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Intertextuality and Mimesis in *Jude the Obscure* by Thomas Hardy

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to explore the role of quotation in *Jude the Obscure*. Quotation will be defined not only as literary quotation, allusion, or motto, but also as any structural citation (such as literary conventions or narrative paradigms) that represents both material and non-material references. I will analyse the poetical role of quotation in the novel’s representation, observed as the work of intertextual relationships producing mimetic effects. This heterogeneous approach requires an investigation of the text’s poetics through its external referents co-ordinated by the dominant discourses. Thus quotation will be investigated in two ways: stylistic, directed at the dialogue between the semantic fields in the text (Kristeva’s vertical intertextuality), and textual, focused on the figurative meaning of the relationship of the text with other texts (Kristeva’s horizontal intertextuality). The main objective is to understand the allegorical sense of references as they represent the world in *Jude the Obscure*, and to deduce Hardy’s attitude towards the mimesis underpinning the Realistic convention.

This thesis argues that quotation is not only evidence of the intertextual affiliations of the novel, but also an engine of Hardy’s self-referential poetics. This will be concluded from the interplay between the signs in the text which, on the one hand, form material and non-material quotations and, on the other, elicit a metatextual discourse of symbolic figures that trigger their mutual contextual references. From this interplay emerges the anti-mimetic and self-consciously critical attitude Hardy manifests towards the realistic representation that, ironically, encompasses his own novel.
# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author’s Declaration</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONE Metonymy – Quoting Authority</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWO Metaphor – Quoting Feelings</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREE Symbol – Quoting Reality</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fig. 1  The Carved Inscription
Reproduced in JO, I, 11: 73

Fig. 2  1895 Manuscript of Jude the Obscure: 75
APP. Photocopy of Manuscript, ref. no.: 761/02/03
(Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge)

Fig. 3  Alleluia
Reproduced in JO, II, 2: 88

Fig. 4  1895 Manuscript of Jude the Obscure: back of 87
APP. Photocopy of Manuscript, ref. no.: 761/02/03
(Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge)

Fig. 5  1895 Manuscript of Jude the Obscure: 46
APP. Photocopy of Manuscript, ref. no.: 761/02/03
(Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge)

Fig. 6  1895 Manuscript of Jude the Obscure: 41
APP. Photocopy of Manuscript, ref. no.: 761/02/03
(Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge)

Fig. 7  "In a Eweleaze near Weatherbury"

Fig. 8  Venus de Milo, 130 -120 BC.
APP. Excavated in 1820.
The Louvre, Paris.

Fig. 9  Capitoline Venus (Rome), c.1 or 2 AD.
APP. "Venus Pudica"
Palazzo Nuovo, Rome.

Fig. 10  Venus de Medici (Florence), c.1-2 AD
APP. "Venus Pudica"
Acquired by the Medici family in the late 16th or early 17th century.
The Museum of the Uffizi Gallery, Florence.

Fig. 11  Aphrodite of Cnidus, c. 350 BC.
APP. Vatican Museum, Rome.

Fig. 12  Aphrodite of Capua, Naples. National Museum.
APP. Reproduced as figure 34 in C.M. Havelock 1995.
Fig. 13  Aphrodite Kalipygos, Naples. National Museum
APP.  Reproduced as figure 35 in C.M. Havelock 1995.

Fig. 14  *Punch* (210), 10 May 1879.
APP.

Fig. 15  *A Venus*, Albert Moore, c.1869.
APP.  York City Art Gallery, York.
Reproduced in A. Smith 1996.

Fig. 16  *The Wife of Pygmalion*, George Frederick Watts, c. 1868.
APP.  Buscot Park, Oxfordshire.
Reproduced in A. Smith 1996.

Fig. 17  *Venus*, James McNeill Whistler, 1869.
APP.  Freer Gallery of Art, Washington DC.
Reproduced in A. Smith 1996.

Fig. 18  *The Cupid Seller*, Joseph-Marie Vien, 1763.
APP.  Musée national du château, Fontainebleau.
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I hereby declare that all material presented in this thesis is my own unless otherwise stated. This thesis does not contain any material that has been accepted for any other degree or diploma etc. in any university or institution.
Abbreviations

APP: Appendices

CL: The Collected Letters of Thomas Hardy, ed. by R.L. Purdy & M. Millgate

JO: Jude the Obscure, T. Hardy

L: The Life of Thomas Hardy 1840-1928, F. E. Hardy

M: Manuscript of Jude the Obscure (1895). T. Hardy

PW: Thomas Hardy, Personal Writings. T. Hardy

TH&HR: Thomas Hardy and His Readers. A Selection of Contemporary Reviews,
ed. by L. Lerner & J. Holmstrom

TLN: The Literary Notebooks of Thomas Hardy, T. Hardy

TMCB: The Mayor of Casterbridge, T. Hardy

TRTN: The Return of the Native, T. Hardy

TU: Tess of the d’Urbervilles, T. Hardy

TW: The Woodlanders, T. Hardy

UTGT: Under the Greenwood Tree, T. Hardy

W: The Works of Thomas Hardy, T. Hardy
All was over; Dick surveyed the chair she has last occupied, looking now like a setting from which the gem has been torn. There stood the glass, and the romantic teaspoonful of elder wine at the bottom that she couldn’t drink by trying ever so hard, in obedience to the mighty arguments of the tranter (his hand coming down upon her shoulder the while like a Nasmyth hammer); but the drinker was there was no longer. There were nine or ten pretty little crumbs she had left on her plate; but the eater was no more seen.

(UTGT: 28)

Realism in Question

Of Hardy and other novelists of his type, an anonymous reviewer offers the following observation:

In one respect they resemble those fashionable and self-opinionated artists who embody their personal conceptions of art in forms that scandalize traditional opinions. In another respect, as we are glad to think, they differ from them very widely. (TH&HR: 152)

The same reviewer also complains that Hardy failed in his attempts to amuse readers, a trait which many readers and critics of the time considered to be the aim of prose: "He would seem to be steadily subordinating interest to the rules by which he regulates his art" (TH&HR: 153). Again, it is Hardy’s predilection for poetical and oblique language that is attacked. Certainly, Hardy’s sophisticated language undermined the clarity of the

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1 Anonymous reviewer for *The Saturday Review*, 4 January 1879. Reprinted in *TH & HR*: 152.
novel and caused doubts regarding the conventions of realism. It is not easy to
categorise this specific form of writing; it derives from the realistic tradition but yet also
subverts it. The nature of Hardy’s writing, in my opinion, can be defined by Peter
Widdowson, who views Hardy “as really a practitioner of humanist realism (the
essential mode of the genre as a whole in its finest incarnation) whose work is marred
on occasion by a perverse deviation from the characteristic features of such a mode:
high moral seriousness, the centrality of human character, versimilitude” (1999: 76). It
must be added, however, that what Widdowson defines as a “perverse deviation” is, in
fact, a strength of Jude in that it reflects and enacts at the level of content, ‘things falling
apart, the actuality of external reality in fiction complicated by ‘foreign’ elements:
realistic conventions undermined, the textual fabric of his language problematised,
sentimental and generic conventions subverted, a slide into the abstract and the
indeterminate. None the less, it must be said, although this writing defies a clear
categorisation typical of realistic prose, it still aims at grasping the outer
reality in all its heterogeneity and vagueness.

Thomas Hardy is not commonly considered a classical realist author. His writings
constantly provoke discussion on the obscurity of his style. The distrust of critics and
readers proves the impossibility of any final definition and classification of Hardy’s
prose. A debate as to whether Hardy is a realist or antirealist has been reinvigorating
analysis of his poetics, language, narration, style, and still inspires new research. In my
study of the problem, I would like to question Hardy’s arbitrary theory of art, his means
of communication with the reader, and the textual fabric of his language.

**ART**

In the nineteenth-century Hardy’s “realism” was recognised according to the
narrative patterns used by most classical writers in his epoch: the authorial voice in the
first-person singular or first-person plural, the links between cause and effect, the logic of events, time and space limitations, the omniscience of the narrator introducing his knowledge beyond the heroes’ consciousness, the wide use of detail and, of course, the mimetic transmission of the external world. Hardy's contemporaries recognised that his characters were made living and breathing realities; there was a powerful love tale ingeniously worked out; the author showed a most intimate knowledge of the rural scenes he sympathetically described; and above all, as is almost invariably his habit, he was quaintly humorous in the talk which he put into the mouths of his rustics. (TH&HR: 153)

In spite of this, what was thematically direct and understandable in his work simultaneously displayed a semantic and generic ambiguity, which confounded and perplexed the reader. Narrative texture was an effect of the author's style, which combined the realist method of viewing the world objectively with an individual, extremely subjective, means of poetical expression. This sounds like a paradox even today, and was not straightforward for Hardy's readers.

The author's notion of the rôle of literature – aside from its connections with classical prose and its norms – can be found in his understanding of aesthetics as a theory of interpretation. We can conclude this both from his novels and poems, where the idea of a universal perspective on individual aspects of life is embodied, and also

\[\text{The position of Hardy's god-like narrator epitomises the classical rule of Realism. In a dialogue between Mr. and Mrs Melbury the narrator interferes in brackets a few times to elucidate the reader with his extra knowledge: "(Grace was the speaker's only daughter); "(Marty South started, and could not tear herself away)" (TW: 13). The protagonists are frequently addressed in a traditional way with the pronoun "our" which shifts the narrator beyond the level of a story, and separates the world of fiction from the abstract domain of its creator. A similar effect of distance is created through the use of the word "scene" or "scenery" reapplied frequently in all novels, distancing the narrator from the world of his fiction.}\]
from his personal writings, where Hardy presents his opinions on the aims of art. It is important to emphasise here that Hardy never denied the necessity of reflecting the actuality of external reality in fiction. As Mary Rimmer puts it: "Hardy was working against the grain of nineteenth-century realism even while he produced it" (2000: 62). However, at the same time, Hardy did not agree with the definition of realism as a scientifically founded imitation, a definition widely approved by writers following the critical apparatus of the French objectivists such as Stendhal, Honore de Balzac, Émile Zola or Hipolite Taine. Hardy writes in his article “The Science of Fiction”:

Realism is an unfortunate, an ambiguous word, which has been taken up by literary society like a view-halloo, and has been assumed in some places to mean copyism, and in others pruriency, and has led to two classes of delineators being included in one condemnation. Just as bad a word is one used to express a consequence of this development, namely "brutality", a term which, first applied by French critics, has since spread over the English school like the other. It aptly hits off the immediate impression of the thing meant; but has the disadvantage of defining impartiality as a passion, and a plan as a caprice. It certainly is very far from truly expressing the aims and methods of conscientious and well-intentioned authors who, notwithstanding their excess, errors, and rickety theories, attempt to narrate the vérité vraie. (PW: 136)

The art of fiction for the author of Jude the Obscure is a possibility, a mode, an impression, or a variation of the experienced world. Consequently, Hardy admits that it is the personal understanding of reality which determines the final shape of a fictional world. It is not enough to be able to count objects in reality and describe them with photographic likeness; it is not sufficient to be an objectivist with sensitive sight instigating "social minutiae" works (for which Hardy reproached Taine), as such a
treatment leads to a description of "life garniture and not life" (PW: 119). The author considered this kind of literary production to be merely feeding average appetites of undemanding readers. The critical realism of the eighties and its new branch, naturalism—called by Hardy "brutality"—was lacking the passion and subjectivism considered by the author to be absolutely essential in artistic language.

Taking into account Hardy's understanding of artistic fidelity, one might compare it to a famous statement by Émile Zola (2001), reiterated also by the Goncourts, Alphonse Daudet, and Guy de Maupassant, who suggested that a picture of reality should be filtered through the artist's temperament. However, we must remember that French naturalist writers considered "temperament" to be a physiological quality of human perception, while for Hardy: "[T]o see in half and quarter views the whole picture, to catch from a few bars the whole tune, is the intuitive power that supplies the would-be storyteller with the scientific bases for his pursuit" (PW: 137). Despite categorising the differences, both the physiological and the intuitive attitudes point to the role of the subjective aspect of narration. The science of fiction for naturalists and realists is bounded by the laws of empiricism, and in this sense, for Hardy, "realism is not Art", but rather craftwork.

Hardy uses the word "science", which should respond to a faithful representation of truth, but presented in the manner "more truthful than truth" (PW: 134). This cryptic definition of a poetical manner raises the question of the illusion of reality, the question first problematised in the classical poetics of Aristotle and Plato. Hardy's apprehension of fiction, however, was built upon a different foundation. It derived more from

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1 See: D. Baguley (1990); G.M. Carsmiga, R.H. Freeborn & F.W.J. Hemmings (1978 [1974]).

2 In his diaries transcribed by Florence Emily Hardy, Thomas Hardy writes: "Art is disproportioning—(i.e. distorting, throwing out of proportion)—of realities, to show more clearly the features that matter in those realities, which, if merely copied or reported inventorially, might possibly be observed, but would more probably be overlooked. Hence <realism> is not Art" (Millgate 1985: 229).
Romanticism than from classical poetics. Hardy approaches a "sympathetic appreciativeness [sic] of life in all its manifestations" (PW: 137). An echo of the Romantic pantheistic means of perception can be discerned in this statement. What is changed in Hardy's epistemology is the lack of the Romantic Absolute, for which he substituted the idea of real life. The author tried to explain this while defending the style of *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*: "I only try to give an artistic shape to standing facts" (TH&HR: 90). To use any kind of literary delineation this "artistic shape" might be referred to as impressionistic – life interpreted through his own medium. Nonetheless, Hardy himself escaped from this, and every other label for his art. What is transitional about Hardy's aesthetics developed within the frames of realism is his disdain for the imitation of life in language. He wanted literature, and art in general, to be an emotional and psychological representation of reality, not its mimetic reflection.

Hardy's individual method takes roots in his deep feeling for the natural and spiritual phenomena of life. He considers material appearances or simple facts in the epistemological sense - as vehicles of insight. The latter should not be confused, however, with the incarnation of the Platonic transcendence. Hardy's theory of insight.

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5 This idea implies the role of the Immanent Will, which governs human fate. Hardy's determinism denied any superior order in Universe, guaranteed by the Romantic Absolute or Platonic idea. According to Hardy, life was ruled by blind chance, which is a predominating motive-power, abjuring human ethical laws and renouncing the laws of Nature. Hardy's determinism, and subsequently atheism, established his faith in paganism as a vital, straight inchoate form of participation in already ordained life. For more on this problem see: F. Brennecke (1966).

6 Interview with Thomas Hardy for *Black and White*, 27 August 1892. Reprinted in TH & HR: 90.

7 In *Jude the Obscure*, Robert Schweik finds an overture of expressionist movement. In his rich analysis, the critic writes: "Hardy's emphasis on intensification and distortion to convey the artist's subjective sense of reality is consistent with the practices and theories of expressionist art whose precursors in literature and painting were emerging just at the time Hardy wrote *Jude*" (1994: 60).

The descriptions in *The Woodlanders*, F.B. Pinion regards as influenced by Impressionism (1990: 24).
most acutely couched in his postulation to “catch from a few bars the whole tune”,
(PW: 137) although might remind of the Platonic *imago* of the cave reflecting the
shadows of the essence in the appearances of particular beings, does not deploy the
inner order of things through their outer representations. There is a difference between
Hardy’s conception of the mediative - ‘worked out’ representation and the
transcendental - given mimesis of Plato. While nineteenth century realists regard
language in the post-Platonic sense as a reflection of reality (idea), Hardy’s approach is,
in fact, quite the opposite. It concentrates on the linguistic surface of signs, rather than
their phenomenal core. In Hardy’s epistemology the fact or the object belonging to
reality is itself the “only thing”, and literature, or the sign of fiction, is one of such
phenomenal occurrences, which as such are worth our concentration and exploration. A
deeper understanding of facts does not lead us to the ideal order lying beneath the
surface, but instead, it creates a possibility of interpretation and new modes of reality.
But none of them can be treated as the only valid one.

Writing is the articulation of those different possibilities into language. In this
sense, a sign from reality cannot be transported into the text since it is already changed
by the context that the writer understands it within. Context producing impression now
can stand for a real object (signified). It would seem that the link between a signified
and signifier becomes broken in this way. However, in Hardy’s language this link is still
maintained thanks to the juxtaposition of the impression and the signified. From an
aesthetic point of view, we can observe that particular events in Hardy’s novels are
presented with a realistic acuteness, and at the same time they are diluted in the shadow
of impression. When Clym Yeobright walks on the heather we can follow every detail
of the landscape transformed into a moment of his feeling:

In half an hour he stood at the top. The sky was clear from verge to verge,
and the moon flung her ryes over the whole heath, but without sensibly lighting,
it, except where paths and water-courses had laid bare the white flints and
glistening quartz sand, which made streaks upon the general shade.

After standing awhile he stooped and felt the heather. (TRTN: 163)

A great abundance of material “objects” emerge from Hardy’s writing, but they
seem to lose their concrete dimension depending on who sees or, rather, feels them.
When Angel reacts with detestation to Tess’s story, it influences the transformation of
the whole room:

The fire in the grate looked impish, demonically funny, as if it did not care in
the least about her strait. The fender grinned idly, as if too did not care.
The light from the water-bottle was merely engaged in a chromatic problem.
All material objects around announced their irresponsibility with terrible
iteration. (TU: 225)

The aim of these special effects is the creation of a correspondence between the subject
and perception. They are to express the character’s subjective mood in the particular
circumstances. In Hardy’s writing we come across sensual, almost palpable pictures of
reality – all immersed in their symbolic haze. Material objects become “alive” in a
process of animisation or personification. Material objects can signify abstract qualities;
while abstract qualities can change into physical substances. Human characters melt into
the landscape, whereas unpredictable nature becomes an engine of the characters’
existence.

An image of Mr. Melbury’s house, which is a fusion of objective observations and
the emotional sensation of the commentator, loses its material contours in favour of its
deeper non-material look:

The house was of no marked antiquity; yet of well-advanced age; older than a
stale novelty, but no canonised antique; faded, not hoary; looking at you from
the still distinct middle-distance of the early Georgian time, and awakening on
the account the instincts of reminiscence more decidedly than the remoter, and far grander, memorials which have to speak from the misty reaches of mediævalism. The faces, dress, passions, gratitudes, and revenges of the great-great-grandfathers and grandmothers who had been the first to gaze from those rectangular windows, and had stood under the keystoned doorway, could be divined and measured by homely standards of to-day. (TW: 24)

This view is gained through the process of perception as a physical activity and at the same time as a kind of inward perception of outward objects. It creates a pathway from the literary world to empirical reality, which changes into a series of phenomenal reflexes. This appeals to the imagination and was appreciated by some of Hardy's contemporaries. Edward Wright wrote in his review of Tess of the d'Urbervilles:

By way of contrast the story is lightened with series of beautiful pictures representing the varied business of farming in Wessex at a period when the continuity with the past remained in all things unbroken. (TH&HR: 97)

The diverse views of the critics on this special aspect of Hardy's style reveal to some extent the confusion the author evoked with his writing. The utterances of such artists as T. S. Eliot and D. H. Lawrence are examples of how diversely Hardy's efforts to be objective were understood. Lawrence ranks Hardy with Leo Tolstoy in regards to their endeavours in making the language intelligible. And he adds as follows:

"It is Art which opens to us the silences, the primordial silences which hold the secret of things, the great purposes, which are themselves silent; there are no words to speak of them with, and no thoughts to think of them in, so we struggle to touch them through art; and the eager, unsatisfied world seeks to put them all into a religious phrase" (1985: 140). What is interesting here is that Lawrence sees Hardy's realism as based on artistic objectivity but pervaded with a transcendental quality of existence affecting the process of writing. This shows the influence of romantic and realistic conventions upon interpretation of Hardy's works.
"Life" in Hardy's novel is not the reflection of outer reality, but the epitome of the impression reality evokes. The personal impression experienced by the writer is frozen or, it could be said, fossilised⁹ in fiction. He presents objects, peoples' encounters, interactions, and adventures in historical time, and equips them with the significance of mythological eternity and non-materiality. The author's intention is to give us an impression of the human condition which is inherent in any aspect of life. However, this procedure can be compared neither to Jung's search for archetypes in variety, nor to the typification suggested by the French realists.¹⁰

As Hardy put it himself, fictional characters were supposed to be "too real to be possible", more beautiful than people are in real life. He named this method "the idealization of characters" (PW: 118). It was to evoke "ethereal characteristics of humanity" (PW: 137), the same that inhabit "material particulars". What is characteristic and important in these quotations is the author's clear comprehension of the aims and capabilities of literature. Hardy, as the author and the creator, wants his novels to signify the world, even to enhance and moralise it. However, it is also apparent that he is aware of the preposterous nature of that task. "Too real to be possible" is an idealisation of reality and refers to the implausibility of fiction and the obstacle of articulation which language tries to overcome. There is reality on one side and literature, which "idealises" or "fictionalises" it, on the other. Hardy mythologises ("fossilises") images, characters, themes or simply signs to create the specific

⁹ On Hardy's fossilisation of history see T. Wright (1991).

¹⁰ What George Lukacs writes about Balzac's method cannot not be attributed to Hardy's method: "It is the quality of Balzacian realism, the fact that it is solidly based on a correctly interpreted social existence, that makes Balzac an unsurpassed master in depicting the great intellectual and spiritual forces which form all human ideologies. He does so by tracing them back to their social origins and making them function in the direction determined by these social origins" (1950: 44).
dimension of fictitious reality named in language. He understands, so explicitly
distinguished in Aristotelian Poetics, the artificial and the aesthetic mode of writing.

However, the artist is also intrigued by the moral and epistemological condition of
fiction. He treats life as material for writing, and writing as a method of life’s
interpretation. Hardy’s style was certainly affected by his psychological, physical and
emotional constitution, and consequently, his specific type of imagination. His
imagination can be called “material”, or as Sheila Berger suggests, “visual” (1990). It
may be easily noticed that Hardy viewed the world in a very physical way – through
objects, colours, scents, shapes, sounds, and gestures, which gained in his eyes the
status of “fetishes of Nature”, the very same that Eliot despised (1955). Berger equates
Hardy’s visual perception with his manner of cognition:

Visual thinking is at the core of Hardy’s aesthetics. Seeing for him is not a
metaphor for knowing; it is a form of knowing. He saw the essential lines and
shapes of everything and tried to let the reader see them too. The whole world
of human concerns seems to have passed through his imagination to become
knowledge in the form of visual structures [...] Hardy – despite his position as
materialist, skeptic positivist – could not finally be content with cold and
lifeless matter; however, neither could he accept the idea of a god in the skies
or in the self. The result is an unresolved tension and a dynamic play among
images. The image and the eye are not the two parts of a harmonious unity, just
as framing and disruption are not two parts of a balanced whole. Rather, these
are opposition points of tension, metaphoric of the collision and resulting
destabilisation from which new meanings can emerge. (1990: 12-13)

In Hardy’s writing images signify new symbolic meanings that emerge in relation
to other signs in the text. Although his language is replete with realistic details,
described almost with a "fetishist" eagerness (to use the author's expression),\textsuperscript{11} it does not rest on signifiers as simple demonstration but deploys their figurative reading. We can observe that Hardy's representation is founded on metonymy ("few bars") which, however, does not aspire to refer to its larger counterpart from the empirical world, as in classical prose, but to the emotional experience of that world (catching "the whole tune"). The intention of such a relation is expressed in Mrs Yeobright's lament on her son's fate: "Cry about one thing in life, cry about all; one thread runs through the whole piece" (TRTN: 181). The object (part) represented in language conveys to us the experienced idea of the object (whole). There is an analogy between this kind of metonymic relation and Hardy's understanding of "fetish". It can be compared to the Freudian definition of fetishisms as "the replacement of the object by a symbolic connection of thought, of which the person concerned is usually not conscious" (1975: 155). In sexual relations "the normal sexual object is replaced by another which bears some relation to it, but is entirely unsuited to serve the normal sexual aim. [...] Such substitutes are with some justice likened to the fetishes in which savages believe that their gods are embodied" (1975: 153).

The heath in The Return of the Native and Far from the Madding Crowd can be regarded as one such fetishised object. It belongs to nature in life, but in literature it changes into a symbolic code in the writer's gods are embodied, which responds to the artists' personal impressions as evoked by the object. Norman Page comments that "whereas both mountains and classical artefacts are, so to speak, public property, associations largely constitute a private discourse, and one of the curious features of

\textsuperscript{11} In Tess Hardy writes that the protagonist's rhapsody to nature is reminiscent of "a Fetishistic utterance in a Monotheistic setting" (TU 14: 141). This parallel between the Fetishistic and the Monotheistic might have been inspired by Comte's division of mankind's "theological" stage into to "fetishistic", "polytheistic", and "monotheistic" parts. Hardy referred to that division in his literary notebooks, see (TLN: 67, 73-74, 77-8).
Hardy’s career is that one whose instincts led him to construct a system of personal symbols” (1999: 40). Page’s references to Hardy reflect the novelist’s own statement: “The beauty of association is entirely superior to the beauty of aspect, and a beloved relative’s old battered tankard to the finest Greek vase” (1: 124).

The similitude between what is real and fictitious in literature is to be suggested, not simply served. A “fetish”, a thing, a reality in Hardy’s writing, is to provoke the impression of the whole, not to stand for it. Thus, the heath can be viewed, as Desmond Hawkins puts it, through Gabriel Oak’s “unempathic qualities that have a kinship with his native landscape” (1976: 53) and it is this kinship that makes an object from nature symbolically idealised. According to Hardy, a concrete object from reality, being first aesthetically appreciated and next emotionally penetrated by the author, might carry a greater dosage of generalisation than religiously understood the pantheist matter of the Universe. Under the influence of Comte’s “Social Dynamics” Hardy made a note: “The doctrine of Polytheism (Greeks) is less poetic than that of Fetishism (worship of material things), which could better idealise the External world” (TLN, 1: 67). The effects of the sensorial worshipping of material things are incorporated into textual signs whose referents have already lost any contact with reality and exist only in his language.

Joseph Hillis Miller, in his phenomenological work on Hardy, describes the specificity of the Author’s method:

Hardy’s writing is an indirect way of exploring the real world. It goes away from reality to try to return to it by a long detour, or to try to reveal the otherwise invisible nature of the real by means of the fictive. It attempts to reach reality by way of the imaginary, to close the gap between words and what words name or create. (1970: xii-xiv)
The objects of reality appear apparently usual: a rake is a rake, a sun is a sun, a hill is a hill. Yet, in Hardy’s prose these objects change into constellations of images, which symbolise reality in a “roundabout” way. Catherine Maxwell explains this method in regard to Hardy’s poetry:

“A substantial number of his poems work by a process of defamiliarization, in which the prosaic object presented to view is suddenly resituated or reviewed by the speaker in such a way that it ceases to be its banal everyday self and is permeated, or even subsumed and displaced, by the history, memories, impressions or associations it evokes. Such objects lose their matter-of-fact solidity and identity as they become uncanny. (2002: 514)

This way leads to the subjectification or poeticization of objects whose peculiar condition the author penetrates. In prose this is realised from the personal perspective of the characters or from the individual subjective perspective of the narrator. Interestingly, both perspectives can overlap when the narrator uses personal, poetical viewing of objects, as in the description of spring tokens in *The Woodlanders*:

> Spring weather came on rather suddenly, the unsealing of buds that had long been swollen accomplishing itself in the space of one warm night. The rush of sap in the veins of the trees could almost be heard. The flowers of late April took up a position unseen, and looked as if they had been blooming a long while, though there had been no trace of them the day before yesterday.

*(TW: 135)*

When the narrator reports on the wide variety of fruit available at Sherton Abbas market where Winterborne sells his cider, they are seen by Grace as “specimens of mixed dates, including the mellow countenances of streaked-jacks, codlins, costards, stubbards, ratherripes, and other well-known friends of her ravenous youth” *(TW: 175)*.

Dry nominal phrases do not signify different kinds of apples for the aim of
classification, but they create a list of recollections awaking in Grace’s memory while she looks at them. Although referring to external reality, signifiers are applied as symbols of the common experience which unites Winterborne and Grace. The apples are usual material objects taken from reality, but in the text they signify the unusual, personal context of their viewing evoked in a metonymic sequence of nouns; they thus stop meaning the objects themselves and change into “potent relics or catalysts” (Maxwell 2002: 514) of the writer’s visual memory.

When the writer employs literary metaphors he thus objectifies the context of real objects to transform them into cultural symbols: a pile of hurdles, which Giles Winterborne builds, is “like the altar of Cain” (TW: 224), the wind over the river “played on the tent-cords in Aeolian improvisations” (TMCB: 102), the long-tied espaliers in Henchard’s garden were “distorted and writhing in vegetable agony, like leafy Laocoons” (TMCB: 75), Clym’s hook and gloves are like “the St Lazarus rattle of the leper” (TRTN: 213).

Metaphors operating with classical names (Aeolian, Laocoon, St Lazarus, Cain) extend the significance of the objects by denying their material status and shifting them to the area of culture. This is language that articulates the reality of fiction from a cultural distance: the author sees reality through discourses drawing on the common cultural heritage. It includes other texts (quotations), ways of speaking (idioclects, sociolects), references to different areas of art. Actually, a thing, or a sign (signifier) ceases to be connected with its real equivalent (signified) and starts speaking with the voice of allusions which determine its textual meaning. The objects (hurdles, espaliers, hook and gloves) are immersed in the context of allusions while the sense of their materiality dilutes in the picture of fictionality. Hardy’s signifying practices aim at expressing reality impossible to be transformed into fiction in its empirical shape.
Materiality takes a new symbolic shape which replaces, not stands for, its real appearance.

What Hardy’s language actually leads to is an articulation of the object missing in the text but desired by the narrator. It was beautifully clarified by Dick experiencing the presence of Fancy through her absence, in the quotation from the motto. Mediating reality through its textual potential allows Hardy a thorough consideration of facts. Being affected by the materiality of facts, things, and also texts, Hardy seeks methods of their translation into his own language: struggling with the material is a factual experience, just as writing is a part of empirical reality before it will change into a cultural artefact. In the moment of writing, however, the facts detach from their empirical background and become interpreted as “more real than reality”, and thus become a fictional version of personal interpretation of “facts”. To decode them is to discover a new territory of reality realised in signs.

For Hardy “more real than reality” is not the metaphysical depth hiding behind the curtain of signs but a different, fictional, dimension of reality which consists of and speaks through signs. Hardy accepts that reality is impossible for the artist to express, but he also regarded it as the only reason of art. As he wrote in The Woodlanders: “Nay, from the highest point of view, to precisely describe a human being, the focus of a universe, how impossible” (TW: 24). By seeking methods to articulate the “impossible”, Hardy operates with a “distant” or “roundabout” poetic language which, through symbolical juxtapositions, opens an access to a new vision of reality, but never to its full understanding, the every thing which the realists hoped to achieve through objective almost scientific study.
Literary creation for Hardy is the objective process of naming reality in response to personal experience. This dialectical situation could be resolved on grounds of style. Style was to transmit and to justify individual understanding of the fact, which was to be presented faithfully but not necessarily realistically. Such an assumption can be examined with reference to the stance of Victorian aesthetes. According to Walter Pater, a writer transcribes his inward seeing of things into imaginative language and thus applies "an expression no longer of fact but of his sense of it, his peculiar intuition of a world, prospective, or discerned below the faculty conditions of the present, in either case changed somewhat from the actual world" (1958: 555). For Pater, "[L]iterary art, that is, like all art which is in any way imitative or reproductive of fact - form, or colour, or incident - is the representation of such fact as connected with soul, of a specific personality, in its preferences, its volition and power" (1958: 556).

According to Victorian aesthetes and to Hardy, literary art rejects factual imitation and opts instead for interpretation of facts. In this attitude, Hardy seems to share Matthew Arnold's opinion on the rôle of poetical expression. In his literary notes Hardy transcribed a relevant quotation from Arnold's "Maurice de Guérin": [T]he grand power of poetry is its interpretative power ...the power of so dealing with things as to awaken in us a wonderfully full, new, & intimate sense of them, [so that] we feel ourselves to have their secret" (TLN 1: 93). An impression of the facts, instead of their mere presentation, is supposed to speak more about reality than a detailed factual description of objectivists, yet for Hardy it can be gained from the intimate experience with reality, while for the contemporary aesthetes it is the intimacy of language itself that forges the directions for style. For Hardy, style should be the source of real emotions influencing life; for the aesthetes, it is a means of self-development and self-refinement detached from life (particularly the life of the lower classes).
Hardy still separates poetry from prose, just as Pater himself did, and in this respect seems to have more in common with the Victorian standpoint, with a clear distinction between the objectivity of prose and the subjectivity of poetry, than with the Modernists, who absorbed and merged both discourses into one of self-expression. Although it is commonly accepted that his prose is of great poetic value,\(^{12}\) in his novels Hardy wanted to remain just a storyteller who favoured an action, an event, and an adventure more than the privileging of psychology, motivation or inner monologue. His narration, however, was very close to poetry as it was supposed to reach “to the level of an illuminant of life” to be gained by “the aesthetic training insensibly given by familiarity with story which, presenting nothing exceptional in other respects, has the merit of being well and artistically constructed” (PW: 120). This illuminant message on reality was the effect of hard practice in style – not of the voice of the Muse or the Absolute.

In this attitude Hardy has much more in common with the aesthetes than with the post-Romantic philosophy of Modernism. His practical approach to writing does not mean, however, that he was a pragmatist relying on inexorable judgements of the mind against those of the heart. As Morton Dauwen Zabel writes: “casual vitality now appears inseparable from Hardy’s emphasis on the significance of chance and accidents in life. In his aesthetic morality it results in a defence of instinctive and emotional qualities above the intellectual” (1963: 28). Hardy could not approve of the Modernist programme because it postulated relinquishing the grid of a story in favour of expressing the “inner psychological soul” of the artist. The post-Romantic, poetic

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\(^{12}\) In his seminal essay, Davidson admits: “He wrote as a ballad-maker would write if a ballad-maker were to have to write novels; or as a bardic or epic poet would write if faced with the necessity of performing in the quasi-lyrical but nonsingable strains of the nineteenth century or later” (1963: 12).
method of self-creation, which typifies Modernist prose, lacked factual credibility for Hardy. He stayed closer to Arnold and Pater's notions of viewing reality through the prism of the author's personal understanding of the unpoetic facts from life instead of creating the poet's soul in language. It therefore appears that T. S. Eliot's critical opinion on Hardy's egoistic self-verbalisation does not seem quite relevant:

The work of Thomas Hardy represents an interesting example of a powerful personality uncurbed by any institutional attachments or by submission to any objective beliefs: unhampered by any ideas, or even by what sometimes acts as a partial restraint upon inferior writers, the desire to please a large public. He seems to me to have written as nearly for the sake of "self expression" as a man well can; and the self which he had to express does not strike me as a particularly wholesome or edifying matter of communication. He was indifferent even to the precepts of good writing. [...] In consequence of his self-absorption, he makes a great deal of landscape; for landscape is a passive creature which lends itself to an author's mood. (1955: 94)

Hardy's self cognition can be recognised as solipsistic, as Norman Page notes (1999: 38), yet it does not amount to a metaphysical manifestation of the self, but rather to pragmatics, and to the author's individual choice reflected in his style. The writer still favoured Newman's idea of the text as the lucid mirror of its author's mind and life, but he also accepted Pater's dictum that the writer is responsible for a literary transposition of reality (Buckler 1958: xi-xix). Pater explains that style does not depend only upon an artist's caprice, but also on his sincerity regarding the subject. This was an ethical consideration for the Victorian aesthetes: sincerity allowed the author to find the most appropriate technique of poetic expression and also allowed for the interpretation of the

For more on this matter see, for example: E. Goodheart (1957); J. O. Lawrence (1975); F. B. Pinion (1977); R. Chapman (1990).
actual world from a moral standpoint. In the name of "sincere" art the author wants to
fulfil his duty of writing the truth, even though it is not approved of and may even be
rejected by the readers.

It is not the truth of naturalists who transplanted into fiction the most basic
symptoms of life to attract the audience's attention to reality. Hardy's artistic
articulation of the truth refers to its critical interpretation. In his literary notes, Hardy
writes: "The end & aim of literature, if one considers it attentively is, in truth, a
criticism of life" (TLN I: 130). A writer, as a critic of life, must be objective or
"sincere", if he wants to be trustful. Being distant, however, is not proposed by realists
as an alternative to being indifferent towards or separated from the object. According to
Hardy a writer should feel the object. To be merely a commentator is to deny personal
engagement with the text. In this sense Hardy's objective criticism appears to be
extremely subjective: fiction is an effect of the writer's personal capability of expression
but its aim is to evoke a truth of life beyond individuality.

To obtain his objective and sincere point of view, Hardy quite often employs the
"hypothetical narrator", who is distanced from events but also specially equipped with
abilities which the omniscient narrator does not want to possess. In The Return of the

11 As Miller notes: "Though Hardy remains turned toward the exterior, looking at it or thinking about it,
his movement of retraction separates him from blind engagement and turns everything he sees into a
spectacle viewed from the outside" (1970: 4). "Blind engagement" could obscure a vision of the real
world. Hardy's critical observations went beyond personal ties with life. However, they had to be based
on individual experience first and undergo a critical analysis later. Miller separates Hardy's consciousness
as reflected in his novels from the writer's personal situation. This is to analyse the text in separation
from its epistemological involvement. Yet, as it is known from Hardy's Personal Writings, as well as
from his autobiography, the writer always emphasised and appreciated the experience of reality as a
stimulus for writing. His observation of reality seems to be very much "from the inside" but being
transcribed on the page they turn to a linguistic performance of which he himself is a creator and an
observer.
Native such a "third narrator's" hypothetical prospect is utilised as a justifying comment for the third person narrator's expression:

"The spirit moved them". A meaning of the phrase forced itself upon the attention; and an emotional listener's fetishistic mood might have ended in one or more advanced quality. It was not, after all, that the left-hand expanse of old blooms spoke, or the right-hand, or those of the slope in front; but it was the single person of something else speaking through each at once. (TRTN: 45-46)

In this quotation we can see how Hardy attributes the perspective of "an emotional listener", who feels and understands more than the narrator, to the "bigger" narrative plan, which was not clearly articulated, but only suggested. We can also recognise a metonymic relation between the particular object (single person) and its complete counterpart dispersed in the text's signs (through each at once). The commentary is multiplied by the different views involved in the scene; it is hard to determine who narrates the passage, and the use of quotation marks, enclosing a paraphrase from the Books of Judges (13:25), makes it even more ambiguous. The narrator comments on his own artistic activities ("a meaning of the phrase"), introducing a metatextual level into the text. This is not, however, a self-referential practice attracting the reader's attention from beyond the text, but rather another distancing practice which allows the author for the greater "sincerity" and objectivity to the theme. His narrator is simply one of the characters who plays his rôle in the text and cannot be analysed as a separate, external tool of the author.

Interestingly, the voice of the distant narrator determines the objective structure of narration which is, at the same time, subjectively poetised. The comments might come from other characters, such as the newcomer in *The Woodlanders*[^1] or from the narrator.

[^1]: "In her present beholder's mind the scene formed by the girlish spar-maker composed itself into an impression-picture of extremest type, wherein the girl's hair alone, as the focus of observation, was
who takes up the position of the omniscient observer, pointing at elements of the text as if they were objects or “fetishes” of his artistic manipulation. When the narrator speaks about Sue’s appearance, he refers to “a painter” who “might not have called her handsome or beautiful” (JO, II, 4: 98); when he considers the peculiarities of the landscape in *The Woodlanders* he compares them to “a sudden lapse from the ornate to the primitive on Nature” canvas” (TW: 51). His comments involve a cultural perspective which could be called external if it did not belong to the same discourse of the narrative. The eyes of the putative painter are the eyes of the narrator who penetrates both the empirical reality and the reality of fiction. Both perspectives, although distinguished by the objectifying distance, intermingle in the process of creating fiction. As it will be shown further in the thesis, in the world of Hardy’s fiction there is no difference between the cultural allusion, quotation and the language of the author. They all come from the common discourse accessible to the writer who treats the arts as the appearances of life.

By referring to the eyes of a “painter” or an “artist”, Hardy tries to make the object of his fiction not more artificial and distanced but more real and intimate, namely, more subjective. Yet textual allusions definitely forge a rhetorical distance between the narrative scene and the authorial view of it. Although it is a “foreign” perspective reserved by the other author (of a quotation, an allusion or the narrative comment), in the text this perspective becomes absorbed into and aligned with Hardy’s subjective narrative. The gap between them, however, is necessarily exposed since it projects an additional possibility for the narrative to articulate reality in artistic terms.

Quotations from *Jude* are indicated parenthetically by part numbers in Roman numerals, (followed by chapter and page numbers in Arabic numerals).
Dissemination of the narrative texture disrupts the coherence of the message and enables its multileveled interpretation, depending on the reader’s reading capability.

The reader seems to be a constitutive part of Hardy’s narration. Hardy’s reader is supposed to be independent enough not only to participate in the process of the interpreting his works, but also to find in the text his or her own individual version of reality presented:

Every intelligent reader with a little experience of life can perceive truth to nature in some degree; but a great reduction must be made for those who can trace in narrative the quality which makes the Apollo and the Aphrodite a charm in marble. Thoughtful readers are continually met with who have no intuition that such an attribute can be claimed by fiction, except in so far as it is included in style. (PW: 122)

According to both the Victorian aesthetes and Hardy, the writer might have followed his private impression of the world, but he also had to be aware of the moral effects of prose. Prose language, Hardy declares in his notebook, “must have a sound effect, if not what is called a good effect, upon a healthy mind” (PW: 118). The didactic aims of Victorian prose imposed some limits on the narration, which had to be both clear and educational (for example the bildungswoman of Charles Dickens, George Eliot, and Charlotte Brontë). Prose of this time was directed at particular groups of readers whose intellectual capacity was taken into account in advance, referred to by Michael Wheeler as “the reader-narrator contract” (1979: 25). It could be said that writing and reading were mutually dependent: a writer had to consider the possible reactions of the reader to his text, if he wanted to be understood; similarly, if the reader was not properly prepared, in other words, if he did not understand the language of the artist, the meaning of the text might become completely distorted or remain undiscovered. This could overthrow the ideology of communication focused on persuasion.
The reader was expected, as Newman put it, to be "intelligent" enough to grasp the author's ideas performed in the novel. This reciprocal kind of writer/reader "transaction" was to guarantee a correct reception of the text's message. This was a novel approach to the writer/reader relationship as far as nineteenth-century realistic poetics was concerned. Today we could say, recalling Umberto Eco's *Lector in fabulae*, that the presupposed participation of the reader in the act of communication determined the style of the sender. Hardy was using far from simplified methods for communicating the meaning, but he also knew that to accomplish his aim he had to be understood by the reader to whom the text was addressed (to the "healthy mind"). Therefore, it was necessary for the writer to take into consideration possible reactions of the reader to his text.

William Morgan compares Hardy's game with the reader to Henry Fielding's experiments that anticipate postmodern communication on a metatextual level (as later described by Barthes):

Just as Henry Fielding in the 1740's, perhaps intuiting that his audience would need some help in understanding and making sense of this new form, so appropriately named the *novel*, included incidental essays on character, plot and probability in *Joseph Andrews* and *Tom Jones*, and just as John Barth and other postmodern writers, intuiting that they are writing in a difficult later mode that requires skills many readers may not have, have included passages of meta-commentary in their work so as to establish a relationship between the readers' existing skills and expectations and the demands of their texts, so Hardy [...] has included passages of verse as a kind of course of instruction – worked into the very fabric of his fiction – in reading fiction such as his, fiction

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that is derived from and modelled upon poetry and that is therefore not to be read as one reads most fiction. (2000: 83)

Aware of the didactic and moral aims of fiction, Hardy, in contrast to other contemporary writers, endows his reader with interpretative freedom (unfortunately, however, not appreciated by the wider public) which went beyond the presupposed model of interpretation. Hardy postulated the idea of "imaginative reading" which revealed:

Generous imaginativeness, which shall find in a tale not only all that was put there by the author, but he it never so awkwardly, but which shall find there what was never inserted by him, never foreseen, never contemplated.

Sometimes these additions which are woven around a work of fiction by the intensitive [sic] power of the reader's own imagination are the finest parts of the scenery. (PW: 112)

Does this mean – as in Roland Barthes' critique – that Hardy's reader has the "right" to create a new text beyond the author's intention? The answer cannot be affirmative when we take into account the didactic norms of prose that Hardy believed in (to write the "truth" which should be discovered by a "healthy mind"). However, when we contemplate the aesthetic dimension of his art, we notice that the reader is invited to an interpretative game which exceeds the boundaries of a traditionally orientated communication. Hardy looks for "the appreciative, perspicacious reader" who "will see what his author is aiming at, and by affording full scope to his own insight, catch the vision which the writer has in his eye, and is endeavouring to project upon the paper, even while it half eludes him" (PW: 117). As a result of this statement and other excerpts from his personal writings it can be concluded that the stylistic techniques, which the author utilises, cannot be interpreted beyond his intentions. However, such an

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17 See: R. Barthes (1975)
attitude is not at all an obstacle to the process of interpretation. On the contrary: to seize the author's intentions, for Hardy, is to conceive a new picture of reality from its literary transcription.

As the quotation above demonstrates, Hardy insinuates that it is the reader's own imagination that influences the final meaning of the text. This is not to say that the reader has the right to an absolutely free response to the text. What Hardy offers his reader is the chance to detect a meaning which should be personally comprehended whilst also being initially inspired by the text. Yet, the text still remains a totality and the act of reading will not disrupt it. This is a perspective of reading in which the text implies the author's intentions articulated at a particular historical moment. However, the interpretative result should be free from any historical bounds, since it also addresses any subsequent receiver and his or her time of reading and his or her moment of existence. Reading is supposed to be a dialogue between a writer and a reader, or, in other words, a process of revealing what is only to happen in the very personal process of interpretation.

Although representation is only a vehicle of meaning, it is also the source of a momentary and quite relevant impression of "truth" which is to be discovered by the reader. The writer suggests the way of understanding his text but it is the reader who takes responsibility for the final effect of reading. This is a personal response to the text, which was not typical in Hardy's time and dissociates his art from the realist convention.

TEXT

According to the semiotic theories of Tzvetan Todorov (1968), Roland Barthes (1972), Philippe Hamon (1973), and Jonathan Culler (1975), it is only the use of language, which produces verisimilitude. There are special methods to guarantee the reader's trust
in the plausibility of realist narration. First, the world of fiction must be delineated by
conventions of perception; as Culler (1988) elucidates, it must be tamed by some
acceptable effects of *vraisemblance*. The reader who is accustomed to and familiar with
literature knows what to expect from realistic prose and cannot be surprised with a
description of a milk-farm scanned from the bird's-eye view of *Tess of d'Urbervilles*:\(^{18}\)
which is, in fact, ruled by the author's trajectory of perception. The audience willingly
participates in the act of fictionalising the reality and commonly accepted various
techniques of verisimilitude, knowing that the writer's knowledge determines the image
of the world in the novel.

The most popular "support-schemes" of that time included half-opened doors
enabling a narrator to peep into the room,\(^ {19}\) the super-sight of a hero distinguishing far-
distanced objects, extra-sensory hearing of a commentator, the loud speech of

\(^{18}\) "The bird's eye perspective before her was not so luxuriantly beautiful, perhaps, as the other one which
she knew so well; yet it was more cheering. It lacked the intensely blue atmosphere of the rival vale, and
its heavy soils and scents; the new air was cleaner, bracing, ethereal. The river itself, which nourished the
grass and cows of these renowned dairies, flowed not like the streams in Blackmoor. These were slow,
silent, often turbid; flowing over beds of mud into which the incautious wader might sink and vanish
unawares. The Froom waters were clearer as the pure River of Life shown to the Evangelist, rapid as the
shadow of a cloud, with pebbly shallows that prattled to the sky all day long. There the water-flower was
the lily; the crowfoot here." (TU: 139-140).

\(^{19}\) In *The Return of the Native*, the child views the interior of Diggory's van: "He skirted the gravel-pit at a
respectful distance, ascended the slope, and came forward upon the brow, in order to look into the open
doors of the van and see the original of the shadow. The picture alarmed the boy" (TRTN: 61).

From the profusion of examples of similar "realistic effects" in the nineteenth-century novel, Charlotte
Brontë's are perhaps the most convincing. The narrator of *Villette* explains: "As the study was opposite
the breakfast-room, the doors facing across the passage, my eye followed her" (Brontë 1853: 21).
protagonists, special positions or objects of observation,\textsuperscript{20} extra characters describing the surrounding: a still patient commenting on the speedy action around him, a stranger observing the landscape or heroes to be introduced.\textsuperscript{21} All these figures extend the omnipotence of the narrator and guarantee the mimetic reliability of the fiction.\textsuperscript{22} Hardy widely used all these techniques, and was quite aware that the real in fiction is only the \textit{effect of reality},\textsuperscript{23} to use Barthes's term, worked out in the process of the signifying practice. What was different in his writing was the semantic effect of the narrative “support-schemes” directed towards verisimilitude. Although applied in a classical way, they supersede the realist picture by contributing to the subjective seeing of the scene which in this way becomes distorted, estranged, and deviated from the real. These devices, by the Russian Formalists classified under defamilirisation, or ‘making strange’. today are believed to be the essence of the literary, but in Hardy’s time they

\textsuperscript{20} Marty South standing in the garden was able to hear a long dialogue between Mrs. and Mr. Melbury who were inside, and she observed their figures through the darkness being lit by a candlelight (see the original: TW: 17-20).

In \textit{Under the Greenwood Tree} Dick Dewy was put on the spot by the narrator: “Having come more into the open he could now be seen rising against the sky, his profile appearing on the light background like a portrait of a gentleman in black cardibard. It assumed the form of a low-crowned hat, an ordinary-shaped nose, an ordinary chin, an ordinary neck, and ordinary shoulders. What he consisted of further down was invisible from lack of sky low enough to picture on him” (UTGT: 34).

An enumerate description of Fancy Day in the same novel was preceded by the narrator’s explanation: “We gain a good view of our heroine as she advantag es to her place in the ladies’ line” (UTGT: 71).

\textsuperscript{21} In the second chapter of \textit{The Woodlanders} Marty South appears, described in detail by the narrator through Mr. Percomb’s eyes. This description is justified by the narrator: “On this one bright gift of time to the particular victim of his now before us the newcomer’s eyes were fixed” (TW: 11).

\textsuperscript{22} Particularly on that techniques in realistic works see: N. Schor (1969); J. P. Richard (1970); J. Kupper (1986).

seemed inappropriate for the realist genre demanding the empirical verisimilitude and plausibility.

When we consider Hardy's narration we can discern several patterns that function together to create the credible picture of Wessex, patterns such as characters, plots, events, descriptions, or languages. It has been widely discussed how exact and faithful this world is in relation to Dorchester and Dorset and how the plots, even those seeming the most incredible, actually incorporate authentic stories from real life.\(^2\) It is important to state once again, that knowing its weight as a literary effect, Hardy intentionally produced *vraisemblance*, but, in doing so, he estranged against rather than contributed to a normative background of realistic poetics. By incorporating in abundance signals referring to real people, places, and facts recognisable in his native county, Hardy actually creates a completely different world grounded on linguistic practices. In chapter three of this thesis I will try to explore this relationship between the fictional and the real in more depth.

Now, it is necessary to say that portraits of Hardy's heroes and detailed descriptions of the local geography, although anchored in a familiar reality of the Dorset County, do not carry any ontological similarity with the original sources of Hardy's inspiration. They are all literary statements entitled to serve as 'true' by force of the realist convention. Therefore, as will be analysed further, all literary allusions or complex intertextual figures, which supply the transfer of the real into the text, in Hardy's novel do not aspire to effect with universal significance (Springer 1983), but rather they reveal the writer's concern with the act of literary communication itself. For example, Grace Melbury's personal disaster caused by her husband's betrayal is assessed by the narrator to be as "old as the hills, which, with more or less variation,

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\(^2\) See for example: B. C. A. Windle (1902); C. J. Weber (1965); D. Kay-Robinson (1972); M. Williams (1972).
made a mourner of Ariadne, a by-word of Vashti, and a corpse of Amy Dudley” (TW: 223). An elaborate range of references encompassing everyday cliché, Greek mythology, the Bible, and the real story of Robert Earl of Leicester’s wife, overwhelm a description of Grace’s realistic tragedy with heavy cultural heritage breaking the boundaries of her ‘case’ with the effect of sarcasm, if not black humour.

However, from an artistic point of view, such a device is also an attempt at *vraisemblance*, whereas from the ontological standpoint, Tomas Pavel sees in it a process of “conventional framing” which forges a pathway between reality and culture:

This label is designed to cover an ensemble of devices, both stylistic and semantic, which project individuals and events into a certain kind of perspective, set them at a comfortable distance, elevate them to a higher plane, such that they may be easily contemplated and understood. In short, granted the two-level structure of our cultural organization, conventional framing consists in moving individuals from the level of actuality to the culturally mediated level. (1983: 86)

Pavel describes a two-level structure of human culture constituted by the experience both of what is real (outer reality) and of what is fictional (myths, texts, legends, traditions). Although these two worlds influence each other, fiction is isolated by the limits of belief, by the physical place of a reader, and by the representational borders of an "object", and this affects the condition of living in reality – it creates culture. In Arnold’s “Literature and Dogma” we come across an illuminating remark on that relation as effected by the process of urbanisation and social atomisation. In his preface, Arnold writes that, particularly in his time, “culture is indispensably necessary, and culture is reading” (1968: 162; Arnold’s emphasis). Further Arnold adds a warning to this statement: “but reading with a purpose to guide it, and with system”. As *Jude the Obscure* demonstrates, it is actually the “system” exercised and promoted by Oxford
that refuses Jude an education. Being itself absurdly hypocritical and deranged, the systematised culture informs other cultural artefacts, such as *Jude*, participating in the maintenance and reproduction of social and political power which controls, as Arnold wants it, a purpose of reading.

Hardy understands Arnold’s claim from the position of a writer who is exposed to texts within and by the system. From a textual perspective Hardy’s novel would be a map of knowledge acquired by the writer through the process of formal and self-education. He was aware that producing culture was the reproducing of texts, and he felt the limitations on the work imposed by that correlation. However, he also understood that a literary work of art, although constructed from other texts, might enrich the existential experience which takes place in a concrete space, and, on the other hand, it might also influence fiction. We are here concerned with the mutual mediation between both territories. It seems that Pavel’s concern with the ontological difference between fiction and reality can be related to the ontology of Hardy’s text, where an analogical transmission of the elements of both worlds (fiction and reality) takes place.

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5 By ‘Hardy’s knowledge’, I mean his knowledge of language (texts), both written texts and told stories, as Mary Rimmer indicates:

Yet Hardy himself seems to have seen no absolute divide between the lived and the learned, the rural and the urban, the oral and the written. […] As Hardy navigated his passages between these separate but connected worlds [the town and the city], he made increasing use of notebooks for collecting and storing quotations and observations, and of printed anthologies. On both counts he was very much of his age. (2000: 60).

The critic argues (heavily influenced by Michael Wheeler, the author of a 1979 study *The Art of Allusion in Victorian Fiction*) on the aim of the typical use of quotations in the Victorian epoch. Her remarks on Hardy’s atypical use of anthologies and treasuries are very illuminating. She notes that Hardy’s aim in his use of quotations is not to reinforce the deteriorating security of the age, but rather to undermine it.
As the contemporary reception of Hardy's prose proves, it is still conceivable to read the Wessex saga beyond its factual determinacy. The reason for the constant validity of these texts (their timelessness) is the symbolic representation of the "object". Hardy's texts can still aspire to social consciousness according to the appearance (and disappearance) of its natural, empirical artefacts. In the process of literary mediation between reality and fiction, the latter becomes an independent, self-reliant web of signs. The articulating structure does not want to be melted away and read as the "object", but instead adopts the names of the objects – referents – to create a reliable version of reality. This process of *defamiliarization* (through symbolical alternations) is supported by *defragmentation*: transplanting the real "objects" from the empirical world into a new semiotic background.26

One important and quite effective technical method of *defragmentation* was through the use of widely known texts from the archive of literature, as well as idiolects and sociolects from the archive of social memory.27 The "real" in Hardy's novels is quite often grounded in everyday language acquired from his own observation. As the writer said himself in an interview for "The Pall Mall Gazette":

> All that I know about our Dorset labourers I gathered from living in the country as a child and from thoroughly knowing their dialects. You cannot get the labourer otherwise. Dialect is the only pass-key to anything like intimacy.

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26 In traditional realistic prose the aim of these operations was to imitate an isolated fragment of reality. The fragment, referred to here as the articulated structure, was hidden in language. Such a process was to convince the reader that fiction was the ideal imitation of the "object"—that it could even stand for the object. This caused the referent to disconnect its designate, and deprived the referent of a symbolic distance in the process of semiotic transmission. It was proposed in the first part of this argument that Hardy managed to avoid that gap by juxtaposing the context and the signified.

27 On the use of dialects and literary discourses in Hardy's writing see: P. Ingham (1971); D. Taylor (1993); A. R. Cooper (1994).
I would not preserve dialect in its entirety, but I would extract from each
dialect those words that have no equivalent in standard English and then use
them; they would most valuable, and our language would be greatly enriched
thereby. (TH &HR: 156)^38

Two conclusions can be drawn: first, for Hardy language was a means of knowing
people ("intimacy") who later become his characters; second, that literature might
protect language by means of imitation.

This second approach is probably the most characteristic of the majority of
Hardy criticism, where the writer’s imitative practices are perceived in terms of his
moral mission to regenerate and preserve Dorset dialects. Raymond Chapman follows
this approach in his consideration of the influence William Barnes had upon the writer:

From Barnes Hardy derived the belief that Dorset dialect had the status of an
old system of language in its own right and should not be considered merely a
development from a new national standard. It was with this conviction that he
brought rustic conversation into his poems and novels, and invested it with the
dignity of his total vision. (1990: 28)

The dignity Hardy affords to local speech is an effect of his artistic interpretation of
Dorset reality. What is transported from reality obtains fictitious status in the novel, and
the author is a mediator of that alternation. However, the presence of dialectical
expression in the novel’s representation increases its objective value in the mimetic
sense. The local vocabulary as social parole guarantees successful communication with
a reader immersed in the same environment. Fragments from the southern dialects can
be treated as quotations which do not require the reader’s education to be recognised.
They are accepted as true automatically, in the way that clichés or gnomic assertions are
believed. Although idiolects do not belong to the common discourse, they are identified

^38 Interview with Thomas Hardy for The Pall Mall Gazette, 2 January 1892. Reprinted in TH&HR: 156.
as factual on the basis of the genuine linguistic performance of the author.\textsuperscript{29} Being considered quotations from nature, idiolects anchor the representation of the novel in the reality of the reader. As a consequence, they play a mimetic function on the one hand, and facilitate communication on the other.\textsuperscript{30}

In addition to oral quotations, Hardy often employed literary quotations derived from both classical and contemporary texts. Quotations are used as mottoes, epigraphs, or narrative statements. Where they are commonly known items, when they are drawn from the current social discourse known to the reader, they work towards sharpening the mimetic effects of Hardy's prose.\textsuperscript{31} On the other hand, however, quotations may also deprive the text of its \textit{vraisemblance}, either when they lose their cultural validity and thus disrupt the reading, or when their graphic marking is perceived as the author's explicit participation in the text's production. In the latter case, the fabric of language is drawn aside to show the ontology of the text to be different from imitated reality.

\textsuperscript{29} Peter Widdowson discusses the "ruralising" process which Hardy undertakes by using idiolects, dialects and real names to symbolise the reality of Wessex. The critic refers to Hardy's \textit{General Preface} where Hardy used the term "ruralising" in the sense of protecting the disappearing world of the countrymen (1989: 55-59). Harold Williams argues that it was Hardy's aim to keep alive all "the older ways, the older thought, the old wisdom, speech and humour" of that world (1970: 429).

For more on Hardy's interest in the rural lifestyle see: M. Williams (1972).


\textsuperscript{31} Herman Meyer, in his seminal work on quotation, accents the communicative rôle of a quotation:

"Precisely in the case of quotation it is of decisive significance whether there exists a literary and cultural background which the author shares with his public and to which he can appeal with full confidence that it will be understood. The quotation thus becomes an important indication for literary sociology, because in it the extent and nature of the literary culture of the public is reflected" (1968: 13).
Nevertheless, such a “risk” does not hinder realists from over-using quotations, primarily as a means of ethically asserting the text's reliability.

Quotations belong to that sphere which Pavel calls cultural, where all effects of fictionalisation meet. Within a literary work, these effects converge in the form of textual exchange. Different texts' elements, which have already contributed to the cultural (textual) archive, become active and remodelled. In Hardy’s writing this process responds to intercultural, or intertextual distribution. To clarify: literature renders the outer reality which has already contained its cultural level. Reality thus offers its own appearances to the writer, and those appearances contain texts. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that Hardy discerned every discursive practice as textualised. Literature can take from reality, but at the same time, in the act of writing and, subsequently, in the act of reading, that reality is supposed to be expanded, or just reinterpreted, or as Hardy would say re-experienced.

For Hardy, the ontology of reality and the ontology of culture remain distinct, but the effect of their meeting can be felt as a unified, existential experience. Using “other” texts – known today by such names as the antecedent, former, anterior, predecessor, or hipotexts – Hardy meant an operation which takes place in life, not in the abstract intertextual space. Although today we can call his adaptations of other texts an intertextual exchange of discourses from the literary archive, for the author of *Jude the Obscure* writing did not just mean the recycling of different texts.

According to Hardy, literature, like any other kind of art, has also its ethical claims and cannot be considered beyond existence. Even when we consider quotations, which are obviously "other" texts, we discover the double nature of their application:

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32 Hardy’s philosophy of literature was related to the Victorian idea of referential language derived from the classical ontology of representation. Hardy was still inclined to divide culture and nature as this allowed him to delineate the borders of text, and to protect his own position as a knowing subject.
they typographically signify the external source, only to neutralize their affiliation on the level of representation (which should be considered a separate reality with its own ethical status). Likewise, in Pavel’s theory, textual culture enters literature but literature also participates in life and conceives textual culture. The process of mutual fertilisation blurs the border between them whilst also providing material for another combination or mediation of their elements. Being aware of that constant exchange, Hardy himself trusted culture more than he trusted blind and chaotic nature. In his autobiography Hardy wrote:

An object or mark raised or made by man on a scene is worth ten times any such formed by unconscious Nature. Hence, clouds, mists, and mountains are unimportant beside the wear on a threshold, or the print of a hand. (PW: 120)

Hardy’s approach has more in common with the theory of art as expressed by Oscar Wilde who stated that it is art that determines life. In “The Decay of Lying”, the author of The Portrait of Dorian Gray elevates art to the ideal:

My own experience is that the more we study Art, the less we care for Nature. What Art really reveals to us is Nature’s lack of design, her curious crudities, her extraordinary monotony, her absolute unfinished condition. Nature has good intentions, of course, but as Aristotle once said, she cannot carry them out. When I look at a landscape I cannot help seeing all its defects. It is fortunate for us, however, that Nature is so imperfect, as otherwise we should have no art at all. Art is our spirited protest, our gallant attempt to teach Nature her proper place.

(1968: 165)

Art for both Hardy and Wilde is an aesthetically grounded performance. Neither for Wilde nor Hardy is there any form of first, bare, innocent fact which could be presented as “real” in language. While for Wilde there is art which imitates life, for Hardy it is life which provides the stimulus and motivation for art. Hardy does not deny that life is real...
and that reality does possess its empirical dimension, but he is also aware that “facts” lose their original factuality when they undergo symbolic transformation into art.

It is thus not art that Hardy wants to render in fiction, but it is instead reality that is worth being transformed into fiction. Therefore, although he is much aware of the aesthetic weight of language, Hardy does not represent the philosophy of modernist aestheticism as it developed within the Victorian novel. Hardy uses language to tell mimetically reliable stories which on an allegorical level infringe the validity of realism. His language is still capable of communicating the world in realistic terms, but it does not necessarily conform to nineteenth-century Realism. Through his signifying practices Hardy does not describe reality per se, but rather reality as determined by convention. For Hardy it is not possible to reach reality beyond the conventions that determine all seeing and writing about facts.

Thus, as *Jude the Obscure* demonstrates, in the creative process a page, a book, a sign, a memory becomes a new “fact”, and subsequently the referent to another representation. It is this that is regarded by Pavel as the constant exchange between culture and nature. There is always the light of subjective interpretation (impression) in which life is immersed, and also of other works of art which inform life.

Signs in Hardy’s language do not refer directly to reality but to the mediative mode that underpins it. This is the mode that Hardy wants his reader to discern, not the specific facts of reality. *Jude the Obscure* reflects this mediative condition of reality which both absorbs culture and produces culture. Hardy, as with many other innovative writers (François Rabelais, Miguel Cervantes, Jonathan Swift, Laurence Stern, Henry Fielding), is aware of the caveats of this process and he incorporates it into his work as an aesthetic effect of his style. By detaching the aesthetic representation of reality (signifier) from reality as such (signified), he departed from the mimetically-oriented conventions of Realism and moved towards the anti-mimetic philosophy of Modernism.
Although generically different, Hardy's writing bridges the achievements of such modern writers as Virginia Woolf, Henry James and James Joyce. It should be noted, however, that all of these writers, regardless of their revolutionary narrative techniques, belong to the last generation of Realists who trusted language as a medium of articulation. Although *Jude the Obscure* overcomes the weakness of language through irony and distance, the novel does not relinquish the desire of voicing life. Hardy's metatextual narration turns against classical mimesis and thus escapes the conventions of Realism, but yet it does not endorse the transcending insignificance of language devised by twentieth-century Modernism.

In this thesis I will attempt to demonstrate how Hardy's writing materialises an awareness of the traditional restrictions of mimesis, but this awareness is camouflaged in the form of a classical story. This dialectical problem will be studied through the poetics of quotation in *Jude the Obscure* (1895), Hardy's final novel, which offers an incrustation of classical and contemporary quotation in an unanticipated abundance.

This is how Norman Page summarises the reception of Hardy's quotations to date:

> In general they have had a bad press, generations of readers from the contemporary reviewers onwards complaining about their incongruity and intrusiveness. Certainly there are many instances hard or impossible to defend, when the intensity of the fictional moments seems to be injured or even dispelled by the interpolated parade of extraneous knowledge. (1992: 42)

It is very true that the "incongruity and intrusiveness" of ubiquitous quotations might disturb the fluency of the narration and distract the reader. Indeed, Hardy's quotations when perceived as foreign belongings from external sources impede rather than

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13 Henceforth referred to within the text as *Jude*. 
facilitate reading. However, when we consider them from a stylistic perspective, we can see that the presence of quotations is crucial to the text's poetics.

In Jude Hardy unveils his understanding of the mediative character of literary texts, and fabricates an allegorical picture of the artistic and socio-ideological self-delusion as experienced by nineteenth-century society. The use of quotations in Jude reflects the ideological constraints imposed on his society and, at the same time, deconstructs the ideological force underlying the artistic conventions of the novel. Through the poetics of quoting, Hardy criticises the repetitive and subservient mode of imitation characteristic of institutionalised, ideologically determined culture. Jude's universe is structured from texts that signify the characters' manners of communication, their feelings, moods of perception, and ways of cognition. Texts determine their narrative position in the novel, but at the same time point to the textualised constitution of external reality. As Ramón Saldivar observes, intertexts in Jude inform the realistic plot, but they also deconstruct it on a metatextual level:

Just as language is constituted through repetitions, so does Jude's life acquire a narratable consistency. But the symbolic "inscription" of Jude's desires upon the surface of Wessex as he travels its roads from Christminster to Shaston, to Aldbrickham and back again, constitutes only provisional creation of meaning through a process of deferment". (2002: 37-38)

This "process of deferment" is aimed at revealing the ethical unreliability of mimetic language. However, this is not conveyed directly through anti-mimetic poetics, but just the reverse, through allegory which rests on the imitation of mimetic gestures derived from other texts. Yet it is precisely this technique of imitating imitation that disrupts the truth of representation.
This poetical device signifies the most ambiguous aspect of Hardy’s narrative: its ironic substance. This aspect of Hardy’s quoting is rarely recognised by critics. Irony generated by the use of quotation in Jude, although not obvious, extols the double identity of the text, or, in other words, the dialectical, dynamic tension between the text and the static representational unity seen in “Romantic mystifications of poetic individuality and organic whole” (Valdes and Miller 1985: xvi). Interestingly, the intertextual poetics of overt quotation both undermines and enables the realistic representation of the novel. Through the names of the authors and the use of typographical marks Hardy mimetically addresses the “common phenomenal world” (Lodge 1977: 40) and yet, through the ironic context, he refuses the mimetic credibility of his own texts. In Jude we observe the recapitulation of the ironic effect within different poetics of quotation, not only metonymic, but also metaphoric and symbolic. They together provide a critical pattern of reading that emerges from separated elements of the narrative. As Wheeler observes: “Even widely separated quotations from and references to the same adopted text can have an accumulative effect, later allusions reactivating earlier allusions” (1979: 161). When read in relation to each other in Jude, intertexts unveil their allegorical sense which establish the novel as proto-modernist in its capacity to play impish word-games and its tendency to the bitterly sardonic quip and darkly playful jibe.

Hardy’s use of quotations is underpinned by an irony that disarms the ethical sense of quoting. Through his ironic distance, or his ‘game’ with quotations, the writer undertakes a critique of imitation (mimesis), imitation understood as the effect of the work of the dominant ideologies of his time, which today can be understood in a Foucauldian sense – as dominant discourses. In Jude the reliability of both Romantic

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and Realistic discourse is thrown into question. Hardy denies the reliability of the Romantic belief in the metaphysical power of the Letter, but he also satirises the mimetic approach to literature inherited by Realism after Plato. His critical approach is articulated through a dialogical narration conferring overt, “material” quotations with other “non-material”, or “structural” discourses framed in the text (Plett 1991: 7).

Overt quotations reveal direct relations between texts, whereas structural quotations indicate associations with ideological rules, codes, conventions, and narrative structures. Plett suggests that structural intertextuality is “a precondition for the constitution of classes and sub-classes of texts” (1991: 7), thus it can be any literary code, such as the genre or style, which polemically develops motifs from another texts, or a narrative structure such as plot or character which is incorporated into a new context as analogy or contrast. For example, the plot in Jude can be compared to all those narrative structures in which the hero develops emotionally and intellectually from a naïve state of innocence to painful maturity, where he reconsiders his initial ideals and experiences disappointment. There is a wide range of texts, derived not only from Realism, which could respond to such a narrative pattern.

As a result of mediation between discourses it is possible to find relationships between virtually all texts. One could say, particularly from the approach of the Yale school of intertextuality (influenced by deconstruction), that the effect of such an approach is the creation of a text without borders which is constantly changing in response to every reader. This is an infinite process of structuralising the text’s meaning. As Barthes observes:

The text is experienced only in an activity, in a production. It follows that the text cannot stop (for example, at a library shelf); its constitutive moment is traversal (notably, it can traverse the work, several works). (1986: 58)

This is true provided that we do not seek a definition of the “intertext”. Deconstruction puts questions, but does not seek the answers; it moves constantly from one text to
another, enriching the context of the text through the reading of other texts. For Barthes and Derrida the aim of interpretation is deconstruction: total reinterpretation that deprives the text of its identity. On the other hand, as Plett notes:

> The intertext runs the risk of dissolving completely in its interrelations with other texts. In extreme cases exchanges its internal coherence completely for an external one. Its total dissolution makes it relinquish its beginning, middle and end. It loses its identity and disintegrates into numerous text particles which only bear an extrinsic reference. (1991: 6)

In my reading of *Jude* I will try to rebuild the figurative sense of the relationships between quotations and the text, within the text's closed poetics. Thus an orthodox definition of intertextuality, as the unlimited context of meanings, does not apprehend my analysis of the overtly signified intertext, such as quotations, allusions or mottoes. My method is closer to the stylistic intertextuality of Riffaterre who, in fact, excludes quotations and allusions from the area of obligatory intertextuality. This is how Riffaterre distinguishes intertexts: “It would be wrong to confuse the intertext with allusion or quotation, for the relation between these and text is aleatory – identification depends upon the reader’s culture – while the relation of text to presuppositions is obligatory since to perceive these we need only linguistic competence” (1980: 627-628). In this thesis, however, I will argue that quotations, as signs typographically

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35 With regard to Hardy’s prose, but from a historical perspective, Raymond Chapman introduces an analogous distinction, which reveals the essential rôle of the cultural affiliation of the reader. Although unintentional, Chapman’s comments point to the limitations of a one-to-one type of intertextuality (represented by an overt quotation), which, being historically determined, does not permit the reader from beyond the cultural circle a full understanding of the text; analysed textually, this form of intertextuality does not enable free interpretation:

> “Direct quotation from another writer, set as an isolated feature of the text, is rather different from allusion or from quotations attributed to characters. It was a practice more acceptable to
marked by the author, have a far deeper allegorical significance in the text’s poetics. At the same time, quotations will be analysed as metonymies of their obvious referents: the sources evoked from the intertextual space.

Being graphically marked, quotation is conspicuously visible and cannot be ignored. Its difference disrupts the narrative space and demands a different way of reading. However, this is precisely why Hardy decided to highlight his quotations (either through quotation marks or indentation), although in many later editions of the novel these graphic signifiers were omitted. I propose that the reason for this lies in the traditional exclusion of quotation from poetical tropes and thus its graphical marks are not treated as part of the text’s semiotics. I will try to show that the use of such graphical marks in Jude is far from accidental. Hardy’s earlier novels, such as Under the Greenwood Tree (1872) and Far From the Madding Crowd (1874), were devoid of quotations, operating rather with allusions. In contrast, in Tess of the D’Urbervilles (1891), The Mayor of Casterbridge (1886) and Jude (1895), the narration is lavishly endowed with quotations to show the writer’s poetical inventiveness.

By the time of writing Jude, Hardy was a very self-aware and mature writer who seized competently upon the moral and aesthetic weight of literary matter. Only with Jude did he decide to make that knowledge a virtue of its own. It can be seen in Jude that quoting plays a critical rôle allegorically articulated, as Barbara Hardy notes: “The novel becomes reflexive as fiction and as fable” (2000: 73). The act of quoting aids the Victorian reader, who would enjoy the recognition of the words, and respond to the feeling which had made the author choose them. Even if we now find the practice less natural in a work of fiction, we should not underestimate the importance of that vast corpus of material which we call English Literature in shaping our ideas and the language in which we frame them. It is not only the literary scholar who is influenced, perhaps unconsciously, by this national possession. For the Victorians, as we have seen, familiarity with classical literature was as great or perhaps even greater” (1990: 55).
mimetic plot and deconstructs it within the intertextual structure of the novel. Whether it was an intentional technique by the writer or not is an open question.

The reader might choose between an ethical interpretation of quotations or their aesthetic structure. The narration is constructed in such a way as to permit such a "double" reading, although the use of graphical marks seem to endorse this two-fold perspective as intended by the writer. Consequently, this double perspective of the novel, intertextual and representational, can be recognised within two levels of the novel's narration: the level of meaning and the level of significance. Riffaterre explains this difference (quoting directly from p.8 of E. D. Hirsch's 1967 work, *Validity of Interpretation*):

I shall speak of meaning when words signify through their one-to-one relationship with non-verbal references, that is, their reference to what we know as reality. I shall speak of significance when these same words signify through their relationship with structural invariants (no one-to-one relationship this time since there must be two or more variants for one variation).

(Riffaterre 1980: 625-626)

In a footnote to this passage, Riffaterre adds an important observation:

As I see it, significance is the product of a second reading stage, and in the bipolar relationship between meaning and significance, meaning appears as the continuously changing pole. (1980: 626)

The second method of reading *Jude*, engaging the relations between all signs of representation, reveals the allegorical context of the novel's discourse. The effect of their intersemiotic dialogue is understood here as an allegory of intertextuality which assigns Hardy's critical approach to the mediative role of language. It is inscribed in the metatextuality of graphical signs which simultaneously create the meaning of the quoting act as a sign of imitation. The poetical figure of quoting, which I term the
‘stylistic thematisation of reference’, reflects Hardy’s recognition of the illusory authority of language and its textual artefacts. In order to argue the double perspective of the novel’s representation, mimetic and anti-mimetic, I will interpret both the technical aspects of quoting and the semantic meaning of the act in the context of the novel. This simultaneous approach will allow me to observe the quotation as a poetical device motivated by its extratextual origin: the poetic role of a quotation will be analysed in relation to the mimetic value of representation and to the intertextual position of the source from which the quotation derives.

However, in making explicit its claim to a one-to-one relation with the pre-text, quotation is excluded from that aspect of intertextuality that permits an unlimited number of referential combinations between the sign and its referent. Intertextuality, by definition, is a work of “fragments in open and endless relations with other texts” (Preminger 1993: 620). Nevertheless, as a trope, quotation submits to the intertextual play in which the whole text participates. In other words, a quotation is a poetical device which contributes to the text’s style, while the style is affected by intertextual processes and political ideologies. Thus the metonymic reference between the text and the external world is a poetical figure whose meaning has been produced from other texts. Although the relation between the source and the quotation is historically determined (a pre-text is already written), it is the question of selection, the ideological moment of choosing the quoted pre-text, which informs the intertextual status of the text. Ultimately, it is not the quotation mark that confirms the intertextuality of the novel (even if it is overfilled with graphic pointers to external sources), but the poetical attitude to the quotation recognised within the text.

In my analysis, intertextuality, by post-structural semiotics defined as the unconscious absorption and transformation of other texts (Kristeva 1986) to be
Independently reinterpreted by the reader (Barthes 1973), will be regarded not as a method of interpretation, but rather as a theme of the novel interpreted from a metatextual perspective. After Gérard Genette, I will define metatextual language as the symbolic effect produced between a sign and the meaning, which in Jude emerges in the allegory of intertextuality embodying Hardy's criticism toward the discursive forms of language. According to Genette, metalanguage is "a discourse that takes shape in the wake of a previous discourse [...] when a figurative expression replaces a literal one" (1982: ix). In Hardy's novel, the literal discourse encompasses a realistic story, while the metatextual commentary refers to its intertextual structure. In my interpretation while drawing upon both the post-structural semiotics and traditional poetics, I also argue analytical insufficiency of both schools. In the semiotic school all signs in the text are treated in the same way: all signs are poetically equal and thus diffused in the text's semantics. In semiotic interpretations a quotation mark does not carry any specific poetical value and thus loses its poetical position. Traditional historical poetics, on the other hand, by enclosing quotation among external sources and influences, separated it from the text and also deprived it of strictly poetical significance.

In my argument, it is not the quotation itself, but more specifically the act of quoting which plays the semantic rôle in the text. However, this rôle is directly connected to the external referent of the quotation that enters the text through a particular interpretative mode utilised by the author. Thus intertextuality does not refer to the presence of quotations in the text, but rather to the techniques of citation; in other words, intertextuality becomes apparent not through what is cited, but through how it is cited. However, the focal point of this analysis is the 'foreignness' of quotation that

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creates its metatextual significance in relation to both the intratextual (semantic) and intertextual (intersemiotic) context.

This multileveled structure of the poetics of quotation engages several diverse methods of interpretation. Firstly, the textual approach, which explores the ideological circumstances of the choice of quotation as determined by the authoritative discourses of the epoch. Secondly, the stylistic approach, which displays the semantic meaning of intertextuality. Thirdly, the psychoanalytical, which demonstrates how the identity of the text is put into question through the act of writing.

By subjecting all signs of representation (including quotation marks) to analysis, I will reveal the dialogical connections between them. I argue that the plot, the characters, the poetical figures, and also individual words and phrases all produce the significance of the novel in response to the patterns from the intertextual space. These various clusters of representation, whether they are words or semantic fields, will be investigated as they are linked together through the process of fictionalising the real.

With attention to the poetical discourse of quotation, this work is divided into three chapters, exploring respectively the meaning of metonymy, metaphor, and symbol. In the First Chapter, the authoritative model of metonymic quotations will be analysed and the absence of any ethical value to the quoting will be discussed. In the Second Chapter, the metaphorical application of quotations will be considered in the context of the emotional discourse of the characters. By identifying the intertextual models underpinning the narration, I will attempt to identify the theatrical aestheticisation of the novel’s representation. In the Third Chapter, my analysis will focus on the intertextual status of the creative process observed through the Lacanian theory of the self. To illustrate the symbolic application of signs for literary representation, I will acknowledge artefacts of reality as quotations which undergo a process of deformation.
The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that the mimesis of *Jude the Obscure* is an artificial construct which evokes the effect of reality from intertextual relations which play a figurative function in the novel's poetics. By emphasising the semantic parallels between the metatextuality of quotation and the self-referentiality of other signs, I intend to demonstrate how mimesis is invoked and simultaneously deformed, thus giving rise to the aesthetic representation of the novel.
Due to the idealist postulation underlying nineteenth-century realistic prose, the world articulated in language was presumed to reflect reality. Textual models were read as empirical facts which the reader was expected to recognise according to his or her experience. Thus a real object and the sign which represented it in language were treated as one. Poetically, this relation is defined as metonymic and refers to a tradition which, according to David Lodge, “depends upon certain assumptions that there is a common phenomenal world that may be reliably described by the methods of empirical history, located where the private worlds that each individual creates and inhabits partially overlap” (1977: 40). In this chapter the meaning of authority and the power of language will be analysed, as it is articulated in the metonymic use of overt quotations.

Metonymy, which plays an essential role in the representation of realistic prose, creates an index of reality and enables mimetic strategies. According to Roman Jakobson (1971), metonymy is typical of non-literary language or “slice-of-life” prose in which realism rests on the affiliation of the sign and the real object.

In poetic language metonymy is a figure “in which one word is substituted for another on the basis of some material, casual, or conceptual relation” (Preminger 1993: 783). Thus a signifier refers to a signified on the basis of a contiguous or continuous association between the two. The process of decoding the meaning of metonymy takes place according to a recognised proximity between the real object and its sign in the text. Being strictly related to its source, an authorial quotation is an example of metonymy, for it overtly demonstrates an affiliation between a part of the text and the whole text. An overt quotation is a metonymy which attributes the qualities of the whole (a pre-text) to its part (a quoted fragment). This *pars pro toto* relation produces associations of cause, quality or effect between, for example, the object and its related...
states of consciousness, between the object and the material of its own construction, or between the object’s abstract qualities and concrete entities.

Thus at the opening of each chapter of *Jude the Obscure* an epigraph introduces additional information which does not affect the meaning of the novel but instead suggests a play with the meaning of pre-text. The epigraph is the most conspicuous form of quotation due to its prominent typography. Epigraphs do not appear in the manuscript nor in the edition published in 1894 in *Harper’s New Monthly Magazine* but, like many other quotations, were added by the author to the first edition (1895). Epigraphs, classified by Wheeler as “mottoes”, function as “crucial plot pointers or thematic pointers” (1979: 24). In *Jude*, epigraph plays the traditional rôle of the “pointer” – it implies a pre-existing narrative frame to be unpacked in the course of the plot, but it also functions as an allegory of intertextuality which can only be denoted in relation to the total context of the novel. Quotations from Esdras,^1^ Swinburne,^2^ Ovid,^3^

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^1^ “Yea, many there be that have run out of their wits for women, and become servants for their sakes. Many also have perished, have cried, and sinned, for women... O ye men, how can it be but women should be strong, seeing they do thus?” (JO, I, 1: 8). Quotation from the Apocrypha, First Book of Esdras 4:26, 27 and 32, in which three palace guards debate “the thing which he judgeth the strength” before the Persian King Darius (522-486 BC). The first argues for wine, the second for the King’s political power, and the third (from whom Hardy takes his epigraph) for women, but above all for the victory of Truth and Justice. The third wins and gains from the King the promise to rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem (Taylor 1998: 411).

^2^ “Save his own soul he hath no star” (JO, II, 1: 76). Quotation from Algernon Charles Swinburne (1837-1909) from his ‘Prelude’, stanza 17, celebrating the pre-Nietzschean hero whose “heart is equal with the sea’s... / And seeks not strength from strengthless dreams... / Him can no God cast down, whom none / Can lift in hope... / Nor holds he fellowship forlorn / With souls that pray... / ‘Save his own soul he hath no star.’” The epigraph either describes the character which Jude will come to be in his post-Christian stage, or is in contrast to the Jude who long continues to be haunted by faith and dreams (Taylor 1998: 423).
Sappho, Milton, Antonius, Esther, and Browning symbolise the meaning of each chapter: they carry a warning, describe the qualities of characters, and suggest events to

“Notitiam primasque gradas victia fecit / Tempore crevit amor” (JO, II, 1: 76). Quotation from Ovid: Metamorphoses IV, 59-60: “Neighbourhood brought gradual acquaintance; Time made their love grow”, from the story of Pyramus and Thisbe, lovers who, separated by their fathers, contrived to meet, but ended as a double suicide (Pyramus first killing himself because he thinks Thisbe has been killed by a lion, Thisbe killing herself when she discovers Pyramus) (Taylor 1998: 423).

“For there was no other girl, O bridegroom, like her!” (JO, III, 1: 128). Quotation from Sappho: trans. by H.T. Wharton, Sappho; Memoir, Text, Selected Renderings, 3rd ed. (London: Lane, 1895), no. 106. (Taylor 1998: 434). This Wharton edition is Hardy’s copy in Dorset County Museum.

“Whoso prefers either Matrimony or other Ordinance before the Good of Man and the plain Exigence of Charity, let him profess Papist, or Protestant, or what he will, he is no better than a Pharisee” (JO, IV, 1: 198). Quotation from Milton, the 1643 pamphlet The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, preliminary address ‘To the Parliament of England’, penultimate paragraph, a passage marked by Hardy in his copy of Milton’s Prose Works (London: Bohn, 1848-1870), Vol. 3 (1949), in the Colby College collection (Taylor 1998: 441).

“Thy aerial part, and all the fiery parts which are mingled in thee, though by nature they have an upward tendency, still in obedience to the disposition of the universe they are overpowered here in the compound mass the body” (JO, V, 1: 256). Quotation from Marcus Aurelius Antonius (121-180 CE), The Thoughts of Emperor: trans. by G. Long (London: Bell and Daldy, 1862); Hardy’s copy in the Yale collection, a gift from Horace Moule in 1865. Book XI, Section 20. The quotation illustrates the conflict Hardy saw embodied in the novel: “the book is all contrasts...Christminster academical, Christminster slums; Jude the Saint, Jude the sinner” etc. (Collected Letters, II, 99) (Taylor 1998: 446).

“And she humbled her body greatly, and all the places of her joy she filled with her torn hair” (JO, VI, 1: 321). Quotation from the Apocryphal portion of the Book of Esther 14:2, the Jewish Queen Esther humbling herself and praying for God’s assistance to save the Jews from the cruel decree of her husband the King; her prayer is answered and she converts the King. Sue will be influenced by this idea of ritual humiliation (Taylor 1998: 454).

“There are two who decline, a woman and I / And enjoy our death in the darkness here” (JO, VI, 1: 321). Quotation from Browning’s poem “Too Late”, stanza 10, picturing two lovers who threw away their happiness. Lines marked by Hardy in his own edition (Taylor 1998: 454).
come. They create short parables of the narrative beyond the actual narrative. Part One of the novel is announced as an unhappy love story encapsulated in a quotation from Esdras:

> Yea, many there be that have run out of their wits for women, and become servants for their sakes. Many also have perished, have erred, and sinned, for women...Oh ye men, how can it be but women should be strong, seeing they do thus.” (JO, I, 1:8)

By developing this quotation in a narrative form Hardy tells his own story of Jude and Arabella. Their unfortunate marriage is similarly based on Jude’s erroneous “running out of his wits” and Arabella’s overpowering charm. As the novel develops, it becomes clear that these similarities actually serve an ironic rather than an analogous function. It is Jude who makes a mistake by sacrificing his idealistic plans for an uneducated woman, yet it is she who survives and grows even stronger. This confrontation of the two systems of values represented by Jude and Arabella will be discussed in chapter two in more depth.

It can be argued that the material presence of epigraphs, just like that of other overt quotations in the novel, allegorically represents the imitative nature of language. This hypothesis is founded on the observation of epigraphs as textual patterns: Hardy’s story is a variation of what is already written and known to the audience from other sources. What might support such an argument is the writer’s decision to use epigraphs for the first edition. Was this decision motivated only by the aesthetic norms widely adopted in realistic prose? Hardy added epigraphs to the first edition only after the publication of the novel in Harper’s where it aroused international scandal.

By applying epigraphs the writer was able to demonstrate the parallels between his novel and the great monuments of literature and philosophy. The text might gain in ethical value through such comparisons, but was this really Hardy’s aim? Although it is
not possible to escape speculation when considering Hardy's real aims, it is legitimate
to conclude that epigraphs relate to the story in an ironic way. This irony might result
from Hardy's disappointment with the serial's reception and from his attempts to avoid
further misunderstanding by pointing to the classical patterns concerned with the same
dramatic problems; it also might derive from the writer's acute awareness of the factual
repetitions within the literary archive. Despite their contingent character, both
observations meet in the poetics of the novel which reveals the allegorical status of
intertext. In *Jude* epigraph contributes to the novel's aesthetics operating with the ironic
methods of communicating the intertextual models of the story.

In the text the names of authors or the titles of their works, along with quotation
marks, are used to acknowledge the source known to the audience from a common,
although often second-hand, circulation. In the nineteenth-century novel an overt
quotation does not need to be known in detail by the reader to be trusted. It is as a
graphical or descriptive pointer provided by the author that the quotation becomes
mimetically credible. Being openly incorporated into the novel, a quotation delineates
the borders of the factual "truth" that cannot be doubted. This is precisely what Hardy's
poetic reveals: texts are trusted not because of what they say, but because of their
authoritative position achieved by institutional dissemination.

In *Jude the Obscure*, an overt quotation provides evidence of factual reality
verified by means of quotation marks. Metonymic quotations in are overt quotations
which designate their *pars pro toto* affiliation with the author of the text; the author is
revealed through the graphic markers which demarcate the foreignness of the quotation.
This double signage distinguishes authorial quotations from ornamental or metaphorical
references discussed in the next chapter. Quotations (*pars*) overtly denoted by the
author as belonging to the cultural archive of his society stand for greater entities
existing beyond the text (italo). The name of the quotation’s author, or the title of the
source, becomes an index of the source that the quotation represents. Incorporating this
information is important, not only as Kellett and Springer claim, for enhancing the
novel’s ethical weight (Kellett 1933; Springer 1983), but also, and more importantly, for
its contribution to the metatextual dispute on texts’ authority. On a metatextual level an
overt quotation is an allegory of the text’s fictional status. Metonymical adaptation of
the quotation thus becomes a trope which produces dialogical relations. Michael
Wheeler identified this as “symbolic relations between adopted texts and adoptive
works” (1979: 161-2) which are to be sought within the semantics of the text. As
Wheeler points out, it is the allegorical adaptation of quotation (allusion, reference) that
contributed to the most important advance on the achievements of Victorian fiction.
brought about by such writers as Joyce, Eliot, Woolf, Beckett and Borges. These writers
developed “the playfulness of much of this fiction”, a distinctive feature of twentieth-
century literature with its “predilection for games and puzzles” (Wheeler 1979: 159,
160). My hypothesis is that Jude can be included among these works because it belongs
to the same literary tradition which is recognised by critics as intentionally
“intertextual” (Springer 1983) or intentionally “playful” (Wheeler 1979).

The aim of Hardy’s overt metonymic quotations is not to verify the truth of the
source but to undermine it, not to maintain the ideology of his society but to challenge
it. Before I move to the detailed analysis of Hardy’s poetical technique, it is necessary
to explain the character and the origin of the ideology he comprises in metonymies. In
my argument I will employ the New Historian concept of de-centred power by Michael
Foucault in order to bring into view the tension between the representation of the novel
and its metatextual and anti-representational poetics. Bearing in mind the dialectical
conflict the Foucauldian approach may cause when confronted with the ideological
background of the novel, I will apply it for a methodological comparison. The
Foucauldian approach is incorporated for the purpose of showing how the novel escapes
the ideology of mimesis by circumventing of its centralised order.

Hardy questions the ethical validity of the source as the authoritative text, a view which
"is indeed the dominant view in aesthetics, from Plato’s Republic onwards, [assuming] that any experience of art is intrinsically involved with ethics" (Small 1979: xiii). Today we can argue that Hardy’s poetics negate the Platonic understanding of representation in favour of the socio-ideological production of “discourse” in the Foucauldian sense.

According to Foucault, models of representation do not epitomise metaphysical meaning but reflect “relations of forces supporting and supported by types of knowledge” (1980: 196), which themselves produce meaning through “discourse” rather than through language.

This discursive approach to representation requires an investigation of the rules of how the social and the individual share these meanings and of what strategic methods are applied in specific situations, historical contexts and institutional systems. In Foucault’s theory, it is knowledge that generates discursive formations and thus imposes the concepts of truth. As Stuart Hall confirms, Foucault “sees knowledge as always being applied to the regulation of social conduct in practice (i.e. to particular bodies”). [...] This led Foucault to speak, not of the “Truth” of knowledge in the absolute sense— a Truth which remained so, whatever the period, setting, context but of a discursive formation sustaining a regime of truth” (Hall 1997: 47, 49).

To understand the strategic mechanisms which formulate a discourse of truth, it is necessary to identify how the powers apply knowledge and for what aims. The regime, or the “ideology” of truth, in Western culture was strongly associated with Christian

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4 The word “ideology” is used in the sense of the “relation between power and knowledge”, as explained by Foucault, not in the Marxist sense. Thus, throughout this thesis, the words “ideology” and “power” will be used interchangeably to signify the same problem.
reasoning founded on the metaphysical presence of the Bible, considered to be a vehicle of sublime and moral restoration for believers. In Hardy’s time it was the Catholic Bible that superseded the validity of the Protestant Bible. The latter began “losing its old status as a sacred and inspired authority, [and] the claim of the Catholic Church to that supreme rôle became more persuasive, and in the context of fear and despair more compelling” (Houghton 1957: 100). The recently converted representatives of the new Anglo-Catholic movement in Oxford tended to emphasise the Bible’s moral value, as evinced, for example, by James Anthony Froude’s *The Nemesis of Faith* (1849), or John Henry Newman’s *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* (1865).

Due to the well-established status of the Bible, any written text, including a literary text, was obliged to bear a similar responsibility: to represent the world in its factual totality and to strengthen the moral spine of the audience. As Ian Small notes, “the argument that art reflected life in such a way as to allow the audience, reader or spectator to make observations about man’s moral nature was of course firmly entrenched in Victorian culture: so much that to call the validity of it into question was tantamount to uttering heresy” (1979: xiii). By the end of the nineteenth-century, realistic literature, despite its fictional affiliation, was expected to supply the help and guidance, both religious and moral, that the old priesthood could no longer provide.

Houghton notes that Victorian literature replaced the authority of the Bible with the authorial voice of the writer (1957: 101). These new intellectual opportunities, affecting even religious thinkers such as Huxley, Kingsley, Mill and Carlyle, became a threat to the former moral unity and social security. As Houghton writes,

> Prolonged introspection, analysis, and indecision; or the sudden collapse of a philosophy or a religion which had been the motivation of action, with nothing to take its place; or the vision of a mechanistic universe without purpose or...
meaning - any or all of these possibilities latent in the intellectual situation can
mean the destruction of all values whatsoever. (1957: 73)

A well-settled and complacent Victorian society was unprepared for this radical
crisis in philosophy, science, and religion that took its roots in the 1830’s and 40’s. As
Houghton points out, “this is not to forget that many of the Victorians were intellectuals
or that the age of Mill and Darwin made significant contributions to thought. It is to
claim only that middle- and upper-class society was permeated by a scornful or
frightened view of the intellectual life, both speculative and artistic, and the liberal
education that fosters it” (1957: 110). Thus, while reacting with confusion and
frustration, society also retained a strong inclination to the monolithic voice of authority
offered by institutions and educational literature. The truth offered by the Church
relieved society of uncertainty and grounded the authority of pro-Christian texts. A
Bible still had a definite and unquestionable voice. It constituted a frame for social
identification and was itself the source of inexorable power by attributing metaphysics
of presence to the written word. The officially accepted stream of philosophical and
religious thought satisfied the need of Victorian society to affirm and confirm the facts
rather than to reject or to question them.

However, under the influence of new philosophies and scientific theories, the
authority of the Bible and the status of Christianity underwent fundamental re-
evaluation. As a consequence, the old, well-established models of life became exposed
to meticulous criticism and mushroomed independent modes of thought from opposing
“camps”. The battles of Darwinians and Deists, Empiricists and Idealists, Rationalists
and Romanticists, were undermining the old religious certainty, baffling the rules of
social conduct, subverting artistic conventions, denying stability of power, and
debilitating people’s ideals. This is how David Cecil presents the abasing abundance of
conflicting ideologies at that time:
Toward the middle of the century it was further disturbed by the higher criticism of the Bible and the Darwinian theory of evolution. People were feeling already uncertain about the philosophic basis of Christianity. Now they began to doubt the historical facts on which that philosophy rested. And not only Christianity - the new ideas struck a blow at all religious and ideal interpretations of the universe. If, as seemed possible, it was only a mechanical process, evolving from no one knew what, in a direction no one knew whither, what was the significance of those moral and spiritual values which man had learned to regard as the most precious things in life? If Christianity was not true, what became of the consolation of Christianity, the conception of Divine justice, bringing all to good in the end? New thinkers -- some rationalist, some romantic -- disputed vaguely and acrimoniously with one another as to what creed should take the place of the old religious certainty. None of their alternatives proved sufficiently convincing to establish itself unquestioned in men's minds, as the old faith done. (1943: 21)

In *Jude* Hardy shows that the texts that represent divine or institutional authority as being corrupt, defiled, pernicious, carrying little shred of ethical truth or social relevance, Jude's Christian idealism and ingenuity is measured against Sue's empirical liberalism and experience. By polarising those ideologies the novel points towards a concomitant move from innocent classicism to tragic modernity producing the insatiable "vice of unrest" (*JO, II, 2: 85*). According to Foucault, this passage encompasses the turn of classicism and modernity, the moment at which people's attitude to language had to change as a result of economic-political reconfigurations:

> Language is simply representation of words; nature is simply the representation of beings. The end of Classical thought -- and of the *episteme* that made general grammar, natural history, and the science of wealth possible -- will coincide
with the decline of representation, or rather with the emancipation of language, of the living being, and of need, with regard to representation. The obscure but stubborn spirit of a people who talk, the violence and the endless effort of life, the hidden energy of needs, were all to escape from the mode of being of representation. And representation itself was to be paralleled, limited, circumscribed, mocked perhaps, but in any case regulated from the outside, by the enormous trust of a desire, or a will, posited as the metaphysical converse of consciousness. Something like a will or a force was to arise in the modern experience -- constituting it perhaps, but in any case indicating that the Classical age was over now, and with it the reign of representative discourse, the dynasty of representation signifying itself and giving voice in the sequence of its words to the order that lay dormant within things. (1977: 209)

By being employed for economic taxation, language in post-classical modernity detached from being which it naturally represented and induced an anti-mimetic ("posited as the metaphysical converse of consciousness") reaction that put the truth of representation into question. In nineteenth-century art, as Hardy writes, "The exact truth as to material fact ceases to be of importance" while the past innocent and unconscious reflects "a student's style -- the style of a period when the mind is serene and unawakened to the tragical mysteries of life" (L: 185). In Jude this move from "innocent" classicism to "tragical" modernity is articulated through the process of emotional, political, and social emancipation undergone by the protagonist. Through the painful recognition of the false rhetoric of the text, Jude reaches a tragic awareness of his own personal situation. Jude's route to a tragic climax unfolds the philosophical, social, and political problems of the contemporary times which interweave to form the major theme of the novel. The novel shows how authoritative powers affect and distort the lives of individuals through manipulation by social, religious and artistic
conventions. The historical origin of these powers and their articulation in the plot has been comprehensively analysed elsewhere. But it should be asserted here again, that in *Jude* school and Church are shown to be the most influential and fearsome engines of ideological exercise. Authorial quotations derived from the educational-religious canon create a picture of systematic breeding all the protagonists undergo, with a particular tragic effect on a broken biography of Jude. In order to identify the allegorical role of the quoting act, which I consider to be an ironic imitation of the scholarly and scholastic practices exercised on and by Jude, I will observe now how Jude’s biography develops and how he becomes involved in the ideological mechanism of the establishment.

At the beginning of the novel, the hero yearns to possess knowledge which would complete his nature and enable him to understand the world surrounding him. Jude’s will to learn is ignited by his most innocent and natural desire to understand, and to transcend his own existential situation. Hardy leads his hero from a very early stage of genuine passion for knowledge in Marygreen, through a series of educational and existential turmoil in Melchester, Shaston, Aldbrickam and “elsewhere”, to the final

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10 See for example: A. Mizener (1940); T. R. Spivey (1954); J. H. Miller (1968); R. Benvenuto (1970); M. Millgate (1971); D. Kramer (1975); H. Bloom (1987); P. Widdowson (1989); J. Fisher (1992); A. Whitlock (1998).

11 According to Widdowson it was Hardy’s personal disappointment with school education that influenced his negative attitude towards institutions and authorities: “Hardy, therefore, left school at 16. Some three or four years later than if he had attended an ordinary school, but his education thereafter was mainly by personal reading, with assistance from better-educated friends like Horace Moule. His later pricketness about the lack of higher education (which gave rise to a dubious remark in *The Life* about the possibility of his going to Cambridge) thus suggests Hardy’s sense of being only partly educated in terms of conventional upper-class criteria. It is a reflex of Hardy’s contradictory class insertion that he could, nevertheless, attack Oxford University so fiercely in *Jude the Obscure*” (1989: 132-133).
stage of his tragic disappointment in Christminster that consumed his initial intentions.

As Virginia R. Hyman writes:

In terms of ethical evolution, Jude moves from the theological through the
metaphysical toward the sociological stage of development. Having reached
this point, however, he finds no response to his needs and, as a result, like Tess,
marks time for awhile and ultimately sinks back into the unconscious from
which he has emerged. (1975: 153)

Jude is a naïve neophyte, an enthusiast of knowledge who truly believes in his
ideals but who has to suffer great misfortune impelled by antagonistic powers. Under
Friedman’s classification of a novelistic plot we could associate Jude’s fate with other
pertinent examples, starting most obviously with John Bunyan’s *The Pilgrim’s Progress*
(1678-1684). Jude’s dramatic downfall certainly resists any instructive and consoling
solutions suggested by Bunyan in *The Pilgrim’s Progress*, and does not meet the
recommendations of the educational genre, practised for example, by Elizabeth Barrett
Browning (*Aurora Leigh*, 1856) or Charles Dickens (*Great Expectations*, 1860-1).

The narrative typical of *Bildungsroman* develops “plots of character” (Friedman 1967:
161) which in *Jude* turns rather to the “pathetic-tragic” denouement, termed by Andrew
Radford an “extraordinary comedy of crises” (2003: 198). Although Hardy’s novel
incorporates elements of a classical *Bildungsroman* pattern, it also differs from it
through the tones of comedy underpinning Jude’s polemical discussion with the
educational and optimistic meaning of the *Bildungsroman* plot. Jude’s unexpected
failure implicates those patterns of narration which show a protagonist “in the full
bloom of faith in a certain set of ideals, [who] after being subjected to some kind of
loss, threat, or trial, loses that faith entirely” (Friedman 1967: 165). In his intertextual

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12 For an alternative interpretation of this intertextual parallel see: V. Newey (1987).
dialogue with Bildungsroman Hardy stressed the hero’s degradation through disillusionment and impoverishment.

Jude’s failure was ultimately caused by his misinterpretation of the ideals incarnated in the great texts, as Friedman writes, “When such a man suffers misfortune, part of all of which he is responsible for through some serious mistake or error in judgement on his part, and subsequently discovers his error only too late”. Jude’s innocent nature leaves him unable to recognise his mistake and leads him to take the text’s false assumption for ideal reality. About such characters Friedman writes, “His will is in some way weak and his thought naïve and deficient” (1967: 198); this reminds us of Tess and of the “pure woman’s” passive volition. At the same time, as the novel indicates, it is not exactly Jude himself who earned his tragic fate. The curve of his biography is structured upon the conflict of powerful ideologies of which he is a victim.

At an early stage in Jude’s self-education, he tries to read both ancient texts and contemporary grammars that he hopes will answer his profound questions about the world: passages from Caesar, Virgil, Horace, and Homer, old Delphine editions, “Carmen Saeculare” (JO, I, 4: 31-35), the New Testament, the Gospels and Epistles in Griesbach’s texts, all representing the range of texts of which knowledge was considered obligatory within university and intellectual circles. The names of Plato, Aristotle, Euripides, Lucretius, Epictetus, Seneca, Antonius, Livy, Tacitus, Herodotus, Sophocles, Aristophanes and Bede are signifiers of the canon that was compulsory in schools. Names and titles are counted to imply discursive powers underlying an officially accepted system of higher education: the system which finally destroys Jude. A canonical list of Jude’s lectures does not correspond to his position as a peasant to whom higher education is refused.

13 Friedman provides examples from Oedipus Rex, Antigone, Othello, King Lear, Hamlet, Julius Caesar (1967: 159).
When the boy, standing on the edge of the plateau in the dim of moonlight, quotes Homer in Latin: “Phoebe silvarumque potens Diana” (JO, I, 5: 34), the reader is struck by the contrast between the pathetic style and tone of the quotation and the inappropriately mundane context in which it is used. This contrast deploys a humorous sense of the whole scene beyond the original meaning of the Homeric text. Irony here might be recognised not in the meaning of the Latin sentence, but in its misused application. Homer’s authority and his place in the literary and educational canon through Jude’s passionate recitation gain the parodic features so characteristic of Hardy’s poetics.

According to Springer (1983), parody and irony are the most characteristic and effective results of Hardy’s use of quotation. Yet Springer also claims that the meaning might be appreciated only by Hardy’s educated readers:

But the more sophisticated segments of his audience could see additional levels of meaning by detecting the authorial judgement evidenced through allusive subtlety. Hardy elevates, undermines, even degrades his heroes by means of the allusions he attaches to them. And by applying a specific allusion pattern to particular characters he wields a stylistic tool to work with the mine of irony that the universe presents to him. (1983: 40)

For Marlene Springer, it is the mockery of the real world that the novel mimetically reflects, while irony is the poetical figure expressing it. Interestingly, Herman Meyer (1968) defies this traditional attitude by finding in irony an overarching trope whose effect was to parody or satirise the process of quoting. In Jude it is the figurative-allegorical adaptation of quotation which produces ironic effects. The analogous effect can be observed in such diverse writers as François Rabelais, Miguel de Cervantes, Laurence Sterne, and E. T. E. Hoffmann. What is shared between the work of these authors and Hardy’s Jude is described by Meyer as allegory of language performed on
different levels of narration. In both Rabelais’ *Gargantua and Pantagruel* (1532) and Cervantes’ *Don Quixote* (1605) Meyer observes that

The author is present in the work as the leader of a game that the reader plays and imitates. At the same time the author stands above his work with sovereign detachment, committed and indifferent alike, bending down to the world of his own creation like the puppeteer over the marionette stage. (1968: 57)

Taking its roots in the work of Goethe, Meyer goes on to develop a concept of play, noting that Goethe wrote “True art can originate only from an intimate union of seriousness and play” (Meyer 1968: 57). Although Hardy never mentions Goethe’s concept, it might help to understand the ambiguity of language so prevalent throughout *Jude*. Crucial contention persuasively expressed related to Hardy’s role as the puppeteer, playing a game infected with existential disappointment with the validity of great texts, predominantly through their deceptive and false ideology, but also from his mature and scalding ironic distance from language that permeates the whole text. The ironic approach in *Jude* reinvigorates the tradition of such writers as Shakespeare, Cervantes, Swift, Rabelais, and Sterne, who within mimetic representation attempted to communicate additional (metatextual) messages.

In his discussion of Sterne’s *Tristram Shandy* (1760-67), Lodge defines this literary approach, common also to Hardy. The common feature is that they “tended to make narration itself the real subject matter of [the] novel [and] tried to alienate it from history in order to replace it with a more subjective perspective of the author” (1977: 40, 41). This perspective reveals a deeper layer in the text’s representation: an additional voice which speaks beyond the text about the text. It constitutes a double message which, as Lodge observes, “alienates the text from history and leads to solipsism, and in literary terms, the abandonment of realism” (1977: 41).
Poetical alienation, however, does not derive from either classical allegory or traditional metaphor (albeit these tropes do contribute to the work’s style), but from pervading the text with a self-conscious attitude to language, the same attitude that eventually led to the disruption of traditional mimetic poetics, to be replaced by Modernist solipsism. In Jude, the poetics of quotation reveal metatextual meanings which might be identified as allegory itself; it is the allegory of reading which derives from the chiasmus between the surface of representation and its ironic self-evaluation. It becomes enlivened when the text is read on two levels simultaneously: the mimetic level of the story and the level of its semiotic significance. Such a text articulates fictional reality in a mimetic way on one hand, but on the other it undermines its mimesis by referring to its fictional status. According to Lodge this is a “technique made for irony, for the destruction of illusions” (1977: 39). Hardy illustrates critically the effects of the ideology of mimesis, which itself determines the social and artistic conventions of his society. Thus Jude has to confront this false belief in the mimetic truth of representation and the mythical stability of meaning.

The meaningful metaphor of the “law of transmutation” (JO, I, 5: 31) desired and sought by Jude explains this problem. The “gigantic error” (JO, I, 5: 31) recognised by Jude regards his false belief in the mimetic truth of representation. While studying Latin and Greek Jude was seeking:

A rule, prescription, or clue of the nature of a secret cipher, which, once known, would enable him, by merely applying it, to change at will all words of his own speech into those of the foreign one. His childish idea was, in fact, a pushing to the extremity of mathematical precision what is everywhere known as Grimm’s Law – an aggrandizement of rough rules to ideal completeness.

Thus he assumed that the words of the required language were always to be found somewhere latent in the words of the given language by those who had
Jude discovers that the written text is an emblem of illusion applicable only to the abstract world of mathematics. "The law of transmutation" is not a magic device which reveals the meaning of all words to the master, but instead appears to be the effect of mundane practice and pragmatic learning. This painful lesson which Jude receives at the beginning of his intellectual career contributes to his future disappointment with great texts.

By permitting Jude to be deceived by language, the narrator points to the hopelessness of human faith in the mimetic truth. More importantly, he aims at false conceptions of mimesis created, disseminated, and promoted by the authorities. Authorities such as the schools and the Church that are responsible for Jude’s disillusion. Jude’s faith in the mythical stability of meaning is probed by the intertextual force of language whose secret code rests, not in the metaphysics of transmutation, but rather in the repetitions and reproductions from which texts are built. The poetics of Jude reveal the illusory status of "the law of transmutation" which can be considered the law of mimetic representation. The only truth for which Jude is searching appears to be a set of intertextual discourses which lack a metaphysical presence. This revelation, however, is presented more in a comic than in a tragic context and as such consolidates the novel’s ironic message about the unreliability of representation. As Terry Eagleton argues, this is a characteristic approach of Hardy’s realism which “is about the limits of art rather than a symptom of despair” (1974: 14).

Hardy’s ironic approach becomes more distinct when applied to Jude’s grown-up observations on the corpus of sacred writings attributed to Oxford. In the novel, Oxford represents the conservative Christian-intellectual powers which focus their activities on the re-animation of the old faith in the name of social and political order. As Kevin Z.
Moore indicates "[T]he lost cause that is housed at Oxford is that of Charles I and the royalists, of oppression and tyranny, of aristocracy and elitism" (1990: 242). In Jude, this lost cause is Oxford-Christminster, affiliated with the conservative authorities with which Hardy polemically argues. Jude's naïve dream that knowledge is embedded in Christminster (a symbol of Oxford) is confronted by the hostile reality of social and political power that frustrates Jude's intellectual capabilities. The letter in which a college dean pinpoints Jude's unacceptable social origins shakes his faith in scholars' infallibility and degrades the value of his self-education. A scene in Christminster, where Jude has a chance for the first time to experience the presence of the greatest fathers of knowledge, ironically extols the seriousness of their authority:

Some of them, by the accidents of his reading, loomed out in his fancy disproportionately large by comparison with the rest. [...] There were poets abroad, of early date and of late, from the friend and eulogist of Shakespeare down to him who has recently passed into silence, and that musical one of the tribe who is still among us. Speculative philosophers passed along, not always with wrinkled foreheads and hoary hair as in framed portraits, but pink-faced, slim, and active as in youth; modern divines sheeted in their surplices, among whom the most real to Jude Fawley were the founders of the religious school called Tractarian; the well-known three, the enthusiast, the poet, and the formularist, the echoes of whose teachings had influenced him even in his obscure home. A start of aversion appeared in his fancy to move them at sight of those other sons of the place, the form in the full-bottomed wig, statesman, rake, reasoner, and sceptic; the smoothly shaven historian so ironically civil to Christianity; with others of the same incredulous temper, who knew each quad as well as the faithful, and took equal freedom in haunting its cloisters. (JO, II, 2: 80)
This description shows the trust of the author in the intellectual capability of his readers. They are expected to recognise the names of Ben Jonson, Robert Browning, and Algernon Swinburne in Hardy’s iterative code.\(^\text{14}\) Knowing that the author unwillingly admitted the real referents of these metaphors in his letter of 10\(^{\text{th}}\) November 1895 to Florence Henniker (CL II: 94), was it essential for the reader to know the factual names of those people to understand the passage? The list of quotations starts with a paraphrase of Arnold’s appraisal of Christminster, next comes a quotation from a speech by Sir Robert Peel and then a fragment added to proofs from Gibbon’s *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. This is followed by three verses from Browning, four lines from Newman’s *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, a stanza by Keble, philosophical comment from Addison, and finally *Evening Hymn*, “a familiar rhyme” by Bishop Ken.

All the authors mentioned are introduced anonymously, but they are presupposed by synecdoches which theoretically make them recognisable to the reader (“sly author”, “the last of the optimist”, “the genial Spectator”). Quotations retained in Jude’s memory

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\(^\text{14}\) Dennis Taylor, an editor of the novel, offers the following identifications (JO: 424): ‘eulogist of Shakespeare’: Ben Jonson, honorary degree at Christ Church (1619); ‘him who has recently passed into silence’: Robert Browning, honorary fellow at Balliol (1868), who died in 1889, i.e. “recently” for Hardy writing in 1894-5; ‘musical one’: Algernon Swinburne at Balliol (1856-9); ‘philosophers’: Thomas Hobbes at Magdalen Hall (1603-8), John Locke at Christ Church (1652-8 and resident thereafter), Jeremy Bentham at The Queen’s College (1760-7); ‘divines’: Jeremy Taylor at All Souls and University (1655-6), John Wyclif at Balliol (c. 1356-61), John Foxe at Brasenose (1532-?) and Magdalen (c. 1538-45), Richard Hooker at Corpus Christi (1568-84), William Pears at Christ Church (1660), Charles Wesley at Christ Church (1726-32), George Whitefield at Pembroke College (1732-5); ‘Tractarian; the well-known three, the enthusiast, the poet, and the formulaist’: The Tractarians began a movement to rejuvenate the Anglican Church by resurrecting its medieval elements and published the *Tracts for the Times* (1833-41). The three are, respectively, John Henry Newman at Trinity (1816-41), John Keble at Corpus Christi (1806-11) and Edward Pusey at Christ Church (1819-22).
seem to be chosen at random, impulsively, without deeper consideration. Patricia
Ingham notes their apparent generic incoherence and semantic insignificance:

The emptiness of assumed appropriation is evidenced by the fact that many of
them are merely indirectly described and remain lifelessly unevocative;
those quoted are not named but periphrastically alluded to also. The reader as
well as Jude is assumed to be an initiate who can supply the names: Peel as he
makes a passionate plea for the repeal of the Corn Laws; Gibbon ironically
wondering at the pagan indifference to Christian miracles; Arnold eulogising
Oxford; Newman defining faith; Addison lamenting morality. The reader
encounters, despite the coherence of individual passages, an incoherent totality:
a boy’s anthology of purple passages, “learning” perhaps in a literal sense,
“touchstones”, a kaleidoscope. (2000: 24)

The method Hardy applies to signify the monumental names of authors who have
contributed to the intertextual archive is based on the metonymic relation between signs.
A synecdochical application of nouns – poet, enthusiast, formularist, reasoner,
statesman, and sceptic – is accompanied by a contiguous series of metonymies –
wrinkled foreheads, hoary hair, framed portraits, the full-bottomed wig. These
expressions create an image of power, seriousness, supremacy, judicature, and
ordinance on one hand, and stiffness, formality, inflexibility, rigidity, obsoleteness and
antiquity on the other. The analogical metonymic mapping Hardy continues on the next
passage, where scientists and “official characters” are recalled through a correlation
with their “meditative faces”, “lined foreheads”, and “weak eyes” (JO, II, 2: 80). The
writer does not need to introduce these factual names of the great authors of his time;
rather he relies on his reader’s knowledge of the typical features of the authors, which
are signified by metonymies and synecdoches. The most important meaning of this
passage is encoded in the idea of authority which might be comprehended beyond the
specific names. It is just to the Christian authority of Oxford that Jude surrenders, and
the semantic context sufficiently supports this conclusion.

The allegorical sense of the Christminster scene emerges when related to the
poetics of quotation. Jude, half-sleeping half-dreaming, recites authorities associated
with the place. Following his introspective visions we travel through a chaotic mixture
of genres, styles, and philosophies. What do they have in common? There is a political
argument from 1846, assessed by the narrator as “the historic words” of Robert Peel, a
Member of Parliament, who turned against his Tory party in defence of the socially-
focused Corn Law:

Sir, I may be wrong, but my impression is that my duty towards a country
threatened with famine requires that that which has been the ordinary remedy
under all similar circumstances should be resorted to now, namely, that there
should be free access to the food of man from whatever quarter it may
come... Deprive me of office to-morrow, you can never deprive me of the
consciousness that I have exercised the powers committed to me from no
corrupt or interested motives, from no desire to gratify ambition, for no
personal gain. (JO, II, 2: 82)

The next statement, called by the narrator, “the immortal Chapter on Christianity” is a
critique of the enemies of Christianity by Gibbon (1776):

How shall we excuse the supine inattention of the Pagan and philosophic
world, to those evidences [miracles] which were presented by
Omnipotence?... The sages of Greece and Rome turned aside from the awful
spectacle, and appeared unconscious of any alternations in the moral or
physical government of the world. (JO, II, 2: 82)

A very optimistic, almost triumphant belief in “a general plan” of God is expressed in the
next quotation from Browning’s “By the Fire-Side” (1855):
How the world is made for each of us!

[...]

And each of the Many helps to recruit

The life of the race by a general plan! (JO, II, 2: 82)

A paragraph from Newman’s *Apologia* (1864) discusses the fundamentals of Christian faith against their apparent incoherence:

My argument was [...] that absolute certitude as to the truths of natural theology was the result of an assemblage of concurring and converging probabilities [...] that probabilities which did not reach to logical certainty might create a mental certitude. (JO, II, 2: 82)

Two lines drawn from *Thoughts in Verse For The Sundays and Holy Days Throughout the Year* (1827) by John Keble provide hope to those who doubt:

Why should we faint, and fear to live alone,

Since all alone, so Heaven has will’d, we die? (JO, II, 2: 82)

The same tone permeates Joseph Addison’s journalistic soliloquy:

When I look upon the tombs of the great, every motion of envy dies in me;
when I read the epitaphs of the beautiful, every inordinate desire goes out;
when I meet with the grief of parents upon a tombstone, my heart melts with compassion; when I see the tombs of the parents themselves, I consider the vanity of grieving for those whom we must quickly follow. (JO, II, 2: 83)

The rhyme adapted from *A Manual of Prayers for the Use of Scholars of Winchester College* (1674) by Bishop Thomas Ken, acts on the biblical teaching that man in every situation should appeal to God:

Teach me to live, that I may dread
The grave as little as my bed.
Teach me to die. (JO, II, 2: 83)
These quotations, although generically eclectic, portray the ideology of Christianity from the educational perspective. This is a traditional scholastic vision of faith that Hardy confirms in the exploration of Jude’s imagination. Quotations emerging in Jude’s mind recall the mechanistic prayer learnt by heart and repeated by believers. By applying these quotations Hardy undertakes an intertextual and polemical dialogue with Tractarianism proper, under the leadership of Keble. G. B. Tennyson discusses the influence of Keble’s *The Christian Year* (1827) on widespread Christian circles at that time: Keble’s catechism “helped make the volume a sacred one in High Anglican Households, it had already become a favourite before Keble’s 1833 sermon launched the movement, and it enjoyed enormous popularity for the remainder of the century in Christian households of all levels of churchmanship, even including non-Anglican households” (Tennyson 1977: 371). As a result of Keble’s achievements, in which he was strongly supported by Bishop Newman, the high value placed by Tractarianism on sacramentalism spread through society.

Traditionally, the sacraments were taught from the Catechism by rote, a method which Hardy recapitulates critically in the scene of Jude’s recitation. Being evoked one after another, quotations reconstitute a metaphorical figure of persuasion devised by the Oxford authorities. It is very interesting to observe how Hardy achieves a univocal scholastic tone from quotations which represent diverse genres and philosophical standpoints. Hardy’s efforts to make them ideologically coherent become apparent in the process of editing the text for publication. In the manuscript, the quotation from Keble is preceded by a modal statement: “Second of them might have murmured” (M: 83), while in Harper’s (1894) and in the first volume edition (1895-96) the same introduction appears as an assertion: “The second of them, no polemic, murmured

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15 The manuscript edition of *Jude the Obscure*, consulted for this thesis, is held at the Fitzwilliam Museum in Cambridge.
quieter things” (JO, II, 2: 82). The phrase, “no polemic”, was added later by Hardy to the manuscript and it functions as a bridge neutralising any contextual discordance between Newman’s critical enthymeme and Keble’s subservient didactics.

The universal, instructive, and confident tone of Browning’s love poem, “By the Fire-Side”, was created in Jude by means of elision. Lines from two stanzas by Browning (separated in the poem by a further six lines describing the complexity of human choice) were in Jude presented as one stanza, with the omissions marked by the presence of dots:

How the world is made for each of us! (241)

..................................................

And each of the Many helps to recruit (248)

The life of the race by a general plan! (249)

The meaning of the last two lines in Browning’s stanza, “The life of the race by a general plan / Each living his own, to boot” (II. 249-50) is also omitted by Hardy, for it suggests conflict between the individual and the universal in which proper believers should not participate. Hardy’s elision creates a unanimous, strictly religious context adherent to the overarching meaning of the passage. The original poem is deprived of its philosophical depth and is re-created as a doctrinal statement solidifying an ingenuous faith in Divine Justice.

Jude quotes several canonical authors who speak to him in direct speech. Yet is it actually Jude who recalls that collection, or the narrator who operates with “borrowed” texts? As the narrative context shows, the quoted works are engaged in a dialogue beyond Jude’s control but under the full control of the omniscient narrator. Hardy uses this method to introduce names virtually unknown to the undereducated protagonist, and this is admitted openly in brackets: “One of the spectres (who afterwards railed at
Christminster as 'the home of lost causes', though Jude did not remember this) was now apostrophizing her thus" (JO, II, 2: 81).

A phrase taken from Matthew Arnold's preface to Essays in Criticism, First Series (1865) is anachronistic given the date of the novel's setting, but chronological accuracy of quotation is not strictly observed by Hardy and there are other such inaccuracies in the novel confirming the narrator's privileged position. The dialogue of texts, however, takes place in Jude's mind and we are to believe that he decides on their sequence. Trying to make the scene more reliable the narrator explains: "As he drew towards sleep various memorable words of theirs that he had just been conning seemed spoken by them in muttering utterances; some audible, some unintelligible to him" (JO, II, 1: 81). Hardy's didacticism disturbs the transparency of the realistic description. The narrator quotes aesthetes "though Jude did not remember this" (JO, II, 1: 81); he speaks about the exhaustion of the ancient convention, but to Jude that vision "was not revealed" (JO, II, 2: 85).

In the fragment analysed above, Hardy demonstrates how quotations can become a tool of Christian rhetoric and ideological propaganda and how civilised bourgeois society absorbs its truths through repetition. The mechanical recitation of quotations, which Jude practises in that scene as well as throughout the novel, is the effect of the educational-religious persuasion that deprives believers of their self-awareness. The realistic liability of quotations is confirmed by quotation marks and metonymic metaphors to be recognised by the readers. From a poetical point of view, the whole scene is a metonymy of the Christian truths embodied in the canon texts regardless of their original meanings. It is also an allegorical parody of the methods employed by authorities who imprint their truths in people's minds in the same mechanic way they carve the quotations on the university walls.
A polemical dialogue with the Tractarian duty of repeating prayers is continued by Hardy in the scene with Sue, who seeks shelter with Jude after escaping from the Training School. Before going to bed Jude confesses: "I am absorbed in Theology, you know. And what do you think I should be doing just about now, if you weren't there? I should be saying my evening prayers" (JO, III, 4: 150). In response to this suggestion, Sue concludes: "You are in the Tractarian stage just now, aren't you" (JO, III, 4: 151). Being "in the Tractarian stage" means, in her terms, submitting to the mechanical persuasion imposed by the Church, with the exclusion of self-awareness and the rejection of liberal attitudes to religious matters, as represented by Sue.

In the Christminster scene Jude is not yet able to question the Christian authorities (no sooner will it happen than he meets Sue). Therefore the series of references performed in Jude's mind's eye corresponds to the knowledge prescribed by the authorities for the people. In his provincial environment Jude does not have the chance to encounter any subversive texts which might put the established canon into question. His memory of sacred writings rests on the repetition of what was permitted and officially validated as suitable for the people. As the narrator admits before Jude enters the gates of the city: "he had read and learnt almost all that could be read and learnt by one in his position" (JO, II, 1: 80). Seemingly accidentally applied, these texts reach an indisputable ideological adhesion. Despite their visionary illogical syntax they speak in one voice – the voice of the official political power.

What the Christminster scene indicates (JO, II, 2) is fully disclosed only against the total context of the novel that proves the helplessness of Jude's naïve faith in the canonical texts. It also explains the purpose of "knowledgeable" quotations applied as a device of persuasion and ideological manipulation. The canonical sources are replaced by metonymic equivalents which poetically indicate the rhetoric of the ideologies that they represent. Thus, as part of the text's semantics, quotations do not need to be
historically deciphered according to their sources. In fact, comparing the original version to that applied in the novel might disturb the process of reading and disrupt the novel’s message.

However, from an intertextual perspective, analysing the two versions enables us to see how the novel produces its meaning and how other texts inform that process. A citation, the author’s name, or an appellative “nickname”, all symbolise the external reality in which the author and his writing exist. However, a citation itself does not imply all the complexity of the source nor its original history; it encapsulates the meaning of the pre-text in one sample that stands for the memory of the source. Hardy relies on his reader’s *déjà lu* impressions\(^\text{10}\) which, as Roland Barthes observes, connote the general memory of pre-texts: a pre-text is known from somewhere and remembered somehow by the reader, but the exact source is not evoked. Thus a quotation feels familiar to the reader and presumably it will not be checked for accuracy. This is enough for the writer to associate the source with its metonymic equivalent: once associated by the reader with the pre-text a quotation will be accepted as real. As a result, overt quotations, while being recollections of empirical experiences by the reader, support the ontological validity of the text. Although this is the ontology of

\(^{10}\) A term by Roland Barthes: “L’intertextuel dans lequel est pris tout texte, puisqu’il est lui-même l’entre-texte d’un autre texte, ne peut se confondre avec quelque origine du texte: rechercher les “sources”, les “influences” d’une œuvre, c’est satisfaire au mythe de la filiation: les citations dont est fait un texte sont anonymes, irrépétables et cependant déjà lues: ce sont des citations sans guillemets” (The intertextual which includes all text because it is itself the ‘between text’ of another text, should not be confused with some (alleged or putative) origin of the text: tracing the ‘sources’, the ‘influences’ of a work is to give credence to the myth of the direct ‘line of ideas’: the constituent references of a text are anonymous, irretrievable and yet already read: these are the references with no quotation marks” [my translation]). See R. Barthes, 1971. ‘De l’œuvre au texte’, *Revue d’Esthétique*, 24: 229.
textual facts which verbalise fiction (the ontology of fiction), it is still perceived in
terms of the reader's reality.

When applied in the form of quotation, Hardy's intertexts signify authorities and
their persuasive methods of communication known to the reader from real
circumstances. Heinrich F. Plett explains this rhetorical relationship thus:

The authoritative quotation occurs in communicative situations that impose on
the sender an obligation to quote. Such communicative situations are closely
attached to social institutions; hence the quotation act assumes a ritualized
character. Illustrative examples are sacral and legal proceedings, where priests
and preachers, judges and lawyers endorse their reasoning by quotations from
the Bible or the Law, respectively. Within their scope of validity, the authority
claimed for such books admits of no doubts about their legitimacy. [...] 
Consequently, every subsequent emphasis of the author reference text
(e.g. Biblical commentaries) and every quotation taken from them is subject to
a very narrow range of application, usually one of exegetical character. When a
quotation in its claim to authority is not questioned at all, its function may also
be regarded as being "ideological". (1991: 13)

The poetics of quotation in *Jude* show this to be the ideological function specifically
questioned by Hardy. By referring to the authorial value of quotations, the writer
intentionally deploys and rejects their apparent legitimacy. Sources of quotations do not
play a semantic part in the text, it is the ritual act of quoting that the writer poeticises
within the semantic figures. Quotation substitutes the source in a metonymic way, and
what speaks is not the content but its authoritative value, signified either by quotation
marks, descriptive expressions, names of authors or the titles of their texts.

In the passage describing Jude's methods of learning, the narrator uses a quotation
without any introduction:
For the present, he said to himself, the one thing necessary was to get ready by accumulating money and knowledge, and await whatever chances were afforded to such an one of becoming a son of the University. "For wisdom is a defence, and money is a defence: but the excellency of knowledge is, that wisdom giveth life to them that have it". His desire absorbed him, and left no part of him to weigh its practibility. (JO, II, 2: 87)

A commonly known quotation from Ecclesiastes (7:12) is used by Jude to reassure himself of the legitimacy of his road to knowledge. But is it really Jude’s intellectual potential that is explored here? This quotation does not appear in the first draft of the manuscript, but was added later by the author to the back page (M: 86). Hardy’s initial intention was to let Jude speak in his own language, but he decided to invoke the quotation to corroborate what has been already said but in an ironic way. If the quotation does not expand the context of the paragraph, why was it used by the writer? Is it applied for traditional aesthetic reasons: to decorate and heighten the style? Hardy’s method is not that obvious.

A biblical saying explains Jude’s doubts and gives him the authoritative support that he needs in the new circumstances. The choice of quotation shows us the way Jude thinks and how he makes decisions – the Bible is for him the source of sanctioned knowledge and he returns to it for further incontestable instruction. This, Plett notes, makes clear the ideological function of the Bible: “When a quotation in its claim to authority is not questioned at all, its function may also be regarded as being ideological” (1991: 13).

Jude’s use of the canonical text is automatic and unthinking, emphasised by the absence of introduction to the quotation. Yet a final comment from the narrator reveals Jude’s lack of deep understanding of the quotation and unveils the irony of the quotation’s usage. If Jude had really comprehended the words of Ecclesiastes, he would
not have trusted them, possessing as he did neither money nor “excellency of knowledge”. But, as the narrator ironically adds, Jude’s “desire absorbed him, and left no part of him to weigh” (JO, II, 2: 87) the quotation’s feasibility. In this comment Hardy points to the ethical unreliability of a pre-text evoked in a naïve habitual way; to paraphrase Plett, people who apply authorial quotations do not consider their content but rather their persuasive ideological status.

The narrative structure of this fragment articulates people’s habitual inclination to address canonical texts for authorial justification of their deeds or thoughts. The Scriptures are the source of sanctioned knowledge for which the protagonists return for incontestable instruction. This is echoed by the use Jude’s aunt makes of biblical quotations. Having discovered that Farmer Troutham banished Jude from the corn field to punish him for feeding rooks, Aunt Drusilla invokes Job:

Farmer Troutham is not so much better than myself, come to that. But ’tis as
Job said, “Now they that are younger than I have me in derision, whose fathers
I would have disdained to have set with the dogs of my flock”. (JO, I, 2: 17)

The meaningless, imitative manner in which Arabella or Physician Vilbert recall the great texts undermines even further their ethical value: reducing authoritative quoting to merely mechanical function. However, through the representation of those characters’ attitude Hardy critically explores the methods of dissemination of knowledge on the lowest levels of society where social and religious rituals replace self-reflection.

Nevertheless, it is not people’s naïve faith in the truth or the ethical power of quotations that is criticised in the novel. Hardy accuses the ideological engine which accelerates people’s blind, non-reflexive attitude to authorities. Hardy’s protagonists are both, the lucky beneficiaries and helpless victims of the cultural traditions in which they were steeped” (Radford 2003: 22) What is notable in the last chapter is the mortal price Jude has to pay for questioning the truths of the canon. On the other hand, being
completely indifferent to the ethical value of the texts they were addressing. Arabella and Vilbert happily survived securing for themselves a respectful place in society. This implies that only passive absorption and mindless repetition guarantees the approval from the social order.

By introducing quotations from "traditions" into the plot, Hardy reveals their ethical inefficiency and epistemological incompetence. An ironic soliloquy from the young Jude expecting a miracle on the road to Christminster proves the futility of the lesson toiled by the Church:

*People say that, if you prayed, things sometimes came to you, even though they sometimes did not. He had read in a tract that a man who had begun to build a church, and had no money to finish it, knelt down and prayed, and the money came in by the next post. Another man tried the same experiment, and the money did not come, but he found afterwards that the breeches he knelt in were made by a wicked Jew.* (JO, I, 3: 21)

Hardy's grim irony accompanies this passage. What is parodied here is people's blind faith in the sacred texts, but in a wider sense it is ideology that is criticised for its mystification employed to rule human minds, constrain changes in socio-political life, and protect the establishment by the dominant power order. When compared to the overarching message of the text: "The Letter Killeth", the scene has a very bitter meaning, also deployed by other acts of quoting throughout the novel.

While commenting on the rôle of literary texts in *Jude*, Patricia Ingham indicates the analogous, piercing attitude of the narrator to both Christian and secular quotations alike: "it is not only the irrelevance and ironic futility of Christian belief which is the point; frequently secular allusions do no more in their fragmented form than encapsulate what Jude and the narrator already know - that pain, injustice, and disillusionment are commonplace" (2000: 25). This sudden need to lay claim to the authority of the Bible is
the effect of the socio-cultural communication typical of his society. Each cultural society operates with sayings and proverbs which derive from the archive of different ideological currents. The narrative structure reflects an automatic way of thinking through which they are introduced into circulation. The need to quote and to appeal to the authorities is presented in the novel as an inescapable effect of ideological indoctrination. By using authorial quotations Hardy actually denies the role of authority as well as the sense of a quoting act as such. The writer's irony unveils the mockery of a quoting ritual being in fact an act of social imitation.

Hardy uses both quotations and semantic figures to produce the same allegorical effect — the distancing of the narrator from the text. To identify these configurations we have to trace the level of mimetic representation and seek similarities on the level of symbolic significance. A motif of disillusionment with textual archetypes, can be found in diverse narrative figures: the tablets of the Ten Commandments, the mason's craft, the architecture of Christminster, or Marygreen's social conduct. To echo Riffaterre: significance ensues when "the same words signify through their relationship with structural invariants" (1980: 625-626). This theme variant is replayed by other signs, which betray their ambiguous meaning when contrasted with the poetics of quotation. When related to the text's semantics, quotations speak with a different voice — they reveal the pernicious and corrosive influence of the institutionalised knowledge which deprives people of social independence and curbs their free choices.

The most striking example of such a peril is presented in the scene with the Ten Commandments (JO, V, 6), the tablets of which are to be renovated by Jude and Sue in the church. The ambiguous marital status of the couple causes a scandal that ultimately results in their dismissal. The inscribed image of the Ten Commandments conveys the power of religion through biblical written instructions on how to live and how to think.
A famous phrase used by Hardy as the novel’s motto, “The Letter killeth” (2 Cor 3.6), is the most obvious illustration of that problem. In the novel, systematised education brings about lethal results, in the most literal sense. This could be the “Letter” in the name of which Christminster denies Jude entrance to the elite society of students (JO, IV, 2: 207), the letter of the law by which Arabella demands her rights as Jude’s wife (JO, IV, 5: 236), or that for which Sue wants to sacrifice herself as a wife to Phillotson (JO, IV, 3: 224-225). These complex narrative components of the plot confirm the same destructive influence of “The Letter” as that contained in small semantic figures such as an image of the Ten Commandments or a quotation misinterpreted by Jude. Thus they play a poetical rôle as metaphor and metonymy which together represent the official knowledge underlying the rules of conduct in society.

A walk in Oxford exposes Jude to the architecture of the city, which in a figurative sense suggests conventions of which both Jude and the city are the “products”. The scene in Christminster is a good example of an “invariant game” pointing to a double layer of meaning: mimetic, as the realistic description of the setting, and figurative, as a comment on the rôle of ideology.

After a night spent speaking to the Christminster ghostly fathers, Jude embarks on a journey to the town centre to find employment as a mason. Looking around the mason’s yard full of “the new traceries, mullions, transoms, shafts, pinnacles, and battlements” (JO, II, 2: 84), Jude suddenly realises that “here in the stone yard was a centre of effort as worthy as that dignified by the name of scholarly study within the noblest of the colleges. But he lost it under stress of his old idea” (JO, II, 2: 85). This observation is extremely important for the text’s poetics. It reveals Jude’s ardent belief in the inherent value in the work of masons and academicians, both dependent upon the

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constant repetition of the rules and codes imposed on them by their masters. As the
narrator reports: “Moreover he perceived that at best only coping, patching and
imitating went on here, which he fancied to be owing to some temporary and local
cause” (JO, II, 2: 85). The same words that might be regarded as a mimetic description
of the art of masonry bring forward their deeper sense when related to the art of writing.

By using quotations within the narrative, Hardy argues for their rôle in social
life. However, by operating with poetical images such as the one above, he also
undermines the aim of quoting, including his own within the novel. These double
meanings acted in the poetics of quotation underlay other stylistic figures. Through the
process of analysing one in relation to the other, it becomes clear that both the
quotations and the words of the author are proclaiming the same: quotations, likewise
words, texts, and stone constructs, are only reflections of the ideological order which
establishes conventions for social life and arts.

A symbolic parallel between the work of masons, who erect Christminster, and
the art of writing, which Hardy performs, is made clear through the use of the same
rhetoric. When Jude observes the city and her buildings, he does not simply see them,
but reads their “numberless architectural pages” (JO, II, 2: 84). The declining condition
of the aged monuments is called “the rottenness of these historical documents” (JO, II,
2: 84). In this description architecture comes to signify a written text which itself stands
for a textual artefact or evidence of the truth. The symbolic rhetoric of the “page” and
the “document” articulates the ideology of mimetic representation based on the belief
that representation is truth.

This poetical picture articulates the pre-modern and the modern attitudes to the
truth. In modern masonry, the stone becomes detached from the worker, just as at the
dusk of Classicism language became an object of articulation separated from its user. Jude
identifies this difference when looking at the Christminster buildings. He felt “Less as an
artist-critic of their forms than as an artizan and comrade of the dead handicraftsmen whose muscles had actually executed those forms” (JO, II, 2: 84). This is an important statement that distinguishes between an “artist” and an “artizan”, the early equivalents of a copyist and a creator. Once again it illustrates Jude’s natural innocence and creativity, and how easily these can be disturbed by the “artist-critic” equipped with such tools as: “precision, mathematical straightness, smoothness, exactitude” (JO, II, 2: 84). Masonry in the countryside, for its being based on instinctive methods, appears to Jude to be more real, more natural, than the Christminster systematically learnt stone-craft. In the town methods he can see the same lacks that characterise the ideology of the authorial systems which are criticised by the narrator on a metatextual level: both the town masonry and the establishment believe in “copying” and “patching” as the only reliable ways of educational practice and they both trust rational reasoning as the only guarantee of order. In the description of the town masons’ tools an adjective, “new”, is used to make the gap between these two masonry styles meaningful. The “new” responds to a copy, the only attainable form of art by the end of nineteenth-century, while “the old” equals an original, forgotten form marked with “jagged curves, disdain of precision, irregularity, disarray”. (JO, II, 2: 85)

Mechanical copying, applying mathematical calculations, is based on the rationalised attitude of masons to their work, an attitude typical of intellectual and economic thinking in post-classicism. In contrast, dissipated antique disarrays and irregularities produced by the old masonry are primitively genuine due to their being free from systematic conventions.

This difference between old and new masonry signifies the difference between the “old times” and the “new times”. “New times” Hardy defines as modernity, are opposed to the idealised ahistorical Romantic past when people lived according to their natural passions and desires. Vertically, beyond the Romantic tradition, there is a
reference to the mythical past understood as the former blissful times when the Old Order was still a reliable cause. Knowing that the Old Order is irrevocably lost, Hardy locates the desired pre-modern idyll in some vague and unspecified dimension of myth, which is constantly pursued by Jude.

This can be compared to the mythological paradises of John Milton and William Blake, who depicted human innocence from the time before Man committed the first sin of eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. As we know, this knowledge, signified in the novel as the ideology of education, brings about Jude’s failure. Therefore, the prelapsarian harmony responds to a state of self-realisation and freedom: a state before language was corrupted in the service of the economy and intellect. Jude’s quest for the ideal unity of emotion and reason is also a polemical allusion to Shelley’s concept of unifying transcendence through the act of love. Shelley’s concept of love, just as Jude’s innocent nature reflected in his approach to other people, animals, and most of all to Sue, was at its basis a pure unifying human force. Kenneth Neil Cameron points out, that Shelley’s understanding of love involved “variant manifestations [of] biological, psychological, and social-sexual love, romantic love, friendship, love of humanity, love of nature” (1973: 8). As Samuel Lyndon Gladden notices, this human force was in Shelley “the agent that incites man to action” (Gladden 2002: 127) and leads finally to the improvement of society and its rules. In his essay On Love (1818), Shelley points at the “contingencies between the love’s movements and the individual’s engagements with the world around him” (Gladden 2002: 123). Jude’s intellectual desire and his passion for Sue were supposed to be, like in Shelley’s essay “a democratizing force” (Gladden 2002: 121) which “dissolves all manner of individual difference and erases modes of division” (Gladden 2002: 121). An idealistic psycho-intellectual connection he established with Sue was to overcome all social obstacles, but the will of the lovers did not suffice to abolish the restrictions imposed on them by
social conventions. In *Love's Philosophy* (1819), Shelley drew such an ideal picture of liberated lovers, who not only gain the erotic satisfaction from their relationship, but also “the well-being of all people around through the occlusion of tyranny” (Gladden 2002:127). Within the poetics of *Jude*, or in its horizontal intertextual perspective, the Shelleyan harmony of body and soul is denied to the protagonist. Particularly the meaning of sexual sublime, so openly emphasised by Shelley, becomes distorted and disrupted when compared with the sexual fixation of both Jude and Sue, but also with Arabella’s regulated promiscuity and Phillotson’s ambiguous reticence. Such a comparison produces the effect of caricature of the Shelleyan ecstatic union of lovers, who in the novel change into frustrated, confused, unsatisfied, and unhappy heroes. In this respect, the polemical intertextuality identified in the novel, can be read as a tragic-ironic allusion to Shelley’s essays: *On Love* (1818), *Love’s Philosophy* (1819), as well as his poems: *Prometheus Unbound* (1819), *Alastor* (1815), *Epipsychidion* (1821), *Lion and Cythna* (1817) and *Hymn to Intellectual Beauty* (1816). In Hardy’s novel it is the nineteenth-century Christian-orientated politics that destroys the protagonists’ pure emotions and their idealist plans; while on the metatextual level it is the post-Classical (postlapsarian) economy of language that traumatically deludes the reader with the mimetic truth of representation.

Jude does not appreciate the precision of modernity achieved by rational tools. He is not one of the newly-skilled craft workers who appeal to mathematics while carving the stone. He remembers “old” methods still practiced in Alfredston, methods which...
the stone. He remembers "old" methods still practiced in Alfredston, methods which
demand passion for the art of masonry and physical devotion, methods which allow the
worker to feel part of nature in the same way that the body and the soul were united in
mythical paradise. Despite Jude's nostalgia, however, the narrator introduces
information which explicitly refutes the myth of the old classical order:

He did not at that time see that mediaevalism was as dead as a fern-leaf in a
lump of coal; that other developments were shaping in the world around him,
in which Gothic architecture and its associations had no place. The deadly
animosity of contemporary logic and vision towards so much of what he held
in reverence was not yet revealed to him. (JO, II, 2: 85)

It is not the first time that the narrator shows his superior knowledge in a very
traditional manner. The narrative, however, is structured in such a way as to produce
additional meanings by switching from one speaking voice to another thus confusing
the subjective and the objective narrative perspective. Hardy's method of feeding
Jude's innocence, only then to ridicule it within the narrative context, maps out the
text's allegorical (critical) meaning. The narrator's statement that "mediaevalism was as
dead as a fern-leaf in a lump of coal" draws attention to Hardy's radical reshaping of the
classical order. The ideal past is exhausted, presented as an archæological curiosity
symbolising a myth of textual but no ethical value. Yet does this mean that modernity is
the remedy for the exhaustion of the past? When Jude is walking "down obscure
valleys" of Christminster the narrator reports in the third-person voice:

Path porticoes, orielas, doorways of enriched and florid middle-age design,
their extinct air being accentuated by the rottenness of the stones. It seemed
impossible that modern thought could house itself in such decrepit and
superseded chambers. (JO, II, 1: 79)
This astute observation from the narrator is completed by an ironic comparison: “These were the ideas in modern prose which the lichen ed colleges presented in old poetry. Even some of these antiques might have been called prose when they were new” (JO, II, 2: 84).

This discussion of modernity and “old times” is marked by the narrator’s standpoint, which does not correspond to Jude’s. The above statements sound incredible in the young mason’s mouth. Critical comments on medieval and contemporary conventions come from the narrator, not from Jude, and they contribute more to the allegorical than to the realistic meaning of the text. While weighing “modern thought” against medieval “rottenness of the stones” the narrator imputes hope for change. Unfortunately, as later events demonstrate, any new wave of thinking will be suppressed by the traditional powers: Sue will not be strong enough to stand against a society which does not understand the modern ideals. Interestingly, as will be analysed in the next chapter, Sue does not comprehend them entirely either; Hardy in fact lampoons the superficial attitude of modernity’s defenders in the novel.

In its contemporary institutionalised form modernity is just another ideological formation and hence the focus for Hardy’s irony. An example is offered in the picture of the Artizans’ Mutual Improvement Society, “including Churchmen, Congregationalists, Baptists, Unitarians, Positivists, and others – Agnostics had been scarcely heard of at this time” whose common aim was “to enlarge their minds” (JO, V, 6: 304). The narrator who unveils the hypocrisy of the Society mocks the artificial ideals of promoting tolerance and self-development as constrained by the dominant ideology.

Supposedly modern, the members expel Jude from their organisation to avoid offending the official system. This is how the narrator describes Jude’s exclusion:

It was late when he arrived: all the others had come, and as he entered they looked dubiously at him, and hardly uttered a word of greeting. He guessed
that something bearing on himself had been either discussed or mooted.

Some ordinary business was transacted, and it was disclosed that the number of
subscriptions had shown a sudden falling off for that quarter. One member—a
really well-meaning and upright man—began to speaking in enigmas about
certain possible causes: that it behoved them to look well into their
constitution; for if the committee were not respected, and had not at least, in
their differences, a common standard CONDUCT, they would bring the
institution to the ground. Nothing further was said in Jude’s presence, but he
knew what this meant; and turning to the table wrote a note resigning his office
there and then. (JO, V, 6: 305)

The ironic approach of the narrator confirms his distrust in ideological manifestations of
any kind. Modernity understood as human freedom, as escape from ideological
constraints, is not crystallised in society yet; as Jude will say in the last chapter: “Our
ideas were fifty years too soon to be any good to us” (JO, VI, 11: 400). Jude’s personal
failure indicates that neither the past unity nor the modern autonomy is available in
reality. All his attempts to live in harmony appear futile and prove the impossibility of
paradise beyond ideological oppression. There is no escape from ideology in the novel’s
universe, just as there is no chance for redemption or restoration of the Old Order in
nineteenth-century society.

The final chapter of the novel significantly strengthens this thesis. The dying
Jude whispers fragments of the Book of Job, interrupted by the loud voices of the merry
crowd shouting “Hurrah!” Interestingly, Hardy added these quotations to the first
volume edition of the novel—they did not appear either in the manuscript or in the
serial. It was a conscious and considered decision of the writer to apply them to the
deathbed scene, summarising Jude’s struggle:
The hurrahs were repeated, drowning the faint organ notes. Jude’s face changed more: he whispered slowly, his lips scarcely moving:

"Let the day perish wherein I was born, and the night in which it was said, there is man child conceived?"

(Hurrha!)  
"Let the day be darkness; let no God regard it from above, neither let the light shine upon it. Lo, let that night be solitary, let no joyful voice come therein"  
(Hurrha!)  
"Why did I not from the womb? Why did I not give up the ghost when I came out of the belly?... For now should I have lain still and been quiet. I should have slept: then had I been at rest!"

(Hurrha!)  
"There the prisoners rest together; they hear not the voice of the oppressor... The small and the great are there: and the servant is free from his master. Wherefore is light given to him that is in misery, and life unto the bitter in soul." (Jo, VI, 11: 403)

The discourse of deterioration gains an additional illustration through the quotations’ application. Originally the Book of Job signifies suffering and helplessness and in the novel it heightens this effect. But does the quotation refer to Jude’s helplessness against God’s verdict? Do both Jude’s curse and Job’s curse derive from the same disappointment? Semantically the quotation does not expand the context of the text, for the narrator sufficiently elaborates on Jude’s pernicious decline. Is the quotation applied then to compare Jude’s fatal story to Job’s tragedy and to raise Jude’s status to that of a universal symbol? Without probing it in relation to the text’s allegorical poetics, the quotation from the Book of Job could be considered decorative embellishment.
However, Hardy’s use of the quotation is far more sophisticated and far less mechanical. It is not the content of the quotation, but rather the poetics of quoting which create the additional meaning in the last scene. Quoting the Book of Job does articulate Jude’s blasphemy (despite the novel never admitting Jude’s loss of faith) but what it also does is to justify Jude’s disappointment with textual artefacts, including the Bible. It is not Jude’s pain that the quotation immortalises; the poetical sense of this scene lies in the quotations’ mechanical recitation (quite implausible in a deathbed scenario) which Hardy then satirises. The ironic tone is produced by the iragi-comic context in which the quotation appears – dying Jude feverishly reciting the Bible seems to be an artificial figure subjected to some kind of automatic function. This is the same habitual function to which Drusilla, Wilbert, Arabella, Phillotson, and Sue submit when in need of an authoritative support to put forward or defend their argument. As argued above, quoting authorities is a rhetorical act which amounts to the use of power. Yet in the last scene Jude is alone, so why and for whom does he perform this rhetorical show while lying on his deathbed? In the mouth of Jude the quotation is subsumed by the act of quoting: a message from Job changed into a theatrical gesture which becomes a self-administered last rite.

The scene also shows that even when defeated by the text Jude habitually refers to it. Text becomes his second identity or, as in Foucauldian theory, the means of social communication. The last act of quoting accentuates Jude’s almost physical dependence on citation, which on a level of significance can be understood as a visible signature of power. Jude changes into its tool and in this sense, as Moore suggests, presents himself as a text:

Alive, he is an allegory of the monstrous power of romanticism in its Promethean sense; dead, he is an emblem of history, or of the history of romantic discourse now become “beautiful”, classical, and statuesque, an act
form without political force. In his last appearance, Jude is depicted as the beautiful and statuesque cadaver of sublime forms of culture. (1990: 231)

Jude's quest for the ideal "pre-linguistic" form of culture appears to be a Quixoteian fancy. "Sublime culture" never existed; as with any other form of culture it was a product of discourse, which had to submit to the dominant ideology. Quotations that appear to represent discourses in fact represent only their rhetoric. As observed in the text, ultimately neither is able to provide ethical support to the characters.

Jude's experience derives from the two apparently different areas: the town (mainly Christminster) and the country (mainly Marygreen). This division also corresponds to a division between the old (pre-modern) and the new (modern) world. Yet Jude cannot actualise his dream of self-realisation in either of these realities. Moore finds in these two worlds a reflection of two forms of culture from which Jude had become alienated: high Arnoldian culture represented by Christminster, and low Wordsworthian culture represented by Marygreen.

Jude begins his life in culture by rejecting his natural Wessex home; thus he alienates himself from Wordsworthian forms of inspiration and stability, from folk tradition and rural culture, as a means of heading "Thither" toward Christminster. After this initial alienation (which repeats the Shelleyan rejection of Wordsworth's conservatism), Jude engages Shelleyan figures of desire in his quest for Christminster, collectively the name of the romantic quester's desired goal. In his attempt to achieve that goal or realise it — he will learn that flexibility is what culture preaches but does not practice, that in fact his city of light is a dark and stony place of institutional power held by an aristocratic and elite clerisy. (Moore, 1990: 226)
Ideal unity, a unity which according to the Romantic tradition might have been achieved in Nature (symbolised by the rural Marygreen), appears to be affected by ideological factors in the same way that Christminster was. A pre-linguistic, or rather pre-textual, environment is already culturally mediated, expressed by Hardy in a poetical observation of Mr Troutham’s field: “in every clod and stone there really lingered associations enough to spare – echoes of songs from ancient days, of spoken words, and of sturdy deeds” (JO, I, 2: 14). The more obvious artifice of Marygreen life rests in the ideological, mercantile rituals in which the village is absorbed and by which it is organised: Arabella’s seduction of Jude, the slaughtering of the pig, artificial hair and dimples, the false pregnancy, and Vilbert’s false medicines. The innocence of the Marygreen rustics – which for the Romantics could have been taken as the epitome of transcendence – is not untarnished, and the writer’s ironical attitude towards them is quite clear. As Eagleton writes of Marygreen:

It is a depressed and ugly enclave by-passed by history, stripped of its thatched and dormered dwelling-houses as the tradesmen, craftsmen and lifeholders move from the land. Like the five bottles of sweets and three buns behind the oxidised panes of Drusilla Fawley’s shopwindow, Marygreen is a stale remnant, a plundered landscape denuded of its historical traditions. (1974: 14-15)

The failure of the Marygreen stage in Jude’s development can be seen as a figurative reference to the Wordsworthian concept of childhood as “the mythic archetype of the divine child of Nature” (Knoepflmacher 1977: 393). A polemical version of the luminous child from “Child of Joy” or “Ode: Intimations of Immortality” is implied in the picture of Jude’s miserable youth. Instead of an appreciation of the symbolic content of Nature, from early childhood Jude undergoes humiliation and disappointment because of the very earthly and economically determined circumstances. Nature, which in Wordsworth signifies the sublime harmony of desires, in Marygreen is
a brutal and manufactured version of human social politics. Being a child of the country (Nature), Jude saves the birds in Mr Troutham's field, but in return he is punished for the financial damage caused to the owner (Culture). The boy's natural personality, unaware of the economic and political rules of his society, earns constant criticism from his aunt Drusilla who tries to improve Jude's character by means of physical discipline reinforced by the Bible.

Jude's first love does not bring him satisfaction either, instead depriving him of his innocent trust in the courtship's verity, illustrated in the novel by Arabella: throwing chitterlings, wearing a hair extension, suffering from a false sting, and faking pregnancy. As a young man trusting in Arabella's natural beauty and her pure instincts, Jude is wounded by her cruel tricks for which he has to pay the price. It is the artful deceit of Arabella and Dr Vilbert (who sold Jude his first book20) that violates his innocence and honesty, whilst also condemning him to the pain of disillusionment. Arabella's animalistic ability to adjust to the insidious conditions of society, on the other hand, pays off in the future when she wins a new suitor in the hour of her husband's death. As it has been frequently stated before, it is a blind survival instinct and a non-reflexive approach of Arabella that victoriously supersedes over Jude's intellectual fixation. Penny Boumelha, considering Arabella's role from a feminist standpoint, argues, that Arabella "is a kind of surrogate mother for the orphan Jude" (1982:217). This anthropologically grounded model of First Mother, or mother-earth which is implied in Arabella's irresistible sexuality and fecundity does not explain, however, her psycho-sociological motivation boosted by the village hierarchical and institutionalised structure. Although it is quite apparent throughout the novel that Jude's increasing weakness secures Arabella's steadfast bloom, it does not mean that her bountiful pagan-like sexual freedom can relieve Jude from the anguish of
social oppression. To support such an argument, Boumelha points at the scene in Christminster hotel where through the sexual act with Arabella Jude feels “whisked back to his milk-fed infancy” (1982:217). In the light of my analysis penetrating both metatextual and textual language of the novel, this scene shows a failure of the mythical concept of the prelapsarian infancy, and it draws our attention to the ambiguity of both characters’ reasoning. Arabella’s meticulous and mercenary motives do not suit the picture of mythical mother earth entirely liberated from any political and economic strains. The actual history behind Arabella’s sham is Hardy’s parody of moral and ethical laws of the village subordinated to the laws of the social and political discourses which the Marygreenians enact. By misrepresenting Arabella Hardy shatters the illusion of pagan paradise and innocent heathen. He shows us that the idea of the un tarnished land, popularised in literature and painting (for example, through the eighteenth-century romantic descriptions of the liberal Encyclopedists exploring the savage lands, such as Denis Diderot, Jean le Rond D’Alembert, Georges Buffon, Francois Rousseau), and symbolised in the onomastic pun, i.e. mar(r)y green, was in fact a culturally-politically conjured creation.

Marygreen, despite the rustic charm of its remote landscape, belongs in fact to the world of modern culture and civilisation ordained by artifice. It is a polemical allusion by Hardy, who argues the Romantic idea of the genuine Nature incarnating the Deity. In the light of late nineteenth-century empiricism and according to Hardy’s own views, Wordsworth’s philosophy was not adequate and could not offer a satisfying solution to modern society. Furthermore, as Hardy clearly depicts, the idea of the “child of joy” living on the bosom of nature is grounded on a false assumption that nature remains uncorrupted by social conventions.

29 Vilbert’s role is not only that of the local provider of textbooks (e.g. canonic knowledge), but, as Penny Boumelha suggests, Vilbert also equips local women with abortion pills which Arabella might have used to miscarriage her putative pregnancy (see Boumelha 1982: 215-220)
On the other hand, idealised Christminster tempts with the force of intellect embodied in the city's majestic shape, first glimpsed by Jude from a distance:

Some way within the limits of the stretch of landscape, points of light like the topaz gleamed. The air increased in transparency with the lapse of minutes, till the topaz points showed themselves to be the vanes, windows, wet roof slates, and other shining spots upon the spires, domes, freestone-work, and varied outlines that were faintly revealed. It was Christminster, unquestionably; either directly seen, or miraged in the peculiar atmosphere. The spectator gazed on and on till the windows and vanes lost their shine, going out almost suddenly like extinguished candles. The vague city became veiled in mist.

Turning to the west, he saw that the sun had disappeared. The foreground of the scene had grown funerally dark, and near objects put on the hues and shapes of chimeras. (JO, I, 3: 21)

This city of light and reason is portrayed as “the Heavenly Jerusalem” or the “Promised Land”. The picture is intensified by poetical imagery of a religious atmosphere of some kind, or of a mysterious ritual accompanied by lustrous colours and immaterial lines.

Christminster offers an idealised promise of emotional and intellectual self-realisation for Jude. He perceives it as a holy place which lives rather in his imagination than in reality. The narrator subtly emphasises that idealised and irrational approach by locating Christminster in heaven: “There actually rose the faint halo, a small dim nebulousness, hardly recognizable save by the eye of faith” (JO, I, 11: 74). At the same time Jude’s “faith” is explained by the narrator as an inherent feature of the protagonist, who cannot help searching for the ideal order: “It had been the yearning of his heart to find something to anchor on, to cling to” (JO, I, 3: 25).

Throughout the novel we observe Jude’s quest for that so very human, and yet so very unobtainable goal: Jude seeks the pre-linguistic unity of mind and flesh, that same
unity desired by Milton in *Paradise Lost* (1667) and by Blake in his *Songs of Innocence and of Experience* (1794). That mythical unity, however, can not resist a social order of people competing for power. The novel depicts the destruction of this prelapsarian harmony by the ideological constructs of knowledge employed on behalf of power. In cultural societies, as Foucault (1980) observes, knowledge is formed within the context of power as inseparable from its regimes. In *Jude*, Christminster is a vehicle of knowledge administered by Christian politics, and as such, cannot be regarded as a mythical centre. As a discourse contributing to the proliferation of power, Christminster does not lead to freedom or transcendence but rather to didacticism and hierarchical rigidity.

Before realising that education will not guarantee the perfect completion of his needs, Jude believes in University as the place of intellectual enlightenment and moral refinement. Even though so difficult to reach, the ideal of Christminster is perpetuated by Jude’s trust. A further sequence of events will prove that naïve faith is not enough to restore a pre-modern order of things. As argued above, the idealistic belief that knowledge could be identified with transcendence and thus open a way to spiritual transition does not meet the conditions of political hierarchy and the ideological caveats of Oxford. In this contrast lies Hardy’s intertextual polemic, with the promise of a perfectly fulfilling education as promoted by Matthew Arnold (1865):

> Academies consecrate and maintain [intellectual requisites], and therefore a nation with an eminent turn for them naturally establishes academies. So far as routine and authority tend to embarrass energy and inventive genius, and, to this extent, to the human spirit’s general advance. But then this evil is so much compensated by the propagation, on a large scale, of the mental aptitudes and demands which an open mind and a flexible intelligence naturally engender, genius itself, in the long run, so greatly finds its account in this propagation,
and bodies like general advance of the human spirit is perhaps, on the whole, rather furthered than impeded by their experience. (1958: 443)

According to Arnold's standards Jude would be one of the best candidates, demonstrating as he does "an open mind and a flexible intelligence" with a "bent toward the things of the mind, towards culture, towards clearness, correctness and propriety in thinking and speaking" (1958: 445). Yet the refining process of education suggested by Arnold was not supposed to involve people from the lower classes, and this was soon painfully experienced by Jude, who then had to reinvent his ideals.

Jude's fate reveals weaknesses in both the rational educational programme of Oxford aesthetes as represented by Arnold, and in the idealistic programme based on faith in the transcendental potential of nature as represented by the Romantics. A dreamy vision -- "The Christminster sentiment" (JO, II, 2: 86) (based on Jude's instinctive, untarnished precognition) -- will emerge as a metonymy of rationalism, dogmatism, social discrimination, and scholastic subservience. This latter sense was tangibly expressed in the pictures of the masons' mechanical work (JO, II, 2), the scene of the Ten Commandments (JO, V, 6), the quotations from the fathers of Christminster, but also in the allusion from the local coal carter travelling through Marygreen, who explains to Jude that education and religion promoted by Christminster is the effect of training. In the carter's view, knowledge results from poor dexterity which he compares to the skill at speaking "foreign tongues used before the flood" (JO, I, 3: 24). The meditative method of interpretation and creation is most symbolically illustrated in the story told by Sue concerning her blasphemous creation of a New Testament. Inciting Jude's "sense of sacrilege" (JO, III, 4: 152) Sue acknowledges that:

I altered my old one [New Testament] by cutting up all the Epistles and Gospels into separate brochures, and re-arranging them in chronological order as written, beginning the book with Romans, following on with the Early
Epistles, and putting the Gospels much further on. Then I had the volume rebound. My University friend Mr.— but never mind his name, poor boy— said it was an excellent idea. I know that reading it afterwards made it twice as interesting as before, and twice as understandable. (JO, III, 4: 152)

Sue’s act of re-arranging the biblical text can be perceived as an allegory (or a fable) of intertextual reading. It foretells the innovative attempts of such twentieth-century writers as Samuel Beckett, James Joyce, Strindberg, and Kafka (Schweik 1994) who tried to reinvigorate literature by commixing accidental excerpts from wildly different genres to create a new text—an amalgamation of intertexts. In Jude this amalgamation is signified by the use of the indefinite article for naming “a New Testament” (JO, III, 4: 152). Jude’s desired “text”, symbolised in Christminster, appears as the archive of ideological discourses, or, as could be said today, a chaos of intertexts whose authoritative standings the novel reflects.

What is important in Hardy’s intertextual discussion is that no ideology of philosophical theory remains predominant. “Documents” of medieval thought as well as contemporary movements are considered by the narrator to be exhausted, yet there is no new concept to replace them. Texts neither buttress intellectual advance nor provide ethical direction; they constrain the protagonists’ behaviour and erode their autonomy. Different systems of thinking, represented in acts of quoting as well as in allegorical figures, conflict with each other with no positive solution. The novel shows characters struggling with ideological obstacles but all in vain. None of them will find satisfaction: Sue will subordinate herself to the fallacy of the Christian punishing hand; Jude will fall to the law deceitfully executed by Arabella. Painful experience does not ultimately cause their mutiny against the system. In Jude, intellectual experience, instead of wrath, brings forward servility and decline.
As was investigated above, poetical implications correspond to the structure of the narrative and deconstruct ideological systems that the characters have to obey. The poetics of authorial quotation reveal the author’s scepticism regarding authorities and their ideological practices. Authority is represented in a metonymic way: through quotations, titles or writers’ descriptive names or their characteristic features, and symbolically through semantic figures. Quotations articulate a mimetic relationship between ideological powers known to the reader from external reality. Therefore overt quotations reflect the parole of Hardy’s contemporaries, who must, however, live within an ideologically settled langue. The poetics of quotation focus not on the quotation’s meaning but on the manner in which the quotation is used. Hardy pinpoints a repetitive and subservient manner of authorial quoting, characteristic of members of institutionalised cultures. By referring to the authorities, his protagonists restate the social and political order which was imposed on them. Hardy’s use of quotations is underpinned by irony: through his ironic distance, or a “distanced game” with quotations the writer undertakes a critique of ideological status quo of his times.

Through constant negations and reinterpretation of references, Hardy achieves a polyphonic discussion and an ambiguous narrative, while through the narrative context he denies the ethical value of quoting. This multi-levelled semantic effect can be fully appreciated when different levels of the narrative are read in reference to each other. According to Riffaterre such a reading is necessary to understand “that several statements are indeed connected, despite their differences, through their identical relationship with another statement, [only then] we realize that they are, so to speak, reformulations or translations into different codes of an archetypal message” (1980: 626). “The archetypal message” in Jude is reformulated on both the textual and the metatextual level. Observed from this double perspective, the novel becomes a critique of power relations which, as Foucault voices, permeates all levels of social existence.
and is therefore to be found operating at every facet of social life – as much in the public sphere as in the private (1980: 119).

Having analysed the rôle of quotation in a formal context, in the next chapter I will discuss how quotation articulates the sphere of personal feelings.
Chapter II
Metaphor – Quoting Feelings

The previous chapter investigated metonymic relations between the quotations and their external sources. This chapter turns to consider quotations and allusions as metaphors reflected in the text’s poetics. It is taken into account here that a metaphor, being a sign in the text, claims its metonymic affinity with the signified, but as a trope it contributes differently to the text’s poetics and maps out the relationships between unrelated signifiers. After Jakobson, it is accepted that the metaphoric mode equals the poetic mode of a literary text (1960: 350-77); but at the same time, as David Lodge asserts:

The metaphoric work cannot totally neglect metonymic continuity if it is to be intelligible at all. Correspondingly, the metonymic text cannot eliminate all signs that it is available for metaphorical interpretation. (1977: 111)

In this argument, metaphor will be interpreted in its double rôle: as a poetical figure articulating the use of quotation, and as a metonymy of the quotation’s source recognised in reality. At first glance this may appear to be a similar path of research to that pursued in Chapter I, where the figurative rôle of metonymy was investigated, but the figurative relation between the two tropes is not equal. Although all signs in realistic prose function as metonymy, not all play the poetical rôle of metonymy. Metaphorical quotations, as well as the metonymic and symbolic, refer to the external signified via graphical pointers, but their main rôle is to articulate the meaning via semantic referral, or in other words, “transformed literalism” (Preminger 1993: 761).

In Classical poetics, metaphor was the most significant feature of poetic style, utilised to convey a relation between two conceptual domains of meaning. In rhetoric, a metaphor is a figure of speech which substitutes an “alien” name for a common name, or, as Aristotle writes in Poetics, it “is the application of the name of a thing to something
else" (1970: 57). He goes on to define the relation between the two as "working either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by proportion" (1970: 57). What is common for all those categories is searching for semblance by Aristotle classified in terms of simile ("the difference is but slight": 1924 III: 1406b), although a simile involves a more visually inclined relationship (because of its "like" or "as if"). Yet, as Terence Hawkes argues, "simile is metaphor’s poor relation, offering only the bare bones of the transferring process in the form of a limited analogy or comparison, whose range is narrow, because pre-determined" (1972: 3).

Transformed by the following generations of philosophers and critics, this approach contributed to contemporary linguistics and semiotics (S. R. Levin, Umberto Eco, Michael Riffaterre), pragmatics (Ted Cohen, John Searle, Herbert Grice), anthropology (B. L. Whorf and Edward Sapir, Claude Levi-Strauss, Margaret Mead) and, partly, phenomenology (Paul Ricoeur, I. A. Richards, Max Black, Monroe Beardsley). Despite differences between these theories, most of them share the view that there is a pre-existing sphere of thought which is to be translated into its mutative equivalent derived from an "insight into likeness" (Aristotle). As noted by Paul Ricoeur, metaphors, symbols, metonymies, and any figure of speech, carries figurative (metaphorical) meaning which

Assumes the nature of a body by displaying forms and traits which usually characterize the human face, man’s “figure”; it is as though the tropes gave to discourse a quasi-bodily externalization. By providing a kind of figurability to the message, the tropes make discourse appear. (1978: 144)

Ricoeur points here to the linguistic materiality of metaphors, which rests in their “ability to set before the eyes the sense that they display” (emphasis added; 1978: 144). Ricoeur defines this model of metaphor as “the picturing function of metaphorical meaning” and attributes it to the “semantic rôle of imagination (and by implication
feeling)" which precedes and determines metaphorical discourse (Ricoeur's emphasis; 1978: 144). In Jude we observe quotations which metaphorically express the characters' feelings and their actions. In the traditional sense, they picture (in a kind of unusual "alien" way) the prior idea of the author.

Nonetheless, as this analysis will show, the art of metaphorical quotations in Jude lies not only in expressing the qualities of characters and their feelings, but also in expressing the textual origin of those qualities and feelings. This argument is based on the overarching thesis in my analysis, that Hardy's quotations play an allegorical role in the text's poetics intentionally playful and self-referential. Therefore the Ricoeurian concept of the "semantic imagination" preceding the use of metaphor will be understood here in terms of the effort of the "textual imagination" engaged in the material and dynamic rather than intuitive and spiritual act of writing.

Understood as a vehicle of metaphorical meaning, quotation transposes the prosaic quality of narration into figurative discourse. Plett calls such quotations "poetic": "As compared to the non-poetic types of quotation (such as the authoritative ones discussed in the first chapter), the poetic quotation is characterised by its lack of an immediate practical purpose" (1991: 14). In this sense its rôle is similar to Jakobson's concept of metaphor as a part of the poetic function of communication which articulates the presupposed meaning in an unrelated way (without practical purpose). Plett discusses two versions of quotation's application: "poeticizing" and "depoeticizing", depending on the contextual environment. In rhetorical terms, it is as an aesthetic stimulus that forms the literal in the abstract. The aim lies in ornamental effect "less subordinated to the normative forces of a communicative situation" (Plett 1991: 14), so important in authoritative argumentation. A poetical quotation applied to prose would mean semantic redundancy in Jakobson's sense, but signified by the presence of
My first observation is that through the use of metaphorical quotations, with which characters identify, Hardy attacks the imaginary force of textual artefacts. For the Romantics this force was considered the source of both transcendence and the artist’s soul. The Romantic soul, which in Romanticism was supposed to regenerate society and over-throw outmoded conventions, in Jude becomes textual cliché transferred into situational parodies. The most provoking effect Hardy achieves by equipping his protagonists with the absolute faith in those clichés, which serve as the articulation of the characters’ inner turmoil. Although punished by the law of the letter, Jude and Sue, as Romantic poets, trust that the letter (in the novel symbolised by quotations, allusions and epigraphs) can readily represent their own views and feelings. Yet in Hardy’s poetics there is another layer of significance which repeals the novel’s apparent dogmatism. This has an allegorical significance, identified by Hardy’s use of irony that informs his Modernist dialectical approach. Preminger explains the dialectics of modern irony: “irony would free the mind from both the scenic and the narrative continuities of romantic art, and the self-reflexive features would allow the full legislative energies of the work of art to serve as direct testimony to spiritual powers irreconcilable with the realm of appearances” (1993: 793). Within such dialectically structured narration, the primary casual relationship between the symbolic order and the social order loses its legitimacy.

Hardy’s method is aimed at a realistic presentation of characters who psychologically identify themselves with the meaning of a particular quotation and who enact it realistically in the situational context. Yet it is the situational or the narrative context that determines the ironic effect. By contrasting the quotation’s semantic
domain and the semantics of the narrative, Hardy constructs a metaphorical figure which operates on an allegorical level. Only when read in relation to other quotations and their symbolic equivalents, does this figure add to the critical level of the novel.

Most of the metaphorical quotations in *Jude* are based on comparisons. In consequence they could be treated as similes, yet, as noticed by Aristotle, the effect relates to a metaphorical juxtaposition of two semantic domains. Semantic markers used by the narrator denote a comparative relation between the quotation and the context. They appear in the form of adverbial expressions: “as if”, “akin”, “like”, “things as”, “by an ache”, or verb-function descriptive parts: “will find himself saying”, “seemed mately to say”, “I am not to be one of”. Their role is to signify the shared properties of referents. Hardy introduces metaphorical quotations as an equivalent of the characters’ emotions. Quotations might appear without any comment – in a direct way, or preceded by the narrator’s introduction. In both cases the narrative scene is arranged to permit a speaker to use a quotation with relevance to the narrative context.

Metaphorical quotations are applied mainly to articulate the emotional and psychological states of the characters. It is entirely understandable that they mostly refer to Sue and Jude. Their overabounding knowledge of miscellaneous texts enables them to quote profusely throughout the novel. Sue’s eloquent pose attain its metaphorical position in Chapter 6 of Part II of the novel in a description by Aunt Drusilla recalling Sue’s performance as a girl at school:

...She would knit her little brows and glare round tragically, and say to the empty air, as if some real creature stood there –

“Ghastly, grim, and ancient raven,

Tell me what thy lordly name is,

On the night’s Plutonian shore!” (JO, II, 6: 111)
Although it is hard to believe that an elderly aunt still remembers lines from Poe’s 1845 poem “The Raven” so exactly, by directly referring to the poem the narrator informs his reader of Sue’s extraordinary ability to identify with literary words (“as if some real creature stood there”). In her relationship with Jude, she will utilise the same emphatic manner when invoking poetical and philosophical texts to enunciate her close emotional affinity with them. Although there is no narrative information pointing to a comparison, it is signified by a verb (“I felt”), which presupposes “like”:

When I was in my saddest, rightest mind I always felt,

“O ghastly glories of saints, dead limbs of gibbeted Gods”... (JO, III, 4: 150)

Sue’s rejection of Christian religion is clearly expressed in one line from Swinburne’s “Hymn to Proserpine” (1866). Neither the title nor the author of the poem is mentioned in the text. What is important here is the particular content which articulates, metaphorically, Sue’s similar attitude to Christianity, an attitude endorsed by quotation marks and inherited from the intertextual archive. It conveys her hostility and disdain towards a naïve religious faith. Naming the author of the quotation is not necessary.

₁ There is a discrepancy in the poem as quoted, possibly a school-girl error by Sue or perhaps a memory error in the part of her aunt or of Hardy. The original lines (verses 46-47) in “The Raven” are:

Ghastly grim and ancient raven
Wondering from the Nightly shore
Tell me what Thy lordly name is
On the Night’s Plutonian shore! (Poe 1845: 1)

₂ Although only one line is used in the published edition, two additional lines are present in the manuscript (M: 154). Through these extra lines Hardy is able to articulate more strongly Sue’s deviation from the Christian creed:

O ghastly glories of saints, dead limbs of gibbeted Gods!
Though all men abase them before you in spirit, & all knees bend,
I kneel not neither adore you, but standing, look to the end. (M: 154)
necessary; decoding the source will not enrich the semantics of a figurative comparison. A notoriously scandalous rhyme from *Poems and Ballads* is metonymically represented in Sue’s act of reading Swinburne twice in the novel (JO, II, 3: 96; JO, III, 4:150), each time in the same barbarian context. This can be seen as an act of defiance towards Christian devoutness, which contrasts with Jude’s ideological standpoint. Sue identifies with the content of Swinburne’s text in the same way she ‘felt’ a verse from Poe. Metaphorical analogy projects Sue’s feelings into the narrative. Her identification creates an allegorical picture: Sue exists among the pictures of reality reflected in texts she knows, and by quoting, she tries to become one of them.

Before Sue starts reciting *Epipsychidion* herself, she coyly asks Jude to describe her using Shelley’s words:

> Say those pretty lines, then, from Shelley’s *Epipsychidion* as if they meant me!

She solicited, slanting up closer to him as they stood. (JO, IV, 6: 244)

Jude replies that he does not know poetry, hence she decides to recite it herself, making a direct connection between her person and a romantic heroine:

> “There was a Being whom my spirit oft
> Met on its visioned wandering far aloft.
> .................................
> A seraph of Heaven, too gentle to be human,
> Veiling beneath that radiant form of woman” (JO, IV, 6: 245)

Does this evoke Sue’s self-representation as a sensitive, ethereal, and mysterious figure? Rather, it is the effect of the author’s decision to parody Sue’s behaviour as encoded in “pretty lines” from Romantic poems. Through Sue’s use of quotation Hardy cloys (and deploys) Romantic tradition as a cliché itself, and hence its contribution to the text as a non-material (Plett 1991: 7) quotation, or generic (Wheeler 1979: 19) type of

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1 Sue recites lines 190-191 and 21-22 of Shelley’s 1821 poem *Epipsychidion*. 
intertextuality. Sue's reactions might be read as an ironic polemic against Pater's "Winckelmann" (1867). As David J. De Laura suggests, "Sue, as the 'epicure of the emotions', with her 'curiosity to hunt up a new sensation' and her desire to 'burn with experiences', may reflect Hardy's reading of Pater" (1969: 89).

In her pretentious pose, however, Sue becomes a parody of the Romantic type, here exemplified by Shelley, Swinburne, and Poe. As in her childhood, she immediately identifies with the piece and almost melts into a Shelleyan bride, as if losing all sense of reality. That psycho-physiological exaggeration is both emphasised and ridiculed in her exclamation: "O it is too flattering, so I won't go on! But say it's me! — say it's me!" (JO, IV, 6: 245). Parodied in this scene are Sue's spontaneous passion, visionary exaltation, and simulated originality. Through this intertextual debate, Hardy is able to poke fun at the fundamentals of the Romantic tradition, particularly the Romantic faith in innocence, transcendental inspiration, and genial creativity. Sue is not an innocent creator of her own character for she articulates herself artificially to make an impression on others and uses a mirror (or a shield?) of literature to absorb that impression as her natural pose. We can say, after Plett, that by this figurative use of quotation the romantic texts become "depoeticized": deprived of its original high aesthetic value by being transplanted onto a contrasting and low context. In this way Romantic discourse is represented as textually rather than divinely determined. When considered on an allegorical level, the quotation's application is in fact a figurative misapplication that, traditionally, is the first condition of irony.

Being enthusiastic readers, the protagonists filter reality through the written texts and try to tune their own life to literature. Sue tries to imitate the Shelleyean bride in response to Jude's delight in her figure. The poem's words qualify Jude's opinion and allow Sue to enact the pattern drawn from her textualised experience. This citation from Shelley materialises the Romantic pose she adopted for her love life; but she also refers
to Browning, Swinburne and contemporary philosophers whose texts refer to the social and political circumstances with which she has to cope. Nevertheless, we don't need to know the original sources she evokes to understand Sue's motivation for citation.

As Joan Grundy indicates in relation to Hardy's theatrical acts, "The language of melodrama is primarily not one of words, but one of action and spectacle" (1979: 91). Sue's spectacle is performed according to textual patterns and it is writing which determines her character. This is emphasised by Hardy through the use of quotation marks singled out within the narration as "foreign" graphic annotations. Thus the realism of the characters is overtly grounded on intertextuality which contributes to the text's semantics. Sue embodies the Romantic faith in the truth of the texts, which she wants to actualise in life. In this sense she recalls Madame Bovary (from Flaubert's 1856 novel of the same name) who was unable to accept reality, and thus tried to create her own from the textual paradigms she was taking for real. Like Madame Bovary, Sue mimics texts in her acts of quoting as if her real life were not satisfying enough.

Although Hardy builds Sue's story upon a theme different from Flaubert's, both novels are concerned with the deceitfulness of a literary language to which both heroines blindly submit. It is worth noting that both authors attempt to express their disappointment with reality, a point entirely missed by their audiences. Flaubert's work even being hailed as a masterpiece of Realism.¹ Both works also demonstrate the authors' distrust of mimetic representation and language's originality. Through Sue's highly artificial behaviour (motivated by reading as was Emma Bovary's), Hardy points out the problems associated with the imitative nature of textual patterns and the disillusion of language. Therefore Sue and Jude's obsession with reading is satirised and

¹ Flaubert wrote to Mme Roger des Genettes at the time of finishing *Madame Bovary*: "People believe that I am drawn to reality, whereas I loathe it: for it was out of hatred for realism that I undertook this novel." (Hemnings 1978: 160).
the texts’ moral intent is refused to them. The expression of feelings developed through and by the texts functions in the novel as an allegory of literary artifice. Jude articulates this side of Sue’s nature when he notes: “Her being able to talk learnedly showed that she was mistress of herself again” (JO, III, 6: 168).

In an attempt to build her confidence sufficiently to enable her to formalise her relationship with Jude, Sue sings Thomas Campbell’s song “The First Kiss” (1802):

Sue taking his arm and murmuring as they walked on homeward:

“Can you keep the bee from ranging,
Or the ring-dove’s neck from changing?
No! Nor fetter’s love…” (JO, V, 3: 272)

In the manuscript Hardy used four lines of Campbell’s stanza:

Can you keep the bee from ranging,
Or the ring-dove’s neck from changing?
No! Nor fetter’s love

In the knot there’s from dying no untying. (M: 287).

Hardy alludes to the same poem in the penultimate chapter of _Under the Greenwood Tree_ (“The Knot there’s no Untying”). As Dennis Taylor suggests in _Under the Greenwood Tree_ Hardy refers to the first stanza to symbolise the permanent knot of pastoral marriage, while in _Jude_ the author “by contrast critiques marriage and so quotes Campbell’s last stanza” (Jude 1998: 448). Although unintentional, Taylor’s astute observation supports my thesis that quotations, when interpreted as poetical figures, do not need to be examined against their sources as the sources are annulled in favour of the new context in the moment of their selection. The processes of selection and also the editorial manipulation of the original text demonstrate that the source cannot be treated as a fixed entity in relation to which we interpret the posterior text, but rather as a constantly changing stream of meanings depending on the writer’s artistic needs.
As Taylor acknowledges, the meanings restored from the original poem act differently in the context of the two novels. I argue that quotations, when overtly signified by the author, serve as the capsules of affirmed messages without roots. Due to the graphical marks, quotations are affiliated with external sources, but the original content of those sources does not participate in the text's semantics. However, it is exactly that affiliation, not the source, that Hardy utilises in *Jude* for his allegorical discussion of the role of sources in representation. The content of the quotation speaks for itself. It does not need to be authorised; there is no narrative comment added. The song metaphorically expresses Sue's desire to win. We know from the narrative context that she wants to encourage herself to undertake a step towards marriage with Jude. The only way she knows is to appeal to examples from literature. Through recitation she tries to justify her decision. The texts in the novel, however, do not guarantee that support; her quoting does not change reality. She will lose her battle, despite the enchanting words of Campbell. Her education and reading experience will turn against her. Hence, the act of quoting lapses into parody; it shows the limitations of literature, which can only be repeated or recited. Reading becomes merely an aesthetic gesture.

Emotional and almost physical identification with the “truth” of the text will not make the text come true.

In this sense, Sue performs quotations only for their representational value. A metaphorical use of quotation lies in the comparison between the narrative context and the meaning of the quotation, or in the picture that the quotation projects. With regard to the latter, for example, finding herself with Jude in his room after her escape from school, Sue teases him for being concerned with the stories she told him about her past. Having let him take her wet clothing away to dry, she hints at her own position with Browning's words from the poem “Too Late” (1864):

> I am not particularly innocent, as you see, now that I have
"twitched the robe

From that blank lay-figure your fancy draped". (JO, III, 4: 149)

Sue's amazing literacy allows her to verbalise particular actions and gestures through quotations. By doing it all the time, by grounding her existence in reading, she starts treating reality as text, hence the reality in which she lives conflates the narrative environment provided by the narrator, and the reality of the texts she quotes.

This confusion is expressed not only through acts of direct quoting but also in the third person narrative statements. Even when she is alone, Sue considers her situation with reference to the texts. She does not recite the quotation but reads it from the book. This is a traditional device, common in prose, which enables a presupposing analogy between a quote and the character's personality. Sue's rebellious behaviour, evinced by her sudden desire to purchase the pagan figures of Venus and Apollo at the market in Christminster, is a response to the pressure from the Christian society, acknowledged in her reference to Swinburne:

> Occasionally, she looked at the statuettes, which appeared strange and out of place amid the other objects and pictures in the room, and as if the scene suggested the action, she at length jumped up and withdrew another book from her box – a volume of verse – and turned to the familiar poem:

> "Thou hast conquered, O pale Galilean;

> The World has grown grey from thy breath!" (JO, II, 4: 96)

Sue does not accept the conduct of the followers of the "Paler Galilean" – Jesus, whose austere memento in Swinburne's hymn meets with Proserpine's tantalizing paganism. As Radford explains, Hardy implies that Sue considers Swinburne "crusading for a renewal of a pagan erotic religious impulse commemorating forces close to nature, such as the love-goddess Venus, or Demeter and her daughter Proserpine" (2003: 187-188). However, as her future downfall will show, Sue will become confined by the
dominating ideology of society, the same ideology that she tries to refute by reading Swinburne's poem.

In terms of poetics, quoting as an act of *imitatio* anchors Sue's existence in the novel's reality: while quoting Shelley she feels herself to be equally a heroine of his poems and Jude's lover; while quoting Swinburne she demonstrates her independent spirit; when reading Mill she changes into an unprejudiced woman acting out her non-conformist life. Beyond the textual world she is hardly able to recognise who she is.

When coming back to Phillotson she admits that her “theoretic unconventionality broke down” (JO, IV, 3: 222) but only to assure herself of the texts' rightness by appealing to Mill:

> She, or he, “who lets the world, or his own proportion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like imitation”.

J.S. Mill's words, those are. Why can't you act upon them? I wish to, always.

(JO, IV, 3: 223)

Sue's wish to demonstrate her free is inescapably entrapped in the net of intertextual voices. She can lead her life only by performing according to the script of memorised textual patterns, and is unable to act freely as a person since her outlook is moulded by the texts she reads. She is unable to communicate beyond their authoritative support. By following the directives suggested by the authors, Hardy's protagonists strive for fully emotional and psychological identification with the "sources" in which they want to trust. Even Sue's final tragic decision to leave Jude for the higher good of salvation and forgiveness is dictated, not by her own feelings (she still loves Jude), but by the socially accepted conduct of the "letter". The letter of the law printed in her memory eventually stifles her liberal intentions.

A thesis can be proposed: that the existence of the protagonists is determined according to the *imitatio* of a presupposed model of mimesis. Being derived from the Platonic
Idea, this was perpetuated in the Romantic ideal of the "Letter" -- the epitome of Immanence opening a way to penetrating insight, in the novel represented by quotations from the Romantic Shelley, and two post-Romantic poets, Browning and Swinburne, each heavily influenced by the author of *The Revolt of Islam*. The protagonists' method of reading (and quoting) reflects and parodies the Romantic manifestation of visionary language, which strives to probe into deeper epistemological terrain. However, at the same time the narrative frame of their quoting suggests that aim is a utopian fancy. Yet, in Sue's interpretation, a heightened awareness of the Romantic writers' claim to verbal agency turns into a mechanical repetition. From this intertextual perspective it is her Shelleyan origin that undergoes a recondite criticism along with the Romantic programme. Hardy criticises not Sue herself but the ideologies that inform her character, and he does it through allegorical use of these ideologies in the acts of quoting.

Although her quotations represent the adversaries of Idealism, she still adopts the same pattern for her reading; she follows the truth of the letter. Regardless of her rejection of the Romantic Absolute, she expresses her trust in the ethical wisdom of other texts. Yet the figurative transformations of narrative scenes serve only to convey the hopelessness of such faith. Sue's attempts to become the text and to enact its message do not guarantee epistemological insight nor result in practical change. A tension with Shelley's approach becomes clear: Shelley's republican programme for enlightened change was to be realised through the contact of the readers with illuminative writing, its transcendence revealed to those in search of the truth. It was the act of wanting which was to result in reward. However, Sue's desire to be, at the same time, both a Romantic heroine and an independent woman, does not have the expected effect. The letter of the law printed in her memory suppresses her liberal action.

Sue's failure can be compared with the failure of Shelley's philosophy to reform his conformist society and break through its passiveness. Shelley's narrative of
revolution in *The Revolt of Islam* (1818) and also *Prometheus Unbound* (1820) advocates the ideas of independence and liberation from oppressive ideologies. In the Preface to *The Revolt of Islam*, Shelley elaborates on the aims of his poem as:

A succession of pictures illustrating the growth and progress of the individual mind aspiring after excellence and devoted to the love of mankind; its influence in refining and making pure the most daring and uncommon impulses of the imagination, the understanding, and senses, its impatience at “all the oppressions which are done under the sun”; its tendency to awaken public hope and to enlighten and improve mankind; [...] the consequences of legitimate despotism, civil war, famine, plague, superstition, and an utter distinction of the domestic affections; the judicial murder of the advocates of liberty; the temporary triumph of oppression. (1927–1930 I: 240)

Hardy, who passionately read and admired Shelley,\(^5\) saw a painful incongruity between reality and the Romantic ideal. He realised that the Shelleyan vision of an ideal past which was to be reinvented beyond history, in people’s hearts, could never be fulfilled, for it endangered the rational logic of the institutional powers, represented in the Victorian epoch by the Christian rationalists. Thus, as Hardy recalled before the Dorchester audience, Shelley “was not tolerated at all in his lifetime [and] in these days of our memory, has been favoured so far as to be considered no lower than an ineffectual angel beating his luminous wings in vain” (L: 435). Shelley’s desire for

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\(^5\) As Morton Dauwen Zabel acknowledges, Hardy’s “poetic loyalties, rooted in the Romanticism of Keats, Shelley, and Tennyson, spent their last real enthusiasm on Browning and Swinburne” (1963: 27). In response to being compared to the Realists, Hardy himself admits that his “art of writing was influenced far more by Shakespeare, Shelley, Browning, etc. than by Crabbe” (CL V: 294). Of Shelley’s poem, Hardy writes: “I have very often felt (but not always) that one of the most beautiful of English lyrics is Shelley’s *Lament*” (PW: 107). However, of Shelley’s *Prometheus Unbound* the writer complains that it is “a waste of means” (PW: 141).
revolution and renovation faced open objection from the prevailing political and philosophical powers, whose aim was to protect the order of society, not to abolish it. Moore describes in detail how the collision of these two movements is reflected in Hardy’s novel. He explains the existential turbulence of the main characters in terms of a conflict between the Shelleyan transcendental beauty of culture (the revolutionary influence of texts) and the Arnoldian cultural elitism (the passive reading of texts); in other words, a collision “between frustrating idealism and a damning history” (Moore 1990: 231). Moore observes that:

The cultural strife that informs Jude, the republican authenticity of Arnoldian culture, is measured against Shelley’s authentic republicanism. In Hardy’s fable, Arnold’s cultural program of reading and flexibility in the 1880s is represented as a rhetoric without substance because culture enforces the order of things rather than critiques them with any “real” or political force geared toward change. Jude the Obscure is thus another Hardyan exercise in past-present comparison where a specific romantic past is pitted against the cultural present which is envisioned as a muted, socialised version of that more powerful and glorious past. (1990: 226)

In such a reality, neither Sue nor Jude will be able to achieve their aims. The protagonists’ desire to identify with the text and revise their situation accordingly cannot resist the pressures of society. Sue will not become a liberal Romantic heroine; Jude will not reach his idealised Christminster. Their dreams derive from the idealised mythical reality which cannot resist history, in the novel symbolised by intertexts.

Jude’s dramatic acts of quoting show themselves to be the same as Sue’s vulnerability to the text’s power. While quoting, Jude identifies with the text’s content and believes it to express what he really feels. His trust in the text is obvious, even when
he evokes it to reject a different text's truth. To convince Sue that he overcame his naïve
trust in religion, he recalls a quotation from Browning (a quotation added to the first
edition of the novel, it did not appear in the manuscript or in Harper's):

The Church is not more to me. Let it lie! I am not to be one of

"The soldiers – saints who, row on row.

Burn upward each to his point of bliss". (JO, IV, 5: 237)

In this case, Jude returns to the quotation to confirm his refusal of Christian propaganda,
but, as mechanistic as this action is, it shows that Jude continues to remain under the
instructive spell of texts as such. As Springer notes, even after Jude's dismissal from
the Church he still "relies on Biblical studies and constantly quotes Scriptures" (1983:
168). Thus although "he struggles successfully to let his mind explore diverse areas of
learning, the allusions attached to his philosophy are not divided" (Springer 1983: 168).
It is paradoxical that at this rebellious stage of his development, he has no choice but to
quote the texts in order to reject them. Being constantly exposed to the Christian
indoctrination, whether by emulation or objection, Jude unintentionally internalises its
discourse.

A critical hint in these poetical figures implies that even if we think that we have
made an independent decision (as Jude does about his revolt), our acts are always
determined by texts. It is not possible to escape from their influence, just as it is not
possible for the novel's characters to stop quoting. Grim disappointment thus emerges
from the metaphorical quotations serving the characters' feelings, a disappointment that,
as analysed in Chapter 1, also permeates Hardy's use of authoritative references.

Ironically, Browning, in his poem "The Statue and the Bust", does not attack the Church
but draws an analogy between the passion of a lover and a saint's devotion. Hardy, who
needs to establish an anti-religious context, eschews that theme: by manipulating two
lines from the poem he adjusts the original source to fit in with ideology of his own text.
Besides the editorial proofs and the situational context, Hardy uses free indirect speech to establish the narrative agreement between the characters’ thoughts and the quotation. For example, the narrator introduces a quotation from Heinrich Heine’s *Götterdämmerung* (1823-4) to illustrate Jude’s nostalgic mood:

He looked back at himself along the vista of his past years, and his thought was akin to Heine’s:

“Above the youth’s inspired and flashing eyes

I see the motley mocking fool’s-cap rise” (JO, II, 6: 115)

From the poem, Hardy takes the lines that most closely correspond to what he would like to say about Jude at this moment. On the level of meaning, this quotation functions as a metaphor for Jude’s psychological and intellectual disposition. There is no need for the reader to explore the original context of the poem: it is the semantic content of these two adopted lines that provides the desired imagery of disappointment and sarcasm experienced by Jude. From a structural perspective, by applying the quotation the narrator builds the character’s textual imagination which infects the ingenuity of the inner monologue.

Later in the novel, Jude’s thoughts are compared to those taken from Pusey (in the manuscript (M: 181) starting with the words, “Plot as I may” in place of the ellipses):

Cruelly sweet, indeed she had been to him that morning; but his thought of a penance in store for her were tempered by an ache:

“.................I can find no way

How a blow should fall, such as falls on men.

Nor prove too much for your womanhood!” (JO, VII, 3: 172-173)

The author of this quotation, taken from Browning’s poem on the unfaithful wife, *The Worst of It* (1864), is not acknowledged by the narrator – we don’t know with which author Jude identifies; it is only the quotation’s content that articulates Jude’s thoughts.
In both the manuscript and in Harper's the narrative introduction is different, and it suggests the quotation's modern origin: “But his thoughts of a penance in store for her ran side by side with some modern lines” (M: 181). In the original version, Jude’s feelings equate with the citation, while in the first edition they are “tempered” by it. These changes make the act of quoting more subjective: Jude is given his own attitude to the text and (being deeply engaged with his thoughts) he does not consider its literary (modern) origin. In the first edition of Jude the quotation evolves from Jude’s consciousness and tempers the narrator’s classical omnipotence. Such a proof shows the care taken by the author in the editorial process to make the act of quoting appear more plausible and more personal.

A compulsory and ominous dependence on texts and texts’ interpretation is also manifested in the tragic figure of Father Time. Although this character is distinguished by his reluctance to use quotations and does not speak much himself in the novel, he is defined by the narrator and by the other characters through scriptural artefacts. His thoughts and his personality are reflected in the narrative composition of events, which

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The name of Father Time was not established straight away, this is how it evolved through the manuscript:

- (M: 298): "If I was you, mother, I wouldn’t marry father. It came from The Ancient"
  The word "Ancient" is crossed out and ‘Little Time’ is added;
- (M: 295): "Ancient is what they always called me"
  Here the word Ancient is crossed out and replaced with "Father Time";
- (M: 308): "Not regardful of themselves alone, they had taken care to bring the Ancient"
  Here "the Ancient" is crossed out and "Father Time" added;
- (M: 309): "The Ancient shuddered" is not changed.
speak for him. The important verbal characterisation comes from Ecclesiastes; a quotation is suggested by an objective narrative voice describing a scene in the train:

At these the fellow-passengers laughed, except the solitary boy bearing the key and ticket, who regarding the kitten with his saucer eyes, seemed mutely to say: “All laughing comes from misapprehension. Rightly looked at there is no laughable thing under the sun.” (JO, V, 3: 276)

This quotation seems unrealistic for a small boy, displaying as it does a profound comprehension of things, unnatural in a child of that age. Yet, the narrator attributes its pessimistic sense to Father Time’s untypical behaviour. The biblical verses come from the omniscience of the narrator, but they enhance the reader’s understanding of the boy’s character through his response to the historical-textual context. Jude predicts Father Time’s fate, if not prevented by him and Sue:

“Let the day perish wherein I was born, and the night in which it was said, There is a man child conceived”. That’s what the boy – my boy, perhaps, will find himself saying before long. (JO, V, 3: 275)

Future events will bring Job’s prophecy, articulated by Jude, to fruition, as if Father Time’s fate was encapsulated in the quotation, only to be developed by the narrative language. When Jude is asked by Father Time what the cause of their suffering is, he refers to the Bible once again:

Because of a cloud that has gathered over us; though “we have wronged no man, corrupted no man, defrauded no man! Though perhaps we have done that which was right in our own eyes”. (JO, V, 6: 308)

The narrator surrounds Father Time with quotations from all narrative sides. The boy’s world is organised around biblical quotations; he thinks with Ecclesiastes, dramatises Job, and rehearses Corinthians and Judges. The quotations addressed to him are later developed as narrative episodes in which the boy is involved. In this way the
narrative semantics and the imagery of the quotations' complement each other. The narrative is heightened by quotations, but, at the same time, quotations validate the narrative as just a textual artefact. The boy believes in stories as if they were a verdict just for him. Quotations told to him, stories he has heard, and finally Sue's tragic revelations, are all accepted by him as models of reality to be followed.

Within the web of texts, Father Time appears as a passive figure who enacts the narrator's decisions about his rôle in the text. On the one hand, this rôle is overtly hyperbolic: the boy impersonates "Time". It is a historical time which has entered a scene of ahistorical time, that of the prelapsarian unity of being so desperately sought by the main protagonists. Father Time's interference symbolises the break in this mythical unity, which brings about knowledge and death: the former embodied in the protagonists tragic obsession with texts, the latter depicted in the scene of Father Time's crime. Here the innocent children of Sue and Jude seem to be epitomes of the ahistorical and apolitical existence destroyed by their brother.

Being thrust into the world of language, Father Time has to submit to its rules. He absorbs stories/quotations which provoke his imitative action, as if he himself were another text to enact. Once history (i.e. language, time, quotation, text, convention, and culture) has conquered the unformed ahistorical reality, communication becomes textual and open to subjective interpretation and errors. Father Time's crime is a result of his subjective interpretation of Sue's story. As Sue will tragically discover, he took her words for the truth, just as she used to do with other texts. The child's allegorical rôle in the novel derives from his archetypal "Ancient" nature (as he was called in the manuscript) which is subject to the "modern" constitution of reality marked by imitativeness.
Errors of misreading or misinterpreting messages determine the actions of all the characters. Jude is deluded by the myth of natural unity, while Sue is seduced by the idea of the uniting civic law. Arabella and Phillotson, while trying to follow the rules of their social environments, lead the superficial existence of unsatisfied puppets, parodied to extreme in the figure of the physician, Vilbert. By exposing and unmasking the baleful rhetorical structure of their “truths”, Hardy illustrates the unstable and deceitful power of language, which, when mimetically taken for reality, might induce destruction and even crime. Through his quotations, Hardy argues that in realistic fiction, “nothing is as it appears” (L: 176) and thus no fiction can ever be treated as the reflection of reality.

The rôle of the narrator in this masquerading process, or simply fictionalisation, is quite ambiguous. On the one hand, as has been shown above, the narrator turns to his characters as individuals and displays their experiences from a subjective perspective, while in other places, he moves beyond characters’ consciousness and describes their world from an objective and omniscient point of view. Ian Gregor appreciates this changing perspective, recognising that it shares the transitional processes of the realistic novel:

Both Hardy and Lawrence have produced fiction in which the presence of the author is an important element in our experience, but it is not a presence like that, say, of Fielding or George Eliot, where we feel the author filtering the book through to us, but rather where the author is participant, undergoing the experience of the book with the characters. (1966: 293)

The use of quotations, through which Hardy allows his characters to articulate their feelings, indicates the writer’s attempts to formulate the subjective narration corresponding with the characters’ points of view. When he speaks of his characters in the third person and openly uses plural pronouns to address them (e.g. “our dear hero”).
the narrator rather "filters" the action from his objective position. As different situational arrangements demonstrate, the narrator is both a part of the story, and at the same time, its director. Nevertheless, from the poetic point of view it is clear that the narrator is the same fictive figure as his characters and belongs to the novel's universe only as a main speaking voice, as Daniel R. Schwarz explains:

The narrator's present tense action is his telling. His verbal action dramatizes a distinct personality. In a sense, by giving the narrator foreknowledge of the completed pattern and the ability to penetrate the characters' minds and render their thoughts and feelings, an author creates a persona in his own image.

But once the act of creation is complete and the final draft is written, the influence of the author's personality ceases and the narrator exists within the fictive universe. (1995: 29)

Jude's narrator, through his dramatic actions and changeable perspective, unfurls the different possibilities of the text's interpretation. Schwarz observes that in Jude, as in D. H. Lawrence's novels Sons and Lovers (1913) or Women in Love (1920), the narrator and the characters, although apparently speaking in many tongues, actually say the same thing; that this "is a function of the author's need to convince himself of the accuracy of his perception as well as the difficulty of his achieving irony towards a version of himself" (1995: 11). As has been argued above, this irony pervades the context of the act of quoting, yet the poetics of quoting reveal the distance of the author from the novel's world.

It is important to see how this double viewpoint encompasses the narrative: treated as aesthetic acts, quotations re-establish their meaning in semantic pictures of different words and phrases applied throughout the novel. While the novel creates a realistic theatre within its narrative, with the characters quoting in every situation of their lives, on the allegorical level it emphasizes the literary artifice. The self-referential and deeply
ironic comment from the narrator: “Everything seemed turning to satire” (JO, III,7:169), on the dramatic circumstances of the protagonists' romance challenges the pathos of the mimetic picture apparently seen from Jude's point of view. Yet it is the narrator who speaks in the indirect speech when Jude receives a letter from his cousin and thus transforms pathos into bathos enhanced by the use of preposition, exclamation mark and a hyphen: “If Sue had written that in satire, he could hardly forgive her, if in suffering — ah, that was another thing!” (JO,III,7:171).

The narrator observes the universe of the text as if it were a scene for actors to play. “Scene”, “drama”, “part” and “satire” are key words in the text's allegorical poetics. They enclose narrative statements in poetical frames that single them out from the text in the same way that quotation marks do. In a letter Jude receives from Sue, the meaning of the word “drama” refers to both their tragedy in an existential sense and a theatrical tragedy in generic terms:

The very unconsciousness of a looming drama which is shown in innocent first epistles from women to men, or vice versa, makes them, when such a drama follows, and they are read over by the purple or lurid light of it, all the more impressive, solemn, and in cases, terrible. (JO,II,4:99)

A theatrical scene can be perceived either visually or aurally, and throughout the novel theatrical terminology is invoked: Mr Troutham's corn-field is “a scene of his labours” where “The only marks on the uniformity of the scene were a rick of last year's produce” and “The foreground of the scene had gone funerally dark, and near objects put on the hues and shapes of chimaeras (JO, I, 2: 14); the image of a stage curtained at the end of the play is evoked to symbolise Farmer Troutham's bleak participation in the plot: “He was the sort

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3 In this, and the quotations that follow, I have added emphasis to make clear the extensive use of theatrical vocabulary.
of man who was born to ache a good deal before the fall of the curtain upon his unnecessary life should signify that all was well with him again (JO, I, 1: 17); a route around Marygreen was “the scene of most of Jude’s education” (JO, I, 5: 32).

The narrator, describing Jude and Arabella killing a pig, chooses the perspective of a robin who “peered down at the preparations from the nearest tree, not liking the sinister look of the scene, flew away, though hungry” (JO, I, 10: 64). The visual elements of this situation are pictured as a “spectacle”: “The main part [of blood] being splashed over the snow, and forming a dismal, sordid, ugly spectacle to those who saw it as other than an ordinary obtaining of meat” (JO, I, 10: 65). The narrator transmits two messages about the same picture: one is concerned with the realistic events of “obtaining meat”, Jude reading on the road, Mr Troutham working, the appearance of the field; the other refers to the same ‘frames’ but seen from a metatextual distance.

The narrator situates himself beyond the text, but only to show his omnipotence. As in Don Quixote (1613), analysed by Meyer, the narrator seems to stand “above his work with sovereign detachment, committed and indifferent alike, bending down to the world of his own creation like the puppeteer over the marionette stage” (1968: 57). A parallel between Cervantes’ novel and Jude becomes even more apparent when the theatrical descriptions of the characters is considered: Jude speaks to the Christminster authorities “like an actor in a melodrama who apostrophizes the audience on the other side of the footlights; till he suddenly ceased with a start at his absurdity” (JO, I, 1: 81): in the Christminster visionary scene, his imaginative interlocutors are “spectres”, “phantoms” looming “out of the shade”; Jude’s shape seems to him “almost his own ghost”, turning his thoughts “to the other ghostly presences with which the nooks were haunted” (JO, II, 1: 79-81).
All these examples are adapted from theatrical nomenclature. Their application can be
considered as typical of the classical novel. The most significant example of such is
Fielding's *Tom Jones* (1749), but other good examples are Rabelais's *Gargantua and
Pantagruel* (1532), *Don Quixote* (1613), Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* (1726), and Sterne's
*Tristram Shandy* (1760-1767), all of which precede the recognition of the narration's
semantic ambiguity that underlies the language in *Jude*. In these novels, as in *Jude*,
theatricality communicates a new self-referential perspective synchronised with a
realistic narration. We might consequently read the novel in two ways: as a realistic
description of events, or as a self-referential commentary on the writing process. In the
nineteenth-century novel such a double vision of the text is not rare. The depiction of
the "metatextual" significance of events was part of the narrator's rôle in the text.

Alison Byerly discusses the problem with regard to the poetics of Thackeray:

> In spite of the dramatic, self-promoting voice of the narrator of *Vanity Fair*,
> [...] the novel's style is not theatrical. The narrator compares himself to both
> an actor and a stage manager, but his oscillation between the two opposing
> rôles makes him an active presence in, rather than detached spectator of,
> his narrative. His very obtrusiveness is a sign of his engagement. (1997: 187)

A narrative statement accompanying Sue's reading, "as if the scene suggested the
action", might be seen in terms of the classical objective "stage direction" typical of a
realistic novel, or as a self-referential suggestion by the narrator, revealing his position
as "a puppeteer bending over the marionette stage". Byerly notes that Hardy's

Depiction of theatre is so consistent with that of Thackeray, Brontë, and Eliot,
in fact, that it seems deliberately to recapitulate and extend the themes they
established. Theatricality represents conscious artifice, especially that it is
economically motivated. Hardy emphasizes the way in which people's
theatrical self-advertisements create a market value for their image that in no
way represents their use-value to the community. Theatre epitomizes a false appearance. (1997: 150)

In Jude this theatricality becomes obvious in the acts of quoting, where the narrator sets up theatrical scenes for his characters. By involving the characters in the scene, the narrator draws them to it, not only as participants but also as viewers; in other words, characters cannot resist the charm of the artifice they enact. When Jude starts preaching to the populace of Christminster (JO, VI, 1: 327-28) he uses quotations for rhetorical effects, but these are not quotations which are “staged” by the narrator: it is the speech itself which is a parody of preaching. When asked to recite the Creed in Latin, Jude yields to the challenge of giving a performance for the drunken clients of the shabby tavern. He knows that his audience cannot understand a word either of his philosophical arguments or even of popular Latin verses, but despite that he keeps on declaiming for art’s own sake. The narrator finally permits him the realisation of the sheer humiliation of the situation and points to the deeply ironic element in Jude’s behaviour, who “in his sudden flash of reason, had turned in disgust and left the scene” (JO, II, 7: 122).

By observing the world of the novel from a distance, the narrator enhances the theatrical effects which are staged as if seen by someone else. For this respect Joan Grundy evokes Hardy’s specific capability as a “sentient seer”. Grundy thus opines about Hardy: “Conscious as always of the image of the scene, he sees life as every kind of show: as picture, play, pantomime, magic-lantern slide (and, by anticipation, motion-picture), conjuring show” (1979: 16-17). In Jude Hardy creates a theatre “that differentiates aesthetic perception or description from the underlying reality it purports to reflect” (Byerly 1997: 185-86). This shows parallels with Eliot’s, Thackeray’s, and Brontë’s “illusory theatre” of art. However, between their texts and Hardy’s there is only a structural parallel, as their ethics differ according to their divergent
understanding of the art-and-reality relationship. Byerly derives this contrast from the
nineteenth-century transition regarding the representational function of art:

In the course of the nineteenth century the distinction between reality and art
breaks down, as individual art and life are credited with representational
abilities that allow them to escape the realm of "art" and enter the province of
truth. Thus, for Thackeray and Bronte all arts are alike in their potential for
"theatricality", or misrepresentation; for Eliot, theatre and painting are linked
with delusion, while music embodies the true expression of the soul; for Hardy,
theatre alone carries the burden of artifice, and the other arts—painting, music,
and architecture—are all seen as natural expression of different kinds of truth.
(1997: 149)

Hardy's theatre serves a reality which has been already aestheticised (textualised)
and this approach differentiates him from the Victorian novelists, who see a means of
poetical expression in mimetic effects. As discussed in the Introduction, art for Hardy
was an aesthetic transposition of reality, whereas for the classical realists aesthetic
resemblance served as an ethical gauge of writing. Hardy could agree with those realists
who made moral claims for art's interpretation, but he did not want to limit the aim of
art, for it to be seen purely in terms of its contiguous relation with reality. George Eliot
for example, describing the rôle of a writer in Adam Bede, admits with sincerity that:

My strongest effort is to avoid any such arbitrary picture, and to give a faithful
account of man and things as they have mirrored themselves in my mind.
The mirror is doubtless defective; the outlines will sometimes be disturbed,
the reflection faint or confused; but I feel as much bound to tell you as
precisely as I can what that reflection is, as if I were in the witness-box
narrating my experience on oath. (1910: 193)
George Meredith applies the same method in order to “throw reflections upon social life” observed “in the drawing-room of civilized men and women, where we have no dust of the struggling outer world, no mere violent crashes, to make the correctness of the representation convincing” (cited in Stevick 1967: 394). In a more acute version of Realism as promoted by the naturalists, reality was to be photographically accurate.

According to a famous statement by Stendhal, a novel should be:

A mirror carried along a high road. At one moment it reflects to your vision the azure skies, at another the mire of the puddles at your feet. And the man who carries this mirror in his pack will be accused by you of being immoral! His mirror shows the mire, and you blame the mirror! Rather blame that high road upon which the puddle lies, still more the inspector of roads who allows the water to gather and the puddle to form. (1968 II: 166-167)

From this poetical description of the writer’s obligation taken from Scarlet and Black (1830), Émile Zola composes a methodological manifesto:

With the naturalistic novel and the novel of observation and analysis, the conditions change at once. The novelist invents, indeed, still: he invents a plan, a drama; only it is a scrap of a drama, the first story he comes across and which daily life furnishes him with always. Then in the arrangement of the work this invention is only of very slight importance. The facts are there only as the logical results of the characters. The great thing is to set up living creatures, playing before the readers the human comedy in the most natural manner possible. All the efforts of the writer tend to hide imagery under the real. (2001: 85)

As seen in the above extracts, fidelity to the real as well as to the plausibility of mimetic effects was the objective of realistic prose ideally operating with a transparent language. At the same time these objectives contain characteristic paradoxes underlying Realism.
which, while using artistic devices of illusion (designing a plan of fiction in the
drawing-room of the artist to tell reliable lies on facts), protects an objective vision of
reality. This conjuncture (difficult, of course, to realise) will eventually produce the
anti-mimetic movement with emphasis on self-referencing aesthetics. As Nicholas
Abercrombie writes, this conflict between the realists and the non-realists arises from
the use of the same aesthetic paradigms but for different aims:

The point is that non-realist cultural paradigms will make use of a realist
aesthetic discourse to argue for the validity of these paradigms. To make an
argument via realist aesthetic discourse is to argue that a given cultural form
 corresponds better to reality, or to “the referent” than does another cultural
form. [...] Realist aesthetic discourse has been used to legitimate supremely
modernist (thus non-realist) cultural texts such as Joyce’s *Ulysses*.
The argument here would be that stream of consciousness corresponds better to
reality as we perceive it than the ordered classic text. (1992: 129)

Byerly notes a similar effect, but identifies the motivation, not as the desire to
imitate textual practices, but just the reverse, a desire to imitate reality. She recognises
the cause of the disruption within Realism as being the invasion of aesthetics, which
results in the non-representational discourse of the *fin de siècle*, whose “goal and effect
is not the realistic portrayal of ordinary human life. Their lavish references to art do
not serve to separate and elevate an underlying reality: they are clearly intended to
reinforce their unambiguously stated claim that good art does not reflect reality at all”
(Byerly 1997: 186). Byerly also argues that Hardy’s intention is to deploy the
authenticity of realistic effects whilst also appreciating language as an instrument of
aesthetics.

By exploiting meanings imprisoned in their figurative associations with literary
stereotypes, Hardy confronts his audience, not with an immediate reality, but with
subjective mirrors of reality. These mirrors are not intended to reflect the Stendhalian "high road", but rather the writer's road to aesthetic results. Hardy uncovers the dilemma of artistic artifice, but it is important to stress that he is not an aesthete committed to "art for art's sake". The writer's artistic efforts are a part of the narrative and should not be considered only in self-referential terms, but above all in relation to the meaning that they produce.

Hardy's writing, although undermining faith in mimesis, is not directed at reinforcing the claims of Pater (in *Marius the Epicurean*, 1885) or Wilde (in *The Portrait of Dorian Gray*, 1891) concerning the anti-representative value of fiction. We cannot forget however, that as Linda Shires recalls, "Hardy is fundamentally anti-realistic. He does not practice a mimetic art which reproduces a likeness of the external world" (1999: 148). Nevertheless, Hardy treats language as a vehicle for artistic effects which in the first place have to be inspired by reality. Looking back at his achievements, the author wrote in 1912: "Is it advisable also to state here, in response to inquiries from readers interested in landscape, prehistoric antiquities, and especially old English architecture, that the description of these backgrounds has been done from the real that is to say, has something real for its basis, however illusively treated" (PW: 46). It is thus not to a traditionally perceived reality that Hardy refers, but to a reality filtered through other texts. His realism is motivated by associations derived from language already experienced in culture, literature, and arts which speak of real life. Pursuing realistic effects is the art of aesthetic deception, but at the same time it is the only way of articulating reality in language. However, it should be emphasised that it is reality which is the most attractive and justified aim of writing for Hardy, and not merely language, as it was for the aesthetes.

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8 On the anti-mimetic poetics of Hardy see also a very interesting analysis of Tess's narrative by C. Thompson. 1983. 'Language and the Shape of Reality', *English Literary History*, 50: 729-62.
Nonetheless, *Jude* demonstrates that neither the characters of the novel nor the author himself can escape the power of language. Texts determine the characters' way of thinking, of perceiving the world, and of understanding their own position within it. Thanks to reading they became who they are. And who are they? The multiplied dimensions of the text's significance show that they are "book persons" and what is most important, they are also poetical figures, made up of "intertexts". D.H. Lawrence noticed that Hardy's heroes "are pathetic rather than tragic figures" (1985: 50), and, I argue, the reason for their apparent artificiality lies in their textual background. The protagonists of the novel live with texts and think through texts. When observed on an allegorical level their figures metaphorically exemplify Aristotelian artifice of fiction. It is difficult to tell who speaks whose language in the novel.

Sue and Jude quote from texts they have studied, but it is also the novel that quotes Sue and Jude quoting. Sue's words can be understood as both self-descriptive and self-referential: "I am not modern, either. I am more ancient than mediaevalism, if you only knew" (JO, III, 1: 135). This puzzle she explains later: "My life has been entirely shaped by what people call a peculiarity in me. I have no fear of men, as such, nor of their books. I have mixed with them – one or two particularly – almost as one of their own text" (JO, III, 4: 147). Sue's existence, as well as Jude's, is designed according to textual patterns. Their figures are constructed out of texts: the quotations they recite, the books they have read. Jude, when comparing their fate to the tragedy of heroes from *The Revolt of Islam*, hints at their textual situation to be recognised by future readers: "They will see wailing humanity still more vividly than we do now, as "Shapes like our own selves hideously multiplied"" (JO, V, 4: 287).

Characters, like the quotations they use, will be "hideously multiplied" in other texts by other writers. The act of quoting is as the act of writing, for both rely on constant repetition. The characters' actions and the narrator's independent position are
all subject to the creative skill of the author, who draws on other texts. Signifying practices applied in *Jude* refer to that skillfulness in an allegorical way, which can be deciphered only when the whole novel is interpreted from two angles: self-referential and realistic. Only then will the ambiguity of particular phrases and words stand out from the fusion at both levels of the novel. Jude's walk along the Christminster streets illustrates how the narrative plot and the significance of signs are able together to produce the double meaning within one poetical figure, incorporating both the author's creative effort and the character's loneliness:

Knowing not a human being here, Jude began to be impressed with the isolation of his own personality, as with a self-spectre, the sensation being that one who walked, but could not make himself seen or heard. (*JO, II, 1: 79*)

Jude feels he is too intangible to "be seen or heard". Is he too weak physically or too unimportant socially to mark his own presence? Only as being considered an aspect of a signifying practice, the mimetic potential of representation falls into crisis. It designates the author's problem of how to make representation real ("seen or heard"). Being observed from a semiotic angle, Hardy's characters are devoid of real existence; they symbolise patterns of signification exercised to make representation "real".

An argument by Irving Howe gains a new sense when observed from such a standpoint. Howe observes that Jude and Sue "suffer, as well, from another 'modern' difficulty: that of thoughtful and self-reflexive persons who have become so absorbed with knowing their experience, they become unable to live it" (1985: 145). It was widely argued that Hardy's writing reflects the "modern difficulty" as it infringed upon the area of both social and literary expression of his time. His writing, as well as his characters, suffers from the "ache" (*Jude, Tess*) of modernity which contemplates the impossibility of self-expression. In this sense Howe's observation that *Jude* "is not the book that can offer the lure of catharsis or the relief of conciliation" (1985: 145) might
refer only to the novel’s moral implications and its narrative pessimism. Yet it should be
taken into account that Hardy’s novel is also a collection of aesthetic implications
produced by the writer in order to be critically interpreted by the “healthy mind” who
knows the border between reality and fiction.

The tragedy the characters undergo should not be only perceived in relation to
life, but also in relation to the artistic form of the novel. While the former depicts the
moral and social purgatory of Jude and Sue, the latter reveals the problems of giving
them formal patterning. Those problems are felt as an “ache” by both the writer and his
heroes, searching as they are for the means of self-articulation. Hardy’s novel invites
both a realistic and an allegorical reading, which however should not be separated, as
Riffaterre explains:

The second meaning is not just different from and incompatible with the first:
it is tied to the first as its polar opposite or the way the reverse of a coin is
bound to its obverse—the hymen as unbroken membrane and as breaking
through of the barrier. (1980: 629)

The figure of the hymen, introduced into critical theory by Jacques Derrida (1972: 249),
implies a symbolic marriage, a fusion and a barrier to be broken through to reach the
desired (Derrida 1972: 249). It can be said that it is a fusion of both allegory and
literalness. When analysed from both perspectives, Hardy’s text explodes with
meanings that lay bare the novel’s textual organisation. This perspective dissolves the
border between the mimetic (representational) and textual (non-representational) aspects
of the text.

By showing the weakness of the ideologies that inform the language of the
protagonists, Hardy denies the stability of both the language and the ideologies. The
novel is preoccupied by the parody of mimetically-understood language, defined by
George Eliot in *Adam Bede* as the “the exact truth” (1910: 195). The narrative context makes it obvious that Jude identifies himself with the Psalm sung in the cathedral-church of Cardinal College:

He had no longer discovered the exact seat that she occupied when the chanting of the 119th Psalm in which the choir was engaged reached its second part, *In quo correget* the organ changing to a pathetic Gregorian tune as the singers gave forth:

“Wherewithal shall a young man cleanse his way?”

It was the very question that was engaging Jude’s attention at this moment. What a wicked worthless fellow he had been to give vent as he had done to an animal passion for a woman, and allow it to lead to such disastrous consequences; then to think of putting an end to himself; then to go recklessly and get drunk. The great waves of pedal music tumbled round, and nursed on the supernatural as he had been, it was not wonderful that he could hardly believe that the psalm was not specially set by some regardful Providence for this moment of his first entry into the solemn building. And yet it was the ordinary psalm for the twenty-fourth evening of the month. (JO, II, 3: 92)

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9 “So I am content to tell my simple story, without trying to make things seem better than they were; dreading nothing, indeed, but falsity, which, in spite of one’s efforts, there is reason to dread. Falseness is so easy, truth so difficult. The pencil is conscious of a delightful facility in drawing a griffin – the longer the claws, and the larger the wings, the better; but that marvellous facility which we mistook for genius is apt to forsake us when we want to draw a real unexaggerated lion. Examine your words well, and you will find that even when you have no motive to be false, it is a very hard thing to say the exact truth, even about your own immediate feelings – much harder that to say something fine about them which is not the exact truth.” (Eliot 1910: 195)
In its wider context, this extract has an ironic tone, for the narrator mocks Jude’s spiritual ascension within the work through this serious description of his mundane concerns. As in the previous examples, it is not the source of the quotation which gives meaning to the scene, but only the “cut-out” piece, which is applied as a metaphor in order to generate the ironic contrast between narrative and character. In terms of allegorical effect, this is a parody of the fallacious impression overwhelming studious readers, who believe that written texts speak to them on behalf of the author. Jude wants to believe that the psalm is “set by some regardful Providence”, but, as the narrator ironically points out, “it was the ordinary psalm for the twenty-fourth evening of the month”. Jude’s approach derives from the self-revelatory tradition of mimetic representation, relating the meaning of the text to the writer who had created it. The Bible in this case is a self-revelatory text whose meaning is violated by Jude’s interpretation. It can be said that by his totalising reading, Jude creates his own text and he posits himself as the Bible’s author. What Hardy’s irony attacks in this passage is the mimetic realistic unity of author and speaker, taken for granted by the nineteenth-century readers.

In the novel, even in the most tragic of circumstances, the characters identify with the message of the text and consequently its author. This is echoed by Jude after his children’s death. He tries to rationalise the tragedy through reference to Aeschylus: “‘Nothing can be done’ he replied. ‘Things are as they are, and will be brought to their destined issue’” (JO, VI, 2: 339). Sue’s first reaction uncovers a functional use of the quotation: “Yes! Who said that?” (emphasis added). In real life it is hardly conceivable that a mother, on hearing of the murder of her children, would be interested in the authorship of a quotation. On the other hand, their tragedy is indeed of Sophoclean proportions and the reference thus seems relevant.
We can see that Hardy employs his original method here: the situation is realistically convincing and the quotation corresponds to it well, but there is always another clue, which serves to subvert the realism of the scene. Sue’s exaggerated curiosity is rewarded in Jude’s answer: “It comes in the chorus of the Agamemnon. It has been in my mind continually since this happened” (JO, VI, 2: 339). As all such acts of quoting show, the perception of both characters is founded on textual cognition: both Jude and Sue interpret their personal situation according to the texts they know. Sue recognises this and thus blames herself for her lover’s paganism: “My poor Jude – how you’ve missed everything! You more than I, for I did get you! To think you should know that by your unassisted reading, and yet be in poverty and despair” (JO, VI, 2: 339). There is sorrow in Sue’s voice and irony in the narrator’s.

Hardy utilises a similar narrative tactic in the tragic denouement of Tess (TU, 58&59: 441-449), traditionally regarded as the artistic climax of the human drama. Andrew Radford, however, regards Tess’s execution at Stonehenge in a different way. Radford’s interpretation of the passage as “an antique melodrama” (2003: 4) can be also applied to Sue and Jude’s theatrical mourning over their children. Radford writes:

Yet the staginess is a deliberate ploy, for Hardy impishly – or even sardonically imbues this episode with more that a hint of Wagnerian grandiosity too.

Whilst at the other extreme of “theatricality”, the disquieting image of the black cloud in the skies above Stonehenge “lifting bodily like the lid of a pot” conveys a spirit of grim foreboding in an image which suggests a naïve stage prop of antique melodrama (a cauldron) or domestic comedy (a cooking pot). Hardy has artfully made sure that there is more to this cruel episode than meets the single eye. (2003:4)

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In both *Tess* and *Jude* the human tragedy is represented as the repetition of textual artefacts resurrected for the purposes of the new context. In *Tess*, it is “paganism repeating itself in the modern re-enactment” (Radford 2003: 5), while in *Jude* it is Modernism articulated through clichés from the canon. Accordingly both novels reveal the discrepancy between the mimetic surface of the narration and their intertextual constitution. In *Jude*, it is the material (overt) references involved in a polemical dialogue with the narrative figures (being themselves non-material references) that expose the intertextual residues of the narrative structure. On the allegorical level of the novel, the poisonous influence of reading (for which Sue blames herself) responds to the ideological discourses that created products of literary culture from the protagonists. As such, they can only repeat and passively reproduce texts they read but without any hope for their ethical support. Quotations thus manifest only an aesthetic appeal and do not carry a moral message.

A quotation in Greek that Jude has learnt by heart from Griesbach’s text illustrates this problem well:

> At the very time that Sue was reading, the policeman and belated citizens passing along under his window might have been heard, if they had stood still. Strange syllables mumbled with fervour within — words that had for Jude an indescribable enchantment; inexplicable sounds something like this:-
>
> "All hemi eyes Theo’s ho Patter, ex our at panda, kais homes eyes auto:
>
> Till the sounds rolled with reverent loudness, as book was heard to close:-
>
> "Kai eis Kurios Iesous Christos, di ou ta panta kai hreneis di autou”.
>
> (*JO*, 11, 3: 96)

The narrator admits that *Jude* does not understand these words from Corinthians, so what is the reason for their occurrence in the text? The quotation, even if translated, does not provide any additional context for the scene. The citing of it derives from an
obligation for everyday repetition, as suggested by Griesbach. Jude thus fulfils his obligation before going to bed. The very act of quoting contributes to his character; it indicates his habits and the range of titles he studies. However, without understanding Greek, can Jude be enriched in any sense by these texts? It seems puzzling at this stage of the plot, since we know that he learnt Greek earlier and managed to translate simple grammatical structures. It looks as if the act of quoting is a virtue in itself, hence it is not to be understood but only “felt”.

Hardy here mocks a Romantic belief in the divine force of the word, as believed by Wordsworth. Through repetition, words compose a prayer which should open a gate to the Spirit, as poetry does according to Wordsworth. The concept of poetry as prayer was popularised by John Keble and his catechism (as discussed in Chapter 1). Keble claimed that both poetry and prayer have the same divine roots and should be perceived as heavenly medicine sent to Man by God in order to release human spiritual turmoil (1912: 159). As Tennyson notes, Keble’s aesthetics was influenced by affective theories and Wordsworthian notions of poetry as the overflow of emotion (1977: 372). In the above scene both theories are parodied in the naïve manner of Jude’s quoting, his exaggerated affection and his blind faith in the word’s spiritual force prescribed to believers by the authority of Griesbach.

The act of reading, and subsequently the act of quoting, manifests its semantic deficiency and pragmatic inadequacy. Their communicative effectiveness is the result only of a combination of given patterns known to the participants of the communicative act. A quotation represents a wider (inter textual) pattern to which a quoting person alludes, but in Jude these patterns disclose their ethical unreliability and non-expressive function. Hardy incapacitates the inchoate meaning of his quotations to expose their repetitive nature and ideological bondage. As such, a quotation no longer carries its original message, but rather reflects the manner and context of its habitual use, which,
as Foucault indicates, are determined by the social and historical adaptations of
customs (1980: 81). Thus quotation, in terms of intertextual theory, can be treated as
a manifestation of the text's *idéologeme* (Kristeva 1969: 114) which marks the text's
historical and social co-ordinates (conventional uses), and these subsequently determine
representation. In this sense the act of quoting encapsulates ideological codes of
communication, yet, being aware of this relationship, the author makes metaphorical
parody of it in his novel.

The next important kind of intertextual relation in the text is the use of allusion, to
which the discussion will now turn. Although structurally different, both allusion and
quotation belong to the "borrowed" signs of representation, signified by their
presupposed reference to the "source".

Ziva Ben-Porat, in her study on allusion, differentiates between allusion as a
device for the formation of intertextual patterns on the one hand, and allusion as a
directional signal to the source on the other (1976: 107). In order to be deciphered,
allusion needs to be referred to its original context: to the external reality from which it
was formed or to a textual source from which it was borrowed (by "textual" I mean any
kind of artistic articulation). An allusive component pre-supposes a competent reader
who would be able to correlate the semantic meaning of the source and its marker
(name, title, descriptive paradigm). Nonetheless, does the reader have to be familiar
with the libertinism of the eighteenth-century in order to understand an appellative noun
used by Jude, when he addresses Sue as a "Voltairean"? (JO, III, 4: 152).

By the end of the nineteenth-century the discourse of literacy contained a wide
range of clichés used in both formal and informal situations. On hearing a character say
"You are a Voltairean", the average educated reader would imagine an individual,
cruel, and rational person objecting to religious superstition and socio-political
control. There were in literary circulation at that time commonly known allusions signifying specific meanings beyond the context of the original sources. Their sources became obscured through their constant overuse. In the poetics of the text they play the rôle of metaphors, but metaphors which are defined by Searle as neutralised tropes. Their abundant application in literary and non-literary contexts denies their creative potential and they become “the properties belonging to the source text’s connotation relevant to the allusions’ meaning” (Perri 1978: 291). They also play a mimetic function in text’s poetics, since they convey the meanings known to the readers from their own reading experience.

What is interesting for us is how allusions map the external discourses within the poetics of the novel. In a dialogue between Phillotson and Gillingham, we come across names and titles standing for idealist and Romantic ideologies. Idealism is scorned by the rational mind of Gillingham, who rejects Phillotson’s approval of Sue and Jude’s desire “to be together – to share each other emotions, and fancies, and dreams” (JO, IV, 4: 231). Gillingham considers this idea “Platonic”, alluding to the common understanding of the idealistic unity of two halves. Phillotson explains that his respect is based on a Shelleyan philosophy: “Well, no. Shelleyan would be nearer to it. They remind me of Laon and Cynthia. Also of Paul and Virginia a little. The more I reflect, the more entirely I am on their side” (JO, IV, 4: 231). The Romantic idea of free love is embodied in the names from Shelley’s poems. Being evoked by Phillotson, it takes on an ironic slant. Phillotson, who finally accepts Sue as his wife against her non-verbalised (but nonetheless obvious) ill-will, uses a popular allusion which, in his mouth, becomes a caricature of republican Shelleyanism. By alluding to the names of famous lovers whose bravado he seemingly accepts, he actually simply demonstrates his feeble understanding of the Romantic philosophy. In this way Hardy unmasks the contemporary understanding of Romanticism, which became deprived of its spiritual
depth and social resonance. If Phillotson believed in Shelleyan freedom, aimed at social revolution and regenerating official order, he would never have taken his wife back. This scene demonstrates how Romanticism, as well as Platonism, has changed into clichés, which can be flexibly used for rhetorical aims.

When Sue attributes to Jude the properties of biblical and literary heroes, she chooses names adequate to his idealism: "You are Joseph the dreamer, dear Jude. And a tragic Don Quixote, and sometimes you are St. Stephen, who while they were stoning him, could see Heaven opened". (JO, IV, 1: 205). As a Romantic, Jude is labelled through references to the Bible, Cervantes, Shelley, and Plato. In Hardy's contemporary culture this recalls an "idealist". As a result of reading, interpreting, and applying these texts in analogous contexts, the image has become "frozen" and changed into a relic of discourse: a part of society's *langue*. Through a mechanical association with the situational scenario in which allusions are used, they are more strongly rooted in reality than any other signs. Thus, being adapted for representational aims, allusion becomes an anchor of reality: it stands for that context which was attached to it through repetition. At the same time, paradoxically, allusion, as a cliché, diffuses an image of the original source and replaces it with an iconic ("fossilised") label.

When unable to come to a decision about their marriage, both Jude and Sue turn to the Bible and other ancient texts for guidance. The couple use allusions to compare their own emotional turbulence with that expressed in the tragedies known from Homer and the Book of Kings:

It makes feel as if a tragic doom overhung our family, as it did the house of Atreus.

Or the house of Jerobam, said the quondam theologian. (JO, VI, 1: 283)

On their arrival in Christminster, Sue's complaint refers to the Passion of Christ:

"Leaving Kennetbridge for this place is like coming from Caiaphas to Pilate" (JO, VI,
The narrator describes the crowd of people at the Christminster exhibition with a reference to the story of St Paul who healed a cripple: “The idle crowd, including the two policemen at the doors, stared like the Lycaonians at Paul” (JO, VI, 1: 325). The image of “tragedy” is thus created mostly through biblical allusions. This signifies that the Bible is still important in the social code, whilst on the other hand, its iconic meaning limits communication: there is only one sense to be deciphered, and if the reader is not able to grasp it, the communication fails. Springer notes that Hardy uses allusions in Jude “as in previous novels, to foreshadow action, and with scathing irony, to heighten a scene” (1983: 123).

However, as the narrative structure of Jude reveals, allusions also denote their own hackneyed meaning familiar to the audience through mechanical repetition. The House of Atreus, the House of Jerobam, Lycaonians and St Paul all demand the reader’s recognition, otherwise the allusion will be only an empty term without any semantic value; although, as noted by Springer, it might enhance the ethical eminence of the novel simply through the reader’s association of a foreign name with a solemn and dignified source. In the nineteenth-century, however, the Bible was still a very popular source of allusions and an inspiration for artists. Its recognition in textual and non-textual artefacts was taken for granted. Hardy’s use of allusion strongly emphasises this metonymic link, but it also demonstrates that, in the overall semantic context of the novel, allusions function as metaphors of the secondary poetics into which they were imported.

In Jude’s style allusions form both complex metaphorical figures and single metonymic structures. This relation of intertextual referents and their textual signifiers can be easily decoded since it is founded on a commonly understood relation, providing that the narrator, the characters, and the reader belong to the same cultural milieu. But this seems to be presupposed in a realistic novel, for which the writer draws generously
from society's langue. Patricia Meyer Spacks notes that authors of classical novels were “defining themselves in relation to their audiences or in terms of a historical tradition rather than by personal reactions of feeling” (1978: xv). The writer's trust in his audience's intellectual capability allows the narrator to allude, for instance, to “certain historic disciples” (JO, I, 1, 10) without mentioning their names but obviously with reference to the Bible. Hardy's narration, profuse in allusions, is self-consciously composed to be read; it is targeted at the “healthy mind” of the audience. Such an attitude is deeply rooted in “reciprocity”, thus creating an arena for communication between the author and the reader. As was explained in the Introduction in reference to Umberto Eco's theory, this communication is based on a “deal” between the two, who know what to expect from each other.

To conclude: allusions in Jude expose the absence of authenticity in the characters and in the situations to which they refer. Ideological and textual models do not guarantee mental and existential stability for the characters. This approach, underlying Jude's language, transmutes the novel's universe into textual artifice. The total narrative significance of the novel reduces the representational value of allusive references back to their textual organisation. By adapting literary titles, alluding to monumental cultural and literary figures and repeating quotations, Hardy incapacitates their inchoate meaning and exposes their repetitive nature and ideological bondage. Rhetorical pomposity, or “enhancing” of style, which effects from the overabundance of intertexts in the novel is Hardy's method of criticism.

On the horizontal level of the text there are nineteenth-century multifaceted and contradictory discourses against which quoting acts are critically performed. Hardy shows that the glory of the sublime and ideal past, as promised by Shelley, has lost its competence, and has been supplanted by the presiding institutions. The mythical law of harmony reflected in the “Letter” is revealed as an ideologically/ rhetorically
manipulated fake. The ideology of the Victorian authorities does not provide a satisfying alternative either. Reading texts approved by the Arnoldian “school” did not improve Jude’s fate, nor Sue’s trust in contemporary empiricists (Mill) and rationalists (Gibbon). Shelley’s Romantic idealism is presented as exhausted in the characters’ self-parodying acts, while the authority of Oxford rationalism loses its reliability through the narrative pictures of the characters’ misfortune.

Quotations applied as metaphors of feelings, like the authoritative quotations from chapter one, provide only an aesthetic, not an ethical, judgment on the representation of the novel. As noted by D.H. Lawrence,

There is a lack of sternness, there is a hesitating betwixt life and public opinion, which diminishes the Wessex novels from the rank of pure tragedy. It is not so much eternal, immutable laws of being which are transgressed, it is not the vital life-forces set in conflict with each other, bringing almost inevitable tragedy – yet not necessarily death, that we see in the most splendid Aeschylus. It is, in Wessex, that the individual succumbs to what is in its shallowest, public opinion, in its deepest, the human compact by which we live together, to form a community. (1985: 50-51)

Although Lawrence’s comments address the ethics of a classical tragedy, they also support the argument that the characters’ fate is determined by “public opinion”, namely convention. Therefore, Hardy’s realism arises not from “the vital life-forces set in conflict” but from intertextual relationships set in poetical figures. Their ethics cannot by judged according to the classical model of mimesis, for they do not aspire to transcend the level of representation; they are just subjected to the aesthetics of style.

Life-force in Hardy is the writer’s effort of creation, which is nonetheless affected by the same conventions which his characters helplessly tried to overcome. In her analysis of the Victorian novel, Suzanne Keen alludes to Jude, describing it as “perhaps
the most-well-known example of the consequences of contesting social norms for representation” (1998: 4). Hardy uses metaphorical quotations to illustrate his characters’ moods or points of view by comparing the content of a quotation with how they feel or think, yet the narrative context shows that they think and feel according to the content of a quotation. The narrator’s ambiguous rôle is to reveal the conflict between the domain of the quotation and the emotional expression. By contrasting the narrative situation and the act of quoting, Hardy parodies the conventional use of textual sources.

By using metaphorical quotations, Hardy draws our attention to their overt material presence, which itself symbolises the textualised form of culture (in the same way that epigraphs and allusions do). From an intertextual perspective they represent ideologies that inform the level of representation. The allegorical significance of the quoting act reveals Hardy’s distrust of ideological approaches to literature and language, as derived from both Romanticism and Realism. Both forms of poetics find in the novel their polemical versions. This is reflected in *Jude* by means of quotations, thematic references, and poetical figures. Their ethical reliability is put into question by the subverting narration. Added to a polyphonic discussion of the ideologies carried out within the plot, they undermine the idea of a stable order, and deny ethical support to both the characters and the readers.

Drawing on the conclusions of the First and the Second Chapters, the last part of the thesis will discuss the relationship between representation and reality. The aesthetic value of quotations, as understood symbolically, will be considered against the aesthetics of representation.
Chapter III

Symbol – Quoting Reality

The intention of this chapter is to demonstrate how the language of *Jude* produces meanings, how it desires articulation, and how this process relates to the external world. After Jacques Lacan, by “desire” I mean the potentially incomplete movement from one signifier to another in a creative process aiming to fill in the absence of the real objects which signs designate. What Lacan calls the real is “the inaccessible realm which is always beyond the reach of signification, always outside the symbolic order” (Eagleton 1983:168). The materiality of language and graphic signs will be considered as the representation of this absence masked in the figurative transposition. In discussing the symbolic and technical aspects of the creative process, I will refer to two methods of interpretation: textual, investigating the poetical effects of representation, and psychoanalytical, observing the text’s motives for articulation. Through these two different directions, my analysis will come to explore how the identity of the text as a subject is constituted from its metaphorical and metonymic relations, and, on the other hand, how these relations participate in a fictionalising process involving the external referents. My findings from chapter one and two, explaining the ideological determinants of metaphors and metonymies in *Jude’s* poetics, will be applied now for the analysis of other symbolic figures. They will recognised after Lacan as symbolic figures of ‘condensation’ and displacement’ of symbolic meanings. Both terms, condensation and displacement are derived from psychoanalysis and correspond to what Roman Jakobson identified as the two primary operations of human language: (metaphor) condensing meanings together, and metonymy (displacing one with another). A notion of the Other from Jacques Lacan will be introduced to show how the
metaphorical world of the unspoken (absent) in *Jude* yielded ground to the metonymic world of language (present).

While phenomenology argues that representation carries a trace of the ideal pre-linguistic order, in psychoanalysis the language stands for the object, and offers only a chain of signifiers leading to other signifiers. In this thesis, the phenomenological approach is applied to explain the conscious attempt to evoke the undistorted feelings or ideas from the pre-linguistic order, but on the other hand, the psychoanalytical theory will explain the impossibility of 'fulfilment'.

However, the text will not be regarded as an autonomous being deprived of any connection with its author, but just the reverse, for the desire of the text is understood as the participation of the author in the process of transposing his intentions into signs. I employed this variety of methods in response to the multileveled construction of the text which, I believe, has to be interpreted within its social, political, cultural, and creative context. The text in my interpretation represents the very ideological, but also psychological forces that are shown in its creative order.

A simultaneous discussion of the relationship between socio-psychological and psychoanalytical motivations of the text finds support in the post-structural semiotic approach which postulates that language shapes the consciousness and distorting the original intentions. In my interpretation of symbolic signification in *Jude*, I argue that the Wessex representation is an artistic, purposely intertextual collection of texts which articulate the failure of the original expression. Using the voices of the Other, Hardy speaks about the real world which had already undergone the process of intertextual mediation and thus it is devoid of its secure primordial phenomenological status. The empirical solidity of reality is contained in signs of *Jude* which are themselves spectacles of fiction.
Alison Chapman shows how this difference between the signifying intention and its representation informs feminist literature, particularly Christina Rossetti's poetry, which absorbs the problematics of a silenced voice. Yet, as Chapman shows, the meaning concealed in the spectral traces: "voices of the dead" (Chapman 2000:30) is not the fossil, or the pre-requisite artefact, which is commensurate with presence and origin claimed by new historicism. According to Chapman, "[t]his other voice threatens rather than safeguards presence but exists alongside the voice as the guarantee of self-presence" (2000:32). It is important for my analysis that the archaic and symbolic history of the voice of the Other contribute to the identity of the Self, which means that the identity of the texts is not only accepted as uncompleted and always in progress.

Hardy's desire to articulate the real, despite its painful impossibility, becomes particularly clear in his poetry. In his "Thoughts of Phoebe" (1890), for example, he clothes reality in words in order to materialise the object of the past:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Thus I do but the phantom retain} \\
\text{Of the maiden of yore} \\
\text{As my relic; yet haply the best of her - fixed in my brain} \\
\text{It may be the more} \\
\text{That no line of her writing have I.} \\
\text{Nor a thread of her hair,} \\
\text{No mark of her late time as dame in her dwelling, whereby} \\
\text{I may picture her there. (ll. 18-25; W: 55)}
\end{align*}
\]

The past, just like the present, can never be resurrected, but the experience might be imported into language. This will be only a vague response, always late, and never synchronised, as Gillian notes: "[h]ence the passage of the sign rests upon the irreducible differences separating off from each other the phases of time" (1982: 127). Recollection
and anticipation delineate that difference which separates the speaking subject from what is being spoken. For Gillan, deriving his terminology from Lacan, this is the difference between “the Self” and “the Other” of phenomenological origin:

Erupting within the impassable distance between the self and the Other, the difference is beyond being. Demarcated in the junctures which form the passage of the sign through time, the signifying differences which constitute meaning in discourse are not. Their temporal character constantly erodes the hold they have on being: for once they are they cease to be. What is experienced in the juncture of the sign is not the dialectic, however, of being and nothingness, but the passage spanning the phases of time, the continual forming and reforming of the past, present and future. The relation to the Other is always elsewhere and thus never coincides entirely with the forms which history would give to it. To speak, consequently, is to wend one’s way through a symbolic world whose sign-posts and pathways are always shifting and disappearing. (1982: 126-27)

In linguistic psychoanalysis, this process responds to the use of language (the Other) by the subject (Self) that attempts to articulate its “fictional ideal”, an ego.

As I said before, although the novel absorbs and represents the constellation of contemporary ideologies, it is also their critique and therefore can be treated as the literary antidote to their oppressiveness. However, as I argued above, the text also articulates the very individual approach of the author to the reality that constitutes a particular context for writing. Kristeva would suggest that it is just the text (a signifying system), not the author, that brings forward the final effect, and that the author only enacts intertextuality in writing. Yet the poetics of Jude convey a strong sense of the author’s actual constitution, not only historical but also emotional and psychological (see my discussion of Hardy’s visual imagination in introduction and beneath in this chapter). Jude’s texture designates the very specific attitude of the author to reality.
which then affects his poetics. According to Kristeva, the novel emanates the writer's readings, but from a socio-psychological perspective it is the readings that emanate the writer. In my analysis these two approaches meet as much as they meet in Hardy and in his writing. In her analysis of allusions in Hardy's work, Mary Rimmer explains this specific amalgamate: "Hardy himself seems to have seen no absolute divide between the lived and the learned, the rural and the urban, the oral and the written" (2000: 60). This conclusion articulates my twofold analysis of the symbolic poetics of Hardy's quotations which are treated as both textual and factual artefacts.

Throughout his life Hardy was deeply engaged with the physical, sensual, and visual materiality of life. In its every shape reality was appealing to Hardy, as many critics have noted (Holloway 1953; Paterson 1960; Brooks 1971; Millgate 1971; Pinion 1977, 1990), and nature in particular was his inspiration. Especially in his rustic "novels of characters and environment"1 we come across picturesque and vigorous descriptions of folk life,2 details of the rural environment,3 and anthropomorphised images of the rude substance of natural objects.4 Hardy's pictorialism is praised and widely discussed

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1 In his General Preface to the Novels and Poems (Wessex Edition, I, 1912), Hardy divides his novels into three groups: "the first group is called 'Novels of Character and Environment', and contains those which approach most nearly to uninfluenced works; also one or two which, whatever their quality in some few of their episodes, may claim a verisimilitude in general treatment and detail. The second group is distinguished as 'Romances and Fantasies', sufficiently descriptive definition. The third class - 'Novels of Ingenuity' - show a not infrequent disregard of the probable in the chain of events, and depend for their interest mainly on the incidents themselves. They might be also characterised as 'Experiments', and were written for the nonce simply; though despite the artificiality of their fabric some of their scenes are not without fidelity to life" (PW: 44-45). According to this classification Jude would belong to the 'Experiments' group, as one of the most "influenced" or "pieced" works.

2 Under the Greenwood Tree: A Rural Painting of the Dutch School (1872).

3 Far from the Madding Crowd (1874); The Woodlanders (1887).

4 The Return of the Native (1880).
(Smart 1961; Scott 1965; Tanner 1975; Berger 1990) and often compared to George Eliot’s verbal drawings (Berger 1990; Chapman 1990; Byerly 1997; Maxwell 2002) or Wilkie Collins’ narrative painting techniques (Pinion 1990: 24). D.H. Lawrence, who saw in Hardy an extraordinary understanding of Nature, particularly appreciated this aspect of Hardy’s art. As John Paterson writes, for both Hardy and Lawrence:

To define reality as a function of the merely human and social was to define it as ordinary and commonplace. But to define it as a function of a natural universe independent of and infinitely greater than the human creature and his cities and societies was to define it as the continuing repository of marvel and magic. (1977: 456)

The tragedies of Wessex are associated with this supreme audio-visual recollection of its inhabitants and its bountiful nature. However, as Pinion notes (and it is also found in Paterson’s comments), Hardy’s “interest in pictures was not in scenic beauty but in deeper realities” (1990: 40). This belief is characteristic of those critical interpretations that search for a metaphysical dimension hidden beneath the surface of representation. Objects of nature, people, animals, even sounds and smells, were supposed to embody “the mystery of life”, or, as Springer writes, the “metaphysical level” of the natural world (1983: 11).

Lawrence ranks Hardy with Giovanni Verga and Leo Tolstoy with regard to their endeavours in “reconciling their metaphysic, their theory of being and knowing, with their living sense of being”, which for Lawrence represents the subliminal action of the mind:

Because a novel is a microcosm, and because man in viewing the universe must view it in the light of a theory, therefore every novel must have the background or the structural skeleton of some theory of being, some metaphysic. But the metaphysic must always subserve the artistic purpose
beyond the artist's conscious aim. Otherwise the novel becomes a treatise.

(1985: 144)

It is interesting to note that Lawrence considers Hardy's realism as based on artistic objectivity but pervaded by the more powerful force of the independent spirit. This metaphysical aspect is frequently associated with Hardy's pessimism, as Stewart argues, who finds in *The Woodlanders* the "thrust of creation; peculiarly representative of the helplessness of humanity before the commands of fate" (1963: 38). Those interpreters who identify Schopenhauer's "Immanent Will" with Hardy's fatalistic "Wyrd" attribute the concept of a monistic universe to Hardy's tentative metaphysics (Weber 1957, 1965; Brennecke 1966; Hands 1989; Wright 1991; Gatrell 1993). According to Wright this is an ahistorical, unconscious movement pervading "object, race, and person" [which] can be approximated by the landscape, with its reminders of the antiquity of man, his kinship with the earth, the rudimentary nature of his artefacts, in the shape of barrows, flints, and stone monuments (Wright 1991: 49-50).

This definition of Hardy's metaphysics reflects the widely accepted critical view regarding the world of Wessex as a symbol of the human tragic universe. However, Wright's description of the primordial history of Wessex as "a cliché of the theory of history that we may learn lessons from the study of our past" (1991: 49-50) suggests a more original understanding of the Wessex tragedy involved in a circle of repetitions. Wright's approach is not intertextual, but it implies that imitation is an important aspect of Hardy's poetics. Hardy himself expresses this most intriguing quality of his poetics, noting that: "An object or mark raised or made by man on a scene is worth ten times any such formed by unconscious Nature. Hence clouds, mists, and mountains are unimportant beside the wear on a threshold, or the print of a hand" (L: 116). It is not Nature and the mysteries of human kind that Hardy incarnates in his writing, but their symbolic-textual reflections found in the artistic artefacts of others, including those
traces of human life which have become artefacts themselves ("the wear on a
threshold"). As Joseph Hillis Miller notes, "Nature for Hardy has meaning and use only
when it has been marked by man's living in it and so becomes a repository of signs and
preserving individual and collective history" (1977: 447). Miller compares this
characteristic transposition of the natural (real) with the semiotic (textual) with George
Meredith’s “Nature” poetry and his novels The Egoist (1887) and One of Our
Conquerors (1891):

Yet their work, too, displays a sublimation of Nature into signs for subjective
states that could exist without Nature, though not without the figuratively used
signs of things in Nature. Meredith and Hardy knew, each in his own way, that
the self and its states are linguistically generated and sustained. (1977: 445)

The relation between reality and fiction in Hardy is based on the mediation of
language, by Wright recognised as clichés which are “fossilised relics of universal
memory” (1991: 49-50), and by Miller as the preserved memory of the “signs of things”
(1977: 445). In this argument, while juxtaposing the conclusions of both critics, I will
consider those symbolic forms of fiction as quotations from reality which carry the need
of the text/author to fetishise the memory of the real. This need will be explored against
the theory of the Other by Lacan in which discourse is understood as an expression of
the identity of the “self”. Thus the text will be seen as an attempt of the text to express
its own identity, an attempt only possible through the discourses of others.

As has been emphasised earlier, Hardy reconstructs Jude's universe from
intertexts that serve the text’s self-referential poetics. However, surprisingly, and
apparently inconsistently, Jude's poetics still draw upon life. Intertexts still refer to
reality but are regarded as a textualised archive of external experiences. This is arguably
the most disputable aspect of the author’s poetics: a chiasmus originating from the
difference between the intertextual artifice typographically marked on the surface of
representation, and the need to ground the text in reality, seen in the novel’s narrative.

Thus although quotations (intertexts) are used to parody quoting (intertextuality), the
text restores the mimetic value of language by creating its own evidence of material
reality, which is the text/sign itself.

Hardy’s writing becomes an attempt of materialisation, or as I will explain further,
‘fetishisation’, of the text’s desire to articulate its identity. This process in Jude becomes
an allegory of failure of symbolic articulation. While desiring articulation, the
text/author produces meaning under the foreign - symbolic structures of representation.
In Jude these structures are relics of meaning once belonging to the reality of the
author’s experience. They are frozen structures, frames of quotations, allusions,
epigraphs, reflections of images, visual landscapes, that Hardy evokes to root his
discourse in materiality. They will never allow the reader full recognition of the author’s
intention, as they will never stand for the exact truth, but they are the only means to
articulate a shifting picture of reality, as Gillan claims, “Incapable of being captured and
assimilated into the folds of consciousness, that reality can only be signified” (1982:
127). Hardy knows that the truth can never be realised – it is always hidden, delayed,
suspended or dispersed in language.

Hardy’s later poems articulate this impossibility particularly clearly, especially in
his second volume of poetry, Poems of the Past and the Present (1901). It can be found
in allegories of reality (“Nature’s Questioning”, 1890), in recollections of sounds and
dance figures (“Reminiscences of a Dancing Man”, 1895), in imitations of sounds and
light (“Lines to a Movement in Mozart’s E-Flat, Symphony”, 1898; “A Cathedral
Façade at Midnight”, 1897), in transposing sources of history (“Drummer Hodge”,
1899; “The Souls of the Slain”, 1899), and in literature (“The Darkling Thrush”, 1900).
It can also be located in the identification of the absent through the present (“A Broken
Appointment”, 1893) and in the proliferation of narrative voices (“So Various in Winter
Words” in *Various Moods and Metres* [1928]); “Voices from Things Growing in a Churchyard” in *Late Lyrics and Earlier* [1922]). Hardy’s self-referential remarks are directly expressed in many poems, including “A Sign Seeker” (1890). “I Looked Up From My Writing”, “Poems of War and Patriotism” in *Moments of Vision and Miscellaneous Verses* (1917), and his famous “On an Invitation to the United States”.

In this last poem Hardy openly acknowledges his awareness of imitation overtaking life, which can be shifted onto art as well as his position as a writer:

> Though my own Being bear no bloom  
> I trace the lives such scenes enshrine,  
> Give past exemplars present room.  
> And their experience count as mine. (ll. 13-16; W: 100)

The reality of Hardy’s poetry evolves in relation to the signifying possibility of a language which has already been captured by discourses constituted in both historical and social space (“past exemplars”). We can argue, using a Lacanian metaphor, that the author’s being or his desire to speak is determined by “the Other”. He is aware of the linguistic potentiality of being as well as of the textual potentiality of literature.

Although discussing his intention through language (“the Other”) is the only possible means of expression, Hardy accepts this, turning a necessity into a virtue. While writing about the impossibility of the ideal execution of memories or impressions in language, Hardy denies a metaphysical attitude to representation; nevertheless, in his constant worshipping of past memories, he articulates his longing for the impossible.

The passage from *Under the Greenwood Tree* that serves as the motto for this thesis enlightens the meaning of this paradox. The motto points to the difference between representation and reality, a difference impossible to articulate in its first form: that what is seen as representation is not what was meant to be shown, but it opens a way to the missing subject:
All was over; Dick surveyed the chair she had last occupied, looking now like a setting from which the gem had been torn. There stood the glass, and the romantic teaspoonful of elder wine at the bottom that she couldn’t drink by trying ever so hard, in obedience to the mighty arguments of the tranter (his hand coming down upon her shoulder the while like a Nasmyth hammer); but the drinker was there no longer. There were nine or ten pretty little crumbs she had left on her plate; but the eater was no more seen. (UTGT: 81)

Hardy composes this scene in relation to the absent subject, which actually enables the narrator to articulate that which is present. Crumbs on the plate, the glass, the teaspoon, metonymically signify the eater who is missing, but through the remnants left, her presence is even more meaningful and palpable. The memory enclosed in these tiny particles of reality articulates Dick’s longing and reproduces Fancy’s image. Thus absence makes the subject present through the writer’s choice of the artistic permutation of signifiers that come to the surface of representation.

An allusion to “a Nasmyth hammer” (evoking the image of the real steam hammer designed by James Nasmyth in the nineteenth-century) seemingly disturbs the trajectory of the poetic description, but this is a quality of Hardy’s art: by employing other discourses, he exalts his own experimental and highly influenced text. As argued in “On an Invitation to the United States”, it is only the reconfiguration of other thoughts and texts that constitutes the “being” of one’s own verse. The Other, or metonymy substituting the missing subject, is a trace of the author’s intention (text’s “desire”) to articulate something prior to representation (“self” of the text), but in the search for verbal expression he only finds other ready-made figures to be restored.

As Foucault observes, these intertextual elements foster the resemblance of representation, which “by drawing things towards one another in an exterior and visible movement, also give rise to a hidden interior movement – a displacement of qualities
that take over from one another in a series of relays” (1977: 23). Thus, the effect of the present subject reveals the missing or displaced object of the text which cannot be identified due to the constant process of transmutation in language. What is actually visible on the surface of representation is a combination of textual artefacts – the result of the artistic “game”. There is thus no further depth or transcendental truth beneath the surface of representation, for what constitutes the meaning derives from the creative use of signifiers. Being used as an artificer of intertext, memories or images refer to that missing totality which was felt before his discourse was punctured by language. What Dennis Taylor says about “Neutral Tones” can be regarded as characteristic of Hardy’s prose: “The retrospective backward look, a common motif in Hardy, gives no illumination except for repetition, a repetition gone old and etched in the mind, but still painful” (1999: 189).

However, production from fragments evokes the pain of instability and incompleteness characteristic of the displaced subject, or, as Lacan writes, after Freud, “decentred” (1977: 80). This fundamental division takes place unconsciously between the poles of “displacement” and of “condensation” or, in other words, between the primary processes of “self” absorption and “self” repulsion (Lacan 1977: 81). The psychoanalytical argument of Lacan refers to the moment of division that the child experiences when first separated from his mother. The idea of gaining consciousness and becoming an individual subject is used by Lacan for the critical interpretation of language which obtains its articulation through the child’s recognition of himself as different, changed from his earlier idea of himself as a part of a bigger whole, or in psychoanalytical terms, a mother. This phase, called after Freud’s *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, “a mirror stage”, is a process of linguistically expressing the self, and responds to the moment of articulating the absent (world) by the present (language):
Through the word – already a presence made of absence – absence itself gives a name to that moment of origin whose perpetual recreation Freud’s genius detected in the play of the child. And from this pair of sounds modulated on presence and absence there is born the word of meaning of a particular language in which the world of things will come to be arranged. It is the world of words that creates the world of things. (Lacan 1977: 65)

Once the mirror stage is overcome, it is the voice of the Other which comes to force, but this longing for ideal unity still underpins articulation.

In Hardy’s poetry we observe this irreconcilable dichotomy embodied in the constitutional elements of imagery and narrative structure. They lie in the constant shifting between the writer’s attention to the work’s own expressive intensity and to his own interpreting experience. Aware of the otherness of language, Hardy enacts his disillusionment and disappointment, suffusing it with “aesthetic semblance”, which according to Wolfgang Iser:

Neither transcends a given reality nor mediates between idea and manifestation; it is an indication that the inaccessible can only be approached by being staged. Representation is therefore both performance and semblance. It conjures up an image of the unseeable, but being a semblance, it also denies it the status of a copy of reality. (1987: 226)

“Semblance” in Jude is achieved through symbolic and aesthetic transformations of referents which are already copies of signs. Reality is thus enacted in intertextual discourse, but for Hardy it is performed in its epistemological complexity. This is the reality of empirical experience; the same reality that the Realists tried to picture in a photographic manner, believing that language may capture the passage between reality
and the sign. The intertextual form of *Jude*, however, denotes their separation: we observe reality already transposed and structured from texts and intertextual patterns that cast the narrative model. While desiring to articulate empirical reality, the text carries the message, not of reality as such, but of the relation of reality to words/texts/language, or in Lacanian terms, the Other. Gillan terms this the “writing of the relation to the Other”, and sees it as an attempt to accept the difference between the self of the text and its actual otherness:

To speak and to write of the relation to the Other, and within that relation to speak and write of the world, is to attempt to give positive outlines, through style, to words that issue from the signifying space created by the distance to the Other. (1982: 135)

In Hardy, these “positive outlines” refer to his playing with quotations, allusions, and epigraphs, as well as to his manipulation of poetical figures that reflect the author’s ironic distance from the text (the Other).

Hardy’s text, although self-conscious, does not deny the mimetic value of language, but, importantly, it modifies the understanding of mimesis. The text changes the relation between the signified and the signifier: when referring to reality Hardy points to its mediatory form (signifier), not the original (signified) which lies beyond linguistic articulation. Semblance in *Jude* is embodied in quotations and references to art, since these forms convey a direct relation to reality: they are fragments of a textually mediated world, recognised by Byerly in Hardy’s references to painting.

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^ As Raymond Tallis explains, in naïve nineteenth-century criticism: “a unity of the work was thought to reflect the unified consciousness or unified world-picture of the author. It was further implied or suggested that behind this again was an experience of unified, unfragmented external reality”. Tallis quotes Bernard Bergonzì who says that today: “We are saddled with all kinds of relativistic structures of consciousness. We do not believe in there being ‘one reality’ out there as undoubtedly Tolstoy did.” (1988: 14, 9)
theatre, music, and architecture. According to Byerly, in her seminal essay on Hardy’s aesthetic forms of representation, Hardy applies foreign forms because they embody “a concrete expression of the will to create and recreate the world” (1997: 150), and this same “will” might be attributed to Hardy’s own effort of writing. In this sense, mediated forms of reality, such as art, reach a credible status of representation. Although unreal, they refer to the very real, naturalistic effort of expression that Byerly associates with Hardy’s “labor of creation” (1997: 149). This is a distinctive feature of Hardy’s understanding of representation and finds its articulation in Jude, which on the one hand displays its own artificiality and literal nature as a work of art, but, on the other, ratifies its mimetic value as a part of reality.

In Jude we observe this ambiguous technique in the multiplication of meanings produced within the poetics of quotations, as well as through the use of symbolic figures that metaphorically signify quoting. There are icons of graphic signs and poetical images of photographs, letters, sculptures, and designs, which participate in the plot as metonymies of originals believed in by the characters, but at the same time they symbolise mediated forms of the story’s discourse. By breaking free of the referential relationships with external reality, these signs attain an autonomous existence as objects within the physical space of the page. Having become objectified images they play a rôle analogous to that of the fetish in Freudian theory.

In the nineteenth-century, before a famous work of Zygmun Freud work was published, the definition of a fetish was discussed by Kraft-Ebbing, in his 1886 work Psychopathia Sexualis, translated into English in 1892. According to Kraft-Ebbing:

The word fetish signifies an object, or parts or attributes of objects, which by virtue of association to sentiment, personality, or absorbing ideas, exert a charm (the Portuguese “fetisso”) or at least produce a peculiar individual impression which is in no wise connected with the external appearance of the sign, symbol or fetish. This
interesting psychological phenomenon may be explained by an empirical law of association, i.e., existing between the notion itself and the parts thereof which are essentially active in the production of pleasurable emotions. It is most commonly found in religious and erotic spheres. Religious fetishism finds its original motive in the delusion that its object, i.e., the idol, is not a mere symbol, but possesses divine attributes, and ascribes to it a peculiar wonder-working (relics) or protective (amulets) virtues. (1965: 11)

The attitude of Jude to the texts as well as other objects of desire, such as Sue’s photo, inscriptions carved in stone, letters written by Sue, reminds of the sexual or religious fixation described by Kraft-Ebing. Interestingly, in the novel the same symbolic relationship can be observed between the signs of the representation. Revised by Julia Kristeva for linguistic aims “fetish” is a “substitution of the symbolic” (1984: 62), but does not itself signify meaning, rather it reproduces it in a mechanistic way. It is the ego’s separated image reflected in the mirror beyond the symbolic (social, historical) order. It exists as an object of desire that denies a stage of the symbolic transposition (thetic) that underlies any act of signification (Kristeva 1984: 62-67). Thus a fetish is the replacement of the sign, as quotations, epigraphs, and allusions in Jude substitute the source. Graphically marked, quotations are labelled simply as elements of another semiotic system, and so they define the explicitly intertextual as the intersemiotic structure of the novel. In Jude, the fetish denotes reality, which has already undergone its symbolic (thetic) phase: it has become a sign system. Being adapted by the process of signification, the fetish becomes a signifier, delineated by its specific representation, and serves the poetics of the text.

The graphic sign of a pointing finger drawn on the page of the novel represents Jude’s inscription in a milestone, carved “with his keen chisel” (JO, I, 11: 73).
There is no additional explanation needed as the sign is just there in its iconic form (See fig. 2). The finger, Jude’s initials, and a word, “THITHER”, are an emblem, in the novel signifying an object from Jude’s reality: “By the light of a match he could still discern what he had cut so enthusiastically so long ago” (JO, I, 11: 73). The letters carved in stone do not signify anything but themselves, in semiotic terms, an icon: signified equal to its signifier. In the novel’s universe this is an icon of reality: a “fetish” which affects Jude’s memory with its physical appearance. Terence Wright writes:

[T]his stone is also one instance of the things on which we leave our imprint. Before the book is ended the carving is already obscured by moss. So it is with all the works of Man. “Object history” is in fact evidence of human history, but all that such evidence shows is our own impermanence. (1991: 47)

Graphically differentiated signs, however, attract our attention with their materiality, as if they wanted to protect the history of their memory from impermanence objectified in print. Before they start meaning in the narrative context, graphic signs influence our perception with their layout, which, in being a part of the page, is also part of the fictional story. When Jude observes the icon, he notes that: “The sight of it, unimpaired, within its screen of grass and nettles, lit in his soul a spark of the old fire” (JO, I, 11: 73). Thus a picture of the stone evoked within Jude’s memory becomes an object of his own history, or a fetish from his past. As a metatextual sign, the letters metaphorically manifest man’s objectifying approach to objects, and this is the same approach that the author shows towards his text while using signs on the page.

An inscription carved by Sue suggests a similar interpretation. When Jude meets Sue for the first time in the shop in Christminster, he does not speak to her, but observes her figure and her work from a distance (JO, II, 2: 88):
He stole a glance round. Before her lay a piece of zinc, cut to the shape of a scroll three or four feet long, and coated with a dead-surface paint on one side. Hereon she was designing or illuminating, in characters of Church text, the single word

**ALLELUIA**

Fig. 3

Sue’s design emerges from the text in its descriptive and metatextual form. The word drawn on the page in Gothic font symbolises Sue’s inscription (See fig.4). However, in the universe of the novel the word on the page plays the rôle of the original inscription, not that of its symbolic reflection. This is the word both Jude and the reader can see unfolding before their eyes. It belongs to the world of fiction and yet is bracketed off from it. What is also evident from the metatextual side is that Hardy adds the whole fragment to the manuscript on the back page, including the precise ornate drawing made in ink (M: 86). We observe how important it is for the author to signal the Christian command in a graphic form. The graphic sign makes the referent materially present and changes it into an object which in the plot overwhelms Jude: “A sweet, saintly, Christian business, hers! thought he” (JO, II, 2: 88). A piece of zinc is just a thing, but through Jude’s perception it becomes a fetish of Sue.

Other fetishes of Jude’s are the books he so admires. The Greek letters which represent the New Testament (JO, I, 7: 43) belong to Jude’s thoughts, but first they draw attention to the materiality of their Greek font. The narrator describes Jude’s act of reading:

He sat down, opened the book, and with his elbows firmly planted on the table, and his hands to his temples, began at the beginning:

**ΠΚΑΙΝΗ ΔΙΑΦΗΚΗ**

In the first version of the manuscript these letters belonged typographically to the main sentence: “The Gospel of Saint Luke” in Greek (M: 41) but Hardy later crossed them
out and indented it to form a new paragraph (See fig. 5). In their present form they amount to a symbol of a book, or from a semiotic point of view, of the intertext which composes the novel. Jude reads the letters incorporated into the text in their original, which provides palpable evidence of their existence, additionally ratified by the detailed description of Jude's physical posture – a plausible frame for the act of reading. The letters reappear in their Greek form in the next scene when their material appearance is identified by Jude (IO, I, 7: 48-49) (See fig. 6):

'There lay his book open, just as he had left it, and the capital letters on the title-page regarded him with fixed approach in the grey starlight, like the unclosed eyes of the dead man:

H ΚΑΙΝΗ ΑΙΑΦΗΚΗ

Sheila Berger suggests that these inscriptions serve a double function:

It is ironic that he responds to his own engraved words as if they were a positive sign of something outside of his self. While the letters, carved in stone, do represent to Jude his individual and ideal plans, they also seem to have an external power over him. He is a romantic, a perennial mythmaker, who grew to idolise his Old Testament study in Greek, and Greek letters, too, were placed on the page as items to worship. (1990: 144)

As metaphorical figures these graphic signs express Jude's passion, while at the same time they refer only to themselves and become fetishes to worship. In the text it is the stylised print that signifies their objectified status. The letters Jude inscribes in the milestone symbolise his past dreams, but, on the other hand, in their material form they become the object of his desire. In following his plans and dreaming about them, Jude is pursuing the symbolic epitomes of the text. In the context of the novel this juxtaposition indicates a transposition of the ideal into a manufactured object. A fetish to worship
appears to be only a sign of fiction, which, although graphically real, does not represent any reality other than that created by the author.

The materiality of the sign participates in the plot of the novel, but it also disrupts the typographical consistency of the page. As a part of the text, the sign discloses its foreign origin and doubles the perspective of the scene. Sue’s work is to be perceived as if it were there in front of Jude, and at the same time it belongs to a metatextual reality. This “doubleness” effect, as Iser writes, reveals “the coexistence of what is mutually incompatible” (1987: 221). Ontologically, either perspective excludes the other, but in the reality of the novel they posit a new as-if-real order within which they can be bridged, yet not blurred, to generate a dialogic representation. In *Jude* these signs play the same rôle as quotations: their typographical difference communicates their extratextual affiliation, yet they are simultaneously involved in the plot as the object of the characters’ observation and recitation. Protagonists observe or recite texts in narrative scenes, but these scenes also disclose the material function of signs in the novel’s reality. Jude and Sue not only read texts, but they also respond to them as icons or fetishes. In this way Hardy reveals that these are texts that inform the imagery in the novel. Quotation draws attention to the moment of mediation, or, to use Kristeva’s term, the moment of the “structurization” of the text from other texts. Thus the novel’s reality is not genuine or real — it is mediated through texts and its realism is textually grounded.

Quotations, like other typographical devices, provide frames which separate the different discourses (or signifying systems) within the text’s representation. As explained at the beginning of this chapter, an analogous framing effect occurs in narrative descriptions of nature, people or objects defined within metaphorical and iconic figures. In the visual sensuality and creative vitality of these descriptions, Berger locates Hardy’s desire to articulate the human world through a process of negotiation with the universe (1990: Preface xii-xiii). She observes that the aesthetic dimension of
that process is fundamental for Hardy’s poetics, but she does not attribute Hardy’s aesthetics to intertextualization. That aspect of Hardy’s aesthetics explains what Berger calls the “movement of image into icon” (1990: xii). According to Berger and other critics (Smart 1961; Paulin 1975), visual thinking is at the core of Hardy’s aesthetics.

Yet, in this analysis, the visual is understood as a text, and it is textual thinking, called at the beginning of this chapter the “semiotic imagination”, that determines Hardy’s writing.

However, in Berger’s analysis of Hardy’s visual imagination, I find a substantial thesis for the analysis of the textually organised poetical effects in *Jude*. Berger argues that:

Seeing for him is not a metaphor for knowing; it is a form of knowing. He saw the essential lines and shapes of everything and tried to let the reader see them too. The whole world of human concerns seems to have passed through his imagination to become knowledge in the form of visual structures. He knew what he knew by observing the surface of things because his modern perspective of a chaotic universe, without absolute meaning or value, could conceive of no other way to know. If he wished to paint the odor of flesh or the soul outside the body, to make hidden energies visible, it was to pull them forth and make them present in a world of surfaces. Nevertheless, the intensity with which he sees ultimately provides meaning to this world of surfaces only.

The existence of external matter as the only reality must exclude any imaginative comprehension; however, an unmediated belief in the value of subjective perception must privilege inner consciousness and vision. Hardy—despite his position as materialist, sceptic, positivist—could not finally be content with cold and lifeless matter; however, neither could he accept the idea of a god in the skies or in the self. The result is an unresolved tension and
dynamic play among images. The image and the eye are not the two parts of a harmonious unity, just as framing and disruption are not two parts of a balanced whole. Rather, these are opposition points of tension, metaphoric collision and resulting destabilization from which new metaphors and meanings can emerge. (1990: xii; emphasis added)

In this important account, Berger pinpoints the most important qualities of Hardy’s aesthetics: human concerns mediated into pictures, the fragmentation of poetical structures, the objectification of reality, and the non-transitory nature of representation. She locates the cause of these effects in Hardy’s personal philosophy and his individual psychophysical constitution. In her approach, the text is produced through both the writer’s imagination (“to become knowledge in the form of visual structures”) and the writer’s mind (“his modern perspective of a chaotic universe, without absolute meaning, or value”). These two phases of creation, however, also involve the filtering of the text through the discursive frames of language within which the preconceived image is articulated. As will be shown, Hardy is aware that this filtering determines not only the process of creation but also the process of seeing things in empirical reality. Berger’s argument, when turned inside out, demonstrates that the real, when “pulled forth and made present in the world of surfaces”, like a sign on the page of the novel, is put among other surfaces only to become one of them. “Surfaces” are representations of signs, which are distinguished only in relation to other signs. By putting signs into typographical frames or quotation marks, Hardy emphasizes the metatextual significance of that difference.

This dialectic relationship between “framing” and “disruption” that Berger identifies as the cause of Hardy’s denial of transcendence, responds, I will argue, to the desire of the text to unite with the Other (discourse). Berger’s observation that “He knew what he knew by observing the surfaces of things because his modern perspective
of a chaotic universe without absolute meaning or value, could conceive of no other way to know” (1990: xii), aptly suggests the problem of Hardy’s anti-mimetic representation, which absorbs only the surfaces of things since things themselves are beyond articulation. Hardy knows this from his own literary practice: from observing reality and from trying to transform it into literary discourse. On the one hand, he is very sensitive and passionate about objects in reality, about people and their relationships, about life itself, and its palpable colours, physical shapes, lines, sensual scents and sounds, indeed its very matter. But, on the other hand, although affected emotionally and involved intellectually, he knows that it is not possible to express either materiality or his feelings in a direct form. What the Idealists and the Romantics were trying to achieve through the “Word” of God, and the Realists through their “observation and analysis” (Stevick 1967: 395), Hardy accepts as impossible and even unnecessary. Although his perception is, as Berger writes, truly intense, it “provides meaning to the world of surfaces only” (1990: xii).

Hardy’s approach to literature, comparable in its results to the Aristotelian argument, retains an understanding of poetry as mystification and artifice. The dialectical conflict which Berger locates in the writer’s suppressed nostalgia for God, considered within the metatextual representation of Jude, proves to be aroused by the artistic rather than by the transcendental obscurity of language. This subsequently provides an explanation for the “unresolved tension and a dynamic play among images” (1990: xii). What Berger argues is that these aesthetic effects of framing, so characteristic of Hardy’s poetics, actually reflect his “unresolved” ethics which are determined by the chaotic universe denying an absolute meaning. As it is not there, Hardy does not see it, and he writes only about what he sees (“the surface of things”); but he also desires to express an absolute meaning and that is why the “unresolved” tension arises.
Such a thesis imparts a contradictory premise, unintentionally confirmed by Berger who writes that, “the image and the eye are not the two parts of a harmonious unity [...] rather these are opposition points of tension” (1990: xii). Thus, in refusing both a unity of idea (image) and a method of articulation (seeing), Berger reveals that they are not the same ontological spheres. Therefore, with regard to fiction, we should not “look through Hardy’s pictures but at them to find meaning” (1990: xii). Having depicted an “unresolved” relation between reality and fiction, it is assumed that there are only “pictures” (representation) where the meaning is conveyed. As Berger clarifies further, “image” and “eye” in Hardy’s poetics meet “in a single word, impression”, which springs from the author’s subjective perception, poetically shaping the reality which he describes (1990: 5).

Contradictions in Berger’s argument disclose the natural impossibility of bridging reality and fiction when treated as ontologically different spheres. It is only in representation that they can meet, and only in the terms of fiction, but only then can they make elements of the same unity, which is just a possible (fictional) world. That is the modified version of language, where images change into icons, people into myths, and object into metaphors. While considering the changing of reality into “impression” Berger does glance at this paradox, but she argues that this movement reflects the patterns of human life, destabilised in reality and framed by the author into fictional pictures to embody that state of destabilisation (or fragmentation). In terms of my argument, however, those bracketed pictures symbolise not the patterns of destabilized human life, but the movement that changed them into destabilised patterns. Speaking of the same effects, Berger indicates that the figurative frames of Hardy’s poetical effects disrupt his language, while in my argument, Hardy’s language is poeticised as a result of the language mediation which distorts reality.
Except for quotations and graphic images, Hardy introduces symbolic figures of the copy. On the textual level it signifies the discourse of the Other which imitates and mirrors both the novel’s Christminster or Jerusalem, the letters of Jude and Sue, the statuettes of Venus and Apollo, but also the table of the Ten Commandments, and those objects of the novel’s reality which indicate imitation. A photograph of Sue is found by Jude in his aunt’s house “between the brass candlesticks on her mantelpiece” (JO, I, 1: 78). Its objectified function is introduced into the text through a sequence of actualised metonyms (candlesticks), which also surround the discovery of Jude’s photograph, encountered by Jude in Alfredston in a shop to which Arabella sold all their property:

A few days later he entered a little broker’s shop in the main street of the town, and amid a heterogeneous collection of saucepans, a clothes-horse, rolling pin, brass candlestick, swing looking-glass, and other things at the back of the shop, evidently just brought in from a sale, he perceived a little framed photograph, which turned out to be his own portrait. (JO, I, 1: 72)

A photograph is a symbolic representation of a person’s likeness, but it is also an object to be used just for decoration, or as a commodity for sale. In the novel the photograph not only conveys a semblance with the original, but it also retains the value of the material object which stands for the original. When Jude moves into his new room in Melchester it “was furnished with framed photographs of the rectories and deaneries at which his landlady had lived as trusted servant in her time” (JO, III, 1: 135), but Jude “added to the furniture of his room by unpacking photographs of the ecclesiastical carvings and monuments that he had executed with his own hands” (JO, III, 1: 136).

Jude and his landlady, although believing in different idols, treat their images in the same fetishistic way, which suggests idolatry in a religious or erotic sense. To the viewers, a photograph, which is nothing more than a copy of reality, is perceived as a special version of reality worth worshipping. Although carrying a symbolic connection
with the original, it becomes detached from this original and starts functioning as a fetish, hence Jude’s need to burn a photograph of himself in the act of destroying his memory of being Arabella’s husband. Similarly, having sent Jude a photograph of Sue, Jude’s aunt becomes afraid that he will fall in love with her image, as if the girl and her photo were the one and the same, and she warns him “not to bring disturbance into the family by going to see the girl or her relations” (JO, II, 2: 85). As the reader knows, Jude does not follow his aunt’s advice, although at the beginning he does try to restrain himself from speaking to Sue, realising that it would be “scarcely honourable towards his aunt to disregard her request so incontinently” (JO, II, 2: 89). His feelings for Sue are fired up even before he sees her; he falls in love with her photograph the first time that he sees it, beyond any rational reasoning. On receiving the photo, it immediately becomes a lively part of his reality:

Jude, a ridiculously affectionate fellow, promised nothing, put the photograph on the mantelpiece, kissed it – he did not know why – and felt more at home. She seemed to look down and preside over his tea. (JO, II, 2: 85)

Jude’s affectionate attitude to the picture could be compared to the passion felt for fetish as the object of sexual desire. His reaction to Sue’s photograph displays symptoms which Kraft-Ebing described as “pleasurable emotions” (1965: 11): the photo evokes feelings of familiarity and safety, yet it also embodies Jude’s erotic expectations suddenly expressed in the kiss that awoke Sue’s photo to life. As Kraft-Ebing explains: “Erotic fetishism makes an idol of physical or mental qualities of a person or even merely of objects used by that person, etc., because they awaken mighty associations with the beloved person, thus originating strong emotions of sexual pleasure” (1965: 11). Jude worships the picture as a private, homely divine radiating with corporal attraction. He attributes to Sue the same qualities that he would attribute to a woman to whom he rather wants to observe than to speak. It is
actually Sue who first sends him a note and initiates their meeting, as Jude, although
dreaming of her, is reluctant to contact her in reality. He is satisfied with the
contemplation of her appearance from a distance, with worshipping her photo or
experiencing her presence in a piece of work she made in zinc.

While considering Jude’s feelings for Sue in free indirect speech, the narrator
acknowledges that:

To be sure she was almost an ideality to him still. Perhaps to know her would
be to cure himself of this unexpected and unauthorized passion. A voice
whispered that, though he desired to know her, he did not desire to be cured.

(JO, II, 4: 98)

His “disease”, indicating a half-religious, half-erotic fetishism, provides those kinds of
“pleasurable emotions” to which he is afraid to succumb, at the expense of meeting his
idol in reality. The pleasure he feels when considering Sue is produced in his
imagination and is beyond any actual interaction with her person. Kraft-Ebing terms this
a “peculiar individual impression which is in no wise connected with the external
appearance of the sign, symbol or fetish” (1965: 11). The distance between Jude and the
object of his worship guarantees the constant reinvigoration of that impression. Jude
recognises that his feelings are different from those he experienced for Arabella: “After
all, he said, it is not altogether an erotolepsy that is the matter with me, as at that first
time” (JO, II, 3: 98). A hypothetical assumption of Jude comparing his direct sexual
experience with Arabella with a fixation he feels for “fetishes” representing Sue
bespeaks the same physical ground of both experiences. Yet in contact with Sue’s
symbolic representations his desire reaches the level of idolatry.

The photograph, which replaces Sue-the-original, symbolises her false appearance
—that which is reflected on the photographic plate. In A Laodicean (1881), Hardy uses
the same figure to expound the artificiality and deception that a copy bears. When
William Dare tries to discourage Paula from going to Somerset, he shows her a picture in which Somerset appears drunk. Paula, who is almost about to believe it, discovers from Charlotte that it is only a distorted photographic image. Byerly notes that “the trick represents in exaggerated form the danger of photographs: that they be taken as exact replicas of their subject” (1997: 164). In Jude’s case, Sue’s replica is taken for more than the original for it constitutes a separate object to worship: a photograph ceases to mean an exact replica or a copy of a given reality; it instead becomes an alternative reality of its own. This juxtaposition signifies the illusion of the embodiment of the real in a symbolic representation, such as fiction. This illusion is known also in religious practices, in which, to repeat Kraft-Ebing, fetish “finds its original motive in the delusion that its object, i.e., the idol, is not a mere symbol, but possesses divine attributes” (1965: 11). The notion of Jude’s half-religious, half-erotic fetishism, the worshipping of an idol from far, is also extended in Hardy’s final published novel, the notoriously black farce, *The Well-Beloved* (1897).

Jude attributes divine qualities to the texts that he studies, to Sue’s photograph, and to a piece of zinc in which he sees the embodiment of her “sweet, saintly, Christian business” (10, II, 2: 88). Ironically, the worshipped goddess is not Christian, but it seems that here her authentic character is not the object Jude’s interest. Being deluded by their actual materiality he turns them into fetishes to worship. The text reveals, however, that Jude’s idols are only copies pretending to be originals and that they should not be trusted. Jude’s ideal plans to study Christian texts are the typographical signs on the novel’s page, while the texts themselves are only quotations devoid of their prior authority. An idealised, enlivened vision of Sue evoked by Jude is nothing more than a mechanical reflection to be reproduced. Yet, as the narrative indicates later, the photograph worshipped by Jude is actually more authentic than the real Sue who builds her life on textual patterns. Hence those signs that represent a copy of the original
within the plot also reveal their illusive meaning interwoven from artifice. However, if believed to be idols or fetishes, these fictional realities transform their function from aesthetical to ethical and thus become trusted by the protagonists. That both Jude and Sue are able to find satisfaction only in and through texts is clear, but I tried also to show that it is the text of the novel which becomes a fetish of the writer himself.

Signs, when objectified and put into frames, guarantee that sense of stability that both the text and its characters need. Having been changed into objects, signs serve as fetishes revitalising the shape of the non-existent original. While looking from his windows at the Christminster buildings, Jude identifies their shapes to motivate his faith:

He could perceive the spire of the Cathedral, and the ogive dome under which resounded the great bell of the city. The tall tower, tall belfry windows, and tall pinnacles of the college by the bridge he could also get a glimpse of by going to the staircase. These objects he used as stimulants when his faith in the future was dim. (JO, II, 2: 87)

The buildings of Christminster are “stimulants” or “fetishes” that convey Jude’s fancy in the same manner as the texts he reads. Glimpsing the shapes of the city is like browsing a book: they both take on the mysteries that Jude attributes to them. As we can see, both types of poetical articulation, metonymic (quotations) and symbolic (copies) overlap and point to the same problem of the illusion of the novel’s reality.

Referring back to Lacan’s theory it can be seen that it is the Other put into a frame, either of visual (quotation marks, graphic signs) or descriptive (narrative) form that enables the fiction’s meaning. By relating to the Other’s delineated form, the text discovers its own fictional limits (possible world) and the possibility of expression. But as has already been explained, the Other is just an intertext, already mediated through
language, and imported into fiction as a symbol of reality. Moore claims that all Hardy's novels are composed of intertexts which refer only to other texts and never to reality:

It is not "life" which motivates his fictions but "text". Wessex is a Frankensteinian body of literature wherein the recognizable parts of other bodies of work are stitched together into the semblance of a whole. This semblance never lives organically as cohesive texts do, or are purported to, though it does simulate that life. (1990: 3)

Although Jude's narration unmasks the novel's "stitched" intertextual structure, it does so in order to resemble a "whole". Yet, do we know what that whole is? While Moore believes that the "whole" is the great intertextual archive that inspires Hardy to write, I suggest rather that empirical reality is the stimulant for his literary impressions.

In Jude Hardy creates fetishes of reality to offer us a first-hand experience of its essence, embodied in the Gestalt of the sign. Despite their differing aims, the effect Hardy achieves could be compared to that of Rabelais. As Wasserman argues, Rabelais, while playing with words, constitutes not only the meaning of his fiction but also the meaning of those words as material objects:

By continuing to build words upon words even after the narrative situation has been exhausted, he transfers the activities of organic life to a verbal plane in which words assume a life of their own as imaginative analogues of the physical world, to be played with in all their possible combinations and permutations. (1977: 325)

In the language of Gargantua and Pantagruel (1532), Rabelais creates significances which convey a semblance of organic life through verbal and non-verbal performance acts, in which the signs are seen to constitute the figures of the staged, heard, and even consumed objects. This is a new non-communicative, non-transcendent joyful
language which fully serves the mimetic level of representation by making it a part of the game. Although these practices are designed in relation to reality, they also point to the mystification of its linguistic experience and to the abrupt representational purposes of the text.

Hardy's signs are staged within the frames of images, which are designed as reflections of empirical reality, but only to be replayed in the frames of the false configurations of other signs. A frame distinguishes the sign from other forms of representation and signifies its materiality. As a materially recognisable Gestalt, the sign is to be understood as evidence of reality. This peculiar way of perceiving reality was illustrated by Hardy himself in his drawing added to a poem “In a Eweleaze near Weatherbury” from Wessex Poems (Paulin 1975:24):

![Fig. 7](image)

Tom Paulin notes that, in this drawing, a landscape and a pair of spectacles:

Have no apparent or necessary connection with each other [...] a relationship is random and gratuitous, like objects in a surrealist picture. His looking at the scene, like his or our general experience of the outer world, has no relation to what he sees and is purely accidental. (1975: 24)

According to Paulin this lack of relation between object and perceiver, symbolically expressed in the figure of the spectacles, points to an impressionistic way of seeing reality, in Hardy’s time understood in relation to David Hume’s notion of “successive
186

perceptions". The appearance of things, in Hume's philosophy, is the result of our habit of seeing them in particular relations, which, when constantly repeated, make objects seem related and familiar. According to Paulin it is to that habit that Hardy's drawing refers, by actualising the accidental borders of what is seen through the glasses.

However, what is of equal importance and yet not noticed by Paulin is the mediative role of the frame of the glasses. The effect of "repeated perceptions" today can be understood as an effect of convention, which is imposed on us in any act of communication. As Paulin justly observes, in Hardy's metaphor of visual communication, "There is no sense, as in Wordsworth and Coleridge, of a creative relationship between the mind and fact" (1975: 25). This is naturally true as the spectacles symbolise accidental, or impressionistic, seeing devoid of interference from a transcendental imagination. However, by displaying the difference between mind and fact, there is also a mediative role ascribed to the spectacles which, when worn over the eyes, changes reality. Whether being put on the face of the object (as in the drawing) or of the receiver, spectacles influence perception. Empirical reality is behind them but how it is perceived is an "effect of repeated perception". To put it in Lacanian terms, perception/writing/creation is always affected by a mediative frame of convention/language/ideology.

Spectacles thus appear to be an indispensable filter between fact and mind, and wearing them is never voluntary. To express reality means to see it through linguistic

4 This theory is discussed in Hume's argument on space and time: "every idea, with which the imagination is furnish'd, first makes its appearance in a correspondent impression". Hardy explains his theory of successive impressions: "Upon opening my eyes, and turning them to the surrounding objects, I perceive many visible bodies; and upon shutting them again, and considering the distance betwixt these bodies, I acquire the idea of extension. As every idea is deriv'd from some impressions similar to this idea of extension, must either be some sensations deriv'd from the sight, or some internal impressions arising from these sensations." (1975: 33).
spectacles that must precede seeing. By framing the narrative of Jude, Hardy reflects the problem of the textual imposed on the real. What the structure of the novel reveals is that articulation depends on language and its conventions, conventions which are ordained by the same ideological forces to which the novel is also subjected. The double consciousness of the text is seen in the conflict between the mimetically reliable representation and its deeper symbolic substratum. Speaking of the protagonists' faith in textual forms, and then mocking that faith, constitutes a chiasmus which forms the double poetics of the text.

As a fictional world commanded by language the novel does not reliably represent reality, but on the other hand, it is itself a part of a reality and therefore, while voicing its problems with literary conventions, the novel, in fact, evokes the real. This paradox confirms Hardy's attitude to fiction “conditioned by its surroundings like a river-stream” (PW: 125), whose originality lies not in seeking the essential laws of Nature but “those laws framed merely as social expedients by humanity” (PW: 127). In Jude, quotations, allusions and epigraphs critically represent those conventions and their habitual use.

Quotations from reality are single perceptions selected by Hardy, who knows, as a perceiver, that seeing/expressing reality in total is impossible. Although Jude's narration is the effect of meditative processes, as a book it is the material evidence of a reality which exists behind the writer's “spectacles”. This argument becomes clear in a conversation between Sue and Phillotson. Sue, who doubts the semblance of the model of Jerusalem, explicitly admits that it is impossible to recreate the original in art: “This model, elaborate as it is, is a very imaginary production. How does anybody know that Jerusalem was like this in the time of Christ? (JO. II, 5: 106). Sue's question is answered by a defender of mimesis, Phillotson, who trusts in the surface appearance of things as “the best conjectural maps”. When empirically measured and confirmed by
“actual visits to the city as it now exists” (JO, II, 5: 106) Phillotson argues that this is enough to establish a credible representation of the place which ceased to exist in its original form thousands of years ago. Phillotson, who reads the second-hand proofs mimaetically, mistaking the surface appearance for the truth, misses the mediative and distorting phase of interpretation, or to use Hardy’s symbol, misses the spectacles put between fact and mind. In opposition, Sue is convinced that “there was nothing first-rate about the place, or people, after all - as there was about Athens, Rome, Alexandria, and the other old cities” (JO, II, 5: 106).

For Sue archaeological relics seem to be the only sound source of information on actuality. Yet, as I will try to show now, the ancient source does not necessarily guarantee the authenticity of the original. In order to understand the relationship between the copy (text) and the original (the source), I would like to analyse the symbolical transfigurations of the problem of mimesis involving different modes of imitation. The poetical variations of a copy as a metaphor of imitation will be first identified in relation to the archaeological interests of Hardy. The examples of transformation of the real into fiction will be discussed in the context of his authentic experience with excavations and the exploration of geology of Dorset.

By emphasising the similarities between the visual presumption of that real experience and the act of writing, I want to show that for Hardy the complications that arise on the level of transforming reality into text are already determined on the perceptual and reflexive level. Therefore archaeological monuments of the past exist in the same ontological reality as textual monuments, and they actively affect, or as Pavel says, mediate, each other’s condition. Memories or impressions from reality create their own possible world which actually resists the formulation of the logic of experience or history.
In this analysis, quotations, as frozen textual models are considered to be an allegory of the pre-mediated phase of reading. These survivals contain the memory of the past in its original state. Yet their iconic meaning is safe only when stored in the museum, where relics are labelled as originals and separated from the rest of the world with a frame of protective glass saying, “don’t touch”. When moved into the world’s environment without that protection, in other words, when absorbed by the web of discourses, they undergo the same processes of mediation and reinterpretation as all other signs.

By putting his signs into the frame of quotation, Hardy tries to preserve the impression of a first-hand experience of reality. This was also the aim of Hardy’s special interest in archaeology which, as a discipline, was taking enormous developmental steps in Great Britain at this time. When related to official politics, dependent on the Church, archaeology’s role was to encourage the collecting of fossils and other things to restate the impression of stability eroded by the scientific and atheistic formations of the nineteenth-century (Darvill 2002). The notion that the world might be older than the Church needed reliable verification, the evidence for which was provided by archaeology. Archaeological investigations, frequently undertaken not only by specialists but also by unqualified enthusiasts, were aimed at proving the originality of the past and people’s affiliation with the achievements of their ancestors. On the other hand, archaeology, like geology, ethnography, historiography and anthropology, was set in motion by Darwin’s revolutionary research (*On the Origin of Species*, 1859) which identified the beginning of history in the theory of evolution. At that moment the European world was faced by the need to reformulate its knowledge of the origin of human kind.
As Bruce Johnson admits, Hardy was heavily influenced by the contemporary achievements of researchers, especially by the theories of the geologist Sir Charles Lyell (Principles of Geology 1830), and the anthropologists Edward Burnett Tylor (Primitive Culture 1871), George James Frazer (Totemism; The Golden Bough 1887), and Lewis Henry Morgan (Ancient Society: or, Researchers in the lines of human progress from savagery through barbarism to civilization 1877), (Johnson 1977: 261).

As Johnson notes, this need for clarification is seen in Hardy’s writing, particularly in Tess, where Hardy examines the contemporary ceremony of the May festival in the same way that Frazer analysed pagan rituals in The Golden Bough. Johnson acknowledges that their method lay in the observing of rituals as though they were living fossils (1977: 259). Besides the textual knowledge of human evolution, however, Hardy was inspired by the real fossils dispersed across Southwest England. His interest in pre-historical monuments was developed first through his contacts with the Dorset County landscape, overfilled with evidence of pre-Roman and Roman culture. The geography of the area was so well known to Hardy due to his duties as an architect and renovator of local churches that, while walking through the countryside, he could observe the traces of history pervading the conditions and needs of the local people.

These observations of life will enter Hardy’s fiction to be interpreted by his contemporaries according to their fidelity with external reality. Yet, I argue, by introducing examples of the authentic earth monuments from Dorset, Hardy produces the effect of reality. It is this same illusion of reality that deludes Phillotson who is unable to distinguish the truth of mimesis from its intertextual matter. Earth monuments and relics from the past found in Dorset conceived Hardy’s imagination and became the material of his prose; but to be transposed into fiction they had to lose their realistic ontological anchorage (self) and gain status as a symbolic object (the Other).
The author's vivid memory of his life in Dorset is full of the voices of Neolithic mysteries and Roman achievements. Particularly in *The Return of Native* and *The Mayor of Casterbridge*, both located in Dorset, Hardy introduces earthly monuments, which were familiar to him as the fossilised evidence of history dispersed in the mythical atmosphere of evolving continuity. The present life of Egdon heath and the rituals of its inhabitants melt into one organic milieu which, in *The Return of the Native*, affects Clym Yeobright's vision of women wreathing the Egdon pole with wild flowers:

> The instincts of merry England lingered on here with exceptional vitality, and the symbolic customs which tradition has attached to each season of the year were yet a reality on Egdon. Indeed, the impulses of all such outlandish hamlets are pagan still: in these spots homage to nature, self adoration, frantic gaieties, fragments of Teutonic rites to divinities whose names are forgotten, seem in some way or other to have survived mediaeval doctrine. (TRTN, VI, 1: 319)

In archaeology, revoking the past is only possible by restoring and protecting its remnants. When excavated from the ground, fossils become a symbol of the common origin of people who in Hardy’s time needed to redefine their position in the world. The relics are perceived as evidence of a glorious past and bracing human heritage, but, on the other hand they also increase the threat of temporality and the insecurity of the past slipping away. Not in Hardy, whose novels use the physical vestiges for purposes of incongruous juxtaposition. Monuments from ancient times possess neither the dignity of human heritage nor the glory and mystery of the past. They are physical components of people’s environment and witnesses of their mundane deeds or even crimes. There is no metaphysical or spiritual connection between the past and the present, as those who lived in the past, as Hardy writes, “had lived so long, their time was so unlike the present, their hopes and motives were so widely removed from ours, that between them
and the living there seemed to stretch a gulf too wide for even a spirit to pass” (TMCB: 63).

The fossils of the past, including intertexts, might be applied in new, surprising ways, quite often unrelated to the original source, instead being more compatible with the needs of the contemporary users. There are always living people who create reality and, by overcoming the sanctity of the fossil, they produce their own history, as did the inhabitants of Casterbridge with the ring of Maumbury, which became “a frequent spot for appointments of a furtive kind. Intrigues were arranged there; tentative meetings were there experienced after divisions and feuds” (TMCB: 69).

In *The Mayor of Casterbridge*, the original past awakens through contact with the local people whose present life is impregnated with the constantly echoing past:

Some boys had latterly tried to impart gaiety to the ruin by using the central arena as a cricket-ground. But the game usually languished, for the aforesaid reason – that of the dismal privacy which the earthen circle enforced, shutting out every appreciative passer’s vision, every commendatory remark from outsiders – everything, except the sky; and to play at games in such circumstances was like acting to an empty house. Possibly, too, the boys were timid, for some old people said that at certain moments in the summer time, in broad daylight, persons sitting with a book, or dozing in the arena, had, on lifting their eyes, beheld the slopes lined with a gazing legion of Hadrian’s soldiery as if watching the gladiatorial combat; and had heard the roar of their excited voices; the scene would remain but a moment, like a lightning flash, and then disappear. (TMCB: 70)

This amphitheatre, described under the fictional name of “The ring at Casterbridge” is, as the narrator explains, “merely the local name of one of the finest Roman Amphitheatres, if not the very finest, remaining in Britain” (TMCB: 68). In this passage
from *The Mayor of Casterbridge*. Hardy refers to the Maumbury Rings: the henge ditch cut about 2-11m deep, recognised as the most prominent earthen circle, adapted by the Romans for an amphitheatre, but originating from the Neolithic period (Collingwood 1975). The henge was one of the burial mounds, or long barrows, such as the Long Mound which dates from 2500 BC, which was more than 500m long (Bahn 1996). Burial mounds were dispersed across the county of Dorset, having circular earthen banks with a ditch on the inside, sometimes including circles of wood or stone, or even pits, as at Maumbury. Being omnipresent in Hardy’s contemporary environment, the real elements of this ancient heritage enter his novels’ representation, but only as symbols of the extinct past stigmatised with death in both the literal and metaphorical sense.

Dorchester, known in Roman times as Durnovaria, was the temporary capitol for the Roman conquerors in the third-century, and the location of the amphitheatre, a part of the Maumbury Rings. The arena was still clearly visible in Hardy’s time as an oval-shaped flat area, where in the past 13,000 people could have been accommodated for entertainment or public pageantry. The Maumbury Rings Amphitheatre, as the place of local women’s executions, was also symbolically remembered by Hardy. One such woman was Mary Channing, whose story Hardy used in *The Mayor of Casterbridge* as evidence from the past, her story actually having been discovered in an old local paper (L: 32-33; PW: 228-230) but transposed by the author into the voice of tradition:

Apart from the sanguinary nature of the games originally played therein, such incidents attached to its past as these: that for scores of years the town-gallows had stood at one corner; that in 1705 a woman who had murdered her husband was half-strangled and then burnt there in the presence of ten thousand spectators. Tradition reports that at a certain stage of the burning her heart burst
and leapt out of her body to the terror of them all, and that not one of those ten
thousand of people ever carried particularly for hot roast after her. (TMCB: 69)

As Keith Wilson acknowledges, that atrocious story and those of two other executions
which the author himself witnessed (Gittings 2001: 57-60) were reflected in the

The memory of the Dorset landscape pervades the fictional tissue of Wessex.

Hardy writes about the archaeological richness of Dorchester, the old Roman capitol,
known in his novels as Casterbridge, from his own experience of being both its
inhabitant and a witness at many excavations:

Casterbridge announced old Rome in every street, alley and precinct. It looked
Roman, bespoke the art of Rome, concealed dead men of Rome. It was
impossible to dig more than a foot or two deep about the town fields and
gardens without coming upon some tall soldier or other of the Empire, who had
lain there in his silent unobtrusive rest of fifteen hundred years. He was
mostly found lying on his side, in an oval scoop in the chalk, like a chicken in
its shell; his knees drawn up to his chest, sometimes with the remains of his
spear against his arm; a fibula or brooch of bronze on his breast or forehead;
an urn at his knees, a jar at his breast, a bottle at his mouth; and mystified
conjecture pouring down upon him from the eyes of Casterbridge street-boys
and men, who turned a moment to gaze as the familiar spectacle passed by.

(TMCB: 68)

Fact and feeling are melded in Hardy's description of archaeological findings. It was
during Hardy's time that professional archaeological expeditions established the
reputation of archaeology and geology and of their historical evidence. To a great extent
this development was due to the achievements of General Lane-Fox Pitt Rivers who
lived in Dorset and was known to Hardy. Pitt Rivers can thus be described as the father
of British Archaeology; his meticulous methods and absolute perfectionism in digging, protecting, classifying, and interpreting fossils laid the foundations of a complex scheme of evidence to outline history.

As Paul Bahn notes, Rivers was the author of the first typology of artefacts (he, in fact, coined the word “typology”) to be ordered in “chronological, developmental sequence” (Bahn 1996: 25). Pitt Rivers also worked on the excavation of the Maumbury Rings between 1908-1913, looking for evidence for the progression of humanity’s material culture, which, as he believed, evolved from generation to generation like a sort of gene (Bradley 1975). Hardy had the opportunity to become more familiar with archaeological methods through his friendship with General Pitt Rivers who used to undertake private archaeological expeditions at the large Rushmore estate in Wiltshire. The author himself participated in a few excavations (PW: 225, 232), particularly those in Max Gate which had to be undertaken before his house could be erected (PW: 195). This need to classify reality and its empirical aspects is reflected in Hardy’s advocacy for archaeological expeditions and his special support for the work of the Dorset County Museum (PW: 73, 191-195).

The most significant enterprise, however, witnessed by Hardy was the exploration of Stonehenge, the mysterious megalithic monument from pre-historic times (PW: 196-201). After many centuries of damage by army regiments, farmers, and local people, Stonehenge gained status as an archaeological fossil in 1858, when the whole area was claimed as part of the British national heritage, and subsequently was financially supported by tourist tickets and archaeological research, which Hardy passionately supported. It was thus undergoing extensive investigations, attracting a
large number of tourists and stimulating the imagination of scholars and enthusiasts alike.7

The danger of such wide exploration was articulated by Hardy, but he was also drawn by the irresistible ambiguity of the stones: Stonehenge aroused his interest in Druidic culture,8 depicted in the description of the mid-summer solstice celebration in the opening chapter of Tess and in the mesmerising survey of the appearance of the stones in the last scene. On the other hand, Hardy’s interpretation makes plain that the grandiosity of the past does not convey any moral support for the characters, just the opposite: being enclosed in a fossil, the past is emptied of any connection with

7 Including, among many others, such names as John Thurnam, the expert on Bronze Age and older barrows; Sir Daniel Wilson, the Scottish antiquary, who, as Chippindale confirms, introduced the word “prehistoric” into the language; Sir John Lubbock, the author of Prehistoric Times (1865); Charles Darwin with his wife, who took measures of Stonehenge in 1877 (2001: 126-136).

8 As Chippindale notes, it was the archaeological findings, ordained by the end of the 70’s by Sir Henry James, colonel in the Royal Engineers and head of the Ordnance Survey, that influenced understanding of the Stonehenge design. However, James’s reports, as Chippindale indicates, were of little lasting value for they contained subjective interpretations of the purpose of the stones. Nevertheless, “the prevailing opinion among antiquaries, as successive editions of an orthodox reference book like the Encyclopaedia Britannica declared, remained that Stonehenge was Druid” (Chippindale 2001: 135).

Hardy’s inspiration might have gone deeper into the past through William Blake’s poetry. In his Jerusalem: The Emanation of the Giant Albion (1804-1820), Blake claimed that:

In Stone-henge & on London Stone & in the Oak Groves of Malden
I have Slain him in my Sleep with the Knife of the Druid. O England!!

(Blake 1977: 201)

As Chippindale notes, Blake’s poetry might have affected the imagination of archaeologists at the time of their exploration of Stonehenge a century later (Chippindale 2001: 234). According to my argument, this would confirm the intertextual exchange (Kristeva’s “structuration”) between all forms of human discourse.
contemporary reality and changes into a literary symbol; a sign of representation. AsRadford acknowledges, Hardy

Repudiated Pitt-River’s naïve, easy optimism that the uncovered remains of outmoded culture might enrich and irradiate the modern movement. Indeed, his depiction of Stonehenge in Tess intimates that the origins of our cultural legacy are based on vicious deeds and are best left behind. (2003: 22)

The aim of archaeological research at Stonehenge, as well as of other excavations of earthen monuments in Britain, was to establish their origin and explain their historical purpose. According to Chippindale, it was characteristic of the Victorian epoch to seek in fossils the evolutionary link with the past, clarified by methods of patterning and objectifying. Chippindale writes of the expeditions of scholars to Stonehenge: “The massive collection of excavated finds, and the organisation of objects and structures into the compartments of the three ages, were the particular forms taken in archaeology by the Victorian passions for accumulating facts and classifying by evolutionary schemes” (Chippindale 2001: 128). It was the refusal of archaeology to submit to ‘allegory’ (Foucault 2002: 155) that attracted Victorian society. The nineteenth-century brought forward the need to clarify and verify human origins through empirical evidence. As a result, archaeological, geological or anthropological findings were considered to be the most reliable evidence of history: being excavated from the ground, fossils are certificates of the truth that cannot be denied. Foucault explains this from a discursive point of view:

Archaeology tries to define not the thoughts, representations, images, themes, preoccupations that are concealed or revealed in discourses; but those discourses themselves, those discourses as practices obeying certain rules.

It does not treat discourse as document, as a sign of something else, as an element that ought to be transparent, but whose unfortunate opacity must often be pierced if one is to reach at last the depth of the essential in the place in which it is held in reserve; it is concerned with discourse in its own volume, as a monument. It is not an interpretative discipline: it does not seek another, better discourse. (2002: 155 emphasis of the author)

In Hardy's novels real objects undergo the same symbolic transformation that they do in life: it is people's action and desire which restores the past from the dead. By adopting, adjusting, or defying items from history, real people create their own story that enters the on-going cycle of historicization, or textualization, of their present experiences. This is an endless process of absorbing the stories of others (Pavel's culturization), stories which should be protected as fossilised items for they encapsulate the essence of someone's life. In literature this process responds to the limitless opportunities for artistic creation operating freely through references, allusions, or memories of other texts. This archive of stories is the source of inspiration for Hardy, and it includes all evidence of living reality, including texts or archaeological fossils. Within ethnography and anthropology these stories come from society's culture: rituals, dialects, music, dancing, language, dressing.

Hardy's interest in ethnography is revealed in his collecting of dialects and idiolects, which at his time were regarded as part of the national historical heritage. Living in the countryside enabled Hardy to identify different versions of the Dorset dialects, and motivated his study. Encouraged by his friend, the poet, William Barnes, Hardy enthusiastically examined local dialects and frequently used them in his prose. However, as Gittings noted, despite this academic influence there is a considerable difference between Hardy's naturalistic use of a "local word" and the more theoretical approach to language of Barnes (Gittings 2001: 125-126). The difference lies mainly in
Hardy's ironic distance, the same ironic distance that can be observed in his use of representations of earth monuments.

Although dialects are almost non-existent in Jude, it is important to emphasise Hardy's analogous method of criticism recognised in the above analysis of overt quotations in Chapters I and II. Radford identifies this method in relation to the writer's reinterpretation of Barnesian idealistic motifs typically seen as an "attempt to 'preserve an imaginative Eden', contrasting the stable perfection of a pre-industrial agrarian order with a blighted and brutalising consumerist epoch" (2003: 21):

Whereas Hardy's revisiting the crumbling abodes of history was not shaped by vacuous and cloying sentimentality for 'traditional values' in an age of escalating technological advance. He knew how reverence for a lost rural paradise could become a form of lotus-eating that narcotized the population, making them forget the present and blot out the most urgent needs for reform... It is the essence of Hardy's art from the very outset to conjure up the relic of time – the objects and occasions which are the 'survivals' of history – to make them play tantalizingly round the immediate object of his concern, and to invite the reader to tease out the implications of the elaborate perspectives which result. And to address the way in which this requires Hardy to employ his full repertoire of tone from the insouciant and playful to the bitterly sardonic is one of the chief excitements of the study of his fictions.

(Radford 2003: 22, 29)

Driven by the same instinctive, almost innate passion for textual artefacts, Hardy also collected quotations, anthologies, and literary notes. He accrued excerpts from literary and non-literary discourses from the earliest stage of his career, as if they were evidence of his studies. His favourites included The Golden Treasury (a gift from Horace Moule in 1862), his own notebook of Studies and Specimens from the same
year, Walker’s *Rhyming Dictionary* (signed by Hardy in 1865), and Henry Reed’s *Introduction to English Literature* (signed in 1865). Hardy drew on different fragments of his favourite anthologies in his novels, sometimes in the direct form of quotation, but more usually by transforming them into poetical figures. Hardy’s wife, Emma, under his supervision, gathered over 200 entries. By the beginning of April 1876 they had produced a reference source which was used by the writer throughout his career. By the end of May 1876, extended by the writer himself, the archive numbered about 450 entries. Robert Gittings admits that Hardy’s passion for collecting textual items became a habit motivated by his desire for self-education and self-improvement: “[A]t every turning point in his creative life, he had restored to intensive study, in the belief that everything, poetry, prose, history, style, philosophy, was to be learnt by hard application and methodical treatment” (Gittings 2001: 377).

Hardy often also referred to contemporary issues found in the national press (*Saturday Review, Spectator, Gentleman’s Magazine, The Sphere, Times Literary Magazine*) and the local press (*Atheneum, Cornhill Magazine, Daily News, Dorset County Chronicle, Dorset Evening Echo, Encounter*), which, for example, provided the theme for Tess’s story, and for Henchard’s deal in *The Mayor of Casterbridge*. It could be said that textual artefacts are for Hardy “fossils” of reality which build the world of his fiction; however, as Gitting points out:

Hardy’s plan was not merely to copy extracts, but to select them as illustrations of some particular point of character, which could thus be reinforced and driven home in the pages of a narrative, providing a kind of home-made dictionary of learned and useful allusions. This involved selecting and heading each note with the characteristic to be illustrated, each carefully underlined, and then quoting from the source he was reading some pithy phrase or parallel allusion. (2001: 379)
Hardy drew on different fragments of his favourite anthologies in his novels, sometimes in the direct form of quotation, but more usually by transforming them into poetical figures. I argue that Hardy's "fossils" are texts whose truth cannot be questioned. When excavated from the source they are shifted into the new context of the text, where they are manipulated, combined and classified according to the artist's methods. They enable discussion of reality in a truthful way, but they are also deprived of the roots with the original ground. Hardy's 'fossils' are texts whose truths cannot be questioned: they become alive again only through integration into a new ground of representation. In *Jude*, quotations and allusions change into symbolic signs of representation, but they do not lose their materiality. They are symbolic facts to be recognised by the audience.

Murray Roston notes that Victorian literature had to be rooted in materiality, recognised by the critic as "the intimidating despotism of a materialistic age" (1996: 81). This approach is evidently reflected in the sequence of metonymies signifying human-like relationships between material objects and their owners. As Roston observes, drawing on Jakobson's theory of metonymy, the metonymic relations with reality which these exaggerated references embody replaces the *horror vacui* - the fear of people who were thrust into a new, unstable world - operating with the modern industrial possibilities of reproduction which aroused that "potential threat which Victorians felt in the face of this plethora of new products" (Roston 1996: 82).

This approach might explain Hardy's proclivity for displaying material nature in an intense realistic manner which creates the sense of a permanent tie with reality. Nonetheless, foreign materiality, whether quotation, text, or intertext, still encapsulates

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10 In traditional prose they relate to descriptions of curiosity shops, inner gardens, decorations, rooms cluttered with bric-a-brac, antiques, dishes, cushions, chivalric busts, framed photographs, family albums, carved paperweights, and other paraphernalia that articulates the "Commodity Culture" (Roston 1996: 68-113) of the nineteenth-century, pervading the works of such writers as Charles Dickens, Jane Austen, the Brontës, and Robert Browning.
the history of humanity’s efforts to give reality an individual shape. It could be a print, a painting, music, or an architectural form; they all restate the sense of the physicality of “human labour” (Byerly 1997: 155). In her argument on Hardy’s interest in music and architecture, Byerly explains the writer’s passion for the collecting of representations:

Music and architecture are both valuable to Hardy because of their capacity to incorporate human associations. Architecture, however, gives tangible form to the cultural memory that music can only ephemerally express. The buildings in Hardy’s novels all reflect the people who built them and the use to which they are put. Hardy’s evaluation of any medium is based not on conventionally “aesthetic criteria”, but on its place in the life of the community.

The functionality of architecture thus makes it his ideal art: it is a concrete expression of the will to create and recreate the world. In this sense, the work of the architecture is identical to the work of the novelist. (Byerly 1997: 150)

Understood in these terms, the fields from which Hardy borrows quotations are simply different areas of life. By utilising these quotations in the text, Hardy creates and recreates the world, or rather a possible world of fiction. He absorbs texts as memories, or impressions, from the empirical world in which and about which he writes. His “borrowing” of texts is thus the work of transforming an impression into a representational form.

When Hardy intentionally and consciously writes in relation to other texts (quotations), he intends them to be experienced as a part of real life. Hardy’s comments on conserving the memory of life in language, in the preface to the Wessex Edition are crucial to this argument: “Yet I have instituted inquiries to correct trick of memory, and striven against temptations to exaggerate, in order to preserve for my own satisfaction a fairly true record of a vanishing life” (PW: 46, emphasis added). I understand Hardy’s acclamation to preserve a vanishing life as an attempt to seize a memory of a particular
moment of existence, an attempt at re-experiencing reality. This *post factum* motivation is recognised by Catherine Maxwell in Hardy's use of the silhouettes: portraits or shades of the personage evoked from the writer's memory. In her analysis of the relations between the phenomenal and the visionary in Hardy's poetry, Maxwell observes that:

> All portraiture has a link with death, the silhouette has an even stronger relation in that it figures absence more graphically, so that, were the subject of the representation is in fact dead, the silhouette becomes the shade of a shade. Alternatively the empty outline of the shade can be thought to offer a greater degree of visionary or imaginative potential, in that it offers the sensitive observer the opportunity of projecting more freely his or her own memories, impressions, fantasies and associations into the charged blank space of the silhouette. (2002: 515)

In response to this comment I posit that such symbols of reality adapted by Hardy are temporary impressions of reality "fossilised" in artistic language. Fiction is for Hardy evidence of the real experience epitomised in the materiality of the book. They are material signs (silhouettes) of the missing object already vanished in the moment of writing.

From the psychoanalytic perspective the book will be an attempt by the text's/author's self to articulate the genuine completeness of that experience (idea), still only possible through the discourse of the Other. In the socio-historical sense, the book, including graphic signs, quotations, allusions, and epigraphs, holds attempts of various kinds and irregularities of human articulation diffused in other discourses. Therefore the identity of the text should not be seen as "the verbal translation of a previously established synthesis" characteristic of pre-modern times (Foucault 2002:60), but rather as the modality – identity in progress of mediation. The passing era of pre-modernity.
when a man saw his empirical domain as “a complex of kinships, resemblances, and affinities, and in which language and things were endlessly interwoven” (Foucault 1977: 54), in Jude is threatened by rationalised history, economy, and the scientific order. “Fossils” in Jude are employed to reveal the impossibility of maintaining the old principles or of articulating the prelapsarian unity of knowledge and language, either within the social or the mythical law.

Jude reflects the transitory nature of the historical and social processes underpinning the artistic discussion held on the pages of the novel. The situation within which the protagonists find themselves is devoid of epistemological stability, an absence that, as Foucault suggests, was guaranteed before the demise of Classicism (Foucault 1977). Prior to the disruption of the Classical unity of reality and knowledge (language), the formation of middle-class identity was entirely integrated in relation to authority – society, king, master, God, or Nature. Dialectical contradictions in the post-Classical movements generated the dissipation of that guaranteed integrity and subsequently caused displacement of people’s identity. When disconnected from its origins and deprived of its relation with the authorial entity, the individual becomes a separate self.

The phenomenon defined by Daniel Bell as the atomisation of society (1976) describes this situation of the fragmented subjects condemned to emotional solitariness and social isolation. As Bell observes, this was the beginning of Modernism, first observed in the counter-culture of Paris after the 1848 revolution and then again in the late 1860’s in the Bohemian movement, which affected other waves of self-awareness, or solipsism, such as those of Decadence and Aestheticism. The Classical sense of completeness and stability in Europe that originated from Christian ontology had ceased to provide a satisfying explanation to the question “What is it that unites all of this?”.

Removing the ancestral foundation from anthropological and ontological paradigms
caused the decentering of Man and the collapse of the Classical epistemological unity.

The proliferation of aesthetic and political discourses that followed the overthrowing of Classicism was deployed by the new scientific discoveries of the nineteenth-century. In Hardy’s time they motivated a need for the redefinition and explanation of the dialectical situation, so painfully experienced by Jude’s protagonists.

At the end of the nineteenth-century, existing (and writing) in relation to the Other (another decentered identity) seemed to be the only possibility to regain a sense of self-identification. In Jude the relation to the Other is spoken through the multiplicity of quotations that enable the text to determine its own discourse. Hardy’s text, however, does not absorb the Other to reconstitute its lost identity, but bases its new identity on fleeting fragments of different Others. Jude is constantly conferred with the entities of other texts speaking with their own voices without gaining stable effects, or as Howe puts it, without “the lure of catharsis or the relief of conciliation” (1985: 145). Instead, the novel produces a creative and dynamic tension between signs/texts which represent varied Others and their separate identities.

Hardy’s play with signs is the work of a collector chasing traces of the lost original among the archaeological fossils. In the museum of his text Hardy reinvigorates past experiences by objectifying them on the surface of representation. Berger’s argument now becomes clear: “if he wished to paint the odor of flesh or the soul outside the body, to make hidden energies visible, it was to pull them forth and make them present in a world of surfaces” (1990: xii).

In his intense “seeing” of things, as Berger calls it, Hardy tries to reiterate the experience of material reality, not the experience of transcendence. Unable to articulate
that experience in a direct way, he transforms feelings of reality into signs (the “surfaces” of reality). Using a key metaphor in this discussion, it can be said that he fetishises this experience in language. This is why his visual images are so permanent and yet momentary, so tactile and yet impressionistic, ephemeral and yet sensual. They create frozen recollections of the physical experiences of reality, produced by a mind which Hardy himself defines as “a portrait gallery lined with a series of speaking pictures or optical poems” (Paulin 1975: 34). They verbalise experience in a visual frame which in fact substitutes memory for the inexpressible memory of the past. While missing the reality inexpressible in language (always altered when put into language), Hardy recreates it in the world of words. The lost unity, although unrecoverable, will be substituted in the game by its fake fossils.

In the museum that is Jude, representation is always conscious of its own mediatory status. Since reality is inaccessible in its pre-mediated original fullness, it can be restated only in the models which imitate the real. Sue, who imitates romantic heroines, stands for the icon of the Romantic lover; when impersonating liberal empiricists she evokes the model of a nineteenth-century freethinker. Jude, who enacts the ideals of the Romantic social order, formulates the figure of the contemporary idealist. These narrative models, however, represent the authorial distance underlying the creation of the characters, and reveal the intertextual mediation informing the creative process. Their realistic semblance is only aesthetic, it is “the effect of reality” (Barthes 1986: 141). There is no given reality preceding the act of writing because it was already mediated in previous textual acts. Aesthetic semblance is only “the condition for the production of an imaginary object” (Iser 1987: 226) which must be unfolded by the recipient who will retrace the relations between an image of representation and its dispersal in the past of other images. In Jude, however, that condition is actualised on the level of representation in the acts of narrative mockery.
Aesthetic semblance thus becomes a part of the text's structure and a part of the author's game with the reader.

Hardy transplants fossilised signs into the text only to transfigure, revise and convert them into forms of signification. The difference between them is bridged in performative acts of typographical duplication, metaphorical mirroring and narrative dramatisation, hence the reality of the text becomes disrupted by marks of the Other (quotations marks), only to be condensed within the self of the narrative. By displacing it structurally and condensing it semantically, Hardy creates a dialectical significance integrated within representation. The explicit difference of foreign entities in the text undermines its mimesis on the one hand, but, on the other, enables the relational process of the text's identification.

Smart discusses the constitutional quality of Hardy's imagination (argued through Hardy's visual sensitivity) in terms of filtering reality through visual artefacts: "when he sat down to write, and to visualize a scene, he would frequently find a picture that he knew well appearing before his mind's eye, quite spontaneously, as though he could not help it" (Smart 1961: 264). What Hardy "could not help" was not up to him indeed, for it was a quality of reality that he perceived as intertextually mediated, through which the writer's "mind's eye" reproduced the texts remembered in the act of writing. Iser terms this form of expression "a symbolic juxtaposition" of the impossible:

Literature turns life into a storehouse from which it draws its material in order to stage that which in life appeared to have been sealed off from access. The need for such a staging arises out of man's decentered position: we are, but do not have ourselves. Wanting to have what we are, i.e. to step out of ourselves in order to grasp our own identity, would entail having final assurances as to our origins, but as these underlie what we are, we cannot "have" them. (1987: 227)
While performative acts of quoting and typographical signification explicitly indicate the text's intertextual boundaries, they do not signal the problem of the poetic difference between the original and the copy. However, there are other poetic figures which define the concept of the copy within a narrative dramatisation, which can be treated as symbolic quotations from reality. Their role in the text is not to signify metatextually the copy as a part of representation (as quotation and graphical signs do), but rather to differentiate metaphorically between the imitation and the original as parts of the narrative plot. These figures include icons (the models of Christminster produced by Jude and Sue), letters, architecture, and people's stories. The models of both Jerusalem and Christminster presuppose their original source: the holy text, in the novel embodied by the dim view of Christminster desired by Jude, by physician Vilbert named the "Heavenly Jerusalem".

It can be observed that the symbolic meaning of Christminster finds its transmuted reproductions within the frames of other figures. Later in the novel it becomes replicated in images of other texts: those framed in inscribed letters and quotations marks, those reified in Christminster architecture, and later reanimated in a consumable copy made by Sue, who, when selling Christminster cakes to Arabella, remarks: “They are reminiscences of the Christminster Colleges. Traceried windows, and cloisters, you see. It was a whim of his to do them in pastry” (JO, V, 7: 312). There is irony in the reduction of the Christminster ideal to a pastry which Arabella “was unceremoniously munching” (JO, V, 7: 312). The image of this powerful city of knowledge is consumed by the simple woman as food, and thereby becomes deprived of dignity and austerity. Oxford, represented in the image of the Christminster cake, undergoes a moral and aesthetic decline which, ironically for Sue and Jude, becomes a great commercial success.
Eventually there is no sign in the text that can reliably be considered the original, because all signs turn out to be copies of others, although within different figures of the narrative. Christminster Cathedral, recalled by Sue as “almost the first place in which we looked in each other’s faces” (JO, V, 6: 306), reflects patterns of convention applied by the people who built it. In Sue’s opinion, “Under the picturesque of those Norman details one can see the grotesque childishness of uncouth people trying to imitate the vanished Roman forms, remembered by dim tradition only” (JO, V, 6: 306).

In this sarcastic tone we recognise the narrator’s criticism of imitation. When copied, the “Roman forms” lose their original ambience and change into art, art representing the mediatory influence of culture interfering in the material appearance of objects structured and perceived according to conventions. Even the commodities which Sue and Jude try to sell “were so quaint and ancient a make as to acquire an adventitious value as art” (JO, V, 6: 305). As the narrator implies in this passage, the economic value of their material belongings is equal to nothing more than the owners’ “personal history” (JO, V, 6: 305) which, as observed by Jude, actually becomes the theme of the customers’ discussion “instead of the furniture” (JO, V, 6: 305). Through the narrative comments pointing at the mockery of the furniture, the couple’s history is also transformed into a fake. Both people and things are ultimately false imitations of originals that never existed. They are only objects of narrative manipulation, like Sue who regards herself a heroine “always much affected at a picture of herself as an object of pity” (JO, V, 6: 299). The subjective perspective of seeing herself in terms of a thing unmarks her fictional status as a sign: it gains meaning only in relation to other signs, through the act of their selection and combination. Ultimately people can represent things, while things can signify people and their histories. Being aesthetically equal, inanimate and animate objects (as well as abstract notions) lose their realistic forms, while linguistic puns that accompany the narrative figures of the copies undermine the
effectiveness of these signs. In the shop where Jude finds the letters painted by Sue, he also spots “ebony crosses that were almost crucifixes, prayer books that were almost missals” (JO, II, 2: 88). The word “almost” blurs the distinction between the objects in the text: one object could mean anything depending on perception. Uncertainty implies “as if” bracketing which suspends the unilateral and univocal meaning of mimetic representation. It also poses the question of whether the sign is what it appears to be, or whether the perception of the sign is dependent on the viewer. This ambiguity of signs is additionally expressed through linguistic puns that correspond to both typographical misguidance and performative misrepresentations. No sign, even when allegedly treated as an icon, can maintain its original status. The scene in which Sue buys the figures of Venus and Apollo combines all these techniques. It can be treated as a condensed illustration of the novel’s manifold systems of signification, and thus this scene will be discussed as a concluding argument to this thesis. Sue, who decides to buy a “Venus of standard pattern”, is able to distinguish the statuettes lying on the stall according to the “successive perceptions” (Hume 1975: 33) that she has learnt under the cultural and education system:

They were in the main reduced copies of ancient marbles, and comprised divinities of a very different character from those the girl was accustomed to see portrayed, among them being a Venus of standard pattern, a Diana, and, of the other sex, Apollo, Bacchus, and Mars. (JO, II, 3: 93)

The figure of Venus is apparently recognised by Sue through her knowledge of other Venus statues. However, as noted by Paul Barlow (2002), the “standard pattern” suggested here does not seem to recall the work of Alexandros – the Venus de Milo, found with her arms missing in Greece in 130–120 BC (See fig. 8). While trying to hide her “heathen” purchase in parsley, Sue was observed “occasionally peeping inside the leaves to see that Venus’s arm was not broken” (JO, II, 3: 94), which suggests that
she was not aware of the armless statue, the Venus de Milo. In 1820 a French anthropologist acquired the Venus de Milo, thus whilst Hardy was in London he could only have seen a cast of the statue in the British Museum. However, while visiting the Museum frequently he would also seen copies of the Venus Pudica, the most popular image of Venus at that time, surviving both as the Capitoline Venus (See fig.9) and as the Venus de Medici (See fig.10), the originals of which were displayed respectively in Rome and Florence. For Hardy, which of these images would have been considered the “standard pattern”?

Barlow suggests that the most likely figure of Venus referred to by Hardy is that of the “modest Venus”. Venus is portrayed bending forward slightly, turning to look over her left shoulder, and holding out her arms to cover her breasts and genitals, as though worried about her nakedness. Such a pose was convincing enough for Miss Fontover, Sue’s landlady, to believe that the figure was that of St. Mary Magdalen. Barlow concludes that Sue’s figurine must be of the Venus Pudica, “which was sometimes used in portrayals of the Penitent Magdalen”. Sue’s concerns about the arms of the figure and Miss Fontover’s mistaken assumption do indeed seem to suggest the Venus de Pudica rather than the Venus de Milo.

But to what extent does it matter which statue is the inspiration for Sue’s Venus figurine? Barlow suggests that knowing the difference between the Venus de Milo and the Venus Pudica enables a greater understanding of Hardy’s allusions. Barlow proposes that, “by alluding to the Venus Pudica (‘modest Venus’) the author makes his comment on both Sue’s naivety (she was not aware of the Venus de Milo) and her embarrassment about her immodest and pagan purchases” (Barlow: 2003). However, Sue’s later reference to the Venus Urania (Universal Venus) (JO, III, 6: 168) reveals that the girl is neither naive nor uneducated. This, as Barlow acknowledges, reveals her knowledge of the range of ancient figures; this knowledge is confirmed later in Jude’s
reference to imagining her watching the Courtesan Phryne sculpted by Praxiteles. In the semantic dimension of the text, all these figures represent the different kinds of love and desire that the characters develop on their progression from modesty and piety to growing independence and confidence. However, on the textual level, Venus is a “foreign” sign: an allusion derived from the empirical world where it was a part of the contemporary cultural parole. Without knowing the meaning of the real Venus figure, it is not possible for the reader to understand the character’s evolution as signified by the allusion. Thus, we have to ask again, which image of Venus would have been known to Hardy at the time of writing Jude?

By the mid-1860s, painting, sculpture and literature were being nourished by the poetic and aesthetic aspects of the myth of Venus, embodied in different forms of ancient relics. As Christine M. Havelock indicates, there were seven key images of Aphrodite/Venus, all inspired by the monumental three-dimensional statue of Aphrodite by Praxiteles, purchased by the city of Knidos in about 350 BC (See fig. 11):

It was an innovation of great significance and with major consequences.
Not only did Praxiteles introduce the naked Aphrodite as a subject into classical Greek art, it is also accepted that his work inspired later Greek versions of the goddess. These in turn were adopted by Rome, which disseminated them far and wide. In this way the female nude as a subject for the plastic arts entered the mainstream of the West. (1995: 1)

The problem with attempting to establish the original image used as a model for later figures lies in the “far and wide” influence of Greek culture, the significance of which has been continually re-interpreted and adapted for more than 2500 years. The original of the huge statue by Praxiteles did not survive:

The work was last seen in the palace of Lausos in Constantinople in the early Christian period, and it was consumed by fire there in AD 476. However, many
copies of the statue, both large and small, of clay, bronze, and stone, were made before its destruction, and they have been found all over the Mediterranean world. (Havelock 1995: 9)

Replicas of the Aphrodite of Knidos began to proliferate through the ages in different materials and forms, created both for public and for private use. She could be recognised in life-size monuments or miniatures, in domestic ornaments and shrines, in parks, villas, and capitols, and even in jewellery and coins. She could take various poses: standing, kneeling, crouching, bending, and turning, with the goddess’s favourite Cupid, or with some other attribute such as a dolphin or tree. The Knidian Aphrodite came to be regarded as the Classical forerunner of the later series of Aphrodite statues: the Capitoline, and Medici in Aphrodites of the seventeenth-century, usually pictured in the “pudica gesture”, the pose named after the position of the arms. The marble Aphrodite from Melos, originating from the middle Hellenistic period, was immediately ordered as a cast by the British Academy once re-discovered in 1820. Walter Pater declared the discovery of the statue to have advanced the art of sculpture “one step into the mystical Christian age” (Havelock 1995: 94).

Creating exact copies of these famous images became a challenge for artists, frequently giving them a well paid profession. In 1803 the Neoclassical sculptor Canova was commissioned by the King of Etruria to create a copy of the Medici Aphrodite, which had been taken by Napoleon to Paris. Canova’s copy, The Venus Italica, was completed in 1811. This popular Medici image was soon replaced by the figure of the very popular The Crouching Aphrodite dating from the third-century BC, recognised in Rome from the sixteenth-century onwards. Eventually, as Havelock recounts, 190 copies were reproduced under different names (Havelock 1995: 83).

Venus’s presence in poetry throughout the late Hellenistic period (particularly in the work of Ovid, Catullus and Philodemos) increased her universal appeal, providing
inspiration for the next generations of artists. Her rebirth in the Renaissance was prompted by Europe's fascination in the antique, which, with the Venusian naked beauty, provided evidence for the artistic harmony and human perfection sought by artists of the time. What is important, and yet more confusing, is Havelock's observation that the Aphrodite of Praxiteles was not the first known goddess to be shown fully nude, previous examples including the terracotta renderings from the eighth- to the sixth-century BC found in the eastern Mediterranean, moulded figurines from the first half of the sixth-century found at Paestum, and the half-draped nudes of the Aphrodite of Capua (See fig. 12) and Kalipygos (See fig. 13) from the fifth-century BC (1995: 85).

These examples, all of which prefigure the model of Knidos and all reproduced and transformed in Western Europe through the next twenty-five centuries, make the original Venus difficult to trace. The original ancient beauty, supposedly the inspiration for Sue's image, is unavoidably affected by them all: the distance between the original and the copy, although linked by the factual names of the historical sculptures, became irreversibly and dramatically widened.

The revived interest in the Antique at the time of Hardy's completion of *Jude* brought about a proliferation of references to all known prototypes of Venus. A caricature magazine from the nineteenth-century, *Punch*, exposed the artificiality and meaningless nature of this new fashion and parodied its obsessive interest in the copying of Classical casts. In a socio-epistemological sense, this caricature reflects the insecurity and confusion that the epoch had to face at the loss of The Old Order, symbolised in the archaeological fossil. The mirroring of images in paintings and the doubling of casts in sculptures exemplify this frivolous proliferation of surfaces at a time when the original was no longer available. As the caricature shows, it was not the
surfaces of things that were over-explored, but also the surface emotions between people.

In the image in *Punch* (See fig. 14), both characters sit with their backs turned as if bored and tired with their relationship. Their creative work no longer gives them any excitement, while their attitude recalls the decadent pose of the Modern spleen characteristic of the bohemian artists. The couple in the picture cannot communicate in any way other than through art. Although they appear to be frowning, the caption reveals that they are not quarrelling but “drawing from casts of the antique”. They do not look at each other, yet they ironically comment on each other’s appearance: “And Angy’s nose turns up so at the end, and she’s got such a skimpy waist, and such a big head, and such tiny little hands and feet!”; “And Edwin’s got a long upper lip, and a runaway chin, and he c-c-can’t grow a beard and moustache!”. There is a tone of distanced irony in this scene which can be compared to Hardy’s allegorical use of references. Although the theme of artificiality is in *Punch* executed in an openly pretentious way, it still parodies the omnipresent over-abundance of artificial artefacts against which Hardy structures his narrative.

Alison Smith notes that the popularisation of the Greek nude in the Victorian epoch reinforced the idealising tradition in art: “In the 1860s the nude acquired an unprecedented respectability in England, with the emergence of a classical ideal and an accompanying aesthetic which elevated the subject beyond any implication of sexuality” (1996: 101). Smith associates this change with a move from the *pose plastique* (common in painting and photography as well as in the *tableaux vivants* so popular at that time) to the reinvention of the classical nude as the ideal form of beauty.

Venus reappeared under many names in all kinds of arts but as myth rather than as historical fact. At the same time, promoting the nude as a paradigm within high art established the artistic value of the original ancient sculptures, such as that interpreted
by Albert Moore whose *Venus* was based on the Venus de Milo (See fig. 15), G.W. Watts’s *Wife of Pygmalion* (See fig. 16), inspired by a bust found among the Arundel Marbles, or J.M. Whistler’s cartoons of Venus appealing to the *Aphrodite* by Praxiteles (See fig. 17). Yet it was not the Venus original that artists were seeking in the nineteenth-century, as Smith identifies:

Artists generally drew little distinction between Greek and Roman sources, their interest residing in the poetic and aesthetic aspects of a myth, not whether it was Greek or not. Moreover, the incursions of the new critical scholarship, which rejected the idea that the ancient myths could be used as historical evidence, encouraged painters to view the classical world exclusively as a transcendent, artistic ideal. (1996: 118)

The ancient Venus ideal was conceived from past and present impressions by artists in all areas of literature, painting, sculpting, philosophy, music, and even politics. She became a metaphor for pure beauty rather than a reflection of any particular model, and as a metaphor was widely adopted for both artistic and non-artistic discourse. When Hardy employs her name, “Venus”, he refers not to the Venus of Melos or of Medici, but simply to a cliché from the nineteenth-century parole. In this sense the Venus Urania or Phryne does not differ from the Venus of the “standard pattern”; they are all poetic figures of speech applied to stress the rhetorical force of the message. Venus is a metaphor which embodies the attributes of life promoted by ancient culture – love, nature, and courage – the very qualities that Sue herself would like to possess.

In the nineteenth-century the ancient figure of Venus could also be identified within Christian discourse by which it was adopted and transformed. The Venus Urania is known as a symbol from the Book of Revelations, where she is presented as a woman clothed with the sun, or as the pagan symbol of fecundity (the archetypal mother known in mythology as Celestial Isis, Demeter, or Cybele). In poetry she signifies pure
emotions, enchanting beauty, and uncontrolled feeling. Hardy might have known a
sonnet by Thomas Gordon Hake (1809-1895), "Venus Urania", in which Venus is
pictured in a general way as a combination of all these qualities:

............... solitude divine

Where love - dreams o'er they waves each other chase

And melt into the passion of thy face. (ll. 3-5; Hake 1887: 16)

It was this combination of eroticism allied with innocence in the paradigm of Venus
which fascinated artists. Jude, on identifying Phryne in Sue's pose, does not refer to the
celebrated courtesan of the fourth-century, famous as the mistress of Praxiteles, but
rather he expresses a general concept of sensuality externalised in the Antique
sculptures. Phryne, Venus and Aphrodite all indicate a single meaning, yet they undergo
semiotic permutations when articulated in a new text, and subsequently reinforce a new
interpretation.

The semantic relevance which occurs within the context of the novel is ironically
depicted through a series of errors by potential interpreters or readers of the Venus. The
statue could equally well be taken for a figure of a Christian saint (Mrs Fontover), as for
a symbol of independence (Sue), or a shrine of eroticism (Jude). Venus, when adapted
in a new context, undergoes semantic changes which symbolically articulate the
anxieties of the characters. To the figurine from Christminster market, Sue attributes the
quality of pagan freedom, hailing it as better than those "everlasting church fal-lals!"
(JO, II, 3: 94), while for Miss Fontover the same figure emanates a religious aura
usually attributed to the Christian saints. As Iser notes, it is typical of the signs of fiction
that they are all "inseparably linked together and thus mutually inscribe themselves into
one another" (1987: 220).

A single sign, encapsulating the history of its own irreducible interpretations,
initiates a series of combinations and duplications enacted within the different contexts
of narration. Christminster, itself a bottomless text, is proliferated further through quotations, buildings, cookies, and the pathetic citing of Jude and Sue. In the novel's narrative these figures address the problem of falsity and wrongful interpretation, explicitly articulated in, for example, *The Woodlanders*: in the symbolic rôle of Marty South’s braid, that provokes a tragedy when, being cut off for Felice’s wig, it is taken for the original by Fitzpiers. The same motif of false hair is repeated in *Jude* in Arabella’s pinned braid, and duplicated in the image of her fake dimples, both utilised to deceive men.

The material object is associated with the fate of all characters in both the symbolic (people pretend to be someone else) and the literal sense (objects appear as something else). What is discerned from the copy depends on the viewer, just as the text changes its meaning depending on the reader’s interpretation. The sign of Venus, a metaphor for the copy (also represented in the protagonists’ actions, their beliefs, and the quotations they use), deludes the reader with the apparent mimetic reliability of the material indexes of reality introduced into the text alongside metonymic continuity disrupted by the allegorical significance of the same semantic figures.

This allegorical significance implies that the act of reading or perceiving is not a completely free act. That seeing is a ‘framed’ act was quite explicitly suggested in Hardy’s drawing of spectacles. How the text is received is not only a question of personal inner perspective, but also of how this perspective is demarcated by external circumstances such as conventions, ideologies, politics, and history: external conditions might affect how objects are seen and how texts are understood. When *Jude* was first published, Hardy experienced this in practice through the negative reviews and hostile reactions of the readers. In the Foucauldian sense, this negative reaction is motivated by, and contributes to, authoritative discourses which hold sway in society. By
demonstrating that subjective interpretation is never free from ideological/textual control, Hardy's novel projects that paradox onto criticism.

The Venus scene in *Jude* illustrates the contemporary interest in the effects of mimesis on the perception of works of art. A good example of this attitude can be found in the debates of the 1860s concerning the aesthetic abstractness of nakedness and its moral value. Works which embodied an atemporal and asexual, purely aesthetic form of beauty were at that stage regarded as closest to the "ideal" — the most revered and valued were John Gibson's *The Tinted Venus* (1862), and Leighton's *Venus Disrobing* (1867). The ancient nude was generally felt to be above any suggestions of impropriety, while non-classical nudes, such as those of Frost, Landseer and Millais, were received with caution. Confronted by so many different versions of the ideal nude, the question of its essential truth has been raised. The problem of the Greek nude grew in importance and became part of the social discourse adapted from both popular publications (*Spectator, Saturday Review, Gentleman's Magazine*) and the professional press (*Fine Arts Quarterly Review*).

In a quarrel between artists and journalists, Gerome's *Phryne before the Judges* (1861) was accused of causing social offence. In their discussion, the problem of artistic merit was raised, traditionally assessed in relation to reality. For the Victorians, the nude was supposed to be a shrine of ideal beauty but devoid of any natural sexuality. As Barthes observes, such a reaction was typical of a Western tradition that promoted "conformity not to the model but to the cultural rules of representation" (1986: 145). This public outrage against *Phryne* proves that in the nineteenth-century, art (even when proposed as the embodiment of the abstract ideal) was still perceived in relation to the ideological socio-political patterns. Through the process of being artistically transformed into symbols of intertext (or a copy) in *Jude*, these patterns are shown to be destructive and dangerous for the protagonists. However, in being read mimetically,
without critical insight into representation, the story of Jude and Sue becomes an
offence to Hardy’s contemporaries.

The implication of the Venus scene is that “reality” is perceived through images
and perceptions that are never original or reliable. Their apparent trustworthiness lies in
what Barthes defines as “the effect of reality” (1986: 141), and emerges from the artist’s
effort to manipulate and pre-arrange images in order to produce their mimetic
semblance. Thus a text is a platform for a semiotic performance and the writer is the
performer of his own semiotic model. The description of the fake antiquities seller
illustrates this effect:

A foreigner with black hair and a sallow face, sitting on the grass beside a large
square board whereon were fixed, as closely as they could stand, a number of
plaster statuettes, some of them bronzed, which he was re-arranging before
proceeding with them on his way. (JO, II, 3: 93)

Before proceeding with signs the writer selects their images and fixes them into
the narrative in different configurations. The narrator of Jude warns the reader that they
are only copies by crying “I-i-i-mages!” over the pedlar’s stall (JO, II, 3: 93). The
writer’s “stall” is structure of the text, which, in Thomas Sebeok’s semiotic theory, is a
canvas for artistic games with words – The Play of Musement – as the title of his book

As Sebeok writes, semiotics are engaged in the play of musement (corresponding
to the “game” in the first chapter of this thesis), while the aim of the semiotic model is
“an illimitable array of concordant illusions; its main mission to mediate between reality
and illusion – to reveal the substratal illusion underlying reality and to search for the
reality that may, after all, lurk behind that illusion” (1986: 77). The texture of the
narrative is the ground model onto which linguistic symbols of reality can be
transplanted. Sebeok calls this pattern a “modelling device” for producing numerous
fictional worlds (Sebeok & Danesi 2000: 1-43). Into the texture of Jude symbols of reality are introduced to create new fictional patterns of the world. This pattern consists of images/signs saturated with their own intertextual history, to be recognised within the frames of poetical figures that they create on the level of representation (e.g. metonyms, metaphors, or symbols).

However, these signs together tell a new history: a fictional history of the novel. Signs in Jude abandon their external sources and speak with their own voices; in other words, signs turn into fleeting images bearing a meaning independent of the original. However, they still symbolically display their affiliation in the frame of their discursive difference that suggests a relation with “the Other”, like the foreign figure of the Venus who speaks with the voices of all her creators and interpreters. She also embodies the artistic effort of many generations, and symbolises the physical energy invested in her material appearance. Just as this energy is encapsulated in her figure, the memory of reality is captured in quotation. Its narrative status is objectified by the pictorial rhetoric which makes it appear more real, thus signs become things or fetishes for the artist who plays with them as if they were toys to create a new model of the world: the fictional reality of the book.

As the text suggests, representation is built on fictional images whose verisimilitude does not guarantee the real. The “Italiante” seller does not pretend that his product is close to the original, but nonetheless it can be taken for real by those who treat images as things. For Swift in 1726, this equation was parodied in the description of the Academy of Lagado, founded on mimetic communication between scholars who decided to use things instead of words, believing that:

Since words are only names for things, it would be more convenient for all men to carry about them such things as were necessary to express particular business they are to discourse on. [...] [M]any of the most learned and wise
adhere to the new scheme of expressing themselves by *things*, which hath only
this inconvenience attending it, that if a man's business be very great, and of
various kinds, he must be obliged in proportion to carry a greater bundle of
*things* upon his back, unless he can afford one or two strong servants to attend
him. (1997: 208-209)

The institution imposing the rules of mimesis was The Royal Society, which tried to
remove both figurative and poetical devices from official language to achieve greater
clarity of meaning. Swift's irony, despite the artistic frame of the novel's polemic genre,
caused great social outrage in those who read the text literally; it was even more
difficult for readers of Hardy's apparently mimetic text to apprehend the ambiguity of
his representation.

Ideological powers, in Swift pictured through commonly known parallels, in *Jude*
are not represented directly but through allegorical figures signifying imitation. Images
displayed on the seller's stall are *things*, but their rôle in the text is to signify things
symbolically. However, the characters exposed to them do not know this and they read
the figure mimetically just as the scholars of Lagado and *Jude*'s readers did. The Venus
is only a symbol of the original, just like the words on the level of representation
symbolise things; they tell of reality, they are a part of reality as a material work of art,
but they do not stand for reality. The fictional story happens in an ontologically
different dimension and should be read from a distance, otherwise it might provoke
distrust or cause offence in the reader who is unable to tell the difference between
reality and art.

By applying mimetic categories of interpretation, the reader falls into the illusory
trap of the words' truth which regards the truth of fiction. Jude and Sue are the best
eamples of this delusion evoked by mimesis. Their fate reveals the dangers of the
mimetic grid that imprisons people's perception and balefully affects their life. In the
Venus scene, Hardy mocks the mimetic approach to fictional representation, but he also alludes to the danger it can instigate in real life when a work of art is measured according to the moral scale (as proved by the debate on the Phryne nude and by the later reviews of *Jude*). The irony overlying the scene corresponds to the comic picture of the Cupid seller (See fig. 18), a famous painting found at Pompeii, in which Barlow finds possible inspiration for Hardy’s “Italiante seller”. The painting shows a travelling saleswoman holding out Cupids from a basket, as though, Barlow suggests, “desirability can be sold like live chickens”. This painting was much imitated by artists in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries, most notably by Joseph-Marie Vien (1716-1809), and Hardy seems to be assuming that the reader will spot the allusion. The exaggerated vision of images regarded as live objects responds semantically to Hardy’s parody of mimetic conventions, a parody which lies at the centre of any *Jude* critique.
The selling of images at the stall in Christminster is an allegory of the sign’s emancipation from its fixed historical origins and boundaries of ideologies. In *Jude*, the original – a word – is only an image, a fake copy to be sold, played with, or utilised within new configurations of signs. The word represents a movement towards flexibility, temporality and exchangeability so characteristic of the modern forms of discourse. As Foucault argues, words then “become a text to be broken down, so as to allow that other meaning hidden in them to emerge and become clearly visible” (1977: 304). By the turn of the twentieth-century, this dissociation of language (in Foucault “the fragmented being of language” [1977: 305]) would result in the multiplication of copies, allusions and quotations, regrouped around the central fact of the production of conceptual models of reality (textual, scientific, or artistic).

Fetishes are objects from real life deposited by history to inspire associations, or in Hardy’s language, ‘impressions’, evoked in the aftermath of experience. Although “the real” is always mediated, writing in relation to experience helps to restore the sense of its lost originality. For Foucault it is this sense of the original that defines the status of Order overthrown at the turn of Classicism. As a result of the loss of the *episteme* (the foundation of what is given to us and reaches us in the force of labour, the energy of life, or the power of speech), “language appeared in a multiplicity of modes of being, whose unity was probably irrecoverable” (1977: 304).

Signs in *Jude* can be compared to Foucault’s notion of words, which “are like many other objects formed and deposited by history” (1977: 305). The rôle of the image in *Jude* is to symbolise a reality formed by language and deposited by history. The Venus figure, although in the text standing for a concrete object, signifies the process of interpretation underlying its representation. The sign of Venus is part of the discourse of
the Other, singled out from the text by the frame of objectification. Speaking through the Other (in relation to the Other) enables the text to establish its own discourse which consists simply of many different voices defining each other. They create the world of *Jude* and maintain their borders within the frame of signs/texts. The discourse of the Other is graphically detached and semantically absorbed into the narrative. Quotations, allusions and graphic signs, as well as images of objects, people or stories, refer to the materiality of the real world. By framing them on the level of representation, Hardy makes them objects of textuality. Being only the mediated copies of reality, they are originals of the text. They do not picture reality but its aesthetic representation.

However, Hardy's aesthetic, although freed from empirical referentiality, does not aspire to represent art for its own sake; just the reverse, it is anchored in the empirical experience of the world. It is the author's most real contact with reality that acts as the stimulus for writing, yet what we obtain from the pages of the novel is a memory of that contact, frozen into symbolic figures. It is that moment of close acquaintance with the object, person, landscape, accent, or text that saturates the poetics of *Jude* with a materiality immediately diffused in poetical impressions. The frames of quotations are visible anchors tying the text into reality, but they also stress the mediatory character of language standing between reality and representation. Quotations in *Jude* on the one hand manifest the desire of the text to restore a feeling of reality, and on the other they reveal the hopelessness of the text in speaking of reality in any direct way. It is not possible to quote reality from the "source" because the source, like the Venus, is not original. Quotations are symbols of the original imprinted in memory: the original will never be fully articulated, yet playing with its copies might provide the sense of its past totality.

The expectation imposed on literature to express reality, people's feelings, or the artist's spiritual self, in *Jude* occurs a possibility - a semiotic variant, a poetical manoeuvre. I
suggest that in Jude, metaphorical quotations add to the aesthetic illusion (called above a "game") of literary representation, while the process of interpretation by the reader is what the writer called "reading for hygienic purposes" (PW: 111), an act that could be compared to Aristotle's notion of catharsis. Hardy's understanding of the aims of literature -- explicitly expressed in his Literary Notebooks -- corresponds to Aristotle's processes of purification or cleansing aroused by fear and pity as an integral part of tragedy. According to Hardy, literature aims at producing "refreshment, if not restoration, in some antithetic realm of ideas which lies in the pages of romance" (PW: 111).

As in Aristotelian poetics, which proclaimed poetical mystification grounded on the artist's skillful artifice, Hardy's novel is a literary mystification, or, in semiotic terms, a combination of signifiers, targeted at producing an aesthetic impression. What Gerald F. Else says about the lacking of the Absolute in Aristotle's poetics may be applied to Hardy's literary art, which "is an entirely secular activity" that creates the ideal world of fiction (Aristotle 1970: 5). Referring to the two dominant forms of Classical poetics, we can say that Hardy's work refutes the Platonic concept of imitation as a "self-defeating, sterile activity", and turns to the Aristotelian definition of poetry as a secular aesthetic activity and a "positive and fruitful one -- within its allowed limits" (Aristotle 1970: 6). For Hardy, this Classical comparison seems to reflect the conflict between Romanticism and Modernism, resulting in the splitting of the platonic-Christian unity of "truth" and "beauty" (a belief so ardently held by Jude Fawley at the

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11 In Poetics Aristotle explains: "Tragedy, then, is a process of imitating an action which has serious implications, is complete, and possesses magnitude: by means of language, which has been made sensuously attractive, with each of its varieties found separately in the parts; enacted by the persons themselves and not presented through narrative, through a course of pity and fear completing purification of tragic acts which have those emotional characteristics" (1970: 25).
beginning of his tragedy), to be replaced by aesthetically orientated "mere impressions of the moment" (PW: 49).

With his last novel, as Howe argues, Hardy deprives us of moral hope, here entitled "faith" in the Old Order; but, as I have shown, the author also compensates for this loss precisely in the dynamic renewal of its symbols, thus Hardy's Wessex should not be read only within the moral borders of the tragic land. In *Jude*, the most pessimistic of his novels, Hardy overcomes the tragedy of people with the irony of language, and in this way he suffuses his text with hope and faith in a new order that might be achieved through artistic creation. This kind of creation could claim a metaphysical depth, if it were not a memory replaying and reinterpreting its textualised artefacts.

Intertextuality in *Jude* is not a method of writing but a way of seeing things, by other critics classified as an effect of the author's visual imagination (Hardy 2000). Aesthetic perception, however, when treated as part of Hardy's literary work, relates to the symbolic transposition of objects from reality into textual artefacts. This thesis considered the poetics of that artistic process, grounded on the text's relationships with other texts. Intertexts in *Jude* were identified in poetic figures of the narration, grouped under three tropes (metonymy, metaphor and symbol) which together contributed to a realistic story and, at the same time, to its anti-mimetic theme. When interpreted in relation to each other, the texture and the structure compose the intertextual themes that Hardy mocks. This deeper significance of the poetics of quotation has been defined as allegorical and includes also the self-referential aspects of Jude's language as revealed in the significance of particular words. Therefore, Hardy's allegorical thematisation of intertextual references can be identified through the analysis of quotations along with those poetical figures which signify imitation.
Harvey uses quotations for his polemics, limited only by the ideological conventions imposed on his generation via textual means. The poetics of quotation in Jude disclose the historical methods of disseminating these conventions (through such conduits as education, Church, and literary discourse) and the effect they have upon society. This is reflected not only within the “foreign” references employed by the author, but also on the metatextual level of representation. The metatextual significance is a result of the novel’s self-awareness which, as Barbara Hardy claims, refuses the dogmatic interpretation of the novel (2000: 58). In her analysis of the imaginary figures in Jude, the critic (thirty years after her first interpretation of the novel in The Appropriate Form, 1964) acknowledges the metatextual motivation for the devaluation of the providence-fiction genre. In relation to the novel’s two-fold composition, Barbara Hardy writes:

As schematic construction it is self-exposed, its arguments and illustrations complicated by Hardy’s fundamental theme of imagination and imaginative construction. As an anti-Providence novel, it is totally aware of the simplifications of the Providence novel, parodies them, plays with them, overrides them and avoids them. (2000: 58).

According to Riffaterre (drawing on Derrida), this self-consciousness is an effect of the novel’s semiosis; in other words, its significance is produced by the text’s signs in response to the intertextual archive of representations. However, Hardy’s response does not originate from his disappointment with art, as art for Hardy still has the power to convey meaning and tell the story, but rather from his disappointment with the conventions which rule art. Beyond the critical self-awareness of the text, we can observe the magnificent self-efficiency of the language used for the production of meaning. Although the text is aware of its own intertextuality, this intertextuality is engaged as a poetical trope which stores, rather than diffuses, the message. This is
where the novel's chiasmus lies: it reveals and criticises the mimetic-textual delusion, and defies moral support from literature, but at the same time it fetishises intertexts to create its textual identity.

By playing with intertextual images, the author hints at language's ideological exploitation, its semantic inefficiency, and its inherent imitativeness. Nonetheless, he still uses language to construct, not to deconstruct, meanings and to affect the reader. However, what Hardy argues in practice is that freedom of interpretation, unregulated by conventions, is, as his novel shows, difficult and sometimes even impossible.

Hardy's modern approach seems to rest on his understanding of language's mediatory (or intertextual) character recognised by the writer through the creative process. Writing about reality naturally refers him to textual artefacts which contain other authors' reflections filtered through the texts that they have encountered. "Naturally", in this case, is characteristic of Hardy: coming from his personality, habits, interests, education, and personal experiences. It is his individual constitution of social, psychological, and physical, which directs him to arts, music, literature, architecture and all the various artefacts of reality.

Transcribing these artefacts into a literary form was here called writing in relation to the Other; the Other understood as the textual image residing in the writer's memory once intertexts meet the writer's creative imagination. In this sense, the universal intertextual memory of texts, which, according to Kristeva, determines the work of art, might be seen as a collection of individual perceptions or responses to other texts. It is thus not the text that "is being written" by ideological powers echoed in intertextual representation, but rather the author who writes the text in response to those powers in his own individual way. Metonymic, metaphoric, and symbolic use of quotations in Jude proves Hardy's original interpretation of intertextuality: for him it is a cause of both criticism and creative inspiration.
Hardy criticises the limited and ideologically determined abilities of language, ironised in his equivocal poetics, but he does not reject language as the vehicle of meaning. His attitude to language is similar to that by Culler described as “attacking design with design”. Referring to the poetry of Charles Lamb, Culler writes:

It is inconceivable that he could be against design itself. He may be against old designs, ugly designs, stupid designs, but he cannot for very long be against design itself. (1968: 243)

Hardy’s design, just like the casts of the antique, does not signify the original but simply the mode of copying. The copy might be reproduced in studios and sold like any other goods at the market, yet it is only the act of copying that evokes the sense of any relation with the original, and the aim of irony might be to accept its unavoidable destruction. Playing with copies might be a way of searching for new meanings that, although no longer conveying the original, produce a new imaginative tale. Irony reveals the artist’s disappointment but does not mark the artist’s failure; rather the reverse, for it seems to be a triumphal mode of using intertexts for original creation.
He had probably cut an incisura on the back of the milestone embossing his aspirations. It had been done in the first week of his apprenticeship, before he had been directed by his master from this purpose. He wondered if the incisura were legible still, if some little batch of the milestone brushed away the nettles. By the light of a match he could still discern what he had cut so enthusiastically so long ago:

THITHER
J.B.F.

The sight of it, unimpaired, seems to screen the grass and nettles, lit in three a spark of the old fire. Surely his plan should be to move onward though good still — to avoid morbid sorrow even though he did see the ugliness in the world: Bene, agere et castari — to do good cheerfully — which he had heard as being the philosophy of one Spinoza might be his own even now.

He might battle with his evil star, or follow out his original intention.

By moving to a spot a little way off, he ended dimension measured the horizon.
What was she doing? He stole a glance round. Before him lay a piece of zinc, cut to the shape of a scroll, decorated with a dead paint or wax side. Herein she was to design, or illuminating, in character, of Church text, the single word:

alleluia!

A sweet, saffron, Christian, benison knew! might she—

Her presence here was now fairly enough explained. Her skill in work of this sort having no doubt been acquired from her father's occupation as an ecclesiastical decoration worker in metal. The lettering on which she was engaged was no doubt intended to be fixed up in some church.
Had he promised to call for her? Surely he had! She would not
wait indoors, poor girl, to waste all her afternoon on account of him.
There was something in her, too, which was very interesting. He ought
to treat fairly with her. Though he had only Sundays & week-days
evenings before for reading, he could afford one afternoon, seeing
her other young men afforded so many. Besides, after to-day he
would never probably see her again. Indeed, it would be impossible, considering
what his plans were.

In that, as if visibly, a compelling sense of extraordinary
power settled hold of him, something which had nothing to with the
spirits of influence that had moved him hitherto. This kept waiting for
his reason. This will, nothing for his elevated intentions, it moved him
violent
along, as ascending in a staircase. He had toled by the other, an
daylight which tended towards the embrace of a human form whom
he had no particular respect or (common ground of sympathy),
the peculiar
girl.

He sprang up & across the room. Foreseeing such an event
he had already arranged himself in his best in three minutes, he was
out of the house, & descending by the path across the wide vacuum
bellow of corn ground which lay beneath the village of the isolated home
of Helene. He & the landscape
easily.

As he waited he looked at his watch. He would be back in two hours,
very long time would still remain to him after that.

Passing the few unhealthy fir trees at cottage where the path joined the
highway he hastened along, a sudden song to the left, descending the steep
He stood, thinking howleasing she was.

Thus they slowly went towards home. He had left his college at half past nine, intending to be getting down again to the New Testament by half past five. It was Nine O'clock when, with another embrace, he stood to deliver her up at her father's door.

She asked him to come in, if only for a minute, as it would seem so odd to her, as if she had been out alone in the dark. He gave way, and took her in. Immediately she was gone he opened the door, a sudden realisation, several neighbours falling round. They all spoke with a congratulatory manner, and both knew, knowing an Arabella, the parties.

They did not belong to his party to be felt out of place or uncomfortable. He had not meant this: a scene of form. Distant walking with Arabella, the young man who had meant. He did not stay longer than to speak to her step-mother, a simple quiet woman without feature or character, a living frame all soft and self-blamed into the reach of the door.

But Arabella soon reassured the way she had gone so far, from the side.

He walked as if he felt himself to be another man from that of yesterday. What was his father thinking of his intentions, whether to head it so thickly, or to wait another single minute? How was the plan of action? Your point of view is a definition that he was just living for the first time; not thinking life. It was better for a woman than to be a pervert, or a bachelor; any, or a failure.

When he got back to the house his aunt had gone to bed, a general depression of his spirit seemed written on the face of all things confounding him here. Instead he went upstairs without a light, the water of his room reflecting him with sad hollowness, like the eyes of a dead cow. Then lay his bed, just as he had left them, on the carpet letting to the middle of the floor. They heard him sigh in the grey, straight, like the unclouded eyes of a dead man.

\[ \text{Η ΚΑΪΝΗ ΔΙΑΘΗΚΗ.} \]
Figure no 8
Venus de Milo, 130-120 BC

Figure no 9
Aphrodite of Cnidus c. 350 BC

Figure no 10
Capitoline Veuns (Rome) (called "Venus pudica")
Figure no 11
Venus de Medici (Florence) c. 1-2 AD (called "Venus pudica")

Figure no 12
Aphrodite of Capua, Naples

Figure no 13
Aphrodite Kalipygos, Naples
PERILS OF AESTHETIC CULTURE.


Helen. "Oh dear no. We've been going in for High Art, that's all."

Appoline. "And charming pairs! Chums of the Author."

Helen. "And Anna's Most flummery at the ball, and she's got such a honey waist, and such a big head, and such a lovely mouth and face! Have it all, I thought her photograph!"

Appoline. "Yes, Uncle John; and Edwin's got a long Upper lip, and a flabby Chin, and he can't chew a Brandy and Menthol! Oh dear! Oh dear!"

Figure no 14
Punch (210), May, 10, 1879

Figure no 15
Albert Moore, A Venus, c.1896

Figure no 16
George Frederick Watts, Wife of Pygmalion, 1868
Figure no 17
James McNeill Whistler, *Venus*, 1868

Picture no 18
Joseph-Marie Vien, *The Cupid Seller*, 1763
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