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Russian Messianism

A Historical and Political Analysis

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Presented for the degree of Ph D

University of Glasgow
Institute of Soviet and East European Studies

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Summary

This is an analysis of the nature and political significance of Russian messianism: the idea that the Russian people or the Russian State is the "chosen people" or the "chosen instrument". I outline the genesis of the theory of Moscow, the Third Rome and discuss the ideas and activities of the nineteenth-century Slavophils, the pan-Slavists, Dostoevsky and Vladimir Solovyov. I examine the influence of messianism on Russian Communism, considering Berdiaev's views. The main part of the work investigates the rebirth of interest in Russian messianism in the Brezhnev period. I try to investigate the links between this cultural movement and the Russian nationalist elements within the political élite. My main sources for this are samizdat journals and articles, in particular the journal Veche, cultural journals such as Novyi mir, Molodaia gvardiia and Nash sovremennik, Party documents and émigré journals. I find that Russian messianism has been especially important at times when the country is in crisis: Russia is in Golgotha, but where there is suffering there is also redemption, not only for Russia but for humanity. It has by no means been always dominant in intellectual thought. It has had little influence (under either tsars or Communists) on the fields of nationality policy, policy towards religion or foreign policy. Today, as in the nineteenth century, its adherents can be opponents or supporters of the existing State structure. The growth of non-Russian nationalism under Gorbachov, combined with glasnost', has fuelled Russian nationalism. This is unlikely to be co-opted into the official ideology, because it would increase the dissatisfaction of the non-Russians.
Abbreviations

Periodicals

AES  Archives_européens_de_sociologie
AHR  American_Historical_Review
APS  American_Political_Science_Review
BJPS  British_Journal_of_Political_Science
CalSS  California_Slavic_Studies
CASS  Canadian-American_Slavic_Studies
CCE  Chronicle_of_Current_Events
CMRS  Cahiers_du_Monde_russe_et_soviétique
CP  Comparative_Politics
CRSN  Canadian_Review_of_Studies_in_Nationalism
CSSP  Canadian_Slavonic_Papers
CSS  Canadian_Slavic_Studies
DN  Druzhba_narodov
FA  Foreign_Affairs
GZ  Golos_Zarubezh'ia
IJSL  International_Journal_of_the_Sociology_of_Language
Index  Index_on_Censorship
JCS  Journal_of_Communist_Studies
JHI  Journal_for_the_History_of_Ideas
JP  Journal_of_Politics
Khronika  Khronika_tekushchikh_sobyti
KP  Komsomol'skaia_pravda
KVS  Kommunist_vooruzhennykh_sil
KZ  Krasnaia_zvezda
LG  Literaturnaja_gazeta
LN  Literaturnoe_nasledstvo
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<td>Literaturnaia Rossiia</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>Molodaia vardiia</td>
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<td>MK</td>
<td>Molodoi kommunist</td>
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USSR_NB  USSR_News_Brief

Vestnik  Vestnik Russkogo Studencheskogo KhristianskogoDVizhenia ("Studencheskogo" omitted afterNo. 111)

VF  Voprosy filosofii

VI  Voprosy istorii

VL  Voprosy literature

VS  Vol'noe slovo

WT  The World Today

ZhMP  Zhurnal Moskovskoi patriarkhii

Others

Places of publication:  M. = Moscow, SPb. = St. Petersburg, P. = Petrograd, L. = Leningrad

AN SSSR  Akademiia nauk SSSR

AS  Radio Liberty Arkhiv_samizdata

CPD  Congress of People’s Deputies

MECW  Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Collected_Works

MEW  Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Werke

PSS  Polnoe sobranie sochinenii

SDS  Radio Liberty Sobranie dokumentov samizdata

Sob. soch.  Sobranie sochinenii
Note on transliteration

I have used the Library of Congress transliteration system for the titles of periodicals, books, articles and organizations. Pre-revolutionary titles are transliterated according to Soviet orthography. For personal names, I have compromised between the Library of Congress system and normal British usage. Tsars are referred to by their English names. "yi" and "ii" are normally rendered as "y" (Dostoevsky); "æ" as "yo" or "o" (Solovyov, Gorbachov, but Khrushchev as it is the most widely used version); hard and soft signs in personal names are omitted (Leontev, but Zinoviev as the most widely used version).

Dates follow the Russian calendar and its change.
Introduction

In 1971 the former Soviet political prisoner Vladimir N. Osipov began publishing within the USSR a samizdat journal, Veche (People's Assembly). What distinguished this journal from a number of others published by human rights activists, social reformers and members of national minorities and religious groups was that it was of the Russian nationalist tendency. The idea that the Russians were the principal victims of the Soviet experience had begun to circulate in samizdat, evoking suspicion and ridicule from the mainstream human rights movement. Leonid I. Pliushch, for example, has said that two such nationalist articles "sounded like a voice from the Stone Age".¹ At a time when other samizdat journals were being forced to suspend publication, Osipov was able to circulate nine issues of Veche, in spite of the fact that he made no attempt to hide his identity from the authorities.

It seemed that unofficial Russian nationalism enjoyed greater freedom than other forms of political dissent. Circles within the regime were apparently extending protection to Veche. This was not surprising, since the late 1960s had seen the appearance of Russian nationalist ideas within the official Soviet media. Part of the Soviet establishment was promoting Russian nationalist and messianist ideas as an alternative to official Marxism-Leninism, an ideology which was proving less and less attractive to the young, and as an alternative to the ideas of human rights and democratization which were invading

¹
from Eastern Europe, the Eurocommunists and the West in general.

Veche sought to continue the line of the Slavophils of the nineteenth century and of the writer Fyodor M. Dostoevsky. These figures represent links in a chain of ideas, going back at least to the twelfth century, which can together be termed "Russian messianism". This is a concept more specific than Russian nationalism; it represents the idea that the Russian people is in some sense the "chosen people". In the period of L.I. Brezhnev's leadership (1964-1982), Russian messianism broadly defined was not confined to samizdat but appeared in "official" literary and political journals as well.

It might appear strange that Russian nationalism should find it necessary to create its own samizdat in the Soviet Union. It has long been accepted that at least from the time of Stalin, Russian nationalism has been a component part of the official Soviet ideology.² In terms of Soviet behaviour in international politics, it has been argued that the Marxist components of the ideology are much less significant than the pursuit of "national" or "State" interests, however much the original revolutionary goals are re-stated. Alec Nove has referred to this possibility: "... a tightly controlled and nominally monolithic political system may devote itself to the pursuit of nationalist great-power causes, while continuing to adhere to 'Marxism-Leninism'."³ More outspokenly, the former
National Security Adviser to US President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, declared in 1984: "The Soviet Union is the political expression of Russian nationalism." Other specialists, seeing the growth of Soviet military power in the Brezhnev period, have suggested that the legacies of Marx and Lenin may still play a role in the Soviet world-view, even if the promotion of world revolution is relegated hopelessly low in the priorities of the Politburo. As Jonathan Steele put it just after Brezhnev's death:

Soviet leaders believe that the struggle between two social systems is the basic international reality of today's world. The enlargement of the world socialist system from being simply "socialism in one country" under Stalin to a "socialist commonwealth" of some dozen nations is considered a truly revolutionary development.

Major studies of contemporary Russian nationalism began appearing in the West in the mid-1970s. The person who has done most to bring Russian nationalism to the attention of the English-speaking reader is John B. Dunlop. Before him much useful work was done by Dimitry V. Pospielovsky. Dunlop and Pospielovsky are both sympathetic to Russian nationalism. They see the tens of millions of Orthodox Russians (and perhaps Ukrainians and Belorussians) as providing a mass base for a nationalist movement which would emphasize Russia's traditional Orthodox culture. In the absence of a strong democratic tradition in Russia, they see nationalism as the most viable alternative to communism. Dunlop's book The New Russian Revolutionaries (1976) portrayed Russian nationalism as a real threat to the regime. In his 1983 volume, The Faces of Contemporary
Russian Nationalism, Dunlop wrote that "Russian nationalism could become the ruling ideology of state once the various stages of the Brezhnev succession have come to an end."\(^7\)

The expectation that Russian nationalism would become more important in the USSR was shared by a former Soviet journalist who had emigrated to the USA, Aleksandr L. Ianov (Yanov). He is of Jewish nationality and, unlike Dunlop and Pospielovsky, he is appalled by Russian nationalism. In his books *Déétente after Brezhnev* (1977), *The New Russian Right* (1978) and *The Russian Challenge and the Year 2000* (1987) he predicted the convergence of dissident Russian nationalism with official Russian nationalism in a diabolical anti-Semitic chauvinism which would be powerful enough to displace traditional Marxism-Leninism as the ideology of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).\(^8\) He claimed that there was a pattern in Russian history whereby Russian nationalist trends, however liberal in origin, always tended towards cooperation with the State.

The "Ianov thesis" has already been subjected to some justified criticism in English-language periodicals.\(^9\) I shall argue below that Ianov's historical analogy is invalid, at least as far as the nineteenth century (his own example) is concerned. Furthermore, empirically, Russian nationalism over the period since the 1960s has not tended to merge with the State. On the contrary, some of it evolved towards the human rights movement. I shall also
argue that Ianov, Dunlop and Pospielovsky all overestimated the possible attraction of Russian nationalism, either as a focus of mass discontent and opposition to the regime, or as a possible direction in which the regime itself might evolve.

Unfortunately, most of the major studies of contemporary Russian nationalism published until now have lacked a detailed historical perspective. If one is to evaluate and explain the ideas of people who claim to be influenced by the Slavophils and Dostoevsky, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the political views and the political and cultural activity of the antecedents. I begin by considering the origin and nature of messianism, in a comparative perspective, with particular reference to Jewish messianism. In the bulk of this thesis, I have sought to explain the nature and political role of Russian messianism, the thread that links such ideas as "Moscow, the Third Rome", Slavophilism, pan-Slavism, Populism (narodnichestvo) and much of contemporary Russian nationalism, as well as influencing even Bolshevism and Stalinism. In the analysis of Russian messianism, I find it helpful to distinguish between two poles: one which emphasizes the State, and one which emphasizes the land and the people. These two poles can be politically totally opposed to each other, although both remain within the messianist framework. The State-oriented messianism is linked with the idea of Moscow's domination of other peoples (nationalist messianism), whereas the people-oriented messianism is linked with the idea of the Russian
people as being a model for other nations to follow (universalist messianism). Both poles, although historically dependent on Orthodoxy, find their reflection in the official Soviet media of the 1980s. These ideas of a unique role for Russia often appear as a reaction against attempts to import Western models, whether they be introduced by tsars like Peter I, Marxists like Georgy V. Plekhanov or liberals like Andrei D. Sakharov.

In the historical part of the thesis, my main primary sources have been the writings of the Slavophils, Dostoevsky, Vladimir S. Solovyov, Nikolai A. Berdiaev and Lenin. I have also considered, where appropriate, Soviet analyses of the thinkers and movements under discussion. In dealing with what I consider the contemporary period, from 1964 onwards, I have used samizdat materials, the official Soviet media and émigré literature. A central feature here is my discussion of the nine issues of Osipov’s *Veche*, the most influential Russian nationalist samizdat journal. There is so far no adequate treatment in English of the contents of *Veche* and the relations between the main contributors. I have attempted to fill that gap. I hope to show that Russian messianism is a major and durable trend of Russian thought, although its influence on policy-makers has not been great. Here I pay particular attention to nationality and religious policy, and some to foreign policy. I have concentrated on developments up to the end of the Brezhnev era, but I have found it worthwhile to include some limited discussion of trends since then.
particular in view of the revival of political and cultural life under M.S. Gorbachov. I conclude by assessing the prospects for Russian nationalism in the future.
Footnotes


Chapter One
The Origins of Russian Messianism

Messianism has a place in many religions, including Persian Zoroastrianism and the "nativistic" religions of primitive tribes (such as the cargo cults of Melanesia). There are elements of it in Hinduism and Buddhism. It has nowhere been of greater social importance than in Judaism, and from there in Christianity. Islam is not essentially a messianic religion, but even there messianic sects have developed, such as the Mahdist movements. Mahdism is central to the ideas of the Shi'ites, but is generally rejected by the Sunnite Muslims.1

The word "Messiah" is from the Hebrew mashiah, meaning "the anointed one"2. What seems to be the characteristic feature of all movements or ideas described as forms of "messianism" is the concept of the "anointed" or "chosen" individual, people or group. This is as true for the contemporary cults around individual "Messiahs" such as Charles Manson and the Rev. Jim Jones in the United States as for the older forms of messianism.3 The elasticity of the term is recognized by R.J. Zwi Werblowsky:

The term messianism ... denoting the Jewish religious concept of a person with a special mission from God, is used in a broad and at times very loose sense to refer to beliefs or theories regarding an eschatological (concerning the last times) improvement of the state of man or the world, and a final consummation of history.4

Hans Kohn defined messianism as

... primarily the religious belief in the coming of a redeemer who will end the present order of things, either universally or for a single group, and institute a new order of justice and happiness.5
This is a good description of Jewish messianism, but the restriction of messianism to "religious" belief is too narrow for present purposes. Messianism will be understood here to embrace secular as well as religious beliefs, and will concern a "redeemer" or "Messiah" which may be an entity such as a particular nation, class or party, or an individual person.

Messianism is closely related to "millenarianism" or "chiliasm", but it is not identical with them. These terms, derived from the word for "thousand" in Latin and Greek respectively, referred originally to the thousand-year Kingdom of God on Earth expected after the Second Coming of Christ. Yonina Talmon defines millenarian movements as "religious movements that expect imminent, total, ultimate, this-worldly collective salvation". The majority of millenarian movements are messianic in that it is expected that salvation will be brought about by a divine (as in Christianity) or divinely-chosen redeemer, but this is not always the case. Conversely, the expectation of a Messiah does not always involve the expectation of total redemption which characterizes millenarianism. Nor should messianism or millenarianism be confused with utopianism, which might be defined as the description of ideal societies without the specification of the means (still less any "chosen" means) to attain them.

It would be wrong to expect the Russian word messianizm to have precisely the same nuances as the English. It is
worth quoting a description of messianizm given by the Russian Christian philosopher, Vladimir S. Solovyov (1853-1900).

Outside the theological sphere, although in connection with religious ideas, in all peoples who have played an important role in history, on the awakening of their national consciousness there has arisen the conviction of the special advantage of the given people, as the chosen bearer and perpetrator (sovershitel') of the historical fate of mankind.

While messianizm has the same wide range of attributes as the English word, in Russian it seems to be particularly associated with the concept of the chosen people, as Solovyov's description suggests.

Father Superior Gennady Eikalovich, a present-day Russian emigre, offers an alternative definition.

Messianism is an ideological philosophy of history (istoriofoiskaia ideologiia), according to which the life of the people in all its aspects must depend as far as possible on the principles of Christian ethics.

He has not justified his definition, which effectively reduces messianism to Christianity. Although his definition does not coincide with that used here, it should be remembered that "messianism" sometimes conveys Eikalovich's definition.

Eikalovich considers Solovyov's definition to be too wide, embracing missionizm as well as messianizm. It is true that these two notions are related and sometimes confused. The difference between them was explained by the Russian Orthodox existentialist philosopher, Nikolai A. Berdiaev (1874-1948), who was himself influenced by Solovyov. Berdiaev wrote, in a passage which is cited with
Messianism derives from Messiah, missionizm from mission. Messianizm is much more exacting than missionizm. It is easy to assume that each nation has its particular mission, its calling in the world, corresponding to the uniqueness of its individuality. But the messianic consciousness claims an exclusive calling, a calling which is religious and universal in its significance, and sees in the given people the bearer of the messianic spirit. The given people is God's chosen people, and in it lies the Messiah.11

Jewish messianism

Judaism told the Jewish people that they were the "chosen" people, and that the Messiah would be born among them. The understanding of the functions of the chosen people and the Messiah changed as time passed. The development of Jewish messianism brought out the tension between universalist messianism and nationalist messianism which has been common to later messianisms. The universalist interpretation of Jewish messianism was that Israel was divinely chosen to enlighten the Gentiles about the one true God and carry His salvation to the end of the earth. The nationalist interpretation, on the other hand, focussed on a national warrior hero. This Messiah would fulfil God's promise to His people and gather them together, reinstate them in Palestine in prosperity and destroy the enemies of Israel. These two interpretations have coexisted throughout Jewish history, although with differing degrees of emphasis on each.12

The first "chosen person" in the Old Testament is Noah, but it was his descendant Abraham who made the "Covenant" with God. Abraham was promised the land of Canaan, and his
descendants were promised greatness, on condition of their being true to God and circumcising their males.\textsuperscript{13} The despair, born of the unhappy fortunes of the "chosen people" in the 4000 years since the supposed Covenant, contributed to the development of expectations of a Messiah and to the support for successive movements, led by people claiming to be the Messiah, which formed an almost permanent part of Jewish history.\textsuperscript{14} Even in its secularized version, the messianic idea exercises "unbroken and vital power" among Jews today.\textsuperscript{15}

For the ancient prophets of the Old Testament, such as Hosea, Amos and Isaiah, the Messiah was a national, political figure of this world, within history, who would restore the national independence of Israel, re-establish the House of David and rule as King of Israel. The country would be glorious and there would be everlasting peace. Sometimes there appears the idea of the other nations coming under Israel's political influence.\textsuperscript{16} The universalist dimension appears, for example, in Isaiah ii, 2-4, written c. 740-700 B.C. Here it is prophesied that "... in the last days ... all nations" will turn to the God of Israel who will judge them and inaugurate peace:

... out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the LORD from Jerusalem.

Spiritual bliss and material prosperity are promised.\textsuperscript{17} Sigmund Mowinckel argues that this universalism is limited by Jewish nationalism, since the God of all nations is firstly the God of Israel. According to Mowinckel, this is true of even "Deutero-Isaiah" (the unknown author of Isaiah
xl-lv), who prophesies the coming of the Servant of the Lord, interpreted by Judaism as the Jewish people and by Christianity as Christ. The "future hope" of this period was for "God's kingly rule on earth through the world-hegemony of Israel and her Davidic ruler".  

Later in the development of Judaism, the wider cosmic background was added into the messianic idea, with expectations of the apocalyptic struggle between Israel and the heathens. Conceptions of the Resurrection of the Dead, the Last Judgement, Paradise and Hell were introduced in order to meet the need for an expectation of personal (as opposed to national) reward and punishment. These ideas are to be found in writings such as the Book of Daniel (c. 165 B.C.) and the two Books of Enoch. The Book of Daniel has been described by Norman Cohn as nationalist propaganda for the lower strata of Jewish society, intended to counter the attempts of their foreign rulers to destroy the Jewish religion. In Daniel's dream (ch. vii), God rewards His people for their loyalty.

And the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints of the most High, whose kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and all dominions shall serve and obey him.

Cohn calls this vision of the everlasting dominion of Israel over all peoples "collective megalomania".  

This later Judaism promoted a dualistic view of the world, with a sharp transition expected between "this age" and the "age to come". "This age" was seen as under the dominion of Satan, represented by the heathen powers ruling
the Jewish people. The sufferings of the Jews would climax in the coming of the Messiah. There were two strands to the character of the Messiah in later Judaism: the first is national and this-worldly, as in the ancient prophets, and the second is universalistic and other-worldly. These two strands were never completely reconciled, and the masses clung to the national Messiah. The fact that frequently a real person was regarded (for a while) by the people as the Messiah demonstrates that the Messiah was seen as a political figure of this world. The spiritual elements never replaced the political basis of messianism. The Messiah would be a warrior, God's active instrument who would destroy the heathen powers. He would allow only those who converted to Judaism and submitted to Israel to survive. They would become tributary vassals to the Messiah and no longer be allowed to live in Israel's land. In this "age to come", Israel would have Paradise in Palestine while the heathen would be in Hell. Further on in the development of Judaism, there was an increasing tendency to distinguish the Kingdom of the Messiah from the Kingdom of God. The messianic kingdom became a transitional, earthly kingdom, of limited duration (500 or 1000 years) after which the Messiah and all living people would die. Then would come the Resurrection of the Dead and the eternal universalist Kingdom of God.22

Jewish messianism is essentially linked with catastrophe. The sufferings of the Jews promoted the messianic ideology, and later, the occurrence of
particularly cruel persecution was seen as heralding redemption. This was the case from 63 B.C. to 72 A.D., when the increasing repression under the Roman occupation promoted expectations of the imminent coming of the Messiah and the appearance of numerous false Messiahs. Judaism refused to accept Jesus Christ as the Messiah, since Christ was not the national, political hero who was expected. Christ's reported interpretation of the messianic prophesies of the Old Testament to refer to inward spiritual salvation, rather than to the historical world, was not regarded as legitimate.

After the sacking of Jerusalem and the dispersal of the Jews, their religion held them together and the messianic idea continued to evolve. Moses Maimonides (died 1204) taught that the Messiah would restore the Jews to Palestine but would not create Paradise or enable Israel to dominate other nations. The world would continue as before, within the laws of nature. But Maimonides' views did not leave a lasting impression on the Jewish consciousness. The sufferings associated with the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492 were again seen as the birthpangs of the messianic era. In the sixteenth-century doctrine known as the Cabbala, it is posited that Israel will redeem the whole world through fulfilling the commandments of the Torah. Thus the Messiah becomes the entire Jewish people, rather than an individual redeemer, and the messianism is universalist rather than nationalist. The most significant Jewish messianic movement after Christianity, however, was that around the individual "Messiah" Sabbatai
Zevi (1626-1676) in Smyrna. Rejected by the rabbinic authorities, he nevertheless attracted followers in every part of the Diaspora, including the Yemen, Russia and Britain. Like other false Messiahs, he failed to restore the Jews, and he himself was forced to convert to Islam. 29

Some universalist religious Jews in nineteenth-century Europe came to regard the Diaspora not as a tragedy but as part of God's strategy to bring enlightenment to the nations through the Jewish people. 30 Other Jews, influenced by European concepts of nationalism, looked towards the gathering of Jews in Palestine. Rabbi Jehuda Alkalay (1798-1878) and Z.H. Kalisher (1795-1874) combined Jewish nationalism with the belief that the messianic age was imminent. Moses Hess (1812-1875), more through the influence of Hegel than that of traditional religion, came like them to conclude that Jews should go to Palestine. 31 Pogroms and persecution of Jews in the Russian Empire in the late nineteenth century and the growing insecurity of Jews throughout Europe added weight to the movement for a return to the land of Zion.

Jacob Katz describes Zionism, the belief in the need for a Jewish home in Palestine, as Jewish messianism, purged of its miraculous elements but deriving much ideological and emotional appeal from the original doctrine. 32 David Ben-Gurion, who became the first Prime Minister of the State of Israel in 1948, was himself an atheist. He considered that a person of Jewish origin
remained a Jew so long as he or she did not adopt another religion. Gershom G. Scholem accepts that Zionism is a secular movement, but one linked with religion and likely to be transitional to a rebirth of Judaism. Similarly, but from an unsympathetic viewpoint, Nathan Weinstock considers Zionism to be a secularization of traditional Jewish messianism, retaining the latter's "mythical" and "irrational" character. The fact that the establishment of the State of Israel followed the mass destruction of Jews in the Nazi Holocaust seemed to conform to the messianic idea of catastrophe being a prelude to redemption.

A fundamental problem remains, however, in reconciling traditional Jewish messianism with modern Zionism. If the establishment of the Jewish State is to be understood as the beginning of the fulfilment of the Old Testament prophecies, then there should be an identifiable Messiah leading the restoration. Mowinckel, aware of this, calls Zionism

... a kind of politico-religious 'Messianism' without a Messiah, thought out in terms of immanent political forces but coloured by a romantic, religious nationalism.

Some orthodox messianist Jews have considered the attempt to create Israel without a Messiah to be blasphemous. These include the Neturei Karta group in Mea Shearim, Jerusalem, who decorate their homes with the slogan "Zionism is a rebellion against God". Although linked with messianism in its origins, political Zionism today is best considered a nationalist movement, even though the
criterion for acceptance into the nation (in the "Law of Return") is religious.

Christian messianism

The Christianity of Jesus was pure messianism. The Greek *christos* (the anointed one) was a translation of the Hebrew *mashiah*, and the Gospels traced Jesus's ancestry back to David, apparently trying to legitimate His messianic status. It has, indeed, been argued that the account of Jesus's activity given in the Gospels was distorted in order to make Christianity less unacceptable to the Roman Empire. Samuel G.F. Brandon suggests that Jesus's disciples believed that He was their national Messiah, and were close in their outlook to the Jewish anti-Roman group, the Zealots. Hyam Maccoby claims that "Jesus was a Jewish Resistance leader." Brandon sees Jesus's triumphal entry into Jerusalem on an ass in the week of the Crucifixion as a political demonstration in which He assumed the "Messiahship". The Roman Procurator of Judaea, Pontius Pilate, sentenced Jesus to death because he was convinced that He was politically dangerous.

Whether or not this is true, as early as the first century A.D. the word *christos* was adopted by Christians to remove the national political connotations of the Jewish Messiah, and spiritualize and universalize the concept of salvation. The "chosen people" were now considered to be not the Jews but the followers of Christ, Jew or Gentile. The Book of Revelations, also known as the Apocalypse (c. 93 A.D.) prophesies the events of the "last days", the
struggles between the forces of light and the forces of
darkness, and the Resurrection of the Dead. It is an
expression of Jewish apocalyptic thought, combining Judaist
and Christian elements. Revelations xix and xx contain the
Jewish visions of a messianic figure with a sharp sword,
and of a messianic kingdom lasting a thousand years. The
Messiah is not a Jewish national hero, however, but an
altruistic warrior, exalting the poor and smiting the rich,
and rewarding the just of all nations. This is in the more
universalistic spirit of the Old Testament prophets of
eyearly Judaism, rather than the nationalism of Daniel.41

Just as the Jews still waited for their Messiah, so
Christ's Apostles looked forward to their Master's Second
Coming, when Christ would rule the earth and fulfil the
promises of the sermon on the mount. He had promised to
return within the lifetime of some of those living then.42
The sufferings of the Christians under the Roman
persecution strengthened their belief that the Second
Coming was imminent, just as Jewish messianic expectations
were strengthened by catastrophe. But Christ failed to
return and the churches moved towards an accommodation with
the earthly powers. In the Eastern Church, millenarianism,
with its promise of imminent salvation for the poor and
punishment for the powerful, was discredited by the middle
of the second century. The Book of Revelations was removed
from scriptural canon. Millenarianism was the accepted
orthodoxy in the Western Church for much longer, but after
Christianity became the official religion of the Roman
Empire in the fourth century, Church doctrine was modified to sanction the political rulers. Millenarianism was denounced as a Jewish heresy at the Council of Ephesus in 431. The belief in the imminent messianic age, with the struggle of Christ and Antichrist predicted in the Apocalypse, was confined to millenarian sects. These were composed mainly of the poor, and they fought Church and State.43

**Messianism in the West**

A series of revolutionary messianic and millenarian movements, based on Christianity, affected parts of north-western Europe from the end of the eleventh century to the middle of the sixteenth. People who lacked a secure place in the rapidly-changing society turned towards individuals and movements which promised to lead them to a new society, often based on common ownership. The enemy was sometimes the Saracens, and usually the rich and the Jews. Unusual suffering again strengthened messianic expectations.44

Later, the victories of the British, American and French revolutions led to the spread of universalist messianism, which frequently became nationalistic and was used to justify expansionism by military means. In 1648 a Member of Parliament named Hugh Peter expressed his belief that England was God's "elect nation", destined to use her military power to root out monarchism throughout Europe.45 These sentiments were reinforced in the nineteenth century, after Britain had acquired an empire. Rudyard Kipling wrote "The White Man's Burden" (1898) and Cecil Rhodes
proclaimed his country to be the "chosen instrument" to bring societies based on "peace, liberty and justice" into existence around the world.46

In the nineteenth century, many Americans became convinced of the "Manifest Destiny" of the United States to carry the torch of liberty throughout the world. Theodore Poesche and Charles Goepp, in a book entitled The New Rome, or the United States of the World (1853), said that all peoples, as they overthrew their tyrants, should demand admission to the USA. "A people cannot forego its mission, and the mission of the American people is not bounded by oceans." As a first step they suggested that the United States should annex the Caribbean, Central America as far as Panama, Hawaii and the whole British Empire.47

It is impossible to divorce these ideologies of nationalist messianism from the nationalist movements that appeared in Europe after the French Revolution of 1789. Students of nationalism have long associated it with industrialization and urbanization. Nationalist ideologies as a rule came from the intellectual strata of the population. Professional groups such as teachers, lawyers, doctors and clergy staffed the movements, while gentry, peasants, industrialists seeking protected national markets, and urban workers provided support. The Royal Institute of International Affairs study group on nationalism led by Edward Hallett Carr presented a classic statement in 1939.
As far as it is humanly possible to judge, the national movements would not have arisen, or would not have merited the title of 'national', if it had not been for the growth of the capitalist system and the Industrial Revolution.48

A prominent nineteenth-century advocate of the view that revolutionary France was "chosen to lead and enlighten the world" was Jules Michelet.49 He considered that France, when poised to invade Belgium in 1792, had represented "Justice" and "eternal reason". Sacrificing herself for humanity, France was "the interpreter between God and man".50 The link between revolution and nationalist messianism is highlighted by Régis Debray, a French socialist and adviser to President François Mitterrand.

...all the revolutionaries I have known personally were ardent patriots whose 'internationalism' was generally a national messianism... in Cuba and Vietnam being a revolutionary - not only now that a workers' state exists, before as well - means being a nationalist. He includes himself in this category.

...let me confess frankly to a personal inclination for Jacobin messianism: I have always really believed that France will again bear the torch of revolution to the rest of Europe.51

The stateless nations in the nineteenth century were no more immune to nationalist messianism than the nations already possessing states. Giuseppe Mazzini, for example, saw the Messiah in the Italian people.52 In the nationalist and messianist movements of the Slav peoples, German ideas were influential. Johann G. Herder, a German romantic, proclaimed in 1784 that the Slavs were to be the leaders of Europe. This was because of their rural
occupation, their unspoilt backwardness, their peace-loving disposition and lack of ambition to rule, which at that time meant that many of them were living under a foreign yoke. He looked forward to their future emancipation.

Another German, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) claimed that God had given each people a particular mission.53 These ideas were taken up by the Russian Slavophils, but before them by thinkers from those Slav peoples that were more culturally oriented to the West. When Tsar Nicholas I crushed the 1831 Polish rising, the Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz depicted Poland as the "Christ of the nations".54

And they martyred the Polish people and laid it in the grave, and its soul descended into darkness.

But on the third day the soul shall return to the body and the nation shall rise from the dead and free all the peoples of Europe from slavery.55

In conclusion, it seems true to say that almost every national group in nineteenth-century Europe, as well as the Americans, found their "prophets" who informed the group that it had been chosen for a particular mission.56 It is worth remembering this before beginning the discussion of Russian messianism.
Russian messianism

This thesis is mainly concerned with Russian messianism, that is, with the idea that the Russian people (or other Russian entity) is uniquely "chosen" in the sense described earlier. Contemporary Russian messianism owes a large debt, which is frequently acknowledged, to earlier Russian messianist doctrines. It is therefore justifiable to devote considerable attention here to these doctrines, including the concept of "Moscow, the Third Rome", the theories of Slavophilism and pan-Slavism, and the writings of Dostoevsky, Solovyov and Berdiaev. These doctrines of Russian messianism, as of other messianisms, have included both nationalistic and universalistic elements.

At present, we are handicapped not only by the lack of work on Russian messianism, considered as a recurring phenomenon with a history lasting several centuries, but also by the lack of a comprehensive study of the development of either Russian nationalism or Russian national consciousness. Instead we have several studies dealing with particular aspects of Russian nationalism and a monograph dealing with national consciousness in the eighteenth century.57

The many histories of Russian philosophy, published in Russian and in Western languages, devote considerable attention to philosophies of Russian messianism in the context of the overall development of Russian philosophy. Similarly, James H. Billington's mammoth study of Russian culture considers many examples of messianism.58 No
student of Russian messianism can ignore the work of Hans Kohn, the author of many books and articles on Russian thought and on nationalism in general. Kohn is particularly noteworthy for having considered Russian messianism in a comparative context. The nature of his comparisons have, however, been criticized for their pro-Western bias. Louis L. Snyder sees a dichotomy in Kohn between "good" West European nationalism and "bad" East European nationalism, and Ken Wolf has supported Snyder's view.59

The monographs of Hildegard Schaeder and Nicolas Zernov have discussed "Moscow, the Third Rome".60 A considerable number of books have appeared on Slavophilism and pan-Slavism, and even more on the work of Dostoevsky. Michael Cherniavsky's Tsar and People deals with the evolution of two central myths of Russian messianism up to 1917: the myth of the Tsar as the "saintly ruler", which is linked with the "Third Rome" idea; and the myth of "Holy Russia", which expresses the idea of the chosen people.61 Berdiaev considered messianism to be one of the most important components of the "Russian idea", and he discussed it frequently in the book of that name and in his other books.62 Three works by Westerners specifically address themselves to the theme of Russian messianism: Emmanuel Sarkisyantz's Russland und der Messianismus des Orients, Gugliemo Guariglia's Il Messianismo russo and Vatro Murvar's long article "Messianism in Russia: Religious and Revolutionary".63 These three share with Berdiaev a
concern with relating the messianism of pre-revolutionary Russia to Bolsheвism and the Soviet State. They have tried to find an explanation for existing Soviet reality in the history of Russian thought. Guariglia and Sarkisyanz (in the first half of his book) provide useful surveys of Russian messianism. (The second half of Sarkisyanz's book concerns the relationship between Russian messianism and messianisms in a number of Asian religions.) Murvar's article is devoted to enumerating the common characteristics shared by religious messianisms and revolutionary messianisms in Russia. Unfortunately, he fails to provide a working definition of "messianism" and this enables him to exaggerate the importance of messianism in Russian revolutionary thought. Furthermore, he fails to consider the importance of messianism in other countries. As a result he overstates his conclusion that revolutionary messianisms in Russia, including Bolsheвism, had an especially "religious" character.64

Perhaps not surprisingly, many of those in the West who write on themes associated with Russian messianism are of Russian origin. This does not mean that they are all sympathetic to Russian messianism. Berdiaev, for example, described messianism as "always a rejudaization of Christianity".65 Writers of Jewish origin or of other nationalities which suffered from Russian imperialism, on the other hand, have been hostile to Russian messianism. For example, one Ukrainian nationalist wrote in a London émigré journal: "...Russian Messianism is the Messianism of a barbarous horde and is furthered by the Russian people."66
It will not be possible to provide a complete outline of all the doctrines of Russian messianism that have appeared in the last five centuries. Only the most influential theories will be considered. I shall be particularly concerned with the attitude taken by these doctrines to the Jews, the proponents of a messianism totally incompatible with Russian messianism; the attitude to the other non-Russian nationalities which came under Russian political control; and the implications of these doctrines for Russian foreign policy. Further, the political consequences of the doctrines will be considered. Did they remain the theories of intellectuals, ignored or rejected by rulers? Or were they ideologies which justified existing circumstances, to which rulers paid only lip service? Did they sometimes affect the policy-making process?

Moscow, the Third Rome

In the second half of the fifteenth century and the early sixteenth century, the idea developed that Moscow had a unique religious and political mission as the successor to Rome and Byzantium. The earliest surviving formulation of this idea is probably that in a letter by the monk Filofei (Philotheus), the elder (starets) of Bleazarov monastery in Pskov, written in 1511. Filofei addressed his Tsar, Vasily III, with these words.

The Church of old Rome fell because of the impiety of the Apollinarian heresy; the Church of the Second Rome, Constantinople, was smitten under the battle-axes of the Agarenes; but this present Church of the Third, New
Rome, of Thy sovereign empire: the Holy Catholic Apostolic Church ... shines in the whole universe more resplendent than the sun. And let it be known to Thy Lordship, O pious Czar, that all the empires of the Orthodox Christian Faith have converged into Thine one empire. Thou art the sole Emperor of all the Christians in the whole universe ... For two Romes have fallen, and the Third stands, and a fourth shall never be, for Thy Christian Empire shall never devolve upon others...67

The supposedly unique merits of the Church of Moscow are used here to justify the claim of the Muscovite ruler to lead a universal Christian Empire. Moscow is the chosen city, and its prince is the chosen Emperor.

I shall outline how the "Third Rome" idea was rooted in Muscovite culture and how it emerged under the impact of the events of the fifteenth century. The link made in Muscovy between a state and a supposedly universal church had a direct antecedent in Byzantium. As the Byzantine Empire declined, the Eastern Church increasingly took on the aspects of a Greek national church rather than a universal church.68 At the same time, Byzantine messianism presented Constantinople as both the "New Rome" and the "New Jerusalem".69 Muscovy could also look back to old-Russian elements in its heritage: Metropolitan Ilarion of Kiev, in a sermon of 1049 entitled "On Law and Grace", spoke of a great temple within the "city of glory, Kiev", evoking the image of the Holy City, Jerusalem.70 Sixteenth-century Moscow appropriated this. The Soviet scholars Iu. M. Lotman and B. A. Uspensky commented:

It is characteristic that the idea of Moscow, the Third Rome, could quite soon be transformed into the idea of Moscow, the New Jerusalem, which did not contradict the first idea but could be taken as its concretization.71
While Rus' was breaking up into raiding principalities, from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, the Orthodox Church became the symbol of national unity. Then, in the period of Mongol occupation, the Church was a rallying point for national feeling. The transfer of the seat of the Russian Metropolitan from Vladimir to Moscow in 1326 was vital to Moscow's assumption of national leadership. Muscovy considered itself a community of faith, and nationality was determined by religion; a Tatar baptised in the Orthodox Church was considered a Russian. Thus there was a tendency to regard Orthodoxy (and therefore Christianity) as synonymous with Russianness.72

From the late fourteenth century, the monasteries developed the ideological claim that Muscovy and her Grand Dukes were chosen to represent the climax of Christian history. The belief was reinforced by the fall of other Orthodox states to the advance of the Muslim Turks, and the success of the Muscovite rulers in drawing other Russian cities around themselves in battle against the Mongols. The Russian monks began to see Moscow as holier than Byzantium herself. In 1439, at the Council of Florence, the Byzantine Church accepted union with the Roman Catholic Church, ending (temporarily) the Schism which had divided the churches of West and East. Hostile to the Latins and feeling threatened by Catholic neighbours, the Muscovite Grand Duke Vasily II repudiated the union. He ousted Metropolitan Isidore, the Russian representative at Florence, who was Greek by birth, in 1441. A Church
Council in 1448 replaced Isidore with a native Russian, without the approval of the Constantinople Patriarch, and proclaimed the autonomy of the Russian Church. The fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453 was later considered by the Russian ideologists to be a punishment from God for the treachery at Florence, and justification for Muscovy's stance.73

The way was now clear for Muscovy to claim the mantle of Byzantium. She was the only Orthodox country apart from Georgia not under Muslim rule.74 By 1461 the Russian Church was describing Vasily II as "the man Chosen by God ... only supporter of the true Orthodoxy ... Tsar of all Rus".75 In 1470 his son, Grand Duke Ivan III, declared the Russian Church independent of the Patriarch of Constantinople. Ivan's marriage in 1472 to Sophia Paleologina, the niece of the last Byzantine Emperor, provided the occasion for the Grand Duke to adopt the titles of Tsar (probably derived from Caesar, but previously applied in Russia to the Tatar khans) and samoderzhets, equivalent to the Byzantine autokrator. In 1480 Ivan ended the last vestiges of the Islamic Mongol tutelage, and adopted the Byzantine eagle as an emblem. Millennial expectations abounded: the Church predicted that the world would end in 1492, and similar apocalyptic premonitions came in 1500. When the world failed to end in 1492, the Metropolitan of Moscow marked the event by proclaiming Ivan III to be the "new Emperor Constantine of the new Constantinople - Moscow". Another prophecy of the time, which recurred frequently in Russian messianist
thought, was that the Third Rome would liberate the Second:
Moscow would capture Constantinople.⁷⁵

Church and State in Muscovy and eighteenth-century Russia

Filofei's letter to Vasily III, then, represented the culmination of a long chain of ideas. The theory of the Third Rome was intended to justify the autocratic position of the Muscovite rulers by portraying them as representatives of God on earth, going rather further than the Western concept of the "Divine Right of Kings". Further, it gave them a messianic duty to expand the jurisdiction of the Orthodox State, to free their co-religionists living under infidel powers and to reconquer Constantinople for Christendom. This did not mean that the actions of the Tsars were dictated solely, or even mainly, by religious motives. Most historians agree that, on the contrary, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries the Russian Orthodox Church was progressively reduced to being a department of the State.

The raising of the Metropolitan of Muscovy to the status of Patriarch in 1589 removed the last token of Muscovy's subordination to Constantinople. Coinciding with a time of relatively weak tsarist leadership, this inaugurated a brief period of ecclesiastical supremacy. In the "Time of Troubles" (1604-1613), when the Catholic Poles held sway in Muscovy, the Orthodox Church led the Russian resistance, centred on the St. Sergei Monastery of the Holy Trinity, fifty miles from Moscow at what is now Zagorsk.
After the expulsion of the Poles, the Zemskii Sobor (Assembly of the Land) chose Michael Romanov to be Tsar. Real power, however, was in the hands of the Tsar's father, Patriarch Filaret, who received from his son the title of "Great Sovereign". Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich (1645-1676) bestowed the same title on Patriarch Nikon. The latter had accepted the Patriarchate on condition that the Tsar and the nobles would obey him. With the Tsar away fighting, Nikon was able to establish something approaching a theocracy. He introduced a number of changes in the long-established Russian practices of religious ritual, attempting to return to what he believed to be the original Greek models. But the Tsar, with the support of the nobles, thwarted the Church's political ambitions. The Church Council of 1666-1667 gave approval to Nikon's changes in worship but dismissed him from the Patriarchate. The Council declared: "...the tsar has power to rule the patriarch and all other priests." This marked the end of the attempts to create a theocracy and represented the subordination of the Church to the State. 77

Nikon's changes provoked within the Russian Orthodox Church much opposition, led by Archpriest Avvakum. Nikon's credo, "I am a Russian but my faith is Greek", was a "terrible blow to the idea of Moscow the Third Rome". 78 The defenders of the traditional Russian methods believed that Nikon was Antichrist and expected apocalyptic events. The Church Council of 1666-1667 excommunicated the traditionalists, finalizing the Great Schism that has, at least until very recently, split the Old Believers.
(starovery, raskol'niki) from the State Church. The State and Church launched repressive attacks on the Schismatics, who came to see the year 1666 as the beginning of the rule of Antichrist. They continued to believe that Moscow was the "Third Rome", and unlike the Orthodox Church they canonized Filofei.79

The reign of Peter I, "the Great" (1696-1725), brought a decisive change in relations between Church and State. Since most of those within the Church who had opposed the extension of State control were in the ranks of the expelled Old Believers, it was easier for Peter to carry even further the subordination of the Church to the State. Breaking completely with Byzantine tradition, he abolished the position of Moscow Patriarch in 1700. He replaced it with a Holy Synod, responsible directly to himself. This followed the Lutheran model and was in line with his policy of modernizing Russia through the selective imitation of Western methods.80 This policy was a direct denial of Russian messianism. The idea of "Moscow, the Third Rome" received another devastating shock in Peter's construction of the new capital, St. Petersburg, symbolizing the abandonment of the Moscow traditions. Peter also showed his rejection of Orthodox messianism by rejecting the title of "Christian Emperor of the East", proposed for him by the Senate in 1721.81 The imperial aspects of the "Third Rome", however, were attractive to the tsars of the eighteenth century. The expansion of Russian power and the quest for empire invited comparison with ancient Rome, and
Peter adopted the Latin title "Imperator". Lotman and Uspensky suggest that the concept of the "Holy City" was transferred from Moscow to St. Petersburg. The German name of the city, Sankt Petersburg, might be translated as the "Holy City of Peter" (sviatoi gorod Petra), referring to the Emperor rather than the saint. The holiness of Petersburg, however, lay in its gosudarstvennost', its dedication to the State. In this sense Petersburg was the "New Rome".

For succeeding generations, the attitude to the personality and activity of Peter served as a touchstone of opinion as to the future direction of Russia. Supporters and opponents of tsarism disagreed among themselves as to whether Russia needed more Westernization, or should rely on her own traditions and resources. In the Soviet period, the negative view of Peter held by the Bolshevik historian Mikhail N. Pokrovsky gave way under Stalin to a more balanced position. Although Peter was the ruler of an unjust society, and the people suffered under him, his military, naval and foreign policies were progressive. The epithet "the Great" was not restored to normal use. This line continued into the Brezhnev period and beyond, as represented by the biography by Nikolai I. Pavlenko, published in 1975 by the Molodaia gvardiia house.

Even at the height of the official acceptance of "Moscow, the Third Rome", it seems that no religious motivation in foreign policy ever prevailed over the
political interests of the Muscovite State. The ideology may well have been significant internally, as a justification for a strong centralized State. The Church constantly encouraged the expansion of Muscovy, from the time when the Metropolitan moved there and desired to bring his jurisdiction of Rus' into a single State. Religious messianism justified Ivan III's annexation of the north-eastern provinces. In foreign policy, the "Third Rome" theory exerted considerable influence as a rationalization, injecting a sense of religious mission into the expansion against the Catholic Poles and Lithuanians in the West and the Muslims in the East. Ivan III used the treatment of Orthodox subjects in Lithuania as an excuse to launch a war against that country (1500-1503), for which the real reason was his desire to expand his territory. Sarkisyanz suggests that religious enthusiasm may have had a decisive influence on expansion as late as 1552, when Ivan IV conquered Kazan. But he concurs that Muscovite expansion thenceforth was pragmatically motivated, and suggests that the "Third Rome" had even less influence on Russian imperialism than the "Holy Roman Empire" concept had on German imperialism. Dmitry Obolensky, similarly, laments that what he sees as the Christian universalism of the Byzantine Empire was distorted in the narrow framework of Muscovite interests.

An example of this is Muscovy's attitude to the Orthodox subjects of the Islamic Ottoman Empire. Fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Muscovy was more concerned
with maintaining trade and good relations with the Sultan than with protecting or liberating the Christians of Constantinople and the Balkans. In 1597 Pope Clement VIII sent a Croat clergyman, Alexander Komulovic, to Muscovy with a plan for the Slavs of Russia, Poland and the Balkans to unite in a "holy war" for the common defence of Christendom against the Ottomans. Neither the plan to liberate the South Slavs nor the bait of Constantinople enticed the Muscovite rulers. No more success was gained by Juraj Krizanic (1618-1683), another Croat Catholic priest who wanted Russia to advocate the unity of the Slav peoples under the political aegis of the Russian Tsar and the religious leadership of Rome (see below, p. 59).

According to Pokrovsky, on only one occasion throughout the whole Muscovite era was a plan drawn up for the conquest of Constantinople from the Turks, and this was during the Polish domination. It was only in the Petersburg period that Constantinople became seriously coveted, with both Peter I and Catherine II going to war against Turkey. The Russian call for the liberation of the Orthodox and the Turkish wars of that time were, it is considered, motivated by State interests, such as the desire for control of the Bosphorus. Under the treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji (1774), Russia gained extra-territorial rights in the Ottoman Empire: she was made guardian of the religious rights of the Porte's Orthodox subjects, a situation which lasted until 1853.

The "Third Rome" may have had some impact on the
relations between the nationalities in Russia. Any ruling group which seeks to impose a uniform ideology on society is likely to face a problem with the Jews. As Ronald I. Rubin says, "the Jew has always fared badly in politically messianic societies". He attributes this to Jewish religious values, minority status, refusal to parrot political orthodoxies, ties to foreign co-religionists and sensitivity to injustice. Perhaps the most important is the inability or unwillingness of religious Jews to accept ideologies incompatible with Judaism. Outbreaks of apocalypticism and messianism in Muscovy, no less than in the West, were accompanied by anti-Jewish feeling. This was demonstrated at the beginning of the sixteenth and in the middle of the seventeenth century.

Muscovy took over from Kiev an anti-Jewish sentiment. This derived partly from the New Testament, as for example in Ilarion's sermon "On Law and Grace". It was also influenced by Kiev's hostile contact with the Khazar Empire, stretching from the Lower Volga to the Crimea, whose rulers had adopted Judaism. Vladimir Monomakh, Prince of Kiev (1113-1125), decreed the total expulsion of the adherents of Judaism from Rus'. The byliny, the epic folk poems of Rus', always presented the Jews in odious forms. Anti-Semitism was incorporated into Muscovy's ideology. James Billington mentions the antipathy of the peasants to the urban non-manual occupations of the Jews. He is probably right to add that "A newly proclaimed chosen people felt hostility toward an older pretender to this
In fact there were few Jews in Muscovy or the other Russian towns. Salo W. Baron attributes this to the "xenophobia of both the Russian masses and their rulers". 

Desiring a homogeneous Orthodox population, the State tried to exclude the Jews. The sect known as the "Judaizers" do not appear to have been directly linked with Judaism, although this is a matter of dispute. But the spread of the sect led to the repression of the Jews. At the Church Council of 1666-1667, the Old Believers and the reformers accused each other of being corrupted by the Jews, or even of being Jewish. Expectations of the end of the world were shared at this time by the Old Believers and the Jewish followers of Sabbatai Zevi, indicating how apocalyptic feelings spread across religious barriers.

Expansion into Poland and Lithuania from the mid-seventeenth century led to the incorporation of the Jews living there. Jews were ordered to be expelled from the Empire in 1727 and 1742, "unless they be willing to adopt Christianity of the Greek persuasion". The partitions of Poland (1772-1795) added numbers of Jews who could not be forced to accept Orthodoxy en masse. Pressure from Moscow merchants and a desire to avoid religious conflict influenced Catherine II's decision to prevent Jews from moving outside the Jewish "Pale" in the West of the Empire.

Did the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century tsars try
to impose Russian Orthodoxy or the Russian language on the other non-Russians of the Empire? It was generally accepted that apart from the Ukrainians, who were traditionally Orthodox, the other groups, such as the Muslims, Lithuanians, Poles and the Lutheran Baltic Germans could not be forced in a body to accept Orthodoxy. As far as the Islamic peoples were concerned, Ivan IV had preached a policy of religious freedom for the Tatars following his capture of Kazan, and this policy was generally adhered to. An exception was under Empress Elizabeth, whose intolerance of Islam provoked an unsuccessful revolt of the Bashkirs in 1754-1755. Catherine II reversed Elizabeth's policy; she sought to strengthen Russian control by coming to an accommodation with Islam. She encouraged the education of the Kirghiz in both Kirghiz and Russian, and had mullahs employed to teach them.

There does not seem to have been any attempt to impose the Russian language on the Ukrainians in this period. In 1596, when the Ukraine was under Polish occupation, some Ukrainian Orthodox Christians were absorbed into the Ukrainian Catholic or "Uniate" Church, which recognized papal supremacy. The Ukraine later won its political autonomy, and in 1654 the Cossack Council (the Ukrainian assembly) asked for the protection of Muscovy against Poland. Under the Treaty of Pereiaslav the same year, the Ukraine was united (or reunited) with Muscovy. In 1686 the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was incorporated into the Moscow Patriarchate.
Tsars from Peter I onwards began to integrate the Ukraine into the Russian Empire. In 1710 he appointed a Russian official to watch over the Ukrainian leader, the hetman, and proceeded to erode Ukrainian autonomy with the help of the Russian Army. In 1764 Catherine II abolished the hetmanate and enunciated the principle of the unified administration of the Ukraine, the Baltic provinces and Finland in the Russian Empire. "These provinces ..." wrote Catherine, "should be easily reduced to a condition where they can be Russified..." This desire to Russify was not at all motivated by religious messianism; indeed, in George Vernadsky's words, "The church was considered essential only for the moral education of the lower classes."

Rather, Russification was associated with Catherine's desire for administrative rationality and her style of "enlightened despotism". The privileges of self-government were removed in turn, ultimately, from all the territories mentioned, and the principle of unified administration was extended to the lands taken in the partition of Poland.

Michael T. Florinsky comments that, except in Finland and Poland, "her successors on the throne (with the exception of Emperors Paul and Alexander I) remained on the whole faithful to the program inaugurred in 1764", right up to 1917.
Holy Russia

It has been suggested above that the doctrine of "Moscow, the Third Rome" was not taken very seriously by the Muscovite tsars as a guide to policy formulation, and the concept was significantly modified or abandoned with the move to Petersburg. But the masses of the population sometimes behaved as if they took aspects of the doctrine very seriously. The peasant version of Russian messianism emphasized the holiness and uniqueness of the Russian land and people rather than the holiness of the Tsar. It should be admitted at once that there is difficulty in ascertaining what exactly the beliefs of the peasants were at any time in Russian history, since they were largely illiterate and their masters when writing about them may well have distorted their position. Nevertheless, the demands of the various peasant revolts make it possible to fit together a plausible peasant ideology, based on the myths of "Holy Russia" and the "saintly ruler".

The first known use of the term "Holy Russian" (sviatorusskii) in political literature occurs in the works of Prince Andrei M. Kurbsky in the sixteenth century. This is in the context of his attacks on Ivan IV for allegedly betraying the divine mission of Russia and the trust put in him by God. Kurbsky began a tradition which has continued to this day among opponents of Russian regimes: rather than challenge directly the ideology of the leader or leadership, he accused the leader of failing to act in accordance with his ideology. Thus, Soviet dissidents of the Brezhnev era holding widely differing
views - Marxists, constitutionalists and nationalists - argued that the regime deviated from Marxism, its own Constitution and patriotism, all of which the leadership claimed to abide by.

Wherefore, O tsar (Kurbsky wrote to Ivan) have you destroyed the strong in Israel [i.e., Russia] and subjected to various forms of death the voevodas [military commanders] given to you by God? 109

The Tsar is portrayed as the antithesis of Holy Russia, dishonouring the "Holy Russian lands". 110

The concept of "Holy Russia" was hardly ever deployed in writings exalting the Tsar, and was used officially only on very rare occasions of national emergency. This failure to use the epithet suggests that there is a considerable portion of truth in Michael Cherniavsky's belief that the concept had a subversive connotation. It is true that a seventeenth-century song which praises Tsar Michael Romanov uses the phrase "Holy Russian land"; but since this was written soon after the Zemskii Sobor had determined the succession by election, it is likely that Michael was seen as a genuinely popular choice. The penetration of Russian messianism among the simple people is illustrated by a folk story. Christ is alleged to have denied that He was Jewish and to have asserted: "I am pure Russian". 111 For official Muscovy, the focus of holiness was the Tsar, and the uniqueness of Russia as in the "Third Rome" theory depended on the uniqueness of the Tsar. For the peasantry, Holy Russia was the Orthodox Russian people and land, whose holiness was independent of the existence of the Tsar and the Muscovite State. Illustrative of this is that the Don
Cossacks, as adherents of Russian Orthodoxy, would die for Holy Russia and even the Orthodox Tsar, but until the union of 1654 they owed no political allegiance to the Muscovite State.\textsuperscript{112}

When the peasants felt that the policies emanating from Moscow or Petersburg were not appropriate for "Holy Russia", they, like Kurbsky, typically articulated their dissent in pro-tsarist form. In the popular revolts from the seventeenth century on, the insurgents sometimes claimed that the Tsar was good but had bad advisors. Peasants desiring the abolition of serfdom, for example, might assert that the "Tsar wishes it but the boyars resist."\textsuperscript{113} At other times the rebel leaders themselves claimed to be the true holy Tsar. Pokrovsky wrote that the myth of the Tsar was the "peasantry's revolutionary ideology".\textsuperscript{114} It is true that the peasants manipulated their belief in the Tsar to justify their rebellion; but as Daniel Field points out, this does not necessarily mean that their belief was not sincere.\textsuperscript{115} These rebellions were essentially conservative, not only in that they sought the return of the "true Tsar" or the implementation of his wishes, but also in that they sought a return to the "true Russian path" which was being abandoned by Westernizing tsars. Billington remarks that "in social composition and messianic utopianism" they resembled the sixteenth-century rebellions of German peasants.\textsuperscript{116} Zernov suggests that the great majority of peasants were unaffected by the Westernizing reforms and genuinely believed the Tsars to be
truly Orthodox. It seems that, even among part of the Petersburg proletariat, only the shootings of Bloody Sunday, 1905, could undermine the people's faith in the Tsar. The shattering of the myth undermined the legitimacy of the Empire. 117

The views of the revolutionary peasants paralleled in many ways those of the Old Believers; in some cases, the two currents merged. Both believed that the holy Muscovite traditions were being destroyed by the tsars; but whereas the peasants sought to return to the traditions by the use of violence, the Old Believers generally stood aside from political struggle and awaited salvation from above. The Cossack revolt led by Stenka Razin began in 1667, close to the time of the Church Council which dismissed Nikon and excommunicated the Old Believers. The Cossacks admittedly rose in the name of Nikon rather than Avvakum; but the two priests were united in the belief that the Church should not be subordinated to the State. Beyond this, even the Old Believers themselves became ridden by schism and strife. Some Old Believers, from 1667, were preparing for the end of world, believing Antichrist had begun his reign, while others merely expected his imminent arrival. Some burned themselves to death, while others fled and created their own communities. Usually the belief in the chosenness of Russia was combined with a withdrawal from the Russian State. 118

The reign of Peter I provided a boost to the strength of the Old Believers. Peter's enthusiastic adoption of
Western methods and his promotion of foreigners (particularly Germans) into high places alienated many Russians. Again the Tsar was seen as Antichrist. Merchants who had lost their privileges through Peter's reforms found that the ideology of the Old Believers was supportive of their interests; many of them broke from the Westernized urban environment and joined the Old Believer communities, spearheading the conquest of Siberia. Old Believer life was industrious and ascetic. Messianic groups with their own prophets constantly emerged and split off, keeping alive the intense religious tradition. They intermingled with the many Protestant sectarian communities which appeared in Russia from the seventeenth century onwards, and were influenced by them. Both the Old Believers and the sectarians expected the imminent end of the natural order, but while the former expected only the Last Judgement, the latter generally expected the millennial Kingdom of God on Earth. Sects such as the khlysty (flagellants), who called themselves "God's People", the molokane (milk drinkers) and, more eccentrically, the skuptsy (castrated ones) showed great vitality, producing numbers of "Christs" and "angels".119

According to Billington, the sectarians differed from the Old Believers in that they did not look back to a past Russian Orthodoxy but propagated a new set of beliefs.120 Vatro Murvar seems not to make a sharp distinction between the two. He writes:

All sectarian religious structures in pre-Revolutionary Russia were messianic... the dissidents' most
fundamental question was whether or not, under steadily increasing foreign influences, the Russian people were still performing their tasks, or at least marching towards the basic messianic goal, and whether their motherland was still Holy Russia... There was no dissent structure in the Russian context which did not share these messianic dogmas. 121

Despite the categorical nature of this statement, Murvar does not seem to establish satisfactorily that the sectarians, as opposed to the Old Believers, really were concerned with "Holy Russia". Rather, he places the sectarians within the framework of Russian messianism by arguing that the sectarians shared certain messianic doctrines with the Old Believers. Murvar's main aim is to show the essential similarity of the religious messianisms and the revolutionary messianisms in Russia. He argues that all religious and revolutionary messianisms shared these common doctrines. He claims further that these doctrines "seem to have been most successfully internalized into the durable and vital value-system of both Tsarist and Soviet Russia". 122

The common doctrines identified by Murvar are "millennialism", "twain cosmogony" and "monism" or "collectivism". All the sects expected that the Millennium would come after a cosmic struggle between Christ and Antichrist. This gave rise to the "twain cosmogony": all humanity was divided into the "children of darkness" and the "children of light", respectively the followers of Antichrist and Christ (the latter being members of the sect). The "chosen" group, the "children of light", sometimes sought to hasten the millennium by rejecting the evil world through suicide, euthanasia and castration. The
leaders of the chosen group were believed to be endowed with mystical powers, if not actually divine. By "monism" is meant the rejection of any distinction between the religious, political and economic spheres of activity; one absolute religious idea dominates all aspects of life. Applied to the economy, it was held that land and other property belonged to God and were intended to be used for the benefit of the people. The concept of private property was therefore considered evil; Nikon and Peter were sometimes accused of inventing it. Hence property in the sectarian communities was held collectively. Murvar states:

The sectarians were not dissenters (in the contemporary Western sense) who fought for their right to dissent; quite to the contrary, they wished to replace Tsarist monism with their own because the former was corrupted by Western influences.123

The State against the Nation

It is clear that the sectarians and the Old Believers were in fundamental opposition to the tsarist State. In this context, the position of Tibor Szamuely is unduly one-sided. Szamuely, in his volume The Russian Tradition, claimed that throughout history the Russian people were devoted not only to their country but also to their State. He attributed this to their supposed consciousness that only a powerful, centralized State could ensure national survival, in the face of enemies from all sides; and to their isolation from Europe. Russians of all classes, he said, looked at the State with "ecstatic rapture" and "exultation bordering on idolatry". People believed in Russia, as a society based on equality and justice, because
it was a society of universal bondage, in which the autocracy prevented the emergence of the type of oppressor class which ruled in Western Europe.24

All this neglects the importance of the Schism, the sectarians and the Cossack traditions of freedom. It is more accurate to talk about a "dual Russia" - the Russia of St. Petersburg and the Russia of the religious dissenters. More generally, the religious Schism symbolized the split between the State and those who sought alternatives. Berdiaev said that the Russians were Schismatics; he included the religious Schismatics, the Cossacks and the nineteenth-century intelligentsia as groups who, in different ways, tried to escape tsarist oppression.125 Robert C. Tucker sees the division perhaps even more starkly: the State, at any rate from the time of Peter's reforms, stood against the nation. The vlast', the gosudarstvo - the central autocratic State power - stood against obshchestvo, the society, and narod, the people or nation.126 Aleksandr I. Herzen, a Russian socialist writing in the nineteenth century, and Pavel N. Miliukov, a Russian liberal writing in the twentieth, agreed on this. Herzen spoke of the "Russia of the dark people, poor, agricultural, communal, democratic ... conquered, as it were", by the official Russia.127 Miliukov wrote that for centuries "the country continued to feel and live independent of the state authorities."128

National consciousness

The discussion of the State as standing against the
nation and the discussion of the popular belief in "Holy Russia" presuppose the existence of some form of national consciousness. A common Russian consciousness dated back to the eleventh century and persisted while Russian land was occupied by the Lithuanians, Poles and Mongols. S.O. Yakobson suggests that it was the presence of Polish troops in Muscovy in 1610 which made "the national idea ... the common possession of the vast masses of the populace" of Russia. The reforms of Nikon and then Peter provoked an upsurge of national feeling, which Yakobson calls "nationalism", in defence of the old traditions. H. Rogger prefers to call this feeling "national consciousness" when applied to the eighteenth century or earlier. He refers particularly to the attempt by educated Russians to develop a distinct Russian identity, character and culture, in reaction to Peter's Westernization. National consciousness, paradoxically, was the product of the most Westernized stratum of society. Charles Ruud emphasizes the "general sense of lagging behind the West" as the "principal stimulus" to "nationalism in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries". It should be added that the bearers of national consciousness and nationalism were divided about the extent to which they wanted Russia to catch up with the West or maintain her own identity.

Catherine II, Imperatrix of the Enlightenment, tried to use the developing national consciousness for the benefit of the State. She presented the government as serving
national aspirations. She emphasized native Russian virtues and sponsored the development of Russian culture. This was partly to pre-empt Russian criticism of the "foreign" monarchy (Western both in its practice and in the ethnic origin of the monarch). Russian native pride was encouraged as a sub-division of loyalty to the Empress. In turn people who wished to end serfdom and improve the living conditions of the masses took advantage of this official Russian orientation to put forward their own view of national priorities. For Nikolai I. Novikov (1744-1818) and Aleksandr N. Radishchev (1749-1802), the Russian peasant, "unspoiled" by Western influence, was the fount of true morality. But Rogger denies that their view was nationalist; neither indulged in "uncritical exaltation" of the people or nation. Similarly, Radishchev and other late-eighteenth-century writers used the official idea of Russia as a successor to ancient Rome as a justification for demanding that the liberties of Rome be extended to Russia.

Thus the Russian national consciousness of the eighteenth century, which was founded on opposition to Westernization, gave rise to the official Russian orientation of Catherine. Sometimes this overlapped with the unofficial national consciousness. The beginning of the nineteenth century saw a shift from the defence of Russian models against Westernization to an "uncritical worship of all things Russian". This sowed the seeds of "official narodnost'" under Nicholas I and of Slavophilism.
Messianism under Alexander I

The reign of Alexander I (1801-1825) began with society and the new Tsar apparently united in enthusiasm for the ideas of Enlightenment. The failure to carry through social and political reforms in this spirit led to the disillusionment which culminated in the Decembrist rising of 1825. It would be wrong to see Alexander as moving in a straight line from reform to reaction, but the general tendency of the period is symbolized by the replacement as Alexander's chief adviser of the reformer Mikhail M. Speransky by the reactionary General Aleksei A. Arakcheev, halfway through the reign. Alexander's change in direction reflected not only his interest in mysticism but also the pressure of the nobility.

A major intellectual influence in this period was Nikolai M. Karamzin (1766-1826). In his Memorandum on Ancient and Modern Russia, offered to Alexander in 1811, he opposed any constitutional reforms and advocated the maintenance of national traditions, including autocracy.135 In his criticisms of Peter I for disrupting national traditions, he proved to be a precursor of the Slavophils, although his attitude to tradition was pragmatic rather than ideological.

In the reigns of Michael and of his son, our ancestors, while assimilating many advantages which were to be found in foreign customs, never lost the conviction that an Orthodox Russian was the most perfect citizen and Holy Rus', the foremost state in the world. Let this be called a delusion. Yet how much it did to strengthen patriotism and the moral fibre of the country!136

As Alexander's official historian, Karamzin produced a 12-
volume history of the Russian State (istoriia_gosudarstva rossiiskogo), the publication of which began in 1818 and was completed only after his death. This history was republished many times and the early Slavophils were familiar with it. 137

In view of Karamzin's influence on Slavophilism, it is worth pointing out that despite his major role in Russian historiography (Pushkin called him "our first historian") this major work was not republished in the Soviet Union before the Gorbachev period. His description of travel in Western Europe was published in Moscow in 1980, and in 1983 a volume about him, intended for a mass audience, was published with a print run of 200,000. 138 In 1986, during his visit to New Delhi, Gorbachev referred to "our famous historian and writer Nikolai Karamzin." 139

Napoleon's attack on Russia in 1812 created the danger that he would appeal to the Russian peasants by promising to end serfdom. Count Fyodor V. Rostopchin (later the Governor of Moscow) sought to unite the peasants with the government by promoting the idea of "Holy Russia". This concept had previously had subversive connotations (see above, p. 42), but Rostopchin's "Holy Russia" referred to the Russian people led by the "Russian God" through the Tsar. After the defeat of Napoleon, the concept was modified: Russia was "Holy" not so much because of her unique relationship with God as because she was ruled by the Tsar. 140
Whatever Rostopchin's intentions, a tremendous boost was given to Russian national feeling by the defeat of Napoleon and the subsequent entry of Russian troops into Paris in 1814. While this was not the first time that Russian troops had served in Western Europe, they had not previously occupied Paris, the cradle of the French Revolution. Purely in terms of the westward projection of military power, Russia advanced further in 1814 than at the end of World War II. The Austrian diplomat Friedrich von Gentz observed at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 that Russia faced "no further real danger" from her neighbours, but would find it "easy" to conquer them. For most Russians, the defeat of Napoleon represented Russia's victory over Europe. 141

Alexander, however, desired neither to conquer Europe nor to impose the Orthodox religion on her. In France he imposed constitutional limitations on the power of the restored Louis XVIII. Elsewhere he acted as chief defender of the status quo in Europe. In 1815 he persuaded the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia to join him in the so-called "Holy Alliance". He believed he had a holy mission from God to defend Europe from liberals and revolutionaries, whom he considered anti-Christian. One could describe his messianism as personal rather than national. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, dismissed the Alliance as "mysticism and nonsense". The members of the Alliance were supposed to conduct their relations on the basis of Christian morality, but while the
maintenance of peace was an important aim, so too was the
maintenance of the existing monarchies, allegedly ruling by
"Divine Right". The defence of "legitimacy" governed
Alexander's foreign policy, and Pierre Kovalevsky is among
those who argue that it was pursued at the expense of
Russia's national interests. Alexander's messianism,
together with the victory over Napoleon, had an important
consequence. They allowed the idea that Russia had a
mission in Europe to appear among the educated classes.

How did Alexander's messianism affect the minorities of
the Russian Empire? A decree of 1804 generally reduced the
discrimination against religious minorities. In 1810,
however, Prince Aleksandr N. Golitsyn, the Oberprokurator
of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, was put
in charge of the minority religions as well, and this
adversely affected them, particularly the Jews. Golitsyn's
Bible Society evoked much interest from a section of
society (religious mysticism not being confined to the
monarch). After the incorporation of Finland into the
Russian Empire in 1808, she was allowed to retain most of
her own laws and customs. Even in 1815 the Kingdom of
Poland was granted her own constitution, guaranteeing the
position of the Polish language, freedom of worship and
wide autonomy in domestic affairs.

Disappointment among army officers and other educated
strata at the slow pace of reform and at Arakcheev's
despotism led to the formation of secret societies.
These later became known collectively as the Decembrist movement, following the attempted coup of December 1825, after the death of Alexander. Vatro Murvar has tried to argue that the Decembrists illustrate his claim that all dissident movements in pre-revolutionary Russia shared "messianic dogmas" and believed in "Holy Russia" (see above, pp. 46-47). He quotes Marc Raeff in his support.

[The Decembrists] craved to introduce into public life what they felt were Russia's own historical institutions and national traditions... Peter the Great, they believed, had imposed institutions too closely imitative of foreign models; it was time to return to genuinely Russian forms. 146

Murvar stops here, but Raeff goes on.

However, the Decembrists never rejected the spirit of modernity and reliance on Western culture and political liberalism. On the contrary, they felt that the successors of Peter I in the eighteenth century and particularly Alexander I, had betrayed what was good and genuinely useful in the Western models and imitated only the harmful externals. 147

Murvar is right to say that the Decembrists believed that the Tsars had betrayed Russia's traditions, but wrong to play down the importance of Western liberalism as an influence on them. They may have been xenophobic, and this was in part brought on by Alexander's lack of esteem for the Russian nation. 148 But they wanted to do something about serfdom and they wanted at the very least what Alexander had given to France and Poland but denied to Russia - a constitution.

Nikita M. Muravyov of the Decembrists' "Northern Society" proposed a liberal and federal constitution for Russia. The most important programme of the Decembrist movement, however, was the Rusekaia Pravda (Russian Law or
Russian Justice', formulated by Colonel Pavel I. Pestel of the Decembrists' "Southern Society", based in the Ukraine. Pestel called for the abolition of serfdom and the introduction of economic liberalism; and for the replacement of autocracy by a republican system of representative government, based on equal rights. While Pestel argued for Russification of the non-Russians and the promotion of Orthodoxy, this was far from the spirit of "Moscow, the Third Rome". Indeed he said that Russia's capital should be moved not back to Moscow but to Nizhny Novgorod. Nations already in the Empire which were politically unviable should remain within Russia: Pestel mentioned "Finland, Estonia, Livland, Courland, White Russia, the Ukraine, New Russia [Novrossiia], Bessarabia, the Crimea, Georgia, the entire Caucasus, the lands of the Kirghiz, all the Siberian peoples and other tribes". He further advocated the annexation of Moldavia, Turkestan and Mongolia in the interests of Russian security, but rejected any further expansion. For Pestel, Poland was a different matter. She had shown her political viability in the past, and Russia should grant her independence, subject to her adopting the same political system as Russia. Pestel advocated a strongly centralizing policy for the territories remaining inside Russia. Any form of federalism, he feared, would lead to the borderlands falling away. He discussed at some length the non-Russian races and argued that the Russian language should be introduced for them. Orthodoxy was to remain the "ruling faith", and, in the spirit of Peter, the clergy
were to be regarded as "part of the government... a division of the bureaucracy". The purpose of all this was clearly the fusion of the races; the government should aim at making them into one single nation and at dissolving all differences into one common mass, so that the inhabitants throughout the entire territory of the Russian state be all Russians.

Perhaps one reason why Pestel was prepared to give Poland conditional independence was that he feared that the Poles might not easily be assimilated into the Russians, especially given their Catholicism. Overall it seems fair to categorize Pestel as a pragmatist, not an ideologist of Russian messianism, despite Murvar's efforts.

One of the groups absorbed by Pestel's "Southern Society" was the Ukraine-based Society of the United Slavs (1812-1825). Like Pestel, this group favoured the overthrow of autocracy and serfdom. What distinguished them was their desire for a federal State uniting all the Slav peoples of Europe, including the Poles, and also the Hungarians, whom they mistakenly believed to be Slavs. At this point it is necessary to pause and rehearse the origins of pan-Slavism and the relation between pan-Slavism and Russian messianism.

**Pan-Slavism**

Pan-Slavism was a movement and an ideology which promoted the cultural and in some cases the political unity of the Slav peoples. It was conceptually quite different from Slavophilism, the latter being a movement and an
ideology which emphasized Russian Orthodoxy and the unique features of the Russian people. Admittedly, some leaders of the Slavophil movement later evolved towards pan-Slavism. Whereas the Slavophils were Russians, the pan-Slavists included Russians and non-Russian Slavs. It would be wrong to portray Slavophilism as "progressive" and pan-Slavism as "reactionary", or vice versa; both movements contained pro-tsarist and anti-tsarist elements.

Two of the earliest pan-Slavists, the Croat clergymen Alexander Komulović and Juraj Krizanić, have already been mentioned (see p. 37). Krizanić, like some later pan-Slavists, saw a special role for Russia in leading the Slav alliance. Vladimir Solovyov declared that Krizanić's pan-Slavism served his desire for Christian unity.156 E. Shmurlo agrees that Krizanić sought religious unity of the Slavs under Rome, but argues that this was secondary to his main desire for the cultural and political unity of the Slavs against the Turks and Germans.157 This sort of pan-Slavism clearly had little to do with traditional Russian messianism in that it was based on the first Rome rather than the Third. Pan-Slavism was given a boost among the South Slavs (the "Illyrian" movement) a century later, in 1783, when Russia annexed the Crimea. From the 1820s the Western Slavs became important in the pan-Slav movement, led by the Lutheran Slovaks Jan Kollar and Pavel Šafárik. Their version of pan-Slavism was more liberal than others.158
By now some Russians were promoting pan-Slavist policies. In 1804 Vasily N. Karazin (1773-1842), a former education official, called on the tsarist government to help the Serbs, who were rebelling against the Turks, and to establish a Kingdom of the Slavs in the Balkans. This kingdom would be linked with the Russian Empire and be a pole of attraction to all Slavs. Karazin made the messianic claim that Russia's role was "celui de défendre la cause du genre humain". He declared that the Tsar could not turn his back on the Slavs, as the supreme head of their Church. Karazin was a reformer who advocated some limitations on the autocracy; his advice on foreign policy was ignored.159

Nevertheless, pan-Slavism played some role in Russian foreign policy up to 1812. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, a Pole, Prince Adam Czartorysky, proposed in 1804 that, after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, the Tsar should proclaim himself the Emperor of the Eastern Slavs, pacifying Austria with some South Slav lands. The most important targets for Russia were Constantinople and the Dardanelles. In 1806, when Russia went to war with Turkey, she expressed support for her enemy's Slav subjects; but when war broke out with France in 1812, Russia made peace with Turkey and abandoned the Slavs to the Ottomans. Pan-Slavism was not a consistent basis of foreign policy, but rather an instrument to be used when convenient, like the "Third Rome" ideology earlier.160 The idea of pan-Slavism largely went underground in 1812, with the Society of the United Slavs. Later came the Brotherhood of St.
Cyril and St. Methodius, also based in the Ukraine and centred around Nikolai I. Kostomarov, and later still the followers of Bakunin. When the Holy Alliance became the lynchpin of tsarist foreign policy, there was little chance of official support for general Slav uprisings.
Footnotes


6. Yonina Talmon, "Millenarian Movements", AES, VII, No. 2 (1960), 159. This article, pp. 159-200, is useful for its citations of the major studies of millenarianism and messianism published before 1960.

7. Ibid., pp. 169, 175.

8. Vladimir S. Solov’ev, "Messianism", Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ (Brockhaus-Eiron, SPb., 1896), XIX, 150.


10. Idem, "Chto takoe 'messianizm'? (Prolog k Russkomu Messianizmu)"; GZ, 1979, No. 13, p. 27.


21. Cohn, pp. 3-4.


24. Cohn, pp. 4-5.


26. Ibid., pp. 25-32.


32. Ibid., p. 269.


35. Werblowsky, in *Jewish Society through the Ages*, p. 44.

36. Mowinckel, p. 343.


42. Matthew x, 23, and xvi, 28.


64. Murvar, pp. 328-34.


66. Dmytro Donzov, "Who were the Spiritual Fathers of the October Revolution? (Or, the Russians about Themselves)", Ukrainian Review, VII, No. 3 (Autumn 1961), 25.


Nikolay Andreyev has argued that Filofei had advanced the "Third Rome" theory earlier, around 1500-1501, in a letter to Tsar Ivan III. This letter (in Malinin, Appendix, pp. 57-60) is, however, generally considered to have been written to Tsar Ivan IV, the successor of Vasily III; this position is defended by N. Maslennikova. See Nikolay Andreyev, "Filofei i his Epistle to Ivan Vasil'evich", SEER, XXXVIII, No. 90 (December 1959), 1-31; and (for Maslennikova's view), I.S. Lure, Ideologicheskaya bor'ba v russkoj publitsistike kontsa XV - nachala XVI veka (M.-L., 1960), pp. 346-57, 482-97, cited in Billington, Icon, p. 650, n. 46.

68. Toumanoff, p. 428.


70. Billington, Icon, p. 11.


74. Lotman & Uspensky, p. 238.

75. Iu. A. Popov, Istoriko-literaturnyi obzor drevnerusskikh polemicheskikh sochinenii protiv Latinian (M., 1875), pp. 394-95, as cited in Wolff, p. 299.


85. N.S. Chaev, "'Moskva - Tretii Rim' v politicheskoi


88. Emanuel Sarkisyanz, "Russian Imperialism Reconsidered", in *Russian Imperialism*, pp. 51-52; Ťčččnsky, p. 46.

89. Traian Stoianovich, "Russian Domination in the Balkans", in *Russian Imperialism*, p. 231.


97. Guariglia, pp. 73-74.


100. Birnbaum, pp. 246-54.


102. Baron, pp. 8-18.


A similar point was made by Nicholas V. Riasanovsky who, when reviewing Cherniavsky's Tsar and People, accused the author of exaggerating the antithesis between the official myth of the "holy ruler" and the popular myth of "Holy Rus'". Riasanovsky, in Political Science Quarterly, LXXVIII, No. 2 (June 1963), 304–305. For an attempt to discover the views of the peasants in the second half of the nineteenth century, see Daniel Field, Rebels in the Name of the Tsar (Boston, Mass., 1976).


In 1985, addressing the readership of the newspaper Sovetskaia Rossia, Skrynnikov accused Keenan of forming a "negative attitude to our people" in maintaining that Ivan the Terrible was illiterate and that the correspondence with Kurbsky was a forgery. Ruslan G. Skrynnikov, "Umel li pisat' Ivan Groznii?" (interview with A. Seregin), Sov Ross, 10 March 1985.


113. Field, p. 14. See also Cherniavsky, Tsar and People, pp. 5-100.

114. Mikhail N. Fokovsky, Tsarizm i revoliutsiia (M., 1918), p. 3, as cited in Field, p. 23.


117. Zernov, Moscow, pp. 77-79.

118. Billington, Icon, pp. 197, 156-60, 174.


120. Billington, Icon, p. 174.

121. Murvar, pp. 287-88.

122. Ibid., pp. 280, 294 (including quotation).

123. Ibid., pp. 283-84, 294-99 (quotation, p. 298). One might quarrel with the term "Tsarist monism", given that some tsars actively encouraged the concept of private property.

124. Szamuely, pp. 60-64 (quotations, p. 60).

125. Berdiaev, Russian Idea, pp. 11-12.


131. Charles Ruud, "Pre-Revolutionary Russian Nationalism", *CRSN*, 1, No. 2 (Spring 1974), 276.


134. Ruud, pp. 277-78.


136. Ibid., pp. 120-27 (quotation, p. 123).


147. Raeff, p. 12.

148. Ibid., pp. 11-12.

149. Excerpts from this are translated in Raeff, pp. 124-56. The document is discussed in Mazour, pp. 98-116.


151. Ibid., pp. 136-37.

152. Ibid., pp. 156, 150.

153. Ibid., pp. 139-47.

154. See Murvar, pp. 310-11.


159. Karazin's letter is in Vasily N. Karazin, Sochinenia. pis'ma i bumagi, ed. D.I. Bagalei (Kharkov, 1910), pp. 36-61, cited in Fadner, pp. 77-82; and see Fadner, pp. 85-89.

160. Fadner, pp. 89-105.
Chapter Two

The Slavophils and Russian Messianism under Nicholas I
(1825-1855)

It was in the reign of Nicholas I (1825-1855) that the Slavophils formulated their ideas. While the extent to which each of them embraced Russian messianism differed, they shared a belief in Russia's uniqueness. This chapter will investigate their ideas, the influences on them and the political consequences of their views. It will consider their relationship to other Russian messianists, and to the State and tsarist ideologists.

Two Ideologies

In 1969 the Soviet journalist Aleksandr L. Ianov launched a discussion on Slavophilism in the Soviet specialist press. His article "The Riddle of Slavophil Criticism" was the first of 12 contributions to appear in Voprosy literatury that year. In this article, and in another entitled "The Slavophils and Konstantin Leontev" in Voprosy filosofii, Ianov posed the problem: why was it that the conservative ideologist Leontev "proved to be the direct heir of the classical Slavophils who devoted their lives to a struggle for freedom"? In Ianov's book The Russian New Right, published in the USA after his emigration there, he explains his purpose in starting the discussion. In the 1960s, Russian national consciousness and nationalist feeling in the USSR had grown, reflected for example in the journal Molodaia gvardiia. (See chapter 6, below.) Ianov sought to show, within the confines of
censorship, that this nationalism would inevitably end in an accommodation with the Soviet State, whether or not it originated in opposition to the regime.

How did it happen that, having begun a noble confrontation with the despotic tsarist regime, the ideologists of Russian nationalism ultimately worked out a formula for collaboration with that regime? How was Slavophilism transformed from a mighty protest against despotism into an equally mighty apologia for it, suitable for practical use in the struggle against democracy? Is there not an objective logic in this tragic evolution of Russian nationalism, leading to such a terrible outcome?5

For Ianov, a clear demonstration of this evolution was the fate of Ivan Aksakov, who as a Slavophil was opposed to the ruling elite and its "anti-national" character, and believed in freedom of the Press, but towards the end of his life was forced by his nationalism to side with the conservatives rather than the "nihilists and liberals"5 (whom he identified as the representatives of an even greater danger).

In "The Riddle of Slavophil Criticism", Ianov emphasised the differences between early Slavophilism and the ideology of Nicholas I. "...Russian social consciousness in the 1830s and 1840s created not one but two competing nationalist ideologies. Two systems of views, each claiming the role of this ideology, but in everything else completely different."6 These ideologies, Ianov argued, "suffered from one and the same defect: they had a religious nature." The official ideology idolized authoritarian government. (As will be shown below, it is inaccurate to describe the official ideology as nationalist, although it had what has been termed a
nationalist wing.) On the other hand, Slavophilism idolized the "simple people". But this idolization of the simple people led to hostility on the part of the Slavophils to the oppositionist intelligentsia, bringing the Slavophils into alliance with reaction and even, as far as the epigones of Slavophilism were concerned, into support for the Black Hundreds. This was about as far as Ianov thought he could go in discussing the "danger" of anti-Soviet Russian nationalism in the Soviet Press, but his writings as an émigré are more explicit. He is not repeating the views of Vladimir Solovyov, Miliukov and others about the decomposition of Slavophil ideology (which will be discussed later). Rather he is saying that there is a "duality in Russian nationalism - 'dissident' versus 'establishmentarian' - which, through a series of stages, completes a complex and tortuous journey from mutual confrontation to convergence..." 

Ianov's writings and the tone in which they are phrased make it clear that he regards this process of "convergence" of nationalist ideologies as inevitable. Such a claim requires careful scrutiny. Undoubtedly, there is a methodological problem in Ianov's approach in that even if it can be shown that Slavophilism evolved directly into Leontev's ideas, it does not follow from this that Ianov's "assertion" or "prediction" about contemporary Russian nationalism is necessarily valid. For this one would have to assume the factors operating on Russian nationalism in the nineteenth century were the same as those operating today. One would also have to have a highly deterministic
attitude to the evolution of ideas and movements, comparable to the view that Stalinism was the inevitable consequence of Marxism. Nonetheless it is likely that some light can be cast on the relationship between the Russian nationalist ideologies in the USSR today by an investigation of the relationship between official and unofficial nationalist ideologies of the nineteenth century.

It should perhaps be pointed out that there was no necessary link in nineteenth-century Russia between anti-Westernizing thought and either the 'left' or the 'right'. If 'left' implies a preference for freedom and equality and 'right' suggests an emphasis on order, privilege and conservatism, then both left and right included Westernizing and anti-Westernizing wings. Under Nicholas, independent public opinion was generally more sympathetic to Westernizing than to Slavophil ideas. In what follows, I use the terms "Slavophil" and "Slavophilism" to refer to the "classical" or "early" Slavophils: Aleksei Stepanovich Khomiakov (1804-60), the brothers Ivan Vasilevich and Pyotr Vasilevich Kireevsky (1806-1856 and 1808-1856), the brothers Konstantin Sergeevich and Ivan Sergeevich Aksakov (1817-1860 and 1823-1886), Iury Fyodorovich Samarin (1819-1876) and Aleksandr Ivanovich Koshelyov (1806-1883).

On the surface, there are several similarities between the ideology of Nicholas I and Slavophilism.
ideology has been referred to since the late nineteenth century (following Aleksandr N. Pypin) as official (ofitsial'naia) narodnost', usually rendered in English as "Official Nationality". The ideology was expressed in 1833 by Nicholas's Minister of People's Enlightenment, Sergei S. Uvarov: "Our common obligation consists in this, that the education of the people be conducted, according to the Supreme intention of our August Monarch, in the joint spirit of Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality." The three elements of Uvarov's triad - Orthodoxy, autocracy and narodnost' - were all believed in by the Slavophils, although their interpretation of these concepts usually differed from the official view. The Soviet scholar Viacheslav A. Koshelyov suggests that the outward similarity of Slavophilism to Uvarov's formula was conscious, with the aim of making it easier for the Slavophils to spread their ideas. Both the official ideology and Slavophilism were hostile to the Western ideas of liberalism and socialism, and they both postulated that Russia was in a certain sense different from the West. The Slavophils nevertheless fundamentally opposed the path of development pursued by Russian officialdom. While there were differences among the Slavophils, they generally rejected the Westernizing reforms of Peter I, the lifestyle of the elite, and sometimes idealized the Muscovite past. In this there was a continuity going back to the concept of "Moscow, the Third Rome" and the ideas of the Raskol'niki. (Herzen called the latter "Slavophils". Furthermore, the Slavophils idolized the Russian people, especially the peasants, rather than the State, and
protested at the lack of freedom in Nicholas's Russia.

Nicholas Riasanovsky has divided the proponents of official narodnost' into the "dynastic" and "nationalist" wings. The dynastic wing included the Tsar, most of his government and the journal Severnoe pchelo (Northern Bee, St. Petersburg, 1825-1864), edited by Nikolai I. Grech and Fyodor V. Bulgarin. This wing was strongest in St. Petersburg. To the right of the government was the obscurantist journal Maiak (The Lighthouse, St. Petersburg, 1840-1845), edited by S. Burachek and P. Korsakov, which carried anti-Western feeling to an extreme. The nationalist wing was headed by Mikhail Petrovich Pogodin (1800-1875) and Stepan Petrovich Shevyryov (1806-1874), respectively professors of history and literature at the University of Moscow. Pogodin was the publisher and first editor of the journal Moskvitianin (The Muscovite, Moscow, 1841-1856), which was patronized by Uvarov. Many of its contributors, together with the poet Fyodor Ivanovich Tiutchev (1803-1875), belonged to the nationalist wing. The nationalists gained much wider support than the dynastic wing among young educated Russians, and they were strongest in Moscow. The emphasis of the nationalist wing on the world mission of the Russian people brought them closer to the Slavophils and, lacking a journal of their own, the Slavophils contributed to Moskvitianin. The chronicler of Pogodin's work, Nikolai P. Barsukov, records however that of all the Slavophils, only Khomiakov had consistently friendly relations with Pogodin.
Despite the similarities between the nationalist wing of official narodnost' and the Slavophils, both Riasanovsky and Andrzej Walicki, two leading scholars of Slavophilism, are insistent on the fundamental divisions between them. Pogodin and the Slavophils emphasised their mutual differences; neither Pogodin himself nor the Slavophils used the word "Slavophil" to describe him, and this distinction was respected in much of pre-revolutionary Russian scholarly literature. Hans Kohn, however, did describe Pogodin as a "Slavophil". Paul Debreczeny restricts "official nationality" to the dynastic wing, and describes Shevyryov as occupying "a place midway between Slavophilism and official nationality". To complicate matters further, Tiutchev considered himself a Slavophil, despite his enthusiasm for Peter. Richard A. Gregg holds that Tiutchev was a Slavophil because of his professed belief that the Orthodox Russian peasantry represented a uniquely Slav way of life which official Russia had abandoned. He claims that other Slavophils considered Tiutchev to be one of them, but cites no evidence. Ivan Aksakov's long biographical essay nowhere calls him a Slavophil, but emphasises his proximity to Slavophil ideas. Some of the Russian Westernizers, such as Vissarion G. Belinsky and Nikolai G. Chernyshevsky, lumped the two major doctrines together. Plekhanov wrote an article intended to show the essential unity of Slavophilism and official narodnost'.

Soviet scholars have generally accepted that
differences exist between the ideologies, while minimizing their importance, and have argued that these differences reflect the different social bases of the ideologies. Thus N.L. Rubinstein argued in 1927 that Slavophilism reflected the interests of the middle strata of the gentry, whereas Nicholas's government drew its support mainly from the top strata. Aleksandr G. Dementev in 1951 had a similar position. 18

It should be emphasized here that Soviet scholars before the Brezhnev era seriously neglected the study of Slavophilism. It was safer and more profitable for them to concentrate on those Westernizers and socialists who were the acknowledged precursors of Plekhanov and Lenin. Academician N. Derzhavin wrote in 1939 in the journal Istorik-marksist that he knew of no post-revolutionary work specifically on Slavophilism, although he thought that it deserved "very serious attention". 19 (He presumably overlooked Rubinstein's work.) The Moscow University professor Sergei S. Dmitriev published an article dedicated to Slavophilism in the same journal two years later, linking the ideology with liberal bourgeois aspirations. This article was the subject of a discussion in the same issue. 20 After this, however, nobody seems to have produced any books or major articles concentrating on Slavophilism until the late Khrushchev period, although works dealing with relations between the Slavophils and other thinkers did appear. (Books were published, on the other hand, on the pan-Slavist movement which coalesced
after the Crimean War. When analysis of Slavophilism became legitimized, it was usually smuggled in under the guise of discussing the poetry or the "literary criticism" of the Slavophils, using the same subterfuge as the writers of the nineteenth century. 21 The collected poems of Ivan Aksakov were published in 1960, under Khrushchev, and of Khomiakov in 1969, under Brezhnev. 22 The 1969 discussion in Voprosy literatury can be identified as the first major scholarly symposium on Slavophilism in the USSR since 1941.

Encyclopaedia entries on Slavophilism in the 1970s and 1980s refer to the Slavophils' opposition to serfdom, to West European political forms and to the revolutionary movement. In the third edition of the Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia (Large Soviet Encyclopaedia, 1976), Dmitriev identified what the Slavophils saw as the uniqueness of Russia. It was "in the absence, as it seemed to them, of class struggle, in the Russian land obshchina and artels, and in Orthodoxy, which the Slavophils considered the only true Christianity". 23 B. F. Egorov, the author of the article in the Kratkaia literaturnaia entsiklopediia (Short Literary Encyclopaedia, 1971), also supplied a short version for the Literaturnyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar' (Literary Encyclopaedia-Dictionary, 1987). In the latter, but not the former, he noted that the Slavophils had posed the question of the historical and national sources of Russian culture. 24

More significant is the appearance of books devoted solely to Slavophilism. The 1972 monograph by Iu. Z.
Iankovsky may have been the earliest, although the mention of Slavophilism or any Slavophils was cautiously omitted from the title.\textsuperscript{25} In 1976, the first book to include "Slavophils" in its title appeared, a monograph by the philologist Vasily I. Kuleshov in a print of 10,000.\textsuperscript{26} A collective work under the imprint of the Gorky Institute of World Literature appeared in 1978, with a print of only 3650.\textsuperscript{27} Editions of the collected works of Ivan Kireevsky were published in 1979 and 1984, both with a print of 20,000, and of the literary criticism of Konstantin and Ivan Aksakov in 1981 with a relatively large print of 100,000. Ivan Aksakov's letters began to appear in 1988.\textsuperscript{28} Two more monographs came, by Vischeslav A. Koshelyov in 1984, under the auspices of the Institute of Russian Literature (Pushkin House), with a print of only 4,500, and a monograph by Nikolai I. Tsimbaev in 1986 with a print run of 5,260.\textsuperscript{29} Kuleshov's 1976 volume repeated Derzhavin's complaint of 1939. "...Slavophilism as a phenomenon of Russian public life of the 1840s-50s has still been studied insufficiently."\textsuperscript{30} As Koshelyov notes in his review of Soviet studies of Slavophilism, some commentators such as Kuleshov claim that the Slavophils' literary creations were "extremely weak", while others, including himself, consider that their work was artistically interesting and went beyond the confines of Slavophil doctrine.\textsuperscript{31}

\textbf{Influences on official narodnost' and Slavophilism}

Similarities between official narodnost' and Slavophilism are partly attributable to the fact that they
were both influenced by similar sources, especially German
romanticism and the nationalist treatment of Russian
history. Further, Pogodin directly affected the Slavophils
through his lectures; Samarin described Pogodin as the
professor who influenced him most. Pogodin's view on the
essential differences between Russia and the West were
published in his Moskovskii vestnik (Moscow Herald) in
1827, well before the emergence of Slavophilism. Pogodin
and the Slavophils both studied in the climate of
reactionary nationalism dominated by the works of Denis I.
Fonvizin, S.N. Glinka, A.S. Shishkov and especially
Karamzin. The theatre was dominated by themes from Russian
history, from Aleksandr Pushkin's play Boris Godunov (1825)
to Mikhail Glinka's opera A Life for the Tsar (1836;
renamed under Stalin, Ivan Susanin). But as Isaiah Berlin
has expressed it, "Almost all the social and political
ideas held by Russian thinkers had their origin in the
West," and the impact of European idealism, especially
German romanticism, on Pogodin and on the Slavophils was
very important. Walicki states that F.W.J. Schelling's
influence on Pogodin was evident in his lectures of the
1820s. Riasanovsky attributes more weight to German
thinkers such as Herder, F. Schiller, J.G. Fichte,
Friedrich Schlegel and particularly Schelling than to other
Russians as influences on the Slavophils. According to
Riasanovsky, "romantic nationalism penetrated the official
doctrine, contending for allegiance with the older dynastic
interpretation"; but one could argue that Uvarov's
formulation of 1833 already reflected to a degree Pogodin's
romanticism.32
An experience common to some of the young men who later became proponents of official narodnost' and Slavophilism was association with the Moscow secret society 'The Lovers of Wisdom' (liubomudry, 1823-1825 or 1826). This was formed to spread German idealistic philosophy (especially Schelling's thought) in Russia. Nevertheless its members were critical of the Russian tendency to imitate Western ideas and advocated, among other things, a genuinely national literature. The society included the Kireevsky brothers, Koshelyov, Pogodin and Shevyryov. A leading role was played by Prince Vladimir F. Odoevsky (1803-1869). In his "Russian Nights", begun in the 1820s, Odoevsky expressed his admiration for European culture, but rejected the self-interest of capitalist society. He emphasised what he called Russia's samobytnost', her uniqueness or originality. Russia's national mission was to lead the West back to a state of love and unity. "There will come a conquest of Europe by Russia, but only a spiritual one, because the chaos of European learning can be brought into harmony only by the Russian mind." 

Neil Cornwell denies that Odoevsky was a precursor of the Slavophils. Odoevsky, he points out, supported Peter's reforms. In the 1840s, he stood between the Slavophils and the Westernizers. Riasanovsky describes Odoevsky as "the first Russian to give a critical philosophical appraisal of Western culture and to formulate on this basis the doctrine of Russian Messiahship". Walicki designates Odoevsky's
views as "missionism" rather than "messianism", but this seems mistaken. Odoevsky wrote: "the sixth part of the world designated by Providence for a great deed (podvig)...will save not only the body but the soul of Europe as well. This idea of Russia having been chosen to save Europe is central to Russian messianism and became important in Slavophil doctrine.

**Chaadaev**

A final influence on Slavophilism who cannot be neglected is Pyotr Iakovlevich Chaadaev (1793-1856). Walicki considers Slavophilism to be in a sense a "reply to Chaadaev". Chaadaev's "Philosophical Letters", written in 1829, expressed his deep unhappiness with the past and present state of Russia, and his admiration for the papacy, which symbolized the past and (for him) forthcoming unity of Christendom. He referred to the "disastrous condition which encroaches upon all hearts and minds in our country" and exhorted his reader to follow the customs of the Church. The Schism in Christianity had prevented Russia from participating in the cultural and intellectual movements of Western Europe, leaving her behind and belonging "neither to the West nor to the East". Russian culture was purely imitative.

Alone in the world, we have given nothing to the world, taken nothing from the world, bestowed not even a single idea upon the fund of human ideas, contributed nothing to the progress of the human spirit, and we have distorted all progressivity which has come to us.

Here he praised Peter I for trying to unite Russia with civilization. But Chaadaev saw little hope for Russia in
the short term.

We are one of those nations which does not seem to form an integral part of humanity, but which exists only to provide some great lesson for the world. The lesson which we are destined to provide will assuredly not be lost, but who knows when we shall find ourselves amid humanity and how much misery we shall experience before the fulfilment of our destiny? 46

The publication of the first letter in 1836 shocked Russian society in its mood of national-self satisfaction. Nicholas had Chaadaev declared insane but did not deprive him of liberty. 47 The following year Chaadaev produced his "Apologia of a Madman", expressing rather different views. But this was not a sudden change, a forced recantation. The July revolution of 1830 in France had undermined his faith in Europe; the aristocratic structures which Chaadaev admired were crumbling. 48 In 1835 he wrote: "...it is Europe to whom we shall teach an infinity of things which she could not conceive without us ... great things have always come from the desert." 49 Norman G.O. Pereira has pointed out that self-doubt often produces self-affirmation and self-exaltation, and suggests that this process was evident in Chaadaev and other nineteenth-century Russian thinkers. 50

In the "Apologia", 51 Chaadaev defended his right as a patriot to speak unpleasant truths; but now the theme which can be summed up in the phrase "the advantages of backwardness" came to dominate. The "Apologia" was a paean to Peter I for liberating Russia from her old traditions and teaching his successors and his people to learn from the West. From his time on, Russia took her whole culture
from the West. Chaadaev argued that Peter's success was possible only because Russia before him did not have a thriving culture and rich traditions; for otherwise, the nation would not have accepted Europeanization. Chaadaev's words became famous. "In his land Peter the Great found only a blank sheet of paper, and he wrote on it: Europe and [the] West; since then we belonged to Europe and to the West." 52

Chaadaev was now in a position of appearing to ally himself with the government, who still venerated Peter, against the "fanatical Slavicists" who wished to "demolish the work of Peter the Great; they want to follow the road into the desert again." 53 At the same time Chaadaev doubtless was appealing to the government to stick to Peter's road, and not be seduced by the national exclusiveness which might be an interpretation of narodnost'. Following Peter's road, Chaadaev thought that Russia would do great things.

I think that if we have come after the others, it is in order to do better than the others... To reduce us to repeating the long series of follies and calamities which nations less favoured than ours had to undergo would be, in my opinion, a strange misunderstanding of the role which has been allotted to us... There is more: I have the inner conviction that we are called upon to resolve most of the problems in the social order, to accomplish most of the ideas which arose in the old societies, to make a pronouncement about those very grave questions which occupy humanity. 54

His view that Russia was divinely chosen for a special mission reflected his discussions with Ivan Kireevsky and others who later became Slavophils. 55 Joseph Frank has written that Chaadaev "provided Russian Messianism with a
philosophical foundation" with his theory of the advantages of backwardness. Chaadaev's sharp differences with the Slavophils were not related only to his pro-Catholic sympathies. While Chaadaev's unique version of Russian messianism was rooted in support for Peter, the Slavophil version looked to Russian traditions which Peter had disrupted; and whereas Chaadaev looked to the élite as the main agency of Russia's development, the Slavophils looked to the common people.

Pravoslavie, samoderzhavie, narodnost'

It was neither Slavophilism nor the ideas of Chaadaev which dominated journalism under Nicholas I, but the official ideology. I shall discuss this in the next two sections, and then consider Slavophil thought. Following that, I shall look at some of the issues of contention between the proponents of the two ideologies, and attempt to consider the relationship between ideology and the actual policies of the Tsar.

Nicholas's reign had begun with the Decembrist revolt, and this served to reinforce the anti-Enlightenment feeling which had been held by the previous Tsar and his government and which characterized the latter part of Alexander's reign. The revolutions of 1830 in Western Europe made Nicholas afraid of the development of a Russian working class, and he refused to stimulate industry. His fears were to be strengthened by the revolutions of 1848. Uvarov expressed his wish to defend Russia, even for only fifty years, "from the fate prepared for her by
theories". The activities of the censorship and the Third Department, the political police, were stepped up. The name of Nicholas I became synonymous with reaction and the regimentation of society.

Uvarov wrote in 1843 that the fall of institutions in Europe and the spread of revolutionary ideas had necessitated the search for the principles which were unique to Russia. Those were the principles enshrined in his triad. In a style typical of much that was written at the time, Uvarov claimed that the Russians were deeply attached to their faith and that an "innumerable majority" believed that "Autocracy constitutes the main condition of the political existence of Russia." Shevyryov in 1841 still more romantically spoke of Russia's unique political harmony.

Only in our land do the tsar and the people comprise one unbreakable whole, not tolerating any obstacle between them: this connection is founded on the mutual feeling of love and faith and on the boundless devotion of the people to its tsar. The West, on the other hand, was dying from a contagious disease. Russians dealing with the West "fail to notice the poison concealed in the carefree intercourse, we do not scent in the joy of the feast the future corpse which is already exuding an odor!" Tiutchev blamed the problems of the West on the Roman Catholic Church's split from Orthodoxy and its assumption of temporal power. This, he said in an article praised by Khomiakov, produced Protestantism and revolution.
Nicholas I seems to have sincerely believed in Orthodoxy. Recognizing that religion was important in maintaining order, he believed at the same time that order and the autocracy itself had to be maintained because it was God's will. The Church remained under the control of the State. Pogodin's arguments for Orthodoxy, like much of the writing of official narodnost', were crude and naive, especially in comparison with the Slavophils' work. Pogodin attacked atheists and materialists not only because they denied his Christianity, but also because he believed that the acceptance of their ideas would undermine the basis of morality and lead to chaos. Only Orthodoxy was the correct form of Christianity; Nicholas I, Pogodin, the poet Vasily A. Zhukovsky and other adherents of the official ideology went so far as to refer to the "Russian God". A handbook bearing Bulgarin's name claimed that the Russian State owed its foundation to Christianity, and that this explained the epithet "Holy Russia".  

Arguments for autocracy rested not only on the analogy between Tsar on Earth and God in Heaven but also on a pessimistic view of human nature. Pogodin seems to be typical of official ideologists in his ambiguous attitude to the Russian people. "The Russian people is marvellous, but marvellous so far only in potentiality. In actuality it is low, horrid and beastly." Grech and Bulgarin spoke of the need for the Tsar to use harsh measures to preserve his autocracy. Bulgarin warned, "There is no beast fiercer than a raging mob!"  

A historical justification for autocracy could be found
in the work of Peter I, revered by Nicholas and the official ideologists. Pogodin attempted to catalogue the manifold achievements of Peter's reign in an article, aimed against the Slavophils, published in the first issue of Moskvitianin. Everywhere one looked, there were signs of Peter's influence: the calendar, clothing, the alphabet, the literary language, newspapers, certain items of food, sexually mixed social gatherings, secular universities, as well as the Table of Ranks and the complaints form, were introduced under him. These reforms were necessary for Russia's survival. It was not Peter's fault if Russians after him began to deify Europe and neglect Russian tradition. Pogodin was not by any means dismissive of the Muscovite, pre-Petrine traditions; and he clashed with representatives of the dynastic wing of official narodnost' when they compared Muscovite Russia to a corpse, with the intention of glorifying Peter the more. Nicholas banned the publication of Pogodin's hagiographic tragedy Peter I because he considered it almost blasphemous to portray his predecessor on the stage. Pogodin and Nicholas agreed, however, about the patriarchal nature of Russian autocracy. The Tsar saw himself as having a father-child relationship with his subjects, and instructed officials, educators, the police and even the manufacturers of Moscow to provide paternal care to the people whom they supervised.66

It is probably impossible to render satisfactorily in English the word narodnost'. It should not be translated as "nationalism"; tsarism was ambivalent towards this.
Riasanovsky acknowledges that "nationality", the usual translation, is "very inadequate". It had this meaning originally, in the sense of simply belonging to a national group, but under Nicholas it acquired the meaning of the spirit or character of a nation or people. Perhaps this does not go far enough; V.V. Zenkovsky states that the concept, deriving from German romanticism, meant "the individuality and 'mission' of each 'historical' nation". Part of the confusion over its meaning derives from the fact that different strands of opinion gave the word different connotations. The word narod itself is ambiguous, carrying the meaning of either the nation as a whole or the people, especially the common people. The meanings of "national" and "people's" are respectively carried today in the phrases "narodnoe khoziastvo SSSR" and "sovet narodnykh deputatov". To follow Martin Malia's explanation, the government used narodnost' to mean "that which is national", referring to the State, autocracy and serfdom; but it also intended the term to reflect the attempt to rely directly on the masses for support. The Slavophils borrowed the term to mean "that which is of the nation as a whole" and "that which is of the masses", referring particularly to the peasants, who had avoided the Westernization suffered by the elite. Belinsky too, in 1841 associated narodnost' with the common people and used natsional'nost' for the whole people. The government used narodnost' for exclusively Great Russian (not Polish or Ukrainian) themes. Perhaps such phrases as "kinship with the people" and "closeness to the people", convey some of the meaning of narodnost'.
Even within the official ideology, there was tension between the "dynastic" and "nationalist" wings over the meaning of narodnost'. Both agreed, however, that devotion to Orthodoxy and the Tsar were particular characteristics of the Russian people. In 1837 the heir apparent was to visit Moscow, and Pogodin was commissioned to write a piece for him. This extract brings out not only his belief in the piety and loyalty of the people but also his respect for Muscovite traditions and his belief in the people as the bearers of national history.

When the imperial standard in the Kremlin Palace announces His arrival, when the great bell of the Cathedral of the Assumption begins its solemn tolling, and the Tsarist square is covered by countless Orthodox people, when a unanimous hurrah! roars like thunder at the sight of the longed-for august first-born of Moscow, let Him look carefully into these faces; let Him listen attentively to these sounds: He will hear in them, He will read in them, more clearly than all the chronicles, our History. He will comprehend through them, more correctly than on the basis of all the statistical data, the secret of Russian power. He will learn, in this great moment of revelation, what is Moscow, what is the Russian man, what is Holy Russia.68

Pogodin claimed that the Western states were founded on conquest and were ridden by class divisions, whereas the Russian State was founded by popular invitation to Norman princes and avoided class struggle. This "Norman theory" of the origin of the Russian State is rejected by Soviet historians, such as Academician Boris A. Rybakov, who in 1984 complained that it was still being taught in the West.69 All the official ideologists postulated a dichotomy between "Russia" and "Europe", but the "nationalists" in particular emphasised it. For the
nationalists, the Russian people were not the mere instruments of autocracy but had a mission to unify the Slavs and even lead the world back to genuine Christianity. While the nationalists emphasized "Holy Russia", Bulgarin of the dynastic wing welcomed a suggestion that Russia should be renamed "Petrovia" or "Romanovia" after the demi-god. This was a fundamental problem with the official ideology: for all the talk of narodnost', the regime continued to glorify the Tsar who had done most to break with national traditions.\textsuperscript{70}

**Pushkin, Gogol and Aleksandr Ivanov**

Two writers of creative literature who made contributions to official narodnost' merit special attention: Aleksandr S. Pushkin (1799-1837) and Nikolai V. Gogol (1809-1852). Pushkin's love for freedom, Western orientation and the repression he suffered under Alexander I made him sympathetic to the Decembrists. When Nicholas made himself Pushkin's censor, the writer's position was made no easier. At the same time, one constant in Pushkin's views was a strong Russian nationalism.\textsuperscript{71} In 1831, when the tsarist army crushed the Polish uprising, this was bitterly opposed by public opinion in Europe and by progressive thinkers in Russia; but Pushkin wrote "To the Slanderers of Russia", in which he told the West to mind its own business. Russia had spilt blood in defence of Europe, and the Polish revolt was "just a quarrel of Slavs among ourselves".\textsuperscript{72} Pushkin's contradictory feelings about Peter I were manifest in his
poem "The Bronze Horseman" (1833). On the one hand he sympathizes with the ordinary person who is a victim of a decision made by Peter. But on the other hand such autocrats seemed to be historically necessary; Peter had lifted Russia into the modern age. Although Nicholas censored the core of the poem, it can be read as a reconciliation with autocracy. "The government is still the only European in Russia," Pushkin declared in 1836.

It may seem odd to depict Gogol as a partisan of the official ideology. The first part of his uncompleted novel, Dead Souls (1842) was acclaimed, by Belinsky among others, as a satire on Russian society and an attack on serfdom; but other writers have seen it as part of his religious quest for national regeneration. The apparent contradictions in Gogol's work led Riasanovsky to conclude: "The great novelist himself did not know what he was doing." The image of Russia as a troika travelling into an unknown future, at the end of Part One, has become famous.

Rus', do you not also gallop like the brisk troika which cannot be overtaken?

They heard the familiar song from above, their bronze breasts strained together at once, and hardly touching the earth with their hooves, they were transformed into nothing but stretched lines, flying through the air, and rushing along, totally inspired by God!... Rus', where are you dashing? Reply. She does not reply ... she flies past everything that there is on earth, and other peoples and states look askance, go to the side and yield way before her.

Gogol's Selected_Passages_from_Correspondence_with

Friends (1847) are animated not only by support for the
political and social systems existing in Russia, but also
by a deep religious feeling (or desire for faith). The
Church can solve all the problems of the world; and by the
Church Gogol means the Russian Orthodox Church, for he
believed in the particular religious calling of the Russian
people and the uniqueness of the "Russian soul". "In our
land before any other, the bright resurrection of Christ
will be celebrated." Gogol believed that Russia was called
upon to create a new Christian culture, which would be a
prelude to the end of the world. According to Zenkovsky,
Gogol was the first to introduce eschatological motifs into
Russian literature, and Berdiaev, who found his social
prescriptions "horrible", agrees that messianism begins in
Russian literature with Gogol. As has been argued above,
Russian religious messianism was much older than this; but
in the context of the trend of ideas that saw Russia as a
model for Europe which could avoid the evils of capitalist
development and revolution, Gogol was one of the first to
put Russia's religious calling at the centre of his thought.

Why does Russia alone act as a prophet? Because she
feels more keenly than others the hand of God in
everything that comes to pass within her, and senses
the approach of another kingdom.

Gogol was at pains to distance himself from jingoism. "We
are no better than anyone else, and our life is more
unsettled and disorderly than all of theirs." But
nevertheless: "The great task which is impossible for any
other peoples, is possible only for the Russian people."

Prior to the publication of Selected Passages, Gogol
had been given a pension by the Tsar and had written to
Uvarov expressing his loyalty. Uvarov publicized this letter. To Gogol's great disappointment, this declaration of loyalty did not prevent the censorship from deleting sections of the Passages which appeared to offer advice to the government. Most readers were disgusted by the book's servility; Belinsky's accusatory letter to Gogol, linking the book and the money, seems to have been a typical reaction. A personal attack on Pogodin alienated the supporters of the official ideology, while a statement in praise of Peter I alienated the Slavophils. Thus Gogol's work attracted little immediate support and much opposition; but the author of The Inspector-General and Dead Souls nevertheless has a significant place in the development of Russian messianism.

The painter Aleksandr Ivanov (1806-1858), a friend of Gogol, probably merits mention here because of his eschatological perceptions concerning the person of the Tsar. In 1845 Nicholas visited Ivanov's studio in Rome, where he was working on his magnum opus, "The Appearance of Christ to the People". Ivanov then discovered that the Russian people was "the last of the peoples of the planet... The Messiah whom the Jews await and in whose second coming symbolic Christians [sic] believe is the Russian Tsar, the Tsar of the last people." The Tsar would become "entirely equal to Christ in his high authority and belief in God". He planned a temple in Moscow which would include a fresco of the Second Coming, with the Messiah presented in the form of Nicholas I. Khomiakov highly regarded the art of both Gogol and Ivanov.
It is not possible to point to a body of doctrine and say that that was what the Slavophils believed. They did not form an organized, disciplined group; they had differences among themselves; and in some cases their views changed over time, with the result that people who had become known as Slavophils came to support ideas which were not shared by the original Slavophils. The very term Slavophil was subject to different meanings (see above, p. 77). Peter K. Christoff says that Slavophilism as such did not exist, only a number of individual Slavophils. Marc Raeff maintains that Slavophilism was not a coherent system, but a mood.

The "golden age" of Slavophilism ran from the mid-1840s and through the 1850s. The leading Slavophils came from a common background: they were from old, traditional, gentry families; they were all well-educated, and most were related by blood and marriage. All spent at least some of their formative years in Moscow; and Khomiakov, the Kireevsky brothers and the Aksakov brothers all attended the University of Moscow. It is often forgotten that around half the population of Moscow at this time were Old Believers, the traditional opponents of Westernization. It would be wrong to say that anti-Western feeling was basic to the original Slavophils; they were not even in agreement over their attitude to Peter I. Zenkovsky is right to note that the essential difference between the Slavophils and the Westernizers was the Slavophil view of
Orthodoxy as the foundation of Russian national originality (samobytnost'). Indeed this was perhaps the central element of Slavophilism. The adherents of official narodnost' also claimed to proceed from this view, but their usually servile attitude to the regime marked them off from the Slavophils.

Rather than creating an "ideal type" of Slavophilism that no real person actually believed in, it seems appropriate to outline the views of the most influential Slavophils in so far as they are relevant to the subject of this study. The problem as to who was the original Slavophil - Khomiakov or Ivan Kireevsky - can be dismissed briefly. It is clear that Khomiakov was the main creator of Slavophil religious ideas whereas Kireevsky was of central importance in philosophy. Berdiaev's view that Christianity is the centre of Slavophilism leads him to support Khomiakov's claim; while Khomiakov was true to Orthodoxy from his childhood onwards, Kireevsky (according to Berdiaev) did not become a Christian until the late 1840s. Riasanovsky describes Kireevsky's "Reply to Khomiakov" of 1839 as the first statement of his Slavophilism, and elsewhere says that Slavophilism can be dated from 1839. Riasanovsky agrees with Berdiaev on Khomiakov's central role, however, and describes him as the "recognized leader" of the Slavophils until his death.

Khomiakov

Khomiakov was steeped in Orthodoxy all his life. Beginning in 1829, his view of Russia's world mission and
her role as leader of the Slavs appeared in his poetry, and he developed Slavophilism from the late 1830s. Walicki considers that he was "far more of a nationalist" than Ivan Kireevsky or Konstantin Aksakov, and indeed a "chauvinist", enthusing about Russian military power (see below, pp. 131-33). He left unpublished his "Notes on Universal History" and his ecclesiastical study, now known as The Church is One (written 1844-1845).97

Nicolas Zernov has called Khomiakov "the first original theologian and authentic spokesman of the Russian Church".98 His major theological contribution was the concept of sobornost'. This meant for Khomiakov the "togetherness" and "oneness" of Christian believers, the collectivity and unity which he held could be found only in the Orthodox Church. Freedom could be gained not by the individual alone but through the collective, in this sobornost'. The adjective sobornyi, he said, represented in Church Slavonic the Greek katholikos (catholic, universal); and he asserted that katholikos meant "according to all". The universal Church, then, was the Church "according to all" the believers; it represented the "free unanimity" of the beliefs of its members.99

In his essay "On Humboldt" (probably written in 1849 but published posthumously) he attacked the Western Churches for leaving behind this "free unanimity". "Christianity... propounded the ideas of unity and freedom indissolubly combined in the moral law of mutual love."100
But legalistic, rationalistic Roman Catholicism believed that freedom was antagonistic to unity, and sacrificed freedom in favour of an external unity. The "one-sidedness" of Rome eventually led to the emergence of Protestantism, which sacrificed the idea of unity to the idea of freedom. Protestantism, in its turn, by retreating from dogma degenerated into scepticism and rationalism; this produced a revolutionary ferment in Western politics. Alternative philosophies such as Hegelianism, socialism and communism were isolated from religion and therefore had collapsed or were about to collapse. The only alternative was Orthodoxy, whose standard-bearer was Russia, and here he drew attention to Russia's pre-Christian communalism.

...man can no longer see the eternal truth of original Christianity except as a whole, that is in the identity of unity and freedom, manifested in the law of spiritual love. That is Orthodoxy. Any other concept of Christianity has henceforth been made impossible. The representative of this concept is the East, and mainly the Slav countries headed by our Rus', which accepted pure Christianity a long time ago, and with God's blessing also became a strong vessel of it, perhaps because of that communal principle by which it lived, lives and cannot live without. She has passed through great trials, has defended her social and cultural principle in long and bloody struggle... and having first saved these principles for herself, she must now become their representative for the whole world. That is her vocation, her destiny in the future. 101

Notwithstanding the divisions in the Church, Khomiakov claimed that in a real sense the Church was united.

The Church is one. Her Unity follows of necessity from the unity of God; for the Church is not a multitude of persons in their separate individuality, but a unity of the grace of God, living in a multitude of rational creatures, submitting themselves willingly to grace. 102

This emphasis on freedom and unity caused him to reject the Roman Catholic distinction between a teaching hierarchy and
an obedient laity; rather, all Christians were teachers. He approved enthusiastically an Encyclical of the Orthodox Patriarchs of 1848: "the guardianship of dogmas and of the purity of rites is entrusted not to the hierarchy alone, but to the whole people of the Church, which is the Body of Christ." The Roman Catholic bishops had violated the idea of sobornost' by independently and arbitrarily adding filioque to the Creed, precipitating the split between the Western and Eastern parts of the Church. While the Catholics were guilty of subordinating the individual to the hierarchy, the Protestants were guilty of individualism. Thus, only the Orthodox were truly Christian.

... only those communities can acknowledge one another as fully Christian which preserve their unity with the Eastern Patriarchates, or enter into this unity. For there is one God and one Church, and within her there is neither dissension nor disagreement.

Khomiakov was not satisfied, however, with the actual situation of the Russian Orthodox Church. He believed that the task of the Church was to regenerate the whole of human life, including its social and economic aspects. He was unhappy at the close links between Church and State, although he claimed that the Church had retained its spiritual independence. He appealed to the West not to judge the Orthodox faith by the official acts of the Russian Church. Berdiaev comments on this that Khomiakov was counterposing an ideal Orthodoxy to real Catholicism, an inherently unfair exercise. Khomiakov's theological works could not be published in Russia in his lifetime.
although some appeared abroad). Walicki points out that the Orthodox Church leaders were not enamoured with the idea of the supremacy of the body of believers, but they permitted Khomiakov's works to be published in 1879. In spite of the apparent practical difficulty of achieving unanimous opinion on matters of religion, Khomiakov's ideas have become part of the canon of Russian theology. 105

Khomiakov's view of the traditional peasant commune (obshchina) governed by the meeting of its members (mir) was an extension into the social sphere of his concept of sobornost'. Customarily the decisions of the mir were unanimous and binding on their members, and were freely accepted. He saw in the obshchina the germs of a new society. The principle would not necessarily be destroyed by industrialization because of the tradition of cooperation among artisans in the small collective enterprise (artel'). The alternative to the preservation of collective customs was "...the concentration of property in relatively few hands", and the "consignment to the proletariat" of most of the population. 106

Khomiakov travelled to Germany and Britain (where he visited Oxford and discovered a fondness for the "organic" Tory principles). He was a long way from the view that simply exalted Russia and denigrated Europe. At one point, rejecting the extreme nationalist viewpoint, he wrote: "We really place the Western world above us and recognize its unquestionable superiority." 107 This may account for his
views on the Russian past and Peter I, which Walicki
describes as "quite out of step with orthodox Slavophile
doctrine". Khomiakov was more critical than other
Slavophils of Muscovite Russia; in his polemic with
Kireevsky in 1839 he rejected Kireevsky's claim that life
in Muscovy represented the expression of Christian
principles. In particular, he disliked the exclusivity
and xenophobia which appeared in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries. It was inevitable, he asserted, that
this xenophobia would lead to its opposite, and the
instrument was Peter. As he said in "On Humboldt":

However strictly future history will judge him (and it
is undeniable that many serious accusations fall on his
memory), it will recognize that the trend he
represented was not completely wrong; it became wrong
only in its triumph, and that triumph was full and
complete.

What the triumph meant was "spiritual enslavement to the
Western world...bitter antagonism against the Russian
land". In 1851 Khomiakov wrote: "Not a small favour
was rendered to us by Peter in acquainting us with the
sciences and intellectual life of the West." What
Khomikov objected to was not the fruits of enlightenment
but the mistake made by the Russians of confusing
enlightenment with the Western forms "clothing" it.
Later, in the "Letter to the Serbs" (1860), he praised
Peter for his "intelligent work" in importing Dutch naval
technology, but deplored Peter's "awful foolishness" in
retaining Western technical terminology.

The statements above suggest that it is rather
misleading for Riasanovsky to assert baldly, "The
Slavophiles were opposed to Peter the Great and his reforms, to contemporary Russian government and society."¹¹³ It is true that the Slavophils disliked the despotic methods and excesses of Peter, and his instituting the split between the Westernized élite and the masses; and his new capital represented the antithesis of what they believed in. Their romantic conception of history, however, persuaded them to assign to Peter some positive role in the evolution of Russia. Khomiakov even saw a use for St. Petersburg, since it separated the site of the State power from the site of the Russian spirit, Moscow. Riasanovsky himself states that the necessity for Peter's reforms was recognized even by Konstantin Aksakov.¹¹⁴ It seems that Khomiakov was not as "out of step" as Walicki suggests. Christoff argues that Khomiakov objected not so much to Peter's reforms in themselves as to the Tsar's energetic interference in the organic process of Russian history, violating sobornost' and obshchinnost'.

Surprisingly, Khomiakov paid little attention even to Peter's absorption of the Church into the State.¹¹⁵

Even though Khomiakov believed that the West had made a positive contribution to world culture, he was in no doubt that this was coming to an end. "The age has passed and the entire West is covered with the shroud of death."¹¹⁶ The path from Catholicism via Protestantism to rationalism and individualism could go no further except to collapse, so long as the West remained bound by its own "principles". But there was light ahead. Russians were now returning to
their native "principles", such as Orthodoxy and the
obshchina, and Russia now had to save the West.

History calls Russia to be at the forefront of
universal enlightenment; it gives her this right
because of the all-roundedness and fullness of her
principles, and a right given by history to a people is
a duty imposed on each of its members.\textsuperscript{117}

It is not enough to say that Khomiakov believed in
Orthodoxy; he idealized and believed in the Russian people
too, and in the "Messiahship of Russia".\textsuperscript{118} (He rejected
the epithet "Moscow, the Third Rome", however, as insulting
to Moscow, since he regarded ancient Rome as legalistic and
self-interested.\textsuperscript{119}) He believed that nations, like
persons, had their own spiritual principles and
personalities; humanity's historical tasks were divided up
according to nations. Thus the Western nations suffered
from various neuroses, but the Russian people felt their
Christian mission.\textsuperscript{120} At the time of the Crimean War
Khomiakov wrote: "The Russian people does not think of
conquests at all - conquests have never seduced it... It
thinks of its duty, it thinks of a holy war [\textit{guerre
sacrée}]."\textsuperscript{121} In a similar vein, he referred to "the interests
of Moscow" as interests of "all humanity
[obshchechelovecheskie]."\textsuperscript{122} "The Russian question is
undoubtedly the only universal issue of our time."\textsuperscript{123}

\textbf{Ivan Kireevsky}

Ivan Kireevsky, the philosopher of Slavophilism,
differed from Khomiakov in that he reverted to Orthodoxy
and became a Slavophil after a period of "Westernism". The
editor of the 1979 Soviet edition of his works, Iu.V. Mann,
aptly refers to the "complexity and contradictory nature" of Kireevsky's development. Even in his first article, "On the Nature of Pushkin's Poetry" (1828), he spoke of the birth of a national literature truly depicting Russia and Russian character, in the "third phase" of Pushkin's development, supplanting the earlier domination of Western styles in his poetry. In his "Review of Russian Literature for the Year 1829" he expressed his great admiration for European culture and the belief that Russia should continue to learn from it. At the same time he argued that Europe needed regenerating by a nation "that would rule over [gospodstvoval] the others thanks to her political and intellectual predominance". Russia, he said, had been influenced by all the major European nations and was well placed to take on this role. Partly under Chaadaev's influence and after his visit to Germany in 1830 (his only trip abroad), the "Western" elements in Kireevsky's thought then came to the fore. This was reflected in the title of his periodical, Evropeets (The European), which was banned after two issues. His article in the first issue, "The Nineteenth Century" (1832) rejected the idea of Russia's samopytnost' and spoke of her role in helping to construct a new European civilization. He defended Peter's reforms. "For our prosperity depends on our enlightenment, and for this we are obliged to Peter." Political developments in Europe, however, were not to his liking; and this, together with the influence of his Orthodox wife, led him to abandon Westernism. The year 1838 marked the peak of his hostility to Peter, "the destroyer of the Russian and the introducer
of the German". The basic principles of his Slavophil philosophy of history appeared in his "Reply to Khomiakov" of that year.128

When Kireevsky took over the editorship of Moskvitianin from Pogodin and Shevryoy in 1845, he dissociated himself from their dislike of the West. His "Survey of the Current State of Literature" reaffirmed his former ideas about Russia taking over the development of culture from the exhausted West.

Were we to tear ourselves away from Europe, we would cease to be a universal nation... love for European enlightenment, as well as for our own, unite, in the final phase of their development into a single love and a single yearning for a living, and therefore universal and truly Christian, enlightenment.129

V. A. Kotelnikov, the editor of the 1984 Soviet edition of Kireevsky's articles, finds his combination of what Kotelnikov calls "European humanism" with concern for Rus' to be "especially instructive" for today.130

The clearest expression of his philosophy of history is his article "On the Nature of European Culture and Its Relation to the Culture of Russia" published in the Slavophils' Moskovskii sbornik (Moscow Compendium) in 1852.131 In this he articulated the central Slavophil concerns about the slavish copying of Western culture and the need to return to Russian spiritual traditions. His attitude to Peter was ambiguous. Kireevsky believed that in the mid-nineteenth century Europe was no longer the sole source of enlightenment; but he seems to have believed that Peter's reforms were necessary at the time. He went
further than Khomiakov towards the Imperator's view; Peter's desire for learning to pass from the West to Russia, said Kireevsky, "to a great extent justifies his extreme measures." Now, however, there was a feeling of disappointment and dissatisfaction in the West; this was due to the unlimited trust that had been placed there on the omnipotence of reason, which had now been outgrown. Russian scholars who had previously been biased in favour of the West and against Russia now became more objective and re-examined Russian traditions. "The sources of Russian culture," argued Kireevsky, "are totally different from the elements composing the culture of the European peoples." He considered three elements of Western culture to be "entirely alien to old Russia." The most important of these was the influence of Roman Catholicism, which had split from the universal Church. Russia, on the other hand, had remained constantly in touch with the universal Church. Secondly, the influence of ancient Roman civilization was reflected in the mentality of the West. The Roman mentality was dominated by law rather than justice, form rather than content, and reason rather than faith. This mentality led to the formation of separate political parties, pursuing their own interests and policies at the expense of the State, and thence to revolution. Thirdly, the European states arose from conquest and were divided along class lines. In contrast to Europe, pre-Petrine Russia had been a united community. Even when the country was politically divided, Orthodoxy (rather than a common language) made
Russia conscious of being "one living body". Since Peter, the educated class had moved from Russian traditions; but, said Kireevsky, "this Russian life-style, created according to, and impregnated with, the ideas of our former upbringing, has still survived almost unchanged among the lower classes of the people." This idealization of the peasantry, as contrasted with official society, sharply differentiates Kireevsky from the official ideologists. He drew an idealized picture of old Russia; she allegedly had "neither victors nor vanquished... nor class (soslovnoe) contempt, class hatred and class envy". The Church influenced the State, but did not seek to rule; the epithet "Holy Russia" was orginally not a proud claim by the State (as the term was sometimes used in the nineteenth century) but reflected the abundance of holy places in the country. Berdiaev later described this view of Russian history as "fantastic" and accused the Slavophils of confusing the past with their utopia. Kireevsky praised the obshchina, but did not put the same emphasis on collective ownership that Khomiakov did; he said that the obshchina's rights were "limited by the right of the landlord". Kireevsky concluded his article by calling on the educated class to return "to the pure sources of the ancient Orthodox faith of its people."

Kireevsky does not seem to have been as extreme in his claims for Russia as Khomiakov. For Kireevsky, Russia's mission was to create a new universal Christian philosophy and thereby initiate a new philosophical age. This
philosophy would essentially reject "autonomy" in favour of "wholeness" and "integralism" in all aspects of human life. Thus it would reject the autonomy of reason in favour of "spiritual wholeness", and reject the autonomy of the individual in the interests of society. Since rationalism had influenced Western Christianity, the new philosophy could be based only on Orthodoxy. Whether this view of Russia's mission is truly a "messianic perspective", as Ekalovitch says, is open to question. Walicki claims that messianism is "nowhere raised in his writings" and it is true that Kireevsky does not seem to regard the Russian people as uniquely chosen to redeem all the world's sins. Berdiaev went so far at one point as to deny that the Slavophils as a group, including even Khomiakov, could "be called in any exact sense 'messianic'"; I find his meaning unclear here, since he also talks of the contradictions of national messianisms in relation to Khomiakov. Christoff is willing to use the term "messianism" to refer to Kireevsky's view that Russia's task was to lead Europe by sharing Orthodoxy with her. It appears, though, that Russian messianism is weaker in Kireevsky than in Khomiakov.

Pyotr Kireevsky

Pyotr Kireevsky, Ivan's younger brother, did not write much but is always remembered as one of the founders of Slavophilism. He was a major influence on Ivan, retaining the Orthodox faith all his life, and he was the Slavophil folklorist. His study of Russian history gave him a more balanced view of pre-Petrine Russia than his brother had.
One significant article which he wrote for Moskvitianin in 1845 was a polemic against Pogodin. He disputed Pogodin's claims about the Norman origin of the Russian State. Further, he accused Pogodin of seeing the Russian people as entirely passive in history and neglecting their resistance to foreign invasion. Pogodin's stubborn reply contributed to Ivan Kireevsky's resignation from Moskvitianin.146

Konstantin Aksakov

Much of the thought and activity of the Aksakov brothers, and of Samarin and Koshelyov, belongs chronologically to the next chapter. Konstantin Aksakov, whose major concern was with history, was the most extreme of the early Slavophils. His nationalist orientation began as a child, when he would burn notes written in French, and lasted his whole life. It was only at the end of his life that he went abroad, and died on an Aegean island. Despite his early enthusiasm for Peter's attempts to bring European education to Russia, by the mid-1840s he was on the way to Slavophilism.147 His poem "To Peter" (1845) accused the Emperor of despising and repressing the people "with a blooded axe". Peter's capital city was a threat to "Rus'", but the people would return to freedom "with their ancient Moscow".148

In 1847 he wrote: "Peter the Great brought in alien principles, but the national principles have been preserved to the present in the simple Russian people."149 In the same vein, his article on the 700th anniversary of Moscow
in *Moskovskie vedomosti*, also published in 1846, declared that the old capital was still Russia's eternal national centre. It was "the true capital of Holy Rus'", i.e. of the Orthodox peasant masses, in contrast to the Petersburg government and élite. Moscow's significance was not merely Russian, but universal; for the Russian people were characterized by their faith in universal principles. Elsewhere Aksakov developed this idea.

> The Russian people is not a people; it is humanity; it is a people only because it is surrounded by peoples with exclusively national essences, and its humanity is therefore represented as nationality. The Russian people is free, it has no state element in itself... 151

This anticipates Dostoevsky's idea of the Russian as the "universal person".
The differences between the views of the Slavophils and of the proponents of official narodnost' will now be outlined, and the relationship between these ideas and the actual policies of Nicholas I will be considered where appropriate. The attitude to Peter I and his reforms has often been seen as the crucial dividing line between official narodnost' and Slavophilism. Having discussed the similarities between the two movements, Riasanovsky states: "Yet the difference is also very important. It centered on the figure and the activity of Peter the Great, and it came to include, as it expanded, divergent views of the government, the people and the entire history of Russia." But as I have tried to argue above (pp. 103-105, 107), Riasanovsky is wrong to depict the Slavophils as uniformly against Peter's reforms. Nor were Pogodin and Shevyryov totally uncritical of the effects of the reforms. Shevyryov claimed to have criticisms of Peter, although his enthusiasm usually overcame them. Pogodin, like some of the Slavophils, disliked the uncritical adulation of the West that followed Peter but exculpated him from responsibility for this. The distinction between the two groups is not as great as has been made out.

Nor was the issue of serfdom one which neatly separated the Slavophils from official narodnost'. The Slavophils were land-owners and serf-owners, but generally in principle they were against serfdom. As a supporter of the obshchina and an opponent of landed property, Khomiakov strongly attacked serfdom as early as 1839, and even blamed...
Peter for its introduction. Pyotr Kireevsky, Koshelyov and Samarin also opposed serfdom, with the former urging that the peasantry be given half the land, apparently without compensation for the landowners. In Khomiakov's opposition to serfdom there may have been an element of fear of peasant violence, which was present under Nicholas. Khomiakov showed his concern for the interests of the landlords by proposing a scheme whereby the State would compensate them for the loss of their serfs. Part of this money could be raised, he suggested, by privatizing State-owned assets to foreign capital. This leads to the unavoidable question of what social interests, if any, Slavophilism expressed. Links between Slavophilism and the Moscow merchants do not seem to have developed until the Crimean War, although they became very important thereafter. Walicki suggests:

Slavophilism was the ideology of the hereditary Russian nobility who were reluctant to stand up on their own behalf as a privileged group defending its own selfish interests, and therefore attempted to sublimate and universalize traditional values and to create an ideological platform that would unite all classes and social strata representing 'ancient Russia'.

Against this, it should be emphasized that there is little evidence that the Slavophils, in the period of Nicholas I, actually had the support of the nobility.

The view that Slavophilism reflected the self-interest of the gentry is strengthened by the case of Ivan Kireevsky but weakened by that of Konstantin Aksakov. Kireevsky depended on the income produced by his serfs. He was, in principle, against serfdom, but in practice showed little
interest in emancipation. In 1847 he argued to his sister that this was not the time for it, and for the rest of his life he maintained an opposition to emancipation that seems to have been governed by self-interest. Koshelyov, who was more concerned with the problem, reproached Kireevsky for having no remorse about being a serf-owner, but (as Christoff points out) he himself did not free his serfs. Konstantin Aksakov, on the other hand, in his commitment to the abolition of serfdom was prepared to discount the interests of the gentry. Although he neglected the question until the last few years of his life, his writings of 1857 express the conviction that the peasants had a right not only to emancipation, but also to land. The benefits to the landlords would be in the moral sphere. 156

The question of serfdom divided the upholders of the official ideology into the dynastic and nationalistic wings. Uvarov argued that serfdom was inextricably linked with autocracy, in the sense that it gave the gentry a stake in the political structures. Nicholas I spoke in 1842 of serfdom as an "evil", but he feared the political consequences of abolition. Grech shared his fears. On the other hand Pogodin, who had serf origins, argued against Uvarov for abolition, apparently both because he thought it would promote political stability and because he believed Russia should be a classless society. He and Shevyryov were to welcome the Emancipation. 157 Thus the nationalist wing of official narodnost' lined up with the majority of the Slavophils against the dynastic wing and Ivan
Kireevsky, demonstrating how much the two ideologies overlapped on political issues.

In religious matters, the Slavophils favoured the rebirth of parish communes and elected priests rather than the existing Church structure headed by Peter's Holy Synod. Ivan Aksakov in 1859 denied any "solidarity with the official spiritual world". Although Ivan Kireevsky claimed that Peter had converted the majority of Russians into Old Believers, thereby apparently expressing some sympathy for them, the Slavophils favoured the return of the Raskol'niki to the Orthodox Church. Within the Russian Empire they advocated the propagation of Orthodoxy at the expense of other Christian denominations, but did not accept the use of force for this. Nicholas's religious policy distinguished between different religions on the basis of their loyalty to the State, and in the borderlands it cannot be separated from his general policy towards national minorities. With some exceptions, he increased the persecution of the non-Orthodox.

On the question of autocracy, the Slavophils rejected the official idea that the Emperor ruled by divine right. They supported autocracy partly because it was the traditional Russian form of government, and partly because they saw political power as a burden, a necessary evil, and if a single person could accept the burden, so much the better. Riasanovsky probably goes too far when he says that the Slavophils advocated autocracy "without enthusiasm". Berdiaev is right to say that Slavophilism
led to the conclusion that the government was "alien" (inorodnaia) to Russia, even if the Slavophils did not come out openly and say that; but this refers to the German forms and practices of the State rather than the principle of autocracy itself. To the Slavophils, the purpose of the State was to defend the people, and interfere with them as little as possible. The Slavophil view was most clearly expressed in Konstantin Aksakov's Memorandum to Alexander II in 1855 (see below, pp. 150-53). Alongside unlimited autocracy, Aksakov posited the unlimited right of the people to advise the government on the correct course to take. This was anathema to Nicholas; but the Slavophil views were to a great extent shared by the nationalist wing of the official ideologists. Pogodin, who himself suffered from censorship, wrote: "We think that every supreme authority, even the wisest, will become still wiser when assisted by the voice of the entire people." Even the phrase vox populi, vox Dei is found in his writings - not an obvious argument for autocracy.

The interpretation of narodnost' also brought Pogodin and Shevyryov closer to the Slavophils than to the dynastic wing of official ideology. As Nikolai L. Brodsky wrote, narodnost' meant serfdom to Uvarov and emancipation to the Slavophils (or to most of them), and he could have added Pogodin and Shevyryov to the latter side. For the Slavophils, narodnost' was associated with what they considered to be the traditions of the Russian peasantry, namely Orthodoxy and (especially for Khomiakov and
Konstantin Aksakov) collectivism. The regeneration of Russia on the basis of Orthodoxy, Khomiakov believed, would serve as a model for the rest of the world. Pogodin believed Russia was chosen to be the unifier and leader of the Slav world. Pogodin's pan-Slavism emphasised racial links more than religion, although it was linked with Orthodoxy. Khomiakov's form of messianism was universalist (originally, at least) whereas Pogodin's was nationalist. Any form of messianism was anathema to the government, which wanted to maintain the world as it was rather than transform it.

I shall now consider what these messianisms meant for the non-Russians of the Empire and the Slavs outside it, and what policies the government pursued towards these peoples. The Slavophils failed to win support from the non-Russians for their ideas. This was because, even among the traditionally Orthodox Ukrainians, individuals who might have sympathized with some Slavophil views were federalist and rejected the Great Russian centralism which accompanied the Slavophil acceptance of autocracy. Even the most nationalist of the Slavophils, Konstantin Aksakov, did not favour forced Russification. Great Russia was the creative force in the Empire, the "head" of the Russian body. Great Russians protected themselves against "one-sidedness" by allowing other nations to develop in the State. Samarin, however, advocated the Russification of the Baltic provinces as a means of destroying the influence of the German barons. In his "Letters from Riga" (1848), he opposed the Tsar's
policy of tolerating the privileges of the Germans and the exploitation of the Estonian and Latvian peasants. His manuscript was circulated privately, and it earned him twelve days in prison and a personal rebuke from Nicholas. The Slavophils had a hostile attitude to the Poles; Khomiakov accused them of betraying the Slavs by accepting Catholicism and becoming imbued by it. In 1831 he wrote an "Ode" attacking the Polish revolt and referring to the "cursed battles" of Slav against Slav.

The Tsar, Bulgarin, Grech and Shevyryov all shared the Slavophils' enthusiasm for the Russian language, and the Court had to abandon the use of French. The question of the Russification of the Baltic separated Pogodin, who supported Samarin, from the dynastic wing who valued the loyalty of the Germans. Pogodin ruled out independence for the national minorities of the Empire. Nicholas punished the Polish revolt of 1830-1831 by annulling the Polish Constitution and giving dictatorial power to the Russian viceroy. No concessions were made to Ukrainian nationalism; the members of Kostomarov's Brotherhood of St. Cyril and St. Methodius, which favoured a pan-Slav federation of autonomous nations, including the Ukraine, were arrested in 1847. In the 1840s, the Orthodox Church made a number of conversions from the Lutheran Church among the Estonian and Latvian peasants. This alarmed the German nobility, who were themselves Lutheran. After the European revolutions of 1848 St. Petersburg began to depend more heavily on the Germans as a conservative
force, and the Orthodox Church was no longer allowed to proselytize among the peasantry.\textsuperscript{170}

The Jewish question did not attract much attention from the early Slavophils. Khomiakov was not hostile towards the Jews, but Ivan Kireevsky did not like them. Ivan Aksakov, on the other hand, as early as 1848-1851 was expressing his hatred for every Jew for, in his view, continuing to crucify Christ. This was (after about 1860) to grow into a central component of later Slavophilism. As for the official attitude, even more than in the case of the Poles, Nicholas's ultimate aims were to assimilate the Jews into the Russian population.\textsuperscript{171}

\textbf{Contentious issues: pan-Slavism beyond the Empire}

Khomiakov had volunteered and fought the Turks in Bulgaria in 1828. He, Konstantin Aksakov and Samarin supported the unsuccessful efforts of the Croat, Ljudevit Gaj, to secure Russian military aid to create a South Slav union in 1838-1840. But a concern for the Slavs outside the Empire was not an important part of Slavophilism until the Crimean War. Christoff, discussing the reasons for this, suggests that the problems of Russia herself were sufficiently daunting for the Slavophils to deal with. Perhaps more important is the fact that some of the Slavs were not Orthodox, and Orthodoxy was the basis of Slavophilism. Ivan Aksakov in 1849 explained that the Slavophils could not support pan-Slavism because of the Catholicism and liberalism of some of the other Slavs.\textsuperscript{172} The very name "Slavophil" is confusing here, applied as it
was to them initially by their opponents; their affinity was specifically for Russian traditions, and they wished these traditions to penetrate all humanity, not just the Slavs.

Pogodin's pan-Slavism changed in form several times. It varied from defending the rights of the Slavs in Austria and Turkey, through the idea of Slav federation, to the total unity of all Slavs under tsarism. Belief in Russia's messianic role was a constant theme. The nationalist flavour of his speeches and writings is captured in his "Letter on Russian History" (1837).

Russia, what country can compare with thee in magnitude?... A population of sixty million people... Let us add to it thirty million more of our brothers and sisters, the Slavs... in whose veins flow the same blood as ours, who speak the same language as we do [sic!], and who feel, therefore, according to the laws of nature, as we do... I ask: who can compare with us? Whom will we not force into submission? Is not the political fate of the world in our hands whenever we want to decide it one way or the other?

...the future belongs altogether to the Slavs...

But which of the Slav tribes occupies the first rank today? Which tribe can by its number, its language, and the totality of its qualities be considered the representative of the entire Slav world? Which offers the best pledge for the future goal? Which shows most clearly that it has the conditions for reaching that goal? Which indeed?...

My heart trembles with joy, Oh Russia, Oh my Fatherland! Is it not you? Oh, if it were only you! You, you are chosen to consummate, to crown the development of humanity, to embody all the various human achievements (which hitherto have been accomplished only separately) in one great synthesis, to bring to harmony the ancient and modern civilizations, to reconcile heart with reason, to establish true justice and peace. You alone can prove not only that science, liberty, art, knowledge, industry and wealth are the goal of mankind, but that there is something higher than scholarship, trade and education, freedom and riches - the true enlightenment
in the spirit of Christianity, the Divine Word, which alone can impart to Man earthly and heavenly happiness. 174

Pogodin's letter was addressed to the future Alexander II, but the official to whom Pogodin sent it refused to forward it, since it contradicted the official policy against pan-Slavism. 175

More lyrical than Pogodin in his support for pan-Slavism was the poet Tiutchev. In a poem of 1831, on the suppression of Poland, he wrote: "Not for the Koran of autocracy did Russian blood flow in a river...[but] to gather under a single Russian banner the kindred generations of Slavs." 176 His ambitions for Russia were made clear in his poem "Russian Geography" (1848): "From the Nile to the Neva, from the Elbe to China, from the Volga to the Euphrates, from the Ganges to the Danube, This is the Russian Kingdom." 177 This poem referred to three "sacred capitals" of Russia as Moscow, the City of Peter and the "City of Constantine". George Florovsky correctly pointed out that Tiutchev's emphasis on Empire (despite the "Koran of autocracy") differentiated him from the early Slavophils. 178 Tiutchev's "Prophecy" (1850) envisaged the Russian Emperor setting up an altar in Byzantium; he would kneel before it and "rise up as the pan-Slavonic Tsar". "Dawn" (1850) spoke of the tide in the Bosphorus glowing red, and continued: "O, Rus', the approaching day is great - the universal and Orthodox day". The messianic theme is of Russian self-sacrifice for the Slavs. 179 In plainer language, Russia and Germany (1844) called for Russia to expand into a "Graeco-Russian Orthodox Empire" which would
be capable of reforming the papacy and creating a universal church.180.

Tiutchev's major contribution to the development of Russian messianism was the view that Russia's mission was to prevent revolution in Europe. He put this forward in "La Russie et la Révolution" (April 1848).

For a long time there have been in Europe only two real powers: the Revolution and Russia... the life of the one means the death of the other.

Russia is above all the Christian Empire... The Revolution is above all anti-Christian.

The revolution represented the absolutism of the human ego, substituting itself for God.

In this war to the death, in this ungodly crusade which the Revolution, already the mistress of three-fourths of Western Europe, prepares against Russia, the Christian East, the Slav Orthodox East, whose life is indissolubly bound up with ours, will by necessity enter the struggle on our side.

Tiutchev thought it "impossible" that the Tsar would fail to intervene against the revolution.181

Nicholas I was committed to halting the revolutions in Europe. But by this very token he could not encourage the Slavs outside the Empire to overthrow their rulers and join Russia. As much as Alexander I, he equated autocracy at home with legitimism and opposition to nationalism and liberalism abroad. Sarkisyanz argues that Nicholas's foreign policy was ideologically motivated - not in support of Orthodoxy or pan-Slavism, but for the divine right of kings. Nicholas's Foreign Secretary, Count Karl Nesselrode, a Protestant from Germany, represented
everything that the Slavophils hated. Tiutchev, who worked for many years in Munich, was provoked into writing a poem attacking him for trying to subvert "Holy Russia". 182

Under the 1833 Berlin Convention, the Holy Alliance was revived. Nicholas crushed a Polish revolt in Cracow in 1846, but then handed the city over to Austria, showing that he was more interested in preserving order and keeping to treaties than in Russian expansionism. In 1847 (partly in response to the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood) the government denounced pan-Slavism. The Russian government banned Russians from attending the Slav Congress held in Prague in 1848. That year, the Russian army crushed the anti-Turkish revolt of the Orthodox Romanians on behalf of the Ottomans. The following year, in perhaps his most well-known counter-revolutionary act, Nicholas saved the Hapsburg Empire by destroying the Hungarian revolution. 183

There is no space here to untangle all the factors involved in the formation of Russian policy towards Turkey in the period up to the Crimean War. It seems clear that the principles of legitimism played a role, but Russia's interest in controlling the Straits may not have been irrelevant. Nicholas's decision to abandon support for the Ottomans and propose the partition of Turkey between Russia and other legitimist empires seems to have been based on the belief that the Ottoman Empire could not survive. It was not until 1853 that the Tsar proposed to abandon the policy of discouraging Slav revolts against foreign oppressors. Even then, he dropped his plan for an Orthodox
rising against the Ottomans, when Nesselrode objected to it as contrary to legitimist principles. Riasanovsky suggests that Nicholas was genuinely concerned about the oppression of Christians in the Ottoman Empire, and that this led to his demand that the Sultan guarantee the rights of his 12 million Orthodox subjects. Whether Nicholas finally went to war for the sake of the Orthodox or in the interest of the State must remain open to conjecture. As might be expected, he claimed that his motive was Christian. What is clear is that racial pan-Slavism was not a force in decision-making. Nicholas continued to oppose pan-Slavism, and as Florinsky points out, the censorship saw to it that pan-Slavism did not become a popular mood in Russia.

**The Slavophils and Moskvitianin**

Riasanovsky argues that the differences between the Slavophils on one side, and Pogodin and Shevyryov on the other, were much greater in the spirit than in the letter. For the generation of the 1840s, Peter I symbolized Nicholas I, and support for Peter blended with support for Nicholas. I have suggested that the Slavophils were not in total opposition to Peter. In philosophical matters, however, the difference was significant. Pogodin and Shevyryov were not interested in sobornost'. Pogodin wrote in 1854: "The New Testament is for the people, while the Old, with its dictum 'An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth' is for the state and its policies." Zenkovsky accurately commented: "How radically different is this idea from all that the Slavophils thought and wrote." Brodsky
affirms that the Slavophils "all had a negative attitude to the ideology of Moskvitianin" and used that journal only because of a lack of an alternative. Westernizers such as Timofei N. Granovsky also wrote for Moskvitianin. Christoff quotes a number of negative comments by the Slavophils on Pogodin's journal, although he claims that Khomiakov found Shevyryov's article describing the West as a future corpse (see above, p. 89) "glorious". Christoff states that on the questions of Church, government and people, Pogodin and Shevyryov were closer to the dynastic group than to the Slavophils, but he is reluctant to decide whether the Moscow professors "belonged to the same ideological camp" as the Slavophils.185

The Slavophils' failure to produce an ideological journal of their own in the 1840s seems to have had several causes. They were not sufficiently ideologically united; they lacked organizational ability and interest; and their chances of securing government permission were not hopeful. By 1844 Moskvitianin was losing subscribers; it had approximately 300-400, in comparison with the 3000 of the Westernizers' Otechestvennye zapiski. After six months negotiations with the Slavophils, Pogodin allowed Ivan Kireevsky to become editor of Moskvitianin (obviating the need for the Slavophils to apply for a licence for their own journal). Kireevsky edited three issues in 1845 and then resigned. This was for several reasons: because he did not receive adequate support from the other Slavophils, because of the clash between his brother Pyotr and Pogodin (see above, p. 112) and because he himself could not get on
Tolerance and repression

The discussion of the issues of contention above suggests that the clear line drawn by Riasanovsky between the supporters of official narodnost' and the Slavophils, while of religious and philosophical significance, seems a less accurate frontier of political division than a line between the dynastic wing of official narodnost', on one side, and the nationalist wing of official narodnost' and the Slavophils on the other. The latter side can be referred to as the "Russian nationalists". Both sections of the Russian nationalists suffered from the attentions of the State.

The Slavophils suffered more; they were denied the professorships awarded to Pogodin and Shevyryov, and their publications were more likely to be banned than not. Reference has been made to the banning of Pogodin's Peter. Nicholas was reluctant to permit the appearance of Moskvitianin, but because it opposed the Westernizers he agreed to it, on condition that it be strictly supervised. A report to Uvarov of 1842 drew attention to the dangers of the journal's talk about the liberation of the Slavs. Khomiakov had attracted the Tsar's displeasure as early as 1839 with his sympathy for the Slavs, and was put under surveillance. Ivan Kireevsky was permitted to edit Moskvitianin in 1845, and the Slavophils published two editions of the annual Moskovskii sbornik in 1846 and 1847.
(This periodical earned the epithet "progressive" from the Soviet historian Nikolai I. Tsimbaev in 1978.) After Uvarov’s circular of 1847 against pan-Slavism, the Slavophils came under more pressure, and the Governor-General of Moscow, Count A.A. Zakrevsky, (according to Aleksandr Koshelyov) on occasion referred to them as "red" and "communists". 187

In 1848, frightened by the revolutions, Nicholas tightened the censorship. Christooff claims that the material interests of the Slavophils led them to support the Tsar’s anti-revolutionary policy, but things were more complex. Khomiakov seems to have hoped that the revolutions would facilitate the spread of Orthodoxy. He complained privately about the censorship. His fellow Slavophil Ivan Kireevsky not only refused to join Pogodin in a petition to loosen the controls on literature, but even argued that they were necessary to help the government fight revolution. Kireevsky’s appearance on the side of the government was brought on by a fear which, according to Riasanovsky, "made him betray the most cherished beliefs of the Slavophils", in relation to both censorship and serfdom. 188 Konstantin Aksakov wrote to the Tsar in March 1848 in support of his manifesto against revolution, but argued that in order to fight revolution, Nicholas should re-establish Russian traditions. Not surprisingly, this increased the Emperor’s suspicion of the Slavophils. Samarin’s arrest in March 1849 was discussed above (pp. 119-20). In the same month, Ivan Aksakov was briefly arrested for political criticism in his letters. In spite of the
latter's dissociation from pan-Slavism, Nicholas marked his file with the comment that pan-Slavists sought to encourage rebellion against Russia's allies, to the disadvantage of Russia. On top of this the Tsar forbade Konstantin Aksakov to wear his "Russian beard" because of the revolutionary connotations of beards in Western Europe. 189

Even the dynastic wing of the supporters of official narodnost' suffered from the events of 1848-1949. Uvarov had been more favourably disposed towards pan-Slav feeling than the Emperor had. Furthermore, his emphasis on Orthodoxy and narodnost' may have been inconvenient at a time when the Orthodox Church was being prevented from expanding in the Baltic provinces. Increasingly dependent on what the Slavophils called the "German Party" at Court, Nicholas sacked Uvarov and replaced him with a still more reactionary bureaucrat, Prince Plato Shirinsky-Shikhmatov. Generally speaking, oppression and censorship were even worse from 1848 to 1855 than in Nicholas's earlier years. Nevertheless, the Slavophils received permission for another Moskovskii sbornik volume, edited by Ivan Aksakov and financed by Koshelyov, which appeared in 1852. It included Kireevsky's "On the Nature of European Culture" (see above, pp. 108-110), with its attack on Western influences in the upper classes. The collection worried the government, who demanded to see in Petersburg the manuscripts for the next volume prior to publication. This included a reply to Kireevsky from Khomiakov, who contrasted Christianity with the institutions of the
Russian State. The government banned the volume and the rest of the series, deploiring the over-emphasis on narodnost' (at the expense of autocracy). Five leading contributors - the Aksakov brothers, Khomiakov, Kireevsky and Prince V.A. Cherkassky - were put under surveillance and banned from publishing anything without special permission from Petersburg. In this atmosphere, Pogodin found himself condemning the regime for introducing "the quiet of a graveyard, rotting and stinking, both physically and morally".190

**Russian messianism and the Crimean War**

The Crimean War was, for Pogodin, Tiutchev and Khomiakov, the time for the enactment of Russia's world-historical mission. Pogodin broke completely from the dynastic wing of the official ideology, demanding a total reversal of Russian foreign policy, the encouragement of Slav revolutions and the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. For both security and religious reasons, he argued, Russia should take Constantinople, which would become the capital of the Slav federation. The whole country should be mobilized for the war, with the Tsar consulting the people and cutting his own expenditure and that of the rich. Such views could not be published openly, but they received sufficient circulation to provoke a statement from Nesselrode.191 Tiutchev also expected the capture of Constantinople, a united Slavdom and the realization of the Orthodox Kingdom. He was filled with messianic, eschatological expectations of the final, decisive struggle between Russia and the West. Russia was
at the "edge of the abyss", and it was "quite simply, the
end of the world". Konstantin Aksakov hoped for
Constantinople and the creation of independent Slav states
under Russian protection. Ivan Kireevsky and Khomiakov
saw the Crimean War as a "holy war" waged by Catholic
France, allied with Britain and Turkey, against Russia.

In his enthusiasm for the war, Khomiakov outdid the
other Slavophils. His poem "Rossii" (To Russia), composed
in 1854 on the eve of the outbreak of the war, remains
controversial. The message of the poem is that in spite of
her unworthiness, Russia has been chosen to be God's
instrument in war. His earlier poem of the same title
(written in 1839) had referred to Russia's mission to bring
God's word to all peoples, but had warned Russia against
pride. The 1854 poem thus seems to put forward a similar
position, but the final verse is more aggressive, referring
to "bloody battles" and ending "Smite with the sword - the
sword of God." The Slavophils, defending Khomiakov,
emphasised his critical comments about Russia, and Brodsky
writing in 1910 considered the final verse "out of place
and superfluous". Other writers, including Walicki, cite
the poem as an example of Khomiakov's chauvinism, and
Walicki calls the Slavophil interpretation
"superficial".

Khomiakov tells Russia that God is calling her to fight
for her brothers (the Slavs). He castigates the evils of
Russia, including "the yoke of serfdom", and continues: "O,
unworthy of election, you were chosen! Wash yourself speedily with the water of repentance!" Official circles were horrified by the poem, and the government required him to give a guarantee not to distribute any of his verses without permission from St. Petersburg. Khomiakov wrote that he supposed it was "impossible even to imagine that such a canon of penitence could be published". 196

What Walicki interprets as chauvinism is seen by Eikalovich (as by the Slavophils) as service; Russia was the nation chosen to save the world. Eikalovich quotes the émigré S. Levitsky to the effect that Slavophil messianism was "national-cultural" rather than "State-imperialist". Both Khomiakov's poems "To Russia" warn against national pride, yet because of the emphasis on Russia's "chosenness" they provoke the accusation of chauvinism, especially the Crimean War poem with its almost bloodthirsty last verse. Khomiakov demonstrated how difficult it was to avoid crossing the line from universalist messianism to nationalist messianism. The Slavophils had believed in the peaceful triumph of Orthodoxy on a world scale, but when war was imminent between Russia and the West, Khomiakov was prepared to live by the sword. In both this and his concern for the Slavs, Khomiakov provided a link between Slavophilism and the later pan-Slavism of Ivan Aksakov. 197

In the 1969 Voprosy_literatury debate the Soviet scholars showed themselves deeply divided over their interpretation of Slavophil messianism. Egorov provided a defence of Khomiakov.
It should be noted that the unique messianism and confidence that precisely the Russian people was called upon to show to all other peoples the way to the ideal led the Slavophils not to national haughtiness but on the contrary to extreme exactingness towards themselves and their country. Chosenness (izbrannichestvo) inspired a great responsibility.\textsuperscript{198}

Vadim V. Kozhinov (whose views will be discussed in chapter vi) also sought to rebut accusations of chauvinism.

The Slavophils did not at all consider that the Russians were somehow superior to the Germans, English, French, etc. They spoke only of the decline of Western culture in their time, and expressed confidence in the approaching great flourishing of Russian culture.\textsuperscript{199}

Kuleshov and S.I. Mashinsky took an anti-Slavophil stance. Kuleshov wrote:

Khomiakov's self-accusation (criticism of Russia) was subordinated to his wider and more important idea: the messianic glorification of Russia, standing under 'god's banner'.

In the Slavophils the messianism of Russia is counterposed to everything European being regarded as corrupt.\textsuperscript{200}

In the article which concluded the series, Mashinsky repeated the above quotation from Kozhinov and flatly rejected it.

The nationalism of the Slavophils was expressed in the haughty attitude to other peoples, in their idea about the advantage of the 'Russian world' over the Western, of the Orthodox Church over the Catholic, and also in their messianic idea about the Russian nation as a whole as 'god-chosen' ('the god-bearing people') [bogoizbrannoi, narod-bogonosets], and, which is especially important, in their insistent striving to cork up Russia and isolate her from all humanity.\textsuperscript{201}

Before the end of the Crimean War, Nicholas was dead. Russian messianism had flourished in his reign, with the different versions reacting on one another. Neither messianism nor nationalism were encouraged by the
government; rather the official ideology promoted a chauvinistic attitude towards the State, devotion to the autocrat and the political passivity of the Russian people. Some of the Russian nationalists could accept some of these ideas. I have tried to show that the line drawn by Ianov and Riasanovskvsky between the adherents of the official ideology and the Slavophils was not as clear as they suggest, and at times disagreements cut across their camps. Perhaps the best example is Ivan Kireevsky's refusal to support Pogodin's petition against censorship.

Nicholas's reign does not bear out Ianov's contention of a convergence of Russian nationalist dissent with the State. Pogodin, indeed, was going in the other direction. In subsequent years, admittedly, as will be seen, the Slavophils moved towards pan-Slavism. But already by the end of the 1840s, Khomiakov's views on the obshchina had formed the basis for Herzen's version of Russian messianism, which was to develop into the anti-tsarist narodnichestvo movement.
Footnotes


4. Ibid., pp. 4-5.


7. Ibid., pp. 115-16 (quotation, p. 115).


9. Ianov says that he saw the "apparent inevitability" of this convergence as early as 1969. Idem, Russian, p. 6.

10. Ianov uses both these words in ibid.


22. The major books with substantial discussion of the Slavophils, or presentation of their literary works, up to and including 1969, were as follows. Ivan S. Aksakov, Stikhotvoreniia i poemy, ed. Aleksandr G. Dementev (L., 1960); S.I. Mashinsky, S.T. Aksakov, Zhizn' i tvorchestvo (L., 1961); Poety kruzhki N.V. Stankevicha. N.V. Stankevich, V.I. Krasov, K.S. Aksakov, I.P. Kliushnikov, ed. S.I. Mashinsky (M.-L., 1964); pp. 281-88 of this contain what may have been, up to that point, the fullest account since the revolution of the activity of a Slavophil, in this case Konstantin Aksakov; "Pesni, sobrannye pisateliami. Novye materialy iz arkhiva P.V. Kireevskogo", LN, No. 79 (1968); Aleksei S. Khomiakov, Stikhotvoreniia i dramy, ed. & intro. B.F. Egorov (L., 1969). In the early Brezhnev period, articles devoted to aspects of Slavophil social thought began to trickle out: A.A. Galaktionov & P.F. Nikandrov, "Istoriko-


27. *Literaturnye vzgliady i tvorchestvo slavianofilov (1830-1850 gody)*, ed. K.N. Lomunov, under the aegis of the Gorky Institute of World Literature (M., 1978). Lomunov's chapter, "Slavianofil'stvo kak nauchnaia problema. Zadachi i printsipy issledovaniia", pp. 5-66, discusses the views on Slavophilism held by pre-revolutionary writers such as Berdiaev and Lenin as well as those of Soviet and Western specialists.


33. Vladimir F. Odoevsky, *Russkie nochi* (L., 1975). This is discussed in V.I. Sakharov, "Dvizhushchaisia estetika

34. Odcevsky, as cited in Zenkovsky, p. 18.


36. Riasanovsky, Russia and the West, p. 20.

37. Walicki, Slavophile Controversy, p. 81.


39. Riasanovsky, Russia and the West, pp. 18-22; Walicki, Slavophile Controversy, pp. 64-82; Zenkovsky, p. 18.


41. Walicki, History, p. 91.


43. Ibid., p. 24.

44. Ibid., p. 27.

45. Ibid., pp. 37-38.

46. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

47. Riasanovsky, Parting, p. 171.


52. Ibid., p. 205.

54. Ibid., pp. 213-14.


60. For a general account of the reign, see W. Bruce Lincoln, *Nicholas I, Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias* (London, 1978).


Troyat suggests that this ending is designed to mislead the censors, while Vladimir V. Nabokov calls the passage a "conjuror's patter". Shevyryov, however, who had mixed feelings about the book, called the troika "a wonderful image for the rapid flight of our glorious Rus". Henri Troyat, *Divided Soul: The Life of Gogol*, trans. Nancy Amphoux (Garden City, N.Y., 1973), pp. 280-81; Nabokov, *Nikolai Gogol*, (New York, 1961), p. 113; Stepan P. Shevyryov, "Pokhozhdenie Chichikova, ili Mertvye dushi. Poema N. Gogolia", Moskvitianin, 1842, Nos. 7-8, as trans. in *Literature and National Identity*, p. 58.

77. Nikolai V. Gogol, "Vybrannye mesta iz perepiski s druz'iami", *Sob. soch.*, VI, 202-421. Nabokov (p. 124) describes Gogol's language here as "almost a parody of sanctimonious intonation".


80. Gogol, as cited in Zenkovsky, p. 38.


82. Gogol, as cited in Zenkovsky, p. 38.


86. Ivanov, as cited in Billington, Icon, p. 343.


91. Riasanovsky, Russia and the West, pp. 28-34.

92. Owen, p. 11.


95. Riasanovsky, Russia and the West, p. 39, and Parting, p. 177.

96. Idem, Russia and the West, p. 36.

97. Ibid., pp. 34-40; Walicki, Slavophile Controversy, p. 186.


99. Riasanovsky, Parting, pp. 177-78 (phrases quoted); Walicki, Slavophile Controversy, pp. 188-200.
100. Aleksei S. Khomiakov, "Po povodu Gumbol'dta", PSS
Alekseia Stepanovicha Khomiakova, 2nd edn., I (M., 1878),
143-74 (quotation, p. 148).


102. Idem, "The Church is One" (c. 1850), in Khomiakov &
William Palmer, Russia and the English Church during the
Last Fifty Years, I, Containing a Correspondence between
Mr. William Palmer, Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford, & M.
Khomiakoff, in the Years 1844-1854, ed. W. J. Birkbeck
(Farnborough, Hants., 1969; a reprint of the London, 1895
edn.), 192-222, at p. 193.

103. Aleksei S. Khomiakov, "Neskol'ko slov pravoslavnogo
khristianina o zapadnykh veroispovedaniakh. Po povodu
broshiury g. Loransi" (1853; trans. from the French), PSS,
4th edn. (8 vols., M., 1900-1914), II, 60.

104. Idem, "Church is One", p. 222.

105. Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 79; Walicki,
Slavophile Controversy, pp. 188-200; Berdiaev, Russian
Idea, p. 162; J. D. Stojanović, "The First Slavophils:
Homyakov and Kireyevsky", Slavonic R, VI, No. 18 (March
1928), 565.

106. Khomiakov, "Sovremennyi vopros", PSS, 4th edn., III,
290. First published in Molva, 1857, No. 28.

107. Khomiakov, as cited in Zenkovsky, p. 46.

108. Walicki, Slavophile Controversy, p. 224; Aleksandr
Solovyov, pp. 45-46.

109. Khomiakov, "Po povodu Gumbol'dta", extract in Rannie
slavianofiily, pp. 53-54.

110. Idem, "Aristotel' i vsemirnaia vystavka" (1851), PSS,
2nd edn., I, 180.

54.

112. Idem, "To the Serbians: A Message from Moscow", as
trans. in Christoff, Xomjakov, p. 257.

113. Riasanovsky, Russia and the West, p. 79.

114. Ibid., pp. 79-81.


(quotation, p. 174).
118. Stojanović, pp. 563-67. The phrase is Stojanović's, at p. 567.


120. Riasanovsky, Russia and the West, pp. 163-65.


123. As cited in Walicki, Slavophile Controversy, p. 222.


129. Zenkovsky, p. 46 (Kireevsky quotation); Gleason, European, pp. 180-209.

130. V.A. Kotelnikov, "Literator-filosof", in I. Kireevsky, Izbrannye stat'i, p. 28.

131. Ivan V. Kireevsky, "O kharaktere prosveshcheniia Evropy i o ego otnoshenii k prosveshcheniu Rossii (Pis'mo k gr. E.E. Komarovskomu)", in Rannie slavianofily, pp. 1-50. (Also in PSS, I, 174-222.)


133. Ibid., p. 9.

134. Ibid., p. 12.

135. Ibid., pp. 1-21.

136. Ibid., p. 30.
137. Ibid., p. 31.

138. Ibid., p. 34.

139. Ibid., p. 37; Berdiaev, Russian Idea, pp. 40-41.

140. Kireevsky, in Rannie slavianofily, pp. 30-50 (final quotation, p. 49). See also Walicki, Slavophile Controversy, pp. 135-48; Christoff, Kireevskij, pp. 247-55; Gleason, European, pp. 246-57.

141. Ivan V. Kireevsky, "O neobkhodimosti i vozmozhnosti novykh nachal dlia filosofii" (posthumously published in 1856), PSS, I, 233-64. English in Christoff, Kireevskij, pp. 346-75. For discussion, see Walicki, Slavophile Controversy, pp. 148-68; Stojanović, pp. 571-78.


143. Walicki, Slavophile Controversy, pp. 149-50.


146. Riasanovsky, Russia and the West, pp. 46-48; Walicki, Slavophile Controversy, pp. 122-23, 56-60; Richard Hare, Pioneers of Russian Social Thought, (London, 1951), pp. 99-100; Christoff, Kireevskij, p. 344.


151. Idem, Sochineniia istoricheskie, p. 630, as cited in Riasanovsky, Russia and the West, p. 121. (This page is missing from the Taylor Institution copy.)

152. Riasanovsky, "Pogodin and Sevyrëv", pp. 166 (quotation), 164.

154. Idem, Russia and the West, pp. 136-40; Christoff, Komiakov, pp. 235-42.

155. Walicki, Slavophile Controversy, pp. 177-78.


157. Riasanovsky, Nicholas, pp. 139-43, 207-211.

158. Ivan S. Aksakov, letter to N.S. Sokhanskaia, 21 November 1859, in Russkoe obozrenie, February 1897, as cited in Christoff, Aksakov, p. 262.

159. Riasanovsky, Russia and the West, pp. 120-24, 130-32, 78, and Nicholas, pp. 223-26; Baron, Russian Jew, p. 32.


162. Riasanovsky, Russia and the West, pp. 149-52; Konstantin S. Aksakov, "O vnuzhennem sostojaniu Rossii", in Rannie slavianofily, p. 96.


166. Walicki, Slavophile Controversy, pp. 476-78; Riasanovsky, Russia and the West, pp. 85-96, and Nicholas, p. 145.

167. Walicki, Slavophile Controversy, pp. 220-21; Riasanovsky, Russia and the West, pp. 111-12.


169. Kostomarov's Zakon Bozhii, inspired by Mickiewicz's work, approached a form of Ukrainian messianism. "The Ukraine shall rise from her grave and shall call on all her Slavic brothers, and they will all rise ... and the Ukraine will be an independent republic in a Slav union." As cited in Von Mohrenschildt, p. 42.

170. Riasanovsky, Nicholas, pp. 130-34, 144-46, 159, 187, 226-33; Fadner, pp. 124-45; Von Mohrenschildt, pp. 40-61;


179. Fadner, p. 283 (including quotation from "Prophecy"); Gregg, p. 123, has extracts from "Dawn" in Russian. At pp. 119-24 he discusses Tiutchev's pan-Slavism up to the Crimean War.

180. Hare, p. 133.


187. Riasanovsky, *Russia and the West*, p. 154; Michael B.

188. Riasanovsky, Russia and the West, p. 44. Ivan Kireevsky had been unhappy for some years about the failure of the Slavophils to discuss their mutual disagreements. His writings of the 1850s, nonetheless, are considered part of Slavophil doctrine, in spite of his differences with other Slavophiles.


195. Khomiakov's "Rossii" poems are in Rannie slavianofily, pp. 150-51 (1839), 160 (1854). First published in Otechestvennye zapiski, 1839, Pt. VI and Russkaia beseda, 1860, Pt. II. Brodsky's comment is at Rannie slavianofily, p. 159. The discussion in Walicki, Slavophile Controversy, pp. 186-88, includes a partial translation of the 1854 poem which I have not retained.

196. Rannie slavianofily, p. 160 (poem); Brodsky, in ibid., p. 159 (Khomiakov's comment). See also Christoff, Khomiakov, pp. 105-106.

197. Bikalovich, "Liubomudry i slavianofily", pp. 212-15; Riasanovsky, Russia and the West, pp. 180-82, has a useful
discussion.


Chapter Three

Pro-Tsarist Forms of Russian Messianism, 1855-1917

The last years of classical Slavophilism

The death of Nicholas I, the accession of Alexander II and the easing of censorship gave rise in Russia to hopes of political and social improvements being introduced from above. Alexander's intention, expressed in 1856, of beginning the abolition of serfdom forced the advocates of change to make a choice faced also by later generations down to the present. Should they seek the overthrow of the regime, in spite of its apparent reserves of strength, or should they help to push the regime further in the direction of reform, in spite of the apparatus of coercion and bloody repression which it continued to deploy? I shall deal now with those tendencies of Russian messianism which sought to work within the existing political system, and consider in the next chapter the revolutionaries such as Herzen and the narodniki.

The Slavophils had never been revolutionaries, and the more relaxed political environment enabled them to play a larger public role than hitherto. Before the end of 1855, Konstantin Aksakov submitted to Alexander his memorandum "On the Internal Condition of Russia". This important Slavophil document appealed for a "return" to the situation which, Aksakov alleged, existed before Peter I, with the government tolerating freedom of opinion. He began by claiming that the Russian people were not "political" (gosudarstvenyi) and continued by positing
the "impossibility of any revolution in the Russian people". This was because the Russian people were concerned with moral, spiritual and social freedom, not political freedom. Leaving the kingdom of this world to the State, they sought the Kingdom of God. In Russia, the obshchina predated Christianity, but Christianity reinforced the obshchina, and the Russians were "perhaps the only Christian (in the true meaning of the word) people in the world". The West, on the other hand, with its constitutions and republics, was ready to "give itself up, if not to the final collapse, then to terrible shocks". In Muscovite Russia, the government and the people had interfered with each other as little as possible, and the Tsars had called assemblies to advise them. "Action was the right of the sovereign, and opinion the right of the country".

Peter had abandoned these principles. He invaded the lives of the people, forcibly changing their morals and customs, and causing a split in society. From then until now, Russia had been like an occupied country under the yoke of its own government. The danger was that, deprived of their inner, social freedom, Russians would seek external political freedom. They would be drawn away from the Russian "soil" (pochva) into support for revolutionary ventures, which (despite his earlier statement on the impossibility of revolution) Aksakov feared could destroy Russia. The continuation of Peter's system would mean that Russia would cease to be Russia.
The point had been reached where each individual was afraid to express a sincere opinion. "All lie [лжут] to each other, recognize this, but continue to lie..." Aksakov claimed that the people wanted only freedom to live, freedom of the spirit and freedom of speech. In restoring these, the government would be returning to Russian principles, without sacrificing autocracy.

"Freedom of speech is an inalienable human right". Over a century before Gorbachov, Konstantin Aksakov demanded glasnost' (openness): proper relations between the State and the land, and free public opinion, would heal Russia's evils, "especially bribery, for which the [glasnost'] of public opinion is so frightening."[9]

This was a devastating attack on the Petersburg style of leadership. The Soviet historian Tsimbaev, in an article published in 1972, rejects the view that the memorandum testified to the reactionary position of early Slavophilism and shows that "to a very great extent it was directed against the policy of the existing autocracy".[10] A.S. Kurilov, in his introduction to the 1981 "Sovremennik" edition of the Aksakov brothers' literary criticism, justly comments that it required "outstanding courage" to address the Tsar in such a way, so soon after the final dark seven years of Nicholas. Kurilov quotes extracts from the memorandum, which has not been published in Russia in full since the October Revolution, but while he evaluates it positively, he describes it as an "exposure of the autocracy and serfdom". In reality, Aksakov hardly
mentioned serfdom and he supported autocracy, while his main demand for free speech is underplayed by Kurilov. Another Soviet critic, Kuleshov, in his 1976 monograph goes to the opposite extreme and claims that all Aksakov's proposals in the memorandum "were envisaged from the point of view of saving the existing system."

It is now known that Alexander saw the memorandum. He may not have been influenced by it, but he made concessions to its spirit by liberalizing censorship, and the Slavophils benefited from this. Aleksandr Koshelyov was allowed to begin publishing the journal Russkaia_beseda (Russian Conversation) in February 1856, and in April 1857 the more popular, propagandistic weekly newspaper, Molva (Talk, or Public Opinion), appeared. Both were based in Moscow. The latter was edited by Sergei M. Shpilevsky, but was dominated by Konstantin Aksakov, who contributed 22 editorials. In the Slavophil manner, they eulogized the "simple people" as the bearer of Russian tradition but, as Kurilov points out, Aksakov did not take a narrow chauvinist viewpoint; he favoured the flourishing of all narodnosti, not only the Russian. "Narodnost' is the personality of the people...long live every narodnost'". Aksakov found the limits of tolerance with an article which sharply contrasted the living conditions and morality of the Westernized "public" and the Russian "people". The Tsar himself considered the article "wicked" and Molva was forced to close. Russkaia_beseda was allowed to continue, however, and from summer 1858 Ivan Aksakov was
effectively the editor. Unlike his brother, he did not idealize the Russian people, and *Russkaia beseda* shifted from the traditional Slavophil emphasis on the spiritual to a concern with social, economic and political affairs. This did not prevent the journal from losing subscribers, and Ivan Aksakov closed it at the end of 1859. Two major issues of concern to the Slavophils at this time were the emancipation of the serfs and the question of the non-Russian Slavs. I shall now turn to these. 19

There seems little reason to question Kuleshov's view that on the question of emancipation there was no difference between Slavophils such as Koshelyov and Samarin and the liberal Westernizers. Samarin circulated a manuscript memorandum advocating emancipation which was read and apparently approved by the Tsar. According to Ivan Aksakov, the proposal to free the peasants with land first appeared in print in *Russkaia beseda*. 20 Samarin and Koshelyov were appointed by the government to provincial gentry committees, and Samarin and Cherkassky were appointed to the Editing Commissions established in 1859 to prepare the emancipation statute. Themselves landowners, they sided with the State in attacking the position of the more reactionary gentry, but they sought to make the reform acceptable to the gentry. 21 Kurilov emphasizes the contradictory position of the Slavophils, being landlords who were both "anti-serfdom" and "anti-bourgeois". 22 Tsimbaev claims that Ivan Aksakov's position on emancipation was that of a far-sighted representative of the landowners, who saw that concessions to the peasants
were necessary to avert revolt. The Slavophils could justify their collaboration with the Petersburg autocracy on the grounds that, on this issue at least, the autocracy was moving in the direction traditionally desired by most Slavophils.

Alexander's government was also more sympathetic than Nicholas's to the position of the Slavs in the Ottoman Empire. In 1858, the publication ban on Ivan Aksakov was lifted. Egor P. Kovalevsky, head of the Asian Department of the Foreign Ministry (which included the Balkans), thereupon encouraged him to produce a weekly newspaper, to be called Parus (The Sail). But Kovalevsky was cautious. As Aksakov wrote to Pogodin,

I should tell you that in proposing that we publish a newspaper, E P Kovalevskii urgently requested that at first neither your name nor mine should appear - two names which St Petersburg stomachs find irritating and somewhat indigestible. Aksakov infuriated official circles by sending a circular on the establishment of a Slav Bureau, associated with Parus, to Czechs, Poles, Serbs and Bulgarians, and he was warned to limit his coverage of the Slav question. Parus finally appeared in 1859, but was banned after two issues, both for Pogodin's pan-Slavist writing and for its domestic material. Aksakov wrote:

You cannot imagine how hateful and despicable Moscow is to Petersburg, what apprehension and fear is evoked there by a word: narodnost'. Not one Westernizer, not one Russian socialist is as frightening to the government as a Moscow Slavophil, nobody suffers such persecution.

Kurilov comments that this was "somewhat exaggerated, but not unfounded".
Slavonic solidarity was not confined to journalism. In 1858 the Moscow Slav Benevolent Committee was formed, initially as a charitable organization to help Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Khomiakov, Konstantin Aksakov, Samarin and Koshelyov were among the founder members, and Pogodin and Ivan Aksakov played leading roles. Gorchakov spoke of the "necessity" to aid the Orthodox. The Tsarina, the Heir Apparent (the future Alexander III) and the Church all helped the Committee or (after its formation in 1867) its Petersburg Section. The Asian Department's support, at least, was politically motivated: Kovalevsky said that assistance to the Orthodox Slavs would "undoubtedly yield a harvest in the future". 28

A link between Ivan Aksakov and the Foreign Ministry was provided by Tiutchev, who was Aksakov's father-in-law. In 1858 Tiutchev was put in charge of the Foreign Censorship Committee. He continued to favour pan-Slavism. In the aftermath of the Crimean War he had become bitterly critical of the late Tsar, Nicholas, and, it seems, more sympathetic to the Slavophil emphasis on the Russian people. A poem for which he is particularly remembered today is as follows.

One cannot understand Russia with the mind.
One cannot measure her with a common yardstick.
She has a special status.
One can only believe in Russia. 29

One of the last documents of classical Slavophilism before its leaders died or became mainly concerned with
pan-Slavism, was Khomiakov's "Letter to the Serbs", published abroad in 1860. This exhorted the newly independent nation to remain true to Orthodox tradition and reject Westernism. Khomiakov referred to Russia's racial as well as religious links to the Serbs, and criticized the Orthodox (but not Slav) Greeks for their alleged pride. In the Slavophil tradition, he attacked serfdom and Russian intimidation of other nations, and urged the Serbs to retain Orthodoxy, freedom of religion, the obshchina, freedom of speech and of the Press and social equality. He criticized Russia's slavish imitation of foreign models and Peter's reforms in particular. The letter was also signed by, among others, the Aksakov brothers, Samarin, Koshelyov and Pogodin.\textsuperscript{30} The fact that Pogodin was prepared to put his signature to a document attacking the style of Peter's reforms is a further indication that the division between Slavophilism and official narodnost' over Peter was not a decisive one.

\textbf{Ivan Aksakov and the transformation of Slavophilism}

Ivan and Pyotr Kireevsky had died in 1856; Konstantin Aksakov and Khomiakov died in 1860, leaving Ivan Aksakov to become the leading Slavophil. He, like Samarin and Koshelyov, put less emphasis on religion and philosophy, and more on politics and economics, than the creators of Slavophilism had done. In 1861, despite police objections, the Tsar gave Ivan Aksakov permission to publish in Moscow a weekly newspaper, \textit{Den'} (The Day), on condition that it did not have a "political section".\textsuperscript{31}
The first issue proclaimed continuity with the "banner of Russian narodnost', understood and defined by the Kireevskys, Khomiakov, Konstantin Aksakov and all the so-called Slavophil school". The lifetime of Den', from 1861 to 1865, saw the victory of pan-Slavism over the old Slavophilism.

Ivan Aksakov wrote in the first issue: "to free the Slav peoples from material and spiritual oppression and to give them the gift of independent spiritual and, very likely, political existence under the protection of the powerful wings of the Russian eagle - that is the historical vocation, the moral right and the obligation of Russia". It is notable that the words "under the protection of the powerful wings of the Russian eagle" are omitted in Tsimbaev's citation of the sentence. Tsimbaev's book, which seeks to legitimize much of Aksakov's activity, was allowed a print run of only 2460. Aksakov saw the liberation of the Slavs as a national task, the accomplishment of which would overcome Peter's division of Russia. Undergoing sacrifice through war and death, the country would achieve redemption. Thus Aksakov maintained the messianist idea of redemption through suffering, but linked it to the goals of the Russian State, more openly than Khomiakov had in the Crimean War. Russia, moreover, was to be the Messiah not for all Europe, but only for the Slavs. His immediate aim was to transform Slavophilism into a popular movement, but in the process he revealed what Kuleshov calls "openly conservative tendencies, the degeneration of Slavophilism into
reactionary pan-Slavism". 34

Was pan-Slavism, then, still a form of Slavophilism? Ivan Kireevsky, at the end of his life, denounced in a letter to Pogodin the chauvinist perversion of Slavophilism.

In the striving after the Russian people's (narodnomu) spirit, there is a possibility of a misunderstanding which unfortunately is often encountered, and which causes much confusion.

By the Russian spirit they understand not the animation of the universal (obshchechelovecheskogo) mind by the spirit of Orthodox true Christianity, but only the negation of the Western mind.35

Peter Christoff argues that both Ivan Kireevsky and Khomiakov, at the end of their lives, avoided crossing the line into militarist expansionist nationalism, but in his study of Konstantin Aksakov he argues that the Crimean War showed the seeds of pan-Slavism within Slavophilism. Leonard Schapiro points out in his review of this study that chauvinistic responses to the Crimean War also came from Westernizers like Turgenev. "Pan-slavism, with its hard-headed, assertive Russian nationalism, antisemitism and expansionism, has nothing to do with the gentle, somewhat naive, sentimental and somewhat unrealistic Konstantin Aksakov".36 A cautious assessment would be that Ivan Aksakov's State-oriented pan-Slavism was not compatible with early Slavophilism, but Khomiakov and Konstantin Aksakov themselves on occasion deviated from their own doctrine in a State-chauvinist direction where pan-Slavism was concerned.
One factor pushing the pan-Slavists towards the State was the Polish revolt of 1863. This was based on the middle and lower-middle classes, with the peasants slow to join in. Herzen and Bakunin were among the few Russians to back the Poles; most Westernizers and the pan-Slavists supported the suppression of the Poles by the Russian government. As Michael B. Petrovich points out, Poland's Westernized élite and Catholic religion were features that repelled the pan-Slavists. "Moreover, Polish Messianism was a rival of Russian Pan-Slavism in its bid for primacy in the Slavic family". Following the outbreak of the revolt, Aksakov in Den' accused the Russian government of pursuing too liberal a policy in Poland. Nevertheless, Aksakov opposed the Russification of Poland as incompatible with the Slavophil view of the free development of nationalities, and (perhaps worse) as likely to allow Polish influence to seep into Russia. Samarin in Den' in 1863 argued that the Russian government should seek support among the Polish people, who despite "Latin" influence, retained a "Slav soul" against the Polish gentry and Catholic priests. Aksakov took this a stage further and called for a democratic Polish parliament, which he believed would strengthen the "Slav" peasants at the expense of the "Latin" elements. Samarin also called for the removal of Polish influence from the Western gubernii, where the landlords were mainly Polish and the peasants mainly Ukrainian or Belorussian. Samarin referred to these peasants only as "Russian".37
The government adopted some of these proposals. In the Western gubernii, it continued its policy of linguistic Russification and took measures to reduce Polish influence, increase the power of Russians and promote the Orthodox Church. In Poland itself, as well as harshly repressing the leaders of the revolt, the government increased the role of the Russian language and of Russians in the bureaucracy. Samarin drafted the official plan for the emancipation of the peasants, which was much more beneficial to them than the programme implemented in Russia.38

As well as changing in practice his attitude to the State, Aksakov was shifting from the anti-capitalism of early Slavophilism to an alliance with the Moscow merchants. Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War had provoked an outburst of nationalism among them. For his part, Aksakov became convinced that Russian industry needed to be developed to meet the Western challenge, despite the social consequences. The fight for tariff protection for Russian industry, Russian control over Russian railways and State sponsorship of industry united the merchants and Slavophils. Moscow merchants funded Russkaia beseda, Sel’skoe blagoustroistvo (Rural Welfare), edited by Koshelyov, Vestnik promyshlennosti (Herald of Industry, 1858-1861), edited by the Slavophil Fyodor V. Chizhov, and Aktsioner (The Shareholder, 1858-1865; distributed as a supplement to Den’ from 1863). Vestnik promyshlennosti argued against serfdom on the grounds of the need for wage labour. Aksakov advocated the extension of the privileges
of the gentry to the rest of society. In 1861 he wrote in
Den': "the further existence of the gentry stratum as a
stratum...is impossible". Tsimbaev comments that his
views in this respect were "progressive". Den' itself,
despite its central position in pan-Slavism and its
gaining, for a while, 4000 subscribers, made a loss and
Aksakov closed it in 1865.

The following year Aksakov was asked by some Moscow
merchants to edit a weekly that would reflect the interests
of the world of trade and industry. The weekly was called
Moskva (Moscow, 1867-1868) and later Moskvich (The
Muscovite, 1868-1869). The merchants' approach was an
indication of Aksakov's ideological evolution; according to
Tsimbaev, the 1860s and 1870s saw the conversion of
Slavophilism into an ideology of the big bourgeoisie. This
was possible because Aksakov saw the Moscow merchants as
the guarantors of a special Russian path of development,
since in his view they were true to the patriarchal way of
life and old Russian traditions.

Moskva suffered repeated proscriptions. It was closed
down after republishing in autumn 1868 some articles from
Samarin's journal Okrainy Rossii (Borderlands of Russia,
Prague, 1868, Berlin, 1871-1876). Samarin had returned to
his earlier attacks on the privileges of the German
nobility in the Baltic and the role of the Lutheran Church,
and advocated the greater use of Russian. To avoid the
ban on Moskva, Aksakov changed the title to Moskvich, but
nevertheless this was also soon closed down. The two
papers were critical of the government in many ways, and the Moscow censors wrote to St. Petersburg of Aksakov's "unconcealed hatred of the administration (administratsiia)". 42 Indeed, a private article written by Aksakov during the Moskvich period revealed the extent of his opposition. He said that if autocracy transcended the political sphere, it became "usurpation, tyranny. That is what it has been in Russia since the time of Peter". 43

Walicki has rightly argued that Aksakov's anti-capitalism was transformed into anti-Semitism. The beginning of Alexander's reign brought some beneficial reforms to Russia's Jews, including the abolition of Jewish child conscription. In 1858 both Konstantin and Ivan Aksakov signed a protest by 147 public figures, including Nikolai Chernyshevsky, Mikhail Katkov, Ivan Turgenev and Kostomarov, against the publication by Vladimir Zotov in his Petersburg weekly Illiustratsiia of his view that the Jews were not worthy of emancipation. Their signatures reflected the absence of anti-Semitism from early Slavophilism (see above, p. 121). 44

Ivan Aksakov's anti-Semitism does not seem to have surfaced in his public work until 1862. In an editorial in Den' (16 February), he attacked a law of 1861 (of little practical significance) which had opened government service to Jewish university graduates. Aksakov favoured allowing the Jews full development of their way of life and to live throughout Russia. He insisted, however, that unless they
converted to Orthodoxy they could not be given the right to participate in administration and legislation in a country carrying the Christian banner. It was impossible to be a Russian and not Orthodox. Thus a Jew who embraced Orthodoxy was much more Russian than a Russian who became a Catholic. Den' also published two anti-Jewish pseudonymous articles in 1862. John D. Klier comments that in the debate on the Jewish question in this period, Den' was virtually the only journal to use religious arguments in favour of excluding Jews from public life. Although Aksakov did not find much support at the time, he helped to create the "Judeophobic vocabulary of the 70s and 80s".45 By 1867 Aksakov was writing in more virulent language. An article in Moskva (15 July) was entitled "Not the Emancipation of the Jews, but the Emancipation of the Russians from the Jews Should be Discussed". It complained about the position of the Jews in the Western and Southern gubernii. "...involuntarily you ask yourself: where are we, in Russia or really in Yiddish Palestine, as our Western territory has been nicknamed for a long time?".46

Slavophilism and pochvennichestvo

The tendency known as pochvennichestvo was influenced by the ideas of the Slavophils. Since pochvennichestvo itself has been an important trend of Russian nationalist thought up to the present, it seems appropriate to examine its origins and development in the early 1860s, before returning to the development of pan-Slavism.
Pochvennichestvo evolved from the thought of the "young editors" who collaborated on Pogodin’s Moskvitianin from 1850 to 1856. The most influential was the literary critic Apollon Aleksandrovich Grigorev (1822-1864). Grigorev saw each nation as an organic whole, animated by a national ideal and a national personality. Like the early Slavophils, he saw Moscow rather than Petersburg as the true capital of Russia; but unlike them he did not see the peasantry as embodying the national personality. He wrote to Koshelyov in 1856, "in the middle class, industrial and chiefly merchant, we see the old immemorial Rus". Thus he anticipated Ivan Aksakov’s evolution. Grigorev did not see the national character (he used narodnost' and later natsionalnost') as fixed, but as evolving in the merchant class, from whom it would expand and embrace all Russians in an organic whole.

The ideas of pochvennichestvo emerged in the St. Petersburg journals Vremia (Time, 1861-1863) and its successor Epokha (The Epoch, 1864-1865). The core of the editorial board of Vremia was composed of the writer Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky (1821-1881), his brother Mikhail, Grigorev and the critic Nikolai Nikolaevich Strakhov (1828-1896). Fyodor Dostoevsky was the leading figure. Born and brought up in Moscow, he lived most of his adult life in Siberia, Petersburg and abroad. There is no space here to discuss his life prior to 1861: his interest in Fourier’s utopian socialism and participation in the Petrashevsky circle in 1848, his mock execution and hard labour in
Siberia and the beginnings of his reverence for the Russian peasant. The position of pochvennichestvo was one of reconciliation - the reconciliation of Russia and the West, of Slavophils and Westernizers, of the educated society with the people and the soil (pochva). Pochvennichestvo has been translated as "native soil" or "return to the soil", and Strakhov in 1862 explained that "soil" had the connotation of the unique characteristics of the Russian people. The pochvenniki rejected the idea that Europe represented the universal ideal. Europe was only part of this ideal, and Russia, like every nation, had its own principle and role to play in this ideal. Russian narodnost', for Dostoevsky, was the ability to synthesize Russian and Western ideas. As he said in the Vremia manifesto in autumn 1860: "...the Russian idea will perhaps be the synthesis of all those ideas which Europe with such obstinacy, with such courage, is developing in its separate nationalities". In his Winter Notes on Summer Impressions (published in Vremia in 1863) Dostoevsky expressed his hostility to the bourgeois individualism of Western Europe and contrasted it with the harmony which he believed could be created in Russia. This was a position very similar to that of Herzen. At this stage Dostoevsky, unlike the early Slavophils, did not see Orthodoxy as the main factor in Russian narodnost'. Grigorev indeed accused him of underestimating the importance of Orthodoxy.

The pochvenniki had much in common with the Slavophils. They supported the principle of autocracy, supplemented by
a Zemskii_Sobor. They favoured the obshchina, and when Alexander II introduced the zemstva they pressed for democratic elections and freedom from State intervention for the new local government organs. They opposed gentry privileges, the bourgeois spirit and any sort of materialistic socialism; they favoured cottage industry, and industrialization through the artel', with the help of tariffs and railways. They distinguished between "officialism" and "the basic forces of the Russian people". Their differences with the Slavophils seemed significant as well. They accused the Slavophils of idealizing Muscovite Russia. Dostoevsky argued that the Raskol was evidence that the common people were alienated from Muscovite life, and considered the Old Belief nearer true Orthodoxy. Ivan Aksakov, on the other hand, supported the official Church and Nikon's reforms.53

Reflecting Pogodin's influence, the pochvenniki supported Peter's reforms and saw them as a necessary element of Russian universalism. Dostoevsky wrote:

Great was that moment of Russian life when the great, entirely Russian will of Peter determined to break the fetters which were holding back our development too tightly. In Peter's work (we shall not quarrel about this now) there was much truth. Whether he consciously divined the pan-human (obshchechelovechesko) purpose of the Russian people, or unconsciously went ahead, according to the one feeling urging him on, the point is that he went rightly. But meanwhile the form of his activity, through its extreme sharpness, was perhaps mistaken. This form into which he transformed Russia was undoubtedly mistaken. The fact of the transformation was right, but its forms were not Russian, not national, but often directly and fundamentally contradicted the spirit of the people.54
Dostoevsky recognized that Peter's reforms had been rejected by the common people, but considered that, contrary to the Slavophil belief, the people had not preserved pre-Petrine customs. Russian nationality existed not only in the peasants but also in the educated people. The Slavophils failed to see the dynamic nature of nationality, which would develop through the reconciliation of the educated strata with the people. Whereas the Slavophil ideal was in the past, the pochvennik ideal was in the future. The pochvenniki believed the Emancipation was an enormous step towards this ideal. Whereas the Slavophils saw existing Russian literature as mainly reflecting the spirit of the Westernized gentry, the pochvenniki believed literature was a moral force representing the ideal of the whole nation. Grigorev and Dostoevsky attached particular importance to Pushkin for reconciling European ideals and Peter's reforms with Russian nationality. Dostoevsky wrote (1861): "We understood in him that the Russian ideal is wholeness, universal reconciliation and universal humanity [vsechelovechnost']." 55

Vremia in 1863 had around 4000 subscribers. This was probably more than Den' had by then, about the same as the radical Westernizer or revolutionary democratic Russkoe slovo, but less than the radical Westernizer Sovremennik or the conservative Westernizer Russkii vestnik. Although Dostoevsky had begun with the idea of reconciling Westernizers and Slavophils, by the end of 1862 he was
alienated from the ideas of the radical Westernizers, led by Chernyshevsky, Dmitry Pisarev and Nikolai Dobroliubov (who had died in 1861). He hated their materialism and utilitarianism in politics and art, and (as was the case for the rest of his life) he was frightened and appalled by the idea of revolution. He also opposed Russkii_vestnik because of Katkov's defence of gentry privilege. The closeness between Vremia and Den' does not seem to have alleviated mistrust. Dostoevsky was hostile to the Slavophils and Den' until he read Slavophil writings in summer 1863; then he reoriented himself to the religious basis of Slavophilism. Grigorev was suspicious of Slavophil Moscow centralism, favouring local diversity, and for the same reason was against the idea of Moscow as the head of political pan-Slavism. Dostoevsky had little interest in pan-Slavism at this time.\textsuperscript{56}

\textit{Vremia} was more tolerant than Den'. It will be recalled that in 1862 Ivan Aksakov published an editorial in Den' saying that Jews who did not wish to convert to Orthodoxy should be excluded from public affairs (see above, p. 163). Vremia responded by accusing Den' of arousing hatred. The Jewish question would be solved by the ending of restrictions against the Jews. Vremia in fact defended the Jews on a total of three occasions in 1862. David Goldstein has cast some doubt on the genuineness of Vremia's support for them. He shows that Dostoevsky was keen to distance himself from the Slavophils and tone down his criticism of the revolutionary democrats, in order to maintain his influence and thereby facilitate
his project for reconciliation of Westernizers and Slavophils. Goldstein writes: "...the Jewish question provided Time with a precious polemical instrument that allowed it to maintain its liberal reputation..."

Nevertheless, Goldstein has not directly accused Dostoevsky of insincerity, and there would appear to be insufficient evidence to back such an accusation.

When the censor closed Vremia in 1863, over an article by Strakhov on the Polish revolt, Ivan Aksakov refused to support the journal, considering it anti-national since it came from St. Petersburg and failed to promote Orthodoxy. Nevertheless, Aksakov and the pochvenniki were gradually converging, with Dostoevsky paying more attention to Orthodoxy. Aksakov did not idealize the peasantry and spoke instead of the need for the people to raise itself to the level of obshchestvo ("society"), the part of the people that was conscious of sharing the national ideal. This was akin to the pochvennik idea of reconciliation.

Vremia's successor, Epokha, was initially edited by Mikhail Dostoevsky. It was hampered by close government supervision, the mood of disillusionment among the intelligentsia brought on by repression, and then the deaths in 1864 of Mikhail Dostoevsky and Grigorev. Circulation fell to 1300. Under the influence of Strakhov, in particular, who now called himself a Slavophil, Epokha became reconciled with Den'. In his notebooks of 1864, Fyodor Dostoevsky expounded the idea of the Russian people as the bearers of true Christanity.
Pochvennichestvo was virtually disappearing into Slavophilism. In 1866 Dostoevsky wrote to Katkov that he was "a real Slavophil, except for some tiny disagreements". 58

Pan-Slavism, 1867–1878. Danilevsky

I shall now turn to discuss the development of the pan-Slav movement and the ideas behind it. Dostoevsky's later thought will be considered below (pp. 180-204).

A high point in the development of the pan-Slav movement was the holding of the Ethnographic Exhibition and the Slav Congress in Moscow in 1867. Eighty-one foreign Slavs attended, mainly from Austria-Hungary. The Ethnographic Exhibition was a private initiative which the Tsar agreed to open. Pan-Slavists, including those around the Moscow Slav Benevolent Committee, took the step of organizing a Slav Congress at the same time. The government did not try to prevent the Congress, and there was wide support for it in both Petersburg and Moscow. Those most involved in the Congress included Aksakov, Tiutchev, Samarin, Koshelyov and Pogodin. Although the government apparently warned the Russian pan-Slavists to avoid politics in their declarations, the Tsar received the visitors and gave them his best wishes. The atmosphere of Slav solidarity at the Congress was heady but proved short-lived. Russian public opinion lost interest, some of the Slav guests were suspicious of Russian domination, and there was no practical outcome. On the other hand, the anti-Russian Press in Europe had a field day in
denouncing pan-Slavism as a tool of Russian imperialism. It would be truer to say that the Russian government was trying to gain some possible advantage from a movement with which it was not fundamentally in sympathy. 59

From 1867, branches of the Moscow Slav Committee appeared in St. Petersburg, Kiev and Odessa, but they were all fairly small. Among the participants in the Petersburg Section were Tiutchev, Samarin, Dostoevsky, Strakhov and Nikolai Iakovlevich Danilevsky (1822-1895). Russian pan-Slavism was now changing its emphasis "from spiritual right to political might". 60 Aksakov wrote in Moskvich, 28 May 1868: "All [the] historical traditions of Russia are rooted in her Slavonic origin". 61 This shift from religion to race as the basis of Slav unity was reflected in the works of Count Nikolai Ignatev, General Rostislav Fadeev and Danilevsky. Ignatev, ambassador in Constantinople from 1864 to 1877, found that his racially-based political pan-Slavism aroused hostility in Gorchakov and other government ministers. Fadeev's Opinion on the Eastern Question (1869) advocated a pan-Slav federation under Russian leadership, created by Russian force, using Orthodoxy as a propaganda tool. 62 Danilevsky's "Russia and Europe" (completed in 1869) 63 was published in Strakhov's journal Zaria (Dawn, St. Petersburg, 1869-1872). Zaria is described by Wayne Dowler as "the last Russian journal to carry the marks of pochvennichestvo". Dowler concedes that the idea of reconciliation, basic to pochvennichestvo, was absent from Zaria. This was
typified in Danilevsky's work to which the journal claimed to be "organically linked". 64

Strakhov described "Russia and Europe" as "a whole code (kodeks) of Slavophil doctrine". 65 Danilevsky rejected the primacy of Orthodoxy, but he still linked Slav destiny with religion.

From an objective, factual viewpoint, the Russian and the majority of the other Slav peoples achieved the historical destiny of becoming, with the Greeks, the chief guardians of the living tradition of religious truth, Orthodoxy, and in this way the continuers of the great cause, which was the lot of Israel and Byzantium: to be the God-chosen peoples (narodami bogoizbrannymi). 66

Danilevsky believed that Peter's political and military activity had been beneficial, but he agreed with the early Slavophils that his attempt to uproot customs and morals "brought the greatest harm". 67 He wrote, "Our obshchina is a historical law", 68 and he believed in a form of "Russian socialism" linked with it. The Russians' humility and obedience meant that Russia had never had, and probably would never have, a political revolution. Danilevsky, however, differed from the early Slavophils in rejecting their belief that the State was an evil. He stood for a strong State. He also rejected the Slavophil view that Russia had a mission to perform in Europe. He denied the existence of universal civilization, and argued instead that civilizations could be divided into a number of historical-cultural types. Russia was not part of the "Germano-Roman" civilization of Europe, which he believed to be in decline, but belonged to Slav civilization, a different historical-cultural type. He claimed that
Europe hated Russia, with a blind racial hatred, and racial hatred was the motive force of history. Russia's foreign policy should henceforth be determined not by legitimism or the "Holy Alliance", but by the Slav interest. The aim should be to destroy the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires and unite the Slavs in a Slav Federation. He urged war with the West to bring this about. Danilevsky's emphasis on the State, violence and war leads Robert E. MacMaster to describe him as a "totalitarian philosopher". He sought to win Slav support by reference to Slav unity and (where appropriate) Orthodoxy, and by giving land to the peasants.69

The Slav Federation that Danilevsky wished to see would be led by the Russian Empire, which would be somewhat expanded to the West. There would be no provision for national minorities within the Empire. Three other Slav kingdoms corresponding approximately to today's Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria would be included, and "those non-Slav nationalities - Greeks, Romanians and Magyars - must enter, willingly or not, the all-Slav federation".70 The Poles, when they began to behave more co-operatively, could also join the federation. Danilevsky put particular emphasis on the idea that Constantinople, or Tsargrad as he called it, should be the capital of the federation. It was to be seized from the Turks and given not to Russia but to the federation as a whole. Constantinople was important above all for security reasons, and as the "second Rome" it was also of ideological significance. The units of the federation
would be autonomous in domestic affairs, but foreign affairs and defence would be federal matters. The common language would be Russian. The head of the federation, stretching from the Adriatic to the Pacific, would be the Russian Tsar. 71

Ivan Aksakov considered Danilevsky's "Russia and Europe" to be a Slavophil work. Partly under its influence, his desire for cultural and spiritual Slav unity gave way to a "striving, by political and military means, to expedite the liberation of the southern Slavs and achieve their inclusion in Russia's sphere of influence". 72 The old Slavophil desire for freedom was not yet abandoned, however. In 1870 Aksakov drafted an appeal to the Tsar asking for the relaxation of censorship and for religious freedom. This was signed by Samarin, Pogodin, Cherkassky, who was now Mayor of Moscow, and a majority of the Moscow City Duma. Moscow merchants played an important role on the Moscow Slav Benevolent Committee, and in 1874 funded the journal Russkii_mir (The Russian World) to encourage pan-Slav feeling. Aksakov's opportunity for engendering mass support came with the outbreak of conflict in the Balkans: a revolt in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1875, and the revolt in Bulgaria and the war of Serbia and Montenegro against Turkey in 1876. 73

Alexander and Gorchakov refused to be drawn into a war against Turkey on behalf of the Slavs, but the Moscow merchants gave huge funds to help the Slavs and to finance
Russian volunteers to fight for Serbia. This aid was coordinated through the Moscow Slav Committee, of which Aksakov, following Pogodin's death, was now the formal as well as the actual head. At the same time, the pan-Slavists campaigned for official Russian intervention against Turkey. The Soviet historian S.A. Nikitin commented: "Aksakov and the Slav Committees, sending volunteers to Serbia, were fighting not so much the Turks as the Russian government." In response, in October 1876 the government intervened in the Slav Committees and subordinated them to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The same month, following a Turkish offensive against the Serbs, the Moscow Duma unanimously passed an appeal drafted by Aksakov asking the government to defend their Slav brothers. The Tsar refused to accept it, but two weeks later made an anti-Ottoman speech to the Moscow Duma. Furthermore, after some hesitation, the government, with the Tsar's approval, gave funds to a commission headed by Aksakov to provide the Bulgarians with uniforms. Aksakov saw the direct involvement of not only the Russian people but of Russia "as a State organism, headed by the government" as essential to solving the Slav question.75 Following the collapse of Serbia in February 1877, Aksakov made a bitter attack on Russian diplomacy for betraying Russian popular sympathy for the Slavs. Finally, on 12 April 1877 Russia declared war on Turkey.76

This declaration of war, against the opposition of the Foreign Ministry and Alexander's own former opinion, deserves some consideration. In earlier periods of Russian
history, as suggested above, ideological pronouncements about the Tsar being the protector of the Orthodox had not been allowed to weigh against the interests of the State. The interests of dynasties had been predominant. Emanuel Sarkisyantz has argued that in 1877-1878, and only then, the pan-Slavist lobby became strong enough to influence the Russian government. It should perhaps be emphasized that the appeal of pan-Slavism in Russia, and its influence on Russian policy, was greatly exaggerated in the West. Ivan Aksakov was wrongly considered to be a voice of official Russia. As early as 1871 Engels was telling the readers of the Pall_Mall Gazette that Russian public opinion was frenetically pan-Slav. He added that there was pressure on St. Petersburg to get out of its domestic problems by fighting Austria or Turkey. But, as Florinsky points out, the autocracy was not accustomed to listening to public opinion in the making of foreign policy. It would seem that the declaration of war resulted not primarily from outside pressure, from Aksakov and others, on the State apparatus, but from support for war that existed within the ruling circles. Those favouring military intervention included the Tsarina, the future Alexander III and those around them, the Church and many senior Army officers. Of particular importance was the role of Ignatev, supporting the Slavs from his embassy in Constantinople. Florinsky admits that the level of pan-Slavist agitation was one factor in policy formation; another was the changing degree of influence with the Tsar of pro-war and anti-war individuals. In the end, according to Florinsky, the
government was forced into war because the abandonment of the Slavs would be seen as "the betrayal of a policy to which the government appeared to be definitely committed". 77

Soviet commentators have generally seen Aksakov's work on the Slav Committee (renamed Slav Society in autumn 1876) as beneficial insofar as it aided the Slavs culturally or helped Slav national liberation movements. There have, however, been differences of emphasis. The traditional, more Marxist view is represented by Kuleshov, who sees the committee as politically "ambiguous, since it masked the pan-Slavist strivings of the tsarist government and interfered with the demarcation of class interests in the all-Slav movement". Tsimbaev writes in detail about Aksakov's practical help for the Slavs; he argues that Aksakov's "reactionary pan-Slavist ideas" did not interfere with his "sincere striving" to assist the Slav struggle. Kurilov is the most enthusiastic; he describes Aksakov's work and does not criticize his views. 78

The Moscow Duma voted substantial financial support for the war; Cherkassky left for the front, where he later died of illness. Russian forces freed Bulgaria, although to Aksakov's annoyance they organized for her a constitutional monarchy and not an autocracy. Russian advances into Turkey provoked British fears that Russia intended to seize Constantinople and the Straits. The arrival of the British fleet in the Dardanelles in turn provoked indignation in Russia. Many who had opposed the
idea of seizing Constantinople now supported it, and the Tsar ordered it to be taken. The British presence, however, made this difficult. In February 1878, Russia and Turkey signed the Treaty of San Stefano, with Ignatev, as chief Russian negotiator, securing benefits for the Slavs and Russia herself. Russia made gains in the Caucasus, Bulgaria became an autonomous principality only nominally under the Ottomans, and Turkey recognized the independence of Romania, Serbia and Montenegro. Aksakov complained that "Tsarigrad [Constantinople] has not been purged of Asiatic nastiness [skverna]"\textsuperscript{79}, but was generally satisfied by the treaty. His hopes that the war would allow the interests and consciousness of the Russian people to penetrate the autocracy were, however, disappointed.\textsuperscript{80}

In May 1878, British and Austrian pressure at the Congress of Berlin forced the Russian government to give up much of what had been won for the Slavs at San Stefano. Aksakov saw the Treaty of Berlin as a betrayal of gains won with Russian blood. According to Tsimbaev, he had an unrealistic understanding of the correlation of forces facing Russia. In a speech to the Moscow Slav Society on 22 June, Aksakov condemned the Congress, with its abandonment of the southern Bulgarians, as "a patent plot against the Russian people. A plot with the participation of the very representatives of Russia."\textsuperscript{81} This view was widely-held in both Moscow and Petersburg, and Aksakov suffered for articulating it. In July the Moscow Slav Society was closed down by the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, after the intervention of Alexander, and Aksakov was exiled from Moscow. Tsimbaev considers his speech "the highest point of Aksakov's publicistic activity". It strengthened the "friendship of the Russian and Bulgarian peoples". A Bulgarian youth group proposed Aksakov's candidacy for the Bulgarian throne. But his attempt to reconcile pan-Slavism with the Russian State had failed. 82

**Dostoevsky**

Since the XX Congress of the CPSU, the influence of Dostoevsky's legacy has become of great importance in the USSR, among both official cultural circles and dissidents. It is appropriate to consider the development of Dostoevsky's ideas from the late 1860s to his death in 1881 in the light of the political environment and events outlined above. His political journalism reached a wide audience in his lifetime: his periodical *The Diary of a Writer* (Dnevnik pisatelia, St. Petersburg, 1876-1877, 1880, 1881) peaked at a circulation of 6000 in 1877. Nevertheless, commentators have questioned whether Dostoevsky's politics should be taken seriously. Nikolai K. Mikhailovsky (1843-1904), one of the leading narodnik theoreticians, says that neither Dostoevsky's supporters nor his opponents seriously considered him to be a political figure. 83 E. H. Carr, in his biography of Dostoevsky first published in 1931, opined that the Diary "has little interest for a later generation", and referred to some passages as "ravings". 84 Ronald Hingley describes Dostoevsky's "Pushkin speech" as "appalling but somehow inspired rubbish". 85 The Czech leader, Tomáš Masaryk, on
the other hand, gave a central role to Dostoevsky in his study of Russian thought. "...what I write about Dostoevskii is the core of the undertaking ... an analysis of Dostoevskii is a sound method of studying Russia ..."^86 Masaryk liked neither Dostoevsky nor Russia; but Dostoevsky has always had his disciples among Russians. After the Revolution of 1905, Dmitry Merezhkovsky entitled his biography of Dostoevsky "The Prophet of the Russian Revolution".^87 The events of 1917, the Civil War and the 1930s appeared to many in the Russian emigration to confirm Dostoevsky's status as a prophet.\(^\text{88}\)

In the USSR, the Institute of Russian Literature (Pushkin House) of the Academy of Sciences began in 1972 to publish the complete collected works of Dostoevsky in a 30-volume edition. The first part of Volume 30 appeared in 1988.\(^\text{89}\) The Diary (republished in 1929 and 1981-1984) began to attract attention as the official attitude to Dostoevsky became friendlier. V.A. Tunimanov, in a study of the Diary published in a collective volume 1972, complained that Soviet critics had either shut their eyes to it or rejected it as reactionary. He found positive elements in Dostoevsky's political journalism, in particular his anti-bourgeois attitude and his understanding of events in Europe, which coexisted with his reactionary ideas.\(^\text{90}\) Ia.E. Elsberg, in the same volume, affirms that the Diary bears witness to the desperate waverings in Dostoevsky's thought, between democracy, socialism and civil resurrection (гражданскому воскресению) on the one hand, and the
and the idealization of the Orthodox Church and monarchism on the other. Like many observers, Elsberg sees Dostoevsky’s philosophy as contradictory. Assessing Dostoevsky’s legacy, the editors of the volume containing these studies declare:

...the authors are unanimous in that the presence of conservative elements in the world-view of the writer could not obscure the progressive meaning of his creative work; in its humanist pathos, its anti-bourgeoisness ...it is undoubtedly our ally in the ... revolutionary transformation of the world.

Other Soviet critics in the official Press and in samizdat in the 1970s and 1980s have declared their allegiance to Dostoevsky’s philosophy.

Before discussing Dostoevsky’s ideas, some biographical facts must be mentioned. From 1867 he lived in Western Europe, avoiding his creditors. On his return to St. Petersburg in 1871, his literary fame was already established by *Crime_and_Punishment* (1865-1866), *The_Idiot* (1869) and *The_Devils* (1871). In 1872 he met Konstantin P. Pobedonostsev (1827-1907). Pobedonostsev had been tutor to the Tsarevich and was later to become Oberprocurator of the Holy Synod (1880-1905) and a prominent adviser to Alexander III and Nicholas II. The two became very close friends. At the end of 1872, Dostoevsky was made editor of *Grazhdanin* (The Citizen), a conservative journal owned by Prince V.P. Meshchersky and supported by the Tsarevich, Pobedonostsev, Apollon Maikov, Tiutchev and Strakhov. He held the position for a year; the *Diary* originated as a feature within the journal. Pobedonostsev introduced Dostoevsky to Court circles, where he made a favourable
impression. Alexander II invited him to have discussions with his two younger sons, Sergei and Pavel, and the sons of his brother. In 1880 he met the Tsarevich. At the same time, he maintained links with radical circles; his novel *Raw Youth* was published in *Otechestvennye zapiski*, then edited by Nikolai A. Nekrasov, in 1875.94

Dostoevsky's basic political, philosophical and religious ideas do not seem to have changed much after 1868. Having accepted the centrality of Orthodoxy, he had become very close politically to the Slavophils, especially Ivan Aksakov, and at times was if anything even more virulent in his nationalism. He still believed in the essence of Peter's reform, but not in all its aspects; the abolition of serfdom had removed the worst fault.95 Riasanovsky correctly says that Dostoevsky's treatment of Russia's relations with the West "deeply resembled" Slavophilism.96 His claim that the Russian people was the "God-bearing people" (narod-bogonosets) could be seen as an extension of the thought of the early Slavophils. He retained the pochvennik preoccupation with the need for reconciliation (see above, p. 166); indeed, Geoffrey C. Kabat describes the gap between intelligentsia and people as the "central theme" of the Diary.97 But the reconciliation was to be on Dostoevsky's own terms. In 1868, he wrote to Maikov of Russia's role in regenerating the world. "A great renovation is being prepared for the whole world through Russian thought (which is intimately connected with Orthodoxy, you are right) and this will be achieved in some hundred years - [that] is my present
faith." 98 Around the same time, Dostoevsky's positive character Prince Myshkin, the "idiot", was saying:

Show the Russian man the renewal of all mankind and its resurrection, perhaps, by Russian thought alone, by the Russian God and Christ, and you will see what a mighty and upright, wise and meek giant will grow before the astounded world. 99

A letter to Strakhov of 1869 also expressed Dostoevsky's belief in Russia's aiding the "resurrection of Europe". 100 All this fits within the Slavophil canon. Like Khomiakov and Ivan Kireevsky, Dostoevsky saw a logical chain leading from Catholicism to Protestantism, and thence to atheism; 101 but Dostoevsky was particularly interested in the link between atheism and socialism, and the similarities between Catholicism and socialism.

Dostoevsky's view of the relation between Russia and Europe is summarized in the January 1877 issue of the Diary. He saw "three ideas" contending, Catholic, Protestant and "Slav". Catholicism in France had produced French atheist socialism. "French socialism of today ... is nothing other than the most faithful and undeviating continuation of the Catholic idea ... nothing other than the forcible unity of humanity - an idea coming from ancient Rome and then fully preserved in Catholicism." Protestantism was the idea of "the German who blindly believes that the renewal of humanity is in him alone, and not in Catholic civilization". The German always lived by negation. After the fall of Catholicism, Protestantism might die because there was nothing left to protest against. The German despised the Slav idea as much as the
Catholic idea, but had only recently begun to take it as a serious threat. The Slav idea was only coming into being; it was still too undefined, but it would have an enormous influence.102

In the realm of social affairs, Russia's moral superiority was shown for Dostoevsky by the fact that serfdom had been voluntarily abolished by the upper stratum on the Tsar's wish.103 He contrasted this with Europe...

... in Europe all the great powers will be annihilated, and for a very simple reason; they will all be made powerless and undermined by the unsatisfied democratic strivings of a large part of their lower-class subjects, their proletarians and paupers. In Russia, however, this cannot happen at all: our demos is content, and as time passes, it will be more content, for everything is leading to this, through the general mood, or rather through agreement. And so there will remain only one colossus on the continent of Europe - Russia. This will happen, perhaps, even much sooner than people think. Europe's future belongs to Russia. But the question arises: what will Russia then do in Europe? Is she ready for this role?104

Dostoevsky was convinced that Europe hated Russia. "Europe has a remarkable dislike for us and has never liked us; she has never considered us as one of her own, as Europeans, but only as vexatious newcomers."105 He accused Europe's leaders of inspiring hatred for Russia, of turning their backs on the atrocities committed by the Ottomans, "the savage infamous Muslim horde", against the Balkan Slavs. "The Slav race is hateful to Europe."106 Russian intellectuals who had been drawn to French socialism became detached from the Russian soil and the soul of the people, and were not respected in Europe. To win Europe's respect, Russians had first to respect their own nationality and
become Russians. But Dostoevsky refused to renounce Europe; "Europe for us is a second fatherland." And soon, given the contradictions within Europe, "one can say almost with certainty that in the near, perhaps very near future, Russia will become stronger than anyone in Europe." 

In the Diary for September 1877, during the Russo-Turkish War, Dostoevsky's expectations of the defeat of European ideas reached new heights. "Papal Catholicism, dying forever" would in the very near future launch a war against the whole world, which would merge with the Balkan war. The outcome would be that Catholicism would be replaced by "reborn Eastern Christianity". The ending of the Russo-Turkish War in no way diminished his expectations of a forthcoming conflagration. The political situation within the European countries, he wrote in the Diary for August 1880, "must unfailingly lead to a huge, final, partitioning political war", within the nineteenth century or even the decade. In Europe, "the proletarian is on the street ...[the proletarians] will throw themselves on Europe, and all the old order will perish for ever." 

Dostoevsky claimed that Catholicism and atheist socialism both sought to deny people their freedom in order to try to give them happiness. His portrayal of Shigalyov's attempt to create paradise in The Devils and of the ideology of the Grand Inquisitor in The Brothers Karamazov are probably attacks on both Catholicism and socialism. Shigalyov proposes to give
one tenth of humanity absolute freedom and unlimited rights over the remaining nine tenths. The latter must lose their individuality and turn into something like a herd, and by their unlimited obedience will achieve, by a series of regenerations, primeval innocence, something like the original paradise, although, however, they will work.

But Shigalyov finds a paradox. "Proceeding from unlimited freedom, I conclude with unlimited despotism." The Grand Inquisitor explains to Christ, who has returned to Seville at the height of the Spanish Inquisition, that people do not want to be burdened with the freedom that Christ gave them. People have instead given their freedom to the Church, and in return received "bread", a symbol for the certainties of Catholic dogma. The Church has taken on itself the burden of the sins of the people, and the people willingly submit to the Church. The Grand Inquisitor admits that in denying people freedom, the Catholic Church has abandoned Christ for "him", the Devil or Antichrist. Mochulsky sees the bread as symbolizing both Catholicism and socialism, and argues that Dostoevsky was convinced that Catholicism would unite with socialism to form the kingdom of Antichrist. Berdiaev believes that the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor is directed against all authority and is essentially anarchist.

Dostoevsky believed that atheism among the Russian intelligentsia was a result of its separation from the people. "Cutting themselves off from the people, they naturally also lost God." The consequence of the loss of God was the ending of morality and the raising of man to be a god. In The Devils, Kirillov becomes a man-god in
his own eyes by overcoming the fear of death and killing himself.\textsuperscript{116} The whole novel can be seen in terms of the loss of morality in the "nihilist sons" of the 1860s as a result of the loss of God by the "literal fathers" of the 1840s.\textsuperscript{117} Pyotr Verkhovensky, a "nihilist son", organizes the murder of one of the members of his secret revolutionary cell. The story is based on a similar incident in 1869 involving Sergei G. Nechaev, who had earlier collaborated with Bakunin on the \textit{Catechism of the Revolutionary}. Dostoevsky emphasizes that Pyotr Verkhovensky is not a socialist but simply a scoundrel. The irrational, depraved, nightmarish world Dostoevsky portrays has inevitably been compared with Stalinism. Philip Rahv wrote at the height of the Great Purge: "Give him [Pyotr Verkhovensky] state power and you get a type like Yezhov or Yagoda." At the end of the novel appears a vision: the "devils" who have supposedly been afflicting Russia over the ages enter the liberals and nihilists and destroy themselves, like the swine in St. Luke's Gospel. Russia is then healed, and "will sit at the feet of Jesus". Rahv argues that Dostoevsky was demonstrating the inevitability of the Russian Revolution; but it would seem that the conclusion to be drawn from this vision, and from his journalism already cited, is that he believed that the revolution would be defeated.\textsuperscript{118}

The philosophy behind \textit{The Devils} is made more explicit in \textit{The Brothers Karamazov}. Ivan Karamazov propounds the view that if, as he believes, there is no God and no immortality, then "everything is permitted".\textsuperscript{119} The
murder of Karamazov père by Smerdiakov, who had heard Ivan express this opinion, and Ivan's reaction, are central themes in the novel. Commentators on Dostoevsky have nevertheless had to face the problem of whether the author really believed in God. From his journalistic writings, the question would appear facile, but his novels provide room for doubt.

Shatov is the character in The Devils who most clearly represents Dostoevsky's Russian messianism. After Shatov's exposition of the idea that the Russian people is a "God-bearing people", Stavrogin asks him,

'Do you yourself believe in God or not?'

'I believe in Russia, I believe in her Orthodoxy... I believe in the body of Christ... I believe that the Second Coming will take place in Russia... I believe...' Shatov began to babble in a frenzy.

'But in God? In God?'

'I... I shall believe in God.'

It would be wrong to attribute automatically the views of a fictional character to the author. Berdiaev said, "Dostoevsky himself was not Shatov, but he was fond of him and... there are elements of Shatov in him." Berdiaev believes that Dostoevsky is showing the falsehood of people-worship, even though Dostoevsky's own deity "is often the Russian God". Mochulsky, on the other hand, describes Shatov as the "herald of [Dostoevsky's] religious-national credo", and points out that Shatov shared autobiographical and physical attributes with his creator. Carr calls Shatov a "self-portrait" or "self-
idealization" of Dostoevsky. 123

Ivan Karamazov's rejection of God, expressed in conversation with Alyosha, has been considered extremely powerful and has cast further doubt on the depths of Dostoevsky's own belief. 124 Pobedonostsev was greatly displeased by the passage. He wrote to Dostoevsky: "When the statue is not a success for the artist, or he is dissatisfied, all the metal goes back into the furnace." 125 Dostoevsky told Pobedonostsev that his section on Father Zosima ("The Russian Monk") was his answer to Ivan Karamazov, but, he worried, "Will it be a sufficient answer?" 126 Masaryk comments that Dostoevsky very much wants to believe in God, but has lost his faith and is a sceptic. This is not necessarily to accuse Dostoevsky of hypocrisy, as Carr suggests it is; the truth may be that Dostoevsky thought himself a believer in God, but was sufficiently insecure in his belief that he was able to produce a repudiation of faith that was stronger than its affirmation. Ernest J. Simmons is probably right to regard Ivan's argument as a "case of an author's artistic integrity triumphing over his personal belief, or perhaps it would be more correct to say, over what he wanted to believe." 127

What, then, did Dostoevsky really believe in? His "self-idealization", Shatov, is vehement in his belief in the Russian people. It is now the only 'God-bearing' people in the whole world, destined to renew and save the world in the name of a
new God, and to whom alone have been given the keys of life and of the new word... The purpose of the whole movement of a people... is solely the pursuit of God, its own God...

God is the synthetic personality of the whole people. A people begins to die when it shares its God with other peoples.

The people is the body of God. Every people is a people only as long as it has its own special God, and excludes all other gods in the world without any reconciliation; while it believes that by its own God it will conquer and drive from the world all the other gods... If a great people does not believe that in it alone there is truth (istina) (precisely in it alone and precisely exclusively), if it does not believe that it alone is able and called on to raise up and save all by its truth, then at once it ceases to be a great people and at once is converted into ethnographic material, and not into a great people. 128

The view that this was the creed of Dostoevsky himself is born out by its reiteration in The Diary of a Writer for January 1877, Dostoevsky wrote:

Every great people believes and must believe, if only it wishes to be alive for long, that the salvation of the world is in it, and only in it alone; that it lives in order to stand at the head of the peoples, to join them all to itself in unity, and to lead them in a harmonious choir to the final purpose, predestined for them all.

He went on to commend the "ideal of the Slavophils", which he interpreted as the universal unity of man, to be shown to the world by the Slavs headed by Russia. 129 Father Zosima, in more moderate vein, expressed Dostoevsky's faith in the Russian people. "The salvation of Rus' comes from the people... The people will meet the atheist and overcome him, and Rus' will be unified and Orthodox." 130 Belief in God, for Zosima as for Shatov, and probably for Dostoevsky as well, can be a consequence of belief in the Russian people.
Whoever does not believe in God (says Zosima) will also not believe in God's people. But whoever has come to believe in God's people, will also behold His sacredness, though he had not believed in it until then. 131

This position was taken up by Russian nationalist Orthodox Christians in the 1970s (see below, chapter 6).

Dostoevsky claimed that the Russian people were characterized by great humility and the ability and even desire to undergo suffering. This suffering gave them the ability to forgive themselves for their sins. The theme of redemption through suffering is particularly strong in The Brothers Karamazov. 132 The Russian people were not all saints, although some were; some were the worst scoundrels, but they always knew when they were doing wrong. Pushkin's Belkin, the peasant Marei who comforted Dostoevsky when he was a child, 133 and in particular Nekrasov's Vlas, the evil man who became holy, represented Dostoevsky's conception of the Russian people.

I am still of the opinion that they will say the last word - these very different 'Vlases', repenting and not repenting; they will show us the new way and the new solution to all our seemingly insoluble difficulties. It will not be Petersburg that will finally determine the Russian destiny. 134

Elsewhere Dostoevsky attacked the "haughty attitude" of St. Petersburg to Russia. 135 In this sense, there is some truth in the statement of the Soviet critic Iury I. Seleznyov: "Dostoevsky's patriotism was never 'official', but was based on a belief in the people's spiritual strength." 136 But his faith in the people was not absolute; if the people turned out to be different from his conception, or if it should reject European culture, then
he would renounce the people.\textsuperscript{137}

Dostoevsky firmly linked the destiny of Russia with Orthodoxy.

Isn't there in it [Orthodoxy] alone both the truth (pravda) and the salvation of the Russian people, and in future centuries of the whole of humanity? Isn't there preserved in Orthodoxy alone the divine image of Christ in all its purity? And, perhaps, the most important pre-ordained assignment of the Russian people in the destinies of all humanity consists in preserving in itself this divine form of Christ in all its purity, and when the time comes, revealing this form to the world which has lost its way!\textsuperscript{138}

Dostoevsky followed Khomiakov in emphasizing the Orthodox traditions of the Russian people, rather than the Orthodox Church structures,\textsuperscript{139} and in his praise of the obshchina for containing the seeds of a new future ideal.\textsuperscript{140}

Berdiaev thought that Dostoevsky's Russian messianism was incompatible with his view of the humility of the Russians.

[Dostoevsky] looked on the Russian people as the humblest on earth, but he was proud of this humility. And that, indeed, seems to be the pride of the Russians. Dostoevsky saw his people as the 'God-bearers', unique among their kind, and consciousness of this particularistic messianism is not compatible with humility; the feeling and mentality of the Jews of old were reborn in them.\textsuperscript{141}

There was no humility in Dostoevsky's attitude to the aspirations of the national minorities of the Russian Empire, or to the Slavs outside the Empire. "The master of the Russian land is solely the Russian alone (Great Russian, Ukrainian [maloruss], Belorussian - it's all the same)." As for the Tatars, "There is not a square inch of Tatar land" in Russia; they were "aliens" on the Russian
Dostoevsky insisted that Russia was motivated by the desire to serve, and not by the desire for glory or riches. "We will begin, now that the time has come, precisely by being servants to all, for the sake of universal pacification." The Slavs would be united, not in order to merge them with Russia, but to allow them to be regenerated. Dostoevsky realized that Europeans reading these lines would think he was interested only in annexation, but this was a misunderstanding. Russia's whole policy throughout the Petersburg period had been one of disinterestedness and service, not the pursuit of her own profit. The Russian people were fully aware of the mission of Russia and the Tsar among the Slavs.

When Russia finally declared war, the Diary for April 1877 declared that "the people themselves, headed by the Tsar", had risen for the war, a "people's war" (narodnaia voina). Dostoevsky emphasized "the union of the Tsar with his people". The war, Dostoevsky now asserted, following Ivan Aksakov's idea, was not only for the benefit of the Slavs: "We are rising also for our own salvation." For Dostoevsky, this was a period of eschatological expectation, the awakening of the Messiah Russia. "Everyone feels that something final has begun ... a step
is being taken towards something altogether new, which splits the past into two, regenerating and resurrecting it for a new life ... and this step is being taken by Russia!" Russia needed war. In a section entitled "Does spilt blood save?" Dostoevsky wrote: "Peace, a long peace, rather than war, bestializes and hardens man." Contrasting the "disinterested" war being fought by Russia with a war fought for markets and stock-exchange interests, he concluded: "If not we, our children will see how England will end." 146

In "The Confessions of a Slavophil" in the Diary for July-August 1877, Dostoevsky again claims that the word from suffering Russia will bring a "new, brotherly, universal union of all humanity". 147 In November, it is affirmed that the new word from the East is in opposition to the approaching socialism; and again we are told that this requires Russia's seizure of Constantinople. 148 What is claimed to be service turns into great-power chauvinism and imperialism; like Khomiakov, but to a greater degree and with less criticism of his fatherland, Dostoevsky showed how easy was the transition from universalist messianism to nationalist messianism. He was aware that this transition could be made; the public prosecutor at the trial of Dmitry Karamazov speaks of how the desire to return to the beliefs of the people often degenerates into "narrow chauvinism". 149 Zernov is one of the commentators who says that Dostoevsky was not a nationalist, since he ascribed the gifts of the Russian people to "their personal
meeting with Christ". Anton Florovsky takes Dostoevsky's position seriously, considering the Russian entry into the war to be disinterested and seeing only spiritual reasons for the seizure of Constantinople. Other critics have been less kind: Zenkovsky, Mochulsky and Masaryk see Dostoevsky as idealizing Russia and falling into narrow nationalism, while Ronald Hingley accuses him of asserting peaceful intentions to conceal his aggressive appetite. Dostoevsky's chauvinism is shown even more clearly in his attitude to the Jews. The extent of Dostoevsky's anti-Semitism has been concealed in the USSR in the past by the practice of omitting some of the hostile references to the Jews from Soviet editions of his works. Russian émigrés have also sought to present Dostoevsky as free of national animosities. Zernov claimed: "A belief in the special mission of one's own nation is often accompanied by intolerance and a dislike of other people. Dostoevsky was free from these psychological dangers." Joseph Frank has argued that Dostoevsky's anti-Semitism should be seen in the context of his general xenophobia; "he was probably more fiercely anti-Polish than anti-Semitic". Frank is right to see conflicts and tensions in Dostoevsky's views; one can cite Vremia's defence of the Jews in 1862 (see above, pp. 169-70), the fact that not all Jewish characters in his novels are monsters, and his statements in the *Diary* on legal equality. It remains the case, as Goldstein shows, that Dostoevsky saw the Jews as playing a special role in the world. This is clear not merely from remarks by his characters, or from comments in letters.
(such comments were also made by Marx and Engels) but from his political journalism.

In 1873, Dostoevsky refers to "the decline of morality, cheapness, Yid-innkeepers, robbery".\footnote{156} He fears that the growth of alcoholism (encouraged by these Jewish innkeepers) will mean that supposedly Russia will fall into the hands of the "kulaks and Yids", and then "the Yids will drink the blood of the people."\footnote{157} In the Diary for June 1876, he writes:

Now the Yids are becoming landowners, and everywhere people shout and write that they are exhausting the soil of Russia, that the Yid, having invested capital to buy an estate, at once, in order to recoup his capital plus interest, drains dry all the forces and resources of the land he has bought. But try to say something against this and people will at once protest to you about the violation of the principle of economic freedom and civil equality.

But the Jews in reality were privileged, according to Dostoevsky; they were able to buy up public opinion through their influence in the Press, and they enjoyed the advantages of being allowed a "State within a State".\footnote{158} Here he seems to have accepted the anti-Semitic fabrications of Iakov Brafman.\footnote{159}

Not only in Russia but in the West as well he claimed to see Jewish finance capital pulling the strings of foreign policy and conspiring against Russia. The Rothschild family and the British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli were particular targets. "And surely the truth is that the Yid has again begun to rule everywhere, and has not only "begun to rule", but never even stopped
The Diary for March 1877 contains a chapter called "The Jewish Question". Here Dostoevsky responded to contemporary accusations that he was anti-Semitic. He denied that he had any hatred towards the Jews. He defended his use of the term "Yid" (zhid), on the grounds that he did not think it was abusive (although by that time the term "Jew" (евреi) was normally used and "Yid" was considered offensive). He also stated that he used it to refer to a particular "idea", by which he meant the rule of the kulaks and bankers. It might be added that Dostoevsky's "Yiddish idea" is very similar to Marx's use of Judentum in his "On the Jewish Question". Judentum was frequently used at the time (1843) to mean not only Judaism but also commerce. Thus Marx wrote: "Money is the jealous god of Israel, beside which no other god may exist... The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judentum." But Goldstein sees Dostoevsky's identification of a nationality with capitalist and kulak exploitation as "an irrevocable verdict against the Jews".

Dostoevsky's chapter goes on to claim that the Jews in Russia exaggerate their suffering; the Russian peasant is as oppressed as the Jew. Further, the dislike of the Russian for the Jew, where it exists, arises not at all from the fact that he is a Jew, not from any sort of racial or religious hatred, but it arises from other reasons where the guilt lies not with the native people but with the Jew himself.
This is what anyone in the Russian borderlands would say about the Jews: "'They have been moved for so many centuries only by pitilessness towards us and only by the thirst for our sweat and blood.'" 165

The Jews were more prejudiced against Russians than the Russians were against Jews. The Jews looked forward to world domination; this required them to maintain their own close-knit identity. If they were given equal legal rights, but allowed to keep their "State within a State", they would be more privileged than the Russians. The consequences of this situation were already clear in Europe.

Thus it is not for nothing that everywhere there the Jews are reigning (tsariat) over the stock exchanges, not for nothing that they control capital, not for nothing that they are masters of credit, and not for nothing, I repeat, that they are the masters of all international politics, and what will be in the future is known also to the Jews themselves: their reign is approaching, their complete reign! 166

Dostoevsky nevertheless declared himself in favour of "full and final equalization of rights", but then hedged this with the qualification "insofar as the Jewish people themselves will show their ability to accept and exercise these rights without detriment to the native population." 167

In his letters and notebooks, Dostoevsky claimed to see the Jews behind the socialist movement, in both Europe and Russia.

The Yid and his bank are now reigning over everything: over Europe, education, civilization, socialism - especially socialism, for he will use it to uproot Christianity and destroy its civilization. And when
nothing but anarchy remains, the Yid will be in command of everything. For while he goes about preaching socialism, he will stick together with his own, and after all the riches of Europe will have been wasted, the Yid's bank will still be there. The Antichrist will come and stand over the anarchy. 168

Goldstein shows that Jewish participation in the Russian revolutionary movement at that time was in fact very low. 169 (It must be conceded, however, that a significant number of leaders of the revolutionary movement after Dostoevsky's death were of Jewish origin.)

The émigré scholar D.V. Grishin claimed that Dostoevsky did not hate the Jews but "hated capitalism, and personified capitalism as the Jewish entrepreneurs and bankers." He points out that some members of the narodnik movements of the early 1880s shared Dostoevsky's anti-Jewish "prejudices", and even sympathized with the pogroms. 170 R. Pletnev, on the other hand, considers Dostoevsky a "blatant anti-Semite", and Goldstein refers to his writings on the Jews as a "sea of lies". Hingley draws a parallel with Mein_Kampf. 171

Goldstein argues that Dostoevsky's "blind hatred" of the Jews "was the inevitable result of his Great Russian Messianism." The Jewish claim to be the "chosen people" was not compatible with his claims for the Russian people. 172

Robert Alter goes a little further, concluding that Dostoevsky considered the Jews the "dark legions of the antichrist, not ready to redeem mankind with their blood but vampirically sucking the blood from mankind ..." 173 It seems probable that Dostoevsky's anti-Semitism was brought
about not only by his belief that the Jews were exploiting the Russians or by his anti-capitalist orientation. In the Diary he suggests that the Jews are told by their religion that they will come to rule the world; and this would seem to be the driving force of his anti-Semitism. The anti-Semitism of both Dostoeovsky and Ivan Aksakov was based on religion, and linked with their hopes for Russia; this anti-Semitism was held simultaneously with anti-capitalist feeling in Dostoevsky and pro-capitalist feeling in Aksakov.

Dostoevsky's opinion of the Jews did not rob him of the acclaim from both Westernizers and Slavophils that greeted his "Pushkin speech" of June 1880. Pushkin's "transformation of his own spirit into the spirit of other peoples" reflected the ability of the Russian people, benefiting from Peter's turn to the West, to accept the cultures of other nations "without racial discrimination", and to enter "the all-embracing pan-human reunification with all the races of the great Aryan family". (This presumably excluded the Jews.) Dostoevsky went on to make what is probably the classic statement of Russian universalist messianism, which deserves to be quoted at length.

Yes, the Russian's destiny is incontestably pan-European and universal. To become a true Russian, to become completely Russian, perhaps means only (in the last analysis, underline this) to become a brother to all people, a universal person, if you like. Oh, all this Slavophilism and Westernism of ours is a great misunderstanding with us, although historically inevitable. For a true Russian, Europe and the fate of the whole great Aryan race are as dear as even Russia herself, as her native land, because her fate is universality, acquired not by the sword but by the
force of brotherhood and our brotherly striving for the reunification of people... Oh, the peoples of Europe have no idea how dear they are to us! And later, I believe that we, that is of course not we but the future Russians, will understand to a person that to become a true Russian will mean precisely this: to strive finally to bring reconciliation to the European contradictions, to show the way out of European despair in our own Russian soul, pan-human and all-uniting, to embrace in it with brotherly love all our brothers, and finally, perhaps, to utter the final word of great, general harmony, of the final brotherly accord of all races according to Christ's Gospel law. 176

As several commentators have noted, this is a considerably more moderate statement of messianism than those of Shatov or the Diary of 1876 and 1877. Dostoevsky is talking not about the "God-bearing people" or the seizure of Constantinople, but about Russia's role in the reconciliation of the peoples. R. Lord suggests that this reflects the influence of Vladimir Solovyov, who also influenced the content of The Brothers Karamazov, which he was then completing. 177 When Dostoevsky's speech was delivered in Moscow, it was received with rapture, since by combining the themes of the uniqueness of Russia and love for Europe, it appeared to offer something to both Westernizers and Slavophils. The Westernizer Turgenev embraced him, and the Slavophil Ivan Aksakov declared the speech a "historic event". Some of the enthusiasm proved to be ephemeral, with Turgenev and Koshelyov both attacking the idea of universalism, while Aksakov accepted it completely. In content if not in rhetoric, the speech differed little from the pochvennichestvo of the early 1860s; Dostoevsky did not mention the Church, even though this played a central role in The Brothers Karamazov. 178 It might be appropriate to make the connection between the
novel's idea of the mutual responsibility of people for each other's sins and Dostoevsky's view of Russia's responsibilities in Europe and the rest of the world.

The religious theme is re-emphasized in the last issue of the Diary, for January 1881. Here Dostoevsky advocates "our Russian socialism": not a programme to raise the living standards of the masses, but the aspiration to create a universal, ecumenical Church on earth. This, he claims, is the "thirst" in the Russian people. "Not in communism, not in mechanical forms is the socialism of the Russian people expressed." He re-affirms the faith of the Russian people in the Tsar. 179

In the final section of the issue, however, Dostoevsky proposed a new orientation for Russia. Prompted by General Mikhail D. Skobelev's massacre of the Turkmen at Geok-Tepe, Dostoevsky called for the expansion of Russian power in Asia. "...the Russian is not only a European but also an Asian. Moreover, in Asia, perhaps, our hopes are still larger than in Europe. In our future destinies, perhaps Asia is our main end!" 180 It would appear that the conquest of Asia had replaced the liberation of the Slavs as the means of Russia's spiritual regeneration. "In Europe we were Tatars, but in Asia even we are Europeans. The mission (missiia), our civilizing mission in Asia will bribe our spirit and attract us there, as soon as the movement begins." 181 In spite of the use of the phrase "civilizing mission", it is clear that Dostoevsky is
talking of conquest and not universal "brotherly love".\textsuperscript{182} After the Crimean War defeat, Foreign Secretary Gorchakov had proposed the same turn from Europe to Asia as Dostoevsky was now proposing.\textsuperscript{183} (It is interesting to note that Engels also favoured a "civilizing mission" for Russia in Asia. He wrote in 1851: "Russia on the other hand is really progressive in relation to the East. For all its baseness and Slavonic dirt, Russian domination is civilizing on the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia and among the Bashkirs and Tatars." In 1888 Engels predicted that, after the overthrow of tsarism, "the noble nation of the Great Russians ... will accomplish its genuine civilizing mission in Asia."\textsuperscript{184})

Thus at the end of his life, in the last issue of the Diary, Dostoevsky managed to combine the call for a brotherly universal church with the call for the expansion of the tsarist Russian State, to the benefit (or at the expense) of Asia. This highlights the essentially contradictory nature of his thought, the one constant theme of which (at least from 1860) was his belief in the unique characteristics and role of the Russian people.
Alexander III and Nicholas II: Russification and the pogroms

In 1881 some terrorists of the Narodnaia volia organization succeeded in assassinating Tsar Alexander II. His son, Alexander III, inaccurately described as the "Slavophile" Tsar, came to the throne with the aim of crushing the revolutionary movement and clamping down on the expression of dissident opinion in the spheres of culture, religion and politics. In this his principal advisor was Pobedonostsev, his former tutor. Pobedonostsev stressed to Alexander III and later to Nicholas II the importance of strengthening the autocratic principle and making no concessions to pressures for liberal reform. He advocated a form of Great-Russian chauvinism, which sought support from the Great Russians of the Orthodox faith by emphasizing the allegedly Orthodox character of the State and promoting the Russification of national minorities. He further hoped that the spread of the Russian language and Orthodoxy would crush minority nationalism. Apart from his claim that the Russian people were imbued with Orthodoxy, his policy had little to do with Slavophilism or any form of Russian messianism. Pobedonostsev wrote nothing on the "Third Rome" or Russia's "sacred mission". Rather than encouraging the blossoming of Russian culture, the free exchange of ideas, or the projection of Orthodox Russia as a model to transform the world, the last Tsars devoted their attention to preserving their own power. It was a replay of "Orthodoxy, Autocracy and narodnost'", now even less compatible with Russia's needs than under Nicholas I.
Pobedonostsev was hostile on principle to all non-Orthodox religious groups. He considered them "enemies of the state, because the laws of the Orthodox Church are the laws of the state".\textsuperscript{187} It was in the religious field that he was prepared to make compromises on language policy. He supported the efforts of Nikolai Ilminsky to promote Orthodox propaganda in the languages of the Muslim peoples. Ilminsky argued that if the government insisted on the use of Russian in schools and churches, the non-Russians in Muslim areas would be thoroughly Islamicized and absorbed by the Tatars. If alternatively the Church used the local languages, and the Muslims became Orthodox, they would ultimately fuse with the Russians.\textsuperscript{188}

Nationalist movements among the non-Russians came to the surface in the 1905 Revolution and made some gains for the minorities. The government issued an Edict of religious tolerance on 17 April 1905. The Imperial Academy of Sciences declared Ukrainian to be a language separate from Russian, and permission was given for the establishment of a Ukrainian cultural society, Prosvita. The victory of reaction led to Pobedonostsev's promotion of Russian nationalism and anti-Semitism in an attempt to rely on the patriotism of the Russian population of the Empire. All the branches of Prosvita were closed down by 1910. Hugh Seton-Watson states that while popular Russian nationalism was strongest in the Western borderlands, where the Jews were concentrated and Ukrainian nationalism was strong, it was winning support elsewhere.\textsuperscript{189}
In 1881, after the assassination of Alexander II, sections of the aristocracy and police stirred up the masses against the Jews. A series of pogroms occurred in the Ukraine and Southern Russia, usually with the acquiescence of the local authorities. The government of Alexander III tightened the regulations on the residence, economic activity and educational opportunities of the Jews. Pobedonostsev's anti-Semitism cannot be doubted, whether or not he made the remark that one third of Russia's Jews should emigrate, one third convert to Christianity and one third should die. 190

Under Nicholas II, the legal position of the Jews deteriorated further, and police repression increased. From 1903, stories were published about a supposed Jewish plot to take over the world, and in 1905 the government itself printed one of these. Another version described a conspiracy between the Jews (Zionist and Marxist), Russian Masons and the British Foreign Office to enslave Russia. The so-called Protocols_of_the_Elders_of_Zion, allegedly describing a Jewish plan for world domination, may have grown out of these fabrications. Encouraged by large-scale anti-Jewish propaganda, a pogrom took place against the Jews of Kishinyov in 1903. This was followed by a series of pogroms in major centres during the Revolution of 1905. A key role in the latter was played by the "Union of the Russian People" or "Black Hundreds". Nicholas showed his support for the pogroms by taking membership in this organization. Some Orthodox clergy also joined the Black
Hundreds and encouraged the pogroms. In its last years, the government revived medieval charges that the Jews were carrying out the ritual murder of Christian children. Significantly, these accusations did not find an echo among the common people; a jury of peasants in Kiev acquitted Mendel Beilis, a victim of the "blood accusation", in 1913.191

Turning to the foreign policy of the last two Tsars, one might expect the sympathy shown by Alexander III to Russian nationalism to be reflected in support for the Balkan Slavs. In fact, whatever Alexander's personal preferences, his reign began with the renewal of the "three emperors' league", an alliance of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary which recalled the "Holy Alliance" of the early nineteenth century. This militated against support for Slav liberation. Ivan Aksakov, Skobelev and Ignatev all attacked Russian policy for failing to support the Bosnian revolt against Austria of 1882. In 1885, the Russian government opposed Bulgaria's seizure of Eastern Rumelia from Turkey. On this occasion, Ivan Aksakov was the only journalist to maintain the pan-Slavist position and support Bulgaria, while the rest of the Russian nationalist Press supported the tsarist viewpoint. From then on, the view that Russia had a mission to liberate and unite the Slavs ceased to have any political importance. The focus of the government was on expansion into Asia, as had been advocated by Dostoevsky, Danilevsky and Vladimir Solovyov. In the early years of the twentieth century,
liberal Russians such as Prince Evgeny N. Trubetskoi established societies for the study of Slav culture. This was associated with the "neo-Slavist" movement, which was based mainly in Austria and sought to increase the political role of the Slavs in the Hapsburg Empire. Conferences were held in 1908 in Prague (the best attended of all the international Slav meetings), 1909 in St. Petersburg and 1910 in Sofia. These had no practical results, and the 1913 war between Bulgaria and Serbia dramatically showed the limits of Slav solidarity. The changing pattern of Russia's international alliances under the last Tsars is largely outside the scope of this discussion. It is only relevant to point out that the reasons for Russia standing by Serbia against Austria in July 1914 had little to do with pan-Slav feeling. If Russia had deserted Serbia in 1914, it would have been the third time in five years that she had done so, and she would have lost any influence in the Balkans. It would have been a damaging blow to her prestige and might have encouraged Britain and France to question her reliability as an ally. Nicholas II in 1914 said nothing about liberating the Austrian Slavs; Russia instead pursued the more prosaic war aims of gaining Constantinople (admittedly an old ambition of Russian messianists) and control of the Straits.192

Leontev

Any discussion of the evolution of Slavophilism must mention the thought of Konstantin N. Leontev (1831-1891). As noted above (p. 73), Aleksandr Ianov described Leontev
as the "direct-heir" of classical Slavophilism. In the
1969 discussion in *Voprosy literatury*, S. I. Mashinsky
claimed that Leontev (and Danilevsky) were the "historical
successors and continuators of Khomiakov and Koshelyov".193
But in his distrust of the Russian people, hostility to
freedom and belief in authoritarian autocracy, Leontev was
an apologist for Pobedonostsev. "Wherever the lawful and
sacred right of coercion over our will has grown weak ... there can be no vital strength, no duration, no stable or
lasting order."194 The confusion over whether Leontev can
properly be considered a Slavophil derives partly from his
own claim to be a Slavophil, in the cultural sense, and
moreover one "closer to the aims of Khomiakov and
Danilevsky than the semi-liberal Slavophils of the immobile
Aksakov type".195 Leontev certainly emphasized the moral
strength of Orthodoxy and the decline of the West. The
Slavophils of his time, however, rejected his claim to be
one of them, considering him a reactionary. Ivan Aksakov
held that Leontev was preaching the "lascivious cult of the
truncheon". Vladimir Solovyov concurred that Leontev had
never been a Slavophil.196

Miliukov considered Leontev's views a product of the
dissolution of Slavophilism. Leontev's writings make clear
that in politics his "Slavophilism" was derived from
Danilevsky, and he rejected classical Slavophilism as a
disguise for egalitarianism and liberalism. Leontev
believed that these two diseases were destroying Europe and
threatening Russia. Against them, Leontev wanted to
strengthen the spiritual discipline which he believed Russia had inherited from Byzantium, and the despotic Asiatic elements he admired in Russia. He had no time for the nationalism of the Slavs, seeing their national aspirations as part of a cosmopolitan revolution and harmful to the old order, which he wished to freeze. Instead, his book *Byzantium_and_Slavdom* (1875) predicted that the Danilevskian "cultural type" which Russia would create would be "neo-Byzantine" rather than Slavonic. His opposition to nationalism included opposition to Russian nationalism; he opposed the Russification of the Baltic and Poland, and defended the privileges of the German and Polish nobles. He considered that the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires should continue ruling the Slavs until Russia was ready to take them over.197

Leontev believed that in the long run, Russia had a global mission, deriving from her possession of the moral force of Byzantine Orthodoxy. She would have to save Europe from herself, by "uniting the Chinese state model with Indian religiousness, and subordinating European socialism to them."198 Whether this position can be considered a form of Russian messianism is dubious. His deep pessimism, authoritarianism and belief in social privilege place him in opposition to those messianists who saw freedom as one of the gifts which Russia would bring to the world. By the end of his life, Leontev came to the conclusion that some form of socialism was inevitable; he looked forward to this being organized, in opposition to atheist socialism, by a Russian Tsar, a socialist
Constantine. Only this Byzantine "powerful monarchical government" would be able to settle the "apparently insoluble modern task of reconciling capital and labour".199

**Ivan Aksakov's last years**

From 1879, as the revolutionary movement grew stronger, Ivan Aksakov continued to regard it with hostility, and also to reject the activity of Russian liberals who wanted a constitution. This latter position led Koshelyov to break with Aksakov, accusing him of betraying Slavophilism. At the same time, however, Aksakov advocated freedom of conscience, opinion and speech, seeing them all as conservative freedoms. From 1880 to his death in 1886 he was allowed to edit a weekly newspaper, Rus' (biweekly 1883-1884), which like his previous ventures was funded by the Moscow merchants. Its collaborators included Strakhov; its circulation was low. His "Russian political ideal" he described at this time as "the locally self-managing land headed by the autocratic Tsar".200 Aksakov was horrified by the assassination of Alexander II and he denounced the terrorist movement. He did not become a simple apostle of reaction, however, but renewed the Slavophil call for a "return" to the alleged pre-Petrine alliance between the autocracy and the people.201

In 1881 Alexander III appointed Ignatev, the pan-Slavist, to be Minister of Internal Affairs. Aksakov persuaded him to propose to the Tsar the Slavophil plan for
the summoning of a Zemskii_Sobor. To Pobedonostsev, this smacked of a constitution; and the Oberprocurator had Ignatev resign. "Pobedonostsev and Katkov will ruin Russia," wrote Aksakov in a letter at this time. Aksakov found that his emphasis on autocracy alienated the liberals and his insistence on human rights alienated the government and the conservatives. A collection of his leading articles from Rus' which he wanted to publish was banned. Leontev commented with some justice that Aksakov's autocrat, heading "the locally self-managing land", would be deprived of any means of power. It seems, then, that it is misleading for Ianov to cite the following statement by Aksakov, suggesting that he had completely deserted to reaction:

> the situation now is such that there can be no middle ground. It is either the nihilists and liberals or the conservatives. One has no choice but to go with the latter, however sad that may be. It is true that, in his very last years, Aksakov began to defend the division of society into estates. It would be more accurate, however, to see this not as the logical evolution of his ideas, but as a senile deviation from them; rather as Plekhanov, at the end of his life, discovered that he hated the German Marxists more than he hated the Romanovs. Aksakov's Rus' continued, however anachronistically, to attack the government, especially over foreign policy. At this time the only type of political dissent that could be published was of the Russian nationalist variety; but by December 1885, even Aksakov's criticism was too much for the government, and his weekly faced the threat of a ban. The following month,
on the day before he died, Aksakov wrote that falsehood and feelings of hopelessness were oppressing society: "How difficult it is to live in Russia!"204

Fyodorov

I turn now to two thinkers who developed their own philosophies of Russian messianism in the late nineteenth century and who were highly influential in later Russian thought. Both Nikolai F. Fyodorov (1828–1903) and Vladimir Solovyov believed that Russia, headed by the Tsar, had been chosen to bring about world unity. Fyodorov, a librarian at the Rumiantsev Museum in Moscow, published little in his lifetime, but after his death his disciples released in a small edition his magnum opus, Filosofiiia_obshchego_dela (The Philosophy of the Common Task).205 In this work, written mainly in the 1890s, he strongly supported Orthodoxy and autocracy, seeing them as unifying influences. He attacked capitalism for its division of humanity into rich and poor, learned and ignorant, and town and country, and for its militarism. He criticized Britain, in particular, for reducing the rest of the world to the status of unskilled workers.206 He opposed socialism also, not only, like Dostoevsky, for its association with atheism, but because the socialist movement aggravated the division of humanity by fostering the hatred of the poor for the rich. He bemoaned the advance of socialism. "Socialism is triumphing over the State, religion and science ... socialism is deceit."207

Like Marx, Fyodorov was a philosopher of action. He
was dissatisfied with the world as it was; the Russian famine of 1891 had a particular impact on him. He believed in the unlimited possibility of human progress, and sought to hasten this. Humanity could be united in the "common task": the regulation of nature, particularly the weather, and the conquest of space. The ultimate aim was to bring about, by human scientific advance, the resurrection of the dead. "The duty of resurrection, the duty to the fathers, the filial duty, as one can call it, appeared in the world together with man." It fell to Russia to organize this unity, because of her Orthodoxy and autocracy, and because of the existence of the obshchina, which he idealized. Additionally, Russia's geographical position, between Europe and Asia and near Africa, and the Russian tradition of "the gathering of the lands" would facilitate Russia's task. The Russian State was also favoured with a tradition of service and self-sacrifice, especially in relation to Western Europe. It is not relevant to explain Fyodorov's imaginative plan to convert the British Empire to Orthodoxy and autocracy, the first step towards unity. Thereafter, he suggested that a joint Russo-British expedition be sent to the Pamir Mountains to discover the remains of the earliest humans, the ancestors of humanity. The remains would then be transferred to the Moscow Kremlin. This would symbolize the role of Moscow as the "Third Rome" (and disavow the Petersburg tradition). Another symbol would be the perennial dream of Russian messianists, the capture of Constantinople. World unity should be achieved, if at all possible, by persuasion; but
if this proved impossible, Russia would have to use armed force. Unity would be political, linguistic and religious; the basis of society would be the *obschina.*

Despite some similarities, Fyodorov had differences with the Slavophils. Lukashevich reports that Fyodorov denounced Slavophilism as an "ideology of unfraternity". There is certainly a major difference in that the Slavophils, or at least the early Slavophils, looked back, while he looked forward. What Fyodorov particularly objected to was any tendency towards racial chauvinism, as in the work of Danilevsky. Thus he spoke of "Russia's difficult mission in the common task, different from the problems of other peoples"; but also insisted that "the Slav race has definitely no right to claim an exclusive position."

In 1878 Dostoevsky and Solovyov read some of Fyodorov's work together, and Dostoevsky found himself agreeing with many of Fyodorov's ideas. Solovyov was still more impressed. He wrote to Fyodorov: "I accept your 'project' unconditionally and without any discussion." He made the acquaintance of Fyodorov, whose influence is reflected in some of his writings up to the early 1890s. Fyodorov claimed that Solovyov accepted his belief in the need to bring about the resurrection of the fathers, but was unwilling to say so publicly for fear of ridicule. The two broke off relations around 1892.

Fyodorov's influence on later Russian literature was considerable. Nikolai Kliuev, Sergei Esenin, Boris Pasternak and Andrei Platonov are among the writers who
reflect Fyodorovian ideas. The extreme utopianism of Fyodorov's aims led Berdiaev to comment, "I do not know a more characteristically Russian thinker." Peter Wiles, writing in 1965, placed Fyodorov's writings in a Russian and Soviet tradition of concern with immortality. In the Soviet period, Fyodorov's belief in the limitless powers of humanity has been purged of its association with Orthodoxy and autocracy, and linked with atheism and the belief in the future united Communist world. Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, whose ideas laid the basis for the Soviet space programme, knew Fyodorov personally. According to Nina Tumarkin's hypothesis, the intention behind the embalming of Lenin after his death was of resurrecting his body at some time in the future. An article in Izvestiia to mark Fyodorov's centenary in 1928 reported that Mikhail Kalinin, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party and President of the All-Union Central Executive Committee of the Congress of Soviets, had recently quoted Fyodorov's words and applied them to the task of building socialism. "Freedom without power over nature is the same as the emancipation of the peasants without land."

Since the mid-1970s, there has been an upsurge of interest in the Soviet Union in the ideas of Fyodorov. This was initiated by an article on him published in 1976 by Svetlana G. Semyonova, who has done more than anyone to familiarize Soviet readers with his name. In 1981 the cosmonaut Vitaly V. Sevastianov, writing in Nash
sovremennik, described Fyodorov as the "ingenious teacher of goodness and humanism and designer of the cosmic future of humanity". In 1982 Mysl', the publishing house of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, published a 50,000-copy edition of Fyodorov's works, including much of Filosofiiia_obshchego_dela, under Semyonova's editorship. This edition came under strong criticism. For example, S. R. Mikulinsky accused Semyonova of playing down the reactionary aspects of Fyodorov's thought, in particular his support for autocracy. Jean-Claude Roberti attributes the publication of the volume to an identity crisis in the USSR which has led intellectuals and youth to seek stable values in their past, in the traditions of messianism and the Third Rome. It would seem, though, that the attempt to link the resurrection of the dead with the building of Communism is likely to encounter opposition from more traditional Marxists.

Vladimir_Solovyov

Vladimir Sergeevich Solovyov (1853-1900) has long been recognized as one of the major Russian Christian philosophers. Discussions of his ideas divide his life up into three periods. In his younger years he was close to the Slavophils. Then he moved away from them, denouncing their Russian nationalism, and also leaning from Orthodoxy towards Catholicism. In this second period he developed his "theocratic utopia", the idea of the unity of humanity through the unity of Christianity, under the spiritual leadership of the Pope and the political leadership of the Russian Tsar. The role of Russia in this unity represented
a new development in Russian messianism. Towards the end of his life he realized the impracticality of his plans, and became concerned in this last period with what he saw as the threat to Christian civilization from the East.

In 1874, when still only 21, Solovyov wrote *Krizis zapadnoi filosofii* (The Crisis of Western Philosophy). Here he defended the Slavophils for attacking the Western separation of reason and faith. But at the same time he criticized the Slavophils for not appreciating the positive aspects of Western thought. It appears that in this he identified Slavophilism with Samarin and Ivan Aksakov, discounting the willingness of Khomiakov and Ivan Kireevsky to learn from the West. His view of Russia's role was developed not in relation to Catholicism and Protestantism, as in the Slavophils, but in relation to the West and the Muslim East. His major article of 1877, "Three Forces", marked his closest approach to Slavophilism. It spoke of the Orthodox Slav, and especially Russian, mission to reconcile the Muslim East, with its despotic unity and acceptance of an "inhuman God", and the West, which aspired to individual egoism and its product, economic socialism, with its "Godless human". The mission involved humanizing God and turning people towards God; the Russians had to mediate between the divine world and humanity, through divine revelation, and were suited to this task by their religiosity and lack of exclusiveness. Like Ivan Aksakov and Dostoevsky, he believed that the war against Turkey would raise the Russian people to their mission. For
Solovyov, the Russian conquest of Constantinople was linked directly not only with the reconciliation of East and West, but with reconciliation between God and humanity. Dmitry Strémoukhov has commented: "in essence, it is only with Soloviev that Slavophilism becomes true messianism." 231 I have argued earlier that Slavophilism was a form of messianism; what Solovyov did in his Slavophil period was to deepen this messianism, portray the Russian people as mediators between God and humanity, and stress the universalist (Russia as servant) rather than the nationalist aspect of messianism. This trend was taken further in his "Lectures on God-humanity" (Bogochelovechestvo, also translated as "Divino-humanity", "God-manhood"; 1877-1881). Here, Western and Eastern Christianity are "absolutely necessary for each other and for the spread of Christ's teaching throughout all humanity". 232 In these lectures he claimed that humanity could become divine through collective unity.

On Dostoevsky's death in 1881, Solovyov portrayed himself as a follower of the writer's ideas. Since Dostoevsky's ideas were contradictory, Solovyov singled out those ideas which were congenial to him and ignored the others. Thus he emphasized Dostoevsky's religiosity and ignored the nationalism. He pointed out that a passage in *The Devils* ridiculed those who worshipped the narod and adhered to Orthodoxy only because it was the religion of the narod. He claimed that Dostoevsky's social ideal was not the people but the Church, which he planned to portray in the series of novels beginning with *The Brothers*.
Karamazov. "A person must bow before the people's faith, not because it is the people's faith but because it is genuine." Further, the faith was not the privilege of a single nation but could only be universal. In 1882 Solovyov said of Dostoevsky:

he considered Russia the chosen people of God, chosen not to rival with other peoples nor to dominate nor have primacy over them, but to serve all peoples without reward and to realize, in fraternal concourse, true universalism and ecumenism.

But already in 1881, this desire for universalism was taking Solovyov away from Slavophilism towards Catholicism. The desire to reconcile the Christian churches became linked with the belief, which had attracted Chaadaev fifty years before, that Catholicism was superior to Orthodoxy. His articles entitled "The Great Dispute and Christian Policy" expressed not only the need for Church unity but also admiration for Catholic discipline. They were published from 1881 to 1883 in Ivan Aksakov's Rus', but Aksakov found it necessary to censor some of them, and attacked Solovyov for separating himself from the Russian spirit. Zenkovsky notes that Solovyov's "Catholic sympathies ... and his Utopian plans completely isolated him from Russian society." In fact Solovyov found a home for his ideas in the liberal Vestnik Evropy, which, although disagreeing with him philosophically, found congenial his opposition to Pobedonostsev and Katkov (who by then had moved to the right). Solovyov had lost his philosophy lectureship at the
University of St. Petersburg in 1881, when he had appealed to Alexander III to pardon the assassins of his father. Moreover, Pobedonostsev considered Solovyov's ideas of a divine humanity subversive, and banned the publication of some of his theocratic work. Solovyov, in response, attacked the official Russian Church for having become a tool of the State. The Russian people, nevertheless, were in his view essentially, and even specially, religious. They were a "theocratic people" and had a mission. This was not the idea of the "Third Rome", since for Solovyov the first Rome had not fallen. The Catholicization of Russia would overcome what Solovyov saw as the religious root cause of the divisions in Slavdom, both outside Russia, and, in the case of Poland, within the Empire.

Although Solovyov never became a Catholic, in the late 1880s he was willing to accept Papal supremacy. He attributed to the Russian Tsar a divine role in the reunification of Christianity on the basis of Catholicism. In La Russie et l'Église universelle (1889), published in France, Solovyov wrote: "the historical task of Russia consists in supplying the church universal with political might, which is necessary to it in order to save and regenerate Europe." Russia's contribution to Christianity, then, was primarily her coercive power. The Tsar was to obey the wishes of the Pope, thereby creating the conditions for a universal theocracy and the regeneration of Christianity. Russia, said Solovyov, would "be free to fulfil its great universal vocation, to unite around itself the Slavic nations and found a new truly Christian civilization." In this pan-Slavism (which
Solovyov himself referred to as "Slavophilism") he acknowledged the influence of the Croat Krizanić (see above, pp. 37, 59).

I shall now turn to Solovyov's attitude towards traditional Slavophilism after his break with it. In 1884 he warned that the awakening of national (natsional'nye) feelings which had occurred in the nineteenth century would be a "renunciation of universal Christianity and a return to pagan and Old Testament particularism" if these feelings were limited to "national egoism". The "principle of nationalities (natsional'nostei)" (the right to self-determination) could be a "demand for international justice through which all narodnosti have an equal right to independent existence and development"; but the narodnost' must not be deified. As examples of Russian universalism, Solovyov cited the appeal to the Varangians to come and rule ancient Rus', and Peter's reforms, ending Muscovite exclusivism. Both had enriched Russian State power and culture with the fruits of other civilizations. Thus Solovyov was again close to Chaadaev in opposing the position of Slavophils who regarded Peter as disrupting national development. Solovyov argued that true patriotism used foreign strengths; religious life, therefore, should be open to free communication with the Western Churches. Also in 1884, Ivan Aksakov attacked Solovyov in Rus' for sacrificing Russian national feelings and interests. Solovyov replied that Aksakov was confusing nationalism and national egoism with narodnost', and therefore equating
national self-denial with the annihilation of narodnost' itself. 243

On another Slavophil theme, Solovyov wrote an article entitled "What is Needed from the Russian Party?" Here he declared himself in favour of voluntary cultural Russification (obrusenie) of non-Russians, but against forced Russification. In language that Lenin would have approved, he wrote:

The shame is that such attempts, while in no way achieving their impossible aim, only in vain stir up national antagonism and decisively impede the imperceptible but real coming together (sblizhenie) of the foreign elements with Russia. 244

The "Russian Party" should demand "the spiritual emancipation of Russia", "full freedom of religion and freedom of opinion and speech". 245

These articles of Solovyov were collected in a volume entitled Natsional'nyi_vopros_v_Rossii (The National Question in Russia), published in 1888. In the introduction, Solovyov pointed out that for many peoples, the national question was a question of their existence. "The national question in Russia is a question not of existence, but of worthy existence." 246 The main article of the volume, entitled "Russia and Europe", was a criticism of Danilevsky. Whereas Danilevsky saw nations as organisms, and denied a universal humanity, for Solovyov humanity itself was an organism. Further, in contrast to Danilevsky's division of civilization into cultural-historical types, counterposing Slavdom to Western Europe, Solovyov insisted that "Russia, with all her particular
features, is one of the European nations."

A second volume of Natsional'nyi-opros_v_Rossii appeared in 1891, with the main article entitled "Slavophilism and its Degeneration". In this Solovyov now accused the Slavophils of subordinating religion to national feeling. "For Slavophilism, Orthodoxy is an attribute of Russian narodnost'; it is the true religion, in the final analysis, only because the Russian people believe in it." He accused Khomiakov of comparing the concrete historical reality of Catholicism and Protestantism, with their one-sidedness and shortcomings, with an idealized conception of Orthodoxy, a "synthesis of unity and freedom" which the Slavophils themselves had conjured up. In this it seems that Solovyov was not paying sufficient attention to Khomiakov's criticisms of the actual state of the Russian Orthodox Church. Khomiakov was showing what Orthodoxy might be rather than what it was.

Solovyov accused the Slavophils of idealizing the Russian people. The real Russian people had built a powerful Russian State and were not interested in the freedom of opinion desired by the Slavophils. Katkov had taken Slavophilism from the original idealists and developed it to "its direct logical consequences". Solovyov said that Katkov "believed in the Russian State as the absolute embodiment of our people's force". It was the real Russian people that Katkov believed in, not the
Slavophil idealization of them. "He had the virility to
free the religion of narodnost' from any idealistic
embellishments, and to declare the Russian people to be the
object of faith and worship, not because of its problematic
virtues, but because of its real force."251

Worshipping our people as the favoured bearer of
universal truth; then worshipping them as a spontaneous
force, irrespective of universal truth; finally,
worshipping those national peculiarities and historical
anomalies which separate our own people from educated
humanity, that is, worshipping our people with the
direct denial of the very idea of universal truth —
these are the three gradual phases of our nationalism,
successively presented by the Slavophils, Katkov and
the latest obscurantists.252

Solovyov, then, held that the "degeneration" of
Slavophilism arose from the nationalism which he saw at the
base of the thinking of its original theoreticians. It
might be objected that his own messianism rested on his
idealization of the Russian people; but his messianism was
strongly universalist and not nationalist. Berdiaev saw
Solovyov's struggle against nationalism as of great
service.253 As Solovyov wrote in 1891:

The sin of Slavophilism was not that it ascribed to
Russia a higher vocation, but that it insufficiently
insisted on the moral conditions of this vocation...
let them proclaim still more decisively the Russian
people as the gathering Messiah, so long as they
remember that the Messiah must also act like a Messiah,
and not like Barabbas.

The basis of Slavophilism was not Christianity but
"zoological patriotism".254 Sergei Levitsky has commented
that Solovyov was wrong to attribute this to the early
Slavophils.255

The unreality of Solovyov's plans for universal unity
became clear to their author. The last period of his life, from about 1891, represented his disillusionment with the possibility of world theocracy. He had found interest from Roman Catholics but none from the Tsar or Russian society. In political terms, he became still more hostile to the Russian conservatives, accusing them of imitating Chinese ancestor-worship in their cult of the past. The consequence of this would be to weaken Russia and lay her open to conquest from Asia. He became obsessed with the "yellow peril":

O Russia!... Which is the East you desire to be:
The East of Xerxes or of Christ?

He had written in "Ex oriente lux" in 1890. His poem "Pan-Mongolism" of 1894 saw the Chinese conquest of Russia as the end of history. This is taken further in his "Three Conversations" of 1899. Cast in prophetic terms, this described the conquest of Europe by the combined forces of Asia, the appearance of Antichrist in Europe, and the unity of the Christian churches as a prelude to the millennium and the resurrection of the dead. Thus the attainment of "God-humanity" was removed from history to eschatology.

To this period in Solovyov's life belongs his important article on messianism, published in the Brockhaus-Efron Entsiklopedicheskii slovar' in 1896 (and cited from above, p. 11). He identified messianism as a persuasion found among several peoples; he cited Slavophilism as representing Russian messianism, although his own former ideas would have been a valid example. Messianism had positive and negative features for Solovyov.
In the messianism of peoples deprived of political independence ... a moral and heroic nature prevails, the higher calling is understood as a duty and a challenge; in victorious and powerful peoples messianism has a contradictory nature - the calling is taken here as a ready-made advantage or a privilege. Messianism of the first sort can be an important inspiration of national renewal, as it was in Italy and especially in Germany; messianism of the other type degenerates into an exclusive and mindless nationalism, blocking the improvement of the people.257

Of particular interest in Solovyov's Russian messianism is his sympathy for the Jews. Whereas Ivan Aksakov and Dostoevsky displayed anti-Semitism, Solovyov's universalism and compassion led him to become one of the few defenders of the Jews against persecution.258 More than this, he had a positive attitude to them for their religious nature and for having been God's people. In the provocatively titled "The Jews and the Christian Problem" (1884), he asked, "Does it not seem strange that in the name of Christ we should condemn all Jewry to which Christ Himself indisputably belongs?" The Jews, therefore, were a "God-bearing race",259 and they remained a "Chosen People".260 Nevertheless they had betrayed their mission by failing to follow Christ. The Jews were not prepared to renounce national egoism and confined the Kingdom of God to themselves. But Jews and Christians were both aiming at universal theocracy; and the Jews would come to Christianity when the Christians began acting like Christians.261 The Russian people would then "spiritually fuse" with the Jews.262

In the USSR, Solovyov attracted attention in the 1970s.

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S.T. Baranov of Stavropol Polytechnical Institute, in a 1973 article devoted to his messianism, portrayed him as a reactionary who sought to win the masses to Christianity by working outside the official Church. Baranov attacked Western writers who linked the Russian revolution with the supposedly religious "Russian spirit" and Solovyov's ideas. Baranov explained that the "historical mission of Russia" had been to be the scene of the first socialist revolution in the world; the mission of the Soviet Union now was to build Communism and defeat imperialism. The use of Solovyov's ideas by Western anti-Communism testified to the latter being forced back to increasingly reactionary positions. A more sympathetic view of Solovyov, by A.N. Golubev of the Academy of Social Sciences, appeared in 1978. It referred to the contradictory nature of Solovyov's ideas and their "living content", while noting how he suffered persecution under tsarism.

What lessons about the direction of development of Slavophilism can be drawn from the thought of Solovyov? Miliukov argued that Solovyov's ideas developed out of the contradictions within Slavophilism. In his article "The Dissolution of Slavophilism" (1893), he stated that the former division between Slavophilism and Westernism had given way to that between narodnichestvo and democratic liberalism. (By that time, he might have added Marxism to the descendants of Westernism.) Original Slavophilism had inseparably linked the ideas of nationality (natsional'nost') and Russia's universal-historical calling. Orthodoxy and the obshchina were the attributes of.
Russian nationality which alone gave it universal significance. But Miliukov saw an internal contradiction in this. "The idea of nationality prevented the necessary development of the idea of messianism, and the messianic idea prevented the disclosure of the idea of nationality."

After the early Slavophils, these two ideas had been separated: nationality was emphasized by the conservative Right group, Danilevsky and Leontev, while messianism, the universal-historical role, was resurrected by what he called "left Slavophilism", in reality limited to Solovyov.

Danilevsky, said Miliukov, with the theory of "cultural-historical types", went from universalism to the idea of the "complete alienation and hostility" of different cultures, and the defence of the institutions of Russia's past as meeting her specific national needs.

With Danilevsky and Leontev, "the national idea of old Slavophilism, deprived of its humanitarian content, was naturally converted into a system of national egoism, and from the latter there was produced, just as naturally, a theory of reactionary obscurantism."

The view that Slavophilism had been transformed into a "police religion" had been expressed by E. Mamontov as early as 1873. Miliukov argued that for Solovyov, on the other hand, "The religious task is higher than anything in the world and is unconditionally higher than nationality."

In other words, Solovyov was prepared to give up Russian Orthodoxy for the sake of universal Christian unity. The need to
abandon nationality for the sake of messianism demonstrated the contradiction within Slavophilism. Solovyov's messianism, with its belief in "the chimera of world theocracy", was only saved from degeneration into obscurantism because of his attachment to the theory of progress.\textsuperscript{270}

Solovyov rejected Miliukov's suggestion that there was any "left fraction of Slavophilism", claiming that he, Solovyov, had no co-thinkers, but Miliukov insisted that the description was appropriate to Solovyov himself.\textsuperscript{271} Nevertheless, to describe Solovyov as any sort of Slavophil after about 1883 seems highly problematical. The view that Russia could unify humanity not through Orthodoxy, but by submission to Rome, is directly contradictory to Slavophilism. The fact that Solovyov was influenced by Slavophilism is not relevant. Further, Miliukov's description of the transformation of Slavophilism into chauvinism is, as Riasanovsky calls it, "extremely artificial". The appropriation of the Slavophil label by Strakhov and Danilevsky did not alter the fact that Pogodin and various Western thinkers influenced their ideas more than the early Slavophils did. Riasanovsky holds that, with minor exceptions, Ivan Aksakov was the last Slavophil; no later major thinker can be significantly linked with Slavophilism.\textsuperscript{272} Ianov, for all his hostility to Ivan Aksakov, is forced to admit that he denounced "the newest pseudo-Slavophiles" for avoiding the essential Christian basis of Slavophilism. Ianov's claim that Slavophilism completed its evolution when it merged with the Black...
Hundreds derives from taking a particular aspect of Slavophil and Black Hundred ideology - belief in the Russian people - out of historical context, and then making a connection which is devoid of logic.273

**Vekhi**

Solovyov's influence was very strong in the movement of Russian intellectuals, from the fin de siècle to 1917 and beyond, towards religion and mysticism. But different aspects of his thought appealed to different people. The Symbolist poets were attracted to his mysticism, while rejecting his Christianity; the philosophers were attracted to his Christian idealism and liberalism.274 The ex-Marxists who had evolved towards liberalism found his critiques of positivism and materialism helpful in their criticism of the revolutionary intelligentsia. This group achieved its greatest political impact with the publication in 1909 of *Vekhi* (Landmarks), "A Collection of Articles on the Russian Intelligentsia".275 The inclusion of *Vekhi* in this chapter is justified, because some at least of its contributors were heavily influenced by the Slavophils, *pochvenniki* and Solovyov.

From the time of its reception in Russia up to the 1980s, *Vekhi* has suffered serious misinterpretation. The contributors certainly believed that the ideologies of the intelligentsia contributed to the defeat of the 1905 Revolution. But it is wrong to say, as Bernice G. Rosenthal and Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak did in 1982: "The
authors squarely blamed the intelligentsia for the drawbacks of their country, stressing their responsibility both for the political and social structure." 276 The majority of the Vekhi contributors were critical not only of the intelligentsia but also of the regime. They believed, however, that political and social progress would be possible only if the intelligentsia were to be concerned with ethics as well as politics.

Berdiaev, perhaps the most anti-regime of the contributors, wrote that the cultural renaissance of Russia demanded "not only political liberation, but also liberation from the oppressive rule of politics". He added: "Political liberation is possible only in connection with, and on the basis of, spiritual and cultural renaissance." His attack on the Russian intelligentsia for its atheism and materialism echoed the Slavophils and pochvenniki, but he put part of the blame for the condition of the intelligentsia on Russian history, the political system and "our eternal reaction". 277 Another contributor who took a similar position was Sergei N. Bulgakov, a "Christian socialist" who worked with the Constitutional Democrats (Cadets) in the Duma but believed in State ownership of industry. He blamed the "police regime" for the mood of martyrdom and heroism in the intelligentsia which led its members to consider themselves Russia's saviours. 278 He praised the intelligentsia's struggle for enlightenment, but argued that in cutting itself off from the people's religion it was cutting itself off from the people and playing into the hands of reaction. (Bulgakov,
as a partisan of Orthodoxy, found that he had to struggle against intelligentsia influence to defend religion.)

Pyotr B. Struve referred to "the loathsome triumph of reaction" after 1905.

Despite such statements of hostility to autocracy, it was the claim by Mikhail O. Gershenzon, the compiler of Vekhi, that the intelligentsia should be grateful to the government for protecting it from the people, which was seen as representing the essence of the book. Gershenzon, however, differed considerably in his views from the other contributors, rejecting any political struggle. His emphasis on the need for the pre-eminence of the spiritual over the social, for individual self-improvement rather than collective action, was expressed in the preface to the first edition of Vekhi. This apparently went too far for the other contributors, who believed that culture and politics should be informed by a moral and spiritual content, but were not prepared to abandon political action. The preface was dropped from subsequent editions. Bogdan A. Kistiakovsky's article also stood out from the other contributions. It criticized the Slavophils, Marxists and the narodnik Mikhailovsky for not realizing the need for a legal order.

Semyon L. Frank, accusing the intelligentsia of "nihilism", said that it was preoccupied with distribution instead of production, and destruction instead of creation. He and other contributors criticized the Russian Marxists
for succumbing to narodnik pressures in these and other respects (see below, p. 274). Eugene Lampert suggests that the vekhovtsy favoured capitalist development, which is true for some of them; Struve, for example, saw the intelligentsia becoming reconciled with the State through its embourgeoisement. But this did not prevent contributors making positive references to the Slavophils and Dostoevsky, as well as to Solovyov. Gershenzon, for example, attacked the intelligentsia for not valuing the thought of Chaadaev, the Slavophils and Dostoevsky, which he saw as representing Russia's uniqueness (samobytnost'). Bulgakov's article arguing that the Russian intelligentsia was religious in disposition, in its propensity for self-sacrifice for an ideal, was favourable to Dostoevsky and Solovyov, citing in particular Dostoevsky's belief that without Christianity, "all is permitted".

It was only Berdiaev and Bulgakov, however, who put forward a special role for Russia in world history. Berdiaev suggested that while truth could only be universal, not national, different nationalities were called on to disclose different aspects of the truth. Russia's vocation was in the sphere of religious philosophy. He saw Russian philosophy as beginning with Khomiakov, who surpassed European rationalism; Solovyov, he thought, could have been Russia's national philosopher. Bulgakov accused the intelligentsia of "cosmopolitanism", and of failing to think through the "national problem". The intelligentsia was indifferent to
the "national idea", to "religio-cultural messianism" and to the defence of nationality. Bulgakov said that "the greatest exponents of our national self-consciousness - Dostoevsky, the Slavophils, Vladimir Solovyov" linked the national idea with the world tasks of the Russian Church or Russian culture. The failure of the intelligentsia to do this was giving a monopoly of patriotism to "militant, chauvinist nationalism". 292

While divisions existed between the Vekhi contributors, they all stressed the importance of the individual more than did Marxism and most variants of narodnichestvo. They emphasized the moral education of the intelligentsia, and then the duty of the intelligentsia to extend this education to the people, as necessary conditions for a stable society. They differed over their attitude to the regime, and in subsequent years their differences widened. Struve moved to the Right, to Russian nationalism and the belief in a strong state. Bulgakov became an Orthodox priest. Berdiaev went on to develop the study of Russian messianism. He was as universalist as Solovyov in his rejection of nationalist exclusiveness and of anti-Westernism, but he strongly adhered to Orthodoxy. Like Solovyov, he not only opposed anti-Semitism but also had a mystical belief in the destiny of the Jews. Berdiaev understood that the apocalyptic events of the First World War would put an end to European dominance of world culture. During the war he wrote:

The end of Europe will see the appearance of Russia as a [the?] determining spiritual force on the arena of
world history... Russia, occupying the place of a mediator between the East and West, and being itself 'East and West,' has been called to play a great role in uniting humanity. The World War brings us to the problem of Russian messianism. Berdiaev's expectations of Russia's role appeared to be confirmed by the October Revolution.
Footnotes


3. Ibid., p. 73.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. 80.

6. Ibid., p. 82.

7. Ibid., pp. 84-89.

8. Ibid., pp. 89-90 (quotation, p. 90). One is reminded of Solzhenitsyn's opinion: "In our country the lie has become not just a moral category, but a pillar of the state." (Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, "The Lie is a Pillar of the State", The Times, 22 January 1974.)


11. A.S. Kurilov, "Konstantin i Ivan Aksakovy", in Aksakov & Aksakov, Literaturnaia_kritika, pp. 5-6 (quotation, p. 6).

12. Kuleshov, Slavianofil_y, p. 44.


15. For example, K. Aksakov in Molva, No. 9 (7 June 1857), reprinted in Rannie_sliavianofil_y, pp. 112-15.


19. Kurilov, p. 22; Kuleshov, Slavianofil_y, pp. 45-47; Walicki, Slavophile_Controversy, pp. 401-64; Christoff,
Aksakov, pp. 164-70; Tsimbaev, Aksakov, p. 63.


21. Walicki, Slavophile Controversy, pp. 482-85. This also discusses the differences between Samarin and Koshelyov.

22. Kurilov, p. 11. The "anti-bourgeois" label can only be attributed to Koshelyov to a limited extent.


27. Kurilov, p. 22.


Tiutchev did not, however, idealize Muscovy or the obshchina, and by the end of his life he considered Alexander II to be God's representative on Earth. See Hare, Pioneers, p. 138; Gregg, pp. 124-27, 132-35.

Richard Gregg assembles a substantial body of evidence to suggest that in fact Tiutchev did not like Russia very much, and was more at home in the West. The faith he expressed in Russia was in his ideal Russia, the Russian principle rather than the Russian fact. (Gregg, pp. 141-57, especially p. 145.)

30. A full translation of the text is in Christoff, Komjakov, pp. 247-68. Extracts are in Rannie slavianofil', pp. 58-68.


32. Den', 15 October 1861, as cited in Tsimbaev, Aksakov, p. 95.


41. Owen, pp. 29-41; Petrovich, pp. 122-25.

42. Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv, Moscow, f. 776, op. 3, ed. 425, l. 208, as cited in Tsimbaev, *Aksakov*, p. 149.


46. Ivan S. Aksakov, "Ne ob emantsipatsii Evreev sleduet
tolkovat', a ob emantsipatsii Russkikh ot Evreev",
Sochineniia (op. cit. n. 45), III, 479-83 (quotation, p. 
482).

47. Apollon Aleksandrovich Grigor'ev: Materialy dlia
biografii, ed. V. Kniazhnin (P., 1917), as cited in Robert
Whittaker, "My Literary and Moral Wanderings': Apollon
Grigor'ev and the Changing Cultural Topography of Moscow",
SR, XLII, No. 3 (Fall 1983), 395.

48. E. Wayne Dowler, "The 'Young Editors' of Moskvityan
and the Origins of Intelligentsia Conservatism in Russia",
SEER, LV, No. 3 (July 1977), 310-22.

49. From the many biographies of Dostoevsky, for his life
up to 1865, see in particular Joseph Frank, Dostoevsky: The
Seeds of Revolt, 1821-1849. Dostoevsky: The Years of
Ordeal, 1850-1859, and Dostoevsky: The Stir of Liberation

50. As cited in Konstantin V. Mochulsky, Dostoevsky: His
Life and Work, trans. & intro. Michael A. Minihan

Robert C. Williams suggests that this approach provided
a means of acculturation to Europe without the loss of a
feeling of Russian superiority. He finds parallels in the
Arab world. (Williams, "The Russian Soul: A Study in
European Thought and Non-European Nationalism", JHI, XXXI,
No. 4 (October-December 1971), 588.)

51. E. Wayne Dowler, Dostoevsky. Grigor'ev and Native Soil
Conservatism (Toronto, 1982), pp. 10-11, 67-81; Whittaker,
pp. 396-97.

52. Dostoevsky's notebook for 1862-1864, in Fyodor M.
Dostoevsky, "Neizdannyi Dostoevskii. Zapisnye knizhi i


54. Fyodor M. Dostoevsky, "Knizhnost' i gramotnost'.
Stat'ia pervaia", Vremia, July 1861, reprinted in his
Dnevnik pisatelia za 1873 god (Paris, n. d.,), pp. 115-16.

This 3-volume YMCA Press edition of Dostoevsky's
journalistic writings, entitled Dnevnik pisatelia za 1873
god, za 1876 god, and za 1877 god (all Paris, n. d.), will
henceforth be referred to as DP 1873, DP 1876 and DP 1877.
The original Dnevnik pisatelia will henceforth be referred
to as Dnevnik. DP 1873 includes writings from Vremia.
DP 1877 includes Dnevnik for 1880 and 1881.

55. Fyodor M. Dostoevsky, "Riad statei o russkoi
46. This paragraph is mainly based on Dowler, Dostoevsky,
pp. 82-127.


60. Petrovich, pp. 141-45, 258 (quotation).

61. Fadner, p. 229.

62. For Ignatev, see Ibid., pp. 293-301, and Petrovich, pp. 258-63. His activity will be mentioned below, pp. 177, 212-13. Petrovich, pp. 264-81, discusses Fadeev and Danilevsky. For Fadeev, see also Fadner, pp. 338-49; Rostislav A. Fadeev, *Mnenie o vostochnom voprose* (SPb., 1870), which was trans. by T. Michell as *Opinion on the Eastern Question* (London, 1871).


64. Dowler, *Dostoevsky*, p. 167.

65. Strakhov, in Danilevsky, p. xx.

66. Danilevsky, p. 525.


68. Ibid., pp. 538-39.


70. Danilevsky, p. 395.

71. Ibid., pp. 416-17, 432-73.


73. Ibid., pp. 231-32; Owen, pp. 74-75, 89-91.


75. I. Aksakov, letter to M.G. Cherniaev, 1 November 1876,
in Gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii muzei, Moscow, otdel pis'mennykh istochnikov, f. 208, ed. 42, as cited in Tsimbaev, Aksakov, p. 234. Aksakov's emphasis.

76. Florinsky, Russia, pp. 991-94; Tsimbaev, Aksakov, pp. 232-35; Owen, pp. 82, 91-93.

77. Sarkisyanz, in Russian Imperialism, pp. 64-65; Florinsky, Russia, pp. 994-97, 1007 (quotation, p. 996); Kohn, Pan-Slavism, p. 208; Friedrich Engels, "The Situation in Russia", Pall Mall Gazette, 16 March 1871, as retranslated in Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Werke (39 vols.; hereafter MEW; Berlin, 1956-1968), XVII, 291-94; Petrovich, p. 282.

78. Kuleshov, Slavjanofily, p. 48; Tsimbaev, Aksakov, pp. 226-38 (quotations, pp. 238); Kurilov, op. cit. n. 11, p. 23.


82. Tsimbaev, Aksakov, pp. 239-46 (quotations, p. 246); Owen, p. 93.


87. Dmitry S. Merezhkovsky, Prorok_russkoj_revolutsii (SPb., 1906).

88. See, e.g., Zernov, Three-Russian Prophets, p. 93, where he calls Dostoevsky a "prophet of totalitarianism".

89. Fyodor M. Dostoevsky, PSS v tridtsatich tomakh (L., 1972- ); Dnevnik is vols. XXI-XXVII.

90. V. A. Tunimonov, "Publitsistika Dostoevskogo. 'Dnevnik pisatelia'", in Dostoevskii, Khudchznik i myslitel'.


92. "Ot redaktsii", in ibid., p. 4.


96. Riasanovsky, Russia and the West, pp. 206-207.


98. Quoted in Mochulsky, p. 331.

99. As cited in ibid., p. 368.


101. For the Protestantism-atheism link, see Dnevnik, August 1880, in DP-1877, p. 531.

102. DP-1877, pp. 5-11 (quotations, p. 8). Dostoevsky's emphasis.

103. Dnevnik, January 1876, in DP-1876, p. 43.

104. Dnevnik, April 1876, in DP-1876, p. 173.

105. Ibid., pp. 171-72.


109. DP-1877, p. 337.

110. Dnevnik, August 1880, in ibid., pp. 555-56.

111. Carr, Dostoevsky, pp. 226-27.


115. "Dnevnik", in Grazhdanin, 1873, No. 1, in DP-1873, p. 188.

116. See Carr, Dostoevsky, p. 177.

117. For a view that emphasizes the similarities between The Devils and Turgenev's novel Fathers and Children, see R.L. Busch, "Turgenev's Ottsy i deti and Dostoevskii's Besy", CSR, XXVI, No. 1 (March 1984), 1-9.


122. Mochulsky, p. 444.


126. Mochulsky, pp. 590-91.

127. Masaryk, III, 54-63; Carr, Dostoevsky, pp. 219-22; Simmons, Dostoevsky, p. 288.


129. DP_1877, pp. 22 (quotation), 26.


131. Ibid., p. 345.

132. Carr, Dostoevsky, pp. 222-31; Mikhailovsky, Dostoevsky, pp. 17, 35.

133. Dnevnik, February 1876, in DP_1876, pp. 58-68.

134. "Dnevnik", in Grazhdanin, 1873, No. 6, in DP_1873, pp. 219-33 (quotation, p. 224).


137. Dnevnik, February 1876, in DP_1876, pp. 60-61. This ambiguous passage is discussed in Kabat, pp. 41-42.

138. "Dnevnik", in Grazhdanin, 1873, No. 8, in DP_1873, p. 258.


140. Dnevnik, July-August 1876, in DP_1876, p. 326.


142. Dnevnik, September 1876, in DP_1876, pp. 363-64.

143. Dnevnik, June 1876, in DP_1876, pp. 254-56.

144. Ibid., pp. 250-58 (quotation, p. 254).


146. Dnevnik, April 1877, in DP_1877, pp. 126, 129, 130, 127, 126, 136, 139.

147. DP_1877, p. 271.


149. Dostoevsky, "Brat'ia Karamazovy", XV, 127.

Ellis Sandoz similarly denies that Dostoevsky was guilty of a banal "Russland, Russland über alles". ("Philosophical Dimensions of Dostoevsky's Politics", *JP*, XL, No. 3 [August 1978], 673.)


152. Goldstein, *Dostoevsky*, pp. xxvii-xxviii. For a survey of Russian and Soviet critics' views on Dostoevsky's attitudes towards the Jews, see ibid., pp. xxxi-xxix. The 30-volume edition, however, reproduces at least some of Dostoevsky's formulations without censoring them; see nn. 164-67 below.


155. Ibid., pp. xi-xii.


165. *DP-1877*, p. 111; = *PSS*, XXV, 84.

166. *Dnevnik*, March 1877, in *DP-1877*, pp. 107-114 (quotation, p. 113); = *PSS*, XXV, 81-85 (quotation, p. 113).


168. Orest F. Miller & Nikolai N. Strakhov, *Biografija*,

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169. Goldstein, Dostoyevsky, pp. 149-53.


171. R. Pletnev, "Zametki k stat' e D.V. Grishina 'Byl li Dostoevskii antisemitom?'", Vestnik, No. 117 (1976), p. 118; Goldstein, Dostoyevsky, p. 140; Singley, Undiscovered Dostoevsky, pp. 185-86.


176. Ibid., p. 526.


179. DP 1877, p. 585 (quotation), 589.

180. Ibid., p. 604.

181. Ibid., p. 609.


184. Engels, letter to Marx, 23 May 1851, in MEW, XXVII, 267; idem, letter to Ion Madejde, 4 January 1888, MEW, XXXVII, 5.

185. Walicki, Slavophile Controversy, p. 472.


194. Leontiev, as cited in Hare, pp. 278-79.


197. Walicki, *Slavophile Controversy*, pp. 519-30; Hare, pp. 290-301.


199. Leontiev, VII, 501, as cited in Ianov, "Slavianofily", p. 105, for the quotation; Walicki, *Slavophile Controversy*, p. 523; Hare, pp. 275, 301.


p. 144; Owen, pp. 93-94, 129.


204. Lukashevich, Aksakov, pp. 154-57; Tsimbaev, Aksakov, pp. 252-55 (the quotation at the end of the paragraph is on p. 255 and is taken from Institut russkoi literatury, Leningrad, f. Aksakov-ykh, op. 2, ed. 11); Seton-Watson, pp. 463-65; Kurilov, in Aksakov & Aksakov, pp. 23-24; Kuleshov, Slavianofily, p. 47. Aksakov's relations with Vladimir Solovyov will be referred to below, pp. 221, 223-24.


207. Ibid., p. 91. My remarks on Fyodorov are based mainly on the Soviet edition of this work and on Stephen Lukashevich, N. F. Fedorov (1828-1903): A Study in Russian Eupsychian and Utopian Thought (Newark, Del., 1977).


209. Ibid., pp. 304-306; Svetlana G. Semyonova, "N. F. Fedorov i ego filosofskoe nasledie", in Fyodorov, Sochineniia, p. 36; Lukashevich, Fedorov, pp. 243-44, 256-57.


212. Ibid., p. 262.


218. It would be impossible to outline here the full extent of Fyodorov's influence on Soviet life. For some of his influence on literature, see Ludmila Koehler, N.F. Fedorov: The Philosophy of Action (Pittsburgh, Pa., 1979); Lukashevich, Fedorov, pp. 13-37; Ayleen Teskey, Platonov and Fedorov: The Influence of Religious Philosophy upon a Soviet Writer (Letchworth, Herts., 1982); George M. Young, Jr., Nikolai F. Fedorov: An Introduction (Belmont, Mass., 1979). For his influence on Pasternak and Nikolai Zabolotsky, see Irene Masing-Delic, "Zhivago as Fedorovian Soldier", ER, XL, No. 3 (July 1981), 300-316, and idem, "Zabolotsky's The Triumph of Agriculture: Satire or Utopia?", ER, XLII, No. 4 (October 1983), 360-76, respectively.


221. For general discussions of Fyodorov's influence in the USSR, see Semyonova, op. cit., pp. 5-8; Sergei Voronitsyn, "Unusual Interest Shown in Long Forgotten Russian Religious Thinker", RL 64/82 (9 February 1982), in RLRB, 1982, No. 6.


227. See note 206.


229. Jean-Claude Roberti, "La résurrection de Moscou Troisième Rome ou la face cachée du projet fédorovien", RGS, LVI, Pt. I (1984), 85. The reference to the "hidden face" of Fyodorov's project in the title is not sustained in the article (pp. 79-85). Fyodorov made no secret of his belief in Moscow as the future world capital.


231. Stremooukoff, Soloviev, pp. 42-44, 128-31 (quotation, p. 130); Walicki, Slavophile Controversy, pp. 559-70.

232. Solovyov, as cited in Zenkovsky, p. 175.

234. Vladimir S. Solovyov, Tri rechi v pamiat' Dostoevskogo (Berlin, 1925), p. 21, as cited in Goldstein, Dostoyevsky, p. 182.

235. Strémooukhoff, Soloviev, pp. 140-56; Zenkovsky, pp. 175-77 (quotation, p. 177); Walicki, Slavophile Controversy, pp. 570-71.


237. Strémooukhoff, Soloviev, pp. 185-92, 204-205.

238. Zenkovsky, p. 177.

239. Solovyov, Pis'ma, I, 189, as cited in Strémooukhoff, Soloviev, pp. 219-20.


242. Ibid., pp. 25-46. This article, "O narodnosti i narodnykh delakh Rossi" was first published in the Izvestiia of the Petersburg Slav Society, February 1884.


244. Idem, "Chto trebuetsia ot russkoi partii?", in ibid., p. 104. First published in Moskovskii_sbornik, 1887.


246. Ibid., p. v.

247. Ibid., p. 141.


249. Ibid., pp. 40-41.

250. Ibid., pp. 78-80 (quotation, p. 80).

251. Ibid., pp. 81, 83 (Solovyov's emphasis).

252. Ibid., p. 97. The "latest obscurantists" appear to be identified with Katkov's followers such as Larosh, who in Russkii_vestnik, January 1889, extolled Ivan the Terrible (ibid., pp. 87-92).


257. Solovyov, "Messianizm", p. 150.


260. Paul Berline, "Russian Religious Philosophers and the Jews (Soloviev, Berdyaev, Bulgakov, Struve, Rozanov and Fedotov)", *Jewish_Social_Studies* (USA), IX, No. 4 (October 1947), 277-78.


I discussed other aspects of Solovyov's messianism and his mysticism, including his idea of Sophia or the Eternal Feminine, in my MA thesis, "R.V. Ivanov-Razumnik's View of Political Change in Russia and the Role of the Intelligentsia" (Carleton University, Ottawa, 1976). I also discussed there Solovyov's influence on the decadent and symbolist poets of the early twentieth century, especially Aleksandr Blok and Andrei Bely.


266. Ibid., pp. 278-80 (quotation, p. 279, Miliukov's emphasis).
267. Ibid., p. 290 (Miliukov's emphasis).
268. Walicki, Slavophile Controversy, p. 471.
269. Miliukov, "Razlozhenie", p. 299 (Miliukov's emphasis).
270. Ibid., pp. 303-305.
272. Riasanovsky, Russia and the West, pp. 211-12.

I discussed this movement towards mysticism in general, and the role of Vekhi in it, in my MA thesis.

277. Nikolai A. Berdiaev, "Filosofskaia istina i intelligentskaia pravda", in Vekhi, p. 22.
280. Pyotr B. Struve, "Intelligentsiia i revoliutsiia", in Vekhi, p. 169.


289. Gershenzon, in Vekhi, p. 81. (See also pp. 85-87 for his further praise of the Slavophils.)


293. Berline, pp. 286-87; Zenkovsky, pp. 180-87 (quotation, p. 185).
Chapter Four

Socialism and Russian Messianism: From Herzen to Stalin

Russian messianist thinkers as diverse as Pogodin, Konstantin Aksakov and Vladimir Solovyov, although critical to different degrees of the policies pursued by tsarist governments, nevertheless shared a basic belief in the principle of autocracy. In this chapter I shall consider theorists and activists who believed in the special destiny of the Russian people, while calling for the overthrow of the political and social system that existed in Tsarist Russia and its replacement by a socialist system; and then discuss the influence of Russian messianism on the Russian adherents of Marxism, itself (I shall suggest) a messianic doctrine.

It would be quite wrong to see in every Russian revolutionary, let alone every Russian liberal, the belief that Russia was going to save the world. The Westernizers of the 1830s and 1840s—Belinsky, Katkov (who moved rightwards only in the 1860s), Turgenev, Timofei Granovsky, Konstantin Kavelin, Herzen and Bakunin—lamented Russian backwardness and viewed favourably Peter's attempt to modernize Russia. Even in Belinsky's period of "reconciliation with reality" (about 1838 to 1840), when he briefly supported the regime of Nicholas I, he did not view Russia as a model for the West. In the 1850s and 1860s, however, the Slavophil idea of the obshchina began to inspire the predecessors and founders of narodnichestvo with the thought that Russia could be a model for the
world, by creating socialism on the basis of the peasant commune. Slavophile influence is clear on such thinkers as Chernyshevsky, Afanasy Shchapov and especially Herzen.

The anarchist Mikhail A. Bakunin (1814-1876) at certain periods used pan-Slav and Russian messianism for his revolutionary ends. In his "Appeal to the Slavs", published in 1848, he called on them to be the core of the democratic world revolution. The Russian nation was likely to be the bulwark of Slavdom, but only after the Tsar had been overthrown by the Russian people. "In Moscow will be broken the bondage of the peoples subjugated by the Russian sceptre and of all the Slavonic peoples; it is also in Moscow that all European bondage will be buried under its own rubble." 2 The social basis of the Russian revolution, Bakunin explained elsewhere, was the obshchina. In 1862, in his appeal "To Russians, Poles and all Slav friends", he called for freedom for all the Slav nations, land for the peasants and a Slav federal government. He demanded that the Russians should expel the Tatars to Asia and the Germans to Germany "and we shall be a free, purely Russian people." 3 Soon after this, however, Bakunin became ambivalent about national movements, and reverted to his earlier position that the Slavs would have to co-operate with other peoples. His own subsequent life was largely devoted to spreading anarchist ideas throughout Europe. 4

Herzen

Aleksandr Ivanovich Herzen (1812-1870) has been
described as "the founding father of Populism". He united the Slavophil view that Russia should develop on the basis of the obshchina with the secularism and commitment to individual freedom that characterized the Westernizers. Having been arrested in 1834 for participation in a Saint-Simonist circle, he returned from exile to Moscow in 1842. He wrote of the Slavophils in that year:

"...together with hate and disdain for the West go hate and disdain for freedom of thought, for law, for all guarantees, for all civilization. In this way the Slavophils become on the side of the government, and do not stop there but go further....Glory to Peter, who repudiated Moscow!" 

Nevertheless, he found that Slavophil ideas had a certain attraction for him. He knew and admired the Slavophils as individuals, particularly Ivan Kireevsky, and he sympathized with their patriotism. He wrote in 1843 of the Russians fusing the best attributes of the European nations, and perhaps being called on to unite theory and practice for the benefit of humanity. It was almost certainly as a result of Slavophil influence that Herzen later took the idea that the obshchina was of central importance in Russia's future. Already in 1843 he described the communal principle and the lack of a proletariat as "excellent seed buds" for Russia's development. But Herzen thought that the Slavophils forgot that even within the obshchina, the peasant had no possibility of self-respect, existing in conditions of oppression and serfdom. Nevertheless, it was "not without foundation", wrote Herzen in 1844, that the Slavophils believed in the "enormous future of the Slavs" and their ability to solve Europe's problems.
still open as to whether the Slavs, via the *obshchina*,
would lead the West to socialism, or whether the West would lead the Slavs there.\(^8\) From 1844, his belief that the *obshchina* constrained individual freedom encouraged him to look more to the upheavals in the West.\(^9\)

In 1844, despite Herzen's efforts to maintain personal relations, the final split occurred between the Slavophils and the Westernizers.\(^10\) Herzen, writing in 1861 after the deaths of Khomiakov and Konstantin Aksakov, said that despite their quarrels, the Slavophils had shared with the Westernizers a love for the Russian people. "We, like Janus, or the two-headed eagle, looked in different directions, but at the same time the heart beat as one."\(^11\) He emigrated to Europe just before the 1848 revolutions, but the triumph of the bourgeoisie led to his disillusionment with the West and a renewed concentration on Russia.

From April 1849, he began to emphasize the virtues of the *obshchina*, and spoke of an "internal force" which sustained the Russian people against the Mongols and the Petersburg bureaucracy.\(^12\) But he still hoped that revolution might succeed in France. In his letter to Jules Michelet, "Le peuple russe et le socialisme" (1851), he claimed that the *obshchina* was the only authority respected by the peasants and the source of their morality. Russian peasants very rarely cheated each other, because they were protected from the corruption around them by the *obshchina*. "The commune has preserved the Russian people from Mongol
barbarism, from civilizing tsarism, from the Europeanized landowners and from the German bureaucracy....It has fortunately been preserved up to the development of socialism in Europe." He was not asserting Russian superiority; he was claiming equality with Europe for Russia. He was stating that Russia might be approaching socialism from a direction different from that of Europe, but was no closer to it than Europe. Nor did he suggest that the obshchina would necessarily develop into socialism; Malia and Acton agree in portraying Herzen as exploring possibilities rather than stating certainties. Herzen was arguing that socialism might come in Russia if the obshchina could be combined with an expansion of the freedom and dignity of the individual. The role of the Westernized "middle gentry" was essential in carrying out the socialist revolution in Russia and adapting the obshchina to socialism. Herzen's "Russian socialism", then, included elements of both Slavophilism and Westernism.

From 1852, he became less hopeful about Russian socialism and more concerned with the practical problems of Russian life. During the Crimean War, he wanted Russia to seize Constantinople, which he hoped would lead to the creation of a Slav federation. Like the Slavophils, he seems to have held some mystical belief that Constantinople and war were linked with some great aim - although in Herzen's case, the aim was European revolution. It may have been Herzen's stance at this time which caused Engels
to link him with Bakunin as a pan-Slavist. Engels accused Herzen of proclaiming a messianic belief in Russia's socialist calling and desiring the Slav conquest of Europe. Russia's failure in the Crimean War promoted Herzen's disillusionment. The death of Nicholas I reinvigorated him, however, and he established a journal Poliarnaia zvezda (Polar Star) to which both Westernizers and Slavophils were invited to contribute. 15

Herzen's main concerns became the emancipation of the serfs with land, the abolition of corporal punishment and the removal of the censorship. In London he published another journal Kolokol (The Bell, 1857-1867), which was smuggled into Russia and became very influential. When Alexander II announced in 1857 that the serfs would be freed, Herzen offered him support and co-operation, and was willing to abandon the revolutionary struggle. This cost him political support among the younger generation of revolutionaries such as Chernyshevsky, Dobroliubov and the supporters of the proclamation "Young Russia", who failed to appreciate Herzen's fear that a revolution in the conditions of the time might be more destructive than creative. Russian repression in Poland, from 1861 to 1863, cast a shadow over the Emancipation and forced Herzen to make a stand against the Tsar's policy; but this isolated him from Russian liberal opinion, which was anti-Polish. He again began to emphasize the socialist potential of the obshchina. This provoked Turgenev in 1862 to accuse Herzen of treating the Russian peasant like "some coming Russian Messiah", when the peasant was really deeply conservative.
Herzen did not, however, commit himself fully to the revolutionary struggle, and instead criticized those revolutionaries who sought to take State power and impose socialism on the peasants, against their will.  

**Narodnichestvo and Russia's special path**

The term *narodnik* (Populist) is used in different ways by different people. Broadly speaking, it can cover all the non-Marxist revolutionary theories and movements existing in Russia from the 1850s. These theories asserted the existence of a special Russian path to socialism, avoiding capitalism. Sometimes they emphasized the role of the peasantry (Populism in its narrow sense) and sometimes the role of a revolutionary elite. Soviet writers counterpose *narodnichestvo* to Marxism, and therefore exclude Herzen and the revolutionary democrats of the 1850s and 1860s from the designation *narodnik*, since they see these thinkers as precursors of Russian Marxism.

Nevertheless, Western writers hold Herzen to be the founder of Russian Populism: "Herzen created Populism; Chernyshevsky was its politician." Chernyshevsky, active in Russia from 1855 to 1862, followed Herzen in believing that the *obshchina* should be preserved and transformed so that it could continue to exist in a socialist society. He did not believe that the Russian *obshchina* would be a model for Western Europe; the latter would find her own way to socialism. If Chernyshevsky represented a Westernizing wing of Populism, then Shchapov in the early 1860s represented a Slavophil wing of Populism, with his call for a Zemskii
Sobor, local self-government and regionalism (oblastnost') - all in the context of a socialist society based on the obshchina. 19

There were continuing debates among the narodniks on the role of conspiracy and acts of terrorism in the transition to socialism. These methods owed nothing to Slavophilism but were imports of Blanquism and Jacobinism. Nechaev's methods (see above, p. 188) were rejected by classical narodniks such as Pyotr L. Lavrov (1823-1900) and Mikhailovsky. It was feared that the use of elitist conspiratorial methods to overthrow tsarism would simply usher in a new dictatorship. Even Nechaev's former collaborator, Bakunin, insisted that the secret anarchist vanguard which would continue to exist after his projected revolution must not impose its rule on society (although he did not say how this could be avoided). 20

Lavrov, in his Istoriicheskie pis'ma (Historical Letters) of 1869, emphasized the moral development of the lichnost', the individual or the personality, and the need for "critically thinking lichnosti" to enlighten the peasantry. Mikhailovsky, in "What is Progress?" (1870), was also concerned with the development of the individual, seeing the division of labour and capitalist industrialization as the enemy of this. This was partly a consequence of his having read Das Kapital. Both Lavrov and Mikhailovsky favoured the obshchina, without idealizing it; but whereas Lavrov participated in the First International and supported industrial progress,
Mikhailovsky tended to believe that the Golden Age was in the past. In this he resembled the Slavophils. His socialism was akin to that of Proudhon and Blanc rather than Marx and Engels; he and the other "Legal Populists" consciously rejected the applicability of Marx's writings to Russia. Mikhailovsky posited instead her special path to socialism, based on "the moral sense of the Russian intelligentsia". He looked to the government to protect the obshchina and artel' from capitalist development. This pointed to a factor which explained why some Russian narodniki, unlike West European socialists, were indifferent to questions of civil and political rights: they thought autocracy a better system than liberal democracy for the achievement of socialism. This led them, like the Slavophils, occasionally to offer co-operation to the autocracy when it appeared to be protecting the people against the wealthy. On the other hand, the "Jacobin" narodnik, Pyotr S. Tkachov (1844-1885) argued for the formation of a revolutionary vanguard to seize power and create a "socialist" society in which equality would be achieved through the destruction of the culture of the few and the "levelling of individuals" down to a standard level. In 1873 Mikhailovsky refused to collaborate on Lavrov's Paris journal Vpered! (Forward!), saying that he was not a revolutionary, and hinting that Lavrov was too influenced by West European models. Nevertheless, it was a central belief of Vpered! at this time that the obshchina could be converted into a constituent part of socialism in Russia, and Lavrov was prepared to entertain the chance of
the socialist revolution appearing in Russia before Europe. 22

In 1874, Tkachov moved towards a political break with Lavrov. He argued that the obshchina was dissolving, while the kulaks and capitalists were growing stronger. The conditions for a social revolution were becoming less and less favourable, and it was necessary to proceed with it at once. He issued a manifesto attacking Lavrov and calling for the creation of a conspiratorial vanguard party to carry out the revolution in Russia. Lavrov responded by saying that the revolution must be made by the people, not by a minority group. If a revolutionary party seized dictatorial power, it would not give up power freely and another revolution would be necessary. Engels jumped to attack Tkachov, provoking the latter to write him a forthright open letter. In turn, Engels accused him of portraying the Russians as the chosen people of socialism. It would be impossible for Russia to have a socialist revolution before Western Europe. The obshchina could survive into the socialist era only if a proletarian revolution occurred in the West before the obshchina collapsed. Tkachov claimed in response that the survival of the obshchina showed that the Russian people were instinctively socialist. 23

Marxist messianism

In this section, I shall discuss the elements of messianism which were present in Marxism before its penetration into Russia. In 1844, in the "Contribution to
the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right", Marx argued that the German proletariat could not free itself from its exploitation and suffering without emancipating the whole of society. It could "redeem itself only through the total redemption of humanity ... Thorough Germany cannot make a revolution unless it is a thorough one. The emancipation of the German is the emancipation of the human". This tendency to identify German interests with the needs of world socialism recurred throughout the lives of Marx and Engels.

The idea of the proletariat as the universal class is central to classical Marxism. It was reformulated, without being restricted to Germany, by Engels in the Preface to the 1888 English edition of the Manifesto of the Communist Party:

... the exploited and oppressed class - the proletariat - cannot attain its emancipation from the sway of the exploiting and ruling class - the bourgeoisie - without, at the same time, and once and for all, emancipating society at large from all exploitation, oppression, class distinctions and class struggles.

In abolishing private property, the proletariat overcomes the division of society into classes and restores the communist form of society, which allegedly existed in primitive times; but the new Golden Age is at an incomparably higher level of culture and technology. The role of the proletariat as Messiah is so pronounced in Marxism that observers have suggested the direct influence of Jewish messianism or Christianity on Marx. For example, Zernov wrote:

Karl Marx believed in the Messiah as only a Jew can
believe in Him, but his Messiah was no longer God's Anointed, but a body of people, the lowest and poorest class of mankind, who did the hardest work and received the least remuneration for it. He proclaimed the coming of a collective Messiah, represented by the proletariat. 26

Similar views were held by the Vekhi contributors, Bulgakov and Berdiaev (see below, pp. 273-74, 289-90). It seems more accurate to emphasize the importance of Hegelian dialectics on Marx's thought, with the proletarian revolution as the universal synthesis. The concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", however, is profoundly messianic: there is no explanation as to how the workers could actually exercise their dictatorship, or whether power would be exercised by a small group claiming to represent the workers and suppressing all opposition. In fairness to Marx, the phrase occurs only a few times in his entire output. Engels was later to emphasize the virtues of universal suffrage and enjoin the Social-Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) to seek power legally. He went so far as to assert that the political form of the dictatorship of the proletariat would be a democratic republic - hardly a dictatorship in the normal sense of the term. 27 Rudolf Bahro, a Marxist dissident writing in the German Democratic Republic in the 1970s, described the view that the proletariat would be "the real collective subject of the general emancipation" as "a philosophical hypothesis, around which the utopian components of Marxism were concentrated". 28

The need for the international unity of the proletariat is a central theme of the Manifesto. "United action, of
the civilized countries at least, is one of the first conditions of its emancipation." Nevertheless, "The Communists turn their main attention to Germany ..." This was justified on the grounds that the forthcoming bourgeois revolution would be "immediately" followed by a proletarian one, because of the strength of the German proletariat.29 The apocalyptic atmosphere of the period found its justification in the revolutions of 1848. Engels, however, found himself in June of that year not arguing for international workers' unity, but applying the Hegelian concept of "historical" and "unhistorical" nations. He wrote in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung that the only possible outcome of the Prague uprising was a "war of annihilation" (Vernichtungskrieg) of the revolutionary Germans against the counter-revolutionary Czechs.30 In January 1849, he declared:

Amongst all the nations and nationalities of Austria there are only three bearers of progress, which have actively intervened in history and are still capable of independent life: Germans, Poles and Magyars. They are therefore revolutionary now.

All the other great and small nationalities and peoples have the mission to perish in the revolutionary world storm. They are therefore now counter-revolutionary.31

It is difficult to avoid accusing Marx and Engels of tending to lapse into German nationalist messianism. Horace B. Davis suggests that they "may indeed have both been unconscious, or subconscious, nationalists in that they hoped Germany would take the lead in establishing socialism."32 On the other hand Solomon F. Bloom states, "Marx simply was not a nationalist."33 Engels decisively rejected the allegations of German nationalism levelled at
the Neue_Rheinische_Zeitung, pointing out that the journal had always supported Polish independence. He added, "...hatred of the Russians was, and still is the first revolutionary passion of the Germans." In 1852, in the New York Daily Tribune, Engels praised the German nation still more strongly.

The history of a thousand years ought to have shown them [the "dying nationalities, the Bohemians, Carinthians, Dalmatians, etc."], that if all the territory east of the Elbe and Saale had at one time been occupied by kindred Slavonians, this fact merely proved the historical tendency and at the same time the physical and intellectual power of the German nation to subdue, absorb and assimilate its ancient eastern neighbors; that this tendency of absorption on the part of the Germans had always been, and still was, one of the mightiest means by which the civilization of western Europe had been spread in the east of that Continent; that it could only cease whenever the process of Germanization had reached the frontier of large, compact, unbroken nations, capable of an independent national life, such as the Hungarians, and in some degree the Poles; and that, therefore, the natural and inevitable fate of these dying nations was to allow this process of dissolution and absorption by their stronger neighbors to complete itself.

Nikolai Ulianov, in a booklet published by the Russian émigré house Possev, accuses Marx and Engels of exhibiting "Nazi chauvinism" towards the Slavs. In private, Marx and Engels were still more pro-German. Marx wrote to Engels in 1870, during the Franco-Prussian War in which they publicly opposed the German seizure of Alsace-Lorraine: "...the French need a thrashing... This [German] predominance on the world stage over the French would also mean the predominance of our theory over Proudhon's etc." Engels wrote in an article of 1892 that the SPD would have to defend the nation against an attack by Tsarist Russia, and fight the French Republic if France were allied with tsarism.
It appears safe to conclude that the founders of scientific socialism believed in the special vocation of the German people in general and of the German proletariat in particular. This was combined with hostility to the Slavs and especially to Tsarist Russia. In 1848, Russia had suppressed Hungary. In 1853 and again in 1855 Marx wrote that the pan-Slavists were looking to the Tsar as a Messiah. In 1855, Engels feared (quite without foundation) that pan-Slavism was about to become the official platform of tsarism. Marx wrote, probably in 1867, that "the policy of Russia is changeless ... the polar star of its policy - world domination - is a fixed star." While hostile to Herzen and Bakunin, Marx and Engels in their later life nevertheless took a keen interest in the Russian revolutionary movement and regarded Lavrov as an ally.

**Marxism in Russia**

The narodnichestvo of the 1860s and 1870s was created, in a sense, out of Marxism: Russian socialists were aware of Marx's critique of capitalism and wished to avoid the miseries of capitalist industrialization. While Engels was eager to accuse Russian revolutionaries of Russian messianism (and pan-Slavism), it seems closer to the truth to say that most Populists were seeking a way to socialism that was different from the West European path, rather than that they wanted Russia to be a model for Western Europe, let alone the entire world. Marx himself gave some
Justification to the narodnik approach, in a letter of 1877, in which he explicitly stated that his description of capitalism in Western Europe could not have universal validity. In his letter to the narodnik Vera Zasulich of 8 March 1881, he described the obshchina as the "mainspring of Russia's social regeneration", but stated that it could not function unless the forces hostile to it were removed. These forces were identified (in the draft of a pamphlet) with tsarist policy, not with any inevitable capitalist development. In the introduction to the 1882 Russian edition of the Manifesto, Marx and Engels made the survival of the obshchina into the future communist society conditional on proletarian revolution in the West.

If narodnichestvo was created out of Marxism, then
Russian Marxism in the 1880s was created out of narodnichestvo. Georgy V. Plekhanov, a leading narodnik, believed that capitalism was inevitable in Russia but bitterly opposed Tkachov's Jacobinism. This led him to break with Populism and establish the first Russian Marxist group, Osvobozhdenie truda (Emancipation of Labour) in Geneva in 1883. But Russian revolutionary Marxists did not believe that Russia would follow exactly the same path as Western Europe. Plekhanov told the founding conference of the Second International in 1889: "In Russia political freedom will be gained by the working class, or it will not exist at all. The Russian Revolution can only conquer as a workers' revolution ..." Lenin's brother, Aleksandr Ulianov (1866-1887), spoke of the possibility of telescoping the bourgeois and proletarian revolutions in
Russia into one, as had the young Marx in relation to Germany.\textsuperscript{45} In this context, the appearance of Trotsky's theory of Permanent Revolution, under the impact of the 1905 Revolution, does not seem surprising.

At the end of 1904, Trotsky's friend Parvus (A.L. Helfand), a Russian-Jewish Marxist based in Germany, predicted, "The Russian revolution will shake the bourgeois world....And the Russian proletariat may well play the role of vanguard of the social revolution."\textsuperscript{46} In June 1905 Trotsky wrote that the Russian working class would be "the initiator of the liquidation of world capitalism".\textsuperscript{47} His book \textit{Results and Prospects} (1906) argued that the Russian bourgeoisie was so weak and cowardly that the Russian proletariat would have to carry out the task of the bourgeois revolution itself. It would not stop there, but would have to begin the socialist transformation of Russia, and in order to stay in power, would have to spread the revolution outside Russia as well.\textsuperscript{48} Such claims were far removed from the beliefs of Marx and Engels.

Commentators have noted the possible influence of Jewish messianism on the ideas of Jewish participants, such as Trotsky, in the Russian revolutionary movement. Moshe Mishkinsky suggests that Jewish workers in late nineteenth-century Russia were receptive to socialism because of their religious background. "The Jewish labor organizations received socialist doctrine as revelation, as a messianic vision which had been nourished to some extent
by Jewish eschatological traditions and universal ideas of redemption. "49 Sergei Bulgakov saw a similar connection. He wrote in 1905 that "atheistic socialism" had the same "earthly" ideals as Jewish messianism, and counterposed both to his "Christian socialism". 50 In 1910 he depicted socialism as a "transposition (perelozhenie) of Jewish chiliasm", in which the proletariat were the "chosen people". 51

Billington sees Populism and Zionism as parallel messianic movements in Russia, for Russians and Jews respectively. (One may disagree about the messianic nature of Zionism – see above, p. 18.) He suggests that Trotsky and other Jews who occupied leading positions "helped give the Bolshevik cause the compelling voice of prophecy and a contagious conviction that messianic deliverance was about to occur on Russian soil". 52 This point must not be pushed too far; the Mensheviks were anything but messianic, but their leader, Martov, and many other influential members were Jewish, while the Bolsheviks were considerably more Russian in composition. Robert J. Brym calculates that 37% of revolutionaries arrested in 1905 were Jews, although they comprised only 4% of the population in 1897. Leaving aside the question whether the police deliberately tried to arrest Jews rather than gentiles, one reason for the high proportion of Jews may have been their high participation in the education system and the lack of job opportunities for educated people. Probably more important, however, was that in conditions of official anti-Semitism, Jews would be more likely to be alienated from society than other
While the influence of Jewish messianism may have had a role in attracting Jews to Marxism, the previous paragraphs leave little doubt that the influence of narodnichestvo added a dimension of Russian messianism to Russian Marxism. The eschatological mentality penetrated Bolshevism, with the "God-building" movement led by Anatoly V. Lunacharsky talking about constructing the messianic kingdom on earth. Lunacharsky, comparing the proletariat with Christ, wrote: "the new Messiah climbs Golgotha, its blood flows, it is nailed to the cross." Already in 1906 Berdiaev was finding a "religious thirst and an eschatological hope" in Russian Marxism. In Vekhi he went further. In Russia, he said, Marxism had become a cover for the traditional narodnik "cliquishness" of the intelligentsia. Thus the intelligentsia was not interested in whether a theory was true, but only in whether it served the people or proletariat. In particular, the Russian Marxists had an "exceptional belief" in the possibility of achieving socialist objectives in Russia earlier than in the West. Frank in the same collection wrote that Populism had swallowed up Russian Marxism, destroying its respect for culture. Bulgakov spoke of the intelligentsia having an "eschatological dream of the City of God". It is relevant to note that at this time Bulgakov and Berdiaev were themselves seen by Prince Evgeny N. Trubetskoi as seeking to revive Russian messianism.
The outbreak of the First World War, a severe test for socialists throughout Europe, divided those in Russia. The majority of the leaders of the narodnik party, the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), gave support to the war effort. Most of the Russian Marxist leaders, on the other hand, opposed the War; all the Social-Democratic deputies in the Duma voted against war credits. In 1915 Trotsky condemned the "social-patriots" who had put nation before class in these terms:

In general it should not be forgotten that there is, alongside of the most vulgar reformism, a national revolutionary Messianism which deems that its own national state, whether because of its industrial level or because of its 'democratic' form and revolutionary conquests, is called upon to lead humanity towards socialism or towards 'democracy'.

August 1914 showed that, with the exception of Plekhanov's small group Edinstvo (Unity), the Russian Marxists were much less liable to nationalist messianism than either the narodniki or the Marxists of other countries.
The group which most fully represented socialist Russian messianism in 1917 was the Left SRs. For this party of romantic revolutionaries, Russia's suffering in the war was akin to the Crucifixion, and the October Revolution represented redemption. Russia was the instrument for the creation of a New World. Providing the Bolsheviks with a valuable bridge to the peasantry, the Left SRs joined the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) in November 1917, and proved particularly enthusiastic in the security police (Cheka). Lenin's argument that Russia should not undergo a period of liberal democracy but could lead the rest of Europe to the socialist revolution appeared to them an implicit acceptance of the narodnik position. The adoption of the SR land policy by the Bolsheviks made the link explicit. For the Left SRs, however, there could be no compromise with the Old World; therefore, when Lenin realized the necessity of an armistice with Germany and signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, they saw this as a betrayal of the world revolution. Not only did they leave the Sovnarkom but they used terrorist methods to provoke a revolutionary war with Germany.

The poets known as the "Scythians", grouped around R.V. Ivanov-Razumnik, the literary editor of SR and then Left SR periodicals, provided a graphic illustration of the messianic revolutionary mood. Sergei Esenin called Russia "the new Nazareth"; Nikolai Kliuev compared Lenin to the Old Believer leader Avvakum. The symbolists, Aleksandr
Blok and Andrei Bely, had absorbed Vladimir Solovyov's eschatology and had been expecting a cosmic struggle against Antichrist. Bely's poem "Rodine" (To the Motherland) of August 1917 addressed Russia as the "Messiah of the Coming Day". His poem "Khristos voskrese" (Christ is Risen) was written in 1918, after the October Revolution. Blok's "Dvenadtsat'" (The Twelve, January 1918), depicted Jesus at the head of a troop of Red Guards. It was not accidental that Trotsky called this poem "the most significant work of our epoch". In his "Skify" (Scythians), written during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, and addressed to Europe, Blok portrayed the Russian people as barbarians. If Europe failed to join the revolution, the Russians would cease to perform their historic mission of protecting Europe from the Asian hordes, and would allow European civilization to be crushed by the yellow peril.

The influence of Russian messianism on Bolshevism itself is much less clear. Consciously, Lenin, Trotsky and the leading Bolsheviks were Marxists, seeking to promote an international working-class revolution which had started in Russia but which would be completed in Europe. Nevertheless, they admitted certain narodnik influences. Lenin approved Chernyshevsky's ideas and the Narodnaia volia organization. Unlike some Western Marxists and the Russian "Legal Marxists", he always saw the poorest peasants as a progressive force, and praised the narodniks for also doing so. Schapiro comments: "The victory of bolshevism in 1917 was at least as much a victory of narodnichestvo as of Marxism." In particular,
commentators have widely remarked on the impact on Lenin of Tkachov and Nechaev, both of whom Lenin admired. The centralized, conspiratorial organization, and the subordination of the individual and all morality to the needs of the revolution, were taken by Lenin from these two figures; V. D. Bonch-Bruevich, who was close to Lenin, confirmed that Lenin admired Nechaev, and Pokrovsky recognized Nechaev as a founder of Bolshevik organizational ideas.66 Such ideas, however, were rejected by many narodniki, and they had no necessary connection with Russian messianism, being linked more with Jacobinism.

Where Bolshevism did appear as a manifestation of Russian messianism was in the belief in Russia as a model for East and West. The British, American and French revolutions all produced people who wished their revolutions to be extended to the rest of the world. With Bolshevism this was the dominant theme: the workers of Europe, and the workers and peasants of the colonial world, should themselves overthrow capitalism and imperialism. The Communist or Third International (Comintern) was established to facilitate this. But, as with the earlier revolutions, there were times when it was considered expedient to spread the Revolution by force. Only with difficulty did Lenin defeat the Left Communists and persuade the Bolshevik Central Committee to accept Brest-Litovsk. The extension of the revolution by means of Russian bayonets was the aim of the attack on Poland in 1920. It was expected that the arrival of the Red Army
would produce support from the Polish workers, but it only intensified Russo-Polish national antagonisms. The question of the other minority borderlands of the Empire deserves separate treatment (see below, pp. 296-307).

With the defeat of the revolutionary wave in the West, Bolshevik attention turned more to the East. An appeal to the "Muslim Toilers of Russia and the East" had been issued in December 1917. In November 1918 Stalin described the Russian Revolution as a bridge between the Western proletariat and the oppressed East. At the first "Congress of the Peoples of the East" held in Baku in September 1920, Zinoviev addressed a mainly Muslim audience: "Brothers, we summon you to a holy war, in the first place against British imperialism!" Karl Radek openly declared:

We appeal, comrades, to the warlike feelings which once inspired the peoples of the East when these peoples, led by their great conquerors, advanced upon Europe. Sarkisyanz makes a direct link between Blok and Radek, and suggests that Russia's Asian policy was linked with Russian messianism for the first time under Lenin. The turn to Asia did indeed evoke the concerns of Dostoevsky, Vladimir Solovyov and Blok's "Scythians". Russia was now seen as a model for the peoples of the East as well as the West.

In addition to appealing to West and East, the Bolsheviks sought to mobilize Russian patriotism in their support in the course of the Civil War. On 21 February 1918 the Sovnarkom issued a proclamation signed by Lenin, declaring: "The socialist fatherland (otechestvo) is in danger! Long live the socialist fatherland!" The
foreign intervention led many forces in Russian society to support the Bolsheviks, seeing them as more authentically national than the Whites. As early as October 1917, before the Bolshevik Revolution, the former tsarist commander, General A.A. Brusilov, had issued an appeal to nationally-minded Russians of all parties to save the country from chaos. From the start of the Civil War, Brusilov and other senior tsarist commanders such as General S.S. Kamenev and Admiral V. Altfater went over to the Bolsheviks, for patriotic reasons (not because of political opportunism or the coercion frequently employed on tsarist officers). The War Ministry itself, as an institution, apparently transferred its loyalty to the Bolsheviks after they took power. These feelings were shared by thousands of tsarist officers who freely volunteered to fight for the Bolsheviks. V.M. Purishkevich, a former leader of the Black Hundreds, and many of the rank and file of that organization, expressed their willingness to serve the Reds. The Polish-Soviet War gave impetus to this. In May 1920, Brusilov and other tsarist military leaders issued an appeal to Russians to support the Bolsheviks in order to defend Russia.\(^7\) In the course of this war, traditional anti-Polish feeling was used by Bolshevik propagandists.\(^7\)

These developments attracted the attention of Russians who had emigrated after the October Revolution. Vasily Shulgin, who had been a conservative nationalist before the revolution, claimed, in his book \textit{1920} written in that year, that Russian nationalist ideas were penetrating the
Bolsheviks. In the Red Army they had rebuilt the Russian Army, and they had restored Russia's frontiers. Mikhail S. Agursky, formerly a Soviet Jewish dissident, a contributor to Solzhenitsyn's *From under the Rubble*, and a person sympathetic to Russian Orthodox nationalism, has written a major analysis of "National Bolshevism", *Ideologiya natsional-bol'shevizma* (The Ideology of National Bolshevism). An expanded version in English is entitled *The Third Rome*. According to Agursky, it was Shulgin who for the first time presented the idea that the Comintern was a weapon of Russian national policy. The nationalist regeneration of the Bolsheviks would be an unconscious process. Shulgin predicted that in the future their ranks would produce a dictator of nationalist views, who would remove his colleagues and lead Russia on to the national path.

In October 1920, after the defeat of Kolchak, the Kadet Nikolai V. Ustrialov proclaimed himself an adherent of "National Bolshevism". The anti-Bolshevik groups, he said, were too closely tainted by foreign links. Soviet power, on the other hand, was a "national factor of contemporary Russian life"; its interests coincided with Russia's State interests, and Bolshevism would "evolve from Jacobinism to Napoleonism". The term "National Bolshevism" seems to have been coined by Radek to describe the policy of some German Communists who attempted to unite with Right-wing German nationalists against the Entente. Lenin's use of the term gave it popularity. Ustrialov considered that National Bolshevism had begun in Russia with Brusilov's
appeal of October 1917.77

In February 1921, in Paris, S. Lukianov, a former Oberprokuror of the Holy Synod and a follower of Vladimir Solovyov, claimed to see a distinction between the "Bolsheviks" headed by Lenin and Krasin, and the "Communists", supposedly headed by Trotsky and Zinoviev.78 This distinction became widely held: the fellow-traveller writer Boris Pilniak in Golyigod (The Naked Year, 1921) portrayed a peasant who supported the "Bolsheviks" but rejected the "Communists". It appears that the Communists were widely and negatively identified with the Jews, and the Bolsheviks were identified as good Russians. Some Russian sects identified the Bolsheviks with Antichrist, but others viewed Lenin as the "Messiah of the twentieth century".79 The removal of the capital from Petrograd, under threat of German invasion, back to Moscow symbolized a turning-back from the Petersburg period. Already in 1917, before the October coup, the Orthodox Church had restored the Patriarchate, not in the then capital Petrograd, but in Moscow, "the Third Rome".80 Lenin and Trotsky strengthened the symbolism by choosing to live, like the Muscovite Tsars, in the Kremlin.

Lukianov joined Ustrialov and other former Whites in contributing to the collection Smena_vekh (Change of Landmarks), published in Prague at the beginning of 1921. The smenovekhoivtsy saw Bolshevism as a Russian national phenomenon, the professed internationalism of which was a
camouflage. Ustrialov discerned a Slavophil spirit in the Bolsheviks. After the New Economic Policy (NEP) was adopted in March 1921, Ustrialov regarded it as evidence of the evolution of Bolshevism; the Bolsheviks were liquidating the revolution. Politically, the smenovekhovtsy encouraged émigrés to return to Russia and collaborate with the Bolsheviks, in the hope of assisting Russia's evolution towards normality. 81

Lenin, Trotsky and other Bolshevik leaders welcomed smenovekhovstvo, insofar as it brought qualified personnel back to Russia, but naturally they opposed the political aims of the movement. Smena_vekh feelings seem to have been widespread among the intelligentsia and middle classes in Russia. Ilia Ehrenburg, in spite of his Jewish origin, and Aleksei Tolstoy were among the creative writers who returned to Russia under the influence of Smena_vekh, and later played a major role in Soviet literature. Smena_vekh ideology, as well as socialist feeling, was also important in the pro-Bolshevik "Renovationist" or "Living Church" (obnovlentsy or zhivaia_tserkov') movement of priests and laity inside the Orthodox Church. Lenin told the XI Party Congress in March 1922: "The smenovekhovtsy express the mood of thousands and tens of thousands of bourgeois, and of Soviet employees who are participants in our New Economic Policy." 82 At the XII Party Congress in April 1923, Stalin linked the movement with what he described as the growing threat of Great-Russian chauvinism, and warned that it was appearing not only in the soviets but also in Party bodies. As Agursky notes, this was odd coming from
Stalin, in view of his role in Georgia a few months before (see below, pp. 305-306). Zinoviev, perhaps because he was head of the Comintern, was the leader most hostile to smenovkhovstvo at this time. Russian patriotism was also emphasized by the émigré group called the Eurasians, which emerged like Smena vekh in 1921. The Eurasians saw Russia as a unique, mystical entity, capable of uniting diverse racial groups.

Agursky is right to say that these nationalist ideologies, permeating Russian society, provided a favourable climate for the reception of Stalin's slogan "Socialism in one country", proclaimed in December 1924. He seems to go too far, though, in his claim that Stalin "accept[ed] National Bolshevism as a political programme and put it into practice". He claims that the decisive influence on "Socialism in one country" was not "Red patriotism" - the use of national sentiments by the Bolsheviks - for this "arose in an epoch when Soviet Russia was striving for world revolution". "Socialism in one country", says Agursky, was "much nearer to National Bolshevism than to any other current". S.V. Utechin's view that elements of National Bolshevism were incorporated in the official ideology only in 1934 seems mistaken; they were there from the mid-1920s. Agursky's view of National Bolshevism, however, as the main influence on Stalin probably reflects a misinterpretation of the nature of the ideology. Agursky describes the National Bolshevism of 1921 as "an attempt to combine the dogmas of Marxism-
This seems to overlook the fact that National Bolshevism was an acceptance of Bolshevism for nationalist reasons, in the hope that Russia would normalize, rather than an acceptance of Marxist ideas. Stalin, on the other hand, remained true to the Marxist heritage in several important respects. He never openly abandoned atheism; what he did abandon was NEP, in order to promote industrialization on the basis of State ownership and to collectivize agriculture. In this perspective, "Socialism in one country" was a logical development of "Red patriotism" in the period of the stabilization of capitalism. Agursky attaches considerable significance to the publication in the USSR in 1926 of Shulgin's 1920 and the writer's visit to Russia in the same year. Shulgin was informed of the existence of Russian "national forces" who would push out the Jews from their positions of dominance. But it stretches credibility to suggest that the publication of 1920 was inspired by Stalin with the aim of portraying his political programme.

From Stalin's viewpoint, the adoption of "Socialism in one country" represented recognition that the USSR would have to rely on her own resources to build socialism, without the direct help of the West European proletariat. It followed from the position Lenin held in his 1918 "Theses on Peace": now that a socialist government was victorious, it was necessary to decide questions from the viewpoint of strengthening the revolution in Russia, rather than gambling on its spread elsewhere. From the viewpoint of the ordinary Party member, and perhaps the
ordinary worker, it allowed a sense of national pride in the belief that Russia was to be the first country to construct socialism. It was a step in the direction of narodnichestvo, for Populists as different as Herzen and Tkachov had suggested that Russia might be closer to socialism than Western Europe. From Trotsky's viewpoint, it meant "a mortal blow to the International". Isaac Deutscher spoke of two "quasi-Messianic beliefs" opposing each other: "Trotskyism with its faith in the revolutionary vocation of the proletariat of the West; and Stalinism with its glorification of Russia's socialist destiny." Trotsky could claim that Stalin's doctrine appealed to those who were tired of revolutionary upheavals; Stalin could accuse Trotsky's followers of lacking faith in Russia.

Agursky refers to the "exceptionally important role" of the national minorities on the Bolshevik side in the revolution and the Civil War. The Jews were especially well represented in Party and soviet bodies. The first two Heads of State, Lev Kamenev and Iakov Sverdlov, and the War Minister, Trotsky, were all Jews; indeed Trotsky rejected proposals that he be made head of the Sovnarkom, or alternatively Commissar for Internal Affairs, partly on the grounds of his Jewishness. The Politburo elected in March 1921 consisted of five full members - three Jews, one Georgian and one Russian; seven of the 27 members of the Central Committee elected in April 1922 were Jews. This over-representation fed traditional hostility towards the
Jews. In the mid and late 1920s, Stalin surreptitiously encouraged the view that the Trotskyite and Zinovievite opposition was a "Jewish mutiny", and this seems to have been believed by many workers. Trotsky accused Stalin of "Messianic nationalism", of seeking to build what he called "national socialism".

It is indeed tempting to see in the conflict between Stalin and Trotsky a clash between Russian messianism and a reconstructed Jewish messianism. To digress briefly, Trotsky's writings of the 1930s show striking similarities with Jewish messianism, despite his rejection of not only Judaism but also Jewish nationality. The theme of catastrophe (betrayals by the Stalinist and social-democratic leaders, the rise of Adolf Hitler and the victory of General Franco, the Second World War) is linked directly with the theme of redemption: the imminent world proletarian revolution, with the Fourth International becoming the most significant political force on Earth. Even a sense of personal messianism, with Trotsky himself as the Messiah, appears in his writings: "There is now no one except me to carry out the mission of arming a new generation with the revolutionary method over the heads of the leaders of the Second and Third Internationals" (1935).

Berdiaev's view of Russian Communism

The principal advocate of the interpretation of the Russian revolution in terms of Russian messianism was Berdiaev. His attitude to Russian messianism, however, was
by no means wholly enthusiastic. Already in 1918 he stated that the belief in the Russian people held by the Slavophils, Dostoevsky and the narodniks had been refuted during the revolution. The Russian peasant appeared to Berdiaev as a destructive force. Berdiaev contributed to a collection, compiled in 1918 by Struve and including authors from Vekhi, entitled De profundis or Iz glubiny (From the Depths). The collection could not be published in Moscow at the time but was put out by its printers there in 1921. The contributors claimed that the revolutionary events justified the fears that had been put forward in Vekhi about the lack of ethics and religion in the ideology of the Russian intelligentsia. The theme of the need for a religious consciousness was stronger in De profundis than in its predecessor. Izgoev saw the evils of Bolshevism as common to all Russian forms of socialism, while Pavel N. Novgorodtsev included Russian liberalism with Russian socialism as suffering from narodnik illusions.99

Berdiaev's attitude to the Russian people was complex. In Novoe srednevekove (The New Middle Ages, 1923-1924), he spoke of the universalism of the Russians, in terms reminiscent of Dostoevsky.

The Russian people, of all the peoples in the world, is the most pan-human and universal in its spirit; this belongs to the structure of its national spirit. And the calling of the Russian people must be the task of world unification, the formation of a single Christian spiritual cosmos.100

He held this idea throughout his life, repeating in The Russian Idea (1946) that the "Messianic consciousness is more characteristic of the Russians than any other people
except the Jews." Yet he was aware of the dangers of "rejudaization" in messianism (see above, p. 27). In Novoe srednevekov'ye, he saw the Russian people facing two temptations: exclusive nationalism and exclusive internationalism. Nationalism, while it had positive features, had produced the world war and threatened to cut Russia off from Europe. The war had, however, demonstrated how the fates of all nations were linked. Internationalism, in its atheist-socialist form, embodied in the Comintern, represented the idea of compulsory (prinuditel'nyi) universalism; what was needed was Christian universalism.

The processes directed towards overcoming national exclusiveness and forming a universal union I call the end of recent history, with its individualistic spirit, and the beginning of the new Middle Ages. In this sense the Communist International is already a phenomenon of the new Middle Ages ... 102

For Berdiaev, as for the Slavophils, socialism resulted from capitalism and both resulted from humanity's falling away from God. As Bulgakov had in 1905, he linked socialism with Jewish chiliasm, since both desired a paradise on this earth.103 Berdiaev like Bulgakov saw Marxism as a religious faith, a secularized form of Jewish messianism. Marx's proletariat was not the real working class but an object of faith, like his socialist society. The coming catastrophe of capitalism replaced the Last Judgement, the proletariat was the chosen people and the communist society replaced the Kingdom of God on Earth.104 Socialism was in principle opposed to democracy; democratic socialism (he mentioned Jean Jaurès, the SRs and the Right
Mensheviks) was not true socialism. Under socialism, power was wielded by a minority which claimed to represent the proletariat, and not by the proletariat itself. Socialism represented unity in Antichrist. Again like Bulgakov, Berdiaev was prepared to call himself a Christian socialist, but emphasized that this was not true socialism. His conception of socialism, then, was of an atheist, vanguard dictatorship. The Russians were not capable, said Berdiaev, of creating a liberal democracy. "Khomiakov and K. Leontev, Dostoevsky and L. Tolstoy, Vladimir Solovyov and N. Pyodorov subvert the bourgeois system and spirit no less than Russian revolutionaries, socialists and Communists. Such is the Russian Idea." The revolution had produced an extreme anti-humanist socialism. "The Russian people, as an apocalyptic people, cannot create a middle-of-the-road humanist realm; it can create either a brotherhood in Christ or a comradeship in Antichrist."

Berdiaev gave himself the ambitious aim, in The Russian Idea, of deciding "...what was the thought of the Creator about Russia". He produced a survey which emphasized the more extreme aspects of Russian thought, climaxing in the Soviet period. He referred to such contradictory propensities of the Russians as despotism and anarchism; slavery and revolt; nationalism and universalism; the unrelenting search for God, and militant atheism; and, above all, to the eschatological and messianic elements in Russian culture, the striving for universal salvation. The same dogmatism and self-sacrifice that was present in the
religious schismatics appeared in the Russian intelligentsia, and Berdiaev saw all the Russian revolutionaries as unconscious chiliasts, expecting the Kingdom of God on Earth. The messianic consciousness was present in the "Third Rome" concept and in the Third International. Just as the messianism of the Third Rome degenerated into imperialism, so was the messianic idea present in Russian Communism, but distorted by the will to power. The Godlessness of the October Revolution came not only from Bolshevik attitudes but because the Orthodox Church served tsarism. In 1917, Berdiaev said, Marxism was Russified and merged with Russian messianism. To Lenin, Marxism was above all the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat; Tkachov was more a predecessor of Bolshevism than Marx and Engels. According to Berdiaev, the messianic mission of the proletariat was identified with Russian messianism, and it was a universalist messianism because it desired a world revolution.108

Berdiaev's later writings show an attitude to the Soviet regime that was as complex as his attitude to the Russian people. The Soviet government was the only power that could defend Russia, and, despite its atheism and denial of freedom, it was somehow promoting positive spiritual values. Communism contained truth and justice, in its proclamation of brotherhood and its opposition to capitalism; the Stalin Constitution contained the best property legislation in the world. "Communism is right as against capitalism," he said.109 It was inevitable and just that the future belonged to the working classes. But
would their spirit be that of God or Antichrist?

Bolshevism made use of Russian traditions of dictatorship; further, the Third International, like the Third Rome, was founded on an orthodox faith. The Third International, moreover, was not international but represented a Russian national idea. Western Communists who joined the Third International were joining the Russian people and realizing the messianic calling of the Russian people. "...the proletariat of the whole world from France to China is becoming the Russian people - a unique people in the world." Approaching the Second World War, Berdiaev warned that "A defeat of Soviet Russia would be a defeat of communism, a defeat of the world idea which the Russian people proclaim."110 Even after abandoning Orthodoxy, the Russian masses were seeking God. Under Stalin, the way was being prepared for the spirit of community necessary for the new Jerusalem; for in the building of the classless society, even under a materialist ideology, there might be a spiritual renaissance, in which it would be seen that atheism and materialism belonged to the past, to the period of class conflict.111

In evaluating Berdiaev's conception of Russian Communism, it should be remembered that the thinkers and movements which he considered in The_Russian_Idea were almost entirely (Filofei excepted) in opposition to tsarism; the ideas of Peter I, Catherine II, Speransky or Alexander II cannot simply be excluded as un-Russian. What Berdiaev was presenting was primarily the ideas of the Russian
intelligentsia of the nineteenth century, as suggested by the subtitle of the Russian edition of the work. While it is true that the Petersburg bureaucracy was cut off from the narod, the intelligentsia was as well; this was demonstrated in 1874. Berdiaev believed not only that the Russians had a consciousness of being the chosen people, but also that they actually had a divine mission to begin to unite humanity. They would not live up to their vocation, however, unless they returned to Orthodoxy. Meanwhile, Orthodox Russians should understand the justified social demands which lay behind the rise of Communism, and seek to promote a religious regeneration of Russia.

Berdiaev's views were widely publicized in the West throughout his lifetime. His ideas were shared to some degree by others in the emigration. Fyodor Stepun held that the social policy of tsarism destroyed the Russian people's faith in Christianity, because autocracy and Orthodoxy were so interlinked. He suggested that Bolshevism had little to do with Western socialism, and was an "aberration of the religious energy of the Russian people". Russia had to reconcile Christian truth, humanistic freedom and socialist righteousness. Zenkovsky agreed with Berdiaev that, after the "horrible catastrophe of 1917", the Russian people could not be idealized. Russia's mission consisted only in being worthy of the Orthodoxy with which she had been entrusted, without any nationalism or messianism. "If the catastrophe of 1917 had its roots in the ideology produced in the West, today it is impossible to deny the
connection of this anarchistic-communistic ideology with rebellious forces that stem from within Russia itself."

If Berdiaev, Stepun and Zenkovsky looked to the Russian past for explanations of Communist rule, other writers have pointed to the non-Russian elements in Bolshevism. Explicitly attacking Berdiaev's analysis, H. Valin pointed to the existence of messianic and millennial movements among the European peoples. While not completely exculpating the Russians from the October Revolution, Valin claimed that the ideology, finance and personnel involved were mainly of Western origin. An insignificant proportion of the revolutionary leaders were Russians; Lenin had no Russian blood (his mother having Jewish-Swedish-German blood and his father Chuvash-Kalmyk blood). Russia had become like a crystal ball in which all peoples could see one of the possible variants of their future. Now, however, she was developing antibodies to the Western viruses."114

Similarly, Solzhenitsyn has emphasized the foreign origin of Marxism and the role of the Latvians in imposing it on Russia (see below, p. 495). His fellow-contributor to the collection From_Under_the_Rubble, Igor R. Shafarevich, takes a slightly different view. Although he does not mention Berdiaev in this context, he rejects Berdiaev's view that Bolshevism was a Russian distortion of Marxism: "the opinion that Bolshevism is a typically Russian phenomenon, the heritage of Nechayev and Bakunin and a perversion of Marxism". Shafarevich sees a "striking
coincidence of Bolshevik ideology and practice and numerous
statements by Marx and Engels". He claims that Marxism and
Russian nihilism are based on the same source - "a burning
hatred for surrounding life that can be vented only through
complete annihilation of that life". This is linked to
Shafarevich's view that a striving for the death of
humanity is fundamental to socialism.¹¹⁵Thus, while for
Solzhenitsyn Bolshevism is alien to Russia, for Shafarevich
it is part of a phenomenon which has occurred at different
times throughout recorded history, in Russia and elsewhere.
Valin, Solzhenitsyn and Shafarevich all reject Berdiaev's
view that Bolshevism is a manifestation of the Russian
spirit.
Trotsky saw the slogan of "Socialism in one country" as inaugurating the break between the internationalism of Lenin and the early years of the revolution, and the Russian "Messianic nationalism" (see above, p. 287) that was to emerge in the Stalin era. One need not take too seriously Nadezhda Krupskaia's observation to her mother-in-law that "Volodya ... is a passionate nationalist". But other writers, such as Alfred D. Low, Richard Pipes, Walker Connor and Mikhail Agursky have analyzed Lenin's thought and actions when in power and challenged whether Lenin was as internationalist as he claimed to be. They see him as seeking to exploit the feelings of the national minorities for the benefit of the Russian proletariat. Low, for example, wrote that Lenin "was partial to the Great Russian people and other large nationalities and considered the smaller nationalities expendable and their rights to self-determination not absolutely valid." After the Civil War, most of the former Russian Empire was re-united in the form of the USSR, under the centralized control of the Russian (or Russified) Bolsheviks in Moscow. The evolution of the attitudes of Lenin and Stalin to Russian messianism and Russian nationalism is best illustrated in the policies implemented in relation to the national minorities of the Soviet Union.

Lenin took great pains in his writings on the national question, as on other issues, to show that his views were derived from applying the method and conclusions of Marx and Engels to contemporary problems. In the application of
Marxist principles, Lenin showed a high degree of flexibility. For example, as a Soviet specialist recently put it, Lenin's views on federalism underwent a "difficult evolution"¹¹⁹: from hostility to federalism to acceptance, under the pressure of events, of the need for it. At the same time, Lenin consistently followed the founding fathers in both theory and practice by emphasizing the need for the unity of the workers of all nationalities, and by subordinating the national question to the class struggle. He also shared their belief that the interests of the proletariat were best served by the existence of large states, which offered the maximum potential for economic development.

From his earliest writings onwards, Lenin expressed his belief that all the Marxists of the Russian Empire, regardless of nationality, should be united in a single party. In 1903 he opposed the demand of the Jewish Social-Democratic Bund to be allowed to form an autonomous section for the Jewish workers in the Russian social-democratic movement. Further, he rejected the Bund's programme for "cultural autonomy" for minorities in the State, and the Armenian Social Democrats' call for Armenia to be allowed to federate with Russia.¹²⁰ Even more did he oppose the demand of the Polish Socialist Party for Polish independence. He believed that while Marxists should defend the right of nations to self-determination, they should also strive for the utmost centralization of the State. ¹²¹
Ten years later, Lenin seemed to have shifted his position somewhat. In his letter to S.G. Shaumian of 6 December 1913 he supported regional autonomy, while fiercely opposing federalism. The right to self-determination did not signify a right to federation. Lenin clearly hoped that the minorities would see the economic and political advantages of remaining in a large State, in which they would be guaranteed equality and language rights as citizens, but no particular collective privileges. If a nation wished to secede, however, it could "go to the devil". This attitude to national minorities - either join a centralized Russian State, or else have nothing to do with us - can be seen as having a chauvinist flavour. Lenin favoured "democratic centralism" within the State, together with "the autonomy of all parts". The right to secession was an exception to the general preference for centralism, an exception dictated by the need to overcome the minorities' fears of Great-Russian nationalism.

Similar motives were behind Lenin's rejection of Shaumian's belief that Russian should be the State language. He agreed that it was a progressive step for the minorities to learn Russian, but it would be still more progressive if they chose to do this voluntarily.122

Confusion was to arise over Lenin's attitude to the longer-term future of relations between nationalities. In his writings he repeatedly referred to the sblizhenie (coming together, convergence) and sliianie (merging, fusion) of nations. Unfortunately he used these words with
different meanings in different contexts. Sometimes the process of sblizhenie and sliianie of nations was occurring under capitalism; sometimes he used the terms to refer to the unity of the masses against capitalism; at other times he used them to refer to the fusion of nations and the dying out of national distinctions under communism. These differences of meaning account for some of the confusion among Soviet specialists on the nationality question as to whether sliianie is going on today, under "mature socialism", or whether it is a phenomenon of the future.

Thus in 1913, in his "Critical Remarks on the National Question", he wrote of the "sliianie of all nations in a higher unity", which grew with every stretch of railway line, every international trust or trade union. He spoke of conscious workers fighting for the "sliianie of workers of all nationalities in the struggle against reaction and every bourgeois nationalism". In these cases sliianie is a contemporaneous process. In early 1916 he was clearly referring to the future, however: "An aim of socialism is not only the abolition of the fragmentation of humanity into small states and every national isolation, not only the sblizhenie of nations, but also their sliianie." This sliianie was "inevitable" and it would come after the disappearance of classes. The sblizhenie-sliianie formula appears seven times in two other works of 1916, referring in each case to a process occurring after the socialist revolution. On one of these occasions it is stated that the process "will be completed
with the withering away of the State." After the October Revolution, Lenin continued to use the formulation in different senses. Thus in early 1918 he described the federation of nations as "a transition to voluntary sliianie". A year later, however, he called for the "sblizhenie and sliianie of the proletarians and working masses of all nations for the revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie".

In his "Critical Remarks", Lenin made clear his belief that assimilation was a good thing. "Whoever is not wallowing in nationalist prejudices cannot fail to see in this process of assimilation [assimiliatsiia] of nations by capitalism the greatest historical progress ..." Ukrainians or Lithuanians could rightly fear that Lenin had little respect for their national cultures. Lenin was aware that the internationalist sliianie he was putting forward (in the perspective of the distant future) might be confused by the minorities with the desire for Russian sliianie with small nations held by Nicholas II. This was why Lenin argued, against the cosmopolitan Marxist Rosa Luxemburg, that to refuse to recognize the right of nations to self-determination would play into the hands of the Russian nationalists and minority separatists. Walker Connor is wrong to say that Lenin underestimated the importance of Russian nationalism and the threat it might pose to the unity of the nationalities. In 1914, before the outbreak of war, he wrote in "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination" that minority nationalism was on the increase in the Russian Empire, and that this would provoke
a rise in Russian nationalism. The proletariat's task was "to combat nationalism of every kind, above all, Great-Russian nationalism". Lenin's article "On the National Pride of the Great Russians" was far from a disavowal of all national feeling, however. Written in December 1914, it rejected the chauvinism of tsarism and of those who supported the War, and took "national pride" in the Russian revolutionary traditions of the peasantry, the Decembrists and the working-class movement of 1905.

In 1916, while still opposed to federation in principle, he accepted that it was preferable to national inequality, and might be "the only road to full democratic centralism". His main point at this time, though, was that freedom to secede was a necessary prelude to the later sblizhenie and sliianie. But the right of self-determination was not absolute; the liberation of large nations was more important than the self-determination of small nations. Lenin explicitly endorsed Marx's view of the necessity of waging war against reactionary nations; if a few nations began a socialist revolution and others represented bourgeois reaction, the socialist nations would have to crush the latter. Other Bolsheviks abandoned the right to self-determination during World War One. G.L. Piatakov, the Bolshevik leader in the Ukraine, for example, rejected the idea of Ukrainian independence on the grounds that Russia needed Ukrainian sugar, coal and cereals. At the VII Party Conference in April 1917, Lenin defeated Piatakov's opposition to the right to self-determination.
and the Bolsheviks condemned the Provisional Government for failing to give unconditional support to the Finnish and Ukrainian demands for self-government.137

After October 1917, the new Soviet government reaffirmed the right of nations to self-determination. Already in December 1917, however, the hostility of the Ukrainian government to the Bolsheviks led Stalin, the People's Commissar for Nationalities, to question this right, and in January 1918 he redefined the principle to be "a right not of the bourgeoisie, but of the working masses of the given nation".138 Stalin's explicit subordination of national self-determination to the needs of socialism was in line with the position taken by Marx, Engels and Lenin. The idea that self-determination was to be exercised by the toilers appeared in Lenin's draft proposal for the Constituent Assembly, the "Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People". This called for a "federation of the Soviet Republics of Russia". The workers and peasants "of all the nations of Russia" were to decide at their own Congresses of Soviets whether or not to participate in the federation.139 The principle of federation was now conceded, in an attempt to win the minorities. In practice, however, the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), adopted in 1918, contained no specifically federal arrangements.140 The use of "Rossiiskaia" rather than "Russkaia" for "Russian" signified, however, that the State was to represent not only the Russian nationality but all the peoples of Russia.141
During the Civil War, the Bolsheviks sought to bring the toilers, as represented by the Russian (Rossiiskaia) Communist Party (RCP), to power in as much of the former Russian Empire as possible. The local nationalities were poorly represented among the industrial workers, and so the dictatorship of the proletariat meant the dictatorship of a Russian minority, effectively making the Russians the "chosen people" in a political sense. The situation was at its worst in Turkestan, where in 1917 the local Russian Bolsheviks banned the indigenous Muslims from participation in the leading bodies of the Soviet. Here, and in Bashkoria in 1920, racial warfare broke out between Bolsheviks and Muslims. The Turkestan ban on Muslims was reversed in 1920, under pressure from Lenin. In reality, there was no question of a free choice for the toilers of any of the nations; only a military struggle between pro- and anti-Bolshevik groups in which outside intervention played a dominant role.

Although Lenin, like the Slavophils and Vladimir Solovyov, favoured the maximum use of the Russian language in the long term, he was anxious about antagonizing the minorities. This is clear from his remarks during the discussion of the Party Programme, adopted at the VII Congress in March 1919.

From the workers of those nations which under capitalism were oppressors are demanded special care in relation to the national feeling of the oppressed nations ... and aid to ensure not only the actual equality but also the development of the languages and literatures of the formerly oppressed nations, in order
to remove all the traces of the alienation and distrust inherited from the capitalist epoch.\textsuperscript{144} This was to be a major part of Soviet nationality policy: not only equal rights for the minority languages, but their further development. Lenin attacked Piatakov for saying that nations, and concessions to the minorities, were unnecessary. Nations would disappear, but only at a higher stage of communism. Communists who opposed the use of non-Russian languages were Great-Russian chauvinists.\textsuperscript{145} It should be stressed that Lenin made these points on many occasions.\textsuperscript{146} In 1920 he reaffirmed that national and State divisions would "still persist for a very, very long time even after the realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat on a world scale".\textsuperscript{147}

The 1919 Party Programme incorporated Lenin's ideas on national equality and the right to secede, while emphasizing proletarian unity. A "federal association of states" was envisaged as "one of the transitional forms" to "complete unity" (\textit{polnoe edinstvo}).\textsuperscript{148} As well as the RSFSR, Communist-rulled soviet republics were established in the Ukraine and Belorussia, and for a time in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. But the VIII Congress made it clear that despite the existence of these independent states, the RCP was to remain a centralized organization operating within them all. The Ukrainian and other regional committees were subordinated to the RCP Central Committee.\textsuperscript{149} Thus the leaders of the "independent" republics were subordinated to Moscow.
In 1920-1921, the Bolshevik conquest (with varying degrees of local support) of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, considered strategically and economically necessary, raised the question of federal links between the soviet republics. Stalin, as Commissar of Nationalities, advocated "autonomization", the transformation of the republics into autonomous republics of the RSFSR, such as had been done in Tataria, Bashkiria, Kazakhstan and Turkestan. Lenin had become increasingly worried about the behaviour of Moscow's emissaries in Transcaucasia and the need to respect native opinion. On 26 September 1922 Lenin sent a letter to the Politburo rejecting "autonomization" and insisting that the RSFSR and other independent republics should federate as equals in a "Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia".\(^\text{150}\) As a first step, the three Transcaucasian republics were federated into one, over Georgian Communist objections; then on 30 December the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia and Transcaucasia united in the USSR.\(^\text{151}\)

On the same day Lenin was in despair at the brutal treatment of the Georgians by Moscow's representative, G.K. Orjonikidze, and the collusion of Stalin and F.E. Dzerzhinsky. He blamed the latter two for what he called a "truly Great-Russian nationalist campaign".\(^\text{152}\) Lenin noted that members of other nationalities (Dzerzhinsky being Polish and Stalin Georgian) who became Russified were particularly inclined to Russian nationalism. Lenin added later that the Chair of the new Central Executive Committee of the All-Union Congress of Soviets should "obligatorily"
rotate around the different nationalities\textsuperscript{153} - a point that seems to have been completely ignored. The "strictest rules" would have to be introduced to guarantee the position of the national languages in the republics, and it might even be necessary to re-devolve to the republics responsibility for all aspects of internal affairs. He predicted, in one of his last writings, that with the Great-Russian chauvinist domination of the State apparatus, the "freedom to secede" from the USSR would be "a mere scrap of paper, unable to defend the non-Russians from the onslaught of that truly Russian man, the Great-Russian chauvinist".\textsuperscript{154}

It can be seen that while some of Lenin's policies favoured centralization, and therefore Russian control of the non-Russians, he was nevertheless very anxious about the dangers of Russian nationalism. He saw the October Revolution as a model for the workers of Europe and the peoples of Asia and the colonial world, and the Communist parties affiliating to the Comintern had to accept the "21 Points" laid down by the Bolsheviks. But unlike the Slavophils and some narodniki, he never had a mystical faith in the Russian people or proletariat, and always regretted Russia's cultural backwardness in relation to Europe. Lenin can be placed only at the margins of Russian messianism, not in the mainstream.

\textbf{Russian messianism and the nationality question under Stalin}

Despite Lenin's last wishes, the 1924 USSR Constitution
reserved most powers to the centre. Central RSFSR organs were typically converted into the corresponding USSR organs. This reinforced the centralized nature of the Party. On the other hand, the XII Party Congress in 1923 adopted the policy of korenizatsiia: seeking roots in the minority populations by recruiting "national" (i.e., national minority) cadres to run the national republics, and increasing the role of the national languages. Lenin's goal of sliianie was not abandoned; but national cultures, "national in form, socialist in content", would be encouraged to blossom, for the time being. Instruction in the national languages was rapidly introduced into the schools, and in some cases into higher education as well. The programme for publishing textbooks in these languages had begun in 1918, and by 1924 they were published in 25 languages. This figure rose steadily to 76 languages in 1931 and 104 in 1934. Many languages which formerly existed only in the vernacular, including Belorussian, were given alphabets and literary forms. The Russian language ceased to be a compulsory subject in the schools of the national republics. In the Ukraine, where most of the industrial workers were Russian-speaking, the Party leadership was handed over to native Ukrainians. These promoted the Ukrainian language to the point where, in 1933, eight-ninths of factory newspapers were in Ukrainian and all university lectures had to be delivered in that language. The XV Congress (1926) resolved that particular attention should be devoted to economic development in the formerly backward borderlands. This
policy led to the migration of workers, specialists and administrators from the RSFSR to develop industry in the non-Russian republics and train personnel from the native population. At least up to the early 1930s, Party recruitment of native cadres was pursued energetically, and the share in the membership of the (still over-represented) Russians and Jews fell.\(^{159}\)

But the policy of *korenizatsiia* was not enough for some of the minorities. There was a rebellion in Georgia in 1924. The Muslim Basmachi waged intermittent armed struggle until 1933, while within the ruling Party the "Muslim Communists" led by Sultan-Galiev revolted against Russian domination. Stalin had Sultan-Galiev arrested in 1923, and this was followed in 1927 by further purges of Muslim Communist leaders on charges of nationalism.\(^{160}\) In 1929 Stalin was still calling for an expansion of the role of the native languages, and asserting that national differences would begin to disappear only after the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat worldwide. In 1930 at the XVI Party Congress he was still saying that Great-Russian chauvinism was a greater danger than local nationalism, and this view appeared in the Congress resolution. At the same time he openly asserted that the aim of encouraging the flourishing (*rastsvet*) of national cultures was to create conditions for their ultimate fusion.\(^{161}\) This seems to indicate the beginnings of a change in the public attitude of Stalin, now supreme leader, to the national question. He apparently increasingly saw the blossoming of the nationalities as a
threat to the State.

In the borderlands, collectivization inevitably took the form of an attack on the national minorities, as the Russian workers from the towns sought to impose change on the non-Russian peasants. It might be noted that in Russia proper, even in 1928 the traditional obshchina (which had been strengthened by the division of the big estates in 1917) was defended in the Party Press as a unit of socialist society, and the new kolkhoz frequently coincided with the territory of an obshchina. The Kirghiz and Kazakhs, however, suffered heavy losses as nomads were forcibly settled. In the Ukraine, it was openly claimed that an aim of collectivization was to abolish the individual peasant basis of Ukrainian nationalism. Purges within the Ukrainian Party in 1930-1932 proved to be the prelude to the artificially-induced famine of 1932-1933 which killed perhaps seven million people. In 1933 N.A. Skrypnik, the leading official proponent of Ukrainianization, committed suicide amidst charges of nationalism, and many nationally-minded intellectuals were exiled or shot.163

The year 1934 marked a clear change. Party leaders for the first time openly began to express and encourage Russian nationalist feeling. The Press began to talk about the importance of loving the fatherland. Such a form of Soviet patriotism, on its own, was not necessarily Russian nationalism; but it was followed in subsequent years by the
rehabilitation of Russia's pre-revolutionary past. This was not the "national pride" that Lenin had taken in the peasant revolts or the Decembrists, but the exaltation of Russian military heroes, be they Muscovite tsars or generals such as Kutuzov and Suvorov. The Press linked the patriotism of Alexander Nevsky, who defeated the Swedes in the thirteenth century, and of Dmitry Donskoi, who defeated the Tatars at Kulikovo Field in 1380, with the patriotism of Soviet Russians, and praised the (tsarist) "national Russian State". Monuments from, and memorials to, the tsarist past were repaired or constructed. The smenovekhovtsy Aleksei Tolstoy and Ehrenburg presented the Russian revolution as a Russian national achievement, rejecting the "cosmopolitanism of the nineteenth century". 164 Agursky sees the purges of the 1930s as a counter-revolution, an attempt to impose the right-wing nationalist ideology on the Party by destroying the leftist leaders. 165 Of particular importance to the non-Russians was the re-interpretation of history. Russian historians claimed that the incorporation of the nationalities into the tsarist Empire, while leading to national oppression, was nevertheless the "lesser evil" in comparison with the alleged alternative, incorporation in the Ottoman or Persian Empires. Further, their presence in the Russian Empire enabled them to benefit from soviet power after 1917. 166

Accusations of bourgeois nationalism abounded against non-Russian Communist leaders, and the native elites were devastated in the purges. N.S. Khrushchev's transfer to
head the Party in the Ukraine is an example of a Russian being sent to do a job previously done by a member of the local nationality. This trend facilitated the resurrection of the Russian language among the minorities. By 1938, many national schools had omitted Russian from the curriculum; in that year, it was made compulsory.\textsuperscript{167} It would appear that the regime was seeking to build a political base among the Great-Russian population, as the dominant nation, in order to hold the Soviet Union together.

In May 1941, Stalin took the Russian nationalist campaign a stage further. The Central Committee ideological journal Bol'shevik published an article, entitled "On Engels's Article 'The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism'" which it said Stalin had written in 1934. Stalin's article was a defence of tsarism against an attack by Engels in an article of 1890. Stalin accused Engels of overestimating the role of Tsarist Russian expansionism as a threat to world peace at the time. He had neglected the struggle for markets, raw materials and colonies and the antagonism between British and German imperialism. It appears from the conclusion to Stalin's piece that the Bol'shevik editors had in 1934 intended to publish Engels's article, and Stalin had told them not to.\textsuperscript{168} Stalin's criticisms of Engels, it should be stressed, were made entirely within a Marxist framework, but their publication on the eve of the Nazi attack must have been designed to facilitate the use of tsarist patriotic symbols in the
The German occupation revealed the negative consequences of the nationality policies pursued in the 1930s. Western and Soviet scholars disagree about the extent of the phenomenon, but it seems that large numbers of Ukrainians and people from the Caucasus and newly-incorporated Baltic nationalities welcomed the invasion. Some fought with the Germans against Soviet Russia (as did some Russians also). Stalin's accusation that whole nationalities - the Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, Kalmyks, Kabardinians, Balkars, Chechens, Ingush, Karachai and Meskhetians - had collaborated with the Nazis was disowned by later Soviet leaders. But the deportation of these groups to Central Asia was a signal to the other nationalities, especially the Muslims, to accept their subordinate place in the increasingly Russian-dominated USSR. (Some Western Ukrainians and Lithuanians continued to offer armed resistance against their annexation until the mid-1950s.)

In terms of its effect on the Russians, however, the appeal to Russian nationalism during the Great Patriotic War must be considered a success. In September 1941 Stalin admitted to Averell Harriman, the American Ambassador, that the Russian people were not fighting for the Party. "We are under no illusion that they are fighting for us. They are fighting for Mother Russia." From the Lenin Mausoleum in Red Square, Stalin addressed the troops bound for the front on the anniversary of the revolution, 7
November 1941: "Let the manly images of our great ancestors - Alexander Nevsky, Dimitry Donskoy, Kuzma Minin, Dimitry Pozharsky, Alexander Suvorov, and Mikhail Kutuzov - inspire you in this war!"171 This invocation of tsarist Russian heroes could appeal to Russians, and to many Ukrainians and Belorussians, but not to the other nationalities. The dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943 was highly symbolic, but perhaps not as significant as it is sometimes considered to be, for most non-ruling Communist parties continued for the time being to be loyal to Moscow. The new anthem of the Soviet Union which replaced the Internationale in 1943 stated that the USSR had been created by "Great Rus'". Alongside Russian patriotism, however, there remained an attempt to appeal to the non-Russians through their own traditions, as well as the more orthodox Soviet patriotism. Walter Kolarz was moved to write during the War that this Soviet patriotism was the ideology of a "new Party" which had replaced the Bolshevism of the "old Party".172

Stalin's "victory toast" of 24 May 1945 made clear that the Russians were to be seen as the core of the USSR. It was both an attempt to carry over into peacetime the support that he had won from the Russians during the War, and a signal to the non-Russians.

I would like to propose a toast to our Soviet people, and in particular to the health of the Russian people.

I drink first of all to the health of the Russian people because it is the leading nation of all the nations belonging to the Soviet Union.

I propose a toast to the health of the Russian people
because it earned in this war general recognition as the guiding force of the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our country.

I propose a toast to the health of the Russian people not only because it is the leading people, but also because it has a clear mind, a firm character and patience. 173

The tremendous losses and sacrifices made in the War by the Soviet population, above all by the Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian and of course Jewish peoples, had a major impact on the feelings of the masses. One of the themes of Russian messianism now taken up by official Soviet propaganda was Russia's military services to humanity. Russia had saved Europe from the Mongols, from Napoleon and now from the Nazis - a view which reflected Russian popular sentiment. 174 Along with this universalist messianism - Russia as servant - came a nationalist messianism, trumpeted from official platforms. The creativity of the Russians was praised to unheard-of heights. Russia owed nothing to the West, but led the world in everything. From 1944, chauvinist claims abounded, such as "Russian science, like all Russian culture, has always been original and independent." 175 A. A. Zhdanov, the ideology Secretary of the Central Committee, claimed in 1946: "Our literature, reflecting a system many times superior to any bourgeois democratic order, a culture many times higher than any bourgeois culture, has the right to teach other people a new, universal, human morality." 176 The virulent attack on Western culture, characterized as bourgeois cosmopolitanism, continued until the death of Stalin. At its height, Peter I and even the nineteenth-century
Westernizers came under attack. From 1945, more emphasis was placed on Marxism in the assertion of Russian primacy; it was pointed out that not only did Russia have the first successful workers' revolution, but Russian had been the first language into which Das Kapital had been translated, and Marx himself had learned Russian.

Stalin's ideological innovation, the leading role of the Russian nation, combined elements of Marxism, Leninism and Russian messianism and nationalism. Commentators such as Boris Ishboldin, like Ustrialov in the 1920s, saw the possibility of Marxism being undermined from within, with the emergence of leaders who would wish to replace Marxism with Russian nationalism. In 1950 F.I. Kozhevnikov updated Stalin's criticism of Engels's views on tsarist foreign policy; American, British and other imperialisms had sometimes been more expansionist and predatory than Russian imperialism. Clearly, for Stalin the use of Russian nationalism was more than a short-term tactic.

In the non-Russian areas, the national languages were maintained in the national schools and Press. An exception was West Belorussia, reunited with Belorussia at the end of the War, where the Press was in Russian alone, apparently because the authorities considered Belorussian nationalism to be weak. Stalin expected that only after the world victory of socialism would the languages of the world merge into "zonal" languages, such as Russian, which would later merge into a common world language. The national languages became mainly a vehicle for the transmission of Russian culture to the non-Russians. It was usually the latter who
were obliged to speak of the leading role of the Russian nation in the USSR. References were made to the "voluntary unification" of particular peoples with the Russians under tsarism. In contrast to the theory of the "lesser evil", it was claimed in 1951 that "In the economic life of the peoples included in Russia, there was much that was new and positive." The non-Russians had benefited from the acquisition of Russian culture. Traditional heroes of the non-Russians, such as Imam Shamil who resisted tsarist expansion into the Caucasus, were portrayed as reactionaries. Against this, it should be emphasized that Russian culture also suffered badly after the war, as exemplified by the silencing of Anna Akhmatova and Mikhail Zoshchenko. But among the full and candidate members of the Party Central Committee elected in 1952, Russians increased from 66.9% (of those elected in 1939) to 71.5%.

The Russian nationalism of Ivan Aksakov and some other nineteenth-century figures had been accompanied by pan-Slavism. It was perhaps not surprising that during the War Moscow sought to stimulate pan-Slav feeling against the Nazi occupiers of Slavdom. In August 1941 an All-Slav Meeting was held in Moscow, and addressed by Aleksei Tolstoy. The meeting created a committee which organized further meetings and a journal Slaviane (The Slavs). This promoted the ideas of Slav union and Moscow as the spiritual centre of Slavdom. Stalin declared that Hitler was seeking to exterminate the Slavs. Support was sought
from Slav emigrants in the Americas. When the Nazis were driven back, Slavonic committees were established in Eastern Europe with the aim of promoting friendship with the USSR. A congress was organized in Belgrade in December 1946. There seems little dispute that Soviet pan-Slavism was a tactic, rather than a long-term ideological change. Moscow wanted not a Slav federation, but a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe which would extend beyond the Slav countries (to Romania, Hungary and Germany), based mainly on bilateral relations with the USSR. In this context pan-Slavism was an obstacle to Soviet aims, and it was largely dropped by 1950.
The Russian Orthodox Church and Russian messianism under Lenin and Stalin

Even before 1917, Lenin's strong antipathy to any form of religion took a particularly hostile form as far as the Russian Orthodox Church was concerned, because of the links of the latter with the tsarist State. At the same time, he saw the adherents of the religions other than the official Church as potential allies against tsarism, because of the persecution some of them had suffered. The 1918 decree on religion, separating the Church from the State and the school from the Church, and nationalizing Church property, severely weakened the position of the Orthodox Church, as the established faith, but had less effect on other religions. The Constitution of 1918 promised freedom of religious and anti-religious propaganda.184

The newly-restored Moscow Patriarchate pursued a line that was generally hostile to the atheist Bolsheviks (even in December 1917 the Sobor demanded that the head of the Russian State be Orthodox), although from 1919 it was formally neutral between the Reds and the Whites. The ruling Party attempted to combine frontal attacks on the Patriarchate with support for the efforts of the pro-Soviet "Living Church" movement to take over the Church from within. Under Lenin, large numbers of hierarchs and priests were arrested, and many believers were killed. The Patriarch of Moscow, Tikhon, was arrested in 1922. In July 1923, having been released, he published a "confession", in which he stated that he had been involved in "anti-Soviet activities" of which he now repented.185 The Church
leaders continued to suffer arrests and exile. Since the "Living Church" lacked credibility with the laity, the regime sought to pressurize successive leaders of the Patriarchate to carry out its wishes. Tikhon died in 1925. In March 1927, the Patriarchal locum tenens, Metropolitan Sergii of Nizhny Novgorod, was released from prison. The following summer he made a declaration of loyalty to the Soviet government. He asked for the position of the Church to be normalized, and for a Sobor to be held to elect a Patriarch.

We want [he said] to be Orthodox, and at the same time to recognize the Soviet Union as our civic motherland, the joys and successes of which are our joys and successes, and the failures are our failures.¹⁸⁶

Following this declaration, Sergii was allowed to take over the administration of the Church, and the government abandoned its support for the "Living Church". The respite proved temporary; the 1929 Law on Religious Associations removed the legal right of religious propaganda, confining the churches to the role of worship. From 1929 to the mid-1930s all the religions in the Soviet Union, including the Orthodox, suffered severe persecution. This was associated with Stalin's "left turn"; the churches were accused of backing the "kulaks" and opposing collectivization. Bishops and priests went to labour camps, and churches were destroyed, including some of great historical significance. One of the effects of this was to drive much religious activity underground; considerable sections of the Orthodox Church had already rejected Sergii's declaration of loyalty to the atheist State. As far as other churches were
concerned, the Roman Catholics had been without a single bishop since 1926; and by 1939 several Protestant denominations had been destroyed. The Russian Orthodox Church itself in 1939 had "only a few hundred clergy and open churches left, only seven bishops were still in office and all diocesan administrations, except those in Moscow and Leningrad, had had to cease their activity." 187

In the late 1930s there seems to have been some slackening of the pressure on the religions, as Stalin subordinated everything to the struggle to develop the defence industry. 188 When the Nazis attacked in June 1941, Metropolitan Sergii responded at once with a call on Christians to take an active part in the war, emphasizing that the fates of the Orthodox Church and the Russian nation had always been linked. The Church collected millions of roubles for national defence, equipping the Dmitry Donskoi tank column and the Alexander Nevsky air squadron. In September 1943 Stalin and the Foreign Minister, V. M. Molotov, received Sergii and two other metropolitans in the Kremlin and promised to improve conditions for the Church. A Sobor of hierarchs was held and elected Sergii as Patriarch of Moscow. At the same time, thousands of Orthodox churches were re-opened throughout the country. Other faiths also had their position improved and regularized; the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists (AUCECB) was established for the Protestant groups, and four Spiritual Directorates were created for the Muslims. A major factor in the change in the official attitude to religion was the
experience in the Western parts of the Soviet Union. Here the Nazi occupiers re-opened the churches, which were then filled with believers. This show of religious feeling must have suggested to Stalin the propaganda advantages of permitting freedom of worship. Provided that religious activity was under the control of approved bodies, who would proclaim loyalty to the government, another channel of political socialization would be created, which could immediately be used to encourage the war effort.\textsuperscript{189}

Within the context of the new religious freedom, the Orthodox Church was given a privileged position. Whereas the other faiths were administered by the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults, it was governed by the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Church was allowed to publish the monthly Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), and the Patriarch's pastoral letters were published in the government paper Izvestiia. Following the death of Patriarch Sergii, a Sobor was held in January-February 1945 to elect Metropolitan Aleksii of Leningrad as Patriarch.\textsuperscript{190}

A graphic example of the State's partiality to the Orthodox Church was the forced incorporation of the Ukrainian Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church into the Russian Church. This was accomplished by a so-called Uniate "Sobor" in Lvov, held in March 1946, when much of the Uniate leadership, including Metropolitan (later Cardinal) Slipyj, was in captivity. The Uniate Church, as the major
denomination in the Western Ukraine, had been a bastion of Ukrainian nationalism, and with the incorporation of the Western Ukraine in the USSR Stalin sought to make the Uniates illegal. The interests of the Soviet State and the Orthodox Church coincided. The State wanted to use the Russian Church as an instrument to fight Ukrainian nationalism, and the Church wished to expand its influence into territories which it considered had been unjustly torn from it centuries before. The Orthodox Church was given especially favourable conditions to proselytize among the Uniates. In practice, many Uniate priests and believers went over to Orthodoxy in appearance only, maintaining their loyalty to Slipyj. 191

The dissident Russian Orthodox priest Gleb Pavlovich Iakunin (born 1934) wrote in 1976 a critical samizdat account of the activities of the Patriarchate under Stalin. He is right to see Stalin's support for Orthodoxy as part of his move to a "nationalist-chauvinist policy", in which the Church was given the role of a "catalyst and cementing component". 192 The Russian Orthodox Church was the traditional church of not only the Russians but also of most Ukrainians and Belorussians, covering the three largest nationalities in the USSR. In return for Stalin's support, the Church heaped the highest praise on him, using language normally reserved for Jesus. Stalin was "the first man of peace", with an "all-embracing heart which takes on itself all the pain of suffering". 193 It was he "whom Divine Providence chose and placed to lead our Fatherland on the path of prosperity and glory". 194
Iakunin suggests that Aleksii expected that Stalin was about to declare the country a pan-Slav Orthodox Empire. 195

The presentation of Stalin as "God's chosen one" was a direct descendant of Filofei's portrayal of the Tsar. This concept was extended to the messianic presentation of Moscow as the "chosen city", the "Third Rome". The occasion was the 800th anniversary of the founding of the city, in 1947. Archpriest N.A. Khariuzov, for example, combining Orthodox and Communist ideas, wrote in Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii:

Now Moscow is the centre of the social life of humanity, the centre which unites all progressive and democratic elements, and in religious life Moscow is not the centre of aristocratically despotic Catholicism or of anarchic Protestantism. Moscow is the centre of true Orthodoxy, rejecting this or that extreme.

It is not only among us Russian people that the thought of Moscow awakens the best memories of our native country, but also among the peoples of the fraternal republics, among all the Slavs, and among all the freedom-loving peoples the thought of Moscow evokes the best, bright hopes for the future...

Moscow is a beacon, a beacon not only for us Orthodox, but also for those seeking true, unclouded civil, national and religious freedom. Moscow is a beacon for all of toiling humanity, for all who seek religious and social truth. 196

In November 1947 the Metropolitan of the Levant, Elie Karam, visited Patriarch Aleksii. In a speech he portrayed the Russian people as the chosen people.

I have found out a lot about the great Russian people and its Church and am now personally convinced that the Russian Orthodox Church is the greatest Church of Orthodoxy... The Lord God blesses the Russian people as He once blessed Abraham. The Russian people is like the people of the Holy Land and the Russian land can be compared with the Holy Land of Palestine. 197
More directly, the Bulgarian Metropolitan Stefan said in 1948: "Moscow became the Third Rome by occupying the place of the First in its confession of Christ's truth." 198

The last two quotations exemplify the use of the Russian Orthodox Church in promoting Soviet foreign policy. Part of the price paid by the Church for its relatively privileged position in the USSR was the obligation to promote among foreign churches, and later in ecumenical church bodies, official Soviet views, as well as denying the existence of any religious persecution. The Russian Church was not successful in its attempt to take over the role of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Orthodoxy, the Patriarch of Constantinople. But, owing to the Soviet military control of Eastern Europe, it was able to establish itself as the "elder brother" of the Orthodox churches in the Balkans, and hence promote Soviet interests through churches in Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia. 199

**The Jews under Lenin and Stalin**

Before the revolution, Lenin and Stalin both argued that the Jews were not a nation or a nationality, since they did not have a common territory. They were a caste, and the best solution to the Jewish question was the assimilation of the Jews to the surrounding nationalities. 200 Lenin opposed both anti-Semitism and Zionism, seeing them as divisive within the labour movement, and his own attitude to the Jews has been described as "philo-Semitism". 201 Stalin, on the other
hand, was anti-Semitic even in his twenties. In his report on the V Party Congress (1907), Stalin noted that while the overwhelming majority of Bolshevik delegates had been Russian, Jews were the largest group among the Mensheviks. He added lightheartedly that this had led someone to suggest that the Bolsheviks should start a pogrom against the Mensheviks.\(^{202}\) According to Edward E. Smith, in Stalin's major work "The National Question and Social-Democracy" (1913), he mentioned the Bund, Jews and Jewish customs over 185 times, and not one comment was favourable.\(^{203}\)

After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks confirmed the ban on religious and national discrimination which had been decreed by the Provisional Government. Lenin yielded to Jewish pressure and gave the Jews the legal status of a nationality. In 1918, Jewish sections (Evsektsii) were established within the Party, and in the State machine a People's Commissariat for Jewish Nationality Affairs was created. (The latter was merged into the Commissariat for Nationalities in 1924.) The prime aim of these bodies, composed of Jewish Bolsheviks, was to conduct propaganda among the Jewish population. The Evsektsii campaigned (until their demise in 1930) against Judaism and Zionism, while promoting Yiddish-language schools and publications. They had the traditional Jewish community organizations dissolved in 1919 for alleged counter-revolutionary activity. Hebrew publications and education were virtually banned from 1919, because of the association of the
language with religion and Zionism. The assault on the Jewish religion was at least as strong as on any other religion. At a propagandistic "trial of the Jewish religion" in Kiev in 1921, it was alleged that the Talmud instructed the Jews to "murder the best of the goyim".204 This occurred despite the numerous pogroms suffered by Ukrainian Jews during the Civil War, which left over 50 000 dead.205

An attempt was made to free the Jews from their confinement to a limited number of occupations, by reconstructing the whole of Jewish economic life. It was considered essential that Jews should become farmers, and there was a substantial programme of Jewish agrarian resettlement. The most ambitious attempt to enable the Jews to preserve their own nationality within Soviet society and undermine the appeal of Zionism was the creation in 1934 of the Jewish autonomous oblast', known as Birobijan. Although it was located in inhospitable territory in the Far East, on the Chinese border, tens of thousands of Jews did go there. Kalinin in 1926 had said: "The Jewish people stands before a great task: to preserve its nationality."206. It was envisaged that this nationality would be preserved by the use of Yiddish as the official language in Birobijan. In practice, the overwhelming majority of Jews remained West of the Urals, where they soon began to use the Russian language and abandon Yiddish. In Birobijan, the share of Jews in the total population never rose above about a quarter; Yiddish never became dominant, and by 1945 there were no Yiddish
schools left. With the decline in Jewish religious belief and observance, many Soviet citizens were reminded of their Jewish origin only by the nationality entry in their passports, introduced in 1932.

The Soviet Press through the 1920s denounced anti-Semitism, and Kalinin admitted that the Russian intelligentsia was more anti-Semitic than it had ever been before the revolution. In 1929 Pravda even attacked the connivance of Party organizations in allowing anti-Semitism. Stalin in 1931 and Molotov in 1936 publicly attacked anti-Semitism, perhaps for the benefit of anti-Nazi foreign audiences, with Molotov even pointing to Marx's Jewish origins. The Great Purge marked a turning-point in the official attitude: former Jewish leaders of the USSR such as Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Radek were denounced as traitors, while the patriotism of the Russians was being exalted. The Central Committee elected as late as 1939 nevertheless still had a Jewish composition of 10.8% - a substantial decline from the early twenties but an overrepresentation of their 5% of the total population.

The period of the Nazi-Soviet pact (1939-1941) was, to say the least, a worrying time for Soviet Jews. The Soviet propaganda machine, in promoting the non-aggression agreement, not only ceased to attack fascism but focussed on the common interest of the USSR and Germany in the defeat of the Western imperialist democracies. The atheist
magazine Bezbozhnik (The Atheist) in 1940 praised the Nazi attack on Judaism. The Soviet Jewish test pilot Mark Gallai wrote in Novyi mir in 1966 of the atmosphere at the time: "Much appeared to us inexplicable, wild, unnatural... fascists ceased to be called fascists." The situation changed in 1941. The Soviet government held a meeting of leading Soviet Jewish representatives of the arts and sciences, where it was pointed out that the Jews were the chief victims of the Nazis. In April 1942 the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was established, with the writer Solomon Mikhoels in the chair and Ilia Ehrenburg a member. The Committee was to mobilize Soviet Jews and win support for the Soviet war effort from Jews in the Allied countries. In this latter purpose, it was analogous to the pan-Slav committee. At the same time, it seems that the partisan detachments who fought behind the German lines were frequently viciously anti-Semitic, especially in the Ukraine. How much this was to do with the Nazi attempts to stir up the Slav and Baltic peoples against the Jews is difficult to say. During (as well as after) the War, internal Soviet propaganda tended to play down the Nazi treatment of the Jews, as indeed did British and American propaganda at this time. At least part of the reason for the silence on the Soviet side was probably the Soviet unwillingness to give any credence to Nazi propaganda claims about "Jewish Bolshevism". Any emphasis on Jewish suffering, coming from the Soviet media, might have played into the hands of the Nazis. Both Germans and Soviets must have been aware of the anti-Semitism present in the Western part of the Soviet Union at this time and demonstrated
later in the Harvard refugee project. 210

An additional factor in the Soviet attitude was the presence of anti-Semitism among the Soviet leaders themselves. Ehrenburg was reported to have referred to this anti-Semitism in 1945. Further, the Soviet leaders believed, according to Solomon Schwarz, that if publicity was given to the Holocaust, the Nazi actions might be welcomed by the Soviet population. In the Ukraine, the Soviet authorities seem to have admitted caution in confronting anti-Semitism; they stated that it could only gradually be uprooted. Schwarz nevertheless suggests that the appointment of a Jew, Lazar M. Kaganovich, as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine in 1947 was intended to condition the population to accept the Jews. An alternative explanation might be that it was designed positively to encourage anti-Jewish feeling in the Ukraine. Jews were virtually excluded after the War (despite their positive role in the Soviet Army) from the ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade. 211

Whether this exclusion reflected genuine fears about the loyalty of the Jews to the Soviet State in international affairs is difficult to ascertain. The Soviet recognition of Israel in 1948, despite long-standing opposition to Zionism, gave some legitimacy to the idea that Soviet Jews might have a homeland outside the USSR. The enthusiasm of some Soviet Jews for the establishment of Israel was shown by the welcome given to Golda Meyerson 329
(Meir), Israeli Ambassador to Moscow, in October 1948.
This may well have been the catalyst for the "anti-cosmopolitan" campaign which began soon afterwards. The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was dissolved in November 1948, and the main Yiddish newspaper Einikeit (Unity) was "suspended" - that is, closed down - at the same time. In April 1949 five leading Yiddish writers were jailed (Mikhoels had died in mysterious circumstances in January 1948). There followed a major attack on the Soviet Jewish community, who were accused of being "rootless cosmopolitans". The wave of purges and executions was much more clearly directed at the Jews than in the 1930s. The Press was full of "criminals" with Jewish names, and in cases where the individuals had Russian names, their original Jewish names were added in brackets. Blows fell on all aspects of Jewish culture. The former Soviet Jewish physicist and emigration activist, Mark Ia. Azbel, writes:

Russians were not wholly exempt from these attacks; but nine out of ten of the criminals were Jews.... No part of the Soviet Union was more amenable to the adoption of measures toward the suppression of Jews than the Ukraine.... the majority considered the ever-increasing dismissals and arrests of Jews in the late 'forties and early 'fifties a matter of indifference, if not a welcome change in policy.212

The proportion of Jews in the 1952 Central Committee (full and candidate members) slumped from 10.8% to 3.0%. The campaign reached its climax in the "Doctors' Plot" of January 1953, when Jewish doctors were accused of plotting to poison Stalin. Anti-Semitism was being stirred up on the streets. Rumours spread that eminent Jewish figures were about to issue a statement recognizing the "guilt" of
the Jewish people, and asking the government to exile Soviet Jews to Siberia. Pogroms were in the air. This atmosphere lifted only when Stalin died in March 1953, and the new leaders announced that the "Doctors' Plot" had been a frame-up.213

Stalinism and Russian messianism: an appraisal

Agursky explains the growth of official Russian nationalism under Stalin by the displacement of Marxism-Leninism by National Bolshevism as the ideology of the top leadership. Rather like Trotsky,214 Agursky sees the purges of the 1930s as part of Stalin's counter-revolution, intended to destroy the Bolshevik Party and replace it with a party committed to a right-wing nationalist ideology. At the same time Stalin did not want to abandon the international appeal of Communist ideology, for it could be used for Russian national objectives. Moreover, he was unsure whether the new elite was prepared to jettison Marxist phraseology. Agursky says that the multinational nature of the Soviet Union also constrained Stalin.215 Opposed to Agursky's position is the view of Frederick Barghoorn, expressed in his Soviet Russian Nationalism (1956) and elsewhere. For the latter, Soviet Russian messianism is "Communist imperialism" in Russian guise.216 Nationalism was only a tactic, under which the Soviet leaders concealed their Marxist-Leninist aims.

...to a surprising degree the rulers have succeeded in utilizing for their own purposes these traditional and spontaneous forces without themselves succumbing to their appeal.

A great weakness in the Kremlin's use of Russian nationalism - and of other elements of traditional
culture, such as the Russian Orthodox religion - is that it cannot, if it is to retain its ideological and power monopoly, be 'sincere' in relation to those elements. 217

Nevertheless, Barghoorn saw Russian nationalism creeping into the Soviet ideology, which he described as "a synthesis of parts of the Russian tradition and parts of Marxism". 218 And he admitted: "To a considerable degree, the 'Soviet' themes and symbols in Soviet ideology mask 'covert' or 'latent' Russian attitudes." 219

It would not be easy to establish whether Stalin's Russian nationalism was sincere. Where Agursky cannot be faulted, however, is in his recognition of a profound reorientation during the 1920s and 1930s, both in official attitudes and in policy, as far as Russian nationalism is concerned. The internationalism and universalist messianism of the October Revolution gave way to "Socialism in one country", initially an attempt to allow the revolution to survive in a hostile capitalist world. "Socialism in one country" developed, however, into a policy of making Russia into something resembling a normal member of the international system (reflected in the Soviet entry into the League of Nations in 1934), unwilling unduly to alienate capitalist allies abroad. Revolution was soft-pedalled or repressed in the Popular Front period (especially during the Spanish Civil War), and even the ideological struggle with Nazism was abandoned during the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. After the War, the division of the world into superpower spheres of influence left ambiguous the Soviet attitude to revolution in the West.
(shown in Stalin's unwillingness to aid the Greek Communists). The imposition of the Soviet model on the East European countries and their subordination to Moscow to some extent can be represented as a result of nationalist messianism. The compulsory teaching of the Russian language in the schools of the satellite countries, and in Bulgaria even the Russification of the alphabet, echoed earlier efforts within Tsarist Russia. The Chinese imitation of the Soviet model, outside Soviet control, did not evoke Stalin's enthusiasm.

In the field of nationality policy, Lenin's worst fears were borne out. Not only did the freedom to secede become a "scrap of paper", but from the 1930s the non-Russian Communist leaders were forced to recognize Russian primacy. It would be wrong to suggest that Russian culture was privileged; many of its creators died in the camps. The Russian Orthodox Church, seen under Lenin as particularly counter-revolutionary, came back under Stalin in a privileged position and did what the Communist Party could not: it proclaimed that Moscow was the Third Rome and that Stalin was chosen by God. Lenin's opposition to anti-Semitism gave way to the apparent adoption of Nazi attitudes by Stalin after the War. It seems at least possible that a reason for the attacks on the "rootless cosmopolitans" was that the very existence of the Jews was a threat to the primacy of the Russian "Chosen People". The traditional anti-Semitism of Russian nationalism here encountered the actual overrepresentation (and sometimes dominance) of the Jews in Soviet political life, arts and
sciences. In proclaiming Russian primacy, and in mobilizing this anti-Semitism at the end of his life, Stalin seems to have been appealing for support to the Russian and Ukrainian masses. The reaction to his death suggests that he got that support. Perhaps Stalin was not really motivated by either Marxism-Leninism or by Russian nationalism, but by a personal ideology, centring on the need for him to maintain and expand his power, at whatever cost.

This chapter has surveyed socialist Russian messianism from Herzen and the narodniki to Stalin. There might seem to be little in common between the messianism based on the agrarian obshchina and the extension of the power of the newly-industrialized USSR into Prague and Berlin. But the Populist belief that Russia could be a model for socialism in the West fed into Russian Marxism and then Bolshevism. The isolation of the revolution meant that it would either collapse, or survive "in one country". This made a certain appeal to national feeling inevitable. The founders of scientific socialism had already shown in the nineteenth century how easy it was to combine their doctrine with nationalist messianism - in their case, the German variety. Stalin, secure in power in a Russia faced with capitalist encirclement, replaced the German ingredient with the Russian equivalent.
Footnotes

1. Murvar, discussing the Westernizers, claims that "their commitment to Russian messianism cannot be questioned." But his account concentrates on Chaadaev and the later (non-Westerner) period of Herzen's life, thus avoiding the body of evidence to the contrary. (Murvar, "Messianism", pp. 312-15.)


3. Mikhail A. Bakunin, Russkim pol'skim i vsem slavianskim druz'iam (Geneva, 1888), p. 28, as cited in Fadner, pp. 163-65 (the quotation is on p. 164), 169-70.


7. Ibid., 24 January 1844, II, 328.

8. Ibid., 21 February 1844, II, 336.


15. Acton, pp. 124-26; Maximilien Rubel, "A Visionary


18. Venturi, p. 129.

19. Walicki, Controversy, pp. 18-20; Venturi, pp. 147, 150-52, 160, 196-203; Gleason, Young Russia, pp. 185-225.


31. Idem, "Der magyarishe Kampf", Neue Rheinische Zeitung,
13 January 1849, MEW, VI, 168.


37. Marx to Engels, 20 July 1870, MEW, XXXIII, 5.


40. Engels, "The European Struggle", New York Daily Tribune, 5 May 1855, in MECW, XIV, 163-65 (I was unable to locate this in MEW).


42. Marx, letter to Otechestvennye zapiski, 1877, MEW, XIX, 107-112.

43. MEW, XXXV, 166-67.

44. MEW, XIX, 295-96; Walicki, Controversy, pp. 179-94; Neil A. Martin, "Marxism, Nationalism and Russia", JHL, 337


48. Ibid., pp. 100-115.

49. Moshe Mishkinsky, "The Jewish Labor Movement and European Socialism", in *Jewish Society through the Ages*, p. 287.


57. Berdiaev, in *Vekhi*, pp. 6, 13 (quotation).


64. This is expanded in my MA thesis and in my "Ivanov-Razumnik and the Russian Revolution: From Scythianism to Suffocation", CSP, XXI, No. 1 (March 1979), 15-27.


68. Sarkisyanz, "Russian Attitudes", pp. 253-54.


73. Agursky, Ideologiiia (see n. 71).

74. Ibid., pp. 51-52, 224.

75. Nikolai V. Ustialov, V_bor'be_za_Rossiiu (Harbin,
1920), pp. 5, 13, as cited in Agursky, Ideologiia, pp. 64-65.

76. Lenin, "Detskaia bolez' 'levizny' v kommunizme" (27 April 1920), PSS, XLI, 60; Agursky, Ideologiia, pp. 62-63.

77. Utechin, Russian Political Thought, p. 254.

78. Agursky, Ideologiia, pp. 78-79.


81. Lenin, "Politicheskii otchet Tsentral'nogo Komiteta RKP(b) 27 marta" (1922), PSS, XLV, 94.


84. Trotsky, Draft Programme, p. 57.

95. Agursky, Ideologija, pp. 238-46. Agursky insists that "it was not Jews who initiated the revolutionary process and directed it." (Agursky, Third Rome, p. 97). The Jews were used, he claims, by the revolutionary organizations and by Lenin. "In the framework of Lenin's quest for Russian world political leadership, Jews must serve the role of natural Russian allies." (Ibid., p. 94.)


100. Nikolai A. Berdiaev, Novoe srednevekov'ye Razmyslenie o sud'be Rossii i Evropy (Berlin, 1924), p. 38.


105. Berdiaev, Novoe srednevekov'ye, p. 87.

106. Ibid., pp. 106-107, 118, 139-42 (final quotation, p. 142).


110. Ibid., pp. 173-74.

111. Berdiaev, Russian Idea, pp. 250-55, Origin, pp. 168-


118. Low, p. 15.


121. Lenin, "Natsional'nyi vopros v nashei programme" (15 July 1903), *ibid.*, p. 233.

122. Lenin, "S.G. Shaumianu" (6 December 1913), *PSS*, XLVIII, 233-36.

123. Lenin, "Kriticheskie zametki po natsional'nomu voprosu" (October-December 1913), *PSS*, XXIV, 131.

124. Lenin, "Eshche o razdelenii shkol'nogo dela po natsional'nostiam" (published 17 December 1913), *PSS*, XXIV, 237.

125. Lenin, "Sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia i pravo natsii na samoopredelenie" (January-February 1916), *PSS*, XXVII, 256.
126. Lenin, "Zametki k tezisam 'Sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia i pravo natsii na samoopredelenie'' (January-February 1916), ibid., p. 457.

127. Lenin, "Itogi diskussii o samoopredelenii" (July 1916), PSS, XXX, 21, 22 (latter quotation), 44, and "O karikature na marksizm i ob 'imperialisticheskom ekonomizme'' (August-October 1916), PSS, XXX, 120 (twice), 121, 129.

128. Lenin, "Chernovoi nabrosok proekta programmy" (published 9 March 1918), PSS, XXXVI, 76.

129. Lenin, "Proekt programmy RKP(b)" (in or before March 1919), PSS, XXXVIII, 94, and again almost identically at p. 111.

130. Lenin, "Kriticheskie zametki po natsional'nomu voprosu" (October-December 1913), PSS, XXIV, 127.

131. Lenin, "Itogi diskussii", PSS, XXX, 44.


133. Lenin, "O natsional'noi gordosti velikorossov" (12 December 1914), PSS, XXVI, 106-110.

134. Lenin, "Sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia", PSS, XXVII, 255-56.


137. Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, I, 267-68.

138. Ibid., p. 272.

139. Lenin, "Deklaratsiia prav trudiashchikhsia i ekspluatiruemogo naroda" (4 January 1918), PSS, XXXV, 223.

140. Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, I, 144-50.


142. Pipes, Formation, pp. 91, 163-83.


144. Lenin, "Proekt programmy RKP(b)", PSS, XXXVIII, 94-95, 111 (quotation).

145. Lenin, "Zakliuchitel'noe slovo po dokladu o partiinoi programme, 19 marta" (1919), PSS, XXXVIII, 181-84.
146. V.I. Lenin, KPSS o sovetsknom natsionalnom gosudarstve (M., 1981), pp. 15-96, includes examples of this, frequently referring to the impact on the peoples of Asia and Africa.

147. Lenin, "Detskaia bolezn'", PSS, XLI, 77.

148. KPSS v rezoliutsiakh i resheniakh s"ezdov, konferensii i plenumov TsK. II, 1917-1922 (M., 1983), 79.

149. V.I. Lenin, KPSS, p. 104.

150. Ibid., pp. 84-86.

151. This relies particularly on Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, I, 259-413; Pipes, Formation, pp. 266-89; Moshe Lewin, Lenin's Last Struggle (London, 1975), esp. pp. 43-89.

152. Lenin, "K voprosu o natsional'nostiakh ili ob 'avtonomizatsii'". PSS, XLV, p. 361.

153. Lenin, "Zapiska L.B. Kamenevu o bor'be s velikoderzhavnym shovinizhom" (6 October 1922), PSS, XLV, 214.


455), and The_Great_Retreat: Growth_and_Decline_of Communism_in_Russia (New York, 1946).


168. Josef V. Stalin, "O stat'e Engel'sa 'Vneshniaia politika russkogo tsarizma'", Bol'shevik, 1941, No. 9, pp. 1-5.


173. Vneshniaia-politika_Sovetskogo_Soiuza (M., 1947), III, 47, as cited in Barghoorn, Soviet, p. 27.


177. S. Kovalev, in Izvestiia, 13 August 1947, as cited in Kohn, Pan-Slavism, pp. 315-16.


181. Militsa V. Nechkina, "K voprosu o formule 'naimen'shee zlo' (pis'mo v redaktsiiu)", VI, 1951, No. 4, pp. 44-48 (quotation, p. 47).


185. Metropolitan Sergii, message of 1 July 1923, as cited in Iakunin, "Moskovskaia", RV, No. 1, pp. 112-14.

186. Metropolitan Sergii and the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, "Deklaratsiia", 29 July 1927, as cited in Iakunin, "Moskovskaia", RV, No. 1, p. 130.

187. Simon, p. 66.


195. Iakunin, loc. cit.


201. Korey, Soviet Cages, pp. 64-65.


211. Schwarz, Jews, pp. 342-53; Baron, Russian Jew, p. 267; Korey, Soviet Cage, p. 57.


221. Roucek, "Fan-Slavism in Our Day", p. 263.
In Stalin's last years a form of Russian messianism had become integrated into official thinking. Khrushchev did not renounce the idea of the Russian people as the elder brother of the other peoples of the USSR, but he did end the extreme Russian chauvinism and anti-Semitic terror which characterized the final period of the rule of his predecessor. While Russian nationalism under Stalin was tightly controlled, the Khrushchev era saw the re-emergence in the USSR of semi-autonomous and autonomous manifestations of Russian nationalism. This came about through two distinct developments. The first was the process of de-Stalinization, promoted by Khrushchev at the XX Party Congress in February 1956 and the XXII Congress in October 1961. The second was the attempt, proclaimed at the XXII Congress, to achieve the basic requirements for the transition to full communism in the USSR by 1980. This aim threatened the continued existence of differences between nationalities, and therefore the existence of the Russian nation, and the survival of religion.

In ideological terms, the most important effect of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the XX Congress was the diminution of faith in official Marxism-Leninism. For decades the personality of Stalin had been at the centre of the ruling ideology. The pro-capitalist dissident Vladimir K. Bukovsky recalls in his memoirs that he was bewildered
that life continued after Stalin's death.¹ Mark Azbel vividly portrays the devastation and sincere grief felt by the overwhelming majority of the Soviet population on the death of the vozhd'.² Yet now the father of his people, the architect of socialist industrialization and the victory over fascism, was being denounced as a mass murderer. The announcement of Stalin's guilt implicitly challenged the infallibility of the Party (although this was far from Khrushchev's intention; he argued that in unmasking Stalin the Party was again showing the people the true path).³ Those who had believed most fervently in Stalin, naturally, were the most disoriented, and some of these were later to seek a new form of infallibility in religion.

Vladimir Nikolaevich Osipov, the future editor of the samizdat journal Veche, described in a 1970 article the consequences for him and part of his generation of Komsomol members of Khrushchev's "secret speech". Osipov was born in 1937 in Chizhikovo village in Pskov oblast'. He became a history student at Moscow University. Stalin was the man who

so personified the existing system and ideology that the very words 'soviet power' and 'Stalin' seemed synonymous. All of us future seditious elements at the dawn of our youth were fanatical Stalinists. At the call of this man, who seemed to us the summit of human intelligence, will and conscience, we were ready to do anything. We did not look at life, or notice the poverty of the villages and the petty tyranny of the officials, and we believed with a truly religious zeal. The personality cult was the super-perversion of the traditional honouring of the leader.

Khrushchev's report and the XX Congress annihilated our faith, tearing out the heart of our world-view, and Stalin was the heart, for such was the propaganda of
Marxism over the preceding quarter of a century.4

Mikhail Iukhanovich Sado, a Leningrader born in 1934, was to become deputy head of the underground All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Emancipation of the People (VSKhSON). Like the other leaders of the organization, he had been a fervent believer in Stalin and communism, and de-Stalinization was a great shock to him.5 Leonid I. Pliuschch, the Ukrainian mathematician, tells how Khrushchev's speech shook "the foundations of my ideology - faith in Comrade Stalin's brilliance and endless kindness toward workers".6 Pliuschch did not lose his belief in socialism, however, but came to combine it with a concern for human rights and the national rights of the Ukraine.

The second effect of the XX Congress was that many of the repressive features of the Stalin era were relaxed or disappeared altogether. Anatoly Emmanuilovich Levitin-Krasnov, born in 1915, an Orthodox Church writer, Moscow human rights activist and socialist, says that people were no longer afraid to think.7 The dissident Moscow socialist Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev notes, however, that it was the XXII Congress which had a much greater impact on the political consciousness of the Soviet people. Whereas Khrushchev's speech at the XX Congress had not been published in the USSR, the anti-Stalinism of the XXII Congress was openly expressed, and led to the redesignation of places named after Stalin and the removal of his body from the Lenin mausoleum.8 Nevertheless, the reduction of repression after Stalin's death showed its effects already
in the mid-1950s, even before the XX Congress. This was seen in the growing freedom of official cultural life, the rebirth of the consciousness of the national minorities and the growth of unofficial cultural and political activity. All these developments fostered the growth of Russian nationalism.

**Literature and Russian national consciousness. Early village prose, Solzhenitsyn and Novyi mir**

An important result of cultural relaxation in the mid-1950s was the appearance of new literary journals. Among these were *Iunost* (Youth), published by the Union of Writers of the USSR; *Moskva* (Moscow), published by the same body and the Moscow Writers' Organization; *Nash sovremennik* (Our Contemporary), established in 1956 as an organ of the USSR Union of Writers, but which in 1958 became an organ of the newly-formed RSFSR Writers' Union; *Molodaia guardiia* (Young Guard), published by the Komsomol; and *Voprosy literatury* (Problems of Literature), published by the Gorky Institute of World Literature. These journals, all based in Moscow, provided homes for writers who criticized various aspects of Soviet life. Further, two volumes of the anthology *Literaturnaia Moskva* (Literary Moscow) were published in 1956, after which the editorial board was disbanded for going too far. The most significant journal in the cultural thaw, however, was the long-established *Novyi mir* (New World), published in Moscow by the USSR Union of Writers. 9

The genre of literature which contributed most to the
development of Russian national consciousness, and then of Russian nationalism, was that known as *derevenskaia_proza* - village, or rural, prose. This began with a concern for the problems of the countryside, and particularly the desire to protect the peasants from the exploitation which they suffered on the collective farm (*kolkhoz*). It developed into a literature which advocated the protection of peasant morality and customs, the villages themselves, and the churches and other historical monuments of Russian culture. It became linked with the defence of the Russian natural environment against the predacity of technological progress. The practitioners of *derevenskaia_proza* became known by the rather condescending term of *derevenshchiki*, which was acoustically close to a word denoting rural idiocy (*derevenshchina*). Some *derevenshchiki* went so far as to give a positive portrayal of the peasants' traditional Russian Orthodox Christianity.

Village prose can be dated back to the writing of Valentin Ovechkin (1904-1968), whose short story "Raionnye budni" (District Routines) appeared in *Novyi_mir* in September 1952, even before the death of Stalin.\(^{10}\) Ovechkin portrayed the real situation on the *kolkhozy*, with peasants trying to avoid their obligations and suffering low living standards. He showed the conflicts among the *kolkhoz* leaders and the supervisory Party officials, exposing the remoteness and arrogance of some of the ruling cadres. A second instalment appeared in *Pravda* in July 1953, after Stalin's death. Ovechkin wrote of the need for
the peasant to feel that he was the master of his land, and in 1956, in his collection *Trudnaia vesna* (A Difficult Spring), he argued the necessity for an effective system of material incentives on the kolkhozy. His stories reflected the changing political situation of these years: a bad Party Secretary might be replaced by a good one, but the problems remained. Ovechkin became a member of the editorial boards of both *Novyi mir* and *Nash sovremennik*. In 1962, at the Kursk raion conference of the CPSU, he criticized Khrushchev's agricultural proposals. Finding himself isolated, he shot himself, but survived and was put in a mental hospital.

Ovechkin's work was followed in *Novyi mir* by other writers, in particular Efim Ia. Dorosh (1908-1973), Gavriil N. Troepolsky (born 1905) and Evgeny N. Gerasimov (born 1903). These three authors advocated a shift of decision-making from the central authorities to the farms, particularly in the light of Khrushchev's mistaken agricultural policies of the late 1950s. Dorosh attacked the State's attempt at the "regimentation of human activity" in the economic sphere; he and Gerasimov called for the expansion of peasant private enterprise and free markets, while Troepolsky called for stability in planning and for the farms to be allowed to make their own decisions about what to sow. Dorosh's *Derevenskii dnevnik* (Village Diary) was published in a number of instalments from 1956 to 1970, charting the changing fortunes of the countryside in the light of emerging problems and Party reactions. More than Ovechkin, he portrayed the peasants as
individuals and showed his respect for them. He sympathetically described their homes, clothes, tools and their caring relationship with the environment. While denying that he himself was religious, he argued for the preservation of village churches and showed appreciation of the peasants' religion. He also called for the rapid extension of modern utilities to the villages, and for the democratization of the kolkhoz, in order to increase the peasants' identification with it. Dorosh was not a xenophobe; he attacked the government's cultural isolation of the Soviet people. "Peoples, like individual persons, cannot live in isolation, and the more boldly a people draws from the outside, the healthier and more vivacious it will be." Dorosh's views in this respect may be associated with the fact that, unlike the other writers of village prose, who all seem to be Russians, males and born in Russian villages, he was of Jewish nationality (and born in the Ukraine) and perhaps more inclined to genuine internationalist strivings.

The work of Dorosh and others might be seen as a response to the call of Fyodor A. Abramov (1920-1983) in Novyi_mir in April 1954 for writers to cease minimizing the real problems of the countryside. In 1958 Abramov himself began a long series of novels. It concerned the peasant Priaslin family of a village in the Arkhangelsk oblast' of Northern Russia, during the War and postwar years. It depicted their mutual solidarity and their oppression by corrupt local Party officials, and was completed only in
1978. He came under attack from the authorities for his 1954 appeal, and for his 1963 story "Vokrug da okolo" (Round and About), which was denounced as anti-Soviet. In the Brezhnev era, he became one of the most popular writers in the USSR for his novels and short stories. 17

The story "Rychagi" (Levers) by Aleksandr Iashin (1913-1968), born in Vologda in the North, shows the transformation of four down-to-earth human peasants when they meet as the Primary Party Organization of their kolkhoz, and speak in the bureaucratic-Stalinist language of their political masters. This appeared in the second Literaturnaia Moskva almanac. His "Vologodskaiia svad'ba" (Vologda Wedding) published in Novyi mir in December 1962 portrayed not only the neglect of the villages by the authorities, but also the moral degeneration of the peasants themselves. Both these stories aroused the ire of the literary critics for their outspokenness, perhaps not only because of their direct attacks on the Party, but also because, unlike in the Abramov series, the events were located in the present. 18

A writer who was to become prominent in the Russian nationalist movement came to notice with the publication of his "Vladimirskie proselki" (Vladimir Country Roads) in Novyi mir in September and October 1957. Vladimir Alekseevich Soloukhin was born in 1924 to a peasant family in the village of Olepino in Vladimir oblast', and these sketches depict his return in 1956 to his native region. This theme of the rediscovery by a town dweller of his
village roots was common among the derevenshchiki of the 1950s and 1960s. Soloukhin showed enthusiasm for marshes and meadows. Like Dorosh, he depicted the peasants' problems but expressed admiration for their customs, their folk art and their churches. Vladimir oblast', as Soloukhin himself has said, is "the very heart of Russia", including the ancient cities of Vladimir and Suzdal, which formed the core of the Russian State prior to the dominance of Moscow. It was from Vladimir oblast' that Osipov was to edit the journal Veche. Soloukhin's essays Kapli rosy (Dewdrops, 1962) and his novel Mat'-Machekha ("Coltsfoot", literally Mother-Stepmother, 1964) continued his preoccupation with the countryside. As Leonid Pliushch points out, this concern for Russian culture did not prevent him from taking part in the denunciation of Boris Pasternak in 1958 after he was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature.

Sergei Pavlovich Zalygin (born 1913) turned only relatively late in his literary life to the problems of the village, with his story "Na Irtyshe" (On the Irtysh) published in Novyi_mir in February 1964. Set in Siberia, where Zalygin had lived most of his life, it told of the injustices perpetrated during the collectivization of agriculture. It showed the resistance of the peasants, and the unnecessarily brutal way in which collectivization had been implemented. This was one of a number of works published in Novyi_mir, up to September 1965, which were critical of Stalin's peasant policy.
It was Aleksandr Isaevich Solzhenitsyn, born in Kislovodsk in 1918, who had the greatest impact on the development of Russian national feeling, both in the Khrushchev period and under Brezhnev. His stories "Odin den' Ivana Denisovicha" (translated as _A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich_) and "Matrenin dvor" (_Matryona's House_), published in _Novyi mir_ in November 1962 and January 1963, respectively, presented his view of the Russian peasant in specific real Soviet contexts. "Matrenin dvor" portrays the appalling poverty of a Russian village in 1953. Moreover, it takes further than any other of the works of village prose the idea of the old peasant woman as the repository of traditional moral values, in a rural world corrupted by the needs of Soviet industrialization. Matryona's spirit of self-sacrifice holds her village together, and she, like the author, is motivated by Christianity. According to Grigory Pomerants, writing in samizdat, "for a million people Christianity began with reading 'Matryona's House'." This figure of the old Orthodox peasant woman was to recur in later village prose, most notably as Valentin Rasputin's Daria in "Proshchanie s Materoi" (see below, pp. 432-33).

As a political statement, "Ivan Denisovich" was of incomparably greater significance than any of the other stories cited here. The illiterate peasant Shukhov shows his shrewdness in his successful struggle to survive in the Stalinist prison camp. The Christian element here is only marginal; Shukhov believes in God, but does not expect any
good from Him. Solzhenitsyn himself was not one of those who had his faith in Marxism shattered in 1956. He had gone to the camps as a Marxist-Leninist, and argued there that Stalin had distorted Lenin. But through his sufferings in prison he changed his convictions and before the XX Congress had become an Orthodox Christian.

What was perhaps most remarkable about "Ivan Denisovich" was that it was published at all; until then, discussion of life in the camps had been virtually banned from the official Press. To understand how Novyi-mir came to publish the story, and indeed much of the other work discussed here, a word must be said about the evolution of the journal and its relation to political liberalization and de-Stalinization. Novyi-mir after the death of Stalin provided a home not only for those concerned with the protection of the villages and peasant traditions, but for anti-Stalinist writers of all tendencies. Representatives of "youth prose" such as Vasily Aksyonov and younger poets such as the liberal Communist Evgeny A. Evtushenko published in Novyi-mir. A shared demand of these different political tendencies was the relaxation or abolition of literary censorship. Criticisms of the mistakes of the Stalin era and of the vestiges of Stalinism in contemporary society appeared regularly in the 1950s and 1960s. The chief editor, Aleksandr T. Tvardovsky (1910-1971) was removed from his post in August 1954 for allowing criticism to go too far. Abramov's appeal was one of the items specifically attacked. This followed a meeting of the
Central Committee Secretariat at which Khrushchev (then seeking to ally himself with conservative forces against Prime Minister G. M. Malenkov) himself came out against Tvardovsky. Konstantin Simonov replaced Tvardovsky (who himself had replaced Simonov in 1950 in the same job). Simonov, however, was not a conservative, and his appointment in 1954 suggested that the Party leaders were prepared to allow Novyi мир to continue in the same direction as under Tvardovsky. Simonov published articles by writers who had been banned under Stalin, and promoted the literature of the national minorities in translation, including criticism of Russian chauvinism. Among the anti-Stalinist essays and novels which Simonov published was Vladimir Dudintsev's Не хлебом единым (Not by Bread Alone, August to October 1956). 27

In 1957, in reaction to the liberalism of Novyi мир and of the Moscow Writers' Organization (and to the Hungarian uprising), there was established the Union of Writers of the RSFSR. This was headed by Leonid S. Sobolev, described by Michael Glenny as a "hard-line Stalinist", and it was intended to weaken the influence of the liberal Moscow writers. The journals Октябрь and Наш современник, previously published by the USSR Writers' Union, were handed over to it. As it was specifically the union of the writers of the Russian Republic, it is perhaps not surprising that it became the major literary centre not only of conservatism (as was the intention) but also of Russian nationalism. 28
Conservative pressure forced Simonov from the editorship of Novyi_mir in June 1958. In a major defeat for the literary Stalinists, however, his replacement was again Tvardovsky. Khrushchev himself seems to have chosen Tvardovsky for his anti-Stalinism, seeing him as a bridge to the intelligentsia. The editorial board still included conservatives who might impede Tvardovsky's efforts. The editor's instinct for what at any given time might be acceptable, and what unacceptable, to the Party leadership, allowed the publication over the next few years of much that criticized the Stalin era and proposed improvements in contemporary Soviet life. The memoirs of the smenovekhovets Ilia Ehrenburg gave some insight into the situation of culture under Stalin, while the same writer also advocated the publication of the work of Russian writers who were not sympathetic to the regime. At the XXII Congress, Tvardovsky called on writers to be bolder in telling the truth. Following this, he became a candidate member of the Central Committee. From September 1961, the anti-Stalinist content of Novyi_mir sharply increased. Dina Spechler suggests that Tvardovsky feared that the wave of de-Stalinization initiated by the Congress would be short-lived, and sought to maximize his output in the time available. The journal also attacked Vsevolod A. Kochetov, who had been appointed editor of the conservative Oktiabr'. Kochetov was a Stalinist writer, close to the Central Committee Secretaries M.A. Suslov and F.R. Kozlov, who themselves were critical of Khrushchev. In this situation, Khrushchev was keen to use Novyi_mir against his
In his memoirs, The Calf Butted the Oak, Solzhenitsyn says that he did not distinguish Novyi mir as standing out from the other Soviet literary journals. More recently, he has revised this assessment. In November 1961, having read Tvardovsky's speech at the XXII Congress, and remembering him as the author of the wartime poem "Vasilii Terkin", Solzhenitsyn decided to submit "Ivan Denisovich" to Novyi mir. Tvardovsky liked it, and after Solzhenitsyn made certain changes and deletions to render it more palatable to the leaders, it was read to Khrushchev. The latter saw the value of the story for his power struggle, but he was unable on his own to overrule the conservative forces in Glavlit, the censorship apparatus, who would oppose publication. Two meetings of the Presidium (Politburo) of the Central Committee were required before the decision was taken in October 1962 to publish the story. Following this decision, Pravda published (at Khrushchev's instigation) Evtushenko's poem "Nasledniki Stalina" ("The Heirs of Stalin"). This drew attention to the conservative forces within the leadership which were opposing de-Stalinization. The enthusiastic reception given by political and cultural figures and journals, other than Oktiabr', to "Ivan Denisovich" facilitated the publication of Solzhenitsyn's other work, such as "Matrenin dvor", which conveyed his real ideas more openly.

Solzhenitsyn in his memoirs states that he was able to have his writings published only by giving the impression
that he was a loyal Soviet citizen, while all the time really aiming for a confrontation with the authorities. He tells how Tvardovsky, a sincere Communist reformer, said of Solzhenitsyn's novel *The First Circle*: "...the novel's standpoint is that of the Party - it contains no condemnation of the October Revolution". Zhores Medvedev, the exiled socialist geneticist, has accused Solzhenitsyn of rewriting history in relation to his own past. He suggests that rather than having tried to cover up his real views in the early 1960s, Solzhenitsyn has evolved ideologically since then into someone much more critical of socialism, and is an "absolutely different person". Here Zhores Medvedev follows the views of Vladimir Ia. Lakshin. The latter was the chief literary critic of *Novyi mir* from 1962 to 1966, and then unofficially Tvardovsky's deputy, until he was removed from the editorial board in 1970. Lakshin believes that Solzhenitsyn was probably sincerely trying to be accepted in Soviet literature and please the top leaders in 1962-1964. If the leadership had had a more tolerant attitude to Solzhenitsyn, Lakshin believes that he would not have assumed the open anti-Soviet attitudes he took in the 1970s.

Lakshin, in a 1975 samizdat rebuttal of Solzhenitsyn's memoirs, provided a summary of what he considered to be the programme of *Novyi mir* under Tvardovsky, from 1958 to 1970.

There were, of course, a number of points on which *Novy Mir* saw eye to eye with Solzhenitsyn. We too disliked the Soviet brand of centralized, bureaucratic socialism; we defended humane justice against dry
dogmatism; we were appalled by the horrors of the Stalinist prison camps and protested, whenever we could, against the many subtle forms of social and political hypocrisy practiced in the USSR. But we believed in socialism as a noble ideal of justice, we believed in a socialism that was human through and through and not just with a human face. We regarded the democratic rights of the individual as incontestable. We sought support for our feelings and convictions among the people, and while abhorring the cheap, phony pathos that so often mars the use of that expression, we always cherished the awareness of a common cause with working people. 34

The balance of evidence suggests to me that Tvardovsky and Lakshin misunderstood Solzhenistsyn. The religious elements in his outlook (to say nothing of his poem "The Feast of the Victors") gave no ground for compromise with Marxist ideology or the Soviet political system. The story told in The_Calf_Buttoed_the_Oak, although by most accounts biased, of a lone figure with a secret strategy to bring down the system that created the GULag, seems both plausible and compatible with Solzhenitsyn's actions, as described by Lakshin.

In late 1962 and early 1963, coinciding with the publication of "Ivan Denisovich" and "Matryona's House", there was a conservative counter-attack on Novyi mir. In February 1963 Kozlov and Suslov persuaded Khrushchev, for a time, to end the discussion of the Stalin era and dam the flood of prison-camp writing that was surging into Soviet literature. Tvardovsky, unlike Khrushchev, did not back down, and published an article by his deputy editor, Aleksandr G. Dementev (born 1904), defending the need for the journal to continue its criticism of alien phenomena in Soviet life. 35 Dementev has been portrayed by Solzhenitsyn
as a "dark spirit" who acted as a brake on Tvardovsky, and it is true that he was generally more cautious than the latter; but he seems to have been as committed as Tvardovsky to the defence of literature, so long as it remained within a Communist framework. On the other hand, conservative forces moved against "Matryona's House". One example was the critic Viktor A. Chalmaev (born 1932) in Oktiabr', who was horrified at the idea that the old woman might be the most valuable person in her village.  
Lakshin produced a strong defence of "Ivan Denisovich" in the January 1964 issue of Novyi mir. But Khrushchev was again vacillating on de-Stalinization. He failed to intervene to prevent the conservatives, fronted by the Komsomol First Secretary, S.P. Pavlov, from denying Solzhenitsyn the Lenin Literature Prize for "Ivan Denisovich". This weakened Novyi mir, and possibly ultimately Khrushchev himself.  

The contribution of village prose, and of the work of Solzhenitsyn, to the development of Russian nationalism in the Khrushchev period was that it presented a source of values, based on the Russian village and Russian Orthodoxy, which began to provide an alternative to the values of Marxism-Leninism, now becoming discredited. This process was to go further in the Brezhnev era.

**Unofficial political activity**

Isolated underground revolutionary groups, claiming to represent the true Leninist heritage betrayed by Stalin,
and bearing names like Istinyi trud Lenina (Lenin's True Work) existed in the USSR from about 1945. More serious threats to the regime came from the Western Ukrainians and the Baltic nationalities. The effect of the XX Congress was to produce a ferment among intellectual youth, with clandestine neo-Leninist groups and publications mushrooming, especially in Moscow and Leningrad. The "Krasnopevtsev-Rendel group" referred to by Andrei Amalrik in Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984? called itself, according to Osipov's account, the "Union of Patriots of Russia", and sought to synthesize the best sides of Bolshevism, Menshevism and Trotskyism. Vladimir Bukovsky belonged for a while to an illegal political organization which lacked a political programme, while Major-General P.G. Grigorenko in 1963 established the "Alliance for the Struggle for the Rebirth of Leninism".

Amalrik's description of the development of the "cultural opposition" in the late 1950s has become well known in the West. No longer intimidated by mass terror, Moscow intellectuals began to read in samizdat the literature which Glavlit would not tolerate: Doctor Zhivago, Akhmatova's banned poems, and literary journals such as Aleksandr I. Ginzburg's Sintaksis (3 issues, 1960), Osipov's Rumberg (November 1960) and Iury T. Galanskov's Feniks (1961). The latter journal reflected the growing concern of the "cultural opposition" with political affairs. Public poetry readings in Maiakovsky Square in Moscow, initially publicized in August 1958 by Moskovskii komsomolets, the newspaper of the Moscow Komsomol, took on
an anti-Stalinist character. The young people had free
discussions, praising Iashin and criticizing Kochetov.41

Among those who later took part in the Russian
nationalist movement should be mentioned Anatoly
Mikhailovich Ivanov, who used the pseudonyms Novogodny and
later A. Skuratov. Ivanov-Skruratov (as I shall refer to
him throughout), born 1934, studied history with Osipov but
was arrested in 1959 for participation in a "circle". He
was sent to a prison psychiatric hospital but freed in
1960. Osipov himself was expelled from university and the
Komsomol in 1959 after publicly defending Ivanov-Skuratov.
The two came together in 1960 in a political "club" which
sought to rally the healthy forces of the CPSU to liquidate
the consequences of Stalinism, and create a society on the
Yugoslav model. They also took part in an unofficial
revival of the Maiakovksy Square meetings, which brought on
them the ire of the authorities. In October 1961 they were
arrested, together with Eduard Kuznetsov (who later became
active in the Jewish emigration movement and was the
central figure in the 1970 "Leningrad hijack" trial).
Galanskov sent a letter of protest against the arrests to
the KGB. Osipov was given a seven-year labour camp
sentence, while Ivanov-Skuratov was given another spell in
a prison psychiatric hospital.42

Khrushchev and the resurgence of the nationalities

After Stalin's death L.P. Beria, the Minister for
Internal Affairs, tried to increase his power base by
promoting the career interests of the non-Russians. Beria's colleagues deposed him, but continued to increase the role of the national cadres in the republics. The 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereiaslav, whereby the Ukraine was joined to Russia, was celebrated with much fanfare in 1954. If the Russians were the elder brother of the Soviet family, then the Ukrainians were the junior elder brother, and the Belorusians were also specially favoured.\footnote{In 1956, Khrushchev denounced Stalin's terror and the "mass deportations from their native places of whole nations".} Khrushchev published Lenin's last articles, attacking Russian chauvinism and Stalin personally. These actions formed a watershed. They laid the political and ideological basis for the eventual resurgence of the cultures of some of the national minorities and their political cohesion. This in turn threatened the relatively privileged position of the Russians in the USSR, and especially those living outside the RSFSR, and also prepared the ground for a Russian nationalist reaction.

An early indication of the confidence of the nationalities was the decision by the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet, within months of Khrushchev's speech, that Azeri would be the sole official language of that republic. Historians from the traditionally Muslim nationalities sought to rehabilitate Shamil fully, while Moscow historians insisted that he was objectively reactionary. Decisions in the late 1950s, particularly the formation of the regional economic councils (sovarkhozy), increased the
economic and cultural powers of the Union Republics. 45

"Natives" predominated among the delegates to the republican Party congresses held in 1958, although Russians were overrepresented in relation to their share in the total population; national cadres increased their hold on the republican Central Committees. Russians, however, continued to head the republican KGBs. From 1954, natives held the position of First Secretary in all the Union Republican Central Committees, except Kazakhstan and Moldavia. These exceptions might be related to the fact that Russians formed a majority of the population in Kazakhstan, with the influx of Slavs to participate in the Virgin Lands programme; and the very low representation of Moldavians in the Party. In the Ukraine, Belorussia and Armenia, the Second Secretary as well as the First Secretary was a native, continuously up to the early 1970s. In Latvia, Lithuania, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the local nationality supplied the Second Secretary as well as the First Secretary for part of the 1950s. In the other republics the First Secretary was a native and the Second Secretary a Russian (or sometimes Ukrainian or Belorussian), which was to become the normal pattern. John H. Miller has contended that the Russian Second Secretary would not only be a representative of all-Union interests but also would look after the interests of the Russians in the republic. Evidence for this latter point is lacking. As Miller himself shows, the Russian official is normally from outside the republic 46, and his job description from
Moscow does not appear to include opposing the normal tendency for the eponymous nationality to be overrepresented in both Party and government bodies.

At the all-Union level, the Uzbek N.A. Mukhitdinov, a Central Committee Secretary, became the first representative of a traditionally Muslim nationality to join the CPSU Presidium (Politburo) as a full member, in 1957.47 The Russian share of the full and candidate members of the Central Committee fell from 71.5% in 1952 to 62.7% in 1961. The most dramatic change was the increase in the Ukrainians - from 6.8% in 1952 to 18.5% in 1961 - mainly involving individuals politically associated with Khrushchev.48

There was around this time a gradual change in the connotation attached to the word Rossiia. Previously the term had been used for Tsarist Russia, while the RSFSR was referred to by its initials or as the Russian Republic. Now the feeling arose that Rossiia had not died with the revolution but was a living reality. This was reflected in the title of the newspaper for the RSFSR which began in July 1956, Sovetskaia Rossiia. The existence of this newspaper brought Russia into line with the other republics, which had long since had their own daily. There was no move to create a Communist Party for the RSFSR (which would have dominated the CPSU), but a Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR was established in 1956.49

These moves seem to have coincided with a growing
emphasis on the Russian language. As the 1959 census was to reveal, native languages had been gaining at the expense of Russian. This process is perhaps exaggerated by a tendency for some Soviet citizens to reclassify their nationality according to language (a factor which would explain why the number of Russians grew faster than Ukrainians between 1959 and 1979). \( ^{50} \) With this qualification, the figures showed that the proportion of native-language speakers rose between 1926 and 1959 for every Union-Republican nationality except the Armenians. The nationalities of the Autonomous Republics in the RSFSR, however (Tatars, Bashkirs, etc.) showed a falling proportion speaking the native language. \( ^{51} \) In 1958, the Central Committee and government proposed to make optional the study of Russian in national schools and the study of national languages in Russian schools. These changes appear to have been designed on balance to reduce the role of the national languages. At any rate they were perceived by several of the republican leaderships to have this effect. Azerbaijan and Latvia refused to pass the changes in the law, and Moscow’s policy was not implemented until after the local leaders had been purged. \( ^{52} \) Interestingly, the number of Russians studying national languages appears to have increased over the following period, in spite of the fears expressed. \( ^{53} \) A justification for the promotion of Russian was spelt out in Kommunist in 1958 by B.G. Gafurov, a former First Secretary of the Tajik Party organization and then Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences. He said that the
"disappearance of national differences and the sliianie of nations" was "inevitable", adding that "the future sliianie of nations presupposes the formation of a single language for the peoples."54

Khrushchev was probably hostile to Russian nationalism but promoted the Russian language, apparently as a means of accelerating the sliianie of nations in the USSR, which he anticipated. It may have been the case, as suggested by Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, that his promotion of sliianie was in response to rising minority nationalism.55 It seems more likely, though, that it was his utopian claim that communism was around the corner, to be achieved by 1980, which drove him to try to reduce the significance of national distinctions, just as it drove him to try to eradicate religion.

The Party Programme of 1961, adopted at the XXII Congress, attacked nationalism and chauvinism and posited the rastsvet (flourishing) of nations under socialism. It laid down that, as communism was built, the nations and national cultures would draw closer together (sblizhenie) until complete unity (polnoe edinstvo) was achieved. The word sliianie did not appear in the Programme, although it was used at the Congress. The Programme reaffirmed Lenin's view that national distinctions would take considerably longer to disappear than class distinctions. For the first time the Party Programme referred to the Russian language. It was described as having become "the language of international'nost'" communication and co-
operation of all the peoples of the USSR". The Programme left open the possibility of increasing the rights of the republics; on the other hand it stated that republican boundaries were "increasingly losing their former significance".56 Scholars such as P. G. Semyonov of the Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences and B.L. Manelis were more specific in indicating the temporary nature of the federal system. This sounded ominous for the national republics, since Khrushchev was proposing to rewrite the Soviet Constitution.57 The emphasis on erianie was equally unwelcome to many Russians, who feared the loss of Russian identity in a Soviet "melting pot". Semyonov argued that Soviet society was reaching the point where the full State and legal erianie of nations would "become a matter of the foreseeable future".58 Implicitly, erianie might take place in the USSR alone and not depend on the world victory of communism.59

The Jews under Khrushchev

In Khrushchev's memoirs he denounced Stalin's anti-Semitism,60 and the Jews were saved from a massive purge by Stalin's death. But de-Stalinization did not improve the position of the Jews as much as might have been expected. For the first time since Stalin's death, Yiddish-language books were published again - but only five titles between 1959 and 1961 and none between 1962 and 1964. In 1961 a Yiddish-language literary review, Sovietish Heimland (Soviet Homeland), began publication, initially as a bi-monthly with a circulation of 25 000. It became a monthly
In other respects Khrushchev continued Stalin's policy of reducing the influence of Jews in the political system. Khrushchev and other leaders openly explained to foreigners that non-Jews — what M.G. Pervukhin called "our own intelligentsia" — were now capable of taking the leading positions in the republics and the all-Union bodies, and so Jews (who allegedly tended to surround themselves with other Jews) had been transferred away. Kaganovich, removed from the Central Committee Presidium in 1957, was the last of the top leadership (Presidium and Secretariat) to acknowledge Jewish nationality. The 1961 Central Committee included only one Jew (0.3%) among its full members (V.E. Dymshits, who became head of Gosplan).

Evtushenko's poem "Babi Yar" published in Literaturnaia gazeta in September 1961, attacked the absence of a monument to the Jews killed by the Nazis in the ravine of that name on the outskirts of Kiev. Khrushchev and some conservative writers denounced Evtushenko for ignoring the fact that the Nazis had killed Slavs as well.

Judaism suffered particularly badly in Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign. The number of synagogues fell from about 450 in 1956 to about 100 in 1961. Between 1958 and 1967 the total number of copies of new books attacking Judaism was seven times the number attacking Islam and twice the number attacking Christianity — even though Jews formed only 1% of the population by then. Further, propaganda against Judaism was more vitriolic than other anti-religious propaganda. Judaism was presented as an exceptionally immoral religion, worshipping the god Money,
and inciting the Jews as the "chosen people" to hate other peoples. It was argued that Judaism was "inseparably linked" with Zionism. A particular stir was caused in the West by T.K. Kichko's *Judaizm bez prikras* (Judaism without Embellishment), published in Ukrainian by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in October 1963. This not only linked Judaism, Zionism, Jewish bankers and Western capitalists in a great conspiracy, but also included cartoons of stereotyped Jews. In April 1964 the Ideological Commission of the Central Committee condemned the book as "crude and offensive", but similar works continued to be published. Much of the literature against the Jewish religion was published in Ukrainian or Moldavian, which Jews rarely read, suggesting that its purpose was to stir up hatred against the Jews rather than to break Jews from Judaism. The stereotype of the greedy Jew was fed by the regular publication in the Press of the names of those executed for economic crimes between 1961 and 1964. Over half of the 250 executed were of Jewish nationality.

It would be difficult to believe that Khrushchev's hostility towards the Jews derived from Russian messianism. Rather, the treatment of Jews under Khrushchev would suggest that he saw them as an element in society which was different from, and even alien to, the other nationalities of the USSR. The Jews had shown the capacity to survive through millennia of repression. It could be speculated that Khrushchev and his allies felt that it would be much harder to melt Jewish identity in the pot of "fusion" than
it would be to deal with the other nationalities.

**The anti-religious campaign and the Russian Orthodox Church**

In July 1954 a Central Committee resolution attacked the success of the Russian Orthodox Church in winning over young people and called for the intensification of anti-religious propaganda. Four months later, however, another resolution criticized counter-productive methods used in the struggle against religion. It was not until 1959 that a massive anti-religious campaign began, headed by Khrushchev and the head of the Central Committee Propaganda Department, L.F. Ilichev. According to Levitin-Krasnov, who was active in fighting persecution then, 1959 to 1964 was a very fearful time. The Soviet State with all its powerful apparatus, with the whole army of Chekists and secret informers, with all its innumerable staff of propagandists, journalists and correspondents, struck against the Church. We were isolated from everyone in this. It seemed as if the Church in Russia was doomed. The Patriarchate took a manifestly collaborationist position...

There is little doubt that the anti-religious campaign was linked with Khrushchev's desire to build communism by 1980. It was also linked with de-Stalinization. While de-Stalinization in other fields meant a relaxation and liberalization, in relation to religion it meant an end to the détente that had developed under Stalin with the major churches. The Russian Orthodox Church suffered from the campaign in the same way as other churches. Levitin-Krasnov's view that the Moscow Patriarchate collaborated with the anti-religious campaign is shared by other writers...
of Orthodox samizdat in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods. These include Boris V. Talantov (1901-1971) from Kirov oblast', and the Moscow priests who wrote to Patriarch Aleksii in 1965, Iakunin (see above, p. 322) and Nikolai I. Eshliman. Nevertheless, Patriarch Aleksii does appear to have put up resistance to the campaign on occasion. In February 1960 he argued that the Russian Church had played a major role in the consolidation and defence of the Russian State through the centuries. Similar themes regularly appeared in Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii. In May 1963 he intervened to defend the rights of the monks of the Pochaev Monastery in the Ukraine. The main cause for complaint, however, and a turning point in the development of Russian Orthodoxy, was the Sobor of bishops of 18 July 1961, held in Zagorsk. Here the Patriarch steamrollered the bishops into accepting a number of changes in the organization of the Church. The most important was that the priest lost all power over the parish and was transformed into a wage labourer, responsible to an executive committee of three parishioners, headed by the churchwarden. Subsequent experience was to show that the authorities would use the new arrangements to discredit priests and close down churches in an offensive against the Church involving the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church and local soviets. It appears that Aleksii, the metropolitans and many of the bishops were resigned to this situation. Similar measures were introduced for other religions. The split which developed in the AUCECB, with unregistered Baptist congregations leaving the official structures and
facing severe persecution, may have stimulated dissent within the Orthodox Church. 73

Eshliman and Iakunin reckoned that 10,000 Orthodox parish churches were closed in this period, representing one half of all those functioning in 1958. Other estimates suggest an even greater proportion. The number of monasteries and convents was reduced by four fifths between the mid-1950s and mid-1960s. The number of parish priests was reduced by about half. These figures conceal an unknown amount of intimidation, physical ill-treatment, beatings, imprisonment in mental hospitals, rape and murder of priests and believers. The evidence for this brutality is in samizdat accounts. These documents sometimes emphasized the link between Orthodoxy and Russian patriotism. 74 Others accused the authorities of abandoning Lenin's ideas and following Stalin's policy of persecution, despite the talk of de-Stalinization. 75 Samizdat allegations could be denied by the authorities. What could not be concealed, and which even attracted criticism in the official Press, was the wholesale destruction of churches. This often took place during the night to avoid opposition from the faithful. Thus in July 1964 even the church of the Metropolitan of Moscow, the Cathedral of the Transfiguration, was destroyed by night. 76

Cultural figures were active in the defence of churches and monasteries as historical monuments. Literaturnaia gazeta on 23 August 1956 carried a condemnation of the
destruction of the Smolensk Cathedral in Ufa. This was signed by the writers Dorosh and Ehrenburg. Izvestiia called in 1962 for the preservation of church architectural monuments, and the liberal writer Viktor Nekrasov complained in Novyi_mir (November 1962) about the destruction of churches and icons. Ordinary believers appealed for the preservation of religious objects as historical monuments. Such pleas were rejected. On 10 May 1962 Pravda criticized an article in Moskva which had objected to the continuing destruction of monasteries and churches in the capital. Khrushchev refused to listen to an appeal on the subject by Sergei Mikhalkov, the author of the words of the Soviet State anthem. Solzhenitsyn, too, understood the importance of churches as monuments to Russian culture. In 1958-1959, after cycling around central Russia, he wrote his "Miniatures". This included "Along the Oka", which described the churches as the source of the beauty of the Russian countryside. In August 1963 he visited Kulikovo Field, and found the ruined medieval church of St. Sergei of Radonezh. The iconostasis had been chopped up for firewood.

It appears that the anti-religious campaign and the destruction of churches provoked a feeling that the churches should be defended, a feeling which spread well beyond religious believers to many people concerned with Russian history and Russian culture. The revival of Russian national consciousness, expressed particularly by the derevenshchiki, faced a challenge in the anti-religious campaign, from which it emerged strengthened. In 1964
Andrei Tarkovsky began his film about the icon painter and monk Andrei Rublev. Completed in 1966, the film was not then shown in the USSR, but it attested to growing interest in Russia's religious past. Also in 1964 the VSKhSON was established with a Russian Orthodox nationalist ideology (see below). In October Khrushchev was overthrown. While it would be wrong to see the reasons for his fall in the anti-religious campaign or the destruction of churches, his retirement was swiftly followed by an official repudiation of the methods of the campaign and the establishment of organizations to protect Russian historical monuments. Despite Khrushchev's desire to create a nationless, atheist Soviet land, the national minorities and the Russians knew more about their cultures and were more nationally-conscious in 1964 than they had been in 1953. The basis was laid for the development of a Russian nationalist movement, outside the control of the Party.
Footnotes


10. Valentin Ovechkin, "Raionnye budni", NM, 1952, No. 9,


14. One instalment was not published in NM but in Literaturnaia Moskva, II, 549-626.


17. On Abramov, see Brown, Soviet, pp. 233-37.

18. Ibid., pp. 231-33.


20. Ibid., pp. 7-9, and Brown, Soviet, pp. 237-43.


24. Grigory Pomerants, "Son o spravedlivom vozmezdi" (Moi


29. Spechler, Permitted Dissent, pp. 76-165.


31. Solzhenitsyn, Oak, pp. 77 (quotation), 82, 87 (references to religion).


34. Ibid., pp. 66-67.


36. Solzhenitsyn, Oak, p. 22.


38. Vladimir Ia. Lakshin, "Ivan Denisovich, ego druz'ia i


45. Carrère d'Encausse, pp. 36-41.


47. Schapiro, *Communist Party*, p. 571.


55. Carrère d'Encausse, pp. 41-44.

56. V.I. Lenin, KPSS, pp. 165-69.


60. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, I, 279-89.

61. Korey, Soviet Cage, p. 35.


65. As cited in Shaffer, p. 21.


69. Pospielovsky, Russian Church, I, 327-33; Bociurkiw, "Shaping", pp. 48-49.


72. Pospielovsky, Russian Church, I, 333-35; Bourdeaux, Patriarch, pp. 77-84, 112.

73. For an account of the Sobor, see AS 703, partly trans. in Michael Bourdeaux, "The Black Quinquennium: The Russian Orthodox Church, 1959-1964", RCL, IX, Nos. 1-2 (Spring 1981), 24-27; Pospielovsky, Russian Church, I, 335-58; Bourdeaux, Patriarch, pp. 24-33 et passim; Simon, Church, pp. 69-72, 79-84.

74. For example, Vadim Shavrov, in Bourdeaux, Patriarch, p. 188.

75. For example, appeal from Feodosiia Varavva of Lvov and three other believers, 1 August 1964, in Bourdeaux, Patriarch, pp. 170-71.

76. Eshliman & Iakunin, in Bourdeaux, Patriarch, p. 200; Pospielovsky, Russian Church, I, 341-49; Simon, Church, pp. 72-79. For samizdat accounts of persecutions, see Bourdeaux, Patriarch; esp. the complaint of the Spiritual Council of Pochaev Monastery to President N.V. Podgorny (1966), which appeared in the samizdat collection Feniks-66 (Bourdeaux, Patriarch, pp. 98-115).


81. Scammell, Salzhenitsyn, pp. 477-78. Solzhenitsyn's story "Zakhar-Kalita" (Zakhar the Pouch) is based on this visit.
During the Brezhnev era (1964-1982), the political leadership generally showed considerably more sympathy to Russian traditions and Russian interests than Khrushchev had. The top leaders and the central Party apparatus were divided among themselves as to how much leeway should be given to Russian national feeling. The abandonment by General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev and Prime Minister A.N. Kosygin of Khrushchev's utopian aim of achieving communism by 1980, together with the shift towards managerialism and pragmatism, widened the ideological gap that had been created by Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin. Some leaders saw the answer in the satisfaction of material demands; others wished to rehabilitate Stalin; others wanted to promote more traditional forms of Russian nationalism. The 1960s and 1970s saw a rise in both Russian and non-Russian nationalism.1

Positive discrimination in favour of the indigenous nationalities of the republics outside the RSFSR in admission to higher education and to the republican élites - a result of de-Stalinization - led to grievances among Russians. Within the RSFSR, the feeling of Russians that the economic interests of Russia were being sacrificed to the development of other Union Republics was fed by official propaganda that this was indeed the case. The Party Programme, adopted in 1961, had contained the sentence:
Depending on mutual fraternal help, in the first place on the help of the great Russian people, all the Soviet national republics have created their own modern industry and national cadres of the working class and the intelligentsia, and have developed a culture which is national in form and socialist in content.  

Similar statements on the generosity of the Russian people were repeated throughout the Brezhnev period (see the following section).

Moreover, the 1970 census showing the rapid growth of the traditionally Islamic nationalities and the stagnation of the Russians raised fears about the capacity of the latter to continue to dominate the Soviet Union. This was linked with fears about the moral degeneration of the Russian people. Alcoholism was on the increase, and had led to declining male life expectancies. Corruption in everyday life was proliferating and was contributing to the spread of cynicism. A deep popular fear of China, fuelled by the Cultural Revolution and the 1969 border clashes, was encouraged by official attacks on Peking. This led people to question whether Russian youth was spiritually prepared for a possible war. The main impulse behind the growth of Russian nationalism under Brezhnev, then, seems to have been the desire to defend Russian interests, and the Russian people itself, against whatever was threatening it. By no means was it mainly an aggressive nationalism, a "great-power chauvinism", although such elements did appear and were particularly linked with anti-Semitism.

Together with Russian nationalism went a growing interest in the Russian past, encouraged by part of the
Russian cultural intelligentsia. It is difficult to disentangle cause and effect here; did Russians become interested in their national past because of their nationalism, or did an interest in icons and churches lead them on to Russian nationalism? Further, some of the figures involved seem to have been at least partly motivated by a sympathy for the traditional Russian national religion, Orthodoxy. Presumably different people travelled in different directions and did not make all the connections; not every icon collector was a Christian or a Russian nationalist.

The Brezhnev era saw the development of the Russian nationalist movement and the reemergence of Russian messianism. In this chapter, I shall consider the nationality policy of the regime, looking at ideological statements and the actual policies pursued towards the non-Russians in the USSR, and discuss the influence of Russian nationalism. Next I shall examine some of the officially-permitted cultural manifestations of Russian nationalism and messianism, looking particularly at the literary journals; and then at examples of the writings of the unofficial Russian nationalist movement, focussing in particular on the journal Veche. After this I shall comment briefly on the attitudes of official political institutions and leaders towards Russian nationalism. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the attacks on Russian nationalism made in the last year of Brezhnev's General Secretaryship and in the following period when
Iu.V. Andropov and K.U. Chernenko were in power. It will be seen that I am touching on a considerable number of topics, about some of which much has already been written. The amount of work done on Solzhenitsyn alone is formidable. I shall necessarily be highly selective, concentrating on what I consider the most interesting examples of the flourishing of Russian messianism under Brezhnev.
Brezhnev_and_the_postponement_of_sliianie

In the field of nationality relations, the talk of sliianie disappeared from Politburo members' speeches. At the XXIII Party Congress in March 1966, while speaking of the Soviet people in the singular, Brezhnev emphasized the sblizhenie of the peoples (plural) of the USSR. He promised that the Party would care for the interests and national particularities of every people, and raise all Soviet people in the spirit of proletarian internationalism.3

In outline, the Brezhnev leadership in the 1970s settled for an ideological position that defended national statehood, i.e. the need for federalism; postponed sliianie to the indefinite future; but sought increasingly to emphasize the greatness of the Russian people. The last factor was never pursued to the extent it had been under late Stalinism, and probably could not have been without the use of mass terror against the national minorities and their élites. On the other hand, the view of Russian superiority appeared in Party documents (which it had not under Stalin) and thus became enmeshed with the official ideology. At the XXIV Congress in March 1971, Brezhnev said:

In the formation, strengthening and development of this powerful union of peoples with equal rights, who have taken the road to socialism, all the nations and nationalities of our country have played their role, above all the great Russian people. (Applause.) Its revolutionary energy, selflessness, diligence and deep internationalism have rightly won it the sincere respect of all the peoples of our socialist Motherland. (Prolonged applause.) But he attacked "nationalism, chauvinism, national narrowness and conceit in any form" and promised "profound
respect for all nations and nationalities". The Party was committed to "the flourishing of socialist nations and their gradual sblizhenie". Brezhnev made no mention of sliianie. A Congress resolution described the "Soviet people" as a "new historical community of people", a theme which became linked with the idea that the Soviet Union was at a stage of "mature" or "developed" socialism. This latter viewpoint, formulated in the Brezhnev era and accepted under Andropov and Chernenko, implies that communism is a long way off; so therefore is sliianie, and it is not necessary to refer to it continuously.

Brezhnev's speech in 1972 on the fiftieth anniversary of the USSR essentially repeated the themes of the XXIV Congress, singling out the Russian people. The speech has become famous for its claim that "the national question, in the form in which it reached us from the past, has been solved in full, finally and irreversibly." But Brezhnev went on to say that relations between nationalities continued to throw up new problems and tasks, on top of existing nationalist prejudices. While the General Secretary emphasized the "all-round (vsestoronnee) sblizhenie" and "cohesion" (splochnost') of the nationalities, it is interesting that republican First Secretaries on this occasion preferred to speak of "flourishing", emphasizing their continued separateness. At the XXVI Congress in 1976, Brezhnev omitted any special reference to the Russian people, and spoke of the "unbreakable unity" of the nationalities, not of
The Soviet Constitution of 1977 retained the federal structure, while incorporating the principle of "democratic centralism" into the State, as advocated by Lenin in 1916. On the adoption of the Constitution, Brezhnev said that certain "very few" comrades had argued that the emergence of the Soviet people as a "new historical community" meant that the republics could therefore be liquidated. They were confusing the "socio-political unity of the Soviet people" with the disappearance of national distinctions.

They propose to bring into the Constitution the concept of a single Soviet nation (natsiia), to liquidate the Union and Autonomous Republics or to sharply limit the sovereignty of the Union Republics, depriving them of the right to leave the USSR and the right to international links. In the same direction are the proposals to abolish the Soviet of Nationalities and establish a unicameral Supreme Soviet. I think that the error of such proposals is clear. The socio-political unity of the Soviet people in no way signifies the disappearance of national differences.

It would be wrong "to force artificially ... the process of sblizhenie".9

In the course of the discussion on the draft Constitution, proposals were made to enhance the rights of the Union Republics, but the only one incorporated into the final version was the suggestion of Moscow University Law Faculty to define the Union Republic as "a sovereign Soviet socialist State" (article 76).10 This would appear to contradict the reference to the "sovereignty of the USSR" (article 75). The Constitution also gave the Union Republics power to participate in federal policy-making (article 77) and granted them representation on the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the USSR (articles 120 and 129, confirming a situation existing since the late 1960s). 

In the late 1970s, Russian nationalist sentiment became increasingly strong in sections of the Party apparatus, the Komsomol and in some cultural fields. From 1978, anniversary messages from the Central Committee to the republics regularly referred to the "great Russian people" (not in the ethnic sense of "Great Russian" [velikorusskii] but as a socio-political characteristic [velikii russkii narod]). In 1979 Pravda published an article entitled "The Russian Character", written by a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, an Armenian living in Baku. The sole purpose of the article was to laud the Russians' "kindness and justice (spravedlivost')", qualities with which "the Russian person is endowed possibly more than anyone else". Lavish praise for the Russians coincided with the wave of Russian national feeling connected with the 600th anniversary of the Russian defeat of the Tatars at the battle of Kulikovo Field in 1380. At the XXVI Congress in February 1981, Brezhnev's last, he praised the "disinterested assistance of the Russian people" to the national minorities. He called for the republican parties to do more for the cultural and language needs of the "non-indigenous" population, presumably referring particularly to the Russians. He denounced chauvinism, nationalism, anti-Semitism and Zionism, and spoke of "unity" and "all-round sblizhenie", but not sliianie.
While the Brezhnev leadership defended socialist federalism and postponed sliianie, academics retained some freedom to take different positions on the national question. A.E. Mordinov, a Yakutsk philosopher, claimed in 1971 that sliianie was a process already occurring under socialism. He claimed that Lenin understood sliianie to mean "complete unity, and nothing else". Mordinov was talking of political, socio-economic and ideological sliianie, rather than a racial-demographic process of the disappearance of national distinctions. He claimed that sliianie had been wrongly associated with the view of Makar Nagulnov, in Mikhail Sholokhov's Virgin Soil Upturned, of a future in which all people will have the same darkish colour of skin. Mordinov was implying that national differences would not disappear; and he quoted Lenin's writings against Russian chauvinism in defence of minority cultures and languages. V.P. Sherstobitov in 1972 rejected Mordinov’s interpretation of Lenin and emphasized the latter’s centralism; he implied that all national differences would ultimately disappear. Like Mordinov, Sherstobitov claimed that "elements of sliianie" already existed, but it seems that the term "assimilation" would be more appropriate to the examples he gave of minor nationalities adopting the Russian language. A collection co-edited by Sherstobitov in 1975, however, hardly mentions sliianie, stressing "flourishing", sblizhenie and "spiritual unity".
appeared to reflect the ideas of the Brezhnev leadership is M.I. Kulichenko, head of the Section for the Theory of Nations and Nationality Relations of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee. He has rejected Mordinov's view that sliianie meant only "complete unity", and cited Engels and Lenin to show that under full world communism, ethnic differences between nations will wither away and a single world language emerge. He accused Mordinov and others of implying that nations were eternal. 19 In a work of 1972, Kulichenko defended national statehood in the period leading from the phase of developed socialism up to "complete unity". National statehood helped encourage national pride in the building of socialism and loyalty to the USSR. He noted that in the political units designed for the minorities, the leading cadres in the Party and State were from the titular nationality, even where that nationality was in the minority. 20 "Complete unity" would come only when communism had basically been achieved. It would involve economic and political equality, a reduction in the importance of national statehood and the mutual enrichment of cultures. Russian would be the language of communication between the nationalities, but the national languages would continue to develop. Only after "complete unity" would the movement towards sliianie begin; although he added (somewhat confusingly) that elements of sliianie already existed under socialism, in the sense of the levelling of social, economic and political life. 21
Kulichenko wrote in 1976 that it was generally accepted that transformations of nationality relations would take place very slowly. This, however, was to ignore the rapid changes in the development of some of the backward peoples of the USSR; and it was difficult to predict how the world victory of socialism would affect Soviet nationality relations. The fate of each nation, in the meantime, was not "passively to await the inevitable sliianie" but to develop its own possibilities. Ethnic differences would persist after the disappearance of national states, but nations could not continue to exist after the social factors that had created them had evaporated. Instead of nations, new forms of community would evolve under communism. While Kulichenko claimed that the Soviet people and the socialist commonwealth represented pointers to these new communities, his argument was mainly supported by quotations from Marx, Engels and Lenin.

In two of his works of 1981, Kulichenko emphasized the importance of the federal system, which had been protected by the 1977 Constitution. He made no reference to the declining significance of national statehood; it was necessary to strengthen both the federal bodies and the organs of national statehood. Such a statement might seem to have little meaning. In fact his emphasis was on strengthening the centre, as economic imperatives dictated central decision-making on the implementation of technical progress and the conservation of natural resources. Kulichenko attacked P.G. Semyonov for wishing to create a unitary State, asserting that a federal system would be
justified for a long time to come. He complained that researchers were ignoring problems which were developing in nationality relations. Studies of these problems might make it possible to warn of the imminence of nationalist phenomena. He referred to the April 1979 Central Committee decree on ideological work, which called for respect for the dignity and culture of the minorities. He rejected the idea that the Soviet people (narod) was being transformed into a single nation (natsiia); it was composed of many nations, although what was common to them was more important than what divided them. He criticized some researchers for having a nihilist attitude to nationality factors.

At a round-table organized by the journal Istoriia SSSR in December 1979, Kulichenko suggested that the role of the "narrowly national, specifically national" was gradually diminishing. This provoked a sharp response from a Jew, Henrikas (G.O.) Zimanas, chief editor of the Lithuanian Komunistas. Kulichenko, he said, had not made himself clear. If he was referring to language, he was wrong, because national languages were flourishing under socialism. Zimanas asked scholars to stop talking about sliianie, since it was not mentioned in any Central Committee document.

Perhaps Zimanas's request had some effect. While rejecting the "eternity of nations", Kulichenko suggested in 1981 that the concept of sliianie might be soft-
pedalled. Confusion had arisen from the fact that some writers were using the word incorrectly, to refer to particular cases of assimilation occurring under developed socialism. He pointed out: "there are still not a few people on whom the very concept 'sliianie of nations [natsiil]' often acts as an irritant, provoking negative phenomena in consciousness and behaviour." Kulichenko added that sliianie had not been mentioned at the XXIV Congress, and in 1973 and 1977 Brezhnev had rejected the idea that sliianie was in progress. Noting that K.P. Buslov had claimed that sliianie of nations was occurring in a socio-political but not ethnic sense, Kulichenko suggested that the term should be reserved for the disappearance of ethnic distinctions. Sliianie was inappropriate for the present, when national statehood and national cultures were being preserved. It should be added that P.N. Fedoseev, Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences, held a similar position to Buslov's. In a 1980 article in Kommunist, Fedoseev stated that when Lenin had used sliianie with reference to the socialist stage of development, he had used it in a political sense: "not the removal of national distinctions, but a tighter unity, a fraternal union of socialist nations".

Language policy and national equality under Brezhnev

I now turn to the actual policies pursued towards the minorities under Brezhnev. Paradoxically, from the mid-1970s, when in the ideological sphere leaders and scholars were postponing sliianie to the indefinite future, more and more emphasis was being put on the Russian language. This
succeeded a period of "flourishing" of national languages. Between 1965 and 1972, the number of pupils attending native-language schools increased by more than the number attending Russian-language schools in every non-Russian Union Republic except Estonia, the Ukraine and Belorussia. The non-Russian-language Press expanded as well: between 1970 and 1975, the circulation of journals in the languages of the non-Russian Union Republics, except Lithuanian and Estonian, (and also in Tatar) increased more rapidly than the circulation of Russian-language journals.

A factor in the subsequent promotion of the Russian language was the 1970 census, showing a gradual decline in the Slav proportion of the population and a rapid increase in the traditionally Muslim nationalities. Soviet scholars such as F.P. Filin, director of the Institute of the Russian Language of the Academy of Sciences, and Iu.V. Arutiunian of the Academy's Institute of Ethnography, argued that the mastery of the Russian language by non-Russians helped to encourage positive attitudes to Russians and to promote integration in the Soviet Union. Already in 1966 Iu.D. Desheriev was referring to the Russian language as the cement of Soviet society, in terms reminiscent of late-tsarist administrators.

... the Russian language, as the language of internationality communication of the peoples of the USSR, cements the monolithic nature of Soviet society, and facilitates the sblizhenie of peoples and of their cultures and the strengthening and development of their fraternal cooperation.

More pragmatically, one might add that, the needs of the
Soviet Armed Forces, in which Russian is the sole language of command, and of the Soviet economy dictate the improvement of Russian-language teaching.

Serious concern about this was indicated at a conference in Tashkent in 1975, when the USSR Minister of Education, M.A. Prokofev, advocated pre-school facilities for Russian teaching. In 1978 Academician Fedoseev questioned the use of native languages in higher education outside philological disciplines, and a decree of the Council of Ministers promoted the use of Russian throughout the education system, including nursery schools. Then in May 1979 an All-Union Scientific-Theoretical Conference on "The Russian Language - the Language of Friendship and Cooperation of the peoples of the USSR" was held in Tashkent. Sharaf Rashidov, candidate Politburo member and Uzbek First Secretary, made the main speech. He referred to Russian as the language of Lenin and of the highest culture, but reassured the non-Russians that growing bilingualism would not threaten the national languages. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone commented, however, that the implementation of the Tashkent recommendations, which she considered unlikely, would reduce these languages "to the level of home and folklore vernaculars".35

After 1975, the growth of the native-language Press was severely restricted. For example, between 1975 and 1982 the absolute circulation of non-Russian newspapers fell for seven of the Union-Republican languages, including
Ukrainian and Belorussian. (The trend was not uniform, however; four languages increased circulation faster than the Russian-language newspapers.) It should be noted that bilingualism, even where it is achieved, does not lead necessarily to linguistic assimilation. The 1979 census showed for nearly all the national minorities a substantial (and in some cases incredible) increase in the proportion of the nationality who claimed fluency in Russian; but among the nationalities with their own Union Republics, it was only the Belorussians and Ukrainians who showed a significant decline in the proportion claiming their national language as their mother tongue.36 These two nationalities (apart from people living in the Western Ukraine and West Belorussia), being traditionally culturally close to the Russians, are the most willing to adopt Russian. (In Minsk, for example, there is no Belorussian-language secondary school.) Soviet propaganda under Brezhnev emphasized the common racial origin and even common national consciousness of the Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians.37

To what extent was the equality of the nationalities achieved under Brezhnev? Ellen Jones and Fred Grupp looked at various measures of inequality, and came to the general conclusion that the nationalities had come closer together in the 1960s and for most of the 1970s. In the late 1970s, however, Moscow decided to give a lower priority to positive discrimination in favour of the more backward nationalities. I confine myself to considering political representation. Party membership is a useful indication of
inequality since it is correlated with occupation, education and urbanization. Jones and Grupp compared the proportion of the adult population of each of 43 Soviet nationalities who were Party members with the proportion of Party members among the Russians. Starting with 1959, they found progressively less inequality of representation in 1970 and 1975, but rather more in 1982. The Georgians were the only Union-Republican nationality to be consistently better represented than the Russians, while the Armenians fell slightly below the Russian level in 1982. Among those which had traditionally been under-represented, the Ukrainian, Belorussian, Baltic and Moldavian nationalities steadily increased their share. The traditionally Muslim nationalities were better represented in 1970 than in 1959, but after that moved in different directions. The Azeris and the Kazakhs were for a time better represented than the Russians, but like most Muslim nationalities were less represented in 1982 than in 1975. The nationality with by far the highest representation was the Jews, in spite of the discrimination against them.\textsuperscript{38} The major omission in the Jones-Grupp calculation is that it does not show what is happening to the Russians. The Russian share in the total Soviet population fell from 54.5\% in 1959 to 52.4\% in 1979, while their share in the Party fell from 63.0\% in 1959 to 59.7\% in 1983, reducing this over-representation insignificantly.\textsuperscript{39}

In the CPSU Central Committee, on the other hand, there was a clear trend throughout the Brezhnev era towards
increasing the proportion of the already over-represented Russians. Among the full members, Russians increased from at least 57% in 1966, to about 62% in 1971 and to at least 68% in 1981. This reflected the fact that the overwhelming majority of heads of All-Union ministries and Central Committee departments, who under Brezhnev normally gained full or candidate Central Committee status, were Russian. At the Politburo, Russian representation was also increased: from 6 out of 11 full members in 1966 (after the XXIII Congress) to 10 out of 14 in 1981 (after the XXVI Congress), and from 3 out of 8 candidate members in 1966 to 4 out of 8 in 1981. The Secretariat was completely Russian from 1966 to 1976, when one Belorussian was appointed to join 10 Russians. The special position of the Ukrainians was symbolized by N. V. Podgorny's appointment as President from 1965 to 1977, and N. A. Tikhonov's appointment as Prime Minister from 1980.

In the Union-Republican parties, the First Secretaries throughout the Brezhnev period were all from the titular nationality. The Ukraine and Belorussia were favoured in that a native or a local Russian normally occupied the post of Second Secretary. By 1982, the bureaus of the non-Slav republics were all dominated by the local nationalities, with a significant minority Slav representation only in the five Central Asian parties. This korenizatsia appeared in the State apparatus also, with even the heads of the republican KGBs outside Central Asia being members of the titular nationality by the end of the Brezhnev era. It would seem that a division of labour developed under
Brezhnev: Russians increasingly dominated the policy-making All-Union institutions, while non-Russians played an important role in the implementation of policy in the national republics. The possibility of removing republican leaders who asserted the interests of their own nationality too strongly was always open to Moscow.

_Nationality_tensions_under_Brezhnev_

De-Stalinization led to the rehabilitation of the nationalities which had been deported under Stalin, and most were allowed to return to their homelands. An exception was the Crimean Tatars. Only in 1967 was the decree accusing them of treason annulled, and even then they were not allowed back to the Crimea. The KGB campaign against their movement to return included the holding of trials in Tashkent. This may have signified a continued willingness to intimidate the Central Asian indigenous population into accepting Russian primacy. In November 1969, three months after a Tashkent trial of Crimean Tatars, the fiftieth anniversary of a letter by Lenin protesting against Great-Russian chauvinism in Soviet Turkestan was marked by the publication of a "Joint issue" of the Russian-language newspapers of the five Central Asian republican parties. This event would seem to be a warning by the Central Asian elites against returning to a Stalinist nationality policy, at a time when the rehabilitation of Stalin was being actively considered in Moscow. It is unlikely that the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was motivated by the desire to teach the
Central Asians a lesson, since it was initially mainly Central Asian troops who were mobilized against the Afghan resistance. In later years, however, it may have been feared in Moscow that a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan would be regarded as a sign of weakness vis-à-vis the Soviet Muslim population.

The promotion of the Russian language, at the expense of the national language, was the principal reason for minority discontent in the Brezhnev period. Already in 1965 the KGB moved against Ukrainian intellectuals defending their language and literature. This led to a wave of protests and further repression, with the Ukrainian First Secretary, P.E. Shelest, giving some surreptitious support to the dissidents. He was removed from his post in 1973, with accusations of nationalism being made against him. National movements against linguistic Russification later became important elsewhere, especially in Lithuania (where it overlapped with the Roman Catholic movement), Georgia and Estonia. By 1968, when the Moscow samizdat Chronicle_of_Current_Events was launched, the national movements were forming links with the human rights movement centred in Moscow.

National grievances on the part of the Russians, on the other hand, have two main sources. The first is the widespread perception that non-Russians live better than Russians. Alain Besançon's statement about political rights - "The Russian people has no privilege" - is seen as being equally applicable in the economic field.
Zaslavsky refers to the "undeniably lower living standard of the Russian population in comparison to those of the populations of the non-Russian republics". 49 This is described by Vadim Belotserkovsky, a recent socialist émigré, as a "myth" with "little currency in the factory milieu" (although he accepts it as true for the rural population). Belotserkovsky backs up this statement by claiming that workers tend to migrate into the RSFSR rather than outward to the national republics, although this claim is not born out by the evidence for Central Asia. 50

Discrimination in favour of the eponymous populations of the Union Republics is the second main source of Russian national grievances. Such discrimination applies not only within the political élite but now within the technical intelligentsia, as the process of korenizatsiia has produced national cadres for managerial and specialist positions. Arutiunian found (in a 1969 study of the Tatar ASSR, where one would expect the process to be less significant than in a Union Republic) that the intelligentsia were as concerned about nationality as were other social strata, and sometimes more so. He linked this with their professional interests and the supply and demand of specialized labour. 51 The sociologist A.A. Susokolov in a 1976 study found that national feelings among the intelligentsia were rising, because more natives were competing with Russians for the specialist jobs. There was possibly, he wrote, "a more intensive growth of national consciousness in those republics where there is a fast
increase in the size of both the national and the Russian intelligentsia. The survey work of Rasma Karklins among émigré Germans has shown that, at least in Central Asia, the Russians perceive the locals as taking over and discriminating against them. Throughout the non-Russian republics, the titular nationality is perceived by Russians as receiving preference in higher education. Even where the Russians are overrepresented in relation to their population share, they may still have been required to achieve a higher admissions requirement than the locals.

The Jews under Brezhnev

In July 1965 Kosygin denounced chauvinism and anti-Semitism, and two months later Pravda followed this up with its first editorial attack on anti-Semitism for twenty years. Novyi mir in 1966 carried a warning that the Party must not follow prejudices of the masses such as anti-Semitism. But the halt to de-Stalinization gave encouragement to elements who wished to stir up anti-Semitism. The victory of Israel in the Six-Day War of June 1967 led to a series of campaigns in the Soviet media which were out of all proportion to either the military strength of the State of Israel or the intensity of Zionist feeling among the Soviet population. In these campaigns, Zionism was sometimes distinguished from both the Israeli State and the Soviet Jewish population, who were stated to be overwhelmingly loyal to the USSR. It was indeed true that the Jews, as the most urbanized and highly educated Soviet nationality, were also the nationality most highly represented in the ranks of the CPSU, as well as being very
prominent in science and culture. But the innumerable Press cartoons of the grotesque Israeli soldier, wearing the Star of David and carrying out the dictates of American imperialism, could only convey to the reader that even Soviet Jews were not to be trusted.

Israel's victory was accompanied by an increase in the national consciousness of Soviet Jews. This may also have been a response to the growing nationalism of other Soviet nationalities; it may have reflected an increasing awareness of discrimination, as the quota systems which favoured the more backward nationalities were used to toughen requirements for Jews (especially in higher education); it may have been a response to anti-Semitism, and an awareness that however much a person spoke and thought like a Russian, the nationality entry in the passport remained "Jew"; it may have been a sympathy for Israel. It is likely that all these factors played their part. The upshot was the emergence of the Jewish emigration movement.

The Soviet anti-Zionist campaign was pursued for a number of different reasons. It suited Moscow's policy in the Middle East, and the Third World generally, to win friends by posing as the implacable enemy of Zionism. It had internal uses: Jews and half-Jews formed a high proportion of the activists in the Moscow human rights movement, and of the Czechoslovak reformers and Polish dissidents of 1968. The notion of an international Zionist
conspiracy could be used to try to isolate these figures from the native population. In the future, if a serious internal crisis developed, some elements in ruling circles seemed willing to use the Jews (Zionists) as scapegoats for popular feeling. Jonathan Frankel showed in a 1972 study that the intensity of the anti-Zionist campaign between 1969 and 1971 varied with the level of pressure from (and from abroad, for) the Soviet Jews to emigrate. Moscow probably feared that if large numbers of Jews were allowed to emigrate, not only would the USSR lose some highly-trained specialists, but other national and religious groups might also be encouraged to seek to leave the USSR. Efforts to persuade Soviet Jews that they would not be happy in Israel coincided with attempts to intimidate them from applying for exit visas, and this raised the level of Jewish discontent. The increasingly desperate efforts to get out, culminating in the attempt to hijack an aircraft and in a sit-in at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, persuaded the Politburo to make the Jews a special case. The decision of March 1971 to allow Jewish emigration was probably also influenced by the desire of Brezhnev and Kosygin to improve relations with the West. 59

The less inhibited form of anti-Semitism was again exemplified by Kichko (see above, p. 376). His *Iudaizm'_siionizm* (Judaism and Zionism, Kiev, 1968) linked Judaism and Zionism as sharing "the chauvinistic idea of the god-chosenness of the Jewish people, the propaganda of messianism and the idea of ruling over the peoples of the world". Equally notorious was Iury Ivanov's *Ostorozhno!*
In 1972 the Soviet Embassies in Paris and Rome published a virulently anti-Semitic document. It turned out to be based on a pre-revolutionary Black Hundred manifesto, with the word "Jew" sometimes replaced by "Zionist". In 1974 Dr. Mikhail Stern, a Jew, was put on trial in Vinnitsa, in the Ukraine. One aim of this trial was to punish him for refusing to forbid his sons to emigrate to Israel. This was presumably intended to intimidate the Jewish emigration movement. Another aim may have been to stir up anti-Semitic feeling. Originally the authorities wanted to accuse him of poisoning Soviet children, in a replay of the 1913 Beilis case (see above, p. 208). It proved impossible to force anyone in the whole town to appear as a prosecution witness with such charges, and the indictment was amended to corruption. Stern was given an eight-year labour camp sentence, but released in 1977 after international protests.

References to the world conspiracy continued to circulate through the 1970s. In particular V.N. Emelianov, a lecturer in Obshchestvo Znanie, the Knowledge Society, claimed that the Zionists had a plot for world domination by the year 2000. They already controlled the USA, and only the USSR could stop them. Ianov has spoken of the electric atmosphere provoked by such statements of transformed Russian messianism at public lectures. (Emelianov himself fell from favour after being accused of murdering his wife.) A review in the literary journal
Nash_sovremennik in 1974 announced, "The Zionists have serious pretensions - like the Hitlerites before them - to world domination [gospodstvo]." The writer attempted to place this in a Marxist-Leninist framework, citing Marx's "On the Jewish Question"64 (see above, p. 198). Conspiracy theories about the Jews expressed in literature and historiography will be mentioned below, pp. 427, 439-41. One work which presented a positive view of the Jews was Anatoly Rybakov's Tiazhelyi_pesok (Heavy_Sand). This novel about a Ukrainian Jewish family from the revolution to the German occupation drew Western attention when published in the conservative journal Oktiabr' in July to September 1978, because it stood out against the general anti-Semitic mood of the time.65
Organizations were officially established in the 1960s under pressure from the Russian nationalists. Already at the October 1964 Central Committee Plenum where Khrushchev's overthrow had been approved, the question of the preservation of historical monuments had been raised. Then on 16 October 1964 - within 24 hours of the fall of Khrushchev - the RSFSR Ministry of Culture issued an "Instruction on the bringing to light, registration and collection of works of old Russian art". In that year the Komsomol organized the "Rodina" (Motherland) clubs for young people interested in the protection of monuments. The Leningrad artist Ilia Sergeevich Glazunov (born 1930) was reputed to be the leader. Leonid Pliushch has characterized his ideas as "Monarchy, Orthodoxy, truly Russian culture", slightly varying Uvarov's formula of the reign of Nicholas I. The members of Rodina were known as rusity (Russites), and later the term "Russkaia partiia" (Russian Party) was used for this tendency. In 1965 the government allowed the formation of the "All-Russian Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments" (VOOPIK), under the auspices of the RSFSR Ministry of Culture. Similar societies had already been established in the three Transcaucasian republics under Khrushchev.

The driving forces behind the formation of VOOPIK were Glazunov and Soloukhin. The restoration of churches and monasteries has been a major part of its activity. By 1982...
VOOPIK had 14.7 million individual members. According to Ianov, it was a forum where Russian nationalist dissidents and official cultural figures could mingle. Both here and in the Rodina Clubs, Jews were considered outsiders and viewed with hostility. The socialist dissident Lev Z. Kopelev in 1974 called VOOPIK "in essence a legal organization of new Black Hundreds". Soloukhin's writings conveyed strong hints not only of Russian nationalism but also of Orthodox Christianity. His "Chernye doski" (Black Boards, 1969) condemned the destruction of churches and religious objects, under Khrushchev and Brezhnev too, and described the continuing power of Russian icons to attract people. The "All-Russian Society for the Protection of Nature" (VOOOP), in which Russian nationalists were also active, was reported to have had 19 million members in 1971.

The journal Voprosy_literatury hosted a discussion on "The Literary Criticism of the Early Slavophils" in 1969 (see also above, ch. ii). Four scholars - S.I. Pokrovsky, Dementev (late of Novyi_mir), V.I. Kuleshov and S.I. Mashinsky - took the traditional Leninist position that the Slavophils were utopian or reactionary. Dementev, defending the traditions of Belinsky and Herzen, argued: "Perhaps it will become clear that both the ideologists of official narodnost' and the Slavophils developed not a national but a nationalist consciousness (samosoznanie), and worked out not a national but a nationalist ideology." The other seven were more favourable - Ianov, Egorov, A.M. Ivanov, L.G. Frizman, E.A.
Maimin, Vadim V. Kozhinov and S.S. Dmitriev. In particular the critics Kozhinov and Ivanov praised the Slavophils for pointing to the uniqueness of the Russian people. Ivanov wrote:

The chief factor which the Slavophils valued in the Russian people was not at all humility, but the communal [obshchinnyi] spirit, what we would now call the feeling of collectivism, as counterposed to the individualism and egoism of the bourgeois West. Kozhinov rejected Dementev's accusation that the Slavophils were nationalist (see above, p. 134). Mashinsky, for the Voprosy literature editorial board, concluded the series by warning against what he called the "rehabilitation" of Slavophilism. The four "opponents" of Slavophilism were all born between 1904 and 1919; the more favourable seven were born between 1921 and 1935, with the exception of Dmitriev (born 1906). According to Vladimir Pavlov, the latter had been criticized after his 1941 Istorik-marksist article for having too positive an attitude to Slavophilism. In the late 1970s collections of the works of the early Slavophils began to be published, together with sympathetic biographies (see above, ch. ii).

Of wider interest was the attempt to claim Dostoevsky, traditionally viewed as reactionary in Soviet criticism, for the Soviet State. (See also above, pp. 181-82.) This reflected the growth of interest in the religious and philosophical thought of Dostoevsky which began in the 1960s and has not diminished. Glazunov praised Dostoevsky as an ally against cynicism and social atomization, and claimed that his critique of the bourgeois world was still
relevant. Further, he quoted Dostoevsky's statement from the manifesto for Vremia, that the "Russian idea" was a synthesis of the best of Europe's ideas. At a closed meeting of literary critics, held in Moscow on 25 April 1969, Anatoly P. Lanshchikov (born 1929) linked the revolution to Russian messianism.

"Our country has a special road. Dostoevsky spoke of that. And that is precisely why the revolution was achieved in our country."

To a comment from the floor - "That's Berdiaev's conception" - Lanshchikov justified the relevance of Berdiaev. Returning to Dostoevsky, he proclaimed: "... if the role of Orthodoxy is to be denied, then I don't know what there remains of Russia." The flood of articles in connection with the 150th anniversary of Dostoevsky's birth in 1971 provided ample opportunities for debate over how much of the writer's ideas could be incorporated into the Soviet canon.

An important source of support for village prose, for the movement to preserve historical monuments and for Russian nationalism in general was provided by the literary journal and the publishing house of the All-Union Komsomol, both called Molodaia_gvardiia. Soloukhin himself and the derevenshchik Iury Kazakov (1927-1982) were on the editorial board of the journal, as was the Kirghiz writer who wrote about the traditions of his own people, Chingiz Aitmatov. Articles by Glazunov and Soloukhin in Molodaia_gvardiia did much to popularize the conservation movement. Soloukhin's "Pis'ma iz Russkogo Muzeia" (Letters from the Russian Museum) in Molodaia_gvardiia in 1966 complained at
the neglect and destruction of Russian treasures and monuments - in particular, churches and monasteries. He emphasized their aesthetic, cultural and historical value and their importance in developing a national consciousness needed for a new society. He showed how Lenin himself had sought to preserve Russia's heritage.\textsuperscript{85} The journal often included a section, "Cherish what is sacred to us" ("Beregite sviatyniu nashu").

In June 1967, in response to an attack by Igor Zolotussky in \textit{Literaturnaia gazeta} the previous April, \textit{Molodaia gvardiia} set forth what was in effect its political programme. This did not talk of proletarian internationalism, the construction of communism or socialist morality. Instead, it spoke of the journal's concern with educating youth with "respect for the people's history, for the native land, for the cultural legacy and for national (natsional'nye) values".\textsuperscript{86} Around \textit{Molodaia gvardiia} were gathered not only nationalists who defended the peasant past and sympathized with religion (best termed the \textit{vozrozhdentsy}, or revivalists), such as the \textit{derevenshchiki}, but also nationalists who, like the National Bolsheviks, believed in a strong Russian State (the \textit{gosudarstvenniki}), and in some cases looked back to the good old days of Stalin. These two groups were sharply divided on questions ranging from the value of religion to the necessity for collectivization.

In 1968, during and after the Prague Spring, articles
appeared in *Molodaia_gvardiia* by the critics Mikhail P. Lobanov, an editorial board member, and Chalmaev, who until November 1966 had been deputy chief editor, and who already under Khrushchev had attacked Solzhenitsyn's work (see above, p. 366). The articles appealed to the "Russian spirit" against cosmopolitanism and Americanization. The October Revolution was presented as a manifestation of this Russian spirit rather than a stage in the international class struggle. Chalmaev invoked Sergei Esenin, who he said counterposed "the cosmopolitan, soulless civilization of America with the spirituality [dukhovnost'] of Russia." He favourably cited the arch-conservative Leontev (discussed in ch. iii), and the derevenshchik Fyodor Abramov. Unlike the classical Slavophils, Chalmaev referred to the attachment to the State (gosudarstvennost') of the Russian people. Lobanov (born 1925) recalled Dostoevsky's Stepan Verkhovensky from *The Devils*, and denounced liberalism in general. He spoke of the mortal struggle of "two irreconcilable forces - moral uniqueness [the Slavophils' samobvtnost'] and the Americanism of the soul". Chalmaev was supported by Lanshchikov. The journal also published a poem by Feliks Chuev glorifying Stalin.

In August 1970 an article "On Values, Relative and Eternal" by the historian Sergei N. Semanov, attempting to rehabilitate Stalin, appeared. It spoke of the "universal equality" brought after the adoption of the Stalin Constitution (in reality the time of the worst purges) and praised Stalin's appeal in 1941 to the memory of Tsarist
war heroes. Semanov, born in 1934 in Leningrad, had been appointed editor-in-chief of the series *Zhizn' zamechatel'nykh lyudei* (The Lives of Outstanding People), published by the Molodaia gvardiia house, the previous year. Other articles appeared, some supporting Stalin and attacking Trotsky; others supported Russian nineteenth-century anti-socialist thinkers such as Strakhov (see ch. iii); others called more generally for more attention to be given to the Russian past. Iury D. Ivanov criticized the foreign influences on the Decembrists and Pushkin. Kozhinov described how the Russian people had saved the world three times, from Genghis Khan, Napoleon and Hitler. "We came out three times in history as a unique force, able to save all the other nations from a grandiose war machine which was striving to crush them." He spoke of Russia's "national and universal [obshchebelovecheskoi] mission".

The First Secretary of the Moscow Writers' Organization, Feliks Kuznetsov, at the above-mentioned April 1969 meeting of critics, suggested that *Molodaia gvardiia* and *Nash sovremennik* formed a third pole in literature and politics. The first two were the liberal *Novyi mir* and the conservative *Oktiabr*. I think this is helpful, if it is understood that the nationalist pole represented by *Molodaia gvardiia* and *Nash sovremennik* included both Stalinists, such as Semanov, and anti-Stalinists, such as Soloukhin and Valentin Rasputin (see below), who condemned the Stalinist attitude to historical
monuments and the peasants. Kuznetsov spoke of the impossibility of combining Chalmaev's position with Marxism. He continued that Soviet misfortunes were "not from socialism but from not enough socialism, not from Europe but from not enough Europe". 101

It should be remembered that, behind these discussions, two major political developments were occurring. On the one hand, the regime was wondering whether to rehabilitate Stalin fully; rumours about this spread in 1966 and 1969, and in 1970 a bust of the leader was erected above his grave behind the Lenin Mausoleum. On the other hand, Moscow intellectuals, fearing further curbs on their freedom and a return to a cultural graveyard, launched the human rights movement. Figures around Novyi_mir such as Andrei D. Siniavsky and Iuly M. Daniel were victims of persecution, and others such as Dorosh and Ehrenburg were participants in protests against persecution. Between 1966 and 1970, the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Fleet (MPA) banned the journal from the armed forces. In early 1967, Dementev ("Tvardovsky's closest friend and top lieutenant") was removed from the editorial board by the officials of the USSR Writers' Union. 102

Despite these difficulties, Tvardovsky continued to publish much of the best of Russian literature, including village prose, and struggled with the authorities in a vain attempt to publish more of the works of Solzhenitsyn. Although not a participant in the petitions to defend the persecuted, Solzhenitsyn became associated with the human rights movement after his letter to the Congress of the Writers'
Union in 1967, appealing for an end to censorship.  

It was over Chalmaev's articles in *Molodaia_gvardiia* that *Novyi_mir* was to clash with the Stalinists. The deviations of *Molodaia_gvardiia* from Leninist orthodoxy did not pass unnoticed. In February 1968 *Lunost'* had accused *Molodaia_gvardiia* of ignoring proletarian internationalism in its adoration of things Russian.  

The magazine of the Union of Journalists, *Zhurnalist*, reported in May 1969 that Chalmaev had been censured by the Central Committee Propaganda Department. In *Novyi_mir*, Dementev wrote an article attacking Chalmaev's chauvinism and rejecting his claim that bourgeois cosmopolitanism posed a danger for Soviet society. "Chalmaev," wrote Dementev, "speaks in the language of Slavophil messianism rather than in the language of our contemporaries." This provoked an attack on *Novyi_mir* by eleven writers of the Russian national orientation, including Anatoly S. Ivanov of the *Molodaia_gvardiia* editorial board, Sergei V. Vikulov, editor-in-chief of *Nash_sovremennik*, Pyotr L. Proskurin and Mikhail N. Alekseev. It took the form of a letter to *Ogonek*, the then pro-nationalist mass-circulation journal of the USSR Writers' Union, whose editor-in-chief, Anatoly V. Sofronov, was close to Glazunov. It asserted that the Soviet Union was indeed threatened by corrupting influences from the West.  

Ianov has claimed that Dementev's article, by uniting the old Stalinists with the new nationalists, sealed the fate of *Novyi_mir*. It is more likely that the sacking of Tvardovsky's colleagues in
February 1970, and his consequent resignation, was connected with his struggle against Stalinism and for Solzhenitsyn.\(^{109}\)

The ideological complexity of this period is shown by the position of Solzhenitsyn, who had achieved publication only thanks to Novyi-mir. Solzhenitsyn found himself philosophically closer to the semi-Stalinist Chalmaev, who had earlier attacked Solzhenitsyn's work, than to Novyi-mir, for Chalmaev was defending religious inspiration as a historical source of Russian patriotism. Whereas Molodaia gvardiia had put up a defence of religion, Novyi-mir had supported Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign. The editors of Ogonek and Moskva spoke more openly about the destruction caused by collectivization than Tvardovsky did. (But when Solzhenitsyn offered his work to Ogonek and to Literaturnaia Rossiiia, the newspaper of the RSFSR Writers' Union, edited by supporters of the Russian orientation, they rejected it.)\(^{110}\)

The nationalism and Stalinism of Molodaia gvardiia went too far for Brezhnev. Iury Melentev, the director of the Molodaia gvardiia publishing house, was sacked from his post and from his membership of the CPSU Central Committee (after, according to Ianov, he had tried to persuade Brezhnev of the need for a 'patriotic' indoctrination campaign among the youth and a purge of cosmopolitanism). Nevertheless, Melentev was quickly made RSFSR Deputy Minister (and then Minister) of Culture, showing that he had powerful backers.\(^{111}\)
Semanov's article "On Values, Relative and Eternal" provoked a vigorous response from the veteran Party member Raisa Lert, in the samizdat journal Politicheskii dnevnik (Political Diary), edited by Roy Medvedev. Her article "The Charms of the Knout" pointed out that while Semanov favoured the preservation of monuments, it was in fact Stalin who had carried out much of their destruction. Semanov cared nothing for the Russian people and Russian culture, but was an apologist for great-power chauvinism, tsarism and Stalinism. She somewhat misleadingly referred to both Semanov and Chalmaev as neo-Slavophils.

More seriously for Semanov, his article appears to have been the catalyst for the Politburo member and Central Commitee Secretary responsible for ideology, Suslov, to initiate a meeting of either the Secretariat or the Politburo to discuss the nationalist challenge. Brezhnev reportedly spoke at this meeting, in November 1970, against the religious themes which were creeping into the Soviet media. It was decided to sack Anatoly Nikonov from the chief editorship of Molodaia gvardiia. Lobanov, Soloukhin and Proskurin were allowed to remain on the editorial board, and in April 1972, A.S. Ivanov, who had been deputy chief editor since April 1969, was made chief editor. Chalmaev later joined the editorial board. After the "purge", though, Chalmaev no longer wrote about church bells; the journal had less village prose but more patriotic memoirs of such Great Patriotic War heroes as
Marshal Chuikov which emphasized Soviet rather than Russian patriotic themes. Meanwhile, Vikulov, deputy editor of Molodaia_gvardiia until August 1968, having become chief editor of Nash_sovremennik, made that journal the principal centre of Russian nationalism.

Who was backing Molodaia_gvardiia and the rusity? It seems likely that the senior patron was the Politburo member and First Deputy Prime Minister, D.S. Poliansky, who, although apparently Ukrainian, has been identified as an extreme Russian nationalist. The neo-Stalinist Politburo member and head of the trade unions A.N. Shelepin probably also gave support. The Cultural Department of the Central Committee, headed by V.F. Shauro, a Belorussian, was strongly supporting the nationalists.115 According to the former Soviet writer Georgy Vladimov, M.S. Solomentsev, in 1970 a Central Committee Secretary, was also a nationalist supporter. Michael Rywkin records rumours that Solomentsev and I.V. Kapitonov, another Central Committee Secretary, were behind the nationalists. These two were the only representatives of the top leadership to attend a Kremlin celebration of the Kulikovo anniversary in 1980. Vladimov suggests that Suslov and P.N. Demichev (in 1970 a Central Committee Secretary and candidate Politburo member) were prepared to use the nationalists against the liberal writers and dissidents, but the nationalists went too far.116 It is certainly the case that Molodaia_gvardiia and Nash_sovremennik have always been hostile to liberal or cosmopolitan writers such as Evgenii Evtushenko, Andrei A. Voznesenskii and Vasili Aksenov. Roy Medvedev reports
that the rusity were backed by the MPA and the Central Committee of the Komsomol.\textsuperscript{117}

A particular example of the Stalinist anti-Semitic approach in fictional literature was Ivan M. Shevtsov's novel \textit{Vo-imia_ottsa_i_syna} (In the Name of the Father and the Son), published by the Moskovskii rabochii publishing house in 1970. This conflated Trotskyists and Zionists in the negative portrait of Jewry. It includes the suggestion that imperialism is a tool of Zionism, and not the other way round, as the usual Marxist position would have it.\textsuperscript{118} This novel was reportedly published only due to the pressure of Poliansky.\textsuperscript{119}

A number of attacks on the Russian nationalists, following Suslov's moves against them, came from \textit{Kommunist} and from Party ideologists. V. Ivanov in \textit{Kommunist} in November 1970 came out against the "single stream" (edinyi potok) view of Russian history which minimized class conflict. He criticized the attacks of both \textit{Iunost'} and \textit{Novyi mir} on \textit{Molodaia gvardiia} for going too far. Concerning Dementev, he wrote: "In the contemporary ideological struggle it is impermissible to belittle the danger of the influence of bourgeois ideology."\textsuperscript{120} On the other hand, he mentioned the articles by Chalmaev, Iu. Ivanov and Semanov, and deprecated the "non-social, non-class, anti-historical approach to the cultural legacy, so insistently brought out by a series of authors in \textit{Molodaia gvardiia}". Chalmaev was guilty of idealizing the
patriarchal village. Historians such as Semanov deviated from Marxism-Leninism to try to "find in the policy of autocracy some 'progressive' features, which supposedly facilitated the strengthening of national consciousness."¹²¹ In an article in 1971 in Kommunist, M. Iovchuk, director of the Academy of Social Sciences, attacked "one-sided" (i.e. hostile) treatment of collectivization, nationalist moods and the idealization of religion, naming Solzhenitsyn, Novyi mir, Molodaia gvardiia and even "Fyodor Kuzkin".¹²² Kuzkin was the hero of a Novyi mir story by the derevenshchik Boris Mozhaev. In the story, Kuzkin, discontented in his kolkhoz, struggles hard to leave and finally succeeds. There is a happy ending, however, because he joins another one where there is scope for his talents.¹²³

The following year A. N. Iakovlev, later to become a leading ally of Gorbachov but then acting head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, published in Literaturnaiia gazeta a long and detailed attack on both official and dissident nationalism. From a traditional Leninist viewpoint, he attacked the derevenshchiki for seeking an eternal, classless morality; Molodaia gvardiia for its positive portrayal of nineteenth-century conservatives; and Solzhenitsyn for anti-communism.¹²⁴ The article is believed to be the reason for his removal from the Propaganda Department and demotion to be Ambassador in Ottawa.¹²⁵
Russian nationalism in literature and art in the 1970s

In a book published in 1980 (based on a conference held in 1978) Jack V. Haney claimed: "the revival of interest in Russia's past on the part of writers and critics, although certainly not ended, is nonetheless muted now ... because there no longer exists an open forum of discussion."

Extraordinarily, his chapter makes no reference to Nash sovremennik.126 As I shall try to show below, Russian nationalism in literature, art and the study of history flourished throughout the 1970s.

It is worth noting that many of the concerns of the derevenshchiki were acted upon by the Brezhnev leadership. The peasants were allowed greater freedom of enterprise, with the increase in the size of the permitted private plot. Collective farmers were given internal passports, allowing them to leave the kolkhozy if they wished. In place of the Virgin Lands scheme, Brezhnev emphasized the development of the Non-Black-Earth zone of Central Russia. Investment in fertilizer, irrigation and the rural infrastructure increased dramatically.127 The derevenshchiki passed from a preoccupation with the village to wider concerns about life and morality.128 In the idea, frequently implicit in their writings, that Russia's future was best secured by a return to what they considered to be peasant values, they had (and have) much in common with the Slavophiles and Dostoevsky. Unlike their nineteenth-century predecessors, however, there is little to suggest that the village prose writers see Russia as a model for the rest of the world. Their concern is solely with Russian problems,
and not even with the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union (although they have their counterparts there).

Vasily Ivanovich Belov was born in 1932 in Vologda oblast', and won fame with his story "Privychnoe delo" (A Normal Situation), published in Sever (The North) in January 1966. Sever is a journal of the Writers' Unions of the RSFSR and the Karelian and Komi ASSRs and of the Arkhangelsk, Vologda and Murmansk Writers' Organizations. As such, and within the realities of Soviet politics, it seeks to represent the interests of the inhabitants of the Russian North. Ivan Afrikanovich, the hero of "Privychnoe delo", became an archetype of village prose as a well-intentioned, easy-going peasant. Belov progressed from a defence of the peasants' immediate interests to the position in his novel Kanuny (Eves, 1972-1976), partly published in Sever, of arguing that the New Economic Policy should have been continued at the end of the 1920s as an alternative to collectivization. (Sergei Zalygin took a similar position in his novel Posle_buri [After the Tempest], the first parts of which appeared in Druzhba_narodov between April 1980 and May 1982.)

Mikhail N. Alekseev, born in 1918 in a village in Saratov oblast', was chief editor of Moskva, the monthly of the RSFSR Writers' Union and the Moscow Writers' Organization (a position he still held in 1989). He was a signatory to the 1969 letter attacking Novyi_mir. The author of a series of novels of peasant life, he wrote in Nash_sovremennik in September 1972 about the 1933 famine in
the Volga region which accompanied collectivization.132

Oleg V. Volkov (born 1900), a literary critic and former
political prisoner, wrote in the same journal in November
1978 of peasant resistance to collectivization.133

The stories of Vasily M. Shukshin (1929-1974) about
rugged individualistic peasants attracted much favour among
Russian readers. While the independence of spirit and
restlessness of his characters tend to mark him off from
the derevenschiki, he has points of contact with them.
His story "Kalina krasnaia" (Snowball Berry Red) published
in Nash sovremennik in April 1973 won still greater
recognition when he made it into a film, bringing images of
the Russian village (including a church) to a large
audience. In his sympathy for the unspoilt, primitive
past, Shukshin has been called a "Scythian" and compared
with Ivanov-Razumnik.134

Probably the most popular of the derevenschiki is
Valentin Grigorevich Rasputin. Successive volumes of his
stories, in print runs of hundreds of thousands, sell out
immediately and become unobtainable. This has normally
been the case with the most valuable Soviet literary
creations. Rasputin was born in the Siberian village of
Ust-Uda on the Angara in 1937, and in 1988 was still living
in Irkutsk, only 300 miles from his birthplace. As well as
depicting the hardships of the Russian peasants in
different periods of Soviet history, he came to challenge
the whole notion of progress.
His "Den'gi dlia Marii" (Money for Maria, Angara, April 1967) depicts the poverty on the kolkhozy and the cruel behaviour of the authorities. The story "Zhivi i pomni" (Live and Remember, Nash sovremennik, October-November 1974), deploys religious symbolism and reveals his debt to Dostoevsky. The relationship between the deserter Andrei and his wife Nastyona echoes that between Raskolnikov and Sonia in Crime and Punishment, while the behaviour of Andrei himself comes to resemble that of one of Dostoevsky's Devils.

Rasputin's novel "Proshchanie s Materoi" (Farewell to Matyora, Nash sovremennik, October to November 1976) depicts the preparations for the death of a village, Matyora. The village and the island of the same name are to be flooded for a hydroelectric power scheme. His positive character, the old peasant woman Daria, believes that people have forgotten their God-given place and have no right to interfere with the environment. Rasputin seems to be recalling Dostoevsky's concept: if there is no God, then "all is permitted". In the epoch of the scientific and technological revolution, Daria knows that if man deifies technology he will become its slave. Daria's religion, it should be pointed out, has pagan elements; she prays to the sun but considers herself a Christian. Daria follows Rasputin's earlier peasant-women protagonists - Maria in "Den'gi dlia Marii", Anna in "Poslednii srok" (Borrowed Time, Nash sovremennik, July-August 1970) and Nastyona in "Zhivi i pomni". They are mother figures in
whom moral values are concentrated, especially the readiness for self-sacrifice. David Gillespie suggest that these women symbolize "Mother Russia". They evoke memories of Solzhenitsyn's Matryona. The end of Matyora is presented in apocalyptic terms with the waters threatening not only the island but the lives of Daria and the other old people who refuse to be evacuated.

In a Voprosy_literatury discussion on Rasputin's stories, O. Salynsky and V. Oskotsky criticized Rasputin for identifying with his heroine's failure to appreciate the benefits of progress. Of significance were the views of the Gosudarstvennik critic Iury Ivanovich Seleznyov, who was born in Krasnodar in 1939 and died in 1984 (see also the next section). He welcomed the story enthusiastically. Rasputin was concerned not only with the disappearance of the countryside but with socio-philosophical and moral problems: "Who are we on this earth; what is this earth for us?" For Seleznyov, Matyora signified not a territory, or a flooding zone, as the bureaucrat sees it, but "mother", "mother-earth" (mat'-Zemlia) and motherland (mat'-Rodina). He compared "Matyora" with Pushkin's "Bronze Horseman": both portrayed the conflict between the individual (lichnost') and the interests of the State (gosudarstvennost'). (Seleznyov presumably believed that such technological feats were in fact against the interests of the State.)

It should be noted that Rasputin was beaten up twice after the appearance of "Matera", in 1977 and 1980.
although there is no evidence to link this with any official organs. With the exception of some short pieces published in Nash_sovremennik in July 1982, he produced no fiction until 1985. In a 1976 interview, he listed his main sources of inspiration among writers then living as Sholokhov, Shukshin, Belov, Viktor P. Astafev, Evgeny I. Nosov, Abramov and the Belorussian Vasyl Bykov. But in 1983 he made clear a deeper debt: "...there were and are (and will be, in my view) no phenomena in literature deeper, more central, more human-directed and eternal than Dostoevsky."

From the mid-1970s, religious themes became almost a regular feature in literary journals such as Molodaia gvardiia, Nash_sovremennik, Volga and Sever. Zalygin's Komissiia (The Commission, Nash_sovremennik, September to November 1975) positively portrayed the peasants' religion. Belov wrote a series of essays entitled "Lad" (Harmony, Nash_sovremennik, 1979-1981), investigating the attitudes and customs of the peasant in old Russia. Village prose writers such as Viktor I. Likhonosov and Astafev defended Orthodoxy. (Astafev's main concern had been the protection of nature, especially in his native Siberia.) Proskurin's hero, an obkom secretary, comes to see Orthodoxy as the spiritual foundation of Russia. Many writers, including the poet Valentin Sorokin, emphasized the role of the Orthodox Church in the Russian defeat of the Tatars and Mongols at Kulikovo Field in 1380. This trend in literature reflected the wider tendency among
sections of the intelligentsia towards the study of religious thought, especially of that of Dostoevsky, Solovyov and the Vekhi writers. The cult of N.F. Fyodorov with its emphasis on progress was rather different but equally non-Marxist (see above, pp. 216-18).

The journal *Nash sovremennik*, the principal centre of Russian nationalism at this time, attracted many of those *derevenshchiki* who had previously published in *Novyi mir*. In November 1968 the composition of the *Nash sovremennik* editorial board had been almost entirely replaced. The new chief editor was the poet and *derevenshchik* Vikulov, who signed the 1969 attack on *Novyi mir*. Vikulov adhered to the view that the peasants were the best representatives of Russian traditions. Chalmaev became the deputy chief editor, a position he held only until March 1970. Shukshin joined the board in 1973, Rasputin in 1975 and Belov in 1978. Other *derevenshchik* members included Astafev, Nosov, Ivan A. Vasilev, Georgy V. Semyonov and Troepolsky. The *gosudarstvennik* litterateur Seleznyov was made deputy chief editor in May 1981 but dropped from the list in May 1982, when the *gosudarstvennik* historian Apollon G. Kuzmin became an editor. From June 1981 the journal carried a slogan "Russia - my Motherland". This was a bold nationalist statement, in view of the traditional position that the motherland for Soviet citizens is the USSR as a whole. In 1973 Solzhenitsyn, by then a Russian nationalist dissident, expressed his continuing affinity with officially-permitted Russian nationalist literature. He named fourteen writers whom he felt represented the core of contemporary Russian
prose. Of these at least eight (Abramov, Astafiev, Belov, Kazakov, Mozhaev, Nosov, Soloukhin, and Vladimir Tendriakov) belonged to the derevenshchiki, and a ninth, Shukshin, was close to them. 149

Religious motifs were never far from the art of Glazunov. His portraits of Russian historical figures such as Ivan the Terrible and Boris Godunov conveyed religious images, and other paintings were primarily religious in content. An example is "The Eve. Before the Battle of Kulikovo", showing St. Sergii of Radonezh. Many of his paintings include iconographic figures. Like the Orthodox Church hierarchy, Glazunov has been a faithful ambassador of the Soviet Union abroad. He visited Vietnam in 1967 during the war, and Chile in 1973, where he painted a portrait of President Salvador Allende. In 1977 his enigmatic "Mystery of the Twentieth Century" became widely known. Christ appears above a collection of political leaders and cultural figures, including Lenin, Stalin, Nicholas II, Churchill, Solzhenitsyn and the Beatles. His "Return of the Prodigal Son" shows a penitent Russian youth in jeans returning to a peasant father who is surrounded by Russian saints and heroes. Widespread Russian interest in Glazunov was indicated by the attendance at his art exhibition, featuring national and religious themes. In Moscow in 1978 500 000 people came, and perhaps a million in his native Leningrad in 1979. Pravda published a review of the exhibition in Moscow, by the gosudarstvennik historian Dmitry Zhukov. The latter appraised Glazunov's
patriotism positively, but criticized his "partiality to religious motifs", and his failure to depict events such as "the birth of the mighty Soviet State". 151 Oleg Volkov entitled his Nash_sovremennik review of the exhibition "I saw Russia". 152

At the exhibition in Moscow, Glazunov met the priest Dimitry Dudko. He later approvingly quoted to some of Dudko's followers Dostoevsky's aphorism that one could not be Russian without being Orthodox. 153 Glazunov encountered much opposition from the Union of Artists but had the support of the RSFSR Writers' Union. Olga Carlisle wrote in 1978: "In Moscow it is generally recognized that Glazunov, a virulent anti-Semite, is a KGB official, although he denies it." 154 Undoubtedly Glazunov became accepted by the top Party leaders; he painted a portrait of Suslov, which pleased the ideology Secretary, and his portrait of Brezhnev was published in Sofronov's Ogonek. 155 This does not, of course, make him a KGB official. The Russian nationalist dissident Leonid Borodin wrote a samizdat article in 1978 praising Glazunov's art and his Orthodox symbols. He declared:

To those who see in I. Glazunov's official status something almost obliterating his whole activity, I would like to remind or make clear that we are not striving for revolution, in which 'whoever is not with us is against us', but for the transformation of all our people, our nation, all strata and levels. 156
Among Russian historians, the most important advocate of the Russian national revival (vozrozhdenets) was Academician Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov. Born in 1906, he served time in Stalin's prison camps but was rehabilitated under Khrushchev. He became the Director of the Department of the Literature of Ancient Rus' at the Institute of Russian Literature (Pushkin House) of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Leningrad division. He played a major role in VOOPIK. In 1975 he was beaten up and had a rib broken in circumstances suggesting the involvement of the authorities. He had previously refused to sign an attack on Academician Andrei D. Sakharov.157

An indication of the differences between the vozrozhdenets and the gosudarstvenniki was shown by the reaction to the book by the Kazakh poet Olzhas Suleimenov, Az_i_Ia. (The title is a pun on the first and last letters of the old Russian alphabet with the "and" in between them, spelling "Asia".) Suleimenov's book, printed in Alma-Ata in 1975 but unobtainable, challenged the accepted Russian view of the origins of the literary epic Slovo_o_polku Igoreve (The Tale of Igor's Campaign). He proclaimed a Turkic influence on the poem; he also suggested that Russians were racists and had an inferiority complex, and called the Jews the "chief People". Likhachov wrote a scholarly answer, taking Suleimenov's claims seriously but refuting them. The gosudarstvennik Kuzmin wrote a sneering review in Molodaia_gvardiia, which after dispatching the
Kazakh launched into an attack on Judaism. Another 
gosudarstvennik, Seleznyov, mocked Suleimenov in a Moskva 
review. He said that the book would be only a short-term 
sensation. He accused the writer of considering the Jews 
the "chosen people", an idea which was akin to Nazism. 
Condescendingly, he described the book as "not only anti-
scientific, but hurtful" to the Turkic peoples who were 
creating their own culture.

The gosudarstvenniki in the late 1970s seemed to be 
becoming increasingly influential. In 1976 Semanov became 
editor-in-chief of the journal of the Ministry of Justice, 
Chelovek i zakon, which henceforth took a strong anti-
Semitic line. He produced a collection, Serdtse rodiny 
(The Heart of the Motherland) in 1977, calling himself a 
supporter of a strong State (gosudarstvennik) and attacking 
"rootless cosmopolitanism". According to Semyon Reznik, 
Semanov respects the Tsars, Lenin and Stalin, and opposes 
all the opponents of Russian governments, from the 
Decembrists onwards, apart from the Bolsheviks. Thus his 
biography Brusilov praised the General's loyalty to the 
Tsar and to the Bolsheviks. Semanov, like the National 
Bolsheviks, elevates the Russian State above all else.

While Semanov was editor of Chelovek i zakon, the journal 
Kommunist carried an article on the need to preserve 
historical monuments and works of art, attributed to the 
"collective correspondent" of Kommunist, the journal 
Chelovek i zakon. Chalmaev, for his part, showed his 
gosudarstvennik credentials when he complained in Moskva 
about writers who placed "ethical-moral problems over
State-patriotic ones". This appeared to be an attack on the derevenshchiki as well as the liberals.

On 21 December 1977, a meeting was held in the Moscow writers' headquarters at which anti-Semitic statements were openly expressed by the deputy director of the Gorky Institute of World Literature, Pyotr Palievsky. Anatoly Efros, a theatre director of Jewish nationality, objected to the proceedings and was sent an anonymous note saying: "Organize your own national theatre and mutilate Russian classics there as you wish." Efros was supported only by Evtushenko. Kozhinov was forced to deny accusations of anti-Semitism, but (after Efros had read out the anonymous note) informed the meeting that his wife had stopped going to Efros's theatre because of what Efros did to Chekhov's plays. Seleznyov reportedly managed to introduce an attack on Zionism into the proceedings, proclaiming "The Third War of the Fatherland is now at its height".

When Seleznyov succeeded Semanov as editor-in-chief of the series Zhizn' zamechatel'nykh liudei it became an instrument of the gosudarstvenniki. Works by Kuzmin, Oleg Mikhailov, Lobanov, Iury Loshchits and Seleznyov himself promoted a positive attitude to tsarism. According to the gosudarstvennik ideology, the non-Russians supposedly all joined the Russian State voluntarily. It was only in the nineteenth century that the Empire began to degenerate, under the influence of "cosmopolitanism"; the October Revolution put the State back on the "national" path.
Anti-Semitic innuendoes were a regular feature of the series. Still more significant was the wide popularity enjoyed by Valentin S. Pikul's novel, \textit{U-poslednei-cherty} (On the Brink), published in \textit{Nash sovremennik} from April to June 1979. This depicted a supposed Jewish-Masonic plot against Russia during the First World War, with the monk Rasputin being a Zionist agent.\footnote{166}

The nationalists and \textit{gosudaretniki} were not unopposed, however. Feliks Kuznetsov continued to defend a Marxist position. "The idealization of the patriarchal way of life in the Russian village is one of today's widespread deviations from the historical Marxist-Leninist social and class approach to the problem of spiritual and ethical values."\footnote{167} K.N. Lomunov, in the 1978 Gorky Institute volume on Slavophilism, denounced the \textit{Molodaia gvardiia} critics. He accused them of trying "to resurrect the Slavophil counterposing of the patriarchal village to the industrial town", and present the peasants as "even today" the preservers of "the people's aspirations and persuasions".\footnote{168} A leading article in \textit{Kommunist} in October 1979 attacked manifestations of nationalism and patriarchalism in Soviet literature. It singled out a book on \textit{Goncharov} by Iury Loshchits (1977) in Seleznov's series and a story by Astafev entitled "Padenie lista" (The Fall of a Leaf).\footnote{169} Brezhnev's denunciation of anti-Semitism as well as Zionism, and of chauvinism as well as nationalism, at the XXVI Party Congress in 1981, may not have been purely ritualistic.
A major occasion for an outburst of Russian national feeling was the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kulikovo Field, which fell in September 1980. In October 1979 the RSFSR Council of Ministers announced a number of measures to celebrate the anniversary, including the repair of monuments, in particular the Church of St Sergii of Radonezh. It may perhaps be significant that it was an RSFSR body, rather than an All-Union body, which was in charge; this meant (in the absence of a Communist Party of Russia) that it was officially handled primarily as a government rather than a Party matter. The impression might have been given that the top leadership was distancing itself from the occasion; only two representatives attended the Kremlin celebration (see above, p. 426) on 8 September 1980. This was organized by the Moscow gorkom (city committee) of the CPSU, the Moscow City Soviet, the Academy of Sciences, the RSFSR Ministry of Culture and VOOPiK.

Two weeks later, Pravda carried an article by Academician Likhachov on the importance of preserving Russia's historic and cultural environment, and linking this to the Kulikovo celebrations. He described how a Moscow church had once conveyed to him a "mysterious idea"; but this church had later been destroyed, in the 1930s.

In March 1980 Novyi mir featured an important article by Likhachov, "Zametki o russkom" (Notes about Russianness). In this he defended patriotism and distinguished it from nationalism. Nationalism was "based
on hate towards other peoples", while patriotism was "based on love for one's own" people. This, with other parts of the article, appears to be a rebuke to the gosudarstvenniki. He discussed the relationship of Russian patriotism to history, nature, the open spaces and the Russian character. He also wrote of the beauty of the English countryside and the Scottish Highlands, and the influence of European culture on Russia. It was the ability of Pushkin to make his own the culture of all Europe which led Dostoevsky to consider him "the ideal of the Russian person". Likhachov also argued that Russia had a responsibility to protect and develop the cultures of the peoples which history had joined to Russia. The article was later expanded to a book which passed through two editions. Likhachov was also in 1980 allowed to edit a volume on the architecture of the Solovetsky Islands in the White Sea. The islands were the site of an old Orthodox monastery, and later of the camp where Likhachov himself was a prisoner.

Valentin Rasputin devoted a whole article to Kulikovo in Sovetskaia kul'tura, the newspaper of the Culture Department of the Central Committee. It was based on Blok's poem "Pole Kulikovo" (Kulikovo Field). Rasputin expressed a view often repeated in 1980, that the Russian people had saved Europe at Kulikovo, but at a huge cost to themselves. The battle was of great significance: "Russia of course did not begin with Kulikovo Field, but she was given direction and defined by it." Blok had predicted a return to such events as the battle; and Rasputin asked:
"Will it not be our fate to go out on Kulikovo Field, in order again to defend Russian land and Russian blood?" I am unable to concur with the view of the émigrés Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova that this article is "militaristic". For one thing, Rasputin answered his own question by expressing the hope that Blok would "turn out to be an unsuccessful prophet." Rasputin's article appeared in January 1980, one week after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but apart from this coincidence of timing there is no evidence to link the two.

A number of books were published in 1980 to commemorate the anniversary. Iury Loshchits made another contribution to the Zhizn'-zamechatel'nykh liudei series with his biography Dmitrii Donskoi. Vadim Ashurkov published the fourth edition of a monograph on the battle, and the Institute of Archaeology of the Academy of Sciences brought out a volume by Anatoly Kirpichenkov. Two volumes of medieval war tales appeared (one published by Molodaia gvardiia and the other with an introduction by Likhachov). A collection including the work of literary writers and critics, past and present, was compiled by Vladimir Kuprin. In 1982 the Academy's Institute of History published a collection of scholarly articles and the following year Moscow University brought out an anthology. Ashurkov was one of the relatively few commentators to take a more traditional Marxist approach. While celebrating Moscow's success in uniting the Russian people, he added that the victory "was accompanied by the
strengthening of the exploitation of the mass of the people on the part of the feudalists and the government of the Grand Prince.\textsuperscript{185}

A curious feature of some of the writing about Kulikovo concerned the national composition of the army which faced the Muscovites. While it had traditionally been referred to as Mongol, Tatar or Mongol-Tatar, the gosudarstvenniki and others saw an opportunity to portray Kulikovo as an example of the "struggle against cosmopolitanism". Kirpichnikov, leaning to the more traditional view, referred to "Mongol-Tatar troops". He explained in a footnote that the forces of the Golden Horde were ethnically mixed, but the "Mongols (Tatars) constituted the nucleus of the ruling class."\textsuperscript{186}

For the gosudarstvenniki, Seleznyov wrote an article on Kulikovo in Nasbý_sovremennik. He portrayed the battle as a victory not only for the Russians, but as "a festival for all the peoples of the country". He listed the Tajiks, Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Turkmen and Uzbeks as having thrown off the yoke of the Golden Horde after Kulikovo (although in reality some of these peoples had not come into existence at the time). He dissociated the Tatar population of the USSR from the Mongol-Tatar invaders, by saying that the occupying Tatars had left their name to the people of the Volga who were formerly Bulgars. Like other writers at this time, he avoided using the term "Tatar yoke" and referred instead to the "yoke of the Golden Horde". As was commonplace, he saw historical continuity in the victory at
Kulikovo and the defeats of Napoleon and the Nazis. What distinguished Seleznyov's approach from that of traditional Soviet scholarship was his description of the Horde as "cosmopolitan". This allowed him to make a link with modern imperialism, which he said was also a cosmopolitan phenomenon. The Golden Horde was a denationalized group: similarly, Napoleon and Hitler did not represent the national interests of the French or the Germans. Loshchits' book, similarly, referred to the "cosmopolitan invasion of the Russian land". Although the leaders of the enemy army were Tatar-Mongol, their forces included many races and religions - pagans and shamanists, Muslims, Catholics, Jews and Karaites. Even the Genoese infantry was cosmopolitan and not purely Italian.

The battle of 8 September 1380 was not a battle of peoples. It was a battle of the sons of the Russian people with the cosmopolitan conscripted or bought rabble, which had no right to speak in the name of any of the peoples of Rus'.

The anniversary was thus a festival for all the peoples of the Soviet Union. The gosudarstvennik position was to be taken still further in 1981 by Kozhinov, who spoke of the victory of the so-called "multinational Russian Rossiiskoe State", rather than of the Russian people (see below, pp. 534-35).

The Russian Orthodox Church sought also to gain from the anniversary. Eight of the 12 issues of the Zhurnal Moskovskoi patriarchii for 1980 had material on Kulikovo. An article on Andrei Rublyov linked his icon-painting to the defeat of the Tatars. Archbishop Pitirim of
Volokolamsk, the editor of the journal, claimed: "The decisive victory, determining the cultural and historical tasks of the whole Russian people, was inspired and prepared in the Sergii-Trinity Monastery." 190 In December a feature emphasized the Church's role in consolidating Russian patriotism. Patriarch Pimen claimed that the Kulikovo battle had great significance not only for Russia, but also "for the peoples and states of Europe, which at the cost of huge losses for Rus' were saved from alien invasion." 191

The journals Ogonek, Oktiabr' and Moskva all carried material on Kulikovo during 1980, but I shall confine myself to that in the latter journal. The articles in Moskva, although nationalistic, did not emphasize the anti-cosmopolitan message. The article by Vladimir Sushchenko and Iury Tiurin in July was laced with quotations from Anna Akhmatova, who had been silenced in Stalin's latter years, and it emphasized the role of the Russian people. 192 V.V. Kargalov's article in the following issue stressed the role of Moscow and the Muscovites in the Russian victory. 193 The October issue featured a series of colour pictures, entitled "Field of Russian Glory", celebrating the victory, and giving some prominence to the churches in the landscape. 194

Three articles which appeared at the time of the anniversary itself are worth mentioning. All put the traditional Soviet position rather than that of the gosudarstvenniki. One was by Academician A.L.
Narochnitsky on page 3 of Izvestiia; the second, on page 3 of Pravda, was a report of the triumphal meeting in Moscow on 8 September 1980; and the third was by Feliks Kuznetsov, on the front page of Literaturnaia gazeta. All agreed that Russia had shielded Europe from the Horde at a high cost to her own development. Narochnitsky and Kuznetsov both attacked the cult of Genghis Khan which they claimed was being fostered by Maoist China, but which in fact was being promoted by Soviet Central Asians. Despite his opposition to nationally-minded trends, Kuznetsov hailed Kulikovo as a moral and spiritual victory of the Russian people. Even he sounded a note of Russian messianism in a quotation from Pushkin: "The developing Enlightenment was saved by a devastated and dying Russia." The West should remember its debt to the Russian people. Having defeated the Horde and the Nazis, the country was now trying to save the world from the "apocalypse" of nuclear annihilation.

In Andrei Tarkovsky's film Mirror (made in 1974 but not released until 1979), Pushkin's words about Russia being a shield protecting Europe from the Tatars were read while footage was shown of Soviet soldiers defending the border against Chinese soldiers who were aggressively shaking Mao's Red Book. Vladimir Kuprin, in his collection, also took up the theme of self-sacrifice. "In the Kulikovo battle was revealed the main distinguishing feature of the Russian national character - to sacrifice oneself in the name of saving others."
Coinciding with the anniversary, VOOPIK published what was described as the first issue of a twice-yearly anthology, *Pamiatniki otechestva*. There had in fact been four volumes published by VOOPIK with the same title, appearing in 1972, 1975, 1977 and 1979. The 1979 issue included articles by the RSFSR Prime Minister Solomentsev and by Likhachov (the latter, on Kulikovo). In spite of the size of VOOPIK, the print run was limited to 10,000 for the first two issues and 8,000 for the next two. The issues published for 1980 had a larger print run, at 50,000, were considerably glossier and included full-colour illustrations. These issues were much less concerned with Lenin and the revolutionary heritage, in comparison with those for 1972-1979; the emphasis was on the Russian State, and on churches and monasteries. This was to continue until the issues for 1983, by which time the political climate had changed. The first issue for 1980 included material on Kulikovo, a statement by Lenin on the protection of monuments, a recent RSFSR decree on the same subject, and essays by the writers Iury Bondarev, Rasputin, E.A. Isaev and the editor-in-chief of *Pravda*, Viktor Afanasev. It listed an editorial council headed by I.V. Petrianov-Sokolov which included Rybakov and Semanov, who had both been on since 1972, and Glazunov, Likhachov, Seleznyov, Dmitry Zhukov and Sevastianov. The anthology joined the existing series *Pamiatniki literatury Drevnei Rusi* (Literary Monuments of Ancient Rus'), published by Khudozhestvennaia literatura since 1978. The environmental conservationists also became involved in the Kulikovo celebrations; they proposed turning the battlefield into a
nature reserve. 198

The wave of Russian national feeling, linked with the Kulikovo anniversary, was reinforced by the lavish praise for the "great Russian people" which was coming from official platforms (see above, pp. 393-96). In the cultural sphere, three groups could be broadly distinguished in regard to Kulikovo. Both the anti-nationalists, such as Feliks Kuznetsov, and the vozrozhdentsev, such as Rasputin and Likhachov, emphasized the victory of the Russian people. The gosudarstvenniki, such as Seleznyov and Kozhinov, emphasized the victory of the Russian State, and linked this with the struggle against "cosmopolitanism". It might also be suggested that the memory of the Russian victory over the Tatars would psychologically strengthen the image of Russian domination over the Muslim peoples in the Soviet Union, and the Russian ability to crush unwelcome religious or physical influences from Afghanistan, at a time when the Soviet invasion was having unfavourable effects on some Central Asians. In May 1981, Kommunist seemed to reflect a mixture of gosudarstvennik and vozrozhdenie influences when it attacked "bourgeois-consumerist cosmopolitanism" and linked Soviet patriotism with the historical memory of the people and the Kulikovo battle. 199 The lone voice of Evtushenko, in an English-language collection of his photographs, attacked those for whom patriotism was still a "last refuge". 200
The All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Emancipation of the People (VSKhSON)

Under Brezhnev, Russian messianism found its most authentic expression in the uncensored literature of samizdat, written by revolutionaries, oppositionists and dissidents. Of importance in the political development of Russian messianism was the All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Emancipation of the People (VSKhSON). This was both the first post-Stalin political organization known to have a Russian Orthodox orientation and the largest revolutionary organization to be uncovered since the death of Stalin. The aims and history of the group have been described in some detail in the very useful book, The New Russian Revolutionaries (1976), by John B. Dunlop. It would be superfluous to repeat his account at length, but some outstanding points should be mentioned, together with material that has emerged since the book was written.

VSKhSON was founded in Leningrad in February 1964, and survived, although the KGB knew of its existence for about two years before arresting its members in February 1967. At the end it had nearly 30 members and 30 candidate members. Its membership was overwhelmingly from the intelligentsia, and its original base was in Leningrad University. The leader was Igor Viacheslavovich Ogurtsov, born in 1937 in Stalingrad, who was taken to Leningrad when very young. His charismatic personality played a major role in the creation of the group. The deputy leader and head of security, Sado (see above, p. 352), was of Assyrian nationality; both were in the Faculty of Oriental Studies.
at Leningrad University. The chief ideologist was Evgeny Aleksandrovich Vagin, a Dostoevsky specialist, born in Pskov in 1938. Among the rank and file was Leonid Ivanovich Borodin, born in Irkutsk in 1938, a headmaster.202 According to Vagin, who emigrated in 1976, the formation of the group was the culmination of political discussions which had begun in 1960. They were aware of the Novocherkassk workers' uprising of 1962 and believed that it might be repeated on a countrywide scale.203 The secret organization, paralleling the Leninist organizations which had existed since the late 1940s, aimed over a period of 15 or 20 years to recruit 10 000 members, and then stage a coup_d'etat by high-ranking military officers to overthrow the CPSU.204

The VSKhSON Programme followed the teachings of the early Slavophils in seeing socialism as the offspring of capitalism, and opposing them both. In their place, it offered "Social Christianity". The economy was to be mixed and "personalized", a rather vague formulation implying some degree of worker co-ownership after large-scale privatization. All companies would have to be organized in "corporations" corresponding to the branch of industry; although this idea is reminiscent of Italian fascism, it was justified on the grounds of social welfare. There would be a Popular Assembly (veche) elected from the localities and corporations. Its decisions could be vetoed by a Supreme Council (Sobor), one third of which would be from the upper hierarchy of the Orthodox Church and two thirds "outstanding representatives of the people, elected
The messianism of VSKhSON was primarily universalist. "Universal Christianity, which is in process of uniting, is laying the religio-cultural foundations for supranational unity." Even a (non-Slavophil) note of sympathy for Catholicism creeps in. The universalist works of Berdiaev, especially Novoe srednevekov'e and Russkaia ideia were considered among the classical texts of the organization. Indeed, Osipov's article on VSKhSON was called "The Berdiaev Circle in Leningrad". Vagin said in 1977 that Dostoevsky's pochvennichestvo, Solovyov and Berdiaev had been the major formative influences on the
group, and they were also interested in the social doctrine of the Catholic Church. He, however, had come to reject Berdiaev and follow Danilevsky, Leontev and especially Fyodorov.\textsuperscript{212} Iury Galanskov, on meeting Borodin and another member in the camps, wrote that the Social Christians "maintain that Orthodoxy is the thought of the Russian people and that Russia will save the world from all corruption".\textsuperscript{213} Such a statement of the group's Russian messianism is stronger than appears in their documents. Galanskov himself died in the camps a "Russian patriot".\textsuperscript{214}

There were also nationalist elements in the group's messianism. One area on which the Programme is silent is that of the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR. The impression is left that the group wished to maintain the existing frontiers of the Soviet Union. In interviews conducted with Vagin in emigration, the issue was not raised.\textsuperscript{215} Amalrik reports that when in 1977 he asked Vagin what he wanted to do with the Soviet Muslims, "he only shrugged."\textsuperscript{216} As far as the East Europeans are concerned, the Programme was more forthright. "Those foreign countries in which Soviet forces are temporarily stationed can be offered help to initiate their own national self-determination on the basis of Social-Christianity."\textsuperscript{217}

Dunlop saw the main significance of VSKhSON in the potential of its ideas to win support.

Soviet leaders probably fear few things more than an opposition based on Russian nationalism and seeking to resurrect the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church.
Such an opposition will inevitably find broad-based support among the populace.

...the revolutionary union was fast becoming a threat... VSKhSON was unmasked just in time.\textsuperscript{218}

Vladimir Bukovsky was less impressed. "All they had time for was to write a silly programme and read Berdyaev (as if half the country wasn't reading Berdyaev anyway, without any parties!)."\textsuperscript{219} At the trials of the members in November-December 1967 and March-April 1968, Ogurtsov was given fifteen years imprisonment and five years exile for "treason", Sado thirteen years imprisonment, and nineteen others received lesser sentences. The use of the "treason" charge rather than merely "anti-Soviet activity" does imply the seriousness with which the KGB regarded the case. Iury Lury, a defence lawyer in the second trial who later emigrated to Canada, believes that the KGB exaggerated the strength of VSKhSON, whereas Dunlop thinks that they underestimated it.\textsuperscript{220} Further, Lury has accused Dunlop of exaggerating the willingness of the organization to use violence.\textsuperscript{221} Osipov, too, emphasized that the practical activity of the group was limited to recruitment and the study of literature, and Levitin-Krasnov understood the immediate aim as the dissemination of the works of Solovyov, Berdiaev and others.\textsuperscript{222}

\textbf{Dissent within the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian messianism}

The fall of Khrushchev ended the extreme measures of the anti-religious campaign and led to a thaw in relations between the State and the churches. Levitin-Krasnov believes that Khrushchev's fall saved himself from imminent
Some members of the Russian Orthodox clergy began to write appeals to the new leaders to improve the conditions for the Church, and to the Patriarch and bishops about their close relations with the regime. In summer 1965 Archbishop Ermogen of Kaluga and seven bishops asked Patriarch Aleksii to rescind the decisions of the 1961 Sobor. The Holy Synod responded by confining the Archbishop to a monastery. At the end of 1965, the two Moscow priests Iakunin and Eshliman sent appeals to President N. V. Podgorny and Aleksii. Further appeals followed from the two priests in 1966 and from Ermogen in 1967-1968. The priests were suspended from their parishes in May 1966. These protests were not spontaneous. Levitin-Krasnov tells of a strategy meeting in spring 1965 attended by Eshliman, Iakunin, Father Aleksandr Men, Father Dimitry Dudko, Feliks V. Karelin and himself. One can speak of a dissident movement within the Orthodox Church at this stage, paralleling the human rights movement, although the Church dissidents had much less support from the hierarchy than the human rights dissidents initially received from leading writers and scientists.

The November 1965 appeal of Eshliman and Iakunin to the Patriarch emphasized the importance of Russian Orthodoxy both for world Christianity and for the Russian State, including ideas of Russian messianism.

There can be no doubt that the Russian Church has a special role to play in the great universal task of a new Christian renaissance. There is much to convince us of this.

Despite its tragic situation ... the Russian Church still remains the largest of all autocephalous Orthodox
Churches and the most influential representative of catholic Orthodoxy among other Christian confessions. The historical fate of the Russian Church is inseparably linked with the fate of the Russian people, whose role in world history has been steadily increasing for the past five hundred years.227

Eshliman and Iakunin continued by describing the contribution of the Church to Russian culture, and in creating a national consciousness directed against the Tatars.

The religious zeal of St. Sergius and of his disciples ideologically paved the way for the uniting of national territories around the principality of Muscovy, brought about a great renaissance of Russian culture in Moscow and inspired the people to a decisive struggle with the Tartars.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the State of Muscovy was literally nurtured by the Russian Church ...228

Like the Slavophils, the two priests attacked the subordination of the Church to the State by Peter I, but they said that the situation had become far worse since Sergii had allowed the Church to be dominated by the atheistic State. Referring to the reign of Khrushchev, they asked the government to remove the effects of "subjectivism and bureaucracy in leadership" on Church life.229

It should not be thought that all those active in the dissident movement within the Church were Slavophils. Levitin-Krasnov (born 1915) described himself in 1966 as "a Christian, a socialist and a democrat".230 His father was a baptised Jew, his mother Orthodox, and he has remained Orthodox throughout his life, being thoroughly imbued with Russian culture.231 In 1967 he wrote to Pope Paul VI: "The construction of industry without a
bourgeoisie is a great historical victory of the Russian people." In his Stromaty (1968) he wrote: "The October Revolution was a great victory of the Russian people." 232

His concern for human rights was not confined to the Church: from 1965 he participated in the mainstream human rights movement, signing petitions and joining the Initiative Group for the Defence of Human Rights in the USSR, formed in 1969. 233 He was subsequently arrested and sent to a labour camp. In the final volume of his memoirs, Rodnoi prostor (Native Space, 1980), he called for a fourth revolution in Russia, to establish democracy and socialism. Citing Belinsky, Herzen, Lavrov and Mikhailovsky among his mentors, he clearly is in the narodnik tradition, embellished by Orthodox belief, but without emphasizing an exclusive role for Russia. 234

The "Fetisov group", including the economist A. A. Fetisov and the architect M. F. Antonov, took a chauvinist position quite different from those just mentioned. They claimed that the Jews had created chaos in Europe for 2000 years, until Hitler and Stalin, embodying the "German and Slav principles", had ended this. The group's programme called for the restoration of the obshchina in European Russia and the transfer of industry and the working class to Siberia. Fetisov left the CPSU in early 1968, allegedly in protest against de-Stalinization, although by then that process had ceased. Shortly thereafter the members of the group were put in mental hospitals. 235
The growth of Russian nationalism and Russian messianism among the intelligentsia was confronted by the pseudonymous Orthodox writers of the "Metanoia" symposium, circulated in samizdat and published in the Paris Vestnik Russkogo Studencheskogo Khristianskogo Dvizheniia (Herald of the Russian Student Christian Movement) in 1970. The articles called on the intelligentsia to return to the Orthodox Church, in order to bring about the liberation and renaissance of Russia and her transformation into a truly Christian people. The introductory article declared Communist rule to be an organic result of Russia's past sins, not something imposed from abroad. In place of messianism, the author proposed repentance.

More Evil was brought into the world by Russia than by any other country, and it is impossible to return to a pre-sin state (which did not exist in Russian history). It is possible to be reborn only through repentance. It is the only way. Spiritual temptation lies at the basis of communism; messianic temptation lies in the idea of the religious purity and preeminence [predizbrannost'] of the historical forms of Orthodoxy before other churches, and this temptation of Great-Power strength is obvious even in contemporary politics.236

In the same symposium, O. Altaev spoke of the "double-think" of the Soviet Russian intelligentsia, involved in the creation of the regime's ideology but alienated from and despising the ideology and the regime. He observed that intellectuals were now seeking to enlighten the government rather than the people. But the history of the intelligentsia since 1917 had been to succumb to a series of "temptations" to believe that the regime was improving, and therefore to cooperate with it. He listed the revolution itself, smenovekhovshchina, the period of
industrialization and collectivization, the War, the thaw, technocracy and finally chauvinism. If the intelligentsia were to succumb to the latter, Altaev warned that the result might be "a new Russian messianism of the German National Socialist type". 237

V. Gorsky's article in the same collection, "Russian Messianism and the New National Consciousness", argued that Russian religious messianism was the essence of Russian national consciousness. "As also in ancient Israel, at the basis of Russian national consciousness lies the idea of the God-chosenness and religious vocation of the people, the affirmation of a special ordinance between it and God." 238 He traced Russian messianism from Filofei to the Populists, seeing in Bolshevism "the extreme revolutionization of Russian messianism". 239 Far from being a foreign import (as VSKhSON had suggested, and as Solzhenitsyn was to claim), "Great Russia nourished Bolshevism more than any other soil". 240 Russia would become free only when she rid herself of the idea of national greatness and "national renaissance", and of the idea of Russia "as the means of the future universal happiness of humanity". 241 The national task was the "renaissance of Christianity and true culture in Russia", and the achievement of a free democratic society, in which the Baltic, the Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia would have the right to secede. 242

The "Metanoia" symposium was of particular importance
because of the opposition it provoked from people who had not lost their faith in Russia. Borodin attacked it in "Veche," emphasizing the large number of Jews among the Bolsheviks. Solzhenitsyn's main contributions to From under the Rubble were rebuttals of the symposium (see below, p. 496). G.M. Shimanov wrote that the articles revealed a hatred of everything Russian.

A strong statement of Russian messianism came from a certain K. Radugin in a samizdat article published in Vestnik. He expounded Dostoevsky's view of Russia's religious mission, her "special apocalyptic service" to world Christianity. Dostoevsky came to his opinion not because of the greatness of the Russian State but because of the sufferings of the Russian people, the narod-bogonsets. Dostoevsky had caused the ancient millennial doctrines to be reborn in modern Russian Orthodoxy. He shared two basic assumptions of the apocalyptic consciousness: "unlimited greed for the realization of the absolute God here and now, on this earth and in human history - and a tragic understanding of the inevitable doom of all utopian attempts." Radugin then presented his expectations of the crucifixion and resurrection of Russia, the Messiah, and the inauguration of the universal millennium.

Orthodox Russia climbed to Golgotha, and was crucified, and taken down from the Cross and placed in a coffin and covered with a stone....

...the hour approaches of the glorious and terrible Resurrection: the earth will tremble, the stones will shatter, and the peoples of the earth shall see with great wonder the Light flowing from the East.
Holy Rus' will be resurrected, and infinitely enriched by the tragic experience of centuries of suffering, will be the heart of the peoples uniting in Christ, of the strongholds in the struggle with Antichrist, the prophetic prefiguration of the Millennial Kingdom.

Holy Rus' will be resurrected, for the word is said to her heart:

So be it!
From the East this star is shining out.

This is precisely the sort of position that "Metanoia" was rejecting. Holy Rus', the Russian people (not the Russian State) have suffered through the centuries; under the yokes of the Tatars, of Petersburg and of Communism. Through her suffering will come redemption - not only for herself but for all humanity. Radugin does not spell out the political implications of this statement; the Millennial Kingdom will be both of, and not of, this world.

**Slovo_natsii**

The samizdat programme signed by anonymous "Russian Patriots", "Slovo natsii" (A Nation's Word or A Nation Speaks, about 1970), took a clearly political position. The authors asserted that in the USSR the Russian people were not privileged, as widely claimed, but were exploited by the other nationalities. The Jews had a virtual monopoly on arts and science. There was no communist party for Russia, as there was for the other republics, and this weakened the Russians vis-à-vis other nationalities. The document particularly attacked Ukrainian nationalism. The Crimea had been given to the Ukraine, and its Russian population was allegedly being "forced to learn the Ukrainian language". Racially-mixed marriages were threatening to cause the biological degeneration of the
Russian people. Russia "must become the ruling nation [господствующей нация], with the abolition of the Union Republics and the transformation of the USSR into a Russian national State. In foreign policy, it called for an end to military confrontation between East and West, but only with the recognition by the West of Russia's uniqueness (самобытность). It proposed the withdrawal of American and Soviet forces from Europe, the abolition of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the reunification of Germany; a treaty with the West on the non-use of nuclear weapons; "the creation of a League of Slav States; and the uniting of Russia, the United States and India against China."

"Long live the victory of Christian civilization over the chaos rebelling against it! Long live great, single and indivisible Russia! God be with us!" In its authoritarianism, centralism and anti-egalitarianism the document recalls Leontev rather than the Slavophils, and its racism evokes memories of the Black Hundreds.

An article in Veche reported that "Slovo natsii" was an answer to the "anti-Russian" part of the "Programme of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union" (1969). This programme, signed by anonymous "Democrats of Russia, the Ukraine and the Baltic" advocated self-determination for all the peoples of the USSR, and cultural or economic autonomy for nations wishing to remain in the federation. The Veche article stated that "Slovo natsii" was "a compromise between the so-called 'legal Slavophils' and yesterday's opponents of the regime", in other words, between establishment and dissident Russian
nationalists. Levitin-Krasnov writes that Ivanov-Skuratov (see above, p. 368) was the author of "Slovo natsii". Indirect confirmation of this has come from Iuliia Vishnevskaya of Radio Liberty. She writes that the name of the author "was well known in Moscow" (where she herself was at the time), and he was arrested in 1981 "on a different charge". Ivanov-Skuratov was arrested in Moscow in 1981 on charges of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda (see below). The Chronicle of Current Events reported on the existence of "Slovo natsii" in December 1970, and also on the response of a democrat, V. Gusarov, who criticized the "great-power and racist views of the 'patriots'". 
The most significant embodiment of Russian nationalist samizdat in the 1970s was the journal *Veche* (named after the popular assemblies of ancient Kiev and Novgorod). This was the organ of several tendencies of Russian nationalism. Ten thick issues appeared between 1971 and 1974; regrettably, it does not seem possible to estimate the circulation of the journal.259 It was founded by Vladimir Osipov, who edited and published the first nine issues. In the prison camps he had been converted to Russian Orthodoxy and Slavophilism. Freed in 1968, he settled in the town of Aleksandrov in Vladimir Oblast, as near to Moscow as he was legally allowed, and he found work as a fireman. Visiting Iury Galanskov, he met Levitin-Krasnov, who introduced him to the Orthodox priest Dimitry Dudko. The latter seems to have been an important influence on Osipov; in January 1980 Dudko called him his "spiritual son". At least two former members of VSKhSON - Leonid Borodin and Georgy Bochevarov - joined Osipov on *Veche*.260

Osipov's nationalism was expressed in his "Tri otnosheniia k rodine" (Three Attitudes to the Motherland, 1970).261 The three attitudes he identified were hatred of Russia and the Russian people; "speculation" on, and manipulation of, patriotism, as practised by the regime; and love for the nation. "Love for humanity can appear only through one's own nation." Attacking "unprincipled cosmopolitanism", he declared: "Only the Motherland, the Motherland, can regenerate the people.... The nation [natsiia], the nation, above all."262
Osipov rejected the ideology of the regime; but he now proclaimed his loyalty to the Soviet State. Unlike the editors of the *Chronicle of Current Events*, he printed his name and Vladimir oblast' address in *Veche* and distributed it through the mail. Since he was allowed to edit nine issues of the journal, from January 1971 to December 1973, a time when other samizdat journals like the *Chronicle* and the *Ukrainian Herald* were stopped, it seems clear that he was protected from above. A parallel may be drawn with Roy Medvedev, who appears to have been protected by other regime circles who wished to keep the door open to reform in the future.

Mikhail Meerson-Aksyonov has suggested that the appearance of *Veche* may have resulted from the fear, following Suslov's move against *Molodaia Gvardiia*, that some extreme nationalist views could no longer be published in the official Press.\(^{263}\) Confirmation of this view is given by Mikhail Kheifets, a Zionist activist who met Osipov in the camps (after the editor had been resentenced in 1975), and who later emigrated to Israel.

People who had supported *Molodaia Gvardiia* ideologically, Osipov told me, were mortally offended by the dispersal of its editorial board. Many of them occupied important seats and offices and considered themselves, being 'Russian patriots', to be the foremost defenders of the Soviet authorities. And then they suddenly gave them such a kick in the arse! And they gave me the initial means for publishing the journal and the first literary connections.

So, the 'gosudarstveniki' entered and occupied the key positions in the party created by a 'Slavophil' [i.e., Osipov].\(^{264}\)
Kheifets says that the differences between the circles which came together to produce *Veche* were greater than the differences between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. With one exception, he does not identify the officials and cultural figures who backed *Veche*, but says that in fact their financial contribution was small. The exception was Ilia Glazunov, who was more generous, and about whose work and life Osipov wrote a warm and laudatory article in *Veche*.

We have no first-hand account of how the situation on the editorial board developed, but we know that in March 1974 the founder, editor and publisher of *Veche*, Osipov, announced that the journal had ceased publication; and that in April 1974 most of the editorial board produced "Veche No. 10" without Osipov and denounced him. Aleksandr Ianov has argued, in line with his conception that dissident Russian nationalism inevitably tends, in the long term, towards collaborating with the State, be it Tsarist or Soviet, that *Veche* had two faces: "and that its liberal face, so to speak, was gradually but inexorably supplanted by its chauvinist face". The view that the split in the editorial board between Osipov and the editors of *Veche* No. 10 was a split between the liberals and the chauvinists is not, however, born out by the evidence. It seems that personal factors, and perhaps the intrigues of the KGB, played a role too. For example, one of Osipov's opponents was Adel Naidenovich, who had been Osipov's third wife in a marriage of convenience, and who was the principal link
between *Veche* and the human rights circle around Pyotr Iakir. Further, Ivan V. Ovchinnikov, the editor of No. 10, had himself, in August 1973, co-signed with Osipov, Levitin-Krasnov, Viacheslav S. Rodionov and Valentina E. Mashkova (Osipov's wife) an appeal on the situation of Soviet political prisoners. Moreover, Ivanov-Skuratov had been the author of an article in *Veche* No. 1 which decidedly placed him (at that time) among the "liberals". Yet he was a key figure in the anti-Osipov group.

The role of Ivanov-Skuratov on the editorial board has been a subject of comment. He had testified against Osipov in 1961, but Osipov had apparently forgiven him. Ivanov-Skuratov had excused himself to Osipov by pointing out that he was legally a madman, and Osipov need not have confirmed his testimony. Osipov turned to him for support in publishing *Veche*. Kheifets describes Osipov as a natural organizer (rather than a thinker), who looked to Ivanov-Skuratov to be the journal's ideologist. Levitin-Krasnov writes that after Osipov (whom he describes as honest, and with whom he remained friends, despite their political differences) began publishing *Veche*, a "completely odious public" crawled on to the editorial board. Among these stood out Ivanov-Skuratov, "a thoroughly enigmatic individual". Semyon Reznik reported in 1982 that Ivanov-Skuratov was in fact an atheist. If he was an atheist when he was writing for *Veche*, and claiming to be Orthodox, then he was clearly...
playing the part of a provocateur. But it would be wrong to draw this conclusion without more evidence. Kheifets points out that Ovchinnikov, a Veche collaborator, had defected to the West in the 1950s and then returned to the Soviet Union, in circumstances which suggested a link with the KGB. Further, in the early 1960s, he had testified to the KGB against Iury Mashkov and the then wife of the latter, Valentina Mashkova. Both Mashkov and Mashkova collaborated on Veche. Iury Mashkov, however, was in the habit of denouncing Jews to the authorities. Valentina Mashkova was now married to Osipov. One can sympathize with Kheifets's point that Osipov was forced to work with morally unprincipled people. 274

In the absence of other adequate discussions of the topic in English, it seems appropriate to make an attempt to summarize the contents of the most important Russian nationalist samizdat journal of the post-Stalin era. 275 The introduction to the first issue of Veche referred to the growth of crime, selfishness, alcoholism and the collapse of the family. It announced itself as a "RUSSIAN PATRIOTIC JOURNAL" (in block capitals) which would "continue the guiding line of the Slavophils and Dostoevsky" and seek to aid the rebirth of Russia. 276 The first article was by Ivanov-Skuratov and argued that Slavophilism was inseparable from Orthodoxy. He particularly praised Khomiakov for seeing the Russian people rather than the Church hierarchy as the bearers of Orthodoxy. Konstantin Aksakov and Ivan Kireevsky, he said, had, under the influence of German messianism, seen Russia
as the ruling nation of the era, but Khomiakov had been above this. Konstantin Aksakov had rightly regarded free speech as an inalienable human right; but an obstacle to implementing this was Aksakov's own belief that the Russian people were not political, which justified the principle of autocracy. The most important contribution of the Slavophils was their emphasis on Russian national originality. 277

The next article, however, was more chauvinist and reflected the opinion of those nationalists closer to the regime and more willing to adapt to Leninism. The title was "The Teaching of the Slavophils - the Highest Achievement of National Consciousness in Russia in the Pre-Leninist Period", and its author was the "Fetisovite" Mikhail F. Antonov (born 1927; see above, p. 458). Successive parts of this article appeared in the second and third issues of Veche, comprising over a quarter of the total number of pages of the first three numbers. 278

In the first part, Antonov attacked those who, from the Westernizers of the nineteenth century to the contributors to the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, linked Slavophilism to "official narodnost'". Paradoxically, he also claimed that Nicholas I himself had sympathies with Slavophilism, which he was politically unable to express. 279 Expounding Khomiakov's views, Antonov praised him for his opposition to liumpenstvo, which Antonov identified with the tendency to fawn before the West, and for his support for Russian
customs. In this context Antonov approvingly cited Vladimir Soloukhin's attempts to rediscover Russian traditions, which had led to his being accused of "rusofil' stvo and of abandoning proletarian internationalism."\textsuperscript{280} The first part of Antonov's article was followed by a rejoinder by "A.S.", presumably Ivanov-Skuratov. This drew attention to the lack of clarity of the term \textit{liumpenstvo} as used by Antonov, and to the "naive peasant belief in the good Tsar, surrounded by evil gentry", which was found in Fetisovite writings.\textsuperscript{281} The editorial board issued statements that it was not in agreement with Antonov's views,\textsuperscript{282} and that the article was being printed "without the sanction of the author" (in blocks).\textsuperscript{283}

In the second part, Antonov discussed Khomiakov's views on philosophy, religion, the Slavs and the \textit{obshchina}, and announced: "Again and again we have to underline one thought: in the \textit{obshchina} is the essence of Russia, the Russian people and Leninism."\textsuperscript{284} This last word explained why A.S., in his earlier rejoinder, had criticized Antonov for portraying Lenin as seeing the regeneration of Russia coming from the village rather than the town.\textsuperscript{285} Antonov's final part (considerably shortened, according to an editorial note) outlined the views of the Kireevsky brothers. Emphasizing the need to return to Russian ways, he condemned the contemporary attempt of "rootless and cosmopolitan elements" to destroy the old centre of Moscow and make it a copy of European capitals.

The idea of Moscow as the Third Rome, as the New
Jerusalem, as the embodiment of Lenin's highest Truth and Justice on Earth - this is what ought to lie ... as the basis of the General Plan for the Reconstruction and Development of Moscow. 286

Ivan Kireevsky could not link the teachings of the Church Fathers with changes in Russian life; only Lenin could do this. An adequate Russian ideology could come only from "the unification of Orthodoxy and Leninism". 287 Communist morality would benefit from an infusion of the teachings "proceeding from the deepest origins of Russian life". In a discussion which contained no analysis of Lenin's real ideas, Antonov declared: "Leninism has incomparably more in common with Orthodoxy and the Slavophils than with Marxism-Catholicism." 288

Another major article, spanning the second, third and fourth issues, concerned the military and political achievements of the nineteenth-century general, M.D. Skobelev. 289 The article was anonymous, but it has since been attributed to Ivanov-Skuratov. 290 It detailed Skobelev's role in the conquests of Khiva and Kokand, in the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War, and in the capture of Geok-Tepe (see above, p. 203). Although the author was in other respects a devoted admirer of the general, he blamed Skobelev for the "repulsive scenes" of the massacre of Asians which followed the fall of the city in January 1881. Skobelev justified the massacre on the grounds that otherwise "the Asians would not consider themselves conquered". 291 The article concludes by emphasizing Skobelev's support for Ivan Aksakov and Danilevsky. 292
Having given its readers a view of the early Slavophils and Skobelev, *Veche* carried a series of articles on later Russian thinkers. Those included were Dostoevsky, Leontev, Danilevsky, the contributors to *Vekhi* and *Iz glubiny*, and Rozanov. Of particular interest was the article on Danilevsky, which has since been attributed to Ivanov-Skuratov. The author sympathetically outlined Danilevsky's theory of "cultural-historical types" and his plan for a Slav federation, but criticized his wish to Russify the national minorities of the Russian State. In relation to Russian messianism, the author made clear his support for the position of Danilevsky rather than for classical Slavophilism.

Danilevsky preserved and developed all the basic positions of the early Slavophils, save only one - Slavophil messianism, the claim to world leadership. The great service of Danilevsky was that he tried to work out a theory which would make absolutely impossible any kind of 'rationale' for such claims.

This rejection of messianism and the insistence on the need for pragmatism in Russian foreign policy seems to place the author on the side of the *gosudarstvenniki*. As Ianov points out, Danilevsky's "isolationism" was contingent on a considerable expansion of Russian influence in Europe (see above, pp. 172-75).

A pro-messianist viewpoint was put by the anonymous author of "Thoughts-Projectors", a collection of aphorisms in *Veche* No. 2, which argued that Russia's sufferings gave her a special position in the world.

Russia is hated, Russia is accused, Russia is said to be going to perish... But all the same the main thing is that Russia is not understood. All the judgements about her are human conjecture.
Russia is the greatest sufferer, slandered and crucified.

Russia will be resurrected in spite of each and all. Suffering must have some meaning!

Christ achieved victory through suffering. Suffering brings salvation, and the more suffering, the nearer is salvation...

This is our faith. And without faith there is nothing, and nothing is needed. Truly: one can only believe in Russia! [a quotation from Tiutchev - see above, p. 156]

In Russia a mysterious process is being accomplished, which encouraged the Catholic [François] Mauriac and which gives us the strength not to be depressed! - to bear everything, to conquer, to rise from the dead.

And look at Russia, at the Russian person, at her Church. Surely, do you see nothing but crimes?

Surely the sweat and blood of Russian people, surely millions of tormented and thousands of shot people do not signify nothing to you? ... Surely God will save her?

Russia will not perish, Russian culture will not perish, the Russian person, the God-bearing people will not perish. She will not perish, although it would seem that everything has perished and there is no hope.... the brightest future awaits us!.... What Russia has understood and what Russia has undergone puts her in a special position. The Russian person is also in a special position.

... Christ is risen! - this is heard from Russia.

Religion must be preserved through national feelings, then it will be an organic phenomenon. 302

Further "thoughts" emphasized the need for nations to have their own uniqueness and national feelings; cosmopolitanism is denounced as "spiritual slavery" and "the preparation for the way of Antichrist". At the same time the author attacks the idea of the "universal person", 303 the term used by Dostoevsky for the Russians (see above, p. 201); this is surprising because of his earlier use of Dostoevsky's term, "God-bearing people".
The author hints that the growth of Russian nationalism is linked with the nationalism of the non-Russians.

Why is the creation of Israel greeted throughout the world, and we too say that the Jews must have their own State - ... but why are our love for Russia and our Russian views maliciously labelled chauvinist and not tolerated? 304

The same comparison between Israel and Russia was made in No. 7 by I. Starozhubaev. "The springing-up of Russian nationalism in the sense of self-defence and self-preservation is a natural desire for today." He attacked cosmopolitanism, and those shouting for freedom and democracy; he spoke instead of the broad Russian soul and of messianism - Russia saving all mankind through her example. His main theme was that Russian nationalism was defensive. 305 In a rare statement on a specific foreign policy issue, Veche took what could be termed a defensive nationalist position on the Japanese attempts to raise claims against the Kurile Islands. It called on the Soviet government to take a firm stand, and noted that the Chinese Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai, had given support to the Japanese "revanchists". 306

In relation to literature, the journal devoted some attention to attacking Novyi_mir, and such bètes_noires of Molodaia_gvardia as Aksyonov, Evtushenko and Voznesensky. 307 Ivanov-Skuratov wrote two articles on Solzhenitsyn's August_1914, accusing him of being pro-German and anti-Russian in his portrayal of the collapse of the Russian Army. 308 The fifth issue carried further discussion of the novel 309 and contained two chapters of
the memoirs of Solzhenitsyn's first wife, Natalia Reshetovskaia; and the ninth contained two new chapters from Solzhenitsyn's *First Circle*.\textsuperscript{310} The *Veche* editors were clearly split in their attitude to Solzhenitsyn. Osipov was ideologically close to him, as later became clear in his response to Solzhenitsyn's *Letter to the Soviet Leaders*, but Ivanov-Skuratov and the *gosudarstvenniki* considered him to be anti-Soviet. Osipov had sought Solzhenitsyn's collaboration on *Veche*, but he had refused on the grounds that the line of the journal was unclear. According to Kheifets, Osipov was very upset at the prospect of Solzhenitsyn's divorce, because of his central position in the Russian national movement. Like many Russian nationalists, Osipov saw the hand of the Masons in the calamities affecting Russia. He suspected that the Masons were behind Solzhenitsyn's attraction to Natalia Svetlova, who was to become his second wife. When Osipov went to warn Solzhenitsyn about the Masons, Solzhenitsyn told him that his fears were "exaggerated".\textsuperscript{311} The appearance of Solzhenitsyn's chapters in No. 9, with Solzhenitsyn's permission, attests to the continuing strength of the liberal nationalist tendency in *Veche* right up to the end.

The demographic problems of the Russian nation attracted some attention from *Veche*. K. Voronov spoke of the need to take drastic action to end "the catastrophic decline in the birth rate in many districts of the RSFSR", especially affecting rural communities. The situation showed the disadvantaged position of the Russians in the
The protection of the world environment, the Moscow City Soviet's plan for the destruction of older parts of the capital, and the preservation of historical monuments in general were discussed. The destruction of Moscow monuments was condemned not only for aesthetic but also for political reasons, in view of the perceived Chinese threat. "On what patriotic feelings will it be possible to win the approaching war?" Osipov's article on Glazunov particularly praised his role in fighting to preserve historical monuments and the architecture of Moscow, and in the establishment of VOOPiK and the Rodina clubs.

*Veche* carried a considerable amount of material on religion and Church affairs. The anonymous "Russian Christian" in the first issue spoke of the link between patriotism and Orthodoxy. He also made two positive references to Stalin, which attracted a special disclaimer from the editorial board. The second issue included an attack on the modernist theology of Metropolitan Nikodim of Leningrad, written by a collective which included Feliks Karelin, Lev Regelson and Viktor A. Kapitanchuk. Of particular interest was the appeal to the Sobor of 1971 (held to elect Pimen as Patriarch), by Georgy Petukhov, a priest from Zagorsk, Hierodeacon Varsonofy Khaibulin, from Vladimir oblast', and a Moscow layman, Pyotr Fomin. This was a call for greater trust between Church and State, which allegedly was being threatened by Satanism and Zionism. "The agents of Satanism and Zionism..."
artificially create tension between the Church and the State with the aim of their common weakening." They were promoting "anarchical liberalism".

Distrust and doubt relating to all spiritual and national values, cosmopolitanism, the spreading of debauchery and drunkenness, the extreme proliferation of abortions, forgetting and neglecting the fulfilment of family, parental and patriotic duty, hypocrisy, betrayal, falsehood, money-grubbing and other vices - this is how they try to seduce our people and all humanity....

It has now become a generally obvious truth that world Zionism is conducting an artful struggle against our State from within and without.

Realizing its holy mission of saving humanity from sin and its consequences, the Church is a moral strength and buttress of the State in its noble struggle against the forces of destruction and chaos.

What was needed, the authors concluded, was the coming together (sblizhenie) of the Church and the State, on the basis of "complete non-intervention in the internal life of the Church". Such positions were aimed against both the general human rights movement and those dissidents within the Church who sought to distance the Church from the State.

In an article for the London journal Survey, published in 1973, Dmitry Pospielovsky reviewed the first and third issues of Veche. While sympathetic to the Russian national trend, he criticized the journal and Osipov for including the work on Slavophilism by Antonov, whom he described as a "neo-fascist", and warned of the danger of racism and anti-Semitism developing into genocide, citing in particular the above-mentioned appeal. An article by "O.M." in the ninth issue rejected these criticisms. It reported that Antonov had married a Jewess, while Fetisov had admitted
that his childhood had lasted 40 years, but his sole interest now was religion. As far as genocide was concerned, the Americans allowed 20 million people to starve every year in the world, despite their wealth, and this was as bad as the Nazi Holocaust. Pospielovsky had ignored the positive proposals of the appeal to the Sobor, commenting only on the link made between Satanism and Zionism.322

The appeal of Petukhov, Khaibulin and Fomin was not typical of Veche's material on the Church. The fourth issue reprinted Pimen's Christmas message.323 Solzhenitsyn's "Lenten Letter to the Patriarch" (1972), criticizing the Church leaders for not speaking out against persecution, appeared in the fifth issue in full, together with two critical responses, one anonymous and the other from Father Sergei Zheludkov. The latter, while expressing respect for Solzhenitsyn's struggle against censorship, accused Solzhenitsyn of overestimating the ability of the hierarchy to act against the wishes of the State. The Patriarchate had to compromise to survive, and for this reason it was unable to answer Solzhenitsyn's charges.324 Veche also carried appeals by Orthodox believers for their rights. One was by Iakunin against his dismissal.325 Two others opposed a new education law, which would oblige parents to bring up their children in "the spirit of lofty communist morality". Iakunin, Kapitanchuk and Karelin signed one of these.326 In the other, Gennady Mikhailovich Shimanov (of whom more below) proposed to amend the law so
as to read

in the spirit of the LOFTY MORALITY OF SOVIET
PATRIOTISM and a careful relationship to socialist
property TO INSTIL IN THEIR CHILDREN A FEELING OF DEEP
LOYALTY TO THEIR PEOPLE AND ITS CULTURE, AND ALSO A
FEELING OF TRUE RESPECT TO ALL OTHER PEOPLES OF OUR
PLANET ... 327 [blocks in original]

The belief in the need for respect for other
nationalities was reflected in the article in the sixth
issue, entitled "The Russian Solution of the National
Question", dedicated to the fiftieth anniversary of the
USSR. In contrast to the position of "Slovo natsii", it
was a defence of Soviet federalism. "The new federation of
peoples was created in the Russian manner." It preserved
the tradition of respect for other peoples, the
UNIVERSALITY of the Russian person, to which Dostoevsky
pointed, universality as compassion and love for others ...

The union of equal republics, preserving their national
uniqueness, by its very structure shows what
distinguishes internationalism from cosmopolitanism.

The article attacked Russification, recalling Lenin's
attack on Stalin for great-power chauvinism, and claiming
that the latter was mainly instigated by non-Russians. It
rejected the idea of a single Soviet nation (natsiia),
pointing out that the nationality question specialist S.
Kaltakhchian had denounced this in Pravda (17 March 1972).
Paraphrasing the State anthem, the article expressed pride
that Great Rus' had gathered together a multinational great
power. 328 A similar position was expressed in the
anonymous article in No. 7, "The Struggle with So-Called
Russophilism [rusoif'stvo], or the Path to the Suicide of
the State". This was an attack on Iakovlev's article in
Literaturnaja_gazeta, and defended the importance of
national traditions for the Soviet State. While citing Berdiaev, Dostoevsky and Solzhenitsyn, the author also defended the goсударственный Semanov. Praising Lenin’s internationalism, based on respect for the nation, the article linked Iakovlev with cosmopolitanism, national nihilism and Trotskyism. Both these articles reflected the goсударственный trend within Veche.

The Veche editorial board took the opportunity to set out its position on the Jewish question in response to an open letter from Mikhail Agursky (see also above, p. 281). The latter was a Jew who had converted to Orthodoxy but also remained a Zionist. He appealed for support from Russian nationalists for Zionism, as a Jewish national-liberation movement. Veche’s response was largely friendly. While it claimed that the Jews had the "best material conditions" in the USSR, it went on:

"Russian' does not at all mean 'anti-Semite'. On the contrary, the Jewish national movement, where it does not claim a privileged position for the Jews in Russia, is not infected by racism and does not hope for the world domination of the 'chosen people', evokes from us the warmest sympathy, like any other national movement."

Veche No. 10 carried on the dialogue, with both Agursky and Veche expressing their opposition to the assimilation of the Jews.

Osipov consistently maintained that the journal was legal, but he was forced to engage in a struggle with the regime to ensure the rights of the journal under the Soviet Constitution. Whereas Shimanov, in line with the early
Slavophils, denounced formal constitutional guarantees as "external" and "bourgeois", and took what he called an "openly pro-Soviet position". Osipov was more sympathetic to the human rights movement. This may have been connected with the personal links he had made before his sentencing in 1961, but it was also directly connected with the harassment that the Veche editors, and especially Osipov himself, suffered from the internal affairs organs (MVD) and the KGB. In late 1971 the police several times invaded the flat of Adel Naidenovich, threatening to arrest her and Osipov for producing Veche. This contributed to the death of Naidenovich's mother. On 23 May 1972 Osipov was taken from a Moscow street to a police station, where he was subjected to a body search and the confiscation of his samizdat. He sent a protest to N.A. Shcholokov, the Minister for Internal Affairs, which was published in Veche together with accounts of the incident. On 29 December 1972 Adel Naidenovich was interrogated by the KGB in connection with the case of Pyotr Iakir and Viktor Krasin, former leading figures in the human rights movement who by then had been forced to collaborate with the authorities.

The human rights movement seems initially to have been wary of Veche. The Chronicle noted the difference between the racism and despotism of "Slovo natsii" and the attitude of Veche, but found Judophobic and Stalinist trends in the first issue. The Chronicle contributor stated that as Veche was not concerned with human rights, future issues would not be annotated in the Chronicle. The second
issue of Veche denied the accusation, attributed to Radio Liberty but perhaps shared by liberal dissidents, that the journal was "extremely chauvinist"; it was concerned to protect Russian culture while respecting other cultures. 338

The Chronicle did after all in fact annotate subsequent issues of Veche. 339

One human rights activist who wrote to Veche was Levitin-Krasnov. Veche No. 9 included a letter to Osipov from Levitin-Krasnov, who had seen "Three Attitudes to the Homeland" and Veche No. 3. 340 Levitin-Krasnov attacked the nationalism of the journal, saying that Chernyshevsky, who called Russia a "serf nation", loved her more than all the Slavophils. Osipov had rejected official "speculation" with patriotism, but Levitin-Krasnov found that in reality Veche was "penetrated by official patriotism". 341 Petukhov and Khaibulin (authors of the "Satanism and Zionism" appeal) reminded him of Bulgarin and Grech, the official ideologists of Nicholas I. The opposition to mixed marriages, expressed in another article, evoked memories of Nazism for Levitin-Krasnov. Osipov in his reply defended the need for free discussion; he added that the number of mixed marriages had "grown unusually". He defined his nationalism as "THE RESURRECTION OF THE CULTURE AND MORALITY OF OUR PEOPLE". 342

Osipov seems to have expressed his views more clearly outside Veche than in it. His interview with two American correspondents in April 1972 included an attack on "world
cosmopolitan forces" and a statement of his "very sympathetic attitude" to the human rights movement. In November 1972, he distinguished his position from those he termed "'legal Slavophils' (Soloukhin etc.)" by saying that he was not a Marxist. (The assumption that the "legal Slavophils" themselves were "Marxists" must be questioned.) Osipov explained that the journal was not political, or anti-government. It made no sense for the democratic dissidents to complain that his nationalism had points of similarity with the official ideology, because the democrats themselves based their position on the Soviet Constitution. "The problem of human rights in the USSR," said Osipov, "is LESS important at this juncture than the problem of the death of the Russian nation." This was why Osipov had moved from active opposition to the regime. If the Russian people were to return to Orthodoxy, they would be sure to survive, but at the moment the only bridge to religion was nationalism.

Christ and his teaching, in the final reckoning, are more important to me than nationalism. But I know the soul of the modern Russian: the national principle at this time is more alive and clear than the religious. So patriotism, national consciousness and self-respect form the only reliable bridge to moral, cultural and biological salvation.

Osipov's position here is like that of Father Zosima in The Brothers Karamazov, that belief in God's people will lead to belief in God (see above, pp. 191-92).

The accounts of both Kheifets and Levitin-Krasnov present Ivanov-Skuratov as the main figure of opposition to Osipov on the editorial board. He was the most frequent contributor to Veche. In addition to the articles
mentioned already, he wrote a number of other historical, literary and philosophical pieces. I cited above (pp. 467-68) evidence to suggest that the split in Veche was not solely between государственники, led by Ivanov-Skuratov, and supporters of human rights, headed by Osipov. Kheifets's account of the last months of Veche, based on what Osipov told him, cannot be considered first-hand, but in the absence of other information it seems worth summarizing.

With Veche coming under pressure from the authorities, Ivanov-Skuratov suggested that the journal, in order to try to prove its loyalty to the Soviet State, publish an article supporting the Palestine Liberation Organization. Svetlana Melnikova, who was the Moscow link between Osipov and official cultural figures and who, according to Khaibulin, was the co-editor of issues 3 to 10, had an additional reason for supporting such an article. Kheifets says that Melnikova thought that a pro-Palestinian article might attract outside funding from the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar Qadhdhafi. Osipov opposed the article, saying that the journal was concerned with internal Russian affairs, and, furthermore, he was opposed to terrorism. Borodin agreed with him, and the editorial board split evenly, two-two. After this, Osipov became suspicious that Melnikova was a provocateur. He accused her, but found himself isolated. Rumours than spread among Osipov's collaborators that the Masons had got control of him. To save Veche, he persuaded Borodin to become editor. Unfortunately,
Borodin's home then burned down, making it impossible for him to fulfil the editorial responsibilities. Khaibulin insists that no one in Veche was working for the KGB, and the disagreements arose only from personal failings.347

On 7 March 1974 Osipov announced that the KGB were preparing false charges of anti-Soviet activity against him, although he had occupied a loyal position in relation to the Soviet system. He warned Veche's supporters that the journal had ceased publication with No. 9.348 On 25 March the editorial board announced that Osipov had been replaced as editor.349 On 17 April, Naidenovich, Ovchinnikov and nine other members of the editorial board, although not (perhaps for tactical reasons) Ivanov-Skuratov and Melnikova, issued a statement claiming that Osipov had betrayed the journal and that he had made unfounded attacks on its collaborators.350 Veche No. 10 was dated 19 April 1974 and included articles by Ovchinnikov, Kapitanchuk, Ivanov-Skuratov, Shafarevich and Berdiaev, and Agursky's letter and Patriarch Pimen's Easter message. It appears to have been compiled before the split with Osipov.351

In July the new board announced that it was ceasing publication because a criminal case had been begun against the journal.352 Osipov, however, assisted by Viacheslav Semyonovich Rodionov from Alexandrov, produced two issues of a new journal, Zemlia (The Land). They were dated 1 August and 25 November 1974.353 The first issue included a programmatic statement by the two editors, entitled "To the
Land!" This made three major points.

1. Nationalism is unthinkable in separation from Christianity...

2. The chief task of Russian nationalism today is the resurrection of the people's morality and of the national culture.

3. The absence of glasnost' and of constitutional guarantees blocks the realization of the national tasks.

This final point reaffirmed Osipov's closeness to the human rights movement. The statement went on to stress continuity with the Slavophils and Dostoevsky. The choice of the title Zemlia deliberately referred to both "native land" and to the land as the nourisher of the people.354

Of the 170 pages of the first issue of Zemlia, 100 pages were devoted to Dudko's conversations, and a further 35 pages to an article on Dudko by Levitin-Krasnov.355 (This was included in spite of the previous differences between Levitin-Krasnov and Veche, and perhaps reflected Osipov's wish to open up towards the human rights movement.) Osipov contributed his article "The Last Day of Moscow", which pointed out how the destruction of old Moscow had proceeded in spite of public opinion, with more historical buildings being scheduled for the bulldozer.356 The "Chronicle" section included coverage of the protests against the expulsion of Solzhenitsyn from the USSR. One item here was an open letter on Father Vsevolod Shpiller's criticisms of Solzhenitsyn, signed by Osipov, Rodionov, Borodin, Agursky, Mashkova and six others.357

The second issue included more of Dudko's
conversations, an article by Shimano "On Equality and Inequality in Marriage", work by Shafarevich and the deceased Galanskov, and an open letter from Osipov to the editors of two émigré newspapers, asking for support against the illegal conduct of the authorities towards him.358 An article by Mashkova, "Who Must Repent?", reviewing Solzhenitsyn's article on repentance (see below, pp. 495-96), stated that Russia was "different" (inoe) from other nations. St. John's Gospel, i, 1-4, tells of God being the beginning of all things, but Mashkova, citing and paraphrasing these verses, substituted Russia for God. Where verse 4 says, "In him was life; and the life was the light of men", Mashkova wrote, "In her [Russia] was life; and the life was the light of men."359 It is perhaps not surprising that in an interview in the same issue, Levitin-Krasnov, who was about to leave for abroad, stated that he would collaborate with the journal only if "chauvinist and anti-Semitic tendencies do not appear". This provoked an editorial response, which reiterated that "a Russian nationalist [was] first of all an Orthodox Christian", not a chauvinist or an anti-Semite.360

In March and April 1974 the KGB carried out searches at the homes of people connected with Osipov.361 In September two of those involved with Veche No. 10, Ovchinnikov and Ivanov-Skuratov, sent a letter to a Western radio station denouncing Osipov and Zemlia. They accused him of a Watergate-style cover-up of his misdeeds and compared his removal from Veche with the resignation of President
Richard M. Nixon. If these misdeeds had included Osipov's interventions in the human rights field, they had continued in 1974; in May he protested against the KGB break-in at the home of Neonila G. Snesareva, and the theft of all her papers by and about Solzhenitsyn; and later in the month he issued an appeal to Amnesty International and the Irish politician Sean McBride on the situation of Ogurtsov in a labour camp. In November, unemployed and faced with a KGB campaign to remove his seven-year-old daughter from her parents, he appealed to Senator Henry Jackson to try to improve his position. But on 28 November, three days after the appearance of Zemlia No. 2, Osipov was arrested. Rodionov issued a statement promising to continue with the journal, but no further issues were produced.

On the day after Osipov's arrest, 16 activists drew up a protest. It claimed that even the publication of loyal journals was considered a threat to the State. The signatories included Rodionov and Borodin; three contributors to From Under the Rubble - Shafarevich, Agursky and Vadim Borisov; the Zionist Aleksandr Voronel; and ten mainstream human rights figures, including Iury Orlov, Valentin Turchin, Sergei Kovalyov, Tatiana Velikanova, Tatiana Khodorovich and Andrei Grigorenko (son of Pyotr). This protest was reprinted in the Chronicle. One day later Andrei Tverdokhlebov issued a further appeal, calling on people to defend Osipov, regardless of their opinion of his Slavophil ideas. Noting that Osipov had appealed to Jackson, Tverdokhlebov asked
whether this was the reason for his arrest. Osipov's wife also sought to mobilize world public opinion.

In September 1975, however, Osipov was sentenced to eight years in a strict-regime labour camp. According to the Chronicle, Ivanov-Skuratov testified against him. Melnikova, by Kheifets's account, denounced Osipov as anti-Soviet. The émigré Vestnik RKhD reported that at the trial two witnesses had rescinded their testimony, according to which Osipov had received money from the West for the journal. The witnesses claimed that their earlier statements had been made under pressure from the investigators. The prosecutor had ignored the withdrawal of the testimony. The major accusations against Osipov, according to Vestnik, were that Osipov had published articles in the West, and the "chauvinistic nature of the journal". Solzhenitsyn attacked the harshness of the sentence, pointing out that Osipov had acted openly throughout. A number of representatives of the human rights movement issued protests in Osipov's support, and Academician Sakharov mentioned his participation in the defence of political prisoners and of Solzhenitsyn as factors additional to his editing of Veches which had led to his punishment.

In a 1974 samizdat document attacking anti-Semitism, Agursky suggested that "neo-Nazi" circles within the regime hoped to make Veches their unofficial mouthpiece. Osipov and other Christian nationalists constituted a major
obstacle to this, however, and these regime figures withdrew their protection from Veche. This allowed Osipov to be put on trial. Ianov's explanation, which is compatible with Agursky's, links Osipov's trial with the decline in Poliansky's influence (and therefore in his ability to protect Veche), which began in 1973 and continued until he was dropped from the Politburo in 1976. Shelepín, too, was losing influence, leaving the Politburo in 1975. The moves against Veche coincided with the expulsion of Solzhenitsyn from the USSR and the publication of his Letter to the Soviet Leaders and the collection From under the Rubble. It may be that the wide circulation given to Solzhenitsyn's nationalist views made the Brezhnev leadership more determined to clamp down on unofficial Russian nationalism (although nobody went to the camps for contributing to From under the Rubble).

Clearly the regime was hostile both to Osipov's combination of human rights activity and Christian nationalism and to the idea of an uncensored regular Gosudarstvennik journal, such as Veche might have become without Osipov.

An attempt to create a successor to Veche, without the participation of Osipov (and perhaps not as sympathetic to the human rights movement) was made by Borodin. The title Moskovskii sbornik (Moscow Compendium) evoked the periodical of that name published by the Slavophils in the 1840s. Borodin's introduction to the first issue, which appeared in September 1974, conveyed the intention of publishing materials on religious and national issues which were already in samizdat. He also included a polemical
attack on Levitin-Krasnov's "Zemlia dybom" (The World Upside Down - itself a critique of Solzhenitsyn's Letter to the Leaders - see below). Borodin ridiculed the eclecticism (or diversity) of influences on Levitin-Krasnov. The material concerning religion included Shimanov's article "Moscow, the Third Rome" (see below), a work of Agursky's on Jewish Christians and an article on Dudko. A long historical article by Ivanov-Skuratov concerned Grigory Rasputin.\textsuperscript{375} The second issue, dated January 1975, failed to reach the West but the Chronicle reported its contents. It again included articles by Ivanov-Skuratov and Shimanov, and it was dedicated to the memory of Galanskov.\textsuperscript{376} After this, the KGB moved in, confiscating the third issue and giving Borodin a stern warning.\textsuperscript{377}
The role of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in the Russian nationalist movement (as in the human rights movement) in the early 1970s was of great significance. So much has already been written about him and his works, however, that my discussion here can be brief. Press attacks on Solzhenitsyn and on Andrei Sakharov, the other leading dissident, grew to a climax in summer 1973. Even figures such as Chingiz Aitmatov, Vasyl Bykov and Sergei Zalygin were forced to sign petitions against him. About this time the KGB discovered The Gulag Archipelago, with its uncompromising insistence that the roots of Stalinism lay in Lenin's repressive policies and class-based morality. In February 1974 Solzhenitsyn was arrested and forcibly deported to Switzerland. His Letter to the Soviet Leaders, completed the previous autumn, was thereupon published in the West and in samizdat. In November the anthology From Under the Rubble, edited by Solzhenitsyn, was launched at Press conferences in Moscow and Zurich.

The programme outlined in his Letter and in his contributions to From under the Rubble is authoritarian and nationalist, but comes out against Russian great-power chauvinism. A central point is that the non-Russians have the right to secede if they desire. Here Solzhenitsyn differs from the position of Shafarevich as expressed in the same volume. Shafarevich said that the Russians were at least as much the victims of communism as the other Soviet nations. There would be no benefit from the
minority nationalities breaking from a post-Soviet Russia. "There is nothing to indicate the necessity of dismembering states into national atoms." Solzhenitsyn implicitly rejected this Russian messianism (see below, p. 497). He was explicit on the national minorities. "With regard to all the peoples in and beyond our borders forcibly drawn into our orbit, we can fully purge our guilt by giving them genuine freedom to decide their future for themselves." In the Letter, he spoke of being concerned solely with Russia and the Ukraine; the other republics should be allowed to leave. In the third volume of Gulag, he goes further (conscious of being half-Ukrainian himself), and offers the Ukrainians the right of self-determination. "We must leave the decision to the Ukrainians themselves - let federalists and separatists try their persuasions."  

Free of the wish to maintain an empire, the Russian government would be able to renounce Marxism-Leninism and replace it with the moral authority of Orthodoxy. The alternative would be catastrophic. Driven by ideology, the Soviet leaders had exported revolution wherever they could, including China. But now the ideological dispute with China threatened to lead to war between the two countries. Solzhenitsyn called on the Soviet leaders, as Russians, to abandon ideology to the Chinese, and to concentrate resources on Russia. Her own North and Siberia should be developed, to keep out the Chinese and revive the spirit of
the Russian people. As well as renouncing the ideology, the leaders should restore some power to the soviets. Although he shares the hostility of his fellow-contributor, Shafarevich, to all forms of socialism, Solzhenitsyn's emphasis is on morality and repentance rather than politics. He speaks of the guilt of the Russians before other nations, but considerably softens the effect by referring to the oppression of Russians by Poles, Tatars and Latvians (in and after 1917), suggesting that the Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians have suffered from evil governments more than anyone else.

Solzhenitsyn's article "Repentance and Self-Limitation in the Life of Nations" refers to the "natural proclivity of Russians to repent". But this proclivity was undermined by Nikon's and Peter's reforms. "The whole Petersburg period of our history - a period of external greatness, of imperial conceit - drew the Russian spirit even further from repentance." This attitude to Peter I is shared by two other contributors to From_under_the Rubble, Vadim Borisov and the pseudonymous F. Korsakov. These contributors share with the early Slavophils a tendency to idealize pre-Petrine Russia. Opposition to State chauvinism also distinguished the early Slavophils (most of the time). Solzhenitsyn succinctly describes, and condemns, what he calls National Bolshevism (although what he is describing seems closer to what I have referred to as the gosudarstvennik ideology than to National Bolshevism): "the Russian people are the noblest
in the world ... tsarism and Bolshevism are equally irreproachable ... blood alone determines whether one is Russian or non-Russian." Shafarevich, also attacking national megalomania, comments that Veche's celebration of Skobelev's conquests "looks like some sort of deliberate provocation." Borisov goes so far as to call nationalism, along with universalism, an "atheist" ideology.

A major factor uniting Solzhenitsyn, Borisov and the early Slavophils is the belief in the need for the spiritual rebirth of the Russian nation. In the "Metanoia" symposium (see above, pp. 458-61), Solzhenitsyn saw "nothing but a denunciation of the irredeemably vicious Russian people". The view that at the centre of Bolshevism was Russian messianism appalled Solzhenitsyn. The Communist ideology, rooted in French and German theories, had made Russia into an occupied country whose traditions were vilified. For Solzhenitsyn, as for the early Slavophils, it was the intellectuals who were the most responsible for the contemptuous attitude to things Russian. His article "The Smatterers", attacking the contemporary Soviet intelligentsia, specifically praised the Vekhi authors for their prescience in seeing the need to put individual moral change before institutional change. He attacked "Metanoia" and the dissidents Grigory Pomerants and Semyon Telegin for pinning their hopes on the intelligentsia rather than on the Russian people. Borisov similarly attacked Pomerants, Roy Medvedev, Sakharov and other intellectuals for fearing the
development of national consciousness among the Russian people.\textsuperscript{397} Pointing out how the regime depended on the intelligentsia for its ideological support, Solzhenitsyn demanded that Russians be prepared to make sacrifices for the sake of change, to bring about a moral revolution. "DO NOT LIE! DO NOT TAKE PART IN THE LIE! DO NOT SUPPORT THE LIE!"\textsuperscript{398} This abandonment of Leninism could, Solzhenitsyn believed, bring about the peaceful transformation of Russia.\textsuperscript{399}

While the emphasis on peaceful change again recalled the Slavophils, one difference in Solzhenitsyn's approach was the absence of Russian messianism. For Solzhenitsyn, Russia's "national mission" is her own North and East. "The Northeast ... will signify that Russia has resolutely opted for self-limitation, for turning inward rather than outward." Only when her own problems were solved would she begin to help others.

When we have recovered our health and put our house in order we shall undoubtedly want to help poor and backward peoples and succeed in doing so. But not out of political self-interest, not to make them live as we do or serve us.\textsuperscript{400}

Shafarevich was less restrained in his discussion of Russia's mission. He made the link, common in messianic thought, between suffering and redemption.

It is hard to believe that any country has ever suffered such a multitude of catastrophes as has been unleashed on Russia during the last half century. Surely they cannot have been senseless and in vain?...

The whole of mankind has now entered a blind alley. It has become clear that a civilization founded on the ideology of 'progress' gives rise to contradictions
that civilization cannot resolve. And it seems to me that the path to Russia's rebirth is the same as the path that will enable man to find a way out of his blind ally, to find salvation from the senseless race of industrial society, the cult of power and the darkness of unbelief. We were the first to reach this vantage point, whence the uniqueness of this path became visible, and it is now up to us to set foot on it and point the way to others. This is my idea of Russia's possible mission, the purpose which can justify her future existence.401

Chaadaev had suggested that Russia's purpose might be "to provide some great lesson for the world" after undergoing a period of misery (see above, p. 86). Shafarevich now seemed to be saying that Russia had shown where the path of socialism and atheism would lead. Through her suffering she would be a negative example for the rest of humanity, but by returning to Christianity she could illuminate the true path.

Among the contributors to *From_under_the_Rubble*, it was Evgeny Barabanov who most clearly articulated messianic strivings. He was concerned not only with the fate of Russia and Orthodoxy, but with the crisis facing the Church (in the singular) worldwide. The Church was forgetting its "objective: the transformation of the world and of life for the glory of the approaching fullness of the Kingdom of God." When he says "we have been entrusted with the great task of transforming the world", there is some ambiguity, but the impression is that "we" is not only Russian Orthodoxy, but world Christianity.402

A considerable number of dissidents felt the need to comment on Solzhenitsyn's *Letter*, showing his position at the time as the leading unofficial thinker. Agursky
collected 14 articles about the Letter in a samizdat symposium, "What Awaits the Soviet Union?". A summary of the symposium appeared in the Chronicle. Sakharov criticized Solzhenitsyn for his authoritarianism and for over-emphasizing the importance of ideology. He agreed with Solzhenitsyn that Russia should "refrain from imposing our socialist messianism on other countries". But he found Solzhenitsyn's nationalism reminiscent of official "anti-cosmopolitan" campaigns, and feared that it could become "dangerous" if taken up by reactionary elements among the leadership. Replying to Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn rejected any accusation of "great power nationalism". Russia needed her "national consciousness" to prevent her own ruin. A strong authority, not the sudden introduction of democracy, was essential, otherwise "wars between nationalities in our country will drown in blood the birth of democracy." Osipov expressed his disagreement with Sakharov and with the scientist's advocacy of political pluralism. He fully supported Solzhenitsyn, as did Leonid Borodin and Ivanov-Skuratov. Shimanov criticized Solzhenitsyn for saying that Russia was not ripe for democracy, thereby suggesting that democracy would be appropriate for her in the future (see next section). At the other extreme, Raisa Lert argued that the "quiet" (tikhii) nationalism of Solzhenitsyn would "inevitably grow over" into the aggressive nationalism of Stalin. Levitin-Krasnov, while agreeing with Solzhenitsyn that Christianity was Russia's only salvation, feared that the development of
Siberia could only be accomplished with Stalin's methods. Roy Medvedev, like Lert and Levitin-Krasnov attacking Solzhenitsyn from a democratic socialist viewpoint, showed the extent to which Solzhenitsyn's nationalist concerns were shared by a wider public. He felt that Russian national life was hampered much more than that of the non-Russians; Russian villages were more neglected, and Moscow had almost lost its Russian traits. Lev Kopelev, also a socialist, defended Marxism against Solzhenitsyn with a quotation from Berdiaev. Osipov, in a further article, noted that in an important respect Roy Medvedev, Levitin-Krasnov, Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn were united in a belief which he shared: the need for gradual democratizing evolutionary changes from the top. "We must persuade the administration that the presence of a loyal opposition will not harm but will benefit the Soviet State." The debate over Solzhenitsyn's programme continued for the remainder of the 1970s and beyond. In 1975 Roy Medvedev and Lert began to publish a socialist samizdat journal, XX-i vek (The Twentieth Century), which carried articles critical of Solzhenitsyn. Although politics are generally outside my scope here, Vadim Belotserkovsky's collection Demokraticheskie al'ternativy (Democratic Alternatives, 1976) probably should be mentioned. It included articles by Leonid Pliushch, Levitin-Krasnov, Ianov, German Andreev and Belotserkovsky, advocating an anti-nationalist "New Left" alternative to Solzhenitsyn. Andrei Siniavsky, who is far from being a
Westernizer and has described himself as close to Berdiaev, has expressed opposition to Solzhenitsyn's tendency to blame Russia's problems on the West. In 1978 he began to publish the journal Sintaksis in Paris to oppose nationalist and anti-Semitic views. Much of the émigré Press in the 1970s and early 1980s was sympathetic to Solzhenitsyn, including Vestnik RKhD (Paris), Posev (Frankfurt), and some newer journals such as Russkoe vozrozhdenie (Paris, 1978-) and Veche (Munich, 1981-). The debate showed that despite Solzhenitsyn's own renunciation of messianism and his concentration on Russia, his opponents continued to fear that his nationalism could lead to xenophobia and chauvinism.

**Gennady Shimanov**

The Veche contributor Gennady Mikhailovich Shimanov differed fundamentally from Solzhenitsyn on the nature of the Soviet State. He was born in 1937 in a Communist family. In 1962 he voluntarily entered a psychiatric hospital, and at about the same time became an Orthodox Christian. In 1969 he was forcibly recommitted to a psychiatric hospital in connection with his religious beliefs and meetings organized at his home. After his release he came to consider himself a Slavophil and a believer in Russian messianism. The "Metanoia" symposium provoked him to write to the editor of Vestnik RKhD, Nikita A. Struve, protesting against its publication. He claimed that the "Metanoia" writers hated everything Russian and suggested that they might be non-
Russians, hiding behind pseudonyms. Two further letters attacked Struve for failing to publish his criticism.\textsuperscript{417}

In a letter written in or before 1975, Shimanov compared his faith in the Russian people to his faith in God.

...just as I in my time came to belief in God, inescapably and for always, now I have come to belief in the Russian people, to a belief near to my heart, but because of a bad education my heritage was inaccessible to me for a long time.\textsuperscript{418}

In moving from belief in God to belief in the Russian people, Shimanov was travelling in the direction opposite to that suggested by Father Zosima and Osipov. Like other Russian nationalists, Shimanov complained that patriotism was considered (by the liberal intelligentsia) acceptable for Jews and Tatars but was immoral, even fascist, for Russians. Pomerants was an example of this approach. "But our faith is that of Tiutchev, Gogol, Pushkin, Dostoevsky and the Slavophils... IT IS NECESSARY TO BE TOGETHER WITH THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE."\textsuperscript{419} The Russian people, according to Shimanov, were returning to the Church; while some, in the post-Stalin ideological vacuum, looked to the West, the most sensitive turned to Orthodoxy. The Soviet government was publishing the works of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy; the Russian religious philosophers, Merezhkovsky, Berdiaev and Bulgakov would be studied, and "the true leaders, the Slavophils, will begin to occupy the minds of the awakening people."\textsuperscript{420} (It should be noted that these words were written before the critical works of the classical Slavophils had been republished in the USSR). Even Evtushenko, who was supposed to be an atheist, had used...
religious phraseology. A danger facing Russia, which was not yet taken seriously, was posed by Rome. The Vatican was planning the Catholicization of Russia, and Vestnik RSKhD was a tool in this strategy.\textsuperscript{421}

Shimanov's answer to Solzhenitsyn was entitled "How to Understand Our History and What to Strive for in it". According to Shimanov, with the fall of Byzantium, Russia was right to feel herself the sole preserver of the true Orthodox faith. While the Mongol yoke reduced the external moral and cultural position of the people, it strengthened the Russian Orthodox soul, so that no subsequent difficulties could destroy it. The Westernization brought by Peter and his successors led to the slow decay of Russia, culminating in the democratic February Revolution. The October Revolution, on the other hand, was the end of the February Revolution and of all the previous decay. Shimanov agreed with Orthodox priests who welcomed the victory of militant atheism in Russia, as preferable to the disappearance of Christianity in the West in the bourgeois spirit to which Western Christianity had given birth. For atheism would only be temporary: "... as crucified Christ was resurrected, so Russian Orthodoxy will also be resurrected, and the light from it will regenerate other peoples."\textsuperscript{422}

The centralized Soviet State, seeking to overturn the whole world, would be the best possible instrument of God's purpose once the leadership saw the need to embrace
Orthodoxy. The leadership would have to do this because of the decline of Communist belief and the need to regenerate Russia to defend herself against China. The Soviet Press should explain that a mistake had been made, and God did, in fact, exist.

Only Soviet power, having accepted Orthodoxy and revealing in itself the source of the water of life, is capable of BEGINNING THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORLD. And this would happen - all humanity would sigh with the greatest relief and would reach out after our country to a new type of life. (Shimanov's capitals, here and below).423

Shimanov criticized Solzhenitsyn for saying that Russia was not yet ready for democracy, instead of rejecting democracy as a bourgeois and Protestant phenomenon. Equally unacceptable was Solzhenitsyn's belief in a democratic solution to the national question. Solzhenitsyn had said

not a word about the possibility that the Soviet Union is not a mechanical conglomerate of nations, ethnically and religiously homogeneous, which had 'accidentally' fallen into Russia's orbit, but a MYSTICAL ORGANISM, composed of nations mutually complementing each other and, headed by the Russian people, composing a LITTLE MANKIND - a source and spiritual detonator for the larger mankind.424

Shimanov nevertheless expressed the view elsewhere that the different nations of the world, including the different nations of the Soviet Union, should not associate unnecessarily with other nations. He was particularly opposed to mixed marriages.425

The tones of Russian messianism appeared again in his article "Moscow, the Third Rome". The October Revolution was of universal significance.
The world needed the death of Russia, in order to be resurrected after her...

Moscow has not ceased to be the Third Rome because in Russia the October Revolution took place. On the contrary, Moscow was preserved as the Third Rome precisely because of the Revolution...

After Great October we must talk about the ORTHODOXIZATION OF THE WHOLE WORLD. 426

Like the nineteenth-century Slavophils, Shimanov considered that the tsars had prevented the Church from functioning freely and had subordinated it to government interests. Also like the Slavophils, he rejected democracy as "the power of money". 427 The introduction of democracy, or liberalization, in Russia, could let in the real ruler of the liberal-anarchic West - "CAPITAL" - and prevent a religious revival. 428 Liberalism would be particularly disastrous in Russia, because it would unleash extreme nationalism. This would lead to massacres of Russians in the borderlands and retaliatory massacres of non-Russians in the centre, and to the expansion of China. One should proceed not from juridical forms, like the democrats, but from Christianity. In Soviet power, Shimanov saw "THE SECRET MEANING AND HAND OF GOD, leading our people through the greatest fall to the greatest rebirth". 429

Referring to Uvarov's trilogy, Shimanov said that it was unnecessary to complement Orthodoxy and narodnost' with autocracy. He would choose monarchy in preference to the "contemporary Western bourgeois-democratic system", but monarchy in Russia was now impossible. Christians should be loyal to the system as it existed, and try to harmonize
relations with the State for the common good. Shimanov's loyalty to the Soviet government is linked with St. Paul's view that "All power is from God", but it goes much further. In a 1975 article, "The Ideal State", he explains that the Soviet regime is "pregnant with theocracy" and predicts that the "approaching" transformation of the CPSU into the "Orthodox Party of the Soviet Union" will bring about the "ideal State". This will be a prelude to the creation of the millennial Kingdom.

Shimanov has denied suggestions that he is anti-Semitic. "I am against hostility to the Jews as such." He had never called them the enemies of Russia, although many of them "slander the Russian people", while others respect and understand other peoples. He believed in the equality and brotherhood of all nations in God. The Jewish people was perhaps the most unfortunate of all "not owing to suppression by those among whom they lived (this is the favourite theory and almost a poem of all Zionists), but owing to certain internal circumstances, arising because in the past they rejected the Messiah. I recognize that compassion for this people is necessary, but only insofar as it does not threaten the existence of other peoples." In an interview with the Jewish samizdat journal Evrei v SSSR (Jews in the USSR), Shimanov tried to explain the social roots of anti-Semitism. He claimed that the tendency of Jews to give each other support was "objectively directed against the people in whose milieu they are living". He called for Jews to be allowed to live
together autonomously. The Zionist solution was not likely to be successful, because it was rooted in inhumanity towards the Arabs. He also expressed the wish that Jews would become Christian and take part in the theocratic transformation of Russia.433

Shimanov explained in his 1976 article "The Basis for Hope" why the Christian transformation of Soviet power was probably inevitable. Although Communism had some religious roots, in the chiliastic teachings of Judaism and Christianity, it grew out of the bourgeois world and had never articulated values which differed in principle from bourgeois values. In the USSR, society was becoming bourgeoisified and Americanized, with people pursuing private consumer and sexual interests, while paying lip service to government policy out of fear. The government would have to find ways of recreating patriotic enthusiasm and crowding out bourgeois values. Externally, the USSR had faced two defeats: the split with China, which now posed a threat, forcing the Soviet leaders into detente with the West; and the breaking of the Communist parties in the capitalist world with the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The West was trying to fight the spread of Communism by striving for the liberalization of the Soviet regime. Such liberalization, however, would give nothing to the West and would lead to a catastrophe in the Soviet Union and to fatal consequences for the whole world. The West should insist not on liberalization but on humanization and the liberation of Christianity in the
Soviet Union from administrative suffocation. In the long term, this would lead to a Christian rebirth in the Soviet Union, the transformation of the country and a chain reaction around the world. If, however, there was no Christian revival, the Soviet tower would crash down. "Without any war our land to the Urals, if not further, will be coloured yellow, and there will be no way out of the world convulsions."434

Shimanov himself acted on his desire for greater freedom for the Orthodox Church. In July 1976 he wrote to Patriarch Pimen, asking him to speak out against State restrictions on the clergy,435 and in August he sent a letter to Brezhnev against the internment of Aleksandr Argentov of the Christian Seminar (see below) in a psychiatric hospital.436 In these actions, he was adopting the practice of the human rights movement, despite his view of the Soviet State.

It is possible that Shimanov's views were close to those held in the Brezhnev era by the upper hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church, who may have been reconciled to Soviet political and economic structures but wished to influence the authorities to move in a religious direction. While his loyalty and almost idolization of the Soviet State tempt one to assign Shimanov to the camp of the "gosudarstvenniki," his insistence that the State will have to abandon Marxism-Leninism and accept Christianity before it becomes an instrument of God's will differentiates his position from them. It is difficult to accept his own
label of "Slavophil" either, because the nineteenth-century Slavophils never wanted to extend the powers of the State. Shimanov's Russian universalist messianism (Russia will save the world through Orthodoxy) is tempered by a nationalist hostility towards the Jews (albeit denied) and the West.

Dimitry Dudko, the Christian Seminar and the Christian Committee

Unofficial Russian nationalist activity after 1975 was centred on people whose primary concerns were religious. This was connected with the revival of interest in religion, which continued through the Brezhnev era. It is difficult to estimate how much this revival affected the ordinary Russian, outside cultural circles. Reports of 30 to 50 million members of the Russian Orthodox Church are cited, but this may refer to little more than the number of people baptized. The existence of a religious revival is attested to by unofficial representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, such as Levitin-Krasnov, who emphasizes the attraction of Orthodoxy for urban intellectual youth. Mikhail Meerson-Aksyonov sees the religious revival in terms of "the conversion to Christianity of tens of thousands of young people who belong to the second and third generation of Soviet citizens and who have received atheist education".

Some official leaders of the Church under Brezhnev also felt able to comment favourably. Metropolitan Iuvenaly claimed, "What today exists in the Russian Orthodox Church
... is a spiritual revival." From about the mid-1970s, the Church hierarchs seemed to display a certain degree of confidence in their strength. The Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate began to mention favourably ideologists who were hostile to Marxism: the nineteenth-century Slavophils (here it reflected and reinforced trends in the cultural intelligentsia) and even twentieth-century thinkers who had opposed Bolshevism, including émigrés like Sergei Bulgakov, and Father Pavel Florensky who died in a Stalinist labour camp. The Party Central Committee seems to have been sufficiently concerned about the Russian Orthodox Church to call for a report from the Council for Religious Affairs. This categorized the bishops in terms of their loyalty to the State.

A major role was played by Father Dimitry Dudko (see above, pp. 437, 456, 465, 487-88). Born in 1922 in a poor peasant family in the region of Briansk, he had entered the Novodevichy Monastery seminary in 1945 but had then been sent to the camps. After the XX Congress, he was rehabilitated. In 1958 he was awarded the degree of candidate of theology by the Spiritual Academy for his thesis "Sobornost' Tserkvi" (The sobornost' of the Church). The title evokes Slavophil strivings and, according to Levitin-Krasnov, Dudko belonged to the tradition of theological thought begun by Khomiakov. Levitin-Krasnov reports that Dudko also followed Berdiaev in seeing freedom as the basis of religious life. As priest at St. Nicholas' Church in the Cemetery of the Transfiguration in
Moscow, he gained popularity and baptized a number of adults into Orthodoxy. In September 1972 he was warned that the authorities wished to remove him, but his parishioners responded to his appeal for support and he was left at his post. His question-and-answer sessions in the winter of 1973–1974 attracted many young people to his church. He avoided specific questions of politics and human rights, but demonstrated a religious Russian nationalism. "My patriotism is based on faith," he explained. Like Shimanov, and like the Church hierarchy, he promoted a certain loyalty to the regime. Religion, he said, is "(if it comes to that) a good builder of communism." Furthermore, he preached a pure Russian messianism.

Now with us in Russia a great miracle is taking place - not only the crucifixion of Christ but also his resurrection from the dead....

... Golgotha isn't simply sufferings, but sufferings which lead to resurrection, and enlighten people...

Golgotha is in Russia, and where Golgotha is, there too is resurrection.

In May 1974 Dudko was removed from his parish, and in September he was appointed to the village of Kabanovo, fifty miles from Moscow. This led to an appeal by his parishioners to Patriarch Pimen, asking that he be returned to them. Muscovites continued to attend his sermons in Kabanovo, and in December 1975 he was dismissed from there as well. This provoked a wave of protests: one from 300 of his parishioners; another from Shaiarevich, Vadim Borisov, Feliks Svetov and other Orthodox intellectuals; another from Gleb Lakunin and Lev Regelson. In April 1976, he was given a church in the village of Grebnevo, outside...
Moscow. Despite continued pressure, he continued to write on the Golgotha theme. His 1977 article, "From the Russian Golgotha", regretted that some people could not hear about Russia calmly: "for them appears at once the Third Rome, Russian nationalism-chauvinism, and most recently National Bolshevism." But "Russia and the Russian person are unthinkable without Christianity." After references to Dostoevsky and Tiutchev, he described Russia as a spiritual force, which cannot be destroyed...

"Russia knows from her own experience how to escape from the misfortune which has hung over the whole world gone mad. Russia is now not only in those territories which the USSR has illegally occupied - she has penetrated everywhere...

Russia is not a question of a particular State, the question of Russia is a world question. On the solution of this problem depends whether or not the world will exist."

In September 1978 he began publishing a newspaper *V-svete Preobrazheniia* (In the Light of the Transfiguration, subtitled An Orthodox Weekly Newspaper). This survived to 1980.

Dudko's influence was present in the Christian Seminar, which was established in Moscow in 1974 and which in 1978 renamed itself the Christian Seminar on Problems of the Religious Renaissance. This group of people, mainly young, discussed Russian Orthodox thinkers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In a list of subjects discussed in the Seminar between September 1974 and July 1976, the names mentioned most frequently were Vladimir Solovyov (four times) and Khomiakov (three times). The founder of the Seminar was Aleksandr I. Ogorodnikov, who was born in 1950.
and converted to Christianity only in 1973. "From Marxist convictions, through nihilism and the complete denial of any ideology, through attraction to the 'hippy' way of life we arrived at the Church," wrote Ogorodnikov in 1976. Elsewhere, he and his co-seminarist Boris Razveev wrote: "Khomyakov, Dostoevsky, V. Solovyov, Fr. S. Bulgakov and G. Florovsky brought us up to the threshold of the Church and set us before its doors." The Seminar also discussed aspects of Western religious and political thought, the Russian saints and their relationship to the State, and the sermons of Dudko. Dudko considered Ogorodnikov among his spiritual children, and Ogorodnikov called Dudko his spiritual father.

In 1977 the Seminar published a religious and philosophical samizdat journal with the Slavophil-sounding title Obshchina (Commune, or Community), under Ogorodnikov's editorship. A declaration of the principles of the Seminar was compiled by Ogorodnikov. This called for the right to practise religion and to live according to the Christian conscience, and for the Church to pay attention to the world as well as to heaven. The declaration predicted that the Orthodox Church would come through its crisis and "affirm itself in its glory through the whole Russian land, also inviting other peoples to the Christian Transfiguration". Towards this end, the Seminar would seek to create a "Christian obshchina", develop the Orthodox world-view and theological education, pursue missionary activity and defend religious freedom. On the
future of Russia the declaration stated:

At the centre of the interests of the Seminar stands the question of the history and future fate of Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church. This question cannot be decided without considering the multinational composition of our country.

There followed a reference to the "Russian Golgotha", and a statement that the Seminar was united in "love for Russia as for a mother... brotherly love for Christians of all nationalities ... respect for the national dignity of people of different ethnic groups." This was as far as the declaration was prepared to go for the non-Russians. "Holy Rus'", the conclusion added, was "the holy of holies of our national consciousness". 456

There were several such groups in Moscow and other cities; the Christian Seminar had links with the religious and philosophical seminar in Leningrad, founded by Orthodox believers such as Tatiana Goricheva but not limited to the Orthodox. This group published the journal 37, 20 issues of which appeared between 1975 and 1981, edited by Viktor Krivulin. 457

According to the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group member Liudmila Alekseeva, the "main center" of Russian nationalism from early 1977 was the Christian Committee for the Defence of Believers' Rights in the USSR, founded in December 1976. 458 Two of the three founder members were former Veche supporters, Khaibulin and Kapitanchuk, although Khaibulin left the Committee in 1978. The third was Iakunin, who continued into the 1970s his campaign of appeals for religious freedom, sometimes together with Lev
Regelson. Of particular note was the June 1976 ecumenical appeal to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet for religious freedom, signed by Iakunin, Regelson, Shaiarevich, Dudko, Zheludkov and others - a total of 28 Christians from six denominations.

The Christian Committee confined its membership to Orthodox believers, saying that since the Orthodox Church had been responsible for religious repression for centuries when it was the State Church, the Committee considered it its "special duty to take the initiative in the cause of the defence of the religious freedom of all believers in the country, irrespective of their confession". It produced thousands of pages, documenting the persecution of people of virtually all the Christian denominations in the USSR, and also of the Jew Iosif Begun, who was sentenced for teaching Hebrew. Meerson-Aksyonov claimed that the Committee had the "silent connivance of the Church hierarchy", but this may overestimate its basis of support. It is true, however, that Father Vasily Fonchenkov, one of the later Committee members, was allowed to continue lecturing at the Moscow Theological Academy for a while after joining the Committee, and that the Committee was never openly attacked by the Patriarchate. Iakunin's report to the Committee, "On the Current Situation of the Russian Orthodox Church and Perspectives for the Religious Rebirth of Russia", highlighted the interest of the intelligentsia and of young people in religion, and the inability of the Patriarchate to meet
Since the activity of the Christian Committee was in the defence of human rights, rather than in the development of Russian messianism, its activity will not be discussed in detail here. In the attachment of its members to Orthodoxy and of at least two of them to Russian nationalism, the Committee can be seen as a reflection of the evolution of the Slavophilism of the 1970s towards the human rights movement.

The activities of the Christian Seminar and the Christian Committee were not ignored by the authorities. Aleksandr Argentov was the first member of the Christian Seminar to suffer persecution: on 14 July 1976 he was confined to a psychiatric hospital in Moscow for a few weeks and given harmful drugs. The newspaper Literaturnaia gazeta carried a long attack, over two issues, in April 1977 on Ogorodnikov, Iakunin, Regelson and Dudko. One week after the second part appeared, Iakunin and Dudko fought back with a Press conference at Dudko's flat. While some Seminar members were harassed, the authorities allowed the Seminar and the Christian Committee to function. As Jane Ellis has pointed out, from the middle of 1977 to the middle of 1979 the KGB generally left religious cases alone while they dealt with the activists of the Helsinki Monitoring Groups, presumably because they saw the latter cases as more serious. An exception was the Christian Seminar leader Ogorodnikov, arrested on 21 November 1978 and initially sentenced to a year in the camps for "parasitism". Regelson replaced him as leader of the Seminar.
From the middle of 1979 came a crackdown on all forms of dissent. This was initially believed to be connected with the desire of the Soviet leaders to clear Moscow of all dissidents in time for the Olympics, due to be held there in summer 1980. The invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was the culmination of the collapse of détente with the West (at least as far as the USA and Britain were concerned, if not yet the rest of Western Europe). This removed the reason for the Soviet leaders not to move against the activists for religious freedom, for fear of alienating Western public opinion. Vladimir Poresh, the Christian Seminar's representative in Leningrad, was arrested on 1 August 1979 for his role in publishing *Obshchina*. He was tried in April 1980 and given five years in a strict regime camp and three years exile. Ogorodnikov was not released when his year was over but retried in September 1980 for editing *Obshchina*, and sentenced to six years of strict regime camp plus five years exile. As far as the Christian Committee was concerned, Iakunin was arrested on 1 November 1979 and Regelzon on 24 December. Kapitanchuk was left at liberty until 12 March 1980. After his arrest the Committee announced that it was expanding to include ten anonymous members, but the supply of documents dried up.471

Probably the most serious blow to the Orthodox revival, and to Russian messianist thought, was the arrest of Dudko on 15 January 1980 and his "recantation" of his activities
on television on 20 June. The recantation was later reprinted in major newspapers. Without in any sense renouncing his Orthodox faith, he said that his struggle against atheism had become a struggle against the Soviet State, and he had become a tool of the West. His apologetic letter to the Patriarch was published in the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. After his broadcast he was released, but the following month he began to recant his recantation. He wrote letters reproaching himself for misleading his spiritual children by giving in to KGB pressure, but also justifying his action. He seems to have been confused and felt isolated at this time, deserted by the same spiritual children. It is not easy to identify the precise reasons for his capitulation to the KGB. It may have been the result of drugs or of threats. There may have been pressure on Dudko from the Patriarchate, who could have been mediating between the KGB and the priest; it was rumoured that Metropolitan Iuvenaly of Krutitsy and Kolomna, or even Pimen himself, had seen Dudko while the latter was in prison.

The political activity of the Orthodox Church dissidents was now in the doldrums. Regelson, Kapitanchuk and Feliks Karelin gave evidence against Iakunin, who was sentenced in August 1980 to five years camp and the same time in exile. Regelson and Kapitanchuk repented at their trials, in September and October, and were released. One journal which succeeded in appearing twice during the crackdown, in 1980 and 1981, was Mnogaia leta (Many Years), edited by Shimanov and carrying major contributions from
Karelin and L. Ibragimov. In accordance with Shimanov's views, outlined earlier, it argued for closer co-operation between Orthodox people and the State.\textsuperscript{476} A samizdat article accused it of being a KGB journal.\textsuperscript{477}

\textbf{The evolution of dissident Russian nationalism under Brezhnev}

The dissident Russian nationalist movement under Brezhnev can be schematically described as passing through three stages. It began with underground organization, represented by VSKhSON; it passed through the stage of programmatic samizdat journals, such as \textit{Vechе}, putting forward an ideology (or range of ideologies) which differed from that of the regime, but which claimed loyalty to the Soviet Constitution; and it ended with open human rights activity, exemplified by the participation of Osipov in protests against repression and by the work of Khaibulin and even Kapitanchuk in the Christian Committee for the Defence of Believers' Rights.

The movement from loyal nationalism to the human rights movement was precisely the opposite of that predicted by Ianov. It is true that some of the \textit{gosudarstvenniki} who worked in \textit{Vechе} disappeared from samizdat after 1974; but these people seem to have always been close to, or part of, the cultural establishment and never to have broken from their official positions. In its three stages of development, Russian nationalism paralleled the democratic opposition; from underground groups, through samizdat journals, such as the \textit{Chronicle} or Valery N. Chalidze's
Obshchestvennye problemy, to open human rights groups such as the Initiative Group of 1969 and the Helsinki Monitoring Groups. The Russian nationalist movement overlapped with, and drew strength from, movements within the Orthodox Church. The Christian protests frequently used nationalist and messianist images. So did the apparently non-political samizdat writings of Christians which appeared in Vechе and elsewhere. The Christian Seminar and other unofficial Christian movements also saw a link between Orthodoxy and nationalism, and Dudko's messianic view of Russia as Golgotha seems to have had wide currency.

**Russian nationalism and the Brezhnev leadership**

Russian nationalist dissidents in the Brezhnev era were in general allowed much more leeway than non-Russian nationalists. Liudmila Alekseeva finds that even as late as the early 1980s, non-democratic dissidents like the Russian nationalists (excluding those linked with the human rights movement) received favoured treatment from the authorities. The articles in Vechе attacking "cosmopolitanism" (and even some of Osipov's statements) are sometimes reminiscent of the work of the officially-published gosudarstvenniki, and the evidence of Kheifets is that they in fact often emanate from the same circles. It may not have been the nationalist or even the Christian orientation of Vechе that led to its closure; after all, Christian motifs were tolerated in the cultural journals, and displayed in the Manège at Glazunov's exhibition. The samizdat journal Mnogaia leta was tolerated as late as
1981, despite its Orthodox nationalism. What was not tolerated was the link between Russian nationalism and the human rights movement which Osipov, facing harassment from the authorities, was forced to make.

The Russian nationalists had powerful backers. According to Reznik, Sofronov's Ogonek published Glazunov's portrait of Ivanov-Skuratov. Russian nationalism also gained support from the Cultural Department of the Central Committee under Shauro. The fact that the Central Committee Propaganda Department was headed from 1977 by E.M. Tiazheinikov, formerly First Secretary of the Komsomol, may have removed some of the barriers to the spread of Russian nationalist ideas. Tiazheinikov's presence at the Kremlin celebration of the Kulikovo victory adds weight to this surmise.

Up to about the middle of the 1970s, the Brezhnev leadership seems to have been hostile to the more extreme forms of Russian nationalism, as is shown by the moves against Molodaja gvardiia, but supportive of milder forms, as is suggested by the demotion of the anti-nationalist Iakovlev. In the later 1970s, however, with the general "decline in social discipline" went a relaxation of ideological control. The leadership seems to have drifted into a situation where Marxist-Leninist values were regularly being challenged by Russian patriotic and religious feelings, without any single member of the leadership (after the fall of Poliansky) being obviously responsible for promoting this.
Agursky described a Russian "national reaction", which gained support from Russian oblast' Party bodies and Russians in the central Party apparatus. He said that this trend opposed both the "internationalist" group based on republican Party leaders and headed by Brezhnev, and a "super-industrializing" military-industrial complex, mainly Russian in composition, headed by Kosygin, Central Committee Secretary A.P. Kirilenko and Minister of Defence D.F. Ustinov. 

Agursky's schema has some attractions, but many oblast' leaders are part of the military-industrial complex, and Brezhnev must undoubtedly have drawn support from Russians on the Central Committee. It seems clear that the armed forces' Main Political Administration (MPA) and the Komsomol gave support to Russian nationalists. The MPA has been promoting the concept of "military-patriotic education" of Soviet youth since the 1970s, with references to tsarist military heroes.

The role of the KGB is less clear. Probably, like other institutions, it was divided on the question. The émigrés Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova claim that when Andropov became KGB head in 1967, he inherited a legacy of nationalism. He then tried to channel this to fuel his political ambitions, while keeping it at a distance. Real evidence linking Andropov with any form of Russian nationalism is tenuous, to say the least, although his subordinates may have been affected by it. It
might be noted that Solovyov and Klepikova are the only writers to claim that the "Russian Party" is not simply a tendency of people with similar ideas but actually "the name of an organization" which has its own members, meetings and central committee.484

The attitude to Russian nationalism of Suslov at the end of his life is a matter of dispute. Reznik claims that Suslov personally supported Glazunov's exhibitions, and Dunlop believes that he protected cultural nationalists.485 It has also been claimed that Suslov prevented corruption charges from being brought against Sofronov.486 Roy Medvedev, on the other hand, states that Suslov was friendly with Glazunov because he liked the artist's portrait of him, but he had no personal sympathy with the rusity.487 Glazunov presumably did not need Suslov's support if he was friendly with Brezhnev. Agursky claims that Suslov supported the goсударственники ("aggressive imperial nationalism") and opposed the возрождёнцы ("isolationist conservative Russian nationalism").488

Concern for the problem is shown by the fact that in April 1979 the Central Committee passed a decree "On the further improvement of ideological and political upbringing work". An article on the implementation of this decree was published over Suslov's name in Kommunist in October 1979. He attacked literary works which conveyed "unhistorical, distorted representations of the past, strange predilections for the characters or historical adventurers, and superficial judgements about contemporary affairs".489 This would seem to be directed against all types of
nationalists.

Did the Russian nationalists have any effect on Soviet policy, despite the expulsion of Solzhenitsyn and the arrest of Osipov? In terms of economic development, the Brezhnev leadership seems to have agreed with Solzhenitsyn in prioritizing Siberia. The plan to reverse part of the flow of the Siberian rivers, the Ob and the Irtysh, into Central Asia to provide irrigation for the burgeoning population of Central Asia was not implemented, but neither was it dropped. In 1981 changes were introduced in family benefits to encourage Russians to have more children, without further encouraging the population growth in Transcaucasia and Central Asia.490 In foreign policy, on the other hand, Russian nationalist pressures for isolationism were ignored, as the leaders sought to increase their influence in the Third World at the expense of the USA and China, without risking a war with either.
It is difficult to deduce the political positions of different members of the top leadership, since statements by Politburo members are as likely to reflect the Politburo majority position (or consensus, where this exists) as the individual position of the politician. From May 1982, when Andropov became Central Committee Secretary with responsibilities in the ideological field, it seems that it was his policies which became the official line, rather than those of the ailing Brezhnev. In the period of Andropov's General Secretaryship, from November 1982 to February 1984, Chernenko was the ideology Secretary, but the public position of the two leaders in relation to Russian nationalism was the same. Chernenko as General Secretary appears to have also held the ideology 'portfolio' until late 1984, when Gorbachov took it over. The latter seems to have avoided committing himself on Russian nationalism before becoming General Secretary in March 1985.

Observers as different in their views as Georgy Vladimov and Zhores Medvedev agree that Andropov, at the end of his life at least, was hostile to Russian nationalism. The fact that Andropov was keen to stamp out Russian nationalism, and that he was not merely allowing Chernenko to pursue his own ideological interests, is suggested by his use of the KGB, still under his control, against it. Vitaly Fedorchuk, Andropov's successor at the KGB, is said to have described Russian nationalism as the main (glavnoe) enemy. Sheila
Fitzpatrick speaks of the "possible" offence caused by Russian nationalism to the non-Russians. One may surmise that Andropov, as former head of the KGB, which puts many more non-Russians than Russians in labour camps for political dissent, was aware of the ill-feelings caused by the expression of Russian nationalism.

In 1981-83 the KGB moved to mop up most of the dissident Russian nationalists. In August 1982 Zoia A. Krakhmalnikova, editor of the Orthodox samizdat journal Nadezhda (Hope), whose nationalist overtones were very mild, and which reportedly had the backing of the Church hierarchy, was arrested; she was later given a relatively light sentence. Of wider significance to the nationalist movement was the arrest of Ivanov-Skuratov in August 1981. In connection with this case, not only dissidents such as Borodin but also the establishment figures Glazunov and Semanov were questioned. The trial in June 1982 revealed that Ivanov-Skuratov's work had been produced on the typewriters of the General Staff. Ivanov-Skuratov "confessed" to anti-Soviet agitation and was given a light sentence. A report circulated in late 1982 that Semanov had been arrested, but this was later refuted. In May 1983, the purge climaxed with the trial of Borodin, on charges which covered the whole of his samizdat activity and sending literary works abroad. He had refused to co-operate with the Ivanov-Skuratov investigation, and he was sentenced to a harsh 10 years in a labour camp and 5 years internal exile. Further
repressive measures included the re-sentencing within the camps of members of the Christian Seminar when they were due to be released, a process already applied to Ogorodnikov. \(^{499}\) The effect of these policies was to diminish but not totally eliminate the volume of Russian nationalist activity. \(^{500}\)

Opposition to Russian nationalism was evident from statements by the leadership. In July 1982 the Central Committee adopted a decree "On the creative links of the literary and belletristic journals with the practice of communist construction". The decree made some concessions to the derevenshciki by inviting writers to encourage "love for the land, nature and agricultural labour". But "some journals" were scolded for portraying "events in the history of the fatherland [otechestva], the socialist revolution and collectivization" in a distorted way, and for failing to evaluate social phenomena "from clear class positions". \(^{501}\) This was an attack on Nash sovremennik and other journals for idealizing the tsarist past and expressing doubts about the new order in peasant life. In December 1982, the pro-nationalist Tiazhelnikov was demoted and replaced as head of the Propaganda Department by Boris Stukalin. \(^{502}\) This was immediately after a strongly nationalist article by Proskurin on the uniqueness of Russia appeared in Pravda. \(^{503}\)

Andropov's increasing influence coincided with the assertion, albeit temporary, of a more traditional Leninist line in discussing the future of the nationalities.
its first issue for 1982, *Istoriia SSSR* had carried an article entitled "The Role of the Russian Socialist Nation in the Development and Strengthening of the Internationalist Unity of the Soviet People". This was a paean of praise to the Russian people, "and first of all the Russian working class", for their aid to the other Soviet peoples. In keeping with Brezhnev's line, the article made no reference to the future sliianie, which would mean Russification as well as Sovietization for the non-Russian nations, and also the disappearance of the Russian nation into a denationalized melting pot.504 But already in the same month in which Andropov rejoined the Secretariat, the May issue of *Problemy mira i sotsializma* included an article by D.A. Kunaev, Politburo member and Kazakhstan First Secretary, citing Lenin on sliianie.505

At a conference in Riga in June 1982, R.I. Kosolapov, chief editor of *Kommunist* and a Central Committee member, launched a strong attack on those who wished to abandon the concept of sliianie, and who had even made it difficult for others to discuss it. Citing Lenin's view that sliianie was an aim of socialism, Kosolapov said that some people nevertheless linked it with great-power chauvinism. He specifically attacked Kulichenko for soft-pedalling the concept in order not to upset people. But Kosolapov's view of sliianie did not include the elimination of all ethnic distinctions. His view was similar to that of Mordinov in 1971 (see above, p. 397); he cited the same passage from Sholokhov as Mordinov had, also claiming that it portrayed
a false conception of sliianie. Kosolapov ridiculed the idea that people in all continents would have the same skin, eyes, hair or even language. He went on:

Racial-national-ethnic distinctions between large groups of the population ... will be subject to essential changes, but are in principle indestructible. Only under this condition can one realistically think of the future sliianie of nations. 506

Kosolapov claimed that economic development was bringing the nations and classes of the USSR together, a theme repeated by other speakers such as Arutiunian, who emphasized the growth of the production intelligentsia among the non-Russians. Referring to the "vanguard role of the Russian workers", Kosolapov spoke of the dangers to social and national relations if substantial numbers of industrial workers were not recruited from all the major Soviet nationalities. He pointed to the ideological benefits that would result from the proposed redeployment of surplus labour from Central Asia and the Caucasus to the labour-deficit areas of the RSFSR. 507

Kosolapov appears in Riga to have been alone in his attitude to sliianie; certainly B.N. Ponomaryov, candidate Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary, avoided the term. 508 Nevertheless, a leading article in Kosolapov's journal in August, discussing national relations, referred to the "future sliianie of nations", while asserting that nobody wished to accelerate it artificially. 509 The speech by Andropov, by then General Secretary, on the sixtieth anniversary of the USSR in December 1982, seemed at first to mark the full rehabilitation of the concept of sliianie.
Andropov said:

Our final goal is clear. It is, to use V.I. Lenin's words, 'not only the sblizhenie of nations, but also their sliianie'. The Party well understands that the path to this goal is long. Here it is impossible in any event either to run ahead or to allow any holding back of processes that have already matured.

Nationality problems would survive "while nations exist, while there are national distinctions. And they will exist for a long time, much longer than class distinctions." Andropov's implication was that national differences would ultimately disappear; it would seem, then, perhaps paradoxically, that Andropov did not subscribe to Kosolapov's understanding of sliianie, but was closer to Kulichenko's.

Progress had led to growing national consciousness, said Andropov, but this should not lead to national arrogance, conceit or disrespect for other nationalities. The continued existence of these was due not only to throwbacks from capitalism but also to mistakes of the present. All the nationalities in a republic should receive their due representation in Party and State bodies. While praising the Russian people (in a low key), Andropov called for tact and attention to be paid to questions of language, historical monuments, historiography and the allocation of cadres, in order to promote internationalism. Addressing the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in January 1983, Andropov urged that more attention be given to the specific needs of all the nationalities, "especially the small peoples".
Thus Andropov combined sliianie with expressions of concern for national rights. K.U. Chernenko, Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary with responsibility for ideology, made a passing reference to sliianie in December 1982. After this, it appears that no Politburo member or republican leader mentioned it. Why the word was introduced and then abandoned remains a mystery. Martha Olcott is right to see Andropov's sixtieth-anniversary speech as an assertion of his authority in nationality affairs. It seems likely that both Andropov and Chernenko, whatever their other differences, were united in reasserting the importance of ideology, in reaction to the cynicism of the later Brezhnev years. Whether either of them wished to use sliianie as an ideological weapon against those who promoted "eternal Russia", and whether they backed down in the face of opposition, are matters for speculation at present. In June 1983 the Central Committee held a Plenum specifically devoted to ideology. Andropov and Chernenko both used sblizhenie. Chernenko spoke of the need to study the specific needs of the nationalities, if ideological work was to be effective. To look ahead briefly, Chernenko as General Secretary appears to have made little impact on the national question; in his speech to the April 1984 Central Committee Plenum on the preparation of the new Party programme, he referred to the "gradual but undeviating sblizhenie" of nations.

At the June 1983 Central Committee Plenum, Chernenko
made the major speech as ideology Secretary. The only political trend in literature that he attacked was Russian nationalism. "It is disturbing that in certain works deviations from historical truth are allowed – in the evaluation of collectivization, for example – and that 'god-seeking' motifs and idealization of the patriarchal order creep into them."517 Later that year A.N. Iakovlev, who a decade earlier had paid with his job for making similar criticisms, was brought back from Canada to head the prestigious Institute of the World Economy and International Relations. During his General Secretaryship, Chernenko made no innovations or major statements in relation to Russian nationalism, but emphasized ideological orthodoxy. In his address to the Union of Writers in September 1984, he insisted that literature serve the needs of the Party and follow "socialist realism". He called for more attention to the "military-patriotic theme".518 In this stifling atmosphere, two leading Russian nationalists decided not to return to the USSR after visits abroad: Iury Liubimov, director of the Taganka theatre, offered his resignation in September 1983, and was replaced in March 1984 by Efros; and Andrei Tarkovsky, director of the film Andrei Rublev, chose to stay in the West in July 1984.519

Throughout this period, argument raged among writers and critics. A 1980 book by Feliks Nesterov, Sviaz' vremen (A Bridge across the Ages) described the patriotism and the supposed closeness to the State of the Russian people through history. It emphasized the role of tsarist military traditions and the patriotism of former tsarist
officers in the Bolshevik victory in the Civil War, as opposed to the class factors. Obshchestvo Znanie awarded it first prize in 1981 for the best "popular-scientific" book; and it was enthusiastically reviewed in Nash sovremennik by Kargalov (of whom see above, p. 447). In a review which did not appear until January 1982, Novyi mir took the opposite position: it quoted Nesterov as saying that the Russian State was supported "by all social strata of the Russian people", and accused him of ignoring the peasant revolts. (A second edition of Nesterov's book, "with changes", appeared in 1984.)

Suslov was barely buried before Pravda carried an attack by Vasily I. Kuleshov, head of Russian Literature at Moscow University, on a number of critics for their uncritical attitude to Dostoevsky. The year 1981 had seen a spate of articles marking the 160th anniversary of the author's birth. The gosudarstvennik lury Seleznyov published two admiring studies of Dostoevsky, in 1980 and 1981. The Molodaia gwardiia critic Mikhail Lobanov, reviewing the earlier study in Oktiabr', attributed the world significance of Dostoevsky to his position in the struggle of good and evil, and to the role of the Russian people in world history, "beginning with the October Revolution". Welcoming Seleznyov's work, he said that it showed the existence of "healthy forces" in literary criticism and in the wider social consciousness.

Kuleshov's principal target was the gosudarstvennik

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Kozhinov for a November 1981 article in Nash sovremennik dedicated to Dostoevsky's anniversary. In this important article, Kozhinov had claimed the existence of a "Russian idea", which he traced from Metropolitan Ilarion's sermon "On Law and Grace" in the eleventh century through Filofei, Pushkin, Belinsky, Chaadaev, Ivan Kireevsky, Herzen, Gogol and Tolstoy to Dostoevsky's "Pushkin speech". He did not mention Berdiaev.) Kozhinov emphasized the uniqueness (svoeobrazie) of Russian thought: its ability to understand and absorb the thought of other nations. He claimed that nobody, since the "Pushkin speech", had disputed Dostoevsky's idea that "the Russian soul, the genius of the Russian people, is perhaps the most able of all peoples to contain within itself the idea of pan-human unity". Among Dostoevsky's predecessors, Belinsky had wondered whether the Russian talent for receiving the fruits of other cultures was not a sign of superiority but rather the result of Russia's own lack of culture. Chaadaev had progressed from this to believe in Russia's "ecumenical mission". The striving for universalism, according to Kozhinov, could be achieved only through the nation and was opposed to "cosmopolitanism": the basic direction of Russian literature (with Dostoevsky representing the apogee) "always preserved the unity of pan-humanity [vsechelovechesnosti] and narodnost'".

Kuleshov complained that Kozhinov had presented a string of writers, both supporters and opponents of tsarism, as if they were all co-thinkers of Dostoevsky. He was particularly upset by Kozhinov's view of Kulikovo.
Kozhinov depicted this not as a battle of Russia against the Tatar-Mongol conquerors, but as "the multinational Russian State" against the "aggressive cosmopolitan armada". It is also noteworthy that, with the help of long quotations from Lenin, Kozhinov emphasized Russia's role in Asia, which Dostoevsky had foreseen. It seems likely that this is linked with Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. A disciple of Kozhinov, and proponent of a "new messianism", is the poet Iury Kuznetsov, who was claimed by Sergei Iurenen of Radio Liberty to be perhaps more popular in the USSR than Evtushenko ever was. Kuznetsov wrote a poem, apparently dedicated to Kozhinov, after the invasion of Afghanistan, depicting Russia "turning her back on the West". Kuznetsov has made no secret of his indifference to socialism.

In 1981 and 1982 a number of attacks were made on Soloukhin. The journal Nash sovremennik, in one of a series of collections of short essays by Soloukhin, published in March 1981 the following statement by him. "In the twentieth century, for every healthily-thinking person there are no doubts that in the world, in the Universe, in the variety of life there is a higher rational source [vysshee razumnoe nachalo]." This suggestion of the existence of a Supreme Being led Kommunist in January 1982 to criticize the passage and accuse him of "god-building". In April (after Suslov's death) Nash sovremennik suffered changes in its editorial board, including the removal of the deputy editor, Seleznyov.
Kommunist in May carried a letter from Nash sovremennik, recognizing the justice of the criticism of Soloukhin's article. It also carried a letter from the Party secretary of the Moscow Writers' Organization, reporting that Soloukhin had assured the Party bureau that he "was and remains a convinced atheist". The October issue of Nash sovremennik reprinted the first letter but not the second. The case of Soloukhin, together with Pravda's attack on Kozhinov, suggests that Suslov's death may have cleared the way for attempts to re-assert the "class approach" in literature and history. It might be more accurate, on the other hand, to link these attacks with the growing influence of Andropov, and thus only indirectly with Suslov's death. Nash sovremennik sought to adapt to the Andropov style by introducing into its pages a section called "Discipline, order, consciousness".

Another storm was created over an extraordinary article in the journal Volga (published by the RSFSR Writers' Union and the Saratov writers' organization) in October 1982 by Lobanov. This purported to be a review of Mikhail Alekseev's novel, Drachuny (The Brawlers). It praised Alekseev for his portrait of the horrors of the famine of 1933, which accompanied collectivization. At the same time Lobanov conveyed a negative attitude to the whole of twentieth-century Russian history, including the socialist construction of the 1930s and socialist realist literature. He exempted some derevenshchiki, whom he considered loyal to the Russian tradition. What stood out in the article were his gratuitous attacks on the writers Soloukhin, Ilia
Ehrenburg, Zalygin and Fyodor Abramov - with all of whom one would expect him to be in at least some measure of political agreement. Lobanov stated openly that for him the sources of moral and patriotic values were the people, in particular the peasants, and the soil. He implicitly defended the "patriarchal principle". The Volga editors printed a disclaimer of Lobanov's views, but justified printing them because of his "sincerity". 538 With his attacks on some derevenschchiki, one might have speculated that the article represented an attack by the gosudarstvenniki on the vozrozhdeny, were it not for the fact that Lobanov was attacking the achievements of the State.

The criticism of the critic began in January 1983, when Literaturnaia_gazeta attacked him for failing to recognize the historical justice of collectivization. It accused him of following the pochvenniki. 539 Literaturnaia_Rossia followed up the attack, accusing Lobanov of a nihilistic attitude to Soviet achievements. 540 The Secretariat of the Board of the RSFSR Writers' Union had a special discussion of the article, at which his sarcasm towards other writers appears to have caused as much offence as his attitude to collectivization. 541 Other attacks continued into July 1984. 542 It should be added that the RSFSR Writers' Union and Nash_sovremennik nominated Alekseev's novel for the 1984 Lenin Literature Prize, 543 apparently in the hope that Chernenko would be more favourable than Andropov to the Russian orientation, but these hopes were unjustified. 544
After Andropov's rise the Press continued to express considerable concern about the "non-class" approach to Orthodox thinkers. *Voprosy_filosofii* accused the editor of Fyodorov's works of playing down the reactionary aspects of Fyodorov's thought, in particular his support of autocracy. The Secretariat of the Board of the USSR Writers' Union put under the microscope the journal *Sever*, which had published important examples of village prose, and discovered errors in its analysis of Dostoevsky. An article in *Kommunist* attacked a novel published by the Molodaia_gvardiia publishing house for presenting an uncritical view of the ethics of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. It made the interesting claim that existentialist, structuralist and neo-Marxist fads which had had an impact on the West had not affected the Soviet Union, where the greater danger came from the ideas of the Slavophils and Fyodorov. *Literaturnaia_gazeta* complained of the influence of Fyodorov and two other religious thinkers, Vladimir Solovyov and Pavel Florensky. But with Andropov out of action, in December 1983 *Nash_sovremennik* re-asserted itself with an attack on Evtushenko. It was a review by Glazunov's admirer, Volkov, of an anti-Stalinist novel *Iagodnye_mesta* (Berry Country) that Evtushenko had published in 1981, and which included a hostile portrait of Glazunov. To complicate matters, the novel had been endorsed by Valentin Rasputin, who was a member of the *Nash_sovremennik* editorial board. Rasputin said:

I would call *Iagodnye_mesta* an *agitational* novel in the
best sense of the word. This is agitation, uniting in itself literature and civic duty, for the benefit of all that is best in our society, all that is best in a person and best in the world, when the world over the last two or three decades has become smaller, and in people there have opened new heights and depths, and not only noble ones, of course. 550

It appears that in early 1984 a neo-Stalinist alliance developed between the journals Ogonek and Molodaia gvardiia, directed against both the pochvenniki and other writers of a more liberal orientation. Under Chernenko, all three tendencies found a public hearing (the liberals less so). Novyi mir and Iunost', which were seen as pro-Andropov, suffered public criticism. In a system where the print run of a journal was determined more by the Party and State than by the readership, these two monthlies had been allowed to increase their print run during the period of Andropov's influence, while the nationalist Nash sovremennik and Druzhba narodov and the conservative Oktiabr' all suffered significant cutbacks.551 According to Sergei Iurenen, by early 1985 a polarization of literary forces had appeared. On the one hand were the neo-Stalinists (now less 'neo' and more openly Stalinist), the National Bolsheviks and other proponents of a strong state (gosudarstvenniki). On the other were the pochvenniki, vozrozhdentsy and the liberals, united first by the desire for more tolerance in literature, but also by a desire for friendlier relations with the West and probably for some economic decentralization. If Iurenen were right, the situation would have similarities with that in the early 1960s when both nationally-oriented and liberal-internationalist figures were protected by Novyi mir.
against the political uncertainties outside.\textsuperscript{552}

2. V.I. Lenin, KPSS, p. 165.

3. Ibid., pp. 183-84.

4. Ibid., pp. 266-70.

5. Alfred B. Evans, Jr., "Developed Socialism in Soviet Ideology", SS, XXIX, No. 3 (July 1977), 421.


10. Eberhard Schneider, "The Discussion of the New All-Union Constitution in the USSR", SS, XXXI, No. 4 (October 1979), 531-32.


15. Rywkin ("Code Words", p. 87) was quite wrong to suggest that sliianie was "a term no longer in use".


17. V.P. Sherstobitov, "Obrazovanie SSSR i istoricheskie sud'by narodov nashei strany", _Istoriiia SSSR_, 1972, No. 3 (May-June), pp. 36-37.


23. Ibid., pp. 370-77.


29. Ibid., pp. 48-53.


42. Bureau members are listed in Ezhegodnik BSE in the sections on the individual republics. I examined the surnames in the 1982 edition. This method is not infallible, and not applicable in the Ukraine or
Belorussia, since many Russians have Ukrainian or Belorussian names.


45. James Critchlow, "Nationalism in Uzbekistan in the Brezhnev Era", in Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev & Kosygin, ed. George W. Simmonds (Detroit, Mich., 1977), p. 312. Among non-Russian dissidents, Lenin's concern for self-determination was often invoked around this time, by, for example, Ivan Dziuba and Leonid Pliushch in the Ukraine, the Crimean Tatars, and (in a collective letter) 17 Latvian Communists.


48. Alain Besançon, "Nationalism and Bolshevism in the USSR", in Last Empire, pp. 10-11. A retired Soviet colonel, who was proud of his Bolshevik family tradition, once told me: "The Soviet Union is an unusual empire. The colonies exploit the metropolis."


52. A.A. Susokolov, "Vliianie razlichii v urovne obrazovaniia i chislennosti kontaktruiushchikh etnicheskikh grup na mezhetnicheskie otnosheniia (po materialam perepisei naseleniia SSSR 1959 i 1970 gg.)", SE, 1976, No. 1, p. 110.

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57. T. Harry Rigby, "Addendum to Dr. Rigby's Article on CPSU Membership", SS, XXVIII, No. 4 (October 1976), 615.


63. Azbel, p. 422; Reuben Ainsztein, "The End of Marxism-Leninism", NSt, 15 December 1978, pp. 814-18, and "The Fall of an Anti-Semite", NSt, 11 July 1980, p. 45; Ianov,
Detente, pp. 48-49.


67. "Predmet bol'shogo patrioticheskogo vnimaniia", contributed by the journal Chelovek i zakon to Kommunist, 1978, No. 11 (July), p. 64.

68. Plushch, History's Carnival, pp. 184-86 (quotation, p. 185).


71. Ianov, Russian, p. 13; Grigory Svirsky in Le monde, 8-9 September 1973, cited in Hyams, p. 238.


77. Dementev, "'Kontseptsiia'", pp. 119-20.


82. Ilia S. Glazunov, "Doroga k tebe. Iz zapisok khudozhnika", MG, 1966, No. 2, pp. 188, 190.


84. See also Seduro, Dostoevski's Image, and Snheidman, "Soviet Theory of Literature".


97. Vladimir Drobyshev, "Bessmerten, kak vremia", ibid., No. 12, p. 278.


100. Vadim V. Kozhinov, "Trizhdy velikaia", ibid., No. 12, pp. 279-83 (quotations, pp. 281-82).


102. Chaffin, in Lakshin, Solzhenitsyn, pp. 119-20 (quotation, p. 120).


108. Ianov, Russian, pp. 49-52.


110. Solzhenitsyn, Oak, pp. 244-52, 121-23.


118. Ianov, Detente, pp. 51-57.

119. PD, No. 68 (May 1970), in End to Silence, p. 175.


121. Ibid., p. 100.


125. Ianov, Russian, pp. 57-59; Dunlop, Faces, pp. 227-29. For a view from the inside of Molodaia svyadnia, which could only be published in the era of Gorbachov's glasnost', see Mikhail P. Lobanov, "Posleslovie. Iz vospominanii", NS, 1988, No. 4, pp. 154-59.


137. Ibid., p. 59.


141. Dunlop, Faces, p. 121.


147. A Soviet study which sought to counter this trend was


158. Dmitry S. Likhachov, "Gipotezy ili fantazii v istolkovanii temnykh mest. 'Slovo o polku Igoreve'", *Zvezda*, 1976, No. 6, and Apollon G. Kuzmin, "'Tochka v krugе', iz kotoroi vyraastet repei", in *MG*, 1975, No. 12; see Haney, in *Ethnic Russia*, pp. 73-75; Ignacy Szenfeld, "Olzhas Suleimenov under Fire from Neoslavophile Critics", *RL* 137/76 (15 March 1976); and Ann Sheehy, "Olzhas Suleimenov Elected First Secretary of Writers' Union of Kazakstan", *RL* 114/84 (21 March 1984).


161. "Predmet" (op. cit. at n. 67), pp. 53-66.


174. Ibid., p. 38.
175. Ibid., p. 32.
183. Kulikovskaiia bitva, Sbornik statei (M., 1982).
184. Kulikovskaiia bitva, op. cit. at n. 171.
185. Ashurkov, p. 65.
186. Kirpichnikov, p. 3.


196. Vladimir Kuprin, "Ot sostavitel'ia", in Mezh Nepriadvoy, p. 3.

197. Mikhail S. Solomentsev, "Nasha istoriia - nasha gordost'", Pamiatniki otechestva, No. 4 (1979), pp. 9-28; Dmitry S. Likhachov, "Kulikovskaia bitva v istorii russkoi kul'tury", ibid., pp. 244-56.


200. "...with some all-important reservations I too would regard it [patriotism] as the last refuge of a scoundrel.... patriotism misdirected to serve the selfishness of nations as a whole is a scourge. In its place, there can only be a patriotism of people, of the whole human race." Evgeny A. Evtushenko, Invisible Threads, trans. Paul Falla & Natasha Ward (London, 1981), p. 12.

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For a view which challenges Soviet interpretations of the Kulikovo Field battle as a decisive point in developing Russian national consciousness, see Charles J. Halperin, "The Six-Hundredth Anniversary of the Battle of Kulikovo Field, 1380-1980, in Soviet Historiography", CASS, XVIII, No. 3 (Fall 1984), 298-310.


204. Dunlop, New Russian Revolutionaries, pp. 81-82.

205. Ibid., p. 290.

206. The Programme is translated in ibid., pp. 243-93; original in Vserossiiskii Sotsial-Khristianskii Soiuz


211. Vladimir N. Osipov, "Berdiaevskii kruzhok v Leningrade", January 1972, Posev, 1972, No. 11, pp. 3-10. Ianov attacks Dunlop for neglecting the influence of Mussolini on Berdiaev, and through him on the ideas of VSKhSON. (Ianov, Russian, pp. 28-30.) As Darrell Hammer suggests, Ianov is distorting Berdiaev's attitude towards fascism. (Hammer, "Russian Nationalism and the 'Yanov Thesis'", p. 314.)


217. Dunlop, New Russian Revolutionaries, p. 293.

218. Ibid., pp. 13-14, 68.

219. Bukovsky, To Build, p. 98.

220. Iury Lury, "Na protsesse VSKhSON", NZh, No. 119 (June 1975), p. 120; Dunlop, New Russian Revolutionaries, pp. 112-31, 96-97.


222. Osipov, "Berdiaevskii", pp. 5-6; Levitin-Krasnov,

223. Levitin-Krasnov, V poiskakh, p. 252.

224. For documents on these cases, see Bourdeaux, Patriarch, pp. 189-254. On the situation of the Russian Orthodox Church under Brezhnev, see ibid., RCL and Vestnik, passim; Simon, Church, pp. 85-130; Pospielovsky, Russian Church, II, 387-468.


228. Ibid., p. 213.

229. Ibid., pp. 214-19.

230. Levitin-Krasnov, "The Lord is My Safe Stronghold", in Bourdeaux, Patriarch, p. 263.


234. Ibid., pp. 486-491.


239. Gorsky, "Russkii messianizm", p. 49.

240. Ibid., p. 51.

241. Ibid., pp. 61, 63.

242. Ibid., pp. 67-68.


246. Ibid., pp. 318-19.


249. Ibid., p. 130.

250. Ibid., p. 129

251. Ibid., p. 131.


254. O. M., loc. cit.

255. Levitin-Krasnov, Rodnoi_prostor, p. 238.


259. Veche, No. 1 (January 1971), AS 1013; No. 2 (19 May 1971), AS 1020; No. 3 (19 September 1971), AS 1108; No. 4 (31 January 1972), AS 1140; No. 5 (25 May 1972), AS 1230; No. 6 (19 October 1972), AS 1599; No. 7 (19 February 1973), AS 1775; No. 8 (19 July 1973), AS 1665; No. 9 (19 December 1973), AS 2040; (Nos. 1-9 are all in SDS, Vol. XXI;) No. 10 (19 April 1974), AS 2452.

Some of the material in this section appeared in my article, "The Fate of Russian Nationalism: The Samizdat Journal Veche Revisited", RCL, XVI, No. 1 (Spring 1988), 36-53.


262. Ibid., pp. 32-34.

263. Mikhail Meerson-Aksenov, "The Influence of the Orthodox Church on Russian Ethnic Identity", in Ethnic Russia, p. 110.

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265. Ibid., pp. 140-41, 146-47.

266. Osipov, "Russkii khudozhnik Il'ia Glazunov", Veche, No. 8, pp. 160-77.

267. Ianov, Russian, p. 64.


270. Ivanov-Skuratov (under pseud. A. Skuratov), "U istokov russkogo samosoznaniia", Veche, No. 1, pp. 4-12. (English in Political, Social, pp. 404-413.)


273. Reznik, "Kto takoi".


277. Ivanov-Skuratov, "U istokov".


280. Ibid., pp. 19-44 (quotation, p. 43).


282. Veche, No. 1, p. 47.

283. "Poisnienie zhurnala Veche po povodu raboty M. F.


286. Antonov, "Uchenie", No. 3, pp. 5-39 (quotations, pp. 37, 38). (Ianov, Russian, p. 78, has a different version and a misprinted reference [n. 51]).


288. Ibid., pp. 44-45.


290. See Mario Corti, "Repressive Measures against two Russian Nationalists", RL 265/82 (30 June 1982), p. 3.


292. Ibid., pp. 62-63.

293. "F.M. Dostoevskomu - 150 let", Veche, No. 4, pp. 6-21.


296. A. Gaganov, "Chto takoe ' Entsiklopediia liberal'nogo renegatovtsa'?" Veche, No. 7, pp. 36-77, and his "Iz glubiny", Veche, No. 9, pp. 36-66.


298. Corti, loc. cit. at n. 229.


300. For Ianov's interpretation, see his Russian, pp. 64-69.


302. Ibid., pp. 29-31.

303. Ibid., p. 32.

304. Ibid., p. 29.


310. Reshetovskaia's chapters were excluded from the VS edition of Veche, No. 5, following legal representations on behalf of Solzhenitsyn. His own chapters are in Veche, No. 9, pp. 67-99.


313. "Dom, kotoryi my stroim", Veche, No. 3, pp. 95-144.


315. Speech of Pyotr Dudochkin, in "Vtoraia Kalininskaia oblastnaia konferentsiia VOOPIK (27 marta 1968g.)", Veche, No. 6, pp. 94-100.


317. Osipov, "Russkii khudozhnik" (see n. 266 above).


327. Gennady M. Shimanov, "V Sekretariat Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR", M., 10 June 1973, Veche, No. 8, pp. 94-106. (Also AS 1734.)

328. "Russkoe reshenie natsional'nogo voprosa (k 50-letiiu SSSR)", Veche, No. 6, pp. 6-10 (quotations, pp. 6-8).

329. "Bor'ba s tak nazyvaemym rusofil'stvom, ili put' gosudarstvennogo samoubiistva", Veche, No. 7, in VS, Nos. 17-18, pp. 19-57. Extracts are trans. in Dunlop, Faces, pp. 327-44.


333. Gennady M. Shimanov, "Kak otnosit'sia k sovetskoi vlasti (otvet V. N. Osipovu)", M., 30 June 1974, AS 1846c, p. 11.

334. CCE, No. 24 (5 March 1972), pp. 139-40.

335. "Zaiavlenie redaktsii zhurnala Veche", 24 May 1972, Veche, No. 5, in VS, Nos. 9-10, pp. 5-7; "Chitatelim nashego zhurnala", Veche, No. 6, pp. 3-6; also CCE, No. 26 (5 July 1972). p. 257. CCE, No. 22 (10 November 1971), p. 43, had reported that Osipov had already been threatened with arrest.
336. CCE, No. 28 (31 December 1972), p. 15.

337. CCE, No. 18 (5 March 1971), pp. 139-40.

338. Osipov, "Zaiavlenie", op. cit. at n. 271.


341. Ibid., p. 183.


344. Osipov, "Pis'mo v redaktsiiu", op. cit. at n. 244.


347. Kheifets, "Russkii patriot", Kontinent, No. 28, pp. 143, 166-73; Varsonoty Khaibulin, "Otkrytoe pis'mo redaktoru Kontinenta", Erliko village, Gus' Khustal'nyi raion, Vladimir oblast', August 1981, Kontinent, No. 32 (1982), pp. 369-72. Borodin told me in April 1989 that his role in Vechе was not quite as important as this account suggests.


350. Adel Naidenovich and 10 other friends and supporters of Vechе, "Po povodu vystupleniia V. Osipova protiv zhurnala Vechе (Zaiavlenie sotrudnikov zhurnala Vechе i lichnykh znakomykh V. Osipova)", 17 April 1974, AS 1787 (MS 32/74).

351. Vechе, No. 10, AS 2452; Kheifets, "Russkii patriot", 564
Kontinent, No. 28, pp. 173-74. See also "O vykhode 10 nomera zhurnala Veche", 20 April 1974, AS 1706 (MS 23/74); Vladislav V. Iliakov and 6 other former political prisoners who had known Vladimir Osipov, "Zaiaavljenie po povodu vykhoda tak nazyvaemogo 10-go nomera VECHH", 25 May 1974, AS 1790 (MS 32/74); Veche editorial board, "Ot redaktsii zhurnala Veche", 12 June 1974, AS 1791 (MS 32/74).


353. Zemlia, No. 1 (1 August 1974), AS 1909 (MS 13/75); No. 2 (25 November 1974), AS 2060 (MS 25/75). Substantial extracts are in "Iz zhurnala Zemlia NoNo 1 i 2", VS, No. 20 (1975).


358. The latter is Vladimir N. Osipov, "Otkrytoe pis'mo" redaktsiiam gazet Russkaiia mysl' i Novoe russkoe slovo ob izdanii samizdatskogo zhurnala Zemlia, Rozhdestveno, 7 August 1974, AS 1908 (MS 6/75).


363. Vladimir N. Osipov, "Zaiavlienie V.N. Osipova", 10 May

364. Idem, "V Organizatsiiu 'Mezhdunarodnaia Amnistia' (Emnesti Interneshenel) g-nu Shonu MakBraidu", 25 May 1974, AS 1761 (MS 26/74), Vestnik, Nos. 112-13, pp. 304-305.


370. For example, Valentina E. Mashkova, "Otkrytoe pis'mo amerikanskomu senatoru" (to Jackson), 3 December 1974, AS 1994 (MS 6/75), and "Otkrytoe pis'mo Valityny Mashkovoii (Osipovoi)", 28 December 1974, AS 2002 (MS 6/75), in Posey, 1975, No. 3, p. 6.


373. Ianov, Russian, p. 62.


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379. See n. 374.

380. Igor R. Shafarevich, "Separation or Reconciliation? The Nationalities Question in the USSR", in *From under the Rubble*, p. 100.

381. Ibid., pp. 88-104 (quotation, p. 99).


383. Idem, *Gulag*, III, 46. Pospielovsky cites Solzhenitsyn's renunciation of any desire to hold on to the non-Russians by force, and suggests that this shows that the contributors to *From under the Rubble* are not against the right of the peoples to choose their future. (Dimitry V. Pospielovsky, "Vol'nye mysli o sbornike iz-pod_glyb", *Grani*, No. 97 [July-September 1975], p. 211.) Shafarevich, however, does not formulate the right to self-determination as clearly as this, and he emphasizes the advantages to the non-Russians of membership in a multinational State. (Shafarevich, "Separation or Reconciliation?", in *From under the Rubble*, pp. 99-102.)


388. Ibid., p. 116.


390. F. Korsakov, "Russian Destinies", in *ibid.*, p. 165.


396. Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, "The Smatterers", in From under the Rubble, pp. 229-78.

397. Borisov, "Personality", in ibid., p. 197.


399. Ibid., pp. 229-78.

400. Solzhenitsyn, "Repentance", p. 142.

401. Igor R. Shafarevich, "Does Russia Have a Future?" in From under the Rubble, pp. 292-94.

402. Evgeny Barabanov, "The Schism between the Church and the World", in From under the Rubble, pp. 172-93 (quotations, pp. 188, 192).

This discussion of From under the Rubble is necessarily very selective. See also John B. Dunlop, "Iz-pod gilyb", SS, XXXVIII, No. 4 (October 1976), 621-28; Shatz, "From under the Rubble and its Predecessors", pp. 111-17; Michael Heller, "Survivors from Utopia", Survey, XXI, No. 3 (Summer 1975), 155-66.


408. Anatoly E. Levitin-Krasnov, "Zemlia dybom", AS 1876, extract, as summarized in CCE, No. 34, p. 81.


416. He used the two terms "Slavophil" and "messianist" in discussions with me in 1977 and 1978.


421. _Ibid._, pp. 36-46.

422. Gennady M. Shimanov, "Kak ponimat' nashu istoriiu i k
chemu v nei stremit'sia (v sviazi s pis'mom Solzhenitsyna)", M., 2 June 1974, AS 1801 (MS 43/82), pp. 2-5 (quotation, p. 2). Agursky included the article in his compilation on Solzhenitsyn's letter, "Chto zhdet Sovetskii Soiuz?", and it was mentioned in CCE, No. 34, pp. 81-82.

423. Shimanov, "Kak ponimat' nashu istoriiu", pp. 4-6 (quotation, p. 6).

424. Ibid., p. 9.


432. Shimanov, "Pis'mo Natal'e Sergeevne", p. 2.


437. For attempts to assess the extent of religious belief in the USSR, see Christel Lane, Christian Religion in the Soviet Union: A Sociological Study (London, 1978); Dennis


441. See The Orthodox Church in Russia, ed. Archbishop Pitirim of Volokolamsk, trans. Michael M. Wolyniec (London, 1982); RCL, X, No. 3 (Winter 1982), 319-20, and XI, No. 1 (Spring 1983), 75.

442. V. Furov, "Iz otcheta Soveta po delam religii - chlenam TsK KPSS. Tserkovnye kadry i mery po ogrаниchenniu ikh deiatel'nosti ramkami zakona", [1975], Vestnik, No. 130 (1979), pp. 275-344.


445. Ellis, Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 309-315.


447. Dudko, O nashem upovani, p. 106.

448. Ibid., pp. 103, 122, 123.


450. See AS 2414-18 (MS 6/76); "Delo sviashch. D. Dudko", Vestnik, No. 117 (1976), pp. 240-62; some of these documents in English in RCL, IV, No. 2 (Summer 1976), 21-31.


459. Some of these appeals are in Gleb Iakunin & Lev Regelison, Letters from Moscow: Religion and Human Rights in the USSR, ed Jane Ellis (Keston, Kent, 1978).


462. Meerson-Aksyonov, "Russian Orthodox Church", p. 104.

463. Ellis, Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 380-81.


468. "Press-konferentsiia na kvartire u o. Dmitriia Dudko 27. iv. 77 g. po povodu statei v Literaturnoi gazete 13 i 20 aprelia s. g.", M., 27 April 1977, AS 3003 (MS 22/77).

469. Ellis, Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 409, 417-19.


471. "From the Transcript of the Trial of Vladimir Poresh", RCL, X, No. 3 (Winter 1962), 344-50; AS 3878 (MS 9/80), 3905 (MS 12/80), 4021-23 (MS 27/80); Tatiana Schipkova, "Imeet li pravo sovetskii prepodavatel' na svobodu sovesti?", Vestnik, No. 130 (1979), pp. 345-54; Ellis, Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 419-22, 427-28, and "Christian Committee", pp. 288-95; AS 3589 (MS 17/79), 3612 (MS 20/79), 3617 (MS 20/79), 3665-66 (MS 26/79), 3746-49 (MS 37/79), 3756-57 (MS 39/79), 3778-83 (MS 42/79), 3878 (MS 9/80), 3905 (MS 12/80), 3960 (MS 17/80), 4007 (MS 25/80), 4021-23 (MS 27/80), concern the Christian Seminar and the protests against the repression of its members; "0


479. Reznik, "Kto takci?".

480. "Nemerknushchaia", op. cit., at n. 95.


487. Medvedev, All Stalin's Men, p. 80.


492. Vladimov, "Chto proiskhodit", p. 27.

493. Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Comment - Russophilism: No Reflection of Popular Grievances", in Ethnic Russia, pp. 67-68.

494. AS 4714 (MS 30/82), 4725-27 (MS 32/82; some in Vestnik, No. 137 [1982], pp. 261-71, and RCL, XI, No. 2 [Summer 1983], 210-13) and AS 4758 (MS 38/82). Issues of Nadezhda have been published in Frankfurt by Possev; excerpts from Nos. 2-6 are in VS, No. 44 (1981).

495. Corti, "Repressive Measures".

496. Vladimov, "Chto proiskhodit", p. 28.

497. Vishnevskaia, "Arrest of Sergei Semanov"; Reznik, "Kto takoi?"


511. Ibid.


514. Olcott, p. 103.


517. Idem, "Aktual'nye voprosy".


523. Some of these are reviewed in U. Guralnik & S. Dmitrenko, "'God Dostoevskogo' (Po stranitsam literaturnykh zhurnalov)", VL, 1982, No. 5, pp. 191-216.


527. Dostoevsky, as cited in ibid., p. 154.


529. Ibid., p. 164.

530. Kuleshov, op. cit. in n. 522.


532. Ibid., pp. 170-76.


537. NS, 1982, No. 10, p. 176. Further discussion of the treatment given to Nash sovremennik at this time is in


539. P. A. Nikolaev, "'Osvobozhdenie' ...ot chego?", *LG*, 5 January 1983.


545. See above, p. 216.


551. Print-run figures quoted in the journals.

Conclusion

I have tried to show that Russian messianism, the concept of the Russians as the chosen people, has persisted as a trend of thought in one form or another since the sixteenth century, with roots going back much earlier. It has usually been linked with Russian Orthodoxy. It has by no means always been a dominant trend, but has emerged and re-emerged periodically throughout Russian history, up to the 1980s.

The concept of a "chosen people" penetrated into Christian thought from Judaism. It emerged in a number of Christian countries in the West. In North-West Europe it first took the form of radical millenarian movements. From the seventeenth century it accompanied the revolutions in Britain, the USA and France, as politicians and ideologists sought to spread the good news to other lands. In Russia, however, messianism has recurred repeatedly in intellectual thought and, it appears, in the popular consciousness as well. Berdiaev was right to highlight this tendency. While the concept of the chosen people was not as central to Russian consciousness as it was to Judaism, for some Russian thinkers it became the main feature of their philosophy.

With the Jews, messianic tendencies were strongest at times of crisis: the destruction of the temple at Jerusalem by the Romans; the mass persecution of the Jews from Spain to Russia around 1666; and, in a somewhat distorted form
(without a Messiah), in reaction to the Nazi Holocaust, the establishment of the State of Israel. It was also at crisis points that Russian messianism sometimes came to the fore: the formation of the Russian State around Muscovy and the struggle against the Tatar yoke; the period of the crisis of serfdom, threatened by pressure from the serfs and (more questionably) from tendencies favouring capitalist development, a crisis which was accompanied by the appearance of Slavophilism; the period of the crisis of the autocracy, from the 1870s to 1917, and the early revolutionary years, which were accompanied by the development of narodnichestvo and of a Russian form of Marxism which was heavily influenced by the narodniki; Stalinism, with the messianic slogan "Socialism in one country", in reaction to the capitalist encirclement of Russia, and the messianism of the Great Patriotic War; and in the Brezhnev period, when Russia seemed to some to be threatened not only by the possibility of thermonuclear war destroying all humanity, but specifically by biological degeneration, drunkenness, falling life expectancy, corruption, the rise of non-Russian nationalism and the possibility of war with China.

In the Jewish concept of the "chosen people" there was a tension between the nationalist messianist belief that the Jews were chosen to rule over the rest of humanity and the universalist messianist belief that the Jews were chosen to serve humanity. The tension has existed in subsequent national messianisms, including Russian. In
Russia, two trends of messianist thought may be identified, one emphasizing the State and the other emphasizing the people. In the sixteenth century, the theory of "Moscow, the Third Rome", as developed in the Orthodox Church, centred on the person of the Tsar and the Muscovite State. The popular folklore of "Holy Rus'" put the emphasis on the land and the people. In the hands of Prince Kurbsky, the Old Believers and later opponents of the Tsar, it was a subversive instrument, when accompanied by allegations that the occupant of the Muscovite or Petersburg throne had betrayed Russian traditions. The nationalist view of messianism as rule over others was linked with the State and chauvinism; the universalist view of messianism as service was linked with the Russian people and the land.

The concepts of the "Third Rome" and of "Holy Russia" were not entirely mutually exclusive; both emanated from Orthodoxy, and on occasion the notion of "Holy Rus'" was used by supporters of the autocracy, especially in the last decades before 1917. The term "Slavophil" has been applied to opponents of the policy of the Petersburg autocracy, and to supporters of it. The early Moscow Slavophils supported the principle of autocracy but believed that the tsars were betraying the principle, particularly since the reign of Peter the Great. They emphasized Russia's uniqueness and hoped she would avoid the capitalist path of development followed by the West. Some saw Russia as having the role of saving Europe, through her Orthodoxy and the obshchina. The Slavophils were influenced by, but different from, the ideologists of "official narodnost'" who backed the
Petersburg regime and rejected messianism. While the Slavophil Konstantin Aksakov saw the State as an "evil", his brother Ivan came for a time to see the Russian State as a possible instrument of Russian messianism. Narodnik messianism was nearly always opposed to the Russian State, except for a brief period following October 1917 when the Left SRs thought that the New World was dawning; on the other hand, Bolshevik and Stalinist messianism supported the State from October 1917. Under Brezhnev, two major tendencies of Russian messianism and Russian nationalism could be identified. On one side, the *gosudarstvenniki* favoured a strong Russian State, and saw this State as the main reason for the existence of the Russian people. On the other side, the *vozrozhdentsev* saw the policies of the Soviet State and, by implication at least, the Marxist ideology as responsible for the demoralization of the Russian people. They favoured the cultural and moral revival of the Russian people, explicitly or implicitly linked with Russian Orthodoxy. Both these tendencies had some access to official media but also used samizdat.

Ianov's view that Russian nationalism inevitably leads to a convergence with the State is not borne out by the development of nineteenth-century Slavophilism. When, after the revolutions of 1848, Nicholas I inaugurated a cultural and political clampdown, the "official nationalist" Pogodin joined the Slavophils in opposing the Tsar's policy. It was when the State began to reform, in the early years of Alexander II, that Slavophils such as
Samarin and Koshelyov became involved in the State structure, by participating in drawing up the plans for the emancipation of the serfs. When Slavophilism developed into pan-Slavism, it was still regarded by the State as subversive. Even when Ivan Aksakov came out in favour of the State and against the nihilists, the authorities still suspected him and periodically censored his journals. The other branches from the Slavophil tree were even less acceptable to the regime. Vladimir Solovyov's pro-Catholic universalist messianism could be tolerated neither by the Church nor by the State, and Fyodorov's project for world unity under Russian leadership could be published only after his death. Among the narodniks, Mikhailovsky hoped that the autocracy would be a barrier to capitalist development, but he can hardly be considered a supporter of the regime. Most narodniks were revolutionaries. The policy of Russification and anti-Semitic pogroms, followed under the last two tsars, had little in common with Slavophil ideology.

From 1917, Russian patriotism seems to have been used more successfully by the Bolsheviks than by their opponents. While Lenin was not a messianist, except in the pragmatic sense that he wanted the socialist revolution begun in Russia to spread all over the world, Russian messianism effectively entered the service of the Communist Party, especially after the proclamation of "Socialism in one country". The rehabilitation of the Russian past in the 1930s and the relaxation of relations with the Orthodox Church during the War meant that Orthodoxy could be
mobilized in support of the regime. Moscow was again the Third Rome, as far as the Church was concerned. De-Stalinization led to the loosening of the controls that had been placed on the expression of Russian nationalist ideas. Together with the decline in faith in official Marxism-Leninism, the political situation favoured the resurgence of official and dissident Russian nationalism which appeared in the Brezhnev era.

The division between what Russian nationalist literature could and what could not be officially published under Brezhnev did not correspond to the division between the nationalism which focussed on the Russian State and that which focussed on the Russian people. In official publications, the gosudarstvenniki attacked the moralism of the officially-published derevenschiki, while gosudarstvenniki and supporters of human rights collaborated on the samizdat journal Veche. It is tempting to draw parallels between the gosudarstvenniki and vozrozhdentsy in the contemporary USSR, and the "official nationalists" and the Slavophils under Nicholas I. The methods of Peter I seem to be generally admired by the gosudarstvenniki, as they were by the official nationalists, but rejected by the vozrozhdentsy, as they were by the Slavophils. In their attitude to more recent phenomena, the contemporary nationalists sometimes need to be more circumspect. Vozrozhdentsy who are being published officially normally have had to declare their support of the October Revolution (although this has begun to change
under Gorbachov), whereas those in samizdat are under no such obligation; gosudarstvenniki both in the official media and in samizdat declare their loyalty to Leninism. Most vozrozhdentsey (and also Lobanov, who otherwise appears to be a gosudarstvennik) are doubtful about the means of collectivization of agriculture, and probably of the end also.

Not all the contemporary nationalists fit into the gosudarstvennik/vozrozhdenets dichotomy. Just as Pogodin represented the nationalist wing of official narodnost' (as opposed to the dynastic wing of Bulgarin and Grech), so Glazunov and Soloukhin with their emphasis on religious motifs, together with their political proximity to the regime (at least under Brezhnev), fall between the two categories. Nevertheless, the differences between the two wings should not be underestimated. In Russian history, as Herzen and Miliukov said, there was a gulf between the State and the people. The Russian historian Vasily O. Kliuchevsky put it very well when he wrote before the revolution on Russia's political development: "The state swelled up; the people grew lean".¹ This was still more true of the expansion of the State under Stalin, at the expense of the Russian people. The socialist dissident Pyotr Abovin-Egides aptly summed up the gosudarstvennik view in the phrase "not Russia for the people, but the people for Russia".² He then linked this with the "Third Rome" imperial idea.³ Solzhenitsyn in From under the Rubble showed his rejection of the gosudarstvennik ideology. Kheifets portrays the gosudarstvenniki as
considering the Russian people to be fools, who are easily manipulated by evil foreigners, like figures on a chessboard. He considers the gosudarstvennik position to be "deeply anti-Russian".

Was Russian messianism ever a predominant influence on the formation and execution of State policy? Most tsars do not seem to have regarded the conversion of their "alien" (non-Russian) subjects to Orthodoxy and the Russian language as a high priority. The main exception was in the case of the Ukrainians, who being mainly Orthodox and culturally and linguistically close to the Russians were considered to be simply Russians, and forbidden to use their language in the Press, Church, school or drama. The emphasis on the benefits of the Russian language and "fusion" favoured by revolutionaries such as Pestel and Lenin resulted not primarily from any Russian messianism, but from a Jacobin desire for centralism. Similarly, the administrative centralism pursued by Catherine II reflected a quest for efficiency rather than ideology. Russification only became of general importance under Alexander III and Nicholas II. Prior to this, the Russian government was usually happy to rule in alliance with Muslim mullahs and Lutheran German nobles. It was perhaps only in a country where not only was the monarchy of predominantly foreign extraction (not an unusual phenomenon), but where the rulers often preferred to speak in a foreign language (French or English) that the concept of narodnost' would have to be proclaimed so insistently. The dismissal of
Uvarov by Nicholas I symbolized the unwillingness of the regime to make concessions to the people whose spirit it had claimed to reflect.

The Jews were the only group under tsarism who suffered persecution solely by virtue of their religion - first by being physically excluded from Russia, then by attempts at forced conversion and finally by pogroms. Whether or not Russians believed themselves to be the chosen people, they had no doubt that the Jews had no right to consider themselves such. Russians of profoundly different beliefs such as Pobedonostsev, Ivan Aksakov and Narodnaia_volia all came out against the Jews. Both late tsarist and Soviet politicians (from the 1930s) also saw the advantages of using the Jews as a scapegoat for the failings of their own political systems. The concept of the Russian people as the leading people of the USSR, proclaimed by Stalin, reversed Lenin's nationality policy and sought support for the system primarily from the Russian people. In the Brezhnev period, the central position of the Russians became an integral part of the official ideology, with lavish praise being given to the Russian people, the Russian language promoted as never before, and the top Party and State bodies being predominantly and increasingly staffed with Russians.

In foreign affairs, the tsars normally put the interests of the State and the dynasty over those of the nation. The "Holy Alliance" was not a body to promote Orthodoxy but was to protect the interests of the empires,
and in particular the Emperors, of Europe. The emphasis on dynastic legitimism did not exclude the possibility of posing as the defender of the rights of Orthodox subjects outside Russia in attempts to put pressure on neighbouring empires. The only occasion when the desire to help fellow Orthodox Slavs became a dominant factor in Russian foreign policy was in 1877-1878, when the pressure of public opinion spilled over into the tsarist bureaucracy. After 1917, Russian messianism was expressed in the view that it was essential to spread the revolution around the world, and also in the opposing view that it was necessary to consolidate the revolution in one country. Soviet leaders since Stalin have naturally sought to expand the world influence of the USSR, whilst avoiding a military conflict with the capitalist countries and China. It is not easy to determine whether this expansionist urge is primarily defensive in origin, or whether it arises from an aggressive desire to assert the power and authority of the USSR. It might be the case that the Soviet leaders, having perceived the weakness of the USA after Vietnam and of China after the Cultural Revolution, pragmatically took opportunities to expand their influence in the way that the leaders of any great power in the past might have done, without any particular ideological motivation, "Russian" or "communist". What I tried to show in my discussion of the Brezhnev period, however, was the ideological disunity of the élite, with some politicians promoting "Leninist" positions and others protecting "Russian" views.
Different ideological positions are illustrated in relation to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Brezhnev justified the Soviet action to the XXVI Congress firstly in terms of the world-historical movement towards communism and the reaction of the bourgeoisie. "Imperialism launched a real undeclared war against the Afghan revolution." But he then added a defensive justification, from the point of view of the interests of the Soviet State. "This also created a direct threat to the security of our southern border." Among the gosudarstveniki, however, the invasion has been seen in quite a different light. A leading representative is the writer Aleksandr Prokhanov, who published two full-page articles in Literaturnaia gazeta in 1985. He referred not to the spread of socialism, but to the "eternal great-power cause" (vekovechnoe derzhavnoe delo). In other words, the Soviet troops in Afghanistan were advancing the age-old interests of the Russian State. The war was seen in positive terms: for the first time since 1945, Soviet soldiers were being given combat experience. According to the samizdat writer Sergei Khovansky, Prokhanov is close to "former leaders of the country and ... influential people within the military". Khovansky describes the position of this group as "war is better than peace". The continuing strength of nationalist ideas within the military was borne out by an article in the MPA journal Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil in 1985, which listed the successes of the Russian armed forces over eight centuries. Prokhanov in his second article specifically attacked the derevenshchiki for their concern with eternal and absolute
morality. Further, Afghanistan had brought out "individual self-sacrifice and renunciation of personal welfare in favour of the State". For Prokhanov, the time of détente had passed. In its place had come the "idea of calamity, of a storm, of impending catastrophe; it prompts us to reread the Apocalypse."¹⁰

There is a danger when considering the ideas of the gosudarstvenniki (as when considering Slavophilism) to attribute to them all certain ideas which may be held only by one or a few. The following general tentative picture is offered (with much uncertainty) based on a combination of the views of the poet Iury Kuznetsov, the critic Kozhinov, the writer Prokhanov and other gosudarstvenniki. The multinational Russian State (tsarist and Soviet) has been engaged in a centuries-old struggle for the "Russian idea", against enemies such as cosmopolitanism, Zionism and freemasonry. At the end of his life, Dostoevsky had predicted a shift of Russian attention from Europe to Asia. Russia by the end of 1978, while seeming unable to make gains in Europe, faced the combined hostility of Japan, China and the USA. (In August 1978 China and Japan, with American encouragement, signed a treaty directed against the USSR; in December the USA and China announced their readiness to normalize relations.)¹¹ Russia, in the words of Kuznetsov's verse, "turning her back on the West" (see above, p. 535) proceeded to strengthen her position in the East. The invasion of Afghanistan then appears as the natural extension of the efforts of General Skobelev to
subdue the Central Asians.
The major contribution of Gorbachov to the development of Russian messianism has been his inauguration of the policy of glasnost'. Normally translated as "openness", its practical application has been the gradual elimination of a series of taboos affecting literary and public activity. Emerging in 1985, with criticisms of the latter Brezhnev period as the "stagnation period", glasnost' gathered strength following the January 1987 Central Committee Plenum and, despite setbacks, was in full swing in 1989. The partial democratization of the political system, exemplified by the XIX Party Conference (June 1988), the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) and the first meeting of the CPD itself (May-June 1989), led to a transformation of the political and cultural atmosphere throughout the Soviet Union. There was an explosion in the quantity of interesting political, historical and cultural articles in the official periodical Press. Unofficial "informal groups" with their own programmes and publications mushroomed from the Baltic to the Pacific. Ideas formerly confined to samizdat erupted into the official journals and on to the agenda of the Politburo. To analyze the flow of new material on Russian messianism would require a book. In view of my intention to concentrate in this work on developments up to 1982, I can give only a very abbreviated account of the trends under Gorbachov. It is necessary to emphasize the dangers of trying to analyze processes which are still continuing and whose outcome is uncertain. With hindsight, it may become clear that I have missed important developments or
given excessive attention to ephemera.  

Some early moves of the new leadership suggested an inclination towards meeting some of the grievances of the Russian nationalists, especially the vozrozhdentsy. In his stern measures against alcohol, Gorbachov took up one of their particular concerns. The driving force of the campaign may well have been the Politburo member and (at that time) ideology Secretary, E.K. Ligachov, who has shown sympathy for conservative Russian nationalists. Alcohol has been portrayed as a non-Russian vice introduced by foreigners. Valentin Rasputin's short story "Pozhar" (The Fire), published in Nash sovremennik in July 1985, was a well-timed portrayal of the consequences of drunkenness in the villages. The campaign was unpopular with much of society, and was partly circumvented by an expansion of illegal home brewing.

Kommunist in July 1985 included a "patriotic" discussion of the Slovo o polku Igoreve. In this, Academician Likhachov emphasized that the three Eastern Slav peoples, Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians, had a "common mother" in ancient Rus'. In 1986 Likhachov was named head of the newly-formed Cultural Foundation of the USSR. This prestigious body, intended to preserve the cultural heritage of the peoples of the Soviet Union, included among the members of its board Metropolitan Pitirim of Volokolamsk and Iuriev, the head of the publishing department of the Moscow Patriarchate, and Raisa
Gorbachova, the wife of the General Secretary.

A considerable victory for the Russian nationalists, and especially the vozrozhdentsy, was the decision not to proceed, at least for the time being, with the plan to reverse part of the flow of the Ob and Irtysh rivers in Siberia. This scheme would have brought much-needed irrigation water to Central Asia. Opposition to this project has been a major issue among derevenschiki such as Rasputin and Sergei Zalygin, the journal Sever and Academicians Likhachov and Rybakov. Supporters have claimed that the project is essential for the burgeoning, traditionally Islamic, Central Asian population. On the other hand, Russian ecologists worry about the effects of the diversion of water on the temperature in the Arctic Ocean and thence the climate in the northern hemisphere. Rasputin has expressed the fear that the withdrawal of water would adversely affect soil fertility in Russia and destroy the Russian North. In January 1986 Kommunist published an article, co-authored by Likhachov, on the need to preserve the North as a monument of Russian culture. The project allowed the vozrozhdentsy to focus on their traditional concerns: the defence of the Russian land, the Russian village, historical monuments, the world environment, as well as the threat to smaller Soviet nationalities such as the Komi (allegedly threatened by the scheme) for whose fate they considered the Russian people responsible. They counterposed ethics to the unbridled worship of technology. If it had appeared that vital Russian interests were being sacrificed for the Central
Asians, there could have been a strong Russian nationalist backlash. But the guidelines for the development of the Soviet economy up to the year 2000, adopted at the XXVII Congress, made no mention of the diversion project. Instead there appeared the injunction "Use water resources more rationally". Belov and Rasputin nevertheless complained at the USSR Writers' Union Congress in June 1986 that work was still going ahead, and the liberal Voznesensky added his voice to the opponents of the scheme, forming an alliance with the vozrozhdentsy. It was confirmed after a Politburo meeting in August 1986, however, that the project had been abandoned.

Nevertheless, a year later the Uzbek Press again began to argue for the project, apparently with the backing of the USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources. The topic has remained live. Under the impact of the Chernobyl disaster of April 1986, public opinion throughout the USSR has become more sensitive to environmental issues, and less willing to allow interference with nature.

The appointment of A.N. Iakovlev as head of the Propaganda Department, and then, at the XXVII Congress, to the Central Committee Secretariat, appeared at first to be bad news for the nationalists, in view of his earlier opposition to them. By the time Iakovlev had been promoted to be a full Politburo member in 1987, it had become clear that he was a leading ally of Gorbachev in the battle for glasnost'. Whatever was Iakovlev's personal position on nationalism, his stance on glasnost' allowed both
"Westernizers" and nationally-minded people to put forward their ideas. The new edition of the Party Programme, adopted at the XXVII Congress, avoids any nationalist references to the "great Russian people".24 In his report to the Congress, Gorbachov spoke against attempts being undertaken "in certain works of literature and art and scholarly works ... to present in idyllic tones reactionary-nationalist and religious survivals, contradicting our ideology, the socialist way of life and the scientific world-view (Applause)."25 This was clearly aimed at both Russian and non-Russian nationalism. On the other hand, the appointment in August 1986 of Zalygin to be editor of Novyi mir in succession to the liberal former political prisoner Vladimir Karpov, who had been appointed First Secretary of the USSR Writers' Union, represented a victory for the vozrozhdentsy.26

As glasnost' developed, unofficial political activity began to revive, after the repressive climate of the first half of the decade. The Russian nationalist group which attracted the most attention in the late 1980s, in both the Western and the Soviet media, was Pamiat' (Memory). This was founded in Moscow in 1980 (originally by staff of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry) with the aim of campaigning to preserve historical monuments. The group attracted support, but fell into the hands of people whose chief concern was not conservation but the "international conspiracy" by Zionists and Masons which, they claimed, was threatening Russia. The key organizer and ideologist was Dmitry D. Vasilev, a photographer, while the head of the Council was Kim
Andreev, who was a CPSU member. Others involved included veterans of the official anti-Zionist campaign of the Brezhnev period, such as V. Ia. Begun and V. N. Emelianov (see above, p. 413). From late 1985, the group had regular public meetings in Moscow, Leningrad (on a weekly basis in 1988) and Novosibirsk. In a hysterical atmosphere, the leaders read the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" and denounced not only the "Masons" and "Satanists", but also more liberal Russian nationalists such as Likhachov and Glazunov. The documents of Pamiat' also talk hysterically about plots, all the while (like everyone else) claiming to support Gorbachov and perestroika.27 An appeal of 8 December 1987, headed "Patriots of the world, unite!", declared:

In our country these days the activity of enemies is becoming more obvious. They are entrenching themselves in all the sections of the PARTY, the leading force of the USSR. Dark elements in it, speculating with Party slogans and Party phraseology, are in practice carrying out a struggle with the indigenous population of the country, and annihilating the national face of the peoples. They are reanimating Trotskyism, in order to discredit socialism, in order to sow chaos in the State, in order to open the sluices to Western capital and Western ideology.28

In particular it attacked Iakovlev, accusing him of Russophobia and of persecuting Pamiat'. Seeking the support of Orthodox Christians, it demanded "full freedom of conscience for believers"; promoting a peace-loving image, it called for an end to "the criminal war in Afghanistan".29

The Moscow section of VOOPIK fell under the control of Pamiat' in April 1987. The following month, Pamiat'
organized a series of demonstrations in Moscow and was allowed a meeting with B. N. Eltsin, at that time a candidate member of the Politburo and First Secretary of the Moscow gorkom of the Party. From that time, the main Soviet newspapers and Central Television have regularly denounced Pamiat', comparing its leaders to the Black Hundreds and the Nazis. Readers' letters and journalists asked why the law was not being invoked against them for stirring up racial hatred.\textsuperscript{30} One article mentioned that Emelianov had murdered his wife.\textsuperscript{31} The Komsomol journal Sobesednik in June 1989 opened its pages to allow a Pamiat' representative to denounce Zionism, the Masons and the "enemy within the State". He denied that Pamiat' was anti-Semitic, or that they believed that the Russians were the chosen people. He did, however, quote a statement by Gorbachov to the effect that Soviet Jews - officially 0.69\% of the population - represented ten to twenty per cent of people in culture and administration. He denounced this overrepresentation and went on to refer to the activities of several Old Bolsheviks of Jewish origin as "criminal".\textsuperscript{32}

How did the Russian nationalist dissidents who had been imprisoned under Brezhnev and Andropov fare under Gorbachov? In 1986 Oleg Volkov (see above, pp. 431, 437, 538) circulated a samizdat document, "Zametki o glasnosti" (Notes on glasnost'). In this he asked the new leadership to demonstrate the break from past practices by releasing the dissidents, and he mentioned in particular Borodin.\textsuperscript{33} From the beginning of 1987, the authorities gradually released virtually all the dissidents (of all shades of
opinion) who had earlier been imprisoned for political reasons. Poresh had been released early, in February 1986; Ogorodnikov was freed in February 1987, Iakunin in March and Borodin in June. Many former prisoners resumed their political and cultural activity. Ogorodnikov, for example, published the Biulleten' khristianskoi obshchestvennosti (Christian Community Bulletin) from July 1987. Meanwhile Ogurtsov, the former leader of VSKhSON, emigrated in November 1987. Dudko issued a statement regretting his recantation of 1980.

Osipov had completed his sentence in 1983 but had been prevented from resuming his public activity. In August 1987 he was able to circulate a samizdat article on perestroika. He attacked what he considered the monopolization of the Press by what he called the "Evtushenko" tendency. He defended Pamiat', saying that the group had never attacked the Jewish nation. Towards the end of 1987 he brought out the third issue of his samizdat journal, Zemlia. On 17 December 1988 he was chosen leader of the Council of the "Christian Patriotic Union" (Khristianskii patrioticheskii soiuz) at its founding congress. This group seems to have grown out of the "Initiative Group for the Spiritual and Biological Salvation of the People", created in July 1988; Zemlia served as the journal of the latter, and then of the Christian Patriotic Union. The Union also published a monthly information bulletin, Russkii vestnik (Russian Herald).
At least six issues of a Russian Orthodox patriotic journal, *Vybor* (The Choice), edited by Viktor Aksiuchits and Gleb Anishchenko, have appeared since 1987. Aksiuchits himself contributed to the third issue his article "Russkaia ideia" (The Russian Idea), which includes an analysis of Russian messianism.

The uniqueness of Russian patriotism is in the realization by the people of the unity of its land, the unity of the nation even in spite of the shattering of the State. It was not the State which united the people, but the religious-messianic idea. Aksiuchits sees the way out of the clash between the two chosen peoples, the Jews and the Russians, in the "return" of both peoples to Christ. It seems safe to classify him as a vozrozhdenets.

Other Russian nationalist dissidents succeeded in getting heard in the official media. In May 1988 *Literaturnaia Rossiia* published a story by Borodin about Lake Baikal. The journal *Iskusstvo kino* (Cinema Art) conducted in June 1988 a questionnaire which brought into the official Press the samizdat debates of the early 1970s, with some of the same participants. The first question began: "What, in your view, are the sources of the Russian messianic idea?" Shafarevich, who has appeared quite frequently in the media, denied that the Russians had ever had the consciousness of being the chosen people in the sense that the Jews had. He described Berdiaev's ideas as "dilettante". (Palievsky [see above, p. 440] in the same debate flatly denied the existence of Russian messianism.) On the other hand, Pomerants (a target of
the From Under the Rubble symposium) provided a sociological explanation of the phenomenon of Russian messianism. He added that the writings of Astafev and Belov (see below, p. 604) revealed a "fantastic ideology" and were "symptoms of illness".47

In June 1989 Nash sovremennik published a shortened version of a long article by Shafarevich, entitled "Rusofobia" (Russophobia). This accused liberal samizdat and émigré writers, including Amalrik, Pomerants, Levitin-Krasnov and (in particular) Ianov, of "Russophobia" for their concern about the danger of Russian messianism. He praised the Vekhi authors and made no concessions to Marxism.48 The ideas of Solzhenitsyn began to be discussed; in February 1989 the journal of the Soviet Peace Committee, Vek XX i mir (Twentieth Century and Peace) published his "Do Not Live by the Lie!"49; and in July 1989 Novyi mir announced that it would be publishing Solzhenitsyn's works, starting, in accordance with the author's wishes, with The Gulag Archipelago.50

Gorbachov has had both allies and opponents among the Russian nationalists. Broadly speaking, the gosudarstvenniki have been hostile and the vozrozhdentsy sympathetic. Novyi mir under Zalygin became the flagship of the pro-perestroika liberal nationalists; other leading representatives on this side include Likhachov and the head of the Filmworkers' Union, Elem Klimov. The key organizer among the anti-perestroika conservative Russian
nationalists appears to be the writer Iury Bondarev, a
member of the Bureau of the USSR Writers' Union, deputy head of the RSFSR Writers' Union and a member of the Nash sovremennik editorial board. The group also includes Proskurin, now head of the RSFSR Cultural Foundation, and Mikhail Alekseev and Anatoly Ivanov, still editors-in-chief of Moskva and Molodaia gvardiia respectively. John Dunlop has identified a "centrist" group of nationalists between the two poles, including Astafev, Belov, Rasputin, Soloukhin, Kozhinov and Glazunov. At least some of Dunlop's centrists, however, have conservative tendencies.

In January 1989 Astafev, Belov and Rasputin joined Proskurin and Alekseev, together with the editor of Nash sovremennik, Vikulov, and the conservative film-maker, Sergei Bondarchuk, in a joint letter to Pravda attacking Ogonek. Bondarev himself did not sign the letter: one of Ogonek's alleged sins had been to publish an attack on him. Since Vitaly Korotich, a Jew, became editor-in-chief of Ogonek in 1986 it has become a pacemaker for perestroika, and as such has been regularly attacked by the conservative nationalists, especially in Nash sovremennik. Kozhinov's article in that journal in January 1989, for example, was directed primarily against Korotich.

In this wide-ranging, programmatic article, Kozhinov claimed that Nash sovremennik had inherited at least part of the mantle of Tvardovsky's Novyi mir, in terms of the writers who had migrated from one to the other. Kozhinov was trying to argue that the letter of the eleven to Ogonek in 1969 about Novyi mir (see above, p. 423) was not in fact
directed against Tvardovsky - a rather difficult task. It was noteworthy that three of the signatories to the 1989 letter about Ogonek - Alekseev, Vikulov and Proskurin - were among the signatories of the 1969 letter about Novyi mir. Kozhinov's article reflected the same concern as the 1969 letter: the threat to Russian traditions from the bourgeois West. He asserted that Lenin was unlike the other Bolshevik leaders in seeing the need to preserve pre-revolutionary Russian culture. Bukharin, who was now idealized by the contemporary Westernizers, had been as bad as Stalin and Trotsky in his desire to root out the old traditions. Kozhinov was concerned primarily with culture; but his view also related to economics. The perestroika radicals, such as Nikolai Shmelyov, Gavriil Popov and Leonid Abalkin argued in varying degrees for the introduction of market forces into the Soviet economy. Kozhinov argued that the solution to Russia's problems could be found not by imitating Western models but by looking back into her collectivist traditions. The argument had been made at length by Mikhail Antonov, the ex-Fetisovite and author of the Veche article which sought to combine Leninism and Slavophilism. In a July 1986 Nash sovremennik article, he argued against "cosmopolitan" attempts to import the methods of unemployment and "hedonism" (consumerism) from the West. Citing Ilarion, Likhachov and the derevenshchiki - as well as Marx - he called for a moral and patriotic approach to applying the "human factor" to improve the economy. Unlike Kozhinov and Antonov, Soloukhin in the era of glasnost' saw no need
to pay lip service to Lenin. He declared that he had refused to sign an appeal of the Memorial Society (led by pro-perestroika radicals) concerning the victims of Stalinist repression, because it ignored the atrocities of the Civil War.56

Speculation has inevitably arisen about the links between three distinct groups: the conservatives in the political leadership; the conservative Russian nationalists in literature; and Pamiat'. Belov's popular novel Vse vpered (Everything is Ahead) published in Nash sovremennik in 1986 depicted contemporary Russia as the victim of a Zionist-Masonic conspiracy.57 The same theme was in the background to his latest novel on collectivization, published in Novyi mir in March 1989.58 Following this, he was challenged by Igor Vinogradov in the radical pro-perestroika newspaper Moscow News to say whether he really believed in this conspiracy.59 Valentin Rasputin has been one of the few public figures to defend Pamiat'; without supporting their whole philosophy, he noted their (supposed) concern for history and culture and asked that they be given the right to speak in the Press.60 Kozhinov, like Pamiat', Shimanov and, for that matter, Dostoevsky, denies charges of anti-Semitism; but, like them, he proceeds to complain about the privileged position of the Jews. In his January 1989 Nash sovremennik article, he cited Gorbachov's statement about Jewish participation in Soviet life (see p. 59%) and complained about the "sharp violation of proportionality in relation to other nations".61 Apart from a similarity of views between Pamiat' and some literary nationalists, there
is other evidence of joint activity. Evtushenkov has
described a meeting held in Moscow on 23 January 1989,
organized by the journals Moskva, Molodaia gvardiia and
Roman-gazeta, where the speakers incited anti-Semitism and
Pamiat' banners decorated the hall.62

As far as the political leadership is concerned, nobody
has defended Pamiat'; the Politburo member E.K. Ligachov,
widely seen as Gorbachov's leading conservative critic,
has, however, been associated with the more conservative
Russian nationalist writers. He is also widely believed to
have been behind the Stalinist and anti-Semitic article
published in Sovetskaia Rossiia on 13 March 1988 over the
name of Nina Andreeva.63

Leaving speculation aside, Solzhenitsyn's fears that
the process of democratization in the Soviet Union would
lead to the growth of tension between nationalities (see
above, p. 499) were shown to be justified in the period of
glasnost'. Nationalist anger appeared in Kazakhstan in
December 1986, following the sacking for corruption of
Kunaev as First Secretary and his replacement by a Russian.
Through 1987, from the Ukraine to Uzbekistan demands grew
for the greater use of the native language, while
demonstrators in the Baltic republics began to demand
secession from the Soviet Union. In 1988 tension between
Armenia and Azerbaijan over the future of Nagorny Karabakh
escalated to the point of an undeclared war. Popular
Fronts appeared in the Baltic republics with mass support.
Their demands included controls on immigration and the granting to the native language in each republic the status of being the sole official language. The year 1989 saw clashes over nationality issues resulting in numbers of deaths in Georgia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The Popular Fronts in the Baltic won the majority of seats to the CPD and proceeded to escalate their demands. The growth of nationality unrest threatened Gorbachev's whole programme of perestro(144,101),(778,947)(124,103),(771,946)ika. It allowed conservative elements in the leadership, such as Ligachov, to argue that glasnost' had gone too far.

The growth of non-Russian nationalism gave impetus to Russian national awareness. In late 1988 conservative Russian nationalists began a campaign to promote the pride of the Russians in their history and their State. The "Association of Russian Artists [ruesskikh khudozhnikov]", formed in November 1988, included Rasputin, Belov, Astafev, Bondarev, Loshchits, Lobanov, Kozhinov, Ivanov and Vikulov. The Association's declaration expressed alarm at the threat posed by non-Russian nationalism. The danger (it said) was aggravated by the degeneration of the Russian people, for which it blamed official policy. It continued:

The command methods used by the leadership in the sphere of nationality relations [have] led to a situation in which it has become common to identify the will of the administrative bureaucratic apparatus with the views of the Russian people, whereas it is precisely Russia that is in the most critical position, close to collapse. And the collapse of Russia will inevitably lead to the loss of the unity of the political and state system of the whole country. 64

In this version of Russian messianism, Russia has suffered the most, and only she can now save the Soviet Union from
catastrophe by a national moral regeneration.

Three more organizations were established in March 1989. In Moscow, the "Otechestvo" (Fatherland) Society was set up, with the involvement of Moskva, Nash sovremennik and Molodaia gvardiia. A Federation for Slavonic Writing and Slavonic Cultures was established, based on official cultural bodies and involving Ukrainians and Belorussians as well as Russians. The "Union for the Spiritual Revival of the Fatherland" was formed with the participation of Russian nationalist groups from different parts of the Soviet Union. Molodaia gvardiia was among the sponsoring organizations; Metropolitan Pitirim was elected to the Council, indicating the tacit approval of the Moscow Patriarchate; and Mikhail Antonov was chosen to chair the group. It seemed that, in public view, there was arising a network of intellectuals who, while claiming to support perestroika, were really driven by other ideals.

Valentin Rasputin articulated these ideals and feelings in his address to the CPD in May-June 1989. The speech showed several similarities with Solzhenitsyn's Letter to the Soviet Leaders. It expressed concern for morality and for the environment. The main difference was that it was delivered after the emergence into the open of nationality tensions.

Russophobia has spread in the Baltic and in Georgia, and it is penetrating into the other republics, to some less, to others more, but it is notable almost everywhere. Anti-Soviet slogans are joined with anti-Russian ones, and emissaries from Lithuania and Estonia travel with them, creating a united front, to Georgia,
and from there local agitators are sent to Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In injured tones, he went on to suggest to the non-Russian nationalists:

perhaps Russia should leave the [Soviet] Union, if with all her misfortunes you accuse her, and if her weak development and clumsiness burden your progressive strivings?

Rasputin added that this would allow Russia to preserve her own resources, regain national awareness, have her own Academy of Sciences which would reflect Russian Rossiiskim interests, and restore morality.

In 1988 and 1989, the Popular Fronts in the Baltic republics and Moldavia succeeded to some extent in persuading their governments to introduce legislation to remedy national grievances. Part of the Russian-speaking population of the republics responded by forming "internationalist" movements to resist what were seen as attacks on their own rights. It seemed likely that anti-perestroika forces within the central Party and State apparatus or the security forces were stirring up the local Russians and trying to create a backlash. Strikes occurred in Estonia in July 1989 over proposals to restrict political rights for immigrants from outside Estonia. Iury Rudiak, a leader of the (predominantly Russian) Interdvizhenie (Internationalist Movement) in Estonia was reported by Moscow News as saying:

We are extremely worried about the growth of nationalist and separatist forces supported by the leadership of the Republic. By setting the peoples of the Soviet Union against each other and lashing out against the Russian people[,] who are accused of all the sins of Stalinism and the stagnation era, they are altering the direction of perestroika from building up
Within Russia herself, pressures for power to be devolved from the USSR to the RSFSR began to penetrate political circles. On 27 July 1989 the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, candidate Politburo member A.V. Vlasov told the Russian Supreme Soviet of plans to increase the sovereignty of the republic by creating new bodies which existed at the All-Union level but not yet at the republican level. He mentioned ministries, social institutions and a Russian Academy of Sciences, as well as a new television channel. On 26 August 1989 the Leningrad oblast' Party conference took this direction to a logical conclusion and proposed the establishment of a republican Party for the RSFSR, with elective leading bodies.

In response to the growing ethnic tension, Gorbachov's strategy seems to have been to show a readiness to make concessions, promising to respect the national cultures and give more independence to the republics. While repeatedly invoking the name of Lenin in relation to the nationality question, he effectively repudiated Lenin's idea of sliianie in January 1989. "We of course cannot permit even the smallest people to disappear or the language of even the smallest people to be lost." He told the CPD in May 1989: "The federal structure of the State should now be filled with real political and economic content." In summer 1989 the nationality situation seemed so serious that Gorbachov was forced to make a special television
broadcast. He declared it his duty "to warn of the growing danger of the sharpening of relations between nationalities."74 The theses for a special Central Committee Plenum on the nationality question, due to be held in September 1989, called for both a "strong union" and "strong republics".75 At the same time it seemed clear that no republics would be allowed to secede. This left open the possibility that the Kremlin might resort to military intervention to preserve the integrity of the State. Gorbachev had presided over the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and permitted the democratization of Poland and Hungary, but was not willing to (or would not be allowed to) give up Soviet territory.

In spite of the promises of national equality, Gorbachev has not neglected the use of Russian motifs in his style of government. This has been most obvious in questions of cadre policy. Here he has followed Brezhnev and Andropov in promoting a disproportionately high share of Russians to the top leadership. A major exception was Gorbachev's selection of E.A. Shevardnadze (a Georgian) as Foreign Minister in 1985. Zhores Medvedev reported that the Russian public was disappointed at Shevardnadze's move, believing that the job should have gone to a Russian.76 The Politburo elected at the XXVII Congress included 8 Russians out of 12 full members and 6 Russians out of 7 candidate members, while the Secretariat was composed of 10 Russians and one Belorussian. By August 1989 9 out of 12 full Politburo members and all 8 candidate members were
Russians. Thus the over-representation of Russians was strengthened. This may reflect the view that during a period of decentralization and tension between nationalities, it is important that the central posts be held by individuals whose loyalty is to the Soviet Union as a whole, and Russians are more reliable in this respect. At the same time, a consequence of the anti-corruption campaign in Central Asia is that the traditionally Islamic nationalities are now entirely unrepresented in the Politburo.

Gorbachov has also tried to appeal to Russians by showing his sympathy with pre-Soviet Russian cultural traditions. In September 1986 Pravda quoted him as endorsing Dostoevsky's Pushkin speech.

...Raisa Maksimovna and I were reading Dostoevsky. He wrote that, perhaps, the Russian heart - and I would now say that of the Soviet people - is more than anything open for brotherhood and unity.

Further on he spoke of the "spirituality" of Russia. In 1988, the millennium of the Russian Orthodox Church was celebrated almost as if it were a Soviet holiday. In April 1988 Gorbachov met Patriarch Pimen and assured the believers that democratization and glasnost' were intended to benefit them, as toilers and patriots. He promised a new law on freedom of conscience. The State made concessions to religious bodies, allowing the opening of more churches and the training of more priests. Symbolically, the Patriarchate moved from Zagorsk back to Moscow. Gorbachov was trying to win active support for his policies from the believers, perhaps (like the
VOZROZHDENTSY) seeing in them reserves of morality and energy which were lacking in the Party and State apparatuses. 79

Calls appeared in the Press for the publication of Russian religious thinkers. In 1989, two of the most influential Christian writers on Russian messianism appeared in the periodicals. Novyi mir published a selection of Vladimir Solovyov's writings. This included a warning from Natsional'nyi vopros v Rossii about the dangers of narodnost' being converted into nationalism. 80 An article by Berdiaev appeared in Voprosy filosofii with an introduction by the contributor to From under the Rubble, Barabanov. 81

How much support did the public give to the different nationalist tendencies, be they gosudarstvenniki or vozrozhdenetsy? A Soviet opinion poll taken in Moscow in late 1988 showed that consumerist interests and desire for Westernizing reform were more widespread than the total support for both varieties of nationalism. The gosudarstvenniki (a term used by the organizers of the survey) clearly had more support than those the survey described as "patriots", favouring a Russian spiritual revival. 82 In the territorial elections for the CPD, Bondarev and Shafarevich failed to get in, whereas such Westernizers as Evtushenko, Korotich and Roy Medvedev were successful. The elections were not always fairly run, however, and much presumably depended on the quality of the other candidates. More research needs to be done on Soviet
public opinion in the conditions of glasnost'.

**Future prospects**

Theoretically, Russian messianism could come to power in two ways: either through revolution, or through the rise of Russian nationalists through the Party and State structures to the top. The least implausible variant of revolution is probably a military intervention (probably in alliance with certain Party figures), perhaps intended to prevent the secession of one or more republics, in a case where the central political leadership proved unwilling to act. The possibility of Russian nationalists coming to power through the existing political system is perhaps stronger. I have tried to suggest that the political elite as well as the cultural elite has contained individuals and groups sympathetic to Russian messianist ideas. The differences between the vozrozhdentsy and the gosudarstveniki are so large as to make it meaningless to talk of a single Russian messianist trend. Ianov's fears of the tendency for official and unofficial Russian nationalism to come together are alleviated by the disunity of the variants of Russian nationalism. Empirically, Ianov's position is apparently weakened by the evolution in the 1970s of Russian nationalist dissidents such as Osipov, Kapitanchuk and Khaibulin away from the regime and towards the human rights movement.

A further obstacle to the reconciliation of dissident nationalists with the regime has been highlighted by
Pospielovsky. In the nineteenth century both the Slavophils and the regime claimed to support Orthodoxy and autocracy (although they differed in their understanding of these concepts). In the 1980s there has been no such ideological congruence between Russian nationalist dissidents and the regime. Although the gosudarstvennik ideology and the ideology of the vozrozhdenets have official supporters, they do not represent the official ideology of the regime. Andropov's attack on Russian nationalism represented the reassertion of Marxism-Leninism. His KGB experience must have made clear to him that Russian nationalism was a cause of much dissatisfaction among non-Russians, both inside and outside the Party. With the Russian and Slav share of the population declining, it would have been expedient to appeal to an internationalist ideology to maintain the integrity of the multinational State, as well as to appeal to the patriotism (without encouraging the nationalism) of the constituent nations.

Dunlop and Pospielovsky both see the strength of the nationalists in the tens of millions of Orthodox believers in the USSR. Pospielovsky argues that ideas which are rooted in the Russian past are more likely to be a successful alternative to the ruling ideology than Western liberal ideas which are not. For him, the question is not whether Russian nationalism will come to power, but which sort of nationalism it will be.
could become the State ideology after the Brezhnev succession was completed. He suggests that if the gosudarstvenniki gained control, they might listen to the vozrozhdentsy and then allow them into power.

\[\ldots\] if the National Bolsheviks [i.e. the gosudarstvenniki] were to come to power, they would be much more vulnerable to the arguments of the intellectually more sophisticated vozrozhdentsy, with whom they have numerous ideational and emotional links, than are present-day Marxist-Leninists. A possible scenario, therefore, would be a brief National Bolshevik interregnum followed by a vozrozhdentsy period of rule. 85

This seems to me a serious misunderstanding of the relations between the gosudarstvenniki and the vozrozhdentsy. If the former were to come to power, they would be likely to seek to tighten censorship and prevent publication of other views, be they of democratic-liberal or national-religious tendencies.

It seems that Ianov, Pospielovsky and Dunlop all overestimated the importance of Russian nationalism, both as a force for dissent and as a potential direction for the regime to move in. Under Gorbachov, Russian national interests will not be neglected. A nationalist ideology, however, is unlikely to be viable for long in a State where the dominant nationality is a minority, as the Russians are becoming. Representatives of the non-Russians on the Central Committee and Politburo can be expected to oppose Russian nationalist tendencies. It must be remembered, though, that Russians continue to dominate these bodies. It may seem to a Western observer that ideas about democratization and decentralization are much more relevant
to the material and moral needs of the Russian people than peasant nostalgia or the exploits of General Skobelev. But politicians do not always act in their own best interests. It cannot be ruled out that the Russian core of the political elite will at some point in the future succumb to Russian nationalist ideas.

If the shift of power from the Party structures to the Congress of People's Deputies and the new Supreme Soviet continues, public opinion will play an increasing role in policy formation. At present nationalist trends do not appear to have majority support among Russians, but there is a widespread feeling against what are seen as the privileges of the non-Russian republics. If non-Russian nationalism continues to grow, the danger of a Russian backlash will grow too. If the economy were to deteriorate further and if Gorbachov and his allies were to be discredited, it is likely that politicians who appealed to Russian traditions rather than Western methods would find a more sympathetic response from Russians than they have until now.
Footnotes


3. Ibid., p. 64.


5. Brezhnev, "Otchet Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS XXVI s"ezdu".


7. Prokhanov, "Zapiski".


10. Prokhanov, "Formuly".


12. For discussions of Russian nationalism under Gorbachov, see "Russian Nationalism Today", RLRB special edn., 19 December 1988; and reports in RLRB and its successor, Report on the USSR.

13. For example, Yeche, No. 1 (see above, p. 469) and the contributions of the derevenshchiki Valentin Rasputin and Evgeny Nosov in Trezvost'-norma zhizni (M., 1984).


19. Dmitry S. Likhachov & V. Ivanin, members of the


29. Ibid., esp. pp. 5, 13 (quotation), 14 (quotation).


and Patriotic Association "Pamyat"", Institute of Jewish Affairs Research Report, No. 3 (July 1987); Iuliia Vishnevskaia, "The Emergence of 'Pamyat'" and 'Otechestvo', RL 342/87 (26 August 1987); Taras Kuzio, "Glasnost and Russian Nationalism", SNS, IV, No. 9 (September 1987), 1-3, and "Russian Culture or Anti-Semitism: What Does 'Pamyat' Stand For?", SNS, V, No. 9 (September 1988), 1-3.


36. USSR NB, 30 November 1987, item 22-54.

37. Ibid., item 22-26.


39. USSR NB, 30 November 1987, item 22-41.

40. Information taken from photocopies of unpublished documents of the Christian Patriotic Union, headed "Perestroike - russkii dukh, russkuiu silu!"


42. Aksiuchits, p. 40.


44. "'Russkaia ideia': problemy kul'tury - problemy kinematografa", Iskusstvo kino, 1988, No. 6, p. 119.

45. Ibid., p. 126.

46. Ibid., p. 122.

47. Ibid., p. 124.


53. Vadim V. Kozhinov, "'Samaia bol'shaia opasnost'...'", NS, 1989, No. 1, pp. 141-79. (Lobanov's article "Posleslovie", in the April 1988 issue, defending the role of Anatoly Nikonov and Molodaia gvardiia in the 1960s, was also part of this campaign.)

54. Ibid.


56. Vladimir A. Soloukhin, "Pochemu ia ne podpisalsia pod tem pis'mom", NS, 1988, No. 12, pp. 186-89.


58. Idem, "God velikogo pereloma. Khronika devyatich mesyatsev", NM, 1989, No. 3, pp. 6-95. This was a sequel to Kanuny (see above, p. 430), the third part of which appeared in Novyi mir in August 1987. The fact that Novyi mir published the story probably has more to do with the journal's desire to maintain its traditional links with the derevenshchiki than with sympathy for the idea of the "conspiracy".


60. Valentin G. Rasputin, "'Zhertvovat' soboiu dlia pravdy'. Protiv bespamatstva. Vystuplenie na V s"ezde Vserossiskogo obschestva okhrany pamiatnikov istorii i kul'tury (g. Gor'kii, iliul', 1987 g.)", NS, 1988, No. 1, pp. 169-76.


79. On the role of the Moscow Patriarchate in promoting Russian nationalism, see my "Orthodoxy and Russian Nationalism in the USSR, 1917-1988", in God's Servants: Church, Nation and State in Russia and Ukraine, ed. Geoffrey A. Hosking, forthcoming.


81. Nikolai A. Berdiaev, "Chelovek i mashina. (Problema


85. Dunlop, Faces, p. 265.
Primary sources for the study of Slavophilism are fairly rare. A particularly useful source for some of the main writings of classical Slavophilism is the volume compiled by Nikolai Brodsky, *Rannie slavianoofilny*. A copy is in the Main Library of the University of Birmingham.

Editions of the collected works of the four leading Slavophils are available. The fourth edition of Aleksei Khomiakov's collected works is at the Taylor Institution, University of Oxford, and the first volume of the second edition is at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London (SSEES). The SSEES library has a complete pre-revolutionary edition of Ivan Kireevsky's works, and the Taylor Institution has the complete works of Konstantin Aksakov. The University of Glasgow has a volume of the works of Ivan Aksakov, while SSEES has a complete edition. With the growth of Soviet interest in Slavophilism in the 1970s, collections of articles by the Aksakov brothers and by Ivan Kireevsky have been published in Moscow, in the "Liubiteliam russkoi slovesnosti" series. It is likely that if *glasnost'* survives, more and fuller editions of the collected works of the Slavophils will appear. Already editions of the works of such influences on Slavophilism as Nikolai Karamzin and Pyotr Chaadaev are on the way. Turning to later pre-revolutionary writings, Vladimir Solovyov's *Natsional'nyi vopros v Rossii* is in the University of Glasgow. Whether this work, or the *Vekhi* collection (reprinted by Possev), will be republished in the USSR in
full remains to be seen.

As far as secondary sources are concerned, the works of Nicholas Riasanovsky, Andrzej Walicki and Peter Christoff on Slavophilism deserve particular note. Riasanovsky's *Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles* remains valuable, and his volume on Nicholas I lays out the social, political and ideological environment which gave birth to Slavophil doctrine. Walicki's *Slavophile Controversy* is a thoroughgoing analysis of the influences on Slavophilism, of the ideas of its main exponents, and of the trends of thought which developed from it. On pan-Slavism, the volumes by Hans Kohn and Michael Petrovich are useful. Nikolai Tsimbaev's monograph on Ivan Aksakov benefits from access to Moscow archives. The series "Zhizn' zamechatel'nykh liudei" has brought out biographies of Tiutchev and Dostoevsky, and under glasnost' may perhaps publish biographies of other Russian nationalist thinkers.

Nikolai Berdiaev's ideas on Russian messianism and its link with Russian communism are expressed in *The Russian Idea* and *The Origin of Russian Communism*. From a different perspective, Mikhail Agursky discusses the nationalist elements in Stalinism in *Ideologiya natsional-bol'shevizma*. Agursky's volume *The Third Rome*, despite its title, is in fact an expanded translation of the previous volume, focussing on National Bolshevism. The best single source for the study of the rebirth of Russian national consciousness after Stalin is probably the journal *Novyi mir*, especially from
1952 to 1970. Dina Spechler's volume is the most detailed investigation of this. In the Brezhnev and post-Brezhnev periods, the journals *Molodaia gvardiia*, *Moskva* and particularly *Nash sovremennik* have been the main carriers of Russian nationalist thought. The works by Dimitry Pospielovsky and John Dunlop, and Aleksandr Ianov's *The Russian New Right*, are the most important secondary sources on Russian nationalism under Brezhnev. I did not see two works which are due to be published in the near future: Darrell Hammer's *Russian Nationalism and Soviet Politics* (Westview) and Stephen Carter's *Twentieth-Century Russian Nationalism* (Frances Pinter).

The leading primary source on dissent under Brezhnev was the samizdat bi-monthly *Chronicle of Current Events*. Despite the dangerous conditions in which it was produced, the editors managed to maintain a high level of accuracy. The most thorough analysis of trends of thought in samizdat was for a long time Ferdinand Feldbrugge's volume, although it was published relatively early in the development of the human rights movement. It has, perhaps, now been overtaken by Liudmila Alekseeva's longer book, *Soviet Dissent*, written by a former participant in the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group. The main sources for the development of Russian messianism in samizdat are the Russian nationalist journals, especially *Veche*, *Zemlia* and *Moskovskii sbornik*. Vladimir Osipov's *Tri otnosheniia k Rodine* is a convenient collection. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's programmatic writings - *A Letter to the Soviet Leaders* and the co-authored *From Under the Rubble*
are indispensable, as is his memoir of struggle against the apparat, *The Oak and the Calf*. Other memoirs of particular relevance to the Russian nationalist movement are those by Levitin-Krasnov and Mikhail Kheifets (on Osipov). Among the various samizdat anthologies in English, the most useful for Russian messianism is *The Political, Social and Religious Thought of Russian "Samizdat"*, edited by the emigres Mikhail Meerson-Aksyonov and Boris Shragin.

The principal archives of samizdat material, both of which I visited, are the Radio Liberty Arkhiv samizdata in Munich and the archives at Keston College in Keston, Kent. Both archives are well organized. Keston College concentrates on religious samizdat. It regularly published a bibliography of new material, in *Religion in Communist Lands*, from 1972 to Autumn 1981 (although only a select bibliography after Autumn 1978). Since then it has periodically produced lists of new material. The Arkhiv samizdata is much more comprehensive, but it should not necessarily be considered to be a representative collection of all the samizdat in circulation in the Soviet Union. Writers or groups who have more contacts with foreigners and thus more opportunities to send their documents to the West are likely to be over-represented in comparison with those for whom Western links are not important. Furthermore, some writers may have expressed the desire that the Arkhiv not hold their material, because they do not want to be associated with Radio Liberty. The Arkhiv
Samizdata initially published its holdings in the Sobranie dokumentov samizdata, and later in the weekly bulletin Materialy samizdata.

Emigré journals which are particularly useful sources for Russian Orthodox samizdat are the Paris Vestnik Russkogo Studencheskogo Khristianskogo Dvizheniia (which since No. 111 has outgrown the Studencheskogo in its title); the NTS Frankfurt publications, Posev, Grani and (to 1981) Vol'noe slovo; and the newer journals, Russkoe vozrozhdenie (Paris and New York) and Veche (Munich). These journals are also useful sources of information on current developments in the USSR. The most useful periodicals in English for the subjects covered here are the Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, renamed since the beginning of 1989 Report on the USSR (the Russian version sometimes includes material not in the English edition); Radio Liberty's Current Abstracts; the invaluable Current Digest of the Soviet Press; Keston College's Religion in Communist Lands; the publications of the Institute for Jewish Affairs (London), Soviet Jewish Affairs and Insight: Soviet Jews; the USSR News Brief (Munich); and Index on Censorship (London).

In this bibliography, the traditional division between primary and secondary sources has not been followed; for my purposes, Soviet discussions of historical topics such as the battle of Kulikovo Field, which might be regarded as secondary sources, are treated as primary sources, since my interest in them is for what they tell us about the views
of Soviet writers today. No method of dividing this bibliography would be completely satisfactory. I have the following sections: bibliographies; works on messianism, nationalism and socialism outside Russia; writings on prerevolutionary Russia, where I have included general works on Russia; writings on 1917 and the Soviet period, which includes Soviet publications on the Tsarist period whose chief relevance is what they convey about the Soviet period; and samizdat writings. I have excluded newspaper articles (other than those I think especially important) and Radio Liberty reports. I have listed English translations of Russian originals where I am aware of them; the version I cite first is normally the version I used. I have given American and Canadian publishers as well as British where possible. In order to keep the length of this bibliography down, I have limited it to those works which I have both cited in the notes and seen.
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