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DEDICATION

To Val, my wife and best friend. I only wish that this had been worthy of your patience and support.
CHAPTER 1

BRITISH MIGRATION HISTORY: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims to review the literature on migration to Britain in order to establish the focus
of the subject-matter of the thesis. The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first
section provides an overview of the literature on British migration history. It begins by
identifying certain assumptions that have characterised popular conceptions of this history, and
then moves on to describe certain key developments in academic research that have called
into question the validity of such common presumptions. It concludes by highlighting certain
empirical and theoretical weaknesses within the extant literature. In the second section, areas
of particular empirical silence are specified and then further explored so as to identify the key
parameters of this research. The final section considers the implications which research on
British migration history has for the sociology of migration.

OVERVIEW

An understanding of British migration history has developed which has tended to draw upon two
widely-held conceptions. First, it is assumed that Britain has evolved as a nation state without
much inward movement of people. In this way, Britain is held to have advanced as a
homogenous society, with the post-war arrival of 'black' British subjects from the New
Commonwealth viewed as an anomaly. As such, the term 'immigrant' has become
synonymous with 'black' people of colonial origin. Second, it is assumed that responses to migrants who did arrive in Britain, and to the minority groups which were subsequently established, have been characterised by a 'tradition' of tolerance. This 'natural' tolerance is believed to have been tested by problems created by 'black immigrants'. The perpetuation of these notions has, over a period of time, been paralleled by relative academic silence on the reality of British migration history.

A growing body of research has, however, begun to challenge the legitimacy of such common-sense assumptions. It has been established that migration to Britain is not a marginal or recent phenomenon, but has been a historically continuous, although variable, process involving significant numbers of people of diverse national origins. Thus, it has been the case throughout British history, 'immigrants, refugees and sojourners have been continually present' (Holmes 1988:276). Moreover, while there is evidence to suggest a long history of 'black' migration to Britain (e.g. Fryer 1984, Visram 1986, Ramdin 1987), most of the migrants who arrived over the past two centuries have been shown not to have originated from the colonies or ex-colonies but from other European nation states (e.g. Walvin 1984, Holmes 1988). In other words, the majority of migrants to arrive in Britain have been 'white' people of European origin, a significant number of whom were alien in legal status. Similarly, there is evidence to suggest that the history of migration to Britain has in fact been characterised by negative responses to migrant and minority groups, which some writers have interpreted as a 'tradition of intolerance' (Kushner and Lunn 1989:4).

The development in historical understanding of migration to Britain, and recognition of the importance of the European dimension, has resulted from increased multi-disciplinary interest in the area. The advances made have included contributions from sociologists (e.g. Kay and Miles 1992), geographers (e.g. Salt and Clout 1976, King 1977) and anthropologists (e.g. Watson 1977). However, the history of migration to Britain has been chiefly identified in studies carried out by social historians. Of particular note are the works of Walvin (1984), Holmes (1988) and Panayi (1994), which provide a general synthesis of the history of migration to Britain during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The work of Holmes is especially
important for, in addition to providing the first and most comprehensive account to date, it also draws attention to the 'significant gaps' that continue to exist in the history of migration to Britain.

Although one of the main developments in the migration literature has been the identification and recovery of European migration to Britain, to a large extent it still remains a 'hidden' history. There are two main reasons for this. First, it is a history which has hitherto been consistently marginalised as an area of academic research. Within the literature on migration to Britain, the primary focus has been upon post-war 'black' migration from the New Commonwealth. This bias has occurred within most of the academic disciplines concerned with the study of migration to Britain, but has been especially apparent within sociology. Consequently, the history of European migration to Britain has been largely ignored by researchers.

Second, while the evidence suggests that migrants from most European countries have been present historically in Britain, the literature has tended to be heavily concentrated on specific groups. There has been particular attention given to Irish migration (e.g. Jackson 1963, O'Connor 1974, Lees 1979, Swift and Gilley 1985, 1989). Such interest in the Irish is testimony to their long established status as the largest migrant group in Britain. Moreover, in comparison to other European migrant groups, the Irish have held a unique position in so far as they have not been classed as 'aliens'. That is, they have constituted an intermediate group, with a special standing within British immigration law. As such, the term alien in the British context refers to, 'persons who are nationals of States outside the Commonwealth, except the citizens of the Republic of Ireland, who are not aliens' (Dummet 1976:36).

In contrast, alien European migrant groups have generally received little consideration, with perhaps one notable exception. The history of European Jewish migration has attracted substantial attention (e.g. Lipman 1954, 1990, Bentwich 1956, Garrard 1971, Gainer 1972, Gartner 1973, Sherman 1973, Wasserstein 1979, Hirschfeld 1984, Berghahn 1988, Ceserani 1990, Alderman 1992). As with the Irish, the prominence of the Jewish migrant group within
the literature can, to a large extent, be seen to reflect its numerical significance. Nevertheless, the history of other sizeable alien European migrant groups such as the Germans (e.g. Anderson 1980, Ashton 1986, Panayi 1991) and Italians (e.g. Palmer 1977, Sponza 1988, Colpi 1991), has attracted comparatively little interest. Virtually no attention has been given to such groups as the French and Spanish (Panayi 1994:2). The situation is such that while the history of some European migrant groups have been relatively well documented, others have either been understudied or continue to await recovery.

In addition to the unevenness in what is known of the various migrant groups, there is a parallel fragmented historical account of European migration at both a temporal and spatial level. Hence, within the literature on European migration to Britain, certain historical periods have been better served than others. This is especially true of the mid to late nineteenth century. For example, much of the work on Irish migration has focused on their presence in Britain during the Victorian era (e.g. Lees 1979, Swift and Gilley 1985). Likewise, the history of Jewish migration is heavily concentrated on the nineteenth century arrival of Eastern European Jews (e.g. Lipman 1954, Garrard 1971, Gainer 1972 and Gartner 1973). In the case of the Italians, the work of Sponza (1988), while arguably the most scholarly, is nevertheless restricted to an examination of Italian migrants in nineteenth century Britain. In addition, the contribution by Anderson (1980) to the history of Germans in Britain is limited to the employment of German clerical workers during the nineteenth century, while Ashton (1986) concentrated upon German exiles in Victorian England.

Although some of the literature has extended beyond the nineteenth century, there are substantial gaps which continue to exist in the history of twentieth century European migration to Britain. Of particular note is the neglect of the history of migration during the period of the two world wars. Thus, while it has been recognised that large scale movements into Britain have occurred during and as a result of total war, relatively little work has been carried out on recovering such migrations. For example, Holmes (1991) has drawn attention to what little is known of the 200,000 Belgian refugees who arrived in Britain during the First World War. The neglect of wartime migration is, however, especially conspicuous in the case of the Second
World War, when considering that it was marked by the largest inward movement of people in British history (Walvin 1984).

Within the migration literature, the Second World War is often represented as a watershed. In this way, empirical research has tended to either precede or supersede the war. The paucity of material on the history of European migration to Britain during and as result of the Second World War generally reflects an intermittent or short lived interest in the various migrant groups. The only group to have stimulated a consistent level of interest has been the German-Jewish refugees, most of whom arrived in the years which immediately preceded the war (e.g. Bentwich 1956, Sherman 1973, Wasserstein 1979, Hirschfeld 1984, Berghahn 1988). The work of Zubrzycki (1956) has drawn attention to the significance of migration during the Second World War, with his account of the arrival of Polish exiles in Britain during and after the war and the subsequent establishment of a Polish community. However, apart from an essay by Patterson (1977), the history of this Polish migration remained under-researched and has only recently begun to receive an adequate level of attention (e.g. Sword 1988, Sword, Davies and Ciechanowski 1989, Kernberg 1990). Similarly, the recent account by Kay and Miles (1992) of the arrival at the end of the war of Eastern European 'Displaced Persons' who were recruited by the British government as 'European Volunteer Workers' is the first major work on the subject since that by Tannahill (1958). In addition, interest in the sizeable German and Italian prisoner of war populations in Britain during and after the war would appear to have waned following a peak in the late 1970s with the publication of the three key works on the subject of prisoners of war (Faulk 1977, Sullivan 1979, Kochan 1980).

Furthermore, there is within the literature an unevenness in what is known of European migration to different parts of Britain. There has been a tendency to view the process of migration to Britain as a phenomenon relevant only to England. As such, most of the research carried out has focused specifically on migration to England. However, this is often not immediately apparent, as researchers have tended to concentrate implicitly on England when writing within a supposed British context. In doing so, they have committed the 'English historian's vice of writing Britain when meaning England' (Walvin 1984:15). Conversely, some
have been guilty of writing England when meaning Britain (e.g. Kochan 1980). Consequently, British migration history has become synonymous with English migration history. In acknowledging this situation, Holmes (1991:200) has noted that the historical recovery of migration to Scotland (as in the case of Wales), has been particularly neglected within migration research. This under representation usually manifests itself within the migration literature by only passing reference made to Scotland. In other words, while some in-roads have been made into the historical recovery of migration to Britain, these have rarely extended into Scotland.

One reason for this inattention within the migration literature may be the prevailing image of Scotland as a country of emigration. In terms of overall demographic trends, Scotland has indeed been characterised historically by high levels of outward migration. However, there is also a history of inward migration to Scotland. Although this aspect of Scotland’s past has been overshadowed and remains largely obscure, there is sufficient empirical evidence to challenge any notion of it being inconsequential and therefore undeserving of research.

The migration to Scotland from Ireland has been considerable and formative (e.g. Handley 1943, 1947, 1964). A long history of Jewish migration to Scotland (with particular emphasis on the period leading up to the end of the First World War), has been identified and recovered by Collins (1987, 1990). And a study by Kolmel (1984) on the presence of German-Jewish refugees in Scotland during the Second World War has highlighted the importance of this phase of Jewish migration. There is evidence to suggest a substantial Lithuanian migration to Scotland during the late nineteenth century which led to the formation of a vibrant Lithuanian community in Lanarkshire (e.g. White 1975, Lunn 1980, Rodgers 1980, 1982, 1984, 1985). A number of studies have also begun to uncover the historical process of Italian migration to Scotland which resulted in the establishment of a sizeable and pervasive Italian community (e.g. Sereni 1974, Colpi 1979, 1988, 1991, Wilkin 1979, 1989, Rodgers 1982, Dutto 1986, Millar 1988). In addition, a study by Kemberg (1990) has described how the arrival of Polish exiles in Scotland during the Second World War led to the establishment of a Polish community in Scotland.
A developing theme within the migration literature is that of hostility towards migrant and minority groups in Britain, which has widely been understood through the concept of intolerance (e.g. Holmes 1988, 1991, Kushner and Lunn 1989, 1990, Panayi 1990, 1993a). Until recently, academic interest in this area had been concentrated largely on the consequences of post-war 'black' New Commonwealth migration. At the same time, this activity prompted research on responses to Jewish migration to Britain, which demonstrated that 'black' migrants have not been the only group to have experienced antipathy (Garrard 1971, Gainer 1972, Holmes 1979). The prominence given to 'black' and Jewish migrants can, to a large extent, be seen to reflect the degree to which both groups have been held to constitute a 'social problem' or 'political issue'. In addition, it mirrors an interest in the extent to which popular reaction to the presence of these groups influenced state migration policy. Consequently, responses to other groups have received comparatively little attention. Nevertheless, recent contributions have provided evidence that animosity has been encountered by most, if not all, migrant and minority groups in Britain. Thus, it has been claimed that 'No newcomers who have entered Britain in the last two centuries have escaped hostility on a significant scale' (Panayi 1993a). In other words, hostility has not been limited to 'black' and Jewish migrants.

The presence of European groups has, at certain times, been perceived as expressly problematic. This has at no time been more apparent than under conditions of total war, when hostility towards these groups has been especially pronounced. However, despite increased recognition of this within recent migration literature (e.g. Kushner 1989, Kushner and Lunn 1990, Panayi 1990, 1993c), there have been relatively few studies of responses to European groups during wartime. The work that has been carried out has primarily focused on anti-Semitism during the two world wars (e.g. Kushner 1989, Kushner and Lunn 1990), with other groups also shown to have been the victims of official and popular hostility. The official response of internment has received particular attention (e.g. Gillman and Gillman 1980, Stent 1980, Kochan 1983). Nonetheless, consideration has mainly been given to German and Austrian internees, so that Italian internees (as well as other internee groups) have been neglected (Holmes 1993:155). In addition, popular responses to minorities have included the
anti-German riots during the First World War (Panayi 1988, 1989, 1991, 1993b), and the anti-
Italian riots during the Second World War (Sponza 1993).

Consistent with the limited attention given to the history of migration to Scotland, responses to
migrants and minority groups from within Scotland have also been little researched. Nonetheless, the prevalence in Scotland of antagonism towards migrant and minority groups
has been identified by a number of studies. For example, there is evidence to suggest a long
history of anti-Irish agitation (Handley 1945, 1947, 1954, Miles 1982, Murray 1984, Bruce
1985). The Lithuanians have been shown to have been the victims of hostility (Campbell 1979,
Lunn 1980), and the existence of anti-Semitism in Scotland has also been identified (Matles
1988). Furthermore, the work by Sponza (1993) on anti-Italian riots during the Second World
War has drawn heavily on incidents in Scotland.

Furthermore, there are certain methodological shortcomings within the migration literature. For
example, there has been a bias, especially within such disciplines as geography, towards
quantitative research methods which have relied heavily upon statistical data in the analysis of
migration. This has tended to 'produce an impersonal, dehumanised approach in which flows
replace individual people and the motives for migration are assumed rather than proven'
(Pooley and White 1991:4). There is, however, an increasing recognition among writers (e.g.
Sullivan 1979, Kochan 1980, Kolmel 1984) of the value of qualitative data, in particular oral
history, in providing insights into the migration process.

In addition to the empirical weaknesses which exist within the literature on the history of
European migration to Britain, there are also theoretical weaknesses. In the main,
contributions to this history have been descriptive and contain few theoretical insights on the
nature and significance of migration. Nevertheless, there is increasing awareness within the
literature of the need for a theoretical understanding of the dynamics of migration (e.g. Kushner
have suggested that 'Structuration Theory', as developed by Giddens (1976, 1979), could be
useful. More conventionally, Panayi (1994) has proposed a model based on the traditional
'push-pull' theory to explain migration. Furthermore, because of the often uncritical use of the notion of intolerance, it may be argued that little consideration has therefore been given to a theoretical understanding of hostility towards migrant and minority groups. Moreover, when the concept of racism has been employed to explain hostility (e.g. Panayi 1993a, 1994), it has tended to be used without an adequate theoretical definition.

THE THESIS DEFINED

This review of the extant literature on the history of migration to Britain has highlighted three areas of relative silence which are in need of further research. These are: the migration of alien Europeans, migration during the period of the Second World War and migration to Scotland. These themes will be further explored here so as to identify the key parameters of this research, which when integrated will involve the historical recovery of the process of alien European migration to Scotland during the years 1933 to 1951. Moreover, this periodisation allows for an examination of migrations that not only occurred in the context of total war, but also during the 'Gathering Storm' (Churchill 1948) and aftermath of the war.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

This thesis argues that, within the context of the history of migration to Britain, the period of the Second World War merits further research for the following reasons. First, the Second World War was marked by the largest and most diverse inward movement of people in British history: 'Between 1939 and 1945 Britain experienced the most remarkable and large-scale migration of people in its history....The result was that Britain became a fascinating mix of nationalities and races' (Walvin 1984:90). A wider recognition of the significance of this episode requires an analysis of migration to Britain during the Second World War.
Second, the war resulted in certain established minority groups in Britain being augmented and others being created for the first time. The lack of research in this area has meant that there is little understanding of the processes which led to the various post-war settlements.

Third, it has been argued that employment has been the 'most fundamental if not the most important relationship into which newcomers entered on arrival' (Holmes 1988:281). In the context of total war, the emphasis within the literature has tended to be upon the extension of employment 'opportunities' for migrants and minorities (e.g. Kushner and Lunn 1990). Research on the period of the Second World War allows for this notion to be critically explored through an examination of the position of migrants and minorities within the wartime and post-war economies. In particular, attention will be given to the impact of refugee and alien status.

Fourth, the mediating role of the state in the process of migration has been an important feature of migration research. Much of this research has focused on issues concerned with the development and implementation of immigration law. But, other social contexts in which the state has played a significant role have been under-researched. As the multifarious nature of state intercession is at no time more evident and transparent than during total war, a study of the period of the Second World War provides an opportunity for an examination of state intervention in the wider pattern of social relations which occurred during the process of migration at this time.

Finally, it has been noted that the position of migrant and minority groups 'changes dramatically in wartime, usually for the worse, as dominant societies view national or racial groupings as hostile' (Panayi 1993:3). As there are relatively few detailed accounts of the social effects of total war on such groups in Britain, a study of the Second World War period allows for the analysis of both official and popular responses to the presence of migrant and minority groups. In addition, it allows for an examination of responses to migrant and minority groups in the immediate aftermath of the war.
ALIEN EUROPEAN MIGRATION

As a consequence of inward migration to Britain during the period of the Second World War, the number of aliens in Britain almost doubled from 239,000 in 1939 to 429,329 in 1950.¹ The significance of alien European migration is that this increase in the alien population can be largely accounted for by the arrival before, during and after the war of certain European groups: specifically, German-Jewish refugees, Polish exiles, German prisoners of war, Italian prisoners of war, Ukrainian prisoners of war and European Volunteer Workers.

In recovering alien European migration, this thesis is not intended as a comprehensive account, but will instead focus on the above migrant groups. There are five reasons for concentrating on these specific groups. First, they represented the most numerically significant alien European migrant groups. Second, it was members of these groups who remained and settled in Britain at the end of the war. Third, these alien European groups were defined by the British state as an important source of labour both during and immediately after the Second World War. Fourth, the alien status held by members of these groups placed them in a relatively weak position, and the extent to which the British state exploited their vulnerability in the pursuit of labour is worthy of consideration. Finally, whilst acknowledging that responses to these groups were complex, their presence was nevertheless distinguished by a considerable degree of official and popular antagonism.

In the light of the unevenness identified above within the migration literature, it should be noted that some of these alien European migrant groups have been more thoroughly researched than others. What follows is a brief account of each of these groups which goes on to feature particular aspects of their migration history that necessitates further research.
German-Jewish Refugees

Following the rise of National Socialism in Germany and Hitler’s succession as Chancellor in 1933, policies were introduced which affected the legal and social position of German-Jews. It was against this background of Nazi persecution that German-Jewish refugees began to arrive in Britain. Initially, this movement was curbed by British immigration policies that effectively restricted entry to such groups as professionals and academics. It was not until the end of 1938 that the main stream of German refugees began to arrive in Britain. This followed the relaxation of restrictions for certain groups, namely domestics, trainees, transmigrants and refugees whose maintenance was guaranteed (many of whom were children). At the beginning of the Second World War, there were some 50,000 German and Austrian Jewish refugees in Britain (Sherman 1973), with a further 10,000 arriving during the War (Wasserstein 1979). During the early part of the Second World War, many of these German-Jewish refugees were interned as ‘enemy aliens’. The majority of internees were later released, many on condition that they entered war service or undertook work of national importance. At the end of the war, a sizeable number of these German-Jewish refugees settled permanently in Britain, and thereby added to the established Jewish community.

It has been acknowledged here that the history of German-Jewish refugee migration to Britain has received a relatively generous level of academic attention. Nevertheless, there is still no complete account of this migration, as certain aspects have not been fully investigated. Within this context, it can be argued that one area which requires further research is the process of German-Jewish migration to Scotland. Thus, while ‘some thousands found refuge in Scotland’ (Kolmel 1984:251), comparatively little consideration has been given to this presence. Apart from a paper on refugee physicians in Scotland between 1933 and 1945 (Collins 1988), the work of Kolmel (1984) represents the only study of this migration to Scotland. Moreover, his research has largely concentrated on only one facet of this history, namely the involvement in refugee organisations. Hence, there has been no attempt to identify the general process of German-Jewish refugee migration to Scotland.
Polish Exiles

Following the German invasion of Poland in September 1939 and the subsequent collapse of Polish resistance, thousands of Polish troops and civilians sought refuge in neighbouring countries. A movement to France ensued, where the exiled Poles reorganised. When, in June 1940, the fall of France seemed imminent, arrangements were made for the evacuation of an estimated 20,000 Polish service personnel and 3,000 civilians to Britain (Sword 1989, Kernberg 1990). A Polish government-in-exile was then established in London, while the Polish troops were mostly located in Scotland where they reformed and were further supplemented by the later arrival of other Poles. The majority of Polish service personnel who arrived in Britain during the early years of the war left in 1944 as part of the Allied invasion force. Nevertheless, the on-going arrival of Poles meant that there continued to be over 50,000 Polish service personnel in Britain at the end of the war (Sword 1989).

Shortly after the end of the war in Europe, the British government transferred its allegiance from the Polish government-in-exile to the provisional government in Warsaw (a government formed after the arrival of the Red Army, and widely believed by Polish exiles to be under the direct influence of the U.S.S.R.). At this time, there were some 250,000 members of the Polish armed forces who were under British command and distributed throughout various countries (Sword 1989). Many of these Polish exiles were strongly anti-Communist, and therefore reluctant to return to Poland. At first, the British government encouraged the Poles to opt for voluntary repatriation, but this policy was subsequently revised to allow for the resettlement of those who refused repatriation under the political conditions in Poland. It has been argued that, 'The fundamental influence over official policy was the economic context in which the government had to operate and the need for additional workers' (Holmes 1988:212). In 1946, arrangements were made to assist the resettlement of service personnel through the agency of the Polish Resettlement Corps. As a result of this initiative, there were 127,000 Poles in Britain in 1949, although by 1950 this number had fallen to around 115,000 following further
It has been noted here that the migration of Polish exiles to Britain during the period of the Second World War has begun to receive an appropriate level of attention. Nonetheless, there remains an incomplete and uneven account of the process of this migration. For example, while Sword (1989) examined a broad range of factors in his study of the circumstances which led to the formation of a Polish community in Britain, he mostly concentrated on recovering the military and political dimensions. As a result, the entry of Poles into the British post-war economy was not as thoroughly researched. Similarly, the study by Kernberg (1990) on the Polish community in Scotland has given relatively little regard to the entry of Poles into the post-war Scottish economy. This is a significant limitation when considering that the settlement of Polish exiles in Britain was, to a large extent, synonymous with placement in employment. In addition, an account of post-war responses to Poles in Britain, and in Scotland in particular, continues to be undeveloped.

**German Prisoners of War**

For most of the Second World War, there was a relatively small German prisoner of war presence in Britain (when compared to the Italian prisoner of war population). For example, in March 1944, their number exceeded no more than 2,000 (Kochan 1980). The main reason for this was the British government's policy from an early stage of the war of transferring German prisoners of war overseas, instead of using them as a source of labour (as in the case of Italian prisoners of war). However, following the Allied invasion of Europe which began in June 1944, an increasing number of German prisoners of war were brought to Britain. This paralleled the decision to begin using German prisoners of war as a source of labour. By the end of the Second World War, a quarter of the 199,550 German prisoners of war brought to Britain had been put to work (and were soon regarded as a substitute for Italian prisoner of war labour). By September 1946, three quarters of the 402,000 German prisoners of war in Britain were in work.
This number began to decline from late 1946 as a result of repatriation, a process that was eventually completed in 1948. Nevertheless, a scheme was introduced which allowed German prisoners of war to remain in Britain temporarily as civilian agricultural workers. Some 15,700 were subsequently given permission to settle permanently, on condition that they stayed in agricultural employment (Isaac 1954). The majority of these former German prisoners of war were released from employment restrictions during the course of 1951.

As stated above, there have been three key works that have examined enemy prisoners of war in Britain during the Second World War period (Faulk 1977, Sullivan 1979, Kochan 1980). Though all have concentrated on German prisoners of war, there is still no comprehensive account of the migration process involving this group. The study by Faulk was specifically concerned with the attempts made by the British government to 're-educate' those German prisoners of war who held National Socialist attitudes. The research by Sullivan was structured by his concern with post-war reconciliation through 'person-to-person peace' (1979:viii). It was within this context that he examined the development of relations between German prisoners of war and the British populace. The work of Kochan was the most wide ranging, as it was concerned with several aspects of the process of German prisoner of war migration as experienced by prisoners of war and those with whom they came in contact. Although one of the aspects examined by Kochan was the employment of German prisoners of war, it was only given superficial attention. The lack of consideration given to the use of German prisoners of war labour, can be seen as one of the most significant limitations of this literature.

**Italian Prisoners of War**

At the beginning of January 1941, the British wartime government decided to bring Italian prisoners of war (captured on the North African Front) to Britain as a source of labour. On their arrival, most were formed into a supplementary agricultural labour force. Following Italy's capitulation in 1943, the Italian prisoners of war were classified as either co-operators or non-co-operators, the former being employed within diverse sectors of the war economy. At the
end of the war, there were 131,800 Italian prisoners of war working in Britain (Isaac 1954). In the immediate post-war period they continued to be widely used as a source of labour, although most were repatriated by the end of 1946 (Sullivan 1979). Some Italian prisoners of war were allowed to defer their repatriation and remain in Britain under a scheme which enabled them to take employment as civilian agricultural workers on twelve month contracts. This scheme was later extended to those who had been repatriated and wished to return as farm workers. Eventually, some 1,100 former Italian prisoners of war were allowed to settle in Britain (Isaac 1954).

The key literature on the movement of prisoners of war to Britain has concentrated explicitly on German prisoners of war, and almost no consideration has been given to Italian prisoners of war. The study by Faulk (1977) made no mention whatsoever of Italian prisoners of war. Although both Sullivan (1979) and Kochan (1980) did make reference to Italian prisoners of war, it was minimal and usually within the context of comparisons made with German prisoners of war. Neither gave any indication as to the significance of Italian prisoner of war migration to Britain. Consequently, the development of the scheme to bring Italian prisoners of war to Britain, and the conditions under which their labour was used, both during and immediately after the Second World War, remains unrecovered. In addition, there is virtually nothing known of the post-war scheme which allowed Italian prisoners of war to remain in Britain as civilian agricultural workers.

Ukrainian Prisoners of War

Following a short period of independence at the end of the First World War, an expansion of Communist control in the Ukraine resulted in its incorporation within the USSR. Between 1922 and 1939, harsh measures were introduced to suppress Ukrainian nationalism. With the German occupation of Ukrainian territory during the Second World War, many Ukrainians believed that their only hope of an independent Ukrainian republic lay in taking up German arms to free themselves from Soviet control (Tannahill 1958). Consequently, recruits were
formed into the Ukrainian 'Halychyna' Division (one of the non-German units constituted by the Nazis to fight on the Russian Front). After surrendering to the British forces in Austria in May 1945, members of the Ukrainian Division were held in Italy as prisoners of war.

In 1947, the British government arranged for a total of 8,397 Ukrainian prisoners of war (who were anxious to escape repatriation to the Soviet Union) to be brought from Italy to Britain. This movement occurred within the context of (on the one hand) pressure from the Soviet Union for their return (at a time of increasing political tension in East-West relations), and (on the other hand) the need for a source of labour to replace German prisoners of war in British agriculture (Tannahill 1958:31). In accordance with international obligations, the Ukrainian prisoners of war had all to be repatriated or to be given civilian status before 1 January 1949. By that date, the majority had assumed civilian status as European Volunteer Workers (Isaac 1954:184). Subsequently, these former prisoners of war were to comprise the core of a distinct Ukrainian community in Britain.

Despite some references within the general literature to Ukrainian prisoner of war migration to Britain (e.g. Isaac 1954, Tannahill 1958), no research has yet been undertaken to adequately chart this process. Consequently, the history of this group remains largely unrecovered. There has been some research carried out on the establishment of a Ukrainian community in Britain after the Second World War (e.g. Paraszczak 1969, Petryshyn 1980). The study by Paraszczak is in the form of an unpublished dissertation and it examines the Ukrainian community in Rochdale, while the study by Petryshyn, also unpublished, examines the political dimension of Ukrainian community development in Britain. However, neither of these works provide a detailed account of the Ukrainian prisoners of war. Although some attention has recently been given to Ukrainian prisoners of war (Cesarani 1992), this has been within the context of a study on the post-war arrival in Britain of suspected war criminals.
European Volunteer Workers

At the end of the Second World War, 'mainland Europe was a veritable refugee camp with millions of people encamped across the ravaged continent' (Walvin 1984:102). These people, most of whom were from the Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia), Poland, the Ukraine, and Yugoslavia, were collectively referred to as 'Displaced Persons'. Over one million did not wish to return to their country of origin, mostly for fear of political persecution, and remained in displaced persons camps. Those located in camps within the British controlled zones of Germany and Austria (and later in all three Western zones), were identified by the British government as a 'pool of human resource' which could be tapped (Holmes 1988:213). Those who volunteered for work in Britain entered through two main government organised labour schemes, namely, 'Balt Cygnet' and 'Westward Ho!' (Tannahill 1958). Between 1946 and 1950, the British government co-ordinated the recruitment and migration of some 80,000 'Displaced Persons' as 'European Volunteer Workers' for employment within the 'essential' industries and services in areas of particular labour shortage in Britain (Kay and Miles 1992).

MIGRATION TO SCOTLAND: A SCOTTISH CONTEXT

As already noted, there has in the main been no analytical separation between the process of migration to England and to Scotland within the migration literature. Rather, a congruence of migration experience is assumed, such that migration to England is viewed as representing a general picture of migration to Britain. Although migration to Scotland is more evenly represented in some of the literature (e.g. Holmes 1988, Colpi 1991), what is not generally acknowledged is that migration to Scotland has occurred under, and been determined by, distinct historically contingent structural conditions. In other words, there have been certain distinct historical and structural developments in Scotland which have led to the creation of a discernible Scottish context. These include specific historical circumstances which have led to social, cultural and ideological differences, and fundamental structural differences in the
economic and political spheres (Hechter 1975, Dickson 1980, 1982, 1989, Kellas 1984). Thus, it has been argued that, ‘Although there are many issues and processes common to political activity and relations in England and Scotland, these historical/structural factors do make for distinct processes in Scotland’ (Miles and Dunlop 1986:31).

The development of the Scottish economy is relatively well documented (e.g. Cairncross 1954). It is generally accepted that capitalist development in Scotland has certain historically specific characteristics, and has therefore not followed the same pattern as in England (Hechter 1975, Dickson 1980). In this way, the Scottish economy is held to have followed a 'distinct historical trajectory' (Dunlop 1988:6), with the concentration and dependence on heavy industry since the nineteenth century viewed as the main distinguishing feature of the historical development of the Scottish economy (Cairncross 1954). The failure of the Scottish economy to adequately diversify following the international decline of heavy industries during the inter-war period has been viewed as having major implications in that it was unable to lessen the impact of the decline and was more vulnerable to economic crises than the English economy (Golland 1948, Saville 1985). In addition, capital investment was not as great as that in England, with the development of Scottish capitalism to a great extent dependent upon and constrained by English capitalism (Dickson 1980). This was to have a significant effect on the development and competitiveness of the Scottish economy in the context of the British and world market. The extent of the economic differentiation between Scotland and England has, however, been the subject of some debate (e.g. Newby 1985, Kendrick, Bechhofer and McCrone 1985, McCrone, Kendrick and Straw 1989, Dickson 1989).

One of the major consequences of the historical and structural development of capitalism in Scotland has been an economy which has been characterised by relatively high levels of unemployment. Indeed, the level of unemployment in Scotland has been significantly higher throughout the post-war period than the British average (Lenman 1977). In this context, it has been argued that large-scale sectoral labour shortages did not develop in Scotland. That migration to Scotland has continued despite no major shortage of labour has significant implications for our understanding of the migration process, because one of the dominant
explanations for migration is that it is a response to demands for labour. In this respect, it is necessary to establish the extent to which the pattern of migration to Scotland was shaped by the structure and characteristics of the Scottish economy.

The distinct political structure of Scotland has developed as a consequence of its historical relationship with England, and can be dated to the Act of Union in 1707. Although Scotland lost political independence as a result of the Union, it retained a number of institutions which included its own legal, banking and education systems in addition to its own religious structure. The continued existence of these fundamental institutions (which are usually identified as characteristics of an independent nation state) has been used to support the distinctiveness of Scotland. Thus, it has been argued that, ‘Scotland constitutes, in important respects, a distinct proto-nation state’ (Miles and Dunlop 1986:26).

The distinct economic and political development in Scotland has given rise to a distinct ideological reproduction of class relations. Consequently, the historical formation of the Scottish working class can be distinguished from the English working class by a number of cultural characteristics (Young 1979). The importance of making the distinction between the historical experience of the English and Scottish working classes has been highlighted by E.P. Thompson (1963) in the preface to ‘The Making of the English Working Class’, where he emphasises that it is possible to ‘regard the English and Scottish experience as distinct’ (Thompson 1983:13-14). At the same time, the historical evidence suggests that the Scottish working class has been far from culturally homogenous (Miles and Dunlop 1986:31).

One of the most important manifestations of the distinct economic and political development in Scotland has been the rise of a political nationalism in the twentieth century. The history of political nationalism in Scotland and its form of expression has important implications for the analysis of Scottish migration history. In Scotland, nationalism has evolved against the background of a loss of national independence and recognition of its peripheral ‘colonial’ status to England (Hechter 1975). In England, nationalism has developed in more diffuse ways, not least because it has not been necessary to formulate a politics of independence. Some
aspects of English nationalism have been expressed in the form of fascist and neo-fascist movements which developed in response to the presence of Jewish and 'black' minorities. In this respect, it has been argued that Scotland can be distinguished from England by the absence of a racialisation of the political process (Miles and Dunlop 1986:23).

The development of political nationalism in Scotland has promoted the notion of a homogenous population which is viewed as an important feature of the Scottish social formation (Kellas 1968, Naim 1977, Harvie 1977, Kellas 1991). This notion has drawn heavily upon the history of outward migration, without taking account of inward migration to Scotland. An uncritical acceptance of this sentiment has, for example, led to the observation that, 'nationalist political organisation (in Scotland), without an identifiable 'foreign' presence to react against...has always proved inherently unstable' (Harvie 1981:VIII). Such arguments imply that, in the absence of a racialisation of the political process, racism does not exist in Scotland.

One aspect of national sentiment in Scotland has been the exaltation of a conception of Scottish national tolerance and hospitality, which has encouraged the perpetuation of a myth of Scotland as 'racist free'. While this notion has been questioned by some writers (e.g. Miles 1982, Miles and Muirehead 1986, Armstrong 1989), it has been generally reinforced by the few references made within the literature to racism in Scotland. An example of the extent to which this myth has been encouraged is to be found in the Encyclopaedia Britannica which states that, 'Scotland is remarkably free from racial and religious strife'. This is a curious observation given the historical legacy of sectarianism and racism towards the Irish in Scotland, and the development of Protestant organisations based upon virulent anti-Catholicism (e.g. Cooney 1982, Bruce 1985).

In examining migration to Scotland, this thesis takes into account a distinct Scottish context within the wider framework of British migration history. It holds that the process of migration to Scotland in specific historical circumstances can only be explained and understood when examined within this context. What is suggested is that at the same time as locating shared historical events and structural processes within the British nation-state, researchers must also
incorporate an analysis which locates the distinct structural and historical national (as well as regional) variations. In other words, researchers must identify and distinguish the process of migration to Britain at both an intra and inter national level, in order to establish a representative and comprehensive analyses of migration to Britain.

As a contribution to the study of migration to Britain, this thesis therefore means to document the arrival, presence and settlement in Scotland during the period of the Second World War of certain alien European migrant groups. In doing so, it aims to challenge the prevailing image of Scottish migration history as almost exclusively characterised by outward migration. In addition, it seeks to recover the effects of official and popular negative responses on certain European migrant and minority groups in Scotland, and thereby call into question the conception of supposed Scottish tolerance. Furthermore, in view of the lack of first hand accounts of migrants within the literature, this thesis intends to respond by interviewing members of each of the groups under study. It will thereby draw on personal narratives, supported by documentary archival material, to provide a more detailed and authentic account of the migration process of each group (see Methodological Appendix).

A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

This thesis is also presented as a sociological contribution to the history of migration to Britain. It seeks to address certain empirical and theoretical limitations which have characterised much of the sociological research into migration to Britain.

It has been acknowledged that 'sociologists have dominated academic research on immigration into Britain', but this recognition has been justly tempered with the qualification that 'sociological literature does not convey any impression of immigration as a continuing process; moreover, the weight of emphasis in these enquiries has centred upon Black and Asian immigration since 1945' (Holmes 1991b:191). This observation by Holmes refers primarily to
sociological research carried out within the 'race relations' paradigm, and draws attention to the limitations of this approach in the study of migration to Britain.

In concentrating almost exclusively upon post-war New Commonwealth migration, sociologists working within the 'race relations' framework have generally failed to take account of the long history of migration to Britain, a history that has been shown to have been primarily characterised by the arrival of migrants from other European nation-states. Consequently, they have unwittingly supported the common sense notion of Britain as having traditionally evolved as a homogenous society.

Furthermore, the dominance of the sociology of 'race relations' has led to a theoretical understanding of responses to migrants which has been chiefly limited to the social consequences of New Commonwealth migration, as conceptualised through the inter-related notions of 'race' and 'race relations' (Banton 1967, 1977, 1987, 1991, 1992, Rex 1970, 1983, 1986). In this conception, the idea of 'race' is closely associated with the idea of 'black', and 'race relations' are constructed around a polarity between 'black' and 'white' (Yeboah 1988). Moreover, the concept of racism has been used almost exclusively to explain the consequences of hostility and discrimination by 'white' people towards 'black' people.

The marginalisation of European migration to Britain would seem to imply that this history has been unproblematic. In other words, responses to European migration would appear to have been excluded from consideration as it involved the arrival of 'white' people, a process held not to have resulted in 'race relations' situations. However, the recent historical evidence suggests that hostility and discrimination was not limited to 'black' migrants, as 'white' European migrants were also seen to constitute a 'social problem' and 'political issue'. Furthermore, it would seem that much of the negative response to migration has common themes and is, to a large extent, independent of the particular migrant group and of the conjuncture in which the migration occurs. The 'race relations' paradigm is therefore unable to adequately account for the consequences of 'white' migration.
It is argued here that sociologists need to re-contextualise New Commonwealth migration within the broader framework of British migration history. This process needs to take place through a critique of the 'race relations' paradigm, and to be informed by a wider theoretical framework which goes beyond the 'race relations' paradigm. This enterprise has been facilitated by the work of a number of writers who have developed a critique of this perspective in recent years, and which has led to the advancement of alternative theoretical traditions (e.g. Hall 1980, Miles 1982, 1987, 1993, Cohen 1987). By building on their interventions, which have included the development of a wider perspective at both a historical and theoretical level, it is possible to establish a broader sociology of migration.

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter has reviewed the extant literature on the history of migration to Britain. It identified the recent expansion in research on the history of alien European migration as one of the most significant developments in the field. At the same time, attention was drawn to disparities within the research which made for an incomplete account of this history. It was shown that while some migrant groups received relatively generous attention, others had been under-researched. In addition, it was noted that certain historical periods were less well researched than others, with the period of the Second World War viewed as in particular need of further research. An unevenness in what is known of European migration to different parts of Britain was also highlighted, with migration to Scotland seen to have been especially neglected. It was proposed that a contribution to British migration history could be made by concentrating upon these three areas of relative silence and integrating them to form the subject-matter of this thesis, namely, alien European migration to Scotland during the period of the Second World War. Finally, it was argued that while sociological research on migration has been largely dominated by the 'race relations' framework, the approach is unable to take adequate account of the empirical consequences of the migrations to be researched by this thesis as it has been formulated solely within the context of post-war New Commonwealth migration.
CHAPTER 2

THE MIGRATION OF ALIEN EUROPEANS TO SCOTLAND 1933 - 1945

INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims to provide a largely descriptive account of alien European migration to Scotland between 1933 and 1945. It is not intended as a comprehensive account, but concentrates on four groups: specifically, German-Jewish refugees, Polish exiles, Italian prisoners of war and German prisoners of war. These groups will be examined separately and in chronological order, so as to establish the specific conjuncture of events which characterised their arrival and presence in Scotland. Accordingly, the chapter is divided into four main sections, each of which focuses upon one of the above groups. The sections are sub-divided, so that they begin by examining the key determinants of each migration, then provide an account of the process within a general British context, and finally within a specific Scottish context.

Furthermore, particular attention will be given to aspects of the migration process that inform the following themes. First, consideration will be given to the role of the state in shaping the position of alien Europeans within the economy under changing historical circumstances. Second, attention will be given to the influence of social relations between migrant groups and the indigenous population, as well as established minority communities, on patterns of subsequent migration and settlement.
GERMAN-JEWISH REFUGEES

During the Second World War there was a significant increase in Britain's European alien population owing to the presence of a 'national conglomeration of refugees' (Holmes 1988:182). A large number of these refugees were German and Austrian Jews, the vast majority having arrived before the outbreak of war. At the beginning of the war there were 49,500 refugees from Germany and Austria in Britain, of whom approximately 90 percent were Jews (Hirschfeld 1984:65). It has been estimated that no more than 10,000 arrived during the war (Wasserstein 1979:82). Of the German-Jewish refugees who arrived in Britain before and during the Second World War, some thousands found refuge in Scotland (Kolmel 1984:251).

This section begins with a brief description of the events which led to the movement of German-Jewish refugees. It is then chronologically divided into two main parts, with the first part examining the period between 1933 to 1939, and the second part examining the period between 1939 and 1945. The two parts are subdivided so that they first provide an account of German-Jewish refugee migration within a general British context, and then within a specific Scottish context.

The Background: Persecution in Nazi Germany

With the rise of National Socialism in Germany and Hitler's succession as Chancellor in January 1933, policies were introduced which affected the legal and social position of German-Jews. Initially, legislation was passed which prohibited the employment of Jews in the civil service, schools and universities, as well as in the legal profession. In 1935, the Nuremberg Laws were enacted which transformed the notion of the 'purity of German blood' into a legal category. The laws forbade marriage and extra-marital relations between Jews and 'Aryan' Germans, and disenfranchised those 'nationals' who were not of German 'blood'. Following the Anschluss in March 1938, the Nuremberg Laws were extended to Austria. In November of that
year, there occurred the Kristallnacht (Crystal night) pogrom that resulted in the deaths of almost a hundred Jews, the destruction of Jewish property, and the detention of some twenty thousand Jews who were sent to concentration camps (Wasserstein 1979:6). One interviewee gave the following personal account of Kristallnacht:

'Crystal night was pretty drastic for me. My parents woke up with two Nazis standing beside their bed with Braun revolvers, and they were both taken to the local prison. My mother was released the next morning and my father was taken to concentration camp. So that was Crystal night as far as I was concerned.'  

The measures taken against the Jews during the pre-war years were intended to drive them out of Germany as 'onwards emigration' was a 'central element in the German Government's Jewish policy' (Wasserstein 1979:6). In January 1939, the Reich Central Office for Jewish Emigration was established to promote the departure of Jews 'by every possible means' (Dawidowicz 1976:140). Consequently, an estimated 226,000 Jews left Germany between 1933 and 1939 (Wasserstein 1979:7).

British Context: 1933 - 1939

During the first years of Nationalist Socialist rule in Germany, only a relatively small number of Jewish refugees were admitted into Britain. Hence, while some 154,000 refugees had left Germany by the end of 1937, no more than 5,500 had entered Britain (Hirschfeld 1984:2). In November 1938, the British Prime Minister (Neville Chamberlain) revealed that, apart from some 5,000 who had meanwhile left for other countries, only 11,000 refugees had been allowed into the country since 1933 (Carsten 1984:12). In response to the exodus of Jewish refugees following the Kristallnacht pogrom, the government responded by introducing a visa system for aliens holding German or Austrian passports which further controlled the entry of refugees into Britain (Sherman 1973:90). However, restrictions were relaxed for 'such categories as transmigrants, trainees, domestics and those refugees whose maintenance was guaranteed'
(Berghahn 1988:113). By the beginning of the war some 50,000 German and Austrian Jews had arrived in Britain (Sherman 1973:271).

Against the background of Nazi persecution, the admission of Jewish refugees into Britain occurred within the context of a highly restrictive immigration policy and a process of selection. The reluctance of the British government to admit a greater number of Jewish refugees into the country was explicitly linked to the issue of unemployment. This was made clear from the outset when in October 1933 the Foreign Secretary (Sir John Simon) wrote that the 'paramount consideration was unemployment and the condition of the labour market'. In this way, the depressed pre-war economic climate, characterised by high levels of unemployment, was an effective bulwark to any large scale entry of refugees. Moreover, it was within this economic climate that the Home Secretary (Sir John Anderson) referred to the danger of the expansion of an anti-Jewish movement in Britain if substantial numbers of Jewish refugees were admitted to Britain. Thus, it has been argued that 'Jews fleeing racist persecution in Germany could not be admitted to Britain because of racist agitation in Britain' (Miles and Solomos 1987:83). Although some Jewish refugees did enter certain forms of employment, this did not alter the official attitude that Britain was a 'country of transit, not of settlement for the purpose of work, except in individual selected cases' (Berghahn 1988:77).

Another feature of government policy towards German-Jewish refugees, was the principle that they were only to be admitted if it were shown that they would not become a financial burden to the state. The migration of refugees who did enter Britain was therefore greatly facilitated by an assurance given to the Government in 1933 by leaders of the Anglo-Jewish community that 'all expense, whether in respect of temporary or permanent accommodation or maintenance will be borne by the Jewish community without ultimate charge to the state' (Sherman 1973:30). This was a highly significant move because a requirement of exit for Jews from Germany was the sequestration by the state of most or all personal capital or property (Miles and Solomos 1987). The undertaking by the Jewish community was honoured until after the outbreak of war.
The Jewish refugee population in Britain before the war was comprised largely of specific and identifiable groups. In the first instance they were mostly 'high profile' refugees, whose entry into Britain was encouraged by the British Government. This followed a Cabinet decision taken in April 1933 to 'try to secure for this country prominent Jews who were being expelled from Germany and who had achieved distinction whether in pure science, applied science, such as medicine or technical industry, music or art. This would not only obtain for this country the advantage of their knowledge and experience but would also create a favourable impression in the world, particularly if our hospitality were offered with some warmth'.

In addition to distinguished academics, other Jewish academics also sought positions in British institutions following their dismissal from German universities and colleges. The Academic Assistance Council (later The Society for the Protection of Science and Learning) was founded in April 1933 in order to assist these scholars, and to help them find posts in either British or American universities (Bentwich 1956:17). In 1946, it was reported that of the 2,541 scholars registered with the Society, 601 were resident in Britain, of whom 307 were German, the 'great majority' having migrated to America (Berghahn 1984:78).

One of the first German-Jewish refugee groups to arrive in Britain consisted of medical professionals. Initially, the British government was willing to accept 500 doctors from Germany, but this number was reduced to 50 following resistance from the British Medical Association (Berghahn 1984:83). Nevertheless, hundreds of German doctors registered with medical schools in Britain to obtain a British qualification, in the hope of securing a permit to practice. Because the qualification held by German doctors was not fully recognised, they were required to gain a British qualification in order to be licensed as medical practitioners. By 1936, of about 1,800 doctors who had left Germany, some 300 had arrived in Britain (Collins 1988:133). Furthermore, German-Jewish medical students were allowed to enter Britain to complete their studies and qualify. Subsequently, German refugee doctors were placed on a Temporary Register of the Medical Council, and were permitted to work in hospitals and to assist British practitioners. By the beginning of the war, there were some 1,000 German and Austrian doctors on the Temporary Register (Berghahn 1984:85).
refugee dentists were allowed to enter and practice in Britain (Berghahn 1984:85). The conditions of entry for refugee dentists were made easier because their German qualification was recognised (Bentwich 1956:53).

One of the main occupational groups of German-Jewish refugees to enter Britain before the war was that comprised of business people. It was ‘relatively easy’ for such refugees to be allowed entry if they were prepared to establish a factory in the so-called ‘Depressed Areas’ of Britain, which included Wales, the north-east of England and Scotland (Berghahn 1984:106). By the beginning of the war, a third of the 500 or so factories set up by refugee business people were located within these areas (Berghahn 1984:106).

The largest group of German-Jewish refugees was formed by those who were given permits to work as domestic servants. Despite the high level of unemployment in Britain during the 1930s, domestic service was one area in which there was a shortage of labour. An increasing reluctance amongst the indigenous population to enter domestic service meant that there was therefore a ‘demand for this type of Refugee’.

Nevertheless, most of the refugees who entered Britain in this way had no actual experience of domestic service, many of whom had previously employed domestic servants. By the beginning of the war some 21,000 male and female refugees, including married couples accompanied by almost 1,000 children, had arrived in Britain to take up employment as domestic servants (Bentwich 1956:45, Sherman 1973:255).

The second largest group of German-Jewish refugees to arrive in Britain before the war was comprised of unaccompanied children. Most arrived after the Kristallnacht pogrom as part of the so-called ‘Kindertransport’, which included transports made up of both Jewish and Christian ‘non-Aryan’ children. This migration followed a House of Commons debate on 21 November 1938 on the Jewish refugee issue, which led the government to announce its decision to permit an ‘unspecified number of Children up to age 17 from German-Occupied Lands to enter the U.K. as transmigrants’. The migration was organised by ‘The World Movement for the Rescue of Children’, which later became ‘The Movement for the Care of Children from Germany’. The Movement had to give an assurance that the ‘children would not become a public charge and
would either be emigrated in due course or absorbed in Great Britain in ways approved by the Government' (Sherman 1973:183-4). The German-Jewish refugee children were divided into two categories: 'Guaranteed' and 'Non-Guaranteed'. The guaranteed children were those whose relatives or friends had undertaken to maintain them, while non-guaranteed children were those who the Movement itself, or local refugee committees, had undertaken to support following their selection by Jewish organisations in Germany and Austria.

Most of the refugee children were transported by train from Germany and Austria to Holland, where they boarded ship and disembarked at Harwich. On arrival, most of the non-guaranteed children were taken directly to a nearby vacant holiday camp at Dovercourt. One interviewee who was among the first 'transports' to arrive in Britain (3 December 1938), gave the following description of her journey:

'We were all told to congregate at a station in Berlin and we boarded the train and travelled to the German-Dutch border. The 250 children on the train were not all from Berlin, some joined from Hamburg and some joined from Hanover. I think the youngest was four and the oldest seventeen. Before we left Germany, all our cases were searched and any valuables were taken away from us. And we were told of course on no account was anybody to make any sound or to cry. We had nothing to eat on the journey until we crossed the Dutch border. We continued to the Hook of Holland and we boarded the ship, it was a very rough crossing. We were all pretty miserable. However, we arrived the next day at Harwich, we were welcomed and then we were taken to Dovercourt Bay holiday camp where I stayed for about a month'.

As the Home Office insisted that the number of children at Dovercourt camp should be kept constant, 'drastic measures' were taken to 'sell' the children so as to enable others to be evacuated (Gershon 1966:35). In the process of finding foster-parents for these refugee children it has been noted that, 'There was an embarrassing competition to get the younger boys and girls' (Bentwich 1956:66). One interviewee who had been employed at the camp and
another who had been there as a child refugee, gave the following accounts of conditions under which many refugee children were placed with foster-parents:

'The Home Office stipulated that at any given time the camp cannot house more than 800. The Germans would have allowed more out, but the Home Office wouldn't let them unless some of the 800 places were vacated. The only way to vacate them, to get foster-parents. It was against all principles of psychology or humanity. They went with people and to places we knew absolutely nothing about because there was no time for investigation or screening. There was no option, through hook and crook to get rid of as many as we can, so that so many places can be taken by those threatened in Germany. And so in the big assembly hall in Dovercourt, the 'Market Place', we scrubbed the children and told them to behave nicely, and we advertised for foster-parents. I remember a couple, both came to my office and said, "We'd like to have a little miss blue eyes and blonde pleats". That's how it went. We took them to the dining hall, they lined up, and they took the one they wanted'.

'At Dovercourt Bay we had English lessons there. Very often when we were sitting at our lessons these people used to come around to appraise us. This was because people were wanting to either adopt children or take children into their homes. And on one or two occasions I was asked to stand up and they said "Are you Jewish?", and I said "Yes". Then it was, "Oh, what a pity". Otherwise they would have taken me. So you were really sort of looked over to see whether you were suitable for them, and if you weren't that was it'.

By the beginning of the Second World War almost 10,000 German and Austrian refugee children had arrived in Britain, of whom approximately ninety percent were Jewish (Bentwich 1956:67).
A further group of German-Jewish refugees who entered Britain before the war consisted of male and female trainee youths. With the increasing persecution of Jews in Germany, Jewish organisations recognised that Palestine was to be a principal destination for refugees, especially for the youth. In preparation for settlement in Palestine, it was considered necessary to train the 'Jewish youth of Germany for a productive life as cultivators of the soil and as artisans' (Bentwich 1956:19). The preparation of Jewish youths for Palestine was largely coordinated by the 'Halutz Movement', which established training centres both inside and outside Germany (Bentwich 1956:86). Immediately following the Kristallnacht pogrom, the Central British Fund proposed an initiative to bring some 1,000 trainee youths from Germany and Austria to Britain. The scheme was endorsed by the government and later extended to accommodate 1,500 youths, for whom permits were issued (Bentwich 1956:94). In Britain, the 'Halutz Movement' was enthusiastically supported by the Zionist Federation, which took a particular interest in the project. A similar scheme called the 'Youth Aliya Movement' was also established in Britain for the purpose of providing training for those wishing to migrate to Palestine, but who had not arrived through the 'Halutz' scheme (Gershon 1988:78, Bentwich 1944). By early 1939, there were 16 agricultural training centres operating throughout Britain. At the beginning of the war, of the 1,500 trainee youths who had been issued with permits, only 1,350 had succeeded in leaving Germany and Austria. Of this number, 475 had been placed in centres, 615 were working with individual farmers, and the remainder were awaiting training in other occupations (Bentwich 1956:97).

Scottish Context: 1933 - 1939

The migration of German-Jewish refugees to Scotland before the outbreak of the Second World War paralleled, in many respects, the wider pattern of migration to Britain. Nevertheless, this migration and the experience of the refugees involved was also related to specific conditions in Scotland, and was therefore in some ways unique.
It has already been noted that German-Jewish refugee migration to Britain was significantly influenced by economic conditions and concerns over unemployment. The structural condition of the Scottish economy was such that the economic depression of the 1930s had particularly far reaching consequences for Scotland in respect to the level of unemployment. In other words, the factors which contributed to the British government's restrictive immigration policy towards German-Jewish refugees, applied to an even greater extent in Scotland.

In response to the refugee situation, a number of organisations were established in Scotland. They included 'The Scottish National Council for Refugees', and 'The Scottish Christian Council for Refugees'. The vast majority of refugee work in Scotland was, however, undertaken by individuals and organisations within the Scottish-Jewish community. The principal Jewish organisations were the Glasgow Jewish Committee and the Edinburgh Jewish Committee, which together represented the Jewish bodies throughout Scotland. It has been argued that the Scottish-Jewish community played a particularly active part in refugee work, regardless of the fact that members of the community were 'predominantly Eastern European in origin and did not feel particularly close to the German Jews' (Kolmel 1984:252). Moreover, it has been suggested that in the process of collecting money to fund the undertaking by the Anglo-Jewish community to maintain German-Jewish refugees, 'every financial demand made on the Jews in Glasgow was a greater burden than similar demands made on Jews in London', as the economic differences between the north and south of Britain were 'even more accentuated in the case of the Jewish communities in Glasgow and London' (Kolmel 1984:253).

The Jewish community in Scotland demonstrated a particular preference for the settlement of German-Jewish refugees in Palestine. Indeed, as early as March 1933 the Jews in Glasgow were discussing the establishment of a fund to assist such a settlement. There were two main reasons for this inclination within the Scottish-Jewish community. First, the Jews in Scotland were especially sensitive to the issue of unemployment, and the possible negative effects which the arrival of Jewish refugees could have for their community. Second, the Jewish community in Scotland, particularly in Glasgow, was a Zionist stronghold and considered that freedom from persecution was only possible in Palestine (Kolmel 1984:254). Hence, on the
occasion of an appeal by the Central British Fund in January 1939, a Jewish Glasgow newspaper wrote:

‘The Jewish tragedy in Germany has proved definitely that there is no hope for the Jewish people but the establishment of their national home, Palestine. On this aim all our activities must be centred and particularly our work for the rehabilitation of the stranded German refugees. Jews must persistently demand their right for national survival. The earmarking of our refugee fund subscriptions for Palestine is an excellent means of demonstrating this legitimate demand’.12

Notwithstanding the reservations which were expressed over the arrival of Jewish refugees, the Scottish-Jewish community made a vital contribution to securing the arrival of German-Jewish refugees in Scotland. The activities of the Scottish-Jewish community in the evacuation of Jews from Germany, is further illustrated through the following accounts of the arrival in Scotland of the various refugee groups.

Among the German-Jewish academics who arrived in Britain before the war were a number who had either received scholarships or secured posts at Scottish universities. In the course of placing these academics in Scotland, it was considered necessary to augment the work of the Academic Assistance Council and to develop a similar but autonomous initiative. Hence, a request was made for part of the money contributed to the Central British Fund by the Scottish-Jewish community to be returned for the support of German-Jewish refugee academics in Scotland (Kolmel 1984:253). By 1935, in addition to those who had received scholarships, seven German-Jewish academics had been given permanent posts at Scottish universities (Hirschfeld 1988:154). At a meeting held in Glasgow University in February 1939, a representative of the Scottish-Jewish community called for more refugee scholars to be absorbed into universities and other education establishments. The Principal of Glasgow University stated that ‘at least two of the displaced scholars were now on the staff of Glasgow University. They were appointed on exactly the same terms as other members of staff’.13
A further dimension to the connection between German-Jewish refugees and Scottish universities was that of entry into medicine. A principal factor here had been the established association between the Scottish-Jewish community, Scottish universities, and the field of medicine in Scotland. It has been argued that this link became a lifeline for Jewish refugee physicians from Nazi Germany (Collins 1988). Furthermore, in the process of obtaining the necessary qualification in order to practice in Britain, refugee physicians were able to take the examinations of the Scottish Triple Qualification Board, which required them only to undertake a one year period of study as compared to two in England. This led to Scotland, and not England, becoming the chief destination of refugee physicians' (Collins 1988:134).

Other German-Jewish refugees from the medical profession who arrived in Scotland were dentists. One interviewee provided the following account of the process by which her dentist husband reached and began to practice in Glasgow:

"My husband had the permission to practice as a dentist here in Glasgow, June 1937. There was permission granted to 40 foreign dentists. He was one of them. He could practice everywhere but the centre of London. So we looked round the outskirts of London which we didn't like. We went to Liverpool which we didn't like. We went to Manchester which we liked already very much, but there were four German dentists there already. A friend of ours who was resident in Manchester said, "Why don't you go to Glasgow? Glasgow hasn't got any German dentists"...My husband just started off on his own, and had a lot of Jewish patients after we joined the synagogue."  

As Scotland was designated as one of the so-called 'Depressed Areas', German-Jewish refugee business people were encouraged to settle there and establish factories in order to provide employment. One interviewee described the circumstances under which her husband founded a business in Glasgow as follows:
'My husband got permission to enter the country on the condition that he would employ labour. Wherever there was a lot of unemployment, they were directed there. He was offered three places, Wales, Northern Ireland, and Glasgow. He said it rained in Wales, and he came to Glasgow. It rained here too! He was actually allocated one of the newly built factories in Hillington. But by the time he came, which was on the third of September 1939, that was restricted area because there were war factories there, so he had to start in town. We had a hat factory.'

It would appear from comments made during meetings of The Scottish National Council for Refugees that the attempt to attract German-Jewish refugee business people to Scotland was not particularly successful. At a meeting of the Council in July 1939, a prominent member of the Edinburgh Jewish community referred to the setting up of a factory in South Wales by Jewish refugees which employed 200 former miners. He stated that they wanted 'some of this work in Leith and Dunfermline and also extended to other parts of Scotland and if they could only take a long view of things just now and select very carefully the people who were coming, they might be able to utilise their intelligence, initiative and wide experience.' At a meeting of the Council in November 1939, it was stated that 'but for the war, negotiations would have been completed for the establishment of several new light industries in Scotland by refugees who had been compelled to give up business in Germany and who were now in France and elsewhere'.

The arrival of German-Jewish refugee domestic servants in Scotland was mostly arranged through the Scottish Domestic Bureau for Refugees, which was established in December 1938 in Edinburgh. The Bureau co-ordinated the work of the Scottish Christian Council for Refugees, The Society of Friends, the Edinburgh Jewish Refugee Committee and a Jewish sub-committee in Glasgow, in placing women and married couples as domestic servants in Scotland. Initially, the case-work for these refugees had been carried out by the Central Domestic Bureau in London, but in June 1939 the Home Office recognised the Scottish Domestic Bureau as the official agency for placing refugees in domestic work in Scotland. The Bureau also opened a domestic training hostel for refugees in Edinburgh to 'enable girls taking
It has been stated above that the vast majority of refugees who arrived as domestic servants had no prior experience of domestic work, and that many had themselves employed domestic labour. Nevertheless, these refugees were generally prepared to undertake whatever was necessary to escape Nazi persecution, even if this meant being regarded ‘simply as cheap labour’ (Kolmel 1984:258). These points are further illustrated in the following account given by an interviewee who, as a child, accompanied her parents to Scotland:

‘My parents eventually managed to get to Britain on a domestic visa. My father had before a good business, and so we had a couple of maids, a cook and a maid who was there for myself. So it was quite a turn-around, you can appreciate. My parents, they worked in a large house, my mother was housekeeper, my father did handyman and some gardening. The people got cheap labour. But my parents did not complain, they were glad to be out of Germany’.

The circumstances under which most German-Jewish refugee children arrived in Scotland, was largely dependent upon their ‘guaranteed’ or ‘non-guaranteed’ status. Those who arrived as guaranteed children did so following successful attempts by parents or guardians to secure guarantors. These guarantors included relatives who, as refugees, had arrived earlier in Scotland. Thus, one interviewee who had arrived in Glasgow with her dentist husband in 1937, became guarantor for a number of family members:

‘We were already established here when we became guarantor for the son of my first cousin. He came over with the Kindertransport from Nuremberg. Guarantor also for my parents-in-law who came over end of ’38, and for my mother who came over in April ’39’.

up domestic posts in Scotland to have a short period of training, prepare them for their future environment, and give them some knowledge of Scottish housekeeping methods. In all some 600 permits were granted by the Scottish Domestic Bureau for Refugees, but by the outbreak of war only 300 domestic permit holders had reached Scotland.
Another interviewee was guaranteed by relatives who arrived as refugees around the time of the Kristallnacht pogrom, and had established a business in Scotland:

'I had an aunt and uncle who used to export to this country. Uncle actually had been here in Glasgow before the Crystal Night to do some business, and he just stayed. My aunt also got out shortly after the Crystal Night with my two cousins. They lived in Glasgow and had a small factory in Hillington'.

Other guarantors for German-Jewish refugee children were obtained through contacts with members of the Scottish-Jewish community. Thus, one interviewee explained how her grandparents knew a Rabbi in Glasgow, who agreed to be her guarantor. Another interviewee described how she came to Scotland after her governess in Germany had contacted, and made arrangements with, a Jewish friend in Glasgow.

The process by which non-guaranteed children arrived in Scotland was determined by whether or not foster-parents had been found for them before their departure from Germany or Austria. Those for whom foster-parents had been identified were conveyed to Scotland almost immediately, while most of those for whom foster-parents were still to be found had to spend a period of time at the child refugee camp at Dovercourt. The manner in which this process developed is illustrated in the following description given by an interviewee:

'We were all taken to some hall where they sorted out the English kids and the Scottish kids. And people came there to collect whoever their name was down for. Many of them went into camps, they hadn't really a home to go to yet. And we stayed there overnight. Then the Scottish ones, we were put on trains in London. And when we came into Glasgow Central, the family I was going to were standing there waiting for me. I had corresponded with them before so they knew who was coming, and I knew who they were.'
The first party of non-guaranteed Jewish refugee children who had not been assigned foster-parents before their departure from Germany, arrived in Glasgow in late December 1938. A press report of their arrival stated that:

'Ten Jewish refugee children, most of whose fathers are in concentration camps in Germany, will find new homes with Glasgow people when they arrive in the city tonight from London. Members of the Jewish community in Glasgow volunteered to assist the refugee Child Aid Committee set up after the recent Jewish pogrom in Germany by becoming temporary foster-parents to some of the children and caring for them until they are old enough to emigrate. The party of children has been selected from those living in a camp at Hull during the past fortnight, and their ages range from 4 to 12 years. They are being brought to Scotland by train under the care of three Glasgow Jewish women, and after their arrival they will be conducted to the Glasgow Jewish Institute, where they will meet their temporary foster-parents. The children will not be legally adopted as the Home Office has forbidden this practice. The boys and girls will go to Glasgow schools, and later will undergo training to fit them, when they have grown up, to emigrate to Palestine or the Colonies. This is the first party of Jewish refugee children to reach Glasgow, and it is expected that others will follow'.

An interviewee who, together with her sister, was among this first group of non-guaranteed refugee children to arrive in Glasgow, gave the following account of her recollection of events:

'We came to Glasgow and Central Station at night and as frightened as can be. We were taken to this place, and then people came to collect us. You know, you don't know what is going on. "You go with her", and "You go with him". And I went with one family, and my sister went to the brother. So we were split up immediately. So I went up to Queens Park, and she lived in the Gorbals....She landed very lucky. They were lovely people, who were so kind, so sweet, and so good. The ones I landed with were not so nice.'
The above description alludes to the diverse experiences of the refugee children within their new temporary families. This ranged from foster-parents who accepted refugee children into their homes with warmth and sensitivity, to others who would appear to have regarded the children simply as a source of cheap labour. This variation can be further illustrated through the following accounts given by three interviewees:

'I had a guarantor, so I came straight to a Jewish family in Glasgow. I stayed with this family the whole time. I was one of the lucky ones, I didn't have many traumas. The people I stayed with were kind to me and helpful, and allowed me to study. Others didn't have it so good, and were exploited'.

'I was fostered by this family at fifteen, and used straight away as a children's nurse...I wanted to go to school but they said, "No, if you don't do as you are asked to do you must go to a camp with other children". Camp to me meant something more than just an ordinary camp, so I kept on working'.

'A family in Edinburgh wanted an eighteen year old person to help in the house, and since I was thirteen I would just have to do....They were not at all interested that I should get an education. When I asked to go to evening classes, they said there was no need for it. So I just cleaned the house. I was called a house daughter, but basically I was just a maid'.

It would appear that Scottish-Jewish organisations experienced some difficulty in finding a sufficient number of foster-parents for the non-guaranteed refugee children because the Jews in Scotland did not come forward in the expected proportions. The Glasgow Jewish Children's Aid Committee responded to this situation by converting a derelict building into a hostel where refugee children could be accommodated until placed with families. There is no record of the number of German and Austrian refugee children who arrived in Scotland, although the Glasgow Jewish Children's Aid Committee was itself responsible for the welfare of more than 300 children.
Most of the older children who arrived in Scotland as trainees were located at Whittingehame near Edinburgh, which was the country estate of the late Lord Balfour. The first of 200 refugee youths who were to receive two years of training in agriculture at 'The Whittingehame Farm School', as it was officially called, arrived in February 1939 as part of the 'Youth Aliya Movement'. This arrival received the attention of the press, which reported that:

'nineteen refugee Jewish girls from Greater Germany had arrived at their East Lothian haven of peace....They were the advance party of 200 young refugees who are to be trained in agricultural work on the Whittingehame estate before going to Palestine....The remainder of the 200 trainees, 170 of them boys, will all be accommodated at Whittingehame within the next month or two'.

The fact that the trainees were to leave Scotland and emigrate to Palestine after two years training, was emphasised by the chairman of the Edinburgh Refugee Committee (R. Cohen). He 'wished to refute rumours suggesting the possibility of the children being found employment in this country'.

British Context: 1939 - 1945

Immediately upon the outbreak of Second World War the British government took steps to halt the movement into Britain of refugees from Germany and countries under German occupation. All visas granted to German nationals before the war automatically ceased to be valid. As a result of the implementation of this policy, there was a marked reduction in the number of German-Jewish refugees entering Britain. However, certain exceptions were made. For example, the Home Office announced the possibility that transmigrants who wished to proceed overseas via Britain could be allowed to enter for 'a very short time' (Wasserstein 1979:81). With the fall of France and the occupation of Norway, Denmark and the Low Countries in the summer of 1940, the movement of German-Jewish refugees into Britain all but ceased. It has
been estimated that the increase in the German-Jewish refugee population in Britain between 1939 and 1945 was no more than 10,000.36

The number of German-Jewish refugees in Britain was reduced during the early years of the war following the voluntary departure of transmigrants to America (Lafitte 1940:252), and the involuntary deportations which took place within the context of provisions for internment (Gillman and Gillman 1980:168-171). Consequently, it has been estimated that by the summer of 1943, the number of German-Jewish refugees in Britain had fallen to 35,000 (Hirschfeld 1984:2).

With the outbreak of war, an increase in the assistance required by refugees meant that Jewish refugee organisations were unable to sustain the commitment given to the British government in 1933 that all Jewish refugees would be maintained by the Jewish community without charge to the state. The undertaking had been given on the assumption that the number of Jewish refugees expected to arrive in Britain 'might be as many as 3,000 to 4,000' (Sherman 1973:70). By 1939, the Jewish refugee population in Britain was being maintained by the Jewish community at a cost of £3,000,000 (Bentwich 1956:41). The demands on Jewish organisations had been compounded by the punitive dismissal of some 3,000 German refugee domestic servants from employment following the declaration of war (Wasserstein 1979:82). By December 1939, there were some 13,300 refugees who were being maintained by Jewish voluntary organisations (Wasserstein 1979:82). The government was initially reluctant to assist these organisations, as it would involve abandoning the established principle of voluntary maintenance. When the Cabinet Committee on Refugees considered the matter in December 1939, it was informed that:

"The heads of the Jewish Organisation had been reminded of the appalling consequences which must follow if their Organisation collapsed and if some 13,000 Jewish refugees were left to be maintained out of public funds. It was inevitable that in such circumstances anti-Semitic tendencies in the country would be strengthened."37
Instead of undertaking to fully fund the maintenance of Jewish refugees out of 'public funds', the Committee approved the recommendation of the Home Secretary (Sir John Anderson) that the government should finance half the cost of refugee maintenance. Nevertheless, there was a steady reduction in the number of refugees requiring financial support, and by May 1940 the number had fallen to 4,150 (Lafitte 1940:67).

A significant factor in the fall in the number of refugees requiring financial assistance was the consequence of a change in government policy towards the employment of refugees. After the initial wave of dismissals of refugees domestic servants from employment, there was little change in the employment situation of refugees during the first months of war. However, in response to a projected shortage of labour within the war economy the Home Secretary issued an Order in Council at the end of November 1939 governing the employment of refugees and other aliens who had arrived in Britain before the outbreak of war, and whose stay was subject to conditions either limiting the period of study, prohibiting them from taking employment, or restricting them to some specified occupation. The Order substituted these conditions with the general condition that refugees could enter employment in Britain with the permission of the Ministry of Labour and National Service. The refugees who arrived during the war were 'invited' to immediately register at local offices of the Ministry. Thus, in order to fulfill an assurance that the services of refugees would be 'utilised to the fullest advantage', local offices of the Ministry were instructed to grant permits for employment other than in certain key industries 'provided that the wages and general conditions of employment were not less favourable than those applicable to British labour, employed in like circumstances and provided suitable British labour was not available'. To gain employment in such key industries as power plants and arms works, refugees had first to obtain a permit from the Auxiliary War Services Department (Lafitte 1940:66).

It has been estimated that in the six months which followed the outbreak of war, some 20,000 refugees were placed in employment (Lafitte 1940:66). The change in employment conditions was described by one interviewee as follows:
'Our passport was stamped that entry on condition was that we take no employment, paid or unpaid. There was a lot of unemployment here too at this time and that was really the conditions many people got in here, that they would not take a job. So we were not allowed to take a job, and nobody knew when that would end. Of course when the war came that was all cancelled, because they needed people for factories and to take the jobs. I was drawn immediately into war work and helped to make uniforms.'

However, the movement of German-Jewish refugees into employment was disrupted in the summer of 1940 when many were interned as 'enemy aliens' (the policy of internment will be examined in chapter 4). Nevertheless, it was not long before the government reviewed this policy and most of the refugees were gradually released from internment. One of the main conditions of release was that they would undertake work which would contribute towards the war effort. In other words, many internees were released into employment. As the war progressed, refugees were located throughout the war economy, including the key industries (Parker 1957). Many refugees, especially those with relevant skills, were drawn into the war economy through the International Labour Branch of the Ministry of Labour and National Service. The formation of this Branch was announced in the House of Commons in August 1940 by the Minister of Labour (Ernest Bevin), who stated that, 'It will be part of the functions of the new International Labour Branch to obtain full knowledge of the persons available for employment and to seek suitable openings for them in industrial or other work'. He went on to explain that there was no intention of employing refugees in the place of British workers, but that he was 'extremely short of skilled men at present, and in utilising the skill and ability of a number of these men, I shall actually be putting Britishers to work'. In addition, many refugees were recruited into Labour Battalions of the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps, and were later able to enlist into combatant units of the British Armed Forces (Bentwich 1950).
Scottish Context: 1939 - 1945

The features which characterised the presence of German-Jewish refugees in Britain during the Second World War were, to a large extent, reflected in Scotland. At the same time, certain distinct processes and social relations in Scotland were to have a determining affect on this presence.

A transformation in the conditions of employment has been identified as one of the defining features of the German-Jewish refugee presence during the Second World War. Following the outbreak of war, this change was initially marked by the removal from employment of a large number of domestic servants in Scotland. This action not only reflected the 'Scottish populations lack of understanding' (Kolmel 1984:261) of the position of German-Jewish refugees, but also the state policy of moving those defined as 'enemy aliens' from the so-called 'Protected Areas'. Hence, when Edinburgh was declared a Protected Area more than one hundred refugee domestic servants were moved to Glasgow.®

When employment restrictions were revised shortly after the outbreak of war, refugees who had been formerly excluded from taking employment began to enter work in Scotland for the first time. However, during the Summer of 1940 many of those who had entered employment in Scotland were interned. Moreover, the extension of the Protected Areas in Scotland meant that those who had not been interned were forced to give up their employment and move elsewhere.® One interviewee, whose parents had been employed as domestic servants, described the impact of these developments on her family:

'Not long after the war broke out my father was interned. My mother and I were left in West Kilbride which became a Protected Area, so we had to leave again. We were constantly on the move. When we came to Glasgow, we had to start all over again. My mother found a job and then when I was old enough I found a job'.®
When the policy of internment was reversed and restrictions upon employment within the key industries were relaxed, many of the German-Jewish refugees in Scotland entered the war economy. Moreover, many of those who had been employed as domestic servants gave up their positions to take a more ‘active role in the war effort’.52

'I first had a job in domestic service with a Scottish family. Then eventually we were able to take on what I would call ‘real work’. I wanted to work on a farm, I thought that would be a great thing to do. I just walked into the agricultural college here (Glasgow) and said “I would like to work on a farm”. I couldn’t join the Land Army at that time. They sent me to do a course with chickens and hens, and then to a farm. I worked on that farm for a couple of years and then in a market garden until the end of the war’.53

The employment in agriculture was most popular among those refugees who regarded this work as preparation for when they would leave for Palestine. Thus, one interviewee recalled how: ‘On the farm where I was working there were other Jews there who were doing this Jewish thing. Some people who wanted to go to Israel went on farms and prepared themselves for work and living altogether’.54 Furthermore, the programme for training refugee youths for eventual settlement in Palestine was continued during the war. Thus, in addition to such training centres as Whitingehame, a number of camps or ‘farm colonies’ were established in Scotland. The first was set up in July 1943 when it was reported that ‘The camp, the first to be organised in Scotland by the Brei Akivah Movement, is modelled on communal centres which have already been established in Palestine’.55

In addition to agriculture, the German-Jewish refugees in Scotland were mainly employed in munitions, engineering and uniform factories, in the coal mines and in nursing.55 The diverse nature of their contribution to war work, as well as the conditions under which this was conducted, was summed up by one interviewee as follows:
During the course of the war all us refugees in Scotland like in the rest of the country, who were able bodied and old enough, had to do war work. We were more or less directed into areas like munitions, nursing or into the Land Army. Nursing was chosen for me. But I think most worked in munitions factories. Yes, it seemed like almost everybody was sent to Hillington to make munitions. One of the conditions was that we were not allowed to take any employment from the British. And then it was always understood it was only to be for the duration of the war.

Another feature of the German-Jewish refugee presence in Scotland during the Second World War was their developing relationship with the Scottish-Jewish organisations and wider community. The various Jewish organisations in Scotland continued to maintain a high level of responsibility for the refugees in the period which immediately followed the outbreak of war. This was particularly true of those in Glasgow who were given added responsibility following the arrival of refugees from the "Protected Areas". In addition, the subsequent internment of German refugees who had entered employment left dependants without a source of income and therefore reliant on the Jewish refugee organisations (Koimes 1984:257).

Nevertheless, the refugee work carried out by Jewish organisations and individuals did not automatically lead to a close relationship between the refugees and the Scottish-Jewish community. Indeed, a common theme which emerged from the interviews was the initial level of friction between German-Jewish refugees and the established Jewish community. This can be illustrated by the following two accounts:

"Despite everything, we were not readily accepted by the Jews here. First of all, they thought the German-Jews are not religious enough. And secondly, they said that we are feeling superior somehow. They had a complex about that."
Between the settled Jewish community and German-Jews there was a certain
distance to begin with. Yes, they were unsure of us. In Germany, German-Jewry
looked down on eastern Jewry. Now the tables were turned, here we come to
eastern Jewry which is established and we are not. That undercurrent was there, it
did exist. We were referred to as 'Yekke', which in Yiddish is a German-Jew. It is
not a compliment. It is used in a derogatory sense.®

However, as the war progressed, relationships between the German-Jewish refugees and the
Scottish-Jewish community did become closer. This was, in large part, influenced by
revelations concerning the 'Final Solution' of the Jewish question (Kolmel 1984:276-7).

There are no figures available on the number of German-Jewish refugees who remained and
settled in Scotland at the end of the war, or indeed on the total number who stayed Britain
(Gershon 1966:7). It would seem, however, that comparatively few subsequently remained in
Scotland. Many went to help build a Jewish homeland in Israel. Moreover, of those who
settled in Britain, most moved to England. It has been suggested that this was because 'their
best prospect in Scotland was the road which led to England' (Bermant 1967:100).
POLISH EXILES

During the Second World War members of the Polish armed forces and Polish government (together with dependants) were given exile in Britain. This Polish presence was especially prominent in Scotland, where most of the Polish Army was based for the duration of the war. This presence was primarily characterised by military reconstruction and expansion, involving the continual movement and widespread dispersal of Polish service personnel throughout Scotland. At the end of the war there were over 58,000 members of the Polish armed forces in Scotland. This section begins with a brief outline of the circumstances which led to the wartime migration of Poles to Scotland. It then describes the landing in Scotland of Polish sailors who, as the first Polish exiles, arrived at the very outbreak of war. The section then concentrates on plotting the different phases of the movement of Polish service personnel into Scotland between 1940 and 1945.

The events which initiated the arrival and presence of Polish exiles in Scotland during the Second World War began with Germany's invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939. At that time Poland was formally allied with both Britain and France, and when the demand for an immediate withdrawal was rejected they exercised a mutual aid agreement with Poland and on 3 September declared war on Germany.

The first Polish exiles to arrive in Scotland were some 600 Polish sailors who formed the crews of three Polish naval destroyers, the 'Grom', 'Blyskawica' and 'Burza', which docked at Rosyth on the Firth of Forth on 1 September 1939. The arrival of these destroyers, which had left Gdynia two days earlier, followed an agreement between Britain and Poland in May 1939 that all Polish naval ships which found themselves clear of the German controlled Baltic at the outbreak of war were to make for Britain. One interviewee was a lieutenant serving on the destroyer Burza when news of the invasion of Poland was announced:
"We had just come out of the Kattegat into the North Sea when the radio officer received a message saying that the first bombs had fallen on Poland. There was first a deep silence, and then it was head straight for Britain....About 30 miles off the Scottish coast we were met by the British destroyers HMS Wallace and HMS Wanderer, who escorted us to the Firth of Forth".\(^2\)

These destroyers and their crews formed the initial part of a Polish Naval Detachment in Britain that was reinforced shortly afterwards by the arrival of other Polish ships and two submarines (‘Wilk’ and ‘Orzel’), and which came under the operational control of the British Admiralty. The various ships of the Detachment were not given a home base as was the case with British vessels, but instead operated out of a number of British ports. However, it would appear that comparatively more time was spent at Scottish ports than any other in Britain.\(^3\) Initially, ships of the Detachment were based for some time at Scapa Flow:

‘Not like the British ships, we were always in different ports. But most of the time in the Scottish ones. The longest time we spent was Scapa Flow. That was the worst place of the whole lot because for that time I wasn’t ashore for 6 months. Never saw another living soul but the fellows on the ship. The weather was always bad, I hardly seen the sun at all. But after that never the same place for long’\(^4\)

In Scotland, the submarines of the Polish Naval Detachment mostly used the base at Rosyth, while the ships mainly worked out of Leith, Greenock and Gourock, with refitting usually undertaken at Clydebank, Dalmuir West and Dundee.\(^5\) One interviewee described how: ‘We come pretty often to Clydebank and Dalmuir West to get the ship sorted. In fact, we were in Dalmuir West when Clydebank was bombed’.\(^6\) Indeed, when the Polish destroyer ‘Piorun’ was being refitted at the John Brown Shipyard in Clydebank at the time of the Blitz in March 1941 (The Piorun, which had been built at the yard and was originally intended for the Australian Navy, had replaced the destroyer ‘Groni’ which had been lost in Norway in 1940) its crew took part in the defence of the town and in tackling the fires that ensued. Their actions were commemorated in March 1994 with the unveiling of a plaque in Clydebank.\(^7\)
During the course of the war the Detachment was expanded and by the end of the war Polish naval personnel numbered some 5,500. This increase was largely made possible by the evacuation of Poles from France in the summer of 1940, and the release of others from the Soviet Union in 1942. The circumstances under which these Poles arrived will be examined within the context of the arrival of the Polish land forces in Scotland.

The main Polish presence in Scotland during the Second World War followed the arrival of Polish troops in three distinct phases: (i) the arrival during the early summer of 1940 of Poles evacuated from France. (ii) the arrival during 1942 of Poles who had been released by the Soviet Union, and (iii) the arrival between 1944 and 1945 of Poles who had been forcibly conscripted into the German army.

The arrival of Poles from France during the summer of 1940 can be identified as the vanguard of Polish wartime migration to Scotland. But before describing the arrival and presence of these Poles, it is necessary to first account for their arrival in France. For more than two weeks after the German invasion had begun, the Polish army had been forced to retreat from the relentless German 'Blitzkrieg'. However, the possibility of further retreat eastwards was thwarted when, on 17 September 1939, Soviet troops invaded Eastern Poland. This move had followed the signing in August 1939 of a non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, a secret protocol of which was the arrangement that Poland would be partitioned between them. With the collapse of Polish resistance some 90,000 Polish troops decided to follow the example of their government and military high command and sought refuge in neighbouring countries, particularly Hungary, Romania and the Baltic states (Sword 1989:37). On entering these countries most were interned. One interviewee described the dilemma faced by the Poles before entering into internment:

"After two and a half weeks we discovered there was no point fighting Germans because we were grossly outnumbered. Then we received the Order from the General who was in charge of the Army to evacuate the whole Brigade. We landed near the Hungarian border late at night from the Lvov district and the
commanding officer, General Maczek, addressed us. "Those who don't want to go and allow themselves to be interned, they can take a vehicle and go home or whatever they like. Those who don't wish to cross, hands up". By going into internment I didn't know when I would see my family again. My driver and I were among those who decided not to go but to go home, and so put our hands up. We started driving back towards Lvov, and then we were stopped by some civilians. They said, 'The Russians are crossing here already'. I said to my driver, 'Let's go back quickly before it's too late'. We managed to rejoin our unit and cross over to Hungary, where we were interned'.

Following an offer by the French government to receive exiled Polish troops, it became the 'prime aim of most exiled soldiers' to escape from internment and make their way to France, and in the event an estimated 38,000 managed to do so (Zubrzycki 1958:54). These troops eventually formed the original core of the Polish army in exile. The escape of so many soldiers from internment was explained as follows by one interviewee who had been interned on his arrival in Hungary:

'Although there was an official internment policy, unofficially there was sympathetic elements in the Romanian Army and in the Hungarian Army. Maybe even in the government, but especially in the army because they were the guardsmen of the camps. Polish soldiers escaped en masse from these camps, the guardsmen helping them, or rather they don't like to see how they are escaping. They are going to Budapest because there was Polish Embassy over there, they supplied false documents and civilian dress'.

As the Polish Constitution empowered the President to nominate his successor during wartime, it was possible to reconstitute a Polish government-in-exile in France at the end of September 1939. It has been argued that this was not only a manifestation of the political continuity of the Polish State; it also marked the beginning of the formation of Polish Forces in Exile' (Zubrzycki 1958:54). In France there began a reorganisation of Polish armed forces under the leadership
of General Sikorski who had been newly appointed as Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief. By June 1940, the Polish Forces in France numbered 84,500 (Zubrzycki 1956:54). This number included the 38,000 who had escaped from internment, and almost 45,000 Polish nationals who had migrated to France and Belgium before the war (Kemberg 1990:56).

When the collapse of France seemed imminent it was decided, following a meeting between Sikorski and Churchill on 19 June 1940, that the Polish government-in-exile together with military and civilian personnel be evacuated to Britain (Anstruther 1943:16). While Zubrzycki (1956:54) estimated that 30,500 service personnel arrived in Britain in June 1940, it has been argued that this was in fact the total number of Poles serving under Allied command (Kemberg 1990:57-8). Both Kemberg (1990:57) and Sword (1989:44) have put the number evacuated at nearer 20,000. Although they concur with Zubrzycki that the number of civilians transferred from France to Britain stood at some 3,000 (1956:54), which included ‘members of the Polish government, civil servants and wives and children of officials and military personnel’ (Kemberg 1990:59-60). As well as the decision to evacuate these Poles to Britain, it was agreed that the Polish government be allowed to reorganise and expand their armed forces in Britain.

On arrival in Britain the Polish government-in-exile and military high command were located in London, whilst most of the Polish land forces were transported to rural areas in Central Scotland. It has been suggested that, ‘There was probably little special significance in the choice of Central Lowland Scotland between Glasgow and Edinburgh. The War Office were influenced by technical and administrative considerations. Their assessment was that the Poles should be sent to an area where camps could be set up in open land but sufficiently near larger centres of population to permit easy transport of supplies’ (Kemberg 1990:86). However, this explanation does not take into account other possible considerations. For example, the decision to place Polish soldiers in often remote areas of Scotland may have been influenced to some extent by the general unease with which all aliens were viewed during the lowest point of the war, and when large numbers of aliens were being interned.
Nevertheless, whatever the reasons for placing the Poles in Scotland, their presence was officially regarded as only a short-term arrangement. This was because their reorganisation and re-arming with British equipment was initially carried out with a view to using them overseas, as revealed by Churchill's comment that 'it is most urgent to rearm the Poles and the French, as we may need them for foreign service in the near future'. In the event, however, a significant Polish presence in Scotland was to continue for the duration of the war.

The initial contingent of 10,000 Polish troops evacuated from France began to arrive in Scotland in late June 1940 (Koczy 1980:5). The first group of soldiers were organised in Bellahouston Park in Glasgow, where they were housed under canvas. Shortly afterwards the majority of Poles were moved to tented reception camps, which were concentrated near the Lanarkshire villages of Biggar, Coulter, Symington, Broughton, Stoneyburn, Douglas and Crawford, while others were placed in camps situated near Newton Stewart, Peebles and Galashiels. By the end of July 1940, there were almost 14,400 Polish soldiers in Scotland, a number that included nearly 3,500 officers (Kemberg 1990:87).

From October 1940 the majority of Polish soldiers, who had been formed into the First Polish Army Corps, were moved from the Borders and Central Scotland to the counties of Perth, Angus and Fife on the east coast of Scotland. With the threat of a German invasion, the Polish troops were given the responsibility of defending a section of the coast from the Firth of Forth to Montrose. There they guarded maritime approaches and built coastal defences:

'From Crawford we organise Field Engineer Company. From where we were going to Lossiemouth. In Lossiemouth we were standing in the forest expecting German invasion, maybe from Norway. We were doing bunkers against tanks and put sharp wooden poles in the fields in case parachute will be dropped, and that was our duty. We finished our job in Lossiemouth, few months we be there. Then from Lossiemouth we come to Leuchars near St. Andrews. There we were building barracks and there was very big aerodrome. From Leuchars we were going to Dundee. In Dundee we was having very big headquarters. From
Dundee, we were going to Buddon Camp near Carnoustie, Arbroath. We stationed there pretty long, because we there putting mine on seaside against tanks because still was thought there will be invasion.\textsuperscript{76}

By the end of June 1941, the number of Polish soldiers in Scotland had risen to over 17,700 (Zurawski 1985). They spent about two years on the east coast of Scotland and were widely distributed throughout the area. The main Polish camps and centres included those at, or near, Arbroath, Broughty Ferry, Carnoustie, Forfar, Montrose, Dundee, Alyth, Blairgowrie, Coupar Angus, Kirkcaldy, Auchtertool, Cupar, Auchtermuchty, Ladybank, Leuchars, St. Andrews, Markinch and Leven.\textsuperscript{77} This Polish presence was characterised by a constant movement of troops: 'We never stayed in one place too long, we were always shifted from one place to another'.\textsuperscript{78} Furthermore, during their time on the east coast of Scotland, Polish soldiers were used as a source of supplementary agricultural labour\textsuperscript{79}:

'Because there was no people to work on the farms we were giving help to the farmers during the war, for example, the harvest and picking potatoes. In the whole of Fife there were Poles in every farm....We were involved in picking sugar beetroot and even in Aberdeen they were picking flax. Most were transported to farms, but some of us were living up to three weeks in the farms....That was for about two years we were helping. But after 1942 that was stopped because there was no time, we needed to organise the Armoured Division for action, the farm jobs ceased.'\textsuperscript{80}

Following the heavy losses sustained by the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain (10 percent of which was accredited to Polish fighter pilots, of whom some 100 were based in Scotland at, for example, Renfrew, Crail and Peterhead),\textsuperscript{81} Hitler abandoned invasion plans for Britain (Operation Sea Lion) and instead turned attention towards the Soviet Union. With the immediate threat of invasion from Germany over, the Polish government-in-exile and military high command were able to concentrate on increasing the size of the Polish armed forces, and this resulted in an even wider distribution of Poles in Scotland. Their principal aim was to take
a significant role in the liberation of Poland. There was particular emphasis given to the creation of an Armoured Division in preparation for an offensive against the Nazis. However, this was made difficult because of a shortage in the number of soldiers that were required, and by the over abundance of officers. An attempt to expand the Polish armed forces by recruiting Polish immigrants from such countries as Canada, Brazil and Argentina had only been partially successful.

The expansion of the Polish armed forces was, however, facilitated by the second major phase of Polish wartime migration to Scotland. This involved the arrival from 1942 of some 7,000 Poles (including service women who were used mainly for administrative duties) who had been among an estimated 1.5 million Poles transported to labour camps in the Soviet Union and then given a so-called 'amnesty' as a consequence of the Sikorski-Stalin Pact of August 1941 (a further 1,000 joined the Polish Naval Detachment and around 3,800 served with the Polish squadrons of the RAF) (Kemberg 1990:70). However, those released had to first make their way to the Middle-East, where a second Polish army was being formed (The release of Poles transported to the Soviet Union made possible the creation of the Polish Second Corps, an army of some 108,000 under the command of General Anders. This army was subsequently moved to Italy, from where many were brought to Scotland at the end of the war). One interviewee gave the following account of his movement, from transportation to the Soviet Union to arrival in Scotland:

'Russian troops came 17th of September 1939 to my part of Poland. Then in February 1940, 4 o'clock in the morning, it was 40 degrees centigrade, they came and said: “By the order of Supreme Soviet you will be transferred to another region in Soviet Union”. They give us half an hour to pack our things. They took my grandmother, father, mother, sister and myself. First they took us by sledges and then into cattle wagons, about 60 to a wagon. Very slowly, train went to Onega port on White Sea. From there by sledges for about 60 kilometres to a gulag, from where we working in the forest. Then I was in labour camps on North Railway. I been in those camps up to the end of August 1941, when General Sikorski signed
the treaty with Stalin. We got three choices, to join the Red Army, work on the collective farms, or Polish army, everybody was for Polish army. We travelled through the Urals, through south east Russia to a camp where the Polish army was stationed. In 1942, left from Krasnovodosk on Caspian Sea in boat packed with troops and their families. Then to Pahlavi in Iran and up to Tehran. From Tehran to Port Said in Egypt, and then to Palestine. There we were trained by the Polish soldiers who returned from Tobruk. After about 5 months in Palestine were going to Iraq, where there was the headquarters of the Polish army....I wanted parachute regiment and was given orders from London to do training in Scotland. Arrived in Greenock in June 1943”.82

The third and final phase of Polish migration to Scotland during the Second World War was comprised of Poles who had been forced into German army service, either within the Wehrmacht or Todt Organisation (labour brigade). On their arrival in Scotland they were incorporated within the Polish First Army Corps. Among the first of these Poles to arrive were those who had escaped from the German army during the invasion of Italy in 1943. One interviewee who arrived in Scotland in early 1944, having been conscripted into the German army at the age of 16, provided the following account:

‘That part of Poland I come from, they said belonged to Germany. So when Germans came to that part of north Poland and Silesia, they treated not as occupation but as if come back to the Reich, to Germany. So they started enlisting us into the German army, I was enlisted in March 1943 and sent for training. In beginning of September they sent 30 of us Poles to work in Italy. I was first in Monte Casino, where they had aluminium factory. We had to load the aluminium onto trains and that was shipped to Germany. Then we had to go to Naples, there were barrels of poison liquid and had to load the barrels onto trucks for Germany. That's how they used us. Then I got in touch with Italian partisans near Naples and they helped me to escape into the hills near Caserta. That time the Americans landed in Salerno and 2 or 3 weeks later they were near Naples. I
just went to the Americans and said that I am Polish. They took me and other Poles who had escaped to a special camp, and then we were shipped to Algiers. There was a Polish camp and they asked us if we want to join the Polish army, so we volunteered. Eventually there were about 200 of us at the camp. We stayed there for 6 months and in February 1944 we were brought by ship to Scotland. I was put into the First Armoured Division in Galashiels and then shipped to Normandy, the invasion.  

Nonetheless, only a relatively small number of Poles who had been earlier conscripted into the German army actually joined the Polish First Army Corps in the Allied invasion. This was because, while an estimated 62,000 of these Poles had been recruited into the Corps between June 1944 and June 1945 (Kemberg 1990:71-2), they had arrived too late to be trained and instead remained in Scotland as reserve units. A total of some 58,000 Polish service personnel were present in Scotland at the end of the war.
ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR.

During the Second World War there was a significant increase in the number of Italian nationals in Britain. This followed a decision taken by the British War Cabinet in January 1941 to bring Italian prisoners of war into the country as a source of labour. Although the majority of Italian prisoners of war were used as agricultural workers, their labour was also widely utilised by most Government Ministries. After Italy surrendered in 1943, the use of Italian prisoners of war labour (who were classified as either co-operators or non-co-operators) became particularly multifarious within the war economy. By the end of the war, a total of 154,000 Italian prisoners of war had been brought to Britain. They were distributed throughout the country, with a sizeable number, including some 10,500 in agriculture, located in Scotland.

This section begins by outlining the circumstances under which Italian prisoners of war were brought to Britain. The arrival and presence of Italian prisoners of war in Scotland is then examined by concentrating upon the use of their labour in agriculture.

British Context

Following Italy's declaration of war on 10 June 1940, Italian and British armed forces were engaged in fighting in the Middle East and Africa. Subsequently, tens of thousands of Italian servicemen were taken prisoner. The following three principal reasons explain why a large number of these prisoners of war were brought to Britain.

First, there was a shortage of labour in Britain. Additional labour was urgently needed for the reclamation and drainage schemes which were being carried out in a drive to increase food production. In these circumstances, the Italian prisoners of war were identified as a pool of labour from which workers could be selected, the precedent of using prisoners of war as a source of labour in Britain having been set during the First World War. Second, as more Italian
servicemen were being taken prisoner, an increasing number of British soldiers were needed for guard duties. Thus, in a memorandum dated 29 May 1941, the Secretary of State for War drew attention to the 'importance of removing Italian prisoners of war from the Middle East and East Africa in order to reduce to the minimum the calls on military units in those territories'. Finally, it was argued that the use of as many Italian prisoners of war as possible in British agriculture would 'free greater numbers of agricultural workers to join the Armed Forces'.

On 16 January 1941, the War Cabinet approved a proposal from the Minister of Agriculture to bring from the Middle East some '2,000 to 3,000 suitable North Italians to be brought here for urgent land reclamation work'. Having decided on the use of Italian prisoner of war labour, it was not long before greater numbers were requested by Government Ministries and Departments for increasingly diverse work.

Before the first Italian prisoners of war began to arrive in August 1941, it had already been decided to extend the scheme and bring a further 25,000 to Britain in batches of 5,000 a month. This, and subsequent decisions to expand the Italian prisoner of war workforce, was in response to increasing demands from, and competition between, the various Government Ministries for their labour. For example, by June 1942, fewer than half of the 14,085 Italian prisoners of war in Britain at that time were used as agricultural labour. The remainder were allocated to the Ministry of Works and Buildings (4,420 for the construction of prisoner of war camps), War Office (2,120 to compensate for the number of British personnel needed for guard duties, with some used as technical tradesmen in ordnance works), Ministry of Supply (850 in timber work), and the Admiralty (600 used for the construction of sea barriers in the Orkneys).

There was a greater diversification of Italian prisoner of war labour following Italy's surrender in September 1943. This was made possible through a process of re-classification, whereby prisoners were divided into 'co-operators' and 'non-co-operators'. Co-operators were prisoners who agreed to undertake any work directly connected with the war effort, thereby according much greater flexibility in respect of their labour within the war economy. They were organised into 'labour battalions' and worked without military escort.
The Italian prisoners of war who co-operated were allowed certain privileges (incentives). They included changing their highly distinguishable uniform, and permission to walk unescorted within a three mile radius of their camp when off duty.²² By July 1944, concern about the unproductivity of Italian prisoners of war placed pressure on the authorities to improve the conditions of co-operators by further extending their privileges. They included fifty percent of pay in cash (as opposed to tokens), access to shops and cinemas, extension to travel up to five miles radius from camps, and visits to private houses (relaxation on non-fraternisation policy). It was anticipated that these 'inducements would get better work out of them and also...induce as many as possible of those who are now non co-operators to change their status'.²³ The following is an account of the consequences of changing status:

‘On the September 1943 the Italian was finished, so we co-operate with British Government. Used to have before a patch here, a blue patch underneath, another one over here and a big yellow one on your jacket. When you co-operate you take off that uniform and give you uniform have 'Italy' over it. So you do your forty four hours working, the farm or anywhere job you are. But in the night when you come back, finish work, you can walk or by bike...you go to pictures, go to cafe. We're getting five shillings a week British money. Before used to get only sixpence an hour working but we're getting not the British money, was a plastic money you could spend in the canteen.'²⁴

The Italian prisoners of war who refused to co-operate were usually segregated from co-operators and placed in separate camps. They were mostly restricted to agricultural work and lived under stricter prisoner of war conditions. There were a number of reasons why Italian prisoners of war did not want to co-operate and assist in the British war effort. They included a continuing allegiance to fascism, and the uncertainty as to whether their co-operation could have some indirect effect upon relatives. These reasons are elaborated in the two following accounts:
'When the Italians collapsed...we were asked who wanted to collaborate on that side, who didn't want to collaborate on that side, the fascists. So the fascists were sent away from the camp because they were not collaborators, they were prisoners of war and not Labour Battalion.'

'After Italy stopped fighting in 1943, I refused to co-operate, as it was called then. It's not because I had anything against them, if I had I would not be here today....I said, 'Well no I cannot. I don't know anything about my brother, my father. I don't know if they are for the Allies or for Mussolini'. I thought as a prisoner of war the only way I don't help one side and I don't help the other side. I remain a prisoner of war, which I am entitled. They can send me to work to the farms but not any other place, and that's what I choose. They come and they always ask me, 'Do you want to join us? You have more freedom, you can talk with the civilian people, you can go out the picture at night'. No, I prefer to remain as I am, I had no news from anybody. I say, 'I cannot'. And that was, 'Well look, gradually we will send you up to Scotland, very cold up there, why don't you join us?'

Under constant pressure to co-operate and with the inducements offered, increasing numbers of Italian prisoners of war did change their status. At the end of the Second World War, 150,000 of the 154,000 Italian prisoners of war who had been brought to Britain were at work, of whom some 25 percent continued to be classified as non co-operators.

**Scottish Context**

Initially, very few of the Italian prisoners of war who were brought to Britain were located in Scotland. Although Italian prisoners of war frequently disembarked at Scottish ports (including 2,300 on 17 April 1942, whose arrival was reported by the Glasgow Herald newspaper under the headline 'Italian Prisoners in Scotland. To work in Agriculture'), the vast majority were transported to England. Of the 14,085 Italian prisoners of war in Britain in June 1942, only 170
(of whom 70 were on loan from England) were engaged in agricultural work in Scotland, as compared to 5,925 in England. To understand why a comparatively small number of Italian prisoners of war were working in Scottish agriculture at this time, it is necessary to examine the development of the scheme alongside the particular conditions which existed in Scotland.

When the decision to use Italian prisoners of war in British agriculture was taken, it had been proposed that camps for 500 prisoners would be set up, from which they would work in gangs of 25 within a ten mile radius of the camp. At a meeting of the Home Defence (Security) Executive on 16 April 1941, this proposal was upheld for security reasons and on the grounds that smaller camps or hostels would require an increased number of guards. Present at the meeting was a representative of the Department of Agriculture for Scotland, who referred to an earlier proposal that a 'further thousand Italian prisoners of war should be employed on similar work in Scotland. It had been thought that the conditions in Scotland would make it necessary for the men to be employed in very small parties, but in view of the preceding discussion this would now be reconsidered'. The 'conditions' referred to concerned the size of farms in Scotland, which were generally smaller and more widely dispersed compared to those in England.

A further reason why the use of Italian prisoners of war in Scottish agriculture had been hindered was the restriction on their employment within a large part of Scotland which had been classified as a 'Protected Area'. At a meeting of the Security Executive on 29 September 1941, it was decided that under conditions of labour shortage the productivity of Italian prisoners of war in Britain could be increased by a reduction in the level of security. In accordance with this decision, the security situation in Scotland was reviewed. It was stated that while it had been 'difficult previously to site camps in Scotland owing to the extent of the prohibited area...now camps could be placed anywhere except within 20 miles of the coast'.

Despite the removal of significant security constraints and a call from the Department of Agriculture for Scotland that 'Scotland should be granted a fair share of the prisoner of war labour', the use of Italian prisoner of war labour in Scotland continued to be frustrated by a
standard camp size requirement which remained at 500. Consequently, demands for prisoner of war labour in the Bonnybridge, Dalry and Lockerbie areas of Scotland at the beginning of October 1941 were rejected on account that, ‘in no case is the number asked for sufficient to justify a camp’. Although the Department of Agriculture for Scotland ‘indicated that Agriculture could use 50 to 100 prisoners from any camp established in a rural area in Scotland’, the Ministry of Labour was not prepared at that time to allocate a proportion of Italian prisoners of war to Scotland. The only Italian prisoners of war then destined for Scotland were those who were to be engaged in timber work at camps which had been sited at Thornhill in Dumfrieshire and Rothes in Morayshire.

In response to constant demands from agricultural representatives for smaller camps or hostels, it was agreed at a meeting of the Home Security Executive in November 1941 that an experiment which would involve placing some 500 Italian prisoners of war in hostels throughout the country could proceed. In an internal Department of Agriculture for Scotland memorandum it was noted that ‘all of these 500 are in England and Wales. In the circumstances it would no doubt be a wise move to make an early demand for say 60 prisoners for two hostels of 30 each for Scotland’. At the same time as expressing concern over securing Italian prisoners of war for work in Scotland, the memorandum also acknowledged a problem in the introduction of even a limited number at that time as it was stated that, ‘One of our difficulties in arranging for a hostel experiment in Scotland is the lack of suitable hostels’. Although there was a particular shortage of suitable accommodation for Italian prisoners of war in Scotland, there was also a general lack of accommodation throughout Britain. Because of this, there was a possibility of delay in the arrival of Italian prisoners of war until accommodation was available. At a meeting of the Security Executive at the end of June 1941, a Foreign Office representative stressed that under the Geneva Convention prisoners of war could not be kept under canvas after 1 October 1941, and therefore should not be brought over until huts were ready for them. It was decided that as there was a shortage of British labour to carry out such work, priority would be given to bringing over prisoners with the necessary trades to construct huts and erect camps for subsequent arrivals.
By early 1942, it became apparent that even with the use of Italian prisoner of war labour, a programme of camp construction for the accommodation of prisoners expected to arrive before 1 October of that year could not be completed without further labour. At a meeting of the Security Executive on 26 February 1942, the Minister of Agriculture proposed that 5,000 British workers should be found for camp construction, even if this involved a delay in the call up of that number. A representative for the Scottish Office responded by stating that, 'Scotland would wish to support the attitude taken by the Minister of Agriculture because of the danger that the arrival of prisoners in Scotland will be delayed still further unless the work of camp construction proceeds expeditiously.'

At the beginning of February 1942, it had been announced in the House of Commons that Scottish agriculture was to be allocated a 'considerable number' of Italian prisoners of war. This was disclosed by the Under-Secretary of State for Scotland when responding to the question of whether he was 'aware of the shortage of agricultural labour in some parts of Scotland; and what steps he proposes to take to make available to Scottish farmers Italian prisoners of war now in this country', to which he replied:

'I am fully alive to the agricultural labour position in Scotland, and in view of the labour shortage I am glad to say that arrangements are being made for the allocation this year of a considerable number of Italian prisoners to Scotland. A small proportion will be available in the Spring, and a substantially larger force in the early Summer'.

In June 1942, it was disclosed that there were 170 Italian prisoners of war employed in Scottish agriculture. Of this number 100 worked from a camp constructed at Lockerbie and 70 from three hostels in Berwickshire. It was expected that, by 1 October 1942, a further 2,500 would be allocated to Scottish agriculture. The perceived importance of Italian prisoner of war labour for Scottish agriculture was underlined by the following response given by the Secretary of State for Scotland, to an appeal for 600 Italian prisoners of war allocated for agricultural work in Scotland to be re-assigned to the Admiralty for construction work in the Orkneys:
"I do not wish to be unhelpful but I must say that I feel greatly disturbed at the prospect of losing any of the prisoner labour earmarked for Scottish agriculture. Only something like half of the Scottish total of 2,500 will be available for the harvest. They will be badly needed, for cultivations have been greatly increased and labour, especially for seasonal needs, is seriously short."

The security restrictions in place during the early part of the Italian prisoner of war labour scheme had particular implications for the use of this labour in Scotland. For example, the delay in the introduction of Italian prisoner of war labour to Scotland meant that the programme of camp construction was further behind the rest of Britain. It may have been to compensate for this that many Italian prisoners of war were eventually engaged in camp construction in Scotland under conditions which contravened the Geneva Convention. One interviewee, who arrived in Scotland in January 1943, found himself in a tented camp set up in a ploughed field near the site of what was to become known as Denny Camp, in Stirlingshire.

"The first period was the bitter and saddest period because we were sleeping outside in a field (under canvas) with just one blanket, sleeping in the mud. The officers told us that a camp would be built at the top of the road, the quickest we built it, the quickest we would sleep in huts. The War Department judged that in one year you should move up the road, but the camp was finished in six months because the men work hard."

During the course of 1943, increasing numbers of Italian prisoners of war were brought to Scotland, many of whom arrived by ship at or near Glasgow. Those directed into agricultural work were mostly taken to Edinburgh, from where they were distributed to camps or hostels throughout Scotland:
"We landed in Glasgow in August or September 1943. Then we were in Edinburgh, there was a big castle there and we were there for about a month. I arrived in Thankerton Camp 62 to work out in the farms. So we went out in the morning, there were ten to twelve in each lorry. If they had a big farm they used to keep one or two prisoners to stay on the farm all the time. But most of the farmers take one or two and just used to go there during the day and sent back at night".115

When work on the harvests had been completed, Italian prisoner of war labour was used during winter months on such work as land reclamation and drainage:

"In July 1943 we arrive in Gourock. From there to Edinburgh castle....Then they send me to the Camp 62, Thankerton. I work on the farm, gather the hay, cut the corn, the wheat, potatoes. To collect potatoes there were on the field 20 prisoners on the one side and 20 Irish girls other side. Then we sow the turnips. After the turnips there was no much work to be done. The camp called my name to go to East Kilbride hostel, where we had given shovel each to clean the ditch to the roadside. Was very cold, that winter 1943. We spent four months on the road, it was really hard".116

Following Italy's surrender in September 1943, an increasing number of those who decided to co-operate were billeted with farmers and were directly employed in agriculture throughout the year.

By 1944 there were 10,500 Italian prisoners of war at work in Scottish agriculture. The majority were accommodated in 12 camps and 57 hostels distributed throughout Scotland, 3,300 were billeted on individual farms.117 There would appear to have been no increase in the number of Italian prisoners of war employed in Scottish agriculture between 1944 and the end of the Second World War, as the number reported to be working on the Scottish harvest in June 1945 remained at 10,500.116
This section has focused upon the use of Italian prisoners of war within Scottish agriculture during the Second World War. There are three main reasons for this concentration. First, there existed conditions within Scottish agriculture which were peculiar to Scotland. By illustrating how they shaped the pattern of arrival and the presence of Italian prisoners of war in Scotland, a distinct process of migration can be identified. Second, although Italian prisoners of war in Scotland were employed, for example, in timber work, papermills, brickworks, foundries and most notably in construction work on the Churchill Barrier at Scapa Flow in the Orkneys, the vast majority were employed in agriculture. Finally, it was from the Italian prisoners of war who were employed in agriculture that those who settled permanently in Scotland after the war were to be drawn.
GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR

During the Second World War there was an increase in the number of German nationals in Britain. This was in large part due to the presence of German prisoners of war. However, for most of the war there were fewer German prisoners of war when compared to the number of Italian prisoners of war. The main reason for this was that Italian prisoners of war were identified as a source of labour power and brought to Britain from as early as 1941, whereas German prisoners of war were not used in this capacity until 1944, and then only tentatively. Gradually, their labour was regarded as a substitute for that of Italian prisoners of war. When the war in Europe ended in May 1945, some 25 per cent of the 199,550 German prisoners of war in Britain had been put to work. Most were employed in agriculture and forestry, and distributed in camps throughout the country. Some were located in Scotland, including 1,500 employed in agricultural work. This number increased markedly after the war, when the use of German prisoner of war labour became more extensive and varied.

This section begins by outlining the arrival and presence of German prisoners of war in Britain at various stages of the Second World War, and illustrates how the process was shaped primarily by security considerations and then by the demand for labour. The arrival and presence of German prisoners of war in Scotland is then examined within this context.

British Context

The arrival of German prisoners of war in Britain began soon after the outbreak of the Second World War. On 22 September 1939, The Ministry of Information announced the arrival of German prisoners at various camps. Initially, the majority of those captured were sailors from the German merchant fleet. By 11 March 1940, there were 1,271 German merchant seamen and 257 military prisoners of war in camps in Britain. Between April and June 1940,
there was an increase in the prisoner of war population in Britain with the arrival of German seamen and soldiers who had been captured during the Norwegian Campaign.

For most of the war, there was only a relatively small German prisoner of war presence in Britain: for example, in March 1944 there were some 2,000 (Kochan 1980:3). The reason for this was the British Government's policy of transferring German prisoners of war overseas, a practice which was undertaken from an early stage of the war. On 28 May 1940, there was a call in the House of Commons for all prisoners of war to be transferred to the Colonies or Dominions. In response, it was announced that such a 'disposal of prisoners of war' was at that time being considered by the government. One of the main arguments for their removal from Britain focused on security: specifically, removal would prevent co-operation with enemy aircraft and parachutists. There was also the perceived risk of 'prisoners rising up and rejoining their armies if the threatened invasion took place' (Kochan 1980:3). However, this policy continued even after the threat of invasion had ceased. Between August 1940 and the summer of 1944, most German prisoners of war who were brought to Britain, including German airmen shot down over Britain, were shipped overseas. A large number were sent to Canada, where there were 33,800 at the end of the War (Kochan 1980:3).

At the same time that German prisoners of war were being transported overseas, Italian prisoners of war were being brought to Britain for their labour. This anomaly can be partly explained by a difference in the perceived security threat posed by the prisoners of war of the two belligerent countries. Thus, although there were numerous calls made in the House of Commons for German prisoners of war to be employed (particularly in coal mining), for the greater part of the war the government decided against the use of German prisoner of war labour in Britain. Thus, in June 1943 it was announced in the House of Commons that although, 'At one time in the last war as many as 65,497 German prisoners were employed in this country....For security reasons it is preferred not to use Germans in this war. We prefer to use Italian prisoners of war, of whom there is a plentiful supply'.


In view of a continuing shortage of labour, the security concerns surrounding the use of German prisoners of war were reviewed in the summer of 1944. This corresponded with the rapid increase in the number of German prisoners of war in Britain, following the Allied Invasion of Europe which commenced in June 1944. Before the invasion took place the British and American governments had agreed that half the number of German prisoners of war would be sent to Britain and half to America. However, the numbers captured far exceeded British expectations. Consequently, America accepted a further 175,000 Germans who were held, 'on the account of the U.K. as British prisoners' (Sullivan 1979: 21-2). By July 1944, some of the 49,000 German prisoners of war who had by then been brought to Britain, were selected for work in agriculture. On 17 October 1944 it was announced in the House of Commons that there were 95,000 German prisoners of war in Britain, arrangements having been made to employ 17,000.

It was expected that German prisoners of war would provide a substitute for Italian prisoners of war in agriculture work, who could then be released for other essential war work. At the beginning of 1945 it was decided, as an experiment, to employ 20,000 German prisoners of war without escort. However, certain security conditions were laid down which resulted in only 4,000 of the 20,000 prisoners being employed by February 1945. At a meeting of the Security Executive on 23 February 1945, it was stated that unless 'some relaxation could be made, the Ministries of Agriculture and Fisheries and of Supply would have to raise the question of abandoning the substitution of German prisoners for Italian prisoners. The present slow rate of substitution was...unsatisfactory from the manpower point of view and as the Ministry of Agriculture had given up more Italians than they had yet been able to replace with Germans, food production would suffer.'

The concern that full use was not being made of German prisoner of war labour, and that their employment on the basis of 'trial and error' was not being allowed to run its course, was also voiced by the Ministry of Labour who 'stressed on behalf of the user departments the urgency of providing German prisoners of war'. Nevertheless, alarm about the number of German prisoners of war escaping as a result of attempts 'to use them on useful work in conditions
where they cannot be guarded 100 per cent served as a brake to the wholesale use of their labour before the end of the war. Consequently, of the 20,000 German prisoners of war who had been brought to Britain by the end of the war, only 25 per cent were at work, as compared to 97 per cent of Italian prisoners of war.

Scottish Context

At the beginning of the Second World War, the majority of German prisoners of war who were brought to Scotland were merchant seamen, the crews of U-boats and a smaller number of airmen. The first German prisoners to be held in Scotland were 40 merchant seamen who happened to be in British waters at the outbreak of war. They were held in an undisclosed camp which was expected to hold a further 1,000. At the end of November 1939 it was reported that there were so many German prisoners of war arriving in Scotland that a large number were taken from a Scottish camp to a camp in another part of the country. The number of German prisoners of war in Scotland was further increased with the arrival of prisoners captured during the Norwegian Campaign between April and June 1940. However, from August 1940, there was a major reduction in the number of German prisoners of war in Scotland due to the government policy of transferring them overseas.

It was not until the summer of 1944 that German prisoners of war were again brought to Scotland in significant numbers. There were two main reasons for this. First, in line with the agreement that half the number of German prisoners of war captured during the Allied invasion be transferred to America, large numbers were taken to camps in Scotland and then transported to America from Scottish ports. The following is a description of events as given by one of the interviewees:

'At the end of August (1944) I was taken by train to Perth. I landed in a camp outside Perth, Comrie, Pow camp 22. It was a special camp, for what you would call 'Nazi Camp'. It was all elite forces, airforce, submarine and so forth in this
camp. Then suddenly a rumour that we were going to be shipped over to America. So we went to Glasgow and we boarded the Queen Mary, at that time she was a troop transporter. On board there were 7,000 POWs....We landed in New York and so I became a German prisoner of war taken by the British in custody to the Americans. I spent quite a while working in America.\textsuperscript{133}

The camp at Comrie in Perthshire was essentially a transit camp. Indeed, two of the interviewees arrived back at Comrie Camp on their return from America in 1946.\textsuperscript{139} This camp was also where so-called 'Super-Nazis' and known Nazi war criminals were segregated from other German prisoners of war and sent to Watten Camp in Caithness, where they were used for the construction of a road at nearby Wick (Sullivan 1979:129-300, Kochan 1980:29).

The second reason why German prisoners of war were brought to Scotland was to detain them in camps with a view to using their labour, especially in agricultural and timber work. As in the case of Italian prisoners of war, security restrictions combined with the agricultural conditions led to a delay in the use of German prisoner of war labour in Scotland. The initial requirement that German prisoners of war had to work in gangs under armed escort proved once again to be particularly detrimental to the utilisation of such labour in Scottish agriculture. This is illustrated by comments made by a representative of the Department of Agriculture for Scotland, following a meeting of the Security Executive on 24 July 1944:

`The employment of German prisoners in agriculture, on timber production, and in quarrying was discussed from the security angle. Strong objection was raised to the suggestion that German prisoners of war might be permitted to work without escort. I then told the meeting that on this footing and since guards could only be provided for gangs of 12 or more there would be no scope for the employment of Germans in Scottish agriculture. With regard to the particular case of Sandyhillock Camp it seemed as though the proposal to change it from an Italian to a German camp would have to be abandoned since the Ministry of Supply could`
employ only some 150 Germans from it in gangs of 12 upwards and we ourselves
could not employ any in this way'.

Nevertheless, German prisoners of war were used in large gangs under guard during the 1944
harvests in Scotland when there was an urgent demand for such labour. Apart from harvest
work, the use of German prisoner of war labour in Scottish agriculture proceeded at a slower
rate than in other parts of the country. By the end of the war, no more than 1,500 German
prisoners of war were engaged in agricultural work in Scotland.

This section, having identified the key features which characterised the arrival and presence of
German prisoners of war in Britain, has attempted to show that this was not a uniform process.
In the case of Scotland, specific conditions existed which shaped a distinctive process of
wartime German prisoner of war migration.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has, through its study of four distinct groups (specifically, German-Jewish
refugees, Polish exiles, Italian prisoners of war and German prisoners of war) demonstrated
that there were significant inward movements to Scotland of alien Europeans during the period
1933 to 1945. The evidence presented indicates that, while these movements paralleled in
many respects the wider pattern of movements into Britain, there were variations which shaped
distinct processes of migration to Scotland. Some of these differences were shown to be
related to specific structural conditions that existed in Scotland and were especially apparent in
effecting the movement of Italian and German prisoners of war. As a consequence, these
groups were less well represented in Scotland than in the rest of Britain. A further departure
was evinced by the decision to locate the vast majority of Polish exiles in Scotland during the
war. It is therefore argued that the wartime Polish presence had a greater social impact on
Scotland than on the rest of Britain.
Furthermore, the process by which each group was constituted and their movements variously structured can be shown to have been determined primarily by the changing circumstances which unfolded within the context of the Second World War. Moreover, a developing pattern can be identified which involved a shift from the state policy of constructing a highly circumscribed position for alien Europeans entering the pre-war economy, towards a programme of organising alien Europeans into a supplementary labour force to help resolve a labour shortage within the state directed war economy. This change was, for example, reflected in the re-definition of the economic position of German-Jewish refugees and in the implementation of a scheme which utilised the labour of Italian and German prisoners of war.

This chapter has also established that a range of social relations developed between members of the various migrant groups and the indigenous population, as well as with the extant minority communities in Scotland. The degree of contact was variable and to a large extent dependent upon the status of the groups. Hence, it was shown how interaction between Polish exiles who were defined as friendly aliens and the Scottish public were unrestricted and extensive, while the association between enemy Italian prisoners of war (and to an even greater extent German prisoners of war) and Scottish people had been constrained by regulations which prohibited 'fraternisation'. Moreover, the nature of German-Jewish refugee migration meant that there was a close bond with the Scottish-Jewish community, even if this was sometimes strained. In addition, contact was made between Italian prisoners of war and members of the Italian community, especially in the latter years of the war when regulations concerning fraternisation were relaxed.
CHAPTER 3

THE MIGRATION OF ALIEN EUROPEANS TO SCOTLAND 1945 - 1951

INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims to provide a largely descriptive account of the process of alien European migration to Scotland between 1945 and 1951. It is not intended as a comprehensive account, but concentrates on five groups: specifically, Polish exiles, Italian prisoners of war, German prisoners of war, European Volunteer Workers and Ukrainian prisoners of war. These groups will be examined separately and in chronological order, so as to establish the specific conjuncture of events which characterised their arrival, presence and, for some, permanent settlement in Scotland. Accordingly, the chapter is divided into five main sections, each of which focuses upon one of the above groups. The sections are sub-divided, so that they begin by outlining the key determinants of the particular migration, then provide an account of the process within a general British context, and finally within a specific Scottish context.
POLISH EXILES

During the immediate post-war period, some 114,000 members of the Polish Armed Forces in exile and 30,000 of their dependants were allowed to remain in Britain through a process of 'institutional resettlement' (Isaac 1954:196, Zubrzycki 1956:54). This settlement was determined by political events shaped by wartime agreements between the Allies, and economic considerations which defined Poles as a source of labour. Although their settlement was synonymous with placement in employment, Poles were not officially restricted to work within particular industries (as was the case with other migrant groups). Nevertheless, large numbers were guided into the essential industries and areas of labour shortage. This led to a distribution of Polish labour throughout Britain, which was also influenced by opposition to their continued presence (especially in Scotland). Consequently, there was a substantial reduction in the number of Poles in Scotland, where most had been concentrated during the war. By 1951 some 8,000 former Polish service personnel and their dependants had settled in Scotland. This section begins by outlining the political and economic determinants which influenced the settlement of Poles in post-war Britain. The process of Polish settlement in Scotland is then examined within this context.

British Context

At the end of the Second World War, many members of the Polish Armed Forces (reconstituted in exile during the war) who were stationed in Britain, Italy, Germany and the Middle East under British command, were unwilling to return to Poland. The principal reason for this reluctance was the post-war political situation which existed in Poland. This situation was determined by the agreements reached by the Allies at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. The outcome of the conference was the incorporation of eastern Poland within the U.S.S.R. and the formation of the Polish Provincial Government of National Unity. The decisions taken at Yalta had a pervading effect upon the many Polish service personnel
(particularly those from the east of Poland) who were vigorously anti-communist, and established a raison d'être for those who remained in exile after the war.

Initially, the British government expected and encouraged members of the Polish Armed Forces, numbering 249,000 in December 1945, to return to Poland. However, during the course of 1946, the government reappraised its attitude and moved towards an emphasis upon both repatriation and settlement. This change in policy can be explained by the political and economic circumstances of the time. The political developments in Poland and the cooling relations with the U.S.S.R. led to greater sympathy in Britain for the ideological position held by many Polish service personnel and to the recognition that their return could be hazardous. Moreover, the British economic climate influenced the redefinition of the position of these Poles, so that they became identified as a source of labour which could be drawn upon to meet labour shortages.

On 22 May 1946, the government outlined its plan to demobilise the Polish Armed Forces. A major feature of this plan was the arrangement to settle Polish service personnel who did not wish to return to Poland as civilians in either Britain or overseas. They were to be discharged from the Polish Armed Forces and enrolled into a specially created Polish Resettlement Corps. This, the government argued, would enable a transition from military to civilian life. As a first step to the demobilisation of the Polish Armed Forces and the formation of the Resettlement Corps, the government announced that the Polish Second Corps were to be brought from Italy to Britain. The enrolment of Polish service personnel into the Polish Resettlement Corps began on 11 September 1946. They were required to sign on for two years service and in appropriate cases were to be given training for civilian employment. Once enlisted into the Corps, the Poles would be either allocated to an employer as part of a group to undertake work of national importance such as harvesting, or transferred into such civilian employment as considered suitable by the Ministry of Labour. Those who refused either to be repatriated or to enlist in the Corps were classed as 'recalcitrants', a number of whom were deported to Germany.
The government was assisted in the placement of former Polish service personnel into employment in Britain by the Trade Union Council. However, this assistance was subject to the following four conditions:

'(a) before the introduction of a group of Poles into any industry, there should be appropriate consultations with the trade unions directly concerned; (b) in any event, no Poles should be employed in any grade in any industry where British labour was available; where Poles require further training for filling posts in industry, the conditions under which such training would be provided should be comparable to those applying to British ex-servicemen; (d) if any Pole was placed in a suitable occupation and for any reason left it, subsequent employment should be secured only through the Ministry of Labour.'

Through the Polish Resettlement Corps, the government was eventually able to guide a sizeable number of Poles into employment within essential industries. The heaviest concentrations were to be found in building, agriculture, coal mining and textiles (Zubrzycki 1956: 66). Nevertheless, the numbers entering these industries, especially agriculture and coal mining, were not as high as the government had first hoped. There were three principal reasons for this. First, the terms of settlement did not restrict Poles to specific areas of employment, as was the case with other alien groups. Second, despite the conditional support of the Trade Union Council, the entry of Poles into employment was restricted by protracted trade union opposition, especially at local level. There was particularly staunch resistance from those unions who represented workers from the coal mining and agricultural industries. Such opposition contributed to a delay in the placement of the Poles in employment, although this was largely overcome during the course of 1947. In May 1947, it was reported in The Times that Poles were being accepted in most industries. Finally, there was an acute shortage of accommodation. Thus, it was reported that the 'lack of accommodation, particularly in the localities of labour shortage, must remain the chief difficulty in the placing of Polish labour.'
By the end of 1948, some 114,000 Polish service personnel had enrolled into the Resettlement Corps. Of this number, over 20,000 had emigrated or been repatriated, about 78,000 had been placed in civilian employment and approximately 14,600 still awaited resettlement through employment. A large percentage of the latter were Polish officers, who were regarded by the government as 'one of our worst problems' in the resettlement process (Sword 1988: 245). In an attempt to overcome this problem, the government established various pre-vocational training courses for officers. It was not until July 1950, that all those able for work had been placed in employment (Isaac 1954: 173).

The resettlement of former Polish service personnel, and some 30,000 of their dependants who were also admitted to Britain, was facilitated by the provisions of the Polish Resettlement Act, 1947. This Act provided the statutory means for the assistance of Poles in such areas as pensions, unemployment assistance, accommodation, health care and education.

Through the agency of the Polish Resettlement Corps and the Polish Resettlement Act, the British government was able to facilitate the discharge of the Polish Armed Forces under its command. Moreover, as the decision to allow the settlement of Polish service personnel in Britain was influenced by concerns over the shortage of labour, the government ensured that the process of settlement was synonymous with entry into employment. For many Poles, including those with professional qualifications, this necessitated accepting employment as unskilled labour under conditions which many British workers would regard as unacceptable.

Scottish Context

Of the 50,000 or so members of the Polish Armed Forces in Britain at the end of the Second World War, most continued to be located in Scotland. During the early post-war period, there was a fluctuation in numbers as a result of the constant movement of Poles into and out of Scotland. However, the general trend was towards a major reduction in numbers. Thus, between September 1945 and June 1948, there was a reduction in numbers from about 58,000
to some 7,500. This departure of over 50,000 Polish service personnel from Scotland involved two distinct processes: namely, the repatriation or emigration overseas, and the transfer to other areas of Britain.

Before the government announced its plans to allow the settlement of members of the Polish Armed Forces in Britain, the reduction in the number of Poles in Scotland corresponded closely with the rate of repatriation. By 20 May 1946, the number of Poles in Scotland had fallen to 45,000 (including about 650 women members of the Polish Armed Forces), with some 15,000 having been repatriated by that time. It was reported that a total of 23,000 Poles in Scotland had opted to return to Poland. Those opting for repatriation to Poland were placed in special camps, which included Polkemmet Camp near Whitburn in West Lothian and Duke's Camp near Inverary in Argyllshire. There was also a repatriation camp at Greenock which had been established for those who had enlisted into the Polish Armed Forces from such countries as France, Argentina and Canada. By late December 1947, it was reported that the main flow of repatriation was over, with 46,130 Polish service personnel having been repatriated or emigrated overseas from Scotland.

The transfer of Polish service personnel from Scotland and their distribution throughout Britain was an important feature of the government's resettlement scheme. This policy of dispersal was largely influenced by the following considerations. First, the economic conditions required that Poles (having been identified as a source of labour) be guided to areas of labour shortage. This resulted in proportionately greater numbers being directed to employment in England. Second, it was viewed as necessary to disperse Poles throughout Britain because of the increasing antagonism towards them in Scotland. This was articulated by Members of Parliament representing Scottish constituencies, who expressed widespread opposition to the concentration and continued presence of members of the Polish Armed Forces in Scotland. This opposition was especially virulent towards those Poles in Scotland, numbering 28,500 in February 1946, who had served (compulsorily) in the German Army. As well as contributing to the transfer of Polish troops from Scotland, such opposition was successful in reducing to a minimum the number who were transported to Scotland from the Continent and Middle East.
For example, only 5,000 members of the Polish Second Corps were eventually brought to Scotland from Italy. A combination of these factors also led many who had not been transferred, but registered with the Polish Resettlement Corps in Scotland, to seek employment in other parts of Britain.

The gradual movement of Polish service personnel from Scotland through repatriation and dispersal during the post-war period occurred alongside the use of Polish labour under changing conditions of employment. From the end of the war until the formation of the Polish Resettlement Corps, many of the Poles in Scotland were used on military work, including the removal of wartime defences and the clearing of training areas. They were also used as agricultural labour during the hay and potato harvests; for example, some 10,000 were engaged in such work in August 1945. Some were given leave and attached to firms or factories as student trainees. A very small number were allowed to enter civilian employment in Scotland on issue of a permit from the Ministry of Labour.

Following their enlistment in the Resettlement Corps, Poles could be employed (under the conditions outlined above) as either members of the Corps, or as civilians. It was not until a Pole had been placed in civilian employment that settlement was seen to have taken place. In other words, settlement was synonymous with entry into civilian employment. A period of employment and training within the Corps, and relegation to the Reserve on entry into civilian employment, were regarded as distinct stages within the process of settlement. As such, they will be examined separately so as to establish the way in which the settlement of Poles developed in Scotland.

When enrolment into the Polish Resettlement Corps began in September 1946, there were fewer than 36,000 Polish service personnel in Scotland (this compared to 64,000 in England and 8,000 in Wales). By 13 February 1947, the number had fallen to 29,772, of whom 20,422 had enlisted in the Resettlement Corps. Of these, 13,200 were employed on camp maintenance, 1,430 were on loan for civilian work (mostly in agriculture), with the remainder undergoing some form of training. By June 1947 most Corps members were stationed in the following
With the formation of the Resettlement Corps, it was hoped that a substantial number of Poles would enter agricultural employment, both as members of the Corps and as civilians. The hope was to extend the use of Polish labour in agriculture beyond harvest time, as well to replace prisoner of war labour. Initially, Poles were either employed in groups working from agricultural hostels, or individually allocated to farmers. The number of Poles employed in Scottish agriculture from hostels increased from a daily average of 400 in March 1947, to 800 at the peak period in 1947 when a total of 1,560 were available for agricultural work. However, such numbers fell short of what had been expected. By August 1947 most members of the Corps in agricultural hostels were unwilling to continue. The use of Corps members within agriculture in Scotland was more successful when those with previous agricultural experience were allocated individually to farmers. Hence, in April 1947 it was reported that 2,100 experienced Poles were assisting farmers, and it was hoped that many of them would 'eventually be absorbed into the agricultural industry'. This would include those Poles who had married farmers' daughters and were employed on the farms. By late 1947, 1,281 Poles enlisted with the Resettlement Corps in Scotland had entered civilian employment in agriculture and horticulture.

At the end of 1947, many of those who remained within the Resettlement Corps were officers and older Poles, as they were often the most difficult to place. Of the 8,175 Corps members in Scotland on 24 December 1947, almost 2,500 were officers, most of whom were undergoing training for civilian employment. This training was provided in centres at former military camps, and was primarily geared for officers whose professional qualifications were not recognised in Britain. The training centres established in Scotland included Lynn Park Camp in Aberdeen for courses on deep-sea fishing, Findogask Camp in Perthshire for courses on farming, and a camp in Kinross for courses in mechanical engineering, building and draughtsmanship. There was also training in commerce and agriculture provided in colleges in Glasgow.
The problems faced by some members of the Polish Resettlement Corps in finding employment were not fully resolved through training. At the end of June 1948 there were still 3,582 members of the Corps in Scotland who had not been placed, of whom about a thousand were registered as professionals, administrators and executives. Although most had entered some form of employment by the time the Polish Resettlement Corps was wound up in September 1949, it was often unskilled and rarely commensurate with past employment in Poland. For example, former high ranking Polish officers were employed in Edinburgh hotels as silver cutlery cleaners, and were referred to as the 'Silver Brigade'.

During the first six months of the Polish Resettlement Corps existence, 1,010 of its members in Scotland had been placed in employment, of whom 340 actually remained in Scotland. Of the 22,000 Poles who had enlisted with the Corps in Scotland by April 1947, almost 2,100 were in employment. Of this number, 700 were employed in Scotland, mostly as farm workers, market gardeners and estate workers. A further 1,100 had volunteered for employment in the mining industry.

The entry of Poles into the coal mining industry in Scotland was, as in the rest of Britain, delayed by trade union opposition. Although 250 Poles in Scotland had been selected for training by April 1947, their settlement in collieries depended on agreement being reached with the local branches of the Mineworkers Union. At the end of May 1947, the National Union of Mineworkers (Scottish Area) advised that all necessary Polish labour be absorbed into Scottish coal mines, and announced that, 'an appeal will be made to overcome any obstacles which have been existing'. Although this did not immediately lead to an end to opposition at local level, Poles did begin to enter the industry in increasing numbers. By late October 1947, there were almost 650 Poles working in Scottish coal mines. At the end of 1949 the number of Poles working in Scottish pits had increased to over 1,000 (Lunn 1989:6).

On 24 December 1947 it was reported that 10,193 Poles from Scotland had been placed in civilian employment, 'in England rather more than in Scotland'. On 29 June 1948, it was announced in the House of Commons that some 4,000 Poles had been placed in civilian
employment in Scotland. It was added that there remained over 3,500 members of the Corps in Scotland who were 'expected to take whatever suitable employment becomes available to them'.

It was not until 1950 that all Corps members were eventually placed in employment, or had entered into business on their own account (Zubrzycki 1956:66). The 1951 Census of Scotland made the observation that Polish nationals constituted almost 50 percent of all male aliens employed in Scotland. The largest concentrations were to be found in agriculture, horticultural and forestry (1,408); mining and quarrying (1,229); unskilled work such as brick making (838); metal manufacture (740); personal service such as kitchen hands and hospital orderlies (847); building (608); and in textiles (315). The Polish females in employment were concentrated in personal service as domestic servants and maids (154) and in textiles (56).

The 1951 Census of Scotland recorded the presence of 10,640 persons 'born in Poland', as compared to 971 in 1931. In accounting for this increase (which represented the largest increase of any alien group for that period) the Census stated that 'a large number of persons stationed in Scotland with the Polish Armed Forces during the Second World War have taken up permanent residence in Scotland'. It was shown that the Poles were distributed throughout urban and rural areas of Scotland, with particular concentrations in the cities of Edinburgh and Glasgow, and in the counties of Fife, Stirlingshire, Perthshire, Ayrshire, and Midlothian. Moreover, the majority of Poles who settled in Scotland had arrived during June and July 1940 from France. It has been suggested that 'Their experience of life among the Scottish people had convinced them that they had little to fear from settlement' (Kemberg 1990:58).
ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR

During the Second World War, Italian prisoners of war were brought to Britain and formed into a supplementary labour force within the war economy. In the immediate post-war period they continued to be widely used as a source of labour under the direction of Government Ministries, although they were gradually replaced by German prisoners of war. This process of labour substitution, which had begun towards the end of the war, was effectively achieved by mid-1946. Most Italian prisoners of war were repatriated by the end of that year. Nevertheless, some 1,400 were allowed to defer their repatriation and remain in Britain under a scheme which enabled Italian prisoners of war billeted with farmers to take employment as civilian agricultural workers on twelve month contracts. This scheme was later extended to those who had been repatriated and wished to return to Britain as farm workers. Eventually, some 1,100 former Italian prisoners of war were allowed to settle in Britain, of whom approximately 120 settled in Scotland (Isaac 1954:183-4).

British Context

At the end of the war, Italian prisoners of war in Britain continued to be classed as either co-operators or non co-operators. As the relatively inflexible position of non co-operators within the process of labour substitution impeded the transition from one nationally differentiated prisoner of war labour force to another, they were continually urged to change their status. By October 1945, the vast majority had done so, with 144,000 (or 96 percent) of the 150,000 Italian prisoners of war then at work in Britain classed as co-operators. By the end of January 1946, the substitution of Italian prisoners of war with German prisoners of war was well advanced, as can be shown by the following comparative figures:
**Agriculture.**

Department.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germans</th>
<th>Italians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>94,300</td>
<td>48,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Agriculture for Scotland</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>100,800</td>
<td>52,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Industry.**

Department.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germans</th>
<th>Italian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Works</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Supply</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>4,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Trade</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of War Transport</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>9,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Food</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>2,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Fuel and Power</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>37,800</td>
<td>28,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Hansard [420] 245-8.*

As the substitution of prisoner of war labour progressed, an increasing number of Italian prisoners of war were repatriated. This process of repatriation began in December 1945, and followed a government announcement on 9 October 1945 that 'it has been decided in principle that the repatriation of Italian prisoners of war in this country to Italy shall begin when this year’s harvest is completed, and as soon as transport is available'.\(^{48}\) Although this supposedly applied to ‘collaborators and non-collaborators alike’, non-co-operators were often the last to be repatriated.\(^{49}\) Indeed, it is possible that the increased co-operation among Italian prisoners of war after the war was to a large extent the result of greater uncertainty engendered within the prisoner of war camps with respect to the repatriation of non co-operators. This was certainly the experience of one interviewee who claimed that on each occasion he was asked to co-
operate and declined, the standard response of camp officials was, 'You won't join us? Well, you do want to go back don't you?'. Nevertheless, most Italian prisoners of war had been repatriated by the end of 1946.

Although the use of Italian prisoner of war labour in Britain had ceased by July 1946, in May of that year the government had authorised the introduction of a civilian volunteer scheme. This made it possible for Italian prisoners of war who had been billeted with farmers to defer their repatriation and remain in Britain on twelve month contracts of service with those farmers who applied to retain them. The scheme effectively came into operation on 1 June 1946, by which date preliminary forms of agreement had to be signed by the Italian prisoners of war and farmers concerned. An essential requirement of the scheme was that the Italians were not to change their employment without the consent of the Ministry of Labour and National Service. Some 1,400 Italian prisoners of war undertook to remain in Britain under this scheme.

The Italian prisoners of war who were repatriated returned to find that Italy had been devastated by the war. The situation was described by one interviewee as follows:

'I went back to Italy. (At) Milan I was looking for a train to Genoa. I asked the people there for the train to Genoa. They said, "That's the one". I said, "What do you mean? That's a cattle truck!". They said, "That's the way we travel". I knew we had lost the war, but I wasn't expecting anything like that. That's what I found. At that time Italy was in a poor, poor condition in every way.'

Moreover, many of the repatriated Italian prisoners of war were unable to gain employment. This was largely because their prolonged captivity in Britain meant that they were often the last to enter the Italian job market. This was the experience of one interviewee who had returned to Italy with some optimism: 'When I went back I spoke Italian, French and English. So I thought surely I will get a job as a waiter in one of the big restaurants or hotels with three languages. But by the time I went back everything was occupied.'
It was under these circumstances that many former Italian prisoners of war endeavoured to return to Britain. Moreover, the shortage of agricultural labour in Britain during the immediate post-war period led to calls within the House of Commons for repatriated Italian prisoners of war who wished to return as farm workers to be allowed to do so. On 4 March 1947, the Minister of Labour announced a 'widening of the door' with respect to former Italian prisoners of war. At the beginning of May 1947, it was announced in the House of Commons that, 'Italians may now return here for Agricultural work'. This resulted in the initial scheme for the employment of former Italian prisoners of war being extended to all those with previous agricultural experience.

Initially, the return of former Italian prisoners of war to Britain was on condition that the 'Ministry of Labour and National Service are satisfied that no suitable British labour is available for the work'. By March 1948, the availability of other sources of alien labour resulted in a hierarchy of preferred labour which, to a large extent, was established on the basis of political expediency. Therefore, permission for the return of former Italian prisoners of war for the purpose of agricultural labour was 'granted only in cases where the Ministry of Labour and National Service are satisfied that suitable British, Polish or European Volunteer Workers are not available'.

By 1949, some 1,100 former Italian prisoners of war had accepted an offer of permanent settlement in Britain, on condition that they remained in agriculture (Isaac 1954:183-4). This employment restriction was removed in 1951.

**Scottish Context**

During the immediate post-war period, Italian prisoners of war in Scotland were employed by various government ministries. However, the largest number continued to work within agriculture. For a period of six months following the end of the war, the number of Italian prisoners of war employed in Scottish agriculture fluctuated between 10,000 and 10,500. By
the end of January 1946, the number had fallen to 3,800, and by April of that year the
employment of Italian prisoners of war in Scottish agriculture had ceased altogether.®

The scheme which allowed Italian prisoners of war to remain as civilian agricultural workers
was operated in Scotland by the Department of Agriculture for Scotland.® The Department
was responsible for initiating the contracts of service which brought the Italians within the
provisions of the Essential Work (Agriculture) (Scotland) Order, 1945. In the event of Italians
being discharged or leaving their employment, the Department was required to place them in
alternative employment with other farmers. As the scheme was contractual, and not intended
as a precursor to permanent settlement, the onus was on the Department of Agriculture for
Scotland, in consultation with the Ministry of War Transport, to ‘arrange the ultimate
repatriation of the Italians at the end of their period of service as civilians’.® An estimated 140
Italian prisoners of war chose to remain in Scotland under the scheme.®

The Italian prisoners of war who had been repatriated and then wished to return to Scotland as
civilian agricultural workers often appealed to the farmers with whom they had previously been
billeted for re-employment. Those farmers who were willing then applied to the appropriate
authorities. Evidence of this practice is illustrated by the following extracts from (a three way)
correspondence between (a) a former Italian prisoner of war, (b) a Scottish farmer, and (c) a
representative for the Secretary of State for Scotland:

(a) ‘In my own country, there is not much hope even if we were to work ourselves
to death; even that is not possible as there is no work at all and I am therefore
compelled to have recourse to my good friends in Britain. It seems that there are
now regulations permitting me to come and work for you, if this is so, could you
please ask for me?. Or else could you please let me know what I must do to join
you and recommence the same old life of an Italian worker, this time as a civilian'.
(b) 'I enclose herewith a letter and translation from the above named ex POW who was in my employment at this farm for two and a half years up to the time of his repatriation on February of this year. I am anxious to have him back for agricultural work and he is most anxious to return. I shall be greatly obliged if you can inform me if it is possible to get (name of pow given) back again from Italy and if so what procedure is necessary in order to let him re-enter the country'.

(c) 'Mr Westwood (Secretary of State for Scotland) regrets that, as (name of pow given) has returned to Italy there is no possibility, at present, of having him returned to this country. Apparently, he had returned to Italy before the scheme for the retention of Italians on contracts of service was announced'.

Before the scheme was announced, The Department of Agriculture for Scotland had received numerous applications from farmers for the return of repatriated Italian prisoners of war. The standard response to such applications was as follows:

"The Department are unable to make any arrangements for the return of repatriated Italian ex-prisoners of war to work on farms in this country. Under present arrangements permits for the entry of individual aliens are issued only very exceptionally where the man has special skill or rare qualifications and when it can be shown that a British worker is not likely to be available for the work. This rule applies equally to repatriated Italian ex-prisoners of war formerly detained in this country for agricultural employment and aliens of other nationalities".

When, in May 1947, the Government decided that former Italian prisoners of war could return to Britain as agricultural workers, the Department of Agriculture for Scotland issued the following standard letter to those Scottish farmers with whom there had been previous correspondence about the return of Italians:
With reference to the enquiry about the possibility of securing the return to this country of an alien ex-prisoner of war the Ministry of Labour have announced that arrangements can now be made, subject to certain safeguards, for Italians previously employed in agriculture to be brought back to this country. The enclosed form (A.R.1) should be completed and sent to the Secretary, Ministry of Labour and National Service, Foreign Labour Division.\(^7\)

Former Italian prisoners of war who wished to return to Scotland, but had not been billeted with farmers, were sometimes assisted by Scottish people with whom they had developed relationships during their period of captivity. For example, many Italian prisoners of war had developed long term relationships with Scottish women, and some were allowed to return for the purpose of marriage.\(^7\) Such relationships served as an important source of contact in the migration process. One interviewee described how, through his Scottish girlfriend (of Italian descent), he was able to secure agricultural employment in Scotland:

"I wrote to my girlfriend and said, "Ask one of the farmers to call me back". She got in touch with one of the farmers and said, "My boyfriend would like to come back here and work on the farm again". So they got all the papers and sent the papers to me. I came back here and I worked on the farm for about a year. Then we decided to get married. So once I was married she applied to the Home Officer and said she was needing me to help run the cafe. So that allowed me to leave my job and run the cafe."\(^7\)

A number of former Italian prisoners of war wished to return as civilian agricultural workers, with a view to subsequently joining, and working for, relatives who had been long established in Scotland. However, few, if any, Italians in Scotland were farmers. Thus, agricultural employment was sought through contacts established in the catering trade, within which most were concentrated. The following official communication indicates that the authorities were aware of such practice. As this went against the aim of the scheme, applications were therefore scrutinised accordingly:
In reply to your letter of the 2nd of February, 1948, concerning the possible employment of an Italian national...it is recorded that in an interview with Mr Stevenson, potato merchant, with whom the man had apparently arranged employment, that nothing was known by Mr Stevenson of (the Italian) as a farm worker nor even as an ex-prisoner of war. It has, however, been established that a brother in law of (the Italian) is proprietor of a fried fish restaurant, Stirling, and it is quite apparent that approaches had been made to Mr Stevenson as his potato supplier for assistance, in obtaining agricultural employment...as the first stage, presumably, prior to the opening of a branch shop. (The Italian's) application for employment in agriculture is not recommended and his action deprecated. 73

To notify farmers of the possibility of meeting the shortage of labour in Scottish agriculture through the use of former Italian prisoners of war, details were announced in the Press and by the B.B.C.. Thus, a letter received by The Department of Agriculture for Scotland referred to, 'Hearing on the radio that we are now allowed to take back Italians for agricultural work'. 74

By the Spring of 1948, the labour of former Italian prisoners of war was being gradually superseded by the increased use of European Volunteer Workers. Hence, a correspondence between the Edinburgh office of the Ministry of Labour and National Service and the Department of Agriculture for Scotland, on the subject of labour supply and the employment of Italians in agriculture, noted that the 'situation may be radically changed in the near future, when the EVWs...become available for employment'. 75

There are no separate figures available for the number of former Italian prisoners of war who settled in Scotland. However, while no Italians were recorded as employed within agriculture, horticulture and forestry in the 1931 Census of Scotland, the 1951 Census revealed that 126 Italians were then employed in those occupations. 76 Most, if not all, of these would have been former Italian prisoners of war. Moreover, this number may have been higher because when employment restrictions were lifted in 1951, some took advantage of the 'national connection' and were employed by members of the extant Italian community in the catering trade. 77
GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR

During the immediate post-war period, the number of German prisoners of war in Britain reached a peak of 402,000 in September 1946 (Kochan 1980:125). The presence of German prisoners of war in Britain was characterised by an extensive and diverse use of their labour by Government Departments. Initially, the labour of German prisoners of war was considered a substitute for that of Italian prisoners of war. However, a continuing shortage of British labour resulted in a further expansion of the German prisoner of war work force. The number employed in Britain began to decline from late 1946 as a result of repatriation, a process which was completed in 1948. Nevertheless, schemes were introduced which enabled German prisoners of war to stay in Britain temporarily as civilian agricultural workers. Some 15,000 were subsequently allowed to settle permanently on condition that they remained in agricultural employment, of whom an estimated 15 percent (2,250) settled in Scotland (Isaac 1954:184). The majority of these former German prisoners of war were released from employment restrictions during the course of 1951.

This section begins by outlining the way in which British government policy towards German prisoners of war in the immediate post-war period was primarily shaped by the demand for labour. The German prisoner of war presence in Scotland is then examined within this context, with particular focus upon the use of their labour in agriculture, the house building programme, and on hydro-electric schemes. Finally, it will be shown how in response to the loss of this labour through repatriation, schemes were introduced which allowed German prisoners of war to remain, first as temporary civilian agricultural workers, and then as permanent settlers.

British Context

With the changed circumstances brought about by the end of the Second World War, security considerations which had limited the use of some 75 percent of the 199,500 German prisoners of war than in Britain immediately gave way to demands for their labour. On 8 May 1945, the
date on which Germany's unconditional surrender was officially announced, the War Cabinet considered various proposals concerning the employment of German prisoners of war and reached the following conclusions:

(1) 'As many as possible of the German prisoners now in this country should be put to work...and restrictions on the conditions of employment of prisoners, both in agriculture and forestry and in other industries, should be suitably relaxed. This conclusion will necessitate the placing of German prisoners in hostels as well as in camps, though not in billets.

(2) German prisoners who by reason of their extreme Nazi views could not easily be put to work in the United Kingdom, should so far as practicable, be returned to Germany.

(3) To replace prisoners returned to Germany an equivalent number of non-Nazi prisoners should be transferred to the United Kingdom as opportunity arose. In selecting these prisoners regard should be had to the type of work for which they were needed.

(4) The Minister of Labour and National Service and the Secretary of State for War should make a further report to the War Cabinet in due course, so that the question of bringing further prisoners of war to this country for employment could be reviewed in the light of the progress made'.

As in the case of Italian prisoners of war, a system of classification was developed which, although essentially based on political convictions, aimed to make the most efficient use of German prisoner of war labour. Initially, it was proposed that two categories of German prisoners of war be introduced. The first grouping would include 'fanatical and confirmed Nazis' who would be referred to as 'Blacks', while the other would comprise 'lukewarm and anti-Nazis' referred to as 'Whites'. It was suggested that the two categories be segregated so that a scheme comparable to the Italian co-operator and non-co-operator classes could be instituted, and different degrees of control applied. The intention was to 'use this labour in static and mobile units to meet the labour demands which will arise and reduce as far as possible security
restrictions on their employment. However, there were reservations about the use of the terms 'White' and 'Black', for they were seen as too rigid and to lack an intermediate category. It was also argued that there was a possibility after the war of a 'White German' group emerging in Germany. Nevertheless, the classification was adopted, but with the inclusion of category 'Grey' prisoners.

By mid-1945 there were 92,800 German prisoners of war at work in Britain, and by the end of the year the number had risen to 145,900. During this time, the total number of German prisoners of war in Britain had remained relatively constant. However, in February 1946, it was announced in the House of Commons that, 'arrangements are in hand to bring further German prisoners to this country from other areas in considerable numbers to make good the loss of Italians, and to supplement the prisoner of war labour forces'. Subsequently, significant numbers of German prisoners of war were brought to Britain from America, Canada and the Continent. By September 1946, the number of German prisoners of war in Britain had reached a peak of 402,000 (Kochan 1980:125), of whom 301,000 were in work.

In the first half of 1946, 123,000 German prisoners of war who had been transported to America (where they were used as an agricultural labour force) were brought to Britain. Most had been led to believe that they were being repatriated. The realisation by German prisoners of war on their arrival in Britain that they were not returning to Germany led to a general mood of bitterness (Faulk 1977:177-8). The state of affairs is cogently recaptured in the following accounts provided by two interviewees:

'The time was the end of '45 and they said, "Right boys, you're all going back home". From Sacramento we were shipped, through the Panama Canal. Then we came nearer to Liverpool, and then we heard the voice of the Captain speaking, "Sorry boys we can't take you home, we've got to drop you off at Liverpool. You will be taken across the country, over to Hull and from Hull over to Hamburg. And we smelled a rat and a rat it was'.
When we left America they told us we were going home. When we landed in Liverpool they told us there was something wrong with the ship, so they would take us off. But that wasn't true either. They just sent us to Scotland to work on the farms. The way they went about it sickened us. At first we just refused to work.67

The use of German prisoner of war labour was regulated by the following three principles. First, they could only be engaged on work of national importance. Second, they could only undertake work for which there was no British labour available. Finally, the consent of the appropriate trade union had to be given.88 The way in which these precepts were interpreted, together with trade union co-operation, ensured that the use of German prisoner of war labour was both extensive and diverse. For example, by the end of January 1946 there were 100,800 engaged in agricultural work under the direction of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, and the Department of Agriculture for Scotland. The Ministry of Works were allocated 30,000 for the preparation of housing sites, building material manufacture and civil engineering. The Board of Trade used 4,800 on timber production, in the fertiliser industry, tyre production, and salvage. The Ministry of War Transport employed 2,000 on the railways, roads, in quarries and on canals. The Ministry of Food employed 800 in 'milk, sugar, milling, seed oil threshing', and the Ministry of Fuel and Power used 200 for the distribution of gas and coal.89

As part of the process of organising German prisoners of war into a labour force, it had been decided at the end of the war to first repatriate those who 'by reason of their extreme Nazi view could not easily be put to work in the United Kingdom'.60 However, it is unclear whether such a repatriation policy was pursued, as the government may have been swayed by the concern that these prisoners 'would engage in subversive activities if released in Germany'.61 Instead, it would appear that emphasis was given to repatriating 'anti-Nazis (Whites) who can be of use in Germany', together with those prisoners who were unfit for work.62 Hence, in September 1946 it was announced that German prisoners of war were to be repatriated at 15,000 a month, with priority given to those known to be 'democratically minded'.63
Initially, when German prisoners of war were due to be repatriated, they were given the opportunity to stay for six months as civilian agricultural workers. Their stay could then be extended as, 'Prisoners of war who have deferred their repatriation for six months may in the fifth month defer for a further period, and so on each time'. By 11 March 1947, there were over 800 German prisoners of war who elected to remain in Britain.

In March 1947, it was announced in the House of Commons that the government was prepared to consider an arrangement under which farmers who could provide accommodation would be able to retain German prisoners of war on a civilian basis, provided that it was not to the detriment of British workers. It was stated that as 'the door has been opened to Italians on a small scale. This does represent an advance along this road'. Those farmers who wished to retain billeted German prisoners of war due for repatriation as civilian workers were required to enter into a contract of service to employ them on exactly the same terms and conditions as British agricultural workers. The contract of service was to be for the period up to 31 December 1947, when the arrangements were to be reviewed. In December 1947, it was decided to extend the arrangements under which German prisoners of war could remain in Britain as civilian workers 'As a means of strengthening the supply of agricultural workers in 1948'.

Some 24,000 German prisoners of war volunteered to remain in Britain as civilian agricultural workers until the end of 1948 (Isaac 1954:184). From 1948, only those Germans who had secured employment and entered into contracts with individual farmers were allowed to remain in Britain as civilians. Subsequently, some 15,000 former German prisoners of war were allowed to settle permanently in Britain, on condition that they remained within agriculture (Isaac 1954:184). They were eventually freed from employment restrictions in gradually increasing numbers from May 1951. This followed an announcement by the Ministry of Labour on 7 February 1951 that former prisoners of war would be eligible to apply for release from employment restrictions after four years from the date when they were given civilian status. They were then 'as British workers, free to choose their own employment, except that in some industries employment of foreign workers is neither precluded or has been made subject to certain conditions by industrial agreement'.


It has been argued that for the German prisoners of war who remained in Britain, 'The most frequent motivation was fear of the Russians, particularly among men normally resident in the Russian zone' (Faulk 1977:49). Many of those interviewed during the course of this research asserted that this did have a major influence upon their decision to stay. Indeed, some were strongly advised not to return to Germany:

'British intelligence officers used to come round camps and they used to give talks to us. They said, “We know by experience that a lot of you boys been repatriated to Germany to the Russian zone. The Russians just took them away again and made them prisoner of war again, took them away to Siberia. So we would advise you not to go back”. A friend of mine and myself we thought about it, and then they came round and offered us to stay in Great Britain'.

However, not all former German prisoners of war who remained in Britain were from that part of Germany incorporated within the Russian zone. Other considerations, including family and economic conditions (which also applied to those from the Russian zone), were also important factors in the decision making process. Thus, one interviewee explained his decision to stay as follows:

'My parents were no longer living and I had nothing to go back to, and the conditions in Germany were such that there were no prospects really of any advancement. Food was rationed and unemployment was great, and I thought the best thing I could do was remain here for a wee while and see how I get on. These things decided me to remain in Scotland'.

Scottish Context

During the immediate post-war period, German prisoners of war represented an important source of labour for various sectors of the Scottish economy. This was particularly true of house building, hydro-electric schemes and agriculture which relied heavily upon their labour.
Housing

On the day which followed the end of the war, it was announced in the House of Commons that, "In order to assist the housing programme, the Government have decided to use German prisoners of war in considerable numbers. They will be employed in the first place on road making, sewer construction, site preparation and other civil engineering work". Following this decision, the Department of Health for Scotland issued a circular to local authorities which set out the terms and conditions under which German prisoner of war labour would be supplied in Scotland. Furthermore, it stated that 'generally prisoner of war labour will be available in most areas of Scotland'. This suggested a wider distribution of German prisoners of war, who had up until that time only been located in certain rural areas of Scotland.

The first authority in Scotland to make use of German prisoner of war labour was Glasgow Corporation. Indeed, a sub-convener of the Housing Committee of Glasgow Corporation had been 'advocating since the winter of 1943 the use of prisoners of war as a means of speeding up the Glasgow housing programme'. By the end of May 1945, the Housing Committee of the Corporation had approved the employment of some 250 German prisoners of war, who were to be engaged on site preparation for the Glasgow peripheral housing schemes at Priesthill and Castlemilk. It was expected that 500 would ultimately be engaged on housing work in Glasgow.

By September 1945, there were 1,580 German prisoners of war employed on Scotland's housing programme. They were employed by authorities throughout Scotland, including sites at Alloa, Stirling, Kilmarnock and Aberdeen. By February 1946, the number of German prisoners of war employed in housing had increased to 2,500, when they comprised some 15 percent of the total housing workforce in Scotland.
Hydro-Electric

During the immediate post-war period, German prisoners of war were also used on the construction of hydro-electric schemes which were seen as an important feature of post-war reconstruction in Scotland. After the Hydro-Electric Development (Scotland) Act was passed in 1943, the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board was created which was envisaged not simply as an organisation to provide electricity but as an instrument for the rehabilitation of Northern Scotland (Payne 1988:45). This development included two major construction schemes, one located at Loch Sloy (north of Arrochar) and the other at Tummel-Garry (near Pitlochry).

Work on the Loch Sloy scheme commenced in March 1945, but was immediately constrained due to an acute shortage of labour. Thus, it was announced in the House of Commons that the, 'North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board are obliged to employ German prisoners of war on the Loch Sloy Scheme as they are unable to obtain sufficient Scottish labour'. At the end of October 1945, a group of 200 German prisoners of war began work on the Loch Sloy scheme. Following the arrival of a second group in December 1945, the number of German prisoners of war stood at 398, as compared to 45 British workmen. At the end of May 1946, the Secretary of State for Scotland announced that a further 265 German prisoners of war were employed on the Tummel Garry scheme, as compared to 105 British workmen. By June 1946, there were over 1,500 German prisoners of war employed on the hydro-electric schemes in Scotland.

Most German prisoners of war working on the hydro-electric schemes in Scotland were used for general labouring work such as the construction of access roads, while some were employed on unspecified skilled work. Those employed on the Loch Sloy scheme were based in camps at Whistlefield, Glen Fruin and Stukenduff, with the prisoners of war working at the Tummel Garry scheme based at a camp in Calvine. The German prisoners of war continued to constitute a significant proportion of the labour force employed on the hydro-electric schemes until they were repatriated in 1948. From that time, the shortage of labour was partly met by European Volunteer Workers and Polish ex-servicemen.
Agriculture

The importance of German prisoner of war labour for Scottish agriculture, and the need to take account of its distinctive conditions, was emphasised by the Department of Agriculture for Scotland in May 1945. It was argued that, 'The only source that can be foreseen for making good the deficiency in our Scottish agricultural man-power position is more prisoner-of-war labour'. The Department went on to argue that there were 'certain special difficulties to overcome in maintaining food production at its present level' which were associated with the question of accommodation of Germans in Scotland. It was regarded as essential to billet 'suitable' Germans, as 'Agriculture gets the most out of prisoner labour if it is billeted on farms or accommodated in hostels close to the farms where their services are required'. It was not until the Spring of 1946, however, that significant numbers of German prisoners of war were allowed to be billeted on farms.

By mid-June 1945 there were 1,500 German prisoners of war engaged in agricultural work in Scotland, and by the end of the year the number had increased to over 9,000. In June 1946, the Secretary of State for Scotland estimated that, to meet Scottish agricultural labour requirements for that year, a total prisoner of war force of approximately 40,000 would be required. Although this figure was not reached, the number of German prisoners of war employed in Scottish agriculture did increase substantially during 1946 and 1947, especially at harvest times. This can be shown by the approximate numbers given in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Peak</th>
<th>End of Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cmd. 7717:48.

Of the 30,000 or so German prisoners of war employed during the Summer of 1947, some 9,500 were billeted with farmers. By the Summer of 1948, the employment of Germans as actual prisoners of war in Scottish agriculture had ceased.
Following the government's decision to allow German prisoners of war who were billeted with farmers to remain as civilian agricultural workers, over 500 contracts of service were entered into by Germans and farmers in Scotland. When the arrangement under which German prisoners of war could be employed as civilian agricultural workers was extended, a total of 4,128 elected to remain in Scotland during 1948. Of this number, 2,292 were employed under a scheme operated by the Department of Agriculture for Scotland. By August 1948, they were distributed throughout Scotland in 33 hostels. The main features of the scheme were set out by the Department of Agriculture for Scotland as follows:

(i) The scheme will apply only to approved Germans. They will be permitted to volunteer for agricultural work and also for work as domestic staff in hostels occupied by German agricultural workers.

(ii) The Germans will be required to enter into a contract of service for employment with the Department as civilian agricultural workers or domestic staff, as the case may be, for the period ending 31st December, 1948. They will be liable for employment in any part of Scotland.

(iii) Germans approved for civilisation will be given civilian status as soon as practicable irrespective of their date of repatriation. They will be housed in hostels and will be employed on the same conditions as other male civilian workers in the Department's employment.

(iv) Prisoners who have already signed the provisional agreement to become civilian billetees on reaching their date of repatriation will be eligible for consideration under the new employment scheme. Those who prefer to be civilianised as farm billetees under the earlier scheme may, if the farmer is willing, be released to civilian status without remaining as a prisoner of war until they reach the date of repatriation.
(v) Germans entering the Department's employment may only be employed on the same work as civilian labour and they may not be employed exclusively as lorry drivers, mechanics in machinery depots, etc. This, of course, does not apply to Germans recruited for domestic work in German hostels, who must be employed solely on that work.

(vi) German civilians recruited for gangs under this scheme will not be allowed to enter into individual contracts of employment with farmers.\textsuperscript{130}

Of the 4,128 former German prisoners of war who chose to remain in Scotland as agricultural workers during 1948, 1,586 elected to be repatriated by December of that year and 2,542 were allowed to settle on condition that they entered into contracts of service with farmers.\textsuperscript{131} When the 1951 Census of Scotland was taken, the total number of German born men employed in Scotland stood at 2,018. Of that number 1,403 were engaged in agricultural related occupations, the majority of whom would have been former German prisoners of war.\textsuperscript{132} One reason for the reduction in the overall number in Scotland and within agriculture would have been the lifting in May 1951 of the restrictions which limited the employment of former German prisoners of war to agriculture. This allowed the movement to other forms of employment, both within and outside Scotland.
EUROPEAN VOLUNTEER WORKERS

Between 1946 and 1950 the British government organised labour schemes which co-ordinated the recruitment and migration of some 80,000 displaced persons as European volunteer workers for employment within the 'essential' industries and services in areas of particular labour shortage in Britain (Tannahill 1958, Kay and Miles 1992). Although the conditions imposed upon the entry and employment of European volunteer workers assumed the characteristics of contract migrant labour, their international status as refugees could not be denied. The anomalous position of European volunteer workers made permanent settlement a likely outcome of migration, although this was not made explicit until a late stage of the scheme.

This section begins by describing the presence of a heterogeneous refugee population in post-war Europe and how the government sought to resolve a labour shortage in Britain by redefining this population as a labour reserve. The setting up of state organised labour schemes which transformed refugees into European volunteer workers is then examined within this context. The section then considers the introduction of European volunteer workers into the 'essential' industries and services of the Scottish economy, with particular emphasis upon their employment in agriculture.

The Background

At the end of the Second World War, 'mainland Europe was a veritable refugee camp with millions of people encamped across the ravaged continent' (Walvin 1984:102). These people, most of whom were from the Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), Poland, the Ukraine, and Yugoslavia, were collectively referred to as 'Displaced Persons'. Over one million did not wish to return to their country of origin, mostly for fear of political persecution, and remained in displaced persons camps which were usually organised on a national basis.
(Tannahill 1958:28). Those located in camps within the British controlled zones of Germany and Austria (and later in all three Western zones) were identified by the British government as a 'pool of human resource' which could be tapped (Holmes 1988:213). Those who volunteered for work in Britain, entered through two main government organised schemes, namely, 'Balt Cygnet' and 'Westward Ho!'.

The Balt Cygnet scheme involved the recruitment of female labour for domestic work in sanatoriums and tuberculosis hospitals. At first a target recruitment of 1,000 was set which was to be restricted to women from the Baltic States (Tannahill 1958:20). The first to enter Britain through the scheme arrived in October 1946. By late January 1947 the Minister of Labour was able to announce that, 'Well over 1,000 women had given great satisfaction, and he thought them to be of an excellent type.' Consequently, the scheme was expanded to permit the recruitment of up to 5,000 women for domestic work in general hospitals (Kay and Miles 1992:51). However, the scheme ended in early 1947 with only 2,575 women having been recruited (Isaac 1954:180). In May 1947, the Balt Cygnet scheme was merged with the Westward Ho!, and led to recruitment being extended to include women of other nationalities, most notably Ukrainians. By January 1951, a total of 3,891 women had been recruited from displaced persons camps for employment in British hospitals (Tannahill 1958:133).

The Westward Ho! scheme broadened the use of Displaced Persons to include both men and women as European volunteer workers, so as to meet labour shortages in the gender differentiated essential industries and services. Thus, men were mostly directed into agriculture and coal mining, whilst women were mainly located within textile related industries. Initially, recruitment was limited to men and women of Baltic and Ukrainian nationalities from the displaced persons camps situated within the British zones of Germany and Austria (Isaac 1954:179, Tannahill 1958:26-7). The scheme was later extended to all nationalities of displaced persons and to all Western zones. Through the Westward Ho! scheme, 57,104 men and 17,308 women were recruited as European volunteer workers, the majority of whom arrived in Britain during 1947 and 1948 (Isaac 1954:180, Tannahill 1958:29). Furthermore, during an early phase of the scheme, 3,724 dependants of European volunteer workers were
allowed to enter Britain (Kay and Miles 1992:61). However, the 'government soon took fright over the implications of its policy and after 1 July 1947 recruitment was confined to single persons' (Holmes 1988:214).

The entry and employment of European volunteer workers was conditional upon their acceptance of two main forms of restrictions. The first related to the conditions of entry which specified that European volunteer workers could not change the employment selected for them by the Ministry of Labour and National Service without consent, and that their entry for an initial period of 12 months was subject to good behaviour (Kay and Miles 1992:56). The second related to the collective agreements between unions and employers. The usual provisions included: (a) that the placing of European volunteer workers was subject to no suitable British labour being available; (b) European volunteer workers would be the first to be dismissed in the event of redundancy; (c) wages and conditions were to be in accordance with existing agreements regarding British workers.\(^{134}\)

The prospect of permanent settlement for the European volunteer workers who migrated to Britain was not made officially explicit until a Government announcement in the House of Commons on 11 November 1948.\(^{138}\) Employment restrictions were lifted from January 1951 for those European volunteer workers who had completed three years of 'essential' work (Isaac 1954:182). At the same time, institutional discrimination of European volunteer workers continued because industrial agreements remained in place.

**Scottish Context**

During the post-war period, a total of approximately 7,000 European volunteer workers were directed to various sectors of the Scottish economy which were experiencing a severe shortage of labour.\(^{135}\) Most of the male European volunteer workers were concentrated in agriculture, coal mining and on hydro-electric schemes (Tannahill 1958:133-8, Lunn 1989:6). Female European volunteer workers were employed mainly in the jute industry and thread mills.\(^{137}\)
The use of European volunteer workers in Scottish agriculture was widely seen as compensating for the loss of prisoner of war labour. For example, a leader article in a Scottish newspaper held that, 'Much will depend on an inflow of volunteer workers from the Continent compensating adequately for the outflow of a dwindling army of German prisoners of war'. It was expected that 10,000 European volunteer workers would be needed in Scotland to, 'fill the labour gap caused by the repatriation of the prisoners'.

The European volunteer workers employed in Scottish agriculture were formally recruited by the Department of Agriculture for Scotland. The recruitment took place at various holding camps in England, and was carried out by a representative of the Department who interviewed and selected the required number of recruits. The selected European volunteer workers were then taken by train to destinations in Scotland. The arrival of these European volunteer workers was frequently reported in the press; for example, 'Parties of mostly Ukrainian, Polish, and Yugoslav workers arrived yesterday in special trains at Dingwall and Denny for farm work under the European Volunteer Workers' scheme'.

The European volunteer workers recruited by the Department of Agriculture for Scotland formed part of a male agricultural labour force which also comprised Polish, German and British workers. This labour force was distributed throughout the country in separate hostels (as with above groups) and hired out to farmers for all year round agricultural work. In providing this source of labour the Department of Agriculture for Scotland stressed to the National Farmers' Union of Scotland that, 'These workers can only be secured or retained on the understanding that they are in regular employment. They are not and must not be regarded as casual workers'. However, the stipulation that, 'displaced persons must be taken on as regular and not casual hands', was regarded as detrimental to the needs of Scottish farmers by the National Farmers' Union of Scotland.

When European volunteer workers first became available for agricultural employment through the Westward Ho! scheme, their use in Scotland was limited. For example, only 150 were employed in Scottish agriculture by late September 1947. One of the major obstacles to this
labour source was the unavailability of accommodation. Thus, it was reported that, 'The main
difficulty will be to find accommodation for the European Volunteers. Camps which were used
for Pows are dwindling in number. Some have been derequisitioned, others have been
occupied by squatters, while some are derelict beyond hope of repair with present shortages of
building materials and labour'. Although the number of European volunteer workers had
increased to 785 (a number which also included Polish workers) by the end of 1947, it was not
until hostels which had previously housed German prisoners of war were vacated in early 1948
that European volunteer workers began to be employed in significant numbers.

By late February 1948, there were some 2,000 European volunteer workers housed in 26
hostels throughout Scotland. However, the problem of accommodation continued to hinder
the placement of European volunteer workers in Scottish agriculture, for although an estimated
3,000 European volunteer workers were required for agricultural work in March 1948,
accommodation was ready for only 2,500. It was anticipated that the problem of
accommodation would be resolved by June 1948 when the number of hostels available
throughout Scotland was expected to increase from just over 30 to 90. Moreover, European
volunteer workers were permitted to transfer from hostels if they secured private employment
with farmers.

Although the problem of accommodation had not been completely overcome by the Spring of
1948, the demand for labour was such that the Department of Agriculture for Scotland was
required to step up the recruitment of European volunteer workers regardless. In March 1948,
the Department aimed to recruit 600 European volunteer workers a week, and by April it was
hoped to have over 4,000 available for agricultural labour in Scotland. However, recruitment
was frustrated by the, 'growing difficulty in getting European Volunteer Workers'. The
Department of Agriculture for Scotland declared, 'surprise and pain that the Ministry of Labour
now express doubts as to their ability to meet requirements in full'. Nevertheless, by mid-
June there were 3,858 European volunteer workers employed in agricultural work in Scotland,
and by the end of November 1948 the number had increased to some 4,500.
In contrast to the Department of Agriculture for Scotland’s protestations about the availability of European volunteer workers, such workers were routinely discharged from the Department’s employment from at least April 1948. In discussing the ‘high wastage’ of European volunteer workers in agriculture, Tannahill uses the particular example of Scotland to illustrate the tendency, ‘to dismiss E.V.W.s on trivial grounds without giving them another chance in the industry’ (Tannahill 1958:62). The conditions under which European volunteer workers were employed made it possible for employers, such as the Department of Agriculture for Scotland, to discharge unsatisfactory or surplus workers at short notice and without obligation. In such circumstances, they again became the responsibility of the Ministry of Labour and National Service, and could be recruited for other essential industries or services. On the other hand, former German prisoners of war were allowed to stay in Britain only on condition that they remained within agriculture. If they were to be discharged, they would continue to be the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture for Scotland until their repatriation. This disparity in employment conditions, and the uneven approach to the discharging of workers which resulted, is poignantly summed up by the following remark from an official of the Department of Agriculture for Scotland: ‘we cannot in fact discharge civilianised Germans from our employment and wash our hands of them entirely as we can do with E.V.W.s’.

European volunteer workers were recruited by the Department of Agriculture for Scotland as part of an agricultural workforce intended for regular employment. However, the preference of many farmers for casual labour and the reluctance of others to employ European volunteer workers on a regular basis because of a general antipathy reinforced by reports of ‘slackness and indiscipline among foreign workers’, led the Department to re-evaluate its policy towards the employment of European volunteer workers. From the end of 1948, large numbers of European volunteer workers were discharged from Department of Agriculture for Scotland employment. Throughout 1949 and 1950, numbers fluctuated as the Department followed a seasonal pattern of redundancies during the winter months and retention (and further recruitment) of workers during periods of major agricultural activity. By 1951 the number of European volunteer workers employed by the Department of Agriculture for Scotland had fallen to 800.
UKRAINIAN PRISONERS OF WAR

In 1947 the British Government arranged for Ukrainian prisoners of war, who had been held in Italy since the end of the Second World War, to be brought to Britain. One of the principal reasons for this undertaking was the identification of Ukrainian prisoners of war as a source of labour who could be used to replace German prisoners of war in agriculture (Tannahill 1958:31). Their migration to Britain may therefore be seen as an 'additional dimension' to post-war state recruitment of European alien labour (Holmes 1988:214). Of the 8,397 Ukrainian prisoners of war who were eventually brought to Britain, some 2,000 were initially located in Scotland. However, this number was reduced through national and international migration, following their re-classification as European Volunteer Workers in 1948 and the gradual lifting of restrictions. By mid-1950 there were an estimated 1,100 former Ukrainian prisoners of war living in Scotland (Isaac 1954:184-5).

This section begins with an outline of the events which led to the presence of Ukrainian prisoners of war in Italy after the Second World War. Their subsequent state organised migration from Italy to Britain for employment in agriculture will then be examined within the context of post-war political and economic circumstances. The section will then focus upon the presence of Ukrainian prisoners of war in Scotland, and their incorporation within the agricultural labour force.

The Background

Following a short period of independence at the end of the First World War, the Ukraine was partitioned between the Soviet Union, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia. The political map of the Ukraine was again changed in 1938 with the occupation of former Czechoslovakian held lands by Hungary and the extension of Soviet territory after the invasion of Poland in 1939. With the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1940, all Ukrainian territory was subsequently occupied by Germany (Dmytryw and Wasyluk 1982:16). From 1941
it was the ‘conviction among most Ukrainians that the Germans would assist, or at least tolerate, the establishment of an independent Ukraine. This hope soon proved to be false, but many Ukrainians continued to believe that their only hope of independence lay in taking arms to free themselves from Soviet control’ (Tannahill 1958:14). Consequently, recruits were formed into the Ukrainian ‘Halychyna’ Division (although the wartime experience of many Ukrainians of military age was forced labour in Germany). After heavy losses following a major defeat against the Soviets in July 1944, the Division was reconstituted at the beginning of 1945 (Tannahill 1958:15). In May 1945, the Division retreated into Austria and surrendered to British forces. All members of the Division were then taken to Italy as prisoners of war, where they spent two years in an internment camp. One interviewee described this process as follows:

'I was taken to the forced labour camp in Germany. Then when the Germans started really recruiting, I joined the army. In May I was on the Eastern Front, and there Russian troops were advancing harder and harder. When the end of the war happened in 1945, we retreated from the Ukraine territory, through Czechoslovakia, right into Austria. Our fullest intention was to hit hard as we could to the Western Allies, to meet either American side or British authorities...but not to fall into the hands of the Soviet Forces. We were lucky to hit the British sector...That’s how the whole Division was taken into the prisoner in Salzburg in Austria where all the arms were given to the British authorities. Very temporarily we were taken to Spittal, and from there transported on lorries over the Alps into Italy. First placement was Riccione...from there they put us into Rimini.'

British Context

The British Government decided in March 1947 that Ukrainian prisoners of war from the ‘Halychyna’ Division, who so elected, could be brought from Italy to Britain. This was partly in response to increased pressure from the Soviet Union for their return: ‘The Russians were intent at this time on punishing those members of the Halychyna Division who had thrown in their lot with the German fascist enemy’ (Holmes 1988:214). In the context of increasing
political tension between East and West, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs announced in the House of Commons on 18 June 1947 that, 'The Soviet Government have requested that the members of this Division be sent to the USSR, but since the overwhelming majority of the men concerned come from the territory incorporated into the Soviet Union after 1st September, 1939, His Majesty's Government have not seen their way to comply with this request.'

However, not only was it 'politic for them to be removed to Britain', Ukrainian prisoners of war were also seen as a source of labour which could replace the returning German prisoners of war employed in agriculture (Tannahill 1958:31).

The Ukrainian prisoners of war were transported to Britain by ship, and their arrival at various ports during May 1947, was widely reported in the Press. The Glasgow Herald, for example, reported the arrival in Glasgow of a troop ship 'the third shipment of the kind' carrying 1,500 Ukrainian prisoners of war who were destined for 'work on farms in England.'

Scottish Context

Of the 8,397 Ukrainian prisoners of war who were eventually brought to Britain, some 2,000 were assigned to agricultural work in Scotland. They included Ukrainians from the first contingent to arrive in Britain who, having disembarked at Liverpool, were taken by train to a transit camp near Glasgow and distributed to various agricultural labour camps. One interviewee gave the following account of his journey from Italy to Scotland:

'In the very beginning of May they said, "Pack your bags, you are going to Britain". I happened to be in the first departure and it was a ship from Venice. At that time to transport such a vast number of people, I think authorities had to organise quite a number of ship to make it possible....We went right round the boot of Italy, right round Gibraltar and into Liverpool. From Liverpool on the train to Scotland...it was somewhere outside of Glasgow....From that first place outside of Glasgow, this is where the distribution happened. A group of us were transported to Haddington Camp, and immediately we were detailed to work on the land.'
The Ukrainian prisoners of war in Scotland were engaged in agricultural work, under the direction of the Department of Agriculture for Scotland. They were formed into a distinct part of the agricultural labour force and employed in groups or individually by farmers:

‘From that particular camp in Haddington, we were transported to and from the farms. That’s how our daily life was, there and back, not under guard by the way. Then we had our own Department of Agricultural vehicles...manned by our drivers and we had an office. They had on the list all the farms, where the telephones were coming in and going out with certain requests...“We need fifteen men here, we need ten men there, we need dairy men”. That’s how it went’.  

Initially, the Ukrainian prisoners of war in Scotland were concentrated in large camps. For example, in early 1948, the camp at Haddington (east of Edinburgh) held 900 prisoners. From February 1948, the Department of Agriculture for Scotland began to distribute smaller numbers of Ukrainian prisoners of war in hostels, in line with an earlier policy adopted towards the rest of its agricultural workforce: ‘From that camp (Haddington) we were dispersed into smaller camps...the Department of Agriculture thought it was a good idea to try and make quite a number of smaller ones to distribute the force right throughout Scotland’.  

This dispersal was increased from August 1948, when the status of selected Ukrainian prisoners of war was changed to that of ‘European Volunteer Workers’. By early 1949, there were almost 1,500 former Ukrainian prisoners of war distributed throughout Scotland in 40 hostels. Following their change of status, the Ukrainians were often placed in hostels with European volunteer workers of other nationalities. However, this transition was not without its problems as other European volunteer workers, especially Poles, were sometimes not prepared to live or work besides former Ukrainian prisoners of war.
With their change of status to European volunteer workers, it was possible for former Ukrainian prisoners of war to be released from agricultural employment to other essential industries. This was made easier towards the end of 1949 and early 1950, when there was 'a surplus of workers in certain districts' which made it 'difficult to object or refuse release of Ukrainians when applied for'.

An increasing number of Ukrainians applied for and gained employment within the textile industry (mostly in England) and the coalmining industry (including pits in Scotland).

Others chose to join relatives or friends who had settled in America or Canada. By mid-1950, some 1,100 former Ukrainian prisoners of war continued to live in Scotland under the employment of the Department of Agriculture for Scotland (Isaac 1954:184-5). However, towards the end of 1950, significant numbers were being discharged as 'redundant to requirement for year 1951'. Consequently, an increasing number were drawn to other forms of employment in Scotland, for example, as bus drivers and conductors, building labourers, and as trawlermen.

Most were drawn to the Edinburgh area, where a sizeable Ukrainian community was established and where the majority of the estimated 3,500 Ukrainians (comprising Ukrainians from the Polish Armed Forces, prisoners of war and displaced persons) in Scotland were concentrated.
CONCLUSION

This chapter has (through its study of five distinct groups: specifically, Polish exiles, Italian prisoners of war, German prisoners of war, European Volunteer Workers and Ukrainian prisoners of war) demonstrated that there continued to be a significant inward movement to Scotland of alien Europeans during the period 1945 to 1951. Moreover, this period saw the start of a process of settlement, whereby members of these groups who had arrived during or after the Second World War decided to remain in Scotland. Consequently, certain established minority groups were augmented and others were created for the first time. It was shown that while this process again paralleled in many respects the wider British pattern, there were variations which shaped distinct processes of migration to Scotland. The specific structural conditions that existed in Scotland were more apparent in the post-war economy. These conditions were especially evident in affecting the movement of Poles who, because they were not formally restricted to the ‘essential industries’ (e.g. coal mining, agriculture and textiles) as were other groups, found that the prospect of employment outside these sectors were limited in Scotland when compared to the rest of Britain.

Furthermore, the chapter described how each of the groups studied had been constituted and their movements structured by the consequences of the Second World War. Moreover, it identified a number of motivations which variously shaped the arrival, presence and settlement of these groups. They were primarily political, ideological and economic factors. As far as the British government was concerned there was an element of humanitarian concern, especially in respect to the Poles and European volunteer workers whose status was, or approximated, that of refugee. In addition, there was sympathy and support for the anti-communist stance of the Poles and Ukrainians in particular, which reflected the changes in the political order in Europe and cooling relations between the communist east and capitalist west. However, arguably the most powerful motivation was the identification of these groups as a source of labour which could be used, or recruited, to help rebuild Britain’s war damaged economy. Thus, within the context of post-war capitalist reconstruction, there was a continuation of the pattern which had
developed during the war of resolving a labour shortage through the state organisation of alien European labour. Indeed, the post-war government viewed such labour as 'the only substantial additional source of man-power which is open to us'. It was the above groups who were the principal source of this labour. A further advantage of this source of labour was the relatively weak position of the alien, especially those who for political reasons did not wish to return to their homeland. This meant that their position in the labour market could be readily controlled by the state, whereby they could be directed into the essential industries where labour shortages were most acute.

As far as group members themselves were concerned, their decision to remain was often shaped by a combination of factors. It was shown that for Poles and Ukrainians, the main motivation was strong anti-communist sentiments combined with concerns over their safety if they returned to their homes. Another aspect was that of 'economic betterment' and the belief their stay would lead to greater opportunities. In addition, relationships which had developed during and after the war between members of the various groups and the indigenous population, as well as extant minority communities, was a further motivational factor.
CHAPTER 4

STATE RESPONSES TO ALIEN EUROPEANS IN SCOTLAND 1939 - 1945

INTRODUCTION

The objective of this chapter is to describe the way in which British state responses during the Second World War affected alien and minority European groups in Scotland. It is not intended as an exhaustive account but instead concentrates upon the implementation of the policy of internment and its effect on German-Jewish refugees and the Italian minority. The chapter begins with an overview of the way in which the policy of mass internment developed, and some of the reasons put forward to explain why the policy was introduced and subsequently reversed. It then examines the above two groups separately by way of a case study of each within a Scottish context.

OVERVIEW

From the outset of the Second World War the British state imposed restrictions upon all aliens resident in Britain. They included, for example, restrictions on the movements of both enemy and friendly aliens. However, the most significant state response towards aliens was that of internment. The policy of internment was chiefly directed towards nationals of belligerent states, who were defined as 'enemy aliens'. Those most affected were German-Jewish refugees, and members of the Italian community. The state was also able, through Defence Regulation 18B, to detain any person of hostile origin or association. This included those who
had become naturalised British subjects, as well as those of German, Austrian and Italian descent who had been born in Britain.

The policy of internment during the Second World War followed a similar pattern to that which characterised the state response towards enemy aliens during the First World War, when almost 30,000 were interned on account of 'spy fever' (Foot 1965:114, Gillman and Gillman 1980:5-7). Indeed, it was to be the policy experiences of the 1914-18 war which 'laid down the basis for what happened between 1939 and 1945' (Holmes 1988:173). Initially, the experience of internment during the First World War, and the criticisms which had followed, led the government to take the view that in the event of war there should be no general internment of aliens, although those of enemy nationality would be subjected to certain restrictions. However, by April 1939 the government had accepted that some internment would be inevitable if war broke out, and arrangements for the accommodation of internees were made (Wasserstein 1979:83-4).

At the outbreak of war in September 1939, the British state immediately began a policy of categorising and interning enemy aliens. On 4 September 1939, the Home Secretary announced that tribunals would be set up to conduct an immediate review of all Germans and Austrians in this country'. The main task of the tribunals was to place enemy aliens within one of three categories. Those classified as 'A' were to be interned, those classified as 'B' were to be exempt from internment but subject to restrictions, and those classified as 'C' were exempt from both internment and restrictions. By January 1940, most of the 74,200 enemy aliens (62,200 Germans and 12,000 Austrians) in Britain had appeared before one of the 120 tribunals which had been established throughout the country (Lalitte 1940:62-3). At that time, a total of 528 enemy aliens had been interned, 8,356 had been subjected to restrictions, and some 64,000 remained at liberty (Wasserstein 1979:85, Lalitte 1940:37). The tribunals were also required to determine whether an alien was a 'refugee from Nazi oppression', a title that was conferred on 55,460 people (75 percent of the total brought before tribunals) (Gillman and Gillman 1980:46).
The large scale internment of enemy aliens began in May 1940, and was one of the first actions of the newly formed Churchill coalition government. On 12 May it declared the establishment of a ‘Protected Area’ along the eastern and southern coasts, within which all male Germans and Austrians (including those identified as ‘refugees from Nazi oppression’) between the ages of 16 and 60 (with the exception of the invalid and infirm) were to be rounded up and interned (Wasserstein 1979:87). Later that month the government extended the scope of internment to include all male and female enemy aliens between the ages of 16 and 60 (the upper age limit being extended to 70 in early June), who had earlier been placed in category ‘B’ (Wasserstein 1979:89).

When Italy entered the Second World War on 10 June 1940, Italian nationals in Britain were immediately defined as enemy aliens and therefore became subject to internment. The police were ordered to detain all male Italian aliens aged between 16 and 70 who had resided in Britain for less than twenty years (Stammers 1983:45). In addition, male and female Italians (including naturalised British subjects and those of Italian descent) who were regarded with suspicion by MI5 were arrested. Most of these were among the 1,500 listed by MI5 as members of fascist clubs in Britain (Gillman and Gillman 1980:151). Subsequently, some 4,000 Italians and a further 300 British subjects of Italian descent were arrested for internment (Gillman and Gillman 1980:155).

In late June 1940, the government decided to intern all category ‘C’ male Germans and Austrians. As a result, the only enemy aliens who had not been interned by the end of June 1940 were non-suspect female category ‘C’ Germans and Austrians, and non-suspect female Italians (Holmes 1988:188). By mid-July 1940, the British state had interned 27,200 men and women. They were held in camps throughout Britain, 'from Seaton in Devon to the remote parts of Scotland', with the largest proportion held on the Isle of Man (Gillman and Gillman 1980:225).
The state policy went a stage further than mass internment when it was decided to deport those internees who were regarded as especially dangerous. As a result, some 8,000 enemy aliens were transported overseas, mainly to Canada and Australia. This policy was almost immediately called into question when on 2 July 1940 the ‘Arandora Star’, a ship carrying internees and prisoners of war to Canada, was sunk by a German U-boat off the coast of Ireland with heavy loss of life (Hickey and Smith 1989). An official inquiry into the disaster, while finding that a number of the internees who died should not have been selected for deportation, largely vindicated the government. Deportations were reduced after the ‘Arandora Star’ tragedy, but subsequent transportation’s still produced a host of difficulties, and some minor scandals’ (Wasserstein 1979:96). The most notorious involved the maltreatment by soldiers of internees who were being transported to Australia on board the troopship ‘Dunera’, this also becoming the subject of an official enquiry (Wasserstein 1979:96).

Towards the end of July 1940, the British government began to moderate its internment policy. A White Paper published by the Home Office on 31 July laid down that internees could qualify for release under one of eighteen categories. These categories mostly extended to those internees who could make a contribution to the war effort. Thus, they included those who had occupied key positions in industries engaged in work of national importance, scientists, research workers, skilled workers in agriculture or forestry, and persons of academic distinction for whom work of national importance in their special fields was available, doctors of medicine and dentists. Internees were also eligible for release if they enlisted into the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps, which carried out such work as the building of roads, camps and airfields, as well as ‘cleaning lavatories, unloading lorries, digging ditches and humping coal’ (Stent 1980:249-50, Gillman and Gillman 1980:258). A number of these former internees were later allowed to transfer from the Pioneer Corps to combatant units (Bentwich 1950). Moreover, many of those eligible for release under the White Paper were persons under 16 and over 70 years of age and the invalid or infirm. These were people who, according to government guidelines, should not have been interned in the first place.
Gradually, the British government widened the categories of internees eligible for release. By August 1941, the number of those who remained in internment in Britain was reduced to some 13,000 after almost 18,000 had been released (Wasserstein 1979:107). At that time, only 2 internment camps on the Isle of Man (as compared to 9 in November 1940) continued to be occupied. By July 1942, most internees had been released with just 300 to 400 still detained, a figure which had fallen to 25 by April 1944 (Wasserstein 1979:108). The release of those who had been deported overseas was not as expeditious, although most were returned to Britain by the end of 1943 (Gillman and Gillman 1980:276, 283).

The reasons which lay behind the implementation by the British state of the policy of mass internment in response to the presence of those classified as 'enemy aliens' during the Second World War were complex. Clearly, consideration must be given to the historical precedence of internment set in the First World War. Nevertheless, the explanation is most likely to be found within the historically specific context in which the decision to proceed with wholesale internment was taken. Hence, within the conjunctural conditions marked by the end of the 'Phoney War', there existed a very real threat of a German invasion of Britain following the invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 1940 and Holland, Belgium and France in May. It was in these circumstances that two sources of pressure can be identified as having particular influence in the decision making process, namely the 'military authorities' and 'public opinion' (Gillman and Gillman 1980:216).

During the Spring of 1940 there was a 'bitter Cabinet struggle over internment', when 'the Home Office had every major force in wartime government ranged against it, including the War Office, the Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Intelligence Committee and MI5' (Gillman and Gillman 1980:VII, 93). Up until that time the Home Office had been the most influential department in the development of a relatively limited internment policy. However, with the imminent threat of invasion, the military and security voices within the government became the most powerful. This situation led a Home Office representative in the House of Lords in August 1940 to assert that mass internment had been forced on the government by the military authorities. Moreover, whilst expressing criticism on the process of selecting internees for deportation, he
defended the actual policy on the basis that 'the risk of invasion was imminent, and it seemed desirable both to husband our resources of food and get rid of useless mouths and so forth'.

The pressure of 'public opinion' would appear to have had a major leverage over the state policy of mass internment. In the House of Lords it was declared that the internment policy had been a response to 'those waves of panic which do occur in war-time'. Indeed, the policy was justified by many officials on the grounds that the 'public at large had demanded such measures' (Hickey and Smith 1989:219). Initially, there was no significant public pressure for the internment of 'enemy aliens'. However, during the early months of 1940 there was an intensification of anti-alien sentiment among the general population. This 'heightened public animosity' towards the presence of German and Austrian 'enemy aliens' in particular and to aliens in general, both influenced and was influenced by the antipathy expressed in the national press, in Parliament and within such government departments as the War Office and MI5 (Wasserstein 1979:85). The general anxiety and suspicion which existed at that time was heightened by the fear of a much publicised 'Fifth Column', similar to that which had reportedly assisted German parachutists during the invasions of Holland and Belgium. Thus, it was argued that 'The invasion and overrunning of Holland and Belgium, which was attributed in the public mind so largely to fifth column activities, made a radical change in the situation' (Lafitte 1940:162).

Moreover, the mass internment of 'enemy aliens' may be viewed as the culmination of popular and official antipathy towards aliens and German-Jewish refugees in particular, as manifested by the enforcement of a highly restrictive immigration policy (Kushner 1989) which was in evidence before the outbreak of war. Hence, in embarking on a policy of mass internment the government would have felt assured of support from the 'strong strains of anti-alienism and anti-Semitism that existed within British society' (Holmes 1988:192).

A number of reasons have been suggested for the relatively rapid diminution of mass internment as a policy of the British state during the Second World War. One of the most favoured is that which has identified the 'fall out' after the 'Arandora Star' tragedy as having led
to a perceptible change in public attitudes towards internment and pressure on the government
to widen the categories of internees eligible for release (Wasserstein 1979:101-6). Moreover,
the period when the British government introduced the policy of general internment has been
described as 'a phase when power in Britain was secretly concentrated and arrogantly
dispersed. The sinking of the Arandora Star lifted that secrecy and broke that power. It also
caused the policy of internment and deportation to be reversed' (Gillman and Gillman 1980:6).
In addition, it has been suggested that the British state increasingly relaxed its policy of
internment when, after the immediate threat of invasion was over, 'Churchill became converted
to a liberal position' (Holmes 1988:190-1).

One reason for the release of internees that has not received adequate recognition was the
need to make use of all available sources of labour towards the war effort at a time when there
was a severe shortage of labour. For example, in a paper presented to the Cabinet by Attlee
on the question of 'alien manpower', it was considered as 'clearly absurd that Britain should be
deprived of the 'potentially useful' and should suffer the 'loss of valuable services' in its fight'
(Gillman and Gillman 1980:230-1). Consequently, many of those who qualified for early
release from internment had skills that were considered by the government as potentially
valuable to work of national importance. For those male internees who did not possess
recognised skills, attempts were initially made to coerce them into the Auxiliary Military Pioneer
Corps. Hence, a notice which appeared at an internment camp in October 1940 proclaimed:

'A small number of internees are delaying their application for the A.M.P.C. in the
hope of being released under some category of the White Paper....In this they may
be disappointed as firms engaged in work of national importance have shown no
particular desire to re-employ aliens now in internment and medically fit for
service....In their own interest internees should be informed that delay in making
up their minds whether or not they wish to join the A.M.P.C. may result in their
internment for the duration of the war'.11
By recruiting internees into the Pioneer Corps, it was possible for the state to both utilise their labour at the same time as maintaining direct control over them. Thus, on being informed at the beginning of January 1941 that 4,610 internees had been enlisted into the Pioneer Corps, Churchill commented that he was 'very much in favour of recruiting friendly Germans and keeping them under strict discipline, instead of remaining useless in concentration camps' (Wasserstein 1979:107). The female internees were mainly released into employment in 'hospitals, nurseries, schools, factories, in the Land Army and in the ATS' (Stent 1980:249-50).

It may be further argued that in the same way that government departments concerned with national security had gained a powerful voice during the period of threatened invasion, so did the voice of the 'user departments' gain in strength after the threat had subsided. That is, labour considerations became increasingly prioritised over stringent security measures. Moreover, the decision taken at the beginning of 1941 to use prisoner of war labour in Britain would have been difficult to justify alongside the continued mass internment of German-Jewish refugees and members of the Italian community, most of whom were eager to assist in the war effort. Indeed, such concerns were raised at a meeting of the Home Defence Security Executive in January 1941 which was considering the use of prisoners of war as agricultural labour in Britain. It was argued that 'recently captured prisoners of war being employed on, and receiving pay for, useful work while so many civilian enemy aliens are still interned would give rise to complaints from those looking after the interests of aliens'. ¹²
GERMAN-JEWISH REFUGEES

The day after Britain entered the Second World War a statement in the press instructed that, 'All Germans and Austrians over 16 years of age who do not intend to leave the country by September 9 must report at once to the police, bringing their passport and documents of identity'. In Scotland, as in the rest of Britain, this was followed by an immediate rush to register. In Glasgow, for example, it was reported that 'Hundreds of aliens...called yesterday at the Aliens Department, Glasgow Police Headquarters, to register under the new Aliens Order. A large number queued up outside the building, while others were seated inside the premises waiting their return to register'.

The majority of those registered with the police in Scotland subsequently appeared before one of six tribunals. The first tribunal opened in Glasgow on 10 October 1939. It was reported that a local barrister (Strachan) 'presided over a sitting of the Aliens Tribunal which opened yesterday in the Justiciary Buildings, Glasgow. Over 20 persons appeared yesterday and this average, it is expected, will be kept up daily for a period of several weeks before the aliens over 16 in the city have been dealt with'. On the following day a tribunal was also opened at the Sheriff Courthouse in Edinburgh which was to examine the cases of 'some 600 aliens from throughout the North, East, and South East of Scotland'.

An interim report dated 24 November 1939 stated that the six tribunals in Scotland had examined the cases of 1,200 refugees, of whom 99 percent had been exempted from 'special restrictions' and had their Alien Registration Certificate endorsed 'Refugees from Nazi Oppression'. By 23 January 1940, the following number of Germans and Austrians, the majority of whom were Jewish, had been examined by Scottish tribunals:
Members of the Jewish community and of the various refugee committees in Scotland played an important role as witnesses and advocates before the tribunals (Kolmel 1984:257). One interviewee described how a tribunal attempted to establish whether her husband, a businessman who had arrived in Glasgow just before the outbreak of war, was indeed a Jewish refugee:

"The people above a certain age had to go in front of a tribunal which was I think a Rabbi, another Jewish man and a Sheriff Officer. They asked him if he could name anybody here who could guarantee that he was Jewish. He said he didn't know anybody, he had just arrived. They gave him a Hebrew prayer book to read out, but he couldn't read Hebrew. So they classified him enemy alien."

Those who were interned immediately following their appearance at tribunals in Scotland were initially held at Donaldson Camp in Edinburgh (which before the war had been a school for the deaf). One interviewee, who at the age of 16 was one of the first to be interned in Scotland, provided the following account:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribunal</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edinburgh</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Andrews</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aberdeen</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dundee</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elgin</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>647</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>1614</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Scottish Regional Archives G1/3/41.*
I became a 'dangerous' enemy alien, Category A, for the simple fact of corresponding with the 'enemy'. I sent letter to my mother and father through an uncle in Belgium, and they did likewise. This mail was intercepted and technically I was corresponding with the enemy. I was to be interned. First, I was locked up in an underground bunker in Maryhill Barracks (Glasgow) with the crews of German merchant ships. Then to Donaldson School in Edinburgh.¹⁹

Following the tribunals there was a space of some 6 months before the commencement of mass internment. It was noted above that the introduction of this policy was partly influenced by increasing disquiet among the general population over the continued presence in their midst of 'enemy aliens' and demands for their internment. Some examples of the way in which such sentiments were expressed in Scotland can be furnished by quoting from some of the letters sent by members of the public to the Secretary of State for Scotland concerning a residential school (Gordonstoun) which had been founded, and was staffed by, German-Jewish refugees:

'I am sending you some of the facts regarding the 'German' school here. Gordonstoun is a large house near the Moray Firth, and adjoining the New Aerodrome at Lossiemouth, and a few miles from the New Aerodrome at Kinross. This school has a completely organised navigation course, which includes a 'look-out' station on the Moray Firth and two boats which cruise about the Firth....There are many rumours in this district about a missing document and several people maintain they have seen a photograph of apparently recent date in which Hitler and Hahn (headmaster) appear....There is no doubt that Herr Hahn makes frequent visits South especially at times of crises....I feel it would be a service to our country to ascertain if there is danger as I know that you would, like myself, do anything possible to prevent any secret espionage in our midst'.²⁰
The fact that these enemy aliens are still in our midst is calling for a good deal of public comment. After all, their true natural allegiance is to their 'Vaterland'. It is the general opinion of the community here that if these German aliens were interned there would be a greater degree of security.\(^2\)^

The increasing sense of public concern over the presence of German-Jewish refugees is further revealed in an Intelligence Report dated 26 April 1940 from the Chief Constable of Moray and Nairn to the Secretary of State for Scotland, in which it is stated:

'In my last Intelligence Report dated 27th October 1939, I commented on the large number of Germans and Austrians at Gordonstoun school, Elgin. The question of so many enemy aliens being at large in such a vulnerable part of the country is giving rise to a considerable amount of talk, if not uneasiness, and there is a growing feeling that they ought to be interned'.\(^2\)^

When the government ordered the first phase of general internment, male Germans and Austrians who resided within the following counties in Scotland were affected: Berwickshire, Roxburgh, Selkirk, Peebles, East Lothian, Midlothian, West Lothian, Fifeshire, Kinrossshire, Angus, Kincardineshire, Aberdeenshire, Banffshire, Morayshire, Nairn, as well as those living in Perth and Inverness.\(^3\)\(^4\) One newspaper, under the heading 'Round Up of Male Enemy Aliens. Swift Action in Scotland', described the events as follows:

'The police yesterday made a sudden swoop on all male enemy aliens between 16 and 60 living in the Eastern half of Scotland...A large number of police officers in plain clothes yesterday carried out this order in Edinburgh district....The round up was carried through quietly and without incident in the early part of the day, and the drivers of the cars were, like the police officers, also in plain clothes. Approximately the number of Germans was about 80 in Edinburgh. The aliens were of all ages and included one or two boys attending schools in the city. Later in the day the Germans were removed in police vans to an internment camp.'\(^2\)\(^4\)
Among those arrested for internment were 21 teachers and pupils from Gordonstoun school. In addition, 34 youths from Whittingehame Farm School were detained, as were an unspecified number of German-Jewish refugee students who had been attending Aberdeen and St. Andrews universities. All were subsequently transported to an internment camp set up at Lingfield Racecourse in Surrey (Stent 1980:88).

In mid-May 1940, when the government ordered the internment of all male Germans and Austrians classified as category 'B', a number of those detained in Glasgow were businessmen. When towards the end of May 1940, the police received orders to arrest for internment category 'B' female Germans and Austrians, it was reported that:

'A round-up of enemy women aliens between the ages of 16 and 60 was carried out yesterday by Glasgow police in accordance with instructions issued...by the Home Office. Detective officers accompanied by policewomen visited the homes of more than 20 women and asked them to go to police headquarters allowing them time only to pack personal belongings....A woman nearly 80 years old was among 3 apprehended in Edinburgh. She is the wife of a German now in his own country, the others were young women....All the women arrested in the southern half of Scotland were removed to a poor-house in the west. A police car from Glasgow piloted a procession of cars containing the women from other towns and counties to the building, which is in a hilly district.'

When the government ordered the round-up of all category 'C' males between the ages of 16 and 70, one interviewee described how the police in Glasgow arrested her elderly father-in-law:

'They came for my father-in-law (67 years of age) at six o'clock in the morning. He had a heart condition so we called the doctor and he came over and said, "You can't take this man away". They called the police surgeon and he said my father-in-law is quite capable to be interned. They took him away, and I saw from the window that they give him a kick into the Black Maria.'
For many German-Jewish refugees, the traumatic experiences of arrest and internment were exacerbated by their earlier ordeals. For example, the father of one interviewee had been arrested by the Nazis during 'Kristallnacht' and had spent six weeks in a concentration camp: 'After war broke out my father was interned and when the police came to pick him up we were terrified. We thought, here we go again, another camp, we didn’t know what to expect.'

At first, the majority of those arrested were detained at internment camps which had been set up in Scotland. The principal internment camp in Scotland was Donaldson School Camp in Edinburgh (Stent 1980:154). Other camps were, for example, erected in Glen Branter near Strachur, at the head of Loch Eck in Argyllshire and in Knapdale near Lochgilphead. During July and August 1940, most of the internees were moved from the Scottish camps to those in England, which included Lingfield Racecourse, York Race Course, Seaton, and Warth Mills in Bury. The vast majority were eventually transferred to camps on the Isle of Man. An indication of the diverse experience of internment is illustrated in the following two accounts:

'For the duration of his internment (my husband) was on the Isle of Man. He was not very happy about it. You see it’s a different age group, my husband was 43 and quite a bit older than many of the others. For the young ones who had no problem, no commitment, it was a university. There were professors of every kind...there was everything to be learned and to be listened to. For my husband, by the time he came out he owed a years rent for the flat and a years rent for the factory. He was sitting there behind barbed wire, not able to do anything. That’s quite a different feeling than if you’re young and you have no commitments'.

'Internment itself was a traumatic episode...But as far as I was concerned, because I was very young, internment was a tremendously high powered school of learning. The 10 months I spent there (Isle of Man) were quite a tremendous education, people from all walks of life there. It was quite a powerful experience.'
Among the German-Jewish refugee internees who were transported overseas were a number who had arrived in Scotland before the war. For example, the husband of one interviewee was interned in Canada together with staff and pupils from Gordonstoun school. Others were onboard the ill-fated 'Arandora Star' which had been bound for Canada, and were included among the survivors who were subsequently transported by the 'Dunera' to Australia.

Some of the first to be released from internment under the categories set out by the various White Papers were the 'invalid or infirm'. The above mentioned elderly German-Jewish refugee who had been arrested despite having a heart condition was released after six weeks, having suffered a heart attack during his internment on the Isle of Man.

Other internees who qualified for release under the White Paper were, 'Persons who are employers of British employees numbering at least twelve persons in works or factories engaged in work certified by a Government Department to be of value to the community, and were themselves taking an active part in the business'. One of those released under this category was the husband of an interviewee who, before being interned, had opened a factory in Glasgow:

'We had a hat factory. We set it up actually in end of '39, but then beginning of '40 my husband was interned for a year so we closed up. When he came back from the Isle of Man then we opened, started again and employed I think between 15 and 25 people'.

The majority of German-Jewish internees were released during the course of 1941 and 1942 under the various utilitarian categories of the White Papers. The category under which the largest number secured a relatively early release was that which enabled internees to enlist into the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps. This also applied to those who had been deported overseas. For example, by January 1941, internees in Canada were being recruited for the Pioneer Corps. It was not until June 1943 that German-Jewish refugees were able to enlist into combatant units of the British Armed Forces.
Furthermore, an increasing number of German-Jewish internees were released to undertake work of national importance in Scotland for the remainder of the war. One interviewee described how: 'Eventually we got out and back again to Scotland because we were friendly enemy aliens and they needed us to work'. After one year of internment the youths who had previously been undergoing training at Whittinghame Farm School were released and returned to Scotland to continue to grow food for Britain (Stent 1980:88). The husband of one interviewee who had been interned in Canada was an experienced miner and returned to work in a Scottish coal-mine.
When Italy entered the Second World War on 10 June 1940, there were approximately 5,000 Italians resident in Scotland. Of this number, few were untouched in some way by the state policy of internment. The police round-up of designated Italians, dispersed as they were throughout Scotland, began immediately after Italy's declaration of war. The largest police operations were carried out in Edinburgh and Glasgow, where the heaviest concentrations of Italians in Scotland were to be found. In Edinburgh, it was reported that as soon as instructions for the arrests of Italians were received at the police headquarters, 'nearly 100 motor cars were brought into service and over 200 officers combed the city... The round-up continued all night, many of the Italians being called from their bed'. The police round-up continued throughout the next day, and by that night some 200 Italians had been detained.

In Glasgow, it was reported that the Chief Constable had, 'retained more than 1,000 plain clothes and uniformed men for the biggest ever round up in the city'. By 12 June 1940, some 350 Italians had been rounded-up for internment. It was reported that, 'Those visited and detained by the police included both men and women, many of whom on reaching the Central Station in police cars carried suitcases. Some of those who accompanied the police were naturalised subjects and others were born in this country. A number of women were weeping. The police are continuing their round up'.

The first Italians to be arrested for internment were usually those listed by MI5, and identified as 'dangerous characters'. They included male and female Italian aliens, naturalised British subjects and British born of Italian descent. Most appeared on the membership lists of fascist clubs (fasci) as well as on the 1933 Census of Italians Abroad which enumerated fascist party members, which were believed to have been acquired by MI5 (Colpi 1991:103). According to the 1933 Census, almost 50 percent of the respondents in Scotland were full members of the Italian Fascist Party. By 1939, the Glasgow fasci (Casa d'Italia), for example, had 470 male and 116 female members (Colpi 1991:93). The majority of Italians were attracted to the fasci and its dependent organisations, such as the dopolavoro (after work), for social rather than
political reasons. However, membership of the *fasci* was to MI5 synonymous with 'professing fascism' (Colpi 1991:103). Consequently, the *fasci* in Edinburgh and Glasgow were immediately raided, any Italians present were automatically arrested and documents and other articles were impounded. It was reported that Italians at the *fasci* in Edinburgh were, 'evidently expecting the police, for when the officers arrived they were busy burning papers'.

The arrest of suspected Italian fascists at their homes was also accompanied by a search for incriminating evidence. One interviewee who was born in Edinburgh of Italian parents was a member of the Edinburgh *fasci*. A number of years earlier he had accompanied children from Scotland to Italy on a holiday, organised and sponsored by the Italian Fascist Party, under a collective passport. He recalled how in the early hours of the morning he was awoken by two detectives who ordered him to get dressed as he was to be taken to the police station:

'I said, "What?, but I'm a British subject". They said, "It's alright, it will all be settled in the police station. Now don't mess about, just give us any of your fascist documents". I said, "I've got no fascist documents". They opened a drawer and here they found my collective passport, I'd kept it as a memory. But of course I didn't know it was going to be a great indictment to me'.

For some Italians, contact with the *fasci* was largely motivated by the opportunity of a holiday for their children in Italy. But this could only be arranged if they joined the Fascist Youth Movement: 'Actually, my father was interned because my younger brother and I had gone to Italy with the Balilla, the Young Fascists. The chance came up, we got a month in Italy at the Italian Government's expense... The old man wasn't a fascist'.

Another Italian who had been enrolled into the Fascist Youth by his father so that he could go on holiday to Italy was, at the age of 14, arrested and interned in Barlinnie Prison for a month: 'I went to one meeting just because I had to make an appearance to be enrolled. So I got to go to Italy. After I came back I never went back in (to the Fascist Youth), but because of that one meeting my name was on the Fascist Youth roll.'
It has been asserted that the main arrests of Italians followed a different pattern across Britain, with the round-up having taken place in the middle of the night in Scotland (Colpi 1991:109). However, this was not substantiated by the evidence uncovered by this research, which found no consistent police approach within Scotland to indicate a specific pattern of arrests. Nevertheless, the evidence did reveal that the timing of arrests and the way in which the arrests were conducted was to be the cause of continued bitterness for many Italians who experienced or witnessed the procedure. Thus, one interviewee recalled how an Italian friend was arrested during the early evening: ‘People were all getting back from work and they were all saying, “He’s a spy, he’s a criminal”. They handcuffed him like a common criminal. He never forgave the police’. 

The interviewees who were arrested during the early hours of the morning, recalled the traumatic experience of being called from their beds by the police. On the other hand, some interpreted such timing as consideration on the part of the police: ‘That was the decency of the local police, because they came during the night so we didn’t have the embarrassment. The police did it the nice way here, we respected the police for that reason’. 

There were many cases of police insensitivity. One of the worst incidents involved the arrest of an Italian man whose baby was dying of pneumonia. When the baby died the following day, a priest and a doctor appealed to the police for him to be allowed home for a few minutes but permission was refused.

According to government guidelines, many of the Italians who were arrested in Scotland (as in the case of the 14 year old referred to above) should not have been. Other cases included Italians who were arrested although they had resided in Scotland for well over 20 years. An Italian who was subsequently drowned on the ‘Arandora Star’ had been in business in Hamilton for almost 50 years and had 3 sons serving in the British armed forces. Another Italian from Hamilton who was arrested and also drowned on the ‘Arandora Star’, had been resident in Scotland for almost 30 years. His daughter described how:
'About 3 o'clock in the morning the knock on the door came. There was 3 policemen up to look for my father. They said, "We want to see your papers". They just looked at his army papers and birth certificate and things like that and said to my mother, "We'll take him away now and we'll get in touch with you later". We stood at the sitting room window...my father looked up and waved. My mother said, "Take a good look at your father, because that's the last time you're ever going to see him", and it was.  

Other Italians were arrested at their place of work, 'without having the possibility of saying, "goodbye" to their families' (Rossi 1991:12). One interviewee recalled how his brother was working in the family fish and chip shop, which was directly across the street from the police station in Inverness, when 'The police crossed the street, they didn't even allow him to take his apron off, and they handcuffed him literally across the street'.  

It would appear that the police in Scotland interpreted instructions for the arrest of Italians with particular verve. A British official charged with examining the conditions of internees who had been transported to Canada was disconcerted to find that many of the Italians had strong Scottish accents. He 'concluded that the Scottish police had interpreted their instructions more strictly than in England' (Gillman and Gillman 1980:269).  

The Italians arrested for internment were first taken to a local police station. An Italian priest, who arrived in Scotland in 1937 to complete his ecclesiastical studies, recalled what happened on his arrival at a police station:  

'I was told to sit on a wooden chair in the middle of a room. A policeman with gun in hand stood before me. This was in the early hours of the morning, and as time went on I felt the need to go to the bathroom. I was given permission and as I moved towards the toilet I noticed that the policeman was following me with a gun at my back, and the gun stayed there during the whole operation.'
On being taken to a police station, the Italians were usually divided into two groups. Into one group were placed those who were British subjects of Italian origin who had been detained under Regulation 18B (including a number who held dual nationality), and into the other were those who were alien in legal status. This practice was described by one interviewee as follows:

'I was taken to the police station...and met lots of youngsters my age and other people. We spent the night in the police station. The following day they sorted us all out, and we were all puzzled why they separated us. I then discovered because we were born in this country therefore technically we were British subjects. But we had dual nationality, I had both the British and Italian passport. According to the laws of the time I could have that until the age of 21, and then renounce one or the other. We were technically British but we were also Italian, so it was a strange situation'.

Those detained under regulation 18B were transferred directly from police stations to prisons. The Italians from the Glasgow area and west coast were taken to Barlinnie Prison, while those from the Edinburgh area and east coast were moved to Saughton Prison.

'When I arrived at Barlinnie Prison...I remember the officer in charge said, "And who have we got here, another bastard Italian? Up against the wall, the same as the rest". I thought they were going to shoot me! Then they put me in a cell. In the block I was in, the whole upper floor was taken up by 18B Italians'.

'They took us to Barlinnie Prison. This was a shock because we were imagining we were going to some camps or a house or a hall or something. It was a shock to see elderly people with us. I remember one man, he must have been in his seventies, with his son protesting that his father had a heart condition and he was put in a cell on his own. The son was saying, "But can't I stay with him? You know he's ill". No, we were all put in solitary confinement. We were kept pretty much in
solitary confinement for weeks. 6 months passed, 4 months in Barlinnie and 2 months in Saughton Prison, Edinburgh. And at the end of that period we faced a tribunal. 67

'They took me first to Hayfield Square police station (Edinburgh) and then to Saughton Prison, under Regulation 18B. Of the 120 people there, 100 were Anglo-Italians. After a few months in there, we started getting a sheet of paper telling you what you were accused of. I was accused of being a member of the Italian Fascist Party. I was kept in there for 6 months.' 68

Most of the Italian aliens who were arrested in Scotland were transferred from local police stations to various collection points in the Edinburgh area. Thus, many of those arrested in the Glasgow area were first moved to the Maryhill Army Barracks in Glasgow, 69 and then taken to either Milton Bridge, Woodhouselee, or Donaldson School Camp in Edinburgh. 70

One interviewee from Hamilton travelled to Edinburgh in the hope of seeing her father who had been arrested a week earlier. She first visited Woodhouselee Camp which was in effect a field around which 'They had hastily erected a double barbed-wire fence, and all the internees were all like cattle in the middle of it. There was no cover or anything like that, they were cut in the open surrounded by armed soldiers'. 71 On establishing that her father was at Donaldson School Camp, she made her way there but 'because it was a high security jail' was not allowed to visit him. 'The next thing we knew, we got a note from my father, he was in some Warth Mills'. 72

Within a few weeks, most of the internees were transferred from Edinburgh to Warth Mills, near Bury in Lancashire. 73 This was the gathering station for the majority of Italian aliens arrested in Britain. The conditions at Warth Mills Camp, a long abandoned cotton factory, were such that it was described as 'By far the worst internment camp...it is a disused factory falling to pieces, rat-infested, with rotten floors, broken windows and a broken glass roof' (Lafitte 1940:101) This description was corroborated by the impressions given by interviewees. 74
From Warth Mills Camp most of the Italians were taken to camps situated on the Isle of Man, where there they were later joined by the Category 18B Italians (Rossi 1991). However, a sizeable number were selected at Warth Mills for deportation to either Canada or Australia. At the end of June 1940, many of those selected for deportation were transported to Liverpool docks where they boarded the ‘Arandora Star’. Of the 446 Italian internees who lost their lives when the ‘Arandora Star’ was sunk off the coast of Ireland, 94 were from Scotland. More than half of this number were from Edinburgh, with the remainder from over 20 towns throughout Scotland (Colpi 1991:278). One of the interviewees who survived the tragedy provided the following account:

‘From Warth Mills we were taken to the Arandora Star. I don’t know why they took me and other people. I was quite young, others were very old. I suppose I can understand about myself, I was 20 then so fair enough, but some of these old men shouldn’t have been there. They must have just picked them at random. So one day out in the Atlantic, we were torpedoed by this German U-boat. At first I didn’t know what had happened. It was about 6 o’clock in the morning, I was half asleep and just dazed. But I didn’t think it was a torpedo, I said to myself, “It must have struck a boat or something”. I was dragged in by some of my friends onto a lifeboat. If they hadn’t dragged me into the boat I’d have been away. The lifeboat was on the verge of going down, it lurched a wee bit then landed in the water. It felt not bad and I didn’t even get my feet wet. Then I saw the cars coming out and one or two, probably Germans, started rowing like mad to get away from the ship, otherwise we would have been sucked down. So after maybe a few hundred yards away from it, we could see the ship tipping up and then going down in the waves. Then about midday a Sunderland flying boat located us, and around about 5 o’clock a Canadian destroyer came along and picked us up and took us back to Greenock. I was one of the lucky one’s.'
From Greenock, most of the Italian survivors from the Arandora Star were returned to Warth Mills. Shortly afterwards some 200 of these survivors were once again taken to Liverpool docks where they boarded the 'Dunera' which transported them together with other internees to Australia (Tolaini 1982:12). Indeed, the 'Dunera' was itself almost sunk by a German U-boat off the coast of Scotland (Gillman and Gillman 1980:243).

Following the Arandora Star tragedy, it would appear that there was recognition within the government that mistakes had been made in the internment and deportation of Italians. Unlike the Germans and Austrians, the Italians had not appeared before tribunals prior to their internment. Therefore, in July 1940 the government set up a committee, headed by Sir Percy Lorraine, to conduct tribunals to assess and classify Italian internees and later to consider their release. However, the Lorraine Committee had 'enormous difficulty in defining what constituted a 'true fascist' and MI5 were reluctantly forced to accept that membership of a 'fascio' did not automatically disqualify individuals for release' (Colpi 1991:125). By the end of 1940, most Italian internees (including Regulation 18B Italians) had appeared before a tribunal.

As in the case of German and Austrian internees, the length of internment for Italians was generally conditional upon their willingness to participate in the British war effort. For the majority of Italians in Scotland, this meant not being able to return to their catering businesses. Initially, many secured their release from internment by entering the Pioneer Corps. Those who declined to enlist into the Corps were often, as in the case of some German-Jewish refugees, just simply 'not prepared to serve as second class soldiers' (Stent 1980:137). Thus, one interviewee was willing to enlist into the regular army, but not into the Pioneer Corps:

"They asked me, "Are you willing to volunteer for the Pioneer Corps?". I said, "Why the Pioneer Corps? Why can we not volunteer for the Royal Scots, the H.L.I., the Cosbies?". "Oh no, it's just the Pioneer Corps". I said, "To hang with that. I know nothing about armies, but to me the Pioneer Corps are the fellows that dig latrines and roads and that. No fear, don't have me as a navvy"."
Other Italian internees were subsequently able to secure their release by agreeing to undertake work which was classed by the government as being of national importance. At first this applied only to the skilled and those under the age of 18, but with the increasing demand for labour the age was lifted:

'I was forced to take employment under the scheme that I was released in, I had to do work of national importance. They gave the option, to go to the farm, or to cut trees, or to go to a coalmine, so I chose the tree cutting. That went on for several years. My father and brother were released in Spring of 1944, to do work of national importance. My father went into cobbling, my brother went into the farm and then transferred into the pits'.

A number of interviewees were engaged in work of national importance with a well known Glasgow firm (Toffolo Jackson) which had Italian connections. Before the war it had specialised in terrazzo, mosaic and marble work, but during the war was pressed into such work as the building of air-raid shelters and the pre-fabrication of houses.

There were, however, a number of Italian internees who persistently declined the offer of release from internment, under the condition that they enter specified employment or enlist into the Pioneer Corps. It has been argued that this 'was not a question of being fascist or anti-fascist, it was a question that we were Italian...this refusal was not a proof of supporting the fascists movement but simply a question of national feelings, but this aspect was continually ignored by the authorities' (Rossi 1991:59). It has also been suggested that 'Group pressure amongst the internees encouraged the individuals to remain a 'good Italian', which meant to stay in' (Colpi 1991:126). However, most had in fact been released by the end of 1942, although some did not return to Scotland until the end of the war.
CONCLUSION

This chapter has, through a study of German-Jewish refugees and the Italian minority in Scotland, recovered aspects of the state policy of internment during the Second World War. In particular, it provided detailed accounts of the initial phase of the process, which included the personal experiences of members of both groups. The internment of these groups (whose members were in the main nationals of belligerent states) within the context of total war, represented the most extreme state response to the presence in Britain of those legally defined as aliens. It is argued that this response connected historically with the role of the state as overseer of alien 'others'. The internment episode, while an exceptional response in extraordinary circumstances, does nevertheless 'qualify the image of a tolerant, benign state' (Holmes 1991:90). Furthermore, the chapter demonstrated how release from internment was largely conditional on the willingness of internees to participate in the 'war effort'. It is argued therefore that this adds another dimension to the state organisation of alien European labour as identified in the preceding chapters.
CHAPTER 5

RESPONSES FROM WITHIN SCOTLAND TO ALIEN EUROPEANS 1939-1951

INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims to provide a largely descriptive account of popular negative responses from within Scotland to alien and minority European groups, both during and immediately after the Second World War. It is acknowledged that popular responses were complex. However, there is an emphasis upon negative responses because of the implications which this may have for the traditional conception of Scottish tolerance towards migrant and minority groups. It is not intended as a comprehensive account, but instead presents two case studies which comprise the two main sections of this chapter. The first will detail responses towards the Italian minority in the shape of wartime anti-Italian riots, while the second will recount responses to the presence and settlement of Polish exiles in the immediate post-war period.
The most significant response from within Scotland towards Italians during the Second World War was the widespread rioting which occurred immediately after Italy's declaration of war against Britain on 10 June 1940. Although the collective violence was primarily directed at Italian owned business premises that were systematically smashed and looted, there were also incidents of physical violence against Italians. This section begins with some accounts of the major anti-Italian riots which occurred in Scotland. It then examines the way in which the police, courts and local government responded to the riots. Finally, it considers some of the suggestions which have been put forward to explain why anti-Italian riots occurred, and why they were more extensive in Scotland than in the rest of Britain.

When Mussolini announced that Italy had declared war on Britain and France on 10 June 1940, there followed a night of hostility towards Italians throughout Britain. This hostility was especially prevalent in Scotland.\(^1\) The extent of anti-Italian rioting in Scotland is revealed in often graphic newspaper reports. They indicate that, whilst rioting was particularly intense in and around Edinburgh and Glasgow, collective violence occurred in most areas of Scotland where there was an identifiable Italian presence.

Although the hostility towards Italians throughout Scotland varied in intensity, a general pattern can be identified. Most incidents began with the gathering of crowds outside Italian shops following the news that Italy had entered the war. The crowds were comprised of men, women and children. Moreover, members of the armed forces were also reported to have taken part in the rioting. For example, it was reported that in Edinburgh crowds were led by soldiers and sailors,\(^2\) while Polish sailors were reported to have taken part in anti-Italian riots in Campbeltown (Sheridan 1985:65). There then ensued a systematic smashing of Italian shop windows and in many cases the shops were completely ransacked. The violence was mainly directed at property, but Italians were threatened with, and on occasion sustained, physical injury.
Some of the most serious rioting took place in Edinburgh. The Scotsman newspaper described 'riotous scenes' on the night of 10 June 1940 when a crowd of over 3,000 gathered in Leith Street and Union Place within the centre of Edinburgh. The paper referred to attacks on Italian owned ice cream and fish and chip shops in different parts of the city as 'an orgy of window breaking and looting'. The rioters were also reported to have 'indulged in singing “God save the King” and shouted anti-Italian slogans'. The police made several baton charges to disperse the crowd, and some 200 rioters were arrested. There were a number of injuries, including 6 members of the crowd who required hospital treatment. It was reported that when the riots in Edinburgh had ended, the streets looked in places as if a series of heavy bombs had fallen. In Italian premises not a scrap of glass remained in single or double windows, furniture broken, windows at entrances damaged beyond repair.

There were similar scenes in Glasgow, especially in the Govan, Tradeston and Maryhill areas of the city. For example, it was reported that:

In the Maryhill district demonstrations were numerous. All along Maryhill Road groups of people were to be seen standing round Italian shops. Most of the shops had been stoned. One shop in Garscube Road was besieged by a crowd of several hundreds. Traffic was brought to a standstill as a mob jeered and shouted anti-Italian slogans and threw stones through the windows.

Following the attacks on Italian shops in Glasgow, some 30 arrests were made. One of those arrested after smashing the windows of two Italian shops was a soldier who was cheered by a crowd of between 400 and 500 people, some of whom apparently ‘patted the soldier on the back and called out, “We’ll finish the job for you”.

There was extensive anti-Italian rioting and looting along the Clyde coast, most notably in Port Glasgow, Greenock and Gourock. The Glasgow Herald gave the following graphic account of events which occurred in Port Glasgow:
Remarkable scenes were witnessed at Port Glasgow last night, when 15 out of 17 Italian ice-cream shops and restaurants in the town were wrecked and the stock looted. The orgy of destruction started soon after eight o'clock and within an hour little was left of the shops but the four bare walls. Men and children concentrated on obtaining cigarettes and chocolate, while women seized articles of furniture. From one shop a woman walked out carrying four chairs and calmly crossed the street to a bus to take her prize to her home. Men were also to be seen walking along the streets carrying tables on their heads. Meanwhile, children were going in by windows, of which frames alone remained, to collect whatever they could and then calmly made their way out again. In the middle of the streets children were smashing cash registers and automatic machines, a scramble following when money poured onto the street. The spectacle was a remarkable one. Young men carrying boxes of biscuits caused hilarity by distributing the biscuits to children as they made their way home. It was not a case merely of clearing out the stocks of the shops. Men climbed on to chairs and tables and took out electric bulbs and lighting fittings, while every article of value was stripped from the walls. After everything of value had been looted, children with sticks continued to smash every piece of glassware on the premises.¹¹

One of the most serious incidents of rioting in Scotland occurred in Hamilton. A local newspaper reported that:

'Within a few hours of the broadcast news that Italy had entered the war on the side of Germany, crowd scenes, accompanied by a wild outbreak of window-smashing and looting of Italians' shops, took place in Hamilton....The amount of wrecking and thieving which occurred in Hamilton, where the police had to draw their batons, was the worst reported anywhere in the West of Scotland, involving as it did all but two of the thirty odd ice-cream shops and fish restaurants in the burgh...irrespective of whether they were owned by native-born, naturalised or British-born Italians....When the crowds, mainly composed of young men, rushed
the shops in the centre of town a number of soldiers voluntarily came to the aid of
the police against those obviously bent on adding looting to their riotous
behaviour...men and women were seen carrying away wireless sets, chairs,
mirrors, cartons of cigarettes and anything they could lay their hands on, including
the engagement ring of a girl member of the family occupying one of the shops. 12

Moreover, one Italian shopkeeper in Hamilton was seriously assaulted when she and her
husband attempted to stop rioters entering their shop. 13 The following is a personal account of
the riots in Hamilton, as given by a daughter of one of the Italian shop owners:

'The night Italy came into the war my father was actually in the cinema when it
flashed across the screen. Then the manager put the lights up and came onto the
stage and announced it that Italy had declared war on Britain. So my father came
home right away. Some of the regular customers were coming into the shop and
were saying, 'You know there's a gang working up, they're going to smash all the
Italian shops and they're gonna put in the windows'. So about 11 o'clock that night
we closed the shop. These boys that were regulars sat with us and we were sitting
in when we heard the yells, it was like a lynch mob. They were all together and
yelling their heads off. They ran up the main street and put a brick through the
window of the people across the road. The next thing was our window went in and
we thought they would pass on, but they didn't. We had these double doors but we
only had it on a wee Chubb, because we thought it would just be the windows.
And the next thing with the force of the mob the doors went right in. These boys
got a hold of us and told us to get upstairs to the house. We had the jars of sweets
in a glass showcase on top of the counter and I can remember them throwing the
whole thing onto the floor and some of them going behind the counter, and there
was mirrors and jars and everything getting thrown about. The boys had us
bundled out the back door to get up to our house and here there was a mob of
women, some was shouting, 'There's the Tally bastards, get hold of them'. One of
the boys went up and said, 'Listen, they're no doing any harm, leave them alone'.
So by this time the other three boys got us up the stairs and one of our neighbours on the stairs came out and said, “Come in here and wait, they’ll not come into the house”. So we went in, my mother kept shouting for my father. My father wouldn’t come, he waited downstairs in the shop. And she said, “They’re going to kill your father, they’ll kill him”. Anyway, about twenty minutes or so after we got up the stairs, father appeared very white faced and just a hopelessness about him. He said, “That’s ten years hard work gone in less than ten minutes”.

Most of the anti-Italian riots in Scotland lasted only for the night of 10 June 1940. However, there were reports of ‘fresh outbreaks of anti-Italian feeling in some districts of Glasgow’ the following morning, when workers on their way home after being on night shift proceeded to smash Italian shop windows. Moreover, there were reports of ‘bands of youths’ making their way to Gourock from Greenock and Port Glasgow by ‘foot, in buses and on cycles’ on the following night, who were intent on further anti-Italian hostility. On this occasion there was relatively little damage to Italian property, as the police were apparently able to keep the mob ‘on the move’. Similar precautions to prevent a recurrence of the rioting were taken in most areas. For example, in Glasgow the streets in which damage had been caused to Italian owned shops were heavily patrolled by the police and any crowds which gathered were ‘quickly dispersed’.

The way in which the police responded to the anti-Italian riots was complicated by the fact that Italians were simultaneously being arrested for internment. Following Italy’s declaration of war, the primary concern of the police was that of effecting an expeditious round-up of Italian enemy aliens. As large numbers of police were deployed for this operation, fewer were available to respond to the rioting which took place.

It is clear that in many areas the police were totally unprepared for the scale of the disturbances and were effectively powerless to prevent the damage and looting which took place. For example, it was reported that in Greenock, ‘police officers were simply brushed aside while looters ransacked all the premises’. Many of the calls for help made to the police from
besieged Italians went unanswered. This lack of response was interpreted as a sign of indifference by the police to the plight of Italians. This impression is reflected in the following extracts from letters written by an Italian shopkeeper from Irvine to the Secretary of State for Scotland: 'During riots on night of June 10th my shop was wrecked and my house looted....I telephoned for the police in ample time for assistance to be sent but no police came although some stood a little distance away and watched but did not interfere. This in itself was disgraceful'. In a second letter he claimed, 'I have witnesses to swear that policemen stood about and actually told the people to help themselves. One policeman was seen helping himself another was heard saying that we did not get it hard enough'.

One interviewee told how the police, 'never even came near us. I've nothing against the police but they should have did their duty, they should have showed when they broke the windows. No, they got away with it and they just carried on....Not one single policeman to be seen'. The conspicuous absence of police in some areas during the riots was a further source of contention for those Italians who were arrested for internment. Hence, another interviewee recalled how only a matter of minutes after her father's shop had been wrecked and looted with no sign of the police, 'The knock on the door came. There was three policemen up to look for my father. So my father said it took three of them to come for him, there was nobody there when we needed them'.

This account of police responses to the anti-Italian riots does, however, need to be qualified. As highlighted by newspaper reports, the police did on a number of occasions respond with baton charges, and large numbers of arrests were made for a wide range of offences. Moreover, the arresting of Italians for internment was not always prioritised over riot related arrests, as testified by the following report of an incident in Greenock:

'A police van which had been rounding up Italians for internment encountered a crowd smashing up a shop. Batons were drawn and the police charged the mob. Several arrests were made, and the Italian internees, who were inside the van, were taken out, and the van drove off with the newly-arrested prisoners'.
Furthermore, the damage and looting would have undoubtedly been more extensive in some areas of Scotland had not the police kept vigil outside Italian owned shops.24

Following the arrests made during the anti-Italian riots, a large number of people appeared in court. However, the charges made, and the penalties given, rarely reflected the seriousness of the acts committed. That is, there was a general reluctance to charge and prosecute those arrested with riot related offences. This was to have serious repercussions for some Italian victims of the riots, and was to be the cause of further embitterment.

In most cases, those arrested were charged with 'malicious mischief' and fined.25 A soldier, who admitted breaking the windows of two Italian shops in Glasgow and in court declared that 'These people deserve all they get', even had his case dismissed by a magistrate.26 There is evidence to suggest, however, that the police were concerned about such leniency being shown. For example, when cases of 'malicious mischief' were brought before the Magistrates Court in Greenock, the police held the view that the acts were part of organised rioting and, because of the serious nature of the offences, should be heard at a Sheriff rather than a Magistrates Court. The presiding magistrate protested and threatened to leave the bench in disapproval, arguing that 'in view of the urgent need for manpower the sooner these men were back to work the better'.27

The police in Hamilton appear to have been one of the few exceptions in charging those involved with mobbing and rioting. Hence, most of the 16 people arrested during the disturbances in Hamilton appeared before the Sheriff Court charged with forming part of a riotous crowd which assembled for the purpose of damaging and looting premises. Those found guilty were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 30 to 40 days. One of those charged also admitted assaulting a police inspector and an Italian shopkeeper. During the trial a defence lawyer made the observation that the Town Clerk would be inclined to dispute the police assertion that the crowd, estimated at between 2,000 and 3,000, which gathered in Hamilton on the night of 10 June 1940 was a riotous assembly. The Fiscal-Depute, 'observed that that was a point doubtless concerned with the question of compensation'.28
It was generally recognised that the Italians were entitled, under The Riot (Scotland) Act of 1822, to claim compensation from local councils. For example, Glasgow's Lord Provost (Dollan), stated that the attacks on Italian shops 'would involve the city in considerable claims for damage and compensation'. However, in many cases the town clerks of local councils disputed and denied liability for compensation claims, a position which was strengthened by the fact that so few of those arrested were actually prosecuted for riot related offences.

In areas where charges of rioting were successfully brought, as in Hamilton, the majority of claims for compensation were eventually settled. In other areas, claims for compensation were disputed. For example, Glasgow’s Magistrates Committee advised the Corporation to repudiate liability for compensation claims lodged by Italian shopkeepers. The Town Clerk argued that the damage did not come into the category of riot damage chargeable to the local authority. Nevertheless, successful actions by Italians were brought against Town Clerks’ in the courts. Thus, an Italian shopkeeper from Glasgow was awarded damages when a Sheriff ruled that the loss and damage to his property was caused by ‘acts of an unlawful, riotous, and tumultuous assembly of persons’.

Some claims for compensation were also repudiated on the grounds that they were not timeous. The Riot (Scotland) Act of 1822 specified that claims had to be submitted within one month after the damage had occurred. However, Italians were not always made aware of this time restriction. One victim of the riots who, as a British subject, was called up for service, wrote to the Secretary of State for Scotland:

‘[After the riots] I was advised to make out a detailed claim and send it to the town clerk....I managed to complete a list and sent it in. I took five weeks to do it. Now I have just recently been informed by the town clerk that as my claim for damages was not submitted within 30 days, I don't get anything. As I was never told to make my claim within 30 days and sent it in as soon as I possibly could, I know that a grave injustice is being made....As far as I’m concerned I have no intention of donning a uniform unless I get compensation. I am too embittered’.
Furthermore, one interviewee was convinced that delaying tactics were used to ensure that claims arrived too late:

'The Town Clerk was telling the people that were wanting to put their claims in that they had to wait. He wanted them to be all gathered together before putting in their claims, and then take the claims in all at the one time. They were putting the people off.'

Following the anti-Italian rioting in Scotland, many of the Italian businesses were left in ruins. Those left relatively unscathed tended to remain closed for some time, 'to let things cool down'. Moreover, many of the Italian shopkeepers had been interned. Nevertheless, there is evidence that some Italian women managed to continue to run businesses with some success. This was despite a boycott of Italian shops, whereby 'businesses that were still open saw a fall-off in trade as customers took their money elsewhere' (Murray and Stockdale 1990:30).

There is evidence to suggest an easing of antipathy towards Italians as the war progressed. Thus, 'a Mass Observation survey of April 1943, before Italy had surrendered to the Allies, revealed that Italians were relatively popular with the public compared with some of Britain's allies' (Holmes 1988:194). However, there is also evidence to suggest a continuation of animosity towards Italians. One feature of this was the practice of rejecting applications made by Italians for catering licences. Hence, two months before the end of the war, it was reported that, 'the granting of licences to men who had been interned as enemy aliens was strongly condemned, and the Italian race as a whole was severely criticised at a meeting of Fife Food Control Committee at Cupar'. During the Committee meeting which was reconsidering an application by an Italian for a fish frying and catering licence which had been previously refused, it was commented that the:
Committee should preserve a firm front against any applications of that kind. Apart from the fact that the Italian nation had behaved in a despicable manner when they declared war against us, a lot of people appeared to be oblivious to the disgraceful way in which our men who fell into Italian hands were treated...it was perfectly scandalous. No race on earth would have treated our men as the Italians did, and the proper place for Italians was between a wall and a bulldozer.®

To understand why there was such widespread collective violence directed towards the Italian minority following Italy’s entry into the war on the side of the Axis, it is necessary to take account of a number of factors. Although this move had been anticipated for some time, the suggestion that ‘its moral and psychological effect is already discounted’ was clearly underestimated.® The entry of Italy into the war occurred at a particularly low point of the war and would have increased already heightened public anxiety surrounding the imminent fall of France and the implications for the possible invasion of Britain.

A broadcast by the Minister of Information (Cooper) on the entry of Italy into the war was particularly inflammatory in its anti-Italian sentiments. Indeed, the broadcast was criticised in Parliament as a ‘blunder of the first order’, and may well have had the effect of inciting trouble.® Moreover, the Chief Constable of Ayr noted that, ‘The feeling of tension which preceded the declaration of war and the speech of Duff Cooper on the wireless that evening are reported as responsible for the rioting’.®

The anti-Italian hostility may also, in part, have been stimulated by what has been described as the ‘Chauvinism of the British who did not go to the front’. That is, involvement in the rioting may have reflected a compulsion to demonstrate allegiance to ‘King and country, and the best method of proof was to show hostility...to the enemy alien’ (Foot 1965:103). The reported singing of ‘God save the King’ during the anti-Italian riots could therefore be seen as a manifestation of this mood.®
Such explanations do not, however, explain why anti-Italian rioting was so extensive in Scotland. One factor may have been the existence of a deep-rooted anti-Catholicism in Scotland. Thus, it has been suggested that "These anti-Italian riots were particularly widespread and vicious in Scotland due, perhaps, to the religious bigotry prevalent in that society. A long-standing hatred and fear of Catholics could well have been partly responsible for the violence vented on this night" (Colpi 1991:105). Indeed, when this explanation was advanced at the time, John Cormack an Edinburgh Councillor and leader of the Protestant Action Society (an organisation that had for some time expressed truculent anti-Catholic sentiment - e.g. Gallagher 1987), tried to discount such rumours in a letter he sent to an Edinburgh newspaper a few days after the riots. He claimed that "the people who actually in the main caused the demonstrations were the very people who 24 hours previously were giving the Italians money for ice-cream and fish and chips".  

A further reason may have been that the Italians in Scotland were an extremely visible and ubiquitous group. That is, their concentration in the catering trade, especially in small cafes, ice cream and fish and chip shops, meant that there was a high degree of direct contact with the public, especially in working class areas. Even before Italy had entered the war, there was evidence of an increasing air of suspicion and growing hostility towards the Italians in Scotland. For example, it was reported that "in working class areas, there has been growing antagonism towards Italy as an outcome of the violent anti-British Press campaign. This has led almost to the boycotting of Italian shopkeepers". On the night of 10 June 1940, the shops became an obvious symbol towards which anti-Italian feelings could be targeted and vented (as had been the case with German butcher shops during the First World War - e.g. Panayi 1993b). The earlier contact with the Italian shopkeepers may well have had the effect of increasing hostility, as if to vindicate the patronising of people who had suddenly become the 'enemy'. The extent of the looting and the often calm and organised way in which it occurred would seem to indicate that there was a general feeling of 'free for all', that as the 'enemy' Italians had relinquished any legitimate claim to their property. This attitude may have been encouraged by the circumstances of wartime austerity.
THE POLISH EXILES

The most significant social response to Poles during the immediate post-war period was widespread and sustained opposition to their arrival, presence and settlement. There was also support for the Poles, which was most often expressed in response to the opposition. Nevertheless, in the battle over images, it would appear that the negative portrayal of Poles was by far the more successful. The opposition to Poles was generally framed within economic, political, ideological, religious and social/moral arguments, although at times it took an overtly racist form. At first, there was a concerted effort through the so-called 'Anti-Polish Campaign', to put pressure on Poles to 'Go Home'. Following the government's decision to allow Poles to settle in Britain, opposition was primarily focused upon the issues of employment and housing. The most vociferous anti-Polish opposition had largely ceased by the end of 1948, although it continued in a more diluted form.

British Context

At the end of the Second World War the dilemma of the Poles in exile was met with relatively little sympathy or understanding of the political situation in Poland. Instead, antipathy which had developed during the later war years continued unabated and intensified as the Poles, unlike other Allied forces, did not immediately leave Britain as expected. The sentiment of 'Poles go Home' was widely expressed, and taken up within the press and in Parliament to form an effective anti-Polish campaign. This campaign was especially successful at arousing hostility within the British working class (Zubrzycki 1956:81). At the same time, there was also support for the Poles from within the Press and Parliament.

The strong anti-Soviet and anti-Communist views held by the Poles were not well received in Britain at the end of the war, when pro-Soviet sentiments still influenced public attitudes and 'vehement anti-Soviet views were taken as fascist sympathies' (Tannahill 1958:70). There was
an ideological battle over the presence of Poles in Britain between the Communist Party and those who opposed Communism. The opposition generated by the Communist Party included agitation and propaganda from within certain trade unions, especially the more specialist unions whose members were particularly sympathetic to the Soviet Union (Stadulis 1952:219). Hostility was also voiced through such newspapers as the Daily Worker and the Tribune, and by the two Communist Members of Parliament, William Gallacher and Philip Piratin (Foot 1965:118). There was support for the Poles from such organisations as the British League for European Freedom, which was to a large extent motivated by an anti-Communist ideology.

The standing of the Poles improved when the Cold War developed and their anti-Communist stance became a legitimate ideology: 'We were called 'Fascists', that's what the Daily Worker said. Eventually things changed because Russia instead friends, got enemies. Then they start looking different way at us'.

The Poles were accused of being 'Fascist reactionaries', 'anti-Semitic' and 'trouble makers' who should 'go home to Poland' instead of 'living in idleness' in Britain at the taxpayers' expense. Allegations were made concerning such emotive issues as food rationing, black marketeering and the 'seduction' of British women. The well publicised activities of Poles who had been involved in crime also fuelled anti-Polish sentiment (Zubrzycki 1956:82, Kemberg 1960:141). Thus, one interviewee described how:

'If Poles' some something, well it would be splashed on first page. In Gorbals a Pole, he broke into safes. Actually during the war he was dropped behind German lines to crack safes. Well, when he was demobbed, he continued. There was a big story about him. Anything like that it was splashed. Everybody say, "Oh, that's a Pole"'.

Following the government's decision to allow Polish service-personnel and their dependants to settle in Britain, a Gallup opinion poll commissioned in June 1946 found that almost twice as many Britons disapproved as approved of the decision (Sword 1989). The anti-Polish campaign was able to further the negative imagery of Poles by portraying them as illegitimate
competitors in the areas of employment and housing. It was argued that Poles were ‘to be thrown in large numbers on the labour market and would jeopardise the maintenance of full employment, bring down workers’ living standards or wages, destroy the hard earned liberties of trade unionists, accentuate the housing shortage and eat food that Britain could hardly spare’ (Zubrzycki 1956:81-3).

The government’s plan to settle Poles in Britain had been prepared in consultation with representatives of the trade union movement. The General Council had agreed to assist the government, subject to certain conditions. The conditions were announced at the annual Trades Union Congress in October 1946, and were as follows: (a) before the introduction of a group of Poles into any industry, there should be appropriate consultations with the trade unions directly concerned; (b) in any case, no Poles should be employed in any grade in any industry where British labour was available; (c) where Poles required further training for filling posts in industry, the conditions under which such training would be provided should be comparable to those applying to British ex-servicemen; (d) if any Pole was placed in a suitable occupation and for any reason left it, subsequent employment should be secured only through the Ministry of Labour. A resolution sponsored by the General Council to allow the employment of Poles under the above safeguards was thoroughly debated at the conference. Whilst there were expressions of support for the Poles who had been allies in the war and who could help to rebuild a post-war Britain, there were strong objections to Poles entering the labour market. A motion to refer back the resolution, was defeated only after the General Council had promised that no known Fascists would be employed in Britain’s labour force.

Despite a conditional agreement to accept Poles into British industry, there continued to be strong opposition from organised labour. This was especially true within industries where labour was in short supply, and towards which Poles were being guided by the government. It has been suggested that such opposition owed much of its motivation to the persistence of xenophobia and to the ‘traditional and deep-rooted fear of foreign labour felt by British workers’, with a consequent lowering of wages and standard of living (Zubrzycki 1956:81). Anxiety was further heightened by the possibility of exposure to the unemployment and depressed
conditions which had characterised the experiences of the working class during the inter-war years (Tannahill 1958:63). These fears were reinforced by a continuation of wartime austerity during the early post-war period, providing grounds for anti-Polish sentiment at a basic materialistic level (Holmes 1988:248-50).

The trade unions, whilst responsible for protecting the jobs and conditions of their members, generally accepted that measures were required to meet the post-war shortage of labour within their industries. At first it was widely believed that this could be done by improving working conditions, and thus attracting indigenous labour. However, it was increasingly recognised that the introduction of foreign labour (under safeguards) was a 'necessary evil' (Kemberg 1990:9). At the same time, the decision to settle Poles in Britain through employment gave unions a powerful bargaining lever with which to push forward reforms.

The National Union of Mineworkers (N.U.M.) insisted that agreement had to be reached on the implementation of the 'Miners Charter' before they would accept Poles into the coalfields (Sword 1989:258). One of the principal demands of the Miners Charter was the introduction of a five-day week. Following lengthy negotiations, the N.U.M. finally agreed to accept Poles into the mines at the end of January 1947 (at a time of the fuel shortage during a particularly severe winter) in return for the introduction of a five-day week from 5 May 1947 (Bramwell 1988:242). This agreement was, however, subject to further conditions which provided for, (a) local consultation with branches of the Union before Poles were introduced to particular collieries; (b) that they became members of the Union; (c) in the event of redundancy Poles would be the first to be discharged (Stadulis 1952:221). As the necessary approval of local branches of the N.U.M. was not always forthcoming, the introduction of Poles into the mines was seriously impeded. In August 1947, it was announced in the House of Commons that many trained Poles had not been placed in mines because of misunderstandings by local lodges of the provisions of the national agreement. Whilst increasing numbers of Poles did gradually enter the mines, local union resistance was at no time completely overcome.
Other trades unions opposed to the employment of Poles in their respective industries included the National Union of Agricultural Workers, Transport and General Workers' Union, Civil Service Clerical Association, National Federation of Building trade Operatives, Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers, the Electrical Trades Union and the Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers. As in the case of the National Union of Mineworkers, even when agreements were made between representatives of unions and employers, the local branches and lodges of these unions often refused to permit the implementation of such agreements. It has been argued that major union opposition was overcome by the end of 1947, when 'the back of the problem had been broken' (Sword 1989:263). Nevertheless, even after Poles had entered employment, there were 'Many incidents of strikes - or threat of strikes - forcing employers to withdraw offers of employment' (Sword 1989:381).

However, not all trades unions were opposed to the employment of Poles. For example, The General and Municipal Workers' Union had established links with the Union of Polish Workers as early as 1943, and under the terms of an agreement between those two bodies, Poles could possess dual membership. This enabled many Poles to find employment at a time when other unions were opposing their introduction and when the more publicised trades union response was one of hostility.

Scottish Context

The hostility towards Poles was expressed throughout Britain during the immediate post-war period. However, it was more pronounced in Scotland where widespread antipathy had developed during the war. The tension was aggravated by the fact that the vast majority of Poles who remained in Scotland at the end of the war had served under the Nazis, and had then been recruited into the Polish Armed Forces. They proved to be a particularly easy target for anti-Polish agitation. Unlike the majority of Polish service personnel who had arrived at an early stage of the war, they were generally not used for occupation duties in Germany, but
remained in Scotland as a reserve corps where they 'greatly helped to swell Polish unpopularity in that country' (Zubrzycki 1956:56).

The antecedents of many of the Poles in Scotland at the end of the war provided ammunition for those who wished to portray members of the Polish armed forces in exile as 'Fascist reactionaries'. It has been argued that much of the anti-Polish propaganda was disseminated by the Soviet Union, with the aim of discrediting the political stance of the Polish exiles and that it was taken up with particular enthusiasm by Communists who wanted the Poles out of Scotland. An example of this involved allegations made by 'Pravda' in June 1945 that the Poles were holding political prisoners in a camp described as the 'Polish Dachau' at Inverkeithing near Edinburgh. It was claimed that, 'at the camp, surrounded by barbed wire and isolated from the rest of the democratic world lies a patch of Fascist Poland....There cannot be any talk of destroying Fascist nests in Europe while this camp in Scotland remains'. These allegations were followed by an emergency resolution carried at the Scottish Area Conference of the National Union of Mineworkers which demanded a government inquiry into the camp. The mover of the resolution was a delegate (Mc'Arthur) from Buckhaven in Fife (an area renowned for its Communist support). He stated that, 'We in Fife feel strongly that such a camp should exist in our community, and we want to make it clear that we abhor the idea'. However, the motive for the resolution was made clear when he went on to assert that, 'There is the strongest resentment in Fife at the growing numbers of Polish troops who are strutting around in our area, and the subject of all election meetings is what is going to happen to the Poles'.

The state of Scottish-Polish relations at the end of the war was described by the Director of the Polish Press Agency in Edinburgh in a letter dated 26 June 1945, part of which stated that:

'The reaction of Scottish society is varied. Few people understand the situation. Even though 'The Scotsman' wrote yesterday in no uncertain terms that the Soviet Union is trying to impose its system of government on Poland, this does not affect the views of Edinburgh people. In addition, one can still see Polish uniforms in all
the most expensive Edinburgh restaurants. This makes local people even more hostile. We should be prepared for the worst, that is, that general boredom with the Polish problem and with the presence of Poles in Scotland will increase and will assume forms very unpleasant for Poles who, for whatever reason, will want to remain in Scotland after the final winding up of the Polish problem by the Allies'.

When recognition of the Polish government in London was withdrawn in July 1945, the position of the Poles in exile was weakened. In anticipation of greater difficulties to be faced by Poles and of increased hostility from within Scotland, it was felt necessary to immediately consolidate the efforts of Polish organisations (including the Scottish-Polish Society) and form a Council of Polish Societies based in Edinburgh. One of the main duties of the Council, was to explain to the Scottish public the reasons why Poles could not return to Poland. To this end, the Council published a statement entitled 'To Our Scottish Hosts' which was to be distributed to, and published by, 'sympathetic newspapers'.

The Scottish press had generally remained sympathetic towards the position of the Poles in exile, and to their cause for an independent Poland. This was especially true of The Scotsman, The Glasgow Herald, The Bulletin and The Edinburgh Evening News, as well as many provincial newspapers and the Catholic press, which published articles in support of the Poles. For example, in The Scotsman on 22 August 1945, an article entitled, 'The Poles in Scotland - Why do they not return home?', concluded:

'They helped us to win our freedom, but they have as a nation lost their own....The representatives of other nations who came to this country during the war have been able to go home, but the Poles remain with us, assuredly not because they do not want to return home, but because most of them distrust profoundly, not without reason, the present political dispensation in Poland'.

However, there was also hostility from within the Scottish press. Anti-Polish propaganda was, for example, disseminated by D.C. Thomson Publications, which included such newspapers as
the Sunday Post, Courier and the Dundee Advertiser. The controversy over the presence of Poles in Scotland was also evident within the press in the form of letters to the editors. For example, in The Edinburgh Evening News on 26 June 1945, a letter demanded the departure of all Poles from Scotland because the Poles had ‘overstayed their welcome’. It also stressed that election candidates should be aware of the need for the Poles to leave, and that voters should persuade candidates to raise the issue in the House of Commons immediately on taking their seats as Members of Parliament.

Issues surrounding the continued presence of Poles in Scotland were taken up both within the House of Commons and in the House of Lords. For example, in the House of Lords on 16 August 1945, Lord Rosebery declared that:

'We have a far larger army in Scotland that we had before D-Day when we had divisions practising for the landing in Normandy. We have a very large and increasing army of Poles. There are over 63,000. They are occupying our school and hotels, they are billeted in our houses, they still manoeuvre over our land - though what they are manoeuvring for I don't know. They are still firing guns across our agricultural fields, and their tanks are still going up the hills of Scotland. We have had them for six years and we were very pleased to have them in time of war. But surely when we want our houses so much for ourselves and our schools, even if the Polish Army cannot be sent back to Poland it could be sent to some of the camps in England evacuated by the American Army'.

Opposition to the Poles was also expressed at local government level. In August 1945, Peebles Town Council passed a resolution to speed up the return of Poles from Scotland to Poland. The councillor who had moved the resolution argued that, ‘it was imperative that something was done about returning Poles to their own land, where so much was required in the way of construction’. He added that the Poles had, ‘overstayed their welcome and apparently had plenty of money to burn’. In response to the Council’s motion, some 800
Polish troops who were stationed in the town adopted a 'non-fraternisation' policy and boycotted local dances, cinemas and public houses. It was reported that:

'About 200 of them, convalescing from wounds suffered in Europe, demonstrated outside Peebles Drill Hall, while a dance was in progress. They stood there silently, and refused to go inside. As the Poles had formed the majority of men dancers at local dances since 1940, the dance flopped.'

From late 1945, many of the Poles who had been based in the Borders and Lothian districts were moved to the North of Scotland and the Orkneys. This relocation was widely seen as a response to the anti-Polish hostility, and was viewed by supporters of the Poles as being influenced by 'Red Propaganda' and as, 'nothing more than an attempt to push these men out of sight'. The process of drafting Polish troops to remote areas of Scotland in order to reduce agitation was continued until at least July 1946.

It would seem that the hostility towards Poles in Scotland which had been fostered by the anti-Polish campaign was largely successful in its main objective. In May 1946, it was reported that of the Poles who remained in Scotland, 'most now express a preference for settlement in the Dominions, U.S.A. or South America. They want to leave Scotland as they feel that there is a feeling of hostility against them.'

Anti-Polish hostility was intensified during May 1946 over fears that there was to be a significant increase in the number of Poles in Scotland. This concern was fueled, in anticipation of a government statement on the demobilisation of the Polish Armed Forces, by reports that the Polish Second Corps was to be brought from Italy to Scotland in batches of 20,000 at a time.

Following Bevin's announcement in the House of Commons on 22 May 1946 that the Polish Armed Forces were to be demobilised through a repatriation and resettlement scheme and the Second Corps brought to Britain as a first stage in the demobilisation process, Churchill asked,
'in what part of the United Kingdom the Second Polish Corps will be quartered immediately on its return. Where will it be placed? Is it to be placed in Scotland, because some parts of Scotland have been for a long time rather overstocked with Polish troops?' In reply, it was stated that, 'They will be distributed all over the country in different units; they will not be kept all together, so as to facilitate absorbing them quickly into private life'.

Furthermore, the Member of Parliament for Montrose (Maclay) asked, 'to draw the special attention of those responsible for the quartering of these troops to the fact that there are certain areas in Scotland where Polish troops have been stationed for a long time? They were glad to welcome them, but it is important that they should not go back there now. There are many reasons for that'. To which Bevin replied, 'I quite understand, in spite of my age. We will distribute them so that the blessings may be spread equally'. This remark was undoubtedly a reference to the image which had persisted from the war of Poles as a 'race of Casanovas', which was particularly strong in Scotland (Zubrzycki 1956:82; Holmes 1991:48). Whilst some 2,500 marriages had resulted from relationships between Polish soldiers and Scottish women, there were many instances of illegitimate children of Polish fathers which had been a major cause of embitterment in Scotland.

Concern about the prospect of further Poles being brought to Scotland was echoed in the press. For example, an article in 'The Scotsman' on the day after the government's announcement stated that the location of the Poles transferred from Italy could cause problems owing to the 'anti-Polish sentiment of local people'.

The escalation in anti-Polish feeling over the anticipated arrival of the Second Polish Corps, was also motivated by the fact that the majority of Poles were practising Catholics. As Scotland was predominantly a Protestant country with a history of anti-Catholicism, most notably against Irish migrants, this had proved to be a fertile source of anti-Polish agitation both during and after the war. Consequently, the Poles 'fell foul of extreme Protestant opinion which categorized them as no better than 'Papist spies' (Zubrzycki 1956: 82).
'Because most of the lads are Roman Catholics this is a Protestant country, they called us 'Papes'. You know, this terrible carry on. Even at work I had a lot of that, "You effin Pape". I haven't got a very favourable opinion in general of Scottish people. No, especially that religion because ninety odd percent of Poles are Catholics. That is the root of the trouble, most because we Catholic'.

A combination of anti-alienism and anti-Catholicism proved to be a potent concoction in Scotland, especially when fanned by such organisations as the Protestant Action Society. The leader of the Society (Cormack) was the chief organiser of a 'Menace of the Poles' protest meeting held in Edinburgh on 3 June 1946, attended by some 2,500 men and women. At the meeting, a resolution was passed which called upon the government to reconsider the decision to bring more Poles to Scotland. According to Cormack (who quoted from such Communist newspapers as 'The Daily Worker' and 'Pravda'), the Poles were to blame for the queues and the food shortages, for the economic depression of Scotland, and for the shortage of housing. Using overtly racist tones, he accused the majority of Poles of being murderers and rapists. The Poles, he said, 'were a mixture of Germans, Russians and Czechs. He regretted that Poland had ever been an independent state'.

The level of anti-Polish hostility, especially that which concerned the arrival of Poles from Italy, may well have influenced the government's decision to limit the number to be placed in Scotland. However, this did not appease those who were opposed to the presence of Poles in Scotland, despite the fact that there had been a steady decrease in numbers. During a House of Commons debate on Polish demobilisation on 6 June 1946, the Member of Parliament for Leith (Hoy) stated that, 'According to the figures which have been given this week, 5,000 Poles will be coming to Scotland. There is great resentment in Scotland about any coming at all'. A month later, Member of Parliament for Aberdeen North (Hughes) asked the Secretary of State for Scotland (Westwood) if he was aware of the widespread dissatisfaction in Scotland at the concentration there of so many of our Polish Allies; if he will have regard to the social and economic consequences of this concentration; and if he will take steps in conjunction with other appropriate Ministers to have them transferred elsewhere. Westwood replied, 'I have had
representations and seen statements in the Press expressing dissatisfaction at the presence of Polish troops in Scotland, but I am informed...that the numbers of such troops stationed in Scotland have decreased substantially.76

The extent of organised opposition to the Poles in Scotland was revealed in the House of Commons on 23 July 1946 when Member of Parliament for Aberdeen North (Hughes) asked the Secretary of State for War (Lawson) whether he had, 'considered the resolutions, of which copies had been sent to him, from the churches, the trades councils and other representative bodies in Scotland calling for the withdrawal of the Polish soldiers from Scotland, and what, and when, steps would be taken to comply with this demand'. Lawson replied, 'It would not be practicable to exclude Scotland from the arrangements entirely. But, under the new distribution, the total allocation to Scotland compares favourably with the allocation to other parts of Great Britain'.77

There was also opposition to the Poles from the Scottish National Party which issued a statement in August 1946, 'urging the Scottish people, through local government and other representative bodies, to protest against the decision of the Government to bring additional Polish troops or nationals into Scotland without consulting Scottish opinion'. Despite dissociating themselves from the 'unscrupulous anti-Polish propaganda of the British Communists', the Scottish National Party declared that:

'In the present economic condition of Scotland any scheme for the importation of large numbers of foreigners is to be condemned. The mounting number of unemployed in Scotland and the country's chronic housing shortage are in themselves sufficient to condemn any such plan. Instead of an increase, in the number of foreign soldiery, Scotland should rather be relieved of the very large number already in the country'.78
A principal feature of the government's resettlement scheme was that of civilisation through employment, which involved the transformation of Poles from soldiers to workers. Consequently, much of the anti-Polish agitation in Scotland came from organised labour. The particularly staunch opposition to Poles by Scottish trade union members was to a large extent motivated by the concentration of Polish troops in Scotland during and immediately after the Second World War. It was feared that a disproportionate number of Poles would therefore be settled in Scotland. In addition, the depression of the inter-war years had hit Scottish workers particularly badly and increased fears of vulnerability to unemployment.

At the annual conference of the National Union of Mineworkers (Scottish Area) held at Rothesay in June 1946, the Secretary (Pearson) argued that the shortage of labour within the mines could be resolved without recourse to Polish labour. With the introduction of a five day week he believed that the difficulty would be to keep boys out of the mines. Without a five-day week Scottish miners would not agree to Poles coming into the mines even on a temporary basis. They would never agree to Poles working in Scottish mines on a permanent basis.\footnote{79}

Criticism of the government's policy towards the Poles, particularly the Polish Second Corps, was launched by Scottish delegates at the Amalgamated Engineering Union Conference on 26 June 1946. A resolution which suggested that all Polish troops be demobilised and returned to Poland was introduced by a delegate from Dundee (Cassidy). He affirmed that, 'Scotsmen could not see how thousands of Polish troops could be absorbed into industry in Scotland when there were already 75,000 unemployed there'. A delegate from Portobello (Irvine), who seconded the resolution, described how in his district, 'one could see men of 55 to 60 walking up and down in Polish uniforms. They had only joined so that they would not have to go back to Poland'. A female delegate from Dundee (Hoy), described the government's policy towards the Polish troops as the 'most unpopular move the Government has ever made'. The Poles' only advocate was a delegate from Glasgow (Connor), who argued that there was no proof that the Polish Army was composed of Fascists.\footnote{80}
At the Trades Union Congress in October 1946, some of the strongest objections to Polish labour were voiced by Scottish delegates. A Transport and General Workers Union delegate from Irvine (M’Kerrow), stated that, ‘If this Government does not put the Poles out of Scotland the people of Scotland will be required to do it’. He described how:

People in my part of Scotland started to do it on one occasion. A fight broke out in the town in which I work. The Poles marched to their camp and brought out bayonets. The British troops, most of them English lads, returned to their camp and brought out machine-guns. Had it not been for the good officers of the police there would have been a massacre in that small town that night....The Poles strut about like the arrogant Fascists that they are - well fed, well clothed - better clothed, indeed, than our British lads....In Scotland, the Poles have made themselves the most unpopular visitors we have ever had....They swank around wearing their Hitler decorations as though they owned the place, as if they had fought for this country instead of against it....The feeling against Poles in Scotland is very bitter'.

The disturbance to which M’Kerrow referred occurred in Irvine on the night of 13 September 1946. As in the case of a number of violent clashes involving Polish and British soldiers and civilians, it started outside a dance hall. An official account of the incident was given by the Secretary of State for Scotland in a House of Commons statement. He described how:

‘four or five soldiers arrived at the hall and announced that they had come to get rid of the Poles. Refused admission, they challenged any Polish soldier entering or leaving the hall to fight. After this provocation had gone on for some time most of the Polish soldiers came out, and a fight developed until the arrival of the police. The weapons used included pieces of gates and railing, broken bottles, sticks and knives. Three British soldiers, two Polish soldiers, and one civilian were known to have suffered injuries'.
The disturbance was witnessed by one interviewee, whose home overlooked the scene. She gave the following account of the incident:

'There was a right battle out in that street. The dance hall on West Road, the Ritz they called it, that's where it started, that's where the animosity started. There was jealousy because the Poles were supposed to be stealing their girlfriends. Then they came from the camp and they met right out here. They had sticks and you name it. We stood at the window, and never saw any police. It was a real battle. It was disgusting, it really was bad.'

Following the disturbance and the widespread attention which it received, the Polish troops were transferred from Irvine.

At the end of 1946, the general response to Poles in Scotland was that of an ongoing and widespread opposition towards their continued presence. By then, anti-Polish agitation was also evident in the Highlands (to where many Poles had been moved due to the friction which had become endemic in other areas of Scotland). For example, the Free Church Presbytery of Dingwall and Tain passed a resolution protesting against the government decision which allowed Poles to settle in Scotland. Support for the resolution included that from Caithness, and Ross and Cromarty County Councils. At that time, the state of Scottish-Polish relations was summed up as follows: 'the warm welcome which Scotland gave to the Poles in 1940 has worn thin. Their presence is now an irritant to every district in which they are stationed.'

During 1947, there developed a grudging acceptance amongst most anti-Polish agitators that the settlement of Poles in Scotland was inevitable. This was made more palatable when it was realised that the numbers involved were not as great as previously expected. Nevertheless, there was continued opposition to the placement of Poles in employment through the Polish Resettlement Scheme, especially from organised labour. It was argued that Scottish members of 'certain trade unions were making the Polish Resettlement Corps unworkable by their attitude of refusing to permit the employment of Poles.'
When the National Union of Mineworkers agreed to conditionally accept Poles into the mines in January 1947, sustained opposition to the move in Scotland was made clear when all six Scottish delegates on the National Executive voted against the move (Lunn 1989:5). However, by the end of May 1947, the Scottish Executive of the N.U.M. advised that all necessary Polish labour be absorbed into Scottish mines, and announced that, ‘an appeal will be made to overcome any obstacles which have been existing’. Nevertheless, in late June 1947, it was reported that Poles who had entered mining hostels in Stirling and Falkirk were ‘in paid idleness’ because of difficulties in reaching local agreements. There was particularly strong opposition from miners in the Fife area, where there was a ‘general trend’ against the employment of Poles in the mines. This opposition was echoed in Parliament by the Communist Member of Parliament (Gallacher) for West Fife. During debates on the Poles, Gallacher interceded with such comments as ‘the Poles should get coal in their own country’, and ‘let them get employment in their own country’. 

There is evidence that opposition to Poles from organised labour in Scotland continued into 1948. In March of that year it was reported that ‘Some 30 Polish plumbers could not get work in a Scottish shipyard because of trade union opposition’. Moreover, one interviewee recalled how in 1948 he was given a job as a garage pump attendant. However, on his first day at work he was met by such antagonism from the other workers at the garage that by lunch time they had downed tools. So the garage boss had no choice but to give me my cards.

Furthermore, observations made by representatives of the Department of Agriculture for Scotland during 1948 reveal that there was widespread discord over the employment of Poles in the industry and to their presence in general. For example, in one memorandum it was remarked that ‘it is now fully recognised here that in general Poles are not popular with Scottish farmers’. In another it was commented that ‘our general experience of Poles has not been too happy. Moreover, from the point of view of the general public, Poles are not exactly sought after in most parts of Scotland’.
 Nonetheless, in the late summer of 1948, the Scottish-Polish Society (which as the leading pro-
Polish organisation in Scotland, had been active in assisting Poles into employment and 
highlighting incidents of anti-Polish agitation) was able to announce that 'much of the 
opposition to the employment of Poles has now died'.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has demonstrated through its focus on Poles and Italians, that groups of European 
origin have been the victims of sustained hostility in Scotland. The hostility towards Poles can, 
to some extent, be understood as a reflection of the animosity which had developed towards 
their presence in Scotland during the war, in addition to concerns over such issues as 
unemployment and housing following the decision to allow them to settle. In addition, it was 
shown how negative responses to the Poles had an important impact on post-war settlement 
patterns. For example, those most likely to settle in Scotland had arrived at the beginning of 
the war. The warm welcome they received at that time left many with this lasting impression, 
which then served to counterbalance subsequent hostility. In comparison, it was shown that 
Poles who arrived towards the end of the war were often greeted with open hostility and were 
eager to leave Scotland. The reasons why anti-Italian riots were so extensive in Scotland are, 
however, not so apparent. Nevertheless, it is argued that the level of hostility in Scotland 
could, in part, be understood as a consequence of certain features distinctive to Scotland. One 
such feature was the existence of a virulent anti-Catholicism, a form of hostility which could 
have been equally experienced by both the Italian and Polish groups who were predominantly 
Catholic. The evidence presented here suggests that the conception of Scottish tolerance be 
qualified accordingly.
CHAPTER 6

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF MIGRATION

INTRODUCTION

This final chapter has two objectives. The first is to draw together the threads of research findings and arguments from the preceding chapter conclusions, so as to provide an overall summary of the empirical contributions made by this thesis to British migration history. The second is to draw from the empirical findings of this research certain themes of significance to key sociological debates. The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part provides a synopsis of empirical findings, while the second part is further divided into two sections, each of which examines a theme of theoretical significance.

A SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

The empirical contributions of this thesis originate in research into three areas which, following a review of the extant literature on British migration history, were identified as being in particular need of further historical recovery: specifically, (a) alien European migration, (b) migration during the period of the Second World War, and (c) migration to Scotland. Together, these three areas formed the primary focus of research, which was the historical recovery of alien European migration to Scotland during the period of the Second World War.
In concentrating primarily upon the Scottish dimension this thesis has responded to an unbalanced account within the literature on the history of migration to Britain that has tended to focus exclusively on England. By describing the arrival, presence and settlement of alien European migrant groups during the period of the Second World War it demonstrated that Scottish migration history has not only been characterised by outward migration. Furthermore, it revealed that while the Scottish experience of migration during this time broadly paralleled the wider British experience, there were divergences which marked it out as distinct. The disparity was ultimately reflected in relative migrant numbers (differences which could not be accounted for by indigenous population variations), which was held to be mainly symptomatic of structural variations. It is argued that the empirical evidence presented here adds support to the case for a distinct Scottish context within the wider framework of British migration history.

This thesis was not presented as a comprehensive account of alien European migration to Scotland during the period of the Second World War but instead concentrated on recovering aspects of the history of certain groups: specifically, German-Jewish refugees, Polish exiles, Italian prisoners of war, German prisoners of war, Ukrainian prisoners of war, European volunteer workers and the Italian minority. In addition to retrieving more of the history of these groups, the thesis has highlighted the historical significance of 'white' alien European migration for British migration history. It therefore further questions the notion of Britain having developed as a homogenous nation-state and challenges the ideological assumption that compares 'immigrant' with 'black' person.

The thesis has underlined the importance of the Second World War for British migration history. This was reflected both in the significant level of inward migration shown to have occurred during this period and in the way in which the events and consequences of the war shaped post-war migration and patterns of settlement. This led to extant minority groups being augmented and others to be established for the first time.
The migration process of the groups studied was shown to have involved a complex interconnection of economic, political and ideological determinants. This was most clearly demonstrated by the changing pattern of state intervention in the economy, as it organised a succession of alien European labour in response to a labour shortage crises in Britain during and immediately after the Second World War. The groups who provided this labour (under varying degrees of compulsion) had been constituted by political and ideological factors, as attested by their respective classification of refugee, exile or prisoner of war. Moreover, the members of each group shared the legal status of alien, which enabled the state to impose and/or maintain conditions upon their position within the economy. In addition to the complex interaction of structural factors, other considerations of individual migrants were also identified as having an influence on the migration process. The most prominent of these were associated with social relations that had developed between migrants and the indigenous population, as well as with extant minority groups.

Through its recovery of official and popular responses towards ‘white’ alien European groups during and immediately following the Second World War this thesis has demonstrated that hostility has not only been limited to ‘black’ British subjects from the New Commonwealth. Indeed, the empirical evidence suggests that the pattern of popular responses towards both groups shared many similarities and that the allegations made against New Commonwealth migrants echoed, to a large extent, those made against alien Europeans. Moreover, the research seriously questions the prevailing conception of Scottish tolerance towards migrants and minorities, and it is argued that this notion should therefore be qualified accordingly.

The empirical findings of this study have given rise to a number of theoretical questions. The most significant of these emerge from two prominent themes that relate to key debates within sociology. The first theme is concerned with the role of the state in the migration process, which has implications for migration theories that have evolved from the debate on the relationship between migration and capitalism. The second theme is concerned with the issue of antipathy towards ‘white’ European migrant group and the relevance of this historical evidence to the debate on the concept of racism.
TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE MIGRATION THEORY

This section aims to question the explanatory potential of dominant theories of international migration. It will do this by drawing upon empirical data from this study to develop arguments made in recent contributions to migration theory. It then surveys a conceptual framework within which the complex social process of international migration could be more comprehensively analysed.

A variety of theoretical approaches have been developed to explain migration, most of which can be placed within either the 'micro' or 'macro' theoretical traditions. The more established micro-tradition has its origin in the work of the geographer Ravenstein (1885 and 1889), who propounded a formal model of migration based upon the formulation of statistical 'laws'. His model was essentially individualistic as it emphasised the individual decision to migrate, and is commonly referred to as the classic 'individual relocation genre'. The 'general theories' advocated by this model have become known as 'push-pull' theories, with the causes of migration perceived as a combination of 'push-factors' which impel individuals to move and 'pull-factors' which draw them. As the determinants of migration are often exclusively viewed as economic, the model has much in common with neo-classical theories of the labour market and more recently with the work of neo-classical economists (Borjas 1989).

The micro tradition has formed the theoretical basis for many approaches developed within such disciplines as geography, demography and economics. In the case of British sociology, however, this tradition has had only a superficial influence, in part because of the virtual absence of a British sociology of migration (Miles 1990). This situation has, in large part, been due to the relative dominance of the 'race relations' paradigm which has given relatively little attention to theorising migration, with the primary concern being that of a critical evaluation of the consequences of post-war New Commonwealth migration. As such, the paradigm offers only some preliminary comments on 'push-pull' factors in determining migration to Britain (Miles 1984:164).
It has been widely argued that the theoretical tradition which has its origin in Ravenstein's classical migration theory has led to theoretical approaches which tend to be ahistorical. This is because they usually lack realistic historical contexts and are therefore unable to explain actual migrations (e.g. Cohen 1987, Sassen 1988, Boyd 1989, Zolberg 1989, Castles and Miller 1993). The idea of individual migrants making free choices which 'maximise their well being' and which 'lead to an equilibrium in the market place' is so far from historical reality as to have little explanatory value (Borjas 1989:482). Moreover, classical migration theory made no significant distinction between domestic and international movements. In concluding that international migration was governed by the same 'laws' as migrants within countries, Ravenstein ignored borders and their effects. This view has been continued within 'push-pull' and 'neo-classical' approaches, which have tended to 'treat the role of the state as an aberration which disrupts the 'normal' functioning of the market' (Castles and Miller 1993:21).

The micro tradition is of theoretical significance to this study in so far as it addresses issues that motivate individuals within the migration process. However, the way in which this theoretical tradition has developed has meant that inadequate attention has been given to the fact that individual actors are located in a particular historical and social framework that largely prepares them for the choices available, and that shapes both the opportunities available and the responses that may be made.

More recent developments in migration theory have led to alternative approaches which together are known as the macro tradition. These approaches are usually characterised by their concern with the relationship between international migration and capitalism, and tend to be historical, structural, globalist and critical (e.g. Wood 1982, Zolberg 1989). With the primary focus upon the post-war period, international migration is typically viewed as a process generated by structural unevenness attributed to capitalism organised on a global scale (e.g. Castells and Kosack 1973, Piore 1979, Petras 1981). The change in emphasis from micro to macro has been described as 'the conceptual shift from a view of "ordinary" international migration as the aggregate movements of individuals in response to differential opportunities,
to a view of this process as a movement of workers propelled by the dynamics of the transnational capitalist economy, which simultaneously determine both the 'push' and the 'pull' (Zolberg 1989:407).

The development of the macro approaches was initially stimulated by attempts to account theoretically for the large-scale movements of people into western Europe between the late 1950s and early 1970s. As much of this movement could be characterised as a response to the demand for labour (involving the recruitment of people from outside the respective European nation states as contract labour to fill vacant positions in the labour force), it attracted the attention of academics working from within the Marxist tradition and led to the movements being incorporated within an essentially functionalist economic analysis (Castles and Kosack 1973, Nikolinakos 1975). For example, Castles and Kosack examined post-war migration into western Europe from a political economy approach. They placed particular emphasis upon the function of the capital accumulation process within the circumstances of uneven capitalist development, and the generation of an industrial reserve army of labour as the fundamental determinants of international migration. The political economy approach has also influenced the work of some British sociologists (e.g. Phizacklea and Miles 1980, Phizacklea 1983, Miles 1982, 1987, Cohen 1987).

Within the macro analytic approach to migration theory, prominence is given to the concept of a global system. This has, in large part, been influenced by the 'world system' approach of Wallerstein (1974, 1979), who viewed the modern world system as an entity synonymous with the emergence of capitalism in western Europe and its subsequent expansion. He argued that within the system, processes of uneven exchange between geographical regions gave rise to a differentiated structure, comprising a core, semiperiphery and periphery; with movements to the core induced by underdevelopment in the periphery. In this way, international migration is understood as the movement of unskilled people of rural origin from the periphery of the capitalist world economy to its core in response to the demand for labour.
Although closer to historical realities than approaches developed within the micro tradition, approaches which have evolved from within the macro tradition have their own limitations. Hence, whilst macro approaches are generally historical in that they take account of historically specific migrations, an almost exclusive focus upon the conjunctural context of the post-war period has shaped a particular conception of migration. In this way, international migration has become synonymous with ‘labour’ migration within the capitalist world economy. It is argued that this framework is far from providing a comprehensive account of international migration. For example, the bias towards economic circumstances as the primary determinant of international migration, while less apparent in more recent macro theoretical developments (e.g. Zolberg 1983, 1989), has resulted in inadequate attention given to the political dimension of the migration process. The limitations of dominant economic explanations are accentuated by this study, which recovered migrations that were not determined by capitalist development but by the conditions of total war. Although the demand for labour was shown to have been a principal factor in determining the actions of the British state in relation to the migrant populations once they were resident in Britain, this did not determine the migration process itself. In other words, it was shown how the demand for labour, both during and after the war, was met by surplus populations which were not constituted by the process of capital accumulation but by political processes and military conflicts.

The migrations that do not conform easily to the dominant economic explanations of international migration tend to be marginalised and/or regarded as something apart. In this way, a sharp distinction is usually drawn between ‘labour’ migration which is held to be ‘voluntary’ and to be determined by economic factors, and ‘refugee’ migration which is held to be ‘involuntary’ and to be determined by political factors. Although it has been suggested that a basic distinction drawn between labour migration and refugee migration may provide the basis for a historical and comparative analysis (Miles 1984:162), it nevertheless belies the complexity of the migration process. The tendency has been to make the distinction an absolute one, so that labour migrants (migrant workers) and refugees are assumed to be mutually exclusive social categories. The limitations of this dichotomous approach can be
developed through an examination of the voluntary - involuntary and economic - political polarities, which are held to distinguish labour and refugee migrations.

It is suggested that labour migrants (unlike refugees) have actively chosen to migrate, and as such their movement is voluntary. However, this notion of voluntary movement needs to be qualified in view of the fact that those who have migrated for economic reasons have often been compelled to move under conditions of relative poverty. Such migrants may have chosen to respond by moving, but the decision would have been taken 'within the wider context of economic underdevelopment and deprivation' (Kay and Miles 1992:181). On the other hand, it is suggested that refugees have been forced to leave their country of origin because of political circumstances, and that their movement is therefore involuntary. However, this notion of involuntary movement does not take account of the fact that many who have migrated under such circumstances have often made a personal decision to flee. In other words, historically, such movements have usually involved a process of self-selection, so that while some decided to leave, others chose to stay. For example, this study has shown how following the collapse of Polish resistance to the German invasion at the outset of the Second World War many members of the Polish armed forces went into exile while others elected to remain in Poland. Similarly, while many Poles refused to be repatriated at the end of the war, others chose to return to Poland.

The problematic conceptualisation of the economic - political dichotomy can be usefully developed with reference to the work of Zolberg (1983, 1989), who has responded to the theoretical bias towards economic circumstances as the primary determinant of international migration by advancing a perspective which places emphasis upon the political dimension. As with most other macro theorists, Zolberg has distinguished between migrant workers and refugees. Nevertheless, he offers an important qualification: 'Much as in the long run foreign workers cannot be confined to an exclusively economic role, so receiving countries cannot avoid considering refugees as economic actors, as well as in terms of their incidence on the integration process' (Zolberg 1983:24). His suggestion that there can be no clear dichotomy
between the economic and political dimensions of international migration is viewed as of particular theoretical significance in the light of the historical data presented in this thesis.

Although macro theorists have generally acknowledged the role of the state within the operation of international migration, the primary emphasis upon the economic dimension has led it to be consistently underplayed. In his critique of the uni-dimensional economic approach to international migration, Zolberg stressed the significance of the state in the process of international migration. Indeed, he argued that 'it is the political organisation of contemporary world space into mutually exclusive and legally sovereign territorial states which delineates the specificity of international migration as a distinctive process and hence as an object of theoretical reflection' (Zolberg 1983:4). Moreover, Zolberg went on to argue that as there can be no movement between nation-states without some form of state intervention the process can be primarily defined by the 'control which states exercise over borders', and as states admit workers or refugees as exceptions rather than the rule it is therefore necessary to 'account for the wall they have erected as well as for the small doors they have provided in it' (Zolberg 1989:405-8).

The manner in which states regulate inward movement necessarily involves a process that is both economic and political in its implementation. Thus, in the event of what are described as voluntary, economic or labour migrations, political issues are a constituent feature of the process. This is because entry for those who are alien in legal status depends upon permission being granted by the state which issues visas as well as residence and work permits and which monitors those migrants to whom they are issued. In the case of what are regarded as involuntary, political or refugee migrations, economic concerns are usually of foremost importance as the state considers the economic (and related political) consequences of allowing entry and settlement. This study demonstrated that while the policy of the British state towards those defined as refugees was influenced by political, ideological and humanitarian considerations, the main reason which determined entry was the changing need for labour as reflected by conjunctural economic conditions. For example, it was shown how the policy of restricting the number of German-Jewish refugees who wished to enter Britain before the
Second World War was, in large part, related to the economic situation of the 1930s when there was mass unemployment. On the other hand, it was shown how there was a less restrictive approach to the entry of refugees (although this status was not clearly defined) following the end of the war when there was a shortage of labour. This highlights the way in which the status of refugee has been assigned as much, if not more, for economic reasons as for humanitarian ones. Moreover, the empirical evidence questions the assumption that the status of refugee is 'naturally' given and underlines the extent to which it is in fact a socially constructed category.

In acknowledging the significance of the state, recent theoretical developments have therefore emphasised its role as a mediating institution in structuring international migration as influenced by the changing demands of capital for labour. The empirical findings of this study indicate that the significance of the role of the state has historically extended beyond that of mediator to initiator of movements in response to its own demand for labour. Hence, both during and immediately following the Second World War when the British state was active in the organisation of the labour market, it organised movements in response to shortages of labour first within the war economy and then within the designated essential industries.

This study has exposed the limitations of a dichotomous approach to understanding international migration through the historical recovery of migrations shown to have been determined by both economic and political factors. That is, while they shared characteristics of both labour and refugee migrations (as defined within the literature) they could not be accurately described as comprising one or the other. Moreover, it is argued that while the socially constructed categories of labour migrants and refugees are politically and economically distinct, the unquestioning acceptance of this arbitrary distinction by academics is a barrier to developing a more comprehensive account of the diverse migrations that have occurred. By maintaining this artificial division the tendency, as with the unidimensional economic approach, is to concentrate almost exclusively on but one feature of the migration process.
In a recent theoretical development it has been suggested that the 'political/economic
dichotomy by which specific instances of migration are categorised should be replaced by a
conceptual framework that seeks to specify the particular manner of the articulation of the
political and the economic in each conjuncture' (Kay and Miles 1992:184). This postulation can
be further advanced by conceptualising international migration as a socially contingent process,
the result of a complex synthesis of economic, political and ideological factors as structured by
historically specific circumstances. It is only through an analysis of the interplay of these
factors at specific conjunctures that the process of migration in a given concrete situation can
be adequately understood and explored. It is argued that, in addition to structural
determinants, a comprehensive theory of international migration must also incorporate an
analysis of social action and the motivations of individuals. Moreover, in building upon the
position developed by Giddens (1976, 1979) in his 'structuration theory', it is proposed that
while structural processes within particular historical circumstances condition decisions they do
not determine them without the active participation of individuals. In this way, international
migration can be seen to embody both social structure and social action simultaneously.
TOWARDS A THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF HOSTILITY TO WHITE EUROPEANS

The aim of this section is to account theoretically for the negative responses towards alien European migrant and minority groups as revealed by this study. It begins with a critical evaluation of the idea of intolerance which has been used within much of the British migration history literature. It then outlines what are considered here to be key theoretical advances within the sociological debate on the concepts of racism and nationalism. Finally, these arguments are further developed by drawing upon empirical data from this study.

As much of the British migration literature has sought to question the conception of a supposed tradition of British tolerance, it would seem legitimate for the recovery of negative responses towards migrant and minority groups to be interpreted as evidence of intolerance. However, there is a problem in applying what are in effect common-sense notions as analytical concepts. For example, the idea of tolerance implies a grudging putting up with, and as such is a value loaded concept. In addition, it can be argued that the vagueness surrounding the largely undefined use of the concept of intolerance de-politicises issues of racism. At the same time, the social historian Holmes, as one of the main proponents of the notion of intolerance, has criticised the sociologists' 'gregarious use of the term racism' that too often 'remains undefined and in many cases has degenerated into little more than a catch-all concept' (Holmes 1991b:195). There would, however, appear to be a move by other social historians away from the use of intolerance as a concept and explicitly towards more sociological conceptions (e.g. Panayi 1994). Nevertheless, the way in which the concept of racism has been employed by Panayi is in turn extremely vague. For example, he states that 'racism is used in the post-1945 sociological and public opinion sense of the word, rather than in a mid-nineteenth century anthropological fashion, to distinguish different 'scientific' races of men' (Panayi 1994:102). This understanding does not reflect the development within the sociological debate which has sought to specify the parameters of the concept of racism, often in a way that is quite distinct from 'public opinion'.
The sociological development of a theoretical understanding of responses to migrant and minority groups in Britain has its origin in the ‘race relations’ paradigm, which was especially prominent within British sociology during the 1960s and 1970s. The sociology of ‘race relations’ was developed to account for the consequences of the post-war migration of ‘black’ British subjects from the New Commonwealth, as conceptualised through the interrelated notions of ‘race’ and ‘race relations’ (Banton 1967, 1977, 1987, 1991, Rex 1970, 1983, 1986). Within this conception the idea of ‘race’ is closely associated with the idea of ‘black’, whereby ‘race relations’ are constituted around a polarity between ‘black’ and ‘white’. Moreover, with attention focused almost exclusively upon migration from the Caribbean and South Asia, discussion on racism within the paradigm tended to assume that its nature and origin were to be explored in relation to Britain’s colonial past. This, in turn, led to the view that racism is a ‘white’ ideology created exclusively to dominate and exploit ‘black’ people.

A number of writers have developed a critique of the ‘race relations’ paradigm which has led to the advancement of alternative theoretical traditions. The first major critique of the perspective was by Miles (1982), who rejected ‘race relations’ as a form of study. His main criticism was directed at the foundation of the ‘race relations’ paradigm, by challenging the continued use of the idea of ‘race’ as an analytical concept. Miles argued that the sociological acceptance of ‘race’ and ‘race relations’ involved a reification of the idea of ‘race’, in so far as it implied an acceptance of the existence of a biological hierarchy of fundamentally different groups as proposed by nineteenth century European pseudo-science. This is despite it having been substantiated since the first half of the twentieth century that the world’s population cannot be legitimately categorised in this way. Moreover, through its reification of skin colour in theorising racism the ‘race relations’ paradigm has therefore erroneously prioritised one specific instance of signification and discarded the historical evidence which has shown that other populations have been signified as distinct (and often inferior) ‘races’ without reference to skin colour. Consequently, whilst Miles rejected the conceptions of ‘race’ and ‘race relations’, he retained racism as an analytical concept.
In challenging the analytical concept of racism as formulated within the ‘race relations’ paradigm, contributors writing from a Marxist perspective advanced a theoretical approach which conceived of the concept of racism as referring to an ideology that is flexible and malleable. In this way, it is suggested that racism can appear in different forms in disparate historical conjunctures and has various populations as its object, rather than being a single ideology with a fixed set of attributes. For example, Hall warned against ‘extrapolating a common and universal structure to racism which remains essentially the same, outside of its specific historical location’, and in doing so, he proposed the discussion of ‘historically specific racisms’ (1980:36,337). In addition, Cohen referred to ‘anti-Semitism and colour prejudice’ as ‘distinct modalities of racism, with their own histories and structures of meaning’ (1988:15).

In advocating a historical perspective and expanding the concept of racism so that it does not refer to a single, static set of images and beliefs, these writers have made important theoretical developments. However, they have not specified what historically specific racisms have in common in order to warrant description as instances of racism. In other words, a definition of racism is necessary so as to identify what it is that different forms of racism share in order to be classified as episodes of racism. Such a definition has been advanced by Miles who suggested that ‘racism is a form of ideological signification which constructs a social collectivity as a discrete and distinct, self-producing population by reference to certain (real or imagined) biological characteristics which are purported to be inherent, and which additionally attributes the collectivity with other negatively evaluated (biological and/or cultural) characteristics. Racism, therefore, attributes meaning to the human body, either somatically or genetically, in order to construct an ‘Other’ which reproduces itself through historical time and space’ (1993:99). Moreover, he noted that this definition does not ‘bind the concept of racism to the explicit presence of the idea of ‘race’. Neither does it require the notion of hierarchical ranking’. The ‘Other’ is, however, always created by reference to ‘nature’ (Miles 1993:99-100).
After 'race relations', a wider perspective at both a historical and theoretical level has therefore been developed. This advancement allows for the analysis of responses to migrant and minority populations that is not limited to antipathy between 'black' and 'white' people as shaped by the colonial project. The concept of racism has moved away from that which refers exclusively to what 'white' people say about and do to 'black' people (Miles 1989). Instead, it has been proposed that racisms are expressed in different conjunctures, have different populations as their object and have a different structure and context. In this way, the concept of racism has been expanded so that 'white' people as well as 'black' people can be identified as the objects of racism. In other words, it is not necessary to be 'black' to become the object of racism. This development has particular significance for this study as, within the context of European history, it permits negative significations of 'white' alien European groups to be considered for inclusion as instances of racism.

Alongside a revision of the analytical and theoretical concept of racism, the sociological debate has also considered the interrelationship between racism and nationalism. The contributors have included Nairn (1981) who proposed that racism has derived from nationalism and Anderson (1983) who in refuting Nairn's assertion, argued that racism and nationalism are antithetic ideologies. Miles (1993), while acknowledging that there exist important differences in the nature and reproduction of the ideologies of racism and nationalism, has argued that their interrelationship is not as fixed as Nairn and Anderson suggest. Instead, he proposed that the ideologies have a common historical origin and formal characteristics which simultaneously overlap and contrast in the process of defining the 'Other'. Thus, by drawing upon Anderson's idea of nation as a specific form of 'imagined community', it can be shown how both the ideas of 'race' and 'nation' have (as imagined collectivities) served as socially constructed categories of inclusion and exclusion. In this way, boundaries are created which divide the world's population into discrete groups that are generally professed to be 'naturally' distinct. In the case of the idea of 'race' the 'natural division' has real or imagined biological characteristics as its object of signification, while the idea of 'nation' has actual or supposed cultural characteristics as its criterion.
In the light of these theoretical developments, material from this study will be examined through a theoretical prism that seeks to comprehend an interaction between racism and nationalism in the signification and construction of migrant and minority groups as the 'Other'. Furthermore, in understanding responses as historically specific, the Second World War (1939 to 1945) and the immediate post-war period (1945 to 1951) are viewed as distinct historical contexts and are therefore examined separately.

In the context of total war

It has been argued above that one of the important features of the recent reconceptualisation of the concept of racism by writers such as Miles and Hall is the emphasis upon the way in which the historical context shapes the particular articulation between racism and nationalism and the specific form that any one racism takes. The period 1939 to 1945 can therefore be conceived as historically specific by virtue of the fact that it was dominated politically and economically by the circumstances of total war. These circumstances were characterised by the organisation of political and economic relations around the objective of waging and winning a military conflict which was of a global character and by the organisation of ideological relations in such a way as to draw a simple and clear distinction between 'We' (the Allies) who were evaluated positively and the 'Other' (the enemy) who were evaluated negatively. Military conflict, especially on a global scale, is a very exceptional situation in which physical survival is at stake, and therefore these conceptualisations of 'We' and 'Other' are integral to an intense social conflict. Because of the German military domination on the Continent of Europe in the early period of the war, the threat of a German military invasion of Britain was a significant political fact which encouraged an ideological climate in which the German and Italian 'Others' were absolutely feared as a threat to 'Our' existence.

The data presented in earlier chapters on state and popular hostility towards migrant and minority groups resident in Britain during the Second World War demonstrates that the intense nationalism, which was stimulated by and used to legitimate the war, was the dominant element
in the conceptualisation of Germans and Italians as 'Others'. The language of nation therefore structured the discourse of 'Other' which, with a heavy negative evaluation, resulted in words such as 'German' and 'Italian' ('Tally' in Scotland) being employed as epithets through which to vilify 'Others'. In this way, the idea of nationalised 'Others' has been shown to have had particular significance at a time of war between nations, when those connected with the enemy nation have in a sense been conceived as the embodiment of the belligerent nation state.

Furthermore, a parallel feature of the nationalised construction of the 'Other' within the context of the Second World War was the potential influence which this had for the construction of an 'imagined' collective consciousness of 'Us' the British. In this way, the nationalised 'Other' could be projected as a threat to 'Our' national existence in the form of an 'enemy in our midst'. Moreover, while those connected with belligerent states were viewed as the principal 'Other', the development of a collective consciousness necessarily involved a distinction being made between 'Us the British' and 'Them the Aliens'. This was highlighted by the presence in wartime Britain, especially during the period of threatened invasion, of a general 'anti-alienism'.

For example, concerning German-Jewish refugees, immediately following the outbreak of war this group was classified by the state as 'enemy aliens' by virtue of their German national origin. The fact that this was not simply regarded as a formal classification was illustrated by the instant dismissal of a substantial number of German-Jewish refugees who had been employed as domestic servants, apparently for no other reason than their German origin. In other words, this would suggest a perfunctory change in the way in which German-Jews were signified so that instead of being viewed as the victims of Nazi persecution, they were suddenly conceived as representatives of Nazi Germany and thereby as a threatening presence. Nevertheless, the signification of German-Jews as 'Other' was still complicated by the defining characteristic of refugee, especially following the tribunals that examined the cases of all Germans and Austrians and which classified the majority of German-Jews as 'refugees from Nazi oppression'. However, as the conditions of war changed with the worsening military situation in Europe and the increased threat of invasion, this study revealed the resurgence of a potent construction of German-Jewish refugees as 'Other' as distinguished by their German
national origin. For example, a residential school in Scotland (Gordonstoun) which was generally known to be run by German-Jewish refugees, became increasingly referred to as the 'German school'. In numerous letters sent to the Secretary of State for Scotland from the local population about the school, concerns and suspicions were expressed through the use of such discourse as 'these German aliens in our midst' whose 'true natural allegiance is to their 'Vaterland'; therefore it was 'the general opinion of the community here that if these aliens were interned there would be a greater degree of security'.

A similar process took place with respect to the Italian minority. Immediately following Italy's declaration of war there ensued a large scale internment of members of the Italian community in Britain. Moreover, this policy was not restricted to Italians classified as 'enemy aliens', but also extended to British subjects of Italian descent. The pervasive and often excessive manner in which the round-up for internment was shown to have been executed has illustrated that, in the main, all considerations apart from the individuals' Italian connection were nullified. For example, it was revealed how: a 14 year old boy of Italian parentage was arrested and imprisoned because he had been to Italy on holiday through a fascist youth scheme; an elderly Italian who had lived in Scotland for almost 50 years with 3 sons serving in the British Armed Forces was drowned whilst being transported overseas; an Italian who had been arrested was refused even the briefest visit to his home from a nearby police station after the death of his baby. These individual cases highlight how their Italian national antecedents had become the overriding, if not the sole, defining characteristic by which they were conceived by those involved in effecting the policy of internment.

While nationalism was the dominant element in the construction of Germans and Italians in Britain as negatively evaluated 'Others', this was not the only element. Miles (1993), amongst others, has pointed out how the language of 'race' was central to the development of nationalist ideology during the nineteenth century, with the result that he has argued that during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries nationalism and racism were often articulated simultaneously. The language of 'race' was grounded in scientific discourse, and was integral to attempts to categorise the human species into distinct populations which were thereby
conceived as 'natural'. The ideas of 'race' and 'nation' thereby often overlapped or were even used synonymously. Hence, the conception of naturally existing European nations was often reinforced by the ideas of 'race'.

There is evidence of this articulation of the ideas of 'race' and 'nation' in the historical evidence surveyed by this thesis. For example, a wartime Scottish regional committee member rejected an application from a former Italian internee for a catering licence on the basis 'that the Italian nation had behaved in a despicable manner when they declared war against us'. At the same time, he criticised the 'Italian race as a whole' because 'No race on earth would have treated our men as the Italians did', and concluded with the remark that the 'proper place for Italians was between a wall and a bulldozer'. In this way, the Italian 'Other' was conceived as both a representative of the hypothesised Italian 'nation' and the Italian 'race'.

The articulation of the ideas of 'nation' and 'race' was, however, more complex in the case of German-Jewish refugees. The Second World War was generally perceived in Britain as not only a war between nations but also as a war between democratic and fascist ideologies. A fundamental feature of the rise of German fascism had been the interrelation of the ideas of German 'nation' (Reich) and 'Aryan race'. The very presence of German-Jewish refugees in Britain was testimony to the way in which the Jewish population in Germany had, because of their supposed 'degenerate blood', been constructed as the antithesis to the 'Aryan race' and its professed 'pure blood'. Hence, the explicitly racial basis of the Nazi persecution of Jews meant that while German-Jewish refugees were still conceived as German national 'Other', they could not as easily be constructed as 'Other' through the idea of German 'race'. Instead, the evidence indicates that in the process of constructing German-Jewish refugees as 'Other' in the circumstances of threatened invasion, specific allusion was made to the historical image which portrayed Jews as a 'race' of conspirators. For example, this notion incited a Scottish lawyer, who had earlier been involved in the tribunals of Germans, to write of 'the disposition of Jews to engage in deception'. This conception therefore contributed to an incredulous double-bind situation, whereby German-Jewish refugees became a feared 'Other' because they were imagined both as representatives of the German 'nation' and as a 'race of schemers'. 
In the context of the post-war period

The period 1945 to 1951 was dominated by the politics and economics of post-war reconstruction. Within Britain, this was in the hands of a newly-elected Labour Government which was committed to the construction of its own interpretation of a socialist society, in which the development of a Welfare State and the nationalisation of certain sectors of the economy were key elements. Moreover, given the close connections between the Labour Party and the trade union movement, the Labour Government's political agenda and objectives were shaped by the interests of the working class as perceived and articulated by the trade union leadership. Memories of the 'evils of capitalism' as revealed by the economic and political crises of the 1930s were strong, and there were therefore strong pressures upon the Labour Government to do everything possible to avoid a return to the conditions that were interpreted as a central cause of the rise of fascism and the drift into total war. However, the economic circumstances of the British economy in this period were extremely difficult. The dominant position of British capitalism in the world economy, assured in the early part of the twentieth century, was further undermined by the Second World War, leaving the United States economy in an even more powerful position. Moreover, while post-war reconstruction offered many economic opportunities, labour shortages in key sectors of the economy hindered economic redevelopment.

This period was also dominated by the political consequences of the division of Europe by the victors of the struggle against fascism. The new 'Cold War' quickly became a major dynamic determining the development of international relations, requiring the Labour Government to take a position with respect to the 'threat of Communism' and the division of continent of Europe into two antagonistic entities. In so far as the nation states on the other side of the 'Iron Curtain' came to be dominated by Communist governments, and in so far as there was ongoing opposition to this change of political regime on the part of citizens resident both within and beyond the boundaries of these nation states, these impacted on social and political relations within western Europe. This was especially the case where the war had left citizens of these nation states resident in western Europe.
It was under these economic and political circumstances that certain alien European groups, who for ideological reasons refused to return to their countries of origin in eastern Europe, were identified by the British government as a source of labour. That fact that this was a Labour Government indicated the depth of the economic crises. The data on popular hostility to the presence of Poles (the numerically most significant of these groups) during the immediate post-war period, demonstrates that nationalism continued to be the dominant element in the conceptualisation of 'Other'. This nationalism, which emphasised 'Britain for the British', was essentially anti-alien in character and was stimulated by the expectation that after the war there would be a return to an imagined 'world order' in so far as people would 'naturally' return to their nations of origin. In this way, the idea of nationalised 'Other' was constructed around the notion of illegitimate alien presence.

For example, the continued presence of Polish exiles in Britain after the Second World War was shown to have been marked by a widespread 'Anti-Polish Campaign' that had 'Poles Go Home' as its slogan and which used the word 'Pole' as a term of abuse. In addition, it was demonstrated how there was particular opposition to what was conceived as the 'Menace of the Poles' from organised labour. Hence, once constructed as a nationalised alien 'Other', Poles were signified as an illegitimate and potential threat to the livelihood of British workers.

Furthermore, while nationalism was the predominant feature in the conception of Poles in Britain as negatively evaluated 'Other'. The Poles were also conceived as 'Other' through the idea of 'race'. For example, the reported 'romantic' exploits of Polish servicemen in wartime Scotland resulted in Poles being referred to as a 'race of Casanovas'. In this way, the Poles were held as responsible for the 'moral deterioration of Scottish women'.

A Scottish context

There is another sense in which historical context is important in a consideration of the theoretical significance of the historical data on responses to migration to Scotland during the period 1939 to 1951. In chapter 1, emphasis was placed upon the importance of considering the particularities of Scottish migration history. It was argued that many writers analysing migration to Britain have, in fact, examined only the evidence of migration to England, and that migration to Scotland requires an historically specific analysis because of the historical evolution of Scottish society as a particular economic and political unit. The force of this argument applies also to consideration of the responses by the state and by sections of the Scottish population to the various migrations discussed in this thesis.

One of the important specificities of Scottish history arises from the fact that the Act of Union of 1707 ensured that the officially recognised organisation of religious observance and practice was retained and that the Church of Scotland therefore played a central role in what might be described as the Scottish proto-state that continued in existence after the Union with England. This Scottish tradition of Protestantism allied to a vigorous anti-Catholicism which received additional reinforcement by the revolts against the Union during the eighteenth century, revolts that were grounded in part in adherence to Catholicism in the Scottish Highlands. 'No Popery' therefore had a much stronger political and emotional appeal in Scotland than in England. This was further reinforced by the consequences of the major migration into Scotland during the nineteenth century from Ireland. Although not all these migrants were Catholics, the majority were, and the concentration of their settlement in the West of Scotland combined with the strong tradition of trade unionism that developed during the same period, ensured that anti-Catholicism became an even more vigorous force, especially within the working class. This was reinforced by the establishment of the political tradition of Orangism in the light of migration from, and the historical links, with Ulster (McFarland 1990). While this is an incomplete account of, and explanation for, what is commonly described as the 'sectarian tradition' in Scotland, the important point in this context is that its existence was a feature of the political context for the migrations that have been described in this thesis.
Furthermore, attention has been drawn to the significance of this 'sectarian tradition' when evaluating the history of racism in Scotland (e.g. Miles and Muirhead 1986). It has been argued that the political reaction to the Irish presence in Scotland from the middle of the nineteenth century contained strong racist elements. Not only were the Irish widely signified as a 'race', quite distinct from the 'Scottish race', but they were also attributed with a wide range of negative characteristics. This racism, while also evident in England in the same period, was arguably more virulent and pervasive in Scotland and, moreover, was allied to a more intense anti-Catholicism for the reasons outlined above. The history of Scottish racisms can therefore be conceived as being historically specific by virtue of the fact that anti-Catholicism was one of their powerful underlying stimulants.

The opposition to Irish migration and the Irish presence in Scotland had a further important consequence. In the early twentieth century, the establishment of a sectarian education system in Scotland, one in which the Scottish proto-state funded separate Protestant and Catholic schools, meant that there was structural basis for the reproduction of the 'sectarian divide'. This too was peculiar to Scotland. Hence, consistent with the argument set out in Chapter 1 for examination of the specificity of Scottish migration history, it is argued here that the negative signification of the Catholicism of migrants from Italy and Poland can be explained in part by the specificity of anti-Catholicism as both a political movement and an element in certain racisms that have evolved in Scotland.
Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the dominant theoretical approaches that have been used within British sociology to understand the process and consequences of migration are unable to adequately account for the empirical findings of this thesis. However, more recent theoretical contributions to the sociological debates that have challenged the dominant paradigms, were shown to provide a framework within which the findings could be better explained. Moreover, the empirical findings were used to support these interventions, in particular the work of Miles, thereby contributing in some way to the development of a wider perspective at both a theoretical and historical level towards the establishment of a broader sociology of migration.
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

There are two broad methodological traditions which can be identified within social research. One tradition has tried to adopt the ‘scientific’ methods of the natural sciences and has therefore advocated the use of quantitative ‘positivist’ methodology. The other tradition, in rejecting the use of natural science methodology, supports the use of a more quantitative ‘humanist’ methodology. In Chapter 1 it was noted that one of the weaknesses in the academic study of migration has been the heavy bias towards the use of quantitative research methods. This observation has also been made by other writers who, for example, have argued that this predilection has ‘tended to produce an impersonal, dehumanised approach’ (Pooley and Whyte 1991:5). Nevertheless, there is increasing recognition of the value of using multiple methods in migration research involving a combination of both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, and thereby using a wider range of sources than has previously been the case. Thus, it may be argued that archival data in the form of documentary and statistical sources could be strengthened by oral evidence provided by migrants. In other words, the recovery and incorporation of data in the form of experiences of ‘real’ migrants would allow for a more humanistic approach.

Notwithstanding concerns over the representativeness and reliability of ‘oral history’ and questions over the accuracy of recollections of the distant past through the perspective of the present, there has been a marked development in recent years in its use as a research method (e.g. Henige 1982, Evans 1987, Lumis 1987, Thompson 1988, Perks 1989, 1992, Tonkin 1992 and Yow 1994). This suggests a growing recognition that oral evidence can provide a richness of detail and insight into specific historical contexts that is not readily available from other sources. By granting the researcher a window into the many aspects of history that are not recorded in documents: ‘It puts a new perspective on the study of the past, placing the lives of ordinary people at the centre’ (McNeill 1989:86). The use of oral history as a research method
in the study of migration recognises that individual migrants are in a unique position to provide
evidence of the experience of the migration process, and can therefore 'put flesh on the bones
of analysis' (Bartholomew 1991:176).

The decision to undertake this study was, in part, influenced by the research opportunity that
existed due to the continued presence in Scotland of members of 7 main European groups who
had arrived, or were present, during the period of the Second World War: specifically, German-
Jewish refugees, Polish exiles, Italian prisoners of war, German prisoners of war, Ukrainian
prisoners of war, European volunteer workers and members of the Italian community.
Moreover, it was realised that members of these groups were in their 'twilight years' and that
this potentially rich source of primary research data could soon be lost forever.

For many members of these groups, the circumstances under which they had arrived and
subsequently settled in Scotland meant that there was a general reluctance to discuss their
experiences. Consequently, the selection of a 'sample' from each of the groups through the
use of standard sampling techniques was not possible. Instead, a more specialised form of
sampling known as 'Snowballing' had to be employed (see Taylor 1984). In the first instance
this involved building up personal relationships with individuals who (as a member of, or on the
periphery of, a group) became 'key informants' and provided an introduction to members of the
particular group. These contacts were then used to obtain introductions to other group
members. Indeed, in many cases it was made clear that agreement to be interviewed had
been given only after certain fears had been allayed, and assurances given, by the respective
contacts.

The interviews carried out were 'guided' in so far as there was an interview schedule.
However, it had become apparent during pilot interviews that interviewees found great difficulty
in responding to questions concerning their experiences during the period of the Second World
War without first recounting a seemingly 'fixed story'. The telling of this story was often a very
emotional experience and any attempt to get 'back on track' would have been highly insensitive
and counterproductive. In the event, it was decided not to discourage those who wished to
proceed in this way, but rather to allow the story to be told and then return to the interview schedule to expand on issues that had been raised and to explore others which had not been covered.

A total of 74 interviews were subsequently conducted and can be broken down into the respective 7 groups as follows: Polish exiles - 24 (males - 22, females 2), German-Jewish refugees - 12 (males 3, females 9), German prisoners of war - 10 (males - 10), members of the Italian community - 10 (males 7, females 3), Italian prisoners of war - 6 (males - 6), Ukrainian prisoners of war - 6 (males - 6) and European volunteer workers - 6 (males 3, females 3). The variation in the sample from each group was mainly determined by two factors. First, the numerical size of the groups was not uniform. For example, the comparatively larger number of Poles interviewed reflected the numerical significance of this group. Second, while some groups were characterised by a high degree of inter-group contact through informal and formal networks (organisations) and were mainly concentrated in the Glasgow and/or Edinburgh areas, others maintained minimal inter-group contact and were more widely dispersed throughout Scotland. Furthermore, the reason for the unequal gender composition is self evident in the case of those groups which were comprised of former soldiers from allied or enemy armed forces. In the case of former German-Jewish refugees this largely reflected the demographic reality of the group, while in the case of members of the Italian community it was because of particular research interest in the policy of internment which affected a proportionately greater number of men than women.

The primary data obtained from the personal accounts of group members was supported by data gathered from a wide variety of documentary sources. The most important source of official papers concerning the various groups was the Scottish Record Office in Edinburgh. Of the many files that were consulted there, which included copies of minutes from all government meetings attended by Scottish representatives, the most productive and widely cited were as follows: Agriculture and Fisheries (AF) Files - AF 59/3/4 on the use of Italian prisoners of war as agricultural labour between 1941 and 1945; AF 59/87 on the retention of Italian prisoners of war as civilian agricultural workers between 1946 and 1949; AF 58/18/3 on the use of German
prisoners of war as gang labour in agriculture and the transition to civilian status between 1947 and 1950; AF 59/18/4, AF 59/18/5 and AF 59/30 which examined the use of European volunteer workers and Ukrainian prisoners of war as agricultural labour between 1948 and 1951. Home and Health (HH) Files - HH 55/5 on anti-Italian riots in Scotland in June 1940; HH 55/52 on police intelligence reports during the war and HH 55/649 on pro-Nazi allegations made against the headmaster and other members of staff at Gordonstoun school during 1939 and 1940. Education (ED) File - ED 26/376 on the education of Poles in post-war Scotland. Environment Department (DD) File - DD 6/377 on the use of German prisoner of war labour by the North of Scotland Hydro Electric Board between 1945 and 1948.

In addition, official files from the Strathclyde Regional Archives, Mitchell Library, Glasgow were examined. The file most quoted from there being G1/3/41, which pertained to the presence of German-Jewish refugees in Scotland. Other official sources which were extensively referred to included Hansard debates and Command Papers (see References). Of the unofficial documentary sources that were consulted, one of the most fruitful was a collection of the personal papers of John J. Campbell held at the Mitchell Library Archives - accession number 891309, which provided information on Poles in Scotland and the activities of the Scottish-Polish Society in particular. Finally, extensive use was made of Scottish newspapers, especially the Glasgow Herald, which proved to be a valuable source of material.
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