CAREER DEVELOPMENT

IN THE

BUREAUCRACY OF JORDAN

BY

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DEDICATED

TO

MY FATHER AND MOTHER
DECLARATION

THIS THESIS HAS BEEN COMPOSED ENTIRELY BY MYSELF

MAHMOUD SALMAN AL-FALEH

SEPTEMBER, 1983
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

"And certainly there were many others ....
from whom I had assimilated a word, a
glance, but of whom as individual beings
I remember nothing".

Marcel Proust, 'Time Regained'.

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SUMMARY

The purpose of this thesis was to examine the existing theories and practices of career development in Middle Eastern bureaucracies, with special reference to Jordan. No comprehensive study exists against which to measure the progress that has been made in this respect and there are no 'norms' existing in Jordan with regard to organizational behaviour in the government service. Therefore, the survey has been concerned with description and analysis of what exists at present.

The administrative system has been analysed by management level, type of personnel, function of government and by types of organisational activity. Research findings were based primarily upon a questionnaire and supported by interviews and documentation. The results of the analysis are presented in chapters which reflect understood and accepted categories of organizational analysis. These include recruitment; financial rewards; promotion and advancement; training and development. They also include organisation and development of the Service; characteristics of manpower within the Service; and 'environmental' factors (geographical, historical, political, social, economic, demographic and educational influences) within which the system operates.

From the findings it has been possible to draw conclusions about the main features of the administrative structure of the Service in Jordan. The outcome of the survey gives a comprehensive picture which demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of existing arrangements and how they compare with the government services of other states. Suggestions are made for ways of improving career development in the bureaucracy of Jordan to take account of changing needs and circumstances.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 NATURE OF THE STUDY

In developing countries the role of government is very important. Not much is written about the structure of the government in many of these states. This is particularly true in the Middle East. There is also the disparity of literature relating to constitutional systems on the one side and the organisation of the government sector on the other. The latter tends to receive less than adequate investigation. In the case of Jordan, it is especially so because it is a small nation without oil wealth and therefore attracts less attention than other middle east countries.

This study concerns career development in the bureaucracy of Jordan. It evaluates the personnel system of Jordan within which the Service has operated. It analyses the present policies, procedures and practices in managing a service of some 70,000 employees under the Central Civil Service Regulations. Their performance is critical in determining the effectiveness and efficiency of the entire government. They run day-to-day affairs of the government. Because of some serious concerns about their quality and quantity, their knowledge, their skills and decisions, which have far-reaching effects on the Jordanian Society, this study was made.

The speed of growth of the government service in Jordan will
intensify existing concern and create new problems. Government spends a considerable part of the national income and is by far the largest employer of labour. No citizen, and certainly no tax payer, should fail to take interest in the resources used by the government. The government sector's use of resources is the only one which comes under close public scrutiny. Any study which investigates such activities might usefully produce findings on consequence of which more effective provision of services can be offered.

Economy and efficiency have been objectives since the creation of the government. Jordan, like other countries, faces the dilemma of desire to limit the functions of government by keeping its cost at a minimum while still developing the government sector rapidly, and the idea still lingers in the public imagination.

Economy is careful management, effectiveness is power to produce desired results. This is as true of manpower as of services. One of the most important factors in the economic and efficient use of resources is the development of an effective career service. Conditions and methods of work and professional ethics in the government service are unique. Naturally public servants tend to over-emphasize the uniqueness of government employment, but there can be little doubt that it takes some time for the government servant to acquire all the characteristics expected of him. These characteristics are evolved over the process of time.

Contrary to the belief in certain Western societies, in Jordan there is a traditional belief that an individual spends a life-time in the public service and becomes progressively less fitted for outside
employment. This belief dies slowly. The position has been greatly changed. Outside employers now eagerly seek bureaucrats (the only people who know the government inside). For this reason, inducements are constantly being offered to attract them away from their public service career. The question is whether there are some advantages to the government, in general, if employees have had practical experience outside the Service and if they had a break at some time during their official career? Does the change of climate add to their facilities of judgement and perspective, and reinvigorate them?

All advocacy of a career service depends not so much on its outstanding advantages as upon the inherent disadvantages of a non-career service - the loss of talent and ability, high turnover, the sense of insecurity, unreliability and doubt, the necessary modifications in professional ethics, the time factor in filling positions; difficulties over promotion and transfer: the loss of efficiency. Do these circumstances apply equally in societies like Jordan? Another point to be investigated is the degree of impartiality, honesty, efficiency, integrity and anonymity of the dedicated career servant, and the factors which affect them.

A career service should give the individual employee opportunity for development to the extent of his capacities, furnish a climate congenial to growth and provide incentives which will promote the maximum of development. Everyone entering a career service does so with the expectation that he should be able to reach the highest posts if he has the resources of training, education, physical ability or whatever it is that is required to get there, and there should be the
reasonable expectation that increasing responsible work will be given to him as his own personal abilities develop. This implies permanency of tenure and conditions of employment which must reflect the position of public service in the public's esteem and the recognition of the rights of any employee in relation to his employer as conceived by the society of which the public servant is part. It is to be investigated whether these traditional attributes of the career service might be sacrificed by wider career movement, additional mobility between the private and public sectors in circumstances of a developing nation.

The two objectives - efficiency and economy, and a career service - are not enough. The employees themselves must be satisfied that they have chosen the right career and their satisfaction will be reflected in the state of morale. Like the measurement of effectiveness, morale can only be measured in terms of outcomes. Among the sample questioned for this study, means investigated were staff participation in the determination of their conditions and methods of work, rate of turnover of the staff, absenteeism (suspected or otherwise) and co-operation. In this study, concentration will be directed to the principles and practices which appear to contribute to staff morale, rather than on direct measurement, in which case personal impressions and feelings must enter into judgement.

Morale, in the form of attitudes, was analysed because it affects the quality and quantity of work. If the personnel are not given opportunities, they cannot contribute. The work of the official is closely bound with the welfare of society. A discontented public service reflects greatly upon the prestige and status of government as an institution, and of the politicians and politics in general. The
consequences may undermine the social and political system. High morale will be reflected in the government dealing with the public.

Indeed much has changed in the government service of Jordan in the past decade and major changes are taking place at the present time. This study examines an important side of administration in this state of change - the individual in the Service. Who is he? What does he do? What does he think? Is he satisfied? What is his working environment like? How does he get to the top? How does he see the bureaucracy of which he is a part? The study attempts to describe the dominant characteristics of manpower within the bureaucracy.

The study attempts to relate personnel policies to individual expectations. The quality of any administrative system depends, in large part, upon the type of people staffing the Service, what they think of the structure and effectiveness of organisation within which they work, and their ability to develop and implement policies. This includes the process of interaction with the persons, units, regulations and institutions that constitute his immediate environment. This raises also questions about "relativities" between careers within/without the Service. In Jordan, government still continues to be regarded as the "model" employer. The institutional negotiation and arbitration procedures in Jordan are therefore yet to develop on a satisfactory basis.

An interesting question to the student of bureaucratic organisations such as government service is how long does it take to become "bureaucratised" (i.e. to absorb its customs, habits and attitudes)? Some have held that the only democratic civil service is a "representative
bureaucracy": reflecting the structure of the society in general to such factors as age, social origin and educational background. The argument is that only a body of government servants recruited in this way can understand the needs of society and respond to its legitimate demands. 12

II

This study attempts to analyse the government service in terms of its environment, organisational pattern and historical perspective, recruitment, financial reward, advancement, training and development. To do this, the author has scrutinised the career patterns of a sample of government servants to see whether roads to the top are many or few, and whether any are notably more travelled than others. He compares the careers of bureaucrats who have reached the top with those of colleagues who came into the Service during the same period but have made less progress up the ladder.

This is all interesting evidence on a relatively unstudied occupational group. No previous research has been done in Jordan, gaps therefore exist in our knowledge of the contemporary civil service. First of all, any study of a civil service must obviously treat all officials of the government as a unit. A second gap is our knowledge of career experience among members of different civil services. There might be differences in careers within the Service. Posts differ widely in the amount of specialised knowledge they require, extent of advancement opportunities and type of organisations. Where a career is limited to one department, it is reasonable to expect that department to provide opportunities for development and recognition that will make up for the lack of mobility. To the extent that circumstances in the
department prevent recognition, development and advancement for employees. A decline in quality of staff may be expected. So far as relates to the Jordanian situation, all of these factors will be examined. Finally, with the advantage of evidence on both career experience within and outside the Service, it would be pertinent to investigate the role of both types of factors in influencing career "success". The study attempts to link social environment and educational background to career progress. Comprehensive studies of careers are rare in any government service context and a broader view of the working experience of bureaucrats would obviously be of interest. This study attempts to fill these particular gaps in our knowledge of the contemporary government Service of Jordan. Apart from providing a description of the background characteristics of the Civil Service, the Study concentrates on two aspects of the bureaucrats - their career experience and factors associated with success in the Service.

The political, economic and social importance of the bureaucracy is manifest today in every nation which has passed beyond the tribal stage of development. In developing nations, the bureaucracy almost always bears major responsibility for whatever is or is not being done for social and political modernisation. In advanced nations, the bureaucracy tends to expand in size, power and scope of activity, entering increasingly into sectors previously regarded as private. Jordan has moved from the first to the second of these stages. Its bureaucracy has been deeply involved into the development of industry, commerce, communications, transportation, education and agriculture. This could be expected to influence the development of policy.

In theory, a bureaucracy merely implements policy decisions made by
political leaders, but in practice it is hard to distinguish clearly between the making and the carrying out of governmental decisions. Laws and ordinances enacted outside the bureaucracy often originate within it; policies announced by politicians have often proposed or been influenced by career subordinates. In any case, statutes and policies often have essential details to be determined by bureaucrats, and execution often requires interpretations which can result in substantial modification of legislative intent. Finally, the method and vigour of execution can determine the effectiveness of political decisions. For all these reasons, a bureaucracy possesses considerably more power than the term "implementation" implies. In Jordan, this might be expected to be particularly true. This is an area which the study investigates.

The study hopes to draw conclusions about the situation which currently exists and the ways in which more effective career development can take place in the future. At the same time, the study hopes to provide those outside the Service with a knowledge and appreciation of what it is like to be a government servant in Jordan.

1.2 SCOPE AND METHOD OF THE STUDY

In a national study of government servants, selectivity is essential, because they are both numerous and dissimilar in function. In legal terms, the Jordanian Civil Service covers a wide range of personnel paid from public funds including technicians, diplomats, judges, teachers, clerks, etc. A study ignoring functional differences within such an indiscriminate grouping would mean very little; yet one taking them all into account would be prohibitively cumbersome. The present study
therefore focuses mainly upon finding representative officials drawn from the whole Service. These are personnel charged with planning, executing, controlling, and approving the endless series of actions by government workers which collectively constitute the process of government administration. In defining the sample, additional criteria must be introduced.

Selection of Organisations

Five departments have been selected, namely: the Civil Service Department, National Planning Council, Treasury, Ministry of Education and Ministry of Agriculture. These departments illustrate different forms of organisation and management: line and staff, field administration, hierarchical and dispersed departments, etc. The study therefore includes organisations which are executive, operational, supervisory, political, ideological, some centralised and some decentralised. What are their functions?

The Civil Service Department (CSD)

It is responsible for recruitment, promotion, training, organisation and management of the Civil Service. It is also entrusted with implementing the Civil Service Regulations, and providing the departments with the relevant assistance and advice.

The National Planning Council (N.P.C.)

It is responsible for preparing long and short-term plans for the country's economic development, for establishing priorities and determining the projects to be implemented. It examines the country's manpower needs and develops systems for the follow-up and evaluation.
It is directly associated with the Budget Department in setting up development expenditures in the budget. It is also responsible for making studies and drawing up, and signing agreements concerning all loans and aid related to development of government administration. It also turned out to have other important functions for which we were not prepared.

The Treasury

The Treasury is an "umbrella" department consisting of six sub-departments, namely, Finance, Budget, Income Tax, Customs, Land and Survey, and General Materials. It handles all revenues and expenditures of the State, including Civil Service pay. It is still regarded as the "senior" central department. Its functions are fewer than they were 20 years ago and particularly since the creation of the Civil Service Department. But its responsibilities for the control of public spending and the general economic performance of the country mean that it is still an enormously powerful and influential department.

The Ministry of Education

This Ministry is concerned with all forms of public education. It is entrusted with the establishment, supervision, and administration of various types and levels of education; the supervision and control of all private, national and foreign educational institutions. It encourages and organises youth activities, such as physical education, military training, camping and boy scouts and girl guides. It prescribes the curricula and textbooks to be used by all public and private schools in the country and recruits all teachers to be appointed in public schools through the Civil Service Department.
The Ministry of Agriculture

This Ministry is concerned with agricultural development and all matters related to it. It makes feasibility studies of agricultural projects, co-operates with other sectors of the economy in preparing the necessary agricultural plans, develops techniques to improve agricultural methods and offers guidance to farmers. Furthermore, it controls animal diseases, and inspects meat and fish products.

Selection of Management Level

A second criterion used in selection is the position to which an official is assigned within his organisation. This is considered in terms of level of responsibility, level of position, function, specialisation, salary and type of appointment based upon categories of the general grades (i.e. classified) and departmental grades (i.e. unclassified and contractual). Three basic position levels are here referred to as "top", "middle" and "lower".

It should be noted that distinction is made between political (or policy) and non-political (or career) posts. According to the Law a political post is that of a cabinet minister. These are by Constitution required to resign when the Cabinet falls. These are political, not career posts. These posts therefore are excluded from the study.

In spite of the rapid growth of the Jordanian bureaucracy, the internal management structure of departments is similar. The highest career position in a ministry is that of a Permanent Secretary and is sometimes assisted by a Deputy Permanent Secretary. Each ministry
also has directorates, headed by directors. Their rank and type of appointment vary with the size and importance of the agency. These positions are included in the Study as the "top" level management.

Directorates are organised into divisions. Each of these is headed by a head of division. For the purpose of this study these positions are classified as "middle" level management. Each head of division supervises heads of section. The "lower" management level consists of heads of sections. On this basis, 300 officials, divided into three categories were selected, twenty officials from each level of the three management levels in every department studied.

Study Methods

Various other methods were used by the Study. First, a literature review was made of comparable studies and what literature existed about the state of affairs in Jordan. This included extensive sets of unpublished reports and statistics. Second, a number of key personnel in various departments were interviewed to obtain "management" judgements on personnel management policies and practices. Third, 300 employees were interviewed and answered the questionnaire. The questionnaire is contained in appendix (2). Fourth, statistical analyses were made of personnel and career data for the officials in the sample to find out how well their own career goals had been met in the Service.
NOTES


2. Effectiveness is defined as the measurement of progress towards achieving those objectives and the consideration of alternative means of achieving objectives. Efficiency has been defined as, given the objectives and the means chosen to pursue the objectives, the minimising of inputs to the programme in relation to the outputs from it. See: GB, House of Commons, Efficiency and Effectiveness in the Civil Service: Government Observations on the 3rd Report from the Treasury and Civil Service Committee, Cmnd 8816, Vol. 1, Session 1981-82, London: HMSO, 1982, p. ix.


8. See: GB, House of Commons, op. cit.


14. Ibid.


17. See the bibliography.
CHAPTER II

ENVIRONMENT

INTRODUCTION

A fact of life for underdeveloped societies is that a vast number of people are on the payrolls of their nations' governments. Although the profession of government is reputed to be the oldest of the world's professions, the large number of government employees today is a relatively recent phenomenon. Jordan has not been spared from this trend. In 1936 the government employed only 683 officials (civil and military officers). By 1982 the government of Jordan at all levels paid the salaries of over 185,000 public officials - nearly 47 per cent of the total labour force of the nation.

Why has the Jordanian bureaucracy grown? How can one explain why 47 per cent of the nation's labour force are paid out of public funds? It will be the purpose of this chapter to place the Jordanian public bureaucracy in its environmental setting - to present some of the dominant features and influences that helped to shape it into the complex entity it is today. Five factors will be discussed: geographical-historical features; demographic characteristics; economic context; social structure; political system; and impact of cultural factors.

2.1 THE GEOGRAPHICAL-HISTORICAL FEATURES

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is an extension of a League of Nations Mandate which came into existence in 1921. The territorial area (i.e. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan) has not varied significantly
since that time. But the land itself has a long history of civilised
development among nations of the Middle East. Since the time of the
Crusades the only continuous cultural influence has been the Arab
culture. Because of its position on the great trade routes of the
ancient world, external influences survive.

Until the First World War the area was part of the Ottoman
Empire, which in turn influenced the attitude towards the government
and administration. Until the end of the First World War in 1918,
Jordan was physically part of Syria. As part of the "carve up" of
middle east territories, Britain and France divided Syria into four
areas: Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan.

To rule Trans-Jordan within the terms of British Mandate,
Prince Abdullah (grandfather of the present Monarch) was invited to
Trans-Jordan to establish a Princedom. Jordan was able to achieve
its independence from British Mandate in 1946 and became known as the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Its first problem was to absorb
Palestinian Arabs from the newly created State of Israel. In 1950,
the Palestinians on the West Bank were united with the East Bank of
Jordan. In 1967 when the West Bank fell under Israel’s occupation,
additional strains were placed upon the government, the availability
of resources and their diversion to cope with new problems. A new
Ministry of Occupied Territories was even created to deal with these
problems.

The geographical location of Jordan as a modern State lies
between longitudes 39° and 34° east and latitudes 29° and 33° north.
It is situated off the south-east of the Mediterranean sea and extends
eastward into the Syrian Desert. Its total area is 96,188 square kilometers (of which the West Bank forms an enclave of 6,644 square kilometers). Over 80 per cent of that is desert or semi-desert. Nearly 7/8ths of the people live in less than 1/6th of the land, (the population density at 24 persons per square kilometre), which is mainly around the Jordan Valley in the north western corner of the country.

The lands of Jordan can be divided into four major groups. First, there are the arid, desert plains of eastern Jordan suitable for limited grazing of sheep and goats. Second, the semi-arid plains located between the desert and the highlands which comprise about 2/3rds of the land area of Jordan in which the cereal crops, tobacco, some fruits and vegetables and livestock are raised. Third, the highland areas are located on both sides of the Jordan Valley in which cereal crops, olives, and grazing are the principal farming practices. This area contains public domain lands and generally small village areas. Fourth, the Jordan Valley area includes a low, flood plain of approximately 500,000 dunums. In this area are grown citrus, vegetables, and other types of intensified agricultural crops. This area offers the greatest agriculture production.

According to FAO estimates for 1974, only 12.0 per cent of the area was arable land, 1.9 per cent under permanent crops and a further 2.3 per cent was used as permanent meadow, pasture or forest. The climate of Jordan is generally arid and the annual rainfall is exceedingly variable. There are also great regional differences; while more than half of the country receives less than 100mm of
precipitation a year, the northern highland may receive as much as 600mm.\textsuperscript{12}

Jordan has only one point of access to the sea at the Red Sea Port of Aqaba. The country is bounded on the north by Syria, on the north-east by Iraq, on the east and south by Saudi Arabia, and on the west by Israel. Amman is the capital city, as well as the nation's industrial and financial centre, with a population of 648,500 in 1979. Other urban centres include Zarka (215,600), Irbid (112,800), Salt (32,800) and Karak (11,800).\textsuperscript{13}

The people of Jordan are predominantly Arab. There are, however, a few small non-Arab communities, such as Armenians, Kurds, and the largest among them, the Circassians who were settled in Jordan during the last century.\textsuperscript{14} The 'official' religion of the State is Islam. The majority of the population are Muslims, though about 7 per cent are Christian.\textsuperscript{15} Arabic is the official language and is universally spoken by the inhabitants.

\subsection*{2.2 Demographic Characteristics}

\textbf{Population Growth}

The population of the East Bank of Jordan is divided into three nearly equal groups: the original inhabitants of Trans-Jordan; inhabitants of former Palestine; and the Palestine refugees.\textsuperscript{16} Table 2.1 represents the population growth of the country.
### TABLE 2.1

Population of Jordan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>East Bank (000)</th>
<th>West Bank (000)</th>
<th>Total (000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>1,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>1,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2,147</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.1 demonstrates two main features. Firstly, the traumatic effect of absorbing Palestinians and consequent effects on public administration, education and social services. Secondly, the problem facing government in dealing with rapidly growing population dependent on native resources.

The annual growth rates on the east and west banks combined were estimated at 2.8 per cent in 1952, and 3.1 per cent in 1961. In the East Bank, they were estimated at 3.6 per cent in 1970, 3.4 per cent in 1975 and 3.8 per cent in 1979. Thus, Jordan occupies the highest growth rate in the world as shown by Table 2.2.

### TABLE 2.2

Population Growth Rate by Geographical Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Average growth rate</th>
<th>percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The World</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed Countries</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-developed countries</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The high rate of growth in Jordan is due to three principal factors. First is the continuous influx of Palestinian refugees and other displaced persons from the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the Israeli occupation of these two areas in 1967. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), there were about 378,000 registered refugees of 1948 and 295,000 registered refugees of 1967 on the East Bank of Jordan at the beginning of 1978, and 193,000 displaced persons (from 1967) were registered with the Jordanian Government only. Second is the increasing number of Arab and non-Arab workers who entered East Bank, especially since 1976. The estimated number of these workers was 70,000. Third, there has been an increase in birth combined with a drop in death rates which resulted in a high natural increase of about 3.8 per cent of population annually, apart from the net migration factor. This is due to marked progress and expansion of the health and sanitary services. The crude death rate dropped from 21 per thousand in 1952-54 to 18 per thousand in 1961, then to 3 per thousand in 1979. The life expectancy at birth rose from 49 years in 1961 to approximately 57 in 1977. It has shown a slight increase from 47.3 live births in 1960 to the level of 48 per thousand in 1978.

Age Structure

The Jordan society is characterised as a "young" one, where those who are under the age of 15 constitute more than half of the total population in 1979 (see Table 2.3). The high fertility accompanied by recent reductions in infant and child mortality have given Jordan a high proportion of children in the population. The young age composition means a very high ratio of child dependency. On the other
hand, the proportion of those who are in the working age (i.e. 15-64) has declined to 45.4 per cent of total population as shown by Table 2.3, whereas in developed countries this proportion reaches more than 65 per cent of total population. 22

TABLE 2.3

Age Distribution of Jordanians (East Bank), 1961.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 15</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 64</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 and over</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This economically unfavourable age structure has affected greatly the dependency ratio in Jordan, 120:100 persons in the working age. This high ratio is further aggravated by the fact that not all of those in the working age are productive or working. A later chapter demonstrates that age structure has important consequences for public pay and pension policy.

In general, the ratio of productive persons in the household in the developed countries is 1:3 persons, where it is 1:5 persons in Jordan. 23 Twenty per cent of the total population in Jordan are working (see Table 2.4). This is, in turn, mainly due to the low participation rate of females who are in the working age group in economic activity.
Although the participation of women (47.7 per cent of population) in the labour force has increased three-fold in the past five years, it was still only about 14 per cent of their total in the working age group in 1979.\(^{(24)}\)

### TABLE 2.4


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Work Force</th>
<th>Crude participation rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inside Jordan (East Bank)</td>
<td>1,953,061</td>
<td>382,800</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Jordan</td>
<td>663,700</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Jordanians</td>
<td>2,618,700</td>
<td>532,800</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Urban/Rural Distribution**

The urban/rural distribution of population reveals that the urban sector constitutes about 60 per cent of total population (see Table 2.5).\(^{(25)}\) This distribution reflects the pattern of rainfall and cultivation, but other factors have also come into play. The influx into the country of several hundred thousand refugees as well as rapid urbanisation have exacerbated the conditions. About 87 per cent of the population is concentrated in less than one-eighth of the land area, in the northwest uplands, while most of the remaining inhabitants live in scattered areas in various parts of the country.\(^{26}\) This becomes a problem when staffing posts to rural areas, especially in the Ministry of Education. Internal migration from rural areas is an important factor in the rapidly increasing population density in
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Bank</td>
<td>2,147,065</td>
<td>1,277,954</td>
<td>869,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>1,185,181</td>
<td>966,507</td>
<td>218,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irbid</td>
<td>609,251</td>
<td>192,648</td>
<td>416,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balqa</td>
<td>151,543</td>
<td>36,694</td>
<td>114,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karak</td>
<td>126,114</td>
<td>37,357</td>
<td>88,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma'an</td>
<td>74,976</td>
<td>44,748</td>
<td>30,228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Some of the reasons behind the rural exodus are: the smallness of individual farm holdings which generate insufficient income to meet family needs; the unavailability of low-cost agricultural inputs; and the lack of rural social services.28

Overall, the available statistics indicate if this growth continues at the present rate until 1990, and it is expected to do so, the population of the East Bank will become 3.3 million.29 Assuming a slight decline in the rate of growth, to 3.8 per cent per annum, the population will more than double at the end of this century (to about 4.8m). The consequence of this for the structure and complexity of the government is obvious. Also the flow of migrants from rural to urban areas will certainly continue to pose the greatest socio-economic problems.
2.3 ECONOMIC CONTEXT

The modern Jordanian economy reflects historical and political developments as well as showing the aspiration of the new independent State. The Jordanian economy is considered a growing economy. In the last quarter century, the economy of Jordan has experienced comprehensive and structural changes.

The period of 1948-1961 witnessed effective State control of the Jordanian economy. The 1948 crisis with its economic and population problems and the inflow of Palestinian refugees to the East Bank created a setback to economic growth. However, the Confederacy of the East and West Banks resulted not only in population explosion and the need for government assistance in social services, but also created market expansion and the increase of money supply which led to more investment opportunities. These factors have been conducive to the creation of various industries such as cement, phosphates, oil, crude oil refining and tanning, vegetables, etc. The participation rate of workers to non-workers was in the range of 23 per cent to 25 per cent at the end of this phase. The labour force was distributed among the economic activities as follows: Agriculture 35 per cent; Mining, Manufacturing, Electricity and Construction, 21 per cent; and Services 44 per cent. (31)

Although economic growth had been achieved during the period to 1963, the real need was for an economic national plan. This led to the setting up of the Economic Development Programme for the period of 1964-1970. This programme aimed at reducing foreign financial assistance to the budget and increasing the gross national product by 7 per cent per annum as well as reducing the level of unemployment. Despite the development of industrial activity during this plan,
the distribution of labour force showed that the Services Sector absorbed most of the increase in the labour force and the labour surplus realised from the Agricultural Sector.\textsuperscript{33}

The Development Plan for 1973-1975 aimed at increasing employment opportunities by creating 70 thousand new jobs, achieving an 8 per cent annual growth of GDP, developing economic and social activities in different areas especially rural areas, increasing the reliance of the general budget on domestic revenues, strengthening the balance of payment and reducing the relative increase in the trade deficit.\textsuperscript{34}

The Plan period witnessed a growing activity in the Industrial Sector. The productive capacity of factories was utilised and the increase of job opportunities and execution of projects was affected. Annual growth averaged 23 per cent which exceeds any previous rates. However, the value added in the Services Sector showed a moderate increase of 3 per cent per annum.\textsuperscript{35}

The Development Plan for 1976-1980 aimed at furthering the development momentum attained during the previous plan for 1973-1975 within a comprehensive framework of development strategy, with the objectives of achieving an annual rate of growth of 12 per cent in GDP, developing social and economic activity in the various regions of the nation, increasing the reliance of the general budget on domestic revenues and reducing the deficit in the balance of trade.\textsuperscript{36}

In this phase, the economic performance was characterised by a realization of growth rates which were quite close to the targets set by the plan.\textsuperscript{37}

The Development Plan for 1981-1985 is based on those principles
and general developmental framework that Jordan had pursued, namely, a liberal economic system, an appreciation of private initiative and maintenance of a favourable investment climate, with adequate incentives to encourage the private sector to play a proper role in the development process. The Plan aimed at achieving a real growth rate in GDP of 10.4 per annum, increasing productive sector's share in GDP to 44.8 per cent, increasing the government's domestic revenues to 35.4 per cent in 1985, reducing the ratio of the deficit in goods and service balance, providing basic necessities to the citizen and improving the labour force.

In 1982, the estimated general budget was JD 765 million. Estimated domestic revenues reached JD 338, whereas loans and financial assistance estimated by JD 391 million. Estimated current expenditure was JD 420 million, while estimated capital expenditure was JD 345 million. Table 2.8 represents the distribution of the estimated expenditures (current and capital) by activity.

**TABLE 2.8**

Estimated Budgetary Expenditure, 1982.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Expenditure (000)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>4160</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Affairs</td>
<td>5814</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture &amp; Information Services</td>
<td>12999</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication &amp; Transport Services</td>
<td>32530</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>94116</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Administration</td>
<td>184028</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence &amp; Security</td>
<td>189750</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development Services</td>
<td>241803</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>765000</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4 SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Jordan falls within the scale of social structures of tradition-transition-modern scale. While Jordan might be considered traditional on the basis of the degree of personalism of social relationships, most of it qualifies as modern on the basis of its attitude to other cultures and transitional on the basis of the rate of change from illiteracy. "In Jordan, one passes through the looking glass into a magic world where extreme modernity rides hand in hand with the desert sheiks and the old ways of Arabia."

Traditional societies are typically personalistic and adherence to such values tends to give more importance to who a person is rather than to what he is capable of doing or has done; to whom one knows rather than what one knows; and to who are affected by particular events rather than what the events are. This value orientation is also reflected in a greater concern for problems of local importance, those in other words, which affect known people and involve known things, rather than for issues that are of national and international significance.

The individual Jordanian can be described as particularistic and personalistic in ethical orientation, a characteristic which implies a greater loyalty to one's own group or family than to one's class or nation. Patai points out:

"In the field of social culture, the most important complex which is basically similar all over the area (the Middle East) is undoubtedly the family. The family occupies a focal position and its structure and functioning are practically identical not only among nomadic and settled peoples, but among the majority of urban population in which Westernization has not yet made appreciable inroads."

One of the most salient Jordanian values is a high regard for authority. Authoritarianism in Jordan is rooted and exemplified in
the Jordanian family structure. For the family to remain close and secure, the father, typically, exerts firm authority and he is to be respected and obeyed.45

"The father in the Jordanian family plays a dominant role, and his image is that of a patriarch presiding over his family's affairs. Once, his authority was rarely ever questioned and his judgements were final." 46

This characteristic also obtains on the societal level and manifests itself by the tendency for one to look to authority figures for help in obtaining employment and other benefits.47

"...It would appear to be more than coincidental that countries with this family system complain of lack of individual initiative and pioneering spirit and of nepotism in both business and government." 48

Another notable Jordanian trait is the predisposition toward subordinating one's personal interests and goals to the welfare of one's family or group.49

"The individual, in Arab thinking, in general, is regarded as subservient to the group. He is to be developed or, alternatively, sacrificed for the glory and power of the group .... What is even more apparent is that the individual in Arab Society philosophy .... is not regarded as the last judge of what is good or bad for himself." 50

An important consequence of group-centredness is the lack of a sense of individual autonomy which reflects the greater importance placed on group effort and group prerogative in Jordanian society.51 Berger points out:

"Through most of their history, despite the recent introduction of Western political forms, Arab communities have been collections of groups rather than of individuals. The family and the tribe have been the social units through which the individual has related himself to others and to governments." 52
Jordanians are generally known for their excessive concern for status in the community. The importance of status consideration can readily be inferred, for example, by the way people are addressed or introduced even in social and informal gatherings. An important consequence of this concern for status is a concern for a hierarchy, for bureaucratic organisation and hence for red-tape. Such a demonstration of formalism is not, however, the way in which the Jordanian public official does business. On the whole, personal contact and direct relationship is the key to understand how business is conducted.

People from all over the world enjoy having prestige. Jordanians are by no means different in this respect. Berger mentioned three sources of prestige in Arab society, namely: piety, education and land. To this list one might add the army officers, the higher public servants, and independent professions (e.g. doctors, engineers, lawyers).

Perhaps the most salient aspect of Jordanian society is the extent of its segmentation. This structural characteristic has long been associated with traditional societies, which according to Lerner:

"deploy people by kinship into communities isolated from each other and from a centre; lacking the bonds of interdependence, people's horizons are limited by locale and their decisions involve only other known people in known societies."

Rooted in the kinship system and the personalistic value orientation of the Jordanians, the segmentation of Jordan society has both vertical and horizontal manifestation. Jordanians form more or less self
contained social enclaves which are made up of people from all socio-economic classes. The apex of such social formations is typically occupied by the wealthiest and, to a large degree, the most powerful. This stratum is typically represented by tribal chiefs, big landlords, entrepreneurs, professionals and, above all, some members of the Royal Family to whom all others are expected to owe loyalty and allegiance.  

An important consequence of the kinship based on vertical, ego-centred segmentation of Jordanian society is the absence of an overriding feeling of class identification among Jordanians. It might be convenient to regard Jordan as a two-class society defined in economic terms. This might be true in the remote rural areas, but there also seems to be an emergent middle class in the cities and towns. This development however has not changed standards of behaviour and values.

2.5 POLITICAL SYSTEM

Constitutional Development

The form and pattern of a political system or a government largely depend upon its constitution. The stages of the constitutional development in the State of Jordan are as follows.

The first stage is the period extending from 1921-1928. The first central administration in the Emirate of Trans-Jordan was established in 1921. During this stage there was no written constitution. The country was under the League of Nations Mandate, administered by Britain.
The Mandatory power recognised Prince Abdullah as the Prince of Jordan. The Prince was empowered by the Mandatory power, to legislate on internal matters by royal decrees, which had the force of the law. The internal administration of the country was personally entrusted to the Prince. Foreign affairs were within the province of the Mandatory power. The judiciary, although independent in name, did not enjoy the privileges as an independent organ of the State.

The second stage extended from 1928-1947. The main feature of this period is that although the country was under British Mandate, there was an Organic Law. The Prince was recognised as the Sovereign and Head of the State. His powers, under the Organic Law, were very wide. He appointed and dismissed the Prime Minister, civil servants, judges and dissolved the Legislative Council. The executive power was vested in the Council of Executives, who were appointed and dismissed by the Prince and were jointly and severally responsible for the administration of the country, to the Prince. The legislative power was vested in the Legislative Council, whose members were mostly elected by direct ballot and partly appointed by the Prince. The Judicial Power exercised through courts by judges whose independence was guaranteed by the Organic Law.

During the third stage (1946-1952), Trans-Jordan achieved independence and Prince Abdullah was proclaimed King of Jordan. A written constitution was promulgated in 1946. The King was recognised as the Sovereign and Head of State and was immune from political liability. His powers, under the Constitution, were wide, but such powers were to be exercised through royal decrees and were to be signed by either the Prime Minister or the appropriate Minister.
These powers included: the right to appoint and dismiss the Council of Ministers; and the right to dissolve the House of Representatives. The executive power was vested in the Council of Ministers who were jointly and severally responsible to the king for their policies and activities. The legislative power was vested in the National Assembly. This consisted of two Houses: the House of Representatives, whose members were elected by direct ballot; and the Senate, whose members were appointed by the King. The judicial power was vested in the law courts, whose independence was recognised by the constitution.

The fourth stage commences in 1952 when a new Constitution was promulgated. It had become imperative to have a new Constitution due to the political developments in the area, and also to meet the changing requirements of the nation.

The King is recognised as the Head of the State and is immune from political liability. He appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister or accepts his resignation. Ministers are appointed and released or their resignation accepted by the King on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The King orders the elections for the House of Representatives with the provision of the law. He convenes, opens, adjourns, prorogues and dissolves the House of Representatives under the Constitution. The King exercises his judicial authority by Royal Decrees.

The legislative power resides in the King and the Parliament. The Parliament consists of two Houses: The House of Representatives, whose members are elected on the basis of direct ballot; and the Senate, whose members are appointed by the King on the basis of meritorious
service and other special qualifications. The judicial power is vested in the courts of law. The judges are independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions, they are subject to no authority but that of the law.

The executive power is vested in the Cabinet. The Council of Ministers, being the supreme executive body, presides over and controls government. It does so through Ministries, headed by Ministers, and independent Agencies, headed by very senior members of the Civil Service, attached to the Prime Minister. Each Minister is responsible for the department under his control, and the Cabinet is collectively responsible to the Parliament.

Features of the Political System

The political system of Jordan demonstrates several salient features. At the local level, government authorities are numerous, weak and fragmented. There is a limited degree of parliamentary democracy at the national level. The Parliament is small; there are only sixty members in the House of Representatives and thirty members in the Senate. The MPs themselves have a relatively high status in Jordan. The position’s remuneration is high; selection procedures screen out the brilliant, innovative and uncontrollable. Thus, the MPs probably represent a cross-section of Jordan society as opposed to forming a group of the "best" of the nation's citizens.

Political parties have been banned since the late 1950s. The members of the Cabinet formed by the King, with complete discretion, are allocated the portfolios of the various departments and ministries. The Cabinet is entrusted with the administration of the internal and

*Local Government (i.e. Municipalities and Local Councils).
external affairs of the State, and with the formulation and implementation of the country's general policy. The ruling Cabinet of twenty three members is not necessarily selected from the members of Parliament.

A feature of the political system of Jordan is the relatively low level of conflict. The successive governments differ very little on basic policies, although one may tend to be more for or against something than the other. Because Jordan is a small nation where there is much face-to-face contact between policy-makers and the influential, low conflict and a spirit of consultation may be necessary in order for the political system to survive. However, the tendency is for business to be done secretly. Laws and ordinances allow or require the government to keep records, information and procedures from public scrutiny and some departments carry this restriction to ridiculous levels. The press is notorious for its spiritless, casual approach to public issues. For the most part, reporters fail to search for news and are content to rewrite press handouts from Ministers, government departments and interest groups. The radio and television media in Jordan are government-owned and, therefore, have never questioned government decisions and practices.

Jordan's political system does display one great advantage over many others - stability. With rare exceptions during the 1950s, the political leaders have shown little inclination to tamper with the basic machinery and process of government. Perhaps the Jordan social and political environment do not urge restructuring and perhaps because MPs are somewhat less than imaginative or dynamic, the basic political system has remained intact for decades.
2.6 IMPACT OF CULTURAL FACTORS

Economic, political and other environmental factors are a reflection of the culture of a middle eastern society like Jordan. In such societies the most important determinant of progress and development is the influence of Islam, communicated through the educational system to those who are to become leaders of the nation. To this extent, there is a direct relationship between the development of forms of administrative organisation, behaviour, attitudes and structures and the way in which people are educated. Present arrangements for education therefore deserve some discussion.

Demography and Education

One way of analysing the educational achievements of a country is to present them quantitatively vis-a-vis the demographical facts of the country. According to the statistical data of 1976, 29.3 per cent of the population surveyed were illiterate (nearly 41 per cent of women compared with 17.8 per cent among men). The incidence of illiteracy was found to be greater in rural areas at 44.3 per cent than in urban areas where the frequency was 26.0 per cent.

On the East Bank in 1976, ninety per cent of children in the 6-11 age group were attending primary schools, 77 per cent in the 12-14 age group were attending preparatory schools, and 53 per cent in the 15-17 age group were attending secondary schools. At the higher level of education, the enrolment ratio for the 18-22 age group was estimated at 21 per cent which is one of the highest in the world. Table 2.7 shows school enrolment in 1976.
### TABLE 2.7

School Enrolment by Sex and Level of Education, 1976
(East Bank)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>6-11</td>
<td>214,570</td>
<td>187,831</td>
<td>402,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory</td>
<td>12-14</td>
<td>71,733</td>
<td>53,249</td>
<td>124,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary:</td>
<td>15-17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td></td>
<td>31,460</td>
<td>21,711</td>
<td>53,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,430</td>
<td>2,117</td>
<td>7,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>18-22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,373</td>
<td>2,465</td>
<td>6,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Institutes</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,283</td>
<td>2,723</td>
<td>7,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Institutes</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,487</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>1,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>333,337</td>
<td>270,499</td>
<td>603,836</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**

In 1980 over one-third of the population was reported to be attending schools.\(^{[96]}\)

Exactly 93 per cent of children in the 6-11 age group of the population were attending primary schools and 87 per cent in the 12-14 age group were attending preparatory schools. 67.3 per cent in the 15-17 age group were attending secondary schools, and 21 per cent in 18-23 age group were attending higher education.\(^{[97]}\)
The Structure of the Educational System

Education in Jordan is centrally controlled by the Ministry of Education. It is free for all. Girls and boys have equal opportunities to learn, and there is no discrimination whatsoever in education among people of different creeds and religions.

Pre-school education in kindergartens is provided by private agencies.* Children are accepted in these institutions if they are over three years of age. The Ministry of Education has issued regulations concerning the administration of kindergartens. According to these regulations, attendance at kindergartens is for two years preceding primary education.

At the age of six, children normally start the six years of primary education. The primary level is followed by three years of preparatory level. All students who pass their school exams at the end of the third preparatory class are advanced to the secondary level.

The duration of the secondary level is of three years. Education at this level is provided by secondary general schools (i.e. secondary comprehensive schools) and secondary vocational schools. The latter include the commercial, agricultural, industrial, postal and nursing schools. Students for all types of secondary schools sit for the General Secondary Education Examination. Those who pass the examination are entitled to pursue their education in institutes of higher learning, both in Jordan and abroad.

Higher education in Jordan is provided by higher institutes. These include teaching institutes and professional institutes of two/three

*Kindergarten means non-educational child supervision.
Presently, there are three universities in Jordan: the University of Jordan, the University of Yarmouk, and the University of Mu'ta.

Tables 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12 show some characteristics of the education system in Jordan.

**TABLE 2.8**

Comparative Statistics of Population, Students, Teachers and Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1922*</th>
<th>1930*</th>
<th>1940*</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970*</th>
<th>1980*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>1,250,000</td>
<td>1700000</td>
<td>1508000</td>
<td>2227000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>2,316</td>
<td>4,698</td>
<td>10,150</td>
<td>76,957</td>
<td>189138</td>
<td>261000</td>
<td>778733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>1,723</td>
<td>5076</td>
<td>8021</td>
<td>27039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>1141</td>
<td>1170</td>
<td>2691</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*East Bank only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>29882</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28803</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>10449</td>
<td>3105</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>16465</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>6150</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6481</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory</td>
<td>2774</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28802</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindergarten</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2347</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparative Statistics of Students, Teachers, and Schools by Level of Education.
### TABLE 2.10

Students Population by Level of Education, 1980/81

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindergarten</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 2.11

Illiteracy Ratios Among Population by Sex, 1961 and 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>84.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 2.12

Graduates by Academic Qualification and Sex, 1980/81

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualification</th>
<th>Graduates</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Certificate</td>
<td>23,366</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Institute Diploma</td>
<td>4,810</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Degree</td>
<td>2,824</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Identification of Major Problems

The major issues and problems of education could be identified as follows. First, there are imbalances of provision of education between urban and rural areas. That is all vocational secondary schools, of three years duration, except the two agricultural schools which are located in the southern part of the country, and all training centres, of two years duration, are located in urban areas. Although male students of rural areas join secondary vocational schools, most of them prefer to join general secondary schools in their areas. Also, a high proportion of those who join drop out through the three years for different social and economic reasons. In general, girls from rural areas are completely deprived of joining any type of vocational education.

Statistics of 1977 indicate that out of the 134 general secondary schools in the rural areas, 55 only are completed secondary schools, that is they contain tenth, eleventh and twelfth grades. The rest are incomplete. As a result of these imbalances, rural students are deprived of science and technology education except, on the one hand, a small number from well-to-do families, who can continue or join scientific education in urban schools. On the other hand, are those students, willing to joint scientific and higher education who put pressure upon their parents. Many families leave their villages for cities, thus evacuating rural areas, which consequently adversely affects agriculture in the country.

Second, imbalance among schools themselves. Newly constructed schools are of a high standard, well-equipped and furnished, and provided with suitable libraries, laboratories and games fields, while a high proportion of the owned old schools and all the rented schools
are lacking adequate classrooms, equipment, furniture, libraries, etc.

The very high proportion of rented premises and the inadequate school buildings in which students have to learn is considered one of the most disturbing features of education in Jordan. The percentage of rented premises at both compulsory and secondary levels 1980/81 was 41 per cent. The conditions of these schools, particularly in rural areas, are totally unsuitable for the learning process; they do not meet the requirements of education, and thus they must have adverse effects on the quality of education.

Moreover, there is no satisfactory maintenance of school premises, even the newly erected proper school buildings, with resultant deterioration. So there is a need for a much larger capitalisation element within the budget of the Ministry of Education than the 8.2 per cent (capital outlays 1980/81) which is allocated for development purposes.

Third, there is a shortage of qualified teachers and personnel. Another disturbing feature of education at the secondary level is the shortage of qualified teachers, particularly teachers of vocational education, mathematics, sciences and English language. Statistics of 1981 indicate that the percentage of qualified teachers, "Holders of first university degree and above, which their qualifications meet the requirements of secondary school teachers as stated by the law of education", was 78.5 per cent in general secondary schools and 41 per cent in vocational secondary schools. The main reason is the low scale of salaries in Jordan. As a result, university graduates are not attracted to the profession of teaching. Also, many qualified teachers on the job and officials of the Ministry of Education in the area of
administration, planning and technical work, leave Jordan for better salaries abroad. Such a drain of qualified manpower puts the government in a difficult situation, especially at the stage of implementing development programmes, including educational reform.

Fourth, there is a gross imbalance between general and vocational education at the secondary level. A ratio of 84 per cent general to 16 per cent vocational points out that the diversification of secondary education: (a) will not be able to achieve the target of expanding vocational education at the secondary level so as to raise enrolment in the first secondary vocational class (Grade 10) to 30 per cent of total enrolment of that class by 1985; (b) still falls short of fulfilling the needs of the students and the country in occupational training.

A critical shortage in the projected labour demand in the Five Year Development Plan(1981-1985)exists in two occupational categories. (a) technical and "sub-professional" occupations; and (b) skilled manual occupations. It is worth noting that the supply for these two categories is expected to be completely dependent on output of the Jordanian educational institutions and schools. This shows the importance of the problem, and the urgency of diversification of secondary education and the expansion of vocational education.

Fifth, education is still of the traditional type. The curriculum of general secondary schools which accommodate 84 per cent of the total enrolment, is slanted very much towards "academic" education, and not related to the world of work. For a high percentage of general
secondary school graduates, secondary education will be terminal, no opportunity existing to join higher education. Their low achievement in the General Secondary Examination Certificate is partly the result of economical and social reasons. Also, a considerable percentage of drop-out occurs during the three years of the level.

A major problem which arises is that these under-educated young people have no training of any kind or occupational education to help them enter the world of work. They are forced to adapt themselves, for two or three years after graduation, to tasks and jobs in establishments which would employ them, because of the shortage of skilled needed labour force at that level, which in turn adversely affects the quality and quantity of production.

Overall, clearly such a situation is not encouraging for real development and improvement within the cycle of national planning. A vicious cycle has been created as thousands of students continue to be disadvantaged by an increasingly outmoded and useless system of education. The longer the present educational system continues to operate along these lines, the more difficult it will be for Jordan to achieve a public service trained for the achievement of a sufficiently rapid rate of growth.
NOTES


7. Ibid.


22. Ibid.


25. In Jordanian terms urban areas are defined of having 5,000 of population.


42. M. Malallah, op. cit. p. 10.

43. Ibid.

44. Raphael Patai, "The Middle East as a Cultural Area", Middle East Journal, 8:1, 1952.


47. M. Malallah, op. cit. p. 11.

49. M. Malallah, op.cit. p. 11.


57. M. Malallah, op.cit. p. 17.


60. Ibid, pp. 17-18.


62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.


66. Trans-Jordan Emirate, Official Gazette, No. 188, Date: April, 19, 1928.


69. Organic Law, Articles 19, 20, 42.


72. Organic Law, Article 45.

73. For details see: A. El-Hiyari, op.cit., pp. 544-568.

75. Ibid, Article 32.
76. Ibid, Articles 26, 28.
77. Ibid, Article 28.
78. Ibid, Articles 29, 33.
79. Ibid, Articles 57, 58.
82. Ibid, Article 35.
83. Ibid, Article 36.
84. Ibid, Article 90.
85. Ibid, Article 25.
91. The late Parliament was elected in 1967 for four years term. It was prorogued several times before its final dissolution in 1975. The reason for lengthening its term was the occupation of the West Bank by Israel in 1967. It was felt that Parliamentary elections could not be held while the West Bank was under occupation. However, in 1978 a Consultative Council was appointed by the King. The Council acts as a debating arena for government activities. It is functioning temporarily and all its laws and legislation are provisional and must be placed before a new elected parliament for approval. For details of the composition, jurisdiction and function of the Consultative Council, see: Government of Jordan, The Consultative Council, Law of the Consultative Council No. 17 of 1978 and Its Amendments, Amman; Mohammad S. Al-Khazwi, The Jordanian Consultative Council, Amman; Arab Company for Printing and Publications, 1979, K. Abu Jaber, op.cit., p. 92.


95. Ibid.


98. Government of Jordan, Ministry of Education, Law of Education No. 16 of 1964, Amman, 1964. The Ministry of Education Accommodates 70.7 per cent of the total student enrolment, the other government agencies accommodate 0.8 per cent, private agencies 9.5 per cent, and Jordan Universities 2.1 per cent. See: Ministry of Education, Education in Jordan in Figures 1980/81, Amman, 1981.

99. For details see: I. Sha'ban, op.cit. pp. 57-61.

100. Ibid.


102. Technical and sub-professional occupations ordinary requiring two years' Post-secondary education or occupational secondary education. Whereas skilled manual occupations ordinarily requiring vocational secondary completion of both two or three years' duration. See: I. Sha'ban, op.cit. p. 62.
INTRODUCTION

By comparison with other organisations in Jordan society, the public bureaucracy is a large, complex and constantly changing entity. Many of the government departments are larger than any organisation in the private sector of the economy. Yet outside of the government service, very little is known about the internal process of the bureaucracy or about the personnel of the various departments. In terms of the level of information and knowledge, the bureaucracy is a "grey area" - unknown to those not a part of it and obscure to many who work within it.

At the same time, a public bureaucracy has to be organised to perform functions of varying kinds, requiring varying skills at varying levels. Effective organisation is an essential ingredient in any development programme. This has been found as true in Jordan as in all developing countries, even countries which have been independent for many years. The push for economic development and innovations in government administration has produced a critical need for a steady pool of qualified manpower.

It is the purpose of this chapter to sketch the dimensions of the Jordanian administrative system. These include development of the civil service and its structure demonstrated by growth patterns, size and distribution of manpower, structure and functions, and the present system of service-wide position classification.
3.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE STRUCTURE

The Ottoman Law was operated in Trans-Jordan until 1925. In that year new Civil Service Regulations were enacted in the Emirate. One of the conspicuous features of the organisation structure provided for by these Regulations is the division of the career ladder into ten grades.

After independence the government increasingly realised the necessity for change. Between 1949-1952 several regulations were passed which attempted to adapt the civil service to changing needs. The regulations require both central and departmental appointments, as follows: (a) the appointment of class I (Grades 1 - 5) is made by the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the Minister concerned with the approval of the King. (b) Each Ministry has its own committee for selection and promotion. Class II (Grades 7 - 10) is appointed by the Minister concerned on the recommendation of the selection committee in the department concerned. (c) The appointment of the unclassified class is made by the Minister concerned on the recommendation of the head of the department concerned.

However, these regulations appeared to be defective for many reasons. Most important is the inability to provide for a public service equipped to meet current needs. This, in turn, limited the ability to meet increasing public demands for more jobs and better services, etc. As a result, the increased importance of specialisation within the government is not reflected by the numbers of...
specialised personnel. Manpower development has been sacrificed because of limited funds. In addition, politicians wanted their own civil servants as consultants and advisers by setting up "political jobs" through a "contractual" scheme. As a result, the Cabinet asked all departments to introduce suggestions in order to formulate a new "career ladder". Some ministers suggested that wages and salaries should be fixed on the basis of performance, responsibilities and value of the work, together with the academic qualifications. Permanent secretaries and heads of departments on the other hand, proposed to give themselves greater authority and higher responsibilities; to reduce the grades within the "ladder" to seven instead of ten; to make ineligible for promotion officials to the three most senior grades without a university qualification; and to establish a Central Selection Board for appointment and promotion.

By 1952 certain problems became evident. A joint committee of the Cabinet and Parliament was formed to look specifically and systematically at the relationships between grades, jobs and appropriate salaries. The Organisation Law of Government Apparatus, No. 57 of 1953 required appointment of committees whose decisions about appointment were obligatory. In reality, however, those committees had not any practical influence.

Between 1953 and 1958 other problems began to emerge. These included relating salaries to cost of living, providing appropriate pension, death benefits and benefits for dependents. A further serious problem which had arisen by this time was the growth of
unclassified employees and the creation of a contractual class. These developments were a result of using the departments' discretion to employ additional staff as required. This increase was made possible by the willingness of the Budget Department to provide additional payments for the employment of specialised staff to be known as a "contractual class" in departments with expanding development programmes. This development demonstrates the weakness of the control of the Central Personnel Agency.

These and other problems brought about the decision of the government in 1961 to invite Sir Eric Franklin, a United Nations Adviser, to prepare a report on what changes should be made in the structure of the Civil Service to accommodate the many problems which had arisen, and to provide a basis for future development. The most significant result of his report was the Civil Service Law No. 26 of 1961. The Law established a Central Selection Board for all classified officials under the Chairmanship of the Head of the Civil Service Department. It makes binding decisions.

In 1963 members of the Central Selection Board were reduced from 5 to 3 members. The significant feature of this reduction is the exclusion of the Head of the Audit Bureau - who reports to the Parliament rather than to the Prime Minister. Without the parliamentary watchdog to take note of expenditure and the way appointments are made, the government had created greater flexibility in taking decisions about the management of the Civil Service. The Civil Service Law, No. 48 of 1963 which restructured the Civil Service, demonstrates a new approach to civil service management. New duties were given to the Central Personnel Agency which was established in 1955, but had not enjoyed great power to supervise
the administrative apparatus of the government.\textsuperscript{18}

From this date (1963) the role of the Civil Service Department which already existed was to be much increased. Together with the Budget Department, it was to make regulations to control civil service affairs, including organisation and grading. This decision gave rise to dispute between government and Parliament in connection with the interpretation of Article 120 of the Constitution. The latter provides government administration and civil service matters shall be governed by regulations made by the Cabinet with the approval of the King.\textsuperscript{19} It has been argued that this provision limits civil service matters to the regulatory field and to control by the Executive Authority, to the exclusion of the legislature.\textsuperscript{20}

In accordance with Article 122 of the Constitution, the matter was presented to the High Tribunal for the Interpretation of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{21} They laid down that the legislative body may not legislate on matters covered by Article 120 of the Constitution. These relate to any law dealing with such matters and state that they will be deemed unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{22} Accordingly, the Civil Service Law No. 48 of 1963 was considered invalid and was replaced by the Civil Service Regulations, No. 74 of 1965.\textsuperscript{23}

This dispute about management of control of the Civil Service obscured the problem about structure and salaries. In 1966 the government set up a commission to review the conditions of service for government servants. The commission was required to make recommendations for ensuring a high and uniform standard of education, qualifications and competence on the part of employees, and to suggest
methods of regulating such matters as standard of recruitment, training, promotion, pay, discipline, etc. As a result, the Civil Service Regulations, No. 23 of 1966 were introduced. These continue to the present day.24

The main fault of the Jordan Administration has generally been defective application of the principles on which the Service is based, not the principles themselves. The essence of the current dilemma is the implication which a small change in the mode of application of regulations has for the whole government service. This problem grows as the Service expands.

3.2 GROWTH, SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION

Since creation of the State there has been a considerable increase in the size of the government service in Jordan from 683 employees (civil personnel and military officers)25 to more than 70,500 employees in 1982.[26] In a country with a population of 2,375,000, the structure of the government is exceedingly complex and the huge numbers of officials scattered in an intricate assembly of departments and corporations. This is due to the expansion of government activities to the point where the public sector occupies the highest percentage of labour among all the main groups of economic activities.27 (See Table 3.1).
### TABLE 3.1


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Sector</th>
<th>Number of Workers (000's)</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Sector</td>
<td>186.2</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and Retail Trade</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and Manufacturing</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communication</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Employment</strong></td>
<td><strong>392.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking work</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Labour Force</strong></td>
<td><strong>400.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>102.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 indicate growth and size of the government service.

### TABLE 3.2

Growth of the Civil Service on the East Bank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population (000's)</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Percentage of increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>27023</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1560</td>
<td>28174</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1820</td>
<td>38329</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2227</td>
<td>65041</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>2375</td>
<td>70540</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 3.2 indicates the extent of central government employment and its growth increased 261 per cent during the previous decade. This is accounted for mainly by operations related to the economic development and other public service provision required by citizens in a growing State. The introduction of the development programmes has led to an increase in the size of the Service. The size of the successive socio-economic plans is an indication of the expansion of the bureaucracy. Their application create new jobs and opportunities for work.

From Table 3.4 two points are notable. The total size of the Civil Service looks much as one would expect for a developing nation like Jordan. This is attributable to the fact that the bulk of the people regard working for the government as the main source of employment. Over a quarter of the people questioned during the field work survey said that what they most valued from a government service job was the status which gives them prestige, power and ability to influence others. Second, departments range in size in relation to functions being performed. This is emphasised with the increasing intervention of the government in the development of national resources. For example, the Ministry of Youth and Culture, relatively unaffected by the scale of national development, still maintains only 23 officials. By contrast, the Ministry of Education now employs nearly 41,000 people. Over 85 per cent of employees are working for Ministries of Education, Health, Communications, Agriculture and
Growth of the Civil Service by Categories of Employees, 1970-1982

TABLE 3.4
Size of Government Departments, 1982*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Royal Hashemite Court</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet and Prime Ministry</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service Department</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Occupied Territories</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Planning Council</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Labour</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit Bureau</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Municipalities and Rural Affairs</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Youth and Culture</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Tourism</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Supply</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Industry and Trade</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Information</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Social Development</td>
<td>1004</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Public Works</td>
<td>1028</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>1118</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Transportation</td>
<td>1238</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>1357</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>2414</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>3198</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Communications</td>
<td>5688</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>8942</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>40672</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>70540</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures include departments affiliated to the Ministries. For example: the Ministry of Youth and Culture (23 employees) has three departments affiliated to it, namely, Youth and Sports Organisation (188 employees), Culture and Arts Department (93 employees) and Dept. of National Libraries and Documentation (44 employees). For details see: Government of Jordan, Budget Department, Posts Establishment Regulations 1982, Amman, 1982.
Treasury, and nearly 14 per cent in the remaining departments.

Jordan possesses a big educational system. Eight per cent of the total general budget goes to education, which is the largest single item of the national expenditure.\textsuperscript{30} Not all of this education provision is made directly by the State, although the Ministry of Education has the responsibility for determining the curriculum and for co-ordinating the various providers of education services.\textsuperscript{31}

The government is also responsible for the Health Service, Post and Telecommunications, Railways and Communications, and Agricultural services. All these activities are also labour intensive.\textsuperscript{32} The large size of the Treasury is accounted for by the variety of functions which is performed beyond the central management of the economy. For example, it is responsible for collection of taxes, customs and excise duties, lands and survey services. However, not all the important functions of the government have grown as rapidly as the Ministry of Education and others. Central management departments like the Budget Department remain small. Another strategically important department like the National Planning Council does not need to grow beyond a certain size.

To indicate functional distribution of government employees, departments have been categorized into eight major functional groups.\textsuperscript{33} (See Chart 3.5). The Chart indicates the overwhelming majority of permanent employees engaged in three major areas: social services; transport and communications; development and
Distribution of Employees by Function, 1982

conservation of resources. The other categories of function in the Chart contain about 10 per cent of public service personnel.

Within the Service, several departments serve to control and co-ordinate other departments. The most important are the Civil Service Department (CSD), Budget Department and National Planning Council. The main function of the CSD is reviewing the machinery of government, the desirability of or need for creation of new jobs, reviewing the efficiency and economy of each department, approving and reviewing establishments of staff. To support this work, the CSD is supposed to prescribe basic training programmes, providing management consultation services and acting as the central personnel authority for the public service. By exercising these functions, the CSD and its staff are often brought into conflict and disagreement with personnel in other departments. What the CSD may regard as properly carrying out its duties, the affected personnel may interpret as bothersome red-tape and meddling.

While the Civil Service Department is concerned with personnel and organisations structures, the Budget Department is responsible for "establishment control". It is also responsible for matters relating to finance and financial control. Though its responsibility for supervising the financial activities of departments, the Budget Department exercises a very important influence over practically all State administration. Its power is evident at all stages of the discussion of any proposal involving the expenditure of public money, from the time of initial planning and Cabinet approval, through the actual expenditure of the amount concerned. As
with the Civil Service Department, the Budget Department and its officials can generate ill-feeling in other departments as power and authority are exercised. New programme proposals must be checked out and expenditure on existing programmes co-ordinated.

The National Planning Council is responsible for longer term development of the economy and basic resources, external funding, contractual training and introduction of new ideas about public sector management. It is a body with unique status in the Jordanian administration. No one can understand the government service in Jordan without understanding the National Planning Council. Indeed, almost all important decisions about use of resources and manpower development are arranged between the National Planning Council and the Budget Department. This discussion serves to emphasise that size and importance are not necessarily synonymous. These departments are relatively small in size (Civil Service Department, 76; Budget Department, 59; National Planning Council, 120 officials).

3.3 POSITION CLASSIFICATION

Classification is an indispensable step in the building of a government service. It involves the identification and description of the different kinds of work in an organisation and thereafter the grouping of similar positions into classes under common job titles. A class in this sense is a group of positions sufficiently similar
in duties and responsibilities that (a) the same title can appropriately be used to describe them; (b) the same salary range can be applied with equity among them. In certain instances, a further criterion might be the requirement to possess the same standards of education and experience (or more likely the same professional knowledge or academic qualifications). In the public service context a classification system eliminates the question of the pay of individuals from the realm of political controversy, inequality and favouritism.

Position classification is a concept which has not heretofore been applied to the government service in Jordan. There has been use made of so-called "jurisdictional classification", which refers to the grouping of positions on the basis of the degree of control exercised by the Central Personnel Agency over such matters as recruitment, appointment, tenure and security of employees covered. In Jordan, however, neither central control nor central classification exist. The data shows for example, that three people working for different departments - Education, Agriculture and The National Planning Council, carrying out comparable jobs, are listed respectively - Deputy of Assistant Undersecretary, Provincial Manager and Inspector. They belong to different categories - classified, unclassified and contractual - with different bases of recruitment (central or departmental). They do not have the same level of salary, although they have the same degree of responsibility. Thus jurisdictional classification is a concept which made them separately different.
The system of classification in Jordan is based on education and qualifications, nature of work performed, level of responsibility and level of salary, etc. These provide the four main jurisdictional classifications, but each of them is again subject to a varying set of requirements on such matters as method of appointment and promotion, appointing authority, fixing of salaries, eligibility for pension and allied benefits, job rights and disciplinary procedures, leave benefits and other conditions of employment. The result is a civil service divided into groups, namely classified, unclassified and contractual officials (see Chart 3.6).

Classified officials are centrally appointed on a permanent basis to "classified posts". These include the Higher Grade Posts; Special Grades; Class I (Grades 1 - 6); and Class II (Grades 7 - 10). (See Chart 3.7). The members of the Higher, Special and Class I Grades are "gazetted" officers, i.e. their names appear in the Official Gazette. They are invested with greater powers and responsibilities for policy development and management and constitute a 'top management team'. By far the bulk of the government employees belong to Class II.

There are also "unclassified" officials who are appointed departmentally on a permanent basis to posts with salaries specified in the Posts' Establishment Regulations, on scale specified for general grades, issued annually by the Budget Department or in the regulations governing autonomous corporations for the posts in which no grades exist. The data demonstrates that an officer who is in Class I, Grade 5, occupying the post of Inspector in the Ministry of

*Classified officials of Grade 1 and above are appointed by the Cabinet, whereas officials below Grade 1 are appointed by the Selection Board (CSD).*
Education, where the level of general grades is very high, is equivalent to an officer who is unclassified, occupying the same post in the Ministry of Agriculture. However, both of these categories of employee work under the control of the same 'top management team' within each department. The creation of this category is justified on the grounds that its members possess lower academic qualifications at entry than those in other categories. At the same time, the government is anxious to employ personnel with a minimum cost. Since this category is non-pensionable, a substantial long-term saving is made.\textsuperscript{41} (See Chart 3.8).

Third come contractual officials who are appointed for a limited period to specialised posts on fixed salaries through contracts concluded between them individually and the Minister on behalf of the government. This type of periodic employment is especially prevalent in departments like the National Planning Council. The survey data shows that jobs as dispersed as 'expert', 'consultant', 'adviser' and 'researcher', are performed on a contractual basis. In addition, this category covers the employment of outside officials drawn mainly from regional and international organisations.\textsuperscript{42} (See Chart 3.9).

Finally, there are temporary and daily wage employees, consisting of unskilled manual workers hired as needed by the departments. For the purpose of this study, however, these positions are not considered.
Distribution of Employees by Categories, 1982

Distribution of Classified Officials by Grade, 1982.

Chart 3.7
CHART 3.8

Distribution of Unclassified Officials by Salary, 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Salary (J.D.)</th>
<th>Number of Officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37-43</td>
<td>8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44-51</td>
<td>6400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52-59</td>
<td>4800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-67</td>
<td>3200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68-77</td>
<td>2400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78-89</td>
<td>1600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90-101</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102-113</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114-131</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132-149</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150-168</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Distribution of Contractual Officials by Salary, 1982

Effects of Classification System

Although the sample was designed primarily to overcome the difficulty of classification by analysing the activities of government servants in terms of level of management in particular departments, the Charts and Tables in this Chapter indicate that the sample is representative of the classification structure throughout the Service. The attitudes expressed by officials in the sample on the subject of grading and classification are, therefore, made even more relevant.

Our sample were asked to express their view on the present classification system. The majority of unclassified officials, (75 per cent), strongly advocated the amalgamation of the two major classes, i.e. classified and unclassified into an integrated system of classification. Their argument is based on the grounds that in the government bureaucracy there is not much difference between classified and unclassified officials at the same level of management, regarding the nature of the work they do, degree of responsibility they hold and the basic educational and technical qualifications they require. They also insist that so-called "breadth of vision" which the members of general grades are expected to bring to the Service are in reality synonymous with "inexperience". On the other hand, members of unclassified classes point out that an advantage of a single amalgamation grading and classification structure would be to provide to the people in unclassified grades the benefits of pensions and other fringe benefits awarded to those in existing classified grades. However,

* The distribution of classes within the sample of 300 was: Class I 29.7 per cent, Class II 41.0 per cent, Unclassified 26.0 per cent, and contractual 3.3 per cent.
the Treasury states that the financial cost of such amalgamation would be unacceptable. But already some members of departmental grades, particularly technical and contractual personnel draw more salary than classified grades (see Table 3.10). Hence the financial effect of the proposed amalgamation might be negligible. A final point made by unclassified officials relates to status rather than financial rewards. They see themselves as a sort of "second class" group of government servants, since only the classified officials enjoy the fullest array of benefits and protections.

Another view of the grading system is put forward by classified officials in the sample. Over one half (58 per cent) of classified grades advocate the retention of the present classification system in Jordan. They advance the argument that the correct course is to examine the criteria which underlie the formulation of each category and to make its retention or abolition depend upon the soundness or otherwise of these criteria. They point out that classified members of the Service have to possess high academic and professional qualifications. They add that these are (or should be) appointed on the basis of competitive examination or selection test, either conducted centrally by the Civil Service Department or departmentally by agreed procedures. In contrast, insofar as competitive examination or selection test held either centrally or departmentally is a 'test of man's general or technical ability'; the members of unclassified grades lack that ability because, ex-hypothesi, they either failed or did not attend at all to take the examination.* In other words.

* The truth of this assertion could not be confirmed or denied by the researcher by any sources.
TABLE 3.10
Comparative Payment of Classes and Grades, 1982.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Salary (J.D.) per month</th>
<th>Number of Employees</th>
<th>Classified</th>
<th>Unclassified</th>
<th>Contractual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36-43</td>
<td>9589</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44-51</td>
<td>19069</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52-59</td>
<td>9690</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-67</td>
<td>9566</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68-77</td>
<td>9727</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78-89</td>
<td>6080</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90-101</td>
<td>3524</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102-113</td>
<td>1606</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114-131</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132-149</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150-168</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>169-200</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201-300</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301-400</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401-500</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-650</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* The above table relates to Charts 3.7, 3.8, 3.9. It provides an idea of government policy in terms of employment, relative costs and salaries. It explains classified grades and their equivalent in unclassified and contractual classes. For instance, the salary range of Grade 10 in the classified class is 36-43 Jordanian Dinars per month which is equivalent to the salary of similar positions in other categories.
members of classified category, who are young men of high academic qualifications and technical skills are destined to rise to positions of higher responsibility, while the members of other categories, who are older with comparatively low academic and professional qualifications fall in different distinct categories. The majority of classified officials, therefore, are of the view that the amalgamation of all classes in such a manner as will put them in an equal position with regard to the right to transfer and promotion to superior posts would be wrong in principle. It would affect efficiency and be unfair to direct recruits to classified posts. Also, the proposed amalgamation will impose additional burdens on the exchequer as the present pay-scale of other classes is lower as compared with the scale of classified officials. However, despite this general view, as much as 30 per cent of the classified officers are of the view that the claims of qualified unclassified officials for promotion must be more clearly and liberally recognised.

One must, therefore, conclude that classification needs re-examination. It may be necessary to elaborate the classification of the Service further. It is open to question whether it is any longer desirable and accurate to divide the administrative hierarchy into four levels of responsibilities to correspond with four categories of public servants. The increasing activities of the government for socio-economic development of the country have led to an expansion of the Service and introduced more functional diversification within it. In addition, while some distinctions among employees are necessary to recognise basic differences in the nature of the employment relationship, the Service could move in the direction of unifying the conditions of employment. This
would help in: firstly, promoting equality of treatment, flexibility of movement and the "career" concept among all employees; and secondly, simplifying the administration of the government service.

Empirical investigations have thus led us to conclusions which are confirmed by findings in other reports, and the opinion of officials who have been interviewed during the field work survey. There is a basic need for a position classification plan in the government service. Such a classification should aim at overcoming the five major deficiencies identified in the present classification system in Jordan.

First, there needs to be a sound base for the scheme of salaries.

A position classification plan would provide a factual basis for logically and consistently related scales of pay relative to work assigned. The principle of "equal pay for equivalent work" requires two determinations: (a) what the work of each position is, and (b) whether the work is in reality equivalent. By grouping comparable positions into a single class there is automatic assurance that all positions in the class will receive equal pay. Further, the class specifications will be of material assistance in determining the "right" pay scale, clarifying the relationships between positions and comparing pay rates of government jobs with those in private employment and those offered by other governments. The ranking of classes within occupational groups in the classification plan facilitates the assignment of higher pay scales for the more responsible and skilled work and lower pay scales for the less responsible and unskilled work.
Second, there needs to be uniform occupational terminology.

A position classification plan would establish a common language consisting of a uniform, significant and defined terminology for the naming of positions. It would designate positions by titles corresponding to the work and level of each position. It will enable all concerned to speak about positions in commonly understood terms.

Third, there needs to be a convenient source of information for evaluating and controlling staffing authorizations in the budget.

When requests are made for either job replacement or addition, a position classification plan will indicate the nature of the service contemplated. The schedules of job titles, supported by job specifications will have the same meaning to writers, reviewers and readers of budget estimates. A classification plan will enable the budget agency and legislative body to appraise more easily the personnel needs of operating agencies and decide for or against the creation of new positions.

Fourth, there is required a systematically arranged source of basic information for use in the recruitment of personnel and testing of fitness.

The class specifications constituting the classification plan will serve as a guide in publicising job openings and answering the questions of applicants. The information shown on the specification about job duties, responsibilities and qualification requirements is essential to test preparation and the evaluation of training and experience both by the Civil Service Department and the appointing
authority. A classification plan will make possible the establishment of registers of eligibility for a number of positions at the same time and by the same means. This saves time and money.

Finally, sound decisions on promotions and transfers need to be informed by details about the position involved.

Sound decisions relating to promotions, transfers, and secondment cannot intelligently be made unless it is possible to compare the position the employee is holding with the one he aspires to. A classification plan not only facilitates these transactions but also outlines career opportunities for employees. Conversely, a classification plan will identify "dead-end" jobs thus making it possible to take corrective measures.

Overall, there appears to be no question but that the classification plan would provide a basic "tool" which would fulfil a number of now unmet needs in the field of personnel management in Jordan. However, there are a number of reservations about the feasibility of developing and applying such a plan in Jordan. It is argued that position classification and job analysis are not suitable for introduction in a developing country such as Jordan because they are complex and expensive to administer. It is also claimed that those in authority in the Service would adhere to the plan only when it suited their convenience, and/or that the government of Jordan is not "ready" for position classification nor presumably
for other elements of a modern personnel system. Nevertheless, one would still have to conclude that there is the need for some kind of overall classification scheme as a first step to improving public service management in Jordan.
NOTES


2. See: Trans-Jordan Emirate, Official Gazette, No. 146, Date: December 30, 1926.

3. Government of Jordan, Civil Service Department, Civil Service Reform in Jordan, Amman, CSD mimeo, 1977, p. 2. The Regulations were criticised, on the ground of the grades system, by the Director-General of the Ministry of Health, who was a member of the Executive Council of the Government. He suggested in his report dated December 20, 1938, reduction of the grades into seven instead of ten, but his suggestion was ignored.

4. Ibid, p. 3.

5. The most important was the Civil Service Regulations, No. 1 of 1949. See: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Official Gazette, No. 994, Date: August 27, 1949.


7. For the composition and jurisdiction of the Committee, see: Ibid, Article 28.


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. The Civil Service Department, Civil Service Reform in Jordan, op. cit., p. 4.

12. Ibid.

13. Contractual Class has been introduced to the Civil Service of Jordan for the first time in 1958. See: Government of Jordan, Civil Service Department, Civil Service Regulations No. 1 of 1958, Amman, 1958.


17. See: **Official Gazette, No. 1730, Date: December, 31, 1963.**


20. The Executive Authority issues regulations, ordinances and acts, whereas the Legislative Authority enacts Legislations and Laws. For the differences and their impact upon the government service, see: Hanna Naddah, **The Government of Jordan**, Amman: Ministry of Culture and Administration, 1973.


23. See: **Official Gazette, No. 1853, Date: June, 26, 1965.**

24. See: **Official Gazette, No. 1853, Date: June, 26, 1965; and No. 1943, Date: August 19, 1966.**


38. Ibid. p. 2.


40. See for example: *Official Gazette*, No. 3040, Date: January, 10, 1981.


43. See for example, Issa Hanania et al., *Job Description in the Civil Service Department as a Model Plan for the Civil Service on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, Amman: Institute of Public Administration, 1981.


46. At present there are two basic systems of classification which are widely used by different governments in the world. One is a 'duties' classification which is based on merit and competence, and the other is 'rank' classification which is based on seniority and hierarchy. See: O. Glenn Stahl, *Public Personnel Administration*, 4th edition, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956, Ch. 9; and United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *A Handbook of Public Administration*, New York, U.N., 1961, pp. 37-40.
CHAPTER IV

CHARACTERISTICS OF MANPOWER

INTRODUCTION

Government bureaucracies normally operate a career structure.¹ A person may join a government bureaucracy and expect to remain in the government's employ, regardless of changing political governments, for the remainder of his working life.² He may expect to pursue a career as a public servant and (whether in central or departmental grades) progress from lower to a higher rank with consequent increases of salary and responsibility.

This chapter deals with career patterns of civil servants, the relationship between characteristics of the society and the Service, and the dimensions of the civil servant's job. This includes asking the official what he does, the number of persons he supervises, his contact with the public, with other departments and Ministers and his role in policy formulation.

4.1 CAREER PATTERNS

Age of Civil Servants

The officers in our sample ranged from 18 to 65 years of age. The minimum age for joining government service is eighteen.³ The retirement age, previously fixed at fifty five for the classified officials, has since been raised to sixty years. There were only
two officers in the sample who had exceeded this age limit. They had been allowed to continue in service after reaching the age for retirement at their own request and on a contractual basis. Table 4.1 represents the age structure of officials in the sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-20 years</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-25 years</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-30 years</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-35 years</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-40 years</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-45 years</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-50 years</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-55 years</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-60 years</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-65 years</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than 95 per cent of the respondents were between 21 and 55 years of age. The average age was thirty five years. In the case of higher management officials, their average age fell in the range of 41-45 years. Among middle management officers it was 31-33 years and among the lower officers it fell in the age 26-30 years. These
frequencies compare interestingly with experience of career in Western bureaucracies.4

In the case of classes, the mean age of Class I members fell in the age-group 36-40 years; Class II and unclassified officers fell in the group 26-30 years; while for the contractual class the mean was in the age-group of 31-35 years. As regards the departments, the Civil Service Department and National Planning Council contained a relatively high proportion of younger officials with only a few years of experience. The mean age of the CSO and NPC employees fell in the range of 31-35 years; the Treasury, Education and Agriculture employees was in the range of 36-40 years. These figures support the findings made in the analysis of the length of service.

Educational Attainment

Table 4.2 demonstrates that a vast majority of officials possessed a higher education qualification. For this there appears to be two major reasons. Firstly, the possession of a Bachelor's degree is becoming the minimum academic qualification for appointment to the senior posts of government service in Jordan.5 Secondly, in most cases the government servant work involves complex tasks of planning, co-ordination and direction of development plans requiring a great range of knowledge and skills.
The shift is also in part accounted for by plan as well as by 'market drift' in Jordan on the part of well educated people. However, some officers see university education as unnecessary. Their argument is that anything one needs to know can be learned on the job rather than from books and study. Practical and experienced men should be preferred. Nevertheless, the growing complexity of society permeates the work of the bureaucracy to the extent that practicality and experience will not be enough to resolve problems, formulate policies and implement them efficiently.

### TABLE 4.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Certificate</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor degree or equivalent</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-graduate diploma</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master's Degree or equivalent</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctorate or equivalent</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A closer examination of educational background reveals that a significant proportion of the officers in the Civil Service
Department and Treasury had not studied beyond undergraduate level. The reason for this state of affairs is that many positions of higher responsibility in these two departments have been filled by promotion. As a result, the educational requirements for officials in these two agencies are generally filled by officials educated at a relatively low level at the time of appointment. This helps to indicate how top bureaucrats got to where they are.

In contrast, the number of postgraduates is significant in the other departments of the sample, i.e. National Planning Council, Education and Agriculture. In view of the shortage of technically qualified personnel and in view of the growing industrial bias in the economy, technical education was especially promoted by the government of Jordan. The existing institutions in technical fields were reinforced and new ones were started. In addition, a large number of civil servants from the technical departments were sent for education and training to institutions of higher learning in foreign countries.

Most officials who possess degrees from foreign universities are located in technical departments. The relationship between technical departments and foreign degrees is not purely one of circumstance but something which is essential. It is illustrated, for example, in the need to travel abroad for a medical qualification. In this respect, the Department of Agriculture leads all other departments studied in the number of foreign trained graduates it employs, even though it also includes a relatively high percentage of people who have no degrees.
In short, though there is a relatively low number of officials who have not attained a university qualification, there is evidence to indicate that in the future university degrees will become increasingly important as a passport to salaried government service employment.

With respect to specialisation, officials in the sample were educated in a wide variety of fields (see Table 4.3).

**TABLE 4.3**

Field of Study of the Officials. (n = 228)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of Study</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business/Law/Social Studies*</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine/Veterinary</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Sciences/Computing</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within the sample, a tabulation relating field of study to respondents' occupation showed a tendency for men to work in the fields of study in which they were educated. Of those in specialist work, over eighty per cent had majored in engineering, medicine, veterinary.

*This includes: Arts, Politics, Administration, Commerce, Accountancy, Economics and Statistics.*
computing and physical science, whereas of those in general administration, more had studied administration and social sciences. This reflects a pattern of "preference for relevance" in the government service of Jordan more akin to the tradition of Western Europe than to the British tradition.

Age of Entrance

For most civil servants in Jordan, a civil service career begins when they are very young. The distribution of ages at entrance among our sample is presented in Table 4.4. Over eighty per cent joined before the age of twenty five. The range was from a low of eighteen years up to a high of fifty years and the mean age was twenty years. It is interesting to note that less than 3 per cent of the respondents had joined the Service after the age of thirty years.

TABLE 4.4

Distribution of Ages at Service Entrance. (n = 300)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of Entrance</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-20 years</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-25 years</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-30 years</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-35 years</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-40 years</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Evidently those wishing to reach the top needed to have joined the Service early in life. Young people are subservient and impressionable. They can be more easily socialised into bureaucratic norms and ways of operating than can older individuals who join a bureaucratic organisation after university or extensive work experience.

Length of Service

The distribution of the number of years of government service among the sample is presented in Table 4.5. Nearly 37 per cent had up to ten years experience in the Service; 17 per cent had 11-15 years of seniority; 46 per cent had been working in the Service more than sixteen years. Notably the top level had 16-20 years seniority. The middle level had an average 11-15 years, while in the lower level five years experience was the norm.

Comparing classes, we find that on average Class I members had fifteen years seniority. Class II five years experience, unclassified had eleven years and contractual had twelve years of seniority. As regards departments, the average seniority of the Civil Service Department and National Planning Council officials fell in the band of 6-10 years, and for the rest of departments in the sample in the band 11-15 years of service.
Table 4.5 disguises the differences in career expectations within and between departments. When the sample was analysed to discover the relationship between seniority and length of service the pattern which emerged is shown in Table 4.6.

### TABLE 4.6

Seniority Related to Levels of Management in Selected Departments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Years of Service Top</th>
<th>Years of Service Middle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Planning Council</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service Department</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The differences in seniority required to attain different levels of management responsibility in these departments can be accounted for in part by reference to the factors of growth and development of the government service described in the previous chapter. Other factors which appear to be involved include the character of departments, the style of management and the opportunity for mobility.

The data in Tables: 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, indicate the difficulty someone would have coming from outside employment to top or middle positions in the Service on lateral entry. Even though persons may apply in this way, indications are that few are appointed. Indeed, if any career public servant does not receive an appointment for which he applies, and the appointment goes to someone not already in the Service, the former has the right to challenge appointment of the outsider to the position he desires. Outside appointees must be exceptional to receive a top or middle level position.

External Mobility

One of the aims of the questions was an attempt to assess the extent and nature of non-governmental experience among government servants. The distribution of scores is presented in Table 4.7. The Table indicates that the vast majority of officials in the sample (80 per cent) had no experience outside the government. But once again the type of work and departmental needs accounted the
differences among those questioned. Sixty people altogether in the sample (20 per cent) had experience outside. Of these, 29 officials were in the National Planning Council, 16 in Agriculture, 7 in Treasury, 5 in Education and 3 officials in the Civil Service Department. Most of them hold technical and professional qualifications in such areas as medicine, engineering, computing and law. The majority of those had five or less years of outside experience.

**TABLE 4.7**

Number of Years of Non-Government Experience. (n = 60)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Years</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1 year</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 5 years</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 10 years</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 15 years</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this connection, those who had outside experience were asked to indicate which employer they worked for the longest before joining the Service. Responses are represented in Table 4.8.
TABLE 4.8
The Longest Non-Government Employment. (n = 60)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employer</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Private Sector</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional/international organisations*</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quasi-government corporations **</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Profession</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


** Corporations in which the government has a controlling interest which are enterprises of commercial character (e.g. Phosphate Rock Industry).

The above Tables 4.7 and 4.8 suggest that the regular exchange of personnel and experience between government and the outside sectors are weak and limited. At the same time data shows that the National Planning Council acts as an interface between the public and private sectors; all but three of its 29 officials who had non-government experience, worked in the private sector. This indicates a degree of lateral movement into and out of the NPC quite unlike the rest of the departments surveyed. This is also reflected in the length of service of managers at different levels indicated in Table 4.6.
In an attempt to assess the usefulness and effectiveness of outside experience, officials who worked outside the government were asked to state the kind of relationship between their work outside and inside the Service. Table 4.9 represents the distribution of scores.

**TABLE 4.9**

Relationship Between Experience Outside and Inside the Service (n = 60)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No relationship</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak relationship</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong relationship</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identical relationship</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing departments, data indicates that staff in the National Planning Council maintain either identical relationship between work outside and inside or at least stronger relationships than staff of the other departments in the sample. Fourteen officials in the NPC were doing identical work and eight more have strong relationships with their present job and the previous non-government employment. Specialist personnel generally have more direct link with their previous experience than "generalists", particularly those performing technical work and occupying comparable jobs.
On the whole, the majority of those who had worked outside stated that there was a strong relationship between tasks performed within and outside the Service. This indication should give the government encouragement to develop further exchanges of personnel with the various types of employers outside the bureaucracy with the aim of improving career development of serving officers. 10

Internal Mobility

The respondents were asked how many departments they had worked in during their career service. This was aimed at finding out how wide is the experience of officials within the Service. (See Table 4.10).

**TABLE 4.10**

Number of Government Departments in which Officials had Worked during Their Career Service. \((n = 300)\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Departments</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The distribution of scores represented in Table 4.10 shows that government servants in Jordan do not move around very much in the Service. Exactly 77 per cent of the sample had worked in only one department. Thirteen per cent had worked in two departments, but only 10 per cent of those asked had worked in more than two departments.

A closer analysis of the data indicated that the Civil Service Department officials have greatest movement between ministries and departments. Twenty seven out of sixty officials of the CSD served in different government departments. This is a far greater movement pattern than that presented among the officials of the other departments studied. The main reason, it seems, is that as the central personnel agency, the CSD acts as consultant to the whole Service. Its officials consequently perceive themselves as the "leading cadre" of the 'civilian army', and therefore have a different attitude to internal mobility.

Experience and Seniority

Officials in the sample also were asked how long they had been in their current departments. The scores, as represented in Table 4.11, are somewhat influenced by age, level of management and seniority of the respondents as well as by the type of organisation they work with. A large number of the sample had spent ten or less years in their departments.

Younger officers predominated in the group who had been in their current departments less than ten years and the older officers
made up those who spent twenty or more years in their current departments. Over two-thirds of senior officials spent more than fifteen years in their present departments, and one half of middle level staff spent more than ten years. But the majority of junior level staff spent only five years in their current departments. However, the average length of service within the current department for the whole sample is ten years.

As regards departments, officials of the Civil Service Department and National Planning Council have less seniority in their current departments than the officials of other departments studied. It has been noted, however, that advancement to increasingly senior positions in different departments is sometimes assumed to include a greater than average amount of inter-departmental mobility.

| Table 4.11 |
| Years Worked in the Current Department. (n = 300) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Years</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1 year</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 5 years</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 10 years</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 15 years</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 20 years</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 25 years</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 - 30 years</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 35 years</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 - 40 years</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is clear from the above tables that a large number of officials had joined a department at an early age and had spent their entire careers working in one government department. It is conceivable that such a career pattern is not conducive to instilling a broad, well-rounded experience in a government servant.

4.2 WORK PATTERNS

Duties of the Job

Each official in the sample was asked to describe his duties. The self-ascribed duties were categorised into fifteen separate "types" of work which are not mutually exclusive (see Table 4.12).

The descriptions provided by the respondents indicate the diversity and complexity of government administration. Some officials had straightforward easily understood and recognised jobs, e.g. personnel officer, accountant or manager in charge of a section in the department. Others did not, and found descriptions harder. Whatever the kind of work being undertaken, the same general rule was seen to apply: as rank increased so did responsibility.

Some 62 per cent of the sample were engaged in work that could be categorised as managerial or administrative. This might consist of implementation of a particular policy, control over a group of subordinates, a division or section within a department. Eleven per cent were engaged in personnel management. About 8 per cent had positions involving auditing or cost accounting. The same number of officers were engaged in the areas of research, investigation
### TABLE 4.12

Duties of the Respondents' Jobs. (n = 300)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management/Administration</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Advice/Legal Advice/ Administrative Consultant</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation/Inspection Advice/ Planning/Control</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Management</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and Intelligence</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auditing/Accounting</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary/Medicine</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Service Workers*</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Relations/Cultural Relations/ Labour Relations</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Services, i.e. Organisation &amp; Methods Analysis, and Project Analysis</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computing</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretarial/Typing/Clerical/Librarian and related</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Services, e.g. drivers, telephonists, etc.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: responses are not mutually exclusive.

*These include agricultural advisers, property managers, agricultural warehouse workers, technicians and transport workers.
inspection, advice, planning and control of some type. Slightly over 7 per cent were involved in teaching. The other types of duties were performed by a smaller number of employees.

**Self-perceived Job Differentiation**

The respondents were asked to state whether their occupation was primarily "managerial" or "specialist". The distribution of scores is presented in graph form, in Chart 4.13. This demonstrates the parallel careers of "generalists" and "specialists" as they rise up the hierarchy.

**CHART 4.13**

Generalists and Specialists in the Hierarchy (n = 300)
At lower levels staff classify themselves in equal numbers as "managerial" and "specialist". In contrast, 60 per cent of the middle level staff regard their tasks as managerial. At the top level of management 85 per cent had become "generalist" against 15 per cent who still considered themselves "specialists". Thus one of the features of the bureaucratic structure of the Jordan system is the emphasis placed on generalist (i.e. non-technical) qualifications as the official moves upwards in the hierarchy.12

Self-perception is strongly influenced by type of education and by job specialisation. The majority of specialist groups have scientific and professional qualifications such as medicine, engineering, veterinary, physical science, computing and law. This has its effect in the nature of work supervision. In departments like Treasury where line managers having background in general administration, economic studies and accountancy predominated supervision tends to be formal and hierarchical with consequences already noted for mobility and the relationship of seniority to levels of management. In departments where specialists are employed in large numbers and take much more responsibility for management in every level, e.g. agriculture, style of management is somewhat different. This is influenced by peer group relationship among professionals and by the extensive control exercised, especially in middle management level, by staff with specialist backgrounds.

Relations with other Government Departments

In addition to working within his own department, an official might also deal with personnel in other departments. Several questions
were asked on the subject of contact with other government departments. In Table 4.14 a distribution of responses is tabulated on the frequency of interdepartmental contact.

**TABLE 4.14**

Frequency of Contact with other Government Departments.

(*n = 300*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very often</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very frequently</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only 13 per cent of the respondents declared that in the duties of their present job, they did not have contact with other departments. Nearly 62 per cent responded that they had frequent or very frequent interdepartmental contacts. Also Table 4.15 demonstrates the extent to which managers' time is taken up by interdepartmental contact and negotiation.

**TABLE 4.15**

Frequency of Managerial Interdepartmental Contact (*n = 150*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very often</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very frequently</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What the Table does not show is the importance of inter-departmental contact as between managerial jobs in different departments studied. From analysing these contacts the single most important fact which emerged was that the extensive contact between managers in the Civil Service Department and the Treasury were due to the close liaison required between these central management departments.

The number of government departments with which officials in the sample had contact is displayed in Table 4.16. Half of the officials had dealings with from two to four departments. Thirteen of those asked declared they dealt with most or all the departments from time to time.

**TABLE 4.16**

Number of Government Departments with which Officials deal (n = 300),

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Departments</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 department</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 departments</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 departments</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 departments</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 departments</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 departments</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 departments</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All departments</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As one would expect, the departments most frequently mentioned by the respondents were Treasury, Budget Office and the Civil Service Department. Other departments commonly dealt with by each department were the Prime Ministry, National Planning Council, Audit Bureau, and Income Tax Department.

Respondents overwhelmingly (61.7 per cent) felt that there was a lack of co-ordination between departments. However, only 23 per cent of the sample agreed with the statement: "In any dealings with officials from other government departments, I usually find them unco-operative and not very helpful."

Dealing with the Public

In addition to contact with other departments, some officials must also deal with the public at large or with representatives of various interest groups. In order to assess the extent to which the public servants deal with the public, those in the sample were asked to indicate the percentage of time at work spent dealing with the public (see Table 4.17).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount of Time</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 10%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 10-25%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-50%</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-75%</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 75%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A substantial number, over one-third of respondents, have a
direct contact with the public in performing their duties. Nearly
one-third (31.3 per cent) who deal with the public spend more than
10 per cent and some up to 50 per cent of their working time doing
so. Less than one-sixth admitted that their particular type of
work kept them from dealing with the public.

It is not surprising that Agriculture is the department closest
to the public. Forty per cent of its officers spend over 75 per
cent of their working time dealing with the citizens. More surprising
is the fact that in the Treasury one-third of the officials spend
50-75 per cent of their time in direct contact with the public. This
is accounted for by the Treasury work involving collecting taxes,
excises, customs, conducting land surveys, paying pensions, etc.
About 30 per cent of Education Department officers spend 25-50 per
cent of time dealing with people. However, the Civil Service
Department and National Planning Council spend less time with
citizens. The nature of their functions directs their attention
mainly towards the government apparatus.

Slightly more than one-third of respondents regarded inability
to communicate effectively with citizens and generally poor public
relations a major problem in their departments. However, most
departments have established active public relations programmes to
deal with adverse criticisms. The sensitivity to criticism from
the public and interest groups still causes concern. One senior
official remarked ".... in general, government servants are criticised
too much - especially by businessmen or people who should realise
that they (public servants) are only doing the job that their
representatives have formed policy for."
Contacts with Ministers

Because they work in a political environment, bureaucrats especially in the top echelons, must deal with the Minister in charge of their department. However, it seems there is no tradition of relations between officers and their political masters having to be entirely hierarchical. As a result, the frequency of dealing between officers in all levels of management and the ministerial heads of departments is far greater than western observers might expect (see Table 4.18). Fifty eight per cent of the respondents indicated that they never have direct contact with their Ministers in the formal course of day-to-day work. Only forty two officials in the sample have frequent or very frequent contact. The most commonly mentioned type of contacts deal with inquiries for information on cases, submissions to the Minister regarding policy formulation and development, and information during parliamentary debates on expenditure proposals.

TABLE 4.18

Frequency of the Respondents' Contact with Ministers (n = 300).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almost every day</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than once per month</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About once per month</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than once per month</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is notable that the National Planning Council officers have more direct contact with the political head - the President of the Council - than officers of other departments studied have with their Ministers. This might reflect the phenomenon of a "human relations" approach in this type of organisation and the policy of "team work". It also reflects the importance of the Council's functions and its centrality. At the other extreme, Treasury officers have less frequent contact with the Minister than the officers of other departments, representing a pattern more typical of large, dispersed, hierarchical departments. In general, however, it is very likely that bureaucrats in positions of directors (mostly third level in the hierarchy) or above would have more contact with Ministers than would the officers below that level.

Policy Role

In Jordan, the commonly-held view of public servants and government policy is that officials only implement policies made by the overtly "political" sector of the political system. This is a rather narrow view of the public policy process - a view that is often perpetuated by ruling politicians eager to take credit for the work of expert officials. While most officers undoubtedly administer and implement policies, other officers are engaged in the formulation and development of government policies. In government departments a large number of officials provide the information and the alternative policy proposals required by Ministers and the Cabinet to make policies.
In order to assess the policy role of the Jordanian bureaucrats, the following question was asked. "Some officials are primarily responsible for the formulation of policy while others are primarily responsible for implementation of policy. With respect to your own job, which of the following statements most accurately defines your role in regard to policy?"

1. My job is almost exclusively that of developing and formulating policy.
2. My job involves the formulation and implementation of policy.
3. I implement policies made by others.

Table 4.19 shows the distribution of scores. Less than half of the respondents (49.3) indicated that their role was exclusively devoted to the implementation of government policies. A relatively large number of those asked indicated that they played an active role in the formulation of government policies. Over 10 per cent of officials in the sample identified their job as being 'almost exclusively that of evaluating, revising, developing and formulating new policies'. Forty per cent of the respondents indicated that their job required both the formulation and implementation of policies.

**TABLE 4.19**

Policy Role of Public Servants (n = 300)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusively developing and formulating policies</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulating and implementing policies</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only implementing policies</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There is variation between departments in regard to policy-making. The National Planning Council plays a vital role in developing and formulating policies. In fact, 22 per cent of the Council's officers are involved solely in developing and evaluating policies and programmes. In contrast, Agriculture officers have less chance than the officers of the other departments studied to contribute to the policy-making process. This relative isolation of professionals or specialists contributes to the view that they are poor administrative decision-makers. As one senior official suggests 'specialists promoted to administrative positions are often very disappointing as managers'.

Although senior and middle management staff play a significant role in the process of decision-making in regard to policies, some staff at the basic level are just as essential. One-fourth of them in the sample have a dual role in both formulation and implementation policies in their departments. One young official was quite proud of the role that junior staff played in formulating policy. He commented: "The Minister must rely upon us to do his work for him. Almost all the policies are developed within the Ministry and sent up to the Minister to rubber-stamp. The Minister and the Council of Ministers have the final say - but we provide them with what they must accept or reject."
NOTES


11. For a contrast in a career pattern in government service of a developing nation, note that in the Indian Administrative Service members are expected to perform a variety of jobs in many levels and departments during their service careers. See: Richard Taub, *Bureaucrats Under Stress*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.


CHAPTER V

RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION

INTRODUCTION

Government has a crucial place in Jordanian society and it is increasingly obvious that Jordan's future depends on the performance of both political leaders and the administrative elite. As yet the cream of the society are not encouraged to devote themselves to public service and no institutions have been established to cater exclusively for the training of potential recruits to the administrative elite. The government of Jordan as an employer has to compete on its merits with other employers and among the self-employed professions. In this respect its recruitment problems are much the same as in older Western countries. The government is perhaps at an initial disadvantage because of poor images of the public service.

It is the purpose of this chapter to explain government recruitment policy. This includes the principles of recruitment; how recruitment is organised and by whom it takes place; the relationship between central recruitment and departmental recruitment; and relationships between the public sector and the educational system. It also reviews methods, techniques and size of recruitment, and the problem of wastage. Finally, the chapter examines the attitudes of officials towards their work in an attempt to explain trends in joining and reasons for leaving the government service.
5.1 RECRUITMENT POLICY

Central Recruitment

Although there is common recruitment of all classified grades, this does not mean that everyone starts at basic grade. First, there is a distinction at entry between "generalists" and "specialists". Second, since the basis of central recruitment is level and type of education, there is a distinction between more and less educated entrants which sometimes overlap the distinction between "generalists" and "specialists". Third, there are two career hierarchies. The first hierarchy is an open one which allows the people who start at the bottom to get to the top. The second is based upon specific appointments to specific posts. Appointment to a "career grade" beyond the basic grade assumes the level of salary at entry which reflects the responsibility of the posts. On the other hand, initial appointment at grades above the basic grade does not imply any automatic seniority. The pattern of direct recruitment to classified grades by entry qualifications is illustrated in Chart 5.1.

Most of the basic work of co-ordinating recruitment activity for the whole Service is done by the Civil Service Department through the Central Selection Board. Departments tell the CSD what they need, the sort of people they want, the type of qualifications they are looking for and conditions of service they offer. Accordingly, the CSD advertises, seeking out qualified applicants, evaluating the qualifications, preparing eligible candidate lists and certifying eligible candidates. Lastly, the CSD provides the department concerned with the opportunity to decide or select from among the
Entry by Level and Qualifications

Chapter 5.4
eligible candidates the one person whose combination of abilities and background best matches the needs of the position to be filled.\(^5\)

Thus the Civil Service Department is mainly performing a technical service in the recruitment process. Whereas the real power resides with the departments as they have the absolute power to reject a proposed eligible list submitted by the CSD. It is often a fact that departments take the step of nominating some candidates to the Central Selection Board. Accordingly, it is erroneous to say that the CSD has any real power and influence. The present practice in Jordan is one of assigning the "final decision" to the departments for appointment of both classified officials (where the bulk of recruitment takes place) and departmental staff.* This seriously impairs the authority of the Civil Service Department at the point where its authority should be unconditionally clear.

**Departmental Recruitment**

As we have seen, large numbers in the Service are in departmental grades (i.e. unclassified and contractual) and Civil Service Regulations assign primary responsibility for their recruitment to the departments.\(^6\) So the Civil Service Department does not directly involve itself with their recruitment process. The employing departments carry on this selection through rules of

* See Chapter III (Charts: 3.7, 3.8, 3.9).
recruitment which should be made after consultation with the CSD.\textsuperscript{7} The power of making appointments has been given to the departments mainly to militate against the delay which would result if these appointments were made by the CSD. It also prevents overloading the CSD with more work when it can hardly keep pace with its present responsibilities. In our sample, over one-fourth (24.3 per cent) were recruited on a departmental basis as "unclassified" and "contractual" officials. Most of them work within the Civil Service Department, Agriculture and the National Planning Council.

Unfortunately, departments in Jordan do not always use this power of appointment judiciously. In most cases the choice made for departmental appointment posts smacks of favouritism, and those responsible for making recruitment selection try to get in their own favourites. There are complaints that tests and interviews held by departments are unfair and not up-to-date. Things, by and large, have been going on in old-fashioned ways. Allegations about favouritism and nepotism are not rare in regard to recruitment by departments. The merit principle in selection is not observed as meticulously as might be desired.

In addition, the Civil Service Department have been making serious complaints in their annual reports that Civil Service Regulations are being extensively misused. In many cases appointments were made by departments without any reference to the CSD. The reports of the CSD contain a large number of cases of such irregularities.\textsuperscript{8} The CSD feels that instances are not good signs of a good, healthy and progressive administration.\textsuperscript{9} Some departments do not even send any returns of such appointments.\textsuperscript{10}
The reader might thus conclude that present recruitment practise is in a deplorable state. Despite the great growth in its size, there has been no single office or agency responsible for the appointment of personnel in the Service. Recruitment functions have been shared between the Civil Service Department and individual departments. Such a lack of single organisation capable of co-ordinating recruitment policies has often resulted in considerable confusion.

5.2 PRINCIPLES OF RECRUITMENT

Recruitment in Jordan is governed by certain principles which have always prevailed. First, recruitment is sufficiently flexible to meet Service needs. Recruitment processes serve the needs of departments, though on occasions inflexible procedures seem to force employing departments to adjust to the needs of the recruitment processes and the education system. The Civil Service Regulations permit considerable flexibility. Legally, the Service has never been wholly committed to specific methods or precisely defined standards.

Second, recruitment is open to all with merit as the only basis for selection. Before the creation of the Civil Service Department in 1955, patronage debarred from the Service many of those who did not know an influential person who would recommend them for a position. This closed the Service to many people desirous of obtaining a secure, privileged and honoured position.
The Service was opened to all comers with gradual abandonment of patronage, the establishment of an independent central personnel agency and the extension of public education. However, the term 'merit' remains suspect, and its use in the Service has been confined to proof of fitness for a position.

Third, recruitment is based on the concept of a "career service", which concentrates on attracting young people and developing them through "on the job" experience to fill vacancies. In Jordan, however, the career service concept has been given a peculiar twist. It is expected that a career service should be recruited from young people who would learn the requirements of their calling on the job, and all the vacancies would be filled by internal promotion. Three consequences follow: (a) the principle that anybody who is suspected of not being able to spend his working life in Service should be excluded. Hence, those likely to be "unsound" in mind or body are excluded by vigorous health checks. In the same way, women are not welcome, as they are likely to leave on marriage or on bearing children, resulting in their internal education and training being "wasted". (b) Lateral recruitment must be confined to positions which become vacant and where no serving officer possesses qualifications of an adequate level to fill the post. As long as an officer could claim to perform the work, outsiders can be excluded even if they might be more capable or display better prospects for advancement.* However, when the Service fails to meet its requirements from graduates and internal promotion, special appointments are made to vacant positions. The extent of this type of recruitment depends upon the structure of the work force, labour mobility, unemployment rate, etc. Lateral entry has been especially important in

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raising the general standard of the Service and in filling top positions. (c) No "barriers" should be placed between the basic grade and the highest positions, so that anyone starting at the bottom of the ladder should have the notional opportunity of rising through the ranks to the top, on the basis of his work performance alone. 15

Fourth, recruitment is related to the educational system. The entry into the Service primarily depends upon educational achievements. 16 Thus the basic element in the process is the recruitment of young people who complete the designated stages in the education system. In other words, the public service of Jordan is a true career service where recruits, from an early age, should spend their working lives knowing both that they will be secure in their posts provided that their work is satisfactory. 17

However, in Jordan this principle is difficult to apply in practice. The reason is that the exact relationships between the public sector and the educational system is not clearly planned. The general rule, at least in theory, is "preference for relevance". In addition, the national curriculum requirements are not directly related to the needs of the public service. 18 In short, there is no co-ordination between recruitment and education. 19 The Civil Service Department has gone to great trouble to adjust its procedures to accommodate changes in the general education at schools, the universities and outside professional bodies. 20
In general, the Civil Service Department has not questioned the value of outside qualifications and it has been prepared to accept degrees at face value. Difficulty has arisen in assessing the value of outside courses and the existence of diverse standards has made the construction of common orders of merit hard. At the same time, the dependence of the Service on the education system means that its standards have declined as problems have arisen within the educational system itself. These problems relate to overcrowding, lack of equipment and facilities, traditional methods of teaching, low teaching standards, psychological tension and friction between principals and teachers, lack of suitable qualifications and lack of professional education among staff, etc. In other words, the majority of recruits enter the Service at a young age.* They come almost immediately after leaving school or taking a degree at one of the universities and the general quality of the pre-entry education of recruits is rather low.

Fifth, recruitment does not end with the offer of employment but with the certification of appointment following a probationary period, as laid down in the Regulations. With the exception of Higher and Special Grades, employment in Jordan is offered in the first instance for a probationary period of two years during which an official shall not be promoted. So, with certain exceptions, all probationers are expected to start at the same level on the basis of their qualifications and advance according to the aptitude they display on the work they are given. Probation is particularly

*See Chapter IV (Table 4.4).
important for those who have been appointed only on the basis of their records or academic performance alone. There is no guarantee that they can manage public service work or are suited to service "norms". The employing departments to which they are allocated have to certify as to their conduct, diligence and efficiency within the specific period. The Civil Service Regulations state that:

"The official is strictly and continuously supervised by his department with a view to ascertaining the proper performance of his duties and the promptness of his orientation in respect of the requirements of the post to which he has been appointed, and to revealing his fitness for staying in the Service or the necessity for terminating his services on grounds of misconduct or inefficiency by the end of the period of probation or prior thereto." 23

Nevertheless, how well employing departments place new recruits, test them on exacting work and otherwise determine suitability is questionable. However, when an official is confirmed in permanent service, the period of his probation is counted as a part of his service. 24

Finally, recruitment is based on the principle of "loyalty" to the Service at whatever salary the government is able to pay. 25 This includes pension scheme, promotion, compensation, remuneration, allowances and all the aspects of financial rewards.

5.3 SELECTION METHODS

Recruiting agencies in Western developed countries give great attention to the process of recruitment. 26 On the basis of their experience developed over many years a healthy programme of selection
must have the following elements: advertising the vacancies; evaluation of the qualifications; the rating of training and experience; written competitive tests of different types and kinds; the interview - which is the most widely used technique of selection; and the probationary period, which is considered the best means of checking the validity and accuracy of the other selection devices.27

In Jordan, advertising is occasionally used, depending mainly upon the number of vacancies. One-fourth of our sample indicated that their posts had been advertised at the time of their recruitment. Much more attention was given to the evaluation of qualifications including academic education, skills and past records of performance. In essence, the purpose of the evaluation step is mainly to rate and rank the applicants on the basis of the degree to which they possess the knowledge, abilities and skills needed for successful performance in the position to be filled. In the case of training and experience, data shows that no weight was given to this factor in Jordan as nobody in the sample presented himself to the Service in this way.

Competitive examination has two major purposes: to test competence; and to establish a system of direct recruitment by education. Applicants are then sorted into groups, classes and grades for which they are fit. Thirty per cent of our sample, the majority are specialists, had an entry examination. However, at present, the number of applicants to the public service posts is less than what is needed. There is consequently no sense in
emphasising the competitive examination as the basis of proper selection. In addition, such methods require a great deal of skilled effort to prepare and the availability of trained staff in the Civil Service Department does not exist.

Nevertheless, within the last few years, competitive examinations in Jordan have found their way as a method of selection in some instances where the vacant posts were fewer than the applicants. Clerks and book-keepers in some departments have to sit for a competitive examination before selection. Some professional and specialist applicants are required to take an entry test on the basis of competition. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs adopts the competitive examination for the employment of Second and Third Diplomatic Secretaries. Candidates must have at least a Bachelor's degree from an approved university and must pass a qualifying physical examination. The written examination consists of three subjects with a total of one hundred points. Those successful in the written test must then take a viva voce test. The written and viva-voce parts of the examination are conducted in Arabic and a live foreign language spoken by the candidate, preferably English and/or French. Members of an ad hoc committee from the Foreign Office conduct these examinations personally in panels of four or five interviewers.

In Jordan, the greatest weakness of using any kind of examination is the lack of a central organisation responsible for the whole machinery of selection. This arises because examination is not used regularly and consistently and, therefore,
no body of expertise has been accumulated on which to conduct them reliably.

Filling a vacancy in any level takes place either by lateral movement within the Service, i.e. "trawling"; or by internal promotion; or by direct entry from outside the Service. Frequently the Service reduces the opportunity for staff to compete internally for established posts by eliminating such posts as they become vacant and allowing additional work to be dispersed among potential candidates for the job, possibly adding "responsibility allowance” to their salary. Had the competitive promotion examination been accepted as a rule, there would have been no difficulty in securing the best candidate whenever a situation arose. A senior official comments:

"The importance of the principle of competitive examination is not only that it sets out to ensure the selection of the best available individuals for the Civil Service so much as it eliminates the personal factor in the choice of civil servants. The competition means equality of opportunity to all of a certain age and of a certain standard of education of its great virtues is that it does not leave the unsuccessful candidate feeling that he has been victimised.” 36

Alternatively, the authorities in Jordan, both central and departmental, rely exclusively on interviews guided by a prior perusal of the candidates' academic qualifications. Ninety per cent of the respondents had an entry interview. The interviews concern mainly the dimensions of personality, character, appearance, behaviour, individual culture and general knowledge.37 Ironically, key officials in the Civil Service Department and other departments strongly criticised the exclusive use of interviews as a method of
selection on the grounds that it was not an infallible method of selecting the most suitable candidates for the government service. The danger lies in the fact that interviews can always be biased and subjective. However, a number of research studies indicated that a more highly structured interview is more effective for selection than a less structured one. Google has indicated two reasons why unstructured interviews may not be reliable:

"Systematic biases and selective perception can affect interviews in different ways, thus resulting in lack of agreement between them. Further, if the interview is unstructured, entirely different topics may be covered by one interviewer than by another ......." 

There are, however, other research studies which have shown that the degree of structure is not a key variable in interviewing, and only a highly unstructured form of interviewing (non-directive) has been found effective by many interviewers trained in its use.

Despite the many criticisms of the interview, Vernon, in his work with the Civil Service Boards in the U.K., concluded that no test produced results of equivalent validity to those obtained through interview. It would appear that the interview is more valid for some situations and occupations than others. The whole matter needs to be looked at in context. When examined in isolation most selection methods contain obvious weaknesses. Further, Bernard Ungerson, who admits to favouring objective selection, sums up the situation rather well "... there are some characteristics which can be assessed only by visual and conversational contact."
The question then is, if the criticism concerning the interview is justified, how can we improve it as a selection device in Jordan? The solution lies in adequate preparation for the interview along with basic guidelines for the conduct of the interview. It is important that special attention should be paid to the training of those who are used for regular interviews of candidates, and that the criteria for each element in the qualities to be measured are as closely defined as humanly possible in order to reduce the area of subjectivity. For that reason also, it is wise to use at least three persons on each panel of interviewers so that the averaging out of the results may achieve a reasonably high degree of objectivity. For instance, the British Civil Service normally uses board or panels (3 or 5 people) to interview large batches of applicants for entry or promotion internally. This is designed to ensure consistency as between individuals applying for the same thing at the same time; to ensure that each candidate gets the benefit of a spread of opinion on different aspects of his abilities; and to ensure that permanent bias does not creep into selection.44

Overall, in Jordan there has been a lack of any adequate attempt to keep recruitment methods up to date. There has been no objective assessment for the country as a whole of the way in which these arrangements have worked. The criteria by which personnel are selected by the Central Selection Board are not up-to-date, and examining and appraising techniques are far from fair and modern. There has been no systematic attempt at job analysis. Qualifications
for various jobs have continued to be laid down in general terms by the Central Selection Board. There is considerable scope for personal preferences and prejudices in the recruitment process. Appointing authorities could not always assess the personality of candidates properly but are apt to pay undue attention to manners, appearance and the amount of information which candidates appearing before them possessed. A more thorough inquiry into the interests, activities and achievements of candidates is not attempted.

In short, the civil service of Jordan does not have any comprehensive programme for selection which would be considered satisfactory by Western standards. Although provisions about merit as the basis of choice may be set forth in the Civil Service Regulations, the individual department concerned is usually free to apply this criterion as it sees fit.

5.4 SIZE OF RECRUITMENT

Recruitment policy disguises conflicting objectives as between the central management departments. The Budget Department is responsible for the management of financial resources, while the Civil Service Department is responsible for the management of human resources. This conflict becomes apparent in the scope and nature of government service recruitment in recent times. Chart 5.2 displays the number of applications and appointments for the period of 1978-1981. Total applications for 1979 and 1980 are about the same, whereas in 1981 they increased nearly by 15 per cent over 1978 and 13 per cent over 1979 and 1980. But appointments for classified posts had declined in 1979 by 20 per cent over 1978 and in 1980 by 19.5 per cent over 1979. In 1981 the appointments of
Number of Applications and Appointments for Classified Posts, and Appointments for Departmental Posts over Time, 1978-1981


- Applications for classified posts
- Classified Appointments
- Departmental Appointments (unclassified and contractual)
classified officials has decreased by 23 per cent over 1979 and 4.6 per cent over 1980. It is noticeable from the Chart that while overall applications have sharply increased, the proportion of classified appointments has progressively decreased. The main reason is that a lot of applicants are already working in the private sector or are self-employed either inside or outside the country. These are applicants who see the government service as the employment of "last resort" if other opportunities collapse and they remain dissatisfied with their existing situation.  

By contrast, while the proportion of classified jobs has decreased, unclassified and contractual employment has become the "norm" of the Service. This is due to the fact that the government wants to reduce the overall costs of the Service. This can be achieved both by reduced recruitment and by reduced security of tenure which unclassified recruitment implies. In addition, some technical personnel prefer to work with the government on a contract basis. Chart 5.3 and Graph 5.4 represent newly appointed classified and unclassified personnel.

Chart 5.5 shows proportion of applications from different educational levels for classified posts 1978-1981. We notice that the percentage of university graduates who applied for a government post increased substantially between 1978-81. Most of the graduate applicants had degrees in arts and social sciences, followed by economics, administration, law and politics.
CHART 5.3

Newly Appointed Classified and Unclassified Personnel by Level of Education, 1981


- Classified
- Unclassified
GRAPH 5.4

Newly Appointed Classified Personnel by Grade and Time, 1979-1981

CHART 5.5

Proportion of Applications from Different Educational Levels for Classified Posts, 1978-1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source: Civil Service Department, Annual Reports of 1978-1981, Amman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- University degree
- Teaching Certificate
- Secondary School leavers
- Less than Secondary School leavers
A relatively high proportion of mathematics and physical sciences graduates presented themselves together with vocationally trained graduates in engineering, medicine and agriculture.\textsuperscript{49}

The number with teaching degrees was highest in 1980 and 1981, consisting of 53 per cent and 45 per cent of the total applications respectively. A trend which the Civil Service Department indicates is attributable to the following reasons. The country needs more teachers. Therefore, more people are being trained for teaching, coupled with the fact that the trained teachers are not merely the front-line teaching force, but also the administrators required to support the large education system. This is especially so in a decentralised administrative structure. Other factors include: the government's policy of expanding opportunities in teaching and polytechnic institutions; the obligation of these institutions' graduates to work with the government (indenture); and new private sector opportunities in privately sponsored technical institutions to produce more skilled manpower. Finally, some school leavers cannot find an alternative but to join these institutions for various reasons.\textsuperscript{50}

The highest number of applications in 1978 and 1979 were the school leavers holding the Secondary School Certificate. These constituted 58 per cent and 60 per cent of the total applications for 1978 and 1979 respectively. However, the number sharply decreased afterwards due to several reasons. First, the Ministry of Education followed a new policy, starting in 1980, at stopping appointment of secondary school leavers as teaching staff.\textsuperscript{51} Second,
a large number of school leavers are required to join the national military service. Third, the attitude of the majority of school leavers is now to go to universities and other higher education institutions. Finally, the stronger private sector competition now attracts or absorbs as much as possible of the school leaver catchment group.\textsuperscript{52}

The trends illustrated in the above Chart, rather than simple numbers, are the key to manpower planning, which is a long-term activity. For instance, it takes perhaps more than five years' higher education to train a veterinarian; and another 6-8 years to turn him into a manager of veterinary services at a mid-career level. Then, after getting experience, some of them attempt to leave to work for other governments or for regional and international organisations such as the United Nations, FAO, ILO, etc. Although Jordan is an agricultural society where the veterinary services are very important, relatively few senior veterinary surgeons are available to the service 15 years after entry.\textsuperscript{53} On this basis, the implications for our sample are clear when it is considered that of 15 veterinary surgeons currently with average length of service 8 years, we expect that five years from now, only one-third of this number would remain in government service.

5.5 SIZE OF WASTAGE

The turnover of employees in recent years has caused the government of Jordan a great deal of alarm. Causes of this phenomenon are various. They include: competition for manpower among
neighbouring countries; competition from the private sector; high cost of living; low pay; absence of an incentive scheme for productive officials; poor physical working conditions; 'red-tape' and poor administrative practices; extensive overtime work; unfair promotion system, etc. Wastage is defined as a permanent loss from the Service for the reasons of retirement, resignations, death, physical unfitness, loss of office, dismissal, etc. Graph 5.6 shows the fluctuation of wastage among public employees.

Chart 5.7 represents wastages against recruitment for the period of 1979-1981. A close investigation of the data discovered that members of the classified class, mainly Class II, constitute the vast majority of staff turnover. In 1979, the classified staff involved in turnover was 1300 officers (83 per cent) against only 270 unclassified officers (17 per cent of the total number). In 1980, the number of classified officials who were involved in turnover was 3179 (82 per cent) against 688 unclassified officers (18 per cent of gross turnover). In 1981, the number of classified officials lost declined to 1840 officers or 66 per cent, while among unclassified staff it rose to 900 officers or 34 per cent.

Resignations have occupied the highest percentage of the total turnover, representing 50 per cent, 47 per cent and 57 per cent for the years 1979, 1980 and 1981 respectively. Loss of office occupies second place, representing 26 per cent in 1979 and 34 per cent in 1980. In contrast, this factor remarkably declined to 14 per cent in 1981. Retirement was 15 per cent in 1979 and 14 per cent in 1980, but the number has increased to 23 per cent in 1981.
GRAPH 5.6


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>71</th>
<th>72</th>
<th>73</th>
<th>74</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>76</th>
<th>77</th>
<th>76</th>
<th>79</th>
<th>80</th>
<th>81</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Recruitment and Wastage Over Time, 1979-1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Recruitment</th>
<th>Wastage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnover among all university degree holders was 31 per cent in 1979, 25 per cent in 1980 and 29 per cent in 1981. Among all teaching certificate degree holders turnover consisted of 23 per cent in 1979, 32 per cent in 1980 and 35 per cent in 1981. The sudden increase in recruitment of teachers at the earlier date is reflected in higher wastage rates in the most recent figures. They now have the opportunity for work inside the country and abroad on a more extensive scale.

The percentage of secondary school leavers involved in turnover was 33 per cent in 1979, representing the highest turnover, 25 per cent in 1980 and nearly 29 per cent in 1981. Turnover among those who hold less than a secondary school certificate was 9.5 per cent, 24 per cent and 4 per cent in 1979, 1980 and 1981 respectively.

As between the sexes, male turnover presents 71 per cent in 1979. By 1980 the number increased to 73 per cent. But in 1981, it was 30 per cent for females against 70 per cent for males.

It is understandable that wastage is very high in professional groups, especially among doctors and engineers. This is due to the law of supply and demand and to the market value of those groups. The high wastage trends of this category affected decisions relating to recruitment policies. The mean incentives given to such personnel to remain in the Service included: direct entry at Grade 5*;

*See Chart 5.1
guaranteed promotion within 3 years; and allowances. Nevertheless, the problem of wastage among skilled personnel still exist and is likely to persist for a long time to come.

Using 1979 as a base, percentage turnover in 1980 was 144 per cent, but improved in 1981 to only 41 per cent. However, the 1980 and 1981 results may be a "freak" not a "trend". Looking to the trend of wastage in the period since 1976 in Graph 5.6, there is clear evidence of attempts to meet crises which occur in one year with remedial action to meet the aspiration of the staff in the hope of avoiding serious wastage in the next year, only to discover some new causes of dissatisfaction or alternative attraction has created a new peak in wastage.

Finally, our sample, supported by wider statistical evidence about wastage, confirms two findings. First, if an officer leaves he is most likely to do so within the first year or two, and almost certainly within the first five years, though turnover figures also vary somewhat according to the economic situation, occupation, grades, classes, skills and departments. Second, the recruitment problem, in existing circumstances, is more a matter of retention than attraction. The lack of experienced staff which this creates in many areas might only be remedied by lateral recruitment to make better use of available manpower resources. To discover what motivates people to join the Service and to get some idea why so many leave, our sample were asked a series of questions on job attraction, experience and satisfaction.

*Technical and Specialisation Allowances
5.6 ATTITUDES TO ATTRACTION AND TURNOVER

Reasons for Joining the Government Service

In order to focus attention on primary motivations, officials in the sample were asked "why did you decide to accept government service?" They have offered twelve different reasons. Many of them gave more than one reason. The replies showed some clear and interesting patterns (see Table 5.8). For the purpose of the following discussion, we can divide these reasons into "positive" (Nos. 1, 2, 6) and "negative" (Nos. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12).

Among negative reasons the most frequent was lack of employment opportunities in other fields. Also, in most cases, these employees did not possess the necessary educational qualifications to train for a profession such as medicine or law, nor did they have the required resources to undertake independent business. They had no choice but to work as salaried servants of the State. Two reasons have mostly been given by the younger officials: the obligation to work with the Service as a consequence of continuing their education at the expense of the government; and the intention to gain experience and training of use for work outside the government in the future.

The most frequently offered positive reasons were the security of employment, promotion opportunities and pension benefits - especially by comparison with the private sector. In addition, public service employment gives certain amounts of prestige to the incumbent of an officer under government. The nature of this argument may become understandable if it is kept in mind that the
TABLE 5.8

Reasons for Joining Government Service (n = 300)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. For prospective pension benefits</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Good prospect of promotion</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No alternative employer</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. No possibility of suitable employment in the private sector for my</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>skills or qualifications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Qualifications required for other trade or profession not possessed</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. For prestige and status/or for power to influence public policy</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Temperamentally not inclined to work in the private sector</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. To get experience/training to work outside the government service</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Family tradition of government service</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Obligation to work with the government (indenture)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Less hard work than private sector enterprise or private practice in</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a profession</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Lack of direction</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: responses are not mutually exclusive.
government system in most developing countries is authoritarian. Association with it creates an aura of authority on the part of the public servant, in official as well as in social life. This feeling was reinforced by the fact that only recently opportunities for filling the most prestigious and profitable jobs in government have become available.

Family tradition as a reason for joining the Service cannot be classified as a negative or a positive reason. It demonstrates an interesting sociological phenomenon, namely the extent to which a tendency exists to follow the occupation of one's father. For instance, a son follows the father's example in accepting salaried employment with the government but does not necessarily enter the same profession or vocation. Adopting government service as a family tradition has another significance which has its roots in the history of the country. The government at the time of the creation of the State, attached great importance to the applicant's family connections with government service while making recruitment. Such connections were supposed to indicate the loyalty of the candidate and his family to the government. Government service had, as a consequence, become a symbol of distinction and prestige, so much so that some people prided themselves in belonging to a family of government servants.

The data indicates that the frequency of negative reasons was relatively high in the Departments of Education and Treasury. The lack of alternative employer for different reasons on the part of
the Education Department is the main factor. The same is true of large unspecialised departments like the Treasury. There market existed offering careers to non-vocationally trained line managers. The frequency of negative and positive reasons account more or less equally for the staff in the Civil Service Department. The considerations offered by the respondents in the National Planning Council and Agriculture showed a far higher frequency of positive reasons. These responses indicate that the higher the prestige of a department, the higher is the frequency of positive reasons for joining it. This suggests, also, the greater skills required for professional work and the incentive created for officials of these departments to seek to influence public policy.

In order to find out how the respondents compared government service with service in a private enterprise, a few more questions were put to them. The first question sought to determine the opinion of the employees about government service as an occupation. The question was put in the following form: 'Do you think that your decision in entering the government service was wise?' The question was designed as an indicator of a state of mind in which the official might be imagined to say: 'If I were to be allowed to make a fresh start, I would choose an occupation other than government service'. The results are shown in Table 5.9.

**TABLE 5.9**

Wisdom of Entry Decision of the Respondents (n = 300)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-response</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Forty-two per cent of the respondents said "yes", in contrast to 57 per cent who said "no". Three persons offered no reply since they have only recently been appointed and have no experience on which to base a decision. The responses given have been influenced by age, classes, grades, seniority, qualifications, level and degree of responsibility, salary, type of organisation, training and academic education of the respondents. For example:

A typical senior official who is working for the Civil Service Department in Class 1, Grade 2, aged 47 years, performing administrative duties, holds a secondary school certificate and entered the Service at 20 years of age. He has now accumulated 27 years seniority, transferred four times around departments, had two central training courses and is satisfied to accept that making the civil service a career of life was a wise decision. By contrast, a mid-career official in Class II, Grade 7, aged 30 years who holds a university degree has been working in the Department of Agriculture for seven years. He was engaged on technical work in the field under the supervision of a non-technical director, felt less satisfied with his salary and considered his career "blocked" because no promotion opportunity existed in his specialism. He tried unsuccessfully to seek transfer because his background specialisation was not required by other departments. He was therefore dissatisfied with his decision to enter the civil service particularly when he compared his prospects within the Service with those existing outside.
The next question was asked to discover what would be the preference of the respondents if they were to choose from among alternative occupations at the present time, allowing for differences of time in government service (see Table 5.10). The object of the question was to find out where any government servants were so dissatisfied with the Service as to be willing to change their occupations at this stage of their careers.

**TABLE 5.10**

Preference Among Alternative Occupations (n = 296)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational preference</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Service</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-owned private concern</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian private concern</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anywhere in the private concern</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that government service continues to command relatively high preference as an attractive choice. A close analysis of the data indicates that officials of departments prefer to continue in the government, with the exception of the National Planning Council Officers, who would prefer to work in the private sector instead. The reason may relate to the nature of the Planning Council and its functions. It has a very strong connection with the private sector.*

* cf. Chapter IV, pp. 92-94.
As to the choice of alternative occupations, professionals (e.g. engineers) and technical groups showed a relatively greater inclination for employment in a private concern. This is indicative of the growing demand for technical personnel by the private sector in view of the increasing industrialisation in Jordan. Another reason may be that authority in decision making is not devolved to them and salaries offered to them by government are well below their market value.

It was observed that the second choice of occupation was, to a considerable extent, determined by the educational qualifications of the respondents. For example, officials with a relatively low level of education exhibited a greater reluctance to suggest alternative employment to public service. On the other hand, the relatively highly educated officials showed greater resourcefulness in offering alternatives.

Officials in the sample who have been in the Service more than 15 years expressed their desire to continue working in the government. Therefore, a recurring consideration for staying in the Service is that 'it is too late to change now'. Most of the respondents who gave this response are senior officials who put in long years of service, have earned many increments in salary and are expecting either promotion or retirement on pension. It, therefore, is understandable that they are unwilling to leave the government for other employment. In addition, some senior people gave other reasons for staying in the Service such as challenge, scope, variety, importance of their work, the enjoyment of working
with good associates and sense of achievement. But inertia and reluctance to change has played a part in their preferences. However, it is notable that a significant proportion (18 per cent) of the senior officials are prepared to leave public service, even at this stage, for alternative occupations. Data also suggests a strong relationship between lower income and preference to leave the Service. On the other hand, a considerable proportion of young people indicate their desire to leave the government in one way or another. During the last decade, opportunities have increased for employment in private industry and commerce. This has created new openings for the mass of job-seeking, educated, young men. In many cases, private enterprises pay good salaries, offer better remuneration, provide greater incentive and freedom in which to work and recognise the achievements of their employees. Human relations between the employees and the employer are reputed to be less impersonal than those in government departments. Foreign-owned private concerns enjoy the reputation of taking special interest in providing for the conditions of service described above.

A comparison of the responses from different departments shows that certain categories of personnel are more satisfied with government service as a career than others. Less than one-third of the National Planning Council and Agriculture officers are satisfied with their decision in entering the government (28 per cent and 30 per cent respectively). The reason is that most employees of these two departments are specialists with professional qualifications.
The Service is dominated by generalists rather than specialists with relatively poor salary structure for the latter in the government. On the other hand, as many as 61.7 per cent of the Civil Service Department officers and 50 per cent of Education officers said that they consider their decision in accepting government service was wise.

It may be concluded that the officers of the first category of departments are the least satisfied and those of the latter category are more satisfied with government service. The responses among Treasury officials indicate that as many as a half "opted" against the Service. These findings are supported by the occupational preferences offered by the respondents. The percentage of officers who would prefer to continue in the Service is 25 per cent of those in the National Planning Council, 31 per cent in Agriculture, 53 per cent in the Civil Service Departments, 47 per cent in Education and 45 per cent of Treasury officers. An explanation of this pattern seems to lie in conditions of service (including level of salary, increments, prospects of promotion, possession of authority, allowances, outside opportunities, status of specialists, age and length of service, etc.).

Comparing the evaluation of the entry decision and occupational preferences with the age and class of the respondents, the following trends were discovered. Older officers and officers belonging to Class I and unclassified grades showed a greater satisfaction in regard to their decision in joining the Service. Perhaps the older officers were satisfied with their decision in entering the Service.
for three main reasons. Their academic qualifications were limited at time of appointment; the Service carried a certain amount of distinction; and alternative opportunities for jobs at the time of entry were few. In other words, their decision made in the past to accept the public service was "right" under the circumstances.

In the past, private industry had been established in the country on a very limited scale and the government was almost the only source of employment.

Class I officers might derive satisfaction from the fact that in government they had been able to obtain a progressive rise in the hierarchy including an increased rate of remuneration which usually accompanies the Class I status. On the other hand, the reasons for unclassified officers' satisfaction might be that they possess a low level of educational qualifications combined with limited opportunities for work outside the government service.

Similarly, as in the case of occupational preferences, more older officers and those in categories of Class I and unclassified grades responded more favourably towards staying in government than did the relatively younger officers of Class II and contractual grades.

Overall, the data established the following general points. First, it is not possible to establish a broad generalisation to the effect that the higher the class of official, the higher is the satisfaction in government service. Second, the evaluation by officials of their decisions to enter the government service were
influenced by their own experiences in the service. On this basis the frequency of responses shows a downward trend. This may be interpreted to mean that the popularity of government service is on the decline. Third, employment opportunities for educated persons, other than those run by the government, are expanding, despite the fact that the government service continues to command a relatively high preference in society. This brings us to the problem of turnover.

**Reasons for Leaving the Government Service**

An administrative system staffed with discontented, fault-finding officials is not a very pleasant place to work. Nor is it likely to be an efficient and effective agent for the implementation of government policies. The measurement and interpretation of job satisfaction is a multi-faceted enterprise. Therefore, it is interesting to note the circumstances under which government officials in Jordan would voluntarily leave government service (see Table 5.11). The factors are not mutually exclusive and any one government official might need to see a combination of advantages offered before being tempted away from the Service.
**TABLE 5.11**

Reasons for Leaving the Government Service. \((n = 300)\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better paying job elsewhere</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved non-wage benefits elsewhere</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor civil service prospects</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better opportunity to utilize skills elsewhere</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better opportunities to obtain skill, training, education, etc.</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frustration and discontent within the Service</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To leave the country</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad internal structure and processes</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To continue academic studies</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Responses are not mutually exclusive.

"Money" is by far the most important single factor quoted by the respondents. This suggests dissatisfaction with the current level of salaries and with the salary structure as a whole compared with outside employment. The bulk of the sample, particularly the technicians and lower grades put significant emphasis on the "pay" factor. Over one-third of the respondents are dissatisfied with the prospects in public posts and they, therefore, would leave for a "better job" (defined as more interesting or satisfying with new kinds of work). The majority of respondents tend to be young people
in Class II working in particular departments. These departments in which these feelings were particularly noticeable were the Treasury and Education. The principal explanation of this appears to be poor prospects of promotion in these two departments compared with the other departments studied.*

One-fourth of officials in the sample felt that if they became too frustrated or discontented with their own work or in their departments they would leave the Service. However, frustrations and discontent revolve around "organisational issues" - red-tape, budget process, slow decisions, etc. Unlike the senior and middle grades officials, lower level officials' criticism is most likely to be directed at structures and internal processes, dissatisfaction with programmes and policies of the departments.62 This suggests reluctance to discuss such matters at a higher level. However, some people assured the reason to be the fact that at a higher level bureaucrats are a fairly content group of individuals and well socialised within their own departments.

Some officials felt that if there was a better opportunity to utilize their skills, training and experience outside government work, they would leave the Service. One-fifth of the sample who offered this reason have been more than ten years in the government service. It is interesting to note that some of the younger officers would leave the Service just to get out of the country. Twenty percent of the respondents, the majority young officials, mention their desire to leave just to continue their education in order to get

*See Chapter IV (Table 4.6).
academic qualifications. All of this indicates a relative decline in the importance of government as an employer.
NOTES


2. Government of Jordan, Civil Service Department, *Civil Service Regulations No. 23 of 1966*, Amman, 1966, Article 33. The Central Selection Board consists of the Head of the Civil Service Department as Chairman; the Permanent Secretary of the CSD as member; two other members selected from government officials and appointed by the Council of Ministers for a period of two years; and the Permanent Secretary of the Department concerned with the appointment or promotion as fifth member.


9. Ibid.


15. See: *Civil Service Regulations*, Articles 45, 49.

16. Ibid, Article 34.
17. For European comparisons, see Frederick F. Ridley (ed.) Government and Administration in Western Europe, Oxford: Martin Robertson & Co.Ltd. 1979.

The membership of the Board of Education consists of the Minister of Education as Chairman; the Presidents of Jordan's Universities; the Head of the Civil Service Department; the Secretary General of the National Planning Council, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Education, three directors of education, a representative of the private schools, a representative of higher educational institutions, and five persons from outside the Ministry of Education. The Board is consulted on matters related to curriculum development and textbooks, but has nothing to do with public service manpower planning.


22. Civil Service Regulations, Article 40.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.


27. Ibid, p. 93.


31. Ibid.


33. The content of the written examination questions normally deal with the politics of the Middle East, Palestine Case, United Nations, the Arab League, Jordan and the Arab World. See for example: Examination of the Diplomatic Secretaries of July, 27, 1971, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Amman.

34. Director of Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interview, Amman, March, 1982.


38. Interviews with Directors of Employment in the Civil Service Department, Treasury, Audit Bureau, National Planning Council, Ministries of Agriculture; Interior; Social Development; and Justice, Amman, March, 1982.


47. Director-General of the Budget Department, Interview, Amman, February, 1982.


53. Vice-President of the Veterinarians Association, Interview, Amman, March, 1982. He comments that the reasons are: (a) low salaries, (b) the government does not recognise veterinarians as medical physicians in terms of allowances, and (c) lack of government's material and equipment support to the veterinary profession.


55. Civil Service Department, Annual Report of 1979-80, Amman, 1981, p. 37. Loss of Office is an action taken by the competent authority in the case of seven days continuous illegal absence from duty by the official. Whereas an official shall be dismissed in the following circumstances. (a) If he has been sentenced to imprisonment for a period of one month or more for having committed an offence. (b) If he has committed an offence which in the opinion of the Board of Discipline is serious enough to warrant dismissal. (c) If a complaint is submitted against an official on the grounds of his general efficiency, misconduct and unfitness for service. See: Civil Service Regulations, Articles 132, 143.

56. Information supplied by Budget Department, Amman, 1982.


58. Director of Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interview, Amman, March, 1982. Cf. In the British Civil Service, for some time the system of recruitment virtually excluded from the upper ranks of the civil service any but the members of the higher strata of Society. It was not until 1949 that the Foreign Office was opened to candidates who could not give proof of possessing a private income. See: Demetrios Argyriades, Civil Service Neutrality in the Welfare State: An Assessment of its Nature and Significance in the Modern British State, M.Sc. Thesis, University of London, 1958, p. iii (unpublished).


CHAPTER VI

FINANCIAL REWARD SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION

Appropriate remuneration is important to the general quality and quantity, tone and efficiency, integrity and morale of the civil servant. Inadequate salaries in the government service are an expense, not an economy. The constant drain of competent and trained personnel from the service, and their replacement by recruits of often inferior ability, is enormously costly and results in inefficiency. It will be impossible to achieve and maintain integrity, efficiency and quality in the service if officers do not receive adequate pay.¹ "Governments encourage corruption among their officials when salaries are inadequate."² A service that is ill-paid is almost invariably unproductive and over-staffed. Pensions, along with other fringe benefits, are regarded as one of the main attractions of the service. All categories of employees attach great importance to the scheme of retirement benefits. This chapter aims to examine the forms of payment within the existing financial reward system in the government service of Jordan.

6.1 SALARY STRUCTURE

The first unified grading system and salary structure was introduced in 1926, which provided for ten classified grades numbered from one to ten and an unclassified grade, with starting rates and
ceilings being fixed for each grade. This salary structure was revised in 1958 \textsuperscript{(4)}, 1975 \textsuperscript{(5)} and 1979 \textsuperscript{(6)}. The revision contained improvements in every grade either by increasing the higher rates or shortening the intervals between increments. However, different principles governed the system of payments for differently recruited categories of employees.

**Classified officials**

The present basic salary scale for classified grades is listed in Table 6.1. At the time of their initial appointment, officials are assigned to a grade on the basis of the educational attainment standards specified in the Regulations. \textsuperscript{7} Thereafter, the officials move through the steps of the grade upon completion of the required periods of time and assuming they render a satisfactory level of performance. \textsuperscript{8} In essence, the present system may be described as one in which grade and salary are geared primarily to educational attainment and length of service, with only incidental consideration of the duties and responsibilities of the positions occupied.

If this salary structure has any merit at all, it is that it is simple to understand and to operate. It consists merely of one fundamental scale, divided into two notional classes and sub-divided into steps or runs of four years each. Thus, for example, an officer entering the Service in Grade 10, knows that his entering salary will be JD. 36 per month, that his salary in the second year will be
### Table 6.1

**Schedule of Categories, Grades and Basic Monthly Salaries (J.O.), 1982.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>1st Yrs</th>
<th>2nd Yrs</th>
<th>3rd Yrs</th>
<th>4th Yrs</th>
<th>5th Yrs</th>
<th>6th Yrs</th>
<th>7th Yrs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class II</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
JO. 37.5 per month, and in his third year JO. 39 per month, and so on, and that, if he works satisfactorily and does not embarrass the government, he will rise, grade by grade, to at least JO. 66 per month at the top of Class II, after some 19 years. If, by virtue of having a university degree, his starting salary is JO. 63 per month in Grade 7, Class II. He knows that he will proceed, grade by grade, to at least JO. 126 per month at the top of Grade 2 in Class I. In short, the salary structure shows at a glance what a new entrant to the Service may expect in emoluments, year by year. A further advantage is that, in terms of control of the manpower budget cost in a developing state, the incremental salary system gives security both to the individual and to those responsible for finding tax income. In addition, a single salary scale, including Special Grades and a few Higher Posts, avoids a multiplicity of pay scales.

Nevertheless, whatever the merits of the salary system may be, they cannot over-shadow its defects. Those defects may be summarised as follows. First, all classified officials are lumped together in ten general grades, whatever their specialities and responsibilities may be. Thus, engineers, doctors, judges, teachers, clerks, typists, etc. all come together in these grades without any clear internal relationship between the salaries paid to them and the duties performed by them.

Second, although there are four incremental steps above the basic salary in each grade, the system "builds in" security at the
cost of any expectation of rapid promotion. It would, in theory at least, take an official who is a non-university graduate some 19 years to rise from entry at Grade 10 to the top of Grade 7, assuming no accelerated promotion. In financial terms this means that it would take him 19 years to rise from JD. 36 to JD. 66 per month. Similarly, a university graduate who enters in the middle of Grade 7 could take 27 years to progress to the top of Grade 2. In that time his earnings would have increased from JD. 63 to a mere JD. 126 per month. Furthermore, since there is no bar to the promotion of a non-university graduate from Class II to Class I, an official who enters the Service at the bottom of Grade 10, and who is unable to gain promotion in shorter periods than the four-year stage laid down for each grade, would take some 46 years to progress from JD. 36 to JD. 126 per month, assuming that he does not die or retire long before the end of that period. In short, the length of the fundamental scales put together is such as to make the whole pay structure somewhat unrealistic and, for that reason, liable to be abused.

Third, in an effort to circumvent the promotion delay involved in an extensive increment system, officials exert all possible pressure to have themselves raised to the next higher grade before they have exhausted the incremental stages of their existing grades. During the survey interviews, some senior officials pointed out that the usual form of pressure is to lobby for promotion. From time to time, officials concerned see their Ministers, formally and informally, and press for the upgrading of their posts in the ensuing budget. Not all officials resort to this method but enough of them
do so to make it a matter of unfavourable comment by Ministers, particularly at the time when budget estimates are being prepared.9

Fourth, should an official succeed in having his post upgraded in the budget for the next fiscal year, he "moves up" with his post, although his duties and responsibilities remain the same. In our sample, for instance, a clerk in the Civil Service Department, Class I, Grade 4, complained because, although he had been promoted several times, he had been working for twenty-one years in the same department doing the exact same job. In point of fact, it is not his post that is upgraded; it is he who is upgraded. This practice which is repeated when an official seeks to move up again to a higher grade, seems completely contrary to the principle that an official should be promoted to a higher grade only if there is a vacancy.10

Fifth, since in most cases the upgrading of posts depends more on personal factors than on anything else, it is not unusual to find holders of the same type of post occupying different grades in different departments. For example, the Chief Clerk in the Treasury is in Grade 5; the Chief Clerk in the National Planning Council is in Grade 7, although their duties and responsibilities are identical. Worse than this, the Chief Clerk in Education occupies a lower grade (Grade 6) than the Chief Clerk in the Land and Survey Department (Grade 4), although the former's duties and responsibilities are heavier. This situation arises simply because he has less total service than the latter or because he has not sought accelerated
promotion. Such a situation, too, is contrary to the normal concept of granting the same pay to holders of the same category of posts.

Sixth, as a result of fixing short runs of four years in each grade, the officials who avoid canvassing for their own promotion and prefer to rise on the basis of their own work and conduct, may find themselves left behind at the top of their grades, while their colleagues, who do canvass, move up to the higher grades. In so doing, the posts they hold have to be upgraded with them. Indeed, if they do not have the goodwill of their superiors and their Ministers, officials may well stagnate for some time in the same grade. Such stagnation is bound to have an adverse effect on their morale, and in the long run this will be detrimental to the national interest.

Seventh, there is no apparent attempt to conform to the pay principle of matching the salary and grade of the official with age, experience and responsibilities. The data shows that a lot of older officials with long experience in the Service, occupying lower grades, drawing less salary, are being supervised by young, newly appointed officials. For example, an official in the Treasury, in Class II at the top of Grade 7, aged 40 years, entered the Service at age twenty, holding a Secondary School Certificate. He has worked in his current post for 17 years. He is being supervised by a graduate aged 26 years, newly entered in Class I at the bottom of Grade 6, drawing a salary of JD. 68 per month. With only a few months of experience, the latter is already acting as a head of
division. The former expressed his attitudes, through an interview, by pointing out that he feels disappointed and his morale has been adversely affected.

Finally, the short runs in each grade and the small incremental stages of JD. 1.5 per month, in Class II are undoubtedly instrumental in inducing a fear of career stagnation. Even in Class I the incremental stages between Grade 6 and Grade 3 are only JD. 2 per month, and between Grade 2 and Grade 1, are JD. 3 per month. This in turn has led to certain officials "breaking through" the grades. According to the Regulations, an official must not be promoted before the expiry of at least two years from the date on which he began to hold his existing position. During the last few years, this particular Regulation has been construed with such flexibility as to enable those officials with sufficient drive and determination to secure their promotions to the next higher grades after spending only two years in their own grades. As a result, a period of only two years in a grade is now looked upon as a "normal" period of tenure before promotion to a higher grade can be requested.

If this practice is accepted as a normal method of advancement in Jordan, non-university graduates might take only eight years to rise from the basic Grade 10 to the top of Grade 7 and ten years from the bottom of Grade 6 to the top of Grade 2, while a university graduate in Social Science would take only 12 years to rise from his entry point in the Service to the top of Grade 2. If the incremental stages were more realistic in terms of the rising cost of living, a
system of salary overlap permitted between grades and the steps in each grade longer, then there would not be so much pressure on the part of officials to secure accelerated or premature advancement.  

Unclassified officials

In addition to 49,000 classified personnel, there are 19,000 unclassified employees.* As in the case of recruitment, their salaries are determined by the appropriate Minister upon recommendation of the Permanent Secretary or Head of the Department concerned. However, if the salary is more than JD. 60 per month, the approval of the Prime Minister is required.  

In general, the objective has been to set these salaries at the same levels as for comparable positions in the classified service. For employees with Secondary education or less, this is specifically regulated by the following conditions on salaries at time of appointment: (a) Graduates of secondary schools, not to exceed a basic salary of JD. 39 per month. (b) Graduates of intermediate schools, not to exceed a basic salary of JD. 38 per month. (c) Graduates of elementary schools, not to exceed a basic salary of JD. 37 per month.  

As might be expected under the present decentralisation of authority to set salaries, there is a wide variety of rates established for unclassified positions with the same job titles. Obviously, generic terms used to describe individuals carrying the same type of responsibilities cannot demonstrate difference in levels of responsibilities. This can be done only in the form of salary differentials.  

* See Chapter III (Chart 3.8).
For example, the latest Posts' Establishment Regulations show salaries for positions with the title of "clerk" ranging from JD. 68 to JD. 85 per month; of "mechanic" from JD. 50 to JD. 106 per month; of "draughtsman" from JD. 50 to JD. 99 per month and so on. It can cover a significant violation of the principle of equal pay for equivalent work. It also has its effect on allowances and retirement benefits which will be discussed later. As shown in Chart 3.8, salaries for unclassified class range from a low of JD. 37 to a high of JD. 168 per month.

**Contract officials**

There are approximately 2,300 positions of this category in the government service*, the occupants of which are paid from project and trust funds under individual employment contracts. Under the present Civil Service Regulations, the salary rates for these positions are determined by the appropriate Minister upon recommendation of the Permanent Secretary or Head of the Department concerned if the salary is less than JD. 100 per month. However, if the salary is more than JD. 100 per month, the approval of the Prime Minister is required.

The same internal differentials in salary rates for positions carrying the same titles exist as in the unclassified service. For example, among Land Surveyors salaries range from JD. 49 to JD. 97 per month. Similarly, among Agricultural Advisers salaries range from JD. 66 to JD. 100 per month, and so on. Clearly, internal systems of salary differentials have developed departmentally within job groups.

*See Chapter III (Chart 3.9).
related to specific departments. As seen in Chart 3.9, rates for contract officials range from a low of JD. 37 to a high of JD. 650 per month.

Overall there can be no doubt that, because of these complications the existing salary structure has contributed, to an appreciable extent, to the general weakness of the administrative machinery of the government. It has certainly given rise in the past to such questionable practices as the exercise of patronage on the part of Ministers and top officials in matters of promotions, canvassing for promotion by the officials anxious to avoid stagnation in their short grades, advancement through personal influence instead of merit and the misapplication of the Civil Service Regulations and the Annual Budget in such a way that posts often follow the incumbents up to higher grades. The sooner, therefore, the present system is replaced by one based on a service-wide system of integrated grading with published and understood criteria relating salary to level of responsibility, the sooner the malpractice described above will be stopped. This view is shared by others responsible for the management of government service.

6.2 PRINCIPLES OF PAY

The government has not enunciated any criteria for the determination of the pay structure and pay scales of the various classes of employees. But they have accepted the following principles. First, the "public service" in Jordan, as in many other countries, is based on the concept of obligation and privilege of working for the State. The government job is by itself the reward for the official's service and not an
acquired right by virtue of owing or occupying the post. Therefore an official must perform the duties required of the post he occupies and devote all official working hours to the performance of productive work. An official may be called upon to work more than the specified working hours if the public interest so requires.\textsuperscript{23}

Second, the payment system must ensure attraction of qualified persons to serve the State efficiently and honestly.\textsuperscript{24} The government cannot expect employees to perform their duties with maximum efficiency if, in fixing their salaries and other terms of service, it gives them cause for dissatisfaction. It is therefore essential that the salary scales and other conditions of service should be devised so that the Service as a whole is able to carry out its duties efficiently in an atmosphere of security. On the other hand, the government, according to the Regulations, should pay enough to cause employees to remain honest.\textsuperscript{25} In the context of Middle Eastern culture, this principle assumes the importance which "loyalty" holds in the government service codes of Western nations. If salaries are adequate, staff tend to remain honest.\textsuperscript{26} But if their emoluments fall short of their needs, they are generally unable to withstand temptation.\textsuperscript{27}

Third, the employment of the best candidates on salaries which the government is able to pay.\textsuperscript{28} This means that the government pays what is necessary to obtain the qualified recruits, to retain them as well as shield them from temptation and keep them efficient and honest for the terms of their service. Unlike the private sector, where profitability is so important and the major factor in determining the level of payment, in the case of the State the major factor is
availability of public financial resources. How much the State can afford to pay varies from year to year. 29

Nevertheless, the Government of Jordan has responded slowly to changing circumstances. As mentioned earlier, the salary structure was revised only once over the 32 years 1926-1958. The next revision took place after another 17 years in 1975. The latest revision was in 1979. Not only was this response too late, but also too limited. It does not even compensate what an official would have lost in purchasing power. 30 As the vast majority of the employees are affected by this relative salary decline, the evidence indicating that some of them want to leave the Service is understandable. Consider, for example, the case of an engineer working for the Ministry of Education who used to work for multi-national company abroad with high salary and comfortable conditions of life. Because he had a sense of "national service", he entered the public service. He was appointed to Grade 5 in Class I, acting as technical deputy head of a division. He found things difficult and was particularly "shocked" by the level of his basic salary (JD. 80 per month). In consequence, he wants to leave the Service as soon as possible. A lot of engineers in other departments think like him.

Some advocates of the government payment policy, however, argue that officials should not claim increases in their salaries because when a person accepts employment in the public office he contracts for the receipt of a specified salary. He should, therefore, expect to adjust his cost of living according to the rise or fall in
the purchasing power. It is arguable, however, whether any body of workers, either in public or private sector, would find this argument acceptable.

It is obvious that the question of establishing principles which should govern pay in the government service of Jordan have never been specifically examined. This is not surprising since, in the general absence of considerations of profit and loss, it is not easy to determine the principles on which public service pay should be based. In spite of this fact, one must still ask what should be the primary principle of pay for the Public Service of Jordan. Critics emphasise a number of factors as a foundation for salary structure. These include standard of living, cost of living, market value, internal relativities, educational qualifications, comparability and reputation of the service.31

On the subject of ensuring a reasonable standard of living and a good pension at retirement, it could be argued that, in the last resort, no member of the community can reasonably claim from his government more than that he might receive income in the pursuit of a gainful occupation. This would, of course, be an extreme doctrine which few would endorse. The alternative view is that standards of living vary between social classes and the State has an obligation to reduce rather than create greater disparities of wealth. It would obviously be wrong to determine a man's salary in the light of the social class to which he belongs. Instead a person should be rewarded according to the work he does. If government work is important, then public servant should be well rewarded. Obviously such considerations
make **obligation** inappropriate as a basic principle of pay.

Increases in the cost of living also cannot be regarded as the only guiding principle of pay. This is not meant to imply that the cost of living should cease to be an important factor or that the government is absolved from relating salaries to price levels. On the contrary, as a good employer, the government should take necessary steps to ensure that it is kept fully informed of movement in the real wages of its servants. But the rising cost of living should not be treated as a firm principle for the fixation of pay since, if basic salaries were raised from time to time on the basis of a cost of living index, they would be pegged at too high a level to be reduced should the cost of living take a downturn at any time in the future. In practice it is difficult, if not impossible, to bring down basic salaries and wages. It must, however, be admitted that the economy of a developing country presents certain peculiar features, one of which is a tendency for the cost of living to go up steadily. For instance, the average rate of increase of the cost of living in Jordan for the years 1975-1980 is 14.7 per cent. (See Table 6.2).

**TABLE 6.2**

Cost of Living Index for 1975-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Annual percentage changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>111.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>127.7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>136.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>156.0</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>173.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Therefore, an employee should maintain an increase in his salary by a rate of 14.7 per cent per annum in order to keep a parallel between inflation and his real income. There is a wide gap between the rate of inflation and the level of salary. While the rate of inflation is 14.7 per cent, the government has increased salaries by 1 per cent, the public autonomous corporations by 2.6 per cent, whereas the private sector has increased by an average of 5 per cent per annum.\textsuperscript{32} The cost of living, having risen, is unlikely to come down. There is therefore a case for reviewing the pay structure of the civil service regularly to ensure that it is realistic in terms of the cost of living.

It is often urged in Jordan that the "market value" of certain professional and technical skills should be treated as a firm principle of pay.\textsuperscript{33} In response to this kind of demand, government of Jordan offered allowances of two kinds: technical allowance and specialisation allowance. In addition, certain technical and professional staff have been offered higher entry grades as shown by Chart 5.1. For instance, a civil engineer who holds a B.Sc. and has recently been appointed to Grade 5, Class I, will have a basic salary JD. 78 per month and a technical allowance equal to his basic salary. In contrast, a newly recruited official who holds a B.A. degree in Social Science was appointed to Grade 7, Class II, with basic salary JD. 63 per month without any technical or specialisation allowances.
However, the "market value" principle should not be accepted in its entirety. While universities and training institutions are in a position to supply enough people with special qualifications where they are most needed in the government and outside, the marginal value which may be attached at any time to the members of certain professions, such as medicine and engineering, will be substantially reduced. In the interests of the tax-payer, it would be therefore wrong to perpetuate in Jordan what is at present an advantage accruing only temporarily to the members of professions.

There are also so-called 'relativities'. The term is used here to denote pay relationships based on the duties and responsibilities of public service posts. But there are two kinds of relativity - one is "vertical" i.e. between grades in the same hierarchy; the other is "horizontal" i.e. between grades of comparable standing or of about the same level of responsibilities in different hierarchies. The consequences of a vertical relativity can be seen in the following way. The salaries of the top official in a ministry (Permanent Secretary) is fixed in higher grades ranging from JD. 180 to JD. 240 per month. That of Assistant Secretary, his deputy, might range from JD. 150 to JD. 168 per month in Grade 1A. That of the next official in the chain of command might extend from JD. 114 per month at the bottom of Grade 2 to JD. 144 per month at the top of Grade 1B.\[34\] The difference in salary structure represents roughly the difference between their duties and responsibilities.

As an example of horizontal relativities in the present pay structure, consider the staffing situation of senior level which arise in large departments with a range of complex and differentiated
functions. An illustration from our survey is the Treasury, which is in reality not a single department but six departments, namely, Finance, Budget, Income Tax, Customs, Land and Survey, and General Materials (see Chart 6.3).

For reasons of historical accident, the principal official in the Ministry of Finance carries the title of Permanent Secretary. He is therefore entitled to a higher grade salary. However, the other five Departments are run by officials of equal position, but they carry the title of Head of Department. Although their salaries are fixed in the higher grades, they are slightly less than that of Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance. Both of these categories (i.e. Permanent Secretary and Heads of Departments) are the highest officials in their respective administrative agencies. Their duties in many cases substantially are the same. But because the Permanent Secretary is thought to carry somewhat higher responsibility, a slightly higher salary or responsibility allowance has been attached to his post. The demonstration of what occurs in the Treasury at senior level, also accounts for the wide disparities between payments to officials in Grade 1B and those in Grade 2. It is to this level that most heads of smaller departments are appointed. This is due to the assumption that their duties and responsibilities are not as great as those of the heads of major departments paid at higher grade rates. A horizontal pay relationship between these three grades of top officials of comparable standing has thus been established on the basis of a difference between the duties and responsibilities of their posts.
There can be no doubt that the principle of relativities is logical since it establishes a sensible relationship based on the duties and responsibilities of posts. It is also objective since it takes no account of such personal factors as favouritism and nepotism. In addition, it is easy to understand. In all the circumstances, there would appear to be no reason why the concept of "pay by degree of responsibility" should not be treated as a primary principle of pay for the public service of Jordan.\(^{35}\)

In the previous chapter we explained the close relationship between educational qualifications and career potential. To some people, particularly those who have had the benefit of higher education, this should be treated as a primary principle of pay. It has, however, been pointed out earlier that when civil service grades are created, the determination of salaries and salary scales is usually influenced principally by relativities based on functional relationships. It is therefore impossible to encompass the view that academic qualifications should be treated as a first principle of pay. But it would be only fair to acknowledge that the fixation of pay is also influenced to some extent by educational qualifications. That is why, in Jordan as in most civil service structures, the lowest pay scales are attached to those grades which carry little or no responsibility and which are open to candidates with lowest educational qualifications. Higher pay scales are attached to those posts which carry more responsibility and call for higher educational qualifications, and the highest to those posts which involve the greatest responsibility and require the highest educational, professional or scientific qualifications, as the case might be.\(^{36}\)

\(^{*}\text{cf. The discussion in Chapter III of the means by which a unified grading system might be established.}\)
Once admitted to any particular grade of the Service, an official might usefully be judged by his performance alone and in consequence be paid for the work he does and the responsibility he shoulders. Advancement to a higher post will then depend on the quality of his work and not solely on his educational attainments.

Another factor to be considered is "comparability". Enthusiasts claim that in Jordan the primary principle of pay for the government service should be fair comparison with current remuneration of outside firms employing staff on broadly comparable work, taking account of differences in other conditions of service. The principle is, however, not feasible because the scope for comparison between posts in the public sector and posts outside, particularly in commerce and industry, is too wide. It is also difficult to compare salaries in the public and private sectors. One reason might be that there is not sufficient similarity of work, and another that each sector is using different valuations in determining the salary of various jobs. Nevertheless, Table 6.4 shows an average rate of salaries in both sectors for some selected posts.

It is obvious that there is a wide difference between salaries inside and outside the government. The most important factor in this is the incremental policy of both sectors. For instance, the basic salary at entry of a university graduate in
AVERAGE MONTHLY SALARIES (J.D.) IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND COMPAREBLE OCCUPATION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, 1960.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of Experience</th>
<th>In Private Sector</th>
<th>In Public Sector</th>
<th>Qualification</th>
<th>Post</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>B.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>B.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>B.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>B.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>B.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>B.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>B.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>B.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>B.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>B.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>B.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>B.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**TABLE 6.4**

the public sector is JD. 63 and will increase by JD. 9 per month after completion of five years service. In the private sector, by contrast, a graduate with the same qualifications starts at JD. 88 per month at entry salary and he will receive increases of JD. 63 per month during the same five years period. Other factors, however, affect the level of salary in both sectors such as experience, skills and the nature of the work, etc.

Another example of difference in remuneration occurs between levels of management. The top management officials (defined as Permanent Secretaries and equivalent Heads of departments of government) receive an average salary of JD. 366 per month; whereas the director-general of autonomous corporations receives JD. 625 per month. By contrast, the average salary of a director-general in private enterprises is JD. 1098 per month. The minimum salary of a director-general in the private sector is JD. 650 per month, which is higher than the maximum salary earned by a Permanent Secretary or a head of department in the government. In 1970, the average salary of top managers in the private sector was JD. 161 per month, and had increased to JD. 1098 per month in 1980, (i.e. by 600 per cent). This far exceeds the increase in the average salaries paid to Permanent Secretaries and heads of departments over the same period. 40

Accordingly, unlike Western countries such as Britain and France, which have to compete with the private sector on an equal basis, Jordan cannot pay the market rate as a principle of
Nevertheless, it is of the utmost importance that the government of Jordan tries to do everything possible, within its financial capacity, to attract the best quality of recruits, particularly in those fields where they are most needed. If, for example, the government enjoyed the general reputation of being a "good employer", the best young men of the country, on leaving school or the university, might choose a career in the civil service despite lower financial rewards.

What is meant by the term "good employer"? The best definition is perhaps to be found in the following extract from the Report of the British Royal Commission on the Civil Service:

"The 'good employer' is not necessarily the one who offers the highest rate of pay. He seeks rather to provide stability and continuity of employment and consults with representatives of his employees upon changes that affect both their remuneration and their conditions of work. He provides adequate facilities for training and advancement and carries on a range of practices which today constitute good management, whether they be formalised in joint consultation along civil service lines or not. Such employers are likely to be amongst the more progressive in all aspects of management policy. Their rates of remuneration will compare well with those of the generality of employers, will move readily and not atypically upward when the trend is in that direction, and will be rather more stable than most when the trend is downward." 42

The above principles can be best described as internal and external relativities. Data shows their impact varies upon officials in the sample. An example of internal relativities can be seen from the circumstance of an official working for the Civil Service Department. He is of a head of division in Class II, Grade 7, aged 39 years without university qualification. He commands salary and allowance less than
some of his subordinates despite his greater responsibilities. He therefore suffers from the effects of internal relativities. A second, but quite different problem involving external relativities can be demonstrated by the case of an official of the Department of Agriculture. He is a specialist with an engineering background in Class I, Grade 4, aged 45 years, occupying the post of Field Manager, and has a relatively large dependent family consisting of 8 persons. His salary is JD. 90 per month and is the only source of family income. The level of prices and the cost of living are increasing with no real increase in the official's salary. Although objective factors suggest that he should leave the government and "realise" his market value elsewhere, subjective factors persuade him to stay in the Service because of his length of service. Finally, his family commitment reduces his desire for mobility.

In Jordan the principles of pay outlined above have been applied in the following manner. Towards the end of each calendar year, each department prepares its budget estimates for the forthcoming calendar year. These estimates make provision for the continuance of existing posts with their grades, for the upgrading of some posts and for the creation and grading of new posts. Each department sends its estimates to the Budget Department for consideration and discussions are held between the appropriate departmental officials. But when these meetings take place, little or no attention is paid to the advice of the Civil Service Department, and the Budget Department determines for itself how many staff each department should have in the next fiscal year and what their grading should be.
It is therefore obvious how important the role of the Budget Department is in deciding how posts should be evaluated. For this purpose it does not employ any specialist staff for job analysis and evaluation. They are content to make an evaluation of both programmes and staff on the basis of discussions with the officials of departments concerned related to the needs of controlling manpower costs.

As a 'system', these arrangements are obviously defective. They do not involve any serious examination and assessment of pay relationships in each administrative unit of the government or in units carrying out similar or analogous functions. There is, however, in the existing processes one redeeming feature which could provide a sound basis for developing what is now a sketchy and unsatisfactory procedure into a more coherent and effective evaluation system. This is the existing legal provision of the Civil Service Regulations that the Civil Service Department is responsible for participating in the examination of the job content of posts within departments, with a view to determining the number of staff required and their grading according to duties and responsibilities. In addition, it advises the Budget Department on the creation of new posts. At the present, the information provided in this way is not effectively used.

The encouraging feature here is that the Civil Service Department is actually examining the duties and responsibilities attached to posts in departments, although it concerns itself more with control of numbers than with the grading of posts. If the
activities of the CSD in this direction could be expanded, so that major attention is given to the evaluation of duties and responsibilities and the appropriate grading of posts, the end result might be an effective method of applying the principles of pay already enunciated. In the meantime the system has developed certain distinct features.

6.3 FEATURES OF PAY STRUCTURE

The most salient features of the pay structure in the government service of Jordan are as follows. First, there is a great disparity in salaries. This is not based on any extensive family budget inquiry, nor does it appear to reflect any substantial improvement from the past. The government made no effort to discover principles by which the maximum salary and its proportion to the minimum salary might be determined. For example, a Permanent Secretary commands a monthly salary JD. 400 without dependents' allowance (i.e. family allowance). By contrast, a junior official working in the same department, has a salary fixed at JD. 37 per month. The system of recruitment, described in the previous chapter, permitted them to enter the Service at the same date and accumulate an equal length of service. Dependents' allowance provide some assistance to the junior official. But the disparity in the basic salary indicates the problem which arises in the organisation where too little thought is given to the social and economic consequences of salary structures. The present disparity
between the highest and lowest level of pay together with the number of disincentsives seem unlikely to advance the cause of building an effective government service such as those which exist in countries like Britain and the United States. In order to give a more balanced pay structure, the gap should be narrowed.

Second, time-scale of promotion, involving promotion barriers between grades, is too long. Age and family responsibilities are not considered. The government determined the compulsory age of retirement at 60 years with size of pension determined by length of pensionable service. The length in posts and promotion must depend, to a large extent, on both the age of retirement and maximum length of service.

Third, there is a considerable rigidity in salary structure. An increase of pay-scales is frequently accompanied by an increase in level of prices, thus reducing the real income. The effect of these circumstances adversely affects the morale and efficiency of employees. In addition, with present salary levels it is not possible to attract recruits of the right calibre to the Civil Service. The introduction of greater elasticity in the salary structure is badly needed.

Fourth, pay-scales do not encompass an "overlap system" reflecting responsibilities but are classified as "fixed scale with automatic progression". The individual progresses automatically up a salary ladder on the basis of service, so that annual increases are pre-determined up to the maximum level. This system is criticised because it does not give enough incentive to effort and to the improvement of performance. Effort might only be rewarded
by promotion in the longer term, if at all. By contrast, an overlap structure is able to take care of senior staff who cannot be promoted, but for whom some additional payment reflecting responsibilities has to be arranged. This is also a way of indicating that a post may rotate between officials of different ranks, provided the lower ranking officer has sufficient seniority in his own grade.

Fifth, there is no one salary structure but rather a variety of different salary arrangements which apply to various categories of employees. For example, there is one plan for special and higher posts, another for classified officials, another for unclassified officials, another for contractual employees and still another for daily wage employees. It would, therefore, be far simpler and more equitable to have a single basic pay structure that covers all employees irrespective of their status in the Service or other terms and conditions of their employment. A pay structure fulfilling the three requirements of normal performance; length of service; and exceptional service would provide a far more effective tool of personnel management than the existing arrangements.

The government has not been altogether blind to the need for improvement of emoluments. Some departments and personnel succeeded in getting some special allowances. A critic may, however, feel that this piecemeal approach tends to generate jealousy among those who remain left out of any improvements. He may also find that lack of internal relativities are made worse by this approach. It is not desirable that sectional pulls and pressures rather than a publicly-declared and integrated policy should guide the changes in the salary
structure. Therefore, an inquiry commission with comprehensive terms of reference could be set up to inquire into the pay structure of the public service as a whole. As well as the central government service, the inquiry should take into account the pay-scale of the other public employees in autonomous corporations so as to establish some sort of co-ordination. The immediate objective would be not only rationalisation but also co-ordination of the salary structure of all public servants.

Better co-ordination has many advantages: (a) improves the employees' morale; (b) it facilitates mobility of personnel between one public employment and the other; and (c) it can help in the proper distribution of capable persons among various employments instead of their being concentrated in those in which salary is much higher. A further advantage might be to co-ordinate the efforts of the Civil Service Department, Budget Department, and National Planning Council as they relate to planning, finance and control of service manpower.

6.4 ALLOWANCES

The policy of the government in Jordan is not to accept the principle that the remuneration of employees should be changed from time to time with variations in the purchasing power of money. But where the cost of living rises or the market rates for certain kinds of manpower increases, some system of bonus becomes necessary to preserve the neutrality of the Service. To meet situations like this, the government has adopted a system of allowances. The most important of these are: family high cost of living allowance;
technical allowance; and specialisation allowance.

The Family High Cost of Living Allowance

This is paid as follows: JD. 7 per month for the wife of the official and JD. 2 per month for each of the first four children. The allowance for each child is stopped as soon as the child has reached 18 years of age. The effect of this allowance on "take-home" pay can be demonstrated by the following illustration. An officer who is married and has four children, receives his basic pay plus a family allowance, amounting to JD. 15 per month. This allowance reduces as each child reaches the age of 18 years till it ceases when the fourth child attains that age. In the sample, 60 per cent of employees from all categories receive this kind of allowance.

The sole merit of the family allowance appears to be that it is an acknowledgement on the part of the government that its employees need to be safeguarded against the rising cost of living. This allowance, however, is objected to on several grounds. Firstly, it has the effect of narrowing differentials in the Service, indeed of suppressing them in certain cases. For instance, an unmarried Director, Grade 2, in the Ministry of Education has a smaller salary than his Assistant, Grade 3, who is married and has four children. Such a narrowing of differentials doubtless occurs throughout the various grades of the Service and it certainly clashes with the basic pay principle that officials who have greater responsibility should receive higher emoluments. Secondly, this allowance begins to shrink and finally to disappear at a time when it is
most needed. It could be argued that an official’s basic salary should have increased sufficiently by the time his children have begun to reach the age of 18 to enable him to carry on without the family allowance. On the other hand, it is more likely that his higher salary will be barely sufficient to cope with the needs of a growing family, and the loss of even one part of the family allowance will be keenly felt. Thirdly, family allowance is quite static and is not geared to any cost of living index.

The question accordingly arises whether this concession should be consolidated into the salary structure, or whether it should be replaced by a cost of living allowance payable to all officials, married or single. There are serious objections to the first course. (a) If basic salaries were to be increased through consolidation, the Exchequer would be saddled with a much higher bill for pensions than at present, and this would prove an intolerable strain to the government while it is trying to carry out a phased economic development programme. (b) If this allowance were merged with basic salaries, the narrowing of differentials would become a built in feature of the pay structure unless the allowance were also made applicable to unmarried officials, in which case the pension implications would be even greater. (c) From the budgetary and accounts aspects, much time and labour would have to be spent on the revision of officials’ salaries as and when their children reach the age of eighteen. In these circumstances, it would seem that this course should be avoided.

As regards the alternative course, there can be no doubt that a straight cost of living allowance, payable to all officials is a fairer system than the present practice. It must be borne in mind that the rising cost of living, including house rent and the daily necessities of
life affects a single official no less than a married one. Also, single officials often have family responsibilities, in that they have to support aged parents and young brothers and sisters. The data shows that 80 single officials were included in the sample. Forty per cent of them support at least one other person, 17.5 per cent have the responsibility for between 3 and 4 people, 3.7 per cent support between 6 and 7 dependents and 5 per cent may have as many as 10 dependents. However, Table 6.5 shows the number of persons economically dependent upon officials in the sample.

**TABLE 6.5**

Number of Persons Economically Dependent upon the Respondents (n = 300)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependents</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 persons</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-10</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Therefore, it would appear, on the whole, that the present system of family allowance paid only to married officials is the only affordable system that is practical for the government of Jordan. It is also well understood and it provides a measure of relief.
Technical Allowance and Specialisation Allowance

These allowances are paid only to particular types of officials, i.e. doctors, dentists, veterinary surgeons, pharmacists, engineers, judges, agricultural engineers, nurses and midwives. For technical allowance, there are two criteria: academic qualifications; and field of study. For specialisation allowance the criteria are academic qualifications; and length of service. However, these allowances vary in amount. Technical allowance vary from 40 per cent to 100 per cent of the basic salary of the official concerned. For instance, doctors and engineers receive 100 per cent of the basic salary; dentists, pharmacists, veterinary surgeons, judges and agricultural engineers receive 70 per cent. Nurses receive 60 per cent, midwives receive 50 per cent and judges under training receive 40 per cent. Specialisation allowance is paid on a flat rate basis ranging from JD. 30 to JD. 180 per month. It is notable that a "specialist" is eligible to claim both of them simultaneously. The consequence, for example, is that in the case of pharmacists, technical allowance is paid at 70 per cent per month of the basic salary, in addition to which a specialisation allowance of JD. 30 up to JD. 120 per month is payable to licensed pharmacists of all grades.

The grant of these allowances is subject to the condition that professionals must close their private clinics and devote their time to the performance of their official duties only. What the government seeks to do by these means is to abolish private practice on the part of professional people and to award them allowances as compensation for the loss of private income.
The payment of these types of allowances to certain specialist officials has advantages as well as disadvantages. On the one hand, it can be defended on the grounds that it is meant to compensate those who choose to serve the State instead of practising their profession outside where they command far higher monetary rewards. On the other hand, it is found objectionable on the following grounds. First, a "special privileged class" has been created within the Service. For instance, only 25 per cent in our sample have access to these allowances. Second, other categories of officials, who feel that they too have a certain market value, feel not adequately rewarded. They are convinced that their duties and responsibilities are of no less importance to the State, and they become frustrated when their claims of a similar allowance are not accepted.

On the whole, the disadvantages of this system outweigh the advantages and it is considered that, in normal circumstances, the best course would be to merge the whole, or a part of these allowances with basic salaries. But in view of the economic situation, Jordan might not be able to follow this course. Firstly, if a whole or part of these allowances were consolidated into basic salaries for specialists concerned, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to bring down the salaries of these officials in line with changing market value in different professional groups. There is also, at present, a sizeable group of young Jordanians studying at medical and engineering institutions inside and outside the country who have expectations of certain standards of living. When
they complete their study the market value now attaching to these professions might be considerably reduced. Therefore, a relatively stable basic salary with flexible allowance permits government to keep pace with supply and demand of specialised manpower. Secondly, the pension charges would be substantially increased by such consolidation. At present the pensions of such officials are calculated on basic emoluments, technical and specialisation allowances not being taken into account for that purpose. Accordingly, it is suggested that technical and specialisation allowances attached to certain posts should continue, at least for the time being but that, as and when more young graduates with the requisite qualifications are available to fill these posts, these allowances might be phased out. 61

6.5 RETIREMENT BENEFITS

In Jordan the retirement benefits to which the employees under the central government are entitled, are of two kinds: pension and provident fund. Classified officials are pensionable, whereas departmental recruited personnel in unclassified posts are non-pensionable but are eligible for the provident funds. Contractual grades are either pensionable or non-pensionable, according to their contracts. 62

There is the so-called "ordinary pension" which is exclusively paid to retired people in the classified grades and to the pensionable
contractual grades. It is paid under two sets of rules: (a) to an officer who is required by rules to retire at age of 60 years or after, completing 40 years of qualifying service; and (b) to an officer who is permitted under rules to retire after completing 30 years of qualifying service. Each of the two cases consists of a monthly pension subject to a maximum limit according to a specific formula. The scale of benefit varies according to the salary and length of service. The pension is contributory at a rate of 7 per cent of the basic salary, paid by the officials.

On the other hand, "provident fund" is a system of lump-sum payments for unclassified and the non-pensionable contractual personnel. It is based on a combined employer-employee contribution, at the rate of 10 per cent to 5 per cent (i.e. total of 15 per cent). This amount is payable to those retiring after completion of at least 25 years of government service or retiring prematurely on account of permanent physical or mental incapacity.

There is also "disability pension" which is paid for all classes of employees on the following grounds. First, to the official who is injured in performing his duty, and to the family of an officer who is killed or dies of injuries received in the execution of his duty. Second, to the official who is permanently incapacitated for public service and for the particular service to which he belongs. There is also provision for a benefit to be paid to the official who is discharged owing to the abolition of his post provided that it is not possible for the government to offer him other suitable alternative employment.
6.6 FEATURES OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS

Age of retirement

Under the existing rules in Jordan an officer may be permitted to retire after completing 30 years of qualifying service, and must retire at the age of sixty, though extension is possible up to the age of sixty five. This practice is neither in the interest of the State, nor in that of the individual and should be amended as soon as possible. At the age of sixty most people are in good physical and mental health and their accumulated experience makes them valuable assets of the nation. The loss of such experienced and well-trained personnel when they are at the height of their usefulness is a serious matter from the point of view of effectiveness and efficiency and imposes a heavy burden on the finances of the State.

However, the government has not recommended any change in the existing practice. This is attributable to the following reasons. First, in view of the existence of unemployment among educated groups, the raising of the age limit, it is feared, would cause some disappointment to young persons seeking jobs. Second, the promotion prospects of those working within the Service are likely to be blocked to a certain extent by this move. According to the government, the raising of the age limit will be contrary to public interest. Once the age limit is raised even inefficient employees will be allowed to stay on, as the very old of these employees will
appeal to the officer who, on compassionate grounds, would hesitate to throw them out.

After the completion of the present Plan for Socio-Economic Development, the problem of unemployment among educated groups would have disappeared to a large extent. This would remove the first objection. As far as the second is concerned, we have to bear in mind the fact that the blocking of promotion prospects would be only temporary and that ultimately employees would stand to gain by the raising of the age of retirement. Jordan needs men of experience to run her administration in this age of planned development, and there is a shortage of senior, trained and experienced officers. Therefore, the age of retirement may be raised especially for technical personnel. On the other hand, the government should retire any officer who is considered physically or mentally unfit even before he attains the age of sixty. Further, the officer who does not want to continue in service beyond the age of sixty should not be compelled to do so. This policy would enable the experience of personnel to be used more adequately than today.

Retirement Benefits Rules

As in the case of salary and allowances, the rules of retirement benefits are not uniform for all employees. It is a grievance of some employees (i.e. non-pensionable) that the rules applicable to them are not fair and just. This discrimination is a legacy from the past when only classified

officials used to receive attention at the hands of government. Successive governments confined their attention to classified staff. The central management agencies, unfortunately, also did not remove this grievance on part of some departmental staff. Discrimination of this kind should have no place in the Jordanian administration.

Pension and Inefficient Officials

An official who is removed from office on account of inefficiency is not entitled to retirement benefits in Jordan, although in special cases benefits may be granted for compassionate reasons, for instance, on the grounds of ill-health. This makes the supervisors reluctant to recommend the dismissal of their subordinates on the grounds of inefficiency. In awarding benefits, however, in such cases the government will be guided by the circumstances of each case and the amount will be higher or lower according to the circumstances. In the interest of efficiency, this rule could be made the general public service rule. This will enable the government to retire unfit persons at all levels without loss of pension rights. This rule, however, needs to be applied discreetly but firmly. The government service today is looked upon as a life-time career. Any significant violation of this idea may destroy the non-political status of the Service and may weaken an official's devotion to work. On the other hand, a proper, just and judicious use of this power is likely to promote efficiency and effectiveness in administration.
Pension and Temporary Service

Under the existing rules service rendered in a temporary post, with certain exceptions, does not count towards pension. It might be easy to justify the principle underlying the regulations in the case of appointments which are purely of a temporary character and have been created for a short period for specific purposes. But it is difficult to justify it where the department is maintained on a temporary footing from year to year. For example, one third of the employees in the Department of Customs has been recruited on temporary basis. The system under which officials are continued on a temporary establishment from year to year without qualifying for pension is definitely unsatisfactory. It creates a sense of insecurity about the future in the minds of the officials concerned. They feel that they have no stake in their service and are constantly looking for other avenues of part time earnings. If they are accorded pension rights, they would be more inclined to see their best interests served by giving all their attention to their official duties.

It is, therefore, suggested that all employees carried on temporary establishments may be allowed to count their entire temporary service for the purpose of pension.

Retirement Benefit Cost

Numerous reports on the pension scheme have referred to the large deficits, which in the fiscal year of 1981 amounted to
JD. 23.7 million (Civil and Military) and which are certain to grow in the future. (See Chart 6.6). This results from two factors: (a) the possibility of retiring at relatively young ages after relatively short period of service, and (b) relatively high pension amounts, particularly for those with relatively short service. These two factors not only produce high costs, but also are undesirable from a personal standpoint, because of the significant incentives that are given to employees in mid-career to leave the Service and draw a sizeable pension, while at the same time obtaining other employment. Such mid-career employees are often at the very peak of their usefulness to the Service. It seems likely that there will be some sort of general pay readjustment, reflected in pension payments, with primary emphasis upon increased salaries. This would make remaining in service more attractive for those who have had valuable experience and technical skills. If this were done, there would be a significant effect on the pension scheme, not only directly, but also indirectly in that there would be less pressure for early retirement.

Internal and External Mobility

The rules of pension in Jordan greatly restrict the sort of movement which many people wish to see. While the rules allow for transferring pension rights in moves between employment in public sector, this does not extend to moves between the public and private sectors of employment. A person who enters the
CHART 6.6

Government Expenditure (Million JD) on Employees' Salaries, Allowances and Retirement Benefits, 1976-1981

Budget Department, Budget Law For the Fiscal Years 1976-1981, Amman.

Salary
Allowance
Pension (Civil & Military)
public service from the private sector cannot transfer his pension rights into the government pension scheme and thus continue to build up a continuous pension entitlement, though he may be able to preserve his rights in his old scheme. A government official who leaves to go to a private employment loses all his pension rights. Clearly this is a serious impediment to movement both into and out of the Service. The Service should, therefore, wherever practicable, make transfer arrangements with private employers to facilitate late entry. In order to provide incentive, all government employees who have served for an appropriate qualifying period should be able to transfer, or preserve their rights on voluntarily leaving the Service.

Retirement Benefits and Length of Service

There is a great inequity in the rules in that short-service employees who voluntarily separate from the Service (except for women) or who are involuntarily separated without cause before having five years of service receive no lump-sum refund of the contribution that they have made.\textsuperscript{75} This practice is unfair, because employee contributions are really the property of the individual concerned.\textsuperscript{76} Therefore, at least this amount should be returned to him upon separation from service.
NOTES


3. See: Trans-Jordan Emirate, Official Gazette, No. 146, Date: December 30, 1926.


5. Official Gazette, No. 2535, Date: February 1, 1975.


8. Ibid, Articles 46, 49.

9. This argument has been confirmed by the Director-General of the Budget Department in an interview at Amman, March, 1982; and the Permanent Secretary of the Civil Service Department during an interview at Amman, April, 1982.

10. Civil Service Regulations, Article 44.

11. Ibid, Article 46.


17. Civil Service Regulations, Article 16.

18. Ibid, Article 153.


21. This is based on interviews with Permanent Secretaries of the Treasury, Civil Service Department and Audit Bureau, Amman, March, 1982.


23. Civil Service Regulations, Article 81.


25. Ibid.


27. Ibid.


29. Director-General of the Budget Department, Interview, Amman, April, 1982.


34. Information supplied by Budget Department, 1982.


42. E. Franklin, op.cit. p. 27.

43. Civil Service Regulations, Article 8.


47. For details on salaries of Special Grades and Higher Posts, see: Budget Department, Posts' Establishment Regulations for 1982, op.cit., Table A.


52. Official Gazette, No. 2987, Date: February, 16, 1981.

53. Official Gazette, No. 2691, Date: March, 16, 1977. The Family Allowance System states also the following provisions. (a) A woman working in the public sector is not regarded as having to support a family, therefore she is not paid the family allowance for her husband; or for her children if her husband is alive and able to work. (b) The husband can only claim for one wife unless that wife is working in a public sector agency.


55. Ibid, Articles 6-12.

56. Ibid, Article 4.

57. Ibid, Article 5.

58. Ibid.


61. E. Frankoin, op.cit., p. 69.

    and its Amendments, Amman, Articles 3,4.

63. Ibid, Articles 12, 13.

64. Ibid, Article 19. 
    Ordinary pension is calculated on the following formula: 
    \[ \text{Basic Salary} + \frac{25}{100} \times \text{Basic Salary} \times \text{Length of the Qualifying Service in months} \]

65. Civil Retirement Law, Article 8.


67. Civil Retirement Law, Articles 47, 48.

68. Ibid, Articles 41, 48.

69. Ibid, Articles 27, 28, 48.

70. Provident Fund Scheme, Article 3; Civil Service Regulations, Article 150.

71. Director-General of the Budget Department, Interview, Amman, March, 1982.

72. Information supplied by Establishment Division, Department of Customs, 

73. Robert J. Myers, Actuarial Report on Pension Plan for Employees of the 

74. Cf. GB, Department of the Government of Actuary, Report on the Civil 
    Service Pension Scheme, London: HMSO, 1980; GB, Inquiry into the Value 

75. See, Civil Retirement Law, Articles 14, 47.

76. R. Myers, op.cit. p. 22.
CHAPTER VII

PROMOTION AND ADVANCEMENT

INTRODUCTION

Promotion is "part of the greater problem of placement within the service, the problem of so allocating the available personnel that the most efficient result is obtained through the maximum use of existing abilities." If this can be achieved, it will be advantageous because it gives the employee an incentive. The question of promotion in the bureaucracy is a complicated, difficult and sensitive one. The bureaucracy offers a life-time vocation and opportunities for growth, development and advancement to "capable" men. The main purpose of a fair and effective system of promotion is to render this possible. Such a system thus has to achieve three important goals: to select the "best" men for the higher positions; to satisfy those to whom it is applied that it is fair and just; and to have a creative influence on the whole staff structure. The success with which this intricate issue of promotion is handled is a very important factor which vitally affects the efficiency and morale of the service.

This chapter aims to investigate the Jordanian system of promotion: its policy, procedures, principles and promotional opportunities. The reporting system and performance appraisal will also be examined. The attitudes of respondents and their images of promotional principles and how to get ahead in the Service are also explored.
7.1 PROMOTION POLICY

Central promotion

In Jordan, promotions to the highest administrative posts – Permanent Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Director-General or equivalent rank – are made by the Cabinet on the recommendations of the Ministers concerned, provided that such action is confirmed by Royal Decree.\(^3\) Like the appointment of this group, there is a political consideration in the promotion process. The scrutiny of the Cabinet in this kind of activity therefore exists. The key positions in the administration should be manned by persons who enjoy the confidence of Ministers collectively.\(^4\)

Promotions of classified officials are made by the Civil Service Department through the Central Selection Board. But in the case of Class I officials the Cabinet should approve the decision on promotion taken by the Selection Board, while in the case of Class II officials the Minister concerned should confirm it.\(^5\) In practice, the assessment reports of the officers within the zone of promotion are sent to the CSD with a memorandum containing the recommendations of the department concerned, and the Selection Board decides which of the candidates are most suitable for the promotion.\(^5\) Thus, classified officials promotions are in reality made by departments and confirmed by central decision taken by the Civil Service Department.

Departmental Promotion

Promotions of unclassified and contractual officials are made
on a departmental basis only. The Civil Service Department is not associated with the promotions of this category of employees but may be consulted in certain cases. However, the procedure differs from one department to another. Some departments use promotion committees or ad hoc selection boards. These committees have become more usual in recent years and are normally presided over by the head of the department or an officer nominated by him and two other officers familiar with the work of the candidates. The committees rely mainly on the personnel records of the candidates (as recorded in the assessment reports). Interviews are seldom used. In other departments, promotions are made on the recommendation of a higher officer who goes through the assessment reports of the candidates. The possibilities of disparities arising between departments in promotion opportunities can be imagined.

Advancement in most large organisations is usually measured by three major methods - annual increments in the scale of pay (i.e. time-scale); efficiency bars at certain points in the time-scale; and promotion bars either at certain stages of the time-scale or between one class of the service and another. In Jordan, methods of advancement and promotion of classified personnel have been regulated through increments and promotion bars. There are no efficiency bars as such. Increments are granted at the sole discretion of the Head of Department if he is satisfied with the performance of the official concerned. Increments are often granted as a matter of course, while the promotion bars at the top of each grade do not operate on the basis of known and consistent criteria of effectiveness and promotion from grade to grade is seldom made on the basis of merit.
Promotions in some cases do not take place promptly. This delay is on account of two main reasons. The Establishment Divisions are understaffed and do not prepare the lists of candidates in advance of vacancies likely to occur in a period of time, say a year. Some attention is being paid to the removal of this defect and things are likely to improve. The reference of each case to the Civil Service Department in the case of classified employees also involves delay since the CSD has not been strengthened numerically to keep pace with the growth of their work. However, there is some evidence recently about improvement in the disposal of cases of promotion by the Civil Service Department.

The normal principle of advancement is that an official must prove by his performance and conduct as an official that he is fit to be promoted. Strict observance of this principle means that the constant efficiency of the Service as a whole is ensured, a matter which is wholly in the public interest. Nevertheless, there are complaints of occasional favouritism and nepotism. These complaints grow as one goes down the hierarchy. Annual reports of the Civil Service Department made serious allegations against the departmental promotion committees. The procedure followed by these committees is not fully conducive to fairness. The departmental officers also come with a certain degree of prejudice for or against certain candidates. In such circumstances, since these cases are not subject to the scrutiny of the CSD, it is difficult for the latter to give an independent verdict as far as the promotion of departmental employees is concerned. This is a serious allegation
and is not by any means helpful in ensuring promotion on the basis of merit. The eradication of such practices cannot afford any delay.

The Civil Service Department can, however, act as a guardian against glaring favouritism and political nepotism involving promotion of classified employees. But it should not be forgotten that since the CSD has still to rely upon assessment reports primarily, its role therefore is limited by the nature of these reports. In a similar situation, Hayes, a British observer, points out:

"The (British Civil Service) Commission is in a difficult position over promotions. Since there is neither time nor staff to interview likely candidates, decisions have to be made on their records and confidential reports. It is notorious in all countries that confidential reports, however sincerely made, vary widely in value. The Commission's duty is not so much to select the best officer for promotion as to protect civil servants against injustice". 18

Transposed to the situation in Jordan, the following measures might remove the defects. Careful selection of the members of promotion committees should be carefully selected. If the committee consists of independent officers, none of whom is subordinate to the other, it is less likely that its decisions will be unduly influenced by the opinion or the likes or dislikes of the head of department or his representative who has to be there. A representative of the Civil Service Department should be associated with the departmental promotion committees in their deliberations. It is also essential to ensure that no names of persons who have a reasonable claim to be considered are withheld from the committees. A complete list of all the eligible candidates should be made in advance.
The materials placed before the committees must be full, adequate and reliable. The representatives or members of these committees should come to the meetings with an open mind and place all the facts before the committees. In addition, the right to appeal needs to be granted for all categories of employees and a candidate who feels himself aggrieved by the promotion decision be enabled to place his case either before a special board to be created for this purpose, or before the next meeting of the Central Selection Board in the CSD and departmental promotion committees.

Limited competition' as a method of promotion might also be organised on a trial in Jordan. This involves written examinations supplemented by interviews. Two advantages could be obtained by using this method. First, it has the supreme merit of making the selection thoroughly impartial and objective. "It ensures the deserving civil servant of equality both of opportunity and in the standard of selection throughout the service." Second, it provides opportunities for promotion to the young officers of ability whose length of service is so short that assessment reports cannot reveal their true worth. The use of interviews can give a more comprehensive idea of the personality and a better picture of the relative fitness of candidates for promotion than does reliance on mere records. Finally, the politicians should exercise self-restraint and not try to press the claims of those officials in whom they feel interested for reasons of nepotism and favouritism.*

*cf. Chapter VI, pp. 163-164.
These measures are likely to minimise the chances of miscarriage of justice on the one hand, and of mistrust on the other. Morale and efficiency of the Service as a whole could thereby be improved.

7.2 PRINCIPLES OF PROMOTION

A major source of stress and tension within bureaucratic organisation can be the criteria of promotion. In Jordan, the Regulations stipulate a set of criteria, namely: competence, i.e. ability to do the job; academic and non-academic qualifications; and seniority.\footnote{22} While these criteria may appear to be rational and not subject to disagreement, the formal Regulations are somewhat different from the way they are applied. For instance, although the Regulations relegate seniority to a criterion of a minor importance, in practice it is the most important criterion. It tends to be the basis of promotion up to the post of Assistant Director-General.\footnote{23} However, it is a controversial issue in the government service of Jordan.

Promotion by seniority is advocated on the following grounds.\footnote{24} First, seniority indicates the length of service which, resulting in the accumulation of experience, is an important factor in equipping the official for posts of higher skill or competence and determines, to some extent, the usefulness of an officer to the State. It is, thus, one of the factors that determines merit itself. Second, the operation of promotion on this basis is objective and intelligible. It is a safe method likely to cause least resentment and there is also less risk of favouritism under it than might be the case under some national principle of merit. Third, most employees seem to like it
because they can understand it and also because it does not produce any embarrassment for elderly employees who might have to work under those who were once their juniors. By avoiding the need to make any distinction between one person and another based on "merit criterion", it removes the embarrassment of promoting a junior officer over the head of an older one. Finally, the promotion of the officer supposedly possessing superior "ability" and "efficiency" is generally mistrusted by the majority of officials as an excuse for nepotism and patronage.

Nevertheless, the basis of promotion by seniority in Jordan has come in for criticism from time to time. The Prime Minister, for instance, remarks: "Consideration of fitness for promotion must have precedence over the claims of seniority." The Civil Service Department, also, is of the opinion that merit or ability must be the primary consideration in governing promotions to higher posts in the government service. The CSD further points out that in all cases the relative merits of the candidates will require careful consideration. "While seniority will be an important factor, it cannot be the sole or the most important criterion." The criticism is mainly based upon the fact that seniority provides no motivation for improving performance, nor does it ensure that positions requiring initiative and innovation are held by persons having these qualities. Ambition is stifled. Moreover, seniority has encouraged a lot of public servants to think of promotion as a right, irrespective of the needs of the Service and the necessary qualifications. This creates disincentives.

A theoretical advantage of seniority is that all members of a
particular grade are equally fit for promotion and vacancies arise in a reasonable continuous flow. But critics argue that, in practice, the occurrence of such ideal conditions is extremely improbable. All members of the grade in one department or across the Service are not equally fit for promotion. The real situation which has existed makes it difficult to believe that personnel management has developed solely upon the use of seniority in public sector promotion. The totality of the bureaucracy in Jordan consists of a multitude of sub-organisations, located in various parts of the hierarchy and engaged in many different tasks. Given so large a number of units, it would be difficult to maintain a uniform personnel system based strictly upon seniority. Indeed, even within a specified group such as middle management, there is a good deal of variation from one department to another. Illustrative cases demonstrate this point. Two officials entered the Service at the same time and they have almost identical qualifications and length of service, one having been working for the Treasury and the other for the Civil Service Department. Although both of them are middle-rank managers, the former is in Grade 5 acting as Assistant Head of Division, whereas the latter is in Grade 4 acting as Head of Division. This demonstrates the extreme improbability that every bureaucrat with certain characteristics is advancing at the same speed.

In addition, promotion on the basis of seniority is rather slow and infrequent. The higher the management level, the smaller the number of available posts. Large numbers of men necessarily fail to win promotion to position of Assistant Director-General or above. Thus seniority may create a sense of frustration which is likely to compel the best officer to turn elsewhere for opportunities.
Recently the Civil Service Department pleaded for more attention to be given to merit as the basis of promotion than had been the case in the past. According to the CSD, while the principle of seniority could not be ignored completely, the possibility of the more extensive use of the principle of merit, judged by a performance appraisal system, should be explored so that, in each field, a person who has the requisite ability can feel assured that if he does outstanding work, the Service provides adequately for promotion to higher levels of responsibility.  

Despite the vigorous advocacy of merit as the criterion for promotion, seniority is still the determining factor in selecting employees for promotion to a higher grade or post. Advocates claim that the rule of seniority may be followed for many situations, especially those of a routine character in respect of which long familiarity with office work itself is an adequate training. But even in this category of posts, occasional examples of exceptional and accelerated promotion of deserving persons would be an inducement to greater endeavour, provided care was taken to guard against all suspicion of nepotism and favouritism. With respect to promotions to higher responsibilities, merit or fitness for the post should be the sole criterion. There is a growing realisation within the bureaucracy of Jordan that seniority, though useful in certain ways, provides no motivation for improving performance. Improvement, in turn, is necessary to achieve effectiveness. Accordingly a more comprehensive re-orientation of promotional principles is needed for the various categories of employees. The formula laid down by the Tomlin Commission, though written in a different context, seems to be a valuable guide in the process of re-orientation in Jordan. The
Commission points out that, for filling higher posts, "merit should be the only consideration"; for the middle level posts, "merit should be the determining factor", for the lower posts seniority should ordinarily carry weight but it should also be provided "that exceptional merit is rewarded by accelerated promotion." 33

7.3 IMAGES OF PROMOTION PRINCIPLES AMONG RESPONDENTS

Individuals in the organisation may prefer that certain criteria and methods be used, but the formal regulations may prescribe a very different pattern. Also people may perceive that criteria of promotion are implemented quite differently from the way the regulations prescribe. In other words, bureaucrats can perceive that promotions are awarded on a very different set of criteria from either those they prefer or those that statutory regulations prescribe.

So, one series of questions in the survey dealt with promotion principles. The respondents were asked to rank six criteria of promotion in order of personal preference. The criteria referred to are listed below in Table 7.1. After recording their preferred ranking, the further question was asked: 'The way promotions are made is often different from the way that one considers ideal. Would you examine the six criteria again. This time rank them the way you think the Service makes promotions.'

A comparison of the preferred and the perceived ranks provided information on how closely the actual promotional behaviour matched
the ideal promotional behaviour. The first three criteria refer to the formal requirements set forth in the Regulations. Results indicate that officials prefer a promotion order with competence (i.e. ability to do the job) ranked first and favouritism (i.e. personal relations with superiors) ranked last. Seniority ranked second; education, training and personality traits are ranked third, fourth and fifth respectively. How officials in the sample perceive promotions to be made by the Service is strikingly different from what they would prefer. Seniority ranked first and personality traits last. Competence is ranked second; education, being well-known to superiors and training are ranked third, fourth and fifth respectively. The data shows that the respondents were nearly consistent as a group in their preferred ranking of the promotion criteria and much less consistent in evaluating how they perceived the criteria were applied in practice.

| TABLE 7.1 |

Ranking of perceived and preferred promotional criteria (n = 300)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Perceived</th>
<th>Preferred</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>84.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal relations</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality traits</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Rank, class and type of the organisation make a difference to the way in which an official thinks about promotion in the Service. The data shows that 65 per cent of senior officials, 78 per cent of middle level and 68 per cent of lower level ranked seniority as the factor of prime significance in promotion. This suggests that seniority is widely used in the bureaucracy of Jordan for making promotion. However, 52 per cent of senior officials and 47 per cent of the middle level managers ranked competence as second rank whereas 44 per cent of junior level ranked the factor of 'personal relations with superiors' as the second influential factor in their promotion. This reflects the importance of social pressure on the bottom of the ladder bearing in mind that the majority of junior level staff are departmental grades.

By contrast, all levels of management (87 per cent of senior, 85 per cent of middle and 81 per cent of junior) prefer competence to be the determining factor for promotion. Seniority occupies second rank at 37 per cent of senior managers, 54 per cent of middle and 47 per cent of the lower ranks. It is noticed that the middle-ranking officials rate seniority higher in both perceiving and preferring than do the higher and lower-ranking officials. This suggests that the middle-rank feel dependent on seniority and they are advanced by the concept of "being promoted on the basis of experience." This also suggests the limited scope for lateral entry to the middle-rank.*

All classes share a clear perception of seniority as a determining

*Chapter IV, pp. 89-92.
criterion in their advancement. Over sixty-five (65.8 per cent) of Class I officers, 77.6 per cent of Class II, 62.9 per cent of unclassified and 62 per cent of contractual officers took this view. However, there was a large difference in perception about the next most important criterion. Fifty per cent of Class I officers and 34.5 per cent of Class II officers perceived "competence" as the second major criterion; whereas 80 per cent of unclassified officers and 55 per cent of contractual officers perceived 'personal relations with superiors' as the second major criterion for making promotion. Only 12.8 per cent of Class I officers and 22.4 per cent of Class II officers perceived that personal influence is used in the promotion process. This shows the difference in experience of promotion procedures.

When preference was tested, 87 per cent of Class I, 81 per cent of Class II and 90 per cent of contractual officials preferred "competence" to be the prime criterion for promotion; 71.4 per cent of unclassified class officials preferred both competence and seniority to be used on an equal basis for promotion. Nearly half of Class I officers (51 per cent) prefer seniority to be second rank, while 46.5 per cent of Class II and 40 per cent of contractual class officers prefer education to be the second rank of criterion. One-third of Class I officers and 39.7 per cent of Class II officers advocated that training courses should be taken into account in determining promotion, whereas 28.6 per cent and 20 per cent of unclassified and contractual officers respectively inclined towards this trend.
As between departments studied, seniority ranked first in all of them except the National Planning Council where "competence" is regarded as the first criterion for promotion. Eighty per cent of the Civil Service Department, 85 per cent of the Treasury, 85 per cent of the Education and 66.7 per cent of Agriculture officers perceived seniority the most significant factor among all promotion criteria. When considering perceived criteria for promotion among the officers of the National Planning Council, 75 per cent perceived competence as the determining principle. At the same time, 55 per cent of the officers mentioned seniority as an influential factor. In the Civil Service Department and Agriculture, competence was the next most important criterion at rate of 31.7 per cent and 38.3 per cent respectively. In the Department of Education, the criterion which was second in importance was the education factor at the rate of 45 per cent.

The importance of favouritism also differs in significance among different departments. In the CSD, 25 per cent of the officers thought it to be an important factor in promotion; whereas in the Treasury, 28.3 per cent considered it significant. In the Department of Education the factor was regarded as important by 31.7 per cent, and in Agriculture by 33.3 per cent. The National Planning Council, however, gives a very limited role to the factor of personal influence. Only five officers considered this factor worth mentioning. It is interesting to note that the National Planning Council is the only department in the sample perceived by its officials to take due consideration of experience; training courses; potential; outstanding accomplishment; physical characteristics and personality traits. The latter include discretion, initiative, ability to negotiate and diplomatic behaviour. Because the National Planning Council is closely
concerned with private enterprises and is less restrained in its ability to offer opportunity to those who show merit, a wider range of attributes is important as criteria for promotion.

In contrast, the overwhelming majority of the respondents, in all departments, prefer competence to be the first criterion. Nearly 77 per cent of both the Civil Service Department and the Treasury Officers, 98.3 per cent of the National Planning Council officers, 90 per cent of Education and 80 per cent of Agriculture Officers prefers ability to do the job as the main principle for promotion. However, 58.3 per cent of the Civil Service Department and 61.7 per cent of the Treasury and 51.7 per cent of Agriculture Officials preferred the criterion of seniority to be used as the main measurement for promotion in the organisation. The criterion of education is ranked second in the preferences of officials in the National Planning Council (45 per cent) and Department of Education (56.7 per cent).

Other variables which affected the responses include age, level of education and length of service. A quick glance at the data shows that the older officials tend to rank the perceived and preferred criteria in similar orders. However, the perceived ranking of criteria displays some significant differences between the younger and older bureaucrats. The younger officials think that the ability to get along with superiors is ranked high by the Service, while the older officials feel more strongly than the younger ones that seniority becomes increasingly less important in promotions towards the most senior grades.
The people who have a lesser qualification than a university degree gave equal significance to seniority and personal relations with their superiors as factor for promotion. Since this group have no university qualification, they preferred promotion to be based on competence and seniority without regard to favouritism. Even the university degree holders perceived seniority as the determining factor. Only postgraduate degree holders perceived that competence is the most influential factor in their promotion. However, undergraduates and postgraduates stated that the Service should give greater weight to academic qualifications and training than at present in the promotion process.

The people who have been in the Service more than ten years are more likely to perceive seniority as the first promotion criterion than people who recently entered. The former even preferred seniority to be considered the most decisive factor along with competence and experience. The people who have been less than ten years in the Service prefer the widest possible range of factors to be taken into account: education, training, outstanding accomplishments, potential and personality, along with competence, to be seriously considered in deciding the bureaucrats' promotion.

On the whole, our sample confirms two major findings. First most government servants are dissatisfied with the promotion criteria arrangement used in the Service. Although many variables were involved in promotions, clearly the most significant factor was seniority. A large number of officials have moved into a certain level of the administrative structure on the basis of seniority. They now find themselves with a rather limited professional career ahead
of them. The challenge to the Service is firstly how these vitally-needed people can be further advanced and their ability retained. Secondly, though it is true that seniority was the dominant factor in promotion, it was noted that seniority rules were not observed rigidly and no two people progress at the same rate of promotion. The data from this survey on job satisfaction indicates that the younger official certainly thinks about leaving the public service. If his career opportunity in government service appears to him to be limited, he may seek other employment. Alternatively he may become very discontented with his present job. This demonstrates the need to have in the system objective predictability about how people advance. Certain questions in the Survey were designed to test respondents' beliefs about the predictability of promotion. This raises the question of who gets to the top.

7.4 HOW TO ADVANCE IN THE BUREAUCRACY: VIEWS OF RESPONDENTS

In our sample, Managers and supervisors were asked for their views on how to advance and succeed in the government service. The responses (see Table 7.2) are not mutually exclusive.

Over two-thirds of the senior officials indicated that in order to advance in the Service one needs to have some kind of educational qualification.* This can be demonstrated from the data by analysing the careers of two officials who entered the Service at the same time working in the Treasury. One of them is

*cf. Chapter V (Chart 5.1)
### TABLE 7.2

How to advance and succeed in the bureaucracy

\( n = 200 \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advice</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Get a University qualification</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work hard</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep good internal public relations, socialise</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get broad experience, generalise</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know your job, know the service, learn about your department</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pick the right department or good work-subject area*</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seek transfers</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apply for available promotions, seek interesting jobs</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obey orders, show respect to superiors</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show initiative, speak out</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get known to your supervisors</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialise, become an expert</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be neat in appearance, be punctual</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** responses are not mutually exclusive.

* This general description covers (a) being in a prominent policy area or powerful department; and (b) job incentive and job satisfaction.

a University graduate who joined the Service at entry Grade 7, while the other is a high school leaver who joined the Service at the basic Grade 10. At present, with 20 years of seniority, the former is in Grade 1A, acting as Assistant to the Director-General, while the latter is still in Grade 5. However, there were many senior officials
interviewed during the fieldwork survey who expressed scepticism about the usefulness of securing qualifications such as university degrees for purposes of promotion.

Nearly 57 per cent of the respondents mentioned 'hard work' or 'applying oneself to the job' as ways of advancing and succeeding in the Service. Seventy-five managers stressed that it was important to be 'friendly, co-operative, to keep good public relations, or be sociable.' One senior official comments: 'One should understand thoroughly the psychology of the organisation and its internal atmosphere.' Others felt that this was not always possible, though it did make for an easier working environment.

In several closely-related categories, 27.5 per cent of the respondents mentioned the importance of selecting the 'right' department to work in, or alternatively, a good subject area for work. Forty six managers (23 per cent) indicated that a person should consistently inquire about available promotions. Another 24 per cent recommended that one should seek transfers to the 'important departments' or being a "fire fighter". Some departments are of importance politically and administratively. Here the turnover is high at the top because of the political cadre which moves as the Minister moves. This affects the rate of promotion. Also, this kind of department recognises the value of discretion, innovation and initiative on the part of the officials in the promotion process. To illustrate the point, consider the experience of an official with university qualification who worked 15 years for the Ministry of Education in the field. In that time, he had only been upgraded to Grade B as a school-teacher. Later, he transferred to the National Planning Council. Within 8 years he was promoted to Grade 4.
occupying the position of a head of division. He gave as his advice, 'do not serve in the field, pick a centralised department and be close to the centre of power.'

Regarding advice about whether to be a generalist or specialist in order to succeed in the Service, 32.5 per cent recommend that an official should seek broad, general experience and only 10 per cent advised that an official should specialise and become an expert in a particular field. One senior manager said: "generalist and specialist streams are two totally different careers. However, experience shows that the latter have a gloomy future in the Service."*

Few senior officials advised that an official must know the bureaucracy in general. He should know how his department functions from top to bottom. On the other hand, 30 per cent of the senior bureaucrats advised that to get ahead, an official should not only know his job and learn about his department but should also know the public service more generally. In fact this is an old organisational problem about which much has been written.36

Some of the less-frequently mentioned items are interesting for the intensity of conviction and forcefulness with which the respondents express them. Nearly 19 per cent mentioned items relating to dealing with superiors: "Let the boss see you are taking an interest. Learn the likes and dislikes of your superiors and be polite to them."

In one important category, 18.5 per cent of the managers regarded 'initiative, drive or speak out' as a way to advance. Even those

* cf. Chapter IV (Chart 4.13)
senior officials who did mention initiative as important, qualified their endorsement of this advice. One illustrated the caution with an official must exercise initiative and speaking out:

'if you are going to question something, do so through the available normal channels. Be prepared to use a modicum of initiative without being too obvious about it.'

Items relating to personal appearance and habits were mentioned by 5.0 per cent of the managers. One senior official's advice was 'pay attention to the traditions and old-established values - punctuality, neatness of dress, respect for superiors.' Only three senior people mentioned having good relations with people or groups outside the Service or their own department as being of use in succeeding in the public bureaucracy.

While almost all the managers and supervisors answered the question asked, several were openly critical or cynical about a career in the government service. Comments such as the following were made: 'If you are imaginative, sensitive and artistic - forget the government service.'

7.5 PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES

People complained that there were not adequate promotion opportunities for them, because of the government's policy of direct recruitment based upon educational attainment, as pointed out in Chapter V. The Civil Service Department recommended that the claims of those already in employment should be recognised in an increasing measure by affording to the deserving amongst them greater opportunities
for promotion. The CSD was of the view that such a change was necessary not only for promoting well-educated persons already working in lower rungs of the government service but also for keeping up the attraction of lower posts. This is a problem which faces all nations when their government service expands. It is also a well known feature of "career blockage".

In the late 1970s, the Civil Service Department pressed for the increase of promotion opportunities throughout the Service. Two arguments were advanced in support of this demand. First, the existing practice was not only resulting in a waste of valuable experience among employees but was also producing considerable frustration among them. Second, entrusting extensive powers to direct recruits both comparatively young and totally inexperienced was neither good for administrative efficiency nor for inspiring confidence and respect among the subordinates.

What is the position today? A superficial observer might feel pleased by the fact that the number of promotion opportunities from lower to higher posts has gone up on account of the increasing need for senior managers. But a careful study could show that while it has benefitted a few officials at the top of certain grades, these tend to be officials in the Higher and Special Grades. It has not meant greater incentive for staff as a whole. This is because the increase in number of posts at lower level has been much greater than those at the higher level. Graph 7.3 represents promotions of classified officials. The number of promotions for the years 1979, 1980 and 1981 was 7129, 8586, and 8330 officials respectively. The growth of promotion was 20 per cent between 1979 and 1980.
GRAPH 7.3

Total Promotion of Classified Officials Over Time, 1970 - 1981*

*Figures in 1970-1978 cannot be subdivided by departments.

 Whereas the growth of promotion was 17 per cent between 1979 and 1981. However, the proportion of promotions decreased by 3 per cent between 1980 and 1981.

Because of its size and variety, the Ministry of Education has always promoted far more people than other departments. In 1979, promotion in the Ministry of Education was 77.8 per cent of the total. Other departments in which large numbers of promotions occurred were the Ministry of Communication, 3.5 per cent; Department of Customs, 2 per cent; Ministry of Agriculture, 1.6 per cent; and the Treasury 1.5 per cent. In 1980, of all promotions made, 74 per cent were in the Ministry of Education; 6 per cent in the Ministry of Health; 2 per cent in the Ministry of Agriculture. In 1981, the proportion had changed as follows: in the Ministry of Education, 77.5 per cent; Ministry of Health, 5.2 per cent; Ministry of Agriculture, 1.7 per cent; Ministry of Communication (including Telecommunication Corporation) 1.5 per cent of the total government promotions.

Graph 7.4 shows the difference in promotion opportunities as between central grades. In 1979 the highest proportion was in Grade 6 consisting of 24 per cent of the total promotions, followed by Grade 8 (22.5 per cent) and Grade 5 (20 per cent). By contrast, in 1980 the highest proportion was Grade 8 consisting of 32 per cent, followed by Grade 9 (17 per cent) and Grade 6 (14.5 per cent). Whereas in 1981, the highest proportion was in Grade 8 (27 per cent). This is due to the government’s decision (referred to in Chapter V) to improve the status of the Teaching Certificate holders, especially in the Ministry of Education, by promoting them from Grade 9 to
Promotions of Classified Officials by Grade, 1979-1981

Grade 8. The next highest proportion was in Grade 6 consisting of 22 per cent of the total promotions.

Clearly promotion opportunities have been affected by many variables: the nature of the department and its staff, the rate of departmental growth, the implications for staffing, turnover, job satisfaction, manpower planning and grading structures, etc. However, despite some limited attempts at improving promotion opportunities, two factors continue to dominate the problem of promotion in Jordan. First, there is the hangover from the past that promoted officers are not assumed to possess the requisite qualities and hence higher posts should be manned mostly by those directly recruited to do so. This avoids too much dilution of quality. The advocates of this viewpoint do not seem to realise that early promotions on the basis of merit and the linking up of promotion with in-service training ought to prevent this fear of dilution of quality. Second, the number of higher grade posts is dictated too much by financial considerations and also too much by administrative needs and incentives. This unreasonably limits the avenues for promotion, thereby depressing the morale of the employees. In addition to this, the survey data suggests that one of the chief causes of low morale in the lower ranks of the Service is the slowness of promotion.

In the future, promotion opportunities may tend to decrease with the increasing drive for economy which is the declared policy of the government today. This would merely reinforce low morale among staff. Moreover, the Budget Department proposes to step up direct recruitment to some extent in order to bring fresh blood into the Service. This again would reduce opportunities for existing
officials seeking grade-to-grade promotion and add to short contract employment. Accordingly, rethinking of the problem of promotion opportunities is needed in Jordan. Both considerations of incentives and fresh energy need proper balancing in the context of the present requirements. While financial considerations should not be ignored altogether, they should not be over-emphasised in the interest of efficiency. Unlike some Western countries, where the pressure exerted by staff associations tends to counterbalance any "tight-fisted" policy of the Treasury, in Jordan no such pressure exists. The responsibility for pursuing an enlightened promotion policy therefore rests upon the shoulders of the government.

7.6 REPORTING SYSTEM

In Jordan, the relative merits of candidates for promotion are assessed mainly from the records of work as contained in the assessment reports. But it is strange to observe that in Jordan, where public service careers are such important avenues of employment, reporting systems have never been seriously studied. A reporting system was introduced, for the purpose of promotion, within the government service in 1957. Since its introduction, the assessment report has been confined to the classified grades only. Categories of departmental grades have no such central service-wide arrangements for assessment reports. However, some departments, on individual basis, have an assessment report designed to suit their departmental employees.

The assessment of central grades is carried out by the immediate supervisor. Since generally he will have day-to-day contact with the official concerned, he should be well equipped to evaluate and
counsel. The assessment report form contains detailed headings concerning the character, conduct, efficiency, capabilities, outlook and temperament of the individual employees. The supervisor is requested to express an opinion about a given ability or type of behaviour of his subordinate. Each ability is rated as: Excellent, Very Good, Good, Medium, and Weak. The standard assessment report form for central grades is contained at Appendix (1). Table 7.5 represents assessment rates from ten departments.

**TABLE 7.5**

Assessment Rates for Employees From Ten Departments, 1981
(n = 1000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Good</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Civil Service Department, Annual Assessment Reports, Amman, 1982.

People complained, however, that reports are not always written accurately and comprehensively. Ratings are less specific and less objective than they ought to be. They merely record superficial impressions. The choice of headings is frequently quite unsystematic when not wildly fanciful. For example, supervisors are asked whether subordinates think independently. They are not given any measure of
how "independent thinking" is to be defined. They are also not helped by the fact that they do not know the purpose for which reports will be used. The points to which the attention of rating officers are called are not necessarily those that would best reveal the competence of an official. The aim of the report appeared to be to rate staff members according to their morale and intellectual facilities rather than to their performance. What such reports reflect most accurately are the varying personalities of the reporting officers. The Civil Service Department has instructed departments to pay "proper attention" to this problem and take appropriate steps to effect improvement.51

Another major weakness of the reporting system in Jordan is that it does not contain any indication of the views of the person reported on, or of his interests and aspirations. Nor does it contain any provision for regularly letting an employee know how he stands in the promotion race.52 Therefore, one of the most controversial issues is whether or not the assessment report should be openly discussed with the employee concerned. In our sample the respondents were asked to express their views on showing the assessment report. Responses are represented in Table 7.6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly desirable</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably a good idea</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral - no opinion</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably a bad idea</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite wrong</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As shown in Table 7.6, some people in the sample (35 per cent) are against discussion of the assessment reports with the subordinates. Their argument is generally based on the allegation that reports, which it is known are to be discussed, are likely to be less reliable. By contrast, advocates of discussion of the reports (60 per cent) argue that without feedback of results, the assessment report can have little development value. The employee can hardly be expected to improve if he is not aware in what way his performance is inadequate. In addition, the consequences of an honest and open exchange of information and ideas must be compared with the possible negative consequences of the assessment report being shrouded in secrecy and suspicion. On this basis, the process of reviewing the person's work would be more valuable if it were a two-way process, with the person able to give his own comments to the supervisor and make his own criticism or constructive suggestions about performance review.

The main formal purpose of the assessment report in Jordan is to provide evidence of fitness for promotion. Respondents in the sample were asked to explain their attitudes towards the value of the reporting system in the Service. The responses (see Table 7.7) are not mutually exclusive.
### TABLE 7.7

The Value of the Reporting System: Respondents Attitudes  
(Measured as preference)  
(n = 257)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motivate staff</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure appropriate staff deployment</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare for promotion</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicate for training needs</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control staff</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Responses are not mutually exclusive.

The data indicates differences between departments studied and levels of management regarding the purpose of the assessment report. Staff of the Civil Service Department regarded the prime purpose of such a report as ensuring appropriate staff deployment. Those in the National Planning Council and Education considered the principle value as being to 'motivate staff' in the organisation. In contrast, Treasury staff were equally divided between those who regarded staff-reporting as a technique to 'monitor staff', and those who saw it as a means of assessing the 'suitability of officials' for promotion. Agriculture, being a technical department, which also employs a large cadre of non-specialists, has staff which reflected both points of view. On balance they regarded the primary purpose to be an 'indication for training needs'. Senior officials in all departments, except the Planning Council, regarded the purpose as being the 'control of staff'. This reflects the attitudes of top managers in a bureaucracy.
Other levels of staff indicated that the first purpose should be 'motivating the staff'. Thus our sample of managers and staff at different levels in different departments demonstrate that the first need is to get acceptance of the purpose of a reporting system to which everyone can agree.

Accordingly, two more questions were advanced: one to managerial, the other to non-managerial staff. Managers were asked: 'Does the reporting system used in the Service give an indication as to the ability and competence of the subordinate and consequently provide an indication of training needs and suitability for promotion?' Responses are shown in Table 7.8.

TABLE 7.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Response</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The question put to non-managerial staff was: 'In your view, does the reporting system create motivation in the Service?' Responses are represented in Table 7.9.
TABLE 7.9

Does the Reporting System Create Motivation in the Service? (Perception of the Respondents)  \( n = 157 \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-response</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables 7.8 and 7.9 suggest two points: first, the manner in which assessment reports are completed do not realise any defined objective; and second, the assessment report as an appraisal system does not play the role of either a motivator of staff or a measurement of fitness for promotion.

In improving the reporting system in Jordan, two things need to be borne in mind. In the first place, the forms of assessment reports should be so designed as not only to provide columns for judging the skill or competence of a person but also for assessing his personality and fitness for promotion. It must follow a pattern deliberately set to elicit the essential information regarding the worth, ability and character of the candidate. Moreover, there should be carefully-worded pointers in each column to guide the officer who is to write the report. Secondly, the reporting officer should try to be accurate and objective to the maximum possible extent. He should observe his subordinate's work more closely and should not let prejudice influence him unnecessarily. Further
limitation on prejudices can also be provided if the report is countersigned by a more senior officer. Menzies remarks:

"Whatever system is adopted, the reports should (a) be similar in form, (b) be based as far as possible on a common standard of judgement to enable valid comparisons to be made, (c) be accepted as fair and reliable by the staff, and (d) give the fullest possible account of present performance and suitability for promotion." 57

We should not, however, think that complete objectivity is easy to attain. The prejudice of reporting officers tend to colour the writing of assessment reports at times. A British ex-civil servant remarks in this connection:

"Some tend to be over-critical, others regard all their geese as swans. A senior may take a strong dislike to a member of his staff or he may be unreasonably prejudiced in his favour. Reporting officers may go to great lengths to boost the claims of their candidates, or they may be quite indifferent." 58

Considerable efforts could be made to make the reporting system as realistic as is possible. This issue of particular relevance in assessing departmental grades at establishing a service-wide system of reporting system. The report can be improved by modification of the form to take account of performance at different levels of responsibility. However, this idea creates immediate opposition. Our sample were asked whether they think that each class or level of management should have a separate assessment report. Nearly 34 per cent of the respondents rejected the idea, whereas 61.4 per cent supported it. The qualities that are important in the different levels and classes obviously vary and it remains desirable that separate assessments are used for the different categories of personnel.
A prototype assessment form for all staff might be based on the following principles. A brief statement should be given of the duties on which the officer has been employed during the year under review. Each form should contain an over-all grading of duties actually performed in the present grade and an assessment of fitness for promotion to the next grade on a specific point scale, in addition to rating on the traditional basis. Each point of the scale should be clearly and fully defined. It would be more useful to use a fully descriptive form for executive officers and upwards, and a simpler semi-descriptive one for clerical officers downwards. The headings should be related as far as possible to performance instead of qualities. Observed performance is likely to be more objective than measurement of the qualities underlying observed performance. But, however carefully designed the form of the report may be, the critics point out that the system is too rough to permit precise and reliable comparison between the candidates of more or less equal merit.\textsuperscript{59}

The pictures presented by the reports may not be precise enough for fine shades of distinction. Nevertheless, the reporting system has, as Professor Finer points out, three advantages. First, there is the regularity of report.

"This means that there must be recurrent attention to the relative merits of subordinates. The deliberateness at stated intervals conduces to conscious attempts to distinction and though there is in all countries a tendency for the certifying officer to tar all with the same brush, so that the total marks tend to prove that all are equally meritorious - distinctions are made." \textsuperscript{60}

Second, again is the "heightening of responsibility (on the part of the supervisor) brought about by the possibility of a representation
against a flagrantly unjust promotion." Third, the staff feels
that the system reduces the possibility of favouritism, jobbery
and nepotism, and that they are having a "square deal". These
are important gains and well worth the time and energy expanded
upon the operation of the system."63

Overall perhaps it may not be possible to obtain complete
objectivity in making promotions. When all measures and precautions
to ensure objectivity are taken, it is yet likely to elude the
assessors because assessment of merit remains essentially a matter
of subjective judgement, not capable of being fully determined by
objective criteria. However, the system of carefully designed
reports, adequate publicity to all the vacancies to be filled by
promotion, the judicious use of promotion committees, the right of
appeal by those adversely affected, the limited competitive examina-
tion and interview might provide a more satisfactory basis to
assess "merit" as the criterion for promotion in Jordan.
NOTES


2. Ibid., p. 99.


5. Civil Service Regulations, Article 33. Officials of Grade 1 and above are appointed and promoted by the Cabinet, whereas the Selection Board is responsible for the appointment and promotion of classified officials below Grade 1.

6. Director of Administration, CSD, Interview, Amman, April, 1982.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.


13. Permanent Secretary of the Civil Service Department, Interview, Amman, April, 1982.


15. Civil Service Regulations, Article 52.


17. Head of the Civil Service Department, Interview, Amman, March, 1982.


22. For details see: Civil Service Regulations, Articles 52, 53.
23. Director of Administration, CSD, Interview, Amman, April, 1982.
31. Head of the Civil Service Department, Interview, Amman, April, 1982.
32. See: I. Hanania et al. op.cit. p. 119.
37. Permanent Secretary of the Civil Service Department, Interview, Amman, April, 1982.


40. Ibid.


43. Director-General of the Budget Department, Interview, Amman, March, 1982.


45. M. Jumeia'an, op.cit. p. 6; see also: The Prime Minister's Office, *Memorandum*, No. 6, Date: January 14, 1957.

46. Civil Service Regulations, Article 55.
Assessment reports are written for classified officials in Grade 3 and below. Grade 2 and above are excluded. The justification is that influence might be exerted upon occupiers of these grades by their superiors.

47. See for example: Assessment report of unclassified officials in the Ministry of Education, 1982.

48. Civil Service Regulations, Article 56.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Director of Administration, CSD, Interview, Amman, April, 1982.

52. See: Civil Service Regulations, Articles 55-61.


59. See: M. Jumeia'an, op.cit; I. Hanania et al., op.cit.


61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.
CHAPTER VIII

TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

Training is a crucial matter for all types of personnel in the government service of Jordan.1 The increase in the variety, number and complexity of functions that have to be performed in developing Jordan has resulted in an imbalance between the needs to be met and the adequacy of personnel to carry them out. This imbalance constitutes a major obstacle to national development. To meet even a part of its growing responsibilities, Jordan must develop the administrative capacity to implement its programmes of economic and social progress.2 To an ever-increasing degree, economic and social development depends upon an effective and well-trained government service. Training, therefore, deserves a high priority on the agenda of development.

This chapter investigates the most crucial issues in training and development of government servants in Jordan. The need for training; its objectives; training policy; central and departmental training, and how this division can be bridged. Methods and techniques used in training are examined and their deficiencies probed. Training abroad and its content is also considered. The chapter also examines the attitudes of the employees towards the various aspects of training.

8.1 NEED FOR TRAINING

Administration has become a highly specialised and complex task calling for a high degree of specialised knowledge. It is symptomatic
of the growing complexity of the task that very few administrative decisions today can be taken without consulting or calling for the co-operation of many interests. This is owing to the increasingly complex nature of administrative duties. An official needs to keep abreast of technological and scientific progress.\(^3\) The standards required for success have become higher than formerly and the consequences of failure are proportionately greater. To avoid failure on such a scale, efficient administration is essential.\(^4\) The training of officials is a vital step in the development of an efficient government administration.\(^5\)

The higher ranking officials in Jordan shoulder the heaviest burden and on them rest greatest responsibilities. On their performance depends much of the success of administrative measures and from their ranks are chosen persons for positions of highest responsibility in the government. It is clearly in the interest of the nation that the fullest possible attention should be paid to the training of senior managers who are in positions of considerable administrative and managerial responsibility.\(^6\) The Assheton Committee, discussing the need of the British Civil Service pointed out:

"While administration can be represented as being primarily a matter of commonsense, ... the achievement of balanced judgement which is the real meaning of commonsense in this connection can be hastened and facilitated by a well-thought-out training scheme." \(^7\)

A new recruit to the government service of Jordan needs a greater practical knowledge of administration and a better grasp of the implication of what he is doing than the education system
provides. This can be provided by a purposeful scheme of training. An individual recruit, if left to himself, will no doubt acquire a conception of the public service administration - with its need for bringing into harmony the ideal and practice; the legally permissible and the politically possible against which all his future decisions are consciously or unconsciously tested. But this is a slow and time-consuming process, because wide experience needs years to acquire, and he has no framework of ideas into which to fit early impressions. Such a framework can be supplied by a well conceived course of instruction at the beginning of his career. A meaningful course of training would give the new recruit the idea that:

"administration means something more than taking a number of unrelated decisions on disconnected files; that what he is doing to contribute to the formation or operation of a policy; that such process are going on in many departments beside his own; that solutions, some good, some not so good, have been found for the difficulties they raise, that there are generally a number of alternative methods of operating a policy besides the one his Department has chosen; and that his mind should be constantly on the alert to criticise or to justify." 8

Training should, therefore, be of great value to the vast body of officials in Jordan. A great part of the daily work in government offices is done by the middle and lower grades. Fully trained and efficient middle and lower ranks alive to their duties and responsibilities are as necessary for the successful execution of the tasks of the administration as are the higher ranks. If they are to be encouraged to give of their best, and the best of them is to be developed, they are to be trained for their tasks as well. 9 Emphasising the need of training, the Assheton Committee pointed out that the
"disadvantages, more especially on the long-term view, inherent in the policy of leaving the recruit to learn his job by trial and error are formidable. They include not only delay in his becoming a fully effective member of the department, but also a risk of dissipating the enthusiasm with which he enters on his first job." 10

8.2 OBJECTIVES OF TRAINING

The main purpose of training in the government service of Jordan, as laid down by the Civil Service Regulations, is to increase the efficiency of the officials, influence their attitudes, improve their standard of service, prepare them for shouldering bigger responsibilities and raising of their cultural and occupational standing.11 Through training programmes, the officer is led to understand ways and methods in which he can speed up his work, eliminate waste, employ manpower and resources.12

Our sample were asked to indicate the objectives of the training they had undertaken during their career service. The question was put to them in the following form: 'People undertake training either voluntarily or as a requirement. Indicate your purpose in taking training.'

Chart 8.1 represents the responses, which are not mutually exclusive. The objective of training of different individuals and of different level of staff vary according to their circumstances. In higher ranks, 42 out of 70 officials indicated that the purpose of training was to assume more senior duties and wider responsibilities. In middle ranks the majority, 37 out of 61 officials thought training courses were to prepare for other duties (e.g. computer programming), and 27 out of 33 officials in lower ranks considered that training
CHART 8.1

Purpose for Undertaking Training at Individual Level (n = 164).

Note: Responses are not mutually exclusive.
was to learn the existing job. Thus the higher ranks feel greater need for wider and thorough training than those in the middle ranks and the latter more than those in lower ones.

Objectives will also vary according to the classes of employees. In Class I, 62 out of 75 officials and in contractual Class 6 out of 8 officials who had received training stated that the purpose was to prepare for other duties and higher posts. In contrast, the majority of Class II, 44 out of 53 officials and unclassified class, 22 out of 28 officials mentioned that their primary purpose was to learn and to keep the existing job. This is attributed to the fact that members of these two classes have less experience in their jobs than the former, who represent the most senior members of the Service. This indicates that the immediate objective of training for this group is to equip them for the assumption of the regular duties of their positions, to help them to develop the best in them, and to fit them gradually for the assumption of increasing responsibilities of higher and varying character.

The purpose of training at the individual level has been affected by the characteristics of departmental organisation. For instance, Departments of Agriculture and Education, being specialist in character and requiring field administration arrangements, have a different attitude towards training from other departments studied. Twenty out of 32 Agricultural officers and 24 out of 35 Education Officers indicated that their primary personal objectives in training was seeking more knowledge and new information.

The purpose of training will also vary according to the nature of occupation. Where the work is of a general character, a broad
type of training will be necessary. If the work is of a technical character, substantial vocational training is called for. Nevertheless, an element of general management training in this case also might not be over-emphasised.  

In the light of the above, the following suggestions can be advanced. First, officials should be able to do the work for which they are first assigned quickly, accurately and intelligently. For this they must know the techniques required for the job. Their standard of performance is likely to be better if they have a clear and lively appreciation of their positions in the scheme or the environment of the government. Everyone should understand clearly the nature and purpose of his work and its relation to the wider purpose of the government. Such a knowledge can give meaning and significance to their work.

Second, the purpose of the respondents for undertaking training, as reflected by Chart 8.1, serves to show that the training of employees has assumed a wider meaning nowadays. It includes not only vocational training designed to make the official fit to perform his current duty, but also instruction on a broader basis to develop his capacity for higher work and greater responsibilities.

Third, training depends upon the general political conditions in a country. It varies according to the form of prevailing political system (e.g. authoritarian or consultative, interventionist or laissez-faire). Training will depend on the nature and variety of the socio-economic plans for the development of the country. It will, therefore, be useful for the officials to have a knowledge of
political, social, cultural and psychological background of the community they are called upon to serve.

Fourth, training needs to be related to grade-to-grade promotion. At present, the vast majority of the respondents, as seen by Chart 8.1, do not think that criteria for promotion are related to the objectives of training.* For this reason, there is fear on the part of officials that by being absent for training they miss their turn for promotion. Hence, the importance of attaching training to the career development arrangements.

Finally, training should not be restricted merely to instructions in administrative techniques (e.g. job analysis, programme budgeting, financial reporting system, etc.), but should include development of management skills (e.g. personnel management). The training scheme could be utilized to develop "esprit de corps" in the Service as a whole.

8.3 TRAINING POLICY

Initial Training

Civil Service Regulations (1966) state that the government shall (a) take steps to assist the appropriate departments in developing their training programmes; (b) concern itself with the orientation period set out for new officials; (c) develop a special programme to guide and train the new officials. The programme must include the acquaintance of officials with the objectives and duties of the department concerned, its organisation, their duties and responsibilities, and the system of supervision. The agency which has been created to

*cf. Chapter VII (Table 7.1)
fulfil these functions is the Civil Service Department. However, little progress has been made in meeting these objectives since 1966. But in 1982, the CSD began organising for the first time an initial training course to be held regularly twice a month for one day. This short course is attended by all new recruits in the Government Service. The syllabus includes: government organisation, administrative divisions in Jordan, dealing with the public, disciplinary procedures, and Civil Service Regulations. The latter is important because there has been a tendency over many years for departments to operate these Regulations to suit themselves.

In some departments, for instance the Ministry of Communications, the new recruit is required to spend a short spell of time, two to four weeks, at the Postal Training Centre, working for the subordinate employees. There were 123 and 144 trainees at the Centre for the years 1980 and 1981 respectively. The Income Tax Department organises initial training courses for new recruits, lasting two months.

By comparison, present arrangements are still very small-scale. In the U.S.A. it is the Universities, particularly Law Schools and Faculties of Business and Public Administration, which provide initial training to persons seeking a career in the public service. In France, the Ecole National d'Administration (ENA) runs a very elaborate course of initial training. In fact, ENA pursues both lines of induction training - (a) new recruit induction; (b) continuous induction for people already in the service moving jobs up the ladder

*See Chapters V and VII.
to higher posts which require a broader training - most of them having already had an earlier induction training in their own specialism in one of the other French "Ecoles" for public service training. 22

To discover what was the experience of initial training among officials, those in the sample were asked to state whether they joined an initial training course when they were appointed. Seventy one officials (23.7 per cent) stated they had. The majority, however, are specialists in the Departments of Agriculture and Education. Their experience seems to reflect a more general trend for specialists to receive such training. To illustrate the induction training for specialists, consider the experience of an official belonging to the Department of Agriculture, holding a technical post without previous experience before joining the Service.

He will be in Class I, Grade 6; typically aged 38 and usually managing a staff of 14 in a field station placement. He is a secondary school certificate holder with 17 years length of service in his department. At the time of joining the Service he had the opportunity to choose to work in either Agriculture or the Treasury. He preferred Agriculture because this Department is more concerned with post-entry training, particularly initial training. His view of the value of initial training was based upon the following expectations. First, his view about how to improve capacity for higher and more responsible tasks in the administration. Second, the crucial need to learn how to deal with the public as a district manager. Such a post also implies the ability to give the right supervision to district officers, and how to conduct their job
appraisals. Third, since he is not a university graduate, training is considered as a means of finishing his education.

Nevertheless, although initial training has been developed to a limited scale, it remains weak and intermittent. It would be to the advantage of both the individual and the department to pay full attention to this type of training as a starting point for an official career.

**In-Service Training**

Training of government officials should be a continuous process, not something that is done once to new employees.\(^{23}\) In every well-run establishment it is continuous.\(^ {24}\) The initial training needs to be followed by in-service training both of formal and informal types. Formal type implies that the official gets away from his routine work for a while and spends the time undergoing specialised training or a particular specialised course of further education. Informal training implies that facilities are afforded to an official while engaged on his job, to improve knowledge and to develop his capacities.\(^ {25}\) By far the greatest proportion of both formal and informal training (initial and continuous) takes place on an in-service basis.

In-service training is by far the most important type of training for government officials.\(^ {26}\) It normally starts after the employee has had a period of service to familiarise himself with the job.\(^ {27}\) This type of training, however, has started attracting some notice only in recent years. Nigro points out:
"Even in the advanced countries, relatively little attention was given to training until recently. Even now it is still generally considered one of the lesser developed areas in public personnel administration, one in which much remains to be done." 28

The pre-independence government service in Jordan had hardly known any form of in-service training. Training by experience, rather than any organised in-service training, was the normal practice. The new recruit was put on the job to learn how to do it over time. After independence, in-service training was adopted at two levels: central and departmental.29 The former is the responsibility of the Civil Service Department and the Institute of Public Administration (IPA). The CSD is responsible for training policy in the Service as a whole and for determining the resources to be allocated for this purpose.30 The CSD interprets its mandate in staffing to include all measures required to meet the needs of the Service for qualified personnel.31 The IPA conducts courses which are common to all departments and government agencies and assists them in developing training programmes of their own.32 In contrast, departmental training programmes are conducted and administered by the line departments.33

Departmental Training

In practice, training activities in Jordan are largely decentralised. Most training activities are conducted by individual departments and their training institutions. In the sample, nearly 55 per cent had taken training, of whom over 90 per cent had taken training in departments. Regulations lay down that Central Training Agencies, i.e. CSD and IPA, will assist and co-operate with departments for meeting their training needs.34 Departmental training in Jordan takes two
main forms, i.e. on-the-job training; and training institutes within the departments.

On the Job Training

Government Service in Jordan widely exercises "training by doing", which is the traditional British approach to post-entry training. This method has even been used by the Civil Service Department for its own staff.\(^{35}\) It takes place in the work situation. It is justified on the grounds that the best training for an official is for him to be immersed in the day-to-day work of his department. He deals with current business as it comes to the office and learns step by step under the watchful guidance of his superiors, the "appropriate" method for dealing with problems. In the course of time, the official builds up a profound and comprehensive knowledge of his own field.\(^{36}\) It is an informal but a continuing activity which is largely the responsibility of the supervisors at different echelons. The middle echelon employees have to be instructed and their attention drawn to the usefulness of this easy-going training.\(^{37}\)

Training Institutes

Frequently departments run their own training institutions for in-service training. These include the Ministries of Education, Health, Tourism, Labour, Social Development, Communications, Information, Transport, and Agriculture; the Telecommunications Corporation, Central Bank, Statistics Department, Royal Scientific Society, Youth and Sports Organisation, Co-operative Organisation, Geographic Centre and others.\(^{38}\) Each institute has its own curriculum, syllabus, duration,
requirements, staff and administration, etc. For instance, the Ministry of Education established the Certification Institute for In-Service Teacher Education in 1970. Unqualified teachers are released from their jobs for a period of 16 weeks, during which time they receive instruction in education and methodology. The Jordan Statistical Training Centre, affiliated to the Department of Statistics, was established in 1964 and the study is for two years. The curriculum is designed to meet specified needs or objectives. It covers statistical methods, mathematics, applied statistics, public administration, sociology, demography, census and survey methods, principles of economics, national income, packages, etc. The Ministry of Social Development established the Institute of Social Work in 1966. Instructions covers academic disciplines and social environments. The curriculum includes social health, economic development, Jordanian society, Psychology, rural and urban sociology, family and child-care, community, individual welfare, etc.

Institutional training is primarily provided for all lower and middle grades. It is designed with generalists rather than specialists. It seeks, therefore, to provide a broad knowledge about the work, department and environment. The lecture method is widely used in this type of training. However, the scale of this training varies among departments studied. While it is heavily used in the Departments of Education and Treasury, other departments are less enthusiastic towards this kind of training, especially Agriculture. Table 8.2 shows an example of the training institutes within departments.
TABLE 8.2
Example of Training through Departmental Institutes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Civil Service Department</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Treasury</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of management</td>
<td>Top</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Deputy of Headmaster</td>
<td>General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty/Function</td>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Teaching</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at entrance</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>B.A.</td>
<td>Teaching</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialisation</td>
<td>Law</td>
<td>Certificate</td>
<td>Certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Government experience</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Social Science</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervision</td>
<td>6 people</td>
<td>12 people</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work location</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of departmental</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>training institute courses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our sample were asked whether they had taken a training course in departmental training institutes. Half of the respondents had, and this group were asked to comment critically upon the departmental training institutes. Table 8.3 shows the responses which are not mutually exclusive.
TABLE 8.3
Respondents Evaluation of Departmental Training Courses (n = 150)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criticism</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too theoretical</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too short</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate selection of participants</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not provided by qualified instructors</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not career related (i.e. promotion or needs)</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate facilities (libraries, equipment)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient financial support</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not relevant to the job</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poorly managed courses (bad organisation)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No emphasis on ethics, personality, behaviour etc.</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Responses are not mutually exclusive.

It should be understood that some departments require more than one institute to serve their needs. These responses are therefore representative of experience in 10 different institutes. The evidence suggests that respondents consider training courses too theoretical, too short, based upon inadequate selection of trainees, not provided by sufficiently well trained or qualified staff and not sufficiently related to the requirements of promotion. Other points made included the lack of facilities and financial support, irrelevant syllabus, disorganised and unqualified administrative staff. They also commented that courses showed lack of concern with attitudes towards dealing with the public.
In the light of the responses, one would highlight the following. First, training institutes in Jordan rely mainly on the lecture method. This is perhaps a less effective method than others such as seminars, case-studies, role-playing and conferences. In France, for instance, the ENA has adopted a method of training which has proved very effective not only in the intellectual training of public servants, but also in making them understand administrative problems realistically. During second year of the training programme, the trainee not merely attends class-room lectures but spends his time mostly in seminars and conferences where discussion goes on in a critical way. In Jordan also, more attention could be paid to seminars, group discussion and residential conferences for imparting knowledge and for stimulating independent thinking.

Second, if the period of training were to be extended for all training programmes, it might then be able to pay more attention to the teaching process. Teaching staff need not be confined to public servants. Each institute could have a few highly qualified teachers who can establish respect for the training among trainees. There are also among government servants some officials who can make an important contribution based upon their own education and experience. The quality of instruction should be of the highest standard. Additional training beyond the competence or resources of the departments could be undertaken by universities. When necessary, senior managers from both the public and private sectors can also be asked for contributions. This is likely to be an antidote to possible inbreeding of bureaucratic norms. Stahl sums up the process by which this development of the training function might be achieved:
"One of the first considerations in working out a group training programme is the selection and training of those who are to assume the responsibility for training others. It may be taken for granted that many a practitioner with a broad understanding of his field lacks the knack of taking on the role of an educator, but, given this knack, he should be stimulated and aided to organise the material to be presented so that it may be offered in a systematic and comprehensive manner." 43

Third, the benefits of training, however well conceived and well organised, may not be realised unless due attention is paid to the physical surroundings in which people are trained. Library facilities should also be adequate. Finally, at present, the emphasis is on vocational training at the expense of learning how to deal with the public. Emphasis has to be given, therefore, to the cultivation of moral standards, ethics, personal conduct, administrative behaviour and personality, etc. A brief course on mass communications, public relations and human relations is essential. The Assheton Committee pointed out:

"Nothing could be more disastrous than that the civil service and the public should think of themselves as in two separate camps. The incultation of the right attitudes towards the public and towards business should therefore be one of the principal aims of civil service training. The civil servant must never forget that he is the servant, and should not lose the human touch." 44

The achievement of these objectives is complicated by another feature of training arrangements. Training theory and Jordanian practice at the present time both strongly favour the decentralisation to departments of a large part of the responsibility for meeting their own needs. 45 However, there are many challenges in the process. It is first necessary to create interest in such activities and to
obtain the support of the top executives. This is not an easy task because departmental training has only recently been developed and remains limited. Therefore, an evaluation of its benefits to the Service had not yet been attempted. Having convinced the top executives, each departmental institute has to make a careful study of the training needs of employees at different levels of the department and must try to cope with the departmental problems which each of these studies reveals. Which employees have to be trained first? What are the most beneficial techniques of training? Where do the trainers come from? Identifying who needs training, and what kind of training is the most difficult and important stage of the process. Management at departmental level is best placed to do this, with back-up help from central training agencies. Unfortunately, there is an obvious lack of contact between the two sides. Admittedly, it is essential for the Civil Service Department and the Institute of Public Administration to assess and know departmental needs so that they can cater fully for these needs. It is also equally essential for the departments to demonstrate these needs and to have them fully catered for. It is only through such two-way communication that central and departmental training can fully achieve their objectives.

Central Training

The Civil Service Department

As indicated earlier, the Civil Service Department retains overall responsibility for training in areas of administration where commonality of training needs are considered to exist. The CSD

* The duration of this type of training does not exceed four months continuously.
provides the opportunities for the administrative and technical training of officials, at all levels, and takes such steps as may be necessary for raising standards of probity in the Service. It is responsible for developing training programmes for officials during service as well as encouraging and co-ordinating such programmes, and participating in the selection of officials for study or training both inside or outside the country. The CSD also maintains liaison with departmental training institutes within the country and comparable institutes abroad.

The Civil Service Department has a major responsibility in respect of national training. In reality, however, its "training" role is limited to receiving offers for training courses from abroad and circulating these offers to the departments according to the nature of the offer and the specialisation of the departments. In return, departments nominate their candidates for these courses and send the lists to the Civil Service Department. The latter has a nominal authority to select the final list of nominees. Three main criteria are used in selection: the grade of the nominee; his specialisation; and the number of training courses already attended.

After completion of the course, each participant is required to submit a report to his department concerning the programme and a copy of the report will be sent to the Civil Service Department. The report includes the title of the programme, its location, number of participants, the syllabus, duration, methods of training, importance of the programme, recommendations, etc. Accordingly, the CSD evaluates the usefulness of these programmes as regards the needs of the Service as well as the individual interest. The official receives a certificate indicating
successful completion of the course. The CSD receives a copy of this certificate which is placed in the personal file of the official. Table 8.4 represents an example of the central training.

**TABLE 8.4**

**Example of Central Training**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>National Planning Council</th>
<th>Treasury</th>
<th>Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of management</td>
<td>Top</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Head of Division</td>
<td>General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty/Function</td>
<td>Manpower Planning</td>
<td>Auditing</td>
<td>Computer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>Contractual</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at entrance</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>M.A.</td>
<td>B.A.</td>
<td>Secondary Certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialisation</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>Accountancy</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-government experience</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervision</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work location</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Central training Courses</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Central programmes cover a wide range of topics and subjects of common interest to officials such as manpower planning, supervisory techniques, office management, public relations, quantitative and
behavioural dimensions of the decision-making process, as well as more specific techniques geared to the needs of particular groups, for example, documentation and information systems in administration. For trainers - case studies in training, training design and research problems; and for personnel managers - recruitment and promotion procedures, etc.\textsuperscript{52}

The programmes concern all levels of staff, i.e. managerial training, supervisory training, and clerical training. However, these programmes exclusively deal with generalists rather than specialists. For instance, a top official holding the position of the Director of Human Resources in the National Planning Council participated six times in such courses, whereas it is hard to find a specialist in the Ministry of Agriculture holding a technical post who found it helpful to attend such courses during his career service.

In an attempt to classify the problems facing the Civil Service Department in pursuing its responsibilities as a central agency for training, we draw attention to the following shortcomings. First, "training" as perceived by the CSD means simply accepting an outside offer for training by an outside institute and communicating this offer to the departments who are asked to nominate their candidates. After that, the CSD supervises the formal procedures associated with the training process, i.e. filling an application and signing a contract with the trainees, etc.\textsuperscript{53} In this arrangement, the CSD is handicapped by two obstacles: (a) it has nothing to do with the nominations made by the departments or whether they need this type of programme for their work.\textsuperscript{54} (b) it is even confined in arranging external opportunities by the need to ensure the co-operation of the National Planning Council and the Arab Organisation for
This is due to the fact that most training courses are initially arranged and financed for the CSD by these two organisations. This raises the unusual role played by the National Planning Council in the training function.

The National Planning Council is the link between Jordan and training agencies abroad. It is therefore obvious that most training courses offered by outside training institutions are arranged by the NPC. Unfortunately, co-operation and co-ordination are very limited. Although the Planning Law emphasises the necessity of co-operation between the NPC and the CSD, in reality the former entirely ignores the activities of the latter in training and development. Many attempts have been made for mutual co-operation but there is no sign of success. In addition, the NPC even conducts its own studies and executes its own annual training programme for all departments without participation on the part of the CSD. As a result, the effectiveness of the CSD in training is severely affected.

This raises a second interesting point: how did the Civil Service Department lose control over training? Co-operation and co-ordination between the CSD and IPA as central training agencies have been rather limited. The latter designs its own training programmes, decides the future plans of training inside the country for government officials in the absence of the former. In the same way there is a lack of co-ordination between the Civil Service Department and departmental training institutes whether in central government, nationalised industries, local government or the private sector.
Second, successive generations of management refuse to allocate a training budget adequate for the development of a significant degree of training related to career needs beyond induction and on-the-job training. At present, training is confined by what the Civil Service Department is offered by the National Planning Council through its contacts abroad. Further, there is neither a central training committee nor civil service training regulations to force attention upon these issues. In the absence of staff associations of the Western kind, there is no organised-pressure for such issues to be examined. However, the CSD has proposed training regulations to the Council of Ministers. So far, there have been no results.

Finally, the Civil Service Department has not a sufficient number of qualified training officers of its own. The Training Division within the CSD consists of only three training officials holding a university degree in Public Administration with between 6-8 years of seniority among them. The work of the Division is intensive to the point of overload.

In the light of the above, it is obvious that the role of the Civil Service Department in training is handicapped by internal and external circumstances. Therefore, it exercises a limited influence in the manpower development process as a whole. To the extent that CSD does influence manpower development, it does so through the IPA.

Institute of Public Administration (I.P.A.)

Civil Service Regulations (1966) state that the Civil Service Department shall concern itself with the establishment of a central
Accordingly, the IPA was established by Law No. 2 of 1968 as "a legal personality with administrative and financial independence." 69

Objectives

The IPA has the following objectives specified by its laws: 70

First, to help the government in improving and developing the organisation and administration of the public service so that public policy and programmes can be carried out as effectively and as economically as possible. The Institute has to focus attention and training activity on the understanding and application of principles, practices and techniques of administration. Secondly, there is special attention to the tools of management and the development of managers which are concerned with planning, staffing, co-ordinating and evaluating programmes. The Institute also assists any public agency or private industry requesting its help with specific organisational problems. Thirdly, it provides practical and academic training to raise the standard of managers and to prepare officials for more responsible tasks with the hope of stimulating efficiency and economy. All of this is to be achieved by means of in-service training. The methods which are used in its programmes include lectures, discussions, fieldwork, conferences, workshops, projects on on-going programmes.

Finally, the Institute produces manuals for in-service training and other documents on administrative operations. It also conducts studies and issues publications on administrative problems in Jordan; promotes the exchange of information on significant development in administration inside and outside the country; maintains a library of
technical information, up to date literature on public administration and departmental reports. To achieve these objectives there are three areas of activity within the Institute: training, research and consultancy.

Training Programmes of the Institute

Top Management Training Courses

In Jordan, one of the distinguishing features of the Institute's training programme was the administrative Leaders' Conference (1968) which brought together senior officials, heads of departments, university teachers, United Nations experts, permanent secretaries and members of other training and research institutions in the country. The major objective of the Conference was to determine the training needs of higher civil servants. Managers met in one place to exchange views, compare experience, discuss administrative problems and various aspects of development administration in Jordan. The result of this initial Conference was the decision to create permanent programmes of seminars and conferences with more specific and limited objectives related to on-going needs at their meeting.

A wide range of subjects was tackled by the Conference. For instance, administrative environment in Jordan, analysis of the administrative problems, application of modern administration in Jordan, etc. The Conference recommended that "training must be comprehensive and should cover pre-entry and in-service training in various agencies in the forms of seminars, conferences, courses and fellowships." An illustration of the courses which followed the original Conference were several seminars held for senior officials at the IPA aimed at management appraisal based upon the problems
facing top departmental managers. Heavy emphasis was placed on the
importance of managers and their role in improving employees' performance.74 These seminars covered the following subjects:
administrative ecology in Jordan, administrative process and its
function, the management of training, management by objectives, and
information systems. Attention also was given to administrative
behaviour, decision-making, self-development, etc. 75

One of the weaknesses of these seminars and courses is that
participants from the non-government sectors are excluded. Their
participation would serve two purposes. First, experience suggests
that conferences which include a balanced proportion of members
from outside the government, representing different interests and
disciplines may be able to contribute to the development of public
servants participants and to help them rise above their special
interests. Second, it enables senior government servants to
recognise and appreciate the problems of the private sector and to
understand more fully the contribution which can be made by the
public service to the private sector.76

Another limitation is that top-level officials find it very
difficult to submit themselves to any training programme, not only
because they have not got enough time to spare for training, but
because training "threatens" their sense of security. As a result,
many of them question the value of training. Some senior officials
believe that administrative effectiveness cannot be achieved in
government through education and training.* Their argument is that

administration is an art which is learned, rather than a science which is taught. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that most of the trainers are junior to the managers sent for training, in both age and rank. 

Training of senior officials in Jordan seems to be neither regular nor problem-oriented in content. Improved training for top-level officials is therefore an urgent requirement. Training arrangements for such personnel should be designed with the following objectives in mind. First, there should be an attention to broaden the horizon of managers by affording them more time to review and reflect policy problems. This involves an appreciation of the techniques employed in improving managerial performance. Secondly, providing managers with a fuller appreciation of the role of middle management and with the development of a "planning mentality." Thirdly, appreciation of the need for a continuous programme of staff development. Finally, efforts should be made to assist them in recognising the merit of external public relations and internal communications. 

Middle Management Training Courses

Most training schemes of the IPA are concerned with middle grades and clerical training levels. It is not simply a question of training the 'administrative class', but also training the 'executive class' if the administrative machines are to function effectively. However, middle management training needs are extremely diverse.

Alive to this situation, the IPA runs a regular training course for middle ranks covering a wide range of subjects. For instance, a
A five-week full time course on 'Middle Management Programme' was organised for executive officials in central and local governments and public corporations. The purpose was to broaden the participants' understanding of the fundamentals of modern administration and the related sciences, behavioural skills, motivation, etc. Topics included administrative processes, national planning in Jordan, supervision and leadership, human relations, forms of administrative organisation in Jordan, communications, etc. Staff who attend such courses are required to be heads of division and to have completed high school education.

Another course was 'Administrative Supervision programme' where 32 heads of divisions participated in the course aimed at examining modern methods of managing people which have shown to produce improved performance on the job. The programme included principles of public administration, leadership and supervision, constitutional and forms of administrative organisation in Jordan, staffing and training, performance appraisal, economic and social development in Jordan, etc.

Middle management training programmes give the participants a wide background in public administration and prepare them for greater responsibilities and future development. Nevertheless, the programmes are theoretical as opposed to practical. A close integration between courses and the office work still remains to be devised by the IPA; and a better appreciation of the use of skills and knowledge required needs to be demonstrated subsequently by those who attend.

**Lower Management Training Courses**

The IPA runs courses for clerical staff and chief clerks, which last from two to five weeks. For instance, the 'Supervision of Office Management Units Programme' aimed at developing a group of supervisors
The IPA also conducts a number of short term specialised courses for middle and junior officials. Participants are graduates and/or non-graduates with long experience in the specific area. The duration of the courses range from two to eight weeks. These courses covered Town and Regional Planning, Supply Management, Managerial Accounting, Cost Accounting, Taxation Procedures, Customs Procedures, Training of Trainers, Personnel Management and Public Relations, etc. These specialised courses have three basic merits. First, they provide an opportunity for those working in the same field in different departments for the exchange of opinions, problems and solutions. Secondly, they enable a two-way exchange of ideas between seminar leaders and participants on the principles and new developments in the field. Thirdly, they point to the advantages and shortcomings of the various systems in operation in Jordan based on first-hand information and the feasibility of applying techniques used in more developed countries.
In an attempt to assess the training courses of the IPA, the following observations are worth making. First, in general, the courses cover a fairly wide ground. But the duration of the courses cover a period of two-months only as a maximum, and are too short to do justice to the syllabus. The programmes become too crowded. The two-month period appears to be too brief to cover any one particular subject widely and effectively. Some breathing space needs to be given to the participants to absorb the new ideas, principles and techniques they may come across; otherwise the training may lose its usefulness. The alternative approach to training - intensive investigation into a few topics - might prove more useful in developing the ability to solve problems. Second, by addressing itself from the start mainly to the middle and lower level staffs of a status-conscious bureaucracy, the Institute came to be associated in the eyes of senior managers with low-level employees (see Chart 8.5). This had seriously constrained its ability to attract senior officials to its programmes and to have a positive influence on the top level echelons of the administration. In a situation where the 'conversion' of senior managers was a pre-requisite for affecting change, this resistance has proved a considerable handicap. It is adversely affected the Institute's programmes. The Institute has, therefore, embarked upon its training programmes without a clear strategy or the ability to obtain information and support in developing a picture of job content and training needs across the Service.84

Research and Consultancy

The IPA has a Research Department (staffed by seven officials) responsible for conducting research and studies aimed chiefly at
CHART 8.5


administrative reform and engaged in consultative services when required. It is also responsible for the editing, printing and circulation of the Institute's publications.

Research activities of the Institute include: theoretical research; developing case-studies, exercises and games that enhance the training process; and conducting contract research projects for government departments and private enterprises. This serves as a tool for decision makers in public and private sectors. The latest in a series of research projects of this kind were: developing a government organisational manual; and conducting a comparative and analytical study of wages and pension systems between public agencies and private firms for use in determining new conditions of service.

There are, however, some factors which limit the Institute's research programme. Perhaps the most important factor is that the government have not realised the value of research and many top public officials view it with suspicion. Many senior officials believe that to expose their operational problems to public scrutiny will reflect badly on their performance. The second important problem is that in most cases the suggestions made for administrative improvement are not put into effect. Thirdly, there are the problems of well-trained researchers and funds. Experience has shown that staff with academic qualifications make better research officers. Only graduates with an aptitude for research should be recruited for this work. It may be necessary to supplement their training on the job by specific training in research methods and techniques at an overseas institutions.
Like most counterparts, central government research agencies especially in the new nations, the IPA has a problem of communicating its research findings with the relevant departments. The International Conference held at the University of IFE (Nigeria) 1974, convened to discuss these problems, and recommended possible solutions. These are: communicating available information while the research is in progress; closely relating the subject of research to the people who will use it; and issuing research findings in non-academic reports.

The IFE Institute of Administration stimulates managers to read its research findings through: (a) making managers assessors of such findings written by academics, (b) setting up research advisory committees to take charge of research projects, and (c) organising seminars to discuss research findings. The Conference report points out that the dangers of using managers as assessors is that:

"Officials might in these cases reject the findings, (on the other hand) the academics, wishing to please the managers, might try to present reports which are acceptable (in consequence the findings) are not directed at solving the administrative problems facing the country or reforming existing institutions and correcting current practices."

Consultancy, on the other hand, is done on the basis of demands received from public and private firms. The IPA is usually consulted in matters such as reorganisation of specific government services, proposed departmental training programmes, etc. In fact, the advice of the Institute on various administrative problems facing government departments and public corporations is much requested. By 1982, the Institute had accomplished nine consultancies for both public and
private sectors and four consultancies are under consideration for the public agencies concerning performance appraisal and procedures simplifications.

The benefits resulting from a consultancy programme are several. As the government becomes more complex, procedures become out-dated and ill-adapted to current needs. A development programme includes new methods and techniques of operation and old ones have to be adapted. Consultancy becomes a necessary adjunct of training, in order to avoid the imbalance between theoretical instruction and departmental practice. Moreover, not only is consultancy useful as a means by which the Institute keeps in touch with, and has access to what is happening in government administration, but it may contribute to its prestige and general standing.

Problems and Prospects

The IPA has been placed as an autonomous body within the regular governmental structure, so that in spite of its nominal independence it is in reality affiliated to the Civil Service Department. The Head of the CSD is the Chairman of the Governing Board of the Institute. The effect of this has been that the Institute could not effectively carry out its mission of administrative reform and change. The Institute could best serve its purpose as an autonomous body within the Prime Minister's Office. The post of Director of the IPA should be equated in status at least with that of a Permanent Secretary of a Ministry.

The IPA also has an internal organisational problem. There are thirty professional staff, most of whom hold a university degree.
They have been taught public administration, management and business studies, psychology and sociology, political science, operations research, accountancy, office management, linguistics, etc. In addition, some of them have attended training courses inside and abroad. But a high proportion of the staff are young, lack experience and have only recently joined the Institute. In fact, 16 officers have joined the Institute since 1979. This high degree of inexperience reduces the credibility of training courses of the Institute in general. It also leaves ample scope for high turnover or re-deployment as we have seen in the recruitment chapter. Therefore, the Institute depends mainly on external lectures to complete its training programmes.

Unfortunately, the IPA also does not get the necessary financial and administrative autonomy which its activities require. Salaries, career and promotion prospects still do not compare at all with similar organisations inside the country, e.g. the universities. As a result, almost all senior staff have left for better jobs. The impact of this brain drain without comparable replacement is serious. In an attempt to remedy a similar situation in another developing nation, one expert remarked:

"Persons eligible and qualified to serve innovative institutions like (the) IPA should not be classed with others in the less inventive or developmental-oriented classifications, on the basis of pay and mobility. The enterprise needed, their policy analysis potential, their behavioural perspectives, their social science skills, which will, if they are well selected, merit more from the government at this time than their colleagues who may be much older, possibly with many more years of experience, but whose impact is of less dramatic character. The personnel of this institution should not be in the normal chain of transfer, promotion, classification and pay. Without this recognition, the brain drain will continue and become more critical."
The solution to the problem may be to ensure the availability of a sufficient number of well trained staff crucial for the development of the Institute. Therefore to attract competent men to join it, salary scales and career prospects should be adequate and just.

At present the lecture method is the predominant method of instruction in the IPA. This is not the only or possibly the best method of training decision-makers and managers. Experience suggests participation in training programmes yields better results. A balanced instructional programme which would include a combination of teaching methods is clearly better than exclusive dependence on one. Since the departmental training institutes are also subject to this criticism, as shown by Table 8.3, they might benefit from this suggestion.

A related problem is that the departments do not assign officers in sufficient numbers to fill the Institute's quotas for available courses. For this situation, the excessive generosity of the government is largely to blame in assigning officers with full pay and total maintenance for training abroad. Many officials feel that if they accept training at local institutions they will imperil their opportunities for more prestigious training abroad.

The IPA still faces difficulty in defining the actual training needs of the public service. This is due to several factors. First, the absence of manpower training inventory to indicate the future needs of officials. Second, the lack of a position classification system to spell out what tasks constitute the jobs in the departments, and the type of skills, knowledge and attitudes job holders must have to perform certain tasks. Third, lack of performance evaluation

* See: discussion in Chapter III, pp. 63-78.
instruments to determine the areas in which officials need specific training*. Fourth, lack of adequate and competent personnel officers to define the training needs of government departments.101

Nevertheless, the IPA remains useful in disseminating knowledge about administration in Jordan and documenting the operation of the government. This helps to widen the horizons of officials with the objective of clarifying their thinking.

On the whole, central training is supposed to form an important part of the training effort provided by the Civil Service Department through the medium of the Institute of Public Administration. However, in practice, the CSD is not a training agency; it is primarily a manpower control department and its efforts mainly relate to general manpower control, costs and staffing, grading issues, promotion, etc. So far as its training activities are concerned, they are the responsibility of the IPA. Unfortunately, however, except for a series of supervisory and clerical training courses conducted by the IPA, little has been done on a systematic basis to implement this responsibility.

Vocational Training Abroad **

The most highly trained personnel in the Service are those who require professional or vocational qualifications. Although great efforts are being made to develop educational institutions for this purpose in Jordan, existing institutions cannot yet satisfy the

*See: discussion in Chapter VII, pp. 234-243

** The duration of this type of training exceeds four months continuously.
demand. Hence, a number of officials are being sent abroad for such training as well as for more general forms of university education.\textsuperscript{102} For instance, in 1981, training abroad covered a wide range of specialisation such as Engineering (17 per cent), Physical science (11 per cent), Economic and Commerce (8 per cent), Public Administration (7.8 per cent) and Medicine (9 per cent).\textsuperscript{103} The officials are sent to many different countries.\textsuperscript{104} Table 8.6 represents an example of vocational training abroad. Chart 8.7 shows the number of participants in vocational training abroad.

### TABLE 8.6

Example of Vocational Training Abroad.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Civil Service Department</th>
<th>National Planning Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of Management position</td>
<td>Top</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty/Function</td>
<td>Veterinarian</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Technician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at entrance</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>B.A.</td>
<td>B.A.</td>
<td>Teaching Certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialisation</td>
<td>Veterinarian</td>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-government experience</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervision</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work location</td>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of training courses taken abroad</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHART 8.7

Number of Participants in Vocational Training Abroad, 1971-1981.

Year	 1971	 72	 73	 74	 75	 76	 77	 78	 79	 80	 81

Except for the Ministry of Education's officials, the agency responsible for vocational training abroad is the Scholarship Committee which is located in the Civil Service Department. It has the following functions. First, the estimation of the country's needs for trained manpower. Second, to ensure that the country utilises its internal facilities for training and also the external facilities offered by friendly countries and institutions. Third, the consideration of the departments proposals connected with courses and the necessary funds to finance them. Finally, to consider the demands of non-government sectors for training abroad.  

Training abroad could be viewed as supplementary to the training being offered at home, and its function is to fill in the gaps in the training offered locally. This type of training should be confined to specialised courses which are not available within the country. Even then, Adedeji says: "every effort must be made to provide such specialised training locally as soon as possible for maximum effectiveness." At the same time, the administration of training abroad needs to be reconsidered in all aspects, especially for the purpose of speeding up the handling of correspondence, the arranging of individual programmes of study, and the shortening of the lapse of time from the receipt of applications to the beginning of training.

8.4 ATTITUDES TOWARDS TRAINING.

Officials in the sample were asked: 'Should there be any institutional training at all (whether departmental, central or abroad) to supplement on-the-job training?' Sharp division of opinions emerge.
Nearly two-thirds of the respondents (62.3 per cent) thought that there should, while one-third (33.0 per cent) were against the idea.

The opponents in the sample think that such training may result in the indoctrination of employees as well as inbreeding. The political regime in power may use the training institutes for propagating its political ideology and programmes. The political neutrality of an official may thus be threatened. Another argument advanced against institutional training is that it entails unnecessary "waste" of time and money. If an individual has already spent a number of years in school and a university, he does not need any more schooling. This argument is also advanced by Bridges who points out that learning by doing the job, under the supervision of the right type of supervisors, is an invaluable way of training public servants. He adds: "... many of the best oarsmen learnt a good deal from the mere fact of rowing in a good crew behind a really good oarsman, for good style and good rhythm proved as catching as measles."108

The advocates, on the other hand, think that institutional training is necessary for broadening the outlook of the official, and for deepening his knowledge of the social significance of State activities in general and of his own job in particular. Such a knowledge will stand him in good stead in functioning effectively in a dynamic and democratic society. This would foster a certain measure of democratic responsiveness in a public service. In addition, institutional training could provide an official with a systematic introduction to his job before he actually begins practical training. This would be useful in two ways. First, it would help
him to learn his job quicker than he is likely to do through an exclusive dependence upon apprenticeship. Second, systematic introduction to his job and machinery of administration could also help officials to understand the significance of overall co-ordination in a period of expanding government activities. This understanding would help co-ordination among public servants.

Accordingly, one would say that the institutional training in Jordan not only continues, but needs to be extended to cover more categories of higher and middle level staffs. This would make for more competence and higher professional standards.

The next question was: 'Whether training should be given in departments or contracted out to universities and other higher academic institutions.' The advocates of training at departments were 47.3 per cent, whereas 43.7 per cent preferred training at universities, etc.

Those who were particularly opposed to department training point out certain shortcomings. First, departmental training institutes tend to produce inbreeding. There is no living contact between the trainees and the outside world. They begin to live in an ivory tower and take a narrow view of things, since they are cut off from the currents of thought and impulses of action prevailing in the country. It is also arguable that if they were to receive instruction in a university, they would breathe in a stimulating and intellectually invigorating atmosphere. Secondly, the teachers whose activities are confined to the teaching of government officials in a staff college would tend to become narrow in their interest and vision. Such instructors would not, therefore, have the capacity to inspire officials.
with high ideals of bureaucracy or help them to understand the real significance of State activity in the service of man.

Professor Laski makes a comparable point in dealing with the British argument about the value of preliminary instruction in a university in preference to a staff college: "What gives its salt to university life is the width of the horizons it has to scan, the variety in the outlook of its teachers, the need in its students to test the values born of contact with different experience, or a different discipline." The standards in a staff college cannot be continually "renewed by being tested in the light of external criteria." The authorities of departmental institutes tend to suffer from self-complacency and may not be readily persuaded to introduce changes in the courses of study or methods of instruction. A university, on the other hand, is a living organism in which ideas keep on moving and standards keep on renewing. Finally, no departmental institute in Jordan is likely to have adequate Library facilities and other useful equipment which a university can afford. Training is, therefore, likely to be more liberalising in a university than in a departmental training institute.

The advocates of training through departmental institutions hold the view that firstly, training of officials in a university cannot be very useful, because in a university the emphasis is more upon theory than upon applied knowledge. On account of this reason, officials are not likely to learn much which would be of use to them in their service careers. Valuable time would thus be wasted and unnecessary delay and expense would be incurred before young
recruits are put on the job itself and become effective servants. Secondly, a realistic study of administration and an effective insight into administrative techniques require that the instructors should be senior bureaucrats, not "mere" scholars. The services of the senior officers can be utilised adequately if there are departmental training institutes as universities do not normally appoint them. Further, in Jordan, universities are not so well developed and well equipped as in advanced countries, and the departmental institutions exist precisely because the university product is not quite satisfactory. A university may be able to arrange courses in administration or in other specified subjects, but "their remoteness from the actual processes of civil service administration would narrowly limit their usefulness." ¹¹¹

There appears to be some element of truth in both viewpoints. But an additional factor of crucial importance is put by Adu who points out that:

"departmental training is really a form of post-entry training and is needed where the public education system does not provide the types of training required, or where the training necessary is peculiar to the needs of a particular department." ¹¹²

Under these circumstances it is more convenient and efficient to have the training courses under departmental control. In spite of all the above arguments, one would conclude that the best course is to devise arrangements which would avoid the dangers of inbreeding as well as deterioration of training standards and which would, at the same time, ensure that instruction and training are carried on in a realistic and effective way. ¹¹³
Overall, our survey provides the following findings. Central training hardly exists and has no clear objectives. As a result, it has failed to contribute to the career development of personnel. This simply reflects the fact that there is a lack of manpower career development strategy for the Service as a whole. Accordingly, departmental training, geared only to departmental needs, is operated on a large scale. However, this practice ignores the fact that there are categories of need which departmental training does not meet - common training needs which can only be provided centrally; and specialised vocational training for which training overseas may be necessary. An illustration of the consequence of lack of central planning can be seen by reference to three cases drawn from the sample:

An official in the Treasury had one central training course, whereas an official of similar grade in the Department of Education had five departmental training courses within the Department. There is yet a third pattern of training illustrated by a veterinary officer in the Department of Agriculture who had been sent to pursue seven specialised training courses abroad during his service career, (see Tables 8.2, 8.4 and 8.6).
NOTES


8. Ibid, p. 27.


10. Assheton Committee, Cmd 6525, p. 27.


13. Objectives of training have been examined by others. See: Assheton Committee, Cmd. 6525, pp. 10-11; and Armin Gretler, The Training of Adult Middle-Level Personnel, Paris: UNESCO, 1972, pp. 75-76.


17. Director of Training, CSD, Interview, April, 1982.

18. Civil Service Department, Internal Memorandum, Date: April, 1982 (unpublished).

19. See: Official Correspondence of the Minister of Communications to the Head of the Civil Service Department, No. 14/26/190, Date: March 20, 1982.


27. Ibid.


32. Acting Director of the Institute of Public Administration, Interview, Amman, April, 1982.


35. See: the Internal Memorandum of the Head of the Training Division, CSD, Date: December 16, 1978 (unpublished); and Internal Circular of the Head of the Civil Service Department No. 38/7/6255, Date: December 24, 1978, Amman.


39. Ibid., p. 45.


44. Assheton Committee, Cmd. 6525, p. 11.


46. Civil Service Regulations, Article 10.

47. Ibid, Article 8.


49. Ibid.

51. See for example: Report No. 51/8/M. Date: March 3, 1979, CSD, Amman.


53. Head of Training Division, CSD, Interview, Amman, April, 1982.

54. A. Ziadeen, op.cit., p. 2.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.


59. A. Ziadeen, op.cit., p. 3.

60. See: Official Correspondence, No. 65/1/7661, Date: November 11, 1980, and No. 38/55/794, Date: February 24, 1981 of the Civil Service Department; No. 146/5/975, Date: March 2, 1981, of the National Planning Council, Amman; and No. 24/15/B/17/2238, Date: February 25, 1981 of the Prime Minister.

61. A. Ziadeen, op.cit., p. 3.


64. Ibid.


68. For improvement suggestions, see: Griffenhagen-Kroeger, Programme for Improving the Civil Service and Personnel System of the Government of Jordan, Amman: Civil Service Department, 1968, pp. 52-56.


70. See: Laws of the Institute of Public Administration, No. 2 of 1968, Articles 4, 5; No. 12 of 1980, Articles 5, 6.


76. cf. E. James, op.cit., R. Rhodes, op.cit.


83. See: A. Al-Terefi, op.cit., p. 132.

84. For further details on training programmes of the IPA, see: Institute of Public Administration, Facts and Figures, op.cit.


88. Ibid.


91. A. Adedeji and C. Baker, op.cit., p. 266.

92. Ibid., p. 266-67.


97. Within the period of 1970-1980, fifty nine officials have left the IPA to work for domestic or overseas agencies. They include 3 Doctorate, 8 Master, and 25 Bachelor degrees holders. See: Globawi M. Salih, Report on Administration Reform and Development in the Civil Service Department and the Institute of Public Administration, Amman: Civil Service Department, 1980, p. 24.

98. UNDP, Management Training and Development: Consultancy Mission to Sudan, (mimeo), 1977, p. 3.

99. A. Al-Terefi, op.cit.

100. The IPA has been criticised for the following. First, the average number of participation in the Institute's training courses is 350 officials annually which is very low figure comparing with the whole number of government officials. Second, the average training programme of the Institute is 13 programmes annually. Third, the tendency of the Institute towards involving itself in autonomous corporations and private sector training rather than concentrating on central government training. See: A. Ziadeen, The Co-operation Between the Civil Service Department and the Institute of Public Administration, op.cit. p. 2.


110. Ibid.

111. Assheton Committee, Cmd. 6525, p. 27.


CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

In spite of the varied system of recruitment, different levels of responsibility and type of jobs, government officials in Jordan displayed a remarkable homogeneity and demonstrated a consistent pattern of career experience. For instance, most joined the Service at an early age and grew up in it. A majority possessed a higher education qualification. There was little mobility between departments or between government and outside employment. However, there are some dis-similarities between the departments studied. For instance, the Civil Service Department officials have greatest mobility between departments. As the central personnel agency, the CSD contains staff whose skills are in training and personnel development. Such staff can move to any department. This is not so in departments such as Agriculture. Similarly, data indicates a degree of movement into and out of the National Planning Council quite unlike the rest of the departments surveyed, because the NPC acts as an interface between the public and private sectors.

As a general rule in all departments, the Survey indicates that there was a strong relationship between tasks performed by those who transferred into and out of the Service. This indication should give the government encouragement to develop further exchanges of personnel with the various types of employers outside the bureaucracy, with the aim of improving career development of serving employees.¹

Unlike career patterns, work experience of officials showed a
wide diversity, reflecting the complexity of government administration. Supervision was practised with different capability and is affected by levels of management, type of departments and personnel (whether generalist or specialist). Departments also vary in their dealing with the public. Some departments are very concerned with the average citizen's needs and, consequently, their officials felt themselves to be an elite in the Society. Contacts between politicians and bureaucrats within departments are much affected by functions of the department concerned and the "style" of management of its political head. However, administration is the joint responsibility of bureaucrats and politicians. While most of the former are busy with planning, executing and controlling, some officials are in constant contact with the Minister. Because of the way business is done in the Middle East, a far wider range of people are in direct contact with Ministers than is the case in Western Societies. Even so, most government servants are devoted to implementation of policy and all have an important role in the final formulation of policy. Playfair, a senior British Civil Servant, describes the Jordanian situation accurately when he comments on the situation in the U.K.

"The formulation of policy is a joint effort - the result of constant discussion. The good civil servant subordinates himself totally to the Minister's decisions but speaks out frankly when advice and criticism is helpful and necessary; the good Minister listens with care to all advice and criticism which he gets and then makes up his own mind." 3

The policy role of public servants in Jordan today has particular importance because the government, in spite of its limited finance, has undertaken ambitious planning programmes. The success of development programmes depends, to a great extent, on the responsibility
of the public servants. Their tasks include planning, executing and controlling the entire economic and social activities. The welfare of the people depends, to a great extent, on their imagination, sympathy and efficiency.

Nevertheless, the government has still failed to grasp the full significance of the recruitment function. Recruitment is treated in isolation, there is a lack of information about service careers, lack of initiative, low salaries and slow career progress. The government would be able to attract better quality applicants by assuring them of a career service where progress was not dependent on political and social factors, but on merit. The most important action at present is to increase attractiveness, maximise retention and minimise turnover. Each department should be required to specify manpower needs in relation to its programmes. A promotion system could be planned by the co-ordinated efforts of the various departments and the central management departments aimed at achieving "fairness" in promotion.

Recruitment depends exclusively on educational attainment. The university remains the main well-spring of recruitment. However, there is hardly any co-operation or co-ordination between the university authorities and departments in forecasting manpower needs. As the number of graduates increases, there is an imminent danger of considerable waste of manpower unless planning between these authorities takes place. On the other hand, the improvement of recruitment methods and techniques can only achieve limited results and will not go far in enabling the government to build up a first rate staff at all levels. A radical reform of the educational system will improve the quality and calibre of the candidates who seek to compete for government service. The task is urgent, immediate and fundamental.
The question which deserves attention is whether the "preference for relevance" principle should be pursued in recruitment. This principle involves greater attention to the field of study as well as to level of attainment. Consequently, subjects of academic qualification would not continue to be ignored in selection. Robson remarks: "It is right to recruit the highest graduates from the universities for the Civil Service, irrespective of the subjects they have studied." In Jordan, this exactly describes the existing practice. Administration in Jordan, at present and in the future, stands to gain if persons with diverse academic backgrounds can find their way to it.

Despite the great growth of the public service, there has been no single office responsible for the appointment of personnel. This function has been shared between the CSD and individual departments. This policy has often resulted in considerable confusion and weakened the role of the central personnel agency. It is necessary to strengthen the latter, and in an attempt to achieve this objective, the following suggestions are made.

First, the CSD could have a new office called the "Director of Examinations" associated with the Ministry of Education. It might be his responsibility to assist the departments to devise more effective selection methods and criteria. He should exercise general supervision over the conduct of the recruitment procedures by the departments. Second, the CSD might constitute a "Working Party" consisting of two or three officials and one chief with the function of visiting the various agencies in order to make an on the spot investigation of existing practices and to explain the exact implications of the regulations and other statutory requirements. This ensures minimum delay by "argument
through correspondence" and makes matters easy. Third, departments should be required to inform the CSD immediately of any departmental appointment made; and at the end of six months it should review the position and report again as to whether the post is likely to continue beyond a year. In this case, the necessary requisition for recruitment is to be sent to the CSD without delay. This procedure would remove suspicion of "nepotism" and "favouritism."

There has been no uniform method of recruitment. Competitive examination is only exceptionally used in selection. The great weakness of using any kind of examination is the lack of a central organisation responsible for the whole machinery of selection. In the introduction of a modern career service, it might be the aim to bring posts under a system of entrance by examination. It is necessary for the administration of the examinations to be in the hands of the CSD which can ensure uniform standards of recruitment.

At present, as the Survey shows, the interview method is widely used for selection. However, there is considerable scope for personal preferences and prejudices. Appointing authorities could not always assess the personality of candidates properly without testing them. They are apt to pay undue attention to manners, appearance and to the attributes claimed by candidates. A more thorough inquiry into the interests, activities and achievements of candidates is not attempted. It is suggested, therefore, that there could in addition to interview be group discussion and role-playing. Another thing which needs careful consideration is whether there should be a preliminary interview. The practice of pre-Board Interview has been adopted in some developed countries. The success of this new practice
depends upon three factors. An adequate number of experienced officers trained to interview; a careful job analysis; and careful screening through preliminary interview to ensure that the number of interviewees at the final selection should not be too large. 6 In Jordan, arrangements could be made for introducing this system without difficulty.

Psychological and intelligence tests have not been introduced in Jordan. It is worth thinking of establishing a "Psychological Testing Section" in the CSD performing the following functions. First, preparing job analysis fundamental to the construction of scientific tests of job capability and other personality characteristics. Second, conducting preliminary research studies for designing selection tests and devices. Third, the construction of aptitude tests and evaluation devices for various selection programmes. Fourth, administering tests to the candidates and reporting test evidence to the Selection Board, analysis and interpretation of the candidates' performance with a view to conducting research into some of the problems vexing those concerned with the task of development, assessment and utilization of human resources. Finally, carrying out follow-up research for the purpose of validating and refining selection tests and procedures.

The turnover of personnel, especially among young people, is serious and is likely to continue to be so. The Survey indicates that the recruitment problem, in existing circumstances, is more a matter of retention than attraction. The first essential step is, therefore, to find out why people leave the Service.

The evidence indicates the following Service shortcomings. First, some of those who consider they have better outside opportunities are
thinking of the long-term prospect. They compare the average expectation in the government with how they might fare outside. Because the structure of the Service is hierarchical, beyond a certain grade upwards there are few positions, though these are separated by attractive salary differentials. Second, a number of those who leave have discovered that they are not temperamentally suited to a service career. They dislike working in a formal atmosphere or they just cannot tolerate service norms. Third, a fair proportion of new entrants “drift” into the public service for no particular reason. Because the work has not stimulated them or nobody has taken a personal interest in them or they disliked their departments and believed that all departments were the same, they drift out again. Finally, sheer frustration drives others out of the Service. They think the standards of performance are too low; payment is also too low; they receive insufficient co-operation from supervisors, colleagues or subordinates; they find their equipment and work environment deficient for effective work performance. There is no job rotation and little chance of obtaining a transfer. All these circumstances may be interpreted to mean that the popularity of government service is on the decline.

One of the most important factors which determines the attractiveness of employment and retention of staff is remuneration. However, data shows serious defects in the structures of the financial reward system. These include: a great disparity in salaries; time-scale of promotion which is too long; a considerable rigidity of the structure; pay-scales which do not reward an overlap of responsibility between grades. There is no one salary structure but rather a variety of different salary arrangements which apply to different categories of employees. These are not clearly based on any recognised principles. Because of its
defects, the existing salary structure has contributed, to an appreciable extent, to the general weakness of the government machinery on one hand, and affected adversely the career progression of its servants on the other.

In designing a pay structure for the Service in Jordan, the aim should be to maintain an honest, efficient and contented public service. The primary principle of pay should be that of "relativities" or pay relationships based on the "duties and responsibilities" of posts. The pay structure should also be so designed so as to reflect through the higher rewards, time and money spent by individuals in equipping themselves for tasks involving the highest responsibilities. Educational qualifications should therefore be treated as a supporting principle of pay. It is not enough that salaries should enable employees to meet only the basic need of life. They should be such as to ensure a moderate standard of living for employees compatible with their status, and a reasonable measure of security not only against retirement and old age but also against serious emergencies.

After such factors as security of tenure, leaves, promotion prospects, retirement benefits, etc. have been taken into account, salaries should be such as to cause officials to feel that their terms of service are on the whole fair, bearing in mind those of their countrymen of similar age and educational attainments who perform comparable duties in business enterprises, industrial organisations and autonomous corporations. Further, the government as a good employer should not be reluctant to adopt effective measures for lessening the impact of rising prices on the purses of its employees, either by increasing salaries, or by raising cost of living allowances or by effective price control.
The salary structure should be so devised as to attract the best recruits to those spheres of nation-building activity where there are serious shortages of skilled and experienced staff. For example, professional and technical personnel are badly needed in the Service, therefore it would clearly be contrary to the national interest for the government not to offer them more than non-technical personnel. On the other hand, these professional staff who sacrifice their own interests by choosing to serve their country as public servants cannot expect to receive from the government as much in emoluments as they can command outside the Service. But they should be able to feel that, in the final analysis, their choice has not been unwise.

Pay principles can be applied effectively if the existing system of evaluating government posts in Jordan is encouraged and developed. It can be developed by the creation of a specific "Pay Unit" in the Civil Service Department. The Pay Unit will make a comparative study of jobs inside and outside the Service from the point of view of pay and other conditions on one hand, and to evaluate posts to their duties and responsibilities on the other. The Budget Department should normally accept the advice of the Civil Service Department as to the numbers and grades of posts shown in the budget estimates of departments. When the former is unable to accept the advice of the latter, the matter should be referred to a "Special Standing Committee" which will settle the point in dispute.

Salaries need to be reviewed regularly, both overall and on an individual basis. The basic reason for this is one of the characteristics of this century: inflation which has spread through the world. Therefore,
general reviews take place in response to inflationary pressures of changes in market rates. The unfortunate fact is that the Government of Jordan has been obliged to make a general salary review three times only since the creation of the State in 1926. However, any substantial changes of the salary structure may be made unilaterally or through negotiation with the staff representatives. In Jordan this process happens unilaterally. The only body authorised to increase salaries is the Cabinet. Thus, the employees should be given some choice as to the form of part of their compensation. On the other hand, individual salary reviews normally take place annually. Although automatic increments are paid, the system reserves the right to withhold an increment in the case of poor performance or in a disciplinary action. This kind of review is the major operation in Jordan, and often forms part of the appraisal process. In this case, it will be necessary to maintain detailed individual records in order to assess the employee’s progress with regard to pay. It is desirable to satisfy each employee about the equity of his salary according to his progress and aspirations.

The following criteria might be applied to achieve this in Jordan. First, systematic and regular performance review as a prerequisite; such reviews to be based upon indicators of performance as far as possible. Second, the review should identify level of performance rewarded appropriately. Third, salary administrators should be of sufficiently senior level to avoid abuse of the system through increases which are outside of the norms laid down.

Alongside remuneration, promotion constitutes the cornerstone of the conditions of service. Like recruitment and salary, there is an
absence of a central policy for promotion. Evidence suggests that departments have a complete discretion in promotion which leads to complaints of occasional favouritism and nepotism. These complaints grow as one goes down the ladder. Most officials are dissatisfied with the promotion criteria arrangement used in the Service. Although many variables were involved in promotions, clearly the most significant factor was seniority. As a consequence of this factor, a large number of officials have moved into a certain level of the hierarchy. They now find themselves with a rather limited professional career ahead of them. The challenge to the Service is how these vitally needed people can be further advanced and their ability retained. Emphasis on seniority tends to defeat any attempts to reward merit which could extend the career prospects of many officials.

Under present circumstances, officials governed by different promotion arrangements, all complain that there are not adequate promotion opportunities for them. The Survey shows those who benefitted most under both central and departmental arrangements for promotion are officials who are at any time in grades closest to the top. This is because all systems favour faster movement at higher grades. This creates relative disincentives for staff as a whole. However, promotion opportunities have been affected by many variables: the type of the department, type of personnel (generalist or specialist), occupation, the rate of the departmental growth, the implications for staffing, turnover, job satisfaction, grading structures and manpower planning, etc.

Assessment of candidates for promotion depends mainly on the reporting system. Assessment reports have been confined to the
classified grades only. Departmental grades have no such central service-wide arrangements for assessment reports. There is a need to establish a service-wide system of reporting. Those about whom reports are compiled complain, however, that reports are not always written accurately and comprehensively. Ratings are less specific and less objective than they ought to be. They merely record superficial impressions, with staff rated primarily according to their morale and intellectual facilities rather than to performance. What such reports reflect most accurately are the varying personalities of the reporting officers, which tend to colour the reports at times.

It is not, therefore, surprising that the field work survey suggests that the reporting system does not indicate competence, and consequently does not provide an indication of training needs and suitability for promotion. Nor does it create motivation in the Service.

The promotion system in Jordan cannot be really effective unless assessment reports are properly written. Each reporting officer bears a heavy responsibility in this matter, both from the point of view of the State and of the official reported on. A report must be fair in all respects and must be an accurate summary of the performance and conduct of an official during the period under report.

Another major weakness is that the assessment report is not discussed or seen by the subordinate concerned. This practice is obviously inconsistent with the primary goal of the report. Adverse remarks pointing a remediable defect should invariably be communicated to the subordinate, so that he may be made aware of his shortcomings.
and may be given the opportunity of improving himself.

In improving the reporting system in Jordan, the following points need to be borne in mind. Appraisers have to be trained, jobs have to be analysed, job descriptions must be developed, and performance be set. The forms of reports should be designed not only to provide columns for judging the skill or competence of a person but also for assessing his personality and fitness for promotion. It must follow a pattern deliberately set to elicit the essential information regarding the worth, ability and character of the candidate. Finally, there must be modification of the form to take account of performance at different levels of responsibility.

Competitive examination as a method of promotion is not used in Jordan. This might be used, supplemented by interviews, in preference to the existing system. Two advantages could be obtained by using this method. First, it has the supreme merit of making the selection thoroughly impartial and objective. Second, it provides opportunities for promotion to the young officers of ability whose length of service is so short that assessment reports cannot reveal their true worth. The use of interviews can give a more comprehensive idea of the personality and a better picture of the relative fitness of the candidates for promotion than does reliance on mere assessment reports.

These measures might introduce the element of promotion by merit (incorporating seniority) which most respondents consider important. Those who are able must be provided with adequate opportunities for the utilization of their ability. The spirit and enthusiasm of the able and the efficient must not be allowed to be drained away by being held down at the end of a long queue. In this, increased opportunities, providing greater responsibilities and interest, are even
more important than actual advancement. However, not only does adequacy of promotion opportunities deserve more attention in the interest of incentives and morale, but the principles of promotion and its policy as a whole also need re-orientation. In addition, the machinery for promotion must be above suspicion. It should satisfy all concerned that however defective and faulty, it at least seeks to reward "merit"; that it is genuinely inspired by the interest of the Service and that it seeks no personal or private ends. Emphasis on objective assessment of performance is called for.

Another important factor in career development is training. Nevertheless, the survey suggests serious handicaps in this crucial area. These include relating the criteria for promotion to the objectives of training; absence of systematic planning and supervised execution; lack of specific information about the content and requirements of occupations; and shortage of qualified trainers. There is also no training budget adequate for the development of a significant degree of training related to career needs. Neither is there a central training committee nor civil service training regulations.

As a result, there is no unified training policy. The Civil Service Department's responsibility in respect of national training is limited to receiving offers for training courses from abroad and circulating these offers to the departments. The survey shows the unusual role played by the National Planning Council in the training function. Since the NPC is the link between Jordan and training agencies abroad, most training courses offered by outside institutions
are arranged by the NPC. However, co-operation and co-ordination between CSD and NPC are too limited. As a result, the effectiveness of training is severely affected.

On the other hand, co-operation and co-ordination between the CSD as the department responsible for training, and IRA as central training agency are weak. The latter designs its own training programmes and decides the future plans of training in the absence of the former. In the same way, there is a lack of co-ordination between the CSD and departmental training institutions. Therefore, the CSD exercises a limited influence in the manpower development process as a whole. To the extent that the CSD does influence manpower development, it does so through the Institute of Public Administration.

The IRA itself has certain limitations. The shortage of experienced instructors and trainers; lack of the necessary financial and administrative autonomy which its activities require; salaries, career and promotion prospects, still do not compare with similar organisations inside the country; and high turnover of the staff. Departments do not assign officers in sufficient numbers to fill the Institute's quotas for available courses. The Institute still faces difficulty in defining the actual training needs of the public service.

In order to carry out its functions most effectively, the status of the Institute is a matter of great significance. Unless it is highly regarded by the government, it will not secure the attention and respect of the employees in general. The revitalisation, re-orientation and reorganisation of the Institute might be an essential
part of any proposed administrative reform programme. The work programme of the Institute could be an important part of the administrative reform programme and closely geared to its requirements. It is necessary to consider and decide on the objectives and goals of the training to know who to train and for what before training is started. It is of little use and may give negative results if instructors are trained in old and obsolete regulations and procedures. It is worth testing the use of participatory training methods and techniques.

On the other hand, to build up the Institute for a new role, the salary conditions and promotion prospects of its staff should be equivalent to those of the universities and other institutions which are concerned with the training of individuals who work for private enterprises and public autonomous corporations. It might be more useful for the Institute to focus on administrative reform programmes, specialised courses, developing trainers and instructors of other institutions, advising and consulting in management services and to give full attention to the development of senior management staff. The Institute could also have a major responsibility for a new training programme for new entrants into the Service. The value of such training is to give the officer a professional approach to his responsibility to enable him to evaluate more readily the experience he gains on the job.

The survey shows that most training activities in Jordan are conducted by individual departments for meeting their own needs. However, departmental training institutes face some shortcomings. These include: they rely exclusively on the lecture method; courses
are too theoretical, too short; based upon inadequate selection of trainees. There is also lack of facilities and financial support; irrelevant syllabus; unqualified administrative staff; and lack of concern with attitudes towards dealing with the public.

Furthermore, there is an obvious lack of contact between departments and central training agencies. It is essential for the latter to assess and know departmental needs so that they can cater fully for these needs. It is also equally essential for the former to demonstrate these needs and to have them fully catered for. It is only through such two-way communication that central and departmental training can fully achieve their objectives.

On the whole, our survey provides the following findings. Central training hardly exists and has no clear objectives. This results from the failure to organise clear objectives in the field of recruitment and promotion. This emphasises again the decentralised nature of organisation and control within the government service.

The first thing that all developing countries such as Jordan, discover in developing their programmes is the need to manage a large budget. The mechanism of budgetary control, auditing and evaluation, would be accepted naturally within all departments we have investigated. By complete contrast, the management of human resources is a function which has been entirely neglected as a central management function. Control, auditing and evaluating of manpower need to be centralised (as in the case of financial resources) for effective career development.
NOTES


5. For instance, the Civil Service Selection Board in Britain has found the Pre-Board Selection Interview a useful refinement of the traditional interviewing technique. See: GB, Civil Service Commission, 84th Report of H.M's Civil Service Commissioners, London: HMSO, 1929.


8. Ibid. Articles 60, 114.
APPENDIX 1

Assessment Report Form for Classified Grades used by the Government Service of Jordan

The Hashmite Kingdom of Jordan.
Assessment Report
19— Confidential

Ministry .....................
Department ........................

1. Full name.  2. Date of birth.  3. Marital Status.
4. Job title.  5. Place of work.
6. Date of appointment to the Service.  7. Present grade.
8. Basic salary.  9. Date of promotion to the present grade.

10. Academic qualifications.
11. Special qualifications.
12. Other experience.
   (A) Duties of the official

   (B) Periodical work done by the official once or twice etc. monthly

13. Additional work done by the official without allowance or pay

14. Additional work done by the official with allowance or pay (Specify the amount of the pay or allowance)

15. The amount of technical allowance being paid monthly to the specialist (e.g. doctor, engineer)

     I attest that the above information is correct to the best of my knowledge.

     Date: ..................... Official Signature: ..............................

     I certify that I have investigated and found the above information is correct. (If the immediate supervisor finds the above information incorrect, he should state the precise information below).

Immediate Official Supervisor
Name in Full: ........................
Signature: ........................... Date: ...........................
16. Efficiency and capability of the Official

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Ability</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Very Good</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Weak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Knowledge of the job.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Work performance and assumption of responsibility.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Execution of instructions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Assumption of greater responsibility.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Independent thinking and innovation.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Depth of understanding.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Dealing with others and Punctuality.

| 1. Public.                                    |           |           |      |        |      |
| 2. Supervisors.                               |           |           |      |        |      |
| 3. Colleagues.                                |           |           |      |        |      |
| 4. Subordinates.                              |           |           |      |        |      |
| 5. Observance of working time.                |           |           |      |        |      |

C. Work Ethics (Integrity and Conduct)

D. Work (For teachers only)

| 1. Keeping discipline in classroom and school. |           |           |      |        |      |
| 2. Method of teaching.                        |           |           |      |        |      |
| 3. Results of his teaching.                   |           |           |      |        |      |
| 4. Degree of adherence to policy.             |           |           |      |        |      |

17. Your general assessment of the official: Excellent, Very Good, Good, Medium, Weak (circle the most appropriate description of the official).

18. Do you think the holder is suitable for his current job, or do you recommend his transfer to another job (Specify the reasons and the job recommended).

19. Any other remarks. ......................................................
   ...........................................................................
   ............................................................................
20. In the light of my personal knowledge of this official's work and relying on information which I have concluded on his conditions, I certify in my belief and knowledge that the information above is correct and the rating of his ability is the most appropriate.

Signature of Immediate Supervisor .................. Date ................

21. The opinion of Education Director (for teachers only)

22. The opinion of the Assessment Committee of the Official

Chairman of the Committee Member Member
(Permanent Secretary or position position
Director-General)

Date .................

Directions:
(1) The Official fills the first page of this report which is then sent to the immediate supervisor for his review.
(2) The immediate supervisor fills the part which applies to him in pages 1,2. In the case of the Ministry of Education officials, the report is sent to the Education Director and the Assessment Committee.
(3) The following words shall be used in rating the official's work: Excellent, Very Good, Good, Medium, Weak.
(4) This report should be completed in duplicate. One copy should be sent to the Head of the Civil Service Department every October and the other kept by the department concerned. (In the case of teachers, the report should be in triplicate, one of them should be kept with the Education Director).
(6) When the ability of an official has been reported to be "Medium", the official will be notified of this rating; and the official whose ability has been reported to be "Weak" shall be warned. In both of these cases, the official concerned shall be impressed by the need to show improvement in their work and to avoid any failure therein. A copy of the letter of warning shall be sent to the Head of the Civil Service Department (Civil Service Regulations No. 23, 1966, Article 59).

N.B. This is an unofficial translation from the original Arabic.
APPENDIX 2

QUESTIONNAIRE

This questionnaire is being issued as part of a research project undertaken at the University of Glasgow. It is designed to elicit information on the career development, work and attitudes of personnel. All information obtained will be kept strictly confidential and used only for the purpose of research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>Job title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4</td>
<td>Management Level</td>
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<td>Q5</td>
<td>Class</td>
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<td>Q6</td>
<td>Grade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q7</td>
<td>Sex: Male □ Female □</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q8</td>
<td>Marital Status: Single □ Married □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q9</td>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q10</td>
<td>Age at Entrance to the Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q11</td>
<td>Level of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q12</td>
<td>Academic Specialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q13</td>
<td>Occupation: Managerial □ Professional □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14</td>
<td>Duties/Functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q15</td>
<td>Length of Service in the government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q16 Length of Service in the current department ......
Q17 Number of government departments in which you have worked ........................................
Q18 Number of government departments with which you deal in your official work ......................
Q19 How frequently do you have contact with other government departments:
   1. Never.   □
   2. Not very often. □
   3. Frequently. □
   4. Very frequently. □
Q20 Number of years of non-government experience .................................................................
Q21 For which employer did you work the longest before joining the government service?
   1. The private sector. □
   2. Quasi-government corporations. □
   3. Local government. □
   4. Regional/international organisations. □
   5. Independent profession. □
Q22 State whether the relationship between your work inside and outside the government is:
   1. No relationship. □
   2. Weak relationship. □
   4. Identical relationship. □
Q23 Indicate whether or not the problems listed below are relevant to your department.

1. Inability to recruit suitably qualified personal  
   - Yes ☐  No ☐  Don't know ☐

2. Large turnover of qualified personnel  
   - Yes ☐  No ☐  Don't know ☐

3. Conflict between administrative and professional personnel over authorities and responsibilities  
   - Yes ☐  No ☐  Don't know ☐

4. Decisions made for political rather than pragmatic reasons  
   - Yes ☐  No ☐  Don't know ☐

5. Lack of coordination between agencies involved in the department's activities  
   - Yes ☐  No ☐  Don't know ☐

6. Inability to communicate effectively with the public  
   - Yes ☐  No ☐  Don't know ☐

7. Cramped physical working conditions  
   - Yes ☐  No ☐  Don't know ☐

8. Lack of adequate technical support  
   - Yes ☐  No ☐  Don't know ☐

Q24 Indicate whether any of changes described below is relevant to your department since you have served there.

1. The number of personnel has increased more than 20%  
   - Yes ☐  No ☐  Don't know ☐

2. Many jobs have become more specialised or technical  
   - Yes ☐  No ☐  Don't know ☐

3. My own duties and responsibilities have been increased  
   - Yes ☐  No ☐  Don't know ☐

4. The budget of the department has been increased by 20%  
   - Yes ☐  No ☐  Don't know ☐

5. There has been greater communication and co-ordination within the department  
   - Yes ☐  No ☐  Don't know ☐

6. The quality of personnel has improved  
   - Yes ☐  No ☐  Don't know ☐
Q25 How frequently do you have contact with your minister in the formal course of day-to-day work?

1. Almost every day. ☐
2. More than once per month. ☐
3. About once per month. ☐
4. Less than once per month. ☐
5. Never. ☐

Q26 By whom do you think that important decisions relating to policy making should be taken:

1. By the officer in charge of the department, without inviting or taking account of the views of subordinates. ☐
2. By the officer in charge of the department in consultation only with all the senior officials whether or not concerned with the decision. ☐
3. By the officer in charge of the department in consultation only with those officials directly concerned with the policy whether senior or junior. ☐

Q27 By whom do you think that decisions involved in the implementation of policy should be taken:

1. By the officer in charge of the department, without inviting or taking account of the views of the subordinates. ☐
2. By the officer in charge of the department in consultation only with all senior officials whether or not concerned with the decision. ☐
3. By the officer in charge of the department in consultation only with those officials directly concerned with the decision whether senior or junior. ☐
Q26 Some officials are primarily responsible for the formulation of policy, while others are primarily responsible for implementation of policy. With respect to your own job, which of the following statements most accurately defines your role in regard to policy?

1. My role is almost exclusively that of developing and formulating policy. □
2. My job involves both the formulation and implementation of policy. □
3. I implement policies made by others. □

Q29 How many people do you supervise? .................

Q30 How much of your time is spent dealing directly with the public?

1. None. □
2. Up to 10%. □
3. Between 10-25%. □
4. 25-50%. □
5. 50-75%. □
6. Over 75%. □

Q31 Which of the following statements best conveys the attitudes of the public towards government officials:

1. As persons who 'rule' the people. □
2. As persons charged with protection of the 'State interest' on behalf of the State. □
3. As 'guardians' of individual rights and interests. □
4. As public 'educators' who encourage correct understanding of government policy. □
5. Other (specify) .........................
Q32 Do you think that all categories of employees should be amalgamated into one unified class?
Yes □ Neutral □ No □

Q33 Indicate to what extent you agree with the statement: 'in practical terms women are not well suited for government service work.'
1. Agree strongly. □
2. Agree. □
3. Neutral/No opinion. □
4. Disagree. □
5. Disagree strongly. □

Q34 Had your post been advertised at time of your appointment? Yes □ No □

Q35 How were you selected for your job at time of appointment?
1. By submitting an application. Yes □ No □
2. After taking competitive examination. Yes □ No □
3. By an interview. Yes □ No □
4. After telling management about my qualifications and experience. Yes □ No □
5. Other (specify) ........................................

Q36 Why did you decide to accept government service?
1. No alternative employer Yes □ No □
2. No possibility of suitable employment in the private sector for my skills or qualifications. Yes □ No □
3. /...
Q36 ....

3. Temperamentally not inclined to work in the private sector.  Yes [ ]  No [ ]  

4. For prestige and status/or for power to influence public policy.  Yes [ ]  No [ ]  

5. Good prospects of promotion.  Yes [ ]  No [ ]  

6. For prospective pension benefits.  Yes [ ]  No [ ]  

7. Family tradition of government service.  Yes [ ]  No [ ]  

8. Less hard work than private enterprise or private practice as a profession.  Yes [ ]  No [ ]  

9. Qualifications required for other trade, profession or occupation not possessed.  Yes [ ]  No [ ]  

10. Obligation to work with the government (indenture).  Yes [ ]  No [ ]  

11. To get experience/training to work outside the government service.  Yes [ ]  No [ ]  

12. Lack of direction.  Yes [ ]  No [ ]  

Q37 Under what circumstances would you voluntarily leave the Service?

1. Better paying job elsewhere.  Yes [ ]  No [ ]  

2. Better opportunity to utilize skills elsewhere.  Yes [ ]  No [ ]  

3. Poor civil service prospects.  Yes [ ]  No [ ]  

4. Better opportunities to obtain skill, training, additional education elsewhere.  Yes [ ]  No [ ]  

5. Improved non-wage benefits elsewhere.  Yes [ ]  No [ ]  

6. Frustration and discontent within the Service.  Yes [ ]  No [ ]  

7. Bad internal structure and processes.  Yes [ ]  No [ ]  

8. Other. (Specify).................................................
Q38  Do you think that your decision in entering government service was wise?  Yes ☐  No ☐

Q39  If you had to choose for yourself now, in the light of your experience in the government, which of the following would you choose:

1. Government service. ☐
2. Foreign-owned private concern. ☐
3. Jordanian private concern. ☐
4. Anywhere in the private concern. ☐

Q40  What is your monthly government salary? .............

Q41  Are you satisfied with your government salary?  Yes ☐  No ☐

Q42  Do you receive an allowance?  Yes ☐  No ☐
If so, specify the type and amount ..........................

Q43  How many persons are economically dependent upon your earnings? .........................

Q44  Do you have income from other sources additional to your government salary, such as buildings, land or investment of any kind?  Yes ☐  No ☐

Q45  Do you think that the government should permit all public servants to hold second jobs outside the Civil Service, or to undertake part-time private business in addition to working for government?

Yes ☐  Neutral ☐  No ☐

Q46  Do you hold other job or undertake side-business in addition to your government job?  Yes ☐  No ☐
Q47 Rank the following criteria of promotion in order of your personal preference.
- competence
- education
- seniority
- training
- favouritism
- personality traits

Q48 The way promotions are made is often different from the way that one considers ideal. Would you examine the six criteria again? This time rank them the way you think the Service makes promotions.
- competence
- education
- seniority
- training
- favouritism
- personality traits

Q49 For Managers and Supervisors
What kind of advice would you extend to an official entering the Service on how to advance and succeed?

Q50 Explain your understanding of the value (i.e. purpose of the reporting system.
1. To control staff.
2. To motivate staff.
3. To ensure appropriate staff deployment.
4. To prepare staff for promotion
5. To indicate training needs
6. Other (Specify)
Q51 Would you say that to show assessment report to the subordinate is:

1. Highly desirable. [ ]
2. Probably a good idea. [ ]
3. Neutral/No opinion. [ ]
4. Probably a bad idea. [ ]
5. Quite wrong. [ ]

52. For Managerial Staff

Does the reporting system used in the Service give an indication as to the ability and competence of the subordinate, and consequently provide an indication of training needs and suitability for promotion?

Yes [ ] Neutral [ ] No [ ]

Q53 For Non-Managerial Staff

In your view, does the reporting system create motivation in the Service?

Yes [ ] Neutral [ ] No [ ]

Q54 For Supervisors

Have you ever had a training course in staff assessment? Yes [ ] No [ ]

Q55 Do you regard the format of the assessment report is:

1. Relevant. [ ]
2. Neutral. [ ]
3. Irrelevant. [ ]
Q56  Do you think that each class or level of management should have a separate assessment report form?

Yes ☐  Neutral ☐  No ☐

Q57  Did you join an initial training course when you were first appointed in the government?

Yes ☐  No ☐

Q58  How many training courses did you attend during your career service?

1. Inside the department. ☐ ☐
2. Outside the department. ☐ ☐

Q59  People undertake training either voluntarily or as a requirement. Indicate your purpose in taking training:

1. To learn the job.  Yes ☐  No ☐
2. To prepare for promotion.  Yes ☐  No ☐
3. To gain money (bonus).  Yes ☐  No ☐
4. To seek more knowledge.  Yes ☐  No ☐
5. Other (Specify) ..................

Q60  Would the training you received in the government enable you to obtain work outside the Service?

Yes ☐  No ☐  Don't know ☐

Q61  Should there be any institutional training at all (whether departmental, central or abroad) to supplement on-the-job training?

Yes ☐  Neutral ☐  No ☐

Q62  Should institutional training be:

1. Given in departmental training institutions.
2. Contracted out to universities and other academic institutions.
Q63 Which of the following criticisms (if any) related to your experience of training:

1. Not relevant to the job.    Yes ☐  No ☐
2. Too theoretical.            Yes ☐  No ☐
3. Not career related (i.e. promotion or needs). Yes ☐  No ☐
4. Not provided by qualified instructors. Yes ☐  No ☐
5. Poorly managed courses (bad organisation). Yes ☐  No ☐
6. Inadequate selection of participants. Yes ☐  No ☐
7. Too short.                  Yes ☐  No ☐
8. Too long.                   Yes ☐  No ☐
9. Other. (Specify).....................

Q64 How many times have you been transferred in the following ways:

1. Within the same department. .................
2. Between departments. ........................
3. To-From public autonomous corporations, nationalised industries, quasi-government enterprises........................
4. Secondment to-from the local government. ............... 
5. Secondment to-from the private sector.....................
6. Other (Specify) .........................
Q65 What were the reasons for the transfer?
   1. Administrative considerations. Yes ☐ No ☐
   2. Improvement of financial position. Yes ☐ No ☐
   3. Grade-to-grade promotion. Yes ☐ No ☐
   4. Disciplinary action. Yes ☐ No ☐
   5. Departmental friction. Yes ☐ No ☐
   6. The need for my qualifications. Yes ☐ No ☐
   7. The nature of the work. Yes ☐ No ☐
   8. For training and experience. Yes ☐ No ☐
   9. Other (Specify) ................................

Q66 On average, how frequently have you been transferred (i.e. time between transfers in months)? .........

Q67 Do you think that public servants should form their own staff associations?
   Yes ☐ Neutral ☐ No ☐

Q68 Are you a member of Staff association/professional association in connection with your job?
   Yes ☐ No ☐

Q69 If the answer above is 'yes', state whether the association is:
   1. Active.
   2. Active only in particular issues.
   3. Inactive.
The following question relates to alternative policies for staff development and the career patterns open to different government officials. Indicate which of the following statements you agree, bearing in mind the effects of such a policy in your department.

1. Technical specialists should hold only technical posts.
2. Technical specialists should be able to hold any post in a department, whether technical qualifications are required or not.
3. Technical specialists should be preferred for appointment and promotion in technical departments, (e.g. doctors in Health Department).
4. In departments where technical expertise is important, managerial personnel should require training before appointment or promotion to posts involving supervision of technically complex work.

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<tr>
<th>Agree Strongly</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree strongly</th>
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