https://theses.gla.ac.uk/

Theses Digitisation:
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglares/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/
This is a digitised version of the original print thesis.

Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author

A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge

This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given

Enlighten: Theses
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/
research-enlighten@gla.ac.uk
Being in Time - the fictional coloniser as Dasein

by

Sean Somerville Armstrong

A thesis submitted to the University of Glasgow in accordance with the requirements of the degree of Ph.D. in the Faculty of Arts, Department of English Literature, November 2002

© Sean Somerville Armstrong, November 2002
Abstract

This study examines the theory and praxis of colonial discourse analysis and the validity of its conception of 'the colonising (white, European, Western) subject' via a Heideggarian interpretation of colonial fiction.

The Introduction provides a brief review of colonial discourse analysis and postcolonial studies since Edward Said's *Orientalism* in 1978 and isolates the main themes to be examined.

The First Chapter examines in detail the problems which adhere to the concept of colonial discourse and its theoretical homogenisation, un-worlding and de-humanisation of the fictional and historical coloniser as understood in relation to Heidegger's description of "Enframing".

The Second Chapter sets out the basic structures of Dasein's existential-ontological constitution as described by Heidegger in *Being and Time* and introduces the principle criterion for the critical analysis which follows.

The Third Chapter re-defines colonial discourse, as "idle talk", in terms of the temporality of Dasein and examines the various ways in which certain fictional colonisers, when understood as "beings in Time", reflect the fact that Dasein's individuality is always already ontologically grounded and made manifest in its "authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self".

The Fourth Chapter discusses the theme of death, as "Being towards death", in the life and work of Rudyard Kipling, and suggests that death, as both a profoundly significant environmental factor and as a fundamental temporal orientation can be understood to bring Dasein before itself as a 'Being in the world'.

The Fifth Chapter examines anxiety and boredom in certain works of colonial literature in terms of the intentional comportments of Dasein's "care" and as those ontological "states-of-mind" which deliver the individual Dasein and the world (as "Being-in-the-world") over to Dasein.

The Final Chapter investigates the cultural phenomenon of 'colonial heroism' in terms of the ontological constitution of the hero, the writer and the reader, as Dasein, and in relation to Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim*.

My Conclusion offers a summary of each of the previous chapters before considering some of the broader ramifications of the arguments which have been advanced.
Dedication

Dedicated to my partner and my family
Acknowledgements

Thanks are due to Dr. Donald Mackenzie for his generous, patient and always stimulating supervision. To my partner, my mother, family and friends for their constant support and encouragement, and without whom this thesis would never have been written. To the Ardfoyle Educational Trust, the Gilchrist Educational Trust and the University of Glasgow for their invaluable financial assistance. My greatest debt is acknowledged in my dedication.
Declaration

This thesis represents my own unassisted work, and no part of it has been submitted previously for any academic qualification. The views expressed are my own and not those of the University of Glasgow.

Sean Armstrong
Contents

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I: Colonial Discourse
1. The Drive Towards Discursive Functionality and Colonial Discourse Analysis as "Enframing"
2. The “Enframing” of ‘the colonising subject’
   (a) Homogenisation
   (b) Un-worlding
   (c) De-humanising

CHAPTER II: Heidegger’s Existential-ontological analytic
1. Dasein and the Ontological Difference
2. The Ontological Analytic of Dasein – authenticity and inauthenticity
3. Death
4. Boredom and Anxiety
5. Ontological heroism and “anticipatory resoluteness”

CHAPTER III: Being in Time and the fictional coloniser
1. Being in Time
   (a) “Idle Talk” and the Inauthentic Temporality of the “They”
   (b) “Idle Talk” and the Fictional Coloniser
2. Dasein’s Temporality – Memory and the “there”

CHAPTER IV: “Being-in-the-world” and Death in Kipling
1. Death and Rudyard Kipling
   (a) “Our near companion…”
   (b) “Being towards death”

CHAPTER V: Anxiety and Boredom
1. Anxiety
   (a) Dread and Uncanniness
   (b) Loneliness
   (c) Fear
2. Boredom

CHAPTER VI: Heroism
1. Towards an Ontological definition of Heroism
2. “Being-in-the-world” and the “Demand”
3. The “Demand” in Colonial Fiction
   (a) The heroic cowardice of Lord Jim

CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Being in Time - the fictional coloniser as Dasein

INTRODUCTION

With colonialism it's easy to tell the good guys from the bad guys.
Robert Young, White Mythologies

Who is 'the colonising subject' of colonial discourse analysis? Who is 'the white man'? Who is 'the European' or 'the Westerner'? As Robert Young's, less than serious, observation implies, we all seem to know who the "bad guys" are. But does this automatically mean that it is subsequently "easy" to know and explain what and how the "bad guys" are, as "bad guys"? If we drop the unhelpful moral epithet and speak more plainly, does this mean that it is "easy" to know what and how the 'the white man', 'the European' or 'the Westerner' as 'the colonising subject' is? In short, what do we mean when we use 'the colonising subject' as a theoretical category and a descriptive term in our analysis of the history, people, culture and, most specifically, literature of the colonial era?

In the twenty years since Edward Said's Orientalism, colonial discourse analysts have, among other things, drawn attention to the ways in which 'white Western' writers, politicians, scientists and colonialists have described themselves, their race and civilisation. In philosophical and political tracts, ethnographic studies, novels and poems, 'the white Western Male' has elucidated and elaborated the supposedly inherent, and eminently noble, attributes of Western society. According to Lord Cromer, speaking as a former consul-general of Egypt:

[T]he European is a close reasoner; his statements of fact are devoid of any ambiguity; he is a natural logician.²

And, as postcolonial commentators and colonial discourse analysts have shown, this confident identification of the innate characteristics of the 'white Western European' is all too often, if not inevitably, conducted in opposition to the 'Black', 'Eastern', 'Oriental' or colonised 'Other'.

[What can be more irreducibly "other" to Western thought, and to those developments which problematize it, than the colonized body?³

¹ Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 5.
³ Annamaria Carusi, ‘Post, Post and Post, Or, Where is South African Literature in All This?’ in Ian Adam and Helen Tiffin (eds.), Past the Last Post: Theorizing Post-Colonialism and Post-Modernism (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), p. 103.
Lord Cromer, again obliges us with an exemplary case in point, when he concludes his earlier line of reasoning with the equally confident assertion that...

...the mind of the Oriental, on the other hand, like the picturesque streets, is eminently wanting in symmetry. His reasoning is of the most slipshod description.\(^4\)

For Said, Cromer's statement plainly articulates the Orientalist fiction that "Orientals were almost everywhere nearly the same".\(^5\) And it is this mode of disparaging and fundamentally racist categorisation which Said notes and describes as "Oriental discourse":

[That] knowledge of the Orient that places things Oriental in class, court, prison, or manual for scrutiny, study, judgement, discipline, or governing.\(^6\)

However, in stating his case against Oriental discourse as "a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient",\(^7\) Said joins Cromer in providing us with some equally confident, albeit significantly less flattering, ideas concerning the inherent attributes of "the European":

For any European during the nineteenth century – and I think one can say this almost without qualification – Orientalism was...a system of truths, truths in Nietzsche's sense of the word. It is therefore correct that every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric...\(^8\)

By suggesting that it is "correct" that racism, imperialism and ethnocentrism are fundamentally intrinsic to "every European", Said can thus be seen to duplicate the homogenising methodology employed by Cromer; and as such, imply that "Europeans" were almost everywhere nearly the same.\(^9\) But why is this important? And what are the problems which this theoretical homogenisation of "the European" raises in the context of Said's argument as a whole? What does it raise in the context of his interpretation of colonial literature in particular? Furthermore, to what extent can the problems associated with Said's deployment of "the

\(^4\) ibid., p. 38.
\(^5\) ibid., p. 3.
\(^6\) ibid., p. 41.
\(^7\) ibid., p. 3.
\(^8\) ibid., pp. 203-204, (my emphasis). Nor is this an isolated instance; elsewhere he maintains that "a white middle-class Westerner believes it is his human prerogative not only to manage the nonwhite world but also to own it, just because by definition 'it' is not quite as human as 'we' are" (p. 108).
\(^9\) In his influential essay 'The Economy of Manichean Allegory', Abdul JanMohamed goes one step further, and unwilingly employs "a generic" construction in his own critique of such employments; "The European writer commodifies the native by negating his individuality, his subjectivity, so that he is now perceived as a generic being that can be exchanged for any other native (they all look alike, act alike, and so on)." 'The Economy of Manichean Allegory: The Function of Racial Difference in Colonialist Literature', \textit{Critical Inquiry} 12, 1 (1985) in Henry Louis Gates, Jr. (ed.), \textit{Race}, \textit{Writing And Difference} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 83 (my emphasis).
European', 'the white' and 'the Westerner', be seen to endure in the work of postcolonial critics in their interpretation of colonial literature and the fictional coloniser today?

In the two decades since Said's most influential work, postcolonial studies has scrutinised, decoded and sought to explain European colonialism and Western imperialism, past and present and has diversified across every conceivable field of scholarly endeavour. As Bart Moore-Gilbert notes, postcolonial criticism and theory

...comprise a variety of practises, performed within a range of disciplinary fields in a multitude of different institutional locations.\(^{10}\)

This is one of the most crucial reasons why any casually generalised conception of postcolonial theory and postcolonial criticism (or indeed, 'postcolonialism'), must be avoided.\(^{11}\) The "variety," "range" and "multitude" of practises, fields and locations, means that a thorough exposition of the history, and the positions adopted by various schools and commentators across the full spectrum of postcolonial thought, would take us far beyond the limits of a reflection upon the 'colonising subject'.\(^{12}\) A broad, and therefore incomplete, review of the larger theoretical, disciplinary and regional sub-divisions which have emerged in the wake of Orientalism will, however, serve to introduce and contextualise many of the key texts and themes to which I will refer in the following study.


\(^{11}\) See, for example, the questions raised by Anne McClintock in her essay, "The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term "Post-Colonialism"", Social Text 31/32 (Spring 1992), pp. 1-5; and Vijay Mishra and Bob Hodge's "What is Post(-)colonialism?", Textual Practice 5, 3 (1991), pp. 399-414. For perhaps the most comprehensive study on the history of postcolonialism, see Robert Young's Postcolonialism: A Historical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999).

After Said, the most influential theorists in postcolonial studies have undoubtedly been Homi K. Bhabha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Bhabha's contribution has largely centred upon his Lacanian psychoanalytical explanation of the inherent ambiguity of colonial and national discourses. His key concepts of 'hybridity', 'sly civility' and 'mimicry' in relation to the economy of the colonial psyche, though undoubtedly contested, are now common currency.13

In her deconstructive, psychoanalytical, feminist and Marxist readings of the 'epistemic violence' of colonial discourse, and the historiographical collaborations with the Subaltern Studies group14 (which includes, among others, Ranajit Guha, Partha Chatterjee and Dipesh Chakrabarty), Spivak has consistently called into question the philosophical, institutional and critical assumptions of the postcolonial critic and postcolonial analysis itself. Yet, as Robert Young has observed:

Spivak shares the assumption with Bhabha that imperialism was not only a territorial and economic but inevitably also a subject-constituting project.15

Spivak's meticulously self-conscious assessment of the constitution of the subaltern16 and Bhabha's comprehensive description of the colonised "Mimic man"17 are a testament to the difficulties involved in the attempt to articulate this assumption. It is an assumption that underpins and informs the work of a range of theorists and commentators in postcolonial studies

---

13 "Hybridity is the revaluation of the assumption of colonial identity through the repetition of discriminatory identity effects. It displays the necessary deformation and displacement of all sites of discrimination and domination. It unsettles the mimetic or narcissistic demands of colonial power, but re-implicates its identifications in strategies of subversion that turn the gaze of the discriminated back upon the eye of power". Bhabha, 'Signs Taken For Wonders: Questions of ambivalence and authority under a tree outside Delhi, May 1817', in Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 112. See also, Robert Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity, Theory, Culture and Race (Routledge: London, 1995).

14 A good introduction to the work of the Subaltern Studies Group is Ranajit Guha's 'On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India', in Ranajit Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies I: Writings on South Asian History and Society (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982). See also, Gyan Prakash, 'Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Perspectives from Indian Historiography', Comparative Studies in Society and History 32, 2 (1990), pp. 383-408; and, the collection of essays Guha has edited with Spivak, Selected Subaltern Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

15 Young, White Mythologies, p. 159. In contrast, Benita Parry, in 'Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse' (Oxford Literary Review 9, 1 and 2, 1987, pp. 27-58) has drawn attention to the profound theoretical differences in Bhabha's and Spivak's respective assessments of this 'project' and, in particular, criticises Spivak's denial of the possibility of there being a resistant subaltern voice.


17 Bhabha, 'Mimicry And Man: The ambivalence of colonial discourse' in The Location of Culture, pp. 85-92.
and colonial discourse analysis from Abdul JanMohamed\textsuperscript{18} to Ashis Nandy,\textsuperscript{19} from the examination of the discursive formations of nationality,\textsuperscript{20} to the critical analysis of the racial\textsuperscript{21} and sexual\textsuperscript{22} politics which are held to be implicit in colonialism’s appropriation of the Other.

\textsuperscript{18} For example, JanMohamed, \textit{Manichean Aesthetics: The Politics of Literature in Colonial Africa} (Ankherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1983).

\textsuperscript{19} For example, Nandy, \textit{The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism} (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982).


\textsuperscript{21} Henry Louis Gates, jr.’s (ed.) \textit{“Race”, Writing And Difference} is still perhaps the most complete and influential volume of essays available on the subject of race in literary studies and critical theory. See also, the huge range of essays and extracts collected in Martin Bulmer and John Solomos (eds.), \textit{Race} (Oxford: Oxfords University Press, 1999); and, Herbert W. Harris, Howard C. Blue and Ezra E.H. Griffith (eds.), \textit{Racial and Ethnic Identity: Psychological Development and Creative Expression} (London: Routledge, 1995); as well as, for example, V. G. Kiernan, \textit{The Lords of Human Kind: European attitudes towards the outside world in the Imperial World} (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969); Paul Gilroy’s important, \textit{There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack} (London: Hutchinson, 1987); K. Malik’s \textit{The Meaning of Race: Race, History and Culture in Western Society} (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); J. Solomos and L. Baek’s \textit{Racism and Society} (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996). For studies of race in English literature, see, for example, Brian Street, \textit{The Savage in Literature: Representations of ‘Primitive’ Society in English Fiction 1859-1920} (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975); the essays collected in David Dabydeen (ed.), \textit{The Black Presence in English Literature} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985); Dorothy Hammond and Alta Jablow, \textit{The Africa That Never Was: Four Centuries of British Writing about Africa} (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1978).

Such an assumption is even implicit in the contentious arguments put forward by Helen Tiffin, Stephen Slemon and Linda Hutcheon, among others, for the recognition of the 'post-colonial' status of the 'white settler' in Australia, Canada and South Africa. More pertinently, in conjunction with these various ideological, theoretical and regional perspectives, the fundamental assumption that colonialism actually poses a 'colonial subject' can be seen to influence the interpretation of fictional character which takes place in the ever-increasing archive of postcolonial literary criticism.

Said's original argument in Orientalism, that Western literature has and continues to function in discursive complicity with the exercise of colonial power, opened up and accelerated a series of high-profile debates within literary studies. The most heated and unremitting of these disputes have been concerned with the status of the Western canon and the role it played in the maintenance of colonial power. In the self-assumed authority of the Western academy; the validity of 'Commonwealth' literature studies as a sub-disciplinary field; and the problems surrounding the consumption of postcolonial literatures in the metropolitan West. While the complex political and theoretical problems that have arisen in the wake of these debates are, as I have noted above, nowhere more self-consciously fore-grounded than in the work of Gayatri Spivak, they can also be seen to inform the undoubtedly more accessible literary critiques of


The broad range of different perspectives which exist within this field can be seen from the essays by these writers and others that are collected in Past the Last Post: Theorizing Post-Colonialism and Post-Modernism; and, Chris Tiffin, and Alan Lawson (eds.), De-Scribing Empire (London: Routledge, 1994).


See, for example, Spivak, 'Three Women's Texts and a Critique of Imperialism', in "Race", Writing And Difference. See also, Henry Louis Gates, jr.'s own assertion that, "to attempt to appropriate our own discourses by using Western critical theory uncritically is to substitute one mode of neocolonialism for another" ('Editor's Introduction", "Race" Writing and Difference, p. 15).
That said, I will be concentrating in this study, upon the various ways in which these critics and others, have employed ‘the colonising subject’ as ‘discursive subject’ in their interpretations of colonial literature, and examining the fundamental problems which arise in its wake. More specifically, I will argue that the theoretical structures within which ‘the colonial subject’ is understood to function and have meaning – the theoretical structures of colonial discourse – constitute a theoretical structuring of reality, and that the characters of colonial fiction are primarily assessed in such a way as to both corroborate and refine this structuring.

Following Said, practitioners of colonial discourse analysis and postcolonial critics of colonial (and postcolonial) literature, have broadly understood colonial discourse to be the Foucauldian “regime of truth” or episteme which determines what “is thought, said, or even done about the

---


27 And in this regard it is perhaps interesting to note Said’s assertion that the texts of Orientalism “can create not only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe” (Orientalism, p. 94).

Orient^{29} (the colony or ‘the native’). As such, in the course of their analyses; the historian, the statesman, the author, the soldier and, most importantly in the context of this study, the fictional character of colonial literature, have all been identified and interpreted as the paradigmatic ‘colonising subject’. In other words, each of these fictional and historical figures have been shown to exhibit the preferred behaviourisms; articulate the preferred opinions; and testify to the accuracy of ‘the colonising subject’ which is posited in the theoretical models of colonial subject relations in postcolonial theory. The ‘colonising subject’ of colonial fiction and the ‘colonising subject’ of material reality can thus be seen to exist in colonial discourse analysis as interchangeable quantities. The justification for this interchangeability is to be found in colonial discourse itself, and nowhere more so than in Leonard Woolf’s now famous, and much cited, observation that:

The white people were also in many ways astonishingly like characters in a Kipling story. I could never make up my mind whether Kipling had moulded his characters accurately in the image of Anglo-Indian society, or whether we were moulding our characters accurately in the image of a Kipling story.^{29}

What we have then, is something like a ‘discursive subject’. For, if history is now a text or narrative,^{31} Richard Burton is as much a textual construction as Kipling’s Strickland; and this means that a common analytical criteria can be used to examine both. What is more, it means they can both be understood to function in their worlds in a similar, even identical, way.^{32}

In order to grasp the fundamental problems which adhere to this theoretical conflation, I will argue that we must recognise ‘colonial discourse’ and postcolonial models of colonial subjectivity as quasi-scientific constructions. For, in the light of Said’s important open question regarding the whereabouts, and the nature, of the position from which one can study another culture,^{33} I will argue that the nature of the position assumed by colonial discourse analysts is

---

^{29} Orientalism, p. 13.
^{30} Leonard Woolf, Growing: An Autobiography of the Years 1904-1911, p. 46, quoted by C. C. Eldridge in The Imperial Experience: From Carlyle to Forster (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), p. 58. See also, Charles Allen (ed.), Tales From The Dark Continent: Images of British Colonial Africa in the Twentieth Century (London: Macdonald Futura Publishers, 1980): “Most of us had seen a film called Sanders of the River, based on Edgar Wallace’s book, before we went out and suddenly here was the thing; it was real; one was walking behind a long line of porters and the sun got up in the morning glinting on the spears of the porters — and it was just like the films” (p. 94).
^{31} See, for example, Bhabha’s Introduction, ‘narrating the nation’, and his ‘DissemiNation: time, narrative, and the margins of the modern nation’, in Nation and Narration.
^{32} And it is this understanding which is implicit in Abdul JanMohammed’s influential assertion that “the ideological function of all ‘imaginary’ and some ‘symbolic’ colonialist literature is to articulate and justify the moral authority of the colonizer and — by positing the inferiority of the native as a metaphysical fact — to mask the pleasure the colonizer derives from that authority” (‘The Economy of Manichaean Allegory’, p. 87).
^{33} See, Orientalism, pp. 45-46.
essentially that of the ‘scientist’ described by Martin Heidegger in his 1954 lecture ‘Science and Reflection’ and his 1955 lecture series, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’.

Following Heidegger’s definition of “modern science’s way of representing” as “Enframing” (Ge-stell), I will show that in advancing colonial discourse and variously affiliated models of colonial subjectivity, colonial discourse analysts engage in a mode of representation akin to that which Heidegger calls the pursuit and entrapment of nature as “a calculable coherence of forces”.

In other words, they enact an ordering and systematising of colonial reality, whereby “the real becomes surveyable and capable of being followed out in its sequences”. And that which is represented within these sequences, that being which is pursued and entrapped in the exegesis of the discursive formations of colonial discourse analysis, the ‘colonising’ and ‘colonised subject’, becomes that which Heidegger calls the “standing-reserve” (Bestand). This means that, that which is represented in ‘the science of colonialism’ known as colonial discourse analysis, “becomes secured in its objectness”;

In the wake of these observations, I would argue that the pursuit and entrapment of the object in colonial discourse analysis can be described in terms of an hermeneutical drive towards the establishment of the object’s discursive functionality. Moreover, the drive towards establishing the discursive functionality of the ‘colonising subject’ is, I will suggest, chiefly characterised by a series of problematically homogenising, un-worlding and de-humanising theoretical methodologies. And, it is as an homogenised, un-worlded and de-humanised construction that the colonising subject is subsequently plugged into the complex ideological, psychoanalytical, semiotic, linguistic and political structures of colonial discourse.

I will examine each of these methodologies separately and in full detail after I have introduced and clarified certain fundamental aspects of Heidegger’s existential-ontological analytic of Dasein. This clarification will involve an explanation of Heidegger’s description of the ‘ontological difference’ between the universal ontological modes of Dasein’s Being and the various ontical characteristics of beings:

The ontology of Heidegger can be read as one of pre-existentiality, of an intimation of primordial being anterior to the particularities of the phenomenal.

---

35 Martin Heidegger, ‘Science and Reflection’ in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, p. 168.
36 ibid., p. 168.
37 George Steiner, Grammars of Creation (London: Faber and Faber, 2001), p. 94.
It is this primary formulation which will form the basis of my critique of colonial discourse analysis' theoretical homogenisation of the 'colonising subject'. In particular, it will underpin my description of this homogenisation as an ontologisation of the ontical, wherein the ontical characteristics of race, nation and colonial status are unquestioningly employed in the construction of conceptual models and discursive systems as universal categories. Furthermore, I will argue that the selection of these ontical characteristics over others as the principal determinants of 'colonial subjectivity' reveals the existence of a hierarchy of ontical prioritisation within the ontologisation of the ontical.

By this, I mean that there is an explicit theoretical assumption that the ontical category of, for example, race, always, everywhere and in every instance exists as the primary determinant of what and how a person is at every level of its Being in colonial society. More importantly, I mean that the possibility of a whole set of equally significant localised and specific alternative ontical determinants – class/caste, sexual, religious, regional or occupational variations, interests and conflicts – is never sufficiently recognised or accounted for. As a result, I will argue that, the assumption that colonialism is a 'subject-positing project' and the employment of 'the colonising subject' as a fundamental analytical unit, constitutes a scientific entrapment of nature as the "standing reserve" (Bestand).

In addition, I will demonstrate the ways in which the employment of 'the colonial subject' as "universal-humanoid abstraction" in colonial discourse analysis and, certain key works of postcolonial literary criticism, constitutes the theoretical transferral of the coloniser into a conceptual world of colonial meaning, a world of artificially prioritised, exaggerated and exclusive cultural, political and racial meaningfulness.

In other words, the critical examination of the individual historical coloniser – exclusively in terms of models and systems of colonial subject-formation and subject relations – effectively translates the essential nature of that coloniser's engagement with its world into an artificially reified, and rigidly defined, process of predictable discursive meaningfulness. The predictability

---

38 Something like an acknowledgement of the problems which inevitably arise in the wake of this overly simplistic prioritisation is to be found in Ania Loomba's observation, when discussing the works of Spivak, Tharu and Lalith, that "[Subaltern agency, either at the individual level or at the collective, cannot be idealised as pure opposition to the order it opposes; it works both within that order and displays its own contradictions]" (Colonialism/Postcolonialism, p. 237). The point I would make here, is that this realisation as to the more complex configurations of 'colonial subjectivity' has almost exclusively been restricted to 'the subaltern', 'the native' and 'the black'. And that this understanding must necessarily include 'the coloniser', 'the European' and 'the white'.

39 The phrase is Wole Soyinka's and is quoted by Ian Adam and Helen Tiffin in their Introduction to Past the Last Post, p. xiv.
of this process, is largely ensured by the fact that because a great many of the practitioners of colonial discourse analysis confine the rules of their investigations to, among other things, a semantics of ‘colonial desire’, it comes as no surprise that proof of the discursive functionality of these characters, however ambiguous or contradictory, is almost always obtained.

More worryingly, the psychoanalytical systemisation of colonial subjectivity in various forms of colonial discourse analysis has enabled critics like Sara Suleri to posit theories about “the psychic disempowerment signified by colonial encounter”, and to elaborate upon “a colonial homoerotic imperative”. This mapping of a peculiarly colonial consciousness and the neat attribution of various colonially-determined psychological imperatives, syndromes and complexes to authors, explorers, scholars, soldiers, civil servants and their fictional equivalents, is perhaps the most explicit articulation of that mode of scientific representation that Heidegger calls “Enframing”. A mapping and attribution which effectively reduces the coloniser to little more than a socio-psychologically predetermined automaton – ‘the colonising subject’.

The question which thus presents itself, is whether or not an interpretative approach can be found for consideration of the fictional and historical coloniser that will not merely secure them in “objectness” as the “standing-reserve”. In exploring this question I would suggest that an essential preliminary adjustment must take place in our thinking. That is, we must relinquish the scientific desire to categorise, order and constitute these colonisers within abstract theoretical systems - systems that are predicated upon the ontical (and therefore inherently and indefinitely diverse) classifications of race, class, nationality and colonial status. This adjustment, I will argue, far from being a deliberate neo-colonialist ploy to suppress the racial and political injustices of colonialism, or a strategic denial of the very real ideological abuses which existed in the era of colonial expansion, is in fact the first step towards the possibility of a more authentic understanding of these injustices and abuses. For, it is only when we dispense with the artificially (and conveniently) homogenised, un-worlded and dehumanised ‘colonising subject’ of colonial discourse analysis and attempt to understand the historical subject as an individual human being in the world of its experiences that we can begin to understand colonialism as the fundamentally contradictory, multifarious, confusing, opaque and irrational creation of the fundamentally contradictory, multifarious, confusing, opaque and irrational people that we ourselves are.

But what is this ‘individual human being in the world of its experiences’? It is certainly not the autonomous Cartesian subject of Western Enlightenment ‘discourse’. No, it relates to

---

Heidegger's phenomenological description of the existential-ontological constitution of Dasein as laid out in *Being and Time*; the existential-ontological definition of man as a being in time and always already in the world.

For Heidegger:

‘The existential analytic of Dasein comes before any psychology or anthropology, and certainly before any biology.\(^4\)’

It does not act as a replacement of psychology, anthropology or biology; but as the vital a priori clarification as to what it is that is being examined in these sciences. A clarification which brings with it a fundamental re-definition of discourse itself; a re-definition of the nature of hegemony, propaganda, ideology and opinion which is founded in an understanding of the meaning of the Being of Dasein.

Moreover, Heidegger’s description of the ontological constitution of Dasein and the most fundamental modes of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world” — “Being in Time” (*In Zeit Sein*), “Being-towards-death” (*Sein zum Tode*), “Anxiety” (*Angst/Unheimlichkeit*) and “Boredom” (*Langeweile*) — can be seen to provide us with important insights into the experiences of the historical coloniser. Which is not to say, that these fundamental modes of Being are, in the manner of colonial discourse analysis, to be understood as being inherently colonial. This is because, from the outset, these modes of Being are to be understood as being universally applicable; as pertinent to people in London, Manchester and Newcastle as they are to those in Lahore, Ladysmith and Khartoum. In addition, the universality of authentic ontology also means that the Self/Other dynamic which Heidegger describes in terms of a “Being-with-others-in-the-world” is not predicated upon racial, national or political lines of difference. It is necessarily stripped of the inevitable variousness of these ontical categories, and it is this ‘stripping’ which necessarily legitimizes its claim to being universally applicable as ontology. The important point is that, the Other in Heidegger is, as a result of this ontical ‘stripping’, just as likely to be the brother, the captain or the district officer as it is to be ‘the native’, ‘the black’ or ‘the Hindu’.

As such, it could be argued that Heidegger’s existential-ontological analytic of Dasein constitutes an attempt to evade, ‘explain away’, or suppress the social, racial and political differences and dynamics of colonial society, and condemned by postcolonial theorists as a neo-colonial strategy. In response to this potential criticism, I must again return to the fact that this type of complaint is itself founded upon a misguided ontologisation of ontical differences and,

more significantly, exhibits a fundamental failure to relinquish the misguided belief in their theoretical ontologisability.

It should therefore be made clear, that my adoption of Heidegger's analytic of Dasein as an authentic ontology with which to assess the fictional subject in the works of Rudyard Kipling, H. Rider Haggard, A.E.W. Mason and Joseph Conrad, is not to be compared to, or taken as an attempt to replace, the various theoretical models of colonial subjectivity that are posited in colonial discourse analysis. In turning to Heidegger, I am rejecting the implicit ontologisation of the ontical, and the "technological" conceit, upon which these models, and the project which makes them possible, are based. Instead, in using Heidegger's description of the fundamental ontological modes of "Being-in-the-world" ("Being in time", "Being towards death" and "Being-anxious-in-the-face-of-death") to examine characters in a number of works of colonial fiction, I will argue that these characters, when understood in terms of an ontologically constituted plane of correspondence, can provide us with important insights into, and alternative ways of thinking about, the nature of the colonial experience. Insights and ways of thinking which are simply ignored or distorted (and in some cases, prohibited) by colonial discourse analysis' interpretation of these characters, and their historical equivalents, in terms of a discursively constituted plane of correspondence, as homogenised, un-worlded and de-humanised 'discursive subjects'.

That said, this Heideggarian interpretation of colonial fiction is not being advanced as the only legitimate, or indeed, comprehensive, critical interpretation of this material – far from it. The ontological criterion of my investigation means that, I will on occasions, and on the one hand, necessarily overlook the ontical specificity of individual works, and on the other, necessarily focus upon certain themes, characters and incidents over others.

What this study is being advanced as, is an examination of the various ways in which those fundamental modes of Dasein's "Being-in-the-world" which constitute Dasein as an individual human being in the world (that is, individualised, worlded and human) are reflected in colonial literature. And reflected in such a way as to raise serious questions about colonial discourse analysis' homogenising, un-worlding and de-humanising understanding and interpretation of the historical coloniser in relation to this literature. Furthermore, it is advanced as an examination of the fact that it is only when we choose to approach the coloniser as an individual human being in the world that we can begin to make sense of an important phenomenon like 'colonial heroism'. And this is not 'colonial heroism' as the unified and coherent object of postcolonial cultural studies, with its discursively constituted heroes, writers and general public but, as the fundamentally complex, contradictory and ambivalent phenomenon that it is, when the hero, the
writer and general public are fundamentally recognised and understood as the beings that they themselves are.
CHAPTER I: Colonial Discourse

Writing nearly ten years before the publication of *Orientalism*, Roland Barthes argued that the goal of structuralist theory is to “reconstruct an object in such a way as to manifest the rules of its functioning”:

> [S]tructure is therefore a simulacrum of the object, but a direct interested simulacrum... the simulacrum is intellect added to object, and this addition has an anthropological value, in that it is man himself, his history, his situation, his freedom, and the very resistance which nature offers to his mind.¹

And despite the inevitable fact that colonial discourse analysis is not in any simplistic or easily generalisable sense wholly dependent upon conventional structuralist or, for that matter, poststructuralist theory and practise,² this brief description of the structuralist’s activity nonetheless provides us with some important preliminary points of orientation with regard to the characterisation and examination of colonial discourse analysis as “Enframing” conducted in this chapter. In particular, I will focus upon the position of the critic him/herself and the nature of the relationship which exists between the critic and the object of scrutiny during the ‘reconstruction’ of “the rules of its functioning”. For in suggesting that the product of this ‘reconstruction’, the “simulacrum”, is “ intellect added to object”, Barthes effectively acknowledges the fundamental presence of the critic’s ‘interest’ in the constitution of the simulacrum itself. The critic, as ‘reconstructor’, is thus in the position of reorganizing and restructuring the object so that “the rules of its functioning” become “manifest”.

So what does this ‘reconstruction’ involve? And how are these “rules” to be established? As Richard Kearney has observed, Barthes employs

> ...the techniques of structural decoding in order to “read” contemporary culture as an interlocking play of signifying systems which determine the dominant myths and metaphors of the social order.³


² See, for example, Annamaria Carusi on the complex questions surrounding the influence of Lacan, Kristeva, Derrida and Deleuze in postcolonial thinking, ‘Post, Post and Post’, in *Past the Last Post*, p. 103. See also, Young with regards to Said’s ultimate rejection of Foucault on the basis that his works could offer no grounds for resistance (*White Mythologies*, pp. 134-136).

Thus, for Barthes, the "rules" in question, and the 'reconstruction' through which they become "manifest", are grounded in an understanding of culture as a complex of "signifying systems", where the fundamental suppositions are:

(1) that every object in our world is a sign, (2) that every sign is linguistic or trans-linguistic to the extent that its signification always involves its structural relation to other signs and (3) that this relation is determined by the hidden codes of a language system.\(^4\)

Barthes' famous analysis of the cover of *Paris Match*, which shows a black soldier saluting the French flag is, of course, especially interesting in this regard. For in his identification of first and second order significations -- the image itself and the concept of French Colonialism -- Barthes can be seen to have provided an important precursor to modern postcolonial analyses of the 'colonised subject'.\(^5\)

So, if the "techniques of structural de-coding" have been employed by colonial discourse analysis in its reading of 'the colonising subject', what are the "rules" which are made manifest in this reading? And what is the nature of the simulacrum that results? I would argue that in the course of such a reading, 'the colonising subject' is necessarily homogenised, un-worlded and dehumanised. And following on from Barthes' influential characterisation of the 'structuralist activity' as the attempt to make manifest the "rules" of the object's "functioning", I would, also maintain that we must seek to understand this homogenising, un-worlding and de-humanising in terms of colonial discourse analysis' drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality.

1. The Drive Towards Discursive Functionality and Colonial Discourse Analysis as "Enframing"

The fundamental assumption at the heart of the explication of 'the colonising subject' in colonial discourse analysis is the functionality of that 'subject' in colonialism and colonial discourse.

This is not to say, however, that this functionality is confined to 'the colonising subject'; the same hermeneutic can also be seen to underpin postcolonial analyses of geography\(^6\) and law.\(^7\)

\(^4\) ibid., p. 320.


\(^6\) See, for example, Graham Huggan's 'Decolonizing the Map' in *Past the Last Post*, pp. 125-138; and, Elizabeth Ferrier's 'Mapping the Space of the Other: Transformations of Space in Postcolonial Fiction and Postmodern Theory', Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Queensland, 1990.

\(^7\) See, for example, Parama Roy's examination of British legislation in the suppression of Thuggee in India, 'Discovering India, Imagining Thuggee' in *Indian Traffic*.
In each and every case, the ‘colonising subject’ included, those conceptual configurations and ideological components, traces, principles and practises that are held to be symptomatic of, or synonymous with, colonial discourse are sought out and elaborated upon. So what is it that all these so eagerly sought out factors, traces and components actually prove? And what is the nature of this discourse in which they are understood to function? If the answers to these important questions are to be found at all, then they are to be found in Edward Said’s foundational 1978 definition of Orientalism:

Orientalism is not a mere political subject matter or field that is reflected passively by culture, scholarship, or institutions; nor is it a large and diffuse collection of texts about the Orient; nor is it representative and expressive of some nefarious “Western” imperialist plot to hold down the Oriental world. It is rather a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an elaboration not only of basic geographical distinction...but also of a whole series of “interests” which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains; it is, rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world; it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power, shaped to a degree by the exchange with power political (as with a colonial or imperial establishment), power intellectual (as with reigning sciences like comparative linguistics and or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), power moral (as with ideas about what “we” do and what “they” cannot do or understand as “we” do). Indeed, my real argument is that Orientalism is – and does not

See, for example, Sandhya Shetty’s ‘(Dis)Locating Gender Space and Medical Discourse in Colonial India’, Genders 20 (1994), pp. 188-230; David Arnold’s Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Zahoor Baber’s, The Science of Empire: Scientific Knowledge, Civilization, and Colonial Rule in India (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996); and, more recently, Alan Bewell’s examination of the ways in which British culture, and the Romantic poets in particular, responded to colonial disease, Romanticism and Colonial Disease (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).


See, for example, David Spurr’s The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing and Imperial Administration (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993).


simply represent—a considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and as such has less to do with the Orient than it does with “our” world. I think it can be shown that what is thought, said, or even done about the Orient follows (perhaps occurs within) certain distinct and intellectually knowable lines.\(^{13}\)

In this dizzying and complex series of assertions and qualifications, Said famously attempts to fuse Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony with Michel Foucault’s thesis of discourse and power and his conception of “Archaeology” as “discourses as practises specified in the element of the archive.”\(^{14}\) And despite subsequent retractions, additions and developments, for example, the increased emphasis upon ambiguity and contradiction,\(^ {15}\) this definition has been adopted, and continues to serve, as the basic working model for Orientalist (and colonial) discourse in postcolonial studies.\(^ {16}\)

But where is ‘the colonising subject’ in all this? If we accept Said’s claim that Orientalism “is, rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world”, then ‘the colonising subject’ could perhaps be seen as a ‘certain’ embodiment of that “certain will or intention”. If so, this is only half the picture. Said’s insistence that this “will and intention” is “produced” by and “exists” in the “uneven exchange” with “power political,” “power intellectual,” “power cultural” and “power moral” in Oriental (and colonial) discourse, means that the possible role, conceptual scope and functional significance of ‘the colonising subject’ in that discourse is comprehensively inflated and extended. ‘The colonising subject’ is thus not simply the representation or simulacrum of postcolonial theory, but is instead the creator and product, conduit, agent and proliferator of a certain type of power (“will and intention”); a power that is understood to constitute, and operate upon, a series of diverse but interrelated conceptual and material planes which are all viewed together under the all-encompassing aegis of Orientalism (and colonialism). In short, all these various political, intellectual, cultural and moral planes upon which ‘the colonising subject’ is held to exist are conceived of, and structured, in terms of an explicitly prioritised Orientalist (and colonial) meaningfulness.

\(^{13}\) Orientalism, pp. 12-13.
\(^{15}\) See, in particular, Homi K. Bhabha, ‘Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse’ in The Location of Culture, pp. 85-92.
\(^{16}\) As Robert Young says, “Said’s major theoretical achievement, [is] the creation of an object of analysis called ‘colonial discourse’” (White Mythologies, p. 173). Among the many alternative variations, see, for example Peter Hulme’s description of colonial discourse as “an ensemble of linguistically based practises unified by their common deployment in the management of colonial relationships”. Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean: 1492-1797 (London: Methuen, 1986), p. 2.
At the most basic level, ‘the colonising subject’ is necessarily read as the straightforward mouthpiece of colonial ideology; the articulator of what Homi Bhabha has called the “treacherous stereotypes of primitivism and degeneracy”,\(^{17}\) and as a result, is complicit in all the odious cultural and psychological affects of this articulation. Yet because ‘the colonising subject’ is simultaneously held to be the embodiment of the colonial stereotype of racial and national superiority, it is seen as the site of colonialism’s necessarily negative articulation of its colonised other, as in Bhabha’s assertion that

\[
\text{The objective of colonial discourse is to construe the colonised as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of administration and instruction...}^{18}\]

and its necessarily positive articulation of its colonising self. We can summarise the more precise nature of this double articulation as follows: firstly, colonialism’s positive articulation of itself, which is predicated upon, reflects and affirms (what it considers to be) the inherent superiority of ‘white’, ‘male’, ‘Christian’, ‘rational’, ‘civilised’ and ‘metropolitan’ Europe as the ‘centre’. Secondly, the negative articulation of its “other”, which is primarily predicated upon, reflects and affirms (what colonialism considers to be) the inherent inferiority of ‘black’ (‘non-white’), ‘female’, ‘heathen’, ‘irrational’ and ‘savage’ colonies as the ‘margin’. This set of binary oppositions is, for Abdul JanMohamed:

\[
\text{[T]he central feature of the colonialist cognitive framework and colonialist literary representation: the manichean allegory – a field of diverse yet inter-changeable oppositions between white and black, good and evil, superiority and inferiority, civilisation and savagery, intelligence and emotion, rationality and sensuality, self and Other, subject and object.}^{19}\]

In the colonial text, as colonial discourse, evidence of these archetypal articulations are sought in, among other things, the imperial rhetoric of the book’s characters and plot, the author’s

---


18 Bhabha, ‘The Other Question: Stereotype, discrimination and the discourse of colonialism’, in *The Location of Culture*, p. 70.

19 JanMohamed, ‘The Economy of Manichean Allegory’ in “Race”, *Writing And Difference*, p. 82. See also, Ranajit Guha’s neatly categorised assertion regarding the fundamental dualism underpinning colonial articulations of difference: “Politically that difference was spelt out as one between rulers and ruled; ethnically between a white Herrenvolk and blacks; materially between a prosperous Western power and its poor Asian subjects; culturally between higher and lower levels of civilization, between the superior religion of Christianity and indigenous belief systems made up of superstition and barbarism – all adding up to an irreconcilable difference between colonizer and colonized”. ‘Dominance without Hegemony and Its Historiography’, *Subaltern Studies* 6 (1989), pp. 210-309, pp. 211-12, quoted by Parry in *Delusions and Discoveries*, p. 6.
stereotypical representations and even the choice of narrative form. In the case of the latter, Said, once again, is a useful case in point:

Without empire, I would go so far as saying, there is no European novel as we know it, and indeed if we study the impulses giving rise to it, we shall see the far from accidental convergence between the patterns of narrative authority constitutive of the novel on the one hand, and, on the other, a complex ideological configuration underlying the tendency to imperialise.

The discursive functionality of 'the colonising subject' can thus, at one level, be seen to reside in the extent to which that 'subject' (as author, reader and fictional or historical character) can be perceived or shown to reflect, verify or maintain the fundamental binary formations of colonialism itself.

The most important theoretical model utilised by colonial discourse analysis in its examination of this double articulation is Lacan's psychoanalytical conception of the necessarily 'split' subject. Taking their lead from Fanon, contemporary postcolonial theorists like Homi Bhabha, Gail Ching-Liang Low and Rey Chow, among others, have adopted Lacan's description of the formation of the ideal ('specular') ego in the earliest stages of the child's development during the "mirror phase" and have tailored it to explain the psychic economy of 'the colonising' and 'the colonised subject' in the colonial encounter and colonial discourse.

Lacan asserts that the child's construction of an idealised "imago" is a response to its own lack of, and passionate desire for, the perceived coherence and stability of the other. The incoherent and unstable symbolising ego of the child's unconscious is thus, Lacan argues, suppressed and denied in the child's fixation with the idealised "imago" of the other, that which it imagines to be its self. Lacanian analysis is thus aimed at dissolving the contradictory nature of this fixation and revealing to the subject that the truth of desire lies in the inter-subjective space between self and other.

---

20 Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 82. See also, Firdous Azim's The Colonial Rise of the Novel (London: Routledge, 1993) in which she examines the ways in which the novel excludes women and people of colour; and Simon Gikandi's, Maps of Englishness: Writing Identity in the Culture of Colonialism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) which assesses the ways in which colonialism engendered narrative forms (for example, those employed by Trollope and Conrad) that changed the nature of Englishness.

21 See, for example, Gail Ching-Liang Low, White Skins/Black Masks: Representations and Colonialism (London: Routledge, 1996).

22 See, for example, Rey Chow, "Where Have All the Natives Gone?", from Angelika Hamer (ed.), Displacements: Cultural Identities in Question (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994) pp. 125-51, in Contemporary Postcolonial Theory: A Reader, pp. 122-146.

23 See, Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: Hogarth Press, 1977), Chapter 8. Homi Bhabha adapts this formulation to the colonial environment when he maintains, in his 'Foreword' to Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks, that "It is always
In colonial discourse analysis, the influence of Lacan manifests itself most forcefully in the investigation and elaboration of the archetypal structures and mechanisms of 'the colonial unconscious' which are to be found in the metonymic and metaphoric rhetorical tropes of signification in that which is posited as 'the colonial consciousness'. The 'transindividual', and symbolic, unconscious language of the Id, which Lacan identifies with the Saussurean *langue*, is thus given priority over the conscious language of the individual Ego, which Lacan identifies with the Saussurean *parole*. And because meaning in Lacanian psychoanalysis is to be found less in *what* is actually said than in the *way* in which it is said, and most importantly, not said, postcolonial theorists have subsequently striven to uncover and extrapolate what they see as the 'diacritical', 'elusive' and 'elliptical' linguistic structures of colonial meaning which permeate Western culture.

In assuming the role of Saussurean de-coder, Foucauldian archaeologist or Lacanian analyst, the hypothetical 'postcolonial literary critic' thus interrogates the signifiers of 'the colonial text' and interprets them in terms of their peculiar function within that which the critic claims is an infinitely extending system of inter-related signifiers. But then again, it is important to realise that in postcolonial structuralist theory and discourse analysis this infinitely extending system of signifiers is not infinitely extending at all. It is, in contrast, ordered and restricted by an explicitly prioritised coloniality. Furthermore, this peculiarly ordered system of colonially-restricted signifiers is entirely, and therefore unusually transparent to the de-coding eye of colonial discourse analysis; and, at least part of the explanation as to why this is the case is to be found in Said's concluding assertion, from the extract quoted above, that

...what is thought, said, or even done about the Orient follows (perhaps occurs within) certain distinct and intellectually knowable lines.

Here Said gives voice to his conviction that these things (as signifiers), and the "rules of their functioning", are genuinely transparent and that they can be brought to light within a coherent field of research and meaning. In a similar way, Gayatri Spivak's later insistence that it is

in relation to the place of the Other that colonial desire is articulated" (p. xv). For a more elaborate synopsis of the ways in which Lacan has influenced postcolonial (and post-colonial) thinking, see Peter Childs and Patrick Williams, *An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1997), pp. 130-133.

See, for example, Richard Terdiman's insistence that, "The representations of relationships between East and West constantly take the figurai form of such metonymies. And indeed this metonymic operation inscribes within itself the full meaning which the Orient bears for orientalizing Europe: the womb, the origin". *Discourse/Counter-Discourse: The Theory and Practice of Symbolic Resistance in Nineteenth-Century France* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 237-238.
possible to “track the mechanics of the construction of the self-consolidating other,”²⁵ bears important witness to the fact that this positivism is alive and well in colonial discourse analysis’ assessments of human subjectivity. And it is precisely this mode of quasi-scientific positivism which can be seen to underpin the psychoanalytical ‘mapping’ of colonial subjectivities that I will examine in more detail at a later stage.

However, what I would emphasise here is the way in which the theoretical representation of a “knowable” Oriental and colonial reality, history and culture within the quasi-scientific framework that is colonial discourse, and the quasi-scientific conceit that is colonial discourse analysis, together affect to make sense of the relationships that exist between ‘the East’ and ‘the West’, between ‘the coloniser’ and ‘the colonised’, the ‘black’ and the ‘white’. And as such, it is this drive towards ‘making sense’ which can be seen to replicate the quasi-scientific conceits of colonial “knowledge” which have been discussed at length in postcolonial theory in relation to the exercise of colonial power:

[Knowledge of subject races or Orientals is what makes their management easy and profitable; knowledge gives power, more power requires more knowledge, and so on in an increasingly profitable dialectic of information and control.²⁶

From the pseudo-sociological project of Katherine Mayo’s Mother India²⁷ to the gathering of census information²⁸ and the recovery, preservation and exhibition of indigenous artefacts,²⁹ from William Jones’s researches into, and translations of, Sanskrit texts³⁰ to the mapping of

²⁶ Orientalism, p. 36. See also his assertion, quoted earlier, that Orientalism is, “knowledge of the Orient that places things Oriental in class, court, prison, or manual for scrutiny, study, judgement, discipline, or governing” (Orientalism, p. 41).
²⁷ See, for example, her ‘Psychological Glimpses through the Economic Lens’ in which she discusses the “depressed status” of “the Indian” and his conception of the “economic drains” upon his country under British rule. Mother India, 8th Edition (London: Jonathan Cape, 1936), pp. 285-298.
³⁰ See, for example, Jones’s Institutes of Hindu Law or, the Ordinances of Man, according to the Gloss of Culluca. Comprising the Indian System of Duties, Religious and Civil (Calcutta: 1794).
colonial possessions and the classification of racial diversity, colonial power is, it is argued, reliant upon and synonymous with ‘colonial knowledge’.

That which defines the thinking of both conceits is the inability to renounce the belief that, in the words of Martin Heidegger:

[N]ature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and that it remains orderable as a system of information.

It is this inability to renounce a belief in the orderability and transparency of colonial reality which is, more especially, exhibited in the plethora of mechanistic explanatory systems, models and epistemologies which have characterised that which the black feminist critic Barbara Christian has called “the race for theory” in postcolonial theory and literary criticism over the last two decades. Indeed, such is the fortitude of this ‘inability’ that even the recent postmodernist and deconstructivist emphasis upon, and fetishization of, the inherent ambiguity and slippage of meaning and language has done little to change the fundamental conviction that the structures and dynamics of Oriental, Western and colonial discourse are essentially “knowable”: it merely changes the nature of that which is “known”. What this means is that

31 A good example of which is Robert Brown’s The Races of Mankind: Being a popular description of the characteristics, manners and customs of the principal varieties of the human family (1873-79), which includes the frequently cited, 'Tschudi table of Peruvian Mongrelity illustrating the mongrel character of the Spanish American population of Peru', wherein Brown contends that the official race of the children born of a “negro” father and a “chino” mother, for example, is “zambo-chino”. Quoted by Sara Mills in Discourse (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 57. Among the many other possible examples, see Robert Knox’s The Races of Men: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Influence of Race Over the Destinies of Nations, 2nd ed. (London: Henry Renshaw, 1862).


34 Christian summarises some of the problematic ramifications of these developments as follows: “The race for theory, with its linguistic jargon, its emphasis on quoting its prophets, its tendency towards “Biblical” exegesis, its refusal even to mention specific works of creative writers, far less contemporary ones, its preoccupations with mechanical analyses of language, graphs, algebraic equations, its gross generalizations about culture, has silenced many of us to the extent that some of us feel we can no longer discuss our own literature, while others have developed intense writing blocks and are puzzled by the incomprehensibility of the language set adrift in literary circles.” ‘The Race for Theory’ from Cultural Critique 6 (1987), pp. 51-63, in The Post-Colonial Studies Reader, pp. 457-464, p. 458.


36 Far from undermining the foundations, coherence and legitimacy of colonial discourse as a theoretical field, the contemporary postcolonial pre-occupation with reading all things as necessarily hybrid and multivalent – whether it be in terms of, for example, Derridean slippage or Bakhtinian carnival – has, instead, resulted in a redefinition of colonial discourse as being, itself, characteristically various, unstable and contradictory, but nonetheless still fundamentally “knowable” and capable of (to paraphrase Said)
the fictional and historical coloniser may well be recognised by contemporary postcolonial theorists, like Bhabha, as being fundamentally contradictory and fractured, especially in psychoanalytical terms; but the coloniser is, paradoxically, no less "knowable" or transparent as a result. It is, instead, simply accommodated within existing discursive structures and homogenised as being contradictory and fractured.®

This accommodation and systemisation of the elusive and the ambiguous in colonial discourse analysis is grounded in the nature of the relationship which pertains between the analyst and the subject matter -- not the subject matter itself. In other words, the way in which that subject matter is approached and subsequently represented, 'reconstructed', 'read' or 'decoded', is, to a very great extent, dictated by the inability to renounce the belief in its orderability. And as a result, the representation of that subject matter as colonial discourse, however ambivalent or contradictory, can be seen to constitute what Heidegger calls, the representation of the world as "picture":

What belongs properly to the essence of the picture is standing-together, system. By this is not meant the artificial and external simplifying and putting together of what is given, but the unity of structure in that which is represented [in Vorgestellen] as such, a unity that develops out of the projection of the objectivity of whatever is...Where the world becomes picture, the system, and not only in thinking, comes to dominance."®

The "unity of structure" in colonial discourse analysis is that colonial meaningfulness toward which everything is invariably directed and in terms of which everything is invariably held to have significance. In other words, the "projection of the objectivity of whatever is" in the concept of colonial discourse is entirely constituted by a preconceived and structured...
coloniality. This coloniality can thus be seen to constitute, what Heidegger calls, the “ground plan of the objective-sphere”.39

But if the concept of colonial discourse constitutes the representation of colonial ‘reality’ as “picture”, the practise of colonial discourse analysis can be seen to conform to that mode of thought that Heidegger, in “The Question Concerning Technology”, calls “Enframing” (Ge-stell):

Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve [Bestand]. The word expresses here something more, and something more essential, than mere “stock.” The name “standing-reserve” assumes the rank of an inclusive rubric. It designates nothing less than the way in which everything presences that is wrought upon by the challenging revealing. Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as object.40

From Said’s ‘latent’ and ‘manifest’ Orientalism to JanMohamed’s Manichean ‘Allegory’ and Homi Bhabha’s theory of ‘mimicry’, in colonial discourse analysis colonial reality is ordered to “stand by” (as “knowable”) and rendered “orderable as a system of information”. And for Heidegger, this ordering of information – which is characterised by a “challenging revealing” (or a “challenging-forth”) as a “setting-upon” – subsequently transforms everything into the “standing-reserve”; that is, it constitutes everything that it orders in terms of its orderability within the system.

However, we cannot fully understand the nature of this process and the problems inherent in it until we have grasped what Heidegger means when he says that “technology” is predicated upon, or indeed, constitutes, a “challenging (herausfordern) revealing”. William Lovitt in the Translator’s Introduction to The Question Concerning Technology succinctly explains that, for Heidegger:

Being may perhaps best be said to be the ongoing manner in which everything that is, presences; i.e., it is the manner in which, in the lastingness of time, everything encounters man and comes to appearance through the openness that man provides.41

39 ibid., p. 121.
40 Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, p.17. As Lovitt usefully points out in a footnote, “Stellen embraces the meanings of a whole family of verbs: bestellen (to order, command; to set in order), vorstellen (to represent), sichernstellen (to secure), nachstellen (to entrap), verstellen (to block or disguise), herstellen (to produce, to set here), darstellen (to produce or exhibit), and so on. In these verbs the various nuances within stellen are reinforced and made specific. All these meanings are gathered together in Heidegger’s unique use of the word that is pivotal for him, Ge-stell (Enframing)” (p.15n).
This definition of Being constitutes the central philosophical concern in Heidegger’s thinking; for it is the phenomenological study of “presence” (Anwesenheit) as the disclosedness or unconcealment of alétheia which characterises, shapes and informs Heidegger’s thought from the meaning of Dasein’s Being in Being and Time, through the “turning” (Kehre) in the 1930’s and on into his later, more poetically inclined, work on the meaning of Being after the war. The “challenging revealing” which Heidegger describes in ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ can thus be understood as a fundamental distortion of that original “presencing” (anwesen). And it is this distortion (as “Enframing”) which constitutes the essence of the “technological consciousness” that dominates our thinking in the modern age. This is not to say that Heidegger is a modern-day William Blake railing against technological progress; at no point in his lecture does he condemn the need for, or the fruits of, scientific research. No, what Heidegger is primarily concerned with here is a bringing to light of the fundamental way in which

The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.

Following this concern of Heidegger’s, I am proposing that colonial discourse analysis’ “Enframing” of the coloniser as ‘the colonising subject’ in colonial discourse denies the possibility of “a more original revealing” of that coloniser. The possibility of an entry into “a more original revealing” which will form the ever-present logic behind the examination of fictional colonisers in colonial literature conducted in the following chapters.

That said, it is necessary to establish the more precise nature of colonial discourse analysis’ “Enframing” of ‘the colonising subject’. For it is only when we have fully understood the fundamentally homogenising, un-worlding and de-humanising character of that “Enframing”, in its drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality, that we will be able to grasp the appropriate criterion for an alternative approach.

---

As David Farrell Krell has pointed out, “Heidegger’s thought circles about a double theme: the meaning of Being and the proprietary event (Ereignis) of disclosure. Sein and alétheia remain the key words, Sein meaning coming to presence, and alétheia the disclosedness or unconcealment implied in such presence”.


ibid., p. 28.
2. The “Enframing” of ‘the colonising subject’

(a) Homogenisation

In the first chapter of *Orientalism*, Said describes what he sees as “the main intellectual issue raised by Orientalism”:

> Can one divide human reality, as indeed human reality seems to be genuinely divided, into clearly different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races, and survive the consequences humanely?\(^{45}\)

This “intellectual issue” is not, however, only raised by or confined to Orientalism. It is, I would argue, perhaps the single most important question which must be asked of colonial discourse analysis and cultural studies as a whole, and even then, it is less to do with whether or not one “can” make these distinctions or “survive the consequences humanely”; it is to do with the theoretical and intellectual validity of these divisions themselves and the results of the analysis which is predicated upon them. So, while Said pays lip service to the problems which attend the polarisation of the distinction which accompanies the use of categories like ‘the Oriental’ and ‘the Western’ as “both the starting and the end points of analysis, research, public policy,”\(^{46}\) he never seriously addresses the important role and the worrying consequences of these distinctions in his own work. In fact, as we have already seen, in maintaining that “every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric”\(^{47}\), Said replicates that same mode of homogenisation of which he is so rigorously critical in his review of Oriental discourse; that mode of colonial homogenisation which Albert Memmi called the “mark of the plural”, wherein:

> The colonised is never characterized in an individual manner; he is entitled only to drown in an anonymous collectivity (“They are this”; “They are all the same”).\(^{48}\)

Nor is this an isolated instance, or even an early oversight in Said’s thinking, for fifteen years later, in *Culture and Imperialism*, he is still adopting these divisions and, what is more, issuing broad-gauged judgements about them. For example, when discussing the Indian Mutiny/Rebellion of 1857, Said maintains that

\(^{45}\) *Orientalism*, pp. 45-46.

\(^{46}\) Ibid.

\(^{47}\) *Orientalism*, p. 203 (my emphasis).

...to be an Indian would have meant to feel natural solidarity with the victims of British reprisal. To be British meant to feel repugnance and injury – to say nothing of righteous vindication.\textsuperscript{49}

What does Said mean when he says "to be an Indian" or "to be British"? Leaving aside the significant specification of an individual "Indian" and a collective "British", in what realm of significance does Said understand this assertion to have meaning? Is it a description of historical reality? A serious socio-psychological, or even ontological, diagnosis? And if so, what is the basis of this description, of this diagnosis? In short, who is Said talking about?

Finding an answer to this last, and possibly most important, question becomes increasingly more difficult when we recognise that the two quantities which Said employs here can only be viewed as unproblematically coherent if we deliberately choose to ignore the obvious fact that each of them (the "British" and the "Indian") are profoundly heterogeneous and incontestably diverse. But, this is precisely what Said and a great many postcolonial critics and theorists actually do. In other words, their adoption of the homogenous classifications of cultural analysis automatically and unavoidably constitutes an elision of the fundamental heterogeneity of the subject matter. So, despite Said’s claim in his 1995 ‘Afterword’, that \textit{Orientalism}

...is explicitly anti-essentialist, radically sceptical about all categorical definitions such as the Orient and Occident, and painstakingly careful about not “defending” or even discussing the Orient or Islam...\textsuperscript{50}

in constructing his argument, he nonetheless makes consistent and explicit use of a whole range of essentialist references to the ‘Occident’ and the ‘West’. For example, he insists that Orientalism is “a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient".\textsuperscript{51} But, what is a “Western style” if not an essentialist construct? What are we to make of his claim that spatial abstractions put

...the Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand?\textsuperscript{52}

How else are we to understand the assertion that, “the imaginative examination of things Oriental was based more or less exclusively upon a sovereign Western consciousness”\textsuperscript{53}

Indeed, this last formulation is particularly interesting and ironic given Said’s righteous indignation, in a later essay, ‘Ideology and Difference’, at

\textsuperscript{49} Said, \textit{Culture and Imperialism}, p. 178 (my emphasis).
\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Orientalism}, p. 321.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., p. 3. (my emphasis)
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p. 7 (my emphasis).
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., p. 8 (my emphasis).
...such supposedly real and stable objects as the Arab mind, the Arab temperament, and Arab cultural weakness.\textsuperscript{34}

This essentialising constitutes the classification and ordering of the colonial world: and as a result, this colonial world, divided along the lines of ‘East’ and ‘West’, ‘European’ and ‘Oriental’, coloniser and colonised, becomes that which Heidegger called “the structured image” (\textit{GeBild}):

...the structured image that is the creature of man’s producing which represents and sets before.\textsuperscript{35}

What this means is that the world, as “structured image”, is peopled with conveniently categorised agents who are themselves ‘structured images’ and who are interpreted as such in colonial discourse analysis. To put it another way, and following Heidegger’s discussion of Plato’s famous cave metaphor, this mode of “producing” in colonial discourse analysis can be understood more simply as the observance of the shadows upon the wall.\textsuperscript{36}

Moreover, this interpretation of ‘the colonial subject’ sets out to, as Barthes says, “manifest the rules of its functioning”. In the process, the considerable difficulties which arise in the wake of Said’s well-intentioned question regarding whether or not reality can be split into “clearly different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races”, are discreetly and necessarily overlooked. As we have already seen, they are overlooked by Said himself when he issues his absolutist declarations upon what it means to “be an Indian” or to “be British”; but they are also overlooked by Sara Suleri when she asks, “To what extent is the \textit{British woman} implicated in the structures of colonialism [?]”;\textsuperscript{57} and by Abdul JanMohamed when he describes how “the European writer commodifies the native by negating his individuality”.\textsuperscript{58} In fact, they are overlooked every time a critic, commentator, theorist or analyst makes use of these terms in their interpretation of colonial reality, history and culture.

The obvious question which now presents itself is: to what do all these various homogenisations actually amount? What is actually being said when Said, Suleri, JanMohamed, or anyone else, offers us their authoritative theoretical synopses upon ‘the European’, ‘the white man’ and ‘the...

\textsuperscript{34} Said, ‘Ideology and Difference’ in \textit{“Race”, Writing and Difference}, pp. 43-44.
\textsuperscript{35} Heidegger, ‘The Age of the World Picture’, p. 135.
\textsuperscript{57} Suleri, \textit{The Rhetoric of English India}, p. 76 (my emphasis).
\textsuperscript{58} JanMohamed, ‘The Economy of Manichean Allegory’ in \textit{“Race”, Writing And Difference}, p. 83 (my emphasis).
coloniser'? Are they pretending to describe every "British woman" and every "European writer"? Certainly Said is apparently content to make such a claim and this is why Aijaz Ahmad, in *In Theory*, is right to describe Said's conception of Orientalism as "something of an original ontological flaw in the European psyche". By suggesting that "every European" was/is imperialist, racist and ethnocentric, Said is arguing that "Europeans" are ontologically constituted as imperialists, racists and ethnocentrics in their *being* "European". This, once again, is exactly what he criticises Orientalism for doing in its depiction of "Orientals as a phenomenon possessing regular characteristics," wherein a national, racial or political grouping is collectively held to exhibit a set of universally applicable character traits. In both cases, the ontical characteristics of beings are confused with the ontological character of Being; or more accurately, the ontical, and therefore various, categories of race and nation are posited within the context of a pseudo-ontological (and therefore pseudo-universal) scope and significance.

The fundamental problem with this ontologisation of the ontical is that it can be seen to constitute the artificial (and distorting) assemblage of human heterogeneity within artificially ontologised categories. And this 'assembling' is also an important characteristic of the "structured image", or *GeBild* (which "represents and sets before"). The prefix *Ge-*, in the words *GeBild*, *Ge-stell* ("Enframing") and *Gestellt* ("Set in place") expresses a 'gathering' or a bringing together into system. And this is precisely what is involved in colonial discourse analysis' employment of 'the colonising subject' and, for that matter, 'the colonised subject'. In its ontologisation of the ontical category of colonial status, colonial discourse analysis 'gathers' each and every 'European', every 'white' and every 'Westerner' (as the "standing-reserve") into the theoretical system of colonial (Oriental and Western) discourse, as well as all the various models which affect to capture the psychic economy of 'the colonising' and 'the colonised' subject. And, of course, the theoretical purpose that this homogenisation as 'gathering' serves


60 *Orientalism*, p. 42.


62 As Lovitt explains, "Enframing is fundamentally a calling-forth. It is a "challenging claim," a demanding summons, that "gathers" so as to reveal. This claim *enframes* in that it assembles and orders. It puts into a framework or configuration everything that it summons forth, through an ordering for use that is forever restructuring anew" ("The Question Concerning Technology", p. 19n).

63 In addition, I would argue that this 'gathering' into system is also in evidence in the absolutist claims of critics like Patrick Brantlinger that "Imperialism, understood as an evolving but pervasive set of attitudes and ideas toward the rest of the world, influenced all aspects of Victorian and Edwardian culture", *Rule of Darkness*, p. 8 (my emphasis). To this we can add Said's inability to conceive of a Western text that is not inherently racist, imperialist or Orientalist: in fact, Denis Porter makes just this point in his essay,
is the self-perpetuation of a more easily organizable, and increasingly comprehensive, subject matter for the more important explication of colonialism at large.

But in conclusion, it is crucial for us to note that it is not just colonialists like Cromer or colonial theorists like Said whose understanding and interpretation of people exhibit this ‘gathering’: in *The Thousand Nights and One Night*, for example, we hear “the notorious truth” that when Allah distributed His gifts to men, “He planted qualities and defects in the soil which bred them”:

Thus the people of Cairo have wit and polish, the men of Upper Egypt great copulative force, the Arabs a love of poetry, the riders of the middle kingdom a steadfast courage, the dwellers in Irak civic genius, the wandering tribes a generous hospitality, the Syrians a low and greedy cunning together with a plentiful lack of any charm.

In *A Sentimental Journey*, Sterne’s Mr Yorrick contends, albeit ironically, that the French

...are a loyal, a gallant, a generous, an ingenious, and good tempered people as is under heaven – if they have a fault – they are too serious.

In *The Importance of Being Earnest*, Algernon Moncrieff famously insists that “All women become like their mothers” and F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Nick Carraway observes that

Americans, while willing, even eager, to be serfs, have always been obstinate about being peasantry.

And as such, it is one of the main objectives of this study to highlight the ways in which this type of understanding and interpretation is in no way confined to the exercises of colonial power, or any affiliated racial, sexual or class debate; it is, instead, a characteristic way in which Dasein understands and interprets itself and other people – from those of the opposite sex to those of a different class or profession, region or colour, they all become “the standing reserve”; they are all assumed or posited as being, in Said’s words, “almost everywhere nearly the same”.

'Orientalism and its Problems', when he says that, “Said does not seem to envisage the possibility that more directly counter-hegemonic writings or an alternative canon may exist within the Western tradition”, in Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: A Reader, p. 153. And finally, we can, of course recognise this ‘gathering’ into system as that which fundamentally underpins and is made manifest in the broad-gauged pronouncements of cultural theory on reader-response and public opinion.


With the coloniser always already homogenised as "the standing-reserve", colonial discourse analysis can proceed to elaborate upon the various ways in which it functions within the controlling, manipulating and incorporating project of colonial discourse. This explication of the discursive functionality of 'the colonising subject' is entirely determined by the "Enframing" character of colonial discourse as "an explicable and surveyable nexus of actions and consequences". More accurately:

Where Enframing holds sway, regulating and securing of the standing-reserve mark all revealing.

The 'regulation and securement' of the coloniser, as 'the colonising subject', can thus be seen to signify something like its theoretical management and manipulation in the process of its being "revealed".

So how is this 'regulation and securement' of 'the colonising subject' conducted in colonial discourse analysis? At the most basic level, this is achieved, or at least conducted, by way of the decoding practises of structural linguistics and, in particular, the theoretical translation of the coloniser as 'the colonial subject', his/her world, and everything in it, into an allegorical realm, or signifying system, of colonial meaningfulness. The colonial meaningfulness of an individual, a world or an object can, of course, be assumed by 'the postcolonial critic' as self-evident from the outset; but more commonly, it is reconstructed and secured through the employment of various theoretical models or methodologies. A good example of this is the (quasi-Freudian) Bakhtinian thesis of projection, wherein, for instance, "Victorians" are understood to have "displaced their repressed sexual desire and guilt for imperial domination onto the dark places of the earth":

---

69 Heidegger, 'The Question Concerning Technology', p. 27 (my emphasis).
70 A translation made explicit in Richard Terdiman's description of what he calls, "Flaubert's hoped-for-absorption in the Oriental referent" (Discourse/Counter-Discourse, p. 238, my emphasis).
71 See, for example, Simon Gikandi's assertion that, "External reality is populated, to use Bakhtin's words, with the speaker's intention". 'Narration in the Post-Colonial Moment: Merle Hodge's Crick Crack Monkey', in Past the Last Post, p. 17. See also, Graham Dawson's reading of Melanie Klein's theory that, "Through projection, the "ego", or self, invests in the social world (including other people) its own impulses and feelings that originate within the psyche. Through introjection it incorporates the social world" (Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, p. 32).
72 Brantlinger, Rule of Darkness, p. 205. See also, Bonita Parry's assertion regarding how "the repressed thoughts" of those "irreproachable matrons", Maud Diver, B.M. Croker, Alice Perrin, F.E. Penny and I.A.R. Wylie, "were brought to the surface by India and were projected onto Indians as proof of their depravity" (Delusions and Discoveries, p. 102).
This enforced recognition from the Other in fact amounts to the European's narcissistic
self-recognition since the native, who is considered too degraded and inhuman to be
credited with specific subjectivity, is cast as no more than a recipient of the negative
elements of the self that the European projects onto him.73

In either case, what is important is that the experiences of the coloniser, its encounters, the
world about it, and even the fundamental ways in which it engages with that world, are firmly
secured within colonially specific chains of meaning and significance. And it is this securement
which results in an artificial onticalisation of the ontological. In other words, ontological factors
like birth and death, time and space, as well as the fundamental nature of human perception, can
be represented in colonial discourse analysis as being determined by ontical factors like colonial
status, race and nationality. Sara Suleri, in The Rhetoric of English India, argues that:

\[\text{If the colonization of temporality is one of the several ill-effects caused by the acquisition of empire, and Kipling is perhaps the most clairvoyant narrator of the temporal derangements dictated by such an abnegation of temporality.}\]

It doesn’t stop there: from “colonial logic”, to “the colonial gaze”, “colonial fear”, to “colonial
astonishment”75, every conceivable emotion, perception and action is secured and discussed as a
colonially-determined signifier.76 As such, colonial discourse analysis, as “Enframing”, can
once again be seen to ‘gather’ and order its subject matter in such a way as to facilitate the
success of its own project; which for Suleri, is to explain the rhetoric of English India and to

---

74 Suleri, The Rhetoric of English India, p. 113 (my emphasis). Suleri defines this ‘imperial time’ as “less
a recognizable chronology of historic events than...a contiguous chain of surprise effects” (ibid). For
other examples of the onticalisation of Time in colonial discourse analysis, see Bhattacharjee, ‘Disenchantment:
Time, narrative and the margins of the modern nation’, in The Location of Culture, and ‘Sly Civility’, in the
same volume, p. 95, as well as Johannes Fabian, Time and The Other: How Anthropology Makes its
Object (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). Other examples of a more general onticalisation of the
ontical include, Ian Adam and Helen Tiffin’s assertion in the ‘Introduction’ to Past the Last Post, that
“an awareness of ‘referential slippage’ was inherent in the colonial being” (p. x, my emphasis); and
Ashcroft Griffiths and Tiffin’s argument that “Imperial conquest has always destroyed the land and often
regarded the human occupants as disposable...But the conquerors themselves...could not feel at home in
the place colonized. Out of this sense of displacement emerges the discourse of place which informs the
post-colonial condition”. The Empire Writes Back, p. 82 (my emphasis).
76 These examples are only the very tip of the impressive iceberg which is Suleri’s fixation with rendering
all things ‘colonial’: a brief selection of some of her more colourful formulations would include the
“colonial universe” (p. 3), “colonial trauma” (p. 5), the “colonizing mind” (p. 28), the “colonizing imagination” (p. 31), the “colonial spectator” (p. 39), “colonial will” (p. 70), “colonial incertitude” (p. 76),
“colonial apprehensions” (p. 85), “colonial arrival” (p. 87), “imperial calm” (p. 96), “the colonial
moment” (p. 111), “colonial loss” (p. 101), the “colonizing camera eye” (p. 110), the “colonial voice” (p. 117),
“colonial communication” (p. 123), “colonial desire” (p. 124), “the imperial epiphany” (p. 125),
“colonial information” (p. 130), “colonial friendship” (p. 132), “colonial disappointment” (p. 141), the
“colonial observer” (p. 143), the “imperial extraordinary” (p. 144) and “colonial travel” (p. 146).
"manifest the rules of its functioning". And when everything is constituted in terms of its coloniality, when everything is interpreted as synecdochical of that coloniality, everything which is, in Said's words, "thought, said, or even done" automatically becomes an archetypal colonial thought, speech or action. Moreover, it is this presumed or asserted, for lack of a better phrase, archetypicality, which facilitates the un-worlding of the coloniser as 'the colonising subject'; for where does this colonial gazing take place? Where is this "enforced recognition from the Other" actually situated?; where is it that the native is "always on the alert"?; the European "a close reasoner"?; or, for that matter, the Englishman, a lover of flowers, a stamp collector, pigeon fancier, amateur carpenter, coupon-sniper, darts player and crossword-puzzler? Where else, but in the "airless spaces of dead concepts and luxuriant abstractions".

But more importantly, if we return to the coloniser, over and above the fact that, as Heidegger says:

Any psychical Objectification of acts, and hence any way of taking them as something psychical, is tantamount to depersonalisation...

what is more worrying here, is that because these things are posited as archetypal articulations, they begin to take on the qualities of inherency and universality. The same inherency and universality which Said notes in those 'editorial asides' in Klm in which Kipling describes how "Kim could lie like an Oriental", insists that "all hours of the twenty-four are alike to Orientals", or refers to the "the Oriental's indifference to mere noise".

In short, these articulations are posited as a priori modes of "Being-in-the-world" wherein various configurations of colonial (or 'Oriental') thought, speech and action are represented as

77 What we are talking about here is, in essence, a comprehensive inclusivity; and this is more than adequately expressed in Suleri's reading of Klm when she points out that "there are no quests that live a charmed life outside of colonial desire" (p. 122) and, with regard to A Passage to India, that "colonial friendship is never autonomous from the literal presence of the racial body" (p. 133).
78 See, for example, Suleri's assertion in her discussion of the trial of Warren Hastings, that, "The lie of the impeachment proceedings is thus its failure to admit that Hastings's misdeeds were merely synecdochical of the colonial operation" (p. 52). However, not everything in the colonial context is deemed synecdochical by Suleri; there is a very significant, and somewhat hypocritical, exception; 'the Indian'. For in her discussion of the photographs of Indians collected in The people of India, Suleri maintains that, "the specificity of each image begs to be read as illustrative of itself rather than as a representative of an ahistorical type" (p. 106). Why the individual Anglo-Indians which she also examines do not "beg" to be read as such is left unexplained.
82 Being and Time, I.1, p. 73.
being fundamentally predetermined. And indeed, this colonial predeterminacy is made explicit in Suleri’s reference to what she believes is “the terrifying absence of choice in the operations of colonialism.”

Furthermore, Suleri’s formulations, by drawing everything into her system of analysis, can thus be seen to exhibit what Said, in his early work Beginnings: Intention and Method, identified as that mode of structuralism which “does not seem to allow for either waste or incoherence”:

[It states, rather, that every item in a sign system is invested with the dignity of message-bearing capability...[T]he structuralist découpage...is borne along by a kind of mathematical ambition to turn details into a coherent field governed by a set whose function it is to operate systematically in linking all the details with one another.]

While it is ironic that this selfsame “mathematical ambition to turn details into a coherent field” is, as we have seen, only too discernible in Said’s own Orientalism, published three years after Beginnings; his critique of “the structuralist découpage” nonetheless correlates with many of the points I have already raised with regard to postcolonial theory’s “Enframing” of colonial reality. In particular, Said’s description of the ‘functionality’ of the “set” which governs the “coherent field” in structuralist analysis closely resembles the discursive functionality which, I have argued, forms the fundamental interpretative dynamic of colonial discourse analysis. More specifically, in the light of this description of the structuralist turning of “details into a coherent field”, I would suggest that the coloniser (as ‘discursive subject’) is fundamentally un-worlded when he/she is interpreted as functioning in this “field”; un-worlded, when he/she is placed in a signifying system which “does not allow for either waste or incoherence”; where he/she is viewed as (pre)determined at every level of its Being in terms of its colonial status and where everything possesses a specifically colonial “message-bearing capability”. In short, and as a result, I would suggest that we are confronted with the crucial question as to whether or not this

---

85 This formulation can be seen to correspond with Catherine Belsey’s influential definition of the task of ideology as being the presentation of “the position of the subject as fixed and unchangeable, an element in a given system of differences which is human nature and the world of human experiences, and...possible action as an endless repetition of “normal” familiar action.” Critical Practise (London: Routledge, 1980), p. 90. See also, Graham Dawson’s description of how “the historical formation and “genealogy” of the Orientalist imaginative repertoire can be mapped across novels, poetry and the literature of travel; extends into sciences such as linguistics, phrenology, ethnology, anthropology and geography; recurs not only in written texts but in forms of painting and architecture; informs mode of colonial administration, and economic and military organization. This archive of narratives, images and other representations structures the framework of possibilities within which Westerners in “the Orient” can locate themselves and their experiences, such that any encounter with actual “Orientals” is likely simply to reproduce historically predetermined expectations” (Soldier Heroes, p. 49, my emphasis).

86 Suleri, The Rhetoric of English India, p. 116. See also, Suleri’s reference to “the imperatives that subcontinental colonial encounter generated between the cultural distinctiveness of race and gender” (p. 134, my emphasis).


35
radically over-determined and theoretically engineered representation of the world as “picture” (Bild) and “structured image” (GeBild) enables us to understand the world as it is, as the world, or the people in that world as they are, as people.

Heidegger’s existential-ontological analytic in Being and Time shows that the basic state of Dasein is “Being-in-the-world”. It is this basic state which is altogether ignored in the “Enframing” of the coloniser as ‘the colonial subject’, colonial reality as colonial discourse, and the translation of that coloniser and its world into an artificially prioritised realm of colonial meaning. So, despite the fact that in the following chapter I will conduct a more thorough examination of Heidegger’s existential-ontological analytic of Dasein in order to establish the interpretative criteria for my critique of the fictional coloniser, at this stage it is important that we anticipate that examination and critique so as to grasp the essential nature of the un-worldedness of ‘the colonising subject’ in colonial discourse analysis.

At the beginning of Being and Time, Heidegger argues that an extended interpretation of “Being-in-the-world” (In-der-Welt-sein) is imperative if we are to “set up our analytic of Dasein correctly”:\(^87\):

The theme of our analytic is to be Being-in-the-world, and accordingly the very world itself; and these are to be considered within the horizon of average everydayness [Durchschnittlichkeit] – the kind of Being which is closest to Dasein. We must make a study of everyday Being-in-the-world; with the phenomenal support which this gives us, something like the world must come into view.\(^88\)

This interpretation takes up almost the entire First Division of the book (‘Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein’), and, more specifically, involves Heidegger’s phenomenological “demonstration” (Ausweisung) of the fact that the “world” is “something constitutive for Dasein”\(^89\) and that Dasein is “that entity which in every case has Being-in-the-world as the way in which it is”.\(^90\)

\(^87\) Being in Time, I.2, p. 78.
\(^88\) ibid., I.3, p. 94.
\(^89\) ibid., I.1, p. 77. “World is the manifestness of beings as such as a whole...We ourselves are comprehensively included in this “as a whole”, not in the sense of some component belonging to it that also happens to be there, but in different ways in each case and in possibilities belonging to the essence of Dasein itself, be it in the form of immersing ourselves in beings, or be it in the form of directly facing them, going along with them, being rebuffed by them, being left empty, being held in limbo, being fulfilled or being sustained by them...ways that are independent of subjective reflection or psychological experience.” Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), II:6:75, p. 353.
\(^90\) ibid., I.2, p. 79.
In *History of the Concept of Time*, presented as a lecture course two years before the publication of *Being and Time*, Heidegger offers the following useful summary:

The determination of Dasein as Being-in-the-world is a unified and original one. Three elements can be brought out in this basic constitutive state and traced more closely back to its phenomenal composition: 1) Being-in-the-world in the particular sense of world, "world" as the how of the being—ontologically, the worldhood of the world; 2) the entity as it is determined from the "who" of this Being-in-the-world and from the how of this being, how the entity itself is in its being; 3) in-being as such."\(^91\)

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger conducts a detailed explication of the "world itself" (as "the worldhood of the world");\(^92\) Dasein’s spatiality;\(^93\) and its "Being-with-others" (as "Being-one’s-self" and "Being-with" the "They"),\(^94\) before concluding the First Division with the definition of all of these various modes of Dasein’s "Being-in-the-world", and thus the definition of the Being of Dasein in general, as "care"("Sorge")\(^95\):

The ontological signification of the expression "care" has been expressed in the "definition": "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (the world) as "Being-alongside entities which we encounter (within-the-world)."

This "definition" of "care" stands as the all-important bridge between the First and Second Divisions of *Being and Time* and leads us on to the second stage of Heidegger’s thesis in which he conducts a phenomenological explication of the ontological meaning of Dasein’s Being ("care") as "temporality."\(^97\) In addition, in his later ‘Letter on Humanism’, Heidegger explains that "care" is also that which expresses and constitutes Dasein’s "humanity":

---

\(^{95}\) See, *Being and Time*, I.5.39, 41-43.  
\(^{96}\) *Being and Time*, II.1, p. 293. See also, *History of the Concept of Time*, I:4, and in particular, pp. 293-304. David Farrell Krell summarizes the meaning of "care" as "a name for the structural whole of existence in all its modes and for the broadest and most basic possibilities of discovery and disclosure of self and world. Most poignantly experienced in the phenomenon of anxiety..."care" describes the sundry ways I get involved in the issue of my birth, life and death, whether by my projects, inclinations, insights, or illusions. "Care" is the all-inclusive name for my concern for other people, preoccupations with things, and awareness of my proper Being. It expresses the movement of my life out of a past, into a future, through the present". ‘Editors Note’, ‘Letter on Humanism’, *Basic Writings*, p. 223. Krell’s definition is, I believe, eminently preferable to Hubert Dreyfus’s unsatisfactorily brief, if not altogether misguided, description of "caring" as Dasein "making itself an issue". Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-world: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I*, 3rd Edition (Cambridge [Mass.] and London: The MIT Press, 1992), p. 238.  
\(^{97}\) It is important to note at this early stage, Heidegger’s differentiation between: (1) "time" (Zeit) as common "world-time" (namely clocks, calendars and the like), (2) "temporality" (Zeitlichkeit) as the "ontological condition of the possibility of the understanding of Dasein’s being and, (3) "Temporality" (Temporalität) as indicating that "temporality" which "in existential analytic, represents the horizon from which we understand being." The *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Revised Edition, trans. by Albert Hofstadter (Indiana University Press: Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1988), II:1, pp. 227-229.
Where else does “care” tend but in the direction of bringing man back to his essence? What else does that in turn betoken but that man (huma) becomes human (humanus)?

Nor is this a conventional Western humanism; indeed, it is precisely that conventional humanism which he rejects as being “stifled in metaphysical subjectivism and submerged in oblivion of Being”.

In contrast, Heidegger’s “humanism”, “is a humanism that thinks the humanity of man from nearness to Being”.

We will return to these arguments in more detail in the following chapter, but what should already be clear, even from this briefest of summaries, is that a fundamental recognition of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world” as “care” is imperative if we are to grasp what and how the coloniser, as Dasein, is.

It follows, therefore, that any interpretation of Dasein which disregards its ontological constitution as “a being in the world” – or attempts to explain what or how it is in terms of abstract theoretical models in which it is artificially detached from its rootedness in the world – is necessarily flawed. Indeed, it is precisely in these terms that Michel Foucault’s proposition that

The world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; there is no prediscursive providence which disposes the world in our favour...

can be seen as the antithesis of Heideggarian phenomenology.

An important example of this structuralist disregard of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world” in colonial discourse analysis is to be found in the work of Homi Bhabha. In fact, as Robert Young has noted, in his influential critique of Bhabha's work in White Mythologies, one of the most serious problems which can be seen to exist in Bhabha’s models of colonial subjectivity is whether or not resistance and compliance

---

99 ibid., p. 248.
100 ibid., p. 245.
102 This is despite the fact that Foucault himself maintained towards the end of his life that “Heidegger has always been the essential philosopher...My entire philosophical development was determined by my reading Heidegger”. From ‘Final Interview’, Raritan, Summer 1985, 8. ‘Le Retour de la Morale’, interview conducted by Gilles Barbade, Les Nouvelles, 28 June 1984, quoted by Dreyfus in Being-in-the-world, p. 8. On the subject of the centrality of the world in phenomenology, see Merleau-Ponty’s insistence in the Preface to Phenomenology of Perception, that “the only pre-existent Logos is the world.” Phenomenology of Perception, 10th Edition, trans. by Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 1999), p. xx.
can be discussed in terms of the positing of a general colonial subject (singular, a somewhat neutralized male, out of time and space) within the demands of an overall schema of the conditions of colonial discourse.\(^{103}\)

Then again, following our clarification of “Being-in-the-world”, it is clear that it is not just the resistance and compliance of ‘the colonial subject’ that is at issue here; the far more urgent question for Bhabha, and colonial discourse analysis as a whole, is whether or not it is valid to posit “a general colonial subject” which is “out of time and space” to begin with.

(c) De-humanising

My on-going objective in this chapter is to question the nature of ‘the colonising subject’ that has been posited in colonial discourse analysis and to ask whether or not it represents, discloses or describes the coloniser as it is. Thus far, I have focused upon the problems which attend the homogenised and un-worlded character of this ‘colonising subject’; and while, to a great extent, these problems, in themselves, more than adequately demonstrate the dehumanisation of the ‘subject’, they do so only in passing.

In order for us to grasp the more specific nature and significance of this dehumanisation, I would suggest that we turn our attention to the psychoanalytical profiling of the colonising psyche in colonial discourse analysis. For it is here, perhaps more than anywhere else, that ‘the colonising subject’ is represented and reconstructed as “the structured image”. In the postcolonial psychoanalytical models and critiques of colonial subjectivity, I will argue, the coloniser is not only homogenised and un-worlded; nor is it only posited as being transparent and “knowable”; it is also secured in its homogenised psychological transparency within a sophisticated and fundamentally un-worlding model of systemised and predetermined meanings. But more importantly, because these postcolonial models are themselves constructed upon orthodox psychoanalytical preconceptions about what human consciousness is, how it functions and the ways in which it can be ‘mapped’, it is important that we properly familiarise ourselves with the problematical nature of these preconceptions from the outset. This familiarisation is rendered all the more necessary when we recognise the importance of both the role that the critique of psychologism plays in the development of Heidegger’s thinking, and his later condemnation of Freudian psychoanalysis for “rendering the relationship to the present more difficult with contrived theories”.\(^{104}\)

103 Young, White Mythologies, p. 152 (my emphasis).
Before turning to Heidegger, it is necessary for us to be aware of the serious criticisms that have been levelled against 'ethnopsychological' and psychoanalytical approaches from within postcolonial studies itself. The most serious of these is the accusation that psychoanalysis owes too significant a debt to what are now seen to be the racist, masculinist and imperialist conventions of traditional Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Postcolonial commentators like Gayatri Spivak and Anne McClintock have, more specifically, drawn attention to what they see as the profoundly problematical nature of the division which exists between "European male adulthood, civilisation and rationality on the one hand" and "non-Europeans, children, primitivism and madness on the other...in Freudian and subsequent accounts of the human psyche". In so doing, these commentators have highlighted the deeply problematic, if not 'neo-colonial', nature of any uncritical postcolonial adoption of such accounts. And it is specifically in this regard that Ania Loomba asks:

Is it at all possible...to use psychoanalysis to think productively about colonial relations? if psychoanalytic theory and practice have been moulded by the histories of colonialism and imperialism, is it possible to appropriate their paradigms or are they too bound up with the colonialist ways of ordering culture and biology? Can we use the master’s tools to dismantle the master’s house?

Nevertheless, these accounts have been adopted and continue to have currency within contemporary postcolonial theory and criticism. In addition to the psychoanalytical studies of writers like Bhabha, the best indication as to the continuing currency of psychoanalysis in colonial discourse analysis is the widespread existence of what can only be called a pseudo-

context of the series of seminars which took place, between 1959 and 1969, at Zollikon, the home of Heidegger’s friend, Medard Boss. It is, however, important to note in this regard that despite Heidegger’s dismissal of Freudian psychoanalysis, phenomenology and psychoanalysis are not altogether irreconcilable. See, in particular, the work of the Swiss phenomenological psychologist Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966) who was profoundly influenced by Heidegger and Husserl and established the school of Daseinanalyse. See, for example, Binswanger, Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins (The Basic Forms and Cognition of Human Existence) (Zurich, 1942). For further information on phenomenological psychology, see Herbert Spiegelberg’s Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972); Raymond J. McCall’s Phenomenological Psychology: An Introduction: With a Glossary of Some Key Heideggerian Terms (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983); Keith Hoeller (ed.), Heidegger and Psychology (Special Issue of the Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry: Seattle,1992); and, Hans Cohn, Heidegger and the Roots of Existential Psychotherapy (London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2002).

See, for example, Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, in Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory, p. 92.

See, for example, McClintock, ‘The Return of Female Fetishism and the Fiction of the Phallus’, New Formations, 19, Spring 1993, pp. 1-22, p. 15.


Ibid., p. 149.
psychoanalytical rhetoric. In other words, the idiom and thematic structures of a loosely defined and casually applied psychoanalytical thinking: a thinking which can be seen to inform, for example, Edward Said’s hypostatized conception of the “ambition” of Orientalism, his psycho-sociological interpretation of the master/slave dialectic within colonialism; and his construction of something called the “sovereign Western consciousness”. A thinking which is evident too in Abdul JanMohamed’s introduction of the notion of guilt into the Manichean Allegory as a consequence of what he sees as the “pleasure” of colonial “authority”. A thinking which is exhibited in Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman’s confident assertion that actual resistance to colonial rule “engendered defensiveness and fear within the colonial subject” and that

...as Rider Haggard’s texts suggest - the colonised other came to serve as a template for self-construction, being a model of the martial power to which the colonist aspired. That the colonial subject could be derivative from, as well as dominant over, the colonised, implies a set of dynamics which require further attention.

In each of these, and any number of other examples, the language of psychoanalytical thinking, however vague, situates and configures the object under discussion – be it an homogenous grouping of scholars or literary texts, a nation, or an individual – within colonially restricted psychoanalytical structures of meaning and significance. When understood as the “structured image”, these things become the psychoanalytical “standing-reserve”; that is, they are represented as functioning in ways which are psychoanalytically orderable and “knowable”. As such, they are posited in order to facilitate the larger project – the explanation of colonialism, colonial discourse and “the rules” of their functioning.

In the case of the individual, this psychoanalytical situation and configuration necessarily involves a whole series of presuppositions with regard to what and how that individual, as an individual consciousness, fundamentally is. As Heidegger (following Husserl) argues, in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, these presuppositions about the constitution of the human consciousness are, from the outset, seriously compromised by the fact that

\[\text{Orientalism, p. 109.}\]
\[\text{ibid., p. 8.}\]
\[\text{For example, “Troubled by the nagging contradiction between the theoretical justification of exploitation and the barbarity of its actual practice, it also attempts to mask the contradiction by obsessively portraying the supposed inferiority and barbarity of the racial Other, thereby insisting on the profound moral difference between self and Other”. JanMohamed, “The Economy of Manichean Allegory”, p. 103.}\]
\[\text{Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (eds.), “Editor’s Introduction”, Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory, p. 17.}\]
Each psychology merely dreams about man and human existence, because it must necessarily make presuppositions about the constitution of the being of the human Dasein and of its way of being, which we call existence. These ontological presuppositions remain closed off for all eternity to psychology as an ontical science.\(^{113}\)

As an “ontical science”, Heidegger sees psychology as being concerned with ‘beings’ rather than ‘existence’, while at the same time, entirely dependent upon “ontological presuppositions” about the nature of its ‘subject’, the “human Dasein”. And that which is foremost among psychology’s “presuppositions about the constitution of the being of the human Dasein” is its formulation of human consciousness itself; its traditional cognition-theory of subject/object dualism. As Safranski explains, Husserl had already proven to Heidegger that

There is no empty consciousness confronting objects with which it would fill its emptiness...Consciousness has no “within”; it is the “outside” of itself...[Indeed, it] is always “directed toward something.” This basic structure of consciousness he [Husserl] calls “intention.”\(^{114}\)

And, in the History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger himself maintains that “all the relations of life are intrinsically defined” by “intentionality,” that all acts (“perception, judgement, love hate”) “have the character of intentionality”.\(^{115}\) Taking perception as “the exemplary case,” Heidegger argues that “intentionality” is “the structure of a comportment as comporting to, directing itself toward”,\(^{116}\) the basic constitution of which is “a reciprocal belonging together of intentio and intentum”.\(^{117}\) The “intentio” is the act of intention, and the “intentum” is the content of intention. That which is experienced phenomenally in “intentionality” always already exhibits the character of a combined and simultaneous disclosure (of itself) and an apprehension (on the part of Dasein); and not as separate stages or in any sequential sense, but as the simultaneous thematic components of a single process. The relation between the “intentio” and the “intentum” should thus not be understood as that which exists between a psychical subject and a physical object; for, as Heidegger points out, even when a physical object which is thought to be there is revealed as an hallucination, or an optical illusion, the intentional character (the “directing toward”) of that perception remains the same.\(^{118}\) More importantly, the

\(^{113}\) Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 1:1:9 (a), p. 54.

\(^{114}\) Safranski, Martin Heidegger, p. 77. For a more detailed analysis of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s understanding of “intentionality”, see Burt C. Hopkins, Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993).

\(^{115}\) Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, p. 36.

\(^{116}\) ibid., p. 37.

\(^{117}\) ibid., p. 46. Heidegger’s phenomenological rejection of the subject/object dualism of conventional metaphysics is perhaps most famously developed by Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception.

\(^{118}\) “The intentional relation does not arise first through the actual extantness of objects but lies in the perceiving itself, whether illusionless or illusory. Perceiving must be the perception of something in order for me to be able to be deceived about something” (The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 1:1:9 (b), p. 60).
very notion of a thinking 'subject', like Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*, "to whose so-called sphere intentional experiences are then supposed to belong", must itself be avoided if we are to achieve a proper understanding of "intentionality". This is because, for Heidegger:

The idea of a subject which has intentional experiences merely inside its own sphere and is not yet outside it but encapsulated within itself is an absurdity which misconstrues the basic ontological structure of the being that we ourselves are. And, of course, this subjective sphere that Heidegger dismisses is, quite explicitly, the subjective sphere of psychology: "the usual separation between a subject with its immanent sphere and an object with its transcendent...the distinction between an inner and an outer is", for Heidegger, "constructive and continually gives occasion for further constructions", and as a result, he insists that he "will no longer speak of a subject, of a subjective sphere, but shall understand the being to whom intentional comportments belong as *Dasein*". In short, then:

The statement that the comportments of the *Dasein* are intentional means that the mode of being of our own self, the *Dasein*, is essentially such that this being, so far as it is, is always already dwelling with the extant.

And this closing emphasis upon "dwelling" brings us back to Heidegger's phenomenological concern with the fundamental centrality of *Dasein's* always already "Being-in-the-world", discussed above. More importantly, for Heidegger what this means is that

With an adequate interpretation of intentionality, the traditional concept of the subject and of subjectivity becomes questionable. Not only does what psychology means by the subject become questionable but also what psychology itself as a positive science must presuppose implicitly about the idea and constitution of the subject and what philosophy itself has hitherto defined ontologically in an utterly deficient way and left in the dark.

Heidegger's phenomenological explication of *Dasein's* "intentional comportments" does away with the subject/object dualism upon which psychology is founded. But in addition, and as we

---

119 Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 1:1:9 (b), p. 64. Cf. Merleau-Ponty's "there is no inner man, man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself" (*Phenomenology of Perception*, p. xi).
120 ibid., p. 64.
121 ibid., p. 64. In the light of Heidegger's rejection of "the distinction between an inner and an outer" (and in addition to his life-long concern with thinking the question of the meaning of *Being*), it becomes apparent that Edward Said's succinct description of his "work" as being "an exploration of one German's inner reality" is as misguided as it is understated. Edward Said, "Labyrinth of Incarnations: The Essays of Maurice Merleau-Ponty", in *Reflections on Exile and Other Literary and Cultural Essays* (London: Granta Books, 2001), p. 11.
122 ibid., p. 64.
123 ibid., p. 65.
shall see in more detail in the following chapter, for Heidegger, the “intentional comportments” of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world” (as Dasein’s basic state of Being), are fundamentally determined by Time, and it is the exclusion of Time from psychologism’s models of subjectivity and human consciousness which Heidegger sees as its most serious flaw.

All attempts to reckon existing reality morphologically, psychologically, in terms of decline and loss, in terms of fate, catastrophe, and destruction, are merely technological behaviour. That behaviour operates through the device of the enumerating of symptoms whose standing-reserve can be increased to infinity and always varied anew.\textsuperscript{125}

In the context of my own assessment of postcolonial psychoanalysis as an “Enframing” and dehumanising representation of the coloniser, Heidegger’s critique of psychology can thus be seen to provide us with two crucially important points of orientation. The first concerns subjectivity itself and the dissolution of psychology’s traditional subject/object dualism in terms of the phenomenological thesis of “intentionality”. The second, concerns Time and, in particular, the “extra-temporal” (or static) meanings that are applied in psychological models of human subjectivity. In order for us to bring the full significance of these arguments, and the formations which they describe, into sharper relief, we will now turn to perhaps the most conspicuous and influential postcolonial psychoanalytical model of the construction and constitution of colonial subjectivities: that is, Homi Bhabha’s account of the psychic economy of colonialism.

In his ‘Foreword’ to Franz Fanon’s \textit{Black Skin, White Masks}, Bhabha depicts the colonised and the coloniser face-to-face within the tense freeze frame of the colonial encounter and examines the role of ‘the Western gaze’, and the returning of that gaze from ‘the Other’, in the construction of ‘colonial selfhood’.\textsuperscript{126} He explains:

\begin{quote}
[T]he post-Enlightenment man [is] tethered to, not confronted by, his dark reflection, the shadow of colonised man, that splits his presence, distorts his outline, breaches his boundaries, repeats his action at a distance, disturbs and divides the very time of his being. This ambivalent identification of the racist world... turns on the idea of Man as his alienated image, not Self and Other but the “Otherness” of the self inscribed in the perverse palimpsest of colonial identity.\textsuperscript{127}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{125} Heidegger, ‘The Turning’ in \textit{The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays}, p. 48. Heidegger continues, “Such analyses of the “situation” do not notice that they are working only according to the reticent and manner of technological dissecting, and that they thus furnish to the technological consciousness the historiographical-technological presentation of happening commensurate with that consciousness” (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{126} On the ‘Western gaze’ as surveillance and control, see, for example, Brautlinger’s identification of the recording Sahib in Meadows Taylor’s \textit{Confessions of a Thug}, as the archetypal colonial observer (\textit{Rule of Darkness}, p. 88).

\textsuperscript{127} Bhabha, ‘Foreword’ to \textit{Black Skin, White Masks}, p. xiv.
Bhabha offers us this stand-off as the fundamentally definitive episode in the construction of colonial identity. But to what extent is there a definitive episode in colonialism, and what are the consequences of positing a totalizing theory of psychic determination which is founded upon such an episode? Indeed, what are the consequences of, and what is the validity of, positing a totalistic theory of psychic determination?

Certainly, in Bhabha's case, before we can begin to examine the substance of his thesis in detail, we are again confronted by the problems which adhere to his, now familiar, employment of abstract theoretical constructs to symbolise the two apparently homogenisable poles of colonial society (“post-Enlightenment man” and “colonised man”). Bhabha's employment of these terms (as the 'gathering' of the “standing-reserve”), can be seen to constitute the theoretical substitution of that which he claims to be examining, the neatly homogenised and segregated identities of cultural theory for the factual human colonisers and colonised and the concrete world; in short, the theoretical substitution of what “applies” for what “is”. What “applies” for Bhabha is a “consciousness” that is entirely determined by its colonial status: in other words, and to paraphrase Said, for Bhabha, the coloniser is first a coloniser, second a human being, and last again a coloniser.\(^{128}\)

But more importantly, and as a result, Bart Moore-Gilbert has rightly pointed out that:

> There is no recognition...that the question of psychic identification in the native subject might be complicated by questions of gender, region, ethnic origin, religion, caste or class. Instead, it implies that the structures of psychic identification and affect which he theorizes apply equally in terms of their operations and results to the Western-educated rajah and the “illiterate” female subaltern.\(^{129}\)

Indeed, this observation is echoed by Ania Loomba in her recognition of the more general fact that

> We cannot forge a template of a split colonised subject and then apply it to all colonised subjects...the processes of individual subject-formation cannot endlessly be expanded to account for social collectivities.\(^{320}\)

\(^{128}\) Orientalism, p. 102.

\(^{129}\) Moore-Gilbert, Postcolonialism: Contexts, Practices, Politics, p. 150. Moore-Gilbert's criticism here can, in many ways, be seen to correspond to that made by Graham Dawson in his observation that Said's “Britishness” (like his notion of a “sovereign Western consciousness”) constitutes a fundamental failure to recognise the fact that “The subjectivities of “Britishness” were never constituted exclusively through the encounter with the Oriental as its other, but in relationship to a multiplicity of “external” others, both colonial and European, besides being “internally” fractured by social relations of class, gender, ethnicity and generation within Britain itself” (Soldier Heroes, p. 50).

\(^{320}\) Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, p. 150. It is interesting to note here that Moore-Gilbert and Loomba both question the validity of these models exclusively from the perspective of the problems involved in their depiction of the native or the colonised.
What Loomba is describing here is of course the ontologisation of colonial status. And while her concerns are undoubtedly well-founded, they are, nonetheless, only raised in the context of the theoretical assessment of the "colonised subject". The psychoanalytical utilisation of certain terms to denote "social collectivities" which Loomba rightly criticises has, however, continued unabated in colonial discourse analysis in the form of an explanation of the 'social collectivity' that is signified by 'the colonising subject'; and this, despite the now common emphasis upon the rejection of such practises in relation to the theoretical assessment of 'the colonised subject'.

In his own particular model of colonial subjectivity, which appeared long before concerns such as Loomba's were raised, Bhabha sets out to explain how the coloniser and the colonised as 'discursive subjects' come to understand who and what they are, in terms of Lacan's theory of the "mirror stage", discussed above. This primarily involves the detailed explication of the content, character and psychic significance of the meaningful glances which Bhabha understands to be at the heart of 'the colonial encounter':

[T]o exist is to be called into being in relation to an Otherness, its look or locus... This process is visible in that exchange of looks between native and settler that structures their psychic relation in the paranoid fantasy of boundless possession and its familiar language of reversal... It is always in relation to the place of the Other that colonial desire is articulated.

With this "exchange of looks", the "native" and the "settler" come to know themselves as "native" and "settler". But what is it in these looks which determines this knowledge? How does "the white man's artifice" come to be "inscribed on the black man's body"? And what is in a gaze that makes it 'Western'? Bhabha's failure to provide us with a satisfactory explanation as to the phenomenological mechanics of the perceptual processes which he describes comes as no surprise when we note that Heidegger warns against just this type of arbitrariness when discussing "The inadequacy of psychology as a positive science for the ontological elucidation of perception".

131 Following Heidegger's definition of "the ontological difference", the only way in which an explanation of "social collectivities" can legitimately take place is when the arbitrary and various ontical characterisations of humankind's existence (for example, colonial status, race, nation and creed) are phenomenologically bracketed off and the ontological character of Dasein as "Being-in-the-world" is recognised as the only authentic universal criterion.

132 Bhabha, 'Foreword' to Black Skin, White Masks, p. xv.

133 Cf. Spivak's assertion in 'The Rani of Sirmur' that the colonisers "necessary yet contradictory assumption of an uninscribed earth...generates the force to make the native see himself as other" ('The Rani of Sirmur', in Europe and its Others, p. 133).

134 ibid., p. xvi.

Psychology takes its stand on the basis of facts...it is a positive science of a specific being...[And thus, when psychologists] make use of presuppositions about what is, about its ontological constitution, [they] leave these presuppositions unmoved, akenetics, do not run through them in philosophical knowledge, in dialectic. But for this they are fundamentally unqualified, since they are not capable of exhibiting what a being is in its own self. They are unable to give an account of what a being is as a being. The concept of being and of the constitution of the being of beings is a mystery to them. 

And, from what we have seen above, I would argue that the concept of Being and the constitution of the Being of beings is a “mystery” to Bhabha as well.

Bhabha’s failure to provide us with a satisfactory explanation as to the essential nature of the perceptual processes which he describes can, in addition, be understood in terms of an important aspect of “Enframing” which we have not yet discussed; namely, “ongoing activity” (betrieb). In ‘The Age of the World Picture’, Heidegger describes this “industrious activity” as follows:

Ongoing activity becomes mere busyness whenever, in the pursuing of its methodology, it no longer keeps itself open on the basis of an ever-new accomplishing of its projection-plan, but only leaves that plan behind itself as a given; never again confirms and verifies its own self-accumulating results and the calculation of them, but simply chases after such results and calculations.

This “chasing” after “results and calculations” is, I would argue, a fundamental characteristic of Bhabha’s, and colonial discourse analysis’, self-verifying drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality. That we are left in the dark about the what and how of these “looks”, does not, however, disguise the fact that Bhabha has onticalised perception. As we noted in the previous section with regard to Suleri and “imperial time”, this onticalisation of the ontological, as a ‘gathering’ into system, posits the thought, speech or action as archetypal and therefore predetermined in the ‘subject’s’ being a colonising or a colonised subject. In the drive towards the establishment of a psychoanalytical discursive functionality, Bhabha’s “Enframing” (as a “challenging revealing”) of the “native” and the “settler” thus involves the ‘regulation and securement’ of their very “looks”.

More importantly, what we have here, is a perceiving ‘subject’ and a perceived ‘object’ – as a “Self” and as an “Other” – and as such, Bhabha’s ‘colonial subjects’ are configured in terms of the dogmatic epistemological preconception of the human ‘subject’ as an “empty consciousness confronting objects with which it would fill its emptiness”. But then again, we must

156 Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 1:1.9 (a), pp. 51-52.
158 That this is the case is emphatically underlined in Bhabha’s agreement with, and quotation of Fanon’s assertion that, “The colonial subject is always “overdetermined from without”” (‘Foreword’ to Black Skin, White Masks, p. xiii).
remember that these are not the conventional taxonomies of traditional psychology and philosophy; they are, as we have already seen, the *colonial* "Self" and *colonial* "Other" wherein, as Loomba says, "cultural difference is pathologised and psychic growth [is] understood in terms of cultural/racial difference". So despite Bhabha's claim, in the extract quoted earlier, regarding

...the idea of Man as his alienated image, not "Self" and "Other" but the "Otherness" of the self...\(^{40}\)

here, the "Self" and the "Other" is, quite plainly, the "native" and the "settler" and they are clearly described as functioning as such. This "Otherness" is therefore not, as Bhabha would have us believe (i.e. *not* Self and Other), it is merely an attempt to provide an ambivalent gloss to his own retention of the "Self" and the "Other" as the "native" and the "settler". After all, the concept of "Otherness" still presupposes the existence of an "Other", and we are left in no doubt as to whom that "Other" is. This is proven to be the case two pages later, when he asserts that

In the postcolonial text the problem of identity returns as a persistent questioning of the frame, the space of representation, where the image - missing person, invisible eye, Oriental stereotype - is confronted with its difference, its Other.\(^{41}\)

The various theoretical and epistemological contortions by which Bhabha attempts to defend what he believes is the essentially ambiguous nature of his colonial subjectivities, thus, at base, fail to hide the fact that they remain fundamentally rooted in a conventional "Self"/"Other", subject/object dualism. And it is this representation of the 'colonial subject' in terms of the conventional "Self"/"Other" which results in the extra-temporality of that 'colonial subject'. If we recall Lovitt's description of Heidegger's understanding of Being as

...the ongoing manner in which everything that is, presents; i.e....the manner in which, *in the lastingness of time*, everything encounters man and comes to appearance through the openness that man provides...

and combine this with Heidegger's own description of the "intentional comportments" of Dasein's "Being-in-the-world" as the "the mode of being of our own self", then it becomes clear

---

\(^{139}\) Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*, p. 138.

\(^{140}\) Bhabha, 'Foreword' to *Black Skin, White Masks*, pp. xiv-xv.

\(^{141}\) Bhabha, 'Interrogating Identity: Fanon and the postcolonial prerogative', in *Location of Culture*, p. 46.
that Dasein's "intentional comportments" are themselves "the manner in which, in the lastingness of time, everything encounters man and comes to presence". For Heidegger:

Temporality makes possible the Dasein's comportment as a comportment toward beings, whether toward itself, toward others, or toward the handy or the extant.

Bhabha's depiction of the colonial encounter between "post-Enlightenment man" and "colonised man" in terms of an "Enframing" subject/object dualism and his failure to understand that encounter in terms of the "intentionality" of Dasein's comportments in the world, in effect, de-Temporalizes it; or as Heidegger would say, as a result of this "Enframing", instead of "real thought processes occurring in time", what we are left with is their "ideal extra-temporal identical meaning". Indeed, Bhabha's model of colonial subjectivity can only ever be configured in terms of "ideal extra-temporal meaning"; for, in the conceptual landscape of Bhabha's colonial encounter, there are only two theoretically reified colonial entities whose sole activity is the seamless exchange of meaningful glances in a perpetual present, with no clearly identifiable past and no clearly identifiable future.

For Heidegger, "the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing". In this chapter I have argued that colonial discourse analysis, when understood as an "Enframing", can be seen to deny the possibility of "a more original revealing" of the historical coloniser. As an integral characteristic of its drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality, and the attempt to "manifest the rules of its functioning", colonial discourse analysis can be seen to posit a fundamentally homogenised, un-worlded and dehumanised representation of the coloniser as 'the colonising subject'. And, it is specifically against this representation and all the diverse conclusions which are predicated upon it, that I will now proceed towards an alternative.

The fundamental criterion of this alternative representation, and the manner of my approach towards it, is of course the same criteria that has formed the basis of my critique of colonial discourse analysis: Heidegger's existential-ontological analytic of Dasein. For if colonial discourse analysis' understanding of the coloniser is founded in a conception of that coloniser which is artificially homogenised, un-worlded and dehumanised, then it follows that my own understanding must, in contrast, be founded in a conception of that coloniser as the fundamentally individualised, worlded and humanised entity that it itself is.

142 See Heidegger's discussion of 'Praesens as horizontal schema of the ecstasis of enpresenting', in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, II:1:21 (a), pp. 302-313.
In his existential-ontological analytic of Dasein, Heidegger describes what and how Dasein is in the world and it is this description which will inform my examination of the fictional coloniser in colonial literature. For, as we shall see, the ontological modes of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world” that Heidegger describes, for example, “anxiety” (Unheimlichkeit), “boredom” (Langeweile) and “Being towards death” (Sein zum Tode), are not only reflected in the historical accounts of the colonial experience, by and about ‘real’ people, they are, more importantly, reflected in the literature of the colonial experience.

Before we can proceed to examine these reflections, we must first more fully clarify the ontological constitution and significance of these modes of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world”. It is to this clarification that we will now turn.
CHAPTER II: Heidegger’s Existential-ontological analytic

The single most important problem in colonial discourse analysis’ “Enframing” (Ge-stell) of the fictional and historical coloniser is its ontologisation of the ontical categories of colonial status, race and nationality. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the product of this false ontologisation, ‘the colonising subject’, is posited in the theoretical explication of colonial discourse and colonialism as a generalisable type that is fundamentally predetermined, at every level of its Being, by its ‘colonising’ (racial or national) status. Because this ontologisation of the ontical is frequently accompanied by an equally false onticalisation of the ontological — in which ontological factors like time and space are posited as ‘colonial time’ and ‘colonial space’ — the coloniser, its world, its perceptions, emotions, thoughts, speech and actions, is effectively, and comprehensively, locked up in the adamantine chains of a peculiarly colonial meaningfulness.

As I have argued in the previous chapter in relation to the work of Sara Suleri, the positing of a colonial ontology in colonial discourse analysis can be seen to result in a ‘colonising subject’ that is, as the “standing-reserve”, entirely (pre)determined and predictable in its ‘coloniality’. It is this artificial predictability which, more than anything else, (re)presents a fundamental closure of the coloniser’s ontological possibility for Being itself, as it is.

In other words, the “Enframing” (homogenising, un-worlding and dehumanising) methodologies of colonial discourse analysis fundamentally distort what and how Dasein is ontologically as an individual human being in the world of its experiences. The drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality means that, colonial discourse analysis conceives of, or constructs, ‘a colonising subject’ that must, first and foremost, be capable of functioning in colonial discourse and colonialism, in such a way as to corroborate the general arguments that it itself makes about what colonialism and colonial discourse actually are, and how they work. What we have here, then, is an inverted methodological progression from colonial discourse, and colonialism in general, to the human coloniser: wherein, in order to substantiate its arguments about the way colonial discourse (and colonialism) works, postcolonial theorists and colonial discourse analysts prioritise and ontologise colonial status and posit a custom-built ‘discursive subject’.

This does not mean, however, that I will subsequently be attempting to reverse this methodological progression, and begin with the ‘human subject’: for as Heidegger explained in *What is called Thinking?*:

No way of thought, not even the way of metaphysical thought, begins with man’s essential nature and goes on from there to Being, nor in reverse from Being and then back
to man. Rather, every way of thinking takes its way already within the total relation of Being and man's nature, or else it is not thinking at all. ¹

But then again, if, as I have argued, the 'colonising subject' of colonial discourse analysis must be understood as the artificially constructed theoretical product of a false ontology, why is this important? And why must colonial discourse analysis bother itself about ontology at all, given that what it is interested in is the examination of the historical and cultural, economic and social affects of European colonialism?

The fact of the matter is, colonial discourse analysis does 'bother itself' with ontology: it 'bothers' itself with ontology by affecting to describe what and how 'the colonial subject' is. For example, in his examination of the characteristics of Orientalist discourse in Orientalism, Said maintains that

For all these functions it is frequently enough to use the simple copula is. Thus Mohammed is an impostor...No background need be given; the evidence necessary to convict Mohammed is contained in the "is". ²

It is 'bothering itself' with ontology in its deliberations upon the psychic mechanics of the 'Western gaze', for example, Balachandra Rajan in his discussion of E.M. Forster:

The multiple readings that constitute and undermine the project of a text that might be India are conveyed with extraordinary sensitivity, but the possibilities all fall within the gaze of dominance.³

And it is perhaps, most explicitly of all, 'bothering itself' about ontology in its critique of orientalism's and colonialism's ontologisation of racial/cultural difference: as when Said insists that, in the prose of Sir Walter Scott

...no matter how deep the specific exception, no matter how much a single Oriental can escape the fences placed around him, he is first an Oriental, second a human being, and last again an Oriental...⁴

² Orientalism, p. 72.
³ Rajan, Under Western Eyes, p. 99 (my emphasis). Rajan's book, as the title suggests, consistently draws attention to the inescapability of this gaze and his interpretation of English literature, from Milton to Macaulay, effectively posits that literature as its textual articulation.
⁴ Orientalism, p. 102. And this is indeed ironic given his earlier assertion with regard to how, "for a European or American studying the Orient there can be no disclaiming the main circumstances of his actuality: that he comes up against the Orient as a European or American first, as an individual second" (Orientalism, p. 11). In both cases, Said is discussing an ontological way of Being, "actuality", but whereas the former is an example of the fiction that is Orientalism and appropriately condemned as such, the latter is stated as truth. See also, Heidegger's analysis of 'actuality' ("Wirklichkeit") as the ontological constitution of the "actual" in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 1:3:13 (c), pp. 138-139.
In all these cases colonial discourse analysis presupposes, or posits, a notion of Being. But in its drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality, colonialism comes to replace time, nature, God, reason or anything else, as the seat of that Being. So, while these ontological themes and structures are seldom referred to explicitly in postcolonial theory and colonial discourse analysis, they are, nonetheless, implicit in the quasi-scientific examinations with which it concerns itself. Indeed, as we saw in the previous chapter with regard to psychology, for Heidegger every science of beings must necessarily make presuppositions about what and how these beings are. In the case of colonial discourse analysis, I am arguing that not only can its presuppositions be seen to be almost entirely configured in terms of its overall project, but that these presuppositions are, as a result, rendered questionable:

The more appropriately the Being of the entities to be explored is understood under the guidance of an understanding of Being, and the more the totality of entities has been articulated in its basic attributes as a possible area of subject-matter for science, all the more secure will be the perspective for one’s methodological inquiry.\(^5\)

In short, and to paraphrase Sartre, if postcolonial theory and colonial discourse analysis is not to “degenerate into a non-human anthropology” then it must “reintegrate man into itself as its foundation”.\(^6\) And not just “man” in a merely tokenistic sense, but essentially, and in terms of the being that it itself is as “openness to Being”. As a result, I would argue that we must subsequently dispense with colonial discourse analysis’ artificially closed and falsely ontologised conception of the ‘colonising subject’ as the ‘subject-matter’ of our inquiry, and instead seek to understand this ‘subject-matter’, these ‘colonising subjects’, “under the guidance of an understanding of Being”.

1. Dasein and the Ontological Difference

In *Being and Time* Heidegger asks, and attempts to answer, what was for him the most fundamental question of philosophy; what is the meaning of “Being”(Sein)? This is the central preoccupation of Heidegger’s work:

> Everything we talk about, everything we have in view, everything towards which we comport ourselves in any way, is being ["seiend"]; what we are is being, and so is how we are. Being lies in the fact that something is, and in its Being as it is; in Reality; in presence-at-hand; in subsistence; in validity; in Dasein; in the ‘there is’.\(^7\)

\(^5\) *Being and Time*, II.4, p. 413.
\(^7\) *Being and Time*, Introduction 1, p. 26.
For Heidegger, the question of Being has priority over all other questions. And this is because, as he explains in his *Introduction to Metaphysics*, the question of Being (ontology)

...seeks a decision with respect to the ground that grounds the fact that what is, is in being as the being that it is.\(^8\)

And the *asker* of the question, the inquirer after Being, is itself the entity which must be made transparent in the search for the answer:

This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term "Dasein".\(^9\)

Dasein ("openness for Being") is thus the subject of Heidegger's existential-ontological analytic of the meaning of Being and this is because Dasein has, what Heidegger calls, a "vague average understanding of Being".\(^10\) It is this (pre-ontological) "understanding" which marks out Dasein, more than any other, as the appropriate entity for the explication of Being. So, while

The task of ontology is to explain Being itself and to make the Being of entities stand out in full relief...\(^11\)

because Dasein, as the subject of ontology, is of course a being, that is, it is *ontical*, "the roots of the existential analytic, on its part, are ultimately *existentiel", that is *ontical".\(^12\)

Ontology has for its fundamental discipline the analytic of the Dasein. This implies at the same time that ontology cannot be established in a purely ontological manner. Its possibility is referred back to a being, that is to something ontical – the Dasein.\(^13\)

The distinction between Being (*Sein*) and beings (*das Seiende*) is what Heidegger calls the "ontological difference"\(^14\) and it is this distinction which informs my description of colonial

\(^9\) *Being and Time*, Introduction I, p. 27. The literal translation of "Dasein", and the one adopted by Macquarrie and Robinson is "Being-there", but as Heidegger himself explains in the later essay, 'The Age of the World Picture', "This openness-for-Being [*Da-sein*] is to be 'understood in the sense of the ecstatic and concealing of Being' ('The Age of the World Picture', Appendix 15, p. 154). And in addition, William Lovitt has pointed out that, 'Heidegger has emphatically expressed his preference for "openness" and his disapproval of "there" as a translation of *da* in *Dasein*" (Translator's Introduction, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, p. xxxv).
\(^10\) *Being and Time*, Introduction I, p. 25.
\(^11\) Ibid., Introduction II, p. 49
\(^12\) Ibid., Introduction I, p. 34.
discourse analysis’ ontologisation of the ontical. Moreover, if “the roots of the existential analytic” are ontical, then they must be sought in Dasein’s average “everydayness” (Allhänglichkeit). In short, we must

...choose such a way of access and such a kind of interpretation that this entity [Dasein] can show itself in itself and from itself. And this means that it is to be shown as it is proximally and for the most part – in its average everydayness. In this everydayness there are certain structures which we shall exhibit – not just any accidental structures, but essential ones, which in every kind of Being that factual Dasein may possess, persist as determinative for the character of its Being. Thus by having regard for the basic state of Dasein’s everydayness, we shall bring out the Being of this entity in a preparatory fashion. Heidegger thus makes plain the necessity of observing Dasein as it is, in its everyday moods and relations in the world, and not in isolation from it as is the case with the reified or idealised ‘subject’ of conventional metaphysics. This is a significant point in the context of our study, especially when we recall the homogenised, un-worlded and dehumanised theoretical constructs which inhabit Bhabha’s psychoanalytical model of the ‘colonial encounter’. As we saw in the previous chapter, the basic state of Dasein is “Being-in-the-world” and it is specifically in terms of Dasein as “a being in the world” that Heidegger understands Dasein’s “everydayness” as the principal mode of this basic state. More importantly, the “way of access” that is chosen by Heidegger as the appropriate “kind of interpretation” for the analysis of Dasein’s “everydayness”, and hence, for “the science of the Being of entities – ontology”, is “phenomenology”:

This expression does not characterise the what of the objects of philosophical research as subject-matter, but rather the how of that research. The more genuinely a methodological concept is worked out and the more comprehensively it determines the principles on which a science is to be conducted, all the more primordially is it rooted in the way we come to terms with the things themselves, and farther is it removed from what we call “technical devices, though there are many such devices even in the theoretical disciplines. Thus the term “phenomenology” expresses a maxim which can be formulated as “To the things themselves”[Suchen selbst].

---

15 “This undifferentiated character of Dasein’s everydayness is not nothing, but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this entity. Out of this kind of Being – and back into it again – is all existing, such as it is. We call this everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein “averageness” [Durchschnittlichkeit]” (Being and Time, I.1, p. 69).
17 Among the many, not always useful comparisons, which Hubert Dreyfus draws between Heidegger and Wittgenstein, is his suggestion that the two “share the view that most philosophical problems can be (d)resolved by a description of everyday social practices” (Being-in-the-world, p. 7).
This call to return "to the things themselves" constitutes the only appropriate methodological articulation of Heidegger's fundamental understanding of the coming to presence of beings in the world; in other words, "phenomenology" is how we attend to the how of Being. As such, we can see that phenomenology is diametrically opposed to those "Enframing" modes of "reckoning" and representation which we discussed in the previous chapter, and which Heidegger describes as being symptomatic of the "technological consciousness".

This definition of the "methodological concept" in the existential-ontological analytic, does not, however, conclude Heidegger's preliminary clarification of the question of the meaning of Being. The phenomenological explication of the Being of Dasein must, from the outset, be conducted and directed in relation to the fact that "the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time".20

[1] The way in which Being and its modes and characteristics have their meaning determined primordially in terms of time, is what we call its "Temporal" determinateness. Thus the fundamental ontological task of Interpreting Being as such includes working out the Temporality of Being.21

The first and perhaps most important step in this task comes with the identification that:

Entities are grasped in their Being as "presence"; this means that they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time - the "Present" ['Gegenwart'].22

Hence, Dasein itself, as the subject of the existential-ontological analytic must be grasped in its "presencing" (anwesen) as that which shows itself, in itself, in Time.23 For as I have set out in the previous chapter, this "presencing" is the way in which "everything encounters man and comes to appearance through the openness that man provides."24

2. The Ontological Analytic of Dasein - authenticity and inauthenticity

Heidegger begins the First Part of his 'Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein' with a reiteration of the crucial fact that, "We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The Being of any such entity is in each case mine".25 By "mine" Heidegger does not merely imply oneself; he

---

20 ibid., Introduction II, p. 40.
22 ibid., Introduction II, p. 47.
23 C.f. note 42 in the previous chapter on the fundamental importance in Heidegger's thinking of Being as the coming to presence, and aletheia.
25 Being and Time, I.1, p. 67.
is emphasising the way in which we ourselves “are delivered over” to our own Being. As Hubert Dreyfus explains, “this cannot mean that each Dasein has a private world of experience”:

Heidegger’s “mineness” must be sharply distinguished from what Husserl calls “the sphere of ownness.” When Heidegger describes Dasein as “owned” in a lecture course in 1923, he warns, “Dasein as its own does not mean an isolating relativization to...the individual (solus ipse), rather “ownness” is a way of being. The universal structures which are determinant for the Being of Dasein are characterised by the “mineness” (Jemienigkeit) of each particular Dasein as “a way of being”. And this remains the case despite the fundamental ontological oscillation between what Heidegger calls the “authentic” (eigentlich) and “inauthentic” (uneigentlich) modes of Dasein’s Being:

Because Dasein is in each case its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, “choose” itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only “seem” to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic – that is, something of its own – can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity...are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterised by mineness.

So, how are we to differentiate between the two? For Heidegger, the inauthentic is characteristic of, and is founded in, Dasein’s everyday immersion in the “they” (das Man). The “they” are those with whom Dasein is in the world. They are, as Heidegger explains, those who

...proximally and for the most part “are-there” in everyday Being-with-one-another (Miteinandersein). The “who” is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The “who” is the neuter, the “they”.

And it is interesting to compare this definition of the “they” with Bhabha’s thinly-veiled re-articulation of Fanon’s original assertion that “the real Other for the white man is and will

---

26 ibid., I.1, p. 67. See also, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, I.3:1.5.(c), pp. 170-173.
28 Being and Time, I.1, p. 68. We should perhaps add Heidegger’s qualification that “the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any “less” Being or “lower” degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterised by inauthenticity – when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment” (ibid., I.1, p. 68).
30 ibid., I.4, p. 164. It is important to note here that I have deliberately retained Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of “das Man” as “the they” over Dreyfus’s preference for “the one” (Being-in-the-world, pp. 144-162), the justification for which is, I feel, seriously problematized by the extract just quoted from Being in Time.
continue to be the black man. And conversely’. For Bhabha and Fanon, as with so many postcolonial theorists and colonial discourse analysts, the fundamental (ontological) “Other” is essentially defined in terms of the ontical categories of race and political status; in short, a very specific group of people are especially “Other”, and are theoretically generalised as such. Heidegger’s ontological definition, on the other hand, does not acknowledge such distinctions, and this is one of those aspects of Heidegger’s thinking, which is perhaps

...most offensive to today’s habits of idea-forming and most unsettling to the skilled acrobats of its empty astuteness.

This is because, for Heidegger, the “they” are strictly those who are not the particular Dasein in question. We are all the “they”, and any theorization of this primordial configuration in ontically categorised terms (for example, the ‘white Self’ versus the ‘black Other’) must be seen as a fundamental distortion.

The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self [das Man-selbst], which we distinguish from the authentic Self – that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way [eigens ergriffenen]. As they-self, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the “they”, and must first find itself.

This “dispersion” (zerstreuen) of Dasein into inauthenticity, as the “they-self”, can more specifically be seen to constitute a “distantiality”, an “averageness” and a “levelling down” or “publizeness” (die Öffentlichkeit). But does this mean that we can subsequently make a direct correlation between, on the one hand, the authentic and the Dasein and, on the other, between the inauthentic and the “they”; in other words, is Dasein only ever authentic on its own, in isolation from the crowd? The previous extract would appear to suggest as much, but this prematurely oversimplifies the complexity of the relation between both authenticity and inauthenticity, and Dasein and the “they”. For as we shall see, at a later stage in his inquiry, Heidegger describes how Dasein can grasp its own authenticity in “anticipatory resoluteness” (Vorläufigkeit des entschliessens) and can authentically “be-with-one-another” (miteinandersein).

31 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, p. 161; quoted by Bhabha in his ‘Foreword’, p. xix. Bhabha actually criticizes Fanon for being “too quick to name the Other, to personalize its presence in the language of colonial racism” (p. xix); but as we saw in the previous chapter, this personalization is itself implicit in Bhabha’s own formulation. See also, Léopold Sédar Senghor’s ‘Negritude: A Humanism of the Twentieth Century’ from Wilfred Cartey and Martin Kilson (eds.), The African Reader: Independent Africa (London: Vintage, 1970), pp. 179-92, in Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory: A Reader, pp. 27-35.

32 Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, I.VII, p. 79.

33 Being and Time, I.4, p. 167.

34 ibid., I.4, p. 165.
For Heidegger, it is Dasein's potential to grasp its own temporality that distinguishes its authentic and inauthentic modes of Being, and this means its potential to grasp the existential projection of its authentic "Being towards death" (Sein zum Tode) as "Being-towards-the-end" (Sein zum Ende). It is only in the "anticipatory resoluteness" of Dasein's "Being towards death", that Dasein can grasp its own "potentiality-for-Being-a-whole". But it is not only in a futural sense that temporality (and thus authenticity) is to be understood; temporality is the comprehension of the future, present and having been, in "ecstatic unity":

The unity of the horizontal schemata of future, Present, and having been, is grounded in the ecstatic unit of temporality. The horizon of temporality as a whole determines that whereupon factically existing entities are essentially disclosed. With one's factical Being-there, a potentiality-for-Being is in each case projected in the horizon of the future, one's "Being already" is disclosed in the horizon of having been, and that with which one concerns oneself is discovered in the realm of the Present.35

The question is, how are we to bring each of these separate factors into clearer significance with one another: "authenticity", "ecstatico-horizontal temporality" and "anticipatory resoluteness"? For Heidegger, it is only in Dasein's potential comprehension of its own temporality as "ecstatico-horizontal" and its subsequent "anticipatory resoluteness" in the wake of that awareness that Dasein can grasp its authentic "potentiality-for-Being-a-whole".36 More simply, it is only when Dasein comes to recognise the certainty of its death within the time span of its own temporal existence, "future, Present and having been", that it can escape the inauthenticity of its "everydayness" and the "they".37

The future, the character of having been, and the Present, show the phenomenal characteristics of the "towards-oneself", the "back-to", and the "letting-oneself-be-encountered-by"...Temporality is the primordial "outside-of-itself" in and for itself. We therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the Present, the "ecstases" of temporality.38
In the “ecstasis” of “anticipatory resoluteness”, Dasein is thus disclosed to itself as its authentic self in the present. But while it is, perhaps, easy for us to understand the futural projection as the anticipation of one’s own death, and hence, one’s own “Being towards death”, it is less obvious how the past, or as Heidegger says, the “having been”, comes to presence in this process.

For Heidegger, the “having been” possesses a double signification for Dasein. It can be the “having been” which is the recollection of one’s authentic “Being-a-whole” as opposed to the tranquillised everyday inauthenticity of the “they”; or it can be the recollection of that inauthenticity. In both cases Heidegger characterises it as “repetition” (Wiederholung). In the ecstasis of “anticipatory resoluteness”, “having been” constitutes a disclosure of the possibility for Dasein to escape from the everyday inauthenticity of the “they” and grasp itself as, and for, itself. Hence, the unity of “ecstatico-horizontal temporality” means that “anticipatory-resoluteness” (as authentic “Being towards death”) triggers that recognition on the part of Dasein concerning what it “has been”. And this process makes manifest in the present Dasein’s authentic “potentiality-for-Being-a-whole”:

Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially futural so that it is free for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factual “there” by shattering itself against death—that is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is equi-primaarily in the process of having been, can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its thrownness and be in the moment of vision for “its time”.

3. Death

Dasein thus comes to understand what and how it fundamentally is, and that it is, in Time; and Death, or more accurately Dasein’s engagement with its own death, can clearly be seen to play a fundamental role in this understanding. But what is the existential-ontological character of death itself?

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger insists that the achievement of an existential-ontological conception of death, over and above any simple biological or psychological (ontical) conception, is imperative if we are to come to an understanding of Dasein’s “Being-as-a-whole”. But how are we to grasp the existential-ontological conception of death if, as Heidegger rightly points out at the beginning of his analysis:

---

39 In his later lecture series *What is Called Thinking?*, Heidegger develops this notion of Dasein’s recollection of its own Being in his examination of the assertion that “Memory is the gathering of thought” (II. p. 3).
40 *Being and Time*, II.5, p. 437.
When Dasein reaches its wholeness in death, it simultaneously loses the Being of its "there". By its transition to no-longer-Dasein, it gets lifted right out of the possibility of experiencing this transition and of understanding it as something experienced.\(^4\)

The answer would appear to lie in its experiencing the death of "Others":

In this way a termination of Dasein becomes "Objectively" accessible. Dasein can thus gain an experience of death, all the more so because Dasein is essentially Being with Others. In that case, the fact that death has been thus "Objectively" given must make possible an ontological delimitation of Dasein's totality.\(^4\)

Heidegger has thus, it would seem, established the existential-ontological significance of experiencing the death of Others in terms of Dasein's fundamental "Being-with-Others-in-the-world". But what is this death of Others that is experienced by Dasein? Heidegger describes the transition from life to death as one which involves the transition from "Being-in-the-world" to "Being-no-longer-in-the-world". The difference between the living Dasein and the dead corpse is thus a difference in Being, wherein the entity ceases to be a Dasein and becomes something "present-at-hand" (vorhanden),\(^4\) and is not merely "lifeless" like a stone, but becomes "unalive" (unlebendiges).\(^4\) But at the same time, can we assume that this "Being-with-the-dead" allows Dasein access to "the loss-of-Being as such which the dying man "suffers""? After all:

The dying of Others is not something which we experience in a genuine sense; at most we are always just "there alongside".\(^4\)

And, for Heidegger, this is because:

Dying is something that every Dasein itself must take upon itself at the time. By its very essence, death is in every case mine, in so far as it "is" at all. And indeed death signifies a peculiar possibility-of-Being in which the very Being of one's own Dasein is an issue.\(^4\)

\(^4\) ibid., II.1, p. 281.
\(^4\) ibid., II.1, p. 281.
\(^4\) ibid., II.1, p. 281.
\(^4\) ibid., II.1, p. 284.
\(^4\) ibid., II.1, p. 282.
\(^4\) ibid., II.1, p. 282.
\(^4\) ibid., II.1, p. 284.
So, if death is always "mine" and it cannot be authentically grasped in the death of Others, why introduce the experiencing of the death of Others at all? In dismissing the possibility of an "Objectively" accessible ontological conception of death as a possible "delimitation of Dasein's totality" Heidegger has steered us away from the premature conclusion that the existential-ontological conception of death is, or could be, anything other than "mine". Hence, "In dying, it is shown that mineness and existence are ontologically constitutive for death".  

But given that Dasein is "essentially Being with Others" we cannot simply dismiss Dasein's "Being with" as superfluous to Dasein's relation to death, indeed, in one important respect it is determinative for that relation in terms of the role of the "they" in Dasein's everyday dealing with death:

It is already a matter of public acceptance that "thinking about death" is a cowardly fear, a sign of insecurity on the part of Dasein, and a sombre way of fleeing from the world. The "they" does not permit us the courage for anxiety in the face of death.

Indeed, it is this "public acceptance" which Joseph Conrad described in 'The Return':

...and then came the idea, the persuasion, the certitude, that the evil must be forgotten — must be resolutely ignored to make life possible; that the knowledge must be kept out of mind, out of sight, like the knowledge of certain death is kept out of the daily existence of men.

And as we shall see in the following section, this is especially important when we come to consider Dasein's flight from the authentic disclosure of its own death as its own "Being towards death" and its retreat back into the security of the "they".

After demonstrating the fundamental "mineness" of Dasein's existential-ontological conception of death, Heidegger turns his attention to a more general analysis of death in terms of "care", discussed in the previous chapter as Dasein's "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-the-world". In doing so, he attempts to uncover the existential-ontological nature of death as belonging to the Being of Dasein, by examining how Dasein is "within-the-world". Thus, if we accept that death is "Being-at-an-end", Dasein must always be "Being-towards-the-end". In other words, death is

47 ibid., II.1, p. 284.
48 ibid., II.1, p. 298.
"something that stands before us – something impending." But not like a storm which may also be something which will happen. Death is, as we know, in each case "mine" and therefore Heidegger compares the impending character of death to something which Dasein itself can undergo; as something which Dasein itself can be:

Death [as impending] is a possibility-of Being which Dasein itself has to take over in every case. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being...Its death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there.

Death as "no-longer-being-able-to-be-there" is also that in which Dasein reaches its "wholeness" (as "Being-a-whole"); it is therefore not merely something in the future, something not yet and therefore removed from Dasein while it is. Death, in its certainty and inevitability and as the achievement of Dasein's totality, is constitutive of Dasein's Being in so far as Dasein is always already "Being towards death", its own death.

Heidegger's identification of "Being towards death" as the basic dynamic which underpins human existence is not, of course, original in itself: in The City of God, St. Augustine had already observed that

...from the moment a man begins to exist in this body which is destined to die, he is involved all the time in a process whose end is death...the whole of our lifetime is nothing but a race towards death, in which no one is allowed the slightest pause or any slackening of the pace.

But, then again, for Augustine, death is God's punishment for the transgression of Adam, and man's fear of death is only resolved in the exercise of divine grace. For Heidegger, Dasein's death is not offset against anything other than Dasein's own possibility:

Death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein's ownmost possibility – non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is, as Dasein's end, in the Being of this entity towards its end.

---

50 Being and Time, II.1, p. 294.
51 ibid., II.1, p. 294.
53 See, for example, Romans, 5:12; "Therefore, just as sin entered the world through one man, and death through sin, in this way death spread to all men, because all sinned."
55 Being and Time, II.1, p. 303.
This ontological conception of death as one’s “ownmost possibility” thus more fully clarifies the ontological context and role of death in the constitution of Dasein’s authentic and inauthentic modes of Being. But our understanding as to how Dasein comes to comprehend its own Being as a “Being towards death”, remains incomplete until we have examined the ontological “state-of-mind” (Befindlichkeit) which is constitutive of this comprehension. For Heidegger:

[A] state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us. Indeed, from the ontological point of view we must as a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to “bare mood”. And the “bare mood” (Stimmung) which discloses Dasein’s own “Being-in-the-world” as a “Being towards death” is “uncanniness” or, as Heidegger says, ‘Unheimlichkeit’.

4. Boredom and Anxiety

In Section 29 of Being and Time, Heidegger discusses how, “having a mood” and “how one is”, “brings Being to its “there””:

In having a mood, Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has been delivered over in its Being; and in this way it has been delivered over to the Being which, in existing, it has to be.


57 Once again, I have chosen to retain Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation, “state-of-mind”, over Dreyfus’s “affectedness”, which he interprets as “where-you’re-at-ness” and “being found in a situation where things and options already matter” (Being-in-the-world, p. 168). To my mind, this distorts Heidegger’s original meaning in precisely the direction against which his thought was progressing; namely, away from the idea of man being subject to “affects” from the outside.

58 Being and Time, 1.5, p. 177. See also Heidegger’s description, in ‘What is Metaphysics?’, of how “the founding mode of attunement [Befindlichkeit der Stimmung] not only reveals beings as a whole in various ways, but this revealing – far from being merely accidental – is also the basic occurrence of our Da-sein...[Thus] What we call a “feeling” is neither a transitory epiphenomenon of our thinking and willing behaviour nor simply an impulse that provokes such behaviour nor merely a present condition we have to put up with somehow or other”. ‘What is Metaphysics?’, trans. by David Farrell Krell, in Basic Writings, p. 100. See also, Michael Hour’s ‘Attunement and Thinking’, in Hubert Dreyfus and Harrison Hall (eds.), Heidegger: A Critical Reader (Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, 1992), pp. 159-172.

59 Being and Time, 1.5, p. 173. See also, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, where Heidegger explains the connection between mood and understanding within the context of “self-finding”; “In terms of fundamental ontology [the understanding of being] can also be expressed by saying that all understanding is essentially related to an affective self-finding which belongs to understanding itself. To be affectively self-finding is the formal structure of what we call mood, passion, affect, and the like, which are constitutive for all comportment toward beings, although they do not by themselves alone make such comportment possible but always only in one with understanding, which gives its light to each mood, each passion, each affect” (II:1:20, p. 281). See also, Bruce W. Billiard, The Role of Mood in Heidegger’s Ontology (Lanham: University Press of America, 1990).
“Mood” can thus be seen to rise out of “Being-in-the-world”, as a mode of Being, and disclose “Being-in-the-world” as a whole. And in the “event philosophy” of his famous 1929-30 lecture series collected under the title *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger explains that one of the most distinctive and important “moods” for Dasein is “boredom” (*Langeeweile*). As Safranski notes, for Heidegger, boredom is

The moment of pure lapse of time. Pure time, its pure presence...the moment when one notices that time is passing because it will not just then pass, when one cannot drive it away, make it pass, or as the saying goes, fill it meaningfully.

Dasein’s recognition of its own boredom is thus the acute recognition of its Being as a “being in Time” precisely because time appears to be standing still:

[T]he fundamental attunement of boredom constitutes an exceptional relationship to time in human Dasein...an intervention into time as a confrontation with time.

In other words, in boredom, the stalling of time distracts us from our concerns and discloses us and our concerns in the world in an oppressive and unsettling moment of emptiness. In saying this, Heidegger is careful to note that something boring, for example, “a thing, a book, a play, a ceremony, yet also a person, a group of people, indeed even an environment or place” is not boredom itself.

The characteristic of “boring”...belongs to the object and is at the same time related to the subject.

More specifically, in ‘What is Metaphysics?’, Heidegger explains that:

Boredom is still distant when it is only this book or that play, that business or this idleness, that drags on. It interrupts when “one is bored.” Profound boredom, drifting here and there in the abysses of our existence like a muffling fog, removes all things and

---

60 “We have seen that the world, Dasein-with, and existence are equiprimordially disclosed; and state-of-mind is a basic existential species of their disclosedness, because this disclosedness itself is essentially Being-in-the-world” (*Being and Time*, I.5, p. 176). See also, William J. Richardson on mood as the “ontological disposition”, in *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), pp. 66-66.

61 In his enthusiastic analysis of these lectures Safranski contends that “his findings in this respect are among the most impressive ideas ever put forward by Heidegger. Only very rarely, in the entire tradition of philosophy, has a mood been described and interpreted as in this lecture. Here boredom really becomes an event” (*Martin Heidegger*, p. 192).

62 *ibid.*, p. 192.


64 *ibid.*, I:2:21, p. 82.

65 *ibid.*, I:2:21, p. 84.
human beings and oneself along with them into a remarkable indifference. This boredom reveals beings as a whole.\footnote{Heidegger, ‘What is Metaphysics?’, p. 99.}

The revelation of “beings as a whole” in the “interruption” of boredom is an important example of that “understanding of Being” which we have already referred to, and which constitutes and makes manifest Dasein’s “openness for Being”. Moreover:

Time entrances [bannt] Dasein, not as the time which has remained standing as distinct from flowing, but rather the time beyond such flowing and its standing, the time which in each case Dasein itself as a whole is.\footnote{Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, 1:4:32, p. 147.}

Dasein is, in its Being, “openness to Being”, and it is in its various “states-of-mind” that this Being, the Being, as “Temporality” (Temporalität) that it itself is, is delivered over to it. But what is the meaning of this revelation of “beings as a whole” in boredom?

As Heidegger explains, in his *Introduction to Metaphysics*, it is the question; “Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?”:

[If] in a spell of boredom, when we are equally distant from despair and joy... when the stubborn ordinariness of beings lays open a wasteland in which it makes no difference to us whether beings are or are not... in a distinctive form, the question resonates once again: Why are there beings at all instead of nothing.\footnote{Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 2.}

Or as Camus puts it:

It happens that the stage sets collapse. Rising, street-car, four hours in the office or the factory, meal, street-car, four hours of work, meal, sleep, and Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday and Saturday according to the same rhythm – this path is followed most of the time. But one day the “why” arises and everything begins in that weariness tinged with amazement.\footnote{Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*, trans. by Justin O’Brien (New York: Vintage International, 1991), pp. 12-13.}

We will return to this “question”, and the consequences of its disclosure, at a later stage, but the important point for us here is Heidegger’s insistence that boredom as a “state-of-mind” is “by no means nothing ontologically”.\footnote{Heidegger, *Being and Time*, I:5, p. 173.} Indeed, Heidegger’s phenomenological demonstration (*Ausweisung*) of boredom illustrates, once again, the extent to which the existential-ontological analytic is founded in Dasein’s everyday “Being-in-the-world”. But at the same time, boredom is
not the “state-of-mind” which is most distinctive for Heidegger in the determination of Dasein’s authentic and inauthentic modes of Being, for that is “anxiety” (Angst).

Following my summary of Heidegger’s critique of psychology in the previous chapter, it is of course crucial that we sufficiently distinguish Heidegger’s ontological definition of “anxiety” as ‘Unheimlichkeit’ from Freud’s psychoanalytical conception of Neurotic Anxiety as Angst (or indeed Adler’s psychoanalytical definition of anxiety in terms of the inferiority complex and Melanie Klein’s hypothesis on the inter-relations between anxiety and composure\footnote{See, for example, Adler’s *The Neurotic Constitution* (New York: Dodd Mead and Company, 1926); and Klein’s ‘Our Adult World and Its Roots in Infancy’, in *Our Adult World and Other Essays* (London, Heinemann, 1963).}).

Freudian anxiety, though similarly opposed to composure in its fundamental characteristics, essentially describes a very peculiar type of psychic disorder which is founded in the repression of libidinal desires; desires which, in turn, are understood to be constituted in terms of a conception of the human consciousness that is divided into the ‘ego,’ the ‘super-ego’ and the ‘id’\footnote{In *Freud and Man’s Soul* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), Bruno Bettelheim has argued persuasively that Freud’s use of the German terms Ich (“I”), über-Ich (“over-I”), es (“It”) which have been translated into English by the Latinate terms “ego,” “super-ego” and “id” profoundly distorts the original meaning of these crucial terms in Freud’s thinking. The bulk of Bettelheim’s critique is, however, centred upon the excision of Freud’s conception of the Soul (die Seele) in English translation and the examination of the dire effect that this has had on our understanding of Freud’s work in the English-speaking world: indeed, Bettelheim goes so far as to suggest that Freud’s essentially “pessimistic and tragic view of life...has been mistranslated to fit American (cognitive) behaviourist theory” (p.108). These important qualifications do not, however, alter the fact that we must still strive to differentiate Freud’s conception of human consciousness from that which is proposed by Heidegger.}. In his *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* in 1933 Freud summarised the fundamental character of anxiety as follows:

Anxiety...is the reproduction of an old event which brought a threat of danger; anxiety serves the purposes of self-preservation and is a signal of a new danger; it arises from libido that has in some way become unemployable and it also arises during the process of repression; it is replaced by the formation of a symptom, is, as it were, psychically bound....\footnote{Sigmund Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, vol. II, trans. and cd. by James Strachey, (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 32, “Anxiety and Instinctual Life”, p. 117.}

For Freud, the ego is the true seat of anxiety and the “three main species of anxiety”, the realistic, the neurotic and the moral are connected with “the ego’s three dependent relations – to the external world, to the id and to the super-ego.”\footnote{ibid., p. 117.} It is not necessary for us to go into any greater detail of Freud’s subsequent elaboration upon this inter-relation within the context of the Oedipus Complex and the Pleasure-Unpleasure Principle, for we are already at a significant remove from Heidegger’s conception of what the human consciousness is and how it actually
functions: a remove which George Steiner can be seen to have overlooked when he maintains
that, “It is striking how closely Heidegger’s evocation of the uncanny resembles Freud’s famous
use of the term”.75

In the wake of our brief analysis of Heidegger’s ontological conception of death as “Being-
towards-the-end”, a more detailed account of the fundamental way in which Dasein actually
comes to grasp its own death is now required. And this account is made easier in the wake of our
clarification of the ontological significance and importance of “mood”. For it is in anxiety, as a
non-psychological phenomenon, that Dasein comes to understand itself as “Being-towards-the-
end” (Sein zum Ende), and for Heidegger, this anxiety, as “uncanniness” (Unheimlichkeit) is
founded in the fact that “to be the uncanniest is the basic trait of the human existence”.76 In his
reading of the famous choral ode on Man in Sophocles’s Antigone (lines 332-375), Heidegger
argues that, “man is the uncanniest”, and not only because human beings

...spend their lives essentially in the midst of the un-canny...but also because they step
out, move out of the limits that first and for the most part are accustomed and homely,
because as those who do violence, they overstep the limits of the homely, precisely in the
direction of the uncanny in the sense of the overwhelming.77

In contrast to Norman Brown’s confident assertion in Life Against Death, that

Apart from psychoanalysis there are no secular or scientific theories as to why man is the
restless and discontented animal...78

Heidegger’s analytic can thus be seen to ground human restlessness and discontentment in the
existential-ontological constitution of the being that we ourselves are. For Heidegger, this
anxiety is anxiousness (sichängsten) about something, and that something about which Dasein is
anxious is an entity with the character of “threatening” (bedrohen). Moreover, “this entity” that
threatens “has the same kind of being as the one that shrinks back”, this entity, “is Dasein
itself”.79

In order to unravel what Heidegger is getting at we must once again call to mind his emphasis
upon the “mineness” of Dasein’s conception of its own “Being-in-the-world”, and thus its own
“Being towards death”; and, at the same time, we must understand that anxiety as a “state-of-

---

77 ibid., p. 161. It is the more precise nature of this overstepping that I shall be concentrating upon in what
follows.
78 Norman O. Brown, Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History (1959) (London:
79 Being and Time, I.6, p. 230.
mind” “brings Being to its “there””. But in saying that Dasein is anxious about itself Heidegger does not necessarily mean that Dasein shrinks in the face of itself as when it would see its own reflection in a mirror. Indeed, Heidegger does not even mean that the entity is Dasein itself, he says that it has the “same kind of being” as Dasein. Furthermore, for Heidegger, this entity is not even a definite entity “within-the-world”; in fact, “That in the face of which one is anxious is completely indefinite”. So how are we, then, to define what it is? Especially when we read that

that in the face of which anxiety is anxious

...is characterised by the fact that what threatens is nowhere. Anxiety “does not know” what that in the face of which it is anxious is. We would thus appear to have come to a dead-end before we have even started. But if we recognise that “that in the face of which” Dasein is anxious is, for Heidegger, “nothing and nowhere within-the-world”, “the world as such” emerges as that (“threatening”) entity that we have been looking for; for as Heidegger says:

[T]he world as world is disclosed first and foremost by anxiety, as a state-of-mind.

The fundamental ontological significance of anxiety is thus revealed; but what is the character of this “world as world” which is disclosed? And why does it make us anxious? Heidegger once again insists that, “what oppresses us is not this or that, nor is it the summation of everything present-at-hand”; what it is, is, “the world itself”. And because, “ontologically...the world belongs essentially to Dasein’s Being as Being in the world”, for Heidegger:

Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious.

Hence, it is not the storm, the fire or the Other in themselves that anxiety is anxious about but the “threatening” disclosure of these things as the disclosure of “Being-in-the-world”. Anything can therefore project this “threatening”, but it is not the specific things themselves about which Dasein is anxious it is their disclosure to Dasein of Dasein’s own “Being-in-the-world”. More
accurately, that which is disclosed by the "threatening" storm in this instance is not primarily the 
storm, it is the potential "Non-being" of Dasein, as "Being towards death". The storm is thus not 
"Non-being", it discloses "Non-being" to Dasein in its "threatening" and in Dasein’s anxiety.57 
Anything can have the character of this "threatening", and anything can trigger the anxiety 
which discloses "Non-being". As Forster notes in his summary of the causes of the 
discomforting acoustics of the Marabar Caves:

Whatever is said, the same monotonous noise replies, and quivers up and down the walls 
until it is absorbed into the roof, "Boum" is the sound as far as the human alphabet can 
express it, or "bou-oum", or "ou-boum", - utterly dull. Hope, politeness, the blowing of a 
nose, the squeak of a boot, all produce "boum".58

So while we can speculate upon those things which are more likely to precipitate this chain of 
events, in doing so we run the risk of unintentionally transferring the primary existential- 
ontological significance to these things themselves (as cause) and away from Dasein and 
Dasein’s intentional comportment towards them.59 Anxiety can take place anywhere and "in the 
face of" anything, not just, or even specifically, "in the face of" the racial ‘Other’, or ‘India’ 
as is frequently implied in colonial discourse analysis. In fact what we must emphasise here is that the 
innocuous is just as likely to stimulate anxiety as the obvious in the sense that we have the 
potential to feel anxious "in the face of" a young child just as much as a charging Zulu impi; the 
ruins of a once great city or, as Thomas Carlyle tells us, the pretension of an unspectacular 
dinner party:

The world looks often quite spectral to me; sometimes, as in Regent Street the other night 
(my nerves being all shattered), quite hideous, discordant, almost infernal. I had been at 
Mrs Austin’s, heard Sydney Smith for the first time guffawing, other persons prating, 
jargoning. To me through these thin cobwebs Death and Eternity sat glaring.50

The possible disclosure of "Non-being" in "Being towards death", as an awareness of “Being-in-
the-world”, is always with us, for this is what we are.

57 The nature of this disclosure/apprehension is, of course, grounded in the “intentional comportments” of 
Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world” that we explained in the previous chapter; “a reciprocal belonging-
together of intentio and intentum” (History of the Concept of Time, p. 66).
59 See, for example, George Bataille’s assertion that “What is disclosed in defilement doesn’t differ 
substantially from what is revealed in death – the dead body and excreted matter are both expressive of 
sort of substance or circumstance to precipitate the disclosure/apprehension of “nothingness” in colonial 
literature will be discussed at more length in Chapter Four.
But, in saying this, are we not perhaps contradicting our earlier observation concerning the non-relationality of Dasein’s conception of “Being towards death”? In suggesting that storm, famine or war can trigger (or stimulate) anxiety, which discloses authentic “Being-in-the-world” as “Being towards death”, are we not implying, by default, that it is in, or because of, these things that Dasein comes to apprehend itself as itself, as it is? If we are to continue to maintain that “Being towards death” has the character of “mineness”, then we must now investigate the way in which the disclosure of Dasein’s authentic “Being-in-the-world” is founded in the phenomenon of Dasein which Heidegger calls “conscience” (Gewissen).

Conscience is the call of care from the uncanniness of Being-in-the-world – the call which summons Dasein to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-guilty.91

“Care” is, as we saw in the previous chapter, “ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (the world) as Being-alongside entities which we encounter (within-the-world)”.92 “Conscience” as the “call of care” is thus grounded in Dasein’s “Being-alongside entities” in the world and this gives us a clue with regard to how “conscience” can summon Dasein’s “ownmost potentiality-for-Being-guilty”. Furthermore, if we remember the point made with regard to Dasein’s apprehension, in anxiety, of what it has been (p. 60), we can comprehend what Heidegger means by “guilt” (Schuld). Dasein is made aware of its own immersion in the inauthentic world of the “they” by its own “conscience”. Its “conscience” calls Dasein to the potential realisation as to what it has been and thus, at the same time, to what it will be, namely “unalive” (unlebendiges).

“Conscience”, understood ontologically, is therefore that which facilitates Dasein’s ownmost potential comprehension of its own “potential-to-be-a-whole”. In other words, it introduces the “potentiality-for-Being-guilty” as a hypothetical intermediary point between anxiety and “anticipatory resoluteness”. At this hypothetical intermediary point, Dasein can either accept its own authenticity (which presupposes an acceptance of this “guilt”) or it can reject it and return to the “they”. Either way, with this clarification of “conscience”, the problem regarding the non-relationality of authentic “Being-in-the-world” has been resolved:

[C]onscience, in its basis and its essence, is in each case mine – not only in the sense that in each case the appeal is to one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being, but because the call comes from that entity which in each case I myself am.93

---

91 Being and Time, II.2, p. 335. See also, ‘The Existential Structure of Authentic Potentiality-for-Being which is Attested in the Conscience’, II.2, pp. 341-348.
92 Being and Time, II.1, p. 293.
93 ibid., II.2, p. 323.
As we know, Dasein may not embrace this "call". After all, the "call of conscience" is essentially anxiety, and hence, Dasein can retreat in the face of the "call" and return to the inauthentic Being of the "they":

When falling we flee into the "at-home" of publicness, we flee in the face of the "not-at-home"; that is, we flee in the face of the uncanniness which lies in Dasein - in Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-world, which has been delivered over to itself in its being.

We already know that the "world" that is being disclosed here means Dasein's "Being-in-the-world" and it is thus its own "Being-in-the-world" which Heidegger now tells us that Dasein "flees" (fliehen) from. This "fleeing in the face of" or "falling" is therefore not what one would perhaps imagine it to be, namely, the introversion of the Dasein - the reversion of the Dasein back to the Dasein and away from the "world" - but the exact opposite. Dasein "flees in the face" of itself (as "Being-in-the-world"), and therefore does not flee to itself, but to the "they" and the "world of its concern". This retreat of Dasein towards the "Being-at-home with all its obviousness - into the average everydayness of Dasein", is Dasein's attempt to escape the "not-being-at-home" (das Nicht-zuhause-sein), which for Heidegger is the existentially-ontological mode of "uncanniness" (Unheimlichkeit). In saying this, it is important to note that while

"Fallenness" into the "world" means an absorption in Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity....[This does not mean that] we take the fallenness of Dasein as a "fall" from a purer and higher "primal status". Not only do we lack any experience of this ontically, but ontologically we lack any possibilities or clues for interpreting it.

The distinction between uncanniness or "not-at-home-ness" as the primordially authentic mode of Being, and the "at-home" (Heimlichkeit) as the primordially inauthentic mode of Being, is thus not to be understood as a distinction between good and bad or higher and lower. Nor, for that matter, can these modes of Being be legitimately understood as being specific to various ontically-defined groups; as when, for example, Homi Bhabha would have us believe that

...the "unhomely" is a paradigmatic colonial and post-colonial condition, it has a resonance that can be heard distinctly, if erratically, in fictions that negotiate the powers of cultural difference in a range of transhistorical sites...[it] relates the traumatic ambivalences of a personal, psychic history to the wider disjunctions of political existence.

---

94 ibid., 1.6, p. 234.
95 ibid., 1.6, p. 233.
96 ibid., 1.5, p. 220
97 Bhabha, 'Introduction', The Location of Culture, pp. 9, 11.
Instead, "the not-at-home-ness" of anxiety and the "at-home" of its immersion in the "they", as the fundamental modes of Dasein's "Being-in-the-world", are necessarily universal.

But what is it about this "not-at-home-ness" which makes it so terrifying for Dasein? What is it about itself that Dasein flees from? For Heidegger, it is the fundamental "nullity" which is disclosed to it in its own "Being towards death"; the "nullity" that constitutes the basis of its own existence.

In this concernful fleeing lies a fleeing in the face of death – that is, a looking-away from the end of Being-in-the-world.

As William Richardson concisely puts it, "It is about Non-being that There-being [Dasein] is anxious". And what is the disclosure of "Non-being" if not the disclosure of "Being-in-time"? For in anxiety Dasein comes to grasp its own "Being-in-the-world" through its own "Non-being" and hence its "Being-towards-the-end". In this sense anxiety is essentially futural. But at the same time, through the "call" of conscience, Dasein is made aware of what it has been. And as such it comports itself temporally towards the future and the past in the present. In other words, in anxiety Dasein comes to "presence" (anwesen), before itself, as itself, in "ecstatico-horizonal temporality". But more importantly, as Heidegger would later argue, in anxiety, it is not just itself that Dasein encounters; it is not just the apprehension and disclosure that it itself is; for in the clear night of the nothing of anxiety, the original open-ness of beings as such arises: that they are beings and not nothing.

This is the question which, as we have already seen in relation to boredom, is disclosed in the Dasein's apprehension of being delivered over to its "there". And thus, if Dasein resists the temptation to retreat, self-deceived and cowering, back into the "they", in 'Unheimlichkeit' Dasein can encounter that "Non-being" which discloses the totality of all entities as they are:

Only because the nothing is manifest in the ground of Dasein can the total strangeness of beings overwhelm us. Only when the strangeness of beings oppresses us does it arouse

---

90 "The "nothing" with which anxiety brings us face to face, unveils the nullity by which Dasein, in its very basis, is defined; and this basis itself is as thrownness into death" (Being and Time, II.3, p. 356).
91 Being and Time, II.6, p. 477.
92 Richardson, Heidegger, p. 72.
93 Indeed, Steiner maintains that it is "the Pascalian-Lutheran stress on Angst [in Being and Time], with its affirmation of the nearness and time-governing presentness of death, that fuse Sein und Zeit into necessary oneness" (Heidegger, p. 79).
94 Steiner rightly refers to this "Non-being" as "an active "nothingness" (das nicht-ende Nichts, Sartre's le néant)" (Heidegger, p. 45), in other words, not in the sense of a passive, inert and natureless void.
95 Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?", p. 103.
and evoke wonder. Only on the ground of wonder – the revelation of the nothing – does the “why?” loom before us...[T]he question of the nothing puts us, the questioners, in question.  

5. Ontological heroism and “anticipatory resolution”

In the Epilogue to Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, William Richardson responds to the interpretations of Being and Time which have seen it as “a pure nihilism” (on account of its emphasis on “Non-being”); and, more importantly, have claimed that “an acceptance of anxiety as a privileged disposition is to raise cowardice to the level of philosophical virtue by which Being (sc. Non-being) is disclosed”. For Richardson:

The anxiety in question is not an emotional state on the ontic level of some psychological subject but the most fundamental modification of the ontological disposition... [A]cceptance to anxiety, thus understood, far from being a surrender to pusillanimity, constitutes that stout-hearted open-ness unto Being that alone can found genuine valour.

I will attempt to develop two aspects of Richardson’s defence: first, anxiety as a “fundamental modification of the ontological disposition” as opposed to an overtly simplistic psychological topic and, second, anxiety as “genuine valour”. It is only when we grasp the fundamental validity of the first of these statements that the full significance of Richardson’s second statement, concerning “valour”, will become apparent.

In Being and Time, Heidegger is conducting the existential-ontological analytic of Dasein; he is pursuing/thinking the meaning of Being and as such explicitly distinguishes his own enquiry from those of the positive sciences which are concerned with beings. The findings of Heidegger’s analysis are thus never to be confused with those of the ontical (positive) sciences. His phenomenological methodology, as the science of ontology, is only concerned with beings, in so far as it is, first and foremost, concerned with the Being of beings. As such, this Being, of which anxiety is a distinct mode, is precisely that which underpins the psychological mode of anxiety that is discussed by psychologists like Freud. Any analysis of Being and Time which

---

104 ibid., p. 109.
105 Richardson, Heidegger, p. 475.
106 Heidegger points out other investigations of anxiety and dread in a footnote in Being and Time (1.6, p. 235). In particular he singles out Soren Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Dread, which he calls a “psychological exposition of the problem of original sin”. Kierkegaard’s thesis, like Freud’s, is nonetheless primarily ontical and as such is underpinned by the structures and modes of Being outlined in Heidegger’s ontological thesis. This raises serious questions with regard to the excessive nature of Dreyfus’s comparison between Heidegger and Kierkegaard in Heidegger’s interpretation of fear and anxiety. Indeed Dreyfus contends that Heidegger “acknowledges...that his account of anxiety is a secular version of an explicitly Christian analysis developed by Kierkegaard” (Being-in-the-world, p. 304). See
interprets Heidegger's (ontological) anxiety as psychological anxiety has profoundly misunderstood the fundamental context, and fundamental objective, of Heidegger’s work as a whole.

But, if we take this observation a step further, precisely the same cautions must apply to the investigations that I will be conducting in my examination of colonial literature. It would be to miss the point entirely if it were to be imagined that the instances of ‘Unheimlichkeit’ that we will be studying in the work of Haggard, Kipling and Conrad constitute merely ‘psychological’ disturbances. This investigation is not an attempt to highlight the archetypically ‘anxious’ psychological context or character of colonial literature and its protagonists as a whole. It is an attempt to attend to the ways in which the ontological modes of “Being-in-the-world” and “Being-in-time”, for example, “Being towards death” and ‘Unheimlichkeit’, are to be found in the works of certain authors during the colonial era.

Turning now to the question of ‘valour’, and following Richardson, we must insist, from the outset, that the “valour” that is inherent in Heidegger’s conception of Dasein’s “potentiality-for-Being” is an ontological “valour” which is never to be confused, at root, with that specific type of ontically defined heroism that is found in the martyrdom of national patriots like Horatio Nelson or James Connolly; religious martyrs like Thomas More; or indeed any other type of martyrdom, from Steve Biko to Emily Davison. (This is not to say that the two are not potentially related, indeed, as we shall see, the former can be seen as that which, in certain cases, underpins and informs the latter. It is, nevertheless, imperative that we consistently bear this fundamental distinction in mind throughout the following explication.)

We have already seen how Dasein can grasp its own “Being-in-the-world” through the disclosure of its own “Non-being” (“Being towards death”) in anxiety and its subsequent flight from itself back into the tranquillised security of the “they”. So we must now ask at which point in this series of events does Heidegger understand Dasein to have “valour”. In his Preliminary Sketch of the Existential-ontological Structure of Death, he notes:

> With death, Dasein stands before itself in its own most potentiality-for-Being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein’s Being-in-the-world.\(^{107}\)

Now, if we can identify “Dasein’s Being-in-the-world” as the “issue” we should, perhaps, be able to extrapolate that it is in Dasein’s resolution to endure this standing before itself in anxiety...
that its potential for "valour" is to be found. Given the immanence of Dasein's potential flight "in the face of" itself, from its authentic "Being-in-the-world" back to its inauthentic "Being-in-the-world" in the "they", does Dasein's "valour" thus depend upon its ability to resist this flight? Heidegger says as much when he maintains that:

Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being-towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being - that is, its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being-free for (propensio in...) the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is.103

The disclosure/apprehension of authentic "Being-in-the-world" thus brings with it the choice between authenticity and inauthenticity. But this fundamental choice, as "Being-free for" (Freiein für), is qualified by Heidegger as a "possibility" and this corresponds to the emphasis that he has placed upon "potentiality" throughout his analysis. The "potentiality" of "Being-free for" is, nonetheless, not something that may not be, in the sense of something that has the potential to happen but may not; it is the constant "potentiality" that Dasein may or may not choose its authenticity in its "Being-free-for" that Heidegger is acknowledging. Dasein may not accept its "Being-free-for" it may instead retreat "in the face of" it back to the forgetfulness of the "they"; but that possibility itself "always is".

As we have already seen, when Dasein accepts the authenticity of its own "Being-in-the-world", when it resists the flight into the "they" and accepts its own "Being-towards-the-end", its own finitude, it anticipates its own death and it is this acceptance and anticipation which Heidegger calls "anticipatory resoluteness":106

Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of understanding one's ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-Being - that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence.110

It is thus, not just, as Montaigne would have it, that "Your life's continual task is to build your death",111 or that, following Cicero, that philosophizing is a preparation for death.112 It is the resolute retention of the understanding of "one's ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for Being" in life, as a "Being towards death", in anxiety that Heidegger is describing here.

---

103 ibid., 1.6, p. 232.
106 In order to maintain the emphasis upon the continual significance of "presencing" in Heidegger's thinking, it is useful to note Macquarrie and Robinson's insistence that "The etymological connection between "Entschlossenheit" ("resoluteness") and "Einschlossenheit" ("disclosedness") is not to be overlooked" (Being and Time, II.2, p. 243n).
110 Being and Time, II.1, p. 307.
112 ibid., p. 17.
In our earlier examination of the "ecstases" we saw that "anticipatory resoluteness" was Dasein's ability to grasp its own temporality as "the unity of the horizontal schemata of future, Present, and having been". But the "authentic existence" that Dasein chooses in "anticipatory resoluteness" is, more importantly, also that fully individualised existence which is Dasein's own. In other words, it is only in "anticipatory resoluteness" that Dasein is authentically "Being-one's-Self" as opposed to the inauthentic (collective) existence of the "they-self":

Death does not just "belong" to one's own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death lays claim to it as an individual Dasein. The non-relational character of death, as understood in anticipation, individualizes Dasein down to itself. This individualising is a way in which the "there" is disclosed for existence.

And this individualisation of Dasein in its "anticipation" of death is, of course, especially significant in the context of our own study given the homogenisation of the coloniser as 'the colonising subject' that we discussed in the previous chapter. For it is in the face of death, that these 'colonising subjects' are most fundamentally disclosed to themselves as the individuals that they themselves are. We will examine several instances of this ontological individualisation in death, in the chapters that follow and in doing so, it is essential that we recognise the fact that Heidegger does not mean that this individualised Dasein is subsequently estranged from the world, removed from it, as it were, in its individuality:

Resoluteness, as authentic Being-one's-Self, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating "I". And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than Being-in-the-world?

Dasein's authentic "Being-in-the-world" is thus not transferred to some transcendental or suprasensuous plain, outside of, or beyond Dasein - Dasein itself is transcendent. Hence, its potential to be authentically "its-Self" is grounded in its existence in the world. For indeed:

Resoluteness constitutes the loyalty of existence to its own self.

But let us not forget that this authentic "Being-in-the-world" is terrifying. Bound up in the disclosure of authentic "Being-in-the-world" in anxiety is the certainty (Gewissheit) of "Non-being", the certainty of death. Hence, "anticipatory resoluteness" in the face of that certainty

---

113 "[T]he transcendence of Dasein's Being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical individuation" (Being and Time, Introduction II, p. 62).

114 Being and Time, II.1, p. 308.

115 ibid., II.5, p. 344.

116 ibid., II.5, p. 443.
constitutes what Richardson called, "that stout-hearted open-ness unto Being that alone can found genuine valour". Indeed, Heidegger goes further still and maintains that:

When Dasein is resolute, it can become the "conscience" of Others. Only by authentically Being-their-Selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another - not by ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative fraternalising in the "they" and in what "they" want to undertake.\(^{117}\)

The heroism of "anticipatory resoluteness" has thus an extended significance in terms of a potentially authentic Being "with one another". And by this he means that in resolutely keeping the authenticity of one’s own “Being-in-the-world” as “Being towards death” before one’s self, and thus “Being-one’s-Self”, Dasein can interact and commune with the Others with whom it is in the world in a genuinely authentic way. But we must be careful not to pursue this too far in case it become confused with the psychological notion of a conscious resolution. “Anticipatory resoluteness” can inform Dasein’s psychological resolution but it is not that resolution itself.

The various definitions from the previous three sections - “Being in Time”, as authentic temporality, death as “Being-towards-the-end” and anxiety as the “state-of-mind” in which this is disclosed -- are now seen to culminate in the fact that, for Heidegger:

Temporality gets experienced in a phenomenally primordial way in Dasein’s authentic Being-a-whole, in the phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness.\(^{118}\)

In *White Mythologies*, Robert Young makes the following observation about, and issues warning to, critics of English literature:

Every time a literary critic claims a universal ethical, moral, or emotional instance in a piece of English literature, he or she colludes in the violence of the colonial legacy in which the European value or truth is defined as the universal one.\(^{119}\)

Does this mean that my adoption of Heidegger’s existential-ontological analytic of Dasein in the critique of colonial literature which follows, involves my collusion “in the violence of the colonial legacy”? Are all universals, when claimed by a European, then automatically colluding in this “violence”?\(^{120}\) And what makes it collusion? The European-ness of the “value or

\(^{117}\) ibid., II.2, pp. 344-345.

\(^{118}\) ibid., II.3, p. 351.

\(^{119}\) Young, *White Mythologies*, p. 124.

\(^{120}\) See, for example, Chinua Achebe’s 1975 essay ‘Colonialist criticism’ in which he famously announced that he “should like to see the word *universal* banned altogether from discussions of African literature until such time as people cease to use it as a synonym for the narrow, self-revealing parochialism of Europe”. From *Hopes and Impediments: Selected Essays 1965-1987* (London: Heinemann, 1988), in *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader*, pp. 57-61, p. 60. See also, Charles Larson’s
truth", the European-ness of the "universalism", or the European-ness of the desire of the critic to make the claim? This type of warning, while effectively prohibiting certain modes of interpretation, can, more importantly, be seen to slam the door on an engagement with the Being that we ourselves are. And yet, such warnings and prohibitions are a commonplace in postcolonial theory and colonial discourse analysis; for example, Benita Parry insists that:

When critics discern in Kipling's work insights into an essential human nature and a permanent human condition, they reveal their own complicity in notions of universality and class orientation."122

What Young and Parry are concerned with here is not just the liberal critical tradition which they see as having failed to address the serious colonialist, racist and supremacist dimensions of colonial literature.123 They are more specifically concerned with, what Bart Moore-Gilbert has called

...a direct and material relation between the political processes and structures of (neo)colonialism on the one hand and, on the other, Western regimes of knowledge and modes of cultural representation."124

And, as Ania Loomba has observed:

By pointing out how deeply its knowledge systems were imbricated in racial and colonialist perspectives, scholars such as Bernal, Said, or Spivak have contributed to, indeed extended, the discrediting of the project of the European Enlightenment by post-structuralists such as Foucault. The central figure of Western humanist and Enlightenment discourses, the humane knowing subject, now stands revealed as a white male colonialist."125

earlier 'Heroic Ethnocentrism: The Idea of Universality in Literature', in which he argues that "The time has come when we should avoid the use of the pejorative term "universal". What we really mean when we talk about universal experiences in literature are cultural responses that have been shaped by our own Western tradition". 'Heroic Ethnocentrism', The American Scholar 42, 3 (1973), in The Post-Colonial Studies Reader, pp. 62-65, p. 63.

121 See, for example, Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin's claim that, "European theories themselves emerge from particular cultural traditions which are hidden by false notions of "the universal"; and that "The political and cultural monocentrism of the colonial enterprise was a natural result of the philosophical traditions of the European World and the systems of representation which this privileged" (The Empire Writes Back, pp. 11-12).

122 For further examples, see Parry's critique of Alan Sandison's The Wheel of Empire in 'The Contents and Discontents of Kipling's Imperialism', New Formations, 6, Winter 1988, pp. 49-64, p. 51, and JanMohamed's description of the "humanistic closure" in M.M. Mahood's The Colonial Encounter, which "requires the critic systematically to avoid an analysis of the domination, manipulation, exploitation, and disenfranchisement that are inevitably involved in the construction of any cultural artefact or relationship." 'The Manichean Allegory', in "Race", Writing and Difference, p. 78.


124 Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, p. 65.
If this is the case, the question which presents itself is whether or not Heidegger's Dasein is "a white male colonialist"? Certainly, as I explained in the previous chapter, Heidegger's ontology should not be confused with conventional 'humanism': as he explained in his 'Letter on Humanism':

Humanism is opposed because it does not set the *humanitas* of man high enough.\(^{126}\)

Nor can his work, as a whole, be easily accommodated within "Enlightenment discourses" given that it is precisely these discourses which he explicitly sets out to "deconstruct" (*überwinden*)\(^{127}\) in *Being and Time*; in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*; in his Nietzsche lectures; and in the series of essays collected in *The Question Concerning Technology*.\(^{128}\) The fact that Heidegger has himself played an important role in the "discrediting of the project of the European Enlightenment" does not, however, free us from the accusation that in choosing to attend to the ontological structures of Dasein in colonial literature we will automatically be suppressing and eliding the oppressive and exploitative ideological dimensions of that literature.

But, then again, this accusation – which effectively amounts to a charge of neo-colonialism – cannot have any authority if it is issued from a theoretical position which elucidates these dimensions in terms of an "Enframed" colonial reality and (falsely ontologised) coloniser and colonised. "[A]uthority can, indeed must, be analysed",\(^{129}\) as Said has said. And I am not arguing that it can not or should not be analysed. The ways in which individuals are influenced by their culture, nationality and race must and can be studied. I am not arguing that these influences do not exist, should not be taken into consideration, or should be replaced by an ontological interpretation.

---


\(^{129}\) *Orientalism*, p. 20.
What I am arguing here, is that the fact of these influences, the reality of injustice, the history of exploitation, the horror of brutality and oppression, does not mean that we can subsequently cut the ontological cloth to fit the theoretical coat in our attempts to understand them. In other words, the ordering and securing of colonialism and the coloniser as “structured image” (GeBild), though initiated under the auspices of an irreproachable desire to uncover and explain the nature of exploitation, brutality and oppression, is not irreproachable in itself. Nor can all criticism of it be dismissed as merely neo-colonial. The question which concerns us, and the question which I will continue to ask, is not whether these colonial dimensions are present, but whether or not we have truly uncovered and explained them when, in the process of uncovering and explaining, the subject matter has been fundamentally distorted and manipulated.

The existential-ontological interpretation of the fictional coloniser in colonial literature that will be conducted in the following chapters does not constitute a neo-colonial elision of political or racial difference simply because it fails to provide broad gauged judgements on colonialism or offer up instances of discursive functionality. Far less is it an endeavour to identify and promote that which Harold Bloom calls a ‘primal aesthetic value, free of history and ideology’. What is undertaken is a reading of these fictional representations as “beings in the world” instead of the theoretically constructed and colonially-determined automatons of colonial discourse analysis: not as the only correct or legitimate reading of the literature in question, but as a reading which opens up new horizons of meaning which have thus far been overlooked.

In short, it is a reading which attends to the ways in which these characters can be seen to exhibit those fundamental modes of “Being-in-the-world” that Heidegger understands as being determinative and constitutive of Dasein’s Being. For, if these characters are to be examined as reflections and articulations, representations or descriptions, of the historical coloniser, and therefore capable of offering us insights into colonialism as a whole, then any correlations which are drawn between the two can be seen to automatically involve the positing or presupposition of a plane of correspondence. And in colonial discourse analysis, this plane of correspondence is founded upon that which Neil Lazarus has called “a tendency to collapse the social into the discursive” via a belief in

... the inherent susceptibility of all social practises, conceived as signifying systems, to structural linguistic analysis.\(^{131}\)

---


In contrast, the plane of correspondence upon which the following reading is based, is defined in terms of Heidegger's description of the existential-ontological constitution of Dasein. And as such, it is important to recognise that the fundamental structures of Dasein's "Being-in-the-world", though undoubtedly complex, are nonetheless founded in the everyday, and concern what, how and that the human subject is in the world. It would therefore be a mistake to imagine that they are beyond the descriptive capabilities of the writers that I will be examining. H. Rider Haggard, Rudyard Kipling and A.E.W. Mason write about human beings and in so doing, they describe, however crudely and unintentionally, the a priori structures of Being which are constitutive of these human beings.  

In making this point, I am consciously drawing a distinction between Haggard, Kipling and Mason and the more familiar authors of existentialism; for example, Proust, Rilke and Hölderlin who have self-consciously attempted to write Being and have been analysed and praised by Heidegger and others for doing so. So while the writers in the following chapters are not engaged in the same creative and philosophical endeavour, they are, nonetheless, as describers of men, inevitably describing the Being of men, however coarsely. And it is this that I shall be focusing upon.

Hence, I am not seeking to make a ludicrous comparison between Haggard and Proust, nor am I attempting to posit Haggard as a precursor (even an unconscious precursor) of Heideggerian existential-ontology. I am attempting to demonstrate the ways in which the characters in these books comply with, and exhibit, the fundamental modes of "Being-in-the-world" that we have been examining, and that these modes of Being disclose important insights into the colonial experience itself. For if the colonial experience, encounter, or phenomenon is to be understood at all, then we must, as Heidegger says in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics:

...precisely avoid losing ourselves in some particular sphere which has been artificially prepared or forced upon us by traditional perspectives that have ossified instead of preserving and maintaining the immediacy of everyday Dasein.

Furthermore, these writers are themselves "beings in the world", as are the reading public, and this is especially important when we come to consider the ways in which authors and their readership have been "Enframed" in postcolonial theory and colonial discourse analysis' deliberations upon the cultural politics of colonial literature and cultural imperialism at large.

In other words, it must be understood as having been initiated and directed by the human beings that the colonisers and the colonised were, and not the artificially homogenised, un-worlded and de-humanised theoretical construct of colonial discourse analysis.
CHAPTER III: Being in Time and the fictional coloniser

In Heidegger's existential-ontological analytic, Dasein's individuality is ontologically grounded and made manifest in its "authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self" (eigentlichem Selbst-sein-können). This means, Dasein always already has the potential to be itself, and it is this "potentiality" that is overlooked, if not altogether negated, in colonial discourse analysis' homogenising representation of the fictional and historical coloniser as 'the colonising subject'. The validity of this postcolonial homogenisation is thus, I would argue, not primarily disproven in the documenting of instances of non-conformity, eccentricity and rebellion; though these are undoubtedly significant in themselves, it is always already disproven, at base, in the fundamental ontological constitution of Dasein itself.

This is not to say, however, that all of the fictional and historical colonisers examined in this chapter are always authentically themselves; as we saw in the previous chapter, Dasein oscillates between its authentic and inauthentic modes of Being, between its own "potentiality-for-Being" and its "they-self":

Dasein is authentically itself only to the extent that, as concernful Being-alongside and solicitous Being-with, it projects itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being rather than upon the possibility of the they-self.2

It is in the world of the "they" that the fictional and historical coloniser, as "they-self", occupies itself with all of the various concerns of the "they". In other words, it is occupied with the 'publicness' of colonial society, the politics of colonial administration, the conceits and prejudices of race consciousness; in fact, with every conceivable collective 'colonial' affiliation, bigotry and affectation. At the same time, the fictional and historical coloniser as "they-self" must also be seen to occupy itself with, and be concerned by, the peculiarities of its own everyday relationships, its own health, its own sexuality, its own family, addictions and interests:

Dasein's facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed [zerstreut] itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining....All these ways of Being-in have concern as their kind of Being.2

1 See, for example, Bernard Porter, Critics of Empire: British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa 1895-1914 (London: Macmillan, 1968).
2 Being and Time, II.1, p.308 (my emphasis)
3 ibid, I.2, p. 83.
All of these circumspective dealings, involvements, encounters, associations and opinions, colonial and otherwise, are, for Heidegger, the always ambiguous, always various characteristics of Dasein’s ontical “concern” (Besorgen):

The everyday interpretation of the Self...has a tendency to understand itself in terms of the “world” with which it is concerned. When Dasein has itself in view ontically, it fails to see itself in relation to the kind of Being of that entity which is itself.

And yet it is precisely the “everyday interpretation of the Self” as the coloniser, the ‘white man’ and the ‘European’ and all of its colonial concerns that has been ontologised in colonial discourse analysis; an ontologisation which, I would argue, is responsible for the negation of Dasein’s “potentiality-for-being-its-Self”. As we saw in Chapter One, in colonial discourse analysis’ theoretical “Enframing” of the coloniser as ‘the colonising subject’, each coloniser is regulated and secured in such a way as to render it always already, and at every level of its Being, archetypically representative of the whole. And the point that I am making here, is that that which is ontologised in this regulation and securing is the coloniser’s “everyday interpretation of the Self”; for example, the everyday interpretation of Cromer when he opines: “the European is a close reasoner”.

Or, to put it another way, colonial discourse analysis concerns itself with the theoretical explication of the operation of this everyday ‘colonial’ (‘white’, ‘European’) understanding, and the organisation of it as coherently distinctive strains of colonial discourse. But as we have already seen, this “everyday understanding”, as the Being of Dasein’s immersion in the manifold ontical concerns of the “they”, is fundamentally resistant to such quasi-ontological organisations and explications. The theoretical edifice of an “Enframed” racial, political or national homogeneity in colonial discourse analysis is thus, I would argue, artificially constructed upon that which is, by its very nature, the foundation of Dasein’s heterogeneity.

Against this artificial homogenisation, I will concentrate, in this chapter, upon some of the ways in which the historical coloniser can be recognised as always already having the “potentiality-for-being-its-Self”; a “potentiality” which is to be found in the ways in which that coloniser (as Dasein) understands himself and exists as a “being in Time”. More specifically, I will argue that, in colonial literature, the depiction of certain basic modes of Dasein’s Being make manifest Dasein’s own ‘temporality’ and illustrate its own “potentiality-for-being-its-Self”; a

---

4 See, ibid, I.3, p. 95.
5 See, ibid, I.3, p. 115.
6 ibid, II.3, p. 368.
manifestation and illustration, moreover, which can be understood to reflect the fundamentally heterogeneous ways in which Dasein and the world are delivered over to Dasein’s own Being as “there”.

1. Being in Time

Being and its modes and characteristics have their meaning determined primordially in terms of time...what we shall call "Temporal" determinateness.®

Heidegger calls the “specific movements in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along” in Time, “historizing”.® And Dasein’s “historizing” is itself to be understood in terms of the distinction between the inauthentic “historicality”® of the “they-self” (in the everyday) and the authentic “historicality” of “anticipatory resoluteness”. This distinction constitutes the fundamental ontological differentiation in Dasein’s understanding of itself as itself, in Time. As Heidegger explains, inauthentic “historicality” is characterised by the dispassionate retrospective and future everyday consideration of past and future events; and authentic “historicality” is characterised by the ‘resolute’ projection of oneself upon the horizon of the past and the horizon of the future in such a way that one’s own “Being towards death”, and thus, one’s own “Being-towards-the-end” and “non-Being”, is dramatically disclosed. In both cases, the fundamental disclosure, or unconcealment, of where, what and how one is, as well as the disclosure that one is, is always characterised by “mineness”. And what is more, it must be understood that, for Heidegger, “Entities are grasped in their Being as ‘presence’”. In other words, they must be comprehended with regard to “a definite mode of time – the “Present” [“die ‘Gegenwart’”]”®

(a) “Idle Talk” and the Inauthentic Temporality of the “They”

Our Fathers in a wondrous age,
Ere yet the Earth was small,
Ensured to us an heritage,
And doubted not at all
That we, the children of their heart,
Which then did beat so high,
In later time should play like part

® ibid, Introduction II, p. 40n. For Heidegger’s discussion and definition of “The Primordial Phenomenon of Truth”, see, Being and Time, I,6, pp.262-269. See also, his description of the “primordiality” of the existential-ontological analytic of Dasein, Being and Time, I, pp. 274-278.

® ibid, II, p. 427.

® ibid, II,5, pp. 429-439.

® ibid, Introduction II, p. 47.
Here Kipling articulates his understanding of a national past and future coalescing in the collective responsibility of the national present. For Kipling, "we" are the children of our fathers, the fathers of our children, the holders of a precious legacy; this is what "we" are. As a definition of collectivity and purpose, Kipling's poem summons up those "myths of nationhood" which Graham Dawson has described as providing "a cultural focus around which the national community could cohere". As such, in Heideggerian terms, these myths represent a distinctive mode of the inauthentic historicality of the "they". As a collective understanding of purpose they serve to facilitate the everyday interpretation and understanding of the Self in Time as the "they-self". In ontological terms, the concept and burden of this understanding can be seen to represent the self-deceptive belief in the continuation of the Self in Time after death. By this I mean that, Kipling's (and nationalism's) projection of the Self in relation to one's real and hypothetical ancestors and descendants, in abstract continuity, is an understanding which manifests Dasein's avoidance of the "non-Being" that it itself is. It constitutes one mode of Dasein's flight from death; the flight from death in which Dasein immerses itself in the rhetoric of, for example, the collective eternity, purpose and identity which is evoked in Tennyson's 'To India and the Colonies':

May we find, as ages run,
The mother featured in the son;
And may yours forever be
That old strength and constancy
Which has made your fathers great
In our ancient island State...

Shall we not thro' good and ill
Cleave to one another still?
Britons myriad voices call.
"Sons, be welded each and all,
Into one imperial whole,
One with Britain, heart and soul!
One Life, one Flag, one Fleet, one Throne,"

12 In the later poem 'The Birthright' (Debts and Credits), Kipling describes this same legacy as an inheritance of precious stones, which "We neither guard nor garner, but abuse; / So that our scholars — ney, our children — fling / In sport or jest treasure to arm a King; / And the gross crowd, at feast or market, hold / Traffic perforce with dust of gems and gold!" (Definitive Verse, pp. 761-762). The analogy thus serves to underline the pricelessness of the legacy bequeathed and the carelessness with which it is being squandered.
14 It would be interesting to examine this definition of nationalism, and a national afterlife as a flight from death in the context of the growth of a more fervent European nationalism in late nineteenth-century industrial Europe.
Britons, hold your own.¹⁵

For, as Heidegger says, the "they" "provides a constant tranquilisation about death" and what is more, "does not permit us the courage for anxiety in the face of death".¹⁶ In holding out the myth of a collective national posterity, nationalism can be seen to tranquilise and mask the authentic ontological meaning of death as "Being-towards-the-end". And this tranquilising and masking of death by the "they" is, for Heidegger, to be found lurking in what he calls the "chatter" and "gossip" of "idle talk" (Gerede).

From the very beginning of his explication of "idle talk", Heidegger insists that "The expression "idle talk" is not to be used here in a "disparaging signification",¹⁷ and this must necessarily and constantly be borne in mind in what follows in this chapter and this study as a whole.

For Heidegger, "The "they" prescribes one's state-of-mind, and determines what and how one "sees"" and it does this through language:

In language, as a way things have been expressed or spoken out [Augesprochenheit], there is hidden a way in which the understanding of Dasein has been interpreted...The way things have been expressed or spoken out is such that in the totality of contexts of signification into which it has been articulated, it preserves an understanding of the disclosed world and therewith, equiprimordially, an understanding of the Dasein-with of Others and of one's own Being-in.²⁸

And this clearly brings us back to the ontological presuppositions which invariably exist in the ontical sciences previously discussed in Chapter One. But, whereas before, these presuppositions were examined in relation to the constitution of the existential-ontological analytic as a whole, here Heidegger describes their more specific ontological significance in the context of Dasein's authentic and inauthentic historicality:

Idle talk...is the kind of Being which belongs to Dasein's understanding when that understanding has been uprooted...Ontologically this means that when Dasein maintains itself in idle talk, it is -- as Being-in-the-world -- cut off from its primary and primordially genuine relationships-of-Being towards the world, towards Dasein-with, and towards its very Being-in.²⁹

¹⁶ Being and Time, II.1, p. 298.
¹⁷ ibid, I.5, p. 211
¹⁸ ibid, I.5, p. 213.
¹⁹ ibid, I.5, p. 214.
What and how Dasein and its world is, is “covered up” (verdecken) in “idle talk”, and from this we can begin to draw comparison with Heidegger’s later description of the “challenging revealing” of “Enframing”. In both cases, what we are dealing with is the way in which Dasein comes to understand itself and its world, the way in which Dasein and its world are disclosed in themselves in the present, and not as a peculiarity of a peculiarly scientific method, but as the “kind of Being of everyday Dasein’s understanding and interpreting”. The “Enframing” of colonial discourse analysts and the “idle talk” of Kipling’s understanding of “heritage” are thus shown to be the same; not because they are both fictions, in the sense of Hobsbawm and Ranger’s “invention of tradition”, but because they both constitute a peculiar kind of “revealing”, an understanding and interpretation of what and how things are.

In pointing out that the “they” “prescribes one’s state-of-mind, and determines what and how one “sees””, it is essential that we do not confuse this ontological characterisation (and its “idle talk”) with colonial discourse analysis’ conception of colonial discourse or indeed Gramsci’s ideological description of the dominant class and its hegemonic manipulation of popular opinion in order to retain political power. The “idle talk” of the “they” certainly includes, and is made manifest in, Kipling’s appeal to “heritage” and “posterity”; but it cannot be confined to Kipling, or indeed the various ideological positions from which he is held to speak.

What I am suggesting is an altogether different conception of the operation of ideology and discourse, one that is founded in the Being of Dasein. For Heidegger, the expression “idle talk” denotes the collective wisdom of every conceivable ideal, virtue, law, value, fad, rationale and ‘world-view’ which circulates and has currency in the ‘public realm’. So while we must

20 As Heidegger explains in History of the Concept of Time, “The deficient mode of disclosing the world is the disguising of it, and the corresponding mode of covering up disposition is inversion” (History of the Concept of Time, 1.4 p. 273).

21 See also, Heidegger’s description of “Curiosity” (Neugier) which, in conjunction with “idle talk” (Gerede) and “ambiguity” (zweifelhaftigkeit), characterises the Being of Dasein’s everydayness: Curiosity “concerns itself with a kind of knowing, but just in order to have known. Both this not tarrying in the environment with which one concerns oneself and this distraction by new possibilities, are constitutive items for curiosity; and upon these is founded the third essential characteristic of this phenomenon, which we call the character of “never dwelling anywhere” (Aufenthaltslosigkeit). Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere. This mode of Being-in-the-world reveals a new kind of Being of everyday Dasein -- a kind which is constantly uprooted” (Being and Time, 1.5, p. 217, my emphasis).

22 Being and Time, 1.5, p. 211.

23 The “invention of tradition” is “taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature which seeks to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past” (Hobsbawm and Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, p. 1).

24 See, for example, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. and trans. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971), pp. 245-266.

25 See, for example, Martin Green’s rather conventional assertion that “Kipling served the master class of an empire...He was not himself of the aristocratic cast, by physique, temperament, or heritage. He was its hereditary bard”, The English Novel in the Twentieth Century: The Doom of Empire (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 31, 20.
certainly recognise the existence and influence of those social, cultural, political and environmental factors which poststructuralists call “discourses”, these are, as the “idle talk” of ‘beings’, in their essence, necessarily non-specific, various and ambivalent. In other words, they are non-generalisable. The distinction being made here is thus to be understood as a distinction founded in a recognition of the ways in which these things can be thought; and as such, is not a comment on the superficiality of the ontical over the authenticity and depth of the ontological. “Idle talk” is, after all, that which we most concern ourselves with, feel most passionately about, identify ourselves with or against; it is the “talk” which affected to justify the annexation of Basutoland in 1868 as well as that which inspired the Boxer Rebellion in 1900; it is the public outcry at the slaughter in Amritsar in 1919, and the rhetoric behind Gandhi’s campaigns of Civil Disobedience.

In the specific context of the inauthentic historicality of Kipling’s “heritage”, however, a yet more pertinent example of “idle talk” is provided by Jean-Paul Sartre in his Preface to Fanon’s *The Wretched of the Earth*:

> You know well enough that we are exploiters. You know too that we have laid our hands on first the gold and metals, then the petroleum of the “new continents”, and that we have brought them back to the old countries.®

Far from being noble and heroic, the imperial legacy bequeathed to us by “our” colonial forefathers is, for Sartre, one which brings with it universal shame and guilt:

> It is true, you are not settlers, but you are no better. For the pioneers belonged to you; you sent them overseas, and it was you they enriched... With us, to be a man is to be an accomplice of colonialism, since all of us without exception have profited by colonial exploitation.®

Sartre’s conception of our collective ‘heritage’ in Time is, in contrast to Kipling’s, constructed in terms of the indissoluble link which he understands to exist between (direct and indirect) economic gain and moral guilt. George Orwell concurs, “We all live by robbing Asiatic coolies”...

...and those of us who are “enlightened” all maintain that those coolies ought to be set free; but our standard of living, and hence our “enlightenment”, demands that the robbery shall continue.®

---

® ibid., pp. 12, 21-22 (my emphasis).
® Orwell, ‘Rudyard Kipling’ from *Dickens, Dali and Others* (1942), in *Kipling and the Critics*, pp. 77.
Nonetheless, it is clear that Sartre, like Kipling, interprets and understands what and how “we” fundamentally are, “the settler which is in every one of us”, in relation to a common past. In both cases what we are dealing with is “idle talk” as the call to self-realisation, the positing (as a “covering up”) of what and how “we” are in ourselves, towards each other and in the future.

In drawing this comparison, I want to emphasise the crucial fact that there is no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ to “idle talk”. This is because it denotes an ontological as opposed to an ethical characterisation. Furthermore, what we must continue to emphasise is that the non-specificity and ambivalence of “idle talk” and the “totality of contexts of signification into which it has been articulated”, means that we cannot detach and promote one strain of “idle talk” as wholly dominant and therefore universally determinative. For, in doing so, we ourselves are engaging in “idle talk”; the “idle talk” of “Enframing”; the “Enframing” which characterises colonial discourse analysis.

(b) “Idle Talk” and the Fictional Coloniser

So, if the “idle talk” of the “they” is fundamentally constitutive of the inauthentic historicity of the historical coloniser’s “everydayness”, what does this mean in the context of our investigation of colonial literature? What does an analysis of the everyday dispersion in the “idle talk” of the “they” in colonial literature tell us about the historical coloniser’s “potentiality-for-Being-itself and its ontologically grounded individualisation”? And if it is the “they” which “prescribes one’s state-of-mind, and determines what and how one “sees””, then, are we not, by introducing “idle talk”, attempting to establish the individuality of the historical coloniser in that very mode of Dasein’s Being in which it is furthest from itself – as the “they-self”?

In order to clarify more fully the terms under discussion, we will return briefly to Edward Said’s definition of Orientalism, in which he describes the “uneven exchange between various types of power”, and in particular, his assertion that “power cultural” designates the “orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values” and “power moral” denotes the “ideas about what “we” do and what “they” cannot do or understand as “we” do”. For Said:

It is hegemony, or rather the result of cultural hegemony at work, that gives Orientalism the durability and strength that I have been speaking about so far...[1]he major component in European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all

---


Orientalism, p. 12.
the non-European peoples and culture. There is in addition the hegemony of European ideas about the Orient, themselves reiterating European superiority over Oriental backwardness, usually overriding the possibility that a more independent, or more sceptical, thinker might have had different views on the matter.31

And it is precisely this concluding emphasis upon the "overriding" of independent thinking which underpins Said's homogenistic conception of an ontologically conditioned European racism, imperialism and eurocentrism.32

In general terms, these modes of "power" (as "hegemony") are representative of "idle talk", but as we have already seen, it is not in general terms that Said understands "power cultural" and "power moral" to function and have meaning. For Said, these modes of "power" are posited in terms of an explicitly prioritised Orientalist (and colonial) meaningfulness and, what is more, a comprehensiveness of application, operation and influence which assumes ontological dimensions. In other words, Said understands these modes of "power" as being fundamentally constitutive of the 'European', 'white', coloniser's Being and that "what is thought, said, or even done about the Orient" is ultimately founded in them.

This is the hegemony of colonialism and colonial discourse, and as such it encompasses everything from the manly values that are imbued on the playing fields of Eton to the protestant work ethic; from the sexual proprieties of the middle classes to the myth of a civilising mission and the sanctity of free trade. More accurately, these are the characteristic auxiliary structures of 'Englishness' as "structured image" (GeBild) discussed in Chapter One; the ideological, moral and social frameworks which define the thoughts, words and actions of the English. And while it is incontestable that these values, ethics and myths have exerted a powerful influence upon whole generations of English men and women, the question which must be asked is whether or not Said, and postcolonial studies in general, has accurately understood and interpreted the extent and character of this influence in his critical assessment of the fictional and historical coloniser. To put the question another way, does Said's concept of a 'colonising subject' that is fundamentally and exclusively organised in terms of these influences, as the ground of an assumed or asserted homogeneity, actually reflect what and how the fictional and historical coloniser is, or what and how these influences are? Or are we merely dealing in the custom-built "structured images" (GeBild) of academic speculation?

As Said himself makes plain, this question must, in turn, be referred back to the age-old problem of how to

31 ibid, p. 7.
32 See, ibid, p. 203.
...recognize individuality and [at the same time] to reconcile it with its intelligent, and by no means passive or merely dictatorial, general and hegemonic context?\textsuperscript{35}

Said's equivocation and inconsistency on this issue has been noted by, among others, Robert Young:

\[\text{[I]n the most traditional, indeed theological, manner, Said wants to hang on to the individual as agent and instigator while retaining a certain notion of system and historical determination.}\textsuperscript{34}\]

And indeed, it is open to question as to whether or not Said succeeds in this most delicate of balancing acts; on the one hand, he contends that:

\[\text{No scholar, not even a Massignon, can resist the pressures on him of his nation or of a scholarly tradition in which he works.}\textsuperscript{35}\]

While on the other hand, in his 1995 'Afterword', in something like a complete U-turn, he argues that:

\[\text{No one has convincingly shown that individual effort is not at some profoundly unteachable level both eccentric and, in Gerard Manley Hopkins's sense, original; this is despite the systems of thought, discourses, and hegemonies (although none of them are seamless, perfect, or inevitable).}\textsuperscript{36}\]

In \textit{Culture and Imperialism}, however, Said seeks to reaffirm his former position when he maintains that one of his "principle operating assumptions" in \textit{Orientalism} had been that:

\[\text{...both learned and imaginative writing are never free, but are limited in their imagery, assumptions, and intentions.}\textsuperscript{37}\]

So, in the midst of these vacillations, how are we to understand the nature of the influence which this "dictatorial, general and hegemonic context" has upon the individual? Or indeed, as Robert Young has observed, how are we to make sense of the "interesting theoretical difficulty" which arises in the analysis and person of Said?:

\textsuperscript{35} ibid, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{36} Young, \textit{White Mythologies}, p. 134.
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Orientalism} p. 271.
\textsuperscript{38} ibid, p. 340.
In other words, how are we to account for the existence of the privileged “observation platform”\(^3\) from which Said hands down his analysis; a “platform” which recalls Merleau- Ponty’s famous description of scientific ‘high-altitude thinking’? And, more importantly, what are the repercussions for the legitimacy of this analysis when Said’s supposed discursive immunity is taken into consideration?

In short, how are we to gain an understanding (and working definition) of these influences which actually acknowledges their fundamental ambivalence and recognises both the possibility of individual dissent and “the totality of contexts of signification” within which that dissent or compliance is exercised? In the context of our own examination, these questions necessitate an identification and understanding of the ways in which the “ideas about what “we” do” can be seen to affect the fictional coloniser and determine what he/she does. Our earlier clarification of Heidegger’s phenomenological definition of “idle talk”, as an alternative definition of how these “ideas” work, means that we must examine the ways in which these influences as “idle talk”, and the actions which they prescribe, are fundamentally grounded in Dasein’s temporal existence as a “being in Time”.

As we have noted, Kipling’s understanding of himself and his countrymen as fathers and sons in Time is representative of the way in which “idle talk” covers up the “primary and primordially genuine relationships-of-Being towards the world, towards Dasein-with, and towards its very Being-in”. At its most basic and straightforward level, this type of “idle talk” can be seen to underpin and dictate the patriotic sacrifice of a character like John Buchan’s Lewis Haystoun in The Half-Hearted, and not just Haystoun, but imperial and national martyrs of a similar ilk. On the eve of his final stand we are told how Haystoun:

...felt the joy of a greater kinship. He was kin to the men lordlier than himself, the true-hearted who had ridden the King’s path and trampled a little world under foot. To the old fighters in the Border wars, the religionists of the South, the Highland gentlemen of the Cause, he cried greeting over the abyss of time. He had lost no inch of his inheritance.\(^4\)

Haystoun can thus be seen to take up the burden of Kipling’s responsibility, that which Said would call “power moral”; and in addition, in laying down his life for the greater good, Haystoun can also be seen to embrace an heroic pragmatism over his former scepticism and

\(^3\) Young, White Mythologies, p. 138.
\(^4\) ibid, p. 139.
inactivity: an inactivity which had arisen following his earlier condemnation of himself as a coward when he had failed to save the woman he loves from a potentially dangerous fall. (As the aged rebel Fazir Khan explains, a man either "talks and allies itself with Bengalis and swine" or "lives in hard places and loves war".41) The logic of Kipling's "heritage" is thus the logic which demands and in some way affects to legitimise a certain course of (heroic) action over another; this is, after all, what "idle talk" does. But more importantly, the logic of this identification of the self in time with one's heritage is the ground for the conviction that this is what one is: a conviction which is all too evident in the comparable episode in Conrad's Almayer's Folly when the proudly swashbuckling Dain anxiously anticipates being discovered by his enemies:

He would wait for his enemies in the sunlight, where he could see the sky and feel the breeze. He knew how a Malay chief should die. The sombre and desperate fury, that peculiar inheritance of his race, took possession of him...He saw the bearded faces and the white jackets of the officers, the light on the levelled barrels of the rifles...He would walk towards them with a smiling face, with his hands held out in a sign of submission till he was very near them...with a shout and a leap he would be in the midst of them, kriss in hand, killing, killing, killing, and would die with the shouts of his enemies in his ears, their warm blood spurting before his eyes.42

When considered in the context of colonial adventure fiction as a whole, this definition of "idle talk" -- as that which affects to legitimise what people do and how people are -- complicates the sharp distinction between romance and realism drawn by Walter Besant when he maintains that: "Romance gives pride of place to action, whereas realism focuses on moral choices".43 In other words, the doing of heroic deeds in the colonial romances of an author like H. Rider Haggard, are always already predicated upon the morality of some strain of "idle talk". And nor is this logic peculiar to Haggard, Kipling or colonial adventure; the same logic underpins the argument which Krishna urges upon the dispirited Arjuna in The Bhagavad Gita:

Whence this lifeless dejection, Arjuna, in this hour, the hour of trial? Strong men know not despair, Arjuna, for this wins neither heaven nor earth.44

41 ibid, p. 27. See also, Haystoun’s friend, Hoddam’s comparable, “I used to compare him with Raleigh or Henri IV - the proud, confident man of action” (p. 44). Buchan plays on the dichotomy between talk and action throughout the book: a dichotomy which is most sharply drawn in the contrast between Haystoun and his rival for Alice, the radical politician and ebullient “talker” Stocks. Moreover, in Haystoun’s fateful failure to be elected to government (he naturally stands as a Tory), he shows himself to be wholly unsuited to a life of “talk”, and, as a result, the door remains open for him to pursue his destiny as a man of action.
43 Walter Besant, The Art of Fiction (London, Chatto and Windus, 1902), pp. 5-6, quoted by Bristow in Empire Boys: Adventures in a Man’s World, p. 120.
This is the rhetoric which affects to make sense of the slaughter and misery to come; it is that
which sergeant-majors bawl out to their wavering troops in the heat of battle, whether in the
trenches of the Somme, the jungles of Vietnam, or the mountains of Kashmir; and as such, it is
an important example of what Conrad's Marlow famously calls the

...idea at the back of it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea; and an unselfish belief in
the idea - something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to....

In The Half-Hearted, it is thus the "idea" of Haystoun's birthright, of his heroic forefathers,
which he himself sets up, bows down before, and ultimately offers himself as "sacrifice" to:

For an instant the extreme loneliness of the exile's death smote him, but in a little he
comforted himself. The heritage of his land and his people was in this ultimate moment a
hundredfold more than ever.

The "heritage of his land and people" is that which, in "this ultimate moment", defines
Haystoun's understanding of who he is and vindicates his immanent martyrdom, but more
importantly, it is his heritage which gives him comfort in the face of his own loneliness and his
own death as anxiety. In other words, it is that which facilitates his own flight from his own
"Being-in-the-world". In his seemingly conventional adoption of a seemingly conventional
strain of "idle talk", Haystoun is thus nothing other than himself. For, it can only ever be
himself that is delivered over to him, both in terms of his own idiosyncratic understanding of his
own "heritage", as "concern" (Besorgen), and more importantly, in terms of the fact that these
temporal processes, as Dasein's "historizing", are always already characterised by "mineness".
Moreover, it is crucial that we do not allow the apparent straightforwardness of Haystoun's
adherence to the "idle talk" of his own heritage to undermine our previous observations on the
always ambiguous, always various characteristics of Dasein's ontical "concern" and the "totality
of contexts of signification into which...[idle talk] can be articulated". Despite the fact that
Haystoun's uncomplicated loyalty would appear to illustrate the inauthentic historicality of
Dasein's dispersion in the "they", we must not make the mistake of supposing that this strain of
"idle talk" is predictable and always applicable in every instance, nor that it cannot, of itself
result in an 'authentic' commitment on Haystoun's part to the matter at hand. For as we shall
see, Dasein's engagement with the "idle talk" of the "they", as the inauthentic "historicality" of
its own temporality, is not straightforward.

---

45 Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness in Youth, Heart of Darkness and The End of the Tether (London:
47 I shall elaborate upon the role of "idle talk" in colonial heroism in more depth in Chapter Six.
In A.E.W. Mason’s* The Four Feathers, the family legacy which has been passed down from father to son, can once again be seen to advance its defining claim:

Father and son, the Fevershams had been soldiers from the very birth of the family. Father and son in lace collars and bucket boots, in Ramilles wigs and steel breastplates, in velvet coats with powder on their hair, in shakos and swallow-tails, in high stocks and frog-coats, they looked down upon this last Feversham, summoning him to the like service.49

The family portrait, as the encapsulation and physical embodiment of the ‘heritage’ that we have been discussing, is of course a recurring theme in colonial adventure fiction. The splendidly melodramatic scene in Haggard’s The People of the Mist, where Leonard Outram and his brother Tom swear an oath on the family Bible before the portraits of their fore-fathers, vowing to recover the ancestral seat or die in the attempt, is an extreme case in point.

(Thus in the home of their ancestors, in the presence of their Maker, and of their pictured dead who had gone before them, did Thomas and Leonard Outram devote their lives to this great purpose.50)

The summons which is addressed to the young Harry Feversham is, however, drowned out by the greater claim that is laid upon him by his own fear;51 a fear which stems from an evening spent in the company of his father and his old Crimea war comrades, where he finds himself terrified by their “stories of death, of hazardous exploits”;52 stories of a different type of “idle talk”, the “idle talk” of honour and bravery, cowardice and fear. That same night, the young boy

...turned over in his bed and lay shivering. He saw in his mind a broken officer slinking at night in the shadows of the London streets. He pushed back the flap of a tent and stooped over a man lying stone-dead in his blood, with an open lancet clenched in his right hand. And he saw that the face of the broken officer and the face of the dead surgeon were one; and that one face, the face of Harry Feversham.53

[In his uninspired but respectful critique of The Four Feathers in Play Up and Play the Game: The Heroes of Popular Fiction, Patrick Howarth provides us with the following character-sketch of its author: “Mason himself was a man who sought adventure and was well equipped to cope with it when it came. Actor, playwright as well as novelist, war-time officer in the Royal Marines, actively engaged in secret service work in Spain, Morocco and Mexico, he found recreation in exploring, sailing and mountaineering...[and] even succeeded, where other novelists had failed, in being returned as a Liberal Member of Parliament.” Play Up and Play the Game: The Heroes of Popular Fiction (London: Eyre Methuen Ltd., 1973), p. 126.

51 See Heidegger’s description of “Death does not just “belong” to one’s own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death lays claim to it as an individual Dasein” (Being and Time, II.1, p. 308).
52 Mason, The Four Feathers, p. 11.
53 ibid, p. 19.]
It is not the flight of the officer or the doctor from their duties, nor their public disgrace
that Feversham dwells upon; it is, very explicitly, their deaths and their corpses. And thus, in
contrast to the retrospective temporal orientation of his family tradition, this disabling fear is
founded in the futural projection of his own act of cowardice, a projection which means death,
and not in any metaphorical or symbolic sense, but death itself, albeit couched in the terms of
the "they". On the subject of Feversham’s cowardice and what it is that he is afraid of, we
should of course bear in mind Heidegger’s insistence that:

*That which fear fears about is that very entity which is afraid – Dasein. Only an entity for
which in its Being this very Being is an issue, can be afraid. Fearing discloses this entity
as endangered and abandoned to itself.*

Indeed, Feversham spells this out in his later confession to Ethne Eustace, when he says:

"That was my trouble always. I foresaw. Any peril to be encountered, any risk to be run – I
foresaw them. I foresaw something else besides... I foresaw the possibility of cowardice... I tried to get
the best of my fears. I hunted, but with a map of the countryside in my mind. I foresaw every hedge,
every pit, every treacherous bank."

Harry’s later captivity in Dongola bears further witness to this anticipatory fear; for, in contrast
to “that fortnight in Berber [where] a hope of escape had sustained him” and “there was no time
for fear or thought”, in Dongola

...there was time and too much of it. He had time to anticipate and foresee. He felt his
heart sinking till he was faint, just as in those distant days when he had heard the hounds
scuffling and whimpering in a covert and he himself had sat shaking upon his horse. He
glanced furtively towards the gallows, and foresaw the vultures perched upon his
shoulders, fluttering about his eyes.

Time, a surplus of time, thus enables Harry to “anticipate and foresee” and what he sees is his
own death. Yet despite these fears, anxieties and premonitions, before his disgrace and the
adventure which leads to his captivity in Dongola, the young Feversham appears to comply with
the summons of his forefathers by joining the army.

After completing an uneventful tour in India he returns home, but on the day before his
regiment is posted to the Sudan for active service, his fear seizes him again and he resigns his
commission. The night before his wedding in Donegal, Feversham receives three white feathers
from his former friends, and a fourth from his wife-to-be when she learns of his disgrace.

55 *Mason, The Four Feathers*, p. 41.
56 ibid, p. 170.
Rejected and reviled as a coward by the woman he loves and his fellow officers, Feversham retreats from society, an outcast, before determining upon a scheme to travel to the Sudan and retrieve his honour.

Thus begins six years of solitary exile during which he endures all manner of hardship and privation while performing the various feats of heroism which will convince his accusers to withdraw their feathers. And, while Feversham, no doubt predictably, succeeds in his mission and returns home to reclaim a now repentant Ethne, it would nonetheless be a mistake to assume that his success constitutes the uncomplicated affirmation of the value-system (i.e. the “idle talk” of military duty and family honour) which denounced him in the first place.®^7

In the course of the book, a very significant shift in attitude takes place with regard to the validity of that value-system, and this is perhaps most explicitly articulated in the contempt with which Ethne receives and dismisses Captain Willoughby, its most unapologetic and obnoxious spokesperson. In fact, at the very beginning of his adventure, Feversham himself makes clear that his efforts are not to do with the demands of his heritage and those social and familial conventions which he has broken; they are more specifically directed towards the possibility of redeeming himself in the eyes of Ethne:

"I have a hope that if--this fault can be repaired...we might still, perhaps, see something of one another--afterwards."®®

So, in contrast to Lewis Haystoun, Feversham interprets and understands himself and his actions, what and how he is in the present and his hopes of a more private future, in terms of a future (and indeed a past) that is peculiarly his own and not that of family, country or the empire. Indeed, at his greatest moment of crisis, before the walls of Berber, when “the great loneliness of the place smote upon him, so that his knees shook”,®® it is not, as it was for Haystoun, the fighting tradition of his family that he draws upon to steel himself for action, it is something altogether more personal:

He dropped upon the ground, and drawing his coat over his head lay, a brown spot indistinguishable from the sand about him, an irregularity in the great waste surface of the

®® Only Harry’s father views his efforts in this light but as we are told throughout, General Feversham never “understood” his son and certainly, he is not aware of the nature of those private anxieties which led his son to take such drastic measures in the first place. In chapter twenty six, entitled ‘General Feversham’s Portraits are Appeased’, we are told that, according to Harry’s father, “The dead Feversham’s in their uniforms would not be disgraced” (ibid, p. 220).
®® ibid, p. 56.
®® In fact such is Feversham’s distress that he “faced about and commenced to run, leaping in a panic, alone and unpursued across the naked desert under the sun, while from his throat feeble cries broke inarticulately” (ibid, p. 85).
earth. He shut the prospect from his eyes, and over the thousands of miles of continent and sea he drew Ethne's face towards him. A little while and he was back again in Donegal. The summer night whispered through the open doorway in the hall; in a room near by people danced to the music. He saw the three feathers fluttering to the floor; he read the growing trouble in Ethne's face...Towards the setting of the sun he rose from the ground, and walking down towards Berber, passed between the gates.

The depth of Feversham's initial loneliness and vulnerability in the world is thus powerfully emphasised in the stark image of him cowering upon “the great waste surface of the earth”, desperately trying to shut out the reality of his present; that point at which, for Camus, “the universe [is] suddenly divested of illusions and light”:

[When] man feels an alien, a stranger...His exile is without remedy since he is deprived of the memory of a lost home or the hope of a promised land. This divorce between man and his life, the actor and his setting, is properly the feeling of absurdity.®

We shall return to crises of this sort in more detail in the following chapter, but here, what we must focus upon is the complex series of Feversham's subsequent temporal associations and identifications: the futural fear of death; remembrance of the past; and the interpretation, in the present, of this past in terms of a possible future after death. Indeed, focus upon these associations and projections as reflecting that which Heidegger calls the “moment of vision”; the moment when Dasein grasps itself as itself and for itself. However, it is important to note that the peculiarity of these associations and projections, as the things of Feversham's “concern” (Besorgen), does not necessarily mean that these temporal projections are any more authentic as a result.

If we remember Heidegger's insistence that, “When Dasein has itself in view ontically, it fails to see itself in relation to the kind of Being of that entity which is itself,” then Feversham's romantic futural projection of himself in terms of the possibility of an afterlife with his estranged lover, as a lover himself, constitutes a failure to see himself in terms of his “ownmost potentiality-for-Being”. Far from being an aberration, this failure is, as we saw in the previous chapter, the temporal meaning of Dasein's “everydayness”, it is how Dasein maintains itself in the ecstatic of the horizontal schema of the future, the present and the “having been”. But more importantly, it is necessarily characterised by “mineness”, the same “mineness” in Time which characterises the romantic futural projection of John Geste in P.C. Wren's Beau Geste:

Love was all and love was enough, until I should return, bronzed and decorated, successful and established, a distinguished Soldier of Fortune, to claim her hand....I

®® ibid, pp. 85-86.
®® Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, p. 6.
would then take my bride to be the admired and beloved Pride of the Regiment, a soldiers star and stay and queen...(Twenty is a great age at which to be – with love in your heart and life before you...).^a

Like Feversham, and indeed Martin Decoud’s self-conscious and grandiose portrait of himself as the architect of an independent Sulaco, in Nostromo, Geste’s ambitions for the future constitute what and how he is to himself, and what he must do in the present, but it is caught up with, and founded in, his concern for another. In a related sense, it is interesting to note here the closing scenes of Buchan’s A Prince of the Captivity – a significantly more sophisticated work than The Half-Hearthed – in which a British hero is once again brought to the brink of certain death. Following his last great heroic exertion in the Italian Alps, in which he saves perhaps the only man who can prevent world war from falling into the hands of the fascists, Adam Melfort is cut off, and with no escape, awaits his enemies and the end:

His eyes were no longer looking at clammy rock and lowering cloud, or the icy shoulder of the Pomagognon lifting through a gap of cliff....They were on blue water running out to where the afternoon sun made a great dazzle of gold. He knew that he had found the sea that had eluded him in all his dreams. He was in a bay of white sand, and, in front, crested with light foam, were the skerries where the grey seals lived. The scents of thyme and heather and salt were blent in a divine elemental freshness. Nigel had come back to him – he saw him skipping by the edge of the tide – he saw him running towards him – he felt his hand in his – he looked into eyes bright with trust and love. From those eyes he seemed to draw youth and peace and immortality.^a

In contrast to the gung-ho visions of identification which reassure Lewis Haystoun, i.e. a patriotic martyrdom and warrior tradition, here, the vision is of a more personal time and place, the time and place of his Scottish boyhood, Eilean Ban, and the memory of his lost son.

So, in the face of these contradictory determinants, how are we to account for this “concern” (Besorgen), as a criteria for action in the context of Said’s “power moral” and the “ideas about what “we” do”? As Heidegger says:

^a P.C. Wren, Beau Geste (London: John Murray, 1929), p. 147. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Wren had first hand experience of serving in a colonial army. After obtaining an M.A. from Oxford, he travelled the world for five years, working in a variety of different and sometimes lowly occupations. He then enlisted as a trooper in the British cavalry, moving on to further service with the French Foreign Legion. For ten years he worked in India for the Bombay government as assistant director of education and physical culture before returning to the military. During World War I he fought with the Indian army in East Africa, rising to the rank of major before being invalided back to England in 1917.

^b As Decoud tells Mrs Gould, “I am not deceiving myself about my motives. She won’t leave Sulaco for my sake, therefore Sulaco must leave the rest of the Republic to its fate. Nothing could be clearer than that. I like a clearly defined situation. I cannot part with Antonia, therefore the one and indivisible Republic of Costaguana must be made to part with its Western province”. Joseph Conrad, Nostromo (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1974), p. 185. And while Decoud may not be deceiving himself about his motives, his miserable death testifies to the fact that he certainly deceives himself about the strength of his own heroic resolve.

Factually, *Dasein is constantly ahead of itself*, but inconstantly anticipatory with regard to its existentiell possibility.\(^5\)

This being "constantly ahead of itself" cannot be confined to an exclusively colonial realm of meaning. Nor, for that matter, can it be confined to idealistic visions of romantic love, for it is that which can also be seen to characterise: Dick Linforth's ambition to finish the road begun by his father in *Mason's The Broken Road*\(^6\); Nostromo's desire for fame and public repute\(^7\); Danny Dravot's and Peachy Carnehan's dreams of kingship in Kafiristan\(^8\); and, the greed of the "pilgrims" in Conrad's middle station.\(^9\)

In all of these cases, regardless as to whether or not they conform to stereotypes, or constitute and collude in what colonial discourse analysis would call oppressive colonial practises, what we must recognise is the fundamental way in which the individuality of these characters is constituted in and through the peculiarity of their own "concernful" projections of themselves in Time. But, more importantly, these private projections, existential disclosures and temporal orientations in "idle talk" – as the inauthentic historicality of, for example, Kipling's "heritage" and the futural and fearful projection of "Being towards death" – all together reflect and bear witness to the fundamentally complex and often contradictory way in which Dasein is "stretched along and stretches itself along" in Time. Hence, not only are the conventional projections and orientations of "idle talk", or Said's "power moral" and "power cultural", cut across and undermined by those of an idiosyncratic personal "concern" (*Besorgen*); the two together, as the way of Dasein's Being, can ultimately be seen to undermine the validity of any generally applicable conception of colonial agency which is understood to function within an exclusively colonial field of meaning and significance. In fact, it is only now, in the light of these observations, that the fundamental problems involved in the "positing of a general

---

\(^5\) *Being and Time*, II.4, p. 386 (my emphasis).

\(^6\) Like Charles Gould and the San Toré Concession in *Nostromo* (which appeared 3 years before), Linforth is consumed by the, albeit slightly less glamorous, legacy of his father's unfinished Road, and unlike Feversham is consumed by what he believes is his destiny in trying to complete the job. As his distraught mother explains to a friend: "Dick feels that work upon that Road is his heritage, if he wants to follow in his father's footsteps, I shall not say a single word to dissuade him". A.E.W. Mason, *The Broken Road* (London: John Murray, 1907), p. 51. Needless to say, Mason's treatment of the theme of a family obsession is markedly more generous and significantly less critical than Conrad's.

\(^7\) Despite the fact that his escape with the Gould silver was "performed in obscurity and without witnesses," we are told that, for Nostromo himself, it nonetheless had "the characteristics of splendour and publicity" which were "in strict keeping with his reputation" (*Nostromo*, pp. 341-342).

\(^8\) "We shall go to those parts and say to any King we find - "D'you want to vanquish your foes?" and we will show him how to drill men; for that we know better than anything else. Then we will subvert that King and seize his throne and establish a Dy-nasty". Rudyard Kipling, 'The Man Who Would Be King' in *The Man Who Would Be King and Other Stories* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 252-253.

\(^9\) "The only real feeling was a desire to get appointed to a trading-post where ivory was to be had, so that they could earn percentages. They intrigued and slandered and hated each other only on that account" (*Heart of Darkness*, p. 78).
colonial subject...out of time” in colonial discourse analysis can be more fully appreciated. For if the coloniser is always already individualised as a “being in Time” in “concern” (Besorgen), its theoretical removal from Time (coupled with the artificial theoretical restriction of its “concern” to a peculiarly colonial realm of interest) fundamentally strips it of that which always already facilitates and constitutes its inherent “potentiality-for-Being-itself”.

2. Dasein’s Temporality - Memory and the “there”

At the beginning of this chapter, we noted that Dasein’s “historizing”, as the way in which Dasein and the world are delivered over to Dasein’s own Being as “there”, must be understood with regard to “a definite mode of time – the “Present” [“die ‘Gegenwart’”]”. And while the “idle talk” of the “they” is an important factor in determining the character of this ‘delivery’ (as disclosure), it is, as we have just seen, not the only factor, nor is it wholly determinative when present. For, running across, undermining, and in some cases contradicting, the directives inscribed in the “idle talk” of Kipling’s “heritage”, and all the other comparable values, traditions and conventions of ‘colonial society’, are the private directives which are inscribed in the individual temporal orientations of characters like Harry Feversham and John Geste. Amongst all these various orientations, it is, however, the temporal orientation towards the past – in the form of vivid memories and sudden flashbacks – which is perhaps most significant. This is because, for Heidegger, “In its factual Being, any Dasein is as it already was, and it is “what” it already was”; in other words “It is its past, whether explicitly or not”:

And this is so not only in that its past is, as it were, pushing itself along “behind” it, and that Dasein possesses what is past as a property which is still present-at-hand and which sometimes has after-effects upon it: Dasein “is” its past in the way of its own Being, which, to put it roughly, “historizes” out of its future on each occasion.71

Hence, those instances in colonial literature in which characters recall past events, are not merely the incidental recollections or chance day-dreams of a dimly apprehended nostalgia; for as Heidegger says, the

...attempt to explain memory as no more than a capacity to retain shows that our ideas stop too soon and too restrictively with the immediate data.76

No. These memories constitute what those characters are themselves, in that they are their own

---

70 Young, White Mythologies, p. 152 (my emphasis).
71 Being and Time, Introduction II, p. 41. See also, Heidegger’s later discussion of memory as “the gathering of thought” in What is Called Thinking?, II, p. 1.
72 Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, II. IV, p. 151.
pasts in the way of their own Being. As Merleau-Ponty observes:

[T]he consciousness of my past which I now have seems to me to cover exactly the past as it was, the past which I claim to recapture is not the real past, but my past as I now see it.

This said, the individualising significance of these episodes will only become apparent to us if we approach these characters (and their historical counterparts) as individual human beings in the world of their experiences and not, as Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin would have them, in a reading of Kipling’s ‘Christmas in India’, superfluous bystanders in a system of signifiers:

The evocative description of a Christmas day in the heat of India is contextualised by invoking its absent English counterpart. Apparently it is only through this absent and enabling signifier that the Indian daily reality can acquire legitimacy as a subject of literary discourse.

In their laboured effort to read into the poem the discursive functionality of a sort of politically meaningful spatial dynamic – wherein the evocation of the centre (as home) is understood to legitimise the periphery (as India) – Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin actually manage to de-temporalise the memory itself. Kipling’s poem is thus stripped of the very thing that it sets out to describe, the memory, and as a result, that which is signified and constituted in the act of remembering, “Being-in-the-world” as a “being in time”, is simply and conveniently disregarded. (And it is discarded too, by T.E. Lawrence in his description of “Class two” of the Englishman in the Middle East, “the John Bull of the books”, who “became more rampantly English the longer he was away from England”:

He invented an Old Country for himself, a home of all remembered virtues, so splendid in the distance that, on return, he often found reality a sad falling off and withdrew his middle-headed self into fractious advocacy of the good old times. Abroad, through his armoured certainty, he was a rounded sample of our traits.

Of the many writers who have considered memory as being fundamentally constitutive for Being, Cf. Samuel Butler’s assertion that all life is “the being possessed of a memory – the life of a thing at any moment is the memories which at that moment it retains”. Unconscious Memory (London, 1880), p. 272, quoted by Jerome Hamilton Buckley in The Triumph of Time: A Study of the Victorian Concepts of Time, History, Progress, and Decadence (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 103.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 69-70.

Ashcroft et al, The Empire Strikes Back, p. 5.

Cf. Kipling’s ‘The Moon of Other Days’, and the following from ‘The Broken Men’: “Ah, God! One sniff of England / To greet our flesh and blood / To hear the traffic slurring / Once more through London mud! / Our towns of wasted honour / Our streets of lost delight! / How stands the old Lord Warden? / Are Dover's cliffs still white?” (Definitive Verse, pp. 96-97).

But furthermore, when pursued to its natural conclusion, does the logic of Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin's reading mean that every comparable colonial remembrance is open to the same charge? In other words, does this mean that, for example, Richard Burton's casual description of the Maghrabi leader "Maula Ali," as "a burly savage, in whom I detected a ridiculous resemblance to the Rev. Charles Delafosse, an old and well-remembered schoolmaster," constitute the evocation of "the absent and enabling signifier" in order to legitimise "Maula Ali" as a "subject of literary discourse"? And if so, how then are we to understand the recollection of the Assistant Commissioner in Conrad's The Secret Agent?:

His memory evoked a certain old fat and wealthy native chief in the distant colony whom it was a tradition for the successive Colonial Governors to trust and make much of as a friend and supporter of the order and legality established by white men...He was physically a big man, too, and (allowing for the difference of colour, of course) Chief Inspector Heat’s appearance recalled him to the memory of his superior.

Is the native chief invoked as an "absent and enabling signifier" to "legitimise" Chief Inspector Heat? Is the colony invoked as the periphery to "legitimise" London as the centre?

It is not just the ontological fact of "Being in Time" which is disclosed in the memories of fictional and historical colonisers; these memories can also be understood in terms of the *ecstasy* of Dasein’s horizontal schema and its own fundamental "potentiality-for-Being-itself". As such, the disclosure and apprehension of one’s past as that which one was and is, is the fundamental disclosure and apprehension of what and how one is, as well as *where* one is (as "there"):

When a man is asleep, he has in a circle round him the chain of the hours, the sequence of the years, the order of the heavenly bodies. Instinctively he consults them when he awakes, and in an instant reads off his own position on the earth’s surface and the time that has elapsed during his slumber...

And in the same way, in colonial literature, as in ‘reality’, memory can serve to situate the character in space. In The Four Feathers, this situation, as an apprehension of the ‘where’ of the Self, brings with it the added apprehension of the consequences of past actions via the contrast between the ‘then’ and the ‘now’. For example, during Faversham and Trench’s imprisonment in Omdurman, the two manage, through bribery, to gain a night of respite from the horrors of the House of Stone and, as they lie beneath the stars:

---

They were no longer prisoners in that barbarous town which lay a murky stain upon the solitary wide spaces of sand; they were in their own land, following their own pursuits. They were standing outside clumps of trees, guns in their hands, while the sharp cry “Mark! mark!” came to their ears. Trench heard again the unmistakable rattle of the reel of his fishing-rod as he wound in his line upon the bank of his trout-stream.®

The random everyday remembrances of the past, which, it should be said, underpin the prisoner’s futurally orientated dream of escape and the exile’s anticipatory dream of return,® can thus be seen to underlie and draw into sharper relief the desperate circumstances of their miserable and precarious present.

Again, it is through memory (as “having-been”), and the contrast it provides, that the young Waverley, in Scott’s classic, becomes conscious of...

...the wild dress and appearance of his Highland associates, heard their whispers in an uncouth and unknown language, looked upon his own dress, so unlike that which he had worn from his infancy, and wished to awake from what seemed at the moment a dream, strange, horrible, and unnatural. “Good God!” he muttered, “am I then a traitor to my country, a renegade to my standard, and a foe...to my native England?”®

Hitherto caught up in the romance and adventure of the Jacobite Rebellion, it is only when Waverley hears the English dialect of the troops across the field in Preston that he remembers who he is and thus the heavy consequences of what he has done.® Indeed, this is precisely what happens to Mersault in Camus’ The Outsider:

Only one incident stands out; towards the end, while my counsel rambled on, I heard the tin trumpet of an ice-cream vendor in the street, a small, shrill sound cutting across the flow of words. And then a rush of memories went through my mind – memories of a life which was mine no longer and had once provided me with the surest, humblest pleasures: warm smells of summer, my favourite streets, the sky at evening, Marie’s dress and her laugh. The futility of what was happening here seemed to take me by the throat, I felt like

---

® See also, Trench’s somewhat melodramatic, “There will be a morning when we shall not drag ourselves out of the House of Stone. There will be nights when we shall sleep in beds – actually beds. There will be...there will be – something more...” (The Four Feathers, p. 239).
® See, Theodore Adorno’s somewhat turgid account of a similar disclosure of self in memory, through language, in Minima Moralia: “One evening, in a mood of helpless sadness, I caught myself using a ridiculously wrong subjunctive verb that was in itself not entirely correct German, being part of a dialect of my native town. I had not heard, let alone used, the endearing misconception since my first years at school. Melancholy, drawing me irresistibly into the abyss of childhood, awakened this old impotently yearning sound in its depths. Language sent back to me like an echo the humiliation which unhappiness had inflicted on me in forgetting what I am”. Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. by E.F.N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 1987), pp. 110-111.
vomiting, and I had only one idea: to get it over, to go back to my cell, and sleep...and sleep.\textsuperscript{85}

It is in these terms too that we must seek to understand the painful recollections of Kipling's Learoyd in 'On Greenhow Hill' when he is reminded of the moors in Yorkshire by the stark sub-Himalayan spurs upon which Mulvaney, Otheris, and himself are waiting to shoot a deserter.\textsuperscript{86} His story ends with the death of Liza, the woman he loved, his enlistment in the army and his own sad reflection that: "I was a young chap i' them days, and had seen naught o' life, let alone death, as is alius a-waitin'".\textsuperscript{87} In describing himself in Time, in looking back to Liza from the present, "I've been forgettin' her ever since",\textsuperscript{88} he acknowledges that death is always waiting, and that he is "Being towards death". And at this point, it is important to reiterate Heidegger's description of Dasein's temporality:

The future, the character of having been, and the Present, show the phenomenal characteristics of the "towards-oneself", the "back-to", and the "letting-oneself-be-encountered-by"...\textsuperscript{89} Temporality is the primordial "outside-of-itself" in and for itself. We therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the Present, the "ecstases" of temporality.\textsuperscript{90}

In literary terms, Learoyd's memory of himself as a young man in love, is juxtaposed in the present with the older man, in his official function as a British soldier in India, waiting to kill another. The dramatic effect of this juxtaposition is that Learoyd is shown to be both of these people; both of these people are him, simultaneously fulfilling his duty and the will of the "they" whilst privately mourning his past loss.

And because of this I would argue that we must disagree with Abdul JanMohamed when he says that "the colonialisit text...lacks the domestic novel's inconclusive contact with an open-


\textsuperscript{86} See, for example, C.A. Bodelsen, in \textit{Aspects of Kipling's Art} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964) and his description of the "frame" within which Learoyd's Yorkshire reminiscences are sandwiched between the introduction and conclusion in the Himalayas (p. 103). This structure is, Bodelsen observes, repeated in a number of Kipling stories, for example, 'With the Main Guard' and 'The Courting of Dinah Shad', and is pre-eminently comparable to the narrative style of Conrad's Marlow stories.


\textsuperscript{88} ibid., p. 95. In Sir Hugh Clifford's short story, 'In the Heart of Kalamantan', we are told of how "Every man east of Suez who is doomed to a lonely life cherishes somewhere at the back of his heart the memory of a girl at home, often blurred by time, often buried deeply beneath the sods which years of ugly life have dumped down upon its grave, but lurking there none the less, and rising ever and anon to haunt and torture like a mocking wraith of a dear one dead. Few men amongst us speak of these things, though each of us knows by introspection the existence of his fellow secrets." 'In the heart of Kalamantan', in \textit{"Blackwood" Tales from the Outposts: Jungle Tales}, Volume VIII (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons Ltd., 1942), p. 95.

\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Being and Time}, II.3, p. 377.
ended present". For what is disclosed in Learoyd’s recollection is just that, the open-ended ecstasis of Dasein’s “Being in Time”, as both a “Being-towards-the-past” and a “Being towards death” in the present. Learoyd exhibits that which Proust called a “sensation of weariness and almost of terror at the thought of all this length of Time”. The remembrance of things past brings with it the possibility of an explicit awareness as to the fact that one is in Time; that Time passes and death approaches. For Francis Yeats-Brown, when he returns to his old regiment after fifteen years in London, this awareness, as the call of “conscience” (Gewissen), brings with it a bitter sadness and the discomfiting realisation as to what he is in the light of what might have been:

I am on the shelf as far as these kind people are concerned, and I must escape from them. I feel weighed down by “sorrow’s crown of sorrow.” What complex is this? Perhaps I am jealous of the life I might have lived, I don’t know. All I know is that I must escape quickly from these scenes of my youth.

In *The Four Feathers*, such remembrances can, all too often, be seen to deliver Feversham over to himself in regret, and regret constitutes one of the most harrowing modes of “Being-towards-the-past”; as Francesca da Rimini tells Dante in the second circle of hell:

...The bitterest woe of woes
Is to remember in our wretchedness
Old happy times...

But moreover, it is regret which brings one before one’s fundamental impotence to rewrite our past. Thus for Feversham, upon his escape from Omdurman:

JanMohamed, ‘The Economy of Manichean Allegory’, p. 88. For JanMohamed, “the colonialist wants to maintain his privileges by preserving the status quo”, and as a result, “his representation of the world contains neither a sense of historical becoming, nor a concrete vision of a future different from the present, nor a teleology other than the infinitely postponed process of “civilising””. In short, for JanMohamed, the colonial text “does not contain any syneretic cultural possibility” and it is “this alone which would open up the historic once more” (ibid., p. 88). JanMohamed’s notion of history and Time is thus entirely predicated upon, on the one hand, his overtly simplistic diagnosis of what the colonialist “wants”; and on the other, the supposition that history is somehow dependent upon that which he calls “syneretic cultural possibility”. In the case of the latter, the question we must ask is, why “historical becoming” should rely upon the representation of cultural syneresis? Does history cease when cultures are represented as remaining apart?


See also Conrad’s Marlow who observes that, in regret, “that mysterious arrangement of merciless logic for a futile purpose” is revealed for what it is: “The most you can hope from it is some knowledge of yourself – that comes too late – a crop of unextinguishable regrets” (*Heart of Darkness*, p.150).
It seemed to him now that there was nothing more wherewith to occupy his life...and there came upon him all at once a great bitterness of despair for that futile, unnecessary mistake made by him six years ago. He saw again the room in London overlooking the quiet trees and lawns of St. James’s Park, he heard the knock upon the door, he took the telegram from his servant’s hand. 

The line which separates reality and imagination, the present and the past, the here and the there, becomes so blurred in the extremity of Fever’s regret that the very sounds of those times and places seem to come to his ears. In *Time Regained*, Proust describes such “resurrections of the past” as being so complete that...

...during the second that they last, that they not only oblige our eyes to cease to see the room which is near them in order to look instead at the railway bordered with trees or the rising tide, they even force our nostrils to breathe the air of places which are in fact a great distance away...they force our whole self to believe that it is surrounded by these places or at least to waver doubtfully between them and the places where we now are, in a dazed uncertainty such as we feel sometimes when an indescribably beautiful vision presents itself to us at the moment of our falling asleep.

Indeed, in Robert Louis Stevenson’s *The Ebb Tide*, these dreams in Time, or “resurrections of the past”, assume a yet more impressive shape when the impoverished Herrick finds himself back in London while steering the ill-fated Farallone (far alone) in the Polynesian ocean:

...the quay rose before him and he knew it for the lamp-lit Embankment, and he saw the lights of Battersea bridge bestride the sullen river. All through the remainder of his trip, he stood entranced, reviewing the past.

For these characters the relationship which exists between the ‘then’ and ‘now’, the ‘here’ and ‘there’, is not, as Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin would argue, one in which the former somehow justifies or legitimises the latter as a subject of literary discourse. They are bound up in the Being of Dasein, as the way in which Dasein is.

So, while on the one hand, what we are dealing with is a key mode of expressing, clarifying and emphasising desperate loneliness in the present, on the other, these memories can be seen to...

---

96 See also, for example, Melfort’s similarly vivid recollections in *The Prince of the Captivity*, while he is escaping from the retreating Turks at the end of the First World War: “It was a nightmare time, but he was not unhappy, for a veil seemed to be lifting from his horizon. He had recaptured his own country. The most alien sights and scents were translated into the idiom of home. As he lay in the hot tamarisk at midday he smelled thyme and bracken, and under a sky of glittering stars he could make believe that he was belated on some familiar moorland. Especially in rain could he retrieve these links, for the odour of wet earth seemed to recreate for him a whole world of ancient comfortable things...the lapping of green water and the tang of salt had carried him over great tracts of space and time. He had found Eilean Ban” (*A Prince of the Captivity*, p. 64, my emphasis).
constitute a key mode of refuge and escape from that present. Furthermore, it is important to note that these memories need not always be symptomatic of, or dependent upon, distress; for as we have seen, Dasein's "historizing" is the way in which it always already maintains itself in Time in the everyday. Thus, for Mr Creighton, the second mate in Conrad's The Nigger of the Narcissus, the memories of the past are merely the romantic memories of young love, the reaffirming and comforting memories of love which define what he has:

[He] stood leaning over the rail, and looked dreamily into the night of the East. And he saw it a long country lane, a lane of waving leaves and dancing sunshine. He saw stirring boughs of old trees outspread, and framing in their arch the tender, the caressing blueness of an English sky. And through the arch a girl in a light dress, smiling under a sunshade, seemed to be stepping out of the tender sky.

Like Feversham's and Geste's private ambitions for future happiness, Creighton's private recollection of his sweetheart, though no doubt superfluous to the requirements of colonial discourse analysis, provides an important snap-shot of the individual concerns of an individual existence and indeed this is a recurring trait in Conrad's fiction. In the same tale, and in the very midst of one of the most superbly violent storms in English literature, Conrad depicts the collective wretchedness of the crew "waiting wearily for a violent death", but at the same time, he consistently makes reference to them as individuals, and he does this through drawing attention to the intimate random details of their private recollections:

Now and then, by an abrupt and startling exclamation, they answered the weird hail of some illusion; then, again, in silence, contemplated the vision of known faces and familiar things. They recalled the aspect of forgotten shipmates and heard the voice of dead and gone skippers. They remembered the noise of gaslit streets, the steamy heat of tap-rooms or the scorching sunshine of calm days at sea.

Everyone has these memories because these memories constitute the way of everyone's own Being, they are, in short, the fundamental structures of everyone's "potential-for-Being-

---

99 Herrick's Arabian Nights tale of a magic carpet ride to London is an exceptional case in point (ibid, pp. 14-15) and H. Rider Haggard, in When the World Shook (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1919), goes a step further still when the hero Humphrey Arbuthnot is actually transported back to London by the evil wizard Oro.

100 Joseph Conrad, The Nigger of the Narcissus in The Nigger of the "Narcissus", Typhoon, and other stories (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1982), p. 29. In a similar episode in The Four Feathers, Colonel Durrance, Feversham's oldest friend and brief rival for Ethne's affections, recalls how, when in the Sudan he had unexpectedly heard a strain of some familiar music from his past: "I listened again, and a sort of haunting melody began to emerge - a weak thin thing with no soul in it, a ghost of a melody, and yet familiar. I stood listening in the street of sand, between the hovels fringed by a row of stunted trees, and I was carried away out of the East to Ramelton and to a summer night beneath a melting sky of Donegal, when you sat by the open window as you sit now and played the Melusine Overture, which you have played again tonight" (The Four Feathers, pp. 151-152).

101 ibid, p. 59.

102 ibid., p. 71.
themselves." And not just Conrad's sailors, or us ourselves, but each and every coloniser that inhabits colonial discourse analysis, as 'the colonising (white western) subject' from Rudyard Kipling to Richard Burton and Robert Clive to Edward Thompson. For, behind the expeditious shorthand of cultural studies, which "Enframes" these colonisers and their fellows as 'colonial subjects', 'white men' and 'Europeans'; which understands their thoughts, words and actions as being synecdochically expressive of 'coloniality', 'whiteness' and 'Eurocentricity'; these characters remain always already possessed of the fundamental potentiality to be themselves in, and through, the nature of their own temporality.

What this means is that if we are to understand these people for what they are, even as 'colonisers', 'white men' and 'Europeans', exposed to all of the various discourses and ideas of Said's "power moral" and "power cultural", then we must recognise the way in which these discourses and ideas are complemented (as with Haystoun), contradicted and eclipsed (as with Feversham) and complicated by their individual "concern" (Besorgen) as "beings in Time". In short, we must never lose sight of the fact that they are always already capable of having memories like Conrad’s Creighton or Kipling’s Learoyd, Stevenson’s Herrick or Mason’s Feversham, and not in the sense that we must feel sympathy, or even empathy, for these men; what is important is that these examples are recognised as testifying to the complex way in which "idle talk", as that which "prescribes one’s state-of-mind, and determines what and how one "sees"", is grounded in the inconstancy of Dasein’s temporality and the manifold modes and objects of its "concern". Or to put it another way, the individuality of the historical coloniser, as the fracturing of Said’s artificial colonial consensus, is not primarily proven in the documenting of instances of colonial non-conformity, eccentricity and rebellion; it is always already disproven, at base, in the fundamental ontological constitution of Dasein itself.

In the previous chapter, we saw how the disclosure of Dasein’s "non-Being" in anxiety brings Dasein before the questions "Why?" and "What for?" and it is in relation to these questions that we must understand the role of "idle talk" in the lives and actions which are depicted in colonial fiction. For if Dasein is confronted by these questions and flees in the face of what they disclose, it seeks comfort, security, and most importantly, a sense of purpose and meaning, in the everyday realm of the "they". It is the inauthentic understanding of Self expressed in "idle talk" that can provide this sense of purpose and meaning, and as we saw with Lewis Haystoun,

103 Author of The Other Side of the Medal (London: Hogarth Press, 1925), which Edward Said calls "an impassioned statement against British rule and for Indian independence" (Introduction to Kim, p. 28). See also, Henia Parry’s chapter on Thompson (5) in Delusions and Discoveries, pp. 153-185.

104 See, Heidegger ‘What is Metaphysics?’, in Basic Writings, p. 109. Questions which must be sharply disassociated from Bhabha’s theorization of the "colonialist" question; "Tell us why we are here". A question which, Bhabha tells us, "reveals that the other side of narcissistic authority may be the paranoia of power." Sly Civility", in The Location of Culture, p. 100.
it can also be seen to elicit a sense of obligation which underpins notions of duty and dictates what one must do; a sense of duty and obligation as the “they-self” which, for Heidegger, represents Dasein’s entanglement and “lostness” in the “they”.

If we are to understand these actions as being predicated upon various strains of “idle talk” then we must subsequently seek to understand them in terms of the inauthentic temporality which belongs to “idle talk”. This means that the actions must be understood and interpreted as being done because of something or for something, past and future. For example, because of an English heritage or for the good of Queen and country, because of personal greed or for romantic love. In saying this, we must therefore be careful that we do not artificially restrict our understanding of the temporality of action (and “idle talk”) to a purely colonial realm of meaning, or, give the misleading impression that these processes are applicable for every coloniser in every instance.

On the contrary, what we must continue to remember is that, these processes are founded in Dasein’s temporality, and as we have seen, they are always already, and in every instance, characterised by “mineness”. What is more, in addition to the peculiarly colonial strains of “idle talk” that we have been concentrating upon, the multifarious contexts, concerns and ways of Dasein’s immersion in the “they” and the diverse strains of “idle talk” which pertain to these contexts and concerns, means that the past and the future projections of Dasein’s inauthentic historicality (which can underpin Dasein’s various actions) must be recognised as being necessarily heterogeneous themselves. In short, we must recognise the full range of possibilities which constitute Dasein’s various ontical concerns, concerns which, as we have already noted, encompass everything from the idiosyncratic to the conventional, the private to the public, and are always already constituted within the horizons of Dasein’s own temporality.
CHAPTER IV: “Being-in-the-world” and Death in Kipling

Kipling is a jingo imperialist, he is morally insensitive and aesthetically disgusting. It is better to start by admitting that, and then to try to find out why it is that he survives while the refined people who have sneered at him seem to wear so badly.

George Orwell, “Rudyard Kipling”

In our ongoing examination of the fictional and historical coloniser upon a plane of correspondence that is defined in terms of Heidegger’s description of the existential-ontological constitution of Dasein, no single phenomenon, theme or subject is more important or revealing than death.

As we saw in Chapter Two, Heidegger’s existential-ontological definition of death is “Being-towards-the-end”:

Death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein’s ownmost possibility – non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is, as Dasein’s end, in the Being of this entity towards its end.

Within the broader context of the ontological schema, death is, moreover, the key future phenomenon “towards” which Dasein is existentially orientated; indeed, Dasein’s “Being towards death” is, for Heidegger, the most fundamental orientation in Dasein’s temporal existence and its “Being-in-the-world” in general. It is that which facilitates “anxiety” (Unheimlichkeit) as an authentic “state-of-mind” and, as we know, it is in anxiety that Dasein can grasp itself as itself in its “potentiality-for-Being-a-whole”. In short, it is in relation to the disclosure of its own “Being towards death” that Dasein can itself come to an authentic understanding as to what and how it is in its Being. And, it is in these terms, that I will, in this chapter, examine the significance of death, and the work of Rudyard Kipling.

Following our examination of ‘the colonising subject’ as an artificially homogenised, un-worlded and de-humanised theoretical construct in colonial discourse analysis (Chapter One), this explanation will, in addition, demonstrate the ways in which death, and the fictional coloniser’s encounter with death, serves to constitute that fictional coloniser in the world of its experiences. But more importantly, this demonstration must itself be understood within the context of the fact that, in the drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality in colonial discourse analysis, the ontological meaning of death has been lost; in other words, it has been ‘gathered’ into the system of colonial discourse as a colonially meaningful signifier.

---

1 Orwell, “Rudyard Kipling”, in Kipling and the Critics, pp. 74-75.
2 Being and Time, II.1, p. 303.
like any other. For example, in her reading of Fanny Parks’s 1852 *Wanderings of a Pilgrim in Search of the Picturesque,* Sara Suleri asserts that:

[T]he Anglo-Indian domestic space is itself infested with tiny but deadly literalizations of India’s power to inspire fear.\(^3\)

Death has become onticalised as India, fear has become onticalised as the fear of India, and instances of this fear have become synecdochical of Anglo-Indian fear in India, in general. An important example of this general colonial fear is, for Suleri, to be found in the Anglo-Indian’s problem with caste:

Rather than supply the invader with a key to a system of cultural control, caste represents the symbolic invisibility of the peoples of India, and the disempowering fear that the colonizer cannot function as the other to a colonized civilization that had long since learned to accommodate a multiplicity of alterities into the fabric of its cultures.\(^4\)

I shall examine this notion of an homogenous colonial fear in Chapter Five, but what I would suggest at this stage is that the plane of correspondence upon which Suleri assesses fear and death, and the Anglo-Indian’s experience of both, is one which is artificially determined by the “Enframing” structures of a colonially, and therefore ontically, prioritised meaningfulness. As a result, I would argue that the Anglo-Indian coloniser, as “the invader” (and ‘discursive subject’), is removed from the world of its experiences, and entirely understood within the confines of that artificially restricted realm of meaning. It is thus not just the ontological meaning of fear and death which is “covered up” (*verdecken*) in Suleri’s reading, the ontological constitution of the coloniser is simultaneously “covered up” as well.

In the wake of these observations, my examination of the fictional coloniser as Dasein and death as “Being-towards-the-end”, can be understood as an attempt to return to the historical coloniser as a “return to the things themselves”, as they are in themselves. For as we have seen:

The more appropriately the Being of the entities to be explored is understood under the guidance of an understanding of Being... all the more secure will be the perspective for one’s methodological inquiry.\(^6\)

---

\(^3\) Fanny Parks, *Wanderings of a Pilgrim in Search of the Picturesque, during Four-and-Twenty Years in the East; with Revelations of Life in the Zenana*, 2 vols. (Karachi and London: Oxford University Press, 1975). Parks was the daughter of a Major in the British Army in India, and *Wanderings of a Pilgrim* are her memoirs of the time she spent there.


\(^5\) Ibid., p. 19, (my emphasis).

\(^6\) *Being and Time*, II.4, p. 413.
And I will argue, that it is “under the guidance of an understanding of Being” that the
prevalence and immanence of death in colonial literature and colonial society as a whole, should
be understood and interpreted. For, if our objective is to attend to what and how the coloniser is,
then we cannot dilute or overlook the crucial role of death in determining the nature of that what
and how; both as a profoundly significant environmental factor (for example, in the death of
others) and as the fundamental temporal orientation (as “Being towards death”) of Dasein’s own
“Being-in-the-world”. In making this observation, and following our discussion of “idle talk”,
we should, however, bear in mind the various ways in which death can exist as an issue for the
fictional coloniser as Dasein; for while Dasein’s authentic conception of its own death is in
every case its own:

(Death does not just “belong” to one’s own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death lays
claim to it as an individual Dasein...This individualising is a way in which the “there” is
disclosed for existence.)

Dasein can also come to understand death in terms of the inauthentic ontical (biological,
psychological and patriotic) conception of the “they”: as such, we must once again remember
Heidegger’s important stipulation that “the roots of the existential analytic, on its part, are
ultimately existentiell, that is ontical”.

1. Death and Rudyard Kipling

In his 1977 critical biography, The Strange Ride of Rudyard Kipling, Angus Wilson maintained
that:

Few writers are more constantly apprehensive of death than Kipling...The fear of death
among Western men seemed to him a paramount obsession.

Wilson frames this observation within the context of the series of highly significant deaths
which beset Kipling throughout his life stretching back to the death of his younger brother in
India before Kipling and his sister were sent to England in 1870; the loss of his only ally in the
House of Desolation, “Captain” Holloway, in 1874; his future wife’s brother and his closest

---

7 Ibid., II.1, p. 308.
8 Ibid., Introduction I, p. 34.
9 Angus Wilson, The Strange Ride of Rudyard Kipling: His Life and Works (London: Panther Books,
1979), p. 57.
describes Holloway as being “the only person in that house as far as I can remember who ever threw me a
kind word” (p. 10). See also, Uncle Harry in the story ‘Baa Baa, Black Sheep’, in The Man Who Would
Be King and Other Stories.
friend, Wolcott Balestier in 1891; his daughter Josephine in New York in 1899; and perhaps most devastating of all, the loss of his son John at the battle of Loos in 1915.

For Wilson, these deaths and the grief, depression and illnesses which came in their wake, marked Kipling the writer as much as it marked Kipling the man; and not only in stories such as ‘They’ (Traffics and Discoveries), and ‘The Gardener’ (Debts and Credits), in which he explicitly addresses the deaths of his own children. But, more notably in his development of, and passionate adherence to, a series of necessarily stoical and resolutely pragmatic philosophies which he hoped would stem the tide of desolation and despair that threatened to engulf him:

Kipling doesn’t subordinate the individual to society, he invents a rigid social rule (The Law) to shield the individual (and himself) from a constant nagging anxiety about his ultimate fate.  

And yet, despite maintaining that his book is an attempt “to suggest that Kipling’s art is suffused with a personal and mysterious despair and apprehension”, Wilson does not elaborate upon the more specific nature of the anxiety and apprehension that he has identified. He merely “suggests” that Kipling sought to counteract that anxiety through “The Law”.

In one important respect then, the current chapter can be seen as an attempt to provide a philosophical (ontological) clarification of the nature of Kipling’s anxiety; a clarification which is lacking in Wilson’s otherwise astute analysis. But more significantly, and in the wake of our discussion of ‘heritage’ in the previous chapter, this clarification will also involve an interpretation of Kipling’s passionate belief in, and literary celebration of, hard work, duty and loyalty as a flight from, and a masking of, death in “idle talk”. In other words, Kipling’s invention of “a rigid social rule” is, I will argue, fundamentally indicative of the ontologically grounded need, drive or will to believe that there is meaning, purpose and togetherness in the world in the face of the questions “Why?” and “What for?”. As such, “The Law” can, to a

---

11 Kipling heard of Balestier’s death while on what was to be his final tour of India, calling short his trip and hurrying home to Carrie whom he married soon afterwards. See, the letters of Henry James which describe the funeral and wedding, in Charles Carrington’s Rudyard Kipling: His Life and Work (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1986), pp. 238-241.

12 As his sister Trix later recalled; “After his almost fatal illness and Josephine’s death - he was a sadder and a harder man”. Quoted by Harry Ricketts in The Unforgiving Minute: A Life of Rudyard Kipling (London: Chatto & Windus, 1999), p. 251.

13 In his Epitaphs of the War, written three years after John’s disappearance, Kipling bitterly confronted his own role in the death of his son in ‘Common Form’; “If any question why we died / Tell them, because their fathers lied” (Definitive Verse, p. 390). It was through Kipling’s intervention with Lord Roberts that John, who had already been turned down by the army on account of his poor eyesight, finally obtained a commission in the Irish Guards.

14 Wilson, The Strange Ride of Rudyard Kipling, p. 173.

certain extent, be seen to comply with the basic criterion of Freud's description of the “Weltanschauung” (or world-view) as

...an intellectual construction which solves all the problems of our existence uniformly on the basis of one overriding hypothesis, which, accordingly, leaves no question unanswered and in which everything that interests us finds its fixed place...Believing in it one can feel secure in life, one can know what to strive for, and how one can deal most expediently with one's emotions and interests.16

And with the possible exception of The Jungle Books, this “overriding hypothesis”, as “The Law”, is perhaps nowhere more deliberately set out in Kipling, than in his 1898 collection of stories written during his time in America, The Day's Work.

Published three years after the second Jungle Book, The Day's Work can be understood, at one important level, as Kipling's attempt to relocate the fable-Law of the jungle to a modern, and thus perhaps more relevant, age and setting.17 Drawing together material from India, New England and Rottingdean, as well as the ships of which he had written in Captains Courageous in the previous year, Kipling assembles a diverse collection of stories which, nonetheless, all together articulate the fundamental tenets of his pragmatic faith. Moreover, the book's appropriately straightforward and down-to-earth title - determined, Carrington tells us, by the inscription from John 9:2, 'The Night cometh when No Man can Work',18 which Lockwood had carved into the chimneypiece of 'Naulakha'19 - operates as an exceptionally powerful organising principle in relation to which the multi-faceted and apparently random elements of Kipling's faith which are depicted in the book draw their ultimate meaning.

The collection opens with the monumental technical triumph of the engineer Findlayson, in 'The Bridge Builders', and his opium-induced vision of a congregation of Indian gods. As “one of Kipling's most successful allegories about the collision between new Western technology and old Eastern spirituality”,20 the story is, I would argue, chiefly concerned with the heroism (and necessity) of human achievement in the face of and despite an inexorable cosmic transience which must ultimately bring that achievement to nought. In 'A Walking Delegate',

17 A relocation which is repeated in the later Puck of Pook's Hill and Rewards and Fairies, when Kipling turns to Suffolk and episodes from the history of England; in this sense, it stands as a thematic and stylistic bridge between the two sets of stories.
19 Carrington, Rudyard Kipling, p. 258.
20 Harry Ricketts, The Unforgiving Minute, p. 247.
one of the two stories in the book to be set in the United States, Kipling reinforces and rearticulates the laws of discipline and hierarchy in his depiction of the upstart “yellow horse” and his revolutionary trade-unionism, which is rejected and derided by his wiser and saner fellows. The importance of the part functioning within the whole is then celebrated in the explicitly didactic Disney-like parable, ‘The Ship that Found Herself’; and in ‘The Tomb of his Ancestors’, Young John Chinn, like Lewis Haystoun and Dick Linforth, takes up the responsibility of his heritage, by continuing the work of his forefathers in Mundesur. At the centre of the book is the two-part story of the selfless toil of British men and women in India in time of famine, ‘William the Conqueror’, and this is followed by the class conscious fable on teamwork (or play), ‘The Maltese Cat’ in which a determined team of polo ponies beat the Archangels to win the Upper India Free For All Cup. ‘The Brushwood Boy’, where “There’s no place like England — when you’ve done your work”. brings the volume to a close: at once complimenting, and to a certain extent, extending, the significance of the opening opium-induced dream sequence and challenging night-world of ‘The Bridge Builders’.

It would, however, be a mistake to assume that “The Law” as it is prescribed here is merely a conscious, or only intellectual, contrivance. “Idle talk” constitutes a fundamental way in which Dasein understands, interprets and maintains itself in the everyday, and it is precisely this maintenance of the self in flight, as the way in which people are, that Wilson identifies (albeit in non-Heideggarian terms) in his incisive description of the companionship of Mulvaney, Learoyd and Ortheris in Soldiers Three:

Mulvaney may be saved from the knife-edge by his wife’s steadfastness, Learoyd by the numbness of a lost past, and Ortheris by the fierceness of lifelong empty loneliness; but what gets them through the days, apart from the mechanical work that is almost done by 8 a.m., is their companionship. It has none of the vocal chirpiness of the schoolboy trio of Stalky. They know each other’s hopeless emptiness. No easy Victorian emotional, let alone, modern physical explanation fully describes the reality. Its something that grows wherever men need protection from the seemingly eternal and intolerable future in boarding schools and on foreign service and in immigrant bidonvilles.

---

21 Kipling had left America and returned to England following the public quarrel with his brother-in-law, Beaty Balestier, two years before.
22 For G.K. Chesterton, discipline was Kipling’s “primary theme”: “The real poetry, the ‘true romance’, which Mr. Kipling has taught, is the romance of the division of labour and the discipline of all the trades”. G.K. Chesterton “On Mr. Rudyard Kipling” (1905) in Roger Lancelyn Green (ed.), Kipling: The Critical Heritage (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1971), P. 294.
25 Wilson, The Strange Ride of Rudyard Kipling, p. 120.
It is thus, not just, as C.S. Lewis argues, that Kipling "loves work for the sake of professional brotherhood". Nor is the primary reason behind his adoption and espousal of "a rigid social rule" confined to his apprehension of the "brutal truth about the world" that, as Lewis says...

...the whole everlasting business of keeping the human race protected and clothed and fed could not go on for twenty-four hours without the vast legion of hard-bitten, technically efficient, not-over-sympathetic men, and without the harsh processes of discipline by which this legion is made. [The] brutal truth that unless a great many people practiced the Kipling ethos there would be neither security nor leisure for any people to practise a finer ethos.

Of course Kipling's portrayal of male companionship in the Indian Army, the mercantile navy, the trenches of the Western Front and the Masonic Lodge 'Faith and Works B.C. 5837', is concerned with trade-craft and exclusivity, technical know-how and solidarity in accountability; but this companionship and loyalty is, I would argue, more primordially grounded in the universal (ontological) need for some form of "protection from the seemingly eternal and intolerable future" that is death:

Heart may fail, and Strength outwear, and Purpose turn to Loathing,
But the everyday affair of business, meals, and clothing,
Builds a bulkhead 'twixt Despair and the Edge of Nothing.

But what of the "everyday affair" of Empire? Does this mean that a character like Creighton in *Kim* is to be understood as somehow balancing on the "Edge of Nothing"? That his covert orchestration of the 'Great Game' is to be understood primarily as a way in which he manages to stave off his existential "Despair"? Certainly not. For as we know, in inauthenticity, Dasein immerses itself in the world of the "they" ("business, meals, and clothing"), and Creighton's 'Great Game', the everyday administration of India, colonial surveillance, tax collection, famine-relief, plantation management, sight-seeing trips, bridge parties and polo matches belong to this immersion. Kipling is himself immersed in these things, in his life and in his writing. And as a result, work is often incidental to his other concerns; in the Simla tales, for example,

---

26 C.S. Lewis, 'Kipling's World', from *They Asked for a Paper* (1963), in *Kipling and the Critics*, p. 112. See also, Lionel Trilling's comparable assertion that Kipling "lusts for the exclusive circle, for the sect with the password...he profoundly admires the technical, secret-laden adults who run the world, the overalled people, majestic in their occupation". 'Kipling' from *The Liberal Imagination* (1943), in *Kipling and the Critics*, p. 90. Kipling himself was no stranger to social exclusion or alienation: when working in Lahore he was especially distressed at finding himself black-balled from the club ("the whole of my outside world") because of his paper's stance on the Ilbert Bill (see, *Something of Myself*, pp. 42-43).

27 Lewis, 'Kipling's World', pp. 106-107. Echoing Lewis, Orwell argues that Kipling "sees clearly that men can only be highly civilised while other men, inevitably less civilised, are there to guard and feed them". And it was this understanding which underpinned that "sense of responsibility" which Orwell saw as having drawn down upon Kipling the hate of the middle-class Left. ('Rudyard Kipling' pp. 77-78).

there is no sign of that "unforgiving minute" which, as Lewis observed "is upon us fourteen hundred and forty times a day" and which he called "the truest and finest element in Kipling; his version of Carlyle's gospel of work". On occasions in Kipling, work and the worker is romanticised along with technology, as in the Pyecroft and McAndrew stories, and on others, it is bound up in the myths of a national history, as with Hobden, the guardian of the land and "Briton of the Clay" in the Puck stories. In fact, at times, Kipling can even be seen to undermine the supposedly indubitable laws of his own social order: how, for example, are we to reconcile Kipling the extoller of effective action in 'William the Conqueror', with Kipling the loafer in *Letters of Marque*? How are we to square our conception of him as a disciplinarian with his gleeful depiction of Stalky and his friends as "inveterate breakers of discipline"?

Where now is the Kipling we thought we knew – the prophet of work, the activist, the writer of *If*... when, in 'The Germ Destroyer', Kipling plainly laughs at a man with "a marked passion for his work". In short, all of these variations, apparent contradictions and subversions on the theme of work are possible in the everyday world of Kipling's "concern":

What man hears aught save what each instant brings?...

is thus as true of Kipling as it is of anyone else. But when "Heart" fails, "Strength" outwears and "Purpose" turns to loathing, work, and the purpose and companionship that it provides, assumes a new, and altogether more vital, significance. For at these times, it is work and companionship which protects us from the knowledge of the death ("Despair and the Edge of Nothing") that we ourselves are as "Being towards death": it is at these times, that the Bull, in

---

31 For a postcolonial analysis of the psychoanalytical and discursive significance of the loafer in Kipling, see Gail Ching-Liang Low, *White Skins/Black Masks: Representations and Colonialism*.
32 Lewis, 'Kipling's World', p. 111.
33 ibid., p. 112.
34 ibid., p. 112.
35 See also, Daniel Bivona's critique of Lewis's emphasis upon Kipling as "England's foremost poet of work" and his own characterisation of him as "a novelist who sets out to undermine the facile ethnocentric privileging of work over play or the "serious" over the "non-serious"" (*Desire and contradiction*, p. 46). Bivona makes this observation largely in relation to *Kim*, but throughout Kipling's life and work, play operates as a constant and crucial counterpoise to the work and toil of everyday life: from his own construction of a magic circle of play in the House of Desolation (recreated in 'The Story of Muhammad Din') to the enchanting month which was spent every year at the Burne-Jones's *Something of Myself*, pp. 13-14) where play shut out the trauma of his abuse; from the anti-authoritarian games and mawkish practical jokes of Stalky to Mowgli in *The Jungle Book* stories where it is intimately bound up with the exercise of "The Law". The point that I am making is that the variousness of these themes in Kipling's life and work testifies to the fact that he is not categorically the one nor the other, a prophet of work or play, but both, depending upon the nature of his "concern" at any given time.
"The Children of the Zodiac", pulls the plough not because he loves the furrow but because it
 distracts him from thinking of the Scorpion.\(^{37}\) That said, even this protection may, indeed, must,
 fail us — "The Night cometh when No Man can Work" — and as we shall see, when it does,
 Kipling is alive to the terrors which result. For far from wishing to sidestep the issue, it is in the
documentation of such terror that the fundamental value and necessity of "The Law" is
hammered home.

Moreover, it is in these moments of absolute crisis, in the face of death and in the face of one's
own death, more than anywhere else, that the superficial trappings of his own "idle talk" fall
away and Kipling's characters can be seen to apprehend their authentic "Being-in-the-world":
not as work, duty, nation or Empire, but as a "Being towards death" when "the universe [is]
suddenly divested of illusions and light".\(^{38}\)

The underlying dynamic of Kipling's fictional treatment of work, can thus, at the most
fundamental level, be seen to correspond with Dasein's oscillation between its inauthentic and
authentic modes of Being. And it is this oscillation which is similarly reflected in the work of
Kipling as a whole: as Lewis observes:

\[
\text{[Kipling's] doctrine of work and discipline, which is so clear and earnest and dogmatic at}
\text{the periphery, hides at the centre a terrible vagueness, a frivolity or scepticism.}\]^

It would thus be a mistake to imagine that Kipling's doctrine of work is simply comparable to
the 'cut-and-dry' sentiments of, for example, the young Winston Churchill, when he maintains
that:

\[
\text{I am clearly of opinion that no man has a right to be idle, whoever he be or wherever he}
\text{lives. He is bound to go forward and take an honest share in the general work of the}
\text{world.} \]^

For while Kipling is, on the one hand, the all too proficient 'idle talker', issuing forth his
inauthentic understanding and interpretation of the world and work in poems like 'The White
Man's Burden' and 'The Galley-Slave' or stories like 'The Mother Hive' (Actions and
Reactions) and 'Below the Mill Dam' ( Traffics and Discoveries); getting carried away with the

\(^{37}\) See, Bonamy Dobrée, 'Rudyard Kipling', from The Lamp and the Lute (1964), pp. 38-64, in Kipling
and the Critics, p. 38.

\(^{38}\) Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, p. 6.

\(^{39}\) C.S. Lewis, 'Kipling's World' in Selected Literary Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

\(^{40}\) Winston Churchill, My African Journey: A rare episode in the life of the young Winston Churchill
schoolboy japes of Stalky,\textsuperscript{41} the high jinks of Pyecroft in ‘The Horse Marines’ (\textit{A Diversity of Creatures}); the hustle and bustle and ‘Being-with-Others’ of the Grand Trunk Road, and the gossip and scandal of \textit{Plain Tales from the Hills}. On the other hand, Kipling is also capable of a more authentic understanding and interpretation of himself and the world in his writing, and this, I would argue, is fundamentally grounded in, and expressive of, his intimate familiarity with death.

\begin{quote}
It is not learning, grace nor gear,  
Nor easy meat and drink,  
But bitter pinch of pain and fear
That makes creation think.\textsuperscript{42}
\end{quote}

As such, the prevalence of death in Kipling’s stories – when understood as an ontological phenomenon, temporal orientation, and that which fundamentally underpins the “idle talk” of imperial rhetoric – can be seen to facilitate (and reflect) those essential modes of Being and “states-of-mind” which are synonymous with Being an individual human being in the world of one’s own experiences.

(a) “\textit{Our near companion}...”

Kipling, like Freud, possessed an innate fear and loathing of biography and biographers,\textsuperscript{43} a practice which he called the “Higher Cannibalism” and which, on the establishment, in 1927, of the Kipling Society, elicited the following angry response:

\begin{quote}
[\textit{H}ow would you like to be turned into an anatomical specimen, before you were dead, and shown upon a table once a quarter? It makes me feel naked as well as ridiculous...The whole thing is unutterably repugnant.\textsuperscript{44}
\end{quote}

At the very beginning of his autobiography, \textit{Something of Myself}, Kipling recalls his mother’s distress at finding a child’s hand in their garden in Bombay – presumably dropped by one of the vultures which fed off the corpses left on the Parsee Towers of Silence.\textsuperscript{45} This incident can be


\textsuperscript{43} Adam Phillips, in \textit{Darwin’s Worms} (London: Faber & Faber, 1999), has argued that Freud was exceptionally uncooperative with his future biographers, but this was principally due to the fact that, for Freud, biography “denies the essentially unformulatable logic of life” (p. 82).

\textsuperscript{44} Quoted by Ricketts in \textit{The Unforgiving Minute}, p. 361. On a more personal level, this is, perhaps, one of the reasons why Kipling had such an aversion to keeping old letters; for as he told Sir Percy Bates towards the end of his life, “I have made a rule, ever since I was a youngster, not to keep letters. They are as bad as old photographs for harrowing up the mind” (in \textit{The Unforgiving Minute}, p. 371).

\textsuperscript{45} Kipling, \textit{Something of Myself}, p. 8.
seen to mark the beginning of Kipling’s long and often traumatic relationship with death; and is thus conspicuously placed in his famously guarded story of his own life. Moreover, it is the suddenness of death’s intrusion upon the peace of our everyday existences that is so vividly reflected in this anecdote and which was to be harnessed as a recurring theme in Kipling’s fiction. As Angus Wilson observes, this relentless return to death was founded in, among other things, Kipling’s conscious determination to show the English reading public the reality of death itself. Throughout his book, Wilson maintains that, for Kipling: “what was wrong with English society was that it feared death too much and accepted death’s reality too little”; and that this “refusal to face death as inevitable is something that strikes him most forcibly, in contrast to India”. Kipling’s consistent and sometimes ruthless portrayal of death in his Indian stories can thus be seen as an attempt to redress this societal flaw:

[I]n a score or more of his stories of Indian life...in the early nineties, he tells them of Death ever present, death of children, death of young men on the edge of attainment or at the peak of their powers.  

The fundamental observations in this, and the previous, quotation from Wilson are echoed by Philip Mason is his reading of Plain Tales From the Hills, when he asserts that:

One overriding impression which they leave is that sudden death is never far away, another that creative work is the best remedy against loneliness, and a third theme is the remorse for lost innocence and lost opportunity that tolls like a bell throughout much of his early work.

Death forms the “ever present” horizon against which the characters in so much of Kipling’s fiction are set, and this is the same horizon against which Kipling places himself in his accounts of life in Lahore:

From the modern point of view I suppose the life was not fit for a dog, but my world was filled with boys...who lived utterly alone, and died from typhoid mostly at the regulation age of twenty-two...Death was always our near companion. When there was an outbreak of eleven cases of Typhoid in our white community of seventy, and professional nurses had not been invented, the men sat up with the men and the women with the women. We lost four of our invalids and thought we had done well. Otherwise, men and women dropped where they stood. Hence our custom of looking up anyone who did not appear at our daily gatherings.

---

49 Wilson, The Strange Ride of Rudyard Kipling, pp 203, 207.
47 The Strange Ride of Rudyard Kipling, pp 206-207.
45 Kipling, Something of Myself, pp. 35 -36 (my emphasis).
Here Kipling depicts a community drawn together and enveloped in death, a community in which an empty seat at the dinner table signalled the worst, and a community in which the worst could strike at any time. It is this matter-of-fact elaboration upon the everyday fatalities of colonial life, spoken with the superior blase of a seasoned campaigner, which was employed by Kipling in many of his early Indian stories.

Year by year England sends our fresh drafts for the first fighting-line, which is officially called the Indian Civil Service. These die, or kill themselves by overwork, or are worried to death, or broken in health and hope in order that the land may be protected from death and sickness, famine and war, and may eventually become capable of standing alone.

And it is this same sense of near inevitable death which is made yet more explicit in the dying lament of Orde, the Deputy Commissioner of Kot-Kumharsen:

Lord! how many men I lie here and remember...Morton’s dead — he was of my year. Shaghnessy is dead, and he had children; I remember he used to read us their school-letters; what a bore we thought him! Evans is dead — Kot-Kumharsen killed him! Ricketts of Myndonie is dead — and I’m going too. “Man that is born of woman is small potatoes and few on the hill”.

Like the Old Testament’s Job, Orde catalogues the frailty of human existence and our common fate; or more accurately, the frailty and fate of English civil servants in India. But in addition, Kipling draws attention to that which he sees as the bitter irony of English men and women dying to prevent the deaths of Indians; and for Kipling, it is this self-sacrifice which constitutes and confirms the heroism of his compatriots. A self-sacrifice, moreover, which purports to define both the fundamental essence of Empire and its selfless foot-soldiers:

...By the brand upon my shoulder, by the gall of clinging steel,
By the welts the whips have left me, by the scars that never heal;
By my eyes grown old with staring through the sunwash on the brine,
I am paid in full for service. Would that service still were mine.

See also, Kipling’s poem ‘Possibilities’ (Departmental Ditties); “Ay, lay him ‘neath the Simla pine — / A fortnight fully to be missed, / Behold, we lose our fourth at whist, / A chair is vacant where we dine” (Definitive Verse, pp. 43-44).


Kipling, ‘Head of the District’ in Life’s Handicap, pp. 119-120.

See also, Kipling’s comparable description of loss in the army, in ‘The Courting of Dinah Shad’ (Life’s Handicap): “Today, of all those jovial thieves who appropriated my commissariat and lay and laughed round that waterproof sheet, not one remains. They went to camps that were not of exercise and battles without umpires. Burma, and the Sudan, and the frontier, – fever and fight, – took them in their time” (p. 44).


Not surprisingly this grim strain of imperial self-flattery has drawn considerable fire from postcolonial critics; for example, Bonita Parry argues that:

The Anglo-Indians held it an achievement to survive India, and in producing a literature of bombastic self-advertisement and cloying self-pity in which they featured as supermen and exceptional women, as marvels of efficiency and endurance, probity and moral excellence, they were manufacturing their own legend and demanding adulation from the British at home.\(^5\)

But if Kipling can be seen to provide us with a (protective) definition of death and the Anglo-Indian in “idle talk”, Parry, in her homogenization of Anglo-Indian opinion, as an ontologisation of the ontical, “Enframes” that death and “the Anglo-Indians” within a peculiarly colonial realm of meaningfulness: in both cases, then, the ontological meaning of death as “Being-towards-the-end” is effectively “covered over”.

Kipling’s belief in the inherently noble and humanitarian self-sacrifice of the British in the colonies has received no angrier a response than that of Jonah Raskin in his militantly and often scathing study of colonial literature, *The Mythology of Empire*. For Raskin, Kipling’s idea of the Empire as the “heroic endeavour of fraternal white men, enslaving themselves to free black men and brown men from poverty and tyranny,” is “The big lie”.\(^6\) And indeed, as Bart Moore-Gilbert has noted:

The depredation caused by disease and military hazards contributes substantially to the note of elegy which is so common in the fiction [of Anglo-India].\(^7\)

But while there can be little doubt that Kipling repeatedly plays the sympathy card in this regard, we are, nonetheless, still confronted with the death-toll itself and the difficult question as to how it could be accommodated in everyday life. In other words, while we can recognise the self-stylisation of Anglo-Indian self-pity, we must also recognise that it is, perhaps, the inevitable logic of a community that sought to justify the validity of its presence to itself in the midst of sickness and death. It is, an example of, the logic of “idle talk”; the rationalisation of purpose and worth in the face of the questions, why? And what for? It is the logic exemplified in, Curzon’s private secretary, Sir Walter Lawrence’s celebration of those “splendid men”, who...

... working like slaves, their wives encouraging them, telling them that it was the greatest of England’s mission and endeavours, well worth the exile, the separation from children,

\(^5\) Parry, *Delusions and Discoveries*, p. 55.


and the certainty of the scrap heap at an age when many are at their best...Their mission was clear; it was to secure the welfare of the millions, to prevent corruption and tyranny, to prevent and to fight famine, plague and pestilence and to ensure that every Indian should have the free right to enjoy unmolested the rites and rules of his religion, his caste and his tribe.°

A logic which is here combined with the doubly righteous Enlightenment ideal of a free and democratic citizenry.°°

In noting these sentiments, it is thus not my intention to suggest that "cloying self-pity" did not exist: it is, in the first instance, that we cannot ontologise this sentiment and assume that every British colonial was animated by a spirit of altruistic selflessness; and in the second, that these sentiments can perhaps be understood in relation to the ontological structures that we have been discussing.

For Kipling, the tragic reality of Anglo-Indian self-sacrifice was not, as Parry suggests, confined to the indifference of the British public at home, or the ingratitude of those they were attempting to help; it was epitomised in the indifference of the Anglo-Indians themselves. India may well be peppered with English graves, the graves of "our fathers" who "ensured to us an heritage" ("The Heritage"), but these graves are all too frequently forgotten:

All India is full of neglected graves that date from the beginning of the eighteenth century — tombs of forgotten colonels of corps long since disbanded; mates of East Indiamen who went on shooting expeditions and never came back; factors, agents, writers, and ensigns of the Honourable the East India Company by hundreds and thousands and tens of thousands. English folk forget quickly, but natives have long memories, and if a man has done good in his life it is remembered after his death.°°

As an appropriately anonymous end for those who had been heroically engaged in an invaluable but thankless task, these neglected graves represent, for Kipling, the crowning irony of Anglo-Indian endeavour: those same Anglo-Indians who bemoan the indifference of the British at home are themselves guilty of not paying proper respect where respect is due. Yet, in the somewhat macabre early poem "A Vision of India", even this last indignity is represented as being part and parcel of the Anglo-Indian's lot:

°° Sir Walter Lawrence, The India We Served (London, 1928), p. 122, quoted by Parry in Delusions and Discoveries, p. 45.

°°° A logic and idealism which can also be seen to underpin Philip Mason's somewhat partisan, but nonetheless honest, study of Anglo-Indian administrators and soldiers, The Men Who Ruled India (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 1999).

°°°° Kipling, 'The Tomb of His Ancestors', pp. 129-130.
Mother India, wan and thin,
Here is forage come your way;
Take the young Civilian in,
Kill him swiftly as you may...

Brown and Jones and Smith shall die;
We succeed to all their places,
Bear the badge of slavery,
Sunken eyes and pallid faces.

Laughter that is worse than tears
Is our portion in the land,
And the tombstones of our peers
Make the steps whereon we stand.62

The intimacy of this juxtaposition of the living and the dead in Kipling’s India is not, however, always drawn in such a grimly, if mischievously, ironic light. As a pastiche on Tennyson’s ‘A Vision of Sin’ (IV), Kipling’s tone is perhaps less stark than Harry Ricketts would have us believe.63 For there is, in the thinly-veiled bookishness, more than a little of the schoolboy smart alecky which characterised Kipling’s early verse (including Departmental Ditties) and which was celebrated in ‘The Propagation of Knowledge’ (Debts and Credits). Kipling’s translation of Tennyson’s “Wrinkled ostler, grim and thin!” into “Mother India, wan and thin,” is nonetheless cleverly drawn and worthy of more attention than I am able to grant it here.

To return to the juxtaposition of the living and the dead; in ‘At the Pit’s Mouth’, an Anglo-Indian graveyard in Simla actually serves as the backdrop for an adulterous liaison, and Kipling makes an example of one of the frivolous and superficial club set who flagrantly disregard and dishonour the memory of their heroic predecessors:

Occasionally folk tend the graves, but we in India shift and are transferred so often that, at the end of the second year, the Dead have no friends – only acquaintances who are far too busy amusing themselves up the hill to attend to old partners...She [“the Man’s Wife”] and the Tertium Quid enjoyed each other’s society among the graves of men and women whom they had known and danced with aforetime.64

The suggestion from the start is that the lovers will shortly be taken to their graves and that those graves will be forgotten too. And this is precisely what happens when the same Quid who had been frolicking among the graves of his former friends, falls to his death from a cliff road and is subsequently “lowered into eighteen inches of water, instead of the twelve to which he

63 Ricketts, The Unforgiving Minute, p. 66.
64 Kipling, ‘At the Pit’s Mouth’ (The Man Who Would Be King and Other Stories), p. 200-201.
had first objected.®® Like The Boy in ‘Thrown Away’, everyone will have forgotten Quid before a fortnight is over.®® Nor is he alone in his ignominy; for throughout these stories, and beneath the grandiose formal rhetoric of his more didactically imperialist work (for example, \textit{The Seven Seas}®®) Kipling is not afraid to show his compatriots, acting out the grubby intrigues of their hypocritical, selfish and shallow little lives: giving us “little Kodak-glimpses” beneath the decorous façade of Anglo-Indian Rule at “the affairs of idle military men, savage soldiers, frisky wives and widows, and flippant civilians”.®®

In addition to the graves and the legacy of their own dead, it is, however, important to note that Kipling’s Anglo-Indians are also confronted by the graves and the legacies of their subjects; for as he recalls in \textit{Something of Myself}:

> The dead of all times were about us – in the vast and forgotten Muslim cemeteries round the Station, where one’s horse’s hoof of a morning might break through to the corpse below; skulls and bones tumbled out of our mud garden walls, and were turned up among the flowers by the Rains; and at every point were tombs of the dead. Our chief picnic rendezvous and some of our public offices had been memorials to desired dead women; and Fort Lahore, where Ranjit Singh’s wives lay, was a mausoleum of ghosts. This was the setting in which my world revolved.®®

And from this, and indeed, the previous extract on “our constant companion”, it is not difficult to see the literal truth which hides behind Wilson’s observation that, “In the midst of life we are in death is ...[Kipling’s] constant assertion about man’s daily being”.®® These nonchalant descriptions of picnicking amongst tombs and stumbling over skulls clearly reinforce our earlier observations on death’s intrusion upon the everyday; but Kipling’s apparent inurement to the

---

®® ibid., p.203.
®® Described by W.D. Howell’s upon its publication in 1897 as having the keynote of “a patriotism intense beyond anything expressed by other English poets...Its patriotism is not love of the little England, “encompassed by the inviolate seas” on the west coast of Europe; but the great England whose far-strewn empire feels its mystical unity in every latitude and longitude of the globe”. W.D. Howells on “The Laureate of the Larger England”, in \textit{Kipling: The Critical Heritage}, p. 192.
®® Robert Buchanan, “‘The Voice of the Hooligan’: A Discussion of Kiplingism’ (1900) in \textit{Kipling and the Critics}, p. 21. \textit{Plain Tales from the Hills} is of course exceptional in this regard with its grim depiction of mixed-race relations (‘Lispeth’, ‘Beyond the Pale’ and ‘Kidnapped’), adultery (‘The Other Man’), race-fixing (‘The Broken-Link Handicap’), opium addiction and “going native” (‘The Gate of the Hundred Sorrows’ and ‘To Be Filed for Reference’). See also, ‘The Big Drunk Draft’ (Soldiers Three) and ‘A Wayside Comedy’ (\textit{The Man Who Would Be King and Other Stories}), as well as \textit{Departmental Ditties}; for example, ‘The Man Who Could Write’ and ‘Delilah’. As Peter Keating has observed, “In the world of \textit{Departmental Ditties}, people get what they are ruthless enough to plan for, not what they deserve". \textit{Kipling the Poet} (London: Secker & Warburg, 1994), p. 19.
®® Kipling, \textit{Something of Myself}, p. 36 (my emphasis). It is interesting to compare this extract with Kipling’s unusual contribution to Filson Young’s \textit{The Complete Motorist} in which he says that “in England the dead, twelve coffin deep, clutch hold of my wheels at every turn, till I sometimes wonder that the road does not bleed. That is the real joy of motoring – the exploration of this amazing England” (quoted by Ricketts in \textit{The Unforgiving Minute}, p. 289).
®® Wilson, \textit{The Strange Ride of Rudyard Kipling}, p. 186.
horror of such scenes can, in addition, be seen to serve as an illustration of the way in which Dasein comes to accommodate death in its tranquilised and inauthentic immersion in the "they". Like Tertium Quid, Kipling is able to enjoy himself among the dead. However, this is not always the case; in 'The City of Dreadful Night', he encounters

...a disused Mohamedan burial-ground, where the jawless skulls and rough-butted shank-bones, heartlessly exposed by the July rains, glimmered like mother o'pearl on the rain-channelled soil.27

This time, there is no nonchalance and there are no picnics to be had, for the dead intrude upon the young Kipling in such a way that, like James Thompson in the original poem, he awakes "from daydreams to this real night"72 and Lahore is revealed for what it is; a place of Death, a city of corpses:

[O]n either side of the road lay corpses disposed on beds in fantastic attitudes – one hundred and seventy bodies of men. Some shrouded all in white with bound-up mouths; some naked and black as ebony in the strong light; and one – that lay face upwards with dropped jaw, far away from the others – silvery white and ashen gray.73

But of course, as we read on, we realise that they are not dead, they are only sleeping. Our startling first impression nonetheless lingers with us, an impression which Kipling exploits to set and then maintain the appropriately eerie and solitary mood.

The living lie alongside the bones of their forefathers in the burial grounds, the former soon to be like the latter, and the latter once the former.74 All around him, Kipling apprehends the truth of man's mortality, and in this apprehension the everyday distinction between the living and the dead is passed over. As the only one awake, Kipling is the only one alive. Beyond the obvious self-stylisation of this Orpheus-like descent into the Indian underworld, Kipling, the seer, is describing the realisation that he is "in the world", as well as the nature of his engagement with it, "Stripped naked of all vesture that beguiles"75; a world in which he is "Being towards death"; a world in which he is fundamentally alone. At the end of the story, as he stands upon the walls of the Mosque of Wazir Khan, he sees:

74 "I have seen phantoms there that were as men / And men that were as phantoms flit and roam..." Thompson, 'The City of Dreadful Night', VII: 15-16.
75 Thompson, 'The City of Dreadful Night', Proem: lines 8-11

129
A woman's corpse going down to the burning-ghat, and a bystander says, “She died at midnight from the heat.”

The woman’s passing from life into death leads Kipling to end the story by confirming that which we have known all along: “the city was of Death as well as Night after all”; one in which the dead, the dying and the soon-to-die all lie side by side in the night.

Kipling’s descriptions of corpses littering the streets of Lahore in ‘The City of Dreadful Night’ is, in addition, a chilling early prelude to the descent into wholesale misery and loss that is described in his later tales of cholera. By this I mean that the arrival of cholera, and the thousands, often tens of thousands of deaths that ensue, only serves to confirm, emphasise and accelerate that which was already there: Kipling’s description of a city of corpses needs only cholera to make it true:

At each station they dragged out the dead and the dying. They died by the roadside, and the horses of the Englishmen shied at the corpses in the grass...The city below them was locked up in its own torments...They heard the wailing in the houses of the dead, and once the shriek of a mother who had lost a child and was calling for its return. In the gray dawn they saw the dead borne out through the city gates, each litter with its own little knot of mourners.

In Kipling’s India, no other hardship that need be endured is portrayed as being more devastating than cholera, not even war. But more specifically, in its unpredictability, its inescapability and its indiscrimination cholera perpetually serves to illustrate the common vulnerability and transience of man’s existence. Beneath the anonymity of death-counts and collective misery, in ‘Only a Subaltern’ Kipling can be seen to intuit the peculiarly intimate and personal bond which exists between the sick and those who nurse them. As Gerard Manley Hopkins says, “This seeing the sick endears them to us, us too it endears”. Echoing Hopkins’ grief at the wasting away of the “big-boned and hardy” farrier, Felix Randall, Kipling mourns the desperate fate of the common soldier who, despite his strength and spirit, is nonetheless laid low:

76 Kipling, ‘The City of Dreadful Night’, p.380
77 ibid, p. 380.
79 And not even famine. Kipling’s descriptions of famine in ‘William the Conqueror’ (The Day’s Work), for example, as well as being offset by the emerging relationship between Scott and William, concentrates more upon the individual efforts of the Administration to bring relief than it does upon the human misery and devastation.
We've got the cholerer in the camp – it's worse than forty fights;
We're dyin' in the wilderness the same as Isrulites.
It's before us, an' be 'ind us, an' we cannot get away
An' the doctor's just reported we've ten more to-day.*

Here in 'Cholera Camp', Kipling conveys, not just the tragic inability of strong men to defeat or escape the disease, but their isolation and a stultifying helplessness. The repetition of the closing refrain, "ten more to-day", convinces us of the inevitable, remorseless, ever increasing, death-toll.

As Wilson has observed, Kipling hammers home the point that no one is immune; officers, soldiers, natives and children of every race and creed. The ineffectual defences of faith and ritual, strength and race, are swept away. All are struck down and as they fall, the characters who are left – whether it be Holden and Ameera in 'Without Benefit of Clergy'; Porkiss, "overtaken with a great and chilly fear" in 'Only a Subaltern'; or Miriam, the fearful wife of Ephraim, in 'Jews in Shushan' – mourn their loss, assess their chances and fret over those they love. An outbreak of cholera in Kipling is thus, much more than just an account of an horrific experience; an exaggerated metaphor for the unavoidability of man's demise; or even a symbolic representation of India as the sickly carrier of death. It is, significantly, in the context of the current study, an example of those circumstances under which man can potentially come to apprehend his own "Being towards death" in anticipation. For Heidegger:

The non-relational character of death, as understood in anticipation, individualizes Dasein down to itself. This individualising is a way in which the "there" is disclosed for existence.**

---

* Kipling, 'Cholera Camp', *Definitive Verse*, pp. 440-441. This poem is among those cited by Charles Carrington as being a testament to the fact that, "No author in any literature has composed, in verse or prose, so full and varied and so relentlessly realistic a view of the soldier's life, with its alternations of boredom and terror, its deadening routine, its characteristic vices and corruptions, its rare glories and its irrational fascination, as Rudyard Kipling..." (Rudyard Kipling: His Life and Work, pp. 263-4). This sympathetic reading of Kipling's depiction of the common soldier, must, however, be read alongside that of George Orwell, who contends that "Kipling is almost unconscious of the class war that goes on in an army as much as elsewhere. It is not only that he thinks the soldier comic, but that he thinks him patriotic, feudal, a ready admirer of his officers, and proud to be a soldier of the Queen. Of course that is partly true, or battles could not be fought, but "What have I done for thee, England, my England?" is essentially a middle-class query. Almost any working man would follow it up immediately with "What has England done for me?". In so far as Kipling grasps this, he simply sets it down to "the intense selfishness of the lower classes" (his phrase)" ('Rudyard Kipling', p. 80-81).

** See, Eliot L. Gilbert, "Without Benefit of Clergy": A Farewell to Ritual', in *Kipling and the Critics*, pp. 163-183.

---

* Kipling, 'Only a Subaltern' (The Man Who Would Be King and Other Stories), p. 163.

** *Being and Time*, II.1, p. 308. As Safranski explains, for Heidegger, "Death individualizes, even though dying takes place in huge numbers. The attempt to understand death as the absolute boundary must, at the same time, understand it as the boundary of understanding" (*Martin Heidegger*, p. 164).
And it is to Kipling’s depiction of death as the individualising disclosure of one’s own “Being-in-the-world” as a “Being towards death”, that we now turn.

(b) “Being towards death”

Thus far, I have focused only upon how death in Anglo-India exists as the always present existential horizon against which Kipling’s characters are set and can be seen to proceed in their everyday lives. In this section, I will examine the responses of individual characters confronted with death, in all its many forms, and discuss the ways which they can be understood to reflect the existential-ontological structures of “Being towards death”.

As we have seen in ‘At the Pit’s Mouth’, by placing his characters in such a close and explicit proximity to the dead, Kipling portrays an Anglo-Indian community that is always precariously on the brink; a community which adopts “the wisdom” of Conrad’s Marlow by “putting out of sight all the reminders of our folly, of our weakness, of our mortality”\(^{85}\) in an endless round of parties and amusements. Simla, like Lahore in ‘The City of Dreadful Night’, is a city of the living-soon-to-be-dead among the dead, but in ‘The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes’, Kipling goes one step further still and casts his hero into the “Village of the Dead” itself; “a town where the Dead who did not die, but may not live, have established their headquarters”.\(^{86}\) Here, the shocked and disbelieving Jukes is told by a former employee, Gunga Dass:

[Y]ou are dead, my dear friend. It is not your fault, of course, but none the less you are dead and buried.\(^{87}\)

But, of course, as we have already said, this disclosure can be understood as an accentuated confirmation of that which was already apparent in Simla. For in both cases the character is alive but as good as dead. Moreover, as Gunga Dass explains:

There are only two kinds of men, Sar – the alive and the dead. When you are dead you are dead, but when you are alive you live.\(^{88}\)

And as such, death strips Jukes of his ‘Anglo-Indian-ness’ and his ‘whiteness’; in other words, it strips him of his ontical identity and all of that which he perceives to be the God-given rights of

\(^{86}\) Kipling, ‘The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes’ (*The Man Who Would Be King and Other Stories*), p. 3.
\(^{87}\) Ibid., p. 12.
\(^{88}\) Ibid., p. 8.
his caste. In the "Village of the Dead", Jukes is merely another body, and this is confirmed in his account of his first night in the hole that has been assigned to him:

The horrors of that night I shall never forget. My den was nearly as narrow as a coffin, and the sides had been worn smooth and greasy by the contact of innumerable naked bodies...

These "innumerable naked bodies", are not Indian or native bodies, they are the bodies of men like himself; or as Nora Crook has argued, in her interesting assessment of Kipling's use of Chaucerian, Dantean and Swinburnian sources, *Kipling's Myths of Love and Death*, "The pagan beggar and the "white man" are brothers under the skin, and all inhabit coffins of clay":

That is a knowledge which Jukes cannot face, and which Kipling, the demon-boy writing ostensibly to entertain the white masters, tells only to those who have ears to hear. All have enlisted in the legion of the damned, all men are pigs, all partake of the dunghill.

But this does not mean that Jukes himself is primarily horrified by the racial levelling of his predicament. What is far more pressing is the disclosure of his own mortality. Jukes has had a glimpse of the fact that he is certain to be one of their number, certain to die whether he escapes from this place or not. Indeed, it should be said that it is this crucial detail which reveals Wilson's choice of *The Strange Ride of Rudyard Kipling* for the title of his book, to be especially insightful. For Kipling too is alive to this certainty. In "The City of Dreadful Night", for example, he emerges in the morning like the Ancient Mariner, carrying his knowledge of death back to the world of the living.

Jukes has been, as Gunga Dass implies, literally buried alive, and thus he is literally experiencing his own death and burial before he has died:

Yes, we were a Republic indeed! A Republic of wild beasts penned at the bottom of a pit, to eat and fight and sleep till we died. I attempted no protest of any kind, but sat down and stared at the hideous sight in front of me.

His alarm is further exacerbated when he learns of the death of the other Sahib: "He died", Gunga Dass explains, "in the burrow as you will die, and as I will die, and as all these men and women and the one child will also die".

---

98 ibid., p. 16.
100 Kipling, "The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes", p. 18.
101 ibid., p. 19.
...I thought of my wretched fellow-prisoner’s unspeakable misery among all these horrors for eighteen months, and the final agony of dying like a rat in a hole, with a bullet-wound in the stomach... I was feeling sick and faint with horror now.\footnote{Kipling, ‘The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes’, pp. 19-20.}

In this explicit act of empathy, Jukes anticipates his own demise, not as an Anglo-Indian, but as himself, delivered over to himself. Zohreh T. Sullivan is thus correct in her assertion that, "Jukes sees before him nightmare images of his mutilated self, first his horse and then the Englishman".\footnote{Zohreh T. Sullivan, *Narratives of Empire: The Fictions of Rudyard Kipling* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 76.} But, then again, Sullivan understands the story as a ‘narrative of empire’ within the context of colonial discourse, and Jukes exclusively in terms of his colonial status. As a result, for her, ‘The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes’ is

A totalising vision of a democratised India as a city of the dead and as a black hole in imperial reality.\footnote{Ibid., p. 76.}

The story, its setting, its protagonists, and most importantly, the sentiments expressed on the subject of death, are thus entirely subsumed within an interpretative frame which emphasises the colonial to the exclusion of all else. Here, I would concur with Norah Crook when she suggests that readings of ‘The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes’, like that of Sullivan’s, which confine themselves to an appreciation of it as a metaphor for the anxieties of ‘the white ruling class’, constitute an actual underestimation of “the story’s artistic coherence”.\footnote{Ibid.} For Crook, it is

A view which seems to me indubitable, but one-dimensional. The exclusively “colonial malaise” reading depends on one’s screening out certain elements, or negating them to the status of plot machinery.\footnote{Ibid.}

A “screening” and “negating”, moreover, that involves the “covering up” (verdecken) of the ontological constitution of Dasein’s “Being towards death” and the ontological meaning of death itself.

This interpretational subsumption and “covering up” is even more apparent in Sullivan’s reading of ‘The Phantom Rickshaw’, an early Kipling story of death and terror, in which Jack Pansay is haunted by the ghost of the woman he had jilted. For while Pansay describes the presence of the rickshaw as filling

---

\footnote{Kipling, ‘The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes’, pp. 19-20.}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 76. See also her insistence that the hole within which Jukes finds himself, constitutes “A metaphoric and gendered India as vaginalized space [which] has swallowed and unmanned the colonizer” (p. 76).}
\footnote{Crook, *Kipling’s Myths of Love and Death*, p. 97.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
...me by turns with horror, blind fear, a dim sort of pleasure, and utter despair...[And confesses] that I dread its advent more than any word can say... I torture myself nightly with a thousand speculations as to the manner of death.98

Sullivan interprets Jack's descent into madness and his terror at the approach of his own death as demonstrating

...the mechanism of self destruction ironically contained in the heart of the system, the Minotaur produced by the colonial system — the colonised human mind that is the fragmented, all-too-human victim, rather than master, of all it surveys.99

In considering this type of criticism, the most immediate question which presents itself is this: how has Sullivan reached such a conclusion from the evidence in the text? Her suggestion that Pansay's madness signifies, or indeed constitutes, a "product" manufactured by the colonial system, is not, anywhere to be found in the narrative. For Sullivan:

The private fear made explicit in the story is the loss of control over a unified imperial self.100

As such, Pansay's terrors are the terrors of this "imperial self", his fears the "imperial" fears which are synecdochical of the fears of the colonial establishment as a whole. The logic of Sullivan's interpretation, like that of Sara Suleri discussed in Chapter One, is the "Enframing" (and 'gathering') logic of her drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality. The most significant factor upon which any perceived functionality of this kind rests is not to be found in any thought, action or speech; it is extrapolated solely from the fact that Jack Pansay is a coloniser and, of course, that Kipling the author is first and foremost, as JanMohamed argues, "the champion of colonialism and British superiority".101 Moreover, this extrapolation, which concludes in a type of psychoanalytical cultural syncretism, can be seen to exist as the sole objective of Sullivan's thesis. The drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality means that Pansay is, from the outset, always destined to lose his individuality; have the one-dimensional mask of homogenous cultural membership slipped over his head; and be assessed exclusively in terms of that membership. The problems which arise from Sullivan's thesis are thus the problems which arise in the wake of her obvious desire to read into and, very occasionally, out of, individual fictional characters, the broad cultural trends that have already been plotted in the canons of colonial discourse analysis. As a result, Pansay, the individual

99 Sullivan, Narratives of Empire, p. 64.
100 ibid., p. 70.
fictional character, exists as simply another vehicle for the elaboration and explication of these trends.

In proceeding now to examine ‘The Story of the Gadsbys: A Tale Without a Plot’, it should be obvious from the above that I will not be attempting to transmogrify Gadsby’s “funk” into a metaphor for colonial paranoia. I will, instead, be conducting the examination in order to identify what it is that he is actually afraid of. And that can only be achieved by attending to what he actually says:

*It never passes with me, Jack. I’m always thinking about it. Me funking a fall on parade...Wait till you’ve got a wife and a youngster of your own, and then you’ll know how the roar of the squadron behind you turns you cold all up the back.*

Here, Gadsby is explaining to his friend Mafflin why he has decided to quit the regiment and return to England. In lines which recall Harry Feversham’s descriptions of foreseeing “every hedge, every pit, every treacherous bank”, Gadsby articulates his anticipatory fear of his own death, and the consequences that would have for his wife and child. “For the past three months, I’ve felt every hoof of the squadron in the small of my back every time that I’ve led,” he says; a vivid premonition, as the futural orientation of oneself as a “being in Time”, bringing with it the disclosure of the “there” of Gadsby’s present. As Mafflin attempts to understand how this could be the same man who had faced death on the battle field without fear, it becomes clear that Gadsby has not arrived at this crisis because he is, or might become, a coward, but because he now sees that others are dependent upon his survival. His fear of death has been precipitated by his love for his wife and child and this illustrates the point already noted regarding the multifarious ways in which Dasein’s death can be disclosed to it. There are no ghosts or corpses here, nobody has died and there are no graveyards in the vicinity; yet death, Gadsby’s own death, has nonetheless been disclosed to him. But then again, is this fear not peculiarly un-English and even cowardly? Are Gadsby, and Pansay for that matter, not examples of what Edward Said has called “Kipling’s White Man”?:

Being a White Man was...an idea and a reality...It meant – in the colonies – speaking in a certain way, behaving according to a code of regulations, and even feeling certain things and not others. It meant specific judgements, evaluations, gestures. It was a form of authority before which nonwhites and even whites themselves, were expected to bend...Being a White Man, in short, was a very concrete manner of Being-in-the-world, a way of taking hold of reality, and thought.

---

Mason, The Four Feathers, p. 41.
Orientalism, p. 227.
The “White Man” that is ontologically constituted (as “a very concrete manner of Being-in-the-world”) as the self-assured and fearless paragon of imperial manhood? Or as Benita Parry would have it, a marvel “of efficiency and endurance, probity and moral excellence.”

On the contrary, in “The Story of the Gadsbys” and “The Phantom Rickshaw”, “Kipling’s White Man” is shown to be that which he is, in his “potentiality-for-Being-himself”, afraid for himself within the private context of the world of his “concern”. It is that same “potentiality-for-Being-one-self” which can, to a certain extent and in addition, be seen to result in the individual acts of violent insubordination and cowardice, which as Kipling says, sometimes means that

...one hears strange and horrible stories of men not following their officers, of orders being given by those who had no right to give them.

Not the stories that “England told itself as it went to sleep at night”, but the “horrible stories” which haunted the young Harry Feversham at the beginning of The Four Feathers. Stories like ‘The Drums of the Fore and Aft’ (considered by Conan Doyle to be among the classic short stories of the English language) in which an entire British regiment flies in the face of enemy fire; ‘In the matter of a Private’, ‘Love-O-Women’ and ‘Black Jack’, where soldiers run amok and try to kill their colleagues; or ‘The Mutiny of the Mavericks’ which tells how a young Irish-American conspirator “dreaded death” and

...remembered certain things that the priests had said in his infancy, and his mother...starting from her sleep with shrieks to pray for a husband’s soul in torment...[He] could see himself, as he lay on the earth in the night, dying by various causes. They were all horrible...

The individual vulnerability depicted here can thus be taken to reaffirm our earlier conclusions on Kipling’s acumen in recognising the point at which the “idle talk” of imperial self-flattery gives way to fear and despair in the face of death. In other words, while there is, on the one hand, the “idle talk” of a poem like ‘The Young British Soldier’ with its council to “go to your Gawd like a soldier”; on the other, in ‘That Day’, another young British soldier tells us:

I 'eard the loives be'ind me, but I dursn’t face my man,  
Nor I don't know where I went to, 'cause I didn't 'allt to see,
Till I 'eard a beggar squealin' out for quarter as 'e ran,
An' I thought I knew the voice an' -- it was me!\textsuperscript{112}

Indeed, in 'Thrown Away' and 'At the End of the Passage' this fear and despair results in Said's and Parry's self-same "White Men" taking their own lives. As the narrator in the latter tale explains:

There was no cholera near Hummil's section even fever gives a man at least a week's grace, and sudden death generally implied self-slaughter.\textsuperscript{113}

A "self-slaughter" which, as the Anglo-Indian Civil Servant, Alan Butterworth recalls often lacked reason or discernible motive:

[Oh]uly too many of my European acquaintances in India have died by their own hands, and I do not remember a single case where a motive could be assigned; always the deed was done in response to the muttered promptings of that \textit{nescio quid doloris} which lurks in our souls.\textsuperscript{114}

But of course, Hummil himself does not take action to commit suicide. Like Duncan Parrenness in 'The Dream of Duncan Parrenness' and Dostoyevsky's Mr Golyadkin, he is confronted with his own doppelgänger, and dies from sheer terror. It is thus interesting to note that the same epigraph from 'The Phantom Rickshaw' (which runs,

\begin{quote}
May no ill dreams disturb my rest,
Nor powers of Darkness me molest.
\textit{Evening Hymn}\textsuperscript{115}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[112]{Kipling, 'That Day' (Barrack-Room Ballads), \textit{Definitive Verse}, pp. 437-438. See also, "The Coward" \textit{(Epigraphs of the War 1914-18)}: "I could not look on Death, which being known, / Men led me to him, blindfold and alone" (\textit{Definitive Verse}, p. 387).}
\footnotetext[113]{Kipling, 'At the End of the Passage' \textit{(Life's Handicap)}, p. 190.}
\footnotetext[115]{Kipling, 'The Phantom Rickshaw', p. 26.}
\end{footnotes}
is sung by the four “lonely folk who understood the dread meaning of loneliness,”* in ‘At the End of the Passage’. Hummil and Pansay are both disturbed and molested by the “ill dreams” and the “powers of Darkness”. And, as Harry Ricketts has noted, Kipling was himself only too familiar with these dreams; indeed, on occasions, he even made these thoughts the subject of public lectures, as in his speech at McGill University in 1907, entitled ‘Values in Life’, when he warned an audience of young students:

There is a certain darkness into which the soul of the young man sometimes descends - a horror of desolation, abandonment, and realised worthlessness, which is one of the most real of the hells in which we are compelled to walk.117

For Philip Mason, “Kipling was intuitive; he felt the dramatic force of the loneliness and heat, of panic and nightmare”.118 And as we saw above, this was, to a very great extent, because he was writing from personal experience when he described the minds and behaviours of men in India who, like Hummil, were breaking under the pressure of solitude, heat and sickness:

I felt each succeeding hot weather more and more, and cowered in my soul as it returned...It happened one hot-weather evening, in '86 or thereabouts, when I felt that I had come to the edge of all endurance. As I entered my empty house in the dusk there was no more in me except the horror of a great darkness, that I must have been fighting for some days.119

It is here, at these moments of crisis, that the companionship mentioned at the beginning of this chapter becomes so important; the companionship which Wilson describes as providing “protection from the seemingly eternal and intolerable future”. And nowhere is the value of this “protection” more in evidence than in the steadying and diversionary efforts of Mulvaney when the three friends are suffering on a sweltering June night at Fort Amara, the “most desolate and least desirable of all fortresses in India”:120

---

116 Kipling, ‘At the End of the Passage’, p. 185.
118 Philip Mason, *Rudyard Kipling*, p. 104. Angus Wilson can be seen to draw the same conclusions in citing an unsigned article of Kipling’s from the *Civil and Military Gazette* of September 1886 in which Kipling makes reference to those “elusive thoughts that like Chinese guards will not let you rest” (*The Strange Ride of Rudyard Kipling*, p. 62).
119 Kipling, *Something of Myself*, p. 52. This, and indeed, any number of the other extracts that we have been looking at in Kipling’s fiction certainly serves to contradict Frank O’Connor’s bizarre suggestion that “Kipling cannot write about the one subject a story teller must write about – human loneliness.” Quoted by Raskin in *The Mythology of Empire*, p. 77.
120 Kipling, ‘With the Main Guard’ (*Soldiers Three*), p. 49.
Half mad with the fear of death presaged in the swelling veins of his neck, Learoyd was begging his Maker to strike him dead, and fighting for more air between his prayers.

In his "blood and thunder" tale of the Black Tyrone, Mulvaney succeeds in helping his friend through the night, and as such, succeeds in drawing him back into the tranquilised inauthenticity of the "they". But in his closing remark:

"Eyah!" said he "I've blandandhered thim through the night somehow, but can thim that helps others help themselves? Answer me that, sor!".

Mulvaney is himself shown to be devoid of that "protection" which he can provide for others. But more importantly, Kipling deliberately draws an explicit parallel between Mulvaney and Christ - "He saved others, but He cannot save Himself" - and in so doing, emphatically underlines both the fundamental nobility and the inherent tragedy of Mulvaney's self-sacrifice.

In a later Mulvaney story, which charts the shambolic progress of his seduction of his future wife, the reasons for Mulvaney's despair at the end of 'With the Main Guard' are laid bare in the account of the terrifyingly comprehensive curse of Mother Sheehy:

"May your eyes see clear evry step av the dark path you take till the hot cindhers av hell put thim out...an' may ye die quick in a strange land, watchin' your death before ut takes you, an' onable to stir hand or foot."

It is a curse which condemns Mulvaney to the consciousness of "Being towards death": a life lived in a perpetual state of awareness as to the certainty and immanence of his inevitable "non-Being". These, then, are the vultures that tear at Mulvaney's liver, these and the memory of his son whose early death Mother Sheehy had also foretold. But Mulvaney is no different from any number of other characters in Kipling who have lost their children. Nearly a decade before the tragic loss of his own child, Josephine, Kipling describes an Anglo-India which is populated by grieving, and often desolate, parents: from Holden in 'Without Benefit of Clergy' to Mr and Mrs Jim in 'William the Conqueror'; the Cusack-Bremmills in 'Three and an Extra' and of course Mulvaney himself; all can be seen to suffer.

---

121 ibid., p. 51.
122 ibid., p. 65.
123 Matthew 27:42.
124 Kipling, 'The Courting of Dinah Shad', p. 64.
125 See also, 'The Incarnation of Krishna Mulvaney' (Life's Handicap); "He [Mulvaney] was silent for a moment, thinking of his little son, dead many years ago" (p. 32).
...the hell of self-questioning reproach which is reserved for those who have lost a child, and believe that with a little — just a little more care — it might have been saved.\textsuperscript{126}

In her discussion on child deaths in the work of Anne Tytler, Sara Suleri describes what she sees as “the picturesque’s ability to embalm the violence of Anglo-India” wherein “Children in particular are eminently killable” and can be seen to function as “a parable for the extreme vulnerability of Anglo-India”.\textsuperscript{127} And as such, Suleri’s analysis once again subjugates the specificity and ontological significance of individual loss (discussed in the previous chapter) to the homogenised structures of a colonially determined discursive functionality.\textsuperscript{128}

As Angus Wilson observes, the overall effect of this infant death-toll, which includes the deaths of Indian children like Muhammad Din and the sister of little Tobrah, is to remind us that

Death...was always round the corner, and children seemed to be the most frequent victims...or was it, one asks, because they were the most tragic?\textsuperscript{129}

Intentionally tragic or not, their loss is a crucial factor in, and painful illustration of, the ways in which their parents come to understand themselves in relation to Time: Time which, Henry Havelock, writing shortly after the death of his third son Ettrick in 1834, was only too consciously trying to fill:

I have been favoured in having been actively preoccupied with rather a troublesome court-martial, and it is probable that its proceedings will keep me at work to-day and part of to-morrow. This is better than having, in such seasons, too much leisure for recalling past events and images.\textsuperscript{130}

For Havelock and the others we have noted, the past is a past in which their child was alive; their present is marked by the child’s absence and their own “self-questioning reproach”; and their future is destined to be only a perpetuation of that absence and reproach. Moreover, and as we saw with Learoyd in ‘On Greenhow Hill’, these remembered deaths, and the act of remembering, can, in addition, be seen to constitute and dramatise the way of Dasein’s own Being, as a “being in Time”.

\textsuperscript{126} Kipling, ‘Without Benefit of Clergy’, p. 169.
\textsuperscript{127} Suleri, The Rhetoric of English India, p. 99.
\textsuperscript{128} On the subject of children in Kipling, see Roger Laurelyn Green’s Kipling and the Children (London: Eelck, 1965); for a postcolonial perspective, see, for example, S.P. Mohanty’s more general observation that “the separate world of childhood registers and refracts crucial political anxieties of imperial Britain.” ‘Kipling’s Children and the Colour Line’, Race and Class 31, 1 (July/Sep 1989), p. 21.
\textsuperscript{129} Wilson, The Strange Ride of Rudyard Kipling, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{130} Quoted by John Clark Marshman in The Memoirs of Major-General Sir Henry Havelock (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1902), p. 44.
As illustrations of the way in which Dasein is "stretched along and stretches itself along" in Time, these acts of remembrance, are however, as nothing when compared to Kipling's most conspicuous "being in Time", John Hay, 'The Wandering Jew'. For it is Hay, more than any other character in Kipling, who stands out as the literal embodiment of Dasein's flight in the face of its own "Being towards death":

[The ghost of his relative stood in the hall of his house...shouting up the stairway that life was short, that there was no hope of increase of days, and that the undertakers were already roughing out his nephew's coffin...The shadow inside his brain grew larger and blacker. His fear of death was driving John Hay mad.]

Hay is, however, diverted from the peculiar madness which threatens to engulf him by the further, and entirely mischievous, disclosure, from "a shriller voice", that "Who goes round the world once easterly, gains one day". And thus begins Hay's deluded progress around the globe in which "he noted in his pocket-book every minute that he had wasted or screwed out of remorseless eternity". These single-minded circuits of the world, which are in sharp contrast with the purposeful circuits of McAndrew and his "one million mile o' sea", continue until "another Hay" attempts to prevent him from wasting his entire fortune and obtaining some of it for him or her self. A stop to the wandering is thus finally called and Hay is fooled into hanging by ropes from the roof of a room "in a whitewashed little bungalow" on the southern coast of India, letting "the round earth swing free beneath him". The surreal closing image, more reminiscent of Samuel Beckett than Rudyard Kipling, of, "an old worn man who forever faces the rising sun, a stop-watch in his hand, racing against eternity", undoubtedly serves to emphasise the foolishness of Hay's efforts, but it also confirms the point made by Philip Mason that throughout Kipling's writing:

...from beginning to end...there is a consciousness of death, of the smallness of man in the face of eternity, of a vastness and a power beyond man's comprehension.

An incomprehension which is implicit in Hay's question, "Why does not the sun always remain

---

131 Being and Time, II.5, p. 427.
132 Kipling, 'The Wandering Jew' (Life's Handicap), p. 314. In a comparable scene in 'The Dream of Duncan Barrenness' (from the same volume), the terrified Barrenness is confronted by a ghostly apparition, albeit an apparition of his own scarred and aged self, and informed of the fact that "there is no return" (p. 404).
134 ibid., p. 316.
135 Kipling, 'McAndrew's Hymn', Definitive Verse, pp. 120-127.
137 ibid., p. 317.
138 Mason, Rudyard Kipling, p. 248.
over my head?";\textsuperscript{130} a question, which resonates with Heidegger’s “Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?”\textsuperscript{140} For in both cases, it is the absence of an answer which defines the human condition: an absence which draws the self before itself in the face of an answer which “remains in its very origin withdrawn into oblivion.”\textsuperscript{141}

So, while the story of Hay is, on one level, a story of lunacy and delusion, the message is both sobering and revealing within the context of the role of death in Kipling’s work. If we recall Wilson’s assertion regarding Kipling’s didacticism on death, we can see this story as Kipling’s most explicit portrait of Western man’s failure to face up to and accept the fundamental nature of his own existence as a “Being towards death”. While the lesson of Hay’s wasted life thus points us towards the only available alternative, a stoical devotion to work, at the same time, and as J. M. S. Tompkins has observed, for Kipling, “Man is a creature of Time, and there can be no absolute value in his productions.”\textsuperscript{142} Yet those productions must nonetheless continue and the great Kashi Bridge across the Ganges must still be built despite the fact that, as Krishna explains to the Mugger, “They come all to thee at the last”\textsuperscript{143}

With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein’s Being-in-the-world.\textsuperscript{144}

In this chapter I have sought to demonstrate the ways in which certain characters in Kipling’s Indian fiction can be seen to stand before themselves, in the face of death, and in their ownmost “potentiality-for-Being”. In isolating and examining instances of, and modes of “Being-towards”, death in Kipling I have, moreover, sought to emphasise the fact that the presence of death in Kipling’s fiction, is founded in his own personal engagement with death as the “being in the world” of his experiences, that he himself is. And as such, that it can be seen to reflect (and in reflecting underline) the fundamentally individualised, worlded and human character of those experiences.

\textsuperscript{130} Kipling, ‘The Wandering Jew’, p. 318. “There is no place where death cannot find us – even if we constantly twist our heads about in all directions as in a suspect land: “Quae quasi saxum Tantalo semper suspendit.” [It is like the rock for ever hanging over the head of Tantalus],” Montaigne, The Essays, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{140} Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{141} Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, II.IV, p. 151.


\textsuperscript{143} Kipling, ‘The Bridge Builders’, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{144} Being and Time, II.1, p. 294.
More importantly, in arguing that death constitutes the existential horizon against which certain characters in Kipling’s fiction come to understand what, how and that they are, I have explained the significance of death in the “idle talk” (that which “prescribes one’s state-of-mind, and determines what and how one “sees””\textsuperscript{145}) of imperial rhetoric, self-flattery, self-pity and work. And in demonstrating the fact that it is in death, and “Being towards death”, that “idle talk” falls away, I have shown that the “structured image” of an homogenised ‘colonising subject’ which is advanced in colonial discourse analysis, can itself be seen to fracture.

In addition, it is important to stress that this concentration upon death in Kipling should not be taken as an elision or negation of the significance of colonialism in Kipling’s life and work. It is, on the contrary, founded in the belief that we can only come to a clearer understanding as to the specific nature of Kipling’s engagement with, and depiction of, the Empire when we grasp, and adhere to, the fundamental significance of death. Kipling’s imperialism is not laid bare in the artificial prioritisation (and ontologisation) of imperial themes and structures; indeed, it is distorted. Nor, for that matter, does the interpretation of Kipling’s imperialism in terms of an exclusively colonial meaningfulness, necessarily mean that we get close to that imperialism. For despite the fact that, Kipling was, as Said would have it

...writing not just from the dominating viewpoint of a white man in a colonial possession but from the perspective of a massive colonial system whose economy, functioning, and history had acquired the status of a virtual fact of nature...\textsuperscript{146}

in restricting ourselves to an interpretation that is exclusively founded upon this “dominating viewpoint” and “perspective”, Kipling and the characters in his books, will only ever be the homogenised, un-worlded and de-humanised ‘colonising subjects’ of a “challenging revealing”. As I have continually argued, we can only hope to understand the Empire as it was, when we recognise the colonisers as individual human beings in the world of their experiences. Beings for whom death is their ownmost possibility, and not just a subject for self pity, or a metaphor for colonial guilt and paranoia.

\textsuperscript{145} ibid., L5, p. 213.
\textsuperscript{146} Said, \textit{Culture and Imperialism}, p. 162.
CHAPTER V: Anxiety and Boredom

In the two previous chapters I have examined important aspects of Martin Heidegger’s existential-ontological analytic of Dasein – “Being in Time” and “Being towards death” – and demonstrated the ways in which these aspects are reflected in the thoughts, speeches and actions of fictional colonisers. In this chapter, I will narrow the focus again and concentrate upon how “Being in Time” and “Being towards death” come together and are made manifest in the ontological “states-of-mind” (Befindlichkeit) or “moods” (Stimmungen) of “anxiety” (Angst, Unheimlichkeit) and “boredom” (Langeweile).

As we saw in Chapter Two, for Heidegger:

...a state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us. Indeed, from the ontological point of view we must as a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to “bare mood”.

It is primarily from this “ontological point of view” that I will be discussing anxiety and boredom in colonial literature. But following my critique of the “Enframing” and de-humanising psychoanalytical methodologies of colonial discourse analysis in Chapter One, I will, in addition, argue that this ontological definition can be seen to draw the deficiencies of postcolonial psychology and psychoanalysis – and its notion of the ‘colonising psyche’ in particular – into sharper focus. By this I mean that, Heidegger’s ontological definition of anxiety and boredom as the “bare moods” in which Dasein is delivered over to itself as itself, can be seen to radically undermine the various colonial neuroses that are unilaterally ascribed to individuals as the a priori psychic structure of the ‘colonising subject’ in colonial discourse analysis.

As we have seen, the positing of a ‘colonial psyche’ – and all of its archetypal manifestations; ‘colonial guilt’, ‘colonial anxiety’ and ‘colonial fear’ – constitutes the artificial containment of human and emotional heterogeneity within artificially ontologised and onticalised categories. As such, it is an important way in which colonial discourse analysis, in its drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality, “gathers” the individual and its emotions, thoughts, words and actions, into the “structured image” (GeBild), or simulacrum, that is the ‘colonial subject’. In contrast to the “challenging revealing” (herausfordern) of these formulations, Heidegger’s phenomenological description of the intentional comportments of human

---

1 Being and Time, 1.5, p. 177.
2 See, for example, Suleri’s description of how “an economy of complicity and guilt is in operation between each actor on the colonial stage” (The Rhetoric of English India, p. 3).
consciousness and his ontological definition of Dasein’s “states-of-mind”, facilitate an understanding and interpretation which holds out the possibility of entering “into a more original revealing,” wherein anxiety and boredom are understood as instances of the most explicit disclosure of what and how Dasein is as an individual human being in the world of its experiences. In short, anxiety and boredom can be seen to reveal Dasein’s fundamental “potentiality-for-Being-itself”. But in addition, and in the wake of our analysis of imperial rhetoric as a strain of “idle talk”, these “moods” can also be seen to signal both the point of Dasein’s fundamental withdrawal from its immersion in the “they”, and the point of its potential return to the “they” as it flies in the face of that which anxiety and boredom disclose. A flight from self which is, as we saw in relation to Kipling, nowhere more plainly made manifest than in Dasein’s immersion in work: or, as Marlow explains in Heart of Darkness:

When you attend to things of that sort, to the mere incidents of the surface, the reality – the reality, I tell you – fades. The inner truth is hidden – luckily, luckily. ¹

The “inner truth” that Marlow hides from is the “inner truth” of his own Being – the “inner truth” that he is. In making this observation it is important to stress that we have resisted the temptation to draw any easy correlation between Marlow’s anxiety and the ‘African-ness’ of the river along which he is travelling; in other words, we have resisted the temptation to interpret this anxiety in terms of a general theory of colonial or African anxiety. For, given that we are discussing anxiety as an ontological (and therefore universal) “state-of-mind”, it cannot be determined by the ontical specificity of any given set of material circumstances; if it were, then the “mood” itself would become artificially onticalised.

When considered within the context of the intentional comportments of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world”, that which is determinative for Dasein’s anxiety and boredom is the ontological constitution of Dasein itself – as opposed to its national, racial or colonial characteristics – in equiprimordial (gleichursprünglich) conjunction with the “threatening” (bedrohen) and boring character of the environment within which it finds itself. So, while we can speculate upon the various circumstantial factors which may be conducive for this “threatening” and boredom – such as, isolation, the immanence of death, monotony and strangeness – we cannot prioritise the ontical specificity of, for example, their geographical location, for in doing so we would automatically forfeit its ontological, and therefore universal, validity. Hence, while we may speculate upon the fact that these circumstantial factors are more prevalent in the colonial realm, and indeed this is what I will be arguing, the crucial point to emphasise is that this

² Conrad, Heart of Darkness, p. 93.
prevalence does not in itself mean that they are somehow innately and peculiarly colonial as a result.

In our ongoing examination of the fictional coloniser, the depiction of anxiety and boredom – as (1) the disclosure of the “there” of Being; (2) the site of the oscillation between Dasein’s authentic and inauthentic modes of Being; and (3) an important indicator as to the nature of the intentional relation which pertains between Dasein and its material circumstances – can be understood as two of the most important fictional reflections of the way in which the historical coloniser is, as an individual human being in the world of its experiences.

1. Anxiety

(a) Dread and Uncanniness

Between the 14th December 1887 and the 28th February 1888 a series of articles by Rudyard Kipling appeared in the Allahabad Pioneer under the title ‘Letters of Marque’. The collection documented Kipling’s adventures in the Native States of Rajputna and, taken as a whole, the nineteen articles constitute a relatively accomplished work of descriptive travel writing; albeit, on occasions, too self-consciously quirky and, no doubt, exhibiting that which Robert Buchanan called “the spirit of ephemeral journalism” which is characterised by “its vulgarity, its flippancy, and its radical unintelligence”.

“Verily”, Kipling tells us, “there is no life like life on the Road”:

And now that the train has reached Ajmir, the Crewe of Rajputna, whither shall a tramp turn his feet? The Englishman set his stick on end, and it fell with its point North-west as nearly as might be.

In the midst of such fripperies, however, lies an account of his visit to the ruined city of Chitor – the second section (number 11) Kipling claims, ‘Proves Conclusively the existence of the Dark Tower visited by Childe Rolande, and of the “Bogey” who frightens Children’. And in the following extract, Kipling describes how he (the “Englishman”) descends the ancient Tower of Victory into the Gau-Mukh (an underground water tank) “which is nothing more terrible than a little spring, falling into a reservoir, in the side of the hill”:

---

7 ibid., 12, p. 108.
8 ibid., 11, p. 99.

Behind him, the Gau-Mukh gurgled and choked like a man in his death-throes...Then it came upon him that he must go quickly out of this place of years and blood — must get back to the afternoon sunshine, and Gerowlia, and the dak-bungalow with the French bedstead...he did not care to look behind him, where stood the reminder that he was no better than the beasts that perish...As soon as the steps gave refuge, he floundered up them, and so came out of the Gau-Mukh, bedewed with that perspiration which follows alike on honest toil or — childish fear.

What Kipling is describing here is anxiety. He is anxious about his own death; he has been made aware of his own imminent “non-Being” by this place of “years and blood”; made aware that he is “no better than the beasts that perish.” The plane upon which this fear is thus based, is not the abstract plane of colonial status or national membership, it is the literal plane of the temporality which Kipling is himself as a “being in Time”. Harry Ricketts is therefore correct when he describes Kipling’s shock as a “moment of existential panic”; however, his following assertion that it

...anticipated the defining episode in E M Forster’s *A Passage to India*, in which the two English visitors, Mrs Moore and Adela Quested, were overcome by the echo in the Marabar Caves...

requires some qualification. And this is because, in arguing that

In each case the overwhelming panic took place in a primordial Indian setting and was accompanied by acute feelings of entrapment, engulfment and psychological panic...

Ricketts fundamentally overlooks the crucial distinction (noted in Chapter Two) between “existential panic” and “psychological panic” (as ‘colonial anxiety’): for whereas the former can underpin the latter, they are not, as Ricketts has it, the same thing. To reiterate, it is not the nationality of Chitor as Indian or Kipling as ‘English’ which precipitates this crisis, it is their temporality and, in the case of Chitor, its “pastness” (*Vergangenheit*). That this is indeed the case is plainly reflected on a number of occasions in the ‘Letters of Marque’ where Kipling can be seen to articulate the nature of his engagement with the land through which he is travelling in terms of Time. In Jodhpur, for example, he describes how:

If you look long enough across the sands, while a voice in your ear is telling you of half-buried cities, old as old Time, and wholly unvisited by Sahibs, of districts where the

---

1. Ibid., 14, p. 101 (my emphasis).
2. Cf. Ecclesiastes 3: 19-20; “After all, the same fate awaits human beings and animals alike. One dies just like the other. They are the same kind of creature. A human being is no better off than an animal, because life has no meaning for either. They are both going to the same place—the dust. They both came from it; they will both go back to it.”
4. Ibid.
white man is unknown... you will, if it happen that you are of a sedentary and civilised 
nature, experience a new emotion — will be conscious of a great desire to take one of the 
lobbing camels and get away into the desert, away from the last touch of Today, to meet 
the Past face to face.}

It is this explicit temporal sensibility which manifests itself in Kipling's dizzying and intricate 
historical catalogue — lifted, we presume, from his trusty Baedeker\(^{15}\) — of Chitor's sieges, 
suicides, battles and massacres. Indeed, it is this disorientating account of the sheer magnitude 
of all that is past which is mirrored in the effect of the city itself, an effect which is responsible 
for that which he calls the discomforting "Genius of the Place"\(^{16}\). For Kipling loses himself in 
the labyrinthine corridors and staircases just as we lose ourselves in the annals of Chitor's 
bloody and heroic past. And this sense of Time and Place as being frighteningly labyrinthine is 
again, perfectly expressed by Kipling in a later letter (number 13) when he describes the city of 
Jodhpur:

It would be a week's work to pick out even roughly the names of the dead who have 
added to the buildings, or to describe the bewildering multiplicity of courts and ranges of 
rooms; and, in the end, the result would be as satisfactory as an attempt to describe a 
nightmare.\(^{19}\)

It is, however, his consideration of the passing of Chitor's formerly corporeal inhabitants which, 
more than anything else, evokes for him the fact of his own mortality:

[H]e tripped and fell, and as he put out his hands, he felt the stairs had been worn hollow 
and smooth by the tread of innumerable naked feet. Then he was afraid and came away 
very quickly, stepping over fallen friezes and bits of sculptured men, so as not to offend 
the Dead.\(^{18}\)

In the same way, it is his realisation that below the Gau-Mukli the "fair Pudmini and her 
handmaidens had slain themselves" which brings about Kipling's final crisis of "childish 
fear".\(^{19}\) Unlike his impassive descriptions of the skulls and bones, cemeteries and mausoleums

\(^{14}\) Kipling, 'Letters of Marque', 11, p. 125 (my emphasis).
\(^{15}\) On the significance of the Baedeker "rereading" or "prereading" of the cities Kipling visits in The 
Letters of Marque, see Sullivan, Narratives of Empire, pp. 19-20.
\(^{16}\) ibid., 11, p. 103.
\(^{17}\) Kipling, 'Letters of Marque', 13, p. 123.
\(^{18}\) ibid., 11, pp. 96-7 (my emphasis).
\(^{19}\) In her reading of this episode, Sullivan concentrates upon the significance of Kipling's encounter with 
the phallus, "the loathsome Emblem of Creation" (11, p. 100), and observes: "Although this piece of 
writing was written about twenty years before Freud's essay on 'The Uncanny' (1919), it is remarkable 
for its precise anticipation of the term: what the Englishman sees in the phallic dismembered and 
enclosed by water is the return of the repressed fear of absence, castration, and self-loss" (Narratives of 
Empire, p. 21). In contrast, my own emphasis upon the Heideggerian definition of "the uncanny" is based 
upon Kipling's description of his encounter with Chitor as a whole and an understanding of his own 
oniological constitution as a "being in the world" and a "being in Time".
which surrounded him in Lahore and to which he had become accustomed; here, the place is strange and instills, or rather the time of the place instills, dread  (Grauen):

In dread Being-in-the-world as such discloses itself, and that not as this definite fact but in its facticity... Dread is nothing but the *disposition to uncanniness*.

Indeed, when Kipling remarks that “there was something very uncanny about the Genius of the Place”; he is articulating the uncanniness of “Being-in-the-world” as “Being towards death”. For it is this which is disclosed in the rock upon which he stumbles, the rock which has been worn down, like Morrowbie Jukes’s hole, by the bodies of others who are now dead. For what else is there to be afraid of? Certainly not some abstracted essence of primordial ‘Indian-ness’. No, Kipling retreats in the face of himself and his own uncanniness – in retreating, he seeks the comforting certainty of the everyday – “the afternoon sunshine, and Gerowlia, and the dak-bungalow with the French bedstead”.

Despite this unnerving experience, Kipling is nonetheless, on the same day, drawn back to the city and, in the gathering twilight as he sits on a tomb overlooking the ruins, the moon turns “the city of dead into a city of scurrying ghouls”, and “the sense of desolation” descends again. Kipling would continue to be drawn back to the place: in his conclusion to the collection, he singles Chitor out for special mention:

One perfect month of loafardom, to be remembered above all others, and the night of the visit to Chitor, to be remembered even when the month is forgotten.

These experiences at Chitor would also later serve as both the thinly-veiled template for Tarvin’s exploration of Gunnaur’s Ruins in *The Naulahka* (written with Wolcott Balestier) and the chilling descriptions of the “Cold Lairs” in the *Jungle Books*.

Following this ontological interpretation of Kipling’s fearful experience at Chitor, it is useful to contrast the understanding of anxiety which underpins such interpretation with the definition provided by Nigel Leask in *British Romantic Writers and the East: Anxieties of Empire*. A

---

21 Cf. Suleri’s description of “the subcontinent” as “a tropological repository from which colonial and postcolonial imaginations have drawn – and continue to draw – their most basic figures for the anxiety of empire” (*The Rhetoric of English India*, pp. 4-5).
22 Cf. Heidegger’s; “Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious” (*Being and Time*, I.6, p. 232).
23 “Shrinking back in the face of what fear discloses - in the face of something threatening - is founded upon fear; and this shrinking back has the character of fleeing” (*Being and Time*, I.6, p. 230).
25 ibid., 11, p. 103.
26 ibid., 19, pp. 203-204.
definition which, in many ways, is characteristic of colonial discourse analysis' understanding of a peculiarly 'colonial anxiety':

Although to be “anxious” is a state which normally defines itself in our culture with reference to Kierkegaard or Freud, a glance at the standard dictionary definition (OED) may be sufficient to show why it is germane to my thesis in this book: “(1) Troubled or uneasy in mind about some uncertain event; being in painful or disturbing suspense; concerned, solicitous. (2) Fraught with trouble or solicitude, distressing, worrying. (3) Full of desire and endeavour; solicitous; earnestly desirous (to effect some purpose).” The anxieties discussed in this book partake of the full semantic range of these definitions; the third in particular shows that if the anxieties which I am addressing sometimes block or disable the positivities of power, they are just as often productive in furthering the imperial will.27

The first point to note here is that, in citing Kierkegaard and Freud, Leask overlooks the crucial fact that for both these thinkers anxiety is not dependent upon the nature of one's political beliefs, ethnicity or nationality. Yet it is precisely these factors which characterise Leask’s adoption of Freud and Kierkegaard in his analysis of ‘colonial anxiety’ in the work of Byron, Shelley, Coleridge and De Quincey. In addition, by arguing that anxiety furthers “the imperial will”, Leask successfully draws the ambivalent and therefore frankly unhelpful (for his purposes) “anti-imperial” concerns and opinions of these writers into the hegemonic machinery of colonial discourse. And it is the ‘gathering’ of meaning into discursive functionality that is exemplified in the quasi-dialectical logic of this formulation; a ‘gathering’ which is also evident in Sara Suleri’s comparable assertion that:

[O]ne of the manifestations of the anxiety of empire is a repression of the conflictual model even where economic and political conflict is at its most keenly operative.28

For Suleri, colonial anxiety is to be found in the absence of conflict which, interpreted catachrestically, is understood as proof of colonial repression.29 Taken together, it is not difficult to see that when we adopt a “full [and therefore sufficiently adaptable] semantic range” of dictionary definitions and combine this with a catachrestic interpretative methodology, all

---

29 See also, for example, Said in his 'Introduction' to Kim and his insistence that “There is no resolution to the conflict between Kim’s colonial service and his loyalty to his Indian companions not because Kipling could not face it, but because for Kipling there was no conflict and, one should add immediately, one of the purposes of the novel was, in fact, to show the absence of conflict once Kim is cured of his doubts and the lama of his longing for the River, and India of a couple of upstarts and foreign agents.” ‘Introduction’ to Kim, (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1989), p. 23. Said also draws attention to Francis Hutchins’ description of how “an India of the imagination was created which contained no elements of either social change or political menace.” Francis G. Hutchins, The Illusion of Permanence: British Imperialism in India (Princeton [NJ]: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 28.
socio-psychoiogical roads can be made to lead to colonial anxiety and everything can potentially be seen to further “the Imperial will”.

Bearing this distinction, and the definitions provided by Leask and Suleri in mind, let us proceed to another, and indeed comparable, example of anxiety in colonial literature, H. Rider Haggard’s depiction of Allan Quatermain at the ruins of Kôr, in the late romance *She and Allan*:

> Everywhere around me stretched the ruins of the great city, now fallen and as deserted as Babylon herself. The majestic loneliness of the place was something awful...I looked and thrilled, though oppressed by the drear and desolate beauty of the scene around me, descended the wall and the ruined slopes and made my way homewards, afraid even of my shadow. For I seemed to be the only living thing among the dead habitations of immemorial Kôr.³⁰

Like Kipling, Quatermain cannot explain his unreasonable nervousness; the night, the ruins, the silence, and his own solitude conspire to bring him out of his reverie, and before himself as “there”. That which was formerly the innocuous backdrop of Quatermain’s more immediate concerns is suddenly “there” in all its fallen glory and desolate “pastness”, and Quatermain literally “flees” in the face of it. But it is in the seemingly incidental remark that he was “afraid even of” his own “shadow” that the true character of this fear becomes apparent: it is not the city that he wants to escape from, it is the feeling that he is the only one alive in it.³¹

Quatermain’s frightening glimpse of his own mortality can be seen to relate to, and understood as an expression of, that fundamental melancholy which Graham Greene, in his short 1951 essay ‘Rider Haggard’s Secret’, emphasised as being at the core of Haggard’s life and work. Reflecting upon the books which had “seemed so straightforward to us once”, Greene opines:

> We did not notice the melancholy end of every adventure or know that the battle scenes took their tension from the fear of death which so haunted Haggard from one night in his childhood when he woke in the moonlight: “I put out his hand...how odd it looked in the moonlight, dead – dead. Then it happened. He realised that one day that hand would be limp also, that he could not lift it any more – it would be dead – he would be dead. The awful, inescapable certainty hung over him like a pall of misery. He felt it would be better if he had died at once – he wished he were dead, rather than have to live with that in front of him.”³²

³¹ Cf. the experience of Mopo in *Nada the Lily* before the vision of the Inkosazana-y-Zulu which instructs him to Kill Chaka: “I looked, and my heart grew afraid. The lightening died away, the silence deepened till I could hear it, no leaf moved, no bird called, the world seemed dead – I alone lived in the dead world”. *Nada the Lily* (London: Macdonald & Co. Ltd., 1963), p. 174.
Following Greene, D. S. Higgins, in his biography Rider Haggard: The Great Storyteller, emphasises what he defines as, Haggard's “terrifying understanding of the reality of death” and again locates it in a specific childhood episode:

It was on 21 July 1869, the day of his sister Ella's wedding...Fear of the unknown made him hysterical. “I shivered, I prayed, I wept. I thought I saw Death waiting for me by the library door.” His experience was “the most terrifying remembrance of my childhood...as I lay there I realised – for the first time – that I myself must die – must cease to play and eat and sleep, and pass away into the dark of nothingness.” At last he did fall asleep, only to dream “that I was already in this hell and the peculiar form of punishment allotted to me was to be continually eaten alive by rats”.

So, while these stories of childhood fear and personal reflections on life are undoubtedly revealing in the context of Haggard’s anxiety about death, and indeed his preoccupation with the themes of mortality and reincarnation in works like She, Cleopatra, ‘Smith and the Pharaohs’, The Ancient Allan and the later novella The Mahatma & the Hare; they can also be seen to reflect important aspects of Heidegger's description of the sudden disclosure and apprehension of one's own “Being towards death” in ‘Unheimlichkeit’. Thus, to a certain extent, they can also be seen to correspond with Quatermain’s apprehension of his own “Being towards death” before the ruins of Kôr.

That being so, the fear of death which Greene and Higgins identify in Haggard is, perhaps, more conventionally expressed in those passages which the postcolonial critic Wendy Katz rather dismissively describes as Haggard’s “rambling about the great questions of ‘Life, Death, and Eternity’.” Katz cites examples like the following from Allan Quatermain, in which Quatermain again finds himself before the ruins of a deserted city; but, in contrast to the previous extract from She and Allan, here there is only the dispassionate and ponderous description of “a symbol of the universal destiny”:

Gone! quite gone! the way that everything must go. Like the nobles and the ladies who lived within their gates, these cities have had their day, and now they are as Babylon and Nineveh, and as London and Paris will one day be. Nothing may endure. That is the inexorable law... For this system of ours allows no room for standing still - nothing can loiter on the road ...The stern policeman Fate moves us and them on, uphill and downhill and across the level; there is no resting place for weary feet, till at last the abyss swallows us, and we are hurled into the sea of the eternal.

---

32 D. S. Higgins, Rider Haggard: The Great Storyteller (London: Cassell Ltd., 1981.) p. 7 (my emphasis). Higgins goes on to note that, "Jottings in his notebooks testify that he frequently referred to The Book of the Dead by E. W. Budge, who was to become a close friend. His own stories are often littered with the well-preserved dead" (p. 8).


34 Haggard, Allan Quatermain (Ware: Wordsworth Editions Ltd., 1994), pp. 30-31, (my emphasis).
With strong echoes of Shelley’s ‘Ozymandias’ Quatermain surveys the ruins of Charra and philosophizes upon the common fate of humanity. Here there is none of the oppressiveness or “anxiety in the face of death” which so alarms him at Kôr; like a Victorian Marcus Aurelius, Quatermain would appear to accept this fate passively and as his destiny. In these terms the account can be understood as the inauthentic “revealing” of “idle talk”, wherein one’s engagement with the certainty of one’s own “Being towards death” is diluted in the more general logic that “everything must go”, that “Nothing may endure”. A more general logic which is given a Poe-like gloss is the following from Haggard’s autobiography, The Days of My Life:

Unless we have lived before, or the grotesque incongruities of life are to be explained in some way unknown to us, our present existence, to my mind, resembles...a great ballroom wherein a Puck-like Death acts as a Master of Ceremonies. Here the highly born, the gifted and the successful are welcomed with shouts of praise, while the plain, the poorly dressed, the halt, are trodden underfoot; here partners, chosen at hazard, often enough seem to be dancing to a different time and step, till they are snatched asunder to meet no more; here one by one the revellers of all degrees are touched upon the shoulder by the Puck-like Death who calls the tune, and drop down, down into an impenetrable darkness, while others who knew them not are called to take their place.

More importantly, when understood as “a symbol of the universal destiny”, Quatermain’s experience of Charra, as an understanding of his own “being in Time”, is consumed in the everyday inauthentic “historicality” of the “they”. And, it is this universalising in Haggard that Katz, in her chapter on racism, takes issue with:

Few formulations are more convenient than that of human nature. Innate and fixed, it is a ready abstraction used to convince us of our limitations, to confine us willingly to the boundaries we know, and to prevent us from crossing to those that are unexplored. Not only, then are all people equal by dint of their subjection to the design of fate; they are also by dint of their subjection to their changeless nature...The immutable “truths” of life which Haggard sees in this society obscure its reality by veiling objective and substantially different differences with subjective philosophical abstractions. The result is

Katz compares this heroic stoicism with that which Jerome Hamilton Buckley called the “counter-decadence” of “Invictus” (the “inversion of Victorian pessimism”) of W. E. Henley. William Ernest Henley, A Study in “Counter-Decadence” of the Nineties (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), p. 26. “To equate the spirit of romance with a healthy and virile optimism” Katz argues “is inaccurate. Although instinctively antipathetic to pessimism, the romance enthusiasts were not, after all, immune to the seemingly endemic malady of doubt that so affected the period. They merely chose not to be disabled by it. While pessimism was rejected out of hand, stoicism and its near relative, fatalism, were heartily endorsed” (Rider Haggard and the Fiction of Empire, p. 84).


a distorted vision of Empire which precludes the possibility of distinguishing between, for one thing, the fears of a subject people and the fears of its ruler .... Can one endorse this notion of a universal human nature without making too little of the fact that whites ruled and blacks served, whites employed and blacks were employed, and whites were educated and skilled and blacks were uneducated and unskilled?59

For Katz, these abstract themes in Haggard’s fiction are thus understood to mask or bypass the actual colonial division of people into masters and subjects: a masking and bypassing on the part of the author which corresponds with Robert Young’s assertion (discussed in Chapter Two), regarding critics who claim “a universal ethical, moral, or emotional instance” in English literature as necessarily “colluding in the violence of the colonial legacy”.40 In both cases, the articulation of the universal is held to elide the reality of colonial rule. This is all very well, except, the imperative underpinning such observations is that authors and critics are obliged to engage with the material facts of imperialism before all else or to the exclusion of all else. It implies that the world itself is, first and foremost, constituted in terms of, and must be understood in relation to, these facts; and, that a failure to respect such stipulations in every instance renders one morally, politically and discursively culpable. We must ask, why should this be the case? Are we to assume that individuals only engage with, interpret and understand themselves and their world, in terms of colonialism or the facts of colonial administration? Of course not. So how then, can we insist that a failure to comply with these strictures necessarily precipitates “a distorted vision of Empire” or collusion in “the violence of the colonial legacy”?

The answer to this important question must be sought in relation to the fact that the accusatory burden of both formulations is grounded in the now familiar ‘gathering’ logic of postcolonial theory and colonial discourse analysis’ “Enframing” . An “Enframing” which draws everything into the (in this instance, morally constituted) “structured image” and “does not seem to allow for either waste or incoherence”.41 In other words, this ‘gathering’ draws the way in which people are at every level of their being, and the full spectrum of their colonial and non-colonial ontical concerns, into an all-encompassing realm of an artificially prioritised colonial and racial meaningfulness. A colonial meaningfulness wherein, what is said (or is not said), thought (or is not thought) and done (or is not done), is always destined to be discursively functional.

It is this insistence upon the catachrestical meaningfulness of every statement, thought and action which underpins Katz’s criticism of Haggard: for, in having Quatermain say one thing,

59 Katz, Rider Haggard and the Fiction of Empire, p. 139
40 Young, White Mythologies, p. 124.
Haggard is always liable to be guilty of not having him say another. This is why Quatermain’s meditations upon the transience of all human life is interpretable as a preclusion of “the possibility of distinguishing between, for one thing, the fears of a subject people and the fears of its ruler”. At the same time, what is ironic here is that, whilst rejecting Haggard’s “notion of a universal human nature” defined in terms of our collective “Being towards death”, Katz can still hold out for the possibility of identifying a generalisable “fear” that is predicated upon a quasi-ontological division of humanity along the lines of colonial status. And this brings us back to my own argument regarding how, anxiety as ‘Unheimlichkeit’ is the only generalisable anxiety because it is grounded in the ontological constitution of the beings that we ourselves are.

In the previous chapter we saw that for Kipling, the English “refusal to face death as inevitable is something that strikes him most forcibly, in contrast to India”. In a similar manner, and in opposition to Katz’s reading of an absolute levelling, I would argue that the theme of a “universal human nature” in Haggard can, on occasions, be seen to stage an important contrast between Haggard’s ‘white’ and ‘black’ characters. For example, in a speech resonant of that made by Quatermain at Charra, in King Solomon’s Mines Umbopa invokes the universal to highlight the arrogance and conceit of his ‘white’ listeners:

What is life? Tell me, O white men, who are wise, who know the secrets of the world, and the world of stars ...tell me, white men, the secret of our life - whither it goes and whence it comes! Ye cannot answer; ye know not. Listen, I will answer. Out of the dark we came, into the dark we go. Like a storm-driven bird at night we fly out of the Nowhere; for a moment our wings are seen in the light of the fire, and, lo! we are gone again into the Nowhere. Life is nothing. Life is all. It is the hand with which we hold off death.”

In this surprisingly bleak peroration, Umbopa describes, however crudely, “Being-in-the-world” as “Being towards death”. But it is his description of life as “the hand with which we hold off death”, which has the deepest significance in the story which follows, and indeed, in our

---

42 In other words, in not referring to the conflict between rulers and ruled, Quatermain can apparently be seen to evince the anxious repression of the true nature of that conflict, referred to earlier in relation to Suleri’s conception of colonial repression. See also, Jameson and the relation between “manifest structure” and “subtext”, The Political Unconscious, pp. 48-49.
43 Wilson, The Strange Ride of Rudyard Kipling, p. 203.
44 Haggard, King Solomon’s Mines, pp. 66-7. See also, Mopa, in Nada the Lily, who in a comparable outburst steps short of an explanation and in so doing extends and emphasises that which Umbopa has attempted to clarify: our ignorance as to the meaning of our own existence: “[Y]ou tamed white people. You know many things, but of these you do not know: you cannot tell us what we were an hour before birth, nor what we shall be an hour after death, nor why we were born, nor why we die. You can only hope and believe”. Nada the Lily (London: Macdonald & Co. Ltd., 1963), p. 216. And, Quatermain’s opening reflections to Child of Storm (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1921), “We white people think that we know everything. For instance, we think that we understand human nature. And so we do, as human nature appears to us, with all its trappings and accessories seen dimly through the glass of our conventions, leaving out those aspects of it which we have forgotten or do not think it polite to mention” (p. 1).
interpretation of the genre of colonial adventure fiction. For, in the almost always dangerous, trying, and precarious progress of the fictional adventure hero, his life is, first and foremost, that which holds off death, a death that is all around.

In colonial adventure fiction, the environmental immanence of death noted in Kipling is, in short, always more constantly made manifest. This, I would suggest, is one of the main reasons why Haggard’s heroes, in contrast to Kipling’s, are, as Katz observes, of “a more exhilarating sort”. But in saying this, the crucial point that Katz overlooks is the important connection which exists between the increased environmental immanence of death and that which we have already seen her describe as Haggard’s “rambling about the great questions of ‘Life, Death, and Eternity’.” This is because, Katz reads speeches like that made by Quatermain at Charra (or indeed, his anxieties at Kôr) in isolation from the circumstances in which the character actually finds himself. When we return Quatermain to the material circumstances of his experiences, and understand him as “an entity for which in [his] Being this very Being is an issue,” these circumstances, and Quatermain’s “Being-in-the-world” can be seen to combine and precipitate in anxiety and the questions “Why?” and “What for?”. Nor is it even necessary for the material circumstances to be so blatantly appropriate, for example, a ruined city, in order for such questions and anxieties to manifest themselves. In Allan Quatermain, on “a beautiful moonlit night” in the wilderness, Quatermain describes how, all at once, and “in the most unaccountable way”:

I had suddenly become nervous. There was no particular reason why I should be, beyond the ordinary reasons which surround the Central African traveller, and yet undoubtedly I was ... Worse and worse I grew, my pulse fluttered like a dying man’s, my nerves thrilled with the horrible sense of impotent terror which anybody who is subject to nightmare will be familiar with ... Above was the black bosom of the cloud, and beneath me swept the black flood of the water, and I felt as though I and Death were utterly alone between them. It was very desolate.

So, while with hindsight, this episode can be seen to constitute the appropriately ominous prelude to a Massai attack, what is important to note, is the fact that the sense of desolation and Quatermain’s confusion at the onset of an inexplicable dread, when understood in ontological terms, replicates the fundamental character of his anxiety at Kôr. It is this confusion which reflects what Heidegger, in History of the Concept of Time, describes as the way in which Dasein comes to be aware of the world in “oriented concern”:

---

45 Katz, Rider Haggard and the Fiction of Empire, p. 67.  
46 Being and Time, 1.5, p. 180  
47 Haggard, Allan Quatermain, pp. 36-8, (my emphasis).
This embattled sense of not being up to the situation is typified by the tumult of running around in panic, in which the stable relations of orientation within the referential contexts of the familiar environment are disturbed. This is the sense of the confusion which more or less accompanies fear, naturally in varying degrees according to the situation.  

Quatermain’s panic can thus be understood as the fictional representation of the fact that the formerly “stable relations of orientation within the referential contexts of the familiar environment are disturbed”. In his anxiety, Quatermain is radically delivered over to himself as himself as a “Being-in-the-world”, a “Being-in-the-world” that is perfectly articulated in his fearful description of “the black bosom of the cloud,” above, “the black flood of the water,” below and “I and Death...utterly alone between them”. In addition, it is this being alone and being close to death, as a “Being towards death” – which recalls the earlier account of his seeming to be “the only living thing among the dead habitations of immemorial Kôr” – that discloses the radical, and hitherto unrealised, precariousness of Quatermain’s predicament. In an almost identical incident in *Finished*, the significance of this disclosure is all the more striking, in ontological terms, in that it is not followed by an attack or disaster of any kind:

[T]owards dawn a great horror took hold of me. I did not know of what I was afraid, but I was much afraid of something. Nothing was passing in either Heda’s or our room, of that I made sure by personal examination. Therefore it would seem that my terrors were unnecessary, and yet they grew and grew. I felt sure that something was happening somewhere, a dread occurrence which it was beyond my power to prevent, though whether it were in this house or at the other end of Africa I did not know... The mental depression increased and culminated. Then of a sudden it passed completely away, and as I mopped the sweat from off my brow I noticed that dawn was breaking.

In both extracts, Quatermain reiterates his inability to explain what is happening and what it is that he is afraid of; this is because, as Heidegger says, anxiety is itself

...characterised by the fact that what threatens is nowhere. Anxiety “does not know” what that in the face of which it is anxious is.  

---

88 Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, p. 287. Cf. Quatermain’s laments on the death of his only son, “The great wheel of Fate rolls on like a Juggernaut, and crushes all in turn...we fly hither and thither - we cry for mercy; but it is of no use...” (Allan Quatermain, p. 9).

89 Cf. Heidegger’s; “[T]he world as world is disclosed first and foremost by anxiety, as a state-of-mind” (*Being and Time*, L6, p. 232).


91 *Being and Time*, L6, p. 231. Steiner brilliantly summarises this type of experience when he notes how, “there arises from within us a sense of the uncanny. We feel literally unheimlich, “homeless,” “unhoused.” As we flail about emptily, the familiarity of the everyday shatters. It is as if we had been caught, all of a sudden, in the interstices of the busy mesh of being, and stood face to face with the ontological, with the *Daseinsfrage*” (Heidegger, pp. 99-100).
As with Kipling's bewilderment before the Gau Mukh which was "nothing more terrible than a little spring, falling into a reservoir, in the side of the hill"; Quatermain is simply baffled as to why this "terror" has descended upon him; there is, in his own words, "no particular reason" why he should feel so threatened: and, for Heidegger, this is related to the fact that "When dread has run its course we say, 'It was really nothing'."

This kind of talk strikes the very heart of the matter. It was nothing: the of-which of dread is nothing, that is to say, nothing that takes place in the world, nothing definite, nothing worldly...That of which dread is in dread is the in-which of Being-in-the-world, and that about which one is in dread is this very same Being-in-the-world...52

The "of-which" and the "about-which" of Quatermain's dread is thus nothing less than his own "Being-in-the-world;" and not in the sense of his being in a boat at night on a river in Africa ("as a definite fact"); it is his "Being-in-the-world" in "its facticity".52

Furthermore, Heidegger's important qualification that this happens "in varying degrees according to the situation" illustrates the fact that 'Unheimlichkeit' does not always necessarily imply, or result in, the fullest possible existential apprehension of one's own authentic "Being towards death." Indeed, as he explains, anxiety can be identified by, and is made manifest in, everyday disorientation and confusion:

We then say: one feels uncanny [or in more idiomatic English: "Things look so weird all of a sudden" or "I'm getting this eerie feeling"].

And this is, of course, especially revealing in the context of the work of an author like Haggard given that the characters, landscapes and plots of his stories are all too frequently weird and, to say the least, not a little "uncanny". But alongside the supernatural beings and fantastical

---

52 Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, pp. 290-291. See also Harrison Hall's 'Intentionality and world: Division I of Being and Time', in which he explains that, "Anxiety for human beings is analogous to breaking down for pieces of equipment. Just as the breaking of equipment can show its worldly character by revealing its place in a network of relations in which it has become dysfunctional, so anxiety can show the groundless character of human being by revealing the contingency of the network of purposes and projects and their background of intelligibility in which we are no longer involved by virtue of our having become "dysfunctional"." 'Intentionality and world: Division I of Being and Time', in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, p. 138.

53 “The "fact" that Dasein "is" at all and "is not not" is not a mere property in it, but can be experienced by Dasein itself in an original experience...Facticity of Dasein means: It is in a manner of its being this being, that it is more accurately: It is its very "there" and "in"." (History of the Concept of Time, p. 291).

54 Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, p. 289. See also, Michael E. Zimmerman's description of how, "Anxiety tears us out of everyday absorption in things; it reveals them to be useless in the face of the radical mortality, finitude, and nothingness at the heart of human existence. Why is human existence weird? Because humans are not things, but the clearing in which things appear." 'Heidegger, Buddhism, and deep ecology', in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, p. 244.
cities, there is the uncanniness of Quatermain's encounter with the plainly unfamiliar, and an encounter with the Masai warrior near the beginning of *Allan Quatermain* makes an interesting case in point:

[W]hat a figure he presented as he stood there in his savage war-gear!...ferocious and awe-inspiring. To begin with, the man was enormously tall...and beautifully, though somewhat slightly, shaped; but with the face of a devil. In his right hand he held a spear about five and a half feet long...On his left arm was a large and well-made elliptical shield of buffalo-hide, on which were painted strange heraldic-looking devices. On his shoulders was a huge cape of hawks feathers, and round his neck was a NAIBERE, or strip of cotton...The tanned goat-skin robe...was tied lightly around his waist...and through it were stuck, on the right and left sides respectively, his short pear-shaped sime, or sword...and an enormous knobkerrie. But perhaps the most remarkable feature of his attire consisted of a headdress of ostrich feathers, which was fixed on the chin, and passed in front of the ears to the forehead, and, being shaped like an ellipse, completely framed the face, so that the diabolical countenance appeared to project from a sort of feather fire-screen.

Quatermain's elaborately detailed observations are, he tells us, gathered from his later encounters; but he does not miss the opportunity to illustrate them in at this stage so as to more fully dramatise and refine the impressively strange affects of this first meeting.

In the analogous account of Edward's unsettling encounter with the Highlander, Evan Dhu Macombich, in *Waverley*, it is the narrator who provides us with the detail: and if we can overlook the obvious circumstantial differences between a Lowland Scottish drawing room and the South African wilderness, the scenario is, nonetheless, almost exactly the same:

[T]he door suddenly opened, and, ushered by Saunders Saunderson, a Highlander, fully armed and equipped, entered the apartment...Had it not been that neither Mr Bradwardine nor Rose exhibited any emotion, Edward would certainly have thought the intrusion hostile. As it was, he started at the sight of what he had not yet happened to see, a mountaineer in his full national costume. The individual Gael was a stout, dark, young man, of low stature, the ample folds of whose plaid added to the appearance of strength which his person exhibited. The short kilt, or petticoat, showed his sinewy and clean-made limbs; the goat-skin purse, flanked by the usual defences, a dirk and steel-wrought pistol, hung before him; his bonnet had a short feather, which indicated his claim to be treated as a Duinhewassel, or sort of gentleman; a broadsword dangled by his side, a target hung upon his shoulder, and a long Spanish fowling piece occupied one of his hands.

---

55 In addition to She and Kôr, see for example, the Zulu wizard Zikali in the trilogy *Marie, Child of Storm* and *Finished*, and Oro in *When the World Shook*; the Viking heroes of *Eric Brighteyes* and *The Wanderer's Necklace*; and, the various gods who direct the proceedings in the Egyptian stories *Cleopatra, Morning Star* and *The World's Desire*, written with Andrew Lang.
56 Haggard, *Allan Quatermain*, pp. 33-34.
57 Scott, *Waverley*, p. 133.
In both cases, it is the suddenness of the encounter and the unfamiliarity of appearance, as much as the martial air and battle accoutrements, which Quatermain and Waverley find so threatening. Nor, in colonial literature, is this alarm necessarily restricted to the coloniser: for do not the two old Burmese women stare at the “Ingaleikma”, Elizabeth Lackersteen, “as English yokels might gaze at a Zulu warrior in full regalia”\(^\text{38}\); does Mungo Park not have his fingers and toes counted by the Africans he visits;\(^\text{39}\) and are not Quatermain and his companions inspected and scrutinised by the people they encounter? Indeed, is it not this mutual potential to shock in strangeness which Haggard employs, with an only moderate comic effect, in the disorderly person of Good upon the group’s arrival in Kukuanaland?\(^\text{40}\)

The weirdness of the characters that Quatermain encounters and the uncanniness of the landscapes and plots that he finds himself in, are all crucial ways in which his formerly “stable relations of orientation” can be seen to have become disturbed. What is more, the instances of his recognition of them as such, can be understood as moments in which he becomes aware of himself:

> It certainly was a curious, and indeed almost a weird, position to be placed in – rushing along, as we were, through the bowels of the earth on the bosom of a Stygian river, something after the fashion of souls being ferried by Charron, as Curtis said.\(^\text{41}\)

Then again, in the midst of all these ontological parallels and qualifications, would a more legitimate reading of this, and similar episodes in Haggard, not perhaps be that this anxiety merely complies with the formal requirements of an exciting adventure plot? To a certain extent, yes. But only to a certain extent, for even if we accept that Haggard is intentionally manufacturing suspense for his reader (and that it is thus an authorial construct), the fundamental details of the incident can still be seen to coincide with the elementary criteria of Heidegger’s description of ‘*Unheimlichkeit*’.

In fact, not only are the two not mutually exclusive, but this basic ontological ebb and flow between the existential states of familiarity and unfamiliarity, between everydayness and anxiety describes perhaps the most important dynamic at work in the adventure novel. As I will go on to argue in more detail in the following chapter, the depiction of these ontological modes


\(^{40}\) See, for example, the questions of their future ally, Infadoos: “How is it, O strangers...that this fat man (pointing to Good, who was clad in nothing but boots and a flannel shirt, and had only half finished his shaving) whose body is clothed, and whose legs are bare, who grows hair on one side of his sickly face and not the other, and who wears one shining and transparent eye, has his teeth that move of themselves, coming away from the jaws and returning of their own free will?” (*King Solomon’s Mines*, p. 103).

\(^{41}\) Haggard, *Allan Quatermain*, p. 125.
of “Being-in-the-world” in colonial literature forms a crucial plane of correspondence upon which the reading public can potentially relate to characters like Allan Quatermain. And it interesting to consider this point in relation to Haggard’s own observations regarding the innate existential appeal of Romance in ‘About Fiction’:

The love of romance is probably coeval with the existence of humanity. So far as we can follow the history of the world we find traces of it and its effects among every people, and those who are acquainted with the habits and ways of thought of savage races will know that it flourishes as strongly in barbarian as in the cultured brats. In short, it is like the passions, an innate quality of mankind.\(^2\)

Indeed, it is the correspondence constituted by this “innate quality of mankind” which is explicitly solicited by Quatermain himself in his earlier description of “the horrible sense of impotent terror which anybody who is subject to nightmare will be familiar with”.\(^3\) And irrespective of the reality or unreality of the scenario, it is this correspondence which necessarily underpins and defines the anxiety of any number of exhilarating, desperate and nightmarish incidents in Haggard. As J.G. Cawelti has argued, the formulaic narratives of adventure fiction constitute

...an imaginary world in which the audience can encounter a maximum of excitement without being confronted with an overpowering sense of insecurity and danger that accompanies such forms of excitement in reality.\(^4\)

But more importantly, this vaguely defined “sense of insecurity and danger” is grounded in the ontological constitution of the reader as being susceptible to “insecurity and danger” in the Being that he/she is. It is this which underpins and defines the anxiety we may feel when we read of the witch smelling in King Solomon’s Mines or of the aging of Ayesha in She. And, of course, not just in Haggard, but in adventure and horror fiction in general; from Kipling’s Indian ghost stories to Conan-Doyle’s The Lost World; from Edgar Allen Poe’s The Pit and the Pendulum to Crusoe’s discovery of footprints in the sand and Richard Hannay’s escape across the heather in The Thirty-Nine Steps.

---


\(^3\) As Heidegger says, “In [anxiety] There-being [Dasein] finds itself before the Non-being of the potential impotence of its existence”. Being and Time, I.6, p. 266, trans. by W. J. Richardson, in Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. 79.

(b) Loneliness

At the beginning of this chapter, I suggested that isolation was one of the most important circumstantial factors which facilitates Dasein's anxiety in the colonial realm. In the cases we have been examining thus far, an overwhelming sense of isolation and loneliness has been a consistently recurring theme, both as a cause, and as a consequence, of 'Unheimlichkeit'. And, as such, I would argue that the depiction of loneliness and isolation in colonial fiction can be seen to represent another crucial plane of potential correspondence between the historical and fictional coloniser on the one hand, and between the fictional character and the reader on the other.

Bearing these correspondences in mind, we can now turn to Louis-Ferdinand Céline's misanthropic and irreverent semi-autobiographical Journey to the End of the Night; here the book's narrator travels to the African colonies aboard the Admiral Bragueton shortly after World War One. As the temperature rises, he relates how:

> In that bubbling cauldron, the sweat of those scalded beings is concentrated, the presentiment of the vast colonial solitude that will soon bury them and their destinies and make them groan like the dying. They cling, they bite, they rend, they froth at the mouth.\(^{65}\)

From the perspective of Dasein's temporality, discussed in Chapter Three, it is clear that, in this largely unsympathetic account of his fellow-passenger's anxieties, Céline is describing the fearful futural projections of "beings in Time". But more importantly, it is the combination of a claustrophobic monotony and a relentless heat that casts these "scalded beings" before themselves and their future loneliness. Unlike the situation of Marlow in Heart of Darkness and the officers in Kipling's district outposts, where "the isolation that weighs upon the waking eyelids and drives you by force headlong into the labours of the day";\(^{66}\) here there is no work for these "beings" to distract themselves with and as a result, "the entire human content of the ship congealed into massive drunkenness";\(^{67}\) the drunkenness which, for Orwell's John Florry, is taken as a matter of course:

\(^{65}\) Louis-Ferdinand Céline, Journey to the End of the Night (London: Calder Publications Ltd., 1997), P. 110. Céline was born Louis-Ferdinand Destouches in 1894. After being severely injured and decorated for bravery in World War I (he was awarded the Médaille militaire and a seventy-five percent disability pension), he lived and worked for a short time in London before taking a post with a lumber company in the Cameroons. Suffering from malaria and dysentery, he returned to France. After World War II he was accused of collaborating with the Nazis and condemned for his anti-semitism which resulted in his being imprisoned in Germany, France and Denmark. After his final release, he returned to France and continued writing until his death in 1961.

\(^{66}\) Kipling, 'The Judgement at Dungara', in Soldiers Three, p. 201.

\(^{67}\) Céline, Journey to the End of the Night, p. 105.
[D]rink is what keeps the machine going. We should all go mad and kill one another in a week if it weren't for that. There's a subject for one of your uplift essayists, doctor. Booze as the cement of empire.  

Offering up his own little piece of "Enframing", Céline maintains that, for "the European", it is in the face of an unremitting heat that

...the frantic unbuttoning sets in, when filth triumphs and covers us entirely. It's a biological confession. Once work and cold weather cease to constrain us, once they relax their grip, the white man shows you the same spectacle as a beautiful beach when the tide goes out: the truth, fetid pools, crabs, carrion and turds.

If the would-be colonials in Céline are terrified at the prospect of a loneliness that would "bury them", then the first-hand report of an old-stager like George Lawrence, in Beau Geste, would have done little to reassure them:

Disappointment, worry, frustration, anxiety, heat, sand-flies, mosquitoes, dust, fatigue, fever, dysentery, malarial ulcers, and that great depression which comes of monotony indescribable, weariness unutterable, and loneliness unspeakable. And the greatest of these is loneliness.

In this grim catalogue of woes, Kipling's "idle talk" about 'our' great imperial sacrifice is conspicuous in its absence; the trauma and suffering of life in a colonial army is simply endured; as is borne out in the story of the Gestes which follows. It is neither glamorous nor directed towards any identifiable end. It is the same feeling which pervades Conrad's viciously ironic portrait of the Western civilising mission, 'An Outpost of Progress', in which the isolated traders Kayerts and Cardier slowly go out of their minds in the back of beyond. In contrast to those occasional episodes and seasonal periods of loneliness and anxiety already noted in Kipling and Quatermain, here the loneliness is perpetual; and it is exacerbated, Conrad tells us, by "the contact with pure unmitigated savagery":

The contact with primitive nature and primitive man...brings sudden and profound trouble into the heart. To the sentiment of being alone of one's kind, to the clear perception of the loneliness of one's thoughts, of one's sensations -- to the negation of the habitual, which is safe, there is added the affirmation of the unusual, which is dangerous; a suggestion of things vague, uncontrollable, and repulsive, whose decomposing

---

58 Orwell, Burmese Days, P. 39.
59 Céline, Journey to the End of the Night, p. 106.
70 Wren, Beau Geste, pp. 10-11 (my emphasis).
71 In her uninspired and trivial book Joseph Conrad as I Knew Him, Conrad's wife, Jesse, recalls that 'An Outpost of Progress' had been written in a "somewhat savage mood", and upon completion, we are told that he wanted it out of the house as soon as possible. Jesse Conrad, Joseph Conrad as I Knew Him (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1926), p. 109.
intrusion excites the imagination and tries the civilized nerves of the foolish and the wise alike.\textsuperscript{72}

Over and above the somewhat conventional contrasting of the primitive and the civilised,\textsuperscript{73} and indeed, the onticalisation of “nerves” (as “civilised”), what is especially striking in this starkly detailed synopsis of Kayerts and Carlier’s predicament is the intimacy of the connection which Conrad makes between isolation and “the negation of the habitual”. It is a combination of isolation and the strange which is similarly conveyed by Conrad’s friend Sir Hugh Clifford\textsuperscript{74} (himself a Colonial Civil Servant) in, ‘In the Heart of Kalamantan’:

It was not only the utter loneliness which those rumparts of blue mountains emphasised, not only the sense of awful isolation, of entire self-dependence cut off from human aid, which numbed and paralysed him, it was the looks, the habits, the savagery of the wild creatures by whom he was surrounded that filled him with disgust, with unconquerable revulsion, with ungovernable fear.

Here too, the increased sensibility of self is framed, on the one hand, by the negation (and hence not just the disruption) of the “stable relations of orientation”, or the habitual; and on the other, by the perpetual affirmation of the \textit{unstable} “relations of orientation”, or the strange. When added to the already powerful “loneliness of one’s thoughts, of one’s sensations”, these environmental circumstances precipitate in the “suggestion of things vague, uncontrollable, and repulsive”; a vagueness and uncontrollability which recalls Quatermain’s nightmarish “sense of impotent terror” in \textit{Allan Quatermain}; the madness of Dowse at the Flores Strait in Kipling’s ‘A Disturber of Traffic’ (\textit{Many Inventions}); and the desperate case of the missionary, young David of St. Bees in ‘The Judgement of Dungarra’:


\textsuperscript{73} As an articulation of “the myth of the Dark Continent”, this extract can no doubt be seen to contain that which Patrick Brantlinger has called “the submerged fear of falling out of the light into the abyss of social and moral regression” (\textit{Rule of Darkness}, p. 194); and Balachandra Rajan calls “the deep fear of being lost in the other, that has been pervasive in imperial discourse” (\textit{Under Western Eyes}, p. 13).


\textsuperscript{75} Clifford, ‘In the Heart of Kalamantan’, in “Blackwood” Tales from the Outposts, p. 75.
Set apart for the Lord's work, [he] broke down in the utter desolation, and returned half distraught to the Head Mission, crying, "There is no God, but I have walked with the Devil!"  

But, more than anything else, Kayerts and Carlier's loneliness manifests itself in a desperate and all-consuming paranoia, and it is this, in conjunction with the delay of the steamer, which finally brings about the crisis that sees the former shoot the latter before hanging himself.

The sorry tale of Kayerts and Carlier stands as one of Conrad's most scathing commentaries upon the hypocrisy, greed and sheer ludicrousness of European colonialism. As the portrait of an exercise in colonial absurdity, it certainly compares to that famous scene in *Heart of Darkness*, where "in the empty immensity of earth, sky and water" a French ship incomprehensibly fires shells "into a continent". As Ian Watt has argued:

In his earlier Malayan fiction, and 'An Outpost of Progress', Conrad was primarily concerned with the colonisers, and there the general purport of his fiction is consistent and unequivocal: imperial or colonial experience is disastrous for the whites; it makes them lazy; it reveals their weaknesses; it puffs them up with empty vanity at being white; and it fortifies the intolerable hypocrisy with which Europeans in general conceal their selfish aims.

For our purposes, however, I would emphasise that like Martin Decoud in *Nostromo*, neither Kayerts nor Carlier is "fit to grapple with himself single-handed," and both can be seen to have "died from solitude":

The enemy known but to few on this earth, and whom only the simplest of us are fit to withstand.

They too evince the fact that "solitude from mere outward condition of existence becomes very swiftly a state of soul"; they too are "swallowed up in the immense indifference of things", and as Otto Bohlmann has observed, it is the indifference of "circumambient being" in Conrad, that produces "a sense of cosmic alienation".

---

81 For some historical accounts of suicide and madness among district officers in Africa, see *Tales From The Dark Continent*, pp. 90-91.
84 Conrad, *Nostromo*, p. 408.
85 ibid., pp. 408-409, 412.
But, not just in Conrad, for as we have seen, this “cosmic alienation” also underpins the overwhelming sense of vulnerability which manifests itself at Chitor and Kôr. That said, it is important to note that whereas the ‘realism’ of much of Conrad’s (and indeed Kipling’s) fiction frequently allows for the depiction of long periods of uninterrupted stagnation and loneliness, the fundamental requirements and momentum of Haggard’s most exciting romances mean he rarely permits such periods of stasis. Quatermain thus only ever has glimpses of his own loneliness – as the disclosure of what, how and that he is – for he is always on the cusp of some new adventure; forever on the point of being re-immersed in the concerns of the “they”. Yet, as an important indication of the nature of Quatermain’s engagement with the world, these glimpses represent another crucial plane of correspondence upon which the reading public can potentially relate to what, how, and where he is.

For that which is disclosed, in these glimpses of loneliness, is the “potentiality” of the environment (whether jungle, desert, mountain or veldt) to evoke loneliness; a potentiality that was in especially sharp contrast to the claustrophobia of nineteenth-century industrial Britain. This is not to underestimate or negate the significance of the loneliness of the crowd, nor to offer up this claustrophobia as universally prevalent in the Britain of that time, but to recognise it as providing possible criteria by which the reader’s understanding of Haggard’s evocation of loneliness may have been conducted.

In colonial discourse analysis, however, the connection between mood and landscape is of course understood within the context of an exclusively colonial realm of meaning. For example, in ‘Scratches on the Face of the Country’, Mary Louise Pratt argues that the depiction of landscape in colonial discourse must be grasped in terms of that which she calls the imperial codification of “difference”. For Pratt, landscape is

...textualized mainly as a source of comfort or discomfort, danger or safety for the protagonist or as a trigger for the outpouring of emotion.\(^\text{83}\)

\(^{83}\) Pratt, ‘Scratches on the Face of the Country’, in “Race”, Writing and Difference, pp. 151. See also, Graham Dawson’s description of Melanie Klein’s theory that “Far-off lands function “in explorer’s unconscious mind” as metaphorical substitutes for the lost mother, expressing a reparative wish to “re-create her and to find her again in whatever he undertakes.” Melanie Klein, Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921-1945 (New York: Virago, 1988), pp. 102-5, quoted by Dawson in Soldier Heroes, p. 45.
As an example of this textualisation she cites the following "famous and highly conventional scene" from Mungo Park's *Travels in the Interior Districts of Africa* in which he describes his distress and loneliness after he has been beaten and robbed by native thieves:

> After they were gone I sat for some time looking around me with amazement and terror. Whichever way I turned, nothing appeared but danger and difficulty. I saw myself in the midst of a vast wilderness in the depth of the rainy season, naked and alone; surrounded by savage animals, and men still more savage. I was five hundred miles from the nearest European settlement. All these circumstances crowded at once on my recollection, and I confess that my spirits began to fail me.  

Like Harry Faversham, Park finds himself "an irregularity in the great waste surface of the earth". The desperate circumstances of his predicament, as the "threatening" disclosure of his "Being-in-the-world" as a "Being towards death", crowd in upon him, and he is brought close to despair. For Pratt, what is important here is the ideological and discursive function of such a scene within colonial discourse as a whole, and the discourse of explorer narratives in particular. As a result, Park, as the 'discursive subject' in the middle of a "commercial assignment", is "Enframed" as the archetypal "European", and his description of his crisis "Enframed" as the archetypical textualisation of landscape as a "source" of "discomfort". In other words, the interpretational movement of Pratt's analysis is such that the radical individualisation of Park himself is effectively dissolved:

> If the land-scanning, self-effacing producer of information is associated with the state, then this sentimental, experiential voice must be associated with that critical sector of the bourgeois world, the private sphere, home of the solitary, introspecting Individual.

In short, Park himself is "covered up" (*verdecken*) in the delineation of his various roles (explorer and "bourgeois" writer): Park's description of his own loneliness – as a manifestation of his engagement with the material circumstances within which he finds himself – gets lost in the translation of Park, 'the historical subject', into Park 'the narrative subject' via Park 'the imperial writer'. Park, the human being in the world of his experiences is nowhere to be seen.

---

84 Park, *Travels in the Interior Districts of Africa*, p. 225, quoted by Pratt in ‘Scratches on the Face of the Country’, pp. 151-152. Cf., the experience of David Livingstone upon his arrival in Ujiji and his discovery that all of his stores have been sold: "I felt in my destitution as if I were the man who went down from Jerusalem to Jericho and fell among thieves. I could not hope for a priest, Levite, or Good Samaritan to come by on either side." Quoted by Basil Mathews in *Livingstone the Pathfinder* (London: Wyman and Sons Ltd., 1928).
As both a fundamental cause and an inevitable effect of anxiety, loneliness can thus be understood as a determining factor in Dasein’s feelings of vulnerability and paranoia. It is in vulnerability and paranoia, among other things, that fear can be seen to manifest itself. However, this does not mean that fear and anxiety are the same; for as Heidegger explains, anxiety is a “state-of-mind” and fear (Furcht) is a “mode of state-of-mind” and this distinction is dependent upon the fact that “anxiety “does not know” what that in the face of which it is anxious is” 57 whereas:

That in the face of which we fear, the “fearsome”, is in every case something which we encounter within-the-world and which may have either readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand, or Dasein-with as its kind of Being. 58

In order to more fully understand what Heidegger is getting at here, we now turn to a conspicuous example of fear in Haggard: the witch-smelling in King Solomon’s Mines. “As for myself,” Quatermain says

...when I saw that old fiend dancing nearer, my heart positively sank in my boots. I glanced behind us at the long rows of corpses, and shivered...Nearer she came, and yet nearer...every creature in that vast assemblage watching her movements with intense anxiety. 59

That ‘in face of which’ Quatermain is afraid would thus appear to be Gagool, but this does not automatically mean that Gagool is also that which Quatermain is afraid about, for as Heidegger explains:

That which fear fears about is that very entity which is afraid – Dasein...fearing discloses this entity as endangered and abandoned to itself. 60

Hence, despite the important difference between anxiety and fear in terms of what “that in the face of which” one is anxious and afraid is; in both cases, that which anxiety and fear is anxious and fearful about, is always that entity which is anxious and afraid. It is always Dasein itself. And following this definition of the ontological meaning of fear, we can look behind Gagool and her henchmen as “that in the face of which” Quatermain is afraid and, recognise instead

57 Being and Time, 1.6, p. 231.
58 ibid., 1.5, p. 179. Safranski describes this important distinction more simply when he says; “Fear is directed toward something definite, it focuses on detail. Anxiety, on the other hand, is vague and boundless as the world” (Martin Heidegger, p. 152).
59 Haggard, King Solomon’s Mines, p. 152
60 Being and Time, 1.5, p. 180.
that, that which is disclosed to, and apprehended by, Quatermain in his terrifying encounter with her is the fragility of his own existence. In short, Gagool is that which facilitates Quatermain's apprehension of his own "Being-in-the-world" as he glances "at the long rows of corpses" and apprehends his own "Being towards death". 

This understanding of Gagool in terms of Heidegger's phenomenological description of the ontological meaning of fear is, however, a far cry from the postcolonial interpretation of this character as a 'discursive subject'. Laura Chrisman, for example, has argued that:

It is through Gagool that imperialism's ambivalence about rationality and knowledge, as well as about Africa and the feminine, are best dramatised...[For] Gagool may, like Ayesha, be seen as a product of imperial discourse's own bad faith. She is its bad mirror, engendered by the conflicting desires, fears and self-knowledges that imperialism cannot acknowledge to itself.

Gagool is thus seen as the discursive product (and proof) of imperialism's "conflicting desires, fears and self-knowledges" and Haggard is seen as the synecdoche of imperialism itself:

Haggard is an apologist of Empire, a writer not noted for his sophistication. Precisely because of this he serves as an example of how imperialism even at its most basic is capable of constructing itself as a contradictory process, of commenting upon its own self-mythologising, and economic, imperatives, while in the course of pursuing them; is able, in sum, to reveal a great deal of self-knowledge but doesn't know what to do with this knowledge.

As a result, for Chrisman, Gagool is the discursive concretion of the (repressive) psychopathology of Haggard's imperialism, a concretion in which imperialism itself is

---

91 See Heidegger's description of what he calls, the "four essential moments" of fear in History of the Concept of Time: (1) "the of which of being afraid"; (2) "the way of being toward that of which one is afraid"; (3) "the about which of fearing" wherein, "being afraid is not only being afraid of, but at the same time always afraid about," and finally; (4) "the ways of being toward that about which fear is in fear" (History of the Concept of Time, p. 285).

92 Laura Chrisman, 'The Imperial Unconscious?', in Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory, pp. 510-511. In saying this, Chrisman is not writing from a narrowly feminist perspective: for indeed this is precisely her own criticism of Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar's Na Man's Land: The place of the woman writer in the twentieth century, Sexchanges (vol. II.). According to Chrisman, the imperial romance is, for Gilbert and Gubar, "no more and no less than an allegory for the penetration and fear of the (eternal and white) feminine" (p. 501). And as a result, Chrisman argues, they fail to address the fundamental importance of race, black Africa and the material processes of imperialism. Furthermore, as Sara Suleri has argued, in her discussion of Edmund Burke's evocation of "rape as a figure for colonial practise"; "When the colonial dynamic is metaphorically represented as a violated female body that can be mourned over with sentimentality's greatest excess, its rape is less an event than a deflection from a contemplation of male embattlement, the figure of which more authentically dictates the boundaries of colonial power" (The Rhetoric of English India, p. 61).

93 ibid., pp. 500-501.

94 As we noted in Chapter One, this psychopathological concretion/projection is an all too common formulation in postcolonial theory and colonial discourse analysis. See for example, Kaja Silverman's suggestion that, "Lawrence clearly projects his homosexuality and masochism onto the Arabs he fights
effectively anthropomorphised. In summarising the theory behind these approaches, Balschandra Rajan has argued:

Freudian-influenced views of the self-other relationship always stress the complicity (or, even more telling, the fear of complicity) that underlies the oppositional staging and that can be a root cause of imperial anxiety. That anxiety is typically allayed by an intensified energy of repudiation, through which the self is reassured of its stability and of the protection of its identity from the purged elements it has made marginal or monstrous.  

And this is, of course, especially relevant given the “monstrous” depiction of Gagool. But then again, is it valid to talk about a phenomenon like imperialism as though it were a thinking subject with all of its own desires, repressions and anxieties? And what must happen to Haggard, as the author, and as the individual human being that he himself is, in order for this talk to take place at all?

In the wake of Chrisman’s single-minded drive towards the establishment of Gagool’s discursive functionality, these questions are never addressed. And this is because, as the “standing-reserve” (Bestand) of Chrisman’s “challenging revealing”, both imperialism and Haggard are necessarily regulated and secured in such a way as to exhibit and ensure the structural unity of colonial discourse as “structured image” (GeBild). In other words, it is not just that, as Rajan says:

Some of the complexities of a mind can be rubbed away when it is put into position as the mainspring of a discourse.

It is that Haggard and imperialism can be whatever the “structured image”, as the “ground plan of the objective-sphere”, requires them to be.

And in this regard, it is perhaps useful for us to note Abdul JanMohamed’s adoption of Northrop Frye’s distinction between the novel and the romance; for Frye:

with, so that the sexuality he finds within them, and with which he identifies, represents a mirror image of his own”. ‘White Skin, Brown Maske: The Double Mimesis, or With Lawrence in Arabia,’ differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 1, 3 (1989), pp. 3-54, p. 48. And Benita Parry’s insistence that “The repressed thoughts of these irreproachable matrons [Anglo-Indian memsahibs] were brought to the surface by India and were projected onto Indians as proof of their depravity” (Delusions and Discoveries, p. 102).

Rajan, Under Western Eyes, p. 17.

For a more extensive analysis of “the monstrous” in colonial discourse, and a critique of Western assessments of Indian art and culture over the last 700 years, see, Partha Mitter, Much Misaligned Monsters: A History of European Reactions to Indian Art (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

“Where Enframing holds sway, regulating and securing of the standing-reserve mark all revealing” (The Question Concerning Technology’, p. 27).

From Rajan’s discussion of James Mill’s The History of British India in Under Western Eyes, p. 90.

The essential difference between novel and romance lies in the conception of characterization. The romancer does not attempt to create "real people" so much as stylized figures which expand into psychological archetypes. It is in romance that we find Jung's libido, anima, and shadow reflected in the hero, heroine, and villain respectively.\(^\text{[100]}\)

When this distinction is applied in postcolonial theory, however, I would argue that the colonial figure in the colonial romance can be interpreted as an expansion of a colonial psychological archetype. This is, as we have seen, the case in Chrisman's analysis of Gagool. But, it is vital to recognise that the burden of Chrisman's argument is not confined to Gagool or King Solomon's Mines; for in positing Haggard as synecdochic of imperialism, Chrisman is simultaneously positing Gagool as the literal concretion of the imperialist's "conflicting desires, fears and self-knowledges": that is, the "conflicting desires, fears and self-knowledges" of the historical coloniser in general. So while, in a roundabout way, Chrisman can still be seen to argue, with Heidegger, that that about which Dasein is anxious and afraid is Dasein itself; for Chrisman, it is an anxiety, fear and self that is not only read out of the characters of colonial romance but is simultaneously constituted in terms of imperial status and translated into the historical realm as such.

As a result, Chrisman's analysis can be seen as an expression of that crucial "tendency" in colonial discourse analysis "to collapse the social into the discursive" noted previously. A collapse that is founded in a belief in "the inherent susceptibility of all social practises, conceived as signifying systems, to structural linguistic analysis".\(^\text{[101]}\) And this is because her peculiar theory of colonial fear and anxiety is drawn from imperialism and personified by Haggard before being brought to bear upon the text. Hence, even if we leave aside the details of Chrisman's psychoanalytical diagnosis, we are still dealing with the problems which adhere to a culturally, racially and nationally generalised and discursively constituted pathology; the problems which I have outlined in Chapter Two in reference to the work of Homi Bhabha; and, the same problems which adhere to Sara Suleri's insistence that "the physiognomy of racial difference can evoke only a colonial fear of the greater cultural alternatives it symbolically represents";\(^\text{[102]}\) and, Benita Parry's confident assertion that "Indians...were not only feared as


\[^{101}\text{Neil Lazarus, 'Doubting the New World Order', quoted by Parry in Delusions and Discoveries, p. 3.}\]

\[^{102}\text{Suleri, The Rhetoric of English India, p. 109. See also, Suleri's bizarre reading of the Anglo-Indian woman's encounter with Kali: "The goddess's bodily demeanour suggests a frenzy beyond the heterosexual, converting her into an icon for the unlocatable aura of colonial threat. When the Anglo-Indian woman confronts the laboring glee that Kali represents, her confinement in imperial calm is suspended into a momentary recognition: both Kali's ecstasy and the colonizing woman's composure}\]

172
subjects who had once rebelled and could do so again, but as perverts threatening to invade and seduce the white world.\textsuperscript{307} The same is true of the argument advanced by Pathak, Sengupta and Purkayastha, in their analysis of the significance of the Marabar caves in Forster’s \textit{A Passage to India}:

“Primal”, “dark”, “fists and fingers”, “unspeakable”, fearsomely advancing to the town with the sunset - those phrases signal the fear and insecurity the imperialist experienced, confronted with what they could not master; to reduce it to stasis was to contain that fear and hold it at bay.\textsuperscript{106}

What we have, in each of these examples, is the archetypically abstract coloniser, or imperialist, functioning in discourse as ‘the discursive subject’ and not the individual human being in the world of its experiences for whom, as Heidegger says:

Fearing discloses this entity as endangered and abandoned to itself. Fear always reveals Dasein in the Being of its “there”, even if it does so in varying degrees of explicitness.\textsuperscript{105}

Rather than being the site, or signifier, of a colonial homogeneity, when understood in terms of the Being that the historical coloniser as Dasein is, fear constitutes one of the most radically individualised modes of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world” in that the disclosure of its Being as “there” is always characterised by “mineness”. But in addition, this “mineness” can also be seen to necessarily characterise the object of Dasein’s fear as that which it itself is afraid of. And this is precisely what the examples quoted above singularly fail to recognise: for, in each case, the object of fear – whether it is “the physiognomy of racial difference”, “Indians” or the Marabar caves – is generically inflated to the level of a quasi-ontological predeterminacy. In other words, the implication in each of these formulations is that Europeans or colonials are ontologically programmed in such a way as to be afraid of these things in their being Europeans and colonials; an implication which is fundamentally unsustainable if those same Europeans and colonials are understood under the guidance of an understanding of the Being that they themselves are.

---

\textsuperscript{307} Parry, \textit{Delusions and Discoveries}, p. 31.


\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Being and Time}, 1.5, p. 180.
2. Boredom

In 1924, Heidegger read Thomas Mann's *The Magic Mountain* with Hannah Arendt, and, while we can only speculate upon the philosophical influence that this book had upon him, in his exhaustive study of boredom in the 1929-30 lecture series on metaphysics the shade of Hans Castorp looms large. For it is into the heart of those "great spaces of time" passing "in unbroken uniformity" and shrinking together "in a way to make the heart stop beating for fear,"^106 that Heidegger takes his classes; and it is here that "the fundamental roar of existence"^107 is to be heard. In the International Sanatorium Berghof, where "all the days are nothing but the same day repeating itself,"^108 Castorp is confronted (and entranced) by that boredom which, for Heidegger, brings Dasein before itself as a "being in the world" in its purest essence. It is this same boredom which can also be seen to permeate and oppress so much of the literature of Empire. For, in conjunction with anxiety, loneliness, uncanniness and fear, boredom represents one of the most crucial ways in which the fictional (and by extension the historical) coloniser can be seen to come to the potentially critical apprehension of itself as "Being in Time" and "Being-in-the-world". As such, it signals that point at which the "idle talk" of the "they" falls away, and "the question resonates once again: Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?"^109 that point at which, as Céline says:

> Men, days, things — they passed before you knew it in this hotbed of vegetation, heat, humidity and mosquitoes. Everything passed, disgustingly, in little pieces, in phrases, particles of flesh and bone, in regrets and corpuscles; demolished by the sun, they melted away in a torrent of light and colours, and taste and time went with them, everything went. Nothing remained but shimmering dread.^110

This is the "Nothing" and the "dread" of Being being brought to its "there"; the "regrets" and indifference of an habitual sameness where "Being has becomes manifest as a burden";^111 the same "burden" of Being which means that Kayerts and Carlier, in "An Outpost of Progress", "could only live on condition of being machines":

> They lived like blind men in a large room...The river, the forest, all the great land throbbing with life, were like a great emptiness...Things appeared and disappeared before

---

^107 The phrase is Safranski’s, *Martin Heidegger*, p. 192.
^109 Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 2. See also, Safranski; "In the face of the abysses of...boredom we are, as a rule, seized by the horror vacui. But this horror has to be endured because it makes us intimately acquainted with that Nothing that raises the old metaphysical question, Why is there Something and not, rather, Nothing?" (*Martin Heidegger*, p. 192).
^111 *Being and Time*, I.5, p. 173.
their eyes in an unconnected and aimless kind of way. The river seemed to come from nowhere and flow nowhere. It flowed through a void.\(^{112}\)

In both accounts, everything is consumed by a never-changing present, lost in the "total absence of any fulfilled or fulfilling time".\(^{113}\) For what else is left? In both stories the commercial returns are so negligible as to fundamentally call into question the very purpose of their being there at all;\(^{114}\) and it is the daily perpetuation of this state of affairs, the daily perpetuation of a seemingly pointless existence which means that the outposts of progress become outposts of stagnation. Like Beckett's Vladimir and Estragon, the two traders are trapped in a seemingly never-ending cycle of pointlessness:

\begin{verbatim}
ESTRAGON: We came too soon.
VLADIMIR: It's always nightfall.
ESTRAGON: But night doesn't fall.
VLADIMIR: It'll fall all of a sudden, like yesterday.
ESTRAGON: Then it'll be night.
VLADIMIR: And we can go.
ESTRAGON: Then it'll be day again. [Pause. Despairing.]

What'll we do, what'll we do?\(^{115}\)
\end{verbatim}

With nothing to do, there is nothing left but one's self and the fact of one's self. And it is this same sense of existential self-subsistence which is reflected in the concluding comments in H. B. Henderson's *The Bengalee*:

"Life in India!" — "tis a strange misnomer; there is no life there, - it is mere existence, as we all know.\(^{116}\)

For Kayerts and Carlier in Africa, this stagnation, as "mere existence", is perhaps most powerfully made manifest in the fact that the conventional units of time cease to mean anything at all; they are like the native station hands who had "engaged themselves to the company for six months" but "without having any idea of a month in particular and only a very faint notion of time in general" had been working for two years.\(^{117}\) As is explained in *The Magic Mountain*, this is because:

\(^{112}\) Conrad, 'An Outpost of Progress', pp. 350-351.
\(^{113}\) Safranski, *Martin Heidegger*, p. 194.
\(^{114}\) Céline arrives at his trading post to find that all the stock is gone and his predecessor on the verge of absconding. Kayerts and Carlier endure months of fruitless inactivity manning a trading-post which does no trade.
\(^{117}\) Conrad, 'An Outpost of Progress', p. 356.
Vacuity [and] monotony have...the property of lingering out the moment and the hour and of making them tiresome. But they are capable of contracting and dissipating the larger, the very large time-units, to the point of reducing them to nothing at all. In *Beau Geste*, this stagnation is once again in evidence, but here the drudgery of the daily routine combines with the claustrophobia of a boiling fort, a tyrannical commanding officer and the maddening effects of absinthe:

[1] Isolated in the illimitable desert like a tiny island in the midst of a vast ocean...life at Zinderneuf was not really life so much as the avoidance of death—death from sunstroke, heat-stroke, monotony, madness, or Adjutant Lejaune.

Like Conrad's ships helplessly adrift in the doldrums, Zinderneuf is adrift in the desert, and the desert's changelessness both reflects and exacerbates the oppressive sameness of the legionnaire's everyday. As Heidegger says "the stubborn ordinariness of beings lays open a wasteland". A wasteland that is here, both literal and existential. But at the same time, there is, in the boredom of Conrad's ships and jungle outposts, Wren's desert forts and Kipling’s district stations, an underlying sense of enclosure and entrapment, both literal and existential. For, on the one hand, there is the purgatorial and Sisyphean repetitiveness of worthless toil and on the other, the prison-like physical character of the environment within which they find themselves. As such, they become like Crusoe who was "locked up with the eternal bars and bolts of the ocean, in an uninhabited wilderness, without redemption"; or Gervase in ‘In the Heart of Kalamantan’, for whom:

[The valley had become to him a prison-house, the mountains rows of inexorable warders shutting him off from life, from human beings, from all the civilised world.]

---

120 See, for example, Falk's descriptions of the terrors upon the broken-down ship the *Borgmester Dahl* in *Falk; a reminiscence in The Nigger of the "Narcissus", Typhoon and other stories*, pp. 321-326.
121 And alongside the barren monotony, there is, as Burton describes, the ever-present presence of death: "In the Desert, even more than upon the ocean, there is present death: hardship is there, and piracies, and shipwreck, solitary, not in crowds, where, as the Persians say, "Death is a Festival"; and this sense of danger, never absent, invests the scene of travel with an interest not its own" (*Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah*, vol. 1, pp. 148-9).
123 See also, the literal entrapment of Gordon in Khartoum and the daily apprehension of disaster: "Wearyness of heart oppressed him; things looked "very black"; he had almost given up all hope of saving the town, and could look back over nine months of "continuous misery and anxiety," while the day-after-day delay had a most disheartening effect on every one." Quoted by Annie E. Keeling, in *General Gordon: Hero and Saint* (London: Charles H. Kelly, 1892), p. 250.
124 On the purgatorial symbolism in Kipling, see Moore-Gilbert in *Kipling and "Orientalism"*, pp. 40-41.
126 Clifford, 'In the Heart of Kalamantan', p. 71. See also, Kipling's 'A Wayside Comedy' and the description of the Station of Kashima as "a prison...bounded on all sides by the rock-tipped circle of the Doshiro hills" (p. 58).
Or those solitary traders Marlow encounters on his journey up the river to find Kurtz:

Sometimes we came upon a station close by the bank, clinging to the skirts of the unknown, and the white men rushing out of a tumble-down hovel, with great gestures of joy and surprise and welcome, seemed very strange – had the appearance of being held there captive by a spell.\(^{127}\)

Once again, I would argue that we can only understand the significance of these landscapes as prisons and voids when we understand Dasein as “openness for Being”. For it is only because Dasein is constituted as “an entity for which in [his] Being this very Being is an issue” that the mountains imprison Gervase, that “the interminable miles of silence”\(^{128}\) evoke dread and fear in Marlow; that Céline finds himself in a great Nothingness; and Kayerts and Carlier, in a void. In boredom, as in anxiety, the world and one’s Being is disclosed as “there”, and not as an ‘African’ world or as an ‘English’ Being – the ‘African-ness’ and the ‘English-ness’ is merely added, both by the coloniser and the postcolonial critic, in the “idle talk” of “Enframing”\(^{129}\) – it is the “Being-in-the-world” that is stripped of ontical specificity that Dasein is in its Being in boredom. It is here that it is snatched back from its dispersion in the everyday, back to itself, as itself:

[T]his “it is boring for one” first brings the self in all its nakedness to itself as the self that is there and has taken over the being-there of its Da-sein.\(^{130}\)

And yet, as Safranski explains:

The irritating aspect of boredom is that, in the situations in question, one begins to be bored with oneself. One does not know what to do with oneself, and the result is that it is now the Nothing that does something with one.\(^{131}\)

This perhaps is what Kipling meant when he said that “the night got into my head”\(^{132}\), when the drudgery of work and heat began to play tricks with his sanity and he joined everyone else in the Club because he was afraid to be on his own. But even then, at the Club

\(^{127}\) Conrad, Heart of Darkness, pp. 94-95 (my emphasis).

\(^{128}\) ibid., p. 98

\(^{129}\) As Heidegger says, “We transfer subsequently those attunements which things cause in us onto the things themselves” (The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 1:2:21, p. 85).


\(^{131}\) Safranski, Martin Heidegger, p. 193 (my emphasis).

\(^{132}\) Kipling, Something of Myself, p. 43. Cf. the description of ‘cafard’ which the sergeant in Marseilles relates to John Geste before he leaves for Africa, “We call it le cafard. The cockroach. It crawls round and round the brain, and the greater the heat, the monotony, the hardship, the overwork, the over-marching, and the drink – the faster goes the beetle and the more it tickles...Then the man...runs amok, or commits suicide, or deserts, or defies a Sergeant” (Beau Geste, p. 180).
...sudden causeless hates flared up between friends and died down like straw fires; old grievances were recalled and brooded over aloud; the complaint-book bristled with accusations and inventions.\textsuperscript{133}

And this is because the “Nothing that does something with one” in boredom can also be seen to do “something” with one’s “Being-with-Others”. In other words, Dasein’s attempts to escape its own boredom in the tranquilised “everydayness” of the “they” fails. It is driven back to itself by the “desolating Club chatter”\textsuperscript{134} which so frustrated John Florry. Not always, and certainly not for everyone, but as Safranski says: “Boredom lurks in the measures of diversion”,\textsuperscript{137} and this is as true of Kipling’s (and Orwell’s) Anglo-Indians as it is of Huysmans’ late nineteenth century decadent hero, Duc Jean Floressas des Esseintes and his extravagant efforts to escape “the universal contempt that was taking hold of him”:

He felt irritible and ill at ease; exasperated by the triviality of the ideas normally bandied about, he came to resemble those people mentioned by Nicole who are sensitive to anything and everything.\textsuperscript{136}

So, while Kipling can, in retrospect, put his own survival under such conditions down to “the pressure of work, a capacity for being able to read, and the pleasure of writing what my head was filled with”,\textsuperscript{137} others are not so fortunate. The stifling and unrelenting boredom of the Indian summer may only have resulted in “sudden causeless hates” to flare up in the Club in Lahore, but in \textit{Beau Geste} and ‘An Outpost of Progress’ this same boredom results in mutiny.

\textsuperscript{133} ibid. p. 51. “One must set these things against the taste of fever in one’s mouth, and the buzz of quinine in one’s ears; the temper frayed by heat to breaking point but for sanity’s sake held back from the break; the descending darkness of intolerable dusks; and the less supportable dawns of fierce, stale heat through one half of the year” (pp. 50-51).
\textsuperscript{134} Orwell, \textit{Burmese Days}, p. 124.
\textsuperscript{135} Safranski, \textit{Martin Heidegger}, p. 194.
\textsuperscript{136} Joris-Karl Huysmans, \textit{Against Nature} (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1971), p. 22. In making this comparison, however, it is important that we distinguish Heidegger’s definition of boredom from the historical period of cultural and spiritual malaise and “world weariness” that manifested itself in the decadent movement. For while the latter can be understood as an especially potent expression of the former, Heidegger’s ontological definition transcends, and is not dependent upon, the specificity of the social, cultural and spiritual factors of any given time. For more conventional analysis of boredom and culture, see Patricia Meyer Spacks, \textit{Boredom: The Literary History of Boredom as a State of Mind} (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995); Sean Desmond Healy, \textit{Boredom, Self, and Culture} (Rutherford [N.J]: Farleigh Dickinson University Press., 1984); and, Reinhard Kuhn, \textit{The Demon of Noontide: Ennui in Western Literature} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
\textsuperscript{137} Kipling, \textit{Something of Myself}, p. 52. See George Orwell’s disparaging comments on Kipling’s Anglo-Indian contemporaries who did not “like or approve of him” for precisely these reasons: “They said, no doubt truly, that he knew nothing about India, and on the other hand, he was from their point of view too much of a highbrow” (\textit{Rudyard Kipling}, p. 78). See also, Robert Graves’s assertion that Kipling “was looked on with the greatest suspicion and even detestation by the Anglo-Indians of the Mutiny tradition”, quoted by André Maurois in \textit{Poets and Prophets}, trans. by Hamish Miles (London: Cassel & Co. Ltd., 1936), p. 6.
murder and suicide; in 'A Wayside Comedy', it convenes the adultery of Boultie and Mrs Vansythen; and at Fort Amara in 'With the Main Guard', it provokes the diversionary heroics of Terence Mulvaney.

"In having a mood", Heidegger says, "Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has been delivered over in its Being." In this chapter, I have sought to demonstrate the ways in which the depiction of the fictional coloniser in the loneliness of anxiety, uncanniness, fear and boredom, can be understood to reflect the fundamental characteristics of this delivery.

I have argued that, when understood in terms of Heidegger's existential-ontological analytic, the depiction of anxiety and boredom in particular works of colonial literature can be seen to reflect those potential instances when the coloniser, as Dasein, is detached from its immersion in the "they"; and, detached from its enslavement to imperial and non-imperial "idle talk", and delivered over to itself in its "potentially-for-Being-itself". In fact, we could say that, in a number of the stories we have been examining in this chapter, the ontological crisis that is signalled in anxiety and boredom, can be seen to result in an almost complete bankruptcy of the imperial strain of "idle talk" insofar as it is obliterated in the terrifying disclosure of the "Why?" and the "What for?". Then again, it is not just imperialism that is called into question when the heart fails, the strength outwears and "Purpose turn[es] to Loathing"; it is existence itself.

As we saw in the previous chapter in relation to Kipling, the identification of these crises, depressions and periods of boredom, loneliness and anxiety in no way denies the everyday carefree concerns of the coloniser in work and play. I am not suggesting that the historical coloniser existed in a perpetual state of anxiety or boredom. Rather, I am suggesting that the presence of these moods must always be understood within the context of Dasein's everyday oscillation between its authentic and inauthentic modes of Being. For every Mrs Hauksbee caught up in the petty intrigues of Anglo-India there is a Mulvaney struggling with the heat and loneliness; for every Tertium Quid flirting with another man's wife, there is a Findlayson immersed in his work.

So, far from being an exercise in philosophical obscurantism or the wilful avoidance of the issue at hand, this phenomenological analysis of anxiety and boredom in these colonial texts has enabled us to attend to the ways in which the historical coloniser potentially responded to the world of his/her experience: a world in which he/she potentially experienced fear, boredom and anxiety. Not as the symbolic manifestations of an abstract and artificially ontologised colonial

guilt, but as the manifestations of "Being-in-the-world" as the being that he/she is. As such, this phenomenological analysis has enabled us to speculate upon that plane of correspondence upon which the reading public can potentially relate to these characters as the "beings in the world" that they too are. Beings who themselves experience anxiety, uncanniness, loneliness, fear and boredom.
CHAPTER VI: Heroism

Many of the fictional and historical colonisers examined in the course of this study are recognisable as heroes - 'colonial heroes'. And given that 'the colonial hero' is perhaps the most conspicuous coloniser in that his/her actions transcend the ordinary, it is not surprising that, in colonial discourse analysis, he/she is held to be among the most discursively functional. More accurately, it is in the figure of 'the colonial hero', and his/her heroism, that many of the most fundamental aspects of colonial discourse are seen to be located and expressed. As Graham Dawson has argued, in Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of Masculinities, this can be understood in relation to the fact that:

[D]uring the growth of popular imperialism in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, heroic masculinity became fused in an especially potent configuration with representations of British imperial identity. This linked together the new imperialist patriotism, the virtues of martialism, and war as its ultimate test and opportunity. A "real man" would henceforth be defined and recognized as one who was prepared to fight (and if necessary, to sacrifice his life) for Queen, Country and Empire.*

Concentrating upon the "soldier heroes" Sir Henry Havelock and T.E. Lawrence®, Dawson examines the more precise nature of this "potent configuration" in terms of, among other things, Melanie Klein's psychoanalytical theories of psychic splitting, integration and composure,® before discussing the ways in which these structures and processes determine the "cultural imaginaries" of imperial masculinity:

The cultural imaginaries of British colonialism furnished the ways of seeing and making sense of colonized worlds such as Ireland, British India or Africa, available to explorers and other British people at any given historical moment. In mapping the significant features of these worlds, and finding them variously attractive or threatening in qualitatively distinct ways, the Irish, Indian and African imaginaries provided the cultural forms that enabled British people to inhabit them and to know themselves in relation to their other inhabitants. They constituted what it meant to "be British" in these contexts.*

---

* Graham Dawson, Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of Masculinities, p. 1.
® See, for example, Dawson's assertion that "The blond Bedouin...represents the management in phantasy of the threat to British identity posed by Arab otherness. Integrating those threatening qualities within the soldier hero both divests the colonized and subordinated other of its disturbing power and reaffirms the unproblematic superiority of a strengthened Britishness. Neither the Turks who are triumphantly destroyed, nor the Arabs who become wild and childlike helpers, present any serious threat to Lawrence's superiority, either morally, physically or psychically" (ibid., p. 187).
® More specifically, Dawson maintains that, "the Kleinian tradition of psychoanalysis...offers a potential solution to the problem of how the psychic and the social may be brought together without reducing one to the other" (ibid., p. 29).
® (ibid., p. 48.)

181
The “cultural imaginaries of British colonialism” are thus offered up as something like the psychic counterparts of various colonial and Orientalist discourses. Drawing these themes together, Dawson explains that he is seeking to bring to light 

...the complex dialectical process whereby the idealized masculinities of adventure are produced, circulated and used in everyday life, being at once psychic fantasy and a cultural commodity, the product of the unconscious as well as of culture industries.®

In other words, if we recall Barthes’ description of the structuralist project, Dawson is attempting to “reconstruct” the ‘colonial hero’ in such a way as to “manifest the rules of its functioning”.® But what is this idealised “imperial masculinity” and how is it understood to relate to the characters that we have been examining? How is it “produced, circulated and used in everyday life”, and by whom? Who “defines” and “recognises” this “real man”? In order to answer these important questions – questions which, it must be said, pertain to the broad assumptions of colonial discourse analysis and cultural theory in general – I would argue that we must first and foremost seek to clarify the nature of its constituent parts or players. And in doing so, we can begin with: the heroic act as historical event and the hero as him/herself. This is followed by the depiction of historical heroism and the historical hero, by the writer as reporter, biographer and historian; in the case of Burton and Lawrence, the writer as autobiographer.®” But because these depictions include the fictional embellishments of propaganda, hagiography and myth-making, they can also be considered alongside and compared to original fictional creations. Hence, we must include here the writer as novelist, poet and playwright. Finally, we come to the hero-worship and cultural currency of the historical hero, and the appreciation of the fictional hero by the nation or public as reader: if we include radio and film, listener and watcher.

So, where are we to locate Dawson’s “heroic masculinity” and “British imperial identity” in all of this? Are we to understand that it is along these lines and in the communication between these parts and players that “the new imperialist patriotism, the virtues of manhood, and war” become joined and “a real man” becomes “defined and recognized”? Or again, do these sexual, psychic and ideological structures exist above and beyond such clearly defined groupings; founded in, relating to, and affecting to explain them, but in effect, functioning independently of any individual hero, writer or reader as the structures of culture and cultural discourse? If so, the question which presents itself is, does the classification and investigation of these people – be it Lawrence as hero; Sir Walter Scott as writer; or Dawson himself as reader – in terms of these

® ibid., p. 7.
® For a more elaborate explication of the discursive structures of autobiography, see Laura Marcus’s Autobiographical discourses: Theory, criticism, practice (Manchester UP: Manchester, 1994).
theoretical structures and processes actually “bury over” (verschüttet), what and how these people are as heroes, writers and readers? Indeed, precisely “bury” them over while affecting to lay them bare?

Indeed, this is just the point which Heidegger raises in his lecture series, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, in the winter semester of 1929-30. In his discussion of “the classification of man in culture” in the work of Oswald Spengler, Ludwig Klages, Max Scheler and Leopold Ziegler — a classification grounded in “expression”, “symbol”, and “symbolic forms” — Heidegger asks if the “view of man” that is provided by this type of cultural philosophy is in fact an “essential one”:

Man, perhaps even contemporary man, is in this way set out in terms of the expression of his achievements. And yet the question remains as to whether setting man out in this way concerns and grips his Da-sein, or indeed brings it to being, whether this setting-out that is oriented toward expression not only factually misses the essence of man, but must necessarily miss it, quite irrespective of all aesthetics. In other words, such philosophy attains merely the setting-out [Darstellung] of man, but never his Da-sein. Not only does it factically fail to attain it, but it is of necessity unable to attain it, because in itself it blocks the path to doing so. And of course it is this “setting-out” which Heidegger would later go on to describe as the “challenging revealing” of the “technological consciousness” which dominates our thinking in the modern age. But more importantly, if, as he maintained in Being and Time, that...

And the existential analytic of Dasein comes before any psychology or anthropology, and certainly before any biology...

then here, he can be seen to argue that it must come before any cultural philosophy as well. In other words, the interpretation of culture and man’s place in it must, for Heidegger, be conducted under “the guidance of an understanding of Being”:

We may not, therefore, flee from ourselves in some convoluted idle talk about culture, nor pursue ourselves in a psychology motivated by curiosity. Rather we must find...

---

9 And this is of course especially pertinent when we consider the character and influence of more recent works of cultural theory; for example, Franco Moretti’s Signs Taken for Wonders: Essays in the Sociology of Literary Forms, trans. by Susan Fischer (London: Verso, 1983) and Frederic Jameson’s The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act.

10 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, I.1.18 (c), pp. 75-76.


12 Being and Time, I.1, p. 71.

13 ibid., II.5, p. 413. “[T]he more the totality of entities has been Articulated in its basic attributes as a possible area of subject-matter for science, all the more secure will be the perspective for one’s methodological inquiry” (ibid.).
ourselves by binding ourselves to our being-there [Dasein] and by letting such being-there [Du-sein] become what is singularly binding for us.\textsuperscript{13}

In the context of an investigation of ‘colonial heroism’, I would argue that this call to bind “ourselves to our being-there” can be understood as a call to adhere to the “being-there” that we ourselves are, and an adherence to the “being-there” of those involved; namely, the historical hero, the writer and the reader. For, if we are to achieve an essential understanding of this, or indeed any other cultural phenomenon, as opposed to a mere “setting-out” of our subject matter as the “standing reserve”, then we must conduct an analysis which fundamentally recognises the ontologically grounded what and how of that subject matter.

The first, and perhaps most important, consequence of this recognition involves our rejection of the theoretical objectives which characterise and determine the methodology of an analysis such as that of Graham Dawson (or indeed Laura Chrisman, Sara Suleri or Edward Said); an analysis which deals in, and seeks to define, among other things, the artificially ontologised categories of an identifiable national and imperial heroism, masculinity and consciousness. For over and above the specific psychoanalytical-cum-sociological conclusions which he draws in his analysis, the most fundamental problem in Dawson’s analytic concerns his un-written assumption that the production, circulation and use of the “idealized masculinities of adventure” – as both “the product of the unconscious” and “culture industries” – can be followed and mapped along “distinct and intellectually knowable lines”.\textsuperscript{14} As we have repeatedly shown, this assumption can be seen to precipitate both the ordering, regulation and securing of reality as “structured image” (\textit{GeBild}) and the expediential adoption of a whole series of abstract theoretical structures and entities. Structures and entities which, in Dawson’s case, include, for example, “British Imperial identity”, “British manhood”, “the British colonial imaginary” and a “collective national imagining”\textsuperscript{15}. In fact, it is precisely the theoretical clarification of these structures and entities (and the interrelations between them) which takes centre stage; a clarification, moreover, which forms the basis for Dawson’s subsequent analysis of the relation between “textual representations of masculinity” and “its lived forms”.\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, it is this methodological progression (from discourse to subject matter and back again) which can be seen to characterise the work of any number of postcolonial theorists and colonial discourse analysts from Said to Sara Suleri. But, whereas before I have largely concentrated upon the

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics}, 1.1.18 (c), p. 77. For Heidegger, “curiosity” (\textit{Neugier}) is a “peculiar tendency-of-Being which belongs to everydayness... [and] expresses the tendency towards a peculiar way of letting the world be encountered by us in perception” (\textit{Being and Time}, 1.5, p., 214). See also, \textit{History of the Concept of Time}, 1.4, pp. 274-277.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Orientalism}, pp. 13.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{DasNSon, Soldier Heroes}, pp. 1, 63, 87, 98.

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid.,} p. 7.
problems which adhere to this methodology in terms of the ways in which it can be seen to posit an homogenised, un-worlded, and de-humanised ‘discursive subject’; here, I am arguing that these problems must also be understood to compromise the interpretation of a cultural phenomenon like heroism. And this is primarily because of the way in which each of the groups that we have identified as being caught up in Dawson’s “configuration” of “heroic masculinity” – the hero, the writer and the reader – are constituted in terms of their peculiar function within that “configuration”. If we accept that, as Dawson says, “Heroes are made not by their deeds but by the stories that are told about them”, then the meaningfulness of the hero and the heroic act is effectively dispersed into a system of signs; and what is more, filtered through the abstract components of a theoretical construction like the “social imaginary”. What we are discussing, then, is an analytical movement away from the ‘things themselves’ (and the world of the things themselves) and the “Enframing” of these things within the “intellectually knowable lines” of the “structured image”. That “Enframing” which

challenges forth into the frenziedness of ordering that blocks every view into the coming-to-pass of revealing and so radically endangers the relation to the essence of truth.  

This, in turn, requires the author as the “standing reserve” (Bestand) to be regulated and secured in such a way as to maximise the facilitation of the cultural, psychoanalytical, theoretical or sociological configurations which are being mapped. Hence, at various times it can be expediential for him/her to function as a self conscious didact; at others, as the unconscious channel for the transmission of hegemonic propaganda and ideology; or as we saw in the previous chapter in Laura Chrisman’s reading of Haggard, the author can simply be posited as the synecdoche of imperialism itself. Indeed, these variations can, to a greater or lesser extent, be understood within the context of a more general belief that:

The concept of an “author” as a free creative source of the meaning of a book belongs to the legal and educational forms of the liberal humanist discourse that emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; it is not a concept that exists within discourses that have developed recently.

In each case, what is important is that the author is fundamentally constituted in terms of a role within the system as spokesperson, channel or manifestation of meaning. And as such, it is

---

17 Ibid., p. 188.
19 See also, for example, Pratt’s assertion that, “The task of Barrow and the others was to invent Africa for the domestic subjects of the British Empire, Humboldt’s discursive challenge was to reinvent Spanish America for a Europe well aware that Spanish control over the region was coming to an end” (‘Scratches on the Face of the Country’, p. 147).
perhaps interesting to note Said's early observations on the subject in *Beginnings: Intention and Method*:

In his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl makes a useful distinction between meaning-conferring acts (or meaning intention) and meaning-fulfilling acts: for the writer, conferring meaning is essential "to the expression as such," whereas fulfilling the meaning, "confirming, realising it more or less accurately, and so actualising its relation to its object," is *something he only hopes to achieve.*

And this can be set alongside the following quotation from Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals* which Said discusses in the context of the analytical discourse of Sigmund Freud:

> The cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual employment and place in a system of purposes, lie worlds apart; whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it; all events in the organic world are a subduing, a becoming master, and all subduing and becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adaptation through which any previous "meaning" and "purpose" are necessarily obscured or even obliterated...The form is fluid, but the "meaning" is even more so.

But of course this early concurrence with Husserl on the fundamental arbitrariness of meaning-fulfilment, and Nietzsche on the perpetual transformation and reinterpretation of meaning is forgotten, or at least seriously compromised, in Said's later explication of Orientalism and cultural imperialism. For in his mapping of "the intellectually knowable lines" of Oriental and colonial discourse, the indeterminacy of the meaning-fulfilling acts of authorial intention and reader response, not to mention the fundamental fluidity of "meaning" in general, are supplanted by an altogether more rigid conception of the way in which "meaning" is constructed, transferred and maintained at every level of society. And it is precisely this rigid conceptualisation of the construction, transference and maintenance of meaning that is in evidence in Dawson's analysis of the "the circuit of imagining" which surrounded 'the colonial hero' in colonial society. In order for this "circuit" to exist as a coherent theoretical field of enquiry, I would argue that the fundamental arbitrariness of authorial meaning-fulfilment and the perpetual transformation and reinterpretation of meaning must be severely regulated and, on occasions, suspended altogether.

So where does this leave us in our investigation of 'colonial heroism'? Are we to assume that because colonial discourse analysis fails to attain an essential view of man, and as a result, the heroism of man, then no such view is possible? Certainly not. What it does mean however, is

---

that an essential view of heroism is never to be obtained in the explication of an artificially ontologised national or 'imperial heroism' that is dependent upon an artificially ontologised conception of a 'national' and 'imperial' masculinity and consciousness. For, if the very notion of an homogenised 'national' or 'imperial heroism' is an artificial theoretical construction, then its clarification is only ever meaningful within the parameters of its own theoretical artificiality.

1. Towards an Ontological Definition of Heroism

If the existential analytic of Dasein comes before the analysis of culture, then it must also come before the analysis of a cultural phenomenon like 'colonial heroism'. In other words, in order to achieve an essential view of 'colonial heroism' we must proceed in our analysis under the guidance of an understanding of Being. And in the wake of our brief examination of the problems which adhere to Dawson's approach, the fundamental criteria of this understanding can be summarised as follows: firstly, we must necessarily dispense with the theoretical fiction of an homogenisable 'British', 'colonial' or 'imperial' hero or heroism; secondly, the (homogenised, un-worlded and dehumanised) historical hero, writer and reader of colonial discourse analysis must be returned to the world of their experiences and understood as the "beings in the world" that they themselves are; and thirdly, we must return to the things themselves, and in particular, the heroic act.

In short, I am proposing that we must attend to 'the colonial hero' as Dasein, and the heroic deed in terms of the intentional comportments of Dasein's "care" (Sorge), or "concern" (Besorgen). Far from providing us with an exhaustive or definitive account of the subject as a whole, this ontological approach is, more specifically, intended as a speculative preliminary investigation of the essential nature of the hero and its heroism prior to their dispersal, distortion and manipulation in the "idle talk" of the "they". Following the precedent of previous chapters, I will once again attempt to develop this argument in relation to colonial literature. And as a result, I will argue that by obtaining an essential understanding of the hero in these terms, we can subsequently begin to speculate upon the existence of a further plane of possible correspondence upon which the reader (as Dasein) can potentially respond.

Before we proceed however, we must attempt to achieve a more precise understanding and definition of this general term, 'heroism'. In particular, we must ask, what is heroic about 'colonial heroism', and can we isolate something like a universally applicable criterion for 'colonial heroes'? When we consider the many heroes and their heroic deeds; all the various feats of bravery, virtue, stamina, sacrifice and strength which mark them out; all the many aspects of class, race, faith and nationalism which they reflect; can we achieve a unified
definition which encompasses each configuration? In short, how are we to find the heroic common denominator in a list of British ‘colonial heroes’ which includes, for example: Rajah Brooke, General Gordon, Richard Burton, Cecil Rhodes, Frederick Selous, T.E. Lawrence, Earl Kitchener, David Livingstone, General Roberts and the defenders of Rorkes Drift? Are they all unproblematical examples of what Dawson calls “exemplary lives”; all “figures for identification”? Can we even assume that they were necessarily and collectively ‘good’ for the Empire when figures like Hastings and Dyer were heroes to some and villains to others? And how is this difference of opinion to be accounted for?

The further we proceed in this line of questioning, the more problematic the concept of heroism appears to become. And this ambivalence is, I would argue, primarily due to the fact that which ultimately defines the heroic character of each individual hero (British, colonial or otherwise) is the “idle talk” and the multifarious concerns of the “they”. For how else are we to explain the hero-worship of a Wellington which was not only not unanimous, but was also fundamentally fickle; how else explain that point “when the wind changes, and the silly crowd is in another and possibly saner temper”? How else are we to account for the perception of a Dyer, a hero for some and a butcher for others? Certainly, we might attempt to classify and contain our subject matter in the invention and sub-division of conventions and discourses of various types; for example, ‘the Soldier hero’, ‘the Christian hero’, ‘the explorer’ and ‘the imperial martyr’. But will this proliferation of types enable us to clarify the differences which exist between a Gordon and a Havelock? A Burton and a Livingston? And can we, or should we, simply overlook the shortfall which inevitably results in deference to the perhaps more

---

20 Ibid., pp. 7, 4.
21 Robert Buchanan speaking of his anticipation of Kipling’s fall from favour, from “The Voice of the Hooligan”, p. 27.
22 See, for example, Dawson’s analysis of Havelock as the exemplary Christian soldier and as exhibiting that which he calls “Christian composure” (Soldier Heroes, pp. 128-144).
23 See, for example, Mary Louise Pratt; “Exploration certainly lends itself to heroic narrative paradigms of adventure, personal prowess, obstacles overcome and prizes won, and explorers in the nineteenth century were certainly seen as heroes”. ‘Scratches on the Face of the Country’, p. 146.
24 See also, Dawson’s recognition of the fact that “Colonial” militaristic masculinities co-existed in the early 19th century alongside the Methodist working man, the Byronic hero, the Jacobin radical and Cowper’s domestic contemplative as masculine heroic forms (Soldier Heroes, p. 62).
25 Compare, for example, Lieut.-Colonel Seton Churchill’s conventional hagiography of Gordon, General Gordon: A Christian Hero (London: James Nisbet & Co. Ltd., 1907), which concludes, “No titles precede his name, nor do any decorations of importance follow it, but his simple and yet heroic self-sacrificing life have fascinated his countrymen, and helped to make the world better by setting before it a higher ideal” (pp. 277-278); and Lytton Strachey’s rather less flattering portrait in Eminent Victorians which ends with the following reflection on Kitchener’s victory at Omdurman thirteen years after Gordon’s death; “Everyone agreed that General Gordon had been avenged at last. Who could doubt it? General Gordon himself, possibly, fluttering, in some remote Nirvana, the pages of a phantasmal Bible, might have ventured on a satirical remark. But General Gordon had always been a contradictory person – even a little off his head, perhaps, though a hero.” Eminent Victorians (Bungay: The Chaucer Press Ltd., 1967), pp. 284-285.
attractive alternative of constructing a neatly coherent psychoanalytical, sociological and cultural theory?

For even when we acknowledge, and attempt to trace, the discursive continuities and discontinuities between such figures and, in so doing, attempt to plug them into larger cultural/psychoanalytical/semiotic systems of meaning, the fundamental artificiality of such generic categories and types (as the regulation and securement of "the standing-reserve") must always already compromise the validity of our results. In other words, it is not just the validity of the results of our analysis of fictional and historical heroes as 'discursive subjects' which must be compromised here; the fundamental inadequacy of these discursive categories must always already compromise our understanding and interpretation of the ways in which these heroes function in culture as a whole.

And, in relation to the ways in which the hero is understood to function in culture and society, it is perhaps useful for us to consider Rousseau's emphasis upon the difficulties that heroism raised in 18th century France, in his essay "Discourse on the Virtue Most Necessary for a Hero": difficulties which were, I would argue, just as relevant in late 19th century imperial Britain. Responding to the question "Which is the virtue most necessary for a hero and which are the heroes who lacked this virtue?", and working from the premise that heroism is a universal historical phenomenon, Rousseau argues that heroism expresses, and hero-worship instils an individual "strength of soul" as a strictly non-moral virtue. But at the same time, Rousseau insists that heroism can also be seen to undermine individual independence, and it is this which raises a number of important difficulties for liberal and conservative democrats. In particular, Rousseau maintains that heroism is itself a far more organic, far less controllable and predictable phenomenon than those who would understand it as a tool of the establishment would have us believe. In fact, in going on to note that heroes are not always strictly virtuous but are instead more closely affiliated or concerned with the public good, and indeed, all too often, the even more unpredictable desire for "personal glory", Rousseau effectively dislocates the joint by which heroism is conventionally attached to morality. In other words, he problematizes the idea that heroes are easily exploitable as straightforwardly instructive moral paragons. And, this is especially interesting in the context of our earlier comments on the difficulties surrounding the public reception of Dyer and Hastings. But more importantly, and as

---

30 Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology", p. 27 (my emphasis).
31 Rousseau's "strength of soul" can thus, I would argue, be compared with Carlyle's robustly heroic "earnestness"; that which, for Carlyle, characterised the heroic lives and deeds of Mohammed and Dante, Samuel Johnson and Oliver Cromwell, 'Lectures on Heroes', Sartor Resartus: Lectures on Heroes: Chartism: Past and Present (London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1865).
Christopher Kelly outlines in ‘Rousseau’s case for and against heroes’, following an examination of the cardinal virtues of courage, justice, prudence, and temperance, Rousseau concludes that:

[F]orch in turn is unnecessary for heroism. Even courage, which might seem to be the most necessary virtue, sometimes abandons heroes without their becoming unheroic.\textsuperscript{33}

And as such, the waters of any easily generalisable conception of heroic endeavour are significantly muddied. That which is singularly decisive for Rousseau is the far more ambiguous “strength of soul”; that is, “the possessor’s ability to avoid being dominated by fortune”.\textsuperscript{34} It is this ability more than anything else which means that “heroism is more closely connected with effectiveness than with morality”;\textsuperscript{35} an “effectiveness” which transcends and potentially displaces the artificially restrictive confines of, for example, a purely colonial meaningfulness. So, while he can be seen to acknowledge the ways in which heroism can foster and enhance ideals of a unitary sense of community and citizenship within democratic societies, Rousseau can also be seen to stress the necessity for consistent vigilance as to the dangers this fostering and enhancement involves. What is more, it is important to note that he locates these dangers, not in the ideological deception of a gullible citizenry but in the possible implications that hero-worship has for the independence of the individual; implications like dependence and imitation which have the adverse effect of precipitating that weakness of the soul which, for Rousseau, can only lead to civic vice.

In conjunction with earlier observations concerning how the ambivalence of heroism is founded in the ambivalence of “idle talk”; Rousseau’s reservations about the operation of hero-worship in society and his description of the necessarily non-specific nature of heroism, can thus be seen to further undermine the validity and coherence of the expediential heroic categories and concepts which are employed in the “Enframing” accounts of colonial discourse analysts like Dawson.

2. “Being-in-the-world” and the “Demand”

As we have noted in previous chapters, the material circumstances of ‘the colonial experience’ are frequently such that they can be seen to facilitate, or involve, the coloniser’s encounter with death, fear and anxiety. If we accept that it is primarily in the midst of these circumstances that

\textsuperscript{34} ibid., p. 351.
\textsuperscript{35} ibid., p. 351.
‘the colonial hero’ comes to the fore, then it would seem obvious that these circumstances play an important role in the essential character of that heroism. But what is the character of this role and how are we to bring it to light?

Can we assume that the former (circumstances) simply evoke the latter (heroism)? Without doubt, heroic acts cannot materialise in a vacuum; but then again, nor can they be seen to rely entirely upon circumstantial determinants – for why else should some run and others stand firm when confronted with the same threat? At the other extreme, can we assume that heroism is somehow ontologically predetermined? Always already present in ‘the colonial hero’ or coloniser, by simple virtue of his/her being a coloniser?

Of course not; some will run and others stand firm. In any case, what we are discussing in both of these formulations is the pre-deterministic mapping of an heroic predictability that is structured in terms of the causality of a subject/object dualism. A dualism wherein the hero, as ‘subject’, is seen to respond to the external influences of an ‘objective’ circumstance. As we have already noted (in Chapter One), it is this subject/object dualism which Heidegger rejects in his phenomenological explication of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world” as “care” (Sorge). For Heidegger, “all the relations of life are intrinsically defined” by “intentionality,” and all acts (“perception, judgement, love, hate”) “have the character of intentionality.”® As such, I would suggest that the relations which constitute the heroic act are necessarily intentional as well. But, before we go on to elaborate upon these relations in detail, we must seek to more fully clarify the nature of its components, and in particular, the nature of the circumstances within, towards, and “in the face of which” ‘the colonial hero’ (as Dasein) can be seen to comport itself.

We must ask, how is this clarification to take place when the infinite variability of the circumstantial contexts within which ‘the colonial hero’ functions as a hero – i.e., the fundamental differences which exist between each and every threatening scenario, challenging environment, and hostile adversary – would appear to make it almost impossible for us to achieve a general definition as to just what these circumstances are? This difficulty does not, however, mean that the essential nature of these circumstances is subsequently inaccessible to us, or that we are somehow not in a position to describe it. We can instead attempt to grasp the how of these circumstances. In other words, if we can leave aside the specificity of each and every individual circumstance, the common characteristic that they can all be seen to exhibit is their capacity to “demand” (Zumutung) that which is subsequently understood in “idle talk” as an heroic, or non-heroic, response.

*Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, p. 36.
Although I have taken this word, *Zumutung*, from Heidegger, he does not of course use it to describe the nature of (that which we will provisionally call) the heroic relation. For Heidegger, *Zumutung* describes the “announcement” (*ansagen*) of Dasein’s Being in the emptiness of profound boredom:

Commensurate with that emptiness as a whole, the most extreme demand must be announced to man, not some arbitrary demand, not this or that one, but the demand pure and simple made upon man. And what is that? *It is that Dasein as such is demanded of man, that it is given to him – to be there.*

Despite the different application, my employment of the word is intended to capture the same “questioning” and “challenging” in announcing that is implied here. A “demanding” which is, in addition, (and in both contexts) only possible because Dasein is constituted in such a way as to be receptive to this “demand” as “openness to Being”. As such, the charging Pathan, the raging torrent and the cholera epidemic can all be understood to present themselves to ‘the colonial hero’ (as Dasein), in such a way as to bring him/her into confrontation with the self as one who is, in the language of “idle talk”, courageous or cowardly, strong or weak. Which is not to say that, at this level, there is anything essentially or inherently good or bad, right or wrong in this confrontation: such moral identifications are, we must remember, firmly located in the ensuing diagnosis of the “they”.

Nor is this being brought before oneself in confrontation only to be understood in the sense of a conscious deliberation on Dasein’s part: it is, instead, primarily to be understood in the sense of the bringing to light (as the unconcealment of *aletheia*) of what it in fact is. Heidegger himself explains the more precise nature of this mode of the unconcealment of Being as confrontation when discussing a fragment (53) from Heraclitus in his *Introduction to Metaphysics*. He translates the fragment as follows:

*Confrontation is indeed for all (that comes to presence) the sire (who lets emerge), but (also) for all the preserver that holds sway. For it lets some appear as gods, others as human beings, some it produces (sets forth) as slaves, but others as free.*

---

38 Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 2, p. 65. Fried and Polt provide the following, “more conventional translation” in a footnote; “War is the father of all and the king of all, and it has shown some as gods and others as human beings, made some slaves and others free” (p. 65n). On the subject of the questionable validity of Heidegger’s translations and etymologies, see, for example, Walter Kaufmann’s ‘Heidegger’s Castle’, in *From Shakespeare to Existentialism* (New York: Anchor Books, 1960), pp. 339-369.
In its most originary sense, "confrontation" (polemos) means struggle (Kampf, bestämmung), and for Heidegger it is struggle which...

...first and foremost allows what essentially unfolds to step apart in opposition, first allows position and status and rank to establish themselves in coming into presence.²⁰

The "position and status and rank" (gods, slaves, human beings and freemen) that Heidegger refers to here is not, as it is with Heraclitus, primarily a description of social class and public standing; for Heidegger these things are not ontologically determinable. He is instead, taking Heraclitus' fragment as an articulation of the fundamental way in which man comes to presence (as the unconcealedness of Being) in struggle.⁴⁸ And in the light of this illustration, I suggest that this struggle can also be understood to characterise the "demand" which manifests itself in what we are calling the heroic relation.

In addition to the "demand" that is made by the material circumstance upon the coloniser there is also, to a greater or lesser extent, a disclosure. For in conjunction with the confrontational struggle of the "demand", there is in danger, the potential for the equiprimordial (gleichchursprünglich) disclosure and apprehension of Dasein's own "Being towards death". Indeed, it is precisely this "Being towards death" which can, in certain contexts, be seen to mark the occasion as one of heroic potentiality; for example, when the possibility of losing one's life does not prevent one from proceeding. But what does "potentiality" mean in this context? It means that Dasein, as prospective hero, can be brought to light before itself as being, for example, either brave or cowardly; and that this is accompanied by a second and more fundamental possibility that it shall, on the one hand, grasp its authentic "Being-in-the-world" (as a "Being towards death") in anticipatory resoluteness; or, on the other, retreat back into the inauthenticity of the "they". It is in relation to this second mode of possibility that William Richardson has argued that anticipatory resoluteness can be seen to constitute, "that stout-hearted open-ness unto Being that alone can found genuine valour".⁴¹

But, is this necessarily the case? Can it be presumed, as Richardson implies, that anticipatory resoluteness corresponds with "genuine valour" in every instance? Could the apprehension of one's own authentic "Being-in-the-world" not just as easily result in a wish to preserve that Being at all costs? Similarly, could the retreat back into the "they" not provide one with the justificatory rationale for the enactment of life-endangering feats of bravery? In fact, as we saw

³⁹ ibid, 2, p. 65.
⁴⁰ See also, Nietzsche's "All events, all motion, all becoming as a determination of degrees and relations of force, as a struggle". Friedrich Nietzsche, Will to Power, trans. by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 299.
⁴¹ Richardson, Heidegger, p. 475.
in Chapter Three, the ontical concerns of the “they” – which involves, we must remember, the worldly ideologies of religion and nationalism, race and class – are precisely those concerns which most frequently provide the prospective hero with the logic he/she requires in order to steel the self for heroic endeavours. More pointedly, we must ask, is it not possible that an ‘ontological coward’ (as he who flies in the face of his own authentic “Being-in-the-world”) can simultaneously be an ‘ontical hero’, and visa versa?

It is this last question which can be seen to bring our ontological examination of heroism before the fundamentally unpredictable nature of the historical coloniser’s propensity to be a hero. For it is this fundamental ontological indeterminacy that always already forms the pre-hercic context within which both heroic and non-hercic actions are possible: this indeterminacy which can be seen to explain the varied and wholly unpredictable character of heroic endeavour as it occurs (or does not occur) in the history of the colonial period. As Heidegger says, “Such ambiguity points to the mystery of all revealing, i.e., of truth”. In this light, I would argue that, if our objective is to understand the hero in everything that constitutes its heroic experiences – a significant portion of which involves an understanding of “idle talk” and its role in heroism as a social, ideological and political phenomenon – this understanding must be grounded in an acknowledgement of the fundamental indeterminacy of these cultural processes and individual heroic experiences. This is particularly important when we come to speculate upon the various ways in which the hero and its experiences are absorbed into, understood, celebrated and/or neglected by the public at home. For, above and beyond the perception and apprehension, appreciation and celebration of the hero’s endeavours in terms of political, racial or nationalistic (i.e., ontical) significance, there is the additional possibility that ‘the colonial hero’ can bring before the general public the immediacy of their own existence. Such a possibility is not, of course, dependent upon the general public being familiar with the intricacies of Heideggarian ontology, but upon their ability to conceptualise empathetically (and not just sympathetically), the circumstances under which ‘the colonial hero’, or indeed any hero, came forth as a hero, a possibility which, in fictional terms, is not only, or even necessarily, dependent upon what Cawelti calls ‘the writer’s ability to evoke in us a temporary sense of fear and uncertainty about the fate of a character we care about’, but is instead dependent upon the public’s ability to comprehend a simple ‘question’: namely, whether they themselves would be capable of doing the same; whether they are the sort of person who would be capable of undertaking an heroic act should they find themselves in similar circumstances. Whether they would walk into

---

42 Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, p. 33. See also, Heidegger’s discussion of the fact that ‘everything that lies before us is ambiguous’ in What is Called Thinking?, II.VIII, p. 201.

43 On Heidegger’s description of empathy as “a relationship of Being [Seinsverhältnis] from Dasein to Dasein”, see Being and Time, I.4, p. 192.

44 Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery and Romance, p. 17.
Kafiristan like Dravot and Carnehan; set off across Arabia for Mecca like Burton; hold firm in the face of certain death, like Lewis Haystoun; or, for that matter, assassinate a Viceroy, take on the might of the British Empire in the Easter Rising of 1916, or stand in front of a tank in Tianenmen Square.

The fundamental "demand" which is asked of the coloniser by the material circumstances in the heroic relation is transferred, by proxy, and in an obviously diluted form, to the general public in the person of the triumphant hero. And while it would be ludicrous to suggest that this "demand" is either universally apprehended in every instance, or that it is the only possible context within which an engagement may take place; I would argue that it can, nonetheless, be seen to constitute an essential horizon of meaning against which the complex relationship between the hero and the public is potentially played out. For, in contrast to an horizon of meaning which is founded exclusively upon certain strains of "idle talk", for example, a political or racial identification, this horizon is founded upon the ontological constitution of the Being that we ourselves are. Not as the only viable, or acceptable horizon to the exception of all else, but as the most fundamental horizon.

It is this final observation which brings us back to those crucial planes of potential correspondence that I have been referring to in previous chapters. More accurately, by clarifying the ontological nature of the heroic "demand", a crucial new point of correlation between the nature of the public's engagement with 'the colonial hero' of material reality and the nature of its engagement with 'the colonial hero' of colonial literature, can be seen to emerge. In order to draw this correlation into sharper focus, I will now turn to that literature and investigate the ways in which its portrayal of heroic endeavour can be seen to reflect the ontological processes and structures we have discussed.

3. The "Demand" in Colonial Fiction

In Chapter Three, I drew attention to the ways in which the fictional coloniser can be seen to reflect those modes of Dasein's temporality (as the inauthentic and authentic temporal projections of its own "historicality") which are constitutive of Dasein's "Being-in-the-world" as a "Being in Time". In doing so, I used the example of Buchan's Lewis Haystoun, in The Half-Hearted, to emphasise the important role that is played by "idle talk" in the formation of the hero's heroic resolve. At the same time, I argued that, when understood in these terms,

45 Lord Mayo was assassinated during a tour of the Andaman islands penal colony in 1872.
46 Cf., for example, Frederic Jameson's insistence that "the "political interpretation" of literary texts is not merely a competitor or an optional extra to the other current methods available today but constitutes "the absolute horizon of all reading and all interpretation" (The Political Unconscious, p. 17).
Haystoun’s recourse to the “idle talk” of “a greater kinship”47 with his heroic forefathers is necessarily characterised by “mineness”. This is the crucial point: for it is precisely the fictional representation of this type of understanding, this type of character and this type of situation which postcolonial commentators hold to epitomise the idealisation of ‘colonial manhood’. The victory of Haystoun’s sense of national and imperial responsibility over his personal fears; his single-handed defence of the British dominion in India against a whole army; and the homage of the rebel Fazir Khan in his, “This man...was of the race of kings”;48 all of these no doubt comply with the conventional discursive requirements of colonial adventure fiction. However, the question here is not to do with whether or not these things exist in the text; but how they are subsequently understood to operate as colonial discourse in colonial culture and society. It is to do with the methodologies which are employed in the explication and extrapolation of this operation. In other words, it is to do with the theoretical regulation and securement of the fictional “standing reserve” in order to make sense of reality.

Let us not forget, that in colonial discourse analysis, the explication of the heroism of a character like Lewis Haystoun, is not only, or even mainly, confined to a fictional or merely textual realm of meaning and significance. As Dawson’s study shows, the delineation of a particular strain of “colonial masculinity” in colonial fiction is read in parallel with the “masculinities” of colonial reality. They are both seen to stem from the same “social imaginary”; both seen to exhibit, make manifest and appease the same psychoanalytical processes; both seen to function discursively in society as “figures for identification” in the same way. It is precisely these presumed correspondences which are, I would argue, most fundamentally problematized by the ontological structures described by Martin Heidegger.

It is in contrast to these discursively constituted correspondences then, that I will now conduct an alternative reading of the fictional ‘colonial hero’; a reading that is founded in an understanding of the ontological constitution of the historical ‘colonial hero’ as Dasein. In doing so, I will suggest that not only can the fictional hero be seen to reflect the basic modes of “Being-in-the-world” in its acts of heroism, but that, when considered in this light, a series of alternative correspondences can be brought to the fore – correspondences which are not only grounded in the Being that the historical coloniser is, but which, in drawing the ambivalent nature of the heroism of the historical coloniser into sharper relief, can subsequently be seen to complicate and undermine the “Enframing” strategies and “intellectually knowable lines” of colonial discourse analysis.

48 ibid., p. 317.
Once again, the important point to emphasise is that the validity of an homogenised historical 'colonial hero' (as 'discursive subject') in colonial discourse analysis, is not primarily disproven in the documentation of instances of non-conformity, eccentricity and rebellion; it is always already disproven, at base, in the fundamental ontological constitution of the historical coloniser itself. And following our examination of the ambivalence of 'colonial heroism' in history in relation to the hero, the writer and the reader, the notion of an homogenous 'colonial heroism' in literature is problematized; problematized in the fact that heroism as a cultural phenomenon is determined by the always already ambivalent, fickle and arbitrary concerns of "idle talk".

(a) The heroic cowardice of Lord Jim

If the heroism of 'colonial heroism' is only understandable in relation to the ambivalent concerns of "idle talk", then so too is its supposed antithesis, 'colonial cowardice'. In perhaps the most famous act of cowardice in colonial literature, Lord Jim's leap from the Patna, the complex nature of this relation is nowhere more plainly brought to light. But more importantly, the circumstances surrounding Jim's crisis can also be seen to reflect the fundamental characteristics of the (heroic/non-heroic) "demand", and in particular, its indeterminacy. For it is precisely this indeterminacy which is so emphatically exhibited in Jim's actions, this indeterminacy in the face of the "demand" which is so unexpected and so unexplainable:

“I had jumped... It seems... I know nothing about it till I looked up... There was no going back. It was as if I had jumped into a well -- into an everlasting deep hole...”49

And, in having jumped, Marlow explains, “he was partly stunned by the discovery he had made -- the discovery about himself".50 Yes, the realisation that he had abandoned his post and betrayed the codes of his craft; that he had abandoned eight hundred dependents to their deaths; but more significantly, Jim discovers that he is this person and no other.

This discovery has most frequently been interpreted by critics as in conflict with the romantic image of himself which Jim had cultivated as a boy.51 When training to be an officer of the mercantile marine:

[He would] live in his mind the sea-life of light literature. He saw himself saving people from sinking ships, cutting away masts in a hurricane, swimming through a surf with a line; or as a lonely castaway, bare-footed and half-naked, walking on uncovered reefs in

49 Conrad, Lord Jim, 9, p. 89.
50 ibid., 7, p. 67.
51 See, for example, John A. McClure, Kipling and Conrad, pp. 121-122; Martin Green, Dreams of Adventure, pp. 313-314.
search of shell-fish to stave off starvation. He confronted savages on tropical shores, quelled mutinies on the high seas, and in a small boat upon the ocean kept up the hearts of despairing men — always an example of devotion to duty, and as unflinching as a hero in a book.\(^\text{52}\)

But after his leap from the *Patna*, is it enough to say that Jim is “stunned” simply by the fact that he is not like a romantic hero in a book? That his shock, shame and distress can be understood in relation to, and as an expression of, “a degraded image of ‘legendary’ heroism”?\(^\text{53}\) Or can it be construed that he sees himself as a traitor to some abstract notion of “fidelity”?\(^\text{54}\) If, as Benita Parry has suggested, these “fantasies of surpassing heroism” must be viewed within the context of British imperialism — wherein they “ironically anticipate his abysmal failure and preview his magnificent achievement, the first violating his nation’s imperialist creed and the other realising its colonial dream”\(^\text{55}\) — does this mean that Jim’s distress should be understood to reflect a sense of “colonial failure”? In short, is it as a sailor, as a romantic hero, or as a colonialist that Jim interprets his own disgrace? Or is it, perhaps, precisely none of these?

In order to comprehend what is at stake here, let us again call to mind Lewis Haystoun at that moment when “the extreme loneliness of the exile’s death smote him.”\(^\text{56}\) For it is at this moment of crisis that Haystoun understands himself most explicitly in terms of his role as an imperial defender and fighting Briton; when he takes on all of the sacrificial responsibilities that that such understanding implicitly involves. In vivid contrast, Jim, on hearing the “wild screech”, “Geo-o-o-orge! Oh, jump!”, \(^\text{57}\) from the boat below, finds none of his prospective roles forcing themselves upon him. He jumps, in the anxious apprehension of his own “Being towards death”, as *that* which has been disclosed to him in the material circumstances within which he finds himself. That “certain combination of circumstances” in which, as the French Lieutenant maintains:

\(^{52}\) Conrad, *Lord Jim*, 1, p. 11.
\(^{53}\) The phrase is Frederic Jameson’s, from “Romance and Realification: Plot Construction and Ideological Closure in *Nostromo*” in *Joseph Conrad* (Phine Jordan ed.), p. 119 (my emphasis).
\(^{54}\) In his preface to *A Personal Record*, Conrad had written that, “Those who read me know my conviction that the world, the temporal world, rests on a very few simple ideas; so simple that they must be as old as the hills. It rests notably, among others, on the idea of Fidelity.” Quoted by Walter Allen in *The English Novel: A Short Critical History* (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1978), p. 304. For a longer discussion of this theme in *Lord Jim*, see Douglas Hewitt’s “Lord Jim: Conrad and the ‘Few Simple Notions’”, in *Conrad: A Collection of Critical Essays*, pp. 55-62.
"Fear is sure to come. Abominable funk (un trac épouvantable). And even for those who do not believe this truth there is fear all the same—the fear of themselves."\(^5\)

Just as it is not as ‘a European’, ‘a white man’, or even as a ship’s captain, that Falk recalls and recoils from his own cannibalism; not as ‘a European’ or ‘white man’ that Kurtz describes the “horror” that is himself; Jim jumps not as a bad sailor, a fallen hero or failed colonialist, but as the man who jumps. In other words, Jim is brought before, and delivered over to himself in the unconcealment (as alethesia) of what he in fact is. This unconcealment, as the “presencing” (anwesen) of himself before himself, can thus be seen to constitute the unequivocal bankruptcy of those codes and laws of caste, race, craft and creed which are presumed to define him. The fiction of an ontologised understanding of one’s race, caste, craft and creed is laid bare; and this is the crucial point, for is he not still, a ‘white man’? A ‘colonialist’? Of course he is. But in leaping it becomes clear that these things do not determine his Being.\(^8\)

In trying to make sense of what he is, or rather, make sense of the fact that he is what he is, Jim strives to preserve the “strange illusion” that had appeased his doubts following an earlier mistake while training to be an officer. The illusion that:

...he had not acted but had suffered himself to be handled by the infernal powers who had selected him for the victim of their practical joke.\(^3\)

And this is the logic of Jim’s flight from self; the logic which defers responsibility and agency,\(^6\) and corresponds with Marlow’s earlier point that:

[There appears on the face of facts a sinister violence of intention—that indefinable something which forces it upon the mind and the heart of a man, that this complication of accidents or these elemental furies are coming at him with a purpose of malice, with a strength beyond control, with an unbridled cruelty that means to tear out of him his hope and his fear...\(^6\)

---

\(^5\) ibid., p. 114.
\(^6\) And as such, it is perhaps interesting to consider Jim’s leap within the context of those “culturally unassimilable words and scenes of nonsense” which Homi Bhabha identifies in his essay ‘Articulating the Archaic’; for Bhabha “the Horror, the Horror [in Heart of Darkness], the owl’s death call [in Nostromo], and] the Marabar Caves [in A Passage to India]...suture the colonial text in a hybrid time and truth that survives and subverts the generalizations of literature and history”. ‘Articulating the Archaic’, in Peter Collier and Helga Geyer-Ryan (eds.), Literary Theory Today (Cornell University press: Ithaca, 1990), p. 208.
\(^8\) ibid., p. 114.
\(^8\) “[A]s a threatened man may look fearfully at his own face in the glass, formulating to himself reassuring excuses for his appearance marked by the taint of some insidious hereditary disease.” Conrad, Under Western Eyes (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1966), p. 181.
\(^1\) Conrad, Lord Jim, 9, p. 86.
In contrast then, to the alienation of man as irrelevant in the face of "the immense indifference of things," here we encounter the alienation of man, as victim, in the face of what appears to be a "sinister violence of intention". As we saw in the previous chapter, this attribution of moods and intents to nature is founded in the fact that Dasein is fundamentally constituted in such a way to be susceptible to them, both in itself, and in the essential structures of its intentional comportments in the world. But while this sense of persecution is an important characteristic of Jim's early self-examination, it does not mean that we can, like John McClure, straightforwardly conclude that Jim is henceforth and unproblematically in a state of childish denial regarding his leap. For as Marlow says, it is precisely Jim's refusal to avoid, deflect or "minimize its importance", that marks him out:

"I don't want to excuse myself; but I would like to explain — I would like somebody to understand — somebody — one person at least!"

Why is it important for one person to understand? And understand what? His jump? Himself? Or himself jumping? Certainly we cannot fault Marlow in his efforts to get to the root of the matter, but as he says:

He was not — if I may say so — clear to me. He was not clear. And there is a suspicion he was not clear to himself either.

Jim's attempts to explain himself and Marlow's commentary upon him are, however, only two perspectives in a book which is both structured around and necessarily complicated by the hypotheses and speculations of a host of secondary characters. As Parry rightly observes:

Through the perceptions of other protagonists who act as his judges or confessors, his motives and actions are expounded from a spectrum of subjective positions on matters of theory and belief, so that what Jim is, and the fiction is concerned to present him as an enigma to be decoded through the exercise of an innovatory system of analysis, is not the same as how he is seen.

But, in her concluding remark that "it is how he is seen that is of significance" — an observation which facilitates her own emphasis upon what she sees as Jim's "outward image as

---

64 McClure explains that his main focus will be upon "Jim's stubborn cultivation of his Jim-myth" and on the disastrous results of this husbandry (Kipling and Conrad, p. 121).
65 *Lord Jim*, 7, p. 67.
66 ibid., 7, p. 66.
67 ibid., 16, p. 136.
68 Parry, *Conrad and Imperialism*, pp. 77-78.
69 ibid.
the very model of colonial manhood” — Parry nonetheless misses the mark. For as Conrad famously explains in his “artistic manifesto”, the Preface to The Nigger of the Narcissus, his primary intention is to “reach the secret spring of responsive emotions”:

To snatch in a moment of courage, from the remorseless rush of time, a passing phase of life...to show its vibration, its colour, its form; and through its movement, its form, and its colour, reveal the substance of its truth — disclose its inspiring secret: the stress and passion within the core of each convincing moment.

In addition, when discussing Falk in his Author’s Note to Typhoon and Other Stories, Conrad maintains; “I insist not on the events but on the effect upon the persons in the tale”. And reading these extracts together, the crucial point to emerge is, that for Conrad, the faithful depiction of the moment and its effect upon those concerned takes centre stage. In Lord Jim and Falk, it is the effect of Jim’s leap upon Jim and Falk’s cannibalism upon Falk that is of importance to Conrad. Or as Edward Crankshaw has argued, in Lord Jim Conrad’s main concern is with “rendering a complete personality in relation to his environment”. The secondary opinions and effects upon the narrators of both tales, are thus always secondary to Conrad’s main artistic objective; to disclose “the stress and passion within the core of each convincing moment”. Hence, it is not what Jim seems that is of concern or significance to those like Marlow, Stein, Brierly, the French Lieutenant and even Jewel in their discussions of him; it is what Jim is. At the same time, “what Jim is” is paradoxically that which must always elude them in their “idle talk” about codes of honour, moral precepts and love. It is an elusiveness which functions, in formal terms, in precisely the same way as that quest for a “focus for authority” that Douglas Brown has identified as the fundamental structural dynamic in Nostromo.25

20
Despite Parry's notion of "an innovatory system of analysis" the enigma that is Jim is never "decoded" by the characters in the book. And I would argue that this is chiefly due to the fact that the inauthentic understanding and interpretation of the "they-self" in "idle talk" which is employed by these characters in their attempts to make sense of Jim, is precisely that which is cast away in the moment and fact of Jim's leaping. The moment when "the few simple notions" collapse and "in the light of day the inner worth of a man, the edge of his temper...the fibre of his stuff...and the secret truth of his pretences" is laid bare to "himself"; to himself, and not, as Marlow would mistakenly have us believe, "to others". For, as the story progresses it becomes increasingly apparent that Jim's "secret truth" remains a mystery to Marlow:

It seemed to me I was being made to comprehend the inconceivable—and I know of nothing to compare with the discomfort of such a sensation. I was made to look at the convention that lurks in all truth and on the essential sincerity of falsehood.

He is, as Douglas Hewitt puts it, plainly "muddled" and this confusion is expressed in his "vague and rather pretentious playing with abstractions", which, Hewitt rightly says, "give across the impression rather of a man who is ruminating to obscure the issue rather than one thinking to clarify it".

But what clarification is possible about Jim? What can be known about Jim and his cowardice; about Jim and his heroism? What judgement would be appropriate; and on what grounds? As Parry observes; the famous leaps—the first from the Patna and the second from the Rajah's compound in Patusan—defy conventional classification, "cowardice does not adequately describe the one", she says, "nor courage the other". Indeed, as I have shown above in my examination of the heroic "demand" (p. 192), it is not a case of saying, like André Maurois, that "Jim ought not to have jumped into the boat". For as Marlow maintains, "These were issues beyond the competency of a court of enquiry"; in other words, they were beyond the purview of right and wrong, truth and falsehood. And this indeterminacy can ultimately be seen to stem

---

79 ibid., 8, p. 75.
81 Parry, *Conrad and Imperialism*, p. 80.
84 As Patrick Brantlinger has observed in his reading of *Heart of Darkness*, Conrad "establishes as one of his themes the problem of rendering any judgement whatsoever - moral, political, metaphysical - about Marlow's narrative" (*Rule of Darkness*, p.264).
from the fact that while, as Crankshaw has astutely observed, *Lord Jim* "certainly has to do with the problem of honour":

[It is not so much a thesis on the theme of honour as a fantasia. And this fact kills it as a didactic essay while making it as a work of art...[For] in spite of the golden opportunity at hand for improving the hour with an allegorical exposition of his moral views he [Conrad] is here, as usual, engaged in rendering, not preaching.]

This is the crucial point that is missed by critics like Parry, and others, in their search for, a neatly coherent and monological didactic; a search which fails to recognise or accept both the inscrutability of Jim himself and that which Crankshaw calls Conrad’s "personal restraint". For example, in her reading of Marlow’s habitual refrain, “he was one of us”, as a strictly geographical and racial identification, Parry maintains that Conrad

...recovers the idea of a moral consensus and locates this as immanent in the idea of the eternal nation, where a continuing tradition embodied in unchanging mores commanding fidelity to agreed purposes is binding on all classes and through the ages.

But, it is precisely this “tradition” which is so emphatically exposed as bogus in Jim’s leap; precisely this exposure which so unhinges Marlow’s conventional thinking (his “redeeming idea”); it precipitates the moral confusion which he never tires of articulating. In her single-minded determination to draw Jim, Marlow and Conrad into a realm of artificially inflated colonial meaningfulness, Parry nonetheless insists that he is

...concerned to prove is how Jim’s fidelity to imperialism’s saving ideals establishes him, despite his defection, as “one of us”...[And that] by hailing Jim’s triumph in bringing peace and prosperity to Patusan as evidence of the white man’s energy, enterprise and ingenuity, he represents Jim as heir to the tradition of colonial chivalry.

Is this an adequate assessment of the complexity of Marlow’s concern for, and depiction of, Jim? Can these things be legitimately detached from the confusion and advanced as the

---

97 ibid., p. 54. Crankshaw goes on, “It is plain enough that Jim has fallen. The task of the artist is to show you the man and his fall, not to measure heights and depths” (ibid.).
98 “[H]e came from the right place; he was one of us. He stood there for all the parentage of his kind, for men and women by no means clever or amusing, but whose very existence is based upon honest faith, and upon the instinct of courage...” (*Lord Jim*, 5, p. 38).
99 Parry, *Conrad and Imperialism*, p. 88. On the opposition between home (as the parsonage) and abroad (as Patusan) in *Lord Jim*, see also, Rosemary Marangoly George’s *The politics of home: Postcolonial relocations and twentieth-century fiction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 80-83. See also, Dawson’s assertion that “If adventure and domestic narratives are seen, not just as simple narratives, but as dynamically inter-related through the splitting of cultural imaginaries, then the domestic imaginary may be read as adventure’s political unconscious, and the adventure quest as a strategy of containment for underlying anxieties and contradictions” (*Soldier Heroes*, p. 76); and, Daniel Bivon’s *Desire and contradiction: Imperial visions and domestic debates in Victorian literature.*
100 Parry, *Conrad and Imperialism*, pp. 89-90.
dominant factor? And, following the previous extract, is Parry covertly suggesting that this reflects some conscious or subconscious intention or complicity on Conrad's part? These questions must be set alongside the fact that Parry's analysis effectively stops short with Jim's attainment of the nation's "colonial dream"; and, set alongside the fact that Parry can be seen to avoid the difficult repercussions which his final fall from grace must have upon the coherence and validity of her general argument. For example, can Marlow's flamboyant description of Jim's ethnic superiority and colonial prowess be detached from his description of the disaster which follows in the wake of his solidarity with Brown? And what part is Gentleman Brown supposed to play in the "colonial dream"? How does he impact upon the "saving ideals of imperialism"?

Far from sidestepping the issues which arise in the wake of Jim's acquiescence to Brown, John McClure argues that this acquiescence can be understood in terms of Octave Mannoni's theory that "the colonial" seeks financial and psychological satisfactions:

Jim's great need is for some confirmation of his sense of power and superiority. To attain it he must rob the Patusan community of some of its most precious resources.\(^3\)

And while McClure acknowledges that the "test" that begins with Brown's appearance

...reveals the failure of Jim's resistance, the unconscious hypocrisy of his pretences, and the fundamental unsoundness of the colonial society he has established...\(^2\)

he is at a loss to explain the rationale behind Jim's decision to offer himself up to his colonial dependents for execution at the end; at a loss to explain why Jim walks calmly to the death which had so terrified him when standing on the deck of the Patna. Instead, Mannoni's social psychology is deftly laid aside and the laboriousness of the grief-stricken, and heirless, Doramin is read as "epitomizing Conrad's view of colonial rebellions in general".\(^5\)

In contrast to both of these readings, I would argue that the disaster at the end of \emph{Lord Jim} fundamentally exposes the spuriousness and fragility of the ideas and conventions upon which such readings depend. In other words, Jim's naive belief in Brown, and Brown's betrayal of him, is yet further evidence that the sham logic of civic virtue underlying Razumov's "act of conscience" in \emph{Under Western Eyes},\(^4\) the self-assured arguments and ideals of "idle talk", and

\(^2\) ibid, p. 126.
\(^3\) ibid, p. 130.
\(^4\) Conrad, \emph{Under Western Eyes}, p. 39.
the quasi-ontological understanding of racial excellence in particular, must ultimately fail to account for the way we are.

Parry and McClure’s insistence that something like a colonially specific and coherent meaning is securable in *Lord Jim*, and their analysis of that meaning within a set of appropriately specific interpretational horizons and thematic fields, is thus fractured by the radical instability of this meaning within the text itself. That instability becomes yet more pronounced when we examine, perhaps the most significant factor upon which Parry and McClure’s readings depend, namely Marlow’s repeated insistence that Jim “was one of us”.

That this recurring phrase must be understood as a racially, politically and nationally defined articulation of solidarity would appear indisputable. After all, Marlow is addressing his tale to a ‘white’ ‘European’ audience (on a veranda after dinner), and in one particular instance, specifically differentiates between Jim as “one of us” and Dain Waris as one of “them”. But again, it is, as I have argued, precisely this notion of an ontically defined communality and fidelity that is paradoxically undermined by the actions and persons described in the book. As such, I would argue that the phrase itself becomes the noose with which Marlow’s concept of solidarity slowly hangs itself. More accurately, as the story progresses, it becomes both more paranoid and more ambiguous. That which begins as an explicit affirmation and clarification is that which simultaneously, and increasingly, serves to highlight and stage the fundamental precariousness of both affirmation and clarification. Taken literally, it must either drag Marlow and his listeners down to the level of Jim’s ignominy, or artificially cover up that ignominy by drawing Jim into the fold.

In another context, I would suggest that Marlow’s continued insistence that Jim “was one of us” can be seen to signify and request a more essential identification on the part of his listeners and readers. This is because the phrase is vague enough to mask its intended, and radically malfunctioning, meaning. It can, simultaneously, be seen to ‘challenge forth’ and announce a potential identification with Jim on the level of the Being that is “us”, and that we ourselves are. So, while on the one hand, the phrase precariously points to the ambivalent solidarity of the ontical in “idle talk” (as ‘white’); on the other, it points towards the more fundamental solidarity of the ontological (as Dasein). If we can allow the luxury of an analogy, this dual significance is reflected in Marlow’s description of how Jim “appealed to all sides at once”:

95 “Beloved, trusted, and admired as he was, he was still one of them, while Jim was one of us” (*Lord Jim*, 39, p. 272.)
...to the side turned perpetually to the light of day, and to that side of us which, like the other hemisphere of the moon, exists stealthily in perpetual darkness, with only a fearful ashy light falling at times on the edge.  

This means then, that he appeals to a specific strain of the Being of everyday inauthenticity, and, at the same time, to the universal Being of fearful authenticity. It is upon the plane of correspondence that is constituted by the latter identification, and in the latter appeal, that we are potentially confronted by the hypothetical question, what would you have done? Not just as a ‘white man’, or as ‘a European’, or as ‘a colonial’, but as the Being that we ourselves are. The Being which emerges in Marlow’s conversation with Stein, when he says “the question is not how to get cured, but how to live,” and Stein responds, “That is the question....How to be! Ach! How to be”. More importantly, this is the Being which underpins Conrad’s own artistic emphasis upon the “spring of responsive emotions”; those responsive emotions which are directly solicited in Marlow’s question:

Which one of us here has not observed this, or maybe experienced something of that feeling in his own person – this extreme weariness of emotions, the vanity of effort, the yearning for rest? For if Jim is only “one of us”, as ‘a white man’, ‘a European’ and ‘a colonial’, must we then be ‘white’, ‘European’ or ‘colonial’ to empathise with this “feeling”, this “yearning for rest”? Certainly not. And so we reach the nub of the matter, that fundamental ambivalence which is signified and paraded in the phrase “he was one of us”. It is the doubly ambivalent significance of the simultaneous selectivity and universality of our potential engagement with the hero – British, colonial or otherwise. The two possible planes of correspondence upon which we can potentially identify with the heroic.

Following my critique of colonial discourse analysis’ assessment of ‘the colonial hero’ and my ontological investigation of the heroic relation, Lord Jim can, at base, be seen to dramatise the fundamentally complex and ambivalent ways in which people encounter themselves and others in the world of their experiences. More importantly, in the inscrutability of Jim himself, and the diversity and inadequacy of all of the various attempts to describe and explain what he is, Conrad captures the essential character of the “kind of Being of everyday Dasein’s understanding and interpreting” — “idle talk”. From Marlow’s metaphysics to Stein’s

---

96 Conrad, Lord Jim, 8, p. 75.
97 ibid., 20, p. 162. For a detailed examination of the analogy which exists here, and more generally, between Lord Jim and Hamlet, see, Chapter Eight of John Batchelor’s “Honour”, “Dream” and “Tragedy”; Hamlet, La Vida Es Sueno and Lord Jim, Lord Jim (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).
98 Conrad, Lord Jim, 7, p. 71.
99 Being and Time, 1.5, p. 211.
romanticism, the inauthentic and uprooted logic of “idle talk” fails to account for Jim and the things he does. And far from being unique, or in some way dependent upon the eccentricity of Jim himself, this failure to reach certainty and consensus reflects the essentially ambiguous nature of the “idle talk” of Dasein in general:

[A]mbiguity [Zweideutigkeit] does not first arise from aiming explicitly at disguise or distortion, and... is not something which the individual Dasein first conjures up. It is already implied in Being with one another, as thrown Being-with-one-another in a world.

Indeed, this failure to reach certainty and consensus by the characters in Lord Jim is fundamentally reflected in the diverse and contradictory range of critical opinions that we have been examining. When considered in terms of the ambiguity of “idle talk”, Stein’s romantic interpretation of Jim, founded as it is in his own romantic inclinations, is thus no different from Parry’s colonial interpretation of Lord Jim, and her colonial concerns; Marlow’s metaphysical endeavours are no different from McClure’s social psychology; Brierly’s outraged professionalism no different from Cornelius’s festering envy or Jesse Conrad’s wifely lack of interest. It is this diverse range of perspective and persuasion, interest and inclination which always already complicates and undermines the “regulated and secured” cultural theories of ‘colonial heroism’ discussed in section one. It is this diversity, and polyphony, which explains the reception and rejection of a Gordon and a Dyer. It is this “idle talk” which reflects and constitutes the ambivalent Being that we ourselves are in our everyday, and which always already disrupts the neatly constructed “cultural imaginaries” and “heroic masculinities” of cultural theory and discourse analysis.

Just as it is

...easy enough to talk of Master Jim, after a good spread, two hundred feet above the sea-level, with a box of decent cigars handy...

I would argue that, by the same measure, it is easy enough to map the “intellectually knowable lines” of human “concern”. “[T]here are men here and there to whom the whole of life is like an

110 Jesse Conrad’s opinion of Lord Jim covers all of half a page in her memoirs and is largely concerned with her role as the copier of her husband’s manuscripts and the worried spectator of his writerly toil. In contrast, her account of a trap accident they had shortly after the book was finished takes up a good three pages, and this imbalance in many ways sums up the nature of her book. See, Joseph Conrad as I Knew Him, pp. 110.
111 Conrad, Lord Jim, 5, p. 32.
after-dinner hour with a cigar"\textsuperscript{109} and their "idle talk" about characters like Lord Jim no doubt bears all the semblance of truth.

\textsuperscript{109} ibid.
CONCLUSION

In this study I have questioned the theory and praxis of colonial discourse analysis and, in particular, the validity of its conception of 'the colonising (white, European, Western) subject'. In so doing, I have focused upon the serious problems which adhere to its theoretical employment in colonial discourse analysis' reading of the fictional coloniser in colonial literature, and the discursively constituted plane of correspondence upon which conclusions are posited on the historical coloniser and colonialism as a whole. In this conclusion, I will summarise the progressive stages of my argument, chapter by chapter, before addressing the broader issues which the study has raised.

Following Martin Heidegger's description of "Enframing" as that mode of "challenging revealing" which characterises the understanding and interpretation of the technological consciousness in the modern age; I have argued that colonial discourse analysis posits both colonial reality and the coloniser as the "structured image" (GeBild). In Chapter One, I have explored how, in the course of colonial discourse analysis' drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality, the historical (and fictional) coloniser as the 'discursive subject' of colonial discourse, is homogenised, un-worlded and de-humanised; and how colonial reality, as the discursively constituted 'house' of the 'discursive subject', is "Enframed" in such a way as to facilitate and corroborate that functionality.

As a result, and in order for this "Enframed" reality and 'subject' to comply with the theoretical criterion of this "objective sphere" as discourse, I have explained how, on the one hand, the ontological factors of Dasein's existence (e.g. death and time) are onticalised and posited as being somehow ontically determinable; and on the other, how the ontical factors of Dasein's existence (e.g. its race and nationality) are ontologised and posited as being universally generalisable. This ontologisation of the ontical and onticalisation of the ontological constitutes the 'regulation and securement' of colonial reality and the coloniser, as the "standing reserve", as well as the 'gathering' of that "standing reserve" into a theoretical system of artificially prioritised ontical (colonial, national or racial) meaningfulness.

When understood within the context of colonial discourse analysis' interpretation of colonial literature, this "Enframing" drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality can, more specifically, be seen to result in the establishment of a discursively constituted plane of correspondence: a plane of correspondence upon which the fictional and historical coloniser and fiction and history themselves, are interpreted and understood in relation to one another within a discursively constituted field of equivalence. It is this discursively constituted plane of
correspondence, with its homogenised, un-worlded and dehumanised ‘colonising subject’, which to the most important question in the context of this study; namely, whether or not the “view of man” which is advanced in colonial discourse analysis is in fact an “essential one”?  

Heidegger’s stipulation that

The more appropriately the Being of the entities to be explored is understood under the guidance of an understanding of Being...all the more secure will be the perspective for one’s methodological inquiry...

reveals how an alternative plane of correspondence can be established in the examination and interpretation of the fictional coloniser and historical coloniser, colonial literature and colonial reality. A plane of correspondence which is constituted in terms of an understanding of “the Being of the entities to be explored”. In contrast to the artificially homogenised, un-worlded and de-humanised theoretical construct of “the colonising subject” that is advanced in colonial discourse analysis, I have explained, that my adoption of an ontologically grounded conception of the historical coloniser constitutes a “return to the things themselves”, and the clearing of dogma and system.

In Chapter Two, I have summarised some of the fundamental aspects of that Being, as described by Martin Heidegger in his existential-ontological analytic of Dasein. This summary has the double significance of, on the one hand, more fully drawing the problems of colonial discourse analysis’ conception of the “colonising subject” into focus, for example, its ontologisation of the ontical in terms of the “ontological difference”; and on the other, clarifying the ontological criteria of my subsequent investigation of fictional characters like Terence Mulvaney, Lord Jim, Alan Quatermain and Harry Faversham; and not just the fictional colonisers, but explorers, soldiers, civilians, authors and their reading public as well.

Accompanying this redefined understanding of the coloniser as Dasein is a redefined understanding of discourse as “idle talk”. As I demonstrated in Chapter Three, for Heidegger, “The “they” prescribes one’s state-of-mind, and determines what and how one “sees”; and it does this in, among other things, “idle talk”. But, unlike the unsatisfactorily absolutist (Said) or ambivalent (Bhabha) theorisation of this “prescription” as discourse – a theorisation which precipitates the expediential “Enframing” of Dasein as the ‘discursive subject’ - Heidegger’s description of “idle talk”, founded as it is, in the ontological nature of Dasein itself, recognises

---

2 *Being and Time*, II.4, p. 413.
3 *Being and Time*, I.5, p. 213.
the fundamental arbitrariness of this ‘prescription’ and ‘determination’, in that it is concerned with, and expressive of, beings, that is, the ontical. What this means is that this redefinition can be seen to account for the blindest of blind spots in colonial discourse analysis; the possibility of individual (and collective) compliance and dissent in the face of that which is called discourse or hegemony, ideology or propaganda: a possible dissent and compliance which is necessarily founded in the varietasness of Dasein’s ontical “concern”.

In response to the un-worlding of the coloniser in colonial discourse analysis, and the theoretical transferral of that coloniser from the world of its experiences to an artificially restricted realm of colonial meaningfulness, I have (in Chapter Four) focused upon the theme of death in the life and work of Rudyard Kipling. As both a crucially significant environmental factor in the everyday and as the fundamental temporal orientation (“Being towards death”) of Dasein’s own “Being-in-the-world”, I have argued that death can be seen to constitute the ever present existential horizon against which the characters in so much of Kipling’s Anglo-Indian fiction are set. The existential horizon which brings these characters before themselves and their own “Being-in-the-world” as a “Being towards death”; the horizon before which, in “idle talk”, Kipling sings of the noble self-sacrifice of the Anglo-Indian civil servant; and, the fundamental existential horizon in terms of which, work, companionship and duty take on an unparalleled, if not altogether decisive, significance.

But more than anything, as evidenced by Morrowbie Jukes and Gadsby, Jack Pansay and Kipling, it is before death and in the awareness of one’s own “Being towards death” that the ‘prescriptions’ and ‘determinations’ of the “they”, the ‘everyday’ trappings of, for example, the ‘imperial’, ‘white’, ‘English’, ‘colonising’ “they-self”, can fall away. And, despite the fact that this falling away is neither guaranteed, nor necessarily irreversible – given Dasein’s oscillation between its inauthentic and authentic modes of Being – I have shown that, in the episodes in question, the fact of this falling away can be seen to problematize the conceptually restricted (“regulated and secured”) interpretations of the coloniser in colonial discourse analysis and, what is more, its colonially-prioritised readings of Kipling’s Anglo-Indian fiction.

Continuing in this vein, I have examined, in Chapter Five, the ways in which the moods and experiences of fictional colonisers in colonial literature can be understood to reflect those basic ontological states-of-mind which disclose the world to Dasein and delivers Dasein over to its

4 “Death does not just “belong” to one’s own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death lays claim to it as an individual Dasein... This individualising is a way in which the “there” is disclosed for existence” (Being and Time, II.1, p. 305).
Being, as where, how, what and that, it is.\(^5\) More specifically, and in contrast to the "Enframed" and artificially onticalised moods of colonial discourse analysis, I have argued that these ontological "states-of-mind" must be recognised as the only legitimately generalisable psychic phenomena in the colonial context. As such, the depiction of anxiety and boredom, uncanniness, loneliness and fear, in colonial literature, can be seen to constitute a fundamentally important, and ontologically grounded, plane of correspondence upon which the reader can potentially relate to the experiences of the fictional and, as we saw with Kipling, Parks and Havelock, the historical character.

Drawing together the arguments raised in Chapters One to Five, I have examined, in Chapter Six, the ways in which a cultural and historical phenomenon like colonial heroism can be understood and interpreted if considered in relation to the existential-ontological constitution of the author, the reader, and most importantly, the hero, as Dasein. In so doing, I have concluded that when we speculate upon the "circulation" of the historical hero as icon in society, we must do so under the guidance of an understanding of the beings that the historical hero and the public (readers, watchers or listeners) fundamentally are.

I also emphasised the importance of resisting the temptation to "Enframe" the human participants involved in the phenomenon of colonial heroism within the homogenising, un-worlding and de-humanising theoretical systems of colonial discourse. An "Enframing" which, as we saw with Laura Chrisman’s treatment of H. Rider Haggard, posits and interprets these constituents solely in terms of the role that they are understood to play within that system. The validity of the various cultural, social and socio-psychological characteristics which are extrapolated from this systematisation of heroism is thus, I have argued, entirely and necessarily compromised by the distortions upon which that system is based. This is a crucial point: for if we recall the always already ambivalent character of Dasein’s engagement with "idle talk", as that which "prescribes one’s state-of-mind, and determines what and how one “sees”", then we must recognise the fundamentally ambivalent and fickle nature of the public’s engagement with the fictional and historical colonial hero: a fickleness and ambivalence that is founded in the inherent variousness of Dasein’s ontical “concern” (Besorgen).

In the light of Heidegger’s phenomenological description of Dasein’s engagement with the world in the “confrontation” (polemos) or “struggle” (Kampf) of its intentional relations, I have suggested that the fundamental characteristic they can all be seen to exhibit is their capacity to “demand” (Zumutung) that which is subsequently understood in “idle talk” as an heroic, or non-

\(^5\) See, Being and Time, I.5, p. 173.
heroic, response. Under the guidance of this phenomenological understanding of the fundamental ambivalence of the heroic act, I then proceeded to examine the various levels upon which the colonial hero and its experiences are absorbed into, understood, celebrated and/or neglected by the public at home. In so doing, I again emphasised that, the nature of the hero’s circulation in society as a public icon is dependent upon the ontologically constituted arbitrariness of that public’s ontical (political, national, regional) “concern”. At the same time, I argued that, there exists the possibility of a more fundamental identification on the part of that public: an identification which now “demands” from them an empathy: an answer as to whether they too are the sort of person who would be capable of such a triumph. It is a “demand” which is carried in the narrative of the hero’s heroism, and which can be seen to constitute an essential horizon of meaning before which the interpretation of heroism is potentially conducted.

And, it is the interpretation of heroism in the public and critical realm which informed my analysis of Conrad’s Lord Jim. For, in addition to my examination of the crucial ways in which Jim can be understood to have been delivered over to himself as the being that he himself is, I have argued that this delivery can be understood as a crisis of those heroic conventions, racial myths and professional codes which were meant to define who and what he is, and how he is supposed to act. As a result, the plethora of different perspectives on Jim, which are provided by the other characters in the book, and which are constituted almost entirely in terms of those same conventions, myths and codes, are simply incapable of accounting for who and what he is. In addition, I have concluded that Marlow’s repeated insistence that, Jim was “one of us”, can be understood within the context of that plane of correspondence which is constituted in terms the Being that we ourselves are, in conjunction with the plane which is constituted in terms of the ontical specificity of Jim’s professional, racial or national character.

Moreover, as a fictional account of one hero’s/coward’s ‘circulation’ in society through “idle talk”, Lord Jim can be seen to dramatise the fundamentally complicated co-existence of these two potential planes of correspondence and identification: in other words, it dramatises the essential confusion and the lack of anything like a coherent consensus which must come in the wake of those potential correspondences. A confusion and lack of consensus which is, I conclude, perfectly reflected in an equally broad range of critical opinion which has followed the book and which is, in itself, symptomatic of the fundamental diversity of Dasein’s ontical “concern”.

The most important question which requires to be addressed in the wake of this study is, whether or not this ontologically grounded interpretation of the fictional and historical coloniser constitutes an elision of the material history of colonial injustice. Or, does the argument that, the
historical coloniser is always already ontologically constituted as a "being in Time", and my focus upon its inauthentic and authentic modes of "Being-in-the-world", constitute the issuing of an ontological 'get-out-of-jail-free' card.

In response I would insist that none of the arguments advanced in this study deny the fact of the 1859 Indian Mutiny/Rebellion reprisals, or the fact of the massacre at Amritsar; nor can an ontological focus be read as an effacement of the barbarity and inhumanity of the slave trade, the genocide of the Aborigines in Australia, the ruthless economic exploitation of the colonial era, nor the problems that on-going Western exploitation causes in former colonies. Rather, it examines the problems which attend the theoretical positing of a 'colonising' (and 'colonised'), 'white' (and 'black') 'European' (and 'African') 'discursive subject' in the interpretation and understanding of these things.

But then again, how can this interpretation of the fictional depiction of, for example, anxiety, as the individualisation of Dasein in Time, help us understand the effects of colonialism in real terms? It might be asked, is this individualisation merely the product of an elaborate philosophical hair-splitting, and therefore only of tokenistic significance? Indeed, could it not be argued that in focusing upon the coloniser's ontological "potentiality-for-Being-itself", we are simultaneously "covering up" (verdecken) and eliding the fact that the majority did, historically, hold certain views and engage in certain activities?

The existence of the views and activities of the majority is not in question. What is being questioned is the validity of the post-structuralist, deconstructionist and psychoanalytical theorisation of this majority and its opinions. Pointing this out does not deny the existence of that majority, the consequences of its activities or the opinions it held. What it does deny is the artificial ontologisation of this majority as a national, racial or political collective, and the theorisation of its opinions as discourse. This interpretation draws attention to colonial discourse analysis' inability to account for the existence (and the possibility) of dissent within 'white', 'Western' colonial society, the fact of collaboration and exploitation within 'black', 'Eastern' colonised society; and the diversely competing loyalties, factors and dynamics which exist in each society in relation to sexual, regional, class, religious and racial differences. And it does this without reverting to theoretical subterfuges of 'counter-discourse' and the psychoanalytical contortionism of, for example, Bhabha's notions of "hybridity" and "mimicry".

It is only when we suspend the drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality, and the artificial ontologisation of the ontical, in our attempt to make sense of these things, and adopt instead, an understanding of the ideas and opinions of the majority as "idle talk", that
these exceptions and diversities can be accounted for and explained. The cost of this suspension and adoption can perhaps, most liberally be defined, as the rejection of broad-gauged judgements.

Saying this, it is nonetheless crucial for us to be clear as to why the suspension of these theoretical practises and the issuing of these broad-gauged judgements — from Said’s and Bhabha’s “Enframing” of colonial reality to Sullivan and Suleri’s drive towards the establishment of discursive functionality in their reading of colonial literature — is of such importance. It is because these judgements, this “Enframing” and these readings presuppose and involve the “Enframing” of our own reality and we ourselves: the ‘white European neo-colonial’; the ‘white post-colonial settler’, or the ‘African, Indian, West Indian postcolonial’: those who are academics and those who are not. It is because the ordering and regulation of reality along discursive lines turns us and our reality into the “standing reserve”; and we ourselves become the homogenised, un-worlded and de-humanised inhabitants of a reality that has become discourse. In the process, we ourselves are accorded our role as victims, collaborators, spectators, inheritors and agitators.

What I have engaged with in this study is the shortfall between reality and theory, between “what is” and “what applies”; a shortfall which stems from the quasi-scientific conceit of a series of methodologies which are not only illustrative of that which Heidegger calls “a no longer customary modesty”, but which are founded in and evince the belief that

...nature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and that it remains orderable as a system of information.

In other words, methodologies which, in their refusal to accept the fundamental ambivalence of nature, the variousness of Dasein’s ontical “concern” and “the essentially unformulatable logic of life”, are indicative of that mode of “challenging revealing” which characterises the “technological consciousness”. Methodologies which enact a “challenging revealing” and, in tracing “the intellectually knowable lines” of what is “thought, said, or even done”, satisfy that which Heidegger calls, “the demands of common speech in usual communication”, wherein no time is lost “tarrying over the sense of individual words”. Words which combine in cultural theory in formulations like ‘the colonising subject’ and “the colonising imagination”: formulations in which

---

8 Phillips, Darwin’s Worms, p. 82.
...everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering.\textsuperscript{11}
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Martin Heidegger

Primary Texts


Secondary Texts

Ballard, Bruce W., The Role of Mood in Heidegger's Ontology (Lanham: University Press of America, 1990)


Primary Material


Buchan, John, *The Half-hearted* (1900) (Bath: Cedric Chivers Ltd., 1975)


- *Allan Quatermain* (1887) (Ware: Wordsworth Editions Ltd., 1994)


- *Cleopatra, Being an Account of the Fall & Vengeance of Harmachis* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1889)
- Eric Brighteyes (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1890)
- Nada the Lily (1892) (London: Macdonald & Co. Ltd., 1963)
- Andrew Lang, The World's Desire (Longmans, Green, & Co., 1894)
- Child of Storm (1912) (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1921)
- Smith & the Pharaohs & Other Tales (1912-13) (Bristol: Arrowsmith, 1920)
- When the World Shook (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1919)
- She and Allan (1920) (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1921)
- The Ancient Allan (London: Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1920)


- Wee Willie Winkie and Other Stories (1888) (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1923)
- The Man Who Would Be King and Other Stories (1889) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)
- Life's Handicap (1891) (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1925)
- Soldiers Three (1895) (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1964)
- From Sea to Sea (1899), vol. 1, (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd, 1922)
- Traffics and Discoveries (1904) (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1987)
- A Diversity of Creatures (1917) (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd, 1922)


Mason, A. E. W., The Four Feathers, (London: John Murray, 1902)

- The Broken Road, (London: John Murray, 1926)


Orwell, George, Burmese Days (1934) (London: Secker & Warburg, 1949)

- Inside the Whale and Other Essays (1957) (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1964)


Sterne, Laurence, A Sentimental Journey through France and Italy (1768) (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1978)


Thompson, James, The City of Dreadful Night and Other Poems (London: P.J. & A.E. Dobell, 1922)


Wren, P.C., Beau Geste (London: John Murray, 1929)
Secondary Material


Barker, Francis, Hulme, Peter, Iversen, Margaret and Loxley, Diana, eds., *Europe and Its Others*, 2 vols. (Colchester: University of Essex, 1985)
Barker, Francis, Hulme, Peter and Iversen, Margaret, eds., Colonial discourse/postcolonial theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994)


Batchelor, John, Lord Jim (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988)


Bewell, Alan, Romanticism and Colonial Disease (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999)

Blabba, Homi K., Forward to Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (London: Pluto Press, 1986)


- The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994)


Bodelsen, C.A., Aspects of Kipling’s Art (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964)


Bongie, Christopher, Exotic Memories: Literature, Colonialism and the Fin de Siècle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991)


Choron, Jacques, *Death and Western Thought* (New York: Collier Books, 1963)


Cooper, Frederick and Stoler, Anne Laura, eds., *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997)


Darian-Smith, Kate, Gunner, Liz and Nuttall, Sarah, eds., *Text, Theory, Space: Land, Literature and History in South Africa and Australia* (London: Routledge, 1996)


Dirks, Nicholas B., Eley, Geoff and Ortner, Sherry B., eds., *Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993)


Donaldson, Laura E., *Decolonizing Feminisms: Race, Gender, and Empire-Building* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992)


Green, Roger Lancelyn, *Kipling and the Children* (London: Elek, 1965)


Hosking, Geoffrey and Schöpflin, George, eds., *Myths and Nationhood* (New York: Routledge, 1997)


Hulme, Peter, *Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean 1492-1797* (London: Methuen, 1986)


Kelly, Christopher 'Rousseau's case for and against heroes', *Polity*, 30, 2 (Winter 1997), pp. 347-367


Klein, Melanie, *Our Adult World and Other Essays* (London: Heinemann, 1963)


Mathews, Basil, *Livingstone the Pathfinder* (1912) (London: Wyman and Sons Ltd., 1928)


McClintock, Anne, ‘The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term “Post-Colonialism”’, *Social Text*, 31/32 (Spring 1992), pp. 1-5

- ‘The Return of Female Fetishism and the Fiction of the Phallus’, *New Formations*, 19 (Spring 1993), pp. 1-22


McClintock, Anne, Mufti, Aamir and Sholat, Ella, eds., *Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial Perspectives* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997)


Gilroy, Paul, ‘There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack’ (London: Hutchinson, 1987)


Midgley, Claire, *Gender and Imperialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998)


Mishra, Vijay and Hodge, Bob, ‘What is Post(-)colonialism?’, *Textual Practice*, 5, 3 (1991), pp. 399-414


- *At the Edge of Psychology: Essays in Politics and Culture* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990)


Prakash, Gyan, 'Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Perspectives from Indian Historiography', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 32, 2 (1990), pp. 383-408

Pratt, Mary Louise, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London: Routledge, 1992)


Richards, Thomas, *The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire* (London: Verso, 1993)


Sharp, Jenny, Allegories of Empire: The Figure of Woman in the Colonial Text (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993)

Shetty, Saadhya, '(Dis)Locating Gender Space and Medical Discourse in Colonial India', Genders, 20 (1994), pp. 188-230


Sinha, Mrinalini, Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth Century (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995)


Steiner, George, Grammars of Creation (London: Faber and Faber, 2001)

Strachey, Lytton, Eminent Victorians (Bungay: The Chaucer Press Ltd., 1967)


- 'Woman Skin Deep: Feminism and the Postcolonial Condition', Critical Inquiry 18, 4 (Summer 1992), pp. 756-69


Tiffin, Chris, and Lawson, Alan, eds., De-Scribing Empire (London: Routledge, 1994)


