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A Comparative Study of the attitudes of students attending Urdu Medium, English Medium and Seminary Schools in Pakistan.

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Abstract

In Pakistan, educational institutions function in parallel under three separate systems: public, private and madrassas. The incidents of 9/11 brought madrassas into the limelight and they emerged as the most controversial educational institutions of Pakistan. International scholarship is polarized on the madrassa issue and presents two opposing pictures about these institutes. For some, madrassas are the cause of radical ideology and militancy, while for others they are a source of free education for the underprivileged. This research compares the attitudes of students attending madrassas with those of students attending other types of school. A comparison of the world view of students coming from different schooling systems was made concerning socio-political and educational issues including an examination of attitudes towards jihad and Islamic militancy.

It is argued that students educated under different systems have divergent ideologies about the primary purpose of education, sectarian diversity, the status of women and non-Muslims in Pakistan and, most importantly, Islamic militancy. To determine the worldview of students about the aforesaid issues, both quantitative and qualitative approaches were used. The data were collected from the students of private and public schools and madrassas in South Punjab (N=500). It is argued that madrassas are stratified with some being more liberal than others. The questionnaire and interview tool used in the study attempted to find out the students' responses on armed Jihad, sectarian divide, the status of women, the position of non-Muslims in Pakistan and about the purpose of education. The analysis illustrated the ways in which Pakistani society is polarized along socio-economic lines and how different types of schooling are associated with distinct world views.

The results indicate that the students from madrassas are somewhat more aggressive and intolerant towards the religious minorities and women than the students of English medium and Urdu medium public schools. They are also less tolerant towards people of other sects and are more susceptible to sectarian prejudices than their counterparts in the English medium and Urdu medium schools. In the same vein, the students from madrassas are more supportive of militancy and jihadist activities than their counterparts. In this regard, the students

from Shia and Brailvi madrassas are comparatively less inclined towards the Jihadi notion than that of Ahle Hadith, Deaoband and Jamaat-e-Islami madrassas.

While most previous studies of madrassas have presented them as homogeneous institutions, this study highlights the extent to which they are internally stratified and shows that the students studying in these schools have contradictory viewpoints with respect to certain socio-political and religious issues.

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Chapter One

Introduction

Rationale and Scope:

The proliferation of madrassas or religious seminaries in the Muslim World in general and in Pakistan in particular has been noted with much concern in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11September 2001. The perceived connection between radical Islamic education and militant behaviour against Western interests, has led development agencies and governments to focus their resources on educational reform.

However, there is scant empirical research grounded in rigorous social science that determines the attitude of students studying in madrassas/ religious seminaries of Pakistan. While the topic has received widespread media coverage and has been discussed within the broader context of radical Islamization, 'evidence' of a link has tended to be derived from observational accounts and anecdotes that range from strongly positive to vehemently negative. There are many writings defending the existence of madrassas in the wake of state's design to check their growth and secularize them. Mostly these writings are in Urdu whether in the forms of books, pamphlets or essays in various madrassa' magazines etc. At the same time, an absence of serious literature suggesting that these institutes are 'nurseries of sedition', 'factories of fundamentalism' and 'hot beds of terrorism'. Interpretations of the role of madrassas are varied, ranging from positive accounts of their educational contribution, to those that link them to extremism. Akbar S. Ahmad (2002: p, 39) regards madrassas to be a 'cheaper, more accessible and more Islamic alternative to education.' Singer (2001) calls them a 'displacement of the public education system.' *The New York Times Magazine* (Goldberg, 2000) has described the madrassa system as 'education of the holy warrior', even before the incident of 9/11/2001. Andrew Coulson (2004: p, 2) refers to madrassas as 'weapons of mass instruction.' Most

consequentially, the 9/11 Commission report (2004: p, 367) refers to madrassas as 'incubators of violent extremism.'

Recently there have also been revisionist accounts of madrassa prevalence that question the sensationalism of some media reports. In an opinion article for the New York Times (14 June 2005), Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey have referred to concern over madrassas as a 'myth'. This assertion is based on a study on the background of seventy-five terrorists behind major attacks on Western targets and concluded that only nine attended madrassas. Similarly, ethno-conflict psychologist Marc Sageman (2004) suggests that the roots of conflict are not to be found in madrassas since only 17 per cent of his study sample of terrorists had madrassa linkage. Focusing particularly on Pakistan, Zahab and Roy (2004) came up with more or less same conclusion but laid the blame on the government for distorting education through State-run schools and curricula. The travel-writer and historian William Dalrymple (2005) has also taken exception to sensationalism about madrassas and provided a more humane and nuanced account of madrassas in South Asia, particularly those in India that have been far more moderate. However, none of these scholarly works focus on the study of attitudes of students attending madrassas that this study attempts to make.

Most of the studies on religious seminaries have taken madrassas as monolithic institution; this is not the case. In Pakistan, for example, there are five distinct types of madrassas, divided along sectarian and political lines. Some sects are more orthodox and may have been radicalised by their exposure to so-called jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir (Ali, 2009). Ali was of the view that most of the foot soldiers for Jihad and sectarian violence are provided by the madrassas and unequivocally took the stance that usually, their core leadership and masterminds are not graduates from madrassas rather, in some instances, they are well educated and have expertise in certain socio-political and even scientific fields. He further adds, though majority of the madrassas do not act as recruiting centres of Islamic militants, the students these seminaries produce carry a very narrow outlook for non-Muslims and modern ideals. This study is determined to find out how the attitude of madrassa students is different from that

of students in mainstream education systems (Public and Private schools). The study also intends to look at the viewpoint of students about the primary purpose of education. What educational priorities do these students have? Do they see any role of education in promoting social equality and economic progress, do they consider education as a mean to promote individual freedom, do they feel that schools should promote the shared values of Pakistani society, what is their take on the position of non-Muslims in Pakistani society, what do they think about equality between men and women and so on. Most importantly, the study aims to find out what the students from diverse types of schools think about militancy and tolerance towards people of diverse sects and minorities. Along with making a comparison of madrassa students and mainstream educational institutes' students regarding their socio-political outlook, this study also aims to take forward a comparative analysis of students of different types of madrassas with respect to their worldview about the aforesaid socio-political and educational issues. It deliberates upon whether or not, the students from all madrassas cheer the concept of armed *Jihad* and carry intolerant views towards minorities of Pakistan.

In contemporary Pakistan, there are three different educational systems working in parallel; state run education system, private schools and Madrassas (religious seminaries). Elite private English medium schools which are also known as 'A-type' private schools have a disproportionately high representation in bureaucracy, businesses, and state offices while madrassa students are the most marginalised sections of the society and hardly have any representation in public and private job sector (Rahman, 2005). These three educational systems are products of totally different historical evolutionary processes. They have different textbooks, different methods of learning, different discourses they are exposed to inside and outside school, and even their familial background (social class) are so different from each other that it might be the cause of polarization in Pakistani society (Rahman, 2004). According to Rahman, what is really alarming, and relatively less known, is the fact that the students of these institutions (the vernacular/Urdu-medium schools, English-medium schools and madrassas) have such different opinions as to live in different worlds (ibid, 2005). This study is to look at certain socio-political and educational issues from the viewpoint of students coming from these different types of schooling

systems. The study will contend, whether or not, owing to these differences, students which pass through these systems have divergent ideologies about education such as what do think what education is for, do they think education's primary purpose is to prepare students for work and employment, education is to promote economic equality and social justice, education's aim is to encourage understanding between men and women, schools are to promote shared values of Pakistani society, should the students have their due share in the decision making process about them in the schools and so on and so forth. The research will also look at whether the worldview of all students, irrespective of their school type, is identical on women rights, status of non-Muslims, sectarian divide, armed Jihad. Along with it, the study has also included a psychometric scale to gauge that to what extent the students believe that they can control events that affect them. The psychometric scale named 'locus of control' refers to the perception of individuals about daily life happenings associated with them; for example those individuals who believe that events in their life are derived primarily from their own actions have high internal locus of control and those who attribute the outcomes of their actions to luck or chance have high external locus of control. In addition, the study will also try to clarify how Pakistani society is polarised along socio-economic lines and this polarisation limits the choice of parents in the selection of type of schools, they chose to educate their children. In order to understand these different institutions and their products, this study is to give a historical overview of the development of these diverse educational institutions in British India and to describe how these institutions expanded in the post-independence era. The study is to argue briefly about the differences in curriculum, pedagogical style and discipline techniques being practiced in these schools.

Making Choices

Pakistani economy is now speedily converting into knowledge economy. At all levels parents are spending funds to provide quality education to their children. The demand for high quality schooling is generally strong across communities in Pakistan, and that parents are willing to pay a high price if necessary to send their children to a decent school. According to Learning and Educational Achievements in Punjab Schools (LEAPS) survey (2007), households have emerged as significant investors in their

children's education. Out-of-pocket spending by households on children's education is higher than ever before. More than one-half of children's educational expenditures are now borne by parents. Even though government schooling is almost a free option, yet low-income parents are spending substantially on their children's education, both by enrolling their children in B-type[1] private schools and spending on additional educational investments beyond school fees (ibid, 2007). Those parents who cannot afford their children's education send their children to madrassa. Even this decision of parents is a compromised one because these children can be bread winners for whole family.[2] Relatively, this shows progressive thinking in the marginalised groups who expect that their children would be able to read and write if they sacrificed the meagre income earned by these children and encouraged them to attend the Madrassa.

The children who attend madrassas usually come from marginalised social groups who spend their life below the poverty line. The state run education system is in a state of disarray and decay (Rahman, 2004) which has hardly any attraction for the parents to send their children for quality education. Madrassa is a place where students get the boarding and lodging in addition to religious education free of charge. The parents who cannot afford the tuition fee of the private schools are constrained to look for Madrassa as an option where along with education; their children can get food and clothing. As a result, poor parents increasingly, see madrassas or religious seminaries as the preferred institutions of learning for their children (ibid, 2004). Ali (2009) during his visit to some madrassas in Islamabad learnt that poverty was not the only driver for madrassa education, for many parents it was discipline and for others simply a matter of religious commitment. Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy, author of several articles on the state of education in Pakistan, stated the following when asked if Pakistani society at large views madrassa education favourably:

> "The poorest will certainly approve, but the middle class overwhelmingly disapproves. They know the kid won't get a job except as a mullah (prayer leader). Of

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[1] Private non-elitist so-called English medium schools.

[2] Child labour is not uncommon in poor sections of Pakistan society. According to Awan et al. (2011) the parents of child labourers are often unemployed or underemployed, desperate for secure employment and income.

course, even among the rich you have some parents sending kids to madrassas but they lie on the fringe" (Dr. Hoodbhoy, personal communication, September 2009)[3].

Rahman (2004) provides an overview of the income distribution of students' fathers in the three types of schools in the appendices part of his book. The data gathered by Rahman for his study shows that more than three quarters of the students in madrassas come from extremely poor background and their fathers' monthly income is less than 5000 rupees (approximately US$ 80). According to his study, the majority of students who attend Urdu medium schools also belong to this income group. While on the other hand, there was not a single student from A-type private English medium schools in Rahman's study that belonged to this income group. In another study of madrassas, Hussain (1994), found that 49% of the students from a madrassa stated that the reason that they attended the madrassa and not a different type of school was their parents' income level and only 5% of them attend madrassas on account of religious reasons. Ahmar (2007) in his essay: 'Neoliberalism and Madrassas: An Unholy Connection' has also tried to establish the argument that children from poor families attend madrassas because other options are too expensive for them to afford. The results from the aforesaid studies support the stance that the parents of madrassa students opt to send their children in madrassas because economically it is a viable option for them, the argument that has been negated by Winthrop and Graff (2010) in their report: Beyond madrassa: Assessing the link between education and militancy in Pakistan. They are of the view that though lower-income households are slightly more likely to send their children to a madrassa than to another type of school, but the relationship is weak. They further added, although madrassas tend to be free of charge but the families tend to use them because they prefer a religious education for their children, rather than for their affordability (Winthrop and Graff, 2010). There are contradictory findings with regard to the argument what compel parents to send their children to madrassas instead of other type of schools.

Like the report of Winthrop and Graff, (2010), there are some other studies as well which suggest that the families that do choose to send their children full-time to

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[3] Shahid (2010) interviewed Hoodbhoy in 2009 for her thesis.

madrassas often do so not out of necessity but preference. According to Nelson (2006) the society of Pakistan might have turned into an Islamic radical society and contemporary Pakistani parents favour a religious education as opposed to a secular one. This trend has acted as an obstacle toward educational reform. Reformers find themselves confronted with a broad range of complex issues concerning the nature of local demands (ibid, 2006). The demand Nelson (2006) referred to is the increased preference for religious education among Pakistani parents. Confusion and challenge faced thus far with respect to educational demand resides in the value placed on religious education in general and madrassas in particular. The findings derived from the interviews of a representative sample of families in Rawalpindi; a twin city of Islamabad, demonstrated that nearly half the families interviewed cited religious education as their "top educational priority." Approximately, 60 per cent said they would not be satisfied if their children were not offered the possibility of attending a madrassa, even if "madrassa graduates suffer from unemployment." This finding is supported by the results of survey conducted by British Council Pakistan (2009) showing that overwhelming majority of current generation of Pakistani students shares its parents' religious beliefs, barring the fact that a sizeable proportion of them do not see eye-to-eye with their parents on social and political issues.

The importance of a religious education for instilling good morals and proper ethics is often cited by parents. In the words of one mother, "Islam is a good religion, and we want our children to benefit from all it offers. It is only certain interpretations that give it a bad name" (Winthrop and Graff, 2010). The data from the LEAPS study show that the majority of families that send a child to a madrassa also send their other children to other types of schools, either government-run or private. This suggests that it is not income that solely drives the choice of sending a child to a madrassa indeed, madrassas have, comparatively, a higher proportion of wealthy students than do public schools—but also a strategic choice to diversify children's employment potential. After all, the traditional career path for a madrassa graduate becoming a Koranic scholar or Islamic political party leader confers status on the family and can often not be achieved through either public or private school routes (Winthrop and Graff, 2010). The financially weak background of parents directly influences the career path of their children who have no say in choice of their career. The children

who attend the madrassa get opportunity to attend the private arranged religious congregation such as *Koran Khawani* (recitation of Koran) or *Meelad* (celebration of prophet's birth) in houses of rich people. During these visits some of the Madrassa students get chance to secure some job or private Koranic teaching tuition. In addition, these children after completion of their education at madrassa get opportunity to act as Imam/mulla (Prayer leader) in local mosques, in local colonies in Pakistan. Even though madrassa graduates occupy hardly any reasonable position in terms of job (Rahman, 2004), yet for some parents from lower social strata, economic motivation for the enrolment in madrassas can be a reason not to ignore. One of the key questions therefore is, can the school produce militant/fundamentalist attitudes and values if these run counter to those in the family, or do the two have to work in harmony. Here I argue that certain types of madrassas are associated with fundamentalist values, but only among a certain proportion of its students who tend to be drawn from certain types of families.

Structure of the Thesis

The thesis has been structured in seven chapters followed by references and appendices. Chapter one deals with the rationale and scope of the study, research questions, theoretical framework and structure of the dissertation.

Chapter Two deliberates upon the Education system of Pakistan. In this chapter different types of educational systems running parallel in Pakistan came under discussion. In addition, this chapter gives a historical overview of the development of educational institutions in British India and describes how these educational institutes are situated in contemporary Pakistan. The chapter then talks about the research context and gives few details of the research site.

Chapter Three gives a detailed account of madrassa phenomenon. It talks about the genesis of madrassas in the Muslim world and their introduction in the sub-continent

and then madrassa legacy in post-independence Pakistan. The organisation and curriculum of madrassas also come under discussion in this chapter.

Chapter Four describes the research methodology, research design (instrumentation and variables), participants and sampling method, potential ethical issues, data collection and data analysis techniques.

Chapter Five presents the findings generated from the data analysis in relation to the existing literature of the field followed by chapter Six where a thorough discussion on these findings takes place along with an attempt has been made to answer the research questions.

The 7th chapter of the thesis concludes the research results is presented followed by a note on the limitation of the study and suggestions for the potential research possibilities on the topic. In addition, this chapter describes how does this thesis contributes to knowledge and what new additions have been made in the existing literature. In the end it gives recommendations on policy and pedagogy.

Chapter 2

The Education System in Pakistan

Introduction

It is widely acknowledged that education is amongst the single most important factor contributing to poverty alleviation. Increasing educational attainment is likely to reduce conflict risk, especially in countries like Pakistan that have very low levels of primary and secondary school enrolment. And in this regard, education quality, relevance and content have a vital role to play in mitigating violence (Winthrop and Graff, 2010, p1). Education also plays an overarching role and has a cross cutting impact on all aspects of human life. It has always been considered as one of the vital factors for socioeconomic and subsequently the national development because of its ability to raise the quality and productivity of human capital (De Silva, 1997). Education also creates awareness, tolerance, self esteem and confidence, which empower people to defend their rights, reduce poverty and inequality and improve in health, status and good governance in implementation of socio economic policies[4]. It also enables the people to protect their ideological inspiration and help in developing national cohesion[5]. In case of Pakistan, there is hardly any convincing evidence to suggest that the country's education system has contributed to the development of a knowledge based economy (Kardar, 1998). However, so far as the question of ideological inspiration and national integration through education is concerned it has been the prime objective of policy makers in Pakistan since its very inception (Jaffrelot, 2002). In order to meet the end of 'Pakistani Nationalism' language and religion were used explicitly to promote national cohesion. That is why the state declared the study of Urdu, Islamic studies and Pakistan studies compulsory not only in government funded schools but also in all private schools through-out the country. Paradoxically, while the state seeks to use education to promote national cohesion, the multilayered educational system may in fact be causing polarization in Pakistani society (Rahman, 2004). In the same vein, in a recent report of standing committee on Education, Health and Environment (2010) serious concerns were expressed by the

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[4] Pakistan Economic Survey 2007-2008 (p169)
[5] National Report of Pakistan (2004)

members about the ongoing diverse and unequal schooling system in the country. The report says:

> It is unfortunate that we see a multilayered educational system in Pakistan, which is harmful to national integrity and national cohesion and is catering to division and divide. There are many systems working here in Pakistan resulting not in synergy but in social division and conflict. Students coming out of English medium schools especially from good private sector school, get the best paid jobs in the country where as those passing out from Urdu medium schools are usually destined to work in clerical or other lower levels positions. Religious madrassa students turnout yet another class who are usually unaware of the world outside their own, with their strong sectarian bias and little or no training in modern disciplines. They are usually ill-equipped to interact meaningfully with the larger society and are also monumental at times in spreading sectarianism[6].

Kinds of Schools in Pakistan

The coming paragraphs of the chapter will deal with the major types of schools in Pakistan. These can broadly be categorised as Urdu language-medium schools, English language-medium schools and madrassas (Islamic seminaries). In most of the cases but not all, Urdu medium schools and vernacular language-medium schools (I have briefly discussed vernacular language-medium schools under the heading of Urdu medium schools) are government funded as opposed to English medium schools and madrassas. No doubt there are some madrassas which are totally government funded and many English medium schools that get their funding from the government but by and large the reality is other way round. According to Rahman (2004) these schools are divided not only according to the medium of instruction and curriculum but also on the socio-economic basis[7]. English language-medium schools cater for the middle, upper-middle and upper classes, and the Urdu language-medium schools are aimed at the lower-middle and working classes while the madrassas provide education

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[6] The report was presented in the parliament on25th of May 2010 by the chairperson of the Standing Committee Ms. Ayesha Bilal.

[7] The data on the family income of students come from a small survey of 230 students undertaken in December 2002 and January 2003.

for poor, marginalized or very religious people. Indeed patterns of expenditure by the state can effectively perpetuate class divisions in Pakistan. On the basis of the results of his survey of 618 students and 243 teachers carried out from December 2002 to June 2003 in Urdu-medium schools, English-medium schools (including private institutions and cadet colleges), and Sunni madrassas Tariq Rahman (2004) came up with a conclusion that the world view of the students of these institutions, especially the madrassas and private English language-medium schools, is so polarized on issues of militancy (regarding Kashmir) and tolerance (of religious minorities and women) that they seem to inhabit different, and violently opposed, worlds. In the future, this may be a source of social instability, internal conflict and violence in Pakistan that is detrimental to national integration the so called objective of education (Rahman, 2004).

Urdu Medium Schools

As Urdu was a symbol of Muslim identity during the Urdu-Hindi controversy period in pre-partition India, so it had an established political significance in the eyes of the Muslim League which fought for the creation of Pakistan and started ruling the country since its birth in 1947. At the time of its birth, United Pakistan[8]; a multilingual country was comprised of 55.6 per cent Bengali speaking population. The ruling elite; Muslim League politicians, bureaucracy and the military that was dominated by Punjabi and Urdu speaking coalition felt threatened by the mere fact of Bengali majority. To neutralize this possible domination by East Bengal, it might have made sense to the ruling elite to fall back on Urdu as a unifying symbol of the state (Rahman, 2002). However, whatever the underlying political motives of the West Pakistani elite might be, there is no doubt that most of the people in West Pakistan particularly the dominant intelligentsia, sincerely felt that it would be in the national interest to integrate the new nation and that Urdu could do that job better than any other language. With this in mind the teaching of Urdu was promoted as part of the overall political imperative of the national integration.

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[8] I used the term United Pakistan for the country which was comprised of West Pakistan (present Pakistan) and East Pakistan (present Bangladesh) before 1971.

The first educational conference was held from 27th of November till 1st of December 1947 at Karachi. The cardinal points regarding language policy of this conference were to make Urdu 'the lingua franca of Pakistan' and to teach it as 'a compulsory language' (PEC 1948: 39). While the conference did not declare it as the medium of instruction in schools, the situation was that it was being used as such in Punjab, NWFP (North Western Frontier Province), Balochistan and in many parts of Kashmir. In Sind alone, out of the provinces of present-day Pakistan, Sindhi was the medium of instruction for most schools. However in the later years, the National Commission on Education made Urdu language as a medium of instruction in the schools of West Pakistan (present Pakistan). The report said:

> We are firmly convinced that for the sake of our national unity we must do everything to promote the linguistic cohesion of West Pakistan by developing the national language, Urdu, to the fullest extent. In the areas of the Punjab, Bahawalpur and Balochistan, Urdu is already medium of instruction at primary stage, and this arrangement should continue." (Edn. Com. 1959: Chapter 21, paragraph 14, p.292).

Most of the non-elitist government schools use Urdu as medium of instruction in the Punjab, Khyber Pakhtoon Khwa (KPK formerly NWFP), Balochistan, Azad Kashmir (AK), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA) and urban parts of Sind. The Urdu medium schools are the largest in number and most representative schools for the ordinary people of Pakistan (Rahman, 2004. p25). As for the vernacular-medium schools, the Pashtu-medium ones run only up to class-5, after which students go to Urdu medium schools. The Sindhi-medium schools operate only in parts of the Sind. All of the non-elitist government schools of Southern Punjab that I selected for my research project are Urdu medium schools. These schools have just one section of able students who are taught Science subjects in English. By and large, these schools are Urdu language medium schools.

According to Rahman (2004), majority of the students and teachers of Urdu and vernacular medium schools come from lower-middle class. I undertook a small survey of 80 students from Urdu-medium schools in South Punjab in the year 2010. It was

discovered that they belong to poor sections of society. Unlike Rahman's survey, students were not directly asked about their family income; rather various indicators were used to have knowledge about their social status. Its detail will come in the subsequent chapters.

After ten years of schooling, students appear in the exam of matriculation held by different Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education in the country. In most of the cases teaching and examinations are in Urdu and in some cases in English. However, in interior Sind (also called rural Sind) exams are held in Sindhi.

Schools are not accessible to all children; they are often too far from where the children live. Therefore, children have to spend a considerable amount of time, energy and money to get to the school daily (Rahman, 2004). According to Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS) of 2001-2002, most of the students travel less than 2kms and a few even travel more than 5kms to their schools. However, girls have to travel long distances in Baluchistan, Sindh and some parts of South Punjab.

Government funded Urdu-medium schools are generally dull, stringent places, often painted a dirty yellow with blue doors and windows and doors with broken glass panes (Rahman, 2004). In some instances there are no school buildings at all. Students get their daily lessons under the shade of trees. Often, such kind of schools are highly regimented with semi-educated teachers, forcing their pupils to memorise passages out of poorly written, poorly printed and extremely dull books (ibid). According to PIHS (2001-2002) on average classrooms are overcrowded with forty one girls and thirty eight boys per teacher at primary level.

Text books are one of the many influences on a pupil's worldview. How significant the influence may be depends on many variables like teachers, peer pressure, family and friends, childhood experiences, social class and exposure to discourses other than textbooks etc. No doubt it is very difficult to determine the degree of influence of

textbooks but the thing which can be determined easily is the intention of writers of textbooks; the policy guidelines of those who get the textbooks written; and the values which the educational authorities responsible for writing and disseminating through textbooks. This issue has been discussed in the later paragraphs under the heading "Islamization of Education in the Name of Ideology and Nationalism".

These schools employ matriculates to teach primary classes and those with FA and BA degrees to teach middle and high school classes (Rahman, 2002). Teachers of these schools get paltry amount of money which adversely affects the quality of teaching. According to Rahman (2004) the low salaries, which Urdu medium schools offer attracts only those who fail to get other jobs. Thus the quality of instruction in most schools is very low. So far as the funding of these schools is concerned, government allocates budget for these schools and charges no fee at all. However, in high schools students are supposed to pay small amount of money for *Faroogh-i-Taleem Fund* (FTF)[9]. For 9th and 10th level students this amount is twenty rupees per month[10].

English Medium Schools

English being the official language of Pakistan is used in government, bureaucracy, military, judiciary, commerce, media, education and research at the highest level. In short, it is used in all domains of power. As it is empowering to learn English, people all over the country are ready to invest in it for the better future of their children. Because of this demand, all over the cities of Pakistan one can see boards advertising institutions which claim to be English-medium schools or tuition centres claiming to teach spoken English and English for passing all kinds of examinations and interviews. They are present in areas ranging from the most affluent to the slums and even in the rural areas. Indeed, going by numbers alone, more of them are located in middle-class, lower-middle-class and even in working-class areas than in the more expensive localities of the cities. Besides the claim made by the boards, these schools

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[9] Fund for the development of Education (its literal meaning). By virtue of this fund pupils of 9th and 10th class are charged twenty rupees (15 pence) per month but no fee is charged.
[10] Source: Office of District Executive Officer (Education) Dera Ghazi Khan.

share little else in common. It is a far cry from the rolling green grounds of Aitchison College[11] in Lahore to a two-room house in a slum which advertises itself as the 'Oxford and Cambridge Islamic English-medium school'. Indeed, if there is anything which links such diverse establishments together it is that they cater to the persistent public demands for English education. In Pakistan, according to Rahman (2004), English is still the key for a good future - a future with human dignity if not public deference; a future with material comfort if not prosperity; a future with that modicum of security, human rights and recognition, which all human beings desire. So, irrespective of what the state provides, parents are willing to part with scarce cash to buy their children such a future.

English medium schools can be classified into three major types:

(a) State influenced elitist public schools or cadet colleges

(b) Private elitist schools (commonly known as A-type Private schools)

(c) Private non-elitist schools (commonly known as B-type Private schools)

Within each category are sub-categories. Indeed, the non-elitist so-called English-medium schools are so varied that they defy classification. Let us focus only on the major categories after a brief history of English medium schools in the sub-continent in general and in Pakistan in particular.

Historical Background

To appreciate the significance of English medium schools in contemporary Pakistan, it is necessary to understand some of the history. Under the British rule, there were two kinds of elitist schools in India: those for the hereditary aristocracy, called the Chief's colleges and those for the newly emerging classes commonly known as European or English schools. These schools taught all subjects in English. Both kinds of institutions served political and social purposes. According to Rahman (2004), the Chief's Colleges were meant to Anglicize young rulers to encourage loyalty to the English Crown and resulted into incidents like mutiny of 1857. This was the principle of 'indirect rule' discussed by James Anthony Mangan (1986) in some detail in the context of schooling. Six major chief's colleges were established: Rajkumar College (1870) at Rajkot, Mayo College (1872) at Ajmer, Rajkumar College (1871) for Bundelkhand, Daly College at Indore and Aitchison College at Lahore. There were

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[11] Aitchison College is one of the most prestigious institutions of Pakistan.

lesser schools for the landed gentry as well. In all these institutions the emphasis was on English as the central symbol and tool in the process of Anglicization. According to Raleigh (1906) Indian Viceroy Lord Curzon believed that the young chiefs who were supposed to learn English language, literature, science and mode of English thought would be allies of British. The political motive of making chiefs loyal to the Crown and so consolidating the empire was justified on the assumption that it was morally necessary to civilize Indians (Rahman, 2004). The families of newly emerging professional upper middle class used to send their children to European or English schools. Both kinds of schools charged very high tuition fees from their pupils. Such pricing policies excluded all but the wealthiest from these institutions. These English schools run on the lines of British public schools where in most of the instances the administrators were missionaries (ibid, 2004).

In the area now comprising Pakistan, such schools existed only in big cities. In the NWFP, for instance, Convent Day School was the major English school where Europeans also used to send their children. In Sind, the English schools were mostly in Karachi. By 1940, there were three such schools in the province. In Punjab the number was thirteen and in Balochistan there was not a single school of this type. The popularity of these schools was very high among Indian parents on account of higher standards of instruction and more efficient discipline as compared to Indian Schools (Rahman, 2002).

When Pakistan was established, the parallel system of elitist schooling did not change, as the military and higher bureaucracy both came from such schools. These schools multiplied in sixties as the professional-middle class started expanding. Ayub Khan was a Sandhurst-educated officer who believed in the superiority of the army over politicians and was in the favour of rule of elite in the country. He believed that such elite could be created in the English medium schools only (Zaidi, 1999 cited by Rahman, 2002). As Commander-in-Chief, he established a number of cadet colleges and academies to train those, according to Zaidi, who would one day administer the country. The armed forces encouraged the use of English at training institutions, at least, of officer corps. The other powerful partner of the army at that time was the

Civil Services of Pakistan (CSP). It was not traditionally anglicized like the army, but also had a larger number of people from the westernised elite in it. Thus it is no surprise that the government dominated by the members of these two elite pressure groups came up with government policies that supported English medium schools. One can see its depiction in the reports of Sharif Commission of 1958 and Hamoodur Rahman Commission of 1966 clearly. The Sharif Commission in its report says:

> While we feel that English must yield to the national languages the paramount position that it has occupied in our educational system so far, we are at the same time convinced that English should have a permanent place in the system (GoP, 1959 p228).

More or less similar views were expressed by the Hamoodur Rahman Commission on Education of 1966 regarding English medium schools. The report said:

> Such establishments are intended to produce some better type of students who would be more suitably disciplined and equipped for eventually entering the defence service of the country or filling higher administrative posts and other responsible executive positions in the government and semi-government bodies and private firms and corporations (GoP, 1966 p18).

The leaders of the Urdu proto-elite criticized this attitude (Abdullah, 1976), although most of the criticism against it came from the supporters of the older indigenous languages (Adil, 1962; Ahmad. S, 1968 cited by Rahman, 1996). In the face of public pressure after 1958 commission, the Hamoodur Rahman Commission agreed that the existence of such schools is the violation of constitution which assures the equality of all citizens before law and recommended the award of scholarships to poor students, so that they can also study in these government-funded elitist English medium schools. This was just a cosmetic recommendation on the part of commission. To allay the public reaction the commission also urged government not to build such schools any more. As a matter of fact these schools continued to thrive during Ayub era (1958-1969). The most significant anti- English policy came in early years of Zia regime (1977-1988). During that time, it was ordered that Urdu would be the medium

of instruction in all schools from class one from 1979. Thus all the students appearing in the matriculation examination in 1989 would use only Urdu. Moreover, the Ministry of Education also said that the nomenclature 'English medium' schools will be abolished. Visible resistance came from the parents whose children studied in English medium schools. As the military-bureaucratic oligarchy was not happy with this decision of the regime, the government expressed hardly any will to implement its policy. According to Lady Viaqarunisa Noon, the General (Zia) had assured her that she could continue to use English as medium of instruction in her school. This suggests that General was under pressure from the westernised elite and that he did not want to alienate them (Noon Interview, 29 Dec 1994 quoted from Rahman, 2004). According to Rahman (2004), during Zia era the elitist schools not only continued to exist, but indeed they proliferated. The real change in policy occurred in 1983 when Zia gave legal protection to the elitist English medium schools by allowing them to prepare students for the 'O' and 'A' levels examinations of the University of Cambridge. On 28th of October 1987, the Pakistan Times reported:

> The Federal Ministry of Education has decided to continue the existing practice of allowing English as medium of instruction in the science subjects besides Urdu or provincial language in all secondary schools of the country.

The Present Situation and Government-funded English Medium Schools

At the moment the federal government has its own English medium schools. The nineteen model colleges of the Federal Government are English medium schools and colleges. In these schools the cost of per student per year is much higher than the cost of Urdu medium schools in the provinces. The military controls eighty eight Federal English medium schools in cantonments and garrisons. In addition to it, there are elite public schools under boards of governors such as the Boys Public School and College in Abbotabad, Sadiq Public School in Bahawalpur. Other state controlled bodies such as WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority), the Customs Department, Pakistan Railways, Telephone Foundation and Police also run English medium schools. They provide schooling in English though in varying quality, for affordable fees from their own employees while charging much higher fees from the ordinary public. The armed forces, besides controlling many English medium schools through

the Fauji Foundation (Army), Shaheen Foundation (Air Force) and Bahria Foundation (Navy), they still get subsidized education for their dependents from some private elitist English medium schools located in garrisons and cantonments. This means that English medium schooling can be bought either by the elite of wealth or that of power. And this has not happened through market forces but has been brought about by the functionaries or institutions of the state itself. Indeed, the state has invested heavily in creating a parallel system of education for the elite, particularly the elite that would presumably run elitist state institutions in future. This leads to the conclusion that the state does not trust its own system of education and spends public funds to create and maintain the parallel elitist system of schooling.

Private Elitist English-Medium Schools

Apart from the schools run by agencies of the state itself like by the federal government, the armed forces, the bureaucracy, in contravention of the state policy of providing Urdu and vernacular medium education at state expense, there are private schools that sell English and which charge relatively high fees. Private schools catering to the elite have existed since British times. In Pakistan the convents were such types of schools i.e. Saint Anthony's in Lahore, Burn Hall in Abbottabad, St. Joseph's Convent in Karachi, Presentation Convent in Rawalpindi and convents in Murree and other places. These schools were not as much expensive as those that replaced them from mid 1980,s onwards. The new schools which took their place were Beacon house, City School, Roots, Froebels, Lahore Grammar and Khaldunia. Most of them have campuses spread all over the country though all are not of equal quality. Their tuition fees vary in amount. Their tuition fee ranges between Rs1500 to 7500 per month. They also charge high admission fee ranging between 15000 to 3000 rupees. In addition, there are incidental expenses, examination fees, and security fee for library, examination fees, and high expenses for textbooks, stationery and uniform. These expenses exclude not only the poor but even the middle class from these schools. Besides what the students have written, indicators of their socio-economic background are, the exorbitant tuition fee their parents pay.

Unlike non-elitist private schools these schools prepare students for the English Ordinary and Advanced level examinations. Their faculty, especially at senior levels is paid better than government school teachers.[12] However, there are vast differences in salaries even in the same school and data bearing figures about salaries was not shared with the researcher by schools' managements.

Teaching methods in these institutions are more humane, modern, innovative and interesting than in Urdu medium schools and madrassas (Rahman, 2004). Books are printed abroad and have pictures and more general knowledge than found in the textbooks of Urdu medium schools. The classics of English, generally in abridged forms, are used to teach English. World history is taught, instead of the propagandist form of Pakistan studies. However, the 'O' level examination makes the study of Pakistan studies, Islamic studies and Urdu compulsory even for these students.

Private Non-elitist Schools

By far the largest number of the so-called English-medium schools is English-medium only in name. According to a 1987 survey of Rawalpind-Islamabad, there were sixty English-medium schools in Islamabad and 250 in Rawalpindi. Out of these 250 only thirty nine were recognised schools (Awan, 1987). A 2001 survey conducted by the government showed that there were a total of 33893 institutions of general education in the private sector. Though the medium of instruction was not given most of them claimed to be English-medium schools (Census Private 2001: 12 as quoted by Rahman, 2004). At present one can see such schools in much proportion, particularly concentrated in the cities though they are fast appearing even in small towns now all over the country. Their fees ranges between Rs 50 to 1500 per month, which is far higher than the state vernacular schools but lower than that of elitist private English schools. In these schools pretence is made of teaching most subjects in English. In

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[12] The researcher got information regarding the tuition fee and salaries of teachers teaching to 10th level students at government schools, Elitist private, Non-elitist private schools and madrassas. The per month salary within madrassa teachers varied considerably depending who is getting residence from madrassa and who is not.

general teachers write answers of all subjects on the board, which students faithfully copy, memorise and reproduce in the examination.

Recently, chains of non-elitist English-medium schools run by organised bodies have sprung in Pakistan. One such chain goes by the name of Hira English-medium schools. The Hira Educational Project created this chain in 1990 in Lahore. In 1997 the name was changed to Hira National Educational Foundation. The aim of this project is to educate students along both Islamic and modern lines. According to a Principal of one of such schools, Islamic moral lessons are taught from class I but the books of science and mathematics are in English. Social studies is taught in Urdu and Urdu is compulsory.[13]

Madrassas

The third tier of schooling in Pakistan is that of madrassas. Madrassa is Arabic for school. It has now come to be used in South Asia exclusively for institutions of classical Muslim religious learning. A higher level madrassa is usually called *darul ulum* (house of knowledge) or *jami'a* (equivalent of a university). In this study, the term madrassa will be mostly used to designate institutions of religious education at advanced levels.

In a society that has persistently neglected the education of its children, and where investment of time and labour in schools does not go very far in fulfilling the needs of livelihood, madrassas have rapidly emerged as a parallel, but non-equivalent, system of education. Present-day madrassa education indicates the existence of an ice age of the intellect when, for reasons that are still debated, time came to a halt a few centuries ago. There is no room in contemporary madrassas for modern subjects. Instead, even 'advanced level' education engages a student in the ancient debates of philosophy, logic, history, astronomy, geometry, and arithmetic that had existed in the tenth to twelfth centuries. The emphasis is on ritualistic aspects of faith, oratory, and means to protect the faith against heretics and blasphemers. Once an impressive

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[13] The researcher visited Hira School in Multan and had an informal sitting with the Principal of the institute.

system of education which had produced towering intellectuals in Islamic civilization, now the scope of madrassa education has been progressively reduced to mere preservation of specific doctrines. Madrassa schooling will be discussed in detail in the succeeding chapter.

Here is a table of statistics to illustrate the respective sizes of each of the major types of school in Pakistan during the years 2005-06.

Table 2.1: Total Number of Educational Institutions including Madrassas and Maktabs (Mosque Schools)

with student enrolment in them 2005-06

Table 2.1

Institutions Type		Institutions	Enrolment by Stage			Teachers		
			Boys	Girls	Total	Male	Female	Total
Pre- Primary	Public	-	2,392,219	1,904,159	**4,296,378**	-	-	**-**
	Other Public	-	48,619	4 6,147	**94,766**	-	-	**-**
	Private	794	1,508,643	1,235,660	**2,744,303**	455	2,950	**3,405**
	Total	**794**	**3,949,481**	**3,185,966**	**7,135,447**	**455**	**2,950**	**3,405**
Primary	Public	137,751	6,639,788	4,932,846	**11,572,634**	221,621	126,669	**348,290**
	Other Public	2,070	136,748	1 31,337	**268,085**	2 ,012	3,815	**5,827**
	Private	16,911	2,770,093	2,223,605	**4,993,698**	18,846	67,605	**86,451**
	Total	**156,732**	**9,546,629**	**7,287,788**	**16,834,417**	**242,479**	**198,089**	**440,568**
Middle	c	14,982	2,169,600	1,376,236	**3,545,836**	5 9,851	54,225	**114,076**

	Other Public	273	48,251	4 8,606	**96,857**	724	1,709	**2,433**
	Private	24,115	875,462	7 44,168	**1,619,630**	4 8,583	145,661	**194,244**
	Total	**39,370**	**3,093,313**	**2,169,010**	**5,262,323**	**109,158**	**201,595**	**310,753**
High	Public	9,110	888,505	2 4,202	**1,452,035**	107,959	53,266	**161,225**
	Other Public	315	24,512	2 4,202	**48,714**	2 ,410	4,281	**6,691**
	Private	13,484	338,041	5 63,530	**632,259**	5 4,420	139,852	**194,272**
	Total	**22,909**	**1,251,058**	**8 81,950**	**2,133,008**	**1 64,789**	**197,399**	**362,188**

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Institutions Type		Institutions	Enrolment by Stage			Teachers		
			Boys	Girls	Total	Male	Female	Total
Higher. Sec/ Inter Colleges (XI-XII)	Public	1,075	335,408	3 43,909	**679,317**	1 6,963	10,396	**27,359**
	Other Public	96	12,183	7 ,963	**20,146**	1 ,087	1,690	**2,777**
	Private	1,825	78,141	7 5,931	**154,072**	1 7,416	21,873	**39,289**
	Total	**2,996**	**425,732**	**4 27,803**	**853,535**	**3 5,466**	**33,959**	**69,425**
Degree Colleges (XI-XIV)	Public	753	105,450	1 76,749	**282,199**	7 ,707	6,892	**14,599**
	Other Public	24	11,768	2 ,865	**14,633**	304	553	**857**
	Private	358	10,567	1 8,594	**29,161**	2 ,072	3,040	**5,112**
	Total	**1,135**	**127,785**	**1 98,208**	**325,993**	**1 0,083**	**10,485**	**20,568**
Non-Formal Basic Education	Public	10,185	123,850	2 37,897	**361,747**	6 02	9,583	**10,185**
	Total	**10,185**	**123,850**	**2 37,897**	**361,747**	**6 02**	**9,583**	**10,185**
Technical & Vocational Institutions	Public	692	53,945	2 8,189	**82,134**	4 ,060	1,847	**5,907**
	Other Public	224	12,564	9 ,054	**21,618**	924	494	**1,418**
	Private	2 ,143	82,532	5 2,403	**134,935**	4 ,923	2,317	**7,240**

	Total	3,059	149,041	8 9,646	**238,687**	9 ,907	4,658	**14,565**
Teachers	Public	146	394,186	1 98,185	**592,371**	-	-	**3,219**
Training	Other Public	-	-	-	**-**	-	-	**-**
Institutions	Private	23	2,323	1 ,898	**4,221**	-	-	**266**
	Total	169	396,509	2 00,083	**596,592**	-	-	**3,485**
Universities	Public	59	200,109	1 62,797	**362,906**	-	-	**31,312**
	Private	57	44,960	1 6,146	**61,106**	-	-	**6,197**
	Total	116	245,069	1 78,943	**424,012**	-	-	**37,509**
Professional	Public	488	127,372	7 5,079	**202,451**	4 ,240	2,198	**6 ,438**
Institutions*	Other Public	71	27,314	9 ,480	**36,794**	597	332	**929**
	Private	957	134,595	4 5,391	**179,986**	7 ,986	2,784	**1 0,770**
	Total	**1,516**	**289,281**	**1 29,950**	**419,231**	**12,823**	**5,314**	**1 8,137**

Institutions Type		Institutions	Enrolment by Stage			Teachers		
			Boys	Girls	Total	Male	Female	Total
Deeni Madrassas	Public	313	26,378	1 1,518	**37,896**	1 ,227	291	**1 ,518**
	Other Public	41	2,632	2 ,277	**4,909**	130	20	**150**
	Private	11,799	913,597	5 56,043	**1,469,640**	41,042	12,199	**5 3,241**
	Total	**12,153**	**942,607**	**5 69,838**	**1,512,445**	**42,399**	**12,510**	**54,909**
Total	Public	175,554	13,456,810	10,011,094	**23,467,904**	424,230	265,367	**724,128**
	Other Public	3,114	324,591	2 81,931	**606,522**	8 ,188	12,894	**21,082**
	Private	72,466	6,758,954	5 ,264,057	**12,023,011**	195,743	398,281	**600,487**
	Total	**251,134**	**20,540,355**	**15,557,082**	**36,097,437**	**628,161**	**676,542**	**1,345,697**

SOURCE: Pakistan Education Statistics 2005-06

Islamization of Education in the Name of Ideology and Nationalism

The term "ideology" is basically a set of beliefs or principles that underlie one's actions in a political, economic or social system (Ray, 1992). It refers to political, economic and social ideas presented or disseminated by groups contending for obtaining power over people's consciousness. The state for instance, disseminates its dominant ideology everywhere. Religious groups in the Muslim world counter this with their ideology. Both may do it through electronic and print media, national anthems and formal and informal education etc, of which textbooks may be a part, which make it necessary for me to look at such textbooks very briefly in the coming paragraphs. In short, when I use the term 'ideology' in this chapter I will use it for ideas given by the state or ruling elite, in the pursuance of some objectives like national integration and maintenance of a group's hegemony on the others.

Among many others, it is history which is used to propagate one's ideology and create a world view which supports the powers that be. In the recent history of Europe, the examples of notorious state interventions in historiography can be found in the regime of Nazi in Germany and Fascist regime in Italy before World War II. Less notorious are the colonial experiments in education and the distortion of American history by erasing parts dealing with slavery and the annihilation of the native Americans (Fitzgerald, 1979). In India the Congress[14], with a view to creating a composite Indian nationalism by eliminating the tension between Muslim and Hindu identities, promoted history which de-emphasised the role of religion and emphasised that of economic and political factors in India's past. The National Council for Educational Research and Training textbooks do not vilify Muslims but they do not accept Islam as a basis for the creation of Pakistan (Behera, 1996 p198). The Hindu nationalist, such as the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) wants to control history as a justification for a Hindu identity for India. In 1977 Moraji Desai (Indian P.M) conceded the Hindu nationalists' demands by banning well-known histories. Among others *Medieval India* by Romila Thapar; *Modern India* by B. Chandra and R.S. Sharma' *Ancient India* were withdrawn from the schools. According to Behera (1996) in 1979 the Indian History Congress endorsed the textbooks reaffirming its commitment to the 'scientific and secular approach to the study of history'. However, after winning October 1999 elections, Hindu Nationalist party BJP came to power and started Hinduizing historical and other texts (Dawn, 20 Feb 2000).

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[14] The largest political party of India.

In Pakistan, too, the main ideology-burdened texts or propagandist texts are historical, political and sociological in nature. The subject of Pakistan Studies contains elements of all three and is meant for disseminating state-supported ideology. As we have seen, such a use of history is not new. All official historians are made to conceal those aspects of the truth which would annoy the powers (state establishment) that be. In this regard the role of the Curriculum Wing of the Ministry of Education cannot be underrated.

In Pakistan, the responsibility for designing the national curricula and textbooks in Social Studies, English, Urdu and Civics from Class I to Class XII, lies with the Curriculum Wing of the Federal Ministry of Education and the provincial Text Book Boards. The Curriculum Wing is mandated to design all pre-university curricula and issue guidelines to textbook writers and school teachers. Provincial Textbook Boards are assigned for the writing of textbooks and get them printed after their contents are approved by the Curriculum Wing. A close analysis by a group of independent scholars shows that for over several decades particularly after the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, the curricula and the officially mandated textbooks in these subjects have contained material that is directly contrary to the goals and values of a progressive, moderate and democratic Pakistan (Nayyar and Saleem, 2003). In their latest analysis of Pakistani school textbooks, which can be found in a report *The Subtle Subversion,* Nayyar and Saleem (2003) came up with a conclusion that the most significant problems in the current curricula and textbooks are:

- Inaccuracies of fact and omissions that serve to substantially distort the nature and significance of actual events in our history.
- Insensitivity to the existing religious diversity of the nation
- Incitement to militancy and violence, including encouragement of *Jehad* (holy war) and *Shahadat* (martyrdom)
- Perspectives that encourage prejudice, bigotry and discrimination towards fellow citizens, especially women and religious minorities, and other towards nations.
- A glorification of war and the use of force
- Omission of concepts, events and material that could encourage critical self-awareness among students

- Outdated and incoherent pedagogical practices that hinder the development of interest and insight among students

Urdu medium schools or non-elitist government funded schools are much more vulnerable to such curriculum, as have rightly been pointed by Ahmed, (2003) in her essay, *Teaching of Social Studies: Class 6 to 10*.

> Unfortunate are the Pakistani students who are forced to follow the social studies curriculum and textbooks designed by the Ministry of Education and the Textbook Boards. In contrast, students from the affluent sections of the society who can afford to go to elite English Medium schools aiming for O and A level examinations of the British universities are extremely fortunate to be exposed to an exceedingly interesting and enlightening material in the discipline of social studies.

However, the project of using Islam to create Pakistani nationalism of the kind which supports increased militarisation is not confined to non-elitist government funded schools alone. Islamic Studies, Pakistan Studies and Urdu are compulsory in all public and private schools of Pakistan and they all contain such lessons. But according to Rahman (2002), "dose is less intensive in the elitist English medium institutions because foreign textbooks, English literature and outside influences[15] counteract it." More or less similar views were expressed by Rahman (2004, p32) in his other book Denizens of Alien Worlds:

> As English-medium school students are exposed to other discourses that probably dilute the influence of the state-sponsored ideological texts, it is only the Urdu-medium ones (i.e. the common people of Pakistan) who face the full brunt of this ideological exposure.

As mentioned above, the states quite often use formal education as a tool to disseminate and perpetuate their political messages. In the Pakistani context, except religion, there was hardly anything common in a socially, culturally and ethnically heterogeneous society. Such diverse disposition of the country made the use of education as a political tool very essential since its

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[15] In the previous paragraphs, he explained about the outside influences, by which he mean the exposure of elitist-English medium schools students to cable, TV, international electronic and print media etc.

birth in 1947. Political leadership of that time found Islam and Urdu[16] useful as integrative symbols against the threat of ethnic breakup. In the face of anti-Urdu and pro-Bengali riots in East Pakistan, the government acknowledged Bengali as a second national language of Pakistan but its policy regarding the place of Islam in education remained intact. The country's education system started to enforce one particular view of Pakistani nationalism and identity, namely that Pakistan is an Islamic state rather than a country with a majority Muslim population. This came about partly due to the insecurity that the newborn nation was facing, and partly because of the emphasis on the "two-nation theory" as the basis for Pakistani identity. These combined to produce the need for a singular homogeneous majoritarian Muslim identity that could be sharply differentiated from that of India, even though it meant suppressing the many different shades within Pakistan.

Brief history of educational policies

The First Educational Conference was called by the Government of Pakistan in 1947. The Federal Minister for Education underscored the direction that was to be taken by the education in the new state. Among the three issues of priority, the foremost was to have an educational system that was inspired by Islamic ideology (Jalil, 1996).

During the military rule of Ayub Khan, a National Commission for Education was established in 1959, whose report was adopted as the National Education Policy. The responsibility for primary education was transferred to provincial governments. During the second 5-year plan (1960-65), primary and secondary curricula were revised, and "much emphasis was laid on Islamic studies and religious education" (Jalil, 1996 p167). The promised financial allocations were severely cut down due to the 1965 war with India. The New Education Policy of 1969 aimed at minimizing the wide gap between the traditional madrassa system and the general system of education.

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[16] Urdu emerged as a symbol of Muslim identity in the wake of Urdu-Hindi controversy period in pre-partition India. According to Rahman (2002), Urdu was related to Muslim identity and had also been linked with the struggle for power between Hindus and Muslims in India.

Following the separation of East Pakistan in 1971, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's government embarked on reforming education but remained committed to designing curricula relevant to the nation's changing social and economic needs compatible with so-called basic ideology. The basic objectives of the education policy of 1972-1980 were:

    (i)   Ensuring the preservation, promotion and practise of the basic ideology of Pakistan and making it a code of individual and national life.

    (ii)   Building up national cohesion through education and by promoting social and cultural harmony compatible with our basic ideology (New Education Policy, 1972-80, p 2-3).

Soon after his coup in 1977, the military government of General Zia ul Haq had its own problem of legitimacy, which it tried to guise in an overarching quest for Islamization of the society. Education was among the first of its victims. Religious political parties became enthusiastic partners in this quest. In the educational sphere, this amounted to a distorted narration of history, factual inaccuracies, inclusion of hate material, a disproportionate inclusion of Islamic studies in other disciplines, glorification of war and the military, gender bias, etc. Subsequent governments either failed to check these harmful deviations, or willingly perpetuated them.

In early months of Martial Law, General Zia-ul-Haq called a national education conference, the goals and objectives of which were "to redefine the aims of education, choose basic strategies, ascertain the main problems in education confronting the nation, and to bring education in line with Pakistani faith and ideology" (Jalil, p 272). The direction, again, was clear. General Zia said in his inaugural speech: "Our curriculum must ensure that our children are brought up educated as good Pakistanis and good Muslims. They must imbibe the lofty ideals and principles of Islam". (Zia's inaugural speech, 1977, quoted by Jalil, 1996).

Under the new policy, the subject of Islamic Studies was made compulsory at all levels of education up to BA, teaching of Arabic[17] was made compulsory in all schools to students of

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[17] Arabic is language of Koran.

all religions, great emphasis was placed on the Ideology of Pakistan, the madrassa education was encouraged by declaring madrassa certificates equivalent to normal university degrees.

This effort formed part of the larger process of Islamization, in which the government imposed several laws including the blasphemy law and the Hudood ordinance, the system of *Zakat* and *Ushr*, established *Sharia* courts. It also started a major process of Islamising the education system by bringing in radical religious ideologues from political parties sympathetic to the dictatorship to devise new curricula and to ensure that textbooks were consistent with these guidelines. As a matter of fact, there was continuity between Zia's policies of Islamising education and the policies of earlier regime. The difference, indeed, was that of degree not of kind. Rahman (2002) commenting on Zia's policy says, "this was not case of a radically new policy but of more of the same" (p 277).

Following the restoration of democracy in 1988, the two major political parties, the Pakistan Muslim League and the Pakistan Peoples' Party ruled alternately – twice each – until the 1999 military coup of General Musharraf. The two parties had different levels of commitment to the Islamization process initiated by General Zia-ul-Haq, and hence different perceptions on the role and utility of the doctrinal contents of curricula and textbooks.

The Muslim League was firmly in favour of the Islamist agenda. It was about to bring in a constitutional amendment for the imposition of Islamic Sharia when the government of Nawaz Sharif was dismissed by the military coup of October 1999. With such a strong commitment, the Sharif government was not likely to change the process of Islamization of education. In fact, the National Education Policy 1998-2010 prepared by his government was intended to:

> ".. provide guidelines on strengthening the ideological frontiers of Pakistan, based on Islamic teachings and to equip the nation with required knowledge and skills." (The National Educational Policy, 1998 – 2010)[18]

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[18] The National Education Policy, 1998-2010, quoted in Nayyar and Ahmed (2003).

The policy made *nazra* Koran[19] compulsory from Class-I and learning the Qur'an with translation from Class -IV. Islamic Studies was made compulsory from Class-I to BA/BSc level. Not surprisingly, there was little effort to change the Zia era curriculum.

Although Benazir Bhutto's government was less committed to Islamization, attempts to undo the ideological content of education during her two tenures were neither well-organised, given high priority, nor subject to scrutiny. It seems the Islamist groups within the educational bureaucracy were able to successfully resist such attempts. The bureaucracy showed how by using its command of details and procedures, which politicians lack when they take office and often never acquire, they could resist long enough for the Minister to either lose interest or be replaced.

The military government of General Musharraf embarked on an ambitious plan to reform the education sector following his unambiguous proclamation against religious extremism. A comprehensive Education Sector Reform (ESR) Action Plan was prepared. It sought to reform all the sectors of education, and supported the reform process by raising the expenditure on education to an unprecedented 3% of GDP. However, the ESR Action Plan came up with hardly any substantial success. Apparent reason was the resistance made by MMA against Musharraf's educational reforms.[20]

Present government led by Pakistan People's Party (PPP) expressed little interest to review the national curriculum. One can gauge the solemnity of present government towards education by the fact that it reduced education budget to 1.85% of GDP this year. It seems clear that unless there is a much greater priority given to education in general and a fundamental change in curricula and textbooks in particular, Pakistani children will continue

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[19] Nazra Koran means the capability to read Koran.
[20] MMA was an alliance of country's right-wing Islamist parties. During Musharraf regime, MMA was the largest opposition party in centre and was coalitional partner in two provinces (out of four) with Musharraf's political Party PML (Q).

to be educated in bigotry, violence and hate, as they have been during the last several decades especially during and after Zia regime.

Theories on the causes of religious extremism in Pakistan

Scholars of neo-Marxist, feminist and social historians have defied the older Marxist and functionalists views about religion as a 'false consciousness' used as a tool to repress class struggle. These new sociologists of religion have portrayed religious institutions and theological worldviews as expressive of class and power struggles, rather than of monolithic ideological hegemony; the interests of the less powerful have been found to be expressed through and in religion. For many, religion, spirituality and belief contribute to enhancing the inherent dignity and worth of every human being. Religion, however, is sometimes used and abused to fuel hatred, superiority and dominance. The politicization of culture and religion creates an intolerable environment and the rise of religious intolerance is a cause for serious concern. Much of the literature on the role of religion in politics and religious extremism falls into three major groups. One school of thought believes that religion is always violent, such as Hent de Vries (2002) and Mark Juergenmeyers (2001). De Vries argues that there is no religion without violence of some sort, and no violence without religion of some sort. But De Vries' theory cannot explain why religious conflict is sometimes violent and sometimes does not lead to violence. "Does violence inevitably shadow our ethical-political engagements and decisions, including our understandings of identity, whether collective or individual?" he asks. Juergenmeyer, on the other hand, argues that religious violence is a result of people's tendency to see their lives as a struggle between good and evil. He asks, 'why do religious people commit violent acts in the name of their god, taking the lives of innocent victims and terrorising entire populations?' He argues that this is because people believe they are part of a cosmic struggle between the powers of good and evil - a battle to bring order and peace out of chaos and darkness. The clash between the forces of darkness and light can be understood not as a sacred struggle, but as a real fight which often involves political manoeuvring. He claims that when there is an identity crisis or problem of legitimacy, threat of defeat; a real world struggle can be conceived as a sacred war where enemies are demonised.

Another school of thought, that includes Daniel Pipes, Samuel Huntington, Bernard Lewis and Jessica Stern, views only Islam and not other religions as inevitably violent. Daniel Pipes, for instance, claims that radical Islam is an ideology incompatible with secular society. Muslims want to force the secular world to submit to their principles. They are thus, kind of extremists who cannot stand the thought of peace (Daniel Pipes, 2002). However, there surely are better explanations of why religion has become an essential 'tool' in politics and its extremist manifestation. For instance, Ted Gurr's model of relative deprivation, mobilization and grievances is extremely relevant to understand the intrusion of religion in politics and the phenomenon of extremism. It is often said that religious extremists are not the poorest of the poor. However, those who are most deprived, oppressed, most in need, are not those who usually violently rebel. In fact, all the big names in the list of the culprits in recent history have turned out to be those who were educated and well off[21]. While there have been food riots and peasant uprisings, most often, revolutions and violence have occurred when conditions are better or have been improving, and by those who are not the most deprived. Explanations vary, but generally focus on two propositions. First, deprivation is subjective and a function of a person's perception, needs, and knowledge. To nail deprivation to an objective or absolute lack of something such as freedom, equality, or sustenance, is to ignore the fact that the definition of these shifts according to historical periods, culture, society, position, and person. The second proposition, deals with these norms. It asserts that we take our presently perceived or expected position, achievements, gratifications, or capabilities as a base of comparison against our wants or needs, or what we feel we ought to have. The gap between wants or ought and gratifications or capabilities is then our deprivation, or relative deprivation, in the sense that it depends on our basis of comparison (Arshi Saleem Hashmi, 2009). According to Ted Gurr, relative deprivation is cause of aggression which he explains in his book 'Why Men Rebel'[22]. Ted Gurr articulates models, suggesting that the gap between expectations and achievement would contribute to the willingness of the people to rebel. In particular, he observed, rebellion was most likely to be fuelled by movements on the basis of perceived deprivation. In this discussion here on religious extremism, the aggressive, violent phenomenon of extremism attests to Ted Gurr's theory that it is actually the gap between the expectations of a regime based on 'true' faith (Sharia in case of radical Muslims) and the reality of an 'adulterated' regime that lead these self-proclaimed custodians to use violence in the name of religion. In case of Islam, it has glorious past and the expectations of orthodoxy

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[21] Osma Bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Khalid Mohammad Sheikh etc.
[22] Gurr, Ted. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

is 'Islamic Revivalism' which generally means that the supporters of the movement want to revisit history and to re-establish the so-called glorious state and societal structures, which once distinguished Muslim civilisations from others.

Here two theories can be made the base; one that grievance born of deprivation (either economic or political) is an individual concern that manifests itself collectively. Quite often material and political deprivation is aggregated within specific groups with a homogenous cultural identity. For example, a religious or linguistic minority might suffer disproportionately in a given society, and this form of grievance can lead to unrest across the social lines that distinguish the minority group. In most regions of the world with ethnic and religious movements, which sometimes are of a violent nature, are minorities rebelling against the system. South Asia, however, is unique in the sense that the religious revivalism in extreme forms in all of its troubled areas was initiated by religious majorities (ibid, 2009). This makes part of the discussion, which argues that to understand the intrusion of religion in politics i.e. 'Political Islam' and the phenomenon of religious extremism in Pakistan, one needs to understand the element of 'Fear'. One wonders if Winston Churchill realized the sweeping political accuracy of his assertion that 'we have nothing to fear but fear itself'. The common thread that weaves violent political movements together is fear. This is true in the case of violent religious movements. The fear of being deprived of something drives one to act aggressively, while the fear of being left out drive movements against prevalent forces. Although it is neither the only motivating factor for the political manifestation of religious violence, nor necessarily the most obvious, it is conspicuously present at all times (Hashmi, 2009). Whenever the question comes to one's mind that why people harbour hatred or why they are willing to kill or die for a cause, the answer inevitably is 'fear'. Religious radicals are united by fear. In this case there is no discrimination of religions, whether they are Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus or Buddhist, the fear of being deprived the role and status that they expect and desire to achieve is common denominator. Some groups fear change, modernisation and loss of influence and others fear that young will abandon the churches, temples, mosques and synagogues for physical and material gratification. They are especially fearful of education, especially if it undermines the teachings of their religion. They fear a future they will have little control over and one they cannot even comprehend. Therefore, if relative deprivation can explain the phenomenon of religious extremism among religious minorities, the fear of being deprived the expected status and the inability to achieve a

'desirable' society can explain the rising religious extremism and militancy among the religious majority. South Asian religious majorities suffer from such fear that have often led to extreme and unfortunate occurrences like the pogrom in Gujarat and Burma unleashed by the Hindu and Buddhist respectively against Muslims. Similarly, Jihad waged by Islamic militants against the 'infidels' in Pakistan, or the Sinhalese Buddhist engaging in violence against Tamil Hindus and Christians in Sri Lanka. If we see the history of Pakistan, it is clear that relative deprivation (Islamic Revivalism) as Ted Gurr suggested and the element of fear both have pushed the Muslim majority in Pakistan into a cycle of religious violence. The political, military and religious forces 'feared' losing the identity on the basis of which the state was carved out, in addition to the vast majority of people who live on the margins of society and feel deprived of political and economic power, leading to the politicization of religion and its extreme manifestation in the form of violence (ibid, 2009).

According to Umbreen Javaid (2011) one of the leading factor behind religious extremism is the failure of orthodoxy to come to grip to the challenges of the modern world. She states that the arrival of Europeans in India not only introduced modern and improving knowledge in India but also made the old stock of the knowledge possessed by the orthodox Muslims irrelevant for the functions of the modern state and the production and distribution process of the modern economy. This redundancy bred frustrations among the old guards. They 'feared' the loss of influence and eventually chose to take up the path of armed struggle.

Founder of Pakistan Mohammad Ali Jinnah's vision of Pakistan as a tolerant, modern, Islamic democratic state was later hijacked by religious elements who found in the new state an opportunity to advance their causes along conservative religious lines (the genesis of Political Islam in the newly born state of Pakistan). These religious elements started making inroads into the state structure during the General Ayub's era (1958-69). The orthodoxy was promoted as an undeclared state policy under the dictation of international force as an effective tool to fight against the onslaught of Communism (Javaid, 2011). In addition to external factor, there were some internal features of the Pakistani society which were very conducive for orthodoxy. For instance, Islam was the only bonding factor in a multi-ethnic state of Pakistan. This policy got its justification and re-enforcement from the attitude of pseudo liberal intellectual of the new state whose half baked nationalism failed to appreciate

the raison deter for the creation of the new state of Pakistan and who, with a comparable dogmatic approach, wanted to enforce a socialist set up in Pakistan as compared to enforcement of ill-defined conservative version of Sharia propagated by the orthodoxy. Interestingly this opposing ideology wanted to use state as a tool for the enforcement of their doctrine. The support of state for the orthodoxy waned and waxed exactly with proportion to the intensity of the ongoing cold war throughout the world between the capitalist and the communist blocs. The support had truly started in Pakistan after the start of Korean War and attained its first peak during the days of the Vietnam War. Internally, the reflection came with an open state patronage for the politics of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the clear collusion between the military generals of the day and the JI (ibid, 2011). The nexus reached at its culmination in the wake of soviet invasion in Afghanistan.

According to Umbreen Javaid (2011) the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 heralded a win-win era for religious extremism in Pakistan. The extremist elements were eulogized and fortified through mass media campaign and excessive funding by national and international agencies. A clandestine international net work was established to promote religious frenzy. The production frontiers were extended upward by broadening the cadre and inducting the Deobandis. Hitherto, the executing agency of extremist agenda was mainly the JI, who in their own right were comparatively literate and futuristic. The opening up of cadres to the Deobandi madrassas opened a flood gate for utter backwardness and rigidity (ibid, 2011). Ahle Hadith school followers had a very thin representation in Pakistan and were not very popular because of their aversion even to innocent pleasures of modern life. Their code of life did not suit or match the aspirations and moorings of an average Muslim of this country. They saw a golden opportunity to expand and swell their ranks with the help of the astronomical money provided by the foreign monarchy (ibid, 2011).

As mentioned above orthodoxy fears change, modernisation and loss of influence. In order to perpetuate its influence on the masses, the orthodoxy, since the very beginning, not only made inroads in Pakistani politics but also established a network of madrassas in the country (Mir, 2006). These madrassas have come to symbolise the stagnation and ossification of knowledge. Madrassa system is an outright opposition to rational thinking in the field of education (A. H. Nayyar, 1998). According to Rana Muhammad Amir (2009) most of the

'Pakistani madrassas are seen as a catalyst promoting extreme views. Their role in shaping the views of their students and the masses and their affiliation with political, sectarian and militant organizations is viewed as a serious concern (ibid, 2009). Umbreen Javaid (2009) traces the emergence of extremism in Pakistan to these seminaries and adds that religious extremism not only stands for militancy and sectarianism but also to subjugation of women and their confinement to the four walls of their homes, intolerance of difference of opinion, disdain and scorn for modern technology and gross violation of human rights of the dissidents and opposing camps (p.282). In this study the researcher has tried to determine the attitudes of students studying in different types of madrassas and mainstream schools regarding the status of women, position of minorities, sectarian differences, armed jihad and primary aim of education.

Conclusion

Religion has often proved to be a powerful binding factor which has merged heterogeneous groups into a distinct nationality. Through appeal to supernatural authority, religion promotes national unity as a divine command. Examples abound in contemporary history: the Greek Church as a source for Greek nationalism, the Catholic Church as a factor in Irish separatism, Judaism and the state of Israel, Islam and Pakistan (Usmani, 2011). Barring the fact, the newly born country was multi-lingual, multi-ethnic and a multi-religion, soon after the creation of Pakistan, the founding fathers sought to create a nation based on common language and common religion. They ignored the notion of 'unity in diversity' and discarded the secular principles that were in vogue in British India. Barring the fact that more than 56 per cent population of the country speaks Bengali, Urdu was declared as the only national language of Pakistan soon after the independence. Language controversy resulted in the eruption of riots in erstwhile East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). The net effect of this process has been to create a deep rooted alienation among certain ethnic entities especially among Bengalis and resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. The policy of Islamization of education is still in practice with same degree of obstinacy. The curriculum of government schools conveys a very harmful message: being a Pakistani is equated with being a Muslim and that only Muslims are true Pakistani citizens. Patriotism has been equated with Islamic zeal. The only thing they have been able to achieve is to alienate non-Muslim population, at a grave cost to the national integration (Nayyar, 2003). In this respect, Kazi (1994) and Ahmed

(1998) has also presented a good critique on Pakistan's educational history in relation to ethnic diversity. They rightly pointed out that the ruling elite has overemphasised Islamic ideology and used Urdu to neutralize ethnic tendencies. The chapter describes how language and religion were used to create a so-called unified Pakistani nation. The policy of 'Islamization of education' on the part of ruling elite to combat ethnicity has also been examined and top of all this, the chapter deliberated upon the three major streams of education systems: English-medium, Urdu-medium and madrassa with a view to determining how did they evolve in post independence period and how do they function in contemporary Pakistan.

Chapter 3

Madrassa Education in Pakistan

Introduction

It is beyond any doubt that all of the three education systems need extensive debate, but as the current study is in particular about madrassa education so more deliberation is required to have deep understanding of the whole phenomenon. In this chapter, the historical evolution of madrassa would be discussed; the development of madrassas system in pre and post colonial era will come under discussion. In the wake of colonization, how these religious schools got reformed, will also make the part of discussion. In addition, the organisation, curriculum and funding of madrassas will be deliberated upon. Moreover, the pedagogical techniques being used in these schools will also make the part of debate.

Before 9/11 academic works on Pakistani madrassas were limited. However, after the tragic events of 9/11, there has been a plethora of academic works, journalistic articles, and policy reports, on madrassas. Numerous concerns arise from the debate on madrassa education, ranging from rise in Islamic militancy due to madrassa education to the incompatibility of non-secular education in a modern globalised socio-economic and educational set up. The ongoing increase in the number of madrassas has raised the eyebrows of educationalists and policy makers in Pakistan as well as in the West. Their writings have highlighted the importance of developing a greater understanding of madrassas. Increasingly, scholars, researchers and educators argued that improving the educational status of Pakistan, which unfortunately is one of twelve states that have lowest literacy rate in the world, will help to bring a positive change. It will not only check the growth of Islamic extremism but will also help to increase the number of citizens prepared to participate in the economic development of the state. In order to pursue these objectives many proposals were forwarded to revamp the whole system.

Madrassa education is an important issue in the contemporary era. The tragic incident of 9/11 further enhanced its significance and took its implications beyond the national and regional domains. After this incident, madrassas of the Muslim world in general and Pakistani

madrassas in particular gained special world attention: mainly because madrassas in Pakistan are seen as more militant in their outlook as compared to their counterparts in other parts of the Islamic world (Jessica Stern,[23] 2000-01; Tariq Rahman, 2004).

Madrassas play a very complex role in the modern Pakistani society. At one hand, they serve as the sanctuaries of 'have-nots' and impart free education to the poor sections of society, while on the other hand some writers have portrayed madrassas as 'factories of terrorism' and 'hotbeds of fundamentalism'. This crucial role played by the madrassas demands a very careful analysis. For this purpose, the chapter has been divided into several sections and different aspects of the madrassa phenomenon have been elaborated separately.

The word 'madrassa' is derived from an Arabic word *darsum* meaning lesson. In the contemporary Arabic language, the 'madrassa' means 'centre of learning' (the Arabic plural form of madrassa is *'madaaris'*, but for the sake of clarity I will use the English equivalent plural form 'madrassas' in this study). Madrassas are in some ways analogous to a seminary in Christian tradition.

Usually, the terms madrassas and maktabs (Koranic schools) are wrongly used for each other. So, before we move on, it is necessary to understand the difference between the two. The Koranic school or *Maktab* is a place where the children go to read and recite the Koran only. Koranic schools can function in the mosque, under a tree, in the house of the Koran teacher or under an open sky.[24] The term Madrassa is usually used for a bit more organized institutions with classrooms and teachers for different levels. Many Madrassas have boarding and lodging facilities for students that are offered free of charge. In addition, whereas a Koranic school is usually a place for lower level of religious education (the recitation and

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[20]Jessica Stern in her writings "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," Foreign Affairs79, no. 6 (2000): 115-126, and "Meeting with the Muj," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57, no.1 (January-February 2001)42-50 has advanced the belief that Pakistan's madrassas are factories of ideological indoctrination and even military training for terrorist organisations throughout Pakistan and South Asia.

[24] In Pakistan, most of the mosques act as maktabs as well. Some parents send their children to maktabs daily (hardly for one hour) to make their children learn how to read and recite the Koran and the affluent families usually hire tutors who come at home to teach their children Koran.

pronunciation of the Koran), Madrassa is the institute where more in-depth religious education is provided. Most of the Madrassas issue certificates of various levels and maktabs don't. According to Saleem H. Ali (2009) "madrassa is organised and integrated religious institution with various levels which maktab simply don't". For the term 'madrassa' there are regional variations in other part of the Muslim world as well. It is interesting to note that in many countries, including Egypt and Lebanon, 'madrassa' refers to any educational institute, while in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh it commonly refers to an Islamic religious school.

Historical Evolution of Madrassas

According to early historical accounts, the first formal education sessions in Islam started at the house of Zaid-bin-Arqam in the valley of the Safa Hills, where the prophet of Islam Muhammad himself worked as a teacher and some of his early followers became his students. After the prophet's migration to Medina (*hijrah)*, a madrassa, namely the madrassa *Ahle-Suffa* was established in a mosque at Medina. Ubada-ibn-Samit was the primary instructor there. Mu'az-ibn Jabal and Abu Zar Ghifari; two well-known companions of the prophet, were among the students. As Islam expanded to other regions of the world (non-Arabic), it became necessary to create uniformity in the teachings of Islam to preserve religious conformity. Henceforth began the tradition of madrassas worldwide, in order to develop writings and textbooks on *Fiqah* (Islamic Jurisprudence), *Sunna* (prophet's traditions), *Hadith* (prophet's sayings) and *Tafseer* (the interpretation of Koran). Anzar (2003) has rightly said that initially it was mosque that acted as a centre of learning. This mosque based understanding and acquisition of knowledge worked very well for the Muslims of the Arabian Peninsula because the tribal traditions combined with the teachings of the Koran were sufficient to govern the lives of people who spoke the same language and had the same cultural background. However, as Islam expanded to other regions and came into contact with other indigenous traditions and languages, it became necessary to create a cadre of Muslim experts who would develop sophisticated writings and textbooks on *Fiqa* – Islamic jurisprudence, *Sunna* – Prophet's traditions, *Hadith* – Prophet's sayings, and *Tafseer* – the interpretation of the Koran, to cater to the needs of non-Arab Muslim populations. Thus began the tradition of Madrassa, the centre for higher learning the initial purpose of which was to preserve religious conformity through uniform teachings of Islam for all.

One of the first known madrassa is believed to have been established in AD 1005 by the Fatmid caliphs in Egypt, teaching the minority shi'ite version of Islam. It was fairly well-resourced educational institute complete with library, teachers for different subjects, including astronomy, architecture and philosophy, and students were provided with free ink, pens and papers. After the Sunni conquest of Egypt, the Sh'ite version of Islam promptly replaced with the Sunni version. Several Shia manuscripts were destroyed but secular writings on astronomy and other fields of general knowledge were preserved. A number of books were subsequently preserved and taken to Baghdad, where Seljuk Vizier called Nizam-ul-Mulk bin al-Tusi established the first organized madrassa called the Nizamiyah in AD 1067.

According to Anzar (2003), two types of education were imparted in madrassas of that time: 'scholastic theology to produce spiritual leaders, and earthly knowledge to produce government servants who would be appointed in various regions of the Islamic empire. The former produced *khatibs* (sermonizers), *imams* (prayer leaders), *qazis* (judges), *mudarris* (teachers), *muftis* (those who can issue religious edicts), and *shayookhul Islam* (the grand religious leaders), while the later produced clerks, accountants, geographers, astronomers, bureaucrats, statesmen, etc. (Nayyar, 1998, p.216). Later Nizam-ul-Mulk established numerous madrassas all over the empire that provided knowledge in the fields of science, philosophy, public administration and governance.' Nizam-ul-Mulk is thus considered to be the progenitor of the Islamic public education system. His act was quickly followed in other regions of the Islamic world. According to Kraan (1984) in the 12th century AD there were thirty madrassas in the eastern part of Baghdad alone, and between AD 1155 and 1260, the number of colleges in Aleppo increased from six to forty four. Even the Mongols built madrassas. The zenith, however, was reached in the Ottoman Empire: madrassas were found in every town and, by the eighteenth century, there were at least 275 madrassas in Istanbul alone. [25]

Offering food, lodging and a free education, madrassas spread rapidly throughout the Muslim empire, and although their curricula varied from place to place, it was strongly religious in

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[25] Miller,Barnette (1941). *The Palace Schools of Mullammad the Conqueror*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

nature because these schools ultimately intended to prepare future Islamic religious scholars (*Ulema*) for their work.

The First Curriculum

The original curriculum, as also the curriculum later devised by Ibn-e-Khaldun, consisted of two main branches of learning: revealed knowledge *(manqoolat, or Uloom-e-Naqliah)*; and the knowledge acquired through intellectual endeavour *(Ma'aqoolat, or Uloom-e-Aqliah).* It consisted of the following topics:

1. Koran: Tajveed, Qir'at, Hifz, and Tafseer
2. Hadith, and the ancillary knowledge of ascertaining the authenticity of ahadith
3. Fiqh and UsuI-e-Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence and its principles)
4. Philosophy of Religion (IlmuI Kalam or dialectics)
5. Tasawwuf (Mysticism)
6. Linguistic sciences: Nahw (grammar), Lughat (etymology), Bayan (Rhetoric), Adab (Literature)
7. Mantiq (Logic)
8. Hisaab (Arithmetic)
9. Ilm-e-Hindsa (Geometry)
10. Ilm-ul-Hae'at (Astronomy)
11. Ilm-ul- Tabiaat (Physics, chemistry, and medicine)
12. Moosiqi (Music)

Topics 1-5 belonged to the realm of revealed knowledge (Uloom-e-Naqliah). These must have formed the core of the curriculum of the seminary part of the school. The remaining topics 6-12 belonged to the realm of intellectual knowledge (Uloom-e-Aqliah), and were deemed necessary for anyone intending to enter into government service.

The separation of 'Islamic knowledge' as against the 'pagan' or *qadimi* (ancient) knowledge of the Greeks took place quite early in history. Although Uloom-e-Aqliah formed a part of the madrassa curriculum, this was probably never a source of achievements of the Muslim scientists for which early Muslim civilization is known. The *Aqliah* curriculum was very restrictive, and perhaps meant only to provide enough knowledge for state employment of the

madrassa graduate. The institutions producing famous scholars in *Uloom-e-Aqliah* were different. It may be noted that the early Islamic kingdoms permitted establishment of educational institutions without enforcing any rigid system of granting accreditation. The schools were mainly recognized for the famous teachers around whom they were established. Within this freedom to establish schools, there was the system of state patronage under the institution of *waqf* (or trust) through which the schools were financially supported. This also turned out to be the instrument by which an independent teacher was made a salaried employee, securing his financial well-being on the one hand, but making him susceptible to state pressures on the ideological front on the other. There was a bias towards religious education in these madrassas. Even during the times when 'the philosophical, natural or "foreign sciences" flourished in Islam, they were rarely taught at the madrassas'[26] because 'the Islamic *waqf*', upon which rested the whole edifice of institutions of learning, excluded any and all things that were considered to be inimical to the tenets of Islam. Hence the exclusion of the godless "science of the Ancients" (knowledge of the Greeks) from the curriculum took place. The exclusion meant that the study of "foreign sciences" had to be pursued privately; without being subsidized in the same manner as the Islamic sciences and its ancillaries. But there was nothing to stop the subsidized student from studying the "foreign sciences" unaided, or learning in secret from masters in the privacy of their homes, or in the *waqf* institutions, outside of the regular curriculum.[27] Thus *waqf* was both a system of support as well as control in the times when not only was Islam grappling with the alien methodology of the imported Greek knowledge, subjecting it to serious tests on the plain of logic, but also with the various schools of thought that had emerged within Islam.

Madrassas in sub-continent

When the early Muslim 'saints' came from the Arab lands, Iran, and Central Asia, and settled in India, elementary religious schools cropped up here and there, mainly around mosques and shrines. Rather than being madrassas, they were simply centres of preaching to the pagan local population and for imparting elementary religious knowledge to the Muslim population.

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[26] Kraan,op. cit., p.11.
[27] Makdisi, G. (1981). *The Rise of Colleges, Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West*. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.

State patronage on the pattern of Arab, Iranian, and Central Asian kingdoms started once the Central Asian conquerors settled down in India and established sultanates. The founding of the first madrassa is credited to Sultan Muhammad Ghauri at Ajmer around AD 1210 which was followed by the Mu'izzi madrassas of Delhi and Badayun, and the Nasiriyyah. The purpose as well as the pattern was the same as in the parent country. The purpose was primarily to educate people for state employment, and the pattern closely followed that of the well-established schools in the Muslim world. As pieced together by Maulvi Abdul Hayy of Darul Uloom Nadwah, the important subjects of study, broadly speaking, were:

1. Grammar (etymology, syntax, and rhetoric)

2. Literature

3. Logic

4: Islamic Law and its principles

5. Koranic commentary

6. Hadith (sayings of the prophet of Islam)

7. Mysticism

8. Scholasticism (religious philosophy)

The books listed contained many of the original texts from the Baghdad schools, but also contained texts from the later scholars of Bukhara and Khwarizm in Central Asia. 'The same curriculum more or less continued for over two hundred years to the close of the 15th century in India'.28 An important change was the introduction of Persian language as this was the court language and of the Muslims who had migrated from Iran and Central Asia. Persian literary classics were introduced into the curriculum. Medicine and music were also important parts of the curriculum. Organized technical education is known to have been given in the time of Firoz Shah Tughlaq, but that was in special guilds outside of the conventional madrassas.

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[28] Sufi, G.M.D. (1941). *Al Minhaj The Evolution of Curriculum in tile Muslim Educational Institutions of India*, p. 29.

Beginnings of Bifurcation

There was a qualitative change in the curriculum during Akbar's reign (1556-1605). Every student was then expected to study arithmetic, geometry, ethics, agriculture, astronomy, physiognomy, economics, civics, logic, and medicine. The higher sciences were divided into Ilahi (theology), Riyadi, (comprising mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, and music), and Tabi'i (physical sciences). History was also an important subject. In studying Sanskrit, students were to learn Vyakarana (grammar), Vedanta (philosophy), and Patanjali (Yogism). Hindus and Muslims were studying in the same schools and colleges'.[29] This was about the time when a clear division appeared between religious and secular education. The Arabic madrassas continued to operate, but were becoming increasingly irrelevant to the needs of statecraft. The court language forced people, both Muslims and Hindus, to acquire skills in the use of the Persian language. The job market thus made Persian schools more attractive because they offered more secular courses, although in various instances the religious courses were almost the same as in Arabic madrassas. The curriculum of Persian schools included a long list of Persian classics, as well as a translation of Sanskrit classics.

Parallel to the madrassas, the secular Persian school system flourished rapidly. These schools were comparatively secular in their outlook and their curriculum consisted of literature, history and ethics[30.] Translations of the Hindu classics, Vedanta, Lilalvati, Patanjali, and Mahabharata were also part of curriculum during Akbar's reign.[31] In general there were many more Persian schools than Arabic madrassas. According to a survey conducted for the British East India Company in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, out of a total of 375 schools in the district of Bareli, there were 228 Persian, 17 Arabic, and 130 Mahajani.[32] The southern

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[29] Ibid., p. 53.

[30] Maulana Abul Hasanat Nadawi discovered a Persian curriculum that was in use in the year AD 1688. This is given in Sufi, G.M.D. (1941). *Al Minhaj The Evolution of Curriculum in tile Muslim Educational Institutions of India*, p. 77-78.

[31] Shahabi, Mufti lntizamullah. *Islami Nizam.e-Ta'aleem ka Chauda Sau saalah Muraqqa* , p. 126. Matb'a S'aeed, Koran Mahal, Karachi.

[32] Ahmed, Shabir (1974). *Taleem ki Kahani*, p. 311. Kifayat Academy, Karachi.

region of Bihar had 291 schools, of which 279 Persian and 12 were Arabic.33 On the other hand, Sindh in 1856 had 374 educational institutions; of which 52 were Persian and 276 were Arabic.[34]

Resurgence of Madrassas in Modern India

The decline of the Muslim empire, the occupation of the land by foreign forces- particularly the defeat at the hands of these forces in the 1857 war of independence (commonly known as mutiny of 1857 in the English history) -the onslaught of the Christian missionaries, introduction of a different educational system by the colonial power, and the failure of the Muslim population in general to accept the available alternative (and hence to be accepted in the employment of the colonial powers) forced a large section of Indian Muslims to fortify their religious identity. This led to a new wave of madrassas in the second half of the last century, many of which piloted a new movement for Islamic education, and which proved standard-bearers of the present-day madrassa. The big names in this category were Darul Uloom Deoband (established in 1867), Nadwatul Ulema (established in 1894)," Darul Uloom-Mazahirul Uloom, Saharanpur (established in 1898), etc. Although they mainly followed *Dars-i-Nizami*, they were distinguished from the earlier madrassas by the mode of teaching, organization, regularization of the curriculum, introduction of a system of examinations on the pattern of the British system, and a system of awarding formal certificates and degrees (*asnad*).

Prior to this formalization, graduation from a madrassa had been rather informal. Education was imparted in institutions as well as by individual teachers. The courses were based on textbooks. A student chose a set of courses and completed as many of the prescribed books as he was capable of. Some restricted their studies to linguistics only, some to arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, and others, possessing special inclinations, chose to go into the deeper realms of *Hadith*, *Fiqh, Usool-e-Fiqh,* and *Kalam*. Whenever a student thought he had had enough, he was given a certificate by the teacher that he had completed the study of such

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[33] Noorullah and Naik, *History of Education in India during the British Period.* p. 40

[34] Ahmed, Shabir (1974). *Taleem ki Kahani*, p. 311. Kifayat Academy, Karachi.

and such books to the satisfaction of that teacher. The mode of examination was also informal and mostly oral. It was not uncommon to find a student attending several madrassas in search of illustrious teachers.

This mode of teaching changed in the new madrassas. The curriculum was structured over periods of time, i.e., years of schooling. Prerequisites were prescribed, and a mixed mode of written and oral examinations was introduced. Certificates and degrees to be awarded were defined. The administration was less personal. Run by a *majlis-e-shoora*, Darul Uloom Deoband had a *sarparast* (rector), a *muhtamim* (chancellor), a *sadr mudarris* (principal), and other staff.

The most distinguished feature of madrassas that developed over a period of time and finally established in the later half of the nineteenth century was that they were conceived to be free of obligation to the state. The earlier schools had almost always had state endowments in the form of land grants to sustain the teachers and students, as well as for books and other essentials. The founders of Darul Uloom Deoband introduced the practice of running their institution on community funds, collected in person by teachers and students, either in cash or kind. For them this practice meant several things. Besides freeing them from the whims of rajas, nawabs (dukes) or governments, it brought into the community a sense of participation in the process, and instilled in both the teachers and the taught a sense of obligation towards the people, rather than towards any rich benefactor. The founders of madrassas were strongly anti-imperialist, and communicated this spirit to their students. Many of the founders were in the forefront of the independence movement and had a nationalistic political outlook. They viewed the imperialism of the West more as that of Christendom, and the modern technology brought in by the imperialists as a tool in the hands of an adversarial religious force. As such, they remained strongly opposed to modern ideas produced in the West. This attitude has not changed since then. In this respect, Prof. Nazeer Ahmed aptly remarked, "The Muslims who had lost the power struggle with the British for the control of India, had a deep distrust for the foreigners whom they called Firangees. This distrust did not stop at the English language and culture, but extended to science, philosophy and mathematics. As a result isolation set in and the old system of education retreated into a corner. Even the rudimentary exposure to philosophy and mathematics that was introduced in the syllabus of madrassas (*Dars-i-Nizami*) was abandoned because the Firangees (Britishers) were much better at these subjects than the Mullas (religious scholars). For survival, the Mullahs had to introduce product

differentiation into religious education and give it new branding. This was done by attaching the label "*deen*" (religion) to the Madrassa. The bifurcation of education into *deeni talim* (religious education) and *dunyavi talim* (worldly/secular education) was now complete." The Madrassa teach medieval times outdated books, some of the books and their dates are given in the appendix.05.

Madrassa growth and profile in Pakistan

As mentioned above the history of madrassas in the modern era started with the establishment of Deoband Madrassa in India in 1867. After it, madrassas sprang up in different parts of the country. After the partition of India, Pakistan inherited some madrassas. According to Malik (1996) "it is estimated that at the time of independence, there were only 137 madrassas." However a survey conducted in 1956 put the number of madrassas in all of Pakistan (excluding East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh in 1971) 244 (ICG Asia Report, 2002, p2). Since then the number of madrassas went on increasing and during Soviet invasion in Afghanistan (1979-1989) the number of madrassas increased radically. According to Dr. Mahmood Ahmed Ghazi (2002); former minister for religious affairs, the number of madrassas in Pakistan is 10,000. However, he acknowledged the problem that as all madrassas are not registered so the number might be more. Table 3.1 shows the growth of madrassas in Pakistan by province.

Table 3.1: Conservative Estimates of Religious Educational Institutions: 1947-2000

Province/Region	1947	1960	1980	1988	2000
Punjab	121	195	1012	1320	3153
NWFP	59	87	426	678	1281
Sindh	21	87	380	291	905
Baluchistan	28	70	135	347	692
AJ Kashmir	4	8	29	76	151
Islamabad	--	1	27	47	94
Northern Areas	12	16	47	102	185
FATA	-	-	-	-	300
Total	245	464	2056	2861	6761
Source: Ministry of Religious Affairs 1979 and Ministry of Education, Islamabad 1988 – 2000, Institute of Policy Studies, 2002.					

It is important to note that the government now acknowledges that the number of madrassas is more than twice what IPS (Institute for Policy Studies) study estimated in 2002. In his recent autobiography, even former President Musharff (2006, p.312), has put the number at approximately 14,000, disseminating education to an estimated 1 million students. P.W. Singer, even, gives the figure of 45,000 madrassas but quotes no source for this number (Singer, 2001).

Teaching in Madrassas

Madrassas in Pakistan are teaching obsolete curriculum as Christine Fair (2006) says that the texts used in madrassa syllabi dates back to 11th and 14th century. In addition, the teaching methods prevailing in madrassas are traditional. An observation of classes in session in madrassa shows that the teachers continually encounter problems because their lessons lack direction, stimuli and motivation (ibid, 2006). These problems might be because of the fact

that they never had any formal training in teaching methods. The most common method of teaching is rote learning. The teaching style of a typical teacher in a Pakistani Madrassa, especially, in lower grades is very autocratic and little children are punished for not conforming to the rules and regulations. Severe corporal punishment is the norm (Anzar, 2003). The teacher often makes a child recite the lesson in a sing-song voice and the class joins in the chorus. Children rock their bodies as they chant the familiar parroted formulas. Essays in languages are written on the black board to be copied verbatim. Any originality, any questioning of given facts, any deviation from the traditional interpretation is frowned upon and sometimes punished. Students memorise Koran even without understanding its meanings. This problem is logical outcome of the fact that most of the teachers in madrassas by themselves don't know the meaning of Arabic text of Koran (Rahman, 2004). Curriculum and pedagogical methods being applied in madrassas clearly serve their vested interests and suits to their ostensible objective i.e. the preservation and transmission of fourteen hundred years old traditions in the modern age. Such non-secular and un-democratic educational system is totally outdated in Pakistan; a county that is moving inexorably towards democratisation and a globalised economy. At this time and stage, a constructive, dynamic and democratic educational set up is desperately required. According to Siddiqui (2009) Education has to move from transmission to transformation for which we have to revisit our definitions of knowledge. This would lead to more vibrant and interactive classroom dynamics where students are engaged in co-construction of knowledge. For this we need to challenge the ideology of an existing assessment system which is memory-based and is unable to tap thinking skills of a higher order (ibid, 2009).

Siddiqui (2009) further added that we need to strive for an assessment system which requires students to think critically and apply knowledge in diverse contexts. For all these changes in learning, pedagogy and assessment, it is important that we revisit our ideology about the very aim of education. The transmission mode of education that supports existing power structures needs to be revamped and replaced with transformation mode where the main objective is to reduce socio-economic gaps in society and empower the underprivileged by maximising their life chances.

Various Sects and their Madrassas

As an Abrahamic religion, Islam follows many of the same tenets of monotheism as Judaism and Christianity[35]. There are two primary sects within Islam--- Sunni: accounting for 85 per cent of the worldwide population of around 1.4 billion and Shia: accounting for 14-15 per cent. Pakistan is a Sunni Muslims majority country and Shias account for around 20 per cent of the population though in absolute terms, the second largest population of Shias in the world after Iran is found in Pakistan (around 27 million)[36].

For our purposes, it may be useful to categorise the madrassas by the sub-sects and then also include Shia madrassas at par with some of these sub-sects. These sub-sects are all from major sect Sunni. This is especially relevant since the federations of madrassas are organised along these lines. The three primary Sunni sub-sects in Pakistan are: Deobandi, Brailvi, Ahle Hadith/Salafi. Each sect has its own madrassas in which their own version of Islam is taught. The two primary wings of Sunni-Islam---Deobandi and Brailvi---dominate the madrassa system in Pakistan.

Madrassas were created to preserve and propagate what these various sects viewed to be the correct interpretation of Islam. Brief descriptions of these sects are as follows:

Deobandis

The madrassa at Deoband, a small town in the United Province (now Uttar Pardesh) of India, was established by Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanautwi and Maula Rasheed Gangohi in 1867. According to Rahman (2004), 'while earlier seminaries were loosely organised, Deoband had a rector (sarparast), a chancellor (muhtamim) and the chief instructor (sadr mudaris)'. Its income was derived from popular contributions and the curriculum was based on the Dars-i-Nizami developed by Mulla Nizamuddin Sihalvi at farangi Mahal; a famous seminary of a family of Islamic scholars (ulema) in Lucknow (Robinson, 2002).

Deobandi school of thought opposed folk Islam in which intercession by saints occupied a major place. Seeking initiation in a mystic order was considered the path to salvation and miracles were seen as crucial and defining attributes of saints and prophets. They do not

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[35] For a popular comparative account of the Abrahamic Faiths, see Armstrong, 1998.
[36] Estimates are based on various sources like adherents.com and islamicweb.com.

oppose mysticism altogether but do argue that adherence to the Islamic law (Sharia) was the path to mystical exaltation. They also oppose folk practices like that of fixing days for distributing food to gain spiritual merit and celebrating the anniversaries of religious personages (for more detail see Metcalf, 1982).

Brailvis

The Brailvi movement was inspired by Ahmed Raza Khan of Barailly (1856-1921) who is highly revered by his followers (Sanyal 1996). The Brailvis justified the 'mediational, custom-laden Islam, closely tied to the intercession of the pirs (saints) of the shrines' (Metcalf 1982: 296). They believed that prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was made of Divine Radiance (Noor) and had knowledge of the unknown (Ilm ul Ghaib). The Deobandis and the Ahl-i-Hadith ulema (religious scholars) challenged both these beliefs.

Ahle Hadith

The movement inspired by Sayyed Ahmed was called Wahabi because, like Mohammad bin Abdul Wahab (1703-1792) of Saudi Arabia, Sayyid Ahmed and his associates also wanted to purify and reform Islam. They claimed to follow no particular school of jurisprudcnce--- Hanafi, Shafi, Hambali, Maliki---and were called nonconformists (ghair muqallid i.e. one who does not follow a fixed path) by their opponents. They used the term Jama'at Ahl-i-Hadith for themselves and appealed to the Government of India that the term Wahabi should not be used for them. The government 'ordered in 1886 that the term Wahabi should not be used in official correspondence' (Ahmed 1994: 203) but it is still used by many people in Pakistan. The Ahl-i-Hadith madrassas emphasize the Koran and Hadith and oppose folk Islam and common practices like the anniversaries of saints, the distribution of food on religious occasions and popular mysticism.

Jamaat-i-Islami

The Jamaat-i-Islami is a revivalist political party created by Abul ala Maudoodi (also spelled Mawdudi) (1903-1979) whose life and achievements have been ably described by Sayyed Vali Reza Nasr (1996). Maudoodi believed in borrowing technology and other concepts from the West in order to empower the Islamic community. As such he favoured more modernist

education than any of the orthodox organizers of the traditional madrassas, He did, however, also emphasize upon the refutation of Western culture and intellectual domination and, therefore, his anti- Western critique is more thorough, trenchant and appealing for educated class than that of the traditionalist seminarians (Rahman, 2004).

Madrassas of Shia

All of the above madrassas are Sunni madrassas, with the exception of Jamaat-i-Islami. Theoretically Jamaat-i-Islami promotes Muslim brotherhood and claims itself to be supra-sectarian but its ideology and mode of worship is alike to Sunni. Besides the Sunni run madrassas, there are also Shia run madrassas as mentioned earlier. The Shias believe that the successor of the Prophet (pbuh) was Ali lbn-e-Abi Talib and not the first three caliphs whom Sunnis take to be his successors. They mourn the battle of Karbala, fought between the Prophet's grandson Hussein and the Umayyad caliph Yazid bin Muawiya in AD 680. This led to the strengthening of the supporters of Ali and the rise of Shia Islam which has been described very competently by S.H.M Jafri (1979).

Organisation of Madrassas

The preponderance of Pakistan's madrassas is associated with one of five Islamic school boards (Wafaq). There are four Sunni madrassa boards (Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadees, Jamaat Islami and Barelvi), and one for the Shia. All madrassa boards even those run by Shias approve Dars-i-Nizami as curriculum for madrassas. However, all boards use different texts which suits their own version of Islam. For instance, every madrassa board recommends Tafseer (Interpretation of Koran) as a vital part of its curriculum, but each board recommends those texts on 'Tafseer' which specifically suits its own maslak (version of Islam). In the same vein, Islamic Law, Islamic jurisprudence, Principles of Hadith, Fiqh, Usul-i-Fiqh etc are taught in all madrassas that are affiliated with these boards but in accordance to their own version.

Each central board issues asnad (Degrees/certificates) for the graduates who study in a madrassa that is affiliated with it. All associated madrassas are registered to these boards and get instructions regarding changes in curriculum or while dealing with other administrative

works. In the table 3.2, complete name of each central board (Wafaq), its location and date of its establishment is given.

Table 3.2   Central Boards of Madrassas in Pakistan

Name	Sub-sect	place	Date established
Wafaq-ul-madaris-al-Arabia Pakistan	Deobandi	Multan	1959
Tanzim-ul-madaris	Brailvi	Lahore	1960
Wafaq-ul-madaris Shia	Shia	Lahore	1959
Rabta ul madaris al Islamia	Jamaat-i-Islami	Lahore	1983
Wafaq-ul-madaris-al-Salafia	Ahl-i-Hadith	Faisalabad	1955

Curriculum of madrassas

Most of the madrassas in Pakistan teach Dars-i-Nizami as a standard curriculum. But before Mulla Nizam Uddin who standardised the curriculum different teachers taught different texts to students and there was no compact curriculum of religious schools. Texts taught in religious seminaries before Mulla Nizam Uddin were mostly religious in contents. As Francis Robinson (2002) in his book 'The Ulema of Farangi Mahall and Islamic culture in South Asia' says that Pre-Dars-i-Nizami curriculum(s) emphasised largely on manqulat (transmitted knowledge/revealed knowledge) and it was Dars-i-Nizami that brought maqulat to forefront. The significance of the enhanced emphasis on ma' qulat in the Dars-i-Nizamiyya lies in part in the superior training it offered prospective lawyers, judges and administrators. As mentioned earlier, at that time Persian schools which impart secular education were much in number and Arabic schools (madrassas) were less in number. In order to enhance the popularity of Arabic schools, their curriculum was revamped and Darsi-Nizami was formulated. The study of advanced books of logic, Philosophy and dialectics were taught. Dars-i-Nizami continued updating of its contents and Dars-i-Nizami educated men were

sought for employment outside the domain of religion at that time (Rahman, 2004). Turning point in the history of religious schools came with the advent of East India Company when they confined themselves to religious sphere only.

In Pakistan, Dars-i-Nizami remained mainly unchanged. [37] Canonical texts are still part of madrassa curriculum. The greatest critic of the madrassa curriculum was Maulana Maududi[38] who argued that, being based on memorisation of medieval texts, the madrassas were not providing relevant education to the Muslim society. The Dars-i-Nizami has come to symbolise the stagnation and ossification of knowledge. It is taught through canonical texts which, however, are taught through commentaries (sharh); glosses or marginal notes (hashiya) and super-commentaries (taqarir). There are commentaries upon commentaries explained by even more commentaries. For the South Asian students, they no longer explain the original texts being themselves in Arabic. They have to be learned by heart which makes students use only their memory not their analytical powers.

Education at Madrassas

However, Islamic education imparted at formal religious institutions is systematized, even though the specific duration and content of education at each level may vary with the sectarian orientation of the madrassa in question and the extent to which it has augmented its curriculum with mainstream subjects. Thus conditions may vary. The following schedule is based on a standard, seventeen-year, formal Islamic education program.

- The first level is *Ibtedai* (primary or elementary), where only the Koran is taught. This level covers the early five-year period of education that is generally equivalent to the primary-school level in the mainstream educational sector.
- The second stage is *Mutawassitah*, or 'intermediary. It is generally three years long and comparable to the middle-school level at mainstream schools.
- The third through sixth levels are each two years long. At this stage students begin the *Alim course* curriculum. Often called Dars-i-Nizami, it is modified according to the particular sectarian affiliation of the madrassa in question. Madrassas of different

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[37] Though some modifications were made in Dars-i-Nizami yet its major contents remained unchanged and canonical texts are still there.

[38] Maulana Maududi is the founder of Jamaat-i-Islami.

sectarian affiliations will teach different versions of the curriculum. Some times this eight-year[39], four-stage program is referred to as *fauqani*. Or it may be called the "*Alim course*," in reference to the final certificate or degree (*sanad*). The first of the four stages is *Thanviyah-e-Ammah,* followed by *Thanviyah-e- Khasah*. The next two stages, *Aaliyah* and *Alimiyah*, are considered advanced. When students complete the *Alimiyah* level, they have completed the Dars-i-Nizami curriculum. This degree is recognized by the government of Pakistan as an M.A. in two subjects (Islamic studies and Arabic). A person with this degree is an *alim*.

- The final stage of religious study is *Takmeel*. Comparable to post- graduate studies, it can be one year or more long and comprises various specialized fields of study.

In table 3.3 the certificates and degrees of madrassas along with their chronological equivalence to mainstream educational institutes is given:

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[39] Yearly curriculum of madrassas is given in the appendix 06.

Table 3.3: Programs of *Madaris* Study and Their Chronological Equivalence to Non-religious School

Level (Darja)	Level	Duration	Certificate (Sanad)	Comparable to mainstream education
Ibtadai	Nazra	4-5 years	Shahadatul Tahfeez ul Koran	Primary (5th Grade)
Mutavasatta	Hifz	3 years	Shahadatul Mutavasatta	Middle (8th)
Sanviya Amma	Tajveed,Qirat	2 years	Shahadatul Sanviya al Amma	Matric (10th)
Sanviya Khasa	Tehtani (Higher Secondary)	2 years	Shahadatul Sanviya Khasa	Intermediate (F.A)
Aliya	Mohqufaleh Khasa va sada	2 years	Shahadatul Aliya	B.A
Alamiya	Daura Hadees Sabia va Sania	2 years	Shahadatul Alamiya phil ulumul Arabia vul Islamia	MA and recognised as MA in Islamic Studies and Arabic by GOP

In the wake of 9/11 religious seminaries came under the gaze of national and international community. Before that madrassa education hardly attracted policy makers' attention. Barring the fact, till 2001 madrassas remained the victim of government's apathy, but successive governments in Pakistan, since inception, formulated policies related to madrassa education from time to time. However, it is debateable to what extent these policies were implemented in letter and spirit. In the face of external pressure, after terrorist attacks, some serious steps were taken on the part of Musharraf government (1999-2007) to reform

madrassa system but because of severe reaction from the religious political parties, no substantial achievement was made in this regard.

Madrassas in Pre-Soviet Invasion Period

Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1980s witnessed the surge of madrassas both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In that time, madrassas not only increased in number but they also had exposure to state sponsored *Jihad* (armed struggle). Pre-Soviet invasion period can be taken as dormant phase in madrassas' history.

Following independence in 1947, Pakistan underwent a series of political convulsions as a result of tensions between the military and the feudal elite. While most of Pakistan's early leaders followed Jinnah's model of modern education, they did not have widespread support in rural areas. The bureaucracy and the military were modelled after the British system which was resented by the Ulema (religious scholars). Though some of these scholars were appointed to government posts their presence was largely symbolic.

The ascendance to power of the military general Ayub Khan in 1958 heralded a new era in Pakistani madrassas' history. As part of his policy of exercising control over religious institutions, the Ayub Khan government established an *awqaf* property (non- transferable religious endowments on which many madrassas were dependent to meet expenses) department to regulate shrines and madrassas. To this day there is a high-ranking civil-service position of 'secretary awqaf' -these officers have jurisdiction over awqaf properties.[40] In response to such moves, the ulema established four *wifaqs* or federations of madrassas along sectarian lines: Wifaq al Madaaris al Arabiya (Sunni-Deobandi); Tanzim al Madaaris- al-Arabiya (Sunni-Bareilvi); Wifaq al Madaaris-al-Salafia (Sunni- :Salafi/Ahle-Hadith) and Wifaq al Madaaris-al-Shia (Shia). Interestingly enough the *Salafis*, who are now most closely associated with the Saudi regime, were the first to take this initiative in 1955 even before Ayub Khan's government while the other sects established their boards in 1959 or later (Riaz, 2005). The government's reform plan included the introduction of secular education in madrassas similar to what was attempted by President Musharraf. The aim was to enable

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[40] The secretaries are assigned through the regular civil service and do not need any approval by the religious establishment.

madrassa students to 'enter public professions' and 'play their full part as citizens.'[41] The madrassa reform efforts of this period were largely rejected by the ulema except for some initial hints of approval from the Jamaat- e-Islaami.

After the fall of Ayub, Z.A. Bhutto came up with the idea of socialism and nationalisation. The education sector was nationalized too; however, most of the madrassas remained independent. According to government data, 1,828 schools, 346 madrassas, 155 colleges and 5 technical institutions were nationalized (Rahman, 2004, p. 16). Bhutto further tried to build alliances with the ulema by offering to grant madrassas the equivalence of public sector certificates and diplomas. The highest degree of the Deobandi wafaq was to be made equivalent with a Master's degree in Islamic Studies from a government university; given madrassa students cleared a Bachelor's level English course. However, this equivalence was largely implemented and institutionalized during the Zia administration that followed Bhutto.

The new military ruler, general Zia-ul-Haq was known for his strong religious proclivities and he believed fervently in establishing a more ideological state. To gain the support of the religious seminaries, the government offered incentives such as the 1979 education policy that promised 5000 mosques schools and a national committee for religious institutes to transform madrassas into an important part of the educational system. A national survey was conducted by Dr A.W.J Halepota, an educator who had also been associated with Ayub Khan's commission for educational reform in the 1960s, which proposed improving the economic condition of madrassas and modernizing them with the aim of eventually integrating the religious and the formal education sectors while 'conserving the autonomy of madrassas' (Malik 1996). Some modern subjects at the primary, secondary and graduation levels were recommended without altering the theological texture of the curriculum. Following the earlier initiative during the Bhutto years, the Zia government declared the highest certificates of *wifaq* boards' equivalent to MA in Arabic or Islamiyat and waved off the condition that madrassa students should clear a Bachelor's level English course. Madrassa graduates were employed as teachers, to widen their horizon of employment. The primary motivation for this was to fill a shortage of Arabic and Islamiyat teachers in colleges and universities created by making coursework in these subjects compulsory at various levels of schooling. It was just the beginning of an age that attained its culmination in post-Soviet

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[41] Quoted in ICG 2002.

invasion in Afghanistan era. Religious parties also flourished during this period. There were only 30 such parties in the country in 1979, and now there are more than 200.

Madrassas in Post Soviet Invasion period

The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets in 1979 necessitated a response from the Islamists as well as the Americans. The linkage between madrassas and the Soviet-Afghan war has been widely contested. While Western writers (Singer, 2001; Stern, 2004) as well as numerous Pakistani intellectuals and nongovernmental organizations (Ahmed, 2003, ICG, 2002) affirm the linkage, the military establishment in Pakistan largely denies any direct connection. When interviewed for this study, General Hamid Gul, who served in the army during the Zia years and was later the head of the Pakistani military's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) towards the end of the Afghan war denied any direct support from the ISI for the madrassas. However, he acknowledged that the influx of Afghan refugees during this time necessitated the establishment of schools for the education of their children and since the Afghan population had a greater proclivity for religious education, madrassas started to emerge naturally near refugee settlements and the military provided logistical support to these institutions.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the Pakistani military as well as its allies in the United States at this time encouraged an ideologically-driven war. Islam was certainly used to galvanize action on the part of the Afghans that were fighting the Soviets as well as to garner public support within Pakistan and in this regard madrassas of Pakistan and Afghanistan played a pivotal role (Allen, 2006). For instance, special textbooks in Darri (Afghan Persian) and Pashto were written at the University of Nebraska-Omaha with US government support and were taught to madrassa students. There are video-taped speeches of the Secretary of State during the Carter administration, Zbigniew Brezinski, hailing the cause of jihad against the 'Godless Soviets' and also hailing the role of madrassas for upholding the morale of soldiers.[42] American arms and money unquestionably flowed to Afghanistan through Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence as a way of defeating Soviet advances in the region. The US decision to support the *mujahideen* (so-called holy warriors) was, however, guarded because of the Iranian revolution that occurred around the same time. Policy-makers were wary of supporting religious zealots but were comforted by the fact that Iran was primarily

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[42] Quoted by Saleem H. Ali (2009)

Shia and Afghanistan was primarily Sunni.[43] Initially the aid was relatively small; amounting to $30 million in 1979, the year the Soviet invasion took place. However, this was increased considerably both directly to Afghanistan and also to Pakistan which interestingly coincided with the establishment of hundreds of new madrassas in both countries. At its peak, the aid to Pakistan amounted to $3.1 billion annually and to Afghanistan over $600 million (Tanner, 2002). New madrassas in Punjab (mainly in the southern belt of the Punjab) were also opened to strengthen ties with Arab countries, mainly Saudi Arabia.

However, the fact that the United States helped the jihadists at the time is unfortunately used by some scholars to dignify the radicalism of the jihadists, suggesting that they are giving America a 'taste of their own medicine.' In particular, a recent book by Mamdani (2004) points the finger directly at the US, suggesting that some 'high-level' jihadists (Islamic militants) were trained in US camps. Mamdani states that in four years some 80,000 *mujahideen* were trained from 43 Islamic countries. In Pakistan, with active US support, over 2,500 madrassas were set up with an annual enrolment of 225,000 students (ibid, 2004).

Madrassas in Post Soviet withdrawal

Following the retreat of Soviet forces in 1989, and the ensuing civil war in Afghanistan, the madrassas' connection to conflict became clearer. For example, the Dur-ul-Uloom Haqqania in Akora Khattak, one of the most well-known madrassa has direct connections with the Taliban (whose name itself means 'the students'). European Union reported that as many as 30 per cent of the Taliban's fighters attended madrassas[44]. Mullah Umar, the leader of the Taliban has an honorary degree from this madrassa. The head of Darul-Uloom Haqqania, Maulana Sami-ul-Haq was elected a member of the Pakistani Parliament in the 2002 election. He was chairman of the pro-Taliban anti-Western Pak-Afghan Defence Force and was once imprisoned by former president Musharraf, but was released. "Haqqania is known in Pakistan as Jihad University, a name not bestowed on it by a sensationalist media but by the Maulana and his charges themselves."[45] Haqqania madrassa has a student body of 1500 boarding students and 1000 day students, from 6 years old upwards. Each year over 18,000 applicants from poor families compete for around 500 open spaces.

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[43] Ironically, the US is now having to deal with Sunni extremism in Iraq and the Shias are perceived to be moderates.

[44] South Asia Times, "Slow Learning curve at Pakistan's Madrassas", March 10, 2004.

[45] Newsweek's The Bulletin, "Jihad Generation", August 2, 2005

In 1988, civilian rule came back to Pakistan to stay for a decade till 1999 when the military decided to take power back. None of the four elected governments could complete their respective tenures before being ousted by another. In the meantime, the Taliban took over most of Afghanistan in 1994 and the Pakistani government, under Benazir Bhutto,[46] recognized the Taliban government (Rashid, 2000). As far as the issue of madrassa epidemic was concerned, Benazir and Nawaz Sharif governments had hardly anything new on their policy papers when Pakistan witnessed martial law fourth time in its short history in October 1999.

Madrassas in post 9/11 era

After terrorist attacks on American soil Afghanistan was attacked and Taliban government was toppled for providing harbour to so called terrorists. Pakistan; one of the three countries that recognized Taliban government was forced to play a front-line state in the war against terror. Owing to external pressure Pakistani government declared 8 religious groups as terrorist and banned them.

In order to counter increasing militancy, Musharraf regime introduced Madrassa reforms. The government of Pakistan came up with some legislation in this regard.

- Pakistan's Madrassa Education Board ordinance 2001

- Voluntary Registration and Regulation ordinance 2002

By virtue of this legislation curriculum of madrassas was destined to change. The ordinances stipulated the induction of secular subjects, like English, Mathematics, Computer Science, Economics, Political Science, Law and Pakistan Studies in madrassa curricula at different levels. In addition, all the madrassas were supposed to get registered so that enrolment of students and scrutiny of finances of madrassas could be materialised. It was also a viable way to have a watch over the entry of foreign students in madrassas. The government declared that 'model madrassas' will be established. All these policies regarding madrassas met with

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[46] Benazir Bhutto became highly critical of *Talibanization* and in an op-ed in the *New York Times*, on 7 November 2007, she stated, "the political parties should unite in a coalition of moderation to marginalize the extremists and to shut down political madrassas; the Islamic schools that stock weapons and preach violence."

abysmal results. Initially, the legislation stipulated registration as mandatory for all madrassas but in the face of opposition from religious parties, the registration was declared voluntary. So far as the establishment of model madrassas is concerned, they are only three in number. Many critics believe that the failure of madrassa reforms was basically the result of half-hearted effort on the part of government (Saleem H. Ali, 2009).

Funding of Madrassa Education

Historically, madrassas in the subcontinent were supported by land grants and wealthy patrons. Their ownership has traditionally been in the form of a trust. In some ways madrassas are public institutions because of their social service dimension and inextricable linkage between Islam and the state in Pakistan. However, they are beyond government control and hence are private. However, as the funding sources indicate, there is a wide linkage of various interests which thus have figurative ownership of the establishments. Most of the madrassas are 'owned' by an individual religious leader; they may have a paper management committee or a board of governors, just for fulfilment of regulatory requirements. In fact, even the management committees or boards of governors are close relatives and hand-picked associates of the religious leader. This proprietorship dimension of madrassa management brings in the very important monetary or economic factor (Ali, 2009). Madrassas being religious schools also act as political institutions. Many madrassas are attached or affiliated to a religious political party and may receive support from them as well. For example, the madrassas organized by the Jamaat-e-Islaami in Mansoora, near Lahore, receive contributions from the party as well. According to estimates provided by the Punjab government, 1256 madrassas are affiliated with various political parties, with more than two-thirds of these affiliated with the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI).[47]

However, the source of the funds in turn to the parties that are earmarked for madrassas need to be better understood. In addition, the motivation for sending students to madrassas may also provide some insights into the source of funding, since much of it is intended in the form of scholarships for the needy. Some scholars have studied economic motivation for madrassa enrolment. According to Fayyaz Hussain (1994), a student who completed his ethnographic research on Jamia Ashrafia of Lahore in 1994, nearly half the students joined the madrassa

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[47] A report by Punjab government (2004)

for economic reasons. According to a survey which was conducted by Mumtaz Ahmad in 1976, 'more than 80 per cent of the madrassa students in Peshawar, Multan, and Gujranwala were found to be sons of small or landless peasants, rural artisans, or village imams of the mosques (quoted from Ahmad, 2000: 185). A survey conducted by the Institute of Policy Studies (2002), says that 64 per cent madrassa students come from rural areas and belong to poor agrarian families. Rahman (2004) conducted a survey in eight cities of Pakistan in December 2002 and January 2003, madrassa students and teachers were asked about their income. Among those who responded, 76.6 per cent belonged to the poorer sections of society. The teachers of the madrassas also mostly (61 per cent) belong to the same socio-economic bracket as their students.

Nevertheless, despite their modest needs, the sheer scale of madrassa prevalence still requires a steady stream of funds. Some of the sources of funds that are considered most salient are as follows:

Funding by Local and Global Philanthropists

Philanthropic donations by local aristocrats, particularly urban based traders and rural land owners, are a major source of funding for most of the madrassas. Every madrassa has certain identified patrons, particularly in rural areas or small urban towns. These donations are mostly motivated by a feeling of charity called *'Sadaqa* and *Khairat.'* It is also a means of atonement and gratitude to God for the devout. Some individuals also dedicate one of their children to study in a madrassa for a few years as an even greater mark of commitment. A study conducted in 2000 by the Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy claims that approximately Rs 7 billion ($120 million) are given in local philanthropy nationally in Pakistan, out of which a considerable proportion is given to local mosques, madrassas and religious shrines.[48] Local financial patrons such as the land owners and traders on every harvest make donations of wheat and cotton to local madrassas. Their financial contribution also forms a huge part of madrassa funding.

A recent study of charitable giving from the Pakistani Diaspora in the United States, authored by Professor Adil Najam (2006) under the auspices of the Global Equity project at Harvard University, concludes that Pakistani-Americans are a 'generous, giving and active

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[48] Saleem H. Ali (2009), Islam and Education: Conflict and Conformity in Pakistan's Madrassas.

Community'. Using a detailed survey of over 400 individuals across America and a series of focus group sessions, the study found that 62 per cent of the respondents reported that religious obligation was of 'high or 'very high' importance in their reason for charity. A slightly higher percentage gave motivational importance to 'helping others in need' (79 per cent) and 'helping family and friends' (69 per cent).

The report also has some sobering news for the Pakistani government. About half of the respondents stated clearly that their contribution would be higher if they had more trust in institutional support across Pakistan that assured them that their contributions were being put to good use. One of the sponsors of this project, The Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy, has undertaken the task of certifying charities through a detailed audit and review process, which can perhaps help in building this trust. This process may have important consequences for addressing concerns about monitoring the financial activity of extremist organizations as well.

By far the most significant individual charity in the Muslim world for development is the Aga Khan network of foundations, which have a collective asset base of almost half a billion dollars.[49] Indeed, the Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy itself had its genesis with the Aga Khan Foundation as well. However, this network of charities is run with utmost professionalism and registered in numerous non-Muslim countries as well. While the community derives its funds from giving by a mild Shia denomination within Islam, they also have numerous commercial investments by the Aga Khan's family such as hotels and tourism operations in Asia and Africa whose profits are also funnelled into the charitable activities of the network. Much of the educational support from this foundation goes to fund mainstream schools, institutions of higher learning and also some Shia madrassas.

Funds from Saudi Arabia and Iran

The role of Saudi Arabia in funding various Islamic organizations has come under criticism on many accounts. First, there is the role of the state itself in promoting the Wahabi doctrine of Islam which is perceived to be highly puritanical. The 9/11 commission report points out that 'awash in sudden oil wealth, Saudi Arabia competed with Shia Iran to promote its Sunni

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[49] Agha Khan Development Network web page: http://www.akdn.org/

fundamentalist version of Islam; *Wahabism*.'[50] Commenting on sectarian strife in Pakistan, Pande (2011) said, "…during Zia regime Pakistan became a battle ground for *Shi'ite* Iran and *Wahabbi* Saudi Arabia." The Wahabi doctrine originated in Saudi Arabia but follows a tradition of puritanical movements in Islam across the ages.

The donation towards Islamic education emanates from two primary sources in Saudi Arabia- government institutions and private foundations. The primary government institution that has supported Islamic educational efforts abroad is the *Rabita Aalam-e-Islami* (The Muslim World League) based in Makkah. This organization was established in 1962 to promote unity in the Islamic world. As part of its mandate, the Muslim World League established several schools around the Muslim world as well. Saudi Arabia through the Muslim World League has certainly helped in promoting a jihadist vision, though often with the acquiescence of Western governments (Yousuf, 2012). As noted earlier, the Afghan jihad was directly supported by Saudi facilitation of foreign militants. It is widely known and acknowledged by US government sources that in 1980, Osama bin Laden was recruited by Prince Turki-al-Faisal, then head of Saudi intelligence, to help organizing the *mujahidin* supply lines in the Russo-Afghan war.

The second major source of funds for Islamic education comes from a series of private charities from Saudi Arabia, Iran and other Muslim countries. In 2003, the Saudi government announced that it was banning private charities and relief groups from donating money overseas, until new regulations are instituted to ensure that the money is not being channelled to terrorist organizations. [51]

There appears to be a common acceptance in many US policy circles that a majority of funding for Pakistani madrassas comes from abroad, particularly Saudi Arabia. Yousuf, (2012) does not single out Saudia Arabia in this regard but pointed at Iran's contribution as well. However, little empirical evidence is provided to support assertions of figures such as those provided by policy research institutions such as the Centre for Security Policy or the Cato Institute that assert that 75 per cent of Pakistani madrassa funding comes from abroad.[52]

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[50] *The 9/11 Commission Report*, p. 70

[51] Armanios, Febe. (2003) *Islamic Schools, Madrassas: Background. CRS Report for Congress.* Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. http://www.fas.org/RS21654.pdf

[52] Alex Alexiev is quoted by Coulson (2004)- who acknowledges in a footnote that there is neither citation nor any empirical basis for these figures.

Our analysis shows that while this may have been true of certain madrassa clusters around the time of the Afghan-Soviet war, it is not a credible assertion based on our contemporary empirical research. The policy implications of simply focusing on Saudi sources of funding can be profound since many of the domestic sources would thus be neglected for regulatory oversight.

Zakat

Zakat is a religious tithe that Muslims are obliged to pay and the rate for its payment is 2.5 per cent of savings/assets that a person holds. Previously it was a private undertaking but in 1979, the government of General Zia-ul-Haq, levied zakat officially and set up an elaborate Federal Zakat Administration, with provincial Zakat Councils and even district Zakat Administrations governed by the Zakat Ordinance.

The purposes for which zakat funds can be spent are clearly mandated by Islamic injunctions. One of the key purposes is welfare of orphans and the destitute. Using this provision as an enabling opportunity, many madrassas that cater to orphans have been considered legitimate recipients of zakat funds. The Central Zakat Administration which is traditionally dominated by religious leaders devised a policy in the 1980s, through which zakat funds are given to madrassas specially those that give services to residential students. It is regulated by a policy called 'Revised Zakat Disbursement Procedure for *Deeni* Madrassas' as approved by Central Zakat Council on 18 May 2002.

It is generally believed that zakat funding provided the major impetus for growth of madrassas in 1980s and 1990s. However the official data of Islamabad Zakat Administration shows that 22 madrassas out of a total of 117 got zakat funding. It shows that though zakat is a source of madrassa funding yet no longer a major source of funding.

Somehow, on aggregate, zakat is also a resource flow to madrassas; approximately 150 million rupees are given by over 100 district zakat committees (DZC) to madrassas all over Pakistan.[53] In Islamabad, DZC gives approximately 2.0 million rupees to 20 different madrassas. These funds are meant for food and lodging of students; however, the DZCs give

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[53] Central Zakat Council, Annual Report 2002.

these funds directly to the managers of madrassas, and these are mostly utilized for infrastructure development and other expenses.

In principle the zakat funding is given directly to the entitled individual beneficiary. However in the case of madrassas, the quantum of funding is decided on the basis of student enrolment, but funds are not given to individual students, but payments are made directly to the manager of the madrassa. This gives him the authority and freedom to spend the funding. Often, such funding is mostly used for physical improvements and extensions in madrassas and rarely used for food, lodging and clothing of students, which is its authorized purpose.

Miscellaneous Sources

Every year after the annual Hajj pilgrimage, Muslims all over the world commemorate Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son by sacrificing a sheep, goat or cow/bull or even a camel: The meat of slaughtered animals is distributed among poor people and close neighbours. Apart from the distribution of the meat of the lambs to the poor and needy, the hides of the animals are also a highly prized and valuable donation. The scale of funds generated through this source is so huge that large political parties, charitable trusts and foundations and many hospitals launch a special campaign for the collection of raw animal hides of scarified animals.

The madrassas launch very vigorous campaigns for collecting the raw hides of sacrificed animals. These hides fetch a very good price in the market of approximately $20 per hide. It is estimated that approximately 9 million small animals (sheep, goats), and one million large animals (bulls, and camels) are sacrificed every year in Pakistan for this festival.[54] The revenue generated is thus significant and deserves further study to ascertain the exact amount that makes its way to madrassas.

While the direct contribution of government funds to madrassas is relatively small, the largest resource transfer to madrassas is the land grants by the state for construction of madrassas. According a survey conducted by Saleem H. Ali (2009) shows that 90 per cent of madrassas in Islamabad Capital territory are built on state / public land and invariably in violation of building and land use regulations. Invariably a mosque is attached to a madrassa and this

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[54] Estimates from livestock enforcement office, Islamabad, May 2005; as quoted by Saleem H. Ali (2009)

coupling greatly hampers any regulatory initiative by the state. Any pro-active initiative will be portrayed as interference by the government in the affairs of the mosque and easily dubbed a sacrilegious action. The ban imposed by the federal government on registration of new madrassas under the Societies Act of 1860, had been lifted in 2004 on the persistent demand of MMA dominated governments of NWFP and Balochistan. This allows for the ostensibly legitimate further expansion of madrassas though as mentioned earlier, most of the madrassas are marginally registered and there is limited enforcement of registration of any schools.

The Pakistani government has initiated a reform effort and is also providing funds to madrassas but not all are accepting this help-it is unclear as to how many madrassas these funds are being disbursed to. According to Rahman (2004), in 2001-02 a total of Rs 1,654,000 was distributed among the madrassas which accepted the help. An additional aid of Rs 30.5 million is promised for providing computers and changing the syllabi which will come to approximately Rs 28.6 per student (assuming around 1.05 million recipients). However, as all madrassas do not accept financial help from the government, the money would not be distributed as evenly as the above calculations might suggest.

Conclusion

Madrassa is a controversial educational institution of Pakistani society. The tragic incidents of 9/11 brought these schools under the gaze of international scholarship as most of the operatives of the Taliban[55] government in Afghanistan were 'educated' in the religious school system. The incident gave rise to many a question with respect to these schools: such as, what are these schools? How did they evolve? How do they function? What do they teach? How do they teach? Where do they get their money? Who supports them? How are they organised, so on and so forth. This chapter has tried to answer some of these questions. It talked about the genesis of these institutes in the Muslim world and their evolution in India and then in Pakistan. The chapter discussed about their kinds, their organisation, structure, curriculum, pedagogy and funding in detail.

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[55] The word Taliban means "students".

Chapter 4

Research Methodology

Introduction

This chapter presents the description of the research design and methodology employed in the present study which aimed to look into the attitude of students from madrassas. It is also destined to determine how the worldview of students coming from three different types of schooling systems is polarized such as what they think what education is for, what is their take on the position of non-Muslims in Pakistani society, what do they think about equality between men and women, what do they believe about *Jihad* (militancy/armed struggle) and tolerance of minorities and people of diverse sects and so on. This study is mixed method and was combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches in which research questionnaire and interview tools were the sources of data collection. This chapter starts with research aims and research questions followed by detailed comments on research methodology such as mixed method (combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies), description of research design (Instrumentation), participants and sampling, procedures, analysis techniques and reliability and ethical considerations.

Aims of Study

The methodology selected for any research project must be appropriate to the goals of the research. As this thesis utilises different approaches, the researcher intends to discuss these in some detail. At the preliminary stage, the aims and objectives of the research had to be clearly determined and the value in adopting one, or more, research methodologies had to be assessed (Cohen and Mannion, 1994). The first step, in developing a doctoral research proposal, involves a search of the existing literature. For this thesis, extensive use was made of several reports, official documents, journal papers and books and so on published on 'religious extremism in Pakistan' particularly in post 9/11 era. Most of the literature blamed madrassas as the training centres of *Jehadis*. In a memorandum dated 16 October 2003, then-Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld posed the following to his Deputy Defence Secretaries and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

> "Today, we lack the metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists everyday

than the *madrassas* and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?"[56]

In addition to it, there is a plethora of writings which traces, along with militancy, the proliferation of sectarianism, women rights violation, suppression of minorities and so on in madrassa education. They are of the view that madrassas are not involved in the recruitment of militants only, but also responsible for the development of anti-woman and anti-minority posture in Pakistani society. According to ICG reports, the madrassa problem goes beyond militancy. Students at more than 10,000 seminaries are being trained in theory, for service in the religious sector. But their constrained worldview and lack of modern civic education give rise to sectarianism, anti-woman and anti-minority behaviour in the society (2002, 2007). Though these writings are of good quality, yet there is hardly any empirical evidence provided to support their stance. In particular, little had been written about the perception of madrassa students about those issues, for which they are blamed for having radical and extremist position. In order to address this, primary data collection was necessary. Keeping in view the aforesaid concerns about madrassas, this study intends to find out the attitudes of students attending madrassas about Islamic militancy, sectarian divide, status of women, place of minorities in Pakistani society and about the primary purpose of education. The intention of this study is not to establish what percentage of madrassa students actually join so-called *Jihad* or are involved in anti-women and anti-minorities behaviour, rather this research explores the views of students in both madrassa and mainstream schools on a range of issues. As mentioned in the previous chapters, madrassas in Pakistan are not monolithic institutions. They adhere to different sects - Deobandi, Brailvi, Ahle Hadith, Jamaat-i-Islami (all these are Sunni) and Shia. Each of these groups has its own madrassas imparting its own version of Islam and has diverse opinion regarding *jihad* (holy war), suicide bombing and primary purpose of education and so on. Along with comparing madrassa students and mainstream educational institutes' students regarding their opinion on a range of educational and socio-political issues, this study also aims to take forward a comparative analysis of

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[56] This confidential memorandum written by Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld was leaked to the news media as was published in its entirety by *USA Today* on 22 October 2003. Accessed on November 2, 2009 from:

http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeldmemo.htm.

outlook of students of different types of madrassas on these issues. The socio-political issues which are the focus of this study are given as under:

- ➢ The role of women in Pakistani society
- ➢ The position of Non-Muslims in Pakistan
- ➢ The concept of jihad and martyrdom
- ➢ Phenomenon of suicide bombing
- ➢ The primary purposes of education
- ➢ Issue of societal cohesion with reference to sectarian differences

Moreover, the study attempts to have a comparative analysis of social behaviour of students with respect to different events or happenings in daily life. For instance, what students think that the events in daily life result primarily from their actions or these are determined by luck and fate? For this purpose various psychometric scales have been incorporated in the questionnaire.

As mentioned previously, currently there are three types of school systems operating in parallel in Pakistan: English medium schools, Urdu medium schools and madrassas. A student coming out of an English medium school may not have ample acquaintance with the established societal norms and Islamic values and a student coming out of Urdu medium school gets least chance of acquiring good job[57]. Madrassas students are group of youngsters that know very little about the outside world. Perhaps, the numbers of educational system that are currently working in Pakistan are not producing synergy but creating conflicts and division among people. This hierarchy of schooling systems not only hinders social mobility in the society but also seem to be perpetuating polarization of worldviews among the students of diverse school systems (Rahman, 2004). This study is to look at education from the viewpoint of students coming from different types of schooling systems. The study will contend, whether or not students which pass through these systems have divergent ideologies about education such as what do think what education is for, do they think education's primary purpose is to prepare students for work and employment, education is to promote economic equality and social justice, education's aim is to encourage understanding between men and women, schools are to promote shared values of Pakistani society, should the students have their due share in the decision making process about them in the schools and so

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[57] Tariq Rahman (2004) has provided statistics about the contribution of manpower for civil services and other related jobs as per students' educational background.

on. The research will also look at whether the worldview of all students, irrespective of their school type, is identical on women rights, status of non-Muslims, sectarian divide, armed *Jihad,* and so on. In order to have an in-depth understanding of the issue, this study is to look at the historical evolutionary processes of these systems. This study is to give a historical overview of the development of these diverse educational institutions in British India and to describe how these institutions expanded in the post-independence era. The study is also to argue about the differences in curriculum, pedagogical style and discipline techniques being practiced in these schools.

Research Methodology

Research methodologies can be broadly divided into quantitative and qualitative approaches. In a quantitative approach, the researcher seeks to analyse data which is presented in a numerical form. It involves data collection procedures that result from primarily numerical data which is then analysed primarily by statistical methods. Typical example: survey research using a questionnaire, analysed by statistical software such as SPSS (Dornyei, 2007: 24). On the other hand, a qualitative approach is one which reflects thoughts and opinions. It involves data collection procedures that result primarily in open-ended non numerical data which is then analysed primarily by non-statistical methods. Typical example: interview research, with the transcribed recordings analysed by qualitative content analysis (Dornyei, 2007: 24). Moyser (1988) and Lamb (2007) highlight an apparent dilemma between the attractions offered by a qualitatively rich array of personal insights into a particular problem, as might arise from some of the less structured methodologies, against the rigour and case comparability of more statistical methods. This thesis sought the opinions of students of madrassas, Urdu medium and English medium schools, on a range of questions relating to status of women and minorities, militancy, sectarian difference and the primary purpose of education. This search for personal, subjective views made, only quantitative approach, inappropriate. Hence, for the core of the thesis, a qualitative means of data collection has also been adopted. So, in order to ensure balance between quantitative and qualitative methods, mixed method technique has been opted. Both quantitative and qualitative methods employed in the study complement each other and the findings of questionnaire are got enriched with the interviews of participants.

Having elements both from quantitative and qualitative methods, this study can be categorised as a mixed method research. Mixed method research involves combinations of qualitative and quantitative research either at the data collection or at the analysis level. Typical example: consecutive and interrelated questionnaire and interview studies (Dornyei, 2007: 24). Using mixed method is practically advantageous due to the reason that it helps to understand 'construct meaning' and 'investigate world' (McCraken, 1988; Morse, 1994; Mertens, 2003; Bell, 1999; Patton, 2002).

Once the decision was taken for mixed method research, the instruments selected for data collection were self-administered questionnaires and interviews. Cohen and Mannion (1994) argue that a questionnaire is advantageous in many research contexts. It is anonymous and therefore can encourage greater honesty of response. Moreover, questionnaires can be more economical in terms of time and money. By standardising the range of responses, questionnaires facilitate the comparison of views held by different individuals or across different groups. In the context of policy analysis, questionnaire surveys present the preferred tool of investigation, where information is collected from a substantial number of subjects; where responses can be easily standardised; and where a comparison of group or sub-group responses is desired. And for this purpose, a closed-ended items questionnaire is the most suitable choice. If a questionnaire carries too heavily open-ended questions, there is a possibility that the survey itself may collapse, in the sense that respondents are too free to interpret the questions posted and the answers sought. In such a case, a comparison of responses may become impossible. If the researcher wants to examine the questionnaire topic further, a follow-up interview to discuss the topic in more depth is the most viable option. Thus, the self-administered questionnaire can be exploratory in nature, and serve as a starting point for other methodologies.

The principal purpose of an interview is to gather information on what an individual knows, likes or thinks. However, it can also be used to test hypotheses, or suggest new ones, and to go deeper into the motivations of respondents and their reasons for their responses (Cohen and Mannion, 1994). The opportunity to go deeper into responses to questions is one of the main advantages of interviews, compared to questionnaires. For this study a two-phase researching methodology has been opted. In the first phase, a questionnaire is given to a good

number of participants and on the basis of certain features the researchers find out informants who show either typical or extreme cases from major aspects of the study. Following the completion of the questionnaire some informants are requested to take part in an interview. It is also important to note that this kind of activity does not prove to be fruitful if the questionnaire is anonymous.

Epistemological Position

As mentioned before, this study has ingredients both from quantitative and qualitative approaches which according to Dörnyei (2007: 24; Dörnyei, 2001b: 192) is a well known distinction in research methodology. It is not just the utilization of 'figures versus non-quantitative data' rather; this division declares two different philosophical approaches to the exploration of the world and construction of meaning (ibid, 1989: 380; Dorneyi, 2001b: 192). The study I embarked on has elements from perspectives of positivist and interpretive fashion. Weber (2004) elaborates this paradigm of research in the following manner:

Ontology: positivists supposedly believe that reality is separate from the individual who observes it. Epistemology: positivists supposedly try to build knowledge of a reality that exists beyond the human mind, hence objective and independent reality gives foundation to human knowledge, Research object: positivists believe that the object they research has qualities that exist independent of researcher, Research method: positivists tend to use laboratory experiments, field experiments, and surveys as their preferred research method, Truth: positivists believe that a statement made by a researcher is true when it has a one-to-one mapping to the reality that exists beyond the human mind. Validity: positivists try to collect data that are a true measure of reality, which has types like; construct validity, internal validity, external validity and statistical conclusion validity. Reliability: positivists believe that results can be replicated by the researcher. Lack of reliability usually is attributed to factors such as researcher biases, inconsistencies in research processes used, differences in the contexts in which research was conducted, and measurement errors (Weber: 2004).

The terms qualitative and quantitative explain the manner of theory construction, the method of data collection and analysis, and general ideological orientation present in the study (Dornyei, 2001: 192). According to Kuhn the theory or paradigm choice depends on normative consensus and commitment within scientific communities, means that the natural

and social sciences are perhaps not that different. Since any process of research has an interpretive dimension, the natural sciences are just as subjective in this sense as the social sciences.

Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected in this study so that an in depth investigation of students' viewpoint and attitudes on different socio-political and educational themes could be found out and explained. On account of the complex nature of the research study, there was no single paradigm that could suitably deal with all of the required methodological aspects. Therefore, the researcher found it necessary to combine the quantitative/positivist paradigm with the qualitative/interpretive paradigm. The blending of both paradigms provided the researcher with the ability to statistically analyse the scientific data whilst also recognizing the complex psychosocial and emotional factors that may help in understanding deeply the attitudes of students.

Instrumentation

More than one research method was employed in this study as it was believed that opting for a combination of methods was appropriate in order to make use of their different strengths as well as for the purpose of cross-checking information obtained. In the first phase of data collection part of the study, I conducted a survey by using self-administered questionnaire. The popularity of questionnaires is due to the fact that they are easy to construct, extremely versatile, and uniquely capable of gathering a large amount of information quickly in a form that is readily process able (Dornyei, 2010; Dornyei, 2003; Rasinger, 2008). To record the responses of the participants, questionnaire is more focused, less time consuming and structured source (ibid, 2003, Cohen, et al 2000).

Questionnaire may give three types of data about respondents (1) Factual (2) Behavioural and (3) attitudinal (Dornyei, 2010: 5; Dornyei, 2003: 8).

(1) Factual questions: this is used to find out about who the respondents are. It typically covers demographic characteristics (age, gender and race), residential location, marital and socioeconomic status, level of education, religion, occupation as well as

any relevant information useful to interpreting the findings of the survey (ibid, 2003: 8).

(2) Behavioural question: these are used to find out what the respondents are doing or have done in the past. They ask about peoples' actions, life styles, habits and personal history (ibid, 2003: 8).

(3) Attitudinal questions: these are used to find out what people think. This is a broad category that concerns attitude, opinions, beliefs, interest and values (ibid, 2003: 8).

The type of questionnaire I constructed has elements from all three categories. As it asks the participants what they thought, they were also asked about their background information (their family system and living style and standard) as well as where they got their previous education. The questionnaire asked 77 closed questions from the participants (Appendix.1). The questionnaire constructed and used in this research is not in line with any standardised socio-educational model, rather questions formulating the questionnaire, were chosen from previous surveys, keeping in view the research questions of the study. Some questions were adopted from the survey of Rahman (2004) and others were framed by the researcher in consultation with Prof. Bob Davis and researcher's supervisor Prof. Andy Furlong.

I preferred closed-ended questionnaire items and provided respondents with ready-made response options to choose from and give an appropriate grade from 1 to 5. The major advantage of closed questions is that their coding and tabulation is straightforward. Dornyei (2003) says that the closed items are also referred as objective items. They are particularly suited for quantitative analyses.

Many questionnaires include a mixture of 'positively-keyed' and 'negatively-keyed' items, and this needs to be addressed before computing the scores or conducting analysis. If a questionnaire includes positively-keyed and negatively-keyed items, then the negatively-keyed items must be "reverse-scored" before computing individuals' total scores and before conducting any analyses. The questionnaire administered in this study also included positively-keyed and negatively-keyed items which were reverse coded before computing individuals' total score and any kind of analysis. Out of 77 questionnaire items 14 items were

reverse-scored. I transformed all 1's on these items to 5's and transformed all 2's to 4's. Similarly, I transformed high scores on the negatively-keyed items to become low scores (thus indicating low levels of the attribute being measured) – recoding 5's to become 1's and recoding 4's to become 2's. Because the 5-point scale includes 3 as a neutral point, I left all 3's unchanged. By reverse-scoring all of the negatively-keyed items, I created consistency among the items. By reverse-scoring the negatively-keyed items, I ensured that all of the items – those that were originally negatively-keyed and those that were positively-keyed – are in consistent with each other, in terms of what an "agree" or "disagree" imply.

Rating Scale

Rating scales are undoubtedly the most popular items in research questionnaire. They require the respondents to make an evaluative judgment of the target by marking one of a series of categories organized into scale. From categories of Likert, semantic differential and numeric rating scale, I preferred Likert scale.

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to define what Likert Scale is. Likert scale is named after its inventor Rensis Likert. Likert scales consist of a series of statements all of which are related to a particular target (individual person, group of people, an institution or concept), respondents are asked to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with these items by marking one of the responses ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. After the scale has been administered, each response option is assigned a number for scoring purpose. Few researchers prefer using an even number of response options because of the concern that certain respondents might use the middle category (neither agree nor disagree not sure or neutral) to avoid making a real choice.

In the current study, measurement of attitudes or opinions of students towards different socio-political issues was performed by the use of Likert style questions. These methods are widely used techniques for attitude/opinion measurement in education, allowing the respondents to express opinions ranging from favourable to unfavourable. For this purpose, I used number as

(e.g., strongly disagree=1; disagree=2; neither agree nor disagree=3; agree=4 and strongly agree=5).

Interviews

The qualitative interviews were conducted to gain in-depth information in connection with the questionnaires. Kahan and Best (1986) say that the interview is in a sense an oral questionnaires. Instead of writing the response, the interviewee gives the needed information orally and face-to-face or one to one. With a skilful interviewer, the interview is often superior to other data gathering devices (ibid, 1986). One reason is that people are more willing to talk than to write. The interviewer gains rapport or establishes friendly and secure relationship with the interviewee, certain type of confidential information (Smith, et al. 1991: 218). In other data collection/gathering instruments it is hard to explicitly explain the purpose but in interviewing the interviewer can explain the purpose (before the formal proceedings) and can answer the interviewees' queries (Kahan and Best, 1986).

Interviews are of different types such as structured, unstructured and semi-structured. In this study I used semi-structured interview instrument.

Semi-structured interviewing is more flexible than standardised methods such as the structured interview. According to Dornyei (2007: 136) such type of interviewing is 'compromise between two extremes' (such as structured and un-structured). Although the interviewer in this technique, usually, have some established general topics for investigation, this method allows for the exploration of emergent themes and ideas rather than relying only on concepts and questions defined in advance of the interview. The interviewer uses interview schedule with set questions which are asked to all respondents. The questions tend to be asked in a similar order and format to make a form of comparison between answers possible. However, there is also scope for pursuing and probing for novel, relevant information, through additional questions often noted as prompts on the schedule. The interviewer frequently has to formulate impromptu questions in order to follow up leads that emerge during the interview. This was very much the case in this research project, where there were of course prepared guiding questions and prompts, but the format was open-ended and the informants were asked to elaborate. The semi-structured interview is good in conditions when the researcher has good understanding of the phenomenon or domain in

question and is able to develop wide questions about the topic prior to conduct of the interview (ibid, 2007). The areas which were covered in these interviews were: why students have particular view point about certain socio-political issue(s)? To what extent do they see the role of their schooling in the formulation of such stance? Did they have same views before joining this school/madrassa? and so on (appendix.4).

According to Walford (1994), interviewing is the preferred tool of analysis, where it is not possible or desirable to pose a set series of questions only. This was, of course, the case in this study, where the primary goal of interviewing was not so much to receive standard answers to set questions, as it had been done before through survey, but rather to elicit in-depth information about the opinions and viewpoints of the selective interviewees. Hence, what was of the greatest importance in these interviews was to enter the 'assumptive worlds' of the interviewees as the term was used by McPherson and Raab (1988).

<u>Participants and Sampling</u>

The study was conducted in South Punjab, Pakistan. South Punjab is described as an area comprising 13 districts: Bahawalnagar, Bahawalpur, Bhakkar, Dera Ghazi Khan, Jhang, Khanewal, Layyah, Lodhran, Multan, Muzaffargarh, Rahimyar Khan, Rajanpur and Vehari. Its estimated population is 27 million. Compared to the rest of Punjab, this area has remained backward. The government and its agencies have exercised lesser control over South Punjab and have left its tribal oriented feudal structure intact. The local sardars[58] were virtually running their fiefdoms in the area, going to the extent of 'appointing' their favourites as local government functionaries. The hold of these local chiefs was, however, getting eroded for many years due to the expansion in influence and activities of officially supported religious hard line groups. These groups have been setting up their base in the area to recruit cadres and train them in connivance with the state for carrying out pogroms against Shias and other religious minorities within as well as for the jehad in Kashmir (Upadhyay, 2009). According to Shireen Mazari, a journalist and strategic affairs expert who hails from the area, there are 185 registered madrassas in Dera Ghazi Khan alone of which 90 are Deobandi, 84 Barelvi, six Ahle Hadith while five belong to the Shia. Most receive foreign funding. The total number of students in Deobandi madrassas alone was 11,535. Similarly, in Bahawalpur, there are an estimated 1,000 madrassas. However, nothing can be said about the numbers of

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[58] Sardar is a title of Persian origin, used for military and political leaders, but in the context of Pakistani society, the word is used for big landlords.

madrassas with certainty. Keeping in view the viability, I conducted survey in five districts of southern Punjab: Dera Ghazi Khan (my native town), Multan, Bahawalpur, Muzaffargarh and Rajanpur.

Participants

Participants of this cross-sectional study were students of 10th level studying in Urdu medium government schools, English medium private schools and privately run madrassas situated in the aforesaid five districts of southern Punjab. Their approximate age would be 15-17 years. Total numbers of participants of the survey were 500. There were 70 students from each category of educational institutes except Urdu medium government school. The number of students from Urdu medium government school was 80.

Table 4.1

Participants of this study (N=500)

S. no	Type of Educational Institute	Number of Participants
1	Urdu medium government school	80
2	English medium private school	70
3	Deoband Madrassa	70
4	Brailvi Madrassa	70
5	Ahle Hadith Madrassa	70
6	Shia Madrassa	70
7	Jamaat-i-Islami Madrassa	70
Total		500

So far as the issue of sampling is concerned, it was kind of a convenience or opportunity sampling. Cohen, et al (2000) says that convenience sampling involves choosing the nearest individuals to serve as respondents and continuing the process until the required sample size has been obtained. In such case, the researcher simply chooses the sample from those to

whom he has easy access (ibid, 2003: 102). Along with the security issue, there were many reasons which led the researcher to choose convenience sampling for the selection of participants as Cohen, et al (2000) says access to sensitive areas might not only be difficult but problematical both legally and administratively.

In addition to the questionnaire research, (N=21) participants were interviewed also. Three students from each category of the above educational institutes (list) were invited, on the basis of their responses. The questionnaire was not anonymized and the interviewees were purposely selected for showing certain characteristics – i.e those who have very strong views or mild stance on certain socio-political issues were interviewed. According to Cohen, et al (2000), in purposive sampling, researchers handpick the cases to be included in the sample on the basis of their judgement of their typicality. In this way, they build up a sample that is satisfactory to their needs.

Piloting the Questionnaire

Rasinger (2008) says that nothing is worse than handing out questionnaires to respondents, only to realize afterwards that it is flawed. Piloting the questionnaire is running a test with only a few participants in order to detect flaws (ibid, 2008). The pilot study should identify any problems with questions, scope of questions, and knowledge of participants (ibid, 2008). I piloted the research instrument, details are as under:

Study site: English medium private school and a Brailvi madrassa situated in Dera Ghazi Khan

Number of participants: n=50

Students of 10th level

Month and Year: August/September 2010

The present study was carried out after the ethics committee of the University of Glasgow scrutinized (1) EAP (2) plain language statement (3) consent form and (4) research instruments. At the first instance, I translated my questionnaire in Urdu and in order to ensure accuracy I got my questionnaire translated from my colleague teachers as well. After that a pilot study was conducted to ensure comprehension of the questionnaire by the students of

10th level and it was administered to madrassa and private schools' students only. On account of flood in Pakistan, summer vacations in government schools were extended up till 14th September 2010, as these schools were housing flood victims in South Punjab. So, no student from Urdu medium government school participated in the pilot study.

As per plan 50 participants were given a Plain Language Statement (PLS) and consent form. They were apprised with their right to confidentially and anonymity. After the participants read the PLS and signed the consent form, research questionnaires were administered to them. I gave them an hour to complete the questionnaire and majority of the students returned the filled questionnaire before time. After getting the questionnaires filled I asked for their feedback regarding their comprehension about the language and subject of questions asked in the questionnaire. The participants were requested to extend their cooperation to reflect verbally on clarity, understandability and any other problems which might hinder them answer these questions. Guided by Gao (2004), following questions were asked:

What will you say about time allocated for completion of questionnaire?

Do you think that all instructions are clear?

Are these questions clear to you? Do you feel difficulty to understand the language or content?

Do you think you have any reservations with answering any items?

What do you think about the number of pages/layout of the questionnaire and time?

Is there anything else you would like to say about this?

Their verbal feedback and their responses to the questions were good. However, some students from English medium school raised their concerns about question number 11 which inquires about the sect of students. They were of the view that they don't know about their sect. In order to cover every aspect of the question I incorporated the option of "Don't Know" in question 11 after consultation with my supervisor. Students responded almost every question asked in the questionnaire. Over all the response of students was good and they exhibited great understanding with respect to questions.

After the successful completion of pilot study, I prepared for the main study. I travelled to urban and rural parts of five districts of South Punjab. I met with principals, teachers and personnel of different educational institutes in order to seek permission and also their cooperation for the logistic arrangements such as (a) classroom for completion of questionnaires (b) quiet office space for the interview recordings and so on. In this regard, the personal contacts of my father and uncle were of much worth. Since the days of my grandfather; who owned a chunk of land and used to give some financial help to the imam (religious cleric who lead the congregational prayers) of local village mosque on the eve of every harvest. This tradition is still intact particularly in rural areas of Punjab where landlords donate a meagre part of their crops' yield to local village mosque/maktab and madrassa. In my case, my father and uncle did carry this practice until the time they lived in village and grew their lands. Though, now they have moved to city but they still have very good terms with religious clerics of the town who helped me a lot in bringing round the patrons of madrassas in gathering data for my project. The nature of help I got to collect data for my study, I don't see any implications for bias in the responses of students at all. The venues of the data collection were the classrooms of the respective educational institute. At the time of data collection one teacher and in some instances head teacher by himself accompanied me because they were of the view that the students might not recognize me and the political comrades might intervene in the data collection process. The questionnaires were distributed by the teacher and the instructions for the questionnaire were read out by me.

In order to avoid any potential difficulties in data gathering process, I selected five districts of South Punjab, instead of all thirteen districts of the area. As mentioned above, the method of sampling was of convenience or opportunity sampling. So far as the numbers of madrassas selected for sampling are concerned, there were four Brailvi, Deobandi and Shia madrassas each, while the numbers of Jamaat-e-Islami madrassas selected for the study were two only. Eighty students from two government schools and seventy students from two A-Type private English medium schools participated in the survey while 70 participants from three Ahle Hadith madrassas took part in this study. It can be said with assurance these institutes were representative of other schools of their type at least situated in the five districts of South Punjab; the area which was focus of my research.

The participants were apprised with their right to confidentiality and privacy. They were told that they can leave or keep the questionnaire blank if they wish so. After I collected the completed questionnaires and the consent forms, I thanked the participants once again and told them about the next phase of data collection such as interview. In addition, I answered their questions regarding difference of education system in Pakistan and the United Kingdom.

Prior to interview, I got appointments from the students who were selected for interviews. The interviews were conducted in the office space in some instances and in some cases a quiet and clean room was provided for interviewing provided with a conducive environment for interview recordings. In case of Shia madrassa, the interviewees and the head teacher did not allow to record interview, so I have to write down notes for that. I kept mineral water bottles for the interviewees so that they could feel relaxed. To create friendly environment with the participant, I sat at a 90 degree angle with the participant so to give him impression that the interview is cooperative rather than confrontational which might have been felt in case of sitting face to face (Denscombe, 2001 cited in Dornyei, 2007).

I began the interview with greetings in Seraiki and Urdu languages ' Keevain haal hin' and 'Khush amadeed' that means 'welcome'. I also said 'Asalam-o-Alekum' which is Islamic way of greeting Muslims when they meet. This is very common practice in Pakistan. Afterwards, I told the participants about the purpose of the study and informed them about their rights to privacy and confidentiality. I informed students that the interview is being recorded. If they want, the transcriptions would be provided to them for confirmation.

During an interview I gave back channelling signals to the participants such as (nods, 'uh-huh noise 'yeah') to appear sympathetic listener. I also gave gestures like 'attentive lean, eye-brow flash and sympathetic smile' as suggested by Miller and Crabtree (1999, in Dornyei, 2007: 142). Further, I provided the interviewees reinforcement feedback showing and confirming that the interviewee's answers are worth recording. However, there were times when I had to give a polite negative reinforcement to the interviewees as suggested by Robinson (2002: 274, in Dornyei, 2007: 142) ' let me stop you here for a moment and go back to what you said earlier to make sure that I understood you well'. I also encouraged

elaborations by giving 'silent probes' by remaining quiet and gave 'echo prompts' by repeating the last word spoken by the interviewee (ibid, 2007).

Editing the interview (debriefing) technique was also used at the end of the interview. I gave pre-closing moves so that the interviewee has chance to say any additional points or correct anything he might have said earlier. I used 'Is there anything else you want to say about aim of education and the certain socio-political issues in Pakistan'. The interview ended with thanks with a smile. The interviewees were escorted to the exit door to show courtesy.

Analysis Techniques and processing Questionnaire Data

I entered the questionnaire data into the 18th version of SPSS which is statistical package for social sciences. By virtue of it, results are typically processed by means of descriptive statistical analysis to provide frequencies, means, percentages and ranges. Questionnaire data is most usable if it is stored in a computer file for coding for analysis. Cohen et al (2000) says that prior to coding or data reduction, it is important to check the questionnaire to identify and eliminate errors made by respondents. Dornyei (2003) says that the initial data file will always contain mistakes so it is important to perform data cleaning (1) correct impossible data (2) Correct incorrectly entered values (3) correct contradicting data and (4) examine implausible data. The data got cleaned up when I calculated frequencies, mean and standard deviation. The graphs showed numerical errors in few columns. I checked the SPSS files again and cleaned the data and again calculated the frequencies which gave correct figures. The missing data was also handled by using SPSS option analyse then handling missing data. The SPSS gives average mean score to the missing data which helps conduct further analyses.

The data was coded in the SPSS. For the second part of the questionnaire, same codes from 1 to 5 were given (1=strongly disagree and 5= strongly agree). So far as the first part of questionnaire is concerned, it is comprised of background questions, for which coding was also done. The main type of questionnaire data was ordinal and background questions were nominal. Each response was already assigned a grade or numbered from 1 to 5. In most of the

background questions, the students simply had to give a grade which was a number. As regards dependent variables, these were reduced and coded accordingly.

Reliability of the Questionnaires

Questionnaires are measuring tools and they must have substantial reliability. Even in cases where there are no resources and opportunities for major validations, it should be taken into consideration that at least well-documented reliability in aspect should be checked which is internal consistency. Internal consistency refers to homogeneity of the items making up the scales within the questionnaires. If the instrument has it, one should feel safe (Dornyei, 2003: 110). The questionnaires used for this study satisfied the reliability requirements.

Internal consistency is measured by Cronbach Alpha. The Alpha value is between 0 and 1. The Apha value should be at least 0.70 even with short-scales of 3 to 4 items. If the value is 0.60 or less that means that the questionnaire has low reliability (ibid, 2003: 112).

Table 4.2

Cronbach Alpha value of scales

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.855	77

The Cronbach Alpha value of questionnaire is 0.855 which is higher than 0.70.

Data collection strategies

Before setting out for data collection and related field work I applied for the ethical approval. The application was submitted with the Faculty of Education University of Glasgow, asking them to accord permission for data collection for the pilot and main study. The ethics Committee scrutinized my application and issued notification in my favour. After that, I left for Pakistan on field trip in the second week of July 2010.

Potential Issues of Access, Confidentiality and Ethics

It is very important for the researcher to be careful and mindful of the ethical issues arising, (1) before the research process begins, (2) During proceedings, and (3) After completion.

In many countries, observing ethical principles is enforced by legal and institutional requirements. In UK, the British 'Data Protection Act' regulates the need to ensure consent to collecting data. In addition, social research is increasingly being subjected to ethical review from the institutional ethics committees to ensure the ethical scrutiny of research involving human subjects. As the current study was supervised by the School of Education, University of Glasgow, the authorities concerned (Ethics committee) accorded permission in response to an application filed by my (through proper channel). The application was supported with detailed statement explaining purpose of the study.

Informed Consent and confidentiality

The principle of informed consent arises from the subject's right to freedom and self-determination. The consent forms were sent out to the participants containing all relevant information thereby the participants were entitled to exercise their right to withdraw at any stage of the research (Gall and Borg, 1989). So the participants were apprised with four elements: (1) Competence, (2) Voluntarism, (3) Full Information (4) Comprehension.

It is with regard to protecting a participant's right to privacy through promise of confidentiality (ibid, 2007). The students who participated in questionnaire survey were informed that even if the researcher knows who has provided the information or able to identify the participants from the information given, they will in no way make the connection public. Cohen, *et al*. (2007) suggests that the more sensitive, intimate or discrediting the information, the greater is the obligation on the researcher's part to make sure that guarantees of confidentiality are carried out in spirit and letter.

<u>Privacy and Anonymity</u>

The participants were informed straight off if they had any reservations with some kind of questions being asked, they could simply exercise their right and skip the question. An individual right to privacy is often contrasted to public right to know.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have tried to give rationale behind the employment of methodology I opt for my research study. It describes the population involved, the instruments utilised, and the procedures followed to collect and analyse the data. But before this, a brief discussion has been made in the initial paragraphs of the chapter to shed some light on the aims of study. The chapter began with aims and objects of the study in which I identified whether there is any difference in the worldviews of students coming from different schools about a range of socio-political and educational issues. This was followed by the research questions. After it, a careful consideration was given to research design which was to be mixed methodology and cross-sectional. The rationale behind using mixed methods was that it allowed researcher to have a robust analysis by taking advantages of the strength of each method involved in the study (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, cited in Ivankova et al, 2006:03). After developing research aims, research questions and research design, research settings were developed which were followed by informants and instrumentation. This further led to ethical considerations followed by pilot study. In the end, it was also mentioned ethical issues were addressed.

Chapter 5

Sample characteristics and worldview of students about educational and social issues

Introduction

This chapter reports my findings based on the questionnaires and interviews used for this study. But prior to this, the chapter talks about the characteristics of the sample such as its residence, parental occupation, previous education etc. The first section of the chapter starts with the description of the background data collected through questionnaires. Background data includes factual and behavioural questions[59]. These questions usually cover age, gender, residential location, marital and socioeconomic status, level of education, religion, occupation, participants' actions, life styles, habits and personal history. After the background data, questionnaire items formulated to see the difference in the outlook of the students (that makes attitudinal questions) from different types of institutes, towards certain socio-political and educational issues have been reported. The questionnaire and interview tool used in this study attempted to measure students' responses on primary purpose of education, status of women in the society and the position of non-Muslims in a Muslim majority state Pakistan. The questionnaire items measuring the themes: primary purpose of education, status of women and position of minorities have been described with the help of cross tabs, mean, standard deviation, Chi square to explore the relationship/relatedness between variables and ANOVA i.e. analysis of variance which will be used to compare the variance (variability in scores) between the different schools (due to the independent variables; like type of institutes etc) with the variability within each of the groups. In addition, the interview data has been linked to have further illustrative insights on the questionnaire data. Along with the aforesaid themes, there are two more themes that make an important part of the study which are: the outlook of students towards Islamic militancy and sectarian diversity in the society and they will be analysed in the next chapter. In the end, this chapter deliberates upon the views of parents (fathers) about the selection of certain type of school for their children.

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[59] Dornyei categorised questionnaire's questions in three types: Factual, Behavioural and Attitudinal questions.

The sample

This part of the chapter deals with the background information of the 10th grade students who took part in this research. 500 students from three different types of schooling systems; English Medium, Urdu Medium and Madrassas, from South Punjab participated in the study. Madrassas have further categorization, five distinct kinds, divided among sectarian and political lines i.e. Ahle Hadith, Deobandi, Brailvi, Jamaat-i-Islami and Shia. The three primary Sunni sub-sects in Pakistan are: Deobandi, Brailvi, Ahle Hadith/Salafi. Each sect has its own madrassas in which their own version of Islam is taught. The two primary wings of Sunni-Islam; Deobandi and Brailvi, dominate the madrassa system in Pakistan. The Jamat-i-Islami is a religio-political party founded by Maulana Maududi in 1941 and is the ideological sister of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was set up by Hasan Banna in Egypt in 1928. The JI started off as an organization that was not interested in active politics but then it came to the conclusion that to implement its interpretation of Islam, it needed to control the levers of state apparatus. The Jamaat-i-Islami is a revivalist political party and wishes to destroy secular Islam and bring back to the world a period of religious Muslim rule. Its version of Islam is very much close to Deoband school of thought but it claims itself supra-sectarian and preaches Muslim brotherhood. The Shias believe that the successor of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was his cousin Ali Ibn-e-Talib and not the first three caliphs whom Sunni take to be successors.

Description of Sample Characteristics

The Tables given under provide some background information of the participants. It gives us information about participants' previous schooling, their social class, familial organisation and religious affiliations etc.

Table 5.1 Previous School attended by respondents, by current school attended (%)

Current School	Urdu Medium School	English Medium School	Madrassas				
			Ahle Hadith	Deobandi	Brailvi	Jamaat-i-Islami	Shia
Number of Participants	80	70	70	70	70	70	70
Previous Education Urdu Medium School	91	19	0	0	0	4	0
English Medium School	3	77	0	0	0	4	0
Madrassa	0	0	70	77	79	61	76
English & Urdu medium schools	6	4	0	0	0	0	0
English medium schools & madrassas	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
Urdu medium schools & madrassa	0	0	30	23	21	26	24
School Type Public school	91	19	0	0	0	4	0
Private school	3	77	70	77	79	70	76
Both	6	4	30	23	21	26	24

Irrespective of type of institutes the students came from, they have one thing in common that is, the majority of them did not deviate from the type of institute they have been studying in. Barring the fact, a large proportion of students from madrassas, like Urdu and English medium schools, stuck to same type schooling, yet roughly a quarter of them attended Urdu medium schools (Table 5.1). So far as Urdu schools students are concerned, 91% of them have their previous education from similar type of schools in which they were currently studying. Only 9 per cent students studying in government schools have their previous schooling from both private English medium schools and government Urdu medium schools. Interestingly not a single student from government school had ever been to madrassa. In case

of English medium schools students 77 per cent of them have their previous education in English schools and 23 per cent of them had their education from both Urdu and English schools. So far as madrassas' students are concerned, like Urdu and English medium school students, the majority of them have had their previous schooling from the same type of schools in which they were currently studying. 70 per cent of Ahle Hadith, 79 % Brailvi, 61% Jamaat-i-Islami and 76 per cent of Shia madrassas students have their education from the religious seminaries since the beginning of their schooling. It means that the majority of the students studying in these madrassas have never been to main stream schooling system. However, data shows that 39 per cent of students from Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas had exposure to Urdu and English medium schools. If we compare the schooling of Jamaat-i-Islami students with other madrassas, we come across an interesting finding that not a single student from other madrassas have ever been to English medium schools while 8% of Jamaat-i-Islami students' previous education has contribution from English schools. However, it is not clear whether the private English medium schools they attended fall in A or B category[60]. Overall, a large proportion of students from all types of schools stick to one type of school, at least, till the start of their secondary education.

Table 5.2 School currently attended, by residential origin (%)

Type of Institute	Urdu Medium School	English Medium School	Madrassas				
			Ahle Hadith	Deobandi	Brailvi	Jamaat-i-Islami	Shia
Number of Participants	80	70	70	70	70	70	70
Place of living							
Urban	72	76	56	41	40	49	56
Rural	28	24	44	59	60	51	44

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[60] For detail see the 2nd chapter of the thesis.

The background information of the participants shows that the majority of the students studying in mainstream educational system i.e. Urdu and English medium schools belong to urban areas (Table 5.2). For instance, 72% Urdu medium schools students came from urban areas and even in case of English schools this ratio is as much as 76%. On the other hand, the majority of those who study in madrassas came from rural backgrounds. 60 per cent of Brailvi and 59% of Deobandi and 51% of Jamaat-i-Islami madrassa students belong to rural areas, but in case of Shia and Ahle Hadith this figure is 44 per cent. However, such figures can definitely vary depending on the location of institute that is part of your study.

Table 5.3 Occupational status of respondents' parents (%)

Type of Institute	Urdu Medium School	English Medium School	Madrassas				
			Ahle Hadith	Deobandi	Brailvi	Jamaat-i-Islami	Shia
Number of Participants	80	70	70	70	70	70	70
Earning Hands							
Father	78	69	86	78	79	86	84
Mother	6	3	0	5	4	3	1
Both	16	28	4	9	7	7	6
Not said	0	0	10	8	10	4	9

The personal information of participants shows that the families of those students who come to study in madrassas have only one parent working. In most of the instances, it is father who fulfills the responsibility of family's livelihood. On the other hand, in case of English medium schools' students more than one quarter of them come from a family that has both father and mother working. Here one interesting thing is noteworthy that the trend of not sharing the information regarding income generator in the family is found only in participants from madrassas. It can be because of the reason that either there is no one working in their families at all or their parents' occupation is of such type that they even don't want to mention a bit of it. As these students didn't told anything about the occupation of their parents in the subsequent questions.

Table 5.4 Current occupations of respondents' fathers (%)

Type of Institute	Urdu Medium School	English Medium School	Madrassas				
			Ahle Hadith	Deobandi	Brailvi	Jamaat-i-Islami	Shia
Number of Participants	80	70	70	70	70	70	70
Father Occupation							
Professional or managerial job	5	29	1.4	0	0	3	0
Lower professions or skilled labour	39	34	44	43	43	40	44
Farmer or unskilled labour	17.5	20	35	37	36	33	29
Services	12.5	14	4	1.4	0	4	4
Teacher	20	0	1.4	11	7	6	9
Not said or not applicable	6	3	14	7	14	14	14
Father Occupation Category							
Government Sector	31	33	16	26	19	20	20
Private sector	26	24	21	24	18	31	29
Self-employed	37	39	53	44	47	42	37
Not said/Not applicable	6	4	10	6	16	7	14

The background information of respondents shows that the students who come to study in the English medium schools belong to a financially sound family. 29% students' fathers' occupations fall in the category of professional and managerial job that figure is much higher than those of students from other type of institutes. Professional and managerial jobs include doctors, engineers, Bankers, bureaucrats, advocates/lawyers, business persons, working in an NGO or private firm at higher position etc. In addition to it, 28 per cent of students from

English schools have both their parents working which definitely add on their family income. As in my previous chapters I have mentioned that education in A class English medium schools is very expensive and those who are monetarily well off, can think of receiving it. 34% of fathers of these students are skilled labour or have lower professions, for instance, working in any factory as a technical hand, mechanic, shopkeeper, lorry owner/driver, stenographer, typist, working abroad, doing job in WAPDA or PTCL, Pakistan railway or other government and semi-government departments. Here one thing is notable that those who are doing ordinary jobs in abroad (Middle East or Europe/America) earn good wages as compared to those who are doing the same job in Pakistan. And interestingly, out of 34% English schools students' fathers whose occupation fall under the category of lower professions, 11 per cent were working abroad as lower professionals or skilled labourers. Urdu medium school students belong to less privileged background as compared to English medium schools students but far better than those who study at madrassas. Only 17.5 per cent Urdu schools students' fathers are associated with farming or unskilled labour while this percentage is 35% in Ahle Hadith, 37% in Deobandi, 36% in Brailvis, 33 per cent in Jamaat-i-Islami and 29 per cent in Shia madrassas' students. Apart from it, there are some students who didn't fill up the part of questionnaire that asked about their parents occupations. Data also shows that, so far as their occupations are concerned, the fathers of students coming from madrassas are relatively less associated with the government and private sector, the majority of them are self employed i.e. they work for themselves instead of government or a private employer.

Table 5.5 Respondents whose mother is currently employed (%)

Type of Institute	Urdu Medium School	English Medium School	Ahle Hadith	Deobandi	Brailvi	Jamaat-i-Islami	Shia
			Madrassas				
Number of Participants	80	70	70	70	70	70	70
Working Mother							
Yes	22.5	31	4	13	11	10	7
No	77.5	69	82	79	76	86	70
Not said	0	0	14	8	13	4	23

The question that intends to see if the mothers of participants are 'working or not' come up with interesting results. More than 30 per cent English schools students response was in positive and almost quarter of the Urdu schools students responded the question positively, but in case of madrassas students, the results are very different. Another interesting finding we came across is that some of the students only from madrassas didn't answer this question and they also didn't tell about their mothers' occupation in the subsequent questions. It can be because of the fact that some conservative sections of society consider the working of women as an objectionable act, and if it happens, they feel embarrassment in sharing information about it; however nothing can be said with conviction in this very case.

Table 5.6 Current occupation of respondents' mothers (%)

Type of Institute	Urdu Medium School	English Medium School	Madrassas				
			Ahle Hadith	Deobandi	Brailvi	Jamaat-i-Islami	Shia
Number of Participants	80	70	70	70	70	70	70
Mother Occupation							
Professional or managerial job	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
Lower professions or skilled labour	7	7	3	7	3	1.4	4
Farmer or unskilled labour	1.4	1.4	0	3	4	6	0
Services	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Teacher	12.5	20	1.4	3	4	1.4	1.4
Household	77.5	69	83	74	73	87	83
Not said or not applicable	1.4	0	13	13	16	4	11
Mother Occupation Category							
Government Sector	16	26	1.4	9	4	1.4	4
Private sector	5	6	0	1.4	1.4	1.4	0
Self-employed	1.4	0	3	9	6	7	3
Not said/ Not applicable	78	69	96	81	89	90	93

Table 5.6 takes our attention towards a very common trend in Pakistani society that irrespective of familial and social background, the majority of the women are confined to household activity only. Nearly seven in ten mothers (69 per cent) of English schools students are non-working that is lowest ratio among other types of institutes' students. Secondly, if women happen to work, the most popular profession among them is teaching. Presence of women in professional or managerial jobs is very rare. One can construe the uncommonness of women representation in professional or managerial jobs from the fact that

there were only two students from English medium schools (3%) whose mothers were doctors among the whole sample of 500 students from different types of schools. Thanks to Musharraf government that introduced quota for women in government and semi-government sectors, even in the parliament of the country. After having a look on the categorization of occupations on the basis of government and private sector, one comes to know that the majority of the working mothers of students are associated with government sector.

Table 5.7 Dwelling places of participants (%)

Type of Institute	Urdu Medium School	English Medium School	Madrassas				
			Ahle Hadith	Deobandi	Brailvi	Jamaat-i-Islami	Shia
Number of Participants	80	70	70	70	70	70	70
House Rented home	43	13	39	47	50	56	50
Owned home	56	79	44	51	46	44	46
Not said	1.4	8	17	1.4	4	0	4
House Type Pakka (bricks made)	56	86	44	44	39	53	51
Kacha (mud made/grass thatched)	36	6	46	53	56	43	40
Not said	8	8	10	3	6	4	9
Rooms 1-2	51	39	66	54	61	65	56
3-4	30	33	19	26	20	20	33
4-5	14	20	11	11	12	9	8
More than 5	5	8	4	9	7	6	3

Along with the occupation of parents, type of house; pakka or kacha, rented or owned, big or small (with respect to number of rooms in it) are also the indicators which are part of

background information of students in order to determine their social status. 13 per cent of students from English schools live in rented house while this figure is 43% in Urdu schools' students, 39% in Ahle Hadith, 47% in Deobandi, 56% Jamaat-i-Islami and 50% in Brailvi and Shia madrassa students. Like information about their parents' occupation, some students did not share information regarding their homes. Keeping in view the data, one can notice a visible difference between English school students and other type of institutes' students in connection with the type of accommodation they have. Such difference can be observed clearly when we look at the kind of house they are living in i.e. kacha and pakka. 86% of students from English medium schools live in pakka (brick and cement made) houses and only 44% of students from Ahle Hadith and Deobandi madrassas students are dwelling in pakka houses. However, in rural areas families of even monetarily sound background prefer to live in kacha houses but in case of urban areas situation is quite opposite.

So far as the number of rooms in houses is concerned 65% of students from Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas live in small houses having 1-2 rooms, Brailvi 61%, Ahle Hadith 66%, Shia 56%, Deobandi 54%, Urdu schools 51% and English schools 39%. In the same vein, houses of 30% Urdu medium schools students are comprised of 3-4 rooms. From English medium schools and Shia madrassa students this percentage is 33%, 19% in Ahle Hadith, 26% Deobandi and 20% in Brailvi and Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas' students.

Table 5.8: Respondents' current family system i.e. Joint family or nuclear family (%)

Type of Institute	Urdu Medium School	English Medium School	Ahle Hadith	Deobandi	Brailvi	Jamaat-i-Islami	Shia
			Madrassas				
Number of Participants	80	70	70	70	70	70	70
Family System Joint family	59	39	58	60	64	67	60
Nuclear family	41	61	39	40	34	33	40
Not said	0	0	3	0	1.4	0	0

In the sub-continent, joint family system has been in existence since ancient times. The father is considered as the head of the family. His wife, sons, daughters-in-law and grandchildren together constitutes a joint family. However, with the passage of time, the joint family system is disintegrating, giving rise to the nuclear family system. Many a studies on India and South Asia suggest that the modernizing forces which entered the system since independence--parliamentary democracy, universal suffrage, land reforms, modern education, urbanization, and industrial technology etc affected the familial structure (Singer & Cohn, 1968). These studies trace the change of social structure with changing relations of politics, law, language, caste system and particularly of economics in the society. In the wake of independence, Pakistani society also gone through this transformation and in this regard the economic viability was one of the important factors. This very fact can be seen in this study as well. Keeping in view the data about parents' occupation of students from English medium schools, one can assess their relative better financial position as compared to other students and the trend to have nuclear family system might be the reflection of their affluence.

Table 5.7 shows that there is no substantial difference in the data with regard to number of rooms; as the size of homes is not solely dictated by social status. There are other factors which have their impact on the number of rooms in a house, for example, size of family, type of family system; joint or nuclear etc. And interestingly the data shows that the trend of joint family system is more common in those students who study in madrassas or government schools as compared to those who study at English medium schools. So far as the statistics about family system are concerned, 61 per cent of students from English medium schools have nuclear family system while only 41% students from Urdu medium schools have nuclear families. There is not much difference between madrassa students and Urdu medium schools students in this regard. 40% Deobandi and Shia madrassa students have nuclear family system, 39% students of Ahle Hadith madrassas, 33% of Jamaat-i-Islami and 34% of Brailvi madrassas students came from families where nuclear family system prevails.

Table 5.9: Participants' siblings (%)

Type of Institute	Urdu Medium School	English Medium School	Madrassas				
			Ahle Hadith	Deobandi	Brailvi	Jamaat-i-Islami	Shia
Number of Participants	80	70	70	70	70	70	70
Siblings							
1-2	17	32	11	3	7	13	3
3-5	44	62	40	42	50	52	48
6-8	28	6	44	44	33	26	46
More than 8 / Not said	11	0	5	11	10	9	3

By virtue of background information of the participants, one comes to know that the students who study in madrassas have very big families as compared to those who study in English schools. For instance, 32% students of English medium schools have small families, comprised of 1-2 siblings. This figure is 17% in Urdu medium school students and 11%, 3%, 7%, 13% and 3% in Ahle Hadith, Deobandi, Brailvi, Jamaat-i-Islami and Shia respectively. The percentage of students of English schools who have up to five siblings is 94% and this figure is 61% in Urdu schools, 51% in Ahle Hadith, 51% in Shia, 57% in Brailvi, 65% in Jamaat-i-Islami and only 45% in Deobandi madrassa students. Rests of the students have families even larger than 5 siblings. Tendency of having big families particularly among those who study at madrassas can be attributed to several factors like lack of knowledge about family planning, religious factor and most importantly a deeply embedded mentality that the more male members we have the more we would have earning hands. This definitely leads to increase in child labour in the society. Religious factor is also there to play its role as many people consider family planning *haram* (not approved in Islam).

Table 5.10: Main decisions in the families of respondents are taken by: (%)

Type of Institute	Urdu Medium School	English Medium School	Madrassas				
			Ahle Hadith	Deobandi	Brailvi	Jamaat-i-Islami	Shia
Number of Participants	80	70	70	70	70	70	70
Family Decision Maker							
Father	48	31	63	60	71	60	53
Mother	14	19	6	11	5	7	4
Jointly	37	50	31	29	24	33	29
Not said	1.4	0	0	0	0	0	14

Table 5.11: In comparison to girls boys are given more importance in respondents' family: (%)

Type of Institute	Urdu Medium School	English Medium School	Madrassas				
			Ahle Hadith	Deobandi	Brailvi	Jamaat-i-Islami	Shia
Number of Participants	80	70	70	70	70	70	70
Importance in Family							
Yes	45	24	57	51	64	57	51
No	55	76	40	48	36	43	43
Not Said	0	0	3	1.4	0	0	6

In order to know whether it is their education only that propagates male dominance or there is any contribution of family environment in promoting this division, two questions were asked in background information. First question says "who makes important decisions in your family?" and give multiple options; father, mother, jointly, other. Second question asked was, "In my family boys are given more importance than girls" with answer options 'yes' or 'no'. These questions brought some interesting information. 31% students from English schools said that it is their father who takes important decisions of family but this percentage was 71% in Brailvi madrassa students, 63% in Ahle Hadith and 60% in Deobandi and Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas students. In this regard the situation of Urdu medium school students is not very different. 48 per cent students of Urdu medium schools believe that main decisions of family are made by their fathers and 53% students from Shia madrassas think in the same manner. However, 14% of students from Shia madrassa refrained from answering this question. More or less similar variation in responses among different types of schools' students was observed in the second question as well. 45% students from Urdu schools think that boys are given more importance than girls in their families. This percentage is 24 in English school students while the majority of students from madrassas believe that in their families boys are given more importance than girls.

Table 5.12: Concerns in family if respondents have friendly relations with people of other sect? (%)

Type of Institute	Urdu Medium School	English Medium School	Madrassas				
			Ahle Hadith	Deobandi	Brailvi	Jamaat-i-Islami	Shia
Number of Participants	80	70	70	70	70	70	70
Friends from other Sects							
Yes	11	7	13	47	10	3	30
No	89	91	81	51	87	96	57
Not said	0	1.4	6	1.4	3	1.4	13

To trace the probable contribution of family in promoting sectarian division in the society, a question was asked saying, "Do you think your parents will mind if you have friendship with boys from different sect". Interestingly a large proportion of students from all types of institutes said 'no' only with the exception of Shia madrassas students. Though the majority of Shia madrassas students (57%) also were of the view that their parents will not mind if they have friends from other sect yet 30 per cent, that is almost one third of total Shia madrassa students, said that they think their parents will mind if they have friends out from their sectarian circle and 13 per cent of them didn't answer the question. Maximum numbers of students saying 'no' were from Jamaat-i-Islami i.e. 96% even more than English medium school students (91%).

Table 5.13: Respondents foremost association is with: (%)

| Type of Institute | Urdu Medium School | English Medium School | Madrassas | | | | |
			Ahle Hadith	Deobandi	Brailvi	Jamaat-i-Islami	Shia
Number of Participants	80	70	70	70	70	70	70
Identification							
Pakistani	60	57	14	41	26	31	29
Muslim	40	43	76	59	67	69	51
Digerian/Multani/Bahawalpuri	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Seraiki/Balouch/Pashtoon/ Punjabi/Sindhi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Deobandi/Ahle Hadith/Shia/ Brailvi/Jamaat-i-Islami	0	0	10	0	7	0	20

More or less similar kind of association with sect was displayed by 20 per cent Shia madrassas students when they were asked, how they identify themselves, as Pakistani, Muslim or Shia. 57 per cent of students from English medium school said, they identify themselves as Pakistani and 43% as Muslims. In case of Urdu medium schools students, those who identify themselves as Pakistani were 60% and 40 per cent were those who think

that their first identification is as Muslims. In case of madrassas students, the trend of Muslim nationhood was far stronger than that of Pakistani nationalism. A large proportion of madrassas students consider Muslim as their foremost identity.

Respondents' views

After personal and familial information of the participants, we will discuss about their views on certain socio-political and educational issues that make the attitudinal part of the questionnaire. In order to know about the opinion of students from seven different types of institutes with respect to primary purpose of education, gender inequality, status of minorities, sectarian divide and Islamic militancy, the questionnaire data has been analyzed with descriptive statistics at first. All the questionnaire statements are multiple items of the variables 'primary purpose of education', 'gender inequality', status of minorities', 'sectarianism', 'Islamic militancy' and 'IELOC' in the questionnaire (Appendix.1). The data of the study is to show, to what extent there is homogeneity in the views of students from different types of schooling systems is found on these core socio-political and educational issues. What is really disturbing is the fact that the students of these institutions (English medium schools, Urdu medium schools and madrassas) have such different opinions as to live in different worlds. This might have happened because their textbooks and methods of learning are different from each other and also because their teachers, the discourses they are exposed to inside and outside school, and even their families are so different from each other. Indeed, all these influences are from 'worlds' which are strange, and even hostile, to each other. To understand these different institutions and their products is to understand how dangerously polarized Pakistani society is and how this has hampered national cohesion and a sense of commitment to unified policies (Rahman, 2004). In the first instance, items under the title 'primary purpose of education' will come under discussion.

What is education for?

First theme that will come under discussion is purpose of education. Purpose of education is a question that has to be thrashed out continually and every nation must grapple with this issue not once, but every generation or more often. But here I am not going to deliberate upon the philosophy of education, nor the policies of nation states on education, is the subject of discussion. In fact, my goal is to know about the viewpoint of 10th grade students of Pakistan from different types of schools on this issue. For this purpose 19 questions were incorporated

in the questionnaire (Appendix01) that covered several aspects of educational objectives ranging from the development of economic and social equality to the encouragement of gender equality and greater understanding with diverse cultures and faiths in Pakistani society. And in this regard questions regarding the role of schools also make the part of questionnaire.

It is said oftenly that "education is the underpinning of development". Now the word development may have different connotations. In one very broad sense, it may suggest that national development begins with education since schooling is the way of breaking out narrowness and to free people from the shackles of convention and provide them with the imagination and larger view of life that would allow them to dream of unseen things and create a better world for them. Yet, for others development may imply economic gains only, and this translates into jobs. In order to cover all these aspects of education, a range of questions regarding the primary purpose of education have been asked in the questionnaire. The questionnaire items of primary purpose of education have been presented here with the help of crosstab are given under:

➢ A key aim of education is to prepare students for work and employment [Career oriented education]

➢ Education should promote economic equality and social progress [Social mobility]

➢ A key aim of education is individual freedom and choice in life [Freedom of choice]

➢ A key aim of education is to prepare students to take their place in Pakistani society [Becoming part of society]

➢ A key aim of education is to increase awareness and appreciation of the world beyond Pakistan [Understanding global society]

➢ Education should promote enterprise and economic development [Economic progress]

➢ A key aim of education is to initiate students into the knowledge and truth of Islam [Exploring Islam]

➢ A key aim of education is to promote understanding of, and respect for, other faiths and cultures in Pakistan [Tolerance for diversity]

➢ Education should encourage greater understanding between men and women [Gender equality]

➢ Education should encourage greater equality between men and women [Discourage misogyny]

➢ Schools should respect the wishes of families in teaching about religion [Religious education with parents' consent]

➢ Schools should respect the wishes of families in all aspects of a student's education [Child education with parents' consent]

➢ Schools should promote the shared values of Pakistani society [Pluralist society]

➢ Schools should promote the shared values of Pakistani society even if this conflicts with the wishes of parents [Pluralism in the face of parents' opposition]

➢ Students should be encouraged to question the institutions of Pakistani society [Defy conventional institutions]

➢ Students should be encouraged to debate social and religious questions in schools [Discussion on socio-religious issues]

➢ Students should be enabled to participate in the decisions made about them in schools [Participation in decision making]

➢ Students should be consulted on what is studied in the school curriculum [consultation with students]

➢ Students should be prepared in school for their roles in family life [Preparation for familial life]

Composite Table 5.14: Views regarding educational priorities (% agree and strongly agree)

Questionnaire Items	Ahle Hadith	Brailvi	Deobandi	Govt. School	Jamaat-i-Islami	Private School	Shia Madrassa
Career oriented education	39	43	43	70	47	74	52
Social mobility	67	70	71	80	70	79	71
Freedom of choice	66	73	67	83	66	89	69
Becoming part of society	71	74	73	79	77	71	79
Understanding global society	60	64	70	79	67	89	67
Economic progress	71	66	63	83	76	90	66
Exploring Islam	74	81	73	73	89	64	79
Tolerance for diversity	67	61	61	71	77	79	71
Gender equality	36	26	33	71	33	86	40
Discourage misogyny	32	24	33	64	36	89	40
Religious education with parents' consent	71	77	69	71	76	69	76
Child education with parents' consent	71	77	70	71	74	67	74
Pluralist society	64	65	63	69	77	82	73
Pluralism in the face of parents' opposition	22	28	36	51	35	55	23
Defy conventional institutions	70	69	67	70	74	60	63
Discussion on socio-religious issues	46	49	47	55	54	49	41
Participation in decision making	69	64	59	48	70	63	72
Consultation with students	36	31	38	50	69	71	27
Preparation for familial life	76	60	69	70	76	76	76

Interestingly, the data of this study shows that the 10th grade students from seven different types of educational institutes of South Punjab have diverse responses towards the basic question, what is education for? In response to a statement in the questionnaire '*A key aim of education is to prepare students for work and employment*' 74 per cent students from English medium private schools expressed their agreement and only 9 per cent of them disagreed. More or less similar response has been given by students from government funded Urdu medium schools students as opposed to those of from madrassas. A large proportion of students from all types of madrassas either disagreed with the statement or was undecided. Some of the students from madrassas even come up with a statement on the questionnaire, "the first and foremost aim of education is to serve religion (Islam)." However, their response in this regard was endorsed further through interviewing. Among students from all types of madrassas, these were only Shia madrassas' students whose responses exceeded slightly above 50% in favour of the statement.

Aware of education's potential as an engine for progress in all dimensions of development-political, economic, social and cultural, Pakistan Human Development Fund and the National Commission for Human Development (NCHD), in partnership with UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) have established more than 9,000 adult literacy centres and enrolled nearly 1.5 million children in schools. One of the fundamental aim of this venture is to promote economic equality and social progress and to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. In response to the question '*Education should promote economic equality and social progress*' students from all types of schools seem unanimous in favour of the statement. Though majority of the students from madrassas also expressed their agreement with the statement, yet they ranked below than government and private schools which is 80 per cent and 79 per cent respectively. More or less similar response was observed among the participants for the question '*A key aim of education is individual freedom and choice in life*'.

Global education is a recent addition in schools curriculum. Like other societies, Pakistani society is changing rapidly and an urgent call for schools to address and instil global awareness into curriculum instruction is being felt. These new developments have made the role of education more crucial than ever, in increasing awareness and understanding of the global society. For this very reason a question "*A key aim of education is to increase*

awareness and appreciation of the world beyond Pakistan" has been included in the questionnaire. Interestingly majority of the students from all schools supported the notion but students from private schools ranked highest with 89 per cent followed by Urdu medium schools students that is 79 per cent. In the same vein, majority of the students from all types of schools cheered the idea that education should promote tolerance for cultural diversity.

Education is a purposeful activity. For some, education might be a process of social progress and for others it is not merely a means of earning a living; nor is it only a nursery of thought or a school for citizenship. It is initiation into the life of spirit and training of human souls in the pursuit of so-called truth and the practice of virtue. In order to have the take of students from different types of schools, a question '*A key aim of education is to initiate students into the knowledge and truth of Islam*' was included in the questionnaire. Interestingly an overwhelming majority of madrassa students particularly from Jamaat-e-Islami and Brailvi madrassas supported the conception the most. In the same vein, regarding the role of schools in dispensing religious education, students from madrassas gave their commendation with same degree.

One probable purpose of education can be to change people's perception about sex role. It is necessary to raise people's awareness about gender equality through education, because many people consider house duties as the only task of women. Education can help to raise men's awareness about their responsibilities both at home and in the society, so they may be willing to share households with their wives and letting their wives to actively participate in the social and managerial works beyond the boundary wall of house. In order to know how differently the students from different schools see the role of education in promoting gender equality, two questions regarding the role of education in promoting equality between men and women have been incorporated under the theme 'primary purpose of education' and one of the questionnaire item has been included in the composite table.

There is little agreement on what schools should be doing. Some may want schools to implant a new set of values in young people who did not pick these up from their family or society and others may demand from schools to preserve what the community could not save. And

for some, the school ought to reflect the living culture, instead of serving as a museum for the exhibit of the past glories of the religion and culture. Everyone may want a piece of education for their own purposes. Keeping in view the diverse demands with respect to the role of schools, some questions about 'what schools should be doing' have been included in the questionnaire. (See Appendix.01)

There are two questionnaire statements under the heading 'primary purpose of education' that talk about the role of schools in the promotion of shared values of the society. In response to first statement '*Schools should promote the shared values of Pakistani society*' the majority of the students, irrespective of their schools' type, expressed agreement with the statement; even more than 3/4th of the students from Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas stood for the statement, that figure comes at second highest only after private schools students i.e. 82 per cent. But interestingly, when the same statement was asked to the student only with the addition '*even if this conflicts with the wishes of parents*' the result of responses changed drastically. The questionnaire statement '*Schools should promote the shared values of Pakistani society even if this conflicts with the wishes of parents*' got negative reply.

Only 22 per cent of Ahle Hadith madrassas students showed agreement with the statement. In case of other types of madrassas, the response is not very different. Data shows that madrassas students don't want schools to promote shared values of Pakistani society at the cost of their parents' will. Though, students from private and government schools still seem to agreeing with the statement, yet one cannot ignore a visible difference in their responses with respect to the schools' role in the promotion of shared value in two different situations.

In modern times, the need of students' involvement in the decision making activities, at least, at school level has become acute. Many schools wrestle with exactly which decisions to allow students to make. There is plethora of arguments that advocates for a vast role of students ranging from the nomination of school principal and other employees to the assortment of curriculum, spending of school funds, selection of text books to teaching methods by the students etc. Under the theme of primary purpose of education, I have included some questions about the role of students at school level and wanted to determine

the take of Pakistani students on it. Like other individual questionnaire items, the students coming from different schools' types have varied opinion about the question whether there is any need of consultation with students on what is studied in the school curriculum. Interestingly unlike other madrassa students, students from Jamaat-i-Islami madrassa are among the ones who support pupils' involvement in the framing of curriculum. They ranked second after private school. It might be because of the fact that Jamaat-i-Islami has been critic of other madrassas' obsolete curriculum and take pride in teaching secular subjects along with religious education. Maulana Maududi; founder of Jamaat-i-Islami had been the greatest critic of the madrassa curriculum and censured the practice of memorisation of medieval texts in the madrassas which, he believed, was not providing relevant education to the Muslim society. No doubt, at least so far as the curriculum is concerned, it is not a sacrosanct thing near Jamaat-i-Islami madrassa students and it might be because of this reason that they favoured the opinion that students should be consulted on what is studied in the school curriculum.

Along with analyzing some of the important individual questionnaire items of the theme 'primary purpose of education' the coming paragraphs will make an analysis of the theme 'primary purpose of education' as a whole as well. A comparison between the outlook of madrassas students and Urdu and English medium schools students will be made with respect to the general question what education is for? In the coming paragraphs, it would also be argued whether the difference in the world view of madrassas students and their counterparts; English and Urdu medium schools students is statistically significant. Along with it, effect size will also be calculated.

Variation of responses across different educational institutes' students on educational priorities

Table 5.15

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Ahle Hadith	70	3.6481	.33233	.03972	3.5689	3.7274	2.95	4.42
Brailvi	70	3.6767	.34580	.04133	3.5942	3.7591	2.79	4.42
Deobandi	70	3.6135	.36408	.04352	3.5267	3.7003	2.32	4.37
Govt. School	80	3.9224	.37638	.04208	3.8386	4.0061	3.00	5.00
Jamaat-i-Islami	70	3.8023	.32413	.03874	3.7250	3.8795	3.05	4.47
Private School	70	4.0519	.37969	.04538	3.9613	4.1424	3.21	4.79
Shia Madrassa	70	3.6857	.35323	.04222	3.6015	3.7699	2.74	4.42
Total	500	3.7745	.38341	.01715	3.7408	3.8082	2.32	5.00

The data reveals that a large proportion of students, irrespective of their school type, have homogenous outlook towards the fundamental question, what education is for? All students regardless of school type seems supporting the stance that education is to prepare students for work and employment, it is to prepare students to take their place in Pakistani society and aim of education is to promote understanding of, and respect for, other faiths and cultures in Pakistan. They approve the role of schools in promoting the shared values of Pakistani society (Table 5.15). However, there is a difference in the degree of their support for the afore-mentioned aims of education. In addition, some students from madrassas, during their interviews didn't approve the aforesaid role of education, which will come in the coming paragraphs of the chapter. The overall mean score of private English schools students, for the theme 'aim of education' is (M=4.05) that is highest among all other schools students. Urdu medium schools students got second highest mean score (M=3.92), followed by Jamaat-i-

Islami madrassas students (M=3.80). The lowest mean score among all types of schools is of Deobandi madrassa that is (M=3.61). The mean score value below (M=3.00) indicates that students disagree with a particular stance and above 3:00 indicates students agreement with that viewpoint while the value 3:00 shows that students neither agree nor disagree with the question asked in the questionnaire. The statistics of the (Table 5.15) demonstrates that all types of schools' students agree with the purposes of education asked in the questionnaire.

Results of ANOVA

Table 5.16

ANOVA

Aim_of_Education

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	11.342	6	1.890	15.028	.000
Within Groups	62.014	493	.126		
Total	73.356	499			

Analysis of variance has been used to compare the variance (variability in scores) between the different schools (due to the independent variable; type of institutes) with the variability within each of the groups. An F ratio has been calculated, that represents the variance between the groups divided by the variance within the groups. A large F ratio indicates that there is more variability between the groups (caused by the independent variable) than there is within each group. A significant F test indicates whether there is any significant difference between different groups or not. And in this particular case, by virtue of it, we can reject the null hypothesis, which states that all the schools score exactly the same and there is no difference in the responses of students from different schools towards the aim of education. So, basically analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests just found out that there is statistically significant difference between the schools but in order to know where these differences actually lie, we have to carry out Post Hoc test.

Variance in responses between the students from different schools about educational priorities

One-way analysis of variance tests were conducted to look at how the responses of students about aim of education diverge according to their schools type. The results are presented in (Table 5.16).

Table 5.17

Primary purpose of education

(I) Type of Institute	(J) Type of Institute	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Ahle Hadith	Brailvi	-.02857	.05995	.999	-.2061	.1489
	Deobandi	.03459	.05995	.997	-.1429	.2121
	Govt. School	-.27425(*)	.05805	.000	-.4461	-.1024
	Jamaat-i-Islami	-.15414	.05995	.137	-.3316	.0234
	Private School	-.40376(*)	.05995	.000	-.5812	-.2263
	Shia Madrassa	-.03759	.05995	.996	-.2151	.1399
Brailvi	Ahle Hadith	.02857	.05995	.999	-.1489	.2061
	Deobandi	.06316	.05995	.941	-.1143	.2406
	Govt. School	-.24568(*)	.05805	.001	-.4175	-.0738
	Jamaat-i-Islami	-.12556	.05995	.358	-.3030	.0519
	Private School	-.37519(*)	.05995	.000	-.5527	-.1977
	Shia Madrassa	-.00902	.05995	1.000	-.1865	.1685
Deobandi	Ahle Hadith	-.03459	.05995	.997	-.2121	.1429
	Brailvi	-.06316	.05995	.941	-.2406	.1143
	Govt. School	-.30883(*)	.05805	.000	-.4807	-.1370
	Jamaat-i-Islami	-.18872(*)	.05995	.029	-.3662	-.0112
	Private School	-.43835(*)	.05995	.000	-.6158	-.2609
	Shia Madrassa	-.07218	.05995	.893	-.2497	.1053

(I) Type of Institute	(J) Type of Institute	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Govt. School	Ahle Hadith	.27425(*)	.05805	.000	.1024	.4461
	Brailvi	.24568(*)	.05805	.001	.0738	.4175
	Deobandi	.30883(*)	.05805	.000	.1370	.4807
	Jamaat-i-Islami	.12011	.05805	.373	-.0517	.2920
	Private School	-.12951	.05805	.281	-.3014	.0423
	Shia Madrassa	.23665(*)	.05805	.001	.0648	.4085
Jamaat-i-Islami	Ahle Hadith	.15414	.05995	.137	-.0234	.3316
	Brailvi	.12556	.05995	.358	-.0519	.3030
	Deobandi	.18872(*)	.05995	.029	.0112	.3662
	Govt. School	-.12011	.05805	.373	-.2920	.0517
	Private School	-.24962(*)	.05995	.001	-.4271	-.0721
	Shia Madrassa	.11654	.05995	.452	-.0609	.2940
Private School	Ahle Hadith	.40376(*)	.05995	.000	.2263	.5812
	Brailvi	.37519(*)	.05995	.000	.1977	.5527
	Deobandi	.43835(*)	.05995	.000	.2609	.6158
	Govt. School	.12951	.05805	.281	-.0423	.3014
	Jamaat-i-Islami	.24962(*)	.05995	.001	.0721	.4271
	Shia Madrassa	.36617(*)	.05995	.000	.1887	.5437
Shia Madrassa	Ahle Hadith	.03759	.05995	.996	-.1399	.2151
	Brailvi	.00902	.05995	1.000	-.1685	.1865
	Deobandi	.07218	.05995	.893	-.1053	.2497
	Govt. School	-.23665(*)	.05805	.001	-.4085	-.0648
	Jamaat-i-Islami	-.11654	.05995	.452	-.2940	.0609
	Private School	-.36617(*)	.05995	.000	-.5437	-.1887

A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of school type on the response of students towards the primary purpose of education, as

measured by the 19 question items that dealt with different aspects of aims of education ranging from social progress and individual freedom to the promotion of shared values of Pakistani society. Subjects are 10th level (class) students from seven different types of schools of more or less similar age group. There was a statistically significant difference at the $p<.05$ level in Aim of Education scores for the seven different schools' types groups [$F_{(6, 493)}=15.02$, $p=.000$]. Although we have found a statistically significant difference between the seven sets of scores, we also need to assess the effect size of this result. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, is .15, which in Cohen's (1988, pp. 284–7) terms would be considered as a large effect size. Cohen classifies .01 as a small effect, .06 as a medium effect and .14 as a large effect. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean scores for private schools (M=4.05, SD=.379) and government schools (M=3.92, SD=.376) were significantly different from all religious seminaries; Ahle Hadith (M=3.65, SD=.332), Brailvi (M=3.68, SD=.345), Deobandi (M=3.61, SD=.364), Jamaat-i-Islami (M=3.80, SD=.324) and Shia Madrassas (M=3.69, SD=.353). However, it is not the case that there is no significant difference within the religious seminaries; Deobandi madrassa (M=3.61, SD=.364) did differ significantly from Jamaat-i-Islami madrassa (M=3.80, SD=.324), less than .05, and that the differences between Ahle Hadith and Brailvi; Shia and Jamaat-i-Islami are not statistically significant. So one can analyze this table in quiet a lot of depth to look at these what it known as is pair-wise comparison.

Perhaps the most fundamental characteristic of (Table 5.17) is that the mean scores of English medium private schools and Urdu medium government schools' students are higher than those of madrassas' students. The students from English and Urdu medium schools expressed more appreciation towards the roles of education in promoting shared values of Pakistani society and bridging gap between man and women as compared to those of madrassa students.

With regard to the views of students about primary purpose of education, the responses in the interview data corroborate with the questionnaire data. However, there are some interesting points which students took up in one to one interview. As discussed in the questionnaire, the students from English and Urdu medium schools were more inclined towards the notion that education should promote shared values of Pakistani society and play its part in diminishing

gap between man and women along with its role in getting jobs, as compared to those of madrassa students. As far as the views of students with respect to primary purpose of education is concerned, there is a visible difference in the stances of students coming from different educations systems.

> *Ali: Worldly education is motivated by material gains. We have nothing like that in our mind. **Our only and only objective is to serve Islam**……………………And we God willing will get thousand times better reward from our God.*

It is quite obvious from the views of a student from a Deobandi madrassa that near him the only purpose of education is the service of Islam. While speaking about the purpose of education, a student from Brailvi madrassa said:

> *Akram: I am not against English schools or government schools………………. Everyone (every education system) has its own utility. If we all go to worldly schools (non-religious schools like private and govt. schools) who will help Islam!!!*

> *Amjad: God has categorically stated in the Holy book (Koran) (he read a verse from Koran in Arabic and then translated for me in native language)that the purpose behind the creation of Human being is no other than to pray to Me…………………… The main purpose of education is and should also be to serve Islam. But today's education has totally forgotten its basic objective (he was pointing towards mainstream education systems)…………… That is why everywhere poverty and crime is rampant. Corruption is because of the fact that people have distanced themselves from Islam.*

Here the views of students from three different type of madrassas has been quoted and all of them are upholders of the notion that purpose of education is the service of Islam, though from the views of a madrassa student, it seems that he has no disliking for non-religious schools but he considers madrassas equally important for the assistance of Islam. When asked to what extent he sees the contribution of his education at the school/madrassa in formulating his opinions, a student from Deoband madrassa said:

> *Ali: It is said that first learning place for a child is his mother's cradle. But for me first and may be last learning place is Madrassa Rahmania (Name of madrassa)……………. Today I am alive because of this madrassa. Everything is because of it……………………… Government is trying to abolish these madrassas because their only crime is that they*

fight for Haqq (truth). They give religious education to many poor and orphans like me.

A visible contrast comes in place when the views of madrassas students are compared with the views of students from Urdu and English medium schools. An Urdu medium school student shared his views about the purpose of education in this way:

Khalid: To get a job is prime objective of education, who will go to school if they are told that no job will be given to them after completing their education…………I am not saying everyone who attends school gets a good job but there is a hope……………I love my school……..My parents are illiterate, whatever I am and I learnt is because of my school……………….When I was a child I used to think that children are sent to schools as a punishment (for bothering their parents) but now I know it is all for our good.

Gender Inequality

Often religion is considered as an obstacle in the way of progressive social change needed to materialize developmental goals such as gender equality. Religion has been particularly controversial in development discourse and planning in the arena of gender equality (Bano, 2010). And interestingly, a little empirical research has been done so far, particularly in Pakistan, which could evaluate the views of those who are involved on religion or could examine the role of religion in social mobilization and activism. In this research, I have tried to determine the viewpoint of students of madrassas and main stream schools of Pakistan with regard to position of women in Pakistani society. Under this very theme 6 questions were included in the questionnaire covering a range of aspects regarding the role of women in Pakistani society. Responses of students towards these questionnaire items have been described in the table given under:

➢ Equal rights should be given to men and women as in Western countries [Gender equality like Western societies]

- It is desirable that equal opportunities should be given to both men and women to become head of state [Head of the sate]
- Women should work shoulder to shoulder with men in all spheres of life [Participation in all spheres of life]
- Women should be confined to domestic responsibilities [Limited to household chores]
- The presence of women in Pak army is a progressive development [Participation in armed forces]
- A fixed quota of jobs for women across a range of occupations is a positive step on the part of government [Women's quota]

Composite Table 5.18: Views regarding gender equality issues (% agree and strongly agree)

Questionnaire Items	Ahle Hadith	Brailvi	Deobandi	Govt. School	Jamaat-i-Islami	Private School	Shia Madrassa
Gender equality like western societies	15	20	18	54	10	77	13
Head of the sate	19	23	19	57	9	79	13
Participation in all spheres of life	19	21	19	58	10	80	11
Limited to household chores	10	14	20	66	9	80	19
Participation in armed forces	19	21	19	54	10	76	10
Women's quota	19	20	20	53	10	74	14

The first item, among the six items that were included in the questionnaire to determine the responses of students with regard to 'place of women in Pakistani society' was *Equal rights should be given to men and women as in Western countries.* A large proportion of students from madrassas disagreed with this notion; however, overwhelming number of students from English schools backed the statement. The response of majority of the Urdu schools students was also in favour of the statement. So far as madrassa students are concerned, as told before, they strongly disapproved the proposal that men and women should have equal rights. Further explanation in this regard will be acquired in the light of interviews from madrassas students.

On November 16, 1988, Pakistan People's Party (PPP) headed by Benazir Bhutto won the single largest bloc of seats in the National Assembly and as a result Bhutto was sworn in as Prime Minister of a coalition government on December 2. Becoming the first woman to head the government of a Muslim-majority state in modern times caused much commotion in the circles of the religious parties and factions. They raised hue and cry by declaring that the becoming of a woman as a head of a Muslim state was not in conformity with the spirit of Islam. Various fatwas (religious verdicts) were issued against her. Bearing in mind such political background, a question was incorporated in the questionnaire that states, *It is desirable that equal opportunities should be given to both men and women to become head of state.* No surprise as data shows students from all madrassas overwhelmingly opposed the proposal.

It is very unfortunate that domestic violence is highly prevalent in Pakistan. There are many forms of domestic violence against women ranging from psychological abuse in the form of controlling behaviour, economic abuse or pressures and social isolation; physical in the form of torturing or beating, and sexual abuse in the form of forced sexual intercourse etc. The prevailing systems of Purdah (veiling) and Izzat (sign of honour) are misused to push the social isolation of women and thus, women are more confined to their homes. According to Jehanzeb Noor (2004) this discrimination against women begins from home. The parents of a girl often do not educate her because she is not required to seek employment. They also fear that education would make her independent, modem and liberal. If family income is low, the male children claim all the family's affection and resources. The girl on the other hand is condemned to perform domestic chores, including looking after younger siblings without any

appreciation or compensation. Women have little choice but to accept these roles (Noor, 2004).

In order to have the take of Pakistani students from different types of schools about the place of women in Pakistani society, a question: '*Women should be confined to domestic responsibilities*' was slotted in the questionnaire. All madrassa students commended the stance. If we look at the statistics of other item statements of the same variable 'Gender Inequality', there is not any substantial difference in responses. For instance, a statement which probes the opinion of students about the 'fixed quota of jobs for women' carries more or less similar figures. Most of the students from madrassas opposed the statement '*A fixed quota of jobs for women across a range of occupations is a positive step on the part of government*.' The ratio of students in the support of statement didn't exceed even 20 per cent in any madrassa, while the majority of Urdu and 3/4th students of English schools backed the policy of government to fix quota in jobs for women. A clear impression comes from the interviews with madrassa students that women should be confined within the household chores. Further explanation in this regard will be made in the interview section.

Variation of responses across different educational institutes' students on status of women

Table 5.19

Descriptives

Gender Inequality

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Ahle Hadith	70	2.0452	1.04755	.12521	1.7955	2.2950	1.00	5.00
Brailvi	70	2.2381	1.06985	.12787	1.9830	2.4932	1.00	4.67
Deobandi	70	2.1476	1.04779	.12523	1.8978	2.3975	1.00	5.00
Govt. School	80	3.4604	1.07890	.12062	3.2203	3.7005	1.17	5.00
Jamaat-i-Islami	70	1.8095	.86871	.10383	1.6024	2.0167	1.00	4.33
Private School	70	4.1000	.91613	.10950	3.8816	4.3184	1.33	5.00
Shia Madrassa	70	1.8476	.92415	.11046	1.6273	2.0680	1.00	4.50
Total	500	2.5400	1.29330	.05784	2.4264	2.6536	1.00	5.00

The data of the (Table 5.19) tells that it is only private and government schools students who advocate equality between men and women. They favour equal participation of women in all walks of life, while on the other hand all students from madrassas irrespective of their type censure the idea of gender equality. The views of students regarding status of women would be further analyzed in interview section. The descriptive statistics (Table 5.19) gives us an idea what the means for each group are, and how big the gaps between the groups are. 3.00 is the mean, we can see that private English medium schools students and government Urdu medium schools students tend to score above the mean while students from all madrassas scored below the mean.

Results of ANOVA

Table 5.20

ANOVA

Gender Inequality

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	343.327	6	57.221	57.417	.000
Within Groups	491.317	493	.997		
Total	834.644	499			

ANOVA test has been conducted to determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the groups. An F ratio has been calculated, that represents the variance between the groups divided by the variance within the groups. A large F ratio indicates that there is more variability between the groups (caused by the independent variable i.e. type of institute in this very case) than there is within each group. A significant F test indicates whether there is any significant difference between different groups or not. And in this particular case, by virtue of it, we can reject the null hypothesis, which states that all the schools score exactly the same and there is no difference in the responses of students from different schools towards the questions dealing with status of women. So, basically analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests just found out that there is statistically significant difference between the schools but in order to know where these differences actually lie, Post Hoc test is to be carried out.

Variance in responses between the students from different schools on Gender Inequality

One-way analysis of variance tests were conducted to look at how the responses of students about gender inequality diverge according to their schools type. The results are presented in (Table 5.21).

Table 5.21

Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable: Gender Inequality

Tukey HSD

(I) Type of Institute	(J) Type of Institute	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Ahle Hadith	Brailvi	-.19286	.16874	.914	-.6924	.3067
	Deobandi	-.10238	.16874	.997	-.6020	.3972
	Govt. School	-1.41518(*)	.16338	.000	-1.8989	-.9315
	Jamaat-i-Islami	.23571	.16874	.803	-.2639	.7353
	Private School	-2.05476(*)	.16874	.000	-2.5543	-1.5552
	Shia Madrassa	.19762	.16874	.905	-.3020	.6972
Brailvi	Ahle Hadith	.19286	.16874	.914	-.3067	.6924
	Deobandi	.09048	.16874	.998	-.4091	.5900
	Govt. School	-1.22232(*)	.16338	.000	-1.7060	-.7386
	Jamaat-i-Islami	.42857	.16874	.148	-.0710	.9281
	Private School	-1.86190(*)	.16874	.000	-2.3615	-1.3623
	Shia Madrassa	.39048	.16874	.239	-.1091	.8900
Deobandi	Ahle Hadith	.10238	.16874	.997	-.3972	.6020
	Brailvi	-.09048	.16874	.998	-.5900	.4091
	Govt. School	-1.31280(*)	.16338	.000	-1.7965	-.8291
	Jamaat-i-Islami	.33810	.16874	.414	-.1615	.8377
	Private School	-1.95238(*)	.16874	.000	-2.4520	-1.4528
	Shia Madrassa	.30000	.16874	.564	-.1996	.7996

(I) Type of Institute	(J) Type of Institute	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Govt. School	Ahle Hadith	1.41518(*)	.16338	.000	.9315	1.8989
	Brailvi	1.22232(*)	.16338	.000	.7386	1.7060
	Deobandi	1.31280(*)	.16338	.000	.8291	1.7965
	Jamaat-i-Islami	1.65089(*)	.16338	.000	1.1672	2.1346
	Private School	-.63958(*)	.16338	.002	-1.1233	-.1559
	Shia Madrassa	1.61280(*)	.16338	.000	1.1291	2.0965
Jamaat-i-Islami	Ahle Hadith	-.23571	.16874	.803	-.7353	.2639
	Brailvi	-.42857	.16874	.148	-.9281	.0710
	Deobandi	-.33810	.16874	.414	-.8377	.1615
	Govt. School	-1.65089(*)	.16338	.000	-2.1346	-1.1672
	Private School	-2.29048(*)	.16874	.000	-2.7900	-1.7909
	Shia Madrassa	-.03810	.16874	1.000	-.5377	.4615
Private School	Ahle Hadith	2.05476(*)	.16874	.000	1.5552	2.5543
	Brailvi	1.86190(*)	.16874	.000	1.3623	2.3615
	Deobandi	1.95238(*)	.16874	.000	1.4528	2.4520
	Govt. School	.63958(*)	.16338	.002	.1559	1.1233
	Jamaat-i-Islami	2.29048(*)	.16874	.000	1.7909	2.7900
	Shia Madrassa	2.25238(*)	.16874	.000	1.7528	2.7520
Shia Madrassa	Ahle Hadith	-.19762	.16874	.905	-.6972	.3020
	Brailvi	-.39048	.16874	.239	-.8900	.1091
	Deobandi	-.30000	.16874	.564	-.7996	.1996
	Govt. School	-1.61280(*)	.16338	.000	-2.0965	-1.1291
	Jamaat-i-Islami	.03810	.16874	1.000	-.4615	.5377
	Private School	-2.25238(*)	.16874	.000	-2.7520	-1.7528

A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of school type on the views of students about status of women in Pakistani society, as

determined through 6 question slotted in the questionnaire. Participants of this survey are 10th level (class) students from seven different types of schools of more or less similar age group. There was a statistically significant difference at the p<.05 level in Gender Inequality scores for the seven different schools' types groups [F (6, 493)=57.41, p=.000]. Although we have found a statistically significant difference between the seven sets of scores, we also need to assess the effect size of this result. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, is .41 which, according to generally accepted criteria (Cohen 1988, pp. 284–7), is considered quite a large effect. Using the commonly used guidelines proposed by Cohen (1988, pp. 284–7) (.01=small, .06=moderate, .14=large effect), this result suggests a very large effect size. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean scores for private schools (M=4.10, SD=.916) and government schools (M=3.46, SD=1.08) were significantly different from all religious seminaries; Ahle Hadith (M=2.05, SD=1.05), Brailvi (M=2.24, SD=1.07), Deobandi (M=2.15, SD=1.05), Jamaat-i-Islami (M=1.80, SD=.869) and Shia Madrassas (M=1.85, SD=.924). Interestingly, there is no significant difference within the religious schools. The (Table 5.19) shows that these are only the students from private and government schools who scored above the mean score i.e. M=3.00, otherwise madrassas' students scored below the mean and they seem to be disapproving the idea that men and women should enjoy equal status and should have equal opportunities.

With respect to the views of students about status of women, the responses in the interview data substantiate the questionnaire data. Some of the interesting points which students took up in one to one interview are discussed here under:

> *Majeed: Concerning women, we should obey the Koran, not the West….. Women*
> *cause all incitement to evil in the society. Allah says women should be covered and*
> *the Angraiz[61] want us to undress our women, whom we should listen to, Allah or the*
> *West!!!............They (women) shouldn't leave the house unless covered. This is what*
> *Koran says about women, they should stay at home……Introducing quota in jobs for*

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[61] In contrast to its literal meaning which is "English people" the common folks in Pakistan used the term Angraiz for all Europeans and Western people.

women was a devilish deed on the part of Musharraf[62] that incurred the wrath of God and now, look, he cannot even come to Pakistan.

A student from Jamaat-e-Islami madrassa expressed his views regarding status of women and took an extreme position and censured the notion that equal rights should be given to men and women as in Western society. More or less similar views were shared by a student Nasir from Shia madrassa regarding the place of women in Pakistani society.

Abbas: Women must be confined to household works……………Today's vulgarity in our Islamic society is because of women liberty. Un-Islamic laws are being implemented with respect to women's place in society…………………It is a shame for men that they accept women rule on them albeit God has made men superior to women……….Qari Naeem sb (Teacher's name) always says that the day government will ban women to go outside, there will be no vulgarity in our society.

A student from Deobandi madrassa, like his counterparts from religious seminaries takes an ardent stance with respect to the position of women in Pakistani society as shown by his views expressed under:

Khan: Education is a duty for both men and women. It suits a woman better when she is covered. She needs to go out covered. There is a command in the Koran, "promotion of virtue and prevention of vice". All incitement to evil is caused by women. I can only advise her to the best of my capacity. In today's society it is a verbal jihad. All we can do is advise them. If they don't accept it, it is out of our hands. Because it has become a custom all over the world, so we can't do much. Killing a woman without hijab is not in the Koran. When Sharia law is in force, we hope they will not come out without a hijab.

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[62] Former Army Chief and President of Pakistan who is in self-imposed exile since his removal as president.

There has also been included the views of two students; one from Urdu medium school and the other from English medium school, though both of them agreed that women should be granted much more rights than the ones not approved by madrassa students, but the student from Urdu medium school consider teaching an appropriate occupation for women as compared to military.

Kabeer: Women make half part of our country and they should work shoulder to shoulder……………I don't think that women should be given permission to join army…………Teaching is a very good profession for women……………Why not! Benazir Bhuttoo was a woman and she was a great leader………I think those are illiterate who oppose women right to rule a country.

Zahid: Girls are not inferior to us in any respect. If we think honestly they are even far better than us……You can see the results of Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, top 16 positions of the board went to girls. It is very good that girls, I mean women joined Pak army……………………They should work shoulder to shoulder with men in every field. Confining girls to the occupations of doctor or teacher only is very bad, my own sister is studying the engineering course in a university out of this city.

As discussed in the questionnaire, the students from English and Urdu medium schools were more inclined towards the notion that equal rights should be granted to women as opposed to men and the students from madrassas come up with some kind of misogynistic views.

Status of Minorities

Religious discrimination in Pakistan is a serious issue. Christians and Ahmadis are routinely discriminated against. Most recently, the issue of forced conversions of young Hindu girls got

media attention. Minorities are refused jobs, loans, housing and have had their postal service stopped. Churches and Ahmadi mosques are regularly attacked and worshipers physically assaulted (Bales, 2012). The International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD) conducted a study in November 2011 which says that Pakistan's public schools and particularly madrassas negatively portray the country's religious minorities and reinforce biases which fuel acts of discrimination, and possibly violence, against these communities. This phenomenon is not new at all but the role of free national media especially after 2004 brought such issues to the lime light. Keeping in view the alleged role of educational institutes in promoting schism between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens of Pakistan, these questions were incorporated in the questionnaire and the position of students from south Punjab on this very issue was found out. The questionnaire statements dealing with the theme 'status of non-Muslims in Pakistani society' contains 11 multiple items in the questionnaire. These items are grouped to prove or disprove this very traditional concept that madrassa students are intolerant towards minorities in Pakistan. Responses of questionnaire items have been explained with the help of crosstab tables which are given hereunder:

- Equal rights should be accorded to Ahmedis in all jobs [Jobs for Ahmedis]
- Equal rights should be accorded to Pakistani Hindus in all jobs [Jobs for Hindus]
- Equal rights should be accorded to Pakistani Christians in all jobs [Jobs for Christians]
- Ahmedis should have right to perform their religious practices freely [Religious freedom for Ahmedis]
- Ahmedis should have right to occupy key positions in Pakistan without any discrimination [Key positions for Ahmedis]
- Ahmedis should have right to propagate their religion freely [Propagation of religion]
- The constitutional clause that says that the highest officials of the state must be Muslims is justifiable [Must be a Muslim]
- Every Pakistani whether Muslim or non-Muslim must read Islamic Studies as a compulsory subject [Islamic Studies obligatory]
- There should be no compulsion on private schools to teach Islamic Studies to their students [Private schools and Islamic Studies]
- All non-Muslims in Pakistan should have the right to celebrate their religious festivals freely [Freedom for religious celebrations]

> As Pakistan is an Islamic country, so all the restrictions on non-Muslims are justified [Justification for discrimination]

Composite Table 5.22: Views regarding status of minorities (% agree and strongly agree)

Questionnaire Items	Ahle Hadith	Brailvi	Deobandi	Govt. School	Jamaat-i-Islami	Private School	Shia Madrassa
Jobs for Ahmedis	19	17	15	41	19	64	14
Jobs for Hindus	40	47	39	39	79	79	30
Jobs for Christians	53	49	47	53	48	76	61
Religious freedom for Ahmedis	54	36	36	56	40	73	51
Key positions for Ahmedis	23	21	23	38	30	49	42
Propagation of religion	50	37	36	56	40	73	49
Must be a Muslim	60	47	60	35	50	16	51
Islamic Studies obligatory	46	34	40	35	27	17	34
Private schools and Islamic Studies	33	39	36	48	21	60	30
Freedom for religious celebrations	57	59	56	78	61	79	59
Justification for discrimination	39	33	47	31	37	14	46

Interestingly, the data shows that students from madrassas did express a bit of intolerance towards non-Muslims in Pakistan. Their responses showed that Ahmedis[63] are victim of their

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[63] Ahmedis are those who consider Ghulam Ahmed Qadian as the last messenger of God instead of Muhammad (pbuh); who by all Muslims is believed to be the last prophet. Ahmedis were declared non-Muslims in 1973 constitution of Pakistan as a result of severe agitation by all religious parties of Pakistan.

bigotry much more than Hindus and Christians. One can make an analogy between Muslims and Ahmedis in the same manner as between Christians and Mormons, so far as the difference of believes is concerned. In response to the statement '*Equal rights should be accorded to Ahmedis in all jobs*' a large proportion of students from madrassas expressed their censure, even this time the majority of students from Urdu schools also shared the viewpoint of madrassas students.

If we look at the responses of madrassas students towards the similar questions only with the replacement of Ahmedis with Hindus and Christians, one interesting finding comes in place. Ahle Hadith, Brailvi and Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas students showed their agreement to the statement which says '*Equal rights should be accorded to Pakistani Hindus in all jobs*' and even Shia and Deoband madrassas students also share similar response with rest of the three madrassas when it is the question of equal rights to Pakistani Christians. Its explanation can be found by virtue of interview with a madrassa student who considers Christians more close to Islam than that of Hinduism because "Christianity like Islam is a revealed religion." If we look at the responses of students towards the issue of religious freedom to all non-Muslims, a clear dichotomy in views can be observed. Madrassas students seem unwilling to accord equal rights to non-Muslims in general and Ahmedis in particular when it is the question of giving equal opportunities in jobs. They opposed the idea that "*Ahmedis should have right to occupy key positions in Pakistan without any discrimination*" and stood by the stance that "*The constitutional clause that says, the highest officials of the state must be Muslims is justifiable*" but at the same time they favoured the thought that "*All non-Muslims in Pakistan should have the right to celebrate their religious festivals freely*." It is quite obvious from the data that a clear majority of students from all types of madrassas gives their approval for religious freedom to non-Muslims in Pakistan. Even the percentage of students from Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas is higher than government schools students and ranks second highest only after private schools students. This can be because of the fact that Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas advocate pluralistic view of Islam and unlike other madrassas they teach reformed syllabus that includes secular subjects like geography, science and even foreign languages like English and Arabic. And so far as Shia madrassas students are concerned, they themselves are victims of intolerance at the hands of Sunni majority and are backers of maximum religious freedom.

Pakistan's first foreign minister Sir Zafar Ullah Khan was an Ahmedi. In 1953 anti-Ahmediya movement headed by Abul Ala Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami ignited a series of violent riots in the city of Lahore. Unable to contain the increasingly widespread civil disorder, civilian government handed over the administration of the city to the army and first ever martial law in the history of Pakistan was imposed in Lahore. In the face of opposition from religious circles, Sir Zafar Ullah had to quit his position as foreign minister of Pakistan in 1954. Anti-Ahmedia movement or popularly known as Tehreek-i-Khatame Naboowwat made three demands.

- Removal of Muhammad Zafarullah Khan from the foreign ministry;
- Removal of Ahmedis from top government offices;
- Declaration of Ahmedis as non-Muslims.

One can gauge the influence of religious groups in Pakistan by viewing the fact that all of their demands were not only accepted but also in later years no civilian or military government dared to offer key positions to Ahmedis. Data of the study also corroborates with this fact when we see that majority of students from all types of madrassas opposed the notion that '*Ahmedis should have right to occupy key positions in Pakistan without any discrimination*'.

Theoretically, in Pakistan it is mandatory for only Muslim students up to Secondary school level to study Islamic Studies as a compulsory subject, but the practice tells another story. Executive Director of National Commission for Justice and Peace (NCJP) Peter Jacob in his study titled 'Life on the Margins' disclosed that 27 per cent minority women (Christian and Hindu) faced discrimination in admissions to educational institutions and were forced to take Islamic studies for absence of any alternative subject (2013). In 2013, Shehzad Roy[64] produced and hosted the 22-episode documentary series titled "Chal Parha" [translated 'Let's Educate']. In this show, issues in public education, for example medium of instruction, curriculum, teachers, corporal punishment were highlighted. Roy travelled across 80 cities in Pakistan and visited more than 200 public schools. The documentary showed that in some government schools of Pakistan Hindus and Christians were being taught Islamic Studies, even in Sindh a Hindu teacher was asked by the school administration to teach Islamic

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[64] Shehzad Roy is a renowned singer, a celebrity in Pakistan.

Studies. After on-airing of just couple of episodes of the show, a massive protest started against Roy, especially on social media. The show was stated as anti-Islamic and against national interests.

If we see the responses of students towards the questionnaire item *Every Pakistani whether Muslim or non-Muslim must read Islamic Studies as a compulsory subject*, a large proportion of students from all types of madrassas either agreed with the statement or was undecided. As far as private school students are concerned only 17 per cent supported the stance *Every Pakistani whether Muslim or non-Muslim must read Islamic Studies as a compulsory subject* and overwhelming majority that is 60 per cent favoured the notion that *'There should be no compulsion on private schools to teach Islamic Studies to their students'*.

Variation of responses across different educational institutes' students about the place of non-Muslims in Pakistani society

Table 5.23

Descriptives

Status of Minorities

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Ahle Hadith	70	2.9325	.52593	.06286	2.8071	3.0579	1.73	4.09
Brailvi	70	2.9390	.62020	.07413	2.7911	3.0868	1.36	4.27
Deobandi	70	2.7883	.65933	.07880	2.6311	2.9455	1.36	4.18
Govt. School	80	3.3091	.59068	.06604	3.1776	3.4405	1.73	4.45
Jamaat-i-Islami	70	2.9390	.48073	.05746	2.8243	3.0536	2.00	3.91
Private School	70	3.9325	.56119	.06707	3.7987	4.0663	2.82	4.91
Shia Madrassa	70	2.9740	.51870	.06200	2.8503	3.0977	1.55	4.09
Total	500	3.1202	.67110	.03001	3.0612	3.1791	1.36	4.91

The data in the (Table 5.23) shows that the students from English medium private schools and Urdu medium government schools scored above M=3.00 that is the mean; otherwise rest of the institutes' students (students from religious seminaries) scored below the mean score. From their responses, it is evident that only private and government schools students believe equality for the non-Muslims in the Pakistani society and object to any discrimination with minorities on the basis of religion. On the other hand madrassa students regardless of their type back this discriminatory treatment of non-Muslims in Pakistan on the premise that Pakistan is a Muslim majority country and all the legal and constitutional restrictions on non-Muslims are justified. Further analysis on this point will be made in the interview section in the later part of this chapter.

Results of ANOVA

Table 5.24

ANOVA

Status of Minorities

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	65.311	6	10.885	33.661	.000
Within Groups	159.426	493	.323		
Total	224.737	499			

Analysis of variance has been used to compare the variance (variability in scores) between the different schools (due to the independent variable; type of institutes) with the variability within each of the groups. An F ratio has been calculated, that represents the variance between the groups divided by the variance within the groups. A large F ratio indicates that there is more variability between the groups (caused by the independent variable) than there is within each group. A significant F test indicates whether there is any significant difference between different groups or not. And in this particular case, by virtue of it, we can reject the null hypothesis, which states that all the schools score exactly the same and there is no

difference in the responses of students from different schools towards the questions asked about the status of minorities in Pakistani society. The value is less than .05 and is .000 that indicates that there is statistically significant difference between the schools but in order to know where these differences actually lie; only ANOVA test is not sufficient, for it we will have to carry out Post Hoc test.

Variance in responses between the students from different schools about Status of Minorities

Table 5.25

Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable: Status of Minorities

Tukey HSD

(I) Type of Institute	(J) Type of Institute	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Ahle Hadith	Brailvi	-.00649	.09612	1.000	-.2911	.2781
	Deobandi	.14416	.09612	.745	-.1404	.4287
	Govt. School	-.37662(*)	.09307	.001	-.6522	-.1011
	Jamaat-i-Islami	-.00649	.09612	1.000	-.2911	.2781
	Private School	-1.00000(*)	.09612	.000	-1.2846	-.7154
	Shia Madrassa	-.04156	.09612	1.000	-.3261	.2430
Brailvi	Ahle Hadith	.00649	.09612	1.000	-.2781	.2911
	Deobandi	.15065	.09612	.703	-.1339	.4352
	Govt. School	-.37013(*)	.09307	.002	-.6457	-.0946
	Jamaat-i-Islami	.00000	.09612	1.000	-.2846	.2846
	Private School	-.99351(*)	.09612	.000	-1.2781	-.7089
	Shia Madrassa	-.03506	.09612	1.000	-.3196	.2495
Deobandi	Ahle Hadith	-.14416	.09612	.745	-.4287	.1404
	Brailvi	-.15065	.09612	.703	-.4352	.1339
	Govt. School	-.52078(*)	.09307	.000	-.7963	-.2452

(I) Type of Institute	(J) Type of Institute	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Govt. School	Jamaat-i-Islami	-.15065	.09612	.703	-.4352	.1339
	Private School	-1.14416(*)	.09612	.000	-1.4287	-.8596
	Shia Madrassa	-.18571	.09612	.460	-.4703	.0989
	Ahle Hadith	.37662(*)	.09307	.001	.1011	.6522
	Brailvi	.37013(*)	.09307	.002	.0946	.6457
	Deobandi	.52078(*)	.09307	.000	.2452	.7963
Jamaat-i-Islami	Jamaat-i-Islami	.37013(*)	.09307	.002	.0946	.6457
	Private School	-.62338(*)	.09307	.000	-.8989	-.3478
	Shia Madrassa	.33506(*)	.09307	.006	.0595	.6106
	Ahle Hadith	.00649	.09612	1.000	-.2781	.2911
	Brailvi	.00000	.09612	1.000	-.2846	.2846
	Deobandi	.15065	.09612	.703	-.1339	.4352
	Govt. School	-.37013(*)	.09307	.002	-.6457	-.0946
Private School	Private School	-.99351(*)	.09612	.000	-1.2781	-.7089
	Shia Madrassa	-.03506	.09612	1.000	-.3196	.2495
	Ahle Hadith	1.00000(*)	.09612	.000	.7154	1.2846
	Brailvi	.99351(*)	.09612	.000	.7089	1.2781
	Deobandi	1.14416(*)	.09612	.000	.8596	1.4287
	Govt. School	.62338(*)	.09307	.000	.3478	.8989
	Jamaat-i-Islami	.99351(*)	.09612	.000	.7089	1.2781
Shia Madrassa	Shia Madrassa	.95844(*)	.09612	.000	.6739	1.2430
	Ahle Hadith	.04156	.09612	1.000	-.2430	.3261
	Brailvi	.03506	.09612	1.000	-.2495	.3196
	Deobandi	.18571	.09612	.460	-.0989	.4703
	Govt. School	-.33506(*)	.09307	.006	-.6106	-.0595
	Jamaat-i-Islami	.03506	.09612	1.000	-.2495	.3196
	Private School	-.95844(*)	.09612	.000	-1.2430	-.6739

A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of school type on the response of students towards the theme 'status of minorities in Pakistan' as deliberated by the 11 question items that dealt with the place of non-Muslims in different aspects ranging from religious freedom to equal opportunities to hold key governmental positions. There was a statistically significant difference at the $p<.05$ level in 'Status of non-Muslims' scores for the seven different schools' types groups [$F (6, 493)=33.66, p=.000$]. Though we have found that there is a statistically significant difference between the seven sets of scores, yet in order to measure its magnitude, we need to assess the effect size of the result. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, is .29, which in Cohen's (1988, pp. 284–7) terms would be considered as a large effect size. Cohen classifies .01 as a small effect, .06 as a medium effect and .14 as a large effect. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean scores for private schools ($M=3.93$, $SD=.561$) is significantly different from government schools ($M=3.31$, $SD=.591$) and all religious seminaries; Ahle Hadith ($M=2.93$, $SD=.526$), Brailvi ($M=2.94$, $SD=.620$), Deobandi ($M=2.79$, $SD=.660$), Jamaat-i-Islami ($M=2.94$, $SD=.481$) and Shia Madrassas ($M=2.97$, $SD=.519$). For the themes Aim of Education and Gender Inequality, there was no significant means difference between the scores of two main stream educational institutes, but here English medium and Urdu medium schools' score difference is statistically significant, that is less than .05. However, so far as the scores of madrassas are concerned, there is no statistically significant difference within them.

The views of students regarding status of minorities in Pakistan, the responses in the interview data corroborate with the questionnaire data. However, there are some interesting points which students took up in one to one interview. As discussed in the questionnaire, the students from English and Urdu medium schools were more inclined towards the notion that equal rights should be accorded to minorities in jobs and to practice their religion, as compared to those of madrassa students. As far as the views of students with respect to the position of non-Muslims is concerned, there is a visible difference in the stances of students coming from different educations systems. A student from Shia madrassa says,

> *Kazim: Islam has categorically stated 14 hundred years ago that Christians and Jews can never be your (Muslims) friends.........It is proved today. If we say this thing openly people call us extremists but how long they will neglect this reality.................I have*

no hatred for any sect…………..Pakistan is for Muslims only…there is no example that Hindus, Christians or Jews have shed their blood for it (for the creation of Pakistan) instead they all opposed it, so why they should be given jobs.

More or less similar views were expressed by Jamaat-i-Islami madrassa student:

Rana: God says in the Koran, "Believers, take neither Jews nor Christians for your friends." Don't be on good terms with the Jews and Christians. You or me cannot deny the verse from the Koran, it is a straight verse…"Believers, take neither Jews nor Christians for your friends." Earth has been created for the Muslims….They will have to accept Islam or pay Jazia or will fight them….And that was how the prophet fought. As our Muslim brothers are under attack in Afghanistan, so it is duty of every man and woman to join the jihad. Koran says 'don't be friends with the infidels. God can grant you honour and He can smite you. It is not in human hands…

A student from Brailvi madrassa also questions the loyalty of Ahmedis with Muslim majority state and disqualifies them from holding key sensitive positions.

Sajjad: Whether Hindus or Muslims, all of us are Pakistanis, if we look our relationship in this way, there will not be any conflicts……Every non-Muslim be it Christian, Hindu or Ahmedi should have religious liberty. As far as their part in jobs is concerned, they should have their due share…….I don't think Ahmedis are qualified for every job, as they are traitors. Along with head of the state and head of the government, all sensitive positions should go to Muslims only.

The views of students from three different types of madrassas have been quoted above and all of them upheld the notion that equality of rights should be denied to minorities in Pakistan. And a visible contrast comes in place when the views of madrassa students are compared with the views of a student from English medium school that are given hereunder:

Rafiq: It doesn't make any sense to me that why should people be discriminated because of their religious beliefs.

Conclusion

This chapter is mainly comprised of detailed analyses of data and presents the findings. But before moving to analysis, the 5th chapter described the sample characteristics and gave an account of background information of the participants. The chapter began with the description of background information of participants that includes their demographic characteristics, lifestyles, habits and personal history, such as respondents' age, gender, residential location, socio-economic status, religion, and level of education and so on and so forth. As far as background information is concerned, it can be seen that differences do exist between madrassa, Urdu medium and English medium schools' students, be it their social class, their family system or previous education. After reporting background information of the participants, detailed analysis of data was presented. In the analysis and findings section, difference in the outlook of students from three different types of schooling systems with respect to three important themes of the study was reported. The themes included in this chapter are primary purpose of education, status of women and position of minorities. The findings of the study were reported by virtue of cross tabs, mean, standard deviation, Chi square to explore the relationship/relatedness between variables and ANOVA i.e. analysis of variance which was used to compare the variance (variability in scores) between the different schools (due to the independent variables; like type of institutes) with the variability within each of the groups. In addition, the interview data was linked to have further illustrative insights on the questionnaire data. From the findings of data, it can be seen then that differences do exist between the outlooks of students coming from three different types of schooling systems regarding their views on primary purpose of education, woman rights and status of minorities in Muslim majority state Pakistan. Data showed that the students from madrassas are the most extremist in their views and English medium ones are the least. The questionnaire data was further endorsed with the interviews of students from respective schools.

Chapter 6

Views regarding sectarian rift and Islamic militancy

Introduction

Religious extremism, in Pakistan, has witnessed unprecedented heights in recent times. Extremism has many facets ranging from the practice of sanctifying oppression against women and minorities to intolerance towards people of other sect and even pursue armed struggle to impose vested agenda. In the context of Pakistan, extremism manifests an absolute position taken by the people or groups of people, who reject plurality of society and want to enforce a uniform viewpoint or ideology, even by using violence by giving it the name of *Jihad* (holy war). The trend of Jihad/armed struggle in madrassas was introduced in the wake of Soviet invasion in Afghanistan when the students of madrassas were trained to fight Soviet forces and madrassas students acted as proper foot soldiers for the war. This very exposure of madrassa students towards armed violence turned them into security threat and they started to be known as 'Jihadi factories' and 'terrorist dens'. Madrassa critics also sustain the view that students are taught to be intolerant towards people of other sect and blame the tradition of 'radd[65]' and related literature for contributing sectarian conflict in Pakistan. They are of the view that madrassas are also bent upon preaching their code of ethics on women in the name of Islamic teachings and curtailing women's mobility to participate in social life (Borchgrevink, 2011).

In the previous chapter, I have discussed the difference in the students from three different types of school systems with regard to their opinions about the 'educational priorities', the 'position of women' and the 'status of minorities'. In this chapter, two more themes such as the take of students on the 'sectarian issues' and Islamic militancy' would be deliberated upon.

Sectarian Issues

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[65] The literal meaning of radd is 'to refute'. Refutation constitutes an important component of the training students at most of the madrassas. Special attention is paid towards training madrassa students to counter or refute the theological worldviews of other sub-sects, beliefs they consider heretical.

There are many reports that declare religious schools as hatcheries of sectarian hatred; but, by and large, these reports are based on observations and are not substantiated by proper practical proof. To have empirical evidence in this connection, 14 item questions were incorporated in the questionnaire. These questions are to cover not only various areas of participants' lives ranging from personal to familial, with relation to sectarian difference, but also have tried to look into the religious and socio-political interests of students as citizens of a Muslim nation state. Here are responses of the students towards these questionnaire items.

> I get along well with people from different sects [Interaction]
> I think a person should be elected on the basis of his personal character instead of his sectarian affiliation [Personal conduct]
> I don't make friends with people who are from different sects [No amity]
> Inter-marriages among different sects are acceptable [Inter-marriage]
> I have no problem in offering my prayer in a mosque of different sect [Place of worship]
> I have no problem in offering my congregational prayer behind an *Imam* from different sect [Congregational prayer]
> If the head of the state/government belongs to different sect, it makes me to feel that I and people from my sect are going to be marginalised [Head of the state]
> Every Muslim must have right to celebrate his/her religious festival freely [Right for religious celebrations]
> I think that the word 'sect' should be removed from all governmental documentations requiring personal information [Personal information]
> All political parties divided on sectarian lines should be banned [Political parties]
> I think there should be different schools for students belonging to different sects [Sectarian schools]
> I didn't have any problem with attending the funeral prayer of a person from different sect [Funeral prayer]
> I didn't have any problem in marrying a girl from different sect [Marriage with diverse sect girl]
> I didn't have any problem with female from my family getting married with a man from other sect [Marriage with diverse sect male]

Composite Table 6.1: Views regarding sectarian issues (% agree and strongly agree)

Questionnaire Item	Ahle Hadith	Brailvi	Deobandi	Govt. School	Jamaat-i-Islami	Private School	Shia Madrassa
Interaction	60	64	56	73	70	77	50
Personal conduct	62	60	67	75	66	81	58
No amity	20	17	34	13	23	11	23
Inter-marriage	12	24	35	63	54	72	19
Place of worship	64	61	70	61	80	83	60
Congregational prayer	70	23	67	60	70	64	11
Head of the state	17	17	31	8	17	11	20
Right for religious celebrations	51	61	61	79	61	87	77
Personal information	51	56	44	60	57	60	73
Political parties	9	14	13	69	23	69	44
Sectarian schools	17	17	30	9	17	11	20
Funeral prayer	56	19	63	70	64	71	14
Marriage with diverse sect girl	72	63	69	73	71	77	23
Marriage with diverse sect male	21	19	24	57	33	55	10

The data shows that large proportion of students from all types of institutes doesn't have any problem with people from other sects. They get along well with people from different sects. Except Shia madrassas students, the percentage of students who disagreed with the statement is even less than 25%. However, a clear contradiction in responses comes in the way, particularly in case of madrassas students, when we compare their questionnaire answers with the viewpoint upheld by them during interviews. During interviewing all questions from the questionnaire were not asked rather the question items were prioritized and this very question was asked by all the interviewees.

In the same vein, the data results for the questionnaire statement, '*I think a person should be elected on the basis of his personal character instead of his sectarian affiliation*' shows that they hardly give any consideration to sectarian affiliation while electing their representatives. More than sixty per cent of students from madrassas (except Shia madrassas) and three-fourth students from English and Urdu medium schools think, it should be one's personal conduct, instead of sectarian association, that should matter in the process of election. Keeping in view the common trend in some parts of the country, that is, people usually vote for those candidates who belong to their sect, this question was incorporated in the questionnaire, but the responses of students from South Punjab do not seem endorsing this practice.

More or less similar responses of students from all types of institutes were observed towards statements like: *I don't make friends with people who are from different sects,* or *If the head of the state/government belongs to different sect, it makes me to feel that I and people from my sect are going to be marginalized.* In the light of responses from all types of schools' students, one interesting finding comes in place that sectarian affiliation hardly plays any role when it comes the turn of participants' personal or individual entity or their role as a citizen of a state but we see a clear difference in the demeanour of students, especially those from madrassas, when they responded to the question items that are about their familial relations.

For instance, majority of the students from madrassas (except Jamaat-i-Islami) expressed their disagreement with the statement '*Inter-marriages among different sects are acceptable*', more or less similar responses were found for the statement '*I didn't have any problem with female from my family getting married with a man from other sect*' as both the aforesaid statements deal with familial relations. With regard to first statement, 63 per cent Shia madrassa students disagreed with the notion that inter-marriages among different sects are acceptable. It is noteworthy that this is the highest number among all types of institutes, and the lowest percentage among madrassas only is 26% that is of Jamaat-i-Islami madrassa, as the later claims (see chapter 2) to be supra-sectarian in nature. Overall the students from the madrassas disapproved the idea of inter-marriages among different sects, however the responses of students from Urdu schools and particularly from English schools were quite opposite. Only 10 per cent students from private schools and 14 per cent from government schools disagreed with the proposal of inter-marriages.

Similarly, if we look at the opinions of madrassas students towards the statement '*I didn't have any problem with female from my family getting married with a man from other sect*' they expressed their disapproval, but if we compare it with the statement "*I didn't have any problem in marrying a girl from different sect*" a kind of variation in response was noticed; a large proportion of students from madrassas except Shia commended the viewpoint. Barring the fact that the majority of madrassa students censured the idea of inter-marriages among different sects, yet most of the madrassas students do not see any problem in marrying a girl from other sect. And a clear dichotomy in responses can be found when we look at the statistics about the marriage of a girl from their families to any man from other sect. This might be because of the reason that in Pakistani society women usually follow their husbands' sect after marriage.

The questionnaire responses on statement '*I think that the word 'sect' should be removed from all governmental documentations requiring personal information*' intrigues one's attention on account of its uniqueness. All types of schools students agree with the statement and in this regard the students from Shia madrassas seem very much vocal even more than the students of English schools. It might be because of the fact that there is a common perception among Shias that they are discriminated because of their sect. This will be further explored in interview section.

A dozen of Muslims gathered in one of the local mosques. It was time for prayer. One of the men was asked to act as the imam[66]. He moved forward and led the prayer. The imam happened to be a Shia but the people praying behind him did not know about it until during the prayer some of them noticed that the imam stood in prayer with his hands down as Shias normally do. After the prayer was completed one moqtadi[67] bluntly asked the imam whether he was a Shia, to which he replied that he was. This started a discussion among the Sunni[68] moqtadis with most of them saying that their prayer was null and void. The imam himself

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[66] A person who leads prayer.
[67] The meaning of term Moqtadi is 'One who follows'. In congregational prayer an imam leads the prayer and all men who follow him are called moqtadis.
[68] Ahle Hadith, Brailvis and Deobandis are Sunnis. Though Jamaat-e-Islami claims to be supra-sectarian but can be categorised as Sunni.

went into a corner of the mosque and started to read the Holy Qur`an. The discussion went on for a while and eventually it was decided that the Sunnis should repeat their prayer behind a Sunni imam, which is what was done (Shafqaat, 1983). In another incident an Ahle Hadith Muslim (also called Wahabi) went to offer his prayer in a mosque that belonged to Brailvi sect. After the end of congregational prayer, it was discovered that a person from another sect was among the moqtadis (ibid, 1983). He was not only insulted and thrown out of mosque; rather the mosque was washed afterwards. These events can explain the sectarian segregation prevailing in Pakistan. Keeping in view this situation a few questions like *I have no problem in offering my prayer in a mosque of different sect* and *I have no problem in offering my congregational prayer behind an Imam from different sect* were included in the questionnaire. Interestingly majority of students even from madrassas have no problem in offering their prayer in a mosque from different sect. That response might be because of the perception that mosques do not really belong to any particular group or individual but to God. Such perception is preached by all sects at least theoretically. In answer to the question I have no problem in offering my congregational prayer behind an *Imam* from different sect, a divided opinion was observed among madrassa students. Deobandi, Ahle Hadith and Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas students' viewpoint is in favour of the notion while students from Brailvi and Shia madrassas did not commend the idea at all.

Darul Iman Jamia Masjid Qurtuba; a newly-built mosque in Islamabad calls upon its followers to shun discrimination along sectarian lines and to start praying together – in whichever way they like – under the same roof. The Imam and Khateeb are both from different sects – and the mosque administration says it will have no problem if a Shia or an Imam from other sect leads prayers. Zahid Iqbal, a business man who purported this idea and purchased land for the mosque shared his views about the reaction of community. I am thrilled by the reaction I received from people. People from different sects are already praying there together. He further added that there has been individual criticism as well. Iqbal told that more than ten members of the Taliban came to his mosque and he debated them for hours and convinced them to stop opposing his interpretation of Islam (zaidi, 2013). Pakistani society needs a space to counter sectarianism and fortunately this mosque is providing a place where members of different sects can find commonality for inter-sectarian harmony and peaceful co-existence.

Variation of responses across different educational institutes' students about Sectarian Issues

Table 6.2

Descriptives

Sectarian Issues

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Ahle Hadith	70	3.3367	.42808	.05117	3.2347	3.4388	2.36	4.14
Brailvi	70	3.2224	.42118	.05034	3.1220	3.3229	2.36	4.07
Deobandi	70	3.3122	.42041	.05025	3.2120	3.4125	2.14	4.14
Govt. School	80	3.9000	.39527	.04419	3.8120	3.9880	2.64	4.93
Jamaat-i-Islami	70	3.6347	.44074	.05268	3.5296	3.7398	2.36	4.50
Private School	70	4.0367	.43059	.05147	3.9341	4.1394	2.64	4.79
Shia Madrassa	70	3.0949	.38909	.04651	3.0021	3.1877	2.00	4.00
Total	500	3.5133	.53237	.02381	3.4665	3.5601	2.00	4.93

The data reveals that a large proportion of students, regardless of their school type, have homogenous outlook towards sectarian issues. All students irrespective of the school they came from seem discouraging sectarianism in every form. The questions asked to judge their outlook with respect to sectarianism includes, "I get along well with people from different sects"; "Every Muslim must have right to celebrate his/her religious festival freely"; "I think that the word 'sect' should be removed from all governmental documentations requiring personal information"; "I think there should be different schools for students belonging to different sects" and "All political parties divided on sectarian lines should be banned" and so on and so forth. Interestingly, the schools in which madrassas students are studying are divided on sectarian lines and there are many a political parties that are based on the edifice of their sect like Jamaat-i-Islami, still students from madrassas, like English schools and Urdu medium schools, opposed the division of parties and schools on the basis of sectarian differences. There were overall 14 item questions that were slotted in the theme of sectarian

issues in the questionnaire and all types of institutes students disapprove sectarian division which is quite unusual phenomenon. However, some students from madrassas, during their interviews, didn't endorse the stance taken by them in the survey. Though all schools scored above the mean score i.e. M=3.00, yet there is a difference in the scale of their disapproval for sectarianism. Mean score of private English schools students, for the theme 'sectarian issues' is (M=4.04) that is highest among all other schools students. Urdu medium schools students got second highest mean score (M=3.90), followed by Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas students (M=3.63). The lowest mean score among all types of schools is of Shia madrassa that is (M=3.09).

Results of ANOVA

Table 6.3   **ANOVA**

Sectarian Issues

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	55.361	6	9.227	52.853	.000
Within Groups	86.066	493	.175		
Total	141.427	499			

Analysis of variance has been conducted to compare the variance (variability in scores) between the different schools (due to the independent variable; type of institutes) with the variability within each of the groups. An F ratio has been calculated, that represents the variance between the groups divided by the variance within the groups. A large F ratio indicates that there is more variability between the groups (caused by the independent variable) than there is within each group. A significant F test indicates whether there is any significant difference between different groups or not. And in this particular case, by virtue of it, we can reject the null hypothesis, which states that all the schools score exactly the same and there is no difference in the responses of students from different schools towards the questions asked under the theme sectarian issues. By virtue of ANOVA we can only find out that there is statistically significant difference between the schools as the value is .000 which

is less than .05, but in order to know where these differences actually lie, we have to carry out Post Hoc test.

Variance in responses between the students from different schools on Sectarian Issues

One-way analysis of variance tests were conducted to look at how the responses of students about sectarian issues diverge according to their schools type. The results are presented in (Table 6.4).

Table 6.4

Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable: Sectarian Issues

Tukey HSD

(I) Type of Institute	(J) Type of Institute	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound	95% Confidence Interval Upper Bound
Ahle Hadith	Brailvi	.11429	.07062	.671	-.0948	.3234
	Deobandi	.02449	.07062	1.000	-.1846	.2336
	Govt. School	-.56327(*)	.06838	.000	-.7657	-.3608
	Jamaat-i-Islami	-.29796(*)	.07062	.001	-.5070	-.0889
	Private School	-.70000(*)	.07062	.000	-.9091	-.4909
	Shia Madrassa	.24184(*)	.07062	.012	.0327	.4509
Brailvi	Ahle Hadith	-.11429	.07062	.671	-.3234	.0948
	Deobandi	-.08980	.07062	.865	-.2989	.1193
	Govt. School	-.67755(*)	.06838	.000	-.8800	-.4751
	Jamaat-i-Islami	-.41224(*)	.07062	.000	-.6213	-.2032
	Private School	-.81429(*)	.07062	.000	-1.0234	-.6052
	Shia Madrassa	.12755	.07062	.545	-.0815	.3366
Deobandi	Ahle Hadith	-.02449	.07062	1.000	-.2336	.1846
	Brailvi	.08980	.07062	.865	-.1193	.2989
	Govt. School	-.58776(*)	.06838	.000	-.7902	-.3853

(I) Type of Institute	(J) Type of Institute	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Govt. School	Jamaat-i-Islami	-.32245(*)	.07062	.000	-.5315	-.1134
	Private School	-.72449(*)	.07062	.000	-.9336	-.5154
	Shia Madrassa	.21735(*)	.07062	.036	.0083	.4264
	Ahle Hadith	.56327(*)	.06838	.000	.3608	.7657
	Brailvi	.67755(*)	.06838	.000	.4751	.8800
	Deobandi	.58776(*)	.06838	.000	.3853	.7902
Jamaat-i-Islami	Jamaat-i-Islami	.26531(*)	.06838	.002	.0629	.4678
	Private School	-.13673	.06838	.416	-.3392	.0657
	Shia Madrassa	.80510(*)	.06838	.000	.6027	1.0076
	Ahle Hadith	.29796(*)	.07062	.001	.0889	.5070
	Brailvi	.41224(*)	.07062	.000	.2032	.6213
	Deobandi	.32245(*)	.07062	.000	.1134	.5315
Private School	Govt. School	-.26531(*)	.06838	.002	-.4678	-.0629
	Private School	-.40204(*)	.07062	.000	-.6111	-.1930
	Shia Madrassa	.53980(*)	.07062	.000	.3307	.7489
	Ahle Hadith	.70000(*)	.07062	.000	.4909	.9091
	Brailvi	.81429(*)	.07062	.000	.6052	1.0234
	Deobandi	.72449(*)	.07062	.000	.5154	.9336
Shia Madrassa	Govt. School	.13673	.06838	.416	-.0657	.3392
	Jamaat-i-Islami	.40204(*)	.07062	.000	.1930	.6111
	Shia Madrassa	.94184(*)	.07062	.000	.7327	1.1509
	Ahle Hadith	-.24184(*)	.07062	.012	-.4509	-.0327
	Brailvi	-.12755	.07062	.545	-.3366	.0815
	Deobandi	-.21735(*)	.07062	.036	-.4264	-.0083
	Govt. School	-.80510(*)	.06838	.000	-1.0076	-.6027
	Jamaat-i-Islami	-.53980(*)	.07062	.000	-.7489	-.3307
	Private School	-.94184(*)	.07062	.000	-1.1509	-.7327

A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was carried out to explore the impact of school type on the views of students about sectarian issues, as determined through 14 question items incorporated in the questionnaire. Participants of this study are 10th level (class) students from seven different types of schools of more or less similar age group. There was a statistically significant difference at the p<.05 level in the scores of theme Sectarian Issues for the seven different schools' types groups [F (6, 493)=52.85, p=.000]. Discovering the fact that there is a statistically significant difference between the seven sets of scores does not answers all the questions. We also need to assess the magnitude of that difference which is only possible by calculating the effect size of the result. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, is .39 which, according to generally accepted criteria (Cohen 1988, pp. 284–7), is considered quite a large effect. Using the commonly used guidelines proposed by Cohen (1988, pp. 284–7) (.01=small, .06=moderate, .14=large effect), this result suggests a very large effect size. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean scores for private schools and government schools were significantly different from all religious seminaries; Ahle Hadith, Brailvi, Deobandi, Jamaat-i-Islami and Shia Madrassas. However, it is not the case that there is no significant difference within the religious seminaries; Ahle Hadith madrassa did differ significantly from Jamaat-i-Islami and Shia madrassa: Brailvi madrassa mean score is significantly different from Jamaat-i-Islami madrassa and there is a significant difference between the mean scores of Deobandi madrassa and Jamaat-i-Islami and Shia madrassa. Shia madrassas' mean score is significantly different from all types of institutes except Brailvi madrassas' mean score.

With regard to the views of students about sectarian issues in Pakistan, the responses in the interview data corroborate with the questionnaire data. However, there are some interesting points which students took up in one to one interview. As discussed in the questionnaire, the students from English and Urdu medium schools were more inclined towards sectarian harmony as compared to those of madrassa students. As far as the views of students with respect to sectarianism are concerned, there is a visible difference in the stances of students coming from different educations systems.

> *Masood: It is obvious that their madrassas are teaching them sectarianism, hatred*
>
> *and violence. You better know that we (Brailvis) have never been found in such*

> *activities. We respect non-Muslims even………………………By birth no one is criminal rather Islam says that newly born baby is innocent even if it takes birth in non-Muslim family……………………Our madrassa deliver religious education only. Unlike Ahle Hadith madrassas we don't take money from Saudi Arab and equip students with gun instead of pen…………………………Who are Taliban??? You better know that they are Americans and Jews agents………………….By saying them martyrs you better know we are humiliating Jihad and martyrdom………………….By Allah Almighty's grace you will see America and its agents will be ruined. (By America's agents he means Taliban and other Deobandi organizations).*

Masood; a student from Brailvi madrassa condemned Deobandi and Ahle Hadith madrassas as dens of terrorists and accuse them for preaching sectarianism. However, a visible contrast can be observed when we compare the views of Brailvi madrassa student with that of Jamaat-i-Islami madrassa student. Jamaat-i-Islami claim to be a supra-sectarian entity and have never been involved in sectarian scuffle.

> *Shahid: I have no problem with boys from other sects at all. Some of my friends are Shias but we never have discussion on religion…….There should be liberty to all sects rather non-Muslims too to celebrate their religious festivals freely…….I personally don't have any objection with inter-marriage but I do know it is not going to be acceptable by the overall community………First of all we are Muslims than anything else.*

The Deobandi madrassas, which grew at a faster rate in post-Soviet invasion era (1979-1989), were more radical and closely linked with sectarian activities in 1980,s. These madrassas have continued to become even more radicalized over the years. In a recent study of religious institutions in Ahmedpur Sharqi (East), S. H. Ali (2009) found that 80 per cent of the 166 Deobandi madrassas were involved in sectarian activities. The views of Munir, a student from Deoband madrassa confirm the perception established about Deobandi madrassas over a period of time, by virtue of his views during interview.

Munir: Allah Almighty says that "your friendship and enmity should be for My pleasure" so the one who commits shirk (polytheism) can't be friend of mine at all (Here the participant was pointing to Brailvi and Shia Muslims).......I wish that all Shia and Brailvi madrassas should be banned as they are harming instead of serving Islam.

If we compare the views of madrassa students particularly of Deoband madrassa student with that of students from Urdu and English medium school students, a notable difference comes in place.

Faiz: Inter-marriage among different sects is a commendable proposal; it can diminish inter-sect enmity and can give rise to Muslim brotherhood. All mosques are sacred and equally dear and sacrosanct to me............All parties those fuel sectarian strife in Pakistan should be dealt iron-handedly. (Student from Urdu medium school)

Ahmed: Taliban are enemies of Pakistan..................If I were the ruler I will close all madrassas.............We all are Pakistani but in madrassas, students are indoctrinated to identify themselves as Shia and Sunni, Deobandi and Wahabi (a term used for Ahle Hadith).…............They are brainwashed to attack each other's mosques….. (student from English medium school)

Intra-Muslim rivalry, particularly between Shias and Sunnis has a long history. Relations between different Islamic groups/sects have been strained for much of Muslim history. Many of them see each other as apostates or even as enemies of Islam. In some countries, such as in parts of Pakistan today, Shia-Sunni conflict has taken seriously violent forms. Although in many cases there are crucial political and economic factors that fuel this conflict, the sectarian dimension acts as a powerful factor in further exacerbating these relations especially

between Shias Sunnis. Halting efforts have been made in the past, and continue to be made today, to promote Inter-Sect dialogue. However, on the whole, it can be safely said, most conservative and traditional ulema have been reluctant, if not openly hostile, to any suggestion of genuine Islamic ecumenism. Literature branding the sectarian other as inveterate foes of Islam continues to be produced and distributed, mostly, although not entirely, penned by conservative ulema. Although such literature has been in existence for centuries, in recent decades it appears to have been given a major boost, particularly in the wake of Iranian Revolution in 1979[69].

According a recent report of Brooking Institution (2013) Zia regime in Pakistan that coincided with Islamic revolution in Iran widened the schism between Shias and Sunnis in Pakistan. It brought Shia-Sunni sectarian warfare in Pakistan that was an alien concept before. Shia-Sunni rift tore down the very fabric of society. Intermarriage between Sunnis and Shia which was not uncommon until late 1970s has now become a historical norm. Nadim (2013) in his recent article rightly pointed out that the lack of inter-sectarian marriages in Pakistan and severe opposition to this idea is also one of the reasons why Pakistan has not been able to fully become a nation. In order to promote harmony among different Islamic sects in the Muslim World overall, recently Qatar-based Sunni Islamic scholar Shaikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi issued a fatwa (religious verdict) which clearly says that he does not regard such a marriage as forbidden (haram).[70] Barring the fact, Islam allows inter marriages between the people of the book, yet it is very unfortunate that students from religious seminaries are the one who disapprove this idea the most when we compare their views with the students of English and Urdu medium schools students.

As mentioned earlier madrassas are divided on sectarian lines and they strongly promote their own religious perspective and genealogy. This practice on the part of madrassas tends to perpetuate an exclusionary worldview within Islamic sects and seem to result in violent conflict with rival Muslim groups. Many a studies have pointed this aspect of madrassa

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[69] In Iran Shia clergy ousted the secular regime of Reza Shah Pehlvi and start propagating its revolutionary ideals across the borders. Shia clergy started the proliferation of its own version of Islam (Shia Ideology) in neighbouring countries and was met with a severe reaction in Sunni Muslim majority country Pakistan at societal and governmental level.

[70] The fatwa is accessible on the website www.islam-online.net

education but the study of Saleem H Ali (2009), in this regard, is the interesting one which is an empirical study on madrassa demographics and sectarian adherence. The region studied by Saleem H. Ali experiences considerable sectarian violence, especially between Deobandis and Shias. Findings of the study show that ties with international terrorism are found in a few politically charged madrassas, but this is not as systematic a problem as the sectarianism fostered by madrassas. Analysis of police arrest data for sectarian attacks between Shias and Sunnis clearly shows that sectarian activity in areas of greater madrassa density per population size was found to be higher, including incidents of violent unrest (Ali, 2009). Brailvi madrassas which were traditionally very tolerant propagate . . . have also started showing violent and sectarian tendencies. In many instances this is a response to violent and aggressive attitudes of some Deobandi institutions and their managers (ibid, 2009). Along with it, there are many other studies and reports that suggest that madrassa education is inherently sectarian and bound to make its students more likely to engage in violence against other religious sects (Mir, 2009), (Malik, 2002), (Malik, 2008), (Jamal, 1996), (Chandran, 2003) and (ICG, 2002). According to an ICG (2002) report, the students of those madrassas who took part in Afghan Jehad during Soviet Invasion, not only involved in outward Afghan Jehad but also looked inwards, fighting a jehad against sectarian rivals in Pakistan. Splinter Deobandi groups, such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba, emerged during the Afghan jihad. With the spread of jihadi madrasas throughout Pakistan and a massive increase in their students, sectarian strife has become endemic and increasingly violent. According to Chandran (2003) the madrassas not only accentuates existing sectarian cleavage in the society but also provided manpower for sectarian organizations for sectarian engagements on the streets of Pakistan.

Sectarianism is a serious and palpable internal challenge for Pakistan, and madrassas in this regard are found to be contributing to this challenge. Barring the fact, currently, some type of madrassas are more radical in their outlook as compared to others, yet still a sizeable number of madrassas are against sectarian violence, and seem willing to overcome this menace (Zaidi, 2013). However, they are also not amenable to stop propagating their sect, even at the risk of exclusivity from religious harmony amongst sects in Pakistani society. Thus, the potential for polarized worldviews promulgated by these institutions sprouting seeds of sectarian violence is quite real (ibid, 2013). The worldview of the madrassa graduate is often

exclusionary and there is a tremendous need to inculcate the Islamic tradition of pluralism in these institutions.

Islamic Militancy

The madrassas of Pakistan have been making headlines since the incident of 9/11. There is a plethora of reports that enunciate the religious seminaries as hotbeds of terrorism and root cause of Islamic militancy. On the other hand there is another opinion that considers madrassas as true centres of religious and moral education. This study is an attempt to clarify their role in the society. For this purpose a survey was conducted and the questionnaire bore 17 multiple questions to see if there is any militant inclination in their outlook with relation to certain national and international issues. Responses of the participants for the questionnaire items of the theme 'Islamic Militancy' are given under:

- ➤ Pakistan should resolve the Kashmir question by force [War]
- ➤ Pakistan should resolve the Kashmir question by supporting Jihadi groups against Indian army [Jihadi groups]
- ➤ Pakistan should resolve Kashmir issue by peaceful means only [Peaceful means]
- ➤ Suicide attacks are Ja'aiz (approved) in Islam [Suicide attacks]
- ➤ Suicide bombers are *Shaheed* (martyrs) [Martyrdom]
- ➤ Talibans fighting against Pakistani army are *mujahideen* (holy warriors) [Holy war against compatriots]
- ➤ Talibans fighting against Western forces and Karzai government are *mujahideen* (holy warriors) [Holy war against West]
- ➤ America and its allies are at war with Islam [At war with Islam]
- ➤ America and its allies are at war with international terrorism [At war with global terrorism]
- ➤ Talibans fighting against Pak army are terrorists [Terrorists who fight against Pak army]
- ➤ Talibans fighting against Pak army are *gumrah* (misled) [Deluded who fight against Pak army]

- Army operations in Swat and FATA are against fellow Muslims [Operation against fellow Muslims]

- Army operations in Swat and FATA are against extremists [Operation against radicals]

- Military personnel killed during the operations are *Shaheed* (martyrs) [Army men martyrs]

- Islamic militants killed during the operations are *Shaheed* (martyrs) [Militants martyrs]

- 9/11 attack was a justifiable act [9/11 attack rightful]

- 9/11 attack was an unjustifiable terrorist activity [9/11 attack indefensible]

Composite Table 6.5: Views regarding Islamic militancy (% agree and strongly agree)

Questionnaire Items	Ahle Hadith	Brailvi	Deobandi	Govt. School	Jamaat-i-Islami	Private School	Shia Madrassa
War	64	50	70	44	63	14	60
Jihadi groups	60	41	68	45	63	13	45
Peaceful means	32	38	29	52	27	60	34
Suicide attacks	58	8	53	32	32	10	21
Martyrdom	51	6	51	30	41	13	13
Holy war against compatriots	51	9	54	14	57	7	7
Holy war against West	64	21	83	63	79	26	42
At war with Islam	81	71	86	62	84	40	70
At war with global terrorism	11	23	13	25	9	47	23
Terrorists who fight against Pak army	20	47	20	63	17	76	79
Deluded who fight against Pak army	30	59	26	65	27	79	76
Operation against fellow Muslims	64	9	83	14	79	7	7
Operation against radicals	26	71	16	59	17	70	84
Army men martyrs	50	79	27	68	39	76	92
Militants martyrs	56	17	69	34	47	17	17
9/11 attack rightful	51	49	49	26	43	10	47
9/11 attack indefensible	17	28	22	60	16	78	19

The data shows that among all types of institutes' students, these are the only private English schools students who opposed the idea of use of force as a way to resolve the issue of Kashmir unequivocally. In case of students from Urdu schools 44% of them supported the notion and more than 16 per cent were undecided. So far as madrassas students are concerned

they grade this proposal with agreement. They also support the view that Jihadi groups should be used against Indian army to figure out the Kashmir issue except Shia. Even in interviews, students from Shia madrassas expressed their outright disapproval for jihadi organizations and commended government's measures to ban them. These responses on the side of Shia madrassas students might be the result of historical fact that in many instances these jihadi groups were also involved in the massacre of Shias.

So far as the responses of Urdu school students are concerned, interestingly, there is a clear contradiction in their opinions; as many of them backed the thought that Kashmir issue should be resolved by the use of force or by supporting religious militants but at the same time, a good number of them agreed with the statement that Pakistan should resolve Kashmir issue by peaceful means only.

In Pakistan, suicide attack is a new phenomenon. Before military operations in tribal areas of Pakistan, the notion that suicide might be used to kill others was considered alien. Indeed, when such attacks began appearing, the community's initial response was to reject the possibility that Pakistanis themselves might be involved. Many writers tried to establish a perception that foreign hands are involved to destabilize the country by sending suicide bombers into Pakistan. But the very unfortunate incident of Lal Masjid[71] in Islamabad, not only brought regularity in suicide bombings but also gained a kind of legitimacy in some sections of the society. There would be hardly any religious scholar, who could denounce suicide attackers unconditionally; even religious scholars from Ahle Hadith, Jamaat-i-Islami and Deoband schools of thought refused to issue a religious verdict declaring suicide bombing *haram* (forbidden) in Islam in the wake of Lal Masjid operation. Unfortunately, suicide attacks are no longer entirely alien to any place or any people. Worldwide the number of terrorist groups employing them has grown over the past two decades. In some of the world's conflict areas they have come to be widely accepted, and even supported, by

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[71] Lal Masjid Incident was a confrontation in July 2007 between Islamic fundamentalist militants and the Government of Pakistan led by General Pervez Musharraf. The focal points of the operation were the Lal Masjid ("Red Mosque") and the Jamia Hafsa madrasah complex in Islamabad, Pakistan. In the result of army operation in that madrassa of Deoband school of thought, hundreds of students including women students were killed. The BBC reported that the number of those killed was 173 but others have claimed casualties of more than 1000.

populations who might once have recoiled at the idea. Pakistan has yet to reach such a stage; with luck it never will. In the questionnaire some questions with relation to suicide bombings were included and there was a clear and visible difference of outlook among the students of different institutes.

In response to statement 'S*uicide attacks are Ja'aiz (approved) in Islam'* students from madrassas have very varied viewpoint. More than 57 per cent of participants from Brailvi madrassas grade this statement with strong disagreement that is even higher than those of English schools students. Overall 83 per cent of the Brailvi madrassas students disagreed with the notion that suicide attacks are approved in Islam but at the same time the majority of students from Ahle Hadith and Deoband madrassas think suicide attacks are approved in Islam. Like Brailvi madrassas, the students of Shia madrassas, with more or less similar force, opposed the conception that suicide attacks are approved in Islam. Almost similar varied views were maintained by these students for the statement '*Suicide bombers are Shaheed (martyrs)'*. Difference of opinions to such extent within the madrassas exposes the fallacy of perception of those writers who take madrassas as a monolithic body. These madrassas differ rather contradict with each other in certain socio-political and religious takes.

Army operation against Taliban is in progress in Tribal areas of Pakistan. Pak army started its proper military operation against Taliban in 2004 and ensued mixed response from Pakistani society. For some they are holy warriors who are sacrificing their lives for a great cause and for others they are terrorists who massacre people in the name of Islam and create mischief in the land are punishable by death. In order to know the opinion of students from different schools, a few questions about Taliban and army operations were made the part of questionnaire. The data shows that like Pakistani society, students from different schools have different viewpoint about Taliban. For instance, majority of students from Ahle Hadith, Deobandi and Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas think that *army operations in Swat and FATA are against fellow Muslims* while an overwhelming majority of students from Brailvi and Shia madrassas and private schools believe that *army operations in Swat and FATA are against extremists.* More or less same response was observed when students were asked who is martyr near them- army men or Taliban. More than 90 per cent students from Shia madrassas

believe that army men are martyrs. For them, those Soldiers of the Pakistani armed forces that fight against this turmoil are the real Mujahideen (Holy Warriors). On the contrary students from Ahle Hadith, Deobandi and Jamaat-i-Islami believe that *Talibans fighting against Pakistani army are mujahideen.*

Variation of responses across different educational institutes' students on Islamic Militancy

Table 6.6

Descriptives

Islamic Militancy

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Ahle Hadith	70	3.5588	.44267	.05291	3.4533	3.6644	2.47	4.71
Brailvi	70	2.6294	.33236	.03972	2.5502	2.7087	2.06	3.65
Deobandi	70	3.7345	.38719	.04628	3.6421	3.8268	2.65	4.47
Govt. School	80	2.7441	.45247	.05059	2.6434	2.8448	1.71	3.82
Jamaat-i-Islami	70	3.5866	.39517	.04723	3.4923	3.6808	2.53	4.59
Private School	70	2.1252	.37578	.04491	2.0356	2.2148	1.18	3.18
Shia Madrassa	70	2.6084	.49071	.05865	2.4914	2.7254	1.53	3.76
Total	500	2.9931	.70445	.03150	2.9312	3.0550	1.18	4.71

The data in the (Table 6.6) reveals that along with private English medium and Urdu medium schools, there are some madrassas also that scored below the mean score, as far as their support for Islamic militancy is concerned. Students from Ahle Hadith, Deobandi and Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas tend to support the notion of *Jihad* (holy war). In order to determine the viewpoint of students with regard to Islamic militancy such questions were asked in the questionnaire: "Pakistan should resolve the Kashmir question by force"; "Suicide attacks are *Ja'aiz* (approved) in Islam"; "Islamic militants killed are martyrs" Taliban are

Mujahiden (holy warriors) etc. The table revealed some very unusual results; as students from Brailvi madrassas that makes the second largest chain of madrassas in Pakistan, and Shia madrassas differed with their counterparts. The overall mean score of private English schools students, for the theme 'Islamic militancy' is (M=2.13) that is lowest among all other schools students. Shia madrassa students got second lowest mean score (M=2.61), followed by Brailvi madrassas students (M=2.63). Both of these madrassas scored less than government schools students even. The highest mean score among all types of schools is of Deobandi madrassa that is (M=3.73). The mean score value below (M=3.00) indicates that students disapprove the notion of militancy and above 3:00 indicates students agreement with the notion of Jihad and martyrdom. The statistics of the (Table 6.6) demonstrates that madrassas are not a monolithic entity and are divided on sectarian lines and on some important issues they have entirely diverse views.

Results of ANOVA

Table 6.7   **ANOVA**

Islamic Militancy

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	162.833	6	27.139	157.787	.000
Within Groups	84.794	493	.172		
Total	247.626	499			

Analysis of variance has been used to compare the variance (variability in scores) between the different schools (due to the independent variable; type of institutes) with the variability within each of the groups. An F ratio has been calculated, that represents the variance between the groups divided by the variance within the groups. A large F ratio indicates that there is more variability between the groups (caused by the independent variable) than there is within each group. A significant F test indicates whether there is any significant difference between different groups or not. And in this particular case, by virtue of it, we can reject the null hypothesis, which states that all the schools score exactly the same and there is no

difference in the responses of students from different schools towards Islamic militancy. So the ANOVA table tells us whether there are any statistically significant differences between the groups or not, so that is sort of what is known as omnibus test. The ANOVA table does not tell where these differences actually lie. In order to know where these differences actually lie, we have to carry out Post Hoc test.

Variance in responses between the students from different schools on Islamic Militancy

One-way analysis of variance tests were conducted to look at how the responses of students about Islamic militancy diverge according to their schools type. The results are presented in (Table 6.8).

Table 6.8

Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable: Islamic Militancy

Tukey HSD

(I) Type of Institute	(J) Type of Institute	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Ahle Hadith	Brailvi	.92941(*)	.07010	.000	.7219	1.1370
	Deobandi	-.17563	.07010	.160	-.3832	.0319
	Govt. School	.81471(*)	.06788	.000	.6138	1.0157
	Jamaat-i-Islami	-.02773	.07010	1.000	-.2353	.1798
	Private School	1.43361(*)	.07010	.000	1.2261	1.6412
	Shia Madrassa	.95042(*)	.07010	.000	.7429	1.1580
Brailvi	Ahle Hadith	-.92941(*)	.07010	.000	-1.1370	-.7219
	Deobandi	-1.10504(*)	.07010	.000	-1.3126	-.8975
	Govt. School	-.11471	.06788	.623	-.3157	.0862
	Jamaat-i-Islami	-.95714(*)	.07010	.000	-1.1647	-.7496
	Private School	.50420(*)	.07010	.000	.2967	.7117
	Shia Madrassa	.02101	.07010	1.000	-.1865	.2285
Deobandi	Ahle Hadith	.17563	.07010	.160	-.0319	.3832
	Brailvi	1.10504(*)	.07010	.000	.8975	1.3126
	Govt. School	.99034(*)	.06788	.000	.7894	1.1913
	Jamaat-i-Islami	.14790	.07010	.348	-.0596	.3554
	Private School	1.60924(*)	.07010	.000	1.4017	1.8168
	Shia Madrassa	1.12605(*)	.07010	.000	.9185	1.3336

(I) Type of Institute	(J) Type of Institute	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Govt. School	Ahle Hadith	-.81471(*)	.06788	.000	-1.0157	-.6138
	Brailvi	.11471	.06788	.623	-.0862	.3157
	Deobandi	-.99034(*)	.06788	.000	-1.1913	-.7894
	Jamaat-i-Islami	-.84244(*)	.06788	.000	-1.0434	-.6415
	Private School	.61891(*)	.06788	.000	.4180	.8199
	Shia Madrassa	.13571	.06788	.416	-.0652	.3367
Jamaat-i-Islami	Ahle Hadith	.02773	.07010	1.000	-.1798	.2353
	Brailvi	.95714(*)	.07010	.000	.7496	1.1647
	Deobandi	-.14790	.07010	.348	-.3554	.0596
	Govt. School	.84244(*)	.06788	.000	.6415	1.0434
	Private School	1.46134(*)	.07010	.000	1.2538	1.6689
	Shia Madrassa	.97815(*)	.07010	.000	.7706	1.1857
Private School	Ahle Hadith	-1.43361(*)	.07010	.000	-1.6412	-1.2261
	Brailvi	-.50420(*)	.07010	.000	-.7117	-.2967
	Deobandi	-1.60924(*)	.07010	.000	-1.8168	-1.4017
	Govt. School	-.61891(*)	.06788	.000	-.8199	-.4180
	Jamaat-i-Islami	-1.46134(*)	.07010	.000	-1.6689	-1.2538
	Shia Madrassa	-.48319(*)	.07010	.000	-.6907	-.2757
Shia Madrassa	Ahle Hadith	-.95042(*)	.07010	.000	-1.1580	-.7429
	Brailvi	-.02101	.07010	1.000	-.2285	.1865
	Deobandi	-1.12605(*)	.07010	.000	-1.3336	-.9185
	Govt. School	-.13571	.06788	.416	-.3367	.0652
	Jamaat-i-Islami	-.97815(*)	.07010	.000	-1.1857	-.7706
	Private School	.48319(*)	.07010	.000	.2757	.6907

A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of school type on the response of students towards the theme Islamic militancy, as measured by

the 17 question items that dealt with different aspects of militancy ranging from the foreign policy of Pakistan towards India to the phenomenon of suicide bombing. Subjects are 10th level (class) students from seven different types of schools of more or less similar age group. There was a statistically significant difference at the p<.05 level in Islamic militancy scores for the seven different schools' types groups [F (6, 493)=157.787, p=.000]. Although we have found a statistically significant difference between the seven sets of scores, we also need to assess the effect size of this result. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, is .66, which in Cohen's (1988, pp. 284–7) terms would be considered as a large effect size. Cohen classifies .01 as a small effect, .06 as a medium effect and .14 as a large effect. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean scores for Ahle Hadith madrassas (M=3.56, SD=.443) were significantly different from all school except Deoband (M=3.73, SD=.387) and Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas (M=3.59, SD=.395). Brailvi madrassas' (M=2.63, SD=.333) mean score difference is statistically significant from all institutes except government schools (M=2.74, SD=.452) and Shia madrassas (M=2.61, SD=.491). In the same vein, English medium private schools (M=2.13, SD=.376) mean score difference is statistically significant from all other schools.

With regard to the views of students about Islamic militancy, the responses in the interview data corroborate with the questionnaire data. However, there are some interesting points which students took up in one to one interview. As discussed in the questionnaire, the students from madrassas were more inclined towards the militant outlook, particularly of Deobandi, Ahle Hadith and Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas, as compared to those of students from English and Urdu medium schools. As far as the views of Deobandi, Ahle Hadith and Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas' students with respect to Jihad and suicide attacks are concerned, there is a visible difference in the stances of students coming from Urdu and English medium schooling systems.

Ali: Every Muslim knows fighting infidels is a duty. There are 400 Koranic verses that are clearly about jihad. God give us good news in the sacred book (Koran) that if you become a martyr you will go to paradise. (Deobandi madrassa student)

Munir: For a Muslim, this world is a test…… "I only created Jinn and humans to worship me". My aim is to spend my life in the way of God. I will spend it earning God's pleasure……..In answer to a question about approval of suicide in Islam, the participant replied, God says, "Prepare against them what force and steeds you can, to frighten the enemy of God and your enemy…" Based on this, God commands us to fight the infidels with any weapon available and a suicide bomber use his life/body as a weapon against the enemies of Allah………..God says "when the infidels attack and assault you, defend yourself any way you can. I have heard that a suicide bomber has no feelings about dying and has no other feelings entwined with worldly gains at all, no pain, nothing. They have chosen the afterlife over this one………..The Holy Koran calls the fight against the infidels a Jihad (holy war). (Deobandi madrassa student)

Rana: As our Muslim brothers are under attack in Afghanistan, so it is duty of every man and 'woman' to join the jihad….(Here he specially pointed that woman are also bound to be part of Jihad because the interviewer asked whether it is justified in Islam to use woman[72] for suicide bombing purposes, and the answer was Yes). (Jamaat-i-Islami madrassa student)

Saleem: America and its allies have openly declared war against Islam. Traitors within us are on their side but it is Allah's promise that His religion will, God willing, prevail. (By traitors he means Pakistan army as he elaborated later during his conversation)…………………By the grace of God my madrassa has equipped me with Illm-e-Deen (religious knowledge) and radiance. It made me capable to hold Holy Koran in my chest (it means he has memorized the whole Koran)…….I am ready to serve my God and His religion Islam in any capacity, be it the sacrifice of life. (Ahle Hadith madrassa student)

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[72] A female suicide bomber struck for the first time in the region in the Afghan province of Kunar, on June 21, 2010 and as a result two US soldiers were killed two Afghan children were wounded. The next female suicide attack took place on Dec. 24, 2010, in Pakistan's tribal agency of Bajaur. The suicide bomber killed 42 Pakistani civilians in an attack at a World Food Program ration distribution point. These heinous attacks ignited hot debate on Pakistani media on new phenomenon of the use of women for suicide bombing purposes.

Zahid: Koran never teaches violence……These are Pathans (an ethnic group) who have defamed Islam………..All madrassas are not bad……………………I believe these are their madrassas that teach such kind of stuff (Interviewee thought that madrassas of their province are bad not of Punjab madrassas)…………………Later the interviewee turned against all madrassas in the country and said, Pakistani government should ban all madrassas in the country as they preach violence on the name of Jihad and martyrdom………… My family could never think of it that I or any of my brothers go to madrassa. (English medium school student)

Masood: Islam is a religion of peace and Taliban at the behest of non-Muslims are tarnishing its real image….. To commit suicide is haram (not allowed) in Islam and those who are involved in suicidal attacks are neither Muslims nor shaheed (Martyrs)…….What Taliban call Jihad is not jihad at all, my teacher says it is "Fasad fil arz" (quoted a verse from Koran which translates as anarchy on the land of God)………Yes! America is at war with Islam and using its agents (Taliban) to attack the holy shrines and mosques of ours….I think Pakistan army should attack India to liberate Kashmiri brothers instead of sending jihadis…..It is not the duty of army only but the whole nation to contribute in the liberation of Kashmir…..Had all Muslims been united, there would have been no sign of Kufr (non-believers) in the world. (Brailvi madrassa student)

Barring the fact, Brailvi madrassas are considered relatively the most moderate and non-militant in their activities among other madrassas, as they have no militant organisations fighting in Kashmir and Afghanistan, yet like other madrassas they are petty minded and possess a narrow outlook out of tune with reality. According to Saleem H Ali (2005, 2009) though the majority of madrassas do not provide recruits and there are only few that directly provide 'foot soldiers' for jihadi activities but all of the madrassas produce such students which usually have very narrow perspective of the world. Such students are not only

intolerant towards non-Muslims but also people of other sects. They are not receptive to modern ideas at all (ibid, 2009).

The aspect of madrassa that caught the gaze of national and international media the most is its alleged connection with Islamic militancy. These schools have been seen as 'jihad factories' or 'weapons of mass instruction'. 9/11 commission report named madrassas as 'incubators of violent extremism', The Sunday Telegraph translated the Arabic word madrassa as 'terrorist training school', while The Daily Mirror wrote them as 'Terror Schools' (as quoted by Dalrymple, W., 2005). More or less similar views were expressed by Coulson (2004) who named madrassas as 'weapons of mass instruction'. Goldberg (2000) referred to madrassa education as 'education of the holy warrior' and according to Ahmad (2002) madrassas are the 'cheaper more Islamic alternative to education'. Though most of these studies are based on personal observations yet there some findings that are supported by concrete empirical research like Tariq Rahman (2004) and Saleem H Ali (2005). According to Rahman who conducted a survey in all three types of schools, the madrassa students are the most militant and the English-medium ones are the least. The findings of my study also corroborate with the results of Rahman's survey. Saleem H. Ali, in an empirical study of madrassas in Pakistan (under a grant from the United States Institute of Peace), conducted a survey of every single madrassa in one district of rural Punjab, Ahmedpur, and found that only 39 out of 363 surveyed madrassas were registered with the Government. This study also found evidence of a link between a large number of seminaries and sectarian violence, particularly in rural Punjab. Analysis of Police arrest data for sectarian attacks between Shias and Sunnis clearly shows that "sectarian activity in areas of greater madrassa density per population size was found to be higher, including incidents of violent unrest. So the militancy in sectarian conflict can be attributed to the teaching in the madrassas. He also held some madrassas responsible for the supply of 'foot soldiers' for Islamic jihad (ibid, 2005, 2009).

Along with determining the viewpoint of students from different type of schooling systems, about five themes named: educational priorities, gender inequality, status of minorities, sectarianism and Islamic militancy, the study did include a psychometric scale to test that to what extent the students believe that they can control events that affect them. The data results

showed that there was no significant difference among the responses of students with respect to the questions asked in the scale, so the details has not been included in the study.

Correlations within scales

In order to attempt to refine the analysis the construction of composite variables to represent the latent constructs in relation to the main areas of investigation was undertaken. The first step in this process was to identify highly correlated items within each of the sub-scales from the survey instrument.

1. The purposes of education

In relation to the section on the purpose of education, there is very little variation in many of the responses with a majority agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statements. There are some exceptions (with over 25% disagreeing or strongly disagreeing) and these include: prepare for work and employment; understanding between genders; equality between genders; shared values if conflict with parents; debate social and religious issues; and students should be consulted.

However, there are some very strong correlations between the following pairs of statements:

- *A key aim of education is to promote understanding of, and respect for, other faiths and cultures in Pakistan* and *Schools should promote the shared values of Pakistani society* ($r = .937$, $p<0.001$)
- *Schools should respect the wishes of families in teaching about religion* and *Schools should respect the wishes of families in all aspects of a student's education* ($r = .948$, $p<0.001$)
- *Education should encourage greater equality between men and women* and *Education should encourage greater understanding between men and women* ($r = .945$, $p<0.001$)

2. Gender inequalities

If we look at the correlations between Items for the section on gender equality a number of very strong correlations can be found. Indeed the exception is the relatively modest

correlations (around 0.3) of Item 'Women should be confined to domestic responsibilities' with the other items.

Following pairs of statements have very strong correlations:

- *Equal rights should be given to men and women as in Western countries* and *It is desirable that equal opportunities should be given to both men and women to become head of state (r = .948, p<0.001)*

- *Equal rights should be given to men and women as in Western countries* and *Women should work shoulder to shoulder with men in all spheres of life (r = .872, p<0.001)*

- *Equal rights should be given to men and women as in Western countries* and *The presence of women in Pak army is a progressive development (r = .937, p<0.001)*

- *Equal rights should be given to men and women as in Western countries* and *A fixed quota of jobs for women across a range of occupations is a positive step on the part of government (r = .947, p<0.001)*

- *It is desirable that equal opportunities should be given to both men and women to become head of state* and *Women should work shoulder to shoulder with men in all spheres of life (r = .915, p<0.001)*

- *It is desirable that equal opportunities should be given to both men and women to become head of state* and *The presence of women in Pak army is a progressive development (r = .889, p<0.001)*

- *It is desirable that equal opportunities should be given to both men and women to become head of state* and *A fixed quota of jobs for women across a range of occupations is a positive step on the part of government (r = .896, p<0.001)*

- *Women should work shoulder to shoulder with men in all spheres of life* and *The presence of women in Pak army is a progressive development (r = .828, p<0.001)*

- *Women should work shoulder to shoulder with men in all spheres of life* and *A fixed quota of jobs for women across a range of occupations is a positive step on the part of government (r = .823, p<0.001)*

- *The presence of women in Pak army is a progressive development* and *A fixed quota of jobs for women across a range of occupations is a positive step on the part of government (r = .899, p<0.001)*

Now, it is to be assessed whether there are any connections between these items across sections? For instance – the two highly correlated items on gender and education from the

section on Purposes of Education could justifiably be added to the highly correlated items from the Gender Inequality section to make the new composite variable: Gender Issues.

Table: 6.9

Gender Issues

					95% Confidence Interval for Mean			
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Minimum	Maximum
Ahle Hadith	70	2.4327	1.02121	.12206	2.1892	2.6762	1.00	4.57
Brailvi	70	2.6469	.99888	.11939	2.4088	2.8851	1.29	5.00
Deobandi	70	2.4857	.95426	.11406	2.2582	2.7133	1.00	5.00
Govt. School	80	3.5554	.94951	.10616	3.3441	3.7667	1.71	5.00
Jamaat-i-Islami	70	2.2653	.75487	.09022	2.0853	2.4453	1.00	5.00
Private School	70	4.1531	.78447	.09376	3.9660	4.3401	1.43	5.00
Shia Madrassa	70	2.2000	.85935	.10271	1.9951	2.4049	1.00	4.57
Total	500	2.8346	1.13605	.05081	2.7348	2.9344	1.00	5.00

Descriptives

Table: 6.10

Gender_Issues

ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	236.415	6	39.402	47.659	.000
Within Groups	407.596	493	.827		
Total	644.011	499			

Table:6.11   **Multiple Comparisons**

Gender_Issues

Tukey HSD

(I) Type of Institute	(J) Type of Institute	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Ahle Hadith	Brailvi	-.21429	.15369	.805	-.6693	.2407
	Deobandi	-.05306	.15369	1.000	-.5081	.4020
	Govt. School	-1.12270*	.14881	.000	-1.5633	-.6821
	Jamaat-i-Islami	.16735	.15369	.931	-.2877	.6224
	Private School	-1.72041*	.15369	.000	-2.1754	-1.2654
	Shia Madrassa	.23265	.15369	.737	-.2224	.6877
Brailvi	Ahle Hadith	.21429	.15369	.805	-.2407	.6693
	Deobandi	.16122	.15369	.942	-.2938	.6162
	Govt. School	-.90842*	.14881	.000	-1.3490	-.4678
	Jamaat-i-Islami	.38163	.15369	.168	-.0734	.8367
	Private School	-1.50612*	.15369	.000	-1.9611	-1.0511
	Shia Madrassa	.44694	.15369	.058	-.0081	.9020
Deobandi	Ahle Hadith	.05306	.15369	1.000	-.4020	.5081
	Brailvi	-.16122	.15369	.942	-.6162	.2938
	Govt. School	-1.06964*	.14881	.000	-1.5102	-.6291
	Jamaat-i-Islami	.22041	.15369	.783	-.2346	.6754
	Private School	-1.66735*	.15369	.000	-2.1224	-1.2123
	Shia Madrassa	.28571	.15369	.509	-.1693	.7407
Govt. School	Ahle Hadith	1.12270*	.14881	.000	.6821	1.5633
	Brailvi	.90842*	.14881	.000	.4678	1.3490
	Deobandi	1.06964*	.14881	.000	.6291	1.5102
	Jamaat-i-Islami	1.29005*	.14881	.000	.8495	1.7306
	Private School	-.59770*	.14881	.001	-1.0383	-.1571
	Shia Madrassa	1.35536*	.14881	.000	.9148	1.7959
Jamaat-i-Islami	Ahle Hadith	-.16735	.15369	.931	-.6224	.2877
	Brailvi	-.38163	.15369	.168	-.8367	.0734
	Deobandi	-.22041	.15369	.783	-.6754	.2346
	Govt. School	-1.29005*	.14881	.000	-1.7306	-.8495
	Private School	-1.88776*	.15369	.000	-2.3428	-1.4327

(i)Type of Institute	(J) Type of Institute	Mean Difference (I-J)	Stad. Error	Sig	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
	Shia Madrassa	.06531	.15369	1.000	-.3897	.5203
Private School	Ahle Hadith	1.72041*	.15369	.000	1.2654	2.1754
	Brailvi	1.50612*	.15369	.000	1.0511	1.9611
	Deobandi	1.66735*	.15369	.000	1.2123	2.1224
	Govt. School	.59770*	.14881	.001	.1571	1.0383
	Jamaat-i-Islami	1.88776*	.15369	.000	1.4327	2.3428
	Shia Madrassa	1.95306*	.15369	.000	1.4980	2.4081
Shia Madrassa	Ahle Hadith	-.23265	.15369	.737	-.6877	.2224
	Brailvi	-.44694	.15369	.058	-.9020	.0081
	Deobandi	-.28571	.15369	.509	-.7407	.1693
	Govt. School	-1.35536*	.14881	.000	-1.7959	-.9148
	Jamaat-i-Islami	-.06531	.15369	1.000	-.5203	.3897
	Private School	-1.95306*	.15369	.000	-2.4081	-1.4980

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Status of minorities and Sectarianism

Using cut off point of +/- 0.500 the following pair of items is strongly correlated in the section status of minorities:

- *Every Pakistani whether Muslim or non-Muslim must read Islamic Studies as a compulsory subject* and *As Pakistan is an Islamic country, so all the restrictions on non-Muslims are justified (Pearson's r= 0.573, p<0.001)*

In relation to the section on Sectarianism there is very strong correlation between the following pairs of statements:

- *If the head of the state/government belongs to different sect, it makes me to feel that I and people from my sect are going to be marginalised* and *I don't make friends with people who are from different sects (r = 0.600, p<0.001)*
- *I think there should be different schools for students belonging to different sects* and *I don't make friends with people who are from different sects (r = 0.809, p<0.001)*

- *I think there should be different schools for students belonging to different sects* and *If the head of the state/government belongs to different sect, it makes me to feel that I and people from my sect are going to be marginalised (r = 0.696, p<0.001)*

After identifying and reporting very strong correlations between the items from the section 'Status of Minorities' and 'Sectarianism', a composite variable is to be created which sums these strongly correlated items together. The new composite determines the insularity and conservatism in the outlook of students in relation to inter-faith and inter-sect synchronization.

Table: 6.12

Descriptives

Insularity_and_Conservatism

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Ahle Hadith	70	2.6714	.70939	.08479	2.5023	2.8406	1.20	5.00
Brailvi	70	2.5629	.82236	.09829	2.3668	2.7589	1.00	5.00
Deobandi	70	2.8971	.77253	.09234	2.7129	3.0813	1.60	5.00
Govt. School	80	2.3100	.77027	.08612	2.1386	2.4814	1.00	4.20
Jamaat-i-Islami	70	2.4914	.85104	.10172	2.2885	2.6944	1.00	4.20
Private School	70	1.9343	.78147	.09340	1.7480	2.1206	1.00	4.20
Shia Madrassa	70	2.7714	.83077	.09930	2.5733	2.9695	1.20	4.60
Total	500	2.5156	.84093	.03761	2.4417	2.5895	1.00	5.00

Table: 6.13

ANOVA

Insularity_and_Conservatism

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	43.705	6	7.284	11.615	.000
Within Groups	309.173	493	.627		
Total	352.878	499			

Table: 6.14   **Multiple Comparisons**

Insularity_and_Conservatism

Tukey HSD

(I) Type of Institute	(J) Type of Institute	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Ahle Hadith	Brailvi	.10857	.13386	.984	-.2877	.5049
	Deobandi	-.22571	.13386	.626	-.6220	.1706
	Govt. School	.36143	.12961	.080	-.0223	.7451
	Jamaat-i-Islami	.18000	.13386	.830	-.2163	.5763
	Private School	.73714[*]	.13386	.000	.3408	1.1334
	Shia Madrassa	-.10000	.13386	.989	-.4963	.2963
Brailvi	Ahle Hadith	-.10857	.13386	.984	-.5049	.2877
	Deobandi	-.33429	.13386	.162	-.7306	.0620
	Govt. School	.25286	.12961	.448	-.1309	.6366
	Jamaat-i-Islami	.07143	.13386	.998	-.3249	.4677
	Private School	.62857[*]	.13386	.000	.2323	1.0249
	Shia Madrassa	-.20857	.13386	.709	-.6049	.1877
Deobandi	Ahle Hadith	.22571	.13386	.626	-.1706	.6220
	Brailvi	.33429	.13386	.162	-.0620	.7306
	Govt. School	.58714[*]	.12961	.000	.2034	.9709
	Jamaat-i-Islami	.40571[*]	.13386	.041	.0094	.8020
	Private School	.96286[*]	.13386	.000	.5666	1.3592
	Shia Madrassa	.12571	.13386	.966	-.2706	.5220
Govt. School	Ahle Hadith	-.36143	.12961	.080	-.7451	.0223
	Brailvi	-.25286	.12961	.448	-.6366	.1309
	Deobandi	-.58714[*]	.12961	.000	-.9709	-.2034
	Jamaat-i-Islami	-.18143	.12961	.802	-.5651	.2023
	Private School	.37571	.12961	.059	-.0080	.7594
	Shia Madrassa	-.46143[*]	.12961	.007	-.8451	-.0777
Jamaat-i-Islami	Ahle Hadith	-.18000	.13386	.830	-.5763	.2163
	Brailvi	-.07143	.13386	.998	-.4677	.3249
	Deobandi	-.40571[*]	.13386	.041	-.8020	-.0094
	Govt. School	.18143	.12961	.802	-.2023	.5651
	Private School	.55714[*]	.13386	.001	.1608	.9534

(i)Type of Institute	(J) Type of Institue	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
	Shia Madrassa	-.28000	.13386	.359	-.6763	.1163
Private School	Ahle Hadith	-.73714*	.13386	.000	-1.1334	-.3408
	Brailvi	-.62857*	.13386	.000	-1.0249	-.2323
	Deobandi	-.96286*	.13386	.000	-1.3592	-.5666
	Govt. School	-.37571	.12961	.059	-.7594	.0080
	Jamaat-i-Islami	-.55714*	.13386	.001	-.9534	-.1608
	Shia Madrassa	-.83714*	.13386	.000	-1.2334	-.4408
Shia Madrassa	Ahle Hadith	.10000	.13386	.989	-.2963	.4963
	Brailvi	.20857	.13386	.709	-.1877	.6049
	Deobandi	-.12571	.13386	.966	-.5220	.2706
	Govt. School	.46143*	.12961	.007	.0777	.8451
	Jamaat-i-Islami	.28000	.13386	.359	-.1163	.6763
	Private School	.83714*	.13386	.000	.4408	1.2334

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Islamist Militancy

After looking at the correlations between Items for the section Islamic Militancy, a very strong correlation was found among the following pairs of items:

- *Pakistan should resolve the Kashmir question by force* and *Pakistan should resolve the Kashmir question by supporting Jihadi groups against Indian army (r = 0.832, p<0.001)*
- Suicide attacks are *Ja'aiz* (approved) in Islam and Suicide bombers are *Shaheed* (martyrs) *(r = 0.867, p<0.001)*
- Suicide attacks are *Ja'aiz* (approved) in Islam and Islamic militants killed during the operations are *Shaheed* (martyrs) *(r = 0.725, p<0.001)*
- Suicide bombers are *Shaheed* (martyrs) and Islamic militants killed during the operations are *Shaheed* (martyrs) *(r = 0.830, p<0.001)*

Table: 6.15   **Descriptives**

Islamist_Militancy

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Ahle Hadith	70	3.5400	.83221	.09947	3.3416	3.7384	1.60	5.00
Brailvi	70	2.3371	.66598	.07960	2.1783	2.4959	1.00	4.40
Deobandi	70	3.6514	.84214	.10066	3.4506	3.8522	1.80	5.00
Govt. School	80	2.8875	.92441	.10335	2.6818	3.0932	1.00	5.00
Jamaat-i-Islami	70	3.3343	.93482	.11173	3.1114	3.5572	1.00	5.00
Private School	70	2.0629	.73626	.08800	1.8873	2.2384	1.00	4.00
Shia Madrassa	70	2.6200	.80156	.09580	2.4289	2.8111	1.00	4.40
Total	500	2.9184	.99581	.04453	2.8309	3.0059	1.00	5.00

Table: 6.16

ANOVA

Islamist_Militancy

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	157.964	6	26.327	38.530	.000
Within Groups	336.867	493	.683		
Total	494.831	499			

Table: 6.17   **Multiple Comparisons**

Islamist_Militancy

Tukey HSD

(I) Type of Institute	(J) Type of Institute	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Ahle Hadith	Brailvi	1.20286*	.13972	.000	.7892	1.6165
	Deobandi	-.11143	.13972	.985	-.5251	.3022
	Govt. School	.65250*	.13529	.000	.2520	1.0530
	Jamaat-i-Islami	.20571	.13972	.761	-.2079	.6194
	Private School	1.47714*	.13972	.000	1.0635	1.8908
	Shia Madrassa	.92000*	.13972	.000	.5063	1.3337
Brailvi	Ahle Hadith	-1.20286*	.13972	.000	-1.6165	-.7892
	Deobandi	-1.31429*	.13972	.000	-1.7279	-.9006
	Govt. School	-.55036*	.13529	.001	-.9509	-.1498
	Jamaat-i-Islami	-.99714*	.13972	.000	-1.4108	-.5835
	Private School	.27429	.13972	.440	-.1394	.6879
	Shia Madrassa	-.28286	.13972	.400	-.6965	.1308
Deobandi	Ahle Hadith	.11143	.13972	.985	-.3022	.5251
	Brailvi	1.31429*	.13972	.000	.9006	1.7279
	Govt. School	.76393*	.13529	.000	.3634	1.1645
	Jamaat-i-Islami	.31714	.13972	.261	-.0965	.7308
	Private School	1.58857*	.13972	.000	1.1749	2.0022
	Shia Madrassa	1.03143*	.13972	.000	.6178	1.4451
Govt. School	Ahle Hadith	-.65250*	.13529	.000	-1.0530	-.2520
	Brailvi	.55036*	.13529	.001	.1498	.9509
	Deobandi	-.76393*	.13529	.000	-1.1645	-.3634
	Jamaat-i-Islami	-.44679*	.13529	.018	-.8473	-.0463
	Private School	.82464*	.13529	.000	.4241	1.2252
	Shia Madrassa	.26750	.13529	.431	-.1330	.6680
Jamaat-i-Islami	Ahle Hadith	-.20571	.13972	.761	-.6194	.2079
	Brailvi	.99714*	.13972	.000	.5835	1.4108
	Deobandi	-.31714	.13972	.261	-.7308	.0965
	Govt. School	.44679*	.13529	.018	.0463	.8473
	Private School	1.27143*	.13972	.000	.8578	1.6851

(i) Type of Institute	(J) Type of Institute	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
	Shia Madrassa	.71429[*]	.13972	.000	.3006	1.1279
Private School	Ahle Hadith	-1.47714[*]	.13972	.000	-1.8908	-1.0635
	Brailvi	-.27429	.13972	.440	-.6879	.1394
	Deobandi	-1.58857[*]	.13972	.000	-2.0022	-1.1749
	Govt. School	-.82464[*]	.13529	.000	-1.2252	-.4241
	Jamaat-i-Islami	-1.27143[*]	.13972	.000	-1.6851	-.8578
	Shia Madrassa	-.55714[*]	.13972	.001	-.9708	-.1435
Shia Madrassa	Ahle Hadith	-.92000[*]	.13972	.000	-1.3337	-.5063
	Brailvi	.28286	.13972	.400	-.1308	.6965
	Deobandi	-1.03143[*]	.13972	.000	-1.4451	-.6178
	Govt. School	-.26750	.13529	.431	-.6680	.1330
	Jamaat-i-Islami	-.71429[*]	.13972	.000	-1.1279	-.3006
	Private School	.55714[*]	.13972	.001	.1435	.9708

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Conclusion

Broadly, two sets of studies shed light on the question of how schooling fuels militancy in Pakistan. In line with research on the background of terrorist recruits globally, one strand looks at the profiles of Pakistani militants and seeks to determine their educational background, income and other biographical information. Christine Fair conducted an insightful survey of families in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa who lost at least one child in militant violence in Afghanistan or Kashmir. According to her findings, a minority of militants were recruited in madrassas or even in public schools, while none were recruited in private schools. The results of her study also showed that fewer than a quarter ever attended a madrassa, and of those madrassa alumni, most also attended public school and a majority had the equivalent of a 10th-grade education, whereas the average Pakistani child only attends school through grade 6 (Winthrop and Graff, 2010). The study suggests that there is not a strong link between militancy writ large and either lack of education or madrassa attendance. However, when the same study examined a smaller set of militants who were suicide bombers in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Fair (2008) found that most did attend a madrassa,

primarily in North and South Waziristan tribal agencies. She reasons that given the thin levels of support for suicide bombings in both countries, militant groups have no choice but to recruit among low-skilled madrassa students. Studies such as this one are important given the dearth of robust information about the profile of militants in Pakistan. The second line of research focuses on the viewpoints of students studying in different types of schools and reaches at a conclusion (like that of Rahman, 2004). Such studies tend to associate the issue of militancy and sectarianism with respondents' extremist views, which according to some writers seems to be tied to the quality of education. According to them poor quality education foster narrow worldviews which highlights aspects of curriculum and teaching that appear to support more pro-militant views. The longer students are exposed to narrow worldview, which is reflected in the curriculum and in textbooks, the more they become prone to extremist perspective (Winthrop and Graff, 2010).

Like Rahman's study, this research tends to look at the viewpoint of students from different types of schools with regard to five important themes that include: primary purpose of education, status of women, position of minorities, sectarianism and Islamic militancy. In the previous chapter the difference in the outlook of students from three different types of schooling systems regarding first three themes has been reported. This chapter dealt with the opinions of students about sectarian divide in Pakistan and ongoing so-called holy war in the name of Islam. Keeping in view the survey results and interviews, one can see that differences do exist between the outlook of students of madrassas, Urdu medium and English medium schools. The findings of the study were reported by virtue of cross tabs, mean, standard deviation, Chi square to explore the relationship/relatedness between variables and ANOVA i.e. analysis of variance which was used to compare the variance (variability in scores) between the different schools (due to the independent variables; like type of institutes) with the variability within each of the groups. The interview data was linked to have further illustrative insights on the questionnaire data that substantiated the survey results. From the findings of data, it can be seen then that diversity do exist between the worldviews of students coming from three different types of schooling systems regarding their views on sectarian divide in Pakistan and issues related to Islamic militancy and *Jihad*. Data showed that the students from madrassas are the most extremist in their views and English medium ones are the least. The questionnaire data was further illustrated with the interviews of students from respective schools.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

Introduction

In the wake of 9/11, the interest of academics, writers and policy makers increased in the Islamic religious schools known as madrassas. These schools caught the gaze of national and international media and as a result, a number of writings and reports linked Islamic militancy to madrassas. Most of these reports rely exclusively on secondary sources that were based on conjecture and were not substantiated by any kind of research. After a long slumber, the policy makers and academics of Pakistan also realised that a lot of our young kids are getting education by that system and poor quality education in government schools was held responsible for it (Andrabi, et al, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; 91/11 report). Though the enrolment in madrassas is less than 1 per cent of the total students' enrolment in Pakistan yet they can pose as an existential threat to Pakistan (Mir, 2009). He further added that these elements might represent a minority view, their threat is real. Like many others Mir (2009) describes that not all madrassas are active centres of jehadis, but even those without direct links to violence promote an ideology that provides religious justification for barbaric deeds. In the face of such stance taken by many writers, by virtue of this research, an attempt has been made to determine the worldview of madrassa students. The research does not focused on madrassa students only but also tried to find out what differences there are in the viewpoint of students coming from three different types of schooling systems about certain socio-political and educational issues. So, the study is destined to give a comparison of viewpoints of students, coming from different types of schooling system, working in parallel in Pakistan, about their educational priorities, and other related socio-political questions such as status of women, tolerance towards minorities and Muslims of diverse sect and Islamic militancy. The study also describes how Pakistani society is polarized along socio-economic lines and how, at least, at the school level, this results in polarization in the world views of students coming from different types of schools. In addition, this research also tries to make an understanding whether parents tend to send their kids to madrassas because they prefer a religious education for their children, or their economic position leaves very limited option for them with respect to the choice of schools for their kids' education. Along with it, by virtue of a psychometric scale, the study was intent to compare the degree to which students from different types of schools perceive that the outcomes result from their own behaviours,

or from the forces that are external to themselves. This orientation is known as "locus of control".

Contributing to knowledge about Madrassa system and radicalism

Madrassas were considered as the centres of education in Muslim world. In addition to providing Islamic knowledge, they imparted secular education in the fields of sciences, philosophy and public administration and governance (Anzar, 2003). With the advent of colonial rule in the sub-continent, a new modern system of education that sought to replace the role of Madrassas in any type of development came into being. In the new schools, only those elite were invited to obtain admission that could be used to run the machinery of colonialism. This resulted in a dichotomy of education system – secular education for the elite and religious education for the poor (ibid, 2003). According to Prof. Nazeer Ahmed, this was the time when clear bifurcation of education into *deeni talim* (religious education) and *dunyavi talim* (worldly/secular education) made a vivid appearance. The new Western powers also brought the idea of separation of state and religion, which for the Muslim leaders was synonym to heresy (ibid, 2003). The new system of governance did not require legitimization through religion and this was seen by Islamic scholars as a direct threat to the established code of conduct for the Muslim rulers and their own power. They were not happy with these developments at all. With the advent of British rule, a new educational system was introduced, which was perceived to be a threat to the Islamic identity of the Muslims, the Madrassa system in India took upon itself the task of opposing the cultural and educational hegemony of the British (ibid, 2003). In the pursuit of their objectives, the Madrassa system underwent drastic changes in terms of Islamic education curriculum and teaching styles and quality and abandoning of the earthly science studies. The madrassas abandoned the quest for rational sciences and focused exclusively on the teachings of Islam as prescribed in the Koran. Ulema used the verses from the Koran to rationalize their stance that the earthly or rational knowledge either should not be taught in Madrassas or should only be studied in the light of the Koran. Without any drastic changes, Pakistan inherited the same type of madrassa system after independence.

In the contemporary Pakistan, the self-proclaimed mission of most the Madrassas is to prepare students for religious duties. Their adherence to strict religious teachings, gave rise to suspicions in the minds of many scholars who take madrassas as jihad factories having less to do with education and more to do with political indoctrination; incubators of Muslim terrorists; origins of conservative violent ideologies, and thus, a security threat to the modern world (Stern 2000; Singer 2001; ICG 2002, 2007; Alexiev 2005; Doumato 2003; Metzger 2005; Loony 2003; Coulson 2004; Fandy 2007; Fair 2008; Brookings 2009; Imtiaz 2011; Kazmi and Pervez 2011). According to them madrassas are driven by such ideological agendas that promote a mindset which is intolerant and violent towards diverse worldview. In order to assess this, the study contended to provide empirical evidence by determining the viewpoint of madrassa students about certain socio-political and educational issues. Owing to the fact that madrassas, Urdu medium schools and English medium schools have divergent curriculum content and pedagogical practices, the study argued whether or not, owing to these differences, students which pass through these systems have divergent ideologies about education such as what do they think what education is for, do they think education's primary purpose is to prepare students for work and employment, education is to promote economic equality and social justice, education's aim is to encourage understanding between men and women, schools are to promote shared values of Pakistani society, should the students have their due share in the decision making process about them in the schools and so on and so forth. The research also looked at whether the worldview of all students, irrespective of their school type, is identical on women rights, status of non-Muslims, sectarian divide, armed Jihad. In the coming paragraphs, each theme (like primary purpose of education, status of women, position of minorities, Islamic militancy) has been discussed as a separate research question. Along with it, the study did include a psychometric scale named 'locus of control' to gauge that to what extent the students believe that they can control events that affect them. In addition, the research work also tried to determine what exactly encourages parents to send their children to madrassas. This study attempts to synthesize the limited knowledge that exists on this subject.

In the first instance, the study contributed to the knowledge about madrassa schooling system by making a comparison of madrassa students' opinions with that of Urdu and English medium schools students regarding the primary purpose of education. By analysing the take of students, the first research question has tried to explore whether there is divergence or

alikeness in the opinions of students from mainstream schools and madrassas running in South Punjab about the 'primary purpose of education'? Basically, the purpose of education is a whole range of things that are applicable, directly or indirectly, to all of us in some respect. However, for this study I choose some aspects like the purpose of education should be to prepare students for work and employment, to promote respect towards other cultures and understanding between men and women. Along with it, the questions about the roles of schools and students also came under the purview of 'primary purpose of education'.

According to some, the fundamental aim of education is to pursue economic development and the preparation of a skilled workforce needed to meet the demands of day today labour market: traditional vocational education or career and technical education (CTE) can be taken as examples in this regard. In recent history such narrow role of education has been criticised severely and according to Hull, Dan (2005) using secondary schools to "train" students in job tasks, or to run pieces of equipment does not represent a good education at all. He advocates the type of education that can help students not only in choosing careers but also to become good citizens of the state and also prepare them for higher education. More or less similar criticism was made by Tanabe and Theobald (1999) for an aim of education that is grounded on the idea of economic utility only. The purpose of education must be intended to increase the odds for an economically just society and should help in dwindling the gulf between the super wealthy and those who live below the poverty line (ibid, 1999).

For some the prime purpose of education is conservation and transference of socio-cultural and religious values from one generation to the next one. Education preserves the basic structure of society by conserving all that is worthwhile in basic values and institutions, by transmitting them to the next generation and by renewing culture afresh whenever degeneration, stagnation, or loss of values occur (Ashraf, 1979). Ashraf came up with a classification; education and instruction. A human being may be a great general, an efficient carpenter or a first-class pilot, a lawyer, a mechanic or a pathologist, a renowned doctor, a chemical engineer or a chartered accountant, but still remain a semi-educated, ill-mannered, immoral, unrighteous or unjust person. We can say that people who have specialized in certain educational fields are well-instructed individuals, but we cannot necessarily regard them as truly educated (ibid, 1979). More or less similar views with respect to aim of

education were made by Baig (2008) when he says "the linking of education to financial goals is extremely unfortunate. It turns the centres of learning into mere vocational centres in their outlook and spirit. It degrades education and through it the society." He further adds, the society must ensure that the common ground i.e. beliefs, values and outlook on life, continues to hold from generation to generation. This is the real purpose of education. Such approach towards education reminds me the views of a Deobandi madrassa student, when I enquired about his take on aim of education: the real purpose of education should not be contaminated with material greed. My only aim (for getting education) is to serve Islam………..when Allah has taken the responsibility of *Rizk* (livelihood) of all human beings rather all creatures, why should I care about my livelihood. Though, in response to questionnaire questions with regard to aim of education, all students irrespective of their school types seem aligned with the notion that *Education should promote enterprise and economic development* and *aim of education is to prepare students for work and employment*, but one of the student who disagreed with that notion came up with aforesaid views as an explanation for his take. The story does not end here, one student from Brailvi madrassa even saw a conspiracy of "enemies of Islam" to dissuade young generation of Pakistan from the only aim of education i.e. 'service of Islam'.[73] One student from Ahle Hadith madrassa was of the view that "as you know Muhammad (pbuh) was the last messenger of Allah and no prophet will come, these schools are the source to conserve and transfer the message of Allah to those who are to come and this process will go on till the day of judgement and our madrassa is playing its humble role in this noble cause." Such role of madrassas has been stated by Mumtaz Ahmad (2000) in these words; the preservation of Islamic culture is of paramount importance to the ulema or clergy of Pakistan and constitutes the raison d'être of the institutions they run. This attitude constitutes the guiding philosophy on which the madrassa curriculum is based (Shahid, 2009). However, so far as the questionnaire responses are concerned, many of the students both from main stream schools and madrassas do not see any harm if education is destined to economic well being along with other objectives pointed in the questionnaire. (see appendix…).

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[73] In April 2004 a severe outcry over proposed changes to ninth and tenth - grade syllabi was witnessed. Madrassa clergy reacted strongly and blamed government for implementing the "Western Agenda" in schools of Pakistan. In the face of this opposition the prime minister, education minister, and religious affairs minister had to capitulate to the uproar and reassert their loyalty to orthodox Islam and eventually the government retracted its proposals.

So far as the purpose of education with respect to promoting equality between men and women is concerned, it had lesser appeal for the students of madrassas (chapter 5). Anzar (2003) sees a vital contribution of madrassa curricula in formulating such thinking among the students of madrassas. She wrote a critique on Dars-e-Nizami; the curriculum which Pakistani Madrassas still teach today. Anzar (2003) quotes two books; Pand Nama, and Karima, these books are didactic and they are in Persian rhymed couplets. Both approve of view that women are inferior, untrustworthy and alluring as, indeed, are beardless boys. Both of the books belong to a male world confident in its superiority. Women are faithless and the wise must suspect them (ibid, 2003). According to a survey by the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS 2002) about 45 per cent of madrassa students considered women to be lesser than men, and only 11 per cent considered them equal to men. Rahman's (2005) survey also bore similar results: more than 77 per cent madrassa students said No when they were asked, Should Pakistan give equal rights to men and women as in Western countries? While 90.52 % students from elitist English medium schools students said yes in response to the aforesaid question. The results of the current study are also aligned to what IPS survey and Rahman (2005) study came up with.

As far as other aspects of purpose of education are concerned, such as role of schools in promoting shared values and the part of students in decision making and formulation of curriculum so on and so forth, all students regardless of their school type seemed to be in agreement with the position. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) unequivocally grants children the right to express their views freely in all matters affecting them. School self-evaluation in England requires schools to consult pupils. The 'Every Child Matters' policy in England, seeks active participation as an educational outcome (Leat & Reid, 2010). Active participation on the part of students in the formulation of curriculum and other activities of schools may enhance interests and satisfaction among students about learning. On the contrary there are some who think that students are disruptive agents in the learning process, liable to interrupt teaching for their own purposes. This view results in a learning environment where the teacher lectures or students prepare written assignments. An opposite view is that students are agents that can and must modify lesson content according to their own predilections, perceptions, and attitudes. These two views represent the endpoints of a continuum on which teachers take varying viewpoints and shifting positions. Research has shown that students prefer classroom activities that require their active

involvement (Webb, 1983). Given this, it should be the role of the teacher to facilitate the positive participation of the students as curriculum developers to such an extent that the students become lifelong learners, able to use their minds to think, explore, analyze, and evaluate the instruction they receive (ibid, 1983). Bragg (2007) goes one step farther and observes that such projects may be read as attempts to instil norms of individualism, self-reliance and self-management, which resonate with new configurations of power and authority under neo-liberalism, respond to specific debates about school standards, effectiveness and competition, and help construct young people as reflexive ''knowledge workers'' (Leat & Reid, 2010).

Another important aspect that came under the purview of the theme 'primary purpose of education' is the role of schools in promoting shared values of Pakistani society to ensure community cohesion. There can be many a friction points in a society but the most frequent and often seen are diversity of faith, race, gender, culture, socio-economic class and so on and so forth. As far as Pakistan is concerned, ethnicity and sectarianism have always seen as major potential threats for the state and society. But, unfortunately in recent times, the issue of minorities has also come under spotlight.[74] In such precarious situations in particular, the responsibility of schools, becomes more significant in promoting long term community cohesion. By virtue of their ethos and curriculum, schools should guarantee strong respect for diversity, and also play their part in promoting shared values and encouraging their pupils to actively engage with others to understand what they all hold in common. So, all schools, whatever the mix of pupils they serve, are responsible for equipping their pupils to live and thrive alongside people from many different backgrounds. Promoting community cohesion is not a new idea in schools. Since September 2007 all schools in UK have been under a legal duty to promote community cohesion.[75] Here one thing is worth mentioning that schools cannot cope with this issue single handedly. There are some other external factors like parents, friends, families and the overall community that formulate the lives and thinking of students. Along with schools, the responsibility for a cohesive community lies with them also. Any effort for community cohesion needs to take into account these factors and requires

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[74] The incidents of forced conversion of Hindu girls and the exodus of Hindus as a reaction came under the gaze of national and international media. In addition to it the plight of Rimsha Masih; accused of blasphemy, has explained further the unfortunate treatment of Pakistan's minorities.

[75] The Education and Inspections Act 2006 inserted a new section 21(5) to the Education Act 2002 introducing a duty on the governing bodies of maintained schools to promote community cohesion.

their active involvement. As far as the results of this study are concerned, students from all types of schools aligned to the notion that schools should promote the shared values of the Pakistani society. In addition, all types of schools' students sided with the conception of involvement of pupils in the governance and organisation of the school and want their consultation about what is studied in the school curriculum.

The second research question is about the attitude of students of different types of schools and madrassas with regard to place of women in Pakistani society. Religious education imparted in madrassas is generally seen as a source of promoting misogynist view of Islam by a narrow interpretation of the Quran. A report; Religious Education, Modernization and Conflict: Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines (2005) suggests a reinterpretation of the texts to allow for more friendly renditions of the Quran with respect to the rights of Muslim women, minorities in Muslim countries, and non- Muslims in general. In this connection some efforts were made by Musharraf government but in the face of protest from religious circles no substantial achievement was made. In connection to madrassa education and women rights, Alexiv (2003, 2005) and Irfani (2004) tried to single out Deobandi madrassas only and intentionally or unintentionally seem exonerating other types of madrassas from this alleged role by not mentioning them. But the results of this study show that all types of madrassas disagreed with the notion that equal rights should be awarded to men and women. The results of my study corroborate with the findings of Rahman (2004, 2005) which suggests that madrassa students, relative to students in public and private schools, are less inclined to support equal rights for women. And if we make a comparison between public schools and private schools, notably, public school students are more intolerant towards women than private school pupils, but less than madrassa students.

According to Qureshi and Rarieya (2007) certain prejudices and biases against women persist in the society that perpetuates the problem of intolerance in Pakistani society. Such biases may include the perception that girls are not intellectually the equals of boys, or that they may lag in certain subjects, or that their education simply does not matter (Qureshi & Rarieya, 2007). In addition to it, Rahman and Bukhari (2006) also provided an overall view of the general state of education in contemporary Pakistan. Their work provided focussed and detailed description of religious schools, their funding, their 'ideology' and their political

agenda. The value system is religious, which includes negative perceptions of minorities and women (Rahman and Bukhari, 2006). The results of my study are aligned to these writings which say, in the obscure Madrassas impressionable young minds are taught a distorted and unnatural version of Islam, by inculcating misogynistic ideals and hatred for non-Muslims. Chinoy[76] (2009); a Pakistani-Canadian journalist made a documentary with the name *Children of the Taliban*: a documentary to trace the suicide attackers and their trainers. She interviewed some of the students from a Deobandi madrassa in Karachi and asked one of the students about the place of women in Islam, "women are meant for domestic care, and that is what they should do. Sharia Law says it, why are women wandering around? The government should forbid women and girls from wandering around outside, just like the government banned plastic bags. No one use them anymore. We should do the same with women." He said, the people who keep women on their proper place are Taliban only (Chinoy, 2009). So far as the results of this study are concerned, more or less similar justifications were made by the students of all madrassas during their interviews, even those from Shia and Brailvi schools of thought who are relatively considered as moderates as compared to Deoband and Ahle Hadith schools of thought. They regarded women as the cause of obscenity and moral degradation in the society. Education, which should be used as a tool in helping to break the pattern of gender discrimination and bring lasting change for women in Pakistan, is in fact doing the opposite, particularly in madrassas. Education in madrassas promotes patriarchal structure in the society. Dominance of males on females is justified in the light of teachings of Islam. According to Farooq (no date) in Deobandi madrassas of females, such literature is taught which succinctly says that men are divinely superior to women. By virtue of carefully selected texts, the patriarchal notion of man's superiority is inculcated in the minds of girl students. *Bihishti Zewar*[77], one of the important texts on girls' curriculum of Deobandi madrasas, indoctrinates the young girls that women are socially subordinate to the men of their families and also tells them that they are possessions of men (ibid, n.d). The book argues that ingratitude towards a husband is as much sin as ingratitude towards God. It induces woman that she should obey her husband's will in all things, seek permission on all matters concerning her life and call the white black if he does. The book instructs woman that she must learn above all to relate to her husband as she

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[76] She is an Emmy and first Oscar award-winning Pakistani. The Pakistani President conferred the Hilal-e-Imtiaz on Obaid-Chinoy on 23rd March 2012, for bringing honour to Pakistan as a filmmaker.
[77] Literal meaning of Bihishti Zewar is Ornament of Paradise.

relates to God, with obedience and gratitude. She is responsible to her husband's disposition and is expected to keep him happy. The book advises the woman:

> Never think of him [husband] as your equal, never let him do any work for you…. If he comes to you and begins to massage your hands or feet, stop him; you would not let your father do this service, and your husband's rank is higher than your father's (Metcalf, 1982 as quoted by Farooq).

Third research question is about whether there is any diversity in the opinions of students from different types of schools and madrassas with respect to position of non-Muslims in Pakistan? The results of the study corroborate with the study of Rahman (2004, 2005) which demonstrates that madrassa students have hardly any fondness for the notion that equal rights should be accorded to minorities of Pakistan. Public schools students are also relatively less inclined to support equal rights for non-Muslim citizens of Pakistan. In this regard, the curriculum of government schools in general and madrassas in particular have been held responsible by most of the critics and policy reports. In its 2011 annual report, the U.S. Commission on international religious Freedom (USCIRF) found that textbooks used in Pakistani primary and secondary schools foster prejudice and intolerance of religious minorities, especially Hindus and Christians. Such intolerant references are not restricted to Islamic studies textbooks: they are found in both early elementary and more advanced social studies texts used by all public school students, including non-Muslim students. Moreover, the textbooks contain stories, biographies, and poems with an Islamic religious character that students of minority faiths must study and be tested on. More or less similar views were expressed by Rahman in his book Denizens of Alien world (2004). Rahman (2004) commented on the differences between the curricula of Urdu and English medium schools: The schools are vastly diverse in their approach toward minorities, Hindus, and other non-Muslims. The indoctrination that occurs against such groups is far more pronounced in Urdu textbooks than in English textbooks and may be a direct cause of greater intolerance among those schooled in Urdu schools (Rahman, 2004). Rahman and Bukhari (2006) also came up with a fair analysis of general state of education in Pakistan and pointed the 'ideology' which through education the establishment of Pakistan tried to promote. The USCIRF (2011) report also made an evaluation about curriculum of Pakistan's madrassas: a significant minority of Pakistan's thousands of religious schools, or madrassas, reportedly continue to provide

ideological training and motivation to those who take part in religiously-inspired violence in Pakistan and abroad (ibid, 2011). A memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed in October 2010 between the ministry of interior and the five main madrassa boards in order to better regulate madrassas' curriculum and financing but no substantial achievement was made in this respect. Mumtaz's (2000) work is a detailed account of madrassa education in Pakistan, which used various case studies to examine madrassa education with respect to what is being taught in the curricula as well as the value indoctrination that occurs on an informal basis. Other works that focus exclusively on the general state of Islamic education in Pakistan includes, al Attas (1979): Aims and objectives of Islamic Education, Baloch (2000): Education based on Islamic Values: Imperatives and Implications, and Ahmad (2005): Islamist School Chains and the coming New Order. During a session on 'rethinking education for pluralism: representation of religious minorities in public and madrassah education' in the Sustainable Development Conference of the SDPI in December, 2011, experts recommended government to negotiate with madrassa umbrella organizations to discuss madrassa reforms and also to allocate funds for financing the process of change. Afsheen Naz of SDPI expressed that ruling elite have encouraged a particular mindset with using curriculum, which has instilled obscurantist vision in general masses in the name of advancing the 'ideology of Islam' that resulted in the marginalising of minorities of Pakistan, in order to protect their own vested interests.

The fourth research question deals with the comparison of views of students from mainstream schools (Urdu medium and English medium) to that of madrassas' with respect to sectarian divide in Pakistani society. The results of the study shows that all students regardless of their type of schoolings disapprove sectarian repugnance, however, receptive feelings towards diverse sects were relatively stronger among the students of private schools as compared to public and madrassas students. Interestingly, the findings of my study do not corroborate with the results of the studies done before. For instance, Ali's (2009) findings showed that sectarian violence is more likely to occur in localities where madrassa penetration is highest.[78] Using incident data in two districts (Ahmedpur and Islamabad), Ali found that sectarian violence correlated strongly and positively with madrassa penetration. Another

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[78] Saleem H Ali made a Geographical Information System Based Analysis by making demographic comparison. He collected data by the surveys of all madrassas in the two regions; Ahmedpur and Islamabad. Interviews were carried out with various stakeholders as well as focus group discussions with leading religious leaders and government functionaries to revalidate the findings.

survey administered by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies in March 2009 found that at least 18% of the madrassas were affiliated with sectarian outfits. One such example is the Binori Town madrassa which has strong bonds to various terrorist groups, including JeM (Jesh-e-Mohammad) HuM (Harkat-ul-Mujahideen) and SSP (Sipah Sahaba Pakistan)[79]. Rana (2009) goes so far to claim that Jamia Binoria[80] is the "backbone" of banned militant group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). An ICG report published in 2007 supports Rana's assertions, claiming that the madrassa has helped establish and sustain these groups. The Binori Town madrassa is also known to be at the heart of anti-Shiite and anti-Barelvi violence. In the last decade, Shiite and Barelvi militants have assassinated at least four leading scholars of this seminary. The aforementioned ICG study has reported on the link between sectarian militancy and madrassas in the context of Karachi; Pakistani's largest city. The study also found that a Barelvi madrassa chain, Faizan-e-Madina, believed to be militant, carried out jihadi activities geared against members of the Deobandis and Ahl-e-Hadith sects. The madrassa chain is run by Dawat-e-Islami, an off-shoot of which, Sunni Tehrik, is a sectarian militant group (ibid, 2007).

There are many other research studies that tried to establish alleged role of madrassas in sectarianism (ICG report, 2002, 2005, 2007; Mumtaz Ahmad, 1997; Saleem H. Ali 2009; A.H. Nayyar, 2003; Jessica Stern, 2004; Qasim Zaman, 2007). According to ICG report (2002), the seeds of factional and sectarian conflicts are in the foundations of the traditional madrassas. Based on sectarian identities, madrassas are, by their very nature, mutually exclusive, driven by a mission to outnumber and dominate rival sects. Students are educated and trained to counter arguments of opposing sects on matters of theology, jurisprudence and doctrines. Promoting a particular sect inevitably implies rejection of the others. "Refutation" (*Radd* in Urdu) has always been an important part of madrassa education. So, 'Radd' literature – the 'logical' refutation of the belief system of other sects, aimed at proving them infidels or apostates – is a main feature of the literature produced by madrassa-based parties. In short, madrassa education and upbringing aim to indoctrinate with an intolerance of other religious systems (ibid, 2002). Mumtaz Ahmad (1997) says that the madrassa graduates indoctrinated with an intolerant ideology against other religious systems provide manpower

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[79] All of these militant organisations are banned in Pakistan and had a long history of their involvement in sectarian killings.
[80] Jamia Binoria is a very big Deobandi madrassa in Karachia and the madrassa allegedly caters to thousands of students from around the world.

for the sectarian movements. ICG Asia Report (2005); The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan states that most of the leaders of sectarian organisations came from madrassas and have been running madrassas (pp 5-23). According to Ali (2009) the doctrine of Jihad has been perceived by madrassas in three categories; Domestic jihad against oppression, Pan - Islamist jihad, and jihad to establish theological purity (Ali, 2009). The third category of jihad described by Ali (2009), defines it as "jihad to establish theological purity and prevent adulteration of Islamic doctrine" (Ali, 2009, p. 79). It is linked to sectarianism and may manifest itself in sectarian violence, although the participants of the study did not identify any such manifestation. He states:

> There are two concepts in Islamic tradition that are often misused and manipulated to motivate this form of jihad and often madrassahs students are indoctrinated with these. The concept of *murtad*, which is a term used to describe someone who has left the fold of Islam after becoming a Muslim. According to most interpretations of Islamic tradition, it is permissible to kill such an individual to prevent doubt from taking hold in the community (Ali, 2009, p. 76)

He (2009) further goes on to state: "the other concept is the notion of *fitnah* or "mischief" that may cause disunity. Often disagreement or dissent is relegated to being *fitnah* and hence jihad is permitted against this" (Ali, 2009, p. 76). So far as the results of my study are concerned, no such manifestation was expressed by any student from madrassa or other type of school. This might be because of the fact that students might be afraid of expressing their true feelings about sectarian differences. It is noteworthy that all leaders of religious and sect-based parties and heads of madrassa boards, at least publically, do condemn sectarianism unequivocally. Such clear and explicit position for equality of rights for women and minorities has hardly been taken by these religious dignitaries.

Fifth research question tries to examine whether there is any difference of opinion among students from different types of schools and madrassas regarding militant activities going on in Pakistan. In recent times, madrassa education has raised numerous concerns in the academics and policy makers with regard to their perverted roles but the most important among those is its alleged connection with militancy. The results of this study show that not all madrassas but the students from Ahle Hadith, Deoband and Jamat-i-Islami madrassas are relatively more aligned to pro-militant outlook as compared to those of students from Brailvi

madrassas, Shia madrassas, Urdu and English medium schools' students. These results of the study corroborate with the findings of ICG report of 2004 which says that many of the Deobandi and Ahle Hadith madrassas in Pakistan support militancy and foster a way of thinking that leads to acts of terrorism. More or less similar views have been made by Mir (2009) when he traces a clear shift in the outlook of Ahle Hadith, Deobandi and Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas doctrines with respect to Islamic militancy and jehad and pointed the radical changes made in their curricula in the face of new developments that took place in Afghanistan and Iran in late 1970s.

According to Mir (2009) Pakistan's religious madrassas were not advocates of militancy since their inception in modern Indo-Pak history. Even the curriculum of Deobandi madrassas, that are considered most important in the context of extremism, focused on purification of faith for the purpose of knowledge, rather than militancy and Jihad. All this changed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Army Chief General Zia; an ardent Islamist who took power after a military coup against a secular and liberal government of Z. A. Bhutto in 1977 had a plan to turn Pakistan into an Islamic state. The incident of Iranian Revolution in 1979 and Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan in the same year gained urgency and fundamentalist tone. In the wake of these incidents Deobandi madrassas narrowed their syllabus by focussing on teaching of Koran and Hadith (sayings of prophet Muhammad) and dropped secular subjects like Mathematics and science in part or whole (ibid, 2009, p194). The emphasis in madrassa curriculum subsequently shifted almost entirely from the standard pillars of faith such as prayer, charity and pilgrimage to the obligations and rewards of jehad. The madrassas taught the young students that the world was divided into believers and unbelievers in a black and white setting. Students were taught militaristic aspects of faith instead of humility, tolerance and kindness. Subsequently, the era of Jehadi madrassas was born which got intertwined with politics and recruit troops for anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan (ibid, 2009).

There are a lot more studies and reports that tried to establish a positive correlation between madrassas and militancy like (Jessica Stern, 2000-01; ICG reports, 2002, 2004, 2007; EC RRM report, 2002; Tariq Rahman, 2004). These reports and studies tried to link rise in Islamic militancy and sectarian violence in Pakistan with the rise in the numbers of madrassas in the wake of Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. Jessica Stern in her writings "Pakistan's Jihad

Culture," (2000, pp 115-126) and "Meeting with the Muj," (2001, 42-50) has advanced the belief that Pakistan's madrassas are factories of ideological indoctrination and even military training for terrorist organisations throughout Pakistan and South Asia. More or less similar findings were shared by ICG report of 2004. Rahman (2004) compared the outlook of students of madrassa, public schools and private schools with regard to solution of Kashmir issue. Findings of his study showed that the students from madrassas, relative to students from public and private schools, are more likely to support mujahideen's role in Indian held Kashmir, and more likely to favour open war with India to resolve the issue of Kashmir instead of peaceful means. Barring the fact, madrassas are divided on sectarian lines and have diverse standing for several socio-political and religious issues but in his study, Rahman treated madrassas as a monolithic being. Results of my study showed that students from Brailvi and Shia madrassas are relatively less inclined to belligerence than those of students from Urdu medium schools. Brailvi madrassas made the second largest in numbers only after Deoband madrassas in Pakistan. The students of Brailvi and Shia madrassas are less supportive for suicide attacks and do not consider Taliban as holy warriors or martyrs. Notably, public school students are more inclined towards belligerence and have pro-militant manifestation in their outlook than Brailvi and Shia madrassas students and private school pupils, but less than Deobandi, Ahle Hadith and Jamaat-e-Islami madrassas students. If we flick through the history of Muslims, there has been a tradition of the spiritual Islam of mystics that accepts and respects all faiths but at the same time the tradition of political Islam is militant and encourages teenagers to join holy wars. Instead of promoting those spiritual and secular traditions that are peaceful, some madrassas are emphasising fundamentalist and militant traditions that promote violence and war. The curriculum of madrassas continues to be an area of concern for the Pakistani government, United States agencies, and the international community because of its alleged linkage with militant and radicalized elements (Hoodbhoy, 2007). The Brookings report entitled Pakistan's Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education, not Jihad (2008) drew a connection between madrassa education and the different manifestations of intolerance in society, including violence. Hatred is allowed within the confines of a minority of madrassas where intolerance and the resultant violence are most palpable. The doctrine of militant jihad, which according to the fundamentalist view condones the killings of men, women, and children who may espouse a worldview different from that of radical Islam, is being taught aggressively in these institutions (ibid, 2008). Although these may be few in number compared to the other madrassas, where simply a conservative Islamic education is being imparted, they, nonetheless, prepare students to take

up arms and may even allow weapons on their premises. These madrassa-trained students then proceed to take up arms in foreign lands such as Chechnya and Kashmir, raising the level of violence in these countries (ibid, 2008). Fair (2006), in her seminal work challenged that premise and suggested that while madrassa education can create conditions conducive to militancy, there is no reason to believe that the majority of militants are madrassa-trained. To address the need for robust analysis of militancy and human capital formation in Pakistan, in 2004 Fair commissioned a convenience sample of the families of 140 militants in Pakistan. The instrument collected detailed information about the militant's group affiliation, work and educational experience, and other relevant personal background as well as detailed household information. The analysis of the data finds that militants in the sample are overwhelmingly not madrassa products. Fair (2006) concluded that madrassa students may propagate public support for terrorism and militancy nonetheless.

Generally children's education depends on parental choice and in the context of madrassa education, the first question comes to one's mind is why parents might want to send their children to madrassas. In this connection three possibilities can be pondered upon: (a) madrassa can be an option where no other schooling options are available; (b) poor parents are more likely to send their children to madrassas as education and lodging in madrassas is free and; (c) the use of madrassas might be greater among certain types of households defined by religiosity or ethnicity. In this research, an attempt has been made to clarify what usually defines the choice of parents in the selection of type of schools; they chose to educate their children. Twelve fathers were interviewed to determine the motive behind the selection of a certain school for their child. In the light of their views, it seems that they send their children to madrassas due to financial constraints. The first possibility (a) can be repudiated on the grounds that the area of South Punjab from where the research sample was chosen was the one where the local madrassa was just one among at least two educational options and vice versa. The findings of my study corroborate with the results of Rahman (2004) who says, that those parents who cannot afford their children's education send their children to madrassa. Madrassa schools' children come from marginalised social groups who spend their life below the poverty line. Interestingly, a father whose child was studying in government school showed his interest to get his child enrolled in an English school if he could afford the exorbitant tuition fee of the private school. Madrassa is a place where students get the boarding and lodging in addition to religious education free of charge. For those who cannot

afford feeding and clothing of their children along with fee might look for Madrassa as an option where along with education; their children can get food and clothing.

Madrassa in perspective

According to Winthrop and Graff (2010) worldview formation is one of important reasons why education and conflict are related. Schooling systems provide one important way of shaping individuals', and hence social groups', worldviews. Many other influences, such as families and the media, contribute to the framework of ideas and beliefs through which an individual interprets the world and interacts with it. But schooling is one such influence that is easily shaped by policy (ibid, 2010). The content of Pakistan's official textbooks has often been criticized by several sources including many within Pakistan for sometimes promoting religious intolerance and Indo-phobia. According to Haqqani (2005), only officially published textbooks are used in Pakistan's schools and colleges since the era of Ayub Khan. This is used by Pakistani government to create a standard narrative of Pakistan's history. During the rule of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq a program of Islamization of the country including the textbooks was started. General Zia's 1979 education policy stated that "[the] highest priority would be given to the revision of the curricula with a view to reorganizing the entire content around Islamic thought and giving education an ideological orientation so that Islamic ideology permeates the thinking of the younger generation and helps them with the necessary conviction and ability to refashion society according to Islamic tenets" (Jamil, 2009). During Zia's rule madrassas not only multiplied in numbers but special emphasis on holy war and martyrdom was given also via jehadi literature (Mir, 2009).

The results of this study show that the students coming from different types of schools have diverse outlook with regard to certain socio-political issues. The students of different madrassas, even, have diversity in their opinions on jehad and militancy. As far as the aim of education is concerned, the findings of the research showed that all students irrespective of their school types were aligned with the notion that education should promote enterprise and economic development but the madrassa students, relative to students in public and private schools, were less inclined to support this stance. And if we make a comparison between

public schools and private schools, notably, public school students are less supportive of intolerance towards women than private school pupils, but less than madrassa students. The study also deliberated upon the most ignored aspect of parent and school relationship in Pakistan educational landscape. Parent-school relationships have evolved into what parents do with their children, such as help with homework, and/or what parents do for their children, such as choosing their school or providing learning resources (Crozier, 2012). But for this study only parent school relationship with regard to their selection of school has been thrashed out. The results of the study support the notion that the parents of madrassa students opt to send their children in madrassas because economically it is a workable choice for them.

In any society, education is a major vehicle for the transmission of ideas, attitudes, and beliefs. This means that control over educational content and access to classrooms can become valuable commodities in a conflict.

Education can perpetuate negative judgments about the "other," engendering hostility and aggression among the young, and firing up the fever to go to war. According to P. W. Singer, the extremist madrassas described by President Musharraf run a curriculum where,

> Hatred is permissible, jihad allows the murder of innocents, and the new heroes are terrorists. Martyrdom through suicide attacks are also extolled, and anti-western speeches are committed to memory. The students are uneducated, young, dependent on the schools, and cut off from contact with their parents for years at a time, and thus highly susceptible to being programmed toward violence. These students from this minority of madrassas are regularly sent abroad to serve in conflicts in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and a number of other wars decided by the school leaders as part of the jihad. In addition, the foreign students of the madrassas return to their home states with a violent outlook and sow the seeds for conflict elsewhere.

The aforesaid statement by Musharraf explains the phenomenon of some of the madrassas that are actively involved in militant activities. He did not miss the point that the students who launch militant activities are cut off from their parents for years which explicate that such students hardly get any input from their parents for their belligerent behaviour. Many

have argued that one of the main reasons so many students are forced to attend the madrassas is the failure of Pakistan's school system to provide an adequate number of teachers and schools, particularly in the rural areas. In addition to it, there are many a ghost schools; the schools that exist on the papers only. According to a World Bank report, in primary government schools of Punjab, the average span of study is 15 minutes per day. Hence, with little alternative available, parents send the children to the madrassa to get some semblance of education. As has been discussed before, the lure is increased by the fact that many of the madrassas provide free room and board the student body an enticement for large, low-income families.

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Questionnaire:

Dear Participant,

Thank you for agreeing to take part in my research project which is to investigate any association between madrassa education and religious radicalism. This project is part of my PhD studies at the University of Glasgow, United Kingdom. Your right of confidentiality and anonymity is assured. Please answer the questions candidly, without consulting your fellows. There is no right or wrong answer as it is not a test. You may choose to leave any statement unanswered. You have the right to withdraw from part of this study any time before, during or after the research process. The questionnaire should take you about 45 minutes.

Name: ……………………………………………………………………………

Name of School/Madrassa: …………………………………………………………………………………………

………..

Background

1. Where did you receive your previous education?

   ❑ English Medium Schools   ❑ Urdu Medium Schools

   ❑ Madrassa   ❑ English and Urdu Medium Schools

   ❑ English Medium Schools and Madrassa

   ❑ Urdu Medium Schools and Madrassa

   ❑ Other   …………………………………………………..

2. Was your previous schooling in?

   ❑ Public School   ❑ Private School

   ❑

Other   ………………………………………….

3. Where are you from?

☐ Urban part of Southern Punjab (City)   ☐ Rural part of southern Punjab (village)

4. Who is/are earning hand(s) in your family?

☐ Father   ☐ Mother

☐ Both   ☐ Other …………………………………………

5. What is your father's occupation?

…………………………………………………

6. The occupation of your father falls in which category?

☐ Government Sector   ☐ Private Sector

☐ Self-employed   ☐ Other …………………………………………

7. Does your mother work?

☐ Yes   ☐ no

If yes

8. What is the occupation of your mother?

…………………………………………………..

9. The occupation of your mother falls in which category?

☐ Government Sector   ☐ Private Sector

☐ Self-employed   ☐ Other …………………………………………

10. How many siblings do you have?

…………………………………………

11. What is your sect?

☐ Deobandi   ☐ Brailvi

☐ Ahle Hadith   ☐ Jamat-i-Islami

☐ Shia   ☐ Other ………………………………………….

☐ Don't Know

12. Where do your other siblings study?

....

13. Main decisions regarding family matters are taken by

❏ My father   ❏ My mother

❏ Jointly   ❏ Other ....

14. In comparison to girls boys are given more importance in my family.

❏ Yes   ❏ no

15. Do you think your parents will mind if you have friendship with boys from different sect.

❏ Yes   ❏ no

16. You live in a

❏ rented home   ❏ owned home

17. Type of house

❏ pakka (bricks wall)   ❏ kacha (grass-thatched/mud made)

18. How many rooms do you have in your house?

....

19. You have a

❏ joint family system   ❏ unit family system

20. I identify myself as:

❏ Pakistani   ❏ Muslim

❏ Digerian/ Multani/Bahawalpuri   ❏ Seraiki/Balouch/Pashtun/Sindhi/Punjabi

❏ Deobandi/Brailvi/Ahlehadith/Shia/Jamat-i-Islami

Tick in the box that best reflects your degree of agreement or disagreement with each statement. This is not a test at all and there is no right or wrong answer.

(A) Questions on the Aims and Purposes of Education

1=strongly disagree, 2= Agree, 3= neither agree nor disagree, 4= Disagree,   5= strongly agree.

#	Please tick the best option for the following statements	Strongly disagree	disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

21.	A key aim of education is to prepare students for work and employment.					
22.	Education should promote economic equality and social progress.					
23.	A key aim of education is individual freedom and choice in life.					
24.	A key aim of education is to prepare students to take their place in Pakistani society.					
25.	A key aim of education is to increase awareness and appreciation of the world beyond Pakistan.					
26.	Education should promote enterprise and economic development.					
27.	A key aim of education is to initiate students into the knowledge and truth of Islam.					
28.	A key aim of education is to promote understanding of, and respect for, other faiths and cultures in Pakistan.					
29.	Education should encourage greater understanding between men and women.					
30	Education should encourage greater equality between men and women.					
31	Schools should respect the wishes of families in teaching about religion.					
32	Schools should respect the wishes of families in all aspects of a student's education.					
33	Schools should promote the shared values of Pakistani society.					
34	Schools should promote the shared values of Pakistani society even if this conflicts with the wishes of parents.					
35	Students should be encouraged to question the institutions of Pakistani society.					
36	Students should be encouraged to debate social and religious questions in schools.					
37	Students should be enabled to participate in the decisions made about them in schools.					
38	Students should be consulted on what is studied in the school curriculum.					
39	Students should be prepared in school for their roles in family life.					

(B) Questions on gender Inequality

40	Equal rights should be given to men and women as in Western countries.					
41	It is desirable that equal opportunities should be given to both men and women to become head of state.					
42	Women should work shoulder to shoulder with men in all spheres of life.					
43	Women should be confined to domestic responsibilities.					

44	The presence of women in Pak army is a progressive development.					
45	A fixed quota of jobs for women across a range of occupations is a positive step on the part of government.					

(C) Questions on the Status of Non-Muslims in Pakistani Society

46	Equal rights should be accorded to *Ahmedis* in all jobs.					
47	Equal rights should be accorded to Pakistani Hindus in all jobs.					
48	Equal rights should be accorded to Pakistani Christians in all jobs.					
49	*Ahmedis* should have right to perform their religious practices freely.					
50	*Ahmedis* should have right to occupy key positions in Pakistan without any discrimination.					
51	*Ahmedis* should have right to propagate their religion freely.					
52	The constitutional clause that says that the highest officials of the state must be Muslims is justifiable.					
53	Every Pakistani whether Muslim or non-Muslim must read Islamic Studies as a compulsory subject.					
54	There should be no compulsion on private schools to teach Islamic Studies to their students.					
55	All non-Muslims in Pakistan should have the right to celebrate their religious festivals freely.					
56	As Pakistan is an Islamic country, so all the restrictions on non-Muslims are justified.					

(D) Questions on Sectarianism

57	I get along well with people from different sects.					
58	I think a person should be elected on the basis of his personal character instead of his sectarian affiliation.					
59	I don't make friends with people who are from different sects.					
60	Inter-marriages among different sects are acceptable.					

61	I have no problem in offering my prayer in a mosque of different sect.					
62	I have no problem in offering my congregational prayer behind an *Imam* from different sect.					
63	If the head of the state/government belongs to different sect, it makes me to feel that I and people from my sect are going to be marginalised.					
64	Every Muslim must have right to celebrate his/her religious festival freely.					
65	I think that the word 'sect' should be removed from all governmental documentations requiring personal information.					
66	All political parties divided on sectarian lines should be banned.					
67	I think there should be different schools for students belonging to different sects.					
68	I didn't have any problem with attending the funeral prayer of a person from different sect.					
69	I didn't have any problem in marrying a girl from different sect.					
70	I didn't have any problem with female from my family getting married with a man from other sect.					

(E) Questions on Islamist Militancy

71	Pakistan should resolve the Kashmir question by force.					
72	Pakistan should resolve the Kashmir question by supporting *Jihadi* groups against Indian army.					
73	Pakistan should resolve Kashmir issue by peaceful means only.					
74	Suicide attacks are *Ja'aiz* (approved) in Islam.					
75	Suicide bombers are *Shaheed* (martyrs).					
76	Talibans fighting against Pakistani army are *mujahideen* (holy warriors).					
77	Talibans fighting against Western forces and Karzai government are *mujahideen* (holy warriors).					
78	America and its allies are at war with Islam.					
79	America and its allies are at war with international terrorism.					
80	Talibans fighting against Pak army are terrorists.					
81	Talibans fighting against Pak army are *gumrah* (misled).					
82	Army operations in Swat and FATA are against fellow Muslims.					
83	Army operations in Swat and FATA are against extremists.					

84	Military personnel killed during the operations are *Shaheed* (martyrs).					
85	Islamic militants killed during the operations are *Shaheed* (martyrs).					
86	9/11 attack was a justifiable act.					
87	9/11 attack was an unjustifiable terrorist activity.					

(F) Questions on Internal-External Locus of Control

88	Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck.					
89	No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you.					
90	I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.					
91	Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying is really useless.					
92	Becoming a success is a matter of hard work; luck has little or nothing to do with it.					
93	It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyway.					
94	Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability; luck has little to do with it.					
95	As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can neither understand nor control.					
96	It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my life.					
97	Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction my life is taking.					

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The University of Glasgow, charity number SC004401

PROJECT TITLE: An investigation into the association between forms of schooling and students' religious beliefs in Pakistan.

Would you help me by taking part in a research study that I am undertaking as part of my PhD degree at the University of Glasgow, United Kingdom. Before you decide whether you want to participate, it is important that you to understand why this research is being done and what it will involve. Please take your time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish so. Ask, if there is anything unclear or if you would like more information. Take your time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.

The study aims to explore associations between different types of education and the beliefs of students. In order to collect data for my research, I would like you to fill in a questionnaire by ticking boxes to show your opinions. It will take about 45 minutes to complete. You have been selected for this study because you are a student in one of the schools I have chosen to represent one of the three main educational systems in Pakistan.

The study is confidential and I will not reveal your identity to anyone. I have asked you to fill out your name on a strip on the front of the questionnaire. I would like this information so that I can select some students to talk to in more depth on a later occasion. You don't have to complete this information, but if you do, the strip containing your name will be detached from the questionnaire and the torn off slips will be kept in locked cabinets safely. The data and torn off slips carrying participants names will be destroyed once research results have been obtained.

If you have any questions about the project, please contact myself, Muhammad Arslan Raheem on phone: 00447529481547 or e-mail: m.raheem.1@research.gla.ac.uk If you have any other concerns regarding the conduct of the research project before commencing, during, or after the completion of the project, you are invited to contact the Faculty of Education Ethics Officer Dr. Georgina Wardle, via email: g.wardle@educ.gla.ac.uk

If you decide to participate, please fill in the consent form which is attached with this letter. Irrespective of your decision of being part of this study, thank you for devoting some time to reading the information provided, and considering its contents.

Yours sincerely

Muhammad Arslan Raheem.

This information sheet is yours to keep.

University of Glasgow | Faculty of Education

Consent Form for Interviewee

PROJECT TITLE: An investigation into the association between forms of schooling and students' religious beliefs in Pakistan.

Name of Researcher: Muhammad Arslan Raheem

(1) I confirm that I have read and understood the Plain Language Statement for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.

(2) I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason.

(3) As a student, I understand that my participation in this study will not have any effect on my examination or grades.

(4) I understand that my name and other data will not be revealed to anybody other than the researcher. I also understand that my anonymity will be protected in any publications arising from the research.

(5) I agree to take part in the above study.

Name of Participant	*Date*	*Signature*

Researcher	*Date*	*Signature*

Appendix-4

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Hi, Thank you for agreeing to be part of my research project on association between certain form of schooling systems and students' religious and social beliefs. The approximare time of Interview will be 25 minutes. There are no right or wrong answers as it is not a test. You are allowed to say anything you wish to say. This interview will be recorded but it is assured that whatever you say will be dealt with confidentially.

Interview Questions

Aim of Education:

What do you think to be appropriate aims of education system?

Equal Rights for Men and Women:

What are your views about the equality of men and women in our society?

Status of Non-Muslims in Pakistani Society:

What are your views about the status of non-Muslims in Pakistan?

Sectarian Differences:

How do you see the issue of sectarianism in Pakistan?

Islamic Militancy:

What do you consider be the most appropriate way to resolve the issue of Kashmir with India?

What are your views about Taliban fighting against Pak army in Swat and Tribal Areas?

What do you say about suicide attacks?

What do you say about the incidents like 9/11?

What do you say about armed jihad?

Thanks…

Dars-e-Nizami Curriculum of Madrassas (books and dates of publication under major categories of curriculum):

General Books

Title of Book	Author	Publication date
Am-Mofassal	Jarullah Zamukhshry	1143
AI-Kafia	Jamaluddin Hajib	1248
Sharh AI Fawaid AI Ziaeya	Nooruddin AI Jami	1492
AI Khulasa	Jamaluddin AI Tafi	686
AI Shfia	Jamaluddin AI Hajib	1248

Rhetoric		
Takhes AI Miftah	Shamsuddin AI Qazvini	1338
AI Mukhtsar, W. AI Mutawal	Saduddin Taftazani	1390

Exegesis of the Koran		
Jalalain	Jalaluddin AI Mahalli	1442
	Jalaluddin AI Syuti	1505
Mudarik AI Tanzi!	Hafizuddin AI Nasfi	1310
Anwar AI Tazi!	Umen AI Bazavi	1266

Principles of Hadith		
Nukhbat Al Fiqar	Shahabuddin Al Asqlani	1448

Hadith		
AI Mwatta	Imam Malik	812
AI Jame AI Sahih	Imam Ismail AI Bukhari	870
AI Jame AI Sahih	Imam AI Muslim AI Qusheri	680
Sun an Ibn-E-Maja	Muhammad AI Qazvini	886
Sunan Abi Dawood	Sulaiman AI Sajistani	886
AI Jame AI Sahih	Mohammad Esa AI Tirmazi	892
AI Sunan AI Sughra	Shaib AI Sanai	915
Sharh Maanil Aasar	Mohammad AI Tahavi	933

Mishkat Al Masabih	Mohammad Bin Khatib Al Umeri	1336

Theology

Aquaid Al Nasfi	Najmuddin	1433
Sharh Aquaid	Taftazani	1487
Al Mwaqif	Qazi Azad Al Din	1384
Sharh Al Mawaqif	Ali Al Jurjani	1413
Al Hashia Al Zahidia	Mirza Mohammd	1689

Jurisprudence

Al Husami	Hassamuddin	1246
Al Manar Vl Anwar	Abu Al Barkat Al Nasfi	1310
Sharh Noor Vl Anwar	Mulla Jeven	1717
Al Tanqih Ma *Sharh Tozih*	Ubaiduddin Masood	1344
Vsul Al Shashi	Nazamuddin Al Shashi	939
Muslim Al Sbut	Muhibbullah Al Baharvi	1776

Law (Fiqh)

Mukhtasar Al Qadori	Mohammad Al Qadori	1036
Al Bidaia Ma'sharh Al Hidaya	Ali Al Marghinani	1196
Kanzudquaiq	Abu Al Barqat Al Nasfi	1310
Al Wiquaya	Mahboob Al Mahboobi	1274
Munya Al Musalli	Sariduddin Al Kashghari	1274
Tanveer Al Absar	Shamsuddin	1595
Sharh Al Durrul Mukhtar	Alauddin	1677
Noor Ul Izah	Hassan Al Wafai	1658
Al Siraji	Sirajuddin	1264

Dialectics (Usul-E-Jadal)

Al Sharifia Ma'sharh Rashidah	Muslafa Al Jhonfozi	1672
Arabic Prose (NasarArbi)	–	–
Mqamat Al Badih	Badi Ul Zaman Al Hamdani	1007
Maqamat Al Hariri	Ali Al Hariri	1122
Al Nafhatularab	Ahmad Al Sharwani	848

Arabic Poetry (Arbi Nazam)

Al Mualiqat Alsabh	Jimarurewaya	772
Al Hamasah	Abu Taam Al Tai	845
Dewan Al Mutnabi	Ahmad Hussain Al Kindi	1452

Logic (Mantiqu)

Al Shamsia	Najmuddin Al Qazvini	1099
Al Qutbia	Qulbuddin Al Razi	1364
Al Tahzib	Al Taftazani	1487
Sharh Mulla Hassan	Mulla Hassan	1784
Hidaitul Hikmat	Asiruddin	1261
Al Hikmat UJ Baigha	–	–

Astrology (Elmul Haiat)

AI Mulakhas FiI Haiat	Mahmood AI Khwarzami	1245
Sharh AI Qazi	Moosa AI Mahmood AI Rohi	1436
Tashrih AI Aflak	Bhauddin AI Amli	1620
AI Sharh AI Tasrih	Lutfullah AI Muhandi	1732

Arithmetic (Hisab Aur Hindsa)

Khulasa Fil Hisab	Sahauddin AI Ami	1620
Tahreer Aqlidus	Nasiruddin AI Tosi	1273

Appendix 6

Yearly Curriculum of a Madrassa

Year 1	Biography of the Prophet *(Seerat)*, Conjugation-Grammar (*Sarf*), Syntax *(Nahv),* Arabic Literature, Calligraphy, Chant illation *(Tajvid).*
Year 2	Second Year Conjugation-Grammar (*Sarf*) , Syntax *(Nahv),* Arabic Literature, Jurisprudence *(Fiqa)*, Logic, Calligraphy *(Khush-navisi),* Chant illation, *(Tajvid).*
Year 3	Koranic Exegesis, Jurisprudence: *(Fiqh)*, Syntax *(Nahv),* Arabic Literature, *Hadith,* Logic, Islamic Brotherhood, Chant illation: *(Tajvid),* External study (Tareekh Millat and Khilafat-e-Rashida- these are Indian Islamic movements).
Year 4	Koranic Exegesis, Jurisprudence *(Fiqh)*, Principles of Jurisprudence, Rhetoric, Hadith, Logic, History, Chant illation, Modern Sciences (sciences of cities of Arabia, Geography of the Arab Peninsula and other Islamic countries).
Year 5	Koranic Exegesis, Jurisprudence, Principles of Jurisprudence, Rhetoric, Beliefs *(Aqa'id),* Logic, Arabic Literature, Chant illation, External study (History of Indian Kings).
Year 6	Interpretation of the Koran, Jurisprudence, Principles of Interpretation & Jurisprudence, Arabic Literature, Philosophy, Chant illation, Study of Prophet's traditions.
Year 7	Sayings of the Prophet, Jurisprudence, Belief (Aqa'ed), Responsibility (Fra'iz), Chant illation, External Study (Urdu texts).
Year 8	Ten books by various authors focusing on the sayings of the Prophet.