McLachlan, Ross Deans (2015) *Syntax, spaces and story : discourse modes and cognitive grammar.* MPhil(R) thesis.

# Syntax, Spaces, and Story:
# Discourse Modes and Cognitive Grammar

*Ross Deans McLachlan*



**UNIVERSITY**
*of*
**GLASGOW**

*Thesis submitted to the University of Glasgow
for the degree of Master of Philosophy
in English Language*

*September 2014*

*12 University Gardens
University of Glasgow
G12 8QQ*

*Supervisors:
Dr Marc G. Alexander
Dr Wendy Anderson*

# Abstract

The existence of text types in discourse is a topic often debated by text linguists. Generally speaking, existing models concerning these notion units of language are explicitly functional or formalist in their theoretical basis. While most of these approaches to text types are valuable in their own right, the tendency is to view text types as discrete structural units of discourse. In this way, very little attention has been paid to the way in which these structural groupings interact with one another at the level of discourse. The richest of these models is to be found in Carlota Smith's *Modes of Discourse.* However, while the conclusions drawn by Smith are far-reaching and applicable, her work finds its foundations in the explicitly formalist approach to discourse comprehension known as Discourse Representation Theory.

This thesis wishes to argue that this reliance on DRT greatly hinders the potential of Smith's discourse typology. As such, the goal of this work is to re-appropriate Smith's work within a model more in line with current research in the field of Cognitive Linguistics. In particular this thesis seeks to present a syncretic model based around three key theoretical frameworks – Cognitive Grammar, Mental Spaces Theory, and Relevance Theory. In doing so, we find that text types can be defined from a strictly cognitive perspective, and that doing so greatly increases the value of a structural typology of discourse above the level of the sentence. While this thesis is primarily geared towards a high-level synthesis of theoretical frameworks, some short worked examples serve as heuristic aids indicative of the potential applications of the theory being developed.

# Table of Contents

# Introduction

The notion of text types in written discourse is not one which commonly finds much favour in linguistic circles. This thesis argues that the existence of text types in discourse can be justified by way of existing linguistic theories of language use at the level of the sentence. Moreover, the primary thrust of this work concerns the following statement: it is not just that such a typology can be constructed from basic principles but that the text types so defined are best viewed as *functionally salient structures at the level of discourse.*

In this way, the focus of this thesis is mainly upon theoretical development of a text type framework from the bottom up. Of course, in order to do this, we must first answer – what exactly is meant by *text type*? As with theoretical linguistics more generally, this answer lacks one clear and definitive answer. Arguably, text types find their earliest formulation in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and the distinction between *logos*, *ethos*, and *pathos* which (very) roughly correlate to three aspects of persuasion, respectively: truth and logic; the ethical dimension; and emotional effect. As with much of Aristotle's thought, this tripartite formulation of rhetorical text types continues to find near direct correlates in more contemporary thought. In particular, these ideas were reintroduced to the study of English in Alexander Bain's (1866/1898) *English Composition and Rhetoric*. In this, Bain sets out four rhetorical modes of discourse – *Narrative, Description, Exposition,* and *Argumentation.* This grouping represents the structural grouping of text types most commonly considered standard. Rhetorical models such as these place emphasis on language as used as a persuasive tool.

A number of differing methodologies have been employed by those who approach text types from a primarily functional or narratological standpoint. Consider, for example, Kinneavy (1971) and Longacre (1983), who rely heavily on complex notions of temporal arrangement in texts. Advancing these notions and echoing Genette (1980), Monika Fludernik's (1996) *Towards a Natural Narratology* represents a great leap forward in the structural study of narrative. In keeping with a pluralistic, interdisciplinary ethos Fludernik notes that her framework is not the final say in the matter of text types, opening the possibility for the revision of categories 'in any way that linguists find corresponds with their material' (2000: 281).

Text types have received varying degrees of attention by text linguists. In these cases, the notion of types has tended to be viewed in a rather minimal way: representing a means of

categorizing and describing structural features present in texts. A particularly relevant early attempt at such organization is to be found in the work of Egon Werlich's (1976) Text Grammar of English. Werlich's analysis derives from a qualitative analysis of various linguistic properties, with text types categorized relative to a fairly small subset of essentially grammatical features. Werlich concludes on this basis that the five basic text types are *Narration*, *Report, Description, Information, Argumentation,*.

The fine grained focus on the linguistic detail of text types is a great strength of Werlich's approach; it is perhaps a pity that his work has not received more mainstream recognition. However, his research ethos finds adoption and continuation in the detailed quantitative analyses of Douglas Biber (1988, 1989). Biber's corpus linguistic approach seeks to categorize text types on account of statistical clustering of lexicogrammatical features from existing discourse. However, Werlich's commitment to qualitative analysis married with fine grain linguistic detail finds an extended correlate in Carlota Smith's (2003) *Modes of Discourse*. The basic structural configuration of Smith's modes derives from properties which are distinctly grammatical rather than lexical. Specifically, her approach rests on the inherent properties of tense and aspect; of the various situation types introduced into the discourse universe; the phenomenon of subjectivity; and surface structure presentation, a notion borrowed from Prague School Functionalism. Based on the intertwining of these properties, Smith notes five basic modes: *Narrative, Report, Description, Information,* and *Argumentation*. Discourse modes are not to be confused with genre as such, where genre is understood as a socially and stylistically marked mode of discourse (as in Steen 2002; cf also Fairclough 2003). Thus, I consider some typical instances of genre to be literary narratives, newspaper articles, blog posts, academic writing, popular science, and so on. Despite the potentially confusing nomenclature, the categories can be distinguished by observing that genres are higher-level structures, whereas discourse modes are smaller structural units of organization. Thus, discourse generally and genres specifically are 'built up' from discourse modes.

Smith's theory of the modes of discourse has an intuitive appeal. With its particular focus on the lexicogrammatical properties of a text, this method allows for a detailed qualitative analysis to be carried out to a considerable degree of depth on a purely linguistic basis. By emphasising the crucial importance of tense, aspect, and situation types in the structuring and comprehension of text, Smith's discourse modes fits alongside other text-driven approaches such as Text World Theory (Werth 1999; Gavins 2006); Contextual Frame Theory (Emmott 1997); and even those narratological approaches mentioned above such as Genette (1980) and Fludernik (1996). In this

way, Smith's theory emphasises the role of discourse modes in the processing of text and meaning construction. Thus, discourse modes can be said to go beyond a strictly structural typology, moving towards a conceptualization of discourse modes as functional text types. As such, I consider Smith's discourse modes to represent a particularly fruitful approach to text types worthy of further attention.

However, it was noted above that Smith's discourse modes are on their way to being functional text types. As it stands, I do not consider this goal to have been fully realized. Smith's work derives a great deal of its theoretical impetus from the work of Hans Kamp and Uwe Reyle's (1993) *From Discourse to Logic*, which develops a modeltheoretic approach to meaning construction in discourse. This framework, known as *Discourse Representation Theory*, represents a formidable achievement in the field of formal semantics and logic. Kamp and Reyle's arguments are lucid and well-defined. However, I wish to argue that DRT is less capable at handling the full phenomenon of textual engagement, particularly with regards to literary text.. To do this, this thesis will consider the theoretical bases of DRT and Smith's theory. In doing so, I aim to show a number of weaknesses inherent in Smith's approach while remaining sympathetic to Smith's motivations. As such, I will adopt and adapt Smith's methodology by approaching discourse modes within a different linguistic model.

Chapter 1 aims to set out the key theoretical features of both Discourse Representation Theory and Carlota Smith's modes of discourse. This short introductory section functions as a critical analysis of both DRT and Smith's work at the root level of axiomatic principles. As we shall see, Smith's basic theory takes a fairly strict formal approach to textual meaning construction. While this approach has its positives, I argue that taking DRT as a basis actually greatly hinders the descriptive and explanatory potential of Smith's discourse modes. However, as noted above, Smith's conclusions and general motivation are worth taking on board and reconsidering. Therefore, what is required is a new understanding of those grammatical features integral to a theory of discourse modes, such as tense and aspect.

In Chapter 2, we lay the theoretical groundwork of Cognitive Grammar, as developed by Ronald Langacker (1987, 1991, 1999, 2002, 2008), which functions as scaffolding for the rest of the theory being constructed in this thesis. Starting from axiomatic features of human cognition, Chapter 2 shows how basic grammatical classes, such as those invoked by Smith, evolve quite naturally and develop into much more complex linguistic structures. Primarily, the focus on this

chapter is on reinterpreting the grammatical categories of tense and aspect. Moreover, we find that by its very nature Cognitive Grammar accounts for a much wider range of linguistic phenomena than afforded by DRT or Smith's explicitly generative approach. Therefore, Chapter 2 shows how much of Smith's key ideas – text progression, situation type, subjectivity, and surface structure presentation – can be accounted for by Cognitive Grammar in one way or another. Rather than focusing on a direct like-for-like comparison, the emphasis is heavily on the theoretical elaboration of Cognitive Grammar from the bottom up, showing how tense and aspect develop out of more basic cognitive properties. As we shall see at the end of Chapter 2, a Cognitive Grammar approach to discourse modes in this way does not square exactly with the model espoused by Smith. The conclusion of Chapter 2 proposes a possible method of reconciliation.

While Cognitive Grammar accounts for a wide range of phenomena at the syntactic level, we find upon closer inspection that it is relatively weak in its account of meaning construction at the level of discourse, above the clause. For a theory of text linguistics involving textual organization at the level of the passage, this is clearly problematic. Chapter 3 addresses this issue head on and proposes a resolution. In doing so, we are introduced to Mental Spaces Theory and Conceptual Blending, as understood through the work of Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner (2002). The basic thrust of this chapter concerns the nature of discourse modes as defined and their possible characterization as distinct mental spaces invoked in the unfolding of discourse. In this way, we find that discourse modes actually represent the potential to be properly understood as functional units of discourse. However, Fauconnier and Turner's theories are not without their flaws, the most prominent of which concerns the nature of contextual information and pragmatic inference. Chapter 3 therefore includes a detailed elaboration of Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) Relevance Theory proposed as a strong contender for a meta-contextual framework by which we may constrain the theoretical claims of conceptual blending. What we find is that a discourse typology so defined has the potential for much wider applications than previously envisioned, such as in Cognitive Stylistic analysis of literary narratives.

Chapter 4 presents a number of very brief case studies presenting such potential applications. In the opening sections, emphasis is placed on aligning the theory outlined in this thesis with existing research, particularly in the field of cognitive stylistics. In doing so, we find that a number of the key claims of this thesis find a number of existing correlates, thereby bolstering the theoretical claims outlined in the preceding chapters. The chapter concludes on a number of short, simple case studies featuring instances of rather idealized types. The texts used in the section are

John Steinbeck's *Of Mice and Men; Everything is Green*, an example of flash fiction by David Foster Wallace; and *1984* by George Orwell. Similarly, in Chapters 2 and 3, I illustrate a number of key points by reference to examples from literary texts. These example are taken from Ernest Hemingway's *The Old Man and The Sea*; the more recent *Americanah* by Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie; *Wide Sargasso Sea* by Jean Rhys; and finally, *Gravity's Rainbow* by Thomas Pynchon. It should be noted from the offset that there is no overaching theme which unites these texts and necessitates their inclusion. Instead, they have been chosen for much more pragmatic reasons.. Firstly, I have attempted to give a broad range of texts from various time periods, with writers of different sex and race, and with often wildly varying ideological concerns and aesthetic principles. Secondly, much more prosaically, the specific examples have been chosen primarily because they are particularly clear examples of the point they are used to illustrate.

These examples are meant as heuristic aids rather than novel instances of literary criticism. The focus of this thesis is on developing a text type theory of discourse constructions with a solidly cognitive theoretical approach to language and meaning construction. Rather than attempting to produce new readings, this chapter aims to show how a discourse mode perspective based on close linguistic analysis can be used to bolster, promote, and often justify existing interpretations (Carter and Stockwell 2008: 291-302). This thesis is therefore primarily a theoretical contribution to the field of stylistics.

In his *Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction,* Langacker writes:

> Starting from single words, like nouns and verbs, we have worked our way up to successively larger expressions: to multiword constructions, to full nominals and clauses, and finally to complex sentences. The next level is **discourse**, where any number of sentences (or fragments thereof) are connected to form a coherent linguistic production – be it a conversation, a monolog (e.g. a speech), or a written text. Although discourse is often considered a separate topic, requiring different methods and descriptive constructs, the contrast with lower levels is at most a matter of degree. Discourse is in fact the very basis for language structure and is thus essential for understanding of grammar.
>
> 2008: 257

I wish to argue that discourse modes can be properly thought of as viable constructs within CG framework and that they have a number of potential descriptive and explanatory applications. In achieving this goal, we find that ultimately that Carlota Smith's initial characterization of the modes of discourse has been left somewhat far back on the horizon. However, the initial springboard for

the rest of this thesis is to be found in her work. It will therefore be beneficial to consider Smith's principal ideas.

# 1
# Discourse and Representation:
# A Preliminary Text Typology

## *0        Introduction*

The aim of this chapter is to present an overview of the theory of discourse modes as most fully outlined in Smith (2003). To begin, it will be necessary to introduce the framework of *Discourse Representation Theory*, developed by Kamp and Reyle (1993). Following this, we see how the DRT framework is advanced by Smith to include a class of five discrete d*iscourse modes*, each of which possesses a unique set of lexicogrammatical properties. The nature of the five modes is then discussed with reference to four key ideas – s*ituation type, text progression, subjectivity,* and *surface structure presentation.* By engaging critically at a theoretical level, the emphasis in this chapter is on illustrating potential theoretical and descriptive problems present in both Kamp and Reyle's and Smith's analyses. However, I hope to show how a number of Smith's insights into the organization of discourse are worth further elaboration, particularly from a cognitive-functional perspective.

## *1        Discourse Representation Theory*

Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) as developed by Kamp and Reyle (1993)[1] is a theory of formal semantics which falls within the model-theoretic paradigm dominant in the latter half of the 20th century. Formulated in response to the theories of Richard Montague (Thomason 1974; Dowty et al 1981), Kamp and Reyle sought to provide a solution to two seemingly intractable problems within such approaches. Firstly, they looked to describe such puzzling problems as 'donkey sentences' discussed by the late Peter Geach (1962). Such sentences can be illustrated by (1) below; in (2), we see a more elaborate instance of the same type.

> 1)                Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.

> 2)                If a farmer owns some donkey, he beats it.

As Kamp and Reyle observe, this is problematic for the formal semanticist. If we consider (2), we

---

1    This framework has subsequently been revised by Kamp, Genabith and Reyle (2011). However, for the sake of this discussion, it will suffice to focus only on 'classical' DRT.

find that 'the anaphoric connection we perceive between the indefinite noun phrase **some donkey** and the pronoun **it** may seem to conflict with the existential meaning of the word **some**' (1993: 1). Similarly, we find there are issues relating to tense and aspect. Consider examples from French in 3) and 4):


3)          J'ai vécu en France

4)          Je vivais en France.


Here we see the difference between the *passé composé[2]* and the *imparfait.* However, within a formal semantic framework, 'to articulate precisely what the difference between these tenses is has turned out to be surprisingly difficult' (1993: 1). Kamp and Reyle therefore posit an added dimension of linguistic meaning hitherto ignored by formal approaches:

> This is the dimension of *interpretation:* the meanings of linguistic expressions are – or so we would  want to claim – inextricably linked with the interpretive canons that must be brought into play by  anyone  who wants to grasp their sense. DRT tries to remedy the one-sidedness of the model-theoretic paradigm by combining its referential perspective with this second interpretation-oriented view-point.
>
> Kamp and Reyle 1993: 1


Put simply, then, DRT posits the existence of semantic representations known as d*iscourse representation structures* (DRS). These DRSs are *interpretations* of sentences and texts achieved by the application of certain rules to the input sentences. These DRS construction rules are in the form of a Generalised Phrase Structure Grammar, the application of which extends beyond the particular sentence being interpreted but at the existing DRS into which that sentence is to be incorporated. Once the DRS is complete, we are then in a position to analyse the DRS from a truth-conditional perspective using predicate logic, thereby providing a complete theory of logic and semantics (1993: 24). To illustrate this more clearly, we may consider a simple account of the way DRT deals with pronominal anaphora.


### 1.1    *DRT in Practice – Pronominal Anaphora*


Take the following pair of sentences, in the form of a short 'discourse':

---

2    In Kamp and Reyle's original discussion of this point, the example used is of the *passé simple*. However, this has since become largely antiquated and replaced by the *passé composé (*Smith 2009: 14; Vinay and Darbelnet 1995: 135)

1) Pynchon wrote *Gravity's Rainbow*. It confuses me.

What is of interest to logicians and formal semanticists is the natural way in which the anaphoric 'it' in the second sentence is taken as referring to '*Gravity's Rainbow*' in the first. As we noted above, DRT posits that this relationship is a result of an abstract semantic representation, defined above as the DRS.

As an illustrative aid, the DRS can be viewed schematically in the way shown in 2):

2)

| Discourse referents |
|---|
| Conditions |

Cann et al (2009) elaborate upon the distinction between the two distinct sections of the DRS as shown above. They note that the two tiers reflect the fact that DRS formally comprise the following:

a.      a set of variables, $x, y, z, \ldots$ , taken as representations of the entities mentioned in the discourse; these variables are called *discourse referents* and such a set of variables in a DRS is called its *universe;*

b.      *conditions*, inserted on the lower part of a DRS, are predications on the discourse referents denoting properties or relations tat must be satisfied by the entities corresponding to those discourse referents in the model relative to which the DRS will be evaluated for truth

Cann et al 2009: 152

To return to example 1), the first sentence of the mini-discourse introduces two new referents to the discourse universe – 'Pynchon' and '*Gravity's Rainbow*'. Each noun phrase here represents a unique entity being introduced. Following the definition of discourse referents above, each noun phrase is therefore assigned a unique variable. Thus, if we assign 'Pynchon' the variable **x**, we find that the first sentence in 1) can be represented as condition 3) below:

3)                    [x wrote *Gravity's Rainbow*]

In 3), the square brackets are used in place more elaborate structures such as syntactic tree diagrams. Syntactic structures such as these will not be included in this expository chapter (see, however, Kamp and Reyle 1993: 59-139).

With 'Pynchon' now assigned the variable **x**, the DRS conditions must also be updated to reflect this information. DRT represents this information in the following way:

4)                    Pynchon(**x)**

Here, 4) should be understood as stating that the variable **x** stands in place of the individual entity denoted by the noun phrase, in this case the proper name 'Pynchon'. Updating the schematic DRS given in 2) with this new information, we end up with 5):

5)

| **x** |
|:---:|
| Pynchon(**x**) |
| [ **x** wrote *Gravity's Rainbow*] |

By a similar logic, we assign the discourse referent '*Gravity's Rainbow'* the variable **y**. Introducing this variable to the discourse universe and adding in the DRS conditions, we arrive at 6):

6)

| **x  y** |
|:---:|
| Pynchon(**x)** |
| Gravity's Rainbow(**y**) |
| [**x** wrote **y**] |

12

The diagram in 6) therefore represents the DRS for first sentence of 1) – 'Pynchon wrote *Gravity's Rainbow*'.

The discourse referents and conditions introduced in the above example were introduced into a DRS which was initially empty. However, the second sentence is to be added to the newly developed DRS in 6). However, the method for doing so remains almost identical. Firstly, we see that the second sentence introduces two entities to the universe of discourse. The first of these is the anaphoric pronoun 'It'. Unlike noun phrases which introduce new referents to the universe of discourse, pronouns must instead refer to an existing referent within the DRS. Based purely on syntactic considerations of 'It' as a third-person, singular neuter pronoun, the 'It' in this case therefore must refer to '*Gravity's Rainbow'* from the preceding sentence. Contrast this with the slightly different mini-discourse given in 7):

7)         Pynchon wrote *Gravity's Rainbow.* He confuses me.

Here, the masculine gender would indicate that the anaphoric 'He' of the second sentence must refer to 'Pynchon'. This discussion overlooks instances where 'He' would be ambiguous, sch as in 'Pynchon wrote to Hemingway. He was angry'. In this case, additional assumptions are required to construct the DRS conditions (Cann et al 2009: 153).

Having established 'It' as referring to '*Gravity's Rainbow'*, we thus assign 'It' a variable, in this case **z.** Having established It($z$) as a discourse referent, we the add the DRS conditions to represent this. As noted above, 'It' refers to '*Gravity's Rainbow*', which we may state as 8)

8)         It = *Gravity's Rainbow*

Or, substituting variables (Kamp and Reyle: 68):

9)         **z = y**

Finally, the second sentence of 1) introduces a second referent to the universe of discourse, 'me'. In this case, 'me' does not function as anaphoric and so is assigned a unique variable. Introducing these variables and conditions into the DRS results finally in the completed DRS shown in 10):

10)

$$
\boxed{
\begin{array}{c}
\mathbf{x\ y\ z\ u} \\
\text{Pynchon}(\mathbf{x}) \\
\text{Gravity's Rainbow}(\mathbf{y}) \\
[\mathbf{x}\ \text{wrote}\ \mathbf{y}] \\
\mathbf{z = y} \\
\text{Me}(\mathbf{u}) \\
\mathbf{z}\ \text{confuses}\ \mathbf{u}
\end{array}
}
$$

This represents the final DRS of the two sentences in 1). What should be apparent at this stage is that the DRS conditions of 10) translate very simply and naturally into truth-conditional statements of predicate logic – a point which Kamp and Reyle take pains to expand through the rest of their work (Kamp and Reyle 1993: 73-74; cf also Cann et al 2009: 169-206).

This represents a real strength of DRT which must readily be acknowledged. Moreover, with some adjustments and expansion such a framework readily allows us to deal with issues surrounding tense and aspect by introducing the discourse referents of time (**t**) and event (**e**). In this manner, for example, sentence 11) can be represented as the DRS shown in 12):

11)         Pynchon wrote *Gravity's Rainbow* in 1973.

12)

$$
\boxed{
\begin{array}{c}
\mathbf{e\ x\ y\ t} \\
\text{Pynchon}(\mathbf{x}) \\
\textit{Gravity's Rainbow}(\mathbf{y}) \\
1972(\mathbf{t}) \\
\text{write}(\mathbf{e},\ \mathbf{x},\ \mathbf{y}) \\
\text{Time}\ (\mathbf{e},\ \mathbf{t})
\end{array}
}
$$

By unpacking the formal content of the final condition in the DRS above, Kamp and Reyle incorporates a complex system of temporal relationships which are used to incorporate the temporal

features of tense and aspect into the formal semantic, model-theoretic representation (1993: 483-689). In this respect, DRT has been fruitfully applied and developed beyond the original formulation to represent a formal approach to discourse comprehension with a solid claim for legitimacy (van Eijck and Kamp 2011). Similarly, DRT is a dynamic theory which seeks to unite truth-conditional and representationalist approaches to meaning construction (Kamp 1981; Cann et al 2009: 150-151). Moreover, DRT's formalist ethos has applications outside of linguistics. For example, Ganesalingam (2013) uses DRT in a unique and novel way to describe the language of mathematics.

However, this formal framework of temporal relations is extremely complex. As more discourse referents and conditions are introduced into the DRS, there is the risk that DRT quickly becomes an unwieldy model for practical use by the analyst. Furthermore, as I will argue going forward, DRT's commitment to formal, truth-conditional semantics, and generative grammar potentially hinders its descriptive applicability, particularly as a model of textual analysis. In Chapter 2, I present a competing model of grammatical analysis in the form of Langacker's Cognitive Grammar. Then, in Chapter 3, I introduce Fauconnier and Turner's Mental Spaces and Conceptual Integration Theory. By the end of those chapters, I intend to show how these cognitive-functional theories taken together can describe and explain structures and relations as DRT in perhaps a less formal but more intuitive way.

However, the basic principles of DRT do act as the foundations for Smith's original theory of discourse modes. The following section seeks to explain a number of Smith's key ideas, before attempting to illustrate how this too can be bolstered by a cognitive-functional perspective.

## *2      From DRT to Modes of Discourse*

As noted in the previous section, Kamp and Reyle's DRT introduces the discourse referents of time and event into their formal model of meaning construction. Smith's theory of the modes of discourse follows quite naturally from this. However, before considering this, it is worth considering Smith's motivation for developing her theory in the first place.

Smith is critical of existing methods of discourse analysis, noting:

It has sometimes seemed, though, that nothing at all is conveyed by linguistic forms while everything is due to pragmatics or lexical content […] I propose a local level of discourse, the Discourse Mode, which

has linguistic properties and discourse meaning. I posit five modes: Narrative, Report, Descriptive, Information, and Argument.

<div align="right">2003: 1</div>

Observing that a practical issue for the linguist engaged in the study of discourse is to find an appropriate level of analysis, Smith argues that the most fruitful level is that of the *passage*. The reasons for this assertion are that, firstly, certain different *kinds* of passage are intuitively recognised as making different contributions to the text; secondly, crucially, there are 'characteristic clusters of linguistics features' (2003: 7). These features are what define each of the individual discourse modes. Therefore, Smith writes:

> Passages of Discourse Modes are linguistic units, since they have recognizable linguistic features. They also have rhetorical significance. In fact, the Discourse Modes are text units both linguistically and notionally. They function as a bridge between the sentences of a text and the more abstract structures that it evokes.

<div align="right">2003: 9</div>

We observe, then, that discourse modes represent a kind of structural organization above the sentence at the level of the passage. Moreover, the different properties of these modes of discourse imply that they have different 'meanings' within the extended discourse. Smith begins with some definitional work before presenting the wider theoretical framework into which she attempts to incorporate her analysis. What follows is a brief summary of the key features of her theory.

## *2.1    Key ideas*

The nature of the five modes is discussed with reference to four key ideas, namely *situation type, text progression, subjectivity,* and *surface structure presentation.* In discussing *situation types,* Smith notes that 'the sentences of a text introduce situations into the universe of discourse' (2003:12). Situation types in this case can therefore been seen as directly related to the notion of the referent **e** introduced by DRT. The main types as categorized by Smith are events, states, general statives and abstract entities. Of the latter two types, general statives are expressed by generic and generalizing sentences which 'invoke patterns of events and states rather than particular situations', whereas abstract entities refer to facts and propositions.

<div align="center">16</div>

*Text progression* deals with the way in which these situation types are related to each other; to the time of the event described; or to a time which is 'internal' to the text. As with situation types, there is a direct relationship with Smith's notion of the temporal dimension of texts and with DRT's use of the time referent **t**. What sets Smith's theory apart from DRT is in her analysis of the specific clustering of lexicogrammatical features in observable ways. Those clusters of temporal grammatical features and situations which are most easily identifiable are what Smith refers to as the *modes* of discourse.

In contrast to the strictly formal account which serves as its foundation, Smith's analysis takes a more qualitative approach. In the Narrative mode there is an advancement of 'narrative time'; in the Report mode, situations are anchored to Speech time and progresses 'forward and backward from that time' (2003:13). Therefore, these first two modes are *dynamic temporal modes* (2003:25), where the text progresses as time advances. In opposition to this, the remaining three modes are *atemporal*. In the Description mode, for example, 'time is static and the text progresses in spatial terms through the scene described' (2003:13). Moreover, the Information and Argument modes are 'atemporal and progress by a metaphoric path through the domain of the text' (ibid). Thus, we may summarise the nature of each of the discourse modes as given below:

The Narrative Mode

Situations: primarily specific Events and States

Temporality: dynamic, located in time

Progression: advancement in narrative time

The Report Mode

Situations: primarily Events, States, General Statives

Temporality: dynamic, located in time

Progression: advancement anchored to Speech Time

The Description Mode

Situations: primarily Events and States, and ongoing Events

Temporality: static, located in time

Progression: spatial advancement through the scene or object

The Information Mode

Situations: primarily General Statives

Temporality: atemporal

Progression: metaphorical motion through the text domain

The Argument Mode

Situations: primarily Facts and Propositions, General Statives
Temporality: atemporal
Progression: metaphorical motion through the text domain

2003:20

Broadly speaking, then, what differentiates the discourse modes is the arrangement of situations types and text progression. In particular, it is argued that 'temporality in the larger sense is the key to the discourse modes' (2003:22). Within Smith's system, I believe this description to be theoretically and descriptively inadequate (cf Unger 2004). What is clear, though, is that Smith wishes to show that our seemingly intuitive understanding of discourse modes is a result of the various entities and processes introduced into the discourse and their interaction, specifically with regards to the grammatical encoding of temporal information through tense and aspect.

*Subjectivity* describes the way in which the text 'conveys access to mind – either the mind of the writer or a text participant – through communication, mental state, perception and perspective' (2003:13). As such, subjective forms may appear in any of the Discourse Modes. Similarly, *surface structure presentation* is a feature of all text passages, looking to describe the way that 'presentational features organize the information in a sentence, usually into topic and comment, focus and background' (2003:13). Smith draws heavily upon traditional approaches of Prague School functional linguistics (Vachek 1964; Steiner 1982; Luelsdorff 1994) I do not consider this additional level of analysis to be necessary. In the following chapter, I aim to show how each of the key features of the discourse modes – situation types, text progression, subjectivity, and surface structure presentation – can be explained in more general cognitive terms. Moreover, by introducing the concept of 'focal adjustments' in language, the model introduced in the following chapter will show how the key features Smith highlights are in fact much more closely related that allowed for within the DRT approach Smith adopts.

## 3      *Criticisms and potential*

It was noted above that a number of features of Smith's analysis of discourse modes are theoretically and descriptively inadequate. Furthermore, I believe there are fundamental methodological issues

raised by her work: for example, how valid is the apparently *ad hoc* adoption of traditional Prague School notions of communicative dynamism into the framework of formal semantics? What is the ontological status of DRT? Moreover, there are a number of seemingly arbitrary definitions which need to be critically discussed. Consider the following excerpt:

> Time and space are pervasive in human experience and in language they are essential in understanding the Discourse Modes. Text progression depends on both domains. The temporal modes progress with changes in time and space, while the atemporal modes progress with metaphorical changes of location through the text domain.
>
> 2003: 92

How are we to understand these 'metaphorical changes of location'? How are we to understand temporal progression? What is the relationship between time and space? These questions receive no attention in Smith's work and thus constitute a weakness in the theory. However, to employ a rather trite idiom, there is a danger here of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. There are a number of positives to be found in Smith's work, such as a novel approach to tense interpretation (2003:92-104). Further, I believe she is right to say that there is something intuitively plausible in the idea of discourse modes, though such a statement must be subjected to increased scrutiny. Moreover, by limiting herself to surface syntactic structure, Smith presents a theory which provides a rigorous commitment to examining the role and function of linguistic forms in the construction and interpretation of discourse.

It must be conceded that Smith openly states that her work is concerned with the construction rules which generate a representation as output and that 'it does not try to account for the actual mental process involved in understanding a text' (2003: 56). This, of course, is the prerogative of a truth-conditional approach to meaning construction such as DRT. However, the rise of the cognitive enterprise means that it is beneficial to re-evaluate such an approach in light of a growing evidence which shows it to be psychologically implausible. Consider, for example, ongoing research into grounded (or embodied) cognition (consider as illustrative Barsalou 1999, 2003, 2008; Pecher and Zwann 2005). Moreover, an increasing body of work seeks to understand the psychological aspects of discourse comprehension in an empirically sound way (Sanford and Emmott 2012).

However, if shorn of any underlying theoretical commitments, there remains in Smith's

19

argument a certain plausibility and appeal, in that there does seem to be something qualitatively different about each of the discourse modes. As an as-yet untested hypothesis, I would propose that a reader presented with 'pure' forms of each mode would intuitively note a difference between them. There does seem to exist a difference in texture between, say, a short narrative, a newspaper report, a picturesque description from a travel guide, an encyclopaedia entry, and a well-written academic paper. Moreover, I believe that Smith argues convincingly in favour of the definitive role played by tense and aspect in establishing this qualitative difference.

Whatever the pros and cons of its DRT foundations and its Prague School inheritance, Smith's discourse modes are a credible attempt to construct a functional discourse typology based on qualitative linguistic analysis. Therefore, rather than characterizing any shortcomings as insurmountable flaws, I believe it is more beneficial to incorporate Smith's model into a wider framework which can provide the answers to these criticisms, giving a renewed vitality to the concept of discourse modes. In the following chapter, I propose a theory which may act as the foundation for this new framework.

# 2

# Cognitive Grammar:

# Theoretical Prerequisites

## *0        Introduction*

Carlota Smith's theory of discourse modes is predicated on the nature of tense and aspect, and the way that these syntactic categories interact at the discourse level. Smith's understanding of these categories develops from a specific focus on generative linguistics (Smith 1991, 2009). While a number of key ideas hold up to scrutiny, this thesis wishes to argue that her reliance on generative linguistic theory actually hinders the explanatory potential of her idiosyncratic discourse typology.

With excessive attention paid to the formal characteristics of syntactic structure, generative linguistics has historically and rather famously overlooked the nature of semantics and pragmatics. While this may arguably be productive at the level of artificially constructed sentences, it proves to be problematic at the level of discourse. As we saw in Chapter 1, Kamp and Reyle's Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) is a direct response to this perceived lack; intending, as it does, to provide a methodology for the generative linguist to move 'from discourse to logic'. By introducing mental representations in the form of Discourse Representation Structures, DRT is an invaluable framework for understanding meaning construction within a model-theoretic semantics. Similarly, its contribution to work in tense logic and so-called 'donkey anaphora' are illuminating and thought provoking. Moreover, it serves as the basis for Smith's discourse modes, which are, of course, the real topic at hand.

However, the fundamental theoretical issues surrounding the ontological status of generative syntax and formal semantics still remain, and are not worth re-examining at present. However, Nist (1965) serves as an early and still relevant critique of generative grammar as a theoretical model, one mirrored in many ways by Pullum (2007). The debate between Johnson and Lappin (1997, 2000a, 2000b, 2001) Reuland (2000), and Roberts (2000) is characteristic of the ongoing problems surrounding the field. recent grammatical theory has tended to criticize or downplay the generative 'rule-based' model of linguistic knowledge, instead focusing on constructional patterns present in language (cf Goldberg 1995, 2006; Croft 2001; Evans 2009; Taylor 2014).

Instead, then, this chapter intends to reinterpret Smith's key theoretical foundations within the framework of Cognitive Grammar. It begins with a short introduction to the most noteworthy difference between Cognitive Grammar (CG) and the generative approach favoured by Smith and DRT. Following this, attention turns specifically to the 'temporal' syntactic categories of tense, aspect, and modality.

Taken together, these categories form what CG refers to as the *clausal grounding system* of English. As we go on, we shall see that the most important property of this system is that grounding is not only temporal in nature – that is, serving merely to ground things and processes in time – but also *epistemic*. This refocusing has some rather interesting and somewhat unintentional effects on the typology of Smith's discourse modes. However, as we shall see, CG theory broadly coincides with GG in a number of ways. Traditional grammatical categories such as nouns and verbs – as well as syntactic functions such as tense, aspect, and agent/patient roles – are taken as axiomatic. Importantly, though, rather than syntactic structure per se, the focus is primarily on conceptual content. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is essentially a process of reinterpretation as opposed to total reconstruction. As the focus of this thesis is primarily on the analysis of literary texts, I have attempted where possible to illustrate certain key points with examples from literary texts. All excerpt and passages used to demonstrate these points have been chosen as being particularly clear examples of the issues at hand. I have further attempted to employ as broad a range of texts as possible, so as not to have too narrow a focus on one particular period or literary movement.

## 1    *Why Cognitive Grammar?*

From its inception, CG has been intended to counteract the paradigmatic thread of generative grammar, from which the likes of DRT and Smith's discourse modes ultimately derive. In each of its successive formulations (cf Chomsky 1965, 1970, 1982 1995), the focus of GG has been on rigorous formalization of language as a self-contained and well-defined formal system. As such, it finds supporting structures in such fields as formal logic and computer programming. In all instances, generative grammars are designed to account for the seemingly infinite creative capacity of the human mind for the production and comprehension of language (Chomsky 1967). In its most basic terms, a generative grammar is 'simply a system of rules that in some explicit and well-defined way assigns structural descriptions to sentences' (Chomsky 1965: 8).

By contrast, CG as conceived by Langacker (1987, 1991, 2008) seeks to challenge the core

assumptions of generative linguistics. At root, the argument can be reduced to the following claim:

> Since language (for reasons developed later) is neither self-contained nor well-defined, a complete formal description (a 'generative grammar' in the classical sense) is held to be impossible in principle […] Unless and until we have a clear conceptual understanding of what's going on, there is no point in seeking mathematical precision.

<div align="right">2008: 10</div>

In contrast to the formalism of generative grammars, CG is explicitly *functional* in its approach. Moreover, it stands in contrast to other functional theories of language, such as Halliday's Systemic-Functional Linguistics (cf Halliday 2002, 2004; Halliday and Matthiessen 1999). While CG shares a lot of common assumptions with Halliday's approach (cf Lemmens 1998: 13), it differs in one key respect. To whit, '[CG] is based on the insight that grammar is the product of human cognition. Therefore we must first understand the principles of cognition that determine grammar' (Radden and Dirven 2007:1). Radden and Dirven further note the following core assumptions of CG:

– The grammar of a language is part of **human cognition** and interacts with other cognitive faculties, especially with perception, attention, and memory.

– The grammar of a language reflects and presents **generalisations** about phenomena in the world as its speakers experience them.

– Forms of grammar are, like lexical items, **meaningful** and never 'empty' or meaningless, as often assumed in purely structural models of grammar.

– The grammar of a language represents the whole of a native speaker's **knowledge** of both the lexical categories and the grammatical structures of her language.

– The grammar of a language is **usage-based** in that it provides speakers with a variety of structural options to present their view of a given scene.

<div align="right">Adapted from Radden and Dirven 2007: XI-XII</div>

Claims such as these continue to receive support from ongoing research in cognitive psychology (see as representative, Barsalou 1999, 2012; Pecher and Zwaan, 2005; Lebois et al 2014). Similarly, the Cognitive Semantics of Talmy (2001) attempts to show how the nature of semantics lies in the

link between *perception* and *conception.* Indeed, the assumptions listed above tend to be taken as central to most – arguably all – work in Cognitive Linguistics more generally (cf: Janssen and Redeker 1999; Croft and Cruse 2004; Evans et al 2007; Geeraerts and Cuyckens 2010).

It is not the goal of the present work to prove the truth or falsity of any of these assumptions. Rather, it is to show how – taking these assumptions as basic – CG can be beneficially married to a text typology such as Smith's. As such, the most important of these assumptions for this thesis are numbers 3) and 5). If we take as given that forms of grammar are inherently meaningful and that speakers select particular structural configurations to present their understanding of a given scene, the descriptive possibilities of Smith's discourse modes suddenly comes into sharp focus. Rather than being simply local clusters of specific lexicogrammatical features at the level of the passage as Smith concludes, CG potentially allows us to think of discourse modes as *functional units of discourse above the sentence.* Not only does this strengthen Smith's original typology, it also re-introduces the concept of text-types to cognitive stylistics and cognitively orientated discourse analysis (Herman 2002, 263-300, Östman 2005). This higher-level, functional application in the field of cognitive stylistics forms the basis of a later chapter. For now, we must outline the theoretical prerequisites necessary to re-evaluate Smith's original notion of discourse modes.

## 2      *Focal Adjustments*

Fundamental to Langacker's conception of Cognitive Grammar is the nature of *designation*, 'characterized by the elevation of some entity to a special level of prominence within a predication' (1987: 183). He goes on to elaborate, stating:

> Linguistic predications are either nominal or relational. A nominal predication designates a thing, and functions as the semantic pole of a noun. Relational predications divide into two basic groups, depending on whether they designate a process or an atemporal relation.
>
> 1987: 214

While each of these groups designates different syntactic categories, the crucial point to note is that they derive from the same basic cognitive capacities. As such, it is beneficial to study these cognitive abilities in a little more detail – but not only in order to understand aspectual classes and temporal relations, as Smith does (cf Smith 1991). Instead, the assertion here is that the relationship between nominal and relational predications proves to be greatly more illuminating than Smith's

approach. The reason for this, quite simply put, is that CG's core assumptions concern the notion of *construal.* In defining the notion of construal, Langacker writes:

> Our present concern is with a broader phenomenon of which variable designation is only a special case: the ability of speakers to construe the same basic situation in many different ways, i.e. to structure it by means of alternate images.
>
> <div align="right">1987: 117</div>

The nature of the relationship between visual perception and mental imagery continues to have a complicated and rather turbulent history in psychological circles (cf Pylyshyn 1973, 2002, 2003; Kosslyn 1994, 2005). The present work makes no claims towards contributing to the resolution of these issues. As Langacker somewhat evasively puts it:

> It is hard to resist the visual metaphor, where content is likened to a scene and construal to a particular way of viewing it. Importantly, CG does **not** claim that all meanings are based on space or visual perception, but the visual metaphor does suggest a way to classify the many facets of construal, if only for expository purposes.
>
> <div align="right">2008: 55</div>

Elaborating upon this visual metaphor, Langacker labels these facets of construal as ***focal adjustments[3]***. Broadly understood in a tripartite structure, the first such focal adjustment is that of ***selection***.

## 2.1    *Selection*

Understood simply, selection determines those parts of a scene which are being directly attended to. This selection is made relative to certain cognitive ***domains*** invoked by the predication. To illustrate this, consider the meaning of 'little' in the following extracts from *The Old Man and The Sea* by Ernest Hemingway:

1)            I must remember to eat the tuna before he spoils in order to keep strong. Remember, no matter

---

3    In the sections that follow, the emphasis is on the classification of focal adjustments as outlined in Langacker's earlier work (cf Langacker 1987a). However, it will be worth noting that Langacker has somewhat revised this taxonomy in more recent publications (cf 2008). I consider this reorganisation more for clarity of exposition and pedagogy, rather than a substantial theoretical improvement on the original classification. Moreover, it is also relevant to highlight the greatly expanded taxony of Croft and Cruse (2004: 46).

how little you want to, that you must eat him in the morning. Remember, he said to himself.

1980[1952]: 48

2)      It was difficult in the dark and once the fish made a surge that pulled him down on his face and made a cut below his eye. The blood ran down his cheek a little way.

1980[1952]: 52

3)      It would be better to gut the dolphin a little later to save the blood in the meat, he thought. I can do that a little later and lash the oars to make a drag at the same time

1980[1952]: 73

In 1), 'little' refers to the lack of will on the protagonist's part; in 2), it is a measure of distance; in 3), it is used to indicate a period of time. While 'little' retains a schematic characterization indicating a small quantity of some unit, its usage in each domain has a differing conceptual content. It follows from this that central to the concept of selection is the *scope* of a linguistic predication, that is to say 'those portions of a scene that it specifically includes' (Langacker 1987: 118). We call the scope of a predication the *base*; the maximally prominent entity designated by this predication, we call its *profile*. This basic arrangement of base and profile is the most fundamental theoretical construct required to describe the semantic content of linguistic predications in CG:

> The semantic value of an expression resides in neither the base nor the profile alone, but only in their combination; it derives from the designation of a specific entity identified and characterized by its position within a larger configuration.

1987: 183

The archetypal example to illustrate this idea is that of CIRCLE compared to ARC, as illustrated in Figure 1 below. While the concepts share the same base, they differ only in the entity profiled within this base. However, the conception of ARC as an arc, 'emerges only when the two are properly construed in relation to one another' (ibid). This amounts to little more than the tautological statement that we can only understand the concept of ARC – i.e. a close line segment of the circumference of a circle – by knowing what a circle is in the first place. However, the purpose of selection as a focal adjustment is primarily related to the distribution of attention and so 'what we

**Figure 1** <span style="float:right">1987: 184</span>

actually see depends on how closely we examine it, what we choose to look at, which elements we pay most attention to, and where we view it from' (Langacker 2008: 55).

So, we may say that the conceptual base of an expression represents the ***maximal scope*** of a viewing arrangement. Within this base, we find that a certain portion of the content is 'onstage' (2008: 66), that is to say it serves as the active locus for viewing attention. Finally, then, the profile represents the ***focus*** of attention within the ***immediate scope***. This can be clarified if we consider Langacker's example of ELBOW, as opposed to HAND. For each concept, the maximal and immediate scopes are identical: BODY in the former case and ARM in the latter. Where they differ is in profiling different substructures of this immediate scope against the maximal scope of the conceptual base. This can be represented visually as Figure 2 below.

This schematicity and the movement from the abstract to the specific is at the root of CG. This point shall be returned to presently in a little more detail. Moving on for the moment, we come to the next broadly defined category of focal adjustments, those that operate in the construal of ***perspective***.



**Figure 2** <span style="float:right">*2008: 64*</span>

27

## 2.2    *Perspective*

This focus on the construal of perspective is one of the main reasons why CG is so amenable to application to textual analysis and why it greatly improves the descriptive content of Smith's discourse modes. These are points to which I shall return at the end of this chapter. Firstly, we consider the structuring property of ***figure/ground alignment***.

### 2.2.1   *Figure/Ground*

In its simplest terms, figure/ground alignment refers to the way in which an entity (the figure) is perceived to 'stand-out' against the rest of a scene (the ground) and is taken to be a fundamental feature of conceptual organization. This recognition of basicness as a cognitive function is not unique to CG but to cognitive linguistics more generally. Consider for example Talmy's cognitive semantics and existing CL work on perspective and point of view (Talmy 2001: 311-344; Verhagen, 2007; Zlatev 2007). Talmy's work has a narrower focus on the spatial domain. Croft and Cruse summarize Talmy's main insights, presenting a detailed list of properties of those objects which tend towards figure/ground construal:

| 3) | *Figure* | *Ground* |
|---|---|---|
| | location less known | location more known |
| | smaller | larger |
| | more mobile | more stationary |
| | structurally simpler | structurally more complex |
| | more salient | more backgrounded |
| | more recently in awareness | earlier on scene/in memory |

Croft and Cruse 2004: 56

Adding to this, Langacker observes that figure/ground organization is not domain specific. Consider, in visual and auditory domains, the now rather anachronistic example of Pong:

> […] while tracking a moving dot (the visual figure) across the screen, I can perfectly well perceive an occasional beep that stands out as a figure in the auditory domain against the background of silence.

1987: 122

Similarly, as we have seen with the discussion of maximal and immediate scope in Section 2.1, hierarchical arrangement of figure/ground organization occurs within single domains as the base/profile distinction. As we go on, we shall continue to see how figure/ground alignment comes to define a large part of the grammatical and conceptual apparatus employed at all levels of language use – from the everyday, through to the literary. However, at this juncture, it is worth noting one important point, namely that the viewing arrangement need not necessarily coincide the profiled entity. That is to say, that the 'figure and focus of attention are sometime dissociable even within a single domain' (1987: 122). Sitting in a darkened room, there is no possibility for figure/ground alignment due to lack of visual contrast. However, there continues to be a focus of visual attention, even if there is nothing to be seen.

> If someone now turns on a flashlight, so that I see a dot of light at the periphery of my visual field, this dot stands out as the figure against the otherwise dark field even though (by definition) it is not at the center of my visual attention. Probably I will quickly shift my gaze to the flashlight, bringing the figure into the focus of visual attention, but the need for this shift indicates that the figure and focus of attention do not inherently coincide.
>
> 1987: 22

Therefore, in this case, figure/ground alignment serves to foreground and background certain inputs that are involved in the construal of attentional focus. In this way, figure/ground alignment can be said to constitute the next category of focal adjustments, that of *viewpoint*.

### 2.2.2  *Viewpoint*

Viewpoint phenomena in language have an extensive literature, deriving from numerous different theoretical backgrounds (Simpson 1993; Oakley 2009 Dancygier and Sweetser 2012). Generally speaking, viewpoint concerns one's relationship to the scene being perceived/conceived[4]. As such, viewpoint is further analysable as the two sub-structures of *vantage point* and *orientation*. Defined broadly, vantage point refers to the position from which a scene is viewed; whereas orientation pertains to the alignment with respect to the axes of the visual field (Langacker 1987: 123). Viewpoint is thus an integral part of construal, indicating the speaker's situation with respect to the scene being construed. Langacker further writes:

---

4    Langacker (2008: 261) note that 'under the inclusive definition adopted in CG, **conception** subsumes **perception** as a special case'. Talmy (2001) designates both processes taken together as **ception.**

We are accustomed to seeing most of the objects in our experience from a canonical viewpoint and in a canonical alignment with respect to their surroundings […] Specifications of vantage point and orientation are central to the meaning of many relational expressions.

<div align="right">1987: 123</div>

Expanding on this point, we find that the construal of a particular vantage point imposes a structural figure/ground alignment which, as we saw above, is that of foreground and background. Consider sentences a) and b).

     a)     The car is in front of the house.

     b)     The car is behind the house.

Each expression invokes roughly the same underlying conceptual content, with a subject (the car) defined in relation to its object (the house). What differs is construal of viewpoint. Whereas in a), the viewpoint is 'such that the subject occupies the path (perceptual or other) that leads from the viewer's vantage point to the object' (1987: 124), this arrangement is reversed in b). Thus, in a), the car is foregrounded and the house backgrounded; in b), the opposite is true. Examples 4 a) and b) are illustrative of the claim that the same objective situation 'can be observed and described from any number of different vantage points, resulting in many different construals which may have overt consequences' (2008: 75).

As with section 2.2.1, it is worth noting that 'the notions of figure, foreground, and focus of attention do not always coincide, despite the naturalness of their association' (1987: 125). Consider the following , again taken from *The Old Man and The Sea:*

     4)     The clouds over the land now rose like mountains and the coast was only a long green line with the gray blue hills behind it. The water was a dark blue now, so dark that it was almost purple.

<div align="right">1980[1952]: 53</div>

In this case, we may say that the sea itself acts as the foreground for the viewing arrangement. The focus, on the other hand, would be the land visible in the distance – the coast and the mountains. Finally, the particular figure of the viewing arrangement would be the clouds, acting as a trajector moving over the terrestrial landmark. The potential uses of this ability to disassociate aspects of the viewing arrangement will become more apparent in the discussion of tense and aspect in section 3.2

<div align="center">30</div>

## 2.2.3   *Deixis*

With regards to viewpoint, Langacker notes that in the canonical viewpoint arrangement, the vantage point and orientation refer to the actual location of speaker and hearer. This means that a communicative event is necessarily grounded relative to its participants and to its setting in time and place. This point forms the basis of another key focal adjustment, namely that of **deixis**. Deictic expressions are those expressions which contain some reference to this shared context. Examples of deictic expressions include *I* and *You*, which are each used to designate participants in a communicative act. Others such as *Here* and *Now*, refer to the time and the place of the communicative act in question. As an important corollary to this, though, Langacker notes the following:

> The pronouns *I* and *you*, for example, have no constant real-world reference. Depending on who is talking to whom, they refer to different individuals in the context of different usage events. They do, however, have constant reference in relation to the speech situation referring to the speaker and the addressee, whoever might assume these roles on a given occasion.

> 2008: 277

As such, we note that deixis serves to *epistemically ground referents relative to a specific discourse context.* As with viewpoint's relation to aspect, it shall become clear that this definition of deixis is key to a complete understanding of tense in CG. It also proves to be one of the most fruitful reasons for attempting to unite CG with Smith's model of discourse modes.

This having been said, Langacker's CG conception of deixis is conspicuously weak with regards to its understanding of epistemic grounding in a discourse context, particularly in contrast to a more robust approach such as DRT. To combat this, Langacker introduces the notion of **current discourse space**:

> As discourse unfolds, at each step the current expression is constructed and interpreted against the background of those that have gone before […] The CDS is a mental space comprising everything presumed to be shared by the speaker and hearer as the basis for discourse at a given moment.

> 2008: 59

31

This concept of a CDS is in all meaningful ways identical to the concept of Discourse Representation Structures. As such, certain issues arise similar to those raised in the previous chapter. While it is superficially acceptable to say that a CDS comprises everything presumed to be shared by participants, this still does not answer a fundamental question – *what can be presumed to be shared and why?* Viewed this way, the issue becomes one of inference and implication and is therefore 'indisputably pragmatic' in nature (2008: 40).

This criticism is not to challenge the role of deixis in perspective, particularly in relation to the category of tense. Instead, what is contested is that Langacker's understanding of discourse contextual grounding is under-developed. This is a key concern which this thesis seeks to address. For now, we note the basic properties of deixis as a focal adjustment and proceed to the related area of **subjectivity/objectivity**.

### 2.2.4   *Subjectivity/Objectivity*

The notion of subjectivity/objectivity constitutes the final method of construal broadly understood as related to perspective. Central to this notion is the self-referential character of language. From what we have already seen, perspective hinges on the roles of viewing arrangement, orientation, figure/ground alignment and so forth. However, what has been excluded from the discussion so far is the fact that the source of a communicative act is understood by way of the relationship between herself and the scene so construed. In a written text, this source may be complex: it could be be the author themselves, or that of a narrator, or a combination of narrating voices (Holquist 1982). Therefore, we may say that a *construal relationship* 'holds between the conceptualizer of a linguistic predication and the conceptualization that constitutes this predication' (1987: 128). Every linguistic expression therefore constitutes a particular construal relationship. From section 2.2.3, any expression which is epistemically grounded is deictic. For a construal relationship to be properly deictic, 'an expression must involve some facet of the ground not only as conceptualizer, but also as an object of conceptualization' (1987: 129).   This balance is at the root of the nature of subjectivity/objectivity. Figure 4 below represents the optimal viewing arrangement.

**Figure 4**                                                                    1987: 129

Langacker has a useful analogy from the domain of visual perception:

> Imagine yourself in the audience of a theater, watching a gripping play. All your attention is directed at the stage, and is focused more specifically on the actor presently speaking. Being totally absorbed in the play, you have hardly any awareness of yourself or your own immediate circumstances. This viewing arrangement therefore maximizes the asymmetry between the viewer and what is viewed...
>
> 2008: 77

In this example, we may say that the viewing subject – the audience member – construes herself with *maximal subjectivity* and the actor onstage with *maximal objectivity*. Extending the theatre analogy, we may therefore say that the viewer's role is *offstage* as opposed to the focus of attention which is *onstage*. This arrangement is illustrated by diagram a) in Figure 4 above. Diagram b), on the other hand, illustrates a situation whereby a deictic element is put onstage as the focus of attention – perhaps where the writer/speaker is discussing herself and situations concerning her. Thus, b) represents an *egocentric viewing arrangement*; an arrangement 'presupposed by deictic expressions that designate either a ground element or a relation in which a ground element functions as a major participant' (1987: 131).

As an illustrative example, consider excerpt 5) below from *Wide Sargasso Sea* by Jean Rhys:

5)      The road climbed upward. On one side the wall of green, on the other a steep drop to the ravine below. We pulled up and looked at the hills, the mountains, and the blue-green sea. There was a soft warm wind  blowing but I understood why the porter had called it a wild place. Not only wild but menacing. Those hills would close in on you.

2000[1962]: 58

In this example, we are first introduced to the scene by way of objective construal, in that it is

described from a wholly external viewpoint. The introduction of 'We' introduces the individuals of the party before finally introducing the fully subjectified egocentric perspective of 'I understood', with the narrator affording us access to her thoughts and value judgements. This is amplified by the deictic grounding in 'Those hills would close in on you'. In this example then, the movement from objectivity to subjectivity mirrors the process of scanning discussed in 3.2 below.

What should be clear from this example is that subjectivity/objectivity are perhaps more accurately thought of as points on a cline rather than acting as a binary opposition. In a purely binary system, it would be unclear how we could account for the intermediary stage of construal of the 'We' in example 5) above, where 'We' is perhaps neither strictly objective or subjecively construed. This point is addressed by Verhagen (2005, 2007). Building on research by Tomasello into primate cognition and human language (Tomasello 1999; Tomasello et al 2005), Verhagen notes:

> Language use, which is dependent on mutually shared knowledge of conventions, is crucially dependent on recognizing others like oneself. So […] Langacker's initial way of construing the construal relationship may be treated as a special case of a somewhat more complex configuration that incorporates the insight that language use comprises more than one subject of conceptualization.
>
> 2007: 60

We may say, then, Langacker's original conception of a canonical construal relationship fundamentally overlooks the fact that the ground consists of both a communicator and addressee. So, to augment the original conception, the ground may be understood as essentially being 'common ground' shared by interlocutors. Langacker's later work on CG incorporates this into his analysis of subjectivity/objectivity construal, as in Figure 5 below. Diagram a) represents the new canonical viewing arrangement with both Speaker (S) and Hearer (H) constituting the subjects on conception or the ground (G). Dashed arrows represent the focus of attention with regards to maximal and immediate scope. In b), we find the construal relationship for an expression which invokes some reference to G and is therefore in some way *grounded*. Finally, example c) illustrates this further with reference to the pronoun *you.* The final diagram d) is a simplification of c).

It is important to note both the similarities and differences to be found between the notion of subjectivity in Smith's theory of discourse modes and the notion of subjectivity as understood by CG. Both theories allow for and indeed place stress on the phenomenon of subjectivity in language

**Figure 5**                                                        2008:261

use. However, I believe the benefit of Langacker's approach is to be found in its minimalistic theoretic approach (Taylor 2014: 122). In this respect, rather than representing an additional layer of analysis, as in Smith's model, the construal of subjectivity/objectivity in CG is closely related to features such as tense and aspect, as shall be shown in the following sections. Similarly, as observed above, viewpoint and deixis necessarily entail a degree of subjectivity in their construal, allowing for the notion of subjectivity to become a more diffuse and pervasive phenomenon in textual analysis. I believe this minimalism allows for a more integrated approach than DRT or Smith's model, while simultaneously reducing the complexity of the structures and models proposed.

However, while CG's extended understanding of the ground as a shared instance of communication acknowledges the role of 'common ground' in construal, it once more has very little to say on *what can be said to constitute common ground for interpretation and why*. Particularly with regards to the ongoing construction of the current discourse space, what information is taken into account and why? Answering this question forms the basis of the following chapter – we are still some way off from this. Instead, the following sections briefly consider the last of the construal operations proposed by CG, before turning attention to their role in the semantics of tense and aspect.

## 2.3    *Abstraction*

Briefly considered, the final focal adjustment of ***abstraction*** concerns the fact that we are capable of conceptualising situations at varying levels of schematicity. By schematicity, we may take it to mean those properties which pertain to specificity or lack thereof or, to put it differently, 'the level of precision and detail at which a situation is characterized' (2008: 55). We may say that schematic representations are instantiated by more specific ones, in a process of *elaboration*. So, we have the

35

examples illustrated below, detailing a hierarchy of conventionally recognized *types;* in b), an elaborative hierarchy of successively more detailed, novel expressions.[5]

    a)      thing → object → tool → hammer → claw hammer

    b)      Something happened → A person perceived a rodent → A girl saw a porcupine → An alert little girl wearing glasses caught a brief glimpse of a ferocious porcupine with sharp quills.

<div align="right">2008: 56</div>

While the notion of abstraction may seem – as it were – rather abstract, we find that the idea of instantiation and elaboration are pivotal in our understanding of the grounding system of English. The reason for this follows from the fundamental CG assertion that basic grammatical classes are semantically definable. Langacker's argument is that the concepts generally considered to be 'basic categories' - such as 'object', 'event', 'location' – are in fact too specific to be valid for all members of the class. As such, basic categories much be sought at a higher degree of specificity (2008: 95-98). At this higher level, we find the two most basic of basic categories – ***things*** and ***relationships***.

## 3     *Things and Relationships*

To understand the connection between things and relationships, we return to the notion of profiling as outlined in Section 2.1. Following Langacker, we may say that profiling is of central importance because

> what determines an expression's grammatical category is not its overall conceptual content, but the nature of its profile in particular. It stands to reason that the profile should have a determining role in categorization, for it is what an expression designates: the profile is the focus of attention within the content evoked.

<div align="right">2008: 98</div>

For example, there are two distinct semantic values for the lexical category of *record*. In the first instance *record* functions as a verb; in the latter, *record* functions as a noun. This is why we may say, somewhat tautologically, that we *record* a *record*. It is important to note, therefore, that the distinction between a thing and relationship depends on which aspect of the conceptualization one chooses to profile. We thus find ourselves back where we started at the beginning of Section 2,

---

5    Arguably, Langacker's elaboration of b) misses out a few steps but it serves as a useful illustrative aid.

having now outlined the basic cognitive capacities employed in linguistic construal.

This conceptual link between things and relationships is of fundamental importance to this thesis as a whole. Throughout the following sections, the reader is asked to bear in mind Smith's original characterisation of discourse modes. In particular, I wish to draw attention to Smith's notion of *temporal progression* and *situation types*. In what follows, I assert that Langacker's CG approach provides a stronger – and much more unified – account of these phenomena than does Smith's. The upshot of which, which will be outlined in the final section of this chapter, is that Smith perhaps goes further than is theoretically justifiable in her taxonomy of discourse modes. We shall see that by minimising these claims, we are actually in a position to strengthen the arguments for the descriptive and explanatory potential of discourse modes. By the end of this chapter, we shall see how the movement from cognitive functions to basic grammatical classes leads quite naturally to structural organization at the level of discourse.

What follows shall first briefly outline the nature of *things* in CG. While not directly relevant to the development of a theory of discourse modes, we shall see that *relationships* can only be understood relative to things. This comprehensive approach to discourse represents, I believe, a great strength of the theory being developed.

## 3.1    *Things*

The basic conceptual schema for a thing derives from the cognitive abilities of ***grouping*** and ***reification***. Grouping derives from factors such as contiguity and similarity (2008: 104). Moreover, this grouping occurs at multiple levels of conceptual organization. Therefore, in Figure 6 below, we may say that a) forms two groups – one with two dots, the other with three. This is a matter of contiguity. However in b) we group the black dots into two groups of three – thus, they are grouped by similarity.

**Figure 6** 2008: 105

Reification occurs when these groups of clustered entities are conceived of as unified, single entities at higher levels of conceptualization. The outcome of this dynamic interaction of grouping and reification is what CG designates as a ***thing***. Langacker proposes that the basic schema for a noun coincides with that of a thing – that is to say, properly defined, a noun profiles a thing. It is worth noting that this claim is not without its detractors. For example, Croft's Radical Construction Grammar (2001) challenges the very notion of a noun as a basic grammatical class. However, the purpose of this thesis is not to critique Langacker's core assumptions in this regard. Instead, we take this definition of a noun as axiomatic and proceed with the work at hand.

Traditionally understood, nouns can be further split into two subclasses – *count* and *mass*. The reader is referred directly to Langacker's work for a detailed exploration of the semantic and grammatical characterizations of count and mass nouns (1991: 13-42). What is pertinent to note at this stage is the following conclusion, illustrated in Figure 7:

> A noun profiles a thing, defined as any product of grouping and reification. In the case of a count noun, this thing is construed as being **bounded within the immediate scope in the domain of instantiation**. The profile of a mass noun is not construed as being bounded in this fashion.
>
> 2008: 132 (emphasis in original)

This distinction between count/mass and bounded/unbounded in nominal predications proves to be a key insight into our understanding of relational phenomena in CG, particularly with regards to aspect. We shall return to this in Section 3.2.1 below. Keeping this in mind, we now turn our attention to the nature of *relationships* in CG.

**Figure 7**                                                                    2008: 13

## 3.2     *Relationships*

Relational predications, like things, can be conceived of at multiple levels of organization by grouping and reification. Where relational expressions differ from things, is by the fact that they have an added temporal dimension. Relationships can therefore be described as being either *temporal* or a*temporal*. In line with Langacker (2008), we refer to this distinction as being either a *process* or a *non-processual* relation; non-processual relations can be further described as being either *simplex* or *complex*.

In all instances of relational expressions, there is an asymmetry between profiled participants. These focal participants are profiled at different levels of prominence. The predominant figure within this relational profile is termed the *trajector* (*tr*); other salient entities in the predications are termed *landmarks* (*lm*) (1987: 217). If we consider the case of non-processual, simplex relationships, we find that the interaction between the trajector and landmark reduces to a 'single configuration fully manifested at a single point in time' (2008; 109). As such, non-processual, simple relationships define *states* or *stative relations*. A number of traditional categories can be characterized in this regard – for example, adjectives, adverbs, and prepositions. The schematic representations of these categories are show in Figure 8 below.

In contrast to these simple non-processual relationships, we may also conceive of relationships which are *complex*, that is to say, relationships built from a number of component relationships. As a corollary to this, complex relationships tend to evolve dynamically through time. Thus, complex relationships define *events*. Langacker gives the example of a ball rolling down a hill:

39

(a) Adjective     (b) Adverb     (c) Preposition

**Figure 8**                           2008: 116

The situation obtaining at any one moment constitutes a simplex relationship: a single configuration in which the ball occupies one particular location. The overall event comprises an indefinite number of such relationships and is therefore complex.

<div align="right">2008: 109</div>

Figure 9 given below illustrates the basic schematic conceptualisation of a ball rolling down a hill. The entire event is characterized as a series of individual states. However, this discrete representation of component states does not accurately reflect the way we actually experience events – we do not conceptualize events as separate successive states but rather as a continuous and unbroken whole which 'unfolds' and develops organically. In Figure 9 above, this continuity is represented by the wedge (>). As with the previous discussion of focal adjustments, Langacker proposes that this continuity of perceptual (and conceptual) experience is a result of a quite ordinary cognitive function, which he terms *scanning*. This notion of scanning relates further to Langacker's proposed distinction between *conceived time* and *processing time*. This distinction is best summarised in Langacker's own words:



**Figure 9**                           2008: 109

[The arrow in Figure 9] represents conceived time (t), time as an **object** of conception. We conceive **of** time whenever we conceptualize an event (which by definition is manifested temporally). Of course, sine conceptualization is a mental activity, it happens **through** time and has its own temporal duration. Time functioning as the **medium** of conception is referred to as processing time.

<p align="right">2008: 110</p>

With this in mind, it is clear that we must differentiate in principle between the time when an event actually occurs and the time of its conception. Of course, this distinction may not always be necessary of relevant. For example if one considers Figure 10 below, we find that conceived time ($T_1$–$T_5$) directly coincides with processing time ($t_1$-$t_5$). While only one state is in focus at any given instance, the whole event is mentally tracked sequentially as it unfolds along the temporal axis. As such, we call this *sequential scanning*. This form of mental scanning is employed whenever we directly observe an event. As Langacker observes:

> If a relationship develops through time, the most natural way of apprehending it is to track it through time in this manner. Hence, sequential scanning is equally applicable whether an event is observed, remembered or imagined.
>
> <p align="right">2008: 111</p>

In contrast to sequential scanning, summary scanning occurs when there is not only one component state in focus at a given moment of processing time. Instead, states are superimposed onto one another and represented as a single gestalt where all constitutive states are active and available for conception simultaneously. The effect is thus similar to a multi-exposure photograph, as opposed to the 'motion picture' effect of sequential scanning. Figure 11 below represents a ball rolling down a hill as an event conceived as a product of summary scanning.



**Figure 10**                                    2008: 110

**Figure 11** 2008: 112

Summary scanning in this way is an important part of textual meaning construction. As a particularly illustrative example, consider the following excerpt from *Americanah* by Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie:

> It surprised Ifemelu, how much she had missed Nsukka itself., the routines of unhurried pace, friends gather in her room until past midnight, the inconsequential gossip told and retold, the stairs climbed slowly up and down as though in a gradual awakening, and each morning whitened by the harmattan.
>
> 2013: 92

In this passage, memories are presented in the form of a list. Individually, these are fairly commonplace memories of daily life and lived experience. However, each of these individual memories combine by way of summary scanning, each adding to the overall construction of meaning. In this case, it is Ifemelu's nostalgia and longing for the minutiae of her past life and experiences, each introduced in excessively fine detail. This list proceeds further, culminating in the following extract:

> The church bazaars would leave the air redolent, smoky from ass cooking. Some nights, the heat lay thick like a towel. Other nights, a sharp cold wind would descend, and Ifemelu would abandon her hostel room and, snuggled next to Obinze on his mattress, listen to the whistling pines howling outside, in a world suddenly fragile and breakable.
>
> 2013: 93

In the end, we are led to infer that the collective memory of these experiences is, in itself, fragile and breakable. Adichie thus exploits a key feature of summary scanning in order to illustrate a certain claim about the persistence of memory and its inherently delicate nature.

Generally speaking, summary scanning is employed in the conception of complex, non-processual events as defined above. Similarly, we define a process as 'a complex relationship which develops through conceive time and is scanned sequentially along this axis' (2008: 112). CG proposes as a basic notion that a *verb profiles a process*; verbs, therefore entail sequential scanning in their semantic categorization. The construal of scanning therefore allows CG to account for some of the less clear aspects of Smith's original theory. For example, in characterizing the temporal features of the Description mode, Smith notes that 'time is static and the text progresses in spatial terms through the scene described' (2003:13). Within her model, this functions as a handy metaphor for describing temporal progression through a static scene. However, it is difficult to justify fully within Smith's theory. The CG phenomenon of scanning goes some way towards explaining this phenomenon in more detail. Moreover, like the other focal adjustments elaborated above, scanning is intimately related and tightly integrated within the CG framework. The principles which result in the construal of viewpoint and subjectivity/objectivity are the same which determine the construal of scanning.

As a final step of theoretical exposition, we shall now briefly elaborate on the nature of verbs in CG before turning our attention to the grounding system of English and how this ties in with the notion of discourse modes.

### 3.2.1  Verbs

In Section 3.1, we saw that the primary distinction between mass and count nouns derives from basic conceptual functions of grouping and reification. CG maintains that this mass/noun distinction holds as being directly applicable to processes as well as to things. Thus, we derive the distinction between **perfective** and **imperfective** verbs – where the former are bounded in time and the latter are not specifically bounded. For things, this bounding can be abstract, depending on the domain of instantiation. However, with verbs, the domain of instantiation is always time. As such, Langacker writes:

> The perfective/imperfective contrast therefore hinges on whether the profiled process is bounded within the immediate temporal scope, and it is bounded if there is some limit to the set of constitutive entities.

> 2008: 152

**Figure 12**                                                                  2008: 153

Figure 12 above depicts this in a schematic way. The important point to note is that in a), the entire profiled process falls within the immediate temporal scope in the domain of instantiation – in this case, time. A) therefore represents a perfective verb. In contrast, the process in b) exists indefinitely for an undefined time in either direction along the temporal axis. Instead, the immediate temporal scope focuses on a specific segment of the process and puts this onstage for focused viewing (2008: 152).

From this basic arrangement of perfective/imperfective verbs, we are in a position to develop conceptual schema for more complex tense relationships. We adopt the 'naive characterisation' (1991: 250) of tenses. That is to say, use of the past tense indicates that the process occurs prior to the time of speaking; the present tense indicates that the instance of the process coincides with the time of speaking (2008: 157). This basic configuration is represented by Figure 13, where the box containing the zigzag line represents the specific speech event.

With this in mind, we are in the position to assign further semantic value to more complex tense arrangements. Upon more detailed inspection, we find that perfective and imperfective verbs can both occur in the past tense and the present tense, though with a certain degree of qualification in the case of present perfectives. Consider the following examples in 6), along with their conceptual schema as shown in Figure 14 below.



**Figure 13**                                                                  2008: 158

44

(a) Past Perfective

MS

IS

t

(b) Present Perfective

MS

IS

t

(c) Past Imperfective

MS

IS

...    ...

t

(d) Present Imperfective

MS

IS

...    ...

t

**Figure 14**                                                                            2008: 158

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| a) | He learned the poem. | [PAST PERFECTIVE] |
| b) | *He learns the poem. | [PRESENT PERFECTIVE] |
| c) | He knew the poem. | [PAST IMPERFECTIVE] |
| d) | He knows the poem. | [PRESENT IMPERFECTIVE] |

2008: 157

Each of these cases holds as unproblematic, with the exception of the present perfective in 6 b). However, this can be easily resolved; contextual information will tend to override any perceived lack of grammaticality. For example, the present perfective occurs with conspicuous regularity in sports commentating, as illustrated by Langacker's example:.

He hits a high fly to left. Jones comes in a few steps... he shades his eyes... he grabs it for the final out.

2008: 159

This usage is indicative of present tense perfective in the default viewing arrangement[6]. A related instance of present tense perfectives can be found in the field of narratology, in the form of the *historic present* and *narrative present* (Fludernik 2003). Fludernik's terminology is distinctly narratological and functions at a level above that of the purely linguistic, as it were. Stylistic concerns such as this are to be addressed more directly in Chapter 4.

---

6    In a special case of this default arrangement, *performatives* are defined as an instance of a present perfective
     process where the event profiled is the speech event itself (2008: 159).

For now, though, we consider those complex tenses derived from tense morphemes in conjunction with present or past participles[7]. These participles are instrumental in the formation of complex tenses and aspectual clauses. Participles have, according to Langacker's CG, a 'substantial impact on the processual base ' (2008: 120) by invoking a certain vantage point. Langacker writes:

> English shows this fairly clearly. The so-called present participle, formed with *-ing*, take an 'internal perspective' on the verbal process. The so-called past participle, derived by *-ed* (and a variety of irregular inflections), adopts a posterior vantage point.
>
> 2008: 120

What we find on the CG account, then, is that tense and aspect in and of themselves afford a certain degree of access to those focal adjustments discussed above.

Consider, for example, the following short excerpt from Thomas Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow:*

> A screaming comes across the sky. It has happened before, but there is nothing to compare it to now.
>
> It is too late. The Evacuation still proceeds, but it's all theatre. There are no lights inside the cars. No light anywhere. Above him lift girders old as an iron queen, and glass somewhere far above that would let the light of day through. But it's night. He's afraid of the way the glass will fall – soon – it will be a spectacle: the fall of the crystal place. But coming down in total blackout, without one glint of light, only great invisible crashing.
>
> Pynchon (2000[1973]: 3)

We find in this passage an example of the historic (narrative) present, as defined above. Stylistically, we may say that this results in an immediacy, similar perhaps to the blow-by-blow sports commentary in Langacker's example. This immediacy is further compounded by nominalization of 'screaming' in the opening line which would otherwise act as a present progressive. Following this, we have the past perfect 'has happened', which promptly shifts forward in time, establishing a new deictic centre in 'there is nothing to compare it to now'. Later in the passage, there is yet another temporal shift forward with 'the glass will fall – soon – it will be a spectacle'. Alongside this, there is an ambiguity in this passage as to role of the narrating voice. There is a potential movement between objective and subjective construal of underspecified

---

7    The formation of these participles follows a similar path as the formation of things and relationships, by way of grouping and reification, scanning, and so forth. In order to avoid repetition and for purposes of exposition, this process is not covered here in detail. However, the reader is referred to Langacker (2008: 119-127) for elaboration.

anaphoric 'him'. Firstly, 'he' is construed as the focus of the viewing arrangement, acting as the landmark of the phrase beginning 'Above him lift girders' and is thus construed objectively. Similarly , though, the introduction of the mental state in 'He's afraid' implies a certain degree of subjective construal. This subjective construal may perhaps lead us to consider the 'future' event of the glass ceiling crashing down as more of an anxious premonition on the part of a subjectively construed individual, rather than an objectively construed state of affairs However, the present progressive 'coming down' and the nominalized progressive in 'one great invisible crashing' serve to reinforce the immediacy and the internal view of this event.

At this stage in the text we are uncertain as to what the 'screaming' is that comes across the sky and do not know who the 'him' referred to actually is. However, the frequent temporal shifts and subtle movement between subject and objective construal potentially creates an instability in interpretation. As readers, we are given no sure footing on which to plant ourselves in order to make sense of the text-world in which we find ourselves. This anxiety potentially mirrors Pychon's larger concerns with temporality and identity in (post-)modernity, as present in *Gravity's Rainbow* and his work more generally (Mattessich 2002; Gourley 2013).

As the above examples show, a CG approach to textual analysis can afford rich evidence in favour of literary interpretations, even just at the level of tense and aspect. This combination of lexical verbs, tense morphemes and auxiliary verbs comprises the ***clausal grounding system*** of the English language. The following section shall briefly note the most important features of clausal grounding not yet covered, before concluding this chapter on a discussion of the relevance of this to discourse modes.

## *4      Clausal Grounding*

A finite clause profiles a process. As such, a finite clause profiles a grounded instance of some type. Following Section 2.2.4, we say that the ground and the grounding relationship are (inter)subjectively construed. That is to say, that only the grounded entity is onstage in any given instance. In contrast to nominal grounding which is concerned with identifying a particular thing, clausal grounding seeks to address when events happen relative to a particular shared discourse space. The distinction between past, present, and future events is related to the actual or potential occurrence of an event. Clausal grounding is therefore primarily *epistemic.*

According to Langacker's conception of CG, discourse participants share a discourse space (2.2.3). While never completely identical, Langacker argues that interlocutors share enough of an overlap in their conception of reality to allow successful interaction (2008: 297). In particular, Langacker focuses on what the speaker in a communicative act *conceives* of as being real. Langacker writes:

> An occurrence construed imaginatively can thus be conceived as real by the speaker and presented as real through clausal grounding […] The reality invoked in a finite clause as the basis for epistemic judgement is therefore not to be identified with either the 'real world' or things considered 'real' in an ordinary, non-linguistic sense.
>
> 2008: 298

The clausal grounding system of English comprises a primary centre of *tense* and the five basic *modals* – may, can, will, shall, must[8]. A full characterisation of the modals shall not be covered here. Instead, the reader is referred to the conceptual semantics of force-dynamics developed at great length by Talmy (2001); and to Hart (2010) for a fruitful application of this force-dynamic model to discourse. Here, we only briefly sketch the nature of the modals – specifically, that they tend to represent the implication of force and a propensity for action.

With this in mind, modals have two distinct senses. Specifically, modals can be described as having a *root* sense and an *epistemic* sense. Roots modals tend to make reference to notions such as 'obligation, permission, intention, and ability' (2008: 305). In this case, the idea of force represents an abstract force rooted in social interaction. Therefore, a root modal is geared towards *effecting* the grounded process, by attempting to bring about a particular process or event. In contrast to this, epistemic modals are related to knowledge, likelihood, and probability:

| Grounding Elements | Grounded Structure | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tense Modals | Perfect (*have + -ed*) | Progressive (*be + -ing*) | Passive (*be + -ed*) | Lexical Verb (V) |
| Auxiliary System ("AUX") | | | | "Main" Verb |

**Figure 15**                                                                 2008: 300

8 Similarly, the 'past tense' modals – might, could, would, should, must.

Thus it bears on the grounded process not in terms of bringing it about, but rather in terms of **accepting** it as **real**. If root modals are aimed at **effective control** of occurrences, epistemic modals are aimed at **epistemic control.**

<div align="right">2008: 306</div>

According to Langacker, then, tense serves to locate an event in time relative to the time of speaking; modals pertain to likelihood of occurrence; and the auxiliary verbs function to impose particular ways of viewing a process. Taken together, these syntactic properties function as the English grounding system, indicated by the table given in Figure 15 above.

At this point, we turn back to Carlota Smith's typology of discourse modes, with the newly outlined Cognitive Grammar framework.

## 5      *Discussion*

The CG characterisation of tense and aspect coincides with Smith's in a number of ways, particularly in relation to their handling of tense and aspect.. However, CG shows is that these grammatical categories develop quite naturally from very basic cognitive functions, regardless of their apparent complexity. Moreover, at each successive level of representation, the functions involved are identical in their application. This results in a number of intermediate conclusions.

Firstly, CG argues that a wide range of seemingly unrelated properties of language are encoded and communicated by the same means. To choose three arbitrary examples, temporal phenomena, perspective and viewpoint, and foreground/background alignment are all a function of grounding, selection, profiling, and so forth. This property of CG assumes added importance in relation to Smith's theory and methodology. From Chapter 1, we saw how Smith sought to define discourse modes in relation to *temporal progression*, *situation types, subjectivity* and *surface structure presentation*. It should be immediately apparent that, from the Cognitive Grammar perspective, this distinction is at once arbitrary and unnecessary. While Smith works from the premise that these phenomena are to be understood by different means and methods, CG takes a more holistic approach.

With this in mind, it is worth asking: how much of Smith's original typology stands up to scrutiny? Firstly, consider the *Narrative* and *Report* modes. Smith argues that what sets these modes

apart in principle is the differing nature of temporal progression of the events and states they contain. Narrative, it is argued, advances chronologically through narrative time; Report advances through deictic time. According to our understanding of tense, modality and epistemic grounding as outlined above, this distinction no longer seems tenable. All clausal grounding is inevitably deictic. Similarly, consider the proposed difference between the *Information* and *Argument* modes. These modes are both understood as being 'atemporal' and are contrasted based on the truth-conditional value of the states introduced into the discourse. This is problematic, in that it presupposes a knowledge in advance of the truth-values of linguistic predications. That is to say, there is no way in principle to differentiate between the situation types that Smith proposes as basic. Grammatically speaking, facts are equivalent to conjecture.

As a result of this, this thesis makes the following proposal. At best, we can say that Narrative and Report both seek to develop discourse along *temporal* lines: that is, to develop a **narrative**. Argument and Information, ostensibly atemporal, seek to develop along *epistemic* lines; that is, to provide an **exposition** on a speaker's position. Therefore, this thesis suggests that, rather than Smith's five-way framework, we may collapse these categories and simplify somewhat. Instead, the proposal is that we consider only three discourse modes – *Narrative, Description, and Exposition*. This simplification does not result from an aesthetic drive for minimalism. Rather, it derives ultimately from the nature of clausal grounding in English as understood within the theoretical framework of Cognitive Grammar. This three-way division has the convenient property of correlating with the division between processes, non-processual simplex, and non-processual complex relations.

This reinterpretation carries with it the added benefit of the greatly increased descriptive possibilities of a holistic theory of language. Text-types so defined in this way have the good fortune of being *functional* in their definition; of being cognitively grounded in their elaboration; and theoretically robust in their ontological status. To put this another way, starting from the observable, regular clustering of specific lexicogrammatical features at a discourse level and describing these clusters by way of Cognitive Grammar, this represents a legitimate and psychologically plausible way to argue for the existence and practical application of a text-type approach to discourse.

However, Langacker's Cognitive Grammar is not, in and of itself, the stopping point of this theory. CG provides a strong theoretical basis for describing syntactic categories such as tense and

aspect in relation to their semantic values. For this reason, it goes far above and beyond the linguistic theories utilised by Smith, and Kamp and Reyle. In particular, I argue that CG affords us a more fine-grained understanding of discourse modes from the individual word, through the clause, up to the level of discourse. To quote Langacker:

> We can find regularities in discourse sequences of any size, viewed at any level of organization. What level we examine determines the scope of the patterns and dependencies described.

<div align="right">2002: 151</div>

Bearing this in mind, I believe the notion of discourse modes elaborated above represent salient discourse level constructs which develop quite naturally out of Langacker's theory of Cognitive Grammar.

Fundamentally, though, Langacker's conception of the *current discourse space* (2.2.3) remains unconvincing. In Langacker's model, I see the CDS as being identical in every real way to the notion of a *discourse representation structure* in DRT. This is not a major criticism per se. Langacker's theory of language is primarily geared towards understanding language at the level of the sentence, with meaning construction at the discourse level being something of an afterthought. In this way, CG does not lend itself easily to direct application at the discourse level. Moreover, now that we have introduced the notion of discourse modes, the principles behind the construction of the CDS require closer attention.

For this, the concept of a *mental space* is one that deserves elaboration. This will serve as the basis of the following chapter. While this chapter has been centred on reinterpreting discourse modes from a CG perspective, what follows builds upon our newly developed tripartite structure. Instead of asking *what* discourse modes are and *why* they come about, I now wish to ask *how* they may be employed in the most fruitful way at the level of discourse. Unexplained so far, for example, is how discourse modes interact and combine at the level of discourse. With this in mind, we now turn to *Mental Spaces Theory.*

# 3
# Blending, Relevance and Style:
# Discourse Modes in Context

## *0      Introduction*

In the previous chapter, we saw how Cognitive Grammar explains traditional grammatical categories as developing out of a core subset of basic cognitive abilities. Moreover, Cognitive Grammar incorporates a large number of *construal operations* into its basic framework, thereby allowing us to account for a large number of seemingly disparate phenomena at the level of the sentence. As a corollary to this, we saw that the nature of the clausal grounding system, viewed holistically, provides a strong theoretical basis for proposing the existence of discourse modes as functional units of language at the discourse level, with minor modifications to Smith's original typology.

However, a number of questions remain unanswered. Firstly, in what way are discourse modes understood to be functional? Secondly, how do the various modes interact? Finally, how – if at all – can a text-type approach to discourse result in fruitful analyses with regards to, say, literary fiction? The answers to these questions have considerable overlap in partially related fields of pragmatics and stylistics, and in narratology more generally. Therefore, this chapter aims to develop discourse modes as a tool to be utilised in the practice of text analysis. The primary proposal is that the three discourse modes defined in the previous chapter – *Narrative, Descriptive, Exposition* – can be most beneficially understood in relation to widely-known stylistic features. In this regard, this approach is best understood in relation to existing models of text analysis such as Text World Theory (Werth 1999; Gavins 2007); Contextual Frame Theory (Emmott 1997); and related work in the fields of cognitive stylistics, poetics, and narratology (cf Herman 2002: Stockwell 2002; Dancygier 2011).

The starting point for this model is to be found in Langacker's own notion of the ***current discourse space***. In the previous discussions (cf Chapter 2 – 2.2.3), it was noted that Langacker's conception of the CDS is somewhat inadequate. Taken at face value, Langacker's conception of a CDS provides no real framework for explaining: 1) what legitimately constitutes shared knowledge

between speaker and hearer[9]; 2) how speaker/hearers choose which information to include or ignore as relevant to interpretation; 3) how new information is added to the current discourse space and how, if at all, this combines with existing knowledge to create new structures.

To his credit, Langacker (2002) attempts to address these issues directly. Primarily, Langacker attempts to contextualize the CDS with reference to 'discourse expectations'. Linguistic structures can therefore be understood as *instructions* intended to modify the current discourse space in particular ways:

> Each instruction involves the focusing of attention within a viewing frame. A discourse comprises a succession of frames each representing the scene being 'viewed' and acted on by the speaker and hearer at a given instant.
>
> 2002: 151

This re-imagining of the CDS in terms of discourse frames is a considerable improvement, invoking as it does Emmott's notion of Contextual Frames (1997). Again, though, Langacker is at a loss to explain how exactly these frames update the CDS in productive ways. By his conception, the process is wholly additive, with 'each increment of structure merely remaining in place, essentially unmodified, as further increments come along' (2002: 180). While this has a certain validity, it is in no way different to Kamp and Reyle's Discourse Representation Theory – the only exception being Langacker's avowedly 'cognitive' persuasion. Moreover, Langacker's theory rests on some rather ad-hoc assumptions regarding memory which seem to contradict and undermine his own arguments (2002: 177-181).

While these methods of discourse interpretation may be adequate for limited linguistic phenomena such as anaphora and reference, they represent a rather one-dimensional view of meaning construction in this regard. In addition to this, the three criticisms raised above are still left unaddressed. In what follows, the goal is to create a more rounded model of interpretation by introducing *Mental Spaces Theory*, with particular reference to *Conceptual Integration*. Following this, the whole endeavour is situated within the pragmatic, meta-contexual framework of *Relevance Theory*. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief excursion into *Cognitive Stylistics* by way of a small set of case studies, illustrating instances from literary fiction where discourse modes can be seen to play an important, interpretative function.

---

9    For the purposes of text analysis, the speaker/hearer is taken to include the relationship between the text and the reader.

# 1     *Mental Spaces and Conceptual Integration*

The notion of mental spaces employed here derives from research conducted in *Mental Spaces Theory* (MST) instigated by Fauconnier and Turner (Fauconnier 1985, 1997; Turner 1991, 1996 Fauconnier and Turner 1995, 2002). Building from the basic principles of MST, research has focused on the ways in which mental spaces combine in the act of ***conceptual integration***[10]. This work derives from numerous diverse fields: from cognitive semantic approaches (Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996; Grady et al. 1999; Coulson 2000); the cognitive semiotics of the 'Aarhus School' (P. Brandt 2004; L. Brandt and P. Brandt 2005; L. Brandt 2012); and in the pragmatics of written and spoken discourse and interaction (Oakley and Hougaard 2008; Dancygier and Sweetser 2005, 2012).

The theoretical impetus behind this chapter derives from the theories and methodologies proposed by the latter of these broad approaches. Following Hougaard and Oakley (2008:1), we refer to this rather disparate body of cross-disciplinary research as a cognitive theory of *Mental Spaces and Conceptual Integration* (MSCI), As we progress, the nature of conceptual blending will come to take focal prominence in this theory. However, first of all it is worth elaborating a little upon the idea of *mental spaces* as understood by MST and MSCI.

## 1.1     *Mental Spaces*

In their most basic characterization, mental spaces are understood as partial assemblies constructed for the purposes of local understanding and action (Fauconnier 2007: 351). Properly understood, mental spaces are distinct from linguistic structures but derive their existence and form according to information communicated by linguistic expressions. Those elements of linguistic expressions that construct new spaces or shift focus to existing spaces are known as ***space builders*** (Fauconnier 1985: 17).  In this respect, space builders can take a variety of grammatical forms, such as prepositional phrases, adverbials, subject-verb complexes and so forth (Fauconnier 1997: 40).

Fauconnier holds that a linguistic expression taken in and of itself, does not have a meaning, as such. Rather, it has a *meaning potential* which is only resolved as a result of contextual, discourse-specific knowledge. In earlier sections, we saw how Langacker attempts to incorporate

---

10  A note on terminology: the terms *conceptual integration* and *conceptual blending* tend to be used somewhat interchangeably. However, in this work they are understood to designate a 'means and ends' relationship. That is to say, *conceptual integration* comes about by way of *conceptual blending*.

this notion into a single CDS by essentially additive means. MST differs in the proposal of a number of separate but internally structure domains linked together by connectors, on the basis of a number of contextual *and* grammatical clues (1997: 38). In this way, this extended concept of mental spaces is entirely amenable to the theoretical framework of Cognitive Grammar. While CG accounts for the internal structure of mental spaces in great detail, MST is essentially pragmatic in its nature, focusing on how mental spaces interact relative to contextual information.

To illustrate this, consider the following short excerpt taken again*he Old Man and The Sea.* This excerpt has been chosen for its concision and clarity in elaborating the key points developed in this and the following sections.

1)      He is a great fish and I must convince him, he thought. I must never let him learn his strength nor what he could do if he made his run. If I were him I would put in everything now and go until something broke. But, thank God, they are not as intelligent as we who kill them; although they are more noble and more able.

<div align="right">Hemingway 1980[1952]: 63</div>

Consider specifically the second sentence of this excerpt. According to MST, the construction *If I were him* functions as a space builder which opens a *conditional space* (M) relative to the discourse *base.* This base space (B) contains the elements *a* and *b* which designate the 'I' of the narrator and the fish attached to the line. These base elements are linked by the connector of *identity* to those elements *a′* and *b′* in the newly built conditional space (M). In this case, M represents a hypothetical scenario in which the narrator finds himself in the role of the fish and considers how he would act, given the benefit of his external knowledge and human cognitive facultities.

The relationship between the Base space (B) and the mental space (M) is shown in Figure 1 below. In this figure, the dotted line is used to show that M is set up relative to and subordinate to B. The bold lines represent the connectors between the spaces. In this instance, the connector is that of *identity* (and are hence marked I). Two things are important to note: firstly, that relevant structure from the parent space B is carried over to the mental space M; secondly, that the roles filled by *a′* and *b′* are only accessible by reference to the Base.

**Figure 1**                                        Adapted from 1997: 72

This simple illustrative example raises a number of points, the most important of which is that unlike Langacker's rather narrow conception of the CDS, MST proposes a plurality of spaces. While each of these spaces is defined relative to the Base, each space can have its own internal structure, so long as this structure does not cause explicit contradictions. While not overtly stated in Fauconnier's argument at this stage, it seems sensible to assume that CG provides an explicit framework for elaborating on these internal structures. On this account, the sentence from exceprt 1) discussed above can be understood in terms of trajector/landmark configuration, where the profiled trajector is that of the narrator ('I') and the landmark the fish ('him'),

While CG can explain how the narrating 'I' and 'him' are construed in this way, it does not adequately explain *why*. As Fauconnier quite rightly observes, the linguistic expression *in and of itself* carries only potential for meaning. In the above example, the landmark 'him' has the potential for a number of distinct meanings, depending on the context of the discourse during which it is uttered. In this way, it must be said that CG and MST represent quite natural counterparts to each other. While CG can be employed at the purely syntactic level to explain a wide range of phenomena, it is necessary to turn to MST in order to account for higher level conceptual representation and meaning construction.

Another way in which MST can be of added benefit to CG is in its treatment of tense and mood (modality). In the previous section, we saw how these grammatical categories were integral to

clausal grounding in English, a process which is simultaneously temporal and epistemic. In this way, grounding is essentially deictic, understood as relative rather than absolute. As discourse evolves and unfolds, it is necessary for us to mentally keep track of where exactly we 'are', relative to the Base. As Fauconnier writes:

> The thinker, speaker, hearer, discourse participant must keep track of the spaces set up, their content, the links between them, and the order in which they appear […] Specifically, this means knowing at a given stage what space is the **Base**, what space is currently the **Viewpoint**, from which others will be accessed or constructed, and what space is the **Focus** – where meaning is currently being constructed.

<div align="right">1997: 72</div>

From this, Fauconnier introduces and develops a method of tense interpretation based around the notion of *Time Paths,* building upon Dinsmore (1991) and Cutrer (1994). This quite novel approach derives from the relationship between four basic types of space: *Base, Viewpoint, Focus* and finally, *Event*. These four spaces are taken to be discourse primitives, dynamically assigned as discourse progresses (1997: 73). For reasons of efficiency, the concept of time paths will not be elaborated upon here in any detail. Suffice it to say that, despite the rather confusing conflation of terminology used for slightly different ends, Fauconnier's approach reduces in essence to to CG's focal adjustments and construal operations.[11] Once more, CG and MST prove to be complimentary in this regard.

Where MST *does* differ, is in the way it describes how mental spaces interact and combine to form novel interpretations – both at the level of the sentence and at higher levels of conceptualization. Rather than discourse spaces updating in a strictly additive manner, as proposed by Langacker, MST allows for a much more intuitive, dynamic, and fundamentally creative form of meaning construction. It does this by way of ***conceptual blending.***

## *1.2    Conceptual Integration*

The canonical interpretation of Conceptual Integration Theory (CIT) is to be found in Fauconnier and Turner (2002)[12]. Blending, according to Fauconnier and Turner, is to be viewed as the interpretative operation par excellence of the human cognitive apparatus. On this account,

---

11  Langacker (2008:50-42) notes the considerable overlap apparent between CG and MSCIT.
12  Mark Turner's website represents a comprehensive archive of MSCIT research over this period – see bibliography.

conceptual blending is not only a major constitutive part of linguistic interpretation, it is fundamentally responsible for whole swathes of human experience from computer interfaces to complex numbers; from sexual practice to college graduation ceremonies (2002: 18-30). The proposals of this thesis are rather more modest. However, it will be necessary to expand on some of the basic claims for CIT, and its governing principles.

CIT is understood to have one overarching goal. Broadly speaking, human beings tend to be able to perceive and conceptualize those things and processes which are at the *human scale*. This tendency shows itself most explicitly in some of the more abstract fields of human thought, such as the sciences and philosophy. Consider, for example, how often the 'billiard ball' model of interaction is employed in physics: from the quantum level of atoms 'bouncing off' each other; through to the movements of the cosmos, in the orbits of planets and movements of galaxies. Similarly, human scale objects form the staple examples of the philosophy seminar, as in Bertrand Russell's discussion of tables in chairs (1964[1912]: 7-16). Therefore, we may say that the overarching goal of conceptual integration is:

Achieve Human Scale.

In addition to this, it is worth noting a number of notable sub-goals which comprise the overarching aim. Specifically, these are:

Compress what is diffuse.
Obtain global insight.
Strengthen vital relations.
Come up with a story.
Go from Many to One.

The most interesting of these sub-goals concerns the nature of ***vital relations,*** which builds upon the idea of connectors in MST. In the example above (Figure 1), we saw how *a* and *b* in the Base space were connected by way of *identity* to *a'* and *b'* in the new possibility space. In this case, identity functions as a connecting relationship between these two spaces. What we find is that, upon closer inspection, a certain set of these connecting relationships appear more regularly than others. This particular subset we call *vital relations.*

CIT proposes that conceptual integration networks are comprised of *outer-space links* which

can be **compressed** into *inner-space relations* (2002: 92-93). In the first instance, vital relations are said to obtain between mental spaces in the network; in the latter, they are within mental spaces in the network (Turner 2007: 381). A full list of the vital relations utilised in blending are:

|  |  |
|---|---|
| Change | Analogy |
| Identity | Disanalogy |
| Time | Property |
| Space | Similarity |
| Cause-Effect | Category |
| Part-Whole | Intentionality |
| Representation | Uniqueness |
| Role |  |

<div align="right">2002: 101</div>

A detailed elaboration of each of these categories is not possible in this work. Instead the reader is referred to Fauconnier and Turner (2002) and Turner (2007) for a principled and thorough exposition. However, a great strength of Fauconnier and Turner's approach to blending lies in the fact that these vital relations are in many ways intuitive to all speakers, hearers, thinkers, and readers. In many ways, they do not necessarily require much in the way of elaboration.

That having been said, for all the intuitiveness of the vital relations, there are a strict set of principles under which blending operates. Turner lists these as:

a. *Topology Principle*: other things being equal, set up the blend and the inputs so that inner-space relations in the blend reflect useful topology in the inputs and their outer-space relations.

b. *Pattern Completion Principle*: other things being equal, complete elements in the blend by using existing integrated patterns as additional inputs. Other things being equal, use a completing frame that has relations that can be the compressed versions of the important outer-space vital relations between the inputs.

c. *Integration Principle*: achieve an integrated blend.

d. *Maximization of Vital Relations Principle*: other things being equal, maximize vital relations in the network. In particular, maximize the vital relations in the blended space and reflect the in outer-space vital relations.

e. *Intensification of Vital Relations Principle*: other things being equal, intensify vital relations.

f. *Web Principle*: other things being equal, manipulating the blend as a unit must maintain the web of appropriate connections to the input spaces easily and without additional surveillance or

computation.

g.    *Unpacking Principle*: other things being equal, the blend all by itself should prompt for the reconstruction of the entire network

h.    *Relevance Principle*: other things being equal, an element in the blend should have relevance, including relevance for establishing links to other spaces and for running the blend. Conversely, an outer-space relation between the inputs that is important for the purpose of the network should have a corresponding compression in the blend.

i.    *Compression Principle*: achieve compressed blended spaces.

2007: 382

These principles will be discussed in more detail in the following section. For now, it will suffice for the reader to be aware of their existence.

Figure 2 below represents the archetypal conceptual integration network configuration. Input spaces $I_1$ and $I_2$ represent mental spaces as properly defined by MST. Added to this, the basic network contains an extra two elements which require further definition – the **generic space** and the **blended space**. The first of these, the generic space, represents those features shared by both $I_1$ and $I_2$. In this way, the generic space is a structurally schematic space of which $I_1$ and $I_2$ represent elaborated instances. Note the correlation here with Langacker's CG conception of abstraction (Chapter 2, 2.3)



**Figure 2**                          2007: 379

We can see process at work in the extract above from *The Old Man and The Sea.* In the passage in question, the 'old man' considers how he would act if he were the fish and invites us to draw comparisons. Here, then, we find the old man as input space $I_1$ and input space $I_2$ is the fish. These spaces are linked at varying degrees by the vital relations of Time, Space, Role, Analogy, Property, Intentionality, and Uniqueness. This sees to it that we maximize and intensify the connection between the spaces. In doing so, the narrator creates a richly structured blended space. In this blended space, not only does he consider how he would act if he was the fish. Equally, the fish itself is imbued with specifically human characteristics of intelligence and nobility. This therefore fulfils the various sub-goals above and the overarching aim of achieving human scale.

What we find in this example is an instance of ***emergent structure***, that is to say the structure which inheres in the blended space which is often not directly intended. This potential for emergent structure is what sets CIT apart from other models as a powerful tool in the process of meaning construction. Moreover, as with vital relations, emergent structure derives from a relatively small set of processes, namely ***composition***, ***completion***, and ***elaboration*** (2002: 48-49). Composition is the process by which extra elements can be carried over from individual input spaces while not being blended by compression of vital relations. In Figure 1, this is illustrated by the elements of $I_1$ and $I_2$ carried over to the blended space (dotted lines) but which are not connected by a bolded line. Completion, on the other hand, represents the way in which blends recruit background knowledge and structures. In this way, it can be said to operate 'behind the scenes' in a blend. Lastly, elaboration treats blended spaces as simulations which we run imaginatively. Elaboration is therefore called *running the blend.*

## *1.3    Types of integration networks*

Essentially, then, the important thing to note is that the blend contains structures not carried over directly from either of the inputs but instead derives from a creative, dynamic cognitive process of composition, completion and elaboration. Two final points about conceptual integration are to be noted. Firstly, that this newly blended space with its emergent structure can serve as the input space for yet another blend. In this way, the depth of possibility in CIT becomes apparent, providing a structured explanation for widely divergent, high-level conceptualizations. This flexibility is not to be found in Langacker's current discourse space.

Secondly, the process described above represents a somewhat idealized model, known as a

*mirror network*[13], where input spaces, the generic space, and the blended space all share the same organization structure or frame (2002: 122). In contrast to mirror networks, blends can also occur in *single-scope* networks. To quote Fauconnier and Turner:

> A single-scope network has two input spaces with different organizing frames, one of which is projected to organize the blend. Its defining property is that the organizing frame of the blend is an extension of the organizing frame of one of the inputs but not the other.
>
> 2002: 126

In a single-scope network, there will be a overt conceptual clash between organizing frames in input spaces. In the resultant blended space, the organizational schema of one input space will be carried over. In this way, single-scope networks represent a form of analogical reasoning (Gentner et al 2001). We may say then, that single-scope blending is an integral part of (conceptual metaphor) construction (Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003).

In contrast, CIT also accounts for *double-scope networks*. Similar to the previous example, double-scope networks feature two input spaces with often explicitly clashing organizational frames. However, rather than carrying over the structure of an input space, a double-scope network includes parts of each input space and also has emergent structure of its own. To quote:

> In such networks, both organizing frames make central contributions to the blend, and their sharp differences offer the possibility of rich clashes. Far from blocking the construction of the network, such classes offer challenges to the imagination; indeed, the resulting blends can be highly creative.
>
> 2002: 131

This potential for blending between clashing spaces represents another great strength of CIT over Langacker's comparatively limited understanding of the CDS, particularly for the theory of discourse modes currently being developed. Moreover, CIT represents a genuine alternative to DRT and proposed discourse representation structures. Kamp and Reyle's DRT or Langacker's CDS are useful constructions in the study of pronominal anaphora and referent tracking. In the former instance, this is perhaps an unfair criticism because in this respect, DRT does exactly what Kamp and Reyle set out to do. However, in the case of CG, the notion of a CDS does not go far enough. Conceptual Integration Theory, though, accounts for these phenomena and many more. In this way,

---

13  Fauconnier and Turner also discuss *simplex networks* (2002: 120-121). Simplex networks are representative of the distinction between CG's types and instances, where the blended space therefore represents a grounded instance of a type.

when combined with CG, this represents a holistic view of discourse comprehension. Whereas CG accounts for linguistic phenomena at the level of the 'sentence', at the level of 'discourse' we must invoke the constructs of Mental Spaces and Conceptual Integration Theory (MSCIT). In Section 2 below, we shall see how this relates to the notion of discourse modes as previously defined.

What stands out from the discussion to this point, though, is that MSCIT allows for a much detailed process of meaning construction than can be envisaged in a DRT based approach such as Smith's. Within MSCIT, a strictly additive, compositional, and truth-conditional approach to discourse comprehension is equally as valid. However, by invoking a wider range of vital relations, double-scope blending, and emergent structure, MSCIT is able to account for much richer interpretations of texts. This, I believe is the central thrust of this thesis, in arguing for the functional properties of discourse modes. This will be elaborated more clearly in the following chapter.

However, a final theoretical point remains. MSCIT proposes a principled set of conditions for blending; a set of vital relations which obtain over spaces in a network; and means for describing the emergent structure of blended spaces. In this way, MSCIT seems to be worryingly unfalsifiable (Popper 1959/2002). Every mental process seems to be capable of description within MSCIT, with enough effort. It would seem, in many ways, that for all of its intuitiveness and dynamism, MSCIT represents an unfortunately laissez-faire approach to meaning construction. In the case of vital relations, for example, one person's *similarity* may be another's *analogy*. Similarly, the process of *completion* contributes to emergent structure by projecting certain elements of background knowledge into the blended space. This excessive freedom of interpretation is MSCIT's strongest and weakest aspect. Again, we are left to ask – *what* background knowledge is projected into the blended space and, crucially, *why*?

In order to address these concerns, it is necessary to situate MSCIT within a pragmatic meta-contextual framework. This thesis proposes that the foundations of this framework are to be found in Relevance Theory.

## 2 *Relevance Theory*

Relevance Theory (RT) developed by Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995; 2012) represents an ostensibly cognitive approach to pragmatics. The nature of pragmatics has a somewhat uncertain

position in Cognitive Linguistics, particularly in relation to CG and MSCIT (Levinson 1997; Langacker 2008: 40). However, Sperber and Wilson take as foundational that there are certain aspects of communication and language that are indisputably pragmatic. They write:

> It is true that a language is a code which pairs phonetic and semantic representations of sentences. However, there is a gap between the semantic representations of sentences and the thoughts actually communicated by utterances.
>
> 1995: 9

As with Fauconnier and Turner, Sperber and Wilson recognize the fact that utterances in and of themselves do not have a meaning and instead rather carry meaning potential.

> In every case, the grammar can only help determining the possibilities of interpretation. How the hearer sets about narrowing down and choosing among these possibilities is a separate question. It is one that grammarians, but not pragmatists can ignore: an adequate theory of utterance interpretation must answer it.
>
> 1995: 10

While all theories of pragmatics take this as axiomatic, RT develops with a somewhat different focus. In particular, RT seeks to differentiate itself from Gricean theories of pragmatics (cf Grice 1989) which 'try to describe a failsafe mechanism which, when properly applied and not disrupted by noise, would guarantee successful communication' (1995: 17). Opposed to this, RT attempts to show how these mechanisms are less definitive, instead showing how these rules make communication possible but do not guarantee it.

Sperber and Wilson argue against the conception of mutual knowledge as an absolute (1995: 15-21). Instead, RT focuses on what Sperber and Wilson call ***cognitive environments***. Building upon a similar visual metaphor as that which Langacker uses (Chapter 2, Section 2), they define cognitive environments as follows:

7) A fact is *manifest* to an individual at a given time if and only if he is capable at that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as true or probably true.

8) A *cognitive environment* of an individual is a set of facts that are manifest to him

> 1995: 39

An individual's cognitive environment is therefore the set of all facts that can be 'seen' at any given time. Crucial to this definition is that the notion of what is manifest to an individual is weaker than the notion of what is known (1995: 40). Facts and assumptions can necessarily be manifest in the cognitive environments of two or more people – for example, if those people share physical environments and have similar cognitive abilities (1995: 41). This intersection of individual cognitive environments and mutually manifest assumptions is called a ***mutual cognitive environment***. Therefore, the crucial point of RT, according to Sperber and Wilson is as follows:

> Human beings somehow manage to communicate in situations where a great deal can be assumed about what is manifest to others, a lot can be assumed about what is mutually manifest to themselves and others, but nothing can be assumed to be truly mutually known or assumed.

<div align="right">1995: 45</div>

Taking this as basic, Sperber and Wilson propose that the overarching aim of all communication is that a speaker intends to alter the cognitive environment of her audience and thereby affect actual thought processes as a result. Based on this, they propose that human cognition is relevance-oriented and that as a result 'someone who knows an individual's cognitive environment can infer which assumptions he is actually likely to obtain' (1995: 46). Crucial to RT, then, is Sperber and Wilson's rather technical definition of ***relevance*** and the related notions of ***efficiency*** and ***ostension***.

## 2.1    *Efficiency, Relevance, Ostension*

Employing the conceptual metaphor of THE MIND IS A COMPUTER, Sperber and Wilson argue that human beings are efficient information-processing devices. Efficiency, in this respect, can be characterized with respect to absolute goals or relative goals. In the former case, efficiency is a matter of achieving a goal with the minimum resource expenditure; in the latter, efficiency is to be found in balancing expenditure and achievement. In addition, there are special cases where efficiency obtains in achieving a goal to the highest degree with fixed expenditure (1995: 46).

Information processing involves a certain degree of cognitive expenditure. All information is either old or new, relative to the individual's cognitive environment. In terms of efficiency, old information is not worth processing. New information can be unconnected to anything in the

individual's cognitive environment, in which case the expenditure in processing outweighs the achievement. Similarly, new information can be connected with existing information in the individual's cognitive environment to produce a new set of inferential premises by which yet further information can be deduced and inferred. New information which achieves this multiplication effect, is said to be *relevant*. Relevance in this way can be further quantified, with information that prompts a greater multiplication effect being said to have greater relevance (1995: 48). As Sperber and Wilson write:

> Our claim is that human beings automatically aim at the most efficient information processing possible. This is so whether they are conscious of it or not; in fact, the very diverse and shifting conscious interests of individuals result from the pursuit of this permanent aim in changing conditions.

<div align="right">1995: 49</div>

In the setting of a communicative act, verbal or otherwise, an individual seeks to alter the cognitive environment of their audience by making manifest new information. In order to be maximally relevant, a communicative act must make manifest the intention to make something manifest. This self-referential act is known is *ostension.* To recall the visual metaphor, showing someone something is a case of ostension (1995: 49). By drawing someone's attention to something, one ostensibly wishes to communicate that the thing in question is worth the cognitive effort of their attention. Therefore, the main thesis of RT is that an ostensive act carries with it a guarantee of relevance which makes manifest the intention behind the ostension (1995: 50).

Therefore, in contrast to Gricean pragmatics, RT reduces to an extremely small set of motivating principles. If we abstract away from the specifics above, Sperber and Wilson conclude the following points:

*Presumption of optimal relevance*

9) The set of assumptions **I** which the communicator intends to make manifest to the addressee is relevant enough to make it worth the addressee's while to process the ostensive stimulus.

10) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one the communicator could have used to communicate **I.**

11)    Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance.

<div align="right">1995: 158</div>

Having thus defined the basic principles of RT, we turn now to consider how RT relates to CG and MSCIT.

## *2.2    Relationship to CG and MSCIT*

While the principles of RT are ostensibly 'cognitive' in their basis, it would seem that a number of Sperber and Wilson's preliminary theoretical standpoints are opposed to such theories as CG and MSCIT. For example, Ungerer and Scmid observe the following:

> In short, Relevance Theory is clearly positioned ore on the logical-deductive side typical of pragmatic work inspired by the philosophical tradition, while Conceptual-Blending Theory has a much richer and multi-faceted view of cognition which is, however, also more hazy and intuitive.

<div align="right">2006: 295</div>

Similarly, Sperber and Wilson's use of the conceptual metaphor of THE MIND IS A COMPUTER seems fundamentally at odds with Langacker who argues against the idea of a language as a self-contained or well-defined formal system. He writes further:

> I likewise reject the metaphor that likens mind to a digital computer and language to a program that it runs. CG is more at home in the 'connectionist' ('neural network') world of dynamic systems, parallel processing, distributed representations, and computation by simultaneous constraint satisfaction.

<div align="right">2008: 10</div>

Fauconnier and Turner make a similar point (2002: 12). However, this need not be a fatal incompatibility. Indeed, Sperber and Wilson's conception of mind as computer derives more from a biologically driven push for efficiency in information-processing systems as opposed to a reductive, computational model of language. The human mind is a dynamic, open system which constantly self-monitors much more sensory information than it is realistically possible to process simultaneously. Instead, the mind chooses that information which is most relevant in updating and

developing the individual's cognitive environment. This proposal represents RT in its purest form, and is somewhat different to Langacker's strictly algorithmic view of computation.

Moreover, there does exist a considerable degree of overlap in the theoretical foundations of these approaches. In particular, each theory takes as basic the idea of semantic knowledge being essentially *encyclopaedic*. The 'meaning' of lexical units therefore resides less in the *dictionary view* of lexical semantics. Langacker terms this encyclopaedic knowledge the *conceptual substrate* of an expression, the individual facets of which include:

1)   The conceptions evoked or created through the previous discourse.
2)   Engagement in the speech event itself, as part of the interlocutors' social interaction.
3)   Apprehension of the physical, social, and cultural context.
4)   Any domains of knowledge that might prove relevant.

Adapted from 2008: 42

Similarly, Fauconnier and Turner criticize generative accounts of compositionality such as DRT for the primacy given to truth-conditional connectors such as identity. As we have seen, identity is only one member of a set of vital relations which adhere equally across spaces. MSCIT therefore takes a looser view of compositionality which permits the additional use of contextual knowledge in the computation of truth conditions. They note:

Specifying the context to the degree that it would specify all the appropriate truth conditions […] would require specifying the framing of the inputs, the counterparts in the cross-space mapping, the details of the selective projection, the degree of matching typology, and all the other parts of the network model of conceptual integration.

2002: 163

By comparison, Sperber and Wilson accept the notion of encyclopaedic knowledge, with a minor addendum. We saw above that an individual's cognitive environment represents the set of all information manifest to the individual. Crucially, this manifest information may take the form of either fact *or* assumption, which Sperber and Wilson roughly correlate as the distinction between logical and encyclopaedic knowledge. In this way, they write:

Our suggestion is that, broadly speaking, the content of an assumption is constrained by the logical entries of the concepts it contains, while the context in which it is processed is, at least in part, determined by the

encyclopaedic entries.

<div style="text-align: right;">1995: 89</div>

Sperber and Wilson therefore make a rather radical claim for the complete reversal of the role of context in meaning construction. By their account, in RT the principle of relevance has absolute primacy in the order of discourse comprehension. Rather than context being determined and the relevance of an utterance assessed relative to this, Sperber and Wilson propose that people assume the relevance of ostensive acts of communication and *then* try to select a context which achieves maximal relevance (1995: 142). Contextual information is therefore added 'after the fact', as it were.

This view of information processing is considered unrealistic by Werth (1999), who argues that context is a discoursal phenomenon, 'in which the preceding text is main driver in the creation and maintenance of context' (Black 2006: 85). In part, this criticism seems to derive from a fundamental – though excessively common – misunderstanding of the role of pragmatics theories as rigid rule-based systems which in some way limit the possibilities of the individual's cognitive and linguistic creativity. Hence, Black's observation that, 'it is telling that Sperber and Wilson's rely on metaphors deriving from computers and economics to explain the workings of the human mind' (2006: 101). In the same way, this criticism is perhaps just as telling.

With regards to the nature of literary interpretation, this point is made succinctly by Stockwell (2009), who writes:

> Aside from academic readers who have an eccentric institutionalised predilection for wilfully innovative readings, the vast majority of natural readers are able to discern a textualised preferred reading and impute it to their mind-modelled schema of the author's intention.

<div style="text-align: right;">2009: 270</div>

Encyclopaedic knowledge varies across speakers and time. Writers and readers may be separated by vast distances, both concrete and abstract. In this way, it is difficult – if not impossible – for a reader to fully share with the writer the necessary contextual information to properly ascribe a text's meaning:

For the displaced situation of most literary reading, the context is minimal, and so the text-drivenness of the stylistic form is even more essential to the reader's evaluation of a preferred response to the text as a whole […] In short, readers assume there is a preferred reading of a literary text, which they impute to the author's intention.

2009: 269

This idea of a preferred reading conforms with the expectations of RT. In this way, the multiplicity of potential readings of a text derives from the reader's attempt to select a context which results in maximal relevance. Therefore, this thesis proposes to take RT as the meta-contexual framework within which this approach to text analysis can be properly understood. The remaining sections intend to illustrate how – taken together – a theoretical synthesis of CG, MSCIT and RT can be employed in discourse comprehension. In particular, the following chapter wishes to show this syncretic approach allows for discourse modes to be applied fruitfully in the analysis of literary texts. In this way, what follows is the application of discourse modes to the field of stylistics (cf Carter and Stockwell 2008; McIntyre and Busse 2010; Stockwell and Whiteley 2014).

# 4
# Spaces and Style:
# Applications in Literary Narratives

## *0        Introduction*

The preceding chapters have contained a great deal of theoretical exposition. Throughout, the emphasis has been on re-situating Carlota Smith's theory of discourse modes within a thoroughly Cognitive Linguistic approach, with particular reference to Cognitive Grammar (CG).  In doing so, we saw how the grounding system of English allows for a more detailed level of interpretation than found within a generative approach such as Discourse Representation Theory. Following this, we saw how the same lexicogrammatical categories function as space builders in Mental Space and Conceptual Integration Theory (MSCIT). From this, it may logically be deduced that these mental spaces are understood as being nearly directly equivalent to Smith's discourse modes. By placing emphasis on viewpoint, epistemic access and the dynamic, inter-subjective nature of meaning construction, CG and MSCIT greatly increase the descriptive possibilities of discourse modes.

This thesis opened with the claim that discourse modes properly understood could be thought of as functional units of discourse above the level of the sentence. In order to tentatively illustrate this proposal, this brief chapter presents some short worked examples of discourse modes and spaces in action in well-known literary fiction. The examples provided are intended to be indicative of potential rather than an entirely exhaustive account of future applications.

## *1        Spaces, Style and Story*

The remainder of this thesis seeks to advance the status of discourse modes as conceptually salient, functional units of discourse above the sentence, at the level of the passage. Chapter 2 showed in detail how discourse modes as (roughly) envisioned by Smith can be accounted for by the basic principles of CG. However, one of the necessary conclusions of this discussion is a marginally reduced typology of only three discourse modes – Narrative, Description, and Elaboration. Each of these modes is clearly delineated by slightly different clusters of specific lexicogrammatical properties. As such, the present work argues that these modes are most fruitfully understood as *building discrete mental spaces*. By employing the theoretical insights of Cognitive Grammar into

focal adjustments and construal, the internal structure of these spaces can be described in fine detail. Building upon this, these spaces combine at the level of discourse by way of conceptual blending. Finally, all of this takes place under the umbrella of Relevance Theory. So, we say that the three modes of discourse are properly defined as *discourse spaces* – that is, ***Narrative Space, Description Space***, and ***Elaboration Space***.

This theory therefore aligns itself squarely alongside other models of text interpretation which involve mental space constructions, such as Text World Theory (Werth 1999; Gavins 2007). A more direct comparison is to be found in Dancygier (2011), which arrives at similar conclusions to this thesis by different means, proposing partial narrative structures called narrative spaces. Dancygier's characterization of a narrative space (2011: 36) is broadly compatible with the theory being developed here. However, the main exception is that the present work proposes a principled set of spaces beyond the purely 'narrative' which correspond to distinct linguistic forms. In this way, the present theory attempts to bridge the gap between the text-driven approach of Text World Theory and the conceptually focused mental-spaces-and-blending framework.

Despite a number of dissimilarities, this thesis wishes to adopt Dancygier's definition of the narratological binary of *text* and *story*. Specifically, Dancygier argues that story is to be understood as an emergent property of the text as interpreted by the reader:

> A 'story' can thus be discussed as a cognitive construct, a blend, emerging through the process of meaning construction triggered by reading. The role of the text is crucial in providing such prompts, but the emergence of a story relies to a comparable degree on the frames evoked in the reader's mind, and on the construction of double-scope blends, integrated into the mega-blend.

<div align="right">2011: 56</div>

The nature of the relationship remains the basis of ongoing debate in literary narrative theory. In contrast to more traditional structuralist narratology (Barthes 1968; Genette 1980; Culler 1975/2000; Todorov 1977), the theory developed here finds closer associations with contemporary cognitive narratology, particularly in Dancygier's work but also in the work of Fludernik (1996, 2009) and Herman (2002, 2003). However, despite these rather loose family relations, the proposal in this thesis is considerably more modest.

While a theory of discourse modes may contribute in a minimal way to the development and

emergence of story, such a theory will never adequately explain the full gamut of interaction the reader has when engaging with a text. However, this is not to deny the potential gains of this model of text analysis. Rather than representing a complete narratological theory, the notion of discourse spaces most fruitfully represents a new addition to the analytical tool-kit of cognitive stylistics. In this way, the whole of the theory represents rather much more than the sum of its parts. Consider, for example, the stylistic notion of ***foregrounding*** (cf Emmott and Alexander 2014). Stockwell (2009: 13-25) notes the obvious correlation between stylistic foregrounding and the cognitive phenomenon of figure/ground alignment. In reference to the textual field, foregrounding is achieved by a number of linguistic and literary devices such as 'repetition, unusual naming, innovative descriptions, creative syntactic ordering, puns, rhyme, alliteration, metrical emphasis, the use of creative metaphor, and so on' (2009: 14). Adapting the standard metaphor of visual perception, such stylistic features are said to confer prominence. By conferring prominence on a certain expression, object, or concept, the text selects certain elements as more deserving of readerly attention (2009: 18).

As such, literary foregrounding is a form of *ostensive-inferential communication* (Clark 2014: 112-119). In relevance-theoretic terms, readers assume that these foregrounded elements are worth their effort to process. In the interpretation of literary texts, processing of foregrounded elements is considered favourable due to the likely result of the largest possible number of weak implicatures (Pilkington 2000). The definition of discourse modes reached at the end of Chapter 2 shows that – at a textual level – discourse modes have noticeably divergent lexicogrammatical properties. So, we may say that a sudden shift between discourse modes represents an instance of stylistic foregrounding. The discourse space built by the mode is thus more likely to be projected into a conceptual integration network, contributing to the unfolding and development of the emergent story. In the same way as sentences, the emergent story of a literary text has only a *meaning potential*, relative to the context and encyclopaedic knowledge of the reader. In the following sections, a number of these ideas are elaborated upon with reference to a set of literary texts. Throughout, the emphasis remains on the practical possibility of discourse modes as functional units of discourse at the level of the passage.

## 2      'Of Mice and Men'

Arguably Steinbeck's most well-known novel, *Of Mice and Men* (Steinbeck 2000[1937]) concerns itself with Steinbeck's most common subject matter – the lives of real people against the backdrop

of the California boom days and the Great Depression. The writing is rich in symbolism and allegory, a full exposition of which would take up a thesis in and of itself (Goldhurst 1990). However, the most salient point is that Steinbeck takes pains to highlight the dignity of individuals trying to live simple lives off the land and sea and of the role of the poor in a society which deprives them of any power. Shillinglaw writes:

> It is a world where personal interaction is marked by instances of petty control, misunderstanding, jealousy, and callousness. The political reality examined by Steinbeck […] is the intense loneliness and anger engendered by hopelessness.

> 2000: xviii

This focus on the theme of loneliness is commonly raised in critical analyses of *Of Mice and Men* (Loftis 1990: 43). In particular, Steinbeck draws attention to the hopelessness engendered by poverty by muting conflicts between those with power and those without. Shillinglaw writes further:

> Gestures of political and social power are diffused or checked […] The opening scene insists on this narrowing, as Steinbeck introduces his two traps in a landscape that conveys both their intimacy with nature and their exclusion from any real power.

> 2000: xix

Loftis (1990: 41) further notes the thematic importance of this opening scene, an expanded excerpt of which is reproduced in Appendix 1. Upon close inspection, we find that this section is ripe for a stylistic analysis based around discourse modes. The novel opens with the following passage:

> 1)      *A few miles south of Soledad, the Salinas River drops in close to the hillside bank and runs deep and green. The water is warm too, for it has slipped twinkling over the yellow sands in the sunlight before reaching the narrow pool. On one side of the river, the golden foothill slopes curve up to the strong and rocky Gabilan mountains, but on the valley side the water is lined with trees – willows fresh and green with every spring, carrying in their lower leaf junctures the debris of the winter's flooding; and sycamores with mottled, white, recumbent limbs and branches that arch over the pool […]*

> 2000: 3

With its characteristic clustering of non-processual complex relationships, we say that this passage is a canonical instance of the *descriptive mode*. Incorporating CG terminology, we may also say that the scene is construed as *maximally objective*. In this way, the scene is viewed by way of *summary scanning* as described in Chapter 2 – as the focus of attention shifts from object to object, a gestalt image of the entire scene is formed in the mind of the reader. In doing so, the reader construes the phenomenon of *fictive motion* (Matlock 2004). When conceiving of movement along a path, we conceptualize the mover as occupying a successive series of locations which constitute a path (Langacker 2008: 529). In the apprehension of fictive motion, the same principle is applied to static scenes by a process of *subjectification.* Langacker elaborates upon this point:

> Through subjectification, the dynamicity inherent in the apprehension of events is transferred to the conception of static scenes. A verb like *run*, which profiles objectively construed motion by its trajector, comes instead to designate a configuration apprehended through subjectively construed motion (i.e. sequential mental access) by the conceptualizer.
>
> 2008: 530

This construal of fictive motion is therefore at play in this opening descriptive mode:

2)      *A few miles south of Soledad, the Salinas River* **drops** *in close to the hillside bank and* **runs** *deep and green.*

3)      *On one side of the river, the golden foothill slopes* **curve up** *to the strong and rocky Gabilan mountain.*

2000: 3

Therefore, we come to account for Smith's original definition of text progression in descriptive modes as being 'spatial advancement through the scene or object' (2003: 20). The cinematic quality of Steinbeck's prose (Swan 1999: 122) is thus given a cognitive explanation. In this instance, the descriptive mode has the role of 'setting the scene', in layman's terms. It is perhaps more representative to describe it as a *framing device*. With the scene thus set, the reader immediately encounters the following passage:

4)      *Evening of a hot day started the little wind to moving among the leaves. The shade climbed up the hills toward the top. On the sand banks the rabbits sat as quietly as little gray, sculptured stones. And then from the direction of the state highway came the sound of footsteps on crisp sycamore leaves. The rabbits hurried noiselessly for cover. A stilted heron labored up into the air and*

*pounded down river. For a moment the place was lifeless, and then two men emerged from the path and came into the opening by the green pool.*

In contast to the previous passage, this represents a markedly different stylistic quality. In particular, note how the dominant type of relationship introduced into the discourse is in this case *processual.* Specifically, these processual relationships are instances of the *past perfective* verb type. As such, they represent bounded clauses grounded relative to the shared discourse space introduced in the preceeding text. To utilise the terminology employed in the previous chapter, we therefore say that this passage represents a *foregrounded narrative space grounded relative to the descriptive space it follows*.

Loftis notes the connection between the entrance of Lenny and Carl and the tree limb 'worn smooth by men who have sat on it' (1990: 41). In this way, the text represents a link between the past and the present. This interpretation follows quite readily from principles of conceptual blending. In this way, the desciptive space *D* and the narrative space *N* are connected by the vital relations of *Time, Space*, and *Cause-Effect*. Fauconnier and Turner cite an example not entirely dissimilar to the present instance which is quoted here at length. Consider the relationship between a fire and the ashes it leaves behind:

> It is not enough to see one thing as caused by the other; rather we need two proper mental spaces, the one with the logs burning and the one with the ashes. These are connected by Vital Relations of Time (one space is later than the other), Space (they are in the same place), Change (the logs become the ashes through the transformation of burning), and Cause-Effect (the fire causes the change and the existence of the ashes). There are subtypes of Cause-Effect. Producer-Produced is one.

2002: 96

Building upon this Producer-Produced relation, the reader is led to blend the descriptive space and narrative space into a newly integrated whole, whereby Lenny and Carl stand for the Producer. In this way, the reader develops a schematic emergent structure in the blended space which relates the static, scenic quality of the descriptive space with the actions and processes of man – that is to say, of the relationship between nature and man.

The shift between descriptive and narrative mode represents an act of stylistic foregrounding and is thus an act of ostensive-inferential communication. Taking the basic schematic information

76

immediately derived from the grammatical and conceptual cues, the reader therefore attempts to find a context which achieves maximal relevance. In practice, this may take the form of a theological treatise on post-lapsarian man (Bloom 1999); a Marxian critique of society and capital (Gibbons 2013); or a feminist criticism of both of these views (Burkhead 2002: 60-62). In all cases, Steinbeck's making manifest of the elements described above is considered equivalent with authorial intent. Therefore, the final interpretation ultimately derives from the implied mutual cognitive environment projected by the reader's encyclopaedic knowledge.

The present thesis has nothing directly to add to this final stage of higher-order literary interpretation, other than to observe a broad affiliation with the notion of *transtextuality*, i.e. 'all that sets the text in relationship, whether obvious or concealed, with other texts' (Genette 1992: 83-84). This idea of transtextuality therefore inevitably touches on the rather murky waters of Literary Theory and concepts of (post-)structuralism. However, a fully systematic account of such relationships would, in many ways, be the holy grail of pragmatic stylistics; the present work is far more realistic in its limitations. Instead, we now turn our attention to another example of an instance when the stylistic use of discourse modes augments the reader's understanding of a text.

## 3      *'Everything is Green'*

The text under consideration is an example of *flash fiction*, a rather loosely defined genre of semi-constrained writing. Originally envisioned as 'stories that could be read without turning the page' (Thomas et al 1992: 12), flash fiction is designed to present complete, self-contained stories in a radically condensed space of usually no more than 750 words. However, as Thomas argues:

> Like all fiction that matters, their success depends not on their length but on their depth, their clarity of vision, their human significance […] These stories are not tricks, or trills of a flute; rather they are very short stage presentations or musical pieces that play to the full range of human sensibilities.

> 1992:12

In particular, this section intends to focus on *Everything is Green* by David Foster Wallace (Wallace 1989: 227-230). In Appendix 2, I have included a key section of the text under analysis in this section.. However, at a mere 685 words including title, Wallace's full piece is noticeably short even for a genre of writing defined by its brevity. Moreover, it is particularly short for those readers

acquainted with Wallace's body of often wildly experimental, post-modern, 'maximalist prose' (cf Ercolino 2012).

Initially published in the collection *Girl with Curious Hair* (Wallace 1989), the story concerns the rather commonplace theme of a couple experiencing difficulties in a romantic relationship (Boddy 2013: 23-42; Boswell 2003: 100-101). In contrast to Wallace's typical maximalism, the prose featured in *Girl with Curious Hair* – including that of *Everything is Green* – is somewhat muted and sedate. Both Boddy and Boswell make the case that this is a deliberate stylistic choice by the author, in order to parody the dominant 'minimalist prose' prevalent in America during the 1980s. Thus, Boswell writes of *Everything is Green*:

> Though the primary function of the piece is to recapitulate the book's ongoing exploration of interiority and exteriority, Wallace also uses this wisp of a story to enact his final critique of the minimalist mode, employing the style one more time not as indictment but rather as a vehicle for lyrical transformation.
>
> 2003: 100

These observations are broadly echoed by Boddy, who writes:

> In 'Everything is Green' though, the main problem is the difficulty one person has in escaping the confinement of his own being: 'In me there is needs which you can not even see any more, because there is too many needs in you that are in the way' (GCH 229). On one level, this sentence reads likes a parody of monosyllabic minimalism; on another, however, it expresses one of Wallace's most enduring and deeply felt preoccupations.
>
> 2001: 33

Boswell and Boddy seem to agree then that the 'meaning' of the text comprises two levels. Firstly, there is the story proper, that of a couple undergoing a period of strife; secondly there is an inferred critique of minimalist prose. This second interpretation employs a contextual element derived from a knowledge of the history of literary style; the literary milieu of the late 1980s and early 1990s in American literature; and a knowledge of Wallace's extant body of work as outlined above. In this case, *Everything is Green* derives its ultimate meaning as literary fiction *qua* literary criticism, typical of Wallace's flamboyantly post-modern writing (see, for example, Letzler 2012 and the essays collected in Boswell 2014).

What, though, is to be said of the more 'direct' interpretation? At the level of syntax, the reader is immediately drawn to the disordered nature of the discourse, as clearly illustrated by the following excerpt:

4)   *I say Mayfly I can not feel what to do or say or believe you anymore. But there is things I know. I know I am older and you are not. And I give to you all I got to give you, with my hands and my heart both.*

This disordered speech is an instance of *free indirect discourse*. Following Sanders and Redeker (1999), we may note that this style of discourse allows greater access to the mental state of the narrator. Following Semino (2002), we refer to this access to mental states as ***mind style***. In this way, the reader infers the disordered mental processes of the narrator and views the text from the narrator's perspective.

From a discourse mode perspective, the text represents a fairly standard alternation between narrative and expository modes. Each indented change of paragraph is indicative of a change in mode. This is illustrated in Appendix 2, where regular text represents expository mode and italic text designates narrative mode. However, consider the following section:

5)   Everything is green she says. Look how green it all is Mitch. How can you say the thing you say you feel like when every thing outside is green like it is.

   ***The window over the sink of my kitchenette is cleaned off from the hard rain last night, and it is a morning with sun, it is still early, and there is a mess of green out. The trees are green and some grass out past the speed bumps is green and slicked down. But every thing is not green. The other trailers are not green, and my card table out with puddles in lines and beers cans and butts floating in the ashtrays is not green, or my truck, or the gravel of the lot, or the Big Wheel toy that is on its side under a clothesline without no clothes on it by the next trailer, where the guy has got him some kids.***

   Everything is green she is saying. She is whispering it and the whisper is not to me no more I know

The bolded section above represents a clear-cut instance of the descriptive mode which stands out in relief to the surrounding text. As with the descriptive mode in *Of Mice and Men*, the response generated in the reader is one of panoramic scanning of the whole scene. In this instance, though, rather than viewing the scene from a purely external vantage point, the reader views the scene from the internal perspective of the narrator Mitch. In this way, the crucial point which specifically draws

79

the reader's attention to this point is primarily stylistic but also inferential. Note how, in the section directly proceeding the text in descriptive mode, Mayfly observes that, 'Everything is green. From Mitch's perspective looking out over the same scene, 'every thing is not green'. However, directly following the descriptive mode, Mitch observes that Mayfly's whisper 'is not to me no more I know'. Why is this considered important enough to be foregrounded?

Turning to a CG analysis, we find that Langacker develops an argument ideally suited to a description of this stylistic discussion. In his discussion of the deictic strategies of nominal grounding, he writes:

> *Every* invokes the everyday experience of seeing group members all at once but still perceiving them as individuals – like the members of a choir or the colors in a box of crayons. *Each* reflects the strategy of examining members sequentially, one by one, until they have all been looked at […] Sequential access has the consequence that just a single instance is being examined at any one moment.
>
> 2008: 294

By our privileged access to Mitch's mind style, we are able to view the descriptive space the text invokes from his perspective. The internal structure of this space is that of a sequential list of objects, each inspected individually as discrete units. Mayfly's perspective, on the other hand, seems to invoke a conflicting viewpoint, which sees the entire scene as a gestalt of connected entities. The conflict between these vantage points is therefore similar to the distinction between *every* and *each* elaborated by Langacker.

Finally, let us consider in detail the passages immediately before and after the descriptive mode. Specifically, consider the following sentences:

6)      Everything is green *she says*.

7)      Everything is green *she is saying*.

Despite their similarity in passing, the difference between these sentences is worthy of elaboration. For example, 6) profiles an instance of a present perfective. In 7), though, this is converted to an imperfective process by way of the progressive. In this way, the process profiled has shifted focus – Mitch's perspective now 'zooms in' on Mayfly. By invoking the progressive, Mayfly's act of saying is now dynamic, ongoing, and unfolding through time. Thus, Mitch concludes,

8) *She is looking outside, from where she is sitting, and I look at her, and there is something in me that can not close up in that looking. Mayfly has a body. And she is my morning. Say her name.*

In this case, then, the emergent story derives from the blending of Mitch's perspectivized descriptive space with information in the minimally constructed narrative and expository spaces that have come before. By Mitch's recognition of Mayfly's individual existence in relation to his, the vital relations that adhere across spaces are *Similarity*, *Analogy*, and *Intentionality*. To invoke the language of continental philosophy, this is the process of Mitch coming to acknowledge the Other in relation to himself.

The text of *Everything is Green* invokes a number of different discourse modes which serve as purely structural ordering devices. However, the foregrounded use of the descriptive mode opens up a perspectivized descriptive space which affords the reader at least partial access to Mitch's revelatory shift of perspective, finally seeing and acknowledging Mayfly as an individual in her own right. Wallace's story therefore assumes maximal relevance when understood in the context of Boswell and Boddy's reading, regarding the nature of interiority and exteriority and the difficulty of escaping oneself. In this case*, Everything is Green* represents an instance of a literary engagement where the ethical dimension is highly salient and foregrounded in the preferred reading, as described by Stockwell (2009: 268-271).

In these first two examples, then, the stylistic foregrounding of the descriptive or narrative spaces can be thought of as an important factor in interpreting the meanings of the texts or passages. In the final example, I present an instance where a similar effect is achieved by the foregrounding of an exposition passage against a narrative.

## 4	'Nineteen Eighty-Four'

George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (2000[1949]) is another literary text where the ethical dimension is prominently foregrounded throughout the text. Orwell's story has come to represent the archetypal dystopian vision of totalitarian society, so much so that a number of its most important concepts have entered wider linguistic usage. Particularly well-known examples include *Big Brother, Room 101,* and *thought crimes*. Indeed, a large part of the story concerns the nature of

language and linguistic usage; particularly the attempt to control and censor language. Orwell's views of language are notoriously well-known (Orwell 1946) and serve as the foundation of *Nineteen Eighty-Four.*

The particular excerpt this section wishes to focus on is presented in Appendix 3. The climax of the novel ends with Winston Smith's resigned submission to the will of Big Brother. Despite a valiant effort, he is left broken and defeated; having spent his life re-writing history for the Ministry of Truth, Winston himself no longer even knows what is true of his own history. The novel ostensibly concludes in the following way:

> *He gazed up at the enormous face. Forty years it had taken him to learn what kind of smile was hidden beneath the dark moustache. O cruel, needless misunderstanding! O stubborn, self-willed exile from the loving breast! Two gin-scented tears trickled down the sides of his nose. But it was all right, everything was all right, the struggle was finished. He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother.*

*THE END*

Stylistically, this represents a fairly typical instantiation of free indirect discourse as described above. Loosely defined, we may say that this is an instance of narrative mode, all things being equal. As before, the text therefore affords us access to the protagonist's mind style – in this case, Winston Smith's faux-triumphalist self-overcoming in the name of Big Brother. This surrendering of individual agency and autonomy is why – quite rightly – *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is read as dystopian.

However, immediately following the end of the story proper, the reader encounters an extended appendix on the nature of Newspeak. The section begins as follows:

*Appendix*
*THE PRINCIPLES OF NEWSPEAK*

> *Newspeak was the official language of Oceania and had been devised to meet the ideological needs of Ingsoc, or English Socialism. In the year 1984 there was not as yet anyone who used Newspeak as his sole means of communication, either in speech or writing. The leading articles in the Times were written in it but this was a tour de force which could only be carried out by a specialist.*

This represents a marked stylistic shift from the preceding text, and is quite deliberately written in

the expository mode one would expect from a standard historical academic paper. In the terminology of this thesis, then, the appendix opens an expository space where new information is added which will contribute to the emergent story.

When we inspect the internal structure of this expository space – particularly with regards to the preceding narrative space – we notice something rather interesting, specifically with regards to tense. Winston Smith's story ends with the definitive past perfect verb, indicating finality and conclusion. However, the Appendix begins:

7) *Newspeak was the official language of Oceania and* **had been** *devised to meet the ideological needs of Ingsoc, or English Socialism.*

The grounding of the expository space continues in this way:

8) *It was expected that Newspeak* **would have** *finally superseded Oldspeak* […]
9) *It was intended that* **when** *Newspeak* **had been** *adopted*
10) *The grammar of Newspeak* **had** *two outstanding grammatical peculiarities.*

We see, then, a pattern developing in the unfolding of the new expository space. We observe by the use of past tense clausal grounding that Newspeak *happened prior to the writing of the appendix*. Notably, though, the events and facts pertaining to Newspeak are characterized as perfective processes. Perfective processes, as such, are bounded and complete. Moreover, in a number of cases this grounding invokes modal auxiliaries and is thus explicitly epistemically grounded. Therefore, we see that not only did Newspeak exist in the past relative to the time of the appendix being written but *it now no longer exists relative to the expository space.*

In this way, the appendix to *Nineteen Eighty-Four* does not represent an elaborative addition by Orwell as author, outside the text. Written, as it were, after the facts of the story, it would be impossible for the appendix to be written by 'George Orwell'. Instead, the reader must infer the existence of a new narratorial voice, writing the history of Newspeak from the vantage point of the future. Therefore, the exposition space is blended with the reader's existing knowledge of the story by way of *Time, Space, Change, Cause-Effect,* and *Intentionality* to construct a new blended space where the emergent story results in a striking realization – that the totalitarian system which existed in the story *must eventually be defeated.*

On this reading, then, the story of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* does not end with Winston Smith's

resigned defeat at the hands of Big Brother. Instead, it ends with a rather banal, academic observation:

> *There were also large quantities of merely utilitarian literature – indispensable technical manuals, and the like – that had to be treated in the same way. It was chiefly in order to allow time for the preliminary work of translation that the final adoption of Newspeak had been fixed for so late a date as 2050.*

<div align="right">2000: 326</div>

The reader of the novel may draw two conclusions here. Firstly, one might conclude that the historical revisionism practised by the Ministry of Truth was utterly redundant. For Orwell, the totalitarian systems of Big Brother and the Party were always doomed to fail. In this way, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* for all its dystopian view of society, refuses to countenance the fact that Big Brother's victory over Winston Smith was anything other than pyrrhic. It is, therefore, an optimistic conclusion. Alternatively, the detached, academic style of this expository space is noticably lacking in terms of subjectivity. The information presented is presented as authoritatively unassailable; historical fact devoid of perspective, ideology, and point of view. However, considering the status of 'facts' in *1984* – and the nature of construal in CG – the critical reader may instead be tempted to question the veracity of this historical analysis.

While this chapter has been relatively limited in its focus, I believe that the possibilities of discourse modes have been brought to the fore. It should go without saying that the texts employed in analysis represent rather idealised cases, where the discourse modes being invoked are clearly defined and differentiated. Indeed, this may be the only instances where a text-type analysis is even possible. In the final chapter which follows, we summarise the key points of this thesis, highlighting any areas which the present author views as requiring further study.

# Concluding Remarks:
# Findings and Further Research

This thesis opened on the proposal that text types can be best rendered as functionally salient features of discourse above the clause. Carlota Smith's theory of discourse modes was singled out as being a particular fruitful approach to text types, based on its qualitative analysis of both the linguistic and functional properties of the modes in question. Smith's initial claim was that discourse modes can be most readily characterized by their lexicogrammatical properties. In the first instance, this thesis was concerned with taking these key insights from Smith's model and developing a theory of discourse modes from first principles within a specifically Cognitive Linguistic model. Instead of directly presuming the functional categorization of the modes developed, as is typical in traditional rhetorical models, this thesis instead aimed to build a working theory of discourse modes working from the bottom up.

Chapter 1 presented a very brief walk-through of the key features of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT). A full exposition of DRT is not possible in a thesis of this length; instead, only a short synopsis of the theory was possible. It was noted that Kamp and Reyle's original work and their later technical elaborations are strong and well-defined approaches to the formal study of discourse structure and meaning construction. From this short expedition into DRT, Chapter 1 proceeded to introduce the work of the late Carlota Smith. This chapter argued that Smith's initial motivations are intuitively plausible and fine-grained enough to provide an interesting approach to discourse modes as functional text-types. However, while her DRT approach is valid in and of itself, it was noted that it one could use Smith's inuitive observations to provide a more richly varied approach to meaning construction in texts. From here, this thesis set out to argue that a cognitive-functional approach to discourse modes allows for these modes to have greater descriptive applicability in the qualitative analysis of discourse.

Chapter 2 developed this by introducing the key features of Cognitive Grammar. Principally, the focus in Chapter 2 was on developing Langacker's theory in such a way as to account not for the wide array of construal operations in English but to argue for the existence of structural categories above the sentence. In this way, the chapter concludes on a proposed model of text types, essentially derived from first principles. The connection between this model and Smith's is that of a family

resemblance. The three-way division between Narrative, Descriptive, and Exposition modes derives ultimately from Smith's qualitative analysis of lexicogramatical clustering.

The reduced framework put forward may lack the depth of Smith's in terms of structural description. What it lacks in this respect, though, it reclaims through its distinctly cognitive alignment and justification. In Chapter 3, these ideas were further developed by way of Mental Spaces Theory and the related notions of Conceptual Blending and Integration. The argument in this chapter reduces to the claim that the specific clustering of linguistic properties means that discourse modes represent individual discourse spaces, each with their own internal structural organization. By the process of conceptual blending, these spaces become integrated into a coherent, conceptual whole. This chapter introduced vital relations and their role in the blending process. Framing discourse modes in this way thus presents the cognitively-minded text analyst with a richly theoretical framework for explaining how exactly these modes interact, rather than assuming them to be discrete and separate units.

However, in proposing this approach, a fundamental issue was brought to the fore. Cognitive Grammar and Mental Spaces theory rely heavily on the schematic nature of language. For all the theoretical depth and understanding shown by Langacker, or Fauconnier and Turner, their conceptualist approach suffer from a discernible lack of an explicitly defined pragmatic framework for explaining the contextual nature of meaning construction. This thesis proposes that the most likely candidate to fill this meta-contextual void is to be found in Sperber and Wilson's Relevance Theory. Chapter Three thus also includes a brief exposition and synthesis of these linguistic theories into a preliminary whole. However, the present author believes that the fundamental issue raised is of concern to the entire Cognitive Linguistic enterprise more generally. A potential way forward from the initial characterization developed in this thesis would be the complete integration of Relevance Theory and Cognitive Linguistics more generally – specifically with regards to Cognitive Grammar.

This thesis ostensibly presents itself as an approach to text types which derives from existing Cognitive Linguistic theories of language. The primary claim, as outlined above, is that these text types represent salient, functional sections of discourse at the level of the passage. As such, it was considered somewhat necessary to substantiate these claims. Chapter 4 presents a very small sample of short case studies showing potential applications in the study of literary narratives. By reference in particular to the stylistic nature of foregrounding as an act of ostensive communication, the

textual analyses developed are indicative of rather simplified instances of an ideal type. A great deal more work is needed beyond the present work to develop further the ideas introduced in this thesis. One particularly fruitful way would be to study the role of discourse modes across genres. For example, are genres defined by the discourse modes from which they are comprised?

In including the analyses of Chapter 4, the intention was not to generate novel interpretations of literary texts. Rather it was to show how existing readings can use discourse modes as another way of validating stylistic claims and to point in the direction of further applications in the field of cognitive stylistics and beyond. It is hoped the concept of discourse modes and spaces developed by this thesis is rich enough to provide the stylistician with a new addition to his or her arsenal. By bridging the gap between the sentence and the passage in a cognitively salient way, this thesis therefore shows the way towards a fully developed framework linking together the three most important aspects of textual interpretation - the text, the story, and the reader.

# Appendix 1

## Excerpt – 'Of Mice and Men', John Steinbeck

A few miles south of Soledad, the Salinas River drops in close to the hillside bank and runs deep and green. The water is warm too, for it has slipped twinkling over the yellow sands in the sunlight before reaching the narrow pool. On one side of the river, the golden foothill slopes curve up to the strong and rocky Gabilan mountains, but on the valley side the water is lined with trees – willows fresh and green with every spring, carrying in their lower leaf junctures the debris of the winter's flooding; and sycamores with mottled, white, recumbent limbs and branches that arch over the pool. On the sandy bank under the trees the leaves lie deep and so crisp that a lizard makes a great skittering if he runs among them. Rabbits come out of the brush to sit on the sand in the evening, and the damp flats are covered with the night tracks of 'coons, and with the spread pads of dogs from the ranches and with the split wedge tracks of deer that come to drink in the dark.

There is a path through the willows and among the sycamores a path beaten hard by boys coming down from the ranches to swim in the deep pool, and beaten hard by tramps who come wearily down from the highway in the evening to jungle-up near water. In front of the low horizontal limb of a giant sycamore there is an ash pile made by many fires; the limb is worn smooth by men who have sat on it.

Evening of a hot day started the little wind to moving among the leaves. The shade climbed up the hills toward the top. On the sand banks the rabbits sat as quietly as little gray, sculptured stones. And then from the direction of the state highway came the sound of footsteps on crisp sycamore leaves. The rabbits hurried noiselessly for cover. A stilted heron labored up into the air and pounded down river. For a moment the place was lifeless, and then two men emerged from the path and came into the opening by the green pool.

They had walked in single file down the path, and even in the open one stayed behind the other.

[…]

# Appendix 2

## 'Everything is Green', David Foster Wallace

[…]

Her hair is up with a barrette and pins and her chin is in her hand, it's early, she looks like she is dreaming out at the clean light through the wet window over my sofa lounger.

Everything is green she says. Look how green it all is Mitch. How can you say the thing you say you feel like when every thing outside is green like it is.

The window over the sink of my kitchenette is cleaned off from the hard rain last night, and it is a morning with sun, it is still early, and there is a mess of green out. The trees are green and some grass out past the speed bumps is green and slicked down. But every thing is not green. The other trailers are not green, and my card table out with puddles in lines and beers cans and butts floating in the ashtrays is not green, or my truck, or the gravel of the lot, or the Big Wheel toy that is on its side under a clothesline without no clothes on it by the next trailer, where the guy has got him some kids.

Everything is green she is saying. She is whispering it and the whisper is not to me no more I know.

I chuck my smoke and turn hard from the morning outside with the taste of something true in my mouth. I turn hard toward her in the light on the sofa lounger.

She is looking outside, from where she is sitting, and I look at her, and there is something in me that can not close up in that looking. Mayfly has a body. And she is my morning. Say her name.

# Appendix 3
# Excerpt – '1984', George Orwell

[…]

He gazed up at the enormous face. Forty years it had taken him to learn what kind of smile was hidden beneath the dark moustache. O cruel, needless misunderstanding! O stubborn, self-willed exile from the loving breast! Two gin-scented tears trickled down the sides of his nose. But it was all right, everything was all right, the struggle was finished. He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother.

THE END

Appendix

THE PRINCIPLES OF NEWSPEAK

Newspeak was the official language of Oceania and had been devised to meet the ideological needs of Ingsoc, or English Socialism. In the year 1984 there was not as yet anyone who used Newspeak as his sole means of communication, either in speech or writing. The leading articles in the Times were written in it but this was a tour de force which could only be carried out by a specialist.

[…]

## Bibliography

Bain, Alexander (1866/1898). *English Composition and Rhetoric*. London: Longmans Green.

Barthes, Roland (1968). *Writing Degree Zero.* New York: Hill and Wang.

Barsalou, Lawrence

    – (1999). 'Perceptual symbol systems', *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*, 22(4), pp. 577-660

    – (2003). 'Situated simulation in the human conceptual system', *Language and Cognitive Processes*, 18, pp. 513-62

  – (2008). 'Grounded Cognition', *Annual Review of Psychology*, 59, pp. 617-45

 – (2012). 'The human conceptual system', in M. Spivey, K. McRae, & M. Joanisse (Eds.), *The Cambridge handbook of psycholinguistics.* New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 239-58

Biber, Douglas

    – (1988). *Variation Across Speech and Writing.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    – (1989). 'A Typology of English Texts', *Linguistics,* 27, pp. 3-43

Boddy, Kasia (2013). 'A Fiction of Response: *Girl with Curious Hair* in context', in Boswell and Burn (eds.), *A Companion to David Foster Wallace Studies*, pp. 23-42

Boroditsky, Lera (2000). 'Metaphoric Structuring: Understanding Time through Spatial Metaphors', *Cognition,* 75(1), pp. 1-28

Boswell, Marshall

    --(2003). *Understanding David Foster Wallace.* Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.

    – ed, (2014). *David Foster Wallace and 'The Long Thing': New Essays on the Novels*. London: Bloomsbury.

Boswell, Marshall and Stephen J. Burn, eds. (2013). *A Companion to David Foster Wallace Studies*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Brandt, Line (2013). *The Communicative Mind: A linguistic exploration of conceptual integration and meaning construction.* Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Brandt, Per Aage (2004). *Spaces Domains, and Meaning.* Oxford: Peter Lang.

Brandt, Per Aage and Line Brandt (2005). 'Making sense of a blend: A cognitive-semiotic approach to metaphor', *Annual Review of Cognitive Linguistics,* 3, pp. 216-49

Brône, Geert and Jeroen Vandaele (2009). *Cognitive Poetics: Goals, Gains and Gaps.* Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Burkhead, Cynthia (2002). *Student Companion to John Steinbeck.* Westport: Greenwood Press.

Cann, Ronnie, Ruth Kempson, and Eleni Gregoromichelaki (2009). *Semantics: An Introduction to*

*Meaning in Language.*

Carter, Ronald and Peter Stockwell, eds. (2008). *The Language and Literature Reader.* Oxford: Routledge.

Casasanto, Daniel and Lera Boroditsky (2008) 'Time in the Mind: Using Space to think about Time', *Cognition,* 106, pp. 579-593

Chomsky, Noam

   – (1965.) *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

   – (1967). 'A review of B.F. Skinner's *Verbal Behaviour*'. In Leon A. Jakobovits and Murray S. Miron (eds.), *Readings in the Psychology of Language*, Prentice-Hall, pp. 142-43

   – (1970). 'Remarks on Nominalization', in R. Jacobs and P. Rosenbaum (eds.) *Reading in English Transformational Grammar*, Waltham: Ginn, pp. 184-221

   – (1982). *Some Concepts and Consequences of the Theory of Government and Binding.* Linguistic Enquiry Monographs 6. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

   – (1995). *The Minimalist Program.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

Croft, William (2001). *Radical Construction Grammar: Syntactic Theory in Typological Perspective.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Croft, William and D. Alan Cruse (2004). *Cognitive Linguistics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Culler, Jonathan (1975/2000). *Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature.* London: Routledge

Cutrer, Michele (1994). *Time and Tense in Narratives and Everyday Language.* Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego.

Dancygier, Barbara (2011). *The Language of Stories.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dancygier, Barbara and Eve Sweetser

   – (2005). *Mental Spaces in Grammar: Conditional Constructions.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

   – (2012). *Viewpoint in Language: A Multimodal Perspective.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dinsmore, John (1991). *Partitioned Representations.* Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Dowty, David R., Robert E. Wall and Stanley Peters (1981). *Introduction to Montague Semantics.* London: Kluwer Academic.

Emmott, Catherine (1997). *Narrative Comprehension: A Discourse Perspective.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Emmott, Catherine and Marc Alexander (2014). 'Foregrounding, burying and plot construction', in Stockwell and Whiteley (eds.), pp. 329-33

Ercolino, Stefano (2012). *From Thomas Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow to Roberto Bolano's 2666.* London: Bloomsbury.

Evans, Vyvyan (2009). *How Words Mean: Lexical Concepts, Cognitive Models, and Meaning Construction.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Evans, Vyvyan, Benjamin K. Bergen and Jörg Zinken (2007). *The Cognitive Linguistics Reader.* London: Equinox.

Fairclough, N. (2003). *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research.* London: Routledge.

Fauconnier, Gilles (1994). *Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fauconnier, Gilles and Mark Turner (2002). *The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities.* New York: Basic Books.

Fauconnier, Gilles and Eve Sweetser (1999). *Spaces, Worlds and Grammar.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fludernik, Monika

    – (1996). *Towards a Natural Narratology.* London: Routledge.

    – (2000). 'Genres, Text Types, or Discourse Modes? Narrative Modalities and Generic Categorization', *Style*, 34(2), pp 274-92

    – (2003). 'Chronology, time, tense and experientiality in narrative', *Language and Literature*, 12 (2), pp 117-34

    – (2009). *An Introduction to Narratology.* London: Routledge.

Ganesalingam, Mohan (2013). *The Language of Mathematics: A Linguistic and Philosophical Investigation.* London: Springer.

Gavins, Joanna (2006). *Text World Theory: An Introduction.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Gavins, Joanna and Gerard Steen, eds. (2003). *Cognitive Poetics in Practice.* London: Routledge.

Geach, Peter (1962). *Reference and Generality: An Examination of Some Medieval and Modern Theories*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Genette, Gerard

    – (1980). *Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method.* Ithica: Cornell University Press.

    – (1992) *The Architext: An Introduction.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Geeraerts, Dirk and Hubert Cuyckens, eds. (2007). *The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics*.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gibbons, Michael T. (2013). 'The Indifference of Nature and the Cruelty of Wealth', in *A Political John Steinbeck,* Zirakzadeh and Stow, eds., pp 146-70

Goldberg, Adele

    – (1995). *Constructions: A Constrution Grammar Approach to Argument Structure.* Lonon: University of Chicago Press.

    – (2006). *Constructions at Work: The Nature of Generalization in Language.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goldhurst, William (1990). 'Of Mice and Men: John Steinbeck's Parable of the Curse of Cain',   in *The Short Novels of John Steinbeck*, Benson (ed.), pp 48-70

Gourley, J. (2013). *Terrorism and Temporality in the Works of Thomas Pynchon and Don DeLillo.* London: Bloomsbury.

Grice, Paul (1989). *Studies in the Way of Words.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Harrison, Chloe, Louise Nuttall, Peter Stockwell, and Wenjuan Yuan, eds. (2014). *Cognitive Grammar in Literature.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Halliday, M.A.K. (2002). *Linguistic Studies of Text and Discourse.* London: Continuum.

Halliday, M.A.K. and C.M.I.M. Matthieson (2004). *An Introduction to Functional Grammar, 3rd Edition.* London: Edward Arnold.

Hart, Christopher (2010). *Critical Discourse Analysis and Cognitive Science: New Perspectives on Immigration Discourse.* London: Palgrave Macmillan

Herman, David

    – (2002). *Story Logic: The Problems and Possibilities of Narrative.* London:     University of Nebraska Press.

    – (2003) *Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences,* ed. London: University of Nebraska Press.

Holquist, Michael ed (1982). *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by Mikhail Bakhtin*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Hougaard, Anders and Todd Oakley (2008). 'Mental spaces and discourse analysis', in *Mental Spaces in Discourse and Interaction*, Oakley and Hougaard (eds.), pp 1- 26

Janssen, T.A.M and Gisela Redeker, eds. (1999). *Cognitive Linguistic: Foundations, Scope and Methodology.* Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Kamp, Hans (1981). 'A theory of truth and semantic representation', in

Kamp, Hans and Uwe Ryle (1993). *From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory.*

Boston: Kluwer Academic.

Kamp, Hans, Joseph van Genabith and Uwe Reyle (2011). 'Discourse Representation Theory'. In: D.M. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds.), *Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 2nd Edition, Volume 15*. London: Springer, pp 125 – 394.

Kinneavy, James L. (1971). *A Theory of Discourse: The Aims of Discourse.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall

Kosslyn, Stephen (1994). *Image and Brain*: *The Resolution of the Imagery Debate.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

– (2005). 'Mental Images and the Brain', in Cognitive Neuropsychology 22:3/4, pp 333- 47.

Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson (2003[1980]). *Metaphors We Live By.* London: University of Chicago Press.

Langacker, Ronald

– (1987). *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Volume 1: Theoretical Prerequisites.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

– (1991). *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Volume 2: Descriptive Application.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

– (1999). Grammar and Conceptualization. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

– (2002). Concept, Image, and Symbol: The Cognitive Basis of Grammar. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

– (2008). *Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lappin, Shalom (1997). 'A Critique of the Minimalist Program', *Linguistics and Philosophy,* 20, pp 273-333

Lappin, Shalom, Robert Levine, and David Johnson

– (2000a). 'The Structure of Unscientific Revolutions', *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory,* 18, pp 665-771

– (2000b). 'The Revolution Confused: A Response to Our Critics, *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory,* 18, pp 873-890

– (2001) 'The Revolution Maximally Confused', *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory,* 19, pp 901-919

Lebois, L.A.M, C.D. Wilson-Mendenhall and L.W. Barsalou (2014). 'Are Automatic Conceptual Cores the old Standard of Semantic Processing? The Context-Dependence of Spatial Meaning in Grounded Congruency Effects', *Cognitive Science*, in press. Retrieved online [14/9/2014]:

http://psychology.emory.edu/cognition/barsalou/papers/Lebois_et_al-in_press-CogSci-

context_dependent_congruency.pdf

Letzler, D. (2012). 'Encyclopedic Novels and the Cruft of Fiction: *Infinite Jest*'s Endnotes', *Studies in the Novel*, 44(3), pp 304-24

Levinson, S. C. (1997). 'From outer to inner space: Linguistic categories and non-linguistic thinking', in J. Nuyts, & E. Pederson (eds), *Language and Conceptualization*, Cambridge University Press, pp 13-45

Loftis, Anne (1990). 'A Historical Introduction to *Of Mice and Men*', in *The Short Novels of John Steinbeck*, Benson, (ed.), pp 39-47

Longacre, Robert (1983). *The Grammar of Discourse.* New York: Plenum Press.

Luesldorff, Philip A. (1994). *The Prague School of Structural and Functional Linguistics: A Short Introduction*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Matlock, Teenie (2004). 'Fictive Motion as cognitive simulation'. Memory & Cognition, 32(8), pp. 1389-400

Mattessich, S. (2002). *Lines of Flight: Discursive Time and Countercultural Desire in the Work of Thomas Pynchon.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

McIntyre, Dan and Beatrix Busse, eds. (2010). *Language and Style.* London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Nist, J.A. (1952). 'A critique of generative grammar', *Language,* 3(19), pp 102-10

Oakley, Todd (2009). *From Attention to Meaning: Explorations in Semiotics, Linguistics and Rhetoric.* Berlin: Peter Lang.

Oakley, Todd and Anders Hougaard, eds. (2008). *Mental Spaces in Discourse and Interaction.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Orwell, George
    – (1946) 'Politics and the English Language', retrieved online [10/9/2014]:
    http://wikilivres.ca/wiki/Politics_and_the_English_Language
    – (1949) *Nineteen Eighty-Four.* London: Penguin.

Östman, Jan-Ola 2005. 'Construction Discourse', in Östman, J. and Fried, M. (eds.), *Construction Grammars: Cognitive Grounding and Theoretical Extensions*, pp 121–44

Pecher, Diane and Rolf Zwaan (2005). *Grounded Cognition.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pilkington, Adrian (2000). *Poetic effects: A Relevance Theory Perspective.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Popper, Karl (2002[1959]). *The Logic of Scientific Discovery.* London: Routledge.

Pullum, G.K. (2007). 'Creation myths of generative grammar and the mathematics of *Syntactic Structures'*,    retrieved online [15/03/15]:  *http://www.lel.ed.ac.uk/~gpullum/CreationMyths.pdf*

Pylyshyn, Zenon

– (1973). 'What the Mind's Eye Tells the Mind's Brain', *Psychological Bulletin*.

– (2002) 'Mental imagery: In search of a theory', *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*, 25(2), pp. 157-238

– (2003) 'Return of the mental image: are there really pictures in the brain?', *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 7(3), pp. 113-18

Radden, Günter and René Dirven (2007). *Cognitive English Grammar.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Reuland, Eric (2000). 'Revolution, Discovery, and an Elementary Principle of Logic', *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory,* 18, pp 843–48

Russell, Bertrand (1964[1912]). *The Problems of Philosophy.* London: Oxford University Press.

Sanders, Jose and Gisela Redeker (1999). 'Perspective and the Representation of Speech and Thought in Narrative Discourse', in *Spaces, Worlds and Grammar*, Fauconnier and Sweetser, (eds.), pp 290 -317

Sanford, Anthony J. and Catherine Emmott (2012) *Mind, Brain and Narrative.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Semino, Elena (2002). 'A cognitive stylistic approach to mind style in narrative fiction', in Semino, E. and Culpeper, J. (eds.), *Cognitive Stylistics: Language and cognition in text analysis*, pp. 95–122

Simpson, Paul (1993). *Language, Ideology, and Point of View.* London: Routledge.

Smith, Carlota

– (1991). *The Parameter of Aspect*. London: Kluwer Academic.

– (2003). *Modes of Discourse: The Local Structure of Texts.* Cambridge: Cambridge University press.

– (2009). *Text, Time and Context: Selected papers of Carlota S. Smith*. London: Springer.

Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson (1995[1986]. *Relevance: Communication and Cognition.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Steen, G. (2002). 'Metaphor in Bob Dylan's 'Hurricane'', in Semino, E. and Culpeper, J. (eds.), *Cognitive Stylistics: Language and cognition in text analysis,* pp 183-209

Steinbeck, John (2000[1937]). *Of Mice and Men.* London: Penguin.

Steiner, Peter, ed (1982). *The Prague School: Selected Writings, 1929-1946*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Stockwell, Peter

– (2002). *Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction.* London: Routledge.

– (2009). 'The positioned reader', in *Language and Literature* 22:3, pp 263-77

Stockwell, Peter and Sara Whiteley (2014). *The Cambridge Handbook of Stylistics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Swan, Kenneth D. (1999). 'The Enduring Values of John Steinbeck's Fiction: The University Student and *The Grapes of Wrath*', in Bloom, H. ed, *John Steinbeck,* pp 115-24

Talmy, Leonard

　　– (2000). *Towards a Cognitive Semantics, Volumes I & II.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

　　– (2011). 'Cognitive Semantics: an Overview', *r*etrieved online [18/9/13]: http://linguistics.buffalo.edu/people/faculty/talmy/talmyweb/Recent/overview.html

Taylor, John (2014). *The Mental Corpus: How Language is Represented in the Mind.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Todorov, Tzvetan (1977). *The Poetics of Prose.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Tomasello, Michael (1999). *The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Tomasello, Michael, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya Behne, and Henrike Moll (2005). 'Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins of cultural cognition', in *Behavioural and Brain Sciences* 28: 675-735

Thomas, James, Denise Thomas and Tom Hazuka (1992). *Flash Fiction: 72 Very Short Stories.* New York: W.W. Norton and Co.

Thomason, Richmond H, ed. (1974). *Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers by Richard Montague.* London: Yale University Press.

Turner, Mark

　　– (1991). *Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

　　– (1996). *The Literary Mind: The Origins of Thought and Language.*

　　– (2014) Personal website, retrieved online http://markturner.org/blending.html [

Unger, Cristoph (2004). 'Modes of Discourse: The Local Structure of Texts', retrieved online [15/9/13]: http://www.sil.org/resources/archives/40610

Ungerer, Friedrich and Hans-Jörg Schmid (2006). *An Introduction to Cognitive Linguistics.* Harlow: Pearson Education.

Vachek, Josef, ed (1964). *A Prague School Reader in Linguistics*. Bloomington: Indiana.

van Benthem, Johan and Alice ter Meulen, eds (2001). *Handbook of Language and Logic, 2nd Edition.* London: Elsevier.

van Eijck, Jan and Hans Kamp (2001). 'Discourse Representation in Context', in  Benthem  J.v.  and

Meulen, A.t. (eds.), *Handbook of Language and Logic*, 2nd edition, London: Elsevier, pp 181 – 252.

Verhagen, Arie

    – (2005). *Constructions of Intersubjectivity. Discourse, Syntax and Cognition.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    – (2007). 'Construal and Perspectivization', in *The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics*, Geeraerts and Cuyckens eds, pp 48-81

Vinay, Jean-Paul and Jean Darbelnet (1995). *Comparative Stylistics of French and English: A Methodology for Translation.* Translated by Juan C. Sager, M.-J. Hamel. Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Wallace, David Foster (1989). *Girl with Curious Hair.* New York: W.W. Norton and Co.

Werlich, Egon (1976). *A Text Grammar of English.* Heidelberg: Quelle and Meyer.

Werth, Paul (1999). *Text Worlds: Representing Conceptual Space in Discourse.* Harlow: Longman.

Wilson, Deirdre and Dan Sperber (2012). *Meaning and Relevance.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zlatev, Jordon (2007). 'Spatial Semantics', in *The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics, Geeraerts* and Cuyckens eds, pp 318-50