



<https://theses.gla.ac.uk/>

Theses Digitisation:

<https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/>

This is a digitised version of the original print thesis.

Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author

A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge

This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given

Enlighten: Theses

<https://theses.gla.ac.uk/>
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk

Duality in the Writing of Thomas Carlyle
and Charles Kingsley

Carol Collins

Ph.D

University of Glasgow

October 1999



ProQuest Number: 10391326

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 10391326

Published by ProQuest LLC (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

GLASGOW
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

11873

(copy 2)

Abstract

Commenting on the view that literary work may pose an easy alternative to running a monastery, Thomas Carlyle, in *Past and Present*, points out that 'literature too is a quarrel, an internecine duel with the whole World of Darkness that lies without and within one'. Crucial to the 'quarrel' within the work of Carlyle and Kingsley is the theme of the dualism of body and soul. For instance, Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus* has as its central character the dualistic Diogenes Teufelsdröckh (meaning 'god-born devil's-dung') and, in *The Saint's Tragedy*, Kingsley, aghast at the rise of asceticism exemplified in the Tractarian movement, deals with a German medieval martyr's conflict between earthly love and religious calling. Like many writers of his time, Kingsley was greatly influenced by Carlyle, and this thesis seeks to remedy the dearth of criticism on Kingsley's debt to Carlyle, and on the dualism within the writing of both, by examining how both men use a rhetoric designed to explore the relationship between the body and soul. As their writing is so deeply concerned with the condition of their society (Carlyle's treatment of social problems appealed to Kingsley who wished to reconnect the church with social concerns), I consider this theme within a cultural context. I maintain that, due to social changes within the nineteenth century, dualistic ideas had a particular resonance for Carlyle and Kingsley, and my reading of their work involves research into such areas as sexuality, religion, science, health, disease and politics. This study is arranged chronologically to show how Kingsley's work developed under the influence of Carlyle, whose career was well-established when Kingsley began to write. In chapter one I provide a contextual background by examining philosophical and religious views of the body and soul and consider dualistic notions within Victorian society. Chapter two examines Carlyle's dualism, providing a context within which to read Kingsley's work. In chapters three, four and five, I then explore the decade 1840-1850 when Carlyle's career was at its zenith and Kingsley began to write. Chapter three considers both writers attitudes to the body and soul in relation to sexuality and marriage. Chapter four looks at their attitudes towards the machine and mechanistic views of man. Chapter five extends this exploration of science to look at how real and figurative disease, and sanitary reform, have implications for the question of whether man is a creation of God or of his environment. Finally, in chapter six, I examine Kingsley's continuing interest in the relationship between body and soul in the 1850s and 1860s, when Carlyle had all but abandoned this concern. I conclude that, although there is an evident similarity in their desires to find a solution to the problem of man's dual nature, Kingsley's project is to produce a unified view of man, while Carlyle recognises the necessary dualism which is inherent in the human condition.




Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter One: Dualisms	12
Chapter Two: 'The Sarcasm of Eternity': Carlyle's Dualism	69
Chapter Three: The Erotic Body and the Ascetic Soul: A Marriage made in Hell?	130
Chapter Four: Man Machine: Reconditioning the Body and Soul Politic	169
Chapter Five: Social Pestilence and Miracle Cures: Divine and Secular Law	202
Chapter Six: 'In the name of Him who is the Word': Kingsley and the Solution of Dualism	265
Conclusion	318
Bibliography	331

Acknowledgements

My thanks go to the Department of English Literature at the University of Glasgow, but especially to Susan Anthony, Susan Castillo, Stuart Gillespie, Andrew Hook, Alice Jenkins, Dorothy Macmillan, David Pascoe, and Nicola Trott who have all provided encouragement and help. I would especially like to thank Richard Cronin, who has supervised my studies for this thesis for the last two years. Douglas Gifford of the Department of Scottish Literature at Glasgow University has also provided encouragement. I have received invaluable help from a number of Carlyleans: Jude Nixon, Margaret Rundle, David Sorensen, D.J. Trela, Mark Cumming and Ian Campbell. I also extend my thanks to the staff of the British Library, the National Library of Scotland, Glasgow University Library and the Carlyle houses both in Ecclefechan and Cheyne Row, Chelsea. On a personal note, I have been greatly encouraged by a number of friends and fellow-postgraduates including Nadia Johnson, Fiona Black, Janice Allen, Fiona Graham, Jane McCauley, Hazel Hynd and Amanda MacLeod. I am enormously grateful to Ralph Jessop who provided me with supervision for the first two years of my research and whose friendship, advice, interest, enthusiasm and expertise have proved invaluable throughout my years of study. Most of all I express my heartfelt thanks to my parents, who have supported me in innumerable ways, to Kirsten, and to my children, Charlotte and Euan.

Introduction

In a letter of January 1842, Thomas Carlyle relates a meeting on the streets of Chelsea:

One thing I must tell you as a small adventure which befell, the day before yesterday. On going out for walking along one of these streets an elderly, innocent, intelligent-looking gentleman accosted me with 'Apologies for introducing himself to Mr. Carlyle whose works &c, &c. He was *the Parish clergyman,*' rector of the Parish of St. Luke's, Chelsea! I replied of course with civility to the worthy man (though shocked to admit that after seven years of parishionership I did not know the face of him). We walked together as far as our roads would coincide, then parted with low bows. I mean to ask about the man (*whose name I do not even know yet!*) And, if the accounts be good, to invite a nearer approximation.¹

The elderly gentleman was the Rev. Charles Kingsley senior. He had accepted the living of Chelsea in 1836 in anticipation of putting his sons through University, and, now, in 1842, his eldest son, Charles Kingsley was preparing to leave Cambridge and enter the Church of England. Whether Carlyle did go on to make further contact with Kingsley senior is not recorded, and it is unlikely that, at this point, there was any physical contact between the writer, whose fame made him a target for the approaches of admiring readers, and the young Charles Kingsley for whom Carlyle's importance was already evident. Later, in the 1840s when Kingsley had begun his career as a novelist, they were to become acquaintances, although not close friends, and it was Carlyle who gave Kingsley an introduction to Chapman and Hall when he was looking for a publisher for *Alton Locke*.² Kingsley made a point of sending Carlyle copies of his books, and Carlyle's responses were always encouraging: 'Your Writings, in the present state of all affairs general and special, give me many emotions for

¹ *The Collected Letters of Thomas and Jane Welsh Carlyle*, ed. Charles R. Sanders, K.J. Fielding, Clyde de L. Ryals et al., 24 vols (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1970-) 14: 9. Hereafter referred to in the text as *CL*.

² See, *Collected Letters*, 25: 36.

you' (CL, 24: 41). Although Carlyle privately confessed to Jane that he thought *Alton Locke* 'worth very little', he wrote to Chapman asserting that he found it 'an article likely to be of benefit to various parties' (CL, 25: 208, 210)

During his period at Cambridge, from 1838-1842, the young Charles Kingsley had experienced the misery of a crisis of faith:

He was then full of religious doubts; and his face, with its unsatisfied, hungry, and at times defiant look, bore witness to the state of his mind. It had a sad longing expression too, which seemed to say that he had all his life been looking for a sympathy he had never yet found -- a rest which he never would attain in this world.³

Kingsley's troubles were not, however, entirely limited to his religious beliefs. Like Carlyle's, Kingsley's formative years at University were marked by self-doubt in his emotional and professional life.

Carlyle had attended Edinburgh University, studying in the Arts faculty, as a prelude to entering Divinity Hall in which he enrolled in 1813. Over six years he was to complete his unsupervised studies and present six annual sermons.⁴ However, by 1817, his religious doubts (Kaplan points out that 'some Ecclefechan neighbours thought that Thomas' "apostasy" or "atheism" caused his mother's breakdown in 1816) and resultant distaste for a career in the Church led to his 'decision not to enroll again in Divinity Hall'; a decision which, at first, he kept from the parents who had destined their son for ordination (Kaplan, 34, 48).⁵ Over the

³ Charles Kingsley, *His Letters and Memories of his Life*, ed. Fanny Kingsley, 2 vols (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1888) I, 26. Hereafter referred to in the text as *LM*.

⁴ Fred Kaplan, *Thomas Carlyle: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 34.

⁵ Kaplan points out that this was a decision by default rather than anything else: 'He arrived to find that Dr. Ritchie was "too busily engaged...quarrelling with his students about the management of the library" and thus "'not at home" when I called to enter myself; - "Good," answered I; "let the omen be fulfilled!"' (p. 48).

following years Carlyle sought for a role in life, tutoring and beginning his writing career. During this period of decision-making, both before he left Divinity Hall and after, Carlyle was also experiencing his first feelings of emotional and sexual desire: 'Affairs of the heart (and of the body) were much on the minds of young Carlyle and his friends' (Kaplan, 35). There were minor flirtations in Edinburgh, such as with the 'vain, affected, empty-headed' Miss Merchant with whom Thomas and his friend Thomas Murray conducted 'a purposefully dangerous game of collaboration and competition designed to provide flirtation without the risk of commitment' (Kaplan, 35). Later, in 1819, a more serious attachment to Margaret Gordon was formed, but came to nothing because of Carlyle's lack of prospects. It has been argued that this episode informed his treatment of romance in 'Wotton Reinfred' and *Sartor Resartus*.⁶ Miss Gordon's rejection was, for Thomas, a confusing experience, at a time when he was unsure of his future. A further unsure, but ultimately successful, courtship with Jane Baillie Welsh (who, like Margaret Gordon, appeared to vassilate between encouragement and rejection of Carlyle) serves to conjure up the portrait of a young man who found it difficult to strike a balance between a passionate, but rather gauche, nature and the conventions of nineteenth-century courtship. Kaplan points out that Gordon was frightened by the 'intimate tone' of letters received even after she had broken off contact with Thomas, while Jane and her mother 'resented the brash appearance of a young man who did not qualify as a suitor and who was too aggressive to be welcomed as a friend' (Kaplan, 58, 80). Carlyle's unhappiness was a conglomeration of all these factors; a loss of faith, uncertainty as to his professional role in life, and a difficulty in managing his emotional attachments. All these anxieties were to emerge in his writing, especially in the semi-autobiographical *Sartor Resartus* (1833-4).⁷ It

⁶ Kaplan, p.58; Ralph Jessop, *Carlyle and Scottish Thought* (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 112; Ian Campbell, *Thomas Carlyle* (Edinburgh: Saltire Society, 1993), p.35.

⁷ *Sartor Resartus* appeared from 1833-4 in *Fraser's Magazine*, and subsequently was published in book form in America in 1836 and London in 1838.

is not hard to see how the example of Carlyle's wrestling with his self-doubts might have provided inspiration for the troubled Kingsley.

Like Carlyle, Kingsley was under some pressure to enter the Church, in his case following his father. Both Carlyle's and Kingsley's fathers had to work hard to provide the money for their sons' educations and, alongside the anxiety of admitting their doubts to their deeply religious families, there was the added pressure of parental expectations. It may have seemed that Charles was always destined for the Church. Fanny Kingsley reveals that, at age four, 'his delight was to make a little pulpit in his nursery, from which, after arranging the chairs for an imaginary congregation, and putting on his pinafore as a surplice, he would deliver addresses of a rather sever tone of theology' (*LM*, 1: 5). However, at University Kingsley became 'cynical about religion in its institutional forms' and considered a career in law.⁸ So unsure was he of his future role, and the possibility of succeeding at University, that 'more than once he had nearly resolved, if his earthly hopes were crushed, to leave Cambridge and go out to the Far West to live as a wild prairie hunter' (*LM*, 28). Carlyle, too, in the depth of despair, had written to his friend Robert Mitchell asking 'what say you to that asylum or rather hiding-place for poverty and discontent, America?' (Kaplan, 55).

By the spring of 1841 Kingsley had eventually decided on a future in the Church. Paradoxically his meeting with his future wife, Fanny Grenfell, in the summer of 1839, provided both the climax to his religious doubts and the 'sympathy' for which he yearned. Kingsley was deeply attracted to Fanny from the first, asserting that the day they met 'was our true wedding day'.⁹ However, Fanny was 'half committed to joining Pusey's community in Park Place', a Protestant movement which embraced asceticism (Chitty, 55). Kingsley himself was troubled by the emergence of the Oxford Movement which he understood

⁸ Brenda Colloms, *Charles Kingsley: The Lion of Eversley* (London: Constable, 1975), p.47; *Letters and Memories*, 1: 34.

⁹ Susan Chitty, *The Beast and the Monk* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1974), p.55.

primarily as one which promulgated asceticism. He may have 'denounced' this threat to 'the most sacred ties' of husband, wife and family, but he was also initially attracted to the Oxford Tracts, as John Maynard has pointed out (*LM*, 1: 27).¹⁰ Charles and Fanny's long courtship (he was thought unsuitable by her family) provided both a resolution to his religious doubts and an opportunity to reconcile his emerging faith with his sexual desires. In the Introduction to his unpublished manuscript, 'The Life of Saint Elizabeth', Kingsley considered the questions arising from the asceticism of 'Popery':

Is human love unholy -- inconsistent with the perfect worship of the Creator? Is marriage less honourable than virginity? Are the duties, the relations, the daily food of man, of earth, or heaven? Is nature a holy type, or a foul prison, to our Spirits?¹¹

The manuscript was written in order to answer these questions: 'The story was to be inscribed on vellum and presented to Fanny on her wedding day as a solemn warning against Puseyite practices' (Chitty, 76).

However, it was more than Fanny's physical attraction which brought him back 'inside the fold' (Chitty, 59). Fanny herself had no religious doubts. She provided the advice and understanding which he felt he lacked: 'Counsel was asked and given, all things in heaven and earth discussed; and as new hopes dawned, the look of hard defiance gave way to a wonderful tenderness' (*LM*, 1: 26). Separated by her family's dislike for Charles, the young couple corresponded, Fanny assuaging his doubts and providing reading which she felt might

¹⁰John Maynard, 'Sexual Christianity: Charles Kingsley's *Via Media* in *Victorian Discourses on Sexuality and Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.88. Kingsley's sexuality and response to the Oxford Movement will be explored in chapter 3.

¹¹'The Life of Saint Elizabeth'. Held in the Kingsley Papers in the British Library Manuscripts Collection, Add. 41296, f. 2-3.

answer his questions and encourage his faith. In 1841, the year Kingsley resolved his doubts, she sent a package containing the works of Thomas Carlyle.

In the introduction to his 'Life of St. Elizabeth', Kingsley acknowledged Carlyle's influence over his thoughts:

Away with those shallow Paleys, & encyclopedists, and
Edinburgh-Reviewers, with their cant about excited imaginations, &
popular delusions, & such sensebound trash! being hollow themselves, they
fancy all things hollow! -- Being sense-bound themselves, they see the
energizing spirit no-where! Was there not a Spiritual truth, of half-truth, or
counterfeit of truth, in those days as in others, the parent of all religion, all
manliness, all womanhood, all work! Many such thoughts Maurice's
writings raised in me, many Thomas Carlyle's.(f.2-3)

Carlyle's writing, then, helped Kingsley assuage some of the religious doubts which were exercising his mind at this crucial period of his life. But Kingsley was also clearly aware of Carlyle's preoccupation with man's spiritual and physical nature, and the emphasis being put on the latter by their society. Kingsley, at this time, was forming the ideas which would pervade his own writing. Dualism, and the questions raised by the problematic relationship between body and soul, would be a central focus of his work and, at this point of formation, as well as the Christian Socialist leader (and friend of Carlyle) F. D. Maurice, Kingsley turned to Carlyle's writing for guidance.

Carlyle's own preoccupation with the dualism of body and soul is evident in the dualistically named hero of *Sartor Resartus*, Diogenes Teufelsdröckh (meaning 'god-born devil's-dung'), the consistently dualistic imagery of that and other works, and in his most overt pronouncement, in the essay 'Characteristics' (1831), on the binary nature of human existence: 'Everywhere there is Dualism, Equipoise; a perpetual contradiction dwells in us'.¹²

¹² *The Works of Thomas Carlyle*, ed. H.D. Traill, Centenary Edition, 30 vols (London: Chapman and Hall, 1896-1899), 28: 27. Unless otherwise stated this edition is used

(*Works*, 28: 27). Kingsley, as we have seen, spoke of the relationship between the spiritual and the physical in his introduction to the unpublished manuscript written for his wife. In *The Saint's Tragedy* (1848), a published version of the same story, Kingsley deals with the German medieval martyr's conflict between earthly love and religious calling. In *Alton Locke*, his social novel of 1849, the eponymous hero asks, 'that there is a duality in us - a lifelong battle between flesh and spirit - we all, alas! know well enough; but which is flesh and which is spirit, what philosophers in these days can tell us?'¹³ His historical novel, *Hypatia* (1853), considers the asceticism of ancient Greek philosophy and the early Church, while *The Water-Babies* (1863) seeks to articulate a reconciliation between the physical and spiritual realms through an evolutionary fantasy. Further, as both Carlyle and Kingsley were deeply concerned with the social problems of their time, their interest in the dualism of body and soul is crucial to the manner in which they suggest that solutions to those problems might be reached.

Little has been written either on Carlyle's influence on Kingsley or, indeed, on either writer's concern with dualism. Although George Eliot claimed famously in 1855 that 'there has hardly been an English book written for the last ten or twelve years that would not have been different if Carlyle had not lived', Carlyle's influence on Victorian novelists has become more of a critical commonplace than a subject for extended criticism, leaving its extent and nature virtually unexplored.¹⁴ Dickens' indebtedness to Carlyle *has* been well-documented by Michael Goldberg and William Oddie, but discussion of the Carlylean influence on novelists has tended to be included in wider studies.¹⁵ Rodger Tarr has given a

throughout this thesis and referred to in the text as *Works*.

¹³ *Alton Locke* (London: Macmillan, 1881), p.5.

¹⁴ *Thomas Carlyle: The Critical Heritage*, ed. Jules Paul Seigel (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), p. 140.

¹⁵ Goldberg, *Carlyle and Dickens* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1972); Oddie, William, *Dickens and Carlyle; the question of influence* (London: Centenary Press, 1972). See, for instance, Kathleen Tillotson's *Novels of the Eighteen-Forties* and Louis Cazamian's

fuller account of individual writers' debts to Carlyle's views on social problems *and* on novel-writing.¹⁶ Further, he includes a chapter on Kingsley, a writer who, in this century, has been unfairly consigned to the edges of the Victorian canon. Like Carlyle, he has been deemed somewhat unfashionable, perhaps because of his moral earnestness and the often over-weening didacticism of his work. Unlike Carlyle, he has also been dismissed as a rather mediocre writer whose typically 'Victorian' nature and engagement with social issues has been considered more interesting than his narrative style. The result has been that there are few books written solely, or even mainly, on Kingsley. Larry Uffelman's *Charles Kingsley* provides commentary on his major works but, being the only study of its kind, is neither adventurous nor advanced in its approach.¹⁷ However, it is an example of literary criticism in a sea of biographical studies and works of religious reverence. Biographical works have, however, consistently acknowledged the Carlylean influence.

Shorter studies, such as journal articles and sections within books with wider concerns, have provided greater insight into Kingsley's work. Rosemary Jackson, Colin Manlove and Stephen Prickett have explored *The Water-Babies* in studies of Victorian or religious fantasy, while Prickett has been one of the few critics to consider the exegetical relationship between Kingsley's writing, primarily in *Hypatia*, and the Bible.¹⁸ Journal articles have explored Kingsley's objection to Tractarianism and his attitudes to sexuality and gender.¹⁹ However, there has been no extended literary criticism of Kingsley which is

The Social Novel in England 1830-1850.

¹⁶ Tarr, 'Carlyle's Influence upon the Mid-Victorian Social Novels of Gaskell, Kingsley and Dickens' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of South Carolina, 1968).

¹⁷ Uffelman, (Boston, MA: Twayne, 1979).

¹⁸ Jackson, *Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion* (London: Methuen, 1981); Manlove, *Christian Fantasy from 1200 to the present* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Prickett, *Victorian Fantasy* (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1979), *Origins of Narrative* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

¹⁹ Oliver S. Buckton, "'An Unnatural State": Gender, "Perversion," and Newman's *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*', *Victorian Studies*, 35 (Summer 1992), pp. 358 - 383; John C. Hawley 'Charles Kingsley and the *Via Media*', *Thought*, 67 (1992), pp.287-301.

centrally concerned with his attitude toward body/soul dualism. John Maynard's 'Sexual Christianity: Charles Kingsley's *Via Media*' does look at his desire to reconcile faith and desire, while Susan Chitty's biography focusses on much the same topic within his life.

The dualistic resonances within Carlyle's writing did not go unrecognised by his contemporary critics. For instance, R. H. Hutton described the interplay between elements of dark and light in Carlyle's style:

Of all our literary artists, he is the greatest of a school, - of Rembrandt we were going to write, - but Rembrandt is too sharp and narrow in his contrasts of light and shade, to suggest the literary effects in which Carlyle most delights. It is not light and shadow merely, but chaos and order, that he loves to paint; not even chaos and order only, but all the great paradoxes of human nature, fiery passions, struggling with stiff conventions, panic and purpose, vague, smouldering discontent, with shrill, confident, punctual precisionism.²⁰

However, Carlyle criticism of this century has tended to focus upon his interest in German Idealism, such as C.F. Harrold's *Carlyle and German Thought*.²¹ Useful as the exploration of Carlyle's interest in German ideas is, more recent criticism has reinvigorated Carlyle studies by considering the ambiguities and uncertainties in his writing. J. Hillis Miller's 'Hieroglyphical Truth' in *Sartor Resartus: Carlyle and the Language of Parable* (1989) considers 'the act of narration[...]as a problematic and uncertain enterprise', while Anne K. Mellor has claimed that Carlyle's theory of language 'anticipates current structuralist

²⁰ 'Carlyle as Painter', in *A Victorian Spectator: Uncollected Writings of R.H. Hutton*, ed. Robert H. Tener and Malcolm Woodfield (Bristol: Bristol Press, 1991), pp.227-230 (p.227). Originally published, following Carlyle's death, in *The Spectator* (March 1881), pp.373-374.

²¹ Other notable studies are Rosemary Ashton's *The German Idea* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), Elizabeth M. Vida's *Romantic Affinities* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), and J.P. Vijn's *Carlyle and Jean Paul* (Amsterdam: John Benjamin's Publishing, 1982). A large number of smaller pieces, such as articles and chapters within books, either deal with the German influence or, at least, take it as the starting point for criticism.

arguments that language has no literal integrity' (1980).²² Some studies have dealt specifically with Carlyle's dualism, such as Tom Lloyd's 'Towards Natural Supernaturalism: Carlyle and Dual Vision, 1823-29' (1986) and Joseph Sigman's "'Diabolico-angelical Indifference": The Imagery of Polarity in *Sartor Resartus*' (1972).²³ The most recent and comprehensive treatment of Carlyle's dualism is Ralph Jessop's *Carlyle and Scottish Thought* (1997).

This thesis will seek to remedy the dearth of criticism that deals with Carlyle's²⁴ influence on Kingsley. In addition, a study of body/soul dualism in the work of both writers will provide the opportunity to reassess both men's writing in the light of a subject which, as I shall explore in the following chapter, has been a central problem of human existence and is especially pertinent to any study of Victorian culture. I shall explore themes within their writing which relate to the status of the body and the soul within their society, looking at the rhetorical strategies they employ to provide some way of relating what often seem to be entirely disparate elements of human existence. Chapter one provides a contextual reading of philosophical and religious views of body and soul, looking at some of the methodologies which have been employed in relating or, indeed, denying the relation between these two elements. Within this chapter, I shall also make a case for claiming that the Victorian age was one which had a peculiarly dualistic resonance. The following chapters, dealing with Carlyle and Kingsley's writing, are arranged chronologically to demonstrate not only how Kingsley's work develops under the influence of Carlyle but also in relation to contemporary ideas and events.

²² Miller's article is in *Victorian Perspectives*, ed. John Clubbe and Jerome Meckier (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 1-20; Mellor's chapter, 'Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus*: A Self-Consuming Artifact' is in her book, *English Romantic Irony* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).

²³ Lloyd, *Philological Quarterly*, 65 (1986), pp. 479-494; Sigman, *Southern Review*, 5 (1972), pp. 207-224.

²⁴ One notable exception is Maria Meyer's *Carlyle's Einfluss auf Kingsley in Sozialpolitischer und religiosethischer Hinsicht* (Weimar: Wagner, 1914).

In chapter two I examine Carlyle's early dualism, predominantly in *Sartor Resartus*, and provide a context for comparing his and Kingsley's work. In the following three chapters, I consider the decade 1840-50 when Kingsley began his career and Carlyle was, arguably, at his zenith. It was during this period that their careers were most closely in contact, with Kingsley taking his social ideas from Carlyle's work both before and during these years. In chapter three I look at both men's attitudes toward the sexual body and its relation to the spiritual element of man. Chapter four examines their attitudes towards the machine, mechanistic views of mind and body and their implications for man as a spiritual animal, while chapter 5 extends this study of both writers' approaches to science and religion by looking at the subject of real and figurative disease, sanitary reform, and their implications. In my final chapter, I look at Kingsley's continuing interest in the relationship between body and soul, in the 1850s and 60s, when Carlyle had all but abandoned this subject, and suggest that a Carlylean debt is still evident. However, throughout this thesis, I shall maintain that, although there is much to compare in their treatment of body and soul, there are fundamental differences in the strategies they employ and, therefore, in their conclusions.

Chapter 1

Dualisms

People try to comprehend the world. They do this in a double sense.¹

The question of whether to order the world in a binary manner, at the core of much philosophical thought, centres around the duality of the body and soul and spreads into related themes of the material and immaterial. The most famous exponent of a dualistic view of body and soul is Descartes, but, as C.A. Van Peursen points out, how to assess the relationship between the body and soul has been a perennial question for thinkers from Plato to Ryle and Husserl.² As Van Peursen's study shows, those considering the body and soul have not always taken a dualistic stance. Materialists, from Feuerbach and La Mettrie (whose *L'homme Machine* was the epitome of the eighteenth-century mechanistic view of man) to modern philosophers such as Dennet and Churchland, have defined man in physical terms:³

The human body is a machine which winds itself up, a living picture of perpetual motion.⁴

At the other end of the scale Berkeley, a proponent of 'out-and-out immaterialism', goes 'a fairly long way towards denying the existence of matter and representing the mind of man as a fixed point or centre to which the visible world is to be referred' (Van Peursen, 65). Van

1 P.F.M. Fonteine, *The Light and the Dark: A History of Cultural Dualism* 13 vols (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1986-1998), 1 (1986), p.ix.

2 C.A. Van Peursen, *Body, Soul, Spirit: A Survey of the Body-Mind Problem* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966). See, chapter 1 'Body and Soul: An Old Problem in a Shifting Perspective'.

3 See, Daniel C. Dennet, *Consciousness Explained* (London Penguin, 1991) and Paul Churchland, *Matter and Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984).

4 Julien Offray de La Mettrie, *Machine Man and Other Writings*, ed. Ann Thomson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 7.

Peursen does however point out that Berkeley's theory was not an abstract one but 'focused entirely on the concrete, on what is directly experienced' (65). But, for Berkeley, physical phenomena existed only insofar as they were perceived or conceived of by the mind.

In simple terms, we can say that materialists believe that the mind or soul does not exist (except as a physical phenomenon) while immaterialists believe that matter does not exist independently of the mind (Berkeley 'sees existence, not as a property of something existing in its own right but as that which man registers "experimentally"') (Van Peursen, 65-66). The two doctrines are alike in that both maintain a single view of human existence. Dualism, on the other hand, as Charles Taliaferro suggests, can be described as 'the view that the mental is distinct from the physical'.⁵

To begin with it is necessary to explain my use of the terms 'body' and 'soul'. Obviously 'body' commonly refers to the sum total of whatever constitutes the human body. But in questions concerning the relationship of mind and body, the two terms ('mind' & 'body') refer to two ontologically distinct entities, and thus 'body' encapsulates *all* material entities whether these belong to human physiology or not. Part of the definition of 'body' is that it is spatial and temporal. However when referring to the 'soul' or 'mind', locating them either spatially or temporally can be problematic. It is tempting to locate the mind in the brain but the workings of the brain are not fully comprehended and, when we use the word 'mind', we seem to refer to something which has implications of self beyond the purely cerebral. The terms 'soul' or 'spirit' tend to refer to a substance which cannot be spatially located and which is often considered to have a life beyond that of the body (Van Peursen also points out that some cultures or religions distinguish between the spirit and soul, adding another layer of complexity).⁶ However, just as I indicated that 'body' will be taken to mean

⁵ *Consciousness and the Mind of God* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 27.

⁶ See, Van Peursen, chapter 8, 'Body, soul and Spirit in the Bible', pp. 95-103.

all material entities, so 'soul' will be taken to mean all that is not material. In modern times we do not tend to use the terms 'soul' or 'spirit', especially with their religious overtones, and this may be why 'mind' is preferred in much modern philosophical writing, becoming virtually synonymous with a secularised 'soul'. However I will be using the term 'soul' because it had not lost currency in Victorian Britain and is regularly used, in a religious and philosophical manner, by Carlyle and Kingsley. As we shall see both writers sometimes make a distinction between the mind and the soul (both men at times rejecting intellectualisation for a more intuitive approach); however, they are attacking materialistic notions of the mind or education rather than suggesting a tripartite schema. Both writers deal with the two basic substances of body and soul, and the aim of this thesis will be to see how they treat their relationship.

Taliaferro makes the case for dualism as a middle ground between two extremes.⁷ He sets out the major positions in a table which ranges from eliminative materialism to eliminative idealism (the former ruling out the notion of the immaterial, and the latter the material, from any serious enquiry into human existence) and runs through various watered down materialisms, idealisms and half-baked dualisms. Located at the centre of the diagram are three major types of full-blown dualism; dualist interactionism (the view that the mental and physical causally affect one another); dualist epiphenomenalism (where the causal affect is one way); and dualist occasionalism (in which there is no causal relationship but each element is harmonised and co-ordinated by God) (28- 31). Taliaferro's study reveals the degrees of relatedness which may result from the view that man constitutes some kind of unity of two distinct substances. If one considers, for instance, the dualism of hot and cold, it is obvious that there are degrees of temperature becoming warmer and cooler until at some

⁷ See, Taliaferro, chapter 1, 'Consciousness' pp. 22 - 89, for his review of the main positions. The table I refer to is on p. 31.

point they must touch. Similarly there may be a relationship between two seeming polarities, or one may depend on the other .

Certainly Descartes maintained the distinction between body and soul, but he also recognised that there was some influential relationship between mind and matter. As Van Peursen points out:

It is surprising that a thinker widely celebrated as the propagandist for a dualistic view of the body and soul should lay so much stress on the cohesion between the two. (22)

Cartesian dualism propounds the view that man is made up of two distinct substances, '*res cogitans*, unextended thinking substance, or mind, and *res extensa*, extended corporeal substance, or body'.⁸ In distinguishing these two human attributes, Descartes further contended that the 'mind' was non-corporeal, that it did not rely on physiological causation or, indeed, a brain. It would seem that no more radical view of the incompatibility of mind and body could be made and yet, as John Cottingham observes, Descartes was unable to deny the apparent interaction of the two:

When Fraus Burman in his interview with Descartes asked the philosopher 'how can the soul be affected by the body and vice versa when their natures are completely different?', Descartes lamely admitted 'This is very difficult to explain, but here our experience is sufficient, since it is so clear on this point that it cannot be gainsaid'. (119)

In fact, Descartes did, famously, attempt to provide a location for the soul, and thus make possible an interaction with the body, in the pineal gland in the brain.

⁸ John Cottingham, *Descartes* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p.119.

In contradiction of Taliaferro's point that dualism is a middle ground, P.F.M. Fontaine questions whether one may use the term dualism at all except where 'there is no longer any relationship or connection at all' (κ). He does concede that 'relative' or 'moderate' dualism may suggest some relationship where 'the second principle is deduced from the first' (sounding rather like Taliaferro's 'dualist epiphenomenalism') but seems to side with the notion that real, or 'radical', dualism is one which feels 'the need to push an opposition to extremes' (263-264). Fontaine's evaluation of dualism differs radically from Taliaferro's, whose view of dualism as a middle ground (one enforced by its location in his diagram at the centre point between two extremes) suggests that it is a position of compromise or conciliation.

Given our awareness of our inner selves and sense of the world around us, and the difficulty in attempting to define ourselves as either physical or spiritual beings, then the sensible thing seems to be to define ourselves in a double manner. Taliaferro confirms this pragmatism when he says 'dualism is frequently characterized by its friends and foes alike as common sense, the philosophy of the "person on the street"' (26). Indeed Descartes accepted that 'our experience is sufficient' in recognising the coexistence and mutual dependence of body and soul, a point Van Peursen makes when he maintains that Descartes thought 'the human mind [was] not equipped to comprehend by a process of thought both the separateness and the reciprocal cohesion of soul and body --- and that one [could] only experience the latter "non-philosophically"' (25). As Cottingham suggests there is a conflict between Descartes 'official dichotomy between mind and matter' and his concessions of the fact of their relationship (122).

Dualism, then, would seem to be favoured by a subjective viewpoint. By this I mean that, in introspection, we seem to discover an unshakeable belief that we can distinguish ourselves from that which is *not* me (that is, the external world). Our view that we are made

up of both a soul and a body is therefore arrived at through the individual experience of being ourselves. Hence, Taliaferro draws a distinction between the objective medical study of man and the subjective experience of being:

The intuitive appeal or commonsensical character of dualism emerges if you imagine a neurologist scanning your brain and claiming to have discovered that your beliefs about Winston Churchill are not just causally related to, but are the very same thing as, brain states, properties, and connections. If you think there are beliefs, and if you think that it would be odd to discover them in the physical realm like this, you have at least some quasi-dualist sympathies. (28)

Taliaferro's example illustrates the typical dualist stance that body and mind or soul are different but '*causally*' related. The problem is in finding or explaining that relation, and it is on these grounds, he says, that materialists attack the dualist:

In the eyes of its critics, dualism produces a bifurcated, cloven picture of nature with no clear way to theoretically corral the mental and physical, whereas a materialism like Churchland's gives us a way of by-passing altogether the problem of how the mental interacts with the physical. (45)

The fact that materialists, such as Churchland, view dualism as creating a 'bifurcated, cloven picture' again seems to draw us back to the notion of dualism as an articulation of extremes rather than one of conciliation. Churchland embraces a *single* viewpoint because it allows him to 'by-pass' the difficulty inherent in producing a philosophical theory relating body and soul. However, it must be noted that a distinction is being made between the pre-philosophical, common-sense approach, which bases itself in the subjective experience of being, and serious philosophising which characterises itself as logical, objective and

scientific. Here it is helpful to consider Ralph Jessop's study of Reidian Common Sense philosophy and its influence on Carlyle.

Jessop examines the Humean legacy at Edinburgh University and Reid's subsequent 'prophetic denunciations' of Hume's scepticism.⁹ Reid and Sir William Hamilton, who was later to interpret and expand upon Reid's 'natural dualism', refuted Hume's theory of Ideas which contended that 'the information of the senses entirely furnishes the mind and all that is known is acquired in the first place by the medium of the sensory apparatus' (Jessop, 63). Unlike Descartes who viewed the mind as non-corporeal, Hume's theory materialised the mind and relied on an analogical relationship between body and soul where the latter worked along the same mechanistic lines as the former. Both Reid and Hamilton rejected this analogical model and embraced a dualistic view of man which 'disallowed as illegitimate the transference of physicalist terminology to mental phenomena' and insisted on 'human ignorance or nescience concerning ultimate realities and immaterial substances such as mind, God and[...]consciousness' (Jessop, 71).¹⁰ Here it is important to note that both Reid and Hamilton's dualisms relied on faith, otherwise the notion of man's ignorance or nescience could easily lapse into agnosticism:

The supernatural naturalism of Reid and Hamilton was an appeal that philosophy should acknowledge and end with the supernatural, that it was native, or a natural feature of the human intellect to believe and have faith in the existence of an incomprehensible, unspeakable entity named God.
(Jessop, 104)

⁹ *Carlyle and Scottish Thought*, p. 55

¹⁰ Jessop makes it clear, however, that Reid's and Hamilton's ideas are not identical, the latter criticising some of the former's arguments. See, for instance, pp. 81-82.

The very unknowability of the mind and its relationship to the body was essential to Reid and Hamilton's dualism. Descartes' belief that the solution could only be non-philosophical is transformed into a theory which embraces the subjective view *as* philosophical:

According to Hamilton, we are conscious of at once the self and the not-self, the ego and the not-ego, and thus the testimony of consciousness guaranteed the reality of mind and body as a duality held in unity. (Jessop, 73)

Jessop insists that Reidian Common-sense argues rationally against Humean scepticism and that therefore 'the word of some supposititious common man in the street does not therefore provide the philosopher of Common Sense with his full remit but only his starting points'.¹¹ But Jessop does point out that Reid sometimes used the term 'common sense' to refer to 'something like the good sense of people of practical affairs and from time to time[...] little more than a basic good sense'. He also cautions us that Reid is partly using his terminology to mock 'intellectual pretentiousness without being anti-intellectual' (76).¹²

Given that the body-soul argument does not fully lend itself to empirical investigation philosophy consistently constructs imaginary scenarios to visualise the relationship between mind and body. For dualists this is not really a problem as the mystery of the mind, its very difference from the physical, is actually articulated within their argument. Taliaferro's example of scanning the mind for beliefs on Churchill demonstrates the absurdity of the materialist argument simply by appealing to the reader's belief or intuition. The materialist attacks the dualist on the very point which the dualist regards as his strength - the fact that it is difficult to give a scientific account of the relationship between

¹¹ For a fuller explanation of the relationship between Hume's, Reid's and Hamilton's ideas see Jessop, chapters 4 and 5.

¹² Jessop also points out that, in a more 'technical sense' Reid uses the term 'common sense' to refer to 'first principles of our natural constitution' or 'common-sense principles' (pp. 76 - 77).

body and soul because they are so different and yet somehow constitute man. On the other hand, materialist attacks on 'folk psychology' (Paul Churchland's dismissive terminology for the language of belief, feeling, imagination and so on) are constantly undermined by their having to fall back on the same kind of hypothesising which sustains the dualist argument.¹³ Dennet, a materialist and staunch anti-dualist, provides his physical account of the world by having to rely on the methodologies he opposes. He concedes that folk psychology has some *practical* use to describe our responses, but takes the behaviourist tack that these can be reduced to non-intentional physical occurrences. However, he illustrates this by a story of the human body peopled by mini-agents which represent intention and may be reduced to 'ignorant, narrow-minded, blind homunculi' and eventually to purely physical mechanisms. This argument, like Taliaferro's tale of the brain scan, relies on the imagination rather than concrete knowledge. The fictive nature of Dennet's theory is enforced when Taliaferro explains it through the simile of a factory reducing the workforce to machines.¹⁴ Common experience is not proof of dualism but it at least needs to be taken into account rather than simply dismissed. But it is the act of describing in which I am interested and not whether Dennet or Churchland might be right or wrong. I am not sure whether we *should* make a distinction here between 'person on the street', common sense responses and those of 'serious' philosophy because, in both cases, some kind of order is being imposed upon the world within a linguistic, or even literary, space.

It is tempting to say that common sense tells us the world is dualistic because its binary nature is evident. But we might just as easily say (especially in a century which has embraced relativism) that its multifariousness is evident. Viewing the world as dualistic (or materialistic or immaterialistic) is one of the ways in which *we* attempt to make sense of our

13 Taliaferro, p. 25; Churchland, *Matter and Consciousness*, p. 43.

14 Taliaferro, pp. 33 - 38. See, Dennet - 'Artificial Intelligence as Philosophy and as Psychology', in *Brainstorms* (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978), pp. 109-128 (p.122).

existence. Take, for example, Gilbert Ryle's argument that mind and matter cannot be considered dualistically because 'the seeming contrast of the two will be shown to be as illegitimate as would be the contrast of "she came home in a flood of tears" and "she came home in a sedan chair"'. The belief that there is a polar opposition between Mind and Matter is the belief that they are terms of the same logical type'.¹⁵ However, Ryle's 'logical type' is only one possible criterion for classification. Michel Foucault suggests in *The Order of Things* that 'there is no similitude and no distinction, even for the wholly untrained perception, that is not the result of a precise operation and of the application of a preliminary criterion'.¹⁶

Foucault's history, or rather 'archaeology', of the way in which man has ordered the world, begins by maintaining that a Renaissance world-view relied on a system of similitudes and resemblances. Of the four major types of similitude, he gives the relationship of body and soul as an example of *convenientia*:

This word really denotes the adjacency of places more strongly than it does similitude. Those things are 'convenient' which come sufficiently close to one another to be in juxtaposition; their edges touch, their fringes intermingle, the extremity of the one also denotes the beginning of the other. In this way, movement, influences, passions, and properties too, are communicated. So that in this hinge between two things a resemblance appears. A resemblance that becomes double as soon as one attempts to unravel it: a resemblance of the place, the site upon which nature has placed the two things, and thus a similitude of properties; for in this natural container, the world, adjacency is not an exterior relation between things, but the sign of a relation, obscure though it may be. And then, from this contact, by exchange, there arise new resemblances; a common regimen becomes necessary; upon the similitude that was the hidden reason for their propinquity is superimposed a resemblance that is the visible effect of that proximity. Body and soul, for example, are doubly 'convenient': the soul had to be made dense, heavy, terrestrial for God to place it in the very heart of matter. But through this propinquity, the soul receives the movements of the

15 *The Concept of Mind* (London: Hutchinson, 1949), p. 22.

16 *The Order of Things* (London: Tavistock, 1970), p. xx.

body and assimilates itself to that body, while 'the body is altered and corrupted by the passions of the soul'. (18)

The Renaissance mind finds the world ordered through a network of visual signs. Things are spatially related; look like one another; act in the same way and so on. It is a cosmically arranged world of magic and religion in which man must identify the relationships between things which are revealed through 'signatures' -- for example, the similarity of the walnut to the brain signifies its effectiveness in treating medical conditions of the head and brain.

Foucault's study explores how systems of ordering altered from this 'empirical' system of signs to a Classical, binary mode exemplified in Descartes recognition of 'self' and 'other'. This system, one which relied on the representative power of language, then gave way to the modern around the turn of the nineteenth century:

The threshold between classicism and modernity (though the terms themselves have no importance -- let us say between our prehistory and what is still contemporary) had been definitively crossed when words ceased to intersect with representations and to provide a spontaneous grid for the knowledge of things. (304)

Of course, Foucault identifies only *predominant* trends. Philosophers and other writers and thinkers do not necessarily abide by his chronology. La Mettrie *does*, however, fully exemplify classical, rationalistic thinking when he embraces the absolute correspondence between signified and signifier to illustrate his thesis that man's intelligence is not determined by a superior soul:

Why then should the education of apes be impossible? Why could he not, if given sufficient care and attention, imitate, like the deaf, the sounds needed for pronunciation?[...]Words, languages, laws, science, and arts came, and thanks to them the rough diamond of our minds was finally polished. Man

was trained like an animal[...]. Everything was done by signs; each species understood what it was able to understand, and that was how man acquired symbolic knowledge[...]. *As we can see, there is nothing simpler than the mechanism of our education! It all comes down to sounds, or words, which are transmitted from one person's mouth, through another's ear and into his brain, which receives at the same time through his eyes the shape of the bodies for which the words are the arbitrary signs.* (La Mettrie, 11-13)
 [My italics]

But a similar approach is also characteristic of many modern thinkers. Ryle thinks he has cracked the body-soul nut by believing that 'logical' types are the only types. He fails to recognise that he has imposed a linguistic category as the definitive reality. Within a linguistic space, the problem of body and soul can be endlessly assessed and reassessed. So, one can say that as 'convenient' types, body and soul are linked spatially because they exist within and therefore constitute a human being. However, as I have already pointed out, the spatial location of the soul is problematic as it is an unknown and immaterial substance. One might then reject the notion of spatial location and assert that body and soul are linked because both constitute the self and are therefore ontological types.

What is becoming clear is that part of our attempt to understand the relationship between body and soul relies on perception and use of language. We may subjectively know that we feel ourselves to be both body and soul but how can we then articulate this? The ongoing argument over man's nature reveals the inconclusiveness of centuries of rational thought and discourse. Language may then be used to articulate the problems the mind faces when addressing this subject, or it may be manipulated to promulgate a particular belief. Both Carlyle and Kingsley, as I shall show, use writing (whether fictional or non-fictional) to articulate their views on the body and soul. But I will also be interested in the extent to which they see their writing as a space over which they have control; whether they can use words to express what they believe the relationship between body and soul should be or,

indeed, is; or whether they acknowledge the difficulty in doing so. As I shall consider in the following chapter, Carlyle's and Kingsley's differing attitudes towards language and its ability to express the immaterial are crucial in their responses to dualism.

However it is not only the question of whether the body and soul are distinct and how, in that case, they can interrelate, which has characterised dualistic theories. When interpreting the world, as Foucault shows, man not only categorises or orders but also accords values to the things he perceives or imagines. Foucault's sixteenth-century example shows how the soul and body were represented as borrowing characteristics from one another: 'But through this propinquity, the soul receives the movements of the body and assimilates itself to that body, while "the body is altered and corrupted by the passions of the soul"' (18). Here, the soul is conceived of as a corrupting influence on the body, and yet the most common values assigned to body and soul are that the body (the material) is bad, and the soul, good. This mindset is found throughout most of the world's religions, from the eastern (and misogynistic) *purdah*, to Western attacks on the sins of the flesh. We might consider that these ideas are not taken seriously now, but the imagery of the soul as good and the body, bad, still pervades our society. Why this should be is probably too complex to evaluate. It may be partly attributable to the maintaining of power. The Church could hold sway over its flock if they were told that the soul's destiny lay in the Church's hands. Men, and this is borne out by the writing of the Bible and its influence on Western misogyny, could devalue women by saying that they were physical while men were spiritual, and therefore superior.¹⁷

17 'The Church's celibates never managed to deal freely and openly with women. Their status and way of life were too firmly based on differentiation from and opposition to marriage and femininity for them not to view women as the negation of their celibate existence and a threat to it. Women have often struck them as the personification of the snares of the devil. The greatest danger in the world, as they see it, lurks in that direction. Chrysostom makes this clear in his *On Priesthood*. "There are in the world a great many situations that weaken the conscientiousness of the soul. First and foremost of these is

But however this duality has been perpetuated, it would seem to originate in the idea that our souls have a higher destiny than our bodies. The devaluation of the body is linked to its finitude. Limited by space and time, the body is rejected for the eternal life of the soul. Of course it is impossible to discover the exact sources of such an idea. Did the idea of original sin result in the rejection of the body, or is it just another construct to articulate a deeply ingrained yearning for an eternal, spiritual life? The latter would seem to be the case as the first notable evaluation of body and soul is not from a Christian source, but is found in the writing of Plato who, as Van Peursen points out, considered the body and soul in roughly the same manner as did Descartes centuries later:

The soul is as different in kind from the body as are, say, the processes of reflective thought, artistic skill, moods and desires, from length, breadth, energy and weight. Thus Plato conceives of the soul as something with distinctive properties of its own, contrasting with matter. Antitheses of this sort remind one forcibly of the terms 'thinking' and 'extensivity', with which Descartes attempted to pin down the essential 'otherness' of the soul's being when set over against the physical realm. (36)

But although Descartes maintained the separateness of body and soul, he makes no moral judgments on their value. Plato, however, regards the spiritual as superior:

The body then, far from being the instrument or vehicle of the soul, is held to be something which encumbers and even defiles it[...]The soul's proclivity is towards another world. It at once becomes evident why the senses are envisaged, not as windows (for looking out of) but as bars (an impediment), since so far as the physical nature of man is concerned it is not just a matter of noting, ontologically, the finite character of its .

dealings with women. In his concern for the male sex, the superior may not forget females, who need greater care precisely because of their ready inclination to sin. In this situation the evil enemy can find many ways to creep in secretly. For the eye of woman touches and disturbs our soul, and not only the eye of the unbridled woman, but that of the decent one as well". (Uta Ranke-Heinemann, *Eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven* [London: Penguin, 1991], p. 121)

existence, but rather one of making an ethical and religious value-judgement on this earthly life from the viewpoint of a higher destiny. (Van Peursen, 37-38)

This imagery of the body as prison of the soul is a familiar one, stemming from ancient philosophies and religions and providing a stimulus for literary imagery such as Donne's 'so must pure lovers' souls descend/...Else a great Prince in prison lies'.¹⁸ Indeed it is such a stock trope that Foucault reverses it, in *Discipline and Punish*, to make his point against behaviour modification in institutional punishment.

This is the historical reality of this soul, which unlike the soul represented by Christian theology, is not born in sin and subject to punishment, but is *born* rather out of methods of punishment, supervision and constraint[...]The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body.¹⁹

Foucault's is a striking image because he so knowingly disrupts the value judgements accorded to body and soul, reducing the higher faculties to a construct of political control. The image of the soul trapped inside the body, however, intuitively has more credibility because of the outward, evident nature of the body and our conception of the soul as invisible and pertaining to our inner life.

The Platonic vision of the spirit imprisoned within the flesh is also evident in Gnosticism, a branch of which provides us with the term which we still use to describe one kind of dualism - Manichaeism, an eastern religion which flourished between the third and sixth centuries AD:

18 'The Ecstasy', stanza 17.

19 *Discipline and Punish*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1991), pp. 29-30.

A Man was not a simple unit, much less an elemental unit, but a particle of Light enclosed in an alien and irredeemable envelope: there is no hope for a Man as such, for he is essentially a fortuitous conglomeration. The hope is that his Light-particles -- roughly speaking, very much what we mean by his 'better self' -- may escape at death from the dark prison-house of the body.²⁰

Although Platonism and Gnosticism both accord a higher value to the soul, it is Manicheism which has provided the imagery of darkness and light which often accompanies dualisms that distinguish between the value of body and soul. Indeed, as we will see in the following chapter, Carlyle's dualistic notions are often articulated through the contrasting images of dark and light. Perhaps the reason why Manichean imagery has persisted into modern thought is because of the simplicity of its mythological theology; 'that there are two eternal sources or principles, Light and Dark' (Burkitt, 4). But the most important result of the Manichean belief that man was a mixture of darkness and light was their asceticism - 'All generation to Mani was hateful, for it was a fresh mixture' (Burkitt, 23). One cannot claim that the asceticism which developed in Western religions was directly linked to Mani's teachings, as the rejection of the body appears to have developed separately within both Christian and non-Christian sects (Manichees and Gnostics were comprised of both) and the emergence of mainstream Christian asceticism was underway within the same period.²¹ However it is interesting to note that the father of the Western Church, Augustine, was at one time a Manichean convert. That Western asceticism developed in some way from the teachings of eastern, ancient religions, rather than the philosophical views of Plato is probably due to the fact that Plato's dualism is ethical rather than religious, springing as it does from the imperative to cultivate the superior mind. As Michael A. Williams points out

20 F.C. Burkitt, *The Religion of the Manichees* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925), pp. 39-40.

21 Geo Widengren, *Mani and Manichaeism*, trans. Charles Kessler (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1965), see pages 119-120, 139.

'it is because one is convinced that the human body has actually been molded by malevolent archons [the Manichean name for agents of the dark] that its description as a "prison" carries a pathos not quite equalled when non-Gnostic contemporaries called it the same thing'.²²

One further point to make about Gnosticism, and its sub sect, Manicheism, is its insistence on the secretive or unknown nature of the spiritual. The central motif of Gnosticism was the *gnosis*, literally Greek for knowledge. As Fonteine explains, *gnosis*

acquired a specific meaning since it began to connote a special knowledge or a theosophical, anthroposophical and 'mysteriosophical' character. Those who possess this knowledge know about the origin of all and about the last things, about the provenance and the final destination of man, and about his fall and redemption. It is a knowledge more mythological in character than philosophical or scientific. What is peculiar about this *gnosis* is that it not only speaks of redemption but brings it about. Making the *gnosis* your own does not lead to redemption; it is redemption itself. Of course, this knowledge is not ready to hand for every one. It is 'esoteric', that is to say secret, and it must remain wrapped in secrecy. (Fonteine, 261)

This notion of an elect who are alone privy to a higher knowledge is also evident in the Manichean hierarchy where 'Elect Manichees' would use lower disciples to prepare their food as it was contaminated with the dark that invaded all things material (Burkitt, 23). And, of course, it is a doctrine which lies at the very heart of Calvinism, Carlyle's childhood religion.

It is the story of malevolent demons moulding the human body into a prison of the soul which gives Manicheism its moral impact. One is more likely now to hear the term or the imagery used in a moral, but not perhaps religious, vein, to describe the notion of the earth, or even the sinful city, as a kind of hell. For instance Ian Spring refers to a 'peculiarly

²² Michael A. Williams, 'Divine Image - Prison of Flesh: Perceptions of the Body in Ancient Gnosticism', in *Fragments for a History of the Human Body* ed. by Michel Feher, 3 vols (New York: Urzone Inc., 1989) I, 129-147 (p.137).

Manichean view of the city' when considering literary and media presentations of Glasgow's 'day and night[...]character'.²³ And Alasdair Gray uses the imagery of dark and light in *Lanark* to describe the contradictory nature of the city of man.²⁴ However, it is important to note that both these writers view the city itself as dualistic rather than merely constituting the dark side of the equation. For them the city is a place of debauchery and salvation, dirt and cleanliness, darkness and light.²⁵ As Michael Williams points out in evaluating the ambiguity of ancient Gnosticism, the body or material world may be the very site for discovering the spiritual which is trapped within the clay: 'Precisely in the human body is to be found the best *visible* trace of the divine in the material world' (130). Of course, the image of the city as a place of darkness and dirt will prove to be important to any consideration of mid-Victorian writers. As we shall see in both Carlyle's and Kingsley's work a concern with such issues as dirt and disease focuses attention on the hell-like qualities of life, primarily, in London. Kingsley is often concerned with the apparent differences between the city of man and God's countryside (although he is at pains to avoid any idealisation of the lives of the rural poor). But, more important, for Kingsley the term Manicheism has a particular resonance as he uses it consistently in his attacks on the asceticism of the Oxford Movement and the Catholic Church.

From this survey of some attitudes towards body and soul it is clear that dualism has assumed a number of different guises; ethical, religious, moral and philosophical, affirming Van Peursen's contention that it is 'an old problem'. However he also suggests that certain

23 *Phantom Village: the myth of the new Glasgow* (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1990), p. 24.

24 In the hell-like city of Unthank dawn hardly shows above the tenement roofs and disappears almost immediately to be replaced by a foggy twilight. (London: Picador, 1985, [p. 11])

25 Dualistic notions of the world as a city surely owe something to Augustine's *Civitate Dei* and *Civitate Mundi* although Raymond Williams has pointed out that the vilification of the city and idealisation of the country originate in the satiric attacks of, for instance, Juvenal. (*The Country and the City* [London: Chatto & Windus, 1973], pp. 46-48).

conditions are responsible for encouraging this problematic view of man. Indeed he points out that primitive thought did not make the 'seemingly obvious distinction between soul and body', but united 'the spiritual and the physical in a single, undifferentiated whole'. That he did this unconsciously is suggested by Van Peursen's apportioning of blame to philosophy 'which in the course of its development[...]has all too frequently put asunder' body and soul (80-81). However, it is also suggested that this primitive acceptance of man's unity is also produced by a particular kind of social organisation:

In and by himself a man is not really a 'finished product'. He cannot be cut loose from the social pattern within which alone he comes to be himself. It may well be that when a man dies, there is mourning and lamentation; yet that may be not on his account at all but on account of the fact that the social structure is disrupted by his decease. Indeed, the very word 'I' is never employed except in a specific combination; and then it occurs only in such forms as 'I-father', 'I-uncle' and so forth: the individual recognizes himself in his relationship to this or that cognate within the tribe or group, and not otherwise. (83)

It is because primitive man was only definable as part of his society (one which was communal in nature) that 'no sharp division can be made between an inner and outer world, and why no clear line may be drawn between soul and body' (83). Van Peursen's study centres on the philosophical rather than social history of dualism and yet his claim that primitive man's unconsciousness of the dualism of body and soul is dependent on his place within the community suggests that an alteration in man's relationship with that community results in an awareness of the difference between his outer and inner self. An increased emphasis on the individual within society produces alienation between self and society and encourages contemplation of the dual nature of our being. Indeed Paul Zweig points out in *The Heresy of Self-Love* that Gnostic sects, which Fontaine indicates were 'dualistic by

definition', were 'highly individualized'.²⁶ It is clear, however, that any attempt to locate the beginning of this self-consciousness and the loss of primitive unconsciousness is highly problematic. Van Peursen suggests that the first indications of the bifurcation of man came in the classical era of Plato.²⁷ And yet, we might argue that the importance of the self in Western thought begins with Renaissance humanism, a revolution from Medieval ideas (in which a feudal community and the unity of Church and State might suggest a unitary notion of self and world), reaching its apotheosis in Romantic self-contemplation, and resulting in the individualism which characterises the modern age. But Foucault locates a binary view of man as emerging only in the 17th century:

At each point of contact there begins and ends a link that resembles the one before it and the one after it; and from circle to circle, these similtudes continue, holding the extremes apart (God and matter), yet bringing them together in such a way that the will of the Almighty may penetrate into the most unawakened corners. (19)

'God and matter' here are separate but conjoined because God has created a world which displays his order - 'the world is linked together like a chain'.

Although we cannot give a precise date to the historical emergence of individualism and related dualism, it is clear that such systems of belief are inseparable from particular social structures. Political, economic, religious and social changes may cause man to consider his nature as dual or allow *us* to identify dualistic outlooks, retrospectively, in a culture. Can we,

²⁶ *The Heresy of Self-Love*, (New York & London: Basic Books, 1968), p. 5; Fontaine, p. 262

²⁷ 'Under the influence of Platonic concepts, which appear time and again throughout the centuries, the body is usually characterized, where the soul is concerned, as something inferior', (Van Peursen, p. 34).

then, detect any reasons why the Victorian age lent itself to a dualistic reading or why Carlyle and Kingsley might themselves be so interested in dualism?

Colin Manlove suggests that 'dualism was[...]in the very fabric of the Victorian period', and Tony Tanner asserts that a characteristic dualism '[expresses] itself in a variety of ways throughout the [nineteenth] century'.²⁸ Certainly, the Victorian age saw some of the biggest social and cultural upheavals since the Renaissance. Walter Houghton indicates that the Victorians themselves viewed their age as one of 'transition' and his study of *The Victorian Frame of Mind* brings out the ambiguities and dualisms of an age in which old values collided with the new:

By definition an age of transition in which change is revolutionary has a dual aspect: destruction and reconstruction.²⁹

Both Houghton's study and my thesis cover the period 1830-1870. But it is important to remember that this was not a homogeneous period. There were clear differences, acknowledged by contemporaries, between the first two decades and the period from 1850-1870, despite Houghton's insistence that a consistent 'Victorianism' can be seen throughout his period (xv). Before I move on to consider more closely some of the issues which may have highlighted the problem of man's dual nature, I want to consider in general, the tempers of these two broad periods of the Victorian age and how they might relate to what Houghton called its 'dual aspect'.

²⁸ Manlove, *Christian Fantasy*, p. 184; Tanner, 'Mountains and Depths - An Approach to Nineteenth-century Dualism', *Quarterly Review of English Literature*, 3, no. 4 (1962), pp. 51-61 (p. 52).

²⁹ Walter E. Houghton, *The Victorian Frame of Mind 1830-1870* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1957), p. 3.

The 1830s and 40s were a period of great instability, crisis and change, culminating in the failed Chartist insurrection of 1848. That this early Victorian period was one of conflict is important because, as I shall suggest, many of the changes in this age of transition focused on issues which revolved around the relationship between body and the soul. However, it is also important to recognise that the first seven years of what are commonly referred to as the Victorian period in literature are not within Victoria's reign and that the age of transition from Regency to Victorian England was not an overnight transformation, with many writers, such as Eliot and Thackeray, continuing to evoke the memory of an older era which was passing away.³⁰ The early Victorian period, as well as a being one of social deprivation and conflict, was one which had not yet shaken off the extravagances and the liveliness of the Regency period. Indeed, according to W.L. Burn, the 30s and 40s were a time of 'excitement, experiment and display'.³¹ Peter Ackroyd explores this notion when he describes the society of men in which Dickens moved in his early career as 'that eminently social, gregarious, energetic, vivacious group which we have come to call "Early Victorians"'.³²

This characterisation of an age has implications for a study of dualistic ideas because the notion that it was one of both social deprivation and of excitement and display suggests a coexistence of the elements of dark and light which mark dualistic thinking. To turn again to Dickens, Ackroyd examines his earnest engagement with social problems and early journalistic work for radical and Benthamite journals, while also presenting him as a figure

30 Houghton quotes from Thackeray's 'De Juventute' in which he refers to 'the old world' of stagecoaches, highwaymen and Druids, (p. 3). Eliot's preoccupation with the passing of the old and advent of the new is evident, for instance, in her portrayal of the reaction to the encroachment of the railway in *Middlemarch*, and her evocation of an older, feudal society in *Silas Marner*.

31 *The Age of Equipoise* (London: Unwin University Books, 1968), p. 59.

32 Peter Ackroyd, *Dickens* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1990), p. 204. He suggests that, though these men were still central to literary culture later in the century, 'by the Sixties men such as Forster were looking over their shoulders at their own past, coming to the end of their own lives in a Victorian era to which it cannot be said that they truly belonged by instinct or temperament' (p. 209).

whose dress was 'colourful to the point of vulgarity', who enjoyed popular theatre indulged in pranks, tricks and parodying his friends, and was 'full of fun, and given to laugh immoderately without any apparent sufficient reason'.³³ John Forster too, although often ribbed by Dickens for his pomposity, was 'known for his loud laugh, and his equally boisterous energy' (Ackroyd, 205). It must be remembered, then, that Carlyle, too often portrayed as the unyielding and morally overbearing Sage of Chelsea of the mid-century, was also the product of an earlier age. Born in the same year as Keats and within a few years of Shelley and raised in a rural community removed both in time and culture from the industrial society which he was to criticise, Carlyle was educated at a University which still rang with the intellectual vibrancy of the Enlightenment. Although perhaps somewhat of an outsider due to his Scottish otherness, on leaving Scotland for London he moved in the same circles as Dickens and Forster, dining with them and indulging in the lively discussions which were later to mark any guest's visit to Cheyne Row. Carlyle clearly recognised the dualistic elements in Dickens's work which Ackroyd identifies in his character; referring to those 'dark, silent elements, tragical to look upon, and hiding amid dazzling radiances as of the sun, the elements of death itself' (Ackroyd, xi). The resemblance of this description of Dickens's vision to Carlyle's dualistic outlook within *Sartor Resartus*, epitomised in Diogenes Teufelsdröckh, is clear:

However, in Teufelsdröckh, there is always the strangest Dualism: light and dancing, with guitar-music, will be going on in the forecourt, while by fits from within comes the faint whimpering of woe and wail. (*Works*, I:142)

Certainly the elements of light and dark are there in Dickens's work, but Carlyle seems also to have been airing his own preoccupations with dualism when speaking of the novelist. And

33 pp. 136, 199, 108.

as I shall suggest, Carlyle's own style, which incorporates both elements of earnestness and of playfulness, is essential to his dualism. He began his writing career for journals which encouraged lively intellectual debate and, in the case of some, humour which would have seemed quite out of place in a mid-Victorian magazine. Houghton's *Wellesley Index* tells us that *Fraser's Magazine* 'was plainly marked -and now (in 1847) thought marred - by the dash and 'riotous mirth' of the Regency'.³⁴ It is not only the coexistence of deprivation and display, then, which gives the early Victorian period a dualistic resonance, but the way in which writers incorporated both those elements in styles which allowed ongoing dialectical engagement with the age's conflicts.

In contrast to the controversy and activity of the previous two decades, Burn suggests that the mid-Victorian period (his book covers 1852-1867) was like the 'day after the feast':

On the day after, the feasters would eat and drink sparingly, choosing the plainest dishes, avoiding the luscious, taking no risks. (Burn, 55)³⁵

Indeed that the mid-century had given way to a tone of equipoise and propriety is evident in the need for editorial change at *Fraser's* -- 'the spirit of the times had become too earnest to enjoy or tolerate the improprieties of Maginn and Co.'.³⁶

However, if I am to claim that Carlyle was a man whose outlook and style were formed by an earlier age, then it must be acknowledged that there was a disjuncture between the time of his and Kingsley's lives and careers. Kingsley was only a young boy when

³⁴ *The Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals 1824-1900*, ed. Walter E. Houghton, 5 vols (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966-1989), II (1972), p. 310.

³⁵ *The Age of Equipoise* carefully steers a course between confirming that this period was one of balance and unity, and remembering that even this time had its conflicting undercurrents. But Burn does suggest that, at the time, there was a certain amount of satisfaction with the level of balance and harmony achieved in society. (p. 17)

³⁶ Maginn was editor of *Fraser's Magazine* from February 1800 to September 1836 and producer of many of the parodic pieces the magazine published.

Carlyle started to become well-known as a writer, and his own writing career began at the end of the decade in which Carlyle wrote the books and essays which established his reputation and profoundly influenced his society.³⁷ Kingsley began by addressing the problems which created the conflict and unrest of the forties and was considered to be somewhat of a radical. However, his output continued to expand and vary after this period.

To a great extent, the Victorian age can be characterised by the material or physical changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution. The development of new technologies meant that there was a change in the means of production and this large scale industrialisation brought about a change in the physical environment:

Not only was there the new machinery itself, there were now entire landscapes created by the machine: slag heaps, red brick factories, red brick houses for the factory workers. Even the countryside was marked by railway tracks, viaducts, and embankments.³⁸

When we think of the industrialised Victorian society we tend to imagine Dickensian London, but the manifestations of the new manufacturing were apparent throughout the country. Indeed Dickens, travelling in his capacity as reporter in the early 1830s, 'for the first time in his life, saw the industrial cities of the Midlands and the North; saw, for the first time, exactly what was happening in a country still expanding its industrial base' (Ackroyd, 156). Dickens' *Hard Times*, along with other provincial works such as George Eliot's *Middlemarch* (with its depiction of the encroachment of the railways into rural life) and Elizabeth

37 Although it is arguable that *The French Revolution* (1837) made Carlyle's reputation, I refer here to Carlyle's influence in the 1840s. A. Le Quesne contends that 'it was between the publication of *The French Revolution* in 1837 and of *Latter-Day Pamphlets* in 1850 that Carlyle's real influence, if not his public recognition, was at its height' (*Carlyle* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982], p. 55. This study of Carlyle was later reprinted in *Victorian Thinkers*, ed. Keith Thomas [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993].

38 Herbert Sussman, *Victorians and the Machine* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 2.

Gaskell's novels of the manufacturing North, show an awareness of the effects of the new technology on the landscape as a whole. This transformation of the environment through technology forms a basis for both Carlyle and Kingsley (and indeed other Condition-of-England writers) in their consideration of the emphasis upon the physical in Victorian society. As I shall discuss in chapter 4, the image of machinery is important to any consideration of their writing on body and soul because it is used as a basis for the metaphorical notion of society as mechanistic in its outlook.

The change in means of production profoundly affected the demography of Britain. In 1801 the population of London was around 900,000, rising to 2,400,000 by 1851 and 4,500,000 in 1901.³⁹ Although more extreme in London, this population explosion was reflected throughout Britain and was accompanied by a demographic shift from country to city as rural manufacturing gave way to larger urban centres. These changes had a number of implications for people's physical well-being as amenities did not develop in tandem with the population. Poor and insufficient housing along with the fact that few households had their own water supply or drainage for sewage contributed to the dirty environment of city living (and, as I shall discuss in chapter 5, to the spread of disease). London, as Henry Mayhew points out, was a teeming, dirty, smelly, noisy city:

The daily and nightly grinding of thousands of wheels, the iron friction of so many horse's hoofs, the evacuations of horses and cattle, and the ceaseless motion of pedestrians, all decomposing the substance of our streets and roads, give rise to many distinct kinds of street-dirt.⁴⁰

³⁹ Llewellyn Woodward, *The Age of Reform 1815-1870* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p.1

⁴⁰ *London Labour and the London Poor: A Cylopedia of the Condition and Earnings of those that Will work, those that Cannot work, and those that Will Not work*, 4 vols (London: George Woodfall [vol. 1] and Griffin, Bohn & Co., 1851-1862), II (1861), p. 185.

Within this squalor people lived and worked, Mayhew's survey of London life showing how many were forced to live off the dirt around them. In the 'wretched locality[...]between the Docks and Rosemary Lane, redolent of filth and pregnant with pestilential diseases, and whither all the outcasts of the metropolitan population seem to be drawn', Mayhew interviews a collector of 'pure' or dog's dung (used to purify leather) who tells him that 'at first I couldn't endure the business; I couldn't bear to eat a morsel, and I was obliged to discontinue it for a long time'.⁴¹ Alongside this undesirable occupation, Mayhew also identifies bonegrubbers, rag-gatherers, cigar-end finders, mudlarks and sewer-hunters as those who etched out an existence from the dirt created by their society. That this period was one of great contrasts is suggested by the coexistence of this kind of poverty with the clamouring for possessions which industrialised production encouraged. Asa Briggs's details the Victorian desire for the acquisition of objects, both useful and ornamental, which reached its apotheosis in the Great Exhibition of 1851.⁴² And Thomas Richards indicates how 'a small group of advertisers saw what was happening, placed themselves at the exact juncture of commerce and culture, and so became the minstrels of capitalism'.⁴³ Richards refers to the 'giant hat sponsored by a Strand hatter' which Carlyle was to satirise in *Past and Present* as an example of 'English Puffery':

The Hatter in the Strand of London, instead of making better felt-hats than another, mounts a huge lath-and-plaster Hat, seven feet high, upon wheels; sends a man to drive it through the streets; hoping to be saved *thereby*. He has not attempted to *make* better hats, as he was appointed by the Universe to do, and as with this ingenuity of his he could very probably have done; but his whole industry is turned to *persuade* us that he has made such!
(*Works*, 10: 141)

41 II, pp. 142-144.

42 *Victorian Things* (London: Penguin, 1990).

43 *The Commodity Culture of Victorian England* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 1.

The link between this capitalist phenomenon of advertising and the London which Mayhew describes is, however, made by Richards' maintaining that the Strand hatter's idea 'was only the latest addition to a crazy street scene catered to by the large and varied class of street sellers investigated[...]in *London Labour and the London Poor*' (20).

The smell of this teeming city, with its dirt-collectors, open-air food-sellers and ever increasing traffic of coaches and people, would have been enough to remind the population of their own physicality. This is not to suggest that eighteenth-century or early nineteenth-century London did not suffer from the same sanitary problems (although not perhaps on such a grand scale) but again it is crucial to note that this is a time of transition in which the population would have been aware of the disjuncture between their surroundings and the notions of progress which Industrialisation promoted. With the overcrowding in London there must have been an awareness of the proximity of others' bodies in the street, home and workplace. William Frith's paintings of 'Derby Day' and 'The Railway Station', and, later in the century, Gustav Doré's engravings, *London: A Pilgrimage*, vividly illustrate this point. In the throng the touch and smell of others (given the lack of sanitation) would have been ever-present. Not only does this lack of space suggest an awareness of others' bodies, it places an emphasis on the individual's relation to the community. As I pointed out earlier, Van Peursen links the notion of unity to the communal living of primitive man where self was definable only through each member's place within his society. But Victorian society equivocated between individualism and collectivism and this had implications for the place of the individual in relation to his society, a notion important to any study of dualism as it concerns the relationship between self and other.

Burn discusses 'the balance between regulation and liberty' which was 'fortuitously' struck in the mid-century.⁴⁴ He draws to our attention the conflict between the broad political ideologies of *laissez-faire*, with its emphasis on the endeavour of the individual, and the interventionist notions which found their source in Bentham who was 'the archetype of British collectivism' (133). Indicating that, in the mid-century, 'public opinion had a bias towards Individualism' he examines how the desire to tackle social problems alongside the desire for individualism meant that 'the State looked benevolently on some activities and critically on others' (150, 161). The question of whether to apply reform measures was one which, throughout the Victorian period, was relevant to issues from maintaining the privacy of the family to regulating the administration of services such as the water supply or the running of the railways. In the home, for instance, as Houghton points out, family life was considered to be 'a place apart, a walled garden, in which certain virtues too easily crushed by modern life could be preserved' (343). But family life could also be a place of abuse or conflict. Agitation for reform within the family would eventually lead to legislative acts such as the Married Women's Property Acts of 1870 and 1882, but there were many who felt that marriage should be beyond the remit of Governmental reform, such as Margaret Oliphant who, in 1856, claimed that 'the law cannot come into the heart of the house'.⁴⁵ Perhaps of more importance to this thesis, however, is how industrialisation affected social relations and precipitated arguments for the need for reform measures in dealing with working and living conditions.

44 Burn, p. 132. In keeping with his complex reading of the mid-century Burn does, however, point out that 'if one talks very much about individualists and collectivists (or anti-individualists) one is in danger of producing a travesty of events[...]it is enough to mention Edwin Chadwick to show that a "collectivist" could be as much of an individualist as the most besotted adherent of *laissez-faire*' (pp. 132, 134).

45 Margaret Oliphant, 'The Laws Concerning Women', *Blackwood's Magazine* April 1856, pp. 379 - 387, (p. 386)

Houghton indicates how the advent of technology 'revolutionized the economic life of England':

The old system of fixed regulations, which paralleled that in fixed social relations, was abandoned for the new principle of *laissez-faire*, on which the manufacturer bought his materials in the cheapest market and sold them in the highest, and hired his labor wherever he liked, for as long as he pleased, at the lowest wages he could pay. (5-6)

This is, of course, Carlyle's 'cash nexus', a phrase which articulated the breakdown of social relations from a moral to a monetary contract.⁴⁶ Carlyle identifies the alienating effects of a society which denies the human ties of responsibility and common interest when in *Sartor Resartus*'s 'Organic Filaments' he refers to a 'Glass Bell' in which each individual is imprisoned (*Works*, 1: 186). However it is crucial to note that neither Carlyle nor Kingsley (or indeed the other Condition-of-England writers such as Dickens or Gaskell) were advocates of Benthamite collectivism. Indeed they were some of its staunchest critics. Benthamite notions of social control, although relying on the idea of a collectivised culture, did not promote the idea of an organic community which was to re-emerge time and again in the Victorian preoccupation with the Middle Ages. Neither *laissez-faire* nor Benthamite paternalism appealed to Carlyle; he usually refers to them in the same withering breath. However, his work does exhibit a belief that individual responsibility and endeavour must be accompanied by reform measures. And, as we shall see in chapter five, Kingsley, addressing the conflicting between the desired individualism of *laissez-faire* and the need for paternalistic controls, appears to espouse a compromise between the two. Behind both Carlyle's and Kingsley's concerns with the manner in which both *laissez-faire* and

46 'We have profoundly forgotten everywhere that Cash-payment is not the sole relation of human beings', (*Past and Present* (1843), *Works*, 10: 146)

paternalistic ideologies viewed the role of the individual in relation to the State, was their belief that both systems often promoted a purely physical or material view of human existence, and neglected the needs of the soul. *Laissez-faire* economics reduced the worker to a commodity while interventionist reform measures were solely concerned with improving physical conditions. Moral change was dependent, in the latter case, on a change in environment or coercive legislation rather than being seen as something which was dependent on man's relationship to God. For many social critics of the time, the removal of God from the equation meant that Industrialism had destroyed the inner life of man, as Sussman suggests:

Combined with the use of the machine as a metonymy for progress was another perception, commonplace now only because it was first articulated by Victorian writers, that the rhythms created by the machine itself had a profound and primarily destructive effect on the psychic life[...]The machine thus becomes both cause and symbol for what writers saw as the declining emotional vitality of their age. (4)

The machine was perceived, then, as having a detrimental effect on the spiritual and emotional life of society and, as Sussman points out, was also employed as a motif for a preoccupation with the physical nature of human life.

It was not just scientific progress which was responsible for the perceived decline in faith, but the conflict between the sciences and religion was to be a major site for the question of the relationship between soul and body. As Elisabeth Jay points out in *Faith and Doubt in Victorian Britain*, 'Darwin's *Origin of Species* became the symbolic text for the conflict of science and religion' in the nineteenth century and beyond.⁴⁷ However, the conflict was well

⁴⁷ Elisabeth Jay, *Faith and Doubt in Victorian Britain* (London: Macmillan, 1986), p. 100.

underway before Darwin published his long-researched findings in 1859 and cannot be limited to, although it could be argued that it was made flesh in, the discipline of biology.⁴⁸ Predating the proliferation of evolutionary theories and texts of the nineteenth century were the developments being made in the field of geology, a science which began in earnest in the late eighteenth century, producing the first hammer-blows against the edifice of religion by striking at its very basis, belief in the Creation. Geology, alongside palaeontology, challenged the time-scale essential to a belief in the Creation by giving the earth 'an age enormously in excess of the Scriptural six thousand years, and [establishing] that organic forms appeared gradually, over much of this time, in an approximately "ascending" series'.⁴⁹ But geological discoveries (earth deposits, fossils, substrata and so on were daily confirming the vast age of the earth) were not enough to provide a fully progressive, evolutionary theory although they were its backbone. For that biology was needed. And although Lamarck had published his theory in France in 1809, it was Robert Chambers' *Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation*, published anonymously in 1844 and combining the disciplines of geology and biology, which made the first, and largely hostile, impression on scientists and public alike. Milton Millhauser points out that *Vestiges* was 'one of the most roundly hated books of its time' (4). To add insult to injury, this evolutionary treatise appeared 'just as the Tractarian excitement was dying down' and its potentially diabolic effect on society is articulated in Millhauser's claim that it was considered by many as 'a work of black materialism that threatened to cut away the foundations of all morality and all religion' (4). Indeed, Chambers, anticipating this reaction, had temporarily left behind his publishing business in Edinburgh to

48 'In 1842 Darwin wrote in pencil an abstract of his theory of evolution by means of natural selection, but then immersed himself for years in the study of barnacles, fossil and living[...] Darwin's leisurely preparations were interrupted in 1858 by a beautifully clear essay on his central idea of "natural selection" by the naturalist Alfred Wallace'. (J.A. V. Chapple, *Science and Literature in the Nineteenth Century* [London: Macmillan, 1986], p. 80)

49 Milton Millhauser, *Just Before Darwin* (Middleton, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1959), p. 58.

move to St. Andrews to write *Vestiges* in the hope of maintaining his anonymity. But his reputation still suffered. Four years later, in 1848, he was forced to stand down in the election for Lord Provost of Edinburgh when an opposing candidate claimed that, in view of his earlier pamphlet on geology, Chambers was probably *Vestiges*' author (3). But, ironically, Chambers was neither a professional scientist nor was he positing a theory which opposed religious belief:

[*Vestiges*] is merely the attempt of a somewhat unconventional mind to synthesize the universe of mid-nineteenth century science: a universe in which law had replaced miracle and the ruling principle was everlasting, forward-moving change. In such a world, with its beaconing future, its all-embracing order, and its vastness of space and time, the unknown author saw God's majesty established even more clearly and triumphantly than in the narrow and capricious cosmos of medieval (and much popular Victorian) theology. (Millhauser, 40)

Here Millhauser's appraisal of Chambers' work highlights some of the major concepts and concerns of the conflict between science and religion. Firstly, Chambers was neither agnostic nor atheist, but a man of religious beliefs who also displayed his age's desire for further knowledge of the material nature of his world:

[*Vestiges*] imposed on modern science, as on all cosmic phenomena, a dualistic pattern of meaning at once stiffly mechanistic and neutrally religious, which reflected the divided nature of the Victorian mind. Science, 'progress', and a little saving piety; a mechanics of secondary causes, with a divine fiat underlying the whole; and, consistently with the unity of the Creative Will, a single clear principle by which the world advanced forever: here was the possible compromise, a glowing future and fixed physical law and a faint and flickering ghost of last-ditch faith. (Millhauser, 117)

Secondly, Millhauser suggests that *Vestiges* was a manifestation of the movement towards modernising religion, repudiating its more superstitious elements in favour of a universe ruled by Divine Law.

This shift replaced the cataclysmic view of the world's history with one of progression. For instance, Charles Lyell's *Principles of Geology* (1830-1833) 'cautiously rejected the claim that Noah's Flood -- or even a series of floods and catastrophes -- could account for the complicated geological facts of the earth's crust' (Chapple, 68).

Catastrophists (those who believed that the Creation and any subsequent geological alterations were produced by great events engineered by God) were ranged against Progressive theorists, like Lyell, who believed that the world man lived in had evolved over a great period of time. But this would not necessarily compromise a belief in God: 'the first reaction of faith to this disquieting new science had been frank hostility; the second and far wiser one was assimilation of it into orthodoxy' (Millhauser, 35). Unfortunately, to effect this assimilation, some odd arguments were concocted. Perhaps the most famous, which persists until this day among Creationists, was that fossils were planted on earth by God to make man *think* the world was old. Further ideas were, for instance, that all geological phenomena resulted from a 1600 year period between the Creation and the Flood, or that the world had only begun to rotate many years into its existence.⁵⁰ The proliferation of these theories only serves to illustrate the extent of the anxiety felt and the existence of a number of well-meaning, but amateur scientists. For, as much as there was a conflict between science and religion, there were issues of professionalism at stake:

Many of the foremost geologists were clergymen, and their lay colleagues were for the most part genuinely devout[...]They were embarrassed, however, by their allies. Behind the professional geologists stood a jostling

⁵⁰ See, Millhauser, page 35, for a discussion of these theories.

line of eager amateurs, simple God-fearing men with a little knowledge and a terrible zeal. (Millhauser, 35)

Certainly at this point in the century serious scientists and amateurs alike were concerned with the business of 'reconciliation', although later evolutionists such as Darwin and Huxley were less anxious to accommodate their theories to religion.⁵¹ Philip Gosse uses the word 'reconciliation' repeatedly in his work *Omphalos* with its eccentric theory of 'prochronism' in which he argued that hereditary features were produced by God creating nature in a pre-formed circle. Gosse argued that even the first cow would have the hereditary features of the supposed previous cow in the circle. This allowed Gosse to argue that Adam would have had a navel, thus giving his work its title.⁵²

Chambers himself was considered to be 'a glib pseudo-scientist' by the professionals, alert to his non-inductive methodologies and some glaring mistakes within his work (Millhauser, 5). But his theory of reconciliation was the most readily acceptable. Chambers replaced a God of intervention who created and interfered with the world with one who initiated an ordered set of laws:

We have seen powerful evidence, that the construction of this globe, and its associates, and inferentially that of all the other globes in space, was the result, not of any immediate or personal exertion on the part of the Deity, but of natural laws which are the expression of his will. What is to hinder our supposing that the organic creation is also a result of natural laws, which are in like manner an expression of his will? (Chapple, 72)

51 Millhauser, p. 36. Jay draws attention to the fact that Darwin 'remained notoriously reluctant to discuss or declare his religious position', while Huxley, an agnostic, fired by enthusiasm for Darwin's theory, 'threw himself into the role of champion for scientific freedom' (pp. 109, 111).

52 Philip Gosse, *Omphalos* (London: Van Voorst, 1857). Millhauser points out that 'the serious geologists, for their part, were obliged to protest against a habit of wild surmise that threatened to make the whole idea of "reconciliation" ridiculous' (p. 36).

Chambers' denial of God's 'personal exertion' indicates that, far from being considered a spiritual perversion, superstition was linked with physicality, a matter to which I shall return in chapter 5. However, Chambers' work is important because it provides a model for reconciling or synthesising the physical world with the presence of a God and, as I shall contend with reference to Kingsley, this notion of a set of Divine laws was central to his own treatment of his twin interests, religion and science. But, as I pointed out earlier, biology, and indeed geology, were not the only participating elements in the conflict between science and religion. Chambers' distinction between a 'capricious' and an ordered universe is also evident in one of the most heated debates of the 1840s and 50s, concerning the prevention and treatment of epidemic diseases.

The poor housing, dirty surroundings and bad sanitation created by the demographic shift to cities precipitated a concern for the bodily welfare of urban inhabitants. However although, as I shall discuss, the connection between dirt and disease brought about agitation for sanitary reform, there were still those who viewed disease as an apocalyptic judgement on their society:

Cholera, it was thundered from a thousand pulpits, was God's punishment for moral and spiritual laxity, drunkenness, failure to observe the Sabbath, and other sins, including advocacy of enfranchisement for the Jews and marriage with the deceased wife's sister.⁵³

53 Anthony S. Wohl, *Endangered Lives: Public Health in Victorian Britain* (London: Dent, 1983), p. 122. Wohl indicates the widespread incidence of dirt and disease throughout all classes when he details the living conditions of a family which 'found that it was unable to isolate itself from the stinks, pollution, and health hazards of the day'. Poor drainage and heavy rain resulted in one occasion where the filth from the Thames rose up through their lawns. The father of the family contracted typhoid and died while at a later date his son also contracted the disease. Wohl reveals this to be the Royal family. (pp. 1-2)

In 1853 the Presbytery of Edinburgh petitioned Queen Victoria for a national fast against cholera as an act of penitence and communal prayer to God for the country's health.⁵⁴

Although there had been previous fasts against epidemics in the 1840s, the tide seemed to be turning in favour of more scientific means of prevention and Lord Palmerston rejected the call, indicating that sanitary reform would be more to the point. It may seem strange to imagine such a superstitious reaction as the Presbytery's taking place within the nineteenth century, revealing a lingering mindset more often associated with the Middle Ages. However, in the light of the nature and extent of the diseases hitting the country, it is understandable.

As Bruce Haley tells us, in 1831, five years after it began its inexorable march across Europe from Bengal, the first cholera epidemic arrived on the shores of Durham, and moved swiftly north to Scotland and south to London to join the other diseases ravaging the metropolis, such as influenza and typhoid.⁵⁵ As Haley points out 'British doctors were well aware of its nature, if not its cause' (6). The approach of this exotic, unknown disease and its frightening symptoms of diarrhoea, retching, dehydration, sever muscle pain and an alteration of skin colour to 'a sort of bluish gray', impressed upon both Doctors and public alike the apocalyptic nature of the disease. Haley quotes from a Victorian doctor's observations:

Our other plagues were home-bred, and part of ourselves, as it were; we had a habit of looking on them with a fatal indifference, indeed, inasmuch as it led us to believe that they could be effectually subdued. But the cholera was something outlandish, unknown, monstrous; its tremendous ravages, so long foreseen and feared, so little to be explained, its insidious march over whole continents, its apparent defiance of all the known and conventional precautions against the spread of epidemic disease, invested it with a mystery and a terror which thoroughly took hold of the public mind, and seemed to recall the memory of the great epidemics of the middle ages. (6)

⁵⁴ Keith Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic* (London: Penguin, 1971), p. 175.

⁵⁵ Bruce Haley, *The Healthy Body and Victorian Culture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 6.

This mythologising of pestilence, even by men of science, illustrates the manner in which it caught the Victorian imagination. In his poem *The Mowers. An Anticipation of the Cholera* (1848), Charles Mackay envisages cholera as a figure visiting death upon the city:

The Cholera comes, rejoice! Rejoice!
He shall be lord of the swarming town,
And mow them down, and mow them down.⁵⁶

Mackay was, of course, using a poetic trope but his mythic personification of disease reflects a strand of thought exemplified clearly in the Presbytery's call for a fast. And that this superstitious reaction to pestilence should coexist with the development of medical and sanitary solutions exemplifies the conflicts that existed between science and religion and, indeed, superstition.

The limitations of medical knowledge meant that even scientific accounts of the disease were tinged by the mythological. For instance, as the discovery of bacteriology was not made until the latter half of the century, the vector for disease was considered to be miasma, a fetid gas which was believed to be emitted by dirty water, diseased human bodies and putrefying organic matter such as food. The threat of miasma was made worse by the claustrophobic nature of most housing and the close proximity in which people lived in the rapidly growing cities. Scientists had identified the source of disease (inductive experiments in cleaning up infected areas had yielded some results) but without the discipline of bacteriology they were mistaken in its mode of transmittance:

The empiricism of English science stressed the eradication of disease through the preventative approach of cleansing and scouring, rather than through the purer scientific approach of bacteriology. The miasma or effluvia theory of disease, with its belief that, wherever bad smells and

⁵⁶ *Everyman's Book of Victorian Verse*, ed. J.R. Watson (London: Dent, 1982), pp. 59-61 (p.61)

noxious effluvia existed, there too would be found the seed-beds of disease, had as its corollary the avoidance of dirt and the importance of cleanliness. Later in the century English bacteriologists made remarkable contributions to science, but one would have to say that the most characteristic attitude prevailing in the medical profession was one of almost anti-intellectual pragmatism. (Wohl, 72)

Cholera was indeed contracted from water, but not through any gaseous emissions. Haley, for example, relates that 'in Soho's St. Anne's parish[...]the faeces of an infant stricken with cholera washed down into the water reserve from which the local pump drew, and almost all those using the pump were infected' (9).

The insidious and invisible nature of the imagined miasma, alongside its high incidence in the dirtier and poorer districts, also provided the opportunity for the identification of dirt and disease with moral degradation. For instance, an *Edinburgh Review* article of 1850, 'Supply of Water to the Metropolis', had as one of its page headings the claim that 'Districts of Filth are Districts of Crime'.⁵⁷ This equation of the physical with the psychological, or moral behaviour, was, as Haley observes, due to the emergence of a holistic approach to medicine:

The emergence of a physiological psychology, together with a psychological approach to medicine, fostered the conviction that the health of the body and that of the mind were interdependent. (4)

This would seem, like Chambers' *Vestiges*, to be signifying a kind of reconciliation between mind and body. But in this case it is a synthesis of body and mind without any necessarily religious connotations. Indeed, it might be said that it materialises the mind. The identification of squalor with moral filth was a socially deterministic theory that relied on a

57 W. O'Brien, 'Supply of Water to the Metropolis', *Edinburgh Review*, 91 (April 1850), pp. 377-408.

materialistic view of man. In opposition to the Presbytery's view that man (made in God's image) was at the mercy of God's whims, most reformers believed that man was a product of circumstance and that disease (real and moral) could be cured through stringent sanitary controls and a better water system. Responsibility for disease was then transferred from a vengeful God to man. However, as I shall discuss in chapter 5, a desire for sanitary reform and belief in God were not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Scientific progress may have been a major influence on the decline in religious belief in the nineteenth century, but, as Carlyle suggests when he describes his society as mechanistic in its thinking in 'Signs of the Times', it was a manifestation of a larger intellectual and cultural movement which lay emphasis on the material nature of man. However, it is also important to note that any conflict between faith and doubt could only take place in a society which had not entirely abandoned religion. Gerald Parsons notes that 'Victorian Britain was, indeed, a society remarkable for the extent and intensity of its religious life' and James R. Moore suggests that the irreligion which was embraced by secularists in the 'golden age of Secularism in the 1880's', 'depended on the robust well-being of the religion on which it was parasitic'.⁵⁸ James Anthony Froude summed up the atmosphere of increasing doubt and anxiety when he remembers his feelings of the 1840s:

All around us, the intellectual lightships had broken from their moorings, and it was then a new and trying experience. The present generation which has grown up in an open spiritual ocean, which has got used to it has learned to swim for itself, will never know what it was to find the lights all

⁵⁸ Gerald Parsons, 'Introduction: Victorian Religion, Paradox and Variety', in *Religion in Victorian Britain*, 4 vols, ed. Gerald Parsons (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), I, 1 - 13 (p. 5); James R. Moore, 'Freethought, Secularism, Agnosticism: 'The Case of Charles Darwin'', in *Religion in Victorian Britain*, I, 274-319 (p. 275).

drifting, the compasses all awry, and nothing left to steer by except the stars.⁵⁹

Froude's expression of his religious crisis, *Nemesis of Faith* (1849), was indicative of a general movement in Victorian intellectual thinking, where Christian dogma seemed too strict for a time which was embracing personal choice and rational enquiry. It would be difficult to identify the exact causes of the crisis of faith which affected many Victorians, but some possibilities do present themselves.

The rationalistic thinking of the eighteenth-century provided a legacy for the nineteenth century, with treatises such as David Hume's 'Of Miracles' providing a model for what Houghton refers to as the 'rise of the critical spirit':

What Mill called 'the disposition to demand the *why* of everything' was a direct inheritance from the eighteenth-century philosophers, notably from Voltaire and Hume, but its immediate Victorian source was Bentham. (Houghton, 94)

Of course Carlyle's hostile opinion of Bentham is evident throughout his writing and his relationship with the writing of Voltaire and Hume was one of both fascination and horror.⁶⁰ As he claims in the biographical section of *Sartor Resartus*, in which Teufelsdröckh's early reading reflects his own, it is those sceptical ideas which question the 'Evidences of religious Faith' which engender doubt (*Works*, 1: 89). That Hume was a major influence on the thinking of the century, or at least was believed to be by Carlyle, is suggested when a stranger

59 James Anthony Froude, *Thomas Carlyle: A History of his Life in London*, 2 vols (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1884), 1: 290-291.

60 Jessop indicates in his chapter on 'Wotton Reinfred' that Carlyle, although worried by Hume's scepticism, advised his brother 'to retain something of that shrewd independence of mind which, under another description, might equally be called self-sufficient Scotch scepticism', (p. 113).

in 'Wotton Reinfred' claims that 'everywhere, disguise it as we may - in the senate, the press, the pulpit, the parlour, and the market -- David Hume is ruler of the world'.⁶¹

As we shall see in chapter 5 of this thesis, both Carlyle and Kingsley engage with the ideas on miracles which Hume propounded, essaying to provide an alternative reading which allows for the miraculous without the tinge of superstition that attended the notion of an interventionist or capricious God. In the spirit of inquiry which rationalist thinking encouraged, the question over the incidence of miracles, and other superstitious elements of Christian dogma, such as the idea of 'a God who was sometimes represented as threatening eternal punishment as the ultimate deterrent to disbelief', meant that writers attempted to provide new ways of maintaining religious belief -- 'A liberal effort to free the mind from these "Hebrew old clothes" seemed to many thinkers the major need of the age' (Jay, 99; Houghton, 49). For Froude it was Carlyle who provided a way of rejecting the old and creating the new as 'dogma and tradition had melted like a mist, and the awful central fact [of God's reality and moral law] burnt clear once more in the midst of heaven' (Houghton, 49).

However, with the critical floodgates open, for some, the certainty which they hoped would attend a new faith was never realised. Works which sought to clarify faith were often instrumental in perpetuating the atmosphere of anxiety. One crucial text was David Friedrich Strauss's *Das Leben Jesu*, which George Eliot translated in 1846 and which 'demolished the supernatural element in Christianity through a combination of logic, textual criticism and historical analysis'.⁶² Whereas eighteenth-century philosophy had denied the miraculous element of the Gospels and 'either produced even more fantastic naturalistic explanations or proceeded to claim that Christian faith was based on a lie', Strauss examined why they had

61 'Wotton Reinfred', in *Last Words of Thomas Carlyle* (London: Longmans, Green, 1892), p. 54. For further discussion of Hume's place in Carlyle's writing see Jessop, who also refers to this quotation from 'Wotton Reinfred', (Jessop, p.116)

62 Jenny Uglow, *George Eliot* (London: Virago, 1996), p.38.

come to be believed and suggested they could 'best be explained as "myths"' (Jay, 102; Uglow, 38). As Jay points out, however, 'despite his desire to produce a positive critique Strauss's own faith did not survive' (103). The effect of spending months pouring over her translation also took its toll on Eliot who told her friend Cara Bray that 'it made her ill dissecting the beautiful story of the crucifixion' (Uglow, 38). Eliot, although she would continue to engage intellectually with Christianity, retained the notions of love and morality exemplified in Christ's life and teachings.

However, it was not only intellectuals and writers who experienced religious doubt. The proliferation of faiths which Jay has examined illustrates the anxiety of an age which was reluctant to give up the moral authority of religion, and yet sought for faiths which would appeal to its individual wants. Creeds embraced stretched from Evangelicalism with its 'insistence on the primacy of the individual's relationship with his Saviour, maintained through prayer and the search for guidance from Scripture' and its participation in liberal philanthropical projects such as slave emancipation, to the Puritan tradition which Houghton claims was strong in the middle classes and which put an emphasis on the religious significance of work (Jay, 1; Houghton, 247). Under the label of Dissent there were a number of 'doctrinal variations' although it was often linked to political dissent, 'the uneducated and violently emotional *or* the parochial expression of the complacent philistinism associated with classes in trade' (Jay, 76). Creeds such as Unitarianism stressed the moral and emotional aspects of spirituality over the doctrinal as did the religion of Humanity which Eliot was to embrace on rejecting the Evangelicalism of her youth.

The anxiety attendant on the decline of the authority of the Church was also exhibited in a concern over the civil unrest which might result from atheism:

What gave edge to these general speculations on the causal relationship of disbelief and disorder was their particular application to the lower classes. For 'everyone' agreed that any discarding of the Christian sanctions of duty, obedience, patience under suffering, and brotherly love was obviously 'fraught with grievous danger to property and the State'. (Houghton, 59)⁶³

James R. Moore notes that, under the conditions precipitated by the industrial revolution and its effect on living and working conditions a 'maelstrom of radical freethought[...]tore many of the more thoughtful working people from their Christian moorings during the 1830s and 1840s' (281). In an article, attributed to R.H. Hutton, on 'The Religion of the Working Classes' (1859), reference is made to the skilled workers whose 'political or socialistic reaction from Religion' was due to their viewing it as 'something humiliating to man, hostile to unreserved assertions of absolute rights, closely identified with what are held to be oppressive institutions, and, in short, fundamentally unfavourable to the notion that it lies with men to make a clear sweep of existing order, and to substitute their own arrangements for equality and brotherhood as they may think best'.⁶⁴ In contrast he speaks of the 'uncultured labourer [who] will not appreciate the various subtle questions of philosophical theory, of historic evidence, of theological controversy', and suggests that their hunger after the supernatural is blunted by 'physical toil' and the desire for pleasure:

"My mate and I were working in a pit," said a railway navvy to the kindly authoress of a recent and very popular work, "and says he, 'I wonder, Bill, whether it is true what they say of heaven being so happy - whether now it can be happier than sitting in the public over a good jug of ale, with a fiddle going?'" (173)

⁶³ Houghton quotes here from *Reminiscences* by E. Belfort Bax.

⁶⁴ [R.H Hutton], 'The Religion of the Working Classes', *National Review* VIII (January 1859), pp. 167-197 (p. 176). Rodger Tarr attributes this article to Hutton in *Thomas Carlyle A Bibliography of English Language Criticism 1824-1974* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976).

In both cases of skilled and 'uncultured' workers, the complaint is the same. A general discontent with the material condition of the lower classes and a belief that religion could not assuage that want. Houghton points out that, on top of the 'skeptical character of radical thought' religious discontent was due to 'the prejudice against the Church raised by the general adherence of the clergy to Tory and aristocratic principles' and 'the neglect of the new town population by the Church of England' (59). The reaction to this perceived threat of danger can be found, in particular, in two religious movements; the Christian socialists (a movement with which Kingsley was closely allied) and Newman's Oxford Tractarians (a group with whom Kingsley was, at first, fascinated, and latterly, in conflict). The Christian Socialist movement, whose most famous member was F.D. Maurice, stressed 'the unity of men in Christ' and desired to reconnect the Church of England with the needs and desires of the working man (Jay, 61). Kingsley consistently criticised the Church for denying the link between the secular and the religious. However, although he supported the Chartist movement, writing under the persona of Parson Lot in *Politics for the People*, he was also worried over the threat to order which they posed. At a Chartist meeting during which the Church was attacked as ineffectual and hostile to their cause, Kingsley stood up and asserted that he was 'a Church of England parson[...]and a Chartist'.⁶⁵ His belief that a return to spiritual values would furnish social reform without recourse to violence coloured his treatment of the Chartist rising of 1848 in the novel *Alton Locke*. Hutton's article on *The Religion of the Working Classes* takes Carlyle's 'Chartism' as one of its points of reference and identifies his concern with the danger of a working class given no spiritual guidance (176-177).

65 Guy Kendall, *Charles Kingsley and His Ideas* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1947), p. 50.

The Tractarian movement, under the guidance of Newman, reacted to the religious crisis in a slightly different manner in stressing that Anglicanism must return to the authority and ritualistic theology of the Catholic elements within the Church. Newman was, of course, eventually to convert to Catholicism and his advocacy of a devotional life which embraced asceticism was to set him on a collision course with Kingsley who, as I shall discuss further in chapter 3, rounded on the Tractarian movement and Newman as a focus for his own concern over the relationship between religious faith and the desire for sexual love. Kingsley's perception of the Tractarian movement and its 'Manicheism' was bound up with his religious faith and his personal life, but his sexual anxiety should be viewed within a wider context. Both Carlyle and Kingsley lived in a time which we have come to view as sexually repressed and, in chapter 3, I shall look at the way in which they consider issues of sex and love within their writing. But to finish this discussion of the elements within Victorian culture which focussed on issues of body and soul, I want to consider some of its attitudes towards the sexual body.

In his *History of Sexuality* Michel Foucault says:

It may well be that we talk about sex more than anything else; we set our minds to the task; we convince ourselves that we have never said enough on the subject, that, through inertia or submissiveness, we conceal from ourselves the blinding evidence, and that what is essential always eludes us, so that we must always start out once again in search of it.⁶⁶

Foucault's identification of the 'immense verbosity' of our culture in considering sex might also be applied to the amount of literature which deals with the sexual mores and practices of

⁶⁶ Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction* (London: Penguin, 1976), p. 33

the Victorians -- 'The Victorians and sex have been exhaustingly, if not exhaustively, written about'.⁶⁷ Foucault, however, points out that this discourse, contrary to popular perception, is *not* a marked contrast to the nineteenth century:

When one looks back over these last three centuries with their continual transformations, things appear in a very different light: around and apropos of sex, one sees a veritable discursive explosion. (17)

But Michael Mason sounds a cautionary note when he identifies the limitations of Foucault's study:

Foucault's stress on the ever-growing torrent of published opinion on sex in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries leads him to reject the 'repressive hypothesis'. According to him, there are more affinities than points of difference between the repressive sexual discourse of 1800 and the anti-repressive discourse of 1900. It will be seen that Foucault does not doubt the repressive hypothesis because he doubts that men's and women's sexuality were repressed: rather he shifts attention away from the matter of behaviour altogether, to focus on 'sex' (as opposed to 'sexuality', bodies' and 'pleasures') in the sense of the topic or subject of a certain domain of discourse.⁶⁸

Mason's attack on Foucault's reinvention of Victorian sex reveals the problem faced when trying to give an account of nineteenth century sexuality. How do we assess something which must be so multifarious? Is there a link between beliefs and practices or, indeed, between professed and private beliefs and practices?⁶⁹ Reading for this section on sex, both in modern critical works and nineteenth century books and journals, I found, as so often happens when

67 Roy Porter and Lesley Hall, *The Facts of Life: The Creation of Sexual Knowledge in Britain 1650-1950* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 132.

68 Michael Mason, *The Making of Victorian Sexuality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 172.

69 See, Mason, chapter 2, 'Sex in Society', the first section entitled 'Can Sexual Moralism be Detected', pp. 37-48.

studying Victorian culture, that there was such a proliferation of ideas and points of view that no simple conclusion could be reached. It would have been convenient, but not quite satisfying, if a clear duality between sexuality and spirituality had been evident, but the view that Victorian society was split between those who behaved and those who did not can have little currency. What I want to do is to consider some of the evidence and points of view given by modern commentators along with nineteenth century non-fictional writing (keeping in mind that the latter cannot possibly represent the sexual ideas or habits of all society) to show that there was an awareness, indeed an anxiety, about the sexual body in the society in which Carlyle and Kingsley lived and wrote. They were part of a culture in which sex was neither invisible nor silent.

Steven Marcus's book *The Other Victorians*, 'a study of sexuality and pornography in mid-nineteenth century England', begins by trying to make clear the status of those 'others':

In part their otherness has to do with the nature of their interests; in part it has to do with the way they went about expressing those interests. At the same time, however, this otherness was of a specific Victorian kind, a kind that was of interest to the Victorians themselves and that remains of interest to us as we try to understand the past and ourselves in relation to the past.⁷⁰

Marcus's 'others' here seem to be set in contrast to that rather too familiar society of prudish, respectable Victorians. The variety which was exhibited among different classes and walks of society is reduced to a homogeneous mass. Although Marcus tries to establish a link between the 'others' and their contemporaries, we are still left with the fact that he is presenting us with a marginalised 'sexual subculture' (xix). His subjects are William Acton (a physician of the urinary and generative organs), the purveyors of pornography Pisanus Fraxi

⁷⁰ Steven Marcus, *The Other Victorians* (London: Corgi, 1971), p. xix.

and 'Walter' of *My Secret Life* fame, and a selection of flagellation writers. As Françoise Barret-Ducrocq has it in her study of the sexuality of the working classes, unimaginative studies of Victorian society would have us believe that it had 'nothing to say on sexual matters but left them to the professionals: medical specialists, pornographer and prostitute'.⁷¹ But what then of the culture from which Marcus's subjects obtain their 'otherness'? Houghton suggests that 'the essential character of Victorian love[...was]the passion that was very much tempered by reverence and confined to the home[...]otherwise love was not love but lust' (341). Fraser Harrison too suggests that 'to study Victorian sexuality is, in effect, to trace the evolution of Victorian marriage'.⁷² But how can we be sure of the veracity of this view? Mason points out that, in fact, the nineteenth century was not the great age of marriage we have imagined. Recent work on parish registers suggests that rates of marriage actually declined around 1800 'after more than a century of almost unbroken rise' (Mason, 49). However, this only proves that marriage rates fell, not that a belief in marriage as the correct site for sexual practices was not the norm. Indeed, the acceptable face of sexuality is often presented as the spiritual union of true and legally, if not also religiously, sanctioned love. This image is maintained from the passion of Coventry Patmore's *Angel in the House* to the moral tracts of sexual science which advocate marital sex over illicit connections:

The whole being of the man cries out, at this period of his life, for, not the indiscriminate indulgence, but the regulated use of his matured sexual powers. And at this time, therefore, but *not before*, the medical man will recommend marriage.⁷³

71 Françoise Barret-Ducrocq, *Love in the Time of Victoria*, trans. John Howe (New York: Penguin, 1991), p. 1.

72 Fraser Harrison, *The Dark Angel* (London: Sheldon Press, 1977), p. 3.

73 William Acton, *The Functions and Disorders of the Reproductive Organs* (London: John Churchill & sons, 1865), p. 79.

Victorian society, if we are to take these accounts as indicative of behaviour, consisted of two exclusive types of sexuality; that which was sanctified by marriage and morally acceptable (with some reservations which we will come to) and a morally degenerate lust which lurked at the edges of society. But William Acton, somewhat in contrast to his moralistic assertion above, does provide a view of mid-nineteenth century life that suggests there was contact between the dark and light sides of Victorian London. Describing a scene at an East End Music Hall, Acton comments:

On the stage some interesting drama was going on, while the spectators drank and smoked; the majority were men, but they were in many instances accompanied by their wives and sweethearts. To make observations on the latter was my object, and I noted that in and out of the passages and bar were passing crowds of well-dressed women, according to East End fashions; some were prostitutes, but many were married women, according to the belief of my informants. *This curious amalgamation -- this elbowing of vice and virtue -- constituted a very striking feature, and was to me a novel one.*⁷⁴ [My italics]

Acton's observations suggest, then, that the acceptable and unacceptable faces of Victorian sexuality often met eye to eye. His scene presents the meeting together in public of respectable couples (albeit from the lower classes), working girls and prostitutes. Indeed, Acton goes so far as to suggest that the gap between immorality and respectability was not entirely unbreachable:

I prove that the great mass of prostitutes in this country are in course of time absorbed into the so-called respectable classes, and I maintain that they assume the characters of wives and mothers with a greater or lesser degree of unsoundness in their bodies and pollution in their minds. (Prostitution, xi)

⁷⁴ William Acton, *Prostitution Considered in its Moral, Social and Sanitary Aspects*, (London: Churchill, 1870), p. 23.

In contrast to the moral strictures of his work on the reproductive organs, Acton's work on prostitutes is fairly liberal in its recognition that 'to put down prostitution by law is to attempt the impossible' (7). Instead he advocates a number of reforms to make the existence of the prostitute safer for herself and the public. However, his work is not without a hectoring moral tone even here. In his description of the music hall and assertion that most prostitutes are 'absorbed' into respectable life it is evident that married love is still considered as desirable. The unsoundness of body and pollution of mind which he detects in prostitutes suggests a link between physical and moral inferiority which is also reflected in a report on prostitution in the *Westminster Review* of 1850. William Rathbone Gregg, although again aware of and sympathetic to the causes of prostitution, reveals a moralistic tone which describes the prostitute as unnatural, indeed bestial, while also insisting that overindulgence within marriage is far from perfect:

Sexual indulgence, however guilty in its circumstances, however tragic in its results, is, when accompanied by love, a sin *according to nature*; fornication is a sin *against nature*; its peculiarity and heinousness consist of divorcing from all feeling of love that which was meant by nature as the last and intensest expression of passionate love; in its putting asunder that which God has joined; in its reducing the deepest gratification of unreserved affection to a mere momentary and brutal indulgence; in its making that only one of our appetites, which is redeemed from mere *animality* by the hallowing influence of the better and tenderer feelings with which nature has connected it, *as animal as all the rest*. It is a voluntary exchange of the passionate love of a spiritual and intellectual being, for the mere hunger and thirst of the beast.⁷⁵

Gregg's describing the sexual appetite as animal-like nicely illustrates the dualistic view of the body versus the soul. Eighteenth century discussions on the soul had centred around

⁷⁵ William Rathbone Gregg, 'Prostitution', *Westminster Review* vol. 53 (1850), pp. 448-506 (p. 450). Reprinted in the collection *Prostitution in the Victorian Age* with an introduction by Keith Nield (Farnborough: Gregg, 1973).

man's difference from the animals, the argument being over whether the soul was a divinely invested faculty exclusive to man.⁷⁶ Sex, as far as Gregg appears to be concerned, is acceptable, if not perfect, when practised spiritually (as part of a loving, legal union) but without that sanction it becomes bestial and wrong.

But without this transforming influence, is sex just bad? It is generally portrayed as such, although the limitations of the sexual discourses available make it difficult to assess society as a whole. Acton exhibits an opposition to sexual incontinence on medical grounds, for instance when he advises the inspection of prostitutes for venereal diseases and worries about the effect, both moral and physical, on groups such as the army. And in a passage from his book on the reproductive organs, the link between medical and moral judgement is exhibited in the familiar Victorian preoccupation with the dangers of onanism:

The symptoms which mark the commencement of the practice are too clear for an experienced eye to be deceived. As Lallemand remarks: 'However young the children may be, they get thin, pale and irritable, and their features become haggard. We notice the sunken eye, the long, cadaverous looking-countenance, the downcast look which seems to arise from a consciousness that their habits are suspected, and, at a later period, that their virility is lost. (8)

Concern over schoolboy masturbation is apparent as a subtext to Matthew Arnold's anxiety over the vice encouraged within the public school system, a point also broached in a pamphlet entitled *The Science of Life* (probably written by the dissenting minister Mark Rutherford) which regrets that 'schoolboys are so liable to have their imaginations excited by the filthy passages that constantly occur in classical authors'.⁷⁷ For thirty-two pages the pamphlet details the way in which masturbation affects both mind and body:

⁷⁶ See, the Introduction to *Man Machine and Other Writings*, p. xi, which gives a good overview of the main arguments.

⁷⁷ 'Public schools are the very seats and nurseries of vice' (*Arnold of Rugby*, ed. by J.J.

It is hardly possible to exaggerate the extent of this frightful evil of self-abuse. In some of our private schools, where boys are not kept beyond fifteen or sixteen years old, the practice is almost universal. It forms the subject of ordinary talk, and is carried on almost without a thought of shame. The bigger boys practise it openly, often ostentatiously, very often without any attempt at concealment except from the eyes of the masters, and the younger ones soon learn it from them[...]Constant indigestion is, perhaps, the commonest result of self-abuse; and with this come continual dizziness and headache, enfeebled hearing and eyesight; the victim grows pale and sickly[...]But beyond this general enfeeblement of the system, there are two inevitable results of any abuse of the sexual powers. The mind of such an offender is never quite free from the dominion of evil thoughts, nor his body from the pollution of involuntary seminal emissions. (10-16)

The pamphlet continues, in a somewhat hysterical tone, to list sodomy and masturbatory voyeurism as among the sins indulged in public schools and even suggests that sexual indulgence can be detected by sports' trainers who 'are able to read the signs of fornication in the style of a man's rowing the morning after the act' (25). This fear over the effect of sexual incontinence on the body might well have been one of the sources for the Victorian enthusiasm for physical hardiness and sporting endeavour. The pamphlet's advocacy of exercise as a preventative or remedial measure is based on the assertion that sedentary habits encourage masturbation. But the exhortation to follow a strict physical regime, including washing the genitals 'every morning in *cold* water', also suggests a desire to assert the will in an act of bodily mortification (24).

Further sexual acts which were considered physically and morally damaging, by Acton and others, were nocturnal emissions (viewed by Acton as a 'safety valve' but

Findlay [Cambridge: The University Press, 1897] p. 128). Arnold's remarks are from a sermon delivered in Rugby Chapel; [Mark Rutherford], *The Science of Life* (London: J. Burns, 1877), p.17. The pamphlet is subtitled as addressed to 'all members of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge'.

nevertheless undesirable), marital excess, and extramarital fornication.⁷⁸ But what was it that produced this moral climate? Roy Porter and Lesley Hall draw attention to the influence of religion on sexual mores:

What is clear is that the changes in moral and social climate which one may associate with Evangelicalism helped shift the sexual debate away from the Georgian 'pleasures of procreation' in the direction of a new emphasis on public character and civic probity, a realisation of love over sensuality, of the moral law over personal impulse or the vertigo of sensibility. (126)

But the debate over public sexuality was also dictated by secular concerns such as social stability. The overcrowding created by industrialism, especially among the working class, raised worries about the moral propriety of close living, as Barret-Ducrocq points out:

Contemporary observers of working-class morals inevitably drew [the conclusion] that there was a close link between living conditions and the development of sexual licence:
*The grossest immorality is the necessary result of their promiscuously crowded habitations.*⁷⁹

But the population increase also provoked a debate which was part of a larger identification of sexuality and economics in Victorian society:

Plagued by fears of overpopulation, moralists swayed by the Malthusian arguments no longer saw the slightest reason for advertising the pleasures of procreation; instead they emphasized the irresponsibility and immorality of procreation and hence sex except under the most stringent conditions (moral principle, financial security). (Porter, 127)

⁷⁸ *The Functions and Disorders of the Reproductive Organs*, p. 153.

⁷⁹ Barret-Ducrocq, pp. 15-16. She quotes here from *The London City Mission Magazine*, 'Westminster', vol. X (1845), p. 162.

Foucault too makes a link between sexual repression and capitalism:

By placing the advent of the age of repression in the seventeenth century, after a hundred years of open spaces and free expression, one adjusts it to coincide with the development of capitalism: it becomes an integral part of the bourgeois order. (*History of Sexuality*, 5)

It is Foucault's contention that the utilitarian society jettisons that which is not economically useful (4). Prostitutes are involved in a business transaction, but they also help to maintain marriage and family life which is central to bourgeois economics. Marriages are maintained and hereditary ownership perpetuated through the double standard which allows men to use prostitutes for the sex which their repressed wives deny. However, this economics of sex can also be seen in the way in which Victorian sexual discourse discusses the wasting of male energy. Porter and Hall point out that Acton was concerned not only with the lack of self-discipline which onanism engendered, but also with the 'physiological harm wrought by seminal loss' (142-143). However, there also appears to be a utilitarian ideal contained in the notion that sperm, and the energy used in expending it, must be preserved for a proper, social use:

The man who has at any period of life abused himself has in that act sacrificed something of his vigour and energy, and enfeebled in some degree his powers of life and mind[...]He will find himself at all times more easily and powerfully affected by those causes which disturb the vital economy. (*Science of Life*, 15)

The effect of this loss of vital energy on the male and, indeed, on society is evident in the claim that the man who indulges in self-abuse or sexual incontinence 'finds that after such indulgence he is unable to work, either physically or mentally, with his accustomed vigour' (*Science of Life*, 25). And, although the author points out that 'the injurious effects of

masturbation are due not so much to the loss of the semen expended as to the exhaustion of the nervous system caused by the *orgasm*', it is clear that semen is viewed as a commodity that must be used 'to serve the purpose for which only it exists', marital procreation (20):

He will regard the act of reproduction as the most important that a man is ever called upon to perform, and will enter upon it, not hurriedly, and to gratify his selfish lust, but after solemn and deliberate preparation, that he may worthily summon a new life into the world; and, throughout his boyhood and youth he will prepare himself diligently for the time when he must discharge the high duties of parentage. (22)

This returns us to the notion that sexual behaviour is only acceptable under certain conditions. And, although I have suggested that there is an element of social utility discernible in the exhortation to preserve energy, the claim that procreation is a solemn duty leads us back to the religious notion of sex as acceptable only through a rejection of gratuitous bodily pleasure (indeed, if the piece *is* by Rutherford, we must note his status as a dissenting minister). Indeed, that attitudes toward sex were also part of a larger denial of physical pleasure is evident in the pamphlet's linking sexual desire with 'the nature and the quantity of our food':

The dining, drinking and sexual indulgence which are practised with unvarying regularity by too many of our young men of the middle classes, who take little or no exercise, are acting as surely, though perhaps slowly, against the *mens sana in corpore sano* of this generation, as the opposite system which I recommend of bodily labour and organised abstemiousness would tend to its maintenance. (26)

I began this exploration of Victorian attitudes towards body and soul by contending that the age could be characterised as, generally, material or physical. However, as my discussion of sexuality, and indeed of religion, shows there was a great deal of anxiety over the body and a desire to emphasise the spiritual element within man. And it is this collision

between the bodily and spiritual elements which provides the impetus for both Carlyle and Kingsley's writing on the body and soul. In chapters three, four and five, I shall discuss some of the ways in which both writers treat some of the social and political issues which I have raised in this section, alongside some of their more personal concerns. However, an overarching concern of this thesis will be, not only to look at the themes which both writers are concerned with, but also to examine the styles and approaches they employ in managing their ideas on the relationship between body and soul. Therefore before I can proceed to make any comparisons or contrasts between their work, or to consider in what ways Kingsley's treatment of body and soul was influenced by Carlyle's, it is necessary to establish the dualistic credentials of Carlyle's writing and to consider how his treatment of body and soul is an integral element of his style.

Chapter 2

'The Sarcasm of Eternity': Carlyle's Dualism

In this chapter I will examine what dualism means to Carlyle and how he articulates it. The main text for this chapter will be *Sartor Resartus* (1833-4) because it so consciously and sustainedly explores dualistic ideas, but it is also a text which is too often read only in the light of Carlyle's interest in German Transcendentalism. Harrold's *Carlyle and German Thought* concedes that specific ideas within Carlyle's writing 'might well have come to him through the processes of his own thought, or through his reading in works other than German', but, as Jessop points out, studies of the German influence on Carlyle have well outbalanced, for instance, those on his interest in Scotch scepticism.¹ Harrold is at pains to point out that there is a tendency among critics 'to over-estimate [Carlyle's] debt to German writers' with the influence of Idealism being 'over-stressed by those attracted to the philosophical passages in *Sartor*' (4). However his seminal work sets a course for critics to emphasise the German influence. Other studies, such as Rosemary Ashton's *The German Idea*, have provided a valuable contribution to Carlyle studies, but Jessop's book, by addressing the lack of work on Carlyle's Scottishness has shown how new approaches can further our understanding of Carlyle's writing. It will not be my point to argue against the German influence, but to consider the complexities of a text which so often professes transcendental ideals but which consistently undermines them.

However, it is not entirely the case that studies of Carlyle's reading of German writers ignore his dualistic notions. Rosemary Ashton, for instance, suggests that, from

¹ Harrold, p. 4; Jessop, p. 7.

Kant, Carlyle 'took what he thought was a proof of the ideality of time and space, which allowed him to voice his dualism rhapsodically'.² In an essay on Carlyle's life and works which was commissioned by the editor of the periodical *Unsere Zeit* in 1866, Friedrich Althaus was the first critic to appreciate the influence of German philosophy on Carlyle's work, although he does not present him as an undiluted transcendentalist. Speaking of *Sartor Resartus* Althaus says:

The contrast between the idealism and the actual condition of things in the state, in the church, and in society, the application of the philosophy of cloths to human history, from Eden and fig-leaves right up to the latest manifestation in the sect of our modern dandies, opens a limitless field to humour.³

Althaus repeatedly refers to dualistic tendencies within Carlyle's work, invoking the image of light and dark, 'chiaroscuro', which has so often been applied to his writing.⁴ Althaus attributes Carlyle's humorous style (which is an integral component of his dualistic outlook as will become evident presently) to the influence of Jean Paul Friedrich Richter. But, this aside, he makes no links between German philosophy and dualism.

This task has been undertaken instead by a modern scholar, Tom Lloyd, who claims that, in *Schiller* (1824), Carlyle considers the body and soul as irreconcilable

² Rosemary Ashton, *The German Idea* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p.100.

³ Friedrich Althaus, 'Thomas Carlyle. A Biographical and Literary Portrait', in *Two Reminiscences of Thomas Carlyle*, ed. by John Clubbe (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1974), p. 84.

⁴ See, for instance, Basil Willey: 'Carlylese is as distinct a dialect as Miltonics, though a style as Gothic in its chiaroscuro as Milton's is classical in its inversions and intonations'. (*Nineteenth Century Studies* [London: Chatto & Windus, 1949], p.104)

elements, where the body is evil and must be overcome to allow the spirit's ascendancy. And he identifies the spiritual and physical suffering that Carlyle was undergoing in this period with Schiller's own problems: 'In *Schiller* Carlyle regards the German's diseased body as an impediment over which his will has to gain a moral victory' (480). However, he charts the movement in Carlyle's thought, through notebooks, letters and essays, to accepting that body and soul, 'good and evil might be opposed but not hostile' (481). Whereas, in the 1824 *Schiller*, Carlyle viewed human existence as 'clearly divided [...]between light and darkness', in the later essay 'Schiller' (1829) a 'more complex interpretation of man's psychological contradictions' emerges (485, 487). Lloyd explains this movement in thought mainly in terms of Carlyle's reading of German writers such as Schiller, Goethe and Richter, whereas Jessop identifies Carlyle's interest in Scotch philosophy as providing a solution to the dualism of body and soul.

Jessop demonstrates the importance to Carlyle of both Hume's sceptical philosophy and that of Thomas Reid. Further we are told that Carlyle's admiration for and friendship with Sir William Hamilton introduced him to that philosopher's theory of natural dualism. Jessop's findings support Lloyd's in attributing to Carlyle a similar view of the mind/body relationship. In *Sartor Resartus*, according to Jessop, Carlyle followed Reid and Hamilton in refusing to 'posit mind and body as contradictory of one another in which their distinction consisted in a relationship of absolute opposition such that whatever is bodily is *not* mental and vice versa' (72). Lloyd and Jessop identify the influence of two philosophical movements on Carlyle's dualistic viewpoint, the German tradition and the Scottish. However it is not my intention to discuss dualism from a purely philosophical standpoint. Rather than merely repeating Church dogma on the

relationship between body and soul, Carlyle grapples throughout his writing with a philosophical or intellectual debate which has existential implications.

In contrast with this view, Joseph Sigman claims that 'Carlyle's portrayal of the divine suggests that the imagery of warring opposites does not indicate a system of philosophical dualism'.⁵ Rather, Sigman suggests, Carlyle's is 'a description of the world in terms of polarity':

In such a world, a superior order harmonizes what seem on one level of experience to be irreconcilables. Polarity differs from dualism in that it sees opposites as not totally different and mutually exclusive, but rather as alternations in a single process, areas of differing tension within one dynamic field. (213)

Sigman's argument is persuasive, but his differentiation between dualism and polarity is suspect. Sigman's comparison between philosophical dualism and 'a Calvinist conception of the universe', suggests that he defines 'dualism' narrowly, as Jessop suggests:

I also want to modify Sigman's view somewhat by suggesting that, while he is right that 'a dualistic pattern of divine humanity and demonic nature [of mutual contradictories] is far too simple' an explanation of the use of polar opposites in *Sartor*, such opposites are at first established in the text in order that their resolution into a unity of polarity may later be attained. Furthermore, this resolution, though it does not abolish conflict, reconstrues the fundamental dualism of mind and body in terms of that philosophical dualism peculiar to Common-Sense philosophy, as interpreted by Hamilton, not as *contradictories* which could and *had* to be explained in terms of either an identification of mind and body or 'an *analogy of existence*', but as *contraries* or *correlates*. (170 - 171)

⁵ "“Diabolico-angelical Indifference” The Imagery of Polarity in *Sartor Resartus*", p. 213.

Jessop's work explores the claim of Common-sense philosophers, especially Hamilton, that the dualistic condition is warranted by our consciousness of a self and a not self.

When I concentrate my attention in the simplest act of Perception, I return from my observation with the most irresistible conviction, of *two* facts, or rather, two branches of the *same* fact; - that *I am*, - and that *something different from me exists*.⁶

Although I have questioned Sigman's limited definition of dualism, his recognition of the complexities of Carlyle's dualism is comparable to Lloyd's, and indeed Jessop's, claims that Carlyle's conception of body and soul is more than a system of 'clearly divided contrasts between light and darkness' (Lloyd, 485). As Lloyd points out, Carlyle came to accept that the concept of the body as bad, or diseased, implied in itself the possibility that the body might be good or healthy (483). Indeed, Lloyd points out that, in *Sartor Resartus*, 'the professor's divisions are far more volatile and, as the conservative Editor laments, difficult to interpret' (485). A quotation from 'Signs of the Times' elucidates this point by showing Carlyle's belief that, although body and soul are differing elements in man, any attempt to separate them is ultimately impossible. Speaking of the Dynamical (inner) and Mechanical (outer) he says:

To define the limits of these two departments of man's activity, which work into one another, and by means of one another, so intricately and inseparably, were by its nature an impossible attempt. (*Works*, 27:73)

⁶ Hamilton, *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform*, 2nd edn (London: Brown, Green and Longmans; Edinburgh: MacLachlan and Stewart, 1853), p. 55.

But no matter how impossible a project Carlyle may have recognised this to be, he does find a manner of articulating the mutual, but difficult, relationship between the two. As Lloyd points out:

From the early 1820s he wondered whether what seemed evil or at least an impediment to the soul might not paradoxically be the means of defeating moral adversity. He eventually determined that what he termed descendent irony could accomplish this. (481)

This conclusion, that Carlyle's ironic style and attitude towards language, are inherently bound up with his dualism is shared by other critics.

Peter Allan Dale attributes Carlyle's humour to the influence of Richter's theory of the 'inverse sublime'.⁷ One point to make here before moving on is the tendency to attribute Carlyle's ironic humour purely to Richter, as Harrold acknowledges:

That [Carlyle's] description of Richter's style happens also to describe his own does not necessarily imply that he chose Richter as a model; his acknowledgement of the influence of his father's speech, and the echoes in his own works of the styles of Sterne, Swift, and Rabelais, make his formal debt to German literature of secondary significance. (6)

However, might we not go further than Harrold's claim for the influence of his father's humour. As Jessop baldly states in 'Carlyle's Scotch Scepticism', 'Carlyle was a Scot'.⁸

Making generalised claims for the characteristics of any nation is fraught with danger,

⁷ Peter Allan Dale, 'Sartor Resartus and the Inverse Sublime: The Art of Humorous Deconstruction', in *Allegory, Myth and Symbol*, ed. by Morton W. Bloomfield (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 293-312 (p. 307).

⁸ 'Carlyle's Scotch Scepticism: Writing from the Scottish Tradition', *Carlyle Studies Annual* 16 (1996), pp. 25-35 (p. 25)

however, might it not also be true that the ironic and often sceptical tone which characterises Carlyle's writing proceeds partly from the tendency of the Scots to indulge in an often dry, self-deprecating, sarcastic humour. Carlyle certainly developed his biting rhetoric at Edinburgh University (Kaplan makes the point that he was dubbed 'The Dean', a reference to Swift, by his fellow students), an institution steeped in a tradition of lively dialectic debate (Kaplan, 34).

It may be that Carlyle's humour, although formed by family and nationality, was given some theoretical framework through Richter's writing. Concluding his thoughts, Dale asserts:

The humorist shares with the romanticist this longing for the infinite, this sense of the oppressiveness of finitude and all limiting forms. But he is a romanticist manqué. He lacks the ability to satisfy his needs by creating a positive vision of infinite beauty. All that he can do is play with, disrupt, and ultimately 'annihilate' through laughter the forms that fail to satisfy or that oppress him. This is his inverse route to the infinite. (312)

Lloyd too uses the example of the 'inverse sublime' to assess Carlyle's humorous approach to dualism, but the conclusion is slightly different. Whereas Dale suggests that Carlyle's irony is a tool of annihilation in the hands of a man who had an 'essentially Platonic longing to escape the bonds of the senses', Lloyd claims:⁹

It became evident that if good was the inverse of evil, and humor, as Carlyle wrote in 'Jean Paul Friedrich Richter' (1827), 'a sort of inverse sublimity', then unquestionably the spiritual could not exist independently of the real. (487)

⁹ Dale, p. 312.

That Carlyle came to recognise a kind of necessary dualism in the world around him is recognised by Lloyd when he says that Carlyle became 'increasingly fascinated by the "inverses" of things, which for him meant the secret relations between apparent opposites' (486). So, for instance, evil is necessary to good, body to soul and so on. Lloyd claims that the interdependence of body and soul was necessary to Carlyle's conviction that 'destruction had to precede affirmation' and Dale says that 'he annihilates in the faith that beyond all forms there is finally a spiritual force, a sublime entity that survives their destruction and fuels the next generation's efforts to achieve the ideal' (Lloyd, 480; Dale, 312). In Dale's case destruction is achieved through the annihilatory properties of Carlyle's humour, whereas Lloyd is more inclined to portray Carlyle's irony as a way to perceive and articulate the process of destruction and affirmation. I tend to the latter view because, whereas Dale views irony as a route towards the ideal, I shall contend that Carlyle's irony expresses the unavoidable dualism of human existence and the impossibility of any project to eliminate one element in favour of the other. Dale's reference to Carlyle's inability to create the beautiful or ideal suggests an element of failure which I would deny. Rather, I would suggest that Carlyle's writing contains an element of intention which Dale's reading denies. Although Carlyle would claim that unity was the ideal state, it is also true that his writing recognises and articulates the dilemma he saw man facing: 'Everywhere there is Dualism, Equipoise, a perpetual Contradiction dwells in us' (*Works*, 28:27).

Indeed, the title of this chapter comes from a comment by G.K. Chesterton in

which he perfectly encapsulates the manner in which Carlyle's humour was formed, not to destroy, but to give voice to the ironies he perceived in man's predicament as both physical and spiritual:

His supreme contribution, both to philosophy and literature, was his sense of the sarcasm of eternity. Other writers had seen the hope or the terror of the heavens, he alone saw the humour in them.¹⁰

Here Chesterton identifies the seriousness of Carlyle's irony which would later erupt into the more savage humour of the *Latter-Day Pamphlets*. But Chesterton also draws attention to the inter-connectedness of body and soul because, not only does he suggest that humour may be used to illuminate the human condition, but that humour is there, as part of a divine plan. This point of contact between man and heaven is central to Carlyle's dualism because his contention that there are two basic substances, material and spiritual, which 'work into one another, and by means of one another, so intricately and inseparably' is articulated through an ironic voice which produces the ambiguous situation in which the bodily can speak as spiritual and vice versa without either becoming the other or revealing where the division can be drawn.

That *Sartor* does not present life as a simple contrast between body and soul is clear from the proliferation of the text's dualities. The most obvious dualistic facet of the text is to be found in its most conspicuous character, Diogenes Teufelsdröckh. The Professor's name immediately suggests that man is divided into two conflicting elements; the bodily,

¹⁰ G.K. Chesterton, *Varied Types*, (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1903), pp. 111-112.

which would appear to have a lesser value by its being named 'devil's-dung' (Teufelsdröckh), and the 'god-born' (Diogenes). However, it is crucial that Teufelsdröckh is one entity, representing, in his role as Professor of Things in General, the unity of existence. It is interesting that Carlyle's text uses one of the mythological tropes associated with Gnostic sects, the notion of clothing, and exhibits many 'Gnostic' traits. Of course one cannot suggest that Carlyle is making any direct allusions to Gnosticism, although G.B. Tennyson contended that 'there can be no doubt that historically Carlyle belongs to that phase of modern thought that leads ultimately to what Eric Voeglin has stigmatized as modern Gnosticism'.¹¹ Further, Cristina Ossato has drawn attention to Carlyle's use of Plato, whose ideas are a type of non-religious gnosticism, in *Sartor Resartus*.¹² And Carlyle shows that he is not unaware of the issues which surrounded the conflicts and movements between ancient eastern thought and Christian religions. In *Wotton Reinfred* he refers to 'Manicheism', as he does in the 'Dandiacal Body' chapter of *Sartor*, and in *Sartor* he speaks of John of Chrysostom and his saying that 'the true Shekinah is Man', emphasising the god-like over the sinful in man (WR, 82; *Works*, I: 228, 51).¹³ P.F.M. Fontein suggests there are certain qualities which all essentially dualistic systems display, one of which is that they are 'esoteric' (261).

Esotericism is a necessary component of a dualistic viewpoint which recognises that there are two basic, distinct substances and that one, the soul, is of an invisible

¹¹ G.B. Tennyson, *Sartor Called Resartus* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 313.

¹² Cristina Ossato, 'Sartor Resartus, Re-Tailoring Plato's myth of the cave', a paper given at 'The Victorians and Modernity' conference at the Leeds Centre for Victorian Studies, Trinity and All Saints College, from 14-16 July, 1997.

¹³ See Michael Goldberg, 'The True Shekinah is Man', *American Notes and Queries*, 24 (Nov/Dec 1985), pp. 42-44.

nature in contrast to the known and visible world. Because the realm of the soul is invisible it is unknown, and dualistic systems recognise this by presenting the spiritual as mysterious or secretive. For instance, Plato's myth of the cave, based on a dualistic philosophy in which the flesh was of less value than the spirit, represents the soul's imprisonment in the body. The inhabitants of the cave must have a mist removed from their eyes to gain knowledge of their spiritual destiny. For Gnostics too the physical world was of less value than the spiritual, and their quest was to slough off earthly concerns and gain the special knowledge, or *gnosis*, which they saw as man's ultimate goal. It must be stressed, however, that it was believed that this knowledge would not be available to all, a creed also detectable in the notion of the Elect in Calvinism, Carlyle's childhood religion.

Like the Platonic myth of the cave, Gnostic sects used mythical tropes to articulate man's dual nature, one of which was the notion of clothing and unclothing. Of course, as is suggested by Carlyle's quotation of Saint Chrysostom's attack on Manichean thinking, it would seem that an essential difference between Carlyle's dualism and Manicheism is that he does not view body and soul as opposed and irreconcilable. But, as Michael A. Williams has contended, 'Gnostic perceptions of the body were actually more complex than is often recognised' (129). Although it is true that they denigrated the body and its desires, they also made the more 'positive claim' that 'its form was a mirror of the divine' because it was superior to the beasts. And, as Williams points out, 'the body as a "garment" was a widely used metaphor in Antiquity', where 'the clothing is viewed as important, not irrelevant to the self's sense of well-being, its purity' (136-7). Further, the notion of actual material clothing was used as a metaphor for physical existence as a

Gnostic myth recounts:

The redeemed son, lost in the sleep of forgetfulness in a foreign kingdom, has been awakened from amnesia by a revelatory letter from his parents. Remembering once again his royal identity, he rips off the clothing which he had put on upon arrival in this alien land: 'And their dirty and unclean garment I took off and left in their land.' The story reads as an allegory of the soul's descent to and ascent from the body. (Williams, 137)

I do not suggest that Carlyle is directly alluding to Gnostic myths. Rather I would suggest that his use of the clothing metaphor displays his engagement with a tradition of dualistic thinking where unclothing represents the possibility of sloughing off worldly concerns. Further, his approach within *Sartor* displays the esoteric properties associated with dualism by Fontaine. What I mean by esotericism, in Carlyle's case, is his notion that there is a spiritual truth which is, by its mysterious nature, beyond man's knowledge, a notion addressed by Jessop when he asserts that Carlyle embraced Hamilton's notion of nescience or learned ignorance.¹⁴ Steven Helmling, too, refers to Carlyle's style as 'esoteric' and defines his position:

These books aim not to explain a doctrine but to involve us in the activity of wresting illumination from bafflement. They instruct us, if obliquely, in how to read them, thus implicitly criticizing or correcting whatever habits of 'reading' (interpreting, understanding) we had before and suggesting that if our reading is sufficiently sympathetic, generous, and intelligent, we will gain some access to the author's sense of things far more vibrant and alive than a mere expository report could offer.¹⁵

¹⁴ See, Jessop, chapter 5.

¹⁵ *The Esoteric Comedies of Carlyle, Newman and Yeats* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 3.

Like the gaining of the gnosis, which, as Fontaine points out, 'does not lead to redemption; it is redemption itself', Carlyle's text enacts a gaining of knowledge. Rather than provide an answer to spiritual doubt, the reading of the text itself provides a catalyst for reading the world in a new manner. To understand the text is to gain the gnosis, but to do so one has to understand the complexities of the text as a whole.

We are informed by the Editor at the very beginning that Teufelsdröckh's philosophy of clothes, *Die Kleider ihr Werden und Wirkin*, is a difficult work 'of boundless, almost formless contents, a very Sea of Thought; neither calm nor clear'. However, he also suggests that the fit reader may make sense of it when he says, 'yet wherein the toughest pearl-diver may dive to his utmost depth, and return not only with sea-wreck but with true orient's' (6). Later again this point is made as, although it is asserted that Teufelsdröckh 'amid all his perverse cloudiness[...]pierced into the mystery of the World', it is also made clear that the reader is not told what to think (165). He must gain the knowledge himself with the help of the text:

Be it remembered however, that such purport is here not so much evolved as detected to lie ready for evolving. We are to guide our British Friends into the new Gold-country, and shew them the mines; nowise to dig out and exhaust its wealth, which indeed remains for all time inexhaustible. Once there, let each dig for his own behoof, and enrich himself. (165-66)

The reference to the 'toughest pearl-driver' implies that this knowledge is not easily come by, which suggests that, like any secret, it is only open to those with special aptitude, a

point recognised by G.B. Tennyson when he says that Carlyle's use of motifs depends 'in large part on the sensitivity of the reader to Carlyle's method' (200). Of course the Editor's identification of the complexity of the professor's Clothes Philosophy is part of the irony of the text. The text which is *Sartor Resartus* is often of as 'boundless' proportions as *De Kleider* and, although the Editor is at pains to draw attention to his ordering role, meaning is, to a certain extent, forged in the text by the interaction of Teufelsdröckh's ideas and the Editor's comments although the reader's engagement is also of prime importance. In other words, one has to be aware of an overarching voice within the text, Carlyle's, as he uses differing points of view to represent his own thought process. As George Levine has pointed out:

The Editor can also be taken as an aspect (more moderate, less sure of himself) of Carlyle. If Carlyle aspired to be a hero, he recognized in himself on occasion no more than the power to be a hero-worshipper. In this sense, Teufelsdröckh at his best is the man Carlyle aspired to be rather than the man he was.¹⁶

Levine is right in his assessment of the importance of the Editor, who is too often looked on as a humorous example of British anti-idealism or a mere bridging device between Teufelsdröckh and reader. Both these ideas hold a modicum of truth. Indeed, the Editor refers to himself as a 'bridge' (62). But the Editor's practical, and often deflationary, remarks express some of Carlyle's suspicion of the tendency of idealism to threaten the existence of the material: 'Much of the irony of *Sartor* is directed against Germanic high level abstractions' (Levine, 29). Further, the Editor, like Carlyle, is a kind of translator of

¹⁶ Levine, *The Boundaries of Fiction* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 30.

German idealism for the unadventurous British mind. However, we cannot simply oppose the Editor and Teufelsdröckh. The similarity between their style and language has often been commented upon and, without the direction of quotation marks it is sometimes easy to forget where one voice ends and another begins. A.J. LaValley points out that 'Teufelsdröckh and the editor represent double stances of a single mind engaged in a single action - the making of meaning. The two processes move through being, each now aiding and now criticizing the other, for both Editor and Teufelsdröckh represent partially conflicting but supplementary methods of reading the mystery of being'.¹⁷ This is one way in which Carlyle shows how opposing ideas can work in and out of one another, as interpenetration which is articulated through irony; both that within Teufelsdröckh's own discourse and that found in the interaction between his ideas and the Editor's comments:

The Editor can either re-inforce the glory of Teufelsdröckh's philosophy by pointing to the sterility of its narrow opposite or reinforce the danger of Teufelsdröckh's philosophy by showing its leaning toward cant, its failure to conform to the world of common sense. (LaValley, 93)

In 'Getting Under Way' we hear Teufelsdröckh claim that he has given up his ironic ways:

Often, notwithstanding, was I blamed, and by half-strangers hated, for my so-called hardness (*Harte*), my Indifferentism towards men; and the seemingly ironic tone I had adopted, as my favourite dialect in conversation. Alas, the panoply of Sarcasm was but as a buckram-case,

¹⁷ *Carlyle and the Idea of the Modern* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 91.

wherein I had striven to envelope myself; that so my own poor Person might live sage there; and in all friendliness, being no longer exasperated by wounds. Sarcasm I now see to be, in general, the language of the Devil; for which reason I have, long since, as good as renounced it. (104-105)

Teufelsdröckh identifies his irony as a 'buckram-case' which both protects and alienates him from others. Buckram is a linen which, stiffened with glue, was used either in clothing or the binding of books, linking Teufelsdröckh's ironic manner both with the making of the book and its clothes philosophy. The notion of encasing both his book and his ideas suggests that, to understand, we have to penetrate to what lies below this 'seemingly ironic tone'. However, just as the text asserts the usefulness of clothes, it would seem that the ironic tone is essential to its meaning. Teufelsdröckh refers to language as the garment of thought. And if his ironic tone is a kind of clothing, or buckram case, then we might assume that, as well as concealing it might also be used to reveal, an idea to which I shall return when considering Carlyle's dual treatment of speech and silence.

Teufelsdröckh asserts that his bitter irony is 'the language of the devil' suggesting that it is his Teufelsdröckhian side which speaks in this manner. But the claim that irony has been rejected is untrue. It is perfectly clear to the reader that the Teufelsdröckh who wrote *Die Kleider* continues to use irony. The Editor suggests on more than once occasion that Teufelsdröckh cannot be taken at face value. Referring to the autobiographical fragments he says:

It is a suspicion grounded perhaps on trifles, yet confirmed almost into certainty by the more and more discernible humouristico-satirical tendency of Teufelsdröckh, in whom underground humours, and intricate sardonic rogueries, wheel within wheel, defy all reckoning: a suspicion, in one word, that these Autobiographical Documents are partly a Mystification! (161)

Teufelsdröckh, the Editor suggests, is being deliberately obfuscatory. Not only does his irony often cast doubt over his meaning but the professed rejection of irony is part of the puzzle of the text. The double naming of the professor as both god-born and devil's dung suggests a view of man as divided, but it is through irony that the relationship between the two elements is described.

A good example of this comes in a passage from 'Adamitism' when the Editor relates a passage from *Die Kleider*:

'You see two individuals,' he writes, 'one dressed in fine Red, the other in coarse threadbare Blue: Red says to Blue, Be hanged and anatomised; blue hears with a shudder, and (O wonder of wonders) marches sorrowfully to the gallows; is there noosed up, vibrates his hour, and the surgeons dissect him, and fit his bones into a skeleton for medical purposes. How is this; or what make ye of your *Nothing can act but where it is?* Red has no physical hold of Blue, no *clutch* of him, is nowise in *contact* with him: neither are those ministering Sheriffs and Lord-Lieutenants and hangmen and Tipstaves so related to commanding Red, that he can tug them hither and thither; but each stands instinct within his own skin. (47)

Teufelsdröckh presents this sombre scene with what the Editor has called 'a certain feeling of the Ludicrous' (38). The ironic detachment which he claims to have rejected is evident in the depersonalisation achieved through the use of colours to denote people and

the darkly comic and desensitised description of the body's despatch. Further, with the contrast between 'fine Red' and 'coarse threadbare Blue' an element of satiric disapproval at this system of justice is registered. All this is spoken in the 'language of the Devil' and we suspect sarcasm in the comment 'O wonder of wonders'. But it is also suggested that the professor *does* find wonder in this example because, such is the symbolic force of the judge's red robes that his word, rather than any physical force, produces the desired result. The man in blue accepts his fate. As Jessop points out Carlyle is providing an argument against a materialist concept of cause and effect:

One of the necessary conditions persistently held to obtain in physical causation is contained in the scholastic maxim, *that a thing can only act where it is*. This axiom is referred to in *Sartor Resartus* when Teufelsdröckh says: '*Nothing can act but where it is: with all my heart; only WHERE is it?*' (66)

Jessop's quotation refers to the use of this phrase a few pages before the quotation which I am concerned with but, in the example of the judge's power over the criminal, the same point is being made. The judge's authority relies on an invisible power beyond that of physical force which resides in the symbolic nature of his clothes.

Of course, the metaphor of clothes symbolises all outward manifestations of earthly life. So, the body is described as the clothing of the soul, and language the 'flesh-garment' of thought (57). However, as the Editor points out the 'Historical-Descriptive' and 'Philosophical-Speculative' parts of the clothes philosophy are divided 'unhappily, by no firm line of demarcation[...]each Part overlaps, and indents, and indeed runs quite through the other' (26-27). So certain colours or clothing can stand as

symbols for institutions such as, in this case, the law - 'Again, what meaning lies in colour!' (28). In this case, then, we see that the physical symbol can act in a spiritual sense in representing a mysterious non-physical cause. But this transcendental idea is articulated through the use of irony. The God-born speaks as devil's dung but also vice versa as the ironic voice is used to create a doubt in the reader's mind as to whether the process is miraculous or, rather, ridiculous. That the symbolic nature of clothes *is* ridiculous is then further emphasised by Teufelsdröckh's humorous deflation of symbols which denote status:

Often in my atrabiliar moods, when I read of pompous ceremonials, Frankfort Coronations, Royal Drawing-rooms, Levees, Couchees; and how the ushers and macers and pursuivants are all in waiting; how duke this is presented by Archduke that, and Colonel A by General B, and innumerable bishops, Admirals, and miscellaneous functionaries, are advancing gallantly to the Anointed presence; and I strive, in my remote privacy, to form a clear picture of that solemnity, - on a sudden, as by some enchanter's wand, the -- shall I speak it? -- the Clothes fly off the whole dramatic corps; and dukes, Grandees, bishops, Generals, Anointed presence itself, every mother's son of them, stand straddling there, not a shirt on them; and I know not whether to laugh or weep. This physical or psychical infirmity, in which perhaps I am not singular, I have, after hesitation, thought right to publish, for the solace of those afflicted with the like. (48)

This passage indicates Teufelsdröckh's desire, which the Editor refers to as his Sanculottism, to strip away the outmoded symbols and reveal the true nature of man. Comparing 'Kings with Carmen', Teufelsdröckh says:

Nay ten to one but the Carman, who understands draught-cattle, the rimming of wheels, something of the laws of unstable and stable

equilibrium, with other branches of waggon-science, and has actually put forth his hand and operated on Nature, is the more cunningly gifted of the two. Whence, then, their so unspeakable difference? From Clothes. (50)

But, as the Editor suggests, Teufelsdröckh does not advocate '*Society in a State of Nakedness*' (50). Indeed, although we may be invited to laugh at the Editor's conservative reaction to the prospect of an entire Court unclothed, there is also a sense that such a sight would be better not contemplated:

Would to Heaven, say we, thou hadst thought right to keep it secret! Who is there now that can read the five columns of Presentations in his Morning Newspaper without a shudder? Hypochondriac men, and all men are to a certain extent hypochondriac, should be more gently treated. (48)

We may suspect Carlylean self-irony here in the reference to hypochondria. There is the suggestion that to reveal what lies beneath the clothes confronts man with the all too puzzling and disturbing question of who he is, as in the anecdote recorded in William Allingham's *Diary*:

Carlyle said, 'Just after I had got out of my bath this morning and was drying myself[...]I exclaimed, 'What the devil am I, at all, at all? after all these eighty years I know nothing about it.' (248)¹⁸

The state of nakedness, where clothes hold not only a denotative meaning, but

¹⁸ This anecdote is recorded from April 1876, illustrating that Carlyle continued to acknowledge the problematic nature of the relationship between inner self and outer body.

represent the trappings of earthly life (so, for instance, the body is the clothing of the soul), reveals that, by piercing through life's garnitures, it may be possible, not only to glimpse the spiritual, but also to be reminded of man's material and mortal nature. This point is made in a passage from 'Characteristics' which also expresses some of the anxiety attendant on delving beneath the surface:

But Nature, it might seem, strives, like a kind mother, to hide from us even this, that she is a mystery: She will have us rest on her beautiful and awful bosom as if it were our secure home; on the bottomless boundless Deep, whereon all human things fearfully and wonderfully swim, she will have us walk and build, as if the film which supported us there (which any scratch of a bare bodkin will rend asunder, any sputter of a pistol-shot instantaneously burn up) were no film, but a solid rock-foundation[...]. Under all her works, chiefly her noblest work, Life, lies a basis of Darkness, which she benignantly conceals. (*Works*, 28: 3-4)

This imagery of Darkness is found throughout 'Characteristics' (1831), and much of Carlyle's writing, where it is contended that 'our being is made up of Light and Darkness, the Light resting on the Darkness' (*Works*, 28: 27). But Carlyle contends that 'the feeblest light, or even so much as a more precise recognition of the darkness, which is the first step to attainment of light, will be welcome' (*Works*, 28: 13). Within *Sartor*, as Sigman and others have argued, the imagery of dark and light also abounds.¹⁹ The revelation of the body reminds man of his material and, at times, evil nature. A dual vision emerges, then, of the invisible forces which lie beneath the forms and functions of existence. K.J. Fielding too has drawn attention, in his introduction to *The French Revolution*, to

¹⁹ 'It has often been remarked that next to clothing the principal imagery of Thomas Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus* is that of light and dark', (Sigman, p. 207).

Carlyle's vision of 'the depth and height[...]revealed in man' and the manner in which the chaotic forces at work during the revolution reveal 'the thin volcanic earth-rind, man's inner madness'.²⁰ This vision of man's precarious existence is articulated in *Sartor* through images of death and darkness, as when Teufelsdröckh describes his reaction to his father's death:

The dark bottomless Abyss, that lies under our feet, had yawned open; the pale kingdoms of Death, with all their innumerable silent nations and generations stood before him[...]My mother wept, and her sorrow got vent; but in my heart there lay a whole lake of tears, pent up in silent desolation. (85)

However, although this recognition of man's mortality - 'the inexorable word NEVER! now first showed its meaning' - causes Teufelsdröckh 'inexpressible melancholy', it is also a learning experience:

Nevertheless, the unworn Spirit is strong. Life is so healthful that it even finds nourishment in Death: these stern experiences, planted down by memory in my Imagination, rose there to a whole cypress forest, sad but beautiful. (85)

The stripping away of life's garnitures, then, reveals a dual vision of man, as both material and spiritual. Paradoxically the state of nakedness both 'degrade[s] man below most animals' and 'exalts him beyond the visible Heavens': 'The grand unparalleled peculiarity of Teufelsdröckh is, that with all this descendentalism, he combines a

²⁰ *The French Revolution*, ed. by K.J. Fielding and David Sorensen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. xix.

Transcendentalism no less superlative' (51). The use of the word 'combines' is crucial here as it indicates the manner in which both ideas must be present to prevent the dissolution which either alone would threaten. Although the process of unclenching reveals that which lies beneath life's institutions and forms, Teufelsdröckh, as the Editor points out, does not advocate a state of nakedness. Indeed, Teufelsdröckh asserts that, without clothes man 'would sink to endless depths, or mount to inane limbos, and in either case be no more' (40).

Jessop's work reveals that to embrace either materialism or idealism alone could engender scepticism:

[Reid] was concerned about the tendencies toward (and of) scepticism latent in monistic theories, such as that of Berkeley, and the social implications of Hume's atomistic philosophy[...]Hamilton thought that Reid's dualism stood opposed to the positions of a host of philosophers whose theories resulted in the unitarian systems of *identity, materialism, idealism*. (Jessop, 57-59)

As Van Peursen points out, Berkeley's immaterialist philosophy led him 'to deny the reality of the whole external world as self-subsistent matter, but to affirm it most emphatically as a reality centred in the mind' (66). It is this 'reduction of everything to ideas', which, Jessop tells us, Reid objected to in Berkeley, and indeed in Hume's theory of Ideas.²¹ Berkeley's denial of the existence of the material except as 'centred in the mind' might precipitate a situation where the existence of the external world would be in doubt (for instance, in the famous example of whether a tree, falling in a forest, would

²¹ Jessop, p. 57. Jessop outlines Reid's rejection of Hume's theory of Ideas in chapters four and five of *Carlyle and Scottish Philosophy*. Van Peursen too makes a link between Berkeley's use of the word 'idea' and its use by Locke and Hume (p. 70).

exist independently of a perceiving mind). Hume's theory of Ideas also relies on the notion of perception, but in a different manner. Whereas Berkeley's monistic theory put emphasis on the non-material (the mind), Hume's theory materialised the mind by analogically identifying it with the body. Jessop demonstrates that as Hume 'inherited the theory of Ideas from Locke, he also inherited a language of mechanical modelling' (62). But Hume's theory not only tended toward the destruction of the spirit, it had implications for man's perception of the external world:

A general outline of the theory of Ideas might run as follows: the information of the senses entirely furnishes the mind and all that is known is acquired in the first place by the medium of the sensory apparatus. (Jessop, 63)

If knowledge of the world is purely contingent on the senses, and Hume's philosophy leads to the possibility that the senses are fallacious, then this representative theory of perception can engender a state of scepticism in which all knowledge of the world, or indeed self, is suspect. Jessop indicates that Hume's theory of perception, as viewed by Reid, situated him between two irresolvable opposites (common-sense and rationality) and thus precipitated a state of impotence or scepticism. Hume asserts that if the senses which tell us that we and the external world exist *are* fallacious then they 'may be corrected by reason' (Jessop, 85). However if reason is in conflict with the senses then 'the mind, considered from both psychological and metaphysical viewpoints, was thrown into a condition of perpetual oscillation between the horns of a dilemma'. This definition of scepticism Jessop characterises as 'uncertainty concerning all things' (Jessop, 87).

Hume's scepticism proceeds inexorably from the notion of mind as an entirely physical mechanism. Jessop points out that the dissolution of the external world which results from this theory of the mind could either be characterised as idealist or materialist (depending on whether Hume believes that the external objects impressed upon the mind by the senses exist independently or not) (Jessop, 66-67). But the source of Hume's ideas in a purely materialistic notion of the mind, and its implications for the destruction of the spiritual, mean that his ideas can be referred to as a sceptical materialism. In contrast Berkeley's certainty as to the existence of 'the mind of God and the minds of men' at least affirms the existence of the soul, if not the body.

To avoid the dissolution which scepticism threatens, unlike the Gnostic trope of clothing and unclothing, *Sartor* does not advocate a spiritual rejection of the physical or vice versa. In the act of re-clothing, indicated in the meaning of *Sartor Resartus* as 'the tailor-re-tailored', the text demonstrates how body and soul are different but related:

Round his mysterious ME there lies, under all those wool-rags, a
Garment of Flesh (or of Senses), contextured in the Loom of Heaven;
whereby he is revealed to his like, and dwells with them in UNION and
DIVISION. (51)

This paradoxical view of man threatens the ultimate certitude which many commentators have found in *Sartor*, especially in the view that the text's movement from doubt to faith is represented in the absolutism of 'The Everlasting Yea'.²² But it must be

²² Levine asserts that in *Sartor* Carlyle rejects 'evil manifested in endless variety' for the 'single, indivisible, infinite fact of God' ('The Use and Abuse of Carlyles', in *The Art of Victorian Fiction*, ed. George Levine and William Madden [New York: Oxford University Press, 1968], p. 109). Carlisle Moore, identifying text with reality, contends that 'Carlyle's achievement of the Everlasting Yea was a victory for him on the broadest

noticed that this is balanced by a No which is also 'Everlasting'. Both 'No' and 'Yea', doubt and faith, body and spirit, are ever present. They are coextensive. Or as Jessop puts it 'Carlyle recognises the dualism of human existence as inscribed from the beginning' (204). But, if 'Everlasting No' and 'Everlasting Yea' are ever-present, how then does the movement from one to the other, through 'the Centre of Indifference' describe the movement from doubt to faith, and is the solution of the 'Yea' sustained throughout the text?

In the 'Everlasting No' Carlyle describes a state of absolute nihilism:

'Doubt had darkened into Unbelief,' says [Teufelsdröckh]; 'shade after shade goes grimly over your soul, till you have the fixed, starless, Tartarean black.' (129)

Teufelsdröckh's descent into unbelief is primarily attributed to his education and the disappointment in his love affair with Blumine. His University is described in 'Pedagogy' as entirely rational, materialistic and 'hostile to Mysticism': 'my whole Universe, physical and spiritual, was as yet a Machine' (90, 92). The scepticism that results is manifested in his 'Inquiries concerning Miracles, and the Evidences of religious Faith', obliquely referring to Carlyle's own reading of the sceptical philosophy of Hume and its effects on his own faith (92). Jessop quotes from an article by Francis Jeffrey to reveal the full implications of scepticism:

possible scale', while LaValley contends that the spiritual certitude which is achieved in the 'The Everlasting Yea' 'reaches its limits in the chapter on "Natural Supernaturalism," where the last two phantasms, space and time, are rent asunder. The Clothes Philosophy is complete with the disappearance of all clothes as the movement of spiritual vision which the book portrays is achieved'. (Moore, 'The Persistence of Carlyle's "Everlasting Yea"', *Modern Philology*, 54 (1957), pp. 187-196 (p. 187); LaValley, p. 75)

We deny existence of the material world...This conclusion annihilates at once all external objects; and among them, our own bodies, and the bodies *and minds* of all other men...This first step, therefore, reduces the whole universe to the mind of the individual reasoner...The second step goes still farther...If we discredit memory...it is evident that we must annihilate our own personal identity...There can be no reasoning, therefore, nor knowledge, nor opinion. (46)

This scepticism which reduces man 'to a condition of dissolution, despair and perhaps much worse' is evident in the 'Everlasting No' where images of darkness and dissolution abound; unbelief is described as a darkening process; Teufelsdröckh feels his soul to have descended into a void, 'the fixed, starless, Tartarcan black' (Jessop, 90; *Works*, 1:129). His scepticism is indicated by the fact that, not only has he lost his faith in God, but 'the very Devil has been pulled down, you cannot so much as believe in a Devil'. A condition of absolute stasis and paralysis is described, as the interplay of God and Devil, good and bad, has been dissolved in a vision of absolute nothingness: 'To me the Universe was all void of Life, of Purpose, of volition, even of Hostility' (129).

However, we are made aware that Teufelsdröckh's plight may not be as extreme as he feels it to be. The Editor informs us that, even in this state of unbelief, there is hope that from this 'mad Fermentation[...]the clearer product will one day evolve itself' (123). Teufelsdröckh indicates that some vestige of belief holds him back from the abyss when he says that 'from Suicide a certain after-shine (*Nachschein*) of Christianity withheld me' (133).

If Teufelsdröckh has ceased to believe, even in the Devil, then the text suggests that a belief in the Devil will be necessary to discovering his opposite, God; a notion

which parallels and illuminates the text's insistence that a recognition of man's descendentalism precedes Transcendentalism, and that death precedes and affirms life. However, 'precedes' may be the wrong choice of word here. Although the movement from 'Everlasting No' to 'Everlasting Yea' is linear in the text, images of the organic cycle within the biographical section and throughout the text affirm that the process is cyclical and ongoing:

As in long-drawn systole and long-drawn diastole, must the period of Faith alternate with the period of Denial; must the vernal growth, the summer luxuriance of all Opinions, Spiritual Representations and Creations, be followed by, and again follow, the autumnal decay, the winter dissolution. (91)

The imagery of the heartbeat suggests the very importance of this continual alternation to life itself. Each element performs a function without which the other would not exist. Indeed this description of the periods of faith and denial as the very life blood of man suggest the possibility that the Humean scepticism which Jessop describes as a 'perpetual oscillation between the horns of a dilemma' (between common-sense and rational philosophy) is written into *Sartor Resartus* as an unavoidable circumstance of the human condition.²³ The oscillation which Jessop describes is one which is present in the constant interplay of opposites and the use of ironic ambiguity in the text, suggesting that Carlyle assimilates Humean scepticism and re-describes it as a fact of life, rather than a threat. By producing a text which switches back and forth between doubt and faith, Carlyle maintains a dialectic that transforms indecision into a positive force. Whereas

²³ I am deeply indebted to Ralph Jessop for all his help in exploring the notion of scepticism within the text and his suggestions in developing my ideas.

Teufelsdröckh's absolute unbelief in the 'Everlasting No' denied the very notion of existence, his recognition of the Devil in the final passages is life-affirming:

Thus had the EVERLASTING NO (*das Ewige Nein*) pealed authoritatively through all the recesses of my Being, of my ME; and then was it that my whole ME stood up, in native God-created majesty, and with emphasis recorded its Protest. Such a Protest, the most important transaction in Life, may that same Indignation and Defiance, in a psychological point of view, be fitly called. The Everlasting No had said: 'Behold, thou art fatherless, outcast, and the Universe is mine (the Devil's);' to which my whole Me now made answer: 'I am not thine, but Free, and for ever hate thee!' (129)

This affirmation of the existence of the self is a movement away from the extreme denial of scepticism. As opposed to the vacuum of unbelief, Teufelsdröckh, in the 'Centre of Indifference' can now engage with the material world, indicated in notions of activity and feeling. His 'Unrest' is increased and the Editor points out that, although his 'Indignation and Defiance' are not 'peaceable inmates; yet can the Psychologist surmise that it was no longer a quite hopeless Unrest' (135-136).

That the process of regaining faith requires not only the knowledge of the self's existence but of the world's is indicated by Teufelsdröckh's travels within the 'Centre of Indifference' where he 'clutches round him outwardly, on the NOT-ME for wholesomer food' (136). That experience of the material world may be favourable to solving Teufelsdröckh's internal questions is suggested by the Editor:

Internally, there is the most momentous instructive Course of Practical Philosophy, with Experiments, going on; towards the right comprehension of which his Peripatetic habits, favourable to Meditation,

might help him rather than hinder. Externally, again, as he wanders to and fro, there are, if for the longing heart little substance, yet for the seeing eye Sights enough: in these so boundless Travels of his, granting that the Satanic School was even partially kept down, what an incredible Knowledge of our Planet, and its Inhabitants and their Works, that is to say, of all knowable things, might not Teufelsdröckh acquire! (141)

This 'Centre of Indifference' is presented as a transitional phase 'through which whoso travels from the Negative Pole to the Positive must necessarily pass' (146). Indeed, that the narrative thrust of these crucial three chapters would *seem* to be from the material to the spiritual, unbelief to belief, is suggested by Teufelsdröckh's assertion in 'The Everlasting Yea' that his 'Temptations in the Wilderness' are part of a 'God-given mandate' that 'the Clay must now be vanquished or vanquish' (146-147).

While in the 'Centre of Indifference', where the Not-Me was embraced, Teufelsdröckh asserts that 'the first preliminary moral Act, Annihilation of Self[...]had been happily accomplished; and my mind's eyes were now unsealed, and its hands ungyved' (149). Certainly this image of the unsealing of the mind and unbinding of the hands suggests a positive step away from the mental and physical paralysis of the 'Everlasting No'. However, although Teufelsdröckh both advocates the annihilation of the self and the vanquishing of the earthly 'Clay', notions which both suggest the primacy of the spiritual over the physical and, indeed, the dissolution of self which the casting off of earthly clothes threatened, the locus for the 'Everlasting Yea' is presented as a very physical one. The victory over the flesh is not envisioned as a rejection of the bodily, but as a right way of viewing and conducting earthly life. The recognition of the Not-Me achieved in the 'Centre of Indifference' allows Teufelsdröckh to break down the barriers

between self and other - 'Oh my Brother, my Brother, why cannot I shelter thee in my bosom, and wipe away all tears from thy eyes' (151). It is through his travels which reveal that his own suffering resembles that of all men that he learns compassion - 'Art thou not tried, and beaten with stripes, even as I am?' (150-151). This move toward embracing mankind, with all its faults, is reflected in Teufelsdröckh's own descent from the watch-tower where he would have been glad to sit 'Philosophising forever' with his 'old calmness and fixedness', avoiding both pestilence and earthquake (18). In the final chapter of the book it is suggested that he has left the isolation of the tower to forward his radical ideas by joining in the struggle in France (236). It is this combination of experience, peripatetic wandering and the recognition of man's common experience and responsibility to one another, which leads to the solution of 'The Everlasting Yea'; one which is based very much in the physical world rather than in an abstract spiritual ideal. The 'Clay' is vanquished, not by being disregarded, but by the assertion that it is man's duty to deny his own importance and pleasure -- 'There is in man a HIGHER than Love of Happiness: he can do without Happiness, and instead thereof find Blessedness[...]. Love not Pleasure; love God. This is the Everlasting Yea' (153-154). This essentially Calvinist doctrine of self-denial is accompanied by the imperative to do one's duty to God, to work. However, although this may solve Teufelsdröckh's problems -- 'Most true is it, as a wise man teaches us, that "Doubt of any sort cannot be removed except by Action"' -- it is a solution which befits the limited scope of man's spiritual knowledge while on earth (156). In other words, 'The Everlasting Yea' does not destroy the material and 'mount to inane limbos' (40). Whereas Teufelsdröckh's doubt was engendered by an education which required proof for everything, including miracles, here in 'The Everlasting Yea' he

repudiates the materialist scepticism of Voltaire by asserting that religion must not be disputed or proved, but be based on 'Belief, all else is Opinion' (155).²⁴

The lack of concrete knowledge about man's nature and the realm of the spiritual is a recurring theme throughout the book. In 'The World Out of Clothes' Teufelsdröckh asserts that 'they only are wise who know that they know nothing' (42). And later, in 'Natural Supernaturalism', where Carlyle engages with Hume's 'Of Miracles' and its contention that empirical evidence must be sought for the miraculous, Teufelsdröckh refers to man's limited knowledge of divine law:

To the wisest man, wise as is his vision, Nature remains of quite *infinite* depth, of quite infinite expansion; and all Experience thereof limits itself to some few computed centuries, and measured square-miles. (205)

In the 'Everlasting Yea' this recognition of the limits of man's spiritual knowledge serves to emphasise the dualism of man. The spiritual is unknown and man can only 'Do the Duty which lies nearest [him]'; a point reiterated in the closing passage of the chapter which suggests that man can only try to do his best in the present while waiting for an unknown future (156):

Be no longer a Chaos, but a World, or even Worldkin. Produce! Produce! Were it but the pitifulest infinitesimal fraction of a Product, produce it in God's name! 'Tis the utmost thou hast in thee; out with it then. Up, up! Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy whole might. Work while it is called To-day, for the Night cometh wherein no man can work. (157)

²⁴ 'Meanwhile what are antiquated Mythuses to me? Or is the god present, felt in my own Heart a thing which Herr von Voltaire will dispute out of me; or dispute into me' (*Works*, 1: 155)

The site for the regaining of spiritual faith is within the physical world: it is 'here, in this poor miserable, hampered, despicable Actual, wherein thou even now standest, here or nowhere is thy Ideal' (156).

However, the above does *suggest* that the Ideal is attainable, even when it does not entail a rejection of the physical, an idea also broached in *The French Revolution* (1837). There Carlyle suggests that man's 'Church, or spiritual guidance; his Kingship, or temporal one' are 'Realized Ideals' (*Works*, 2: 8). We see here that Carlyle suggests a need for guidance which addresses the dual nature of man, a notion which he was again to advocate in *Past & Present* when he spoke of the need for both 'a spiritual Guideship' and 'a practical Governship' (*Works*, 10: 242). In *The French Revolution* he also makes clear that these realized ideals are 'Symbols, divine or divine-seeming' (10). That they may be 'divine-seeming', considering that Carlyle acknowledges that no one can know what *is* divine, suggests that these symbols are an approximation, or the nearest earthly equivalent, of the spiritual ideal. And, considering that Carlyle often points out that earthly life is temporal, it would seem that these symbols too are ephemeral:

How such Ideals do realize themselves; and grow, wondrously, from amid the incongruous ever-fluctuating chaos of the Actual: this is what World-History, if it teach anything, has to teach us. How they grow; and, after long stormy growth, bloom or mature, supreme; then quickly (for the blossom is brief) fall into decay; sorrowfully dwindle; and crumble down, or rush down, noisily or noiselessly disappearing. The blossom is brief; as of some centennial Cactus-flower, which after a century of waiting shines out for hours! (*Works*, 2: 10)

It is suggested, then, that the ideal exists in another, unknowable locus and that the earthly symbol of that ideal, although realizable, is not sustainable, a notion which is also suggested in Hillis Miller's contention that, for Carlyle, the symbols of the divine, such as Jesus Christ, 'will ever demand to be anew inquired into and anew made manifest'.²⁵

Of course, this is the project of *Sartor Resartus*, to re-tailor the symbols which have lost their meaning or importance and to re-imbue man's surroundings with mystic wonderment, as is suggested in 'Natural Supernaturalism':

Innumerable are the illusions and legerdemain tricks of Custom: but of all these perhaps the cleverest is her knack of persuading us that the Miraculous, by simple repetition, ceases to be Miraculous. (206)

Without this process of making new, symbols 'although perennial and infinite', will 'fade and become inefficacious' (Miller, 10). Miller then concludes that, because earthly symbols of the divine have to be reworked to have significance for passing generations, the relationship between symbol and symbolised is not one of direct representation:

It is all very well for Teufelsdröckh to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic symbols, but if no symbol can be counted on to remain permanently valid, then no symbol has the kind of permanent and logical relation to the kingdom of heaven ascribed to them, for example, in medieval Christian allegorical interpretations of the Bible. (12)

Such a stable, symbolic language is evident, not only in Medieval Christian interpretations of the bible, but in a work which Francis Espinasse referred to when he

²⁵ 'Hieroglyphical Truth' in *Sartor Resartus*: Carlyle and the Language of Parable', p. 10

said that *Sartor Resartus* was 'the *Pilgrim's Progress*[...]of the nineteenth century'.²⁶

Espinasse suggests that *Sartor* describes a movement 'from doubt and despair to "blessedness" and belief' and yet, if we compare the two works it becomes clear that *Sartor* and Bunyan offer two differing types of representation (Espinasse, 57). *Pilgrim's Progress* employs names which directly represent things. Therefore, the hero is called Christian (there is no doubting this name in contrast to the dualistic ambiguity of Diogenes Teufelsdröckh) and there are characters such as Giant Despair and Worldly Wiseman. The Valley of the Shadow of Death is literally reproduced (and often illustrated in pictures in which Christian walks through a landscape laden with skeletons, demons and grotesque animals). Bunyan's 'Wicker Gate' denies ambiguity by asserting that there is only one, straight route toward salvation. Bunyan suggests this spiritual truth is knowable in his physical representation of heaven as 'The Celestial City', with gold paving stones and angels. In contrast Carlyle employs names within the text which do not provide any clear meaning, but playfully suggest a number of interpretations (several articles have been written on the allusions of the name 'Teufelsdröckh for instance) or merely draw attention to the mysterious, or even ironic, nature of the text - 'Wahngasse' (Fantasy Lane), 'Stillschweigen und Co' (Silence & Co.), 'Weissnichtwo' (Know-not-where) and so on.²⁷

²⁶ Francis Espinasse, *Literary Recollections and Sketches*. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1893), p. 57.

²⁷ Articles on Teufelsdröckh's name include Patrick Brantlinger's "'Teufelsdröckh" Resartus' where he draws attention to the use of the word 'devil's dust' as 'an industrial term for a type of cheap cloth and also for the flock produced by running rags through a machine called a "devil"' (*English Language Notes*, 9 [1972], pp. 191 - 193, [p. 191]). And, as Brantlinger points out, 'G.B. Tennyson and others have shown that the name of Carlyle's hero, "Teufelsdröckh," derives from the German term for asfoetida, a smelly resin formerly used as a laxative' (p. 191).

Chris Vanden Bossche too recognises this distance between symbol and symbolised in *Sartor* when he talks about “Symbolism” as the Art of “Approximation”.²⁸ He points out that Carlyle's early interest in the sciences was a search for 'certainty', especially through mathematics 'which, as the language of science, has traditionally served as a metaphor for real and unambiguous language':

Instead of finding a new faith, however, he discovered the same problem of analogy that haunts ordinary language: some geometric proportions compare entities that are incommensurable. Carlyle's solution is to develop a method of analogy in which, 'since the proportion still continues accurate at every successive approximation, we infer that it will, in like manner, continue accurate at the level we can approach indefinitely, though never actually reach' (281).²⁹

Whereas Christian reaches 'The Celestial City', the sublimity of Teufelsdröckh's destination is both limited and unsustainable. Faith, rather than spiritual knowledge, is the key word of 'The Everlasting Yea', attained by converting metaphysical theorising into physical practice:

Inasmuch as all Speculation is by nature endless, formless, a vortex amide vortices: only by a felt indubitable certainty of Experience, does it find any centre to revolve round, and so fashion itself into a system. (156)

So we see that recognition of the dualistic nature of man, the incontrovertible difference

²⁸ Chris Vanden Bossche, 'Revolution and Authority: the Metaphors of Language and Carlyle's Style', *Prose Studies*, 6 (1983), pp. 274-289 (p. 280).

²⁹ Vanden Bossche here quotes from Carlyle's translation of A.M. Legendre's *Elements of Geometry and Trigonometry* (1822) (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1824), p. x. This was partly translated by Carlyle's brother, John.

between the physical and the spiritual, also leads to a reconciliation of the two elements:

'The Situation that has not its Duty, its ideal, was never yet occupied by man' (156).

The other chapter which is often given primacy in the text is 'Natural Supernaturalism'. Like 'The Everlasting Yea' it is understood as resolving the dualism of the text. Again this solution is based on the acknowledgement of the limited knowledge of the spiritual which allows faith to flourish. Further, as in 'The Everlasting Yea', it is suggested that, in the light of those limitations, an approximation of the spiritual can be achieved through recognising the miraculous in everyday life:

The true inexplicable God-revealing Miracle lies in this, that I can stretch forth my hand at all; that I have free Force to clutch aught therewith. (209)

However, the sublime heights which Teufelsdröckh reaches in 'The Everlasting Yea', and, indeed, 'Natural Supernaturalism', are not only limited, but unsustainable. The move from scepticism to faith is dependent on accepting that there is a spiritual truth beyond man's understanding and that, therefore, proof is no longer necessary. However, the nescience which Jessop shows Carlyle learned from Hamilton is also uncomfortably close to agnosticism in its presupposition of the unknowability of God. Even if 'The Everlasting Yea' and 'Natural Supernaturalism' provide some kind of solution to the doubt engendered within the text, the tone of the greater part of the text remains an ambiguous one which articulates the ongoing battle between belief and scepticism.

Even in 'The Everlasting Yea', the Editor casts doubt on the sincerity or seriousness of Teufelsdröckh, and his dualistic tendencies are again drawn to our

attention. His words are 'nothing but innuendoes, figurative crotchets: a typical Shadow, fitfully wavering, prophetic-satiric, no clear logical Picture'. He is described as involving himself in 'eye-bewildering *chiaroscuro*' (148). The Editor even goes so far as to question the professor's sincerity and, therefore, the thrust toward the positive pole, by making one of the clearest references to his dualism:

Might we not also conjecture that the following passage refers to his Locality, during this same 'healing sleep;' and indeed that the repose is already taking wholesome effect on him? If it were not that the tone, in some parts, has more of riancy, even of levity, than we could have expected. However, in Teufelsdröckh, there is always the strangest Dualism: light dancing, with guitar-music, will be going on in the forecourt, while by fits from within comes the faint whimpering of woe and wail. (149)

This quotation clearly indicates the coexistence in Teufelsdröckh of doubt and belief.

The ironic tone is identified with the articulation of this dual nature because it undercuts and questions the impulse toward the ideal. And the ironic tone is one which we are asked to identify with 'The Centre of Indifference'. Teufelsdröckh refers to his 'Hardness [...and] Indifferentism' as a characteristic which, alongside his 'ironic tone', alienates him from others (104). Further, the Editor draws attention to the contrast between Teufelsdröckh's earnest care for mankind and his indifference:

Gleams of an ethereal Love burst forth from him, soft wailings of infinite Pity; he could clasp the whole Universe into his bosom, and keep it warm; it seems as if under that rude exterior there dwelt a very seraph. Then again he is so sly and still, so imperturbably saturnine; *shews such indifference*, malign coolness towards all that men strive after; and ever with some half-visible wrinkle of a bitter sardonic humour, if indeed it be

not mere stolid callousness,- that you look on him almost with a shudder, as on some incarnate Mephistopheles, to whom this great terrestrial and celestial Round, after all, were but some huge foolish Whirlbigg, where kings and beggars, and angels and demons and stars and street-sweepings, were chaotically whirled. (25) [My italics]

The editor also refers, at various points, to Teufelsdröckh's 'god-like indifference', his 'diabolico-angelical Indifference' and his 'almost diabolic patience and indifference' (20, 187, 51). The Editor then identifies indifference (which Teufelsdröckh himself suggested was exhibited in his ironic tone) with both the god-like and the satanic, the soul and the body, good and bad. The 'Centre of Indifference' is itself defined dualistically by McSweeney and Sabor as 'literally, the point midway between the two poles of a magnet, at which the attractive force is stable.³⁰ Although, at the end of 'The Chapter of Indifference', it is suggested that this is a transitional phase 'through which whoso travels from the Negative Pole to the Positive must necessarily pass', the tenor of the text is established more by this balancing of opposites than by any absolute (either positive *or* negative). This balancing act holds in check the impulse to the dissolution which either materialism or idealism threatens, a point recognised by George Levine when he quotes from Cazamian:³¹

What happens seems at least partially to justify the view that the 'Everlasting Yea' was 'certainly a decided movement toward the certitude that action requires, but alas, it is also a movement toward the certitudes that develop into dogmas and prejudices. The Carlyle of *The Everlasting Yea* often makes us regret the extinction of the Carlyle of *The Centre of Indifference*'. (Levine, 29)³²

³⁰ *Sartor Resartus*, ed. Kerry McSweeney and Peter Sabor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), Explanatory Notes, p. 257.

³¹ Levine does recognise the ambiguity of the text, but refers to it as 'surface ambiguity' (p. 59).

³² Moore, in 'The Persistence of Carlyle's "Everlasting Yea"' suggests that Carlyle's 'last

I would suggest that, by associating the Centre of Indifference with an ironic and ambiguous stance, and imbuing almost the entire text with that tone, Carlyle articulates the ongoing dialectic between body and soul, good and bad, which he sees as an unavoidable state of existence.

If 'The Everlasting Yea' provides a solution to the conflict between scepticism and faith, it does not set the tone for the remainder of the text. Unlike *Pilgrim's Progress* where Christian and Christiana's narratives move inexorably toward closure, 'The Everlasting Yea' is the climax to the biographical section of *Sartor* but not the text as a whole. Indeed, shortly after the limited sublimity of Teufelsdröckh's conversion, the Editor again casts doubt on Teufelsdröckh's sincerity and suggests a complexity which defies any single interpretation:

It is a suspicion grounded perhaps on trifles, yet confirmed almost into certainty by the more and more discernible humouristico-satirical tendency of Teufelsdröckh, in whom underground humours, and intricate sardonic rogueries, wheel within wheel, defy all reckoning: a suspicion, in one word, that these Autobiographical documents are partly a Mystification! (161)

We might expect that, following the 'Everlasting Yea' a note of certainty would be sounded within the text, but the above is from the following chapter 'Pause'. At the end of this chapter, the Editor draws attention to the disjuncture between Teufelsdröckh's strange, enigmatic and not altogether clear ideas and his search for an absolute truth:

years seem more like that other middle condition', (196).

Perhaps in entering on Book Third, the courteous Reader is not utterly without guess whither he is bound: nor, let us hope, for all the fantastic Dream-Grottoes through which, as is our lot with Teufelsdröckh, he must wander, will there be wanting between whiles some twinkling of a steady Polar Star. (164)

Firstly, the Editor's use of the journey trope indicates that Teufelsdröckh has not reached his ultimate destination. Again we see the notion of approximation and limitation in the idea that only 'some twinkling of a steady Polar Star' may be discernible. Indeed, whereas Levine suggests that Carlyle rejects the ambiguities of the text for the certainty represented in the 'Polar Star', I would contend that the star is a light to steer by rather than a destination.³³ It is evident that Carlyle accepts there is an ultimate truth which may be momentarily glimpsed but that man's limited insight disallows any absolute knowledge. The text's refusal of the closure which absolute certainty would allow is suggested both at the beginning of 'The Everlasting No' and here, at the end of 'Pause'. In both quotations from these chapters we see that Teufelsdröckh's plight represents the uncertainty which characterises human life:

Man is, properly speaking, based upon Hope, he has no other possession but Hope; this world of his is emphatically the Place of Hope. (129)

The whole energy of his existence is directed, through long years, on one task: that of enduring pain, if he cannot cure it. (164)

One might expect any solution gained in the 'Everlasting Yea' to herald a new and more

³³ 'Use and Abuse of Carlylese', p. 109.

earnest tone within the text. Indeed, Hillis Miller has drawn attention to the directness with which Carlyle articulates Teufelsdröckh's epiphany at the end of the chapter: 'Surely no one has ever spoken more sincerely or more from the heart than Carlyle here in the guise of Teufelsdröckh' (18). And yet Miller too recognises the indirectness of much of the text and questions if even the 'Everlasting Yea' should be taken 'straight': 'It is of the nature of ironic fictions like *Sartor* to be in this particular way undecidable' (14). It is significant that 'The Everlasting Yea' and 'Natural Supernaturalism' are succeeded by one of the most playful chapters of the text, 'The Dandiacal Body'.

There Carlyle, as he did in *The French Revolution*, speaks of the church or sect as symbol which must be endlessly renewed,:

"In these distracted times," writes [Teufelsdröckh], "when the Religious Principle, driven out of most churches, either lies unseen in the hearts of good men, looking and longing and silently working there towards some new Revelation; or else wanders homeless over the world, like a disembodied soul seeking its terrestrial organisation, - into how many strange shapes, of Superstition and Fanaticism, does it not tentatively and errantly cast itself! The higher Enthusiasm of man's nature is for the while without Exponent; yet must it continue indestructible, unweariedly active, and work blindly in the great chaotic deep: thus Sect after Sect, and Church after Church, bodies itself forth, and melts again into new metamorphosis." (Works, I: 219)

By representing the Dandies as a Sect, Carlyle suggests that man's ability to worship has been both secularised and trivialised. Further, he engages with contemporary religious issues by considering the proliferation of sects which he identifies as accompanying the loss of religious certainty and the resultant need for some spiritual nurture. He ironically presents the habits and practices of the Dandies as if revealing the secrets of an ancient,

mystical religion: 'A certain touch of Manicheism, not indeed in the Gnostic shape, is discernible enough' (219). That the sect's 'Articles of Faith' turn out to be nothing more than fashionable dress codes parodies the silver-spoon novels of Bulwer Lytton, indicated in a reference to *Pelham* and a passage quoted from *The Disowned* (222). Their lack of worth for Carlyle is indicated in Teufelsdröckh's assertion that the reading of these novels produced 'scrammel-piping' in his ears followed by 'Magnetic sleep' (221). However, this chapter is more than a skit on Dandyism. A number of things are going on. Carlyle, in the guise of Teufelsdröckh, also parodies theological discourse. By referring to 'Articles of Faith' he refers back to his suggestion in the previous chapter that 'the Thirty-nine Articles themselves are articles of wearing apparel (for the Religious Idea)' (215) By making an implicit comparison between the church creeds and those of the Dandies, Carlyle could still be drawing attention to the manner in which secular materialism has become man's religion. He may equally be drawing attention to the now defunct nature of rigid and pointless 'Articles' by identifying them with the Dandyism sect. However, the possible levels of meaning go further than this. By acknowledging that man's 'higher Enthusiasm' leads him to embrace a religion, even a mistaken one, Carlyle still suggests that there is wonder inherent in the Dandies (219):

Nay, if you grant, what seems to be admissible, that the Dandy has a 'Thinking-principle in him, and some notions of Time and Space, is there not in this Life-devotedness to Cloth, in this so willing sacrifice of the Immortal to the Perishable, something (though in reverse order) of that blending and identification of Eternity with Time, which, as we have seen, constitutes the Prophetic character. (217-218)

This treatment of the Dandiacal sect is somewhat reminiscent of the mixture of seriousness and hoax which was found in the passage on the Judge and criminal earlier, suiting style to the blending of spirit and body which is suggested in the 'identification of Eternity and Time'. The reader is asked to 'Understand [the Dandy's] mystic significance' which 'cannot always remain hidden under laughable and lamentable hallucination' (218). One can detect serious points in this chapter, but they are constantly undermined by the ironic voice. The Editor has attempted throughout the text to create a 'firm arch, overspanning the Impassable with paved highway'. But the text's meaning remains uncertain, and it works to re-create that uncertainty within the reader's mind. The Editor has only managed to construct 'some zigzag series of rafts floating tumultuously', a description evoking the manner in which the text unanchors the reader and sets him adrift on a precarious and unsettling journey (213-214).

Carlyle sets up in contrast to the Dandies another sect, the Drudges. We might expect these two sects to be used as a critique of social inequality and, to a certain extent, this is the case as the two sects represent the 'the Two Nations':³⁴

Such are the two Sects which, at this moment, divide the more unsettled portion of the British People; and agitate that ever-vexed country. To the eye of the political Seer, their mutual relation, pregnant with the elements of discord and hostility, is far from consoling. These two principles of Dandiacal Self-worship, and Poor slavish or Drudgical Earth-worship, or whatever that same Drudgism may be, do as yet indeed manifest themselves under distant and nowise considerable shapes: nevertheless, in their roots and subterranean ramifications, they extend through the entire structure of Society, and work unweariedly in the secret depth of English national Existence; striving to separate and isolate it into two contradictory, ucommunicating masses. (227)

³⁴ Disraeli later took this phrase as the subtitle for his novel, *Sybil* (1845).

However, the beggars are not represented more sympathetically than the Dandies. Carlyle identifies the beggar sect with Ireland and, as with much of his writing on Irish immigrants, his attitude is equivocal. He sympathises with their plight while presenting them in a humorous light:

While in Ireland, which, as mentioned, is their grand parent hive, they go by a perplexing multiplicity of designations, such as *Bogtrotters*, *Redshanks*, *Ribbonmen*, *Cottiers*, *Peep-of-day Boys*, *Babes of the Wood*, *Rockites*, *Poor-Slaves*[...]Something Monastic there appears to be in their Constitution: we find them bound by the two Monastic Vows, of Poverty and Obedience; which Vows, especially the former, it is said, they observe with great strictness; nay, as I have understood it, they are pledged, and be it by any solemn Nazarene ordination or not, irrevocably enough consecrated thereto, even *before* birth. That the third Monastic Vow, of Chastity, is rigidly enforced among them, I find no ground to conjecture. (223-224)

The multiplicity of names suggests authenticity by giving a comprehensive list (much as Teufelsdröckh claims that the 'Articles of Faith' are quoted from the original 'to avoid possibility of error' [222]). However, the slang and sometimes comic names ('hallanshakers' 'stook of duds') also serve to suggest the hoax nature of the chapter. Secondly Carlyle ironically suggests that the state of poverty in which the beggars live is not a result of socio-economic factors, but a self-imposed ascetic practice. The passage is highly Swiftian, resembling, like the chapter 'Helotage' where Teufelsdröckh advocates the hunting of beggars, the bitter satire of 'A Modest Proposal'. The passage satirises the views of Malthus's *Essay on the Principle of Population*, but Carlyle seems also to be making a joke on the prolific nature of Irish Catholics. In other words, it is difficult at

any moment in this chapter, or indeed throughout the majority of the text, to confirm any single stance being adopted.

At the end of the chapter the Editor seems to function as a rather naive straight man to Teufelsdröckh's comic. He asks whether the professor's ideas on Dandyism as a religion reveal his 'tendency to Mysticism and Religiosity, whereby in every thing he was still scenting out Religion' or whether those ideas have 'something of intended satire' (229). Even if the chapter *is* just a satiric attack on society, then its coming after the 'Everlasting Yea' confirms that an earnest, positive approach has not been entirely embraced. Teufelsdröckh has not given up his old ways and is, as the Editor suggests, guilty of 'some perverse, ineffectual, ironic tendency'. Conversely, the Editor says we may suspect that, if Teufelsdröckh is entirely serious in his 'tendency to Mysticism and Religiosity', he displays an 'owlish purblindness' (219). Neither pole of transcendentalism nor of materialism is given primacy in this chapter, a point exemplified in the opposition of Drudgism as 'the Negative', and Dandyism as 'the positive'. Again we are placed in the 'Centre of Indifference', the 'point midway between the two poles of a magnet':

One attracts hourly towards it and appropriates all the Positive Electricity of the nation (namely, the Money thereof); the other is equally busy with the Negative (that is to say the Hunger)[...]till your whole vital Electricity, no longer, healthfully Neutral, is cut into two isolated portions of Positive and Negative (of Money and of Hunger); and stands there bottled up in two World-Batteries! The stirring of a child's finger brings the two together; and then -- What then? the Earth is but shivered into impalpable smoke by that Doom's-thunder-peal; the Sun misses one of his Planets in Space, and henceforth there are no eclipses of the Moon. (228-229)

This state of healthy neutrality is not one in which positive and negative poles are brought together, which would result not in harmony but in an explosion. Instead Carlyle uses an ambiguous ironic style to contain and relate opposites. By presenting Dandies as both of mystic significance *and* as inherently materialistic (they are self- or Demon-worshippers) he paves the way for the remaking of symbols through the Tailor metaphor in the following chapter 'Tailors'. The Dandies exemplify man's capability for worship, but the clothes must be reworked. Further, although the satiric edge of the chapter might suggest the worthlessness of the Dandy's vanity, the Editor has earlier provided the practical answer to Teufelsdröckh's sometime tendency toward dissolution:

Will Majesty lay aside its robes of state and Beauty its frills, and train-gowns, for a second-skin of tanned hide? By which change Huddersfield and Manchester, and Coventry and Paisley, and the Fancy-Bazaar were reduced to hungry solitude. (169)

So it is evident that even after the 'Everlasting Yea' meaning is still not articulated through the use of the direct and earnest word.

Answering John Sterling's charge that the style of *Sartor Resartus* was too idiosyncratic, Carlyle claimed that 'in a world crumbling into chaos, a revolutionary style that helped to dramatize the fall of such classical and Johnsonian illusions of order was not only appropriate but necessary' (Kaplan, 245). In *The Order of Things*, Foucault draws attention to the breakdown of the representational power of language from the beginning of the nineteenth century onward. Foucault contends that in the period prior to this, which he calls the Classical age, language and meaning were linked by a logical

process of signification. He contends that in the Classical age, language is pre-eminent 'because words have been allotted the task and the power of "representing thought"' (78). However, Carlyle's rejection of this rational approach is linked to the project of *Sartor* to reject a totally materialist approach and acknowledge the existence of notions beyond man's understanding or articulation.

In the chapters 'Prospective' and 'Symbols', Carlyle addresses the disjuncture between signifier and signified. In 'Prospective' he points out that language is a symbol for the inward spiritual realm of thought:

Language is called the Garment of Thought; however, it should rather be,
Language is the Flesh-Garment, the Body, of Thought. (57)

This contention links his ideas on language with his interest in the relationship between the earthly and the spiritual. And, just as the body and soul are different and yet related, so are language and thought. Like the other symbols spoken of throughout the text, language cannot *be* thought, only an approximation of it. If thought is inward and ultimately unknowable it cannot be fully articulated by speech, a point Carlyle emphasises in his evaluation of the two elements in 'Symbols': 'Speech is silver, Silence is golden'. Silence pertains to the ideal (it is 'of Eternity'), whereas Speech is 'of Time' (174). Carlyle also points out that language too has dual properties. It is divided into 'primitive elements (of natural sound)' which, in their description as 'osseous' are indicated to be permanent immovable givens, resembling Foucault's point about the base level of language in Renaissance thinking *prior* to the Classical age (58): 'In fact,

language exists first of all, in its raw and primitive being, in the simple, material form of writing' (*Order of Things*, 42). But it is metaphor which, Carlyle contends, comes closest to articulating thought because it functions as the 'muscles and tissues and living integuments' of speech (58). Like other symbols, language, it is suggested, must change to be effective:

The difference lies here: some styles are lean, adust, wiry, the muscle itself seems osseous; some are even quite pallid, hunger-bitten, and dead-looking; while others again glow in the flush of health and vigorous self-growth, sometimes (as in my own case) not without an apoplectic tendency. (58)

So metaphor (and Carlyle suggests that all language is some kind of metaphor) has an efficacy which depends on the act of making new.

Carlyle's 'revolutionary style' represents a way toward articulating the silent and spiritual by reinvigorating language. Metaphor, then, acts as a kind of intermediary between speech and an unknowable order. Again, Foucault defines this tertiary notion as pertaining to Renaissance thought. Speaking of the raw tools of language he says:

It also gives rise to two other forms of discourse which provide it with a frame: above it, there is commentary, which recasts the given signs to serve a new purpose, and below it, the text, whose primacy is presupposed by commentary to exist hidden beneath the marks visible to all. (42)

In Carlyle's case the 'text' would be an absolute truth which lies beneath appearance, the Eternal as opposed to the temporal, and metaphor works to link this with the material

world. However, as Foucault points out, 'the task of commentary can never, by definition, be completed':

Language sets itself the task of restoring an absolutely primal discourse, but it can express that discourse only by trying to approximate to it by attempting to say things about it that are similar to it[...]The commentary resembles endlessly that which it is commenting upon and which it can never express. (41)

Although Foucault here describes what he calls a Renaissance order, he does point out that, with the modern age, language regained some of the interpretative power which the binary system of representation had disallowed:

The threshold between Classicism and modernity[...]had been definitively crossed when words ceased to intersect with representations and to provide a spontaneous grid for the knowledge of things. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, they rediscovered their ancient, enigmatic density; though not in order to restore the curve of the world which had harboured them during the Renaissance, nor in order to mingle with things in a circular system of signs. (304)

One cannot slot Carlyle conveniently into either of Foucault's definitions of pre- or post-Classical language. For instance, Carlyle does not establish the visual similitudes between microcosm and macrocosm that Foucault contends was the ordering practice in Renaissance times. Nor, for Carlyle, has language become an entirely 'fragmented' thing.³⁵ But Foucault's work is useful in considering the manner in which Carlyle, in a

³⁵ Of course, Foucault acknowledges his own ordering role when he points out that his terms 'Classicism' and 'modernity' 'have no importance' (p. 304)

book which sets out to provide an antidote to the rational thinking which contributes to Teufelsdröckh's religious despair, utilises language to provide an indirect discourse which articulates the uncertainty inherent in man's dualistic nature. The text both represents a search to articulate the unknowable and an acceptance that the way towards faith is to accept that the value of the invisible, spiritual world lies in its unknowableness. It is the contradiction which many critics have seen in Carlyle's noisy advocacy of the value of Silence.³⁶ The indirect mode of discourse which Carlyle adopts, exemplified in the use of irony and metaphor, both seeks to approximate thought or silence *and* to articulate its unknowableness. In other words, language both reveals and conceals the truth as Carlyle suggests in 'Symbols'.

Having extolled the virtues of 'Silence and Secrecy' (which acknowledge the unknowable and therefore legitimise faith above knowledge), Teufelsdröckh goes on to say (174):

Of kin to the so incalculable influences of Concealment, and connected with still greater things, is the wondrous agency of *Symbols*. In a Symbol there is concealment and yet revelation: here, therefore, by Silence and by Speech acting together, comes a doubled significance. And if both the speech be itself high, and the Silence fit and noble, how expressive will their union be! (175)

Carlyle's style both represents speech and silence, so both approximating the spiritual and acknowledging speech's limitations in order to register man's dualistic nature. His style can do both these things because it is not direct as Hillis Miller suggests:

³⁶ Christine Persak refers to 'the famous crack that [Carlyle] preached the gospel of silence in thirty volumes'. ('Rhetoric in Praise of Silence: The Ideology of Carlyle's Paradox', *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, 21 (1991), pp. 38-52 (p. 39).

If, for Carlyle, the highest cannot be spoken of in words, and if the aim of *Sartor Resartus*, which is precisely words, words on the page to be read, and by no means simply gestures, is to speak of the highest, which clearly *is* its aim, then that speaking must necessarily be of the most oblique and roundabout sort. It must be a speaking which, in one way or another, discounts itself in its act of being proffered. (7)

Sartor Resartus can also be considered in the light of Bakhtin's theory of the dialogic imagination. Bakhtin charts the emergence of two distinct types of writing; the direct and monoglotic word, seen for instance in epic and prophetic writing, and the polyglotic satire or parody which

introduces the permanent corrective of laughter, of a critique on the one-sided seriousness of the lofty direct word, the corrective of reality that is always richer, more fundamental and most importantly *too contradictory and heteroglot* to be fitted into a high and straightforward genre.³⁷

This latter discourse is 'multi-generic, multi-styled, mercilessly critical, soberly-mocking - reflecting in all its fullness the heteroglossia and multiple voices of a given culture, people and epoch' (61). Bakhtin considers that it is this polyglossia which can best communicate the complexity of being: 'Language is transformed from the absolute dogma it had been within the narrow framework of a sealed-off and impermeable monoglossia into a working hypothesis for comprehending and expressing reality' (61). The dialogic principle therefore not only refers to a single parody or satire of one form of writing, but proposes a style which can incorporate the diversity of speech within a

³⁷ *The Dialogic Imagination* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981), p. 55.

culture's language, both literary and non-literary. Bakhtin illustrates his point by referring to dialogue, but he also recognises the dialectic principle inherent in an author's 'dialogic contact' with both his own and others' words. The ambiguity attainable through this approach is evident when he says that the other's language is 'simultaneously represented *and* representing' (45).

The applicability of this theory of discourse to *Sartor* is immediately evident. The multiplicity of voice, and dialectic interaction of those voices, along with the use of irony and a metaphoric style which refuses to give absolute values for the symbols it employs, results in an indirect style which both articulates the complexity of man's nature and refuses to endorse the closure which a full resolution of the dualism of the text would result in. Instead the dialogic nature of the text exemplifies the ongoing dialectic between despair and belief, body and soul, evil and good, as the Editor suggests in his final comments:

Have we not, in the course of eternity, travelled some months of our
Life-journey in partial sight of one another; have we not lived together,
though in a state of quarrel! (238)

The text ends on an open note in which an ongoing conflict, rather than closure, is acknowledged, a point which Bakhtin makes when he talks about polyphonic dialogue's 'lack of finalization'.³⁹ If the direct word cannot satisfactorily articulate the spiritual, then the nearest thing to not speaking would be to use a style which never makes a definitive

³⁹ 'From Notes made in 1970-71', in *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1986), p. 151.

statement. And Carlyle's use of irony is of importance here because, as Bakhtin suggests, irony is 'a special kind of substitute for silence' (Notes, 148). Teufelsdröckh's advocacy of Silence over Speech seems at times to threaten the text with dissolution, a notion which Mellor addresses in 'Self-consuming Artifacts': '*Sartor Resartus* is a fictional work designed to consume itself by revealing the limitations both of its own symbolic language and of language as such'. Mellor indicates that this self-consuming urge is staved off because the text is not 'intended as a monument of truth but as a goad to action' (133). To embrace silence totally, to dissolve the written word, would be to mount to the 'inane limbos' which the dissolution of all symbols threatened. The text would in theory disappear if this were the case, and no knowledge would be imparted. But Carlyle's dialectic style which, through irony, indicates an engagement with the speaker's own ideas, and through the use of a number of voices creates an ongoing argument within the text, prevents this dissolution. Carlyle's style therefore manages to combine speaking with not speaking, a ploy which both expresses the need to approximate the spiritual while acknowledging its unutterability.

How then, considering the uncertainty inherent in the text, can Carlyle embrace the idea of spiritual truth at all? The text is not a linear one which leads inexorably from doubt to faith but repeatedly re-enacts over and over again that movement, denoting the ongoing conflict which man faces. The text confirms that body and soul, doubt and faith, evil and good are coeval, expressed in the everlasting nature of 'No' and 'Yea'. However what man cannot confirm is the existence of a spiritual truth. Rather its existence relies on his mode of viewing the world. Man's redemption is not dependent on God, but on himself, as Carlyle suggested in a letter to his young follower, Espinasse: 'Your help lies

within yourself; your hindrance too lies there' (Espinasse, 60).

The language of faith (that which attempts to articulate the workings of God and the soul) is constructed by man and must constantly be made anew. However, faith then relies on man's perception of the world, rather than the revelation of any absolute truth. This point is driven home throughout the text. In a later chapter on sexuality and romance, I shall talk about the role of fantasy in determining whether love may be a route to salvation or further despair. The role of fantasy or imagination is recognised in the chapter 'Symbols':

'Yes, Friends,' elsewhere observes the Professor, 'not our Logical, Mensurative faculty, but our Imaginative one is King over us; I might say, Priest and Prophet to lead us heavenward; or Magician and Wizard to lead us hellward[...]The Understanding is indeed thy window, with its colour-giving retina, healthy or diseased.'" (176-177)

Man's perception and his manner of articulating that perception can lead both to despair and belief, or even to a constant interaction of the two. Rather than the divine harmonising order which Sigman identified in Carlyle's treatment of polarities, this suggests that man must take on the ordering role. The lack of closure or certainty in the text which results from this view serves to emphasise the subjective nature of faith, rather than the existence of a rational, objective truth. Carlyle's ironic and ambiguous style acknowledges the complexity of the dualistic but coexistent nature of body and soul by asserting that no absolute unity can be achieved. Kingsley's views are very different.

In an article for *Fraser's Magazine* of July 1859, entitled 'The Irrationale of Speech',

Kingsley reviews two books (*The Unspeakable; or, The Life and Adventures of a Stammerer* and *A Manual of the Philosophy of Voice and Speech*). The subject was close to Kingsley's heart as he himself was a stammerer, although he spoke perfectly when preaching. In this article Kingsley, like Carlyle, recognises the mysterious nature of human existence. He speaks of the 'minute philosopher',

who holds that things are strange in proportion to their commonness; that the fit attitude for the human mind is habitual wonder; and that true science, so far from explaining phenomena, only shows that they are inexplicable, or likely to be so, not merely as to their final but as to their proximate causes.⁴⁰

However, unlike Carlyle, Kingsley does not recognise a disjuncture between speech and thought. Rather, he contends that, like mysterious phenomena, 'few things seem more miraculous than human speech' (1). Although the unknowability of the divine is acknowledged, the gap between word and meaning is collapsed:

One is forced to confess the whole process of speech to be utterly transcendental and inexplicable, lying in that region below consciousness, in which, after all, lie all the noblest and most precious powers of our humanity. (3)

Language, then, inhabits the same space as thought. Like Carlyle, however, Kingsley does recognise that there are two levels of language. He speaks of 'articulation in its most rudimentary, and perhaps unconscious state, using the example of a seal (or 'talking fish')

⁴⁰ Charles Kingsley, 'The Irrationale of Speech', *Fraser's Magazine*, 60 (1859), pp. 1-14, (p. 1).

to illustrate 'that the primary consonant, in mammals at least, is produced by suddenly opening the just closed lips, and driving the breath forcibly out'. However this, he says, does not explain how a child learns to 'form those endless combinations of lips, teeth, and tongue, which produce the various consonants[...]so as to produce the endless variety of tones by which he expresses each and every passing emotion' (2). Kingsley then contends that man's ability to express meaning through speech is a God-given thing by referring to David's confession in scripture: 'I am fearfully and wonderfully made, oh Lord; and that my soul knoweth right well' (2).

Although Kingsley, through his recognition of the mystery of life, contends that there is 'no rationale of speech' (rather it is a transcendental act), he does propound the view that to stammer is an 'irrationale', suggesting that he sees imperfect speech as a divergence from some kind of order. Indeed, he suggests that all men would be stammerers if it were not that 'Nature takes better care of us than we can of ourselves' (3). Kingsley's view of language, and its right articulation, as a divine gift is then confirmed by his intentional mis-quotation from *Hamlet*:

There's a Divinity doth shape our 'words,'
Rough-hew them as we will. (3)

Kingsley goes on to parallel the difference between stammering and the right articulation of sounds, with man's inability and ability to speak spiritual truths. He suggests that some clergymen need to read the book he reviews on the *Philosophy of Voice and Speech* to 'get some hints at least as to the strange mechanism and the right employment of those

organs of voice which they so sadly abuse every Sunday' (12). In this way, Kingsley collapses the dualism between sound and meaning as well as between thought and speech. For Kingsley, the good minister has 'the self-taught eloquence which comes from intense and passionate conviction, from clear imaginative vision' (12). This notion may seem similar to Carlyle's view that to articulate the spiritual depends on the ability of the speaker to reinvigorate speech. However, Kingsley's contention that the good speaker knows 'the trick of art: and the trick of nature' suggests that man's 'self-taught eloquence' comes from divine inspiration. Unlike Carlyle, whose recognition of the disjuncture between signified and signifier means that the truth can only be approximated through an oblique and ambiguous rhetoric which both strives to reveal the spiritual and recognises its unknowability, Kingsley's view that speech and thought are part of the same process means that the articulation of belief is a much less problematic process. Indeed, in comparison to the element of doubt which emerges in *Sartor*, Kingsley believes that the right articulation of language proceeds from 'passionate conviction'. In contrast to Carlyle's oblique and limited route to the sublime, Kingsley believes that the spiritual can and should be directly and unequivocally articulated through speech, a point he emphasises by referring to the rhetoric of Henry Newman.

At the centre of the dispute which erupted between Kingsley and Newman in 1863, and eventually resulted in Newman's writing of *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, was the notion that the Catholicism, to which Newman converted, encouraged lying. In a review of Froude's *History of England* Kingsley contended that

Truth, for its own sake, had never been a virtue with the Roman clergy. Father Newman informs us that it need not, and on the whole, ought not to be: that cunning is the weapon which heaven has given to the saints wherewith to withstand the brute male force of the wicked world which marries and is given in marriage. (Colloms, 269)

The first thing to notice here is that Kingsley equates lying with dualism. Throughout his writing, as we shall see, Kingsley equates dualism with the 'Manichean' views of the Tractarians and Catholics which opposed body and soul and advocated the rejection of the bodily. That for Kingsley the right use of language is linked to a unity of body and soul is evident from his contention in 'The Irrationale of Speech' that stammerers must 'keep up that *mentem sanam in corpore sano* which is now-a-day called somewhat offensively, muscular Christianity' (11) The stammerer is advised to steer clear of extremes of 'sexual excess' and also the asceticism which Newman embraced both in the Tractarian movement and his conversion to Catholicism.

Brenda Colloms points out that Kingsley's accusation against Newman was founded on no more than his use of the scriptural text 'Behold, I sent you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves; be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as doves' (269). However, by considering Kingsley's thoughts in 'The Irrationale of Speech' on Newman's change of rhetoric after his conversion we may come closer to understanding what it was that he objected to. Pre-conversion Newman is depicted as perceiving and speaking the, often unpalatable, truth:

Perfectly still he stood, disdaining the slightest show of passion, trusting to eye and voice alone -- to the eye, which looked through and through every soul with the fascination of a serpent; to the voice, most sweet and

yet most dreadful, which was monotonous indeed: but monotonous with full intent and meaning, carrying home to the heart, with its delicate and deliberate articulation, every syllable of words which one would have too gladly escaped; words which laid bare the inmost fibres of the heart, and showed to each his basest and his weakest spot. (18)

But of post-conversion Newman Kingsley asks:

Why is thy once sweet voice all jarred, thy once pure taste all fouled, by bitter spite and insult to thy native land? Why hast thou taken thyself in the net of thine own words, and bewildered thy subtle brain with thy more subtle tongue. (18)

The accusation against Newman of lying can then be related to Kingsley's critique of his style. Whereas Kingsley views truth as articulable through direct speech, Newman is perceived as making his point through more 'subtle' means. And in this perception Kingsley was not alone. In 1898, Walter Walsh accused Newman of being, at worst, a liar, and, at best, 'adept in the art of mystifying people'. He refers to Newman's confessed use of irony:

'I used irony in conversation,' [Newman] wrote, 'when matter-of-fact men would not see what I meant. This kind of behaviour was *a sort of habit with me.*' 'Irony' is defined in our dictionaries as 'a mode of speech in which the meaning is contrary to the words,' and as 'dissimulation' for the purposes of ridicule. But surely, when those to whom this irony was addressed, as in this instance, did 'not see' the irony, but took the falsehood for truth, they were nothing better than wilfully and shamefully deceived by Newman.⁴¹

⁴¹ *The Secret History of the Oxford Movement* (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1898), pp. 269-270.

Newman's obliquity is also recognised by Stephen Helmling when he talks of both Newman and Carlyle as 'esoteric' writers:

These books were wilfully and self-consciously *difficult*, and advertised their difficulty as an index (and a criticism) of the insufficiencies of ordinary habits of discussion and understanding, as well as a challenge to the fit audience, though few - that citizenry of 'the selector world'. (9)

In both cases truth is not accessible through the direct word. Kingsley, on the other hand, embraces the earnestness which is exhibited in his use of the direct word. Whereas Carlyle's metaphoric, ironic, ambiguous style highlights the fact that symbol and symbolised cannot be fully equated, Kingsley embraces a style in which thought and word directly correspond. In contrast to Carlyle's irony, Kingsley's writing is earnest and direct. Carlyle's esotericism requires the reader to interpret his ideas and, like the Editor and Hofrath Heuschrecke, he is inlocked 'in the labyrinthic tortuosities and covered ways' of the text (*Works*, 1: 153). But Kingsley's aims are more didactic than inspirational. Speech is used to communicate truths, the central one being the unity of body and soul. As we shall see in the following chapters, Kingsley's is not a metaphoric style. The relationship between body and soul is either articulated through a prosaic and didactic discourse in which we are told the truth, or, as in the case of *The Water Babies*, parable, which, as in *Pilgrim's Progress*, provides a cash value for the symbol.

Chapter 3

The Erotic body and the Ascetic Soul: A Marriage made in Hell?

Sex and marriage are major topics in the assessment of attitudes towards body and soul. In this chapter therefore, I want to look at texts by Carlyle and Kingsley which deal with sex, romance, marriage and women, and consider how they reflect on the relationship between body and soul. Obviously the writers' attitudes towards sex and the relationship between men and women (exemplified in marriage) are a central focus of this chapter, but I will also be looking at the way women are portrayed because, as Fontein points out in *The Light and the Dark*, dualistic systems are usually marked by attitudes concerning gender which typically result in 'the denigration of women' (xii). This denigration would be evident in, for instance, the writings of St. Paul or Jerome, as Marina Warner confirms in *Alone of All Her Sex*:

When Augustine, Ambrose, and Jerome endorsed virginity for its special holiness, they were the heirs and representatives of much current thought in the Roman empire of their day. And in this battle between the flesh and the spirit, the female sex was firmly placed on the side of the flesh.¹

I shall focus on Kingsley's three works, *The Saint's Tragedy*, *Yeast* and *Alton Locke*, and Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus* (1833-34) and the earlier *Wotton Reinfred*, the latter unfinished and published posthumously, although written at Comely Bank around the beginning of Carlyle's married life (1827). These are the only works in which Carlyle addresses the notion of how physical love might overcome the problem of the relationship between body and soul. *Wotton Reinfred* seems to rehearse some of the themes of *Sartor* which in turn exerts an influence on Kingsley's writing of the 1840s and provides interesting comparisons with Kingsley's sexual

¹ Marina Warner, *Alone of All Her Sex: The Myth and The Cult of The Virgin Mary* (London: Picador, 1985), p. 57.

ideology.²

It may be the apparent incongruity between a prudish society on the one hand and the amount of sexual scandal on the other which has prompted fascination with the domestic arrangements of famous Victorian writers. Ruskin's divorce on the grounds of non-consummation, Dickens' extramarital affair with Ellen Ternan and subsequent separation from his wife, Swinburne's passion for the lash - all these sexual irregularities (and more) in the lives of Victorian Men of Letters have provided biographers and social historians alike with the opportunity to penetrate deeper into the private world of the writer, or to affirm that the Victorians were not as repressed as we think they were, only hypocritical.³ It remains doubtful how far profitable use may be made of an author's private life, specifically his sexual relationships and habits, in the study of his writing. But, in a study which purports to examine the writer within his cultural context, his sexuality and its place within that culture cannot be ignored.

Charles Kingsley himself provides some justification by making a central concern of his private life a pivotal issue in his fiction, as John Maynard contends:

For Kingsley, the union of sexual and clerical commitment that Protestantism allowed became the cornerstone of his existence and his site point as a writer.⁴

² Thomas Carlyle, 'Wotton Reinfred' in *Last Words of Thomas Carlyle* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1892). In *Carlyle and Scottish Thought*, Ralph Jessop points out that *Wotton's* publication in the *New Review* in 1892, resulted in 'the discovery that many passages in the text were in various ways reproduced in his later work *Sartor Resartus*' (p. 111).

³ See for instance, Peter Ackroyd's *Dickens* which deals extensively with Dickens' affair with Ellen Ternan and the rumours which surround his relationship with his sister-in-law, Georgiana (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1990); Ronald Pearsall's *The Worm in the Bud*, lists Swinburne in his index as 'poet and pervert' and refers to Victorian 'inconsistencies and hypocrisies' [(London: Macmillan, 1969), ix].

⁴ 'Sexual Christianity: Charles Kingsley's *Via Media*', p. 101.

Not just in the matter of sex and marriage, but when dealing with any social issue, Kingsley used his fictional writing to articulate clearly, one might even say to promulgate forcefully, his ideas. Further, information on Kingsley's sex life, his relationship with his wife Fanny, both before and after marriage, and his opinions on sexuality are now accessible through publications of extensive extracts from the private letters (housed in the British Library), in Susan Chitty's biography, *The Beast and The Monk*, and selectively in Maynard's essay.⁵ The bulk of the evidence is before us and we may make informed connections between biography and fiction.

Charles Kingsley attended Magdalene College between 1838 and 1842 and, as Chitty points out, Cambridge 'was still a place where the majority of undergraduates enjoyed a spell of high spirits and hard drinking before settling down on the family acres' (51). Kingsley, although not of the same class, was no different and seems to have led a mildly dissolute existence. The *Letters and Memories* indicate that, in his second year at Cambridge, Kingsley neglected his studies in favour of physical pursuits because he was 'full of religious doubts' (*LM*, 1: 26): 'He read little, went in for excitement of every kind - boating, hunting, driving, fencing, boxing, duck-shooting in the fens' (*LM*, 1: 28). Chitty's biography, however, informed by the private letters and unconstrained by Fanny Kingsley's editorial modesty, tells a different story. She suggests that Kingsley's unrest at University, indeed even his religious doubts, were closely linked to his developing sense of his own sexuality, an opinion echoed by Maynard (Chitty, 51-62; Maynard, 89). Chitty points out that, in Kingsley's friendship with Charles Blanchford Mansfield, a 'latent' homosexuality is detectable.⁶ It was with Mansfield

⁵ I use Chitty's biography extensively in this chapter at the expense of other works, partly because it is the most recent Life, but also because Chitty focuses on Kingsley's sexuality and marriage, embodying in her title the dual impulses of his life.

⁶ Chitty quotes from a letter to Ludlow - 'He [Mansfield] was my first love. The first human being, save my mother, I ever met who knew what I meant'. Kingsley also claimed, after being married for eight years, that 'he would walk ten miles to see a certain butcher's nephew playing cricket, "in spit of the hideous English dress. One looks forward with delight to what

that he had his first sexual experience, probably in his first year, with a prostitute in a brothel near to the College. His guilt at this encounter was later displayed in an anguished letter to his fiancée, Fanny:

'Darling,' he wrote, 'I must confess all. You, my unspotted, bring a virgin body to my arms. I alas do not to yours. Before our lips met I had sinned and fallen. Oh, how low! If it is your wish, you shall be a wife only in name. No communion but that of mind shall pass between us. (Chitty, 57)

Kingsley had met Fanny Grenfell during the summer vacation between first and second year, when his father moved to the rectory of Checkenden in Oxfordshire, by which time he was already undergoing the 'fashionable' ordeal of a crisis of faith (Chitty, 53-54). There was an immediate attraction although no serious relationship was formed at this point. Kingsley's subsequent immersion in sporting pursuits, Chitty puts down to an attempt to assuage his rising sexual desires (57).

Alongside this growing awareness of his physical needs, Kingsley's religious doubts had been exacerbated by the rise of the Oxford Movement, 'a renewal of emphasis upon the Catholic elements that remained in the Church of England', including the advocacy of a life of celibacy.⁷ The *Letters and Memories* indicate that Kingsley 'fiercely denounced the ascetic view of sacred human ties which he foresaw would result from [the Oxford Tracts]' (1: 27). Yet Kingsley also admitted 'privately' that his "own heart[...]strangely yearned towards" the Oxford Tracts "from the first" (Maynard, 88). Kingsley, then, was a very confused young man. He was drawn to the asceticism of Rome, and yet he reacted vociferously against this attraction. He formed emotional attachments, probably to a few male friends, but certainly to

he would be 'in the resurrection'" (Chitty, pp. 52-3)

⁷Joseph Ellis Baker, *The Novel and the Oxford Movement* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1965), p. 1.

Fanny Grenfell, and he assuaged those yearnings by physical pursuits which he later denounced as sinful (Chitty, 56). Added to this, the object of his deepest affections, Fanny, was, along with her sisters, 'a whole-hearted Puseyite' already half promised to a Protestant nunnery which encouraged a pure and sometimes austere ascetic life for young women (Kendall, 26). In the face of all this confusion, Kingsley set about constructing an ideology in which these conflicting elements of flesh and spirit could be reconciled.

In *The Dust of Combat*, Robert Martin points out that Kingsley's battle with doubt was won 'thanks to Fanny's help'.⁸ Fanny certainly urged Charles to read his Bible and not to lose faith; however it seems to have been his attraction to her more than her advice which settled his will -- 'On the last Sunday in March the couple met and kissed once more and this time Fanny confessed her love to Charles. Within three days he wrote to her to announce he was at last safely inside the fold' (Chitty, 59). In reaction to the conflicting elements he found within himself, Kingsley focused upon his love for Fanny as a legitimate site for conjoining the flesh and the spirit -- 'You are to me a middle point between earthly and ethereal morality' (Chitty, 58).

Sex, within a loving marriage, became for Kingsley an act of worship. His fear of sexual excess was allayed by situating sex within marriage, but, more important, marriage to a woman he passionately loved and revered. Similarly, his ascetic leanings were accommodated in a relationship in which sex was stripped of any lustful connotations. Of course, the fact that Kingsley only endorses sex within a loving marriage means that his ideas are not outstandingly radical. James Hinton, a leader of the free love movement, for instance, went further than Kingsley to say that 'there is no desire or indulgence that is forbidden; there is not one good and another evil' (Pearsall, 191). Kingsley still believed that sex outside marriage was sinful and therefore his denial that the body is sinful relies on a certain type of

⁸Robert Bernard Martin, *The Dust of Combat* (London: Faber, 1959), p. 45.

sex. However, he was going further than many writers on sex in his time who seemed not to have progressed from Augustine.⁹ Nineteenth-century discourses on the dangers of sexual excess also recommended that marital sex should be kept to a minimum and regarded as a purely procreative act. Kingsley, although he had a large family, seems also to have condoned marital sex for its own sake. In a letter of 1848, he explains to a friend his 'higher and spiritual view of marriage' in which 'Man is a sexual animal' (*LM*, 1: 149). He concedes that the early teaching of the Church, including that of Christ and St. Paul, held that fleshly pursuits, especially sex, were 'unclean', but he contends that this was because the 'heathen world' necessitated a reaction against sin which would prevent a backsliding into barbarism. Indeed, he blames Christ for man's one-sided view of human existence:

Thus Christ, in every age of the Church for the sake of enabling our piecemeal and partial minds to bring out one particular truth, seems to permit of our pushing it into error, by not binding it with its correlatives; e.g., state authority v. ecclesiastical authority, and Free Will v. Predestination. (*LM*, 1: 150)

Kingsley acknowledges here the dual nature of man's existence, but advocates that the opposites be bound together: 'In this day only can we reconcile the contradiction by which both Scripture and common sense talk of our bodies as at once not us, and yet us' (*LM*, 1: 151). In his attitude to sexuality, and through his marriage to Fanny, Kingsley brings together sex and religion, the body and the spirit, earth and heaven. He asserts that 'man is a spirit-animal, and in communion with God's spirit has a right to believe that his affections are under that spirit's guidance', indeed, 'he is bound[...]to give himself up to his love in child-like

⁹ In *Eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven*, Uta Ranke-Heinmann points out that St. Paul was not as strong an opponent to marriage as has been assumed, Augustine being the 'man who fused Christianity together with hatred of sex and pleasure' and vociferously opposed marriage, conceding that marriage was legitimate only as a procreative union. (pp. 75-98)

simplicity and abandonment' (*LM*, 1: 152). Marriage and the children produced by its sexual union are not only approved of, they are also a means of perfecting man's love for God:

He can know most of God, because it is through those family ties, and by those family names that God reveals Himself to man, and reveals man's relations to Him. Fully to understand the meaning of 'a Father in Heaven' we must be fathers ourselves; to know how Christ loved the Church, we must have wives to love, and love them. (*LM*, 1: 154)

Kingsley's sexual relationship with his wife was, therefore, conceived of as a heaven on earth, articulated in his belief that it could result in a regaining of Eden, 'the very garden of the Lord' (*LM*, 1: 152). But, by asserting that their marriage and indeed their sex life might continue after death, he also collapsed the distance and difference between heaven and earth and directly contradicted the Manichean view that the body is the prison of the soul. Indeed, his suggestion that the body will actually ascend to heaven dramatically breaks down any division between matter and spirit:

Heaven will be a place of 'resurrection of the flesh, wh [sic] is the great promise of Eternity - no miserable fancies about[...]souls escaped from matter[...]but bodies! *our* bodies, beloved, beautiful bodies, ministers to us in all our joys.' (Maynard, 94)¹⁰

Having made this reconciliation in his mind between flesh and spirit, Kingsley was an enthusiastic participant in his sexual relationship with his wife. During their courtship there appears to have been *some* physical contact -- 'every moment the thought comes across me of those mysterious recesses of beauty where my hands have been wandering' - and after marriage, and throughout his life, Kingsley's letters still pulsate with physical desire for his

¹⁰ Quoting from Kingsley's Letters, British Library, Add.62552, f.183.

wife - 'I dreamt of you last night in *all* your beauty and loved you' (Chitty, 82, 89). However, before their marriage could be effected, and their love consummated fully, there was a lengthy period of separation which severely tried both lovers and reveals some of the tensions which lie behind Kingsley's harmonious vision of man as a sexual-spiritual animal.

As a result of Kingsley's social and economic standing, any match between himself and Fanny was opposed by the Grenfell family, not to mention the objections of Fanny's fellow Puseyite sisters. The lovers were allowed little time together and, even though Charles had secured a curacy, in 1842 Fanny was forced by her family to undergo a separation of one year from Charles to 'test[...]their love' (Chitty, 73). During this time, Kingsley contrived a program of bizarre sexual and ascetic practices to allow them to cope with separation and prepare their bodies for marriage. Fanny had already rejected her Puseyite leanings at Charles' behest:

His letters to Fanny were full of attacks on the Tracts, for he was anxious to cure her of what he called her Manicheanism, the doctrine that the flesh is evil. (Chitty, 65)

Yet the rituals which he invented for both himself and Fanny involved what Maynard calls 'a kind of positive parody of the anti-sexual traditions of asceticism' (98). Firstly, there were 'festival' nights when 'the two lay, in imagination, in each other's arms', and which letters suggest may have led to masturbatory fantasies:

Never control any desire of pleasure because I am not there to share it with you! (Maynard, 91)¹¹

¹¹Quoting from Kingsley's letters, British Library, Add.62552, ff.71, 46v,

But for the Friday of each week, Kingsley devised a regime of penance when he would lie on the cold, stone floor and scourge his naked body. He would not allow Fanny to harm herself, but her sexual frustration emerged through fits when she 'longed to wring her hands, groan, roll on the floor, scream, run until she dropped' (Chitty, 74). Even after the Grenfells conceded defeat and allowed an engagement, Kingsley still planned strangely erotic-ascetic rituals for himself and Fanny. He instructed her to make two sets of hair shirts to facilitate their nights of penance, and, when Fanny seems to have requested he whip her, Kingsley declines only to say that he will kneel outside her door and pray if she wishes to whip herself (Chitty, 80).

Clearly, Kingsley's conviction that sex could be a spiritual experience was one which put him under intense strain. Indeed, he argued that his penitential acts were not a denial of the flesh, but a preparation for marital sex (perhaps, subconsciously, a cleansing act in response to his experience with a prostitute). Yet his fear of his own sex drive does not seem to have abated even with the contrivance of a legitimising ideology. He suggested to Fanny that, to 'purify and prolong' their physical bliss, sex should be postponed until a month after their wedding (Chitty, 81). They should lie together but resist full intercourse. But these ascetic leanings seem also to have been a way of letting erotic desire in by the back door. As Maynard confirms, Kingsley's nights of self-flagellation and, as will be seen, their manifestation in his fiction, suggest an enjoyment, a 'kink' (98). Further, although originally forbidding Fanny to whip herself, there is a voyeuristic element in his later agreement to listen outside the door. His fantasies of Fanny's penance also extended to scenes in which he would absolve her of her sins: she would come to him 'penitent, barefoot, with disheveled hair, wearing one coarse garment only' (Chitty, 80). No doubt Maynard is correct in his assessment that 'the narrow path [Kingsley] set for himself in sexual matters makes it hard for him not to stray to one side or the other' (130). And yet there may be another explanation.

Kingsley's ascetic practices and fantasies, although of a sexual nature, also display a desire for power over the body, both his own and Fanny's. Indeed, as Maynard suggests, Kingsley's sexual frustration is often rerouted into violence, real or imagined (it seems to me that his description of the penitent Fanny represents a fantasy of at least ravishment, if not rape) (Maynard, 131). This desire for power over the body is important to Kingsley's construction of an ideal union of the body and the spirit within a sexual relationship because, firstly, the body is scourged of its impurities, and, secondly, because the act of will required in mortifying the flesh is also needed in constructing an ideology in which the conflicting elements of flesh and spirit are forced together into what Maynard refers to in his title as a '*via media*'. However, this phrase suggests an element of harmony or balance incongruous with Kingsley's own rather erratic, and often forced, sexual ideology. In an article which deals with Kingsley's relationship to the churches of his day, John C. Hawley labels Kingsley's reconciliation of disparate elements 'dogmatic anti-dogmatism'.¹² That is, he suggests that Kingsley rejects extreme polemic stances to embrace an as strongly maintained middle course. This forcing together of polarities requires that Kingsley expresses beliefs which often contradict his own feelings. It is true that, after marriage, his slightly violent ascetic practices and fantasies seem to have abated, and yet, he does not seem to have experienced the foreseen bliss. His marriage was not unhappy, and yet he appears to have been unable to maintain a settled relationship with his wife. He spent a good deal of time away from Fanny, who refused to go to Cambridge with him when he became Professor of History there, where he walked, fished and explored the seashore often with equally enthusiastic friends. He suffered from a nervous disorder which was exacerbated by work and, once again, as in his student days at Cambridge, tamed the flesh by physical pursuits. This man with all his nervous energy does not fit the picture of someone experiencing an

¹² 'Charles Kingsley and the *Via Media*', (p. 287)

earthly paradise. Perhaps the reality never lived up to its anticipation. Perfection of his beliefs, however, may have been something which he could more readily attain in his writing.

But if Kingsley's life and writing proclaim his 'extraordinary awareness of sexual issues', it is a different case with Carlyle (Maynard, 93). A mystery surrounds his marriage and sex life which has ensured a continuing interest in it, but which also makes the tracing of any connection between life and writing a difficult matter. The notion that there was something wrong in the Carlyles' marriage stems from Froude's *Life* and *My Relations with Carlyle*, although Froude suggests that 'there were floating suspicions long before in the circle of Cheyne Row'.¹³ The second two volumes of Froude's four-volume biography, *Thomas Carlyle: A History of His Life in London 1834-1881*, refer to arguments and hint at physical estrangement between Thomas and Jane, but it is in *My Relations With Carlyle*, Froude's justification of his biography and publication of the *Reminiscences*, that he makes a clearer statement on the sexual problems the Carlyles supposedly experienced.¹⁴ He asserts that, when Geraldine Jewsbury, Jane's confidante, heard the biography was to be written, she approached Froude to tell him that 'Carlyle was one of those persons who ought never to have married' (*My Relations*, 21). Froude goes on in his euphemistic manner to say that 'she [Jane] had longed for children, and children were denied to her' and that he, Froude, had originally 'supposed that[...]they had agreed[...]that they would do better without a family' (21-22) The revealing moment comes when Froude relates one of Miss Jewsbury's anecdotes that 'the morning after [Carlyle's] wedding-day he tore to pieces the flower-garden at Comely Bank in a fit of ungovernable fury' (23). It is difficult to say how much truth there is in Froude's

¹³James Anthony Froude, *My Relations With Carlyle* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1903), p. 21.

¹⁴David Alec Wilson contends in *The Truth about Carlyle* that 'the esoteric meaning [of the biography] plainly written between the lines of many a page, whispered in society from the first, and alluded to in the leading newspapers, was that Carlyle was a eunuch, and that his wife's sorrow was the lack of sexual intercourse' (London: Alston Rivers, 1913), p. 27.

implication that Carlyle was impotent, although Froude himself made great play of his own integrity.¹⁵ Miss Jewsbury's credibility was questioned by David Alec Wilson in *The Truth About Carlyle*, but his testimony to Carlyle's manliness was marred by an unnecessary attack on Jewsbury as a 'would-be husband thief', and his overweening reverence for Carlyle: 'Are you going to let the memory of such a man continue smeared by smutty fiction?' (38, 26). Wilson's attack on Jewsbury unfortunately overshadows his more valid point, that Jane described her as 'a fussy, romantic, hysterical woman, a considerable fool, with her head packed full of nonsense' (40). The desire to prove Carlyle's masculinity (Wilson refers to him as 'physically like other men') resulted in some undignified detective work (26). Medical evidence as to whether Jane was *virgo intacta* is picked over by Wilson, and Carlyle's truss-fitter and witnesses to him bathing are trotted out to testify to his physical normality (Wilson, 53, 58). What is surprising is that the question of Carlyle's manliness appears to be more important than his supposed mental and physical cruelty towards Jane, suggesting that anxieties over masculinity took precedence over morality.

Modern biographies too have dealt with Carlyle's sexual capabilities. Kaplan, whose biography picks up on the ascetic nature of Carlyle's Calvinistic upbringing - 'the young boy was taught to repress his physical instincts' - gives a measured account of the arguments for and against Carlyle's impotency (18, 118-119). The tabloid journalist, Simon Heffer, devotes some space to Carlyle's sexuality, acknowledging that 'we do not know the truth'. He draws attention to the family story that Jane had a miscarriage in 1831 and that 'baby clothes were found in her drawer in Cheyne Row after her death.'¹⁶ Ian Campbell gives perhaps the most convincing reading of the situation when he says that 'writers, anxious to trace the causes for

¹⁵ 'The usual custom is to begin with the brightest side and to leave the faults to be discovered after. It is dishonest and it does not answer. Of all literary sins Carlyle himself detested most a false biography' (*My Relations with Carlyle*, p. 37).

¹⁶ *Moral Desperado: A Life of Thomas Carlyle* (London: Phoenix, 1996), pp. 88-89.

strain between husband and wife, gathered fragments of gossip which suggested a rapid breakdown of any deep relationship between Thomas and Jane' and concludes that 'their physical attraction for each other is inescapable to any student of their letters written after 1826'.¹⁷ Campbell's suggestion that rumour and gossip were responsible for the perception of the Carlyles' marriage is given credence by the fact that Froude cites as one of his sources 'anonymous letters, written to myself, that the state of things in Cheyne Row was no secret at all' (*My Relations*, 26).

Whatever was the case with Carlyle's sex life, the question I am concerned with is what bearing it might have on his writing. Trev Broughton takes a historical/literary approach when she suggests that the Carlyle-Froude 'embroilment' was part and parcel of a wider discussion on marriage in the late nineteenth century, and instrumental in a reassessment of the Man of Letters as husband, leading to later controversies over literary marriages, such as that of the Lawrences.¹⁸ But in the light of the conjectural nature of the knowledge of the Carlyles' sex life, and considering how little Carlyle refers to marriage and love in his works, literary approaches have tended to detect signs of his sexuality as manifesting themselves in his writing or, in more extreme cases, to apply psycho-analytic techniques.

Amongst the more interesting type of criticism is Gillian Beer's evaluation of Carlyle's erotic style:

One exception to Carlyle's breaking open of categories is notable. A strain in Carlyle's style which is never discussed, though much responded to by his contemporaries, is its ungainly eroticism. His syntax is typified by an effortful reaching towards climax - a climax deflected and often forgotten in the hurly-burly of intervening concerns.¹⁹

¹⁷ *Thomas Carlyle*, p. 61.

¹⁸ Trev Broughton, 'The Froude-Carlyle Embroilment: Married Life as a Literary Problem', *Victorian Studies* Summer 1995, pp. 551-585.

¹⁹ Gillian Beer, 'Carlylean Transports', in *Arguing with the Past: Essays in Narrative from Woolf to Sydney* (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 74-98 (p. 90).

Carlyle's rapturous description of events such as Teufelsdröckh's 'Baphometric Fire-baptism' certainly have an atmosphere of mounting excitement. Although Beer has identified an element of Carlyle's style here without making any *ostensible* claims for a link between writing and biography, she relies on a commonplace premise about Carlyle's sexuality and, in so doing, she reaffirms the highly questionable link between Carlyle's supposed sexuality and his writing. Beer does notice something very interesting about the manner in which Carlyle's style refuses to provide a sustained and conclusive climax (whether this has something to do with his sexuality or not). But this is more profitably applied to exploring his refusal to apply sexual or romantic love as a sop to the despair of unbelief (a point I shall return to in this chapter) or to considering the manner in which his writing represents a constant striving toward something which seems either unattainable or at most unsustainable as I contended in chapter two. However, if Beer, by sleight of hand, manages to avoid making any direct link between writing and biography, others have not.

Herbert Sussman's 'The Condition of Manliness' in *Victorian Masculinities*, in which he suggests that Carlyle '[displaces] the inner chaos and physical pollution that men feel within themselves onto the female', depends on the assumption that Carlyle was 'repelled by the male body, by male sexuality', indicating just how far the charge of impotence has become an unquestioned foundation for discussing Carlyle's treatment of gender.²⁰

Unfortunately, attempts to identify sexuality as surfacing subliminally can lead to conflicting conclusions, depending on the theory which the critic brings to bear on the text. Sussman, for instance, assuming a 'fear of female sexuality', identifies Carlyle's description of the

²⁰ Herbert Sussman, 'The Condition of Manliness Question', in *Victorian Masculinities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 16-72 (pp. 17, 24).

Maenadic women of *The French Revolution* as rooted in fears of female chaos and the threat of castration, whereas John Clubbe more convincingly suggests, in 'Carlyle's Subliminal Feminine', that Carlyle's presentation of the Revolutionary Maenads is proof that he was 'other and more than a patriarchal oaf' (Sussman, 24).²¹ Clubbe's article contends that, by putting the women's march on Versailles at the centre of his vision of the revolution, he 'represents the female principle as a dynamic, creative force without which no new world order can come into being'. However, Clubbe's contention that Carlyle's struggle with 'his own creative chaos, draws in "The Insurrection of Women" upon the feminine in his inner core' comes unnervingly close to an argument for gendered writing (86). From here it is only a short walk to some of the more extreme claims for the influence of Carlyle's sexuality on his writing. James Halliday infamously expounded on the influence of toilet training and resultant awareness of the genitalia on Carlyle's 'anal' style.²² Frank Harris, whose 'Talks With Carlyle' D.A. Wilson labels fraudulent, contends that Carlyle's impotence had implications beyond his wife's unhappiness: 'What concerns us now is the fact that this bodily disability of Carlyle explains most of his shortcomings as literary critic and writer'.²³ These early twentieth century psycho-analytical approaches which voice concern over Carlyle's literal and literary impotence resemble modern concerns with the gendering of writing, such as the feminist theory of Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar.²⁴ If, in *The Madwoman in the Attic*, they could ask 'if the pen is a metaphorical penis, with what organ can females generate texts?', then subliminal approaches to Carlyle's sexuality beg the question 'with what can an

²¹ John Clubbe, 'Carlyle's Subliminal Feminine: Maenadic Chaos in *The French Revolution*', *Carlyle Studies Annual*, 16 (1996), pp. 75-88 (p. 81).

²² James Halliday, *Mr. Carlyle: My Patient: A Psychosomatic Biography* (London: Heinemann, 1949) pp. 43 - 44.

²³ David Alec Wilson reproduces Harris' article from the *English Review* of February 1911, in *The Truth About Carlyle*, pp. 60-69 (p. 69).

²⁴ Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, *The Madwoman in The Attic* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 7.

impotent man engender a text?'. Clearly the subliminal approach is a minefield, and one which I intend to avoid, partly because there is no proof as to Carlyle's sexual appetite or ability, but also because I am concerned with looking at ways in which Carlyle and Kingsley attempt to grapple with the problem of body and soul dualism, and a subliminal approach denies the element of intent which I want to explore.

Little has been written on *Wotton Reinfred*, perhaps because, as Jessop contends, critics have judged it 'a dreadful failure', and yet it is an interesting attempt at the novelistic genre (112). Carlyle is clearly not entirely unable to sustain a plot, but the problems within the text arise from an awkward juxtapositioning of philosophical argument and narrative. Carlyle's opposition to romance literature and the novel finally would be one reason for this and explains his ultimate rejection of the romance plot. However, before this rejection is realised, both here and in *Sartor*, Carlyle dallies with and gives *some* importance to love and sexuality.

Wotton Reinfred opens with Wotton as a young man experiencing extreme scepticism and with a broken love affair behind him. We hear that he has been rejected by Jane Montague. It is this failed relationship, implies the Doctor, which has led to Wotton's pessimistic worldview: 'Is thy game lost because the first trick has gone against thee? Patience, and shuffle the cards! Is the world all dead because Edmund Walter is a scoundrel jackanapes' (5). However, as Jessop points out, 'Wotton has already been reduced to the impotence of uncertainty before the failure of his romance with Jane helps to confirm his doubts and exacerbate his despair' (114). Wotton's, like Teufelsdröckh's, despair is rooted in his rational materialistic education, and reading of metaphysics, which reject any mysterious, spiritual aspect of man's existence.²⁵ Wotton has a spiritual nature (at University his peers'

²⁵ 'It was a university in which the great principle of spiritual liberty was admitted in its broadest sense, and nature was left to all not only without misguidance, but without any guidance at all[...].nor in metaphysics did he find any light, but rather, doubt or darkness',

'speculations were of far more earthy matters than his'), and yet his education has ensured a lapse into unbelief (21). If the failure of love is not the cause of Wotton's, and Teufelsdröckh's, skeptical outlook, however, successful love, exemplified in a union with a woman, *is* momentarily mooted as a way to link together the material and the transcendental, body and soul, and so cure Wotton's skepticism. For Wotton, Jane's 'presence brought with it airs from heaven', their month spent together is 'fair and heavenly' (36, 39). In physical, earthly love, Wotton thinks he has found the means to regain his spiritual beliefs. However, Jane's engagement and then subsequent announcement of the cancellation of her marriage to Edmund Walter, suggest Carlyle's rejection of romance as an anodyne to spiritual malaise, or indeed as a site point for uniting body and spirit.

It may be difficult to know exactly what Carlyle intended for Wotton and Jane's relationship because the work is unfinished, but the outlook is bleak. When they are reunited in the hills near the House of the Old again the possibility of the unifying nature of love is explored. Sexual contact breaks down the barrier between self and other, but a physical relationship is ultimately rejected:

Neither knew how it was, but his arms were around her, and her bosom was on his, and in the first pure heavenly kiss of love two souls were melted into one. It was but for a moment. (130)

Jane informs Wotton that she is not made for love but for 'sterner stuff' (130). What this 'stuff' is we never hear, although Jane explains that from a young age she rejected the usual marital role for women to embrace the life of an intellectual (137). Her apparent flight from Edmund Walter, the protection of her brothers in her wanderings, her destiny for 'other tasks'

(*Wotton Reinfred*, 20, 22); 'Besides all this, we boasted ourselves a Rational University; in the highest degree, hostile to Mysticism'. (*Works*, 1: 92)

suggests her future as a virgin, even an anchorite figure (130).

This flirtation with romance, only leading to its rejection, is present in a more playful sense in *Sartor Resartus* where Carlyle has moved from the narrative form of a novel to a discourse which allows the interplay of serious intent and deflating irony in a dualistic tone which in turn allows a coexistence of ideas. The Editor quotes from Teufelsdröckh's views on young love:

'If in youth,' writes he once, 'the Universe is majestically unveiling, and everywhere Heaven revealing itself on Earth, nowhere to the Young Man does this Heaven on earth so immediately reveal itself as in the Young Maiden.' (*Works*, 1: 107)

Women are, for Teufelsdröckh, one of the material symbols of the immaterial world as 'a visible Divinity dwelt in them; to our young Friend all women were holy, were heavenly' (108). A permutation of the dualism of body and soul is that of the self and other because subjective knowledge of self or soul separates us from the objective and material other. Like Wotton's soul-uniting kiss with Jane, Teufelsdröckh sees love as a bonding process between 'Me' and 'all Thees':

It is in this approximation of the Like and Unlike, that such heavenly attraction, as between Negative and Positive, first burns out into a flame. Is the pitifullest mortal Person, think you, indifferent to us? Is it not rather our heartfelt wish to be made one with him; to unite him to us, by gratitude, by admiration, even by fear; or failing all these, unite ourselves to him? But how much more, in this case of the Like-Unlike! Here is conceded us the higher mystic possibility of such union, the highest in our Earth; thus, in the conducting medium of Fantasy, flames forth that *fire*-development of the universal Spiritual Electricity, which, as unfolded between man and woman, we first emphatically denominate as LOVE. (*Works*, 1: 107-108)

Something of Beer's description of Carlyle's erotic style can be found in this passage. It

certainly seems that Teufelsdröckh is giving some credibility to the unifying powers of love, and a fairly physical love at that. However, we must sound a cautionary note, as Carlyle does. The text suggests that Love is a matter of perception, perhaps even a chimera. Teufelsdröckh describes love '[flaming] forth' through 'the conducting medium of Fantasy'; his conversation during Aesthetic Tea flows from a soul 'wherein also Fantasy bodies forth form after form, radiant with all prismatic hues'; Love is described as 'Madness' wherein 'Fantasy superadds itself to Sight' (108, 114, 115). This 'Fantasy' has a double edge. It may seem negative to suggest that love is not real, merely an act of perception, but as Teufelsdröckh points out this Fantasy[...]on the so petty domain of the Actual' might 'move at will the infinite Spiritual' (115). Unlike Kingsley who invents an ideology which he then propounds as true, Carlyle declares himself conscious of the precariousness of any idea, especially a dream of love - 'Fantasy I might call the true Heaven-gate and Hell-gate of man' (115). Teufelsdröckh, like Wotton, believes in the first flush of love that it can lead to 'scaling the upper Heaven'. The Editor, so often a cautionary voice to Teufelsdröckh's excess, brings the discussion back down to earth when he says 'Diogenes[...]is]verging towards Insanity, for prize of a "highsouled Brunette," as if the Earth held but one, and not several of these' (116).

This humorous note reflects the element of comedy within the 'Romance' chapter, which is, in part, parodying the romantic genre. Both Thomas and Jane later expressed a dislike for the romantic nature of Geraldine Jewsbury's writing, Kaplan pointing out that the unpublished manuscript 'Phallus-worship' (1848) was a veiled attack on her latest novel.²⁶ The manuscript itself attacks the influence of George Sand and modern French literature, asserting that the twin deities of society are 'a Phallus and a moneybag': 'the Bible of Phallus-worship is the Circulating-library' (Phallus Worship, 23). Carlyle disliked romance

²⁶ "Phallus-Worship" (1848): Unpublished Manuscripts III - A Response to the Revolution of 1848', *Carlyle Newsletter*, 2 (March 1980), pp. 19-23, (p. 21).

writing because he saw it as sensationalist, and banal. As Kaplan says 'in the reshuffling of central human values, the highest aspiration of human beings had become fulfillment in love'.²⁷ Teufelsdröckh's delirium of love is described in a chapter which debunks romantic clichés. Blumine is variously 'Queen of Hearts', 'a star among earthly lights', 'his heart's sun', 'Earth-angel' and 'Heaven's-Messenger' (112-116). Carlyle appears to be playing with the Victorian romantic cliché of women as 'purer than men, more religious, more altruistic, more devoted'.²⁸ Accusations may have been made against Carlyle of misogyny and cruelty towards women and his wife, yet it would be difficult to accuse him of this idealised and patronising view of women. Certainly there is no question of Carlyle's comic deflation of romance when he asks whether the exotic 'Goddess of Flowers', Blumine, may not be merely a common or garden 'Flora' (101). Carlyle rounds off his parody in the following chapter 'Sorrows of Teufelsdröckh', an ironic reference to *The Sorrows of Young Werther*, by listing the options open to the disappointed romantic hero either to 'establish himself in Bedlam; begin writing Satanic Poetry [a reference to Byron]; or blow out his brains' (119).

Parody, however, is not an entirely negative genre. It allows an airing of ideas even while they are being mocked, so that an ambiguous dual vision emerges.²⁹ This duality between the serious view of love's role in connecting 'Me' with 'Thees', and a mocking disregard for Romance, is mirrored in the dual possibilities that love presents. Fantasy, the 'conducting medium' of Love, can be a 'Heaven-gate' or a 'Hell-gate' (108, 115). 'Discerning' can be either 'true or false, either seraphic or demoniac', and Blumine/Flora seems to fall into the latter category (115). As Marina Warner points out, for men such as St. Paul and Jerome,

²⁷ *Thomas Carlyle: A Biography*, p. 333.

²⁸ Katherine M. Roger, *The Troublesome Helpmate* (Seattle & London: University of Washington Press, 1966), p. 189.

²⁹ See, my 'Anti-Dogmatism and the "Metaphorical Quashee": Thomas Carlyle's "An Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question"', *Carlyle Studies Annual*, 17 (1997), pp. 23-40, on Carlyle's parodic ambiguity.

'the female sex were firmly placed on the side of the flesh' (57). As a result of this asceticism, an alternative woman emerged, the virgin exemplified in Mary.³⁰ There are two types of woman in this schema; the angel and the whore. Teufelsdröckh believed Blumine to be an 'earth-angel', his 'Heaven-gate', but her actions, and hints contained within her descriptions suggest she is the whore type.³¹ As with Jane in *Wotton Reinfred* another man is involved but, unlike Jane, Blumine appears to be happy with her choice and marries Teufelsdröckh's friend Herr Towgood. She is presented as flighty, insincere and fickle, crying over her parting with Teufelsdröckh, only to be seen later in a 'gay Barouche-and-four' with Towgood (Works, 1: 118, 123). Indeed, even in Teufelsdröckh's panegyric to Blumine there are references to the Fall. Blumine is 'some fairest Eve' in a Garden which has at its centre 'a Tree of Knowledge' (108). Jane, on the other hand, has been forced into her engagement to Edmund Walter, and, as far as we can tell, maintains her virginity (WR, 143-147). *Sartor Resartus* follows almost exactly the same romantic story line as *Wotton*, even down to the final kiss when Teufelsdröckh and Blumine's 'two souls, like two dew-drops, rushed into one', but the heroine is portrayed in a different light (113). For the hero, however, neither physical nor ascetic woman appears to provide the answer.

Is there, then, no sustained positive view of the relationship between men and women in these two pieces of writing? In *Wotton Reinfred* the community within the House of the Wold displays a harmonious living arrangement between men and women, with a marriage at its centre. However, the community is curiously asexual. The men philosophise while the woman play instruments, and the marriage is childless with the reason unknown:

³⁰ Warner contends that Mary was a second Eve 'through whom the sin of the first was ransomed'. (p. 61)

³¹ 'As a young man Teufelsdröckh is waylaid[...]by a surrender to a physical passion', (Tom Lloyd, 'The Feminine in Thomas Carlyle's Aesthetics' [p.179]).

They have no children; at least they are now childless; though thereby hangs some secret, for a tale goes of one child having been mysteriously stolen from them while abroad; but on this subject you shall never hear them speak, nor is it safe to question them. (WR, 78)

It is tempting to conjecture that, written as this work was between February and June of 1827, Carlyle was aware of his and Jane's childless state, that they had perhaps decided not to have children, or, if he *was* impotent, that they were unable. The notion of a lost child may even be attributed to the claim that Jane was, at one point early in their marriage, pregnant but miscarried. But this is only conjecture. There is a wistfulness about this passage, and Carlyle seems to believe that the sexual relationship of man and wife is something best kept secret. The same, however, cannot be said of Kingsley whose writing rehearses over and again his relationship with and marriage to Fanny and his attitudes towards sexuality, with the central theme an attack on Manicheism and its denigration of the flesh.

Even before the Grenfells allowed an engagement to take place, Kingsley was working on a *Life of St. Elizabeth* as a wedding present for Fanny. Because of the erotic illustrations he produced to accompany the text, Chitty describes this manuscript as 'another outlet for his frustrated sexuality' (76). The pictures portray a young woman, whom Kingsley admitted to be Fanny, in various penitential poses such as carrying a cross or being whipped before an altar (Chitty, 77). The drawings are grotesquely erotic and one, reproduced in Maynard's chapter on Kingsley, reveals the extent of the violence which underlies Kingsley's fantasy. A page from the prose manuscript of the *Life of St. Elizabeth* shows female stigmata at the four corners, as Maynard points out, in a 'rape position' (92-93, plate 13). It is perhaps the shocking nature of these illustrations that leads Maynard to view *The Saint's Tragedy*, a verse life of St. Elizabeth published in 1848, in a more favourable light: 'Kingsley succeeds in this drama in at least making asceticism credible without being carried away by its sadistic

material' (110). But I would contend that the play has a dark and disturbing quality evoked by the concentration on the physical and mental abuse which Elizabeth suffers. What is most disturbing is that Kingsley is using the play as a vehicle for his anti-ascetic ideology, and yet one senses his complicity in, even enjoyment of, the sado-masochistic elements of the play.

In the Preface Kingsley indicates that the battle between the flesh and the spirit is his reason for writing *The Saints Tragedy*:

In deducing fairly, from the phenomena of her life, the character of Elizabeth, she necessarily became a type of two great mental struggles of the Middle Age; first, of that between Scriptural or unconscious, and Popish or conscious, purity: in a word between innocence and prudery; next, of the struggle between healthy human affection, and the Manichean contempt with which a celibate clergy would have all men regard the names of husband, wife and parent.³²

However, this issue is not confined to the Middle Ages, as Kingsley indicates when he declares that his mission is to discourage those young men 'who in books and sermons are whimpering meagre second-hand praises of celibacy' (xxiii). No doubt this is a message to followers of the Oxford Movement. Kingsley's reference to 'healthy human affection' sets a precedent for his attempt to expose asceticism as a disease, a perversion as dangerous as carnal lust, a point supported by Oliver S. Buckton's contention that Kingsley attacked Newman's conversion to Catholicism as a perversion.³³ However, as his words in the introduction are aimed at young men, so the brunt of his criticism falls on Conrad, a priest who becomes Elizabeth's confessor and advisor, rather than on Elizabeth herself.

Elizabeth's ascetic leanings are revealed from the first. She is 'St. John's sworn maid', St. John being the protector of virgins (32). Betrothed from childhood to Lewis, the

³² *The Saint's Tragedy* (London: Parker, 1848), Introduction xvi-ii.

³³ "'An Unnatural State": Gender, "Perversion," and Newman's *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*', (p. 361).

Landgrave of Thuringia, her charitable work among the poor provokes the taunts of his mother and sister and the members of court -- 'There goes our pet nun' (33). Elizabeth's nurse, Isentrudis, confirms her saintly constitution with the comforting words, 'They are of this world, thou art not, poor child' (34). We are encouraged to sympathise with Elizabeth, because her asceticism is channeled towards a laudable social cause (she refuses to wear rich clothes or jewelry and forgoes food to serve the poor). In contrast the Thuringian court is markedly corrupt and the source of social injustices towards the people.³⁴ Indeed, Isentrudis depicts Elizabeth as the pure soul trapped within the sinful, rotting body of the court:

See here[...]how this pearl of price
Is faring in your hands! The peerless image,
To whom this court is but the tawdry frame,-
The speck of light amid its murky baseness,-
The salt which keeps it from rotting, - cast
To be the common fool, -the laughing-stock
For every beardless knave to whet his wit on! (39)

Elizabeth's self-sacrificing ways represent an element of asceticism, but one which Kingsley clearly applauds. But if Kingsley has confirmed Elizabeth's good, spiritual nature, she also needs an earthly element to reconcile the flesh and the spirit and be a partner within a loving relationship. Of course, Kingsley could not merely invent a plot to suit his ideas, as his text was based on a historical figure. He points out in the Introduction that he 'abstains' from using as a source the newly published life of Elizabeth, by Count Alembert, to 'draw [his] facts and opinions, entire and unbiased, from the Original Biography of Elizabeth, by Dietrich of

³⁴ Social problems of nineteenth-century England are transported into Medieval Thuringia. Game-laws which protected landowners against poaching by the poor, while they shoot for sport, are satirised in Lewis's speech on ownership on page 41 (Act I, scene i) and again on page 102 (Act II, scene vii); Malthusian arguments on population control are mooted by Count Hugo on page 112 (Act II, scene ix); Elizabeth's philanthropic visits prompt discussions over poor relief and a Page echoes the sentiments of his 'elders' that 'every one is not as fond as you of beggars' brats' (Act I, scene i, page 38).

Appold, her contemporary, as given entire by Canisius', even going so far as to back up parts of the text with notes from Deitrich (xv).³⁵ Some of Elizabeth's ascetic practices are verified in notes, but the central theme of Kingsley's play, Elizabeth's anguished conflict between body and soul, has been brought to the fore. In Elizabeth's dilemma between the flesh and the spirit one can detect something of Kingsley's own attraction to the asceticism of the Oxford Tractarians.

Initially, Elizabeth is opposed to a physical relationship with Lewis. Betrothed from birth, she asks 'why is he not my brother/And I his sister?' (34). But her asceticism is still treated with sympathy by Kingsley who puts any criticism into the mouth of one of Elizabeth's persecutors, Sophia the Langravine: 'Thank heaven, my saintliness/Ne'er troubled my good man by day or night' (58). Elizabeth's opposition to a sexual union, however, is defeated when Lewis sends a letter professing his love and she decides to become what sounds like the archetypal Victorian wife:

I am a woman,
And all things bid me love: My dignity
Is thus to cast my virgin pride away,
And find my strength in weakness. (61)

However, her marriage night and subsequent life with her husband are marked by guilt and suffering. Clearly, Elizabeth's spending her wedding night on the floor of her room 'within a step of bliss' resembles Kingsley's own pact with Fanny to abstain from intercourse for the first month of their marriage. Kingsley is self-consciously working out the conflicts which he, and his wife, felt over the seemingly irreconcilable duality of body and spirit. Elizabeth is

³⁵ Chitty mistakenly attributes *The Life of St. Elizabeth* to Kingsley's reading *Alembert*, but Kingsley's statement that he 'believes' the new edition of *The Life* to be by *Alembert* suggests he has never actually seen it. He has also 'hitherto abstained' from reading the English translation (Chitty, p.76; *Saint's Tragedy*, xv)

tortured by her 'rent and twofold life' (67). She desires 'bliss' and yet 'they tell me love is of the flesh/And that's our house-bound foe, the adder in our bosoms' (67). The sinfulness of the flesh is articulated in images of the soul imprisoned within an unclean world. Heaven is described as 'the ceiling of the dungeon where we lie'; 'secret fountains' struggle through 'dreary prison clay'; and Elizabeth wonders if their souls can escape to find love in the empyrean - 'Spirit-love in spirit-bodies, melted into one existence' (69).

Clearly these are not images which bind together the body and soul, or make a case for the body as good. This work represents, for the most part, the battle that Kingsley underwent within himself between desire and guilt - 'fightings within and without' (66). However, if as Maynard suggests, Kingsley's irrational hatred of the Catholic Church was a case of 'inner temptation [becoming] objectified as external threat', then it is understandable that his sympathetic treatment of Elizabeth leads to an attack on the representative of Catholic ideology, the monk Conrad (Maynard, 93). It is Conrad who tries to dissuade Lewis from marriage and who takes Elizabeth under his wing after the wedding in an attempt to make her a saint by discouraging her from earthly love:

This night she swears obedience to me![...]
 Obedience to my will! An awful charge!
 But yet, to have the training of her sainthood;
 To watch her rise above this wild world's waves
 Like floating water-lily, toward heaven's light
 Opening its virgin snows, with golden eye
 Mirroring the golden sun. (85)

This imagery suggests a marriage with God rather than on earth, and Conrad's interference with Elizabeth's marriage represents the fears which Kingsley displays, a very Victorian fear, that asceticism interferes with the family. Conrad sets himself up as a rival to Elizabeth's husband, expecting her obedience and chastising her for the characteristics Kingsley

presented as positive -- her philanthropic endeavours. Even these are seen by Conrad as earthly self-glorification, 'self-willed humilities' (93). Indeed, Conrad also encourages Elizabeth to give up her children, after Lewis dies, to become a nun (181-2). It is this rejection of a normal family life which Kingsley condemned as unhealthy in his introduction, leading him to portray Conrad's asceticism as a perversion.

It is clear that Conrad derives some satisfaction from the task of delivering Elizabeth into sainthood. Elizabeth, who has already taken up flagellation after her marriage, is supported in her ascetic ways by Conrad and his nuns, who beat her nurse and maid. But while encouraging her asceticism, Conrad also reveals on two occasions his attraction to Elizabeth. On anticipating his task of teaching Elizabeth, his enthusiasm leads him to exclaim 'she is most fair! Pooh! I know nought of fairness', and after her death he reveals the erotic pleasure derived from her martyrdom (86):

Oh, happy Lewis! had I been a knight --
 A man at all -- what's this? I must be brutal,
 Or I shall love her; and yet that is no safeguard;
 I have marked it oft: ay -- with that devilish triumph
 Which eyes its victim's writhings, still will mingle
 A sympathetic thrill of lust -- say, pity. (208)

Extreme sexual self-denial, it is suggested, will ultimately result in a kind of perverse lust, as Kingsley contends in both *Yeast* in which Claude Mellot contends that 'prudish Manicheism always ends in sheer indecency' and *Alton Locke* when Alton says 'so do extremes meet' (*Yeast*, 42; *Alton Locke*, 4).

Given that his wife had once been inclined to join a Puseyite sect and that Kingsley was a minister involved in the religious controversies of the day and especially interested in asceticism, it is probable that he was aware of some of the stories surrounding Puseyism. As

Ronald Pearsall points out 'any dirt associated with [Puseyism] was assiduously collected' (79). Pearsall goes on to quote from a letter by the Reverend Cookesley which reveals the extent of abuse, and its erotic content, practiced by male confessors on Puseyite sisters:

A Sister who had been hasty with her tongue, and had thrown out some unguarded expression, was commanded by the Rev. Mr. Prynne, one of the Confessors to the Institution, *to lie down flat on the floor, and with her tongue to describe the figure of a Cross in the dirt.* (81) [my italics]

Pearsall draws attention to the fact that 'this kind of behaviour is mentioned at length in Victorian pornography though without the ecclesiastical connotations' (81).

Kingsley wants to bring together the flesh and spirit, but this meeting of extremes represents the wrong kind of union. Rather, through a loving marriage, extremes are modified until they meet in harmony:

Ay, marriage is the life-long miracle,
The self-begetting wonder, daily fresh;
The Eden, where the spirit and the flesh
Are one again, and new-born souls walk free,
And name in mystic language all things new,
Naked, and not ashamed. (*Saint's Tragedy*, 126-7)

The meeting of extremes provides an unhealthy and perverse mockery of the normal sexual-familial model Kingsley envisions at the heart of his ideology. However Conrad's recognition of the sexual attraction of a 'victim's writhings' is reflected in the indulgence in sado-eroticism by the author in the writing of the text. It must be noted that both Conrad, and Kingsley as the writer of the text, display an awareness of the sexual feeling which *could* be aroused by ascetic practices, but neither appears to acknowledge his own pleasure.

Elizabeth's flagellation by her maids and the image of her following chanting priests

'clad in rough serge' bear resemblance to the ascetic rituals Kingsley invented during his courtship (88). In part, they represent his own acts, but they must also be a wish-fulfillment of his fantasies about Fanny. It is significant, then, that her actions are prompted by the monk, Conrad. If, as Maynard suggests, with reference to the *Life of St. Elizabeth*, Kingsley 'himself is a stand-in for Elizabeth's concerned husband, who watches her scourging and agonies with sympathy, but who thus also has a voyeuristic relation to them', then in *The Saint's Tragedy* Kingsley not only stands behind the husband Lewis, but also the confessor Conrad (Maynard, 100). Surely Kingsley's desire to absolve a penitent Fanny, his direction of their ascetic practices and the mixture of eroticism with bodily censure are, either consciously or subconsciously, being explored in the figure of Conrad. Kingsley leaves us in no doubt that he means to recommend the loving marriage which Elizabeth and Lewis share briefly as an Eden 'where the spirit and the flesh are one again', but the power of the verse drama is in its depiction of Elizabeth's tortured battle between body and soul vividly inscribed on her battered, starved, and frozen body, and Conrad's perverse encouragement of her asceticism:

These shoulders' cushioned ice,
 And thin soft flanks, with purple lashes all,
 And weeping furrows traced! Ah precious life-blood!
 Who has done this? (70)

This may be because, as a continuance of the *Life of St. Elizabeth* project which he took up during courtship, the writing of *The Saint's Tragedy* reflects the difficulties experienced by both himself and Fanny before marriage settled their minds. Certainly, although *Yeast* also depicts scenes reminiscent of the Kingsleys' courtship, Kingsley finds it easier in the two novels, *Yeast* and *Alton Locke*, to portray a harmonious bonding of body and soul within a romantic relationship. He sets out to recommend the bonding of body and soul by depicting oppositions of types of characters, who live overly physical or spiritual lives, and who are

either altered or suffer for their extreme behaviour.

In *Yeast*, the romantic couple, Argemone and Lancelot, are the focus of Kingsley's attack on Manicheism. Argemone is proud, intellectual, a 'sweet prude' and promised, like Fanny Kingsley, to a Puseyite 'beguinage', encouraged by 'her favourite vicar, - a stern, prim, close-shaven, dyspeptic man, with a meek, cold smile, which might have become a cruel one'.³⁶ The vicar is Anglican but wishes to find a more 'Catholic' destiny for Argemone than mere good works, indicating yet another attack by Kingsley on the Oxford Tractarians. Lancelot, in contrast, has led, like the young Kingsley, a dissolute life, a fact attributed to his parents' prudery (again we see the view that abstention will lead to overindulgence): 'All conversation on the subject of love had been prudishly avoided, as usual, by his parents and teacher[...]. Love had been to him, practically, ground tabooed and "carnal"' (3). In line with his own vociferousness on the need for a balanced view of sexuality, Kingsley was an advocate of sex education as he enjoins both fathers and clergymen to 'tell boys the truth about love' rather than presenting it as foul and sinful (*Yeast*, 4). Like Kingsley, Lancelot led a dissolute life at Cambridge:

He was one of a set who tried to look like blackguards, and really succeeded tolerably. They used to eschew gloves, and drink nothing but beer, and smoke disgusting short pipes; and when we established the Coverley Club in Trinity, they set up an opposition, and called themselves the Navvies. And they used to make piratical expeditions down to Lynn in eight oars, to attack bargemen, and fen girls, and shoot ducks, and sleep under turf-stacks, and come home when they had drunk all the public-house taps dry. (81)

Lancelot is a physical creature who has 'given himself up to the mere contemplation of Nature', rather than religion, and who follows his 'appetites' (40, 26). Indeed, like Kingsley, Lancelot does not bring a virgin body to his relationship with Argemone: 'To think[...]. that

³⁶ *Yeast* (London: Macmillan, 1890), pp. 55, 130, 80.

she would bring to him what he could never, never, bring to her! -- the thought was unbearable' (125). However, neither Argemone nor Lancelot represent extremes of asceticism or licentiousness, but are set against characters who display more extreme traits but who do not reform their ways. For instance, Colonel Bracebridge, like Lancelot, follows physical pursuits, such as hunting and chasing women. His dalliance with a working-class woman of the village leads to her murder of the resultant child and the Colonel's suicide (232-233). On the ascetic side, Lancelot's cousin, who eventually converts to Catholicism, is presented as a pathetic figure who becomes permanently estranged from his father. There, but for the grace of God, go Lancelot and Argemone. However, although Argemone and Lancelot are not saint and villain, they do have to embrace the element of life which they have neglected; in Argemone's case, love, and in Lancelot's, God.

As Laura Fasick notes, Kingsley confirms the dominant Victorian idea that men and women could not be considered as 'equal'. Theirs' must be a 'symbiotic relationship that allowed each sex to benefit from contact with the other'.³⁷ The ideal is described in, for instance, Ruskin's *Sesame and Lillies*, in which the man is provider and protector while the woman is spiritual, weak and domestic.³⁸ These traits are confirmed by Katharine Rogers:

Women were purer than men, more religious, more altruistic, more devoted. As members of the delicate sex, they were absolutely entitled to chivalrous protection; no decent man would even criticize them harshly. (189)

Argemone, already more spiritual than Lancelot, recognises her physical inferiority and discovers sexual attraction on a dark, country road:

³⁷ Laura Fasick, 'Charles Kingsley's scientific treatment of gender' in *Muscular Christianity: Embodying the Victorian Age*, ed. By Donald Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) pp. 91-113 (p. 92).

³⁸ John Ruskin, *Complete Works*, 39 vols. (London: Allen, 1905), 18, pp. 109-144

Cold! When every vein was boiling so strangely! A soft luscious melancholy crept over her. She had always had a terror of darkness; but now she felt quite safe in his strength. The thought of her own unprotected girlhood drew her heart closer to him. She remembered with pleasure the stories of his personal prowess, which had once made her think him coarse and brutal. For the first time in her life she knew the delight of dependence - the holy charm of weakness. (92-3)

Lancelot too is modified. Having already sensed a 'ghastly discord' between 'the mad noisy flesh, and the silent immortal spirits' during a foxhunt, he becomes ashamed of his dissolute past in the face of the 'saintly[...]unfallen' Argemone (11, 87). Argemone softens before our eyes and forgoes her hardline Scriptural dogmatism, whereas Lancelot acknowledges a growing spiritual faith. To his cousin Luke he reveals, 'even I am beginning to believe in believing in Him' (136). Through contact with each other, Argemone and Lancelot are made into whole characters who accept both the physical and spiritual aspects of love.

The modification of Argemone and Lancelot's characters is not the only way in which Kingsley draws together disparate elements of body and soul. Central to the possibility of a harmonious relationship is the character of the woman. Again Kingsley uses two characters, Argemone and Honoria, to illustrate aspects of body and soul and to recommend a *via media*:

But lo, here come a couple as near ideals as any in these degenerate days - the two poles of beauty: the *milieu* of which would be Venus with us Pagans, or the Virgin Mary with the Catholics. Look at them! Honoria the dark - symbolic of passionate depth; Argemone the fair, type of intellectual light! Oh, that I were Zeuxis to unite them instead of having to paint them in two separate pictures, and split perfection in half, as everything is split in this piecemeal world! (43)

Honoria is portrayed as an earthly creature, ruled by her feelings, 'for she lived in a perpetual April-shower of exaggerated sympathy for all suffering, whether in novels or in life' (19).

However, her 'extravagant passion[...]made her also shrink with disgust from anything which thrust on her a painful reality, which she could not remedy' (151). Like Conrad, whose ascetic extremity resulted in perversity, Honoria's extreme passion distances her from the real. As a result she turns away from the man who loves her, Tregarva, when he reveals his radical politics (151). Argemone in contrast is a passionless creature who sits in her room untouched by feeling and surrounded by 'books and statuettes, and dried flowers' (18). All these artifacts, especially the last, represent Argemone's estrangement from nature. Although Lancelot gave too much veneration to nature and not enough to God, his statement that 'admiration of nature [might be] an act of worship' reveals Kingsley's belief in the presence of God within the world. It is not a love of nature, but an extreme and one-sided Pantheism that is being attacked (45). If before her love for Lancelot is realised Argemone is 'out of tune' with 'harmonious' nature, then her surrender to love replaces her within the natural order:

A strong shudder ran through her frame - the ice of artificial years cracked,
and the clear stream of her woman's nature welled up to the light, as pure as
when she first lay on her mother's bosom. (142)

In *The Saint's Tragedy* Conrad attempts to lure Lewis away from Elizabeth toward the life of a monk by detailing the attractions of the Virgin and a variety of female saints. Mary, Conrad suggests, represents 'Love's heaven, without its hell; the golden fruit without the foul husk', in other words, the sinful body (51). However, his descriptions of the martyred saints suggest a certain erotic involvement:

Let Catharine lift thy rapt soul, and with her
Question the mighty dead, until thou float
Tranced on the ethereal ocean of her spirit.
If pity father passion in thee -- hang
Above Eulalia's tortured loveliness. (49)

Geoffrey Ashe, in *The Virgin*, quotes from an essay by John de Satgé, written in 1963, in which he suggests that the cult of the Virgin Mary was partly a result of enforced asceticism, perverted into new channels: 'Is the increasing emphasis on a female object of devotion in some way a form of psychological compensation?'.³⁹ In *Yeast*, Lancelot's cousin's letters refer to his need for the motherly sympathy of Mary, but they are tinged with eroticism:

Would you have me try to be a Prometheus, while I am longing to be once more an infant on a mother's breast? [...] Will you reproach me, because when I see a soft cradle lying open for me...with a Virgin Mother's face smiling down all woman's love about it...I long to crawl into it and sleep a while? I want loving, indulgent sympathy. (64)

Lancelot, however, wants 'a living, loving person -- all lovely itself, and giving loveliness to all things! If I must have an ideal, let it be, for mercy's sake, a realised one' (43) For Kingsley Mariolatry represents a perversion of the true love due to a woman who is both angel and lover.

Yeast, then, uses a proliferation of dualisms exemplified in contrasting characters to recommend a middle course which unites body and soul. The same type of process, on a lesser scale, is to be found in *Alton Locke* which does not, however, give the same emphasis to romance within the novel, focusing as it does on social conditions and radical politics. Alton, tailor and poet, falls in love with a young and beautiful upper class woman, Lillian, only to discover after much heartbreak that it was a purely physical attraction. Lillian's sister Eleanor asks: 'What was it that you adored? a soul or a face? The inward-reality or the outward symbol, which is only valuable as a sacrament of the loveliness within' (400).

³⁹ *The Virgin*, (London: Arkana, 1988), p. 8.

However, before Alton can realise his mistake, and come to love Eleanor, he has to regain his spirituality. His faith lost through a strict Baptist upbringing which taught him that all men, except the elect, are destined to damnation and that the flesh is evil, Alton becomes a thorough-going materialist:

Yes; I too, like Crossthwaite, took the upper classes at their word; bowed down to the idol of political institutions, and pinned my hopes of salvation on 'the possession of one ten-thousandth part of a talker in the national palaver'. (118)

However, the journey of Alton's life leads him steadily back to God and a recognition of the spirit: 'Fool that I was! It was within, rather than without, that I needed reform[...]I believe no more in "Morison's-Pill-remedies" as Thomas Carlyle calls them' (119). It is Eleanor, Lillian's sister, who proceeds to teach spirituality to Alton and to assuage his doubts ('The True Demagogue', 395-408). However, she too must be modified, as her proud and unfeeling manner gives way to a more caring approach. She realises that spirituality must have practical applications and sets about helping fallen women (420-421). Again, as in *Yeast*, Kingsley uses a man and a woman to show the contrasting elements of body and soul, alongside a complementary duality of two women; Eleanor, the ascetic, and Lillian, the physical. Alton professes his love for Eleanor, and although like Lancelot and Argemone there is no earthly wedding (Argemone dies from typhus contracted during a visit to the poor), love in both body and spirit has been promulgated as the ideal path. Further, the lack of earthly sex and marriage is not a crucial setback considering Kingsley's views on marriage in heaven:

'It must be very delicious,' said Argemone, thoughtfully, 'for any one who believes it, to think that marriage can last through eternity. (*Yeast*, 94)

Alton, on realising that Eleanor is mortally ill, pleads 'Oh that I might die, and join you' (*Alton Locke*, 434). Although she bids him stay to finish his work writing about the lives of the poor, his death three pages later leaves us in no doubt of Kingsley's intentions.

Carlyle and Kingsley, then, appear to be considering the same issues surrounding sex and love, and yet their findings are very different. This can be illustrated by looking at the way Kingsley earnestly reworks the 'Romance' chapter from *Sartor Resartus*. The similarities to *Sartor* in *Alton Locke*, and to a lesser extent in *Yeast*, are quite striking. Like Teufelsdröckh, Lancelot in *Yeast* is in his "'Werterean" stage' (2). Further, both *Yeast* and *Alton Locke*'s protagonists proceed to a regaining of faith through, first a love of nature and then the love of a woman. It is in *Alton Locke* that Alton's romance most clearly mirrors Teufelsdröckh's, with one crucial difference. Whereas, in *Sartor*, Teufelsdröckh's physical passion for and ultimate rejection by Blumine means that *he* then rejects love and, in the Editor's words, 'in more recent years [was] a man not only who would never wed, but who would never even flirt', Alton's love for Lillian (surely it is no coincidence that hers too is a floral name), although physical and wrong, does not dissuade him from carrying on to find real love embodied in a physical and spiritual woman (*Works*, 1: 110). Kingsley's entirely earnest treatment of romance allows a resolution of duality, whereas Carlyle's text has a serio-comic ambiguity. Tom Lloyd's suggestion that Carlyle 'failed to apply his ironic "dual perspective" to his consistent stereotyping and dismissal of women' is mistaken because he assumes that Teufelsdröckh's 'surrender to a physical passion that negates his nascent irony' is *not* undercut by Teufelsdröckh's dual personality and the other voices within the text; the Editor with his deflationary remarks, and Carlyle who manipulates both men and articulates his thoughts through them.⁴⁰ Neither is Lloyd accurate in contending that Carlyle entirely rejects the feminine. Lloyd's is another case of reading biography into text without

⁴⁰ 'The Feminine in Thomas Carlyle's Aesthetics', (pp. 190, 179)

justification. He blames Carlyle's distrust of women on his Calvinism, suggesting that his infamous pre-marital remark to Jane that 'The Man should bear rule in the house and not the Woman' was a result of his 'education and upbringing in rural Scotland' (186). Apparently, the entire patriarchal system of Victorian Britain should then be attributed to class and nationality. Carlyle may not have been an enlightened liberal where women were concerned, but his refusal to propose love as a solution to Teufelsdröckh's scepticism does not imply, as Lloyd does, that '[Carlyle's] unity was achieved only through exclusion of the autonomous feminine principle' (187). Instead, the rejection of love and marriage, both in *Sartor Resartus* and 'Wotton Reinfred' suggests a maintenance of the duality of body and spirit; the higher subjects, which Beer sees Carlyle delaying climax for, taking precedence over the lowlier subject of love, an idea articulated in the jostling for attention of the romance and philosophical plots of 'Wotton Reinfred'. Further, the ambiguity with which Carlyle treats the romance story, especially within *Sartor*, helps to amplify the dualism. Just as, in 'Characteristics', Carlyle desires 'the ideal, impossible state of being' so the romance narrative broaches the possibility of a perfect union of body and soul in love only to qualify it with the sceptic's irony (*Works*, 28: 8). The dual possibilities of 'Heaven-gate and Hell-gate' are realised in Blumine who seems an angel, but turns out to be a whore (figuratively speaking). Carlyle's use of 'Fantasy' as a 'conducting medium' displays his awareness of the self-delusory nature of love but also of how art, *his* art, might body forth 'form after form, radiant with all prismatic hues' (108, 115). However, this very awareness undercuts any sincere optimism in his treatment of romance. Kingsley, on the other hand, relies on art to articulate a unified vision, which underlying tensions sometimes threaten. It is therefore crucial that it is Claude Mellot, the artist, who says 'Oh, that I were Zeuxis to unite them instead of having to paint them in two separate pictures, and split perfection in half' (*Yeast*, 43). Kingsley's work, may in part, display his anxieties over the sinfulness of the body, and yet he fights to maintain a

middle point between extremes. Carlyle too gives some commitment to a binding of body and soul. In *Wotton Reinfred* he gives an indication that he disagrees with the view that matter is entirely evil when Williams scathingly refers to a 'Manichean' theory that 'God is the devil' (82). But, ultimately, Carlyle maintains a dialectic in which life has dual possibilities, articulated in Wotton's reaction to his failed affair: 'My whole life one error, a seeking of light and goodness and a finding of darkness and despair' (WR, 6). Jessop says of 'Wotton Reinfred' that 'as Carlyle refuses to let the way of sexual love raise his hero out of the melancholia of the sceptic's impotence, he uses sexual failure to intensify what is primarily an intellectual crisis' (114). This undermining of the impulse toward the ideal, with the 'melancholia of the sceptic's impotence', is also evident in Carlyle's own perception of the generative failure of his works: 'They gave me much trouble. I brought them into the world with labour and sorrow, and I must reckon most of them but small trash after all (Allingham, 196). Carlyle may have been unsatisfied with his ability to provide solutions to the problems he raised. But, contrasted with Kingsley's sexually charged attempts to reconcile the body/soul dualism through his art, Carlyle satisfyingly articulates the dilemma he saw man facing.

But what of Carlyle's Calvinism and supposed impotency in all this? Certainly, Carlyle does not put women or sexuality to the fore in his writing. But lack of interest does not necessarily indicate inability or inaction. Indeed, it may indicate a sense of decorum. Foucault's contention that the anxiety of Victorian society over sexuality resulted in a plethora of sexual discourses illuminates Kingsley's garrulous and central treatment of sex in his novels. Kingsley displays an anxiety over women that is markedly absent from Carlyle's life; for instance, Carlyle carried on relationships and correspondences with several women, including Lady Ashburton, Margaret Oliphant, Geraldine Jewsbury and Elizabeth Gaskell, whereas Kingsley left any correspondence with women to his wife and cultivated no female

friendships, suggesting a mistrust of his own desires. Given Foucault's dictum on the relationship between anxiety and verbosity, what might Carlyle's reticence in sexual matters say about his marriage?

Chapter 4

Man Machine: Reconditioning the Body and Soul Politic

In this and the following chapter I want to deal with Carlyle and Kingsley's responses to developments within science, and how they represent notions of man as either a spiritual or physical being. Here I shall be talking specifically about both writers' perceptions of the effect of mechanisation on society, and how they use the machine to represent its increasingly material nature. In the following chapter I will look at the sanitary reform debate, and how it highlighted wider notions of man's relation to his environment.

Kingsley enjoyed a lifelong love of natural science engendered by his childhood spent in a variety of country parishes where his father, a rector, held the living. His time spent in the Fens parish of Barnack up until age eleven stayed with him for the rest of his life, the surroundings there inspiring his scientific interests:

Wild duck and coot, bittern and bustard, ruffs and reeves were plentiful in the Fen. Butterflies, of species now extinct, were not uncommon then, and used to delight the eyes of the young naturalist. (*JM*, 1: 7)

But Kingsley was not only fascinated by the living world. The biographical section of his *Letters and Memories* relates the young boy's zeal for all natural phenomena. While repeating his Latin homework to his father one evening, Charles became increasingly agitated by the sight of the fire: 'At last he could stand it no longer; there was a pause in the Latin, and Charles cried out, "I do declare, papa, there is pyrites in the coal' (*JM*, 1: 7).

As an adult his scientific interests persisted. During fishing and rambling trips to his beloved Devon, especially his one-time home Clovelly, Kingsley collected specimens from the shore-line, corresponding with naturalist friends over his finds. He formed the Chester Natural Science Society in the early 1870s and was made a Fellow of the Geological Society at the instigation of his friend Sir Charles Lyell. Indeed he counted among his friends Charles Darwin, T.H. Huxley and Sir John Lubbock and corresponded with them over the evolution controversy.

Kingsley may strike us as the archetypal amateur Parson naturalist who so enraged the professionals and yet he earned the respect of the highest names in this scientific field. In fact he was present with Lubbock during an important discovery in June 1855 when both men were staying with a Mr. Riversdale Grenfell at Ray Lodge, Maidenhead. During a walk they found an arctic Musk Ox skull, of import because it was strong evidence of a glacial period in Britain. Further, the gravel pits in which the skull was found confirmed the high antiquity of man because the gravel corresponded with specimens found in the Somme which contained man-made tools.¹ Kingsley was also enthusiastic about the technological advancements of his age, strongly supporting Prince Albert's Great Exhibition of 1851, although, as will become evident, he did harbour some worries over the possible misuse of machinery. And he joined other Victorians in his concern over the pollution caused by industry, linking this with perhaps his most urgent social concern, sanitary reform, a field in which he was constantly active, even entering the debate over the call for a cholera fast. And through all this, Kingsley was a

¹ H.G. Hutchinson, *The Life of Sir John Lubbock, Lord Avebury* 2 vols (London: Macmillan, 1914), I, 36 - 39. I am indebted to David Bonnick for drawing this anecdote to my attention.

rector, desperate to maintain his two loves; God and the natural history of the world.

In contrast to Kingsley, Carlyle was less obviously engaged with the scientific life of his age. He did not display Kingsley's zeal for natural science or his practical involvement, although he was conversant with mineralogy and geology. He told Goethe in a letter of 1829 that it was a desire to read the German geologist Abraham Gottlob Werner's 'Mineralogical Doctrines' which first inspired him to learn German, and he attended lectures on Mineralogy at Edinburgh University from 1818-1819 (Althaus, 13). But beyond this his interest in nature seems more attributable to a rural native's love of the landscape and healthy air of the countryside. There is little evidence that he read either Chambers or Darwin and any comments on evolutionary theory, made after Darwin's publication of *Origins*, were dismissive in the extreme.² He was acquainted with many of the scientists of his day, and was corresponding with Robert Chambers around the time he was writing *Vestiges*, although his letters show no indication that he was any wiser than the public as to its source.³ He knew Charles Darwin (although it was his brother, Erasmus Ayles Darwin, who was a close friend of the Carlyles), Lubbock, Wallace and Huxley, and Professor John Tyndall was both a friend and admirer who accompanied him on his trip to receive the Rectorship of Edinburgh University in 1866.

But then Carlyle often maintained friendships and inspired great respect even amongst

² In his *Diary* William Allingham records numerous occasions on which Carlyle repudiated the theory of evolution. Commenting to Allingham on an argument he had with his friend Tyndall, Carlyle said 'he was vexed by an outburst of mine against Darwinism. I find no one who has the deep abhorrence of it that I have in my heart of hearts!' (p. 224).

³ On April 20th Carlyle returned a cheque to Chambers in St. Andrews where the latter had gone to write *Vestiges*, but Carlyle's letter displays no awareness of Chambers' reason for going there (*CL*, 18: 15). In 1845 Jane wrote to Thomas relating a conversation with James Martineau in which he referred to *Vestiges* as 'animated mud', but again no knowledge of the book's author is indicated (*CL*, 19: 149).

those with whom he did not agree.

But if he displayed little interest in the natural sciences, in his early years Carlyle showed great promise in a more theoretical science. While attending Edinburgh University with the intention of entering the Church, Carlyle, in his second year, 'diversified into mathematics and logic' (Heffer, 32). He specialised in geometry and later, in 1821, was commissioned to write a translation of Legendre's *Elements of Geometry*. During this time Carlyle was experiencing debilitating religious doubt and eventually disappointed his parents' hopes of him taking orders. Throughout his work, Carlyle emphasises the need to discover Facts and, at this period in his life, mathematics seemed to provide the truth that religion lacked. He told Allingham that during his College days he 'studied the *Evidences of Christianity* for several years, with the greatest desire to be convinced, but in vain. I read Gibbon, and then first clearly saw that Christianity was not true' (Allingham, 232). It was the physical manifestations of God which Carlyle found so hard to believe. James Halliday draws attention to Carlyle's questioning of Christ's 'revelation and miracles' - 'it is as certain as mathematics that no such things have been on earth' (203). Halliday characteristically gives no source for this quotation and his psychoanalytic treatment of Carlyle's life and work has little credibility now; however Allingham's *Diary* provides us with Carlyle's own pronouncements on the physical manifestation of God:

Christianity -- age fifteen, spoke to his mother -- her horror. 'Did God almighty come down and make wheelbarrows in a shop?' She lay awake at night for hours praying and weeping bitterly.
 'This went on about ten years. Goethe drove me out of it, taught me that the true things in Christianity survived and were eternally true.' (253)

But, although ‘mathematical problems’ provided the ‘certainty’ which Carlyle sought, as Althaus points out with Carlyle’s agreement in the form of an attached note, they did not provide the ‘unity of thought and feeling, of the real and the ideal, whose childhood formulations his own reflections had destroyed for him’ (Althaus, 37).⁴ Mathematics, certain as it was, it did not account for the spiritual force Carlyle felt to be within himself and all men:

For several years, from 1813 onward[...] ‘Geometry’ shone before me as undoubtedly the *noblest* of all sciences; and I prosecuted it (or Mathematics generally) in all my best hours and moods, -- tho’ far more pregnant inquiries were rising in me, and gradually *engrossing* me, *heart* as well as head. (Althaus, 36)

By 1821 Carlyle had ‘entirely thrown Mathematics aside’ and was moving towards embracing religious belief although this did not necessarily entail accepting the Hebrew old clothes, evident in his assertion that Goethe taught him the ‘true things in Christianity’ (Althaus, 36). Carlyle’s faith has been consistently viewed as lacking content. T.H. Huxley famously referred to his religion without theology, and Simon Heffer has recently named him a ‘theist and a post-Christian’.⁵ The need to believe in rather than to prove God’s truth has rightly been stressed about Carlyle’s religion, and yet his was not an unquestioning belief. As Ian Campbell has pointed out Carlyle, influenced by his father, saw the ‘virtue in a man who retain[ed] a strong and unquestioning

⁴ Carlyle had received a copy of Althaus’s ms. in 1866 and added marginal remarks. At this point in the text he writes ‘not so ill guessed’.

⁵ McSwcency and Sabor, p.i; Heffer, p. 18

religious belief of a strongly authoritarian nature, yet simultaneously a questioning turn of mind which takes nothing for granted'.⁶

The disparity in Carlyle and Kingsley's engagement with scientific disciplines might lead us to expect a difference in their responses to the progress wrought by industrialisation. Kingsley *was* enthusiastic about the possibilities for progress which the machine age promised. Carlyle might be assumed to be unequivocally opposed to industrial progress. And yet, the case is not so simple for either writer. As Campbell's identification of Carlyle's 'questioning turn of mind' suggests, his writing upon the machine represents an engagement with the problems of mechanisation for both the physical and spiritual aspects of society, which refuses either to accept the unquestioning enthusiasm of the age without some searching enquiry or to engage in blind criticism. And as the foremost critic of the machine age, Carlyle's writing has a clear influence on Kingsley's response; one which is also fuelled by a desire to re-inject some spiritual elements into an increasingly materialistic society. What will emerge, however, is that Kingsley's deeper interest in the sciences, and his desire to forge some relationship between that interest and his faith, means that there is a difference in the degree and extent of their criticisms.

For many Victorian writers 'the machine is important not merely as an image, a representation of a visual experience, but as a symbol, an image that suggests a complex of meanings beyond itself', and here one immediately thinks of Carlyle's famous rallying cry against mechanisation, both literal and figurative, in 'Signs of the Times' (1829) -- "It

⁶ Ian Campbell, 'Carlyle's Religion', in *Carlyle and his Contemporaries*, ed. John Chubbe (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1976), pp. 3-20, (p. 6).

is the Age of Machinery, in both the outward and inward sense of that word' (Sussman, 3; *Works*, 27: 59). Although Carlyle is concerned with the outward effects of mechanisation, evident in the industrial changes around him, Sussman is correct in saying that 'Signs of the Times' more clearly addresses 'its effects on the psychic life' (20). Carlyle extends the image of mechanisation from its physical manifestations to apply to the 'Machine of Society', its Benthamite politics, rational materialistic outlook and bureaucratic, corporate mindset (66):

Has any man, or any society of men, a truth to speak[...]they can nowise proceed at once and with the mere natural organs, but must first call a public meeting, appoint committees, issue prospectuses, eat a public dinner; in a word, construct or borrow machinery, wherewith to speak it and do it. (61)

Indeed, indicative of the encroachment of the mechanistic into the inner life, the life of the soul, there is even the 'Bible-Society, professing a far higher and heavenly structure, [but] found, on inquiry, to be altogether an earthly contrivance[...]a machine for converting the Heathen' (61). Not only is Carlyle concerned at the increasingly rationalised manner in which religion conducts itself, his picture of the converted heathen displays his anxiety at the manner in which the 'Machine of Society' might be brought to bear upon the individual. He uses the image of an engine to articulate this potential control, describing it as 'the grand working wheel from which all private machines must derive, or to which they must adapt, their movements' (66).

This vision of a society stripped of its individuality reveals Carlyle's concern over Benthamite fantasies of social control and behaviour modification in which the privacy

of the individual is invaded and sacrificed to a prescriptive collectivism. His ironic reference to 'private machines' indicates his anxiety over materialist definitions of the mind which deny the notion of self as a distinct and unknowable essence created by God and which suggest that the mind is merely a physical mechanism that can be altered by the same forces of cause and effect that occur in the material world. Jessop provides evidence for Carlyle's familiarity with Hume's theory of Ideas, one which used a mechanical model to describing the mind as a purely physical entity which acquired information through the senses:

The train of physiological events in the human body (understood as a machine) provided a basic model for the workings of the mind in perception. An argument for legitimating mechanical modelling might run along the following lines: just as the human body is analogous to a machine, the mind analogous to the body, so also is the mind analogous to a machine. (63-64)

The self loses its autonomy and becomes a programmable entity, open to projects of mind control and subjugation by the state mechanism. A model for this mechanism is to be found in the work of Carlyle's *bête noir* and a central target in 'Signs of the Times', Jeremy Bentham.

In providing a model for his imagined institution of surveillance and correction, the Panopticon, Bentham describes its objectives in suitably mechanistic terms:

A new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example; and that, to a degree equally without example, secured by whoever chooses to have it so, against abuse. - Such is the

engine; such the work that may be done with it.⁷

To effect this aim, Bentham devised an architectural plan, whether for prison, madhouse, or school, which would provide a central and economic source of control:

The building is circular. The apartments of the prisoners occupy the circumference. You may call them, if you please, *cells*. These *cells* are divided from one another, and the prisoners by that means secluded from all communications with each other, by *partitions* in the form of *radii* issuing from the circumference towards the centre[...][The apartment of the inspector occupies the centre; you may call it, if you please, the *inspector's lodge*. (40)

In addition to the above, in a concept which Foucault has referred to as the 'efficiency of power', Bentham emphasises that light must be allowed to pass through the cells so that the inspector may watch each cellmate, but each inmate's view of the interior of the lodge must be blocked by screening of the through light.⁸

Ideal perfection, if that were the object, would require that each person should actually be in that predicament [always watched], during every instant of time. This being impossible, the next thing to be wished for is, that, at every instant, seeing reason to believe as much, and not being able to satisfy himself to the contrary, he should *conceive* himself to be so. (40)

The prisoner or, if we extend the 'mechanism of power' to society as Foucault contends Bentham intended, the ordinary citizen, must behave because he never knows when he is

⁷ Jeremy Bentham, *Works* 11 vols. (Edinburgh: Tait, 1843) IV, p. 39.

⁸ *Discipline and Punish*, p. 202.

being watched (205). Further, the power of the state over the individual prisoner is facilitated by the uninterrupted attention which is (or at least is *imagined* to be) concentrated on each individual with minimal human contact and no communication with other inmates. An institution, or, indeed, a state, based on a mechanical philosophy, as Carlyle points out both in 'Signs of the Times' and *Sartor Resartus*, discourages spontaneous, 'individual endeavour' and any human, organic relationship between individuals - 'like some glass bell, [Mechanism] encircles and imprisons us' (*Works*, 27: 63, 81).⁹ Further Bentham's description of the institution as an 'engine' and its architectural layout (circular with radii emanating out from a centre) bear a close resemblance to Carlyle's assessment of the 'Machine of Society' as 'a grand working wheel from which all private machines must derive'.¹⁰ This works on a more abstract level too, as Bentham's model for state control envisioned the normalisation of the inmate or citizen through instruction -- 'power of mind over mind'. Foucault indicates that this 'gentle way in punishment' switched the emphasis of state power away from the spectacle of physical pain or death (a threat or example to the citizenry) to a more subtle form of coercion in which the soul or mind was the object of correction (104). If the human mind was a purely physical phenomena then it could be altered by environment and instruction, something like programming a computer. 'The Panopticon was[...a laboratory; it could be used as a machine to carry out experiments, to alter behaviour, to train or correct individuals' (203)

In Bentham, Carlyle finds a source of materialist notions which fed into

⁹ See, also, *Works*, 1: 195.

¹⁰ Sussman points out that this image 'refers to the typical early textile mill in which each separate machine was connected by a belt to a single rotating shaft turned by either a water wheel or a stationary engine', (p. 17)

nineteenth century political ideals. Benthamite visions of social reform helped to create an idea of order and control based on acquiring and spreading information. Carlyle, in 'Chartism', attacks the idea that statistics can really shed any light on, or radically alter, the working man's way of life:

The condition of the working-man in this country, what it is and has been, whether it is improving or retrograding, - is a question to which from statistics hitherto no solution can be got. Hitherto, after many tables and statements, one is still left mainly to what he can ascertain by his own eyes, looking at the concrete phenomenon for himself. (*Works*, 29: 126)

Here, as always, Carlyle impresses on the reader the necessity for a human evaluation rather than a mechanistic, rational one. Carlyle satirises Charles Knight's Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge for filling 'your mouth with a figure of arithmetic!' (*Works*, 29: 125). Although Knight had consulted Carlyle as a well-known advocate of mass education when considering what books the Society might publish, Carlyle objected strongly to Knight's scheme for an 'Analytical Library' and dismissed him with a suitably mechanistic metaphor (*CL*, 11:17):

My chief objection was[...]to have my name bandied about in conjunction with their steam-engine enterprises. (*CL* 11: 44)

But, whatever Carlyle's opinion, Victorians were fascinated with mass observation and statistical results. Sociological studies by utilitarians such as William Acton, whose study of *Prostitution* provided a wealth of information on numbers and classes and advocated

the registration of prostitutes, or Henry Mayhew, whose *London Labour and the London Poor* surveyed and statisticised the life of the streets, brought previously unregulated lives under scrutiny.

Such endeavours are greatly facilitated by mechanisation, and a combination of the desire to accumulate information and the use of technology is evident in the nineteenth century in the person of Charles Babbage, a greatly accomplished mathematician, often described as the 'Father of Computing'.¹¹ Babbage, we are told in *Computer Pioneers*, 'wanted to quantify everything' and delighted in the production of statistical tables (57). Indeed he even wrote to Tennyson suggesting that he change a line of poetry to ensure statistical accuracy, although it is hard to believe that the following is intended without a shade of irony:

'Every minute dies a man/Every minute one is born': I need hardly point out to you that this calculation would tend to keep the sum total of the world's population in a state of perpetual equipoise, whereas it is a well-known fact that the said sum total is constantly on the increase. I would therefore take the liberty of suggesting that in the next edition of your excellent poem the erroneous calculation to which I refer would be corrected as follows: 'Every moment dies a man/And one and a sixteenth is born'. I may add that the exact figures are 1.167, but something must, of course, be conceded to the laws of metre.¹²

Babbage's desire to 'quantify everything' was brought to fruition in 1822 with his first notable invention, the Difference Engine, a calculating machine which produced tables of numbers. Babbage was given government assistance to build his machine but before it

¹¹ J.A.N. Lee, *Computer Pioneers* (California: IEEE Computer Society Press, 1987), p. 51. Babbage was Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge.

¹² *Babbage and His Calculating Engines*, ed. Phillip Morrison and Emily Morrison (New York: Dover, 1961), p. xxiii.

was built he came up with a new idea, the Analytical Engine, now considered to be the first digital computer. Whereas the Difference Engine calculated problems, the new machine could 'eat its own tail'.¹³ It used calculated results to change the instructions set into it. It could, in a primitive manner, think for itself and was an attempt to reproduce, or even improve upon the analytical capacity of the human mind. Neither of Babbage's Engines was completed in his lifetime as government funding was eventually withdrawn. But his work displays the way in which machinery might be developed until it constituted a reproduction of the mind. Jean-Claude Beaune indicates that 'Lady Lovelace [Byron's daughter and Babbage's friend], no less than Babbage, was profoundly aware that with the invention of the analytical Engine, mankind was flirting with mechanized intelligence', even believing that it might 'compose elaborate and scientific pieces of music' (461). Considering his withering sarcasm in 'Signs of the Times' directed at Dr Cabanis whose *Rapport du Physique et du Morale de l'Homme* suggested that 'Poetry and Religion[...]are "a product of the smaller intestine"', Carlyle would hardly have been enamoured of this view that the mysterious, artistic capacity of man could be reproduced mechanically (*Works*, 27: 65). Carlyle may not have been aware of Ada Lovelace's ruminations, but he *was* aware of Babbage's endeavours and, as Carlisle Moore has pointed out, he scorned 'the first computers: Pascal's "famous arithmetical machine" and Charles Babbage's Calculating Machine'.¹⁴ Moore goes on to say that in *Sartor* Carlyle displays a 'foreshadowing of some of our attitudes towards science today -- the fear that

¹³ Jean-Claude Beaune, 'The Classical Age of Automata: An Impressionistic Survey from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century', in *Fragments for a History of the Human Body*, I, pp. 430-480, (p.461)

¹⁴ Carlisle Moore, 'Carlyle and the "Torch of Science"', in *The Norman and Charlotte Strouse Lectures on Carlyle and His Era*, ed. Jerry D. James and Charles S. Fineman (Santa Cruz: The University Library of California, 1982), 1-25 (p.7).

machines and computers may dehumanize men' (22).

This contrast between a mechanistic and vitalistic approach informs Carlyle's reactions to Benthamite ideas of social control. A brief side-swipe at the radical pamphleteer Marcus, in 'Chartism', provides evidence of Carlyle's awareness of Bentham's Panoptic dream, linking it with another eighteenth-century proponent of social control and providing a possible reading of Teufelsdröckh's domicile in *Sartor Resartus*, 'the speculum or watch-tower' (*Works*, 1: 15):

Marcus is not a demon author at all: he is a benefactor of the species in his own kind; has looked intensely on the world's woes, from a Benthamite-Malthusian watch-tower, under a Heaven dead as iron.
(*Works*, 29: 202)

Jessop provides a novel approach to the baffling episode of Teufelsdröckh's observational tower when he suggests that 'the strangeness of this place[...] seems to invite the reader to treat Teufelsdröckh's watch-tower apartment as a metaphor or symbol for the mind' by using the Lockian image of a machine, the *camera obscura*, to provide a physicalist definition of the mind based on sensory perception.¹⁵ Jessop contends, however, that Carlyle draws the reader into this possible reading only to thwart it through a 'vagueness' and 'multiplicity of possible interpretations' which leaves the reader with a puzzle. This 'puzzlement, mystery, wonder, is a crucial part of Carlyle's aim in attempting to recover wonderment in an age of increasingly austere materialism, utilitarianism, and the rationalist dogmatism that envisaged a brave new world of

¹⁵ Ralph Jessop, "'A Strange Apartment': the Watch-Tower in Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus*", *Studies in Scottish Literature*, 29 (1997), pp. 118-132 (p. 123). See also *Carlyle and Scottish Thought*, chapter 9.

limitless progress in the physical sciences' (119-20). Why then, in the light of this hostility to Benthamite ideals, would Carlyle identify the transcendentalist Teufelsdröckh's apartment with the Panopticon?

The evidence is slim but suggestive. There is the repetition of the watch-tower image and the emphasis in *Sartor* on Teufelsdröckh's tower's observational capacity. Windows look out from every side, 'wherefrom, sitting at ease [Teufelsdröckh] might see the whole life-circulation of that considerable City' (15). Further, as Jessop points out, Carlyle makes reference to an 'engine' of surveillance, the *camera obscura*, of which Edinburgh had two prompting Jane Carlyle to write with a paranoid edge, 'look about for a nice pleasant little garret that has a fine view[...]out of reach of the camera obscura'.¹⁶ In a book about the coexistence of the physical and the spiritual, Carlyle produces his critique of a rational, materialistic philosophy by transforming its own imagery. Teufelsdröckh *can* see the whole town, as in the Panoptacist dream, but his observations suggest that his is a different kind of tower. Teufelsdröckh does not observe men as statistics, he does not desire that the subjects of his reveries should adapt to the machine, but is fascinated by their individuality, their variety, their humanity:

Couriers arrive bestrapped and bebooted, bearing Joy and Sorrow bagged up in pouches of leather[...]the lamed Soldier hops painfully along, begging alms[...]The Lover whispers his mistress that the coach is ready, and she, full of hope and fear, glides down, to fly with him over the borders: the Thief, still more silently, sets-to his picklocks and crowbars[...]Gay mansions[...]are full of light and music and high-swelling hearts; but, in the condemned Cells the pulse of life beats tremulous and faint. (*Works*, 1: 15-17)

¹⁶ Jessop, "A Strange Apartment", p.127

Teufelsdröckh's world-view is different from Bentham's, just as Carlyle's vision of the mind differs from that of the materialist. However, one has to be aware of the possibilities for 'power of mind over mind' which are present in both Teufelsdröckh himself and *Sartor Resartus* as a whole, but which differ crucially from the mechanism of Benthamite controls. The models for these opposing types of power are to be found in two systems of education which are discussed in the central biographical section of *Sartor Resartus*. Teufelsdröckh's injurious education is described in terms of machinery. Greek and Latin were "'mechanically" taught', his teachers 'inanimate, mechanical Gerund-grinder[s]', concurring with his opinion in 'Signs of the Times' that 'intellect, the power man has of knowing and believing, is now nearly synonymous with Logic, or the mere power of arranging and communicating', the like of Smith and Hume being referred to as grinders in the 'Logic-mills' (*Works*, 1:84; 27:74-75). This type of rational, sceptical education deadens man's soul. It does not 'foster the growth of anything, much more of Mind, which grows, not like a vegetable (by having its roots littered with etymological compost), but like a Spirit, by mysterious contact of spirit; Thought kindling itself at the fire of living Thought' (*Works*, 1:84). Benthamite power, like the rational, materialistic education seeks to transform the mind by providing the cause (instruction or environment) to bring about the effect (moral or intellectual improvement), in a process debated with crunching simplicity by La Mettrie:

As we can see, there is nothing simpler than the mechanism of our education! It all comes down to sounds, or words, which are transmitted from one person's mouth, through another's ear and into his brain, which receives at the same time through his eyes the shape of the bodies for which the words are the arbitrary signs. (*Man Machine*, 11-13)

Carlyle questions materialist notions of gaining knowledge of the world by suggesting that there are things beyond the ken of linguistic and visual representation which can be communicated by 'mysterious contact of spirit' (*Works*, 1:84) Both *Teufelsdröckh* and *Sartor* provide an example of this contact. *Sartor* does not instruct, but provides a spark of human thought at which the reader must kindle his own mind. The fictional Editor of *Teufelsdröckh's* philosophy impresses the fact that the ideas contained in the book are intended as inspirational rather than prescriptive; that to read the book provides the opportunity of a new way to read the world:

We are to guide our British Friends into the New Gold-country, and shew them the mines: nowise to dig out and exhaust its wealth, which indeed remains for all time inexhaustible. Once there, let each dig for his own behoof, and enrich himself. (*Works*, 1:166)

Interestingly Carlyle's use of mineralogical terms in describing the inspirational nature of *Sartor* suggests the subsuming of the scientific within the transcendental. Further, Carlyle's use of the language of material gain -- the reader 'enrich[es] himself' -- sets up a contrast between the aims of Benthamite and *Teufelsdröckhian* views of social control and morality. Through the 'Machine of Society', religious law or morality, 'the Sense of Right and Wrong in Man', is replaced by "'accounting for the Moral sense'".¹⁷ The absolutes of good and evil give way to environmental considerations and morality becomes a matter of cause and effect, the responsibility for which lies with the state

¹⁷ 'Shooting Niagara; and After?' (1867), *Works* vol. 30, pp. 28-29.

rather than the individual:

This 'superior morality' is properly rather an 'inferior criminality,' produced not by greater love of virtue, but by the greater perfection of Police. (*Works*, 27:78)

This materialist paternalism has as its ultimate aim the maximisation of the citizen's utility. Foucault's description of Bentham's Panopticon as the 'utility of power' can be extended to suggest that the normalisation of society's transgressors was conceived of as leading to a more economically efficient society, a point Carlyle makes in 'Signs of the Times' when he says that government is 'to the discontented, a "taxing-machine;" to the contented, a "machine for securing property." Its duties and its faults are not those of a father, but of an active parish constable'. (*Works*, 27:67)

Like *Sartor* as a whole, Teufelsdröckh himself represents a contrast to physicalist notions of education and control, as an agent of the fire of human thought. The Editor refers to Teufelsdröckh's philosophy as 'an enormous Pitchpan which our Teufelsdröckh in his lone watchtower had kindled, that it might flame far and wide through the Night, and many a disconsolately wandering spirit be guided thither to a Brother's bosom!' (*Works*, 1:235). Like the watcher in the Panopticon, at the end of *Sartor* Teufelsdröckh is absent from his tower. The watcher's absence signalled a sinister combination of utility and control, whereas Teufelsdröckh's disappearance is a mystery enacted while the 'Beaconfire blazed its brightest' (235-236).

This benign, inspirational power relies on a communing of vibrant, spiritual beings. The mind is not a machine and to treat it as such is to cultivate inhumanity. In the

'Pure Reason' chapter of *Sartor Teufelsdröckh* criticises Science based on 'Logic alone', his distrust of the divorce of the cerebral from the peculiarly human capacity for emotion leading him to produce a grotesque image of the human head which again attacks physicalist notions of the mind:

And what is that Science, which the scientific Head alone, were it screwed off, and[...]set in a basin, to keep it alive, could prosecute without shadow of a heart, -- but one of the mechanical and menial handicrafts, for which the Scientific Head (having a soul in it) is too noble an organ? (53-54)

This detachment of the scientific head, prefiguring the image of a computer, significantly follows a passage which seems to refer to contraptions such as Babbage's Analytical engine:

'Shall your Science,' exclaims [Teufelsdröckh], 'proceed in the small chink lighted, or even oil-lighted, underground workshop of Logic alone; and man's mind become an Arithmetical Mill, whereof Memory is the Hopper, and mere Tables of Sines and Tangents, Codification, and Treatises of what you call Political Economy, are the Meal?' (53)

It is worth noting that Babbage's Analytical Engine was the first to supplement the storage capacity of the computer with a *mill*. Carlyle's interest in mathematics at Edinburgh University, his knowledge of Babbage's work as early as 1831, and a personal acquaintance with Babbage (described by Carlyle as having 'viper eyes' and the 'acridest egotism'), may suggest that he was aware of the theoretical ideas which preceded

Babbage's actual proposal to the Government in 1834.¹⁸

Carlyle's critique of the 'scientific Head' and the need for 'soul', echoed in Dickens's comment from 1847 on the limitations of Babbage's work -- 'Not all the figures that Babbage's calculating machine could turn up in twenty generations[...] would stand up in the long run against the general heart' -, confirms the central thesis of 'Signs of the times'; that 'the Body-politic [is] more than ever worshipped and tendered; but the Soul-politic less than ever' (Ackroyd, 510; *Works*, 27: 67). Given Carlyle's attack on the mechanistic, one might assert that a value judgement was being made; the spiritual is good, and the physical bad. This would then entail a rejection, or at least a re-tailoring of science. And for many critics Carlyle's dilemma between the soul and body has led them to search for reconciliation or resolution in his writing. They identify points where Carlyle subsumes the mechanistic into a transcendental philosophy, so dispelling the problematic dualism of outward and inner. Sussman, in response to what he sees as Carlyle's rejection of 'the machine as a philosophic metaphor' and attraction to 'the tangible iron and steel machines of his day', suggests that he 'sought to break this union by absorbing the machine into his transcendental philosophy' (14-15). Moore sees the 'grand climax' of 'Organic Filaments', and the subsequent 'Natural Supernaturalism', as finally uniting the opposites of science and religion which have 'inform[ed] the whole work so far'.¹⁹ Both Sussman and Moore provide examples of Carlyle's spiritualising science. For instance Sussman is right in saying that Carlyle admired Richard Arkwright and James Watt because they worked from inspiration rather than pure analysis so absorbing them into his transcendental vision, a point which Moore emphasises in both

¹⁸ Froude, *Thomas Carlyle: A History of his Life in London*, 1: 200.

¹⁹ 'Carlyle and the "Torch of Science"', p.20.

'Carlyle and the "Torch of Science"' and 'Carlyle and Goethe as Scientist' when he says that Carlyle differentiated between an older ideal of science with wider connotations of intuitive knowledge, and mechanical sciences with their analytical process.²⁰ As Chapple points out the latter definition of science, 'a systematic study of the material and natural universe', had, in the nineteenth century, replaced the definition of science as any 'knowledge acquired by study' (1). However, to accept this as Carlyle's final stance is to ignore his fluctuating epistemology, his ability to see the impossibility of the ideal in the human experience.

Carlyle does generally reject mechanical philosophies. But his admiration for some of the benefits of the machine, although tempered by concern at the manner in which those benefits are utilised, allows him to praise Industrial progress. Sussman quotes from 'Signs of the Times' to illustrate Carlyle's spiritualisation of the machine:

The shuttle drops from the fingers of the weaver, and falls into iron fingers that ply it faster. The sailor furls his sail, and lays down his oar; and bids a strong, unwearied servant, on vaporous wings, bear him through the waters. (Sussman, 23).

However, he omits the previous sentence:

Our old modes of exertion are all discredited, and thrown aside. On every hand, the living artisan is driven from his workshop, to make room for a speedier, inanimate one. (*Works*, 27: 59)

²⁰ Sussman, p. 26; 'Carlyle and the "Torch of Science"', p. 16; 'Carlyle and Goethe as Scientist', in *Carlyle and his Contemporaries*, pp. 21-34 (p. 33).

Carlyle's admiration for 'individual endeavour' is evident in his reference to the weaver's 'modes of exertion' (*Works*, 27: 63). The negative connotations of 'discredited' and 'thrown aside' reveal his hostility to the hasty rejection of the vital, as represented in the 'living artisan', in favour of the 'inanimate one'. The speediness of the new machine represents the move toward utility over humanity which provoked Carlyle's anxiety. Machine does not, as Sussman suggests, 'take[...]on the qualities of life' (23). Rather, Carlyle applies a physiological description to the machine to ironise its replacement of the human. Indeed Sussman denies that there is any irony at all in Carlyle's 'Macaulay-like praise of technological progress' (23):

What wonderful accessions have thus been made, and are still making to the physical power of mankind; how much better fed, clothed, lodged and, in all outward respects, accommodated men now are, *or might be*, by a given quantity of labour, is a grateful reflection which forces itself on every one. (*Works*, 27: 60) [my italics]

Carlyle's qualification ('or might be'), however, indicates the source of his irony. His concern, repeated in *Past and Present* (1843), is that a society based on material gain rather than spiritual values cannot be improved by technological advances alone: 'England is full of wealth, of multifarious produce, supply for human want in every kind; yet England is dying of inanition' (*Works*, 10: 1). Of course 'inanition' refers to individuals' real starvation but also to the country's spiritual state; society is empty, hollow, exhausted. The Machine Age may have increased production but, in practice, it is not fairly distributed - 'Touch it not, ye workers, ye master-workers' (*Works*, 10: 1). Further, even those who own the means of production do not profit from it -- 'We have

sumptuous garnitures for our Life, but have forgotten to *live* in the middle of them' (Works, 10: 5). Without its soul, England lacks the fair and mutually beneficial labour-relations to take advantage of progress.

Carlyle's reservations are therefore in stark contrast to those who view their society's progress with 'grateful reflection'. Sussman fails to pick up on the nuances of Carlyle's tone, evident in the implications of 'forces itself on everyone', suggesting an element of unquestioning zeal in the supporters of progress: 'It is[...](the age which, with its whole *undivided* might, forwards, teaches and practises the great art of adapting means to ends' (Works, 27: 59). This 'undivided' is the key to Carlyle's response to mechanism. It is the single-minded dominance of machines and mechanistic thinking which disturbs him, a point he makes when he advocates a 'right coordination of the two'; 'the inward or Dynamical' and the 'outward or mechanical' (Works, 27: 73). Carlyle may at times speak of science as intuitive or transcendental, but he never loses sight of the mechanical as physical. His admiration for the machine does not have to be spiritualised to be legitimised, it merely has to be put in its place. Carlyle's call for right coordination represents a desire to balance two distinct properties, a point Jessop also recognises when he refers to Raymond Williams' claim that 'there is a genuine balance in this essay [Signs of the Times]' (Jessop, 150):

Undue cultivation of the inward or Dynamical province leads to ideal, visionary impracticable courses, and especially in rude eras, to Superstition and Fanaticism, with their long train of baleful and well-known evils. Undue cultivation of the outward, again, though less immediately prejudicial, and even, for the time productive of many palpable benefits, must, in the long-run, by destroying Moral Force, which is the parent of all other Force, prove not less certainly, and

perhaps still more hopelessly, pernicious. (*Works*, 27: 73)

Carlyle's own impulse towards the ideal is, as was seen in chapter 3, always checked by an underlying urge toward the practical, so the spiritualising of science represents only one aspect of his thought. However, in dealing with *Sartor Resartus*, Moore misses this by identifying Carlyle with Teufelsdröckh's transcendentalism -- 'Teufelsdröckh is Carlyle's literal, and also his figurative, spokesman' (*Torch of Science*, 12). Although Moore recognises the Editor's role as rationalist in *Sartor*, he does not grasp that the two men represent Carlyle's own conflicting thoughts. He sees 'Organic Filaments' and 'Natural Supernaturalism' as the climactic chapters of *Sartor* in which the dualisms of the text are resolved, but does not question why, in that case, the book ends on a dialectic note - 'have we not lived together, though in a state of quarrel' -- nor why both 'nay' and 'yea' are 'everlasting' (*Works*, 1: 238).

Of course, the maintaining of dualism, that allows value to the 'outward' and 'inner', is also suggested by Carlyle's ambiguity of tone. Again, as in *Sartor*, Teufelsdröckh speaks as Diogenes and vice versa. If we return to Carlyle's comments in 'Signs of the Times' on the improvements wrought by technology, we see a complex interplay of the serious and ironic. When he exclaims, 'how much better fed, clothed, lodged and, in all outward respects, accommodated men now are', Carlyle would seem to be parodying the enthusiastic rhetoric of progressionists, but not to deny its truth. Sceptic speaks as believer and believer, as sceptic.

A similar response is evident in the example Sussman uses of Carlyle's account of his first railway trip:

The whirl through the confused darkness, on those steam wings, was one of the strangest things I have experienced -- hissing and dashing on, one knew not whither[...]We went over the tops of houses -- one town or village I saw clearly, with its chimney heads vainly stretching up towards us -- *under* the stars; not under the clouds but among them. Out of one vehicle into another, snorting, roaring we flew: the likeliest thing to a Faust's flight on the Devil's mantle; or as if some huge steam night-bird had flung you on its back, and was sweeping through unknown space with you, most probably towards London.²¹

Sussman notes that Carlyle substitutes the vitalistic image of a bird for the mechanistic (although 'steam night-bird' suggests combination rather than substitution), but the most striking point of the description is the wonder inherent in its satanic imagery. This does not however mean mechanical becomes transcendental. As in *Sartor* when the god-born delighted in the earthly here there is a sense of awe at the diabolic. Ambiguity creates dual possibilities. A relationship between body and soul is indicated, but one which does not negate either or subsume one within the other. To accuse Carlyle of subsuming all science in transcendentalism would be to convict him of the very practice he attacks.

Inner and outer, dynamic and mechanic are different :

To speak a little pedantically, there is a science of *Dynamics* in man's fortunes and nature, as well as of *Mechanics*. There is a science which treats of, and practically addresses, the primary and unmodified forces and energies of man, the mysterious springs of Love, and Fear, and Wonder, of Enthusiasm, poetry, Religion, all which have a truly vital and *infinite* character; as well as a science which practically addresses the finite, modified developments of these, when they take the shape of immediate 'motives', as hope of reward, or as fear of punishment. (*Works*, 27: 68-69)

²¹ Froude, *Carlyle; A History of his Life in London*, 1: 167; Sussman, p. 25.

Like body and soul in man, the dynamic and mechanic are different but both together constitute human existence. Carlyle's ambiguity and fluctuating epistemology represent the unknowable, intertwining relationship between the two: 'To define the limits of these two departments of man's activity, which work into one another, and by means of one another, so intricately and inseparably, were by its nature an impossible attempt' (*Works*, 27: 73). Further Carlyle's dislike of Superstition and Fanaticism leads him to exclude the 'undue cultivation' of the inner as a counter to the over-mechanisation of his present society.

Although he is opposed to the application of mechanistic ideas to the spiritual nature of man, especially the mind, Carlyle is certainly of the opinion that mechanism in itself is not in any way evil. In 'Signs of the Times' he recognises that mechanistic philosophies are 'grounded on little more than metaphor' but that ideas can "'harden[...] into a shell,'" and 'the shadow we have wantonly evoked stands terrible before us' (*Works*, 27: 66). In other words, it is man, not machine, who dictates the propensities of his society:

For man is not the creature and product of Mechanism; but in a far truer sense, its creator and producer[...]. This deep, paralysed subjection to physical objects comes not from Nature, but from our own unwise mode of viewing Nature. (*Works*, 27: 72, 81)

Although Kingsley would argue that God was the creator he would certainly agree that the machine merely presented man with dual possibilities, to use it for good or bad

(*Works*, 27: 70).

In a series of lectures on science, Kingsley indicates Carlyle's influence over his own thought by citing him as a major scientific thinker:

And let me say that the man of our days whose writings exemplify most thoroughly what I am going to say is the justly revered Mr. Thomas Carlyle. As far as I know he has never written on any scientific subject. For aught I am aware of, he may know nothing of mathematics or chemistry, of comparative anatomy or geology. For aught I am aware of, he may know a great deal about them all, and, like a wise man, hold his tongue, and give the world merely the results in the form of general thought. But this I know; that his writings are instinct with the very spirit of science; that he has taught men, more than any living man, the meaning and the end of science; that he has taught men moral and intellectual courage; to face facts boldly, while they confess the divineness of facts; not to be afraid of Nature, and not to worship Nature[...]. That he would have made a distinguished scientific man, we may be as certain from his writings as we may be certain, when we see a fine old horse of a certain stamp, that he would have made a first-class hunter, though he has been unfortunately all his life in harness.²²

Unlike Carlyle, Kingsley did not restrict himself to general thought on scientific matters.

Kingsley's scientific writing is primarily in the form of lectures for the masses which verge on the patronising. He does concern himself in these with the theoretical questions of the day but his approach is practical and his intentions didactic rather than dialectic.

Contrasted with Carlyle's intermittent flirtations with the transcendental, Kingsley often fully and clearly expresses a belief that science is a part of religion. He employs religious, almost evangelical, rhetoric in describing its benefits as when he preached at St.

Margaret's, Westminster four days after the opening of the Great Exhibition of 1851:

²² 'Science', in *Scientific Lectures and Essays*, (London: Macmillan, 1880), p. 249.

If these forefathers of ours could rise from their graves this day they would be inclined to see in our hospitals, in our railroads, in the achievements of our physical science, confirmation of that old superstition of theirs, proofs of the kingdom of God, realizations of the gifts which Christ received for men, vaster than any of which they had dreamed. (*LM*, 1: 221)

Further, Kingsley *seems* to lack the scepticism evident in Carlyle's writing as to the benefits of technology. In the preface to *Scientific Lectures and Essays* (mostly given in the 1860s and 70s and gathered together in one volume in 1880), he expounds on the 'fresh amount of employment, of subsistence, which science has, during the last century, given to men' (10). This earnestness may be the root of Kingsley's admiration for Carlyle but also an indication of how they ultimately differ. It would appear, in many of his comments on Carlyle's writing, that he is entirely unaware of any irony, a point evident in a comment made after an afternoon's visit to the Carlyles which Guy Kendall identifies as a moment of 'disillusionment':

'Never heard I,' he says, 'a more foolish outpouring of Devil's doctrines, raving cynicism which made me sick. I kept my temper with him; but when I got out I am afraid I swore with wrath and disgust, at least I left no doubt in my two friends' minds of my opinion of such stuff - all the ferocity of the old Pharisee without Isaiah's prophecy of mercy and salvation - the notion of sympathy with sinners denounced as a sign of innate 'scoundrelism', a blame I am very glad to bear[...]I never was so shocked in my life, and you know I have a strong stomach and am not easily moved to pious horror.' (Kendall, 28)²³

It would seem that the alienation which Teufelsdröckh's buckram-case of sarcasm had caused was also evident in the effect of Carlyle's own conversation.

²³ Kendall traces this comment to a letter written to F.D. Maurice in 1856.

Kingsley's earnest response to the machine is evident in his preface to the *Scientific Lectures and Essays* when he quotes from an essay 'urging the institution of schools of physical science for artisans':

The discoveries of voltaic electricity, electromagnetism, and magnetic electricity, by Volta, OErsted, and Faraday, led to the invention of electric telegraphy by Wheatstone and others, and to the great manufactures of telegraph cables and telegraph wire, and of the materials required for them. The value of the cargo of the Great Eastern alone in the recent Bombay telegraph expedition was calculated at three millions of pounds sterling. It also led to the employment of thousands of operators to transmit the telegraphic messages, and to a great increase of our commerce in nearly all its branches by the more rapid means of communications. The discovery of voltaic electricity further led to the invention of electro-plating. (10)

And so it goes on, listing benefits to country and Empire. Nowhere in Carlyle do we find anything like this. And yet, if we look deeper, Kingsley did have anxieties over industrialism and the possible misuse of technology which certainly resemble, if they are not influenced by, Carlyle.

In the virtually unknown text of three lectures given to the Royal Institution on the *Ancien Regime*, Kingsley ends his rather idiosyncratic history of pre-revolution France by considering how his age will be viewed by future historians and asks whether it will be considered an age of progress. Like 'Signs of the Times' and *Sartor Resartus* Kingsley's lecture highlights the deficiencies of nineteenth-century science. He points out that present day scientists have merely developed the ideas intuitively discovered by greater men of the past century. And, like Carlyle, he characterises the science of his age as rational, physical and lacking an understanding of man's emotional nature or of larger,

spiritual themes. He asks,

Whether our positivist spirit, our content with the collection of facts, our dread of vast theories, is not a symptom -- wholesome, prudent, modest, but still a symptom -- of our consciousness that we are not as our grandfathers were; that we can no longer conceive great ideas, which illumine, for good or evil, the whole mind and heart of man, and drive him on to dare and suffer desperately.²⁴

Also like Carlyle he attacks a mechanical education system which has become merely 'improved constitutions, and improved book-instruction' (129-30). That 'Signs of the Times' was a major influence on this piece (although the lectures were delivered four decades later in 1867) is clear from Kingsley's distinguishing between 'men of science, whether physical or spiritual' and his assertion that, although mechanical science had its advantages, 'no outward and material thing is progress; no machinery causes progress; it merely spreads and makes popular the results of progress. Progress is inward, of the soul' (129). The enthusiasm in the preface of *Scientific Lectures and Essays*, written around the same time, for transport and communication technology has become muted - 'Railroads? electric telegraphs? all honour to them in their place: but they are not progress; they are only the fruits of past progress' (129).

This difference may merely be due to audience. In his lectures and essays he addresses himself to the artisans he hopes to inspire and teach. His patronising manner resembles his writing for children and it is clear that he considered the artisans unable to understand the more complex sentiments of the lecture delivered to the intelligent

²⁴ *Three Lectures delivered at the Royal Institution on the Ancien Regime* (London: Macmillan, 1867), p.129.

members of the Royal Institution. This is not to say that he was not an enthusiast (after all he believed that working men should learn about science) but that the popular image of Kingsley as the Victorian parson/didact sometimes conceals a more complex character. As we saw a strain of anxiety beneath Kingsley's carefully constructed synthesis of sexuality and religion, here he displays a darkness which matches Carlyle at his most apocalyptic and prophetic. We have already seen how both men criticised the organisational nature of nineteenth-century mechanisms, both referring to the collecting of facts. In addition, although Kingsley says that the "'triumphs of science"[...]have been as yet, as far as I can see, nothing but blessings' he harbours doubts over the possible future misuse of technology which resemble Carlyle's concern over the control of the Machine of Society. Kingsley makes a link between the political and philosophical mechanisms which Carlyle viewed as exerting control over the minds of men, and the manner in which the machine might facilitate that control. In contrast with his admiration for communications technology, expressed in the preface to his scientific essays, here Kingsley employs an image which chillingly prefigures the computer networks of today:

I have my very serious doubts whether [the triumphs of science] are likely to be blessings to the whole human race, for many an age to come. I can conceive them -- may God avert the omen! -- the instruments of a more crushing executive centralization, of a more utter oppression of the bodies and souls of men, than the world has yet seen. I can conceive -- may God avert the omen! -- centuries hence, some future world-ruler sitting at the junction of all railroads, at the centre of all telegraph-wires -- a world-spider in the omphalos of his world-wide web. (131)

Indeed, Kingsley's dark vision of the future can be said to resemble Wells's concern over

the role of technology in war:

Let us remember that the things themselves are as a gun or a sword, with which we can kill our enemy, but with which also our enemy can kill us. (*Ancien Regime*, 130-1)

But, like Wells who in *The Salvaging of Civilization* advocated that mankind had to learn to 'control its pugnacity' rather than abandon technological development, Kingsley is also capable of a vision where the machine heralds a possible utopian future, articulated in religious terms.²⁵

And yet science may scale Olympus after all. Without intending it, almost without knowing it, she may find herself, hereafter upon a summit of which she never dreamed; surveying the universe of God in the light of Him who made it and her, and remakes them both for ever and ever. On that summit she may stand hereafter, if only she goes on, as she goes now, in humility and in patience; doing the duty which lies nearest her; lured along the upward road, not by ambition, vanity, or greed, but by reverent curiosity for every new pebble, and flower, and child, and savage, around her feet. (*Ancien Regime*, 135-6)

Both Carlyle and Kingsley recognise the folly of scientific progress without moral progress and the limited nature of mechanistic thinking. But Kingsley's work differs in tone. His educatory science lectures are almost wholly optimistic and, as we shall see, engage positively with the evolution debate of the day, but, in the *Ancien Regime*, he reveals anxieties very like Carlyle's. Kingsley's earnestness means that he does not employ the ambiguity or irony which informs all Carlyle's writing. Further, although he

²⁵ H.G. Wells, *The Salvaging of Civilization* (London: Cassell, 1921), p. 10.

expresses his fears, they arise from the possibility that machines may be misused rather than from the intermingling of the god-like with the Faustian that for Carlyle defines the human condition.

Chapter 5:

Social Pestilence and Miracle Cures: Divine and Secular Law

Carlyle and Kingsley were able to resist the extension of mechanistic criteria to the body and soul because of the difference between organic matter and a manufactured machine, but the advances within the natural sciences and their emphasis on man's material nature were less easily refuted.

So for instance, as Peter Bowler has pointed out, evolutionary theories had implications for how Victorians viewed 'the moral character of mankind'. This was partly because 'by the middle of the century few educated people could escape the realization that[...]the Creation by God offered at best only a symbol' but also because its seemingly random nature contradicted the view of an ordered universe with a system of morality. Bowler explains how evolutionary ideas were then adapted within politics to stave off the threat of disorder which evolution posed - 'the idea of progress was of central importance because it offered a compromise between the old creationism and the more extreme manifestations of the new materialism'.¹ And, of course, Darwin's theory of natural selection, which was later adapted to apply to social evolution as survival of the fittest, became a justification for individualism and class mobility. The questions raised by emerging evolutionary theories were therefore part of a general movement which I want to address in this chapter by looking at some of the concepts of man's nature and relationship with God which Carlyle and Kingsley identified and engaged with, whether in a positive or negative manner.² I shall focus mainly on their responses to three

¹ Peter Bowler, *The Invention of Progress* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 4-5.

² Although the texts which I shall deal with in this chapter pre-date Darwin's *Origin of Species* (1859), as I pointed out in chapter one, the discussions surrounding botany,

interrelated areas which we can term natural sciences; the treatment and identification of disease and sanitary reform, and theories of evolution which held currency prior to Darwin's *Origin of Species*, a book whose influence, especially on Kingsley, I will treat in chapter six. However, these sciences did not develop within a vacuum, but can be related to broader concepts of man's place within society and I shall also be considering their importance to the Condition-of-England question and the political and spiritual solutions broached by both writers.

The nature of man was a central topic of debate within the natural sciences. In simple terms a purely Creationist view held that man's behaviour, bodily health, morality and so on were created by and dependent on his relationship with God, whereas a purely materialist thinker would contend that man was a product of a number of physical agencies, including environment. This concern with the manner in which man and his character, or soul, is created has implications for the Condition-of-England question because it is integral to the way in which society can be improved, providing as it does an indication of how character may be affected or changed. Whereas Creationism would presuppose that morality was a matter of personal sin within a divinely ordered system of right and wrong (redemption being possible only through prayer and God's grace), materialist approaches suggest that man is shaped by his environment and that all concepts of right and wrong are therefore relative to that environment. Under this latter view change could then be effected through social reform which would improve man's surroundings, working conditions, economic situation and so on. If society's problems

biology and palaeontology were well under way earlier in the century and it is clear that both Carlyle and Kingsley engaged with the questions on man's nature which texts such as Chambers' *Vestiges* posed.

demanded a solution then the two opposing ideologies of Creationism and Materialism upheld two opposing kinds of law; divine and secular.

In the debate over public health in the nineteenth century the two approaches clashed. Although advances were being made in both medical and sanitary science they were, like evolutionary ideas, partly based on empirical evidence and partly on theoretical conjecture, in a phase when, as Beer has pointed out, “a fact is not quite a scientific fact at all” and when “the remnant of the mythical” is at its most manifest.³ As I indicated in chapter two this led, even among the medical profession, to a mythologizing of pestilence, especially in the case of cholera which was described by one doctor as 'outlandish, unknown, monstrous' (Haley, 6). The invisible and fearful nature of disease seemed to legitimise theories of miasma, the poisonous gas which Victorians believed was emitted by dirty water, rotting meat, vegetation and infected human bodies. Later the discovery of bacteria served to contradict these ideas and the vectors of various diseases were discovered. For instance, it was found that typhus was passed by fleas, while cholera was carried in water and other products such as bread. Fears over dirty water supplies *were* well-founded and cleaning up polluted streets was a step in the right direction but, until bacteriology was discovered, specific knowledge of how diseases were actually carried was lacking. The famous example of the Great Stink (1858/9) during which disinfected cloths were placed over the windows at Westminster to keep out the miasmatic gases emanating from the polluted Thames shows how unsophisticated and misguided disease prevention often was. As Haley points out, 'it should have been a blow to the theory of pythogenesis [the dirt which resulted in

³ *Darwin's Plots* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 4.

miasma] when no outbreak of fever ensued from this monstrous stench' (10).

Miasma also provided a metaphor for the spreading of moral sickness in society. The fantastical and unknown properties of disease and its insidious permeation, especially of the city, lent themselves to imaginative discourse, as when Dickens allows the images of sickness and a miasma-like fog throughout the Chancery-blighted society to permeate *Bleak House*:

Fog everywhere. Fog up the river, where it flows among the green aits and meadows; fog down the river, where it rolls defiled among the tiers of shipping, and the waterside pollutions of a great (and dirty) city.⁴

But more prosaic literature, such as journal articles and sanitary reports, also maintained a link between environment and moral degradation as well as using the pestilence metaphor to identify the spread of social disharmony.⁵

Bruce Haley accounts for this link when he discusses the advances being made in both physiological and psychological treatment in *The Healthy Body and Victorian Culture*. There he charts the emergence of a holistic approach to medicine, one which he labels 'psychophysiological':

⁴ Charles Dickens, *Bleak House*, ed. Norman Page (London: Penguin, 1985), p. 49.

⁵ M.W. Flinn contends that one of the 'most valuable contributions' to the advance of social policy in Edwin Chadwick's *Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Gt. Britain*, presented to the House of Lords in 1842, was its 'unequivocal statement of the interaction of bad and inadequate housing with intemperance, immorality, bad spending, as well as disease' (Introduction to Chadwick's *Report* [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1965], p. 58). The utilitarian statistician and sanitary reformer, W.A. Guy, in an article on 'Church Lane, St. Giles', speaks of the overcrowding and dirt in that area but points out that 'it is not within the province of statistics to reveal the moral consequences of these physical evils' (*Fraser's Magazine*, 37 (March 1848), pp. 257-260 (p. 259)).

Through the notion of ascending dependencies, all knowledge of man and his activities is shown to ground itself naturally in the study of the body: the physiology of the brain 'depends on' that of the body as a whole; the make-up of the mind depends on that of the brain; and a person's social activity depends on the constitution of his mind. (18)

However, although this recognition of the interdependence of mind and body suggests a breaking down of a dualistic division of the self, Haley also points out that, in looking for solutions to mental disturbances 'the bias was usually toward physical descriptions and remedies, even for diseases we would now consider wholly mental' (24). Indeed, Southwood Smith, a doctor and contributor to the Poor Law Commission's report on sanitary conditions in 1838, is quoted as contending that 'the mind is dependent on the body' (Haley, 17). The emphasis within Victorian culture on the effect of physical health on the mind is indicated by the aphorism *mens sana in corpore sano* ('a healthy mind in a healthy body') which was 'a living article of faith to millions' (Haley, 23). Haley identifies Carlyle and Kingsley as exponents of this aphorism, although he contends that they define holistic health as springing from different sources. Kingsley 'direct[s] his concept of health towards matters pertaining to [the body]' whereas Carlyle only views the body as 'the divinely created manifestation of the soul, its "vehicle and implement"' (117, 72). What is clear is that both writers consistently use the image of society as practically and metaphorically diseased. An occurrence of the early 1850s, allows us to understand the importance of the debate on the causes and cures of disease and its implications for how man viewed the relationship between himself, the world and God.

The Edinburgh Presbytery's petition to Queen Victoria for a national fast against

cholera in 1853 (referred to in chapter one), and Lord Palmerston's refusal, is a defining moment in what was really a slow scientific revolution. The Presbytery's request reflects the religious belief that God could inflict judgements on the earth's population and could be appeased into withdrawing that judgement through a show of religious devotion and repentance. Further, the call for a fast places this approach within an ascetic tradition which suggests, paradoxically, that to maintain the body's health it must be mortified and denied. Palmerston's response to the Presbytery that water and lime applied to the dirty environment which caused disease would do more to alleviate suffering than fasting, reflects the growing acceptance of sanitary science since the last cholera fasts of the 1840s had been enacted. However, as I shall consider later, it is also a transformation of an ascetic tradition of cleanliness which we most readily equate with Calvinism, into a scientific act. It may also indicate an increasing reaction against interventionist views of God in a society which was rapidly reassessing its religion in the face of emerging scientific evidence.

Kingsley was among those who argued that this new evidence could be wholly reconciled with their religious faith. Indeed, in January 1854, Kingsley produced an article for *Fraser's Magazine* entitled 'Lord Palmerston and the Presbytery of Edinburgh' to make it clear that members of the clergy could and should support sanitary reform. There he claimed that at a dinner attended by 'staunch members of the Church of England[...]they were, without a single exception, on the side of the broad churchman, science, and common-sense' apart from one 'worthy fanatic' who attacked Palmerston 'on the ground that Cholera was "God's judgement on the sin of filth"'.⁶ Kingsley's also

⁶ Charles Kingsley, 'Lord Palmerston and the Presbytery of Edinburgh', *Fraser's Magazine*, 49 (January, 1854), pp. 47-53 (p. 47).

published four sermons called 'Who Causes Pestilence?' in support of Palmerston and the cause of sanitary reform:

I feel bound to express my gratitude to Lord Palmerston for having refused to allow a National Fast-day on the occasion of the present re-appearance of pestilence, and so having prevented fresh scandal to christianity, fresh excuses for the selfishness, laziness, and ignorance which produce pestilence, fresh turning men's minds away from the real causes of this present judgement to fanciful and superstitious ones.⁷

These sermons were, in fact, not newly written. Kingsley had delivered all four to his congregation in 1849 during an earlier cholera outbreak, the acknowledgement of Palmerston being part of a preface added when the sermons were published in 1854. However, the otherwise unchanged published sermons allow us to look at the views which Kingsley held in advance of the publication of his two social novels of the late 1840s *Yeast* and *Alton Locke*. The sermons often elucidate the stance he takes in both novels, both on sanitary and other reform and wider notions of the relationship between science and religion. It is possible to claim, in the light of these sermons and the essays on *Science and Superstition* delivered at the Royal Institution in 1867 and later published in the *Scientific Lectures and Essays*, that Kingsley reconciled his belief in developments in the natural sciences with his faith, thus refuting the interventionist and, as he and many others saw them, superstitious views of the Presbytery.

Both *Alton Locke* and *Yeast* tackle problems of dirt and disease in the poorer areas (urban

⁷ Charles Kingsley, 'Who Causes Pestilence?' (London & Glasgow: Griffin, 1854), Preface (p.3). My thanks to Jon Grennan of Special Collections, John M. Olin Library, Washington University at St. Louis, for providing me with a photocopy of this ms.

and rural, although the city is more generally seen as the locus of contagion) in a more detailed and specific manner than any other popular Victorian novel. Dickens' description of Tom-all-Alone's in *Bleak House* may be devastatingly effective in its depiction of loneliness and poverty, but Kingsley's descriptions of the physical conditions of the poor have a more didactic aim and are given authenticity from their source in Kingsley's own experience while visiting the worst hit areas. Writing to his wife from London where he had rushed to agitate during the cholera outbreak of 1849, he recounts the 'Bermondsey Horrors', an area known, along with St. Giles, as one of the most dirty and impoverished in London:

I was yesterday with George Walsh and Mansfield over the cholera districts of Bermondsey; and, oh God! what I saw! people having no water to drink -- hundreds of them -- but the water of the common sewer which stagnated full of...dead fish, cats and dogs, under their windows. At the time the cholera was raging, Walsh saw them throwing untold horrors into the ditch, and then dipping out the water and drinking it!!
(*LM*, I: 177)

This scene re-emerges in the chapter 'The Lowest Deep' in *Allon Locke* when the hero is taken to the home of the Irish sweater, Jemmy Downes, in Jacob's Island, Bermondsey:

The light of the policeman's lantern glared over the ghastly scene -- along the double row of miserable house-backs, which lined the sides of the open tidal ditch -- over strange rambling jetties, and balconies, and sleeping sheds, which hung on rotting piles over the black waters, with phosphorescent scraps of rotten fish gleaming and twinkling out of the dark hollows, like devilish grave-lights -- over bubbles of poisonous gas, and bloated carcasses of dogs, and lumps of offal, floating on the stagnant olive-green hell-broth -- over the slow sullen rows of oily ripple

which were dying away into the darkness far beyond, sending up, as they stirred, hot breaths of miasma. (372)⁸

In *Yeast*, Kingsley, who often attended the sickbeds of his parishioners in Eversley, strips the reader of the illusion that the countryside is always a healthy place ('those picturesque villages are generally the perennial hotbeds of fever and ague') when the novel's hero is revealed as a fledgling sanitary reformer (32):

'Here's Mrs. Grane's poor girl lying sick of the fever -- the Lord help her! And the boy died of it last week.' [...] 'No wonder you have typhus here,' said Lancelot, 'with this filthy open drain running right before the door. Why can't you clean it out?' (187)

Kingsley's writing displays an enduring concern with sanitary reform, which persists in his treatment of a cholera outbreak in *Two Years Ago* (1857) by which time he seemed to have lost the desire to write about political matters and had produced the philosophical/historical novel *Hypatia* and the stirringly nationalistic *Westward Ho!*. Indeed Kingsley was always active in lobbying for sanitary reform, supporting the Anti-Cholera Fund, writing begging letters, contributing articles to *Fraser's Magazine* and *The North British Review*, delivering speeches and sermons on related issues, and visiting Palmerston as part of a delegation which eventually led to the abolition of the Sewers Commission and the accountability of a General Board of Health to Parliament.⁹

⁸ Dickens' *Oliver Twist* sets much of the action, including Sykes' attempted escape, in the squalid backstreets of Jacob's Island, but, although Dickens was concerned with bringing these conditions to public prominence, Kingsley's novel is more centrally concerned with sanitary reform.

⁹ See, Colloms, p. 173.

I have a very heavy evening's work before going to Lord Palmerston[...]What a thought that we may by one great and wise effort save from ten to twenty thousand *lives* in London alone! (*LM*, 1: 322)

Brenda Colloms rightly claims that 'as Kingsley grew older it seemed to him that sanitary reform, especially if coupled with education[...]was of far more practical use in improving the material and cultural lot of the working class than the vote or the kind of political democracy which he saw in the United States' (174). Kingsley's work as a sanitary reformer suggests a belief in purely physical causes and cures for contagion, and yet his asking the question 'Who Causes Pestilence?' through sermons, and his use of a religious rhetoric which often suggests the notion of a judgemental God, in his novels and other prose, suggests that the case is more complex.

In *Alton Locke*, when the hero goes to speak to a group of agricultural labourers discontented with the low price of bread and their living conditions, an old man steps up to give his opinion on the source of their troubles:

It's all along of our sins, and our wickedness -- because we forgot Him -- it is. I mind the old war times, what times they was, when there was smuggled brandy up and down in every public, and work more than hands could do. And then, how we all forgot the Lord, and went after our own lusts and pleasures -- squires and parsons, and farmers and labouring folk, all alike.[...]We was an evil and perverse generation -- an so one o' my sons went for a sodger, and was shot at Waterloo, and the other fell into evil ways, and got sent across seas -- and I be left alone for my sins. But the Lord was very gracious to me and showed me how it was all a judgement on my sins, he did. He has turned his face from us, and that's why we're troubled. And so I don't see no use in this meeting. It won't do no good; nothing won't do us no good, unless we all repent of our wicked ways, our drinking, and our dirt, and our love-children, and our picking and stealing, and gets the Lord to turn our hearts, and to come back

again, and have mercy on us, and take us away speedily out of this wretched world, where there's nothing but misery and sorrow, into His everlasting glory, Amen! (295)

The man's appearance as he turns his 'grey, sightless head from side to side, as if feeling for the faces below him', gives him a mysterious, even prophetic air, suggesting an element of truth in his speech. Indeed, Gerald Majer claims that in much Condition-of-England writing 'plagues are seen as God's punishment for Victorian social injustices'.¹⁰ Kingsley *did* believe that man had turned his face away from God and had brought punishment upon himself through sin, and God's name *is* invoked in connection with disease in Kingsley's novel when Alton's cousin George is killed by typhus and the eponymous hero interjects 'Just, awful God' (416). However, the old man's insistence on a God who judges 'our wicked ways, our drinking, and our dirt' seems too close to Kingsley's indictment of the Church of England fanatic in his Palmerston article, who saw disease as 'God's judgement on the sin of filth', to be accepted at face value. Further, the old man's opinion that, rather than change his life on earth, man should look forward to a speedy removal to Heaven, does not coincide with Kingsley's Christian Socialist view that political agitation could alter society. 'Who Causes Pestilence?' pours scorn on the 'Manichean and unscriptural distinction' made by certain ministers between the spiritual aims of the church and the practical needs of society, and makes clear Kingsley's distaste for the 'gross, heathen, fleshly, materialist notions of God's visitations' which he maintained many Victorians held (4, 39):

¹⁰ Gerald Majer, 'Infectious figures: Contagion and the Victorian Imagination' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Northwestern University, 1994), p. 133.

To be plain then, many, I am afraid, are thanking God for having gone away and left them. While the Cholera was here, they said that God was visiting them; and now that the Cholera is over, they consider that God's visit is over too, and are joyful and light of heart thereat. (36)

There would appear to be a discrepancy in the stances being taken by Kingsley between the view of God as 'just' and awful' and the ideas put forward in the sermons. But to find the solution to these seemingly contradictory stances it is necessary to consider what Kingsley suggests is the real cause of society's problems.

In *Yeast*, Lord Lavington who neglects the tenants is contrasted with the reforming landowner, Lord Minchampstead who 'took all the cottages into his own hands and rebuilt them, set up a first-rate industrial school, gave every man a pig and a garden, and broke up all the commons "to thin the labour-market"' (79). Disease on Lavington's land is presented as a result of landlordly neglect, a case Kingsley was to put many times, leading, as Colloms has pointed out, to his disapprobation by the Tory party (174). Both here and in *Alton Locke*, Kingsley links problems of disease and dirt to wider notions of social malaise.

Alton Locke's two major themes are the economic and physical hardships suffered by tailors and the diseased environment of the poor's homes and workshops. As the young Alton is introduced to his first place of work, Kingsley connects the real and metaphorical sickness of society by suggesting that social injustice and disease go hand in hand. The cramped and airless conditions of a tailors' workshop are described in suitably miasmatic terms by one of Alton's new workmates:

Concentrated essence of man's flesh, is this here as you're breathing.

Cellar workroom we call Rheumatic Ward, because of the damp. Ground floor's Fever Ward -- them as don't get typhus gets dysentery, and them as don't get dysentery gets typhus -- your nose'd tell yer why if you opened the back windy. First floor's Ashmy Ward -- don't you hear 'um now through the cracks in the boards, a puffing away like a nest of young locomotives? And this here most august and upper-crust cockloft is the Conscrumptive Hospital. (24)

The tailors' illnesses are presented as a result of socio-economic factors. Within the city, workers are trapped by laws of political economy; literally trapped within their own disease-ridden homes and workplaces. The oppressiveness of Alton's first day at work in the 'Conscrumptive Hospital' (a disease of which he dies at the end of the novel) prefigures the actual incarceration of workers in a sweater's den later in the text. Alton's employer dies and his son is 'fired with the great spirit of the nineteenth century - at least with that one which is vulgarly considered its especial glory - he [resolves] to make haste to be rich' (109). By contracting out work which is then subcontracted to in-house workers, profits are secured for contractor and sweater. The worker, or rather inhabitants, of a den, desperate for work, are paid so little that they run up debts to their employer/landlord far outstripping their wages and cannot leave the house without paying.¹¹ On visiting one of these dens, Alton finds men who have been shut up for five months without fresh air or light, driven to pawn their 'relaver' [reliever], a coat used in

turn to go out. Workers within the novel are presented as physically weakened by their

¹¹ In 'Cheap Clothes and Nasty', a pamphlet which was published as part of a series of *Tracts on Christian Socialism*, and prefixed to the 1881 edition of *Alton Locke*, Kingsley reveals the inhumane practices perpetrated in sweater's dens: "We worked in the smallest room and slept there as well -- all six of us. There were two turnup beds in it, and we slept three in a bed. There was no chimney, and, indeed, no ventilation whatever"[...]The usual sum that the men working for sweaters pay for their tea, breakfasts, and lodging is 6s. 6d. to 7s. a week, and they seldom earn more money in the week. Occasionally at the week's end they are in debt to the sweater. (*Alton Locke*, preface, p. lxvii)

environment. In the sweater's den, one man clutches Alton's arm 'with his long, skinny, trembling fingers' and Crossthwaite, a tailor from the first workshop who becomes Alton's friend, is described as 'small, pale, and weakly' (221-222):

He might have been five-and-twenty; but his looks, like those of too many a working man, were rather those of a man of forty. Wild grey eyes gleamed out from under huge knitted brows. and a perpendicular wall of brain, too large for his puny body. (28)

Alton's own sickness, too, is presented as a result of his life in the city. Brought up in a 'shop in the city[...]with its little garrets reeking with human breath, its kitchens and areas with noisome sewers' the young boy dreams that he might one day 'flee miles away into the country, and breath the air of heaven once, and die' (3)

This view that both the dirt of an industrial environment and the economic system which puts profit before worker were responsible for the workers' ill health is enforced in a speech which Kingsley gave to the Kirkdale Ragged Schools in Liverpool in 1870 in which he describes the children of poorer areas in terms of industrial by-products:

We know well how, in some manufactures, a certain amount of waste is profitable -- that it pays better to let certain substances run to refuse, than to use every product of the manufacture -- as in a steam-mill every atom of soot is so much wasted fuel; but it pays better not to consume the whole fuel and to let the soot escape. So it is in our present social system; it pays better. Capital is accumulated more rapidly by wasting a certain amount of human life, human health, human intellect, human morals, by producing and throwing away a regular per-centage of human soot - of that thinking and acting dirt which lies about, and, alas! breeds and perpetuates itself in foul alleys and low public-houses, and all and any of the dark places of the earth. (*LM*, 2: 242)

This passage criticises current industrial practices by appearing to mock Benthamite ideas of human utility. The imperative to clean up the dirt which caused the miasmatic poisons which were the vector of disease extends to the view that, not only could dirt result in moral contagion, but that the resultant 'social pestilence' must also be cleared up. Alain Corbin suggests in *The Foul and the Fragrant* that 'not until the nineteenth century did sanitary reformers use tactics that created a distinction between the deodorized bourgeoisie and the foul-smelling masses'.¹² Foucault, to whom Corbin is indebted, also suggests that, far from being an altruistic movement, sanitary reformers had an ulterior motive:

The plague-stricken town, traversed throughout with hierarchy, surveillance, observation, writing; the town immobilized by the functioning of an extensive power that bears in a distinct way over all individualized bodies -- this is the utopia of the perfectly governed city. (*Discipline and Punish*, 198)

Both Foucault and Corbin maintain that the opportunity for control presented by the diseased city goes beyond the physical to the moral. Foucault uses the example of the hospital, prison or ship as a model for social control, while Corbin contends that 'the enormous fetidity of social catastrophes whether riots or epidemics, gave rise to the notion that making the proletariat odorless would promote discipline and work among them', even noting that some reformers 'nursed the plan of evacuating both sewage and vagrants, the stench of rubbish and social infection, all at the same time'. Some

'suggested using beggars to do the sweeping' (Corbin, 143, 93). Foucault and Corbin deal

¹² Alain Corbin, *The Foul and the Fragrant* (London: Picador, 1994), p. 55.

almost exclusively with French examples (although Foucault pays close attention to Bentham) but a perusal of Victorian British journal articles on the threat of contagion reveals the relationship between sanitary reform and social control pressed by some, predominantly utilitarian, thinkers.

In an article entitled 'Spasmodic Cholera', the anonymous author, suggests that 'in the event of the dreaded arrival of cholera upon our shores, the town should be divided into districts, each district should be placed under surveillance of a medical sub-commission, which would have erected for their use a temporary hospital centrally situated, and severe penalties should be inflicted upon all who do not inform the members of this commission the moment symptoms of the disease were detected'.¹³ Another article, in an 1846 issue of the *Westminster Review*, considers the necessity for appointing practitioners as the ominously named 'Medical Police of the United Kingdom' to enforce the inspection and cleansing of commercial premises, asylums and homes.¹⁴ Josephine Guy claims that the Victorians considered moral behaviour purely in terms of the individual and stresses that a social problem would have been seen as one occurring in or affecting society rather than as a problem caused by social factors. She suggests that Britain was far behind France in the development of sociological thinking and uses the example of drunkenness to make her point, contending that 'a mid-Victorian public tended to see drunkenness as a form of personal immorality, the remedy for which lay in a personal commitment to teetotalism'.¹⁵ But tendencies in social, political and scientific

¹³ *Westminster Review*, 15 (1831), pp. 484-490, (p. 486). *The Wellesley Index* suggests that, on evidence of his other writing on sanitary reform, this article is almost certainly by Southwood Smith.

¹⁴ 'Medical Police'. *Westminster Review*, 45 (1846), pp. 56-58.

¹⁵ *The Victorian Social-Problem Novel: the Market, the Individual and Communal Life* (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 9.

thought suggest that an awareness of the effect of environment on man's moral behaviour was fairly widely accepted at least among intellectuals. To use Guy's example of drunkenness, a sanitary reform article entitled 'Supply of Water to the Metropolis' (1850), which claimed that 'districts of filth are districts of crime', suggested that drunkenness and crime were a result of dirty and impoverished surroundings:

The effort to struggle against the surrounding mass of filth and wretchedness, is given up in sheer hopelessness, and the man's best energies are sapped by the irresistible poison, even while he is endeavouring to resist its influence. The class of workmen that in other places drink nothing but water, in London drink anything but water, so bad is it. The labourer comes home tired, and is glad to escape from the dirt and discomfort - the poisonous atmosphere of his home -- to a pothouse[...]. Soon the comforts of life are gone; then its decencies are neglected; the moral feelings, one after the other, are broken down before the most sordid appetites, alike ungovernable and insatiable: he is crushed by drunkenness, profligacy, and poverty, and sinks from one stage of vice and misery to another, till the intellectual faculties become dimmed, all moral and religious feeling expires, the domestic affections are destroyed, all regard for law or property is lost, and hope is quenched in desperate wretchedness.¹⁶

The popular currency of this view is clear from Dickens' *Hard Times* where he attacks the view of alcohol and drug abuse as an individual moral weakness by satirising the tabular statements of the Teetotal society 'who complained that these[...]people *would* get drunk, and showed[...]that they did get drunk'. Dickens points out that 'exactly in the ratio as they worked long and monotonously, the craving grew within them for some physical relief' and suggests that 'some relaxation, encouraging good humour and good spirits' was required to satisfy the emotional and imaginative needs of the worker; needs which he

¹⁶ W. O'Brien 'Supply of Water to the Metropolis,' *Edinburgh Review* vol. 91 (April 1850), pp. 377-408 (386-7).

intended his own writing to supply.¹⁷

Kingsley, although well aware of 'the horror of our English drunkenness', was opposed to the ascetic nature of Teetotalism and, in response to a column in the 'Christian Socialist', wrote an unpublished letter providing his solutions to the problem:

The true remedies against drunkenness[...]are two. First, to agitate and battle for that about which the working classes are so culpably and blindly lukewarm,-- proper Sanitary Reform, which, by improving the atmosphere of their dwellings, will take away the morbid craving of their stomachs for stimulants, and render temperance easy and pleasant. (*LM*, 1: 223)

Secondly Kingsley recommended the establishment of small home-breweries, to produce wholesome and affordable beer and encourage moderate drinking within a family environment. Kingsley clearly believes that an unclean environment not only causes disease but leads to moral degradation. He links the lack of a good water system with drunkenness in *Alton Locke*. In his Jacob's Island home, Jemmy Downes responds to Alton's refusal to give him money if it is only to be spent on gin:

'Curse you and your drinking water! If you had had no water to drink or wash with for two years but that -- that,' pointing to the foul ditch below - 'if you had emptied the slops in there with one hand, and filled your kettle with the other[...]Everybody drinks it; and you shall, too -- you shall!' he cried, with a fearful oath, 'and then see if you don't run off to the gin-shop, to take the taste of it out of your mouth'. (371)

Gin is preferable to polluted water, but Downes's speech also points to the debilitating effect which daily life in a slum has on its inhabitants. Kingsley's distrust of the

¹⁷ Charles Dickens, *Hard Times* (London: Penguin, 1994), pp. 20-21.

teetotalism campaign is shown by his attitude toward the 'water-drinker' in *Alton Locke*, Crosshwaite. His 'ascetic habits' are mooted as one possible source of his ill-health while Sandy Mackaye, a bookseller but also a member of the lower classes (and based on Carlyle), is healthy because he avoids both the dirty water and infected food which others eat and drink. In his house he keeps 'a barrel of true Aberdeen meal[...]and a "keg o' whusky, the gift o' freens"' (28):

'It was a' poison,' he used to say, 'in London. Bread full o' alum and bones, and sick filth -- meat over-driven till it was a' braxy -- water sopped wi' dead men's juice. Naething was safe but gude Scots parrich and Athol brose.' (66-67)

Kingsley's linking of unsanitary conditions and moral decline suggests that both problems could be remedied through government action to improve the environment. Given that it was Carlyle who coined the term environment we might expect that he too would recognise its importance in the fight against disease and the formation of morality.¹⁸

In contrast to Kingsley, however, Carlyle did not involve himself actively in sanitary reform. He did, however, make some comments on the need for sanitary legislation in *Past and Present* (1843):

¹⁸ The Oxford English Dictionary indicates that the first usage of 'environment', meaning 'that which environs' was in Carlyle's 'Richter' in the *Foreign Review*, 34 (1830), pp. 1-52: 'Baireuth, with its kind picturesque environment'. The first usage of the second meaning of 'environment', 'the conditions under which any person or thing lives or is developed; the sum-total of influences which modify and determine the development of life or character', is located by the OED in Carlyle's 'Goethe': 'In such an element with such an environment of circumstances'.

Are not Sanitary Regulations possible for a Legislature? The old Romans had their Aediles, who would, I think, in direct contravention to supply-and-demand, have rigorously seen rammed up into total abolition many a foul cellar in our Southwarks, St Gileses and dark poison-lanes. (*Works*, 10: 264)¹⁹

His concern at the threat of cholera is evident in his letters to his mother on the cholera outbreak of 1831 and, according to Simon Heffer, both he and Jane had lived in fear of the cholera epidemic reaching London (*CL*, 6: 37-38; Heffer, 127). Perhaps it was his stoic Calvinist leanings which led him to ask during an outbreak in Dumfries, 'what is there new in cholera? Death has not been new here for the last six thousand years' but his strongest interest in disease was metaphorical: it furnished him with a means to describe the 'sad social pestilence' that he saw around him (Heffer, 127; *Works*, 29: 123):

England lay in sick discontent, writhing powerless on its fever bed; dark, nigh discontent, in wastefulness, want, improvidence, and eating care, till like Hyperion down the eastern slopes, the Poor-Law Commissioners arose, and said, Let there be workhouses, and bread of affliction and water of affliction there! (*Works*, 29: 129)

This passage seems to suggest that Carlyle sees England's problem as a political one. As Kingsley attributed both physical and moral sickness to industrial and political practices,

¹⁹ W.A. Guy's 'Church Lane, St. Giles' describes that area before it was changed into 'the broad and showy thoroughfare of New Oxford Street':

All that is most revolting to feeling, and most disgusting to sense, seems to have sought shelter here, A roadway strewn with every species of filth, the play-ground of children covered with rags, and the loitering-place of their idle and squalid parents, is skirted by houses in perfect keeping with their occupants' (p. 257)

Carlyle too attacks the manner in which new modes of manufacture were affecting the environment. As in the presentation of the city in *Alton Locke*, Carlyle attacks the industrial practices and free market economy which turn man's world into a Manichean hell:

Is Industry free to tumble out whatever horror of refuse it may have arrived at into the nearest crystal brook? regardless of gods and men and little fishes. Is free Industry free to convert all our rivers into Acherontic sewers; England generally into a roaring sooty smith's forge? Are we all doomed to eat dust, as the Old serpent was, and to breathe solutions of soot? ('Shooting Niagara' [1867], *Works*, 30: 47)

However, this is more concerned with man's effect on the natural world than the world on man. Rather than make a direct link between a dirty environment and moral behaviour, Carlyle's work is almost entirely concerned with a metaphorical notion of moral sickness.

Rather than view social circumstance as affecting the individual, Carlyle often employs the trope of the body politic, each individual constituting a necessary part of the whole, and appears to suggest that it is the behaviour of the individual which affects society: 'The condition of the great body of people in a country is the condition of the country itself' (*Works*, 29: 121). However his Condition-of-England writing is also charged with the image of an invisible malaise invading that body:

Fatal paralysis spreading inwards, from the extremities, in St. Ives workhouses, in Stockport cellars, through all limbs, as if towards the heart itself. Have we actually got enchanted, then, accursed by some god? (*Past and Present*, *Works*, 10: 6)

Any hint of divine vengeance here is dissipated by the use of the small case but there is the suggestion, in 'sprcading inwards', that some external agent is infecting society. At St. Ives he sees men sitting outside the workhouse 'in a kind of torpor':

In the eyes and brows of these men hung the gloomiest expression, not of anger, but of grief and shame and manifold inarticulate distress and weariness; they returned my glance with a glance that seemed to say, 'Do not look at us. We sit enchanted here, we know not why.' (2)

And he reports a case from the Stockport assizes where parents poisoned their three children to defraud a burial society (4).

Although Carlyle in no sense condones their actions, he provides mitigating circumstances. Faced with their own and their children's starvation 'they, with their Irishism and necessity and savagery, had been driven to do it' (4). These people are 'Irish savages', but on the whole he sees them, along with the St. Ives men whose helplessness reveals a total lack of agency, as victims of circumstance. Although 'England is full of wealth' the fruits of labour are not fairly distributed and 'skilful workers some two millions' are left to rot in workhouses (*Works*, 10: 1). However, there is also the suggestion that this problem goes beyond the political sphere. Of the St. Ives incident Carlyle repeatedly uses the word 'enchanted' and stresses the men's own bewilderment as to the cause of their torpor. The unfathomable nature of society's sickness takes on a phenomenological air.

In a general way we can locate his identification of the source of social pestilence in the wholesale movement away from spirituality towards the material:

Now this is specially the misery which has fallen on man in our Era. Belief, Faith has well-nigh vanished from the world. (Characteristics [1831], *Works*, 28: 29)

In 'Chartism' (1839) he ironically employs the use of old-testament rhetoric - 'Let there be workhouses, and bread of affliction and water of affliction there!' - to reveal the manner in which political reform has been made the new religion. He also suggests that political problems and resultant social unrest are not the disease, but merely its symptoms:

Glasgow thuggery, chartist torch-meetings, Birmingham riots, Swing conflagrations are so many symptoms on the surface; you abolish the symptom to no purpose, if the disease is left untouched. Boils on the surface are curable or incurable, - small matter which, while the virulent humour festers deep within; poisoning the sources of life; and certain enough to find for itself ever new boils and sore issues. (120)

By using this metaphor of an afflicted body as a sign of deeper malaise he indicates that its location is in the inner being, the soul. The essay 'Characteristics', which makes the most extensive use of the sickness metaphor, makes the more specific charge that it is modern society's self-consciousness which lies at the heart of the problem:

The healthy know not of their health, but only the sick: this is the Physician's Aphorism; and applicable in a far wider sense than he gives it. We may say, it holds no less in moral, intellectual, political, poetical, than in merely corporeal therapeutics; that wherever, or in what shape soever, powers of the sort which can be named *vital* are at work, herein lies the test of their working right or working wrong. (*Works*, 28: 1)

In the first section of the essay, Carlyle uses the paradigm of the body to show how self-consciousness results in 'Division [and] Dismemberment' (2). He contends that 'the

first condition of complete health is, that each organ perform its function unconsciously, unheeded'. It is only unconsciousness which leads to a sense of wholeness - 'In fact, unity, agreement is always silent, or soft-voiced; it is only discord that loudly proclaims itself. Self-consciousness, then, would seem to be the source of the illness which is a lack of unity within the self - 'when we feel ourselves as we wish to be, we say that we are *whole*' (1-2).

Carlyle's use of this medical paradigm to describe the disunity of the self probably has its source in his own ill-health. His lifelong bugbear was dyspepsia, his personal writing displaying an obsession with this, probably psychosomatic, illness.²⁰ Haley points out that many nineteenth-century writers had lifelong constitutional problems and that many of them suffered from hypochondria which, although it is now considered a disease of the mind, was then looked upon as 'a chronic disease of the whole person':

The onset of the acute or critical phases of hypochondria, dyspepsia, or melancholia ordinarily occurred during periods of sever mental stress, often at times of religious doubt or doubt as to one's adequacy in filling his appointed place in life. (28)

In Carlyle's case bouts of dyspepsia coincided with periods of stress. Heffer details how '[Carlyle's] health began to suffer' as a result of doubt over his future career, loss of religious faith, and the need for fulfilment within a personal relationship (46). The years which provided some of the biographical content for *Sartor Resartus* were described by Carlyle himself as 'huge instalments of bodily and spiritual wretchedness in this my Edinburgh Purgatory', showing, as Fred Kaplan has pointed out, that he 'could not

²⁰ 'I am for some tincture of cardamum or other bitter; for positively my inner man is ill' (*Collected Letters*, 5: 388).

separate depression from stomach pain' (Heffer, 46; Kaplan, 64). Physical dysfunction, especially with the faecal nature of dyspepsia, seemed to raise for him the idea of the dirty body undermining the spiritual ideal. In a letter to his brother John in 1821, Carlyle wrote:

Do but think what a thing it is! that the ethereal spirit of a man should be overpowered and hag-ridden by what? by two or three feet of sorry tripe full of _____. (*CL*, 1:325)

Whether dyspepsia was a result of depression or stress, it resulted in the self-consciousness which was itself a symptom of spiritual malaise and it is from this point of view that he writes in 'Characteristics'. The dualism which is implicit in Carlyle's comments on the digestive system is suggested there as the source of individual and social sickness. Haley has argued that Carlyle's insistence on the interdependence of the physical and spiritual 'repudiates the Cartesian division between soul and matter, between 'thinking substance' and 'extended substances', as in the following passage from 'Characteristics' (Haley, 72):

[...]Let us be content to remark farther, in the merely historical way, how that Aphorism of the bodily Physician holds good in quite other departments. Of the Soul, with her activities, we shall find it no less true than of the Body: nay, cry the Spiritualists, is not that very division of the unity, Man, into a dualism of Soul and Body, itself the symptom of disease; as, perhaps, your frightful theory of Materialism, of his being but a Body, and therefore, at least once more a unity, may be the paroxysm which was critical, and the beginning of cure! (*Works*, 28: 4)

But it is important to note that Carlyle puts opposition to 'dualism of Soul and Body' into

others' mouths - the Spiritualists and Materialists.

Carlyle looks to the past when society was what we name healthy, sound at heart' (*Works*, 28:15). Located, in 'Characteristics', in the Roman Republic, this state of wholeness results from a lack of division between the State and the higher spiritual needs of man:

For if the mystic significance of the State, let this be what it may, dwells vitally in every heart, encircles every life as with a second higher life, how should it stand self-questioning. (14)

In *Past and Present*, Carlyle provides a model for a perfect and unconscious society in the story of Abbot Samson of St. Edmundsbury, where the spiritual and political life of the monastery are undivided. In the chapter entitled 'Government' we hear how Samson had to 'institute a strenuous review and radical reform of his economics' while also taking in hand the behaviour of his monks: 'Drunken dissolute Monks are a class of persons who had better keep out of Abbot Samson's way' (*Works*, 10: 91, 93). The Abbot is Carlyle's archetypal hero, the strong man elected on his own merits, who 'arranges everywhere, struggles unweariedly to arrange and place on some intelligible footing, the "affairs and dues[...]" of his dominion' (92). His concern with the practical running of the monastery, Carlyle suggests, might seem strange for a religious leader. But in a chapter which unites the spiritual and the political, entitled 'Practical-Devotional' Carlyle points out that there was no clash of interests at that time:

It might seem, from Jocelin's Narrative, as if [Abbot Samson] had his eye all but exclusively directed on terrestrial matters, and was much too

secular for a devout man. But this too, if we examine it, was right. For it is *in* the world that a man, devout or other, has his life to lead, his work waiting to be done. (115)

The Abbot's, and his society's, wholeness is partly attributable to the fact that their faith thrives unquestioned -- 'this comparative silence of Abbot Samson as to his religion [is] precisely the healthiest sign of him and it' (116). In contrast, Carlyle says in 'Characteristics' that 'at a later era[...]Religion split itself into Philosophies' (*Works*, 28: 15). Metaphysical speculation is attacked for its role in encouraging spiritual doubt and moral behaviour becomes a self-conscious display of 'Sentimentality' (9). However, the wholeness of Abbot Samson's administration is also attributable to the union between the spiritual and the practical:

Heaven lies over him wheresoever he goes or stands on the Earth; making all the Earth a mystic Temple to him, the Earth's business is all a kind of worship. (*Works*, 10: 116)

Carlyle indicates the importance of Jocelin of Brakelond's narrative for his own society's problems when he claims that old books might 'from the Past, in a circuitous way, illustrate the Present and the Future' (38). Abbot Samson's practical problems of running a monastery mirror those of governing the state, and the presentation of an ideal society and an ideal leader is sandwiched between sections which deal with the problems of a modern society. The two chapters that precede and follow the story of Abbot Samson employ medicinal imagery to show how neither reform measures nor a superstitious appeal to religion can cure social pestilence without social and spiritual regeneration, or

palingenesis as he names it.

In book I, chapter iv, 'Morrison's Pill', Carlyle criticises the use of parliamentary reform alone to deal with the problems, such as the St. Ives Workhouse, which he has drawn attention to:

It seems to be taken for granted, by these interrogative philosophers, that there is some 'thing', or handful of 'things,' which could be done; some Act of Parliament, 'remedial measure' or the like, which could be passed, whereby the social malady were fairly fronted, conquered, put an end to; so that, with your remedial measure in your pocket, you could then go on triumphant, and be troubled no farther. (*Works*, 10: 23)

Carlyle uses the image of the quack panacea, the 'Gamboge Pill' developed by John Morrison, which he advertised as a cure for any disease, to illustrate the folly of believing in an easy cure for England's problems. In 'Chartism' he claims that social unrest was only surface evidence of a deeper disease, and here he shows that the remedial measures demanded by that unrest would only cure the surface symptoms. In Book III, chapter xv, 'Morrison Again' he deals with those who believe that a return to religion will cure society, but comes to the conclusion that 'they fancy that their religion too shall be a kind of Morrison's Pill, which they have only to swallow once, and all will be well. (227). Although Carlyle did recommend a return to spiritual values, this chapter attacks those who prescribe religion as a remedy for social unrest:

Fancy a man, moreover, recommending his fellow men to believe in God, that so Chartism might abate, and the Manchester Operatives be got to spin peaceably! The idea is more distracted than any placard-pole seen hitherto in a public thoroughfare of men! (226)

In making reference to 'some twelve or thirteen New Religions[...]arrived here from various parts of the world' he criticises the manner in which the lack of faith in society was leading to a proliferation of creeds and advocates the need for a return simply to faith (226). This faith is presented as a recognition of issues beyond the purely temporal:

This Planet's poor temporary interests, thy interests and my interests there, when I look fixedly into that eternal Light-Sea and Flame-Sea with *its* eternal interests, dwindle literally into Nothing. (226)

Furthermore, this regeneration must be personal. Rather than merely profess a belief in God and practise the relevant rituals -- 'Rituals, Liturgies, Creeds, Hierarchies; all this is not religion' -- man must recognise his spiritual self and this can only be achieved from within (228). In 'Signs of the Times' he pointed out that social change would not come from political reform because 'the only solid, though a far slower reformation, is what each begins and perfects *on himself*' (*Works*, 27: 82). Here, in 'Morrison Again' he points out how this should be achieved:

My brother, thou must pray for a *soul*; struggle, as with life-and-death energy, to get back thy soul! Know that 'religion' is no Morrison's Pill from without, but a reawakening of thy own Self from within. (*Works*, 10: 232)

Carlyle made no comment on the Presbytery's call for a cholera fast in 1853, but his emphasis on the individual's agency in his regeneration suggests that he would have rejected this interventionist viewpoint. And, indeed, he continues to attack the 'old

liturgies fallen dead; much more, the manufacture of new liturgies that will never be alive; how hopeless! Stylitisms, eremite fanaticisms and fakeerisms' (232).

This emphasis on personal regeneration leaves us with the question of how Carlyle assesses the relationship between morality and society. The view that personal regeneration is necessary to social palingenesis backs up his claim that the health of the individual dictates that of the Body Politic but it also suggests that morality is an internal quality rather than a product of environment. Indeed, in 'Characteristics' he attacks modern conceptions of the sources of action:

Goodness, which was a rule to itself, must now appeal to Precept, and seek strength from Sanctions; the Freewill no longer reigns unquestioned and by divine right, but like a mere earthly sovereign, by expediency, by Rewards and Punishments: or rather, let us say, the Freewill, so far as may be, has abdicated and withdrawn into the dark, and a spectral nightmare of a Necessity usurps its throne; for now that mysterious Self-Impulse of the whole man, heaven-inspired, and in all senses partaking of the Infinite, being captiously questioned in a finite dialect, and answering, as it needs must, by silence, — is conceived of as non-existent, and only the outward Mechanism of it remains acknowledged: of Volition, except as the synonym of Desire, we hear nothing; of 'Motives,' without any Mover, more than enough. (*Works*, 28: 9)

Further, Carlyle bemoans the manner in which moral absolutes have been rejected saying 'there is properly no longer any true and false', and prefers to admire Kant's 'awful sense of Right and Wrong' (*Works*, 29: 151; 30: 29). This would suggest that he rejects the moral relativism which accompanies sociological views of environment. And yet, as we saw with his treatment of the Stockport Assizes where the parents murdered their

children, he does accept that there can be social pressures which dictate moral behaviour. And this is no isolated case. He refers to the arrival of Irish paupers in England as a kind of contagion and describes them as abiding in 'squalor and unreason, falsity and drunken violence', but there is some ambiguity in his attitude towards them (*Works*, 10: 139). He concedes that 'the Irish National character is degraded, disordered' and accepts that they are motivated by social factors: 'And yet these poor Celtiberian Irish brothers what can they help it? they cannot stay at home, and starve' (137, 139)

Hostility towards Irish immigrants was not peculiar to Carlyle. Indeed, a utilitarian, W.A Guy, who, paradoxically, considering Carlyle's opposition to his creed, openly admired Carlyle's ideas, wrote an article for *Fraser's Magazine* in April of 1848 using the trope of moral contagion to describe 'The Plague of Beggars' afflicting the capital. Guy refers specifically to 'our neighbours of the Emerald Isle' and attributes their condition almost wholly to an inherent moral quality rather than their circumstances:

We must confess that, with one or two undeniable good qualities, they appear to us to present this combination of meanness and good-nature in an unparalleled degree. This, and nothing else, makes them the nation of beggars that they are. An oppression ten times worse than that under which they have suffered could not have reduced them to their present state of destitution and degradation, unless an inbred disposition to idleness, a meanness of disposition which is not ashamed to ask, and a weakness of character which is unable to refuse, had been essential parts of their character. (398)²¹

²¹ 'The Plague of Beggars', *Fraser's Magazine*, 37 (April 1848), pp. 395 - 402, (p. 398). Guy's intolerance to beggars shows that utilitarians, although in favour of reform, were not always liberal in their ideas. Like the French reformers of which Corbin spoke, Guy appears to desire the eradication of beggars. Guy's complex views on reform are also evident in his article on 'Thomas Carlyle and John Howard' in which he supports Carlyle's attack on 'morbid sympathy, and philanthropy so called'. He agrees with Carlyle's point in 'Model Prisons' that the 'poor honest working man' is neglected in favour of 'the murderer and thief', but upholds Howard's position as a penal reformer. (*Fraser's Magazine*, 41 [April 1850], pp. 406-410, [p. 406]).

Whereas Guy attributes their condition almost entirely to character, Carlyle admits mitigating circumstances suggesting that man is in conflict with, rather than a product of, environment. This viewpoint suggests that neither the extreme creationist view that man's moral character is a divine absolute nor the materialist view that morality is relative to environment is sufficient to describe human nature.

In 'The Water Supply of London' Kingsley again relates the notions of real and moral contagion when he talks of the reasons for the poor living in the conditions which produce their diseased condition. He speaks of the

habitual ingrained personal dirt, where washing is either impossible or not cared for; the dirt of thousands and tens of thousands in our great cities, who literally never dream of washing, simply because it has been to them from childhood a luxury as impossible as turtle or champagne.²²

However, although in this example he talks of those who have lost their fight against environment and become accustomed to their condition he also speaks to his wife, in a letter of 1849, of those who try to fight against circumstance:

It is most pathetic, as Walsh says, it makes him literally cry - to see the poor soul's struggle for cleanliness, to see how they scrub and polish their little scrap of pavement, and then go through the house and see '*society*,' leaving at the back poisons and filth. (*LM*, 1: 177)

This distinction between a more noble working class who strive against environment and

²² 'The Water Supply of London', in *Miscellanies* 2 vols. (London: J.W. Parker, 1860), II, 204.

those who have gone beyond the pale is also brought to the fore when Kingsley draws attention to the threat of moral contagion to those women and children who have to queue for water at public pumps and 'may come into contact with persons of the very worst character, hear very bad language, and at last become regardless of decency' (*Water Supply of London*, 210). This threat from an underclass is also articulated by Carlyle in 'Model Prisons' (1850) where he suggests that the criminal must be eradicated 'lest I become partaker of his plague' (*Works*, 20: 66). This text raises questions about how moral contagion might be dealt with, but legal recourse is also pertinent to the more practical concerns of real contagion. By looking at ways in which the state could control the environment which led to dirt, we can also consider how that control might regulate moral behaviour.

Gerald Majer rightly states that Carlyle and Kingsley (along with other Condition-of-England writers) were opposed to utilitarian ideologies (102). However, they were also hostile to the ideology which utilitarians opposed, that of *laissez faire*. Kingsley attempts to find a compromise between paternalism and *laissez faire* which allows for the coexistence of a quasi-sociological view of man as victim of circumstance and the view that man has an inherent morality. Although Carlyle also displays this attitude to a certain extent, he does not embrace a sustained ideology but often wavers between one approach and another.

It is easy to see why control might be desirable in reaction against a government policy of neglect. In 'The Water Supply of London' Kingsley indicates that the Victorian mistrust of paternal government is a reaction against its unrestrained practice in the eighteenth century, but continues to insist that advocates of paternalism and *laissez faire*

have 'some truth on their side [if] properly limited and explained' (202). It certainly seems sensible that, in epidemic circumstances, information must be acquired and controlling measures taken to limit its impact. Kingsley admits that "*Laissez-faire*," in its extreme meaning of 'no human government whatsoever is in fact the ideal state of mankind' and he transforms the economic intentions of *laissez faire* (to allow unbridled competition) into a religious view of morality by quoting Augustine's 'ama, et fac quicquid vis' (love and do whatever you want). However, he points out that, in the present climate, the aphorism would be more appropriately 'ama teipsum, et fac quicquid vis' (love yourself and do whatever you want) and states that leaving men to themselves means 'to leave those weaker than them to be their prey' (199, 200).

Justification for intervention into the poor's living and working conditions, to clean up the filth which surrounds them and hopefully improve their moral condition, lies in the perception of the lower classes as unable to know what is good for them: 'if any class be animals, they must have tamers' (Water Supply of London, 201). Corbin's claim that sanitary reform allowed the bourgeoisie to express a distaste for the dirty lower classes draws attention toward the manner in which many reformers took it upon themselves to make the decisions which the poor were apparently unable to. If the reformer wished to sanitise the conditions of the poor, the question remained whether the poor wished to be cleaned up and, if not, whether they should be for their own good. Henry Mayhew's *London Labour and the London Poor* provides an interesting insight into this question. Our sensibilities, and presumably those of Mayhew's middle class readers, are disturbed by accounts of pure finders (those who collected dog faeces to treat leather) and sewer hunters (who scavenged for valuables). The pure finder interviewed

finds her occupation, enforced by poverty, unpleasant, although she has become partially used to it. But Mayhew discovers that the sewer hunters 'have a fixed belief that the odour of the sewers contributes in a variety of ways to their general health' (143-144, 152). In the light of Corbin's information on the French utilitarians who saw sanitary reform as providing work for the poor, it is interesting to note that, in Mayhew's survey, many of the poor are forced to scavenge from the dirt around them to sustain life. Corbin's critique of sanitary reform purely as a tool of social control can therefore be countered by the argument that lack of paternalism had created an underclass forced to live off their own, and others', filth.

Kingsley certainly believes that the poor and their environment should be cleaned up for their own benefit. Quoting from Mill's *Political Economy* (1848), he asserts that where the consumer is not a competent judge of a product (in this case water), and this is proven by his insistence on drinking dirty water, then a governing body must legislate (Water Supply of London, 203-204). The accent on legislation is also central to the question of moral contagion. Kingsley maintained that sanitary reform could help to combat problems such as drunkenness. However Carlyle also extends the notion of moral sickness to those who contravene society's laws when he describes criminals in terms of dirt: 'With them I should be apt to make rather brief work; to them one would apply the besom, try to sweep *them* with some rapidity into the dustbin' (Model Prisons, *Works*, 20: 58). How then do Carlyle and Kingsley's engagement with developments in the nineteenth-century penal system elucidate their views on the formation of moral sickness and its cure?

Foucault maintains that there are two discernible types of punishment; that which concentrates on the body through torture or execution and that which came with the development of liberal reform of the penal system, a 'gentle way in punishment', that concentrated on reforming the soul (*Discipline and Punish*, 104). The first pre-supposes that the criminal is confirmed in his immorality and is therefore to be either disposed of or deterred by punishment from reoffending. The second system suggests that the criminal's behaviour can be modified to produce a better citizen. Given that Kingsley, in his advocacy of environmental reform, seems to partially accept the latter point of view, it is surprising to find, in a letter of 1868 to Henry Taylor, that he attacks the perception of crime as 'a result of all the circumstances of [the criminal's] existence; and that therefore if anything or person is responsible for a crime, it is the whole circumambient universe'. He states that many 'supplement' this belief with 'a half belief in the human responsibility of a criminal' leading to confusion and a reticence in inflicting punishment (*J.M.*, 2: 215). Indeed, Kingsley advocates the bodily punishment which 'the effeminacy of the middle classes' shies away from (2: 214). There would seem to be a paradox here. Kingsley clearly states that he believes in the responsibility of the criminal, and yet this view that there is a moral absolute would seem to be one which pertains to divine rather than secular law. This is explainable if we consider more closely Carlyle's essay on 'Model Prisons'.

Kingsley held the view that there were those who attempted to fight against the influence of their environment, for instance in cleaning the homes which were polluted by lack of proper sanitation and water supply, but that there were also those who seemed to have slipped below this level and had become morally bad. In 'Model Prisons' Carlyle's

critique of the liberal reform of the penal system revolves around his belief that money should not be spent on those who are beyond saving when 'all around this beautiful Establishment [the prison], an Oasis of Purity intended for the Devil's Regiments of the line, lay continents of dingy poor and dirty dwellings, where the unfortunate not yet enlisted into that force were struggling manifoldly' (Works, 20: 58). Reform in prisons had ensured that conditions of cleanliness were improved, suggesting the notion that improved environment might facilitate the process of personal reform. But here Carlyle suggests that the cleansing required within the outside environment and, as I shall discuss, the metaphorical, baptismal cleansing of the self which both Carlyle and Kingsley employ as a symbol of self-regeneration, is insufficient to solve the problem of crime. He states that 'to cure a world's woes with rose-water' and attempt only to 'whitewash your scoundrel', reveals a system which has ceased to penetrate to the heart of the problem, and attempts only to deodorise and sanitise its appearance (49. 69).

Rather than apply the 'gentle way in punishment' Carlyle envisaged a system which would enact God's law on earth. God 'hates sin' and man 'must translate that message from Heaven and the Eternities into a form suitable to this World and its Times' (79). Parliament must 'in its lawmakings, really try to attain some vision again of what heaven's Laws are' (85). Because the 'Devil's Regiments' have contravened the absolute Laws of right and wrong he prescribes capital punishment (56):

As a palpable deserter from the ranks where all men, at their eternal peril, are bound to be: palpable deserter, taken with the red hand, fighting thus against the whole Universe and its Laws, we -- send thee back into the whole Universe, solemnly expel thee from our community; and will, in the name of god, not with joy and exultation, but with sorrow stern as thy own, hang thee on Wednesday next, and so end. (77)

Rather than view crime as relative to environment which suggests that the individual can be rehabilitated, Carlyle's recommendation of a return to public executions reconnects crime with punishment. As Foucault indicates with reference to crimes against the Head of State, execution makes 'everyone aware, through the body of the criminal, of the unrestrained presence of the sovereign' (49). For Carlyle, the function is much the same in reminding man of God's presence but also in fulfilling his Laws. Public execution, he says is 'a divine sermon *acted*. Didactic as no spoken sermon could be. Didactic, devotional too; in awed solemnity a recognition that Eternal Justice rules the world' (*Works*, 20: 83). Of course, this is from one of Carlyle's later works which have been accused of being extreme in their views, but, as George Levine has pointed out, the anti-democratic sentiments which Carlyle evinces in the later works are evident throughout his writing (*Boundaries of Fiction*, 23). Certainly the line he takes here in 'Model Prisons' accounts both for his view that environment *and* an inherent character, 'the miraculous breath of life[...]breathed into my nostrils by Almighty God' (suggesting the soul), contribute toward man's moral behaviour (*Works*, 29: 163). This is why he bemoans the disappearance of the notion of Freewill in 'Characteristics' because modern ideas of 'Necessity' and 'Precept' have denied man's own 'Volition', disallowing the self-regeneration which Carlyle advocates.

Carlyle's desire that man return to God's Laws suggests that he does not see present secular law as having any hope of curing social pestilence. Indeed Majer rightly recognises that, although Carlyle and Kingsley attack 'the specious "laws" of

utilitarianism and political economy', their rhetoric has 'as a concomitant the promise of an alternative description of laws and the social order' (69). He maintains that they merely substitute one controlling order for another. However, we must be careful in assessing both writers' notions of divine law. Kingsley, as we saw, rejected the view of an interventionist God which the Presbytery aired, and both he and Carlyle are not averse to some ideas of secular reform.

Carlyle's desire for a reconnection of the penal system with Divine Law suggests that secular law has strayed from a God-given system of morality. Indeed, he advocates that the bible should be re-substituted for 'Human Statute-Books' (*Works*, 20: 72). This is, notably, not a call for Divine vengeance, but for man to re-align himself with God's laws, a crucial argument in Kingsley's views on disease as punishment. The seeming contradiction between images of a 'just, awful God' in *Alton Locke* and Kingsley's contempt for the Presbytery's judgemental views is explainable by considering how he sees God's laws as being enacted. In 'Who Causes Pestilence?', where he indicts the fleshly views of God as interventionist, Kingsley asserts that 'judgement and punishment are two things':

When a judge gives judgement, he either acquits or condemns the accused person; he gives the case for the plaintiff, or for the defendant: the punishment of the guilty person, if he be guilty, is a separate thing, pronounced and inflicted afterwards. His judgement, I say, is his *opinion* about the person's guilt, and even so God's judgements are the expression of His opinion about our guilt. But there is this difference between man and God in this matter -- a human judge gives his opinion in words, God gives His in *events*; therefore there is no harm for a human judge, when he has told a person why he must punish, to punish him in some way that has nothing to do with his crime - for instance, to send a man to prison because he steals, though it would be far better if criminals could be punished in kind, and if the man who stole could be forced either to

make restitution, or work out the price of what he stole in hard labour.
(13-14)

Secular punishments are arbitrary or conventional, whereas God 'always pays sinners back in kind' (14). However, he is removed from any direct agency in punishment by Kingsley's contention that 'God punishes us, as I have often told you, not by His caprice, but by his Laws. He does not *break His laws* to harm us; the laws themselves harm us, when we break them and get in their way' (14). The cholera and other outbreaks are not Divine punishment but judgement: '*We break His order, and the order goes on, in spite of us and crushes us; and so we get God's judgement, God's opinion of our breaking his Laws*' (14). Kingsley synthesises his belief in sanitary reform and his religion by showing that the dirt which causes disease is a direct result of breaking the natural laws of God:

And when the Sanitary Commissioners proved to all England fifteen years ago, that Cholera always appeared where fever had appeared, and that both fever and cholera always cling exclusively to those places where there was bad food, bad air, crowded bed-rooms, bad drainage and filth -- that such were the laws of God and Nature, and always had been; they took no notice of it, because it was the poor rather than the rich who suffered from those causes. (11)

Kingsley's support of sanitary reform is prompted by a desire to maintain the natural order which God created.

Further, this view that man is responsible for breaking God's laws and bringing the consequences upon himself also accommodates both Kingsley and Carlyle's dual perspective on human morality. God creates the world with an ordered set of rights and

wrongs but gives man freewill within that order either to uphold or break his laws. Once man breaks a natural law, by, for example, polluting his surroundings, then the laws themselves punish him. If we return to *Alton Locke* we can see how Kingsley illustrates this idea both with reference to disease and to moral behaviour. Majer, who simply accepts that the Condition-of-England writers view disease as divine punishment, cites the case of Alton's cousin George's death from typhus as the punishment of a 'just, awful God' (Majer, 133). But he neglects to consider the rest of the passage in which Alton refers to George's 'determination to carry the buy-cheap-and-sell-dear commercialism, in which he had been brought up, into every act of life!' (*Alton Locke*, 416). George has caught typhus from a coat which was sewn by Jemmy Downes and was laid over the disease-ridden bodies of the man's family. George's fate is a result of his own actions; it is his 'nemesis' (indicated in the title of the chapter), just as the Irishman Downes and his family meet their fate because he originally ran a sweat shop. Of course, we might question why Downes's family, and the other innocents who die of disease, must suffer for the sins of others but Kingsley accounts for this in 'Who Causes Pestilence?' by quoting from Exodus xx.5. - 'Visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children' (18).

In *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, Keith Thomas claims that Palmerston's refusal to sanction a fast ignored the opportunity to foster a national unity through prayer which might have deflected attention away from social problems (175). However Kingsley uses the text of Exodus to embrace a different type of unity which rejects a determinist view of man's sin: 'Adam's curse and "original" sin, as people call it, is a good and pleasant excuse for laying our sins and miseries at Adam's door' (*Who Causes Pestilence?*, 20). Instead Kingsley embraces a sense of unity which relies on social

responsibility. Referring to those doctors and clergymen who die while working in fever areas he says:

The fever could not spare them any more than it could spare the children of the filthy parents, though they had not kept pigsties under their windows, nor cesspools at their doors. It could not spare them any more than it can spare the tenants of the negligent or covetous house-owner, because it is his fault and not theirs that his houses are undrained, over-crowded, destitute, as whole streets in many large towns are, of the commonest decencies of life. It may be the landlord's fault, but the tenants suffer. God visits the sins of the fathers upon the children, *and landlords ought to be fathers to their tenants, and must become fathers to them some day*, and that soon, unless they intend that the Lord should visit on them all their sins, and their forefathers' also, even unto the third and fourth generation. (23) [My italics]

George's and Downes's deaths in *Alton Locke* show how it was not only environmental pollution which disrupted God's natural order and thus precipitated disease. God's moral laws have also been broken by the political and social practices which disrupt the bonds between men and create inequality. In an attempt to show that it will only be through a return to God's laws rather than political agitation that change will be effected, Alton's spiritual counsellor, Eleanor, points out to him 'you are free; God has made you free. You are equals - you are brothers' (403).

This view that men are equal under God's law is illustrated in Kingsley's sermons on pestilence when, after claiming that the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children, he demonstrates the unavoidable relationship between men by alluding to the case of an Irish typhus widow, a story probably indebted to Carlyle's *Past and Present*. There Carlyle refers to a widow who, after the death of her husband, applies to the Edinburgh authorities for help:

At this Charitable Establishment and then at that she was refused; referred from one to the other, helped by none; -- till she had exhausted them all; till her strength and heart failed her: she sank down in typhus-fever; died, and infected her Lane with fever, so that 'seventeen other persons' died of fever there in consequence. (*Works*, 10: 149)

This passage appears in the chapter 'Gospel of Mammonism' where Carlyle indicts a society that puts economic imperatives before humane ones, ironically asking 'would it not have been *economy* to help this poor Widow? She took typhus-fever, and killed seventeen of you!' (149). Carlyle's concern that modern society has driven a wedge between people is articulated in the religious rhetoric which re-asserts the relationship between men under God:

The forlorn Irish Widow applies to her fellow-creatures, as if saying, 'Behold I am sinking, bare of help: ye must help me! I am your sister, bone of your bone; one God made us: ye must help me!' They answer, 'No, impossible; thou art no sister of ours.' But she proves her sisterhood; her typhus-fever kills *them*. (149)

Carlyle cites Dr. Alison's *Observations on the Management of the Poor in Scotland* as his source, whereas Kingsley gives none. Further Kingsley's account differs from Carlyle's in that he sets the incident in Liverpool. But this could be accounted for by the fact that Kingsley often drew on texts from memory, and the lesson which he derives from the incident certainly suggests that the 'wise man' of the following passage is Carlyle:

A wise man tells a story of a poor Irish widow who came to Liverpool, and no one would take her in or have mercy on her, till, from starvation

and bad lodging, as the doctor said, she caught typhus fever, and not only died herself, but gave the infection to the whole street, and seventeen persons died of it. 'See,' says the wise man, 'the poor Irish widow was the Liverpool people's sister after all, She was of the same flesh and blood as they. The fever that killed her killed them, but they would not confess that they were her brothers. They shut their doors upon her, and so there was no way left for her to prove her relationship, but by killing seventeen of them with fever.' (*Who Causes Pestilence?*, 24)

The effectiveness of secular law depends on the evident link between crime and punishment. One who contravenes secular laws does not necessarily have to believe in them to know that he will be punished. However, given that God's laws are invisible, adhering to them depends on belief and assent. Although Carlyle and Kingsley both view the story of the Irish widow's disease as proving man's brotherhood, they also consider that each individual has to accept this fact. Reiterating his point in 'Morrison Again' that each man must find a soul, Carlyle answers the Edinburgh people who would ask how they could address the problem of the Irish widow by saying 'Nothing, my friends, - till you have got a soul for yourselves again' (*Works*, 10: 149). Real disease is again shown to be dependent on the metaphorical disease of society when Carlyle claims that the re-gaining of a soul will effect a cure:

For all human things do require to have an Ideal in them; to have some Soul in them, as we said, were it only to keep the Body unputrified. And wonderful it is to see how the Ideal or Soul, place it in what ugliest Body you may, will irradiate said Body with its own nobleness; will gradually, incessantly, mould, modify, new-form or reform said ugliest Body, and make it at last beautiful, and to a certain degree divine! (*Works*, 10: 189-190)

This link between the real and the metaphorical is evident in both writers' work in the

way that they articulate the spiritual cure they envisage through two rhetorical devices which describe the movement from doubt to faith; the images of feverous purgation and baptismal water.

Carlyle and Kingsley extend their belief that sanitary measures can cure disease to use water as a metaphor for the cleansing of the self and society. Carlyle recommends the spiritual qualities of cleanliness:

What Worship, for example, is there not in mere Washing! Perhaps one of the most moral things a man, in common cases, has it in his power to do. Strip thyself, go into the bath, or were it into the limpid pool and running brook, and there wash and be clean; thou wilt step out again a purer and a better man. (*Works*, 10: 233-234)

Haley points out that many Victorians, including 'Lewes and Eliot, the Carlyles, The Dickenses, Macaulay, Darwin, Huxley, Ruskin and Tennyson' tried 'hydropathy', bathing in and drinking water, to cure their various health complaints (16). But beyond this view that cleanliness was next to godliness, Carlyle also uses it in 'Morrison's Pill' to describe how, rather than merely professing religious belief, individuals must entirely change their way of thinking and living:

There will no 'thing' be done that will cure you. There will a radical universal alteration of your regimen and way of life take place; there will a most agonising divorce between you and your chimeras, luxuries and falsities, take place; a most toilsome, all-but 'impossible' return to Nature, and her veracities and her integrities, take place: that so the inner fountain of life may again begin, like eternal Light-fountains, to irradiate and purify your bloated, swollen, foul existence, drawing nigh, as at present, to nameless death! (23-24)

Kingsley too employs the trope of personal cleansing in *The Water-Babies* where he not only recommends to his schoolboy readers that they wash 'like a true Englishman' to ensure their moral state but where Tom, the chimney sweep, is physically and spiritually cleansed by his journey through the river to the ocean.²³ The transition from the early part of the book, dealing with conditions of child-labour, to the spiritual parable of the second, in itself links together the physical problems of society with religious ideas.

The image of spiritual cleansing is also employed by Kingsley in *Yeast*. As I indicated earlier, the diseased homes of the poor tenants are the product of Lavington's neglect and the desire for sanitary reform is transformed into a moral judgement through the prophesied flooding of the Nun's pool:

The story goes, that in the old Popish times, when the nuns held Whitford Priors, the first Mr. Lavington that ever was came from the king with a warrant to turn them all out, poor souls, and take the lands for his own. And they say the head lady of them -- prioress, or abbess, as they called her -- withstood him, and cursed him, in the name of the Lord, for a hypocrite who robbed harmless women under the cloak of punishing them for sins they'd never committed[...]And she told him, 'that the curse of the nuns of Whitford should be on him and his, till they helped the poor in the spirit of the nuns of Whitford, and the Nun-pool ran up to Ashy Down.'
(189)

As Haley points out, referring to Bulwer Lytton's particular interest in hydropathy, the use of water is important because it confirms the belief that 'to cure disease is to let Nature herself dispose of it' (16). Haley may only be referring here to literal disease, but both

Carlyle and Kingsley's use of the water metaphor as a sign of spiritual regeneration

²³ Charles Kingsley, *The Water Babies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 183.

enforces the idea of re-establishing God's laws.

It is significant, then, that the second image which both writers employ to articulate spiritual re-birth is the natural one of sickness leading to health through feverous purgations. The heat identified with fever is likened to the cleansing properties of water in Carlyle's description of Teufelsdröckh's 'Spritual New-birth, or Baphometric Fire-baptism' (works, 1: 135). The Professor's spiritual doubt is articulated in terms of disease and dirt:

We conjecture that he has known sickness; and in spite of his locomotive habits, perhaps sickness of the chronic sort. Hear this, for example: 'How beautiful to die of a broken-heart, on Paper! Quite another thing in Practice, every window of your Feeling, even of your Intellect, as it were, begrimed and mud-bespattered, so that no pure ray can enter; a whole Drugstore in your inwards, the foredone soul drowning in quagmires of Disgust.' (133)

However, this sickness is later seen to be necessary to his health: 'By benignant fever-paroxysms is Life rooting out the deep-seated chronic disease, and triumphs over Death' (153). Implicit in this view of disease as a necessary prelude to health, doubt to faith, is the virtue of Christian suffering. It emphasises the importance of an organic, and therefore divinely natural, cycle of death and rebirth, a typological example of Christ's resurrection:

As in long-drawn systole and long-drawn diastole, must the period of Faith alternate with the period of Denial; must the vernal growth, the summer luxuriance of all Opinions, Spiritual Representations and Creations, be followed by, and again follow, the autumnal decay, the winter dissolution. (*Works*, 1: 91)

However, it is not always clear whether Carlyle sees this dualistic cycle as desirable or as an unavoidable consequence of human existence. After all, he points out, 'in such winter-seasons of Denial, it is for the nobler-minded perhaps a comparative misery to have been born, and to be awake, and work' (*Works*, 1: 91). In 'Characteristics' he also points out that this is not the ideal but the real. His claim that 'were defeat unknown, neither would victory be celebrated' suggests a necessary dualism and precedes a passage in which the desirable is contrasted with the actual:

Nor, in our actual world, where Labour must often prove *ineffectual*, and thus in all sense Light alternate with Darkness, and the nature of an ideal Morality be much modified, is the case, thus far, materially different.
(*Works*, 28: 8)

But, although Carlyle claims that an unconscious unity is the ideal, his desire for this is belied by the vitality inherent in his description of life's duality. Beyond describing it as an unavoidable consequence of life, it is, in fact, the constant interchange of opposites which he says gives life its interest and importance. 'Conscience' would have no meaning without sin just as the celebration of 'victory' only exists with its concomitant 'defeat'. Although the doubt which precedes faith is often unpleasant, it is a state without which faith would not exist. Speaking again of society's self-consciousness, he asks:

Nay, is not even this unhealthy action of the world's Organisation, if the symptom of universal disease, yet also the symptom and sole means of restoration and cure? The effort of Nature, exerting her medicative force to cast-out foreign impediments, and once more become One, become whole? (*Works*, 28: 32)

The move towards wholeness is still the goal, but, having already stated in 'Characteristics' that man can only attain an approximation of the ideal, we are left with the fact that Carlyle views life as an eternal cycle of conflict between disease and health, doubt and faith.

Alton Locke, too, embraces this idea of Christian suffering to show that disease is necessary to health, and it is surely no coincidence that the use of this trope in *Sartor Resartus* ('the tailor re-tailored') is also to be found in perhaps the most Carlylean of Kingsley's works in which he is repeatedly quoted and the tailor, Alton, undergoes a spiritual re-birth. There we see that Alton's sickly nature is integral to his role as poet and his understanding of society's problems. But again Kingsley does not attribute this to an interventionist God. He denies his mother's claim that his disease is 'God's will' but does accept that his existence as 'a sickly, decrepit Cockney[...]was the cross which God has given [him] to bear' (3):

I do not complain that I am a Cockney. That, too is God's gift. He made me one, that I might learn to feel for poor wretches who sit stifled in reeking garrets and workrooms, drinking in disease with every breath, - bound in their prison-house of brick and iron, with their own funeral pall hanging over them, in that canopy of fog and poisonous smoke, from their cradle to their grave. I have drunk of the cup of which they drink. and so I have learnt -- if, indeed, I have learnt -- to be a poet, a poet of the people. (2)

Alton may not be a working class Everyman (his educated narrative sets him apart) but he is created to represent working-class lives to the reader. Alton's life among the

working classes eventually leads him to Jemmy Downes' house in Jacob's Island where he not only witnesses the lowest degradation of society but also contracts the typhus which kills his cousin George, but which, for him, initiates a curative fever represented in a dream-sequence.

During this dream, Kingsley parallels both the movement from disease to health, and doubt to faith, with an evolutionary process in which God is a central figure. It is significant, then, that the description of divine law, in which God sets nature in motion, which permeates Kingsley's approach to disease and sanitary reform, is also central to Robert Chambers *Vestiges of Creation*:

We have seen powerful evidence, that the construction of this globe, and its associates, and inferentially that of all the other globes of space, was the result, not of any immediate or personal exertion on the part of the Deity, but of natural laws which are expressions of his will. What is to hinder our supposing that the organic creation is also a result of natural laws, which are in like manner an expression of his will?²⁴

Alton begins his dream 'at the lowest point of created life' and then evolves through a number of animal selves until he becomes part of a human community. Alton's doubt is represented in a narrative in which his descendentalism is crucial to his progress. As Eleanor points out in the dream, 'He who falls from the golden ladder must climb through ages to its top' (376). His lack of faith and his desire for the material solutions of radical agitation alongside his physical love for Lillian have torn him asunder - 'I was not one thing, but many things - a crowd of innumerable polypi'. In response to the question 'when will he be one again?', Eleanor answers 'he who tears himself in pieces by his lusts, ages only can make him one again. The madrepora shall become a shell, and the

²⁴ Quoted in Chapple, p. 72.

shell a fish, and the fish a bird, and the bird a beast; and then he shall become a man again, and see the glory of the latter days' (376). The growth of consciousness is represented in animals which exhibit increasingly human characteristics. As a madreporite all his 'individuality was gone' (376). He then goes on to become a crab whose only motivation is self-preservation (377). However a link between the animal and human state is also established. In the later sense of Darwin's theory of evolution to describe the survival of the fittest in society, Kingsley uses the animal world to describe the predatory nature of characters within his own story. His cousin, who upholds an unjust system, employs sweaters to sew his clothes and uses Lillian for his own social climbing, is represented as 'a huge shark', rushing after Lillian (a flying fish), 'greedy and open-mouthed' (377). The animalistic state is next represented in Alton as a mylodon 'whose highest consciousness was the enjoyment of muscular strength' (378) But, again the link between animal and man is articulated by showing that the physical tendencies of the mylodon are also evident in the human:

But I did more -- whether from mere animal destructiveness, or from the spark of humanity which was slowly rekindling in me, I began to delight in tearing up trees for its own sake. (379)

However, man is shown to have more than physical urges.

To begin with, in the case which Alton feels how it would be to be a mylodon, he detects the human quality of imagination, contradicting the purely physicalist notions of the mind suggested by John Locke:

Where I had picked up the sensation which my dreams realized for me, I know not: my waking life, alas! had never given me experience of it. Has the mind power of creating sensations for itself? Surely it does so, in those delicious dreams about flying which haunt us poor wingless mortals, which would seem to give my namesake's philosophy the lie. (378)

Once he becomes an ape he develops feelings of a more human nature, through 'germs of a new and higher consciousness -- yearnings of love towards the mother ape' (381).

However, the anxiety attendant on the realisation that man evolved from lower species exhibits itself in a fear of returning to an animal state:

I saw year by year my brow recede, my neck enlarge, my jaw protrude; my teeth become tusks[...]I watched in myself, with stupid self-disgust, the fearful degradation which goes on from youth to age in all the monkey race, especially in those which approach nearest to the human form. (381-382)

Once he has advanced to a primitive human state the way toward continual progress, and the threat to that progress are revealed. In 'child-dreams' he becomes aware of 'a sense, awful and yet cheering, of a wonder and a majesty, a presence and a voice around, in the cliffs and the pine forests, and the great blue rainless Heaven'. This wonder is first to be found in a familial community but, more crucially, under the eyes of an 'All-Father' (383) Within the community he then describes, man has been sent forth to do the will of God.

At the beginning of Alton's dream, Kingsley indicated that even the lowest form was 'created', but here he shows how man must evolve under God's laws to create a fair and equal society and he parallels the story of an ancient community with the problems inherent in his own society. This early community of men are described as journeying

west, 'Titan babies, dumb angels of God, bearing with them in their unconscious pregnancy the law, the freedom, the science, the poetry, the Christianity of Europe and the world' (384). As an 'Arian' race they represent the superiority which Kingsley perceived in his own white, western civilisation (later articulated in *Westward Ho!*), but they also represent the way in which man must learn to understand God's laws. Faced, on their journey, with impassable mountain walls, one man suggests that they pray to God to 'send the earthquakes, and blast the mountains asunder' (384). Echoing Kingsley's attitude toward the Presbytery's call for a fast to remove society's problems, the community pray but no earthquakes come. Instead they must do God's will, which is to distribute land equally between them, to feed themselves and bore through the mountains by their own labour. In this way Kingsley indicates that it is man's responsibility on earth to solve his own problems and create a fair society, under the guidance of one who knows the will of God (a point which resembles Carlyle's belief that a strong man must emerge to guide society):

So we were all equal -- for none took more than he needed; and we were all free, because we loved to obey the king by whom the spirit spoke; and we were all brothers, because we had one work, and one hope, and one All-Father. (385)

The community, however, degenerates in ways which reflect the problems of Victorian society. Individuals become greedy and selfish, wishing to have more land than the weaker members. They refuse to follow God's word, ceasing to bore the mountain and creating an unequal society in which they buy the poor man's ground and pay him wages to till it for them. Faced with the poverty and unrest this causes, the landowners provide

gifts of food, suggesting the remedial measures of the Poor-law and philanthropy, which in turn drains their own resources and encourages idleness among the poor. Alton's recognition that recourse to revolutionary activity, in the face of social injustice, is wrong is represented in his reaction toward the uprising of the poor within his dream. As they attack the rich of their community he cries out to them:

Fools! Will you do as these rich did, and neglect the work of God. If you do to them as they have done to you, you will sin as they sinned, and devour each other at the last, as they devoured you. (388)

The answer to society's problems is presented as a return to God's laws. Each man again works an equal amount of land and, on resuming boring the mountain, the community break through to see 'far below us the good land and large, stretching away boundless towards the western sun' (389).

Man's returning to spiritual ideals is presented in the dream as the way of progress and moral superiority. Both Alton's and society's healing are linked to the evolutionary process. But whereas, as Bowler pointed out, many Victorians looked to the moral progress of reform to combat the threat inherent in the relativism of a purely physical evolutionary theory, Kingsley shows that the immoral actions of those like the 'shark', George, are only to be dealt with through a return to a spiritually grounded morality in which God's laws are seen as the basis of evolution. As we saw in his worry over technological progress in the previous chapter, Kingsley asserts that 'progress[...]'is inward': 'The self-help and self-determination of the independent soul - that is the root of progress' (*Ancien Regime*, 130). This idea of progress through the spiritual rather than

the material, as we saw earlier, was central to Carlyle's views on social palingenesis, when he claims that each man must find a soul. And, although Carlyle was notoriously opposed to evolutionary ideas (in 'Characteristics' he attacks both 'the Improvement of the Age' and the 'Progress of the Species' in the same breath) he does display some anxiety over the implications of man's origins for his superior status (*Works*, 28: 18). Kingsley's descendent narrative, in which man must go back to the lowest rung of creation to evolve as a better, spiritual being, resembles Carlyle's use of the idea of descendentism as a necessary concomitant of transcendentalism in *Sartor Resartus*:

The grand unparalleled peculiarity of Teufelsdröckh is, that with all this Descendentism, he combines a Transcendentism no less superlative; whereby if on the one hand he degrade man below most animals[...]he, on the other, exalts him beyond the visible Heavens, almost to an equality with the gods. (*Works* 1: 51)

But Carlyle does not use such ideas to effect a reconciliation of spiritual belief and evolution. The road to transcendentalism through descendentism, for Carlyle, ironically involves the stripping away of earthly signs, exemplified in clothes. Descendentism, for the shocked Editor of the text, becomes a degradation below that of animals, but it also allows man to shed all material things and so find the route to his spiritual being. We are reminded that the state of nakedness is one of 'Adamitism', returning us to the Creation rather than an evolutionary beginning. And throughout his writing we see a fear that man may, within the present materialistic society, lose his soul. For instance, the Jamaicans of 'The Nigger Question' (1849) are presented as having living bodies but dead souls due to their emancipation into the free-market economy.²⁵ And, as I indicated earlier, Carlyle, in

²⁵ 'Dead corpses, the rotting body of a brother man, whom fate or unjust men have killed,

'Morrison's Pill', advises that each man find the soul he has lost. This may sound very like Kingsley's call for man to follow God's way in Alton's fever-dream, but Carlyle is merely playing with the imagery of evolutionary progress rather than using it to justify a reconciliation of ideologies. Kingsley is more apt to embrace the imagery of progress by bringing together evolution and faith than Carlyle who, as we saw, envisioned a continuing cyclical process.

However, both men agree in their opposition to change through the intervention of God as they both put an emphasis on man's role in his own improvement. And, much as Alton's spiritual counsellor, Eleanor, has to convince him that having faith in God will lead to political change, both Kingsley and Carlyle's writing endeavours to show that the spiritual is present in the physical domain without recourse to the superstitious ideas behind the Presbytery's call for a fast.

In his essay 'Superstition', a lecture originally given along with one on 'Science' to the Royal Institution in 1867, Kingsley claims that superstition is 'a physical affection, as thoroughly material and corporeal as those of eating or sleeping, remembering or dreaming'.²⁶ He points out that, due to a fear of the unknown, the superstitious attribute natural phenomena to a supernatural agent. Thus, he says, they view the invisible world of the spiritual as materialised. However he claims in the essay 'Science' that it is in the struggle with superstition that science gains its strength.²⁷ He unites theology and science

this is not a pleasant spectacle; but what say you to the dead soul of a man; - in a body which still pretends to be vigorously alive, and can drink rum?' (*Works*, 29: 356). 'An Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question' was originally published in *Fraser's Magazine*, 40 (December 1849), pp. 670-79. It was reprinted in 1853 in pamphlet form, with emendations, under the title 'The Nigger Question'. It is the latter version which appears in the *Works*.

²⁶ *Scientific Lectures and Essays*, p. 202.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 247.

against superstition in the essay 'The Natural Theology of the Future' (read at Sion college, 1871). There he talks about 'those laws of Nature which are the voice of God expressed in facts'.²⁸ He counters superstitious claims for God's intervention in the world, by asserting that God is present in both natural and invisible moral laws. Of course, this would suggest that he would have to reject both prayers and miracles as they rely on the image of God as interventionist. However, in a sermon from 1866, entitled 'Prayer and Science', Kingsley attempts, if somewhat unconvincingly, to reconcile the two positions.

Man, he asserts, should not pray for divine help because that would be asking God to 'alter the laws of His universe'.²⁹ But, by force of rhetoric rather than any rational argument, he offers seafaring men as an illustration of the manner in which science and religion might be reconciled under prayer. The only justification for this argument, though, seems to be in the fact that seamen 'have been forced to be scientific [and...] equally forced to be religious' (28). Using the example of the storm he shows how sailors do not use prayer to ask God to alter the natural forces which affect the sea. Instead the seaman uses his instruments to judge the storm and act accordingly. He can also pray, not that the storm is averted, but that his forecast is correct and that 'God may so guide and govern my voyage, and all its little accidents, that I may pass it by' (32). Kingsley seems to have talked himself into a dead-end here. But it bears out his claim in 'Natural

Theology', that God acts through Grace as well as Nature (325). This may appear to

contradict his opposition to an interventionist God, but in both 'Who Causes Pestilence?',

and in his treatment of 'Miracles and Science' in *Alton Locke* Kingsley shows how God's

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 318.

²⁹ *Discipline and Other Sermons* (London: Macmillan, 1899), p. 24. My thanks to the staff of the Armstrong Browning Library for acquiring this text from the Colgate Library on the Baylor University Campus, Waco, Texas.

influence, rather than his actions, may help both to cure pestilence and change society.

And, in this, he is clearly influenced by Carlyle's approach to miracles in *Sartor Resartus*.

In 'Characteristics' Carlyle partly attributes society's sickness of self-consciousness to the metaphysical disquisitions of philosophers such as Hume (*Works*, 28: 26). Hume's 'Of Miracles' in the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* is a paradigm of eighteenth century scepticism where he lays emphasis on the need for 'testimony' to the miraculous, insisting on the very values that Carlyle attacks when he says:

There is no more fruitless endeavour than this same, which the Metaphysician proper toils in; to educe conviction out of Negation. How by merely testing and rejecting what is not, shall we ever attain knowledge of what is?' (*Works*, 28: 27)

Hume's desire for proof exemplifies this negative approach. Not only does he refuse to believe without evidence, but having discussed the importance of eye-witnesses, proceeds to discredit them by asserting that, no matter how credible the witness, their testimony is outweighed by the implausibility of miracles:

And what have we to oppose such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility, or miraculous nature of the events, which they relate? And this, surely, in the eyes of all reasonable people, will alone be regarded as sufficient refutation.³⁰

Of course, believing in the physical manifestation of the spiritual, exemplified in both Christ's presence on earth and his miracles, was an early stumbling block to Carlyle's

³⁰ *The Philosophical Works of David Hume* 4 vols. (Edinburgh: Black, 1854), IV, p. 142.

faith. His pragmatic, and often darkly humorous, manner of dealing with such matters is evident in a statement he made to Allingham concerning Newman's 'Primitive Christianity':

I do not in the least believe that *God* came down upon the earth and was a joiner and made chairs and hog-troughs; or came down at any time more than He comes down now into the soul of every devout man.
(Allingham, 238)

As I pointed out in chapter four, Dr James Halliday recalls Carlyle saying that 'it is as certain as mathematics that no such things have been on earth'. This is not so much an expression of Humean scepticism as a rejection of the compatibility of scientific proof and faith because of the limits implicit in empiricism, and it is these limits which provide his argument against Hume.

Hume's belief in the 'absolute impossibility' of miracles is based on his assumption that man knows the laws of nature through experience. But, in 'Natural Supernaturalism' Carlyle answers this objection by questioning man's ability to know those laws entirely. Whereas Hume contends that we must accept as true only that which we have encountered as uniform experience, Carlyle asks 'what are the Laws of Nature? to me perhaps the rising of one from the dead were no violation of these Laws, but a confirmation; were some far deeper Law' (*Works*, 1: 203-204). Kingsley is clearly influenced by this argument when he presents the last stumbling block to Alton's conversion to the Christian faith as the incompatibility of science and miracles. Miracles, says Alton, seem impossible 'just because they break the laws of Nature'. But his friend the Dean, who, earlier in chapter 15 ('The Man of Science'), was convinced that science

and religion must be considered separately, responds by echoing Carlyle's argument. Like Carlyle, the Dean suggests that man cannot know the extent of God's laws, only its customs, saying that 'Nature's deepest laws, her only true laws, are her invisible ones' (411). He argues against the view that miracles break the laws of nature by proving rationally that they are a re-establishment of order:

'Tell me, then -- to try the Socratic method -- is disease, or health, the order and law of Nature?'

'Health, surely; we all confess that by calling diseases disorders'.

'Then, would one who healed diseases be a restorer, or a breaker of order?'

'A restorer, doubtless'. (412)

Kingsley characterises Christ not as a magician, but a divine physician. The plausibility of the miraculous, as a natural phenomenon, is enforced by his view that medical knowledge is a revelation to man, from God, of his healing art: 'These modern discoveries in medicine seem to show that Christ's miracles may be attributed to natural causes' (414). God's role in healing cholera is therefore envisioned, not in any direct intervention, but in the knowledge he gives man. Therefore Kingsley can claim, in 'Who Causes Pestilence?' that 'he has answered the prayers of those two first Cholera Fasts in the best way in which rational beings could wish a heavenly Father to answer prayer, namely, by showing us how to extirpate the evil against which we prayed' (2).

Kingsley is more anxious to reconcile opposites than Carlyle. Carlyle makes no claims for God's role in fighting disease, being content to point out the existence of the supernatural within the actual. For him in 'Natural Supernaturalism', the miraculous is to be found in the world around us if we would only recognise it. Both men's articulation of

the miraculous in everyday life does, however, give grounds for their argument for curing society through spiritual regeneration. In chapter thirty-seven of *Alton Locke*, 'the True Demagogue', Eleanor's suggestion that Alton should trust to God for earthly reform, may seem platitudinous to the reader. But his argument that the curing of disease is merely a learning of natural laws supports his view that a return to divine laws of equality would inspire social re-birth.

Haley claims that Carlyle sees the notion of health, both real and figurative, as springing from the spiritual, whereas Kingsley views spiritual health as proceeding from the body.³¹ Certainly Carlyle seems much more concerned with the spiritual than the bodily, as his relative lack of engagement with the notion of sanitary reform suggests. However, as we have seen, he does support the notion of cleaning up the environment and accepts that moral behaviour may be partly attributable to social conditions. But his method of dealing with social pestilence is almost entirely on an abstract and intellectual level. The consistently metaphorical treatment of social malaise works toward imbuing the physical with the spiritual by using a style which engenders wonder and establishes a symbolic connection between the two. However, the use of metaphor suggests that they cannot be *directly* equated.

In contrast, Kingsley's treatment of the relationship between bodily and spiritual health is enacted within the practical world of sanitary reform. Certainly he seems much more concerned with man's bodily element. However his claim that physical health is part of a wider system of natural laws, which are initiated by God, contradicts the idea that he sees the unity of a healthy body and mind as having its source purely in the

³¹ See page 206.

material. Nevertheless his prosaic and rational treatment of the link between real and moral contagion suggests a unity which Carlyle's metaphorical approach denies. *Alton Locke*, *Yeast* and the sermons which constitute 'Who Causes Pestilence?' seek to demonstrate that the spiritual world, rather than being an unknown, is one which is evident within the natural world. At the end of *Alton Locke* radical reform is rejected in favour of spiritual change. But the characters to whom spiritual agency is granted do not inspire the reader with full confidence. Crossthwaite and Alton are forced to leave the country for America. Alton dies of consumption and it is suggested that Eleanor does not have long to live. In claiming that spiritual reform must accompany practical reform, Kingsley brings his novel to an impasse because neither seems possible at that moment. The failure of the Chartist uprising along with the rhetorical nature of the spiritual re-birth he advocates means that any possible solution is delayed to a future point and cannot be represented within a realistic, prosaic narrative. Similarly in *Yeast*, any solution to the social problems raised in the novel are not enacted within the narrative. Indeed, Kingsley has to adopt the more figurative approach which Carlyle uses when expressing the hoped for solution. As we have seen, in *Alton Locke*, Alton's spiritual re-birth is articulated through the medium of fantasy, and at the end of *Yeast* the impulse toward change is checked when the philanthropic Argemone dies and Kingsley ties up his narrative with a mysterious, fantastical denouement. Both Lancelot and Tregarva, who recognise that social change is contingent upon spiritual change, disappear with the mysterious figure Barnakill (a shaman-like figure who has wandered the earth and has links with eastern mysticism). The text suggests that they are going to join a religious community as preparation for the task of transforming society, but the abrupt and mysterious manner of

this departure also suggests that their journey into the spiritual life represents death.

Whether or not this is successful it is clear that Kingsley uses fantasy in both *Alton Locke* and *Yeast* in an attempt to reconcile the spiritual with the real. The fantastical elements of both texts fulfil an allegorical function by using action which occurs in the real world to represent a spiritual idea. *Alton Locke*'s fantasy of evolutionary progress is depicted as a character's dream and the departure of Lancelot and Tregarva, no matter how mysterious, is presented as a real incident.

Having compared, over the last three chapters, the ways in which Carlyle influenced Kingsley and the ways in which their treatment of body and soul can be compared and contrasted, I want to move on in the following chapter to look at how Kingsley continues to develop this project to find a unity between the two elements in his later novels. It may be that, whereas Kingsley is anxious about the need for unity of body and soul, Carlyle recognises and accepts the essentially dualistic tenor of life.

Chapter 6:

'In the name of Him who is the Word':

Kingsley and the Solution of Dualism

After the 1840s Carlyle no longer used his work as a rhetorical strategy for discussing the problematic relationship between body and soul, but Kingsley continued his project to reconcile the two. It is a project that might be said to be more congenial to the spirit of harmony and equilibrium that characterised the decades which followed the conflicts of the forties. Indeed, in a Preface to *Alton Locke* in 1854, and 'addressed to the working men of Great Britain', Kingsley was more apt to blame the ignorance of the workers who had not grasped the opportunity of association in the years 1849-50, than those governing.¹ And a later reprint in 1862 contained a Preface 'to the Undergraduates of Cambridge' in which Kingsley accepted that his original criticisms of the upper classes at the University were erroneous (in fact, he altered scenes from Alton's visit to Cambridge to appease those who had complained). Further he goes on to praise the influence which religion and the Whig party have had on the upper classes, expresses regret at an uprising which he admittedly never fully supported, and revels in the improvements which the country has undergone:

Those political passions, the last outburst of which it described, have, thank God, become mere matter of history by reason of the good government and the unexampled prosperity of the last twelve years.
(xcviii)

Perhaps it was because he sensed an improvement in social conditions that

¹ The 1881 edition which I use contains a Prefatory Memoir by Thomas Hughes, a reprint of the pamphlet 'Cheap Clothes and Nasty', the 1854 preface to the working men, and the 1862 Preface to the undergraduates at Cambridge.

Kingsley's writing departs from the expressly political concerns of *Yeast* and *Alton Locke*. Apart from one novel, which I shall consider presently, he turns to writing about religious, philosophical and, in the case of *The Water-Babies*, contemporary scientific, debate. In the decade after the novels of the late 1840s he writes two histories, *Hypatia* (1853) and *Westward Ho!* (1855), the former of which deals with the early history of the church and the latter of which, although a ripping yarn, shockingly displays Kingsley's anti-Catholicism, English jingoism and colonialist mindset. Both novels reflect his ever-present hostility to the contemporary resurgence of Catholicism which were to result in his public battle with Cardinal Newman, *Hypatia* dealing with notions of asceticism (both as evident in the ancient church and the philosophies of the protagonist) that had so incensed him ever since his earlier brush with the Oxford Movement. In 1852 Kingsley also produced the pamphlet 'Phaethon', an attack on Emerson in the guise of a Socratic dialogue on the nature of truth. And in 1863 his, perhaps, most enduring story appeared, *The Water-Babies*.

However, Kingsley did not entirely abandon his social writing. In 1857, the novel *Two Years Ago* was published which, although not as overtly political as *Yeast* and *Alton Locke*, carried on his crusade to extend an awareness of the need for sanitary reform to a wider audience. In his *Alton Locke* Preface of 1854 he had emphasised to the working men that, although improvements were ongoing, society must not lapse in its efforts to maintain both real and moral cleanliness:

As for the social evils described in this book, they have been much lessened in the last few years, especially by the movement for Sanatory [sic] Reform: but I must warn young men that they are not

eradicated[...]. And I must warn them also that social evils, like dust and dirt, have a tendency to re-accumulate perpetually; so that however well this generation may have swept their house (and they have worked hard and honestly at it), the rising generation will have assuredly in twenty years' time to sweep it over again. (xcix)

The currency of social problems meant that both *Yeast* and *Alton Locke* did not actually enact any solutions, but *Two Years Ago* opens with a discussion between Stangrave and Claude Mellot on 'the improvements in the quality of life since 1848'. Although the action then backtracks to a point sixteen years before, the conflict-ridden years of the 1840s are viewed in retrospect. Here and in *Westward Ho!*, Kingsley, as in *Yeast* and *Alton Locke*, uses the device of characters with opposing qualities to comment on the relationship of body and soul. But unlike the earlier novels, the main characters of Tom and Grace (and, indeed, Amyas and Ayacanora in *Westward Ho!*) finish ultimately in a loving, earthly relationship.

In Tom Thurnall is to be found some justification for the charge that Kingsley was an advocate of 'Muscular Christianity'. He is a doctor, a keen natural scientist and an all round action hero who weathers global travel, wars and insurrections, kidnap by cannibals, gold-mining in Australia and, eventually, the storm which leaves him washed up in Abergalva, the main locus for the novel. His character is clear from his description as 'that bull-terrier type so common in England'.² However for much of the novel we are made aware that he lacks true spiritual belief:

Tom was certainly not one of those ungodly whom David had to deal

² Charles Kingsley, *Two Years Ago* (London: Ward, Lock & Co., 1910), p. 22.

with of old, who robbed the widow, and put the fatherless to death. His morality was as high as that of the average; his sense of honour far higher. He was generous and kind-hearted. No one ever heard him tell a lie; and he had a blunt honesty about him, half real, because he liked to be honest, and yet half affected too, because he found it pay in the long run, and because it threw off their guard the people whom he intended to make his tools. But of godliness in its true sense - of belief that any Being above cared for him, and was helping him in the daily business of life - that it was worth while asking that Being's advice, or that any advice would be given if asked for; of any practical notion of a Heavenly Father, or a Divine education - Tom was as ignorant - as thousands of respectable people who go to church every Sunday, and read good books, and believe firmly that the Pope is Antichrist. (40 - 41)

Amyas Leigh, the hero of *Westward Ho!* is similar, but, unlike Tom, Amyas does profess a belief in God and, as with the other English heroes who go to fight the Spaniards in the South Americas, this is exhibited in his staunchly Protestant (and, indeed, Anglo-Saxon) anti-Papism. The conflict with the Spaniards and the race to colonise the South Americas and reap the benefits of that continent's natural resources is portrayed as a religious quest in which the English Protestants are God's chosen people:

And as he stands there with beating heart and kindling eye, the cool breeze whistling through his long fair curls, he is a symbol, though he knows it not, of brave young England longing to wing its way out of its island prison, to discover and to traffic, to colonize and to civilize, until no wind can sweep the earth which does not bear the echoes of an English voice.

'The rightful owners of the said goods being either miserably dead, or incapable by reason of their servitude of ever recovering any share thereof, the treasure, falsely called Spanish, cannot be better bestowed than in building up the state of England against them, our natural enemies; and thereby, in building up the weal of the Reformed Churches throughout the world, and the liberties of all nations, against a tyranny more foul and rapacious than that of Nero or Caligula; which if it be not

the cause of God, I, for one, know not what God's cause is!³

Indeed, *Westward Ho!*'s celebration of England's fighting spirit had a great deal to do with Kingsley's support for war in the Crimea which, as Colloms explains, was also bound up with his antagonism to High Church groups: 'He accused them of hankering after the Russian Orthodox Church, for lack of an alliance with Rome' (183). As we shall see, the Crimean War figures in the plot of *Two Years Ago* as a test of men's mettle.

Like Tom, Amyas is a physical hero, whose actions at school might well be construed as trouble-making and disobedience, but are portrayed by Kingsley, with a great deal of humorous indulgence, as evidence of *his* bulldog spirit. The message is that boys will be boys:

[Amyas] had been for some time past, on account of his extraordinary size and strength, undisputed cock of the school, and the most terrible fighter among all Bideford boys; in which brutal habit he took much delight, and contrived, strange as it may seem, to extract from it good, not only for himself but for others, doing justice among his school-fellows with a heavy hand, and succouring the oppressed and afflicted; so that he was the terror of all the sailor-lads, and the pride and stay of all the town's boys and girls, and hardly considered that he had done his duty in his calling if he went home without beating a big lad for bullying a little one. (9)

Sir Richard Grenville chastises Amyas for breaking his slate over the school-master, Vindex Brimblecome's, head. But we are told that that old hero too had 'very much in like manner, broken the head of Vindex Brimblecombe's father, schoolmaster in his day' (28).

³ *Westward Ho!* (London: Robinson, 1989), pp. 10 & 13. The latter speech is by Sir Richard Grenville, a 'forgotten worth[y]' (p. 2).

The result of these high spirits is that Amyas is permitted to go to sea to extend his own brand of justice to the Spaniards who are 'rank cowards, as all bullies are' (4).

However, although Amyas is portrayed as a believing Christian, like Tom Thurnall, he lacks a spiritual, although not a moral, dimension:

Neither was he what would be nowadays called by many a pious child; for though he said his Creed and Lord's Prayer night and morning, and went to the service at the church every forenoon, and read the day's Psalms with his mother every evening, and had learnt from her and from his father (as he proved well in after life) that it was infinitely noble to do right and infinitely base to do wrong, yet (the age of children's religious books not having yet dawned on the world) he knew nothing more of theology, or of his own soul, than is contained in the Church Catechism. (9)

Like Tom, whose father is a religious man, Amyas has been taught the doctrines and duties of religion, but he has not attained any spiritual understanding. His religion is expressed almost entirely physically and he lacks emotional and intellectual depth.

Kingsley's famous line 'Be good, sweet maid, and let who can be clever' has often earned him the reputation of an anti-intellectual, but the line, and his portrayal of Amyas Leigh, are directed not against the intellect so much as self-consciousness, which Kingsley, like Carlyle, represented as the characteristically modern disease from which Amyas is blessedly exempt: 'For the rest, he never thought about thinking, or felt about feeling' (*Westward Ho*, 9).⁴ In accord with Carlyle's edict that abstract thought and self-consciousness should give way to action and duty, the sweet maid of 'A Farewell' is advised to 'Do lovely things, not dream them' and Amyas has 'no ambition whatsoever

⁴ From 'a Farewell', written in 1856 and included in the collection *Poems* by Charles Kingsley (London: Macmillan, 1891), p.20.

beyond pleasing his father and mother' (*Westward Ho*, 9). But Kingsley contends that a spiritual understanding of God cannot be reached without marital love and familial affection.

Like all the other young men of Bideford, including his brother Frank (an intellectual, courtier and friend of Sir Philip Sidney), Amyas is in love with 'The Rose of Torridge', Rose Salterne, but she elopes with the aristocratic Spaniard Don Guzman. However, as in *Alton Locke*, the hero's first love has only physical beauty: 'And so the Brotherhood of the Rose was scattered far and wide, and Mistress Salterne was left alone with her looking-glass' (175). Larry Uffelman has pointed out that if Frank Leigh is the 'euphuistic courtier' then Rose Salterne provides him with 'his courtly ideal'.⁵ But it is through the love of another woman that Amyas finally becomes a more balanced character than the physical hero we witness throughout the text. During the failed quest to find and take Rose home to England (thwarted by the jesuitical and traitorous Eustace Leigh, leading to the execution of both Rose and Frank by the Inquisition) the sailors come across a young woman, Ayacanora, originally thought to be Indian, but who it transpires, much to Amyas's disgust, is half English and half Spanish.

Ayacanora's love for Amyas is not returned until he has undergone a learning process during which his physical and increasingly brutish character is tempered by a spiritual understanding. During a sea-chase after the battle with the Armada during which he seeks to exact revenge on Don Guzman, Amyas 'appears to be possessed by a devil' and receives the punishment which seems to have been a statutory one for men in need of moral and romantic education in Victorian novels - he is blinded (Uffelman, 101).⁶

⁵ *Charles Kingsley* (Boston: Twayne, 1979), p. 104.

⁶ I refer here, of course, to *Jane Eyre* and *Aurora Leigh*.

Not only does this convince him of his sin in hating the Spaniards, so paving the way for his marriage to Ayancanora, the clear reference to Samson suggests that with the loss of his strength and physical sight, he gains in spiritual and emotional insight:⁷

The crowd made way for him in solemn silence, as for an awful being,
shut up alone with all his strength, valour, and fame, in the dark
prison-house of his mysterious doom. (591)

As Uffelman contends, Amyas' strength is compared favourably with the physical weakness and intellectual nature of his brother Frank (104). Frank does become more physically active during the novel, but it is significant that the intellectual character who gains physical attributes does not survive, whereas Amyas, whose physicality is tempered by blindness and dependence on others, lives. Kingsley represents the wholeness to which he aspires as springing from a healthy body and basic moral goodness rather than the intellectual spirituality exemplified in the courtier. However, his reduction of Amyas' strength and the judgement on overweening aggression in the end suggests that the term 'Muscular Christianity' (one which Kingsley was unhappy with) gives a rather one-sided view of his vision of spiritual and physical unity.⁸

This is also the case with his portrayal of Tom Thurnall. Tom's role as reforming doctor and interest in natural science obviously meet with Kingsley's approval, but his lack of emotional maturity and irreligion is repeatedly reprov'd. Hardened by his worldly exploits, Tom affects a devil-may-care attitude in which he trusts only to himself and the

⁷ Kingsley does not recant, however, on his attack on the Spaniards. It is merely the sin of hate which is punished.

⁸ In 'The Irrationale of Speech', Kingsley refers to 'that *mentem sanam in corpore sano*, which is now-a-days called, somewhat offensively, muscular Christianity', (p. 11).

'Dame Fortune' he constantly alludes to (78). Again Kingsley indicates that love is aligned with an understanding of God as Tom speaks to Frank Headley about earthly ties:

I have but one, and that is love to my poor old father; that's all the religion I have as yet: but I tell you, it alone has kept me from being a ruffian and a blackguard. (194)

Tom fights to control even the emotions he does have. While in Australia he receives a letter informing him that his father has gone blind and he is momentarily overcome by his feelings:

To give the lie to all his cool arguments, he sat down among the ferns, and burst into a violent fit of crying.
 'Oh, my poor dear old daddy!'
 Yes; beneath all the hard crust of years, that fountain of life still lay pure as when it came down from heaven - love for his father. (42)

It is the aim of the novel to show how this soft interior is gradually revealed and, in his moment of spiritual revelation, Tom recalls this occasion in Australia when he 'felt like a lost child' (555). Tom's mistake is to imagine that he can get by without real emotional contact with others or with God (the first of which is essential to the second). The image of the lost child reveals the loneliness beneath the 'wrought metal' exterior, displayed in a cynical approach to life (40). His ability to believe and to make contact with others is portrayed as latent, rather than absent, and, again, it is the love of a woman which brings about a change. However, this appeal to earthly love as a necessary concomitant to spiritual belief is made more complex by the significantly named Grace's role as Tom's

literal and figurative saviour.

Although Grace is integral to Tom's spiritual redemption, it is also suggested, as it was of Argermone and Eleanor in the earlier social novels, that her spirituality is too unearthly and tends towards the superstitious:

She was treated by the simple folk around her as all but inspired; and being possessed of real powers as miraculous in her own eyes as those which were imputed to her were in theirs, (for what are real spiritual experiences but daily miracles?) she was just in that temper of mind in which she required, as ballast, all her real goodness, lest the moral balance should topple headlong after the intellectual, and the downward course of vanity, excitement, deception, blasphemous assumptions be entered on. Happy for her that she was in Protestant and common-sense England, and in a country parish, where mesmerism and spirit-rapping were unknown. (195)

Further, Grace is an ascetic, repudiating the body in favour of the spirit, and viewing human life as sinful and death as a merciful escape. Speaking of her attitude to the children in her care at the school, Kingsley says:

To make them as happy as she could in a world where there was nothing but temptation, and disappointment, and misery: to make them 'fit for heaven,' and then to pray that they might go thither as speedily as possible, this had been her work for now seven years; and that Manichæism which has driven darker and harder natures to destroy young children, that they might go straight to bliss, took in her the form of outpourings of gratitude (when the first natural tears were dried), as often as one of her little lambs was 'delivered out of the miseries of this sinful world.' (50)

Kingsley is careful to show that Grace is not an example of untempered spirituality. As

in the earlier social novels, the central characters have *tendencies* toward either body or soul and the process of modification under each others' influence provides a movement toward unity as they take on facets of their opposite.

Grace's notion of the world as worthless because sinful is confirmed by the mysterious disappearance of Tom's money belt, stolen as he is plucked from the stormy seas:

'Let me go home; you need not come. I am sick of this world. Is it not enough to have misery and death, (and she pointed to the row of corpses) but we must have sin, too wherever we turn! Meanness, and theft: and ingratitude too!' she added , in a lower tone. (94)

Indeed her standing within the community (one villager says 'she's not one of us. There's no saying what's going on there in her' and the young men of the village, although they would like to marry her, don't dare woo her) is further enhanced by the view that she takes the weight of the village's sins upon her own shoulders (71):

There was another soul in danger of perdition; another black spot of sin, making earth hideous to her. The village was disgraced; not in the public eyes, true: but in the eye of heaven, and in the eyes of that stranger for whom she was beginning to feel an interest more intense than she ever had done in any human being before. Her saintliness (for Grace was a saint in the truest sense of that word) had long since made her free of that 'communion of saints' which consist not in Pharisaic isolation from 'the world,' not in the mutual flatteries and congratulations of a self-conceited clique; but which bears the sins and carries the sorrows of all around. (104)

However, a 'saint' who believes that the world is 'hideous' is hardly a candidate for the

loving relationship between man and woman which Kingsley aims to show is the route toward the unity of body and soul. Grace therefore has to cast off the sins of the world and accept a more earthly, and less superstitious, religion.

Tom instructs Grace, and the curate Frank Headley, on the importance, both physical and spiritual, of sanitary reform, Tom pointing out to Frank Headley, the curate, that 'moral evil is your devil, and physical evil is mine' (251). Frank Headley has become alienated from his flock because of his High Church leanings: he prefers the 'pomp and circumstance of worship' (543). Further, although Frank is not portrayed as a bad character (indeed Kingsley comments that he could teach Tom a thing or two) his physical weakness is contrasted with Tom's strength and Tom also berates him for refusing to take a wife and have a family (103):

'And so,' said Tom, 'having to doctor human beings, nineteen-twentieths of whom are married; and being aware that three parts of the miseries of human life come either from wanting to be married, or from married cares and troubles - you think that you will improve your chance of doctoring your flock rightly by avoiding carefully the least practical acquaintance with the chief cause of their disease.' (194)

Tom extends his medical metaphor to convince Frank that, instead of merely judging the villager's sins, he must diagnose before he applies his medicine, and for this he needs to understand them: 'Well go, and prosper; only recollect that the said sick are men and women' (195). This link between the physical and the spiritual is again indicated when Tom lectures Frank on the responsibilities of the clergy in relation to sanitary reform. Here Kingsley addresses this notion using a rational, Socratic argument, which sets out to

prove that dirt contravenes the Ten Commandments:

'You must know, that there is a feeling, - you would call it a prejudice, - against introducing such purely secular subjects into the pulpit.'

'Tom gave a long whistle.

'Pardon me, Mr. Headley; you are a man of sense; and I can speak to you as one human being to another, which I have seldom been able to do with your respected cloth.'

'Say on; I shall not be frightened.'

'Well; don't you put up the ten commandments in your church?'

'Yes.'

'And don't one of them run: "thou shalt not kill"?''

'Well?'

'And is not murder a moral offence - what you call a sin?'

'Sans doute.'

'If you saw your parishioners in the habit of cutting each other's throats, or their own, shouldn't you think that a matter spiritual enough to be a fit subject for a little of the drum ecclesiastic?'

'Well?'

'Well? Ill! there are your parishioners about to commit wholesale murder and suicide, and is that a secular question?' (243-4)

Significantly, by the end of the novel Frank has taken on some of Tom's characteristics (he embraces the cause of sanitary reform, becomes more physically hardened and even goes to fight in the Crimea) and abandons celibacy to marry Valencia St. Just.

Grace is also affected by Tom's views on sanitary reform. As Tom presses Grace to help him in his crusade to clean up Aberalva, Grace balks at the notion: 'Oh, if I could but believe all this! Is it not fighting against God?' (263). Tom voices Kingsley's view's against the notion of a judgmental God, leading them on to discuss the notion of sin and purgatory. Whereas Grace sees the opportunity of saving lives as a chance also to save souls (those cut off suddenly from life through disease may have no opportunity to be shriven) Tom suggests that God would not be so cruel to condemn those who have

never had 'a fair chance' (264). Grace's God is judgmental while Tom's (although he says he does not believe in him) is forgiving. While Tom's worldly travels have brought him into contact with death and love, and shown him that man is both sinful and good, Grace's view is altogether negative. But through her love for Tom, Grace takes on his crusade for sanitary reform and eventually casts off the weight of sin, exemplified in the stolen money belt.

On discovering that it was her mother who stole the belt, Grace sends a note to Tom only to discover that he has gone to fight in the Crimean War. In search of him she goes to the battlefields, nursing dying soldiers, and all the while wearing the belt, the symbolic significance of which comes to light years later when she is reunited with Tom:

'Take it! I have carried it for you - worn it next my heart, till it has all but eaten into my heart. - To Varna, and you were not there! - Scutari, Balaklava, and you were not there! - I found it, only a week later! - I told you I should; and you were gone! - Cruel, not to wait! And Mr. Armsworth has the money - every farthing - and the gold: - he has had it these two years! - I would give you the belt myself, and now I have done it, and the snake is unclasped from my heart at last, at last, at last!' (553)

However, although Grace must cast off the weight of sin before she can embrace life and form an attachment with Tom, the otherworldliness which sees her take on the villagers' sins is central to her role as Tom's saviour; a role which she performs both literally and figuratively. Tom is impressed by Grace's devotion to the villagers and, although as we have seen he disagrees with her more superstitious notions, on discovering her with a dying child he concedes that Grace's spiritual balm can do more than his medicine (256). On his return at the end of the novel, after years in a foreign jail,

Tom indicates that it was Grace who began his spiritual tutelage: 'For you have begun the work; and you must finish it' (554). It is Grace's act of pulling Tom from the sea which represents the beginning of his redemption and draws our attention to the significance of her name. Tom does not believe in a divine power on which men's lives depend (Frank Headley calling him the 'model of self-sufficiency'), instead preferring to refer to 'Dame Fortune' as a way of articulating his belief that he will continue to cheat death (278). When he refers in an offhand manner to his being the only survivor of the wreck, the coast-guard lieutenant points out that 'that girl's pluck saved you':

'Well; but it did save me: and here I am, as I knew I should be when I first struck out from the ship.'

'Knew! - that is a bold word for mortal man at sea.'

'I suppose it is: but we doctors, you see, get into the way of looking at things as men of science; and the ground of science is experience; and, to judge from experience, it takes more to kill me than I have yet met with.

If I had been going to be snuffed out, it would have happened long ago.'

(86)

However, Grace has a different explanation for his survival:

'Ah! and such a precious soul as yours must be; a precious soul - all taken, and you alone left! God must have high things in store for you. He must have a great work for you to do.' (91)

Kingsley's sermon on 'Science and Prayer' (discussed in chapter 5), offers an explanation for Grace's view. The lieutenant's admonition to Tom that men of the sea should understand their powerlessness echoes Kingsley's contention in his sermon that

seamen are the most likely to understand the relationship between prayer and science. There, Kingsley preached that man cannot pray for divine intervention to allay the natural law of the storm but he may pray for help in using science to guide the ship. However, he also states that in the case of 'unknown dangers' we may 'pray to God to deliver us from them, if it seems good to him':

Are there not men here who have had things happen to them, for good and for evil, beyond all calculation? who have had good fortune of which they could only say, The glory be to God, for I had no share therein? or who have been saved, as by miracle, from dangers of which they could only say, It was of the Lord's mercies that we were not swallowed up? who must, if they be honest men, as they are, say with the Psalmist, We cried unto the Lord in our trouble, and he delivered us out of our distress? (Science and Prayer, 29)

In Tom's account of the sinking ship we do not hear that he prayed for himself, but, as the storm rages off Aberalva, Grace sits silently staring out to sea: 'Maybe she's praying; maybe she sees more than we do over the sea there.' (71). Of course Tom is saved, literally, by Grace. But it is also suggested through Kingsley's use of the word 'Grace' at crucial parts of the text that he means us to understand the notion inherent in her name.

Tom's only religious feeling is one entirely linked to Nature: 'I do not know what sort of God yours is, Miss Harvey. I believe in some one who made all that!' and he pointed round him to the glorious woods and glorious sky' (264). In a pointed conversation between Tom and Frank Headley, in which Tom reveals he has no belief in God's Grace, Kingsley indicates that where Tom represents Nature, the schoolmistress represents Grace: "'Ah!'" said Tom, as he entered. "As usual; poor Nature is being

robbed and murdered by rich Grace” (185). When Tom accuses Frank of putting his health at risk by rushing straight out after dinner to visit his parishioners, Frank reveals that it is his worry that his parishioners may judge him rather than the notion of Grace which prompts his actions. Tom indicates that his use of the word was merely a rhetorical gesture: 'Oh, I quite agree with you that Grace has nothing to do with it. I only referred it to that source because I thought you would do so' (186). However, the relationship between Grace's, the character's, role in saving Tom from the storm, her example to Tom of the goodness of religion *and* her representative role as God's Grace, becomes evident in the final chapter.

To fulfil Kingsley's ideal of a physical and spiritual hero, Tom must come to have faith in God's Grace. The workings of Divine Grace which were begun at the shipwreck (the cry of 'Saved!' which resounds on the beach as Grace Harvey pulls Tom clear of the waves prefiguring the final scenes of Tom's redemption) are seen to have their consummation in Tom's speech on returning from incarceration and the threat of death. Tom's belief in God's Grace is prompted by, but also represented in, his love for Grace Harvey, and is also prefigured by his belief in her; he comes to accept that she did not steal the belt. The repeated and significantly placed use of Grace's name enforces Kingsley's point:

I found out that I had been trying for years which was the stronger, God or I; I found out I had been trying whether I could not do well enough without Him: and there I found that I could not, Grace; - could not! I felt like a child who had marched off from home, fancying it can find its way, and is lost at once. I felt like a lost child in Australia once, for one moment: but not as I felt in that prison; for I had not heard you, Grace, then. I did not know that I had a Father in heaven, who had been looking

after me, when I fancied that I was looking after myself; - I don't half believe it now - If I did, I should not have lost my nerve as I have done! - Grace, I dare hardly stir about now, lest some harm should come to me. I fancy at every turn, what if that chimney fell? what if that horse kicked out? - and, Grace, you and only you, can cure me of my new cowardice. I said, in that prison, and all the way home, - If I can but find her! - let me but see her - ask her - let her teach me; and I shall be sure! Let her teach me, and I shall be brave again! Teach me, Grace! and forgive me!' (555)

Uffelman, with some justification, complains that 'Tom's end-of-the-novel conversion does not ameliorate 400 pages of swagger and bravado'. And, indeed, Tom is 'throughout the novel[...]portrayed as a shrewd, cunning, and selfish man who uses his medical skill as a device to gain power over the residents of Aberalva and to advance himself' (Uffelman, 60). However, as I have shown, Kingsley also goes to great lengths to show his latent spirituality. It is Kingsley's point that Tom has faults. He is a sinner who has turned away from God and refuses to recognise him. Grace's carrying of the belt, as she carries the sins of the village, also implies that she bears the burden of Tom's sins - 'Take it! I have carried it for you' (553). Kingsley views God's Grace as a process of forgiveness and conversion, a notion which he addresses in his sermon 'Free Grace'.⁹ Kingsley there compares the God of Mercy, revealed in Christ, with the judgmental God of Moses. Grace's bearing of Tom's and the village's sins suggests that, on one level, Kingsley is using her as a type of Christ.¹⁰ Further the sermon reveals Kingsley's belief, fictionalised in Tom's conversion, that God's Grace works upon men to bring them into the fold.

⁹ 'Free Grace' in *The Water of Life and Other Sermons* (London: Macmillan, 1890), pp. 90 - 97.

¹⁰ Stephen Prickett, in *Words and The Word*, points out that although the Higher Criticism saw biblical study 'liberated[...]from the strait-jacket of typology' Kingsley among others was still inclined towards its use. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 124.

Kingsley's description of God calling the reluctant or doubting believer is paralleled in his story of Tom who resists both the literal and figurative Grace (Tom leaves Aberalva partly because he does not want to succumb to his love for the schoolmistress). However, it is because he has 'heard' Grace that he realises God is watching over him in prison.

The final scene of the novel allows Kingsley to unify notions of body and soul on several levels. Firstly we see that Tom has taken on the spiritual element that he lacked and Grace has shed her burden of sin. It is at this moment that Grace Harvey seems to become a flesh and blood woman, instead of a saint, as she falls into Tom's arms. Secondly, and in contrast to both *Yeast* and *Alton Locke* where heroes and heroines' relationships do not outlast the end of the novels, Kingsley realises his ideal of a physical and spiritual relationship where earthly love is integral to understanding God. The novel ends in a celebration of marriage where Grace and Tom's union seems inevitable, Frank and Valentia are married, and Stangrave and Marie (characters of a subplot) are found to have married in Tom's absence and had a family. Lastly, Kingsley uses the union of Tom and Grace to draw attention to the interdependence of Nature and Grace, the physical and spiritual aspects of God's world.

As was evident in Kingsley's presentation of Lancelot near the beginning of *Yeast*, Kingsley was opposed to pantheistic views which represented God as immanent in Nature, but did not recognise a living God and his moral laws. In 'Free Grace' he speaks of a God 'whom natural religion does not reveal to us, divine and admirable as it is' (94). One of the main targets for this kind of criticism was Ralph Waldo Emerson. In 'Phaethon', written in 1852, two men discuss the ideas of a visiting American Professor

whose 'very "spiritualism" seemed more materialistic than his physics':

His notion seemed to be[...]that it is the spiritual world which is governed by physical laws, and the physical by spiritual ones; that while men and women are merely the puppets of cerebrations and mentations, and attractions and repulsions, it is the trees, and stones, and gases, who have the wills and the energies, and the faiths and the virtues and the personalities.¹¹

The narrator and his friend, Templeton, discuss the fact that God seems to be absent from the Professor's liberal creed:

'Did his 'Unity of the Deity' sound in your English Bible-bred heart at all like that ancient, human, personal 'Hear, O Israel! the Lord thy God is one Lord'?'
'Much more like 'The Something our Nothing is one Something.'" (361)

In *Alton Locke* the chapter 'An Emersonian Sermon' also criticises an American lecturer, Mr. Windrush, originally a Calvinist preacher who has 'cast away the worn-out vestures of an obsolete faith' (229). Here Kingsley certainly seems to recognise that Carlyle did not wish to see society in a state of nakedness or to entirely cast off his religious roots, as the Carlylean character, Sandy Mackaye, makes clear:

'An' ran oot sarkless on the public, eh? I'm afeared there's mony a man else that throws aw' the gude alud plaid o' Scots Puritanism, an' is unco fain to cover his nakedness wi' ony cast popinjay's feathers he can forgather wi'. Aweel, aweel - a pair priestless age it is, the noo. (229)

¹¹ Charles Kingsley, 'Phacathon' in *Literary and General Lectures and Essays* (London: Macmillan, 1890), pp. 353 - 420 (p. 356 - 357)

Mackaye mistrusts the sansculottist notions of the Emersonian's creed where unity among men is to be attained merely by 'want o' breeks' (233). Crossthwaite, an admirer of Windrush, shows how this liberty extends to 'conscience', asserting that the American 'will allow everyone[...]to realise that idea to himself, by the representations which suit him best' (189). Again, it becomes clear that Kingsley sees this as engendering a situation where God disappears to be replaced by the individual's own whims and, in 'Phaethon', this is related to the ancient subject of the novel *Hypatia*: (published in 1853, the year after the Socratic dialogue):

As the Professor talked on, I could not help thinking of the neo-Platonists of Alexandria, and their exactly similar course - downward from a spiritualism of notions and emotions, which in every term confessed its own materialism, to the fearful discovery that consciousness does not reveal God, not even matter, but only its own existence; and then onward, in desperate search after something external wherein to trust, towards theurgic fetish worship, and the secret virtues of gems and flowers and stars; and, last of all, to the lowest depth of bowing statues and winking pictures. ('Phaethon', 358)

Hypatia's subtitle 'New Foes With An Old Face', indicates the contemporary nature of the issues it raises. The quotation from 'Phaethon' reveals that one of Kingsley's targets is the neo-Platonism with which he had charged the Emersonian movement.

Stephen Prickett points out in *Origins of Narrative* :

The physical ruins of the landscape are matched by the intellectual decay of classical paganism represented by the beautiful but deluded Hypatia. The classicism that inspired the Schlegels' Romanticism and

Schleiermacher's myth of the soul is reduced either to sterile formality or to an introverted complexity understood only by its initiates - if at all. Hypatia lectures to crowded halls of students in Alexandria on the mysteries of Neo-platonism, spinning from Homer ever more elaborate mystical and allegorical interpretations.¹²

Prickett's comments on Kingsley's critique of Hypatia's neo-Platonism clearly reveals the link with his views on Emersonian ideas in *Alton Locke* and 'Phaethon'. In *Alton Locke* Sandy Mackaye points out the pitfalls of a creed 'in which the Christian idea naturally embodied itself in imaginative minds' (189). Just as Hypatia's Gnosticism means it is 'understood only by its initiates', Mackaye points out that 'every pair fellow as has no great brains in his head will be left to his superstition, an' his ignorance, to fulfil the lusts o' his flesh; while the few that are geniuses, or fancy themselves sae, are to ha' the monopoly o' this private still o' philosophy' (*Alton Locke*, 234).¹³ Indeed, Prickett refers to Hypatia's 'Emersonian paganism' and draws attention to her pantheistic elimination of the 'gap interposed between God and nature' which 'in effect divinised nature by eliminating original sin' (231).

Prickett's comments on the conflation of God and nature here would suggest that Hypatia's pantheism creates a unity of body and soul. However, as he points out, this is not the case as her 'revived religion more resembles the Anglicanism of the Tractarians than Emersonian transcendentalism[...]. As far as Kingsley was concerned, what was fundamentally wrong with both was their contempt for the flesh' (232). Hypatia shows 'a contempt for the burden of the flesh', only embracing pure, philosophic thought (1: 84). Her Gnostic creed, where a higher knowledge is attainable only by the few, presupposes a

¹² *Origins of Narrative* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 227.

¹³ *Hypatia*, two volumes in one (New York & London: Garland, 1975), 1: 179, 2: 235.

dualistic viewpoint where soul is good and body, bad. The notion that a pantheistic view of nature is one which does not unite body and soul, and, further, is aesthetic rather than moral, is at the heart of Kingsley's sustained critique of those who worship nature, such as the Shelleyan poet Elsley Vavasour, in *Two Years Ago*. As with Hypatia's 'elaborate mystical and allegorical interpretations', Vavasour is more concerned with contemplating the scene of the sinking of the Hesperus as an instance of the sublime than with the eternal fate of the passengers' souls:

All is over. What shall we do now? Go home, and pray that God may have mercy on all drowning souls? Or think what a picturesque and tragical scene it was, and what a beautiful poem it will make, when we have thrown it into an artistic form, and bedizened it with conceits and analogies stolen from all heaven and earth by our own self-willed fancy? Elsley Vavasour[...]took the latter course. (69)

Kingsley also indicates Hypatia's ascetic nature by drawing attention to her opposition to Christ's nature, at once divine and human. Like the Manichean gnostics who denied that Christ could be human, she attacks the idea of a physically manifested God:

As soon believe the Christian scriptures, when they tell us of a deity who has hands and feet, eyes and ears, who condescends to command the patterns of furniture and culinary utensils, and is made perfect by being born - disgusting thought! - as the son of a village maiden, and defiling himself with the wants and sorrows of the lowest slaves! (I: 80)

This sounds uncannily like Carlyle's childhood question to his mother, 'did God Almighty

come down and make wheelbarrows in a shop?'. Indeed much of Hypatia's speech resembles the more extreme elements of Teufelsdröckh's transcendental flights of fancy with their use of the clothes symbol:

Facts, objects, are but phantoms matter-woven - ghosts of this earthly night, at which the soul, sleeping here in the mire and clay of matter, shudders and names its own vague tremors sense and perception. Yet, even as our nightly dreams stir in us the suspicion of mysterious and immaterial presences, unfettered by the bonds of time and space, so do these waking dreams which we call sight and sound. They are divine messengers, whom Zeus, pitying his children, even when he pent them in this prison-house of flesh, appointed to arouse in them dim recollections of that real world of souls whence they came. Awakened once to them; seeing through the veil of sense and fact, the spiritual truth of which they are but the accidental garment, concealing the very thing which they make palpable, the philosopher may neglect the fact for the doctrine, the shell for the kernel, the body for the soul, of which it is but the symbol and vehicle. (178)

But this does not necessarily constitute a criticism of Carlyle, who is not to be identified directly with Teufelsdröckh's transcendentalism. Two characters in *Hypatia* undergo journeys toward either a regaining or retailoring of faith. Indeed, it becomes clear that, like Carlyle, Kingsley is opposed to an entirely transcendental faith.

The action is set against the influence of two dualistic and ascetic systems; Hypatia's neo-Platonism and the early Catholic church. Larry Uffelmann points out that the action of the novel then revolves around 'bringing two of its leading characters, Philammon and Raphael, into contact with the contending forces of their day' (89). Philammon is a young monk, living in the seclusion of the desert Laura at Scetis, banned, by the bishop, from entering some temple ruins close to the Laura where just discernible

friezes reveal what seem to Philammon exotic and beautiful pictures:

Every one of these ladies who sat there, with her bushy locks, and garlands, and jewelled collars, and lotus-flowers, and gauzy dress, displaying all her slender limbs - who, perhaps, when she was alive, smiled so sweetly, and went so gaily, and had children, and friends, and never once thought of what was going to happen to her - what must happen to her....She was in hell. (1: 5)

As Prickett has pointed out, a main theme of *Hypatia* is that of 'sexual love as a prelude to spiritual' (227). However, as Prickett suggests in his contention that the sexual attraction of Hypatia for her followers is 'no more than a dangerous delusion', Kingsley is at pains to contrast the wrong kind of sexual desire, which is born out of asceticism, with the sexual and spiritual love which can be found in Christian marriage (227). As in *The Saint's Tragedy* when Conrad's instruction of Elizabeth becomes a kind of perverted voyeurism, both the Alexandrian monks' and Hypatia's asceticism barely conceals their pent-up sexuality. Philammon's confusion between his feeling that the women on the ancient temple walls were beautiful, and Abbot Pambo's stricture that they are 'the first-fruits of the devil', finds vent in his latent physical attraction to Hypatia which he denies when he insists that his feelings are merely those of a pupil (1: 9).

Kingsley indicates his belief that extreme spiritualism merely leads to a kind of materialism, as Hypatia attempts a trance in the chapter 'Seeking after a Sign'. Here Kingsley uses the trope of unclothing to signify the notion of eschewing the fleshly for the spiritual, as Hypatia disrobes and lies naked on the floor (seeming almost to enact the kind of self-mortification which Kingsley had practised prior to his wedding). However,

her efforts are fruitless:

Hypatia could bear no more; and sprang to her feet with a shriek, to experience in its full bitterness the fearful revulsion of the mystic, when the human reason and will which he has spurned reassert their God-given rights; and, after the intoxication of the imagination, comes its prostration and collapse. (2: 244)

The scene smoulders with the sexuality inherent in Hypatia's overheated spiritualism (the very thing which attracts her followers) and the following chapter sees her reduced even further from her philosophic heights. Duped by the Jew, Miriam, into attending a ceremony at which she is promised Apollo will appear, Hypatia's desperation to behold a sign of divinity leads her to indulge in the superstition and idolatry which Kingsley pointed out in 'Phaethon' resulted from neo-Platonic creeds. Miriam has plied Philammon with drink intending to reveal the truth beneath the asceticism of both the Church and philosophy: 'You are all in the same lie, Christians and philosophers, Cyril and Hypatia' (2: 264). The scene as Hypatia awaits the appearance of Apollo substitutes mystical effect for true spiritual revelation, and physical ecstasy for worship:

The next moment a sweet heavy scent, as of narcotic gums, filled the room - mutterings of incantations - and then a blaze of light, in which the curtain vanished, and disclosed to his astonished eyes, enveloped in a glory of luminous smoke, the hag standing by a tripod, and, kneeling by her, Hypatia herself, robed in pure white, glittering with diamonds and gold, her lips parted, her head thrown back, her arms stretched out in an agony of expectation. (2: 269)

In contrast to this perversion is the love which precedes Raphael Aben Ezra's conversion

and Philammon's solution of the conflict between love and sin which he finds in familial affection.

Raphael, of Jewish race but with no discernible faith, is a sometime follower and admirer of Hypatia who abjures her charms 'partly because he cannot entirely shed his Jewish background, but also because he recognises how much of his interest in her ideas is activated by the sexual attractions of their proponent' (Prickett, 228). The Christianity which he eventually finds is based on a unification of sexual and spiritual love, prefigured by Miriam's statement that 'the only man who keeps his manhood, the only man who is not ashamed to be what God has made him, is your Jew' (2: 264). Kingsley again makes his point about the moral vacuity of neo-Platonism when Hypatia recognises that Raphael possesses the 'moral earnestness' lacking in her followers (1: 174). However, before Raphael, and the novel, can reach an affirmation of faith, he undergoes a crisis which resembles that of Teufelsdröckh in *Sartor*.

Like Carlyle, Kingsley indicates that the philosophic abstractions which Hypatia deals in can lead to a state of scepticism. Symbolically, as Raphael prepares to leave Alexandria dressed in the clothes of a beggar, he is met by Hypatia. Before this he has displayed a 'deliberate and consistent luxury [which] he had always boasted[...]he was able to put on and take off at will like a garment' (1: 175). In reaction to Hypatia's shock at his beggarly appearance, Raphael ironically refers to her own ideas on the casting off of the material:

You have been preaching to us all a long time the glory of abstraction from the allurements of sense. It augurs ill, surely for your estimate either of your pupils, or of your own eloquence, if you are so struck with

consternation because one of them has actually at last obeyed you. (1: 169)

It is significant that Raphael then reveals his intention to wander the world as 'the New Diogenes', becoming himself like Teufelsdröckh, as he is described at one point in *Sartor*, a 'Wandering Jew' (*Hypatia*, 1: 170; *Works*, 1: 40). In the chapter 'The New Diogenes' Raphael asserts that the Jews' ruin has been 'our fancy for loading ourselves with the thick clay' (1: 134). He removes his rich clothes, changing them with one of the monks besieging his house. However, just as Carlyle predicts in *Sartor*, when he suggests that without clothes man 'would sink to endless depths, or mount to inane limbos, and in either case be no more', the trope of unclothing in *Hypatia* does not reveal the divine. Hypatia's nakedness as she tries to induce a trance in the hope of finding 'something to make me sure that anything exists beside this gross miserable matter, and my miserable soul', results in her seeing 'Nothing! nothing! Nothing!', and Raphael's unclothing accompanies a state of scepticism which resembles the 'Everlasting Nay' (2: 248).

At the 'very bottom of the bottomless', Raphael, like Teufelsdröckh, suffers from a lack of belief in either God or the Devil:

No man, angel, or demon, can this day cast it in my teeth that I am weak enough to believe or disbelieve any phenomenon or theory in or concerning heaven or earth; or even that any such heaven, earth, phenomenon or theories exist - or otherwise. (1: 260)

But, although Raphael symbolically divests himself of his 'earthly clay' he is not in a state of nakedness. Indeed, he takes on the vestments of a monk which, although the novel is

clearly critical of Cyril's church and his mob-like followers, paves the way for the idea of a Christian re-clothing (1: 140). In Raphael's case, like Teufelsdröckh's, 'the salutary phasis of scepticism or unbelief must be undergone and conquered' (Jessop, 176). The state of scepticism is one in which all knowledge, either of the material or the spiritual, is suspect. The process which Raphael undergoes to regain faith in chapter 13, 'The Bottom of the Abyss', is similar to Teufelsdröckh's in the 'Everlasting Nay' and 'The Centre of Indifference', as he comes to recognise and affirm the existence, firstly of the 'I', and secondly the 'Not I'. Indeed, Prickett notes that self-consciousness is central to Kingsley's view of conversion as 'Raphael, at the bottom of the abyss of scepticism, has already contemplated what it means to be himself' (236). Once this has been established (although Raphael still expresses some doubt) he sits 'working out the last formula of the great world-problem: 'Given Self; to find God' (1: 264). Like Teufelsdröckh, one step toward this solution is to recognise the connection between the inner self and the material world, both the body of the self and of others.

Just as Teufelsdröckh contemplated notions of mortality through images of war, Raphael watches soldiers on the plain and asks:

What possible proof is there that if a two-legged phantasm pokes a hard grey-iron phantasm in among my sensations, those sensations will be my last? (1: 265)

Raphael's question about the existence of the material world is somewhat comically answered by a scene with his dog Bran who gives birth to a litter of puppies. As he tries to deny both her and their existence, and their dependence on *his* existence, her

persistence and unthinking care for the brood prompts Raphael to accept the notion of the 'Not I':

*****!' said Raphael, with a mighty oath; 'you are right after all! Here are nine things come into the world; phantasms or not, there it is; I can't deny it. They are something, and you are something, old dog; or at least like enough to something to do instead of it; and you are not I, and as good as I, and they too, for aught I know, and have as good a right to live as I; and by the seven planets and all the rest of it, I'll carry them!' (1: 269-270)

As in Carlyle, abstract thought is replaced by duty and action. Further, it would seem that Kingsley is at least aware of the philosophical rationale behind Carlyle's recognition of the importance of the individual's consciousness of the self and others as Raphael says to Bran - 'You shall be my guide, tutor, queen of philosophy, for the sake of this mere common sense of yours' (1: 270). But Kingsley's approach is prosaic and literal whereas Carlyle's is achieved rather through abstract rhetoric. Further, Raphael's recognition of the 'Not I' is achieved through an established relationship of affection (albeit with his dog) and relies on the image of the dog intuitively caring for her pups. Indeed, it would not be stretching the analogy too far to say that the image of familial affection and procreation, and its effect on Raphael, is an affirmation of Kingsley's view that such relationships constitute a way toward uniting the body and soul:

I needed even my own dog to awaken in me the brute consciousness of my own existence, or of anything without myself. I took her, the dog, for my teacher, and obeyed her, for she was wiser than I. And she led me back - the poor dumb beast - like a God-sent and God-obeying angel, to human nature, to mercy, self-sacrifice, to belief, to worship - to pure and

wedded love. (2: 286)

It is in this that Kingsley diverges from Carlyle. Raphael's ultimate conversion, prepared for in this chapter, is fulfilled through the love he finds with the Christian Victoria. Whereas Carlyle refers to love as subject to 'fantasy', Kingsley produces the reality (*Works*, 1: 115). And that reality, as Prickett points out, is given validity through 'an act of biblical re-interpretation' (234).

Raphael's first reactions to Victoria mirrors his response to Hypatia. He tells Synesius, the Bishop of Cyrene, that he is afraid to convert to Christianity in case it is merely because of his love for Victoria (2: 137). But whereas Raphael rejects both Hypatia and her ideas by leaving Alexandria, like Diogenes, 'to find a man', he overcomes his reticence toward Victoria through re-interpreting the Hebraic Song of Songs, 'a key work on erotic and heavenly love', to validate both his faith and his love for Victoria (*Hypatia*, 2: 355; Prickett, 234). Unlike Hypatia, 'whose refined taste could never endure the sight, much less the contact, of anything squalid and degraded', Victoria's conduct reveals the truly 'sublime, the heavenly, the Godlike' (1: 168):

What if I had seen a human being, a woman, too, a young weak girl, showing forth the glory and the beauty of God? showing me that the beautiful was to mingle unshrinking, for duty's sake, with all that is most foul and loathsome; that the sublime was to stoop to the most menial offices, the most outwardly-degrading self-denials; that to be heavenly, was to know that the commonest relations, the most vulgar duties, of the earth, were God's commands. (2: 301)

Prickett says of Kingsley's attitude to sexual attraction in *Hypatia*, that 'the idea of a close

relationship between carnal and spiritual love is less a private perversion[...]than a key quality in conversion or even behind "perversion". Further, he contends:

Though we first encounter the theme negatively, in the various levels of self-delusion among Hypatia's admirers, as the story unfolds it becomes clear that the very suspectness of this route from the human to the divine is part of its importance. In other words, a recognition of the route's deeply problematic ambiguity is for Kingsley[...]an essential quality of the route itself. (233)

Prickett is correct in acknowledging that the difficulty of the route is important.

However, I would contend that a slightly different approach to the idea of perversion may elucidate that difficulty.

Kingsley was highly critical of mariolatory and the asceticism which accompanied it. Like Raphael in *Hypatia*, *Yeast*'s hero Lancelot tells the priest 'I want not a mother to pet, but a man to rule me' (203). Oliver S. Buckton has drawn attention to the fact that 'Kingsley attacked Newman's conversion to Catholicism as a perversion' (361). Although, as Prickett, has pointed out, Newman's *Callista* (a novel which deals with the same issues and times as *Hypatia*) takes Kingsley 'on his own ground: sexual love', it is clear throughout Kingsley's writing that marital love, both sexual and spiritual, is presented as the healthy solution to the perversions engendered by either asceticism or carnal lust (Prickett, 245). The notion that extreme asceticism may lead to physical perversion was broached in Conrad's voyeuristic enjoyment of Elizabeth's martyrdom in *The Saint's Tragedy*. Similarly the monks' attack on Hypatia as they tear her limb from limb, suggests that their denial of the physical has erupted in an almost Dionysiac orgy of

sexually-charged violence.

Prickett contends that 'only when [Hypatia's] Emersonian uplift is set against what Kingsley sees as the reality of a biblical understanding of the world do we begin to realise how the counterfeit can only be known by the presence of the true' (237). So, too, the true love which accompanies the true faith, is only revealed in comparison with the counterfeit. Unlike *Sartor*, *Hypatia* drives towards a faith in which body and soul are fully united. Raphael's conversion is presented as a gaining of true faith and a rejection of scepticism which is sustained. Raphael becomes a good Christian, an earnest preacher of the word, whereas *Teufelsdröckh* never abandons his ironic tone

The importance of earthly relationships to a spiritual understanding also underpins Philammon's retailoring of his faith. Although his resolution of his spiritual doubts does not rely on sexual love, Philammon, along with his sister Pelagia, must come to realise the true notion of Christian familial love. Pelagia, the Athenian dancer brought to Alexandria by Miriam, is the living embodiment of the women on the ancient Temple wall whom the Abbot assured Philammon were destined for hell. Whereas Hypatia represents cold asceticism, Pelagia is sensual and erotic, the contrast made clear in her description in the chapter 'Venus and Pallas':

Gifted by nature with boundless frolic and good humour, wit and cunning, her Greek taste for the physically beautiful and graceful developed by long training, until she had become, without rival, the most perfect pantomime, dancer, and musician who catered for the luxurious tastes of the Alexandrian theatres, she had lived since her childhood only for enjoyment and vanity, and wished for nothing more. (2: 6)

Pelagia is involved in a sexual relationship with the leader of the Goths. Kingsley's reference to Spenser's *Faerie Queene* in the title of the chapter 'The Bower of Acrasia' enforces the view that the pleasure-loving life of this couple is both delusionary and sinful. However, it is suggested that Pelagia's ability to show devotion to the Amal, for whom she gives up her public dancing, foreshadows the possibility of her redemption:

But her new affection, or rather worship, for the huge manhood of her Gothic lover had awoke in her a new object - to keep him - to live for him - to follow him to the ends of the earth, even if he tired of her, ill-used her, despised her. And slowly, day by day, Wulf's sneers had awakened in her a dread that perhaps the Amal might despise her... Why, she could not guess: but what sort of women were those Alrunas, of whom Wulf sung, of whom even the Amal and his men spoke with reverence, as something nobler, not only than her, but even than themselves? (2: 6)

Philammon's discovery that he has a sister awakens in him the notion of earthly love which has been denied in the strict asceticism of the Laura. And, again, a contrast is established between this and his false love for Hypatia:

A sister! of his own flesh and blood - born of the same father, the same mother - his, his; for ever! How hollow and fleeting seemed all 'spiritual sonships,' 'spiritual daughterhoods,' inventions of the changing fancy, the wayward will of man! Arsenius - Pambo - ay, Hypatia herself - what were they to him now? Here was a real relationship... A sister! What else was worth caring for upon earth. (2: 18)

However, although Philammon's horror at the machinations of the Patriarch, Cyril, and the mob-rule of the monks has led to his temporary apostasy, he is appalled at the sinful

nature of Pelagia's life. As he exhorts her to 'think of the doom of sin', she counters that 'God is not so cruel as you say':

Philammon stood stupefied and shuddering. All his own early doubts flashed across him like a thunderbolt, when in the temple-cave he had seen those painted ladies at their revels, and shuddered, and asked himself, were they burning for ever and ever? (2: 336)

Pelagia does not abandon the Amal, choosing love over the threat of damnation and, when the Goth is killed in a struggle with Philammon, she escapes accusing her brother of murder.

However the final chapter of the novel finds both Philammon and Pelagia have gained a new faith through their ordeals. Through his love for his sister and her love for the Amal, Philammon comes to understand the notion of man's sin and embraces the idea of a merciful God. His abbotship of the Laura provides an alternative to the corruption of the Patriarch Cyril, and a model for Kingsley's vision of how the church should attract men back to the church in his own time:

That there is a seed of good in all men, a Divine Word and Spirit striving with all men, gospel and good news which would turn the hearts of all men, if abbots and priests could but reach it aright, was his favourite doctrine. (2: 370)

In the final pages of the novel, a story emerges of a holy woman said to live on the mountain above the Laura. Again Kingsley uses the notion of unclothing to signify the search for the spiritual:

And they inquiring who this Amma might be, the Moors answered that some twenty years ago there had arrived in those mountains a woman more beautiful than had ever before been seen in that region, dressed in rich garments; who after a short sojourn among their tribe, having distributed among them the jewels which she wore, had embraced the eremitic life, and sojourned upon the highest peak of a neighbouring mountain; till her garments failing her, she became invisible to mankind, saving to a few women of the tribe. (373)

Here, as well as denoting Pelagia's casting off of her sinful life, the removal of clothes seems to result in her entire dissolution, suggesting a rejection of the physical for the spiritual. However, after a vision in which Philammon sees both Hypatia and Pelagia calling to him from the afterlife (implying of course that Hypatia too has at last attained spiritual truth) he sets out into the desert. The final image of brother and sister is one of forgiveness and unity in which familial ties are affirmed, bodies and souls united, and, significantly, Pelagia is visible and re clothed:

For in the open grave lay the body of Philammon the abbot; and by his side, wrapt in his cloak, the corpse of a woman of exceeding beauty, such as the Moors described. Whom embracing straightly, as a brother and sister, and joining his lips to hers, he had rendered up his soul to God; not without bestowing on her, as it seemed, the most holy sacrament; for by the grave-side stood the paten and the chalice emptied of their divine contents. (2: 374)

Although Pelagia's relationship with the Amal is portrayed as sensual and sinful, Kingsley does not entirely condemn them. As Prickett points out:

They may be pagan barbarians, but they are the torch of the future, which will bring a new vigour and vision to the effete world of the Mediterranean. Above all[...]they have a reverence for women and a belief in monogamy that will eventually find its true expression in North European Protestantism. (238)

Prickett goes on to quote the passage from the preface to *Hypatia* in which Kingsley asserts that 'those wild tribes were bringing with them into the magic circle of the Western church's influence the very materials which she required for the Western Empire, as in the Eastern' (*Hypatia*, xiv; Prickett, 239). Although Philammon is a Catholic he functions as a critic of that church; 'he began with a second-hand faith; he returns with a personal one' (Prickett, 238):

'On the Catholic Church alone,' he used to say, 'lies the blame of all heresy and unbelief: for if she were but for one day that which she ought to be, the world would be converted before nightfall.' (2: 370)

As in Alton Locke's fever-dream when evolutionary and moral progress are aligned in the vision of an 'Arian tribe' moving ever westward and towards God, the novel embraces an ideal of progress that reconciles faith with evolution, an idea that is also present in *The Water-Babies*.

That *The Water-Babies* is an allegory in which biological evolution is identified with moral or spiritual evolution is not at question, as Prickett points out in *Victorian Fantasy*. 'Kingsley's book brashly proclaimed its allegorical status in almost every line and

incident'.¹⁴ For many Victorians evolution legitimated the idea of moral progress through social reform. The crisis of faith which afflicted the nineteenth century could therefore be offset by recognising a secular moral force at work. But the project to maintain religious belief in the face of scientific evidence was never fully abandoned, and, as we have seen throughout this thesis, Kingsley believed that moral progress was not attainable without religious belief.

In his introduction to *The Water-Babies* Brian Alderson claims that any expectations which the reader has, based on Kingsley's previous critique of social problems in *Alton Locke* and his anger at child-labour, are disappointed:

His attack only arrives obliquely through some grim threats by Mrs Bedonebyasyoudid and some whining by Mr Grimes, stuck fast in his chimney. Tom himself is never shown to be a victim of exploitation[...]Instead, the vigorous description of his life and prospects in the opening pages of the book suggest a dogged acceptance of the system, the author's chief worry not being about the child-sweeps but about child-sweeps who do not know the crucified Christ when they see him.¹⁵

Tom is not portrayed as a victim, instead becoming the object of the moral lesson which the book promulgates. However, Alderson fails to understand the wider perspective of Kingsley's novel. Tom functions as a kind of Everyman, whose spiritual journey represents the progression which all society can make if it follows the correct values. Kingsley shows how only a complete change of outlook, rather than particular social

¹⁴ Stephen Prickett, 'Adults in allegory Land: Kingsley and MacDonald' in *Victorian Fantasy* (Hassocks : Harvester Press, 1979), pp. 150 - 197 (p. 151).

¹⁵ Introduction to *The Water-Babies*, World's Classics Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. xxiv.

reforms, can transform society. At the beginning of the novel we see that Tom is already becoming part of the cycle of social injustice which Grimes represents. On his way to clean the chimneys at Hartover Place Tom fantasises about his future as a man, and reveals that he has already been initiated into Grimes's world:

And he would have three apprentices, one, two, three, if he could. How he would bully them, and knock them about, just as his master did to him, and make them carry home the soot sacks, while he rode before them on his donkey, with a pipe in his mouth and a flower in his button-hole, like a king at the head of his army. Yes, there were good times coming; and, when his master let him have a pull at the leavings of his beer, Tom was the jolliest boy in the whole town. (6)

This is the passage to which Alderson refers when he suggests that Kingsley displays a 'dogged acceptance of the system'. But it works to indicate that, without the change that Tom undergoes, he would perpetuate the system. If Kingsley were merely to attack Grimes then it would be somewhat like the 'Morrison's Pill' remedy which Carlyle satirised in *Past and Present*. Instead Tom's progress represents the way in which all Grimeses might be changed. At the end of the novel Tom has learnt through his journey that he is part of a community which must care for one another. Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid represents more than an impulse toward tit-for-tat punishment. As I discussed in chapter 5 Kingsley contended that those who broke God's laws of nature, whether through polluting the earth or furthering social injustice, would be punished by those laws. The solution to Grimes's predicament is in his own hands - 'He has come to the place where everybody must help themselves' (175).

Kingsley's project is to illustrate the unity of the spiritual and the physical

through contending that the physical world is bound by spiritual laws. It is essential to his argument that he not only use evolution as a tool to describe moral progress, but also that he accept it as a scientific fact. His response to the publication of *Origin of Species* was to write to Darwin putting forward his view that evolution and religion were not irreconcilable. Darwin printed Kingsley's comments in the third edition of his work.¹⁶

In contrast to Kingsley, Carlyle's comments on Darwinism were merely dismissive: "The Darwinian Theory tried to meddle with things that are out of man's reach; and besides - I don't care a straw about all that! People ought to be modester" (Allingham, 196). A column in the *New York Times* of January 1877, entitled 'Mr. Carlyle on the Gospel of Dirt' reveals more of his objections:

The Ardrossen and Saltcoats (England) [sic] *Herald* published the following extract of a letter written to a friend by Mr. Carlyle: 'A good sort of man is this Darwin, and well-meaning, but with very little intellect. Ah, it's a sad, terrible thing to see nigh a whole generation of men and women, professing to be cultivated, looking around in a purblind fashion, and finding no God in this universe. I suppose it is a reaction from the reign of cant and hollow pretence, professing to believe what, in fact, they do not believe. And this is where we got to. All things from frog spawn: the gospel of dirt the order of the day. The older I grow - and I now stand upon the brink of eternity - the more comes back to me the sentence in the catechism which I learned when a child, and the fuller and deeper its meaning becomes. 'What is the chief end of man? To glorify God, and enjoy Him forever.' No gospel of dirt teaching that men

¹⁶ 'A celebrated author and divine has written to me that "he has gradually learnt to see that it is just as noble a conception of the Deity to believe that He created a few original forms capable of self-development into other needful forms, as to believe that he required a fresh act of creation to supply the voids caused by the action of His laws"' (*Darwin's Plots*, p. 138). Colin Manlove points out that Kingsley 'unhesitatingly entered into debate with Charles Darwin and T.H. Huxley[...]and tried to show them how the acceptance of their ideas could be shown to heighten rather than diminish our sense of God's presence in Nature. He did not persuade them; nor did they dissuade him' (*Christian Fantasy from 1200 to the present* [London: Macmillan, 1992], p. 185)

have descended from frogs through monkeys can ever set that aside.¹⁷

A comment of Carlyle's in Allingham's *Diary* reveals his concern that evolution was an entirely materialistic theory which denied the divine source of morality: 'It is an utterly contemptible theory, that out of dead blind dust could spring the sense of right and wrong!'.¹⁸ Whereas Diogenes Teufelsdröckh represented Carlyle's view of man as both body and soul, bad and good, the use of the imagery of dirt links evolution purely with the Teufelsdröckhian (devil's-dirt) facet of man. But *The Water-Babies*' spiritual journey is articulated in images of water and cleansing which suggest, through the alliance of the real and the metaphorical, that evolution can be seen as a spiritual as well as a physical progression.

Before his journey through the water, Tom looks in a mirror and beholds, in contrast to the beautiful 'white' Ellie (her lack of dirt denoting her lack of sin), his own image:

He suddenly saw, standing close to him, a little ugly, black, ragged figure, with bleared eyes and grinning white teeth. He turned on it angrily. What did such a little black ape want in that sweet young lady's room? (17)

Rosemary Jackson has noted the race and class prejudice inherent in Kingsley's depiction of Tom.¹⁹ However, what I am interested in here is Tom's uncleanness and likening to an ape. The evolutionary reference to apes is as clear as it was in the fever-dream in

¹⁷ *New York Times* January 30 1877, p. 5.

¹⁸ Allingham, p. 245.

¹⁹ *Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion* (London: Methuen, 1981), p. 151.

Alton Locke. The notion that cleanliness is next to Godliness works on two interconnected levels in the novel, displaying Kingsley's linking of spiritual and social issues. He returns to the subject of sanitary reform and, by contrasting the dirty, diseased environment of many children to the world of the water-babies suggests that a clean environment is a spiritual imperative and re-establishment of God's natural laws. At St. Brandan's Isle are to be found 'all the little children in alleys and courts, and tumbledown cottages, who die by fever, and cholera, and measles, and scarlatina, and nasty complaints which no one has any business to have' (105). Until Tom looks in the mirror he has no notion of his uncleanness: 'behold, it was himself' (17). Of course, Kingsley refers to Tom's moral as well as literal dirt and, as Prickett points out, 'by the standards of many children's writers of the forties and fifties, Tom's early depravity, however much it may have been a reflection of his poor environment, could only lead to one end: Hell' (*Victorian Fantasy*, 164). However Tom's figurative baptism, as he falls into the water, corrects this - 'Tom was amphibious; and what is better still, he was clean' (47). Again though, as Prickett notes, the meaning of Tom's fall into the water is two-fold: '[His] immersion in the water in Vendale is 'death' by drowning; it is also a baptism, and, as has been indicated, a re-birth' (170). The children who have come to St. Brandan's Isle are clearly dead from disease. But, it is suggested, far from damned to Hell for their dirt and ignorance, their baptism in the water has saved them. Further, their being re-united with God's natural order, becoming water-babies, has taught them to avoid dirt:

Only where men are wasteful and dirty, and let sewers run into the sea, instead of putting stuff upon the fields like thrifty reasonable souls; or throw herring's head, and dead dog-fish, or any other refuse, into the

water; or in any way make a mess upon the clean shore, there the water-babies will not come. (101)

On one level Kingsley contends that a return to spiritual values will convince man of the need to keep clean, and on another he asserts that it will absolve him of the sin of dirt. Cleanliness is seen to be a natural law which exists in the spiritual world and must be adhered to in the physical.

Kingsley also links Tom's existence on a lower part of the evolutionary scale with his moral ignorance. The first step toward moral regeneration comes with Tom's recognition of himself as dirty and ape-like. Tom's dawning spiritual awareness is then denoted by the sound of the churchbells which 'rang so loud, he began to think that they must be inside his own head', this indicating that moral regeneration must come from within rather than be enforced - 'Those that wish to be clean, clean they will be' (25, 32).

Once in the water Tom is cleansed. However this is only the beginning of an education which sees an insistent reiteration of the link between moral and evolutionary progress:

Some people say that boys cannot help it; that it is nature, and only proof that we are all originally descended from beasts of prey. But whether it is nature of not, little boys can help it, and must help it. For if they have low, mischievous tricks in their nature, as monkeys have, that is no reason why they should give way to those tricks like monkeys, who know no better. (51)

Kingsley is at pains here to contradict the view that evolution supersedes the moral order, as the Social Darwinians suppose. Although man is evolved from primates his place on

the evolutionary scale denotes his moral progress. Kingsley satirically attacks the notion put forward by the President of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Professor Richard Owen, who defended mankind from any link with the apes by asserting that physically their brains were different. In contrast, Kingsley suggests that the difference is one which pertains to the soul:

You may think that there are other more important differences between you and an ape, such as being able to speak, and make machines, and know right from wrong, and say your prayers, and other little matters of that kind. (83)

Although Kingsley identifies a difference between man and monkey he sees it as one of development. By representing Tom as a monkey Kingsley re-enacts the progress of the species as Tom learns to care for the other animals just as Alton Locke dreamt of his moral progress when, as a monkey, he began to learn the human trait of love.

Although Tom has been baptised by his fall into the river, he is still 'a savage[...]like the beasts which perish' and for this reason he cannot see the other water babies until he has learnt certain moral lessons (33). The point Kingsley makes is that, even though his cleansing has transformed him, Tom is unaware of the spiritual truths of his cleansed state until he has learnt the morality that underpins faith. On freeing a lobster from a pot in which he is trapped, Tom looks round and realises that what he thought were 'shells, or sea-creatures' are in fact water-babies:

Now, was not that very odd? So odd, indeed, that you will, no doubt, want to know what happened, and why Tom could never find a water-baby till

after he had got the lobster out of the pot. And, if you will read this story nine times over, and then think for yourself, you will find out why. It is not good for little boys to be told everything, and never to be forced to use their own wits (100)

The ability to act morally then, would seem to be what sets man apart from the beasts, but morality is itself represented as an evolutionary development. Tom encounters an otter who is killed because it is 'wicked' and salmon are described as 'true gentlemen [who] always choose their lady, and love her, and are true to her' (97, 67). It could be claimed here that the animals' moral traits are merely allegorical example (the salmon's monogamy reflecting Kingsley's ideal of marriage) rather than representing a chain of being. But it is from the community of the river that Tom consistently learns his lessons and it is suggested that those laws are natural ones. A clear comparison is invited between Tom's transformation as he enters the water and leaves behind 'his whole husk and shell', and that of a dragon-fly a few pages later (44):

Tom stood still, and watched him, and he swelled himself, and puffed, and stretched himself out stiff, and at last - crack, puff, bang - he opened all down his back, and then up to the top of his head. And out of his inside came the most slender, elegant, soft creature, as soft and smooth as Tom. (53)

The description of the dragon-fly is used as a physical model for the moral transformation of the soul. That physical and moral transformation are in fact linked is further demonstrated when Tom steals sweets from Mrs Doasyouwouldbedoneby:

And Tom looked at himself: and he was all over prickles, just like a sea-egg. Which was quite natural; for you must know and believe that people's souls make their bodies, just as a snail makes its shell. (119)

Alderson has drawn attention to 'the inadequacy of [Kingsley's] Darwinian reconciliation', claiming that it is both 'unprovable and unnecessary' (xxiii). In the discussion of miracles in *Alton Locke*, Kingsley argues for the probability of the unknowable laws of nature through those already known. This is again the case in *The Water-Babies*. Kingsley imbues the natural world with a spiritual dimension by drawing attention to the wonder inherent in it. Quoting the zoologist Quatrefarges he says:

Who would not exclaim that a miracle had come to pass, if he saw a reptile come out of the egg and dropped by the hen in his poultry-yard, and the reptile give birth at once to an indefinite number of fishes and birds? Yet the history of the jelly-fish is quite as wonderful as that would be. (43)

Kingsley writes here in reaction to both purely materialist science (Professor Pithmlnsprts denies the existence of water-babies) and children's educational literature which presents a merely factual view of the world and denies both its inherent wonder and the possibility of the unknown (86):

If Cousin Cramchild says, that if there are water-babies, they must grow into water men, ask him how he knows that they do not? and then, how he knows that they must, any more than the Proteus of the Adelsberg caverns grows into a perfect newt? If he says that it is too strange a transformation for a land-baby to turn into a water-baby, ask him if he ever heard of the transformation of syllis, of the Distomas, or the common jelly-fish. (42-3)

If we did not know that animals, such as the dragon-fly, can burst their outer shell and transform into an entirely different animal, we would not believe it. But once that is accepted we should accept the possibility of this occurring throughout nature. The justification for Tom's transformation from boy to water-baby, essentially a moral transformation, is analogous to the physical changes within nature but also suggests the manner in which the spiritual world and the physical are part of the same continuum:²⁰

For if the changes of the lower animals are so wonderful, and so difficult to discover, why should not there be changes in the higher animals far more wonderful, and far more difficult to discover? [...] Does not each of us, in coming into this world, go through a transformation just as wonderful as that of a sea-egg, or a butterfly? and does not reason and analogy, as well as Scripture, tell us that transformation is not the last? and that, though what we shall be, we know not, yet we are here but as the crawling caterpillar, and shall be hereafter as the perfect fly? (43 - 44)

This passage joins together the Word of the Bible with the language of science, 'reason and analogy'. This yoking together of kinds of authority is also reflected in the unity of the spiritual and the physical world which the miracle of birth, life and death makes apparent. The lines between these states are blurred by claiming that all is one process of

²⁰ P.M. Heimann points out that scientists such as Tyndall 'had expounded a materialistic conception of nature'. The doctrine of 'the uniformity of nature' which Tyndall embraced contended that all nature could be investigated through science. In opposition to this view Balfour Stewart and P.G. Tait produced a book in 1875 entitled *The Unseen Universe: or Physical Speculations on a Future State* 'to confute "the materialistic statements now-a-days so freely made" by demonstrating that "immortality is strictly in accordance with the principle of Continuity (rightly viewed)", the principle of the uniformity of nature'. Heimann contends that 'these developments in the philosophy of nature can be traced in the writings of physicists in the mid-Victorian period. ("The Unseen Universe: Physics and the Philosophy of Nature in Victorian Britain", *The British Journal for the History of Science*, 6 (1972), pp. 73-79 (pp. 73, 75)

nature. Prickett has pointed to Kingsley's indebtedness to Wordsworth's 'Immortality Ode', a part of which is quoted in chapter 3 of *The Water-Babies* to draw attention to 'the feelings which some children have about having lived before' (*Water-Babies*, 48; *Victorian Fantasy*, 159). Just as Wordsworth's ode argues for the close relationship between childhood and the spiritual state from which the child emerges at birth, the above quotation on transformation also suggests the return to that world which Tom's fall into the water seem to imply. However, what of the view that the fall does not represent death but an allegory for spiritual cleansing from which Tom emerges.

Stephen Prickett claims that the allegorical complexity of the novel disallows any direct correspondence between the narrative and its symbolic meaning so that any attempt to 'produce a minute commentary on the various allegorical potentials of the story' would 'run up against the fact that the fundamental inconsistencies of the book are not accidents or mistakes, but part of its basic aesthetic structure' (170). He is correct in castigating Colin Manlove for seeing these inconsistencies as 'flaws in the artistic workmanship' (*Victorian Fantasy*, 171). However, although Prickett claims that *The Water-Babies* has a 'unity of extravagant inconsistencies', he is not always true to this perception (171). For instance, Prickett asks 'either Tom is to grow up and marry Ellie, or he is to enter heaven: does it really make sense to talk about him doing both?' (170). But the entire novel blurs the lines between the physical world of the story and the spiritual world it represents by indicating that the processes within nature are an instance of the natural laws which reign through the visible and invisible world, so that sanitary law is a material enactment of divine notions of cleanliness. Tom's dual nature as both a physical boy who grows up to marry Ellie *and* a drowned boy who journey's towards becoming

'the perfect fly' illustrates Kingsley's view that physical life must be governed by laws which have their source in an invisible world.

Wordsworth's view that the child, by proximity, remembers more closely the nature of the soul is given voice in Kingsley's novel through the image of the water-babies. Clearly their fantastic status suggests that they represent the unknown spiritual world in which many refuse to believe. Tom's age too seems to have some bearing on the depth of his sin - 'Why God's guided the bairn, because he was innocent! (31). But if Tom's fall into the water represents death then this swift return to a spiritual world offers little scope for considering how man may change within life. Tom's lessons within the spiritual world of the water-babies parallel the manner in which those invisible laws, embodied in Mrs Bedonebyasyoudid, Mrs Doasyouwouldbedoneby and Mother Carey, may also act upon the physical world. As we saw in chapter 5 Kingsley rejected the notion of an interventionist God and envisioned a unity of the material and spiritual under the auspices of natural laws set in motion by God. When Tom puts pebbles into sea-anemones' mouths Mrs Bedonebyasyoudid punishes him in kind. When Tom then protests that he did not know it was wrong, she articulates the way in which nature punishes those who break its laws:

People continually say that to me; but I tell them, if you don't know that fire burns, that is no reason that it should not burn you; and if you don't know that dirt breeds fever, that is no reason why the fever should not kill. (107)

Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid describes herself in mechanistic terms:

I work by machinery just like an engine; and am full of wheels and springs inside; and am wound up very carefully, so that I cannot help going[...]I was wound up once and for all, so long ago that I forget all about it. (108)

However, although the image is mechanistic, it expresses the notion that God has set her in motion. Alderson suggests that the three women represent a more ancient and pagan vision of Retribution, Consolation and Creativity, with Tom and Ellie's vision of the three united at the end owing more to 'Goethe's "chorus mysticus" than Christianity (xxv). I would claim, on the contrary, that the three women represent God's workings in the world. Mrs Bedonebyasyoudid and Mrs Doasyouwouldbedoneby represent the way in which God's laws can both punish and reward us and Mother Carey symbolises a kind of evolutionary creation. Rather than make things, she 'make[s] them make themselves' (149).

As a child who dies and returns to his spiritual state, Tom learns the lessons which all men should learn. By suggesting also that Tom does live and marry Ellie, Kingsley shows how the transformation of the soul the text describes is one which can also happen in life. But, though similar, the two kinds of transformation are not identical: 'What has been once can never come over again. And people can be little babies, even water-babies, only once in their lives' (73). Growth toward being a good Christian adult is of a more complex, and difficult nature - 'people who make up their minds to go and see the world, as Tom did, must needs find it a weary journey' (73). Arguably, the adult's search for redemption is of a more rewarding nature just because of its difficulty. Tom

advises a giant, who wishes to see what the boy has seen, 'you had best put your head under water for a few hours, as I did, and turn into a water-baby, or some other baby, and then you might have a chance' (162). The giant, however, bemoans the impossibility of returning to that spiritual state, just as Grimes does when Tom finds him stuck in a chimney:

If I was but a little chap in Vendale again, to see the clear beck, and the apple-orchard, and the yew-hedge, how different I would go on! but it's too late now. (176)

But, as Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid claims, it is 'never too late', Grimes is freed from the chimney through his own tears, confirming Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid's dictum that 'everybody must help themselves' (175):

For, as poor Grimes cried and blubbered on, his own tears did what his mother's could not do, and Tom's could not do, and nobody's on earth could do for him; for they washed the soot off his face and off his clothes; and then they washed the mortar away from between the bricks; and the chimney crumbled down; and Grimes began to get out of it. (177)

The cleansing metaphor clearly likens Grimes's redemption to Tom's, and the giant too is capable of redeeming himself. With his scientific paraphernalia of 'collecting boxes, bottles, microscopes, telescopes, barometers, ordnance maps, scalpels, forceps', the giant is clearly represented as a natural scientist who, in his eagerness to catch specimens, destroys 'the great idol temple' (162, 163): 'The roof caved in bodily, smashing idols, and

sending the priests flying out of doors and windows, like rabbits out of a burrow when a ferret goes in' (164). The reference to 'idols' and 'priests' suggests a conflict between the material implications of natural history and the asceticism of the Catholic Church. The 'pretty quarrel' between science and religion cannot be resolved because people are too afraid to listen to the giant and he cannot confront them because he runs backwards, suggesting his inability to convert his knowledge into moral progress (163, 164). That, Kingsley tells us, can only be attained, and science and religion united, when 'either he, or they, or both, turn into little children' (164-165). They must recognise the moral and spiritual basis of all life as Tom has done. Kingsley therefore seems to contradict his earlier claim that man can never return to being a water-baby by asserting that the reader will not gain Tom's wisdom 'unless you be a baby, whether of the water, the land, or the air, matters not, provided you can only keep on continually being a baby' (164). The contradictions of Tom's journey matter not as the message of the text is the unity of the invisible and the visible world expressed through the notion of natural or divine laws, as Prickett suggests when he distinguishes between Kingsley's and George MacDonald's use of Fantasy:

In telling us, therefore, of the extraordinary life of the river bed in *The Water-Babies*, Kingsley is exhibiting natural theology in action, and revealing moral truth. For MacDonald, on the other hand, the truth is hidden beneath nature, rather than visible in the surface of things[...]Whereas Kingsley's world is, and remains *this* world, MacDonald's two adult fantasies depend on the interrelation and tension between two separate worlds. (178)

Kingsley's world remains this world because he asserts that the material and

spiritual realms are one and the same. Compared to the juxtapositioning of realistic and fantastical elements within *Alton Locke* and *Yeast*, in *The Water-Babies* the sustained use of fantasy works to identify the body and soul through a medium which allows the actual portrayal of the spiritual. Kingsley's desire to reconcile body and soul drives him on throughout his career to use different ways (historical allegory, fantasy, social realism) to reiterate and promulgate his central tenet of the unity of human existence.

Conclusion

It cannot be denied that the majority of Kingsley's work is direct and literal. Even in his less directly political works, such as *The Saint's Tragedy* and *Hypatia*, the social implications of the novels are made clear by a direct identification between events and ideas within other historical settings and contemporary events. One might even say they act as parables. It is Kingsley's certainty as to the rightness of his views which repeatedly emerges in his work. The directness of his message is achieved through a directness of rhetoric. The anti-Catholic sentiments of *Westward Ho!*, for instance, are dogmatic in their articulation. This sure, didactic tone underpins the moral certitude of *The Water-Babies*, which, as Chitty points, out led to the Chimney Sweepers Regulation Act (222). However, for a novel which has the undoubted aim of 'revealing moral truth', it consistently toys with the notion of truth and how it can be articulated. Kingsley playfully confesses the fictionality of the text: 'Am I in earnest? Oh dear no. Don't you know that this is a fairy tale, and all fun, and pretence; and that you are not to believe one word of it, even if it is true?' (44).

Like Carlyle, who attacked such movements as the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge for their rational and analytical theory of knowledge acquisition, and like Dickens who attacked in *Hard Times* Grandgrinism in education, Kingsley is concerned at the elimination of playfulness and wonder from education. The point is explicit in the depiction of the Isle of Tomtoddis, a place very like Swift's Isle of Laputa. As in Gradgrind's school, where imagination was prohibited, 'when Tom got on shore the first thing he saw was a great pillar, on one side of which was inscribed, "Playthings not allowed here"' (165). On the Isle Tom then encounters 'nothing but turnips and radishes, beet and mangold wurzel, without a single green leaf among them, and half of them burst and decayed, with toadstools growing out of them' (165). These vegetables are children whose parents would not allow

but have subjected them to a hot-house education. The turnips are replete with useless information:

And another, 'Can you tell me the distance between α Lyrae and β Camelopardalis?
And another, 'What is the latitude and longitude of Snooksville, in Noman's County, Oregon, US?' (165)

The absurdity of the text in part reflects this need to assert the wonder of nature's variety, and to avoid its reduction to dry facts. The children who have turned into turnips should have been allowed to 'pick flowers, and make dirt pies, and get birds' nests, and dance round the gooseberry bush'. But instead they have been kept 'always at lessons, working, working, working, learning weekday lesson all weekdays, and Sunday lesson all Sunday[...]till their brains grew big, and their bodies grew small, and they were all changed into turnips, with little but water inside' (167).¹ This may simply be an instance of Kingsley's anti-intellectualism, but in *The Water-Babies* he does seem to insist on a distinction between true understanding and accumulation of facts. One turnip explains that 'my mamma says that my intellect is not adapted for methodic science, and says that I must go in for general information' (166). This repeats an earlier satiric attack on modern education:

For in the stupid old times, you must understand, children were taught to know one thing, and to know it well: but in these enlightened new times they are taught to know a little about everything, and to know it all ill. (82)

¹ Valentin Cunningham claims that this anxiety over the child reduced to brain, without body, is 'an illustration of the Biblical stress on the moral accountability of life in the body: upon judgement of 'deeds done in the body', but also upon the redemption and resurrection 'of the body'. ('Soiled Fairy: *The Water Babies* in its time', *Essays in Criticism*, 35 (April 1985), pp. 121-148, [p. 135]).

Kingsley's claim that 'the physical science in the book is *not* nonsense, but accurate earnest' suggests his respect for scientific fact, but the absurdities, nonsense words, verbally redundant lists, its 'complications, fragmentation, Rabelaisian encyclopedism', help the text to avoid the worst pitfalls of a directly didactic work (*LM*, 2:127; Cunningham, 144). Indeed, Kingsley tells F.D. Maurice that he intended his style to further his pedagogical aims for both old and young:

If I have wrapped up my parable in seeming Tom-fooleries, it is because so only could I get the pill swallowed by a generation who are not believing with anything like their whole heart, in the Living God. (*LM*, 2: 127)

In an article which deals with Kingsley's privileging of social purpose over aesthetic form, John C. Hawley quotes this as an apology 'for having written an entertaining novel'.² However, Kingsley also confirmed to Maurice that the story was intended 'to make children and grown folks understand that there is a quite miraculous and divine element underlying all physical nature'. Employing the same imagery as Kingsley, Prickett suggests that style in the novel is crucial to meaning:

The whole point of sugaring a pill normally is to make it palatable by *concealing* it; Kingsley's method is the exact opposite of this: he is, in effect, constantly calling attention to the sugar'. (*Victorian Fantasy*, 151-152)

In other words, Kingsley is constantly calling to our attention the way in which he communicates his ideas.

Kingsley's claim in *The Irrationale of Speech* that 'few things seem more miraculous than human speech' exemplifies his belief that there is no disjuncture between thought and

² 'Charles Kingsley and Literary Theory of the 1850s', pp. 174-175.

speech and that, as a result, it can satisfactorily articulate the spiritual. This is partly due to Kingsley's views on the relationships between truth, writing and the aims of fiction. As we have seen throughout this thesis, the subjects and campaigns of Kingsley's novels are often little more than fictionalised versions of his political beliefs and sermons. To this effect, Hawley quotes Tom Taylor's 1855 review in which he claimed Kingsley was 'true to his mission - in which the novel-writer's desk is used as a second pulpit, to attract a larger and more awakened audience' (178). Hawley also quotes from the *Letters and Memories* to show that, although not opposed to poetic diction, Kingsley believed himself incapable of using it and believed a more direct style was needed for communicating his ideas:

Considering that what the world needed was not verse, however good, so much as sound knowledge, sound reasoning, sound faith, and above all, as the fruit of evidence of the last, sound morality, [Kingsley] did not give free rein to his poetical faculty, but sought to make it his servant, not his master, to use it to illuminate and fix the eyes of men on the truths of science, of social relationships, of theology, of morality. (Hawley, 170)

As Rodger Tarr points out, Kingsley's writing fulfils Carlyle's dictum that 'a worthwhile novel should contain a message, stated or implied, propounded with an intensity of conviction and supported by realistic portrayals, fundamental truths, and dominant beliefs'.³ In fact Kingsley fulfils Carlyle's desire for direct truth in a way which, ironically, Carlyle's own recognition of the difficulty of perceiving and portraying truth refuses to do.

Kingsley's major criticism of Emersonian Transcendentalism was its relativistic notion of moral truth. In 'Phaethon', Socrates refuses to distinguish objective from subjective truth, thus proving that truth has an absolute value:

³ 'Carlyle's Influence upon the Mid-Victorian Social Novels of Gaskell, Kingsley and Dickens', p. 8.

S. 'Now, tell me - a thing is objectively true, is it not, when it is a fact as it is?'

A. [Alcibiades] 'Yes'

S. 'And when it is a fact as it is not, it is objectively false; for such a fact would not be true absolutely, and in itself, would it?'

A. 'Of course not.'

S. 'Such a fact would be, therefore, no fact, and nothing.'

A. 'Why so?'

S. 'Because, if a thing exists, it can only exist as it is, not as it is not; at least my opinion inclines that way.'

'Certainly no,' said I; 'why do you haggle so, Alcibiades?'

S. 'Fair and softly, Phaethon! How do you know that he is not fighting for wife and child, and the altars of his gods? But if he will agree with you and me, he will confess that a thing which is objectively false does not exist at all, and is nothing.'

A. 'I suppose it is necessary to do so. But I know whither you are struggling.'

S. 'To this, dear youth, that, therefore, if a thing subjectively true be also objectively false, it does not exist, and is nothing.' (369)

Throughout his work Kingsley is fond of using this type of Socratic discourse to prove his point. He confirms his belief in the revelatory power of words when the narrator of 'Phaethon' suggests to the doubting Templeton that he, like Socrates, use Dialectics to 'arrive at absolute eternal truths' (410). Whereas, as we saw, Carlyle recognised a problematic relationship between language and thought, here in 'Phaethon' Kingsley, as he did in 'The Irrationale of Speech', asserts that speech and thought are one and the same:

That, I say, is a question of Dialectics, in the Platonic sense of that word, as the science which discovers the true and false in thought, by discovering the true and false concerning the meanings of words, which represent thought. (413)

Truth for Kingsley can therefore be articulated through direct utterance. In comparison Carlyle's recognition of the problematic nature of perception, where 'Fantasy superadds itself to Sight', is articulated through language which re-enacts for the reader this state of nescience. Carlyle therefore employs the indirect style which I spoke of in chapter 3; one of

ironic ambiguities, multiple voices, puzzles within puzzles, allusions and metaphors. It is significant, given that Carlyle's style is metaphorical rather than literal (and keeping in mind Teufelsdröckh's assertion that all language is metaphor), that Kingsley admitted 'his own inadequacy in the use of metaphor' (Hawley, 170). Indeed, he often reveals a mistrust of non-literal speech.

Kingsley's public conflict with Cardinal Newman, which led to the latter's publication of *Apologia pro vita sua*, was prompted by his assertion that Newman condoned a lie if it should lead to a truth. In *Hypatia* Kingsley re-iterates this view of the Catholic church as a whole when he describes the patriarch Cyril 'making a fresh-step in that alluring path of evil-doing that good might come' (2: 123). Kingsley also objected to Newman's esoteric style. His mistrust of a metaphoric style, and preference for plain-speaking, is already evident in *Hypatia* in Raphael's reaction to the sermon of Augustine:

He spent some minutes over the inscription of the psalm - allegorized it - made it mean something which it never did mean in the writer's mind, and which it, as Raphael well knew never could mean, for his interpretation was founded on a sheer mistranslation[...]And as he went on with the psalm itself, the common sense of David seemed to evaporate in mysticism[...]And Raphael felt very much inclined to say with a smile, in his haste, 'All men are liars' (2: 162)

Raphael compares Augustine's metaphorical rhetoric and 'that unreal, subtilizing, mystic pedantry, of which he had sickened long ago in Hypatia's lecture-room' (2: 163). Kingsley is seen to be attacking those who mystify the 'Hebrew words', or 'the common sense of David', but there is also a distinction made between Hypatia's and Augustine's sermons (2: 162). Anticipating Kingsley's charge against Newman, Raphael longs 'to persuade himself that Augustine was building up a sound and right practical structure on the foundation of a sheer lie' (2: 166) However, 'in spite of all conceits, allegories, overstrained interpretations'

Augustine's sermon 'went on evolving from the Psalms, and from the past, and from the future, the assertion of a Living, Present God' (2: 165). In other words Augustine's sermon is based on Scripture and, it is suggested, made accessible and effective through his style:

He could not help watching, at first with envy, and then with honest pleasure, the faces of the rough soldiers, as they gradually lightened up into fixed attention, into cheerful and solemn resolve. (2: 166)

Indeed, Augustine's words are part of the process which sees Raphael embrace a life of faith. Raphael's admiration for Augustine's sermon, despite its figurative language and 'overstrained interpretations', suggests that Kingsley's position on plain-speaking is more complex than has been assumed. *The Water-Babies* seems, to some extent, to transgress against his desire for the expression of direct truths through direct words. Indeed, in this novel Kingsley seems closer to Carlyle's language and style than anywhere else in his work. Meaning is not communicated directly. Rather the text abounds with puzzles that depend upon a perceived disjuncture between words and thought.

Kingsley wrote of the song sung by the schoolmistress over Tom's grave:

Those are the words: but they are only the body of it: the soul of the song was the dear old woman's sweet face, and sweet voice, and the sweet old air to which she sang; and that, alas! one cannot put on paper. (*Water-Babies*, 46)

Like Carlyle when he claims that language is the body of thought, Kingsley suggests that words cannot fully express what is contained within the soul. The old lady sings about man's temporal state, but the ultimate mystery of life can only be contained within the music. This identification between music and higher feelings is not novel. M.H. Abrams shows how the

notion of art as imitation - *ut pictura poesis* - gave way in the late eighteenth-century to an 'expressive theory' which sought to illuminate feelings and ideas rather than directly represent them. He indicates that this notion became a commonplace of romantic poetry and quotes Hazlitt: 'It is the music of language, answering to the music of the mind'. For 'German writers of the 1790s, music came to be the art most immediately expressive of spirit and emotion'.⁴ Music is thought of as something beyond the material; an emotive force which can reflect thoughts and feelings that cannot be expressed in words. It is as disembodied as the soul. However, it is also thought of as part of the process of worship. In a letter of 1843, Kingsley makes clear his link between music and an articulation of religious belief:

How fearfully and wonderfully we are made. I seem all spirit, and my every nerve is a musical chord trembling in the wind!...and yet I am sane, and it is all real. I could find no vent for my feelings, this afternoon, but by bursting out into the Te Deum, to no known chant, but a strange involuntary melody which told all. (*LM*, 1: 71)

At the moment of intense and intuitive contact with the spiritual world, his feelings are beyond words and yet *The Water-Babies* is predicated on the tenet that language can communicate spiritual truths:

A Water-baby? You never heard of a water-baby. Perhaps not. That is the very reason why this story was written. There are a great many things in the world which you never heard of; and a great many more which nobody ever heard of; and a great many things, too, which nobody will ever hear of, at least until the coming of the Cocqsigrués, when man shall be the measure of all things. (39)

⁴ *The Mirror and the Lamp* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp, 50, 92.

Tom's journey, as we are told, takes the reader to see 'all the wonderful and hitherto by-no-mortal-man-imagined things, which it is my duty to relate to you in the next chapter', and yet within the same text Kingsley admits the inability of language to express certain truths (153).

The reference to the 'coming of the Cocqigrues' sets a limit to the narrator's, and man's, knowledge of the spiritual world. For instance, although Tom and Ellie seem to have reached the end of their journey, when they look upon the image of the three women combined into one the light is too strong for their eyes and they cannot fully perceive her:

And her eyes flashed, for one moment, clear, white, blazing light: but the children could not read her name; for they were dazzled, and hid their faces in their hands. (181)

Significantly, although these women represent God's laws, Kingsley never attempts to represent God himself. As the combined figure of the three women says - 'Not yet, young things, not yet' (182). Ultimate knowledge of God will come with death or when the mythical 'Cocqigrues' appear. This mingling of the revealed and the hidden is articulated in the mingling of clarity and obscurity in the style of the text.

The use of nonsense words, various and redundant lists and the lack of a consistently clear relation between the symbols and meaning of the story, together with seeming inconsistencies in the narrative, all imply a disjuncture between word and meaning. Like Carlyle, Kingsley appears to be using language to show the impossibility of fully, and directly, articulating a world which is unseen and, therefore, unknowable. As in the old woman's song, Kingsley uses fantastical images, seemingly impossible ideas, and nonsense words, sounds which have no concrete referent, to give an idea of something which lies beyond normal discourse.

But even here in this fantastical work, Kingsley's approach is more prosaic and, ultimately, more certain in its ability to reveal the truth than Carlyle. Indeed, Manlove maintains that Kingsley is 'an empiricist and a "realist"' (186). Although the invisible, spiritual world is represented as beyond the realm of normal utterance, his language and style are adequate means of articulating the *idea* of that world. Like the song, Kingsley seeks to express the emotions, the beauty, and the wonder of God's world through a different medium. In comparison, Carlyle's use of language expresses the *experience* of the individual as he engages with notions of doubt and faith. Wonder at God's world is articulated and even encouraged in 'Natural Supernaturalism' for instance, but his words are mainly inspirational rather than directly revelatory. We are told that Teufelsdröckh 'has looked fixedly on Existence, till one after the other, its earthly hulls and garnitures, have all melted away; and now to his rapt vision the interior, celestial Holy of Holies, lies disclosed' (*Works*, 1: 203). But the 'Holy of Holies' remains unspoken. Indeed, as Teufelsdröckh warns us, a world without clothes runs the risk of mounting to 'inane limbos'. If Silence represents the perfection of the spiritual world, then to glimpse that world would be to encounter a space without words. Therefore Carlyle never shows us what is beyond the clothes, for that could be expressed only by blankness, silence. Instead, as we have seen, he represents the constant dialectic between the body and the soul, the material and invisible worlds, by the interaction of silence and speech; by words which never conclude.

In contrast Kingsley is convinced that his truth can be spoken. Indeed, in the following passage from his *Letters and Memories* Kingsley indicates the real, rather than metaphorical, imperative to communicate his vision of God:

That is *no metaphor*, when the Psalmist calls on all things to praise God, from the monsters of the deep to 'worms and feathered fowls!' They are all witnesses of God, and every emotion of pleasure which they feel is an act of

praise to Him! I dare not say an unconscious act! This is not imagination, for imagination deadens the feelings[...]but I, when I feel thus, seem to see all the universe at one glance, instinct with *The Spirit*, and feel ready to turn to the first beggar I meet, and say, 'Come, my brother, all this is thine, as well as mine! Come, and I will show thee thy goodly heritage!' Oh, the yearning when one sees a beautiful thing to make some one else see it too! Surely it is of Heaven! (*LM*, 1:71)

In *The Water-Babies*, in a bid to make us see, Kingsley allows himself to use the creative means that Augustine employed in *Hypatia*. But there is also much in the text which works on the literal level of a religious parable where symbol and meaning have a direct correlation, even if, as Prickett points out, this is executed in a self-conscious manner:

The Water Babies is one of the very rare examples in literature of inverted allegory[...].Kingsley's frequent disclaimers of 'a moral' are coupled with a structure that clearly implies the existence of any number: why else, for instance, should we have that pair *in loco parentis*, Mrs. Doasyouwouldbedoneby and Mrs Bedonebyasyoudid? The very names reek of Bunyan. (*Victorian Fantasy*, 153)

Indeed, Bunyan himself is adduced as an authority for the virtue of plain-speaking: 'Whereby you see that Tom was no poet: but no more was John Bunyan, though he was as wise a man as you will meet in a month of Sundays' (*Water-Babies*, 169). However, Tom, unlike Christian, does not reach the Celestial City. He returns to the world as a 'a great man of science[...].and knows everything about everything, except why a hen's eggs don't turn into a crocodile, and two or three other little things which no one will know till the coming of the Cocqicigrues' (182). The text ends with a wry admission of the limitation of human knowledge.

Bunyan's allegory charts a journey that represents the soul's journey towards heaven. The lessons that Christian learns may be relevant to the readers whom Bunyan hoped would

be taught to lead a good Christian life, but the real world which Christian leaves and the spiritual world are distinct. Places may appear familiar (such as Vanity Fair) but they are offered as moral lessons. We are never in any doubt that Christian's ultimate destination is death and the Celestial City. However in *The Water-Babies*, we are left uncertain whether Tom is dead or alive, and the natural location of the text mean that we cannot draw any distinct line between the material and spiritual worlds. The lessons Tom learns seem at times to be enacted in a kind of spiritual classroom, with Mrs. Doasyourwouldbedoneby and Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid functioning as natural forces *and* as teachers. Images of nature serve to indicate the truly miraculous essence of the material world, but they also serve as moral lessons.

This sounds, then, something like Carlyle's conclusion in 'Signs of the Times' when he says of the relationship between the inner and outer realms of man that they 'work into one another, and by means of one another' (*Works*, 27: 73). Indeed, Alton Locke echoed this sentiment when he asked 'which is flesh and which is spirit, what philosophers in these days can tell us?' (5). But whereas Carlyle sees the relationship between body and soul as too mysterious to articulate, Kingsley sees the indistinctness of the relationship as a validation for asserting their unity.

The nescience which Carlyle embraces requires belief, or the reliance on the value of the unknown may be easily undermined by doubt and become agnosticism. Carlyle's truth, rather than being a certain revelation of God and his laws, is rather the truth of man's experience of the psychological conflict between belief and scepticism articulated through a style which consistently undercuts the certainty of Teufelsdröckh's conversion. Carlyle is often described as a prophet, and yet his most valuable asset (and the one through which he acquired so many followers) was to articulate the complexity of man's perception of himself with all its uncertainties. For Carlyle body and soul exist in a dialectical relationship that

reflects his claim that 'a perpetual contradiction dwells in us' (*Works*, 28: 27). But Kingsley is confident that his language has the power to resolve that contradiction, a confidence that rests ultimately on a trust that language, his language, is quite literally God-given:

Having begun these lectures in the name of Him who is The Word, and with the firm intention of asserting throughout His claims as the inspirer of all language and of all art, I may perhaps hope for the fulfilment of His own promise: 'Be not anxious what you shall speak, for it shall be given you in that day and in that hour what you shall Speak.'⁵

⁵ Charles Kingsley, 'On English Composition' in *Literary and General Lectures and Essays*, (London: MacMillan, 1890), p. 241.

Bibliography

- Abrams, M.H., *The Mirror and the Lamp* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953)
- Ackroyd, Peter, *Dickens* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1990)
- Acton, William, *The Functions and Disorders of the Reproductive Organs* (London: John Churchill & sons, 1865)
- Prostitution Considered in its Moral, Social and Sanitary Aspects*, (London: Churchill, 1870)
- Allingham, William. *A Diary, 1824-1889*. Ed. by H. Allingham and D. Radford. (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1985)
- Althaus, Friedrich, 'Thomas Carlyle. A Biographical and Literary Portrait', in *Two Reminiscences of Thomas Carlyle*, ed. by John Clubbe (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1974)
- Anon., 'Mr. Carlyle on the Gospel of Dirt', *New York Times* January 30 1877, p. 5
- Ashe, Geoffrey, *The Virgin: Mary's Cult and the Re-emergence of the Goddess* (London & New York: Arkana, 1988)
- Ashton, Rosemary, *The German Idea* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980)
- Baker, Joseph Ellis, *The Novel and the Oxford Movement* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1965)
- Bakhtin, M.M., *The Dialogic Imagination* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981)
- 'From Notes made in 1970-71', in *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1986)
- Barret-Ducrocq, Françoise, *Love in the Time of Victoria*, trans. John Howe (New York: Penguin, 1991)
- Beaune, Jean-Claude, 'The Classical Age of Automata: An Impressionistic Survey from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century', in *Fragments for a History of the Human Body*, ed. Michel Feher, 3 vols (New York: Urzone Inc., 1989), I, pp. 430-480
- Beer, Gillian, *Darwin's Plots* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983)
- 'Carlylean Transports', in *Arguing with the Past: Essays in Narrative from Woolf to Sydney* (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 74-98
- Bentham, Jeremy, *Works* 11 vols. (Edinburgh: Tait, 1843), IV

Bossche, Chris Vanden, 'Revolution and Authority: the Metaphors of Language and Carlyle's Style', *Prose Studies*, 6 (1983), pp. 274-289

Bowler, Peter, *The Invention of Progress* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989)

Brantlinger, Patrick, "'Teufelsdröckh" resartus', *English Language Notes*, 9 (March 1972), pp. 191-193

Briggs, Asa, *Victorian Things* (London: Penguin, 1990)

Brooks, Gerry H., *The Rhetorical form of Carlyle's Sartor Resartus* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972)

Broughton, Trev, 'The Froude-Carlyle Embroilment: Married Life as a Literary Problem', *Victorian Studies* Summer 1995, pp. 551-585

Buckton, Oliver S., "'An Unnatural State": Gender, "Perversion," and Newman's *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*', *Victorian Studies*, 35 (Summer 1992), pp. 358-383

Burkitt, F.C., *The Religion of the Manichees* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925)

Burn, W.L., *The Age of Equipoise* (London: Unwin University Books, 1968)

Campbell, Ian, *Thomas Carlyle* (Edinburgh: Saltire Society, 1993)

-- 'Carlyle's Religion', in *Carlyle and his Contemporaries* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1976)

Campbell, Robert A., 'Charles Kingsley: A Bibliography of Secondary Studies, Part I & II', *Bulletin of Bibliography*, 33(1976), pp. 79-104 & 127-130

Carlyle, Thomas, *Works*, Centennial Edition, ed. H.D. Trail, 30 vols. (London: Chapman & Hall, 1896-1899).

-- *The Collected Letters of Thomas and Jane Welsh Carlyle*, ed. Charles R. Sanders, K.J. Fielding, Clyde de L. Ryals et al., 24 vols (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1970-)

-- 'Wotton Reinfred' in *Last Words of Thomas Carlyle* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1892)

-- *Sartor Resartus*, ed. Kerry McSweeney and Peter Sabor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987)

-- *The French Revolution*, ed. by K.J. Fielding and David Sorensen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989)

Chadwick, Edwin *Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain*, ed. M.W. Flinn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1965)

- Chapple, J.A.V. , *Science and Literature in the Nineteenth Century* (London: MacMillan, 1986)
- Chesterton, G.K. , *Varied Types*, (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1903)
- Chitty, Susan, *The Beast and the Monk* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1974)
- Churchland, Paul, *Matter and Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984)
- Clubbe, John, 'Carlyle's Subliminal Feminine: Maenadic Chaos in *The French Revolution*', *Carlyle Studies Annual* no. 16 (1996), pp. 75-88
- Collins, Carol, 'Anti-dogmatism and the "Metaphorical Quashee": Thomas Carlyle's "An Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question"', *Carlyle Studies Annual*, 17 (1997), pp. 23-40
- Colloms, Brenda, *Charles Kingsley: The Lion of Eversley* (London: Constable, 1975)
- Corbin, Alain, *The Foul and the Fragrant* (London: Picador, 1994)
- Cottingham, John, *Descartes* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986)
- Cunningham, Valentine, 'Soiled Fairy: *The Water Babies* in its time', *Essays in Criticism*, 35 (April 1985), pp. 121-148
- Dale, Peter Allan, 'Sartor Resartus and the Inverse Sublime: The Art of Humorous Deconstruction', in *Allegory, Myth and Symbol*, ed. by Morton W. Bloomfield (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981)
- Dennet, Daniel C. , *Consciousness Explained* (London Penguin, 1991)
- Dickens, Charles, *Hard Times* (London: Penguin, 1994)
- Dyer, Isaac Watson, *A Bibliography of Thomas Carlyle's Writings and Ana* (Portland, Maine: 1928)
- Espinasse, Francis. *Literary Recollections and Sketches*. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1893)
- Fasick, Laura, 'Charles Kingsley's Scientific Treatment of Gender', in *Muscular Christianity: Embodying the Victorian Age*, ed. Donald E. Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 91-113
- Findlay, J.J., ed., *Arnold of Rugby*, (Cambridge: The University Press, 1897)
- Fontein, P.F.M. , *The Light and the Dark: A History of Cultural Dualism* 13 vols (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1986-1998), I
- Foucault, Michel, *The Order of Things* (London: Tavistock, 1970)

- *Discipline and Punish*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1991)
- *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction* (London: Penguin, 1976)
- Froude, James Anthony, *Carlyle: A History of his Life in London*, 2 vols (London: Longmans, Green & co., 1884)
- *My Relations With Carlyle* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1903)
- Gilbert, Sandra and Susan Gubar, *The Madwoman in The Attic* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1984)
- Goldberg, Michael, *Carlyle and Dickens* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1972).
- ‘The True Shekinah is Man’, *American Notes and Queries*, 24 (Nov/Dec 1985), pp. 42-44.
- Gosse, Philip, *Omphalos* (London: Van Voorst, 1857)
- Gray, Alasdair, *Lanark* (London: Picador, 1985)
- Gregg, William Rathbone, ‘Prostitution’, *Westminster Review* vol. 53 (1850), pp. 448 - 506 (p. 450). Reprinted in the collection *Prostitution in the Victorian Age* with an introduction by Keith Nield (Farnborough: Gregg, 1973)
- Guy, Josephine, *The Victorian Social-Problem Novel: the Market, the Individual and Communal Life* (London: MacMillan, 1996)
- Guy, W.A. , ‘Church Lane, St. Giles’, *Fraser’s Magazine*, 37 (March 1848), pp.257-260.
- ‘The Plague of Beggars’, *Fraser’s Magazine*, 37 (April 1848), pp. 395 - 402
- ‘Thomas Carlyle and John Howard’, *Fraser’s Magazine*, 41 (April 1850), pp. 406-410
- Haley, Bruce, *The Healthy Body and Victorian Culture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978)
- Halliday, James, *Mr. Carlyle: My Patient : A Psychosomatic Biography* (London: Heinemann, 1949)
- Harris, Styron, *Charles Kingsley: A Reference Guide* (Boston, MA: Hall, 1981)
- Harrison, Fraser, *The Dark Angel* (London: Sheldon Press, 1977).
- Harrold, C.F., *Carlyle and German Thought 1819-1834* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934)
- Hawley, John C., ‘Charles Kingsley and Literary Theory of the 1850s’, *Victorian Literature and Culture*, 9 (1991), pp. 167-188

--'Charles Kingsley and the *Via Media*', *Thought*, 67 (1992), pp. 287-301

Heffer, Simon, *Moral Desperado* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995).

Helmig, Steven, *The Esoteric Comedies of Carlyle, Newman and Yeats* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)

Houghton, Walter E., *The Victorian Frame of Mind 1830 - 1870* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1957)

-- ed., *The Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals 1824-1900*, 5 vols (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966-1989)

Hume, David, 'Of Miracles', in *The Philosophical Works of David Hume* 4 vols. (Edinburgh: Black, 1854) IV

Hutchinson, H.G., *The Life of Sir John Lubbock, Lord Avebury* 2 vols (London: MacMillan, 1914)

Hutton, R.H., 'Carlyle as Painter', in *A Victorian Spectator: Uncollected Writings of R.H. Hutton*, ed. By Robert H. Tener and Malcolm Woodfield (Bristol: Bristol Press, 1991)

[Hutton, Richard H.], 'The Religion of the Working Classes', *The National Review*, (January 1859), pp. 167-197

Jackson, Rosemary, *Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion* (London: Methuen, 1981)

Jay, Elisabeth, *Faith and Doubt in Victorian Britain* (London: MacMillan, 1986).

Jessop, Ralph, *Carlyle and Scottish Thought* (London: MacMillan, 1997)

--'Carlyle's Scotch Scepticism: Writing from the Scottish Tradition', *Carlyle Studies Annual* 16 (1996), pp. 25-35

--'"A Strange Apartment": the Watch-Tower in Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus*', *Studies in Scottish Literature*, 29 (1997), pp. 118 - 132

Kaplan, Fred, *Thomas Carlyle: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983)

--'"Phallus-Worship" (1848): Unpublished Manuscripts III - A Response to the Revolution of 1848', *Carlyle Newsletter*, 2 (March 1980), pp. 19-23

Kendall, Guy, *Charles Kingsley and His Ideas* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1947)

Kingsley, Charles, *The Saint's Tragedy* (London: Parker, 1848)

--'The Life of Saint Elizabeth'. Held in the Kingsley Papers in the British Library Manuscripts Collection, Add. 41296, f. 2-3

- *Yeast* (London: MacMillan, 1890)
- *Alton Locke* (London: MacMillan, 1881)
- 'Phaethon' in *Literary and General Lectures and Essays* (London: MacMillan, 1890)
- *Hypatia* (New York: Garland, 1975)
- *Westward Ho!* (London: Robinson, 1989).
- *Two Years Ago* (London: Ward, Lock & Co., 1910)
- *The Water Babies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)
- *His Letters and Memories of his Life*, ed. Fanny Kingsley, 2 vols (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1888)
- 'The Water Supply of London', in *Miscellanies* 2 vols. (London: J.W. Parker, 1860), vol. I
- 'The Irrationale of Speech', *Fraser's Magazine*, 60 (1859), pp. 1-14
- 'Lord Palmerston and the Presbytery of Edinburgh', *Fraser's Magazine* vol. 49 (January, 1854), pp.47-53.
- 'Who Causes Pestilence?' 4 sermons (London & Glasgow: Griffin, 1854)
- *Scientific Lectures and Essays* (London: MacMillan, 1880)
- *Discipline and Other Sermons* (London: MacMillan, 1899)
- *The Water of Life and Other Sermons* (London: MacMillan, 1890)
- *Poems* (London: MacMillan, 1891)
- La Mettrie, Julien Offray de, *Machine Man and Other Writings*, ed. Ann Thomson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
- La Valley, Albert J., *Carlyle and the Idea of the Modern* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1968)
- Lee, J.A.N., *Computer Pioneers* (California: IEEE Computer Society Press, 1987)
- Le Quesne, A.L., *Carlyle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982)
- Levine, George, *The Boundaries of Fiction* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968)
- 'The Use and Abuse of Carlylesc', in *the Art of Victorian Fiction*, ed. George Levine and William Madden (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968)

- Lloyd, Tom, 'Towards Natural Supernaturalism: Carlyle and Dual Vision 1823-1829', *Philological Quarterly*, 65 (1986), pp. 479-494
- 'The Feminine in Thomas Carlyle's Aesthetics', *European Romantic Review*, 2 (1992), pp. 173-194
- Majer, Gerald Stephen, 'Infectious Figures: Contagion and the Victorian Imagination' (unpublished Ph.D thesis, Northwester University, 1994)
- Manlove, Colin, *Christian Fantasy: from 1200 to the Present* (London: MacMillan, 1992)
- Marcus, Steven, *The Other Victorians* (London: Corgi, 1971)
- Martin, Robert Bernard, *The Dust of Combat* (London: Faber, 1959)
- Mason, Michael, *The Making of Victorian Sexuality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)
- Mayhew, Henry, *London Labour and the London Poor: A Cylopedia of the Condition and Earnings of those that Will work, those that Cannot work, and those that Will Not work*, 4 vols (London: George Woodfall and Griffin, Bohn & Co., 1851-1862)
- Maynard, John, 'Sexual Christianity: Charles Kingsley's *Via Media*' in *Victorian Discourses on Sexuality and Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)
- Meyer, Maria *Carlyle's Einfluss auf Kingsley in Sozialpolitischer und religiosethischer Hinsicht* (Weimar: Wagner, 1914)
- Miller, J. Hillis, 'Hieroglyphical Truth' in *Sartor Resartus: Carlyle and the Language of Parable*, in *Victorian Perspectives*, ed. by John clubbe and Jerome Meckier (London: MacMillan, 1989)
- Millhauser, Milton, *Just Before Darwin* (Middleton, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1959).
- Moore, Carlisle, 'The Persistence of Carlyle's "Everlasting Yea"', *Modern Philology*, 54 (1957), pp. 187-196
- 'Carlyle and Goethe as Scientist', in *Carlyle and his Contemporaries* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1976), pp. 21-34
- 'Carlyle and the "Torch of Science"', in *The Norman and Charlotte Strouse Lectures on Carlyle and His Era* 2 vols (Santa Cruz: The University Library of California, 1982) I, 1-25
- Morrison, Phillip and Emily Morrison, ed., *Babbage and His Calculating Engines* (New York: Dover, 1961)
- O'Brien, W., 'Supply of Water to the Metropolis', *Edinburgh Review* 91 (April 1850), pp.377-408

- Oddie, William, *Dickens and Carlyle; the question of influence* (London: Centenary Press, 1972)
- Oliphant, Margaret, 'The Laws Concerning Women', *Blackwood's Magazine* April 1856, pp. 379 - 387
- Ossato, Cristina 'Sartor Resartus, Re-Tailoring Plato's myth of the cave', a paper given at 'The Victorians and Modernity' conference at the Leeds Centre for Victorian Studies, Trinity and All Saints College, from 14-16 July, 1997
- Parsons, Gerald, ed., *Religion in Victorian Britain*, 4 vols (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988)
- Pearsall, Ronald, *The Worm in the Bud* (London: MacMillan, 1969)
- Persak, Christine, 'Rhetoric in Praise of Silence: The Ideology of Carlyle's Paradox', *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, 21 (1991), pp. 38-52
- Peursen, C.A. Van, *Body, Soul, Spirit: A Survey of the Body-Mind Problem* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966)
- Porter, Roy, and Lesley Hall, *The Facts of Life: The Creation of Sexual Knowledge in Britain 1650 - 1950* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1995).
- Prickett, Stephen, *Victorian Fantasy* (Hassocks : Harvester Press, 1979),
- *Words and The Word* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986)
- *Origins of Narrative* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
- Ranke-Heinemann, Uta, *Eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven* (New York: Penguin, 1991)
- Richards, Thomas, *The Commodity Culture of Victorian England* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991)
- Rogers, Katharine M. , *The Troublesome Helpmate* (Seattle & London: University of Washington Press, 1966)
- Ruskin, John, *Sesame and Lillies*, in *Complete Works*, 39 vols (London: Allen, 1905), 18
- [Rutherford, Mark], *The Science of Life* (London: J. Burns, 1877)
- Ryle, Gilbert, *The Concept of Mind* (London: Hutchinson, 1949)
- Seigel, Jules Paul, ed., *Thomas Carlyle: The Critical Heritage*. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul)
- Sigman, Joseph, "'Diabolico-angelical Indifference'" The Imagery of Polarity in *Sartor Resartus*', *Southern Review*, 5 (1972), pp. 207-224

- [Smith, Southwood], 'Spasmodic Cholera', *Westminster Review*, 15 (1831), pp. 484-490
- Spring, Ian, *Phantom Village: the myth of the new Glasgow* (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1990)
- Stowell, Sheila, 'Teufelsdröckh as Devil's Dust', *The Carlyle Newsletter*, 9 (Spring 1988), pp. 31-33
- Sussman, Herbert, *Victorians and the Machine* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968)
- *Victorian Masculinities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)
- Taliaferro, Charles, *Consciousness and the Mind of God* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)
- Tanner, Tony, 'Mountains and Depths - an Approach to Nineteenth Century Dualism', *Quarterly Review of English Literature*, 3 (1962), pp. 51-61
- Tarr, Rodger, 'Carlyle's Influence upon the Mid-Victorian Social Novels of Gaskell, Kingsley and Dickens' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of South Carolina, 1968)
- *Thomas Carlyle: A Bibliography of English-Language Criticism, 1824-1974* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976)
- Tennyson, G.B., *Sartor Called Resartus* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965)
- Thomas, Keith, *Religion and the Decline of Magic* (London: Penguin, 1971)
- Uglow, Jenny, *George Eliot* (London: Virago, 1996)
- Uffelman, Larry K., *Charles Kingsley* (Boston, Mass.: Twayne, 1979)
- Vance, Norman, *The Sinews of the Spirit: the ideal of christian Manliness in Victorian Literature and Religious Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)
- Vida, Elizabeth M., *Romantic Affinities: German Authors and Carlyle: A Study in the History of Ideas* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993)
- Vijn, J.P. *Carlyle and Jean Paul: Their Spiritual Optics* (Amsterdam: John Benjamin's Publishing, 1982)
- Walsh, Walter, *The Secret History of the Oxford Movement* (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1898)
- Warner, Marina, *Alone of All Her Sex: The Myth and The Cult of The Virgin Mary* (London: Picador, 1985)
- Wells, H.G., *The Salvaging of Civilization* (London: Cassell, 1921)

Widengren, Geo, *Mani and Manichaeism*, trans. Charles Kessler (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1965)

Willey, Basil, *Nineteenth Century Studies* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1949)

Williams, Michael A. , 'Divine Image - Prison of Flesh: Perceptions of the Body in Ancient Gnosticism', in *Fragments for a History of the Human Body* ed. Michel Feher, 3 vols (New York: Urzone Inc., 1989), I,129-147

Williams, Raymond, *The Country and the City* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1973)

Wilson, David Alec, *The Truth about Carlyle* (London: Alston Rivers, 1913)

Wohl, Anthony S., *Endangered Lives: Public Health in Victorian Britain* (London: Dent, 1983)

Woodward, Llewellyn, *The Age of Reform 1815 - 1870* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962)

Zweig, Paul, *The Heresy of Self-Love*, (New York & London: Basic Books, 1968)

