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MODES OF INCORPORATION AND RACIALIZATION:
THE CANADIAN CASE

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SUMMARY

This thesis makes a contribution to three areas of sociological thought. First, it is concerned with the elaboration and extension of the political economy approach to migration as it is represented in the work of Stephen Castles and his various co-authors. It suggests that the work of Castles, et. al. is relatively silent on the role of the state, and ideological relations in the structuration of migration. In seeking to further refine the political economy framework as it is applied to migration, this thesis draws upon two other sets of literature which, in part, have emerged as counters to some of the more economistic of their formulations. In this light, the second area of sociological literature I draw upon is the recent work on the concepts of free and unfree labour. Finally, this thesis is informed by an analysis of recent debates on the concept of racialization. In synthesizing these three strands of sociology, this thesis advances the theoretical claim that political economy oriented theorists should focus on modes of incorporation, or the manner in which foreign-born labour articulates with capital and the state. Within this context, four distinct modes of incorporation under capitalism are identified. These modes of incorporation are designated as: free immigrant labour, unfree immigrant labour, free migrant labour and unfree migrant labour. This thesis suggests that agents are subject to particular modes of incorporation, in part, on the basis on the process of racialization.

This thesis uses the cases of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Chinese migration to Canada, and the post-1945 migration of farm labourers, from a number of source countries, including, specifically, the Netherlands, Poland, Germany, and the Caribbean, to the south western Ontario fruit and vegetable industry to highlight
the centrality of the state in the process of migration, and the differential modes of incorporation of foreign-born persons into sites in production relations. Furthermore, the process of racialization is seen to have an impact on whether particular groups are allowed entry to a social formation, and upon how they are incorporated into sites in production relations.
INTRODUCTION

In the early 1950's, members of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, one of the branches of the Canadian state which exercised control over international migration to the country, debated whether they should deport immigrants who were initially granted entry to the country on the basis of their intention to work as farm labourers but who, shortly after their entry, found better paying jobs in other industries. The following are a few extracts from that debate:

It may well be argued that implementation of such a law is an infringement of the freedom of the individual and abnegation of human rights which cannot be justified in a democratic country. It involves applying a control and regimentation to immigrants which would be unacceptable to Canadians, at the same time as we profess an earnest desire to make these immigrants into good Canadian citizens .... The denial of opportunity of a man (sic) to better himself is difficult to defend for it may be argued that the sum of self improvement is a national benefit.¹

... as we are proud of the freedom experienced in Canada and must endeavour to maintain our present standards which are advertised abroad, it would not be feasible to impose a contract which would amount to virtual slavery.²

... it is difficult to force immigrants to remain at farm work as this would closely approximate forced labour.³

... a sounder means of control lies in facilitating the movement of races that experience has shown are likely to remain in agriculture ... and tightening up on the screening of those races that tend to drift into occupations adequately provided for now ....⁴

Taken collectively, these statements contain implicit assumptions about the nature of Canadian capitalism, capitalism's apparent incompatibility with 'unfree labour', and the importance of political and ideological relations in general, and the idea of 'race' in particular, in the process of migration. Moreover, they succinctly encapsulate one of the main theoretical objectives of this thesis, which is the exploration, within the framework of political economy,
of the nature and extent of the permiability of the boundaries of the Canadian nation state. In other words, it examines the processes whereby foreign-born workers have been excluded from entry to the country, included, and allocated to particular structural positions in the relations of production. These processes are examined first, through an analysis of the modes by which Chinese migrants to Canada were incorporated into sites in production relations around the turn of the twentieth century, and second, through an analysis of the various ways in which European and Caribbean-born people were incorporated to fill labour shortages in the southwestern Ontario fruit and vegetable industry in the period since 1945 (the reasons for this focus are discussed in more detail in the section on methodology later in this Introduction).

The second theoretical objective of this thesis is the exploration, again within the framework of political economy, of the relationship between migration and capitalism in Canada. In so doing, it seeks to specify the limits to the political economy approach to migration, as represented by the work of Castles and Kosack, and Castles, Booth and Wallace. Two general problems with their approach are identified and explored. The first problem concerns the historical limits to their conception of the link between capitalism and migration. This thesis seeks to question the view that migration contributes soley to the reproduction of capitalist relations of production. Through an analysis of migration to Canada during the 19th century, it is suggested that migration contributed to the formation of those relations. The second problem is conceptual, and involves a set of questions related to the analysis of the nature of migration during the period when capitalist relations of production have become hegemonic within a social formation. It is suggested that in their analysis of migration under capitalism, they under-emphasize both the role of the state in organizing and controlling the spatial relocation of agents across international boundaries, and the importance of political and ideological relations in the structuration of migration flows. Additionally, I argue that they fail to take into account different forms of migration that have been associated with
the development of capitalism. These latter difficulties, I suggest, derive from their silence on the place that migration occupies in the formation and reproduction of the nation state.

In the remainder of this introduction I briefly review, and locate this thesis within, Canadian literature on migration in general, and the emergent tradition of the political economy of migration in particular. I then specify the broad lines of the political economy approach to migration which this thesis expands upon and refines. This is followed by an outline of the content of each chapter and a discussion of methodological issues.

Migration in Canadian Academic Literature

Studies of migration to Canada have traditionally focused on three sets of empirical and/or theoretical issues. One perspective, which has its basis in the pioneering work of John Porter, consists of statistical studies of the comparative occupational, status and income stratification of immigrant groups in Canada. Within this tradition explanations for the stratification of immigrants range from structural, to cultural, to biological. A second perspective, represented by, among others, the work of Hawkins, Corbett and Parai, examines the formulation and implementation of Canadian immigration policy, and the effects of immigration policy on the occupational, skill and demographic composition of the flow of people to the country. A third traditional perspective focuses on the differential social, cultural and behavioural 'assimilation' and 'adaptation' of immigrant groups in Canada, and is represented most notably by the works of Richmond, Reitz and Danys.

Until fairly recently, the tradition of political economy, which is otherwise quite vibrant in the study of many aspects of social, historical, economic and political structures and processes in Canada, has not problematized the process of international migration to the country. One indication of the relative lacuna of studies of migration to Canada from an explicitly political economy framework is
provided by a brief perusal of a comprehensive annotated bibliography, published in 1978, of political economy oriented studies of Canada. The bibliography, compiled by Wallace Clement and Daniel Drache does not contain a separate heading pertaining to 'migration' or 'immigration', and not more than a handful of the several hundred selections appear to concern themselves explicitly with the nature of the relationship between migration and the development of capitalism in Canada.

However, there are signs of a recent change. The work of Bolaria and Li constitutes an important conceptual break with the hitherto dominant traditions identified above. Rather than study the 'problems' of 'assimilation, adaptation and integration', tasks which suffer from a range of conceptual, methodological and theoretical confusions too numerous to mention in detail here, their work over the past decade examines the wider links between the development of capitalism, the process of migration and the articulation of racism. The analysis of racism and migration is located in the specificities of uneven capitalist development in the country, and structural processes associated with the procuration of labour for the process of commodity production.

Notwithstanding the problems with this work (many of which are similar to the problems identified with the work of Castles et. al. in chapter one), this thesis should be seen as an attempt to build upon the conceptual and theoretical foundations of the political economy of migration approach that Bolaria and Li have been so influential in developing. The following section seeks to specify the 'core' of the political economy approach to migration.

Migration, Capital Accumulation and the Reserve Army of Labour

According to Charles Wood, there are a number of models which make up the political economy perspective on migration. These models differ, in part, because of competing marxist definitions of capitalism, which either define the term within the sphere of
production or the sphere of circulation. However, Wood also argues that despite the theoretical diversity which is implied by the existence of particular models, the theoretical unity to the 'historical-structural', or political economy perspective on migration is provided by Marx's analysis of the process of the general law of capital accumulation and by his concept of the reserve army of labour. The latter concept is now a matter of theoretical debate. The two lines of the debate which will be drawn upon here concern the distinction between the concepts reserve army of labour and relative surplus population, and whether the entire category of 'immigrant' can be categorized as a reserve army of labour.

Marx identified four empirical forms of the reserve army of labour. The first consists of the latent surplus population, or those displaced by the penetration of capitalist relations of production in agriculture. The second consists of the floating surplus population (or relative surplus population) of those workers who have been expelled from the process of production by the operation of the law of capital accumulation. The third consists of the stagnant surplus population of the irregularly employed, and the fourth consists of the paupers, or those people 'impoverished and marginalized by capitalist exploitation'. Only the first two categories of the reserve army of labour have a direct bearing on the dynamics of the process of migration, and they are therefore the only ones of interest to us in the following.

The existence of a latent surplus population is presupposed by the existence of different modes of production (or forms of labour control, in 'circulationist' terms) within centres and peripheries of the world system. According to Samir Amin, within centre formations...

... the capitalist mode of production is not merely dominant but, because its growth is based on expansion of the internal market, tends to become exclusive. These formations therefore draw closer and closer to the capitalist mode of production, the distintegration of precapitalist modes tending to become complete and to their replacement by the capitalist mode ....
Conversely, within peripheral formations, while

... the capitalist mode of production does indeed predominate, this domination does not lead to a tendency for it to become exclusive, because the spread of capitalism here is based on the external market. It follows that pre-capitalist modes of production are not destroyed but are transformed and subjected to that mode of production which predominates on a world scale ....³⁰

The penetration of the capitalist mode of production in previously non-capitalistically organized agricultural sectors of production, which involves an increase in the use of machinery in relation to labour and thus a reduction in the amount of labour needed to produce a given quantity of commodities within either peripheral or central formations of the world economy, creates a class of potential international migrants. In Marx's terms

Part of the agricultural population is therefore constantly on the point of passing over into an urban or manufacturing proletariat, and on the look-out for circumstances favourable to this transformation. This source of relative surplus-population is thus constantly flowing .... The agricultural labourer is therefore reduced to the minimum of wages, and always stands with one foot already in the swamp of pauperism.³¹

The question of whether the latent part of the reserve army of labour actually drifts into the 'swamp of pauperism' or whether sections of it migrate to fill wage labour positions in urban industry within centres of the world system depends, in part, on the nature of the process of capital accumulation as it occurs within centre formations, and the nature of the corresponding demand for labour.

Marx suggested that there are two countervailing tendencies associated with the 'law of capital accumulation'.

It is its tendency ... to create as much labour as possible; just as it is equally its tendency to reduce necessary labour to a minimum. It is therefore equally a tendency of capital to increase the labouring population, as well as constantly to posit a part of it as surplus population—a population which is useless until such time as capital can utilize it.³²

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In order to understand the dynamics of these countervailing tendencies, it is first necessary to understand the labour theory of value. Within the capitalist mode of production, all commodities have a use value and an exchange value. That is to say, all commodities have a selling price and possess some utility. The exchange value of a commodity is determined by the amount of socially necessary labour time which is needed to produce it.33

In the course of capitalist production, owners of the means of production purchase labour power, or variable capital, and combine it with tools and other means of production, or constant capital. Marx called the combination of variable capital (V) and constant capital (C) in the process of production the organic composition of capital, and expressed it as a ratio of C/V.34 Under capitalism, labour power is also a commodity which possesses the same twofold value dimension as other commodities. The wage constitutes the exchange value of labour power. Capitalists purchase a certain length of time during which they maintain the right to the use of labour power. They can therefore organize the production process, or the specific combination of variable and fixed capital, to ensure that the workers produce commodities with a value greater than what they receive as a wage. The utility of labour power to the capitalist, then, is not simply that it can be put to work to produce commodities, but that it has the special capacity to produce commodities which possess values greater than it itself has.35 That is, it can produce surplus value, or values created by the labourer after creating sufficient values to ensure the reproduction of his/her labour power. Because of the nature of the exchange process, the surplus value produced by the worker is the property of the owner of the means of production.

Surplus value can only be realized by the capitalist if the commodities are sold for money in a market. Part of the surplus value which is produced by the worker and which is appropriated by the owner of the means of production is consumed unproductively by the latter in order to reproduce his/her own existence. But part of the surplus value is reinvested in more means of production. If we assume that
the quality of the means of production remains constant over the cycles of production, appropriation and reinvestment, then the greater the amount of surplus invested in machinery, the greater will be the demand for new labour to produce commodities with the expanded stock of means of production. Theoretically, then, with all other factors constant, the demand for labour is proportional to the amount invested in machinery. In practice, however, the quality of the means of production does not remain constant, and so this assumption has to be set aside. Capitalist production is also competitive production: different production units attempt to sell more commodities than their competitors. One of the ways that more commodities can be sold by one enterprise at the expense of another is through reducing the selling price of the commodity. One of the ways to lessen the price of the commodity is to lessen the cost of its production. Because all value is derived from the application of labour power to means of production, in order to lessen the cost of production of the commodity, the capitalist must try to cheapen the cost of labour power.

This can be done in an absolute way by the intensification of the production process. This in turn can be achieved by lengthening the working day without a commensurate increase in wages paid to the direct producers. The ability to intensify work in this way, or to increase the rate of absolute surplus value, is limited by the length of the working day. Furthermore, there are social, political and historical limits to such practices. Such attempts by the owners of the means of production are the subject of class struggle, the outcome of which is contingent upon the bargaining powers of the respective classes involved.

A second alternative available to capitalists is to increase the rate of relative surplus value. The capitalist can use the surplus value produced in prior production cycles to invest in qualitatively different types of machinery which require the use of less labour.
power to produce a given quantity of goods. Thus, the capitalist can attempt to increase the organic composition of capital, or the ratio of C/V. Thus, to produce a given number of commodities, less labour power is used because of the introduction of new machinery and techniques. Thus, an increase in relative surplus value is obtained by shortening that part of the working day during which the worker reproduces the equivalent of his/her wage.\textsuperscript{39}

This process has important implications for patterns of labour demand and supply. When the rate of surplus value is increased in such ways, there is a lessening of the demand for labour because fewer workers are required to produce a fixed quantity of commodities than before. Marx makes the implications of this process for the working class clear:

The labouring population therefore produces, along with the accumulation of capital produced by it, the means by which itself is made relatively superfluous, is turned into a relative surplus population.\textsuperscript{39}

Or alternatively,

The whole form of the movement of modern industry depends, therefore, upon the constant transformation of a part of the labouring population into unemployed or half-employed hands.\textsuperscript{40}

As already noted, those people who have been expelled from the capitalist production process by the introduction of new techniques associated with an increase in the organic composition of capital are referred to by Marx as the relative surplus population, or the floating portion of the reserve army of labour.\textsuperscript{41} In this light, then the concept of reserve army of labour must been seen as a broader concept than that of the relative surplus population.\textsuperscript{42} The latter is, as noted above, one form that the reserve army of labour takes. The floating portion of the reserve army of labour (or relative surplus population) also constitutes a class of potential international migrants when countervailing tendencies associated with the process of capital accumulation do not operate.

\textsuperscript{9}
In some historical circumstances a countervailing tendency operates to increase the demand for labour within centre formations. Where the total amount of surplus value which is reinvested is sufficiently great (when it results in the creation of a new production plant for example), even with the introduction of labour saving technology, there can be an increase in the demand for labour associated with the process of capital accumulation. Similarly, in cases where new technology breaks down tasks previously carried out by the use of skilled labour, and introduces less well paid unskilled or semi-skilled labour in its place, there can be an increase in the numbers of workers employed without greater outlays for wages. Under such conditions, the process of capital accumulation can result in an increase in the demand for labour.

The tendencies of capitalist accumulation identified by Marx do not operate in the same combination in each sector of the national economy, let alone between national economies. As already noted, capitalism is characterized by uneven development, both nationally and internationally. Productive units within the same social formation undergo different forms of structural transformation, and therefore have different labour force requirements. Thus, some sectors of a national economy may undergo structural transformations which lead to the expulsion of workers from production, and at the same time other sectors of the national economy may undergo transformations which require the recruitment of new workers.

Again, the increase in the demand for labour can be filled via the mobilization of the floating portion of the reserve army of labour which was expelled from the process of production during previous cycles of production--sale of commodities--investment in other sectors of a national economy. But, in certain historical instances, the size and/or the composition of the reserve army of labour which is located within the boundaries of a particular social formation is inadequate to feed the process of capital accumulation. Aside from the movement of political refugees (which occur as a result of political pressures), international migration occurs, then, when the latent
and/or floating portions of the reserve army of labour within other social formations move to fill these labour shortages. Once migrants find work within the social formation they have relocated themselves in, they cease to be part of the reserve army of labour. Instead, they come to constitute part of the active labour army. They can, however, if they become unemployed, once again come to constitute part of the reserve army of labour. 46

In sum, then, migration from the political economy perspective is defined as both a cause and consequence of the process of capital accumulation. Capital accumulation initially propels, or forces certain groups of people to migrate because of the associated economic dislocations which accompany it. Capital accumulation is also the stimulus to migration to the extent that it constitutes the conditions which give rise to labour shortages and points of attraction for wage labour. Within this view, then, migration augments the size and composition of an already pre-existing labour force, and migrants are incorporated into the capitalist labour market, characterized by the purchase and sale of free wage labour.

Organization of the Thesis

Having specified the 'core' of the political economy approach to migration above, the main aim of this thesis is its refinement and extension. Part one of the thesis elaborates on the conceptual and theoretical links between capitalism, migration, unfree labour and racialization. The first chapter presents a critique of the work of Castles and Kosack, et al. It shows that the work of Castles and Kosack is silent on the distinctiveness of forms that migrations have taken under capitalism, on the role of the state in the structuration of migration, and on the political and ideological relations which structure patterns of migration. Building upon this critique, chapter two seeks to specify analytically different modes of incorporation within a social formation dominated by the capitalist mode of production. It also suggests that the state, and the process of racialization, play key roles in the process of migration through the
former's regulation of the manner in which the boundaries of the nation state have been breached, and the latter's role in the allocation of foreign-born persons to particular sites in production relations.

Part two specifies the historical limits to Castles', et. al. analysis of migration, which tends to define migration solely in terms of the reproduction of capitalist relations of production. Chapter three suggests that in certain historical instances, and here I refer to those social formations defined as settler capitalist (Denoon, 1983), migration contributes to the initial formation of a class of free wage labour, not simply the augmentation of its size and/or composition. Thus, it is suggested that migration plays a role in the initial establishment of capitalist relations of production and not simply their reproduction. Migration, then is identified as a feature of the primitive, or primary accumulation of capital within a social formation.

Chapter four, which is a case study of the political and ideological reaction to Chinese migration to the country during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, demonstrates that migration was an integral part of the process of nation state formation. It also demonstrates that the 'imagined community' which constituted the Canadian nation was defined, in part, in terms of 'race'. And finally, it suggests that racism and the process of racialization had important effects on the form that Chinese migration to Canada took.

Part three involves a shift in the historical canvas and is concerned primarily with the modes of incorporation of various foreign-born groups who filled farm labour positions in the southwestern Ontario fruit and vegetable industry between 1945 and 1966. Specifically, chapter five examines the structure of fruit and vegetable production in southern Ontario, the patterns of labour demand, and the nature and extent of labour shortages in this industry. It sets out the nature of Ontario fruit and vegetable growers' 'labour problem', and the various strategies, short of labour

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import, which have been used to combat it. In this light, primary focus is on the manner in which internal reserves of labour were mobilized by the Canadian state in its attempts to resolve labour recruitment and retention problems.

Chapter six demonstrates that the state's efforts to mobilize internal reserves of labour were inadequate to fill all of the employment vacancies in this industry. This meant that farmers had to turn to labour born and raised outside of the boundaries of the nation state to fill farm labour positions. But, the recruitment of labour to fill these positions did not involve the simple reproduction of the social relationship between free wage labour and capital. Rather, it is suggested that there were three distinct modes by which foreign-born workers were incorporated into sites in production relations within this industry: free immigrant labour, unfree immigrant labour, and unfree migrant labour. Further, it demonstrates that the state's allocation of agents to sites in production relations was structured by a range of economic, political and ideological relations, one of which was racialization.

Chapter seven suggests that post-war migration to Canada in general, and farm labour migration in particular, did not occur in an ideological and political context denuded of the idea of 'race'. It demonstrates that between 1947 and 1966, certain groups of people were never defined as suitable sources of immigrant labour to fill farm labour shortages in the Ontario fruit and vegetable industry. It shows that 'black' workers were not defined as suitable permanent settlers by the Canadian state, nor as suitable immigrant farm labourers, because of its fear that they would cause a 'race relations' problem in the country.

Chapter eight examines in detail the pressures placed on the Canadian state, since 1947, by south western Ontario fruit and vegetable growers and representatives of a number of Caribbean states, to allow Ontario farmers the opportunity to exploit the labour power of Caribbean workers under contract. It also documents the Canadian
state's response and resistance to such a proposal. Until 1966 this resistance was based, in part, on its racialization of 'black' labour from the Caribbean, and its concern over the creation of a 'race relations' problem in the country. The state's eventual sanctioning of this migration in 1966 was the result of a number of factors, the most important of which was that by allowing Caribbean workers to enter the country on a temporary, migrant basis, it hoped to stem pressure to increase the number of 'black' permanent settlers who would be allowed to enter Canada.

In the concluding chapter, I return again to theoretical issues and in light of the historical evidence presented in parts two and three, link together analytically the relationship between free and unfree labour, racialization, migration and Canadian capitalism. It suggests that the use of unfree labour was not confined to the 'prehistory' of capital, or the phase of primitive accumulation, in Canada. The state's allocation of agents under distinct modes of incorporation was structured by political and ideological relations, and that the 'imagined community' which constituted the Canadian nation has been defined, in part in terms of 'race'.

Methodological Considerations

There are several theoretical and methodological reasons for the particular empirical focus taken in parts two and three of this thesis. First, in part three, I wanted to chose a case in which an industry has displayed a historical dependence on foreign-born labour for the process of commodity production, and which has involved the simultaneous use of the range of the modes of incorporation available under capitalism identified in chapter two. Between 1945 and the present, the southern Ontario fruit and vegetable industry has relied extensively on labour born and raised outside of the boundaries of the nation state. Similarly, this labour was not a homogeneous category, because foreign-born workers have been incorporated within the industry as free immigrant labour, unfree immigrant labour, and free migrant labour.
Second, I wanted to demonstrate that the presence of relations of production using unfree labour has not been confined to the 'pre-history' of capitalism in the country. That is, I wanted to show that the use of unfree labour in Canada has not been confined to the colonial period, and to the period during which there was an absence of a labour market. I therefore chose Chinese migration around the turn of the century, and migration to the Ontario fruit and vegetable industry since 1945, to show that the use of unfree labour has continued to be used in the process of commodity production in Canada, even when capitalist relations of production of have been dominant. Both of these cases highlight, therefore, the reproduction of unfree relations of production within a capitalist society into the twentieth century.

Third, I wanted to include cases which highlighted the centrality of racism, and the process of racialization in the influence over who entered the country and over the subsequent mode by which foreign-born workers were incorporated into sites in production relations across the whole span of capitalist production in Canada. I chose cases which highlighted the influence of what I call a racialized 'imagined community' over the manner in which foreign-born persons have been incorporated into Canadian society during the period in which capitalist relations of production have been present within the country. In this light, the cases chosen highlight the centrality of racism and racialization for the entire period of capitalist development. Racism, and racialization were, then, not simply moments in the early history of the development of capitalism in Canada.

Finally, a few words are also necessary about sources of data. The main source of data for part two of the thesis comes from secondary sources (of which there are many on Chinese migration to Canada). Primary sources consist of the hearings, minutes and reports of three Royal Commissions (one held in 1885, another in 1902, and the third in 1907) which dealt with various aspects of Chinese migration to Canada. Even though participation in Royal Commissions by members

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of the public is a selective process, in the sense that people who wish to pursue particular interests associated with the issues covered under the commission's terms of reference tend to participate in them more extensively that people who do not, the submissions presented in 'evidence' do seem to reflect accurately the ideas, values and beliefs of those who chose to participate.46

The main source of data for part three of the thesis are the files of the Deputy Ministers of the government departments which excercised control over migration to Canada during the post war years. Between 1945 and 1966, control over migration to Canada was split between two branches of the Canadian state: the 'Manpower' section of the Department of Labour, and the 'Immigration Branch' of the Department of Mines and Resources, which became the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in 1950, and the Department of Manpower and Immigration in 1966. In 1966, the 'Manpower' section of the Department of Labour merged with the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, and since then control over migration has rested solely with the Department of Manpower and Immigration, which itself was renamed the Department of Employment and Immigration in 1973 and Employment and Immigration Canada in 1980. These files are stored at the Public Archives of Canada in Ottawa.

There are two sound methodological reasons for the use of such date in the realization of the objectives of this thesis. First, Hawkins suggests that in the case of Canada immigration policies have originated in the main within the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and later the Department of Manpower and Immigration. Policy making in immigration has largely been a bureaucratic prerogative.47

And furthermore, again according to Hawkins, within the bureaucracy, The process of policy initiation and development has taken place within a very small group of senior officials working with the Deputy Minister .... The Deputy Minister has been immensely influential, a key figure, lending his own special tone and direction to departmental operations, determining very often the pace of development and degree of experiment,
making the final decision over a very wide range of matters, and exercising substantial powers of veto. 43

Hawkins certainly overstates the degree of autonomy of the state, and the degree to which immigration policies are the result of the individual personalities, philosophies and ideas of state agents. Similarly, as this thesis shows, she understates the degree to which various competing and contradictory pressures have been placed on state agents with respect to how the boundaries of the nation state are to be breached by non-citizens. However, the important element of truth to her observations is that the state bureaucracy in general, and the Deputy Minister in particular, are central to the process of decision making pertaining to matters related to immigration to the country.

This methodological point is confirmed more generally by Petras, who has suggested that

It is difficult to obtain definite confirmation of the aims of states in forming definitions of their national boundaries (and therefore, by implication, immigration policy and modes of incorporation), since these aims are often matters of secret policy which can be established only by reference to archives long after the event. 45

Fortunately in the case of Canada, the Access to Information Act of 1982 stipulates that Canadian citizens have the right of access to all government documents, with the exception of those which are deemed by and 'Access to Information Officer' to be 'sensitive' to national security or diplomatic relations, or which contain 'personal information'. This means that the use of governmental material by researchers is not a priori ruled out for thirty years after the event, as it is in the case of Britain. It is therefore possible to undertake research topics which deal with the state that are more immediate in scope. Although, as found through personal experience through the course of this research, the closer to the present that the topic is, the more likely the material will be deemed by 'Access
to Information Officers' to be 'sensitive' to national security or diplomatic relations, and closed to academic perusal.

However, when these files are open to academic analysis, as they were for most of my research, there is a second methodological reason why they are valuable as sources of data. Through their use, we get an indication of the 'actual practices' of state officials. Because the documents of the various branches of the state which I examined were not initially intended for public consumption, they provide us with a more accurate picture of social processes than the public utterances of state agents and the public documents of state agencies. The documents not intended for public consumption, and the positions articulated in them, did not undergo a process of what Reeves, in *British Racial Discourse*, has termed 'sanitary coding' because they were not intended for public consumption. This is important in the case of the analysis of the state's racialization of migration during the post-war period because, on the one hand Canada, along with many other governments of the world, condemned Nazi 'racial' theorizing, and yet on the other hand imposed a highly restrictive set of immigration controls which sought to preclude the entry of certain 'races' of people to the country. Many public documents therefore either obscured this contradiction by remaining silent on it, or explained it away by reference to selectivity being based, less perniciously, on geographical area of origin.

And finally, the use of such material corresponds with a realist view of science. According to Keat and Urry

The realist view of explanation can be conveniently summarized in the claim that answers to why-questions (that is, to requests for causal explanations) require answers to how- and what-questions. Thus, if asked why something occurs, we must show how some event or change brings about a new state of affairs by describing the way in which the structure and mechanisms that are present respond to the initial change. To do this, it is necessary to discover what the entities involved are; to discover their natures or essences. It is sometimes said that science cannot tell us why things happen, but only how; or, that science is concerned only with description, and not with explanation. But the realist rejects the contrasts implicit in such
claims. For, to explain why is partly to say how; and causal explanation itself requires descriptions.

Since the bulk of part three of the thesis is concerned with the questions of why the Canadian state resisted proposals to bring farmworkers from the Caribbean to fill farm labour shortages in the south western Ontario fruit and vegetable harvest, why the Canadian state eventually allowed the entry of Caribbean workers to the country, why they were incorporated into sites in production relations as unfree wage labour, and why other foreign-born groups were incorporated as free immigrant labour, unfree immigrant labour and unfree migrant labour, it is necessary to examine how the state resisted the proposals, how the state came to its decisions, and how the foreign-born were incorporated into Canadian society.

Conclusion

In sum, this thesis is conceived as a contribution to three interrelated areas of sociological work. First, and above all, it is a contribution to the political economy perspective on migration. Second, it contributes to the literature on racism and racialization, and third, to the sociology of unfree labour.
PART ONE:

THEORETICAL ISSUES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MIGRATION

Part one seeks to clarify what is distinctive about the theoretical approach of this thesis. Chapter one consists of a critique of the work of Stephen Castles and his various co-authors, while chapter two builds on this critique by drawing on recent literature on unfree labour and racialization. As an alternative to the work of Castles and Kosack, et. al., it is suggested that political economy oriented theorists should focus on the modes by which foreign-born workers are incorporated into sites in production relations. A focus on modes of incorporation implies that the state, along with various political and ideological relations, must be accorded a central place in the study of the process of migration.
CHAPTER ONE

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND MIGRATION: A CRITIQUE OF CASTLES AND KOSACK

Introduction

This chapter offers a critique of Castles and Kosack's *Immigrant Workers and the Class Structure of Western Europe*, and Castles, Booth and Wallace's *Here For Good: Western Europe's New Ethnic Minorities* with the aim of extending and refining the political economy approach to migration. The former work is now widely regarded as the 'classic' statement of the marxist analysis of the interrelation between migration and capitalism, and while portions of the latter depart significantly from the marxist tradition (which will be noted below), it too will undoubtedly take its place as an important work within the political economy tradition. There is much that is of value in the work of Castles et. al. They reject those theoretical traditions which analyze migration simply in terms of individual decision making in the context of a variety of discrete 'push' and 'pull' factors in favour of an approach which examines the significance and dynamics of migration in the material and structural processes of capital accumulation and uneven development. Their analysis has therefore become an important corrective to orthodox studies of migration which focus primarily on individuals who migrate and their 'problems' of 'adaptation, assimilation and integration'.

Despite these merits, this chapter sets out and develops three critical themes in relation to their work. First, it questions their tendency to homogenize the category of 'immigrant' or 'migrant' (terms which they use interchangeably). It is suggested that within western Europe, the category of 'people who migrated in order to to sell their labour power for a wage' is characterized by divisions based on class and gender. Furthermore, by treating the category of 'immigrant' as a homogenous political and analytical category, Castles, et. al. are
unable to specify the differences in the way people who migrate can be incorporated into sites in production relations within a social formation.

Second, it questions that part of their analysis which attributes the state with a peripheral role in the process of migration. Third, and related to this, it questions their instrumental and functionalist view of the role of the state in the process of migration. Using the cases of migration to post-war Britain and Switzerland, it is suggested that state intervention was structured not only by need to provide employers with a cheap and potentially docile labour force, but also by a range of political and ideological relations which were not directly functional for 'capital'. Before these critical comments are developed, Castles and Kosack's, et. al. general argument is set out, along with the continuities and discontinuities between the two works.

Migration to Western Europe

Both works locate the initial stimulus of migration to post-war western Europe in the process of uneven development and capital accumulation. The theoretical dynamics of this process were outlined in the Introduction and need not be reviewed again here. During the early post-war years, the process of capital accumulation resulted in an increase in the demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labour. Unskilled and semi-skilled positions were vacated by the indigenous male working class, members of which found better paying work in more skilled sectors of production. Western European capital responded to this trend by mobilizing internal reserves of labour. They included, among others, women who previously worked in the household and the latent reserves of rural agricultural commodity producers. In most cases, however, these internal reserves were exhausted shortly after the war and were insufficient to fill all of the emergent vacancies.²

The respective states, and employers within various social formations, responded to the continued demand for unskilled labour, in some cases,
by implementing new labour-saving technologies and in others through the recruitment of foreign-born labour.3

Castles, et. al. identify two main sources of labour: the colonial and ex-colonial formations in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, and the physically proximate formations of the Mediterranean and North African periphery. They suggest that those who migrated to western Europe were primarily young single males and females who were displaced by the penetration of capitalist relations of production in agricultural sectors of peripheral formations. As such, the majority of post-war migration to western Europe was made up, according to Castles, et. al., of a movement of a latent reserve army of labour which was spatially located in the periphery of the world capitalist system.4

During the initial phase of mass labour migration, which lasted from about 1950 to 1973, the state is accorded a peripheral, but nevertheless instrumental role in the process of migration. State intervention in the process of migration, in the form of the formulation, articulation, and administration of an 'immigration policy', was only developed several years after the migratory process began.5

Government immigration policies have come after the event, to control and direct already existing movements rather than to determine them from the outset.6

Thus, before 1973, migration is defined as a relatively spontaneous reaction to labour demand.7 But the minimal nature of state intervention which did occur was structured solely by the interests of employers. According to Castles,

When recruitment started in the late 1950's state migration policies were concerned only with the short-term fulfillment of capital's labour requirements.8

The years 1973/1974 proved to be a turning point in the history of migration to post-war western Europe. Each western European state,
with the exception of Britain (which did so in 1962), placed restrictions on the entry of primary migrants, or people in search of work. According to Castles et al., the restrictions were the outcome of a number of conjunctural economic, political and ideological factors.

The immediate economic reason for the partial ban on primary labour migration was the 'oil crisis' and the accompanying economic recession. However, Castles, et al. suggest that the restrictions were also motivated by important political and ideological considerations. The repeated renewal of labour contracts and the accompanying process of family reunification, without corresponding increases in state expenditures on services in demand by foreign-born workers and their families, meant increasing 'immigrant' competition for education, housing, health and social services with the indigenous population. The competition for scarce resources resulted in increasing conflicts between the foreign-born and indigenous populations, and constituted a threat to the social order of the labour importing societies. Furthermore, foreign workers were becoming increasingly militant both politically and on the shop floor. Their presence became defined as a threat to the long term stability of the social order, and the scope for their use as a docile and manipulatable labour force became limited.

The restrictions imposed on migration, then, signalled the emergence of a set of qualitatively new political priorities and concerns on the part of the respective states. Whereas prior to 1973, the state and capital both defined foreign-born labour in strictly 'economic' terms whose value lay in their relative 'cheapness' and in their contribution to industrial production, after 1973 'political' and 'ideological' considerations about the future stability of the nation state pushed these strictly 'economic' factors into the background. The important point according to this perspective is that state intervention and political and ideological concerns were articulated only after the migration was underway.

<24>
While the state-imposed restrictions did partially curtail the flow of labour, they did not reduce the total foreign-born population and their offspring in the receiving countries. In some cases, family class migration increased so that the long term effect of the restrictions was a shift in the social and demographic structure of the 'immigrant' community, with an increasing proportion made up of spouses and children of the workers.  

The transition from a phase of 'mass labour migration' to the phases of 'family reunification' and 'ethnic minority' formation, which occurred in the early 1970's, is identified as a 'natural' and 'inevitable' feature of the migration process. Castles, in a later paper, is unequivocal on this matter:

> The logic of the migratory process is inescapable: virtually all migrations, whether organized or spontaneous, start with movements of young adult workers ... (and) lead to increased family reunification. Once children are born to migrants in the new country, or grow up and go to school there, some degree of permanent settlement is inevitable.

According to Castles, et. al., the ban on the further immigration of labour and the accompanying process of permanent settlement and family reunification resulted in important changes in the nature of class relations in the labour importing social formations. It is at this point that an important analytical discontinuity arises between the two works.

Castles and Kosack and Castles, et. al. argue that between 1945 and 1973 'immigrants' constituted the most 'exploited' and underprivileged section of the working class. They occupied working class positions by virtue of their position in production relations as sellers of labour power. But, they were also paid less, lived in poorer quality housing, possessed fewer political rights, and worked under more difficult conditions than the indigenous working class. They were also the subjects of a racist ideology perpetuated by the state and employers. The acceptance of much of this ideology on the part of the indigenous working class subjectively reinforced the
objective division between the two groups of workers. In this light, Castles and Kosack and Castles, et. al. suggest that the 'immigrants' constituted a distinct, but homogeneous, fraction of the working class.\(^1\)

Castles' et. al. reject this specific formulation, along with Marxist class analysis in general, in favour of categories derived from the sociology of 'ethnic relations' for the analysis of the position of the foreign-born workers and their families in the post-1973 class structure.\(^2\) They identify four specific processes, which in their view, constitutes a valid rationale for revising marxist class analysis. First, they point out that a small portion of the foreign-born population and their offspring in each of the social formations they consider is now made up of shopkeepers, professionals, and intellectuals.\(^3\) As such, they occupy petite bourgeoisie positions, and are not part of the working class.

Second, like Sivanandan\(^4\), Castells\(^5\) and the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies\(^6\), they accord analytical priority to racism in structuring the class position and social reality of the foreign-born in post-1973 western Europe. Thus, foreign workers ... experience their class position as the specific result of institutional discrimination and racism, rather than as the result of the relationship between labour and capital in general.\(^7\)

Third, they point to a processes of community formation now occurring. Before 1973

... the dominant rôle of migrants, especially in West Germany and Switzerland, was that of worker. Since then labour migration has turned into settlement, temporary migrants have become settlers, and new communities are developing in most major cities. The former migrants are still mostly manual workers, but their involvement in social processes outside of work is of growing significance. These are processes of community establishment, cultural change, political and social conflict, and of ethnic exclusion.\(^8\)
And fourth, in the context of the children of foreign-born workers, they suggest that

the classic marxist analysis of class, with its objective component of 'class in itself' and subjective component of 'class for itself', is no longer sufficient to grasp what is happening.25

Castles, et al. argue that the current trend within marxist writing to locate the 'second generation' in class relations as part of the reserve army of labour is inadequate insofar as the concept is not sufficient to describe the growing political consciousness and militance of minority youth. Their struggles are not primarily to secure access to the labour process, but to defend themselves and their communities from racism. Their direct opponent is not the capitalist employer, but the state, represented by school, welfare bureaucracy and police.26

In this light, Castles, et al. claim that the settlement of the 'immigrant' population since 1973 has introduced fundamental changes in the class structure of western European society. A dual stratification system has emerged. These societies continue to be class societies (where classes are defined in terms of the relationship to the means of production), but they also suggest that they are now in addition, plural or 'multi-ethnic' societies characterized by the presence of 'minority' and 'majority' ethnic groups. The relationship to the means of production, however, are clearly subordinate to these other social process which are occuring. Class status is overridden by 'minority group' status.27

But despite the divergence in the analysis of the nature of class relations, both works conceive of the category of 'immigrant' as homogeneous. Before 1973, 'immigrants' are conceptualized as a homogeneous fraction of the working class, whereas after 1973, they are deemed to have become a homogeneous class of ethnic minorities subject to various forms of exclusionary practices and racism.
A Critique of Castles and Kosack, et. al.

Certain aspects of the work of Castles and Kosack have already been criticised by others. For example, Lever-Tracy\textsuperscript{29} and Miles\textsuperscript{29} have questioned their use of the concept of the 'reserve army of labour' to describe the structural position of foreign-born workers within western Europe, Burawoy\textsuperscript{30} has questioned their assumption that migrant labour is 'cheap labour' and their instrumentalist view of the state, Bohning\textsuperscript{31} has criticized their tendency to over-generalize and blur important differences in patterns of migration both within and between nations, and Miles\textsuperscript{32} and Phizacklea and Miles\textsuperscript{33} question their functionalist analysis of the relationship between racism and migration and their conception of the impact of migration on the class structure of Western Europe between 1945 and 1973. As yet, however, the work of Castles, Booth and Wallace has not been subject to the same critical scrutiny.

Three sets of critical comments are made in the remainder of this chapter. First I evaluate Castles, et. al. rationale for the partial rejection of marxist class analysis and their introduction of the concepts of 'minority group' and 'majority group' to describe the post-1973 Western European stratification system. This has the wider objective of reasserting the primacy of marxist class categories, and of questioning their tendency to homogenize the category of 'immigrant'. Second, through an analysis of post-war migration to Britain and Switzerland, it is suggested that: (1) different migrant groups were incorporated into qualitatively different sites in production relations; (2) the state played a fundamental role in the process of migration right from the outset of the phase of mass labour migration; and (3) important political and ideological relations structured foreign-born worker incorporation. Third, their explanation of the transition from the phase of mass labour migration to permanent settlement is questioned. It is suggested that the transition was not a natural and inevitable feature of the migration process, but rather the result of an historically specific set of conditions associated with the process of capital accumulation.
Migration, Settlement and the Class Relations

There are four reasons why Castles, et. al. rationale for rejecting marxist class theory for the analysis of post-1973 patterns of migration and settlement is inadequate. Each revolves around their economistic, deterministic and reductionist understanding of marxist class theory and their corresponding adoption of a relational, subjectivist conception of class. Their critique sets up a 'straw man' which is unrepresentative of the true complexity of marxist analysis of immigration and the class structure.

First, it is true that 'immigrant' workers no longer define themselves, and are no longer defined by others, simply as economic agents. It is also the case that these workers and their families engage in non-work related social activities. The occurrence of these processes are not disputed. But, the argument that the occurrence of these processes means that marxist class categories can 'no longer grasp the reality' of foreign-born workers' lives, is based on a conflation of different levels of abstraction. It suggests that within marxist theory classes must behave in certain ways if they are to truly constitute real social classes.

It is, moreover, a curious argument inasmuch as it assumes that those who occupy class sites in concrete conjunctures normally do not develop social relationships outside of the area of work with members of their own, or other social classes. If their logic is accepted, we would be forced to conclude that if and when members of the 'indigenous' working class develop such social relationships, and cease to think of themselves simply as 'workers' whose role in life is to provide labour power for employers, their position in the class structure is somehow magically altered. In this case, it is doubtful whether they would argue that the existence of such processes would constitute a sufficient rationale for revising marxist class analysis. Rather, what always needs to be explained in the problem of why certain alliances, associations and non-work related social groups are formed between members of the same and different social classes.
According to Katzenelson, particular sites of residence and non-work related associations have historically provided the partial material out of which class struggles are formed.

The making of classes at work is *complimented* by the making of classes where people live; in both places, adaptive and rebellious responses to the class situation are inevitably closely intertwined. 

And again,

Community spaces provide the necessary, if not sufficient nurturing environments for the continuity of shared cultural identities. Within the space created by the logic of the capitalist territoriality, the working class creates its own cultures of everyday life. And within the community, shared institutions of family, worship, politics, conversation, shopping and recreation facilitate the reproduction not only of class but of the ties of affect made even more important by the increasing depersonalization and routinization of workplace relations.

Thus, the concepts of 'class' and 'community' are not opposed to one another: classes are always formed and reproduced in certain spatial, social, ideological and political contexts. In short, the recognition that foreign-born workers and their families increasingly engage in non-work related social behaviours, does not constitute a sufficient rationale for rejecting the validity of marxist class analysis.

Second, a similar confusion over levels of analysis characterizes their discussion of the political consciousness of the children of foreign-born workers. They are correct to question the application of the category of reserve army of labour to describe the class position of all members of the 'second generation'. But they do not do so on the most logical grounds that a large proportion of these youth are actually engaged in wage labour employment, and therefore occupy an 'objective' position in the relations of production as part of the working class. Rather, they do so on the basis of their observation that the children of foreign workers do not possess the form of political consciousness (a concern over securing access to the labour
market) which corresponds with their 'objective' class position as a 'reserve army of labour'.

Even if we accept for the moment that a certain portion of the children of foreign workers (those who are unemployed, or who have never been employed) can be categorized as part of the reserve army of labour, it is important to recognize that the patterns of struggle and consciousness of those who occupy particular class sites are always historically specific. Thus, while attempts to gain access to wage labour employment may be one particular form of the struggle that those who have constituted a part of the reserve army of labour have engaged in, it is certainly not the form which they necessarily have to engage in if they are to 'truly' constitute a reserve army of labour. Historically, some parts of the reserve army of labour (especially those subject to displacement by the penetration of capitalist relations of production in agriculture) have struggled to resist proletarianization, and resist being incorporated into wage labour employment. The occurrence of such struggles do not mean that they ceased to be part of the reserve army of labour. Forms of class struggle are always historically constituted, and their content cannot be defined a priori.

Third, Castles, et. al. are correct to reject Castles' and Kocack's previous formulation that the category of 'immigrant' simply constitutes a fraction of the working class. It is true that a proportion of the foreign-born people in each of the countries they consider is made up of a petite bourgeoisie. But, having recognized that certain class divisions exist within the 'immigrant' population, they down play their analytical and political importance. Their suggestion that this population is united by state propagated racism more than it is divided by class and other relations avoids important differences in the economic position, political ideologies and social practices within the 'immigrant' population.

In the case of Britain, there is some evidence to suggest that the foreign-born petite bourgeoisie and their offspring articulate an
ideology which is 'conservative'. This is expressed in the form of 'tougher standards in school', in being in favour of some forms of assisted repatriation, free enterprise, the privatization of British industry, and the denial of the existence of racism. It is also expressed in the small but nevertheless politically significant degree of support for the Conservative Party in both national and local elections.

The silence on the divisions within the 'immigrant' population is especially serious when class divisions overlap with gender divisions. The nature of the social relations established between the primarily male 'ethnic' small shop and business owners, and their 'ethnic' female workforce is only now coming to light. But research by Anthias into the employment of Greek Cypriot women in restaurants owned by Cypriot men, and by Hoel into Asian women employed by Asian male sweatshop owners, suggests that the success of these 'ethnic' enterprises is based, in part, on the male petite bourgeoisie's ability to appropriate and manipulate an ideology of ethnic solidarity. Hoel demonstrates further that at least some segments of the Asian male petite bourgeoisie take advantage of Asian females' marginalized position in society and the labour market, subject these women to intimidation to deter them from forming or joining trade unions, and articulate sexist stereotypes to justify their exploitation. Thus, in stressing the apparent homogeneity of experience within the 'ethnic minority' population in the face of state racism, Castles' et. al. formulation ignores the specific experiences of migrant women which are structured by the triple oppression of class, 'race' and gender.

Finally, the suggestion that all foreign-born workers and their families are united by the experience of racism assumes that all 'immigrants' are defined as, or are, 'black'. This too is an odd assumption given Castles and Kosack's earlier criticism of those social scientists and politicians who equate the category of 'immigrant' with 'black person'. The wider significance of Castles and Kosack's reminder to readers on the very first page of their book
that 'nearly two-thirds of the immigrants in Britain are white'\textsuperscript{61}, seems later to be lost to both Castles and Kosack, as well as Castles, et. al. While it is true that 'black' people are not the only objects of racism, in the current political and ideological climate of Britain, and some western European societies, where 'black person' is equated with 'immigrant', such a claim simply reproduces commonsense stereotypes that all 'immigrants' are, by definition, 'black' and that all 'black' people are, by definition, 'immigrants'.

Examining such class, gender and other divisions within the 'immigrant', or 'black community' is not, as Gilroy suggests, an exercise in 'dogmatism'.\textsuperscript{52} Rather, it is an attempt to come to terms with complex historical processes and to obviate criticisms of 'white' sociologists made by some 'radical' theorists and political activists that the former are Eurocentric and fail to acknowledge the full cultural, political, and ideological diversity/heterogeneity within the 'black population'.\textsuperscript{63} More importantly, examining such differences is also a matter of political significance insofar as it is an attempt to assess the potentialities for unitary and successful collective action within and between social classes.

The concept of class fraction, which the authors are not unfamiliar with, provides a more coherent and parsimonious conceptual framework to understand the class position and political practices of the foreign-born and their offspring. While it is true that classes are defined primarily by their relationship to the means of production, it is also the case that economic, political and ideological relations structure relationships within and between social classes.\textsuperscript{64} According to Wolpe

\begin{quote}
A class is ... constituted, not as a unified social force, but as a patchwork of segments which are differentiated and divided on a variety of bases and by varied processes.\textsuperscript{65}
\end{quote}

Unitary class action in concrete conjunctures is always problematic and can never be simply assumed.\textsuperscript{66} If political and ideological alliances are formed within the 'black' population between
groups who otherwise occupy quite diverse structural positions within the division of labour, in terms of class and gender, then this becomes problem for political and theoretical analysis.7

Furthermore, the recognition of the complex ideological and political processes that foreign workers and their families are subject to (racialization, sexism, gender role stereotypes, stigmatization, and the denial of civil rights), the complex patterns of social life within 'immigrant' communities (which may at times involve the formation of political and ideological alliances across the parameters of social class), and the complex patterns of struggle and political consciousness of the children of 'immigrants' does not negate the validity of class analysis. Rather, it points to the ways in which ideological and political relations structure social and productive relations both within and between social classes. Similarly, the production and reproduction of racism and racialization within Western Europe, and the conflicts and alliances which have formed around these processes adds to the complexity of the class structure and class struggles, not their negation. These processes are never simply external to class relations, but rather constitute the partial substance of class relations. The unity of social classes, defined in terms of the relationship to the means of production, is always problematic on the level of the concrete conjuncture.8

Migration and Modes of Incorporation: Britain and Switzerland

It should be evident from the above that Castles and Kosack, et. al. view all people who migrate as subject to similar processes and practices, and as allocated to similar structural positions in the relations of production. The remainder of the chapter suggests that their tendency to homogenize the category of 'immigrant' results in an inability to specify analytically distinct modes by which those who migrated to western Europe were initially incorporated into sites in production relations. The migration of European Volunteer Workers and Colonial subjects to Britain, and of 'guestworkers' to Switzerland
is examined in order to highlight: (1) the key role of the state in the process of migration; (2) the political, legal and ideological relations which structured the period of mass labour migration to western Europe and (3) the variations in the structural positions different groups occupied within the relations of production.

Britain

As in other western European formations after the end of the Second World War, certain industrial and service sectors of the British economy faced shortages of labour. The ensuing migration of eastern European refugees and people from colonial and ex-colonial formations was not, however, a spontaneous reaction to labour demand.

Let us consider first the case of the migration of eastern European refugees, or European Volunteer Workers (EWW's) as they were later to be called. In the immediate post-war years the British economy absorbed 77,000 Displaced Persons, 8,000 Ukrainian ex-prisoners of war, and approximately 88,000 Polish Servicemen. The British state intervened to structure these migrations in several ways. First, the state provided the political/legal framework for the recruitment of Polish Servicemen and their families, and European Volunteer Workers by reference to the pre-war Aliens legislation. Second, the state actively recruited and screened refugees to insure that they would be productive workers in the country. Representatives of the Ministry of Labour 'handpicked' the labourers, 'with preference going to "men of labouring type who are hardy and of good physical standard" ... and those prepared to leave behind their dependents until further arrangements could be made'.

Third, the state intervened in the process of migration by imposing conditions on their ability to remain in the country. With the exception of Polish servicemen (whose entry to the country was not conditional), workers from eastern Europe were initially granted entry to the country for a period of one year. Their ability to remain in the country was conditional, in part, on their behaving 'as a worthy
member of the British community'. The British state's intention, however, was that these people would eventually settle permanently in the country.

This was reflected in the provisions of the Polish Resettlement Act of 1947, which constituted the fourth form of state intervention in the migration. The Act provided the provision of money and other resources for the establishment and running of three Polish hospitals, educational facilities and hostel accommodation.

And fifth, the British state intervened in the process of migration by controlling the migrants' circulation in the labour market. Again with the exception of the Polish Servicemen, the EVW's were initially constituted by the British state as a class of unfree labour (this concept is discussed in more detail in chapter two). The EVW's entry to Britain was conditional upon their signing a labour contract. The terms of the contract stipulated, among other things, that they would accept work selected by the Minister of Labour and that they could change employment only if they had the permission of the Minister of Labour. They therefore faced political/legal compulsion to provide specific amounts of labour power to specific employers and were unable to circulate freely in the British labour market.

It was this fifth form of intervention which meant that EVW's occupied a qualitatively different position in production relations than their British working class counterparts, and as we shall see in a moment, their counterparts from colonial and ex-colonial formations. Whereas the latter two groups were 'free labour' to the extent that they could circulate in the labour market, the former were a form of 'unfree labour' to the extent that they were unable to circulate freely in the British labour market.

It was precisely the EVW's inability to circulate in the labour market which made them into an especially desireable labour force from
the point of view of both British industry and the state. According to an interdepartmental working party

... the 'Westward Ho' scheme [one of the specific programs EVW's were brought to Britain under] enables the Department (of Labour) both to put these foreign workers into specific jobs and to keep them in those jobs. The sanction that lies at hand to guard against noncompliance with these landing conditions is deportation of the workers concerned to the 'Displaced persons' camps in Europe, and this sanction has from the very beginning proved to be an extremely effective one. Besides being kept out of 'inessential' industries, European Volunteer Workers who have been brought into this country could not for any length of time remain unemployed at public expense ....**

The working party also went on to suggest that

Unlike British citizens, European Volunteer Workers must not only accept whatever job is selected for them, but approved employment. If their employment record in this country is unsatisfactory in any respect, the sanction of deportation lies at hand.**

Their inability to circulate in the labour market was not, however, permanent. In 1951, the Department of Labour decided that all state restrictions over to whom they sold their labour power were to be lifted after three years of residence in Britain. When these restrictions were lifted, the EVW's were granted the right of permanent settlement, and they could then send for their families who had remained in the Displaced Persons camps in western and southern Europe.70

The British state's initial decision to allocate EVW's to positions in production relations as unfree labour reflects a dialectic of economic, political and ideological rationality. In part, it wanted to ensure that specific industries which were short of labour would have a 'guaranteed' workforce for at least three years. But it is also the case that their formal legal status as aliens (i.e., as people who did not possess the right to enter, settle and sell their labour power for a wage in the country) structured the
British state's decision to allocate these people initially to a site in production relations as unfree wage labour. 71

The case of colonial and ex-colonial migration contrasts with the case of BWV migration. Even so, a dialectic of political, ideological and economic relations also structured the process of colonial migration to Britain after the end of the war. Refugees as a source of labour had been exhausted by the early 1950's, but the demand for labour remained brisk. British employers continued to rely on Irish workers along with labour from other Western European countries to fill employment vacancies. 72 But, employers were not able to fill all of the emergent vacancies with these sources. Thus, it is in this context that migration from the colonial and ex-colonial formations of Asia and the Caribbean occurred, and the subsequent legal framework for a system of contract migration, applied to colonial and ex-colonial migrants, emerged in the late 1970's.

The British Nationality Act of 1948 made a formal distinction between British subjects who were citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies and those who were citizens of independent Commonwealth countries. Both groups, however, had the right to enter, settle, sell their labour power for a wage, and circulate freely within the British labour market. 73 While the debate surrounding the meaning of the Act is complex 74, the Act constituted a specific intervention on the part of the state which had the effect of making it legally possible for people from the colonies and ex-colonies to enter Britain.

The just over 400 Jamaican passengers on the Empire Windrush were one of the first groups to take advantage of this legal provision in 1948. Between 1953 and 1962, net in-migration from the New Commonwealth is estimated to have stood at 485,300. 75 Unlike the case of BWV's, the state did not directly recruit people from the colonies and ex-colonies. Rather, the migration which followed the arrival of the Windrush was largely 'spontaneous' and approximated a pattern of chain migration, although some employers, London Transport
and the British Hotels and Restaurants Association did recruit labour directly in Barbados. 76

Even though the state did not actively recruit labour in the Caribbean, this does not mean that the state was absent from the subsequent migration. 77 The state intervened in two important ways. First, the lack of state-organized recruitment of labour in the colonies and ex-colonies was in itself a form of intervention. The decision to not recruit such labour was a conscious decision on the part of high ranking officials within the state. According to a prominent civil servant

Whatever may be the policy about British citizenship, I do not think any scheme for the importation of coloured colonials for permanent settlement should be embarked upon without the full understanding that this means that a coloured element will be brought in for permanent absorption into our population. 78

Second, between 1948 and 1962, the British state intervened directly in the process of colonial and ex-colonial migration through the use of various covert administrative measures, some of which were illegal. 79 The measures varied according to the Commonwealth or colonial status of the potential entrants. In the case of the West Indies, for example, Carter, Harris and Joshi have documented that

Governors were asked to tamper with shipping lists and schedules to place migrant workers at the back of the queue; to cordon off ports to prevent passport-holding stowaways from boarding ships and to delay the issue of passports to migrants. This last measure was also adopted by Indian and Pakistan where the '...Governments refused passports if migrants had no firm prospect of establishing themselves. Police reports were carried out at the request of the Home Office to establish the basis of these prospects. 80

Thus, well-before the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, the state actively, although surreptitiously, intervened in the process of migration. The 1962 Act, and the subsequent interventions in the process of migration by means of various administrative practices and
Acts of Parliament, are now well documented and will not be recounted here.\textsuperscript{e1}

The various interventions of the state, in the form of the British Nationalities Act, the non-recruitment of colonial and ex-colonial subjects, the development of covert administrative mechanisms, and finally the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts were the result of complicated political and ideological processes, and cannot in any direct way be attributed to the economic needs of employers as is implied by the work of Castles and Kosack, et. al.\textsuperscript{e2}

For instance, the state did not formally recruit colonial subjects precisely because their formal status as British citizens meant that they could not be subject to deportation like the Polish and eastern European aliens. It was because they could not be allocated a position in production relations as unfree labour that worked against their recruitment by the state. Joshi and Carter, for example, discovered that in 1948, the civil servant cited above put the matter in these terms:

Unlike ex-prisoners of war or other aliens, I assume there could be no authority for deporting coloured British subjects if they felt they wished to stay here and take their chance. If there were any assurance that these people could in fact be sent away when they had served their purpose, this proposition might be less unbearable.\textsuperscript{e3}

In short, it was because people in the colonies possessed the right of permanent settlement in Britain that the state was unwilling to engage in any organized recruitment of their labour for British industry. This assessment is confirmed by Harris who argues that 'it was precisely the conditions that made EVW's attractive--their colour and lack of politico-juridical subjectivity--that made West Indian labour unattractive'.\textsuperscript{e4}

In addition, the state did not actively recruit in the Caribbean and other colonial and ex-colonial formations because of its concern
over the creation of a 'race relations' problem in the country. Carter, Harris and Johns summarise the evidence in the following terms:

Black immigration, it was alleged, would create problems which were insoluble precisely because their provenance was 'racial' and not social. Black people were unemployed not because of discrimination but because of their 'irresponsibility, quarrelsome ness and lack of discipline'. Black people lived in slums not because of discrimination, but because they knew no better. Indeed, their very nature was held to predispose them towards criminality. All of these stereotypes were evoked vividly in the concept of 'new Harlem', an alien wedge posing an unprecedented threat to the 'British way of life'.

Thus, the representatives of the state, along with the media and sections of the working class constructed the 'imagined community' which constituted the English nation in terms of the idea of 'race'. 'Black' people were/are defined as an 'alien race' whose presence constituted a threat to the 'British way of life'.

In this light, what Castles, et. al. identify as the beginning of the period of the British state's intervention in the process of migration, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, was really the formal culmination of a process of racialization and state intervention which began immediately after the end of the war. The state did not restrict colonial and ex-colonial migration through a formally codified and publically visible 'immigration policy', in part, because of an apparent continued commitment to the idea of a 'free and equal' Empire/Commonwealth. Similarly, the British state intervened in the process of migration through the recruitment, control and provision of settlement assistance to eastern European refugees, practices which suggest that from the British state's point of view, not all of those people who were born outside of the spatial boundaries of the British nation state were defined as equally suitable sources of wage labour.

<41>
Switzerland

The case of Switzerland, is often held up as the archetypical instance in which a country made use of a strictly 'economic rationality', or 'capital logic' in its recruitment of labour after the end of the war. The following examination of the use of 'guestworkers' in Switzerland suggests that as in the case of Britain, the state played a key role in the process of migration from the start of the phase of mass labour migration in the later 1940's and early 1950's, and that a dialectic of economic, political and ideological relations structured the forms of state intervention.

The Swiss economy emerged relatively unscathed from the effects of World War Two. Swiss capital was able to take almost immediate advantage of the increase in demand for consumer goods which accompanied the end of the war. While internal reserves of labour were partially mobilized, they proved to be both quantitatively and qualitatively inadequate to fill the emerging vacancies, especially for unskilled and semi-skilled manual labour positions. The Swiss state responded to these shortages, and hence intervened in the process of migration, in part, by the provision of the legal framework for employers to import and exploit labour from outside of the boundaries of the nation state. Most of the workers who subsequently entered the country originated from the physically proximate formations of Italy, Yugoslavia and Turkey.

From table 1-1 it is evident that during the phase of mass labour migration (1945-1973), most of the foreign-born workers who entered the country did so under 'Permits of Abode'. These permits constituted a second specific intervention by the Swiss state in the process of migration. Permits of Abode were normally granted by the state to workers for a period of one year in the first instance. Thus, foreign-born workers could only formally remain in Switzerland for a period of one year. Workers granted such permits required permission from the Foreigners Police to change their employment, take on additional work not originally specified under the Permit of Abode,
or to engage in independent economic activity. The renewal of a Permit of Abode was subject to conditions in the labour market and the worker's conduct. These state-imposed restrictions over both their ability to remain in the country and their ability to circulate in the labour market, meant that during the initial phase of mass labour migration, foreign-born workers were defined as temporary additions to the labour force and as a form of unfree labour.

From table 1-1 it is also evident that the majority of foreign workers now possess 'Permits of Permanent Residence'. Such permits are granted at the discretion of the pertinent authorities but usually only after ten years of continuous residence in Switzerland. They must be renewed every three years, but this is only a formality to ensure that the person continues to reside in the country. They can, however, be revoked if the holder commits a serious crime. Those granted such permits are allowed to stay in Switzerland permanently, and have the right to change jobs, pursue independent economic activities and to change their Canton of residence. Their position in political/legal relations has now come to approximate that of the Swiss worker, although the 'foreigners' still do not have the right to vote or stand in local or national elections.

In this context, there are two problems related to Castles and Kosack's et al. argument which require elucidation. First, why did the Swiss state define foreign-born workers as temporary additions to the labour force and why did it impose restrictions over their circulation in the labour market? And second, how do we explain the transition from the phase of mass labour migration to the phase of permanent settlement and family reunification.

Let us deal first with the former problem. Swiss employers would certainly have derived economic benefits from the initial employment of workers under contract and who were not free to circulate in the labour market. Thus, Castles and Kosack, et al. are correct to stress in their explanation that the anticipation of such benefits played a key role in why the Swiss state defined the workers as
temporary residents, and why it restricted their ability to circulate in the labour market once they entered the country. However, the strictly economic considerations do not exhaust the reasons why the Swiss state initially allocated foreign-born workers to positions in production relations as unfree migrant labour. Like the case of the 1971 Immigration Act in Britain (which provided the political-legal basis for a 'guestworker' system there)\(^4\), the Swiss state's implementation of the 'guestworker' system was also based, at least in part, on its concern over the fate of the Swiss 'nation', and its concern over the threat to the Swiss 'nation' that these workers might pose if they were allowed to settle and remain permanently in the country.\(^2\)

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### Table 1-1

**Foreign Residents in Switzerland by Permit of Stay, 1960-82**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Permit of Abode %</th>
<th>Permit of Permanent Residence %</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>584,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>810,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>982,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>1,012,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>892,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>925,826</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Hoffman-Nowotny, 1985:219*

Hoffman-Nowotny and Killias have outlined the historical continuities between Switzerland's xenophobic immigration policies during the inter-war years and its post-war migration policy in the following terms:

<44>
it was feared that the integration of a larger number of aliens would threaten the national identity—that is, weaken conditions about the Swiss state. A connection between the tendency to emphasize national identity and the tendency to discriminate politically against foreigners appeared at this time, as it has more recently."

Hoffman-Nowotny has accordingly identified the dual significance of the Swiss state's post-war attempt to reinforce foreign-born workers' status as unfree migrant labour. The particular mode of incorporation was of economic significance in that it provided Swiss employers with a labour force that was reliable, manipulable and cheap. But at the same time, according to Hoffman-Nowotny, foreign-born workers the status of temporary entrants to the country was also seen by the Swiss state as a method of protecting the 'Swiss nation' from the perceived negative effects of the permanent presence of a 'foreign' population. Hoffman-Nowotny argues that

Because the postwar economic boom was expected to last only temporarily, immigration policy aimed at 'rotation' as a means to prevent immigrants from staying permanently ... it was believed that a rotation policy would protect Switzerland from becoming 'over-foreignized'.

The concern about 'over-foreignization' and the future of the nation state also takes the form of numerous referenda, which are usually just barely defeated, which seek the expulsion of foreign workers from the country. It is also evident in the Swiss state's continued denial that it is a 'country of immigration', and in the corresponding difficulties foreign-born workers and their families face in becoming naturalized Swiss citizens, despite the fact that the majority of 'foreigners' now possess the right of permanent residence.

Clearly, the Swiss state's articulation of concerns about 'over-foreignization', and the various practices which have emerged to protect against it, reflect a delineation of group boundaries between 'Swiss' and 'other'. What requires more research (which is beyond the scope of this thesis) is whether the boundaries between 'Swiss' and
'other' are based on the social selection of certain phenotypical criteria (racialization), or whether they are based on certain socially selected cultural criteria (nationalism).

The second issue identified above pertains to Castles, et. al.'s explanation for the transition from the phase of mass labour migration to the phase of permanent settlement and family reunification. As already noted, Castles, et. al. regard this transition as a 'natural' and 'inevitable' feature of the migration process. The British state's current practice of issuing deportation orders against persons who have been granted a visa to temporarily enter the country and who subsequently become married to a British resident while on such a visa, should lead us question Castles', et. al. view of the 'naturalness' and 'inevitability' of permanent settlement and family reunification.\textsuperscript{102} For those people currently living in church and temple basements throughout Britain fighting these orders of deportation, the naturalness of permanent settlement and family reunification in Britain is far from inevitable. Contra Castles, et. al., the remainder of this section suggests that the transition in western Europe was the result of a set of historically specific processes.

In the case of western Europe, there were several conditions associated with the phase of mass labour migration which undermined various efforts (including those of the Swiss) to maintain systems of unfree migrant labour. First, foreign workers realized that their initial earning targets could not be realized as quickly as anticipated. This resulted in increases in the length of stay and the desire to be joined by, or to form, family units.\textsuperscript{103} 'This carried the prospect of increased earnings as family members entered wage labour, although it also increased reproduction costs and extended their commitments to the social formation to which they had come (e.g. school attendance by children). For many, the consequence was to further increase the length of stay'.\textsuperscript{104}
Second, employers began to increasingly make use of unfree migrant labour to fill skilled and semi-skilled positions in production relations. The policy of worker rotation also entailed costs (as well as benefits) to capital because it meant that new groups of workers had to be recruited and then trained for these positions. Therefore, 'where a stable and experienced, if not skilled, labour force was required, there were financial advantages in extending the contracts of workers already hired and dispensing with rotation'.

Third, as the demand for labour increased, the states which contracted to supply migrants were in a better bargaining position to demand and receive better conditions for their citizens, including the right to family reunification and extended settlement. This in turn improved the conditions for the reproduction of the migrant worker but also for the reproduction and increase in the total migrant population resident in Western Europe.

Fourth, the state's ban on further in-migration in 1973 had the unintended consequence of increasing the length of stay of those foreign workers and their families already in the country. Workers realized that if they left the social formation of western Europe they had been resident in, they would probably never be able to return. Permanent settlement was therefore an insurance policy taken out over an uncertain future.

And fifth, and possibly most important, there was a continuing demand for workers to fill particular positions in the economies of western Europe. It was not anticipated by either the state or employers that the period of economic expansion would last for a period of nearly thirty years. The state, responding to this continuing demand for labour, renewed contracts for successive years. However, the state still does not define these people as 'immigrants', and as such their precarious position in political and legal relations must be recognized.
The analysis of the reaction to Chinese migration to Canada during the latter part of the 19th and early part of the 20th centuries, and of Caribbean farm labour migration to Canada since 1966 presented in subsequent chapters demonstrates, among other things, that these observations about the centrality of the state in the process of migration, the differential experiences of 'immigrant' groups, and the problematic nature of family reunification and permanent settlement are also applicable to outside of western Europe.

Conclusions

In sum, this chapter has suggested that despite the merits of Immigrant Workers and the Class Structure of Western Europe and Here For Good: Western Europe's New Ethnic Minorities, there are three main problems with the analysis presented in the two works. First, the analysis of migration to post-war Britain and Switzerland has demonstrated that both the Swiss and British state's intervened in the process of migration from outset of the phase of mass labour migration, not, as Castles, et. al., claim near the end of the phase in the early 1970's (or 1960's in the case of Britain). Intervention within each social formation took several historically specific forms. In Switzerland, state intervention in the migration process not only involved the provision of assistance to employers in the form of the recruitment and screening of labour, but also involved the allocation of agents to sites in production relations, the imposition of restrictions over their ability to circulate in the labour market and the initial definition of the workers as temporary additions to the labour force and society.

In Britain, the state also intervened directly in the process of migration. It was intricately involved in the initial recruitment and selection of European Volunteer Workers, and the subsequent control over their circulation in the labour market. Unlike the case of Switzerland, these initial recruits were defined as potential future settlers. In the context of colonial and ex-colonial peoples, further state intervention took the form of the 1948 British Nationality Act,
which regardless of the intentions of those who formulated it, had the effect of 'opening the door' to colonial and ex-colonial migration. Similarly, the state's conscious decision to neither recruit nor encourage people in the colonies to fill wage labour positions constituted a specific intervention. Likewise, the various covert administrative practices which sought to deter the flow of 'black' people to the country, and the Commonwealth Immigrant's Act of 1962 which imposed restrictions on the entry of labour to the country also points to the centrality of the state in the process of migration. In short, evidence from the case of Britain and Switzerland suggests that contrary to Castles and Kosack et. al.'s view, the state does not simply intervene and control migrations after they occur, but it structures them from the outset.

The second conclusion to be drawn from the analysis presented above is that the process of migration is not structured solely by 'economic' considerations which stem from the exigencies of the process of capital accumulation. Evidence from Switzerland and Britain has shown that a number of political, legal and ideological relations structured who entered the respective countries and how they were allowed to cross the respective boundaries of the social formation. For instance, in the case of Britain, restrictions were imposed on the circulation of European Volunteer Workers within the British labour market because they were aliens, whereas such restrictions could not be imposed on colonial or ex-colonial migrants because they were formally British citizens. In Switzerland, political and ideological relations also structured the state's development of the 'guestworker' system.

The final conclusion to be drawn from the critique of Castles and Kosack, et. al. presented in this chapter is that we should not define the category of those who 'migrate' as a homogenous political and analytical category. Their conception of immigrants as an 'ethnic minorities' implies a homogeneity of experience which they do not, in fact possess. The category of 'immigrant' is characterized by class
and gender divisions, and corresponding divisions in political ideologies and practices.

The heterogeneity of the 'immigrant' population is, moreover, evident in the British state's differential definition and treatment of European Volunteer Workers and colonial and ex-colonial peoples. While the EVW's initially faced restrictions over their circulation in the labour market, they were defined by the British state as a future settler population. They were also given various forms of financial and administrative assistance to facilitate the process of settlement. Colonial and ex-colonial peoples, on the other hand, were defined as the cause of a future 'race relations' problem in the country and the state imposed various restrictions over their entry to the country.
CHAPTER TWO

THE STATE, MODES OF INCORPORATION AND RACIALIZATION

Introduction

This chapter seeks to refine and extend the political economy approach to the study of migration by building on the critique of the work of Castles and Kosack et. al presented in the previous chapter. In so doing it draws, somewhat critically, on two emergent traditions within political economy which have, in part, sought to correct some of the more economistic of Castles and Kosack's et. al. formulations. These two inter-related traditions consist, on the one hand, of literature on the concepts of free and unfree labour\(^1\), and on the other hand, of literature on the concept of racialization.\(^2\)

There are three parts to this chapter. In the critique of the work of Castles and Kosack, et. al., and the analysis of European Volunteer Worker and colonial and ex-colonial migration to Britain and 'guestworker' migration to Switzerland, it was demonstrated that the state played a central role in the process of migration. Therefore, and first, this chapter begins with a brief discussion of the role and nature of the state in capitalist societies in general, and of the role of the state in the process of migration in particular. Three forms of state intervention in the process of migration are identified. It is suggested that the state precludes the entry of certain groups of people to the social formation, it allows certain groups of people entry to the social formation, and in the case of those who are included, it allocates groups to particular sites in production relations.

The further distinctiveness of the theoretical approach of this thesis is highlighted in the second part of the chapter. It consists of an elaboration of the concept modes of incorporation. It suggests that within social formations dominated by the capitalist mode of
production, there are four analytically different modes by which foreign-born labour which is allowed to enter a social formation can be incorporated into sites in production relations. The four modes of incorporation are designated as: free immigrant labour, unfree immigrant labour, free migrant labour and unfree migrant labour.

The third and final part of the chapter consists of a discussion of the economic, political and ideological relations which structure the nature and form of state intervention in the process of migration. Two sets of inter-related political and ideological relations are examined in detail: the way in which the 'imagined community' which constitutes the nation is constructed, and linked to this, the process of racialization.

The State

Two sets of issues are examined in this section. First, I will discuss in general terms the role and nature of the state in capitalist societies, and second I will discuss the role of the state in the process of migration in particular.

The State in Capitalist Societies

Currently, Marxist oriented theorists concerned with the analysis of the state in capitalist societies disagree with one another about a range of conceptual, theoretical and methodological issues. They differ, for instance, with respect to the specification of the institutions which make up the state, the precise manner in which those institutions operate, and the nature of the 'fit' between the economy and the state.3

Despite these disagreements Stasiulis suggests that there are four 'connecting threads' which run through the general Marxist approach to the state.4 These threads define the boundaries between Marxist and non-Marxist analyses of the state. First, she suggests that it is generally accepted that there is a primacy of material
conditions in shaping social structures, social relations and human consciousness. This implies that

the enhancement of conditions necessary for the orderly extraction of economic surplus by capitalists becomes the most imperative motivating the activities of the state."

In other words, the form, structure and operation of the state is, in the 'final analysis' determined by economic relations."

The second thread which links together Marxist approaches is that the state does not represent the collective interests of society as a whole, but rather is the political expression of the class relations inherent in production. The state is an arena where class conflicts and class alliances are played out.

The third link concerns the view that 'liberal democracy has provided cherished liberties and mechanisms for the expression of popular demands through which subordinate classes have won real and important benefits'. Gough for instance, in his analysis of development of the welfare state, suggests that many of the current state welfare policies are the outcome of working class pressure and action expressed through various extant bourgeois-democratic channels of political participation.

The final connecting thread within marxist theory refers to

the state's materialization as a set of interacting institutions separate from civil society.

In other words, the state has a 'real concrete form in a set of apparatuses which are charged with real tasks and dispose of real resources'.

Within the four 'connecting threads', the most important feature of the state for our discussion is the view that it is charged with the reproduction of the relations of production and the maintenance and re-creation of the conditions required for the accumulation of
In this context, it is important to note that the conditions necessary for the extraction of surplus, or the social relations of production in Sayer's terms, are not simply 'economic'. The relations of production, and the conditions which are necessary to sustain the accumulation of capital, refer not only to the relations between people involved directly and immediately in the production of objects to satisfy human needs, but also include 'a much wider set of relations which are required to exist in order to ensure that production takes place'. Thus, for Sayer the concept of 'social relations of production' is therefore an historically open category which consists of all 'the social relations with which individuals produce'... inasmuch as they are demonstrably entailed in a given mode of production.'

On the basis of this formulation, the concept of the relations of production also includes those political and ideological relations which necessarily sustain and accompany the process of commodity production.

The state's role in capitalist societies, then, is not confined to the provision of the conditions for the direct accumulation of capital. It is also structured by the need for the legitimization of the process of capital accumulation. The state's various forms of intervention involve the oftentimes contradictory provision of the direct economic conditions necessary for production to occur (the provision and training of labour power and infrastructure projects, for example), and the political and ideological conditions which sustain, and are a constituent part of, the process of production. The contradictory pressures to provide for the accumulation of capital on the one hand, and the legitimization of the accumulation of capital on the other hand, is a constituent part of many of the state's interventions in capitalist societies.
The State and Migration

Given this conception of the state in capitalist societies, how should we conceive of the state's role in the process of migration? In the critical analysis of the work of Castles and Kosack, et. al, it was evident that the state is considered to play a key role in the process of migration via its regulation of the manner in which borders of the nation state are breached by those who are not nationals of the social formation. The state is, in a sense, a gatekeeper. I suggest here that there are three forms that state intervention in the process of migration can take. The possible reasons for the state's intervention in the process of migration are discussed in more detail in the third section.

First, the state can intervene to exclude or preclude the entry of certain groups of people to the social formation. At any point in time after the Second World War, there have been an innumerable number of people in the world who have been subject to compulsion to migrate, either by economic dislocations associated with the increasing organic composition of capital, by the penetration of capitalist production relations in previously non-capitalist sectors of production, or by a range of political instabilities. But, even though massive international migrations have occurred since the middle of the nineteenth century generally, and since 1945 particularly, only a very small proportion of people who are subject to compulsion to migrate ever come to spatially relocate themselves in sites in production relations in a social formation different from the one they were born and/or raised in.

Similarly, whereas the process of capital investment is now internationalized, and money and means of production now flow relatively freely between social formations to seek out the most profitable locations for natural resources, markets, and labour supplies, no such freedom is allowed to the movement of people. It is a paradox of the present historical conjuncture that three of the most important international documents on human rights, the 'United...
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights', the 'International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights', and the 'International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination', each specify as a 'fundamental human right' the ability of persons to leave their country of birth or nationality. Yet, none of these documents contain any provision for the right of people to freely enter the social formation of their choosing. Collectively, these observations suggest that the spatial movement of people across international boundaries is presently a selective process, structured primarily, although not exclusively, by the state. States possess the right, and actively exercise the right, to limit entry to the social formation.

But the role of the state in the process of migration is not confined to the question of who is eligible for entry to a social formation. That is, the state's role is not purely a negative one. Thus, and second, the state plays a role in the determination of who can be included within its spatial and symbolic boundaries. If the state determines who is not eligible for entry to the social formation, then by definition it can determine who is allowed entry to a social formation. Finally, within the process of inclusion, the state determines how people will occupy sites in production relations, or the manner in which foreign born persons are incorporated into sites in production relations.

In the remainder of this chapter, I first specify how groups of people who are allowed by a state to enter a social formation can be incorporated into sites in production relations. Second, I specify the basis upon which the state decides: 1) to grant people the right to enter a social formation when their aim is to find work, and 2) to allocate people to particular sites in production relations.

Modes of Incorporation

The term mode of incorporation refers to the manner in which people who seek to spatially relocate themselves in sites in
production relations articulate with capital and the state. According to Gibson and Graham, for those concerned with a comprehensive understanding of migration from a political economy framework, the methodological and theoretical task involves the examination of migration phenomenon in terms of specific (economic) sites of incorporation of ... [foreign born] labour and specific (political) modes of control over incorporation.

Or, in Portes and Walton's terms, the task is the examination of the modes in which workers are controlled and utilized in different areas of the world system.

Two dimensions to the process by which foreign-born labour is incorporated into sites in production relations within social formations dominated by the capitalist mode of production are considered here: one is temporal and the other is structural. The temporal dimension to modes of incorporation is denoted by the terms migrant and immigrant labour, whereas the structural dimension is denoted by the terms free and unfree labour. Thus, a total of four distinct modes of incorporation are identified: free immigrant labour, unfree immigrant labour, free migrant labour, and unfree migrant labour.

Migrant and Immigrant Labour

Before I specify the manner in which the terms migrant and immigrant labour are defined in this thesis, it is first necessary to critically evaluate two of the ways in which the terms have been conceptualized within the political economy literature. Aside from the tendency to blur the distinction between the two forms of migration, which is evident in the work of Castles and Kosack, et. al., there are two other views on the analytical distinction between the categories of migrant and immigrant labour within the political economy tradition. The first view considered here is represented by the work of those who do attempt to maintain a distinction between...
migrant and immigrant labour, but who see it in terms of individual intentions. The second view defines the two different forms of migration as characteristic of different phases of the development of the world capitalist system.

Phizacklea and Miles define 'migrants', or the term's various synonyms, as individuals who, at the point of departure, intend to settle only temporarily abroad and eventually return to the social formation of origin. Conversely, they define 'immigrants' as individuals who, at the point of departure, intend to settle permanently in a social formation which is different from the one they were born and raised in, and who do not have any intention to return. While this conceptual strategy is useful in understanding patterns of political consciousness and action amongst those who have migrated, there are sound empirical, theoretical and methodological grounds for Marxist oriented theorists to avoid the construction of a typology of migration based on individual intentions.

First, a focus on individual intentions and motivations is the methodological and theoretical hallmark of neo-classical approaches to the study of migration. Marxist usage of this conceptual strategy constitutes a theoretical and methodological sleight of hand. Phizacklea and Miles are explicitly critical of neo-classical assumptions concerning the process of migration, and tend to be dismissive about the explanatory power and analytical utility of focusing on the individual motivations of those who migrate. Yet they themselves incorporate a key aspect of the neo-classical approach when they suggest that migrant and immigrant labour is defined analytically on the level of motivations. By advancing such a formulation, they implicitly accept at least certain features of neo-classicism, and they therefore open themselves up to the same criticisms which they make against neo-classical theorists.

But this conceptual strategy is not inadequate simply because it has a certain affinity with neo-classical theories of migration. Thus, and second, it is inadequate to the extent that like the neo-
classical approach in general, it lends an 'unwarranted veneer of free choice to the analysis of migration'. Like the individual decision to migrate, the decision to migrate either temporarily or permanently takes place in a context where structural constraints limit the degree of choice individuals or groups possess in the matter. As noted above, one of the most important of such structural factors is the state.

The second problem associated with the use of the terminology of migrant and immigrant labour within the political economy tradition concerns its use to describe different forms of migration within different phases of the development of the world capitalist system. Carchedi, following Lenin's *Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, suggests that permanent, or settler migrations, which are said to be made up of movements from the less developed formations of the centre to the more developed formations of the centre of the world system, are characteristic of the phase of 'classic imperialism'. Conversely, temporary migrations, which are defined as being made up of movements of people from the periphery to the centre of the world system, are characteristic of the phase of 'late imperialism' or 'late capitalism'. In the latter case, there has emerged an internationalization of the purchase of labour power.

According to Carchedi, the shift in the fundamental nature of migration during classical imperialism and late capitalism is the result of the changing exigencies of the process of capital accumulation. Permanent migration during classical imperialism responded to a structural shortage of labour power within the more developed formations of the centre, whereas temporary migration during the phase of late capitalism is a result of conjunctural shortages of labour power. Labour migration tends to be temporary during late capitalism because of its buffer function. It provides a cushion for the process of capital accumulation by replenishing the reserve army of labour when the demand for labour increases, and contracting the size of the reserve army of labour when the demand for labour decreases.
This broad periodization of different forms of migration is inaccurate for three reasons. First, Carchedi's formulation implies that there is a certain homogeneity to the process of capitalist development between social formations. It assumes that all capitalist formations, because they exist in a common temporal space defined as 'early imperialism' or 'late capitalism' display particular structural contradictions which in turn require the same solutions through the import of the same type of foreign labour. Furthermore, his approach is silent on the manner in which political and ideological relations structure the forms of migration under capitalism. His approach, then, is characterized by a considerable degree of 'capital logic'.

Second, permanent migration from western Europe to the settler capitalist formations of Canada, Australia and New Zealand during the phase of 'early imperialism' involved migrations of people from one area of the periphery (the Scottish Highlands and Islands, Ireland, and eastern Europe) to other parts of the periphery (or emerging semi-periphery) of the world system. Much of the mid and late 19th century migration to Canada occurred from other regions of the British periphery, including Ireland and the Scottish Highlands. Contrary to Carchedi, then, migrations during the period of early imperialism were not made up solely of movements between centre formations.

And third, as chapter six shows in more detail, in some social formations (Canada and Australia in particular) during the phase of late capitalism, temporary migration has not totally replaced permanent migration. It is true that in Canada, since the economic crisis of 1973, the state has increasingly tended to grant foreign-born workers a migrant, rather than immigrant status. However, it is also the case that during the post war period, or the phase of 'late capitalism' in Carchedi's terms, the state recruited and allowed the entry of large numbers of permanent settlers to cross the national border. In Canada between 1947 and 1972, the state admitted well over three million persons as immigrants, or persons who possessed the right of permanent settlement. This has been followed closely by Australia, where the state admitted over two and one-half million
persons as permanent settlers between the end of the war and 1972. Post-war settlers accounted for 55% of the increase in the total Australian population, and provided 61.2% of the increase in their labour force. The number of immigrants admitted to Canada or Australia exceeds by far the number of migrant workers admitted to any single western European social formation during the same period of time, yet they are accorded little analytical significance by Carchedi.

In light of these critical comments, the categories of migrant and immigrant labour are considered in this thesis to be statuses which are accorded by the state to foreign born persons who seek to relocate themselves in the relations of production in a social formation different from the one they were born and raised in. Furthermore, the presence of these different forms of migration do not correspond in any direct way to different stages of the development of the world capitalist system.

*Migrant labour* refers, then, to those foreign-born persons who seek to relocate themselves in sites in production but whose work and stay within a social formation is subject to temporal constraints imposed by the state. Migrant workers are those who are not granted the right of permanent settlement by the state in which they sell their labour power. In theory, if not in practice, they are subject to repatriation to their country of origin. Conversely, *immigrant labour* refers to those foreign-born persons who are awarded the right of permanent settlement, and who possess the possibility of becoming naturalized citizens within the social formation they have spatially relocated themselves in.

It is possible to specify the further implications of this conceptual distinction by reference to Burawoy's discussion of the difference between the processes of labour force maintenance and labour force renewal. Labour force maintenance refers to the process whereby workers subsist from day to day, or reproduce their capacity to provide labour power in the quantities and qualities
required by those who purchase it. Labour force renewal refers to the process whereby 'new recruits' for the process of production are raised, trained and allocated to emergent employment vacancies. Under capitalism, when employers make use of citizens of the nation state, the process of maintenance and renewal are neither geographically, nor institutionally separated.

Burawoy suggests that with employers', or the state's use of migrant labour, there is a coercive separation of the processes of labour force maintenance and renewal. This separation is initially established and subsequently reinforced by the state's system of border control. The day to day maintenance of labour power and the reproduction of the capacity to work on a daily basis, occurs in a spatial setting (usually, but not always, a distinct social formation) different from the one where the reproduction of future generations of workers occurs. The processes are also distinct in the sense that two different sets of institutions accomplish these ends within different spatial locations. Conversely, an employer's use of immigrant labour does not involve a coercive separation of the processes of labour force maintenance and labour force renewal. Persons granted the right of permanent settlement are usually allowed by states to migrate with their families in the first instance, or at least send for them after a certain period of time.43

In short, then, the conceptual category of migrants, or migrant labour, differs from the category of immigrants, or immigrant labour, in that in the former case, there are temporal limits imposed by the state on the ability of persons to remain within the social formation. Furthermore, with the use of migrant labour, there is a coercive separation of the processes of labour force maintenance and renewal such that individuals within family units (but not the family units themselves) are allowed by the state to migrate. In the case of immigrant labour, state imposed limits on the ability of people to remain in the social formation are absent. Family units are allowed to migrate, and there is no coercive separation of the processes of labour force maintenance and renewal.
Free and Unfree Labour

A conceptualization of modes of incorporation which focuses on the difference between migrant and immigrant labour is useful insofar as it suggests that there are differential state imposed temporal constraints on spatial relocation to sites in production relations. But, the examination of the purely temporal dimension to modes of incorporation is inadequate because it does not tell us anything about the character of the position in production relations which those people who migrate occupy. It cannot be assumed a priori that in instances of migration to social formations dominated by the capitalist mode of production that those who migrate will automatically be allocated by the state to a position in production relations as free wage labour. As Miles, Cohen and Corrigan have argued, in certain historical conjunctures within societies dominated by the free wage labour/capital social and productive relationship, relations of unfree labour have been established to sustain commodity production. All of these authors suggest that the historical presence of relations of unfree labour are neither confined to the 'prehistory' of capital (or phase of primitive accumulation) in those societies characterized by the dominance of the free wage labour capital social relationship, nor to peripheral formations within the capitalist world system.

The analytical and historical significance of the concepts of free and unfree labour vary for competing Marxist definitions of capitalism, and associated issues will be considered in more detail in chapter three. However, despite disagreements over the theoretical significance of the categories, those who define capitalism within the sphere of production and those who define capitalism in the sphere of circulation appear to agree about the definition of the concepts of free and unfree labour.

So, what is meant by the terms free and unfree labour? For Marx, free labour invariably refers to wage labour. However, he also makes use of the concept of 'really free working' to refer to work
under conditions of individual self determination. 'Really free working' is contrasted by Marx with wage labour, slave labour and serf labour, each of which he terms 'external forced labour' (see Miles, 1987:24). In this light it is evident that the characterization of wage labour as free labour is relative, and involves particular forms of freedom and compulsion. What, then, are the forms of freedom and compulsion which distinguish free from unfree labour?

In Marx's terms, wage labourers are

free labourers, in the double sense that neither they themselves form part and parcel of the means of production as in the case of slaves, bondsmen, etc., nor do the means of production belong to them, as in the case of peasant operations; they are, therefore free from, unencumbered by, any means of production of their own.

Or alternatively, wage labour is

free from the old relations of clientship, bondage, servitude, and secondly, free of all belongings and possessions and of every objective material form of being, free of all property; dependent on the sale of its labour capacity or on begging, vagabondage, and robbery as its only source of income.

In the first sense, freedom means that the wage labourer is free from relations of direct political and ideological domination which structure and determine who he/she provides surplus labour for. Very broadly, the individual relates to labour power as private property which he/she disposes of in a labour market. Workers possess the freedom to determine to whom they will sell their capacity to labour. Thus, they are free to determine which of the positions offered by potential buyers of wage labour they will fill, a decision which lends a degree of personal determination within the limits set by market forces. This means that the wage labourer is formally free to change employers and to seek out better paying and more 'agreeable' positions within the division of labour.
Marx's characterization of wage labour as free labour also extends to the sphere of consumption. The wage which the labourer receives in exchange for the provision of labour power is used to enter the market to purchase commodities necessary for physical, psychic, and generational reproduction. Thus, individuals are in principle free to determine how the wages they earn are to be disposed of.\textsuperscript{63}

The characterization of wage labour as free labour does not, as indicated above, mean that it is free from compulsion. Rather, free wage labour is subject to a range of constraints, each of which derives from economic compulsion to provide labour power for another. The transition from feudalism to capitalism involved the separation of the worker from the land and means of production, a process Marx termed the primitive, or primary accumulation of capital.\textsuperscript{64} This separation meant the labourer was forced by virtue of economic compulsion into selling his/her labour power for a wage in a market. Thus, free labour is compelled by the condition of propertylessness to enter the labour market to earn a wage which is sufficient to purchase commodities for the reproduction of the capacity to work, and of the reproduction of future generations of workers.

Marx himself does not use the term unfree labour, but it can be derived analytically from his work.\textsuperscript{65} Unfree labour is a concept which refers to relations of production where direct political/legal compulsion is used to acquire and exploit labour power, or where labour is constituted as the private property of another and therefore forms part and parcel of the means of production.\textsuperscript{66} In cases where labour constitutes a part of the means of production, as in the case of slavery, the wage relation is absent. The exploitation of surplus labour in such cases does not occur via the wage relation and the market, but rather is a result of the direct political/legal domination of the worker by the owner of the means of production.\textsuperscript{67} The condition of unfreedom derives from the inability to circulate in a labour market (indeed the absence of a labour market), the inability to determine to whom he/she must provide surplus labour for, and the
inability (or lack of necessity) to enter the market to purchase commodities for the reproduction of the capacity to work. Miles refers to such social relations as *unfree non-wage labour*.68

But, relations of unfreedom are not confined to those instances where the worker constitutes the private property of another, nor to those cases where the wage relation and/or labour market is absent. There are certain forms of social/productive relations which involve the payment of a wage, and therefore formally appear as free wage labour, yet involve political and legal restrictions over the circulation of labour power in a market. This can occur, for instance, in cases where persons contract with a specific employer for a period of time during which they give up the right to take up other positions offered to them by other employers of labour power. It can also occur in instances where political/legal relations prevent people from taking up certain positions within the division of labour. In such instances, the condition of unfreedom is determined by the inability to circulate freely within a national labour market.69

Miles uses the term *unfree wage labour* to formally signify that some forms of wage labour involve political and legal compulsion to provide labour power to specific employers, and/or is subject to political/legal relations which restrict its ability to circulate in a labour market.69 In both the cases of unfree wage and non-wage labour, the common determinant of unfreedom is that the worker faces formal-legal restrictions over the disposal of his or her labour power.

In this light, Miles identifies six specific forms in which the state intervenes in the process of production in instances where foreign-born persons who migrate occupy positions in production relations as unfree labour. First, the state can constitute in law the relations of production. Legislation can set the conditions under which labour power is exploited and the various obligations the producer faces in relation to the non-producer. Second, it can enforce the relations unfreedom by imposing sanctions for non-
compliance to the conditions of work. Third, the state can arbitrate the relations of unfreedom by mediating relations between the direct producers and the non-producers to eliminate excessive abuses. This is motivated by humanitarian considerations, but also in order to ensure a continuous supply of recruits and the smooth operation of the process of production. Fourth, the state can directly exploit unfree labour, a process which usually occurs in the context of the construction of an economic infrastructure within a social formation. Fifth, the state can recruit those people who occupy positions in production as unfree labour. And sixth, the state can be involved in the suppression of resistance to incorporation as unfree labour. Each form of state intervention is historically specific, and not all of them need to appear at the same time.  

In sum, then, it is suggested here that foreign-born labour (as well as indigenous labour for that matter) can, in certain historical instances, be incorporated into sites in production relations within social formations dominated by the capitalist mode of production as either free or unfree labour. This structural dimension of foreign labour incorporation is also mediated by temporal constraints placed by the state over foreign born persons' stay within the social formation. Thus, in terms of a typology, there are four distinct modes of incorporation which the state can impose on persons who are born and raised outside of the boundaries of the nation and who seek to relocate themselves in sites in production relations. These modes of incorporation are referred to in this thesis as: free immigrant labour; free migrant labour; unfree migrant labour; and free migrant labour.

Economic, Political and Ideological Dimensions to State Intervention

Having suggested above that the state plays a key role in migration through processes of exclusion, inclusion and allocation, the final section of this chapter addresses the problem of the relations which structure these various forms of intervention. This section suggests that the state's process of exclusion, inclusion, and
allocation is structured by a range, and dialectic, of economic, political and ideological relations associated with the reproduction of the relations of production.

As already noted in the critique of the work of Castles and Kosack, et. al., the state's intervention can be structured by important economic considerations which stem from the exigencies of the process of capital accumulation and the nature and extent of the supply and demand for labour within the social formation. The logic of this approach has already been outlined in the Introduction and shall not be reviewed again here.

Political economists have less frequently, although increasingly, pointed to the importance of various political and ideological relations in the state's structuration of migration. Two interrelated sets of political/ideological relations are dealt with in what follows. Considered first is the process of the reproduction of the 'imagined community' which constitutes the nation, and second, is the process of racialization. It should be noted, however, that these are not simply idealist categories. They form part of what was referred to above as those wider sets of political and ideological relations which accompany, and are necessary to sustain the process of commodity production.

The State and the Imagined Community

The criteria the state uses in the selection of candidates for entry to a social formation, and in their subsequent allocation to a site in production relations under one of the above mentioned modes of incorporation stems, in part, from the particular form that the 'imagined community' which constitutes the 'nation' takes. According to Anderson,

the nation is an imagined political community--and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.
Nations are imagined 'because members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them', and yet in people's minds there is a sense in which each person lives the 'image of their communion'. 'Nations', then are social creations. They are limited because even the largest of nations 'has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations'. They are imagined as sovereign in the sense that the people who reside within their boundaries can theoretically determine their own fates. And finally, nations are imagined as a community, because regardless of class divisions, the degree of exploitation of one group by another, and the extent of material inequalities, they are still conceived of as 'a deep, horizontal comradeship'.

The state's, or more precisely the state representative's, conception of the 'imagined community', and its conception of people who have been born and raised outside of the boundaries of that imagined community, play an important part in the regulation of the manner in which the borders of the nation state are breached. The conceptions of ego and alter which are constituent parts of the imagining associated with the nation, plays a key role in the state's structuration of migration flows to a social formation.

Anderson suggests that 'nations' are conceived in cultural terms, primarily language. That nations are conceived primarily in terms of language is evidenced by his claim that 'even the most insular nations accept the principle of naturalization ... no matter how difficult they make it'. Thus, because language skills are in principle acquirable, this implies that any person who has the capacity to learn a language is in principle able to become part of the nation.

But if it is true that nations are conceived in terms of language, and language only, and if language in acquirable, then, in the context of a state's program of border control we are faced with the problem, given a certain level of demand for labour from outside of the boundaries of the nation state, of why certain groups of people
are granted entry to a social formation and why others are excluded. If 'the nation' is conceived only in terms of language, it is difficult to explain why, for example, some state's have imposed a hierarchy of desirability over the ability of foreign-born persons who speak different languages to enter a social formation.

It is therefore necessary to somewhat revise Anderson's formulation. Rather than conceiving of 'nations' being defined solely and exclusively in terms of language, it is suggested here that at least some nations have also been defined in terms of 'race'. Thus, related to the concept and processes associated with the formation and reproduction of the imagined community which constitutes the nation, are the concepts of racism and racialization. These concepts form the second set of ideological relations which structure state intervention in the process of migration which are discussed in this thesis.

Racism and Racialization

As noted above, the particular modes by which foreign-born workers are incorporated into sites in production relations are structured by a variety of economic, political and ideological relations. As indicated by one of the quotes in the introduction to this thesis, the process of racialization plays a key role in the state's determination of the permissibility of the boundaries of the nation state, and in the allocation and incorporation of foreign-born persons to positions in the division of labour. In this section, the meaning of the concepts of racism and racialization are clarified.

The concept of racialization is becoming increasingly popular in the language of those interested in the sociological analysis of racism, 'racial' discrimination, and 'race relations' in both Britain and North America. In order to clarify the meaning of the concepts, two of the ways they have been used in British academic discourse will be outlined and then subject to critical analysis. The first is Banton's usage, and the second is Miles'.
There are important differences in the ways the terms racism and racialization are defined and used by the two authors and these will be noted below. However, both usages are premised on the formal recognition that 'race' does not refer to an objective, biological sub-group of the human species. Rather it is a social construct which has been applied in certain historical contexts to describe and explain certain forms and patterns of physical variation and their presumed social correlates. This view has its political and intellectual foundations in the various UNESCO conferences on 'race and racism' held since 1945. They had as one of their objectives the definitive refutation of Nazi biological theories, and used the current findings of biology and population genetics to sustain their case that 'race', when used to refer to fixed and discrete categories of people classified on the basis of phenotypical or genotypical criteria, is a concept with no scientific utility.

The recognition that 'races' of people do not exist in any meaningful biological sense (at least when the term makes reference to phenotype), has led to a corresponding recognition that 'race relations' are not naturally occurring and recurring forms of social relations. Rather 'race relations' is a term which has been used to describe and define certain forms of social relations. 'Race relations' are therefore forms of social relations that are constructed and reproduced with reference to the term 'race', or with reference to patterns of phenotypical or genotypical variation.

While both Banton and Miles agree that there is no biological reality to the concept of 'race' and that 'race' is a label used to describe and explain certain patterns of phenotypical and genotypical variation, Banton is considerably less consistent in his usage of the term as an analytical category than Miles. At times, the former uses 'race' as if it were a descriptive and analytic category that refers to real sub-groups of the human species.

Banton's analysis of racism and racialization is grounded in a particular historical/scientific construction of the idea of 'race'
which emerged in the early part of the nineteenth century and which became dominant in the latter part of that century. Banton accepts that the term 'race' had been used in various literary, scientific and biblical contexts before the early nineteenth century. However, he claims the term tended to be used to refer to a lineage, where groups defined as 'races' were thought of in terms of lines of descent which in turn were the result of historical circumstances. While such lines of descent were seen to be maintained over generations, they were not defined as fixed, eternal and biological.

Banton suggests that the meaning of 'race' shifted around the beginning of the nineteenth century. It began to be increasingly used to refer to biologically fixed categories of the human population. 'Racism', then, refers to the doctrine of 'racial typology'. Banton identifies four key elements of this doctrine. First, variations in the constitution and behaviour of individuals were explained as the expression of different underlying biological types of a relatively fixed and permanent kind. Second, differences between biological types explained variations in the cultures of human populations. Third, the distinctive nature of the types explained the superiority of Europeans and the inferiority of 'non-Europeans'. And fourth, friction between nations and individuals of different type arose from their different innate characters. Thus, Banton suggested that racism consists of the 'doctrine that a man's [sic] behaviour is determined by stable inherited characteristics deriving from separate racial stocks having distinctive attributes and usually considered to stand to one another in relations of superiority and inferiority'. In short, racism is the 'scientific doctrine which suggests that "race" determines culture'.

Banton uses the term 'racialization' to refer to the 'social process whereby a mode of categorization was developed, applied tentatively in European historical writing, and then, more confidently, to the populations of the world'. As such, it refers to the process by which the doctrine of racial typology was formulated, elaborated and reproduced within the realm of science.
Racialization was therefore a particular moment in the history of science whereby scientists increasingly thought and wrote about the world as being divided into distinct biologically-based 'races' which were hierarchically ordered.

Operationally, Banton measures the process of racialization by noting the frequency with which the term 'race' appears in scientific discourse. This definition allows Banton, through a content analysis of western scientific texts, to periodize the era of racism and racialization from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century. Racism was a scientific error committed by nineteenth century scientists who were honestly attempting to understand, describe and explain events in the world and patterns of physical and cultural variation. It also allows him to claim that the current scientific rejection of the doctrine of racial typology means that 'racism is dead'. For Banton, the current scientific disrepute of the concept means that there is no longer a place for the term 'racism' in sociological analysis, and that the world has entered a period of de-racialization whereby 'politicians and educators seek to correct the [scientific] mistakes of the past'.

One of the strengths of Banton's conceptualization is that racism and racialization are easily identifiable. His definition is clear about what constitutes racism (the doctrine of racial typology) and the ideational content of the process of racialization. Furthermore, it clearly identifies the social agents (scientists) involved in the original formulation and reproduction of the doctrine of racial typology, and those responsible for 19th and 20th century racialization of the world.

The shortcomings of Banton's approach, however, derive from its narrow scope. First, his conceptual strategy precludes the labelling as 'racist' much everyday and 'commonsense' discourse (including for example stereotypes, proverbs, symbols, and folklore), which in spite of the claims of 'science', continues to attribute in a
deterministic manner certain negatively evaluated social characteristics with certain patterns of physical variation. Such attributions occur without recourse to a systematic scientific doctrine which supports the claim. Thus, racist theories can have functional substitutes which have the same effects as the doctrine of racial typology.

Therefore, and second, the agents involved with the initial production and subsequent reproduction of racism, and those responsible for the racialization of the world, were (and are) not only scientists. Other groups of social actors have taken up, articulated and applied less systematic versions of the doctrine of racial typology, the effects of which continue to be felt in many forms of social relations characterized by domination and subordination.

Third, his approach is idealist. Even though Banton recognizes that 'the political utility of racial classification to late nineteenth century colonialism is ... obvious', he tends to divorce the analysis of the original production and eventual reproduction of the doctrine of racial typology, and the process of racialization, from material social relations. Certain ideas are simply seen to be the product of other ideas which are in turn seen to be the products of yet other ideas. This leads to an infinite regress and to an analytical position which sees ideas as the determination of social structure.

Miles, in recognizing these difficulties, suggests more broad definitions of both racism and racialization, although he too suggests that the definition of the terms should be limited to certain sets of ideas. In *Racism and Migrant Labour*, Miles refers to racism as 'an ideology which ascribes negatively evaluated characteristics in a deterministic manner (which may or may not be justified) to a group which is additionally identified as being in some way biologically (phenotypically or genotypically) distinct'. Or, alternatively, it refers to those negative beliefs held by one group which identify and
set apart another by attributing significance to some biological or other 'inherent' characteristic(s) which it is said to possess, and which deterministically associate that characteristic(s) with some other (negatively evaluated) feature(s) or action(s).94

'Racialization' is a broader category than racism and is equated with the process of 'racial categorization'.95 The process of 'racial categorization', or 'racialization' involves the attribution of social significance and the delineation of group boundaries by primary reference to (supposedly) inherent and/or biological (usually phenotypical) characteristics, or with reference to the term 'race'.96 Central to this definition are the notions of group boundary formation and the manner in which they are defined. Racialization involves the delineation of group boundaries by reference to biological criteria, and where such groups constitute a discrete breeding population and which therefore subsumes a pattern of gender differentiation.97 In this light, the process of racialization, can be said to occur even in the absence of the term 'race' from discourse.

When compared with Banton, Miles' definitions of racism and racialization are different, and have certain advantages. First, whereas the ideational content of the doctrine of racial typology and the process of racialization is the same for Banton, for Miles the content of racism and racialization differs. The difference between the two terms in Miles' usage is that racialization need not involve a negative evaluation of phenotypical differences and their presumed social correlates, while racism necessarily involves a negative evaluation. Historically, the process of racialization and the ideology of racism have been intertwined98, but in the contemporary context, the two concepts need to be analytically separated.

The importance of the distinction can be illustrated by reference to the various Race Relations Acts in effect in Britain since the mid-1960's. The 1968 Act specified, among other things, that discrimination on the basis of 'colour, race, ethnic or national origins in the employment, housing and the provision of commercial and
other services' is unlawful. The 1976 Race Relations Act is broader in scope than its 1968 counterpart, but the underlying intent remains the prevention and elimination of 'racial discrimination'. In this context, the various Acts imply that 'races' are real, biologically-based groups of people. Furthermore, they accord social, political and legal significance to patterns to biological difference. While the intent of the Acts has undoubtedly been ameliorative, and while they do not contain negative evaluations of patterns of physical or cultural variation, they do maintain the legitimacy of a 'racial' categorization of the peoples of the world. As such, they legitimate commonsense views of 'race' and 'race relations' which see the world as divided into different 'races'. In using this terminology, then, it is possible to suggest that the Race Relations Acts have contributed to the further racialization of British politics and society, but they are clearly not pieces of racist legislation. In short, then, racism entails a process of racialization or racial categorization, but racialization does not necessarily entail racism.

Second, for Miles, the agents of racialization are not simply scientists attempting to make sense of the world. The 'carriers' of racism and racialization can be social classes, social groups, political parties, the mass media and the agents and institutions of the state. Thus, for Miles, the particular content of the process of racialization varies on the basis of the class position and the lived experiences of those who are its exponents. Third, racism does not need to be a systematically articulated doctrine. Racism can consist of statements of 'fact' which are unsupported by logically coherent arguments or doctrines. Fourth, in conceptualizing racism and racialization as ideological processes, their emergence, articulation and reproduction is related to the larger nexus of class relations. Both racism and racialization are dialectically connected with larger material processes and conflicts. They occur within and under certain historical circumstances, and have corresponding effects on those historical circumstances. The formulation and reproduction of 'scientific' racism is therefore seen not simply as a process occurring in the realm of science independent of material processes
and contradictions, but in the context of the reproduction of modes of production. Miles therefore recognizes that racism and racialization have certain effects on material social relations, and that the process of racialization and the articulation of racism has a longer history than what is suggested by Banton.¹⁰²

Thus, and in sum, the process of racialization, which may or may not involve elements of racism, can be thought of as a mechanism which the state can use to exclude people from the entry to a social formation, include people and allocate people to sites in production relations. Similarly, the imagined community which constitutes the nation can be defined in terms of 'race'. In using this terminology, it is possible to speak of a racialization of production relations when the allocation and reproduction of certain agents in particular sites in production relations occurs with reference to non-gender based biological criteria.¹⁰³

Conclusion

The argument of this chapter, and the conceptual approach of this thesis generally, can be conveniently summarized by reference to figures 2-1 and 2-2. Figure 2-1 is a model of state intervention in

\[ \text{A} \quad \text{B} \quad \text{C} \]

\[ \text{labour supply} \leftarrow \text{state} \rightarrow \text{labour demand} \]

\[ \text{capital accumulation} \]

\[ \text{D} \]

\[ \text{political and ideological relations} \]

1) imagined community
2) racialization

Figure 2-1: State Intervention Which Excludes

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which the state denies entry to the social formation of certain groups of people. In the context of uneven development and capital accumulation which at once conditions both the demand (C) for labour within a particular nation state (and its supply from within the same nation state), and the supply of labour available from other social formations (A), via economic displacements associated with the penetration of capitalist relations of production in agriculture and/or an increase in the organic composition of capital, the state can intervene to preclude the entry of certain groups of people.

![Diagram]

**Figure 2-2: State Intervention Which Includes and Allocates**

Figure 2-2 is a model of state intervention in which the state allows foreign-born groups to enter a social formation. It shows that in the context of uneven development and the world-wide processes of capital accumulation (A and C), the state (B) can intervene to allow the entry of foreign-born labour to a social formation (ABE). Associated with such an interventions are four distinct modes of incorporation available to the state (B). These modes of
incorporation are designated as free immigrant labour, unfree immigrant labour, free migrant labour and unfree migrant labour.

Both figures suggest further that the state's decision to deny certain groups entry to the country, as well as the decision to allow certain groups entry to the country, and the subsequent mode of incorporation foreign-born persons are subject to, is the result of a dialectic of economic, political and ideological relations, such as the demand for labour, the particular nature of the construction of the imagined community and the process of racialization (B, C and D).

The question of which combination of economic, political and ideological criteria or conditions the state uses in particular instances is historically specific, and cannot be determined a priori. They can only be determined after historical analysis. This historical analysis is the object of the next two parts of the thesis.
PART TWO:

MIGRATION AND THE FORMATION OF SETTLER CAPITALISM

Perhaps one of the most important things the self-governing Dominions have to undertake is to recruit a population; and the attraction of a good type of emigrant, together with the exclusion of undesirables, has become one of the most important functions of their governments.

In order to fully explore the interrelation between capitalism and migration, the use of unfree labour and the process of racialization in Canada, it is necessary to take an historical perspective. In the case of Canada, theoretical generalizations about the link between capitalism and migration cannot be based solely on the analysis of the historical period when capitalist relations of production have been established within the country. This is the case because, first, migration was a reality in Canada prior to the establishment of capitalist relations of production, and second, migration contributed to the formation of a new society. Similarly, production relations based on unfree labour have formed the background to the development of capitalism in Canada. One of the aims of the focus on the use of unfree labour in pre-1850 Canada is to demonstrate that the forms of unfree labour which emerged within post-war Canada in the context of fruit and vegetable production, discussed in more detail in part three, are not without historical precedent. Finally, the post-war racialization of migration to Canada has its roots, in part, in turn-of-the-century ideas and practices which emerged in the context of Chinese migration. In this light, part two of this thesis demonstrates that: (1) the use various forms of unfree labour was prevalent in Canada before the middle of the nineteenth century; (2) migration contributed to the formation of a class of free wage labour;
(3) migration to Canada was a central aspect of nation state formation; and (4) the imagined community which constituted the Canadian nation has been defined since the start of Confederation, in part, in terms of 'race': in other words, there was a racialized conception of the nation state. Chapter three is concerned with the first two processes, and chapter four with the latter two processes.
CHAPTER THREE

SETTLER CAPITALISM, MIGRATION AND THE FORMATION OF A LABOUR FORCE

Introduction

The first part of this chapter specifies the historical and analytical problem, for political economy oriented theorists, of the formation of capitalist relations of production in a social formation which was initially sparsely populated, and within which capitalist relations of production were initially absent. The second section suggests that the early economic development of Canada occurred under the auspices of merchant capital in which the production of commodities destined for both export and local consumption was carried out via the use of various forms of unfree wage and non-wage labour. The third part of the chapter suggests that the restriction of access to land, coupled with large scale Irish migration to Canada during the middle of the nineteenth century, contributed to the development of a class of free wage labour, capitalist labour market, and the development of capitalist relations of production in the country. In the case of Canada, then, migration contributed to the formation of capitalist production relations, not simply to their reproduction.

Settler Capitalism: the Historical and Analytical Problem

Canada is presently a capitalist society. But the geographical and political unit which now constitutes the Canadian nation state has not always been characterized by the presence of capitalism. Canada was initially sparsely populated by an aboriginal population which was engaged primarily in subsistence production under what Wolf calls a "kin-ordered mode of production", or what Bourgeault calls "primitive communism". Given that aboriginal production in Canada before European contact was non-capitalist in structure, and given that capitalist production is not a naturally occurring and recurring
feature of Canadian, nor any other society, there arises for political
economy oriented theorists the historical and analytical problem of
identifying the initial formation of capitalist production relations.
Marx called the process whereby capitalist relations of production are
initially established within a social formation the primitive, or
primary accumulation of capital. How one conceives of this
historical/analytical problem is contingent, however, on how the term
'capitalism' is defined. It is the issue of definitions of capitalism
that is addressed in the first section of this chapter.

Within the tradition of Marxian theory, capitalism has tended to
be defined in two distinct ways. Sweezy, Frank and Wallerstein among
others, have defined capitalism within the sphere of circulation
as the process whereby commodities are produced in order to be sold or
exchanged in a market, and where the objective of the sale/exchange is
the realization of maximum profit. What is important from this
perspective is not how commodities are produced, but rather why they
are produced.

Within this perspective, when production is oriented to the
market in order to realize a profit, various forms of 'labour control'
or 'relations of production' (which can include both free wage labour
and forms of unfree wage and non-wage labour such as slavery, convict
labour, indentured servitude and contract labour) are all considered
as forms of 'proletarian labour'. For Wallerstein, forms of labour
control, or relations of production, do not provide the conceptual
basis for the delineation of distinct modes of production. Thus, in
terms of the discussion in chapter two, the predominance of free wage
labour within a social formation does not identify what is
particularly capitalistic about the society. However, for
Wallerstein, during the historical period characterized by the
hegemony of the capitalist world system, forms of labour control do
provide the basis for the differentiation of types of societies which
make up the capitalist world system. Free wage labour tends to
predominate within 'centres' of the world system, unfree labour in

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'peripheries' of the world system, and combinations of free and unfree labour prevail within 'semi-peripheries' of the world system.'\textsuperscript{11}

For those who adopt this conceptual strategy, then, the explanation of the emergence and subsequent spread of capitalism within Canada focuses on the point at which commodities began to be produced with a view to their sale or exchange in a market. Thus, the transition from systems of subsistence production carried on by individuals or groups (where exchange links with other producers were either weak or non-existent), to a market economy and the associated generalization of trading and exchange links between various regions and peoples within and outside of the country, would constitute the process of primitive accumulation, and the historical path of capitalist development in Canada.\textsuperscript{12} Using this conceptual framework, then, some have suggested that after the 'discovery' of Canada by Europeans, and their subsequent extraction of raw materials from the environment, which occurred with a view to their being sold or traded in an international market, Canada became a society capitalist in structure.\textsuperscript{13}

On the other hand, Denoon\textsuperscript{14}, Dobb\textsuperscript{15}, Laclau\textsuperscript{16} and Miles\textsuperscript{17}, among others, have defined capitalism as a particular mode of production: that is, by reference to the specific manner in which people produce their means of subsistence. Capitalism is defined as a mode of commodity production which involves the purchase and sale of labour power as a commodity within a market. In Denoon's terms, it is

a mode of production in which the means of production are privately owned, and labour is performed by workers who sell their labour power for wages.\textsuperscript{18}

Capitalist production, then, is premised on the historically constituted presence, first, of a group of people who neither own nor control any means of production of their own (which they could combine with their labour power to reproduce themselves independently), and second, of a group of people who possess a monopoly over the ownership and control of the means of production.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, within this
perspective, the discussion of the distinction between free and unfree labour presented in chapter two assumes a fundamental importance for the analysis of capitalism. For modes of production theorists, capitalism involves the production of commodities via the exploitation of free wage labour by owners of the means of production. It is the social relations of production predominant and hegemonomic within a social formation that constitute the basis for the differentiation between different types of societies.

Within this conceptual approach, modes of production are abstractions. They refer to abstract relations between people and people and between people and material objects; they never exist in a pure form in reality. Economic systems refer to the abstract relations between different modes of production. The term social formation is used to designate actually existing societies at particular historical conjunctures. Thus, within any single social formation more than one mode of production can be present (although one is usually dominant and determinate). Similarly, economic systems can designate the mutual relations between modes of production both within and between social formations.

As Taylor has pointed out, if this conceptual framework is adopted, there is a twofold historical problem associated with the explanation of the emergence of capitalism, or the process of primitive accumulation. The first problem involves the explanation of how money, wealth and the means of production became concentrated in private hands. The second problem involves the explanation of how a class of free wage labour, defined in terms of economic compulsion to sell its labour power for wages, is initially formed. Put differently, the latter involves the examination of how direct producers are separated from means of production of their own. In the case of Canada, the study of the process of working class formation has been developed most notably in the work of Palmer, Hutcheson, Pentland and Kealey, among others.
Associated with these two definitions of capitalism has been a debate over which corresponds more closely to the letter and spirit of the work of Marx, and more importantly, over their respective analytical utilities and explanatory powers.\(^27\) To enter into these debates in any detail is beyond the scope of this thesis. But in order to justify analytically the definition of capitalism made use of in this thesis, it is necessary to summarize briefly the main lines of the debates.

Those who define capitalism within the sphere of production as a particular mode by which commodities are produced suggest that the circulationist position is problematic for the following reasons: first, the definition of capitalism within the sphere of production corresponds more closely to the body of Marx's work in *Capital*; second, the circulationist position is unable to specify what is analytically and historically specific about the capitalist mode of production because commodity production for exchange in the market has been a feature of human societies 'since the neo-lithic period onwards';\(^29\) third, the circulationists' analysis of the spatial distribution of forms of labour control is teleological and functional to the extent that it is assumed that the ruling classes within each type of society simply 'chose', or impose on the 'working class', the most profitable form on the basis of the position of a state within the world system;\(^29\) and fourth, the spatial distribution of forms of labour control does not correspond with what is predicted by Wallerstein's world systems approach. Forms of labour control based on the use of unfree labour continue to be constituent features of centre formations of the world system.\(^30\)

Conversely, those who hold to a circulationist position have criticised modes of production theorists on three main grounds. First, they suggest that modes of production theorists make use of a too narrow unit of analysis. They argue that the structure and dynamics of social formations cannot be analyzed in isolation. Rather, they can only be analyzed as part of a world-wide set of unequal and exploitative relations.\(^31\) Second, they suggest that
modes of production theorists have a tendency to equate the presence of distinct sets of relations of production with the presence of distinct modes of production. Modes of production are therefore defined in an empiricist manner such that whenever deviations from free wage labour/capitalist production relations are identified in reality, a new mode of production is therefore 'discovered'. This has led to the identification of numerous 'modes of production'. And finally, they suggest that there are conceptual problems associated with the expansion of capitalism outside its 'homeland'. The problem which arises is how to characterize those 'societies created in underdeveloped countries by their incorporation into a world system dominated by the centres of capitalism'.

To even begin to resolve these conceptual debates is far beyond the scope of this thesis. But even though there are conceptual and empirical problems associated with both positions, there appear to be two sound theoretical reasons to retain the conceptual approach of those who define capitalism with the sphere of production. First, according to Brenner, the mode of production is of crucial importance in determining the evolution of the forces of production and in determining development and underdevelopment. He suggests that the structural features of the capitalist mode of production (defined in terms of the purchase and sale of free wage labour in a market) are inherently connected to their dynamics. For Brenner, one of the differentiating features of capitalism is the production of relative surplus value, and therefore the tendency to increase productivity. Free wage labour is crucial to this process because it can be expelled from the production process, gathered together in larger productive units, and reallocated to sites in production relations in accordance with the structural necessity to maximize profits. In short, the use of free wage labour is not merely a secondary feature of capitalism, as suggested by circulationists, but a central factor in the explanation of the dynamics of capitalist societies.

The second reason for retaining an emphasis on the relations of production in the analysis of capitalism is, according to Miles, that
the nature of the means by which a surplus is obtained has a
determinant but dialectical relationship with class
formation and class struggle, and with the role of the
state. Distinct relations of production ... sustain
distinct patterns of political and ideological relations.\textsuperscript{37}

Thus, the mode of extraction of surplus value, and hence the social
relations of production, conditions and structures the political and
ideological relations within which production occurs.

Given these theoretical considerations, capitalism is defined in
this thesis in a manner consistent with the modes of production
theorists. What is taken as problematic in the remainder of this
chapter, then, is the specification of the historical formation of a
class of free wage labour in Canada. I begin by describing the
colonization motive, and the social relations of production associated
with commodity production during the colonial period. Within this
context, it is suggested that shortages of labour were endemic to
early Canadian society, and that several forms of unfree labour were
developed in order to recruit and retain labour power for the process
of commodity production. This is followed by an explanation of the
development of a class of free wage labour and capitalist labour
market.

The Colonization Motive

Unlike the other settler capitalist societies of Australia, New
Zealand, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina and South Africa, which were
established primarily as military outposts of various European
states\textsuperscript{39}, the initial European presence in Canada stemmed from a
combination of both military and economic interests.

Parts of what is now Canada were initially established by the
French and British governments in order to contribute to Imperial
defense. For example, English settlement in Nova Scotia in the mid-
1700's was governed primarily by military interests. From its
inception in 1749, Halifax was founded as a garrison town and as a
naval base for British military vessels' policing of colonial traffic.\textsuperscript{39} Furthermore, after the American War of Independence in 1776, Britain defined British North America, in part, as a site which would check further American expansion in North America.\textsuperscript{40} Loyalists and English ex-army and navy officers were offered large grants of land to populate with their previous subordinates in order to achieve inexpensive imperial defence against American expansionism.\textsuperscript{41}

But perhaps more importantly, the lands which now make up Canada were of economic value to European mercantile traders. Canada made important contributions to commodity production in Europe via the provision of raw materials, its ability to assist in the reproduction of the continental European population through the provision of certain foodstuffs, and from the presence of certain commodities which were valued for their use in mercantile trade. In Harold Innis's\textsuperscript{42} terms, Canada was very much defined by the British as a 'staple', or primary producer state.\textsuperscript{43}

The discovery of rich stocks of fish (primarily cod) off the coast of Newfoundland and Cape Breton resulted in fishing fleets from several European nations, including Portugal, Spain, England and France, making annual trips to the east coast of Canada. Most of the fish caught by French vessels was destined for consumption in the French market, while much of the British catch was destined for trade with the Iberian peninsula. In the latter case, most of the catch was dried on the land, and then transported to Spain and Portugal where it was exchanged for wine, specie, salt and other commodities which were in demand in Britain.\textsuperscript{44}

Subsequent metropolitan interest in the objects which Canada possessed, and in settlement in particular, stemmed from the discovery of plentiful stocks of fur which were extracted from the environment by aboriginal peoples, and an increase in the demand for beaver fur for the production of hats in Europe.\textsuperscript{45} The French attempted to establish permanent settlements on the land, in part, to consolidate control over the trade in beaver fur with aboriginal peoples both
north and south of the St. Lawrence River and Great Lakes. By the latter part of the sixteenth century the French state sought to promote colonization in Canada by granting wealthy merchants, barons, counts and 'other dignitaries' the right to exclusive trade with the aboriginal population.45

The English state was also interested in the trade in beaver fur with aboriginal peoples on the mainland. However, it pursued this interest through the use of the chartered company. In 1670, the English state granted the 'Company of Adventurers of England Trading into Hudson's Bay', commonly known as the Hudson's Bay Company, a monopoly over all trade through Hudson Strait, together with exclusive possession of all the lands within the drainage basin of the Bay.47 The Company attempted to gain control over the trade by means of trading posts established at strategic points along rivers leading into Hudson and James Bays. The territory in which they established trading posts or 'factories' was under the formal control of the French until the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713.48

With the Treaty of Utrecht, the British were granted sovereignty over the lands in the immediate vicinity of Hudsons Bay, and the Company was able to consolidate its control over the trade in beaver fur with aboriginal peoples.49 When aboriginal peoples' signed treaties during the 19th century with the British and then Canadian state, in which they formally relinquished ownership and control of the land50, the company assumed formal ownership of much of what is now northern and western Canada until 1869 when it was bought out by the Canadian state in order to construct a nation state from the Atlantic to the Pacific coasts.

In sum, then, the early economic development of Canada occurred under the hegemony of a class of mercantilist oriented traders who were interested primarily in extracting raw materials from the Canadian environment, exporting them to the European metropole and importing finished consumer goods for sale in the Canadian market.51 Canada's role as a 'hewer of wood and drawer of water' was further
reinforced by political/legal relations which were associated with the British mercantile system.\textsuperscript{22} These relations structured what could, and what could not, be produced in the colony. For instance, the Navigation Acts of 1651 and 1660 were designed, in part, to ensure that manufacturers in Britain possessed cheap and assured supplies of tobacco, sugar, indigo, cotton, rice, naval stores and beaver furs. The Wollen Act of 1699 limited the ability of colonies to manufacture woollen yarn or cloth, and the Hat Act limited the production of beaver hats in British North America.\textsuperscript{23} Also, in 1750, the erection in the colonies of a rolling mill, plating forge or furnace was prohibited.\textsuperscript{24}

The Organization of Production in Canada to 1850

As in other settler capitalist societies, the nature of the social relations of production which predominated under merchant capital in Canada was structured by a perennial shortage of labour.\textsuperscript{25} Shortages of labour were the result of two factors. First, Canada was initially sparsely populated when European expansion into North America began. Ponting and Gibbins suggest that at the time of European contact, there were about 200,000 aboriginal people in what is now Canada.\textsuperscript{26} Notwithstanding their crucial contribution to the production of furs, their contribution to other forms of commodity production for exchange was limited. This stemmed, in part, from their partial decimation/extermination, and their resistance to incorporation in forms of employment inconsistent with their traditional way of life.\textsuperscript{27} By the time of Confederation, there were only about 102,000 aboriginal peoples in the country, and they constituted only 2.5% of the total population.\textsuperscript{28} Much of the decline in the size of the aboriginal population in Canada in particular, and North America in general, was an unintended consequence of the spread in a number diseases brought to the 'new world' by European settlers and traders.\textsuperscript{29}

After the decline in the fur trade, the remaining aboriginal peoples were defined by the British administration and then the

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Canadian state as a potential labour force for commodity production outside of the fur trade. Both levels of the state felt, however, that before aboriginals could engage in productive labour outside of the fur trade, they would have to be 'civilized'. A reserve system was established to this end. The reserves were designed to constitute a training ground whereby aboriginal peoples were to learn the habits of regular and systematic labour. Aboriginal resistance to the state's project into the present, coupled with racist hiring practices by employers, has meant that aboriginal peoples have not come to play the role in the labour market which was initially envisaged for them by the state. These two factors combined meant that the scope for the use of aboriginal peoples in the production of commodities outside of the fur trade was limited.

Labour shortages in Canada before 1850 also stemmed, in part, from the availability to colonists of 'free' land. Land was 'free' in the dual sense that there was usually no purchase price (or a nominal purchase price), and that aboriginal peoples had been forced off the land onto reserves. Means of production in the form of land in much of what is now Ontario and the Maritimes was either free or relatively inexpensive to purchase. Many of those who migrated to the British North American colonies from other peripheral areas of the British Empire (Highland and Lowland Scots and Irish farmers and farmworkers) or from the United States (United Empire Loyalists and other Americans) during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were able to acquire land of their own and become petite agricultural commodity producers. Much of the early migration to the country contributed neither to the formation nor reproduction of a reserve army of labour and/or active labour army. Rather, early migration to Canada contributed to the formation of a class of small-scale agricultural commodity producers who produced goods for local consumption. Nor did these migrants' offspring contribute to the reproduction/formation of a proletariat because they too, until the mid-nineteenth century, could acquire land relatively inexpensively.
These two structural conditions meant that those people in Canada who owned land or other means of production, and who required the use of quantities and qualities of labour power over and above those that they themselves or their families could provide for the process of commodity production, were faced with a recurrent problem of recruiting and retaining suitable supplies of labour. Pentland suggests that within the context of a shortage of labour in New France, and later in the British North American colonies, various forms of unfree labour were made use of in the process of commodity production. The existence of shortages of labour and relatively easy access to land meant that few people offered their labour power for sale in a market. Indeed, it meant that there was an absence of a labour market. Like the other settler capitalist formations discussed by Denoon, commodity production under the influence of merchant capital in Canada until the middle of the nineteenth century was undertaken by the use of various forms of unfree labour. The various systems of unfree labour developed in the context of early commodity production included the use of: aboriginal labour under a kin ordered, or 'feudal' mode of production; habitants; slaves; indentured servants; military and convict labour; and paternalism. The following sub-sections examine the various forms of unfree labour made use of in pre-1850 Canada.

Aboriginal Peoples

Aboriginal peoples played a key role in the economic success and reproduction of the fur trade via their extraction of furs from the environment, in semi-processing raw furs into castor gras (skins which had the long guard hairs removed by constant wear and which were more valuable), and later in the provision of food supplies (especially pemican) to the trading posts on the prairies. The specific nature of the exchange relations aboriginal peoples entered into with mercantilist traders depended upon whether they traded primarily with the British or primarily with the French. French fur traders usually made excursions into the wilderness to trade guns, ammunition, cooking utensils and trinkets with the aboriginal peoples. British
traders, on the other hand, tended to initially remain in their forts along Hudson's Bay and encouraged aboriginal peoples to journey to the forts in order to exchange commodities. 74

The precise characterization of the social relations of production which were involved in the production and distribution of furs for trade by the aboriginal population with the European traders is now a matter of debate. 75 Bourgeault tends to characterize European/aboriginal relations of production as feudal. He suggests that European traders constituted the lords and aboriginal peoples a 'bonded' peasantry which was forced into remaining in the trade primarily because of the increased dependence on European technology which the fur trade itself cultivated. 76 Wolf, on the other hand, describes European/aboriginal relations in the fur trade as based on a modified and extended kin-ordered mode of production in which exchanges of fur and implements were preceded by ceremonial exchanges of gifts. Production, he argues, focused around the kin group, and the distribution of surplus accumulated from the trade was based on the ties of kinship. 77 Despite differences over the characterization of these productive relations, both positions agree that European/aboriginal relations were not organized on the basis of a free wage labour/capital social relationship. 78

Outside of the fur trade, and in the context of the process of commodity production via the use of various forms of 'European' labour, other relations of production based on unfree labour were also developed. These are documented in the following, again with the aim of suggesting that forms of unfree labour were constituent parts of production in early Canadian society, and that later forms of unfree labour which emerged in the context of fruit and vegetable production after the Second World War were not without historical precedent.

The Seigneurial System

French settlement in New France began in the latter part of the sixteenth century, and sixteenth century France was a country
characterized by feudal relations of production. Both the society of New France, and the organization of production outside of the fur trade, was consciously modelled on the relations of production found in the mother country. The axiom of 'no land without a seigneur' was assumed from the beginning of settlement to be the basis of the system of land distribution in the colony. By the end of the French Regime in Canada (1763), some three hundred seigneuries were granted. Seigneuries were located along both sides of the St. Lawrence River from slightly north-east of Quebec City to just west of Montreal, and they ranged in size from seven to over one thousand square miles.

In return for the grants of land,

The seigneur's obligations were to render fealty and homage to the king in the person of the royal governor, to live on his own seigneury, have it laid out in farms, and bring out settlers to cultivate them.

In the context of the development of settlements, seigneurs were required to sub-enfeudate the lands they were granted, and to promote their settlement with habitants. The habitants were engaged primarily in subsistence agriculture where among other things wheat, peas, barley and livestock were produced primarily for local consumption. They faced several financial and non-financial obligations in relation to the seigneur. Obligations of military service were probably the most significant of the non-financial obligations, but they were also required to provide several days of labour for the seigneur at both seeding and harvest time. The habitant had to pay a rent, either in cash or in kind, for the use of the land, as well as certain charges for the use of the seigneur's fishing grounds, woodlands, and commons. They were required to mill their grain at the seigneur's mill, and the seigneur was entitled to one-fourteenth of the amount that was milled. The state retained ultimate control over the land, although habitants and seigneurs in practice did dispose of land as if it were their private property. Land tenure was therefore bound up in complex systems of state, seigneurial and habitant control.
During the French Regime, approximately four thousand habitants were recruited in France by individual seigneurs, sometimes with the assistance of the French state. The subsequent increase in the size of the habitant population occurred primarily through high birth rates and internal population growth. This was encouraged by the colonial administration by offers of financial bonuses for early marriage and large families, and by the imposition of taxes on bachelors.

The structural characteristics of the seigneurial system described above have led some Canadian historians to conclude that the social relations of production in New France were characterized by feudalism. While it is admitted that feudalism was more 'mild' in Canada than in Europe (in part because of a shortage of habitants in relation to seigneurs), these relations of production remained intact much longer in Canada than in Europe. Even though New France was ceded to Britain in 1763, seignorial tenure remained intact in Lower Canada until it was abolished by the British administration in 1854.

**Slavery**

In addition to the use of aboriginal peoples under kin-ordered, or 'feudal' relations of production, and the seigneurial system, the process of commodity production in Canada before the middle of the 19th century was also carried out by the use of slaves, indentured servants, and convicts.

Slaves were made use of in limited aspects of the production process in New France and British North America. The majority of slaves in New France were domestic servants, while approximately 23% were field hands who were involved primarily in the tasks of clearing land for later settlement by habitants. Under British rule, slaves also tended to be used primarily as domestic servants and as field hands involved in chopping wood and clearing fields in preparation for agricultural production. In the Maritimes, however, some slaves were also used in shipbuilding and other forms of construction.
The slave population in early Canada was composed of *panis* (aboriginal peoples) and Africans who were either imported to the colonies directly from the African continent, or indirectly from Africa via the United States or the Caribbean. Slaves were constituted as the private property of their masters, and could therefore be sold and traded in a market like any other commodity. They themselves, and not their labour power, were commodities. Slaves formed part of the means of production. They could not enter a market either to sell their labour power or to reproduce their daily existence because they did not receive a wage.

The legal basis for slavery in New France was provided in 1689 when the colonial government received authority from France to import African slaves. The legality of aboriginal enslavement in New France was provided by an ordinance in 1709. Under the British, the institution of slavery was given formal legal status in 1790 when an imperial act authorized the issue of licences to new settlers in British North America to bring slaves with them.

By 1759, there was a total of 3,604 slaves in New France, and they constituted about seven or eight per cent of the population of the colony at the time. Of this total, 1,132 were of African descent, and the remainder were aboriginal peoples (usually Pawnee Indians) who were captured by other tribes and then sold or traded to French seigneurs, civil servants or military officials. After the American War of Independence, many of the United Empire Loyalists who migrated northward to Canada brought with them the slaves which they owned in the United States. In 1773, for example, Loyalists brought about 2,000 slaves with them, over 1,200 of which settled in Nova Scotia with their masters. By the early years of the 19th century, however, slavery as a relation of production had in practice all-but disappeared (for reasons which will be noted below) and was in effect abolished when various courts in the colony refused to enforce enslavement.
Indentured Servants

Also used on a limited scale in both New France and British North America were indentured servants. In 1653, indentured servants formed one-half of the population of Montreal, and in 1666, there was a total of about three hundred and fifty indentured servants in the colony of New France. They constituted one-quarter of the male population over the age of fourteen in the entire colony. During the French regime in Canada, it is estimated that 40% of all immigrants to the colony consisted of indentured servants. Under British rule during the eighteenth century, indentured servitude became less frequent for reasons that will be noted below.

Indentured servants under the French regime were primarily, although not exclusively, young males who contracted themselves out to employers, usually for a period of three years. The servants' wages were paid in money. Before they left for Canada they received advances which consisted of one year's wages or half of the wages for three years. The servants were required to use this advance to purchase their own clothing, while the master was responsible for the provision of food and shelter. Most were employed on seigneuries in large gangs where they had to cut, square and trail trees in order to clear the soil for settlement. The females who entered into indentures were usually domestic servants.

While the servants appear to have usually entered the contract 'freely', in the sense that they did not face threats of physical violence for not doing so, once they entered the contract, they in effect became the property of employers. They were obliged to go wherever, and do whatever the master wanted, and could legally be sold or hired out to other employers. According to Mauro, the indentured servant was a

\[ \text{man [sic] who, during the time of his indenture, was obliged, like a slave, to go every where and to do whatever his master ordered.} \]
Under the French regime, the penalties for desertion were harsh. For example, an ordinance of 1676 stated that

In order to remedy the abuses which increase every day through the desertion of domestic servants from their masters to the great detriment of the colony, all indentured servants are forbidden to leave or abandon the service of their masters, under pain of being placed in the iron collar for the first offence, and for the second to be beaten with rods and burnt with the impression of the fleur-de-lis; all persons are prohibited from giving them refuge without written permission from their masters or a written certificate from the commander, judge, or parish priest that they are indentured to no one, under penalty of fine of twenty livres and of paying for each day of absence from said service fifteen sou (monetary unit in New France), as responsibility for the acts of the fugitives.\(^{10}\)

The French colonial administration also attempted to prevent desertion by obliging everyone embarking for Canada to carry a passport which specified their status. Fines were levied, or corporal punishment inflicted, on those who did not carry a passport. If an escaped indentured servant was caught without a passport, the fine usually involved a lengthening of the indenture.\(^{10}\)

Convict and Military Labour

In addition to the use of slaves and indentured servants, convicts and military personnel were used in the process of commodity production in both New France and British North America. Military units were used intermittently in the construction of canals and roadways. More frequent, however, was the use of convict labour. Between 1715 and 1744, approximately 1,000 French convicts were sent to Canada by the French state.\(^{10}\) The French convicts sent to Canada were people who were convicted of evading the salt tax, or were other 'petty' criminals convicted of such things as poaching and wife beating.\(^{11}\) They were bound to a master in a form similar to that of an indentured servant, usually for a period of five years. The difference between the use of convict labour and indentured servants was that in the former case, wages were not usually paid. Masters were required to undertake the reproduction costs of the convicts.
during the entire five year period. The transportation of convicts to Canada was interrupted by the outbreak of war between France and Britain in 1744, and was never resumed under the British. 112

Under the British, some local convict labour was employed in the context of an emergent penitentiary system. Around the middle of the nineteenth century, confinement in prisons in Canada was increasingly defined as a site and method for moral and spiritual reform rather than simply as a method of punishment. 113 Such reform was seen to be achievable, in part, through engagement in regular and systematic labour.

The first penitentiary in Canada was built in Kingston in 1834-35, and its inmates were put to work producing shoes and rope. 114 Limited measures of craft training were provided in prison workshops, and by 1839, prison administrators were prepared to draft out to private employers, on a daily basis, a variety of workers including blacksmiths, tinsmiths, stone cutters, masons, lathers, carpenters, painters, tailors, quarrymen, seamstresses, cooks, and nurses. 115

Despite the divergent forms of unfree labour described above, the characteristic common to each was the formal intervention of the state in the process of production. With the exception of aboriginal labour, the state reinforced the conditions of unfreedom and acted as the arbiter between employers and the employed. It constituted in law the relations of unfreedom. It also attempted, sometimes successfully and sometimes unsuccessfully, to suppress resistance to incorporation as unfree labour.

Structural Constraints on the Use of Unfree Labour

There were various structural constraints which limited the extent to which these various forms of unfree labour could be used in the production of commodities in early Canada. These constraints, therefore, resulted in a particular articulation of modes of production. Slavery in both New France and British North America
never became a widespread, let alone dominant relation of production because of climatic conditions, and the nature of the productive activities in the colonies. As noted above, much of the non-agricultural productive activities in both New France and British North America were organized around the export of raw materials and semi-finished goods. Most activities which involved the extraction of raw materials from the environment could only take place during certain seasons of the year. The felling of timber was carried out primarily during the winter, fishing and farming in the summer, and the trapping of fur in both the winter and summer. Many of those industries with fixed physical operations which produced finished and semi-finished commodities were also seasonal. Shipbuilding was a summer activity, and so was ironwork. Furthermore, many of these productive activities required high degrees of skill, initiative, independent judgement and mobility on the part of their workforce. Close and strict supervision over a workforce was not feasible in the context of much early commodity production in the country.

In this context, slave relations of production were unsuitable because they involved the owners' undertaking the reproduction costs of the slave during the entire year and, therefore during relatively long periods when the slave was unproductive. The costs associated with the reproduction of the slave were usually greater than the amount of surplus that was extracted from the use of their labour. Many settlers who brought slaves with them to Canada when they migrated, especially the United Empire Loyalists during the 1780's, gave up the use of slaves voluntarily after a few years in the country because of the institution's inability to earn slaveowners a profit. By 1800, the use of slave labour effectively ceased.

Despite the harsh punishment associated with the desertion of indentured servants, servitude did not become a dominant relation of production. The relative ease with which it was possible to break the terms of the contract simply by escaping into the wilderness meant that shipowners or other entrepreneurs who could afford to recruit labourers under indenture became increasingly reluctant to do so.
Many of the couriers des bois, independent French fur traders, were known to be escaped and ex-indentured servants. Many also established themselves on the land as petite agricultural commodity producers after their period of indenture ended. Thus, the use of indentured servitude did not lead to the creation of class of free wage labourers.

Servitude also suffered from many of the same limitations as slavery. Owners of indentured servants were required to undertake the reproduction costs of the servants even during periods of un- or underemployment. Indentured servants also required a high degree of supervision which was difficult to achieve in the context of commodity production in the face of a vast frontier.

Under the French regime, the use of convict labour was limited, in part, because of a shortage of labour in France itself. Most French convicts were required for commodity production in the mother country, and the French state did not, therefore, actively encourage their transportation abroad. The scope to use convict labour in the context of the penitentiary system was limited by the agitation on the part of local craftsmen who complained about unfair competition coming from within the prison system.120

Paternalism

Within the context of perennial shortages of labour in Canada, in conjunction with various structural constraints which restricted the ubiquity of slavery, indentured servitude, and convict and military labour, the dominant relation of production in pre-1850 Canada was, according to Pentland121, paternalism, or what in an earlier context he termed quasi-feudal relations of production.122

Like other forms of unfree labour used in Canada before the middle of the nineteenth century, paternalism involved the use of extra-economic measures of coercion to retain workers for production. Unlike the other forms of unfree labour, however, these extra-economic
measures did not involve the formal intervention of the state. Paternalism was made profitable and became regularized by the employers' development of close personal relations with their employees in order to reduce the expenditures required to reproduce the labour power of the workforce during periods of un- or under employment.\textsuperscript{123} While the state was not necessarily absent in such relations, it did not play as direct a role in the reinforcement and constitution of the conditions as unfreedom as it did with other forms of unfree labour.

The precise forms that paternalism took varied from one production site to another and from one activity to the next.\textsuperscript{124} Perhaps the best way to describe paternalistic relations of production is by way of example. For Pentland, the relations of production established between workers and the owners of the St. Maurice Forges for a 150 year period provide a good example of the meaning of paternalism.\textsuperscript{125} The St. Maurice Forges were one of several ironworks established in New France during the course of the eighteenth century. They were located near the town of Three Rivers and operated more or less continuously from 1732 to 1883. The forges had a permanent workforce of about 120, made up of labourers, skilled craftsmen, bookkeepers, boatmen, carpenters, prospectors, carters and sawyers. This permanent workforce was augmented by, at times, as many as 500 temporary employees drawn from the surrounding habitant population. Because of a shortage of skilled labour in Canada, the original owners of the forges were required to recruit most of their skilled labour in France.\textsuperscript{127} These workers were initially offered high salaries to leave France, and had their transportation paid by the company.

Upon their arrival in New France, some were enticed by the offer of even higher wages to work in New England while others returned to France. Despite these initial losses, the owners of the forges initially possessed more workmen than were initially required. This surplus of labour entailed serious losses for the owners. The workers were recruited under contract, and had to be paid regardless of whether they worked or not. Thus, the forges, like other industries
in the country, suffered not only from shortages of labour but also, at certain times of the year or during certain phases of the production cycle, from a temporary surplus.\textsuperscript{127} The problem of potential labour shortage and temporary labour surplus was a recurrent one as the forges were inoperative for five months of the year during the winter. For the owners, it was impractical to release the skilled workers from their contracts when one production cycle ended, and force them to reproduce their own labour power when they were un- and under-employed because of uncertainty over whether they would return to employment at the forges when they were needed again.

Such uncertainties meant that the employer's were forced to assume the overhead reproduction costs of the workforce when it was unemployed or underemployed. However, in order to lower the reproduction costs of the workforce when it was unemployed, employers developed a variety of non-economic measures to reduce those costs and reduce the likelihood of the workers' circulation in the market. In the case of the forges, the permanent employees lived with their families on the site and constituted a village of about 400 people. A company store provided most of the provisions for the community. The owners provided cottages or other housing, granted each family a plot of land for a garden and offered lifetime employment to the workers and their sons and daughters. The director of the forges was the social and moral arbiter of the community and workers and their families could not entertain or keep 'outsiders' in their homes without his permission. During the winter months, the director sponsored festivals, entertainment and other forms of 'gaiety'.

Paternalistic relations similar in form to those associated with commodity production at the St. Maurice Forges were also the dominant relation of production in the timber trade, and boating, and the small industrial enterprises which were established. Paternalism also characterized the social relations of production established within the Hudson's Bay Company between the chief factors (traders) and the 'European' component of their workforce.\textsuperscript{128}
According to Pentland, the common feature of the different forms of paternalism, and what constituted paternalistic relations of production as a form of unfree wage labour, was that employers assumed the overhead reproduction costs of the workforce when it was unemployed or underemployed, but at the same time sought to reduce these costs through the development of close personal bonds with the workforce.\(^{129}\) The development of these personal bonds had the effect, according to Pentland, of militating against movement and against any agency that would induce movement.\(^{130}\)

Thus, the workers who were employed under paternalistic relations of production may have received wages in return for the provision of their labour power, but because of the absence of a labour market, could not sell their labour freely to other employers. In terms of the discussion of free and unfree labour in chapter two, the bonds developed by the employers to retain their respective labour forces involved forms of extra-economic coercion which precluded the operation of market mechanisms for the distribution and retention of labour power.

Irish Migration and the Formation of a Class of Free Wage Labour

To this point, it has been suggested that early European interest in Canada stemmed primarily, although not exclusively, from the contribution which Canadian produced raw materials made to commodity production in Europe. In this context, those people who were interested in the production of commodities in Canada faced a problem with respect to the recruitment and retention of adequate supplies of labour. Labour shortages were precipitated by the decline in the absolute size of the aboriginal population, their marginalization on reserves, and the offer of 'free' land to settlers of European origin. In response to the chronic shortage of labour employers, developed several forms of unfree labour to carry out the process of commodity production. These forms included slavery, serfdom, indentured servitude, convict labour, military labour and paternalism.
But, if early forms of commodity production in Canada were characterized by the use of various forms of unfree wage and non-wage labour, and if capitalism is defined, following the first section of this chapter, as the process whereby commodities are produced for sale in a market by the use of free wage labour, then where did the class of free wage labour that is a defining feature of capitalist relations of production come from, and what were the conditions which led to the formation of a class of free wage labour?  

Restricted access to land, coupled with large scale Irish Catholic migration are two of the chief factors in this process which are identified in the following.

By the early part of the 19th century, access to land in eastern Canada to newly arrived immigrants had become severely restricted. In Canada, acquisition of land was one of the principal expressions of social and political influence. Those people close to British government administrators or local sources of political power such as bishops, magistrates, lawyers and surveyors, along with military officers and United Empire Loyalists, were able to obtain large allotments of land under very favourable terms. Many of the lands granted to such individuals were not worked productively. Rather, they were left idle and used as sources of speculation. By the 1820's, the monopolization of land had reached a new phase. According to Armstrong

Increasing land values attracted corporate investors from Britain, who began operations with the formation in 1824 of the Canada Land Company and in 1834 of the British American Land Company ... British corporate capital dealt in the tens and hundreds of thousands [of acres] in both Upper and Lower Canada ... On this basis, the Huron Tract in Ontario and the Eastern Townships in Quebec were assigned and expropriated by the land companies.

The alienation of land into the hands of private land companies and speculators meant that newly arrived immigrants, as well as people who lived in Canada for generations who had not taken up positions on the land, faced difficulty in acquiring land of their own to settle on in Canada. This meant that people were becoming increasingly forced.
by virtue of the condition of propertylessness into selling their labour power for wages.

Restricted access to land in Canada also occurred at a time of large scale Irish Catholic migration to North America. Protestant Irish migration from Ulster to Canada began with the rise in the trade in timber between British North America and Britain in 1815. Ships which transported timber from Canada to Britain offered cheap return fares to Canada. Irish Catholics also took advantage of the low costs of transatlantic migration. Irish Catholic migration from both Ulster and southern Ireland occurred in a context of economic displacements associated with a shift in production from subsistence agriculture to cattle and dairy production, and the failure of successive potato crops in the 1840's.¹³

In sheer quantitative terms, the scale of Irish Catholic migration to British North America around the middle of the nineteenth century was impressive by any standards. For instance, for each year between 1817 and 1847, migrants from Ireland constituted from 47% to 85% of the total number of immigrants who landed in Quebec city and Montreal. In the early 1830's, there were approximately 25,000 Irish Catholic migrants and their offspring in British North America. This figure increased to approximately 85,000 in the first years of the 1840's and increased to 140,000 by 1848, 200,000 in 1852 and to 280,000 in 1861.¹³⁷ In 1830, Irish Catholic immigrants and their families constituted about 4% of the population of British North America, whereas by the early 1850's, they constituted nearly 11% of the population of the colonies. Many of these Irish Catholic immigrants settled in urban areas. For instance, by the middle of the nineteenth century Irish immigrants comprised 37%, 32% and 35% of the populations of Toronto, Hamilton and Halifax.¹³⁸

Upon their arrival in Canada, Pentland suggests that they formed a permanent pool of labour that employers could draw upon at will.¹³⁹ Employers could hire the quantities and qualities of labour power when and where they required. They did not have to assume the overhead
reproduction costs of the workers when they were unemployed in order to ensure that they had access to labour power when it was required. The Irish immigrants possessed the legal freedom to accept, reject or change employment. Thus, Pentland suggests, that it was only with the migration to Canada of large numbers of Irish Catholic immigrants in the middle of the nineteenth century that a free labour force and capitalist labour market emerged.

Pentland suggests that that Irish Catholic migrants had such horrific experiences with agriculture in Ireland that once in Canada, they wanted little to do with further petite agricultural commodity production. They preferred to sell their labour power for a wage in the market rather than settle on the land. Pentland clearly under-emphasizes the role of restricted access to land as a factor in the explanation of the Irish Catholics labour market behaviour and over-emphasizes the role of 'ideas' in the explanation of Irish Catholic behaviour. With the west not yet opened for settlement, and with much of the best, and even much of the worst agricultural land either occupied or alienated into the hands of land speculators in Ontario, they were one of the first immigrant groups to face structural constraints which limited the degree of 'free choice' they exercised in the matter of entering the labour market or settling on the land. The important element of truth to Pentland's argument, which must be retained even in light of recent criticisms by Greer and Akenson, is that without means of production of their own in the form of land, and without any intention/possibility of acquiring such means of production, they were one of the first groups who were forced by economic compulsion to sell their labour power for wages.

Conclusion

Given that capitalist relations of production are not naturally occurring and recurring forms of social/productive relations, political economy oriented theorists face a historical problem concerning the initial formation, and subsequent reproduction, of such relations. If capitalism is conceptualized, following modes of production theorists
as a form of commodity production via the use of free wage labour, then the historical and analytical problem centers around the conditions leading to the formation of a class of free wage labour.

The historical analysis presented in this chapter has suggested that commodity production for the market was an important reason for European mercantile expansion in the country. But, European mercantile expansion did not, as Baran seems to suggest, automatically transform Canada into a society capitalist in structure. As noted in this chapter, capitalist production is premised on the formal separation of labour from the means of production. Despite the occurrence of migration to the country before the middle of the 19th century, migration did not contribute to the formation of a proletariat. Rather, with free land available, migration contributed, in part, to the formation of a class of petite agricultural commodity producers. In this context, much of the non-agricultural production, and some of the agricultural production (especially on large farms) was carried out via the use of various forms of unfree labour. These included, among others, the use of slaves, indentured servants, convict labour, military labour and paternalistic employment practices. This indicates an articulation of feudal and slave modes of production.

It was only in the middle of the 19th century, with restricted access to land coupled with large scale Irish migration to the country that there emerged a class which was forced by economic compulsion to sell its labour power in order to survive. What is significant about Irish migration to Canada in particular, then, is not that it contributed to the augmentation of the size of the reserve army of labour available to employers from within Canada, but rather contributed to the initial formation of a class of free wage labour. In this historical instance, migration contributed to the actual emergence of capitalist relations of production through its role in the formation of a class of free wage labour.
CHAPTER FOUR

CHINESE MIGRATION, RACIALIZATION
AND NATION STATE FORMATION

A government cannot look at a citizen of a free country as a mere tool in the hands of capital. The jade is much more docile than the charger, and each is useful in its place. A country is not developed merely by work. The character and habits of the workers are of importance, as well as the incidents attaching to the labour ....' 

... if the end to be sought is building up the nation, and not the exploitation of these resources, the vital interest to be secured above all others is an immigration of settlers of whom we may hope to make Canadians, in the best sense of the word. That this object ought to be the one in view is supported by the recent public utterance of a very distinguished personage when he said: "No one who has the privilege which we have had during our tour could fail to be struck with one all-prevailing and pressing demand--the want of population. Even in the oldest of our colonies were abundant signs of this need,--boundless tracts of country yet to be unexplored, hidden mineral wealth calling for development, vast expanses of virgin soil ready to yield profitable crops to the settler; and these can be enjoyed under conditions of healthy living, liberal laws, free institutions, in exchange for the overcrowded cities and the almost hopeless struggle for existence which, also, too often is the lot of many in the old country. But one condition and only one, is made by our colonial governments, and that is--send us suitable immigrants. I would go further and appeal to my fellow countrymen at home to prove the strength of the attachment of the motherland to her children, by sending them only the best. By this means we may still further strengthen, or at all events pass on unimpaired, that pride of race, that unity of sentiment and purpose, that feeling of common loyalty and obligation which, knit together, alone can maintain the integrity of our Empire". 

Introduction

The previous chapter has argued that migration was integral to the initial formation of a class of free wage labour in Canada. But, as the quotes which began this chapter from the two Royal Commissions
established to 'investigate' Chinese (and Japanese) migration to Canada. The chapter suggests that migration to Canada during the late 19th and early 20th centuries had more than just an 'economic' significance (in the sense of constituting a labour force) for the formation of capitalism. Despite a labour shortage in British Columbia, not all 'immigrants' were equally desired or welcomed. There were, therefore, significant political and ideological relations involved in the constitution of a labour force and the 'imagined community' of the Canadian nation.

This chapter examines the political and ideological reaction to Chinese migration to British Columbia around the turn of the century. There are three main aims of the analysis presented here. First, it seeks to demonstrate that the 'imagined community' which constituted the Canadian 'nation' was defined, in part, in terms of 'race'. Despite different positions in production relations of various classes, these classes and the two levels of the state, defined the Canadian nation in terms of a common 'race'. Second, it suggests that in light of a racialized conception of the nation state, migration to Canada was defined as a crucial aspect of nation state formation. Finally, the racialization of the nation state, and the complex political and ideological relations (of which I consider racism and racialization) surrounding migration to the country had important effects on the nature and extent of Chinese migration to Canada, and the modes by which people from China were incorporated into sites in production relations in the country.

From Colony to Nation

By the time Canada formally became a relatively sovereign nation in 1867 (Britain retained the powers of decision in foreign relations, peace and war until 1931), free wage labour/capitalist relations of production had already been established in eastern Canada. One of the chief projects of those in positions of political power, therefore, was the maintenance of the conditions for the reproduction and extension of capitalist relations of production within the new...
This process was facilitated by the fact that many of the personnel of the state were themselves the owners of the means of production and of large amounts of accumulated wealth. But, for those in positions of political power, the problem of the reproduction and extension of capitalist production did not simply entail the formation and reproduction of a class of free wage labour. As noted in chapter two, the development of capitalism takes place within certain social, political and ideological parameters. Part of the state's agenda is therefore structured by the necessity to form and reproduce such political and ideological relations which are part of, and sustain, capitalist production.

The political and ideological relations which were to prevail in the settler capitalist formation of Canada were explicitly modelled on the basis of 'British institutions'. Sir John A. Macdonald, Canada's first Prime Minister, suggested that Confederation involved the creation in North America of a new nation which would be a 'subordinate kingdom' in the British Empire. This 'subordinate kingdom' in the northern half of the continent was to be a 'free country', and was to 'perpetuate British institutions in America for all time to come'.

The intimate connection between 'British institutions' and the emergent Canadian nation state was codified in law in the form of the British North America Act of 1867. For example, in the preamble to the Act, which constituted the legal basis for the federation of the Canadian colonies and their formal independence from Britain, it was stated that

the provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have expressed their Desire to be federally united into One Dominion under the crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom.

What were these British institutions and what was the nature of the 'freedom' that was to prevail in Canada? By British political institutions, the 'fathers' of Confederation meant the existence of a
parliamentary system in conjunction with a reigning monarch. Parliament was to enjoy supremacy over the Crown, but the latter was to retain a symbolic importance in its role in formally sanctioning laws passed by the federal legislature. Within Canada, though, the structure of the parliamentary system differed from that found in Britain by virtue of the existence of provinces. Thus, the British parliamentary system was modified to the extent that by virtue of the British North America Act the provinces possessed relatively autonomous legislatures which could enact laws in matters of local interest such as education.

As with Britain at the same time, parliamentary democracy did not entail universal suffrage; indeed, none of those in British North America who were involved in the negotiations over the terms of Confederation appear to have been in favour of universal suffrage. As one of his biographers has noted, Sir John A. Macdonald viewed universal suffrage as one of the greatest evils that should befall a state ... The idea that a man should vote simply because he breathed was ever repellant to ... [his] conception of government.

In this light, Macdonald claimed that unless property were protected, and made one of the principles upon which representation was based, we might perhaps have a people altogether equal, but we should cease to be altogether free.

From Macdonald's and other fathers' of Confederation's dislike of universal suffrage it is evident that the freedom that was to prevail in Canada was to take particular forms. E.P. Thompson has summarized the relative conception of the nature of freedom predominant in Britain during the early part of the nineteenth century in the following terms:

Freedom from absolutism (the constitutional monarchy), freedom from arbitrary arrest, trial by jury, equality before the law, the freedom of the home from arbitrary entrance and search, some limited liberty of thought, of speech and of conscience, the vicarious participation in
liberty (or in its semblance) afforded by the right of parliamentary opposition and by elections and election tumults (although people had no vote they had the right to parade, huzza and jeer on the hustings) as well as freedom to travel, trade and sell one's own labour.14

If we add to this list 'freedom from the British colonial office'16, Thompson's description of the nature of the British definition of freedom appears to apply equally well to what those responsible for the confederation of the Canadian colonies probably meant by the term. Thus, like the 'freedom' associated with wage labour, the 'freedom' associated with participation in the Canadian nation state was relative, and allowed only certain forms of political participation and social and economic activity to certain classes and to certain groups within and between classes.

Even though the nature of the 'freedom' which was to prevail in Canada was relative, the remainder of this chapter suggests that certain classes of Chinese migrants in the country were defined as biologically incapable of participation in a society characterized by such 'freedoms'. They were therefore deemed to be not suitable as permanent settlers. Before the political and ideological reaction to Chinese migration is documented, it is necessary to first give an indication of the background and scale of this migration to Canada.

The Dimensions of Chinese Migration to Canada

Despite the formation of a well stocked labour market in eastern Canada by the 1850's (see chapter three), the situation in that part of Canada which laid west of the Rockies was different. A shortage of European labour was an endemic feature of British Columbia until the 1920's.16 Shortages of European labour in British Columbia were the result of the existence of restrictions on emigration in many European countries, the difficulty, time and expense it took to travel to British Columbia from other parts of Canada, the United States and Europe, the ability of American employers to offer better wages to
newly arrived immigrants in North America, and of the availability of relatively free land for settlement on the prairies.  

Shortages of labour in British Columbia threatened both the economic and political viability of the emergent nation state. Employers and state representatives realized that the development of capitalism in the province was deterred by the shortage of labour. Furthermore, one of the terms of British Colombia's entry into Confederation in 1871 was that within ten years of that date, the federal government would complete the construction of a transcontinental railway in order to provide a fixed transportation link between the eastern and western seaboards. While the construction of the railroad had already begun by 1880, it was still far from completion and British Columbia politicians were threatening to withdraw from Confederation because the federal government had failed to live up to the terms of the agreement. Thus, once railroad construction began, its completion became a priority for Macdonald and the Conservative Party.

In this context, between 1858 and 1924, a total of about 83,000 Chinese migrated to Canada, the vast majority of whom were males. In 1921, they constituted just under 7.5% of the total population of the province of British Columbia. This migration was made up of three flows of people. The first Chinese to migrate to Canada came via California during the Fraser River Valley gold rush. There were about 2,500 in Canada at the peak of the gold rush in 1860. When the gold rush ended, some remained in the province, and others migrated elsewhere. Second, there were those who arrived in Canada with the intention of selling their labour power for a wage. A large number were recruited by Andrew Onderdonk, the contractor for the five western-most sections of the British Columbia portion of the Canadian Pacific Railroad. They were employed under direct service contracts in which they were formally bound to the contractor. The remaining portion appeared to have been recruited by the Six Companies of Kwangtung under a form of debt bondage called the credit ticket system. Such workers were employed throughout the British Columbia
economy, but appear to have predominated in salmon canneries, market gardening, coal mining, road construction and other industries which required large amounts of unskilled and low cost labour. As the next section of this chapter shows, both direct service and credit ticket migrants occupied positions in production relations in Canada as unfree wage labour. And finally, there were those who migrated as petite bourgeois merchants, traders, shopkeepers, and labour contractors. Many owned restaurants, laundries, grocery or general stores or market gardens.

In the remainder of this chapter, the ideological and political reaction to this migration is traced. The analysis focuses on class variations in the reaction to Chinese migration. Gender based variations in the reaction were undoubtedly important, and more research needs to be carried out on this. Two dimensions to the class variations in the reaction are examined. First, class actors articulated different representations of Chinese migrants. Members of the B.C. working class, petite bourgeoisie, bourgeoisie and the state racialized Chinese migrants in that each defined them as constituting a 'race' apart from the dominant 'white' society. But there were important variations in the exact nature of the process between classes and in the consequences which flowed from these processes. And second, the representations distinguished between different classes. Both merchants and unfree wage labourers were subject to a process of racialization in that they were identified as fixed biological groups 'racially' different from the dominant 'white' population. However, in some cases, the difference of 'race' was evaluated in positive terms.

These class variations to the reaction to Chinese migration are examined in order to demonstrate that despite differences in the politics, ideology and economic interests of classes and various levels of the state, there was a shared a racialized conception of the 'imagined community' which constituted the Canadian nation. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates that the racialization of the
nation state had important effects on the modes by which Chinese migrants were incorporated into production relations in the country.

Variations in Representation: the Unfree Chinese Labourers

I begin with an examination of the racialized reactions of the 'white' working class, the state and bourgeoisie to the presence of Chinese labourers in the province. This is followed by an examination of the 'white' petite bourgeoisie's and state's racialized reaction to the presence of Chinese merchants, and an analysis of the effects of the process of racialization on the modes by which the Chinese were incorporated into Canadian society.

Working Class Representations

The Knights of Labour, at the 1885 Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration, submitted what became the standard working class criticisms of Chinese labourers throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It is worthwhile, therefore, to quote their submission at some length:

Chinese labour is confessedly of a low, degraded and servile type, the inevitable result of whose employment in competition with free white labour is to lower and degrade the latter without any appreciable elevation of the former. Their standard of living is reduced to the lowest possible point, and, being without family ties, or any of those institutions which are essential to the existence and progress of our civilization, they are enabled to not only live but to grow on wages far below the lowest minimum at which we can possibly exist. They are thus fitted to become all too dangerous competitors in the labour market, while their docile servility, the natural outcome of centuries of grinding poverty and humble submission to a most oppressive system of government, renders them doubly dangerous as the willing tools whereby grasping and tyrannical employers grind down all labour to the lowest living point. It is for this latter reason, chiefly, that we object to the Chinese, not altogether because they accept lower wages.

There are several points of interest in the working class's representation of the Chinese. First, the Knights were quite specific
about who their complaints were directed at. The objects of the union's representation were Chinese labourers, not the entire Chinese population in Canada. Second, the working class, in identifying itself as 'white' labour, simultaneously identified Chinese labourers as 'non-white' labour. Thus, the working class's reaction to the presence of Chinese labourers entailed a process of racialization whereby social significance was attached to patterns of phenotypical variation (see chapter two).

Third, in addition to being subject to a process of racialization, the Chinese labourers were identified as possessing a variety of negatively evaluated traits. In other words, the process of racialization was accompanied by an ideology of racism in which various 'races' of the world were arranged in a hierarchy of superiority and inferiority. They were identified as 'sojourners' who did not bring their families to the country, as possessing an historically lower level of subsistence, as incapable of participation in bourgeois democratic political institutions, and as a group which accepted wages lower than what 'civilized', 'white' labour could live on. In other contexts, the British Columbia working class also suggested that the Chinese labourers degraded the employment they took up, deterred 'white' labour from taking up positions alongside of them, and therefore deterred the general flow of permanent settlers to the country. They were also defined as a deterrent to settlement to the extent that it was suggested they took the jobs that bona fide settlers relied on to earn enough money to purchase a plot of land and establish themselves on the land as petite agricultural commodity producers.

And finally, in addition to the working class's self-identification as 'white' labour (which possessed certain positive characteristics) and the definition of Chinese as 'non-white labour' (which possessed certain negative characteristics), it also identified itself as 'free' labour. Their 'freedom' was juxtaposed to Chinese 'servility', 'slavery' and 'docility', each of which were conditions which were negatively evaluated.
These latter representations must be considered analytically. They should not simply be seen as instances of working class rhetoric. These representations pointed to a racialization of labourers who were located in a position of unfreedom. While the Chinese labourers were clearly not 'slaves' as the Anti-Chinese Union claimed at one of its meetings in 1885, and while the reason for the Chinese workers' apparent 'docile servility' had little to do with their 'nature' as the Knights of Labour claimed, the important element of truth to these representations was that they pointed to the fact that the Chinese workers occupied a qualitatively distinct position in production relations from that of their 'European' counterparts.

While the 'white' portion of the working class were free wage labourers to the extent that they could circulate freely within the Canadian labour market, Chinese workers constituted a form of unfree wage labour. Extreme poverty and economic displacement associated with China's loss of the Opium Wars meant that few could afford to pay the costs of transportation to North America to seek out wage labour employment. In order to reach Canada to sell their labour power for a wage, people in China entered into a debt, primarily with one of the Six Companies of Kwangtung (Guangdong). The companies, who also recruited labour for employers in southeast Asia, South and Central America, Australia and the Pacific Islands, paid for the cost of their transportation to Canada, as well as assumed the costs of food, clothing and shelter during the passage and during periods of unemployment.

With direct service contracts, Chinese labourers were recruited specifically for Andrew Onderdonk, the contractor for the five western-most sections of the railroad. Under the terms of the contracts, the wages of the labourers were paid directly to a representative of the Six Companies, from which they deducted 2.5% of the workman's weekly wages in repayment of the debt associated with their transportation to the country.
The credit ticket system of recruitment appears to have operated in Canada from at least 1865. In that year, for example, a Chinese merchant who was also a labour contractor informed the colonial administration of the services he offered in the following terms:

Being an agent for the "Chinese coolies", lately arrived and to arrive I am in a position to at all times supply any number you may require. If you will kindly write if you are in want of workman.\textsuperscript{37}

The 1885 Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration was told of the operation of this system in the following terms.

... they give bonds, before leaving China, to Chinese companies to work for them for a term of five or ten years, and all that the Company have to do is to furnish them with the bare necessities of life and their clothing, and the company have all their earnings. After they serve their time, of course, they go then and work for themselves.\textsuperscript{30}

The workers were not, then, initially recruited for specific named employers, but were rather found work by representatives of the Companies once they arrived in Canada. The worker in return had to repay the debt along with interest which accrued at a rate of approximately 4-8\% of the principle per month.\textsuperscript{39} The representatives of the Company found work for the workers, and collected the workers' wages from the employer, from which they deducted their proportion. Labour market decisions, which involved the question of to whom the workers sold their labour power to and at what price, were made by the Companies. Until the time that the debt was repaid, the Company possessed a lien on the workers labour power.\textsuperscript{40}

These relations approximated a condition of indentured servitude, but differed insofar as there was an indeterminant length of indenture, the period depending on the type of employment they were drafted out to and on the wage they received.\textsuperscript{41} In general though, it varied from about four to ten years, and increased when the Canadian state implemented first a $50.00 and then a $100.00 head tax on Chinese labour migration.\textsuperscript{42}
Working class action which accompanied the racialization of unfree Chinese labour tended to be organized around calls for their exclusion from entry to the country; or, failing exclusion, the imposition of strict limitations over their entry to the country and restrictions over their ability to sell their labour power for a wage in certain industries. Chinese labourers were, for example, excluded by law from employment on the construction of the Grand Trunk Railroad during the early years of the 20th century, they could not be employed underground in coal mines by virtue of the Coal Mines Regulation Amendment Act of 1900, they were prohibited from employment on public works in the province in 1897, and could not obtain a hand logger's licence, nor take up the positions of law and pharmacy until the late 1940's. The working class's success in this regard meant that their agitation further reinforced the Chinese labourers' condition as unfree wage labour by restricting their ability to circulate freely within the Canadian labour market.

State Representations

Both the federal and provincial levels of the state shared with the British Columbia working class much the same view of the unfree Chinese labourers. A good indication of the state's general view of unfree Chinese labourers was provided by one of the Commissioner's involved in the hearings of the 1902 Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration. He prefaced his comments on Chinese migration to Canada by suggesting that

the Chinese of the labour or coolie class ... come from southern China, drawn mainly from the poorer classes, reared in poverty where a few cents a day represent the earnings which must suffice for a family ....

His reference to the 'Chinese of the labour or coolie class' is important because, again, it was specific about the objects of the state's concern: the evaluation was not intended to apply to the entire category of 'Chinese' in the country, but rather to Chinese labourers alone. He went on to describe the labourers as possessing
... customs, habits and modes of life fixed and unalterable, resulting from an ancient and effete civilization, with no desire to conform to western ideas. They form, on their arrival, a community, separate and apart, a foreign substance within, but not of our body politic, with no love for our laws and institutions; a people that will not assimilate or become an integral part of our race and nation. From a moral and social point of view, living as they do without home life, schools or churches, and so nearly approaching a servile class, their effect upon the rest of the community is bad. They pay no fair proportion of the taxes of the country. They keep out immigrants who would become permanent citizens, and create conditions inimical to labour and dangerous to the industrial peace of the community where they come. They spend little of their own earnings in the country and trade chiefly with their own people. They fill the places that ought to be occupied by permanent citizens, many of whom leave the country on their own account. They are unfit for full citizenship, and are permitted to take no part in municipal or provincial government .... They are not and will not become citizens in any sense of the term as we understand it. They are so nearly allied to a servile class that they are obnoxious to a free community and dangerous to the state.45

Thus, like the working class, state representatives defined the unfree Chinese labourers as a fixed biological group which possessed several fixed and negatively evaluated social traits. They were identified as being biologically incapable of change or 'assimilation', and this incapacity constituted them as undesirable future citizens. The traits which they did possess, and which were defined as incapable of being changed, were also negatively evaluated.

Furthermore, the representatives of the various levels of the state defined the imagined community which constituted the Canadian nation in terms of 'race'. Chinese labourers were defined, in a racist manner, as a 'race', which was unwilling and unable to change, and which was unfit for citizenship in the Canadian 'nation'. Conversely, the 'white race' was defined, in a racialized manner, as the only group that was really capable of participation in bourgeois democratic institutions. Sir John A. Macdonald was clear about the capacities and capabilities of different 'races' in this regard.

I share very much the feeling of the people of the United States and Australian Colonies against a Mongolian or
Chinese population in our country as permanent settlers. I believe that it is an alien race in every sense, that would not and could not be expected to assimilate with our Aryan population ....".

This representation was shared by members of the British Columbia legislature. For instance, the preamble to 'An Act to Regulate the Chinese Population of British Columbia' passed in 1884 but subsequently disallowed by the courts because it infringed on federal jurisdiction, stated that

Whereas the incoming of Chinese to British Columbia largely exceeds that of any other class of immigrant, and the population so introduced are fast becoming superior in number to our own race, are not disposed to be governed by our laws, are dissimilar in habits, are useless in cases of emergency, habitually desecrate graveyards, by the removal of bodies therefrom and generally the laws governing the whites are found to be inapplicable to the Chinese, and such Chinese are inclined to habits subversive of the comfort and well-being of the community ....".

Thus, as in Australia, members of the Anglo-Saxon 'race' defined themselves as possessing an inherent capacity for freedom and self government; unfree Chinese labourers were defined as a 'race' which did not possess such a capacity. Thus, it was felt that those who did not naturally possess such capacities should be excluded from the imagined community which constituted the nation.

Bourgeois Representations

Like the working class and the representatives of the state, the British Columbia bourgeoisie identified Chinese labourers as a fixed biological type that was 'racially' distinct from the 'white' population of the province. But, unlike the British Columbia working class and state representatives during the later years of the 19th century, employers initially tended to evaluate the difference of 'race' in positive terms. The correlation is clearly not perfect, but many employers of unfree Chinese labour characterized them as 'industrious, sober, economical and law abiding, more so than the same
class of white labourers'. Many also claimed that 'they respected their engagements with white men', and that there was 'nothing in their habits ... that [was] injurious to the public peace or public health'. In this light, the president of the C.P.R., Sir William Van Horn, claimed that

We of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company have pretty large experience with Chinese and European labourers, and we know from the stores accounts that an average Chinese labourer spends much more than one Italian labourer and no objection is made to the latter, although they come here with a view to earning a certain amount of money and going home again, as is the case with the Chinese. And, in point of morality and good behaviour, the Chinese can give this class good odds.

Others claimed, probably not incorrectly, that the Chinese were necessary to fill a great want in the labour market. Without them a number of industries could not be carried on.

They tended to argue further that if the state restricted Chinese migration to the province,

The effect would be to keep capital from the country, as the price of labour would be out of proportion to the returns derived from investments made.

Thus, in contrast to the working class, and federal and provincial levels of the state, the presence in the province of Chinese labourers originally tended to be defined in positive terms by employers. The C.P.R.'s positive evaluation of the presence of Chinese labourers in the province stems, in part, from the fact that the company ran a highly profitable steamship service which carried the Chinese migrants back and forth between Canada and China. Other employers' positive evaluations appear to have been based on the fact that the Chinese were unfree labourers whose labour power was considerably less expensive to purchase than that of 'white' workers. For example, around 1885, Chinese labourers in the mining industry earned between $1.00 and $1.25 per day while 'white' workers earned $2.00 or more. Chinese labourers in road construction earned between
$15.00 and $20.00 per month and 'white' labourers earned $40.00. General labourers earned $1.25 per day if Chinese, and between $2.00 and $2.50 if Chinese. Given Chinese labour was less expensive to purchase than 'white' labour for several reasons. They possessed a historically lower level of subsistence, the reproduction costs of Chinese labour were borne largely in China rather than in Canada (because they migrated without their spouses and children), and they were accorded an inferior status in political legal relations. And most importantly, coupled with their unfreedom, these factors allowed contractors who found employment for them to underbid on the price of 'white' labour.

However, by the turn of the century, the bourgeois representations of Chinese labourers came to increasingly approximate the negative and racist evaluations of the working class and the state. The President of the United Canner's Company of Vancouver put the matter in these terms:

Sentimentally I am in favour of restriction, but from a business point of view I would favour it to a certain extent .... I prefer exclusion. I would certainly rather see the country developed by white labour. I think it would be desirable, because the Chinese does not assimilate. He is a foreigner all of the time.

Several conjunctural conditions appear to have been responsible for this shift in representation. First, there was an increase in the supply of European labour. Employers therefore became less reliant on the labour power of Chinese workers. Second, the credit ticket system was gradually being phased out by labour contractors because of the state's imposition of a $500.00 head tax on every Chinese labourer who entered the country. Evidence suggests that when the Canadian state imposed a head tax of first $50.00 and then $100.00 in 1885 and 1900 respectively, the merchants paid the tax for the labourers. It simply constituted another fixed cost the labourer was required to repay before he was freed from the debt bondage.
According to a merchant interviewed by Mackenzie King during the hearings of the 1907 Royal Commission to Investigate the Manner in Which Oriental Labourers Have Been Induced to Come to Canada, and who had previously played a role in contracting out labour in the salmon canning industry, the imposition of a $500.00 head tax made it less profitable for merchants to engage in the recruitment of labour under debt bondage. The head tax increased the length of time required by the labourer to repay the costs associated with their transportation and entry to the country, and introduced a heightened degree of uncertainty as to whether the labourer could ever repay the debt. The merchant told King that

How can you follow them? ... $1,000 [would be] very hard to get a man to pay it back .... I don't think [I] can afford that.

And third, Chinese labour was becoming more expensive for employers to purchase because of the $500.00 head tax. The labour contractors were forced into asking higher wages for the workers in order for the latter to repay to the merchants the cost of the head tax and passage to Canada. For instance, the same merchant interviewed above suggested to Mackenzie King that before the five hundred dollar head tax was implemented, wages in the canneries stood at $15.00 per month. After the head tax was introduced in 1903, wages had to be increased to $30.00 per month.

Variations in Representation: the Chinese Merchants

The other notable variation in the political and ideological reaction to Chinese migration occurred in the context of class divisions within the Chinese population. Chinese merchants during the 19th century, like the unfree Chinese labourers, were generally defined as a 'race' that was biologically distinct from the European or 'Aryan race'. But again, the meaning that was attributed to 'race' varied for the groups who were attributed as such. In the following section, the reactions of the European merchants and the state are examined.

<126>
The European Merchants

By the turn of the century, merchants of European origin were becoming politically active in their calls for restrictions on the entry of Chinese merchants to the country, and on their subsequent ability to take up positions as petite commodity producers. The increase in political activity appears to have been due, in part, to the increased competition they faced from Chinese petite commodity producers, merchants and small shopowners. In 1885 for example, approximately 3.3% of the Chinese population in the country was made up of merchants, traders and shopkeepers. The remainder was made up of people who occupied working class positions as unfree wage labour. By 1901, over 25% of the population was made up of people who occupied petite bourgeois positions, whereas the remaining 75% continued to occupy working class positions. This shift in the class composition of the Chinese population in the country appears to have been an unintended consequence of the working class practices which excluded Chinese labourers from selling their labour power in certain sectors of the economy. Many of those who freed themselves from their bondage were therefore forced to become self-employed.

Thus, at the 1902 Royal Commission, the Chinese merchants, in addition to being defined as a 'race' apart from the dominant 'white' population, were also negatively evaluated by all those with whom they were in competition. Thus, racialization was accompanied by an ideology of racism. For instance, a Victoria tailor told the Royal Commission that

The presence of Chinese affects my business very seriously, for the reason that they make ordered clothing for the price of a ready-made suit, and many people go to the Chinese instead of coming to us merchants. They compete directly against us. I consider they have a very serious effect on everything. They drive white men out of the country. I consider the country would be better without them.

A South Vancouver farmer told the Commission that

The Chinese can grow vegetables as good as myself. I cannot compete with them because they work more hours than I do,
and they get their countrymen to work cheaper for them than I can get work done for.71

And similarly, a grocer from Victoria stated that

They injure my business to a great extent. I am in favour of further restriction. I look at it from a British standpoint. They interfere with our labouring people and they confer no benefit on the country. They do not assimilate and do not take part in our institutions. We have institutions to keep up, and if the Chinese were not here we would have white people in their places who would help to keep up those institutions and benefit the country at large. They will never unite with us. It would not be desirable if they would assimilate. Their presence lessens the volume of my trade.72

These evaluations of the Chinese merchant presence in the province highlights the dialectical nature of the meaning of competition under capitalism, and the manner in which Chinese merchants were identified as the embodiment of the contradictory nature of competition. While competition is one of the hallmarks (and apparent virtues) of the capitalist mode of production, too much competition from individual producers' points of view is destructive and has certain negative consequences. While the merchants agreed that competition was a virtue, too much competition was defined as a vice. The Chinese were defined as too competitive and therefore their presence was negatively evaluated.

Furthermore, it is evident from the above that like the racialization of the labourers by the working class and the state, the Chinese merchants were identified by other merchants as a fixed biological type, inherently incapable of change or 'assimilation'. The 'British' were defined as biologically capable of rule, and the Chinese were defined as incapable of taking up the rights and duties associated with free and democratic institutions. This is further reflected in a newspaper report of the time which suggested that

It is bad enough that good Canadians are unable to find employment while Orientals are at work, it is worse when Orientals become employers themselves, engage in trade and business and even settle on the land. These settlers can
never become Canadians. There can never be any blending of the two races, and the Canadians cannot live in competition with the Oriental in any line of business.\textsuperscript{73}

Clearly then, the presence of Chinese merchants in the province was, in the 'European' merchants' racist view, a threat to the constitution of British Columbia as part of a European settler capitalist nation state, and for this reason should be excluded from entry to the province.

The State

State representatives also racialized the Chinese merchants by defining them as a fixed biological grouping of people. But unlike its representation of members of the unfree Chinese working class, the state tended to attribute the merchants with positively evaluated social characteristics: that is to say, racialization in this instance was not accompanied by racism. This is reflected most clearly in the remarks of one of the Commissioners at the 1885 Royal Commission. He stated that

\begin{quote}
It is universally admitted that the merchants are honourable and capable men, of high credit and of great commercial advantage to the community; and these would not only be welcomed but would be desirable.\textsuperscript{74}
\end{quote}

Thus, like the initial bourgeois racialization of unfree Chinese labourers, the racialization of Chinese merchants was not an explicitly racist process because of the absence of negative evaluations of their presence; indeed their presence was defined in positive terms.

The state's differentiation of merchants from unfree labourers appears to have been based on the fact that by the turn of the century, European migrants were more plentiful, and there was less need to rely on the recruitment of Chinese workers. But, because capital was scarce, the state was hesitant about introducing measures which would deter its flow to the country. In addition to
establishing businesses in the country, they also imported goods for which they had to pay import duties on. For example, between 1874 and 1884, the value of goods imported from China to Canada amounted to $1.4 million, and during the same period, the state collected a duty of $411,970.60 on these imports. They also provided goods and services for the population (which, as we have seen, in some cases involved the recruitment and control of Chinese labour). Furthermore, the Canadian state defined the Chinese merchants as a link in a chain which would eventually lead to exports of Canadian produced goods to the large, and hence potentially lucrative eastern markets.

Implications of State Racism and Racialization

Chinese labourers were subject to a process of racialization by the state, which in addition attributed them with a range of negative traits. As such, they were subject also to an ideology of racism. Chinese merchants, on the other hand, were defined by the state as a distinct 'race', but were attributed with a range of positive characteristics; they were not, therefore, defined by the state in a racist manner.

These differences in representation had important effects on the differential modes of incorporation of different classes of Chinese into Canadian society. In this context, the Chinese merchants were defined, and incorporated, by the state as permanent settlers, and not as temporary additions to Canadian society. The unfree Chinese labourers were defined, and incorporated by the state as temporary additions to the labour force, and not as permanent settlers.

While they possessed the right to remain in Canada permanently after they entered the country, the federal government felt that once there was enough 'white' labour in the province, employers would stop employing Chinese labourers. It felt that market forces would eventually make 'white' labour as inexpensive as Chinese labour, and once this occured the latter would simply leave the country because of employers apparent preference for 'white' labour. This assessment of the nature of the supply and demand for labour was articulated
clearly by Sir John A. Macdonald in the context of his sanctioning of the admittance of unfree Chinese labourers for the construction of the C.P.R. According to Macdonald, the Chinese labourers came

... merely to work on the railway, to finish it as soon as possible, and we may well put up with a temporary inconvenience, as I understand it, of the presence of these Chinese .... The Chinese bring no women to British Columbia with them, and are not likely, therefore, to be permanent settlers .... (After they have finished this particular work they can go back to China again.)

The state's hope that the Chinese merchants would settle permanently in the country and form family units was reflected in the legislation directed against the Chinese. For instance, the Chinese Immigration Act of 1885, which acted on the recommendations of Royal Commission report of the same year, stipulated among other things, that each Chinese labourer arriving in Canada had to pay upon landing a $50.00 'head tax'. Chinese merchants, on the other hand, were not required to pay the tax and could accordingly enter and settle in Canada without restriction. Members of a merchant's family could also enter Canada without the payment of the head tax. The spouses and the children of the unfree Chinese labourers were, however, required to pay the head tax. Similarly, when the head tax was increased to one hundred dollars for every Chinese labourer entering Canada in 1900, and when it was increased again in 1903 to five hundred dollars per Chinese labourer, Chinese merchants, and their spouses and children could still enter and settle in the country without the payment of the head tax.

Even the 1923 Chinese Immigration Act, which was one of the most restrictive pieces of immigration legislation in the history of the country, continued to differentiate between Chinese merchants and Chinese labourers. By the terms of the Act, it became unlawful for Chinese labourers to migrate to Canada. The only individuals of 'Chinese origin', irrespective of 'allegiance, citizenship or country of birth', allowed entry to the country were members of diplomatic corps and the Canadian born children of Chinese parentage and whose
parents actually lived in Canada. Merchants were allowed to enter, but only if they had at least $2,500 invested in a business in China which they had been engaged in for three years or more, and who were prepared to invest a minimum of $2,500 in a business in Canada. Labourers could not enter under any circumstances. The Act also provided that of those who were allowed entry to the country, they could only do so at the ports of Vancouver and Victoria. Other immigrant groups could land anywhere in Canada. To ensure that even these much restricted classes would not enter Canada on anything but a minor scale, the Act stated that a vessel could only carry one Chinese person for every 250 tons of its burthen. Under the General Immigration Act, which applied to all other groups, vessels could bring one immigrant for every 200 tons. Furthermore, section 27 of the Act forbade a Chinese person to change their status once in Canada. Thus, if a Chinese merchant became bankrupt, he/she could not sell his/her labour power for a wage in the labour market. Rather, they were subject to deportation. The Act remained in force until 1947.

Conclusion

The masses of these young British dominions were more than labourers—they were colonists. They were not unacquainted with the political and economic creeds of revolutionary Europe, nor were they unaware of the opportunity offered to them of creating a society in which a life of economic well-being and social security might be lived by all their members. They feared the large immigration of Chinese coolies might frustrate their hopes. They were not without the power to rid themselves of the object of their fear.

D'Arcy McGee, one of the more eloquent of the 'fathers' of Confederation, in a retrospective summation of the outcome of the 1864 Charlottetown Conference at which leaders of the various British North American colonies decided to form a single nation state under the name of 'Canada', suggested that 'we consulted the oracles of history and our race'. While McGee offered a highly mystical interpretation of the process by which the Canadian nation state was formed, it does convey the sense in which the formation of the Canadian nation during
the late 19th and early 20th centuries was a extremely self-conscious process in which those in positions of political power felt that they had the destiny of a 'race' and 'nation' in their hands.

Despite the fact that the freedoms which were to characterize the emergent Canadian nation were relative, one of the important political and ideological features of the historical period considered here, and which had a subsequent impact on the reproduction of the nation state, was that it was believed, both in Britain and Canada, that only certain 'races' of people were (biologically) capable of the burdens associated with this 'freedom'. Not all people of the world were defined as capable of self-rule, participation in a society characterized by even limited forms of democracy, and of 'coping' with the responsibilities of 'freedom'. British people believed themselves to be capable of participation in a free society, but other 'races' were defined as incapable of social action which would sustain 'free institutions'.

To the extent that Canada was to be populated primarily by British settlers, and that the flow of British settlers corresponded with the demand for labour, the problem of sustaining these relations of freedom was relatively minor. However, when there was a disjunction between patterns of labour demand and the supply of British settlers, a process of racialization emerged which evaluated the 'racial' features of migrants to the country and assessments of their ability to reproduce a 'free' nation state.

In this light, this chapter has demonstrated that the various classes in British Columbia shared in a racialized conception of the imagined community which constituted the Canadian nation state. Despite differences in class position and live realities, they each defined the Canadian nation in 'racial' terms. It has furthermore demonstrated that different classes of Chinese migrants were differentially incorporated into Canadian society. Merchants were incorporated as permanent settlers, whereas unfree labourers were defined as migrant workers. These different modes of incorporation, stemmed, in part, from the state's differential racialization of the two classes. Merchants were attributed with a range of
characteristics which defined them as having positive effects on the community, while unfree labourers were, in a racist manner, attributed with a range of biological characteristics which were in turn defined as having negative effects on the community.
PART THREE:

FOREIGN LABOUR IN THE ONTARIO FRUIT AND VEGETABLE INDUSTRY

In 1966, 264 male workers from Jamaica were allowed entry to Canada to work on a seasonal, contractual basis, in the southwestern Ontario fruit and vegetable industry. During the past two decades, the movement of migrant workers from the Caribbean has expanded to the point where approximately 5,000 workers enter the country every year. They now constitute about five percent of the total harvest labour force in the industry, and have in Castell's terms, become a 'structural necessity' for the process of fruit, vegetable and tobacco production in the province.

The main empirical aim of this part of the thesis is the examination of the conditions which led to the emergence of the migration stream in 1966. Through this analysis, it will be demonstrated: 1) that there have been persistent shortages of labour in this industry since the 1940's; 2) that a number of Caribbean states were willing to help organize the recruitment of migrant labour to fill this demand since 1947; 3) that there were pressures placed on the Canadian state by southwestern Ontario fruit and vegetable grower and processor organizations since the mid-1950's to import Caribbean migrant labour; 4) there has been a tradition of state intervention in this industry which has involved, among other things, the recruitment for the harvest of labour from within Canada and the recruitment of various foreign-born workers; and 5) that the state's resistance to the Caribbean state's and Ontario growers' requests were based, in part, on its racialization of Caribbean workers.

The main theoretical aims of this part are to demonstrate: 1) that migration to social formations dominated by the capitalist mode of production can take different forms; 2) that foreign-born workers have been subject to three distinct modes of incorporation in the
fruit and vegetable industry; 3) that the use of unfree labour in Canada has not been confined to the historical period before the formation of a capitalist labour market; and 4) that the process of racialization played a key role in the state's various interventions in the process of international migration to this industry.

I begin part three with the process of accumulation, because, as noted in the introduction, labour migrations are structured by the nature of the supply and demand for labour. Chapter five examines the nature and extent of post-1945 labour scarcity in the south western Ontario fruit and vegetable industry, the extent to which capital has been substituted for labour to offset the scarcity, and the Canadian state's and employers' mobilization of reserves of labour available from within the boundaries of the nation state.

Chapter six shows that despite these two strategies, Ontario fruit and vegetable farmers have continued to demand quantities of wage labour over and above those available from within Canada. Specifically, it documents the different modes by which foreign-born workers were incorporated into sites in production relations in the industry between 1947 and 1966. Contra Castles, et. al., it suggests that the category of 'immigrant' was not homogeneous, and was in fact made up of groups of people who were incorporated into three analytically distinct sites in production relations as either free immigrant labour, unfree immigrant labour and unfree migrant labour.

Chapter seven shows that the process by which foreign workers were selected to become immigrants and fill vacancies in Canadian industry in general, and the fruit and vegetable industry in particular, was not governed solely by 'economic' considerations. The state constituted a central gatekeeper which excluded certain groups of people from entry to the country. Between 1947 and 1966, the Canadian state imposed a racialized hierarchy of desirability over potential permanent settlers to the country. Groups from the Caribbean, by virtue of the racist belief that they possessed certain negatively
evaluated 'racial' characteristics, were not defined as suitable candidates for permanent settlement in the country.

And finally, chapter eight suggests that despite the state's mobilization of various forms of free and unfree immigrant and migrant labour for this industry between 1947 and 1966, farmers continued to demand labour over and above those allowed entry by the state. It examines the pressures placed on the Canadian state by Ontario growers organizations and representatives of a number of Caribbean states to allow the former to make use of Caribbean labour on a migrant labour basis. The state's publically articulated reasons for denying Ontario farmers the opportunity to employ Caribbean migrant labour are contrasted with its privately articulated reasons. The juxtaposition of the public and private discourse of the state suggests that like the state's decision about the entry of permanent settlers from the Caribbean to the country, the decision about the entry of migrant labour from the Caribbean was structured by a process of racialization and an ideology of racism.
CHAPTER FIVE

LABOUR SHORTAGES AND ALTERNATIVES TO LABOUR IMPORT IN THE ONTARIO FRUIT AND VEGETABLE INDUSTRY

Introduction

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part documents the pattern of labour demand, and the nature and extent of labour shortage in the south western Ontario fruit and vegetable industry since the Second World War. Further, it explains why fruit and vegetable farmers have faced shortages of labour in terms of the political economy of agricultural production in the country. It suggests that labour shortages are not the result of workers seeking to avoid 'bad employers', but rather the result of the structural contradictions associated with fruit and vegetable production. The second part of the chapter documents two sets of responses on the part of the Canadian state and employers to shortages of labour in this industry. It suggests that while substitution of capital for labour has been partially effective in offsetting the demand for labour, farmers have continued to require a high content of variable capital in the harvest. The remainder of the chapter examines the manner in which internal reserves of labour have been mobilized by the state for employment in the industry, and the political/legal mechanisms made use of by the state to attempt to restrict the movement of workers out of fruit and vegetable production. For purposes of exposition, a distinction is made between the state's mobilization of internal reserves of labour during, and after, the war.

Southwestern Ontario Fruit and Vegetable Industry and Labour Shortages

The area extending south west of a line running from Toronto to Georgian Bay to the shores of Lakes Huron, Erie, and Ontario is the single most important fruit, vegetable and tobacco producing region in Canada. While some of the crops now produced by Ontario farmers were
grown by aboriginal peoples well before the arrival of Europeans, the large scale commercial production in the province of crops such as apples, peaches, pears, cherries, asparagus, cucumbers, sugar beets, tobacco and tomatoes, extends back about one hundred years. 2 Currently, Ontario produces about 36% of all vegetables, and 43% of all fruit grown in the country. In terms of specific commodity groups, it produces 72% of the processed vegetables, 57% of the fresh vegetables, 72% of the tender fruit (which includes among others apricots, peaches, cherries, plums and pears), 29% of the apples, and 95% of the grapes grown in Canada. 3

The majority of the commodities produced in the region are destined for consumption within Canada. Exports of Ontario fruits and vegetables to other parts of the world are small, and constitute only 2.1% of the value of total agricultural exports from Ontario. 4 Similarly, Canada as a whole exports only 3.5% of all canned vegetables produced and 13% of all canned fruit produced in the country. 5 Consumption of fruits and vegetables grown in Canada is either in fresh or canned/frozen form. During the late 1960's, 41% of the fruit and 56% of the vegetable crops were destined for further processing in the form of jams, jellies, and canned fruits and vegetables. 6

Since the 1940's, there has been a dramatic shift in the relative importance of agriculture in the Canadian economy. Table 5-1 presents the changes in the components of the Canadian labour force since the 1940's. In 1941, 28.6% of the Canadian labour force was employed in agriculture, but by 1968, this figure dropped to 7.2%. In absolute terms, in 1941 some 1,224,000 people were employed in agriculture; in 1968 the figure dropped to 546,000, a decline of 55.4%. 7 The reasons for this shift are noted below.

However, as is evident from table 5-2, changes in the components of the agricultural labour force, which is made up of owners and operators of agricultural enterprises, unpaid family members, and
Table 5-1
Canadian Labour Force, Agricultural and Non-Agricultural, 1941 to 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Employed</th>
<th>Employed in Agriculture</th>
<th>Employed in Non-Agriculture</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>thousands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>4,271</td>
<td>1,224</td>
<td>3,047</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>5,097</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>4,158</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>6,055</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>5,374</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>7,152</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>6,069</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>7,537</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>6,992</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Andarawewa, 1970:6,

hired workers, have not been uniform. While there has been an absolute decline in the size of each component of the agricultural

Table 5-2
Employment in Agriculture by Class of Worker

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Self-employed</th>
<th>Unpaid Family Members</th>
<th>Paid Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>thousands</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>thousands</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1,186</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1,018</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Andarawewa, 1970:46

labour force, the proportion of hired labour in the total agricultural labour force increased from 10.7% in 1947 to 18.1% in 1968. The relative increase in the hired labour component of the farm labour
force, and the increase in the size of the average farm in Canada in general from 237 acres in 1941 to 404 acres in 1966, is indicative of a continued, and increasing demand, for paid wage labour.  

An indication of the importance of paid wage labour in the Ontario fruit and vegetable industry is given in table 5-3. In the mid 1960's wages paid to hired farm labour constituted the single most important cost for farmers who grew crops such as sugar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Operating</th>
<th>Tractors &amp;</th>
<th>Total Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>per Acre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cucumbers</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaches</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asparagus</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherries</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apples</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures for Tobacco are for 1963-64; Cucumbers, 1970; Peaches 1965-67; Tomatoes, 1961-62; Asparagus, 1962-64; Cherries, 1965-67; Apples, 1958-60.

beets, tomatoes, cucumbers, cherries and peaches. For example, hired labour constituted 55.9% of the total production costs per acre for cucumbers grown in the province, 38.5% of the total costs per acre of cherry production, 22.2% of the total cost of peach production, 27.1% of the cost of apple production, 34.2% of the cost of asparagus production and 34.1% of the cost of tobacco production.

Historically, two types of farm labour have been in demand by fruit and vegetable farmers in Ontario: permanent, year round employees and temporary, seasonal employees. In the south western Ontario fruit and vegetable industry, the demand is increasingly for seasonal labour. According to Dawson and Freshwater

The demand for labour in this industry (fruit and vegetable growing) is primarily a seasonal one peaking at harvest. Recently, the requisite supply of labour has not been available ... the existence of the shortage is crucial because the fruit [and vegetables] must be harvested when ready or else it will rot.

This assessment of the pattern of labour demand in the industry has been confirmed by the Canadian Federation of Agriculture's report on farm labour problems, which stated that 'there is a continuing need for seasonal harvest labour for picking, on fruit, vegetable, flower and tobacco farms', and by several other independent commentators, including the Food Prices Review Board, on the problems farmers in southern Ontario face.

The vast majority of both permanent and seasonal farm labour positions have been filled via operation of the labour market. Market mechanisms are the predominant basis upon which labour power finds its way to farm labour employment. As such, the seasonal positions on offer by fruit and vegetable farmers in Ontario have been filled through relatively 'spontaneous' migrations of labour from within Canada. Regions of the country which consistently have surpluses of labour power relative to the available economic opportunities (the Maritimes, Quebec, northern Ontario, and aboriginal reserves), have
constituted important sites for the reproduction of the reserve army of labour for the southwestern Ontario fruit and vegetable industry.  

With the exception of the period between 1958 and 1962, which was a period of economic recession and high unemployment (see table 5-4) and which therefore resulted in a significant increase in the supply of labour that Ontario farmers could draw upon from within the boundaries of the nation state, these spontaneous migrations have not been able to fill all of the farmers' demands for seasonal wage labour.

Table 5-4

Unemployment Rates for Ontario and Canada 1946-1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>ONTARIO %</th>
<th>CANADA %</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>ONTARIO %</th>
<th>CANADA %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a. = not available

Growers of fruits, vegetables and tobacco in southwestern Ontario have generally been confronted with two problems with respect to seasonal labour. First, they have faced problems of initially recruiting an adequate number of workers for the harvest, and second they have faced problems in retaining those workers for the duration of the harvest.
Table 5-5 gives an indication of the dimensions of the former problem in the mid 1960's. It shows that during the summer months in the eight most important fruit and vegetable producing counties of Ontario, farm employment vacancies registered at the Canadian state's employment exchange (the National Employment Service) have far outnumbered the placements which the state has been able to effect. Between April and October of 1963, for example, the discrepancy between vacancies and placements stood at 3,292. Between April and October of 1965 this discrepancy increased to 10,342.

Table 5-5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Vacancies on Order</th>
<th>Placements Effected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April-October 1962</td>
<td>16,479</td>
<td>12,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April-October 1963</td>
<td>12,546</td>
<td>9,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April-October 1964</td>
<td>16,663</td>
<td>8,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April-October 1965</td>
<td>21,659</td>
<td>11,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April-October 1966</td>
<td>19,514</td>
<td>9,437</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kitchener, Leamington, Newmarket, Oshawa, St. Catharines, Simcoe, Wallaceburg and Windsor counties

SOURCE: 'Seasonal Agricultural and Food Processing Workers From the West Indies', Program Development Service, Department of Manpower and Immigration, PAC, R.G. 118, Accession 85-86/071, Volume 82, File 3315-5-3.

One of the larger employers of wage labour in the south western Ontario fruit and vegetable industry gave an indication of the scale of the labour turnover/retention problem which farmers' face when he reported that 'to get dependable labor from 75 local men ... he'd have to hire 150'.'
The difficulty, and at times inability, of farmers to recruit and retain suitable supplies of wage labour for the harvest is the result of several historically specific conditions associated with the farming industry and farm labour employment. In general farm labour employment is characterized by poor wages, poor and unsafe working conditions, long hours of work, the lack of protection under provincial labour standards legislation, and the absence of habitable accommodation. These conditions are rooted in the process of capital accumulation in other sectors of the Canadian economy, the cost price squeeze, and the Canadian state's cheap food policy.

Even though farm wages in Eastern Canada have increased more rapidly than any other farm input since the end of the war, they continue to lag far behind wages paid to industrial workers. In 1949, for instance, the average monthly wage of persons employed in agriculture in Canada stood at $85.00, while the average weekly wage in all other industries stood at $43.00. Agricultural workers earned 49% of the wages that all other workers earned. In 1961, the average hourly earnings of agricultural labourers was seventy-seven cents per hour, compared with $1.83 per hour in manufacturing and $1.98 per hour in construction. In 1974, average hourly earnings in agriculture increased to $2.25, but average hourly earnings in manufacturing increased to $4.23 and in construction they increased to $6.24. In 1974, farm workers earned 53.2% of what workers in manufacturing earned, and 36.1% of what workers earned in construction employment.

The working and living conditions of farmworkers have recently been the objects of journalistic, trade union, and government task force 'exposes'. These conditions have been documented extensively by others, and it is not my intention to review them in detail here.

However, it is the case that the perpetuation of poor work and living conditions is, in part, the result of the inapplicability of provincial labour standards laws to those employed in agriculture.
1966 farm labour was excluded from minimum wage legislation in every province. None of the provinces had hours of work legislation which applied to employment in agriculture, and farm workers were not included in legislation providing for annual vacations with pay. Provincial laws dealing with public holidays generally do not apply to farm workers. Similarly, laws in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Quebec and Nova Scotia which require an employer or employee to give notice of termination of employment do not apply to farm workers and farm employers. Moreover, while farming remains the third most dangerous industry in Canada in terms of work related industries, with the exception of Saskatchewan, provincial health and safety legislation does not apply to farmworkers.

It was only in 1965 in Ontario and 1966 in the rest of Canada that farm workers were covered under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Employment in agriculture was one of the main categories of employment exempted from provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Act.

More recently, many farmers claim that the amendments to the Unemployment Insurance Act introduced on June 23, 1971, which have included provisions for farmworkers, have exacerbated their labour recruitment and control problems. Persons drawing unemployment insurance benefits are not required to accept jobs which are available; if the jobs are deemed to be not suitable, then they can continue to receive Unemployment Insurance benefits. According to the Unemployment Insurance Act, unsuitable employment is

employment of a kind other than employment in his [sic] usual occupation either at a lower rate of earnings or on conditions less favourable than those that he [sic] might reasonably expect to obtain, having regard to those conditions that he [sic] habitually obtained in his [sic] usual occupations, or would have obtained.

Thus, according to the Act, an individual is not required to accept a job that offers a lower rate of pay which he/she received in their previous job. Given that agricultural wages tend to be lower than wages in almost every other sector of the Canadian economy, anyone
made redundant in an industry outside of agriculture need not accept agricultural employment because of the discrepancy in wages.

It is easy to personalize the farmers' labour recruitment and retention problems and identify individual farmers as the 'evil culprits' in the provision of poor wages, poor working conditions, etc. Indeed, this was the strategy used by the Task Force on the Seasonal Farm Labour Situation in Southern Ontario in 1973, and in Bob Ward's report on farm working conditions in the southern Ontario fruit and vegetable industry prepared for the Ontario Federation of Labour. Many of these conditions, however, are related to structural factors beyond the control of individual farmers.

For instance, it is the case that the various levels of the state appear to be unwilling to introduce health, safety and labour standards legislation in the farming sector, in part, because of the political power of farmers in relation to the political powerlessness of farmworkers. The latter are by and large non-unionized, although recently farmworkers in British Columbia have formed the Canadian Farmworkers Union. And until recently, farmers have constituted an important political group which various levels of government have sought to woo.

Furthermore, many of the conditions which make farm work less attractive to labour and which have contributed to farmers' labour recruitment and retention difficulties can be linked to structural processes which also have contributed to the post-war decline in the family farm, low farm owner incomes and the larger problems of Canadian agriculture. These processes include: the process of capital accumulation, the 'cost-price squeeze' faced by Canadian farmers, and the Canadian state's pursuit of a cheap food policy.

Urban based industries, as well as the resource extraction industries in Canada have witnessed a significant degree of expansion since the end of the war. In Canada, as in other capitalist societies, the process of post-war capital accumulation was fuelled,
in part, by the proletarianization of petite agricultural commodity producers and through the rural to urban migration of wage labour.\(^\text{32}\) Because of their structural characteristics, urban-based industries have been able to offer the working class higher wages, better and safer working conditions, and more steady employment.\(^\text{33}\) Similarly, these industries have been easier to unionize, and workers have been better organized to fight for protection under provincial labour standards legislation, better rates of pay and safer working conditions. These factors have contributed to the unattractiveness of farming as a vocation, and farm labour as a form of employment.\(^\text{34}\)

The cost price squeeze refers to a situation where farmers increasingly pay monopoly prices for inputs such as machinery, fertilizer and seed, and increasingly receive competitive prices for their outputs. Combined, this means that in the long run, the costs of farm inputs tend to outpace the prices received for the commodities produced.\(^\text{35}\) An indication of the dimensions of the squeeze as experienced in post-war Ontario is provided in table 5-6. In 1941, the index number of farm output prices stood at 120.2 and the index number of farm input prices stood at 118.6. However, by 1968, the price index of agricultural products stood at 336.1 and the price index of commodities and services used by farmers stood at 438.6. In other words, prices of farm outputs increased by 180% but prices of farm inputs increased by 270% over the same period.

The rapid increase in the prices of farm inputs have been attributed to the monopolization of the farm implement, fertilizer and seed industries, where a relatively small number of multinational corporations have come to control ever larger proportions of the total output.\(^\text{36}\) During the mid-1960's, the cost price squeeze was further aggravated by increases in wages paid to farm labour, which is indicative of a shortage of farm labour and a corresponding relative increase in the bargaining power of indigenous farmworkers. Table 5-7, disaggregates farm input costs and shows that between 1961 and 1970, farm wages increased by 91.3%, whereas the cost of equipment and materials increased by only 22.9%, interest and taxes increased by...
51.8%, and the costs of family farm living increased by 25.7% during the same period.

Table 5-6

Index Numbers of Farm Prices of Agricultural Products in Ontario and Eastern Canada Price Index of Commodities and Services Used by farmers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Index numbers of farm prices of agricultural products in Ontario</th>
<th>Eastern Canada composite index of commodities and services used by farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>120.2</td>
<td>118.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>187.9</td>
<td>160.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>315.0</td>
<td>234.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>250.5</td>
<td>251.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>265.3</td>
<td>286.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>328.0</td>
<td>354.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>336.1</td>
<td>438.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1935-1939 = 100)


Conversely, pressures to keep fruit and vegetable prices low are due, in part, to the concentration and centralization of the food processing industry in the hands of American based multinationals such as Heinz, Campbell's Soup Company, Del Monte, Green Giant and Libby's. In 1961, there were some 335 fruit and vegetable processing plants in the country, but this figure dropped to 281 in 1974 and to 245 in 1975. In southern Ontario, for example, the number of firms involved with canning peaches declined from nineteen in 1965 to just four in 1972. In 1962, approximately 60% of the processed fruit and vegetable industry was under the control of
### Table 5-7

Eastern Canada Price Index Numbers of Commodities and Services Used by Farmers, 1941-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS</th>
<th>TAXES AND INTEREST RATES</th>
<th>FARM WAGE RATES</th>
<th>FARM FAMILY LIVING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1935-1939 = 100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>109.4</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>167.0</td>
<td>114.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>122.9</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>211.8</td>
<td>119.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>124.9</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>270.5</td>
<td>121.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>128.2</td>
<td>103.2</td>
<td>268.4</td>
<td>122.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>128.7</td>
<td>103.0</td>
<td>290.9</td>
<td>123.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>130.1</td>
<td>100.7</td>
<td>312.8</td>
<td>127.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>139.8</td>
<td>112.2</td>
<td>343.7</td>
<td>138.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>177.6</td>
<td>118.0</td>
<td>373.4</td>
<td>162.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>183.3</td>
<td>126.1</td>
<td>368.5</td>
<td>171.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>192.5</td>
<td>131.2</td>
<td>360.3</td>
<td>175.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>206.2</td>
<td>142.0</td>
<td>412.4</td>
<td>196.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>216.3</td>
<td>152.4</td>
<td>436.7</td>
<td>208.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>207.5</td>
<td>158.7</td>
<td>431.5</td>
<td>201.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>202.4</td>
<td>164.5</td>
<td>424.1</td>
<td>202.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>204.7</td>
<td>166.4</td>
<td>429.0</td>
<td>201.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>207.3</td>
<td>178.8</td>
<td>461.4</td>
<td>201.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>209.4</td>
<td>186.4</td>
<td>493.4</td>
<td>210.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>208.2</td>
<td>192.3</td>
<td>497.8</td>
<td>215.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>214.8</td>
<td>201.3</td>
<td>524.1</td>
<td>219.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>217.4</td>
<td>214.3</td>
<td>540.6</td>
<td>221.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>221.5</td>
<td>223.6</td>
<td>550.2</td>
<td>223.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>230.4</td>
<td>234.5</td>
<td>560.0</td>
<td>227.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>233.9</td>
<td>249.3</td>
<td>587.3</td>
<td>236.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>237.0</td>
<td>255.7</td>
<td>613.8</td>
<td>241.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>241.7</td>
<td>266.3</td>
<td>661.3</td>
<td>240.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>249.2</td>
<td>283.0</td>
<td>754.1</td>
<td>248.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>260.1</td>
<td>298.2</td>
<td>825.2</td>
<td>260.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>265.0</td>
<td>309.4</td>
<td>912.1</td>
<td>267.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>269.0</td>
<td>339.4</td>
<td>998.7</td>
<td>275.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>272.3</td>
<td>339.4</td>
<td>1,052.8</td>
<td>281.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

subsidiaries of American based multinationals, and by the late 1960's, this figure stood at 70%. With relatively few processors in the region, and a large number of producers (albeit usually represented by one or another marketing agency) farmers who produce crops for processing are price takers who are subject to corporate decisions made in New York, Washington and Los Angeles.

Finally, the farmers' difficulty in recruiting and retaining suitable supplies of wage labour, the low prices they receive for their outputs, and the general decline in the family farm in the country are also the result of the Canadian state's cheap food policy. A cornerstone of this policy has been the maintenance of a low tariff on the import of fruits and vegetables that could be, and are grown in Canada. Despite a capacity to increase production by increasing the numbers of acres put to use for fruit and vegetable production, Canada relies heavily on imports to supply domestic demand. In 1974, for example, Canada imported 34% of the canned vegetables and 77% of the canned fruit available to consumers.

An indication of the relatively insignificant nature of Canadian tariffs on the imports of fruits and vegetables from abroad is provided by a comparison of tariffs on imported peaches with those of the United States. The Canadian duty on 24-twelve ounce cans of peaches had been fixed at sixty-three cents between 1965 and 1975. This meant that as the value of peaches increased over the years, the significance of the tariff decreased. In 1965, the F.O.B price of a box of canned peaches was $4.50, in 1971 it was $6.36 and in 1975 it was $8.00. Thus, the Canadian tariff on canned peaches decreased from 14.4% of the F.O.B price in 1965, to 9.9% in 1971 and to 7.0% in 1975. In United States, however, during the same period the duty on a case of 24-12 ounce cans of peaches was fixed at 20% of the cost the product, which meant that in 1965, the duty stood at ninety cents, in 1971 $1.28 and in 1975 stood at $1.60. In the latter year, this meant that American tariffs on canned peaches were 154% higher than Canadian tariffs on the same product. These differences apply to other fruit and vegetable products as well.
The state has tended to pursue a cheap food policy to keep inflation down and to dampen pressures placed on employers by the urban based working class for increased wages. The state has been able to pursue this policy, and keep the prices of farm products produced in Canada low, because of the availability of low priced fruit and vegetable imports from South Africa, California, Mexico and South Korea. Growers in these countries can produce agricultural commodities which cost less than those produced in Canada because they have access to cheaper labour, lower land costs, possess economies of scale and have a longer growing season.\textsuperscript{49} Low priced imported fruits also come from Australia where the state directly subsidizes farmers who produce peaches, pears and apricots for export.\textsuperscript{49}

In sum, then, farmers' labour recruitment and retention problems for the fruit and vegetable harvest in Ontario are rooted in the process of capital accumulation, the cost-price squeeze, and the Canadian state's cheap food policy. These processes have also contributed to the decline in the family farm and low producer incomes.

Alternatives to Labour Import

According to Saskia Sassen-Koob, in a situation where employers face a shortage of labour

... there would appear to be at least four alternatives to labour imports. These are (a) increasing imports in order to diminish labour needs by freeing labour presently used; (b) implementing labour mobility and manpower training policies, including mobilization of so-called marginal workers, e.g. teenagers, elderly, handicapped, etc.; (c) capital substitution of labour; (d) export of productive activities.\textsuperscript{50}

Even though Sassen-Koob, like Castles, et. al., fails to distinguish between different forms that labour import can take, this model is a useful first approximation to understanding the contextual significance of migration during a period when capitalist relations of production are already established within a social formation. It
suggests that recourse to foreign-born labour is not the sole alternative employers face when confronted with shortages of labour from within the boundaries of the nation state. In the remainder of this chapter, the strategies, short of labour import, used by the Canadian state and Ontario growers to resolve the latter's labour recruitment and retention problems are examined.

Sassen-Koob's fourth noted alternative to labour import is not applicable to the southwestern Ontario fruit and vegetable industry. Land, a key factor of production, is simply not exportable to offshore production sites. The third option, increasing imports in other sectors of the economy in order to diminish labour needs and thus release labour for use in farming, has only a partial applicability in this case. This option is feasible only in cases where shortages of labour are absolute and not relative. Freeing workers from other production sites through increasing imports would not, therefore, contribute substantially to the solution of labour recruitment and control problems in this industry.

Pursued to a greater extent has been the option of the substitution of capital for labour. Mechanization has been implemented with a considerable degree of success by farmers in grain growing provinces since the early part of this century. Currently, relatively little hired wage labour is required to produce most cereal crops. Mechanization of harvest processes has also been pursued in the southwestern Ontario fruit and vegetable industry, albeit less extensively than in the grain growing west. For instance, the average value of machinery and equipment used on Ontario farms increased from $844.00 per farm in 1941 to $8,167 in 1966 (although in Canada as a whole the figure increased from $813.00 per farm in 1941 to $9,850 in 1966). This process has resulted in significant increases in agricultural productivity. Between 1935 and 1963, farm productivity rose threefold, whereas productivity in manufacturing did not quite double. In 1948, the average farmer was feeding thirteen people; by 1963, he/she was feeding thirty three people.
But investment in fixed capital in Ontario has affected labour demand for only some crops. The introduction of mechanical harvesting equipment has been widespread in the case of green and wax beans, peas, and sugar beets, for example, but other more tender crops such as peaches, apples, cucumbers, tomatoes, tobacco and asparagus, continue to require a high proportion of variable capital in the harvest. For example, during the late 1960's the production of green and wax beans required seven labour hours per acre, whereas the production of tomatoes for processing required 165 labour hours per acre, and cucumbers required 287 labour hours per acre.

In some cases, especially tomato production, the mechanization of the harvest process has been stunted because of the relatively small scale of the production units, and uncertainties over markets. More recently, the mechanization of all aspects of the agricultural production process has been retarded by the high costs of machinery and credit. Thus, despite an increasing organic composition of capital in this industry, certain sectors of fruit and vegetable production continue to require a high content of variable capital in the harvest.

Sassen-Kooob's second option, the mobilization of internal reserves of labour (or 'marginalized' workers from within the boundaries of the nation state) has been pursued extensively by the growers and the state. As the following sections note, between 1943 and 1966, at different times and with varying degrees of success, the Canadian state and employers have attempted to mobilize temporarily unemployed farmworkers by paying for their transportation costs from their place of residence to the harvest. They also attempted to mobilize the urban unemployed from the Toronto, Hamilton and Windsor areas, Quebec, and the Maritimes, children between the ages of ten and sixteen with the assistance of the YWCA and YMCA, female household workers, military personnel, aboriginal peoples, high school students and patients from psychiatric hospitals. The remainder of this chapter examines the state's mobilization of these internal reserves of labour. For clarity, the discussion which follows makes a
distinction between state recruitment of labour during the war and state recruitment after the war.

An Emergency Labour Regime: Mobilization of Labour During the War

The state's system of labour force recruitment for the south western Ontario fruit and vegetable industry since 1945 was initially established during the course of World War Two. During the course of the Second World War, 41% of Canada's male population between the ages of 18 and 45 (over a million men out of a total population of just over twelve million) had passed through the armed services.

The scale of enlistments constituted an important conjunctural condition which aggravated labour shortages in industry in general and the fruit and vegetable industry in particular.

The Canadian state responded to wartime labour shortages in the country by suspending the operation of market mechanisms to allocate and distribute labour power to production sites. Instead of relying on the market, the state channelled specific groups of workers to the Ontario fruit and vegetable industry. The nature of state intervention at this time points to what Cohen, in a different context, refers to as an 'emergency labour regime' in which market mechanisms are temporarily suspended in order to ensure that certain sectors of production have an assured source of labour.

The state's labour market control mechanisms were first organized under the National Labour Supply Council in 1940, but were replaced in 1942 by the National Selective Service Regulations. Under these regulations, labour remained wage labour, but was subject to political-legal restrictions over its circulation in the market. The regulations were many, and varied according to conjunctural conditions. By 1943, 'postponement orders' could be issued to keep men of draftable age in essential industries such as agriculture. For each locality, elaborate systems of labour priorities were established. All employers were required to hire new labour, and all workers were required to seek work, through the National
Employment Service, a state-run labour exchange. In essential industries, government permission was needed before a worker could quit or be discharged, and farmers and farm workers could not leave agricultural employment, except for a maximum of sixty days of the year for seasonal work, without a permit. Also, employers were not allowed to publicly advertise job vacancies.64

But state intervention in the labour market during the war did not end with the National Selective Service Regulations. The state also responded to the shortages of farm labour by the creation of the Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Program. The program began in 1943 and involved a series of agreements between the federal and provincial governments concerning the costs associated with the interprovincial, intraprovincial and international recruitment and transportation of labour for Canadian farms. During the war, the Federal Department of Labour paid for the entire costs of the international and interprovincial recruitment and transportation of labour to farms, and contributed 50% towards the costs associated with the intraprovincial transportation of workers. After the war, all expenses, including administrative expenses, were shared on a fifty-fifty basis between the federal and provincial governments. The program also saw the creation in each province of a Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Committee whose task was the identification of pools of potential labour, and the organization, coordination and placement of labour to sites of labour shortage.65 The Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Program functioned until the early 1970's when it was replaced by the system of Canada Farm Labour Pools.

Most of the wartime state organized transfers of farm labour within Canada were effected under the auspices of the Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Program. Similarly, most of the post-war migrations of farm labour were organized under the program. In Ontario, the program was organized under the name of the 'Ontario Farm Service Force'. In the following sub-sections, the wartime activities of the Ontario Farm Service Force are examined, as well as the usage of German prisoners of war, Japanese Canadian internees, and
conscientious objectors. Each of the latter groups were subject to forms of political/legal compulsion over and above those which applied to the Canadian working class under the National Selective Service Regulations.

The Ontario Farm Service Force

The Ontario Farm Service Force was formed in 1941, and its objective was the organization of the recruitment of farm labour in Ontario to ensure that the production of food in Canada would be sufficient to feed the European allies. It was originally organized and funded entirely by the Ontario Department of Agriculture. But when the Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Program was established in 1943, the federal government, through the Department of Labour, began to contribute to both its funding and the organization of labour force recruitment.

During the war, the Ontario Farm Service Force consisted of all those from 12 years of age up to 85 or more who ... [were] willing and able to help relieve the farm labour situation and who ... [could] give any time from a few evenings a week up to 12 months continuous service.

Those who formed the Force did not face political-legal compulsion to join. Strictly speaking they were volunteers. However, the organizers of the Farm Service Force did conduct a 'Patriotic National Service Campaign' to encourage people to volunteer for one of the brigades, and the organizers of the force were able to convince school board authorities to allow students who joined one of the brigades to delay the start of the fall school term as the children were needed in the harvest. Additionally, it 'planned a program of publicity [which included newspaper advertisements and radio announcements] to appeal to women folk'.

The force was originally composed of eight distinct, but at times overlapping, 'brigades'. First, the Children's Brigade was made up of
boys between 12 and 15, and girls between the ages of 12 and 16 who lived in rural areas. They worked on their parent's farms, neighbour's farms, on relative's farms or for farmers known to the parents of the children. Second, the Farm Cadet Brigade was formed by male school teachers, young men between fifteen years of age and military age, and males who had been rejected for military service on medical grounds. Third, the Farmerette Brigade was made up of female teachers, and women over sixteen who were enrolled in an educational institution. Fourth, the Women's Land Brigade was composed of women from urban areas who were not enrolled in an educational institution and who wished to work on a farm. Fifth, the Farm Girls Brigade was made up of women under 26 years of age who lived on farms, who were not enrolled in an educational institution, and who wished to work on other farms in their community or near their residence. Sixth, the Holiday Service Brigade was made up of men and women who were prepared to give up from one week to three months of their holidays (away from their regular occupation) to work on a farm. Seventh, the Farm Commando Brigade was made up of those who were unwilling to leave home but who wished to work the occasional evening, half day or full day on a farm. And finally, there were Day-By-Day Workers who were employed by truck farmers in suburban areas. Farmers collected workers in the morning from a designated meeting place and returned them in the evening. Day-by-day workers were drawn from all of the brigades of the Force. 70

The workers who constituted the Ontario Farm Service Force made important contributions to the harvest of fruits and vegetables in the province during the war. Table 5-8 provides an indication of the size of each brigade and of the total size of the Service Force during the 1942 season.

The workers who made up the various brigades either lived at home and commuted to work daily, lived and worked on individual farms, lived in small private camps of between ten and forty people and worked for individual farmers, or lived in large state run camps of between forty and one hundred persons and worked for any number of
farmers, depending on demand. For those who worked in camps for more than three weeks, the government paid for the workers' return transportation costs.71

Table 5-8
Placements of the Ontario Farm Service Force, April 1st to November 23, 1942

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Children's brigade</th>
<th>Girls</th>
<th>Boys</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>9,390</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmerette Brigades</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,213</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm Cadet Brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,610</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Land Brigade</td>
<td>1,985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm Girls Brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td>902</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holiday Service Brigade</td>
<td>239</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm Commandoes Brigade</td>
<td>13,330</td>
<td>46,669</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the case of government funded camps for young children, girls were under the supervision of members of the YWCA and boys the YMCA. They were responsible for discipline, health, recreation and feeding of the 'campers'. The 'campers' were taken out in small groups each morning to work on farms in the area and then were brought back to the camp in the evening. Each worker received a minimum hourly rate of wages, or a fixed piece rate, depending on the needs of the farmer.72

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During the summer of 1943, forty-one labour camps operated in Ontario under the terms of the Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Program. Camps were established in tourist cabins, barns, agricultural society buildings, community halls, church halls, school gymnasiums, under canvass tents, or constructed from scratch. During the war, the expenses of construction and the operating costs including the salaries of the administrators were shared evenly between the federal Department of Labour and the Ontario provincial Department of Agriculture.

In addition to the workers recruited under the Ontario Farm Service Forces, the state also made German prisoners of war, Japanese Canadian internees and conscientious objectors available to farmers.

*German Prisoners of War*

The legal framework for the use of prisoner of war labour in Canada was provided by Order-in-Council, P.C. 2326 of May 10, 1943. The prisoners consisted of those who were captured in Europe and sent to Canada for confinement. The Order-in-Council provided the Minister of Labour with the authority to utilize POW's in agriculture and other industries which were deemed to be short of labour.

By October of 1945, there were 15,584 prisoners of war working on some 169 labour projects in nineteen different types of industry. The majority of prisoners of war were employed as woodworkers', and were involved in the production of firewood, pulpwood, lumber ties and cord wood. The prisoners of war also made important contributions to the harvest of grain on the prairies and fruits and vegetables in Ontario. However, their impact on agricultural production seems to have been greatest in the sugar beet industries of Ontario, Manitoba and Alberta. According to the Deputy Minister of Labour

If it had not been for the Japanese labour and the German prisoners of war who were available during the war years, the sugar industry would not have been carried on.
Employers who desired the use of prisoner of war labour contracted with the Department of Labour. The Department of National Defence supplied the Department of Labour with the prisoners, provided army guards on all projects and was responsible for the security of the prisoners and their discipline. Army personnel escorted the prisoners in transit to and from labour projects and screened their mail. The Department of Labour approved the type of work and the location of the proposed project, was responsible for the welfare of prisoners while on the projects. They exercised continuous supervision over all labour projects through inspection officers and other staff personnel. In the few cases where only one prisoner was requested by an employer, the Department of Labour approved the accommodation provided by the employer. In the majority of cases, however, prisoners were employed in large groups and resided in camps. They would commute on a day to day basis to their place of work under the control of the Department of National Defence. Employers paid to the Department of Labour a fixed rate for the services of the prisoners. This rate was equivalent to the going rate of wages in the area for similar work, and averaged around thirty-five cents an hour in Ontario.\textsuperscript{76} The prisoners, for their part, received from the Department of Labour a nominal wage. The wage initially varied from $1.00 per day to $25.00 per month during 1943, but was lowered to fifty cents per day between 1944 and 1946.\textsuperscript{77}

During the 1945 harvest season, an average of 3,512 prisoners were employed in the sugar beet fields in the provinces of Alberta, Manitoba and Ontario. The largest number employed at any one time in agriculture was 4,172 during the beet harvest in the fall of 1945.\textsuperscript{80} In 1945, it was estimated that prisoners of war harvested sugar beets with a total sugar content of 33,250,000 pounds.\textsuperscript{81} In 1946, prisoners of war harvested sugar beets with a sugar content of 10,870,272 pounds in Ontario, 8,320,000 pounds in Manitoba, and 6,611,000 pounds in Alberta, for a total of 25,801,272 pounds.\textsuperscript{82}

In addition to being of significant economic value to farmers and other employers, the prisoners were also of economic value to the
state. It is evident from table 5-9, that the differential between the rate employers paid to the state for the use of prisoner of war labour, and the 'wage' the prisoners received, was a source of limited revenue for the government coffers.

Table 5-9
Receipts and Disbursements Associated with Contracting-Out of Prisoner of War Labour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Total Receipts $</th>
<th>Total Disbursements $</th>
<th>Net Gain $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1943-44</td>
<td>252,013.31</td>
<td>166,552.36</td>
<td>85,460.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944-45</td>
<td>3,835,088.42</td>
<td>3,209,406.51</td>
<td>625,681.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-46</td>
<td>7,450,509.99</td>
<td>5,197,948.91</td>
<td>2,252,661.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-47</td>
<td>1,197,347.40</td>
<td>399,704.72</td>
<td>797,642.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12,735,059.12</td>
<td>8,973,612.50</td>
<td>3,761,446.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Canada Department of Labour, Annual Report, 1947, p. 87.

Japanese Canadian Internees

A second source of labour that was mobilized from within Canada during the war, and which also faced labour market restrictions over and above those which applied to the rest of the Canadian working class were Japanese Canadian internees. Agitation on the part of a number of right wing members of parliament and sections of the Canadian media resulted in the forcible evacuation from the British Columbia coast of Japanese Canadians who had settled there since the turn of the century. The Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbour sparked the fear that Japanese Canadians might constitute a 'third column' in the country and assist in the coordination of Japanese air and naval attacks on the West coast of North America. In March, 1942 the British Columbia Security Commission was appointed. Its objective was...
to 'evacuate all persons of Japanese race' from strategic areas of British Columbia, and to relocate them in other parts of the country. Their property was confiscated by the state, and then sold at considerably less than its market value to other residents of British Columbia.64

In a move which reflected the state's belief that even though the Japanese Canadians might not be good citizens they would be good labourers (note the parallels with its view of Chinese labourers), control over the Japanese internees was passed to the Department of Labour once the evacuation was completed.64 While two-thirds of the 23,902 Japanese Canadians were relocated to internment camps in the interior of British Columbia, the other third were relocated to work camps (either individually or in groups) in Ontario, Manitoba and Alberta. Those who remained interned in British Columbia worked primarily in road construction and lumbering, while those interned in work camps west of the Rockies were either employed on road construction crews, in forests as woodworkers', or in family groups in the sugar beet harvest. Table 5-10 provides the distribution of Japanese Canadian internees in the war economy.

Table 5-10

Employment of Japanese Internees as at March 31, 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adults employed in farming</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults employed in trade, service and industry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mainly in Eastern Canada</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men employed in forest industries</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults in miscellaneous employment</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Labour, Annual Report, 1945, p. 75.
As previously noted, the Deputy Minister of Labour claimed that Japanese internees made important contributions to sugar beet production in Canada. Furthermore, according to the Director of the Ontario Farm Service Force, which helped coordinate the use of Japanese internees in Ontario, the Japanese internees who worked in the Ontario sugar beet fields 'gave splendid satisfaction'.

Like the German prisoners of war, the Japanese Canadians received a wage from employers for the provision of their labour power. While they could formally 'choose' to stay in internment camps in B.C or to be moved west to the labour camps, the choice occurred in the context of political/legal restrictions over their civil rights. Once they made the 'choice', they were forced to remain in the employment they were allocated to.

Conscientious Objectors

A third form of unfree wage labour that was supplied by the Canadian state to Canadian farmers and other employers were conscientious objectors. Conscientious objectors were primarily people of the Mennonite faith. In lieu of their unwillingness to register for the armed services because they were pacifists, they were forced to work in essential industries. By the end of 1943, 58.2%, or 5,160 out of a total of 8,858 conscientious objectors were placed on farms. During 1944, 70%, or 6,510 out of 9,300 conscientious objectors were working on farms. The largest proportion of these were in Ontario.

The Director of the National Selective Service, Arthur MacNamara, not only acknowledged their important contribution to production, but also identified their unique structural position in the Canadian labour market when he told the Dominion Provincial Farm Labour Committee that

The use of conscientious objectors for 12 month per year farm jobs has been a very good help. In the main, these men
are good workers and they are not in a position to walk off the job.

They were placed under contract with their employers. They could not quit their jobs or be fired without the sanction of the state. They were paid $25.00 per month, and farmers were required to furnish board and lodging. The difference between the monthly wage and the going wage rate for other wage labour (which was approximately thirty-five cents per hour) was paid by the state to the Canadian Red Cross.

Mobilizing Internal Reserves: Post-War Efforts

After the end of the war, the emergency labour regime ended. Prisoner-of-war labour was sent home, conscientious objectors were released from their obligations and Japanese Canadian internees were released from internment (although many of the latter were subsequently repatriated to Japan). Similarly, the National Selective Service Regulations were phased out and there was a return to the use of market mechanisms for the distribution of wage labour to most production sites. However, the state, albeit less actively, continued in its recruitment of labour from within Canada for the Ontario fruit and vegetable industry.

Even though most of the 'brigades' were disbanded after the end of the war, the Ontario Farm Service Force continued to operate, in modified form, various recruitment and placement schemes until the spring of 1953. Its main post-war activities involved the recruitment of students for work on individual farms or placement in labour camps, the recruitment of married couples for full time farm work, and the operation of a day-by-day labour recruitment service from west Toronto. It also attempted to reconstitute the Holiday Service Brigade, but was considerably less successful in that endeavour. After 1953, some of the Ontario Farm Service Force's labour recruitment programs were taken over by the National Employment
Service, the state run employment exchange organized under the auspices of the Department of Labour.

The Camp System

After the end of the war, the cost sharing arrangements associated with the construction and operation of the camps were modified. The state attempted to shift some of the costs of the operation of the camps to the farmers themselves. The federal and provincial governments each contributed one-third of the cost of the construction of new camps. Farmers who wished to make use of camp labour were required to purchase shares in the camp at the rate of $50.00 per worker required. The farmers thus formed cooperatives and the shares contributed to the remaining third of the cost of construction and the daily operating costs. The costs of staffing the camps with cooks, cooks' assistants, 'camp mothers', camp directors, and labour secretaries were shared between the two levels of government and the farmers. Other operating costs were assumed by the farmers. In addition, the growers also paid $1.75 per worker per week to cover the costs of hiring camp staff. Other individual farmers operated private camps, and were constructed and operated without the financial assistance of the government.

In the fall of 1950, the females who were housed in the camps earned forty cents per hour, while the boys earned fifty cents and adult males fifty-five cents per hour. Payments for board, food and laundry services depended upon whether they were employed for more than 32 hours per week. If they did not work a full 32 hours per week, their payments for board were pro-rated following a set formula. If females worked the minimum number of hours, then they paid $4.50 per week in 1946 and $6.00 per week in 1950. Males paid $5.00 per week in 1946 and between $7.00 and $8.00 per week in 1950.

The costs of transporting the workers from their place of residence to either the cooperative or private camps was paid for by the state through the Dominion Provincial Farm Labour Committee.
the workers remained in the camps for more than three weeks, then their transportation home was also paid for by the Committee. If they left farm labour employment before the end of the three week period, then they had to pay for their own transportation home. Table 5-11 gives and indication of the scale of the Ontario Farm Service Force Camps in operation between 1946 and 1953.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1947</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1952</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cooperative girls camps</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of camps</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of girls</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private girls camps</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of camps</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of girls</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>277</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Num. of girls camps</strong></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Num. of girls in camps</strong></td>
<td>689</td>
<td>1,192</td>
<td>1,447</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cooperative boys camps</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of camps</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in camps</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>363</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private boys camps</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of camps</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in camps</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>201</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total num. of boys camps</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total num. of boys in camps</strong></td>
<td>507</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mixed student Christian camps</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of camps</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of students</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Number of Camps</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Number in Camps</strong></td>
<td>1,271</td>
<td>1,832</td>
<td>2,011</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,133</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dominion Provincial Farm Labour Committee, Minutes, 1947-1952.
Children were enticed to sign up for camp work by state-sponsored advertisements which claimed that they could 'share pleasure and profit with hundreds of young people who are volunteering for this important work'. But even though the day to day operations of the cooperative camps were run by representatives of the YM and YWCA, they were neither leisure, recreation nor holiday camps. The young people recruited for the camps were expected to work. In 1949, for example, 21 children were dismissed for their 'conduct', 8 were dismissed on the basis of their 'conduct and work', and 12 on account of their 'poor work'. Those dismissed for such reasons were required to pay for their own transportation home, although those dismissed for medical reasons were returned home at the expense of the state.

All but two or three small privately run camps were dissolved at the end of the 1952 growing season because of increasing costs associated with their operation. The camps also faced increasing difficulties in recruiting large numbers of children for the work because of the greater importance placed on formal schooling by parents and the state. There also appears to have been a slight increase in the availability of local labour for the fruit and vegetable harvests during the early years of the 1950's, which may have been a result of the state's attempt to mobilize women who previously worked in the household. In 1957, the cooperative camp system was revived for a brief two year period by the South Western Ontario Field Crops Association, but this effort will be discussed in more detail in the chapter eight because farmers attempted to stock the camps with Caribbean migrant labour.

Urban Unemployed and Students

After the war, male and female unemployed workers and students from the Toronto area were recruited by the state for day by day labour. The workers were recruited daily for truck farming in the area around Toronto and Holland Marsh. The workers were paid a daily wage which depended on the number of hours worked. Farmers drove to central points in the city of Toronto (and later Hamilton), where they
would transport the day labourers to their fields and then return them to the city at the end of the day. The state ran advertising campaigns to recruit workers for farmers and provided the services an employment officer to coordinate the movement.\textsuperscript{27} Table 5-12 gives an indication of the size of the movement between 1947 and 1962. The numbers of growers who made use of the service ranged from a low of 64 in 1957 and 1958 to a high of 145 in 1962. The number of workers involved ranged from 2,286 in 1948 to 610 in 1959.

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Day by Day Workers Recruited by National Employment Service, 1947-1962*}
\begin{tabular}{lcccc}
\hline
Year & Girls & Boys & Days of Work Supplied & Number of Growers Served \\
Women & Men & & \\
\hline
1947 & 797 & 1,224 & 13,000 & 120 \\
1948 & 1,099 & 1,187 & 18,425 & 133 \\
1949 & 502 & 867 & 10,304 & 112 \\
1950 & 843 & 655 & 12,667 & 133 \\
1951 & 706 & 834 & 12,320 & 120 \\
1952 & 723 & 557 & 12,213 & 102 \\
1953 & 691 & 647 & 12,189 & 84 \\
1954 & 560 & 529 & 19,542 & 83 \\
1955 & 557 & 655 & 19,542 & 83 \\
1956 & 999 & 15,323 & 75 \\
1957 & 761 & 17,569 & 64 \\
1958 & 636 & 19,680 & 64 \\
1959 & 620 & 23,416 & 78 \\
1960 & 806 & 35,555 & 111 \\
1961 & 1,540 & 39,932 & 145 \\
1962 & 1,535 & 36,323 & 134 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\footnote{\texttimes Figures are for those recruited in West Toronto.}
\end{table}

Aboriginal Peoples

During and after the end of the war, the state also attempted to systematically mobilize aboriginal peoples who lived on reserves in Northern Ontario to work in the southwestern Ontario fruit and vegetable harvest. The provincial governments and sugar beet growers in Manitoba and Alberta made extensive use of aboriginal labour in the process of sugar beet production in those provinces, but it seems that the scale of aboriginal participation in the harvest of Ontario sugar beets and other crops was minimal. While there may have been many aboriginal peoples who migrated to the south western Ontario fruit and vegetable harvest relatively spontaneously (without the formal intervention by the state in terms of the provision of funds for transportation of the workers from reserves to farms), they do not appear to have been formally recruited by the state for work in Ontario until the late 1950's in the context of the South Western Ontario Field Crops Association which will be discussed in more detail in chapter eight. In 1964, some 255 aboriginal peoples from Northern Ontario were provided with transportation by the state to southern Ontario for the fruit and vegetable harvest. In 1965 this figure increased to 549 but dropped to 162 in 1966.9

Like the workers who were transported interprovincially, and like the students who were transported to the labour camps established by farmers, the transportation of the aboriginal workers to the fields was paid for by the Dominion-Provicial Farm Labour Committee, and if they worked until the harvest was completed, their transportation home was paid.9

Others

The Ontario Farm Service Force also helped place small numbers of children in the employment of individual farmers for the summer. Between 1947 and 1952, some 4,205 young people were recruited by the state to work for individual farmers for the summer. The vast majority were young boys. Similarly, the Ontario Farm Service force
placed some 195 married couples in farm employment between 1947 and 1952. And in 1948, there was a brief return of a version of the Holiday Service Brigade, when the Ontario Farm Service launched a recruiting drive amongst workers who were on their summer holidays. In that year, they placed some five-hundred workers in the privately run and cooperative camps for the summer.100

Later in the 1960's, the state also attempted to make use of patients in psychiatric hospitals in the southern Ontario area for work in the fruit and vegetable harvest.101 At other times, it made use of military personnel102, and in Quebec in the early 1970's, the use of convict labour from penitentiaries in apple growing regions of the province.103

Conclusion

This chapter has suggested that farmers who grow tender fruit and vegetable crops face two problems with respect to their labour force. First, they face an initial problem of recruiting suitable supplies of wage labour, and second, they face a problem of retaining those workers for the duration of the harvest. The farmers' difficulties in this regard result from the cost-price squeeze, the process of capital accumulation which drained off labour previously employed on farms, and the Canadian state's cheap food policy which advocates low tariffs on fruit and vegetable imports. While the farmers' have attempted to resolve these shortages of labour through the substitution of capital for labour, certain sectors of the industry continue to require a high content of variable capital in the harvest.

Much of the demand for labour is filled via spontaneous, non-state organized migrations of labour from peripheral regions of the country. However, with the exception of the period between 1958 and 1961, these spontaneous migrations have proven to be inadequate to fill all of the demand for labour expressed by southern Ontario farmers.
Since the Second World War, the Canadian state has intervened in the process of fruit and vegetable production by its mobilization and control of internal reserves of labour. During the war the state suspended the operation of market mechanisms to distribute labour. Specific interventions to help resolve the shortages of labour in the Ontario fruit and vegetable industry involved the use of prisoners of war, Japanese Canadian internees, and conscientious objectors, as well as children, students and women who previously worked in the household. While the suspension of market mechanisms during the war meant that all labour in Canada was in a sense unfree (its ability to circulate within the labour market was restricted), the use of POWs, Japanese Canadian internees and conscientious objectors involved forms of political/legal compulsion over and above those which other workers were subject to.

There was a nominal wage involved in the exploitation of the labour power of prisoners of war, Japanese Canadian internees and conscientious objectors. Similarly, Japanese Canadian internees could formally 'choose' to stay in internment camps in B.C. or to be moved west to labour camps. Despite the formal appearance of the wage relation, and despite a certain limited ability of Japanese Canadians to 'choose' to whom they provided labour power for, the usage of these three groups of labour on farms, in lumbering and in other industries can be considered as forms of unfree labour. Each group was unable to quit or change their jobs and circulate in the labour market. They did not formally choose who they provided labour power for, and they were not required to purchase the means for the reproduction of their ability to work in the market. The 'choice' exercised by Japanese Canadian internees occurred in the context of political/legal constraints over their civil rights and over the disposition of their labour power. Once they made the choice of the location of their residence, they were forced to engage in the employment which they 'choose'. The political/legal relations they were subject to meant that they occupied a position in class relations as a form of unfree wage labour.
After the war, the state continued to intervene in the process of fruit and vegetable production via its organizational and financial support role in the recruitment of various reserves of labour available from within Canada. The state attempted, in George Haythorne's terms, to 'remove or reduce some of the imperfections in the farm labour market' by helping farmers recruit day-to-day labour, by funding the construction and operation of labour camps stocked by students and unemployed workers, and paying for the transportation costs of workers from their homes to production sites if they completed certain minimum periods of employment with farmers.¹⁰⁴

The next chapter examines the state's recruitment of labour born outside of the boundaries of the nation state and the various modes by which foreign workers were incorporated into sites in production relations in this industry between 1947 and 1966.
CHAPTER SIX

'WITHOUT IMMIGRANTS YOU DON'T GROW CASH CROPS':
FOREIGN LABOUR IN THE SOUTHWESTERN ONTARIO FRUIT
AND VEGETABLE INDUSTRY

Introduction

Despite the various spontaneous migrations and the state assisted
recruitment of labour from within the boundaries of the nation state
documented in the previous chapter, south western Ontario fruit,
vegetable and tobacco growers continued to face labour force
recruitment and retention problems during the post-war years.
Recourse was therefore made to labour which was born and raised
outside of the boundaries of the nation state. This chapter examines
the issue of inclusion, or, the Canadian state's recruitment,
mobilization and control of foreign-born labour for the Ontario fruit
and vegetable industry between 1946 and the early 1970's. It
demonstrates that agricultural capital lacked sufficient internal
reserves of labour and therefore became dependent on the mobilization
of various forms of migrant and immigrant labour from outside of the
boundaries of the nation state.

The statistical dimensions of the movement of immigrants, persons
who were defined by the state as permanent settlers and who possessed
the right to remain permanently in the country, are given in table 6-1.
In themselves, however, these statistics do not give us an
indication of the variations in the political/legal relations
different immigrant groups were subject to. Like the work of Castles
et. al. noted in chapter one, they tend to blur the distinction
between different categories of 'immigrants'. Furthermore, these
statistics do not give us an accurate indication of the full impact of
foreign-born labour on the Ontario fruit, vegetable and tobacco
industry. There are at least three labour migrations, made up migrant
labourers which, until recently, have not been included in published
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ontario</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Ontario as a % of Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946-1955</td>
<td>65,510</td>
<td>636,033</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>3,743</td>
<td>90,662</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>4,902</td>
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<td>3.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>2,622</td>
<td>63,853</td>
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<td>1958</td>
<td>2,751</td>
<td>55,976</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2,857</td>
<td>54,491</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1,172</td>
<td>36,518</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>861</td>
<td>37,210</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>49,216</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
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<td>79,702</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>107,621</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>116,850</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1,730</td>
<td>96,155</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1,091</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1,009</td>
<td>80,732</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>64,357</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,093</td>
<td>63,805</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1,723</td>
<td>103,187</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1,222</td>
<td>120,115</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>98,417</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>72,031</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>544</td>
<td>56,594</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>42,397</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>591</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>62,257</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes those classified as 'farmers', 'farm labourers' and 'farm managers'.

Column 1, total number of immigrants destined to agricultural occupations in Ontario; Column 2, total number of immigrants destined to Ontario; Column 3, Column 1 as a % of Column 2; Column 4, total number of immigrants destined to agricultural occupations in Canada; Column 5, total number of immigrants to Canada; Column 6, column 4 as a % of Column 5.

immigration statistics. These include the movement of American workers from the southern states to the Ontario tobacco harvest, the movement of European university students who migrate to Canada under the guise of an international student exchange, and undocumented workers.

In light of the theoretical claims advanced in chapter two, this chapter suggests that there were important variations in the way different groups of foreign-born workers were incorporated into sites in production relations in the industry. Specifically, it suggests that foreign-born workers were incorporated either as unfree immigrant labour, free immigrant labour, or unfree migrant labour, and that these different modes of incorporation were structured by a complex of economic, political and ideological relations. The organization of this chapter is therefore analytical. Between 1945 and the early 1970's, different modes of incorporation were used simultaneously by the Canadian state.

Unfree Immigrant Labour

On the basis of the conditions of initial recruitment, two groups of foreign-born workers were incorporated into sites in production relations as unfree immigrant labour: Polish War Veterans and Displaced Persons. This category refers to those who were allocated the status of 'immigrants' by the Canadian state (in the sense that they were defined as 'potential' future settlers and citizens) but who initially faced political/legal restrictions over their participation in the Canadian labour market.

Polish War Veterans

One of the first groups allowed entry to Canada after the war were Polish war veterans.' They were initially destined to fill farm labour positions in Canada in general, and farm labour positions in Ontario's fruit and vegetable industry in particular. The 4,527 Polish veterans who were recruited to Canada in 1946 and 1947 were members of
the 2nd Polish Corps who fought as part of the British 8th Army in the Mediterranean. As 'anti-communists', they refused to be repatriated to Poland after the end of the war. As noted in chapter one, the British government accepted the vast majority of the soldiers and their dependents as permanent settlers, as a response to labour shortages in industry. While Britain was willing to absorb most of the 130,000 veterans and dependents, it was not prepared to absorb them all. The British government therefore encouraged Canada, along with Australia, New Zealand and several South American countries to accept at least a small number of Polish veterans as permanent settlers. As an inducement to these states to accept the veterans, the British offered to pay the costs of their transportation from Italy to the country of destination.

The Canadian state accepted Britain's request, in part because of pressures coming from Ontario farmers to find replacements for German prisoners of war. The Acting Under Secretary of State for External Affairs outlined the reasons for the state's acceptance of these people in the following terms:

by agreeing to take demobilized Polish soldiers in return for the German prisoners of war we would be getting a supply of heavy labour of a type which is in considerable demand, and that the movement ... would make an appreciable beginning on the very difficult task of disposing of the large forces of Polish soldiers, who for understandable reasons, are unwilling to return to Poland.

It is evident then that the state defined the veterans, in part, as a specific replacement for the repatriated prisoners of war. Both the British and Canadian governments did not, however, want this to become public knowledge. According to the High Commissioner for Canada in Great Britain,

The United Kingdom recognized that our present willingness to take Polish veterans is linked with our loss of prisoner of war labour, but urge that this relationship be not unduly stressed in any publicity given these arrangements because of the adverse effect it would have on Polish morale.
The Canadian state formally approved the entry of 4,000 male Polish veterans to work on Canadian farms by Order-in-Council in July, 1946.\(^1\) The ex-soldiers were initially granted the right of temporary entry to the country. This right was in turn only granted to those who signed a labour contract which stated among other things, that they would remain in the agricultural employment, to which they were originally allocated by the Department of Labour, for a period of two years. If they fulfilled this requirement, and after three more years of residence, they qualified for Canadian citizenship.\(^1\) The contracts they signed further stipulated that they were to receive a minimum wage of $45.00 per month with board. Housing, meals, and at times laundry services were provided by the farmers so the veterans did not have to purchase all of the means of their day-to-day reproduction in the market. The contract also specified that they were to 'enjoy living and working conditions prevailing in the locality where they were employed'.

The number of hours of work the veterans were required to provide were left unspecified in the contract, but the state informally expected that the veterans should work about sixty hours per week. The workers were subject to the denial of permanent admission to the country, and faced deportation for not living up to the terms of the contract. They could not quit, change jobs or be fired without the consent of the Department of Labour. The responsibility of the organization of their allocation to particular positions was undertaken by the various Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Committees. Married men who were recruited were required to leave their wives and children in Europe until they completed the terms of the contract.\(^1\)

The contractual arrangements were later modified. The most important modification provided that if a veteran had completed one year's employment with the same farmer, he was allowed to make his own arrangements for farm labour employment during the second year. But like the previous contract, they could only do so on the condition that the arrangement was completed through the local Placement Officer of the National Employment Service or the local representative of the
provincial Department of Agriculture. Thus, while the state continued to restrict the workers' ability to circulate in the labour market, it did allow them a degree of 'free' choice in the determination of to whom they sold their labour power.

The Canadian state sent a recruitment team to Italy to select the requisite number of veterans shortly after Cabinet approval of the plan. They were given medical examinations, and were screened by the R.C.M.P. to ensure that 'communists', 'Jews', Nazis and German collaborators were not inadvertently recruited. By late October of 1946, the recruiters had selected some 3,600 male veterans, most of whom were between the ages of twenty and thirty. They were unable to select the full quota at that time, so arrangements were made with the British government to select the remaining veterans the following spring from camps set up in Britain. In the following year, the recruiters selected several hundred more than the originally planned 4,000 and in the end, the state allowed a total of 4,527 men to enter the country. The veterans thus arrived in two waves. The first arrived in November, 1946 and the second in the spring of 1947. Their regional distribution in Canada is provided in table 6-2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>First Group</th>
<th>Second Group</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maritimes</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>1,233</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>1,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prairies</td>
<td>1,077</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>1,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,876</td>
<td>1,651</td>
<td>4,527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Canada Department of Labour, Annual Report, 1948, p. 63.
Throughout the term of the contract, the Department of Labour maintained close supervision over their employment. According to the High Commissioner for Canada in Great Britain

so long as they were, in effect, employed under a contract of indenture, the Departments of Government concerned would supervise their placement so that their special status was not exploited by their employers.16

Clearly, the state's concern in this context was not that the surplus product produced by the veterans would be appropriated by farmers, but rather that the farmers might treat the veterans unfairly or badly by virtue of their position as unfree labour.

Despite the concern on the part of the state over the potential for the 'exploitation' of the veterans' 'special status', the wages they received were generally lower than those received by Canadians doing the same work. According to a Department of Labour survey of the working and living conditions of a sample of Polish veterans in southern Ontario conducted in the summer and autumn of 1947, the average wage of the sixty eight veterans interviewed was $53.00.17

But, even though on average they tended to receive more than the minimum specified in the contract, this figure was low considering that the average wage rate for hired farm labour in Ontario at the time was approximately seventy dollars per month, including board.18 Several veterans reported that they received the minimum of $45.00 per month at the same time that that they were working alongside men who earned between $9.00 and $10.00 per day plus board during the tobacco harvest. In fact, the chief complaint the veterans' had regarding the conditions of employment was that wages were too low given the long hours and kinds of work they were required to do.19

While it is the case that farmers had access to not only cheap but also unfree wage labour, the contract did at times pose certain disadvantages for them. The condition that they pay a monthly wage on a year round basis meant that they had to assume a greater part of the reproduction costs of the labour power when it was unemployed or
underemployed in the winter than when the workers were fully employed in the spring, summer and autumn. This was especially a problem in the case of farmers who concentrated solely on fruit, vegetable and grain production, but less of a problem with those who engaged in mixed farming where the hired hand tended the livestock during the winter. Thus, some employers were critical of the contracts because they only really needed hired farm labour for part of the year. The state responded to these criticisms by arguing that farmers should be willing to make such commitments because they had a guaranteed source of labour for two years, and were therefore virtually assured of the availability of at least some hired labour during the peak period of labour demand at harvest time.²⁰

Despite poor wages and difficult working conditions, the vast majority of the workers lived up to terms of their contracts.²¹ In fact, two thirds remained in the employment of the farmer they were originally contracted to during their first two years in Canada. However, as of November, 1947, there were a small number of 'problem cases', fifty-two to be exact, who left farm employment to seek out other work without the permission of the farmer or of the Department of Labour.²² Thus, slightly over one per cent of the veterans failed to live up to their contracts by circulating in the labour market without the sanction of the state.

One of the more vocal critics of the Polish veterans in this regard was the editor of the Calgary Albertan newspaper. In a series of editorials in late 1947 and early 1948, he criticized both the veterans who had been channelled to Alberta for failing to live up to their contracts, and the state for its apparent failure to enforce the conditions of the contract through repatriation. He claimed that the state's lack of enforcement of the contracts was ruining 'a good immigration scheme', creating a wave of hostility against future immigration, and that the farmers

... are disgusted. In their present mood, most of them don't want to have anything to do with Polish immigrants,
whereas 10 months ago they were in hearty praise of these people.\textsuperscript{23}

While his claim that 'large numbers ... have walked off farms to which they were recruited'\textsuperscript{24} was untrue, and while he was told so by the state, he persisted in his claims, and in a later editorial stated that

These men are now wandering and working at will. Most of them have shown utter disregard to their contracts. They come and go when they feel like it, [and] pick up city jobs by the dozen at somewhat higher wages.\textsuperscript{25}

The editor was careful, however, to qualify his criticisms of Polish veterans. He told his readers

It should be stated once more that we are not supporting the idea of contracted labour. In many ways it is a kind of serfdom.\textsuperscript{26}

Thus, his stance seemed to have been motivated by his concern over 'law and order'. While the contracts were a 'kind of serfdom' which he claimed he disliked, a contract was a contract, and if the workers were failing to live up to the terms of the contract, then they should be repatriated.

Contrary to the Albertan editor's opinion, the state was serious about the terms of the contract and expected the veterans to live up to their obligations. Both farmers and the Department of Labour solicited the help of the R.C.M.P. in cases where veterans left farm employment without permission. The Mounties tracked down several veterans and returned them to the custody of officials of the Department of Labour. Depending on the circumstances, they either returned them to the farmer they were originally contracted to, or placed them with a different farmer again under contract.\textsuperscript{27}

Even though only a handful of veterans failed to live up to the terms of the contracts by attempting to sell their labour power outside of the farm labour market without the sanction of the state,
the state did begin deportation proceedings against three 'especially recalcitrant' cases. It felt that the continued refusal of the three to remain in farm employment was having a 'disturbing' influence on the others. In the words of the High Commissioner for Canada in Great Britain, failure to take action 'pour encourager les autres', would seriously prejudice the success of the scheme. While there was some initial confusion as to which country the three would be repatriated to, the British government eventually agreed that they could be returned to the United Kingdom. In the end, none of the veterans were actually repatriated. Two of the veterans returned to farm employment once deportation proceedings against them were started, and the other returned 'voluntarily' to Britain before the proceedings were completed.

At the December, 1947 annual meeting of the Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Conference

All present expressed regret that none of the Polish veterans who had been recommended for deportation had actually been deported. It was felt that had it been possible to deport at least a few of the worst offenders, it would have had considerable effects on the other veterans who are making little or no effort to fulfill their undertaking.

While none of the veterans were deported, the threat of deportation was common. Farmers and local officials of the federal Department of Labour and provincial Departments of Agriculture used the threat as a stick with which to beat the veterans. One man who left farm employment was even fined and threatened with deportation by a provincial magistrate. The state also repeatedly 'reminded' the veterans, in a series of Newsletters issued on behalf of the Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Program, that they should live up to the agreements. The newsletters were written in Polish, English and French, and at times threatened deportation if they left their employment without the sanction of the state or pointed out that those who were not living up to their contracts were jeopardizing the future possibility of further Polish migration to Canada, a strategy which,
as we shall see in the next section, was later used with Displaced Persons who were also recruited to Canada under contract.

Similarly, in a special letter sent to all Polish veterans in late 1947, the Department of Labour reaffirmed its position regarding the contracts. The Deputy Minister of Labour, Arthur MacNamara, told the veterans, among other things, that they should feel grateful because employers wanted them in Canada.

I would like to say first of all that you would not have been here at this time had there not been farmers in Canada who were in need of your services. Because of the urgent need for food, the British Government was prepared not only to make shipping available for you when it was not obtainable by others but also to help finance your journey to Canada. As you will understand, your obligation is a serious one. These farmers not only provided an important means of your coming to Canada before others were able to come, but they have been of much assistance to you in becoming adjusted quickly to Canadian life and conditions.

The attempt to mystify the original circumstances of their arrival in the country in order to justify their allocation to positions in production relations as cheap and unfree wage labour did not meet with passive acceptance by all veterans. In a letter responding to the Deputy Minister of Labour, one veteran unmasked the veiled threats and the attempt of the Deputy Minister to create a feeling of guilt over their being in the country. He began by reminding MacNamara that

we did not come here to make a fortune or beg for bread, but came here as political immigrants, forced to find some place in which to start a new life and work peacefully.

In relation to the claim that they were the recipients of supposed preferred treatment on the part of the British state concerning their transportation to Canada, he stated that
We are demobilized soldiers of the 8th British Army. Each British soldier after his demobilization is entitled to demobilization gratuity, to 56 days paid leave and a free passage home. Canada was chosen by us for our home, therefore, according to the above mentioned normal regulations, we were entitled to a free passage to Canada. For what, then, are you telling us to be thankful?

And, in terms of MacNamara's suggestion that they should be grateful that Canadian farmers required their labour power

For Canada it was the most convenient way to bring farm helpers over in a short time. While choosing workers among the not yet demobilized soldiers, using the full help from the military organizations, the recruiting commission could fulfill her job very quickly .... Please do not reproach us concerning our obligations ....

After the expiry of the stipulation that the veterans remain in farm employment for two years after their arrival in the country, they qualified for permanent residence and could circulate freely in the labour market. Despite attempts on the part of the state to encourage them to remain employed on farms, which involved the glorification of rural life and the exposure of the 'evils' of the 'big city', it appears that few continued to work in agriculture for any appreciable length of time after the contracts expired. A small number eventually settled on farms of their own but most left agricultural employment to fill better paying positions in urban manufacturing or mining.

**Displaced Persons**

The second group of foreign-born persons who were initially allocated a position in production relations as unfree immigrant labour in the south western Ontario fruit and vegetable industry were Displaced Persons. Between 1947 and 1954, Canada admitted some 165,697 Displaced Persons to the country. Some were admitted as sponsored relatives of eastern European immigrants already settled in the country. These cases were admitted on the condition that a close relative would undertake the responsibility for their welfare and physical reproduction if they became unemployed during their first
five years in Canada. Displaced persons admitted as sponsored relatives were free immigrants to the extent that once in Canada they were allowed to circulate freely in the Canadian labour market. In this way, they occupied a position in production relations which approximated that of indigenous free wage labour. However, a large proportion of Displaced Persons, initially came as contract labourers, or under what Dirks calls the 'Sponsored Labour Scheme' and what Rawlyk calls the 'Group Movement Plan'. The Canadian state patterned this scheme after the British European Volunteer Worker program, and its own earlier recruitment of Polish veterans. In this section, I discuss those recruited under the group movement plan.

The Canadian state expected, and indeed hoped, that the Displaced Persons who came under contract would eventually settle permanently in the country, either as wage labourers or as petty agricultural commodity producers. There were therefore formally 'immigrants'. However, those recruited under the 'Group Movement Plan' were initially unfree immigrants to the extent that they were subject to political legal restrictions over their circulation in the labour market for a period of time after their arrival in Canada.

The state advanced the costs of transportation to the contract labourers. These costs were repaid by the workers through monthly deductions from their wage packet. The contract specified the minimum rate of pay (which it hoped would be the same as the rate paid to Canadian labour doing the same work in the same locality), provided for the itemization of deductions made by the employer, and specified the type of accommodation that would be provided as well as the extent and nature of medical and social insurance coverage. It also stated that the worker had to remain in the employment he/she was initially allocated to by the state for a period of one year after arrival in the country. If the Displaced Person did not remain in that employment, and if he/she circulated in the labour market without the sanction of the state, then they were subject to deportation and/or prosecution under provincial civil law pertaining to contracts.
It is difficult to estimate the exact number of Displaced Persons who initially came as contract labourers because the published immigration statistics do not distinguish between contracted Displaced Persons and sponsored relatives. It is also difficult to determine precisely their distribution within the occupational structure. In general terms, however, Displaced Person contract workers were originally concentrated in unskilled and semi-skilled manual labour positions which were being increasingly vacated by indigenous labour in favour of better paying positions in other sectors of the Canadian economy. Men tended to be found in forestry work, mining, and farming, and women worked as domestic servants, sewing machine operators in clothing sweatshops, and also as farm labourers.48

A certain number of Displaced Persons under contract were channelled into the southwestern Ontario fruit and vegetable industry. According to statistics derived from the Dominion Provincial Farm Labour Conference Reports, some 7,016 Displaced Persons were initially channelled to farms in Ontario between 1947 and 1954 through the program.49 This figure may be an underestimate of their impact on the Ontario farm labour market because not all Displaced Persons were processed by the Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Program.50

Generally, there were three types of agricultural contracts: those which involved single male workers, those which involved married couples with less than three children, and sugar beet contracts for large families. In Ontario, the minimum wage for single male Displaced Persons was $45.00 with board. Married couples with less than three children were paid $75.00 per month. The minimum wage paid to single male displaced persons was considerably lower than the average wage for farm labour, which was around $70.00 per month51, which suggests that farmers had access to a cheap and unfree labour force as they had with Polish Veterans.

Even though the state recognized that some farmers' labour requirements were for seasonal harvest labour, it hoped that farmers would assume the overhead reproduction costs of the labour power for
the full year. Farmers really only needed workers for their seasonal labour demands, but as in the case of the employers of Polish veterans, the state encouraged the farmers to assume the overhead reproduction costs of the labourer and/or the labourer's family during the slack season, because they were assured of at least a certain amount of labour at harvest time.\(^{52}\)

Their impact on farm production in Ontario was recognized by many who were familiar with their employment. According to the Ontario representative of the Dominion Provincial Farm Labour Committee:

The service rendered by D.P.'s to Ontario farmers has been and still is, very considerable, and it is hard to conceive what the situation would have been without their presence—and indeed many of them have proved to be excellent workers who have received high commendation from their farmer employers.\(^{53}\)

However, like the Polish Veterans and many of those who were subsequently recruited under the state's Assisted Passages Scheme (to be discussed in more detail in the next section), there were two 'problems' associated with the use of Displaced Persons. First, a certain proportion left farm labour positions (as well as other positions for which they were contracted to) before the expiry of their contract, and second, few remained in farm labour employment after the contracts expired.

A rough indication of the frequency of the former 'problem' can be gained from statistics for 1948 in Ontario. During the course of 1948, some 1,596 Displaced Persons were placed under contract on farms in Ontario. By November of 1948, forty-two, or 2.6% of the total, were reported as 'away without official leave'.\(^{54}\) This compares with a figure of about 5% for Displaced Persons recruited under contract for other industries in the country.\(^{55}\)

Despite the relatively small numbers involved, farmers and some state officials wanted some of the Displaced Persons deported in order to encourage the others to remain in the employment they were
allocated to. Like the Polish veterans, Displaced Persons were subject to political and ideological coercion to remain in the positions they were initially channelled into. For instance, the Minister of Labour, Arthur MacNamara sent a standard letter to various foreign language newspapers in Canada to encourage editorial comment along the following lines:

it is a grand opportunity for those unfortunate people who are now in Displaced Person Camps to come to free Canada and without financial burdens .... In making application [to come to Canada] the applicants, both men and women of their own free will and accord, sign an application and give their undertaking to the Minister of Labour that they will remain in the employment for which they were selected to a period of one year .... Credit must be given ... to the vast majority of newcomers who are working contentedly and industriously for employers to whom they have been assigned .... There are, however, cases where the workers, regardless of consequences to their fellow nationalists [sic] who are still in Germany, refuse to carry out the terms of the undertaking given on the application forms. There are cases too where a good deal of reluctance and unsatisfactory service is evident and there are still others where men and women deliberately leave their positions. You will appreciate that it is very necessary for these people who are taking their first step towards becoming Canadian citizens to carry out the undertaking made .... The future of this movement depends on the success of those immigrants already in Canada in becoming assimilated and it would be unfortunate if the general public were led to believe, through the actions of a few, that the programme as a whole was not satisfactory .... It would be appreciated if we could have the cooperation of the newspaper of which you are editor in urging workers who came from Displaced Persons Camps to stay in their jobs in accordance with their undertaking ....

The Deputy Minister's statement is of interest for several reasons. First, it defined Canada as a 'free' country, or as a country with free institutions. One of the features of this freedom was that labour was able to circulate in the market and seek out the highest returns possible. Second, migration was defined not simply as a method by which the accumulation of capital was facilitated, but rather as an aspect of nation state formation. As previously argued, movements of immigrant labour involved people who were to eventually become citizens of the country. Third, keeping a contract was an
obligation of citizens of a free country. This was important even though such a contract contradicted the idea of freedom, insofar as it was advocated as an absolute, and even though it constituted the immigrant as a form of unfree wage labour. Fourth, like the case of the Polish veterans, the state made use of the threat that those who failed to live up to the terms of their contracts would be jeopardizing the future migration of their nationals to the country. And fifth, the Displaced Persons were defined as having entered their contracts under their own free will and in the absence of any external constraints.

Notable by their absence, however, were threats of deportation for those who failed to live up to their contracts. This may have been because of the fear of criticism from some parts of the press and labour movement that Displaced Persons were employed under contracts of 'serfdom', and because the editor's were unlikely to cooperate with the state if such drastic measures were implemented.

The Deputy Minister was, however, more explicit about the serious consequences of failing to live up to the terms of the contract when he sent letters directly to all Displaced Persons who entered the country under contract.

The requirement that you remain in the job to which you are assigned for one year is important. It is as much in your own interest as it is in the interest of Canada. The great majority of Displaced Persons who have come to Canada have shown a fine appreciation of their responsibility to remain in the jobs to which they are assigned for one year. There are a few, however, who are inclined, now that they are in Canada, to treat their undertakings lightly. This is a grave mistake. The government and people of Canada will do all that they can to assist in the re-establishment of Displaced Persons who show good faith. Those who prove to be uncooperative cannot expect the same assistance and arrangements have been made with the International Refugee Organization whereby Displaced Persons who have come to Canada and prove to be undesirable will be returned to the place from which they came. It is my hope that we will not have to take advantage of this arrangement with I.R.O.
To add further force and legitimacy to the threat of deportation, and at the same time make it appear that Displaced Persons in Canada were being treated fairly compared with their compatriots' treatment by other states, the Minister of Labour also enclosed an article clipped from the publication The New Australian, which was the monthly bulletin of the 'Australian Department of Immigration to Assist European Migrants'. The article, entitled 'MINISTER’S WARNING TO THOSE WHO LEAVE JOBS', stated that Displaced Persons in Australia were required to sign labour contract which were in force for a period of two years, not one as was the case in Canada. According to the Australian Minister of Labour, the contracts were designed to 'assist in their assimilation into the Australian economy, and to give maximum benefit to industry', which perhaps unwittingly exposed the blatant self interest of both state's in their recruitment of people who were formally refugees.  

But, more importantly, however, the article stated that

The Minister for Immigration ... has threatened to deport European migrants who leave, without permission, the jobs to which they have been allotted .... Last month four European migrants who had left their jobs without permission were charged with being prohibited immigrants. They would be deported.  

While it appears that no Displaced Persons were actually deported by the Canadian state for leaving the employment to which they were contracted, it did make use of the services of the R.C.M.P. to track down and return Displaced Persons to the positions they were originally allocated to. Some were, however, deported for other reasons. For example, one woman was deported to Germany because she is addicted to the use of alcoholic beverages and in some cases had stayed out all night. It is also reported that this D.P. said she was a professional prostitute in Europe ... [and she] was found guilty ... of being drunk in Fort William.  

Deportations and the threat of deportations clearly contradicted the Minister's apparent sympathy for these 'unfortunate' people. The threat of deportation, given their marginal status in the country to
begin with, undoubtedly had the effect of further increasing their sense of marginalization.\textsuperscript{c3}

As noted above, the second 'problem' with Displaced Persons was that they did not remain in farm labour employment after the expiry of their contracts. Thus, they were criticized by farmers and others for not remaining in farm employment, or other employment for which they were recruited, even after they were formally released from their contracts. Again, according to the Ontario representative at the 1949 Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Conference

We must, however, recognize that ... a large number of these workers do not remain in agriculture for more than the year of their undertaking to do so. This appears to be particularly true in the case of those men whose employers have sponsored the entry to Canada of their wives and families, but who promptly leave their employers at the end of their twelve month period, regardless of the inconvenience it may cause the employers during the harvest time. This tendency is damaging to the farmers' outlook toward D.P.'s, more especially in the case of those who were brought to Canada during the summer months, so that their twelve month term ends in the busiest farm season. We recognize the difficulties attendant upon this matter, but would suggest that particular attention be paid to bringing as many workers as possible in the months of April and May, rather than June and July.\textsuperscript{c4}

Despite the dissatisfaction articulated by farmers, Displaced Persons who completed the terms of the contract were issued with cards, or 'certificates of merit' by the Department of Labour which certified that they had completed their undertakings and were therefore free from state imposed restrictions over their circulation in the labour market.\textsuperscript{c5}

In sum, like the recruitment of Polish veterans, the recruitment of Displaced Persons did not create a permanent farm labour force that Ontario farmers could draw upon when they needed to hire labour and discard when they were no longer required. Like the Polish veterans before them, and like Canadian labour they sought out better paying positions elsewhere in the economy.\textsuperscript{c6} They reacted to labour
market conditions in much the same way that indigenous labour did in that they took advantage of the upward mobility afforded to them by the process of capital accumulation. Therefore, the structurally induced problems of labour shortages remained, in part, because the state and employers were reluctant to constitute unfree relations of production as a permanent condition for a specific category of people.

**Free Immigrant Labour**

Foreign-born workers were also incorporated into sites in production relations in the southwestern Ontario fruit and vegetable industry as free immigrant labour. Such workers were defined by the Canadian state as permanent settlers. Their length of stay and ability to remain in the country were not restricted by the state. While these workers were originally admitted to the country on the basis of their stated intention to fill certain positions which were short of labour (of which farm labour was only one of among many), once they arrived in Canada they could immediately circulate freely in the Canadian labour market.

Some free immigrants who could afford to pay for their own passage to Canada found work in the southwestern Ontario fruit and vegetable industry independently of the Canadian state: once in Canada they simply reacted to labour market pressures. The number of these people would have been small, and they would have consisted primarily of immigrants from Britain, as the Canadian state did not attempt to formally channel them into positions in Canada. These people are not discussed here. However, there were two other groups who were channelled into farm labour positions by the Canadian state after they entered the country but who were not subject to political/legal compulsion to remain in those positions after entry to the country. Discussed first are people who were farmers in Holland before and during the second world war, and who were initially channelled into farm labour positions. Discussed second are the people granted Assisted Passage loans by the Canadian state. Some were also channelled into farm labour positions. It is these two groups, and
the political/ideological relations surrounding their migration to Canada, that I want to concentrate on in the following section.

Dutch Farmers

In 1947 the Canadian and Dutch governments entered into an informal agreement whereby the latter recruited and screened Dutch farmers and their families for emigration to Canada.\(^7\) The flooding of large areas of agricultural land in the Netherlands which accompanied the destruction of dykes by the retreating German army, combined with a steady increase in the number of young people entering the labour market as a result of a high rate of natural increase of the population during the 1930's\(^6\) and the repatriation of Dutch nationals from Indonesia after 1945, meant that the Dutch government was faced with a problem of managing a large reserve army of labour after the end of the war. The process of land reclamation helped to solve part of the Dutch state's problem as it applied to farmers, but organized emigration was also defined as a viable solution to the problem.\(^6\) The Canadian state perceived this situation as an opportunity to recruit a group of 'suitably qualified' immigrant farmworkers who might eventually establish themselves on the land as petite agricultural commodity producers.

Those recruited by the Dutch government for emigration to Canada were defined by the Canadian state as permanent settlers.\(^7\) Their ability to remain in the country was unconditional, and they qualified for citizenship after five years of residence. Furthermore, once they entered Canada they could circulate freely in the labour market. They could take up any position offered to them by employers of labour in the country. Each individual worker or family who migrated was nominated by a farmer in Canada, where the 'settlement conditions' were investigated by the Canadian state before the farmers application was approved.\(^7\) That is, there was an attempt to channel them into areas where 'good' farms were for sale, with the hope that they would eventually purchase them. Consideration was also given to the
expressed desires of the immigrants as to the areas in which they wanted to settle.\[7\]

Between 1947 and 1951, approximately 19,300 workers and their dependants were admitted to Canada under this arrangement.\[7\] Most of the Dutch immigrants who were initially channelled into farm wage labour employment in Canada had owned their own farms in Holland but sold them when they left for Canada. Because of restrictions on currency exchange and shortages of Canadian currency in the Netherlands, the immigrants were forced to migrate to Canada initially without the funds derived from the sale of their farms. Initially, then, they had to sell their labour power for wages in the country. The money from the sale of farms was forwarded to Canada several years after their arrival.\[7\]

After their arrival in the country, and like some of the Polish Veterans and Displaced Persons, some of the Dutch emigrants left farm labour employment and found more remunerable positions in other sectors of the Canadian economy. As such, they were the objects of criticism by farmers, who in turn called on the state to intervene by formally restricting their ability to circulate in the labour market for at least one year after their arrival in Canada.\[7\] The state did not intervene, and the reasons for this policy will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.

Even though only a small proportion of the total number of immigrants who entered Canada during the post-war years settled on farms of their own\[7\], of those who did settle on farms, a large proportion were initially from the Netherlands (see table 6-3).\[7\] Between 1950 and 1959, of the 6,093 immigrants who settled on farms of their own in the country, 3,855, or 63.3% were from the Netherlands. Of the 3,464 immigrants who settled on farms in Ontario during the same period, 73.3% were from the Netherlands.\[7\] Given that immigrants from the Netherlands constituted only 8.4% of the total number of immigrants to Canada, and 8.1% of the immigrants to Ontario during that same time, it is evident that they were substantially over-
represented in the numbers who settled on farms as petite agricultural commodity producers in Canada.

Table 6-3
Number of Immigrants Reported Established on Farms in Canada and Ontario by Nationality, 1950-1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Ontario</th>
<th>Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>2,504</td>
<td>3,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavain</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,464</td>
<td>6,093</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Assisted Passages

A second source of free immigrant labour for Ontario farmers were those recruited by the Canadian state under the Assisted Passages Loan Program. The scheme began on February 1, 1951\(^7\), and was designed to assist in the recruitment of immigrant labour from Europe. Initially, loans which covered the costs of transportation from Europe to Canada were provided only to those immigrants who were destined to enter the labour force; the dependants of immigrants were required to pay their own way, and indeed were encouraged by the Canadian state to
remain in Europe until the breadwinner found steady work, repaid the loan, and found accommodation suitable for families. In 1955, when the state faced increasing difficulty in recruiting heads of households who were willing to be separated from their families for, at times, several years, it was forced to provide transportation loans to the worker's dependants as well. The loans were not, however, given to all prospective permanent settlers. Rather, until the mid-1960's, they were offered only to 'European immigrants' who were deemed 'suitable, desirable and acceptable and who would otherwise be unable to finance the journey to Canada.' The reasons for this will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

The group which appears to have been the first target of the state's recruitment under the assisted passages scheme were ethnic Germans who lived in the Eastern Zone but who escaped to the west through Berlin. Until then, Germans had been defined as 'enemy aliens', and were barred from entry to the country. Later, a range of other western and southern European immigrants were granted assisted passage loans, including a large number from Portugal. Between February 1, 1957 and November 30, 1955, a total of 32,600 persons took advantage of the loan scheme.

Assisted Passage immigrants were initially recruited to fill the same types of positions which Displaced Person's filled previously; wage labour positions as woods workers, domestic servants, construction workers, miners, factory labourers, and farm labourers in the south western Ontario fruit and vegetable industry. While precise figures are difficult to obtain, from the annual reports of the Dominion Provincial Farm Labour Committee, it appears that between 1951 and 1955 at least 4,700, or about 14.4% of the total of Assisted Passage immigrants were channelled to Ontario farms.

Those who were granted an assisted passage loan were required to repay them within two years of arriving in Canada. They did so by instalments; employers deducted a fixed amount from the worker's monthly pay packet, which was in turn remitted to the Canadian
government. Those who were granted such loans were expected to remain in the employment to which they were initially allocated to until the loan was repaid, or in any case, for at least a period of one year.

In theory, then, during their initial year in Canada, assisted passage immigrants were unable to circulate in the labour market. They could not quit their jobs, nor could they be fired or made redundant without the formal sanction of the state. In this light it is possible to see the loan system as a subtle form of debt bondage whereby the state attempted to insure that those permanent settlers admitted to the country would remain for at least one year in the employment for which they were recruited. In addition to a mechanism to help the state recruit permanent settlers from Europe, the scheme could also be seen as a form of state control over the circulation of labour in the market.

In practice, however, Assisted Passage Loans did not have the effect of immobilizing workers in certain positions in production relations for a full year. Even though one of the formal conditions of receiving a loan was that the person agreed to remain in the employment for which they were recruited for a period of one year, a large proportion appear to have left farm labour positions before they repaid their loans and before the end of one year in the country. These workers seem to have been more likely to leave farm employment before the expiry of their contract than Polish Veterans and Displaced Persons. For instance, in 1953 some 2,050 single male German farm workers who arrived under the Assisted Passages plan were allocated to farm labour positions in Ontario by the Ontario Federal Provincial Farm Labour Commitee. By the end of the year, 639 or 31.2% had left the farm labour positions for which they were recruited. In Alberta, this figure was even higher as it stood at 60%, and it was recorded to be almost as high in New Brunswick and Saskatchewan.

Like the other groups who refused to remain in farm labour employment the problem tended to be defined in individualistic, rather than structural terms. The permanent settlers admitted under the
assisted passages scheme were the objects of a process of character assassination perpetrated by farmers and some state officials. The representative of the Alberta Department of Agriculture at the Eleventh Annual Federal Provincial Farm Labour Conference, somewhat facetiously, summed up how farmers in Alberta felt about the 'single German workers'. He stated that

This would appear to be a misnomer since many of the men are not single, and some of them are not workers. However, they probably are Germans ....

As with Polish Veterans and Displaced Persons who did not live up to the terms of their contracts, farmers and other employers exerted pressure on the state for the deportation of Assisted Passage immigrants who refused to live up to the terms of their agreements. But, unlike the Polish veterans and Displaced Persons, the state did not force them, nor Dutch farmers, to remain in those positions. The final part of this chapter examines why this was the case.

What is notable about the state's response to the circulation of Polish Veterans, Displaced Persons and Assisted Passage in the labour market was that it did not define the movement of immigrants away from farm labour employment as a structurally induced process. Rather the state defined the process as a sign of the 'poor quality' of the workers recruited. Reflecting on the former two groups at the 1951 Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Conference, the Ontario representative stated that

The movement of Polish Veterans and Displaced Persons into Canadian agriculture has done little to add to the working force in agriculture. The reasons for this are many, but perhaps there is one fundamental cause. If we are to place in agricultural employment a group of men who will remain there, we need men who are mentally inclined towards agricultural work. This becomes the responsibility of those who are making the initial selection.

Some even defined the 'problem' in terms of 'race'. One member of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, as noted in one of the quotes which began this thesis, suggested that
... a sounder means of control lies in facilitating the movement of races that experience has shown are likely to remain in agriculture ... and tightening up on the screening of those races that tend to drift into occupations adequately provided for now.\textsuperscript{33}

It appears that the Ontario representatives plea for tighter selection had some effect on the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. In an Operational Memorandum sent from Ottawa to all Immigration Offices abroad (except Hong Kong and New Delhi, which as the next chapter will show did not recruit in those regions), the Department of Citizenship and Immigration provided the following guidelines for the selection of immigrants (including Assisted Passage immigrants) for farm work:

[They] possess farm experience, are temperamentally suited for farm life and who, as far as the selection Officer can judge, are sincere in their intention to remain in farm employment for at least a year. Selection of those who, though they may have had farm experience at some time or another, are qualified in a trade or occupation in demand in Canada must be avoided as a far too large proportion of those in this category are continuing to seek other employment within a short period after their placement on farms, inviting justifiable criticism from individual employers, agricultural organizations, provincial authorities and the public at large.\textsuperscript{34}

This directive offered recruitment officers the following general physical criteria that should be sought out in potential farm labour immigrants:

in addition to general physique, the applicants appearance, and particularly his hands if roughened and hardened, should indicate at least whether or not he has been accustomed to heavy outdoor work ....\textsuperscript{35}

The more specific physical requirements specified the following criteria:

Age - minimum 18 years - maximum 45 years.

Preference given to applicants 25-40 years of age.

Proportionately well developed in height and weight.
No amputations or deformities and normal functional use of all limbs.

Men who have had previous injuries, operations or illness, must be restored to perfect physical condition enabling them to carry on heavy manual work.

Men suffering from or who are incapacitated, even slightly, through arthritis, rheumatism or similar muscular ailments should not be considered for farm work.

Those with varicous veins, flat feet or hernia are not acceptable.

Good vision and hearing; chest, lungs and heart must be in good condition.\(^{26}\)

Despite the precise specification given of the types of people who were likely to remain in farm labour employment, the tightening of selection criteria appears to have had little effect on the subsequent labour market behaviour of those recruited for farm work as farmers continued to complain about the 'poor quality' of the workers recruited.\(^{37}\)

The strict selection criteria introduced by the state for the recruitment of immigrant farmworkers did, however, have the effect of narrowing the range of potential recruits, and of reducing the flow of free immigrants initially destined to farm labour positions in the country. This too caused farmers some concern, and was taken as an indication that the state was unsympathetic to their plight. In at least one instance when labour shortages in the upcoming harvest were deemed to be especially serious, the state responded to further pressure from farmers by waiving its normal security screening procedures intended to ensure that ex-Nazi's, 'Communists', Jews and other 'subversives' would not enter the country. In 1956, the Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, in a confidential letter to the Commissioner of the R.C.M.P., stated that

there is likely to be quite a serious shortage of farm workers in Canada this year and the Minister has asked the Immigration Branch to do whatever may be possible to expedite the movement of applicants abroad who would come to Canada to be employed as farm labour, and to increase our
selection abroad of farm workers. Germans from the East Zone are one of the main sources from which we can expect to receive farmworkers this year. Although the delays in obtaining clearance for security on persons coming from West Germany have been shortened considerably, there is still delay of a few weeks, and the Minister thought that it would be advisable to waive security in those cases .... In order to prevent the application of admission of persons who might be subversive, this procedure of waiving security of farm workers coming from the East Zone of Germany would last for only six weeks, and should not be made known. 30

Thus, by the late 1950's, the state was faced with the dual problem of recruiting enough farm workers in western Europe to satisfy the labour demands of farmers and an inability to attract enough workers for such work. The latter problem was due, in part, to increased competition for unskilled immigrant labour with employers in western Europe and Australia. As the process of capital accumulation was being increasingly fuelled by the migration of workers from the regions of the European periphery where the Canadian state concentrated its recruitment efforts, it faced a dwindling pool of labour upon which it could draw.

The onset of economic recession in 1958 with a corresponding increase in the supply of labour available to farmers from within the boundaries of the nation state, and both an inability and unwillingness to control the circulation of free immigrant farm labour out of the farm labour market, meant that the state eventually refused to recruit free immigrants as farm workers. Since that time, immigrants destined to agricultural occupations have never constituted more than 2% of the total flow of immigrant workers to Canada in any one year (see table 6-1).

It would be untrue, however, to suggest that all of those who entered Canada as free immigrants and who the state hoped would fill farm labour positions left the farm labour market shortly after their arrival in Canada. As noted in the case of the Dutch, some remained in agriculture and eventually became petite agricultural commodity producers themselves. It is important, therefore, to discuss the
reasons why some did not move out of the farm labour market, as it lends credence to the view that labour circulation, and the recruitment and retention problems were not simply the result of the state's faulty recruitment of 'suitably qualified' workers or of some peculiarly 'ethnic' characteristics, which in the case of Polish war veterans, was defined in terms of 'restlessness'. A brief examination of the employment practices of the Canada and Dominion Sugar Company is useful in this respect because it shows that recruitment and retention problems were structural problems which required structural solutions.

The Canada and Dominion Sugar Company was the largest sugar beet processor in the province between 1945 and 1960. By the early 1960's it achieved a monopoly position as the only beet processor in the province. The Company was formed in 1930 when the Michigan-based Dominion Sugar Company merged with the Montreal-based Canada Sugar Refining Company. The Company appears to have closed down its Ontario processing operations in 1967 because of the elimination of state subsidies for sugar beet producers in the province.

The company stood at the peak of the process of sugar beet production in southwestern Ontario. Formally independent growers entered into acreage contracts on a yearly basis to supply it with sugar beets at fixed prices at the start of each year. The sugar beets grown in Ontario were processed by the Company into sugar or into two sugar by-products, beet pulp and molasses. Most of the output of the Company was destined for consumption within Canada. Growers received an initial payment for each ton of beets delivered in the fall which was based on their sugar content. Additional returns received by the growers were based on the net returns obtained by the processor on the sugar content of the crop and included one-half of the proceeds obtained by the processor for the by-products.

The growers in turn required, depending on the size of their operations, a certain amount of hired labour to assist in the cultivation and harvest of the beet. Until the introduction of single
germ seeds (which eliminated the need to thin the crop) and mechanical harvesting equipment in the early 1960's, sugar beet production required large amounts of hand labour for thinning, weeding, blocking and harvesting. Between 1957 and 1961, the decline in the demand for labour is reflected in production cost statistics. In 1957, labour costs which included the costs of the farmer's own labour and of their family's, plus the cost of hired labour, accounted for 39% of the total costs of sugar beet production. In 1961, this figure stood at 27% of total production costs.\textsuperscript{103}

Formally, growers were responsible for the recruitment and retention of the hired labour which they required. However, since its formation in the 1930's, the Company played a key role in recruiting and retaining immigrant labour for farmers who contracted with them. After the war, the company, with the assistance of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, selected and recruited single workers and family units in Europe for work on farms in Ontario.\textsuperscript{104} The Company usually selected its immigrant workers from Holland, Belgium, West Germany, France, and Istria. The company did not recruit immigrants for the actual processing aspect of sugar beet production (although some immigrants were employed in this part of the process after the harvest) which tended to be better paid work and which they had little difficulty filling with indigenous labour.

But the company was unique not only because it recruited labour for the growers who were contracted with them, but also because it underwrote and absorbed many of the reproduction costs of the labour when it was un- or underemployed during the winter. In some cases, un- or underemployment could last as long as six months of the year because of the seasonal nature of sugar beet production. The company, in addition to placing workers in cash crop production with individual growers, provided the immigrants and their families with housing, furniture and other housekeeping necessities. It also helped them find work in the off season, and if necessary, provided them with loans to see them through the winter.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{105}
The paternalistic measures adopted by the company helped produce a reliable and dependable workforce that seemed to remain in the farm labour market for several consecutive seasons. The company's interests in this were obvious. First, in assuring that farmers had a supply of reliable wage labour for the production of the crop it could be sure that the farmers' contracts would be fulfilled and that the processing of beets would occur when it was scheduled to occur. It could better plan the processing part of the production process. Second, a more long range benefit to the company was that in some cases, immigrants eventually established themselves on farms of their own. In this event, it was anticipated that these immigrants would be more amenable to enter into beet contracts with the Company rather than grow an alternative cash crop.

One farmer who made use of immigrant labour supplied by the Company described the dynamics of this process in the following terms:

... I had a Danish fellow working for me. He worked hard and saved his money. In a short time he bought land, bought a t.v. set, a fridge, a car, furniture, clothing and groceries. He's an asset to the community .... New Canadians will work .... My only complaint is they make too much money and buy their own farms. But I'll never find fault with them for buying farms of their own. The Danes are outstanding farmers, the Dutch too. And they make good Canadians. Too bad we can't get more of them.106

The practices adopted by the company also endeared it to the state. One of the more beneficial aspects of such practices in the state's view was that those immigrants who were recruited by the company rarely became a charge on public resources, either in terms of the provision of public welfare or in terms of the its provision of state-run job search services. But they also meant that whenever the Company required the use of new supplies of immigrant labour for its farmers, the state was usually (but not always, as will be shown in chapter seven) willing to sanction and cooperate with its recruitment in Europe.107
Unfree Migrant Labour

This section examines the Canadian state's recruitment of those foreign-born workers defined as unfree migrant worker: those who were granted the right of only temporary entry to the country and who faced political/legal restrictions over their circulation in the Canadian labour market. There were two main groups of workers who constituted such flows: American tobacco workers from the southern United States, and Western European university students who worked in the tobacco industry under the guise of international/cross-cultural student exchange programs. Mention is also made of workers from Detroit, Michigan and Mexico, who migrated to the fruit, vegetable and tobacco industry in the mid-1960's.

American Tobacco Workers

Since 1936, the Canadian state has responded to pressures placed upon it by southern Ontario tobacco growers by allowing the entry to the country of workers from the southern United States to work in the Ontario tobacco harvest.\textsuperscript{106} Table 6-4 gives an indication of the magnitude of the yearly movement between 1941 and 1981. It shows that the number of workers admitted varied considerably from year to year, in part because of variations in the yearly supply of labour from within Canada. The mid-1950's, which were periods of economic expansion and low rates of unemployment, were the peak years of the movement. However, a large number of workers were allowed entry to the country during the period 1958-1961, which were years of economic recession and high unemployment. By the early 1970's, the flow from the U.S. became negligible, in part because they were replaced by workers from the Caribbean (as chapter eight shows in more detail).

Most of the workers who came north for the harvest during the 1940's, 1950's and early 1960's were from North and South Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Florida. The majority were skilled male tobacco curers who were involved with the curing of the tobacco
in farmer's kilns. Smaller proportions were made up of unskilled primers and tiers who were primarily members of the curer's family. 1

Table 6-4
American Tobacco Workers Admitted to Canada, 1941-1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1,610</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>2,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>2,636</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>2,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>1,496</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1,512</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1,540</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>n. a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>n. a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>1970</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1,652</td>
<td>1971</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,660</td>
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<td>1954</td>
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<td>1975</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,775</td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1977</td>
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<td>1978</td>
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<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3,402</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>3,173</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


During the initial years of the migration, the state sent several of its representatives (usually members of the Department of Labour) along with representatives of the tobacco growers to recruit and
select the workers. During the recruiting drives, the terms and conditions of employment were outlined to prospective workers, arrangements were made, and the dates that the workers arrived and departed on were agreed. Those recruited were also granted visas for temporary entry to the country. As the migration became regularized, the formal recruitment of workers was undertaken by authorities of the American Department of Labour. In most cases, however, the process of recruitment was less structured. Many of the curers who worked in Canada worked for the same farmers year after year. When the crop was ready for harvest, farmers simply notified their regular curer either by telephone or mail on what date their labour power was required. The latter would then proceed to their local state employment office where they were then issued with a Canadian visa (which were sent by the Canadian Department of Citizenship and Immigration to the local employment office) for temporary entry to the country. In those cases where farmers did not have knowledge of a specific named worker, they would contact the Canadian Department of Citizenship and Immigration which would then contact local state employment agencies who would recruit and then issue a suitably qualified worker a visa.

While most of the workers went through these regular channels of employment, other workers from the United States migrated to Canada on a seasonal basis without the requisite visas and found employment in the tobacco harvest. Those who did so were defined by law as 'illegal immigrants' and formally subject to deportation. The state, however, was more than tolerant of these 'illegal immigrants'. If and when they were found out by local employment officers of the Department of Labour, or Citizenship and Immigration, they were not deported, nor were they threatened with deportation. Nor were farmers fined or charged with an offence for hiring 'illegal aliens'. Rather, the Canadian state representatives simply instructed the workers to return to the point at which they crossed the border into Canada, obtain the requisite work visa, have it validated by Canadian immigration officials, and then return to their employment in the Canadian harvest.
It is difficult to determine the extent to which tobacco workers who came to Canada ended up settling permanently in the country. The state's system of border control in relation to the United States was not structured to prevent the entry of American citizens to the country. It is the case, however, that whenever possible the state sought to actively discourage these workers from remaining in the country. Their discouragement of permanent settlement, and the reason why they were defined by the state as migrant workers in the first instance, stemmed in part from its desire to not antagonize American growers by draining off their sources of skilled labour. Canadian state officials realized that, to a large extent, they relied on the 'goodwill' of the tobacco growers in the southern United States on the ability to recruit labour to the country. If large numbers of these workers ended up as permanent settlers in Canada, then this would constitute a threat to the American growers future labour supply."

In sum, these workers were defined by the state as migrant workers. They were granted visas which restricted their ability to remain in the country. Furthermore, the visas which they were granted formally prohibited them from taking up other employment while in Canada: they could only work in the tobacco harvest. It is for these reasons that we should consider this group as a class of unfree migrant labour.

Western European University Students

It is difficult to put a precise date on the point at which the Canadian state began to allow the entry of students enrolled in western European universities to work in the tobacco harvest in Ontario during the summer months. This stems, in part, from the state's tendency to mask the true meaning of this migration to the Canadian public. Publically, this migration has been defined by the state as an international exchange whereby European university students gain the opportunity of learning about life in Canada."

As such, until recently, the total numbers coming to Canada to work in the tobacco harvest tended not to be included in the Department of
Citizenship and Immigration's publicity regarding its recruitment of foreign labour, nor in its published immigration statistics.

The state's internal record keeping procedures suggest however, that such migrations have occurred since at least 1966, when the state admitted, among others, 350 university students from Belgium under a 'Belgium in the World Working Holiday'. It appears that during the early 1970's, such workers (from a number of western European countries, including France, Germany, Holland, Sweden and Norway) constituted an increasingly important source of supply of labour for Ontario tobacco growers. In 1971, 746 were admitted to the country for the tobacco harvest; in 1972, 719 were admitted; in 1973, 1,162 were admitted; and in 1974, 1,315 were admitted to the country. In the latter year, these Western European university students constituted 11.8% of the total number of workers (from both within and outside of Canada) who were recruited by the Canadian state for work in the southern Ontario fruit, vegetable and tobacco harvest.

That this migration is more than simply a 'working holiday' from the Ontario farmers' point of view is indicated in the 'General Report of Agricultural Activities, 1973' for the Ontario region which suggested that 'all growers were pleased with the worker's performance and are looking forward to participating in the programme ... in the future'. Their entry to the country is job specific, and they are not allowed to circulate in the labour market. Furthermore, they do not qualify for permanent residence once in the country.

Other Migrants

During the mid-1960's, there were two other numerically smaller international migrations of migrant labour to the southwestern Ontario fruit and vegetable industry. During the 1965 harvest, when shortages of labour were at a peak, the state organized the recruitment of workers on a day by day basis from Detroit, Michigan. In September of that year, as many as three hundred and fifty workers from Detroit crossed the Canadian border each day for work in the fruit and
vegetable harvest, and in some canning plants. They returned to their homes in Detroit at the end of the day.111

A second group, for which there is little documentation, but which appears to have begun to migrate seasonally to the southwestern Ontario fruit and vegetable industry during the mid-1960's were people of Mennonite faith from Mexico.112 These migrants consisted of people who previously lived in Manitoba and their offspring, but who moved to Mexico in the late 1920's and early 1930's in protest over the state's institution of a universal public school system. In Mexico, they established themselves as petite agricultural commodity producers, but like the rest of the Mexican agricultural producers, found themselves in a condition of extreme poverty. When shortages of labour were at their peak in the mid-1960's it appears that farmers of Mennonite faith in Ontario were actively involved in the recruitment of these people and their Mexican-born offspring to work on a seasonal basis in the fruit and vegetable industry. Some appear to have chartered coaches to carry them from Mexico to Canada, a distance of several thousand miles.120 The legal status of these workers is difficult to determine. It appears that they had remained Canadian citizens while in Mexico, and as such their offspring would also have been Canadian citizens, so that technically speaking these workers were not in Canada illegally.

Political/Ideological Relations and Modes of Incorporation

In any society which has to seek members from outside there will be varying judgements about the extensive reservoirs that exist in the world.121

The final section of this chapter examines why Polish War Veterans and Displaced Persons were incorporated into sites in production relations as unfree immigrant labour, and why Dutch and other Assisted Passage recruits from western Europe were incorporated into sites in production relations as free immigrant labour.
Insight into why Assisted Passage immigrants were, in effect, free wage labour once they arrived in Canada can be gained from an analysis of the debate surrounding why the state chose not to deport them, nor threaten to deport them for circulation in the labour market while they were formally under contract. Within the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, there was a division of opinion regarding the necessity, desirability, and practicality of deporting those Assisted Passage cases who failed to live up to the terms of their loans by circulating in the labour market. Several advantages of deportation were identified. First, it was argued that such a measure should result in more effective direction and control of the labour force and thus enable us to meet short term labour needs more satisfactorily.122

Second, it was claimed that it would help 'foster and maintain the good will of at least a section of the Canadian public' towards immigration. The section of the 'public' the state was primarily concerned about pleasing were clearly employers.

There is no doubt that some employers have been inconvenienced and annoyed by immigrants leaving them summarily after a short employment to take jobs elsewhere, and some of these employers have justifiable complaints. They have planned on the assistance of immigrants, helped them in their initial establishment in Canada, only to have them leave when they are becoming useful. Such experiences prejudice an employer towards all immigrants and tend to build up opposition to immigration as such.123

Third, it was felt that organized labour would favor such a practice insofar as it would prevent non-union workers from competing at lower than union rates for positions in industries which were organized. And finally, it was argued that the measure might have some effect on discouraging the movement of persons to the country who misrepresent their qualifications for certain lines of employment. 'This problem is most acute in the countries which have [a] surplus population such as Italy'.124
The arguments against the proposal centered around the idea that Canada was a 'free country', and some state official's view that if immigrants were to constitute future citizens who contributed to the reproduction of the nation state (defined in terms of the existence of free institutions), then they must themselves be free immigrants. Thus,

\[
\text{It may well be argued that implementation of such a law is an infringement of the freedom of the individual and abnegation of human rights which cannot be justified in a democratic country. It involves applying control and regimentation to immigrants which would be unacceptable to Canadians, at the same time as we profess an earnest desire to make these immigrants into good Canadian citizens ... The denial of opportunity of a man (sic) to better himself is difficult to defend for it may be argued that the sum of self improvement is a national benefit.}^{125}
\]

It was this line of reasoning which constituted the state's publically articulated position on the matter. According to Corbett

Mr. Harris and Mr. Pickersgill, as Ministers in charge of the Department (of Citizenship and Immigration), have explained on several occasions that in their view it would be inconsistent with the principles of a free Canadian society to force anyone to work for a particular employer against his will, and this position met with general support from all political parties.\(^{126}\)

But, and furthermore, it was privately argued that employers might take advantage of, and 'exploit' the provisions, for their own selfish purposes.

There is a real possibility of abuse by employers whose interest is entirely selfish, and as we have cases in which the immigrant did not play fair with the employer we also know of instances in which the employer was at fault.\(^{127}\)

Unions might also be opposed to such practices. It was felt that they would view its 'application with alarm' and define it 'as a forecast of a control in the labour field generally, which they would resist'. This concern was not entirely unjustified given some unions' negative reaction to the contracts which Polish Veterans and Displaced Persons had to sign.\(^{128}\)
It was also argued that they might have even more difficulty than ever in recruiting European immigrants if they were to come to the country under conditions which approximated indentured servitude. That is, there were important practical reasons why the terms of the loan could not be formally enforced.

The effect on recruitment and selection of desirable immigrants overseas is an important consideration. Such a law could not help but colour the attitude of other governments and peoples toward emigration to Canada. It may be safe to assume that the countries least affected would be those in which there are population pressures and whose people would accept more readily most any conditions we might apply, e.g. Italy and Greece. Others who are not so keen to have their nationals emigrate might well limit our activities within their boundaries or refuse to allow us to operate at all. These . . . are in the majority and this would apply in varying degrees to the Scandinavian countries, Holland, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland.129

And finally, pointing to the fact that some potential immigrant groups were more deserving of freedom than others, it was suggested that

This restriction could scarcely be applied to nationals of the United Kingdom, France and the United States.130

Upon weighing the advantages and disadvantages of deportating western European immigrants who came under the Assisted Passage program but who failed to live up to their undertaking to remain in the employment for which they were recruited for a period of one year, the state decided against deportation for the reasons outlined above.

Similar ideological, political and practical considerations structured the Canadian state's view on Dutch farmers and farm workers. The Canadian state attempted to maintain close control over the ideological conditions surrounding Dutch migration to Canada. From the start of their migration to Canada, the Canadian state regarded them in a special light. They were qualitatively distinct from groups coming under the Assisted Passage Scheme, the Polish Veterans and Displaced Persons. Whereas it was admitted by the state that the latter consisted of 'bulk labour movements', the former were

<214>
defined as future independent petite agricultural commodity producers and settlers on the land. State representatives were eager to maintain a distinction between the former and the latter, and they thought of the distinctiveness of the Dutch in the following terms:

These are not farm labourers in the generally accepted meaning of the term. They are experienced farmers mostly with funds frozen in Holland, many of them the sons of well to do farmers in that country coming to Canada to first obtain Canadian farm experience in districts where there is opportunity to later purchase farms in the class of farming to which they are accustomed. If these Dutch immigrants were [regarded] as ordinary farm labour primarily to meet the seasonal demand [for farm labour] this desirable movement would be lost to us.¹³¹

This assessment of the movement of Dutch farm workers appears to have had its basis, in part, in the Dutch state's concern over how its nationals were defined in Canada, and the Canadian state's fear of losing the cooperation of the Dutch government in the organization of their recruitment to Canada. According to the Agricultural Attache of the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Ottawa,

As you know, the Dutch Government is not in favour of looking upon the immigration as a bulk movement for labour purposes. We want it to be clearly understood that all immigrants are farmers, who are aiming to establish themselves eventually as independent farmers. So in our opinion it would not only be necessary to take care of the placement but the organization should also be able to handle and promote the definite settlement of immigrants. In fact, right from the outset the placement should be organized with a view to possibilities of future settling. From our point of view it is far more important to concentrate all efforts in order to bring about the settling as farmers than the initial employment.¹³²

Aside from the pressure from the Dutch government to ensure that the emigrants were not defined as farm labourers, it appears that the Canadian state defined them as 'racially' unsuitable for incorporation as unfree labour in the country. According to representatives of the Department of Labour, '... we cannot consider them as a mobile working force for agriculture and direct them to activities selected by us at will'.¹³³ The reasons why they could not be 'directed' to activities

(215)
selected by the Department of Labour were set out clearly by the
Director of the Immigration Branch of the Department of Citizenship
and Immigration.

... the well known responsibility of these people, their
urge to a free initiative, their close-knit family ties and
their spiritual and moral characteristics would doom any
movement to failure if regarded as merely a mass movement to
meet labour deficiencies.¹³

This assessment of the Dutch 'people' by the Director of the
Immigration Branch was echoed by what Porter argues was a common
belief in the 1950's that

... members of these three language groups (English, German
and Dutch) ... are physically interchangeable .... They have
the same standards of personal and household cleanliness.
At the higher social levels they dress in identical ways and
appreciate the same leisure time pursuits. They profess
Christian forms of religion and greatly value military
prowess. Understandably, such ... groups are welcomed in
Canada, and they prosper soon after settlement here.¹³

What is notable about the state's evaluation of Dutch immigrants
(as well as English and German immigrants) in this context was that
they were defined as a fixed biological grouping which seemed, in a
deterministic manner, to possess a range of relatively fixed social
and cultural traits. As such, the Dutch were the objects of a process
of racialization, but this process involved a series of positive
evaluations of their 'racial' characteristics, and was not, then,
strictly speaking, racist. These evaluations meant that the Canadian
state defined them as a naturally 'free' group of people who were
unsuitable for a mode of incorporation which would limit their ability
to circulate in the labour market.

The state's claim that these people's 'free initiative' could not
justifiably be curtailed even for an initial limited period of time
after arrival in Canada contrasts starkly with its position on Polish
Veterans and Displaced Persons. In the latter two cases, an initial
period as unfree labour in Canada was defined by the Canadian state as
a prerequisite for citizenship, assimilation, and the enjoyment of
subsequent freedoms in the country. The state's apparently anomalous treatment of Polish Veterans and Displaced Persons in relation to Dutch and Assisted Passage immigrants was explained in the following terms:

The Polish veterans and refugees (Displaced Persons) were in a position where they had little alternative but to emigrate from their European countries of residence. At present, however, most immigrants are employed in their own country and come to Canada not through necessity but as a matter of choice. It is necessary to sell them on the idea of coming to Canada.

The state's willingness to allocate Polish veterans and Displaced Persons to positions as unfree wage labour was therefore based on the fact that they were political refugees who did not choose to migrate to Canada 'freely'. This contradicted the Deputy Minister of Labour's claim noted earlier that Displaced Person's entered into these contracts 'freely'. Thus state's recognition that Polish veterans faced political compulsion to migrate provided the impetus for the state to allocate them to positions as unfree immigrant labour.

Conclusion

Since the Second World War, fruit and vegetable producers have faced a structurally induced problem of recruiting and retaining suitable supplies of wage labour for the harvest. Some producers have attempted to reduce their dependence on wage labour by mechanizing the harvest process. However, in those instances where mechanization has been less extensive, farmers continue to require amounts of wage labour for the harvest. The previous chapter suggested that the state responded to the farmers' recruitment and retention problem by mobilizing internal reserves of labour. This chapter has demonstrated that within the industry, despite mechanization and the mobilization of internal reserves of labour, there has also been a historical dependence on foreign-born labour to fill harvest labour positions. But, what is particularly interesting about this dependence is that foreign-born workers have been differentially incorporated into sites
in production relations. From the Canadian state's and farmers' view, 'immigrants' were not a homogenous category. Three distinct modes by which foreign-born workers have been incorporated into sites in production relations during the post-war period have been identified.

The exigencies of the process of capital accumulation cannot alone explain why recourse was made to different modes of incorporation. The basic structural problem was the same, yet attempts to resolve the problem took different forms, or entailed different modes of incorporation. Evidence presented in this chapter has suggested that political and ideological relations structured the ways in which different foreign-born groups were incorporated into sites in production relations. These relations, in a racialized manner, defined some groups of workers, primarily those from Holland, Germany and Britain, as inherently 'free', and as unsuitable occupants of positions in production relations as unfree labour. They also recognized that political compulsion to migrate provided a unique opportunity to situate Displaced Persons and Polish veterans in production relations as unfree immigrant labour for an initial period of time after their entry to the country.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE RACIALIZATION OF PERMANENT SETTLEMENT

The policy of the government is to foster the growth of the population of Canada by encouraging immigration. The government will seek by legislation, regulation and vigorous administration, to ensure the careful selection and permanent settlement of such numbers of immigrants as can advantageously be absorbed in our national economy.... With regard to the selection of immigrants much has been said about discrimination. I wish to make it quite clear that Canada is perfectly within her rights in selecting persons whom we regard as desirable future citizens. It is not a 'fundamental human right' of any alien to enter Canada. It is a privilege. It is a matter of domestic policy.... There will, I am sure, be general agreement with the view that the people of Canada do not wish, as a result of mass immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population.'

Introduction

As noted in the models of state intervention in the process of migration presented in chapter two, the state's regulation of the manner in which the borders of the nation state are breached is both a matter of inclusion and of exclusion. Whereas the previous chapter was concerned primarily with who was included as either free or unfree migrant or immigrant labour in the country, this chapter is concerned with who was excluded from the possibility of becoming an immigrant to Canada between 1947 and 1966. This chapter demonstrates that there were certain groups of people who were never defined as suitable candidates for positions as either free or unfree immigrant labour in the Canadian economy in general, and the southern Ontario fruit and vegetable industry in particular.
From chapter four, it should be evident that international migration to the country of permanent settlers during the late 19th and early 20th centuries was not solely a spontaneous reaction to labour demand. The state imposed a racialized hierarchy of desirability over the entry of different groups of people to the country. This chapter analyzes the Department of Citizenship and Immigration's background preparation for the Canada-West Indies Conference held in Ottawa in the summer of 1966, its decision to not open an immigration office in the Caribbean during the mid-1960's, and the concerns articulated over the migration of 'black' female domestic servants to the country. In so doing, it suggests that the Canadian state's racialization of permanent settler migration continued well into the post-war period, indeed until the mid-1960's, if not later. Specifically, it calls into question the view that there was a de facto de-racialization of immigration control in the country after 1962.

The Racialization of Post-1945 Immigrant Supply

Mackenzie King's now well know statement made in the House of Commons in 1947, which was cited at the beginning of this chapter, constituted the guiding philosophy behind the Canadian state's program of immigration control between 1947 and 1962. Its interest lies in the fact that it attached importance to migration, not only as a means by which specific shortages of labour were to be resolved (and hence how it further fuelled the process of capital accumulation), but also as a source of future permanent citizens who would contribute to the reproduction of the 'imagined community' which constituted the nation. This imagined community, as we have seen in chapter four, was defined in terms of the presence of bourgeois democratic freedoms, capitalist production relations and 'race'.

Even though King did not make use of the category of 'race' in his speech, most people in the country at the time appear to have known (or at least interpreted his speech in such a way) that 'non-white races' were not to be permitted to enter Canada as permanent
settlers. For instance, the Trades and Labour Congress (one of the two largest union congresses in the country during the early post-war years) submission at the hearings of the Standing Committee of the Senate on Immigration and Labour in 1947 stated that

We recognize the need for selection and the exclusion of all races that cannot be properly assimilated into the national life of Canada. It must be recognized that there are citizens of other countries who may be good brothers and sisters internationally, but yet would not be good brothers and sisters-in-law to Canadians. 3

Furthermore, in a rather cryptic reference to the political and ideological reaction to Chinese migration at the turn of the century which was noted in chapter four, its representative went on to suggest that

Experience has clearly demonstrated that ... certain nationals who have in the past been admitted to Canada remain a distinct race and will remain a problem for future generations. 4

With more subtlety but the same meaning, the Canadian Congress of Labour at the same hearing suggested that while 'racial discrimination should have no place in our immigration policy', 'people from some countries would fit more easily into Canadian life than others'. 5

In addition to advocating a continuation of racialized immigration control, these statements are notable because none of the representatives of the Immigration Branch, members of parliament, and of the Senate who were part of the hearings challenged or contradicted either organization's statements regarding 'race', 'assimilation', and 'social problems'. 6 This suggests that there was in tacit agreement, or consensus between trade unionists and state representatives regarding the continuation of restrictions over 'non-white' migration to the country.

A similar degree of consensus was also apparent within the ranks of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, the most important of the two state agencies which excercised control over migration to
the country. The other agency, the Department of Labour, will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Between 1945 and 1962 the criteria for selection of permanent settlers were framed, for purposes of public consumption, in terms of 'assimilibility', 'culture' and geography, but privately, and for administrative purposes, in terms of the categories of 'colour', 'coloured person' and phenotypical signifiers. Reference to phenotypical criteria points to a delineation of group boundaries, and attribution of social significance to patterns of physical variation and therefore points to a racialization of immigration control on the part of state officials.

People defined as 'coloured' were never completely barred from entering, settling, and selling their labour power for a wage in the country. According to state policy in the 1950's, the admittance of 'coloured or partly coloured persons' was restricted to: 1) certain classes of close relatives of Canadian citizens; 2) 'cases of exceptional merit ... [of] immigrant[s] who will contribute appreciably to the social, economic or cultural life of Canada'; and 3) female domestic servants.

In terms of the latter, the state allowed for the entry, beginning in 1955, of females from the Caribbean on a quota basis to fill job vacancies as domestic servants. Many of the women admitted were secretaries, clerks, teachers and nurses in the Caribbean who took advantage of this opportunity to migrate to the country. To be eligible, applicants had to be single, be between the ages of 18 and 35, in good health, and in possession of at least a grade eight education. The women were formally tied to domestic labour positions for a period of one year after their entry to the country, and were formally subject to deportation if they quit their jobs without the sanction of the state (although it does not appear that any were in fact deported for so doing). After completion of the one year contract, they were granted landed immigrant status and could then circulate freely within the Canadian labour market. After five years of continuous residence in the country, they qualified for Canadian
citizenship and could therefore sponsor certain classes of close relatives to come and settle in the country.  

During the first year of this migration, the Canadian state imposed a quota of one hundred females. In subsequent years the quotas increased to two-hundred and eighty per year. After 1962, a certain number of women from the Caribbean also migrated to the country to fill positions as domestic servants but they came through the regular immigration channel. The quota system remained in place until the early 1970's.

Table 7-1 gives an indication of the size of the migration from the West Indies to Canada between 1946 and 1965, although it probably overstates the amount of 'black' immigration because the figures included those who were defined by the state as 'white'. Even so, during this time people from the West Indies never constituted more than one per cent of the total flow of foreign-born people to the country.

Those people who were defined as 'coloured', but who fell outside of the three categories outlined above, were generally not allowed to enter and settle in the country. This was made clear by the Director of the Immigration Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in 1955, who stated that

It has long been the policy of this Department to restrict the admission to Canada of coloured or partly coloured persons.  

In 1958, the Director of the Immigration Branch was even more explicit about the state's racialization of permanent settler selection criteria when, in a summary of the state's position, he suggested that

it has been our long standing practice to deal favourably with British subjects of white race from the British West Indies provided there are reasonable grounds for assuming the proposed immigrant will become satisfactorily established and has either sufficient funds for maintenance or evidence of satisfactory settlement arrangements. On the other hand, apart from a limited domestic movement, no
encouragement is given to persons of \textit{coloured race} unless they have close relatives in Canada or their cases have exceptional merit, such as graduate nurses, qualified stenographers, etc.\textsuperscript{13}

Table 7-1
Caribbean Migration to Canada, 1947-1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Direct From Caribbean</th>
<th>Indirect From Britain</th>
<th>Total Direct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Annual Average</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1955</td>
<td>5,939</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1961</td>
<td>6,902</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>2,227</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2,199</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3,655</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22,402</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>2,876</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{SOURCE:} 'Immigration to Canada from the Commonwealth Caribbean', Department of Manpower and Immigration, June 1, 1966; PAC, R.G. 26, Volume 145, File 3-33-6, Canada-West Indies Conference.

The Director went on to explain the state's rationale for the racialization of immigration control in the following terms:

It is not by accident that coloured British Subjects other than negligible numbers from the United Kingdom are excluded from Canada .... They do not assimilate readily and pretty much vegetate to a low standard of living. Despite what has been said to the contrary, many cannot adapt themselves to our climatic conditions.\textsuperscript{14}

The definition of 'coloured' British Subjects, and 'coloured races' as unable to assimilate and unable to compete in a competitive capitalist economy points to not only a delineation of group
boundaries on the basis of phenotypical criteria, but also a negative evaluation of those phenotypical criteria (see chapter two). In a context where competition is a virtue, inability to compete is a negative evaluation of certain characteristics. There was then, a deterministic association between phenotype and social behaviour. This association constituted the presence of 'black' people in the country as a potential problem, which the state hoped to avoid by restricting their ability to enter the country. The state's representation of 'black' people is indicative, then, not just of a process of racialization but also of racism.

The definition of 'black' people from the Caribbean as unable to adapt to climatic conditions is also interesting in that 'climate' appears to be an important element in Canadian national mythology and self definition. Arguments about climate were used persistently by the state to deny access to permanent settlement to persons from the Caribbean. For instance, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, in response to a question posed to him in the House of Commons in 1952 on why the 'black' niece of a 'black' Canadian citizen who wanted to sponsor her entry to the country did not qualify for permanent settlement stated that

in light of experience it would be unrealistic to say that immigrants who have spent the greater part of their life in tropical countries become readily adapted to the Canadian mode of life which, to no small extent, is determined by climatic conditions. It is a matter of record that natives of such countries are more apt to break down in health than immigrants from countries where the climate is more akin to that of Canada. It is equally true that, generally speaking, persons from tropical countries or sub-tropical countries find it more difficult to succeed in the highly competitive Canadian economy.18

The ability to resist cold weather as a defining feature of 'Canadianness', or of the ability to become 'Canadian', continues to be articulated in the 1980's. According a Toronto Globe and Mail report, John Oostrom a Tory MP who sits on the House of Commons Immigration Committee has suggested that
[Canadians] ... are telling the Commons immigration committee ... that if there have to be immigrants, they should be trained immigrants from Europe. That's not racism Mr. Oostrom said. Rather, Canadians are merely seeking 'people who can adjust to this climate'.'

In sum, then, it was this racialized view of potential immigrants to Canada which constituted the reason why so few were allowed entry to Canada between 1947 and 1962. They were defined as unable to 'assimilate', unable to adjust to the Canadian climate, unable to compete in a capitalist economy, and as the cause of potential problems in the country, all of which were negatively associated characteristics linked to 'race'.

In 1962, the Canadian state claimed publicly that it was committing itself to a form of 'de-racialized' immigration control: a policy of immigration control which selected persons for permanent settlement on the basis of the skills, training and talent which they could bring to the Canadian labour market. Section 31 (2) of the 1962 Immigration Regulations stated that the following persons were eligible for permanent settlement:

A person who by reason of his education, training, skills or other special qualifications is likely to be able to establish himself successfully in Canada, and who has sufficient means of support to maintain himself in Canada until he has established himself .... (or) has come to Canada, under arrangements made or approved by the Director [of Immigration] for establishment in a business, trade or profession, or in agriculture.'

Absent in this list are references to 'race', 'colour' or other phenotypical signifiers. With some notable exceptions, this publicly articulated position on the de-racialization of immigration control has by and large been accepted by academic commentators on Canadian immigration policy. Indeed, this has provided the basis for Freda Hawkins', a well-known and oft-quoted commentator on Canadian immigration policy, confident and definitive claim that 'Canada officially abandoned racial discrimination in immigration in 1962', and that 'the 1962 Immigration Regulations created a universal, non-
discriminatory policy ... in which the major emphases were on the admission of skilled immigrants and the reunion of families'.

The apparent shift in the state's program of immigration control has been attributed by some to a 'distaste' for racialized immigration control on the part of a 'liberal' bureaucratic elite within the government, and to the 'impracticality' of racialized immigration control at a time when Canada was seeking to expand trade with 'third world' countries. It has also been attributed to the efforts of John Diefenbaker, the Conservative Prime Minister of Canada between 1957 and 1962. He was committed to the concept of a 'colour-blind' Commonwealth and recognized the incompatibility of racist immigration laws with his 1960 Bill of Rights which outlawed discrimination by reason of 'race', national origin, colour, religion or sex. It has also been attributed to a process of economic restructuring, whereby skilled workers were increasingly in demand by Canadian industry, and to the perception that traditional source countries could not provide the requisite numbers of skilled workers required by Canadian industry.

After 1962, it is the case that there were increases in the number of skilled, professional and technical workers recruited and changes in the relative importance of different countries as sources of immigrants. In 1970, for instance, 51.1% of those granted landed immigrant status were from Europe, while 14.3% were from Asia, and 8.4% from the Caribbean. These increases are attributed by many to the apparent de-racialization of immigration control, and the end of preferential selection of 'white' immigrants in 1962. While the increase in the number of permanent settlers to Canada from non-traditional source countries cannot be denied, there are sound empirical grounds to question the view that there was a de facto de-racialization of immigration control after 1962.

The examination of the state's post-1962, non-publicly articulated position on the admittance to the country of people defined as 'racially' different from the majority population in the
remainder of this chapter demonstrates that there was a serious discrepancy between what the state was concerned about privately and what it articulated publicly regarding immigration control. This is illustrated by reference to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration's background preparation for the Canada-West Indies Conference held in the summer of 1966, its position on the opening of an immigration office in the Caribbean during the 1960's, and its concerns over the migration of female domestics from the Caribbean. In-so-doing, certain parallels can be drawn between the private discourse of the state after 1962 and the earlier era of racialized immigration control.

The De-racialization of Immigration Control?

With independence, various Caribbean states became interested in the development of links with Canada. They hoped that with de-colonization, Canada would contribute materially to the process of 'development' of the region. In this light, various Caribbean states were also interested in the promotion of the emigration of their nationals to Canada in order to aid the process of development.

Uneven development, associated with European colonialism and imperialism, has created a reserve army of labour within the Caribbean. This has in turn, resulted in some Caribbean nations having long traditions of emigration. These migrations have taken Caribbean workers to various parts of the globe so they could sell their labour power for a wage. People from the Caribbean have acted as a reserve army of labour for capital in several parts of the world. Their eventual destinations have included Panama for the construction of the Panama Canal, Costa Rica for work on banana plantations around the turn of the century, Cuba for work on sugar plantations in the 1930's, America for agricultural work during and after the Second World War, and Britain for primarily unskilled and semi-skilled manual labour employment between 1947 and 1962.
Various Caribbean states have, at different points in their history actively encouraged the out-migration of their population in order to ease social and economic contradictions which give rise to, and result from, uneven development. Accordingly, they have attempted to persuade other states to accept nationals of their countries as either migrant workers or permanent settlers.\textsuperscript{27} Emigration has traditionally been seen as a method to reduce the relative surplus population and to stimulate economic growth through the acquisition of foreign currency by those who work abroad as well as the transfer of skills and technology.

This view of the significance of migration was summed up succinctly by the \textit{Daily Gleaner}, Jamaica's most influential newspaper in the 1960's, in the context of Jamaican workers temporary migration to the United State fruit and vegetable harvest.

There are also indirect benefits to the West Indies on which a specific cash value cannot be placed: the value of the contrast by thousands of men from the small West Indian territories with ... America and the American way of life. The workers not only see some of the bright light of the cities and vast stretches of agricultural lands under production but they also see new techniques, methods and procedures on the farm. They also observe how the American farmer, even though he may be several financial strata above his employee - American or foreign - is still willing and able to work side by side with the humblest of labourer so as to get the task done.\textsuperscript{22}

Thus, from the Caribbean states' point of view, the Canada-West Indies Conference held in Ottawa in June, 1966 constituted a forum where matters of 'mutual interest' could be discussed between representatives of the Canadian and several Caribbean governments. Issues discussed between the various government representatives included tourism, foreign aid, the development of closer transportation and communications links, finance, trade, and immigration. The promotion of emigration to Canada became a prominent item on the political agenda of discussions between the Canadian and Caribbean states, in part because the latter had
interpreted the 1962 Immigration Regulations as a sign that Canada had 'opened its doors' to 'black' immigration from the Caribbean.

The formal discussions which were held between the various governments are not of my immediate concern here because they only recorded the public statements of representatives of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Rather, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration's preparations for the meetings will be examined, as they provide us with considerable insight into the Canadian government's non-publicly articulated position on migration to Canada from the Caribbean.

The proposal for holding a conference between members of the Canadian government and various Caribbean governments was first articulated in 1964, apparently after a tour of the region by Lester Pearson, the Canadian Prime Minister. From the Canadian state's point of view, it appears that the Conference was intended to help prepare the way for an increased penetration of Canadian based capital and exports into the newly independent Caribbean states. According to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, one of the more important 'special interests' which the Canadian state was hoping to pursue at this Conference was to solidify the trade and financial ties between Canada and the West Indies, which already are significant and appear likely to continue growing.

In this light, in October, 1964, an inter-departmental meeting was held to discuss each branch of the state's view of the necessity and/or desirability of a conference. At this meeting it was agreed that a conference should take place, and an agenda which was to be submitted to Pearson's Cabinet was drawn up. During the course of the meeting, the representatives of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration were staunchly against the idea of having the issue of immigration placed on the agenda. In fact, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration initially did not want to participate in the conference at all. However, representatives of other departments
suggested that because immigration to Canada would be a topic which the Caribbean governments would inevitably want to bring up at the conference, it would be better to confront directly matters pertaining to immigration rather than remain silent or skirt around the issues.

It was expected that the Caribbean governments would want to address a range of issues relating to immigration. These issues included: differential standards of admission of individuals from the Caribbean; the promotion of immigration and the opening of immigration offices in the region; Canadian assistance in training and education so that individuals could acquire the skills and talents that would qualify them for entry to Canada under its new immigration regulations; the extension of the program for the admittance of female domestic workers to the country; the possibility of the admission of migrant agricultural workers for the southern Ontario fruit and vegetable harvest (discussed in more detail in the next chapter); and discrimination in Canada's immigration policy and recruitment procedures.\footnote{32}

The Department of Citizenship and Immigration was most concerned about the last item, and three ways they could deal with it if it arose during the conference were mapped-out. First, it was suggested that they should set Caribbean migration to Canada against the background of Canada's relationship with other Commonwealth countries, namely India and Pakistan. The point of this was to suggest that the Caribbean already occupied a 'favourable' position in Canada's immigration program because of the arrangement which brought female domestic workers to Canada. Canada had no such arrangement with India, Ceylon or Pakistan, and Canadian officials attempted to construct this as an instance of the Caribbean's 'preferred' position in Canada's immigration program.\footnote{33}

Second, it was suggested that they place Canada's immigration policy in the context of various Caribbean state's immigration policies. That is, it claimed that with independence, some Caribbean states 'in a somewhat subtle way are making a concerted effort to ease
It was suggested that Canada could use this 'fact' to point fingers, and suggest that if its immigration policies were discriminatory, it was only exercising a natural right to place restrictions over entry to the country, which Caribbean states were also exercising.

And third, in the event that these two arguments failed to convince, it was suggested that the Department be prepared to offer, as a concession, an expansion of the female domestic labour program. Officials of the other government departments suggested that they might accept as a tolerable minimum the continuation of the special program for domestics, especially if some hope could be offered of a probable gradual increase in coming years in the numbers of those admitted as household servants.

Shortly after a draft agenda was drawn up, but before it was submitted to Cabinet for approval, the Canadian High Commissioner in Georgetown, British Guiana, suggested that instead of organizing a conference, it might be better to organize a 'tour' of several islands by a delegation of Canadian officials and led by a Minister of one of the government departments. The High Commissioner suggested that a tour would be preferable to a conference because it would take less planning and would be perceived as a 'genuine expression of Canadian interest' in the Caribbean. The Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, asked the relevant department's concerned what their preference was.

The Department of Citizenship and Immigration's reply was formulated by the Deputy Minister, C.W. Isbister. On the question of whether the Department wanted a conference or a trip, it favoured the latter, but only 'if the leader of the delegation is not a minister responsible for any of the departments having the more thorny items [like immigration] on the agenda'. The Department also favoured a tour, because it felt that the prospects for a 'successful' outcome of a conference were not substantial. It would only raise the Caribbean states' expectations, and result in disappointments. He claimed that
none of the Departments which were to participate in the conference or tour had anything 'to offer' and if this did not change, the delegation would be received as 'a travelling circus, including the laughter'. The Department itself was not prepared to concede much in the way of immigration:

The area of immigration is the most expensive field of public policy in which to seek appropriate concessions and for this reason I am not recommending it. In brief, we should recommend either that the government make a decision to provide the delegation with something in hand, my own mind turns to a few million dollars in the field of aid or else a decision should be made to call off the project which cannot very well lead to credible results.³⁵

The Department of Citizenship and Immigration's position was clear. It would be less 'costly' for the Canadian government to provide a few million dollars worth of aid than it would be to recruit immigrants more actively in the Caribbean.

The proposals for a conference/tour were shelved shortly after this exchange, probably because of the election held in the fall of 1965. After Pearson was re-elected, and during a subsequent tour of the West Indies, he again agreed to a suggestion put forward by the Caribbean governments for holding a Canada-West Indies Conference sometime in 1966.³⁶

Upon his return to Canada, Pearson instructed the Department of External Affairs to cooperate with the West Indian governments in the organization of a conference. He stated that he took this conference 'very seriously', that he considered that the 'long range effect of increasing contact should be great', and that in the future Canada would have to take an 'increasing responsibility' in the area. However, like the Department of Citizenship and Immigration's previous position, he only wanted to develop certain kinds of 'contact': ones that promoted Canadian capitalist penetration in the Caribbean and not Caribbean migration to Canada. In this light, he suggested that

... the delegation [to plan the conference] should include fairly senior officials from the Departments of Finance,
Trade and Commerce and External Affairs ... [Pearson] has further agreed that, although the question of immigration may well be discussed, it would be unwise to attract special attention to this matter by including a representative from the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.40

Despite the hesitation on the part of the officials of External Affairs and the Prime Minister, it was agreed once again that it would be better to confront immigration issues directly rather than try to avoid them altogether. The Department decided to send one of its more junior officials, Jack Manion, to a series of preparatory meetings held in Kingston, Jamaica. The Assistant Deputy Minister prepared a detailed position paper which was to be used by Manion in his public presentation of Canada's immigration program. The position paper began with the by then standard public denial concerning the presence of racialized selection criteria in Canadian immigration regulations

... our policy is not racially discriminatory and we are prepared to accept immigrants of all races and from all parts of the world. However, our policy is selective in the sense that we recruit only those with enough education and training to establish themselves in Canada.41

This claim was, however, contradicted in the next breath when the position paper went on to suggest that

... although our policy is not racially biased we do concentrate our main operations in those countries (Europe and the United States) which have traditionally given us most of our immigrants. While our immigration intake has since 1962 been becoming less European and more racially varied, we have proceeded with some caution in order to avoid a too-rapid rate of change which might result in adverse reaction by the Canadian public which in turn could weaken the whole concept of a universal and non-discriminatory policy.42

This suggests then, that the Canadian state was concerned about the 'races' of people who were being admitted to the country, and that this concern played an active part in their decisions about who to recruit as permanent settlers. That 'race', or the phenotypical characteristics people possessed, continued to structure the Department of Citizenship and Immigration's recruitment of permanent

<234>
settlers to the country even after the formal elimination of racialized selection criteria in 1962 is further confirmed in a confidential summary of Canada's position on Caribbean migration to Canada prepared for the use of Lester Pearson at the Prime Ministers' Conference held in London in 1965. At the conference it was expected that Britain would try

To persuade countries like Canada and possibly Australia to ease the pressure on Britain by taking more immigrants from the problem countries of the West Indies, India and Pakistan.43

Despite a decided sympathy for Britain's 'problem', which was defined by the Canadian Department of Citizenship and Immigration as too much 'black' immigration, the Department was unwilling to help with finding a 'solution' which involved an increase in 'black' immigration to Canada. Thus, the Department suggested that

... although Canada may not discriminate racially in its immigration policies we cannot deny the right of a state to decide its own social and racial composition and refuse to accept immigrants whose presence would cause severe disruptions or drastic change.44

What is interesting about the state's position on this matter is that it appeared to contradict the Declaration of Racial Equality which Canada took at active part in drawing up at the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference held in London in 1964. The Declaration, which was intended to condemn 'racial discrimination' in South Africa, became, according to Pearson, a 'virtual charter for members of the Commonwealth'.45

It was at best ironic, and at worst hypocritical, for the Canadian state to argue that 'racial problems' in the country could only be avoided if it excercised close control over the racial groups being admitted to the country. The position taken by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and which Pearson appeared to have agreed with, suggests not only that the MacKenzie King philosophy of immigration control still structured the question of which groups were
allowed to cross the Canadian national boundary, but also that the presence of 'racially' distinct groups of people in the country would be the cause of 'social problems'. In defining the presence of 'black' people as a 'problem', there are important parallels with the state's pre-1962 structure of immigration control.

Immigration Offices in the Caribbean

The state's continued racialization of immigration control was also evident in its decision not to open an immigration office in the Caribbean during the mid 1960's. Before 1962, applications for permanent settlement which were received from the Caribbean were screened by the Immigration Branch, and a judgement made about the ability of the applicant to 'assimilate'. Signs of the ability to 'assimilate' involved assessments of whether the applicant had in their possession any special training or talent that could be made use of in the country. Above all, though, it was linked to the phenotypical characteristics of the applicant. Thus, the screening process also involved state officials' examination of photographs of applicants in order to determine their 'colour'. This decision making procedure is evident in the following minute from one of the meetings of the Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration held in 1951:

After discussion, the Committee noted that while from her photograph ... [she] has characteristics of the negroid group, available evidence indicates her negro origin stems solely from her great grandmother. The Committee approved the admission of the above named.46

The introduction of the new Immigration Regulations in 1962 led to changes in the procedure whereby applicants from the Caribbean were processed and selected for permanent settlement. Between 1962 and 1967, the state processed applications for permanent settlement from the region through the use of travelling interview teams. People in the Caribbean who applied for landed immigrant status had their applications forwarded to Ottawa for initial screening by a 'Central Selection Unit'. In theory, the Unit had three options in regard to the outcome of the application: it could accept the applicant, refuse
the applicant, or defer the decision. In practice, none of the applicants appear to have been accepted on the basis of a 'paper screening' only. The Department generally rejected outright the applications for settlement coming from those who were unskilled, and deferred decisions for those which appeared to be skilled until an interview could be conducted in the Caribbean. For the latter, a team of immigration officers proceeded to the Caribbean to interview the applicants.47

The first such immigration team went to the Caribbean in early 1962. It accepted for settlement 163 or 53% of the 311 deferred applications. The team, 'with more or less the same opinion in mind of the West Indian that we have held over the years ... thought if 40% of the candidates were accepted we would do quite well', was surprised at the 'high calibre' of persons applying.48

What is particularly interesting about the teams were the character assumptions some of the interviewing officers held about certain groups in the Caribbean. According to one of the officers who conducted interviews in the Caribbean in the spring of 1963,

One characteristic of the West Indian Negro, which is of interest and value when considering him for immigration is, that in order to get continued good results in his work output he has to be continually humoured, encouraged, and complimented on his work. If he is reprimanded, or told to perform his work in a manner different from what he is accustomed to, he becomes sulky and unco-operative and a poor worker. He finds it very difficult to re-adjust and adapt himself to new and different approaches to a job.49

The Canadian state official's description of 'Negro' males from the Caribbean as childlike, indolent, lazy and stupid was not dissimilar to eighteenth and nineteenth century racist stereotypes which were used as outright justifications of slavery and colonialism.50 According to Walvin, one early 'humanitarian' wrote

The dull stupidity of the Negro leaves him without any desire for instruction. Whether the Creator originally formed these black people a little lower than other men, or that they have lost their intellectual powers through
disuse, I will not assume the province of determining .... The stupid obstinacy of the Negroes may indeed make it always necessary to subject them to severe discipline from their masters.61

In both cases, there was an attribution of social significance to patterns of phenotypical variation, and the negative evaluation of certain patterns of phenotypical variation.

On the question of opening an office in the Caribbean the interview officer suggested

I personally believe from what I observed during my visit to these islands, that we would, by opening of such an office, be encouraging more people from these areas to apply for admission to Canada.62

He was thus clearly against the encouragement of more 'black' people from the Caribbean applying for permanent settlement in Canada.

Between the time of the first immigration team's return from the Caribbean and the end of the year (1962), the Department of Citizenship and Immigration received another 957 applications for permanent settlement from the region. In a memorandum to Cabinet which sought to gain approval for the establishment of an immigration office in the Caribbean (which was prepared by the Immigration Branch), the cost of servicing the applications under the then current arrangements was estimated to amount to about $40,000 per year. The Minister of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration argued in the Memorandum that it would be more cost effective to establish a permanent immigration office in the Caribbean than continue with present practices.63 In the memo, there was no suggestion that the reason the Department wanted to open an office in the region was for increased recruitment. It was simply seen as an administrative mechanism which would make the control of Caribbean migration to the country more cost effective.
Before the Cabinet made a decision on the matter, there was a change of government. The Conservatives had lost the 1962 election, and were replaced in power by the Liberals under Lester Pearson. Because of the change of government, the Department had to submit a new memorandum to the new Cabinet and have it approved before an office could be established.\textsuperscript{64} The Department did not submit another request to Cabinet. In April, 1964, when the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration was being pressed on the matter of opening an immigration office in the Caribbean by members of the Department of External Affairs, the Immigration Branch stated that it was a 'dead issue' and because the 'branch has had second thoughts about the necessity of an office in the West Indies'.\textsuperscript{55}

Why did the Immigration Branch have 'second thoughts' on the matter? First, it appeared to the Branch that too many of the immigrants admitted since 1962 had chosen to settle in inner city areas in Toronto and Montreal. They perceived in this situation the potential for the development of a serious 'race relations' problem; a problem which they felt existed in Britain because of Caribbean migration. One representative of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, for instance, was

... afraid areas of Montreal and Toronto would become inhabited by these people ... eventually producing a situation similar to that existing in London, England.\textsuperscript{56}

In light of this apparent over-concentration in Toronto and Montreal, two members of the Branch arranged to interview Citizenship Liaison Officers, National Employment Service Officials and University Placement Officers in Toronto and Montreal in order to determine the 'scope' of the 'problems' they experienced with recent 'black' immigrants. The main finding of this exercise was that

While the Caribbean movement has not presented any problem as yet, the officers interviewed expressed some apprehension over the increased volume. Some employers who have given jobs to male Negroes and who have had to fire them because of their attitude towards their work are subsequently very reluctant to employ any more Negroes. In the circumstances there is some concern that if the trend to increase is

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allowed to continue without more attention being paid to personal suitability it may very well prove increasingly difficult to place these people in employment.  

It is evident that the officials 'discovery' that there was not any 'problem' did not soothe their worries. It appears, however, that their reaction to racist hiring practices was to maintain strict control over the recruitment of 'black' immigrants to ensure that only those with proper 'personalities' were selected. The implication of this for the opening of an immigration office in the Caribbean was that 'all or almost all Negroes should be personally interviewed before admission'. The Branch felt, then that the extant system would be suitable.

Further insight into the nature of the Immigration Branch's 'second thoughts' is gained from the previously cited position paper prepared for the Canada-West Indies Conference. The Deputy Minister claimed that there were both 'operational' and 'policy' grounds for not opening an immigration office in the Caribbean. In terms of the operational grounds, he argued that the department feared too much publicity and interest in immigration would be generated and that the office would then be 'inundated with applications largely from unqualified people' who they would have to turn down because of their lack of qualifications. He felt this would lead to a situation where they would have to lower their selection standards, which would then in turn make the Department subject to both official and public criticism in Canada.

On policy grounds, he echoed this same theme except in the context of the reaction of Caribbean governments. Thus, we feared that an office in the Caribbean would be a focal point for West Indian resentment at the selective aspects of our policy. Moreover, once an office were opened in the West Indies it would be virtually impossible for political reasons to close it even though the number of qualified persons might drop to where the flow is negligible.

But, and most importantly, however, he also argued that
It should also be mentioned here that one of the policy factors was a concern over the long range wisdom of a substantial increase in negro immigration to Canada. The racial problems of Britain and the United States undoubtedly influenced this concern which of course still exists today. 

He then went on to suggest, and Tom Kent, the Deputy Minister of the Department agreed, that it would be 'unwise' for them to consider opening an immigration office as a 'concession' to the Caribbean states at the conference. He also suggested that their representative at the preparatory meetings in Kingston only explain the 'operational' grounds for their unwillingness to open an office in the Caribbean. This was because of what, in a different context the Department felt was the 'West Indians ... natural sensitivity towards real or imagined discrimination'.

The state's concern over the reproduction in Canada of the 'racial problems' found in Britain and the United States was also echoed in a background paper which was initially intended for public distribution at the Canada-West Indies Conference but which in the end was not distributed. It is possible that it was rejected for distribution because of the following view of the nature of 'race relations' in the country.

In recent years some Canadians who in normal circumstances would not have any prejudice in respect to race, colour or creed, have shown concern that through rapid increases in the intake of under-educated and un-skilled immigrants, especially if multi-racial, we could end up with situations (race riots) similar to those in the United Kingdom.

Similarly, the view that if an Immigration Office were established in the Caribbean by the Canadian government, it would be more for the purpose of control over immigration given a formal commitment to non-racist selection criteria rather than in the promotion of immigration from the region, was confirmed in a briefing paper prepared by the Immigration Branch for the use of Prime Minister.
Pearson on the occasion of Alexander Bustamante's visit to Canada in 1963. The Branch argued that

Opening an office in Jamaica would, to Jamaica and others in the area, create the impression that Canada was wanting to stimulate immigration, and when they realized that the function of the office was more for the purpose of control than promotion, then there is little doubt that such an office would be subject to considerable adverse publicity, and be accused openly and possibly violently of applying coloured discrimination.  

Despite these concerns, on April 28, 1967 and June 6, 1967 respectively, Canada did establish immigration visa offices in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Kingston, Jamaica. It is difficult to determine precisely the events which led to the establishment of offices in the Caribbean, in part because the files have been deemed to be 'sensitive' to Canada's diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, some hypotheses are offered here. First, the number of applications for permanent settlement from the Caribbean had increased dramatically since 1962. For example, between September 1 and December 21, 1966, the Department of Manpower and Immigration received 4,559 applications from the Caribbean. Because of a policy of refusing to accept any applicants as permanent settlers on the basis of a paper screening only (which it did for applicants from Britain, Germany, France and the United States) those processing applications had a choice of either denying outright the applicant or deferring the decision until they could be interviewed in the Caribbean. Even though they refused outright some 1,108 of the 4,559 applications for settlement during that time, this left well over three thousand applicants to be interviewed. In practical terms, this meant that three immigration officers would have to hired on a year round basis to interview applicants from the Caribbean alone. This confirms the earlier logical arguments which were rejected for racist reasons.

Second, according to the Director of the Home Branch of the Department of Manpower and Immigration there is a great deal of illegal immigration from the Caribbean area, mainly from Jamaica. Jamaicans compromise
by far the bulk of our non-immigrant problem at the present time. The opening of an office in Jamaica would tend to eliminate the motive for seeking to immigrate in the guise of tourists. This would be particularly so in the case of the better qualified Jamaicans, who give us much of our trouble.  

The veracity of the claim that Jamaica gave the Canadian state the biggest 'problem' in regard to illegal immigration is difficult to assess. According to Anderson and Higgs, it was people from Italy, Greece and Portugal who constituted the biggest 'problem' groups in this regard.  

What is interesting, though, is that the Director saw the opening of an immigration office as a method to better control the migration, and indeed, to curtail the illegal migration of individuals from the Caribbean. Thus, like earlier concerns, the state was interested in the control of immigration from the Caribbean rather than promotion per se.  

In sum, in the context of an immigration office in the Caribbean, the Immigration Branch was concerned with controlling entry given a formally deracialized immigration control policy. It was not concerned with active recruitment, nor the promotion of immigration, as it was in the case of Western Europe. It continued to define 'black' immigration to the country as a potential problem, or the cause of a 'race relations' problem. This calls into question the view that the opening of an Immigration Office in a particular country or region is necessarily a sign of the state's interest in the recruitment of nationals of that country or region.  

**Female Domestic Workers**  

A similar process of racialization was evident in the state's strategy in dealing with the flow of female domestic labourers from the Caribbean to Canada. As with immigration in general, the state was seeking to reduce the flow of 'black' permanent settlers to the country, while at the same time attempting to make it appear that they were not making decisions based on 'race' when in fact they were.
In the context of the Canada-West Indies Conference, the Assistant Deputy Minister suggested that 'in order to avoid pressure for major concessions we should be prepared to adopt a more flexible attitude' with respect to the domestic servant question. The strategy was outlined in the following terms.

At present we admit about 400 West Indian domestics each year, 150 over the quota and the movement outside the quota is developing rapidly. Our employment officials are pleased with these girls and advise us that there is an almost unlimited demand. I would like to suggest the possibility that we might agree to double the quota on the understanding that the quota will cover all domestics and not just those referred to us by the West Indians and with the additional proviso that selection be done by us and not by the West Indian authorities. Thus, although the quota would be increased by 100% our actual intake of domestics would only be increased by 25%, its future growth controlled and we would be able to develop a much more orderly programme. In Jamaica it will be enough to say that we have the quotas under study and discretely explore the acceptability of our suggested provisos.

The state's strategy here highlights a dialectic of economic rationality and ideological determination. Despite an almost 'unlimited demand' for female domestic labour in the country, it was keen to maintain control over this migration and ensure that it did not get too large. In fact, it was only willing to see one-hundred more female domestics entry the country each year. Why was it that the Department did not want to see the migration increased in order that this 'unlimited demand' be filled by women from the Caribbean?

Officially, the Department claimed that the quota system was anathema given that immigration was to be tied more closely than ever to labour market criteria, and that entry was no longer structured by 'race'. However, the reason why they admitted domestics from the Caribbean to Canada in the first place was, according to the Deputy Minister of Immigration, that

it is mainly to meet the pressure by influential persons seeking domestics for their own employ.
At one point these 'influential persons' included the conservative Minister of Citizenship and Immigration during the early 1960's and L.B. Pearson the Prime Minister of the country between 1962 and 1968. The Deputy Minister suggested that 'similar requests for other kinds of workers have not been met with so generously'.

Privately, the Department's dissatisfaction with Caribbean domestic workers appears to have been based, in part, on the fact that the migration constituted only a temporary solution to a labour problem and contributed to the creation of a long term 'race relations' problem. The Director of Immigration in 1960, suggested in this context that '... the admission of such workers meets only a short-term need and may be creating future problems'. He elaborated on the nature of this contradiction in the following terms:

... the admission of such workers from countries like the West Indies ... as is done presently does provide a short-term remedy to the problem. Once in Canada, however, these girls, as soon as they are established, are free to apply for the admission of their relatives and fiances. Girls chosen as domestic servants are either from the lower classes in their own countries, in which case the relatives they sponsor are likely to be unskilled workers, or if they are superior types they are unlikely to remain in domestic service.

Thus, the state was concerned primarily about the fact that domestic workers possessed the right to sponsor their relatives once they arrived in Canada, a concern which was also articulated by the state in the context of southern European immigrants to the country.

One single female domestic servant may take a year or two to become established but she may then begin to sponsor brothers, sisters, fiancé, parents, at a fairly rapid rate. The one unsponsored worker may meet someone's need for a domestic servant for a year or two, but the result may be ten or twenty sponsored immigrants of dubious value to Canada and who may well cause insoluble social problems ... I am greatly concerned that we may be facing a West Indian sponsorship explosion.

Earlier, the state had attempted to obstruct male fiancés of domestic servants from entering Canada. If a male fiancé was admitted, the
couple had to be married within thirty days; otherwise, the fiance was to be deported to the Caribbean. Similarly, females had to prove to Immigration officials that the man they sponsored really was their fiance by surrendering personal letters to substantiate the relationship. Neither of these practices were applied to the 'white' fiancees of 'white' immigrants."

The state's concern over domestic servant migration was also linked to a concern about the alleged 'immorality' and sexual mores of women from the Caribbean. According to the Canadian High Commissioner in Trinidad, promiscuity is widespread here and it is quite usual, especially in the lower end of the social scale, to find (a) that people who describe themselves as 'married' are not, in fact, legally married; (b) that parents have children of diverse paternity or maternity, and (c) that single, unmarried women have one or more (sometimes several) children, more often than not entrusted to the care of relatives."

This observation was also articulated by the Director of the Immigration Branch, who appears to also have been something of an amateur anthropologist.

West Indian mores are quite different from ours. Illegitimacy is pretty well accepted as a fact of life. It is not uncommon for a single girl to have children by 2, 3 or 4 different men."

This construction of 'black' female 'immorality' was also manifest in the state's institution of compulsory medical examinations for those women who arrived in Canada as domestic labourers. According to Mackenzie, women arriving under the scheme were not only subjected to extensive medical tests in their home countries—including x-rays and tests for tropical diseases—but were subjected to extensive gynecological examinations (testing for syphilis) when they arrived in Canada. The governments of Jamaica and Barbados were expressly not informed of the tests."

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As with the description of 'black' males from the Caribbean, the state's construction of 'black' female sexuality parallels eighteenth century myths constructed in the context of slavery. According to Walvin, one of the 'least extreme' planters who wrote about such matters in the 1790's wrote that

The Negroes in the West Indies, both men and women, would consider it as a great exertion of tyranny, and the most cruel of all hardships, to be compelled to confine themselves to a single connection with the other sex. Their passion ... is mere animal desire, implanted by the great author of all things for the preservation of the species. This the Negroes, without doubt, possess in common with the rest of animal creation, and they indulge it, as inclination prompts, in an almost promiscuous intercourse with the other sex.\textsuperscript{60}

Clearly, then, the state was concerned about the 'uncontrolled' growth of a resident 'black' population in Canada. Such a growth was identified as the cause of 'insoluble' social problems. This suggests that the representatives of the state, in a racist manner, defined females from the Caribbean as a fixed biological group which possessed certain traits which would be the cause of social problems in the country. This growth was sparked by the ability of females to sponsor close relatives who were of 'poor quality', and by beliefs about their supposedly libidinous 'natures'.

At the conference, the Department was granted its wish to increase the quota by 100% but to only increase the total flow of domestic workers by 25%. The representatives of the various Caribbean states did not catch on to the Department's sleight of hand. For the Immigration branch, this was a major achievement. The representative of the Department who managed to convince the Caribbean governments that they received a major concession when they in fact did not, was roundly congratulated by the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, who stated that he was 'most convincing and persuasive'.\textsuperscript{81}
Conclusion

The evidence presented in this chapter regarding the establishment of an immigration visa office in the Caribbean contradicts Hawkins' explanation of the state's delay in establishing an immigration office in the Caribbean. She argues, rather economistically, that the 'delay' was the result of the 'fluctuating economic depression' and the 'austerity in the fiscal policies of the Conservative government' of the time which in turn made it impractical to establish and enlarge immigration offices in non-traditional source countries. More generally, the evidence presented in this chapter contradicts her claim that changes in the composition of the flow of immigrants reflect not only the new immigration regulations and selection system and what appears to be a changing pattern of demand, but also a serious departmental effort which began before 1967 to improve overseas immigration operations. This included the opening of new visa offices and the strengthening of existing offices in Asia and the Caribbean.

It is evident that even after 1962 there was a continued racialization of immigration control in the country where social significance was attached to phenotypical signifiers. But, this was also a racist process in that the state's view on the opening of an immigration office and the entry of female domestic workers to the country was structured by a concern over 'race relations' in the country. The 'problem' for the state was not that a there might be a racist reaction on the part of 'white' Canadians to the presence of 'black' people, nor that employers engaged in racist hiring practices. Rather, the 'problem' was defined as the presence of 'black' people who would disrupt an otherwise peaceful and harmonious 'host society. Thus, uncontrolled 'black' immigration was defined as the cause of 'insoluble' 'race relations' problems in the country.

In light of the historical evidence, the migration of permanent settlers to Canada did not take place in an ideological climate denuded of negative evaluations of certain 'races'. The implication
of this was that even when there were labour shortages in certain industries, the state was unwilling to permit the entry of 'black' immigrant labour to fill those shortages. Thus, despite a strong demand for foreign labour by the south western Ontario fruit and vegetable industry, the state never seriously considered allowing persons from the Caribbean to fill farm labour shortages and become permanent settlers. The next chapter considers the state's reactions to proposals for the entry of Caribbean workers on a migrant basis.
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE RACIALIZATION OF
CARIBBEAN MIGRANT FARM LABOUR

Introduction

Chapters five through seven have shown that there has been a tradition of state intervention in the south western Ontario fruit and vegetable industry. This intervention has taken the form of the mobilization of internal reserves of labour and the recruitment and incorporation of various forms of foreign-born labour into sites in production relations. Chapter seven has shown that the state also intervened by exclusion, and that the process by which permanent settlers were selected for entry to the country was structured by a processes of racism and racialization. This chapter documents the pressures placed on the Canadian state to admit farm workers from the Caribbean for the fruit and vegetable harvest on a migrant basis and the state's response to these pressures. Specifically, it examines further the state's process of exclusion, inclusion and allocation.

Since 1947, pressures placed on the Canadian state to admit workers from the Caribbean on a seasonal, temporary basis came from two sources: 1) representatives of various colonial governments in the Caribbean (and the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada), and 2) south western Ontario farmer and food processor organizations and their Members of Parliament. Until early 1966 (when the 'manpower' branch of the Department of Labour merged with the Department of Citizenship and Immigration to form the Department of Manpower and Immigration), the decision to admit Caribbean workers to the country was the responsibility of two branches of the Canadian state, the Department of Labour and the Department of Mines and Resources (which later became the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in 1950), both of which had overlapping jurisdiction in regard to immigration
matters.' In light of the history of the Canadian state's history of immigration control, the Ontario farmer's demand for Caribbean migrant labour to resolve labour shortages constituted a significant conjunctural contradiction, which itself required resolution.

This chapter begins by documenting the pressure placed on the two branches of the state to admit workers from the Caribbean on a seasonal, contractual basis. Three phases to the state's public response to the pressures are identified. Between 1947 and 1963, the state publically responded to the pressures by denying that there were shortages of labour. Between late 1963 and mid-1964, its public response was to personalize farmers' labour recruitment and retention problems. After the 1964 harvest season, a split emerged between the Department of Labour and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. The latter came to identify farm labour shortages as a structural problem which could be resolved through the importation of Caribbean migrant farm labour, whereas the former continued to individualize the problem. The chapter then goes on to demonstrate that the state's privately articulated position differed from its public response to the pressure. The state's private position on the entry of workers from the Caribbean was structured by racism. It is argued that the process of racialization, accompanied by an ideology of racism, was involved in both the state's decision to exclude Caribbean workers from entry to the country and in its decision to assign them a position in production relations as unfree migrant labour.

1947-1963: The Denial of Labour Shortages

Between 1947 and 1963, the pressures which were placed on the two branches of the state to admit workers from the Caribbean on a migrant basis were intermittent and unsystematic. The state's public response to the proposals, especially to the Caribbean governments, was to deny that farmers in Ontario were experiencing problems of labour recruitment and control during the course of the fruit and vegetable harvest.
Caribbean proposals

The first post-war request to the Canadian state that it permit the entry of seasonal workers from the Caribbean for the fruit and vegetable harvest in south western Ontario came from the British Colonial Office and the United Kingdom High Commission in Ottawa. In the spring of 1947, the United States imposed restrictions on the use of Caribbean workers in the harvest of crops in the southern states. In the search for an alternative outlet for the surplus labour of the Caribbean, the Labour Commissioner for Barbados and a representative of the United Kingdom High Commission in Ottawa (apparently independently of each other), 'semi-officially' approached Canada about the possibility of the temporary entry of Barbadian and Jamaican workers respectively for the fruit and vegetable harvest in Ontario.

In 1952, the Jamaican Minister of Social Welfare, and in 1954, the colonial government of Barbados, once again put forward proposals for Canada to allow the entry of temporary labour from the Caribbean for the fruit and vegetable harvest in Ontario. The timing of these requests also seems to have been tied to events in America. The McCarran-Walter Act, restricted Jamaican migration to the United States to one hundred people per year, and their proposals again seem to have been motivated by an attempt to provide an outlet for their respective relative surplus populations.

Additionally, the Barbadian request of 1954 seems to have been related to a 'vacation' in Barbados by several southern Ontario farmers during the previous winter. The farmers had apparently been in contact with members of the colonial state to discuss with them the tight labour market situation they faced in previous years, and the possible solution of this problem via the temporary migration of labour from Barbados. Armed with this information about labour shortages in Ontario, the Barbados House of Assembly passed a resolution which sought to draw to the attention of the Governor of the colony
... the fact that there is an acute shortage of labour at the present time in the Dominion of Canada and that both industry and agriculture are urgently in need of additional labour forces .... Farmers in Southern Ontario and the Niagara Belt are experiencing the utmost difficulty in getting crops reaped by the early autumn and that the labour shortage is also being felt in the West. Organizations of agriculturalists in both these areas are claiming for assistance to relieve the situation and would welcome migrant labour at harvest time. The house would emphasize that there are definite prospects for temporary emigration of appreciable numbers of both men and women to Canada during the summer and early autumn.  

The assembly went on to urge the Governor to 'head a delegation which should depart for Canada as expeditiously as possible in order to take advantage of the position'. This resolution was forwarded by both the House of Assembly and the Governor to Canadian officials for consideration.

Both the Department of Labour and the Immigration Branch of the Department of Mines and Resources refused the requests of 1947, 1952 and 1954. Their public response to the 1947 request was to deny that there was a shortage of labour. Both branches claimed that 'at the moment ... we shall not need to draw on this source of labour during the coming season'.  

In the case of the request from Barbados, both the Departments of Labour, and Citizenship and Immigration were less than enthusiastic about the proposal. For all intents and purposes, the Canadian Minister of Labour lied in his response to the member of the Barbados House of Assembly who submitted the resolution. The Minister stated

The situation in Canada this year is that no shortage of harvest workers is foreseen. Local supplies of labour are adequate and there is no likelihood of any problems arising at harvest time that cannot be met by the employment of persons already in Canada. Over the years we have developed a pattern of moving workers from one area of Canada to another to meet harvest needs and it has rarely been necessary to bring workers into Canada to meet harvest situations.
In a similar vein, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration replied to the Barbados Governor's and House of Assembly's queries by telling them that they were 'misinformed' about labour shortages in Canada, and that

with regard to the permanent admission of farm workers, we find that our farmers are not satisfied unless farm workers have had some previous experience in the types of agriculture practiced in Canada and that obviously limits the area from which they may be selected."

As chapter six has shown, in that year alone the Canadian government admitted over 3,000 American migrant tobacco workers for the Ontario harvest and over 3,000 workers from Europe as immigrant labour. Furthermore it was reported at the Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Conference held at the end of the year that the Canada and Dominion Sugar Company's request for two hundred European immigrant workers could not be filled, and that while Ontario farmers had requested the state to recruit 1,500 workers from Germany, only 365 were actually recruited. In both cases, the full quota of workers was not recruited because of shortfalls in the supply of people in Europe willing to migrate to Canada initially as farm labour."

This type of public response on the part of the state, which suggested that the farmers in southern Ontario did not face shortages of labour and that they did not require the import of foreign-born labour for the harvest of fruits and vegetables, was used in the state's dealings with subsequent requests by Barbados and Jamaican representatives in the late 1950's and early 1960's."

Ontario Growers: the Southwestern Ontario Field Crops Association

During the latter part of the 1950's, Ontario growers organizations began increasingly to look to the Caribbean for a solution to their perennial labour recruitment and retention problems. They did so, in part, because of the Canadian state's reluctance to prevent the circulation of immigrants out of the farm labour market (see chapter five), in part because they saw the Caribbean as an
almost unlimited source of labour that they could draw upon and expell at will, and in part because they had observed the American fruit and vegetable growers and processors use of Caribbean workers as far north as Michigan.

Aside from the visit by Canadian farmers to Barbados in 1954, one of the first concerted attempts to convince the state to allow the entry of migrant workers from the Caribbean to Canada came from the South Western Ontario Field Crops Association (SWOFCA). The Association, which claimed to represent over 10,000 vegetable growers in the province, was formed in 1957. Its stated goals were to promote the 'general image' of agriculture in Ontario, and to 'render services and assistance to its members in recruiting farm labour and in coordinating the seasonal movement of farm labour from crop to crop during the harvest season'. To achieve this end, and with the use of working capital supplied by H.J. Heinz Company and Libby, MacNeil and Libby Company, two multinational food processors in the area, the Association constructed a series of camps where farm workers were housed during the course of the growing season. It was hoped that such an arrangement would create a centralized pool of labour that farmers could draw upon when they were required. Members paid to the Association a fee of one dollar per worker per day. As such, the Association sought a return to the earlier era (documented in chapter five) whereby workers were housed in state and employer financed camps.

In the spring of 1957, the Association, along with the Canada and Dominion Sugar Company, proposed to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration that it help organize and cooperate in the recruitment of '300 coloured workers from the West Indies for a period of approximately six months each summer.' SWOFCA pressed its case by arguing that American growers were making use of Caribbean migrant labour (and thus in possession of a 'cheap' labour force) and that Ontario tobacco growers had access to American migrant labour to assist in their harvest (and that therefore the use of foreign migrant labour in Canada was not without precedent). They also assured the
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration that the 300 migrant workers from the West Indies would not displace Canadian labour, and that they would recruit the same numbers of women, high school students and immigrants during the harvest as they had done before.  

The Department rejected SWOFCA's proposals publicly on the grounds that, first, it was unconvinced that the Caribbean migrant workers would not take jobs away from Canadians and immigrants, and second, that the American tobacco workers who were allowed entry to the country were in possession of skills that were otherwise unavailable in Canada.  

The latter claim, was, as chapter five has shown, not entirely accurate since some of the workers were unskilled primers and tiers. Instead of permitting the entry of Caribbean migrant farm workers, the state offered to recruit and place at SWOFCA's disposal urban unemployed workers and aboriginal peoples. As a further compromise measure, it channelled three hundred male Portuguese immigrants to the camps.

By the mid-1950's, Portuguese migration to Canada was beginning to be defined as a 'problem' by the Canadian state as many unskilled workers who came as sponsored relatives of Portuguese already in Canada were having difficulty finding urban employment. They therefore required some state support for the reproduction of their labour power. The Department hoped that their placement in agriculture would reduce the unemployment rate amongst newly arrived Portuguese immigrants, and at the same time solve the growers' labour recruitment problems. The Department also told the growers that it would pay each Portuguese worker who remained in the employment of SWOFCA or the Canada and Dominion Sugar Company for a period of six months or more, the sum of one hundred dollars in order to reassure them that they would have a reliable and dependable labour force to staff their camps. According to the Director of Immigration, this was not too far a deviation from the practice of refunding inland transportation to farm workers who remain in farm employment for a full year (which was a feature of the Assisted Passage Loans). I think that the suggestion of a bonus at the end of six months will have some effect on
those who may be offered other employment at a higher wage.\footnote{17}

These state expenditures to guarantee the growers the presence of a labour force turned out to be ineffectual. Despite the offer of the bonus, many of the Portuguese workers recruited for the camps migrated to urban centres after a short period of employment for SWOFCA.\footnote{16}

In the spring of 1958, the Association and the Canada and Dominion Sugar Company once again requested that the Department of Citizenship and Immigration permit the Association's recruitment of three hundred workers from the Caribbean to staff its labour camps. Part of its strategy to convince the state that they could not do without Caribbean migrant workers was to engage in a process of character assassination of the internal reserves of labour mobilized for them by the state. This was a strategy used by growers of fruits and vegetables in California, Arizona and Texas in the 1940's and 1950's to convince the American government that it should institute, and then retain, the Bracero program.\footnote{19}

In reference to the urban unemployed, a representative of the Association told the sixteenth annual meeting of the Dominion-Provincial Farm Labour Committee in 1958 that

The men were screened as thoroughly as possible but as many of these men ... could be classed as casual workers, they were an extremely poor type. They were transferred to Chatham [Ontario] by bus and in many instances, the men merely travelled to Chatham for the bus ride. These workers were also difficult to manage and there is no doubt that many of them had criminal records. This poor calibre of men resulted in a large turnover and this fact was clearly illustrated in that over 550 men were employed by SWOFCA in 1958 but at any one time the maximum number of men on camp strength was only 182. The operating loss of SWOFCA in 1958 was $16,000 in 10 weeks. These figures speak for themselves. If SWOFCA was forced to rely on this type of men to man its camps, there is no doubt that the SWOFCA operation would come to a sudden conclusion.\footnote{20}
A small number of aboriginal peoples were also recruited by the state to staff SWOFCA's camps in 1958. Like the urban unemployed, the aboriginal labourers were also subject to a process of character assassination. Again, according to the SWOFCA representative

It was not realized that the various tribes could not live and work together harmoniously. In the particular movement to our area 41 Manitoba Indians from the Sioux and DeSoto tribes were sent. The men from two tribes could not live and work together harmoniously. Conditions reached the stage where the two tribes clashed in physical combat, and SWOFCA was forced to send the workers back to Manitoba earlier than was originally planned. The Indians were also troublesome in that they spent a great deal of their wages on drink and became extremely unruly necessitating SWOFCA bailing them out of jail on more than one occasion.21

The validity of the accusations made against urban unemployed workers and aboriginal peoples is difficult to assess. The state, however, was evidently unconvinced by the Association's claims. Thus, despite the growers attempts at character assassination, the state once again refused the request for Caribbean migrant labour. While it continued its efforts to place immigrant labour at the disposal of SWOFCA, given the experiences of the year before, it did not attempt to regulate the immigrants' circulation in the labour market by the offer of a cash bonus.

In the autumn of 1958, the Association folded because of the heavy financial losses incurred during the year with respect to the construction, maintenance and operation of its housing camps. In fact, it had lost a total of $30,000 during the course of 1958 alone.22 Despite SWOFCA's bankruptcy, the Canada and Dominion Sugar Company continued in 1959 to press the state to permit the importation of Caribbean migrant workers. There was, however, one major difference between the Company's later proposal and the proposals of the previous two years. It only wanted to make use of fifty Jamaican workers during the months of June and July for thinning and hoeing sugar beets on land it owned. Seeding, which occurred earlier in the spring, and harvesting, which occurred in the autumn, would be done by machinery.23 It proposed that these workers be recruited from a group
who were employed under contract for periods of between one and two years in the United States. After the sugar cane harvest in Florida, the Company was prepared to pay for the workers transportation to Ontario from Florida and back, with the Florida growers being responsible for their transportation back to the Caribbean.24

This proposal was subsequently taken up by the Jamaican government for other sections of the fruit and vegetable industry and so remained a live issue for the Canadian government for another two years. By the autumn of 1961 though, it had been dropped from active consideration by the Canadian side. Publically, the reasons given were that there were sufficient quantities of labour available for their operations from within the country.25

The Lull and the Renewal of Pressures

There appears to have been a lull in the pressure placed on the Canadian state between 1959 and 1963 by Ontario growers. This can be attributed to several conjunctural conditions. First, the period between 1958 and 1962 was recessionary, and resulted in the highest rates of unemployment in the country since the end of the war.26 Second, the early part of this period (1957, 1958, 1959) was characterized by high levels of immigration. The conjunction of high unemployment and high immigration was due, in part to the large refugee movements from Hungary and Egypt in 1956 and 1957. Both factors combined meant that there was a temporary expansion in the pool of labour available from within Canada that farmers could draw upon for the harvest of crops. As such, there was an important element of truth in the Canadian state's public rejections of proposals submitted to it in the late 1950's and early 1960's to bring in migrant farm workers from the Caribbean. Workers from within Canada were probably available in numbers adequate to fill positions in the fruit and vegetable harvest.
Pressures on the state to admit Caribbean migrant workers to the country were renewed after the 1963 harvest. Caribbean nations intensified their pressure, in part, because of the passage in Britain of the Commonwealth Immigration Act in 1962. The Act curtailed the free entry of 'black' people from the Caribbean (and India), and imposed a voucher system which dramatically reduced the flow of people seeking work. 27

Pressures were renewed by farmers primarily because of conditions in the labour market. First, 1962 witnessed the beginning of a period of economic expansion that was to continue more or less unabated until 1973. 28 This resulted in a lowering of the unemployment rate, and a reduction in the number of unemployed who could be recruited to fill farm labour positions. 29

Second, economic expansion in other parts of the Canadian economy intensified the cost-price squeeze farmers' faced, especially in the form of increases in wages for hired farm labour. As table 5-7 of chapter five shows, between 1961 and 1970, farm wages increased by 91.3%, whereas the cost of equipment and materials increased by 22.9%, interest and taxes increased by 51.8%, and the costs of family farm living increased by 25.7% during the same period. 30

Third, as stated in chapters six and seven, the Canadian state shifted its emphasis on immigrant recruitment toward the selection of skilled immigrants. It felt that there were sufficient numbers of unskilled and unemployed Canadians and immigrants already in the country to fill unskilled manual labour positions and that there was no need to recruit more unskilled immigrant workers from abroad. This resulted in fewer immigrants allowed entry to the country on the basis of their claim that they would fill farm labour positions.

1964: Personalizing the Problem

After the 1963 harvest, representatives of the Jamaican and Barbadian states began to act in concert with Ontario farmers to
convince the state to allow the entry of Caribbean workers on a temporary basis. During the course of 1964 both branches of the state remained opposed to such a proposal. While both branches acknowledged that farmers faced problems with recruiting and retaining suitable supplies of labour for the harvest, they identified farmers themselves as the cause of the problems: they personalized the 'problem'.

In early January of 1964, members of the Ontario Fruit and Vegetable Growers Association (OFVGA), an umbrella group which claimed to represent all fruit and vegetable growers in the province, met to consider the impact of the shortage of labour they experienced in the previous year's harvest. Members of the Association claimed that, in 1963, all agricultural areas in the province had experienced severe shortages of farm labour. They suggested that the labour shortages were aggravated by the 1962 immigration regulations which made it more difficult for people to enter the country as immigrants on the basis of their intention to fill wage labour positions in agriculture. At the conclusion of the meeting, it was resolved that the Department of Citizenship and Immigration should allow more immigrant agricultural workers to enter the country, and that those admitted should be 'properly screened as to their agricultural background and desire to remain as such in Canada'. In addition to this formal resolution, the Association sought to informally test the opinion of the Departments of Labour and Citizenship and Immigration regarding the entry of migrant labour from the Caribbean for between three and four months during the harvest season, and to determine whether either of the departments would offer financial or administrative assistance in the organization of such a migration.

Upon learning through press reports of the OFVGA's meeting that fruit and vegetable growers had faced problems in recruiting and retaining enough labour for the 1963 harvest, Mr. Ivo DeSouza of the Jamaican High Commission in Ottawa contacted the Association and proposed that it organize a series of meetings in various locales so he could explain to farmers how American fruit and vegetable producers made use of workers under contract from Jamaica for their harvest.
The OFVGA obliged, and at these meetings DeSouza explained that during the previous year, some 20,000 Jamaican migrant workers were employed under contract in the American fruit and vegetable harvest. The figure DeSouza cited was clearly an exaggeration, as Reimer suggests that at most, three thousand workers migrated each year from the entire Caribbean basin on a temporary basis.\footnote{4}

Despite this inaccuracy, which was probably calculated in order to impress the farmers, DeSouza went on to explain that the workers ranged in age from 25 to 40 years and were required to possess an 'agricultural background', or to have been 'recently engaged in agriculture'. Remuneration was either on the basis of a fixed hourly rate or on piece rates. The workers were responsible for the payment of their transportation costs from Jamaica to America and employers were responsible for the costs of transporting the workers back to Jamaica. Employers provided the workers with accommodation and, depending on the particular arrangement, either supplied meals (for which they could charge the workers a fixed daily rate), or provided the workers with utensils with which they prepared their own meals. Before their departure from Jamaica, the workers were given a thorough medical examination, and screened with respect to criminal records. If the worker was deemed medically unfit, or if a worker had a criminal record, the applicant was not allowed to leave the country for work in the U.S. They were contracted to particular employers, and could not quit or change jobs without the sanction of the state. The length of the contract varied, but tended to range from between four months and two years.\footnote{5}

DeSouza suggested to the Ontario growers that, in light of the relatively short harvest season in the province (which lasted from approximately 15 August to 10 October), it would be impractical to import workers directly from Jamaica. Rather, he suggested they could probably be brought to Canada via the United States. A certain number of Jamaican workers employed in the northern United States could make their way to Ontario for the harvest, return to the United States, and then be returned to Jamaica at the expense of their original American
employer. The growers agreed that this arrangement would be suitable, but only if they did not have to pay any of the transportation costs associated with acquiring the labour. DeSouza suggested to the growers that the costs of returning the workers to Jamaica would probably be borne by the American growers, and the costs of transportation from and to the United States would be borne by the workers themselves. According to the representative of the National Employment Service present at these meetings, the growers were 'very much impressed' by Mr. DeSouza's proposal.

In fact, it appears that John Sandham, a member of the Association, and also Chairperson of the Farm Labour Committee of the Niagara Peninsula Fruit and Vegetable Growers Association (a regional association affiliated with the OFVGA), was so impressed with the proposal that a week later, he and his wife took a 'vacation' to southern Florida where they spent time looking into the use of Jamaican workers in the sugar cane harvest. In a letter to Dr. John Brown, the secretary of the Association, Sandham wrote from Florida that he had interviewed two 'prominent' growers, Fred Sykes of the U.S. Sugar Corporation and secretary of the British West Indies Employers Association, and George Winston of the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association. Sandham reported that he

... was very much impressed with the quality of his [Winston's] labour. Both Sykes and Winston were loud in their praise of the men provided, even when the B.W.I. men were not listening in ....

Sandham also spoke to some of the workers. He told Brown that

Both Charlotte [his wife?] and I were impressed with their moral and general attitude. They seem to have one objective, that is to go back home with as much loot as possible. Hours of work appear to be no object if the pay is there. As a result, social problems are negligible as they are too busy earning money to get into trouble. I talked with 6 or 7 groups ranging from 3 or 4 men to 30 or 40. As soon as they heard I was Canadian they were coming from all directions and would have climbed in the car and come with me right then ... Not one of the over 100 men I talked with came from the city or town. I am quite satisfied that these men are highly suitable for our own
harvest needs. The accommodations I saw were no better than what we could now offer.

Sandham's observation about the nature of the accommodation that Florida growers provided points to the fact that working and living conditions of farm workers were structurally induced problems of production characterizing an industry at a global level, and not simply matters of individual farmer's choosing. It was also significant in that he articulated a concern over 'social stability' in the communities where the workers would be employed, the potential creation of 'social problems' by the presence of the workers in the country and the workers' 'morals'.

Sandham's letter was forwarded by Dr. Brown to Mr. DeSouza, who in turn, forwarded copies to the Departments of Labour and Citizenship and Immigration. DeSouza also sent along a covering letter which contained a report on the outcome of his previous meetings with Ontario growers, a detailed summary of the arrangements under which Jamaican migrant workers were employed in the United States, and a proposal which suggested that a similar movement be organized for Ontario growers as soon as possible for the 1964 harvest.

Upon his return to Canada, John Sandham met with members of the Farm Labour Committee of the NPFVGA, to discuss the outcome of his trip to Florida and the farm labour situation for the upcoming harvest. Sandham attempted to predict the dimensions of the recruitment problem they faced for the 1964 harvest by releasing the results of a survey he conducted of 150 growers in the Niagara Peninsula. The survey indicated that growers required approximately 629 men and 679 women over and above their known available supply. He claimed that similar results were obtained from other fruit and vegetable growing counties in the province. The committee then went on to consider and evaluate alternate sources of farm labour which included: local unemployment agencies (NES offices), Quebec, the Maritimes, the United States, aboriginal peoples and the Caribbean. The committee was least enthusiastic about the possibility of making
use of aboriginal labour (they would be used as a 'last resort'), mildly hopeful about the first three sources and most enthusiastic about Caribbean migrant workers. The committee believed that the supply of the latter was 'inexhaustible', they were 'reliable', and they 'could be provided on about one weeks notice'.

It went on to draft a series of recommendations to both the Department of Labour and Citizenship and Immigration which included: a state sponsored advertising campaign to attract female household workers to also seek employment in the harvest on a part-time basis; making unemployment insurance available to farm workers; increasing the number of agricultural training courses available for students and the unemployed; the recruitment of unemployed persons from other parts of Canada; the formation of what they called a 'pool' of 'qualified' aboriginal labour; granting preference in the immigration program to those who stated a willingness to engage in farm labour employment; and, anticipating that these efforts would be largely unsuccessful, the immediate approval of the importation of migrant workers from the Caribbean if workers from other sources were not available.

During the summer of 1964, Eugene Whelan, farmer, Liberal M.P. for Essex county, and future Minister of Agriculture under Trudeau, apparently under pressure from his constituents, began to press the Liberal government for the admittance of Jamaican labour on a temporary basis for the harvest of fruits and vegetables. In a series of letters and telephone conversations with Rene Tremblay, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, and W. Thompson of the National Employment Service, Whelan took up the growers' cause. In a letter to Tremblay, he claimed that during the previous year, fruits and vegetables rotted in farmers' fields for want of harvest labour. He told Tremblay that he himself lost $4,000 worth of crops because of the 'instability and insecurity of obtaining help'. He argued further that Ontario fruit and vegetable growers were faced with unfair competition from American growers because they had access to 'cheap' foreign migrant labour for their harvest, and that farmers in his constituency were seriously considering cutting back on seeded
acreages in 1965 because of uncertainties over the supply of labour. And, in another letter, he also accused the department of 'racial prejudice' in its continuing refusal to allow the growers the opportunity to make use of Caribbean labour.

Both branches of the state remained firm in their opposition to the proposals coming from the OFVGA, the NPFVGA, the Jamaican High Commission and Eugene Whelan. While both departments acknowledged that farmers faced a 'difficult' labour supply situation, they claimed that the shortages were relative and not absolute, and that farmers themselves were the 'cause' of their own problems. While their strategy was noticeably different from that of the previous fifteen years (where they denied that labour shortages existed and blamed the labour turnover problem on the poor quality of immigrants who were recruited), they continued to personalize the problem by blaming it on 'poor quality' employers.

In response to the Ontario Fruit and Vegetable Growers Association's resolutions, for example, the Chief of the Settlement Division of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration identified certain features of farm labour employment as the chief cause of the farmers' problems. But these features were not defined as structurally induced contradictions which were endemic to farming. Rather, they were 'chosen' by farmers. In his view, labour shortages were the result of

the almost complete lack of accommodation provided by the employers (for labour recruited outside of daily commuting distance); the reluctance of growers to provide transportation; instability of wages, and the lack of arrangements to assure continuity of employment from one grower to another.

Both departments were unwilling to recruit immigrant labour to fill seasonal employment vacancies because, as past experience showed, working conditions and rates of pay 'offered' by farmers were insufficient to insure that 'even immigrant labour' would remain in farm labour employment for the length of one harvest. Further, the
Department of Citizenship and Immigration felt that unskilled immigrants were over represented in the ranks of the urban unemployed, and that they had no desire to further fill those ranks with immigrants who were originally recruited to fill farm labour positions.

such persons are generally in the unskilled or semi-skilled categories. In the season when there is little or no demand for their service's, they tend to gravitate to urban centres, creating additional pockets of unemployed. It is in the unskilled and poorly skilled classes of workers that our unemployment problem really exists.47

Both branches of the state also responded negatively to the query regarding the entry of workers from the Caribbean on a temporary basis to fill seasonal farm labour positions. They claimed that farmers could draw upon unemployed workers, but that they would at the same time have to improve wages, accommodation and working conditions, and offer to pay the transportation costs of the workers from their place of residence to the place of work.48

Similarly, in response to Mr. DeSouza's proposal, the Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration 'explained' that the reason for the growers' shortage of labour lay in their employment practices: the growers 'refused' to provide adequate accommodation, transportation, working conditions and wages to local labour. He suggested, that when the growers made the appropriate changes, there would be no shortage of Canadian workers for the upcoming harvest. He therefore informed Mr. DeSouza that the response on the part of the government of Canada to the proposal was negative.49

Finally, the Minister of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration assured Mr. Whelan that the decision was not based on 'racial prejudice' and that the factors which determined the state's position were strictly 'economic'. He explained that the growers' labour shortages were relative and not absolute (many workers would work in the harvest if only the farmers improved working conditions,
offered suitable accommodation and improved wages), and concluded by saying that

it is my responsibility to see that the immigration process is not used to bring people to Canada for employment under conditions and wages unacceptable to our native population. Exploitation of immigrant labour is something which this Department in Canada's interest and good name, is committed to resist.}

The Minister was clearly not concerned that the surplus value produced by immigrant labour was appropriated by employers. Rather, he was concerned that they would not be taken advantage of by 'evil' employers who 'chose' to pay their workforce poor wages.

1965: Structural Problems and Structural Solutions

The period after the 1964 harvest witnessed the emergence of a split within the state on the question of the admittance of Caribbean migrant farmworkers. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration became increasingly sympathetic to the growers requests while the Department of Labour remained opposed. The former shifted towards a structural analysis of the 'problem'.

After the 1964 harvest, the annual convention of the Essex County Associated Growers (ECAG), another regional growers organization affiliated with the Ontario Fruit and Vegetable Growers Association, took up the issue of the importation of seasonal workers from the Caribbean and/or Mexico. Shortly after the convention, and after informal discussions with Mr. DeSouza of the Jamaican High Commissioner's Office, Kenneth Butler of the ECAG met with representatives of the Jamaican government in Kingston, Jamaica, during a combined business and vacation trip. At these meetings, he sought Jamaican cooperation in the alleviation of their farm labour shortages.61 Butler outlined the extent of the labour shortages in southern Ontario and stated that they would be 'about five per cent short' of their labour force requirements for the 1965 harvest season. He went on to tell the representatives of the Jamaican government that
in spite of repeated pleas on the part of his and other grower organizations in Ontario, the Canadian state had consistently refused to allow them to use Caribbean migrant labour in the harvest.52

Butler's original proposal was framed along the lines of Mr. DeSouza's proposal of the year before. That is, he wanted the work contracts of Jamaican workers already in Michigan and Wisconsin extended so they could migrate to Canada for a short period of time. This was rejected by the Jamaican government, apparently in order to maximize the total numbers of workers sent abroad to earn foreign currency. It proposed instead that a separate movement of workers be organized directly from Jamaica. Like their American counterparts, Ontario growers would pay for the transportation costs of the workers to Canada and the workers themselves would be responsible for their transportation costs back to the island. While Butler was uncertain about the feasibility of a separate movement because of the costs of transportation, he agreed to discuss their proposal with members of his association.53

Upon his return to Canada, Butler met with the members of the BCAG to discuss the outcome of his meetings with Jamaican officials. The other growers appear to have accepted the Jamaican proposal, and remained enthusiastic about the possibility of making use of Jamaican migrant workers.54

The Farm Labour Committee of the Niagara Peninsula Fruit and Vegetable Growers Association also met in February 1965. They argued that despite assurances given to them by the National Employment Service that a sufficient number of aboriginal workers, workers from Quebec and the Maritimes, and urban Ontario unemployed would be found for the harvest, they would still face a shortage of labour. Along with the problem of acquiring sufficient quantities of workers, they also expressed doubts about their 'quality'. The committee suggested that while the 'urban unemployed' supplied to them in the previous harvest were 'nice fellows', it also suggested that they were 'just not suited to farm work'.55 Some members of the committee also
reported that they had spoken to a Michigan farmer who made use of Caribbean migrant workers, and who was 'very satisfied' with his labour. Finally, the committee agreed that it should take whatever steps were necessary in order to bring an experimental group of Caribbean migrant workers to Canada for the upcoming season, and that it should contact Mr. Desouza who had earlier suggested that they arrange a meeting with him, and Mr. Harold Edwards, a representative of the British West Indian Labour Organization in Washington, D.C.

Mr. DeSouza had been in contact with several other grower organizations at the same time, so when the NPFVGA met with him and Mr. Edwards, also present were representatives of the Essex County Associated Growers, the Ontario Asparagus Growers Association, Essex County Vegetable Growers Association, LaSalle Vegetable Growers, the Ontario Burley Tobacco Growers Association, and of several processing companies. Edwards explained to the representatives of the various associations the terms of the contracts they would be expected to sign if they made use of workers from Jamaica. Contracts would stipulate that the growers pay a fixed minimum wage of $1.15 per hour, or a piece rate which was agreed to in advance. They would provide accommodation for the workers, pay for medical and accident insurance, and transportation costs of the workers from and to the Caribbean if recruited directly from Jamaica, or from the United States to and from Ontario if recruited in America. They had to assure the workers that they would be paid for a minimum of no less that thirty-six hours per week, and that they received no less than $26.00 per fortnight.

The growers appear to have been responsive to Edwards' proposal because shortly after the meeting, the Niagara county growers formed the Niagara-British West Indies Employers Association and the Essex county growers formed the Essex County British West Indian Farm Labour Employment Association. Furthermore, a member of the NPFVGA went to Jamaica for further discussions with representatives of the Jamaican state. The Essex county growers also undertook a study of the farm labour situation in south western Ontario. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the state of the labour market and the rhetorical purpose of the
survey, it showed that there would be a severe shortage of labour in the upcoming harvest.

Armed with this study as proof of the problems they faced, the growers demanded that 'a limited number of seasonal farm workers be recruited outside of Canada' by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, and that 'one airplane load of workers from the Caribbean arrive in Canada on May 1 for growers in Essex county and another on July 15 for growers in the Niagara Peninsula'.

After this meeting, DeSouza and Edwards met with representatives of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration where they outlined the terms of the contract as they had done with the growers. The representatives of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration responded by stating that the overall management of manpower rested with the federal and provincial Departments of Labour and if they could certify that there were no workers available from within Canada to do the work, then they would be prepared to admit Caribbean workers to the country on a temporary basis. They also stated that they would urge the Department of Labour to give the proposal 'consideration'.

The Structural Analysis

The Department of Citizenship and Immigration's response to the proposal was noticeably different this time. During the previous four months, there was emergent support for farmers within the Department. There was a recognition that the problems of labour force recruitment and retention were structurally induced problems and not simply matters of farmers' own choosing.

The Deputy Minister of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration pointed out the contradiction inherent in making use of free immigrant labour to fill seasonal, and poorly paid positions that indigenous labour did not want to fill.

... I am not at all certain that we are justified in expressing the serene self-satisfaction which is set forth
in the letter [to Eugene Whelan] ... I do not mind refusing landed immigrant status to unskilled labourers who might work for only one season in some sub-marginal agricultural industry and then move permanently to the city."

He succinctly outlined the state's shift in position when he went on to tell the Assistant Deputy Minister of Immigration that

I feel less confident that we are right when we are rejecting a proposal for the temporary admission of migratory Jamaican labourers and justifying our rejection on the ground that the National Employment Service says they can find a substitute in Canada, whereas Whelan says they have failed ... We should write a letter to the Department of Labour to make them squirm about this matter as much as I do."

Both the Minister and Deputy Minister wrote to their counterparts in the Department of Labour to seek out their advice on the matter but did not give them any indication of their emergent position. The Department of Labour remained opposed to the proposal, again on the grounds that shortages of labour were relative and not absolute, and that farmers had only themselves to blame for their labour recruitment and retention problems.

The Department of Citizenship and Immigration went on to develop a position paper on the question of the admittance of workers from the Caribbean. Its intention was to place the 'burden of responsibility [for the decision] where it belonged': with the Department of Labour and the growers themselves. According to the Assistant Deputy Minister of Immigration

The N.E.S. position may be correct if we accept two basic assumptions: (a) That the growers can offer better wages and accommodation. They may be able to do so but one must ask whether it is possible to increase agricultural wages beyond certain economic levels. Farmers must compete with industry for workers but must also compete price-wise with imported foods. Use of the phrase 'acceptable wages and living accommodation' implies that there exists some form of standard to determine whether the employer is offering adequate inducements to labour. There is no such standard, as yet, and it is extremely difficult to convince the farmer that his inability to attract labour is because of his inadequate wages and working conditions when we have no
objective standard we can point to as an illustration. (b) That Canadian workers will do the work if wages and working conditions are improved. This is arguable. It may be that the improvement necessary to achieve this result would be greater than any farmer could afford.

This assessment by the Assistant Deputy Minister of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration pointed to the fact that there were structural limits which farmers faced in their ability to increase wages in order to recruit and retain suitable supplies of wage labour for the harvest. It also pointed to the fact that the improvement in working and living conditions of farm workers were difficult to improve, in part, because of the cost/price squeeze.

Their new public position, then, was that they were prepared to admit Caribbean farm workers to the country on a temporary basis under the following conditions: 1) the National Employment Service certified that the prospective employer offered suitable wages, accommodation and working conditions in accordance with local standards; 2) the N.E.S. found it impossible to locate suitable workers within Canada; 3) that the N.E.S. had no objection to the importation of the workers for farm labour positions; 4) employers form an association for the purposes of negotiation and the acceptance of the legal responsibilities associated with such a movement; 5) and that employers meet the same conditions applicable to farmers in the United States who made use of Caribbean migrant labour with respect to wages, guaranteed minimum wages and hours of work, sickness and accident insurance, repatriation and transportation.

In practice, the final conditions meant that Canadian growers had to import the workers directly from the Caribbean and pay at least one-half of the transportation costs, rather than import them indirectly from the United States and not pay any of their transportation costs. This broad line of approach was approved by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in February, 1965, which was subsequently communicated to the Department of labour.
The Department of Labour's Response

The Department of Labour remained unmoved. It suggested that it would still be possible to meet the growers' labour force requirements from internal sources, that growers were largely responsible for their own labour recruitment and retention problems. It also warned the Department of Citizenship and Immigration not to give encouragement to growers who wanted to import migrant labour from abroad.

Throughout the spring of 1965, the Department of Labour stood alone in its public opposition to the importation of Jamaican migrant farm workers for the fruit and vegetable harvest in Ontario. In response to the Essex County Associated Growers, Allan MacEachen, Minister of Labour, for example, stated that

Your representation concerning the temporary admission of workers from abroad is based on the assumption that workers in the numbers required cannot be recruited in Canada. This, however, has not been established and it is felt that the requirements of agriculture can be met through a vigorous recruitment program involving local recruitment, day-haul movements, and the transfer of workers within and between provinces. It is the view of the government that we cannot import temporary workers at a time when the government is spending large sums to rehabilitate unemployed agricultural workers ... in other parts of Canada, when we are proposing to move workers who need employment from designated areas at public expense and when substantial sums are being spent through retraining and in other ways to move unemployed workers into employment in Canada ... If the growers were to offer wages and conditions to the extent proposed in respect to workers from Jamaica, taking into account the total cost of such a movement to the growers, it is felt that we can meet your labour requirements from within Canada.

He then suggested that the growers contact their local office of the National Employment Service and inform it of their labour force requirements with them so that they could begin to assess the extent to which they would have to recruit workers from other parts of Canada for the Ontario harvest.
MacEachen took this same position in his submission to Cabinet on the matter: he recommended that the importation of migrant labour from abroad not be authorized by the Cabinet, at least until it was determined that domestic labour was unavailable on the basis of the same offers of employment as made to Caribbean workers.

As later sections of this chapter will demonstrate, the Department of Labour's opposition to the proposal was based, in part, on the idea of 'race'. However, its opposition to the proposal, appears also to have been based on its desire to protect the Unemployment Insurance fund, which it was charged with administering. It felt that a scheme for the admittance of foreign workers would take jobs away from Canadians and increase the expenditures of Unemployment Insurance Commission. This interpretation is consistent with Mahon's observation that within the unequal structure of representation within the Canadian state, the Department of Labour's role is the protection of the interests of, and the exercise of control over, the Canadian working class.

Summer of 1965: The Negotiations Begin

Despite the increasingly sympathetic stance of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Ontario growers associations remained active in their efforts to convince the state to allow them to make use of Caribbean migrant labour throughout 1965 and 1966. On February 17, 1966, the Farm Labour Committee of the Canadian Horticultural Council (a national umbrella organization made up of fruit and vegetable grower associations from across Canada), met with representatives of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. The main line of discussion focused around the farmers' claim that unless they had immediate access to 'a nucleus of experienced off-shore labour', they would experience serious financial losses during the 1966 season. They argued further that they would shift production to crops which could be harvested mechanically rather than grow crops which required hand labour to harvest. This was already occurring, they argued, in the case of a decrease in the production of peaches.
strawberries, asparagus and tomatoes, which were being imported more cheaply from the United States and Mexico where growers had access to a well-stocked labour pool.\textsuperscript{7a}

This discussion led to the following resolutions at the annual meeting of the Canadian Horticultural Council held a few weeks later: (1) that shortages of labour existed in all fruit and vegetable growing provinces in Canada; (2) the Federal government step up its efforts to develop various sources of farm labour from within Canada; and (3) that because an availability of reliable and experienced farm labour was basic to the success of fruit and vegetable production in Canada, because the problem of securing farm labour was becoming more acute each year, and because the development of various domestic sources of farm labour would take time and training, they urged the department to permit them to make use of a nucleus of off-shore farm workers on a seasonal basis.\textsuperscript{7c} Growers were clearly searching for a record of reliability in the future labour force when they defined 'experienced farm workers' as 'workers with three years experience in agriculture, at least one of which was for one employer'.\textsuperscript{7d}

During the spring and summer of 1965, support for the growers' position came from several other sources. First, the Liberal Cabinet was apparently unconvinced by the Minister of Labour's submission which urged that 'no encouragement be given' to the proposal to bring in Caribbean workers on a temporary basis. The Cabinet instructed the Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration, Labour and Agriculture to meet as soon as possible with grower organizations in southern Ontario to discuss further their request for Caribbean migrant labour, and determine whether labour force requirements could be filled by using domestic sources only. Thus, the Cabinet had not vetoed the proposal and left the door open for farmers. Second, the Ontario Department of Agriculture offered growers a grant of $150.00 per farm employee 'to construct clean, comfortable housing' for Caribbean workers, and suggested that the federal government match this figure.\textsuperscript{7e}
Third, in May, it came to the attention of some Ontario growers and M.P.'s that groups of Danish and Norwegian farm workers and university students had been allowed to enter Canada to work for the summer on farms in Western Canada. This was a movement of people which had apparently been occurring for several consecutive years and was defined as a movement of labour by the Essex County Associated Growers and Liberal M.P.'s Herb Gray, and Eugene Whelan. Gray, M.P. for Essex South, incensed at the apparent lack of consistency governing the state's decision to allow foreign-born workers temporary entry to the country, demanded an explanation. Terry Wright of the ECAG also asked for an explanation of the discrepancy. In a hastily worded response to both queries, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration claimed that this was not a labour migration, but rather a 'traditional movement of foreign agricultural students designed to foster international goodwill' and to stimulate interest in migration to Canada from the countries concerned." While the latter claim was probably true, the former appears to have been designed to mislead. As chapter six has shown, the state has a tradition of attempting to mask such temporary migrations of labour in terms of 'international student exchanges'.

Fourth, the Department of Labour's position that there would be sufficient supplies of labour available from within Canada for the 1965 harvest became even more untenable by the autumn of 1965. Shortages of labour from within Canada were so severe that the state was forced to recruit day labourers from Detroit, Michigan, for work in fruit and vegetable harvesting and processing in southern Ontario (see chapter six). In September and October, the state recruited and admitted to the country approximately three hundred workers on a daily basis for employment, a practice which appears to have been unprecedented in the post-1945 migration to Canada. The state, or more specifically the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, in Pied Piper fashion, sent vans equipped with loudspeakers through the streets of Detroit advertising job openings in the Canadian harvest. This indicated that the Department of Labour was unable to fulfill its claim that it could supply enough workers from within Canada for use
by Ontario fruit and vegetable growers. The necessity to do so vindicated the growers' earlier predictions and indicated that their claims about labour shortages were not simply rhetoric.

And finally, an article entitled 'Will Jamaican Workers Be Admitted?', appeared in the Financial Times of London. It was an attack on the 'racial discrimination' involved with the Canadian state's decision to not grant entry to the country of Jamaican workers on a seasonal basis. It claimed that

A labour problem that has flushed out and revealed the fact that racial discrimination does exist in Canada at a high government level has created a hornets nest of trouble at the Cabinet table in Ottawa.²⁷

It went on to suggest that

... the colour problem appears to be one of the main worries of the Ottawa government .... Since the Jamaicans are British subjects, they could make life difficult if they decided to stay in Canada once the harvest was over in the autumn. The Government could expect a full scale row in the House of Commons if it were forced to explain why it had ejected a group of Her Majesty's Subjects.²⁸

The timing of the appearance of the article proved to be particularly embarrassing because the Prime Minister was scheduled to appear in London later in the month for Commonwealth Prime Minister's meeting (the claim itself will be evaluated in more detail below).

These factors combined had the effect of softening the Department of Labour's intransigence on the matter. During the summer of 1965, the Director of Employment Services, within the National Employment Service instructed its legal advisor to compare the conditions of employment offered to Jamaican workers in the U.S. with the proposed conditions of employment of Jamaican workers in Canada.²⁹ Further, by September 1965, the National Director of the National Employment Service began to canvass the regional offices to determine whether, and how many, Jamaican farm workers could be absorbed in farm labour.
employment in the area. Both indicate an increasing willingness and recognition of the legitimacy of the proposed migration.

By early 1966, the Department of Labour's opposition to the proposal became a dead issue because of the reorganization of the responsibilities of government agencies (which occurred independently of the disagreements over the proposals). The Department of Labour's role within the country was reduced to the field of industrial relations and the mediation of industrial disputes. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration and the 'Manpower' branch of the Department of Labour, merged to form the Department of Manpower and Immigration.

At a meeting of the Federal-Provincial Agricultural Manpower Committee on March 15, 1966, all parties agreed that there would be an overall shortage of seasonal farm labour in Ontario during the upcoming harvest. Furthermore, it was clear to both the federal and provincial authorities present that they could only avoid further public criticism by the growers if and when they finally allowed growers to make use of Caribbean migrant farm labour.

Shortly after this meeting, the Department of Manpower and Immigration commissioned a Task Force on Seasonal Farm Labour, in order to confirm that farmers would in fact face shortages of labour in the upcoming harvest. The findings of the Task Force supported the farmers' predictions, and were used as the basis for the Minister of Manpower and Immigration's submission to Cabinet regarding the entry of Jamaican labour on a seasonal basis for the southwestern Ontario fruit and vegetable harvest. He told the Cabinet that

The growers have ... made strong representations to be allowed to bring in workers from outside of Canada. I believe that, in the situation this year, it would be very unwise to maintain blanket refusal to such requests. On the other hand, it is most important that any importation of labour should be under strictly controlled conditions, that it should be kept to numbers which are unlikely to create any large scale social problems, and that there should be no danger whatever of labour entering Canada on conditions that would be instrumental in holding down the wages paid to
Canadian workers. The most suitable source of such labour is the West Indies, where there is a good supply of experienced stoop labour which is most required, and governmental agencies have long experience with controlled seasonal movements.  

And, almost as an afterthought, the Minister also suggested that the bringing in of labour from this source would fit in with the Government's general program of aid and cooperation with the West Indies.

Thus, after nearly twenty years of pressure, the Canadian government gave Cabinet approval to the proposal on March 31, 1966, which started the formal negotiations over the terms of the contract which the workers would be employed under.

*Buying a Pig in a Poke: Negotiations Over the Terms of the Contract*

The state's initial position on the details of the contract was set out in the Task Force's recommendations to the Department, and in Marchand's submission to Cabinet. It proposed to grant admission to the country to Jamaican males over the age of eighteen for agricultural employment, provided that growers complied with the following conditions: (1) they offer a wage rate of $1.50 per hour; (2) they guarantee a minimum weekly wage of $50.00 per worker; (3) they furnish satisfactory meals and lodging at a cost to the workers which would not exceed $20.00 per week; (4) the duration of employment offered to be not less than eight weeks nor more than twelve weeks; (5) the hours of work were not to exceed the normal and usual hours prevalent in agriculture in the area, except under the consent of both parties; (6) they paid the transportation costs of the worker both from and to the Caribbean.

The determination of the wage rate growers were required to pay was a complex process. It involved a consideration of the wages paid, and the working conditions offered by 'better than average growers' to local labour; average wages paid in agriculture in 1965; the wage
rates and working conditions suggested by Mr. Edwards in his proposal of the previous year; and the growers' orders for seasonal workers listed with the National Employment Service in 1965. According to the Task force, 'better growers' during the previous year offered $1.25 per hour for Canadian labour. It added a 'premium' of twenty five cents per hour on to this rate because it anticipated that Caribbean workers would be experienced with agricultural work, and thus be more productive than Canadian labour. They would also be more productive because they were employed under contract, which meant that they would remain continuously on the job, 'more so than had been the experience with domestic labour'.

The Department outlined the proposed terms of the contract at a meeting of the Ontario Federal-Provincial Agricultural Manpower Committee meeting on April 5. The representatives of the growers reacted negatively to the terms of the contract. They stated that few, if any, growers could afford to make use of the labour under the terms set by the Department. Specifically, they argued that the wage rate was considerably in excess of the going rate for workers in 1965, and would probably be in excess of the rate for 1966. They also pointed out that the rate proposed was in excess of the Ontario minimum wage, which for 1966 was $1.25 per hour. They felt that they should not be required to pay much more than that figure.

Second, they felt that wages should be expressed on an hourly basis which included the cost of food and lodging. They claimed that this was customary in the industry, and that the cost worked out to between ten and fifteen cents per hour. If the Department adopted the figure of $1.25 per hour, then this would make the wage packet worth between $1.35 and $1.40 per hour.

Third, the growers quarelled with the minimum weekly wage of $50.00 per worker per week. They indicated that this condition was difficult to accept because bad weather or other unforeseen circumstances often meant that workers could work only one or two days per week. Instead, they suggested that they could probably guarantee

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the figure of $50.00 per week over the entire period of the contract. This meant that if a worker's contract were for six weeks, the growers would guarantee them a minimum total wage of $600.00.

And finally, there was considerable opposition to the provision which would require them to pay for the return transportation costs of the workers. While they did not object to the payment of one-way transportation costs, as the American growers were required to do, they claimed they could not realistically pay for transportation from and to the Caribbean.

At the end of the meeting, the growers were asked by a representative of the Department of Manpower and Immigration to give an indication of the number of workers that would be requested under the terms of the contract as set out by the Task Force. Growers responded by stating that under those terms, no orders would be forthcoming, but if the contract were revised along the lines suggested, they they would make use of approximately 750 workers.

After consideration of the growers proposals, the state gave in to the first three recommendations, but remained firm on the fourth. They agreed to a wage rate of $1.25 per hour, which included the costs of food and lodging, and to a minimum wage which was equal to $50.00 multiplied by the number of weeks worked. They did not agree to the requests about transportation costs because it saw this as the major control to assure that the growers would prefer to seek out Canadian labour as long as adequate supplies of reasonable quality were available.

Cabinet approved these revisions on April 14 and Mr. Marchand announced the program in public in a speech to the House of Commons the following week.

Some farmers were pleased with the announcement of the program. The Windsor Star, for example, suggested
proof that perseverance pays on Parliament Hill, as well as in other places, is borne out by the announcement from Ottawa that farmers in the Niagara Peninsula, the tobacco belt and Essex and Kent county may import Jamaicans if they cannot secure adequate help in Canada.

And Terry Wright of the Essex County Associated Growers said that 'farmers will welcome the opportunity of importing Jamaican labour to harvest fruit and vegetable crops'.

Other growers remained dissatisfied with the terms of the contracts, largely because of the requirement that they pay the costs of return transportation. A later article in the Windsor Star commented:

Many farmers in Essex County would like to spend a few weeks in Jamaica. They've never felt they could afford such luxury of a winter vacation to the West Indies. But, under the regulations laid down by the government at Ottawa, the same farmers will be paying the air fares both ways for Jamaican help to harvest their crops... a farmer who needs 10 workers has to plunk down $200.00 for each worker before he sees the white of their eyes. At the moment he's not sure he's going to plant tomatoes or any crop.

And John Sandham, who then represented the Ontario Fresh Fruit Marketing Board, suggested that while farmers were facing the most acute shortage of labour since the Second World War, they would not use Caribbean workers on a large scale. He stated that

When farmers read the fine print of the required contracts, 'they threw up their hands in despair. A grower who needed 10 men would have to pay out $2,550 before he even sees the men' if they were brought in on scheduled air flights. 'It would be like buying a pig in a poke.'
The requirement that they pay the return transportation costs appears to have acted as a disincentive to farmers' use of Jamaican labour. By June 8, 1966 (and the approach to the picking season) the Department had received requests for only 104 workers; they originally expected that by June there would be orders for between 800 and 1,000 workers. When the Department undertook a survey of 375 farmers to determine why they had not requested the use of Jamaican labour, the majority stated that the transportation costs which they had to pay were too high.

Private Concerns: Racism and Racialization

The state's privately articulated concerns over the proposals to import Caribbean workers to the country on a migrant basis between 1947 and 1966 differ substantially from its publically articulated reasons for rejecting the proposals. The public rejections of the proposal varied from claims that there were no shortages of labour in the industry in the 1940’s and 1950’s, to claims in the early 1960’s that the farmers' themselves were responsible for their own 'problems' and that they could solve them by 'offering' better wages and working conditions. Underlying each public rejection was a privately articulated process of racialization which defined the workers from the Caribbean as a 'race' apart from the dominant 'white' population, and whose presence would be a 'problem' in the country. As was the case of permanent settlement from the Caribbean examined in chapter seven, the process of racialization, which was accompanied by an ideology of racism, structured the state's decision to exclude these people from entry to the country and subsequently allocate them to positions as unfree migrant labour.

Like the state's control over the entry to the country of permanent settlers from the Caribbean, temporary migrants were denied the opportunity to sell their labour power for a wage in the country after the war on the grounds of 'climate' and a concern over the creation of a 'race relations' problem by virtue of their fixed and unchanging 'natures'. The state's privately articulated reasons for
the rejection of the proposals put forward by the Labour Commissioner for Barbados and the United Kingdom High Commission in Ottawa in 1947 were spelt out clearly by the Director of the Immigration Branch:

The admission to Canada of natives of the West Indies has always been a problem with this Service (the Immigration Branch) and we are continually being asked to make provision for the admission of these people. They are, of course not assimilable and, generally speaking, the climatic conditions of Canada are not favourable for them.26

The Deputy Minister of the Department of Labour concurred in this assessment of the biological capacities of Caribbean workers when he suggested that 'there would be a problem ... with the colder weather in the fall', and that 'these people ... would merely create problems for us later'.27

Even though both departments rejected the proposal, they developed a counter-proposal which in fact contradicted the claim that there would not be a shortages of labour in Canada for the harvest. The Immigration Branch had asked the American government whether Ontario sugar beet growers could employ, for a short period of time during the year, 'several hundred Spanish workers' (by which they probably meant 'Bracero workers') who migrated to Michigan for the apple harvest. The branch suggested to the Americans that they could bring 'in a few hundred more workers from the West Indies to offset this movement to Canada'.28 The American state snubbed the Canadian proposal. It suggested that if Ontario growers wanted to make use of migrant workers, then they should recruit them in the Caribbean in the same way that they were previously forced to do.29 After this rebuff, the Immigration branch did not press the matter any further.

It is unclear why both Departments preferred 'Spanish' to Caribbean workers, but given the state's concern over the phenotypical features of those who entered the country noted in the previous chapter, it is possible that they saw the latter as being less visible and 'racially' closer to the majority of the dominant Canadian population than Caribbean workers. It may also have been based on the
belief that 'Spanish' workers were better able to withstand the autumn weather. According to the Assistant Deputy Minister of Labour:

"...a considerable number of these people come north to Michigan every year and ... they perform on the whole quite satisfactory work."

In each case, however, there was an attribution of social significance and a judgement made about the capacity to provide labour power in quantities and qualities required by farmers on the basis of phenotypical criteria, and as such these qualify as a racialized private response. The proposals of 1952 and 1954 were also rejected, in part, on the grounds that 'it would be extremely doubtful if labour from warmer climates could withstand our climatic ... conditions'.

The state's privately articulated response to the proposals put forward by SWOFCA and the Canada and Dominion Sugar Company in 1957 and 1958 were rejected on the grounds that 'in a migration of the sort the growers were proposing', there would 'always be problems of control'. It felt that the American state experienced 'problems' of border control and anticipated that Canada would too if it sanctioned such a migration. In fact, it was suggested that Canada's control problems could turn out to be even more serious than the American 'problem' because many of the Caribbean countries were part of the Commonwealth. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration argued that Canada would be put into a 'difficult' position because

- once they were here, and [because they] are members of the Commonwealth [they] would apply to remain permanently and pressurize us to that end.

The 'problem of control' which he identified, then, was not related to the circulation of their labour power in the market, as it was with European immigrants, but rather with ensuring their exit from the country. What the state was primarily concerned about in this context was the possibility that Caribbean workers, admitted to the country on a temporary basis would make claims for permanent residence in Canada by virtue of the historical ties of the Commonwealth. In order to
preclude this from happening, the state chose to not take any chances about the possibility of the permanent settlement of people from the Caribbean by not allowing their entry to the country, even on a temporary, seasonal basis.

It was this concern over the possibility that the workers might use the ties of the Commonwealth to make claims for permanent settlement which appears to have been behind the state's unwillingness to allow Caribbean workers already in the United States to migrate northward to Ontario for short periods of work in the harvest. From the Canadian state's point of view, the major stumbling block to such proposals was insuring the departure of the workers from Canada upon completion of their contracts. In 1960, for example, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration suggested that if they could get a guarantee from the American state that the workers would be allowed to re-enter the United States from Canada, then they were prepared to admit a small 'experimental' movement to the country. According to the Deputy Minister of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration

We do not want these people to remain in Canada: we do not want to get involved in difficulty or embarrassment forcing them out .... [It must be gotten] across to the workers themselves that we are willing to try this once on a small scale, but if we have any difficulty at all, it will not be repeated. If it works well the first year, we might well be encouraged to repeat it, and after a few years possibly enlarge it. But the minute we find that these transient workers are causing us difficulty by refusing to leave, we are through.102

When the Canadian state learned that the Americans would not guarantee the re-entry of Caribbean workers to the United States after their term of temporary employment in Canada, the proposal was dropped. Again, according to the Deputy Minister,

This is the clincher. If they could not be assured of re-entry to the U.S. I wouldn't consider touching it even if all other aspects of the proposal were favourable, which of course they are not.103

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Thus, even though Canada was never legally, ideologically, nor morally bound to accept citizens of the Commonwealth as permanent settlers, it was concerned about the negative international reaction which would result from the forced repatriation of the 'Queen's subjects' from Canada. As noted, the reason they did not want these workers to remain in the country was that they would inevitably cause a 'race relations' problem by virtue of their supposed inassimilability.

**Why the Change of Position**

In the light of this, the shift in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration's publically articulated position requires explanation. First, its position that adequate supplies of labour would be available from within Canada if only farmers paid better wages and offered better working conditions was increasingly difficult to defend publicly by the mid-1960's. The mid-1960's saw a dramatic cut in the numbers of people unemployed in the country, and therefore a reduction in the supply of labour available from within the country for the fruit and vegetable harvest in Ontario. In January of 1965, for example, there were some 98,000 people who were fourteen years of age and older who were registered as unemployed in Ontario. In the previous year, this figure stood at 120,000, in 1963 it stood at 130,000, in 1962 it stood at 149,000, and in 1961 it stood at 202,000.105 Thus, the pool of unemployed workers which farmers could theoretically draw upon was cut in half within a five year period.

As such, there were important economic and structural reasons for the state's willingness to allow Ontario farmers to employ Caribbean workers generally, and incorporate them as unfree migrant labour in particular. But, as with the state's original denial of the requests, the decision was also structured by political and ideological relations. Recall from the previous chapter that in 1962, the Canadian state publically committed itself to a system of 'non-racialized' immigration control. Also recall that accompanying this public commitment were pressures coming from a number of Caribbean
state's for Canada to allow the entry to the country of more unskilled immigrant workers from the Caribbean. In this light, the Canadian state felt that its sanctioning of a migrant labour stream from the Caribbean would help defuse pressures being placed upon it to allow the entry of unskilled black people as permanent settlers to the country.

The Deputy Minister of Immigration, in a way which highlighted clearly the dialectics of economics, politics and ideology which went into the decision, stated that

Such a measure would not only meet the need of Canadian employers but it might also have a very real side effect of value to this Department. By admitting West Indian workers on a seasonal basis, it might be possible to reduce greatly the pressure on Canada to accept unskilled workers from the West Indies as immigrants. Moreover, seasonal farm workers would not have the privilege of sponsoring innumerable close relatives (to come and settle in the country).

This position was also confirmed in the context of the Department of Manpower and Immigration's preparations for the Canada-West Indies Conference discussed in the previous chapter. The Assistant Deputy Minister, in the position paper prepared for the conference, admitted that

from an immigration standpoint our only real concern is that seasonal workers may attempt to stay here permanently.

It is clear from the above that the representatives of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration saw the incorporation of Caribbean workers as unfree migrant labour both as a method to resolve a 'labour problem' and as a method that would prevent 'black' settlement in the country. Because contract labourers did not possess the right of permanent settlement, and could not become landed immigrants, they did not have the right to sponsor relatives to the country and the ability to increase the numbers of 'black' settlers. As the previous chapter has noted, this concern over 'black' settlement was based on the Departmental representatives racist belief that they would be the cause of a 'race relations' problem in the
country by virtue of their inability to assimilate and their lack of competitiveness.

The manner in which racism structured the state's decision to allocate Caribbean workers to a position in production relations as unfree migrant labour in the fruit and vegetable industry is highlighted further by an examination of how the state dealt with pressures coming from other sectors of the economy to employ Caribbean workers on a seasonal, contractual basis. The following examination of the state's strategy in dealing with requests from food processors, tobacco growers and mining companies (which was the result of the publicity accompanying the announcement of the program) points to the continuing importance of the process of racism and racialization in the structuration of the state's decision making procedures regarding the entry of foreign labour to the country.

In late April of 1966, Garth Mathews of the Ontario Food Processors Association (OFPA), an umbrella organization which represented the interests of forty-eight fruit and vegetable processing companies in southern Ontario, including H.J. Heinz Co., Libby, McNeill & Libby Co., Green Giant of Canada, Ltd, Campbell Soup Co., and Canadian Canners Ltd. (a subsidiary of Del Monte), wrote to the Deputy Minister of Manpower and Immigration to request a meeting with members of his association in order to discuss the possibility of processors making use of Caribbean migrant labour. In the letter, Mathews claimed that processors in the province had experienced serious shortages of labour during the previous year. Mathews claimed that, in 1965, a survey of seven of the forty-eight companies which employed labour in processing fruits and vegetables, showed that the average daily shortage of labour was 375 males and 904 females, and the highest single day's shortage was for 487 males and 1,162 females.\(^\text{100}\)

Even though the fruit and vegetable processors were in a superior position in relation to growers to the extent that they constituted a virtual oligopoly which could set the prices which farmers received
for their outputs, they too were experiencing their own version of the cost-price squeeze. As chapter five has shown, low tariffs on processed fruit and vegetable imports, and rising wages for workers in the industry, suggests that they too were facing economic difficulties.

At the meeting, which was held on May 5, 1966, representatives of the association told the departmental officials that a survey conducted that year showed that for the nine largest food processors in the province there would be a shortage of 1,500 male and 650 female workers. They asked the representatives whether they could import some 650 male Jamaican workers on the same basis as the growers. The Deputy Minister remained non-committal on the matter but agreed to discuss it with other members of the department.

Privately, the officials of the department were hesitant about agreeing to the processors request. Their hesitation was based in part, on racist and sexist assumptions concerning sexual relations between 'black' men and 'white' women. In a manner consistent with the findings of chapter seven, 'black' men were defined as especially libidinous and as having difficulty in controlling their sexual urges. Similarly, it was felt that 'white' females, who would be working and sleeping in physical proximity to 'black' men, would be unable to resist the sexual 'temptations' which would 'inevitably' arise. In addition, it was also based on the definition of the inherent working capacities of 'black' males from the Caribbean. Like the Mexican 'Bracero' workers who entered the United States in the 1940's and 1950's, Caribbean workers were defined as 'beasts of burden' who by virtue of their physical stature were capable of certain kinds of work but incapable of others: it was believed that they were particularly able to withstand heat and to maintain stooped positions for long periods of time without becoming weary.

Both concerns were articulated succinctly by L. Coulson, the Regional Employment Officer, of the Department of Manpower and Immigration.
these operations [processing] require a high content of female labour and to introduce Jamaican males into the plants and provide accommodation adjacent to that used by domestic female labour could create social difficulties. Moreover, the Jamaican male is adapted to field rather than factory work and while the processors felt that they could train them to the latter, it does not seem they could hope to staff plants entirely with this labour. These factors are not present in field employment. The Jamaicans are adapted to the work, the work units are smaller and there need not be a male-female, or even a Jamaican-domestic mix of male labour on any one operation ...."11

These factors led Coulson to suggest that the Jamaican 'experiment' be confined to growers during the 1966 season.12 Tom Kent, the Deputy Minister of the Department of Manpower and Immigration (and himself a post-war immigrant from England) agreed with Coulson's assessment of the 'problem'.

There are some obvious and very difficult problems involved in this proposition. Perhaps the most serious are the social difficulties that might develop when groups of Negroes are working among, and far outnumbered by, Canadian female workers. My initial reaction to the proposal was to advise that it be turned down on the grounds that one experiment of this kind is enough for this year, i.e., let us see how successful is the movement for the growers and what problems arise before extending it to the processors.13

Kent felt, however, that there was one weakness in their approach. Because of the terms of the contract, few farmers had made requests for Jamaican labourers. He felt that the low level of subscription on the part of farmers would prove to be grounds for further criticism of the government by farmers and also be disappointing to the Caribbean governments. Kent's strategy, then was to recommend that if the growers did not request more than five hundred workers before the 20th of May, and notwithstanding the two 'problems' they identified, then the department would agree to recruit up to six hundred Jamaican workers for the processors.14 Growers did not request anywhere near the five hundred workers by the 20th of May, and so when the deadline arrived the processors were informed that
they would be allowed to make use of workers from the Caribbean along broadly similar lines as the growers.113

The concern over 'race relations' on the shop floor, and the view that Jamaican males were 'suited' to 'field labour' and not 'factory labour' also appears to have been behind the state's refusal to allow mining companies in northern Ontario the use of Caribbean migrant labour when request was made by the Jamaican government that Caribbean workers be recruited on a contractual basis for that industry also.113

Finally, the state representatives also articulated a concern over social stability and productivity in the workplace when Ontario tobacco growers requested that they be allowed to make use of labour from the West Indies or Mexico on a seasonal, contractual basis in the same way that fruit and vegetable growers were allowed. One of the little known features of this movement (and one which George Haythorne, the Deputy Minister of Labour at the time chose not to mention in his 'academic' book Labour in Canadian Agriculture) was that the Canadian state requested to the American authorities that

no coloured workers [be] included in those selected ... for work in the tobacco fields of Ontario.117

The representatives of the Department of Manpower and Immigration were against the tobacco growers' request for West Indian labour because

it might be very dangerous to mix the racially sensitive West Indians with the Southern United States workers now entering. The result could be to ruin the existing U.S. movement.116

In the end, representatives of the government suggested that the tobacco growers recruit more American workers for their harvest.

The state's construction of the 'problem' is consistent with its previous concern over the creation of a 'race relations' problem in the country by the migration of 'black' people. It defined the
'problem' not as the racist harrassment of 'black' workers by the 'white' workers from the American south, but rather as the 'racial sensitivities of 'black' people. This meant that the state could define any potential claims made by 'black' workers about racist harrassment as stemming from their 'suspicious' natures.

Furthermore, the statement clearly suggests that the Canadian state would rather allow the entry to the country of racist American workers than workers from the West Indies. When faced with the option of having either 'white' American workers or 'black' Caribbean workers, it clearly imposed a racialized hierarchy of desirability over who entered the country. It was also a racist hierarchy because 'black' workers were attributed with negative attributes by virtue of their being defined as the cause of 'race relations' problems.

The Reproduction of the Migrant Labour System

The seasonal migration to Canada of workers from the Caribbean on a temporary and contractual basis has been occurring for over twenty years now. It has expanded along several dimensions and some of the employment conditions have changed slightly. From the first 264 workers admitted in 1966, the migration has expanded to the point where during the late 1970's and early 1980's an annual average of 4,700 men (and a small number of women) enter the country to sell their labour power to Ontario farmers for anywhere from between six weeks and eight months per year.119 The workers now come from a number of Caribbean countries. Workers from Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago were allowed entry to the country under this arrangement in 1967, and in 1976, workers from the Eastern Caribbean countries of Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent were included as source countries. Collectively, the workers from the Caribbean constitute about five per cent of the total harvest labour force in Ontario and over 50% of the total number of workers who are formally mobilized by the Canadian state for the Ontario harvest. Furthermore, when the migration began in 1966, thirty-one employers hired Caribbean farmworkers; between

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1981 and 1985, an annual average of 925 employers hired one or more Caribbean workers.\textsuperscript{120} Thus, approximately five per cent of the Ontario growers who hire any wage labour at all, hire at least some Caribbean workers.\textsuperscript{121}

Despite some opposition from sections of organized labour to Ontario growers' recruitment of Caribbean migrant labour\textsuperscript{122}, and relatively high rates of unemployment, especially during the late 1970's and early 1980's, Caribbean workers are now identified by the Canadian state and Ontario farmers as forming a 'nucleus', or 'core' labour force which is a structural component of the fruit and vegetable harvest. For example, in its recommendations for the 1971 harvest season, the Windsor Employment Office of the Department of Manpower and Immigration suggested that

... the West Indian source of labour supply must remain available to vegetable growers ... and to apple growers ... in order to provide a 'core' of labour guaranteed to be on the job till the harvest is finished. Canadian labour, available when needed, will then be used to fill out the 'core' workers to full operational strength.\textsuperscript{123}

But in addition to the workers' constitution as a 'core' labour force that growers can rely upon for the duration of the harvest, the absence of worker claims for permanent settlement based on the ties of the Commonwealth has played a key role in why the migrant labour stream has been reproduced. While some workers go 'AWOL' in the country, the proportion of such workers in any one year is small and is usually no more than one or two per cent.\textsuperscript{124} Furthermore, while some workers would like to remain in the country, few, if any, appear to have pressed their cases to remain in the country by formal reference to their status as citizens of the Commonwealth.

Furthermore, the state's ability to render the workers relatively 'invisible' socially (which is due to their status as unfree migrant labour), has meant that there has been limited or no hostile racist reaction from the Canadian population. The comparative absence of racist hostility on production sites, or in the communities near where

\textsuperscript{295}
they live, has played a key role in why the migration has been reproduced, and extended to the fruit and vegetable processing industry and to the tobacco harvest. In the state's assessment of the 1969 movement, the Assistant Deputy Minister of the Department of Manpower and Immigration stated that

They [Caribbean farmworkers] remain in their accommodation during the evenings and there have not been any problems with people in local communities. In many cases, workers come to Canada and return home before local residents become aware of their presence."

The state appears, however, to take the view that if 'social problems' associated with the presence of Caribbean workers do emerge, then these problems are caused by the workers presence in the country, and not the racist harassment they might be subject to by the indigenous population. For example, the state's evaluation of the first year of the movement stated that

There were very few social problems. The workers, for their part, were happy in Canada and did not sense any discrimination. Canadians interviewed at work and outside, found the Jamaicans to be generally polite, clean, neat, honest and well-behaved. While the workers patronized local taverns on Saturday nights, they did not cause any trouble and were accepted by other customers."

Thus, because they are 'black', from the Canadian state's point of view, they will always constitute potential causes of a 'race relations' problem in the country.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the Canadian state was faced with the option of recruiting Caribbean migrant workers from as early as 1947. The Canadian state's decision to not allow south western Ontario fruit and vegetable growers the opportunity to make use of Caribbean migrant labour between 1947 and 1966, and its subsequent decision to incorporate Caribbean workers as unfree migrant labour, was not based on the simple question of the supply and demand for
labour. Rather, it was structured by the idea of 'race', and an ideology of racial superiority and inferiority. The state's fundamental concern in the context of the entry, recruitment and employment of Caribbean migrant labour in Canada, was not so much whether they had jobs or not, or whether they would take jobs away from Canadians, but rather that this group might come to constitute a settler population in the country. They were defined by the state as a qualitatively different 'race' of people, who, in a racist manner were further defined as possessing certain negatively evaluated traits. Their simple presence in the country was seen to constitute a threat to social order and therefore the state was unwilling to allow these people even temporary entry. But the process of racialization, again accompanied by an ideology of racism, also structured their incorporation as unfree migrant labour in the country. Given pressure to admit people from the Caribbean as permanent settlers, incorporation as unfree migrant labour meant that a 'labour problem' could be resolved at the same time that a political/ideological problem was resolved. The state could reduce pressure to admit permanent settlers, fill a labour shortage, and not increase further the the size of the 'black' population in Canada by incorporation as unfree migrant labour.

In sum, the underlying theme of the evidence presented suggests that the Canadian state constructed 'race', or 'colour' as a problem. The state's initial strategy to deal with the 'problem' was pre-emptive. It restricted the entry of people it defined as the source of the 'problem', namely 'black' people. But given this solution was increasingly impractical in light of the high demand for labour in the southwestern Ontario fruit and vegetable industry, the state's second line of 'defence' against the 'problem' was to carefully control the workers' conditions of entry, their circulation in the labour market, and their exit from the country.
CONCLUSION

MODES OF INCORPORATION

It is the very qualities (real or imagined) that make certain groups particularly suitable for their role as workers that make them unsuitable for membership in the receiving society. Shared by all classes and strata in the receiving society, these integrative concerns, whether expressed in manifestly xenophobic ideologies or by way of euphemistic codes, universally impinge upon the determination of immigration policy. The conflicting interests of industrial societies—to maximize the labor supply and to protect cultural integrity—can be thought of as a dilemma to which a limited number of solutions are possible.

Introduction

The explanation of the dynamics of international labour migration must make reference to the process of capital accumulation. During the historical period when capitalist relations of production have been hegemonic within the world system, many of the people who have migrated to social formations different from the one they were born and raised in have been forced into migration because of economic displacement associated with the penetration of capitalist relations of production in agriculture or by an increase in the organic composition of capital. Similarly, the patterns of labour demand within particular social formations are structured by the dynamics of the process of capital accumulation. As such, international migrations have important effects on capital accumulation in terms of augmenting the size and/or composition of the reserve and/or active labour armies in labour importing formations.

But, an analysis of international migration to Canada which concentrates solely on its relationship to the process of the capital accumulation is inadequate for two reasons. First, migrations to
Canada have occurred prior in time to the period when capitalist relations of production have been established. Migration has therefore played a key part in the initial formation of capitalist relations of production via its role in the creation of a class of free wage labour. And second, during the period in which capitalist relations of production have been both dominant and determinant, the entry to, and subsequent incorporation in Canada of people born and raised outside of the boundaries of the nation state has been structured by a variety of economic and political and ideological relations. The latter relations, while structured by need to maintain the political and ideological conditions which accompany and sustain commodity production, cannot be derived solely from the operation of the process of capital accumulation.

The presence of political and ideological relations which are inherent parts of the state's system of migration control have meant that there have been qualitatively different modes by which foreign-born persons have been incorporated into sites in production relations in the country. Through the examination of Chinese migration to Canada during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and of post-1945 international migration to the southwestern Ontario fruit and vegetable industry, three distinct modes of incorporation of foreign-born labour have been identified. Chapters four through eight have suggested that during the period when capitalist relations of production have been predominant in Canada, people born and raised outside of the boundaries of the nation state have been incorporated as free immigrant labour, unfree immigrant labour, and unfree migrant labour.

There are two main aims of this conclusion. First, it highlights the analytical significance of migration for the process of the formation of capitalist relations of production. It suggests that migration was an aspect of the primitive accumulation of capital in the country. And second, it seeks to analytically justify the concept modes of incorporation and demonstrate that particular modes of incorporation, and the state's regulation of the permiability of
national boundaries generally, are the outcome of a complex of historically constituted, economic, political and ideological relations which cannot be derived mechanically from the immediate exigencies of the process of capital accumulation.

Migration and the Formation of a Proletariat

Given that capitalist relations of production are historically constituted rather than a natural and universal set of relations, there must be a process whereby these relations are created and then reproduced. The former process is referred to by Marx (1967: 713) as the primitive, or primary accumulation of capital. Marx, in his analysis of the workings of the capitalist mode of production, was concerned primarily with the process of primitive accumulation in Britain. In Britain, this process occurred over a period of centuries. The formation of a class of free wage labour involved the breaking of the bands of feudal retainers in the 15th and 16th centuries, the breaking up of the estates of the Catholic Church during the Reformation, the enclosures of the common lands and their transformation into private property of landlords in the 18th century, and the clearing of estates, which took its most extreme form in the Highland Clearances during the late 18th and early 19th centuries. These processes resulted in the denial of agricultural producers access to land, and thus forced them to sell their labour power as a commodity for a wage in a market.

The second moment of primitive accumulation, the accumulation of wealth, money, property and means of production in private hands (or the formation of a class which purchased and exploited wage labour in the processes of commodity production) is now a matter of theoretical and empirical debate. To use Marx's, the debate focuses on whether 'the producer becomes merchant and capitalist ... or else, the merchant establishes direct sway over production'. Within both formulations, however, the process is linked to the colonial system. The colonies provided a market for goods manufactured in Britain, and constituted a source of wealth which could be transformed into capital.
and expanded means of production. Other consequences of the colonial system which had a bearing on this aspect of primitive accumulation included the development of trade, credit and banking systems along with the formation of a national debt.

Marx did not examine in any detail the two moments of the process of primitive accumulation as they occurred in other social and historical contexts. However, he did suggest that the process of the formation of a proletariat and a bourgeoisie was an historically variable phenomenon. This was the case because he viewed capitalist development as always occurring within given historically variable material conditions. For example, with regard to the question of the formation of a class of free wage labour, he suggested that

The history of this expropriation, in different countries, assumes different aspects, and runs through its various phases in different orders of succession, and at different periods. Thus, the particular manner in which groups of people are transformed into a class of free wage labour is always a historically specific processes founded on prior historical conditions.

Even though Marx's few comments about the process of primitive accumulation in general, and the formation of a class of free wage labour in particular, within the settler colonies of Canada, Australia and New Zealand are not systematically developed, they are nevertheless instructive. In his critique of the work of Wakefield, Marx pointed to the analytical and historical importance of the presence of free wage labour for the development of capitalist relations of production. Marx argued that while Wakefield did not discover 'anything new' about the colonies of Australia, New Zealand and Canada, he did discover 'in the colonies the truth as to the conditions of capitalist production in the mother country'; the primary condition being the presence of a mass of free workers, who because of economic compulsion, had to sell their labour power for a wage in the market. Marx suggested that
the essence of a free colony ... consists in this--that the
bulk of the soil is still public property, and every settler
on it therefore can turn part of it into his private
property and individual means of production, without
hindering the later settlers in the same operation. This is
the secret both of the prosperity of the colonies and its
inveterate vice--opposition to the establishment of
capital."

The 'inveterate vice' which Marx identified in this context was the
fact that the presence of a shortage of labour (precipitated by the
availability of land which was free or inexpensive to purchase)
deterred capitalist investment. Capitalists, he claimed, were
hesitant to invest in the colonies because of uncertainties over the
availability of labour power to exploit. Many of those who initially
migrated as free immigrants, along with their offspring, took up
positions on the land as petite agricultural commodity producers and
did not sell their labour power for a wage. Many were able to retain
the surplus they produced, and hence increase their general
prosperity. Thus, many of the first immigrants to the country did not
contribute to the formation, let alone augmentation of a labour force,
but rather to the formation of a class of independent commodity
producers."

There is a large body of political economy oriented literature in
Canada regarding the formation of the Canadian capitalist class."1
Questions which are asked less often in the case of Canada are: how
was the 'inveterate vice' identified by Marx overcome, and how was the
class of free wage labour formed? It was these latter questions
which were examined in chapter three."4

Unlike other settler capitalist formations, the Canadian colonies
were initially of value for their commercial possibilities. They
possessed several commodities which were of value to European based
mercantilist traders. As chapter three has shown, employers in
eastern Canada who required the use of more labour power than they and
their immediate family members could provide for the process of
commodity production were forced into developing extra-economic
mechanisms for the recruitment and retention of labour power. Thus, during the initial period of settlement, the production of commodities for export to Britain, as well as the production of a limited number of commodities destined for internal consumption, were produced via the use of various forms of unfree labour. Some of the mechanisms of labour control involved the formal sanction of the state, for example slavery, indentured servitude, and convict labour. Other mechanisms, most notably what Pentland has called 'paternalism', did not involve the formal sanction of the state. Under paternalistic relations, control over the circulation of labour in the market was achieved by the development of close personal bonds by employers with his/her employees. We have also seen that aboriginal peoples played a key role in the economic reproduction of the colony during the period of the dominance of the fur trade, which lasted until the early years of the 19th century. Their labour was used extensively in the extraction of furs from the environment and in the processing of pelts into usable furs for hatmaking in Europe.

After the decline of the fur trade, the aboriginal population was defined as a potential future industrial labour force. But it was also envisioned first by the colonial, and then by the Canadian state that members of the aboriginal population would have to go through a 'civilizing' process before they could become productive wage labourers and full members of the 'Canadian nation'. The aboriginal population did not come to participate in the process of commodity production via the sale of their labour power to the extent and in the manner originally envisaged by the state. They did not, in part, because of their resistance to the 'civilizing' mission to which they were subject, in part, because of racist employment practices which precluded their employment in industry, and in part, because they retained access to the means of production in the form of land. The latter points to a more general contradiction inherent in the reserve system to the extent that access to land tends to reduce economic compulsion to sell labour power for wages. However, even if these attempts at 'civilization' and incorporation as free wage labour had been 'successful' from the Canadian state's point of view, the size of
the aboriginal population was not large enough to satisfy the emergent demand for wage labour. By the time of Confederation, there were only 102,000 aboriginal peoples in the country, and they constituted only about 2.5% of the total population. It was only in the middle of the 19th century that access to land in eastern Canada became restricted enough for the emergence of a class of people who were forced by economic compulsion to sell their labour power for wages. Evidence suggests that much of the best, and even much of the worst land in Ontario was in private hands in the 1840's because of lavish land grants by colonial administrators to Loyalists and ex-military personnel. Coupled with the large scale migration to Canada of Irish Catholics in the 1840's, there emerged in Canada a class of free wage labour, and a capitalist labour market.

According to Pentland, the Irish Catholics had little or no desire to take up positions on the land as petite agricultural commodity producers because of their horrific experiences with subsistence agriculture in Ireland. While he overstates the degree of 'free choice' the Irish immigrants exercised over the form of economic activity they engaged in, and while his explanation of why different immigrant groups were differentially located in economic relations is idealistic, the important point is that they constituted a group who were forced by economic necessity to sell their labour power for wages. Employers could draw upon their labour power at will. Because there was a labour supply which exceeded demand, employers could purchase quantities and qualities of labour power in the market when they were required, and therefore did not have to develop extra-economic measures of coercion to recruit and retain labour power. In this context, then, migration contributed to the formation of a proletariat and reserve army of labour (not simply their augmentation) and to the partial dissolution of social/productive relations based on the use of unfree labour.

Contrary to Denoon, then, if capitalism is defined as a mode of production, Canada (along with other settler capitalist societies) was
not a 'capitalist' society from the start of European settlement. It is true that commodity production for the market (in the form of fish, furs and timber) was a defining feature of economic life in Canada from the start of settlement, and that with the exception of New France (which later became Lower Canada) the institution of private property was established early in the life of the colonies that eventually went on to make up Canada. But if capitalism is defined as a particular form of commodity production, as Denoon himself does, the existence of private property alone does not mean that a society is capitalist. Thus, in suggesting that settler capitalist societies were capitalist from the start of European settlement, Denoon fails to appreciate the historical significance of a process of primitive accumulation, and the analytical significance of the use of unfree labour. Strictly speaking, in the original absence of a class of free wage labour, no society can be 'capitalist from the start'. Before capitalist relations of production can be reproduced, they must be initially established.

In light of this and the discussion in chapter three, it makes more sense, following Pentland and Palmer to characterize Canada before 1850 as a social formation where merchant wealth predominated, where production was organized primarily for subsistence production, the export of raw materials and semi-finished goods, and where such production occurred via the use of various forms of unfree labour. It is this period which Palmer has described as the phase of primitive accumulation of capital in Canada. There was, accordingly, an articulation of modes of production in which paternalism was both dominant and determinant. It was only in the middle of the 19th century, with large scale Irish migration, and the arrival of large amounts of British portfolio investment, that a class of capitalist employers emerged who produced goods for the market via the exploitation of free wage labour. Thus, if capitalism is defined as a particular mode of production, Canada only became 'capitalist' in the middle of the nineteenth century with the formation of a proletariat via the large scale international migration of labour from one area of the periphery to another.
As chapters four through eight have suggested, in a context where the capitalist mode of production is present within a social formation, migration continues to play a fundamental role in the development of capitalism through its augmentation of the size and composition of the reserve and/or active labour armies. But, explanations of the spatial mobility of labour across international boundaries which focus solely on the process of capital accumulation are inadequate insofar as they do not leave conceptual space for the state, nor for a distinction between different forms of migration under capitalism.

The examination of Chinese migration to Canada around the turn of the century presented in chapter four, and of the migration of workers to the south western Ontario fruit and vegetable industry presented in part three suggests, contra Castles and Kosack, et. al., that the state plays a central role in the process of migration via its regulation of who crosses the national boundaries, and the conditions under which certain groups are allowed to cross those boundaries. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that 'immigrants' are not a homogeneous analytical category. These theoretical issues are considered in the context of the concept modes of incorporation. The term mode of incorporation refers, as noted in chapter two, to the manner in which foreign-born workers articulate with capital and the state. Three analytically distinct modes of incorporation are discussed further in the sections which follow. These modes of incorporation are designated as: free immigrant labour, unfree immigrant labour, and unfree migrant labour.

Free Immigrant Labour

The category of free immigrant labour consists of those foreign-born persons who are allowed entry to a country as permanent settlers, and whose ability to work and stay in the country is not restricted by the state. They are free to take up any position in the division of labour, and can therefore circulate freely within the labour market.
The vast majority of people from Europe who entered Canada in search of work between 1947 and 1972 were, upon entry to the country, allocated a position in production relations as free immigrant wage labour.30 Once they entered the country, they could circulate freely in the labour market and take up any position offered to them by employers. Admittedly, many faced compulsion to sell their labour power to owners of the means of production for wages, but this compulsion was economic in nature and derived from their non-ownership of means of production. After five years of residence in the country, they qualified for citizenship, and as a result they possessed the same rights and privileges as other Canadian citizens. In many respects, then, once they entered the country, they occupied positions in economic, political and ideological relations which paralleled that of indigenous classes.

A certain indeterminate portion of the flow of free immigrant workers from Europe initially took up wage labour positions in Canadian agriculture in general, and the Ontario fruit and vegetable industry in particular, independently of the state. As demonstrated in chapter six, there were at least two instances where there was some degree of state direction involved (in that jobs were arranged by the state before they arrived in the country). People from Holland recruited by the Canadian state to initially fill farm labour positions and then establish themselves on the land as petite agricultural commodity producers were defined as immigrants. They were selected as candidates for emigration by the Dutch government, in part, on the basis of the likelihood that they would become 'successfully established' on farms in Canada. The ability of Dutch farmers to initially enter the country, and their ability to subsequently remain in the country, was not conditional. They could stay in Canada indefinitely, and qualified for Canadian citizenship after five years of residence. Similarly, they could circulate freely within the Canadian labour market, and were therefore incorporated as a form of free immigrant labour.
Those who migrated under the state's Assisted Passages Loan Scheme were also defined by the state as free immigrants. Assisted Passage Loans were granted by the state to western European workers (and eventually their families) who could not afford to pay for their own transportation to the country. There were two conditions to the loan. First, workers were to repay the loans through deductions from their monthly pay packet, and second, persons were granted a loan only if they agreed to remain for one year in the jobs which they were allocated to by the state. The loan scheme can therefore be seen, in part, as an attempt by the state to recruit western European workers to the country as permanent settlers, and in part as an attempt to control the circulation of immigrant labour in the Canadian labour market.

The successive waves of western and southern Europeans who took advantage of this program to migrate to the country were thus defined and constituted as immigrants by the state. In fact, it was the state's desire to attract persons from western Europe as permanent settlers which led to the establishment of the scheme in the first instance. Formally, their ability to subsequently remain in the country was conditional upon their repayment of the loan and their remaining in the employment they were initially allocated to by the state for one year.

However, breaches of these conditions were frequent, and as a mechanism to control the circulation of immigrant labour in the labour market, the scheme was unsuccessful. The state did not rigorously enforce the conditions pertaining to their circulation in the labour market, nor was it particularly concerned if the loans were not repaid. Those who violated the terms of the contract were neither deported, nor threatened with deportation, nor subject to legal sanctions under Canadian law in the same way that Polish veterans and Displaced Persons earlier were. The contracts, then, were largely symbolic, and had no practical effect on immobilizing these workers in particular positions for one year after their entry to the country. Thus, even though they were recruited under contracts and thus
formally unable to circulate in the Canadian labour market for a period of one year after their entry to the country, in practical terms the Assisted Passages' immigrants were incorporated into sites in production relations as free wage labour.

The labour market behaviour of free immigrants pointed to an important contradiction in the state's use of this mode of incorporation to fill positions which indigenous labour did not want to fill. In the absence of extra-economic measures of coercion which restricted their ability to circulate in the labour market, and in the absence of informal employment practices which discriminated against their employment in better paying sectors of the economy, free immigrants tended not to remain in work which was unattractive, poor paying, arduous and difficult to fill with Canadian labour. From the Canadian state's point of view, the recruitment of free immigrant labour did not solve 'labour problems' which derived from the structural conditions associated with farm labour employment.

Unfree Immigrant Labour

Not all entrants to Canada after the second world war have been immigrants who were allocated a position in production relations as free wage labour. Similarly, the use of unfree labour in Canada did not disappear, as Pentland claims, with the formation of a well stocked labour market in the middle of the 19th century. While Polish veterans and Displaced Persons were both formally defined as immigrants by the Canadian state, they were initially incorporated into sites in production relations as unfree wage labour. As such, they are termed unfree immigrant labour. The category of unfree immigrant labour refers, then, to those foreign-born persons who are granted the right of permanent residence by the state, but who face political and legal restrictions over their circulation in the labour market. Theoretically, these restrictions can either be temporary or permanent in nature.
Polish war veterans and Displaced Persons were considered by the Canadian state as immigrants to the extent that it was hoped they would become permanent settlers, and that they were granted the right of permanent residence upon completion of the terms of the contract. The Polish Veterans and Displaced Persons, like other immigrant groups, qualified for citizenship after five years of continuous residence in Canada. But, there was an initial two-year formal separation of the processes of labour force maintenance and labour force renewal, in that those who were married could not migrate to the country with their spouses and children. They could only send for their relatives after they completed the terms of the contracts. Being granted Canadian citizenship meant that they could then sponsor for settlement in the country a range of other relatives, including their fathers, mothers, and brothers and sisters.

The state played an essential role in their incorporation as unfree immigrant labour in the country. They were initially recruited to the country by the state. Agents of the state were sent to refugee camps in western and southern Europe to select candidates for permanent settlement. Their entry into the country, and their subsequent ability to remain in the country, was conditional upon their signing a labour contract. In the case of Polish veterans, the contracts stipulated, among other things, that they were to remain in the farm labour employment that was chosen for them by the state for a period of two years after their entry to the country. For Displaced Persons, this condition was reduced to one year. During the terms of their contract, they could not quit or change jobs without the formal sanction of the state. But even if they were allowed by the state to change jobs, they had to remain in farm labour employment. Thus, Polish veterans for their first two years in the country, and Displaced Persons for their first year in the country, could not circulate freely in the Canadian labour market and could not take up any position offered to them by employers.

Contrary to those recruited under the state's Assisted Passages Loan Scheme, the terms of the contract were actively enforced by the
state, especially those which pertained to remaining in the jobs for which they were recruited. The state attempted to enforce the terms of the contract, and suppress resistance to incorporation as unfree labour by threatening them with deportation. The Polish veterans were threatened with deportation to Britain, and Displaced Persons were threatened with deportation to refugee camps in western Europe. The state also threatened to not allow their close relatives to come to Canada if they broke the terms of the contract.

While none of the Polish veterans and Displaced Persons were actually deported for circulating in the labour market, this does not mean that the state was simply 'bluffing', and that its threats were 'empty'. Given that Displaced Persons faced, at worst, execution, and at best, several years of hard labour if they returned to eastern Europe from the west\textsuperscript{14}, and given that many of them had relatives who were waiting in the refugee camps to migrate to Canada, the Canadian state's threats to deport these people manipulated and took advantage of their marginal political/legal status in the country.

Unfree Migrant Labour

The category of unfree migrant labour refers to those foreign-born persons whose ability to work and remain within a social formation is limited by the state. They possess the right of only temporary entry to the country. They are also subject to political/legal constraints over their circulation in the labour market. Two groups of unfree migrant labourers have been discussed primarily in this thesis: Chinese contract labourers and Caribbean farmworkers (similar arguments could be made in the case of American tobacco workers also).

Chinese labourers initially possessed the status of non-settlers, or migrant labour, although some eventually settled permanently.\textsuperscript{21} Sir John A. MacDonald, the Prime Minister at the time of their entry to the country as railroad construction workers, was explicit about the status these workers possessed in the eyes of the state. They
were recruited primarily for work on the railroad, and therefore admitted to the country because they filled a labour shortage. It was felt also felt, however, that they are not likely ... to be permanent settlers .... [After] they have finished this particular work, they can go back to China again.365

In the case of those employed in the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railroad there was an agreement between the workers and the contractor that the latter would pay for the costs of their return to China. This facet of the contract was not lived up to by the contractor. Further, because they were defined as non-settlers, they were accorded an inferior status in political/legal relations by being denied the franchise.37 Similarly, the British Columbia provincial legislature, following on agitation by the 'white' working class, instituted various pieces of legislation which prohibited their employment in certain industries in the province.

Insofar as they were defined as unsuitable material for permanent settlement, they were not accorded the same legal rights as 'bona fide' settlers. The head taxes of first $50.00, then $100.00 and finally $500.00 per person were designed by the federal government to discourage their entry, and obstruct the process of permanent settlement and family reunification. Unlike the family members of Chinese petite bourgeois merchants, the immediate family members of the labourers were required to pay the head tax. After the passage of the Chinese Immigration Act it was illegal for Chinese labourers in Canada to bring to the country their spouses and children who had initially remained in China. In this case, then, the Chinese labourers were defined by the state as non-settlers, and the state attempted to maintain a coercive geographical and institutional separation of the processes of labour force maintenance and labour force renewal.

Chinese migrant workers in Canada during the late 19th and early 20th centuries also occupied positions in production relations in the
country as unfree wage labour. There were two dimensions to the Chinese labourers' condition of unfreedom. First, they were a form of unfree labour by virtue of the relations of debt bondage they were recruited under. And second, they were a form of unfree labour by virtue of the state sanctioned restrictions over their ability to circulate in the Canadian labour market.

As chapter four has demonstrated, Chinese labourers who entered Canada during the late 19th century were unable to pay the costs of their own transportation to the country in order to sell their labour power for a wage. In order to migrate in search of wage labour, then, they entered into a debt with a labour contractor. The contractor possessed a lien on the worker's services until the debt was repaid. The contractor found work for the person, and took responsibility for the provision of food and shelter for the worker during the periods in which they were employed and unemployed. While the workers received a wage in return for their labour power, the wage was initially paid to the contractor who subtracted a certain predetermined amount in repayment of the debt and of the day to day expenditures on the maintenance of the worker. A labourer who entered into such a contract could not circulate freely in the labour market. Once a contract was entered into, the subsequent labour market decisions about to whom their labour power would be sold, and at what price, were made by the labour contractors.

Under direct service contracts, workers were recruited specifically for the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway. Direct service contracts were also a form of debt bondage to the extent that a labour broker paid for the transportation costs in return for a portion of the wage the worker received from employment in Canada. Until the debt was repaid, the contractor exercised control over the manner in which the worker's labour power was disposed of. Thus, even though there was a wage element involved in the social relations under which they were employed, it was not the primary mechanism by which the workers were retained by employers. Ultimate control over the labourer's circulation in the market was
exercised via the Chinese agents, or bookmen, who were representatives of the Six Companies of Kwangtung or other labour contracting companies.

In both cases, there was not a full commodification of the purchase, sale and reproduction of their labour power. In terms of the latter, those recruited under direct service contracts were required to purchase their daily provisions at the company store, which meant that they did not enter the market to purchase the commodities required for their physical reproduction. Similarly, in the case of employment under the credit ticket system, the workers were provided with food and shelter by the contractors, for which they also deducted a certain amount from their wages. They too did not enter the nexus of commodity relations for their daily physical reproduction.

In the case of direct service and credit ticket migrants, the state played both a direct and indirect role in their constitution as unfree labour. The state was aware of the fact that the contractor for the C.P.R. was importing workers under a form of debt bondage. Furthermore, the state appears to have been aware of the operation of the credit ticket system at least since the Royal Commission hearings in 1885. While it appears that the state did not actively intervene in the enforcement of the terms of the contract, the state informally sanctioned the relations of unfreedom by not constituting them as illegal. However, to the extent that the state-imposed head taxes increased the burden of debt the worker had to repay to the company, and accordingly lengthened the period of debt bondage, then it can be said that the state played a more direct role in lengthening the period of unfreedom.

According to Cloud and Galenson, it was the Chinese labour contractors who were the primary agents of social control. This occurred not so much through their use, or threatened use, of physical violence, but rather through their control over the means of return transportation to China. The Six Companies of Kwangtung had an
arrangement with the steamship companies which plied the waters between the west coast of North America and China. This arrangement provided that Chinese persons were not allowed to board ships bound for China without a certificate indicating that they cleared themselves of all debts to the company. The success of this control mechanism was premised on the fact that most of those who entered into a debt with the Companies hoped to eventually return to China with their accumulated savings to purchase small plots of land of their own. 39

In both cases, the period of unfreedom was temporary. They were constituted as unfree labour until such a time that they repaid their original debts along with the interest which accrued on those debts. Thus, their condition approximated that of indentured servitude because the contracts provided for the eventual freedom of the debtor. 40 It also differed in important respects from indentured servitude. First, the contracts were usually verbal, and not written as they tended to be in the case of indentured servitude. Second, the legal status of the contracts of Chinese labourers was vague, whereas during the periods when indentured servitude was in operation it had the sanction of law. And third, the period of unfreedom was not fixed in advance. It varied on the basis of employment opportunities in Canada and the wage which the workers received.

There was, however, a sense in which the state intervened directly in their constitution as unfree labour. This intervention lent a relative permanence to their unfreedom. The various practices which excluded their employment on public works, on crown owned lands, the construction of certain railroads, from underground employment in coal mines, and which provided that they could not take up the positions of law or pharmacy, nor purchase crown owned land to become petite agricultural commodity producers, were all sanctioned by law by the various levels of the Canadian state. Thus, even those Chinese labourers who remained in Canada after they freed themselves from their debt bondage remained unable to circulate freely in the Canadian labour market. They were subject to political/legal relations which
structured to whom they could sell their labour power. As such, they remained a form of unfree wage labour in Canada until all such restrictions were formally lifted in the 1940's.

Like the Chinese labourers, workers from the Caribbean who are presently recruited under contract to fill labour shortages in the south western Ontario fruit and vegetable industry are constituted as a form of unfree migrant labour. They are granted the right of only temporary entry to the country by the state, and have in practice, not been allowed by the state to become permanent settlers. Furthermore, they cannot circulate within the Canadian labour market.

The case of Caribbean farm worker migration to Canada constitutes an interesting empirical test of Castles, et. al. claim, noted in chapter one, that permanent settlement and family reunification are 'natural and inevitable' features of the migration process." It suggests, contrary to Castles, et. al., as well as Zolberg that the migrant labour system is not necessarily unstable and that it can be maintained over time under certain conditions.42

This migrant labour system has been in place for over twenty years now, and few of the persons coming to Canada under this arrangement have become immigrants. This is the case even though many of the workers want to settle permanently in the country. The desire to remain in Canada permanently was readily apparent after the first year of the migration. For instance one worker told the Chatham Daily News that 'I like the place, the people and the climate is not too bad ... I would like to live here permanently'.43 The desire to remain in the country continues to be articulated, and is not simply the wish of isolated individuals. In a survey of a sample of Caribbean workers employed in Canada during the 1983 harvest, it was found that 38% of those from Barbados, 67% of those from Grenada, and 24% from St. Vincent thought at one time of migrating to Canada as permanent settlers.44
With the exception of those workers who marry a Canadian citizen or permanent resident of the country, the state has consistently denied these workers the status of 'immigrant'. Its position on this matter was outlined succinctly after the 1966 harvest and has remained the same since then:

when the government approved the special experiment this year [1966] it was solely to relieve a shortage [sic] of seasonal harvest labor in Ontario. It had been clearly stated the workers must leave Canada on completion of their contracts and must not use this means of gaining immigrant status.\(^{46}\)

The state is able to maintain the system of migrant labour, in part, then, because the positions which the workers fill are by and large temporary. Furthermore, in those few cases where the jobs they fill are relatively permanent in nature, the state ensures that workers return to the Caribbean at least once a year and do not bring their relatives to Canada. This confirms Burawoy's more general observation that 'the volume of migrant labour is not something to be taken as given but is created and recreated by the state'.\(^{46}\) Thus, when systems of migrant labour become transformed into settler migrations, the process has to be explained, and not simply be assumed to be a 'natural and inevitable' part of migration.

Absent in the case of Canada, then, are mechanisms whereby a Caribbean worker who has come to work in successive harvests eventually qualifies for the right to settle in the country permanently. Thus, some men who have participated in the migratory flow since its inception in 1966 are still considered to be 'foreigners' by the state, without the right to enter and settle in the country permanently. They must go through the same formal application procedures to apply for permanent settlement in the country as a person who has never been to Canada. Since 1973, when the state increasingly began to only admit as permanent settlers workers with 'high quality skills' which were in short supply in the country, the outcome of these applications for permanent settlement were likely to have been turned down.
In this respect, Canadian policy governing the entry of migrant labour to Canada is considerably less 'liberal' than the post-war western European 'guestworker' system. Even during the height of the movement of migrant workers to western Europe in the 1960's and early 1970's, most labour importing states had certain mechanisms in place which allowed migrants to settle permanently in their country. In the Netherlands for example, migrant workers qualified for permanent residence status after five years of continuous work and residence in the country. In Switzerland, this period was ten years. In some cases, it was also possible for workers who were originally migrants to become naturalized citizens of the countries they migrated to.

The contradiction (and injustice) of a situation where in many cases the same temporary workers have come to constitute a permanent part of the Canadian labour force is not lost to the workers themselves. According to one participant in the migration stream we have become the new coolies in Canada—good enough to work on the land but not good enough to remain in the country.

Nor has this fact been lost on Canadian farmers. While some farmers have made the occasional representation to the state to allow one or two workers to stay permanently in the country, others realize that granting the workers landed immigrant status would mean that they would face the same recruitment and retention problems prior to the arrival of migrant workers from the Caribbean. A representative of the Essex County Associated Growers suggested that while they would like to see the length of time that a worker could be employed in Canada extended,

There is one possible danger in extending the length of the program ... If the Caribbeans start working full time, they may become landed immigrants, putting more people on unemployment insurance ... At least this way we know they're getting back.
In not granting permanent residence status to Caribbean workers, the state has attempted to enforce the distinction between labour force maintenance and labour force renewal. Workers who do not possess the right of permanent settlement must leave their families in the Caribbean. Thus, the Canadian state does not assume any formal responsibility for the physical reproduction of the workers' family. Nor does the Canadian state assist in the assumption of the reproduction costs of the labourer when he/she is unemployed. Unemployment is simply exported to the Caribbean where the workers are forced to reproduce their capacity to work in the next harvest from the wages they received during the previous years work in Canada, and from any other subsistence activity or employment they undertake in the Caribbean.

A dialectical component of their status as migrant labour in the country is their status as a form of unfree labour. Their entry to the country is conditional upon their entering into a labour contract. While they may enter into the contracts freely, their doing so is structured by the relative absence of opportunities to commodify their labour power in the Caribbean. They therefore face economic compulsion to enter into the contract. But this economic compulsion is not what constitutes them as a form of unfree labour in Canada. As noted in chapter two, free wage labour is subject to economic compulsion to provide labour power for others. Once they enter into a contract, political/legal relations restrict their ability to change jobs and seek out other forms of employment in Canada. It is these political/legal relations which constitute the migrant workers as a form of unfree labour in Canada.

The contracts stipulate, among other things, that they are to remain in the employment of the farmer they have originally entered into the contract with. They cannot change jobs without the permission of the state, and they can only do so if the farmer breaches some term of the contract, or if the farmer agrees to release the worker for the terms of the contract. The contract specifies that the Caribbean workers must provide the quantities and qualities of
labour power (within limits) when and where they are demanded by their employer. If they do not, then this constitutes a breach of contract and the workers are then subject to deportation from Canada at their own expense.

The contracts further stipulate that accommodation facilities and meals are to be provided by the farmers. Farmers are allowed to deduct a fixed amount from the wages the worker's receive in partial repayment for their expenditures on meals. There is not, therefore, a full commodification of their labour power insofar as they do not have to enter the market to reproduce their capacity to work while in Canada.

The state plays a central role in the incorporation and reproduction of Caribbean migrants as unfree labour. First, it has constituted in law the terms of unfreedom. The contracts which farmers and farmworkers enter into are enforceable with reference to Canadian contract law. Second, the state arbitrates the relations of unfreedom through its funding of a liason service. The service mediates relations between Caribbean workers and Ontario farmers. Liaison officers attempt to iron out day-to-day practical difficulties which arise from the employment contract. The issues they deal with range from complaints by workers about the quality of housing, food and working conditions, and rates of pay, to complaints by employers over the quality and quantity of labour power that is expended by particular workers or groups of workers.

Third, the state enforces the terms of the contracts and suppresses worker resistance to the contract. This occurs, in part, through the liaison service, but also by recourse to repatriation for those workers who breach the terms of their contract. Table 9-1 gives an indication of the proportion of workers who were repatriated in 1973, which appears to have been an 'average' year in terms of the proportion of workers repatriated. It shows that in 1973, 4.5% of the total number of Caribbean workers admitted to the country were repatriated. The vast majority, some 67%, were repatriated for
'breach of contract'. While the type of action which constitutes a breach of contract is not specified in the statistics, these violations usually have something to do with refusing to work when the farmers want the workers to work. During the first year of the migration, for example, several workers who refused to work on Saturdays because they were Seventh Day Adventists were repatriated for 'breach of contract'.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Breach of Contract</th>
<th>Domestic Reasons</th>
<th>Medical Reasons</th>
<th>Total Number Deported</th>
<th>Total Number of Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3,048</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Caribbean worker contracts differ from relations of indentured servitude in several distinct ways. First, once the contract has expired, the workers have no right to remain in Canada. In this respect, indentured servants, Polish veterans and Displaced persons were much better off than Caribbean migrant farm labourers are. Second, during the time that they remain in Canada, they are permanently constituted as unfree labour. In the case of indentured servitude, and the employment of Polish veterans and Displaced Persons, the period of unfreedom was fixed in advance, so that it was possible for them to eventually become free wage labour. Third, costs of return transportation absorbed by employers in the case of Caribbean farm workers, whereas only the costs of one way transportation are paid for the indentured servant.
Racialization and Modes of Incorporation

In ... selecting and sorting out of immigrants of different ... backgrounds into various occupations and so into the class system, a number of factors have operated in varying intensities at different times in Canada's history. Important among these were the evaluations by the 'charter' members of the society of the jobs to be filled and the 'right' kind of immigrants to fill them.

The Canadian state has intervened in the process of migration via the means of exclusion, inclusion and allocation. Within the processes of inclusion and allocation, three modes by which foreign-born labour has been incorporated into sites in production relations in Canada have been identified in this thesis. The final question to be addressed here, and which is posed in modified form by John Porter above, is: upon what basis have different groups been excluded from entry to the country, allowed to cross the boundaries of the nation state, and subsequently allocated to differential sites in production relations?

As the Introduction to this thesis has noted, without doubt, the process of capital accumulation, patterns of labour demand within sectors of the Canadian economy, and the derivation by Canadian employers of economic benefits from the entry of foreign-born labour during the 19th and 20th centuries, constitute a fundamental set of relations which explain many of the broad dynamics of migration to Canada. In this vein, state intervention in the process of migration, is part and parcel of the state's larger project of the reproduction of the conditions which allow accumulation to occur. However, while the state's regulation of the manner in which the borders of the nation state are breached is structured by such relatively short-term 'economic' considerations, and while each particular mode of incorporation has had important effects on the process of capital accumulation, reference to the immediate process of capital accumulation cannot alone explain why the Canadian state has allocated different groups to different positions in production relations.
Migrations and the associated modes of incorporation are also structured by complex political and ideological relations (of which in this thesis I have concentrated on racism and racialization) which in turn derive from the place that migration occupies in the process of nation state formation.

In the case of Canada, the particular construction of the 'imagined community' which constitutes the nation has played a key role in structuring the process of migration to the country. In chapter two, it was noted, in Anderson's terms, that nations are 'imagined political communities' which possess certain symbolic boundaries which in turn structure who is, and who can become part of, 'the nation'. Contrary to Anderson's claim that nationalism and racism are contrary ideologies, evidence presented in this thesis has suggested that the parameters of the 'imagined community' which constitute the Canadian nation have been defined, in part, in terms of 'race'. Furthermore, racism and the process of racialization structured who was allowed to enter the social formation, and how those groups which were allowed entry were incorporated into sites in production relations.

The articulation of nationalism and racism was evident in the political/ideological reaction to Chinese migration to the country during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This articulation points to a racialized conception of the nation state, where 'white' people were defined as biologically fit for entry to, and participation in, a society characterized by bourgeois democratic institutions, and where 'non-whites' (i.e., the Chinese) were defined as unfit for, and incapable of participation in, a 'free' society. To the extent that 'white' people were defined, in a deterministic manner, as a 'race' which possessed a range of positive characteristics, they were subject to a process of racialization. But to the extent that labourers from China (and their offspring) were, in a deterministic fashion, attributed with a range of negative characteristics, they were subject to racism.
In 1907, Mackenzie King, the Deputy Minister of Labour, and future Prime Minister of the country, defined the relationship between racism and nationalism succinctly.

[that] Canada should desire to restrict immigration from the Orient is regarded as natural, that Canada should remain a white man's country is believed to be not only desirable for economic and social reasons, but highly necessary for political and national grounds. 69

This definition of Canada as a 'white man's country', the Chinese labourers as 'non-white', and the particular articulation of 'race' and nation constituted the Chinese labourers as undesirable permanent settlers and as a form of unfree migrant labour in the country. When 'white' labour was more plentiful in the country, racism acted to exclude the Chinese from entry to the country, even against the wishes of at least some powerful interest groups.

This racialized conception of the nation state, and the sense in which migration is a crucial aspect by which the Canadian nation state was to be reproduced, has persisted into the post-war years. There has been, in Anderson's terms, a continued 'imagining' of the Canadian nation in terms of 'race'. This has been coupled with the racist belief that only certain 'races' of people were are capable of participation in a competitive capitalist society like Canada. As demonstrated in part three of this thesis, this process is evident in the state's racialization of post-1945 migration control.

It is in the analysis of the apparent de-racialization of immigration control that some liberal and marxist theorists err in their discussion of post-war migration to the country. Despite important analytical differences between them over the nature, meaning and significance of post-war international migration to Canada, both liberal and marxist theorists have adopted a highly economistic approach to the study of international migration to Canada since 1962. For liberal theorists, migration control since 1962 is said to be based on universalistic criteria where labour market conditions are the prime determinants of who enters the country. 60 And Paul Cappon,
a noted representative of the marxist tradition in Canada, in a comment about a later phase in the development of Canadian immigration policy, but which nevertheless applies to the period considered here, has remarked that

> The objective of Canada's immigration policy remains the importation of foreign labour to supply the requirements of Canadian-American capital.

The element which is common to both positions, and the one which is questioned in this thesis, is that since 1962, international migration to Canada was no longer structured by an articulation of economic, political and ideological relations, but rather solely on broadly defined 'economic' grounds.

The evidence presented in chapters seven and eight regarding the Canadian state's position on the establishment of an immigration visa office in the Caribbean, the admittance of female workers for domestic labour positions, and the admittance of farmworkers from the Caribbean, suggests that there has been a continuing relevance of not just racialization, but also of racism, in the state's regulation of who crosses the boundaries of the nation state in general, and in the processes of exclusion, inclusion and allocation in particular. In this context, racism was more than an ideology which was used by employers and the state to justify the 'super-exploitation' of particular groups of people. Between 1945 and 1966, with certain exceptions, racism precluded the ability of 'black' people from entering the country, the end result of which was that they were not allowed by the state to be exploited by various fractions of capital.

The state's position on the opening of an immigration visa office in the Caribbean demonstrates that racism structured the state's attempted exclusion of people from the Caribbean. In addition to contradicting Hawkins' argument concerning the state's resistance to opening an immigration office in the Caribbean at this time, the evidence presented in chapter seven demonstrates that the delay was the result of the state's fear that an immigration office would
encourage people in the Caribbean to apply for landed immigrant status and become permanent settlers. They felt that 'black' people were uncompetitive, and therefore unsuitable as candidates for permanent settlement in the country. Furthermore, state representatives feared that an increase in the number of immigrants from the Caribbean in Canada would create a 'race relations' problem. This 'problem' was not defined by the state in terms of the immigrants being subject to racist harassment by Canadian citizens. Rather, the 'problem' was defined, in a racist manner, in terms of the 'racial sensitivities' of 'black' people and their inability/unwillingness to adjust to the social, economic, cultural and climatic conditions of the country.

The state's view of 'black' people as uncompetitive contrasts sharply with the state's earlier view of Chinese merchants and labourers. The latter were defined as too competitive, and therefore not suitable as permanent settlers. The former, however, were defined as not competitive enough and should therefore be excluded from entry to the country. The state's apparently contradictory position on this matter again highlights the dialectical, contradictory nature of competition under capitalism. Too much competition is problematic, yet not enough competition is also problematic.

The state's position on domestic servants also outlined in chapter seven displays a similar articulation of economic, political and ideological considerations. State officials defined females from the Caribbean as inordinately fecund, and especially promiscuous. In part, the state feared that these females, because of their perceived excessive fecundity, and because some appeared to have children of their own in the Caribbean whom they could sponsor for settlement in the country, which in turn would provide a foot in the door for an 'explosion' in 'black' immigration and settlement in the country. Some state officials were therefore against having a special system for the admittance of female domestic servants from the Caribbean, despite an 'almost unlimited demand' for their labour power, and despite the fact that several politically powerful individuals within the state system had consistently lobbied the Department of
Citizenship and Immigration for their entry to the country. Exclusion, again, was structured by racism to the extent that an increased 'black' presence was believed to be the cause of 'race relations' problems in Canada.

Over a twenty year period, the state's non-publicly articulated position, documented in chapter eight, which resulted in the exclusion of farmworkers from the Caribbean from entering Canada displayed a similar attribution of social significance to patterns of phenotypical variation. Decisions about whether to allow these workers entry to the country, on either a temporary or permanent basis, were made, in part, on assessments of the implications this movement would have on social stability in the country in general and in the workplace in particular, on the tendency for the 'black' population to get progressively larger, and the belief that they would be the cause of 'race relations problems' in the future.

Furthermore, the state's eventual decision to admit workers from the Caribbean to fill farm labour positions in the south western Ontario fruit and vegetable industry on a migrant as opposed to immigrant basis was not simply a matter of it wishing to externalize the reproduction costs of labour power during periods of unemployment. Although such considerations played an important part in why they were allocated to a position in production relations in the Ontario fruit and vegetable industry as unfree migrant labour, this does not constitute the end of the matter.

There were political and ideological considerations which structured the state's incorporation of Caribbean workers as unfree migrant labour. First, the state felt that by allowing the entry of unskilled labour from the Caribbean on a migrant basis, pressure to admit unskilled workers from the Caribbean on an immigrant basis would be reduced. Second, the state was concerned about the potential increase in the number of 'black' immigrants which would subsequently have the right to enter the country as relatives of those admitted as farm labour migrants. If some workers were admitted as immigrants for
the fruit and vegetable industry, they would have the right to sponsor a range of relatives as permanent settlers. The state felt that such an uncontrolled increase in 'black' migration to Canada would be the cause of a 'race relations' problem in the country. Third, the state felt that in granting workers from the Caribbean the right of only temporary entry under carefully controlled conditions which would make them socially invisible, then there was little chance of a 'race relations' problem developing in the workplace. Furthermore, the subsequent reproduction, and in some cases the extension to other sectors of the fruit, vegetable and tobacco industry, of this migrant labour stream has been based, at least in part, on the state's view that their employment in the country has not resulted in the creation of large scale 'social', or 'racial' problems.

Taken collectively, these findings suggest that even after 1962 representatives of the Canadian state who exercised control over international migration to the country tended to define the imagined community of the Canadian nation in terms of 'race'. 'Black' migrants were defined as potential problems, or as agents who would potentially disrupt the social order. This was not because of the political beliefs they may or may not have possessed, nor because of any apparent trade union militancy which they may have possessed, but rather because of the racist belief that as a 'race', they were unable to 'assimilate' to the 'Canadian way of life'.

The process of racialization also structured the state's position on farm workers from western Europe, but with the opposite effect. Farmers wanted the state to incorporate workers from western Europe as unfree labour by forcing them into signing labour contracts and by enforcing the extant contracts associated with the Assisted Passages Loan Scheme. However, the racialized conception of the Canadian nation in particular, and of the peoples of the world in general, constrained state official's ability to incorporate western European groups as either unfree migrant or unfree immigrant labour.
The belief that certain 'races' of people were inherently capable of self-rule, democracy and 'proper' forms of capitalist competition, and that others were inherently incapable of behaviour to sustain the economic, political and ideological relations which surround Canadian capitalism, meant that it was difficult for ideological reasons for the state to constitute 'white' immigrants from Britain and western Europe as unfree labour in Canada. If Canada was a free country characterized by the 'opportunity of a man [sic] to better himself', and if members of the 'white' race were inherently capable, knowledgeable and schooled in the burdens of self-rule, democracy, and freedom, then the state could not allocate 'white' immigrants to positions as unfree wage labour in Canada. For the Canadian state, such practices simply ran against the apparent 'laws' of biology.

The difference in the state's position regarding the imposition and enforcement of labour contracts for people from the Caribbean and its corresponding unwillingness to impose such contracts on workers from western Europe also reflects a process of racialization. During the twenty year period in which proposals were put forward by representatives of the Caribbean states and Ontario growers to import Caribbean workers on a seasonal, contractual basis, the state representatives never rejected the proposals on the grounds that their entry as contract labour would contradict the idea that Canada was a 'free' society and that people from the Caribbean were a 'free race' of people. Indeed, the absence of a debate about 'freedom' in the context of the entry of Caribbean workers meant that the Minister of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, after the migration was approved in 1966, saw neither an irony, nor contradiction, in his claim in the House of Commons that

... I am not very enthusiastic about having formal agreements in order to compel a free citizen to stay in a certain job for years if he does not like or, or can find a better job somewhere else. 63

Evidently, people from the Caribbean were not considered to have laid within the realm of 'free citizens' in the same way that people from
Holland, Germany, Britain and other western European countries were. From the state's point of view, then, there was no contradiction in allocating people from the Caribbean to positions in production relations as unfree labour because they were not 'free' to begin with and were not deserving or capable of the 'freedoms' enjoyed by 'white' people in Canada.

But there were also other practical constraints which limited the Canadian state's ability to incorporate immigrants from western Europe as a form of unfree labour. Officials of the Canadian state involved in the recruitment of persons as permanent settlers from western Europe realized that they were in competition with other labour recruiting countries for such settlers, the most notable of which was Australia. Australia offered free passages to persons from western Europe as an inducement to settlement, and once in Australia they could circulate freely in the labour market. State officials felt, perhaps not without some justification, that if prospective immigrants faced the choice of a free passage to Australia and the subsequent freedom to circulate in the Australian labour market to seek out the highest returns for the expenditure of their labour power, or, in the case of Canada, of a transportation loan which had to be repaid, and then face subsequent restrictions over their ability to circulate in the Canadian labour market, they would invariably choose the former option. Thus, given the Canadian state's desire to recruit western European immigrants in a competitive environment, competition constrained the manner in which they could incorporate such immigrants in production relations.

In this same context, the representatives of the state felt that the governments of Holland, Belgium, Britain, Switzerland, West Germany, and France would not look favourably on structures which would constitute their nationales as unfree labour in Canada. If fact, state officials in Canada felt that attempts to do so would inevitably result in these state's restricting the ability of Canada to recruit immigrants in their countries. In retrospect, the irony of this perception is difficult not to notice. At the same time that many of
these states constituted nationals from Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and North Africa, among others as forms of unfree labour to fill specific shortages of labour in specific industries (Miles, 1987:160-67), the Canadian state felt that these states would never allow their own nationals to be constituted as unfree labour in Canada.

Thus, contrary to Wallerstein, who suggests that forms of labour control (or modes of incorporation in terms of this thesis) are the result of ruling class choices, or ruling class computations of profitability which in turn stem from a state's position in the world economy$^{68}$, evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the Canadian state faced certain ideological and political constraints in allocating some groups of post-war immigrants to positions as unfree wage labour, even for a limited period of time after their entry to the country. Modes of incorporation, as either free immigrant labour, unfree immigrant labour and unfree migrant labour are the outcome of historically specific combinations of economic, political and ideological relations.

**Conclusion**

Given the continuities in the expression of racism in the constitution of Canada as a nation state from the late 19th century to at least the latter part of the 1960's, migration was more than just a method by which the reserve and/or active labour armies were increased in size and changed in structure. The discussion in this thesis of the articulation of economic, political and ideological relations which structured who entered the country, and the modes by which those granted entry to the country were incorporated into sites in production relations, has pointed to the fact that migration is also an aspect of nation state formation. Migration has contributed to the formation of the nation state, and continues to contribute to its reproduction. In Sassen-Koob's terms 'state formation points to what is distinctive about immigrant labour other than low wages'.$^{69}$
Distinct modes of incorporation of foreign-born labour can be seen as attempts to resolve the contradictions, identified by Zolberg at the beginning of this conclusion, which arise from migration as an integral part of the process of capital accumulation and migration as an aspect of nation state formation. Specifically, the state's allocation of agents to sites in production relations as unfree migrant labour constitutes a solution to this contradiction in the context of a racialized conception of the nation state. Unfree migrant labour helps resolve particular labour shortages, and constitutes agents as relatively docile labour (which may or may not be 'cheap' in terms of comparative wages), while at the same time attempts to ensure that the imagined community which constitutes the nation state (defined in terms of race) remains intact. It allows employers to exploit the labour power of particular groups of people without threatening the symbolic order within which capitalist production takes place.

In the mid-1950's, a Member of Parliament, chastising the government for what he thought was a lack of restrictions over international migration to the country, remarked that 'if you put pants on a penguin, it could be admitted to this country'. Among other things, this thesis has demonstrated that this claim was only a half truth: penguins were more likely to be admitted to Canada if, under their pants, they were completely white.
ENDNOTES

Introduction

1. 'Draft memo' from the Deputy Minister to the Minister, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, October 23, 1951, PAC, R.G. 26, Vol. 138, File 3-38-6.

2. Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration, Minutes, 51st meeting, June 8, 1953.

3. Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration, Minutes, 52nd meeting, June 10, 1953.


16, pp. 320-41.

23. See A. Brewer, *Marxist Theories of Imperialism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), for a review of these issues, which will also be discussed in more detail in chapter three.


30. Ibid.


34. Ibid., p. 612.

35. Ibid., p. 193

36. Miles, 1986, p. 52


39. Ibid., p. 631.

40. Ibid., p. 633.

<335>
41. Ibid., p. 641.
43. Miles, 1986, p. 53.
44. Ibid.
45. See Lever-Tracy, 1983; Miles, 1986; Collins, 1984; see also Anthias, 1980 for a similar argument in the case of women.
48. Ibid.

Chapter 1: The Political Economy of Migration

5. Ibid., p. 6.
10. Ibid., p. 29.
11. Ibid., p. 30.
12. Castles, et. al., 1984, pp. 29-32; this was an especially dominant theme in academic work in Britain where some claim that the period before 1962 was an 'age of innocence' and lack of political concern over migration, see N. Deakin, Colour and British Citizenship (London, Panther Books, 1979), p. 47 and see B. Carter, C. Harris and S. Johshi, 'The 1951-55 Conservative Government and the Racialization of Black Immigration', Immigrants and Minorities, 1986, 6, 335 for a critique.
24. Ibid., p. 97.
25. Ibid., p. 213.
26. Ibid., p. 214
27. Ibid., pp. 96-100.
32. R. Miles, 1982; Miles, 1986.
34. See D. Stasiulis, 'Pluralist and Marxist Perspectives on Racial Discrimination in South Africa', British Journal of Sociology, 1980, 31, p. 465 for further discussion of this rhetorical technique used against marxist theorists.
38. Ibid., pp. 232-233.
44. See Richmond, 1988, p. 50


Britain (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), pp.4-6.


64. Layton-Henry, 1983, p. 64.

65. Miles and Solomos, 1987, p. 86.

66. Ibid., p. 67.


69. Ibid., p. 61.


73. Ibid., p. 25; Miles and Solomos, 1987, p. 86.


76. Ibid., p. 23; Sivanandan, 1982, p. 102.


80. Ibid., p. 336.


84. Harris, p. 1987, 62.
91. Ibid., and see also Castles, et. al., 1984, p. 69.
100. Ibid., pp. 229-31.
103. Miles, 1986, p. 64.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid., p. 184; see also Mayer, 1965, p. 125.


Chapter 2: The State, Modes of Incorporation and Racialization


4. Stasiulis, 1988; but see also Jessop, 1982.


26. A. Portes and J. Walton, Labour, Class and the International


38. D. Stasiulis, 'Racism and the Canadian State', Explorations in Ethnic Studies, 1985, 8; Wong, 1984; Bolaria, 1984a, p. 140.


42. Burawoy, 1976, pp. 1051-1053.

43. Ibid., p. 1052.

44. Miles, 1987a.


52. Miles, 1987a, p. 25.
53. Ibid.
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