, however, it was more than a decade since the last major campaign, and even then English participation was relatively limited. Richard of Cornwall and Simon de Montfort joined the 1240 crusade to the Holy Land along with a small number of others who would go on to fight in the Barons’ War, but neither saw major action. In 1248, William Longspée led a number of English on crusade but involvement was generally limited. Participation was curtailed in part by Henry’s request to the pope to delay an English expedition by a year, a deadline that subsequently continued to be postponed. Longspée and many of the English with him died at the Battle of Mansourah in 1250 and the earl was remembered as a crusading hero. By contrast there was little direct English military involvement in the Albigensian Crusade, 1209-1229 (some fighting continued to the 1240s), though these were the wars in which Montfort’s father Simon was to gain his reputation for military skill and brutality in equal measure. Henry’s reluctance to become involved may partly be explained by the fact that Raymond VII of Toulouse was his cousin. The only other significant English foreign military involvement, this time in Italy, occurred in 1238 when Henry III dispatched a force under Henry de Turbeville to assist his brother-in-law, the Emperor Frederick II. Turbeville himself was dead by the time of the civil war and the men who comprised his force are not mentioned. The campaigns in Wales and Gascony therefore provided the principal venues for direct experience in warfare for the majority of combatants in the civil war.

**Pitched Battle**

By the 1260s there had not been a major battle in England since Lincoln in 1217, while at Taillebourg and Saintes, Henry III had declined both the opportunities to arise in France. Major

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26 *Paris*, iii, pp.485,491.
battles indeed were the exception rather than the norm in medieval European warfare. Gillingham, in his study of Richard I’s generalship, comments that ‘what is certain is that he [Richard] did not adopt a battle seeking strategy’ despite fighting several major battles, while his father, Henry II, never fought one. Engaging in a major battle was a huge risk for they were highly unpredictable affairs and defeat could easily spell complete disaster for the loser. The Roman writer, Vegetius, whose influential treatise on warfare, De Rei Militari, was in wide circulation by the thirteenth century, in fact specifically warned against engaging in battle. Pitched battle was not to be fought unless on very favourable terms or after ‘every expedient tried and every method taken before matters are brought to this last extremity’. Many medieval commanders, whether they had read Vegetius or not, seemed to have held to this view. For commanders such as William Marshal, as Gillingham notes, ‘the intention was not to seek out the enemy’s knights and meet them head-on in a clash of arms. On the contrary, the aim was to send his armed forces in the wrong direction, and then, in their absence, destroy his economic resources’. Offering battle was not usually desired by experienced commanders in the thirteenth century unless on very favourable terms. Morillo argues that ‘foreign’ or ‘external’ wars were fought around the possession of castles and territory and as a result the adoption of Vegetian strategies was the “natural” mode of those involved. He makes an exception to this, however, by stating that civil wars were not about the conquest of territory, but rather were ‘aimed at eliminating rivals for control of a central authority whose presence and role were uncontested’, and as a result were liable to witness an active battle seeking strategy. One of the examples he cites for this is the battle of Evesham and the Lord Edward’s active attempt to bring Montfort to battle. We will discuss Morillo’s contention further in the conclusion but it is worth highlighting that the battles of Lewes and Evesham were rare events, not just in terms of English military experience, but in a European context as well. None of those involved in the battle

of Lewes had any experience of conducting an engagement of that size, thus discipline, communication and co-ordination all would have been deeply problematic for the complex patchwork of forces fielded. For some, however, the tournament field provided some relevant military experience.

The Tournament

The tournament, which still principally took the form of an open field melee between opposing teams of knights, was an important venue for acquiring military experience in the thirteenth century. Whereas the tournament in England had been licensed by Richard I from 1194, tournaments were usually prohibited by Henry III, who was apparently uninterested in the activity. Such prohibitions though did not stop the baronage’s attempts to organise them. The continental tournament circuits continued to flourish and a number of young English knights, including the Lord Edward and William de Valence, frequented them. Edward may have used the tournament circuit to recruit foreign knights into his retinue, the presence of whom in 1263 prompted much resentment amongst his former associates the Marchers. The nature of the tournament encouraged the development of the tactics of fighting as a body of horsemen. Edward and his associates had considerable practice fighting together on the tournament field and it is therefore perhaps unsurprising that it was Edward’s division of the royal army, including the Marchers, which engaged first at the battle of Lewes and routed the Londoners. The royalist advantage due to their tournament experience was even noted by the author of the Song of Lewes who declared that; ‘may the knighthood that praises the tournament, that it may thus be rendered ready for battle, learn how the party of the strong trained men was here crushed by the arms of the feeble and unpractised’. The contrast was perhaps somewhat disingenuous, as the nobles fighting with Montfort were no less attracted to the tournament than their royalist compatriots.

34 Morris, A Great and Terrible King, p.54.
36 quod cessit victoria de se confidenti hinc discat milicia, que torneamenti laudat exercitium, The Song of Lewes, pp.12,41, lines 360-64; Barker, The Tournament in England, p.20.
Knights, however, were not the only participants in tournaments. An ordinance from 1292 stipulated that each knight was to bring no more than three squires, each of whom must wear the device of their lord; neither knights nor squires were permitted to carry pointed swords, knives, clubs or sticks, only broadswords. Footmen or grooms were forbidden to carry the above weapons but the list of prohibited weapons was expanded to include stones, while spectators were barred from wearing armour.37

Where tournaments did take place in England during Henry III’s reign they often saw teams divided on regional lines, either the knights of Northern England versus those of the South or Englishmen versus Aliens, and both types were ‘liable to develop into real battles’.38 These could be conducted with sharpened or blunted weapons, and death or serious injuries were not uncommon.39 An illegal tournament in 1241 descended into a free-for-all mêlée resulting in the death of Gilbert Marshal and one of his followers, as well as the serious wounding of many others.40 The mêlée for the tournament held to mark Edward’s debut in 1256 at Blyth became so fierce that many important men, including Roger de Quincy, earl of Winchester and Roger Bigod, although distinguishing themselves ‘exerted themselves beyond their strength to such a degree that their muscles were torn and they never afterwards recovered their health’.41 Even the more regulated jousts could be fatal. At the Round Table held in 1252, Roger Leybourne killed one of the king’s household knights, Arnold de Montigny, when his sharpened lance went beneath the protection of Arnold’s helmet and into his throat. Foul play by Roger was suspected in this instance as Arnold had broken Roger’s leg in a previous tournament. When the lance head was extracted from Arnold’s throat it was found to be ‘very sharp’ and ‘as broad as a knife’, in violation of the required use of blunt lances.42 The potential for uncontrolled violence inherent in tournaments was a source of serious concern, particularly during the war. In early 1265, with the Montfortians now politically ascendant, two tournaments were proposed between the sons of Montfort and the de Clare brothers, first at Dunstable and then at Northampton.43 While the former event was

39 Most tournaments permitted the use of unblunted swords, Crouch, Tournament, pp.98-102.
40 Paris, iv, pp.135-36.
technically prohibited by Henry III, it is more likely that it was blocked at Montfort’s instigation. The individual most likely to benefit from an outbreak of fighting between these two parties was Henry himself. The growing antipathy between the sons of Montfort and the de Clare brothers, and the potential for bloodshed between the allies, was probably the primary motivation for Montfort’s refusal.

The tournament remained a crucial training ground for elements of English knighthood prior to the war. The limitations imposed by Henry III in England do, however, leave in question the spread of this experience amongst the ranks of the knighthood. The number of knights who chose or who could afford to spend time on the continental tournament circuit in the decade prior to the war is unknown. It is possible therefore that tournament experience may have been limited to those knights in the retinues of the richer, tournament inclined lords such as the Lord Edward, the sons of Montfort and William de Valence.

**Military Experience**

Attempting to assess the comparative military experience of the Montfortians and royalists prior to the civil war is difficult, for lists of those serving in campaigns have not survived as they have done for Edward I’s wars in Wales and Scotland. The surviving scutage rolls, recording those knights quit of paying scutage in return for military service for a particular campaign, only list knights and barons and not those in their service or from other layers of society. Scutage and Pipe Roll lists also record not ‘service provided but rather service asked for’. Individuals who provided military service for their immediate lord or as part of the posse comitatus are usually invisible in the royal records and no relevant seigneurial records survive. Our view of the available military experience of each side is thus heavily weighted to the upper end of society and even then it is incomplete.

The Patent and Close Rolls are the two main sources for acquiring the names of those who definitely participated in the campaigns of Henry’s reign. Out of 654 recorded individuals, eighty-one men who served on the 1257 campaign in Wales were subsequently known to have fought in the civil war. Of the eighty-four who fought in Gascony in 1254, thirty-nine individuals (including two who it is unclear if it is the father or son) were also in Wales in 1257. While any conclusions

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44 Critchley, ‘Summonses to Military Service’, p.79.
must be tentative as this number by no means denotes a fully systematic trawl of all records, it does, however, suggest several points. Eight men chart campaigning experience back twenty-two years to the Taillebourg campaign; two of these, Humphrey de Bohun and Richard of Cornwall were involved in campaigns as far back as the Brittany expedition of 1230. Three, Simon Montfort, Richard of Cornwall and Philip Basset had been on the 1240 crusade. All but two of these men, Simon and Peter de Montfort, were royalists during the civil war. The youthful composition of Montfort’s army at Lewes was remarked upon by the Song of Lewes and while the author may be guilty of over emphasising this, Table 1:1 does suggest a generational divide in support.46

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Brittany 1230</th>
<th>Crusade 1240</th>
<th>Gascony 1242</th>
<th>Wales 1245</th>
<th>Crusade 1248-9</th>
<th>Gascony 1254</th>
<th>Wales 1257</th>
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<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
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<td>R</td>
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<td>P</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montfort, Simon de</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R (him or son?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>P</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Table 1:1 Individuals with the most Recorded Military Experience Prior to the Barons’ War47

Not surprisingly the predominantly royalist Marcher lords and the members of the king’s household knights had considerable recent experience from the on-going struggle with the Welsh. On the baronial side, Montfort retained a core of support from men who had served alongside him

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46 The Song of Lewes, pp.4,12,35,41.
in Gascony; at least four out of eight of his inner circle were definitely in Gascony from 1248 onwards.\footnote{Thomas de Astley, Peter Montfort, John de la Haye, Ralph Basset of Sapcote; Maddicott, \textit{Simon de Montfort}, pp.61-62,66,68.} Gilbert de Clare, earl of Gloucester also brought a number of men from the March, such as John Giffard, with experience of fighting the Welsh.\footnote{\textit{CR 1256-59}, p.140.} There does seem however to be a distinct experience weighting in the favour of the royalist faction at the war’s outset.

How experienced then were the principal leaders of each side at the outbreak of the war? This next section will examine the military experience of Henry III, the Lord Edward, Montfort and Gilbert de Clare and assess its impact upon them.

**The Military Experience of Royalist and Rebel Leaders**

Henry III was never praised as a knight or military leader as Montfort was and he seems to have had very little interest in either the tournament or hunting. As such, Ridgeway concludes that Henry ‘was essentially a man of peace, kind and merciful’ and ‘although he ordered important improvements to many royal castles, he had no military ability,’ and ‘hated campaigning’.\footnote{See \textit{Paris}, iv, pp.209-226; H.W. Ridgeway, ‘Henry III’, \textit{ODNB}, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/12950?docPos=2 [accessed 06.05.2014]; On portrayals of Henry III by chroniclers see B.K.U. Weiler, ‘Henry III through Foreign Eyes- Communication and Historical Writing in Thirteenth-Century Europe’, \textit{England and Europe in the Reign of Henry III} (1216-1272), eds. B. Weiler with I.W. Rowlands, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), pp.137-161.} These issues have a tendency to obscure a key point about Henry by the commencement of the Barons’ War: he was a highly experienced commander. He might not have distinguished himself in the way men like Montfort had, but he had long and sometimes hard experiences to draw upon, particularly when it came to mobilising and supporting his forces. While Henry could be easily led, was over-ambitious, stubborn and indecisive in some of his actions, he should not be considered incompetent. He might lack the decisiveness of Simon Montfort or the Lord Edward, but his record during the war demonstrates solid and cautious decision making and a generally effective choice of his captains and castellans. In 1236, Henry had inscribed over the new door into his Painted Chamber in Westminster Palace the motto ‘He who does not give what he has, will not get what he wants’. This statement perhaps provides an interesting insight into the king’s attitude towards his
policies and endeavours. Reflected in his stubborn streak that was so clearly evidenced in his pursuit of the Sicilian affair, this attitude could also pay dividends on campaign in the right circumstances, as his siege of Kenilworth shows. The campaign up to Lewes was, indeed, one that demonstrated consistent good sense. His base at Oxford allowed him to strike east or west. He appreciated the strategic value of Northampton, took the town by assault and his reduction of the midlands was only interrupted by Simon’s attack on Rochester. Henry’s final weeks of freedom were spent securing the ports for his reinforcements from the continent. Even if the inspiration for these moves came from his advisers, he was still wise enough to listen to them.

Henry III’s actions in the lead up to the battle of Lewes were careful and sensible. Scouts detected the advance of the Montfortian army on the 13 May and Henry secured his army from surprise attack by utilising the defences of Lewes Priory and the castle. The ability of Henry to retreat to this fortified base when the battle went ill had a great impact upon the negotiations of the Mise of Lewes when to avoid a siege of the priory Montfort agreed to the free departure of the Marchers and Northern royalists. The raid on Henry’s army at Grosmont in 1233, when his army’s horses and baggage were stolen, probably taught him the wisdom of a fortified base. In Henry’s choice at Lewes one might also detect the influence of the writings of the Roman military expert Vegetius. It is unknown if Henry himself possessed a copy but his son Edward was in possession of one of the earliest extant vernacular translations of it in the war’s aftermath. The defeat at Lewes may have had less to do with Henry’s generalship than ill fortune and the fog of war.

Edward had enjoyed some military experience in Wales and Gascony prior to the war. The amount of direct experience he was able to gain from Gascony is uncertain as the duchy continued to be primarily run by royal officials even during his visits. Edward’s exposure to any military action so young would probably have been under close supervision. The duchy was rocked by

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52 See Chapter 3, pp.130-39.


renewed revolt in 1255 shortly after Edward’s arrival, forcing the 15-16 year old prince to seize towns, fortify castles and order the construction of ships, while trying to bring in supplies from his lordship of Ireland. Henry III rapidly dispatched reinforcements to his son’s aid, but he and his officials also intervened in Edward’s military decisions. When, for example, Edward ordered the razing of La Reole’s church following its occupation by Gascon rebels, some delay was apparently introduced allowing Henry III to write to his son forbidding the church’s destruction. Edward can, however, be shown to have been active in Wales in 1257, 1260 and 1263 attempting to relieve castles and reverse Welsh gains. It was here that he began to forge his alliance with the Marcher lords. Edward’s Lusignan uncles, to whom he was close, had also gained considerable experience on both the tournament circuit and in effectively helping to crush rebellion in Gascony in 1253. Between these men and his uncle Montfort, Edward had a strong cadre of advisors in the years prior to the war. His time abroad on the continental tournament circuit in 1260-1 must also have been valuable experience in commanding men, particularly companies of knights.

Simon Montfort’s military reputation has been trumpeted by both chroniclers and historians. Before the war, Matthew Paris in 1248 termed him ‘a man of Mars (vir Martius), famous and experienced in warfare’ and to Guillaume de Nogent he was ‘a man strenuous in arms and most skilled in the science of arms’. Probably gaining his first experience of warfare at the tail end of the Albigensian Crusade in the following of his elder brother, Montfort served in the Brittany campaign of 1230, fought briefly alongside the Emperor during his journey to Rome in 1238 and went on crusade in 1240-1. He fought at Saintes in 1242 and went to Wales in 1245 with Henry III. Experienced on campaign he was, but as Maddicott points out there was ‘very little fighting’ in Brittany, the Holy Land or Wales and neither did his actions ever make their way into chronicle accounts on these occasions. His reputation is in some ways ‘a minor mystery’. The distinction he won against the French at Saintes in 1242 is the first major praise he is recorded as receiving and

56 Morris, A Great and Terrible King, pp.20-21.
57 Morris, A Great and Terrible King, pp.34-35.
59 Morris, A Great and Terrible King, pp.47-8.
60 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, p.271.
62 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, pp.6, 109.
63 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, pp.109.
he built upon this during his tenure as seneschal of Gascony from 1248. Gascony seems indeed to have formed the core of his practical experience and gained him a reputation enticing to younger knights and made him a natural choice as the commander of baronial forces. His experience in siege craft prompted the Westminster continuator of Matthew Paris, to remark on his skill in this field. It is noticeable, however, that Montfort’s experience was primarily of the Anglo-French style of warfare, rather than the Anglo-Welsh. This is perhaps reflected in his chastisement of Humphrey de Bohun the Younger at Evesham when Montfort proclaimed that the infantry should go before the cavalry. Montfort’s tactical ability was probably sound, but his grasp of Anglo-Welsh warfare perhaps less so, as a large portion of his infantry was now formed of light Welsh troops whose preferred method of warfare was to avoid fighting heavily armed knights in the open field. Humphrey the Younger, son of the earl of Hereford, may have appreciated this fact better than his general (or he was simply unable to persuade the infantry forward).

Montfort’s military leadership through the war frequently displayed elements of boldness. Montfort’s assault on the Royalist armies at Lewes and at Evesham displayed the sort of decisive aggression of his father at Muret in 1213, particularly the same use of a sudden cavalry charge against an outnumbering foe at Evesham. Montfort’s military achievements often relied on the successful outcome of calculated risks, however, as much as any special skill he possessed as a general. In late 1263, his force only escaped capture by the royalists outside London after the timely intervention of sympathizers within the city. While Montfort’s victory at Lewes against the superior royal army was a considerable feat, it was a gamble indicative of Montfort’s own strategic weakness. Despite his successful manoeuvres to seize the high ground, the early royalist success in the routing of the Londoners nearly spelt disaster and the Montfortian victory was in a large part due to the Lord Edward’s division’s over-enthusiastic pursuit of the Londoners as much as Simon’s own skills as a general. Montfort was the archetype of the ‘fortune favours the brave’ character. Henry III by contrast, was to be cursed by ill luck on his military endeavours, from disappearing allies to errant divisions of his own army.

64 Rishanger, De Bellis, p.25; Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, p.109.
68 See Chapter 4, p.170 and the Conclusion, pp.242-43.
Gilbert de Clare, out of all the major military leaders in the war, seems to have had the least opportunity to gain much practical military experience prior to its outbreak other than perhaps as a boy in the company of his father. Experienced retainers of his father no doubt provided advice and he would have benefitted from his time in Montfort’s company after joining his party in early 1264.\(^69\) The marcher John Giffard, who held lands in the orbit of the Clares, joined Gilbert’s retinue sometime after the battle of Lewes. Giffard seems to have been one of the Montfortians’ most effective commanders. He spearheaded efforts to take Gloucester castle twice, in 1263 and 1264, and seized Warwick by surprise in 1264. His shift to the royalists along with Gilbert de Clare was a heavy blow to the Montfortians as Giffard helped harass Montfort’s army through its march in Wales, even to the point where he tried to tempt Montfort to pitched battle outside Monmouth castle.\(^70\)

Knowledge of and experience in warfare was a feature of most of the major generals on both sides at the war’s outbreak, with the exception perhaps of Gilbert de Clare. It is worth noting, however, that very few had any experience of fighting pitched battles. For Montfort, the skirmishing and sieges of Anglo-Gascon warfare was his primary experience of warfare, whereas for Henry III and many of his followers, including the Lord Edward and the Marchers, as well as for some Montfortians like John Giffard, their primary experience was in fighting in the wilds of Wales. It is these experiences that helped shape the behaviour of the combatants during the war.

The Nature of the Forces

In the mid-thirteenth century, English armies were split between three principal elements; royal forces, baronial forces and shire levies. The first two groups can be further subdivided between those serving for pay and those serving on the basis of military tenure. We shall start by examining the royal forces and its components before moving on to the shire levies and finally the retinues of knights and magnates.


\(^70\) Wykes, p.166.
The Familia Regis

The closest thing to a standing army in England was the military household of Henry III, the familia regis. There have been a number of studies of the familia regis under Henry III’s predecessors, most notably J. O. Prestwich’s work on the military household of the Norman kings, Chibnall’s in depth examination of mercenaries in the household of Henry I and Church’s study of the household knights of King John.\(^{71}\) The most detailed study to date of Henry’s III’s military household remains R.F. Walker’s unpublished thesis on the Welsh Wars. This section will draw upon Walker’s discussion, but will have a tighter and more detailed chronological focus on the immediate lead up to the outbreak of war and the forces available during its course.

Henry III’s household comprised a mixture of knights, sergeants and crossbowmen. It was not a large body in peacetime, probably consisting of only a few hundred men all told. Most of these men were deployed where needed as small groups in garrisons, almost always in Wales.\(^{72}\) Designed principally as a small but flexible rapid response force, the household retained an importance in the Welsh campaigns, as Walker remarks, ‘far greater than mere numbers would appear to show’.\(^{73}\)

On the battlefield Henry’s household were responsible for defending the king’s person, particularly against potential capture. No English king had died on the battlefield since Harold Godwinson in 1066 but Henry I had been struck on the head by an assailant at the battle of Brémule in 1119 and the capture of King Stephen at the battle of Lincoln in 1141 graphically revealed the risks faced by a monarch fighting in the front line. Joinville’s account of the battle of Mansourah recounts how the knights and sergeants of Louis IX’s familia regis stayed in close proximity to the king to guard him. The sergeants were also utilised to serve as the king’s personal messengers in the height of battle.\(^{74}\) The *History of William Marshal* provides perhaps the most vivid portrayal of the role of household knights on the battlefield. The Marshal was lambasted for

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\(^{72}\) Walker, ‘The Welsh Wars’, pp.92-3; see Chapter 3, pp.82-85 for more discussion on the composition of castle garrisons.


abandoning Henry the Young King’s side during a tournament, and thereby risking the safety of his lord, in order to gain prisoners for ransom.\(^75\)

**The knights of the ‘familia regis’**

Henry’s household knights were international in composition, with men drawn not only from Henry’s continental possession of Gascony but also from Poitou, Flanders and even Burgundy.\(^76\) They were retained with either an annual fee, if they had spent a longer period in royal service, or by wages, which could vary from 1-2s per day.\(^77\) Its composition was fluid with its numbers increasing dramatically at a time of war.\(^78\) Henry’s retinue indeed reached its peak in the Welsh campaign of 1228 when it boasted at least seventy knights but over the course of the reign averaged thirty two members. Following the Provisions of Oxford in 1258 and the concurrent drive to reform Henry’s finances, the number of those in his *familia* receiving fees fell from thirty nine to nineteen. With his reviving fortunes in 1261-2, the *familia* exploded in number once more to sixty seven, with a total of thirty six knights receiving fees for the first time.\(^79\) Walker calculates that in 1260-1 £4,116, 14s and 5 ½d went on fees and wages of knights and sergeants ‘besides part of £4000 odd paid to knights, sergeants and crossbowmen in the two years 1259-61’.\(^80\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of knights fees being paid</th>
<th>No. of new fees being paid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1258</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1259</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1260</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1261</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1262</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1263</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1264</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1265</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1266</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1267</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1:2 Knights Fees, 1258-67 based on Walker, ‘Welsh Wars’, p.71.**


\(^77\) This is over the course of the reign, Walker, ‘The Welsh Wars’, pp.68,79,80.


\(^79\) There were no fees granted during the period of 1264-5; Walker, ‘The Welsh Wars’, pp.70-71,81.

\(^80\) This includes clerks as well, Walker, ‘The Welsh Wars’, p.84.
While comprised partially of foreigners, much like King John’s, the *familia regis* by 1261 contained a large number of English tenants-in-chief or their kin.\(^{81}\) The Welsh Marchers had a tradition of serving in the royal household and several Anglo-Scots lords were also present from 1261 onwards, including Robert de Brus and John Comyn, lord of Badenoch.\(^{82}\) The *familia* were frequently utilised as both field commanders and castle constables in Wales and elsewhere. A survey of those constables Henry III appointed in 1261 unequivocally demonstrates Henry’s reliance upon current or former members of his household in securing the royal castles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appointed Constable</th>
<th>Castle</th>
<th>Household = HH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reynold son of Peter</td>
<td>Southampton</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Muscegros</td>
<td>Exeter</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Grey</td>
<td>Hereford</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan la Zuche</td>
<td>Northampton</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William de Grey</td>
<td>Lincoln</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Russel</td>
<td>Salisbury</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Basset</td>
<td>Sherborne and Corfe</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Basset</td>
<td>Hadley</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William la Zouche</td>
<td>Guildford</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James de Audely</td>
<td>Bruges, Shrewsbury</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Marmion</td>
<td>Norwich, Orford</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Balliol</td>
<td>Nottingham</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Plessetis</td>
<td>Sauvey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter de Percy</td>
<td>York</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam de Jesmond</td>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eustace de Balliol</td>
<td>Carlisle, HH (former)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert de Walerand</td>
<td>Canterbury, Rochester</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathias de Mara</td>
<td>Colchester</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Basset</td>
<td>Oxford</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aymo Turemberd</td>
<td>Windsor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Lovel</td>
<td>Cambridge, Huntingdon?</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam de Monte Alto</td>
<td>Lancaster</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1:3 Constables appointed 9 July 1261\(^{83}\)

Although records of appointments of constables become more chaotic in the period of late 1263 to May 1264, household knights remain prominent amongst royalist constables. Philip Basset,

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\(^{81}\) Approximately 25% of John’s household were foreigners, I have been unable to find any calculation made for their proportion in Henry III’s reign; Church, *The Household Knights*, pp.34-38.

\(^{82}\) *CPR 1258-66*, p.198; *LR 5*, p.90; Walker, ‘The Welsh Wars’, p.89;

\(^{83}\) *CPR 1258-66*, pp.157,158,163-4.
Nicholas de Molis, John de Muscegros, Alan de la Zouche and John de Grey were among those who served in this capacity during these months. It is extremely hard to gain a fully accurate list of who was in the familia regis during the war because of disruption of record keeping and the capture of Henry III, and we are accordingly forced to rely on the earlier information from 1261-3. By 28 January 1267, the overstretched royal finances were clearly no longer capable of sustaining the payment of fees and these were stopped. Some fees were renewed in October, but by contrast these were for men ‘who were actually on the king’s service, so that at the end of our period’…’it looks as if the whole system of money fees was being reviewed.’

‘Servientes-ad-arma’

There were two sorts of sergeants in royal service; the sergeants (servientes) and the sergeants-at-arms (servientes-ad-arma). Sergeants-at-arms were professional soldiers and like the knights of the familia regis formed a group of trusted and skilled armed retainers. Like their knightly counterparts they also received robes and other gifts and could sometimes hold ceremonial positions within the household. In reflection of their more specialised status these men could earn the high wage of between 9d. and 12d. per day, depending on whether they were mounted. Sergeants were less well paid, the infantry receiving between 2d. and 3d. per day and those with horses from 6-7d. Unlike sergeants-at-arms these men could be recruited for a specific campaign, although some may have been retained on a permanent basis. The terminology referring to these groups is not always entirely clear and depends as much upon the context in which a scribe was writing as anything else. King’s servant (serviens regis) would seem to have been another term used to denote sergeant-at-arms but the same men could also be referred to as simply sergeant. For example, the Carlisle garrison under Eustace Balliol that served throughout the war, consisted of two knights each paid at 2 shillings a day; one sergeant with a barded horse, 12d.; fourteen esquires, at 6d each; nine foot

85 Walker, ‘Welsh Wars’, pp.81-2; CLR 1267-72, no.43.
87 For example see CLR 1251-60, pp.130,265; E101/3/6d. See also, Walker, ‘The Welsh Wars’, p.90.
88 See for comparison CPR 1266-72, pp.142-143, CLR 1267-72, no.563.
crossbowmen, 3d.; thirty six foot archers, 2d.\textsuperscript{89} Two noticeable points about this account are the equipment of the sergeant and his wages. At 12d a day the individual is clearly in reality a sergeant-at-arms but here he is simply labelled a sergeant, even though equipped with a barded horse, he came closer to having a knight’s equipment.\textsuperscript{90} If we examine Roger Clifford’s recorded garrison of Marlborough castle in 1266 we see this variability in equipment more clearly:

- 4 knights with barded horses
- 4 sergeants-at-arms with barded horses
- 12 sergeants with un-barded horses
- 54 footmen
= £63. 10s.\textsuperscript{91}

To muddy the water further, however, the entry for the wages of the Newcastle garrison between 1265-66 lists sergeants-at-arms in the garrison but gives their wages as only 3d a day.\textsuperscript{92} Whether this is a scribal error or perhaps indicative that the term was sometimes applied loosely is unclear. Records of wages rather than the terminology used in the sources are a more reliable guide to the status of these men. Sergeants-at-arms helped form the backbone of royal garrisons, though they were often only in very small numbers as the examples above indicate. In peace time Windsor often had only four sergeants-at-arms as a permanent garrison.\textsuperscript{93} Even in late-1265 to early-1266 Newcastle’s waged garrison contained only ten sergeants-at-arms.\textsuperscript{94}

Examination of the surviving names of sergeants quickly highlights the international nature of the men in Henry’s service. Not confined to the lands listed earlier, these men were drawn into Henry’s service from Provence to Hanover. In 1252 there was even a Henry ‘the Saracen’ serving in Gascony.\textsuperscript{95} These men seem to have worked in small units of varying size, sometimes ten to twelve or as few as four men under some form of officer. This individual or a king’s clerk appointed for the task would often ‘draw pay from the exchequer for the whole force or for a section of it serving in the same place’.\textsuperscript{96} The clearest proof of the existence of this organisation during the war is in the Patent and Liberate Roll entries for the Tower of London’s garrison in

\textsuperscript{89} CLR 1267-72, no.738
\textsuperscript{90} He could have been the constable responsible for the infantry?
\textsuperscript{91} CIM, i, no.319.
\textsuperscript{92} CLR 1260-67, p.296.
\textsuperscript{93} See for example CLR 1251-60, p.56.
\textsuperscript{94} CLR 1260-67, p.296.
\textsuperscript{95} Whether this meant he was a Saracen or perhaps came from Outremar is unknown, CPR 1247-58, p.132.
\textsuperscript{96} Walker, ‘The Welsh Wars’, p.92.
1267. The men listed in both sources are split into four groups each under one individual, with the rest in the group labelled under the heading ‘and his fellows’. ⁹⁷

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>John de Berkham</th>
<th>Robert de Boyval</th>
<th>and ‘his fellows’,</th>
<th>and ‘his fellows’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rabas (Rabate]</td>
<td>William de Boyval</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giles Martin</td>
<td>Robert le Eveske</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baude de Jorny</td>
<td>Gerard le Alemaund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam de Waudon,</td>
<td>John Oureslond alias Houresland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bertin de Steynewell,</td>
<td>William de Boyval</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William du Bois,</td>
<td>Jakenin Moran</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen de Richelbrech</td>
<td>John de Fekenet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Isaac de Berkham</td>
<td>Tassard le Boleneys</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jakenin de Boyval</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>William le Quarter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam de Greigii/Gregun</td>
<td>Ambeshas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and ‘his fellows’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence Ungrewel,</td>
<td>‘And his fellows’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John le Neym</td>
<td>John de Attinsham</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakenin de Lungevill</td>
<td>Peter de Lungevil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingram de Ringesham</td>
<td>Rouland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Hareng</td>
<td>John de Ysek</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janettus de Anderwik</td>
<td>Ewerwin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everard de Tylloy</td>
<td>Robert de Hanoveu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de (?) Leonire</td>
<td>Joyres</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh de Tilloy</td>
<td>Jakenin Haneveu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hugh le Provencal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guion Boife</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>James de Haneben/(Haneveu?)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1:3 King’s Sergeants in the Tower of London 1267

One of these men at least, William Boville, may have served in Gascony in 1254 and Wales in 1257. ⁹⁸ The list provided of the sergeants-at-arms of the Tower in 1267 is unusual, both in their number, reflecting the crucial strategic situation of the Tower during de Clare’s renewed rebellion, and in the naming of those concerned.

⁹⁷ Note that the names included vary slightly in the two rolls; CPR 1266-72, pp.142-143; CLR 1267-72, no.563.

⁹⁸ CPR 1247-58, pp.244, 659.
The King’s Crossbowmen

The king’s crossbowmen were similar to the king’s sergeants and there was ‘no difference in status’ between the two groups in the household. In the 1240s, Henry III’s ‘keeper of the king’s sergeants’, one Halengret, was also a crossbowman by profession. In 1259, one Martin le Balister was named as a king’s sergeant, as was a Picard le Balister who was amongst the royalist garrison of Windsor Castle in 1264. In the Liberate roll several individuals, including Nicholas de Wyncele, are referred to variously as both sergeants-at-arms and king’s crossbowmen. The specialised status of these men is reflected in both their small numbers and often in their surnames. The garrison lists of Nottingham and Scarborough castles in late 1264 each contain two men with the surname le Balister or le Arblaster. Much like those men listed as Porter or Tailor, these individuals were recognised by their profession. Powicke’s study of the Angevin defence of Normandy in the late twelfth to early thirteenth centuries characterises these men as ‘the élite of the military profession’. They received rewards for their service, including robes, oaks from the royal forest and even occasionally estates. In the Newcastle garrison, mentioned above, the garrison contained one mounted crossbowman serving for eighty days who was paid 12d a day, possessed two horses and was accompanied by two grooms. This may be an individual named as Kempe the Crossbowman who actually held land near Newcastle, probably by gift of the king.

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104 CLR 1260-67, p.296.
105 E372/111, m. 26.
Visual depictions of crossbowmen from the mid-thirteenth century indicate they could be well armoured with helms and mail coats. The French Macieowski Bible, dating from c.1250, shows a crossbowman well armoured in mail and utilising the shelter of a compatriot’s shield during an assault on a town.\textsuperscript{106} The same can be likewise seen in an illustrated copy of Vegetius’ \textit{De Re Militari} given to the Lord Edward c.1265-72.\textsuperscript{107} Their crossbows varied in size and power between \textit{ad unum pedem} (for one foot) and those \textit{ad duos pedes} (for two feet) although it is unclear by the mid-thirteenth century if this still denoted the method of spanning or simply the power of the bow in question.\textsuperscript{108} A whole industry in castles such as St. Briavell’s and the Tower were responsible for manufacturing the bolts for these.\textsuperscript{109} These specialists helped form a small core of professional experienced troops both in garrisons and on expeditions. Roger Leybourne’s campaign into Essex against the Disinherited in 1266 for example, as well as boasting thirty knights and several hundred archers, also contained seven sergeants-at-arms, seven king’s grooms and seven king’s crossbowmen.\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{106} Joshua Conquering the City of Ai, Macieowski Bible, c.1250, Pierpont Morgan Library, New York. Ms M 638 f.10v
\textsuperscript{107} Copyright, Cambridge, Fitz William Museum, Ms.Marlay Add1.f. 86r; Strickland, \textit{The Great Warbow}, p.116.
\textsuperscript{109} See Chapter 2, pp.71-72.
\textsuperscript{110} E101/3/6.
Shire Levies

While the household troops formed a small disciplined core which could be supplemented by mercenary troops, the shire levy remained an important means of raising large numbers of men for campaigns. These levies were frequently called upon during the civil war. At the site of the Battle of Lewes approximately 1500 bodies buried in three pits were discovered in 1810, most of which, due to the low recorded death toll amongst the knights, were probably infantry levies or Scots sent to Henry III.\(^{111}\) They were also mustered to repel the queen’s threatened invasion in the summer of 1264, the siege of Richmond in 1265 and the campaign against the Disinherited in East Anglia in 1266. The reign of Henry III had witnessed a series of statutes of arms in 1223, 1225, 1230, 1233, 1238, 1242 and 1253, most prior to the launching of a major royal campaign. These statutes marked significant developments in the organisation of the shire levies. The 1242 \textit{de forma de pacis conservanda} stipulated that in each hundred there would be one or two constables who were charged with checking the equipment of the men of the hundred and who would be in turn answerable to the sheriff for their state.\(^{112}\) In London and probably several other towns like Canterbury, the city militia was organised on the basis of the city wards. Appointed alderman, men like Arnald fitz Thedmar, provided their ward’s banner and ensured that each ward was raised and its array checked.\(^{113}\) The city as a whole in the war served under the appointed constable and marshal of London, Thomas de Pwelsdon and Stephen Buckerel, and followed the city standard.\(^{114}\) Although we lack direct evidence for the organisation of other town militias in England they were probably raised along the same lines. The power for raising the levies lay with the king alone, but the system could be easily abused by groups on both sides if the local constables raised men without official authorisation. The Marchers’ assault on Hereford in late 1264 was accompanied, according to an inquisition late that year, by the \textit{posse} of Shropshire led by the royalist sheriff.\(^{115}\)


\(^{112}\) Title is given as \textit{conservande} in the published edition of the Close Rolls. See above, \textit{CR 1237-42}, pp.482-4.


\(^{114}\) \textit{Cron. Maior.}, pp.55,61.

\(^{115}\) JUST 1/42, m. 3. For a deeper discussion of the role of local officials in forcing out the shire levies see Chapter 6, pp.204-9; \textit{CIM}, i, no.291.
The levies were restricted to forty days service, but were sometimes pressured to serve for longer during the civil war. Simon the Younger’s siege of Pevensey in 1264 initially relied on the possess of Surrey and Sussex, but by 27 November firm orders were issued by the Montfortian government that they were to be disbanded and not to be distrained or harassed, due to both their labours during the siege and in the defensive efforts of the summer. Montfort, heavily reliant upon the good will of the populace for his support, may well have feared the potential for a backlash from pushing the service of the county possess too far beyond the forty days. For the sustained royalist siege of Kenilworth, detachments of men from different regions were probably sent for the forty day period, with fresh ones being raised to replace them at periodic intervals. Northampton’s recorded contribution to the siege was only forty men, a lot less than the full number of men it could raise under the 1242 statute’s terms that stipulated all men from 15-60 years must bear arms.

It is important to remember, as Carpenter remarks, that ‘village society was highly militarized’. The 1242 de forma listed the expected equipment brought by men in the event of a muster according to the value of their lands or chattels. The 1253 statute innovatively spread this burden further by insisting that vills provide the bows, arrows and light weapons (levibus armis) at their own cost and retain these for the use of the vill. Michael Powicke argues that this is the ‘first evidence of communal responsibility for arms’.

The question arises what sort of proportion of the eligible populace was expected to fall into each category? The richest group (£15 of land or 60 marks of chattels) were the wealthy sergeants, as from 1241 the assumption of knighthood by those possessing lands yielding £20 per-annum became obligatory, regardless of whether such land had previously been classified as a knight’s fee or was held in chief or not. Those groups below the £15 boundary were sergeants and wealthy peasants.

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117 See Chapter 6, pp.204-9 for a discussion of impressment into castle garrisons.
118 CLR 1267-72, no.179.
120 CR 1251-53, pp.492-3; Powicke, Military Obligation, p.90.
<table>
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<th>Land Value</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>£15</td>
<td>Hauberk, helmet of iron, a sword, knife and horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£10</td>
<td>haubergeon, a helmet of iron, a sword, a knife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100s</td>
<td>a doublet, a helmet of iron, a sword, a lance, a knife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40s-100s</td>
<td>sword, bow, arrows, a knife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less than 40s</td>
<td>scythes, gisarmes, knives and other small weapons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chattel Value**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Value</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60 marks</td>
<td>Hauberk, helmet of iron, a sword, knife and horse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 marks</td>
<td>haubergeon, a helmet of iron, a sword, a knife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 marks</td>
<td>a doublet, a helmet of iron, a sword, a knife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 marks</td>
<td>sword, bow, arrows, a knife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 40s-10 marks</td>
<td>scythes, gisarmes, knives and other small weapons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1:4 Wealth and Arms**

Carpenter’s study of the involvement of the peasants of Cambridgeshire and Buckinghamshire recorded in the Dictum Eyres draws on information from the Hundred Rolls for their wealth. None of the numerous examples he cites would have exceeded 40s-10 marks. The probability is that the majority of men mustered would have been in the last category. This explains Montfort’s stipulation on 9 July 1264 that those coming to the coast should be the ‘best men, mounted and foot’, noting in particular that they should be equipped with lances, crossbows, bows and axes. The popular appeal of the muster that summer was mentioned by fitz Thedmar, who describes ‘innumerable people’ travelling to the coast on both horse and foot. On 4 October 1264, the ‘poor men’ of Suffolk were excused from attending due to the burden it placed upon them and instead the army was to be composed of the ‘knights, free tenants and all others who are able to bear arms and have tenements by which they can be sustained’. Quality rather than quantity of recruitment was apparently the preferred approach of Montfort.

The shire levies were a key component of the forces raised in the Barons’ War and were utilised heavily by both sides. Not only did they provide large numbers of men but the militarization of village society meant that they were equipped to conduct the war at a local level as well. Out of all the groups discussed in this chapter, the shire levies are also the one we know least about, despite on some occasions providing the bulk of the forces present. Military experience is impossible to trace and we can only see some of their local actions in the surviving eyre returns.126

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122 CR 1237-42, pp.482-83.
123 For a deeper discussion of these issues see Carpenter, ‘English Peasants’, pp.7-14.
124 CPR 1258-66, p.360.
126 See Chapter 6.
Nevertheless it is important not to ignore or sideline the involvement of these forces in the conduct of the Barons’ War.

**Archers and Archery**

Archers (*sagittarius*) are a relatively hard body to trace during the Barons’ War. While the 1242 *De forma* required anyone with either land valued at between 40-100s or 10 marks in chattels to possess a bow, it also stipulated that ‘all others who can do so, shall have bows and arrows outside the forest; those within the forest bows and bolts’.²⁷ How large a section of the population was expected to be equipped with bows is unclear. The tactics of mass archery later to be employed by medieval English armies are not apparent during the Barons’ War and the decades preceding it. Crossbowmen remained better paid than a conventional *sagittarius*, receiving daily 3d compared to 2d in Roger Leybourne’s account of the expenses of Nottingham garrison of 1267.²⁸ While royal government manufactured large quantities of crossbow bolts at its major castles, by contrast the 1253 assize of arms had made it the responsibility of the vills to provide their bows and arrows, and their manufacture remained principally vill based during the war.²⁹ Nevertheless, archers did play an important role in the composition of English armies. Roger Leybourne’s accounts for his campaigns of 1266-7, particularly against the Cinque Ports and into Essex, record the use of hundreds of archers. In 1266, 527 were used in the assault against Winchelsea and 500 in Essex. They seem to have been primarily from the Weald.³⁰ In 1264, the ambushes by Weald archers on the royal host’s march through the Weald to Battle Abbey and the subsequent killing of the king’s cook, Master Thomas, drove Henry to have 315 local archers rounded up and beheaded at Flimwell and then to fine the abbot of Battle because some had been his tenants.³¹ Montfort likewise placed an equal emphasis upon the provision of bows and crossbows alongside other weapons in the summer of 1264.³² The ratio of archer to non-archer is impossible to accurately assess as most of these archers have made it into the records because they were in receipt of royal pay and we cannot accurately compare them to the numbers of men serving in retinues or as part of the county *posse*.

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The impression these examples provide though is that English armies did prefer to maintain a very sizeable percentage of bowmen at the period of the war.

Archers serving for wages were also relatively regularly employed in castle garrisons during the war. Eleanor countess of Leicester took twenty nine archers, who had served with her son Simon the Younger at the siege of Pevensey, into the garrison of Dover where she was residing.\(^{133}\) Similarly twenty archers were employed in the Nottingham garrison, a ratio of 2-1 over the waged crossbowmen.\(^{134}\) Those men serving for wages would probably have worn the livery of their lord; those in royal service presumably wore the king’s. Roger Leybourne’s campaign expenses for Essex in 1266, for example, record 200 tunics purchased for stipendiary archers serving in his force.\(^{135}\)

That bows and crossbows were in wide circulation in England at this period is quite evident from legal records, which feature multiple cases of death caused either accidentally or deliberately by men armed with bows or crossbows. In one incident on 23 April 1264, a member of the abbot of Kirkstall’s household was accidentally shot and slain in the darkness by a fellow when they rushed outside to fend off a band of robbers trying to plunder the abbot’s cattle.\(^{136}\) In another undated domestic dispute, two brothers, armed with bows and arrows, assaulted a tavern, broke down the door and one was killed by being shot with an arrow by the son of the owner.\(^{137}\)

The reasons for this preference are not too hard to conceive. As defensive weapons crossbows were especially useful. Missile weapons were also a way to make the otherwise lightly armed and ill trained peasants militarily effective on a battlefield. Archers were capable of moving swiftly through cover, could kill horses at a distance with their arrows and could be used to devastate the lightly armoured troops in an opposing army. Accounts of the 1224 siege of Bedford, for example, record many casualties inflicted upon the attackers assaulting the outer bailey.\(^{138}\) At Rochester in 1215, King John executed the crossbowmen in the garrison, while during the first siege of Gloucester in 1263 a carpenter equipped with a crossbow killed a squire. After the castle’s

\(^{133}\) Manners, pp.67,85.
\(^{134}\) E101/3/10
\(^{135}\) See Chapter 5, p.184 for further discussion of the context, E101/3/6; Cron. Maior., p.86.
\(^{136}\) See Chapter 6, p.213; CIM, i, no. 2116
\(^{137}\) CIM, i, no.2168.
\(^{138}\) Ann. Dun., p.87.
surrender the man was thrown from the keep in revenge.139 This latter example in particular may help partially explain an intriguing point, namely the apparent dearth of knights recorded as killed by arrows or crossbows. While better armour quite probably contributed to this, the brutal treatment meted out to archers and crossbowmen if they caused heavy casualties or killed higher status individuals may reveal a reluctance to target such individuals because the kin, followers or lord of the killed man might well seek revenge.

**Retinues**

The retinues and forces that the earls, barons and knights could field were an important component of armies during the Barons’ War. The comparative paucity of source material for seigneurial retinues in the early to mid-thirteenth century has left the topic understudied in comparison to work done on the retinues from the end of thirteenth century. This issue had resulted in the underappreciation of both their numbers and role in the civil war. The existing studies of the mid-thirteenth century retinues of William de Valence, Simon de Montfort, Roger de Quincy and Roger Bigod have focussed primarily upon the knights in their service.140 This focus is largely the product of the limitations the reliance upon charter witness lists imposes. While these provide information on the inner circle of a lord’s *familia*, it usually only does so for those of knightly class. In the same manner as the king’s *familia*, men of lower status formed part of a lord’s retinue as well. The nature of military retinues from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries has attracted considerable debate.141

In particular there has been discussion as to the comparative fluidity of their membership over different campaigns; the changing composition of these retinues from ones primarily based around men-at-arms to mixed forces of men-at-arms and archers by the time of the Hundred Years War;


and the change from annuities and tenurial bonds to contracts of indenture.\footnote{The best summary of these debates is by Spencer, ‘Comital Military Retinue’, pp.46-59.} In particular, Andrew Spencer has demonstrated that by the 1290s, due to the demands of the wars in Scotland and France, comital military retinues came to be composed of men on five grounds; ‘familial relationship; ties of service; tenurial relationship; ties of neighbourhood and military practicalities’.\footnote{Spencer,‘Comital Military Retinue’, p.50.} While Spencer argues that this is in many ways identical to the composition of retinues in the fourteenth century, the point can be stretched further back in time as all these issues are equally applicable to seigneurial retinues of the 1260s, although we are not blessed with the same available information.

Seigneurial retinues can be subdivided into those of earls, bannerets and knights bachelor (lesser knights).\footnote{Abbots and bishops of course also possessed their own retinues, for a discussion of this for the twelfth century see Daniel Gerrard, ‘The Military Activities of Bishops, Abbots and other Clergy in England c.900-1200’. (Unpublished Ph.D thesis.; University of Glasgow, 2010), pp.77-85.} The principal division, however, is between the military retinues of earls and bannerets, which had a number of knights serving in them, in contrast to those of knights bachelor, who might have at most one.\footnote{See Tout for the debate on the meaning of this term around the period of the war T.F. Tout, ‘The Communitas bacheleriae Anglieae’, EHR, 17 (1902), pp.89-95.} These retinues, comprised of knights, sergeants and other individuals, provided small but significant groups that helped form the core of most forces on both sides during the war. Both types of retinue were composed of those serving either for pay or through teneurial obligations. Just as with the familia regis, this could include knights serving for an annuity though these are far harder to detect due the general lack of surviving seigneurial accounts. As Stenton remarks, ‘the household knight is an elusive person’ as his lack of lands means he rarely appears in many of our records.\footnote{Sir F.M. Stenton, The Frist Century of English Feudalism 1066-1166, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd rev ed.1961), p.140; Simpson, ‘The Familia of Roger de Quincy’, p.117.} Additionally, as Simpson notes in his study of Roger de Quincy’s familia, given the variety of methods of referring to individuals, particularly less prominent ones, it can prove ‘difficult to establish a coherent sequence of biographical facts about some members’.\footnote{Simpson, ‘The Familia of Roger de Quincy’, p.105.} He notes that the inner circle of those apparently closely associated with the earl consisted of a mixture of the earl’s relations, stewards and administrators; some of whom
possessed ‘modest’ lands while others ‘appear to be landless men perhaps receiving a form of salary.’\textsuperscript{148}

While the discussion of comital military \textit{familias} has focussed upon knights, these were only a small part of a retinue. Ridgeway’s study of the retinue of William de Valence up to 1272 estimated ‘an average annual strength of a dozen or so knights’ and provides ten names for the period of the war.\textsuperscript{149} These knights might also provide their own knights, and presumably sergeants and squires as well. Simpkin’s study of average retinue sizes of knights bachelor based on horse inventories for Edward I’s campaigns (which sadly do not exist for the civil war) calculates for the earliest date, 1282, an average of 5.5 mounted individuals per-retinue leader. Of this figure, only an average of 0.8 of those in the retinue were knights, 4.7 being of sub-knightly status.\textsuperscript{150} Simpkin’s examination of the company sizes of bannerets and bachelors recorded in the Wardrobe book in 1297 shows bannerets averaged a company of thirteen men (knights and lower) while a bachelor managed 3.2. These figures remain roughly consistent in Simpkin’s survey up to 1303-4.\textsuperscript{151} This is in line with the average size of a banneret’s force in the late twelfth century, estimated by Prestwich from the figure given by William Marshal of 15 bannerets providing 200 knights for Henry the Young King’s tourniery retinue in 1179, yielding an average of thirteen knights per banneret.\textsuperscript{152} Given that the number of knights was decreasing during the thirteenth century, many of those who might have been knights in the twelfth may have been classified as sergeants by the late thirteenth century.\textsuperscript{153}

Hugh de Neville’s testament in 1267 provides an insight into a contemporary knight bachelor’s retinue. Hugh, a former rebel who had surrendered at Axholme in 1265, had subsequntly gone on crusade to Acre. There he made provision for four individuals: his page, Jakke the Palmer, Pain, whom he described as ‘my man’ and who was at that point beyond ‘the sea of Greece’, and another

\textsuperscript{148} Simpson, ‘The \textit{Familia} of Roger de Quincy’, p.118.
\textsuperscript{149} Ridgeway, ‘William de Valence and his \textit{familiares}’, p.245; see Appendix 2.
\textsuperscript{150} Simpkin, \textit{The English Aristocracy at War}, p.60.
\textsuperscript{151} Simpkin, \textit{The English Aristocracy at War}, p.62.
\textsuperscript{152} Prestwich, \textit{Armies and Warfare}, pp.13-14.
two men, Lucel le Cu and Beverle, who were presumably already with Hugh.\textsuperscript{154} Hugh had a military retinue of at least four men (with a chaplain and clerk as well), which match the figures given by Simpkin for Edward I’s reign. This was also the retinue maintained by a man in apparently straightened financial circumstances as a result of the war and the cost of his crusade, according to a letter to him from his mother.\textsuperscript{155} Hugh’s military retinue size and composition could be viewed then as essentially a basic core of personnel that a knight would take on campaign with him, albeit in Hugh’s case in the special circumstances of a crusade.

Civil war conditions might affect numbers within retinues in several ways. The figures provided by Simpkin concern those retinues raised to meet an expected number of men for a foreign expedition, while military retinues during the civil war could potentially draw on all of a lord’s available resources, as they were fighting closer to home. Some retinues might suffer depreciation due to the split loyalties of their followers, but more men might also be realistically mustered for short periods, including men serving as infantry. Potentially a lord could call out all of his tenants. While we have little evidence from the war for the numbers of tenants serving with their lords, evidence from prior to 1264 suggests this could yield very large numbers of men. In 1253, for example, William of Kyme was accused before the king’s court of sending 300 of his men to raid the lands of William Bardolf at Awick and Coteland in Lincolnshire with Benedict his sergeant appointed as their constable.\textsuperscript{156}

Applying the above points to the pre-existing studies of comital military \textit{familias} provides a clearer context to the number and types of men forming these retinues. In the retinue of William de Valence, for example, if, for the sake of argument, we apply to each knight the 1282 figure of 5.5 men,\textsuperscript{157} (including sergeants, squires, perhaps other retainers, as a core military retinue like Hugh de Neville’s), what starts as a list of ten knights swiftly expands to be an armed retinue in Valence’s service of 60-70 men and perhaps higher. Such a figure would lend credence to Guisborough’s claim that John de Warenne, Valence and Guy de Lusignan fled the battle of Lewes

\textsuperscript{155} Giuseppi, ‘On the Testament of Hugh Neville’, p.360.
\textsuperscript{157} The average ‘bachelor’ retinue sizes between 1282 and 1307 vary between 2.6 to 6.4, Simpkin, \textit{The English Aristocracy at War}, pp.60-62.
with 700 chosen armed men of their household and *familia*. For the greater lords the numbers are far higher. The Lord Edward reportedly boasted a retinue of 200 horsemen prior to 1258, a very high number that would have done much to contribute to his financial difficulties.

The retinue of Gilbert de Clare provides a useful example of the composition of a comital retinue and its potential fluidity during the civil war. A survey of those named as associates of Gilbert de Clare during the war up to 1267 renders seventy nine names (excluding clerks). Eighteen are listed as yeomen, two as esquires, and twenty-one as either knights or bachelors, of which eighteen are of the latter. Five individuals whose status is unclear are classified as in Gilbert’s household, *familia* or service. One individual was Gilbert’s bailiff and another two men were involved in the seizure of rebel lands after Evesham on Gilbert’s behalf and five more are recorded as acting as his messengers. As Simpson remarks of de Quincy’s household, ‘the pattern of the *familia* is kaleidoscopic and changes constantly as men are drawn into it and pass beyond it’.

Most of our information for de Clare’s retinue comes from the post-1267 standoff at London and lists of those being pardoned for their part in his rebellion. Twenty-four of those listed in 1267 were rebels who had apparently received de Clare’s protection prior to or at London and were included in the terms of the peace deal. Some men had a longer association with de Clare, such as Sir Robert Hadris of Kent, who had served with him at Rochester in 1264 but who is not explicitly labelled as part of de Clare’s *familia*. Sixteen were labelled as being at London, but unlike others in the same list are not given an association with the earl. The Banastre brothers, Richard and William were part of John fitz John’s garrison at Windsor in 1265 and seem to have subsequently joined up with de Clare’s forces at London, receiving protection as a result. A William Atwell of Berkshire followed a similar path through the Windsor garrison and eventually became associated with de

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158 Guisborough, p.195, *Fugitque comes Warenna cum duobus fratribus regis Willelmo de Walance et Gwydone fratre eius, et sequebantur eos plusquam septigenti armati electi qui erant de domo et familia eorum*. 
159 *Paris*, v., p.539, *cum ducentis equis equitavit*. 
160 This list does not seek to be a detailed study of de Clare’s *familia*, an interesting topic requiring more study than the present thesis has room to explore, rather this is snap shot of those recognised as attached to him at various points of the war. *CPR 1258-66*, pp.634,669; *CPR 1266-72*, pp.143,146-8,240,268,315,447,532,617; *Rotuli Selecti*, p.199; JUST 1/42, mm. 5, 8d, 10d; JUST 1/59, m. 8d; For the actions of de Clare’s bailiffs see, *CIM*, i, nos.719,726,761,778,785,816,818,829,836,855,875,877,936,1024; Dodsworth, f. 226; See Appendix 2. 
161 Simpson, ‘The *Familia* of Roger de Quincy’, p.121. 
162 *CIM*, i, no. 726. 
163 *CPR 1266-72*, p.146; JUST 1/42, m. 5.
Clare at London. De Clare’s retinue by this counting boasted at least twenty one knights by 1267, a significant force. When the Disinherited arrived at Southwark it was to Gilbert de Clare and his army that the citizens of London turned to repulse them. The seventy nine individuals we have named, when factoring in twenty one knightly retinues averaging perhaps 5.5 men per-retinue, along with others in de Clare’s service, could have potentially mustered 200 men, probably a lot more depending upon the number of tenants he could bring out. The considerable military power that de Clare could raise is also demonstrated by the apparently great strength of the forces that the earl and his close ally, John Giffard, could muster. During Montfort’s final months trapped beyond the River Severn in 1265, the force at Giffard’s command was seemingly large enough to deter Montfort from accepting offers to battle.

The military retinues of magnates and knights were significant in forming the backbone of the forces of each side during the Barons’ War, but they are very difficult to trace in the surviving source material. The focus upon knights tends to overshadow the full numerical resources available in these retinues. Even when the great magnates were absent, a grouping of enough barons and knights could yield a significant field force. The inquest in 1265 following the Marchers’ attack on Hereford in November 1264 breaks their army down into distinct groups. It lists fourteen principal participants of knightly rank or higher, although some, such as Ralph Mortimer were probably part of a family member’s retinue (in this case his father Roger’s). These men brought with them ‘their men’, while Hamo Lestrange, royalist sheriff of Shropshire, brought ‘his posse of Shropshire’. Further, many men of the Liberty of the Prior of Leominster accompanied them. The marshal was identified as John de Turbeville. Together, this ‘great army’ arrived at Hereford ‘with banners displayed’. In essence the inquest identifies the principal components making up the army; fourteen or less retinues, probably containing a mixture of tenants and waged men, the shire levy and some men from the liberty of Leominster. Armies in the Barons’ War were heterogeneous affairs, the true scale of which is usually obscured by the focussing of records on landholding knights.

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164 JUST 1/42, m. 10d.
165 Cron. Maior., p.90.
166 Wykes, p.166; See Chapter 1, p.37.
167 CIM, i, no.291.
Mercenaries/Stipendiaries

Distinguishing between a mercenary and a stipendiary can be a difficult task. Knights, sometimes foreigners who served in a retinue for wages or a fee rather than on the basis of tenurial links, are most usually referred to as stipendiarius rather than mercenarius. Both sides recruited knights from abroad. In 1261 for example, Henry III summoned help from the Count of St. Pol, with sixty knights; the long term Gascon troublemaker Gaston de Béarn with ten knights and mounted crossbowmen, and from Richard Munbeliardi of Burgundy for three or four knights.\(^{168}\) Henry seems to have encouraged the recruitment of crossbowmen from Gascony, for as well as Gaston, two other Gascon lords, Galliard de Solio and Bertram de la Dils were also summoned, each to come with 'good crossbowmen'.\(^ {169}\) The Count of St. Pol was summoned again in 1267 to help break the standoff at London and the arrival of these troops seems to have had a key role in resolving the conflict. On this latter occasion the count was granted £324 for the expenses ‘of himself his knights, sergeants and esquires and for loss of horses for the time that he was with the king in his service in England’.\(^ {170}\) It is hard to decide whether we should classify these men as mercenaries or stipendiaries. The term mercenary retained certain moral overtones that harked back to the notorious bands of Flemings, Routiers and Brabancons in the employ of kings such as Stephen and John, whereas those summoned by Henry III, like St. Pol, tended to be drawn from either his continental domains or from foreign allies often through the agency of Queen Eleanor.\(^ {171}\) In effect these men were mercenaries though, or at least would have included those serving purely for pay.

Montfort also made use of foreigners in his service, despite the considerable anti-alien sentiment in England during the war. His treaty with Llewelyn in 1265 granted him the service of Welsh infantry. A group of eleven men, possibly knights, who departed the rebel garrison of Kenilworth castle on 14 November 1265, possess continental names and were probably Simon’s stipendiaries.\(^ {172}\) Robert of Gloucester, in an otherwise unsubstantiated statement, claimed that Gilbert de Clare had turned against Montfort in part due to his use of foreigners as castle

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\(^ {169}\) CR 1259-61, p.496.
\(^ {170}\) CPR 1266-72, p. 87.
constables.\textsuperscript{173} There is little direct evidence for this, but the \textit{Flores} remarks that when Montfort celebrated Christmas at Kenilworth in 1264 his \textit{familia} was reported to have ‘no less than 140 stipendiary knights’.\textsuperscript{174} As Maddicott points out, ‘the profits of war gave Montfort the means to buy up men and service’ and his military experience and reputation had in the past ‘often given him access to formidable numbers of mercenaries’.\textsuperscript{175} The downside of mercenaries, however, was that their service was acquired by money. If the money ceased they might well depart or plunder the countryside. Such a problem was likely for Montfort when trapped beyond the River Severn in 1265 and this was also vividly illustrated in the Lord Edward’s 1263 raid on the treasure in the New Temple to pay his foreign knights.\textsuperscript{176}

The royalists made use of groups of Welsh mercenaries, particularly during the post-Evesham period. Roger Leybourne’s account records the use of Welsh scouts (\textit{Walenses exploratores}) when campaigning in Essex in 1266.\textsuperscript{177} A surviving fragment of a record of Welsh mercenaries hired for an undated campaign in Henry’s reign provides an insight into the recruitment and organisation of these Welsh contingents. Recruited on a local basis, each company could vary in size from between a score to over 300. These were usually led by one or two constables, often mounted, sometimes with a barded horse, as well as one or two standard bearers. The majority of the men in the surviving documents appear to be from Monmouthshire and Glamorganshire; Calidcot for example raised a company of twenty footmen led by a constable on an unbarded horse. Turbeville controlled Coity provided one constable with an unprotected horse (\textit{nudas}), one standard bearer and 369 footmen.\textsuperscript{178} The smallest contingent, the Forest of Dean’s, provided only twelve men of the Forest, at a wage of 3d a day. These were presumably skilled archers as they were paid a higher wage than normal for that profession.\textsuperscript{179} The most noticeable feature of this recruitment was the sheer numbers often recruited. Most of these companies were between a hundred and three hundred strong, and these figures are only what can be identified from the remains of the documents. In

\textsuperscript{173} Robert of Gloucs., ii, pp.752-3.
\textsuperscript{174} Flores, ii, p.504, \textit{Fertur autem habuisse eum ex propria familia ad minus cxl. milites stipendiaries.}
\textsuperscript{175} Maddicott, \textit{Simon de Montfort}, pp.310-11; B. Wild, ‘A Captive King: Henry III between the Battles of Lewes and Evesham, 1264-5,’ \textit{TCE XIII}, (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2011), pp.41-56, at 50-51, Wild suggests he may have also been redirecting purchases from the royal household.
\textsuperscript{176} Morris, \textit{A Great and Terrible King}, p.56; Maddicott, \textit{Simon de Montfort}, p.340; Ger. Cant., ii, p.222.
\textsuperscript{177} E101/3/6; JUST 1/42, m. 9d.
\textsuperscript{178} C47/2/1/14.
\textsuperscript{179} C47/2/1/14.
1242, perhaps the date of these records, Henry III requested as many as 4000 Welsh men to be recruited and sent to him for the campaign in Gascony.\textsuperscript{180} Much as under earlier English kings, the Welsh provided a ready source of good infantry willing to serve Henry III for pay, a resource which Montfort also tapped into in 1265.\textsuperscript{181} That the Welsh were unpopular in England is noticeable in the records. Montfort’s allies were slain by the locals in Tewkesbury as they fled Evesham, while one man accused of burglary in Windsor successfully shifted blame by claiming that Welshmen were serving in the area at the time.\textsuperscript{182}

A final type of stipendiary employed during the war was the engineer (\textit{ingeniator}). These specialists were responsible for building, maintaining and deploying engines and other methods of siege warfare.\textsuperscript{183} A few of these men are traceable in royal service. Master Henry the king’s builder was responsible for making shields and providing other materials for the siege of Kenilworth.\textsuperscript{184} A Master Gerard the Carpenter was tasked with building two engines in Newcastle in November 1255 and appears to be still in the king’s service in 1262.\textsuperscript{185} Some of the king’s crossbow makers seem to have doubled as overseers of the manufacture of siege equipment. John Malmort, maker of the king’s quarrels at St. Briavells, for example, was charged with making \textit{barbetains} in 1260-1.\textsuperscript{186} A Master Peter the Engineer and his assistants were recorded in the expenses of Roger Leybourne at the assault on Sandwich in 1266.\textsuperscript{187} At least one engineer, a Master William, is recorded in Montfort’s service through the surviving accounts of the Countess Eleanor. He may have participated in the Montfortian siege of Pevensey and had some connection to Montfort’s engines defending Kenilworth.\textsuperscript{188} The \textit{Flores’} description of Montfort’s engines at Kenilworth as being ‘Unheard amongst us and unseen’ might suggest Simon’s employment of foreign engineers, some

\textsuperscript{180} \textit{CR 1237-42}, p.514.  
\textsuperscript{182} JUST 1/42, m. 9d. one of the accused mentions that Welshmen were in the region as a defence against charges of theft.  
\textsuperscript{184} E372/110, m. 13d.  
\textsuperscript{185} CLR 1251-60, pp.248,267,319; CLR 1260-67, p.114.  
\textsuperscript{186} E372/109, m. 10.  
\textsuperscript{187} E101/3/6.  
\textsuperscript{188} \textit{Manners}, pp.55,57,66-7.
of whom he may have recruited as a result of his military campaigns in Gascony. Whatever their origin, these men provided a vital service to both sides during the war.

‘Customs of War’

The concept of ‘customs of war’ has received major study in the past couple of decades by, for example, Strickland, Gillingham and Keen. This section examines the fundamental aspects of these customs in order to provide a contextual framework for their further discussion in relation to the topics of the following chapters.

The capture rather than the killing of knights was a noticeable feature of both the battles of Northampton and Lewes in 1264, but in contrast both battles also saw very heavy casualties amongst the infantry. This behaviour was in line with the customs of war during the thirteenth century, which were influenced by the status of the participants and the region warfare was conducted in. Noble combatants could expect to be taken prisoner for ransom rather than killed, because the killing of fellow knights risked breaching a reciprocal code of behaviour, potentially endangering the killer and his compatriots in the future. It furthermore robbed the killer of a potentially lucrative ransom. This code did not usually apply to commoners, unless perhaps they were rich merchants, and they could be killed out of hand on a battlefield. At Saintes in 1242, both sides took prisoners but no knights are mentioned as killed. In Gascony, Montfort had captured and imprisoned but not executed rebel nobles like Gaston de Béarn. Even in Wales, where there was a history of executing even noble prisoners, such behaviour was becoming less common in the thirteenth century and several men are recorded as being taken prisoner and ransomed. Guy

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189 Manners, pp.55,57,66-7; Flores, ii, p.489; Wild, ‘The Siege of Kenilworth’ p.16.
191 See above, p.46.
193 Paris, iv., p.213.
de Brien, for example, was captured by the Welsh and ransomed back in 1257. Following the baronial victory at Lewes the royalists were ordered by Montfort to release without ransom those rebels captured at Northampton and to bring them before the king. Eight months after Lewes, in January 1265, the royalist knights John Bracebridge, Hugh de Tywe and John de Craunford were still receiving demands for the release of four prisoners they were holding at Shrewsbury castle. Some of the Montfortians did well out of the proceeds of the ransoms of those royalists captured at Lewes. Hugh Despenser for one was paid 700 marks by Peter de Petrapont for Peter’s release. The unequal distribution of ransoms in Montfort’s favour began increasingly to sour the relationship between Gilbert de Clare and Montfort between 1264 and 1265.

By the time of Evesham the enmity between the royalists and Montfortians had reached such a pitch that most of the Montfortian knights were slain on the field of battle and their army harried mercilessly, many reportedly pursued into the church and killed. Simon himself was killed, mutilated and his head mounted on a spear and paraded before being sent to Roger Mortimer’s wife at Wigmore. This is a stark contrast to the maximum of three knights reported killed at Lincoln in 1217. Executions for the crime of lèse majesté, as Strickland points out, occurred in the decades leading up to the war. In 1238, for example, a squire who attempted to assassinate Henry III was executed by being dragged apart by horses, his body cut in three and sent to different parts of the realm. This, however, was not at a time of war. A recently discovered narrative of the battle of Evesham recounts that a number of royalists swore an oath to deliberately cut their way to

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196 *CPR 1258-66*, p.399.
197 *CPR 1258-66*, pp.464, 492.
Montfort and ensure that he did not leave the battlefield alive.\textsuperscript{203} The destruction of the Montfortian army and most particularly the mutilation of Montfort’s remains were a highly unusual event and one that even the royalist chronicler Wykes was disturbed by.\textsuperscript{204} The following chapters will consider in more detail how ‘customs’ of war were applied in the different theatres of the war and how these too might have changed.

**Conclusion:**

This chapter has attempted to present an overarching view of the nature and experience of warfare and its organisation in England at the civil war’s commencement. While England itself had enjoyed a remarkable period of domestic peace, military experience was available, especially in Wales from 1257 onwards and on the tournament scene. Three distinct groups emerge who possessed the most active military experience prior to the war, the Marcher lords, the *familia regis* and the affinity of Simon de Montfort. The royalists appear to have had an early advantage, enjoying the military experience of both the Marchers and *familia regis*, as well as a preponderance of the older nobles. English society itself was highly militarized with both sides easily able to raise forces from a composite mixture of tenants, paid retainers and impressed levies. Small armies could be raised on an ad-hoc basis with some ease, of which the non-knightly component was of more significance than the numbers provided in royal records would suggest. The following chapters 3, 5 and 6 will provide additional discussion on this issue in relation to castle garrisons and local violence. These points were the foundations which underpinned the nature of warfare at the commencement of the civil war in 1264.

\textsuperscript{203} Laborderie, ‘The Last Hours of Simon de Montfort’, pp.403,408,411.
\textsuperscript{204} Wykes, pp.173-5.
2 The Role and Significance of Castles and Towns before the Barons’ War

When William of Newburgh dubbed the castles of England as the ‘Bones of the Kingdom’ in the late 1190s he did not exaggerate.¹ Little had changed in the following seventy years to alter the validity of that view. The castle remained a fundamental lynchpin in both the military and administrative control of England in the 1260s, while the importance of English towns in the war is inextricably linked to that of the castles. Both were, as we shall examine, vital military objectives due both to the resources they commanded and their geographical significance. As such, they were crucial in determining the priorities of each side and thus the course of events in the civil war. Castles and towns therefore fundamentally shaped the nature of war in this period. First, we will study the role, nature and importance of castles at this period, as well as their physical state prior to the conflict. Second, we will apply the same approach to English towns, though a discussion of the state of town defences is reserved for Chapter 4. Third, we shall examine the struggle for control of the royal castles and the methods used to obtain it by both parties from 1258 until December 1263.

‘The Bones of the Kingdom’: Castles in mid-Thirteenth Century

R.A. Brown has argued that the ‘castles policy’ of royal governments since Henry II’s reign sought to redress the balance of military power in the crown’s favour by taking select seigneurial castles into royal hands; destroying key rebel castles and resuming control of royal fortresses from de facto alienation by noble custodians. In addition, expenditure on royal castles was increased and up to 1224 the tendancy was, as Eales notes, for ‘the concentration of resources on selected key sites as on the accumulation of fortresses’. The result was a growing disparity between royal and seigneurial fortifications in terms of the strength of their defences.² Architectural developments during Henry III’s reign saw an increasing emphasis upon heavily defended curtain walls and

gatehouses, with new gatehouses built at Shrewsbury, Bristol, Winchester, Nottingham, Corfe and Deganwy and with especially sophisticated works on the Black Gate at Newcastle-upon-Tyne and at Dover. Barbicans were also built in Henry III’s reign at Bristol, Dover, Lincoln, Marlborough, Scarborough, Shrewsbury and Windsor. As the defence of the gatehouse was emphasised, so too was the defence of the curtain wall from assault. Timber palisades were rebuilt in stone and at Windsor, Winchester, Nottingham, York and the Tower of London the number of mural towers were increased. These developments stand in contrast to the continuing French emphasis on the importance of the ‘donjon’ in castle designs. French architectural influences were evident, however, in the English royal keeps that were rebuilt during the reign, including the unusual quatrefoil design at York in 1245. Timber fortifications, however, remained commonplace even in major royal fortresses, for example, at Nottingham castle the outer bailey remained palisaded. Despite this, with the conversion of the defences of the middle bailey to stone, Wykes described Nottingham as having ‘no peer in the kingdom of England’.

The estimated average minimum yearly expenditure on castles under Henry II was £650, which rose to £1000 under John. During Henry III’s reign this average was £1,500, though inflation in building costs helps explain part of this increase. During Henry III’s minority, particular efforts were focussed upon resuming royal control over royal castles in the wake of the civil war. Despite these early efforts, over the course of his reign Henry opted to transfer on a temporary basis a number of royal castles into the hands of certain nobles. He did this not only to alleviate the burden of their maintenance on the already indebted Exchequer, but also to reward his supporters. Kenilworth, for example, which Henry’s father John had done much to reinforce, was granted to Simon de Montfort for his lifetime; Pevensey to Peter of Savoy and The Peak to the Lord Edward. These factors combined saw the number of castles in royal hands dropping over the course of the reign from fifty-eight at its beginning to forty-seven at its end; a sharp contrast from the ninety-

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3 HKW, i, pp.115-18.
three held by John in December 1214. Henry’s main expenditure was therefore principally focussed upon a smaller group of castles than his predecessors, concentrating particularly on strategically vital fortresses such as the Tower of London, Dover, Gloucester and Windsor. In contrast, little real effort was made to maintain the lesser royal castles; as Brown comments ‘to restore their original timber defences would have been pointless: while to rebuild them in stone would have involved heavier outlay than their military importance could justify.’

Spending on Dover was exceptionally high. In the thirty five years following the unsuccessful sieges by Prince Louis in 1216 and 1217, Dover castle had ‘well over £6000’ spent upon it by both Hubert de Burgh and Henry III, including extensive defensive improvements to the gates and curtain walls. Likewise, Windsor had substantial defensive improvements made over the course of the reign including the completion of the curtain wall in masonry and new D-shaped towers. Much work under Henry III, however, was focussed on improving the royal apartments and domestic arrangements in several castles, particularly at the Tower of London, Windsor and Winchester. These works included at least two heads dating from c.1250, a wall painting of the apocryphal miracles of the Virgin from c.1240, panels of a seraph and a prophet in the ceiling of the Painted Chamber and a Zodiac in the lower ward. By 1263, the author of the Flores felt compelled to note as an aside in its account of the developing crisis, that Windsor was the ‘most beautiful’ castle and at ‘the time there was no more splendid within Europe’. There had emerged by the 1260s a core of strategically placed castles upon which royal government concentrated its resources. This expenditure resulted in the formation of a ‘super league’ of royal fortresses which both physically displayed royal power and served as a strong point for a garrison.

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9 Pounds, *The Medieval Castle*, p.82; Eales, ‘Castles and Politics’, p.368.
11 HKW, i, pp.118-9.
12 HKW, ii, 634.
16 Flores, ii, p.481
In contrast to their royal counterparts, the full number and scale of many seigneurial castles are nearly impossible to properly ascertain by the period of the civil war, due both to the lack of surviving financial accounts and the natural degradability of timber which leaves scant surviving archaeological evidence. The increasing resource gap, however, between the nobility and the crown meant that by the 1260s only the wealthiest of the magnates could afford castles on the scale of the great royal fortresses. The defences of many of these castles, in Pounds’ view, ‘were of little military significance’. Most seigneurial castles remained at least partially constructed in timber and could be little more than a manor complex surrounded by circuit of earth and timber defences and a ditch. The example from 1274 of Eaton Bray castle demonstrates this disparity as it was described in the inquisition post-mortem of George Cantilupe as ‘a manor, enclosed with moats and walls, and two drawbridges’ including ‘a bridge [across the moat] towards the park, weak, with drawbridge and gate …[un]roofed and shaky’. While doubtless its defences were ample protections against opportunistic raids, the description given is not of a major fortress, in the style of Warwick and Beeston, capable of withstanding the latest techniques in thirteenth-century siege warfare. Timber did not entail that these were unimpressive buildings, but they remained more vulnerable to siege engines and fire than their stone counterparts. On the other hand, the timber and earth defences of old sites could potentially be put back into operation fairly quickly at the outbreak of war and for a low cost in comparison to their stone equivalent. The smaller role of these fortifications in comparison to the past, however, is reflected in the apparent lack of any condemnation or orders concerning their destruction by the royal government after the war. The emphasis in the reissue of Magna Carta in February 1218 was upon the demolishment of ‘adulterine castles built or rebuilt since the start of the war.’ As Coulson notes, in the aftermath of the Barons’ War there was ‘no tidying up of the castellated detritus as had followed 1154, 1176 and

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22 Higham, Timber Castles: A Reassessment’, p.108.
24 Coulson, Castles in Medieval Society, p.136
1217’ and the issue of such fortifications makes barely, if any, impact on the comparatively far greater amount of surviving legal records covering 1264-7.25

Coulson has strongly argued against treating castles as purely military installations as well as the imposition of artificial definitions of what did and did not constitute a ‘castle’.26 Asserting that castles were primarily administrative centres rather than being designed principally for war, Coulson notes that ‘surviving ornate early “keeps”’ including the White Tower (London), Colchester, Norwich and Rochester, to name a few, were ‘very evidently meant to be imposing, not to be defended’.27 In his view, noble architecture ‘was militant not military’ and it ‘was generated by status-aspiration more than by fear of violence’.28 Creighton stresses that the siting of many castles had more to do with the symbolism of power than strategic considerations.29 The discussion in the next chapter will examine this more fully, but the non-military interpretation of castles has some compelling points in its favour in the context of the Barons’ War.30

The State of Royal Castles Prior to the Barons’ War
The sustained period of relative domestic peace that England had experienced from the late 1230s, coupled with the strained financial resources of the crown, meant that by 1260 a number of the royal castles were in an increasingly parlous state of both repair and supply. The sudden interest displayed by the baronial council in the state of the royal castles after 1258 and also by Henry III, following his resumption of power, demonstrates both a contemporary acknowledgement of the potential for armed conflict by each side and the perceived importance of the royal castles in that event. At Scarborough castle, an inquisition in May 1260 discovered that there were holes or worse in the roofs of the great hall, great chamber, wardrobe, kitchen and stables. The hall in the inner bailey was omnino est discoperta, the keep was lacking four doors and twenty nine windows, the beams were broken and the floors of the corner towers of the keep were putrifacta et defecit. The wall circuiting the keep was collapsed in many places and the crenellations and alures of the walls

25 Coulson, Castles in Medieval Society, p.140.
27 Coulson, Castles in Medieval Society, p.76.
29 Creighton, Castles and Landscapes, pp.65-88.
30 See Chapter 3.
facing the town were in many places *deteriorantur et magna indigent reparacione*. To complete the sorry picture two of the bridges were *putrefacte pro mangna parte* and the castle was lacking in crossbow quarrels and all necessary arms for its munition.\(^{31}\) In June that same year, the sheriff of Yorkshire was ordered to begin the repairs ‘where absolutely necessary against the coming winter’ as well as spending £12 on repairing breaches in the wall.\(^{32}\) Scarborough was not alone in being in a less than optimal state in 1260. Between 1258 and 1260, Northampton castle was reported to be lacking roofs on several turrets and instructions were issued that the west wall, which was apparently close to collapse, was to be patched with timber.\(^{33}\) It is unknown how far these repairs had progressed prior to the war, though there are signs that at least Scarborough had been rendered defensible.\(^{34}\) Northampton castle possibly suffered further damage in the assault in 1264 and on 21 April the new sheriff was ordered to repair the *bretaschias*, barriers and ditches. By November, fresh orders were issued to repair the buildings of the castle ‘which threaten to fall down’.\(^{35}\) The maintenance of the majority of royal castles, with perhaps the exception of those like the Tower of London and Windsor which served as royal residences, was not a priority in peace time and as such it is not unreasonable to assume that many, like Scarborough and Northampton, were in a poor state of repair by 1260.

During 1261, Henry III maintained efforts to render the royal castles defensible as he prepared the ground work for securing his return to personal rule. An inquest carried out before Matthew de Mare’s brief tenure as constable of Sherborne in January to February 1261, witnessed that at the castle ‘all buildings, walls and everything else’ were ‘in a ruinous state (*in debili statu*)’. Corfe appears to have been in better repair, in part perhaps due to the order issued in September 1260 for the repair before the winter of the ‘the king’s buildings’ ‘which have fallen down’. Its equipment was less impressive, with the inquest recounting that ‘on the platform above the chapel at the top of the great chamber’ there were ‘two rusty hauberks, three pairs of large, rusty iron caparisons, thirty rusty iron caps, twenty five rusty helmets.’ While the castle was well supplied with crossbows there were however ‘twenty nine pieces, both bows and tillers, for crossbows, which had rusted, with six

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\(^{31}\) *CIM*, i, no.252; *HKW*, ii, p.831.

\(^{32}\) *CLR 1251-60*, pp.512-13; *HKW*, ii, p.831.


\(^{34}\) More repairs were, however, ordered in November 1265, *CLR 1260-67*, p.187. See Chapter 3, pp.84-5.

\(^{35}\) *CLR 1260-67*, pp.136,147.
rusty and also inoperable (*immunitis*) winches’. The castle’s mangonel was in pieces, with five of the slings described as ‘rusty and *immunitas*’. The last supply of equipment to the castle for which we have a record was in 1252, when thirty-six crossbows were provided to the garrison. In total the castle had armour for about sixty men, eighty bows, primarily crossbows and 26,000 bolts of varying sizes.

The process of repairing the royal castles seems to have been an on-going project. On 23 February 1261, the sheriff of Wiltshire was ordered to repair the draw bridge of Salisbury castle as well as the well and to roof the [main] tower and the tower above the gate with lead where necessary. On 23 December 1261, the sheriff of Gloucestershire was ordered to let the keeper of the king’s works have 20 marks from the issues of the county to make two breast works (*bretachias*) and repair the king’s buildings in Gloucester Castle. At the Tower of London building work was increased a pace, with stern demands issued on 23 February to the sheriffs of Surrey and Kent to respectively send 1000 quarts of lime and twenty boat loads of ‘good free stone’ and another twenty of ‘stone and chalk’, both without delay to make a turret at the Tower. The aim of this work may have been to complete a section of the western curtain wall that had collapsed shortly after construction back in 1240 and which was still incomplete in 1253. Payments for repairs recorded in the Liberate rolls fall off markedly after the resumption of Henry III’s personal rule in the middle of 1261. Whether this suggests complacency and overconfidence by the royalists, or that the necessary castles were now deemed to be in a fit state is unclear.

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37 *CFR 1260-61*, no.198; Ridgeway, ‘Sherborne and Corfe Castles’.
38 *CLR 1260-67*, p.23.
39 *Bretachias* is described alternately as a palisade or wooden tower. Higham, suggests that it may be a cross-braced timber structure, a bit like a belfry. Some form of timber or timber and earth fortification is certain, for in Robert of Gloucester’s account of the first siege of the castle of Gloucester he refers to the burning of the *brutaske* and bridge outside the castle, indicating that both were timber; *Revised Medieval Latin Word-List: From British and Irish Sources with supplements*, ed. R.E. Latham, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, repr 2008), p.56; Higham, ‘Timber Castles: A Reassessment’, p.113; *CLR 1260-67*, pp.76-77; *Robert of Gloucs.*, ii, p.737.
The Arteries of the Kingdom: Towns and Castles

The involvement of towns in the Barons’ War was, to a significant degree, dictated by their strategic importance. Each significant town was of interest to each side for reasons of geography, resources (including man power), exploitable wealth, and their value as defensive or offensive bases. Gloucester, for example, commanded one of the best places to cross the river Severn and thence into Wales from the south-west and it served as an important port in the river trade of the Severn, and, via Bristol, onto Ireland. Dover and the other Cinque Ports were important harbours for trade with the continent. Towns were also usually foci for industry, frequently based on the resources of the local area. The iron industry in the Forest of Dean, for example, made Gloucester a centre for the manufacture of arms. Oxford was not only a major crossing point of the Thames, but also several major routes, such as from the Midlands to Southampton and from London via Gloucester into Wales, passed through it. Its location allowed it to act as a major trading point for the wool produced in the Cotswolds and the corn grown in the fertile lands around it. The town itself was an important centre of cordwainers and tanners, and maintained a strong cloth and wine trade with France and Flanders. If William of Newburgh could dub castles as the ‘the bones of the kingdom’ we should perhaps consider the towns as ‘the arteries of the kingdom’ through which its economic life blood flowed. Philippe Contamine summarizes the general importance of towns in medieval warfare most succinctly when he comments that they:

…offered space, material and moral resources favourable for prolonged resistance and,… while a conqueror might easily ignore an inaccessible castle, it was absolutely vital to control such centres of economic, administrative and human resources as were represented by towns.

Fortified towns in particular played an important role as military bases during the war. Their size, geographical location and the protection offered by their walls made them an ideal centre of operations for each side. In particular, town defences significantly reduced the chance of a successful surprise attack on the forces sheltering within. The Lord Edward’s success at Kenilworth in 1265 was made possible by the decision of Simon the Younger to stay in the undefended town.

41 VCH: Gloucester, ed. N.M. Herbert, 10 vols (London: Published for the University of London, Institute of Historical Research by Oxford University Press, 1907), iv, pp. 13-18.
45 Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p.101.
Likewise at Chesterfield, similarly unfortified, Henry of Almain’s men were able to sweep into the town unopposed by defences to capture Robert de Ferrers.\textsuperscript{46}

Towns and castles, particularly royal ones, were inextricably linked. Major royal castles were often sited in major county towns, and served as the administrative centre for a county’s sheriff, such as at Northampton, York, Gloucester and Hereford. Royal castles were more than a military base; they were often the centre of royal government with both administrative and symbolic value. The castle was also frequently an integral part of a town’s economy, as at Warwick (a seigneurial castle).\textsuperscript{47} Given their strategic importance, the presence of castles within most major towns is unsurprising. These castles often sat within the circuit of a town’s defences, if it possessed any, such as at Northampton, Gloucester, Lincoln and London.\textsuperscript{48} As a town’s castle was designed to guard and overawe the town, the citizens were naturally at a disadvantage if they came into conflict with its garrison. The control of the Tower of London was vital in determining London’s quiescence. Only with the arrival of de Clare’s army in April 1267 did those elements of the population in favour of the reformers gain ascendancy.\textsuperscript{49} The loyalty of any castle garrison in a town would also likely determine any resistance by the town’s people. It is, for example, very hard to gauge the popular support by the citizens of Northampton for the defence against the king in 1264 when the presence of a large baronial force in the castle and town rendered any objections by the citizens futile.

The royal castles of the Tower of London, Dover, Gloucester and St. Briavells retained especial importance as the principal manufacturing points for crossbows, quarrels and other engines, which were then distributed throughout the other royal castles as needed. The location of, and industry in, Gloucester made the royal castle a strategically vital arsenal. Gloucester, indeed, previously had acted as a staging post for campaigns into Wales in 1228 and 1246-47.\textsuperscript{50} In one week of early 1264,

\textsuperscript{46} See Chapter 5, pp.180-1.
\textsuperscript{49} See Chapter 3, pp.107-111.
\textsuperscript{50} \textit{VCH: Gloucester}, iv, p.13.
eight smiths were ordered to work on manufacturing crossbow bolts for the garrison. A handful of specialists in royal service were employed in this role in the 1260s: Thomas of the Holy Sepulchre, maker of the king’s crossbows in Rochester castle before the war, and in 1265-66 at the Tower; Alan Smith (*Faber*), maker of the king’s quarrels at the Tower; a Henry, maker of the king’s crossbows in Windsor Castle; John de Malemort, maker of the king’s quarrels at St. Briavells, and Master Conrad, the artiller of the king’s horn crossbows and his three servants. These highly skilled men were responsible for the maintenance, manufacture and ammunition of the crossbows of royal forces, a time consuming job but well paid. John Malemort, for example, was paid 7 ½d a day for making a hundred quarrels and an additional 3d a day for the fletching.

Certain castles seem to have been used as depots or construction sites for the king’s siege engines, namely the Tower of London, Windsor and Gloucester. How many were kept stored there before the war’s outbreak is unknown. Most of our administrative records for siege engines come from the period of the siege of Kenilworth and thus may have been built specially for that siege. These include a *berefridus* or siege tower built at Gloucester castle for the siege of Kenilworth. Corfe contained one in 1261, while Carlisle had possessed two in the 1250s. The number of engines kept in storage in different castles is unknown. Castles and towns were an intrinsic part of the government and control of the realm and it is therefore unsurprising that the control of them would become so important to both sides, both before and during the war.

**The Struggle for Control of Castles, 1258-1263**

*Either you return the castles which you have from the king or lose your head!* Simon de Montfort’s blunt declaration to William de Valence at the Oxford parliament in 1258 is both excellent testimony to the St. Albans chronicler’s view of Montfort’s forceful approach to dealing with obstacles, as well as to the beginnings of the struggle between Henry III and the baronial opposition for control over the royal castles in England. From 1258 until the beginning of

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53 E372/110, m. 2d.
54 E372/110, m. 11; E372/110, m. 2d; E372/113, m. 1d.
55 E372/110, m. 2d.
56 CFR 1260-61, no.198; CLR 1251-60, p.248
the war in March 1264, strenuous efforts were made by both sides to control royal castles. This section examines the course of events during this period, particularly the efforts put into acquiring the control of the castles at a time of nominal peace.

In 1258, the changes of constables were done with the aim ‘to preclude any likelihood of a Henrician recovery’. The fear was presumably that Henry would garrison and stock his fortresses, holding out until he could summon foreign mercenaries and overawe any baronial opposition. Although the atmosphere was fraught it seems unlikely, given the Savoyard participation on the opposing side, that Henry contemplated using force at this early stage of events, even if Edward, Henry of Almain and the Lusignans were perhaps inclined to aggression. The barons decided to give him no choice, however, and in the twenty-fourth and final clause of the Provisions of Oxford appointed new constables to twenty one of the most important royal castles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constable 1258</th>
<th>Castle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robert de Neville</td>
<td>Bamburgh, Newcastle upon Tyne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilbert de Gant</td>
<td>Scarborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Bardolf</td>
<td>Nottingham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Basset of Sapecote</td>
<td>Northampton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh Bigod</td>
<td>The Tower of London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard de Grey</td>
<td>Dover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas de Moules</td>
<td>Rochester, Canterbury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(absent from document)</td>
<td>Winchester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger de Samford</td>
<td>Porchester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen de Longspée</td>
<td>Corfe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathias de Bezill</td>
<td>Gloucester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry de Tracy</td>
<td>Exeter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Rochele</td>
<td>Hadleigh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Grey</td>
<td>Hereford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert de Walerand</td>
<td>Salisbury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh Despenser</td>
<td>Harestone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Montfort</td>
<td>Bridgnorth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The earl of Warwick</td>
<td>Devizes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John fitz Bernard</td>
<td>Oxford</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2:1 The Constables Appointed in June-July 1258

The act of resumption, which took back all alienated royal castles and lands, was aimed directly at the king’s half-brothers, William de Valence, Aymer, bishop of Winchester and Guy, who stubbornly refused to agree to the terms. It was this refusal which prompted Montfort’s

58 Jobson, Revolution, p.25.
59 Why York or Carlisle are not on this list is unclear, DBM, pp.112-3.
60 DBM, pp.112-13.
Following Montfort’s threat, the Lusignans escaped from Oxford with John de Warenne, earl of Surrey, and took refuge in Aymer’s episcopal castle of Wolvesey, outside Winchester. There they were swiftly besieged by the barons. The possibility of the use of force against the Lusignans had existed ever since the arrival of the armed reformers at parliament. At Wolvesey the gloves now came off to reveal the mailed fists beneath. The subsequent exile of the Lusignans marked the end of any potential armed resistance. The new constables were themselves a mixture of known royalists such as Robert Walerand, the steward of the royal household, and Mathias Bezill, a Burgundian Savoyard, and reformers such as Hugh Despenser and Peter de Montfort. Though humiliating for Henry, the change in constables was thus not an overtly aggressive act by the reformers. This stands in stark contrast to the changes in 1260 when Henry first began to regain control.

Henry’s victory in the parliament crisis of 1260 allowed him to remove a number of the pro-reform constables from eight royal castles. Most of these were firm supporters of Montfort (the exceptions were Robert de Walerand and William Bardolf) and this was a clear attempt by Henry to take back a firm grip on the royal castles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constable Appointed May 1260</th>
<th>Castle</th>
<th>Replaced Constable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hugh Bigod</td>
<td>Scarborough</td>
<td>Gilbert de Gant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew de Columbariis</td>
<td>Salisbury</td>
<td>Robert de Walerand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Balliol</td>
<td>Nottingham</td>
<td>William Bardolf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Gredle</td>
<td>Northampton</td>
<td>Ralph Basset of Sapecote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James de Audely</td>
<td>Bridgnorth and Shrewsbury</td>
<td>Peter Montfort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger Mortimer</td>
<td>Hereford</td>
<td>John de Grey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William de Say</td>
<td>Rochester</td>
<td>John de Cobham</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2:2 The Constables Appointed 19 May 1260

Curiously there is no sign that the revival of Montfort’s fortunes around Michaelmas 1260 led to another change in constables, despite the appointment of Montfort and Edward’s supporters as the Justiciar, Chancellor and Treasurer. Perhaps, reliant as Montfort was on the support of the moderate Richard de Clare, earl of Gloucester and Edward, this act would have been perceived as too aggressive by his allies. Henry, however, apparently had no such scruples and he began to ready and repair the royal castles in the months following Montfort and Edward’s departure for the

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63 CPR 1258-66, pp.70-71.  
64 Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, p.201.
continent in late 1260. On 28 January 1261, he ordered Robert de Walerand to deliver 15,000 quarrels from St. Briavells to Richard of Cornwall for his castles, including 8,000 for two foot crossbows and 7000 for one foot.65

On 9 February 1261, Henry retreated to the Tower of London. On 11th he temporarily appointed Matthew de Mara as keeper of Sherborne and Corfe castles, presumably with the intention to secure the south-west following the death of Stephen Longspée the previous constable. Geoffrey Gascelin, another royalist, was made constable of Hereford on the 27th, and on 4 March Robert de Walerand was appointed constable of Marlborough and Ludgershall.66 On 14 April Eustace de Balliol, brother of John, was made constable of Carlisle.67

Henry’s efforts seem to have focussed upon securing those castles guarding the south coast, probably with the intention of permitting the ready arrival of foreign mercenaries. On 3 May, Henry arrived at Dover and removed Hugh Bigod as its constable and replaced him with the ubiquitous Robert Walerand and at Corfe replaced Matthew de Mara, a loyal if minor noble, with the influential Philip Basset.68 On 12 May, he ordered the sheriffs of Sussex and Hampshire to take oaths of loyalty from ‘knights, freemen and others’.69 The sequence of actions was completed with the arrival of the papal bulls that annulled the Provisions of Oxford. On 25 May, now nearly ready, Henry replaced Hugh Despenser as constable of the Tower of London with his chancellor, John Mansel, thus securing the royal hold on the capital. He then released the papal bulls at Winchester on Whitsuntide.70 Henry, now happy to act openly, began to reappoint the sheriffs as well as the constableships of major royal castles. In all twenty six castles had new constables appointed, mainly ‘from the baronage and ministerial elite’.71 Henry’s actions during the course of 1261 demonstrated both his understanding of the levers of military power in England as well as his methodical approach to grasp and use them.

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66 CPR 1258-66, pp.143-44.
67 CPR 1258-66, p.149.
68 CPR 1258-66, p.151.
69 Jobson, Revolution, p.63.
70 Jobson, Revolution, p.63.
71 Jobson, Revolution, p.66.
The installation of rival baronial keepers of the peace from late June onwards saw the prospect of the use of force dramatically increase. A number of the royal castles remained out of royalist hands, their constables refusing to hand them over to the king’s appointees. In Suffolk and Norfolk, for example, the royal sheriffs were blocked from holding the castles by the keepers and Roger Bigod, earl of Norfolk. Hugh Bigod, Roger’s younger brother, refused to surrender Scarborough and Pickering. Henry began to ready the castles under his control for potential siege as the opposition to his revocation of the Provisions intensified and he awaited the arrival of his foreign allies. On 20 October, a stream of writs were sent to the constables of Lancaster, Shrewsbury and Bridgnorth, Gloucester, Devizes, York, Rockingham and Northampton promising their reimbursement for any money spent on the victuals for their castles, as long as they remained to the king, ‘unless by reason of war they are consumed in its defence’. The constables of Nottingham, Norwich and Carlisle were likewise promised recompense for expenditure on the ‘king’s houses and other works’ in their castles. On 9 November, John Balliol was busy augmenting the defences

Table 2:3 Constables Appointed 9 July 1261

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Castle</th>
<th>Replaced Castellan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Winchester</td>
<td>William de Wintreshill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exeter</td>
<td>Henry de Tracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hereford</td>
<td>Roger Mortimer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northampton</td>
<td>Simon de Patteshull</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincoln</td>
<td>Hamo Hauteyn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salisbury</td>
<td>Matthew de Columbarii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherbourne and Corfe</td>
<td>Philip de Cerne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadley</td>
<td>Richard de la Rokele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guildford</td>
<td>John de Wauton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridgnorth, Shrewsbury</td>
<td>William de Kaveriswell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwich, Orford</td>
<td>Hervery de Stanhou, Roger Bigod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nottingham</td>
<td>William son of Herbert, Simon de Aslakston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sauvey</td>
<td>William Bagod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>York</td>
<td>John de Odeton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>Thomas son of Michael</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlisle</td>
<td>sheriff of Cumberland?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canterbury, Rochester</td>
<td>John de Cobbeham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colchester</td>
<td>Roger Bigod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford</td>
<td>Walter de Ripariis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windsor</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambridge, Huntingdon?</td>
<td>John de Scalaris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancaster</td>
<td>Geoffrey de Chetham</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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72 CPR 1258-66, pp.163-64.
73 Jobson, Revolution, p.67.
75 CPR 1258-66, p.179.
of Nottingham with wooden hoardings. Peter de Percy, sheriff of Yorkshire expended £32 9s 6d of his own money on the wages of knights, crossbowmen both mounted and un-mounted, and archers in chasing the baronial partisans John de Eyvill, Adam de Newmarket and Richard Foliot as well as garrisoning York castle for 5 days from the 24 to 28 November. By December, Henry’s twofold tactic of negotiations and the threat of force had paid off and he was finally returned to full control of England without needing recourse to open warfare. Throughout this crisis, castles had played a key role, and were to continue to do so.

The Barons’ War may not have officially started until 1264 but in reality the first major fighting broke out in June 1263 in the March of Wales. Remarkably, despite the growing crisis in England, Henry made no recorded effort to prepare the royal castles in the first half of the year and it was only following the Marchers’ rebellion in June that Henry began to ready his defences. Henry’s priority, as in 1261, was to secure the castles on the southern coast. His first act was to appoint on 9 June, Nicholas de Crioll as warden of the Cinque Ports, with orders to the constable of Dover, Robert de Glastonia, to counsel and aid him. Henry also instructed the people of Dover on 10 June to provide ‘two or three of the most approved men for the security and defence of the said port by land or sea’. Two days later Henry began to arrange the defence of the rest of the kingdom, appointing Stephen of Penchester as captain for the defence of Kent and Sussex and Robert de Neville as captain for the lands north of the Trent. The constables of Rochester and Corfe were replaced and other royal castles were ordered to be provisioned, including Shrewsbury and Bridgnorth, both of which had already defected to the rebels.

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76 *hurdicia*, a wooden overhang built out from the ramparts that allowed defenders to fire on attackers at the wall’s base. The entry also mentions wood being used *ad cleias*. The meaning of this word is unclear; *CR 1261-64*, p. 4.

77 *CLR 1267-72*, no. 699; though marked as for the 45th year the liberate entry was in 1269 and seems to have been an error as Peter de Percy was not made sheriff until 1261, I therefore agree with Oscar de Ville’s suggestion that this in fact was meant to be the 46th year, i.e. 1261, not 1260; O. De Ville, ‘John de Eyville: A Neglected Rebel’, *Northern Studies*, 34 (1998), p. 21; *CPR 1258-66*, p. 179.

78 *CPR 1258-66*, pp. 263-64.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constables ordered to Provision castles</th>
<th>Castle</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James Audley</td>
<td>Shrewsbury?, Bridgnorth</td>
<td>June 16th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Basset</td>
<td>Oxford, Devizes</td>
<td>June 16th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam de Jesmond</td>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>June 16th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamo le Strange</td>
<td>Shrewsbury?, Bridgnorth</td>
<td>June 16th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert de Walerand</td>
<td>Dover, Marlborough, Ludgershall</td>
<td>June 17th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Russel</td>
<td>Old Sarum</td>
<td>June 17th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2:4 Constables Ordered to Provision Castles, June 126380

A curious omission from this list was Nottingham castle. It is possible that the castle may have been seized already, but there is no evidence to confirm or deny this. In the North, de Neville had been ordered to defend against those who ‘devastate the lands of the king's faithful men by fire, plunder and other means’.81 De Neville’s position was tenuous; the lands north of the Trent were a vast area with significant tracts of it dominated or contested by the rebels. He was faced with a nearly impossible task, as he politely pointed out to the chancellor, Walter de Merton, a few days later.

I have recently received the letters of the king, containing that he has appointed me his Captain of his counties beyond the Trent, (...) and the custody of the shire and castle of York. Truly, because to assume such is not possible without great expense, I have been led to beg (...), your counsel and help (...) in order to signify to me where and from whence, (...) I shall be able to acquire the money for the custody of the before said county and castle.82

The situation was, however, deteriorating faster than Henry could react. In the March, the Marchers’ rising had sealed off the river Severn. They first stormed Hereford then seized Bridgnorth, Shrewsbury, Worcester and later Bristol, as well as Robert de Walerand’s castle of Kilpeck.83 Gloucester was besieged and taken.84 In the wake of the successful coup, Montfort, now in control, followed the pattern set by Henry and appointed new baronial keepers for eight royal castles. Five castles he put under the control of his supporters, including Peter de Montfort, John de la Haye and Ralph Basset of Sapecote.85 This was a surprisingly limited change in some ways, with castles like Bamburgh, Scarborough and Newcastle receiving no new appointments. Gloucester castle was held by the Marcher Roger Clifford, while Shrewsbury and Bridgnorth were in the the

80 CPR 1258-66, pp.263-64.
81 CPR 1258-66, p.264.
82 Foedera, i, p.429.
83 Jobson, Revolution, pp.86-7.
84 See Chapter 3, pp.101-3.
85 Jobson, Revolution, p.100; Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, p.68, Richard de Grey was a latecomer to Montfort’s affinity.
hands of Hamo le Strange. Montfort either trusted his Marcher allies or he had only limited control over them as they remained in control of the castles they seized. Once more the need to prevent or obtain outside aid saw the south coast castles become the first objectives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baronial Keeper</th>
<th>Castle</th>
<th>Previous Constable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William Bardolf</td>
<td>Nottingham</td>
<td>John Balliol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry de Tracy</td>
<td>Exeter</td>
<td>John de Muscegros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter de Montfort</td>
<td>Corfe, Sherborne</td>
<td>Nicholas de Molis, Philip Basset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Eyvill</td>
<td>York</td>
<td>Robert de Nevill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de la Haye</td>
<td>Winchester</td>
<td>Reynold Son of Peter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard de Grey</td>
<td>Dover</td>
<td>H. bishop of London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Basset of Sapecote</td>
<td>Northampton</td>
<td>Alan la Zuche</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2:5 Montfort’s Appointments, 18 and 26 July 1263

The collapse of the new regime was marked by Edward’s bold seizure of Windsor castle on 16 October, where he was joined shortly by his father. On 25 October, Pevensey castle was committed to Edward by Peter of Savoy, then abroad, presumably as part of an attempt to organize the royalist campaign in the south. The Montfortian constable, John la Warre was ordered firstly, not to molest the men within and secondly, to grant safe-conduct to Edward’s men coming and going from the castle and finally, to prevent any plots against it. Similarly in Yorkshire on 6 November, Savoy’s steward, Guiscard de Charron, was appointed to hold Savoy’s castles and lands including Richmond. In late October to early November, Henry left Windsor with ‘a great force of men’ and proceeded to regain control of the chancery at Oxford, though it is unclear if he also took the castle. Next he took Winchester castle, expelling the baronial appointee John de la Haye, before making his move on Dover.

The seizure of Windsor highlights not just the defensive value of the castle, which now put Henry and Edward beyond the reach of Montfort, but also provides a useful illustration of its function as a military centre. A letter patent on 29 October, a day after Henry had set out for Oxford, instructed the constable to let Edward have from the castle, ‘4 great targes, 16 smaller ones, 6 one-foot crossbows and 3 haubergeons to the use of him and his household in going with

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86 Robert of Gloucs., ii, p.737-8; see above.
87 See Chapter 4, pp.170.
88 CPR 1258-66, p.271,358.
89 CPR 1258-66, p.295.
90 CPR 1258-66, pp.297,301.
the king on his present expedition’. The targes in particular might have been for siege work, providing protection for crossbowmen. Control of Windsor meant control of the equipment stored there and a material advantage for royalist forces in their campaign. To help secure it he left reinforcements of 31 sergeants with the constable Drogo de Barentein from late November to early December. On 3 December, the holders of Dover refused to surrender the castle to Henry without the permission of the absent warden, Richard de Grey. Unready to conduct a siege, the royalists retreated, and, after just missing Montfort at Southwark on the 11th, Henry began work on regaining command of other castles. From 12 December onwards a small flurry of writs were dispatched to constables such as Eustace Balliol in Carlisle and Roger Clifford in Gloucester, aimed at either gaining or confirming control of castles. Hamo le Strange, for example, was rewarded with the control of the manor and castle of Ellesmere and renewed efforts were made for Guiscard de Charron, to gain Savoy’s castles, Richmond and Bowes, both of which had been placed under the control of Robert de Vipont by the barons.

Conclusion

The castle was a crucial implement of war and was treated as such by both sides in the run up to the conflict. The efforts expended to control, repair and garrison these dominated key periods of tensions from 1258 onwards. In particular it was the major royal castles which attracted the greatest attention, those that Henry III had concentrated his resources upon during his reign and which sat at strategically vital locations in England. The appointment of rival constables and sheriffs by the opposing sides was likewise part of the wider struggle for the control of England. As the centres of local administration and as major symbols of local power, control of the castles, particularly the royal ones, were crucial means of establishing the effective and symbolic authority of each side. It was these considerations that helped dictate the strategies adopted by both sides before and during the war.

92 Interestingly this is dated the day after Henry left Windsor, either this was retrospective or Edward was following behind Henry’s force, CPR 1258-66, p.294.
93 C47/2/1/6.
3 The Castle at War

Pounds contends that ‘castles played no significant role’ in the civil war with the exceptions of the capture of Northampton Castle at its commencement and the siege of Kenilworth.¹ This chapter will challenge Pound’s view and, building upon the themes discussed in chapters 1 and 2, it will study the composition of garrisons during the civil war; the nature and problems of sieges in the conflict and the techniques commonly used; how the ‘customs of war’ were applied in this time of civil war and rebellion and how this compares to the period prior to the 1260s. The chapter will also examine the previously unstudied resistance of royalist castle garrisons and its impact between the battles of Lewes and Evesham and finally the logistics behind the biggest siege of the war, that of Kenilworth in 1266. The Barons’ War will be contextualised in terms of broader debates about the changing role of castles in war. Eales, in examining the role of castles in the civil war of 1215-17, argues that most castles remained essentially unutilised in the conflict and that minor castles (by which he implies primarily seigneurial and lesser royal castles) were of low military importance.² Prestwich’s study of the role of castles in Edward II’s reign concludes that, in contrast to the thirteenth century, castles played only a very minor role in in the struggles of the reign, in which there were only very brief sieges.³ This chapter will examine the extent to which the role of castles in the Barons’ War conformed to that of earlier and later periods. This chapter also provides the opportunity to examine the dispute over the primary function of the castle in the context of a single war rather than in the customary study of an individual castle or pan-century survey.⁴

¹ Pounds, The Medieval Castle, p.121, he wrongly describes Kenilworth as the last act of the war.
² Eales, ‘Castles and Politics’, p.371.
Garrisons

The garrison was the crucial constituent part to the function of the castle in wartime. As Coulson puts it, ‘the human element always came first’ in defence.\(^5\) This section will therefore further the discussion from Chapter 1 and examine the formation of castle garrisons during the war.

Castles should not be viewed as simply defensive strong points, but also as vital bases for offensive operations. A castle might provide protection for those inside, but to control a region it required the presence of a garrison capable of reacting and covering ground swiftly.\(^6\) As a result, at least part of any garrison was usually mounted. In peace time the majority of royal castles were usually only staffed by a few porters and wardens. Garrisons of royal sergeants and crossbowmen both mounted and on foot, were usually retained only in major royal fortresses, such as the Tower of London, and the castles in the March.\(^7\) With the lack of comparable records for seigneurial castles it is hard to make an accurate assessment as to numbers and types of troops garrisoned within, but during peace time these were probably small. In wartime, garrison sizes were liable to fluctuate depending on the strategic importance of the castle and whether it was serving as the centre of operations for the fighting in its locality. Small groups of stipendiary troops, such as archers, could be assigned to bolster the defenders as and when needed, such as at Bamburgh in mid-1265.\(^8\) The surviving expenses account of Rochester castle in 1267, during de Clare’s renewed rebellion, demonstrates the fluctuating size of a wartime garrison. The garrison size is not listed but the number of horses for which oats are being provided regularly varies between ten and ninety six as men come and go from garrison.\(^9\)

In *tempus guerrae*, the king retained the right to demand the temporary render of a seigneurial castle into his hands and to garrison it with a royally appointed constable and troops.\(^10\) While this right became an issue in the 1215-17 civil war, particularly in sparking the siege of Rochester castle, the issue of render is less visible in the 1260s.\(^11\) The only two clear instances both involve

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\(^5\) Coulson, *Castles in Medieval Society*, p.149.
\(^8\) C47/2/1/13; Pounds, *The Medieval Castle*, p.122. See also Chapter 3, pp.128-29.
\(^9\) E101/3/5.
Pontefract castle which was in the hands of Alice de Lacy, the widow of Earl Edmund of Lincoln. In 1264, Robert de Neville informed Henry III that he had garrisoned the fortress strongly. Just three days after the escape of Edward in 1265, a letter patent was dispatched to Pontefract castle instructing Alice that it was ‘unexpectedly’ required, and ordering her to surrender it to a Peter de Castre. While other renders may have occurred, they seem to have played only a very small role in the war.

There are several pitfalls in attempting to make an accurate assessment of the numbers in garrison during the Barons’ War. Surviving records of royal castles often mention the number of men, knights, sergeants, crossbowmen and archers etc. that were serving in a garrison in receipt of royal wages. As Prestwich notes, however, a wartime garrison’s numbers were probably slightly higher than that indicated by the number of men receiving wages. Yet this data has sometimes been taken as a definitive, or nearly such, number of men in a garrison. In particular, care is needed to differentiate between a permanent garrison on foreign campaigns and those operating during periods of civil war, as in the latter situation those men receiving royal wages were liable to be only part of the garrison. An additional problem in the current historiography has been the consistent failure by historians to adequately differentiate between seigneurial and royal castles. This has resulted in an unhelpful blurring of the lines between the two. For the Barons’ War we have no information for the former but some for the latter, making it problematic to treat both the same.

Men could join garrisons for a variety of reasons. The custom of castle guard, whereby men in the vicinity of the castle were required to perform military service in its garrison for forty days,
could be used to augment garrisons during wartime. The evidence for castle guard is, however, limited and in many cases ambiguous. Prestwich in particular casts doubt on its application into the thirteenth century, while Painter argues that castle guard was increasingly being commuted in return for payments.¹⁵ At Clun, in one known thirteenth-century instance of castle guard, the tenants of the seigneurial castellany are referred to as owing forty days castle guard during wartime in both 1254 and 1272. Suppe reckons that there were only nine knights or sergeants owing service on this basis.¹⁶ It is less clear how this system affected those men from the 100s in land value and 40 marks in chattels or lower brackets. Clun, a castle based in the volatile March, is also by no means necessarily representative of seigneurial castles in the quieter regions of England at this period. Furthermore, the castle guard system’s ability to function in a time of civil war is open to question. Some men could also be compelled to join a garrison and thus would not necessarily appear on any wage roll.¹⁷ A civil war furthermore created circumstances of political polarization which meant that men might also volunteer for service in garrisons for reasons of personal adherence to one faction, and operating alongside impressed men and those serving in retinues.

The garrison of Scarborough provides an excellent example of the likely composition of a wartime garrison. When it surrendered to John de Eyville in 1264 the garrison consisted of fifty individuals, of whom fifteen have surnames based on place-names within approximately 10-12 miles of Scarborough. Another eleven have names that can be partially traced to lands further away but still within North and East Yorkshire. A further seven have names based on an occupation probably related to permanent service in the castle, e.g. Porter, Baker, Usher and Hunter, while there are also a Cobbler and Taylor, though these latter two may have come from elsewhere. One individual, Richard Marshal, was a king’s sergeant and two others carried the surname or title of Arbalester (crossbowman) suggesting they were also known by their profession and were stipendiary soldiers of the garrison. A number of men are difficult or impossible to place and could either have been other stipendiary troops or part of the retinue of Sir John de Oketon, the

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¹⁷ See Chapter 6, pp.208.
constable. Scarborough suggests that during the war a garrison was usually a composite body of royal stipendiaries, retinue members, castle guard levies and volunteers.

Siege
This section of the chapter focuses upon the actual siege of castles during the civil war and particularly the key themes in their treatment and strategic importance. We will examine the ‘customs of war’ in this period regarding castles and their application during the civil war; the effectiveness of castle defences in the face of attack and what this may reveal about the role of castles in warfare in light of the comments by Eales and Prestwich. Several important sieges afford more detailed case studies, including those of Gloucester Castle.

Customs of War
The established ‘customs of war’ regarding castle sieges seem to have been followed during the course of the Barons’ War. These unwritten norms of behaviour governed the treatment of garrisons whether a castle fell by storm or surrendered on terms. The ‘right of storm’, which could trace precedent back to biblical times, placed the lives and goods of the besieged in the hands of the besiegers. This custom gained particular prominence in previous rebellions against the crown in England, most notably King Stephen’s refusal to accept terms at Shrewsbury in 1138 resulting in the storm of the castle and the subsequent execution of ninety-three men. At the siege of Bedford in 1224, the defenders were all hanged regardless of rank after the successful mining of the keep compelled them to surrender unconditionally. Remarkably perhaps, given the increasing bitterness of the conflict, there is no evidence of a mass execution of a castle garrison during the Barons’ War. The principal reason for this is that most castles surrendered, it seems, on terms. There are a number of castles that did fall to storm, principally Gloucester in 1263, Warwick, in 1264, Alnwick in 1267, and a number of Marcher castles like ‘Hulkes’ (possibly Castle Coch) in 1265, but if these garrisons were systematically put to the sword then the chroniclers do not say so. It is possible in the case of the capture of some small, lightly defended castles that the death of the entire garrison might have escaped attention during the confusion of the war but it is noticeable

18 CPR 1258-66, p.391.
20 Wykes, pp.167,197-98; Northumberland Pleas, p.264; Flores, ii, p.489; CIM, i, nos.321,940.
that there was no execution on the scale of those carried out after the siege of Bedford. Following the capture of Gloucester in 1263, for example, although one man was executed, the constable Matthias Bezill and the other survivors were spared. William Mauduit, earl of Warwick and his family were taken prisoner when Warwick fell. At Alnwick, the Lord Edward’s assault took the castle but according to Wykes, Edward displayed notable leniency to the defeated garrison.21

A demonstration of mercy by a besieger towards those captured in a siege was often motivated as much by practical concerns as moral. In 1216, after King John threatened to hang the rebel garrison of Rochester, he was warned that to do so risked reciprocal treatment of royalist supporters in the future.22 A similar disincentive was provided by the complex web of familial relationships that linked the opposing sides together in the 1260s. There are no recorded cases of tit-for-tat killings of castle garrisons, although after the defeat at Evesham the garrison of Kenilworth threatened to execute Richard of Cornwall and later severed the hand of the king’s messenger.23

The surrender of castles on terms was the most common and least costly method of taking them. The custom of respite meant that a besieger could grant a garrison a stated period to seek aid from their lord. If the defenders’ lord failed to deliver aid, or granted permission to the garrison to surrender, the garrison would leave under terms.24 The most lenient conditions could permit men to depart with their horses and arms. Confiscation of these or agreements to refrain from bearing arms were also used. At Kenilworth, the final surrender occurred after the expiration of the requested customary forty day period for the garrison to seek aid from Simon the Younger.25 In June 1265, in return for yielding Gloucester castle and bearing arms against Edward in ‘no place’ for forty days, the garrison was allowed to depart not only with life and limb, but their arms, horses and ‘all other things’.26 One member of the Gloucester garrison, Grimbauld Pauncefoot, reportedly swapped sides following the castle’s surrender and was knighted by Edward as a reward.27 Two other members of the garrison, Robert de Ros and Robert de Lisle, likewise seem to have enjoyed a relatively swift return to favour. In 1266, de Ros, for his good behaviour following the surrender, was officially forgiven his trespasses, while de Lisle was granted the wardship and lands of

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21 Robert of Gloucs., ii, pp.737-8; Flores, ii, pp.480,489; Wykes, pp.197-98.
22 Wendorver, iii, p.335.
24 Strickland, War and Chivalry, pp.208-212.
26 Robert of Gloucs., ii, p.759.
William de Aubeny’s heirs on 21 November 1265. Arranged surrenders remained preferred by both factions as the least costly method of resolving the fate of a castle, and this could often result in quite favourable terms for garrisons. The particular motivations of Montfort’s treatment of castles will be explored later in the chapter.

The castle’s lord played an important role in any surrender. If the lord, whether seigneurial or royal, was not present, the lord’s appointed constable was not meant to surrender the castle without permission. If a constable failed to make at least the appearance of a sufficient effort to defend the castle they invited accusations of betrayal by their lord. In the complex political circumstances of the Barons’ War this issue could be particularly troublesome. On 8 and 15 February 1264, for example, Henry sent messengers to Dover castle demanding admittance. The garrison refused, claiming they could not hand over the castle without the permission of its absent constable, Richard de Grey, even though Dover was a royal castle and technically de Grey was an appointment of the king. Lordship, as in early wars, played an important role in the issues of surrender and resistance by castle garrisons.

Siege warfare was not, however, free from acts of brutality, which was principally against non-nobles. When the Montfortian attack on Rochester in 1264 was abandoned, for example, Montfort left behind a small holding force. The surviving garrison, upon realising Montfort’s army had departed, sallied out and defeated the holding force. In an act of revenge for the siege, the royalists severed the hands and feet of the captured, presumably non-noble, rebels. There are, however, very few recorded incidents of this nature.

**Siege Technology**

Siege technology played a significant if perhaps under reported role in the Barons’ War. It is hard to fully assess the impact of siege technology in the war as narrative accounts only provide details of sieges when it was of major castles, most notably against Kenilworth, as opposed to minor castles. The danger then is that we judge the effectiveness of mid-thirteenth century siege

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28 It is uncertain which Robert de Ros this was, of Wark or Helmesly; *CPR 1258-66*, p.627; *CIM*, i, no.930; *CR 1264-68*, pp.149-50.
30 De Grey was an appointment of the council in 1263 and so received a letter patent in the king’s name, *CPR 1258-66*, p.271; *Ger. Cant.*, ii, pp.232-3.
31 This mirrors the fate at the hands of King John of those expelled from the garrison of Rochester in 1215, Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, p241; Wykes, p.147; *Ger. Cant.*, ii, p.236.
technology on the basis of its success against the most powerful and modern fortresses, and as a result underplay its performance against weaker fortifications. Developments in siege technology had a material impact on the development of castle designs. Hubert de Burgh’s major augmentation of the defences of Dover castle, an already powerful fortress, in direct response to the damage inflicted by Prince Louis’ mining provides the most direct testimony to this effect.\textsuperscript{32} For the smaller royal and seigneurial castles the construction of such expensive improvements was unlikely and this contributed to the widening gap between the strength of the major and minor castles.

In addition to starving a garrison out, there were several major tools at the besieger’s disposal in England by the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. For more sustained sieges the mine and the siege tower could be utilised. While the first use of the mine in England is unclear, the \textit{Gesta Stephani} records that King Stephen used it at least once in his 1136 siege of Exeter.\textsuperscript{33} The mine was utilised to great effect against both Rochester and Dover in the 1215-17 war, and it once again proved decisive at the siege of Bedford.\textsuperscript{34} There is little indication, however, that the mine played a major role in 1264-67. The only two recorded attempts at mining were Montfort’s at Rochester in 1264, and Henry III’s at Kenilworth in 1266. Both of these attempts failed; the former due to lack of time and the latter due to the moat around Kenilworth.\textsuperscript{35}

The erection of siege towers is recorded only at the siege of Kenilworth in 1266. These were used primarily to provide a platform to sweep wall tops clear of defenders and had been used at the siege of Bedford in 1224.\textsuperscript{36} Henry III and the Lord Edmund had each erected very large towers at Kenilworth. Edmund’s could reportedly host more than 200 crossbowmen while Henry III’s was so large it was named ‘The Bear’.\textsuperscript{37} Some of the materials for these seem to have come from Gloucester castle.\textsuperscript{38} Unfortunately, both these machines were destroyed after hits from the defenders’ own engines.\textsuperscript{39}

The main innovation by the Barons’ War was the introduction of the counterweight trebuchet into England. Siege engines, the traction \textit{petraria} and the torsion \textit{mangonellus} had been in use for

\textsuperscript{32}HKW, ii, p.634.  
\textsuperscript{33}Gesta Stephani, pp.22-23.  
\textsuperscript{34}Ann. Dun., pp.88-89.  
\textsuperscript{35}Rishanger, De Bellis, p.56.  
\textsuperscript{36}Rishanger, De Bellis, p.56; CLR 1260-67, p.289.  
\textsuperscript{37}Rishanger, De Bellis, pp.55-56.  
\textsuperscript{38}See Chapter 3, pp.133-134.  
\textsuperscript{39}Rishanger, De Bellis, p.56.
centuries. These were used to bombard castles with stones and fire, both to demoralise the enemy garrison and to affect a breach in the defences.\textsuperscript{40} The trebuchet was first recorded as being introduced by Prince Louis against Dover castle in 1217. By 1225, Henry III’s government had hired a Master Jordan as the king’s \textit{trubechetarius} who, over a five year period was involved in constructing \textit{trebucheta} (lighter counterweight lever engines) at Dover, Windsor and Winchester. That Master Jordan’s position was unique is indicated by the fact he is the only individual ever to be accorded this title by the royal government.\textsuperscript{41} While older siege engine designs, the \textit{petraria} and the \textit{mangonellus} were still in use at the siege of Bedford, Bachrach has demonstrated how by the 1240s both had been or were in the process of being phased out of the royal arsenal by the new \textit{ingenia}, which were specifically described as \textit{trebucheta} or the larger \textit{blida}. Royal records cease to refer to \textit{trebucheta} after 1244, and thereafter it seems \textit{ingenia} had become the accepted term.\textsuperscript{42} These engines could inflict significant damage and enjoyed an impressive range, between 170 and 420 yards depending upon the design of the machine.\textsuperscript{43} By the siege of Kenilworth, Henry III had deployed 11 engines to hammer the castle defences; some of these stones have subsequently been excavated.\textsuperscript{44} One of the clearest signs of the impact of the new engines on castle design is provided by an account for the construction of the new D-shaped towers on the western wall of Windsor the works of which were done ‘by view of the master trebucheter’.\textsuperscript{45} By the 1260s, these engines were not confined to royal hands. Montfort possessed engines at the siege of Pevensey and in Kenilworth. Gilbert de Clare deployed engines against the Tower of London in 1267; while the Marchers and Edward were able to use them against Gloucester castle in both 1263 and 1265.\textsuperscript{46} On 11 May 1265, Montfort ordered the sheriff of Hereford to erect a building in Hereford castle for housing the engines he was bringing with him. He may have used these engines subsequently

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\textsuperscript{41} Bachrach, ‘English Artillery’ pp.1421-22; D. Renn, ‘Master Jordan, who made the King’s Trébuchet’, \textit{Arms and Armour}, 1 (2004), pp.25-32.
\textsuperscript{42} Bachrach, ‘English Artillery’, pp.1423-24. While chroniclers were not always as reliable in assigning the correct names to machines, some older machines may still have been in service. Robert of Gloucester for example, refers to the threat by the garrison of Wallingford to throw Edward out of the castle by a mangonel, and Corfe is referred to as possessing these, so some of these engines were still in use. See Chapter 3, pp.90-91.
\textsuperscript{44} Rishanger, \textit{De Bellis}, p.57; Wild, ‘The Siege of Kenilworth’, p.18.
\textsuperscript{45} Jansen, ‘Henry III’s Windsor’, p.99.
\textsuperscript{46} See Chapter 3, pp.101-3.
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against Monmouth castle. It seems highly probable that Montfort was able to deploy engines against the Marchers’ castles on his campaigns in the March in 1264-65 and this may have contributed to the swift fall of the Marcher castles.

**Surprise**

A consistent theme in the accounts of assaults on castles in the Barons’ War is both the use of surprise attacks and the vulnerability of castles to this tactic. The logic behind launching a surprise attack was that it could capture a castle swiftly and with minimal bloodshed, while, in the recorded instances of failure, it did not seem to result in any heavier casualties on the attackers than a ‘conventional’ assault. As a tactic it had no real downsides. The use of surprise attacks against Warwick and Alnwick were notably successful. Surprise meant a garrison might not be able to man the defences swiftly enough to repulse an attack, a particular problem if the garrison was small and could place only a handful of men on watch at any one time. An attack at night time or the early morning made early detection even harder and thus increased the chance of success. If such techniques worked on strongly built and sited castles like Warwick, the likelihood of success against smaller, less impressively fortified seigneurial castles was even greater and it is probable that this technique was tried more often in local warfare than just those incidents recorded in the narrative accounts might suggest. An alert garrison might fend off the attack, but accounts of failed attacks highlight that it was those castles with concentric layers of defence (sometimes including town walls) which had the greatest chance of successfully responding to and fending off the attack. When, for example, Sir John Giffard and Sir John Balun attacked Gloucester in 1264, they used subterfuge to achieve surprise, reportedly fooling the gate guards of the town into thinking they were Welsh merchants. They failed, however, to take the castle. Again, in 1265, surprise helped breach the town walls of Gloucester, but once more the castle was able to hold out. In both cases the attackers would have been slowed overcoming the town’s defences, giving additional time for the castle garrison to become alerted.

The royalist attempt to free Edward from Wallingford in the autumn of 1264 provides the most interesting illustration of this type of attack. Determining that the garrison of Wallingford was

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47 *CLR* 1260-67, p.175; *Wykes*, p.167.
48 The use of the siege castle in contrast to 1138-53 is unrecorded in the Barons’ War. Why this is the case is unclear.
weak (according to Robert of Gloucester through the advice of the queen), Warin de Bassingbourne, the royalist commander of Bristol and member of the familia regis, led three hundred horsemen from Bristol in a surprise raid.\textsuperscript{50} Wallingford was a royal castle which Henry had granted to Richard of Cornwall in 1231.\textsuperscript{51} Over the 1240s, Richard substantially improved the castle with the construction of three concentric walls and moats on the northern side of the castle, making it one of the few concentric castles in England. Creighton has contended that these changes were done with the principle purpose of the conspicuous display of Richard's wealth and power and dubs it a ‘concentric show-fortress’. In particular, Creighton notes that the course of the road into the borough of Wallingford was altered to bring it round the foot of the castle where Richard’s works, including the concentric walls, could be viewed to greatest effect.\textsuperscript{52} While part of Richard’s intentions behind the construction of this triple ditch and curtain wall may have been display, the improved defences also had a very practical defensive purpose. The northern approach to the castle was the only direction from which the castle itself could be directly attacked without first entering through the town. Although the town defences were in an unknown state by 1264, the significant bank and ditch and the provision of night watchmen dictated by Henry III’s 1242 de forma pacis meant that if the objective was to seize the castle by surprise, there was little practical incentive for an attacker to approach from that direction due to the increased risk of detection.\textsuperscript{53}

When Bassingbourne’s men arrived from Bristol at sunrise on a Friday morning they assaulted and breached the outer wall from the direction of the church of All Hallows, which lay directly on the road leading to the town from north. The attack seized the outer-ward, but the garrison were alert enough to contain them there and ‘with arbalests and with other engines, fast against them cast’. The attack was finally halted when the garrison threatened to hurl Edward from one of the castle’s mangonels, a threat Edward was forced to personally affirm, urging his would be rescuers to depart ‘otherwise he was dead in truth’.

\textsuperscript{50} Robert of Gloucs., ii, pp.751-2.
\textsuperscript{52} Christie, Transforming Towns, pp.159, 216-7.
\textsuperscript{53} See Chapter 6, p.220.
\textsuperscript{54} Christie, Transforming Towns, p.167; Church Historians, v, pp.368-9; Robert of Gloucs., ii, pp.751-2.
have also provided a useful illustration to Edward of the benefits of concentric defence, a feature which he incorporated into both his later work on the Tower of London and into a number of his Welsh castles, such as Beaumaris.55

**Treachery**

The betrayal by some defenders of a castle is a recurrent theme in accounts of sieges in the war. The motives of these individuals likely varied but the narrative or legal records never elucidate the reasoning of those involved. Personal considerations rather than political ideology do seem the most likely cause. Simon the Younger’s recapture of Tonbridge castle after the battle of Lewes was reportedly assisted by a Roger de Fonte who had betrayed the castle’s state to Simon.56 Roger’s motivation is never made clear. Politics may have been involved but so too might the desire to avoid being trapped defending an isolated castle for an apparently losing side with little or no prospect of relief. At the siege of Kenilworth, as the circumstances of the garrison became more desperate, the resolve of a number of the defenders’ broke and they attempted to haul up the royal banner in surrender. They were overwhelmed by the other rebels and executed.57 Again, the motivation for betrayal was probably personal; perhaps the individuals were seeking to avoid harsher royalist reprisals by facilitating the castle’s fall. In 1263 at Gloucester, the desperate constable, Matthias Bezill, unwisely released the prisoners held in the castle to assist in the defence. These prisoners, deciding that their prospects were improved by assisting the attackers, opened the postern to let in the rebels.58 One by-product of the use of conscripted locals in garrisons was that such men were liable to be unwilling participants and might desert when the opportunity arose. One Richard Walecon, for example, is recorded in the Berkshire Eyre as having been conscripted into Odiham Castle by the rebel constable, Richard de Havering. The jury accepted Richard Walecon’s assertion that he had escaped from the castle when he could, clearing him of wrongdoing.59

The most significant and intriguing case of treachery, however, involved the fall of Dover in October 1265. With Montfort’s death his wife Eleanor, now based in Dover castle, became a centre

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56 CIM, i, no.760.
58 Flores, ii, p.480.
59 JUST 1/42, m. 3.
for Montfortian resistance in the south east. Henry III wanted his sister and the remaining Montforts brought to heel and on 28 September he ordered the barons and bailiffs of Dover to prevent her departure without his permission. On the 2 October, messengers were sent to Louis IX to discuss the fate of Eleanor and her children while on 10 October Henry complained to Louis that Eleanor had dispatched her younger sons Richard and Aumary by ship to Gravelines with 11,000 marks. Just as in 1264, however, no moves were made to besiege the castle.

Henry III had invested heavily in the defences of Dover ever since the unsuccessful siege by Prince Louis, making good the vulnerabilities revealed in that siege. By the 1260s, Dover was one of England’s most formidable fortresses and there can have been little relish for a siege amongst the royalists. Over the summer of 1265, Dover’s garrison readied the castle for a potential siege, with references appearing in Eleanor’s household roll for the period of 23-26 August of oxen taken de praeda (from plunder) rather than de stauro (from stock). Eleanor also paid the wages for twenty-nine archers residing in the garrison, probably the same twenty-nine men who were listed as serving at the siege of Pevensey.

All, however, was not well in the fortress. Since the battle of Lewes, Dover had been used as a prison for a considerable number of captured royalists, including the major Anglo-Scottish lord Robert de Brus. According to Wykes, sometime before 26 October two of the three custodians (custodes) of Dover castle conspired with the royalist prisoners to seize control of the keep while the third was in the town. Barricading the keep’s doors the royalists held it against the garrison’s determined attempts to retake it. On receipt of this news, Edward set out at once with a large force of knights, travelling without sleep until they arrived at the castle and assailed it. Caught between the keep, which was well provisioned with food and crossbow bolts, and Edward’s army, the rebels surrendered in return for the terms of departing with life, limb, horses and arms. Edward

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62 See Chapter 2, pp.64-5; *HKW*, ii, pp.633-38.
63 On 29 August, two masons and two servants were tasked with building a furnace in the castle, presumably for defensive works. Wilkinson, *Eleanor de Montfort*, p.124; *Manners*, pp.83-4.
64 Wilkinson, *Eleanor de Montfort*, p.124; *Manners*, pp.67,85. These archers seem have become attached to Sir John de la Warre, at least temporarily.
65 As many as forty, Wykes, p.178; Wilkinson, *Eleanor de Montfort*, p.120; *Manners*, p.50.
66 Flores, iii, p.7-8; *CIM*, i, no.724, The *Inquisitiones de Rebellibus* conducted a couple of weeks beforehand claimed two of the constables were a Sampson de Soles and Stephen Pirie. Nothing more is known regarding these men.
prioritised obtaining possession of the castle over punitive action against the garrison. On 26 October, Eleanor negotiated for the return to favour of several of her household before departing the castle on terms on the 28th with her two young children. Treachery was crucial to ending the resistance of one of England’s most powerful castles. Dover was a serious potential problem for the royalist cause in the early autumn of 1265. The strength of the castle, the possibility of foreign support for the rebels and the assistance of the rebellious Cinque Ports which could have supported it, rendered the castle a serious longterm threat to the newly revived royal government. Had the two constables not betrayed the garrison, the royalists may have been faced with the necessity of besieging both Dover and Kenilworth, a monumental undertaking given the ramifications of the royal siege of Kenilworth in 1266.

Gloucester and Control of the Severn

In the course of the war several castles became crucial focal points for the conflict. With the exception of the siege of Kenilworth in 1266, these sieges have received very little attention in current historiography. This section will examine those for which we have good surviving narrative accounts and will discuss the context and importance of the sieges as well as building up a picture of the problems and methods of siege warfare during the Barons’ War.

Gloucester castle came under siege on three occasions between the summer of 1263 and June 1265. In 1263, the royalist constable, Mathias Bezill, rejected demands from the allied Marchers and reformers that he surrender the castle, declaring as the king’s appointed constable that ‘he would be no traitor, nor ever yield up the castle’.

Bezill’s garrison were only ‘a few’ according to the local chronicler Robert of Gloucester, who seems to have been an eye witness or at the very least interviewed those who had been for his account. Robert’s view is supported by that of the Flores based at nearby Pershore abbey. It was the inadequate garrison that was to prove the greatest contributing factor to Gloucester castle’s fall. The rebels were well equipped and over four days

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67 Wilkinson, Eleanor de Montfort, p.121; HKW, ii, pp.636-7; Eleanor and her household they were probably residing in the new domestic buildings in the inner bailey during these events.

68 Wykes, p.179; Ger. Cant., ii, p.243; Royal Letters, ii, pp.294-6, Sampson de Soles and Stephen Pirire were both included in this list, adding some mystery to the events in the castle.

69 See Chapter 3, pp.130-39 and Chapter 5, pp.177-85.


assaulted the castle with ‘crossbows and engines’, destroying the brutaske and the bridge that were ‘all of wood’. The Flores reports that the gate to the city was also burned in the fighting, although it is possible that this refers to the same brutaske and bridge as Robert. It was Bezill’s desperation for men, according to the Flores, that persuaded him to release some of the prisoners held in the castle to help defend it. Their treachery forced Bezill back to the ‘most strong keep’ which was fortified with three doors and bars of iron. The defenders held out for a while longer but apparently took heavy casualties, as Robert lamented ‘but for want of help many were destroyed’. The siege ended when the attackers broke through the doors with iron mallets and axes and seized Bezill.

The most interesting point in this account is the use of siege engines (ginnes) by the rebels. What Robert means by this is left vague but his phrasing suggests some kind of throwing machine, possibly trebuchets given that Robert also uses the term magonel. Where the rebels got these is unknown. It is possible some might have been seized from the other castles captured that summer, or perhaps some had been built during the recent wars in Wales to reclaim the castles lost to the Welsh. Perhaps Montfort had provided some from Kenilworth. If Robert’s account is accurate then it suggests the rebel forces were very well equipped. While nothing in either account contradicts the other, it is curious that the usually very well informed Robert omits the story of the prisoners’ treachery and this does raise questions about the Flores’ version. Yet both accounts agree on certain key features. The outer defences, possibly including the gate towards the city, were burned. The garrison was inadequate, and with the fall of the outer bailey Bezill retreated to the keep. While Gloucester was a powerful fortress, the root of its fall though seems to have rested on its inadequate garrison, a fact supported by the service of a carpenter in the defence.

The siege of 1263 displays both the crucial importance of the castle on the river Severn but also the difficulties of conducting the siege of a major fortress. It also highlights the necessity of a sufficient garrison size for a prolonged defence. In addition, as the first major siege of the civil war it would have helped inform the attitudes and approaches of the participants to siege warfare in the rest of the conflict.

74 Robert. Gloucs., ii, pp.737-8, al of tre; Flores, ii, p.480. All but a carpenter were spared.
75 See Chapter 3, pp.87-90.
76 See Chapter 1, pp.24-6.
In February 1264, a second attack on Gloucester became highly probable following the arrival of Montfort’s sons, Henry and Simon, in the March. The royalists senses an opportunity to trap the Montforts while they were busy capturing of the royalist seigneurial castles of Wigmore, belonging to Roger Mortimer and Thomas Corbet’s Radnor as well as ravaging royalist lands. On 4 February 1264, following the swift return of Edward from the continent, a letter close was dispatched to Roger Clifford, sheriff of Worcestershire and constable of Gloucester. Clifford was ordered to ‘destroy and throw down’ all the bridges in his bailiwick on the River Severn, except at Gloucester, and to ‘sink and break’ the boats, barges and ships on the river to block the eastward passage. The intention was to cut off the sons of Montfort and their allies from the Montfortian strongholds of the Midlands, including the great Montfortian fortress at Kenilworth. The motive for making Gloucester rather than one of the other towns on the Severn the only crossing point probably had much to do with its location. The bridge at Gloucester permitted supplies from St. Briavell’s Castle and the Forest of Dean to take the most direct route to Oxford, the muster point of the royal army. Likewise this route allowed Edward’s forces to move directly to Oxford on their return while conversely forcing the Montforts to march further south in an effort to reach their Midland bases, rather than being able to cross the Severn at Bridgnorth or Worcester. Gloucester also boasted a major castle and town fortifications that could be used to help defend the crossing. Gloucester and its castle therefore became the logical hinge upon which the campaign in the March would turn.

Gloucester castle’s role as the seat for the sheriff of Gloucester and Worcester further increased the importance of its position in early 1264. Since the switch in loyalties of the Marchers to the royalist faction in late 1263 the region around Gloucester had been contested between the two factions. In particular, there was skirmishing as the Montfortian John Giffard from his castle of Brimpsfield vied with the royalist sheriff, Roger Clifford, to dominate the region. Clifford, who had held Gloucester since the ejection of Bezill, had learned from the fate of his predecessor and

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78 CR 1261-64, p.374.
79 See Chapter 2, p.70.
80 See Chapter 2, pp.70-72.
ensured ‘he stored the castle with power enough’.\textsuperscript{81} The garrison was reinforced with an unknown number of men receiving royal wages, their pay listed in the Pipe Rolls as starting from 21 December 1263. Clifford would later claim £100 was spent on repairs to the walls and battlements, brattices and engines in the castle, deepening the ditches and replacing portcullises. Much of this was probably a legacy of the damage inflicted in the previous summer’s fighting.\textsuperscript{82} John Giffard similarly prepared his castle of Brimpsfield, sited 12 miles from Gloucester, storing it ‘well enough’ by gathering and driving the property of his neighbours to the castle and increasing his forces with ‘the most stalwart men he found’.\textsuperscript{83} In one incident of the escalating conflict in either the second half of 1263 or early 1264, Clifford attempted to hold the hundred court in Quedgley, two miles from Gloucester. Giffard, departing Brimsfield castle with an armed force, fell upon the court, killing men and forcing Clifford to flee and others to hide in a church.\textsuperscript{84}

The date of the commencement of the second siege of Gloucester is uncertain, but it may have been underway for around a week before Edward’s arrival on 5 March. Despite Clifford’s precautions in setting a good watch, the town was taken by surprise, though the castle remained in royalist hands. Unable to take the castle by assault, the resultant standoff developed into a full siege when the Montfort’s and their army arrived from the March and added their efforts to securing control of the vital fortress.\textsuperscript{85} On Ash Wednesday, 5 March, Edward’s army, fresh from taking the castles of Huntington and Hay from Humphrey de Bohun, crossed the bridge over the Severn from the west and assaulted the town. Despite the Montfortians being caught between Edward’s attack and a simultaneous sally conducted by the garrison, the royalist assault was repulsed.\textsuperscript{86} The royalist failure to lift the siege meant that providing direct aid to the garrison was the next priority. Edward therefore commandeered a ship belonging to the Abbot of Tewkesbury and entered the castle from the river.\textsuperscript{87} Edward then raised his standard above the castle. These acts had both symbolic and practical significance; for as well as bringing needed reinforcements, by raising his standard, the

\textsuperscript{81} Robert. Gloucs., ii, p.739, he astorede þe castel wiþ poer inou.
\textsuperscript{82} The total sum of £897, 2s, 1½ d. also included Clifford’s expenses from his resumption of control from late June 1265 until Easter 1266, E372/110, m. 1d; HKW, ii, p.654.
\textsuperscript{83} How Giffard recruited these men is unknown. Were they his tenants or were some stipendiaries? Robert. Gloucs., ii, p.739.
\textsuperscript{84} Robert. Gloucs., ii, pp.739-40.
\textsuperscript{86} Flores, ii, p.486; Robert. Gloucs., ii, p.743; See Appendix 1 for a more detailed discussion of the chronology of events.
\textsuperscript{87} There is little in surviving evidence for the layout of Gloucester castle. It is known to have possessed two ditches; HKW, ii, pp.652-56.
king’s son was making a statement that the garrison had received its royal lord’s aid. To facilitate resupply, Edward next reportedly had the bridge to the castle across the Severn to the castle Mead repaired. Despite Edward’s reinforcement of the garrison, the siege continued, with the rebels besieging the castle whilst ensconced within the protection of the town walls.

The Montfortian siege seems to have made little progress. In contrast to 1263, the Montfortians apparently lacked throwing engines; the garrison did, however, and from ‘within cast out, with their engines fast’. The Montfortians were apparently unable or unwilling to starve the garrison out, perhaps due to Clifford’s preparations and Edward’s supply efforts. A protracted siege was not in the Montfortians’ interests since there was the possibility that further royalist reinforcements might arrive. Likewise Edward was keen to break the siege; first to avoid being trapped in Gloucester for a prolonged period, particularly if more rebels might be on their way, and second, because the date

Figure 3:1 Gloucester Castle and the River Severn c.1500

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88 Flores, ii, p.487.
89 See Chapter 4, pp.160-1.
90 Map adapted from, VCH: Gloucester, iv, pp. 63-72..
for the muster at Oxford was fast approaching. According to Robert, each side conducted a series of indecisive assaults and sallies between the castle and town and sniped at range with bows, crossbows and the castle’s engines. The ‘bicker lasted long’, Robert noted. John Giffard, who had reportedly returned to Brimpsfield at some point, re-joined the siege, burning the bridge to the Mead once more and cutting the castle’s supply route.  

Efforts to achieve a negotiated peace were, however, still underway. The bishop of Worcester, Walter de Cantilupe, and Abbot Reinaud of Gloucester frequently mediated between the two sides and prevented battle, as Edward and his men ‘often were within, upon the point to strike out’. It is possible that the two ecclesiastics tried to arrange day-by-day truces, in lieu of a more significant compromise. The fighting underway in the country at this stage remained in a strange semi-legal limbo of rebellion yet not quite rebellion, as Henry III himself had not yet personally entered the fray nor had the barons formally defied him. Despite the efforts of the two men, there was no appreciable lull in the fighting as ‘bicker, slaughter and shooting, between them often was’. The siege ended on 13 March when, according to Robert of Gloucester, royalist watchers spotted the approach of Robert de Ferrers’ army from the direction of Tewkesbury. Edward struck a peace deal with Henry de Montfort via the mediation of Cantilupe, which permitted the abandonment of the siege on the provision that the citizens of Gloucester would not suffer retribution for their involvement. With the agreement, the rebels withdrew to Kenilworth, leaving the newly arrived Ferrers enraged.

Existing interpretations of the Montfortian failure to take Gloucester have been inspired primarily by the Annals of Dunstable’s claim that Montfort was angry at Henry de Montfort for his failure to capture Edward. This has led to a general perception that Henry was somehow naive in agreeing to a peace and needlessly squandered a chance to capture Edward. The charge of naivety may be true, particularly as regards the assurances extracted for the protection of the citizens of Gloucester, yet this would be misreading the situation in March 1264. First, the Dunstable account

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91 Robert of Gloucs., ii, pp.743-44.
93 Robert of Gloucs., ii, p.745. This is a slightly odd event. Edward must have struck a peace deal very quickly upon sighting Robert, and for Henry to abandon the siege at the point of reinforcement suggests either he was low on supplies or he was unaware of Ferrer’s approach. The other alternative is that Ferrer’s arrival at the point of a peace deal was pure chance.
94 See Appendix 1; Robert of Gloucs., ii, p.745.
of events at Gloucester bears little resemblance to the local accounts of Robert or the *Flores*. It omits any details of the fighting, except that the barons feared their army was too small and called for Ferrers’ aid. It then refers to a mass knighting in preparation for conflict. The latter point is not mentioned by the other sources and smacks as deliberate foreshadowing of the battle of Lewes by the annalist. Robert of Gloucester’s far more detailed information, replete with precise local details, instead shows the siege instead being a close fought encounter.  

Second, the assumption is that the arrival of Ferrers’ force changed the underlying dynamic of the siege. With no knowledge of the state of supplies in the castle we cannot predict how long the castle could continue holding out. Even if Ferrers’ force had brought siege engines with them the likelihood is that it would have still taken days to affect a breach. The reinforcements might discourage Edward from sallying out, but they did little to alter the fact that the castle remained a formidable barrier to assault. Perhaps the castle could have been taken by storm with fresh troops, but Henry may have decided such a course risked a pyrrhic victory. Third, we assume Henry’s position was strong enough to maintain the siege for much longer. Despite Montfort having lands and allies in the March, the Marchers were primarily royalist, and as such further supplies or relief forces for Gloucester were possible from the West. Henry’s ability to provide his army with food and ammunition is unclear as the supplies the host were carrying with it when they arrived at Gloucester were unlikely to have been large. By the time of Edward’s arrival, the siege had already been going on for a week or more and supplies may have been an increasing source of concern for the Montfortians. Coupled to this may have been the issue of the service of any levies brought with them, who may have been reaching the forty day limit. Fourth and perhaps most importantly, was the timing, as Henry III arrived at Oxford on 8 March for the muster of the main royalist host. This worrying news may well have reached Henry de Montfort on or before 13 March and the potential of being caught by the main royal host, which was only around fifty miles away, may have motivated the decision to withdraw to the safety of Kenilworth.

The second siege of Gloucester provided a salutary reminder to the combatants that when adequately garrisoned and supplied, major stone fortresses could only be taken with the necessary

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96 Gransden believes Robert’s section on the Barons’ War is contemporary, Gransden, *Historical Writing*, pp.432-38; It lists John fitz John with Henry, but Wykes accuses him of being in London around the same time, personally strangling the Jew Cok son of Abraham, though Maddicott places this event later in April, *Ann. Dun.*, pp.227-8; Wykes, pp.142-3.
equipment and preparation. By contrast, seven seigneurial castles are recorded as falling to both parties in the space of a month, through either short sieges or direct assault whether due to inferior defences or inadequate garrisons. Failure at Gloucester had a price as well. As the Dunstable annalist’s account shows, Henry de Montfort’s reputation suffered slightly for his perceived outwitting by Edward, however unfair such a view may have been.

The third siege of Gloucester again grew out of an attempt to seal the River Severn. In the summer of 1264, the damage Montfort’s army was able to inflict unchecked against the lands and castles of the Marchers in the March prompted a change in strategy by the latter when they renewed their rebellion that autumn. Montfort was too strong in the field and the Marchers’ castles had proved vulnerable. While the royalists attacked Gilbert de Clare’s castle of Hanley, south of Worcester, in early October and the Montfortian stronghold of Hereford on 10 and 11 November, they also sought to prevent Montfort from entering the March by blocking his passage over the Severn.97 These efforts were assisted by their continuing control of the royal castles, with the Flores commenting that the royalists were established in castles from Bristol to Chester.98 The plan worked in that Montfort was blocked from crossing at Worcester, but it failed when the Marchers were outflanked by a combined attack from the west by Montfort’s ally Llewelyn and from the north into Cheshire by Robert de Ferrers.99

The strategy of sealing the Severn was, however, once more applied by the royalists in the summer of 1265. The town and castle had been surrendered to the Montfortians in December 1264 and Montfort had since reinforced the garrison.100 In the week before midsummer, the royalist assault seized the town by surprise and the Montfortian defenders retreated to the castle.101 In

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97 CIM, i, no.291; CPR 1258-66, p.374.
98 Flores, ii, p.502.
99 See Appendix 1; Flores, ii, pp.503-4; Ann. Dun., p.235.
100 They numbered five knights banneret with their familias and three hundred horsemen, Flores, iii, p.2; Robert de Ros was one of the guards that Edward escaped from at Hereford on 28th. He later surrendered at Gloucester, suggesting Montfort sent reinforcements after 28 May, Guisborough, p.198; CPR 1258-66, p.627; Chapter 4, pp.160-2.
101 The specific start date of the siege is not given, but the Flores remarks that the siege was for fifteen days, while Robert of Gloucester commented that it was ‘about an þre wouke’, Flores, iii, p.2; Robert of Gloucs., ii, p.759. These figures would put the start date of the siege somewhere around 14 June. Gloucester was still open on 7 June when Montfort instructed reinforcements to come that way rather than Worcester, CPR 1258-66, p.487.
contrast to the second siege, the besiegers this time had *stronge ginne* to bombard the castle.\(^{102}\) It seems inadequate supplies rather than an inadequate garrison was the prime reason for the castle’s fall this time, as Robert of Gloucester comments that they waited for ‘succour’ from Simon ‘for else they must need, the castle yield and tower’.\(^{103}\) On 29 June, with no relief from Montfort evident, the garrison yielded to Edward on terms.\(^{104}\) It is unclear if the date of surrender was agreed beforehand or whether the garrison simply gave up. Robert’s account provides no indication of any respite granted in the siege while relief was sought. The garrison were granted terms by Edward who, much like Montfort since the battle of Lewes, was keen to gain control of the castle without further time and effort.\(^{105}\)

Why Montfort remained static in Hereford until 23 June is unknown. He made no recorded effort to relieve Gloucester or attempt to march north to make the crossing at Shrewsbury, where the castle at least seems to have been in his hands until late June.\(^{106}\) Lack of information and perhaps the strength of the royalist host at Gloucester may have played a role in this hesitancy. Castles may also partially explain his failure to move north. The early capture of Ludlow suggests the crossings of the River Terne, which barred any march north, were also guarded. With Gloucester’s fall, however, Montfort’s army was cut off from aid. While Montfort’s southwards march took Monmouth castle and Castle Coch, neither materially assisted his efforts to escape and he was forced to retreat once more to Hereford.\(^{107}\) Gloucester and the other castles and towns along the River Severn were crucial in dictating the shape of the war in 1265.

The sieges of Gloucester castle demonstrate the strategic importance of this major royal fortress and how its possession helped shape the conduct of the war in the region. More generally, the sieges highlight the critical role that supplies and garrison strength could play in the success of the defence of even powerfully built castles. While negotiations were apparently the preferred method of resolving a sustained siege by both parties, it is noticeable that the deployment of siege engines occurred in both the successful sieges. Engines, as well as inflicting physical damage on the fabric of defences, also applied additional psychological pressure on the defenders. By the late

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\(^{102}\) *Robert of Gloucs.*, ii, p.759.

\(^{103}\) *Vor ells hii moste need . be castel yelede & tour, Robert of Gloucs.*, ii, p.759.

\(^{104}\) *Flores*, iii, p.2.

\(^{105}\) See below, pp.111-30.

\(^{106}\) *CPR 1258-66*, p.434.

\(^{107}\) *Wykes*, p.167.
summer of 1265, the physical toll inflicted by the three sieges was severe, damage that would not be repaired in some cases for decades. One of the sieges had resulted in the burning of the top two floors of the keep, damage that had still not been repaired by 1303.\(^{108}\) In 1270, an inspection ordered by the king and conducted by the abbot of Gloucester and prior of Llanthony, reported that in the assessment of the carpenters, masons and ‘divers trustworthy persons’, it would cost 60 marks to repair the bridge across the river (burned by Giffard) which was now ‘nearly pulled down’ and to repair the walls and other less badly damaged buildings. This sum, however, excluded ‘the repair of the tower and the buildings that are altogether ruined and pulled down’.\(^{109}\) The garrison’s efforts to improve the defences also resulted in substantial damage to the neighbourhood of the castle. In 1267, an inquisition noted that the damage caused to the priory of Llanthony by the digging of a ditch and the burning of a number of its buildings close to the castle was 31s, 10d yearly. By 1268, a review of Gloucester’s defences seems to have concluded that the priory’s buildings had compromised the defences and therefore the king granted the meadows of Southmede and Waleham to the priory in exchange for the one below the castle.\(^{110}\)

**The Siege of Rochester and the South Coast**

The decision to besiege Rochester castle, like that of Gloucester, was determined by its strategically vital location defending a river crossing. Unlike the sieges of Gloucester, however, that of Rochester differs in the very tight time scale in which it was conducted, which resulted in the application by Montfort of quick, but costly tactics to ensure its reduction. The siege also marked Montfort’s personal entry into the civil war as well as the largest and fiercest siege conducted under his command.

Montfort’s decision to attack Rochester in April 1264 addressed two objectives; to remove a royalist garrison that guarded a major crossing on the River Medway thus severing land contact with Montfort’s allies in the Cinque Ports; also to distract Henry III from his successful campaign in the Midlands, which threatened the lands of both Montfort and many of his allies. The attack on Rochester also provided an opportunity to combine his forces with those of Gilbert de Clare, who

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\(^{108}\) *HKW*, ii, p.654.

\(^{109}\) *CLR 1267-72*, no.1125.

\(^{110}\) *CIM*, i, nos.338,351; *CLR 1267-72*, no.1010; *HKW*, ii, p.654.
had recently joined the rebel cause. De Clare had based himself at his castle of Tonbridge, south of the Medway, a situation that permitted Montfort to launch a two pronged attack on the town from both north and south of the river. Had de Clare not joined Montfort’s side in the assault, Montfort’s forces would have been compelled to battle the undivided royalist garrison when trying to cross the river. De Clare and his army arrived at Rochester on Thursday 17 April, laying siege to the town and castle. The next day Montfort’s army, including the London militia, arrived on the north bank of the Medway at the suburb of Strood.\footnote{Ger. Cant., ii, p.235-6; Flores, ii, p.489.}

De Clare’s initial assault on the walls was repulsed and Montfort twice failed to take the fortified bridge before the pair co-ordinated a joint attack around the time of Vespers. As de Clare assaulted the walls, Montfort used boats to cross the river and resorted to ‘a most subtle trick’ to defeat the bridge’s defences. Using a little boat he ‘set a great fire with pitch, charcoal, sulphur and with pig (fat)’ before using this fire ship to burn down the timber ramparts built on the bridge (and probably part of the still mainly timber bridge itself).\footnote{Similar sorts of ingredients were used for the mining operation at Rochester in 1215, McGlynn, Blood Cries Afar, pp.147. Work on the bridge, town gates and upon making bretachias around the city was underway in July 1262, CLR 1260-67, p.104; The Rochester Bridge Trust, http://www.rbt.org.uk/bridges/roman.htm [accessed 28.02.2014]; The slightly excitable Dunstable annalist claimed this was ‘Greek Fire’, Ann. Dun., p.230; Ger. Cant., ii, pp.235-6; Flores, ii, p.490.} The defenders were driven back to the castle. Two days later Montfort launched a determined attack on the castle which succeeded in taking the outer bailey and forcing the garrison back to the great keep, which, as in 1215, continued

\begin{figure}
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\caption{Castle and Town defences of Rochester\footnote{Author’s own map.}}
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to hold out. Crucially, according to the Dover Chronicle, following their success the rebels then rested on Easter Sunday before resuming their attacks on the Monday. The Dover Chronicle remarks that it was only the rebels’ decision to rest on two feast days that prevented the castle’s fall. Given both the attackers efforts of the previous two days and Montfort’s own strong religious sensibilities, the decision not to press the attack is not perhaps surprising.

Henry’s alarm upon learning of the attack on Rochester was reflected in the haste with which he marched the royal army south. According to Wykes, Henry drove the royal army’s march from Nottingham so hard that they marched nearly without sleep and as a result they made it to Rochester well within five days. The news of the king’s approach and Edward’s simultaneous threat to Tonbridge castle caused the rebels to retreat to London in the night, leaving only the small holding force that Wykes dubbed *victimas*.

(Image has been removed due to Copyright restrictions)

**Figure 3:3 Besieger with a pick, Joshua Conquering the City of Ai, Macieowski Bible, c.1250, Pierpont Morgan Library, New York, Ms M 638 f.10v**

Rishanger, writing in 1290s and early fourteenth century, proclaimed that Simon ‘gave an example to the English of how assaults ought to be made on castles, of which in those days they

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116 Wykes, p.147.
117 Wykes, p.147; *Ger. Cant.*, ii, p.236.
were wholly ignorant’. Considering the success others had enjoyed against castles so far in the war, this claim should be taken with a large pinch of salt. Yet Montfort’s assault against Rochester’s strong defences does indeed demonstrate elements of good planning, cunning and a high degree of determination. The prosecution of the siege needed to be swift in order to take the castle before a relief force could arrive and Montfort pressed it with considerable vigour, with the exception of the breaks on the feast days. He had come well equipped for a siege. As well as the materials he used for the fire ship he brought engines with which he bombarded the keep after the capture of the bailey and attempted to mine it as well, perhaps recalling accounts of King John’s successful siege fifty years before. Some of those involved in the mining appear in the Inquisitiones de Rebellibus for Kent. A Richard Lambard of Borstal was accused specifically of digging or sapping the wall of Rochester castle while a William Lodman and John Phelipe of Strood ‘came to the siege of Rochester crossing the river Medway in a boat with arms and pickaxes to attack the city and castle’. The keep, described by Coulson as ‘meant to be imposing, not defended’ once more proved resilient to siege. Although details of the garrison are largely unknown, we do know that it was led by the constable, Roger de Leybourne, John de Warenne, earl of Surrey, John fitz Alan, earl of Arundel and William de Breuse. Given the crucial location of the castle and the significance of the men holding it, a large garrison formed from a combination of royal troops, stipendiaries and retinues was likely. Townsmen, whether willingly or not, were also involved in the defence. The death toll of the fighting is hinted at by the Dover continuation of Gervase of Canterbury, which comments that ‘many’ were ‘captured, wounded and killed’ as well as the Flores’ statement that Simon’s final assault on the city on the 18 April only succeeded ‘after many wounds and slaughter of his [men]’. The casualties inflicted on the besiegers were likely high, following at least one attack on the town walls, the three assaults on the bridge, the storming of the outer bailey, as well as the subsequent week of siege. There is no indication, in contrast to the sieges of Gloucester, of any attempted negotiation between the two parties, as both presumably anticipated that Henry must come to the castle’s relief.

118 Rishanger, De Bellis, pp.v-xxv:25.
119 Ger. Cant., ii, p.235; Flores, ii, p.491; CIM, i, no.767; Wykes, pp.146-7.
120 Coulson, Castles and Society, p.76.
122 Flores, ii, p.490.
123 Flores, ii, p.490.
Montfort and de Clare demonstrated that even a well garrisoned major stone castle could be nearly taken by force if the attacker was willing to pay the high price in casualties. Montfort’s need for haste meant that direct assault was the only real option open to him and his tactics at Rochester were not perhaps those that he or many other commanders would be inclined to follow given the choice. We should note though Montfort’s later reluctance to engage in major siege warfare in Rochester’s aftermath.\textsuperscript{124} The fabric of Rochester castle, like that of Gloucester, suffered heavily in the siege and took decades to repair. In a writ of 1273, the main gate into the bailey was noted to have been destroyed during the war.\textsuperscript{125} The keep had been subject to battery by Montfort’s engines and, whether by design or accident, Roger Leybourne had also burned down the king’s hall in the castle prior to the siege. The castle subsequently remained in poor shape and it was only in 1281 that the hall and chambers, ‘long since burned’, were licenced for demolition, while much of the damage was not made good until the mid-fourteenth century.\textsuperscript{126}

\section*{The Tower of London 1267}

The siege of the Tower of London was the last siege of the war. There has been no full account of the siege, despite the significance of the event and the implications de Clare’s failure to take the castle had for his rebellion.\textsuperscript{127} De Clare had become increasingly alienated by the royal policy of disinheritance and by the perceived failure of Edward to honour the promises made to him regarding reform. De Clare began to collude with the Disinherited at somepoint perhaps in February 1267. The plan, it appears, was to seize the capital and combine forces with the Disinherited in order to pressurize the king to ameliorate his terms for the restoration of the Disinherited’s lands.\textsuperscript{128} On 8 April 1267, de Clare arrived outside London with his army and was let into the city the next day by the papal legate, Ottobuorno, who was unaware of de Clare’s intentions. The arrival of some of the Disinherited at Southwark on 11 April and de Clare’s refusal to confront them was the first sign to the legate that something was amiss. Events moved slowly,

\textsuperscript{124} Chapter 3, pp.111-130.
\textsuperscript{126} HKW, ii, pp.809-10.
\textsuperscript{127} For an account of the background to this event see, Jobson, \textit{Revolution}, pp.158-60.
however, suggesting some caution by de Clare, as his men only moved to seize control of the city gates after 17 April. This event and the resulting revolution in London caused Ottobuorno and his household to retreat to the security of the Tower. De Clare seems to have sought not to alienate the legate and even permitted Ottobuorno’s free movement from the Tower and into the city to preach the crusade at St. Paul’s. On 27 April, Ottobuorno moved from issuing stern remonstrations against the situation in London to the declaration of an interdict on the city. De Clare’s patience now gave out and he demanded the Tower’s surrender, laying siege to it when the garrison refused to comply.

De Clare’s failure to secure the Tower had serious consequences, for without it his control of London remained incomplete. From 1263, the Montfortian domination of London had been reinforced by control of the Tower under its constable, Hugh Despenser, and was garrisoned with men drawn from as far away as Cambridgeshire. Henry III was well aware of the castle’s importance, and he made efforts to ensure that it remained well garrisoned following the castle’s surrender by Hugh Despenser’s widow after the battle of Evesham. By mid-March, the garrison of the king’s sergeants was at least thirtyfive strong with wages being paid to fifteen mounted and twenty infantry sergeants. That de Clare failed to achieve it peacefully is in part due to his slightly misjudged handling of Ottobuorno as well as the determination of the royal garrison. Control of the Tower mattered to de Clare’s plans. That he had siege engines with him does suggest he had come prepared for the possibility of a siege but the immediate seizure of both London and the Tower, as in 1263, had almost certainly been his intention. The Tower’s defiance was a litmus test as to both de Clare’s resolve in the face of the unfolding crisis and the importance he placed on possession of the castle. The fierceness with which de Clare conducted the siege is informative on both points.

130 Knowles, ‘Disinherited’, Part i, p.53; Wykes, pp.201-2; Flores, iii, p.14.
132 See Chapter 3, pp.43; Wykes, p.175.
133 Wykes, p.201; CLR 1260-67, pp.263-64.
The importance of the Tower was such to de Clare that a simple blockade was not sufficient. Instead, he set up engines in the parts of the city adjacent to the Tower, probably close to the location of the main gate, and continuously bombarded the castle. The defenders raised their own engines but these were too small to respond properly. While fitz Thedmar curiously avoids describing the siege he does mention that following de Clare’s subsequent reconciliation on 23 June ‘the whole of the covered way’ (claustra) ‘which the earl had made between the city and the Tower, was entirely broken up and the timber carried away’. The next day twenty workmen from each ward were sent to demolish a ditch that the earl had built. Presumably these works had been used to shelter the besiegers from the castle defenders and its construction is indicative of the large effort to which de Clare went. Knowles’ discussion of de Clare’s rebellion mentions that the siege was conducted with vigour by de Clare, but does not consider the nature and significance of

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134 Adapted by author from HKW, ii, p.709.
135 The damage inflicted on the Tower by this bombardment is unclear but £20 was allocated in 1268-9 for roofing and repairing the Tower and the hall and other buildings; CLR 1267-72, no. 532.
136 Mayors and Sheriffs, p.97; Cron. Maior., p.91; Wykes, pp.201-2.
137 Cron. Maior., p.93. Knowles misinterprets fitz Thedmar by assuming that this passage meant that de Clare had dug a ditch around the city. One should already have existed and a royal decision to level this long established earthwork seems unlikely. The placement of the passage directly after the mention of the claustra suggests fitz Thedmar is referring to the same location, i.e. between the Tower and the city, Knowles, ‘Disinherited’, Part i, p.56.
de Clare’s acts. The decision to actively bombard a royal castle while a papal legate was inside marked a dangerous escalation in the confrontation and is indicative perhaps of a degree of desperation on de Clare’s part in contrast to his rather cautious moves during April.

Supplies became a problem for the garrison, but following the arrival of Henry III and his army from Cambridge after 7 May, reinforcements were brought into the castle via the southern gate by the river and the legate was escorted to safety. By 30 May, at least forty two royal sergeants are recorded as being in the garrison. Given the castle’s importance the likely number of reinforcements was probably higher. The relief accomplished, the royal army moved off to Stratford, only four miles from the Tower. Despite Henry’s failure to enter the city, he made Stratford his base, within easy distance to reinforce the Tower in the case of assault. In the meantime, Henry once again prioritized securing his ability to bring in foreign reinforcements from the continent. He ordered Roger Leybourne to reinforce both Rochester castle and Dover with additional supplies and then dispatched Leybourne to the continent to bring the reinforcements.

A combination of factors eventually led to a peaceful resolution to the London crisis, but throughout De Clare’s position in the capital remained insecure, weakening his negotiating position. More generally, the royalist domination of the key castles thwarted any wider ambitions de Clare may have harboured in his actions.

De Clare’s position in London was never fully secure throughout his rebellion in 1267. This factor added to the pressures building upon him over the course of May as further royalist reinforcements arrived. The siege of the Tower possibly left several longer term legacies. One of these may have been to further focus Edward’s mind upon the importance of the Tower for the control of London. The massive building works that transformed the already powerful fortress into a ‘major concentric castle’ were begun shortly after his return from crusade in 1275 and continued until 1285. De Clare too may have found any lessons he had learned from the siege of

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139 See above and Chapter 1, p.43; Wykes, pp.201-2; Flores, iii, p.15; CPR 1266-72, pp.142-143; CLR 1267-72, no.563; Knowles, ‘Disinherited’, Part i, p.55.
140 Wykes, pp.201-2; Knowles, ‘The Disinherited’, Part i, p.53.
141 Rochester was still apparently in a parlous state of defence. The constable, Simon de Cray, and two others were accused by hundred jurors in 1275 of, during Simon’s tenure in 1267, using castle timbers as firewood and permitting more than 60s worth of lead to be removed; HKW, ii, p.809; Lewis, ‘Roger Leybourne’, p.207.
143 HKW, ii, pp.715-6.

\textbf{King’s Men without the King}

Of the many problems facing the new Montfortian regime in the wake of Lewes, the control of castles would prove to be one of the most difficult to resolve. Montfort’s approach combined both political and military pressure but displayed a consistent reluctance to engage in protracted siege warfare and actively favoured acquiring the surrender of castles through diplomatic means. This section will examine the resistance of the royalist garrisons, particularly the final three holding out in 1265, Bamburgh, Pevensey and Richmond, and the pressures on both Montfort and the royalists at this period. This section will also examine how the on-going siege of Pevensey may have affected Montfort’s response to the remaining royalist garrisons.

On 15 May, less than a day after the Battle of Lewes, the first writs of the new Montfortian controlled royal administration were sent out. It is notable that the very first of these was an instruction to the ‘knights and others’ in Windsor castle ‘not to go out of the said castle to do any ill in those parts, or permit any to be done, upon peril of all the lands they hold in the realm’.\footnote{\textit{CPR 1258-66}, p.318.} The same writ was then sent to another fourteen castles demanding the same.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Active Royalist Garrisons, pre-May 14th 1264} & \textbf{Possession, May 1264} \\
\hline
Windsor & Royal \\
Pevensey & Peter of Savoy/Lord Edward \\
Tonbridge & Captured from Gilbert de Clare \\
Rochester & Royal \\
Reigate & John de Warenne \\
Northampton & Royal \\
Nottingham & Royal \\
Oxford & Royal \\
Stamford & John de Warenne \\
Benefield & presumed captured after Northampton from Humphrey de Bassingbourne \\
Salisbury & Royal \\
Winchester & Royal \\
Fotheringhay & John Balliol \\
Lincoln & Royal \\
Hertford & William de Valence or Royal \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{List of Royalist Castle Garrisons Mentioned on 15 May 1264\footnote{\textit{CPR 1258-66}, p.318.}}
\end{table}
The majority of these are royal castles although five are seigneurial, of which one, Tonbridge, had been recently captured from Gilbert de Clare. This is not a comprehensive list of royal castles, nor even of the most powerful, as it does not include castles such as Bamburgh or Gloucester. Nor does it include all the castles belonging to those royalists caught at Lewes. Instead, strategic value and contemporary knowledge seem to have been at play in the composition of the list.

Figure 3:5 Geographical Distribution of Royalist Castles Mentioned on 15 May 1264
An examination of the geographical distribution of the listed castles suggests that the strategic intelligence available to Montfort was one of the probable factors underpinning the selection. Four of the castles lay in Kent, Surrey and Sussex; namely Tonbridge, Rochester, Pevensey and Reigate. The presence of active royalist garrisons in these castles was probably obvious to the Montfortians during the campaign in the run up to Lewes. Likewise, the close proximity of Hertford and Windsor to London meant that Montfort was probably relatively well informed as to the activities of their garrisons. Winchester, Oxford and possibly Salisbury had been taken from the Montfortians by Henry in late 1263 and so also featured on the list, as had Northampton and Nottingham in April 1264. Further north, the rebel dominance in the midlands meant that Montfort would have had a good idea of what garrisons were against him. Fotheringhay held by John Balliol, Stamford, possibly belonging to Warenne, and Benefield, probably captured from

See Chapter 2, pp.79-80.
Humphrey de Bassingbourne, formed a trio of closely situated royalist strongholds. Their close proximity to Northampton and the Midlands heartlands of the Montfortian faction suggests the receipt of active intelligence from his supporters that these garrisons were causing problems. Lincoln appears to be something of an outlier in this list but two of Montfort’s main supporters, Nicholas Seagrave and Henry de Hastings, both had lands in Lincolnshire and presumably informed him about the garrison’s activities. By 15 May, it would have been several days since Montfort likely had last received intelligence on these garrisons.

This list provides an insight into Montfort knowledge of the strategic situation in England the day after Lewes. Totally absent from this list are any castles north of the Humber or in western England. Perhaps Montfort assumed that the garrisons in these regions were less of a threat to the peace in the short term or maybe it demonstrates his ignorance of the situation outside the south and east. De Neville’s control of Pontefract may have limited the intelligence reaching Montfort concerning events in the North and likewise the royalist control of the River Severn may explain the absence of castles from the west and Welsh March. The royalist captures of Northampton and Nottingham in April probably also disrupted his communications with the region of the Midlands, effecting his strategic knowledge.

Between 15 May 1264 and August 1265, Montfort’s objective was to end the resistance of royalist castle garrisons. To achieve this he relied on a strategy which involved a combination of political pressure and the limited use of force. Montfort’s first recourse in the wake of his victory at Lewes was to use the authority of the captive king to appoint new constables and sheriffs. On 4 June, Montfort appointed the custodes pacis, men responsible for restoring law and order to their counties whose powers focussed upon ‘matters of a military and policing nature’, with orders to arrest ‘without delay’ those ‘malefactors and disturbers of the peace…bearing arms’. In addition to these appointments, Montfort also began to replace the royalist sheriffs and constables. Between 28 May and 23 July, Montfortian constables were appointed to a total of twenty castles. Resistance by the affected royalist constables and garrisons now entailed a direct defiance of royal

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149 Jobson, Revolution, p.120; Foedera, i, p.442, CPR 1258-66, p.360.
150 Simon the Younger’s appointment to Nottingham was cancelled; See table below.
commands. This pressure, however, seems to have had limited effect upon most royal castle garrisons and seems not to have been applied to the vast majority of baronial fortresses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rebel Constable</th>
<th>Castle</th>
<th>Appointment Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Henry de Montfort</td>
<td>Dover</td>
<td>28th May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John fitz John</td>
<td>Windsor</td>
<td>c.2nd June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humphrey de Bohun (the younger?)</td>
<td>Goodrich</td>
<td>5th June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. de Clare</td>
<td>Pembroke</td>
<td>6th June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John fitz John</td>
<td>castles of R. de Vipoint</td>
<td>7th June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Abernun; John de Wauton</td>
<td>Lewes</td>
<td>8th June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Burgo the elder</td>
<td>Norwich</td>
<td>11th June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas de Seagrave</td>
<td>Rockingham</td>
<td>17th June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger Bigod</td>
<td>Orford</td>
<td>8th July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas Espirgonel</td>
<td>Colchester</td>
<td>10th July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilbert de Clare</td>
<td>Richmond</td>
<td>10th July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hervey de Borham</td>
<td>Hadley</td>
<td>10th July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry de Hastings</td>
<td>Scarborough</td>
<td>10th July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh Dispenser</td>
<td>Devizes</td>
<td>12th July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh Dispenser</td>
<td>Oxford</td>
<td>12th July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William son of Herbert</td>
<td>Nottingham</td>
<td>13th July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry de Montfort</td>
<td>Corfe</td>
<td>15th July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry de Hastings</td>
<td>Kertling</td>
<td>17th July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon the Younger</td>
<td>Nottingham</td>
<td>18th July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William son of Herbert</td>
<td>Hareston</td>
<td>18th July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh Despenser</td>
<td>Orford</td>
<td>18th July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humphrey de Bohun the Younger</td>
<td>Winchester</td>
<td>23rd July</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3:2 Montfortian Appointed Constables 28 May - 23 July 1264

Early Montfortian successes were focussed in the South-East as Montfort sought to eliminate the royalist garrisons near London. He had two principle advantages in this region in both the proximity of the garrisons to the captive king and the potential assistance of the London militia in conducting a siege. On 2 June, the Windsor garrison were persuaded to leave with safe conducts, and the constable, Drew de Barentein was replaced by Sir John fitz John. The surrender of the castle provided an additional coup as it was the residence of Edward’s wife, Eleanor of Castile and her household, as well as William de Valence’s pregnant wife Joan. Tonbridge was retaken by Simon the Younger, aided in part by treachery. Pevensley castle, however, to which a number of notable royalists had fled following the battle of Lewes, held out.

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152 CPR 1258-66, p.329.
153 CPR 1258-66, p.325.
154 CIM, i. no.760.
Beyond the South-East, the same tactics seemed to have gained little traction with royalist garrisons, particularly with the northern lords and Marchers, as both groups retained control of their royal castles. Montfort’s first attempts to bring them before the court failed as they refused the summons to aid in the defence against the queen’s expected invasion that summer. The Northerners claimed that they were being harassed by the Montfortians John de Eyville, John de Vescy, Thomas de Moulton, William Marmion and Gilbert de Umfraville. The northern Montfortians destroyed the royalist Thomas de Furnivall’s castle of Sheffield and captured of Skipton, held in wardship by Edward, both seigneurial castles. They did not, however, take any of the royal castles or other major stone fortresses. On 15 August, the Yorkshire knight William Bossall was appointed to hold York castle, with Robert de Neville instructed to surrender it to him. De Neville refused. Montfort’s efforts to bring the northern royalists to the court did not succeed until early 1265. The northern castles remained in royalist hands until late 1264 and early 1265.

Following the failure of political pressure, the Montfortians turned to the use of force in their dealings with the recalcitrant Marchers. The Marchers, in addition to retaining control of several royal castles, including Gloucester, Shrewsbury and Bridgnorth, were alleged to have committed ‘many depredations’. They furthermore continued to hold many of the prisoners captured at Northampton against the form of the peace and were demanding ransoms for their release. Montfort and de Clare raised an army, including the posses of Gloucesstershire, Shropshire and Herefordshire, and with the assistance of Llewelyn, assaulted the Marchers’ lands during the summer of 1264. They retook Hay and Hereford, forced the surrender of Richard’s Castle by Hugh de Mortimer and took Roger Mortimer’s castle of Ludlow. The speed of this campaign and lack of sustained sieges suggests that the garrisons surrendered due to lack of men or supplies or fell to storm. Sadly, little information on the campaign exists to confirm or deny these possibilities. The ready fall of seigneurial castles is yet again noticeable. No details are provided of the fall of the royal castle of Hereford except the Flores’ statement that Montfort intravit Herefordiae, suggesting

155 CR 1261-64, pp.399-401; CPR 1258-66, p.332.
156 CIM, i, nos.321,939.
159 CPR 1258-66, pp.362-3.
the entry was not violent. The most notable point, however, is that Montfort did not attempt to besiege the royal castles. He seems to have struck the smaller, more vulnerable targets, which allowed him to still hurt his adversaries and force them to terms.

Although the Marchers were forced to terms in July at Montgomery, the possibility of achieving a decisive victory was undermined by the necessity of returning to the south coast to prepare to repel the queen’s invasion force. The Marchers were forced to promise to surrender the royal castles and their Montfortian prisoners, while both James Audely and Mortimer each surrendered a son as hostages to Peter de Montfort and John fitz John. The Marchers, however, rapidly reneged on the deal. A number of other garrisons remained a thorn in the Montfortian’s side. Bristol was held by a number of Lewes survivors, including Warin de Bassingbourne and John de Muscegros, both members of Henry III’s familia regis. They were among seven knights banneret that had retreated to the fortress in the wake of the battle. These remained active in the royalist cause, not least in undertaking the audacious but failed rescue attempt of Edward at Wallingford castle at some point in the summer or autumn of 1264.

The collapse of the Marchers’ military resistance after Montfort’s second campaign in November to December sparked a wider one amongst the royalist garrisons in general. Montfort’s successful reduction of the Marchers, again without resorting to besieging the royal castles, meant that he could now turn his attention to the remaining royalist garrisons in England, a fact probably apparent to the garrisons themselves. The Montfortian campaign and the subsequent submission of the Marchers at Worcester on 12 December seems to have led to the near total capitulation of the remaining royalist garrisons in the rest of the country. Newcastle-upon-Tyne was apparently ready to surrender on 2 December. The fifty strong garrison of Scarborough marched out under safe conduct on 3 December and John de Grey’s forty strong garrison in Nottingham did the same on 18 December. Safe conducts appear to have been granted for all of those departing. That of

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162 Flores, ii, p.498.
163 Flores, ii, pp.499-500; Jobson, Revolution, p.1123.
164 The household knights of Henry seem to have helped form a core of resistance in immediate post-Lewes period. Men such as Bassingbourne, John Balliol and Adam of Jesmond all continued to hold out for the king: Robert of Glouces., ii, p.751.;
Gloucester Castle was around 24 December and the Bristol garrison departed around the 19th and 20th.\textsuperscript{166}

The surrender of Bristol castle demonstrates the extent to which Montfort was willing to compromise when seeking the surrender of the royal castles in the second half of 1264. The garrison of Bristol had already proved itself to be an active threat to the Montfortian regime. Strategically they were also occupying a major port that allowed them contact with the royalists on the continent. The royalist control of the castle was significant as it meant they dominated the principal landward assault route on the city, wedged as it was between the natural barriers of the rivers Avon and Frome.\textsuperscript{167} On top of these motivations, the castle was also a long festering source of contention between the Clares, Montfort’s allies, and the king, who had given it to Edward in 1254 as part of his appanage.\textsuperscript{168} Montfort, according to Robert of Gloucester, had Henry make frequent but unsuccessful demands for the garrison to surrender.\textsuperscript{169} Montfort’s final solution to gaining the castle’s surrender prioritised control of the castle over the neutralisation of its garrison, by granting safe conduct to the royalists to go to the royalist held Salisbury castle and stay there until ‘the king made ordinance touching their state’.\textsuperscript{170} Montfort’s strongest card in forcing this departure may have been the support of the town against the garrison.\textsuperscript{171} The seeming generosity of these terms suggests both Montfort’s eagerness to secure the castle and the stark military reality that he could not force the garrison’s total capitulation at that point in time. The royalist position was apparently equally weak, perhaps because they were harassed by Montfort’s campaign in the March or threatened by a revolt in the town that endangered their supplies.\textsuperscript{172} Whatever the cause, they decided to agree to the transfer sometime around 19 December.\textsuperscript{173} While not an unadulterated victory for Montfort, this was nonetheless a significant achievement, removing the royalists from

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{166}The Dunstable Annalist claims at this point that the Marchers seized control of Gloucester, Bridgnorth and Marlborough castles, however in Gloucester’s case there is no indication that the castle had actually ever fallen previously, both the Pipe and Close rolls date Roger Clifford’s custodianship lasting until 24 December 1264, \textit{Ann. Dun.}, p.234; E372/110, m. 1d; \textit{CR 1264-68}, p.165; \textit{CPR 1258-66}, p.396.
\bibitem{167}\textit{Gesta Stephani}, pp.37-38. See Chapter 4, p.168.
\bibitem{169}\textit{Salisbury was held by R. Russel. The garrison, perhaps due to its small size, does not seem to have been terribly active after Lewes, \textit{CPR 1258-66}, p.396; E368/38, m. 5.
\bibitem{170}\textit{Flores}, ii, pp.482-483.
\bibitem{171}\textit{Flores}, iii, pp.3-4.
\bibitem{172}\textit{CPR 1258-66}, p.396.
\end{thebibliography}
control of a valuable port. The departure was an effective admission of defeat by the royalists as now they were left isolated in a castle whose state of repair was unclear and that, according to a poem by Henry d’Avranches, was,

…exposed only to the winds, which were strong enough to shake its summit. Little water was to be found: …The chalk soil was bad enough, but the shortage of water worse. The former dazzled the eyes, the latter provoked thirst. The silence of birds was a loss still worse than the violence of the wind. The one deprived us of pleasure, and the other destroyed our very dwellings.

Once the garrison had been cut-off from further reinforcement additional efforts could then be applied to obtain their final surrender. On 12 March 1265, Montfort’s approach appeared to pay off as the key commanders were given simple protection provided they did not attempt to come before either Henry III or Edward without permission from the council. This presumably was to prevent another attempted raid to free the king or his son under the guise of coming before them. Robert of Gloucester does not mention the transfer to Salisbury, but instead remarks that the garrison agreed to go into exile along with the Marchers, and that their removal was the result of letters sent by Edward.

On the 14 March, the same men, including Maurice de Berkley, and other knights in the garrison of Bristol castle were instructed to come before the king, wherever he was, around the octaves of Easter. On 17 March, Bassingbourne was dispatched with two others into south Wales ‘on the affairs of Edward the King’s son’. What these affairs may have been is suggested by the same safe conduct, which included ‘Richard de Tunderle, Roger de Mortimer, yeoman, Nicholas son of Martin and other sergeants in the munition of the castles of Carmathen, Cardigan and Cilgerran, coming to the king wherever he may be in England’. Perhaps Bassingbourne was himself to be the bearer of the safe conducts to these garrisons. That he had now, for the time being, been brought to heel by Montfort is clear and the earl seemingly utilised him as a further tool in his quest to bring the royalist garrisons in Wales into line.

174 CPR 1258-66, p.396.
175 CR 1261-64, pp.334,339. On 4 April 1264, Henry III had ordered the guardian of the Forest of Clarendon to give the constable Ralph Russel ten oaks for making barriers (barreras), ladders (scalas) and other necessary works; E368/39, m. 6; Avranches wrote this in justification for the cathedral’s removal to its new site, Creighton, Medieval Town Walls, p.81.
176 These were Warin de Bassingbourne, Robert Walerand, John de Muscegros, Payn de Charworth, Robert de Tipetot, and Geoffrey Gacelin, CPR 1258-66, p.412.
177 Robert of Gloucs., ii, pp.754-5.
179 CPR 1258-66, p. 414.
By March 1265, the majority of the northern royalists had run out of options for further resistance and had finally travelled south. When they appeared at court, Montfort ordered John Balliol and Peter de Brus, who held the strong stone fortresses of Barnard Castle and Skelton respectively, to surrender their castles and stand trial, if requested, in return for safe-conducts. With this success, one indeed that had been achieved without resorting to repeated expensive and time consuming sieges, Montfort could now concentrate upon bringing the final recalcitrant garrisons to heel.

The facilitation of the surrender of the castles rather than the capture of the garrisons was apparently the priority for Montfort during this period. The garrisons were presumably allowed to disperse. As Saladin’s conquest of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1187 illustrated, however, this method of gaining the castles but not necessarily neutralising the men who held them was not without potential drawbacks. The generous terms Saladin offered to the garrisons of the Frankish castles in some cases assisted his swift reduction of the key fortresses without the necessity of resorting to long sieges, but it also meant that the freed garrisons were able to concentrate their resources in remaining centres of resistance. The influx of men into Tyre was important for its success in resisting Saladin’s subsequent sieges. As we possess only two garrison lists, we unfortunately cannot trace the movements of most of the men subsequent to their departure. One possible instance of an individual migrating from royalist garrison to royalist garrison can be found in the Scarborough garrison. A Richard son of John de Dunwich is listed elsewhere as a member of the household and fellowship of John de Warenne, earl of Surrey. Where Richard was during the Lewes campaign and how he ended up in the garrison of Scarborough is open to speculation. He may have been a member of de Warenne’s garrison at his castle of Sandal or elsewhere, or he even may have been an escapee from the battle of Lewes. Whatever his origin point, with his lord in exile in France, he may have made his way north to join royalist forces there. While lack of surviving evidence prevents a deeper assessment of how Montfortian policy impacted on the concentration of royalist resources, the pattern is detectable during the subsequent rebellion of the Disinherited from late 1265 to the summer of 1267. Then rebel groups sometimes cohered into

180 CPR 1258-66, pp.414-5;
182 CPR 1266-72, p.516.
larger forces when forced to vacate one base, most notably when some of the rebels dispersed from Chesterfield to Kenilworth after their defeat in May 1266.¹⁸³

Montfort’s use of both political pressure and targeted military force proved to be a great success. The royalists were kept under steady pressure to comply with Montfort’s demands through his use of negotiation. This was underpinned by Montfort’s retention of key hostages in the form of the king (effectively), Edward, Richard of Cornwall and Henry of Almain. Coupled with the sticks of military force and royal command was the carrot of a peace settlement that could potentially secure Edward’s release. On 14 December 1264, for example, he granted Roger Leybourne, Roger Mortimer and Roger Clifford permission to go to Kenilworth and meet Edward, so that the prince could urge them to accept the covenants of the peace deal.¹⁸⁴ Montfort used the peace arrangements of March 1265 to try and gain control of a host of key castles, stipulating that Edward’s castles of Bristol, Chester, Newcastle-under-Lyme and the Peak would be surrendered to him. To these would be added the royal castles of Dover, Bamburgh, Scarborough, Nottingham and Corfe which would be transferred from royal control to that nominally of Edward. This complex transaction, removing key royal fortresses from royal control, much as Montfort had acquired Kenilworth, would then be completed by Edward’s surrender of the castles into Montfort’s custody.¹⁸⁵ At a stroke of a pen rather than a sword, Montfort alienated some of the key castles of the realm into his personal control.

There were several reasons for Montfort’s failure to engage in large scale sieges of major castles during this period. First was the necessity of prioritising targets. From July to September 1264, the threatened invasion required Montfort to concentrate the bulk of his forces in the south, therefore a long siege, like that which developed at Gloucester earlier in the year, was not an option. The second attack on the March in November again did not witness any attempt to launch major sieges. Now, however, the limiting factor was probably the onset of winter and the sparcity of necessary supplies caused by months of warfare ravaging and burning the lands in the March. From the early New Year until March 1265, the negotiations next demanded that some semblance

¹⁸⁵ For discussion of the tensions surrounding Ferrers’ seizure of the Peak see Appendix 1; Powicke, King Henry III, ii, p.489.
of peace should be maintained, a fact aided by the surrender of the majority of the royalist castles in December.

By the end of March 1265, only three castles were definitely still in royalist hands, two in the north, Bamburgh and Richmond, and one on the south coast, Pevensey. Of the three castles, only two were besieged, and of these the siege of Pevensey further explains Montfort’s reluctance to engage in a sustained siege.

**Pevensey, Bamburgh and Richmond**

Three principal questions arise from the continued resistance of these castles: why did these fortresses in particular continue to resist while the others surrendered? Who were those resisting and what affect did this have upon Montfort’s regime? Both Pevensey and Richmond castles had been in the possession of the queen’s uncle, Peter of Savoy and this fact may partially explain their continued defiance. Peter was on the continent from 1263 and through most of the war. In November 1263, Peter’s lands in Yorkshire including Richmond castle were committed during pleasure by the king to Guiscard de Charron. Guiscard was closely linked to Peter. A foreigner by birth, Guiscard held lands in both the north and south of England, at least some of which were from Peter.\(^{186}\) He was clearly highly trusted by Peter, for as well as being described as Peter’s steward, in 1262, when Peter was abroad, he was one of only two named individuals who could appoint attorneys to act in Peter’s stead ‘in all pleas moved for or against him before justices in eyre or others’. The other was Queen Eleanor.\(^{187}\) The importance of acquiring the lord’s consent to surrender their castle, discussed above, may well have had a role to play in Guiscard’s refusal to bow to Montfortian demands to come before the court and surrender Richmond.\(^{188}\) The same scenario may have been played out at Pevensey as well. We have the names of only three men in the castle from a writ demanding their surrender; John de la Rede, Hanekin de Wissant and Imbert de Montreal. De la Rede, Peter of Savoy’s steward in Sussex, had all of his lord’s lands in the county committed to him by the king on 13 December 1263.\(^{189}\) He also had connections to the Lord Edward, to whom the castle was committed on 25 October 1263. De la Rede acted in Edward’s

\(^{186}\) In May 1266, Peter was described as Guiscard’s lord, *CPR 1258-66*, p.591.


\(^{188}\) *CR 1264-68*, pp.101-2, 113; *CPR 1258-66*, p.410.

name as Steward of Hastings from 1254-9, following his lease of the Rape at farm to Peter in 1254.\textsuperscript{190} In 1262, following Edward’s quitclaim of Hastings and the castle to Peter, the custody probably went once more to Rede.\textsuperscript{191} De Wissant was listed as the constable of Pevensey on 7 August 1263 when the council demanded that he surrender the castle ‘as he loves his body’, to John de Warenne.\textsuperscript{192} De Wissant was presumably Peter’s appointee and he remained in office under Edward as of 8 July 1264.\textsuperscript{193} Little is known of de Montreal prior to the war, though he seems to have been of some importance in the region of Sussex and Kent in c.1261.\textsuperscript{194} De Montreal and de Wissant, given their surnames, may have been foreign members of Peter’s familia. In addition to the original royalist garrison, the situation in the castle was complicated by the arrival of William de Valence, John de Warenne and Hugh Bigod following their flight from the battle of Lewes. These men reportedly arrived with 700 men and upon their departure probably left a number of these to bolster the defence of this strategically situated castle.\textsuperscript{195} The likely result was a garrison that was a hotchpotch of different allegiances. By the summer of 1264, the power structure in the garrison had cohered around three men, of whom two at least were closely associated with Peter. By 17 March 1265, though, the Montfortians remained uncertain as to who commanded the castle for, in another effort to make them surrender a vaguely worded safe conduct was issued ‘for two or three of those who are in the castle of Pevensey’ to go to speak with Edward.\textsuperscript{196}

That two of the three remaining royalist castles should both be Peter of Savoy’s is striking, especially when the possibility of deliberate co-ordinated resistance between the two castles must have been very low. Peter himself maintained an active role during this period supporting Queen Eleanor on the continent, including paying men for military service, presumably for the intended invasion of England.\textsuperscript{197} Pevensey was also receiving assistance from the continent, suggesting that it remained in contact with Peter.\textsuperscript{198} Like de Charron at Richmond, Hanekin and Rede could legitimately refuse to surrender the castle unless permitted to by Peter. The likely Montfortian counter argument was that the castle was committed by Peter to Edward in 1263. That commitment

\textsuperscript{190} CPR 1258-66, p.295. 
\textsuperscript{191} Ridgeway, ‘The Politics of the English Royal Court’, p.420. 
\textsuperscript{192} CPR 1258-66, p.274. 
\textsuperscript{193} CPR 1258-66, p.333. 
\textsuperscript{195} Flores, ii, p.495; Guisborough, p.195. 
\textsuperscript{196} CPR 1258-66, p.414. 
\textsuperscript{197} Howell, Eleanor of Provence, pp.214-15. 
\textsuperscript{198} Chapter 3, p.125.
was presumably intended to be temporary by Peter, but the safe conducts for the garrison’s leaders to go to Edward in March 1265 probably mark Montfort’s efforts to exploit this legal weakness. Unlike with Warin de Bassingbourne, however, there is no sign that representatives of the Pevensey garrison went to meet Edward and instead they remained defiant.

Bamburgh was a different case. Robert de Neville, the constable, had made his career in royal service from the late 1250s, becoming sheriff of Northumberland in 1258 and constable of Bamburgh in 1259.\textsuperscript{199} He also served as a messenger to the Scots court during these years.\textsuperscript{200} His loyalty was with the king during the turbulence of 1258 onwards, and in 1261 he was appointed to keep the forests beyond the Trent. On 6 May 1263, he was made constable of Devizes castle, but his command was changed and enlarged to that of the unusual title of \textit{capitanus} for the defence of the lands north of the Trent. This included the holding of York and Bamburgh castles and required the royalists in the region to be answer to him.\textsuperscript{201} As constable of a royal castle, Robert’s defiance was a more serious issue than that of Guiscard and the leaders at Pevensey. He refused either to appear before the court or to surrender the castle when ordered.\textsuperscript{202} Again as with Richmond and Pevensey, we do not have a record of any justifications he may have used for his refusal to surrender, which may simply have been the illegitimacy of writs issued by a king in captivity. If so, de Neville’s arguments were unlikely to have been unique amongst the royalist garrisons prior to December 1264. The survival of these three garrisons of Richmond, Pevensey and Bamburgh, while partially based on stubbornness and probable issues of lordship, rested also upon additional, more practical factors.

While the longest recorded siege in English history is commonly thought to be that of Kenilworth in 1266, this is not strictly true, for in duration, although not in scale, the siege conducted by the Montfortians of Pevensey castle surpassed it.\textsuperscript{203} This occasionally has been misconceived as three separate sieges; instead it was simply one long one that saw peaks and troughs of activity.\textsuperscript{204} With the growing threat of the queen’s invasion during the summer, the control of Pevensey, probably

\textsuperscript{199} \textit{CPR 1258-66}, p.19.
\textsuperscript{200} \textit{CPR 1258-66}, pp.38, 90.
\textsuperscript{201} \textit{CPR 1258-66}, pp.159, 257, 263-64.
\textsuperscript{204} Jobson, \textit{Revolution}, p.120.
the last royalist garrison in the south-east, became increasingly important. The garrison had been aggressively raiding the lands surrounding the castle since the battle of Lewes and perhaps prior to this. By 8 July, the attention of the Montfortian regime had been drawn to the castle through a combination of the garrison’s ravaging, which probably prompted a growing storm of complaints to the new government, and the need to secure the coast from invasion. As with the other castles, Montfort first tried the diplomatic approach. On 8 July, safe conduct was issued for the three leaders to come to the king ‘as the king understands that many enormities have been committed by them and others in the munition of that castle’. This was apparently rejected by the leaders but the offer was renewed by Montfort on the 18 July, but this time with safe conduct for them to go ‘beyond seas’. In line with his general strategy, Montfort also appointed Ralph de Camois as the new constable. These actions yet again had no appreciable effect on the garrison.

The castle and village of Pevensey were sited on a bluff by the sea on the south coast. It was built within the remains of the old Roman fort, part of which still made up the castle’s fabric in the 1260s. Significant improvements were made to the defences during Peter’s tenure. The wooden palisade that provided the curtain wall of the inner bailey was removed, probably around 1254, and was replaced by a new stone curtain wall, reinforced with three towers each of three stages. These linked with the stone gatehouse that had been built in the 1220s and were surrounded in turn by a ditch (it is unclear if a moat existed at this stage or not). The walls and towers themselves possessed tall battering plinths around the new circuit. These defences were thus very new by the time of the war and likely state of the art.

Pevensey provided a direct link to the royalists on the continent, which probably dictated why, in stark contrast to Montfort’s usual strategy, it received the attention of a full siege. Efforts in this direction began at some point in the summer of 1264 under the command of Simon the Younger. Perhaps limited at first to trying to contain the garrison, it apparently became clear that the castle would not fall easily. On 18 September, John fitz Alan, Eobert de Saint John, Franco de Bohun, Robert Aguilun and ‘the knights, free tenants and all others’ were ordered to muster at Pevensey with ‘horses and arms and their whole service, and with the whole posse of their friends’ to ‘give

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205 CPR 1258-66, p.333.
their counsel and aid’ to Simon ‘in besieging the castle, and in repressing and taking the king’s enemies within that castle, who are perpetrating homicides, burnings and plunderings.’\textsuperscript{208} Despite these reinforcements the siege showed no signs of ending by the beginning of November. In fact the expense of maintaining of the siege forced Montfort to promise £800 to his son in ‘part satisfaction of his expenses in the siege of the castle of Pevensey.’ The chronic expense of the siege necessitated the assignment to the younger Simon of the bishop of Winchester’s fine for the king’s corn and stock, with the first 500 mark instalment being transferred to him with orders for the bishop to pay the other 700 marks owed directly to him.\textsuperscript{209} By 27 November, however, it was obvious the siege would continue for several months yet. The county posses of Surrey and Sussex were disbanded with firm orders issued to the sheriff not to distress or harass the men of the county due to their many ‘expenses and labour’ in the siege, as well as in guarding against the coming of aliens in the summer. Instead, money was allocated for ‘maintaining certain men for making the said siege’ in ‘the instant of winter’.\textsuperscript{210}

In addition to the strong defences, the garrison’s resilience is explained by Montfort’s orders on 3 December to the barons of Hastings, Winchelsea and Rye to watch and capture ‘certain individuals’ who were ‘endeavouring by ships to munition the castle of Pevensey with men and victuals to the king’s damage’.\textsuperscript{211} Able, due to its port, to achieve resupply from their continental allies, the garrison could not be starved out without naval support. During the winter months Simon the Younger’s siege drew down into a blockade, his father providing £100 in part payment of another 250 marks granted to him to maintain the siege and also to dig a ditch in front of the castle ‘so the king’s enemies may not get out.’\textsuperscript{212} Simon the Younger received another 100 marks on 15 February after having spent a presumably chilly few months before the castle buffeted by the sea winds. The castle still showed no signs of surrender, even as Montfort was gaining the upper hand elsewhere in England.

The final failed efforts at negotiation in mid-March 1265 marks the last recorded word of the siege in the record material until the Waverley Annals recount that Simon the Younger raised it on

\begin{flushleft}\textsuperscript{208} CPR 1258-66, p.371. \\
\textsuperscript{209} CPR 1258-66, p.386; CLR 1260-67, p.145. \\
\textsuperscript{210} CR 1264-68, p.80. \\
\textsuperscript{211} CPR 1258-66, p.392. \\
\textsuperscript{212} CLR 1260-67, p.152.\end{flushleft}
16 July to come to his father’s assistance.\footnote{Ann. Wav., p.363.} Robert of Gloucester remarks that word from his father reached Simon while he was besieging the castle, \textit{as he longe adde ido}.\footnote{Robert of Gloucs., ii, p.760.} As no narrative account of the siege itself survives we are left with only our inferences from administrative records. In addition to the use of the ditch and attempts at a sea blockade, the only other record is an Exchequer account from 1288 mentioning that an unspecified wall was thrown down at the time of the war.\footnote{Peers, ‘Pevensey Castle’, p.11.} It is impossible to say if the discovery of an ‘extraordinary number of stone balls’ used for siege engines in the bailey and many others in the ditch are connected to the war or may be explained by the possible role of the castle as a centre for their manufacture.\footnote{Peers, ‘Pevensey Castle’, p.15, a record from 1304 orders 200 round stones fit for engines to be sent from Pevensey to Winchelsea.} The presence of engines is confirmed, however, by a record in the Countess Eleanor’s household accounts referring to efforts to retrieve an engine from outside the castle following the siege’s abandonment.\footnote{Manners, p.65.}

The unsuccessful siege of Pevensey explains much about both Montfort’s failure to besiege other castles in this period, including Bamburgh and Richmond. The heavy expense and scant success of the siege probably deterred him from risking the commencement of a fresh one until either the successful reduction of Pevensey or at least a significant improvement in his strategic position. Like Pevensey, both Bamburgh and Richmond were formidable stone fortresses, and again like Pevensey, Bamburgh could be easily resupplied from the sea. At the same time as Montfort was being forced to deal with the Marchers, the threat of invasion and other potential enemies, he was simultaneously committing valuable resources to a siege, one vital to prevent the landing of royalist reinforcements. The siege of Pevensey was therefore an expensive necessity for Montfort at a time when royal revenues were already affected by the war, and as such it provided a strong disincentive against the launch of any further sieges.\footnote{Collingwood notes that Warwickshire and Leicestershire, the Montfortian heartlands, were in fact the few counties that actually increased their yield during the period of the war, J.A. Collingwood, ‘Royal Finance in the Period of Baronial Reform and Rebellion 1255-70’, (Unpublished Ph.D thesis King’s College London, 1995), pp.240,242,247-8; B.L. Wild, \textit{The Wardrobe Accounts of Henry III}, (London: Pipe Roll Society, 2012), p.clix;}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{213} Ann. Wav., p.363.
\item \textbf{214} Robert of Gloucs., ii, p.760.
\item \textbf{215} Peers, ‘Pevensey Castle’, p.11.
\item \textbf{216} Peers, ‘Pevensey Castle’, p.15, a record from 1304 orders 200 round stones fit for engines to be sent from Pevensey to Winchelsea.
\item \textbf{217} Manners, p.65.
\item \textbf{218} Collingwood notes that Warwickshire and Leicestershire, the Montfortian heartlands, were in fact the few counties that actually increased their yield during the period of the war, J.A. Collingwood, ‘Royal Finance in the Period of Baronial Reform and Rebellion 1255-70’, (Unpublished Ph.D thesis King’s College London, 1995), pp.240,242,247-8; B.L. Wild, \textit{The Wardrobe Accounts of Henry III}, (London: Pipe Roll Society, 2012), p.clix;
\end{itemize}
the relatively isolated nature of the location of Pevensey itself. The pro-royalist Wykes, one of the few chroniclers to mention the siege, summed it, and Simon the Younger’s efforts, up with the single damning phrase, *frivolam et inutilem.* Montfort, as with the second siege of Gloucester, escaped the tarnish of failure that had now touched two of his sons. While leaving the thankless task of the conduct of the siege of Pevensey to Simon the Younger on a practical basis allowed him to concentrate on greater issues, it also had the effect of isolating himself from the popular perception of failure at a time when maintaining the image of strength that followed his victory at Lewes was of critical importance to Simon’s rule.

The peace agreement of March 1265 marked the high point of Montfort’s regime and left him free to take more direct action against the castles of Richmond and Bamburgh. On 23 April 1265, Montfort instructed the sheriff of Yorkshire, William Bossall, and the Keeper of the Peace, John de Eyville, to raise the *posse* of Yorkshire and to commence a siege of Richmond. We know even less about the events at Richmond than we do Pevensey. An attempt on 16 January to persuade Guiscard to appear before the court was a failure, despite Montfort’s issued stipulations to the northern Montfortians not to molest Guiscard. By 5 March 1265, an increasingly confident Montfort issued a fresh safe conduct to Guiscard in a letter patent. However, in a letter close dated the same day, Montfort threatened that Guiscard’s failure to comply would result in the seizure of his lands and the raising of the whole county *posse* of Yorkshire to storm the castle. Guiscard’s response was clearly a refusal for on 23 April Montfort fulfilled his threat by ordering John de Eyville and William Bossall ‘so manfully and so powerfully to besiege’ Richmond. Virtually no details survive of the siege outside a few, very brief, references in the *Inquisitiones de Rebellibus* that recount accusations against seven individuals who were alleged to have been with de Eyville at Richmond. How far the siege advanced is unknown, though clearly some effort was made. On 30 May, Montfort dispatched a letter close to de Eyville demanding that he hurry day and night with the whole of his posse to Worcester. De Eyville never arrived in the March and it probably took

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219 Wykes, p.169.
221 *CPR 1258-66*, p.400.
223 *tam viriliter tamque potenter obsideri, CR 1264-8*, p.113.
224 *CIM*, i, no.939; *Rotuli Selecti*, pp.160-1.
several days for the letter to reach him, so the siege of Richmond probably ended in early June.\textsuperscript{225}

Whenever the siege was abandoned, John de Eyville seems to have retreated south to Scarborough with a number of his followers to garrison the castle there.\textsuperscript{226}

Bamburgh, despite the ravaging reportedly committed by its garrison, was not besieged. The choice to besiege Richmond over Bamburgh was a practical one again. Richmond was not isolated in the far north and taking Richmond continued the Montfortian tactic of pushing the royalists to the fringes of the kingdom. Yet of the two, Bamburgh seems to have been considered the more important by Montfort as it was one of the castles included in the peace agreement in March 1265.

Attention turned to it on 17 March when it was officially handed over to the Lord Edward. On the 19 March, Robert de Neville was ordered to surrender the castle with Gilbert de Clare promising to bring de Neville before the court. By 6 April, Montfort complained this had still not been done with de Neville refusing to comply, even under the pretext of rendering his account of the castle at the Exchequer.\textsuperscript{227} Instead the garrison commenced or continued ravaging lands in Northumberland, most probably those of Montfortians such as John de Vescy of Alnwick. On the same day that the siege of Richmond was ordered, the sheriff of Northumberland was instructed to prevent the exit of the garrison from the castle and to seize the lands of those within.\textsuperscript{228} Montfort had more cause to besiege Bamburgh, but he did not.

The decision not to launch a full siege of the castle is very telling. Already committed to two sieges Montfort probably could not afford to commit the time and resources to a third without leaving himself overstretched. The garrison itself seems to have been fairly large. While there are no surviving narrative accounts, the partially surviving record of the expenses of the waged section of the garrison running until 10 August 1265 is for ten knights and squires, eight mounted crossbowmen and sixteen archers and watchmen. As has been shown for Scarborough, this would have been only part of the garrison present.\textsuperscript{229} Sadly the poor state of the document prevents discovery as to whether the garrison number fluctuated during 1264-5. The garrison however was

\textsuperscript{225} CR 1264-68, pp.124-25.
\textsuperscript{226} CIM, i. no.939.
\textsuperscript{227} CR 1264-68, pp.33-34, 43-44; CPR 1258-66, p.414.
\textsuperscript{228} CR 1264-68, pp.102-3.
\textsuperscript{229} C47/2/1/13. Chapter 3, p.84.
large enough to cause a growing problem and one that probably needed more resources to deal with properly than Montfort could spare.

A siege of Bamburgh risked something else as well. The *Flores* remarks that in the Christmas of 1264, in the furthest north, John Balliol and Alexander III, son-in-law to Henry III, were conspiring against Montfort.\(^230\) Indeed, the Scottish source, the *Gesta Annalia II*, reports that Alexander had sent troops to help Henry at Lewes, confirmed by the *Flores* and *Furness* accounts, and in 1265 was raising an army to come to Henry III’s aid. Its march was only prevented by the royalist victory at Evesham.\(^231\) Scottish support for Neville, a man who was known at the Scottish court for his services to Queen Margaret in the 1250s, was not improbable. Although invasion remained unlikely until the escape of the Lord Edward, Montfort may have judged that besieging a castle so close to the Scottish border might risk provoking Alexander’s direct intervention before Montfort was ready to respond. Instead in March, Montfort dispatched letters to both Alexander and Margaret urging them to accept the peace terms and ‘not to delay’ them ‘through any defects’.\(^232\) The decision of Gilbert de Clare to promise to obtain Bamburgh’s surrender in March 1265 is also potentially significant. By February 1265, de Clare seems to have been already plotting against Montfort. Given the timing of events it seems possible that de Clare was deliberately using the negotiations as a cover for contacting de Neville to co-ordinate resistance. De Neville furthermore provided a likely link to Alexander and any potential Scottish support.

The fate of the royalist garrisons between the battles of Lewes and Evesham reflects Montfort’s apparent aversion to committing himself to sieges of major fortresses and instead his preference to reduce the royalist garrisons through an approach that combined the astute application of force with political pressure. This policy was only reinforced by the fruitless siege of Pevensey that dragged on, draining both men and money. The three castles that resisted Montfort in England were able to do so on the basis of their formidable defences, the stubbornness of their commanders, Neville and de Charron, and their ability to resupply from the sea, in the cases of Bamburgh and Pevensey. The most remarkable of these stories arguably is the one we know least about. Of the two, Richmond would seem to have been in the weakest position, yet it too held out. This is in stark contrast to

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\(^{230}\) *Flores*, ii, p.504.

\(^{231}\) *Fordun*, i, p.302; *Flores*, ii, 496; *Newburgh*, ii, p.544; *Guisborough*, p.194-5.

\(^{232}\) CR 1264-68, pp.102, 103-4.
events in the March of Wales, where by May 1265 the Marchers had apparently given up trying to hold castles, as Edward’s escape found Roger Mortimer camping out in the woods rather than in Wigmore castle.  

These castles played an indirect role in the eventual fall of the Montfortian regime. Had Simon the Younger not been engaged in the siege of Pevensey he might perhaps have reacted sooner to events in the March after Edward’s escape; it took him, however, six weeks to raise the siege. It is also likely that the siege of Richmond also distracted further reinforcements from coming to Montfort’s aid. Few men from Yorkshire or Northumberland were with Montfort at Evesham, and few seem to have been in the relief army that Simon the Younger took to Kenilworth. Royalist castle garrison resistance was a distraction, but it may have proved a costly one for the Montfortian regime in 1265.

**The Logistics of a Siege, Kenilworth 1266**

This final section of this chapter examines in more detail the logistics necessary for conducting large scale sieges during the war. The siege of Kenilworth provides the best case study for a study of logistics, for while the scale of the siege was unusual it is also the one for which there is the greatest abundance of both surviving administrative and chronicle material. We will also examine the siege in the light of the previously discussed themes and examine its importance to the Disinherited.

Kenilworth rapidly became the focal point for Montfortian resistance following the battle of Evesham, with the garrison being joined, according to the Evesham Chronicle, by ‘a great multitude of the retainers of those killed and of those who had escaped from the battle [of Evesham] and of those who were having bitterness of spirit for the fathers and brothers and friends slain’. Efforts to gain the castle’s surrender began soon after Evesham. On 24 August, Edward ordered that the garrison should be instructed to surrender, and this was performed by the 26th. Simon withdrew from Kenilworth sometime between 11 and 23 November, leaving it under the command of a Sir William de la Cowe and John de Warre. Simon joined up with John de Eyville

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233 Wykes, pp.163-4.
234 This is based on a survey of the recorded counties of origin of men recorded as being at Evesham or Kenilworth in the surviving *Inquisitiones de Rebellibus* in *CIM*, i, nos.608-940.
and other rebels at the Isle of Axholme.237 His motive for leaving the castle was probably similar to that of Roger Mortimer’s for not remaining in Wigmore castle; a desire not to be trapped in a siege and preference for freedom of movement that permitted him to rally his supporters and harass his foes. Perhaps, as Knowles suggests, this move was also designed to distract attention from any possible attack on Kenilworth.238

On 14 November, eleven men ‘lately in the munition’ of Kenilworth were granted safe conduct and licence to go beyond seas. Otherwise unknown, these individuals’ surnames suggest that they were French and Flemish in origin and they were possibly some of the roughly 140 stipendiary knights recorded as having spent Christmas with Simon at Kenilworth in 1264.239 Their departure may denote that Simon the Younger’s funds had run out or at least were too strained to continue to maintain the knights. Alternatively, with Simon’s departure, the mercenaries decided to withdraw from the apparently hopeless situation of the Disinherited’s cause.

The decision to besiege Kenilworth was presumably reached in October or November with a muster at Northampton arranged for 13 December. Amongst those issued summonses on 20 November were masons and other workers from Warwickshire instructed to come with spades, picks and other tools to the muster.240 This force, however, was diverted to help Edward besiege the Isle of Axholme.241 Although Simon submitted and subsequently agreed to the surrender of Kenilworth, the garrison did not comply. Henry de Hastings, having abandoned Axholme, arrived at the castle with reinforcements and assumed command, before continuing to stock the castle by raiding the surrounding region.242 He refused Simon’s instructions to surrender, declaring that they would yield Kenilworth neither to the king, Edward nor Simon, but only if Eleanor de Montfort, who they now treated as the castle’s lord, personally instructed them to do so. As at Dover and possibly Pevensey and Richmond, the absence of the authorisation of the castle’s lord was used as a method of resisting even royal authority.243 Following the failure of diplomatic pressure, on 20 December preparations began for deploying the entire resources of the crown against the castle,

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237 Wykes and Waverley provide two conflicting dates of Martinmas and Saint Clement’s day; Wykes, p.181; Ann. Wav., pp.367-8.
239 CPR 1258-66, p.504; Flores, ii, p.504, the fate of the rest of these men is unknown, though many may have died at Evesham.
240 CPR 1258-66, p.520; CR 1264-68, p.150.
241 Knowles, ‘The Disinherited’, Part i, op cit, p.21
with orders for a muster at Northampton arranged for 27 January, although this was subsequently
delayed, possibly due to the winter.\footnote{Wild, ‘The Siege of Kenilworth’, p.16.}

Curtailing the plundering by the garrison of Kenilworth became the next priority for the
royalists. This would be a crucial first step to begin to limit the supplies reaching the garrison, for,
as Robert of Gloucester commented, Henry de Hastings ‘had well stored the castle on each side, of
corn and flesh he gathered in the country wide’.\footnote{Hi alde wel astored, þen castel in ech side, of corn & fless igadered, in þe countreie wide, Robert of Gloucs., ii, p.770.} As well as providing a statement of the re-
imposition of royal authority on the war torn region, critically, it also began to fulfil Henry III’s
imperative as king to defend his subjects. A parallel can be seen in the orders issued by Montfort in
March 1265 for the containment of the garrisons of Pevensey and Bamburgh.\footnote{Chapter 3, pp.127-29.} By 26 December,
the situation around Kenilworth had deteriorated to such an extent that Osbert Giffard and Reynold
son of Peter were ordered, alongside the posse of both Oxfordshire and Warwickshire, to ‘subdue
those who hold out in the castle of Kenilworth’.\footnote{CPR 1258-66, p.652.} Edmund and a strong force reoccupied the
damaged Warwick castle as a base for these efforts.\footnote{Wykes, pp.182-3,190; Ann. Dun., p.241.} Henry’s delays in commencing the siege
were probably primarily down to practical reasons. The start of spring would hopefully bring more
clement weather for the besiegers; it would allow more preparation time and would furthermore
provide space for the royalist commanders to defeat the bands of the Disinherited roaming the
countryside who might threaten the realm while siege efforts were underway. On 15 March, a new
summons was issued for 28 March, Easter Day, at Oxford.\footnote{Wild, ‘The Siege of Kenilworth’, p.16.} To raise the needed manpower Henry
issued an order for four or five men from each vill in Oxfordshire and Berkshire to come to Oxford
alongside those owing service. This requirement was extended to at least Northamptonshire as
well.\footnote{Ann. Wav., p.370; CLR 1267-72, no.179.}

On 20 April, Henry’s army arrived at Oxford before departing for Northampton on the 27\textsuperscript{th} and
then moving to the forward base at Warwick by 18 June. The siege commenced on 25 June.\footnote{Ann. Wav., p.370; Ann. Osney, pp.187-88; CLR 1260-67, pp.219-20.}

According to the Dunstable Annalist the garrison of the castle now contained 1,070 men and 160
women as well as an unknown number of servants. There must be some scepticism about this figure for the simple reason of logistics. The amount of food needed to supply this number of men and women for the duration of the siege from June to December would have been staggering. The possibility cannot of course be ruled out, particularly given the unusual specificity of the figure, but the length of time the garrison lasted under siege makes the figure seem unlikely, even reckoning upon attrition.

The siege of Kenilworth was to be the royalists’ equivalent to the Montfortians’ siege of Pevensey, slow burning but hugely expensive, yet on a far greater scale. Kenilworth was a state-of-the-art castle, heavily garrisoned by a determined opposition. Henry III, unlike Montfort at Pevensey now committed himself to the fall of the castle, and proceeded to throw the resources of the kingdom behind the endeavour. This required a huge outlay in resources. The Pipe and Liberate Rolls reveal a sophisticated royal war effort which involved several royal castles acting as hubs for the supply of major materials. The Pipe Roll accounts for Gloucester show the industry involved in the logistics of the siege. A siege tower was transported, presumably in pieces, from the castle to Kenilworth along with materials for the repair of the king’s siege engines including seven virga machinaria or beams for siege engines, along with nails. In addition 4000 quarrels from St. Briavells were made and transported to Kenilworth alongside three hammers and timber for the king’s works. Iron from the Forest of Dean was another important resource, with the sheriff of Gloucester ordered on 4 September to provide 10 marks worth ‘seeing that the king is in no small need of iron at the present siege’. In London, Hugh of Windsor was paid £8, 4s for large siege pavises (targiis). Raw materials for the crossbow industry at the Tower of London were provided by two citizens of London, Markemano de Cologne (presumably a German merchant) and Bartholomew Le Estreys, who were recompensed 47s for providing wattle, cloth (cortice), bow strings, and fletching for the king’s crossbows. Thomas of the Holy Sepulchre was hard at work

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254 Like at Bedford in 1224, at least two of these were used in the siege; one built for Edmund was of such ‘remarkable height and width’ it contained 200 crossbowmen, while another, dubbed the ursus was erected by Henry. Both were destroyed by the rebels’ engines; Rishanger, De Bellis, pp.55-6; Wild, ‘The Siege of Kenilworth’, p.18; Ann. Dun., pp.87-88.
255 E372/110, m. 2d .
256 This was transported alongside engines for the cost of £7 2s 8d by the knight Peter de Neville in possibly two trips as he was allocated £15 on 28 September for transporting the engines; E372/110, m. 2d; CLR 1260-67, pp.231,36.
making quarrels with the sheriff of Kent ordered to provide his 9d a day salary. 15s were paid for the carriage of the king’s equipment for engines and crossbows. Finally twenty-four carpenters were paid 100s for coming to the king from London to Kenilworth. Windsor’s contribution was smaller with only six belts used for spanning crossbows recorded as being dispatched to Kenilworth. Other materials were transported from across the country, some from the counties surrounding Warwickshire. Horsehair from Oxfordshire and Berkshire was carted to Kenilworth for the engines. Hemp and cables were purchased by the bailiffs of Bridport for £11 8s. Boats were taken from Chester and the Abbot of Gloucester over land to the mere surrounding the castle to try another attack. The demand for arrows apparently outstripped the supply provided by the local vills and on 8 September the sheriff of Sussex and Surrey was required to provide 300 sheaves of ‘well prepared arrows out of the issue of his bailiwick’ for the siege. In total nearly 80,000 quarrels were sent to the siege, 30,000 of them from Lincolnshire (10,200 recorded paid for in the Pipe Rolls). Of these 20,000 were for crossbows for one foot and 10,000 for two feet from the Tower alongside the 4000 from St. Briavells. The order for the Tower’s supply was given on 9 August at Kenilworth and comments that the king ‘is in extreme need thereof for the present siege’. Whatever supplies of quarrels Henry had collected before the siege’s commencement were already running alarmingly low after approximately 6 weeks of siege, an indication of the formidable rate of their consumption in the fighting. Another 13,500 were delivered to Kenilworth from Lincoln soon after 1 November.

257 atilli ingenii balistarum nostrarum, E372/110, m. 11; CLR 1260-67, pp.219,227,234;
258 E372/113, m. 1d.
260 CLR 1260-67, pp.231-2
263 Wild gives the figure as 60,000, the November batch of quarrels may have been separate and this figure does not apparently include the 4000 mentioned in the Pipe Rolls, Wild, ‘The Siege of Kenilworth’, p.18; CLR 1260-67, pp.225,230; E372/111, m. 11; E372/110, m. 2d.
265 CLR 1260-67, p.263.
Figure 3.6 Origins of Supplies to Siege of Kenilworth

Material for the defensive siege lines were provided by the surrounding counties, with quotas assigned to individual forests, presumably based on some pre-existing assessment of the available resources and industry. In Northamptonshire 220 hurdles, 10 foot long and 8 foot wide were constructed in Whittlewood Forest and transported to Kenilworth for £11. The Liberate Roll shows Henry ordered in total 500 from Northamptonshire, the others possibly constructed in other forests, with instructions that they be ‘thick and close-wattled’ (densas et spissas).266 On 28 July, the sheriff of Oxfordshire was ordered to have 500 8 foot long and 7 foot wide hurdles made in Bernwood and another 1000 in Wychwood with firm instructions to deliver them to the king by 15 days after 29 July. The sheriff of Worcestershire was similarly ordered to produce 500 hurdles from Feckenham Forest.267 In addition to those known, it was ordered that unspecified numbers of ready hurdles from Buckingham and Bedfordshire, Gloucester and Warwickshire should be transported to the siege. These hurdles were presumably to act as cover for the attackers against missiles fired from the castle. The Northamptonshire hurdles were possibly designed to be placed closer to the

266 E372/111, m. 2; CLR 1260-67, p.226.
defender’s engines and crossbows. Kenilworth had been equipped with its own throwing machines by Simon shortly after his return in 1263, which were described by the impressed author of the Flores as ‘Unheard amongst us and unseen’. They may have been built by Master William the Engineer who was in de Montfort’s employ. Robert of Gloucester’s account notes the regular exchange of fire between the engines of the two sides and the Flores remarks that the engines of the royalists were being shattered by those of the besieged. Another potential use for the hurdles was as a defensive barrier against sallies by the defenders which are reported in Robert of Gloucester, the Annals of Dunstable and the Flores. In a show of defiance the defenders kept the castle gates open and made regular attacks on the besieging army.

Feeding the besieging army was also an issue, particularly as the garrison had been stripping the countryside for months beforehand. Gloucester dispatched grain to Kenilworth and bucks were ordered taken from the forests of Gillingham and Clarendon. On 10 October, thirty five oxen and fifty wethers were delivered to Kenilworth. One Master Thomas de Wymundham had one hundred and ninety three and a half quarters of wheat taken for the king’s use during the siege, for which he was eventually paid £43 10s 9d.

268 Robert of Gloucs., ii, p.772.
269 Sadly little additional information appears to survive on William and his career; Manners, pp.55,57,66-7; Flores, ii, p.489; Wild, ‘The Siege of Kenilworth’, p.16.
270 Robert of Gloucs., ii, p.772; Flores, iii, p.11; for the repairs see above, E372/111, m. 25.
272 E372/110, m. 2d; CLR 1260-67, pp.231,237,246,252,255.
Figure 3:7 Artist's Impression of Kenilworth Castle viewed from the east after building work under King John

The methods employed against Kenilworth closely resemble those used against Bedford in 1224. In the case of Kenilworth, however, with its large artificial mere, the royalists did not have the option of bombarding the castle from multiple directions and the moat defeated attempts at mining.\(^{274}\) It was only hunger that finally brought the garrison to its knees.\(^{275}\) With desperation mounting in the garrison, as the siege entered November they finally agreed to surrender if Simon the Younger did not relieve them. On 14 December, the garrison finally surrendered and were allowed to depart safely. How many were left is unknown but the conditions inside were so bad by the conclusion that upon entering the royalists were said to have been nearly overcome by the stench.\(^{276}\) Closing the siege operations, Henry departed Kenilworth for Oxford leaving two knights, Roger de Wauton and Ralph de Hotot, to dismantle the siege works including the engines.\(^{277}\)

The sheer scale and expense of the siege of Kenilworth provides the starkest illustration of the disincentives for Montfort to embark on sieges of this scale. The six month siege of Kenilworth became a national effort, in some ways akin to Montfort's massive muster on the south-coast, albeit without the same popular appeal. Yet, Montfort had only really obtained access to the resources

\(^{274}\) *Ann. Dun.*, pp.87-88; Rishanger, *De Bellis*, p.56.
\(^{275}\) For Henry’s use of feasts see Wild, ‘The Siege of Kenilworth’, p.20.
\(^{277}\) *CLR 1260-67*, p.294.
commanded by Henry after December 1264 with the surrenders of Nottingham and Gloucester, while Henry was able to pit the resources of the crown against Kenilworth. At Pevensey and then later at Richmond, Montfort and his allies could neither command the same resources, nor did they focus their efforts on the reduction of those castles with the same degree of determination. Instead both sieges were relatively local affairs involving the local county levies and regional Montfortian adherents. Henry III, in contrast, used the realm to break the last castle of the rebels.

While the financial cost of the siege was high with £2,948 0s 4d for the wages of soldiers and craftsmen alone, this figure also covered Henry’s subsequent campaigns up to the confrontation at Stratford in 1267 (including the fortification of Cambridge), which were also on a large scale.278 This sum for a six month siege and Henry’s subsequent campaigns is actually surprisingly favourable when compared to his expenses at the siege of Bedford in 1225 which had been £1,311 18s 2d. for the wages of the soldiers and craftsmen for eight weeks.279 Simon the Younger’s siege of Pevensey had cost over £1,700 for 11 months (although this sum may not have been confined to wages).280 This does raise the question as to why Henry may have spent less on wages at Kenilworth than he did at Bedford forty years earlier. Perhaps he made greater use of the free military service owed to him and maintained a smaller stipendiary field force. There are no records, such as that of the fifty three Breton crossbowmen and their associates employed by the king for the siege of Bytham in 1221, indicating the number of any stipendiaries employed.281 To contextualise the scale of the expenditure on these major sieges, in comparison Henry had spent over £6,000 over a thirty-five year period upgrading Dover castle into the greatest fortress in the land; while York from 1245-62 had £2,450 spent upon it.282 It was comparatively more expensive to take a castle than to maintain and improve it.

After all this expense and time, however, in the Dictum of Kenilworth agreed on 31 October Henry had agreed to let the garrison go free and furthermore had been required to moderate his

278 E372/115, m. 1; Wild, ‘The Siege of Kenilworth’, p.18.
280 See above; the figures recorded were of £800 and 1450 marks. Roughly converted into pounds this is about £1,700; Jobson, Revolution, p.xiii.
281 Roll of divers accounts, p.17.
282 HKW, ii, pp.634,890.
policy of disinheritance.\textsuperscript{283} To temper this disappointment, though, were the strategic gains. Kenilworth, one of England’s strongest castles and held by a powerful garrison, had been taken. Victory was perhaps inevitable due to the disparity in power between the two sides but the expense and resources required at a time of turmoil in the state made the commencement of the siege by no means an easy choice. Despite these obstacles Henry’s forces had outlasted the defenders, and he had fulfilled the oath which he had taken at the start of the siege that he would either have the castle surrender or he would capture it.\textsuperscript{284} His enemies would laud the rebels’ courage and fortitude but Henry had used the siege as a venue to demonstrate his restored power and that his captivity had not ‘irrevocably impaired’ it.\textsuperscript{285} The siege certainly made an impression amongst some chroniclers, as well as demonstrating the garrison’s bravery (or perhaps desperation), the power of Henry’s resources and determination to take Kenilworth were clearly displayed. The siege of Kenilworth further illustrates why so few sieges of major castles were prosecuted during the war. Grossly expensive and time consuming only someone with the power of the state behind them could co-ordinate the resources to reduce them.\textsuperscript{286}

The sieges of Kenilworth and Alnwick as well as that of Dover, mark the rebels’ handful of attempts to hold castles against the royalists after the battle of Evesham. In 1215, the successful siege of Rochester castle by King John had the effect that, as the Barnwell annalist commented, ‘few cared to put their trust in castles.’\textsuperscript{287} The Disinherited, as with the royalists prior to Evesham, seem to have followed the same doctrine, except at Kenilworth.\textsuperscript{288} The siege of Kenilworth demonstrated the effectiveness of modern fortifications, but it also reinforced the message of the siege of Rochester fifty years before. Without support, the castle on its own could not win the war and even the mightiest could be reduced with the application of the necessary resources and determination. In 1266, Henry III displayed he had both of these requirements.

**Conclusion**

Several themes emerge from a study of the role of castles during the Barons’ War. Castles were fundamental to both shaping the course of the war and, just as importantly, to the minds of those

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{283} DBM, pp.316-337.
\bibitem{284} Ann. Wav., p.371.
\bibitem{286} Ann. Dun., p.242; Wykes, pp.190-1; Flores, iii, p.11.
\bibitem{287} McGlynn, Blood Cries Afar, p.147.
\bibitem{288} This issue will be explored further in Chapter 5.
\end{thebibliography}
fighting it. The low military importance of minor castles that Eales observed concerning the civil war of 1215-17 can, however, also be seen in 1264-7. When unsupported minor baronial castles were attacked, such as Skipton and Sheffield, they nearly always fell, though our sources never elucidate the causes of the fall. Certainly the defences of these were no longer on a par with those of many of the major royal castles or those possessed by the great magnates. Coulson argues that, ‘lords and their vassals, particularly if of lower rank, tended to more interested in the symbols of strength’ and any more ‘would take them out of their class and usually beyond their means’. 289 If we judge on the basis of the Barons’ War, there would seem grounds to support this conclusion. The defences of most seigneurial castles seem to have been inadequate in the face of major attack, whether due to their lack of sophistication or the weakness of their garrisons. The improvements in siege technology over the thirteenth century may provide an additional explanation for this situation. We should, however, perhaps not be too dismissive as to their defensive value. That they were not proof against large armies equipped with siege engines does not mean that they did not provide protection against smaller raiding parties. The absence of appropriate records, particularly more detailed accounts of local warfare in some regions, prevents a proper assessment of the effectiveness of seigneurial castle defences in this regard. The deterrent effect upon raiding parties of attacking even modest castles protected by banks, ditches and timber palisades, would have been no less than that on their forebears. Lack of evidence does not in this instance equate to lack of effect. Castles, particularly the major royal fortresses, however, were fundamental in helping to shape the development of the war. One of the major incentives for Henry III’s decision to march his army to Lewes was that the town was controlled by the castle of the royalist John de Warenne, earl of Surrey. This seigneurial castle, reinforced by Edward, held out against assault. 290 It was the Montfortian attack on Rochester that pulled Henry III from the Midlands and it was the Montfortian presence at Kenilworth as well as the royalist control of castles such as Gloucester that were a major influence on the movements of Montfort in the final days of the Evesham campaign. 291

289 Coulson, Castles in Medieval Society, p.81.
291 Chapter 4, p.168; Jobson, Revolution, pp.138-41; see the Conclusion for a wider discussion on the castle and the shape of the war.
Castles were indeed built as status symbols, but display and defence were not mutually exclusive concepts for those building them at the time of Barons’ War. Status could be accrued by the display of practical modern fortifications. Rochester’s great keep, dismissed by Coulson, proved its strength against major siege operations twice in a century. The improvements to Pevensey under Peter of Savoy no doubt displayed Peter’s wealth to the locality in peace time, but in war the improvements had very practical benefits. The triple wall built by Richard of Cornwall on the northside of Wallingford looked impressive and displayed the earl’s great wealth, but it also served an entirely practical military purpose. While most of Kenilworth’s defences were probably already in existence by the end of John’s reign, Montfort still apparently added to the castle, for as the Flores remarked he ‘strengthened [the castle] with remarkable buildings’.\(^292\) Kenilworth was a powerful status symbol for the earl, the king’s brother-in-law, particularly as he sought to increase his influence in Warwickshire.\(^293\) While much of Henry III’s reign had indeed been peaceful, conflict in England was never beyond the realm of possibility, particularly amongst an aristocracy for whom the conduct of warfare remained an integral part of their identity. Henry spent much on improving the comforts in his castles, but he never seems to have lost sight of the importance of major royal fortresses, such as the Tower of London and Windsor, as defensive bastions. Defences might be neglected in peace time, but in war time they became a priority for government expenditure. The Barons’ War demonstrates that while the castle could fulfil many roles in the thirteenth century, it remained also a military tool for a military elite.

Strong defences might assist in a garrison’s ability to resist but the success of this resistance was determined by more human factors, for example, sparse supplies doomed the defence of Gloucester castle in both the first and third sieges. The size of the garrison might also play a role. Too few made it difficult to adequately defend the castle; too many made it more vulnerable to swift starvation. Fear of the consequences of capture if the castle was stormed would doubtless have preyed on the minds of the defenders, particularly if their participation was less than voluntary. Although there was only one reported execution of a prisoner post-capture of a castle, that of the carpenter at Gloucester in 1263, lethal reprisal for resistance remained a real possibility, particularly when fighting the crown. Whether Henry’s execution of the eighty men at Bedford

castle in 1225 was still in popular memory is unknown but it is possible, and was probably known amongst those of knightly rank.

While modern castle defences gave defenders an edge, they remained largely vulnerable to the same pressures as any other castle. Surprise was favoured in attacks over expensive full sieges. John Giffard and Edward’s successful surprise assaults on the castles of Warwick and Alnwick demonstrate that advanced design was for nought if the garrison was unready. This technique was tried less successfully at Wallingford by Warin de Bassingbourne and at Gloucester by Giffard and Edward in 1264 and 1265 respectively. In both cases multiple lines of defences, whether from a concentric castle design or the inclusion of town defences, seem to have provided advance warning and delayed these attacks enough to allow the garrison to repel the assault. If surprise could not be achieved, however, the only methods of taking these castles were by political and diplomatic pressure, the method apparently favoured by both sides, or by siege. The major sieges required to take these castles were vastly expensive, time consuming and fraught with difficulty, especially as specialists were required for the construction of siege engines. Sieges were therefore avoided except when absolutely necessary, as at Pevensey, Kenilworth and Gloucester. The reduction of one of these castles without the element of surprise or the garrison’s capitulation required a truly national effort with command of resources that only the king was capable of drawing upon during the war. When considered in this light, Prestwich’s observations concerning the small number and brevity of the sieges in Edward II’s reign, alongside Eales’s work, starts to seem less like a change but rather a continuation of a pre-existing trend dating back to the beginning of the thirteenth century at least.
4 Towns and Warfare in the Barons’ War

Towns have been a largely neglected topic in the historiography of the Barons’ War and warrant particular attention, not only because of their crucial importance to the economy of the country but also because of their distinctive role in warfare which sets them apart from castles.¹ This chapter’s aim is not to address in detail the complex issue of their mixed loyalties during the war’s course, a large topic in its own right, though some discussion of this is necessary. This chapter will instead examine towns’ strategic value, their actual involvement in warfare, how the application of the ‘customs of war’ operated in regard to them in a time of rebellion, and finally the possible impact of the war on the development of town defences after the war.

Loyalty and Resistance

In Chapter 2 we established the strategic importance of towns for each side. This section will examine the factors that determined why certain towns became actively caught up in the war, whether through political allegiance, the presence of a castle garrison or attempts at self-defence.²

The political loyalties of some towns helped shape their subsequent military interactions during the war. There was urban involvement in the reform movement from early on, with town concerns about abuses of royal authority addressed in the original *petitio baronum* in 1258. Article 22 complained about the excessive prises taken in the king’s name by his appointees in ‘fairs, markets and cities’, and the corruption of the officials involved.³ In article 23 the king was accused of ‘scarcely ever’ paying for his prises and thus impoverishing English merchants and discouraging foreign ones.⁴ Other issues included unfair fines by justices or sheriffs (20 and 21) and the power of


² See Chapter 2, pp.70-2.

³ *DBM*, pp.85-87.

⁴ *DBM*, pp.86-87.
Cahorsin money lenders in London (26).⁵ In the actual Provisions though, these were watered down to simply the demand to remedy:

the city of London and all the other cities of the king that have gone to shame and destruction through tallages and other oppressions.⁶

Writing about events in 1263 after the overthrow of the Aldermanic regime in London, Wykes commented that through the whole kingdom of England in the major cities and boroughs there were ‘low people… proclaiming themselves bachelors (bachelarios) publicly and with daring violence they were oppressing the greater [citizens] in the towns and boroughs’.⁷ ‘Bachelor’ usually implies a retainer but could also mean a junior craftsman.⁸ The Annals of Burton claims that in 1259 the Provisions of Westminster were instigated by a deputation self-styled the communitas bacheleriae Angliae, who demanded reform of the abuses of the great magnates. Tout judged this group to be no more ‘than a chance number of rash young gentlemen’.⁹ The styling of ‘bachelors’ may either indicate some town involvement in the crafting of the Westminster Provisions or perhaps marks a later conscious assumption of the term by sections of town communities in order to identify themselves with the reform of and resistance to the abuses of those in power, whether the king, magnates or town elites.¹⁰

Previous political involvement and interest in the reform process did not necessarily translate into support for Montfort in 1264. Despite his statement, Wykes only specifically mentions London, leaving the suspicion that he could be guilty of a degree of hyperbole.¹¹ We know most about events in London thanks to the London alderman Arnald fitz Thedmar’s contemporaneous chronicle. The commune’s radical overthrow of the aldermanic government and the policies of the populist mayor, Thomas fitz Thomas, pushed it firmly into the Montfortian camp in a way that is more exceptional rather than illustrative of a wider pattern of urban support in England. A royalist victory would mean an end to the city’s new government at the very least and entail serious

⁵ DBM, pp.83-89.
⁷ Wykes, p.138; Jacob, Studies, p.283.
⁸ Wykes dates from 1278-1293, though partly based on the contemporary Osney Chronicle so potentially these two uses may have separate senses; see: T. F. Tout, ‘The Communitas bacheleriae Angliae’, EHR, 17 (1902), p.92; Revised Medieval Latin Word-List, p.41; Gransden, Historical Writing in England, p.464.
¹⁰ Jacob, Studies, pp.137,283.
¹¹ The only other town reported to possess a ‘bachelors’ movement, and possibly the inspiration for Wykes’ comments, is Bury St. Edmunds, Wykes, p.138; See tract Qui se bachelarii vocari fecerunt, printed in H.W.C. Davis, ‘The Commune of Bury St. Edmunds, 1264’, EHR, 24 (1909), pp.314-317; Bury, p.34.
repercussions for those involved. The Londoners could especially expect retribution for the insults offered to the queen in 1263 and the burning of Richard of Cornwall’s manor of Isleworth in early 1264.\textsuperscript{12} The Cinque Ports, Bristol and to a slightly lesser degree Bury St. Edmunds, also decisively backed the Montfortians but the towns of England and the March largely seem to have remained wary of involvement.\textsuperscript{13}

Urban support was not confined to the Montfortians.\textsuperscript{14} On 16 July 1265, the citizens of Winchester, in one of only two firmly identified instances (outside of London) of a town deliberately slamming the gates on an army for political motivations, opted to resist the army of Simon the Younger when he approached the city on his way to Kenilworth. This loyalty may have had several root causes. Winchester was Henry III’s birthplace, and the king consciously referred to himself as Henry of Winchester even on the battlefield of Evesham when he reportedly cried ‘Do not kill me, for I am Henry of Winchester your king!’\textsuperscript{15} Winchester was one of Henry’s favoured residences as well as being an established royal centre and he spent £10,000 over the course of his reign on repairing and improving the castle, both its defensive features and its living quarters.\textsuperscript{16} Henry visited the city at least once a year in forty six out of the fifty-six years of his reign, usually at least twice a year. Five of the years when he was unable to visit were due to the Barons’ War. He celebrated Christmas eighteen times in the city, and his affection for the town was perhaps reinforced by the war as he spent increasingly long periods there, including three months in 1268-9, as well as the last five Christmases of his life.\textsuperscript{17} The citizens’ hostile relations with St. Swithun’s may have also played a role in their loyalty, for the English church’s generally favourable stance towards the Montfortian party (the bishop of Winchester, John of Exeter, was on the baronial side as was the prior of St. Swithun’s Ralph Russel), may have pushed the townsmen in the opposite direction.\textsuperscript{18} On 4 May, the citizens’ dispute with the priory boiled over, resulting in the burning of

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{13} For details on Bury’s behaviour see Bury, p.34. See below for the Cinque Ports; S. K. Cohn, Popular Protest in Late Medieval English Towns, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp.84-5;
  \item \textsuperscript{14} For some examples see Knowles, ‘The Disinherited’, Part ii, pp.100-102.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Guisborough, p.201.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} HKW, ii, pp.858-62.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} D. Keene, Survey of Medieval Winchester, 2 vols (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1985) part i, i, pp.100-3.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
St. Swithun’s houses outside the priory walls and in the killing of seven of its men. Noticeably there were no attacks on the Jews in the town, the king’s personal property, until Simon the Younger’s sack in 1265. Winchester’s loyalty was rewarded by a six year exemption from rendering their farm at the Exchequer ‘in consideration of their losses sustained for the king’ from Simon’s sack.

The military involvement of towns in the Barons’ War was very frequently reactive rather than proactive, with self-defence a key motivator. The wealth of towns was extremely tempting to both sides, particularly when they were low on funds, and the most direct method of accessing this wealth was to plunder the town. Fears concerning the intentions of an approaching army therefore greatly increased the attraction of manning the defences for those towns that possessed them. In March 1264, at Chester, the justiciary William de la Zouche and the citizens took defensive action, ‘fearing that the city was about to be besieged’. Such fears were well founded. Ironically de la Zouche and other royalists earlier that month had attacked Stafford … and returning ‘they burned the town of Stone and forcibly entered the Church and plundered all that they found there’. A few days later they again went to Stafford, but were repulsed and on their way back burnt the town of Eccleshall, broke into churches and took many captives and spoil. Stories such as these, even if exaggerated, would have provided ample motivation for a fortified town’s decision to resist an army.

Castles and their garrisons could lead to a town’s involuntary military involvement in the war. As castles were designed to guard and overawe their town, the loyalty of the castle garrison would also likely determine any resistance by the town’s people. The 1264 occupation of the town and castle of Northampton by a large baronial force, for example, makes it very hard to accurately gauge the degree to which the participation of the citizens was voluntary. The control of the Tower of London was vital in determining the capital’s quiescence. Only with the arrival of de Clare’s powerful army in April 1267 did those elements of the population in favour of the reformers gain

21 CPR 1258-66, p.470.
24 See Chapter 2, pp.70-73.
ascendancy. There are, however, examples of towns which successfully defied a castle garrison of a different loyalty, such as at Bristol in 1263 and December 1264. In the summer of 1265, Shrewsbury’s citizens harassed the Montfortian garrison, preventing their effective supply of the castle. However, successful resistance by towns to a castle does not appear to have been common and outside intervention tended to be necessary when withstanding the will of its castle.

The ‘Customs of War’ and Towns

The ‘customs of war’ described for castles in Chapter 3 were generally the same as those applied to towns, though with several differences. Firstly, there would have always been a great temptation or even the explicit pressure for an attacking army to sack towns. With regular streams of income disrupted by the war, both sides were reliant upon raising funds by less savoury methods. For example, protection payments from both religious houses and towns were relatively common. After 1265, towns such as London, Northampton and Hereford among others were fined by the royalists. London’s massive 20,000 mark fine was used to pay off a loan from Louis IX of France. Conducting a sack, in contrast, could be a direct and swift way of both paying an army and raising its morale. At Northampton in 1264, the Dunstable annalist noted that the victorious royalists ‘plundered the burgesses and all other inhabitants to the last half-penny’. In fact sacks appear to have been fairly common place during the war. Winchester, Northampton, Worcester, Gloucester, Lincoln, Cambridge and Norwich, to name probably only the best known, were all subjected to sack during the war and its aftermath, the latter two helping fund the activities of the Disinherited post-Evesham.

A secondary use of the sack was as an exemplary punishment. Edward’s sack of Gloucester in 1264 was revenge upon the townsmen who had supported the rebels. He hanged the porters of the town’s gate whose negligence had originally allowed the Montfortians inside. The burgesses were

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25 Flores, ii, pp.482-483.
26 CPR. 1258-66, p.434.
28 See Chapter 6, pp.216-7.
31 See, Chapter 5, p.186.
then arrested with a ‘great ransom’ extorted from them, and finally he destroyed ‘all the town.’

Such actions were both a punishment of the town and a warning to others that might follow suit. How far this actually discouraged the resistance of other towns is unclear. Given, as discussed previously, that some towns had little choice in resisting and might perhaps fear the sack regardless of any resistance offered. The surrender of London in 1265 may, however, be indicative of this deterrent effect. Following the Battle of Evesham the spectre of eventual defeat and all the horrors of the sack probably influenced the citizens’ decision to surrender. The Disinherited’s sack of Norwich on 16 December 1266 carried off an ‘abundance of booty’, in one account as much as 140 wagon loads. On 31 May 1267, fearing a further attack the ‘constable for keeping the peace’, Thomas de Carlton, killed a city sergeant, Walter de Starston, who, when requested by de Carlton to call the citizens to assist the defence of the city against the Disinherited, refused, using ‘base language’ at Thomas.

It is noticeable that while chroniclers describe sacks they never actually condemn them. In fact the only real condemnations come from Robert of Gloucester’s account of Edward’s treatment of Gloucester in 1264 and Wykes’ of the royalist sack of Northampton. Though Robert clearly sympathizes with the citizens, his condemnation is not that the sack occurred; rather it is because Edward broke his word to Henry de Montfort not to punish the townspeople after the Montfortian withdrawal. For Wykes it was the ‘sacrilege’ of sacking the churches, rather than the sack itself that provoked his outrage. The indication therefore is that, though considered awful, the sack was still recognized as being within the accepted rules of war. One factor influencing this perception may be that sacks during the war did not in the main involve killing. Few narrative accounts mention the murder of citizenry, and those that do, such as Wykes’s account of the taking of Winchester, indicate that the casualties were low. Plunder was the primary objective.

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32 Robert of Gloucs., ii, p.744; Church Historians, v, p.366.
33 See Chapter 2, pp.70-3.
34 Bury, p.37.
37 Wykes, p.145.
38 Wykes, p.169.
The Cinque Ports provide an interesting coda to this discussion in that, though some such as at Winchelsea were subjected to the sack, they are noteworthy in the comparatively favourable terms subsequently shown to them. Edward’s treatment of the Cinque Ports in 1266 varied. The *Flores*, for example, comments that ‘for their demerits’ some of the ports were punished, some terrified and others ‘he [Edward] accepted to the peace generously’. At Winchelsea, a comparatively remarkable degree of leniency, including the restoration of their liberties, was exercised to encourage the town’s future good behaviour following its assault and capture. The Waverley Annals claims that Gilbert de Clare recommended the sparing of one of the principal men of the town, whom Edward was about to hang, because sparing him would encourage the rest of the townspeople to submit peacefully. The Dover/Canterbury chronicles comments that, following the ports’ surrender, ‘the lord King conceded all those liberties, on land and on sea, which they had before’. The leniency of their treatment by the royalists caused note. Fitz Thedmar, presumably bitter that the Ports had escaped so lightly compared to London, remarked that ‘for what reason or through what necessity all the concessions aforesaid were made unto them, I know not’. Such treatment is further indicative of the strategic importance placed in the compliance of the Ports.

Town Fortifications and the Barons’ War

English town defences by the 1260s were neither ubiquitous nor sophisticated. For those towns that possessed them, the defences were often based on pre-existing Roman fortifications or those of the Anglo-Saxon burghs. From the late twelfth to the mid-thirteenth century there was a period of rapid urban growth with larger towns demonstrating ‘clear signs of a growing independence in terms of self-government, the development of laws and craft regulation’. This growth also prompted the display of this increasing autonomy through the construction of urban defences, bars and gates. Some new circuits were constructed during the thirteenth century but documentary sources such as murage grants (the right for towns to charge a toll towards the construction or maintenance of town defences) used by Turner, do not necessarily indicate the absence of defences around a town prior

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39 *Flores*, iii, p.8.
41 *Ger. Cant.*, ii, pp.244-245.
42 Mayors and Sheriffs*, p.88; Cron. Maj., p.83.
to the first grant.\textsuperscript{44} Towns with defences were actually a minority in England; out of 640 boroughs in medieval England and ‘more than a thousand other places with markets’, only a maximum of 211 are believed to have possessed defences.\textsuperscript{45} Such defences were not confined though to the largest towns, but were rather spread throughout the ‘urban hierarchy’.\textsuperscript{46} The greater part of the largest and wealthiest English towns, the majority of which were royal boroughs, possessed defences (places like Norwich being notable exceptions). Seigneurial boroughs, by contrast, were less likely to possess defences, perhaps as a reflection of some lords’, particularly ecclesiastical ones, concerns against promoting aspirations for communal self-control amongst the inhabitants of their settlements. In addition, Creighton and Higham postulate that the acquisition of urban defences by seigneurial boroughs was further curtailed by possible lordly concerns that murage grants might result in an increased royal influence over their borough.\textsuperscript{47}

By the time of the Barons’ War, defences could vary from simple ditches and banks topped by a timber palisade to a full stone enceinte with ramparts surmounting an earthen bank, further reinforced by a ditch on the outside. In some cases only a ditch and bank were present, as at Norwich, though when constructed with enough steepness and depth this remained a significant obstacle.\textsuperscript{48} Timber town defences were gradually replaced by stone over the course of the thirteenth century, mirroring the contemporary evolution in castle architecture. Both Shrewsbury and Oxford, for example, had respectively replaced their enceintes with stone by 1242 and 1244 at the latest.\textsuperscript{49} As Creighton points out, however, there was no smooth transition; Stafford, for example, was granted murage in 1224, but in 1233 the king granted sixty oaks to plug three gaps in the walls. Even by 1600 two gaps remained covered by palisading rather than stone.\textsuperscript{50} Yet even wooden fortifications when well-constructed were, as Turner comments, ‘as strong as anything bound with mortar’, and quicker and cheaper to repair in times of emergency.\textsuperscript{51} Ditches, as well as providing a physical obstacle to assault, also prevented siege engines getting too close to the wall base, made it

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} Turner, \textit{Town Defences}, p.52; Palliser, ‘Town Defences in England and Wales’, p.106; Creighton, \textit{Medieval Town Walls}, p.87.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Palliser, ‘Town Defences’, p.106; Creighton, Higham, \textit{Town Walls}, p.218.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Palliser, ‘Town Defences’, pp.109-110; Creighton, \textit{Medieval Town Walls}, p.211.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Turner, \textit{Town Defences}, pp.109-110; Creighton, \textit{Medieval Town Walls}, p.218.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Turner, \textit{Town Defences}, p.54.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Creighton, \textit{Medieval Town Walls}, p.89.
\item \textsuperscript{51} Turner, \textit{Town Defences}, p.54.
\end{itemize}
difficult to erect scaling ladders and provided some protection against sapping. Nevertheless, the record of town defences in successfully repelling attacks during the war is not inspiring. Contamine, speaking generally of town defences in Europe before the fourteenth century, has commented that town ‘fortifications were often very rudimentary and it was rare indeed when an enceinte did not have some weak points’. Similarly, while noting that ‘the degree to which defences were effective is not […] easy to assess’, Turner has questioned how far English town defences of the mid-thirteenth century ‘could ever act as a useful and effective barrier against attack’. This stands in contrast to continental developments. In comparison to the often very basic design and limited spread of English town defences those in France and Flanders were much more advanced and by 1300 ‘almost all’ towns and burgs ‘boasted crenelated stone and brick enceintes bristling with mighty towers and fortified gates’. This growth was stimulated by rising wealth, local insecurities and both royal and lordly interest in safeguarding ‘the towns upon which so much of their power rested’. In Flanders, for example, Namur had acquired a double-walled enceinte and four towers by the mid-thirteenth century. In the far south, towns such as Carcassonne and Toulouse played a major role in the Albigensian Crusade. The towns and cities enjoyed considerable independence and power in the political structures of the region prior to the crusade, while local instability and the topography encouraged the erection of stronger fortifications. The majority of older German towns were also fortified with stone walls by the end of the thirteenth century. The growing prosperity of these towns, such as Cologne, permitted the building and upkeep of new defences, the maintenance of urban troops under the command of the patricians, town arsenals, and access to both political alliances and mercenaries. No thirteenth century English town, except perhaps London, approached this sort of power.

The prime difference underpinning the development of these continental examples and their English counterparts was the comparative security provided by the greater dominance of royal

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52 Turner, Town Defences, p.57.
53 See below.
54 Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p.101.
55 Turner, Town Defences, pp.76-77.
56 Wolfe, Walled Towns, p.16.
57 Wolfe, Walled Towns, pp.9,35,47.
58 Wolfe, Walled Towns, p.47.
59 Carcassonne even boasted extra walls around its suburbs; Marvin, ‘War in the South’, pp.382-3; Wolfe, Walled Towns, pp.14,32-33.
Unlike the fractured political structures of Flanders, Germany and many regions of France, English towns were located in a relatively stable political environment by the thirteenth century. Although disputes over rights existed, the armed seizure of towns was rarely a realistic threat, except in the event of civil war, and thus there was no pressing imperative to build and maintain sophisticated defences. The main exceptions to this were those towns located in the region of the Welsh March and the northern towns of Carlisle and Newcastle.

Towns and cities such as London, Oxford, Gloucester, York, Northampton, Hereford, Rochester and Winchester all possessed communal fortifications by the mid-thirteenth century. Frequently, however, town walls were designed to enable civic authorities to monitor the entrance into and exit of individuals, a particular issue if communal liberties restricted the right of free trade for outsiders. A statement of civic wealth and prestige, walls also afforded a sense of security which encouraged trade and provided both a convenient barrier to prevent the entry of undesirables such as plague victims as well as a defence against brigands or, in the March, opportunistic Welsh raiders. Henry III, for example, permitted the bishop of Salisbury to fortify the new town with either ramparts or ditches, ‘for fear of robbers’. The security aspect of town defences is emphasised in Henry III’s *de forma pacis* which specified that at night every city gate was to be guarded by sixteen men, every borough gate by twelve and in rural townships by six or four men.

The military value of town walls was appreciated by both sides in the war. Concurrent to the efforts to repair castles in 1261, we also witness eight murage grants, four of which were at the instigation of Richard of Cornwall (Exeter, Chichester) and Edward (Stamford, Bristol). In fact, when compared to the period of 1247-58 when twenty six grants were made in eleven years, we see twenty seven grants made in the eight years from 1258-66, and twenty-four for the period of 1266-72. Some key towns also received direct investment by the crown. In 1262, Rochester’s town defences were augmented in obvious anticipation of war. Alongside recorded repairs to the castle

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65 *CPR 1258-66*, pp.144,155,179,189.
66 *CPR 1247-58; CPR 1258-66; CPR 1266-72*. 

on 10 May, payment was made on 11 July for £25, 5s. and 5d. for the timber used ‘for the works of Rochester bridge and the town gates, and to make breastworks (bretachias) round the town’. 67

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Table 4:1 Murage Grants 1259-67 68

Despite the advantages of town walls and grants of murage, maintaining walls was a costly business and there is evidence from the early thirteenth century of attempts at deferring these costs by leasing out the mural towers to tenants in return for their agreement to maintain them. Chapels were often built in the gatehouses, holes could be made for aqueducts and drains, as at Carlisle in 1238, and posterns cut into the walls, as at Shrewsbury and Worcester, where they provided entrances to friaries. 69 In 1235, Alexander Swerford, Treasurer of St. Paul’s, was permitted the free use of a wall turret close to Ludgate in London with allowance to construct what buildings he pleased. London’s Newgate was turned into a gaol by 1219. 70 The effects of these attempts to defray maintenance costs led to the domestication of sections of the defences, which in turn ‘must have made the nature of the wall less defensive’. 71

The towns of the Welsh March were more likely to possess viable fortifications in the 1260s than those in other parts of central and southern England, due to the increasing numbers of Welsh

67 CLR, 1260-1267, pp.85:104.
69 Turner, Town Defences, p.88.
70 Creighton, Medieval Town Walls, p.171.
71 Turner, Town Defences, p.89.
incursions over the previous decades of Henry’s reign. Although tracing the existence of town fortifications prior to grants of murage is difficult, the March received a large proportion of the first murage grants between 1220 and 1250.\textsuperscript{72}

**Town Defences in the War**

It is particularly worth noting that in the main towns had not experienced warfare since the 1215-17 civil war and the more geographically limited Marshal rebellion of 1233-34.\textsuperscript{73} After forty years of relative peace the town defences that did exist were not necessarily in an optimal state. In a period of sustained calm, the constant expense entailed in the maintenance of town defences could render them, in the citizens’ eyes, an unnecessary burden. As a result walls could sometimes simply be left to decay. Northampton’s, for example, were in poor condition as late as June 1263 when the king granted borough taxes to the mayor and burgesses to fund repairs to the defences ‘for his security and theirs’.\textsuperscript{74} The sudden creation of a wide breach by the royalists in their assault was imputed by the Dunstable annalist to treachery, but it may have been merely down to their dilapidated state. This pattern was, as already discussed, often equally true for the castles, including Northampton castle.\textsuperscript{75}

The walls were not the only part of the defences that could have been compromised by the war’s outbreak. As space became a premium there was a growing temptation to either build upon or dump refuse within a town’s defensive ditch, increasingly compromising the defences. Urban sprawl beyond the town wall, when conducted without consideration for the military efficacy of the defences, could provide cover for the advance of any attackers. In some cases this could result even in buildings that overlooked the ramparts, providing attackers with ready firing platforms with which their archers could sweep clear wall tops.

Following the royalist attack on Hereford on 10-11 November 1264, an inquiry was launched into ‘robberies and other trespasses’. It recorded the defenders’ efforts, upon receiving word of the royalist advance towards them, to put the defensive ditch that surrounded the walls back into good

\textsuperscript{72} Turner, *Town Defences*, p.27.
\textsuperscript{73} On the Marshal rebellion see Weiler, *Kingship, Rebellion and Political Culture*; and Crouch, ‘The Last Adventure’, pp.7-30.
\textsuperscript{75} *Ann. Dun.*, p.220; See Chapter 2 for further discussion. It is unknown if those repairs were carried out; Treharne, ‘The Battle of Northampton’, p.311.
order. The citizens seized land and threw down houses in order to ‘widen the ditch, which was to the great improvement of the city’. They even threw earth from the ditch, presumably in an effort to deepen it, onto the bishop of Hereford’s land, and ‘pulled down part of the mill-pond because it was on the town ditch’. The same behaviour is recorded in the Chronicle of St. Werburg’s abbey at Chester, where the chronicler expresses fury at the citizens’ decision to dig a ditch around the city.

Figure 4:1 Hereford c.1264

At Hereford, the inquiry’s main focus was apparently upon ecclesiastical property damaged during the events, concentrating as much upon the citizens’ actions as upon that of the attackers. The inquiry explicitly accused the citizens and garrison of Hereford of burning ‘certain houses in the suburbs which hindered the defence’. From the gate of St. Nicholas to Thithene they threw down houses ‘to the damage of one tenant of the bishop and tenants of the king’. Between the gates of Thithene and Widemarsh ‘for the same cause’ they pulled down the ‘Prior of St. Guthlac’s mill and two houses of the bishop’s fee’ and the mill house of a clerk. On the night of the royalist army’s arrival the Montfortian castle garrison burnt down the prior of St. Guthlac’s mill and eight

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76 It was launched on 8 February 1265, CIM, i, no.291.
77 CIM, i, no.291.
78 Ann. Cestr., p.87.
79 Authors own map, based on - 1st Edition Ordnance Survey, 1886.
houses on Bithebroke Street. The mill was explicitly said to have been burned ‘because by it the enemy could cause them much annoyance’, probably since by its height archers could threaten the walls, as were the houses because they were ‘an annoyance to the castle and city.’

Figure 4:2 Chester 1264

In 1264, the citizens of Chester ‘at the suggestion of a certain cursed fellow named Robert Mercer, then sheriff of the city’…‘pulled down the houses of St. Werburg that were in Bog lane’ and destroyed the gardens before digging their ditch. The damage at Rochester in 1264 was even more severe. Roger Leybourne, the royalist castle commander, torched the suburbs facing Canterbury, including parts of the town and the priory before the Montfortian attack. We can see these actions repeated in other periods, particularly in French towns such as Rheims during the Hundred Years War. Such destructive efforts were usually compounded by the actions of the

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80 CIM, i, no.291.
enemy as well, for example, when at Hereford the royalists burnt the suburb of Bisopstrete. It is interesting to note that in the first two cases above, we only know about the defensive preparations through the complaints of the local religious community. It seems that even at a time of civil war it was only the threat of imminent attack that prompted some towns to emend their defences. At Hereford, Chester and Rochester it was the castle garrison that apparently took the lead in these efforts, further emphasising the important role of urban castle garrisons in determining the military resistance of towns. As commented in Chapter 3, such activities were in the garrison’s interest as the town defences were frequently important to the defence of the castle itself and often bore the brunt of the initial fighting.

Despite being relatively unsophisticated, town fortifications demonstrated the ability to repulse direct assault by major armies on several occasions during the war. At Worcester, Winchester and Rochester, the determined resistance of the defenders drove off direct attempts to storm the towns. During Robert de Ferrers’ attack on Worcester in 1264 the earl’s army was reportedly ‘vigorously resisted’ by the citizens on the walls, forcing him to adopt other methods for gaining entry. Robert of Gloucester comments that at Winchester in 1265 *pe biker longe ilaste* when Simon the Younger attempted to take the town. Again direct assault apparently failed. Gilbert de Clare’s initial attacks on Rochester’s walls were also driven off. At Northampton, despite the wall reportedly having been breached, the defenders repulsed two royalist assaults before the third broke through. In this case the rubble and ditch probably remained a potent hindrance to the attackers. Simon the Younger was reportedly unhorsed and captured when holding the breach, as he impetuously charged into the midst of the attackers. Little need was ever shown for the deployment of siege engines against towns. Though Roger Leybourne came with siege engines for the reduction of Sandwich, he took it with the first storm. Indeed, it is striking that the only recorded sustained siege of a fortified town is that of Winchelsea in 1266 which only lasted a few

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85 *CIM*, i, no.291.
87 *Flores*, ii, pp.486-7.
89 See Chapter 3, pp.103-7; *Flores*, ii, p.490.
days. The stipendiary archers hired for the campaign only received two days’ wages at most before it too fell to storm.\(^{91}\)

The lack of major town sieges in the Barons’ War stands in stark contrast to the Albigensian crusade and the wars in Germany in the first half of the century. Toch ascribes the strength of German towns in terms of their ‘stone fortifications, the very size of cities, the sheer number of the population, ruling patricians aspiring to a knightly way of life, urban arsenals’… ‘and access to military alliances’ which together in the thirteenth century made them ‘into military powers in their own right.’\(^{92}\) The explanation for the disparity with English towns during the civil war lies not just in the smaller scale of English towns but also in an inherent problem with English town defences, namely their size and condition.

While town defences demonstrated an ability to withstand direct assault when properly manned, the narrative accounts also reveal that they appear to have been very vulnerable to surprise attack against usually untended sections of wall. These most frequently, though not exclusively, were connected to the grounds of a religious house. This phenomenon highlights the general issue in English town fortifications that ‘frequently, town walls acted as arenas where power plays between different sectors of the urban community were acted out’.\(^{93}\) The petitioning by religious houses for the creation of postern gates in their wall sections was one demonstration of their privileged status which could undermine the integrity of the town’s defences, as could the expansion of their precinct.\(^{94}\) In 1278, the proposal by the Carmelites to enclose part of Northampton city walls and block the crenellations as part of the construction of a new precinct ran into resistance when the jury for the enquiry noted that this work would hinder the town’s watch who used the crenellations to ‘watch for malefactors approaching the town’. If closed up, they noted, ‘various misdeeds and stratagems might pass undetected’. The jury also argued that the enclosure would be a nuisance to the citizens as the burgesses and the sick often walked on the walls between gates to get the air, and during the winter they used it to avoid the muddy streets.\(^{95}\)

\(^{91}\) See below, E101/3/36; E101/3/9d; Flores, iii, p.8.
\(^{92}\) Toch, ‘The Medieval German City Under Siege’, pp.36-40,47.
\(^{93}\) Creighton, Medieval Town Walls, p.171.
\(^{94}\) See above for examples; Creighton, Medieval Town Walls, p.171.
The responsibility for the upkeep and access to wall sections could also be a source of dispute. In the fourteenth century, for example, Oxford’s New College, after some negotiation, agreed to take responsibility for the upkeep of the city wall section to which it adjoined.96

Winchester provides the best documented example of the impact that multiple jurisdictions could have on the effectiveness of town defences during the war. According to Wykes, Simon the Younger breached the defences through the priory cathedral of St. Swithun’s ‘that adjoins to the city wall’ by breaking a window and opening the door.97 St. Swithun’s sat within the wall’s circuit in its own enclosure.

![Figure 4:3 Winchester 1265](image)

The citizens and priory had fallen out in part over the custody and maintenance of the walls and gates in that sector. Winchester’s defences were maintained via the city’s right to collect murage. This right, however, was divided. The citizens were responsible for the northern circuit. St. Mary’s abbey was responsible for the east gate. The South-East corner, containing Wolvesey Palace was

97 Wykes, p.169.
the bishop’s responsibility, and the walls near the cathedral close St. Swithun’s. The South-West corner was meant to be maintained by the city and castle in conjunction. The maintenance of over a third of the wall was out of the jurisdiction of the citizens and only one of the five gates belonged to them. The explosion of violence between the two areas of the town probably did little to assist the citizens’ ability to police the region of the precinct adequately. The prior may have resisted the entrance of armed citizens into the grounds, even though access to the walls for assembly and maintenance during time of war was a requirement of royal permission for new intramural enclosures in the mid-thirteenth century. The sack of the city seems to have spurred a resolution to this dispute as in 1266 the Priory and citizens agreed that the Priory was responsible for maintaining King’s Gate, South Gate and its drawbridge, as well as the walls adjoining each gate.

![Figure 4:4 Gloucester 1264-5](image)

101 Keene, *Survey of Medieval Winchester*, p.44.
102 It is worth noting that the route and extent of the western defences is not entirely clear for this period.
This pattern is repeated at Gloucester in 1265. The initial royalist assault was against the north end of the town but the defenders managed to hold the attackers off ‘wel inou’.\(^{103}\) However, as Robert of Gloucester comments:

Between St. Oswald’s gate and the north gate, indeed, is a long wall, where the abbot’s orchard is, and within the orchard were no people to defend the town. Therefore in the assault some went without, and broke a piece of the wall before they were aware within.\(^{104}\)

As the map indicates, the inclusion of the abbey in the wall’s circuit hugely increased the area requiring guarding and in this case no watch was placed on this sector either through oversight or the refusal of the monks to allow defenders into the precincts. The presence of the orchard would have provided additional cover to the attackers. The apparent ease of the destruction of a section of wall there is also suggestive of poor maintenance of the defences by the abbey. In 1263, the discovery by the new abbot, Reginald de Homme, that the abbey had debts totalling 1500 marks, lends credence to the possibility that the abbey was not in a position to be assiduous in the wall’s maintenance. In 1272, the abbot’s financial difficulties were so great that he appealed to the crown for assistance and the abbey was transferred temporarily into royal custody.\(^{105}\)

In 1264, the royalists breached Northampton’s city wall reportedly by mining it at the section enclosing the priory of St. Andrews at the same time the king was demanding entrance to the town; an event that led to suspicions that the prior had betrayed the defenders to the king by weakening the wall.\(^{106}\) Guisborough’s account goes as far to say that the wall was levelled so that it was possible for forty horsemen to enter abreast.\(^{107}\) Northampton’s defences were generally in a poor state and whether the priory was actually responsible for the maintenance of its section is unknown. In a visitation in 1262, however, the priory was noted to be 272½ marks in debt suggesting again that, like Gloucester, if it was responsible, the maintenance of the wall may not have been a priority. This could explain how the wall was mined so quickly before being detected.\(^{108}\) The capture of Worcester by Robert de Ferrers, although not achieved through the grounds of a

\(^{103}\) Robert of Gloucs., ii, p.758.

\(^{104}\) Robert of Gloucs., ii, pp.758-9: Church Historians, v, p.372


\(^{107}\) Guisborough, p.189.

religious house, was obtained, according to the *Flores*, through the grounds of the ‘Old Castle’ that had by that period fallen into disrepair.\(^{109}\)

It is noticeable that London was never directly attacked during the war, despite its crucial strategic significance, and this begs the question as to why. The perceived formidableness of the defences may provide one explanation. More akin in scale to the larger continental towns, London boasted a large population and powerful militia, a strong position further augmented in 1264-5 by the Montfortian control of the arsenal in the Tower. The walls themselves were impressive. Much of their fabric dated to Roman times, with later modifications to its upper portions, and was reinforced at various points by at least twenty five towers of both Roman and medieval origin, some large enough to accommodate siege engines. The surviving fragments of the wall, indicate that some sections were at least 10.7 metres tall and this was fronted by a ditch that was, when in good repair presumably, 1.8 metres deep and 4.8 metres wide.\(^{110}\) These defences were very formidable and if replicated around the enceinte, would have rendered the city largely impervious to direct assault without the assistance of more specialised siege machines.

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It is impossible to make an accurate comparison of the strength of London’s defences to those of its contemporaries due both to the fragmentary remains and the result of subsequent modifications over the centuries. Repairs to the walls were underway on the king’s order in 1257 as they were ‘in a dilapidated condition, and without ramparts’, with murage granted for 10 years on 9 April 1257. The *Bury Chronicle* and *Annals of Winchester* record the presence of ‘barriers and iron chains,’ which the *Bury Chronicle* remarks ‘were remarkably effective for the defence of every open space and narrow street of the city’. These inner defences were a practical second line of defence designed to rob cavalry of their advantage. As Turner points out, ‘the town wall was probably the only defence the citizens enjoyed against possible hostiles’ and the defenders ‘had no parallel to the keep in a castle to which they could retire if things went badly’. Even during 1267 the royal army seems to have conducted nothing more than a blockade of the city, harassing and skirmishing with foraging parties of the Disinherited. In all incidences when a proper siege of London was potentially imminent there are of course additional factors to explain why it never took place. After Northampton in 1264, Henry was focussed first on securing the south coast for reinforcements before committing himself to a lengthy siege. In 1265, after the battle of Evesham, the citizens debated as to whether they should fight but, to London Alderman fitz Thedmar’s relief, cooler heads prevailed and the city submitted. The arrival of significant reinforcements for Henry III in 1267 might have encouraged him to commence a proper siege, but the same force also played a role in persuading Gilbert de Clare to settle matters peacefully.

Towns during the Barons’ War, while frequently effective in defeating direct assault, simply covered too large an area to be effectively defended. As a result they were usually left vulnerable by blind spots resulting from the sheer breadth of their circuits and the competing jurisdictions within the town. Additionally the defences were sometimes in a poor state, and the citizens perhaps

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115 JUST 1/59, m. 5d. During this time the Disinherited apparently fortified Southwark as they were not allowed to occupy the city, *Cron. Maior.*, p.95.
117 *Flores*, iii, pp.15-6.
too inexperienced to spot flaws in the defence. English towns were simply not the military powers that their continental cousins were and were less used to the prospect of major attack.

**Towns and the Active Conduct of War**

Towns were not simply passive bystanders during the civil war but could also conduct active warfare against targets of local concern. Boasting comparatively large populations, they could raise significant numbers of men more quickly and easily than rural areas. In 1267, the citizens of Lynn spearheaded the attack on the Disinherited on the Isle of Ely.\(^{118}\) While Rishanger considered the attack as partly motivated by the desire to persuade the king to return their liberties, the ravaging of the towns of Cambridge, Huntingdon and Norwich by the Disinherited combined with their attack on Lynn itself in the Easter week of 1266, would have easily convinced the citizens of the merits of destroying this local threat.\(^{119}\) Towns also contributed to the preparations against the queen’s threatened invasion in 1264. A distinction, however, seems to have been made between the summonses issued to the commonalties of Norfolk, Suffolk and the other counties and those to the towns of Lynn, Yarmouth, Dunwich, Orford, Ipswich, and ‘all other persons of the cities, boroughs and towns by the sea coast’, who were to be placed separately under the supervision of Roger Bigod, earl of Norfolk.\(^{120}\) These coastal towns aside, it is unclear whether the towns as a whole sent troops to the muster or merely contributed financially. The *Bury Chronicle* adds that ‘every borough and town’ as well as the countryside and clergy were taxed ‘to provide for the coastal defences and men to fight, and pay them adequately for as long as they remained there’.\(^{121}\) Bedford, for example, was required to raise money and provide a relatively high wage of 3d and then later 4d per day for an unstated number of footmen.\(^{122}\) The ports were required to prevent ships landing and to guard the seas, presumably through their ship service.\(^{123}\) Other large military operations such as the 1266 siege of Kenilworth involved the call up of detachments of militia from nearby towns. Northampton, for example, contributed forty men while the mayor and bailiffs of Oxford were instructed to ready their horses and arms and whole *posse* to go forth and ‘grieve and subdue’ the

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\(^{118}\) *Chronica et annales*, pp.44-5.

\(^{119}\) *Bury*, p.34, *Chronica et annales*, pp.44-45.

\(^{120}\) *CPR*, 1258-66, pp.360-362.

\(^{121}\) *Bury*, p.29.

\(^{122}\) *CR 1264-68*, p.364.

\(^{123}\) *CR, 1261-1264*, p.361; *CR 1264-68*, p.80; *Bury*, p.29.
king’s enemies. The provision of mounted troops in Oxford’s case is worth noting as it highlights that towns could provide more than just infantry. The Disinherited’s presence on the Isle of Ely in 1266 necessitated the call up of an unknown number of levies from the area of East Anglia, probably including townsmen.

These forces would have also acted in defence of their town: the townsmen of Lynn fought off the Disinherited in 1266, while at Rochester in 1264 at least four or five of the burgesses died defending the city’s walls against Montfort’s assault. Similarly we know that the townsmen were defending Winchelsea, for their relatives were still allowed to inherit despite their family members being killed during the assault. At Winchester in 1265, as Robert of Gloucester comments, ‘the people who were in the town made fast the gates and kept the town against’ Simon the Younger. Local concerns usually dominated the active military involvement of towns during the war.

The active military contribution of London was exceptional, but its militia also concentrated most of its activity on local targets. The burning of Richard of Cornwall’s manor at Isleworth in March to April 1264, as well as other outlying royalist estates around the city, was among the first outbreaks of violence in the war. The London militia reportedly distinguished itself at the siege of Rochester, while it formed a significant part of the baronial army at the battle of Lewes. Here they were routed by the Lord Edward with apparently large loss of life. Though Fitz Thedmar does not give any indication of the casualties suffered it seems likely that there would have been a significant number of dead and wounded, given the apparent length (an hour according to the Flores) and ferocity of Edward’s pursuit. The predominance of references to the Londoners’ casualties suggests a high percentage of those slain on the rebel side may have been from the city’s militia.

London’s low military involvement following Lewes is notable. Whether the region around the city was largely pacified is not mentioned nor, perhaps unsurprisingly, are any Londoners described as accompanying Montfort in his pursuit of Gilbert de Clare in 1265. Wykes alone refers to a troop of Londoners with Simon the Younger’s army besieging Pevensey; though whether they

124 CLR 1267-1272, p.21; CPR, 1258-66, p.663.
125 See Chapter 5, pp.184-94.
127 CPR 1258-1266, p. 574; Church Historians, v, p.373; Wykes, p.169.
130 Chronica et annales, pp.27-8; Flores, ii, pp.495-496; Wykes, pp.150-151.
accompanied his attempt to relieve his father prior to Evesham in 1265 is unknown.\textsuperscript{131} On such evidence it seems as though London’s military activity was largely confined to the south-east of England, probably due to issues of security and practicality. William fitz Stephen’s \textit{Life of Thomas Becket} (1170-1183) remarks that the city had an estimated twenty thousand horsemen and sixty thousand men on foot ‘fit for war’ at the time of King Stephen.\textsuperscript{132} The accuracy of this figure cannot be verified, nor can we with confidence apply it to London seventy years after Fitz Stephen’s death. The three-to-one ratio of foot to horse, however, may provide an indication of the general proportion of London’s forces. Fitz Thedmar refers to the Londoners consisting of ‘horse and foot’ at Lewes and also comments that during the standoff between the Lord Edward and Richard de Clare, earl of Gloucester in 1260 at London, it was instructed that all persons of fifteen years and upwards, each to the best of his ability, should be well provided with arms’.\textsuperscript{133} By this reckoning a full muster dispatched from London could have effectively stripped the male population of the city and left this key base poorly defended; a concern that must have influenced other town militias. This worry about the vulnerability of the city with the bulk of the militia away, and the relative slowness the preponderance of infantry suggests, may in part explain the decision of the Londoners and the barons to withdraw to London again at Henry III’s approach following the failure to take Rochester castle in April 1264.\textsuperscript{134}

Little information is available for the mounted forces which the city of London, or any other town, was able to raise but it would seem likely that such cavalry forces were capable of being sent further afield than the infantry. Ironically, the only Londoners we know to have been active outside the South-East in 1265 were royalists. With the escape of Edward on 28 May, Stephen de Cornhill, a royalist draper ‘of patrician stock’, gathered his men and rode out to join the royalist army.\textsuperscript{135} His loyalty was well rewarded with exemption for life from all tallages andprises at the instance of both Gilbert de Clare and William de Valence.\textsuperscript{136} Apart from these references it seems that, as with other towns, London’s offensive military ability was geographically limited.

\textsuperscript{131} Wykes, p.169.  
\textsuperscript{132} EHD, ii, p.1025.  
\textsuperscript{133} Cron. Maior., pp.44,61-62, armis essent bene muniti.  
\textsuperscript{134} Cron. Maior., p.62  
\textsuperscript{135} Williams, \textit{Medieval London}, p.232.  
\textsuperscript{136} CPR 1258-66, p.585.
London’s military power may have suffered a decline after 1264 due to the heavy casualties received at Rochester, Lewes and Croydon. The latter incident, according to Rishanger, occurred when the royalist garrison of Tonbridge heard that the Londoners who had fled Lewes had regrouped at Croydon. The garrison fell upon the Londoners, killing ‘very many’ and carrying away the spoils.\(^{137}\) When the Disinherited encamped at Southwark in 1267, fitz Thedmar comments that ‘the citizens themselves had not the means of attacking them without the assistance of the earl’ of Gloucester. While fitz Thedmar may have been trying to excuse London’s failure, this remark might also suggest an acknowledgement of the weakening of the militia since 1264, or perhaps, more mundanely, simply that it could not match the number of heavily armed knights in the forces of the Disinherited.\(^{138}\)

**Case Study: The Ports**

Control of the ports was a crucial issue during the course of the Barons’ War.\(^{139}\) The importance of port towns was dictated by their ability to control the sea and coast of England, acting as conduits for trade and, crucially, providing access for foreign support. Both in 1215-17 and in 1260, foreign troops had been brought in to help each side. In 1215-17, King John had brought in large numbers of mercenaries through Dover, mostly from Flanders.\(^{140}\) By contrast, Prince Louis’s campaign in 1216-17 was hindered by the royalist fleet, which not only helped disrupt Louis’ two sieges of Dover castle, but was also able to destroy a major French relief fleet at the battle of Sandwich.\(^{141}\) In 1260, when Henry III re-seized control of the realm he brought foreign soldiers with him and on 7 April issued protection to those foreign knights in royal service landing at the Cinque Ports.\(^{142}\) Henry’s concern over the possibility that Montfort might bring foreign troops with him caused him on 18 May 1261 to instruct the ‘bailiffs and barons’ of the Cinque Ports to prevent Simon de Montfort from bringing ‘into the realm aliens with arms against the king to the disturbance of the

\(^{137}\) *Chronica et annales*, p.29

\(^{138}\) *Cron. Maior.*, p.90.

\(^{139}\) For a full discussion of the naval dimensions of the Barons’ War see, A. Jobson, ‘The Naval Theatre, 1258-1267’, *Baronial Reform and Revolution, 1258-1267*, (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, forthcoming 2016), 000-000. My thanks to Adrian Jobson for allowing me to see an advance copy of his article.


\(^{142}\) *CPR 1258-66*, pp119-120.
peace and grievous cost to the realm'. On 8 May 1263, the king dispatched a letter to the barons and bailiffs of Dover, chastising them for not arresting men landing at their port with horses and arms. He reemphasised the same injunction to the other Cinque Ports, as well as Portsmouth, Ipswich, Dunwich and Yarmouth.

That both sides were fully alive to the necessity of controlling the ports was demonstrated on several occasions during the war. Montfort’s efforts to obtain the removal of the royalist garrison of Bristol in 1264 and his favourable approach to the town, exemplified in his letter patent commending the townsmen for their loyalty on 26 June 1265, is partly indicative of the strategic importance of Bristol itself as the principal port in the region. The *Gesta Stephani* in the twelfth century named Bristol as ‘almost the richest city of all in the country, receiving merchandise by sailing ships from lands near and far’. The Bristol fleet nearly rescued Montfort from Wales in 1265, and by persuading the royalist garrison to depart Montfort broke the garrison’s ability to communicate with the queen and other royalists on the continent. Montfort’s assumption of both Bristol and Chester castles, both situated in the port towns, into his hands, also allowed him to more readily control contacts with Ireland. Ireland remained primarily royalist by 1265, despite Montfort’s efforts to impose his own justiciar there and make common cause with the Geraldines against the de Burgh family. That a number of major royalists possessed lands in Ireland, including Edward, Roger Mortimer and William de Valence, perhaps made this support unsurprising, though a number of Montfortians, including Montfort himself via his wife Eleanor also had lands there. On 17 November 1264, orders were issued for the release of a ship belonging to the abbey of St. Mary’s, Dublin, which had been impounded on the Isle of White. The ship had been seized because a knight on board was carrying suspicious letters to Ireland’s magnates. If Montfort had concerns over potential Irish aid for the royalists these would have been justified in the late summer to early autumn of 1265 by the arrival to assist Edward of a

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143 CPR 1258-66, p.185.
144 *Royal Letters* ii, pp.245-246.
145 *Gesta Stephani*, p.37.
number of Anglo-Irish lords, including Sir Maurice fitz Maurice, Sir Maurice fitz Gerald and Sir Walter de Burgh.\textsuperscript{150}

The Cinque Ports were to prove the most strategically vital, prominent and active of the English ports and they were subject to several concerted campaigns during the war.\textsuperscript{151} Situated on the coast of Kent and Sussex, these comprised the five head ports of Dover, Winchelsea, Sandwich, Hythe and Rye, together with a number of smaller affiliated ports.\textsuperscript{152} As well as being sited on the section of coast closest to France and Flanders they were also responsible for ship service to the crown of fifty-seven ships with forty days warning and two weeks service.\textsuperscript{153} With only a small royal fleet, the existence of which was unclear by the 1260s, Henry III was as reliant as his predecessors had been on the fleets of ships the Cinque Ports and other port towns could provide him.\textsuperscript{154} These ships could command the Channel and thus control who could cross it.\textsuperscript{155} The importance attached to the ports was such that two special crown offices existed, the Wardenship of the Cinque Ports and the Chamberlainship of Sandwich, and throughout the war the post was filled alternately by some of the most trusted men in each faction. On 5 December 1263, Roger Leybourne was appointed Warden and given the Chamberlainship. Fourteen days after the battle of Lewes he was replaced by Henry de Montfort.\textsuperscript{156} Leybourne was reinstated on 24 August 1265, just twenty days after the battle of Evesham, but in late November Henry III appointed the Lord Edward as the Warden and gave him the constableship of Dover castle, which was frequently attached to the post.\textsuperscript{157}

The control of the Cinque Ports essentially determined the very rationale for the campaign that culminated in the battle of Lewes in April to May 1264: their loss would not only have undermined Simon’s position but would have spelt the reformers’ certain defeat. When Henry was rebuffed once more from Dover castle, he set about trying to bring the Cinque Ports into his peace as a

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid, p.252; M. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, p.268.
\textsuperscript{154} Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea, pp.54-60.
\textsuperscript{155} VCH: Kent, ii, pp.244, 255.
\textsuperscript{156} CPR 1258-66, pp.300-319.
\textsuperscript{157} CPR 1258-66, pp. 444,507; Brooks, The English Naval Forces, pp.96-97.
crucial step towards receiving reinforcements from abroad. With the presence of the large royal host on their doorsteps and Montfort entrenched at London, the ports started to submit to Henry, beginning at Winchelsea after 1 May 1264.\textsuperscript{158} The threat of these losses helped spur Montfort’s decision to quit London and seek battle.

The ports again became crucial to the war effort during the Montfortian government’s preoccupation with the potential invasion by the queen’s army in the summer of 1264. Merchants and envoys were restricted to travelling only through Dover while towns like Lynn and Yarmouth and ‘all other persons of the cities, boroughs and towns, by the sea coast’ in Norfolk and Suffolk were to prepare defences against invasion.\textsuperscript{159} The men of Hastings, Winchelsea and Rye were also ordered to try and intercept ships carrying men and supplies to Pevensey castle during the siege.\textsuperscript{160} The Montfortian government encouraged the Cinque Ports to police the channel, which the Cinque Ports seem to have taken as a free licence for piracy. Such behaviour was actively encouraged by the Montfortians themselves. The \textit{Ship of St. Lawrence} from Bayonne, for example, was seized in Portsmouth by Simon the Younger on the assertion that its master, one Demonionus de Argilaz, favoured the Lord Edward. Its cargo was dispersed between Simon the Younger and others and the ship was handed over to the men of the Cinque Ports rather than those of Portsmouth.\textsuperscript{161} Such favouritism may have ensured the Cinque Ports’ loyalty to the Montfortian cause but it had the effect of pushing the Cinque Ports’ rivals towards the royalist camp. Yarmouth, for example, party to a longstanding dispute with the Cinque Ports over the holding of herring fairs, seems to have remained more inclined to support the royalist cause. On 24 October 1264, in a display of clear favouritism, Montfort blatantly rewarded the Cinque Ports by promising a ‘special grace’ and ruling against Yarmouth in a dispute between the two.\textsuperscript{162} On 12 February 1266, Henry III used this rivalry to encourage Yarmouth’s loyalty by granting the men of the town the right to keep all spoils they might seize when hunting the pirates of the Cinque Ports.\textsuperscript{163} Following the battle of Evesham, the Cinque Ports remained stubbornly defiant in support of the Montfortian cause. Continuing their campaign of piracy, the Cinque Ports targeted their rival, Portsmouth, burning the town on 25

\textsuperscript{159} CPR 1258-66, pp.360-361.
\textsuperscript{160} See Chapter 3, p.125.
\textsuperscript{161} CPR 1258-66, p.517.
\textsuperscript{163} CPR 1258-66, p.551.
November. This act was carried out despite an apparent agreement by the ports to pay a fine to return to peace. On 12 December, Ralph de Saunzavers and his son Hugh were appointed Wardens of the Seashore in the parts of Sussex to go against the king’s enemies in the Cinque Ports who ‘with a great fleet keep at sea and continue to commit offences and will commit greater’. The ports’ continued loyalty to the Montfortian cause subsequent to Montfort’s death is not too surprising. The ports had done well under the Montforts and their continued loyalty offered the potential of a Montfortian revival if Simon the Younger could raise an army abroad. Furthermore, the severe retribution meted out by the royalists to Montfortian London, did not provide the Cinque Ports with much incentive to surrender. Their continued rebellion, therefore, might have also been a tool to extract concessions from the royal government.

The reduction of the Cinque Ports swiftly emerged as the first major objective for the royalists in 1266. On 1 January, Yarmouth was ordered to provide 20 ships with 800 men to attack the Cinque Port galleys at Sandwich. On 4 January, Roger Leybourne was ordered to take Sandwich. Edward had reappointed Leybourne as Chamberlain of Sandwich in his stead in addition to Leybourne’s positions of sheriff of Kent and constable of Rochester. On the 15th, Leybourne arrived at the port and took it with the first assault. That he had been prepared for a longer siege is demonstrated by his financial accounts which record wages for a Master Peter the Engineer and his assistants, alongside money to masons for carving the stones for an engine. The assault was physically costly, however, with £200 spent on horses lost.

A pause took place following the fall of Sandwich on 15 January, perhaps to allow negotiations with the other ports. This pause ended, however, around the time of Simon the Younger’s escape from London to Winchelsea on 10 February. With the threat posed by the Cinque Ports now exacerbated by Simon’s presence, their surrender became a crucial issue. Leybourne advanced to Hastings and either captured or forced the capitulation of the defenders before proceeding to strengthen the castle between February and early March. Leybourne was reinforced, according to

165 *CPR* 1258-66, p.509.
166 *CPR* 1258-66, p.652.
169 E101/3/6.
171 E101/3/6; Lewis, ‘Roger Leybourne’, p.201.
the Waverley Annals, by Edward and Gilbert de Clare, before an assault was finally launched on 24 March (the 18th according to the Dover Chronicle). Naval support was provided by a fleet mustered from East Anglia, including Yarmouth, Ipswich, Orford, Lynn, Blakeney and Gosford.\textsuperscript{172} The land force included a combined force of 577 Weald archers in Leybourne’s pay, 323 of them paid for two days and 254 for one day.\textsuperscript{173} The assault was apparently a bloody one with many killed, a number of the defenders in particular were drowned when they were forced to flee towards the harbour.\textsuperscript{174} By late March, the royalists had brought the ports to heel. Perhaps most crucially they had both removed the Disinherited’s allies and also denied them the possibility of receiving foreign reinforcements from Simon the Younger. The ground work was being laid for the siege of Kenilworth. In this success the assistance of the royalist ports had played an important role.

**Legacy**

Despite their shortcomings, town defences were still perceived to have value in the post Evesham period, particularly against opportunistic raiding conducted by the Disinherited and other marauders. St. Albans, the continuator of Matthew Paris noted, was diligently garrisoned and the gates locked and barred. All those wishing to cross through the town, especially horsemen, were denied entry.\textsuperscript{175} The spate of attacks committed by the Disinherited against towns, particularly their 1266 raid on un-walled Norwich, concentrated minds on the value of defences. On 27 April 1266, for example, the king ordered the mayor and citizens of Oxford to repair ‘the barriers (barreras), crenallations (kernelllos), embankments (alivas) and defects of the wall and dyke of the town’ and to ‘dig out the ford below the priory of St. Frideswyde’.\textsuperscript{176} In May 1266, murage grants were granted to Lynn and Lewes for the first time.\textsuperscript{177}

In 1267, Henry chose to base his headquarters at Cambridge for his campaign against the Isle of Ely. Un-walled and a previous victim of the Disinherited’s raiding, the town was acutely vulnerable and Henry invested considerable expense and effort to fortify it. The Barnwell Chronicle recounts that Henry ordered gates to be erected and a ditch dug around the town, not

\textsuperscript{172} Ger. Cant., ii, p.244; Ann. Wav., p.368; Lewis, ‘Roger Leybourne’, p.201.
\textsuperscript{173} Ann. Wav. is the only source to mention de Clare’s presence, E101/3/6,9d; Lewis, ‘Roger Leybourne’, p.201.
\textsuperscript{174} Ann. Wav., p.369; Flores, iii, p.8.
\textsuperscript{175} Chronica et annales, p.38
\textsuperscript{176} CPR, 1258-66, p.663.
\textsuperscript{177} CPR 1258-66, pp.590; 596; Bury, p.34.
permitting the workers to cease work even for feast days.\textsuperscript{178} Henry’s works seem to have left a lasting impression on the town as the ditch seems to have acquired subsequently the name ‘King’s Ditch’. The work is confirmed in the Pipe Rolls. The friars of Mount Carmel were required to provide timber for the palisade worth 2 marks and for the ‘barriers and obstruction of diverse gates’ worth 16s. Twenty-five measures of iron were purchased and allowance provided for Master John de Richmond, the king’s builder, ‘for the work on the barrier within the town before said,’ for 25s through the king’s writ, and 36s 6d paid for the king’s carpenters and workers. Another 48s were paid out for ‘timber for the barriers and palisades and iron for chains therewith made in the town of Cambridge’.\textsuperscript{179}

It is hard to say if the events of the Barons’ War provoked a distinct growth in town defences in England. Turner remarks that, ‘from the early thirteenth century onwards a connection between fighting and the provision of defences can be established.’ In particular Turner notes that chronologically the murage grants fall into ‘clear geographical groupings’.\textsuperscript{180} In that sense the Barons’ War holds at least partially true to that pattern. A study of murage grants show a spurt of grants between 1251-99 for towns affected by the Barons’ War in East Anglia, such as Lynn and Norwich and also for Lewes in Sussex. In Norwich’s case, however, no murage was granted until in 1297, which is not very compelling evidence for the direct impact of the Barons’ War on the construction of the fortifications. Some of the gateways, however, predate the walls and might be related to the conflict.\textsuperscript{181} The bulk of new defences constructed in the post-war period seem to have been concentrated in the Welsh March and have more to do with the long running warfare in the region than with any impact of the civil war.\textsuperscript{182} Likewise, it is not really possible to say with any degree of confidence that the war produced any redesigns in town fortifications. The only noticeable change from c.1260 until 1390 was the introduction of D-shaped mural towers in all the towns defences built within this period. These projected further out from the wall but usually with a reduced diameter compared to their predecessor, providing a smaller area exposed to enemy attack.

\textsuperscript{178} Liber Memorandorum, p.122. \\
\textsuperscript{179} E372/111, m. 5. \\
\textsuperscript{180} Turner, \textit{Town Defences}, pp.24-25. \\
\textsuperscript{181} Turner, \textit{Town Defences}, p.136. \\
\textsuperscript{182} Turner, \textit{Town Defences}, p.27.
while simultaneously permitting a better angle for flanking fire along the wall.\textsuperscript{183} To assert a direct causal link with the Barons’ War would, however, be pushing the limited evidence too far again. Very unusually the defences of Oxford were augmented in the later thirteenth century with the addition of a concentric line of defences along the northern perimeter, although once more any link with the war is unclear.\textsuperscript{184} The war may have spurred changes to town defences or at least highlighted their deficiencies to men like the Lord Edward when it came to fortifying towns in Wales, but the link is currently speculative.

Towns’ involvement in the Barons’ War retain a number of features distinct from castles. The economic and strategic significance of towns and particularly London and the Cinque Ports, resulted in their control becoming crucial objectives for both sides during the war’s course. Walled towns were frequently utilised as bases of operations by larger armies as the defences provided security for a larger area than offered by most castles. Much like the lesser castles in the war, town defences, however, frequently proved themselves unable to cope in the face of an attack by proper armies. An exception to this perhaps was London. Town defences, while they demonstrated the capability to repel direct attacks even by large forces, suffered from enceintes that were often too great in size to guard effectively and which were compromised by decades of neglect and competing jurisdictions. Nevertheless, town defences remained relatively popular, particularly in the face of the Disinherited’s campaign from 1266 onwards. Town sacks were relatively common and while judged a normal part of the conduct of war, these events had a serious impact on the citizens, most notably at Winchester. Not confined to simply defensive involvement in the war, towns, most particularly London, were an important source of man power and some towns, particularly the ports like Lynn in 1266, could engage in offensive operations of their own. As such the towns were a significant factor in the shaping the nature of the Barons’ War both as participants and objectives.

\textsuperscript{183} Turner, \textit{Town Defences}, p.58.
5 ‘To the Woods and Fields’

This chapter examines the importance and use of the wilderness in warfare during the civil war as well as its limitations as an effective method of resistance. In this we shall focus principally upon the type of warfare used by the Disinherited and in the royalist campaigns to supress them from late 1265-67. While Knowles’s thesis provides a good narrative account of the campaigns of 1266-67 his focus is to provide a framework for his discussion of the Disinherited themselves rather providing an analysis of the type of warfare and its location. This chapter will follow a more narrative structure at points than the preceding chapters as this provides the most effective format for analysing the development, problems and effect of this kind of warfare and particularly how it was inextricably linked to the siege of Kenilworth. We shall see that the use of the wilderness areas as safe havens for rebels was a distinct form of warfare tracing itself back to earlier centuries and also how the nature of the Disinherited’s rebellion had a potentially wider cultural impact in the development of the Robin Hood legend.

An Uncivil Peace: The Disinherited’s Rebellion 1265-67

It is important first to clarify the nature of events in the period of late 1265 to the summer of 1267. Legally the civil war was declared over at Winchester in September 1265. Although the declaration is important for purposes of assessing the legal context of subsequent events, in reality the fighting continued for another two years and England cannot be considered realistically to have been in a state of peace during this period. What can we call this period then? Alun Lewis referred to it as ‘the Pacification of England’, but pacification suggests that peace was restored principally by brute force. Such was not the case.¹ Most of England returned swiftly and peacefully to the royal fold in the wake of the battle of Evesham. There is a danger, however, in conferring a new name upon the conflict post-Winchester; it potentially suggests it was a new conflict rather than a continuation of the old. Yet, the motivations of some of the participants had changed significantly. The resistance of the Disinherited, though perhaps ideologically driven for some, was also about obtaining

restoration of lost lands. For most the restoration of the Provisions must rarely have seemed a realistic prospect after Montfort’s death. Bearing these problems in mind, it is still perhaps best to maintain the sense of a transition to a new phase of the conflict. The period from September 1265 to the summer of 1267 may be termed ‘The Disinherited’s Rebellion’ as it not only indicates the continuing nature of the conflict, but also its underlying rationale and composition.

The ‘Woods and Fields’ and the Shadow of Kenilworth

The ineffectiveness of all but the most powerful castles in the face of major attack, discussed in Chapter 3, saw castle commanders on both sides of the conflict abandon their castles and retreat to the wilderness rather than face siege. In 1264, John de Eyville had abandoned York in the wake of the fall of Northampton; and in 1265 Roger Mortimer had gone to stay in the woods near Wigmore while leaving his wife in charge of the castle. Later the same year, Simon the Younger abandoned Kenilworth to journey to the Isle of Axholme. While the abandonment of castles by their owner might seem a strange move, doing so permitted them the freedom of movement to both harry their enemies as well as the opportunity to gather more support. By adopting this course of action the owner might help relieve pressure on any castle garrison he may have left behind by diverting troops away from a siege by raiding and hampering the besiegers’ attempts at gathering supplies. If the rationale for the siege was the owner’s capture, then such an act could perhaps undermine the desire to conduct it. If he had not left a garrison, he was free to avoid clashing with his superior foes and could hopefully harry their lands instead. By contrast, if he stayed in his castle he risked being trapped inside by a siege and potentially being starved out. This was a relatively common theme since the Conquest; for example, in 1075 Ralph de Gael left his wife in charge of Norwich castle while he went to gather aid in Denmark, and in 1224 Falkes de Bréauté decided to leave Bedford in the hands of his brother William. Gilbert de Clare and John Giffard had adopted similar tactics in 1265 when Montfort arrived at Gloucester in May. Instead of staying at

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3 See Chapter 3, p.131; CPR 1258-66, pp.314,383; de Eyville apparently went to London in late March in order to sign the oath, the dating of the abandonment is unclear, but the advance south of the northern royalists on their way to meet the king may well have been the prompt although it is possible that the abandonment occurred when de Eyville left to go south as the only datable instances are 1 March when the castle was still noted to be in de Eyville’s hands and 20-21 April when it was apparently in the hands of the mayor and citizens of York; Stone, ‘The Rebel Barons of 1264’; pp.8-9.
Brimpsfield castle, Giffard and de Clare’s forces resided in the woods and hills surrounding the city, with Giffard lighting a huge fire each night on Erdlond hill so his enemies knew where he was. As Montfort left for Hereford de Clare’s forces shadowed him and, as Robert of Gloucester comments when Montfort thought de Clare was far off instead, ofte he was ner. This freedom of movement had much to recommend itself for the weaker party in the war, both for the royalists in 1264-5 and particularly for the Disinherited in the period between Evesham and July 1267 when the rebels on the Isle of Ely finally surrendered.

The retreat to the wilderness had a long standing precedent in rebellion England and in Wales. The wilderness offered the chance for prolonged resistance by those who did not possess, or could not expect to hold castles. After the Norman Conquest men like Eadric silvaticus and Hereward the Wake had successfully resisted the new authorities from the Welsh March and the wilds of the Fens respectively. During the civil war of Stephen’s reign, Geoffrey de Mandeville also took refuge in the Fens, seizing Ramsey Abbey and turning it into a fortified base. Fulk fitz Warin waged a successful guerrilla campaign against King John from the woodlands of the March, eventually forcing John to agree a settlement. During the invasion by Prince Louis in 1216-17, a large band of archers from the Weald led by a William of Cassingham (or Willikin of the Weald) used the thickly wooded countryside of the Weald to successfully harass and ambush the French army. Exposure to Welsh methods of warfare, with its emphasis on raiding and ambush in the forests and hills rather than the defence of castles, meant that the Marcher lords like Mortimer, had considerable practical experience of this sort of warfare.

The destruction of much of the rebels’ military strength and leadership at Evesham saw the survivors turn to these tried and tested methods of resistance. Some men, most probably the

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5 The location of Erdlond Hill is unclear, but it was presumably in a location where smoke rising from it was visible from Gloucester. In the Hunterian manuscript of Robert of Gloucester the name is not Erdlond, but appears to be Duthelond. Why Wright went with Erdlond is unclear. Neither name is identifiable in modern placenames though. The motive for Giffard’s actions may have been partly a psychological ploy to unsettle the Montfortians in Gloucester, Robert of Gloucs., ii, p.755; University of Glasgow, Special Collections, MS Hunter 415 (V.3.13), f. 119d.
northerners such as John de Eyville, had gained experience in this type of warfare as early as 1261 when Peter de Percy had been tasked with hunting him during the disturbances of that year.\textsuperscript{12} The southern Montfortian knights are less well documented as engaging in this activity prior to 1265, though men like Adam de Gurdon seem to have adapted readily enough.

In 1265, the Isle of Axholme served as the first centre of resistance in the wilderness. In September, John de Eyvill surrendered Scarborough castle and subsequently retreated to Axholme which bordered his own lands at Adlingfleet.\textsuperscript{13} From thence forward Axholme began to serve as a focal point for resistance. Reinforcements arrived after Martinmas (11 November) including Baldwin Wake and Simon the Younger, following the latter’s departure from Kenilworth. Axholme was a natural fortress, according to Wykes, a region of marshes ‘surrounded by great rivers’.\textsuperscript{14} This had been a base of Roger de Mowbray in the Young King’s rebellion of 1174.\textsuperscript{15} Utilizing these ready-made defences, the rebels employed guards to observe the ‘narrow ways and crossings of the waters’.\textsuperscript{16} From this region they struck out and ‘began to ravage the neighbouring provinces’.\textsuperscript{17}

The royalist response to this new threat was swift and demonstrated a clear appreciation of the problems that the terrain around Axholme would cause. Preparations for the muster against Kenilworth were abandoned and some of the troops raised for it, possibly including the Warwickshire workmen, were redirected to assist Edward.\textsuperscript{18} The county posses of Nottingham and Derby were summoned to join Edward, as was a force commanded by Henry of Almain. Edward’s solution for overcoming the natural defences was direct and clever. Rather than trying to spread out to besiege the entire island he had ‘skilfully designed’ wooden bridges constructed which allowed him to move freely across the rivers and marshes, allowing his forces to corral the Disinherited’s movements.\textsuperscript{19} Wykes’s account is sparse on geographical details, but Edward’s operations apparently forced the rebels into the southern end of Axholme, because they negotiated a peace at Bycarr’s Dyke (between the Rivers Idle and Trent) in December that year. There Simon the

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\textsuperscript{12} CLR 1267-72, no.699.  \\
\textsuperscript{13} De Ville, ‘John de Eyville’, p.21.  \\
\textsuperscript{14} Wykes, pp.180-81, provinciam quandam paludosam et magnis fluminibus circumcinctam.  \\
\textsuperscript{15} Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi Benedicti Abbatis, 1169-92, ed. W. Stubbs, (Rolls ser., 1869), p.68.  \\
\textsuperscript{16} Wykes, p.181, viarum angustias et transmeatus aquarum adhibitis custodibus observabant.  \\
\textsuperscript{17} Wykes, p.181.  \\
\textsuperscript{18} See Chapter 3, p.131; Rishanger, De Bellis, p.41.  \\
\textsuperscript{19} Wykes, p.181, pontibus ligneis artificiose excogitatis.
\end{flushright}
Younger agreed to depart with Edward to London.\textsuperscript{20} Though Simon had surrendered, his companions including Baldwin Wake and John de Eyville seem to have revoked their pledges and resumed raiding.\textsuperscript{21} Edward’s use of pontoon bridges to outflank an enemy may mark the beginnings of his wider interest in this form of military engineering. He repeated the tactic in 1303 when he ordered the construction of a pontoon bridge across the River Forth to outflank Stirling castle and the bridge which remained in Scottish hands.\textsuperscript{22}

Events at Axholme had demonstrated to those involved that remaining in one place for too long, even one with good natural defences, risked isolation and defeat for the rebels. Bycarr’s Dyke therefore marked a change in strategy for the Disinherited. The chronology of events and the movements of the Disinherited are very difficult to trace for this period. Some men, such as John de Eyville, were believed to have come to peace in late January.\textsuperscript{23} Others, however, continued, or at the very least quickly resumed fighting. On 10 February, on the same day as Simon the Younger’s escape to Winchelsea, Henry of Almain and the northern lords, including John de Eyville, were ordered to defend the parts of Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and Yorkshire as the raiding there intensified.\textsuperscript{24} They failed, however, to bring the Disinherited to battle and de Eyville was already or soon back in rebellion.\textsuperscript{25} Wykes reports that de Eyville, Baldwin Wake and Henry Hastings, at some point after the withdrawal from Axholme, retreated to a wood called ‘Suffieldfrith’. Denholm-Young identifies this as Suffield Wood to the north of Norwich.\textsuperscript{26} While possibly still in Norfolk, this group was joined by Robert de Ferrers.\textsuperscript{27} This withdrawal was possibly in response to Henry of Almain’s activities, but the retreat was only temporary. In early May, the strain of the anti-Disinherited campaign and the concurrent preparations for the siege of Kenilworth began to cause complications for the royalist operations. A number of northern lords, Balliol and de Neville included, were summoned with their military service to attend the muster for the siege. Already

\textsuperscript{20} Wykes, p.181; Ann. Dun., p.240.  
\textsuperscript{21} Robert of Gloucs., ii, p.769.  
\textsuperscript{22} Freeman, ‘Wallbreakers and River-Bridgers’, pp.9-11. Built in Lynn, Edward’s active interest in the project is revealed by his summoning of the chief architect Master Richard of Chester, to Windsor to discuss the plans.  
\textsuperscript{23} CPR 1258-66, p.536.  
\textsuperscript{24} CPR 1258-66, p.656.  
\textsuperscript{25} CPR 1258-66, pp.656, 601.  
\textsuperscript{26} Wykes, p.187; Denholm-Young, ‘Thomas Wykes and his Chronicle’, p.166.  
\textsuperscript{27} Wykes, p.187.
committed to aiding Henry of Almain a number of them were subsequently excused from going to Kenilworth after it was confirmed they had served their forty days in the north.\footnote{CPR 1258-66, pp.594,612,664. This incident may explain the curious admission of Robert de Neville into the king’s peace on 11 July. De Neville is not included in the quittance of 23 May from service at Kenilworth. The admission may therefore have been an acknowledgement that his forces were absent with good cause.}

It took the royalists until 15 May to finally catch the rebels. The Disinherited had made their base at Baldwin Wake’s manor of Chesterfield. On the morning of 15 May, while twenty-two of them, including Hastings and Wake were out hunting, Henry of Almain descended upon the town and routed the rest. De Eyville and a small group of the remaining guards made a break for it and in the process de Eyville reportedly unhorsed an opponent and wounded several others.\footnote{Langtoft, ii, pp.150-1.}

Chesterfield, like Bycarr’s Dyke, marked a change in strategy for some of the Disinherited. De Eyville and Wake opted to take to ‘the woods and to the fields’, as Robert of Gloucester put it.\footnote{Robert of Gloucs., ii, pp.770-1; Langtoft, ii, pp.150-1.}

Henry Hastings and some others, however, decided that the defence of Kenilworth was a greater priority. Chesterfield was undoubtedly a blow to the Disinherited. One knight, a Robert de Wollerinton, was caught and promptly hanged by Henry of Almain, while many folk were slain, though whether these were rebels or citizens of Chesterfield is never made clear. Most importantly Robert de Ferrers, who was being treated for his gout that morning, was captured.\footnote{Langtoft, ii, pp.148-49; Robert of Gloucs., ii, p.770.}

According to the Bury chronicler, the survivors ‘collected in bands in the woods, which were suitable hiding-places, and made hide-outs in various places. They were more dangerous to meet than she-bears robbed of their cubs and seized everything they wanted from anywhere.’\footnote{Bury, p.37.}

The small bands of outlaws plaguing the forests became a widespread problem in England during the civil war. The royalists launched a series of operations to tackle these groups. From 8-11 October 1265, Roger de Leybourne advanced into Essex, though as Lewis notes, this ‘can have been little more than a reconnoitring expedition’.\footnote{E101/3/9; Lewis, ‘Roger Leybourne’, p.198.} Between 4 and 11 November he conducted another short expedition, leading several hundred men to pacify the Weald and to keep ‘the fairs...
and woods of those parts free of bandits and conspirators’.  

Fairs provided a ready concentration of supplies that raiders could target. The rebels at large in the region were probably working in small bands unlike the large group that had formed at Axholme. Leybourne, having reportedly suffered several ambushes, seems to have quickly decided that his force was ill suited to hunt such opponents. He retired leaving 200 archers paid 3d a day for ‘guarding the king’s peace in those parts’, apparently judging that they would be sufficient for the task.

Of particular significance is that the region of Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and South Yorkshire were so frequently involved in the predations of these bands at this period. As early as the beginning of March 1264, problems in Sherwood were noted when the king’s messenger, riding north to bring the king’s summons for the northern royalists to gather at Oxford, was seized and the royal letters taken. As well as the ravages of the bands of de Eyville in 1265, fighting also continued to plague Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire in late 1266 and well into 1267. A group of rebels who had been operating for an unknown amount of time, including John de Eyville’s cousin, Nicholas de Eyville, and the former baronial sheriff, William fitz Herbert, were becoming an increasing strain on the garrison of Nottingham. On the 5 November, a letter close noted that they were preventing the sheriff John Balliol and his under-sheriff Simon de Hedon from collecting the issues of the counties. The situation in Nottinghamshire was clearly deteriorating, so much so that by 6 January 1267 Roger Leybourne, now appointed the guardian of Nottingham castle, dispatched William Leybourne with eight knights and thirty sergeants to boost the garrison. The fighting claimed a heavy toll, with many men and horses from the garrison either wounded or killed when they engaged the enemy at the Forest of ‘Rossold’ (possibly Rufford) during Passion Week. On 20 March 1267, William Mortain was appointed sheriff of Nottingham and Derby and was instructed to hunt down the rebels, while Leybourne and his sub-constable Alan de Kirkby were ordered to let Mortain and his household use Nottingham castle as a base.

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35 in illis partibus pax domini Regis custodiend, E101/3/6; E101/3/9d; Lewis, ‘Roger Leybourne’, p.199
36 CR 1261-64, p.381.
37 CR 1264-68, pp.262, 270; De Eyville, ‘John de Eyville’, p.28.
38 E101/3/10.
39 CPR 1266-72, pp.133-4.
well as other outlaws. This period seems to have played a role in the development of the Robin Hood legend. Holt points to the prevalence in the legends of the locations of both Barnsdale in South Yorkshire and Sherwood; the former is located very close to Axholme. He also notes a number of parallels between the story of Robert Godberd, a former member of the Montfortian garrison of Nottingham who plagued Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire until 1272, with some of the tales of Robin Hood. Walter Bower, writing in the 1440s, believed that Robin Hood had been active in the post-Evesham period of the war, noting that ‘John de Eyville occupied the Isle of Ely; Robin Hood was an outlaw amongst the woodland briars and thorns’. Crook notes an entry in the 1261 eyre roll concerning an outlaw William son of Robert the smith. The record of the same case in the 1262 memoranda roll alters the surname to ‘Robehod’. Crook argues that ‘the implication must be that whoever altered it was aware of the Robin Hood legend in some form or other’. The amount of evidence to support this thesis is very limited, but it may suggest that some of the ideas underpinning the legends were beginning to form by this period. The nature of the war being waged by the Disinherited had historical precedent and demonstrates evidence of a deeper cultural impact on society.

The siege of Kenilworth and the royalist preparations for it played a key role in determining the tempo and shape of the royalist campaign against the rebels in 1266. During the winter of 1265 and spring of 1266, royalist efforts were principally reactive and involved the dispatch of forces to either hunt down particular bands of the Disinherited or to tackle hotspots of disorder. Combined with the royalist victory at Chesterfield, May 1266 marked the royalists’ most successful month. The king, concerned by the lesser citizens’ (minores) displays of support for the imprisoned Thomas fitz Thomas, the Montfortian mayor of London, ordered Roger de Leybourne to the capital in a show of force. Leybourne’s arrival on 8 May with a great company of knights and sergeants, armoured beneath their clothes, impressed the Alderman Fitz Thedmar. These clothes may have carried the king’s arms as an added display of royal authority for Leybourne’s expenses reveal that

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he had purchased tunics for his troops prior to the campaign.\textsuperscript{44} Leybourne rounded up a number of trouble makers in the city and reasserted royal authority there. His real objective though was to the north. Henry ordered the sheriff of Surrey and Sussex to raise 200 ‘good archers’ to join John de Warenne at London from either 13 May or 21 May. These reinforcements were probably to relieve Leybourne of the duty of holding down the city.\textsuperscript{45} Leybourne then departed for Essex, launching a campaign against the Disinherited in the district that lasted approximately from 20 May to 16 June, assisted by another force led by William de Valence and John de Warenne.\textsuperscript{46} The force raised by Leybourne was large and consisted of a substantial body of men serving under royal pay. Thirty-two knights served for twenty three days for a total of £73 12s. Seven royal sergeants-at-arms and seven king’s crossbowmen served for thirty and twenty six days respectively while 500 Welsh or Weald archers served for twenty three days (the documents confusingly say both) of which 200 were provided with tunics (tunici).\textsuperscript{47} Stopping at various places during his campaign he used Colchester, and presumably its royal castle, as a base between the 9 and 12 June. The losses in the campaign led Leybourne to claim £110 for horses killed.\textsuperscript{48}

Adam Gurdon, a knight with lands in Hampshire, Dorset and probably Gloucestershire, had also retreated into the ‘woods and fields’ following his disinheritance. He initially seems to have retained a strong popular following in Somerset and Devon from his time as the Montfortian constable of Dunster and Lundy castles.\textsuperscript{49} He subsequently withdrew from there to Essex and joined forces with another rebel, David Offington. This group and the other bands plagued the regions near London. Gurdun’s plundering and burning attracted particular attention from chroniclers like Wykes and was one of the spurs for Leybourne’s campaign into Essex.\textsuperscript{50} Gurdun and Offington led a band of horsemen up to twenty four strong to raid the priory of Dunstable’s manor of Shortgrave in Bedfordshire. Staying for a day and night they apparently got wind of the impending campaign and retreated over the Chilterns, stopping at Kimble in Buckinghamshire and

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{…cum magno comitatu militum et servientum sub pannis armatorum, Cron. Maior.}, p.86.
\textsuperscript{45} \textit{CR} 1264-68, pp.191-2; Lewis, ‘Roger Leybourne’, p.203.
\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Bury}, p.34.
\textsuperscript{47} See previous page, E101/3/6; Lewis, ‘Roger Leybourne’, pp.203-4.
\textsuperscript{50} Wykes, pp.187-8.
then moving south to base themselves in the woods of Alton in Hampshire.\textsuperscript{51} Sometime in this period David de Offington apparently left the group as he reappeared amongst those Disinherited surrendering in August 1267.\textsuperscript{52} On 6 May 1266, Edward decided to flush out the band and managed to locate their camp in the woods. In the ensuing fight Gurdun was captured and his companions were hanged.\textsuperscript{53}

The combined campaigns of Edward, Henry of Almain and Leybourne’s forces, demonstrate that the royalists were making strong efforts to bring the Disinherited to heel prior to the commencement of the siege of Kenilworth. This strategy achieved some notable successes with the capture of Adam Gurdon and Robert de Ferrers.\textsuperscript{54} Royalist efforts to combat the bands of the Disinherited intensified noticeably in the periods of November 1265 and from March to May 1266, each contemporaneous to the commencement of active preparations for a siege of Kenilworth. While the reduction of Axholme in November was in part motivated by the chance to combat the large concentration of rebels under a key figure like Simon the Younger, it also served as a necessary preliminary for a siege. Simon’s agreement to order the garrison’s surrender is indicative that in royalist minds the reduction of Axholme was linked to that of Kenilworth. Strategically, the anti-Disinherited campaigns of this period demonstrate the royalists’ awareness that the siege required the concentration of their resources and would concurrently increase the threat that the bands of the Disinherited posed to the peace in the kingdom, and also particularly to the logistical efforts needed for the siege. Yet, although the Disinherited had suffered several heavy blows by June 1266 they still remained at large and the siege provided these groups with the very respite from major pursuit that the royalists efforts had sought to avoid.

The Campaign in the Fens

This section principally details the Disinherited’s seizure of the Isle of Ely and the campaign to retake it; examining the historical context of rebellion in the region and the topographical challenges that supressing it involved. Other than Knowles’ brief overview the campaign has

\textsuperscript{52} CPR 1266-72, p.150.
\textsuperscript{53} See Chapter 6, pp.221; Wykes, p.189;
attracted little in the way of detailed study and due to its important role in the lead up to the war’s conclusion this section will provide a closer focus on the conflict.

The concentration of royalist forces on the siege of Kenilworth eased the military pressure on the bands of the Disinherited remaining in the ‘woods and fields’ and as a result spurred their activities. Sometime in the early to mid-summer of 1266, John de Eyville and Baldwin Wake’s band began to ravage Lincolnshire again, this time launching a major raid against Lincoln. Attacking with some strength, the Disinherited stormed the city and sacked it, breaking open the coffers and seizing all the charters and deeds of the Jews. The attack reportedly resulted in the killing a hundred and sixty people, including women and children. The Disinherited even assaulted the castle, though it is unclear if they succeeded in taking it.\(^55\) They were long gone by the time Edward could arrive with reinforcements.\(^56\) The sack of Lincoln arguably marks a transition to a fresh phase in the rebellion of the Disinherited. The successful sack of a city and the Disinherited’s ability to avoid reprisals served to encourage the expansion of their campaign and its audacity in the wake of their defeats in May. The sack of Lincoln also marked the decision of de Eyville and Wake’s band of Disinherited to abandon Axholme again and return once more to East Anglia. They began to ‘plunder all’ and joined forces with another rebel band led by Sir Hugh Peche, the steward of Henry de Hastings’ lands at Bury St. Edmunds (possibly the manor of Lidgate which Henry held from the abbot of St. Edmunds, close to Peche’s manor of Kedington). On 9 August, they arrived at the Isle of Ely.\(^57\) Several different dates are given for the seizure of Ely, including Michaelmas 1266, but the Bury Chronicle and Rishanger account’s mention of 9 August would seem to be supported by an inquisition launched on 25 August 1266 that questioned whether three individuals were at the sack of Lincoln ‘or with the king’s enemies at Ely’.\(^58\)

Ely was the perfect base from which the Disinherited could operate. The Isle was a natural fortress and largely inaccessible except via a causeway and by boat. By using the complex web of waterways in the region, the Disinherited could launch a raid and then escape back into the Fens before royalist reinforcements could arrive. The Liber Eliensis’ account of William the

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55 The targeting of the Jews and the charters and deeds in this attack suggests a mixture of private and political motivations for the participants, particularly financial, CIM, i, no.313; Langtoft, ii, pp.150-1.
56 Langtoft’s account is rather later but contains some interesting details suggesting local knowledge of events at Lincoln, his dating of April is highly suspect though, Langtoft, ii, pp.150-1.
57 CIPM, vol. i, no.719; CIPM, vol.iii, no.30; Bury, p.36; CIM, i, no.716; Langtoft, ii, pp.150-1; Rishanger, De Bellis, p.58.
58 CIM, i, no.313; Wykes, p.192; Flores, iii, p.13.
Conqueror’s attempts to take Isle in 1070-1, paints a vivid picture of the difficulties the Fens presented to an invading army.

It deterred many to be advancing in armour across marshy ground which would hardly support the footsteps of a man or of any animal. And you could see that it posed threats, easily targeted as it was by an arrow shot from afar: collapsing like chaos into a whirlpool of solid matter into which, when loosened by the slightest rain, flow <waters> in streams and rivers, disguised all the time by the hazardous beds of flag-iris in general marshy ground encourages to grow.  

The approach by the causeway was apparently little better for its ‘narrow windings’ …‘were hindrances to sight and speech’.  

The author of the *Gesta Stephani* remarked that it was ‘inpenetrably surrounded on all sides by meres and fens, accessible only in one place, where a very narrow track affords the scantist of entries’.  

The Isle itself, seven miles long and four wide, could provide its occupiers with food, with substantial local fishing available, and, as the author of the *Gesta Stephani* remarks, it was ‘rich in land that is fertile and fit for pasture’.  

There were no extant castles in the Fens, those that had existed appear to be gone by the 1260s. Instead the region was dominated by a number of monastic houses including Ely, Ramsey, Crowland, Thorney and Peterborough.  

During Stephen’s reign, the rebel Geoffrey de Mandeville had used Ramsey Abbey as a base for ravaging the surrounding area, and decades earlier Hereward the Wake had used the Isle of Ely.  

Henry III was alive to the strategic danger a rebel occupation of the Isle could pose and during his preparations for the siege of Kenilworth he had made provision for its defence. The Barnwell account describes how the bishop of Ely, Hugh de Balsham, in following the king’s orders, constructed barriers on the Isle which were to be guarded day and night by armed men. For a number of months these efforts succeeded in protecting the Isle from those Disinherited operating in the region. In August, however, the rebels ‘stealthily’ managed to penetrate the defences and seized control. The Bury chronicler attributes this fall to the fact that the bishop had ‘gone away

60 *Liber Eliensis*, p.225.  
61 *Gesta Stephani*, p.66.  
62 *Liber Eliensis*, p.3.  
64 *Gesta Stephani*, pp.108-10.
and abandoned it’. Henry was reportedly furious with Balsham when the bishop informed the king of the very disaster that Henry had specifically sought to avoid.65

Initial royalist efforts at containing the Disinherited at Ely were reliant upon the levies of the counties surrounding the Fens.66 On 16 December, unable to face the well-armed and trained knights who formed the core of the Disinherited, an attempted siege by these forces was routed with some of the Disinherited pursuing the survivors into Norwich and sacking the city.67 Raids

65 Hugh was perhaps lukewarm to the royalist cause but he was not strongly affiliated to the baronial party either. D.M. Owen, ‘Balsham, Hugh of,’ ODNB, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/1250?docPos=2, [accessed 16.04.14]; Bury, pp.36-7; Liber Memorandum, p.121; Rishanger, De Bellis, p.58.

66 Author’s own map.


68 Rishanger, De Bellis, p.58; Bury, pp.36-7.
were made on Cambridge and Bury, and fines were extorted from the inhabitants, the proceeds of which the rebels may have used to buy the ‘necessaries of life’ from towns, or at least so alleged a Cambridge jury during the Dictum Eyres of 1269.\textsuperscript{69}

The surrender of Kenilworth castle on 14 December finally enabled the king to release forces to aid in the suppression of the Disinherited and particularly against those occupying the Isle of Ely. On 30 January, William and Richard de la Zouche were appointed to keep the peace in Essex, with express authorisation to treat the rebels ‘as if he [Henry] were there in person’.\textsuperscript{70} Henry’s efforts were slow to materialise, however, much to Wykes’ indignation. The delay was in part the result of the negotiations led by the papal legate, Ottobuorno, aimed at reaching a compromise with the Disinherited. These efforts had failed by 22 February and by the 24\textsuperscript{th} the king was at Cambridge where he began to fortify the town. Wykes imputes the failure of the talks to the Disinherited’s belief that the inaccessible nature of the area meant that they would not be attacked.\textsuperscript{71} The task of besieging the Isle was indeed a formidable one. In 1140, King Stephen had successfully taken the Isle from the bishop of Ely by crossing the narrowest point of the channel on a pontoon bridge built from boats lashed together. The final leg of the journey was made with the assistance of a local monk who knew of a shallow ford to cross the remaining stretch of fens.\textsuperscript{72} Against de Mandevilles’ rebellion Stephen’s strategy had been to construct a series of castles around the Fens to hem in de Mandeville’s forces. This strategy had eventually succeeded when de Mandeville was mortally wounded attacking Burwell castle. The downside to such an approach, however, was that it was slow and expensive and there are no signs that Henry III attempted to repeat Stephen’s strategy.\textsuperscript{73} In further contrast to de Mandeville’s rebellion, the Disinherited apparently concentrated their forces to the Isle of Ely, instead of occupying the other abbeys of the region such as Ramsey and Fordham.\textsuperscript{74} Despite the numerous challenges, the royalists attempted to place the region around Ely under a form of siege. Henry’s decision to choose Cambridge as his base was a sensible one. As well as possessing a royal castle, the town lay right on the edge of the Fens, about thirteen miles as

\textsuperscript{69} Jacob, \textit{Studies}, pp.236-7.
\textsuperscript{70} Wykes, p.196; CPR 1266-72, p.129.
\textsuperscript{71} Knowles, ‘Disinherited’, Part i, p.41; Bury, p.37; Wykes, p.196.
\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Gesta Stephani}, p.66.
\textsuperscript{73} Crouch, \textit{The Reign of King Stephen}, pp.210-11.
the crow flies from the Isle. The river Cam flowed into the Fens by Ely and Cambridge itself formed an important part of the water borne trading network of the region. In 1120, the town had acquired a charter from Henry I decreeing that it was the only port in Cambridgeshire that ships were allowed to put into, although there is evidence that many of the other Fen edge communities had their own ports.\textsuperscript{75} Richard of Cornwall based himself further north at Barnwell Priory, close to the River Nene which fed into the Fens past Peterborough.\textsuperscript{76}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure5_2.png}
\caption{Figure 5:2 Approximate Areas of Royalist Defence Responsibility 1267}
\end{figure}

Henry appointed a number of knights to help organise the defence of the region around the Isle. On 4 March, Peter de Neville was dispatched to Lynn to guard the town and sea coast, with orders issued to the men of the town and those ‘of the king’s faithful’ coming there ‘with horses and arms’.\textsuperscript{77} He, however, was to be under the authority of John de Vaux, keeper of the king’s fleets in

\begin{itemize}
\item Sayer, ‘Medieval Waterways’, 139-43; \textit{VCH: Cambridge and the Isle of Ely}, iii, pp. 2-15.
\item Why he did not base himself at Peterborough is unclear, \textit{Liber Memorandum}, p.122.
\item \textit{CPR 1266-72}, p.130.
\end{itemize}
the counties of Norfolk and Suffolk. Sir Robert de Tattershall was appointed to keep the peace and to aggrieve the king’s enemies in the northern fens and a writ of aid was issued to the knights, free men and others in the region of Wisbech and Meresland (possibly modern day March) to assist him. Berengar le Moine was named captain and granted the same powers for Huntingdonshire. Berengar expressed some doubts as to the loyalty of the men he could recruit in the Huntingdon area, and requested permission to raise men from outside the shire ‘who would be readier to carry out his orders’. That the local population’s views of the Disinherited were somewhat mixed is indicated by eyre returns that show a number of local men serving on the Isle. John de Eyville’s decision to write to the citizens of Lynn to try and tempt them to abandon the royalist side suggests that he did not consider such an effort to be entirely futile. Berengar was granted permission to assess all persons in the county in order to raise money to maintain his men for the defence of the region. While it is unclear who was responsible for defending the region to the East and South-East of the Fens, this area did possess a larger number of royalist fortresses, including the royal castles of Colchester, Norwich and Hadleigh as well as John de Warenne’s castles at Eye and Castle Acre and Roger Bigod’s at Framlingham. The royalist efforts resulted in skirmishing between the two sides. At Horningsea, close to Cambridge, a rebel raid by boat was driven off and four men captured. The disinherited knight Walter Cothenham was caught and, like Robert de Wollerinton after Chesterfield, was hanged. The other three captured rebels were beheaded.

Henry seems to have appreciated quickly that a naval dimension perhaps offered the best method of dealing with Ely. Arguably, it was also presented the cheapest strategy for the cash-strapped Henry. In the early spring the water level of the marshes was probably still high, rendering a land attack impractical. The best Henry could hope to achieve with his own forces at this point was to try and restrict the Disinherited to the marshes and the region of the Isle itself. The East Anglian ports, however, owed him military service and Henry did not necessarily need to spend another penny if the men of the ports could take Ely for him. A fleet of ships from Norfolk and Suffolk, including the ports of Ipswich, Dunwich, Yarmouth and Lynn were scheduled to meet at

78 CPR 1266-72, p.130.
79 CPR 1266-72, p.133.
80 CPR 1266-72, p.132.
81 See for example Rotuli Selecti, p.131; Knowles, ‘The Disinherited’, Part i, p.43.
83 Liber Memorandum, pp.122-3.
Lynn on 5 March to attack the Isle, but this force proved difficult to raise. Indeed, on 5 March, Henry issued another letter patent that promised that any townships that raised enough men according to the ordinances of John de Vaux and Sir William Charles (who were responsible for mustering the troops) would ‘be quit elsewhere of the aid which the king exacts from others who do not make such subsidy, so long as they have their people at their own cost in the said service’.  

Aware of the rivalries between the port towns, Henry also issued stern injunctions against any disturbance that would affect the muster, giving power to Vaux and Charles: ‘…so that if any one, by word or deed, molest them [the towns] whereby impediment of the business result, they shall punish him by penalty of prison, life or limbs, according to the quantity of his offence according to that which may be done by the rigour of justice, sparing none by prayer or price, grace or favour’.  

On 20 March, Henry noted that William Charles had been authorised to amerce all those on the coast of Norfolk and Suffolk who had resisted efforts to provide well equipped barges for the attack on Ely. William was given full power to levy the amercements.  

When the fleet attacked the Isle, its ships were laden with crossbowmen and archers and ‘all kinds of repaired arms’. Yet the East Anglian naval force, apparently spearheaded by the men of Lynn, was defeated heavily. No knights or stipendiaries are recorded as being with them and it is not clear if any of Henry’s appointees, Vaux, Charles or Tattershall even accompanied the attack. Outclassed, the posse were routed with many killed or wounded and the men of Lynn, according to the later account of Rishanger, returned home in disgrace. The royalists now needed to attempt the potentially expensive and tricky task of taking the Isle on foot. The Lord Edward though, had already proved this could be done at Axholme.

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84 It is unclear if this is the same event as recorded by Rishanger who only mentions the men of Lynn, Wykes, p.197; Rishanger, De Bellis, pp.58-9; CPR 1266-72, pp.44,131-2.
85 CPR 1266-72, p.132.
86 CPR 1266-72, p.133.
87 omnique armorum genere refectis, Rishanger, De Bellis, p.58; Ipswich provided 200 men, Knowles, ‘The Disinherited’ Part ii, p.100.
88 See for one participant Chapter 6, p.215 and Jacob, Studies, p.238. Chronica et annales, pp.44-45; Wykes, p.197.
The campaign against Ely was curtailed, however, by the upsurge in rebellion elsewhere in the kingdom. By late February to March 1267, revolt was flaring in the Weald again and Roger Leybourne was once more dispatched to police it. In Hampshire, William de Wintreshull and Gerard le Grue were instructed to ‘enquire touching malefactors wandering in the county of Southampton and committing robberies, burnings, homicide and other enormities there’. The sheriff and the county posse were to assist them, but with the caveat that ‘all who owe service to the king and who are summoned before the king at St. Edmunds, be there to do what the king shall enjoin upon them’. The exceptions to this were ‘the services of the bishop of Winchester and the abbot of Hyde, Winchester, which he has assigned to the steward of the bishop and the sheriff of the county to keep the peace in those parts’. Sussex and Surrey apparently were not required to send men to the king in January, for on 28th John fitz Alan, earl of Arundel, was instructed along with the sheriff and county posses to:

enquire touching these things as well within liberties as without, and to take and keep those whom he finds guilty until further order; and to act vigorously in this behalf for the preservation of the peace and the confusion of the king's enemies.

On 30 February, Nicholas de Yatingdon was appointed to keep the peace in Oxfordshire and Berkshire ‘and to pursue and repress the king’s enemies there’ with the aid of the freemen and others of the county, except those already summoned, ‘with horses and arms’ and due service to

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90 CPR 1266-72, p.128.
91 CPR 1266-72, p.128.
come to the king at Mid-Lent. In the North, the Lord Edward was forced to put down the rebellion of John de Vescy and he stopped at Pontefract en route to Alnwick in mid-March. The de Vescy rebellion provides an interesting contrast of the effectiveness of castle based rebellion compared to more mobile guerrilla operations. The assault and seizure of de Vescy’s headquarters of Alnwick castle put down the rebellion with great swiftness. The Disinherited in East Anglia could not be quashed with the same ease. Despite these efforts, de Clare’s renewed rebellion and seizure of London on behalf of the Disinherited in April caused the abandonment of the siege of Ely and Henry’s advance on London to Stratford along with his summoning of foreign reinforcements and orders to Leybourne to ensure the provisioning of Dover and Rochester castles against attack. With the king gone, those Disinherited who had remained on the Isle descended on Cambridge, burning the new gates and the buildings Henry had resided in and generally plundering the town. The burgesses fled the town in advance, conscious of the coming danger. The Disinherited even threatened to burn Barnwell Priory in revenge for the Prior’s alleged role in trying Walter Cothenham. Only intervention from the brothers, Hugh and Robert Peche, allegedly saved it; nevertheless the Prior fled to Waltham Abbey.

The resolution of the London stand-off meant that by 1 July 1267 only the diehards holding out in the Isle of Ely and in a few other places remained in rebellion. Edward therefore returned to the Fens with an army and the intention of finally bringing the Isle back under control. Roger Leybourne was also dispatched with several hundred men to quash a rising in Winchelsea, which was apparently retaken on 20 June before he had even arrived. Edward, as with the Isle of Axholme in 1265, took a more direct approach to the problem of the Isle’s natural defences than his father, reinforcing the pattern of decisive behaviour that he had exhibited repeatedly through the war from the siege of Gloucester to the capture of Alnwick. Several factors were present to assist him though, which had been absent during Henry’s efforts. Firstly, the Disinherited upon the Isle had been heavily weakened by the surrender on terms of many of their number at London. Secondly, Edward may have been able to build upon the ground work of Henry’s preparations and

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92 CPR 1266-72, p.131.  
93 Rotuli Selecti, pp.231-2.  
94 Wykes, pp.197-8.  
95 Lewis, ‘Roger Leybourne’, p.207.  
96 Liber Memorandum, p.123.  
planning during Lent. Finally, Edward was now able to play upon the existence of the compromise reached at London. Fighting was not the only realistic option for those on the Isle.

Entering the Fens itself with his force, Edward made his base at Ramsey Abbey. With the assistance of either the rebel Nicholas Seagrave or Seagrave’s mother, according to Wykes and the Annals of Dunstable respectively, as well as some locals who knew the region, they scouted a crossing place onto the Isle. Edward’s advance was assisted by his good timing, for by now the natural defences of the isle had been weakened as a dry summer had rendered the ground more navigable. He approached the Isle and sent forward archers and crossbowmen to cover the crossing of the stream. At the same time he issued an edict threatening that any rebels who might prepare obstacles for him would be either beheaded or hanged. Faced with the choice between the possibilities of summary execution or submitting quietly on now more acceptable terms, the remaining Disinherited submitted and let Edward enter the Isle. After nearly a year’s occupation the Isle had been retaken.

Conclusions

The period from Evesham to the fall of Ely demonstrate the same key themes mentioned at the beginning of this section. Castles were not used as the primary tool of rebellion; instead guerrilla warfare utilising areas of difficult terrain to prevent discovery or to act as a natural fortress was the preference of the Disinherited. Kenilworth stands as the exception to this rule, and itself exemplifies the problems and advantages of a major siege for both sides. The expense and time needed to reduce Kenilworth were formidable and a test of fortitude for the royalists. Without the possibility of outside relief, however, the garrison could be starved out eventually. Conversely the rebels operating in the wilds enjoyed a freedom of movement and the ability to plunder for supplies that castle garrisons lacked. They could threaten large swathes of the country, disrupting the royalist attempts at restoring order and as a result fundamentally challenge Henry’s kingship via his failure to provide security for his subjects.

Did the Disinherited ever have a realistic chance of military success? If we view the movement principally as one aimed at persuading the king to concede the restoration of their lands, then yes; if

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98 Wykes, pp.207-8; Ann. Dun., p.246.
some retained greater ambitions about defeating the royalist party, then no. The principal problems faced by the royalists post-Evesham were the number of the Disinherited and their popular support. This facilitated both the geographical spread of the rebellion and its maintenance in the localities to a degree that made it difficult for the royalists to tackle. This problem is most clearly demonstrated by the events of 1267. The outbreak of multiple rebellions between February and April strained royalist resources immensely. Despite these problems the royalists, by the conclusion of the London stand-off, remained in a militarily superior position. All castles were supplied and in royalist hands, major reinforcements had arrived from the continent and as a result the rebels were left with few realistic chances for achieving a greater victory. Once Henry was able to fully mobilise his resources he could overawe the opposition.

The Disinherited achieved most success when Henry’s main force was tied down in a protracted siege, such as those of Kenilworth and Ely, which prevented the royalists from actively hunting down the rebel bands. It is hard to say whether this was a deliberate tactic by the Disinherited or merely good fortune. When Henry was not engaged in such a siege, as in early 1266, the Disinherited remained on the back foot, losing the Cinque Ports and suffering defeats at Alton and Chesterfield. The recipe for rebel success, however, was problematic. It required a significant concentration of rebels in a location that could withstand even the main royal host for an extended period. The strength of Kenilworth made it ideal for achieving this and after the surrender of Dover indeed it was the only castle of that strength still in rebel hands. Its defiance allowed the other groups to continue their raiding relatively unmolested. Yet if the castle fell, not only would the rebels lose a major base, but they also risked the capture or death of a large proportion of their number. It was this calculation that seems to have in part driven the royalist siege. The Dictum of Kenilworth was a partial victory therefore for the rebels who sought a way to gain restoration of their lands, but with the fall of the castle they had also lost one of their last and greatest bargaining chips. The castle’s surrender was also a critical failure for the probably dwindling number of diehards who might dream for some form of wider victory. Simon the Younger did not come to its relief, and only the intervention by a third party could hope to tip the military balance in their favour. Unlike in 1216-7, this help was not forthcoming from France or Scotland. The intervention of Gilbert de Clare at London several months later again marked a victory for the Disinherited in
that it allowed further amendment of the harsh terms of the Dictum, it did not however, mark a full victory; de Clare still supported the principle of restoration by redemption. A military defeat of the royalist party remained unlikely, despite de Clare’s support. The holding of the castles, including the Tower, and the arrival of reinforcements for Henry guaranteed this failure.

The rebel strategy, whether deliberate or not, was effective at maintaining itself and persuading moderate royalists of the necessity of pushing for terms, but it was not likely to achieve more while Henry kept his castles manned and ready. These played a key part in his efforts to re-establish control in the localities, notably at Rochester and Nottingham. The Disinherited’s very strategy of avoiding holding castles meant that they could make little in the way of concrete long term military gains. When Kenilworth fell so too did any real chance of defeating Henry. Had Henry withdrawn from the siege the damage to the royalist side would have been immense, though not fatal. Kenilworth could have continued to dominate the Midlands and the other groups would have remained emboldened. As it was the fall of Kenilworth marked the effective death of any ambition the Disinherited may have had for major military resurgence. Without Gilbert de Clare’s seizure of London, Henry would have reduced Ely and effectively broken the Disinherited by removing their last base. The Disinherited’s taking to the ‘woods and fields’ helped win them their lands, but without the castles they lost the war.

Note: Knowles, ‘The Disinherited’, Part i, p.46.
6 Conflict in the Localities

The Furness chronicler, when commenting on the widespread outbreak of local violence in England that followed the battle of Lewes, noted that ‘old quarrels between neighbours broke out renewed in communities, while it seemed whoever was more powerful preferred to [rob] with impunity, and to oppress the weak and the low’.\(^1\) In his pioneering work of 1926, *Essays on the Period of Baronial Reform*, E.F. Jacob provided a concise and detailed study of the nature of local violence during the war, utilising a plethora of mainly unpublished legal records. Jacob’s observations are acute and he notes early on the importance of examining the role in the rebellion of the lesser as well as the greater folk in society.\(^2\) Similar efforts have been continued by Carpenter on the role of the peasantry, King on the clergy, local studies such as Hunt’s on Staffordshire and more generally by Valente.\(^3\) The aim of this chapter is to build upon this pre-existing works’ conclusions and to examine the impact and nature of the war at the local level and to assess how far this differed from violence in peace time. After discussing the available legal source material, we shall first examine how the wider war’s conduct and demands impacted on communities. Next we will consider the nature and possible extent of local conflict, how it related to the major campaigns of the war, and finally the problems of maintaining the peace and pursuing justice. The chapter will conclude with a case study of Richard de la Vache and the Windsor garrison in 1264-5, which throws light on many of the themes raised.

**Legal Difficulties and Definitions**

The two principal sources for local violence are the judicial eyres held from 1267 onwards that were prosecuting rebels under the terms of the Dictum of Kenilworth, and the *Inquisitiones de Rebellibus* conducted in September to October 1265. While legal records relating to acts committed during the war survive in other sources, such as the *Curia Regis* rolls, the eyres and *Inquisitiones* offer the most systematic coverage for the period of the civil war.\(^4\) King, in the best modern

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\(^1\) *Newburgh*, ii, p.545.

\(^2\) Jacob, *Studies*, pp.222-75.


\(^4\) For a full discussion of the available legal records see Jacob, *Studies*, pp.147-221.
discussion of the inherent problems in using legal records from the Barons’ War, notes in relation to the Dictum eyres that, ‘the use of the presentments as historical evidence involves almost all the problems which are characteristic of the legal sources generally’. The difficulty with these sources lies in the fact that both the Inquisitiones and the Dictum eyres are summary records of the testimony given to the jurors of a hundred and of the jury’s subsequent verdict. As such, questions remain both over the reliability of such testimony and the extent to which juries were biased or subject to local pressure. In the wake of the civil war these juries, frequently composed of former active participants in the conflict, were hardly impartial bodies. Acts committed by the royalist side were not pursued, and those juries with predominantly Montfortian sympathies would be understandably reluctant to convict their fellows. For many jurors delving too deeply into the past was hardly to be encouraged when their own wartime misdemeanours might potentially come to light. The confused picture in England as a whole during the war meant it would have been - and still is - difficult if not impossible to establish if the jury’s verdict was not unduly swayed by the above factors. There are many cases where the jury reached an apparently considered verdict in the eyres, clearing the accused of some charges and convicting them on others to impose a fine under the Dictum of Kenilworth. Yet the choice in some instances to convict on certain charges and not on others was not necessarily a sign that a jury was acting impartially. Being compelled by force into an act of rebellion was on its own worth a lesser punishment than being convicted of plundering, a difference of between one and as much as five years revenue under the Dictum’s original terms. For example, in Berkshire the men of Kintbury were forced to redeem their lands at one year’s value due to their involvement in the siege of Marlborough (the fine was one year because they were not men of the earl of Leicester; their compatriots in the attack, the men of Hungerford, who were the men of the earl, were only fined two marks). By contrast, Andrew Badking, who was found guilty of plundering animals with Robert de Ferrers’ men, was required to pay two years’ value. The number of men who admitted the charge of being compelled into an act of rebellion but denied engaging in plundering begs the question of whether in some juries these

5 King, ‘Friar Tuck’, p.31.
6 Jacob, Studies, pp.196-9.
7 JUST 1/42, m. 2.
defences were accepted with a perhaps less than thorough examination. Often those accused could be neighbours of the jurors themselves and tied together by local society and even family. The pitfalls of the jury system in treating rebellion are well illustrated by a case Asaji highlights in the Cambridgeshire Eyre. In Radfield hundred it was revealed upon questioning by the justice, that out of the twelve jurors, three of them had been in the Tower of London against the king and another three had received gifts from another rebel, Michael Kirkby of Burgh, when he too was based at the Tower. As a result the jury was placed in mercy. This fits a broader historical pattern of behaviour with Hanawalt noting the existence in fourteenth century cases, of ‘mutual agreements not to convict in order to avoid reprisals within villages’. This issue could, of course, work the opposite way, with jurors potentially convicting men as rebels on a number of possible grounds, ranging from the personal unpopularity of the accused to pressure from local royalist lords. These factors are similarly close to impossible to trace with the sources available.

Edward Powell’s critique of the approaches of historians such as Hanawalt, in regard to the sociological study of medieval crime, raises the cogent point that historians have relied upon the information of presentments rather than those of convictions when formulating their results. In essence they presume guilt in all cases. Here I work not on the assumption that all accused are guilty, but rather that the crimes alleged to have taken place may have occurred in some form, albeit without those accused necessarily being the guilty party or all details being correct. This reflects the actual contents of the records themselves, for while men are cleared of a crime by a jury the same jury rarely deny that the crime took place only that its alleged participants did not attend.

The eyres raise several other issues. As Valente notes, ‘the nature of the records is to exaggerate violence’ with the legal formulae often encouraging hyperbole from the plaintiffs regarding the level of destruction inflicted. During the Barons’ War the formula to denote rebellion was often that the individual was present ‘with horses and arms’ (cum equis et armis).

The eyre returns are only extant for Cambridgeshire, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Norfolk, Essex, DBM, pp.325, 333.


Valente, Theory and Practice, p.76.
Warwickshire, Suffolk and Northamptonshire. It is unclear whether the others were ever completed or simply have not survived. The biggest issue of relevance to this present study, however, is that frequently the presentments and verdicts do not mention the alleged date of the incidents they record. In particular, suits brought to court, and trespass actions in particular, were extremely loose in their legal phrasing. Not all incidents relating to the war were actually designated as ‘in the time of war’ (in tempus guerrae) or ‘in the time of the troubles’ (in tempus turbatio). As King comments, ‘there is much evidence that the identifying phrases (such as in tempus turbatio) were not used with sufficient consistency to warrant excluding cases which lacked them from consideration’. Context may well suggest the time frame, but some cases ‘in the time of the troubles’ which may refer to 1263 could equally refer to events from 1264-5 or perhaps even up to 1267 depending on the interpretation of those presenting or recording them. Regnal years are not usually provided and only very rarely are other methods of dating used. Part of the reason for this relates to the fact that the eyres were being conducted in some cases from two to as many as seven years after the alleged events: memories could be hazy, sometimes deliberately so. We can therefore plot a map of all the incidents of plundering occurring in a given county, but we are not able to assign the cases to particular years so as to analyse the ebb and flow of violence, though we may make an informed guess as to the particular peaks from other sources.

The Inquisitiones de Rebellibus returns from 1265 present further issues. The inquest, still largely unstudied, was set up on 21 September 1265 and was to be run by two commissioners assigned to one or two counties. The knights William de Engelfield and Thomas de Valoines, for example, were appointed to cover Oxfordshire and Berkshire. All counties of England existing at that time are listed, except Cheshire and Durham, which were administratively separate from the other counties. Of those listed the returns for Cumberland, Westmorland, Shropshire, Staffordshire, Cornwall and Lancashire do not appear to survive or were never made. Why this should so particularly affect the counties in the western half of England is unknown. Similar to

15 CIM, i, no.608.
16 CIM, i, no.608.
17 The explanation seems unlikely to be political in nature as most of these regions demonstrated divided loyalties during this period. The existence of additional returns for Yorkshire and Northumberland recorded by the antiquarian William Dodsworth outside the collection in the National Archives in Kew would suggest this is rather an issue of survival; Dodsworth, ff. 220-31.
the special eyre, each county reported on a hundred by hundred basis although not every hundred’s return has survived.

Working with the relevant county’s sheriff, the commissioners were to first seize the lands of all rebels in the counties, assessing their extent and wealth and sending this information back to the king by the Feast of Saint Edward, 13 October 1265. Secondly, they were to appoint two ‘discrete persons’ from every hundred or wapentake who were to ‘enquire and collect the rents of this instant Michaelmas term’ and were to certify the names of the holders and sum of the rents collected. If someone had already collected the rents, they were to be distrained until full restitution was made. Finally, if the land had been seized into someone else’s hands it was to be taken into the king’s possession. This process appears to have been conducted in part by the use of local juries in their respective hundred or wapentake who would report on those who were against the king and value their lands for the collectors to act upon. The jury was also asked to name the persons from whom any such lands were held, and who was currently in possession of them.

The inquest, as set out, should therefore have rendered information in the manner exemplified by this return from the wapentake of Aslacoe in Lincolnshire:

The chief messuage of John le Despenser in Kavenby is worth half a mark; land 60s, rents £4. 18s. 6d. of which 32s. 10d. due at Michaelmas, Robert de Typetoft received [them].
Collectors –William son of Ranulf de Helmeswell, Thomas de Glenteham.\textsuperscript{18}

The conception of the inquest, however, appears to be broader than the initial outline given by the king’s instructions. The reports frequently include details of acts of violence and local conflicts that the accused was alleged of being party to and are more akin to inquiries into local disorder than their original remit concerning rebel lands. For example:

William de Longvilers was openly in rebellion in that he was with Sir John de Eyville with horses and arms at Cleveland and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{19}

Or

William de Bulkton, Vivian de Flamborough and Ralph de Hunmanby were in Scarborough castle defending it against the king, when it surrendered to Sir John de Oketon.\textsuperscript{20}

In both cases attention is given to the individual’s alleged involvement in the rebellion, particularly their presence at what was demonstrably an act of rebellion. In the latter example no mention of their lands is given, merely information on their rebellious act. This broader remit or perhaps

\textsuperscript{18} CIM, i, no.774.
\textsuperscript{19} CIM, i, no.940.
\textsuperscript{20} CIM, i, no.939.
differing local interpretation of the inquest’s purpose is highlighted by the inquest in the town of Louth in Lincolnshire. Its response to the inquest is unique and takes the form of a series of answers. Unusually it also lists the questions they have been asked.

Firstly it states that the jury knows nothing of the rebels’ lands seized since the whole township ‘is of the alms of the mother church of Lincoln’. Second, they claim they know nothing of the Michaelmas rents. Third, they claim ignorance of any rebel lands and tenements restored since the Exaltation of the Cross (14 September) nor of any lands ‘not yet seized, or seized and redeemed.’ These are all in line with the inquest’s original remit. Then, however, they list questions that do not appear in the original mandate:

Of those who robbed their neighbours they name Geoffrey de Hastings.
Of those who robbed ecclesiastics or religious they know nothing.
Of those who robbed their neighbours after the peace, they know nothing.
Of those who maliciously attacked their neighbours who were not rebels they know nothing.

They also include accusations concerning five named individuals and various depredations they had committed locally.

The emphasis of the latter questions is obvious - it is an inquest into breakdowns in law and order. Whether this was an approved expansion, a misinterpretation by those conducting the inquiries, or alternatively a sign of their initiative is unclear. There is no indication in either the Close or Patent Rolls of additional instructions to add to the inquest’s remit. If these additions were made by those conducting the inquests then it is possible that pressure by the local populace was brought to bear demanding the restoration of law and order. This idea is supported somewhat by the regional variations in the information the inquests collected.

The nature of the conflict reported could vary wildly from hundred to hundred. While some reports deal with the accused rebels’ actions in the major events of the war, others concentrated on much more mundane conflicts. For example, in the Wapentake of Horncastle in Lincolnshire we have an example of these two extremes:

Sir Robert de Barkworth, of the household of Sir Gilbert de Gaunt, took to flight at Northampton and was afterwards taken at Kenilworth as a rebel.

Conversely we find:

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21 *CIM*, i, no.795.
22 *CIM*, i, no.795.
23 *CIM*, i, no.795.
24 *CIM*, i, no.790.
There being a quarrel between Walter rector of the church of Langeton and Richard de Preston, John Rokett came without Richard’s consent and set fire to a stack of beans, Richard has nevertheless made satisfaction to the said rector for his loss.  

We are then left with a number of unanswered questions about the conduct of these inquests. Were these changes a sign of an appetite for restitution and the return of law and order by local areas? Does an expanded inquest in a particular hundred demonstrate that region’s stability or its general loyalty to the king in comparison to other, more conflict wracked or politically hostile, localities? Do they reflect local vendettas or methods of revenge upon certain individuals? It must also be born in mind that a significant number of the seizures were against individuals who, local juries claim, were not rebels. Was the increased remit in some areas a response to the cynical or apparently indiscriminate seizure of lands by loyalists as well as rebels? We shall examine some of these issues subsequently in this chapter.

**Fighting the Barons’ War**

The deliberate targeting and destruction of an enemy’s economic assets was a fundamental strategy of medieval military conflicts, and the Barons’ War was no exception. As the author of the *History of William the Marshal* remarks ‘for when the poor can no longer reap a harvest from their fields, then they can no longer pay their rents and this, in turn, impoverishes their lords’.  

Even the great men of England were only as great as the income derived from their lands. On the continent large scale well organised plundering expeditions, the *chevauchée*, were a common tactic in the wars between the Angevin kings and their opponents. Robbing the opposition of their assets both materially weakened them and enriched the attacker. Kaeuper’s comments that ‘if an army destroyed stores of foodstuffs, livestock and agricultural implements the economic effect on a village or region can scarcely be dismissed’ are equally applicable to the more localised warfare inherent in a civil war. In the decades before the Barons’ War the wars in Gascony and particularly Wales provided ample and relatively recent experience to many individuals of the methods of conducting this sort of warfare. In England the civil war of 1216-17 and the rebellion of Richard Marshal had witnessed the frequent ravaging and burning of lands. In the rebellion of 1234, Richard Siward ravaged the lands of Richard of Cornwall, Peter des Roches and Stephen de

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25 *CIM*, i, no.790.
27 Kaeuper, *War, Justice and Public Order*, p.84.
Seagrave just as Richard Marshal’s estates had suffered the same fate at the hands of the king in 1233. In this type of warfare distinction was made rarely between combatants and non-combatants and to the majority of the population this facet of the war would have had the most direct personal impact.

The legal records from the Barons’ War shed considerable light on manorial spoliation and the important role of castle garrisons and the Disinherited in this, as well as the importance of local officials in its organisation, the seizure of land, and the stealing of goods. The rest of this chapter will look in particular at the physical impact of war, local violence, as well as offshoots of the break down in law and order through the emergence of a black market and the methods and problems of trying to maintain the peace.

**Officials of Disorder**

According to the Evesham Chronicle, in the aftermath of the battle of Evesham Simon the Younger, gathered to him a great army indeed and he subjugated to him the whole county of Warwickshire, making in his name bailiffs, and under-bailiffs and other ministers through the whole county just as if he was the king of that county, and he sent of those now here and now there through the neighbourhood to prey upon the villages and manors of their adversaries.

While this account might be subject to some exaggeration, it is notable that Warwickshire and the nearby counties rendered no surviving accounts at the Exchequer from Michaelmas 1265-67, in contrast to their year under Montfortian rule. The Evesham account provides an excellent example of a far broader theme within local warfare during the Barons’ War, namely the use and importance of local officials in conducting the war as well as their often symbiotic relationship with castle garrisons. In particular, these individuals were crucial for recruitment and leadership in localities.

The returns of the Dictum eyres provide important insights into the important leadership role which Montfortian officials apparently played in the localities. William Marshal, the Montfortian appointed ‘guardian of the peace’ in Northamptonshire, for example, was said to have ‘collected

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31 Jacob, Studies, pp.222-75.
33 Cox, ‘Evesham Chronicle’, p.344; Compare counties listed in E372/109-111.
together’ the county at a location referred to as ‘Cow Meadow’ and tried to persuade them to back the party of the earl of Leicester.\textsuperscript{34} In Stoke hundred in Buckinghamshire, Simon Russel was accused of being the ‘constable’ of his district during the \textit{turbatio} and of ‘keeping watches by day and by night against the peace’.\textsuperscript{35} Fernandes notes that in the county of Northamptonshire, while Montfort’s ‘visits to the shire may have been fleeting, yet in his wake he left a powerful apparatus of baronial appointees and a number of his own bailiffs.’\textsuperscript{36} The network of Montfort’s bailiffs extended well beyond Northamptonshire. One of these men was William de Stokes, who was accused in the Buckinghamshire eyre of being the bailiff and ‘minister’ of Simon de Montfort and plundering Aylesbury. In his defence, William said he had been Simon’s bailiff for twelve years before the war and that he had raided Aylesbury at the order of the earl.\textsuperscript{37}

Local bailiffs and ministers were crucial to both sides for the effective muster and organisation of elements of the war in their locality. Fitz Thedmar’s account of the Londoners’ campaign of burnings in the first months of 1264, for example, reveals the importance of the city officials in the organisation and execution of these attacks. According to Fitz Thedmar, the attack on Richard of Cornwall’s manor of Isleworth was organised and planned by the newly appointed Montfortian constable and marshal, respectively Thomas de Piwelesdone and Stephen Buckerel, who summoned the city militia by ringing the great bell of Saint Paul’s. The citizens then followed the standards of the constable and marshal out of the city but ‘they were ignorant where they would be destined to go or what [they] would be accomplishing’.\textsuperscript{38} While it is possible that fitz Thedmar was trying to shift some blame for the incident, his comment is indicative of the power and influence that local officials could wield during the war.

When John de Eyville and William Bossall were ordered to raise the posse of Yorkshire and lay siege to Richmond castle in 1265, it would have been the ministers and bailiffs appointed by or sympathetic to the Montfortians, who were tasked with encouraging or distraining the local populace into arms.\textsuperscript{39} In Buckinghamshire, Stephen de la Haye was accused of being a constable conducting 200 men to the coast, presumably during the threatened invasion of the summer of

\textsuperscript{34} Jacob, \textit{Studies}, p.229; Fernandes, ‘Midland Knights’, p.57; \textit{Rotuli Selecti}, pp.194-5.
\textsuperscript{35} See Chapter 1, pp.46-7 for the role of constables; JUST 1/59, m. 16; Jacob, \textit{Studies}, p.229;
\textsuperscript{36} Fernandes, ‘Midland Knights’, p.110.
\textsuperscript{37} JUST 1/59, m. 14d.
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Cron. Maior.}, p.61, \textit{nesciebant quo ire deberent, vel ad quid faciendum.}
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{CR 1264-68}, pp.112-113.
When Hereford was besieged in late 1264 the royalist army was comprised of not only the Marchers, including 'Hamo Lestrange (the sheriff of Shropshire and Staffordshire) and his men’, but also ‘his posse of Shropshire’ which presumably Hamo had used his officials to call out.\(^{41}\) The situation in such instances could have been quite confusing for those being distained to arms. Confronted by competing claims and rival local officials from each faction, it would not have been easy to determine the validity of orders or to opt to resist such pressure.

Officials whose activities feature prominently in the eyre returns were frequently closely tied, and indeed were often active members of, local castle garrisons. The Berkshire eyre roll in particular highlights how the county seems to have been caught between the forces of the Montfortian garrisons of Windsor under Sir John fitz John and Wallingford and Odiham castles under Sir Richard de Havering. William le Fraunceys ‘bailiff of Curridge’ in Berkshire, for example, was accused in the eyre there as having, alongside one Matthew of the neighbouring vill of Chieveley, helped muster men from the vills of Hungerford and Kintbury and forced them to attack the castle of Marlborough during the war. Both men were part of the rebel garrison of Wallingford under Richard de Havering.\(^{42}\) Similarly John Plugenet, William Bithewy and Simon Steperand from Lambourn hundred claimed that they were distrained by the bailiff of John fitz John, to plunder Odstone.\(^{43}\) The frequent mention of distrain being conducted by men of or connected to the garrisons in several regions highlights the gravitational pull of these fortresses on their surroundings.

The eyre returns also reveal a frequently symbiotic relationship between some religious houses, the actions of local officials and castle garrisons in war related activities. The accounts of Rochester castle in 1267 reveal that the Priory of St. Andrews was a frequent supplier of the garrisons’ ale.\(^{44}\) Other houses were likewise tied into the supply of castle garrisons and in wartime might supply additional men and material. In the Berkshire eyre, a number of the local religious houses were accused of dispatching men and materials to the garrisons of Wallingford and

\(^{40}\) JUST 1/59, m. 3.
\(^{41}\) CIM, i, no.291.
\(^{42}\) JUST 1/42, m. 3.
\(^{43}\) JUST 1/42, m. 1d.
\(^{44}\) E101/3/5. The account does not always specify the origin of the ale purchased for the garrison. The priory is explicitly mentioned three times providing ale to the garrison as well as other items. Perhaps the castle did acquire ale from other sources, but the priory’s location next to the castle makes it probable that the priory served as a principle supplier and the failure to mention the priory in some instances could be down to a lack of consistency by the scribe.
Windsor. The abbot of Chertsey, for example, accepted that he had sent ‘wood, grain and other
necessaries’ to Windsor, although he denied rebellion, while the abbot of Abingdon was accused of
using great distress to send his knights to Windsor castle. The latter claimed he had been in turn
distressed by the constable of Windsor who bore the king’s writ. The prioress of Goring was even
accused of giving counsel and aid to Wallingford castle, which may suggest that she had dispatched
men to its garrison.\(^{45}\) Such assistance was by no means necessarily unwillingly given. King has
demonstrated the considerable degree to which the clergy of all ranks were engaged in the Barons’
War on both sides.\(^{46}\) One Berkshire court case saw the abbot of Reading defending himself against
the accusation that he had favoured the rebel cause, not only by sending men and giving aid to
Montfort, but also by acting as his envoy (\textit{legatus}). It also recounts a more serious accusation that
when Warin de Bassingbourne and the men from the royalist stronghold of Bristol castle were on
their way to the surprise assault on Wallingford, they paused in the village of Blewbury a few miles
from Wallingford and attempted to rouse the villagers to arms to assist in the attack. Instead of
assisting them the abbot reportedly informed the earl.\(^{47}\)

It is hard to determine the extent to which men were compelled by local officials into actions
they would not otherwise have participated in, but the juries’ acceptance of some of these pleas and
their rejection of others suggest that this was a recognised occurrence. John de Molis, for example,
claimed to have been abducted and compelled to join the garrison of Windsor but he had never, he
said, participated in plundering. The jury accepted that he was initially abducted but also pointed
out that subsequently he had left and returned to the garrison freely.\(^{48}\) Like King for the clergy,
Carpenter has demonstrated that both the reform movement and the king retained popular and
active support amongst some of the peasantry.\(^{49}\) Local officials were important in bringing out local
levies on the Montfortians’ behalf through both compulsion and by exploiting in some cases local
enthusiasm.

The importance of officials on both sides of the war does not rule out the existence of more
spontaneous acts of local warfare. There is, however, in some instances of plundering and raiding
\(^{45}\) JUST 1/42, mm. 8d, 13, 15d.
\(^{46}\) King, ‘Friar Tuck,’ p.52.
\(^{47}\) JUST 1/42, m. 10.
\(^{48}\) JUST 1/42, m. 15.
\(^{49}\) Carpenter, ‘English Peasants’ pp.3-42; D.A. Carpenter, ‘A Peasant in politics during the Montfortian
regime of 1264–1265: The Wodard of Kibworth case’, \textit{Fine of the Month} September 2010
http://www.finerollshenry3.org.uk/content/month/fm-09-2010.html [accessed 18.06.2014].
evidence of a degree of planning at a broader level. As Jacob notes, while ‘local unpopularity may account for many’ of the attacks on royalists in the 1263-64 period it does not account for the ‘simultaneous or practically simultaneous assaults in different and widely separated parts of England’.\(^50\) Pressure was brought to bear on individuals by garrisons, Montfortian officials and sometimes even by religious houses, presumably using their own officials, to engage in the local war, whether by co-opting men into raids and other military expeditions or into supplying men and materials for the defence of fortresses. Doubtless there were those playing equivalent roles on the royalist side, but due to the lack of cases concerning their actions they are far harder to trace.

**The Physical Effects of Warfare**

The Evesham chronicle reports that in 1265 the garrison of Kenilworth, in addition to creating alternate officials in the shire, burned manors and seized 200 sheep and oxen.\(^51\) The plundering of enemy manors by castle garrisons was an inevitable part of the war being waged, having not only an economic purpose but also being a practical military necessity.\(^52\) The increase of a garrison’s size in response to wartime demanded a corresponding increase in the amount of supplies required for maintaining it, and in time of war access to the usual source of these supplies might no longer be possible. In addition to fulfilling the daily requirements of a garrison, demand was further increased by the necessity of ensuring that a castle was fully stocked to withstand a period of siege. An examination of just a three day period from the surviving expense account of Sir Simon de Cray and Sir John de Rivers at Rochester Castle in April to May 1267, provide a clearer idea of the demands entailed in the provisioning a major royal fortress during wartime. This account covers period of the crisis of Gilbert de Clare’s seizure of London and the subsequent reinforcement of castles, such as Rochester, at Henry III’s command. The size of the garrison is unknown, and the number of horses recorded each day fluctuates indicating that men were coming and going regularly. It is not unreasonable to suppose that from fifty to as many as a hundred men may have been quartered in the castle.\(^53\)

\(^{50}\) Jacob, *Studies*, p.229.


\(^{52}\) An interesting absence from this period, compared to the civil wars of the twelfth century is the lack of demands for tenserie or payment to a lord for the construction and maintenance of their castle and its garrison; Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, p.85.

\(^{53}\) See Chapter 3, pp.82-85; Prestwich, ‘The Victualling of Castles’, pp.169-82.
- For the day of Saturday following [Passover 1267]. In 4 [quarters] of grain purchased for bread. 2s. 8d. In 5 sextars of wine. 9s. 2d. Of ale purchased from the priory. Provisions: plaice, 2 shillings; whiting (fish), 13d. whelks. 5d; mustard half a penny. In 2 quarters and a half of oats purchased for 64 horses, 5s. 2d. In the wages of 17 grooms [garciones] 3s. 1 ½d. In candles. half a penny.

- The total is 46s 11 ½ d.

- For the day of Sunday following bread from stores. In 5 sextars and 1 gallon of wine purchased, 8s. 9d. In ale, 9s. 6d. Provisions: 1 limb of bacon purchased, 18d. In meat victuals and pork, 19d. In saffron, 1d. In mustard, ½d; In 2 quarters 6 bushels of oats purchased for 64 horses 5s, 2d. In wages for 16 grooms, 2s. In 4 pounds of wax. 2s. 1d.

- The total is 30s 8 ½ d.

- For the day of Monday following bread from store. In 7 gallons of wine purchased, 2s. 11d. In ale 2s. 1d. In 2 sides of bacon purchased 6 shillings. beef from stores. In fresh pork, 11½d. In bread for baking 2d. In pottage 1d. In 100 eggs 4d. - In 2 quarters and 6 bushels of oats purchased for 62 horses 5s. 2d. In white candles, ½ d. In parchment 7d.

- The total is 18 shillings 7d.\(^{54}\)

What becomes clear from these demands was the sheer amount of provisions required day to day. This situation was exacerbated by the short shelf life of many supplies and these factors necessitated castle garrisons to engage in continuous resupply efforts.\(^{55}\) The easiest method for a garrison to obtain the necessary supplies was to seize them from their locality. This action permitted them to feed themselves while simultaneously denying these supplies to their enemies. The impact of these actions on the locality was severe. In March 1265, Montfort’s orders to contain the garrison of Bamburgh were aimed at curtailing the damage being inflicted locally and simulataneously to deny the garrison supplies.\(^{56}\) In Purbeck hundred, the Inquisitiones de Rebellibus reports that Sir Robert de Verdon, the baronial keeper of Corfe castle which neighboured the hundred, and his followers ‘pillaged frequently at Purbeck and elsewhere’.\(^{57}\) The raiding by Pevensey’s royalist garrison attracted Montfortian attention as early as 8 July 1264 when it was noted that ‘the king understands that many enormities have been committed by them and others of the garrison of that castle’. The writ authorising the siege of the castle on 18 September clarified further that the garrison was ‘perpetrating homicides, burning and plunderings’.\(^{58}\) Some of these actions were undoubtedly attacks on rebels, but as many may have been simply aimed at stocking the castle.

\(^{54}\) E101/3/5. Fish was a very important part of the garrison’s diet.

\(^{55}\) Pounds, The Medieval Castle, pp.113,123-5; for a good discussion of the problems faced in maintaining castle provisions see Cornell, ‘English Castle Garrisons’, pp.61-78.

\(^{56}\) CR 1264-68, pp.112-113.

\(^{57}\) CIM, i, no.652.

\(^{58}\) CPR 1258-66, pp.333,371.
This behaviour was, of course, not limited merely to castle garrisons. The rebels on the Isle of Ely, for example, did much the same. The Barnwell Chronicle, written close to events, described how the Disinherited seized men for ransom, stole wealth and ‘transferred also the sheep and oxen, the corn and malt and whatever they were able to take possession of, into the Isle’. The chronicler even records a confrontation between the prior and the rebel, Philip le Champion, who arrived at the priory demanding ‘I want to have, for the needs of my lord, the whole of your corn, the whole of your malt and the whole of your larder. Therefore deliver to me the keys!’ Philip was reportedly faced down on this occasion by the prior, but the priorities and actions of the Disinherited of Ely were no different from those of the garrison of a castle. Jacob theorizes that the plunder and fines extracted by the Disinherited elsewhere were used, perhaps surprisingly, to purchase some of the goods necessary for their maintenance. The Cambridge town jury claimed that the Disinherited ‘bought there corn and other necessaries’ and that in ‘truth the whole province sold the rebels necessaries of life which they took back to the island’. Permitting markets to function helped to prevent the alienation of some communities who supported the Disinherited and facilitated their acquisition of supplies. Nevertheless, whether paid for or not, the demands for provisions by military forces on both sides of the war had a major impact on the countryside, inflicting considerable pressure and damage on its resources.

Robbery and Local Violence

Much of the violence recorded in the eyres and Inquisitiones de Rebellibus was not necessarily war related, but was nevertheless influenced by it. Medieval England was indeed a naturally violent society, and many of the issues the remainder of this chapter will discuss also occurred in peace time. Yet wartime not only provided an excellent excuse for breaching the king’s peace under the banner of the greater war, but it also increased the scope and openness of local violence.

59 Liber Memorandum, p.121.
60 Liber Memorandum, p.122.
61 Jacob, Studies, pp.236-7.
62 Jacob, Studies, p.224, when discussing war related violence recorded in these sources comments aptly that ‘to see political significance of some kind in every act of robbery and violence would, of course, be absurd.’
Hanawalt highlights the importance of the concept of ‘conflict theory’ in understanding crime and justice, namely that the social groups involved in medieval justice were focussed on the advancement of their own power at the expense of others. Furthermore, she contends that ‘most groups in society derived some benefits, either financial or political, from corruption of justice’. 64 Justice was essentially a means to an end under this model, and ‘for those people who felt that they could not insure their power position in the courts, the only solution that remained was personally to right the wrongs done to them through violence or through stealing items they thought owed to them.’ 65 Distinguishing between what was or was not warfare, as opposed to opportunistic crime is, however, frequently impossible.

The focus of many of the plunderings and robberies recorded in the Inquisitiones and the eyres were predominantly targets local to the alleged perpetrator and were committed by individuals not mentioned as being part of a garrison. 66 In Yorkshire, for example, Roger le Poitevin is recorded as raiding Towton, barely two miles away from his own land at Saxton, land later seized by Alesia de Lacy. 67 In Northumberland, Sir Thomas de Lisle of Newton was accused of plundering Rothbury, again less than two miles from his lands. 68 In Buckinghamshire, a Robert de la Legh of Buckland was accused of robbing James, parson of Aston (Clinton), about a mile or less away from Buckland. 69 Stephen Cheindut, a royalist, in particular seems to have suffered from his near neighbours’ predations, as he accused a Thomas Cleric and Thomas son of John Cleric (both from Cheddington) of robbing his land at Cheddington. John son of William Gorlec from Halton (about one mile from Cheddington) was accused of doing the same, as were a William de Pranbolf and a Badecok of Leighton (Buzzard), four to five miles away from Cheddington. These men were accused of plundering grain, oxen, sheep, cows and utensils to value of £40 from Cheddington. 70

A downside to the trying of cases before hundred juries was that these juries were never going to be an effective setting for the identification and prosecution of malefactors from beyond the county borders. This may therefore skew the weight of our evidence unduly towards the role of

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64 Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict, p.62.
65 Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict, p.63.
66 Jacob, Studies, p.224.
67 CIM, i. no.938.
68 CIM, i. no.847.
69 JUST 1/59, m. 14d.
70 JUST 1/59, mm. 7, 11-11d.
local perpetrators in these crimes. Several times men are identified in a presentment as being with ‘other malefactors’ at raids. Some are named, many are not. These others of course could be locals, but it is possible they were not. The identity of these ‘other malefactors’ is open to speculation. In Berkshire, for example, a William Wlrich (sic) of Wantage was accused of robbing at night the house of Reginald Ruffin in Windsor. He, however, instead blamed Welsh malefactors then allegedly present in the neighbourhood for the crime, though he claimed ignorance of the identity of the culprits. He was deemed not culpable by the jury on this occasion. The bands of the Disinherited such as those of Adam Gurdon, Nicholas de Eyville and John de Eyville, are likely candidates in a number of cases. Some of these robberies, however, may have simply been by robber bands with no real connection to the rebellion and who may have drawn their members from a number of different counties. Nevertheless, local knowledge does seem to have played a role in a number of crimes, permitting the perpetrators to identify and plunder likely targets. The case of Robert Cariman’s raid on Kirkstall Abbey on 23 April 1264, suggests this mixture of opportunism and local knowledge. Cariman, described as a ‘common robber’, chose his timing well, for around 20 April 1264, the northern royalists reportedly arrived at Nottingham, presumably taking a significant proportion of the royalist troops in the north with them. With most of the armed men now at Nottingham, places like Kirkstall could not rely on the support of the local knights and lords in either coming to their aid or in hunting down the perpetrators.

The case of William Grayndeorge of Flashby and Newsholme provides a useful illustration of the duality of crime and warfare and its impact on local areas. According to the Inquisitiones, the area around the royalist castle of Skipton had a strong concentration of rebel lands including those of John de Eyville and William de Longvilers at Gargrave and Mauger le Vavassur at Draftun. William de Grayndeorge, who was described as a ‘rebel’ by the inquest, was claimed to have been present at the rebel attack upon the castle of Skipton. William, however, seems to have taken the conflict beyond the royalist garrison, being accused by the jury of robbing six separate individuals.

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71 JUST 1/42, m. 9d: This could date to the time of Leybourne’s May-June 1266 campaign which involved Welsh stipendiaries or Henry’s campaign against Ely in 1267. The Dunstable annalist reported that two Welshmen were beheaded for robbery outside Dunstable as the king’s army passed through on their way to Stratford. Ann. Dun., pp.245-46; see Chapter 1, pp.58-9.

72 See above.
Whether he did this against royalists or was merely using the war as a cover for personal gain is uncertain. The names are given, but not where the victim came from in most instances. We can, however, match the victims’ surnames to the following locations, shown by the red dots on the map. The close proximity between the victims and the lands of William at Flashby and Newsholme are marked. For example the surname of Sir Ellis de Ryllestun is congruent with Rylstone, little over a mile from Flashby. A Sir Alexander de Skos can similarly be linked to Scosthorpe, approximately three miles away.\footnote{CIM, i, no.940.}

Figure 6:1 Region of Skipton and Robberies of William Grayndeorge

William may have been a member of the garrison of Skipton Castle, though he is not charged as such. The geographical relationship of the targets to his own lands suggests that these were the launching pads for his raids, rather than Skipton castle. William’s motives are impossible to identify with certainty, but this pattern does suggest that personal and possibly criminal reasons, as much as those relating to the wider war, lay behind the raiding.
Redress

The pursuit of justice through the courts was particularly hard, even impossible, during the war; even more so if the alleged offence was committed by royalists. An account in the Chronicle of Barnwell provides a useful example of this problem. The Chronicle narrates an incident from early 1267 in which the prior, Jolanus, received a grant of land in Wiggenhall in Norfolk, from a James the Chaplain who had recently inherited it. The overjoyed prior left Barnwell with a ‘great familia’ and hurried across the Fens to Wiggenhall, just to the south of Lynn. Engaged in celebration in the manor with his household and James the Chaplain’s neighbours, the party was suddenly assaulted by an armed band led by the bailiff of William Bardolf. In the ensuing chaos the prior and his men were forced to clamber out the windows and over the walls, abandoning their horses and harness to the delighted bailiff. Prior Jolanus himself was forced to flee to Dereham Abbey. While the actual cause of this incident is unclear, the chronicle notes that after the war William Bardolf granted all the lands and holdings in Wiggenhall that pertained from the gift of a William fitz Oliver to the prior and convent of Barnwell. It seems possible then that this was a land dispute in which Bardolf claimed the lands of James the Chaplain. Another possible explanation may be that the prior’s large party was mistaken for some of the Disinherited due to warfare then raging in the Fens. The prior’s decision to venture into the region at that period, even with a large company, certainly was unwise at best. Bardolf had joined the king’s party after the fall of Northampton in 1264 and was captured at Lewes fighting for the king. He does not seem to have got into much trouble for his bailiff’s attack and most significantly the chronicler of Barnwell notes that ‘it was not then possible for the Prior to implead through the king’s court against the malefactors at this time, because he [the king] was then under threat as it was war time’. The legal pursuit of outrages committed by royalists during the war was likely to be particularly challenging and chances of regaining any goods taken were very small. The chronicler in particular laments that ‘in our days’ there were no longer as many good horses in the house of Barnwell due to this event.

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74 Liber Memorandum, pp.119-20.
75 Flores, ii, p.496; Wykes, p.146; CPR 1258-66, p.347.
76 Liber Memorandum, pp.120-1.
77 Liber Memorandum, p.120.
Ransoms, Fines and the Black Market

‘Rich men and clerics they had kidnapped and chained while levying fines on others.’

The seizure and ransom of wealthy individuals was not a practice confined to the Kenilworth garrison alone. In Buckinghamshire, for example, Master Roger Geve accused Alexander de Areles of seizing and imprisoning him until he made a fine of 24 marks and a further 4 marks. Alexander countered that he took the 4 marks for the unspecified work of the royalist Maurice de Berkeley. The Disinherited seem to have made a particular habit of this practice, especially when they raided towns. During their raids on Norwich and Cambridge in 1266, alongside an abundance of loot, ‘they seized Jews and other rich men… for the purpose of fixing on a price for their ransom’. In one case cited by Jacob, two merchants on the opposing sides, one Harvey Helden of Ipswich and one Andrew Gurd of Bury St. Edmunds both succeeded in getting captured by their rivals. Harvey was one of the men of Ipswich who joined the unsuccessful royalist attack on Ely in early 1267 where he was recognised by the ‘robbers’ on the Isle. When Harvey later went on business to Royston in Hertfordshire the ‘robbers’ laid in wait and then captured him, taking him back to the Isle. Andrew Gurd reportedly kept Harvey prisoner there and then took him to Bury. A ransom is never mentioned but the lengths taken to apprehend Harvey surely suggest a pecuniary motive. Andrew himself then ventured into the region of Ipswich and was spotted and captured by Harvey’s partners. Pulled into a boat he was taken to Cranwich Wood, beaten, and threatened with drowning unless Harvey was released. In fear of his life Andrew sent word to his wife and partners to send Harvey on to Ipswich.

The extortion of fines from towns or religious houses was another common feature of the war, one which the royalists were particularly liable to carry out. Henry III kept a separate roll of fines for military service owed but not fulfilled, beginning with his muster at Oxford in March 1264 and continuing through the campaign until the battle of Lewes. While this roll is now lost it existence is

79 For the example of John Pollard at Windsor, see below; For examples of non-noble ransoms in operation in the fourteenth century see N. Wright, ‘Ransoms of non-combatants during the Hundred Years War’, Journal of Medieval History, 17 (1991), pp.323-332.
80 JUST I/59, m. 9d.
81 Rishanger, De Bellis, p.58.
82 Jacob, Studies, p.238.
attested to in other records.\textsuperscript{83} Henry levelled a 100 mark fine from Battle Abbey for the presence of its tenants in the ambushes the royal army faced in the Weald in May 1264.\textsuperscript{84} In 1264, the Dunstable annalist records that the wapentake of Wirkesworth in Derbyshire promised £200 to Edward in the wake of the assault on Northampton, though it is unknown under what persuasion. The annalist records this because the prior held the manor of Bradbourne there, but it seems certain that other towns and hundreds would have received similar ‘persuasion’ from both parties.\textsuperscript{85} William de Valence and John de Warenne extracted a fine from the citizens of Bury St. Edmunds for supporting the Disinherited.\textsuperscript{86} This behaviour was not confined to the royalists, however, as Cambridge, in order to acquire protection from the Disinherited’s plundering, were forced to provide them with 300 marks.\textsuperscript{87} The fines of both parties had the principal motive of raising money and discouraging resistance.

In addition to ransoms and fines, the eyres reveal that the war also stimulated a black market of stolen goods and animals at the county level. In Buckinghamshire, large amounts of stolen livestock seem to have been driven to Windsor for the garrison, but a considerable number of the smaller raids reported seem to have resulted in the seizure of a horse or horses. Horses, as Hanawalt notes, were a particular target even in peace time as their comparative mobility and financial value made them attractive targets.\textsuperscript{88} They were also a crucial military asset; garrisons could only be effective if they had sufficient mounts for offensive operations, while the Disinherited in particular relied upon mobility for their survival and therefore required remounts and replacements for lost horses. We see then a split in purpose between the two sorts of horse thefts during the civil war: those for criminal profit and those for practical purpose. The Buckinghamshire eyre renders at least fifteen accusations of horse theft, of which five appear to be raids in which the horse was the only major thing of value reported taken, while ten involved other livestock, usually sheep and oxen, being stolen.\textsuperscript{89} Three may be robberies directly related to

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Battle Chronicle}, p.375.
\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Ann. Dun.}, p.230.
\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Bury}, p.34.
\textsuperscript{87} \textit{VCH: Cambridge and the Isle of Ely}, iii, pp. 2-15; Jacob, \textit{Studies}, pp.236-7. For discussion of the fine levelled on London see Chapter 4, p.147.
\textsuperscript{88} Hanawalt, \textit{Crime and Conflict}, p.62.
\textsuperscript{89} JUST 1/59, mm. 2, 6, 6d, 15; 3, 6, 6d, 7, 10d, 15.
acquiring horses for the war, for example, Sir William de Beachampton, who was in Kenilworth castle, was accused of stealing a horse from his brother Walter.\(^90\) Those individuals accused of raiding Stephen Cheindut claimed in their defence that Stephen’s brother Ralph had sent a horse to the earl of Leicester during the war.\(^91\) While many of the other instances reported may have been for war related purposes, a number are clearly not. In two cases the accused was actually found to have purchased stolen goods, albeit unwittingly, while another was convicted of knowingly purchasing a stolen mare.\(^92\)

Buckinghamshire and probably the other counties during the war had a ‘black’ market of stolen horses and other livestock. The small number of cases mentioned above might call into question the scale of this phenomenon, but as ever, what we see reaching the justices in 1269 is likely to be only the tip of the iceberg. Many instances may have been resolved without the courts, in other instances people simply may have never identified with any certainty those involved in the theft or the victims may have been still reluctant to accuse those they knew to be responsible in fear of reprisals. For example, the almoner’s horses at the priory of Dunstable, worth 100s were stolen at some point in 1266; it is unclear if they were ever recovered. The thirteen good horses belonging to the prior of Barnwell captured by the bailiff of William Bardolf were never returned, inflicting long-lasting harm on the priory.\(^93\) Theft of horses and other livestock is likely to have been far more widespread than records indicate. In another example, from Berkshire this time, one William de Garston was cleared of stealing a horse from a Richard de Henham when it transpired that he had arrived at the abbey of Reading only to discover there the horse that had been previously stolen from him. William had been imprisoned in Wallingford Castle by a Henry P[er]a of Sholyoch and forced to redeem his freedom by giving his horse away. The abbot returned the horse to him while Richard was fined for purchasing a stolen horse.\(^94\) The keenness of the Disinherited not to alienate some Fen edge communities saw the leaders on the Isle of Ely hand over to the monks of St. Edmunds several ‘ruffians’ (ribaldi) and the horses that they had stolen from the abbey. These men were required to lay their swords at St. Edmund’s altar ‘as acknowledgement of their impiety’.

\(^90\) JUST 1/59, m. 6.  
\(^91\) JUST 1/59, m. 7.  
\(^92\) JUST 1/59, mm. 3, 6d, 13.  
\(^93\) Chapter 6, p.214; Liber Memorandum, p.120.  
\(^94\) JUST 1/42, m. 10d.
That the monks had feared the theft of the horses beforehand is suggested by the chronicler’s comment that the animals had been ‘hidden in the most secret places within the precincts’.  

The war allowed other stolen goods, including wood and livestock, to circulate the countryside more openly than in peace time. Perpetrators used the robberies to further enrich themselves by selling the goods on to others. In some cases those purchasing the goods were perhaps unaware, or at least followed a policy of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ concerning the origins of their acquisitions. A Nicholas Faber, for example, was acquitted of purchasing two sheep from Ralph Faber of Stenle because Ralph was knowingly selling on stolen animals. John le Waleys accused Roger, chaplain of Hartwell of stealing 120 sheep and forty pigs from him. Roger was convicted of buying twelve sheep and eight pigs worth 20s from those plundered from John, and as a result was left in mercy. John himself was in fact accused of rebellion, but received protection for being with the earl of Gloucester at London in 1267. A Robert P[er]mis of Clifware, one of those in Windsor Castle, was accused of selling stolen goods, possibly from the proceeds of the raids conducted by the garrison. Between Michaelmas 1264 and Michaelmas 1265, the city bailiffs of Norwich were faced with a number of cases involving the selling and receiving of stolen goods. This trade was apparently being conducted openly within the city, for a Ralph of Hadestock, an approver of Norwich castle, accused two men and two women of purchasing stolen goods from him, but not paying. Ralph’s role suggests that some garrisons may have served as unofficial hubs of the black market. The stealing of wheat was another staple crime. Geoffrey Hondde, for example, was accused of gaining four quarters of grain from Stephen Cheindut unjustly and against the peace, while a Hiwelyn de la Broke of Wycombe reportedly seized the land of Simon de Sandredon and took his grain to the house of Thomas Angod of Wycombe. One man was convicted of selling wood from the park of Windsor while an Alexander le Parker was accused of doing the same and

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95 Bury, pp.38-39; in secretioribus locis curie.
96 JUST 1/59, m. 6.
97 JUST 1/59, m. 14.
98 CPR 1266-72, p.146.
99 JUST 1/42, m. 16.
100 The Records of the City of Norwich, ii, pp.207-8, an ‘approver’ was presumably responsible for confirming the value of the expenses and works on a castle.
101 JUST 1/59, mm. 11, 15.
receiving money for it. Woodland was a particularly tempting target if the perpetrators were intent on inflicting long term damage, because it would take years to regrow.

**Keeping the Peace in tempus guerarе**

Methods of keeping the peace in wartime seem to have differed relatively little from those of peace time, the main exception being the preoccupation of the county sheriff and his forces with conducting the war. While judicial sources generally say little on the subject, snap shots of community responses to disorder are provided in commissions of inquisition recorded in the Patent Rolls, as well as in a few incidents mentioned in chronicles. In addition to detailing the equipment that men were obliged to bring to the muster, the assize of arms of 1242 and 1253 stipulated the number of armed men who should guard vills at night. Strangers were to be arrested if abroad at night, and those of good character to be released in the morning, while others were to be held until the sheriff arrived. If they fled, the hue and cry, i.e. the summoning and armed pursuit by the local populace of malefactors, was to be raised in surrounding vills to hunt down the strangers. On this basis, the duties of providing local security rested heavily on the shoulders of the local communities themselves. This remained the case during the war, but with the added problem that it would be far from clear in some regions who, when or even if the authorities would turn up.

With royalist forces overstretched during 1266 and 1267, Henry seems to have emphasised the use of local forces to police the countryside. On 25 May 1267, for example, during the earl of Gloucester’s renewed rebellion at London, a William de Stanegate accidentally killed a Desiderata le Chaumpeneys, ‘a particular friend’ and the godmother of his child. Desiderata reportedly accosted William, who was carrying a crossbow and poisoned arrow, asking him in jest whether he were ‘one of the men who were going about the country with crossbows, bows and other weapons,

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102 JUST 1/42, mm. 14d, 15d.
103 King, ‘Friar Tuck’, p. 45.
105 Summerson, ‘The Structure of Law Enforcement’, p. 316, the 1242 statute was essentially repeated in 1253; *CR 1237-42*, pp. 482-4; See Chapter 1, pp. 46-9.
107 *CR 1237-42*, pp. 482-4; See Chapter 5 for Henry’s initial reliance on the shire levies against the Disinherited in East Anglia.
to apprehend robbers and evil doers by the king’s order’. Armed as they were, the use of lethal force against malefactors, even in peace time, was liable to be common and even more so during the heightened tensions of a civil war. On 2 August 1264, William de Engelfield was commissioned by the council to investigate an incident at Bampton in Oxfordshire, where a group of ‘evildoers’ had attacked a mill belonging to William de Valence, possibly assuming that with Valence’s exile it was an easy target. The miller raised the hue and cry in Bampton and a John de Cranefeld ‘hearing them [the evildoers] with his neighbours, followed them so manfully that he killed one of them, John Bastard’. On 18 February 1265, Gilbert de Preston was ordered to determine whether a William Gorham of Stapelford, who came with certain evildoers to the Montfortian Peter de Montfort’s manor of Garthorp (Leicestershire) and maltreated Peter’s men, ‘was killed in the fields of Wymondham by premeditated assault or not, and to let the sheriff know the names of those whom he [found] guilty’. When Robert Cariman raided the cattle of Kirkstall one of the abbot’s retainers was accidentally hit by an arrow fired at the robbers by another of the abbot’s men. While these examples were in self-defence or in the course of a pursuit, it is notable that they were not automatically exempt from the process of the law, even in wartime. Not every incident, however, even in peace time, necessarily followed the law though and, as Musson notes for the early fourteenth century, summary justice ‘may have been commoner than is usually supposed’. While it is impossible to ascertain accurately if incidences of rough justice did increase in wartime, anecdotal evidence suggests that it may have done. The Furness Chronicle, for example, recounts the case of an unnamed pro-Montfortian knight from Spalding Moor in Yorkshire, whose manor was seized by some supporters of the king, his park broken and all goods found in the manor destroyed and scattered. The said knight located seven of the perpetrators and dealt with the incident by locking them within one of their houses and burning it down with them inside.

Fear of and anger against armies could also manifest itself violently in communities, particularly in the aftermath of a defeat. In the aftermath of Lewes, the Battle Chronicle reports that

108 CIM, i, no.2133.
110 CPR 1258-66, p.479.
111 CIM, i, no. 2116.
112 Musson, ‘Sub-Keepers and Constables’, p.12.
113 Newburgh, ii, pp.544-5.
royalists, ‘dispersed through flight, were everywhere slaughtered by villeins living in the
countryside’.\textsuperscript{114} Whether this was down to the political allegiance of the villeins is unclear, but the
arrival of scattered groups of strange and possibly aggressive armed men likely provoked a violent
response from the nervous men of the vills. A similar fate was reportedly met by the Welsh
mercenaries after Evesham.\textsuperscript{115}

These cases are not proof of systematic execution but rather indicators of a ‘rough justice’
approach by some groups or communities. As with the idea of Conflict Theory, there is a sense in
these cases that people during the war, possibly fearful that the perpetrators could never be
successfully tried or that justice would be too slow and possibly corrupt, reacted forcefully and
sometimes lethally to breaches of the peace. While we lack a detailed study of levels of violence
prior to the war, violent incidents of this kind were liable to be more common during wartime when
the established channels of redress were undermined.

Communities could show considerable determination to pursue those who attacked them. The
Annals of Dunstable recounts the Lord Edward’s pursuit of Adam de Gurdon and David
Offington’s band following their raid on the manor of the priory of Dunstable at Shortgrave in
April 1266. Alone amongst accounts of events at Alton, the Annals mention the presence of one
Robert Chad with Edward’s party. The decision of the annalist to include this otherwise unknown
individual in the account suggests he held some local significance to Dunstable. Although there is
no other record of Robert Chad, a Henry Chad appears as a merchant of Dunstable, responsible in
1272 for assisting in the restoration of the priory church. While the precise connection between the
two men is unknown, Robert’s presence with Edward’s party suggests that men from Dunstable
assisted in the pursuit of the raiders who had ransacked Shortgrave.\textsuperscript{116}

\textbf{Personal Conflict, Escalation and Revenge}

\textit{Tempus guerrae}, while providing the conditions for crime to flourish, likewise provided a
convenient arena for the violent settling of personal conflicts.\textsuperscript{117} The English crown at this period,
unlike others in Europe, had, as Richard Kaeuper puts it, ‘a working monopoly of the means of violence associated with war’.\textsuperscript{118} There was no legal right for an English noble to make war on his rivals, save in the Marches.\textsuperscript{119} Whether attacking lands, persons or goods, these were breaches of the king’s peace. Strict penalties, in theory, applied to those who broke the king’s peace, which by extension was rebellion against the king.\textsuperscript{120} While moves in this direction were underway in France, reflected for example, in the \textit{Commentaria super Titulum de Actionibus} written by the jurist Jean Blanot around 1256, England was further advanced.\textsuperscript{121}

Thirteenth-century England was a violent society, even in peace time, but accurately quantifying how much more violent the civil war made it is not really possible with the surviving legal records. Surviving inquests into violent deaths do indicate that at least amongst the peasantry, all armed by law, the violent settling of disputes was not uncommon even in peace time. As Valente notes many of the types of offences being committed during the war ‘occurred in peacetime as well, as often and as violently’.\textsuperscript{122} To contemporaries the war did, however, mark a noticeable surge in local violence as the Furness chronicler’s quote at the beginning of the chapter suggests.\textsuperscript{123}

The act of burning was often associated with plundering, but it represented a serious escalation in a conflict and was a very rare crime in peace time.\textsuperscript{124} Arson was, as Miriam Mûller comments, ‘wholly non-acquisitive in nature’; the purpose was purely to hurt the victim.\textsuperscript{125} The decision to deliberately set fire to buildings or crops, as well as having a significant impact on the affected individuals in terms of the cost of the physical damage, was also a very public punishment. The smoke from a torched manor, castle or crops could be visible for miles around. The burning of


\textsuperscript{119} For the Marchers’ rights to limited forms of war see Strickland, ‘In coronam regiam’, pp.176-77.

\textsuperscript{120} See Chapter 1, pp.29-31 for Henry III’s restrictions on tournaments; ‘The Assize of Northampton (1176)’, \textit{EHD}, ii, pp.444-446; Kaeuper, \textit{War, Justice, and Public Order}, p.227.

\textsuperscript{121} Strickland, ‘In coronam regiam’, p.172.

\textsuperscript{122} See for example the \textit{CIM}, i, nos.806-940; Valente, \textit{Theory and Practice}, p.76.

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Newburgh}, ii, p.545.


Raskelf and Whorlton, for example, were both public acts of revenge by the Montfortians for the continued resistance by Robert de Neville and his followers in the north, as was the royalist reprisal campaign against the lands of Robert de Ferrers in April 1265. The Londoner’s choice to burn as well as plunder Richard of Cornwall’s manor at Isleworth in 1264 not merely hurt Richard but proceeded to rub salt into the wound, and explains much about the normally restrained Richard’s furious defiance of the Montfortians on the eve of Lewes. Burning was liable to provoke or seriously exacerbate personal conflicts.

The fighting between Montfort and Roger Mortimer may have been conducted on a far larger scale than most personal conflicts, but it is an informative study in their development and escalation. Originally a supporter of reform, Mortimer had transferred his allegiance back to Henry III prior to the war, joining the familia regis and possibly prompting a deeper antagonism with Montfort in the process. Mortimer’s original tensions with Montfort may have dated to Henry’s grant to the earl of the manors of Dilwyn, Lugwardine and Marden in Herefordshire in 1259 as part of the agreed conversion of parts of Eleanor de Montfort’s maritagium into land. Montfort’s sudden emergence as a power right in the midst of Mortimer’s lands potentially threatened Mortimer’s influence in the region and may have provoked his jealousy. Mortimer was by then engaged in his own unproductive legal dispute with the king and Richard of Cornwall over the valuable manor of Lechlade and Montfort’s success may have rankled. Mortimer remained aloof from the coup in 1263, but Henry III won him back to the royalist cause in part by the grant on 18 December 1263 of £100 per annum from the farm of the manors of Norton and Bromsgrove until he could be granted land of equivalent value. In December 1263, Mortimer, according to the complaints the barons presented to Louis IX, ‘with a considerable army invaded as an enemy’ the lands of Montfort in the March at Dilwyn, Lugwardine and Marden bearing Henry’s letters. He had the corn threshed; he devastated and carried off other goods and finally usurped ‘to himself the

127 The destruction included the head of the expensive fish pond and the wrecking of anything that could not be stolen; N. Denholm-Young, Richard of Cornwall, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1947), p.126; Chronica et annales, p.24.
lordship of the manor, extorting an oath of fealty from its men and tenants, and collecting and making off with the rent for the Christmas term’. His household also captured and imprisoned Montfort’s constable of Dilwyn castle.¹³¹ That this attack had been ordered by Henry III and was not Mortimer’s initiative alone is clear from Mortimer’s possession of Henry’s letters. If relations between Mortimer and Montfort were not already tense prior to this event, then they certainly were so after the attack, and it was upon Mortimer that Montfort took his revenge. This commenced an escalating cycle of violence between the two men. It is important to note that Mortimer was never accused of burning Montfort’s lands in 1263. In February 1264, Henry and Simon the Younger were dispatched with an army, supported by John Giffard, to enact revenge. What Montfort’s specific instructions to his sons may have been are unknown, but Henry and Simon’s retaliation apparently went far beyond the scope of Mortimer’s actions and subsequently escalated the conflict into something far more personal. They ravaged Mortimer’s lands in Herefordshire, not just attacking his crops but burning as well. To add insult to injury they also captured his caput and castle of Wigmore. The annals of Tewkesbury’s account is the most lurid, claiming that all Mortimer’s lands were destroyed, his castles ruined and that in one day at least 200 men were killed. Tewkesbury is the only source to report killings, but it is not the only one to mention the burnings.¹³² Some of this damage, including to the castle of Radnor, was actually inflicted on lands which belonged in right to Mortimer’s wife, Maud, who was lady of Radnor.¹³³ Both husband and wife now had very personal reasons for hating the Montforts. Whether Mortimer initially retaliated for this is unrecorded, but seems highly likely. In June 1264, when Montfort entered the March to force the Marchers’ compliance he again proceeded to burn and devastate Mortimer’s lands.¹³⁴ It seems likely that the burning of Mortimer’s lands lay, at least in part, behind the savage mutilation of Montfort’s corpse at Evesham. The parading of Montfort’s head on a spear and the presentation of it to Mortimer’s wife, Maud, all speak of a deeply personal revenge perhaps not just for

¹³¹ DBM, pp.266-67.
Mortimer and his wife but for his followers as well, many of whom may have suffered from the effects of Montfort’s burnings.\footnote{Wykes, pp.173-74; Robert of Gloucs., ii, p.765; Jobson, Revolution, p.146.}

**Mauger le Vavassur**

The conduct of Mauger le Vavassur provides an excellent example of personal conflict under the cover of the war. Mauger le Vavassur is recorded in the Skipton return of the *Inquisitiones de Rebellibus* as having attacked Richard de Bolton’s lands at Wheatley and those of John le Vavassur at Addingham, both of whom were of the king’s party.\footnote{CIM, i, no.940; Rotuli Selecti, pp.160-61.} The inquest notes that his land of Draughton ‘is of the fee of the earl of Aumale and is held of John le Vavassur’.\footnote{CIM, i, no.940.} Mauger was almost certainly a first-cousin once removed of John, and Mauger was thus from a junior branch of the family holding a sub-tenancy from the senior line.\footnote{EYC, vii, p.173.} He held more land at Walton in fee from Henry de Percy and also at Denton (the ownership of which is unclear).\footnote{CIM, i, nos.937, 940.} Mauger’s raid on Addingham would seem, on the basis of the return, to be an opportunistic assault on his cousin, and but one part of a broader trend of raiding on others in the locality as part of the war. Mauger appears again, however, in the 1268 eyre for Northamptonshire where the full extent of his activities becomes apparent. His attack on Addingham emerges as part of a larger focussed campaign of ravaging against John le Vavassur’s lands in Yorkshire. The eyre records accusations that he ‘plundered the before said John [le Vavassur] of horses, cattle and sheep and all other goods’ in John’s caput of Hazelwood and that ‘he burned the manor before mentioned and the church of the before mentioned vill’.\footnote{Rotuli Selecti, pp.160-1.} Mauger was similarly accused of coming to another manor of John’s at Woodhall, plundering it and afterwards burning it, while, at Richard de Bolton’s manor of Wheatley it was alleged that he had plundered all his goods before taking them to his manor of Denton.\footnote{Rotuli Selecti, p.161.} The final accusation was that he had taken part in the assault on Richmond castle.\footnote{Rotuli Selecti, p.161.}

Mauger’s attacks on John are revealing of a far deeper conflict between the two men, one that presumably pre-dated the war. His differing treatment of the lands of Richard de Bolton and John is particularly noticeable. John’s were pillaged and burned, Richard’s were only plundered. Mauger
clearly went out of his way in an effort to hurt his cousin by burning his manors. The case only appears in the surviving eyre rolls because Mauger also held land at Weekley in Northamptonshire which had been granted to John Balliol and for which Mauger owed a fine under the Dictum. The issue was a sore point for Mauger who contested that the case should be held in Yorkshire where the crimes were alleged to have occurred.¹⁴³

Figure 6:2 Location of Lands and Raiding of Mauger le Vavassour

Mauger’s case is exceptional in our records for two reasons. First, his crimes in the hundred of Skipton are known due to the Skipton jury’s relatively unusual decision to go into more detail on some of the offences committed there during the war. This is suggestive of strong local demand for justice in the immediate aftermath of Evesham. Secondly, by chance, Mauger’s alleged offences in one county were recorded in another county with a surviving eyre. These two factors perhaps suggest that activities like Mauger’s may have been less unusual than their infrequent appearance in the records might suggest. Personal conflicts were doubtless relatively common during the war, as the Furness Chronicle’s lament would suggest. Mauger, it should be noted, was not one of the hard core of the Disinherited but received a pardon at the instance of the king’s son Edmund on 13 May 1266 when the king was at Northampton readying for the siege of Kenilworth.¹⁴⁴ This suggests that in Mauger’s case he was less ideologically motivated and had made efforts to

¹⁴⁴ *CPR 1258-66*, pp.595-96.
ingratiate himself back into royal favour. Perhaps his personal conflict with his cousin was in fact the determining factor of his involvement with the rebels in the first place.

**Case Study: Richard de la Vache and the Windsor Garrison**

The actions of Richard de la Vache and the Montfortian garrison of Windsor castle provide an interesting case study of local violence illustrative of many of the above points and also the inherent problems of the available judicial material. A local Buckinghamshire landholder, holding 4 marks worth of land at Chalfont St. Giles and land at Shenley near Whaddon, Richard seems to have been drawn into the rebel camp in part due to his position as a local seneschal to Sir John fitz John.¹⁴⁵ The latter was lord of Whaddon (putting Richard in his orbit), Aylesbury and Wendover in Buckinghamshire, meaning that he was a powerful local landholder, and as such a logical choice for controlling Windsor due to its relative proximity to his own lands.¹⁴⁶ Richard’s career as a rebel is an interesting, if relatively short one. He was part of John fitz John’s garrison holding Windsor and seems to have remained part of the garrison while fitz John was absent campaigning with Montfort in the March from May 1265 onwards. This seems to have worked in his favour as the garrison’s decision to surrender promptly to the royalist advance party was apparently done on the generous terms that, provided they stood trial, the garrison would receive safe conduct, be remitted the king’s indignation and have their lands returned to them. Richard received his safe conduct and remittance respectively on 6 and 9 October.¹⁴⁷ By 20 March 1266, Richard’s position had improved such that he was appointed to enquire by jury in Surrey concerning an issue of disputed seisin relating to John de Warenne.¹⁴⁸ By the time of the eyre in Northamptonshire in the late 1260s, Richard was listed as a bailiff of the earl Warenne, presumably a powerful disincentive for anyone wishing to prosecute him.¹⁴⁹ If anything Richard de la Vache was also a perfect example of the flaws in the royalist policy of disinheritance post-Evesham.

According to the presentments in the Buckinghamshire eyre Richard was apparently in charge of conducting raids in the region around Windsor. These seem to have been partly for acquiring supplies for the garrison and partly for ransacking royalist estates. Principal amongst these events

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¹⁴⁵ *CIM*, i, no.628; *CPR 1258-66*, p.461; Just 1/59, mm. 1, 10d, 14; Carpenter, ‘English Peasants,’ p.7.
¹⁴⁸ *CPR 1258-66*, p.660.
¹⁴⁹ *Rotuli Selecti*, p.156.
in the presentments was the major raid carried out on the queen’s manors of Wingrave and Ivinghoe. To muster the manpower for this, Richard and others seem to have forced a number of locals to attend. Herbert Bolbec and Geoffrey Neyrunt asserted that Richard actually attacked their house to force them to attend the raid. The principal targets of this raid were the animals and other goods kept there, rather than the destruction of the manor itself: horses, oxen and sheep as well as other goods valued at £100 were alleged to have been stolen. Richard also conducted a raid on John de Grey’s manor at Eton, close to Windsor and ordered some of his followers to raid other locals; for example, Henry de la Hulle and William Hallinge of Stoke were ordered to distrain one Wigam de la Mare of oxen, sheep and one calf. The two were forced to redeem their lands at two years income under the Dictum. The most striking point from the eyre, however, is that Richard himself is never charged, only his accomplices. Richard’s record was not in dispute apparently, but, unlike those who had served alongside him willingly or not, he was seemingly untouchable.

Richard’s raid on the queen’s manors of Wingrave and Ivinghoe, as well as the royal manor of Piddington in Oxfordshire, had several practical benefits. As Jacob comments, ‘it was not de Montfort’s policy to strip or confiscate legitimate sources of royal wealth.’ Though it might not have been Montfort’s policy, his supporters apparently had no such qualms. In fact Richard de la Vache’s actions were perfectly logical. Royal manors were liable to be comparatively rich and well stocked, and with the royalists on the back foot, unguarded. They were therefore a ready target for a garrison in need of supplies. In Ivinghoe and Wingrave’s cases the fact that they were possessions of the queen, who was still abroad, would have been a powerful added incentive. The same is true of the lands of other major royalists and vice versa. If the lord, particularly a rich one, was known to be engaged elsewhere then the manors in question would have been tempting targets due to their lack of defence. The Isleworth raid by the Londoners is another prime example. Richard of Cornwall, just as with the other royalists in early 1264, was not in a position to respond to the attack. The same is true for John de Grey’s lands in Buckinghamshire.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Buckinghamshire Rebels</th>
<th>Claimed Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geoffrey Neyremyt</td>
<td>forced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert de Bolbec</td>
<td>forced</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

150 JUST 1/59, mm. 13d-14.
151 JUST 1/59, m. 14d.
152 Jacob, Studies, p.225.
153 See above.
Table 6.1: Rebels' Connections to Richard de la Vache

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eustace de Greynville</td>
<td>forced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William du Lay</td>
<td>forced others to plunder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Angevin</td>
<td>making distraint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry le Seler</td>
<td>making distraint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert parson of Hyvinglo</td>
<td>forced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert F/Sinel</td>
<td>with Richard ordering others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry de la Hulle</td>
<td>plundering through order of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Hallinge de Stoke</td>
<td>plundering through order of</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ralph de Vernay</td>
<td>forced</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert fitz Nigel</td>
<td>with Richard</td>
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<td>Ralph Crok</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ralph Gorg? Of Aylesbury</td>
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<td>Richard Carr of Ivinghoe</td>
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<td>Michael Bator</td>
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<td>Ralph de Ponte</td>
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Richard’s position as the seneschal of John fitz John was presumably why he took such a prominent role in the garrison’s operations in Buckinghamshire. That he was indeed employed as fitz John’s local enforcer is suggested by the claims of some of the accused in the eyre that they were acting under coercion. Ralph Crok, for example, declared he was seised ‘for the works of his lord, Sir John fitz John’. William Angevin and Henry le Seler, noted in the margins of the document as *homines* of Sir John fitz John, were accused of plundering Walton with others. They claimed they were making a distraint and that they had the authority of the seneschal, Richard de la Vache, to do so. Richard’s official role seems to have been geographically confined to Buckinghamshire and Windsor itself. While his name is a relatively common occurrence in the Buckinghamshire eyre roll, in Berkshire he only appears in reference to Windsor. This is suggestive that John fitz John employed several men in his garrison as bailiffs, perhaps each focussed on one particular county. In Berkshire’s case the identity of this official is harder to pin down, but John of St. Helens appears a number of times in the roll engaged in activities similar to Richard’s, though his position is never defined.

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154 JUST 1/59, mm. 1-15.
155 JUST 1/59, mm. 12, 10d.
156 JUST 1/42, mm. 8d,15, 16.
The Windsor garrison also used their dominant local position for distinctly non-war related objectives, but acting under a veneer of legal process. One John Pollard, for example, was revealed in an inquest to have made over to John of St. Helens (St. Helens is near Abingdon), allegedly of his own free will, a charter of conveyance giving over all his goods. Under questioning it was revealed that one member of the garrison had confronted Pollard and forced him to sign a charter that granted away Pollard’s goods. Having unwillingly complied, Pollard was seized and imprisoned in Windsor.\textsuperscript{157} The activities of Richard de la Vache in the Windsor garrison are a prime example of the important local role that the officials of major rebels played in the supply of the castle and the organisation of the war in the locality.

**Conclusion**

The way war was waged at a local level during the Barons’ War demonstrates how the wider organisation of the war, through the actions of castle garrisons and the officials of each side, was closely intertwined with local conflicts and disorder. England in the thirteenth century was a violent society, and the hostile actions we see performed in war were usually an extension of those of peace time. The difference, however, lies in the scale of war time acts and the blurring of local acts of violence with those of the wider war. The security of local society was rocked by the warfare between the royalists and Montfortians, which resulted in the plunder and ravaging of lands. This instability had the simultaneous affects of disrupting law and order and providing increased opportunity for the violent resolution of personal disputes. Castles in particular had a significant and often negative impact on the peace of their surroundings. Seizure of foodstuffs, livestock and horses might, sometimes, be just a part of a garrison’s efforts to keep themselves provisioned, but this could descend into plain criminal profiteering during the war’s course. While burning was a normal part of war it still, as in peace time, marked a serious escalation in violence. Local defensive responses to some of these events were frequently direct and violent, but this behaviour can also be seen in peace time. Warfare and violence in the localities was fed by the broader civil war and as the examples of Richard de la Vache and Mauger le Vavassur demonstrate, was an integral part of its nature and impact. While the extent of local violence no doubt varied from region to region, it is worth noting that for the vast majority of society in

\textsuperscript{157} JUST 1/42, m. 15; Jacob, *Studies*, p.235.
England this would have been the face of the war that they saw, as opposed to the great campaigns of Lewes and Evesham.
Conclusion

This study has sought to provide for the first time a broad view of the nature of war in Barons’ War of 1264-67 and to demonstrate the closely interlinked aspects of the conflict, from the state and use of castles, down to very local conflicts. The intention of this conclusion is not only to summarise the points discussed in the previous chapters, but also to use these points to examine why the war developed in the manner it did in comparison to previous conflicts. This aims to not only help inform understanding of the development of Barons’ War as a military conflict, but also provide insights into its predecessors.

Of all the aspects of the conflict discussed, the role of castles remains the most important and pervasive through all levels of warfare, from the strategic control of England down to the shaping of local conflicts. In contrast to Pounds’ assertion that they played little role in the war, castles were its crucial implements. Both parties displayed a sustained interest in controlling castles and the emphasis placed on them by contemporaries leaves us in no doubt as to their perceived importance. Nevertheless, the Barons’ War continued the trend already evident in the 1215-17 civil war which saw the low importance of seigneurial castles, and this would be a feature, as Prestwich has demonstrated, of the rebellions of Edward II’s reign. The dominance of the major stone castle had decisively shifted strategic power into the hands of the crown and the greatest magnates. But it was not enough now just to possess stone fortresses, for these, such as Alnwick, Wigmore and Tonbridge, seem to have fallen to both sides without long sieges. Only the greatest and most powerful fortifications, well manned and provisioned, ever seemed to provide sustained resistance. Those castles that featured heavily in the struggle were all present or former royal fortresses and all were of key importance both as defensive and offensive military bases and arsenals. These are the lessons the Lord Edward would take from the civil war and apply to his conquest of Wales. The civil war provided evidence to him of the benefits of newer types of castle design such as the concentric fortress, which became a feature of a number of his Welsh castles.

While castles often seemed to fall very easily, there was also a notable reticence by both sides from engaging in sustained sieges due to the cost in time, money and men necessary to complete them. The symbolism of the defence of or capture of castles and a commander’s success or failure in this regard played a part in this. The successful siege of Kenilworth became a matter of prestige
for Henry III, as well as a strategic imperative. The Montfortian siege of Pevensey never gained the same prominence for Montfort, probably because he never staked his military reputation personally on the action. Even so he expended a great deal of money in the siege, something of which he had little to spare. In the instances when one side committed itself to a siege, such as at Gloucester three times, Pevensey, Kenilworth and the Tower of London, negotiated surrender or failure were the only two outcomes; no major castle ever fell by assault.

The role of the towns in the Barons’ War was closely linked to that of castles, being vital both strategically and economically. Of these, the ports retained especial significance as they helped control potential foreign support for each side. Walled towns in particular, due to their size served repeatedly as mustering points for major armies, Northampton, Oxford, Hereford, London, Nottingham and Gloucester, for example, all served in this capacity. English towns during the war, however, never reached the same military effectiveness or importance as their continental neighbours. Defences were unsophisticated, frequently too large to defend easily and compromised in some cases by a patchwork of competing jurisdictions and rivalries within the towns themselves. Furthermore, after decades of domestic peace, walls and ditches were not always in the best repair, were frequently viewed as a burden by the townspeople, and were often as much about status as they were for defence. They remained useful during the war, however, particularly in repelling opportunistic raids. Towns were sacked on every recorded occasion that they fell to assault. The populace of towns were frequently subjected to far harsher treatment than castle garrisons due to the financial incentives offered by plunder, the sack’s value as an exemplary punishment and the customs of war. The presence of castles also tended to drag towns into the conflict, and in the cases of Gloucester and Rochester, turned the town itself into a battlefield as one side held the castle and the other the town with the townspeople caught in between.

The Barons’ War, however, was by no means confined to the struggle for control of castles and towns. The use of guerrilla warfare, raiding and plundering by armed bands operating from the wilderness areas of England became an increasingly important part of the warfare, particularly during the rebellion of the Disinherited. Natural fortresses replaced man made ones, conforming to a long established method of waging war by a weaker side against a stronger. This was not confined to the rebel side, but was also practised by the royalists, particularly the Marchers prior to
the battle of Evesham. Castle commanders, sometimes because they knew the weakness of their fortresses or preferring to be able to raid at will against besiegers, seem to have frequently remained outside their own walls. A mobile form of warfare was deemed preferable. Such an approach, however, was an essentially defensive technique and on its own could not lead to victory. Castles remained the key arbiter of power with its ability to control territory. The losses of Dover in 1265 and Kenilworth in 1266 combined with the royalists’ firm grip on the castles denied the Disinherited any chance, however small, of a more meaningful military success. Kenilworth’s fall was in essence the beginning of the end for those who wished more than just the return of their lands.

The deliberate killing of Montfort and his most prominent supporters at Evesham marked a turning point in the treatment of rebellious nobles.\(^1\) It is less clear, however, if it escalated the brutality of the conflict in general. Certainly there were examples of brutal conduct, such as Henry de Hastings’ mutilation of the king’s messenger at Kenilworth and the summary hanging of captured Disinherited knights. Yet, for the broader war the evidence is less clear. No castle garrisons are reported as having been executed. Mass killing never appears as a by-product of the sack of towns (with perhaps the exception of Jewish communities), but there was a consensus amongst narrative accounts that the sack was an expected event. Killing in general appears to have been principally confined to the arena of the battlefield and its immediate aftermath. The mass mutilation of the Montfortians not of knightly status caught at Rochester and the execution of the Weald archers in 1264 mark probably the largest acts of mass brutality outside the slaughter at Evesham, and both predated it. All three incidents were committed by royal forces and they retain a veneer of judicial authority that the rebels did not possess. Killing and mutilation definitely occurred during the war, but it was limited and we never see the sheer level of barbarity that characterised religious conflicts such as the Albigensian crusade.\(^2\) The setting of a civil war may help to explain this restraint as men hesitated at killing neighbours and kinsmen of the same faith and culture. Illustrative of these

constraints is the incident recounted by Walter of Guisborough that at the fall of Northampton
Henry III was so furious with the resistance shown by some Oxford students in the town that he
wanted to have them executed. He was dissuaded when it was declared; ‘Heaven forbid you should
do this, O King; for the sons of your magnates and other men of your realm have come here with
the university. If you have them hanged or beheaded, even your own people, who are now loyal to
you, will rise against you, and will not allow the blood of their sons or relatives to be shed if they
can help it’.³

Thirteenth-century England was already a violent society, but the civil war disrupted normal
methods of law keeping and provided the cover of war for the conduct of personal conflicts, such
as that of Mauger le Vavassur. Castle garrisons and local officials played important roles in
stimulating and organising this violence, as the example of Richard de la Vache and the Windsor
garrison show, and in which the peasantry were widely involved. Concurrently, the disruption of
the war, both in terms of the violence but also relating to the disruption of the usual methods of
maintaining law and order and seeking legal redress, created a demand for justice, reflected in the
Inquisitiones de Rebellibus in the months following the battle of Evesham. The maintenance of law
and order was a fundamental function of government and as such its restoration was a critical
necessity for both Montfort and Henry III. The continuing raiding by both sides undermined these
attempts over the years of the war.

The returns of the Inquisitiones de Rebellibus demonstrate that all regions experienced the
effects of the fighting, including a probable upsurge in local conflict and violence. It is harder to
say which parts of England were affected most by the war. The narrative and legal records do not
provide the breadth of geographical coverage, nor the chronological details required to make a
proper assessment of the conflict in some regions, most particularly the northern border counties
and Devon and Cornwall. Several regions, however, probably suffered the most. The Welsh March
experienced three separate major campaigns. The North Midlands, including Kenilworth, South
Yorkshire and Lincolnshire suffered the royalist harrying campaigns following the capture of
Nottingham in April 1264, the Montfortian and Ferrers’ assaults and seizures of royalist castles
during the summer of 1264 and the Disinherited’s campaign in 1266-67, including the ravaging

³ Lawrence, ‘The University of Oxford’, p.100; Guisborough, p.190.
committed by the garrison of Kenilworth. Furthermore, the battle of Evesham resulted in the death of many of the leading landholders in certain counties such as Warwickshire, further undermining the state of order in the region.\(^4\) Finally, East Anglia during the Disinherited’s rebellion suffered the effects of constant raiding and skirmishing. Taken as a whole, the effect of the war on England must have been profound. Many towns had been sacked, local law enforcement was badly disrupted and many manors had experienced plunder and even burning. Throughout the conflict castle garrisons had been a looming presence over many communities, liable to inflict substantial damage whether in military action or simply in their efforts to provision themselves.

It is uncertain if the civil war had a longer term impact on the state of law and order in England. The death of Henry III in 1272 and Edward’s absence on crusade until 1274 were partially responsible for allowing the rivalries of the earls to go unchecked by royal mediation. Robert de Ferrers’ capture of Chartley castle in 1273 and the Lord Edmund’s siege of it certainly had its roots in the war.\(^5\) Burt argues that for Warwickshire at least, ‘it would be a mistake’ to associate all the conflict in these years with the civil war.\(^6\) A proper assessment of the extent to which the legacy of the Barons’ War had a comparatively negative impact on law and order in the late thirteenth century is a topic that requires further research, most particularly of its state in the decades prior to the war.

Despite the period of sustained relative peace enjoyed by England since the Marshal rebellion in the 1230s, more military experience was open to the participants in the civil war before 1264 than is perhaps readily apparent. The nature of retinue and general recruitment for campaigns in Wales and Gascony does much to obscure the full scope of the numbers involved and the experience open to them. The near constant fighting running through the Welsh marches from 1257 onwards was a crucial proving ground for the Marcher lords in particular, but also for figures such as the Lord Edward. Warfare there, and in Gascony, retained essential features that would inform the behaviour of the participants including hit and run raids and the vulnerability of lesser castles and garrisons to

sudden assaults. Few men who took up arms from 1263, however, can have had experience of a major battle, for these were extremely rare in medieval warfare.

Previous studies of the composition of armies and garrisons in the medieval period have often failed to appreciate the differences between those raised in times of civil war and those raised for foreign expeditions. The number of men receiving wages was only ever one part of the English forces at this period as were those of knightly status. The role of knights in particular can be overemphasised due to the comparative abundance of documentary evidence relating to them. While knights and sergeants, both of the familia regis and seigneurial retinues formed the backbone of much of the fighting, both sides also made heavy use of levies and county posses. While levies lacked the equipment and training of the knights and sergeants, they provided vital numbers and support both in campaigns and in garrisons. Their importance, particularly in the supply of archers and crossbowmen for armies, was high. At its heart the forces of both sides were a mixture of men from different backgrounds, formed by bonds of tenure, pay and loyalty who fought throughout the conflict and in much the same manner as they had since the twelfth century. What we may see, however, is the war’s influence on the future organisation of accounting for the expenditure of royal generals. The records of Roger Leybourne’s campaign expenses mark the beginning of the extant detailed accounts of military campaign expenses that survive in relatively greater numbers for the reign of Edward I. This survival could, of course, be down to fluke, but the civil war was a crucial training ground for Edward I’s later wars and these records may indicate that the conflict helped to inform the underlying administrative framework of these later campaigns.

The Barons’ War was the proving ground of many of the knights and common troops of Edward’s generation, providing them with valuable military experience that they were able to transfer to the wars later in his reign. Important royal generals during the Welsh wars included for example, William de Valence, John de Warenne, Roger Mortimer, and Roger Clifford. Former rebels, such as John Giffard and John de Eyville, served in Edward’s wars, de Eyville, for example, eventually became a banneret in Edward I’s familia in the 1280s while Giffard was entrusted as the constable of Pondensac in Gascony in 1294-5. Amongst the magnates, Spencer notes that the

‘dominant comital figures in the first twenty-five years of Edward’s reign’ had all participated in the Barons’ War. This conflict seems to have helped forge bonds between these men and interestingly Edward’s two main opponents in 1297, the earls of Hereford and Norfolk, both came of age during Edward’s crusade and had not fought in the civil war. The experience of the Barons’ War did not, however, remain confined to the nobility and it is quite possible that peasant levies who had fought in the civil war also served in some of Edward’s early campaigns. The nature of war and its impact on society in the Barons’ War deeply affected all levels of society.

The Shape of the War

The final section of this conclusion seeks to examine why the course of the war developed in the way that it did in comparison to earlier conflicts. The intention here is to not only gain a clearer idea of the factors shaping the Barons’ War but also to indirectly cast light on it predecessors. This will involve discussion of the impact of the battles of Lewes and Evesham, and their contextual importance in relation to the issues discussed in the previous chapters.

There is a curious disparity in the comparative durations of the 1173-74, 1215-17 and the 1264-67 civil wars and that of the 1138-53 civil war of Stephen’s reign. Castles played an important role in all these conflicts, but in Stephen’s reign castles were not only very prominent in the fighting but also proliferated during its course and contributed to the development of a stalemate which lasted a number of years. The increased expenditure on royal castles from Henry II’s reign onwards, the growing cost of new fortifications and the deliberate policy of assuming control of former seigneurial fortresses, were all differences between 1138-53 and the later civil wars. These factors alone, however, do not fully explain them. The decisive pitched battles of Lewes and Evesham provide one explanation in the case of 1264-67, as will be discussed shortly. There were, however, several other factors at play: mutual support, developments in siege technology and sources of authority, which, combined with the pitched battles of Lewes and Evesham, help explain the divergent course of these wars.

8 Spencer, The Earls and Edward I, p.195.
9 Chapter 2, pp.64-67.
The strategic situation in 1264-67 differed to that of 1138-53 in part due to the opposing sides’ comparative lack of territorial cohesion, as well as in the lower number of extant castles. In 1138-53, the Empress’s supporters were able to control a block of territory in the Welsh march and west of England thanks to the loyalty of three of the region’s most powerful landholders, Earl Robert of Gloucester, Brian fitz Count and Miles of Gloucester. Together these three men and their allies controlled key castles and towns as far east as Wallingford. While this territory’s boundaries varied over the course of the war, these men and their followers could offer to one another something that the factions in the Barons’ War frequently lacked, mutual support. The presence of multiple garrisons within close proximity to each other permitted the swift raising of field armies in the event of one of their castles coming under attack. New castles were sometimes erected in order to assist in the suppression of enemy garrisons or to solidify control over a region. In 1144, for example, in Stephen’s absence, Earl Robert of Gloucester erected three castles in close proximity to the royal garrison at Malmesbury. When Stephen arrived and launched a fierce assault on the castle at Tetbury, Robert ‘immediately collected a vast force of knights, as he had a great many castles near by, some belonging to himself and others most loyally obedient to him’. Outnumbered, Stephen was required to abandon his siege of Tetbury. This is a noticeable difference to 1264-67, when neither side enjoyed a comparable level of territorial cohesion and density of castle control. Rogers proposes that even heavily fortified regions required three elements to successfully resist conquest: one, adequate garrisons, two, sufficiently motivated garrisons and three, that the defending party could also raise a substantial field force in addition to the garrisons. The field force was necessary to relieve sieges, by curtailing the besieger’s ability to forage for supplies and potentially bring the besiegers to battle. For at least part of the 1138-53 civil war the Empress’ faction seems to have met all three criteria. This was not the case for the participants in 1264-67. The only occasion when one side came close to achieving this state was in the summer of 1264, when the royalists controlled a range of royal and seigneurial castles stretching from Bristol in the south up to Chester. The integrity of this block was undermined though by the threat of Llewelyn

11 This force was supplemented by troops from Wales and Bristol, *Gesta Stephani*, pp.113-15.
from the West, which forced the division of royalist forces, as well as the lack of clear military leadership for the royalist party comparable to that offered by Earl Robert of Gloucester in 1138-53. The royalists could put together field armies in the region in 1264-65, as the attacks on Robert de Ferrers in March 1264 and Hereford in November 1264 indicate. In 1264, the royalists displayed an unwillingness or inability, however, to successfully threaten Montfort’s operations in the two campaigns against them. Combined with Montfort’s swift capture of seigneurial castles, this contributed to the collapse of the royalists’ position. In 1138-53 by contrast, the factors discussed above rendered the reduction of territory a far slower process as forces were either split to tackle a larger area, or if concentrated against one area, risked permitting the enemy progress in another.

If the erection of new supporting castles was efficacious in 1138-53, why then is there no evidence of a comparable strategy in 1264-67? The duration of the conflict could be one factor as, with perhaps the exception of the royalist position in the west during the summer of 1264, neither side had a real opportunity for a systematic entrenchment. In the Montfortian case for much of 1264 and 1265, such activities may have been actively discouraged as part of their efforts at restoring a form of political normalcy. After the battle of Evesham and the subsequent collapse of Montfortian resistance, the royalists had little requirement for the construction of such fortifications and the Montfortians little capacity. The construction of easily erected earth and timber castles, furthermore, may have been judged as an essentially futile effort in the face of advances in siege technology. While the basic timber and earthwork fortifications in the style of 1138-53 remained formidable to a poorly equipped force, in the face of new technology their efficacy declined, thus undermining the rationale for their spread in 1264-67.14 Combined with the reduction in the number of castles in England, the ability to dominate regions with multiple mutually supporting castles had been significantly degraded by the Barons’ War.

Perceptions of political legitimacy and authority are perhaps the last piece of this jigsaw. The willingness of a garrison to continue to resist in the face of adversity might be dependent on their perception of the political legitimacy and authority behind them. In 1138-53, following the arrival of the Empress and then later under her son Duke Henry, their followers were fighting for a rival claimant to the throne and as such they denied the validity of Stephen’s right to rule. Again in

14 See Chapter 3, pp.87-90.
1173-74, the garrisons of the rebel castles could point to their loyalty to another anointed king of England, Henry the Young King, in opposition to Henry II. In 1264-67, by contrast there was no legitimate rival to the king’s authority. The Provisions of Oxford might curtail Henry III’s right to independent rule, but it was a system still built around Henry’s kingship.

This difference was less of a problem while fortune favoured the rebel side, but it became one when they were losing. The collapse of the Montfortian position in the wake of the battle of Evesham was far more dramatic than that of the royalists after the battle of Lewes. The comparably more decisive result of Evesham does provide one explanation for this, but it took a far greater degree of ideological commitment to continue to resist the king in adversity when the king’s victory in the event of a rebel’s continued resistance threatened death, imprisonment or total forfeiture. Prompt surrender to the royalist side, however, could potentially lead to the rebel’s political reintegration. With the right incentives, such as those offered to the garrisons of Gloucester and Windsor in 1265, the royalists potentially could persuade rebel garrisons to surrender in return for the eventual restoration of their lands. This issue does much to emphasise the gravity of the mistake by Henry III in disinheriting the rebels in September 1265, as it removed a key advantage from the royalists and assisted in lengthening the fighting for another two years. The royalists, by way of contrast, enjoyed a psychological advantage in the face of reversal. After the battle of Lewes they knew they were fighting for the anointed king and as such were less likely to feel that the Montfortians could offer them anything. This offers a partial explanation for the more sustained resistance by royalist castle garrisons after the battle of Lewes in comparison to the Montfortians in the aftermath of the battle of Evesham.

Perhaps the most significant factor in the different shapes of 1264-67 and 1138-53 was pitched battle. Here we again turn to Morillo’s contention that the conduct of civil wars differed from external wars in that changing control of the realm was the objective, not territorial conquest. Morillo furthermore argues that in comparison to earlier conflicts ‘castles only played a minor role’ in 1264-67, citing the example of the Lord Edward’s battle seeking at Evesham which he takes as a demonstration of ‘just how far the parameters of strategy had been transformed by the evolution of

15 Chapter 6, p.227.
central authority in England’. On the surface this is quite a compelling argument, but it is guilty to a degree of placing the cart before the horse. Castles and fortified towns might have played a minor role in the context of the number of sieges being conducted, but they were also a major determiner in both the decision to seek battle and in shaping the campaigns that resulted in them. It was the threat of the submission of the Cinque Ports as well as the royalist capture of towns and castles both in the Midlands and the south-east that spurred Montfort to seek battle at Lewes on 14 May 1264. He sought battle when battle had essentially become the only means of obtaining victory. Montfort’s decision to split his forces between Northampton and London at the war’s outset would seem to indicate that he had intended to fight a war in the classic ‘Vegetian’ fashion. The forces in Northampton and London could threaten royalist activities in both regions, and, in the event of a major royalist attack on one of them, the other field army could come to its relief. The failure of this strategy in April 1264 was down to the royalists’ decisive efforts to undo it by taking Northampton swiftly, much as William Marshal had done at Lincoln in 1217. It is possible that Montfort had hoped for an opportunity to bring the royalists to battle in 1264, but as his caution during the Evesham campaign indicates, it was probably only if it was on terms favourable for victory. Montfort demonstrated an unwillingness to give battle under unfavourable circumstances at both Monmouth and on his advance to Evesham. The royalists, by contrast, sought battle specifically because the situation was in their favour. Montfort’s calculated gamble to fight at Lewes paid off, albeit not completely. Ironically perhaps, the entrenchment of Henry III in the Priory and the Lord Edward in Lewes castle provided their position with enough strategic strength that it necessitated the Mise of Lewes and the resulting freedom for the Marchers. Control of the castles and towns had caused the battle; now they arguably sowed the seeds for Montfort’s defeat.

While the royalists seem to have enjoyed a decisive numerical advantage over Montfort’s army during the Evesham campaign, the decision to seek battle, just as with that at Lewes, was also arguably predicated by castles. The intention was to smash both the core of the Montfortians’ leadership and its field army. Assuming for a moment that Montfort had avoided being cornered at Evesham and had regrouped in more friendly territory at say Kenilworth, Bristol or even London,

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18 Chapter 4, p.170.
20 Chapter 1, p.34.
how would that have effected the development of the civil war? With the Montfortians in control of most of the major castles in the Midlands and South-East, the potential for a protracted war was great. A pitched battle at a later date would have been by no means improbable, but depending upon Montfort’s ability to maintain support, the resulting conflict risked descending into a series of sieges. A siege of Kenilworth in such circumstances would have been a far more dangerous affair if Montfort was active with a field army. The seeds of a more protracted conflict dominated by castles, like that in Stephen’s reign, would have been laid. It is probable that, barring another Lewes-like reversal, Edward’s forces could have prevailed in the longterm, as the divisive nature of Montfort’s rule continued to take its toll on his supporters. Such an issue would have been by no means certain though. The royalist battle seeking strategy at Evesham specifically sought to prevent any such possibility. Not only did it result in the death of Montfort but also many of his key supporters, lords like Peter de Montfort and Hugh Despencer, who were critical for the raising and maintenance of the Montfortian army. In that sense castles played a major, albeit quite different role to that in 1138-53, and decisively shaped the actions of the participants and thus the course of the war.

This thesis has sought to demonstrate the nature of the Barons’ War at both the macro and the micro level. The struggle for the control of castles and towns was felt across the social spectrum and helped shape the course of the war both at the strategic level, as discussed above, and the local. For many participants the raiding committed by both sides and the unleashing of personal conflicts over the three years of its duration were the visible faces of the war. The Barons’ War also demonstrates continuity and development in warfare in thirteenth century England. Crucially the war was a formative experience for many of the participants in Edward I’s wars and as such left both a political and a military legacy in the late thirteenth century. This was the nature of war and its impact on society in the Barons’ War, 1264-67.

21 Chapter 1, pp.51-56; Chapter 6, pp.204-8.
Appendix 1: ‘Of noman so sore adrad’?

This appendix examines Robert de Ferrers’ involvement in the complex chain of events surrounding the second siege of Gloucester in 1264, discussed in Chapter 3. In particular it seeks to interpret Robert of Gloucester’s comment that Edward was ‘of no man so sorely afraid’ than Robert de Ferrers, a strange remark that has yet to receive a convincing explanation. This appendix will suggest that this remark should perhaps be interpreted in the context of the campaign, an important event in the war that has remained understudied despite good surviving sources. This does not seek to be a full account of Ferrers’ involvement in the Barons’ War which falls outside the purview of the thesis, but rather to provide a further context to an event that has received little critical study.¹

Figure 0:1 approximate location of Ferrers’ lands and castles before the war

Background

¹ Robert of Glou. ci, ii, p.745; The author was unable to consult P. Golob’s thesis on the Ferrers earls of Derby.
Robert de Ferrers’ background played a vital role in shaping his conduct during the war, particularly at Worcester and Gloucester in 1264. The Ferrers’ family fortunes had waned considerably since the death of Robert’s father, Earl William, in 1254, whose income by the early 1250s was approximately £1,500 p.a. The Ferrers estates were concentrated in the West Midlands, but he had manors scattered across Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire, Staffordshire, Oxfordshire and Lancashire. A third of these lands were part of Robert’s mother Margaret’s extensive dower grants, including the major manor of Chartley, to which she was entitled after William’s death. Coupled to this diminution in wealth, Robert was obliged to provide manors for his younger brother William and also two manors to his wife Mary, a niece of Henry III, to hold in her own right. These factors all resulted in a difficult financial picture for the new earl of Derby when he came of age in 1260. His wardship had been held by the Lord Edward from 1254-57 who then sold the wardship of most of the estates to his mother the queen and Peter of Savoy, in return for 6000 marks. Some estates remained in Edward’s keeping though, even after Robert came of age, further compounding Robert’s problems. The two men were around the same age and Edward’s possession of Robert’s wardship and retention of some of his manors may well have influenced the development of Robert’s very apparent enmity towards the heir to the throne at the opening of the war and consequently helped to shape the course of events at the siege of Gloucester. Coupled with this dramatic reduction in his income (down to only around £100 p.a.) were the debts of nearly £800 his father had left the family, which caused him to resort to borrowing from the Jews. In addition to the parlous state of the Ferrers’ finances in the 1260s, Robert also had claims to the honour of Peverel, forfeited to the crown in 1155. In 1199, Earl William had gained partial restoration of the honour in return for the resignation of his claims to the remainder, which however included the castles of the Peak and Bolsover. The acquisition of the Peak in particular would have raised ‘the Ferrers into a different league of power’. It dominated a major region of lead mining and large tracts of forest while the castle itself controlled seventeen

4 Maddicott, ‘Robert de Ferrers’. ODNB
fees ‘some of them held by important knightly families’. The castle was transferred into the hands of Edward as part of his appanage in 1254 thereby further increasing the tensions between the two men. The desire for control of this region remained a potent influence on Robert de Ferrers and did much to dictate the course of events during the war as it did his relations with the Lord Edward.

Ferrers’ financial position apparently did not hinder his ability to raise large forces of men, presumably from amongst his tenants, although it does suggest that he would have had trouble fielding large numbers of stipendiaries. When Ferrers joined the second Montfortian campaign against the Marchers in late October to early November 1264 he reportedly led into Cheshire a 20,000 strong force of horsemen and infantry. While the figure of 20,000 is almost certainly an exaggeration, the approach of his army caused the retreat of a Marcher army mustered to meet him and led by William de la Zouche, justiciar of Chester, David brother of Llywelyn and James Audely. Ferrers demonstrated he could raise strong forces through loyalty or threats in the same manner as other lords during the war, and it is likely that such men made up much of the army he led into Cheshire in late 1264. Ferrers’ officials raised men from many counties, for example an Andrew Badekyng in the Berkshire Dictum eyre claimed he had been forced into plundering by the bailiffs of Robert de Ferrers and was accused of being ‘against the king in battles, castle sieges and in towns’. Likewise a Gilbert Fraunceys in Buckinghamshire was involved with Ferrers during the war. There is evidence that he may have recruited prisoners from Worcester gaol as well.

Ferrers therefore could command significant resources and was a major threat to the royalist faction in early 1264.

‘Of noman so sore adrad’

The sequence of events surrounding the second siege of Gloucester in March 1264 has attracted little critical analysis. Here it is necessary to contextualise the wider campaign that culminated in

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6 HKW, ii, p.777.

7 Ferrers’ pursuit reportedly slew up to a hundred men with many others captured, while only one of his own followers was wounded, Ann. Dun., p.235.

8 JUST 1/42, m. 2.

9 JUST 1/59, m. 17.

the siege and the Montfortian withdrawal in order to help explain Robert de Ferrers part in it and also Robert of Gloucester’s comment about Edward.

When the civil war began in earnest in early 1264, Ferrers was the initiator of one of the first major acts of the conflict. His attack on Worcester is remarkable both for its brazenness, and the comparative lack of comment the assault and capture of an important town has elicited in the historiography. Ferrers was initially repulsed by the citizens until he broke into the town through the old castle. He then sacked the city, ‘destroyed’ the Jews and broke open the city gaol freeing (and possibly recruiting) some of the prisoners within. Ferrers’ attack may have been partly designed to seize the crossing point at Worcester for the rebels following the barring of the crossings of the River Severn on 4 February. The more pressing motive for the attack, however, seems to have been Ferrers’ Jewish debts, as he also removed the chest of chirographs, records of debts owed to the Jews, (including presumably those of his own) and took it to his castle at Tutbury.

We do not know for certain where Robert de Ferrers was following the sack of Worcester. Maddicott assumed he was still at Worcester when news was sent to him of Edward’s siege of Gloucester. There are, however significant reasons to doubt this. The Chronicle of Worcester dates the fall of Worcester to the 29 February. Problematically it also describes the attacking army as being led by Robert de Ferrers, Peter de Montfort and Henry de Montfort. Peter’s presence was possible, but Henry was either in the March or besieging Gloucester at this point. The bridges over the Severn had been broken down after Henry and Simon the Younger had ventured into the March meaning they could not have assisted in the assault on Worcester from the west bank of the Severn. Robert of Gloucester’s account also indicates that the sons of Montfort entered the city over the bridge (therefore crossing from the west bank of the Severn) after the seizure of Gloucester’s gates. While the Chronicle of Worcester’s use requires some caution as, for example, it also fails to mention the siege of Gloucester at all, the specificity of the date given for the attack stands, in

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12 Flores, ii, pp.486-7; Worcestershire Eyre Roll, 1270, p.1284.
14 CR 1264-68, pp.82-3.
15 Maddicott, ‘Robert de Ferrers,’ ODNB.
this instance, in contrast to the usually vague information provided by the chronicle. If the attack occurred on or around the 29 February, Ferrers’ delay until 13 March in coming to Gloucester, only twenty five miles away, is hard to fathom. The Dunstable Annals problematic account of the siege reports that a request for aid was sent to Ferrers. The pre-existing tensions between Edward and Ferrers and the latter’s known aggressive inclinations suggest that Robert would have responded swiftly to word of Edward’s arrival at Gloucester on 5 March. If he was still at Worcester, however, it should not have taken him eight days to receive the news and arrive at Gloucester.

If Ferrers was not at Worcester where was he then? One explanation is that he may have accompanied the seized chest of chirographs back to Tutbury. A second explanation behind Ferrers’ absence, however, is suggested in the Chronicle of St. Werburg abbey, Chester. Three days before Edward’s first relief attempt on Gloucester, Edward’s appointed justiciar of Cheshire, William de la Zouche and David ap Gryffudd with an army of men from Cheshire, alongside Hamo Lestrange ‘with many men of Shropshire’, launched a large raid into Ferrers’ lands. This force took the town of Stafford and, crucially, seized one of the jewels in the Ferrers’ crown, Chartley castle. Chartley was an impressive fortress and had undergone major work in the early thirteenth century when in the hands of the earl of Chester, with the addition of a stone keep and curtain walls, so it was not an easy target.

On their return they also burnt the town of Stone, which lay to the north of Stafford.\textsuperscript{21} This attack may have been revenge partly for the sack of Worcester, but its timing seems suspiciously well co-ordinated with Edward’s relief attempt at Gloucester. If Ferrers was still at Worcester on 2 March it left enough time for him to receive word and return north to confront the royalists before Edward’s first attempt to raise the siege of Gloucester. The specifically anti-Ferrers’ focus of the campaign by targeting his most valuable lands makes it not unreasonable to suggest that it may have been conducted with the deliberate purpose of luring Ferrers away from Gloucester. To reinforce this impression the same royalists returned to Stafford on the 12\textsuperscript{th}, but this time ‘they were repulsed thence by the barons’. This force of barons included men drawn from the Midlands region, such as the Montfortian Ralph Basset of Drayton.\textsuperscript{22} In revenge the royalists burned Eccleshall, including the bishop of Lichfield’s castle there, and ‘broke into many churches’ and ‘took many captives and much spoil.’\textsuperscript{23} The veracity of at least some of the Chester account is proved by subsequent legal proceedings against rebels in Staffordshire. One Geoffrey de Gresley was confirmed captured at

\textsuperscript{22} Ann. Cestr., pp.86-7.  
Chartley by Hamo Lestrange, while a Henry de Verdon and Hugh de Weston admitted they were in the retinue of Ralph Basset of Drayton defending Stafford also against Hamo. Whether Ferrers was with the unnamed barons at Stafford is unknown (only Ralph Basset is confirmed), but in terms of geography and motivation this is not unlikely. He certainly had great incentive to head north again at the news of the destruction of Chartley which could have arrived by the 3 or 4 March. Despite the small rebel victory of the repulse at Stafford, de la Zouche’s two large scale raids probably fulfilled their purpose, distracting rebel help from the siege of Gloucester.

Several curious points of Robert of Gloucester’s account of the siege of Gloucester become more explicable under the above interpretation of Ferrers’ movements. If Edward had been actively trying to distract Ferrers and his powerful forces from Gloucester, the knowledge that Ferrers was on his way would, on this reading, have been bad (although not necessarily fatal) news for his position in the castle. It also helps explain Robert of Gloucester’s report that Edward was of noman so sore adrad than Robert de Ferrers. Robert’s words have attracted little analysis. Powicke and Jobson ignore them while, for example, Maddicott merely notes that the two had a feud. Robert, a very reliable and detailed source for events at Gloucester chose adrad deliberately, yet Edward possessing a personal fear of Ferrers himself would seem odd, particularly as it is uncertain how many times the two men had even come into personal contact. Robert only came of age in 1260 and played no active role in the politics leading up to the war but rather seems to have remained on his lands at Tutbury. Robert of Gloucester may, however, have picked up reports that Edward had been particularly concerned with Ferrers’ potential aid for the besiegers, and this practical fear was subsequently misinterpreted as a personal fear of Ferrers himself. If Ferrers had participated in the defence of Stafford on the 12th then he would have had around sixty miles to cover to reach Gloucester to arrive on the 13th. It was, Robert of Gloucester claims, when


28 Maddicott, ‘Robert de Ferrers,’ *ODNB*.

29 It seems likely that the first attack on 2 March was co-ordinated by Edward given its highly convenient timing. The second is less certain as the extent of Edward’s contact with the outside world after entering Gloucester is unclear.
Ferrers was sighted from the keep approaching from the direction of Tewkesbury that Edward was prompted to make terms. The agreement, according to Robert, was made prior to Ferrers’ arrival, a very short space of time, but not impossible, since the terms seem to have been simply for Edward to allow the rebels to depart and promise not to harm the townspeople. If Ferrers had been at Stafford or at least was in the region trying to defend his lands, he may have had just over twenty-four hours to cover the 50 to 60 miles to Gloucester riding hard, and the speed of his march is strongly suggested in Robert of Gloucester’s account.

The earl Robert Ferrers, when he came thither, he was well-nigh mad for wrath that they had made agreement. He smote his steed with the spur, as did all his company. And turned himself for wrath again, as quick as he might hasten.\(^{30}\)

Two points come from this passage in the context of Robert’s involvement at Gloucester. His frustration becomes not just about the lifting of the siege but about his missed opportunity to face Edward personally, to avenge both old and quite probably new injuries, including the loss of Chartley. His anger might also have stemmed from his failure to reach Gloucester in time due to the distraction of the attacks. The other pertinent point is that his company is indicated as being all mounted; a force capable of covering the required distance, but also indicative that he was not based at Worcester if he took so long to arrive. While the above discussion involves a degree of informed speculation, the timings of events are highly suggestive of a broader and concerted royalist campaign to keep Robert de Ferrers, and probably others, from assisting Montfortian forces at the siege of Gloucester in March 1264.

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\(^{30}\) *Church Historians*, v, p.365; *Robert of Gloucs.*, ii, p.745.
### Appendix 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Years connected to Retinue of William de Valence</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geoffrey Gascelin</td>
<td>1258, 60-62, 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger Gascelin</td>
<td>1262, 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William de Kirketon</td>
<td>1262, 66, 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Bussay</td>
<td>1258, 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>William de Bolleville</td>
<td>1266-7, 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingram de Vilers</td>
<td>1261?, 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William de Barentino?</td>
<td>1266?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Gravenel?</td>
<td>1266?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imbert Guy?</td>
<td>1261?, 66-68?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert Aiguillon</td>
<td>1260-1, 1271</td>
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Table 0:1 The *familiares* of William de Valence at the time of the civil war, Ridgeway, ‘William de Valence and his *familiares*’, p.245

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relationship to Gilbert de Clare</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relationship to Gilbert de Clare</th>
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<tr>
<td>More, Robert de la</td>
<td>yeoman of, in household</td>
<td>Tracy, William de</td>
<td>knight of</td>
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<td>Bragenham, Thomas de</td>
<td>Yeoman of</td>
<td>Plessetis, William de</td>
<td>Knight of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roynges, Hamo de</td>
<td>Yeoman of</td>
<td>Ingoldesthorp, John de</td>
<td>in service of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ardern, Stephen de</td>
<td>Yeoman of</td>
<td>Walton, Roger de</td>
<td>in household in 1257 for Earl Richard?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clerk, William le</td>
<td>Yeoman of</td>
<td>Borham, Hervey de (cleric?)</td>
<td>in company bearing message from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanet, Stephen de</td>
<td>Yeoman of</td>
<td>Savage, William le</td>
<td>familia of</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stotesbrok, Henry de</td>
<td>Yeoman of</td>
<td>Fevere, Robert le</td>
<td>faithful to him during troubles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lung, Hugh le</td>
<td>Yeoman of</td>
<td>Harewell, William</td>
<td>faithful to him during troubles</td>
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<td>Chartres, Ralph de</td>
<td>Yeoman of</td>
<td>Brasur, Thomas</td>
<td>faithful to him during troubles</td>
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<td>Podelicot, Richard son of Henry</td>
<td>Yeoman of</td>
<td>Capilli, Thomas</td>
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<td>Haywod, William de</td>
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<td>Capilli, Geoffrey</td>
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<td>Scarsted, Peter de</td>
<td>Esquire of</td>
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<td>esquire (armijero) of</td>
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<td>Pyulesdon, Roger de</td>
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<td>Trillawer, Master Robert de</td>
<td>Carrying message from at London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Function</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clerc/e?, John de</td>
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<td>Munteny/Mountney?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paynel, John</td>
<td>Yeoman of</td>
<td>fitz John son of</td>
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<td>wth at Roch siege</td>
<td>Montfort, Robert de</td>
<td>carrying message</td>
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<td>Banastre, Richard</td>
<td>wth at London, let off by</td>
<td>More, Bartholomew de</td>
<td>bailiff of</td>
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<td>Hardres, Robert</td>
<td>wth at London</td>
<td>Gricke, John</td>
<td>Bachelor of</td>
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<td>Linton, Robert de,</td>
<td>wth at London</td>
<td>Gouiz, Sir Brian de</td>
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<td>citizen of London</td>
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<td>Banastre, William</td>
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<td>Solar, John de</td>
<td>wth at London</td>
<td>Marisco, Tristram</td>
<td>Bachelor of</td>
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<td>Wodetric/csiche,</td>
<td>with at time of troubles</td>
<td>Mainard, Robert</td>
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<tr>
<td>John</td>
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<td>Waleys, John le</td>
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<td>Bataile, Peter de la</td>
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<td>Chirchull, Thomas de</td>
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<td>Veer, John de</td>
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<td>(brother of John)</td>
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<td>Faber, William of</td>
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<td>Neville, John de</td>
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<td>Hauteyn, Sir Hamon</td>
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<td>Hendred, Richard de</td>
<td>always a faithful</td>
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<td>Apodorfeld/</td>
<td>carried mess from at</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apildorefeud, William de</td>
<td>Lond</td>
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</table>

Table 0:2 associates of Gilbert de Clare during the War, especially 1267

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