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The Operation of Underground Armed Movements in Cyprus and their Influence on the Transition of a Colony into a Republic 1955-1963

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M. Phil. History (Research)

University of Glasgow
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Abstract

The dissertation examines the formation and operation of opposing (Greek and Turkish) underground armed movements on the island of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean, between 1955-1963, and analyzes their catalytic contribution to the violent inter-communal strife during the last colonial years (1955-1958) and their ambiguous, manipulative role in the first years of the newly established Republic of Cyprus (1959-1963).

The first chapter, as a prelude to the main argument, presents the ideological background of the Cypriot Greek aspiration for Enosis and the factors that gravely predetermined the outcome of the anti-colonial armed struggle. The following chapter analyzes the operational conception, the underground structure and the internal politics of EOKA, as well as the reasons that led to the strategic failure of its anti-colonial campaign despite its tactical triumph. The third chapter presents the revival of Pan-Turkism, the covert colonial incitement of the Turkish factor (Turkish Government and minority), as well as the desperate Cypriot Turk underground efforts (KITEMB, VOLKAN, 9 Eylül Cephesi, Kara Cete) against the underground domination of EOKA. The following chapter focuses on the important underground action of TMT (November 1957-August 1958) and the four phases of its militant development, and examines how its violent Taksim offensive contributed towards the derailment of Enosis. The fifth chapter analyzes the ideological chasm between former EOKA members, after the termination of the anti-colonial struggle, and the antagonistic operation of Greek Cypriot underground paramilitary movements (KEM, PSA, OPEK, EOK, Lyssarides Groups) for the acquisition of political power during their reputed preparation against Turkish underground ambitions. The last chapter presents the military infiltration of Turkey into the island, the re-establishment of TMT on a paramilitary structure under the control of Ankara and the clandestine operations for the importation of arms and ammunition, and investigates the internal intrigues within the organization for domination over the community between 1958-1963.
Introduction

The last years of colonial rule and the first years of the newly established Republic of Cyprus are deeply interconnected, both in their visible political maneuvers and their invisible underground armed manipulations. The eruption of the explosive inter-communal strife of December 1963-August 1964, that almost brought the decline of the young Republic, is not the exclusive outcome of post-colonial constitutional friction, sociopolitical suspicion, and the deterioration of the inter-communal environment. Its roots lie in the last colonial years when the two communities – the Greek seduced by the idealist aspiration for Enosis under the immature guidance of its political leadership and the incompetent diplomatic maneuvers of motherland Greece, and the Turkish by the Pan-Turkist objective of Taksim under the aggressive strategic ambitions of motherland Turkey – skillfully manipulated by the colonial ruler and its divide et impera doctrine, were frivolously led into a violent confrontation, the deep wounds of which were hastily veiled under the imposed Zurich and London Agreements. The purpose of this research is to study the operation of the underground armed organizations of the two communities, and interpret their influence on the destiny of the island during the critical transformation of the Crown colony into an independent Republic.

While the existing bibliography had examined, quite extensively, the political aspects and diplomatic developments of the 1955-1963 period,¹ the

underground armed movements, the leaders of which, ironically, were the political leaders of the two communities, for a variety of reasons — extremely limited secondary bibliography, almost complete absence of archival material, the controversial activities of the underground organizations are still considered today a taboo — were left almost untouched. Beyond the scarcity of secondary bibliography, the extreme secrecy behind the operation of the underground


The underground operation of TMT during its invisible period, between 1957-1963, was considered, for many years, a well-preserved secret among the Turkish community in Cyprus. Researcher Dr Ahmet An, in his book Kibris Nerseye Gidiyor? [Where is Cyprus heading to?], 2nd edn (Istanbul: Everest Yayinlari, 2003), pp. 141-171, traces the first important disclosures about TMT in 1993, when part of the personal diary of Lieutenant Colonel Riza Vuruskan was presented in Dervis Manizade, 65 Yil Boyunca Kibris, Yazdiklarin Soylediklerim [Cyprus during 65 years, what I have written and what I have said] (Istanbul: [n. pub.], 1993). On 4 February 1995, the first public discussion entitled 'The position of the Turkish Resistance Organization
organizations and the criminal involvement of some of their members did not permit the keeping of formal records. Both limitations posed an important

and the Cyprus Problem initiated a series of apocalyptic articles in the Turkish – Milliyet (6-12 February) and Turkish Cypriot press – Yeni Cag (13 February, 20 February-30 March), Ortam (6 February, 22 May-7 June, 19 September-4 October), Kibris (8 March). During the following year more revelations appeared in Ortam (6-12 February), while the Ankara periodical Kibris Maktabu (June 1996-July 1997) began a series of articles presenting the testimony of former Major Ismail Tansu who revealed, for the first time, the clandestine preparations of TMT in Ankara and Cyprus. 1997 brought more publicity on TMT and the other Turkish underground organizations – Halkin Sesi (26 May-25 September) and Ortam (26 May-17 June), which continued in the following years. Major bibliographical sources about the Turkish underground movements between 1955-1963 are: Aydin Akkurt, Turk Mukavemet Teskiiati: 1957-1958 Mucadelesi [Turkish resistance organization: The 1957-1958 struggle] (istabul: [n. pub.], 1999); Ismail Tansu, Asinda Hic Kimse Uyumuyordu: Yaralinda Sihahl Bir Gizli Orgut, Hem de Devlet Ellyle ... TMT [In reality no one was sleeping: An underground armed secret organization with the support of the state ... TMT] (Ankara: Minpa Matbaacilik, 2001); Mehmet Ali Tremeselli, Ayios Spiridon Canlari [The bells of Agios Spyridon] (Nicosia: Galeri Kultur, 2007). The expected publication of Hasan Demirag, Kibris, Onlar ve Biz [Cyprus, us and them], vol. 5 (Nicosia: Kibris TMT Dernegi Yayinlari, [n. avail.]) will undoubtedly offer important inside information about TMT operations from a former cadre. Criticism about TMT – the same applies for Greek Cypriot underground organizations – is very rare and may be found in Dr Ahmet An, Kibris'Ta Firtinali Yillar 1942-1962 [Troubled water years in Cyprus 1942-1962] (Nicosia: Galeri Kultur, 1996), and in Arif Hasan Tahsin, E Anodos tou Denktash stin Koryphi [The rise of Denktash to the top], trans. by Thanasis Haranas (Nicosia: Archelo, 2001). Important disclosures from TMT leader Rauf R. Denktash appear in Erten Kasimoglu, Eski Gunlar, Eski Defterler [Old days, old notes] 3rd edn (Nicosia: Novemberson, 2006), and in Nezire Gurkan, Zirvedeki Yalnizlik Kulesi: Rauf Rauf Denktash [The castle of loneliness on the top: Rauf Ral Denktash] (Famagusta: Cumbez, 2005).

The secret correspondence of EOKA, between Digenis and the sector commanders and group leaders, does not exist today since Grivas (for security reasons) gave strict orders for the immediate destruction of all EOKA messages, reports or orders, after their acknowledgement by their recipient. An exception to this directive was his own diaries and notes, part of which were unearthed by the colonial authorities and were published in Government of Cyprus, Tromokratia en Kypro: To Emeroiogion tou Griva [Terrorism in Cyprus: The diary of Grivas] (Nicosia: Cyprus Government Printing Office, 1957). After the termination of the struggle, a number of documents of Grivas' orders appeared in publications, when some cadres avoided destroying them for sentimental reasons. Almost all proclamations of EOKA, PEKA and ANE
methodological obstacle that was overcome through private interviews with cadres of the underground movements of both communities, and the study of documents from private collections.\(^1\) The utilization of oral sources became an important research tool that offered, on one hand, inside (eyewitness) information about controversial incidents and their background stories, which are revealed publicly for the very first time. But, on the other hand, the reliability and objectivity of the interviews – in the absence of documentary evidence – became a critical element that had to be investigated with caution and precision. Two methods were used for the verification of the accuracy and reliability of the interviewees. Whenever it was possible, incidents, and the stories behind them, were indirectly verified by other interviewees and by the study of newspaper reports of the period. Due to the controversial and illegal nature of many incidents (murders, bomb explosions, provocations, etc), such verification was not always possible, since the interviewee might have been the only eyewitness alive. In such occasions the reliability of the source was investigated by the accuracy of the interviewee’s descriptions to known (verifiable) events, as well as by the consistency of the interviewee’s answers when specific issues (questions) were raised in repeated meetings.\(^5\) It appears

\(^1\) Private collections played, in some occasions, an extremely important role for the documentation of the ideology, paramilitary structure, and operation of some Greek Cypriot underground movements, particularly of OPEK and EOK, the documents of which – due to the controversial nature of their activities – vanished, and today are not available in any public collection.

\(^5\) The testimony of Turkish Cypriot A.A. regarding the underground activities of TMT proved extremely important; the absence of other eyewitnesses and documentary evidence required
that there were no attempts towards misleading descriptions or unreal incidents, since, in some cases, the interviewees of both communities preferred to keep silent for events, which - for various reasons - they wanted to avoid.

The contribution of this dissertation to historical research is twofold. Firstly, in spite of the existing scarce bibliography, it simultaneously investigates the growth and studies the interaction among the opposing underground organizations in both communities. Secondly, it attempts to fill the bibliographical gap regarding the armed underground movements in Cypriot historiography. Hopefully -- in spite of the time limitations regarding the life of the remaining eyewitnesses -- it will form a foundation upon which other researchers will be able to build their research work and expand, in quality and volume, the depth of this work.

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List of Abbreviations

Public archives, libraries, collections and publishers

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AECA</td>
<td>Archive of EOKA Combatants' Associations, Nicosia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPAL</td>
<td>Cyprus Police Academy Library, Nicosia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMSO</td>
<td>Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRL</td>
<td>House of Representatives Library, Nicosia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKK</td>
<td><em>Idrīma Konstantīnos G. Karamanlis</em>, Athens&lt;br&gt;[Konstantinos G. Karamanlis foundation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCNC</td>
<td>Michalakis Christophi Nikolaou Collection, Nicosia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIO</td>
<td>Public Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Petros Savvides Collection, Nicosia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>State Archive, Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNA</td>
<td>The National Archives, Kew, London</td>
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Organizations and associations

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AKEL</td>
<td><em>Anorthōtikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou</em>[&lt;br&gt;Reform party of the working people]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANE</td>
<td><em>Alkimos Neolaia EOKA</em> [Valiant youth of EOKA]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Cyprus Auxiliary Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Cyprus Special Constabulary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANE</td>
<td><em>Dioikēsis Alkimou Neolaías EOKA</em>&lt;br&gt;[Valiant youth of EOKA command]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEK</td>
<td><em>Demokratikī Enosis Kyprou</em> [Democratic union of Cyprus]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td><em>Demokrat Parti</em> [Democratic party]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAEM</td>
<td><em>Etlaiōn Arrages Ethnikon Metopon</em> [United solid national front]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAL</td>
<td><em>Enosis Agoniston Lefkosias</em> [Nicosia fighters' union]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAP</td>
<td>Enosis Agoniston Paphou</td>
</tr>
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<td>EAPEL</td>
<td>Enosis Agoniston Poleos kai Eparchias Larnacas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDMA</td>
<td>Enialon Demokratikon Metopon Anademiourgias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELDYK</td>
<td>Elliniki Dymanis Kyprou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMA</td>
<td>Eiriniko Metopo Anademiourgias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOK</td>
<td>Ethniki Organosis Kyprion</td>
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<td>EOKA</td>
<td>Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston</td>
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<td>EOX</td>
<td>Eldikes Omades Heirovomviston</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPE</td>
<td>Ehniki Pnevmatiki Estia</td>
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<tr>
<td>KATAK</td>
<td>Kibris Adasi Turk Azinligi Kuruma</td>
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<tr>
<td>KEM</td>
<td>Kypriakon Ethinkon Metopon</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIP</td>
<td>Kibris Istirdat Projesi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KITEMB</td>
<td>Kibris Ilk Turk EOKA'ya Mukavemet Birligi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTAK</td>
<td>Kibris Turk Alay Komutanligi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTC</td>
<td>Kibris Turktur Cemiyeti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTK</td>
<td>Kibris Turktur Komitesi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTKD</td>
<td>Kibris Turk Kultur Demegi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTKF</td>
<td>Kibris Turk Kurumleri Federasyonu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTMB</td>
<td>Kibris Milli Turk Birligi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTP</td>
<td>Kibris Turktur Partisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTTF</td>
<td>Milli Turk Talebe Federasyonou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OA</td>
<td>Omades Amynis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHEN</td>
<td><em>Orthodoxos Christianiki Enosis Neon</em></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Christian Orthodox youth union]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OKT</td>
<td><em>Omades Katadromon Tifekioforon</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Shotgun ranger groups]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEK</td>
<td><em>Organosis Prostasias Ellinon Kyprion</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Organization for the protection of Greek Cypriots]</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEK</td>
<td><em>Panagrotiki Enosis Kyprou</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Panagrarian union of Cyprus]</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEKA</td>
<td><em>Politiki Epitropi Kypriakou Agonos</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Political committee for the Cyprus struggle]</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEO</td>
<td><em>Panagriotiki Omospondia</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Pancyprian federation of labor]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEON</td>
<td><em>Panukyrios Ethnikí Organosis Neolaias</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Pancyprian national youth organization]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td><em>Panagriotiki Syndesmos Agonistón</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Pancyprian figheters' association]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSAK</td>
<td><em>Panagriotiki Syndesmos Agonistón Kyprou</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Cypriot student fighters’ association]</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAPEL</td>
<td><em>Syndesmos Agonistón Poleos kai Eparchias Lemesou</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Fighters’ association of Limassol town and district]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEK</td>
<td><em>Synomospondia Ergaton Kyprou</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Confederation of Cypriot workers]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STK</td>
<td><em>Seferberlik Tektik Kurulu</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Mobilization supervision committee]</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEK</td>
<td><em>Turk Egitim Klubu</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>[Turkish cultural association]</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPMT</td>
<td><em>(Turk Polis Mukavemat Teskilati)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Turkish police resistance organization]</td>
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<tr>
<td>TMT</td>
<td><em>Turk Mukavemat Teskilati</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Turkish resistance organization]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOLKAN</td>
<td><em>Var Olmak Lazımsa Kan Akitmamak Niye</em></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[If we have to exist why not spill blood]</td>
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### Other abbreviations

<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Auxiliary Police Constable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAB</td>
<td>Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Colonial Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMS</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td><em>Pathitiki Antistasis</em> [Passive resistance]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Police Constable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td><em>Politiki Diafotisis</em> [Political enlightenment]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Police Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHQ</td>
<td>Sub-Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNT</td>
<td>Trinitrotoluene (chemical explosive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>War Office</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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Chapter I

The birth of a national aspiration and the political campaign for *Enosis*

The gradual emergence of a national aspiration in a strategic land

Since antiquity, the pivotal position of the island of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean, at the crossroads of three continents, and its importance for geopolitical domination in the region of the Middle East, had a catalytic influence in transforming this strategic land\(^1\) into a nucleus of rivalry among foreign powers. Its people had suffered, through the centuries, the oppressive rule of consecutive foreign conquerors, the national interests and geopolitical ambitions of which, most often, dictated the destiny of the island. Even today, the Cypriots still pay the bitter debts arising from the island's geo-strategic position that initiated foreign intervention amid dramatic domestic mistakes. The de facto military division of Cyprus, after the Turkish invasion of 1974, remains an open wound in united Europe, forcefully segregating its people in the north and the south.

Today's perplexing political situation emerged at the end of British colonial rule and the first years of the newly established Republic of Cyprus, between 1955 and 1963; one of the most critical periods in the history of the island, that irreversibly determined the fate of its people. The bitter and

hazardous roots of inter-communal fear and hatred, grown during the last years of British rule, were not foreshadowing a prosperous and peaceful future for the Cypriots. This dissertation concentrates on the formation and operation of underground armed movements on the island during the anti-colonial struggle and the first independence years, and investigates the contribution of these organizations in the deterioration of the political situation and their role in the incitement of violence between the two communities. Before analyzing the main subject, a brief description of the historical environment that led to the outbreak of the anti-colonial struggle, will provide the foundation for the understanding of the ideological roots of the Cyprus question.

The 1821 Greek War of Independence against the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of an independent Greek state, as well as the appearance of a revived Greek national identity under Megali Idea [Great Idea] – the reborn Greece, united in one state, for one purpose, into one force, one religion, and finally one constitution – brought inspiration to the Greek population of Cyprus. The concept of Enosis – the union of an occupied Hellenic land with the newly established Greek state – firstly appeared at the revolutionary movements of Kephalonia (Ionian Islands) in 1848-1849 and the Cretan Revolution of 1866-1869. The accession of the Ionian Islands from Britain in 1864 and of Thessaly from the Ottoman Empire in 1881, supported by the indisputable belief of the Cypriots for their Hellenic descent, gradually nourished the hope that one day the island would be united with motherland Greece.

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The signing of the Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey\(^5\) in Constantinople, on 4 June 1878, was erroneously perceived, as was proven later, by the local Greeks, who thought that the freedom-loving and democratic British would be the 'golden bridge'\(^6\) leading to **Enosis.** In the following decades the Cypriot Greek leadership - the Christian Orthodox bishops and the members of the Legislative Council - never ceased raising the issue of Enosis to the British High Commissioners in Nicosia and the British Governments in London. 'Hardly a year has passed since the occupation without the Hellenic idea finding expression in some form or other.'\(^7\) There were plenty of motions in the Legislative Council, resolutions, petitions, and deputations to London,\(^5\) and despite the fact that important political personalities, such as Gladstone and Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies Winston Churchill, theoretically acknowledged the logic of Enosis,\(^10\) the British projected the argument that Cyprus, although occupied and administered by

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\(^2\) *Correspondence Respecting the Convention between Great Britain and Turkey of June 4, 1878*, C. 2057 (London: Harrison, 1878), pp. 3-5.

\(^3\) Grivas, *Apomnemonevmata*, p. 5.


Britain, technically was still Ottoman soil. Despite the aggravation of the political situation after the unilateral annexation of the island on 5 November 1914, the Cypriot Greeks, nevertheless, did not hesitate to contribute to the war effort with almost 15,400 volunteers that joined the British Army. The following year was rather prophetic for future Greek-Cypriot Greek relations; the formal British proposal offering Cyprus to Greece – on the condition of entering the war in support of Serbia – was rejected by the Greek Government. The Cypriot disappointment did not affect their effort for Enosis that continued with more telegrams, petitions, motions, and resignations from the Legislative Council, as well as two pan-Cyprian Resolutions – on 25 March 1921 and 25 March 1930. Robert Holland and Diane Markides remark that the Cypriot Greeks developed, at the time, a ‘Cyprus alone’ awareness where ‘if necessary to seek their national redemption independently of Athens’.

On 21 October 1931 the outbreak of spontaneous and violent demonstrations against the British refusal to consider the Cypriot claims, led to the burning of the Government House, the death of nine Greeks, and the arrest of hundreds; the Cypriot Greek disobedience was punished with the imposition of strict and repressive measures. Despite the heavy feelings and
disappointment of the Cypriots, the outbreak of World War II and the British call to contribute to the war – offering also an opportunity to strengthen the struggling local economy – was met with enthusiasm. More than thirty thousand Cypriots – Greeks and Turks – volunteered and served under the Cyprus Regiment and other local military units, and 338 of them gave their lives – buried in 47 cemeteries in 15 different countries – for the ideal of liberty.

**Strategic burdens**

The end of the war was met with high expectations; that Britain, appreciating the vital contribution of Greece – the high cost she inflicted against the invading Italian and German forces and its occupation by the Axis – and the Cypriot dedication towards the allied war effort, would fulfill the theoretical promises she offered when in need. Three factors were destined to play a vital role in transforming the aspiration for *Enosis*, into a national ideology and into a dynamic political campaign: The consistent British refusal to acknowledge the Cypriot claims, the decisively high percentage – 95.7% – of the 15 January 1950 Plebiscite in favor of *Enosis*, and the emergence of Michael Mouskos as

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Archbishop Makarios III on 16 October 1950. The disappointment and emotional fatigue had exhausted the seventy-year Cypriot patience, and indignation and emotional excitement turned Cypriot Greek hope towards the national ideology of Enosis kai Monon Enosis [Union and only union]. From that moment, a series of mishandlings and misconceptions set the clock of Cyprus into a hazardous countdown. 

On the political frontier the Ethnarchy (the leadership of the Cypriot Greek Orthodox Church) under the insistent, inflexible leadership of Archbishop Makarios, entered a dynamic diplomatic campaign pursuing the internationalization of the Cyprus issue. The Cypriot political conception,\textsuperscript{22} dictated by emotional impulsiveness rather than a deep understanding of the emerging post-war geopolitical environment, revolved around two raw – 'ethical' – factors. Firstly, the acknowledgement of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as fundamental principles in post-World War II international affairs, safeguarded by Paragraph III of the Atlantic Charter, Article 1(2) of the Charter of the United Nations, and the 16 December 1952 Resolution 637 (VII) of the General Assembly of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{23} Secondly, the confidence of the Cypriots for the soundness and legitimacy of their claim for Enosis and for their right to decide their future, arising from their three thousand-year old Hellenic background and their 82% majority status on the island.

\textsuperscript{22} Various pamphlets were published, mostly in English, to attract the attention of international public opinion about Cypriot Greek political views: Savvas Loizides, The Cyprus Question: Its Evolution and Present Aspect after the Plebiscite of January 1950 (Nicosia: The Ethnarchy of Cyprus, 1951); Zeno G. Rossides, The island of Cyprus and Union with Greece (Nicosia: The Ethnarchy of Cyprus, 1953); C. Spyridakis, A Brief History of the Cyprus Question (Nicosia: The Cyprus Ethnarchy Office, 1954).
\textsuperscript{23} Atlantic Charter, issued on 14 August 1941, \url{http://www.nato.int/docu/basics/txt/b410814e.htm}; Charter of the United Nations, signed on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco, \url{http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/}. 
Eventually, four burdens — with strategic implications — critically undermined the dynamic Cypriot planning and the chances for its successful implementation. The first burden arose from the fact that the Ethnarchy — that is, Makarios — neither had the knowledge nor was willing to take into consideration, in its political campaign for Enosis, the post-World War II geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East; the emotional excitement for the national aspiration blinded every logical thought. To the microcosmic world of Cypriot Greeks, the Cold War, the decline of the geopolitical situation in the Middle East, the rise of Arab nationalism, Soviet infiltration to the Middle East, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and British strategic interests in the region, were issues of secondary importance. It was in this spirit that Archbishop Makarios made, on 10 August 1953, a unilateral appeal to the Secretary General of the United Nations, raising the issue of self-determination for Cyprus; the effort of course failed since the subject had to be raised by a member state.

The second burden related to the almost de facto imposition (by Makarios) of Cypriot demands — for Enosis and for the internationalization of the issue through the United Nations — on the Greek Government. The post-war Greek internal realities were harsh. Greece, suffering the results of German occupation and the consequences of a civil war, was almost in ruins. The Greek economy was dependent on foreign support, internal politics were fragile, Greek foreign diplomacy was prescribed by Washington and London,

and the wounds between the rightists and the communists were too fresh to be forgotten. At the same time the opposition, influenced by the rise of nationalist feelings and party interests, took advantage and exercised heavy pressure on the unstable Greek Governments in favor of Enosis. Archbishop Makarios realizing Greek vulnerability, not only manipulated Greek national feelings, but did not hesitate to threaten the Greek Government, that if Greece was not willing to support the Cypriot demands in the United Nations, then he would turn to a third country for support.\textsuperscript{98}

Greek efforts to discuss the issue and find a solution with its ally and friend Britain found no response. The first coup de grace was given in the House of Commons, by the Secretary of State for the Colonies Henry Hopkinson, on 28 July 1954, who, when talking about Cyprus, stated that 'there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent'.\textsuperscript{29} The cold-blooded 'never', closed every door for a friendly settlement and forced the Greek Government of Field-Marshal Alexandros Papagos to appeal to the United Nations, for the very first time, by inscribing on 22 August 1954 the item 'Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people in the case of the population of the island of Cyprus'.\textsuperscript{30} The responsibility for the third strategic burden belongs to the Greek Government, which failed to oppose to Cypriot pressures and fell into the trap she set for herself, without taking into serious consideration the geopolitical interests in the region, and particularly British reaction and possible Turkish involvement. The failure of Greek diplomacy in the United Nations, in 1954, had two extremely severe implications. It attracted, with British

encouragement, the attention of the Turkish Government, initiating its dynamic involvement in Cyprus, and provided the excuse for the outbreak of the anti-colonial armed struggle for Enosis. The doors of conflict were now wide open; the dynamic but politically immature Cypriot Greek leadership and the seduced Greek Government of Papagos, had entered a dark tunnel, without realizing the severe implications of their action, without ever safeguarding an emergency exit and a safe way out.

The prophetic connotations of the underground preparations

The preparatory period for the underground campaign opened in December 1950, when retired Greek Army Colonel George Grivas, in an informal visit to General Georgios Kosmas, Chief of the Greek Army, expressed the necessity for the organization of a liberation movement in Cyprus. Grivas, former leader of the anti-communist organization ‘X’ during the Greek civil war, was a strong-minded, military man of decisive action, who enforced his military decisions without hesitation, but was vulnerable and easily manipulated by his close associates on many other matters. He was the man who conceived and pushed hard for an armed liberation movement in Cyprus, and for this reason he made two reconnaissance tours to the island, in July-August 1951 and October 1952-February 1953, where he had private discussions with Makarios, made contacts, studied different locations on the mountains and the coasts, and recruited the first combat nuclei.

On 2 July 1952, an important secret meeting took place in Athens under the chairmanship of Archbishop Makarios, in the presence of Colonel Grivas and a few Greek and Cypriot patriots. The Struggle Committee born on that

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31 Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 15.
33 Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, pp. 16-17, 19-20.
34 Grivas, Memoirs, pp. 17-21; Papageorgiou, Kypriaki Thileia, pp. 73-74, 78-79; Loizides, Aychi Kypros, pp. 97-102.
day became the core of underground preparation in Athens, despite the fact that Makarios faced – for almost four years (1951-1954) – Grivas’ proposals, with scepticism and severe hesitation. In the first meeting, he was very pessimistic about the prospects of an armed struggle and told Grivas that ‘not even fifty men would be willing to follow you’. The first serious disagreement between Makarios and Grivas appeared on the type of the armed struggle. Grivas, as a military man, proposed a combination of sabotage acts and guerilla warfare, while Makarios, without any military knowledge, insisted solely on sabotage. He had the misconception that after three or six months of sabotage ‘the British Government would surrender to our demands’. It was only in the Autumn of 1954 – when Makarios started to realize the limited chances of achieving a favorable resolution in the United Nations – that he begun supporting dynamic action, although he never understood how the benefits of an armed movement might have been used in favor of a political campaign. Under those ambiguous conditions Archbishop Makarios, code-named S. Haris, undertook the political leadership of the underground campaign and Colonel Grivas, code-named Digenis, became its military leader.

These personal and rather amateurish Greek Cypriot moves, faced initially the immediate opposition of the Greek Government. Greek Prime Minister Alexandros Papagos sent a clear message to Grivas that a liberation movement in Cyprus was premature, and on 14 March 1953 General Kosmas informed Grivas that the Prime Minister ‘was not interested to get involved, and did not even want to be known that he was informed about’ the intentions of the Colonel. Thus Grivas’ request for arms and explosives from the Greek military was not only refused but he was placed himself under surveillance; a Greek Minister even threatened to arrest him if he did not abandon his underground

35 Grivas, Apomemonevmeta, pp. 16-17, 23.
36 Grivas, Memoirs, p. 18.
37 Grivas, Apomemonevmeta, p. 20.
38 Grivas, Apomemonevmeta, p. 17.
moves. Grivas, realizing the reaction of the Greek Government and the hesitation of the Archbishop, continued pressing hard for the underground movement and managed to collect the first shipment of arms and ammunitions – from the armory of former organization 'X' – that was covertly smuggled to Cyprus in March 1954.

'A new Makarios' appeared in October 1954, when he unexpectedly changed his mind and started pushing hard for an immediate second shipment of arms; for this reason he even authorized the release of money for the expenses of the boat. Makarios and Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos were desperate for Grivas' immediate departure for Cyprus, since 'it was now considered that action was required “before” the debate at the United Nations, so as to persuade the Americans, that an adverse attitude would start trouble in Cyprus, and thus the Middle East'. The desperate and poorly improvised Greek and Cypriot maneuvers, to exercise pressure on the Americans, failed even before they had been applied. Grivas believed that action was determined by the completion of the underground preparations and not by the 'hasty and unrealistic decisions of Makarios'. Eventually, after the Greek diplomatic disaster in the United Nations, Papagos had given his theoretical consent for the armed movement; an act without any practical meaning any more.

The dynamic liberation movement – inspired by Grivas, indirectly imposed on the undecided Makarios, against the controversial neutrality of the Greek Government that did not have the courage to clarify its position – broke out on 1 April 1955, after four years of spasmodic Cypriot moves. The fourth strategic burden derived solely from to Grivas who erroneously perceived the oncoming conflict as a local confrontation between the Cypriot guerillas and the colonial administration. While his preliminary tactical planning for armed action

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40 Grivas, Apomnemonevmeta, pp. 17-18; Grivas, Memoirs, pp. 20-22.
42 Ibid., p. 24.
was detailed and imaginative, it completely failed to assess the strategic consequences of the underground campaign. Grivas had neither predicted nor taken into consideration, the possibility of a Cypriot Turk reaction or the strategic interference of Turkey, both of which caused at the end, with British blessings, the derailment of the anti-colonial struggle.
Chapter II

The underground guerilla campaign of EOKA against colonialism

Initial operational concept

The anti-colonial struggle of Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA) [National organization of cypriot combatants] against the British colonial administration of Cyprus, its security forces, and the British Army that undertook emergency security tasks, was a dynamic underground guerilla campaign defined by courageous and daring acts of self-sacrifice, that earned the exasperation and vengeance of the colonial authorities. It is not coincidental that – in spite of the severe blows it suffered and the arrest of many of its members – EOKA managed to survive, and remained lethal and extremely difficult to suppress, for the whole duration of its operation, between 1 April 1955 and 9 March 1959. Its proscription on 14 September 1955 and later the imposition of a State of Emergency, as well as the introduction of strict military counter-measures by Governor Field-Marshal John Harding, did not succeed in crushing the outlawed organization and admittedly caused his resignation in October 1957. The revealing titles of British newspapers – ‘EOKA is impossible to beat’ and ‘A Field Marshal, Three Generals, and 40,000 British soldiers were not capable of beating EOKA’ – are indicative of the hard and intricate

1 'Prokirixis' [Proclamation], EOKA proclamation, 1 April 1955, in Parageorgiou, Kypriaki Thyella, p. 120; 'Pros ton Ellenikon Kyprikon Laon' [To the Cypriot Greek people], and 'Pros tous Agonistas tis EOKA' [To the EOKA fighters], EOKA proclamations, 9 March 1959, in Grivas, Apomnemonevmeta, pp. 403-405.
2 Order in Council No. 2785, The Cyprus Gazette, No. 3859, 15 September 1955, p. 523.
3 A Proclamation by the Governor, The Cyprus Gazette, No. 3891, 26 November 1955, p. 715.
4 Parageorgiou, Kypriaki Thyella, p. 169.
character of the confrontation between the Cypriot guerillas and the imperial forces.

The Preliminary General Plan of Insurrectionary Action in Cyprus\(^6\) was conceived and prepared by Grivas after his second reconnaissance visit to the island (February 1953). The three main objectives of the plan were 'to attract the attention of international public opinion by acts of heroism and self-sacrifice', to declare, through the continual harassment of the colonial regime, the indisputable determination and terminal commitment of the Cypriot Greeks towards the achievement of their purpose, and to force 'the international diplomacy – United Nations – and the British, to examine the Cyprus issue and provide an immediate solution according to the aspirations of the Cypriot people'.\(^6\) The Action Plan consisted of five main elements:\(^7\) a) sabotage acts against government and army installations in towns (primary action task); b) surprise attacks against the British forces by combat-guerilla groups (secondary action task); c) passive resistance measures to strengthen the morale and the resistance capacity of the Cypriot population; d) elimination of any opposition (especially communists) and neutralization (execution) of Cypriot collaborators of the British; e) dynamic demonstrations in Greece in favor of the anti-colonial struggle and propaganda to enlighten world public opinion. Peculiarly \textit{Enosis}, the main strategic objective of the EOKA campaign, was not mentioned, even once, in this plan; an accidental coincidence from a military man dedicated to detail and precision or the prophetic instinct of an underground leader devoted to war?

\(^6\) Grivas, \textit{Agon EOKA kai Antartopolemos}, Appendix, pp. 3-8; Grivas, \textit{Guerilla Warfare}, Appendix I, pp. 91-95.
\(^6\) Grivas, \textit{Aporhnmonevmata}, Appendix, p. 3.
\(^7\) Ibid., Appendix, p. 3.
The men, women, and youth of EOKA

The selection and training of the first members commenced immediately after the secret arrival of Grivas on the island, on 9 November 1954. The men were recruited from two youth organizations, *Orthodoxos Christianiki Enosis Neon* (OHEN) [Christian Orthodox youth union] and *Pankyprios Ethniki Organosis Neolaias* (PEON) [Pancyprian national youth organization], as well as other organizations such as *Panagrotiki Enosis Kyprou* (PEK) [Panagrarian union of Cyprus]; every member was sworn to the bible, but extraordinarily the main objective of the struggle, *Enosis*, was again not included in the oath. On the outbreak of the underground campaign - 'liberation struggle' for the Greeks, 'terrorism' for the colonial administration - EOKA consisted of no 'more than eighty men'. The daring operations of the guerilla movement, the clumsy reaction and vindictive behavior of the colonial forces towards the local population, and the patriotic character of the struggle under the strict but charismatic leadership of Digenis, immediately attracted the attention of the Greek population. Realizing the importance of earning the support and trust of the people, Grivas 'began the battle for the minds of the population'.

Young men between sixteen and forty – average age twenty-four – became the core of EOKA combat groups, and great many of them were distinguished during the underground operations for their ethos, courage and self-sacrifice. The leadership of sector commands and combat groups was assigned to the most competent and dedicated cadres, who played a very important role in the hierarchy of the organization, in implementing the strict orders of Digenis as well as planning and carrying out the underground combat missions, many of them falling loyal to their oath, such as Markos Drakos-

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6 Grivas, *Chronikon*, p. 3.
10 Ibid., p. 34.
11 The average age of the sixty-eight men of EOKA killed in action was 24.3 years. For details about their identity and age see Ch. Papachrysostomou, *Archeion Pesordon* [Archive of men who fell in action] (Nicosia: [n. pub.], 1969), pp. 10-30.
Lykourgos or Mavilis, Gregoris Afxendiou-Zedros, Kyriakos Matsis-Miltiades, and Photis Pittas-Gythos.¹²

Many young women became members of the organization and undertook a variety of important tasks, as couriers of the secret EOKA correspondence, escorts during the movement of wanted men, carriers of handguns for the execution teams, or companions of British senior officers for the extraction of valuable information, such as Nitsa Hadjigeorgiou.¹³ Two of the most reliable couriers of the secret correspondence of Grivas were Elli Christodoulides and Maroulla Panagides, while Elenitsa Seraphim-Philaretos or Gerasimos became the sector commander of Larnaca.¹⁴ Digenis was very proud of the courage and dedication of EOKA women, and considered them more trustworthy and less talkative than men; they never ‘let me down or gave way under interrogation’ he wrote in his memoirs.¹⁵

As early as May 1955, Grivas issued orders for the engagement of secondary school students in various tasks such as the distribution of leaflets, the collection of information, and the surveillance of suspects opposing EOKA;¹⁶ the students were particularly distinguished for their participation in mass demonstrations, which kept the morale of the population high and caused great harassment to the security forces. By January 1956 he invited the primary school students into the struggle;¹⁷ the children were involved in the distribution of proclamations, and ‘the battle of the flags’¹⁸ in their schools, that turned out

¹⁵ Grivas, Memoirs, pp. 143-144.
¹⁶ Grivas, Apomnemonevmeta, pp. 37-40; Grivas, Chronikon, pp. 4-6, 8-13.
¹⁷ Grivas, Chronikon, pp. 13, 16.
¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 13-14.
as a war of nerves against the colonial forces. The youth movement, said Grivas, became ‘one of the most important weapons in my hands’.  

The patriotic conception of the underground movement, founded on the Enosis ideology and the courage of EOKA men, became a powerful driving force within Cypriot Greek perception. The massive participation of the population – with the exception of leftist Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou (AKEL) [Reform party of the working people] – was an unparalleled phenomenon in guerilla warfare, and British efforts to scare the people away from EOKA, achieved precisely the opposite effect. Chemists, electricians, metal-workers and other scientists offered their valuable services voluntary for the production of explosive mixtures, and the construction of devices such as different types of mines, hand-made grenades and bombs. Lawyers, such as Tassos Papadopoulos and Glafkos Clerides-Iperides, became members of the organization, while the Christian Orthodox clergy contributed significantly to the underground effort. The Bishop of Citium Anthimos-Protephs, undertook important political responsibilities substituting Makarios during his exile, deacon Anthimos Kyriakides became the chief liaison officer of the organization, and deacon Papastavros Papagathangelou was its chief recruiter.

The growth of EOKA – according to Grivas – was impressive. By February 1956, its strength rose to almost 1000 men. On the mountains there were 7 groups of 53 men, 47 groups of 220 men in the six towns, 2 groups in the British Bases, and 75 groups with approximately 750 men in the villages. From the 131 combat groups – each one consisting of three to ten men, depending on their mission – the front-line elements were those in the mountains and the towns, forming 54 groups of 273 men, sharing about 100 military rifles and handguns. The other 77 groups in the countryside and the villages were armed with shotguns and undertook secondary missions. EOKA,

19 Grivas, Memoirs, p. 62.
21 Grivas, Chronikon, pp. 40-45.
during the four years of its underground operation, in spite of the severe blows it suffered — 68 of its members died in action, 9 were hanged, 345 were wanted, 886 were imprisoned, while 3363 others were enclosed in detention camps without a trial — never faced a ‘shortage of good men’.

The colonial forces, unable to break the cohesive and well-organized underground structure of EOKA, ‘had resorted to judicial murder’ — the hanging of young members aged between 19-24 — and invented two hideous methods to penetrate the organization. The first, was the extraction of information through horrific torturing during the interrogation of arrested EOKA members, nine of whom died during the heavy punishment; among the victims of this method were guerilla leader Kyriakos Matsis-Miltiades who fell in his secret hideout refusing to surrender, and the Liopetri group, the hideout of which was revealed by EOKA member Elias Samaras, who was forced to provide information for his brother Xanthos Samaras-Aitolos and the other three members of the group, causing their death after a three-hour battle. The second method was betrayal by paid informers, mostly Cypriot Greeks, who revealed the secret guerilla hideouts, the couriers, the habits of combat groups,

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22 Papachrysostomou, Archaion Pesanton, pp. 10-35.
26 Grivas, Memoirs, p. 34.
26 Ibid., p. 71.
and other sensitive aspects of the underground organization. This practice caused extreme damage to EOKA, and became the main reason for the discovery of the secret hideouts of many groups, among them, that of sector commander Gregoris Afxendiou-Zedros, who was burned alive after an eight-hour battle on 3 March 1957.\footnote{Grivas, \textit{Chronikon}, pp. 44-45, 561-564.}

\textit{Digenis} was irreconcilable regarding the fate of paid informers and collaborators; approximately eighty Cypriot Greeks of all political backgrounds — rightists and leftists, even a woman, a priest, and members of the organization — were executed by EOKA.\footnote{\textit{Prodotes kai Ekteiesthendes ston Apeleutherotiko Agona 1955-1959 kai AKEL [Traitors and executed in the 1955-1959 liberation struggle and AKEL], ed. by Syndesmos Agoniston EOKA, (Nicosia: [n. pub], 2002), p.4.} A number of others who survived the lethal bullets of the organization were protected by the colonial regime and sent to Britain, Australia, and Africa in self-exile. Among the less severe measures against collaborators was, advising, written warning, threatening, haircut ridicule for women, and heavy beating.\footnote{Ibid., p. 3.} These measures naturally were not limited to traitors; \textit{Digenis} and the organization were cruel and merciless regarding the implementation of EOKA directives, and did not hesitate to impose their will by force on the population, when there was deviation from the prescribed policy of the organization. Such instances, although limited, included, among other things, the passive resistance campaign, the complaints of affluent merchants about the restrictions on importations from Britain, and the unauthorized use of the EOKA name for personal gains. It is important to clarify that participation in EOKA was completely voluntary, and there was not a single recorded case where the organization forced the participation or collaboration of any member.
Underground structure

The operational structure of EOKA imposed by Digenis, who did not tolerate any questioning of his command, was cohesive and airtight; the absolute control of all sector commands and other sections converged to Archegos [the leader] Digenis who avoided a complicated, pluralistic command system in favor of a simple centralized hierarchy; he believed that a multi-person committee would be inflexible and susceptible to disputes and rivalries.\(^{\text{34}}\) His dedication to discipline, led quite often to the issue of strict warnings, clearly stating that disobedience would immediately be punished by death.\(^{\text{35}}\) It was precisely those strong qualities of Digenis that contributed to the tactical success of EOKA; no other military leader would have been able to manage such a difficult underground campaign so successfully, and even Grivas himself acknowledged that 'my death would mean the end of the campaign, for there was no one to take my place'.\(^{\text{36}}\)

Grivas, in his underground hideouts, did not have the luxury to have any staff, other than a personal aid, and did not encourage the idea of a deputy leader. He considered, out of courtesy, S. Haris (Archbishop Makarios) as his superior,\(^{\text{37}}\) responsible for the political exploitation of the military results in the international arena. His relation with the Greek Government, through the Greek General Consulate in Nicosia which acted as a liaison, and specifically with Foreign Minister Evangelos Averof-Isaakios\(^{\text{38}}\) – who was handling the Cyprus issue for Prime Minister Karamanlis – was only consultative, and never had the military struggle come under the control of the Greek Government. EOKA reached the apex of its underground capabilities in 1958, when the combat experience and tactical maturity earned during the previous years, along with

\(^{\text{34}}\) Grivas, Apomnmonomenvmeta, p. 34.

\(^{\text{35}}\) Grivas, Memoirs, p. 25.

\(^{\text{36}}\) Ibid., p. 40.

\(^{\text{37}}\) Tromaokratia en Kypro, pp. 11, 16-17, 19, 28, 32.

the sophisticated unorthodox warfare tactics developed, led to a quite extensive underground operational structure (Diagram 1). Immediately under his command, were twenty-three combat sector commands, the *Politiki Epitropi Kypriakou Agonos* (PEKA) [Political committee for the Cyprus struggle], the *Dioikesis Alkimou Neolaias EOKA* (DANE) [Valiant youth of EOKA command], the critical liaison echelon, and the propaganda, intelligence, and supplies sections.

The political organization of the population was in Grivas’ mind from the very start, but it took a more concrete form in August 1956 – after the exile of Archbishop Makarios – with the establishment of PEKA, which was assigned the coordination between the military and civil aspects of the struggle, the preservation of a cohesive internal front, the uplift of public morale and the counter-action against enemy propaganda. PEKA was proscribed on 20 September 1956 but continued successfully its underground operation until the end of the struggle; in 1958, a new organization was formed, *Eniaion Arrages Ethnikon Metoperon* (EAEM) [United solid national front], under PEKA, with the purpose of organizing and coordinating *Pathitiki Antistantis* (PA) [Passive resistance] and confronting the Turkish threat.

*Alkimos Neolaias EOKA* (ANE) [Valiant youth of EOKA] was established in the middle of 1957 and its sections in towns and the villages were subordinate to the sector commanders, while the directions of policy were taken from DANE, which was under the immediate control of *Digenis*. ANE, proscribed on 6 March 1958, was based on a well-developed youth network, the elements of which spread in every school under a school leader and in out-

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39 Diagram 1 was prepared after taking into consideration three relevant diagrams in Grivas, *Antartopolesmos*, pp. 39-41.
of-school groups.\textsuperscript{45} Digenis, describing the character of the Cypriot youth remarked: 'Prevailing was an unthinkable spiritual strength and an unprecedented determination. I knew that I was commanding souls and not human flesh.'\textsuperscript{46} DANE published two monthly patriotic magazines, \textit{Egerterion Salpisma} for secondary school students and \textit{Agogi ton Neon} for the primary school students.

The liaison system\textsuperscript{47} of EOKA played an extremely important role and contributed significantly to the tactical success of the underground movement, since Grivas did not trust and never used wireless or telephone communications; Digenis never revealed full details of the system. There was a main center where all secret correspondence of EOKA was forwarded. To safeguard the security of the system and the main center, he created an elaborate communications network, where the secret correspondence passed from various other intermediate centers or persons before arriving to the main center. He also developed and maintained, two independent and unknown to each other, courier networks; the main operational network and a reserve one, which were sometimes interchanged in their operation in order to confuse the opponent. 'A tough battle unfolded between the British and us for the liaison network; them, trying to destroy it, and us, to safeguard its operation' Digenis stated emphatically.\textsuperscript{48}

The intelligence\textsuperscript{49} section of EOKA offered valuable services to the underground campaign, and quite often the ingenuity of its men and the unorthodox methods used for the collection of information, led to the avoidance of many catastrophic blows against the organization. The three main sources for the collection of information were selected Cypriot Greek officers in the police force who passed important information about the movements and

\textsuperscript{45} Grivas, \textit{Chronikon}, pp. 8-13, 17-24; \textit{Archoion}, ed. by Papageorgiou, pp. 427-458.

\textsuperscript{46} Grivas, \textit{Chronikon}, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{47} Digenis, \textit{Guerrilla Warfare}, pp. 16-17, 30; Grivas, \textit{Apomnemonevmata}, p. 30.

\textsuperscript{48} Grivas, \textit{Antartopolmos}, p. 28.

operations of the police force and the army, garrulous British agents and personnel talking with Cypriot Greeks (women) about British plans, and the youth network of ANE that accumulated and reported any kind of information from surveillance, contacts, or observations.50

The operation of EOKA was financed by the Archbishopric of Cyprus and by the Greek Government through the Foreign Minister, Evangelos Averof who was code-named for this purpose Evargetis [Benefactor].51 The financial matters52 of the organization were handled by a treasurer under an extremely strict system of control imposed by Digenis, while the collection of money and their distribution, was always accompanied by signed invoices. Grivas had given strict orders to all sector commanders and informed the population through leaflets, that EOKA did not collect money or donations by anyone. It was estimated that the total amount of money spent for the operation of combat groups, the purchases of arms, ammunitions and other materials, and the support of the families of wanted EOKA members, rose, between 1955 and 1959, to 140,000 Sterling Pounds.53

Sector Commands in 1958

The combat experience and consequent growth of EOKA strength had dictated its underground order of battle that, by 1958, consisted of twenty-three sector commands (Diagram 2).54 There were three types of sectors, each one with a distinct composition, determined by the geographical characteristics of the sector and the particular operational needs of the organization in each area; the town sectors, the mountain-guerilla sectors, and the countryside sectors. All combat groups in every sector were under the command of Tomearchis [Sector

50 Grivas, Antartopolemos, p. 36.
51 Tromokratia, pp. 7-8, 12-13, 15; Grivas, Chronikon, p. 624.
52 Grivas, Chronikon, pp. 624-625.
53 Ibid., p. 624.
54 Diagram 2 was prepared from a map showing EOKA sector borders in Grivas, Antartopolemos, Appendix.
commander], while groups of the same combat type had a leader, mainly for the coordination of communication between the group leaders and the sector commander. By 1958, the interference of Cypriot Turk underground elements compelled Digenis to create special combat groups against the Turkish threat, independent from the groups operating against the colonial authorities.

In the town sectors there were three different types of combat groups against the British. The saboteur groups\textsuperscript{55} were assigned specific types of targets such as military installations, airfields, and government buildings, and used imported and home-made explosives, incendiary mixtures, ordinary and electrical detonators, time bombs, and many other home-made devices. Probably the most famous act of sabotage was by Andreas Vasiliou, who succeeded, on 26 November 1957, in penetrating the highly secure area of RAF Akrotiri Air Base and planting two time bombs, causing the destruction of two Canberra bombers and damages to three other aircraft, of total value 4.5 million Pounds.\textsuperscript{56} The ambush groups\textsuperscript{57} were assigned various other targets such as mobile army and police patrols, and raids against police stations; their weapons were pressure or electrically detonated mines, homemade grenades, improvised launchers, and military rifles. The execution groups\textsuperscript{58} consisted of two to four daring men, and their mission was the extermination of soft targets such as British military personnel, members of the Intelligence Service and the police Special Branch, torturers of arrested EOKA members, and traitors or collaborators of the British. Notorious execution groups were those of Praxitelles Vogiazianos, Esehios Sophocleous, and Nikos Samson in Nicosia, and Michalakis Thrasivoulides in Limassol. The fourth type of combat groups, urgently formed in the main towns, in the summer of 1958, to confront the Turkish attacks against the Greek population, were the \textit{Eidikes Omades Heirovomviston}\textsuperscript{59} (EOX) [Special hand-grenade throwing groups], which were

\textsuperscript{55} Grivas, \textit{Guerrilla Warfare}, pp. 64-65.
\textsuperscript{56} Grivas, \textit{Chronikon}, pp. 411-415.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., pp. 47, 86-90; Grivas, \textit{Chronikon}, pp. 188-188.
\textsuperscript{59} Digenis, \textit{Guerrilla Warfare}, p. 32.
intended to stop, by the use of hand grenades, the massive attacks of the Turkish mobs against innocent Cypriot Greeks and their property in areas neighboring the Turkish quarters of towns.

In the countryside the structure of sectors commands was quite similar, but the ambush groups were replaced by Omades Katadromon Tifakioforon (OKT) [Shotgun ranger groups] that consisted of 4-5 men equipped with shotguns, hand-grenades, mines, and sometimes with light automatic weapons; they undertook a variety of secondary, general-purpose missions. To face Turkish aggression against the Greek population, special anti-Turkish groups were formed as Omades Amynis (OA) [Defence groups], most of which did not possess any weapons and were armed with wooden sticks. Five of the thirteen countryside sectors included guerilla groups in their order of battle.

But probably the most hard-bitten combat groups were the antartikes omades [guerilla groups] operating in the mountains, composed mainly from EOKA members that were wanted by the security forces. These groups usually consisted of three to eight men and operated in seven sectors on the Troodos mountain range. Each guerilla group was assigned a specific mountain area of the sector for its operation, and was accommodated in guerilla hideouts covertly prepared in the mountain areas. Many of the mountain guerilla groups, planned and executed sabotages against military targets, daring ambushes of military columns, and provocative raids against police stations, causing great destruction and harassment to the colonial forces.

The unfolding of underground action

_Digenis_, after the outbreak and for the whole duration of EOKA operations, was neither in a position to predetermine the development of the confrontation, nor its final outcome. The unfolding of underground action, characterized by

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63 Digenis, _Guerilla Warfare_, pp. 69-70; Grivas, _Apomnemonevmata_, pp. 89-96.
61 Grivas, _Antartopolemos_, p. 47.
62 Grivas, _Chronikon_, pp. 161-166; Grivas, _Guerilla Warfare_, pp. 57-64.
dynamic waves of offensive strikes against the colonial authorities was dictated — almost depended — on political developments in Cyprus and the United Nations, rather than the military aspects of the campaign, and on the ambiguous assumption that the periodic military successes of EOKA would be politically exploited by Makarios and the Greek Government. Its operations were not based on a pre-planned schedule of action but rather on a month-by-month evaluation of underground operation and British counter-action. In spite of the fact that the British Army had undertaken extensive operations against EOKA and caused severe damage to the organization, mostly after treachery, it absolutely failed to ever undertake the military initiative of the campaign. Digenis ordered the interruption of underground operations in various instances: three times by a unilateral cease-fire — 16 August 1956, 14 March 1957, and 4 August 1958 — and a few other times by the temporary suspension of activities. The two main reasons for these interruptions, were the pressure exerted by the Greek Government on Grivas, in the form of ‘suggestions’, in order to facilitate the political dialogue, and the breath needed by EOKA to reorganize its combat groups, recruit new men, evaluate its action during the preceding period, and change its underground mode of action in adaptation to the political developments.

The patriotic resistance of EOKA against foreign domination, and the inability of the colonial government to contain effectively the underground campaign, turned very soon into a matter of prestige between the two opponents. Against Governor Harding’s boast that ‘the days of EOKA are numbered’, Grivas decided and managed ‘to transform the whole island into a battlefield’ causing extreme surprise and frustration to the British, who could not understand how a few hundred guerillas, saboteurs and ambushers, were able to compete and fight successfully against almost 40,000 men, amongst

64 Ibid., pp. 120-121, 165, 272.
66 Grivas, Memoirs, p. 60.
67 Ibid., p. 86.
them elite commandos and parachutists. The exile of Archbishop Makarios to the Seyhelles on 9 March 1956 caused the immediate reaction of Grivas who ordered *Agon mechr is eshaton* [Struggle until the bitter end]. He erroneously – as was proven in 1958 – believed that EOKA had nothing to loose and that it could fight unobstructed to the very bitter end. *Digenis* was so obsessed with his struggle against colonialism that was unable to see – clearly around him – the rise of nationalism in Turkey and the gradual ignition of Cypriot Turk reaction. Realizing, from the very beginning, the military difficulties and embarrassment of the colonial forces to contain effectively and suppress the crisis, Grivas took full military advantage of the situation. By changing continuously the tactics and methodology of the underground campaign – implementing the tactical objective of creating friction, damage and confusion to the opponent, utilizing unorthodox underground tactics based on surprise, deception and cunning, enforcing guerilla warfare in the mountains and the countryside and a covert conspiratorial fight in the towns – he managed to prevail in the military front. He based his military conception on a “void” in the battlefield, by cultivating the idea to the opponent that ‘we are everywhere, but he is unable to find us’.

**EOKA and its Cypriot Greek opponents**

Adding to the complicated geopolitical situation on the island, there were two controversial aspects in the relations and affairs of EOKA with the Greek community. Firstly, it was its involvement in an intra-communal confrontation against the communists; secondly, the appearance of internal intrigues within the organization and the abuse of EOKA membership against others as a means for solving personal differences.

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88 Grivas, *Apomnemonevmata*, p. 94
70 Grivas, *Guerilla Warfare*, p. 43.
The strong anti-communist feelings of Grivas and other leading members of the organization, along with the superficial anti-EOKA attitude of the communist leadership of Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou, sparked a controversial confrontation between EOKA and the communists, and opened a second -- intra-communal -- front, that had grave consequences. Grivas, a pure anti-communist who fought against the leftist armed groups during the Greek civil war, avoided from the beginning any communist involvement in EOKA, and considered that participation was an exclusive privilege of the ethnikofrones [nationally-inspired]. Suspicion rose from the first day, when AKEL issued a proclamation condemning EOKA action, naming its members 'thugs' and 'dynamidards', and its leader 'pseudo-Digenis'.

Passions rose a few weeks later when, in a radio broadcast, the leader of the Greek communist party Nikos Zachariades, publicly denounced EOKA and revealed the secret identity of its leader Digenis. Grivas initially avoided any counter-action against the communists, but deeply inside he was burning for retaliation. In a 1958 proclamation Digenis declared that 'We are not attacking communists; we are respecting their ideology, but we do not bear having our way, flooded with blood, blocked by those who refuse to spill even a drop, for our liberation from the British'. The confrontation between EOKA and AKEL turned sour when the organization murdered, between 1956 and 1958, nineteen members of AKEL and the leftist trade unions, and attempted the murder of thirteen other. Harassment spread to beating, mauling, and stabbing of many other leftists, some of whom died from the heavy punishment; all incidents were carried out in villages by 'unknown' masked-men. The reasoning of both sides was contradictory and conflicting.

71 Neos Demokratis, 2 April 1955, p. 1.
72 Grivas, Memoirs, p. 35.
73 Tromokratia, pp. 21-22; Archelion, ed. by Papageorgiou, pp. 221-272.
74 'Oi Adiorthotoi' [The incorrigible], EOKA proclamation, 31 August 1956, Archive of EOKA Combatants' Associations (AECA).
75 Michalis Poumbouris, Meras Dakimasias [Days of crucible], 2nd edn (Nicosia: [n. pub.], 1999), Appendix 7, pp. 166-176.
The organization openly accused AKEL and the leftists of treachery.\textsuperscript{76} Its argument included a variety of accusations such as leftist cooperation with the British, threats of revealing publicly the identities of EOKA men,\textsuperscript{77} the removal of the masks of EOKA men under the leftist slogan \textit{Kato e maskes} [Down the masks], the shadowing of EOKA movements by the AKEL vigilance groups-\textit{omades epagrypnisis}, the public denunciation of EOKA, even the refusal of the leftists to raise the Greek flag in their houses.\textsuperscript{79} On the other hand the leftists accused EOKA of anti-communist prejudice and that the political assassinations and harassment of leftists were part of EOKA’s campaign to extinguish any influence of AKEL in Cypriot political affairs and to secure the political monopoly of EOKA. They strongly refused the accusations of treachery and challenged the organization to investigate any rumors about leftist traitors in front of an independent enquiry committee.\textsuperscript{79} What is the truth in this ambiguous issue? EOKA, out of the nineteen murders of leftists, while accepted the responsibility for all of them, declared that only nine cases were ‘proven’ to be related with treachery, while the other ten cases, were simply victims of the EOKA-AKEL confrontation.\textsuperscript{80}

There are also strong indications that there were dubious internal intrigues within EOKA, amongst its members. On a few occasions, some of them, exploiting their status, even took revengeful action against innocent individuals on the pretext that they were collaborating with the British or simply for not being faithful to EOKA. The full scale of such personal rivalries cannot be determined, since the issue is controversial and considered, even today, a

\textsuperscript{76} ‘Idou Pioi Einaei’ [Here who they are], EOKA proclamation, 1958, AECA; ‘Prodotoi kai Lipofaktai Keroskopoi’ [Traitors and deserters opportunists], EOKA proclamation, date unknown, AECA.

\textsuperscript{77} ‘Oi Adiorthotoi’, EOKA proclamation, AECA.

\textsuperscript{78} ‘Oi Anemomiloi tou AKEL’ [The windmills of AKEL], EOKA proclamation, date unknown, AECA; \textit{Prodotes}, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{79} Proclamation of AKEL, 8 February 1958, in Poumbouris, \textit{Meres Dokimasias}, Appendix 2, pp.151-153.

\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Prodotes}, p. 13.
taboo. Nonetheless there are some notorious cases that remain unresolved: the mysterious disappearance and possible murder of EOKA member Christakis Demetriou, in December 1955; the cold-blooded murder of EOKA member Chrysanthos Mylonas and guerilla group leader Evagoras Papachristoforou by their comrade Michail Ashiotis in October 1957, who found refuge in Britain; the disappearance and murder of former Nicosia sector commander Giannakis Stephanides-Atinias at the end of 1958. It is strongly believed that his fate was dictated by a rivalry with Nicosia sector commander Polykarpos Giorkadjis-Kikeron.

The arbitrary abuse of underground power was not confined within the organization but in some instances spread into the innocent population. EOKA fighters themselves accept today that ‘it is possible that some mistakes did happen ... but the law of the struggle and the revolution excuses them’. Under this statement personal interests, individual antipathies, inner obsessions and complexes, and selfish motives, found various forms of expression by few, in the name of EOKA. Although Digenis strictly forbade such discrepancies, the chaos created by the underground campaign gave the opportunity for the arbitrary occurrence of such acts. While the EOKA violence against the communists had the approval of Digenis, there were many instances where the beating and harassment of communists was dictated by personal differences and the law of guns, rather than the orders of the organization. The execution by EOKA of leftist Neophytes Kleanthous on 13 October 1956 was attributed to malicious and unfounded information. Similar were the cases of the executed leftists Andreas Michaelides on 18 October 1956, Kyriakos Patatas on 6 May 1958, and Pieris Pistolas in 1957. In another instance an alleged member of

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92 Grivas, *Chronikon*, pp. 592-593.
93 Drousiotis, *EOKA*, pp. 133-147.
94 *Prodotes*, p. 7.
95 Ibid., p. 10.
96 Ibid., p. 11.
the organization accompanying a female foreign journalist, that was preparing an article on the organization, used his alleged EOKA status to sexually abuse his guest. When Grivas was informed about the atrocity he immediately ordered his execution. While it is expected that in an anti-colonial struggle most victims would be those related to colonialism — that is, soldiers, policemen, and government personnel — in the case of EOKA, peculiarly, most victims were Cypriots. In the period between 1 April 1955 and 15 November 1958, 393 people were killed while 1076 were wounded from the underground action of EOKA, excluding the victims of inter-communal violence. Among the dead were 104 British military personnel, 51 policemen, and 238 civilians, of whom 203 — 71.7% — were Cypriot Greeks.

The tactical triumph and strategic failure of EOKA

Between 1955 and 1959 there were thousands of incidents against the British colonial authorities on the whole island; ambushes, sabotages, shootings, bomb-throwing, vibrant student demonstrations, destruction of government property, stone battles against the police, executions of British agents and army personnel, and every other conceivable act of resistance. In 1956 alone there were 523 explosions of powerful bombs, 452 other explosions, 441 unexploded bombs, 15 massive strikes and 445 strikes by students and workers, 28 massive demonstrations and 201 illegal gatherings. The fatal casualties were: 60 military personnel, 24 policemen, and 112 civilians out of whom 94 were Greek.

Despite the severe ‘lawful’ measures taken by the Government of Cyprus, empowered by the State of Emergency, and the countless ‘illegal’ actions of the British Army and the security forces — the revengeful harassment of the population, the cruel interrogation of arrested members, the extensive

\[\text{Interview with Praxitelis Vogiazianos, } 23 \text{ May 2006.}\]

\[\text{Crouzet, } Le \text{ Conflict, vol. II, p. 555.}\]

\[\text{Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 137.}\]
confinement of thousands in concentration camps, the abusive collective fines, and abundant violations of Human Rights – EOKA remained operational and dangerous until the last day, when its leader Digenis ordered the termination of the underground campaign. There are four main factors that contributed to the tactical strength of EOKA. Probably the most crucial, was the competent, disciplined and imaginative command of its military leader, Colonel Georgios Grivas-Digenis. The strong personality, the decisive character, and the aggressive underground ingenuity of Digenis, left no pretensions to the local population about his intentions, and caused from the very beginning, great surprise and embarrassment to the British military. Similarly, the advanced guerilla tactics of unorthodox warfare utilized by Grivas led to the creation of ‘an invisible army’ that was almost impossible to discover and extremely difficult to combat. ‘This army was everywhere, in every village, spreading in the last corner of the island. It was everywhere but never revealed itself’. The main elements of his guerilla warfare conception were secrecy, surprise, flexibility, deception, cunning and courage. Another factor was the ethos and absolute dedication of most EOKA members towards the underground movement. The concept of Enosis became a precious virtue that inspired extremely hazardous operations against a dramatically superior opponent, and courageous acts of bravery, heroism and self-sacrifice. Finally, the extensive support of the local Greek population – a rough estimation would revolve around 70% – that embraced the organization with passion, and offered great help to the underground operations. The planning of a revolutionary movement, particularly of a guerilla warfare, does not have any chance of succeeding, no

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90 Grivas, Antartoplemonos, p. 20.
91 Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. vi.
92 There are no verified conclusions about the extend of EOKA support, but an arbitrary indication would revolve around 70%, taking into consideration that on the 13 December 1959 presidential election, Ioannis Clerides, supported by AKEL and those who were against the agreements (DEK and pro-Grivas supporters), won 33.13% of the votes.
matter how great the value of its leader is' Grivas believed, 'if it does not have the absolute and unreserved support of the population'.

While EOKA tactically triumphed in the battlefield against a much more powerful opponent, it failed strategically to achieve the national objective it was fighting for. The terminal outcome of the EOKA struggle was dramatically determined by various factors that involved three different parties; the Greek, the British and the Turkish.

The Greek responsibilities towards this strategic failure were immense and converged into a series of colossal mistakes and catastrophic mishandlings, before the outbreak (four strategic burdens inherited from the preparatory period, 1951-1955) and during the unfolding of the campaign. Firstly, the almost complete luck of proper understanding between the political and military leadership of the organization. The three most influential figures, Colonel Georgios Grivas-Digenis, Archbishop Makarios III-S.Haris and Greek Foreign Minister Evangelos Averof-Isaakios, despite the fact that, in theory, were supposed to defend the same strategic objective, careful examination of their secret correspondence reveals that, quite often, they pursued their own line, the three lines contradicting one another. As a result, the political leadership of EOKA (Makarios) and the Greek Government, failed completely to exploit the tactical successes of EOKA in the diplomatic front. Secondly, the dramatic deviation of strategic objectives between Greeks and Cypriot Greeks. While Athens initially surrendered to Cypriot demands and ‘accepted’ the responsibility to support the Cypriot cause in the United Nations, quite soon proved unable to pull the diplomatic lever to the very end. By autumn 1956, the Greek Government realized that its internal political stability, the effort for the development of its economy, and the fate of Hellenism in Turkey, were much more important than the issue of Cyprus. The strategic roads of Greek Cyprus

Grivas, Antartopoimatos, p. 21.

and Greece, started to diverge in June 1955, when Britain invited Greece and Turkey into a tripartite conference in London.

While Greek blunders never ceased, the other two parties involved, Britain and Turkey, took full advantage of the controversial relations between Cypriot Greeks and their motherland. The British contribution to this strategic failure revolved around two factors. Initially, the manipulative colonial doctrine of divide et impera; Britain, unwilling in the beginning and unable later to pay the high cost of confronting the Cypriot determination for Enosis, tried to safeguard her strategic interests by involving a third party. The British patronage of Turkish interest in the United Nations in 1954 and the introduction of Turkey in the Tripartite Conference in London in 1955, as a counter-balance to the Cypriot demands, were fundamental efforts destined to shift dramatically the fragile equilibrium on the island and the Eastern Mediterranean. Then, the introduction of partition-Taksim as a possible solution of the Cyprus issue. The infamous statement of Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alan Lenox-Boyd, on 19 December 1956 about partition became the second coup de grace, after the infamous 'never' of Hopkinson in 1954, skillfully disguised in June 1958 as the Macmillan Plan.96

The British inability to handle effectively the military situation in Cyprus, along with Greek hesitation to support decisively the political front of the underground campaign, created a 'void' that allowed the gradual infiltration of a third party into the crisis. Turkey, having nothing to lose, under the pretext of protecting the interests of Cypriot Turks, begun nursing her wrath. 'The prime mistake is yours' said Karamanlis to Prime Minister Macmillan. 'You have put the Turks to bark and now they start to bite; and thus it is difficult for you to pull them together. Who is responsible?' Eventually the British encouragement turned bitter when Turkey was unleashed to pursue her own strategic

objectives, growing into the most decisive factor for the settlement of the Cyprus question. The Turkish contribution towards the strategic failure of EOKA was founded on two main factors: Firstly, the aggressive intervention of the Adnan Menderes Government that revolved around indirect threats against Greece for the fate of Hellenism in Istanbul and Smyrna, the crude pressure against the British in their bold demand for Taksim, as well as the clandestine establishment of an underground armed organization in Cyprus by the Turkish armed forces. Secondly, the instrumental role of the extremely violent - but successful in its mission - Cypriot Turk underground movement (November 1957-August 1958), operating under the control of Rauf Denktash, against the Greek community.

Eventually, the fate of Cyprus was not determined by the military campaign, but by foreign geopolitical interests and diplomacy. Obviously it was not Greek or Cypriot Greek diplomacy. The Cypriot shortsightedness, the Greek diplomatic incompetence, the colonial manipulation, and the Turkish nationalist aggression, created a Gordian Knot, that led to the forced abandonment of Enosis, under the threat of Taksim, and to the establishment of a crippled Republic.
DIAGRAM 1
Operational Structure of EOKA in 1958

Foreign Minister Evangelos Averof (code name Isaakios)

Archbishop Makarios III (code name S. Haris)

General Consul Angelos Vlachos (code name Glafkos)

Consul A. Frydas (code name K. Xeros)

Colonel Georgios Grivas (code name Digenis)

DANE since 1957

PEKA since 1956

EAEM

LIAISON

propaganda

intelligence

supplies

(23 sectors / sub-sectors)

towns

mountain

countryside

SECTOR commander

SECTOR commander

SECTOR commander

ANE

PEKA

ANE

PEKA

ANE

PEKA

leaders

execution groups

ambush groups

EOX groups

guerilla groups

execution groups

sabotage groups

groups against the British

groups against the Turks

groups against the British

groups against the Turks

groups against the British

groups against the Turks
Chapter III

The rise of Pan-Turkist nationalism and the birth of the first Turkish underground movements in Cyprus

The abandonment of Turkish interest for Cyprus

The ambivalent geopolitical realignment in Southeastern Europe – after the end of the Balkan Wars, World War I and the Turkish War of Independence – as well as the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923, had significant implications on the destiny of Cyprus. Turkey not only recognized, under Article 20, the annexation of the island by Britain but renounced, under Article 16, all rights and claims on territories – including Cyprus – outside the frontiers defined by the Treaty.\(^1\) The abandonment of obsolete Ottomanism and the establishment of the modern Türkiye Cumhuriyeti [Republic of Turkey] by Mustafa Kemal- Atatürk [father of the Turks], accompanied by radical political, social and cultural reforms as well as the adoption of a progressive foreign policy under the Kemalist doctrine of Yurtta Sulh, Cihanda Sulh [peace at home, peace in the world], dissuaded, for many decades, any interest for the geopolitical position and the internal affairs of the British colony. The statement of Foreign Minister Necmeddin Sadak in the Parliament on 23 January 1950, immediately after the plebiscite in Cyprus, that "there is no such affair as Cyprus Issue\(^2\)" was characteristic of Turkish foreign policy over Cyprus.

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\(^1\) Treaty of Peace with Turkey and other Instruments Signed at Lausanne on July 24 1923, Cmd. 1929 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1923), pp. 21-23.

But this indifference was not meant to be eternal. The political agitation for *Enosis*, by the Ethnarchy of Cyprus, gradually began to attract Turkish attention; the statement of Foreign Minister Fuat Koprulu a year later, was indicative of Turkish sensitivity:

*Because of geographical importance and our historical relations with the Turkish population on the island, we are closely interested in the situation in Cyprus. We do not see any reason to be concerned that the legal status of the island would change. But if it ever changes, we shall not allow this to be done without us, in a way that is contrary to our rights.*

Ironically, it was not the Turkish Government that would exasperate Turkish interest in Cyprus in the following years; it was the unfortunate Greek diplomatic maneuvers, the covert incitement of the Turkish factor by the colonial power, and the emergence of acute *Pan-Turkism* in Turkish public opinion. Eventually, the Turkish Government could not resist manipulating these elements — in pursue of her own expansionist strategic interests — to penetrate deep into the heart of the Cyprus question, overturning both the colonial strategic planning and the Idealist Greek national aspirations.

**The emergence of Kibris Turktur, the covert colonial incitement, and the provocative interference of the Turkish Government**

The nationalist ideology of *Turkcuiuk* [Pan-Turkism] — that sought the cultural and physical union ‘among all peoples of proven or alleged Turkic origins’ particularly of ‘Outside Turks’ — and the irredentism attached to it, provided, in 1954, the catalyst for the awakening of public opinion and the rise of mass nationalism in Turkey; consequently, the re-emergence of Turkish strategic interest for Cyprus, which had been one of the pet issues of Pan-Turkists in

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Turkey since the end of the Second World War.\(^6\) Turkish unrest over Cyprus started to appear in the beginning of 1954 when the *Milli Türk Talebe Federasyonu* (MTTF) [National Turkish student federation] held meetings concerning Cyprus and issued leaflets of acute nationalist content.\(^7\) The Greek inscription of the Cyprus question in the United Nations brought the immediate reaction of nationalist circles in Turkey, and on 24 August 1954, the *Kibris Turk tur Komitesi* (KTK) [Cyprus is Turkish committee] was born, the executive council of which consisted of nationalist MTTF members and newspaper editors.\(^8\) The main objectives of the new organization were to influence world public opinion that Cyprus was Turkish, to defend Turkish rights regarding Cyprus, and to condition Turkish public opinion. At the same time the inflammatory articles and anti-Greek editorials that began appearing in the Istanbul papers *Hurriyet*, *Istanbul Ekspres*, *Vatan*, and the Ankara *Zafer*, created an unreasonably explosive atmosphere for Cyprus.\(^9\) On 2 October 1954, the organization acquired legal status under the name *Kibris Turktur Cemiyeti* (KTC) [Cyprus is Turkish society]. Ultranationalist advocate and *Hurriyet* editor Hikmet Bili became its president, discharged army officer and *Zafer* correspondent Kamil Onal became general secretary and the main provocateur of the organization, while publisher and *Vatan* editor Ahmed Emin appeared as the third most influential figure.\(^10\)


\(^9\) Ioannides, *Turkey's Image*, p. 78.

\(^10\) Ibid., pp. 83-87.
Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes — under intense British pressure to strengthen Turkish involvement in Cyprus¹¹— realizing the vast potential offered by the nationalist activism of KTC, made his government a ‘silent partner’ of the organization, that eventually turned out to be a dispensable instrument in the hands of the *Demokrat Parti* (DP) [Democratic party], after the completion of its catastrophic mission in September 1955.¹² The three components of KCT — the press, the students, and the labor unions — intermingled and strengthened by the vast DP network, grew, in almost a year, into an influential hard-line organization of eighteen branches in Istanbul, and another 118 in Turkey and Cyprus, with more than 200,000 members.¹³ The inflammable mixture of Pan-Turkist nationalism, skillfully manipulated by the Menderes regime for the implementation of its new aggressive policy over Cyprus — ‘the Cypriot diversion’¹⁴— became an effective antidote to the severe internal economic problems and to the discontent of the opposition.

In the United Nations, Britain — unable to respond effectively against the Greek appeal — used Turkey as an invaluable ally for the defense of her case against self-determination. While the formal Turkish position was the continuation of British rule over Cyprus, the British Foreign Minister, during the visit of the Cypriot Turk representatives in London, declared that ‘it is a shame in our times to ask for the continuation of colonialism’ and advised them ‘to request the return of Cyprus to her old owner’.¹⁵ Selim Sarper, the Turkish Ambassador to the UN, was eventually obliged — although he was not authorized — to adopt the manipulative British maneuver that ‘if Britain will withdraw from Cyprus, then the island must be returned to its former

¹³ Ibid., p. 51; Hikmet Bil, *Kibris Olayi ve Ic Yuzu* [The Cyprus incidents and the inner connection] (Istanbul: [n. pub], 1976), p. 89.
¹⁴ Holland, *Britain and the Revolt*, p. 266.
¹⁵ Excerpt from the Faiz Kaymak memoirs, in Tahsin, *Anodos*, pp. 204-211.
occupant'. While in September 1954 the inscription of the Cyprus issue by Greece was for British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd an 'interference in a matter of domestic jurisdiction', in July 1955, Prime Minister Anthony Eden unexpectedly invited Greece and Turkey for discussions 'on political and defense questions which affect the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus'.

The colonial planning – based on the doctrine of divide et impera – to introduce a third party, as a political counterbalance against the Greek demand for self-determination, soon collapsed; the Turkish Government of Adnan Menderes, initially playing the British game, vigorously started to depart from the colonial line in pursuit of her own strategic objectives. A malicious rumor spread by Dr Kutchuk – originally contained in a letter to Hikmet Bil on 13 August 1955 – about an alleged massacre of the Cypriot Turks on 28 August, initiated a vast disinformation campaign by the KTC network that spread immediately through the press to the ethnic Turkish masses. On 24 August, Menderes himself did not avoid intensifying the inflammable content of the rumor. While the misinformation was proven completely false, it served adequately its purpose in exasperating anti-Greek feelings. On 6 September 1955, the detonation of a fuse – imported secretly from Turkey by Oktay Engin, and planted by consular employee Hasan Ucar – in the consular complex in Thessaloniki against the alleged house of Atatürk, turned out to be the signal for the outbreak of a devastating pre-planned catastrophe. In just nine hours, the synchronized and pre-orchestrated attacks of infuriated crowds, armed with implements, against Greek quarters and neighborhoods in Istanbul and Izmir, created immense destructions, that cost the lives of at least thirty-seven Greeks, the serious injury of many others, and the rape of an undisclosed number of women. 4214 Greek shops and 1004 houses were destroyed, 73

18 The Times, 1 July 1955, p. 10.
19 ioannides, Turkey's Image, pp. 102-110; Vryonis, Mechanism, pp. 82-93.
20 Vryonis, Mechanism, pp. 93-95; ioannides, Turkey's Image, pp. 110-113.
21 Vryonis, Mechanism, Appendix B, pp. 581-582.
Greek Orthodox churches were destroyed or burned and two Greek cemeteries were desecrated.\textsuperscript{22} The full responsibility of the Turkish Government for planning the Turkish pogrom, and the involvement of KTC and of DP, were fully disclosed in the following years – during the courts-martial administered by General Aknoz in 1956, and the eleven-month Yassiada Trials of 1960-1961 – where former government officials Menderes, Zorlu and Polatkan were found guilty for violating the constitution and were subsequently hanged, while many of their associates were sentenced to life imprisonment or given various prison terms.\textsuperscript{23}

The Turkish pogrom of 6/7 September 1955 against the affluent Greek communities of Istanbul and Izmir brought the material and psychological destruction of Hellenic presence in Turkey, deeply traumatized Greek conscience and national pride, and touched the Greek Achilles heel. The Tripartite Conference in London\textsuperscript{24} ended ingloriously with Greece recognizing the new British position, that Turkey was a formally interested party. The frozen reaction of the Greek government after such a monumental catastrophe was indicative of the new regional realities: Turkey ceased to follow the British diplomatic directives over Cyprus and entered a period of aggressive, nothing-to-lose foreign policy; Greece, realizing that the Greek community in Turkey turned into a hostage of the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus, started to abandon its theoretically strong supporting role towards the anti-colonial campaign of EOKA; Britain realized that the Cyprus solution had to pass through Ankara.

\textsuperscript{22} Dilek Guven, \textit{6-7 Eylül 1955 Olayları} [The 6-7 September 1955 Incidents] (İstanbul: İletişim Yayinlari, 2006), p. 220.
\textsuperscript{23} Vryonis, \textit{Mechanism}, pp. 523-530.
The Turkish role in the Cyprus Police

The outbreak of the EOKA campaign caught the colonial Government of Cyprus unaware and unable to cope effectively with the internal crisis. When the administration realized that the underground campaign was unfolding in unpredictable ways, it decided to reinforce the Cyprus Police by the massive recruitment of Cypriot Turks.²⁵ Theoretically, the practical need to strengthen the security forces was logically turned towards non-Greeks. Politically, the indirect introduction of Turks into the conflict served as a buffer, between EOKA and the colonial regime, absorbing part of the fatal blows that sooner or later would inflict Turkish reaction.

The establishment of the Cyprus Police Mobile Reserve on 20 September 1955 – an all-Turk force under the command of a small number of expatriate officers who were assigned key positions in its paramilitary structure – the members of which were known to the Turkish community as the Komandolar [commandoes] was meant to dramatically change the internal security situation on the island. Not by its 'lawful' police action, but rather as an instrument of counter-violence against EOKA and the Greek population, both of which experienced an unprecedented harassment by its provocative actions. Beyond its main anti-riot duties, the Mobile Reserve became the operational reserve striking force of the Cyprus Police against EOKA, participating in mountainous anti-guerilla operations – sixteen of its men were trained as mountain trackers,²⁷ in the horrific interrogation of EOKA suspects for the extraction of information, in the destruction of Greek property during searches, and many other, exclusively anti-Greek, duties. The demand for its units was so great that the 1955 planning for a composition of nine units proved inadequate;²⁸ the initial strength of 170 men in 1955, grew in the following year

²⁵ Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 98.
²⁶ Times of Cyprus, 18 October 1955, p. 1.
to 569 men.\textsuperscript{23} By the end of 1957, the Mobile Reserve numbered 580 men, comprised of 12 units of 30-35 men; three units were held at police headquarters while the other nine were posted at police divisions. Each unit was operationally independent and consisted of five sections under the command of a Gazette officer or an Inspector.\textsuperscript{30}

Similarly, an emergency Cyprus Auxiliary Police (CAP)\textsuperscript{35} was established on 1 August 1955, the members of which were assigned guard, patrol and paramilitary duties in order to relieve the Cyprus Police to other more important security assignments.\textsuperscript{32} The temporary auxiliaries were given the same salaries as regular policemen, and became another critical pole of attracting more Turks to the security forces. The strength of the emergency CAP in 1955 was 1084 men while in 1956 its manpower rose to 1417,\textsuperscript{33} reaching 1594 men in 1958.\textsuperscript{34} The enlistment of men in the CAP lasted for the whole duration of the emergency while, not surprisingly, its racial composition revolved around 96\textendash{}100\% for the Turks and 4\textendash{}0\% for the Greeks. Additionally, the Cyprus Special Constabulary (CSC)\textsuperscript{36} established in the six main towns in January 1953, was reorganized in 1955 and its strength increased considerably with more Turks
and a few British; its 1955 manpower of 750 men rose to 1595 in 1956 and declined to 560 by 1957.\textsuperscript{38}

A similar phenomenon appeared in the composition of the Cyprus Police. The 1954 strength of 1397 men, rose to 1838 men in 1955, 2417 men in 1956, 2692 men in 1957, and reached its apex in 1958 with 3014 men;\textsuperscript{39} the ethnic composition of the force in 1958 was indicative of the internal racial politics within the Cyprus Police: 47% Turks (population 18%), 31% Greeks (population 80%), 21% expatriates, 1% Armenians and Maronites.\textsuperscript{38} The need — real or intentional — to strengthen the security forces through the massive recruitment of Turks into the regular and emergency forces was encouraged by the shrinking of educational and basic entrance requirements. The condition for the \textit{Mobile Reserve} recruits was to be 'literate with ability to read and write Turkish or Greek' while for the auxiliaries the educational requirement was none\textsuperscript{39} A great number of them were proven unfit for security duties, many being convicted for various criminal offences ranging from homicide and attempted murder to theft, while numerous others were discharged from the police force.\textsuperscript{40} The Greek complaints for the immediate dismantling of the \textit{CAP} and the \textit{Mobile Reserve} and disarm of Turkish policemen were continuous but as expected, without any result.\textsuperscript{41} The almost non-existent requirements and the high salaries offered — almost double than the average salaries earned with difficulty by uneducated and poor workers — made a great difference for the Turks; 'it was better to be a policeman than a shepherd'.\textsuperscript{42} The illusion of

\begin{thebibliography}{40}
\bibitem{36} \textit{Annual Report on the Cyprus Police 1956}, pp. 26-27, CPAL; \textit{Annual Report on the Cyprus Police 1957}, pp. 24-25, CPAL.
\bibitem{37} \textit{Annual Report on the Cyprus Police Force for the Year 1958}, ed. by John E. S. Browne (Nicosia: Police Force Headquarters, 1959), p. 6, CPAL.
\bibitem{38} \textit{Annual Report on the Cyprus Police 1958}, p. 8, CPAL.
\bibitem{39} Weekly Order No. 8 of 24 February 1956, \textit{Cyprus Police Weekly Orders 1956 (Part I)}, CPAL.
\bibitem{41} \textit{Times of Cyprus}, 31 May 1956, p. 6.
\bibitem{42} Personal interview with Kamil Tuncel, 25 February 2006.
\end{thebibliography}
temporary power and financial comfort gradually changed their behavior towards the Greeks; while in the beginning their attitude was rather reserved, it later became hostile and abusive,\(^43\) culminating by 1958 in raw hatred.

But most importantly, the Turks of the security forces infiltrated into the Turkish underground organizations, either as active members or in auxiliary duties. According to Grivas, Turkish policemen were providing arms training in Turkish villages in the Nicosia district, while EOKA information indicated that the British had informally given the green light for the execution of Greek policemen by Turkish members of the security forces, the murders of whom would be debited to EOKA.\(^44\) Underground execution teams composed of Turkish policemen were allegedly organized in the Nicosia area under the direction of British sergeant Willard and the command of Turkish policeman Tahsin Ali Riza for the indiscriminate attack against Greeks, such as the Heracleous family in Palouriotissa, Andreas Ashiotis in Famagusta, and many others.\(^45\) According to EOKA information, discharged or active police members such as officers Kasim and Nihat of Lefka police station, and corporal Enis and British constable Macloud, went to Turkey for secret training on 14 May and 20 May 1957 respectively.\(^46\) Under the cover of their police identity, Turkish members of the security forces, such as Turgut Ozkaloglu in Nicosia,\(^47\) Ahmet Bahic, Ibrahim Davulcu,\(^48\) Selcuk, who had his own underground group in Sackaria, and Rasit, who kept underground groups in Nicosia, Famagusta, and Vatyli,\(^49\) offered invaluable services to the Turkish underground organizations.\(^50\)


\(^{44}\) Grivas, *Apomnemonevmata*, p. 51.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., p. 149.

\(^{46}\) Ibid., p. 188.

\(^{47}\) *Halkin Sesi*, 7 August 1997, p. 4.


\(^{49}\) Personal interview with A.A., 16 May 2007.

\(^{50}\) Personal interview with A.A., 18 March 2006.
EOKA and the Turks, the first attacks against the police

The operational conception of Grivas for the Turkish element was straightforward; he was so focused against the colonial rulers that the existence of the minority offered — he arbitrarily considered — no obstacle in his underground plans. For this purpose, he had given strict orders to his sector commanders that there would be no direct attack or any intimidation against the members or the property of the Turkish community. A directive that he kept with devotion until the bitter summer of 1958, when the indiscriminate Turkish attacks against innocent Greeks, led — after a four-week hesitation — to the retaliation of EOKA.

A controversial exception to this policy — with intricate consequences — appeared from the very beginning, when EOKA began its intimidation campaign against the police. The objective of Grivas — in preparing the ground for the operations of the guerilla groups — was to terrorize the police and cause the paralysis of its command in order to attract the involvement of the British Army in security tasks and cause the dispersion of its forces. For this purpose he issued a strict warning to the police: 'Do not try to stand against us because your blood will be spilled, without you being able to obstruct our objectives ... I have ordered: Anyone providing resistance against the Cypriot patriots will be executed.' His action plan consisted of forceful attacks against police stations and patrols, as well as executions of suspected policemen collaborating with the colonial administration against the organization.

51 There is not a single indication in the works of Grivas — *Apomnemonevmata*, *Chronikon* and *Antartopolemos* — which suggest that he ever considered any threat or made any planning against the minority, either during the preparatory period or the first years of the campaign.
52 Personal interviews with former EOKA sector commanders: Thasos Sophocleous, 25 October 2006; Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006; Gregoris Gregoras, 20 March 2006.
21 June 1955, was a conspicuous turning point for the EOKA struggle; Digenis – wrote in his diary – ordered Melas 'to strike indiscriminately against traitor policemen, Greeks or Turks'. He was so passionate about the action against the colonial administration, that he was unable to foresee the consequences of his order. On the same day, several Turkish Cypriot policemen were slightly injured – it was the first attack involving Turkish members of the security forces – and a Greek passer-by was killed, when an EOKA time bomb exploded outside the Nicosia Divisional Police Headquarters. The incident caused the furious reaction of Cypriot Turk leader Dr Fazil Kutchuk who sent telegrams to the Prime Ministers of Britain and Turkey, and to Governor Armitage, protesting that 'extremist Greek elements have attacked our right of existence, and the blood of fourteen innocent Turks has been shed. We demand a guarantee of our security, our life and our property, and the termination of this situation'. He then asked prophetically: 'Is the Government expecting that the Turkish community will take measures for the defence of its life and property? The Turkish casualties shocked the minority and daily Bozkurt clarified that 'the Turkish community will not sit with folded arms ... but will certainly take drastic measures'. A critical question arose. Would the outcome of the Greek campaign have been different if Digenis concentrated his attacks exclusively against British policemen and Greek 'traitors' in the police force? Most probably not. Turkey had already penetrated deep into the heart of the Cyprus question, and the Cypriot Turks began their own underground preparations (Diagram 3) to defend the new Kibris Turk tur policy; its first victim was 21-year old Fikret Mehmet, killed accidentally on 18 April 1955 when he was secretly negotiating the purchase of a revolver.

55 Grivas diary (21 June 1955), Tromokratia, p. 27.
57 Bozkurt editorial translated in The Times of Cyprus, 28 June 1955, p. 5.
58 Dr Kutchuk's Kibris Milli Turk Birgisi (KMTB) party changed its name on 24 July 1955 into Kibris Turk tur Partisi (KTP) after a party congress in the presence of Hikmet Bil and Kamil Onel.
The first Cypriot Turk underground movement appeared six weeks after the beginning of the EOKA campaign, in the middle of May 1955, under the name KITEMB, that, according to Ahmet An, means Kibris İlk Türk EOKA'ya Mukavemet Birliği [Cyprus Turk initial resistance union against EOKA], or just Kibris Türk EOKA'ya Mukavemet Birliği [Cyprus Turk resistance union against EOKA]. The life of the organization was very short— from May to September 1955—and its existence became known from a few leaflets and threatening letters that were circulated or mailed in three Cypriot towns (Nicosia, Limassol and Paphos) and London. Although there are no accurate indications about its leader, Dr Kutchuk appeared to had some involvement and knowledge of its operation. His clinic in 172 Kyrenia Avenue in Nicosia probably served as the center of the group, where Dr Kutchuk allegedly swore trusted individuals as members of the organization in front of a small Turkish flag.

KITEMB’s operation was passive—an ideological reaction to Enosis rather than an armed response against EOKA—and focused on the exchange of written threats with the Greek organization. Its first public appearance was made on 14 May 1955, when Reuters reported that Themistoklis Dervis, the Greek Mayor of Nicosia, received a letter, written in Turkish and signed by KITEMB, that threatened to ‘kill the mayor and his friend the Nicosia district commissioner’, and that it would ‘settle the accounts with Archbishop Makarios as well’. Four days later, in his editorial entitled ‘Lie and Deceive’, Dr Kutchuk

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61 Personal interview with researcher Hasan Demirag, 5 September 2008.
claimed that the alleged organization was a Cypriot Greek plot to harm the relations between the two communities. 65

On the night of 29/30 June 1955, a number of leaflets written in the Turkish language were found in Limassol, some of which were posted on walls, calling the Turkish youth to help KITEMB combat EOKA and Enosis. On the night of 1/2 July 1955 more KITEMB leaflets, typed in the Turkish language, were found in the streets of old Famagusta, that announced the formation of a secret organization to fight against EOKA and invited the Turkish youth to join. Similar leaflets were distributed and posted on walls in Nicosia, some of which were typed while others were handwritten. The next move appeared on 4 July 1955, allegedly coming from EOKA which sent a threatening letter, handwritten in Greek with red ink, to Turkish leader Dr Kutchuk. The letter stated that EOKA learned that the Turkish national party had recently formed an organization named KITEMB, and gave the advice that the Turks 'should not stand against our sacred struggle and should be advised to sit quiet'. 'In case the Turks continue their actions they will get what they deserve'. The letter warned Dr Kutchuk that if the directives are not followed, 'you will be the first victim, and if needed you will be accompanied by his excellency the Governor Sir Robert Armitage'.

On the same day, EOKA circulated a proclamation in the Turkish language, reassuring the Turks of Cyprus that its struggle was focused against the colonial rulers and not against the Turkish community. The proclamation clearly stated that 'our intentions for the Turkish inhabitants of the island are pure and friendly'. 'We perceive the Turks as honest friends and allies, and as far as we are concerned, we are not going to endure any provocation against

66 Hursoz, 29 June 1955, p.1; Eleftheria, 1 July 1955, p.1; Grivas, Apomnemonevmeta, p. 51.
67 Hursoz, 3 July 1955, p.1; Times of Cyprus, 3 July 1955, p.1; Halkin Sesi, 5 July 1955, p. 3.
68 Bozkurt, 4 July 1955, p. 4.
the life, dignity, honor and property' of the Turkish community. There was an immediate reply – 6 July 1955 – from KITEMB, which issued a two-page proclamation in English entitled 'Why No Enosis', where it was alleged that Cyprus had never been Greek and that Greece was not its motherland. The organization asked for the deportation of Greek teachers, the distinction between the Greek Church and politics, the prohibition of raising Greek flags in the churches, and the indefinite rule of Cyprus by Great Britain.

Later in July, a threatening letter was sent by KITEMB to a [Turkish] police sergeant, while on 8 September 1955, Zenon Rossides, the Cypriot adviser of the Ethnarchy in London, received a blood-stained threatening letter from KITEMB, posted from central London, that carried the warning: 'If you love your life, stop the folly for Cyprus'. Eventually the organization silently disappeared, probably because of its detection by EOKA, obliging Dr Kutchuk to establish a new underground organization under another name.

Threats for the eruption of the Volcano

The campaign for the intimidation of the police continued indiscriminately; during a guerilla raid against Amiandos Police Station, on 22 June, EOKA killed the first member of the police force, Greek PS (Police Sergeant) Ioannis Demosthenous. The second police fatality was another Greek PS Costas Costopoulos executed by EOKA in Famagusta on 12 August, followed by the execution of Greek PC (Police Constable) Herodotos Poullis on 28 August in

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70 Eleftheria, 5 July 1955, p. 1; Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 52.
71 Eleftheria, 7 July 1955, p. 1; Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, pp. 51-52.
72 Haikin Sesi, 23 July 1955, p. 3.
73 Eleftheria, 10 September 1955, p. 1; Hursoz, 11 September 1955, p. 3; Haikin Sesi, 11 September 1955, p. 3.
74 Altay Sayil in Gazloglu, Direnis Orgutleri, p. 3.
76 Eleftheria, 12 August 1955, p. 1.
Nicosia, the execution of Greek PC Nicolas Panayi on 5 October in Famagusta, and the fatal wounding of Greek PC Panayiotis Constantinou in an ambush against the security forces on 5 December 1955.

In its violent attacks, EOKA did not distinguish race or nationality among its victims; during its four-year operation, many innocent Greek civilians were killed as a result of its actions, such as Kyriakos Kyprianou, and Ioakim Panayi, while hundreds of others were injured. In this cyclone of patriotic enthusiasm and violence against the colonial authorities, Digenis, and consequently his sector commanders and combat group leaders, were not interested to discriminate the civilians from the security forces, or the Greeks from the Turks. While the operational principles of EOKA did not include attacks against the minority, the organization failed to protect the lives of innocent Cypriots, Greek or Turk. The first injuries among Turkish policemen and innocent Turkish civilians, caused great concern within the minority, and offered the excuse – or the need – for the formation of a respective underground organization that would undertake the mission to protect the minority from indiscriminate EOKA action.

In the middle of August 1955 – while KITEMB appeared to be still in operation – a new Turkish organization named VOLKAN [volcano] emerged, which warned that ‘for every Turk killed, four EOKA members will be killed’ in retaliation. On 9 September, another proclamation distributed in Nicosia, declared that the organization will avoid any bloody clashes between the two communities, ‘but if they touch a Turk, be it policeman, government official or civilian, we will not hesitate to take immediate strong action’. The leaflet affirmed that VOLKAN was established to protect the life, honour and property
of the Turkish community. On 12 October, a new proclamation addressed to Sir John Harding, the new Governor of Cyprus, stated that the 'British colonialists sooner or later will abandon the island ... no other flag will be streaming other than the Turkish. This island which was never Greek, will never become Greek as long as the children of bozkurt [gray wolf] live."

The unexpected appearance of the new Turkish organization and the threatening tone of its proclamations surprised the Greek community, while rumours began spreading in the Greek press and Athens Radio that VOLKAN was organized and directed by the British. In one of its proclamations, EOKA even threatened that it would execute 'Mr Roe', the alleged British leader of VOLKAN. Even Rauf Denktash implied later -- causing strong reaction among former members -- that VOLKAN was established by the British, and accused those 'who had served the British during that period' that they 'had received their compensation and left' to Britain. Denktash's mistrust was born when he learned that Hussein Selcuk -- the deputy leader of VOLKAN -- was teaching Turkish language lessons to the British director of the Public Information Office. 'From that day a suspicion rose in my mind. I suspected that our organization was established by the British themselves.'

VOLKAN, through the patriotic content of its proclamations under the slogan Her Turk Bir Volkandir [Every Turk is a volcano], gradually developed into a symbol-concept of hope and resistance within the Turkish community, helping the people to keep their morale high. On 17 November, a VOLKAN

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84 Hursoz, 13 October 1955, p. 1.
85 Halkin Sesi, 25 September 1955, p. 3.
88 Rauf Denktash in Gurkan, Zirvedeki Yalnizlik Kulesi, p. 122.
89 Ibid., p. 121.
90 Halkin Sesi, 2 July 1997, p. 4.
91 Personal Interview with Hasan Demirag, 5 September 2006.
warning was addressed to the Governor: 'We will never, and in no way, allow the Turkish Cyprus to become Greek. Do not forget that next to us are twenty five million Mehmetcik [soldiers]. If you feel unable to rule Cyprus, then deliver the island an hour earlier to its real owner, Turkey'.\(^5\) Other leaflets scattered in Nicosia on 3 December 1955 defined clearly the political ideology of the organization:

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\text{We come from a race that knows how to fight and die fighting.}^3 \text{ We do not have any intention to spill blood in our hands, but we, the Turks of Cyprus, who have the noble blood of the Great Turkish Nation ... we have only one reply to those who aim to drive us into slavery: Ya Olum Ya Istiklal [Death or Independence]! O! You noble children of the Great Turkish Nation! ... The days of the national struggle are approaching. Be ready!}^4
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In 1955, VOLKAN action was limited to verbal threats, but the situation began to change when Turkish APC (Auxiliary Police Constable) Ibrahim Muhsin 'accidentally' shot and wounded two Greek children at Kilani village. In retaliation, EOKA shot and wounded Muhsin,\(^6\) while on 17 December, it wounded Turkish APC Fahri Osman.\(^6\) VOLKAN, in a proclamation distributed in Nicosia on 20 December 1955, announced that 'after an explicit decision of its Executive Committee' the organization would execute retaliatory actions and informed 'our esteemed people that the time has come for cooperation with the [colonial] government for the extinction of these dogs'.\(^7\)

The leading decision-making nucleus of VOLKAN - the alleged 'Executive Committee' - consisted of three men; carpenter Sakir Ozel, an acquaintance of Dr Kutchuk, and teacher Hussein Selcuk, were the operational leaders of the organization, under the political guidance and influence of Dr Kutchuk. The close relation between the leader Sakir Ozel and Dr Kutchuk, was

\(^{53}\) Halkin Sesli, 18 November 1955, p. 1.
\(^{53}\) Times of Cyprus, 4 December 1955, p. 1.
\(^{54}\) Halkin Sesli, 4 December 1955, p. 1.
\(^{54}\) Eleftheria, 4 December 1955, p. 1.
\(^{55}\) Eleftheria, 7 December 1955, p. 1.
\(^{56}\) Eleftheria, 18 December 1955, p. 5.
not coincidental in the control of the organization, since quite often it was the
Turkish leader that was giving the political directions for the termination of the
VOLKAN agitation. The main operational nucleus of the organization was in
Nicosia, composed of men like Kemal Mison, the bomb-maker of VOLKAN,
Yekta Remzi, Hasan Skordo, Topal Mahmut (Buyuk), Ismail Sadikoglu, Kasap
Ahmet, Ulus Ulfet, and Ismail Beyoglu. The role of Turkish members of the
security forces, such as Turgut Ozkaloglu – an APC and bodyguard of a British
public prosecutor who used the service car to carry out operations for the
organization – was instrumental in the underground operations of the
organization. Grivas wrote that many young men of VOLKAN were recruited in
the CAP and the Mobile Reserve, which became the 'mastix' [scourge] of
Cyprus; Turkish members of the force were used as torturers of EOKA
suspects during interrogation, and as collaborators and guides of the British
Army in searches and destruction of Greek property.

According to Kemal Tanrisevdi, Turkish members of the security forces, under the influence of their
British superior officers, encouraged the Turkish youth to trust VOLKAN.

While most members of EOKA – whose occupational background
ranged from university graduates (pharmacists, doctors, high-school teachers,
agriculturalists, and other professionals) to secondary education students,
villagers, clerks, workers or employees – were everyday men and women that
entered the organization to contribute towards the collective national Cypriot
Greek effort for Enosis, membership in the Turkish organization was rather
different. The hard core of VOLKAN consisted of men well-known to the
nightlife of the island, a few of its members were involved in black market
transactions, gambling, and underworld activities – as well as physically strong
men. On the contrary the Greek members of the underworld not only did not

50 Personal interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006.
52 Altay Sayil in Halkin Sesi, 7 August 1997, p. 4.
53 Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 96.
54 Interview to Neiman Cahit in Ortam, 29 May 1997, p. 9.
support the anti-colonial struggle, but often turned into collaborators of the British, such as the notorious Zacharias family from Ipsonas village, while some of them were executed by EOKA as a precautionary measure.\footnote{Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 91.}

VOLKAN had neither a definite underground structure nor organized combat groups as EOKA; it was rather an emergency underground organization that was responding spasmodically against EOKA activities. The nucleus of the organization was in Nicosia, but progressively it spread to the Turkish quarters of other towns, in Famagusta and Limassol, as well as to main Turkish villages such as Lefka and Louroudjina. The Turkish organization did not possess its own armory, and the handguns used in its operations were all personal weapons that belonged to its members. The meetings between the members of the organization were held at Sakir Ozel’s shop at Abdi Cavus street in Nicosia, while some of its leading members frequented in Chelynkayia football club for gambling.

While 1955 passed with wounded Turkish policemen and accidentally injured Turkish civilians, the execution of PS Abdullah Ali Riza in Ktima by EOKA, on 11 January 1956 – the first Turkish fatality – caused the immediate appeal of Dr Kutchuk to Archbishop Makarios, for the denunciation of the murder, who indifferently avoided to reply. On the same day, hundreds of Turkish youths – some armed with knives, shouting ‘VOLKAN’, ‘We shall avenge Abdullah’s death’ – entered, for the first time, the Greek quarters of Tahtakalas and Chrysalinictissa in Nicosia, breaking windows and stoning Greek shops, houses and cars.\footnote{Times of Cyprus, 12 January 1956, pp. 1, 5-6.} VOLKAN supported the riot with explosions of bombs against Greek premises near Ataturk Square, the heart of the Turkish quarter in Nicosia,\footnote{Cyprus Mail, 13 January 1956, p. 1.} and a few noisy explosions in the Turkish quarter, that, according to Grivas, ‘were intended to fanaticize the Turkish mob’ against the Greeks.\footnote{Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 91.}

\footnote{Personal interview with A.A., 9 June 2006.}
On 19 March, a serious inter-communal clash in the mixed village of Vasilia caused by Greeks after a feast, ended with sixteen Turks and three Greeks injured, and the destruction of property in the Greek quarter of Nicosia 'while the police, the majority of whom are Turks, looked on passively'. Speaking to foreign correspondents, Dr Kutchuk warned that if there was no end to the Greek outbreaks, the 'knives and daggers of Turks will be the decisive factor'. In April, the killing of Turkish PC Nihat Vasili by EOKA, as well as of Turkish worker Djafer Ferhat at the Adarth tobacco factory, caused serious clashes between the two communities. Following the pattern of the two previous demonstrations, outraged crowds smashed windows and furniture, and stoned Greek shops and houses in the Greek quarter of Nicosia. But the new retaliatory element introduced by VOLKAN was arson; five fires broke out simultaneously in a Greek timber yard and other premises, while on the following day, the riots continued with nine more fires burning Greek property and causing extensive damage.

Digenis – completely underestimating the Turkish factor – continued to focus his attention purely on the anti-colonial campaign, failing to assess the hazardous potential of the escalating Turkish counter-actions. May was a month of heavy inter-communal tension and hazardously different from previous incidents, both in the duration and the extent of violence; the new retaliatory elements introduced by VOLKAN – beyond the destruction of Greek property by rioters, and arson – were attacks against innocent Greek civilians and murder. On 23 May 1956, the execution of Turkish PC Lisani Ahmed in Polis Chrysochous by EOKA, led to strong anti-Greek demonstrations and inter-communal clashes in various towns, that resulted in serious injuries of Greeks and extensive damage to Greek property. In Hermes street Nicosia, VOLKAN members shot, from a passing car, and wounded a Greek, while other innocent

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109 The Times, 21 March 1956, p. 10.
110 The Times, 24 April 1956, p. 8.
Greeks were beaten up by excited Turks. On 25 May, the statement of Dr Kutchuk that 'it could not be expected, we should stand by and see innocent Turkish blood flowing' was accompanied by Turkish attacks against Greek neighborhoods in Larnaca, that caused severe damage to shops and houses, while seven Greeks and a Turk were taken to hospital; four of the Greeks were seriously injured from stab wounds. The following day, Turkish APC's returning from a wedding celebration opened indiscriminate fire against Greeks in a coffee shop in Aphania village wounding eight of them. In the violent clashes that followed, Turkish RAF APC Ali Mustafa Ekmedji was killed by Greek rioters, five Greeks were seriously injured and a Greek was killed by the security forces. After an EOKA bomb explosion in Ktima on 27 May, the death of Turkish APC Ahmet Moulla Hussein lead to more clashes. The following day, the funeral of Turkish policeman Irfan Ali, who died from wounds sustained from an EOKA bomb, turned into an attack of fanatic Turks and APC's against a Greek factory, causing the death of one Greek, Christos Salides, and the injury of twenty others. On 29 May, two Greeks, Pieris Panteli and Costas Michael, were murdered in an ambush outside Nicosia.

The explosive inter-communal strife in May eventually ended with the implant of the first seeds of segregation between the two communities. The erection of a temporary barbed wire fence between the two quarters of the old city of Nicosia, by the British Army, – the Mason-Dixon Line was not only a bitter necessity for the protection of life and property, but a sign of geographical partition and the prelude to the imposition of the infamous Green Line in December 1963 and of the Attila Line in August 1974.

113 The Times, 26 May 1956, p. 5.
117 Times of Cyprus, 26 April 1956, p. 1; Cyprus Mail, 28 May 1956, p. 1; Times of Cyprus, 6 June 1956, p. 4.
Despite the violent attacks against Cypriot Greek property and the killing of innocent Greeks by VOLKAN and infuriated Turkish mobs, EOKA continued undeterred its anti-colonial campaign and its attacks against the security forces – including Turkish and Greek policemen – without following the VOLKAN practise, to retaliate against innocent members of the minority. The pattern of killing Turkish policemen by EOKA and of innocent Greek civilians by Turkish policemen, inexplicably continued until the summer of 1958.

In the middle of August 1957, Digenis – alarmed by the murders of innocent Greeks by Turkish policemen, the catastrophic action of the Turkish mobs, the provocative agitation of VOLKAN, and the increasing ‘Anglo-Turkish collaboration’ – realizing his deep responsibilities and the possibility of ‘the slaughter by the Turkish mob’\textsuperscript{119} started, for the very first time, to consider the introduction of defensive measures against the Turkish threat.\textsuperscript{119} After careful consideration of the two-fronted situation, he developed a defensive conception that revolved around the following three elements. The already existing – anti-colonial – combat groups of EOKA would not participate in the defence against Turkish attacks.\textsuperscript{120} Secondly, special independent combat groups would form, with the mission of reacting against Turkish attacks on Greek neighborhoods and quarters. For this purpose, he issued directives to the sector command leaders for the preparation of \textit{Plan T-P}\textsuperscript{121} [Plan for Turks in the towns] and \textit{Plan T-X} [Plan for Turks in the villages] for each sector. Thirdly, the Greek civilian population would undertake various passive self-defensive measures for the protection of Greek property and life, such as night-watch guards by shopkeepers, neighborhood protection groups in towns, and surveillance groups in villages; for this reason Grivas issued \textit{Instructions for Village Defense against Turkish Attacks}\textsuperscript{122} – a special directive regarding the organization of

\textsuperscript{119} Grivas, \textit{Apomnemonevma}, p. 195.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., pp. 193-194.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., p. 194.
\textsuperscript{121} Grivas, \textit{Guerrilla Warfare}, pp. 96-97.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., pp. 98-99.
armed and passive defense in villages – as well as General Instructions for the Self-defense of the Greek Population against Turkish Attacks in the cities.\textsuperscript{123}

Later, in December 1957, Grivas ordered the sector commands to prepare reports about the conclusions derived from Turkish attacks against Greek property and life, and special assessments about the possible methods and future Turkish plans against the Greek population in each sector. His intention was to make operational alterations to the already existing Plan T-P's and Plan T-X's. He also issued a special order to encourage the Greeks living or working near the Turkish quarters, indicating the importance of self-defense for the protection of Greek property and life against Turkish attacks.\textsuperscript{124} On 16 January 1958, the growing threat of Turkish attacks forced Digenis to issue an order authorizing the sector commands to be on alert for the immediate implementation of the Plan T-P's and Plan T-X's without further order.\textsuperscript{125}

VOLKAN continued its underground operation, but it appeared that the threats in its proclamations, the demonstrations it initiated, and the uninhibited action of the Turkish auxiliaries supporting it, could not meet the expectations of the nationalist circles in the minority. The heat of the volcano that gradually turned VOLKAN into the organization of Var Olmak Lazımsa Kan Akitmamak Nıye [If we have to exist why not spill blood],\textsuperscript{126} proved inadequate to become an effective counter-force against EOKA. The Turks, in their desperation and thirst for protection against Greek ambitions, “tried to trust the organization, but soon realized that it was unable to provide what the Turks of Cyprus were expecting ... it was working for its own advantage and not the national interests of the community. The people had expectations which at the end remained unfulfilled.”\textsuperscript{127}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{123} Grivas, Guerilla Warfare, pp. 97-98.
\footnote{124} Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, pp. 211-212.
\footnote{125} Ibid., p. 223.
\footnote{126} Interview of Mehmet Ali Tremeselii to Nelman Cahi, in Ortam, (20 – 28 April, 1992), 22 April 1992, p. 7.
\footnote{127} Personal interview with Hasan Demirag, 5 September 2006.
\end{footnotes}
Other peripheral underground groups, *9 Eylül Cephesi*, and *Kara Cete*

The dynamic progression of the Greek anti-colonial campaign and the casualties among Turks had caused great anxiety to the minority of the island, both for the personal safety of its members and the future of the community under Enosis. Although EOKA had never intended or planned to strike against the Turkish community, Mehmet Ali Tremeseli, the leader of a strong peripheral underground movement, remarked that 'the armed uprising started from the villages and not the center ... since it was the Turks in the mixed villages that felt the danger'.

By 1956, when the attacks of EOKA against Turkish policemen remained unanswered by VOLKAN, other local organizations started to germinate in the periphery. But since there was no central command for their co-ordination, each group operated on its own initiative.

One of the most powerful of these underground movements, having probably more arms than VOLKAN, consisting of about fifty armed men in six self-formed combat groups, emerged in the Spring of 1956 under the control of Tremeseli, in six Turkish and mixed villages, not far from the capital. A thirteen-member group under Tremeseli began operating in the mixed village of Tremetousia, while other groups were formed in the neighbouring villages: Arsos, six members under Mehmet Kucuk; Melousia, eight members under Mehmet Kondoz; Agla, 12 members under Ahmet Yaman; Petrophani, four members under Ali Riza Veli; Pyrol, six members under Hasan Skordo.

The members of the groups were armed with personal handguns which they secretly bought with their own money, that were also used 'to avoid being caught sleeping' by local EOKA groups, the moves and activities of which were constantly under surveillance by the Turkish groups.

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130 Personal interview with A.A., 23 March 2006.
In 1956, the effort of the Tremeseli groups to buy water-pipe bombs from VOLKAN almost ended in bloodshed. Raising fifty pounds among the poor Turkish villagers for the purchase of bombs – for five pounds each – from VOLKAN, turned bitter when Selcuk and Mison sent, through a Turkish policeman, five black gun powder-filled bombs which, when tested, proved to be completely ineffective. The demand for the return of the money – which were already lost in gambling – brought the immediate reaction of Mison who was sent to execute Tremeseli; coincidentally, he was away from the village at that night and the attempt failed. This incident terminated the effort of the group to approximate itself to VOLKAN, and inspired the production, with the help of Ahmet Omer, of their own TNT-filled water-pipe bombs at a cost of one to two pounds each.

EOKA identified the movements of Tremeseli and made its first unsuccessful attempt against his life in 1957. By the summer of 1958, the Tremeseli groups were fully engaged in the merciless inter-communal confrontation between EOKA and Turk Mukavemet Teskilati (TMT) [Turkish Resistance Organization], and the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians from both communities, operating in their area, but also in Nicosia, with other TMT groups. Greek Orthodox monk Nectarios and nun Agathoniki, who were shot outside the Metamorphosis Monastery at Avdeliero on 10 July 1958, and three young alleged EOKA members, Anastasis Michael, Christofis Panayides, and Georgios Georgiou, who were shot and stabbed near Tremetousia on 2 August 1958, were among the fatalities in the operational zone of the Tremeseli groups.

Another independent underground group was the Ayse Hanim [Lady Ayse] in the Paphos district, consisting of five to six members under the leadership of brothers, Halil and Kamil; their fate turned out almost fatal. Even though the group was invited to Nicosia by Rauf Denktash, who arranged for

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133 Personal interview with A.A., 18 March 2006.
135 Tremeseli, Ayios Sipiridon, pp. 192-195.
their settlement in the capital, later, three of its members were shot and wounded by TMT, in broad daylight, in the Nicosia municipal market. The three injured victims urgently left Cyprus for the United Kingdom. There are two possible explanations given for the incident. Rauf Denktash asserts that the group was invited to Nicosia by the new TMT leader Lieutenant Colonel Riza Vurushkan; their execution was ordered by Vurushkan when Denktash was away in Ankara, as there were suspicions that they were informing the British intelligence both about EOKA and Turkish activities. According to another explanation, members of the group went to Turkey and brought arms, which they refused to surrender to TMT. Since TMT was an organization which enforced its will by force, its leadership did not hesitate to order the execution of the Ayse Hanım leadership, to safeguard its absolute monopoly in the underground life within the Turkish community.

During the EOKA campaign, other Turkish underground armed groups were formed, operating independently in various areas of the island. One such group was established in Sakarya Famagusta by police officer Selcuk and his brother Fikri, well-known members of the Famagusta nightlife. Police officer Rasit of Agios Sozomenos organized his own independent groups in the towns of Nicosia and Famagusta as well as the villages of Vatyli and Agios Sozomenos. In the town of Paphos, the Cakırlar brothers formed their own underground group, while Husein and Ziya from Kantou village, well-known members of the Limassol nightlife, operated a strong group in Limassol and a smaller group in Kantou.

The failure of VOLKAN to effectively react to the attacks of EOKA against Turkish members of the security forces, gradually diminished the hopes of the Turkish community, which realized that the organization was unable to offer protection and safeguard the new Turkish cause of Taksim [partition of the island between Greece and Turkey], formally introduced on 19 December 1956.

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136 Rauf Denktash in Nezire Gurkan, Zirvedeki Yalnizlik Kulesi, p. 129.
by the Secretary of State for the Colonies Alan Lenox-Boyd, where London recognized 'that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options'.

In the Summer of 1957, dissatisfied members of VOLKAN formed with the support of Dr Burhan Nalbantoglou – later one of the TMT co-founders – a new underground organization under the name 9 Eylül Cephesi [9 September Front]. The choice of the specific date had a significant historical importance in Turkish conscience as a milestone of victory against the Greeks: on 9 September 1570, the besieged city of Nicosia fell into the hands of Lala Mustafa Pasha, while on 9 September 1922 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk entered triumphantly in Smyrna during the Turkish War of Independence. The short life of the new organization – its activity was limited to a few bomb explosions and the circulation of a few leaflets – was cut off when a tragedy blew its leading nucleus apart. On the night of 31 August 1957, a mysterious bomb explosion in an Omorphita house caused the fatal wounding of four of its members; Ismael Bayogolou, Kubalay Altayli, Mustafa Ertam Djalal, including its leader Ulus Ulfet. During the same period, a leaflet distributed in Nicosia, signed by 9 Eylül Cephesi, threatened to destroy Ledra Street – the most commercial Greek road of the capital – on 9 September 1957, the Turkish national day. Taking into consideration the catastrophic strength of the Omorphita bomb, as well as the material found by the police in the house of the explosion – sixteen water-pipe bombs, bags of gunpowder, fuses and detonators – it appeared that the execution of the threat by the organization was quite possible.

The circumstances under which the explosion occurred were never clarified, but a series of indications around 9 Eylül Cephesi raised questions whether the incident was accidental, given that its leader Ulus Ulfet, a university student in Ankara, at some time served the British administration as an auxiliary policeman in the Special Branch, the intelligence section of the

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189 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol. 562, col. 1268.
190 Times of Cyprus, 2 September 1957, p. 1.
191 Times of Cyprus, 4 September 1957, p. 1.
Cyprus Police. Kemal Tanrisevdi -- another TMT co-founder -- asserted that Ulus Ulfet was probably a British agent, and remarked that Ulfet had political ambitions and wanted to prove himself by making bombs. Tanrisevdi revealed that on that night he was himself invited, but learned about the explosion when he was in Paphos. Writer Arif Hasan Tahsin remarked that all the allegations against Ulus Ulfet were meant to diminish the importance of 9 Eylül Cephesi, an underground organization that was established before TMT. Researcher Dr Ahmet An also questions whether the tragic explosion of 31 August was an accident, and remarks that 9 Eylül Cephesi was a progressive underground group, rather anti-British and probably left-oriented. These inclinations of the organization might have alarmed the nationalist circles of the minority; whatever the real circumstances were, the new organization, accidentally or intentionally, crushed before it commenced its underground operation.

One of the very few known proclamations of 9 Eylül Cephesi released after the tragic explosion, on 29 September 1957, signed by S.B. on behalf of the organization, referred in mild language — contrary to the nationalistic language of the VOLKAN leaflets and the inflammable content of the TMT proclamations — to general issues concerning the organization and the Turks of Cyprus, without announcing anything of importance. It was mentioned that the organization was formed out of the bagrindan [bowels] of the Cypriot Turks. ‘Coincidentally’, the same wording was used two months later in the first proclamation of TMT.

Another group that emerged in Nicosia during the period was Kara Cete [Black Gang]. Its members were young men of the Turkish underworld, closely

143 Arif Hasan Tahsin in Avrupa, 6 February 2000, p. 7.
145 Arif Hasan Tahsin in Avrupa, 6 February 2000, p. 7.
146 Personal interview with Dr Ahmet An, 21 April 2007.
147 Altay Sayil in Halkin Sesi, 18 June 1997, p. 4.
connected with prostitution and the Nicosia nightlife, that wondered around the town riding on motorcycles under the leadership of Kambur Salahi, Kemal Sirrik, Gunay Bulli, Harbi, and Ozeragi. Initially, the Turks of Cyprus thought that Kara Cete was protecting the national ambitions of the community, but then realized that they only worked for their personal interest. They acted on their own, without the knowledge of the Turkish leadership and did not hesitate to terrorize, abuse and beat innocent Turks. When EOKA began targeting Turkish policemen, Kara Cete found the opportunity to act indiscriminately against the Greeks, destroying property, looting shops, breaking into Greek property, and setting Greek premises on fire. The gang was also systematically abusing and terrorizing left-wing Turks, while the progressive athletic and cultural club TEK became a permanent target. On 7 June 1958, the opening day of the Turkish offensive, TMT informed the Turkish people that the `worthless band, who is uttering threats right and left, is robbing and defrauding people and is demanding money from everyone' was watched closely by TMT. The proclamation warned the members of the gang, which were no more than ten, that unless they suspended their activities `which bring total harm to our cause' they would be wiped out by the TMT `killer teams'.

Rauf Denktash, critically analysing the operation of the Turkish underground organizations in Cyprus, remarked that VOLKAN was a `very amateurish organization', while 9 Eylül Cephesi and Kara Cete `led the situation into a stalemate due to the terrorism that they had started to exercise on the people'. He observes that the actions of some individuals, in the name of various underground organizations, began damaging the Turkish cause; thus it was time to establish a new organization that would `bring the actions of underground organizations to a level that was in harmony with the national

141 Tremesis, Ayios Sipridon, pp. 116-118.
142 Personal Interview with Hasan Demirag, 5 September 2006.
143 Personal Interview with Kiamil Tuncel, 25 February 2008.
144 Personal Interview with Hasan Demirag, 5 September 2006.
146 TMT proclamation, 7 June 1958, 238/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
147 Personal Interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006.
policy. The new organization, *Turk Mukavemet Teskilati*, 'was established to dissolve this chaos' and take charge of this 'irresponsibility.'

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153 Rauf Denktash in Gazloglu, *Direnis Orgutleri*, p. 2.
DIAGRAM 3
Greek and Turkish Underground Armed Movements in Cyprus between April 1955 and March 1959

- EOKA (Including PEKA and ANE)
- CYPRUS POLICE Mobile Reserve
- CYPRUS AUXILIARY POLICE
- CYPRUS SPECIAL CONSTABULARY
- VOLKAN
- KARACETE
- 9 EYLUL CEPHESI
- KITEMB
- Mehmet Ali Tremeneli groups (Tremetousa, Agia, Melousia, Pyrol, Paphos, Ayia Napa)
- Peripheral groups: Celciu-Fikri (Sakarya), Raeei (Paphos, Nicosia, Vathis, Cakartar), Husein-Ziya (Limassol)
- Peripheral groups: Ayse Hanim (Paphos)

April 1955 - November 1957 - August 1958 - March 1959
Chapter IV

The critical emergence of *Turk Mukavemet Teskilati* and the Turkish offensive of *Taksim* against *Enosis*

The preparatory period

The inability of VOLKAN to effectively deter EOKA attacks against Turkish policemen, the absence of a cohesive Cypriot Turk policy against Greek objectives, the fear that the Greeks would eventually impose their will on the British for self-determination and eventually *Enosis*, as well as the urgent need to implicate the direct involvement of Turkey in the protection of the minority and the defence of Cypriot Turk aspirations, led, in November 1957, former Crown counselor Rauf R. Denktash code-named¹ *Mulayim*, medical doctor Burhan Nalbantoglu-Nazim, and Turkish consular employee Kemal Tanrisevdi-Raci, to the decision of establishing a new underground armed organization under the name *Turk Mukavement Teskilati* (TMT). The appearance of the new movement – the name of which did not include the word *Kibris* [Cypriot] – was the offspring of continual night meetings in Tanrisevdi’s house and extensive discussions, between the three co-founders,² until morning hours.³

Initially, Nalbantoglu and Tanrisevdi thought of forming an organization under Cypriot Turk control without involving Turkey, and of collecting money from the local Turks for the purchase of arms. Denktash insisted that, in order for the new organization to be ‘effective’, Turkey should undertake the supply of arms and the financial support of the organization, as well as become involved

¹ The codenames are according to Kemal Tanrisevdi, in Akkurt, *Turk Mukavemet Teskilati*, p. 38.
² Gazioglu, *Direnis Orgutleri*, pp. 6-7, 9-12.
³ Ibid., pp. 7-8.
in the command and training of its men by Turkish Army officers.\(^4\) As he foresaw deep into the future, Denktash, from the very beginning, considered that TMT was ‘the armed wing of a national policy’;\(^5\) he was certainly not referring to the trembling Cypriot Turk underground alchemies of the past, but to the new national policy of motherland Turkey and the aggressive policy of the emerging young Cypriot Turk leadership.

The murder of Special Branch Inspector Mustafa Ahmet Bayaz and the injury of his young fiancee Fatma Hussein by EOKA, on 9 November 1957, culminated Turkish anger and became a catalyst for the formation of the new movement.\(^6\) The decision of the three co-founders to send Nalbantoglu – with the objective of requesting their, selective as was proven later, participation in TMT – to the local VOLKAN leaders in all districts,\(^7\) was a wise move that prevented any opposition from them and initiated the gradual ‘transformation of VOLKAN into TMT’\(^8\). In the first TMT proclamation of 27 November 1957, announcing the formation of the new organization and the dissolution of VOLKAN and \(9\) Eylül Cephesi, the Central Committee – initially consisting of the three co-founders – assured that it was not an offensive organization and emphasised it mission: ‘the duty of defending the Cypriot Turks from the imperialist colonial administration as well as from the Cypriot Greek gangs that strive to achieve Enosis’.\(^9\) Strangely, the proclamation contained almost identical wording – in its affirmation that the organization was formed out of the bagrindan [bowels] of the Cypriot Turks – as the \(9\) Eylül Cephesi leaflet.

Dr Kutchuk – who was marginalized by the Central Committee because he allegedly did not have good relations with Nalbantoglu and would supposedly react negatively against a new organization – was upset and

\(^4\) Personal interview with Raul Denktash, 22 August 2006; Gazioglu, \(Direnis Orgutleri,\) p. 8; Rauf Denktash in Gurkan, \(Zirvedeki Yalnizlk Kulesi,\) p. 120.
\(^5\) Raul Denktash, ‘Not Defteri,1957’, in Akkurt, \(Turk Mukavemet Teskilati,\) p. 44.
\(^6\) Rauf Denktash in Gazioglu, \(Direnis Orgutleri,\) p. 7.
\(^7\) Personal interview with Rauf R. Denktash, 22 August 2006.
\(^8\) Raul Denktash, ‘Not Defteri,1957’, in Akkurt, \(Turk Mukavemet Teskilati,\) p. 45.
suspicious; he perceived — not erroneously — that the dissolution of VOLKAN and the formation of TMT without his knowledge, was an intentional act against his leadership. The suspicions of Dr Kutchuk were not unrealistic. Not long ago, Denktash had undertook, under obscure conditions, the presidency of Kibris Turk Kurumleri Federasyonu (KTKF), ostracizing Faiz Kaimak. But the maintenance of Dr Kutchuk in the leadership of the community and the presidency of the Kibris Turk Partisi (KTP) [Cyprus is Turkish party] provided a perfect alibi for the covert agenda of Denktash, the role of whom proved instrumental in the derailment of Enosis kai Monon Enosis and the forceful imposition of Ya Taksim Ya Olum [Partition or Death], in the following year.

Although the life of TMT under Cypriot Turk control was quite short — from November 1957 to July 1958 — its contribution to the almost terminal disruption of the anti-colonial struggle, was nevertheless extremely crucial. The selective recruitment of former VOLKAN members such as Kemal Mison, Yekta Remzi, Topal Mahmud (Buyuk) and Ismail Sadikoglu — its two leaders Sakir Ozel and Hussein Selcuk were not invited — in the following months, as well as of Turkish auxiliary and Mobile Reserve police constables, members of other peripheral organizations such as Mehmet Ali Tremeseli, and new members such as strong-men Topal Mahmud (Kucuk), Alpay Mustapha,

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11 Tahsin, Anodos, pp. 46-47.


13 There are tens of publications by Greek authors, mostly journalists, about the patriotic character of the EOKA struggle and the heroic self-sacrifice of some of its cadres, but almost none investigates the role of the Turkish underground armed movements and the impact of their action on the anti-colonial campaign; the mythological dimension of EOKA in Cypriot Greek conscience had erroneously diverted research away from this critical element.

Mehmet Kondoz and Unal Raif, had brought, in the summer of 1958, the manpower of the new organization to 200-300 men.\textsuperscript{15}

TMT had neither the combat experience of EOKA nor an organized underground order of battle, composed of distinct combat groups. Its armory consisted of the personal revolvers and pistols of some of its members, and according to Denktash, of home-made hunting guns constructed from water-pipes.\textsuperscript{16} Despite Greek rumors for the secret importation of arms from abroad,\textsuperscript{17} TMT, with rare exceptions, did not possess the quantity or the quality of weapons in the EOKA armory, that included among others, Bren light machine guns, Sten, Sterling, Thomson, and MP 38/40 sub-machine guns, as well as Lee-Enfield No. 4 rifles.\textsuperscript{18} Its underground actions were carried out by an inner circle of tough, hard-line men, and Turkish policemen that were using their police identity to operate undisturbed, even under curfew.\textsuperscript{19} Many Mobile Reserve members actively involved in TMT operations, in addition to their service arms, possessed and used in underground activities their own personal hand-guns.\textsuperscript{20}

Analysis of its operations reveals that the tactical success of TMT – and the consequent strategic implications of its underground action on the anti-colonial struggle of EOKA and the Cypriot Greek objective of Enosis – derived from the following factors: The pre-determined and methodological directives

\textsuperscript{15} Personal interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006. The assessment of the colonial administration about TMT membership referred to 300 members throughout the island; Foot to Colonial Office, No. 1116, 16 July 1958, Top Secret, FO 371/136281, TNA.


\textsuperscript{17} Grivas, \textit{Apomnemonevmata}, pp. 118-119.

\textsuperscript{18} Mouseio Agonos EOKA 1955-1959 (MAE) arms collection, Nicosia.

\textsuperscript{19} Angiotourkiki Synergasia [British-Turkish cooperation], EOKA proclamation, (June 1958), MAE; Angiotourkiki Englimatiki Synergasia [Criminal British-Turkish cooperation], EOKA proclamation, (July 1958), MAE; Deftion Angiotourkikis Synergasias [Report of British-Turkish cooperation], EOKA proclamation, (July 1958), MAE.

\textsuperscript{20} Interview of gunsmith Omer Akay in \textit{Olay} (22 January 1979), in Public Information Office, \textit{Turkey's Expansionist Designs on Cyprus: The Role of TMT} (Nicosia: PIO, 1979), pp. 7-8.
and the nothing-to-lose aggressive orders of the TMT leadership, and particularly of Rauf Denktash, whose role proved pivotal; the dedication of its members to impose forcefully, at any cost, the hard-line policy of the TMT leadership against Greek soft targets, mostly innocent unarmed civilians; the pro-Turk tolerance and anti-Greek discrimination of the colonial administration and its security forces; and the void in the tactical operation of EOKA, that focused its underground action against the colonial administration avoiding — until the summer of 1958 — to take retaliatory action against Turkish civilians.

The nine-month life of TMT under Cypriot Turk control may be distinguished into four phases: the preparatory stage (end of November 1957-early January 1958), the anti-British demonstrations for Taksim in January 1958, the establishment of control within the community (February-May 1958) culminating to the anti-communist campaign in May, and the Taksim offensive against the Greek community between 7 June and 5 August 1958.

On 13 December 1957, the second TMT proclamation of the ‘preparatory stage’, addressed to the Turkish villagers, clarified the intentions of the Central Committee and began to prepare the ground for action. The leaflet, by exaggerating previous inter-communal clashes and manipulating fake incidents such as alleged attacks against Turkish schools and mosques, rapes, and kidnappings, skillfully cultivated anti-Greek fanaticism and encouraged the rise of nationalism for the defence of ‘the soil that was soaked by your fathers’ blood’; it gave directions for the immediate formation of defensive armed groups in villages, warning that traitors would be executed. On 20 December 1957, the TMT Central Committee, analysing the British foreign policy over Cyprus, expressed its deep concern for a possible colonial compromise over Greek demands for Enosis. It clearly stated that the Cyprus Issue was not a local affair but one involving twenty-six millions of Turks, and that Taksim sedece Taksim [Partition and only partition] was the sole political principle acceptable by the Cypriot Turks. Careful examination of its content allows the


extraction — at a very early stage, only three weeks after the appearance of the organization — of TMT strategic objectives: to prove — to the British — that the Turks of Cyprus would never accept Enosis or any concessions to the Greeks; to declare that Taksim was the only acceptable political solution; and to attract the attention and convince the Turkish Government\textsuperscript{23} that the Cyprus issue was a national affair of the motherland and not a foreign local dispute.

After a mutual arrangement between Denktash and Kutchuk, in a meeting in Ankara with Foreign Minister Fatin Zorlu on 2 January 1958, Denktash informed Zorlu about the formation of TMT and directly asked for the support of the Turkish Government, requesting 'experts to organize it properly and also arms'.\textsuperscript{24} Zorlu expressed an interest on the issue, but on the question whether the organization could receive arms safely, Kutchuk — contrary to Denktash's positive reply — remarked that he was not sure.\textsuperscript{25} Denktash returned to Cyprus while Kutchuk remained in Turkey for further consultations; according to Denktash 'that comment of Dr Kutchuk delayed our work, the sending of experts and later of arms, by about nine months'.\textsuperscript{26}

The anti-British demonstrations for Taksim

His return to Cyprus signaled — not coincidentally in Dr Kutchuk's absence — a series of anti-British demonstrations which were of tremendous importance, both, for Cypriot Turk claims and the colonial attitude towards the minority. According to Denktash, past experience had revealed that the British rulers 'did not seriously consider an ineffective, unarmed organization without political directives'.\textsuperscript{27} Denktash, fearing a possible British concession over Cyprus — 'self-determination was going to be implemented within, first fifteen years, then

\textsuperscript{23} Kemal Tanrısevdi, discussion in BRT television station (1 August 1994), in Demirag, Kibris, p. 317.

\textsuperscript{24} Personal interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006.

\textsuperscript{25} Rauf Denktash in Kasimoglu, Eski Gunler, p. 79.

\textsuperscript{26} Personal interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006.

\textsuperscript{27} Rauf Denktash, 'Not Döfteri, 1958', in Akkurt, Türk Mukavemet Teskili, p. 21.
ten years, then seven years' – 'realized that we are going to lose'; 'that Britain was going to play this role, trying to protect the minority but give Cyprus to Greece'. Thus it was time for TMT action. At this stage, the community had to make sacrifices to prove, to all interested parties, that the Cypriot Turks had autonomous political aims, and also to lever pressure on Turkey, after the failure to attract its immediate support in the Zorlu meeting.

The misinformation campaign and the 'political smoke screen by Kutchuk' started in December 1957 when he and his colleagues 'recounted many tales of the hazard to Turks in mixed villages', which at the end, had 'been checked and found to be mainly distortion of facts'. In Ankara, Kutchuk continued his provocative statements about alleged threats for the massacre of the Turks, openly declaring 'that further co-existence is impossible and partition is the only remedy'. On 21 January, a Turkish demonstration in Nicosia, caused allegedly by EOKA slogans on the Turkish Lycee, peculiarly ended up with strong anti-British – instead of anti-Greek – demonstrations against Governor Hugh Foot and in favor of Taksim, as well as clashes, for the very first time, with the security forces. On the following day, the British Embassy in Ankara reported that 'these were part of the recent campaign to increase excitement among the Turkish community' and prophetically foresaw that 'they might lead to more serious demonstrations to coincide with the Secretary of State's visit to Ankara'. Dr Kutchuk, continuing his 'inflammatory statements', blamed, for the incidents, the Greek Cypriots and 'the mistaken policy' of 'Sir Hugh Foot's lack of control and partiality'. On 25 January, a pro-Taksim demonstration in Limassol, timed to coincide with the opening of informal discussions in Ankara between Foreign Secretary Selwyn Loyd and the Turkish Government over the Cyprus question, after heavy stoning of the security

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38 Personal interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006.
39 O.A.G. (Cyprus) to Colonial Office, No. 23, 6 January 1958, Secret, FO 371/136279, TNA.
51 Ankara to Foreign Office, No. 130, 22 January 1958, Confidential, FO 371/136279, TNA.
32 Ibid., TNA.
33 Ankara to Foreign Office, No. 133, 23 January 1958, FO 371/136279, TNA.
forces and the *Mobile Reserve* itself, was broken up by tear gas and ended with two rioters and ten Turkish policemen injured.\textsuperscript{34}

The sudden and mysterious anti-British feeling of the minority – the initially softer, less aggressive approach of Governor Foot towards the anti-colonial campaign and the release of a few Greek detainees (as a political gesture of goodwill) raised Turkish fears for a pro-Greek discrimination – ‘the extreme course on which the Turks now seem to be embarked’,\textsuperscript{35} culminated on the birthday of Denktash on 27 January 1958, when *Bozkurt* in a provocative headline announced that *İngiltere Taksim Kabul Etti* [Britain Accepted Taksim].\textsuperscript{36} The absence of Dr Kutchuk to hold back the crowds, the presence of Denktash in the streets, allegedly trying to pacify the demonstrators,\textsuperscript{37} and the unfounded – as was proven – headline of *Bozkurt* on Denktash’s birthday, were accidental coincidences, where simply the ‘savagery of the rioting’ turned the pro-Taxim demonstrations to ‘the fiercest anti-British outbreak ever by the Turkish minority’. The Turkish riots in Nicosia, under a heavy barrage of stones, bottles and bricks against the British Army and the Turkish policemen, ended up with two Turks fatally wounded by a military Land-Rover heavily stoned by angry crowds, four others seriously wounded, while another fifty were treated for injuries; twenty-eight policemen, twelve soldiers and fourteen firemen were injured.\textsuperscript{38} The following day, the continuation of violent riots in all major Turkish quarters of towns, ended with two Turks shot dead in Famagusta and another three shot dead in Nicosia by the British Army.\textsuperscript{39}

A series of critical questions arose regarding these sudden events. How accidental or spontaneous were the Turkish riots? How coincidental was their timing only sixty days after the formation of TMT? Tanrisevdi admitted that the

\textsuperscript{34} *Cyprus Mail*, 26 January 1958, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{35} Foot to Colonial Office, No. 104, 24 January 1958, Secret, CO 926/643, TNA.
\textsuperscript{36} *Bozkurt*, 27 January 1958, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{37} Personal interview with Rauf R. Denktash, 22 August 2006.
\textsuperscript{38} *Cyprus Mail*, 28 January 1958, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{39} *Phileleftheros*, 29 January 1958, p. 1; *Cyprus Mail*, 29 January 1958, p. 1.
demonstrations were organized by TMT,\textsuperscript{40} while Denktash contradicted Tanrîsevîl's statement and remarked that the Turkish resistance against the British forces began and developed as a people’s movement; ‘it was spontaneous, it was not planned’ and ‘we were not prepared for it’.\textsuperscript{41} As for their objective, the words of Denktash are revealing: ‘These dead are useful to us. With these we will make our voice to be heard in the world’.\textsuperscript{42} ‘Now the world will understand what we are trying to defend’.\textsuperscript{43} Researcher Arif Hasan Tahsin remarks that the events were precipitated by Denktash since ‘in such a struggle you can not win without the pouring of blood ... it was impossible to achieve a result just with words’.\textsuperscript{44} Denktash, analysing the impact of the demonstrations remarked that ‘the 27-28 January incidents, indicated to the British that the Turks are claiming rights as well in Cyprus and that they can resist even without Turkey’.\textsuperscript{45}

The exercise of control over the community and the anti-communist campaign

The third phase of TMT operation, between February and May 1958, revolved around two main objectives. Realizing the importance of discipline and cohesiveness, the Central Committee decided to exercise full control over the internal affairs of the minority, either by earning the respect and trust of the people or by imposing forcefully its will and its national directives on the community. The period provided also the opportunity for the psychological preparation of the Cypriot Turks, and the strengthening of nationalist feelings, before the opening of the summer TMT offensive.

\textsuperscript{40} Ortam, 30 May 1997, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{41} Personal interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006.
\textsuperscript{42} Sevim Ulfet, in Tahsin, \textit{Anodos}, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{43} Personal interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006.
\textsuperscript{44} Tahsin, \textit{Anodos}, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{45} Rauf Denktash in Kasimoglu, \textit{Eski Gunler}, p. 82.
In May 1958, the decisiveness of the Central Committee to impose strict discipline to TMT objectives, culminated against progressive and leftist Cypriot Turks. The massive 1 May parade organized by communist party AKEL, where hundreds of Greek and Turk workers — in an effort to ‘prove to the people of Cyprus that the Turks and the Greeks could live together’ — marched in Nicosia holding Greek and Turkish flags, attracted the immediate attention of right-wing TMT. Denktash, perceived the strong participation of Turks in the parade as a threat ‘not necessarily to TMT but to the Turkish Cypriot leadership’ and assumes that ‘that may have been the reason that triggered the executions’ of leftists Turks. On the same night, TMT members broke into the premises of the progressive Turkish Cypriot athletic and cultural association Turk Egitim Klubu (TEK) in Nicosia, and destroyed all the furniture, settling the building on fire.

The Central Committee of TMT — in reality Rauf Denktash, since Tanrisevdi was abruptly transferred to Teheran on May 1958 while Nalbantoglu was sent, in the summer of 1958, to Turkey in order to avoid his arrest by the colonial regime as well as friction with Kutchuk — by manipulating in its proclamations anti-Greek hatred and anti-British feelings, intensified the psychological preparation of the minority for dynamic action. On 5 May 1958, a TMT leaflet accusing Governor ‘Foot, the enemy of the Turks’ as serving Greek ambitions, ridiculed the Greek organization as ‘the EOKA comedy’ and provoked Turkish feelings, that under a self-governing regime ‘the Turks would either have to leave the island or they would completely annihilated’. The proclamation warned that if any attempt was made to force a settlement other than Taksim, then ‘it would not be necessary to wait for an order to go into

47 Personal interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006.
49 Gazioglu, Direnis Orgutleri, p. 17.
general action', and stated that 'a separate order will be given as regards killings'.

On 8 May, TMT circulated an inflammatory leaflet that advised 'the killers' of EOKA, the 'minister of slaves' Lennox-Boyd, and Greece, 'the illegal child of England', to consent immediately to the partition of the island. The proclamation declared that 'the Turks of Cyprus are a volcano, and nobody can play with them', and threatened that it will erupt and 'the island will turn into a field of violent conflict, unprecedented in history'; it concluded with the phrases *Ya Taksim Ya Olum* [Taxim or Death] and *Ne Multu Turku Diyene* [How Happy is the one who says he is a Turk]. On 11 May, a TMT leaflet announced the imposition of drastic passive resistance measures — the avoidance of commercial dealings with the Greeks, the prohibition of entertainment in Greek bars and cabarets, the deletion of Greek and English street names in the Turkish quarters, as well as the compulsory use, within fifteen days, of the Turkish language on all Turkish shop names and trade signs — and gave an austere warning that the organization's 'special teams' would continue their 'control activities' for the strict implementation of the measures within the community. It also warned that 'drastic measures will be mercilessly taken against anyone' who acted or spoke against TMT.

On 19 May, the Central Committee referred to the martyrdom of Anatolia's War of Independence which 'was fought with sticks and axes' and informed the community that 'the hour of the declaration of self-government will be the day of general action and uprising', and that 'the Turkish Resistance Organization VOLKAN will be the main target'. The strange reference to VOLKAN, almost six months after the first TMT proclamation that announced its dissolve, might have not been coincidental. On one hand, it created confusion to EOKA and the colonial administration regarding the operation of

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50 TMT proclamation, 5 May 1958, 173/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
52 TMT proclamation, 11 May 1958, 184/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
53 TMT proclamation, 19 May 1958, 202/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
Turkish underground movements, and on the other, it prepared the ground, within the Turkish community, for underground acts the responsibility of which would not damage TMT image.

Meanwhile, the strict directives of the organization had not excluded the progressive Cypriot Turks — leading members of TEK or the Turkish office of the Greek leftist worker’s union PEO, who refused to adopt the nationalist Taksim Ya Olum — that, after the 1 May parade, were labeled as ‘the nation’s mean traitors’. The harassment of progressive or leftist Turks by TMT during the following weeks ranged from intimidation, to threatening and beating, culminating into murder. The first victim of TMT was trade union leader Ahmet Sadi — former editor of banned Turkish progressive newspaper Emekdji [Labourer] and director of the Turkish office of PEO — and his wife, who were shot outside their house on 22 May 1958 and were seriously wounded; they eventually escaped to England and never returned to Cyprus. The second victim was leftist, former editor-owner of banned Turkish newspaper Inkilapci [Reformist], Fazil Onder, shot and stabbed to death on 24 May 1958, in the center of Nicosia. Another left-winger, Abdurahman Djamal, was shot and wounded by off-duty auxiliary policeman H.Y. near Famagusta Gate in Nicosia on 27 May 1958. Kamil Tuncel, who had already an attempt against his life, was in a great dilemma: to save his life by renouncing publicly his membership in the Greek trade union PEO or escape to England without abandoning his political beliefs. Inspired by Niazi Hikmet’s poem ‘against the

54 Personal interview with Kamil Tuncel, 25 February 2006.
55 TMT proclamation, 26 May 1958, 213/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
56 Ahmet An, ‘O Rolos tis TMT sto Kypriako’ [The role of TMT in the Cyprus question], in To Vathi Kratos: Tourkia, Ellada, Kypros [The deep state: Turkey, Greece, Cyprus], ed. by Ahmet An and others (Nicosia: Alfadi, 2004), pp. 125-145 (p. 136).
57 Cyprus Mail, 23 May 1958, p. 1.
60 Cyprus Mail, 28 May 1958, p. 1.
61 Kamil Tuncel, Dusmana, p. 72.
enmity of the enemy I will live for one more day’, he eventually decided to place a special declaration, on 25 May, in Halkin Sesi and Bozkurt newspapers, that ‘as of today I quit from the Greek trade union, I have no relationship with them, and that I fully support the views of the Turkish community’.63

The following day, TMT issued a leaflet taking full responsibility for the actions against Ahmet Sadi and Fazil Onder. The proclamation in extremely harsh wording stated that ‘TMT has passed into action’ against the ‘degenerates’ who received their ‘merited death penalty’, and warned their comrades that their punishment ‘will be a bullet fired into their brains’. The Central Committee announced that the lives of those who publicly clarified their position in Turkish newspapers and ‘genuinely purged their souls of communist poison have been spared for the present’, but warned that ‘our killer teams’ were closely watching and shadowing the national traitors.64 Under death threats from TMT, a great number of leftist Cypriot Turks were obliged to declare publicly in paid Aciklama [declaration], in the two Turkish newspapers Halkin Sesi and Bozkurt,65 their devotion to the Cypriot Turk cause of Taxim, by renouncing their loyalty to the Cypriot Greek worker’s union PEO. The fate of another victim, Ahmet Yahya, was ironically predestined on the morning hours of 30 May 1958. Despite his declaration in Bozkurt that ‘I was never inclined towards the Left’ and ‘I state that I always obeyed and I will follow the path inscribed by our leaders’,66 on the same day Halkin Sesi reported his execution.67 On the following day, a TMT leaflet announced that ‘another traitor [Ahmet Yahya], who is not a genuine Turk, has been eliminated by our killer teams’ and gave a last warning:

We have given the necessary instructions to our Killer Teams to suspend actions till the 10th June 1958. All persons whom we have listed as traitors should take the

63 Bozkurt, 25 May 1958, p. 4.
64 TMT proclamation, 26 May 1958, 213/58, CO 926/352, TNA; Cyprus Mail, 28 May 1958 p. 1.
65 The first Aciklama by Kamil Tuncel appeared in Bozkurt and Halkin Sesi on 25 May 1958, followed daily by tens of others until the middle of June 1958.
66 Bozkurt, 30 May 1958, p. 4.
necessary steps, during this ten-day respite, to convince the community that they have
changed heart and are with us.\textsuperscript{68}

In spite of its announcement, the murder campaign of TMT continued on 5
June with the murder attempt against PEO member Hasan Ali, followed by the
murder of Ahmet Ibrahim in Limassol on 30 June 1958 – for having friendly
relations with the Greeks – and the murder attempt against Arif Hulusi Barudi
on 3 July 1958, for continuing to work in a Greek-owned business after
receiving a warning letter to abandon his occupation.\textsuperscript{69}

Rauf Denktash, defending the ‘dark days’ of his community, declares
that ‘TMT or my group never acknowledged it as their thing. It is for us a
question mark. Was VOLKAN still active, in spite of us, or people taken into
TMT who did it?\textsuperscript{70} Denktash’s effort to shift the responsibility to others, such as
former VOLKAN members in or outside TMT, is understandable, particularly
when he admits that ‘our complaint about [Turk] leftists was that they failed to
understand that AKEL Cypriotism was based on the Hellenization of Cyprus’.\textsuperscript{71}
Despite his effort to protect the organization, it is revealed that important TMT
orders were passed from Denktash to the intermediary I.S. who was
responsible for transferring the directives to the proper channels – strong-men
– for the execution of the operations.\textsuperscript{72} A.A. remarks that ‘Denktash never
touched the fire with his bare hands; he always touched the fire with tongs’\textsuperscript{73}
TMT survivor, leftist Kamil Tuncel, later discovered that it was the men of TMT
strong-man Topal Mahmut Colak that attempted to execute him.\textsuperscript{74}

By the end of May 1958 it was obvious that important events were
accumulating under the summer Cypriot clouds. A leaflet by the TMT Youth

\textsuperscript{68} TMT proclamation, 31 May 1958, 221/58, CO 926/852, TNA.
\textsuperscript{69} Turkey’s Expansionist Designs, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{70} Personal interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006.
\textsuperscript{71} Personal interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006.
\textsuperscript{72} Personal interview with A.A., 2 July 2007; Personal interview with Hasan Demirag, 5
September 2006.
\textsuperscript{73} Personal interview with A.A., Nicosia, 2 July 2007.
\textsuperscript{74} Personal interview with Kiamil Tuncel, 25 February 2006.
Branch recovered in Nicosia on 27 May, invited the Turkish youth of Cyprus into duty ‘to save Turkish independence and the Turkish Republic’, and emphasized the need to prepare for conditions which ‘may be very unfavourable’. A TMT leaflet — responding to the EOKA proclamation headed ‘Boyd is pouring oil over the fire’ — accused, on 28 May, the ‘Secretary of State for Slaverries’ and declared that EOKA was ‘in a ridiculous state of crisis’. In highly inflammatory language the Political Committee — instead of Central Committee — warned EOKA and the Greeks of Cyprus, ‘these mentally unbalanced people’, that they will be treated ‘as they were treated in Smyrna ... thrown out into the sea ... buried in the waters of the Mediterranean’. Reaffirming ‘the national fury and the determination’ of the Turkish nation and the Cypriot Turks, it gave a raw warning:

Today the Turks of Cyprus are a volcano. No one can play with it. The slightest action, whether on the part of their English masters or themselves ... will be enough to set this volcano ablaze. It would happen in a matter of seconds. In such an event the island will become the scene of a conflict never recorded in history before.

The TMT offensive against the Greek population: Taksim versus Enosis

Day after day, the content of TMT proclamations became more provocative and harsh; the stormy clouds were approaching the island, while the unsuspected Greeks and EOKA were blindly preoccupied in their anti-colonial struggle. The apocalyptic TMT leaflet of 7 June, distributed in Nicosia, informed the Turks of the island that ‘we are getting ready for our freedom which is expected to begin at any moment’ with the aim of Ya Taksim Ya Olum. The leaflet warned ‘the traitors who are out to exploit the situation and besmirch the name of the organization’ asking for money, that its ‘killer teams’ would take necessary action. Similarly, another TMT leaflet distributed in Larnaca on the same day, reaffirmed that ‘our control of the market continues’ and warned those sending

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75 TMT proclamation, 29 May 1958, 218/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
76 TMT proclamation, 28 May 1958, 216/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
77 TMT proclamation, 7 June 1958, 236/58, CO 926/941, TNA.
threatening letters, ‘making use of the organization’s signature’, that they ‘will be shot at once’. Addressing the Turkish youth, the Central Committee declared that ‘the day is near when you will be called upon to sacrifice your life and blood in the Taksim struggle – the struggle for freedom’.  

The consistency of Turkish underground methodology was impressive. The excuse for the eruption of the Cypriot Turk ‘volcano’ against the Greek population appeared on the same night, when an obscure bomb explosion – similar to the one that exploded at Ataturk’s house in Salonica in September 1955 – at the information office of the Turkish Consulate in Nicosia, triggered an explosive wave of violence against Greek life and property, that lasted for sixty days. Denktash, without admitting any involvement to the incident, asserts that, years later, he learned that the provocation was orchestrated by two individuals – TMT member Hazim Remzi and Turkish employee at the building Dundar Arcayurek – without the knowledge of the organization. But former leading TMT cadre Hasan Demirag reveals that the order for the provocation, came to Ismail Sadikoglu through Hazim Remzi; Sadigoglu had disclosed that the order was directly given by Rauf Denktash. The manufacturing of the device was undertaken by Sadikoglu and Demirag, who was working at the time in the dry-cleaning business of Sadikoglu, while the actual throwing of the bomb against its Turkish target, was carried out by Demirag and Alpay Mustapha. A few days later the colonial administration, in a secret report to the Governor, revealed that ‘evidence suggests ... that the bomb was exploded by Turkish Cypriots as a pretext for attacks on Greek property’.

The destruction that followed the explosion at the information office was devastating, causing, according to the official colonial list, the death of 107

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78 TMT proclamation, Larnaca, 7 June 1958, 237/58, CO 926/941, TNA.
79 Personal interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006.
80 Personal interview with Hasan Demirag, 5 September 2006; The names of the three Cypriot Turks that were responsible for the manufacture and placement of the bomb are revealed for the very first time.
81 Account of incidents of 7th-13th June, Secret, (26 June 1958), CO 926/926, TNA.
civilians – 56 Greeks and 51 Turks – as well as 8 Turkish policemen. The colonial fatality list demonstrates the different means of death and the magnitude of violence employed by each community. Out of 59 Turks killed by EOKA, between 7 June and 5 August 1958, 47 (79.7%) were shot with a gun, while 12 (20.3%) died from other causes. The corresponding data for the Greek victims was terrifying. Out of 56 fatal casualties, only 16 (28.6%) were shot; the other 40 (71.4%) were fatally wounded after they had been stabbed, butchered, or beaten to death. Five of the Greek victims – Theocharis Panagi, 64, Charidimos Antoniou, 77, Panayiota Aristodemou, 70, Christos Costa, 75 and his wife Panayiota Kosta, 75 – were beheaded, while Eleni Costa, 64, was mutilated, because she refused to obey the TMT order to abandon her house in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia; her husband Kostas Elia, 76, obeyed the order and survived.

Although the summer inter-communal conflict was skillfully presented as the spontaneous response of the Turks against a Greek ‘provocation’, the eruption of the Taksim offensive was preceded by a series of co-incidents. On 23 May, Dr Kutchuk and Denktash departed for Ankara, according to Reuters, after a Turkish Government invitation for talks on the Cyprus affair and the British proposals that were planned to be announced on 17 June. On 27 June, Dr Kutchuk’s Halkin Sesi announced in a provocative article that the Greeks would attack the Turks on 1 June and that ‘an order was given to raise Greek flags outside their houses’. The newspaper concluded that ‘the Turks are fearless and each one is able to confront fifty Greeks’, and prophetically warned that ‘we will respond with terrible reprisals against the Greeks if they attack us’. In a joint statement from Ankara, Dr Kutchuk and Denktash asserted that the two communities could not live together and that ‘in any

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82 Official casualty list in Crasahaw, The Cyprus Revolt, p. 408. The catalogue of Greek victims in Papachrysostomou, Archelon Pesonton, presents the names of 63 Individuals killed between 7 June-5 August 1958.

83 List of killed or mutilated by the Turks, in Papachrysostomou, Archelon Pesonton, pp. 49-60.

84 Xaravgi, 23 May 1958, p. 4.

85 Halkin Sesi quoted in Xaravgi, 29 May 1958, p. 4.
moment one community may attack against the other'. Dr Kutchuk boasted that
the Turkish community will demonstrate what may be done with arms or
without arms. We will die but we will not become prisoners. Partition or
Death'.86 A few weeks after the outbreak of the TMT offensive, the leading war
historian Capt. Cyril Falls, accused Turkey of 'incitement to violence'. Dr
Kutchuk and Denktash, said Falls, had meetings with the Turkish President and
the Foreign Minister (26 May), and held discussions with the Defence and
Press Ministers (29 May) in Ankara. On 3 June, at the invitation of Prime
Minister Menderes they arrived in Istanbul, and on that day the Turkish council
of ministers had a Cyprus meeting that lasted for six hours; later the two
Cypriot Turks were received by premier Menderes.87 Eventually, on 6 June,
Rauf Denktash returned to Cyprus; on the following day the Taksim offensive
began.

The throwing of 'the bomb' by Demirag and Mustapha on the night of 7
June, gave the signal for the eruption of a three-hour inferno of arson, bombing,
shooting, stone-throwing, stubbing and beating. The invasion of furious Turkish
crowds within Greek neighborhoods in Nicosia, caused the death of two
innocent Greeks, the wounding of many others, and the destruction of
extensive property, including the burning of Olympiakos Club.88 On the
following day Turkish attacks in Larnaca caused the death of two more Greeks
and the serious wounding of many others, while gradually the violent attacks
spread on the whole island. The vandalism and destruction of Greek property in
all towns, the looting of shops and the furious attacks against the Greeks
continued uninhibited in the following days.89 TMT, unable to track down the
invisible underground EOKA network, turned its ferocity against innocent and
unprotected civilians.

86 Xaravgi, 1 June 1958, p. 6.
87 Times of Cyprus, 1 July 1958, p. 1.
88 Cyprus Mail, 8 June 1958, p. 1
89 Cyprus Mail, 9 June 1958 p. 1; Xaravgi, 10 June 1958, pp. 1 and 4; Philoleftheros, 11 June
On 12 June, the arrest, by the security forces, of a group of 35 villagers from Kontemenos, turned into a massacre, when, under obscure conditions, the Greek villagers intentionally released outside the Turkish village of Geunyeli were ordered to walk to their village which was 13.5 miles away. The suspicious interaction between the security forces and Turkish auxiliary policemen from Geunyeli, soon turned into a horrific attack of a crowd of Turks, lead by two motorcycles, that ended with the mutilation of eight Greeks – shot and stubbed to death with multiple wounds – and the serious wounding of many others. The *Geunyeli Massacre*\(^9^9\) shocked the Greek population. The vague official inquiry of the incident had found no responsibility to the security forces,\(^9^1\) while the preliminary inquiry against twelve Turks – including PC Yusuf Mevlet, *Mobile Reserve* PC Ozkan Hussein, and RAF APC Veli Ahmed Avdji – identified by their victims, ended with the trial of nine of them, accused of the premeditated murder of the eight Greeks, and their eventual release; the case was considered closed, in what effectively amounted to a cover-up.\(^9^2\)

Uninhibited Turkish attacks continued during the whole month of June against anything that was Greek. Three Greek Orthodox churches – Agios Lucas, Agios Iakovos, and Agios Demetrianos – in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia were no exception, all of which were broken into, looted, desecrated and finally burned.\(^9^5\) Hermes street, the most commercial road in Nicosia, was deserted because of the Turkish attacks, while the municipal market in the Turkish quarter of the town was forcefully occupied. Arson damaged the Pallas Cinema and the Ardath cigarette factory, in Nicosia, the Lanitis warehouses in Famagusta, while tens of Greek shops and houses were plundered and then burned. The fear exercised by TMT forced all Greeks and Armenians living in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia to abandon their houses which were immediately

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\(^9^2\) *Times of Cyprus*, 3 August 1958, p. 3; *Times of Cyprus*, 23–30 August 1958, various pages.

occupied by Turks. Violent attacks against the Greek neighborhoods of Agios Kassianos and Chrysaliniotissa and the suburb of Omorphita disrupted life and forced the Greek inhabitants to move away into safety.  

Despite the Governor’s reassurances, many of the Greek houses were forcefully occupied by Turkish families. This human catastrophe unfolded in a Crown colony, the security forces of which remained indifferent, causing the strong reaction of the Greek population who accused the colonial administration of pro-Turk discrimination and demanded the immediate disbandment of the *Mobile Reserve* and the Auxiliary Police. 

Grivas admitted that EOKA was taken by surprise since it did not expect the Turkish attacks, and that was the reason that the special anti-Turkish groups of the *Plan T-P* in Nicosia were very late in their mobilization during the first days of the *Taksim* offensive. 

Despite his previous directives for the preparation of a self-defence mechanism, the TMT offensive found the Greek population completely unprepared. Immediately after the outbreak of violence, the Greek population – in all towns and villages – alerted by the danger of the Turkish attacks, started to organize community meetings in the village churches and the town halls, to elect special committees that were assigned the duty of organizing a local *Poliotofylakti* [Civil guard]. 

Indicative of the complete absence of any self-defence mechanism is the fact that the community meetings were held publicly – not in secrecy – and the names of the committee members were often announced in the Greek press, which was reporting, day after day, the rapid spread of the civil guard teams. The committees included representatives from the leftist trade union PEO, the rightist trade union SEK, EAEM, and other public organizations. The *Omades Alloamynis* [Self-defence groups] were
composed of volunteers, Greek men aged eighteen to fifty, armed with wooden sticks and other improvised defensive weapons, that were assigned night guard duties in areas of danger such as the Archbishopric palace in Nicosia, Greek schools and churches near the Turkish quarters or neighborhoods, other important buildings, as well as Greek houses and shops.

According to Grivas the Turkish attacks aimed at demonstrating that the co-existence between the Greeks and the Turks was impossible, at breaking the morale of the Greek population in order to enforce the unacceptable – to the Cypriot Greeks – MacMillan Plan, and at compelling EOKA to fight a two-fronted struggle against both the British and the Turks. Digenis acknowledging the grave danger of the Turkish offensive, was not carried away by the violence of events, causing the complaint of Archbishop Makarios that EOKA had not given a lesson to the Turks. In his 26 June austere reply to Makarios, Grivas indicated that 'the British had set a trap so that I engage and reveal my forces, in order that they give me a fatal blow'. The inequality of the June fatal casualties – sixteen Greek civilians (89%) against two Turk civilians (11%) and one Turkish policeman – are indicative of Grivas's hesitation to enter hurriedly into counter-action.

The self-restraint of EOKA – translated by TMT as a deficiency, an inability for reaction – accompanied by the indifference of the security forces to restore order, strengthened TMT violence against the Greeks. A proclamation distributed in Nicosia two days after the outbreak of the offensive, threw provocatively the responsibility for the 'most ferocious Greek acts of barbarism' to 'these maddened Greek dogs':

_Boiling like a volcano ... to prevent the filthy Greek boot ... have given to the perfidious Levantine English bastards ample proof of what the Turks are able of doing. We have avenged tenfold our few wounded brothers ... the number of Greeks shot and killed by_

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96 Grivas, _Apomnemonevmata_, p. 257.
97 _Cyprus Statement of Policy_, Cmnd. 455.
98 Grivas, _Apomnemonevmata_, p. 258.
our organization is very great ... our struggle for independence has commenced ...

Partition or Death.\textsuperscript{102}

It was obvious that TMT, not only manipulated the pro-Turk tolerance of the colonial administration, but was completely indifferent to British objectives, pursuing its own strategy of provocation, violence, harassment, and death. On 11 June, a TMT leaflet declared that 'we, Turks, are resolved to die ... to defend to the last drop of our blood this heavenly fatherland, which our forefathers have left to us'. It concluded that 'our decision is final. We shall convert Cyprus into a cemetary and the Mediterranean sea into a coffin for you and for your shameless English masters'.\textsuperscript{103} Another leaflet circulated in Larnaca, advised the Turks to 'keep in your houses such defensive objects as knives, axes, sledge hammers, pointed tools, large stones, boiling water, especially petrol'.\textsuperscript{104}

While, in its short life, TMT copied various of its operational and ideological conceptions from EOKA – such as the passive resistance campaign, the anti-communist hatred, the imposition of its directives on the community, and the execution of alleged traitors – there were also important cultural differences between them: EOKA never used in its proclamations such obscene language, against either the British or the Turks; until June 1958, EOKA never targeted Turkish civilians in its operations, the only exception were the Turkish members of the security forces, the strikes against whom were not racially motivated; the EOKA means of inflicting death against its opponents – British, Greek or Turk – was always the handgun, the military rifle or the hunting gun. EOKA never used axes, butcher knives, and other improvised sharp instruments to impose death, and there are no recorded cases of barbarous acts such as the stabbing, butchering, or decapitation of its victims.

The offensive caused also unpredictable problems within the Turkish community, and the TMT leadership tried hard to control the internal situation by issuing strict directives. The Central Committee 'ordered that no Turk shall

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{102} TMT proclamation, 9 June 1958, 240/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
\textsuperscript{103} TMT proclamation, 11 June 1958, 249/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
\textsuperscript{104} TMT proclamation, 14 June 1958, 257/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
\end{flushleft}
leave Cyprus under any pretext whatsoever, and threatened severe punishment to those seeking to escape abroad.\textsuperscript{105} Exploiting ‘these dark days’, some unknown individuals, particularly in Ktima, circulated unauthorized leaflets with the signature of TMT asking their fellow Turks for a generous financial aid to the organization.\textsuperscript{103} This caused great concern to the Central Committee which issued a strict warning against those sending threatening letters or those exploiting the organization’s signature.\textsuperscript{107} On 30 June, TMT published a ‘Black List’ of Cypriot Turks that were either supporting British interests or acted against the community, such as ‘the family of Sir Munir, who for years served the English’, the Commissioner of Famagusta Faik Muftizade who ‘is doing his best to destroy Turkish nationalism’, the pro-British Kemal Bey who was dismissed from EFKAV for misappropriating 10,000 Pounds, the Police Superintendent M. Niazi, and many others.\textsuperscript{108}

The Turkish offensive for Taksim, not only caused great fear to the Greek population of the island, but also endangered the national strategic objective for Enosis. The silence of EOKA during June, and the passivity of the colonial administration and its security forces, made TMT action uninhibited. The continual TMT attacks against unprotected Greeks, injured and indiscriminately killed every day on the island, started to make EOKA patience run out. On 30 June, the injury of a Greek on the Nicosia-Famagusta road brought the retaliation of EOKA, members of which shot and killed a Turk in Limassol;\textsuperscript{109} the first intentional fatal casualty of an innocent Turkish civilian since the beginning of the EOKA campaign. It became apparent that Grivas would eventually have to face a two-fronted situation, where the temporary primary objective would focus on the as-soon-as possible elimination of Turkish underground action, to clear the ground for the continuation of the anti-colonial

\textsuperscript{104}TMT proclamation, 29 June 1958, 283/58, CO 926/941, TNA.
\textsuperscript{105}TMT proclamations, 15 June 1958, 262/58, CO 926/352, and 24 June 1958, 274/58, CO 926/941, TNA.
\textsuperscript{107}TMT proclamation, 5 July 1958, 300/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
\textsuperscript{108}TMT proclamation, 30 June 1958, 299/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
\textsuperscript{109}Grivas, \textit{Apomnemonevmata}, p. 284.
objective. The growing Turkish attacks against Greeks forced Grivas, on 3 July, to issue a special order regarding self-defence that included the possibility of counter-attack. The horrifying butchering of two 60-year old shepherds in Tymbou on 8 July, brought, the following day, the immediate reaction of Digenis who issued a very important order. He authorized the attacks against police stations — the Turkish policemen being the main targets — and lifted all existing restrictions regarding the execution of Turks. The nucleus of his plan was to undertake limited counter-attacks against the Turks, without wearing down his underground forces, in order to demolish their morale through violence, and raise, through successful acts, the morale of the Greek population. On 10 July, the mutilation of 10-year shepherd Christakis Vyzakos and the cold-blood murder of Nun Agathoniki and Monk Nektarios by the Turks, caused the immediate retaliation of EOKA. In an ambush of a bus near Sinda, EOKA killed five Turks and injured many others. The Greek ambush brought the immediate retaliation of TMT, which continued its attacks against Greek life and property. On 18 July, Grivas lifted all restriction against Turkish targets, and authorized his sector commanders to undertake counter-attack operations against the Turks. The colonial casualty list for July, clearly demonstrated the prevailing equilibrium after the reaction of EOKA: Beyond the execution of four Turkish policemen, out of 72 civilian deaths, 28 were Greek (39%) and 44 were Turk (61%).

The decisive anti-Turk operations of EOKA, dramatically changed the content of TMT proclamations. On 11 July, the Central Committee announced, for the first time since the beginning of its Taksim offensive, the need for 'the adoption by us of urgent and effective measures and the maintenance of constant vigilance in the towns and the villages'. TMT warned that 'if the EOKA-

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11 Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 268.
14 Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 269.
15 Official casualty list in Orashaw, The Cyprus Revolt, p. 409.
sponsored armed Greek attacks on innocent and unarmed Turks continue, we will retaliate not with a blow for a blow, but with double force.\textsuperscript{116} Two days later the Central Committee, referring to the Sinda ambush by EOKA, praised in a mourning mood 'the death of our five martyrs' and assured that it 'will definitely be avenged'. The proclamation, ordered the community to 'hold ourselves in a state of readiness'. 'The effect of our blow will be so terrific that it will be impossible for them to recover. We have an account to settle with Lyssi. It will be our bounden duty to wipe off this village from the Cyprus map'.\textsuperscript{117} Another proclamation complaining about EOKA action against the Turks, turned into an anti-British condemnation:

\textit{Our community has no more faith in either the British Government or Foot's administration. Foot ... has been helping the EOKA criminals secretly. We do not want such a Governor. Damn him! ... Enough with British oppression!}

The Central Committee also warned the 'profit-seekers and opportunists' and the merchants that sold goods in black market prices, that will be severely punished.\textsuperscript{118} The situation turned critical since it unfolded uncontrollable into a civil war. By 14 July, the Governor, alarmed by the magnitude of the disorder, was 'urgently considering' the imposition of measures, including the proscription of TMT and the arrest of some of its members.\textsuperscript{119} But the affair was not so simple for the British Government which had been 'repeatedly warned from Ankara that any such action will provoke a sharp reaction from the Turkish Government'.\textsuperscript{120} The alternative – revealing of colonial manipulations – plans prepared by Foot's Director of Operations involved the arrest of 3000 EOKA members and 70 members of TMT.\textsuperscript{121} On the following day, the Colonial Office

\textsuperscript{116}TMT proclamation, 11 July 1958, 318/58, CO 926/852, TNA.

\textsuperscript{117}TMT proclamation, 13 July 1958, 326/58, CO 926/852, TNA.

\textsuperscript{118}TMT proclamation, 20 July 1958, 337/58, CO 926/852, TNA.

\textsuperscript{119}Governor Foot to Colonial Office, No. 1100, 14 July 1958, Secret, CO 926/940, TNA.

\textsuperscript{120}Ross, Colonial Office, 14 July 1958, Secret, FO 371/136281, TNA.

\textsuperscript{121}Governor Foot to Colonial Office, No. 1106, 14 July 1958, Secret, CO 926/940, TNA.
stated its raw hesitation for Foot's desperation for action against TMT, the principal object of which, according to the Governor, was 'to bring about partition by communal disturbances'. Eventually the massive arrest of 1500 Greeks on 22 July was followed, during the same night, by the arrest of 59 Turks, the vast majority of whom neither belonged to the hard-core nucleus of TMT nor had any relation to the organization. According to A.A., leading TMT member Kemal Shemi revealed to him that the list for the arrest of alleged TMT members was prepared by Rauf Denktash and himself in cooperation with British officers of the security forces. TMT was finally proscribed as an unlawful association on 23 July, after the formal consent of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Indicative of the colonial success against TMT is Turkish Cypriot reaction. In a meeting with the colonial authorities, Turkish leaders Denktash and Orek 'appeared to be relaxed and cheerful' and Denktash even remarked that 'It was a great pity it [the Government] had delayed this action until the Turks had put their foot in it but he hoped it was not too late for them to pull it out'.

On 27 July, a new TMT proclamation described in an apologetic language 'the hardest days of our struggle' and indicated, for the very first time, traces for a unilateral compromise:

Our organization is willing to assume a spectator's role, provided that the Greeks do not attack the Turks, and provided that they do not force us to retaliate. Our action of tomorrow will depend on what happens to us today ... We will not touch them if they do

122 Colonial Office to Foot, No. 1005, 15 July 1958, Secret, FO 371/136281, TNA.
123 Governor Foot to Colonial Office, No. 1128, 17 July 1958, Secret, FO 371/136281, TNA.
124 Halkin Sesi, 16 August 1997, p. 4.
127 Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor Foot, No. 1061, 22 July 1958, Top Secret, FO 371/136281, TNA.
128 Foot to Colonial Office, No. 1192, 23 July 1958, Secret, FO 371/136281, TNA.
not touch us. We shall be patiently waiting for the end of the Foot-Grivas fight. All our armed groups have been given the necessary orders.\textsuperscript{129}

In the meantime, the secret arrival of Turkish Army Lieutenant Colonel Riza Vurushkan, at the end of July 1958, was accompanied by a TMT showdown, -- fifteen Greeks were killed during the first five days of August -- probably intended to impress the new commander. The appeals of the Greek and British Prime Ministers and of Archbishop Makarios for a ceasefire, as well as the severe Greek fatalities from TMT attacks, led Grivas, on the night of 4 August 1958, to issue an order for the temporary cease-fire against the British and the Turks until 10 August.\textsuperscript{130}

On the following day TMT issued her own order for the termination of action,\textsuperscript{131} thus putting a temporary end to inter-communal bloodshed. The rapid progression of diplomatic manoeuvres in the secret negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers might have led into a political settlement in Zurich and London, but the deep scars, the hatred and the fear of the Cypriot people could not easily be erased.

\textsuperscript{129} TMT proclamation, 27 July 1958, CO 926/952, TNA.

\textsuperscript{130} Pastrika, [Clear Message], EOKA proclamation, 4 August 1958, MAE.

\textsuperscript{131} TMT proclamation, 5 August 1958, 359/58, CO 926/952, TNA
Chapter V

The ideological chasm in the post-EOKA era and the formation of Greek underground paramilitary organizations

The effort to control the fighters

The desperation of the Greek Government — since October 1956 — for the indefinite shelving of self-determination," to get the Cyprus issue out of the way" — even with partition,³ accompanied by the aggressive, nothing-to-lose policy of the Menderes Government over Cyprus, the shocking fatalities of TMT's Taksim offensive, as well as the acute threat from the 'Adventure in Partnership' - the MacMillan Plan, prescribed the abandonment of almost all Greek political inhibitions towards the achievement of a settlement. The secret negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Governments,⁵ initiated by Fatin Zorlu on 6 December 1958, ended up — in record time for such a perplexed issue — into the signing of the controversial Zurich and London Agreements.⁶

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1 Averof quoted in Ankara to Foreign Office, No. 828, 12 October 1956, Secret, CO 926/277, TNA.
2 Averof quoted in Athens to Foreign Office, No. 896, 11 October 1956, Top Secret, FO 371/123930, TNA.
3 According to documentary indications the concept of partition originated from Averof: Ankara to Foreign Office, No. 829, 12 October 1956, Secret, FO 371/123930, TNA; internal Colonial Office memo of W.A. Morris to E. Melville, 16 October 1956, CO 926/277, TNA.
A vague parameter that would have severe repercussions on the post-colonial stability of Greek Cypriot politics, revolved around the role of Archbishop Makarios in the signing of the agreements and the complete disregard of EOKA. Despite the rather theatrical opposition of Makarios against the fait accompli manipulations of the Karamanlis government, the Archbishop — who finally gave his consent and signed the agreement — had intentionally left his military commander Digenis uninformed. Afraid of the strong reaction of Grivas over the complete derailment of Greek Cypriot objectives, Makarios invited various political personalities from Cyprus — including five communists from AKEL — as his political advisers, but awkwardly avoided to inform EOKA or invite its representatives to the London Conference.

The signing of the agreements on 19 February 1959 was followed by eighteen days of cold EOKA silence; Digenis, in his last proclamation to his men wrote:

*From the announcement of the Zurich Agreement until today I have passed through grave moments of agony, and weighed my responsibilities towards you, towards Cyprus, towards Panhellenism; if it was right to accept an agreement that was not completely satisfying our aspirations or if it was proper to reject it and continue the struggle.*

Fearing that ‘a fratricidal discord’ would bring ‘the destruction of Cyprus’ and realizing that he ‘was obliged to accept the agreements’, Grivas ordered, on 9 March 1959, the termination of the armed struggle and advised his men that ‘egotism and personal ambitions should be subjugated by the wishes of the Etnarch [Archbishop Makarios], to whom you owe absolute obedience’.

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7 The agreements developed into a constitutional partnership where the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus (Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks) had to transform themselves into Cypriots (Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots).

8 *Pros tous Agonistas tis EOKA* [To the EOKA fighters], EOKA proclamation, 9 March 1959, MAE.

9 *Diatagi* [Order], EOKA proclamation, March 1959, MAE.

10 ‘Pros tous Agonistas tis EOKA’, MAE.

11 ‘Gennoei Maxitai tis EOKA’ [Brave fighters of EOKA], EOKA proclamation, March 1959, MAE.
Caring deeply about the 'future of the organization', Grivas stressed the importance of the integration of EOKA members under a national organization and proposed the establishment of *Eiriniko Metopo Anademiourgias* (EMA) [Peaceful reconstruction front], under a central five-member committee in Nicosia and three-member committees in all former EOKA sectors.\(^\text{12}\)

A critical question arising after four years of dynamic and violent underground action, was the rehabilitation – and consequently the political control – of former EOKA fighters. After the compulsory departure of military leader *Digenis* for Athens, Makarios, despite his acclaimed political prestige, realized that he was unable, to exercise on his own full control over the hard-line fighters. Thus, an ambitious former EOKA sector commander, Polykarpos Giorkadjis-Kikeron, found the golden opportunity to infiltrate in this gap, enforcing himself as the closest associate of Makarios.\(^\text{13}\) The Archbishop’s dependence on former EOKA men, for his ascent to the presidency of the Republic and the implementation of his political agenda, led silently into the rise of Giorkadjis into the No. 2 position of Greek Cypriot internal affairs, and consequently into the tolerance – on behalf of Makarios – of innumerable political, financial, administrative, and personal misappropriations.

The first attempt of EOKA sector commanders – under the invisible guidance of Giorkadjis – for the organization of all former members under one political identity appeared on 1 April 1959, when the formation of *Eniaion Democratikon Metopon Anadymiourgias* (EDMA) [Unified democratic reconstruction front] was announced, carrying the blessings of both Makarios

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\(^12\) ‘Dialagi’, MAE.

\(^13\) The fate of Giorkadjis (Minister of Interiors, 16 August 1960–1 November 1968) was tragic, since his alleged involvement in a murder attempt against Makarios on 8 March 1970, ended into his own murder on 15 March 1970; Panayiotis Papademitris and Andreas Neophytou, *Polykarpos Giorkadjis: Telefmes tou Stigmes* [Polykarpos Giorkadjis: His last moments] (Nicosia; [n. pub.], 1994), pp. 11-30, 228-358.
and Grivas. In an anonymous proclamation addressed to all members, signed by 'The Sector Commander', Giorkadjis ordered all former EOKA, PEKA and ANE members to follow the directions of the EDMA District Committee, and ironically indicated that virtues such as 'love, peace, unselfishness, self-sacrifice, unity and iron discipline' would guide towards 'the peaceful struggle for re-establishment and reconstruction'. The theoretical principles – morality, freedom, equality before the law, and social justice – the patriotic ideology, and the progressive political program of the new movement, brought almost hysterical enthusiasm – among former EOKA members and ordinary Greek Cypriots alike – for the post-EOKA prospects of the new state, and initiated its massive expansion in the following weeks.

But its life was destined to be short. The first ideological disagreement about the meaning of the 'achieved liberty' appeared on the day of the First EDMA Convention from former sector commander Photis Papaphotis. In the meantime, rumors about the alleged mishandling of funds – nobody knew exactly where the funds were coming from, but it was believed that EDMA was funded by Archbishop Makarios – the appointment of unsuitable former members into key positions, and the forceful imposition of the pro-Makarios EDMA directives on anybody opposing or disagreeing with them – Praxitelis Vogazianos, a former member of the elite execution groups was attacked and beaten, when he publicly asked Giorkadjis the whereabouts of an alleged secret EOKA sum, intended for the purchase of arms, in the hands of the

17 Personal interview with Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006.
18 Personal interview with Mikis Michailides, 14 January 2009.
Nicosia sector commander\textsuperscript{19} \textendash; led rapidly to its decline.\textsuperscript{20} By October 1959, six months after its establishment, Makarios referred to the need ‘for the re-organization of EDMA on another basis’.\textsuperscript{21}

Immediately after the dissolution of EOKA, Kikeron \textendash; the Nicosia sector commander who became known for his miraculous escapes (as EOKA’s Houdini, since under obscure conditions he managed to escape from British custody three times)\textsuperscript{22} and his controversial involvement in the disappearance (execution) of former Nicosia sector commander Giannakis Stephanides-Aineias,\textsuperscript{23} rather than his combat underground action \textendash; started to form an underground nucleus around him composed of former EOKA members. In pursuit of his disguised political ambitions, he began \textendash; as Minister of Labour and Social Services in the provisional government \textendash; organizing a personal intelligence network, for the collection of information about the post-EOKA internal affairs; for this purpose he covertly recruited Cyprus Police officer Georgios Lagodontis, who developed in 1959 and 1960, on behalf of Kikeron, an extensive information gathering network. In 1960 he also arranged for the training of Lagodontis and Cyprus Police officer Philapos lordanous in Athens, by the Greek secret information service.\textsuperscript{24} Former EOKA members were secretly recruited for the formation of his personal underground armed groups, which undertook the mission of enforcing the political line of Makarios and the invisible ambitions of Giorkadjis, by terrorizing their opponents. One such armed group terrorized the monks of Machairas Monastery,\textsuperscript{25} while similar

\textsuperscript{19} Personal interview with Praxitelis Vogazianos, 23 May 2006.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{21} Makarios to Grivas, 18 October 1959, in \textit{Krisima Ntikoumenta}, ed. by Papageorgiou, vol. 1, p. 192.


\textsuperscript{23} Makarios Drousiotis, \textit{EOKA}, pp. 133-147.

\textsuperscript{24} Georgios Lagodontis, \textit{Lagodontis Report to Grivas}, in \textit{To Vathi Kratos}, ed. by Ahmet An and others, pp. 185-222 (186-187).

\textsuperscript{25} Personal interview with Praxitelis Vogazianos, 23 May 2006.
attacks were carried out against K. Kyrou, the director of daily *Estia* in Athens, and against the director of opposition paper *Ethniki*, Loizos Kythreotis, who was seriously wounded.

The post-EOKA ideological chasm: The conspiracy of KEM and the underground anti-Zurich manipulations of PSA

The abandonment of *Enosis* and the de facto imposition of the *Zurich and London Agreements* on Grivas and EOKA – by the Greek government and indirectly by Archbishop Makarios – caused disappointment and bitterness to many former members, who refused to accept that the national aspiration was forever lost. The depressing atmosphere was further aggravated by the rather monopolistic manipulation of Greek Cypriot internal, social, and economic affairs, by Makarios and the EOKA men who attached themselves around him under Giorkadjis. The political aspirations of Grivas for the next parliamentary elections in Greece and the manipulative role of former members who traveled to Athens to inform *Digenis* about post-EOKA affairs, made things worse. By the end of July 1959, the rumours appearing in the press about the differences between the two leaders were substantiated. On 26 July, Makarios in a provocatively austere speech warned those who criticize the agreements and particularly ‘the circles in Athens’ [Grivas] that their personal ambitions, their opportunist attitude and egoism, were endangering the division of the Cypriot people. Grivas, in reply, publicly renounced the agreements and declared that ‘I will not hesitate to restart the struggle, and die if needed, to crush the dark

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29 Personal interview with Mikis Michailides, 14 January 2006.
powers here [in Athens] and in Cyprus, that are seeking the enslavement of the island.  

On 11 August 1959, the disagreement between the two former EOKA leaders became critical and hazardous, when a new underground organization under the name *Kypriakon Ethinkon Metopon* (KEM) [Cypriot national front] made its appearance, circulating leaflets against Archbishop Makarios. The organization — that caused the reaction of the Turkish Cypriot leadership — announced in its leaflets that ‘it will fight by all available peaceful means, if needed even by force, towards the fulfilment of our national aspirations and rights’. According to press reports, the new organization was affiliated to the supporters of Grivas and its objective was the achievement of Enosis. A letter that fell into the hands of Makarios, exchanged between the supporters of Grivas in Athens and Nicosia, criticising the 'stupid' Archbishop and encouraging the support of pro-Enosist bishop of Kyrenia, accompanied by press reports regarding the secret importation of arms from Athens, and an anonymous threat letter against Giorkadjis, complicated the situation. Despite Grivas's denial of any connection to KEM, the new underground organization sent a threat letter to Averof warning that ‘unless you are not careful, you should know that we do not punish only with words. After our glorious struggle, our hands do not tremble when they hold the pistol’. A new proclamation circulated by KEM on 30 August, threatened that the organization would

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execute Karamanlis and Averof if they ever thought of coming to Cyprus; 'As they have buried the Cyprus issue, we will bury them here as well'.

The conspiracy against Makarios and the agreements, under the alleged leadership of former sector commander and close associate of Grivas, Photis Papaphotis — who publicly denounced any involvement — culminated in the middle of September 1959, when press reports disclosed a secret plan according to which Archbishop Makarios, ministers Giorkadjis, Papadopoulos, and Paschalides, members of the EDMA Central Committee and others from a proscription list of 60 individuals, would be arrested and executed on 14 August 1959. The objective of the plan was to assign the archbishopric throne to the pro-Enosist bishop of Kyrenia, to cause the derailment of the implementation of the agreements, and to continue the struggle for Enosis. Although the KEM plan is denied today as a fabrication, some subsequent activities of the individuals allegedly involved in the conspiracy, denote that the plan might have not been a remote impossibility. A few months later, at the end of January 1960, three pro-Grivas Cypriot students — Renos Kyriakides, Michael Christodoulou, Andreas Andoniou — were arrested in Athens in possession of automatic weapons, handguns and ammunition.

In the meantime, despite the absence of any visible reasons, EDMA gradually disappeared (Diagram 4), failing to accomplish the idealist and patriotic promises it offered a few months earlier. While publicly declared the importance of creating a Republic, founded on social justice, morality and

31 Phileleftheros, 1 September 1959, p. 6.
32 Personal interview with Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006.
33 In September 1971 Grivas returned secretly to Cyprus and established an underground paramilitary organization under the name EOKA B. Among its members were the individuals that were allegedly involved in the KEM conspiracy and later became members of PSA; their objective was to overthrow by force the government of Archbishop Makarios and declare Enosis. The underground operation of EOKA B included attempts against the life of Makarios, executions of pro-Makarios supporters, as well as bomb attacks and raids against police stations.
34 Ethniki, 29 January 1960, p. 6.
respect, in reality, Makarios silently acknowledged the underground domination of the political life by Giorkadjis, that invisibly served the Archbishop's own personal ambitions and political plans as well. Papaphotis observes that 'when Makarios had the need of somebody, he was willing to give him anything in order to have him by his side'. Numerous unqualified former EOKA members, loyal to Giorkadjis and subsequently to Makarios, were appointed to key positions in the police force, the government, and other public services, offered substantial salaries, material privileges, and social status. A. Efstathiou, N. Ioannou, L. Stephanides, A. Nikolaides were only a few of those who, without any specialized qualification or training other than their former EOKA membership, undertook key positions in the police force; feeling indebted to Giorkadjis for their appointment, they would not hesitate to become the executioners of his underground ambitions.

On 15 July 1960, ninety three former members – pro-Grivas supporters – opposing the agreements decided to establish Pangyprios Syndesmos Agoniston (PSA) [Pancyprian fighters' association], with the objective of pursuing 'the continuation of the 1 April 1955 fighting spirit'. The formation of the new association caused the immediate reaction of Denktash who declared that there were many Turks willing to die in order to defend the rights earned by the agreements. The failure of the association's four candidates in the parliamentary elections of 31 July 1960, was followed by a revelation in pro-Makarios daily Phileleftheros that 'a group of extremists conspires against the Cyprus Republic'. According to the report, former EOKA members opposing the agreements, in a secret meeting held in Nicosia, were planning to place bombs in various parts of Nicosia in order to create inter-communal incidents on 16 August 1960, the Independence Day.

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44 Personal interview with Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006.
45 Eleftheria, 17 July 1960, p. 6.
PSA, composed solely of pro-Grivas supporters, gradually developed into a strong anti-Makarios opposition. The aggressive background history of some of its hard-line members and the monolithic administration of Makarios-Giorkadjis were not foreshadowing a tranquil life for PSA. The first serious incidents between PSA and the underground groups of Giorkadjis unfolded on 15 January 1961, the eleventh anniversary of the Enosis plebiscite, when PSA announced its intention to hold a peaceful parade in the streets of Nicosia. During the previous night armed men of Ethniki Pneumatiki Estia (EPE) — established with the encouragement of Archbishop Makarios, under the control of Giorkadjis and his associate Lagodontis — were preparing to break into the premises of PSA and forcefully destroy the placards intended for the parade. The tension was deflated temporarily when the police, which had full knowledge of the ERE intentions, finally visited the premises and confiscated the placards. On the following day, armed masked men of ERE stopped, in the Nicosia-Mia Milia road, vehicles carrying PSA supporters from Trikomo and Akanthou and forced them to return to their villages. Police officer Theophanis Demetriou revealed that the armed groups of ERE were operating under government orders and that their arms were provided by the Archbishopric Palace. During the same day, the parade of PSA ended in violence, when members of ERE attacked and wounded many pro-Grivas members.

On 19 January 1960, Soteris Pedkios, a PSA member, was attacked by four masked men armed with clubs and handguns. In August 1961 a wave of violence against anybody opposing the Makarios regime, had serious repercussions. On 2 August, I. Ierides, one of Giorkadjis's police bodyguards, and D. Malas, a relative of Archbishop Makarios, attacked and injured Loukis.


Lagodontis Report, pp. 185-222 (204-207).

Demetriou, Politika Eglimata, p. 40.


Papaphilippou, a member of PSA’s Central Committee. On the following day, the vice president of DEK (Demokratiki Enosis Kyprou) [Democratic union of Cyprus], Dr Ioannis Polydorides was attacked by an armed man in his clinic, causing his severe wounding.\textsuperscript{54} In a written protest, DEK accused the government 'of abandoning the people of Cyprus into the mercy of the law of the jungle'.\textsuperscript{55} A few days later, on 14 August, two armed men attacked and seriously injured lawyer and DEK member, Kostas Shiakallis.\textsuperscript{56} The anti-PSA violence culminated on 16 August 1961, when police sergeants L.S., V.C. of the Information Service and policeman A. of the Strovolos Police School, under direct orders from the Minister of Interiors Polykarpos Giorkadjis executed, using a Sterling gun of the Service,\textsuperscript{57} two PSA members, Neoklis Panagiotou and Evripides Nouros.\textsuperscript{58} Giorkadjis, seeking to create confusion about the identity of the murderers, prepared a deceptive leaflet dated 15 August, that shifted the responsibility to a vendetta between members of the Limassol underworld.\textsuperscript{59} The reaction of PSA was immediate; it issued a leaflet stating that PSA did not trust the police and that its members, from that moment, were undertaking the responsibility for their self-protection. Papaphotis states that 'simultaneously with the circulation of the leaflets, we have thrown grenades and placed bombs in different villages, a reaction that earned our security; they realized that we were determined. They stopped and did not try to murder other fighters'.\textsuperscript{60}

The Pangyprios Syndesmos Agoniston was a legally registered association directed by a Central Committee in Nicosia under the chairmanship of its general secretary, dentist Dr Andreas Lambrou. The political line of PSA was dictated by the Central Committee – which issued frequent public

\textsuperscript{51} Machi, 4 August 1961, p. 1. \\
\textsuperscript{55} Ethniki, 10 August 1961, p. 1. \\
\textsuperscript{52} Ethniki, 16 August 1961, p. 1. \\
\textsuperscript{57} Lagodontis Report, pp. 185-222 (211-222). \\
\textsuperscript{58} Philaleftheros, 17 August 1961, p. 1/6. \\
\textsuperscript{59} A photocopy of the leaflet was published in Philaleftheros, 18 August 1961, p. 1. \\
\textsuperscript{60} Personal interview with Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006.
announcements that were reported in the opposition daily *Ethniki* — members of which visited Grivas in Athens, where they exchanged views and received *Digenis*’ directives.\(^{61}\) The district committees were responsible for the support of its members and the co-ordination of PSA activities in the districts, the most active of which were Nicosia and Famagusta, where there were local strongholds in villages such as Trikomo, Agios Memnonas, Lapatohos, Vokolida, Patriki, and Akanthou.\(^{62}\) An affiliate association under the name *Panspoudastikos Syndemos Agoniston Kyprou* (PSAK) [Cypriot student fighters’ association] was established in Athens on 25 March 1961 — the anniversary of the 1821 Greek War of Independence — with the objective of continuing the 1 April 1955 struggle for the achievement of the demand for *Enosis*.\(^{63}\) PSAK had a structure similar to PSA, directed by a Central Committee, under its general secretary Giannakis Spanos.

Beyond its visible facade, PSA and PSAK had organized underground armed groups under the command of Renos Kyriakides and Photis Ch. Papaphotis in Cyprus and under Photis K. Papaphotis in Greece. In December 1963 the British military intelligence estimated that the total underground manpower of PSA was 800 men, ‘the greater part of whom are armed’,\(^{64}\) and another estimation indicated that ‘680 were well armed, dispersed throughout the island’.\(^{65}\) While PSA could mobilize up to one thousand men, at the end of 1963 it was in possession of no more than one hundred military rifles, fifty of which were EOKA arms saved in the hands of Karpasia sector commander Papaphotis.\(^{66}\) Other arms were smuggled from Greece through connections with customs officers, while the most successful method was the throwing of sealed cases with arms, in the sea of Limassol, from passenger ships coming

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\(^{61}\) Personal interview with Dr Andreas Lambrou, 17 May 2006.


\(^{64}\) Annex to JIG (Cyprus) (63)-11, 20 December 1963, Top Secret, p. 2, CAB 191/6, TNA.

\(^{65}\) Paragraph 5 of FSIR No. 35 (Part II) of 29 November 1963, referred in JIG (Cyprus), Security Intelligence Report No. 37, 23 January 1964, Secret, p. 2, WO 386/2, TNA.

\(^{66}\) Personal Interview with Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006.
from Athens; the cases which carried floating indicators were secretly collected later by fishing boats. There were armed groups of PSA in Nicosia and Limassol, but Papaphotis admits that its armed bastion was his former EOKA sector in Karpasia. In one of the night training activities of a Karpasia group, on 17 August 1962, the gendarmerie, acting on information, set an ambush near Lithrangomi against the PSA group, that ended with an exchange of fire and the arrest of five of its members.

Kyriakides and Papaphotis, informed about the training activities of the underground paramilitary organization under Giorkadjis, decided to approach Colonel Kondylis, commander of Elliniki Dymanis Kyprou (ELDYK) [Greek Army Contingent in Cyprus], proposing the secret training of their men by Greek Army officers and the subordination of its armed groups under the command of ELDYK. Kyriakides had accepted the training of the PSA men on the condition of surrendering all its arsenal to ELDYK. The intervention of Papaphotis, who refused to surrender the PSA arms, eventually evaporated the hope for any co-operation with ELDYK.

Strangely, despite the assurances of its military leaders, that the underground elements of PSA were intended against the Turkish threat, when the inter-communal strife erupted on 21 December 1963, 'there have been no indications that they have taken active part in the recent disturbances'.

Probably the truth lies in the words of Papaphotis towards Digenis: 'The arms I possess will definitely protect us; actually they protected us from Makarios who was not democratic.'

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67 Personal Interview with Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006.
69 Personal Interview with Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006.
70 Ibid.; Personal Interview with Renos Kyriakides, Nicosia, 10 January 2006.
71 JIG (Cyprus), Security Intelligence Report No. 38, 17 January 1964, Secret, p. 2, WO 386/2, TNA.
72 Personal Interview with Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006.
The emergence of Nicos Samson and the manipulations of OPEK

The return of Nicos Samson Atrotos — a hard-line EOKA member of the Nicosia execution team, 'who now seems to be completely unbalanced' — on Independence Day, signaled more complications for the post-EOKA stability. Makarios and his associates, gravely worried about his behavior, decided 'to try to control him' after his return to the island. The beginning of the publication of weekly *Machi* [Battle] on 24 October 1960 initiated the unfolding of his ambiguous and naive political ambitions. *Machi*, under the editorship of Samson turned into a hyper-patriotic — with a strong anti-Turkish character — newspaper, expressing, not coincidentally, the ideas of both Makarios and Grivas, that quite often manipulated irresponsibly the Cypriot public opinion with exaggerated articles and exclusive stories about TMT, the alleged appearance of suspicious lights or submarines [Turkish] in the northern coast of Cyprus, and fabricated inside information of Cypriot Turk affairs.

The former EOKA hard-liner with 'the talent of having the most firm hand in Cyprus, with the pistol and the Sten gun,' began attracting around him a number of supporters that initially formed the 'Nicos Samson Movement'. Among them, the Nicosia police director Michalakis Pandelides — who felt disappointed for his non-appointment in the position of police chief by Giorkadjis, police officer Lagodontis, and many other policemen. Atrotos [invulnerable], frequently expressed complains that he was not offered any position in the young Republic; he felt that he was unfairly treated, since he

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71 Governor Foot to Colonial Office, 5 August 1960, No. 582, Secret and Personal, CO 926/1472, TNA.
74 Governor Foot to Colonial Office, 5 August 1960, No. 582, Secret and Personal, CO 926/1472, TNA.
78 *Phileleítheros*, 14 October 1959, pp. 1/6.
was not appointed Minister of Interior, considering his contribution to EOKA as more important than that of Kikeron.\footnote{Demetrikou, \textit{Politiki Eglitima}, pp. 36-37.}

Samson, feeling Giorkadjis’ cold distance and the caution of Makarios towards him, blinded by his hunger for self-assertion and social reward for his contributions – executions – in the EOKA struggle, strove to force himself into the political scene, at any cost and by any means.\footnote{The director of Machi was awarded yesterday the golden Medal of glorious Messolongi; front page headline in \textit{Machi}, 11 August 1961, p. 1.} On 25 April 1961, the appearance of a new underground organization under the name \textit{Organosis Prostasias Ellinon Kyprion} (OPEK) [Organization for the protection of Greek Cypriots] made the already swampy waters more turbulent. The secret oath of OPEK, consisting of six articles, stated with clarity the objectives of the organization: ‘I swear to the holy bible that I will serve my distinct homeland Cyprus in order to complete the struggle that we started on 1 April 1955 under the leadership of Makarios-Digenis ... I will fight in all my power to abolish the joint sovereignty with the Turks and the British’.\footnote{OPEK oath, [n.d.], private collection SC, Nicosia.} According to its leaflets, signed by Chief \textit{Promitheas} [Samson], the objective of OPEK was ‘the safeguard of the endangering interests of Hellenism in suffering Cyprus’. \textit{Promitheas} asked the Cypriot Greek people to wake up and warned them not to sell even an inch of land to the Turks.\footnote{OPEK proclamation, reported in \textit{Ethniki}, 26 April 1961, p. 4.} Another OPEK leaflet circulated in Nicosia on 11 May 1961 warned that the violators of the organization’s order, not to sell Greek property to Turks, would be exemplary punished. ‘We will not allow Cyprus to become Turkish because some are indifferent to the interests of the whole.’\footnote{OPEK proclamation, reported in \textit{Phileleftheros}, 12 May 1961, p. 6.}

The following day, the cold-blooded execution of 36-year old British architect Peter Gray, in broad daylight, in front of his wife and two young children, left the Cypriot people speechless.\footnote{\textit{Phileleftheros}, 13 May 1961, p. 1.} Acting on information, Giorkadjis,
as Interior Minister, after receiving the approval of Archbishop Makarios, ordered the arrest of Samson and of his close associate Neoptolemos Georgiou Leftis. Makarios, shocked by the murder, offered a 20,000-Pound reward for information leading to the murderers. The two suspects – Samson had his hair cut and Leftis his huge mustache trimmed during their custody – after their non-identification by the eyewitnesses, were eventually released. A month later, an exclusive report of Machi, in an effort to justify the execution, identified Gray as an agent of MI6; it was another of Machi’s fabricated stories intended to manipulate Cypriot public opinion.

In another leaflet, OPEK condemned the ‘extremist elements’ of the ‘two factions [pro-Grivas PSA and pro-Makarios groups under Giorkadjis] that prepare the curse of brotherly bloodshed’ and warned the Greek Cypriots that the Turkish minority ‘will take advantage of our prepared killing one another’. OPEK, the leaflet assured, ‘is in a position to protect you against enemy intentions.’ Addressing the 28 October 1940 anniversary, Promitheas declared that ‘we are friends of peace and of harmonious coexistence’ but ‘we are not determined to stand an insignificant minority, asking to impose its will on the overwhelming majority of the Cypriot people’. Samson affirmed that ‘we are dedicated to safeguard by any means and with any sacrifice the sacred symbols of our struggle’ until ‘we reach the happy end of our national aspirations; OPEK is the sleepless guard of the interests of Greek Cyprus’.

Neoptolemos Georgiou Leftis, the closest associate of Promitheas, reveals that he and Samson began forming the first armed groups in April-May 1961, when OPEK emerged, to ‘offer protection from the Turks’. In the initial stages, the groups consisted of about thirty loyal men, that, in case of need,

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85 Lagodontis Report, pp. 185-222 (191-194).
86 Lagodontis, in Drousiotis, EOKA, pp. 385-386.
87 Machi, 14 June 1961, p. 1
88 OPEK proclamation, [n.d.], private collection SC, Nicosia.
89 ‘Menima pros ton Ellinikon Kyprioton Laon gia tin 28 Octovriou’ [Message to the Greek Cypriot people for the 28 October anniversary], OPEK proclamation, [n.d.], private collection SC, Nicosia.
would be armed with weapons secretly kept by Leftis; in 1962, the OPEK arsenal was further enriched with three Bren guns and six Aden guns stolen by Leftis from the British military installations at Nicosia airport.90

Makarios, realizing the growing power of Giorkadjis and his underground domination in the young Republic, while he did not agree with the irresponsible and provocative acts of Samson — his alleged involvement in the Peter Gray case, the anti-Turkish character of his newspaper Machi, the writing of OPEK slogans on walls near the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, and his racist hatred against the British and the Turks, among others — tolerated his behaviour, as a means of counter-balancing the power of his Interior Minister. Similarly, in 1963, he allowed the formation of another underground group under his political adviser, Dr Vasos Lyssarides, that became known as Omades Lyssaridi [Lyssarides groups]. Fearing the unpredictable and hard-line reaction of Samson, Giorkadjis did not hesitate to approach Promitheas’ strong-man Leftis; ‘the Organosis of Giorkadjis did not have good intentions. Giorkadjis wanted other things from us, but we did not accept to chase EOKA comrades. He even asked me to leave Samson and join his armed groups’.® Despite the loyalty of Samson’s inner circle of men and its immense influence in mobilizing the young students of Nicosia, the failure of OPEK’s reactionary and superficial activities, the naïve thinking of Promitheas, as well as the dangerous rivalry between Giorkadjis and Samson, led by 1962 to its decline.

As early as 1961, Giorkadjis, fearing that Samson was preparing his murder, decided to plan his execution.92 The friction between the two men emerged when the Interior Minister realized that the ‘familiar and irresponsible trouble-maker’, ‘boasting of himself as a gang leader’, quite often used his pro-Makarios artificial loyalty to promote his personal business [Machi], presenting himself as a superhero.93 The competition and hatred between the two men

90 Personal interview with Neoptolemos Georgiou Leftis, 29 August 2007.
91 Ibid.
93 ‘Epagrypni te Kata ton Diaspaston’ [Be vigilant against those who seek to disrupt], EOK internal leaflet, in Krisima Ntokoumenta, ed. by Papageorgiou, vol. 1, pp. 223-225.
culminated on 20 May 1963, when former EOKA member and close friend and associate of Samson, Andreas Kikas was murdered in Famagusta. Glorkadjis, issuing an internal leaflet to his men, tried to hide the fact that the murder was politically motivated and asserted that ‘the murdered and the arrested for interrogation ... were distinguished EOKA members, and both were members of our Organosis’. Samson, fearing his execution, wrote a letter on 26 August 1963, which he kept in a sealed envelop:

*Brothers, when this envelop is opened I will not exist. I will be dead, murdered from guns held by murderous hands. I accuse towards Justice and our people that the murderers of Interior Minister Glorkadjis, A.S. [full names mentioned], P.P. and the rest of the murder gang studied and planned my murder. They are the same men that killed Kikas and the Limassol fighters Nouros and Neoklis. The murder of Neoklis was committed by V., A.S. and L.S. [policemen]. The decision for my murder was revealed to me by fighter E.P., friend of A.S. and P.P.; they asked him to help them in my murder. Good Bye, Nicos Samson.*

In spite of the Atrotos-Kikeron clash, the fear of a sudden Turkish attack – Samson allegedly received private information about Turkish preparations from paid informers – alarmed Samson and Leftis, who applied to ELDYK for military guidance. The training of Leftis men was carried out during the night in the remote area of Archangelos in Nicosia, by Greek Army captain Marios Gasparis, and NCO’s Giorgos Dragoumas and Theodoros. The need for military arms was internally solved by Leftis and his men that began to produce hand-made 0.45 caliber Thomson sub-machine guns. By 1963 they managed to produce thirty guns, while in 1964 they produced an improved version of another seventy. When the inter-communal conflict erupted on 21 December

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95 ‘Pros Apanda ta Meli’ [To all the members], EOK internal leaflet, personal collection D.V., Limassol.
96 ‘Pros tin dikaiosini kai ton Ellinikon Kyprion laon: Na anobithi kai na dothei opou prepel ean mou simvoi kako ean mo skotosoun’ [To Justice and the Greek Cypriot people: To be opened if something bad happens to me, if they kill me], 2-page letter, 26 August 1963, private collection SC, Nicosia. The letter is revealed for the first time.
97 Personal interview with Neoptolemos Georgiou Leftis, 29 August 2007.
1963, Giorkadjis, seeing his military plans failing, did not hesitate to ask for Samson's help for the confinement of the crisis. A group of eight men under Leftis undertook a hazardous mission to defend the Severis Flourmill, while another forty one, under Praxitelis Vogazianos, Kostas Nikitas and Pambos Kakoulis, operated successfully in the endangered suburb of Omorphita.

**EOK**

Giorkadjis – initially as Minister of Labour and Social Services in the transitional period and later as Minister of Interior – controlled, with the indirect blessings of President Makarios, almost all Greek appointments in the public service. The Greek candidates, mostly former EOKA members, to the newly established Cyprus Army were personally invited by Giorkadjis, while many former members, loyal to him, were appointed in key positions in the police force, the gendarmerie, and the newly established, in April 1961, Information Service. Beyond his absolute control of the security forces of the young Republic, the operation, since 1959, of his personal intelligence mechanism and armed groups, as well as his ambivalent role as the protegee-protector of Archbishop Makarios, metamorphosed Giorkadjis into *kratos en krati* [a state within a state].

The countdown for the establishment of a Greek Cypriot underground movement began in March 1959 when EOKA surrendered most of its arsenal;

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100 Personal interview with Eftichios Salatas, 12 August 2004, Patros Savvides collection (PSC).


102 Personal interview with Praxitelis Vogazianos, 23 May 2008.
the only exception was a small quantity of arms kept by each sector commander, after an order from Digenis. The Police Chief Superintendent assessed that ‘over 60% of all EOKA arms have been brought in’. Rauf Denktash describing the surrender of arms by TMT remarks that ‘we piled all those homemade guns in Dr Kutchuck’s residence and we called Sir Hugh Foot. He looked at them and said, “thank you very much, if this is what you are going to give us, then we do not want them”’. They were almost useless. EOKA did the same. Beyond Governor Foot’s worry that Turkish arms were not surrendered, persistent information revealed that the Turks of Cyprus, during the transitional period, intensified their efforts to strengthen their arsenal. Boasting that ‘money is plentiful’, they tried to buy arms and ammunition from British soldiers, while in another case, Cypriot Turk Ali Hussein Mohammed and his wife were arrested in Lebanon, in July 1959, smuggling twenty 6mm Accra revolvers from Damascus. The strong complaints of the Greek Cypriot leadership to Foot and the Greek Government, reinstated the colonial supervision measures of the coasts, and caused intense Greek representations to the Turkish Government. On the early hours of 18 October 1959, the self-sinking of Izmir-registered motor boat Deniz – loaded with an estimated 150,000 rounds of 0.303 ammunition – during its chase by HMS Burmaston, and the arrest of its three-member crew, two of whom were members of the Turkish armed forces, created a severe shock to the Greek

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103 Personal Interview with Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006.
104 Foot to Colonial Office, No. 468, 15 March 1959, Secret, FO 371/144891, TNA.
105 Personal Interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006.
106 Letter of Foot to Colonial Office, 21 May 1959, Secret, FO 371/144891, TNA.
108 Foot to Colonial Office, 22 June 1959, No. 930, Secret, FO 371/144691, TNA.
109 Letter of British Embassy Beirut to POMEF Cyprus, 14 August 1959, Confidential, CO 926/1035, TNA.
112 Acting Governor to Colonial Office, No. 1394, 18 October 1959, FO 371/144692, TNA.
113 Foot to Colonial Office, No. 1471, 2 November 1959, Top Secret, CO 929/1037, TNA.
Cypriots, who justifiably began to question the Turkish sincerity and willingness for a peaceful settlement. In the following months, the continuous arrests of Cypriot Turks carrying weapons, caused even greater anxiety about Turkish intentions.  

Alarmed by the seriousness of Turkish underground preparations, the Cypriot Greeks, by May 1960, began thinking more carefully about organizing defensive measures;  

with the knowledge of, or probably at the initiative of, Archbishop Makarios, a detailed scheme is being worked out for the protection of the Greek Cypriot community against attack by Turkish Cypriots. Well known EOKA leaders have been placed in charge of the detailed planning of this scheme in the several districts. It seems clear that these measures are intended for defence only.  

Acting under the directives of Makarios and Giorkadjis, Nicos Koshis, undertook the responsibility to organize an underground intelligence office – totally independent of the Information Office of the police that was staffed with Turkish Cypriots – with the mission of collecting information about the underground preparations of TMT. The office recruited agents from the Turkish community, while its activities included the tapping of Turkish telephone lines under the control of police inspector Nikos Ioannou Psomas. "The amount of information coming to us was alarming" says Koshis. Giorkadjis sent a multi-page report to Averof, providing full details about the Turkish underground preparations, asking for the support of the Greek Government, without ever receiving a reply.  

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115 Foot to Colonial Office, No. 406, 29 May 1960, Secret, CO 926/1443, TNA.  


117 Lagodontis Report, pp. 185-222 (188).  

118 Personal interview with Nicos Koshis, 24 May 2006.
In the meantime, the refusal of Turkish members of the House to vote for the renewal of the customs tax legislation – in retaliation to the delay for the implementation of the 70:30 ratio in the civil service – had given the first sign that the Turks were determined to use their constitutional privileges to blackmail the Cyprus Government.\(^{119}\) On 7 April 1961, in a letter to Averof, Giorkadjis – addressing the issue of 'the arming and the conspiratorial organization of the Turks' and 'the threat of butchering the Cypriot Greeks' – asked for the supply of arms by the Greek Government for 'the defence of Cypriot Hellenism in case of danger from the Turkish side', so as 'the Greek Cypriot leadership ... speak from a position of power'.\(^{120}\) Giorkadjis, impudently threatened Averof that if his demands were not met, he would seek arms and support from a foreign country, he would interrupt his communication with the Greek embassy in Nicosia, and he would make negative comments to the press.\(^{121}\) The Greek Foreign Minister, criticising the threatening tone of Giorkadjis' letter, stated that 'the Greek Government considers, for many reasons, unjustifiable and dangerous the supply of arms ... to the Greek community of Cyprus'.\(^{122}\)

It was during this period that Archbishop Makarios – worrying about Turkish underground moves and the refusal of the Greek Government – asked Giorkadjis and Koshis to organize 'a few groups in case the Turks create any troubles'.\(^{123}\) The first unarmed groups began forming urgently, from former EOKA members, in the towns, initially with the mission of shadowing the Turkish underground activities. The gradual spread of the underground groups on the whole island led in 1961 to the formation of *Ethini Organosis Kyprion* (EOK) [National organization of Cypriots] – later called *Organosis* – under the


\(^{120}\) Letter of Giorkadjis to Averof, Athens 7 April 1961, Confidential, Evangelos Averof Collection, File 98/3, Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation (IKK).

\(^{121}\) *Phiileftheros*, 14 April 1961, pp. 1/6.

\(^{122}\) Averof to Royal Greek Embassy Nicosia, 9 April 1961, Top Secret, Evangelos Averof Collection, File 98/3, IKK.

\(^{123}\) Personal interview with Nicos Koshis, 24 May 2006.
leadership of Archegos [Chief] Akritas [Giorkadjis]. Two elements of the new underground movement were perhaps not so coincidental. The name of the organization was a derivative of EOKA, while the code-name Akritas — deriving from the medieval Greek hero Digenis Akritas — was the second part of the code-name used by Grivas; it seems that there was a need — either in the mind of its leadership or to attract the massive loyalty of its members — to emphasise that EOK was a continuation of EOKA and that Digenis was succeeded by Akritas.

The formation of pro-Makarios former fighters’ associations in major towns — under the absolute control of Giorkadjis — after the dissolution of EDMA and the establishment of pro-Grivas PSA, turned into the most important pole for the recruitment of EOK members and for the management of the underground affairs of the new organization. A leading association that played a vital role in the formation and training of EOK underground groups in Limassol\(^{124}\) was Syndesmos Agoniston Poleos kai Eparchias Lemesou (SAPEL) [Fighters’ association of Limassol town and district], established on 4 December 1960.\(^{125}\) Another important association, that contributed in the defence of the capital during the December 1963 crisis,\(^{126}\) was Enosis Agoniston Lefkosias (EAL) [Nicosia fighters’ union], established on 23 July 1961,\(^{127}\) after long behind-the-scene preparations which began as early as January 1961.\(^{128}\) Similar associations were established in other towns, such as Enosis Agoniston Poleos kai Eparchias Larnacas (EAPEL) [Fighters’ union of Larnaca town and district], and Enosis Agoniston Paphou (EAP) [Paphos fighters’ union], established on 1 April 1962.\(^{129}\)

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121 Personal interview with Takis Varavas, 31 August 2001, PSC.
125 Philaletheros, 6 December 1960, p. 6; Elettheria, 18 December 1960, p. 4.
126 Personal interview with Andreas Coutas, 22 May 2001, PSC.
129 Philaletheros, 3 April 1962, p. 6.
The former EOKA cadres that undertook the responsibility to form EOK, might have had deep knowledge on guerilla warfare and sabotage, as well as immense patriotic enthusiasm, but did not possess the knowledge of military tactics, street warfare and paramilitary organization. The effort to fill this critical gap was undertaken by the Greek Army officers serving in ELDYK and the Tripartite Headquarters.\(^{130}\) Strangely, while the Greek Government strongly refused to provide arms to EOK, it allowed the training of its men by her military officers. The attempt to offer an explanation to this peculiarity leads to the presumption that the Greek Government, while it acknowledged the rationality behind Greek Cypriot fears, it did not trust its leadership to be armed; Athens believed that – despite the operation of a strong Turkish underground movement on the island – the possession of serious quantities of arms in Greek Cypriot hands, increased the possibility of an armed conflict, and the odds for a Greek-Turkish War.\(^{131}\)

The covert contribution of Greek Army officers to the formation of EOK was critical. Loizos Karamichalis, remembers that in a secret meeting between the SAPEL leadership and the Commander of ELDYK, Colonel Condylis, referring to the threat arising from the Turkish paramilitary movement, stressed the necessity for the underground organization of the Greek population and explained the operational mechanism for the formation of defensive forces in Limassol and the countryside.\(^{132}\) Similarly [in 1961], Greek officers undertook the covert training of a group of EOK cadres in Lanition Gymnasium in Limassol; the month-long night program included theoretical training in military tactics and various types of arms. The trained men became the nucleus for the recruitment and training of more men, and the formation of the first paramilitary groups in Limassol.\(^{133}\) In another occasion [probably in 1963] EOK cadres from

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\(^{130}\) Personal interview with Nicos Koshis, 24 May 2006; personal interview with Spyros Drousiotis, 18 January 2006.

\(^{131}\) Averof to Royal Greek Embassy Nicosia, 9 April 1961, Top Secret, Evangelos Averof Collection, File 98/3, IKK.

\(^{132}\) Personal interview with Loizos Karamichalis, 7 September 2001, PSC.

\(^{133}\) Personal interview with Stavros Michaelides, 6 September 2001, PSC.
Limassol were trained by Greek officers – among them Captain Spyros Xylogiannakis and Captain Menaides – during night sessions in the Nicosia Technical School, in military tactics and heavy weapons such as bazookas, machine guns, and mortars; the EOK trainees, dressed in military uniforms in ELDYK camp, were transported by military vehicles to a shooting range where they carried out exercises with heavy weapons. Similarly, Greek Colonel Frangiskos of the Tripartite Headquarters, after studying the local military situation and the threat arising from TMT in Limassol, pointed out the defensive measures, the observation posts and the sensitive areas of EOK’s defensive perimeter around the Turkish quarter of town. Greek Army officers, that served as military advisers to the Cypriot underground leaders – Major Demetrios Ioannides of ELDYK, later the dictator of Greece, was the adviser of EOK Chief of Staff Koshis – undertook also the task of preparing the defensive plans of the organization in case of a TMT attack.

By the end of 1963, the underground paramilitary structure of EOK (Diagram 5) consisted of the brain of the organization – the Headquarters in Nicosia, and seven district Sub-Headquarters in all major towns. The Headquarters, consisted of the Chief, Interior Minister Polykarpos Giorkadjis-Akritas, the Deputy Chief, Labour and Social Insurance Minister Tassos Papadopoulos, and the Chief of Staff, House of Representatives member Nicos Koshis, under whom operated five Staff Offices; Personnel, Intelligence – under police officer Andros Nikolaides, Operations – under the President of the House of Representatives Glaftcos Clerides, Support – under Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou, and Political Enlightenment – under deputy schoolmaster Frixos Petrides (Diagram 5). The operational echelons of EOK spread in all major towns – as Sub-Headquarters (SHQ) – under the command of men, strictly loyal to Giorkadjis: Nikos Ioannou Psomas (Nicosia), Stelios Katsellis (Kyrenia),

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134 Personal interview with Demetris Voskarides, 20 June 2001, PSC.
135 Personal interview with Spyros Drousiotis, 18 January 2006;
137 Glaftcos Clerides, 31 January 1967 meeting, (20), House of Representatives Minutes, Session VII, HRL.
Pavlos Pavlakis (Famagusta), Giorgos Tzirkotis (Larnaca), Aristos Chrysostomou (Limassol). Theoretically, Akritas was fully responsible to Archbishop Makarios, the President of the Cyprus Republic, that was supposedly kept informed about the underground operation of EOK, although there are indications that he was not fully aware about all its aspects. When he realized the real dimension of EOK, expressing privately his mistrust for Giorkadjis, he complained to the Chief of Staff that 'I have told you to organize a few groups and you have formed a whole army'.\[^{138}\]

The underground structure of EOK, theoretically was impressive, reaching at the end of 1963 a manpower of 12,000, that received various levels of secret training through the use of 200-300 military arms island-wide.\[^{159}\] Voskarides, the arms-keeper of the Limassol Town Command reveals that its training arms were ten military rifles and sub-machine guns of various types, five hunting guns and one revolver.\[^{140}\] While EOK grew, in its thirty-month covert life, into a well-organized defensive paramilitary mechanism that consisted of volunteers, willing to receive secret night training in various houses,\[^{141}\] to man night observation posts around the Turkish quarters and mixed villages,\[^{142}\] to perform night patrols,\[^{143}\] and return in the following morning to their daily occupations, something extremely vital was missing; arms. Clerides revealed that he went to Athens to discuss the issue of arms,\[^{144}\] where he was formally informed by Foreign Minister Averof that the Greek Government 'was not willing to give us any arms because we would use them to overthrow the Zurich Agreements ... and because they did not believe that the Turks would ever use arms to overthrow their benefits. I have stayed in


\[^{159}\] Ibid.

\[^{140}\] Personal interview with Demetris Voskarides, 20 June 2001, PSC.


\[^{142}\] Personal interview with Gregoris Gregoras, 20 March 2006.

\[^{143}\] Personal diary, private collection of D.A., Limassol.

Athens for three days, begging for arms and eventually I was turned away.\textsuperscript{145}
The cold refusal of the Greek Government turned the desperate attention of EOK leaders towards other circumstantial solutions. With great difficulty, some WW II arms were collected through personal contacts from individuals in Crete and other parts of Greece, and two or three loads of arms offered by Egypt were carried by a small fishing boat,\textsuperscript{146} while the use of hunting guns became a temporary solution.

The eruption of the crisis in 21 December 1963 had created a desperation that turned almost into panic. The shortage of arms was so acute, that almost caused the collapse of Organosis. The first shipload of WW II arms, carried by fishing boat \textit{Agia Eleni}, came from Egypt and consisted of 54 Brens, Mauser rifles and 150 Lanchester sub-machine guns.\textsuperscript{147} The \textit{Maid of Verdelia} had also made two trips to Egypt\textsuperscript{148} for arms and ammunition.\textsuperscript{149} A Cyprus Government request for the urgent purchase of 100 Bren guns from Belgium was turned down,\textsuperscript{150} while a similar request from an American firm was rejected.\textsuperscript{151} Parallel to the desperate efforts of the Cyprus Government, many individuals went abroad to Greece, Italy and other countries and managed to buy small quantities of arms; among them Nikos Samson for former OPEK,\textsuperscript{152} Photis Papaphotis for PSA,\textsuperscript{153} Sofoulis Karletides,\textsuperscript{154} and many others.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{146} Personal interview with Nicos Koshis, 24 May 2006.
\textsuperscript{147} Papademetris and Neophytou, \textit{EOKA's Houdini}, pp. 364-367.
\textsuperscript{148} U.A.R. Arms for Cyprus, Memo of A. M. Wood, 9 March 1964, Confidential, FO 371/174761, TNA.
\textsuperscript{149} JIC (Cyprus), Intelligence Report No. 51, Secret, 9 April 1964, WO 386/2, TNA.
\textsuperscript{150} Foreign Office to United Kingdom Delegation to Nato Paris, No. 552, 28 January 1964, Confidential, FO 371/174761, TNA.
\textsuperscript{151} Memo of A. M. Wood, 14 February 1964, Secret, FO 371/174761, TNA.
\textsuperscript{152} JIC (Cyprus), Joint Intelligence Report No. 44, 18 February 1964, Secret, WO 386/2, TNA.
\textsuperscript{153} Personal interview with Pholis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006.
\textsuperscript{154} Personal interview with Sofoulis Karletides, 5 October 2001, PSC.
\end{footnotesize}
The illusion of strength – an Organosis of 12,000 men – and the overconfidence in the minds of its civilian paramilitary leaders that declared we are the sleepless guards of the interests and the security of Cypriot Hellenism in an effective manner, without screams, shows, and untimely bravados. Cyprus is well guarded and the real guards never scream\textsuperscript{155} collapsed on 21 December 1963. The patriotic calls of Akritas to the ‘real fighters’ of EOK that ‘will be preparing for the realization of the 1 April 1955 aims [Enosis], the final implementation of which no force is able to retrain’,\textsuperscript{156} and that ‘EOK will govern Cyprus and will lead her to the completion of her national aspirations’\textsuperscript{157} were nothing more than superficial promises of a naive civilian leadership that erroneously believed it possess the military knowledge to command the fate of the Greek Cypriot population and the political future of the Republic of Cyprus.

\textsuperscript{155} ‘Pros olas tas Omaedas EOK and PD’ [To all EOK and PD groups], EOK internal leaflet signed by Chief Akritas, private collection of D.V., Limassol.

\textsuperscript{156} ‘Pros Apanda ta Meloi mas’ [To all our members], EOK internal leaflet signed by Chief Akritas, private collection of D.V., Limassol.

\textsuperscript{157} ‘Pros Apanda ta Meloi’ [To all members], EOK internal leaflet signed by Chief Akritas, private collection of D.V., Limassol.
DIAGRAM 4
Greek Cypriot Underground Paramilitary Movements between March 1959 and December 1963

EDMA (1-4-1959)
- Pro-Zurich
- Pro-Makarios

EAP

EAPEL
(4-12-1960)

SAPEL

EAL
(23-7-1961)

PSA / PSAK
(15-7-1960) (25-3-1961)

KEM

PSA armed groups
[Renos Kyriakides - Photis Papaphotis]

Organosis Prostasias Ellinon Kyprion (OPEK) [Nicos Samson]
Ethniki Organosis Kyprion (EOK) - Organosis [Polykarpos Giorkadjis]

9 March 1959
19 December 1959
30 March 1961
25 March 1962
21 December 1963

Underground paramilitary organizations/groups
Former EOKA fighters' associations
DIAGRAM 5
Operational Structure of EOK in Dec. 1963

[Diagram showing the operational structure of EOK, including names of officers and locations of headquarters, sub-headquarters, town commands, and country commands.]
Chapter VI

The underground military penetration of Turkey into Cyprus

The preparation of Turkish infiltration

Despite Turkish efforts to protect itself – through NATO and in cooperation with its neighbor Greece – from the Soviet threat and stabilize its economy, the Cypriot Greek agitation for Enosis in the 1950’s, had definitely aroused Turkish military interest in Cyprus. At least on four occasions, Turkish Army officers, under a fake identity, arrived secretly on the island to collect information about the situation. Between 1951-1953, Turkish Army officer Omer Faruk Kilinc, presenting himself as a calligraphist and painter, visited Cyprus and traveled extensively throughout the island. In autumn 1955 Turkish journalist Necati Zincirkiran had seen three Turkish Army officers, in civilian clothes, doing photography and mapping in Paphos. Mehmet Ali Tremeseli remembers that in 1957, a lieutenant colonel – in charge of the Turkish military folkloric band that came to the island – looking for information, asked and received from Tremeseli and his brother Ibrahim a ten-page report about EOKA and Greek underground activities; to express his appreciation he offered them his Kirikkale revolver as a present. According to information received by Grivas, another Turkish Army colonel of Cypriot origin, Hasan Tahsin Ogerlat, arrived in Cyprus


3 Article of Necati Zincirkiran in Gunaydin (20 July 1984), reported in Cyprus News Agency release, 7 February 1991, File 2374/1, PIO.

after 8 February 1957, disguised as a photographer. In the following year, a military committee under Brigadier Cemal Tural prepared and presented to General Salih Coskun, a detailed three-option study for the partition of Cyprus.

The spark that ignited Turkish military interest for Cyprus, on a strategic level, was the briefing of Foreign Minister Fatin Zorlu – about the formation of underground TMT – during the Ankara visit of Dr Kutchuk and Denktash in January 1958. Zorlu, attracted by the strategic prospects of an underground movement in Cyprus, turned his attention to the Turkish armed forces, the deputy chief of which, General Salih Coskun, assigned the investigation of the matter to Lieutenant General Danis Karabelen, head of the invisible Seferbertik Tektik Kurulu (STK) [Mobilization supervision committee]; the Turkish ultra-secret branch of the European underground Stay Behind network, established on 27 September 1952 immediately after the entrance of Turkey into NATO.

The secret Kibris Istirdat Projesi (KIP) [Project for the recapture of Cyprus] prepared by Major Ismail Tansu, code-named Dogan, provided for the establishment of an underground paramilitary organization in Cyprus – named Turk Mukavemet Teskilati – under the control of Turkey. The objective of the plan was to train and arm five thousand Turkish Cypriots by the end of 1959, creating by the end of 1960 a paramilitary force of ten thousand men. Its primary mission was to safeguard the security of the Turkish Cypriots on the island and to support the Cyprus policy of the Turkish Government. In case of extensive EOKA operations for Enosis, TMT would act as an advanced party to

3 Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 211.
5 Tansu in Halkin Sesi, 27 May 1997, p. 5.
6 Associated Press report from Ankara, 4 December 1990, File 2674/1, PIO.
8 The archive of STK is still considered top secret and is securely kept by the Command of the Turkish Armed Forces. The writings and interviews of retired Colonel Ismail Tansu, are the only primary sources about the covert preparations of STK for the establishment of TMT in 1958.
9 Tansu, Asliada, p. 46.
prepare the ground for an invasion by the Turkish armed forces that would eventually occupy the whole island.\textsuperscript{12}

In the meantime, Zorlu tried to soften the reservations of Prime Minister Menderes – a personal friend of Karamanlis – who believed in Greek-Turkish friendship and co-operation through NATO.\textsuperscript{13} Eventually, in April 1958, Menderes, giving his written consent, authorized the implementation of the secret plan and assured the STK that all needs for arms, supplies, personnel and funds would be provided by the Turkish Government.\textsuperscript{14} By May 1958, the Ankara TMT Headquarters (HQ) were established in Yenisehir, Ankara, in a building offered by \textit{Kibris Turk Kultur Dernegi}, which served as an intermediary for the diversion of secret Foreign Ministry funds to TMT in Ankara and Nicosia.\textsuperscript{15} The Ankara HQ were staffed by a small number of selected STK officers and was equipped with an AM radio for direct communication with Nicosia.

The TMT Ankara HQ – that was trusted to operate completely independently under the command of Lieutenant General Danis Karabelen, codenamed \textit{Cankurt} [Soul of the wolf] – was supported by an invisible executive government network consisting of Foreign Minister Zorlu, the main supporter of the organization, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Defence Minister Ethem Menderes that arranged for the covert supply of arms and ammunition, as well as the confidential transfer of army officers, and the Interior Minister that provided passports and fake identities to the officers intended for Cyprus.\textsuperscript{16} Two secret training centers were established in Zir Ankara and in Antalya, while three supply centres were formed in Mersina, Anamur, and Egridir Antalya. The June 1958 meeting in Modern Palas Hotel in Ankara, between Karabelen, Tansu, and the first TMT commander Lieutenant Colonel Ali Riza Vuruskan-Bozkurt [Gray Wolf], with Dr Kutchuk-Agri, and Rauf

\textsuperscript{12} Tansu, \textit{Aslinda}, pp. 32-33.
\textsuperscript{13} Tansu in \textit{Hetkin Sesi}, 28 May 1997, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{14} Tansu, \textit{Aslinda}, pp. 35-36.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 42.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., pp. 40-42.
Denktash-Toros, laid the foundation for the absolutely necessary co-operation between the military leadership of TMT and the political leaders of the Turkish community.\textsuperscript{17}

The metamorphosis of \textit{Turk Mukavemet Teskilati} under Bozkurt

The arrival of \textit{Is Bankasi} bank inspector Ali Riza Vuruskan in Nicosia, under the name of Ali Conan, along with another four officers – Major Necmettin Erce, Major Sefik Karakurt, Captain Mehmet Ozden, and Captain Rahmi Ergun – under fake names and occupations, in July 1958,\textsuperscript{18} initiated on 1 August the operational metamorphosis of \textit{Turk Mukavemet Teskilati}. According to Bozkurt, the new organization – in reality it was a continuation of Denktash’s TMT, re-organized, staffed, armed and strengthened on a paramilitary structure – was given the same name as the existing organization to conceal the formation of a new underground movement.\textsuperscript{19} By November, the arrival of another twelve reserve officers,\textsuperscript{20} disguised as special learning teachers, primary school inspectors, and religious clergymen, strengthened the internal paramilitary skeleton of TMT, particularly in the villages.

During the leadership of Vuruskan (August 1958 - September 1960), Toros became the political adviser of the Bozkurt and probably his most valuable assistant filtering all the information coming to Nicosia from the districts.\textsuperscript{21} Turkish Cypriot leader Agri was kept informed of TMT activities, although he did not support armed action. Nalbantoglu had said that ‘we wanted to achieve our objective through guns. The doctor was afraid that the cost would be heavy, and tried to prevent it. Eventually he was proven right.’\textsuperscript{22} At some time, the powerful role of Denktash in TMT affairs and his dominant

\textsuperscript{17} Tansu, \textit{Aslinda}, pp. 49-51.


\textsuperscript{19} Riza Vuruskan’s diary in Manizade, \textit{65 Yil Boyunca Kibris}, pp. 673-682.

\textsuperscript{20} Tansu, \textit{Aslinda}, p. 61.

\textsuperscript{21} Written directions of Karabelen to Vuruskan, Ibid., pp. 70-71.

\textsuperscript{22} Alpay Durduyan in Ortam, 8 February 1996, p. 10.
influence on Vuruskan, caused the concern of Dr Kutchuck who felt his political role in his community was diminishing; the misunderstanding even reached Menderes.\textsuperscript{23} Various other educated Turkish Cypriots such as lawyer Osman Orek (later Defence Minister), Dr Niyazi Manyera (later Health Minister), Dr Semsi Kazim, Dr Burhan Nalbantoglu, Dr Orhan Muderrisoglu, post office director Kemal Shemi, Nevzat Uzunoglu, Paphos mayor Halit Kazim, and teacher Neodet Husein, formed, in the initial stages, the inner circle of the organization.\textsuperscript{24} The assertion of Tansu that TMT was a completely new organization, not related to an existing one,\textsuperscript{25} justifiably caused the reaction of Denktash, who bitterly declared that Tansu 'converted the resistance struggle of the Turkish Cypriots into a resistance of Turkey'.\textsuperscript{26} 

The fundamental operational element of the new TMT was the 
Hucre \[the cell\], consisting of 3-7 men that were initially called Kurt [wolves]. The strict secrecy and security measures imposed by the TMT leadership, did not allow its members to have knowledge of the activities or the members of other cells. The underground paramilitary structure of TMT (Diagram 6) consisted of six district formations codenamed Yayla [mountain plateau], that included a number of Otag [great tent]. Each Otag was composed of Oba [camp tent] which consisted of Cadi\'r [tent].\textsuperscript{27}

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\textsuperscript{23} Tansu, \textit{Aslinda}, p. 71.

\textsuperscript{24} Tansu, in \textit{Halkin Sesi}, 27 August 1997, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{25} Tansu in \textit{Halkin Sesi}, 26 August 1997, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{26} Gurkan, \textit{Zirvedeki}, pp. 118-119.

\textsuperscript{27} There are at least two known versions of the TMT oath: a) 'Turk Mukavemet Taskilatina Andi' published in \textit{Machi}, 17 August 1962, p. 1; b) 'TMT Andi' presented in Milli Mucadele Muzesi [National struggle museum], Nicosia.

A group consisting of eleven Turkish Cypriots—eight students in Turkey and three sent from Cyprus—began their training course in Ankara on 6 August 1958, that was completed on 20 September. In the meantime, the secret training camp established in Zir Ankara, accommodated the second group, the training of which commenced on 22 September and was completed on 22 October 1958. The selected men were sent by air, from Nicosia to Ankara, in groups of 20-25 men. The military training of the Kurt, who were wearing military uniforms during their stay in Turkey, had a duration of one month and included rifle training and shooting, guerilla warfare, sabotage, and secret operation techniques; the course was concluded with a military ceremony and the oath. The following year—in September 1959—another secret training center was established in the forests of Antalya, providing training to Turkish Cypriots that traveled to Turkey by ship. According to Tansu, between 1958-1960 the TMT training centers in Turkey had trained almost one thousand men—mostly in Zir—that, on their return to Cyprus undertook the responsibility to train more men, under the supervision of TMT Turkish officers.

The primary objective of training and arming five thousand men led to the supply—through the support of the Defence Minister and the Deputy Defence Minister—of one thousand pistols, one thousand sub-machine guns, one hundred machine guns, three thousand rifles, twenty thousand hand grenades, and adequate ammunition, that were stored in Egridir Antalya, in Mersin, and in Anamur. ‘In July 1958’ Tansu remarks, ‘we have concluded all our preparations and by August, we were ready for the shipping. The government and the armed forces had never refused our request for arms’. The arms smuggling mechanism between Turkey and Cyprus was initiated almost accidentally, when three Turkish Cypriots—Vehbi Mahmut, Asaf Elmas, and Cevdet Remzi, in their desperation to purchase arms, arrived on 13 August

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29 Tansu, Aslinda, pp. 103-109.
30 Ibid., pp. 105-106.
31 Ibid., p. 109.
32 Tansu, Aslinda, pp. 113-114.
1958 in Turkey, where they were initially arrested. Their interrogation proved that their motivation was purely patriotic, thus it was decided to trust them the first shipment of arms to the island. On 16 August 1958 the three men began their return trip to Kokkina carrying, in their small fishing boat *Esther*, eight sub-machine guns, twenty pistols and six thousand cartridges of ammunition.®® Tansu wrote in his memoirs that 'we were very excited; the road of shipping arms to Cyprus had opened in such a coincidental way'.®

From that day, the *Bereket Hucresi* [blessing cell] — consisting of ten men under the leadership of Vehbi Mahmut — code-named *Ari Ekibi* [group of bees] undertook, through immense danger, the responsibility of smuggling, between 16 August 1958 and 1 January 1959, arms and ammunition for eight hundred men. During their nine trips between Anamur and Kokkina, *Ari Ekibi* succeeded in transferring to TMT, 270 pistols, 267 sub-machine guns, 6 Bren guns, 6 rifles, 350 hand grenades, 20 2.5 lbs plastic explosive, adequate ammunition and a radio set.®® Although the achievement of *Ari Ekibi* was of tremendous importance during the first stages of TMT formation, the cost of its missions was far from being minute. During rough sea, on 9 November 1958, the mission ended in tragedy, when Asaf Elmas and Hikmet Ridvan lost their lives after their loaded boat was sunk; Vehbi Mahmut, in the second fishing boat, was forced to throw the arms and ammunition into the sea to save his boat and life.®® Strangely after the second mission (27 August 1958), Lutfu Celul, a member of *Ari Ekibi*, disappeared after his arrest by the Greeks.®

The strong momentum behind TMT and the need to precipitate the covert effort of shipping arms to the island, led Tansu, in mid-December 1958, to Istanbul, in search of a boat, able to carry 10-15 tons of arms in each trip. The purchase of *Kosa*, a 25-ton motor boat, that was renamed *Orhan Gazi*, under the ownership of KTKD, and the recruitment of captain Resat Yavus,

®® Ibid., pp. 126-129.
mechanic Oguz Kotoglu, and Turkish navy signaller Ali Levent, brought inspiration to the TMT effort. The first three missions of Orhan Gazi, codenamed Elmas – in memory of Asaf Elmas who was lost in the sea, in the beginning of March 1959, were not successful, since its crew failed to make the night contact with the local coast group. But during the fourth mission, on 24 March 1959, fifteen tons of arms and ammunition were unloaded in a remote coast east of Kyrenia. In the following months, the night missions of Elmas continued invisibly every ten to fifteen days, until the morning hours of 18 October 1959, when in its trip between Tasucu in Silifke and Exi Mili east of Kyrenia, after treachery by a Turkish Cypriot informer – he abandoned Cyprus for England, but on his return it is alleged that he was executed – Elmas was intercepted by HMS Burmaston off the coast of Cape Plakoti. The crew of Deniz – the alleged name of the ship – carrying, according to Tansu, 100 pistols, 200 sub-machine guns, 30 Bren guns, 154 rifles, 250 grenades, and serious quantities of ammunition, unable to avoid the interception, was given, through radio, the order to sink the boat. All traces disappeared in deep waters, except two cases of 0.303 ammunition picked up, in the last moment, by the search group of HMS Burmaston. The suicide of Elmas exploded like a bomb in the mass media; the news shook the people' says Tansu. The Deniz case went down in history very quickly; in spite of the conviction of its crew by a colonial court, the following day was deported to Turkey. In fourteen months (16 August 1958-18 October 1959), TMT had managed to send in absolute secrecy, serious quantities of arms and ammunition for five thousand men; 872

38 Tansu in Halkin Sesi, 23 September 1997, p. 4.
39 Tansu, Aslinda, pp. 154-158.
40 Ibid., pp. 160-161.
41 Ibid., p. 170.
42 The Times, 19 October 1959, p. 10; The Times, 20 October 1959, p. 10.
43 Tansu, Aslinda, pp. 163-165.
44 Ibid., p. 166.
45 The Times, 13 November 1959, p. 12.
Tokarev pistols, 747 sub-machine guns, 96 Bren guns, 2997 British rifles, 6800 grenades, and 1,348,000 cartridges.\textsuperscript{46}

The Vuruskan era under the domination of Toros

The mission of Lieutenant Colonel Ali Riza Vuruskan in Cyprus was delicate and complicated. Tansu remarks that 'in spite of his multiple responsibilities, he never took advantage' of his powerful position, and the assessment of Ankara indicated that he carried out his duties successfully.\textsuperscript{47} Vuruskan never complained about the financial matters of the organization, and Tansu revealed that during the internal crisis of April-May 1960 in Turkey, Vuruskan had even sent to TMT Headquarters, 25,000 Turkish Lira.\textsuperscript{48} Later, Major Selik Karakurt insinuated maliciously to Denktash – who was the intermediary for the transfer of funds from the Foreign Ministry, through the president of KTKD, Mehmet Ertugruloglu, to Riza Vuruskan in Cyprus – that the financial accounts of Vuruskan were not completely settled.\textsuperscript{49} An elite cadre with deep knowledge of TMT internal affairs believes that Vuruskan was an honest man, but questions his ability to control effectively the organization, under the dynamic influence of Denktash.\textsuperscript{50}

When the Bozkurt arrived in Nicosia, TMT, under the control of Denktash, had already enforced a passive resistance campaign that boycotted all financial transactions with the Greek Cypriots and prohibited any friendly relations with them.\textsuperscript{51} The campaign, known as 'From Turk to Turk', continued during the leadership of Vuruskan, as a means of strengthening the economy of the community, since the Turkish leadership feared that the financially and culturally stronger Greeks would eventually absorb the minority, both financially

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{47} Tansu, \textit{Aslında}, p. 73.
\item\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 152.
\item\textsuperscript{49} Denktash in Gurkan, \textit{Zirvedeki Yaintzlik Kulesi}, p. 134.
\item\textsuperscript{50} Personal interview with A.A., 5 July 2007.
\end{footnotes}
and politically. Thus the protection of Turkish financial interests became a vital issue; daily Bozkurt declared that ‘we will survive from destruction only through the strict implementation of the orders of our leaders, that have already taken important decisions about our prosperity’. While theoretically the campaign had a reasonable cause, the methods used by TMT for its implementation were oppressive and often inhuman. In March 1959, Ozdemir Ozgur had to pay a two-Pound fine for buying a pair of shoes from Greeks, while a Turkish grocer in Paphos was forced to close his shop because he had financial transactions with Greeks. Journalist Sevgul Uludag remembers that the refusal of her father Niyazi, after receiving warnings from TMT to stop his relations with Greek Cypriots, ended with his imprisonment (1961). In jail he suffered a heart attack and was released, but he was unable to find a job since his employers were threatened by TMT. He eventually died of a heart attack at the age of fifty. Turkish Cypriot progressive leader, Dr Ihsan All wrote that 'with the prohibition of commercial exchanges with the Greek cohabitants, the people suffered. Some cunning people [buying from Greeks] exploited the prohibition and created a black market ... Although this fact was known to the Turkish Cypriot leadership, the continuation of this disgusting situation was allowed. The worst was that the Turks who did not obey the prohibition were punished, either with fines and beating up or with imprisonment.' Writer Arif Hasan Tahsin remarked that 'the Turks shopping from Greeks were beaten and their purchases were destroyed. There were no courts. If someone was making a mistake, he was beaten by TMT, even killed. There was neither freedom nor a

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52 Bozkurt, 7 July 1959, p. 1.
53 Ozdemir A. Ozgur, Cyprus in My Life: Testimony of a Turkish Cypriot Diplomat, Peleus No. 7 (Mannheim und Mohnresse: Bibliopolis, 2001), pp. 32, 168.
54 Philileftheros, 15 July 1959, p. 6.
56 Ali, My Memoirs, p. 46.
normal life in a society that was commanded by an underground organization. The people were scared and were afraid to talk against them.\textsuperscript{57}

TMT, copying the tactics of EOKA against alleged Greek traitors and collaborators of the British, begun, after the end of the \textit{Taksim} offensive, to settle its own open accounts.\textsuperscript{56} TMT cadre A.A., reveals that he received an order from Vuruskan and Kemal Shemi—a Turkish Cypriot that undertook a leading position in TMT hierarchy—to execute Special Branch police sergeant Mehmet Suleyman Yildirim, who was allegedly a paid informer of the British, initially against EOKA—which failed to execute him—and later against TMT. He was eventually executed by A.A. on 2 August 1958—only a few days after Vurushkan’s arrival—in Fellahar street in Nicosia.\textsuperscript{50} Bozkurt, expressing his satisfaction for the outcome of the operation, offered the executioner a 0.45 Colt revolver as a present. Although it is not clear if this first TMT execution, under the leadership of Vuruskan, was cleared by TMT in Ankara, A.A. assures that all TMT executions were authorized by Ankara.\textsuperscript{60} In September, a new execution order by Shemi against three leading members of the \textit{Ayse Apla},\textsuperscript{61} was given to A.A. who assigned the operation to three of his men; U., I., and M.\textsuperscript{62} On 29 September 1958, in broad daylight, the three men shot and seriously injured in the municipal market of Nicosia, Dervis Mustafa, Kemal Mustafa, and Mehmet Suleyman.\textsuperscript{63} A few days later, TMT referred to the persons ‘who were shot as traitors in Nicosia on 29 September’, indirectly taking full responsibility for the attempted murder.\textsuperscript{64}

In the following year, an execution order against Special Branch police sergeant Selim Mustapha, an alleged Turkish Cypriot collaborator of the British
against TMT, assigned initially to the execution group of N.U., was re-assigned by Shemi to A.A. who ordered three of his men to carry out the operation. After three days of search, eventually M. and R. shot and killed their target outside a Shell petrol station in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia on 27 August 1959. The inquest on the murder revealed that the victim was shot with two pistols, both of which were used in previous criminal incidents. One of the pistols was used in the murder of monk Nektarios and nun Agathoniki on 10 July 1958, while the other pistol was used in five attempted murders against Greeks and in eight murders against seven Greeks — including monk Nektarios and nun Agathoniki, as well as the three young men murdered near Tremetousia on 2 August 1958 during the Taksim offensive — and against Ahmet Yahya, a leftist Turkish Cypriot that was executed by TMT on 30 May 1958. A few days later, Ismail Arif Petasi, an alleged paid killer, was executed by TMT on 5 September 1959 in Cumhuriyet street, in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, by two gunmen — A. and E. — that used a 0.45 inch and a 9 mm pistol. Kemal Shemi initially requested the undertaking of the operation by A.A., who avoided to carry out the execution, since the victim was an acquaintance of him. The inquiry of his death revealed that one of the guns was used in two murders — including Fikret Osman on 18 September 1958 — and four attempted murders against Sakir Mustafa on 18 September 1958 and the three members of the Ayse Hanoum on 29 September 1958.

The TMT network gradually spread to the six districts and the arms clandestinely imported to the island were covertly decentralized — distributed to all TMT formations in the villages and the towns. The storage procedure utilized by the organization was almost immaculate. All the arms and ammunition

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65 Personal interview with A.A., 1 July 2007.
66 The Times, 28 August 1959, p. 8; Phileleftheros, 28 August 1959, p. 1.
67 Cyprus Mail, 3 October 1959, p. 1.
68 Personal interview with A.A., 1 July 2007.
69 Phileleftheros, 6 September 1959, p. 1.
70 Personal interview with A.A., 1 July 2007.
71 Phileleftheros, 7 October 1959, p. 1.
cases were individually wrapped in cotton fabric and then were repeatedly submerged in hot bee wax, that upon its solidification it completely sealed, in an airtight enclosure the content, providing full — as it was thought — protection. The TMT leader in each village or area, would then authorize two of his men to hide the sealed weapons under the ground; for security reasons the leader did not know the location of the secret hideouts. The unearthing of the TMT arsenal was possible only after an order by the Bayraktar — as the TMT leader in Cyprus was named when the internal structure of the organization was developed. In each TMT formation, a few arms were kept hidden for the training of the Ari [bees] — the TMT members, according to the new nomenclature. The underground storage of the TMT arsenal offered two main advantages. It did not permit the unauthorized use of force by local TMT commanders, and drastically reduced the danger of discovery, initially by the security forces of the colonial administration and afterwards of the Cyprus Government. The main disadvantage was humidification and the corrosion of metal under the earth. Although the Ankara Headquarters had foreseen this possibility, and recommended the semi-annual maintenance of the arms and, if needed, the relocation of the underground hideouts, in reality the directive was not followed in Cyprus. As a result, when the Bayraktar, in a real situation, ordered in the morning hours of 22 December 1963 the unearthing of the TMT arsenal, it was discovered that a number of weapons were corroded, damaged by humidity, while a more serious problem arose with the cartridges, many of which could not be fired.

At some stage — probably to exercise control on local (Turkish Cypriot) commanders — it was decided to change and improve the internal underground structure of the organization; the former nomenclature founded on the tent system was later based on the bee structure. The Headquarters in Nicosia were organized as Bayraktarlik [flag-bearer duties] while the TMT leader was

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73 Tansu, Aslinda, p. 114.
74 Personal interview with Hasan Demirag, 5 September 2006.
named the Bayraktar [flag-bearer]. The six TMT formations in the districts, equivalent to regiment commands, were organized as Sancactarlik [standard-bearer duties] and the Turkish Army officers that undertook their command became the Sancactar [standard-bearer] while their Turkish Cypriot deputies became the Serdar [commander]. Each Sancactarlik consisted of Kovan [beehive] – equivalent to battalion – that was composed of a number of Petek [honeycomb] – equivalent to company. Each Petek consisted of platoons, Ogul [swarm of bees], while the TMT members, former Kurt, were named Ari [bees].

Contrary to the previous TMT habit of issuing proclamations by the Central Committee, Karabelen and Tansu, in the determination of the principles dictating the establishment and operation of TMT in Cyprus, considered that "the organization would avoid making its presence visible, would not organize meetings or marches, and would not circulate leaflets with announcements". The directive of Ankara was devoutly obeyed in the following years, with the exception of the first months. The cease fire proclamation of 5 August 1958, signed by the TMT Central Committee, contrary to the previous inflammatory leaflets, was short and precise, consisting of five military-style directives, that included wording such as, 'all armed groups should stop all kind of activity until further orders. Necessary instructions will be given to group leaders', as well as 'send to the Headquarters through proper channels'. Three days later, a second proclamation titled 'A Second Order', consisting of four directives, advised the Turks to avoid shopping from 'money-seeking' grocers Mesut Pasha and Heseyin Shishman 'who think of nothing else but filling their purses'. The leaflet also warned 'a fearful English spy' named Sellas that if he did not withdraw 'a second order will be given as to your end and you will not be able to read this order'. Finally it warned the Turkish Cypriot police 'spies' – that

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76 The twenty operational principles agreed between Karabelen and Tansu are mentioned in Tansu, Aslında, pp. 37-39.
were sent to Turkey by the colonial security forces to find out about TMT — that ‘will be entered on the traitor’s list’. The leaflet ended with familiar language; ‘We do not fear death. We are the children of a nation which smiles at death. How happy is he who is a Turk’.78 On 22 August 1958, the Central Committee, announcing that the truce was continuing, declared that ‘if EOKA does not attack Turks, TMT will make no reprisals and will not act’.79 A few days later, another leaflet informed the ‘esteemed Turkish Community’ that some ‘dishonourable, disloyal persons’ visiting villages, supposedly collecting money for TMT, were not from the organization; the Central Committee warned the traitors that ‘your names are recorded in the black list of TMT ... your punishment will be death’.80

Four other leaflets — circulated between August and October by TMT in various parts of the island (Famagusta, Larnaca, and Lefka) presumably from local TMT leaders — warned those Turks ‘trying for their benefit ... to fill their pockets’ and those shopping from Greek establishments that they will be punished. TMT warned Kel Eyyup, Salih Kiremitci, Yılmaz Zeki, and Sergeant Falk Kavus who ‘spy against our organization’ that it will ‘crush the heads of all these persons amongst us like you’, and threatened that ‘if Ahmet Teyfik does not shut his mouth, his mouth will be torn’.81 Another proclamation warned Hasan Dervish for cooperating with the police, and declared that ‘as from today the right of playing cards from the clubs and coffee shops is removed’. It warned that those who continue gambling, including women, would be punished.82 Another announcement addressed to the Turkish ladies asked; ‘Are you not embarrassed to gather in houses for gambling while the country is

78 ‘A Second Order’, TMT proclamation, 8 August 1958, 368/58, CO 926/941, TNA.
80 ‘Announcement of Turkish Resistance Organization’, TMT proclamation, 27 August 1958, 409/58, CO 926/941, TNA.
81 TMT proclamation, recovered in Famagusta (12 August 1958), 384/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
82 TMT proclamation, distributed in Larnaca (6 September 1958), 384/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
crying for blood?'. The leaflet warned that 'as from now, it is warned that bombs will be thrown at houses where gambling is seen'.

On 19 October 1958, a proclamation signed, for the very first time, by the 'Head-leader' [Vuruskan] announced that the attempt of some Turkish intellectuals in Larnaca to establish another secret organization was not necessary since 'TMT exists in Larnaca as well as in all parts of our green island'. On the following day the Head-leader austerely warned Kara Cete members 'issuing and distributing notices under the forged name of TMT' and the opportunists 'profiteering with dishonesty and merciless actions', 'who have not yet been condemned to death' to immediately 'stop and follow the national route'. In November, 'the Chief Leader of TMT' under the name Zafer – Vuruskan did not used his real code-name Bozkurt – issued two more proclamations. The language used by Vuruskan – either as Head-leader or as Zafer – although precise in military style, was completely different from the usual harsh and aggressive TMT wording. Addressed 'to the brothers who do not belong to TMT' Zafer, stressing the importance of the cooperation and support of the Turkish community, gave advice to those who were 'anxious to serve the TMT' and encouraged the people not to disclose what they know or see about the organization. He also invited 'cultured personalities, idealist teachers and all sensible people' for service. Zafer, in another leaflet, asserted that the 'Turkish Resistance Organization is not based on imperialistic ideas and is not an adventurous terrorist organization like EOKA, but it is a completely legal organization and which is the guardian of its house'. Zafer confidently declared that 'today is the day that Turks realized that they cannot live together with the Greeks'. The last known public proclamation of TMT, signed by the 'TMT Leader', was addressed to the students that participated in the 20 February 1959 march, and disapproved 'the sentiments on some of the

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13 TMT proclamation, distributed in Lefke (8 September 1958), 428/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
14 TMT proclamation signed by the Head-leader, 19 October 1958, 508/58, CO 926/941, TNA.
15 TMT proclamation signed by the Head-leader, 20 October 1958, 507/58, CO 926/941, TNA.
16 TMT proclamation signed by Zafer, (13 November 1958), 547/58, CO 926/942, TNA.
17 TMT proclamation signed by Zafer, (24 November 1958), 566/58, CO 926/942, TNA.
placards you carried'. Vuruskan assured the youths that 'the bullets of TMT only pierce the breasts of enemies and traitors' and that 'there is no reason to feel any worry about the next political developments concerning your future'. 'TMT is one of the institutions struggling to assure an honourable and prosperous future for the Cypriot Turks'. From that moment, and for the following years, until the eruption of inter-communal strife on 21 December 1963, TMT submerged to invisibility.

The operation of TPMT in the Cyprus Police and Gendarmerie

The Turkish Cypriot policemen had played a critical role during the Cyprus Emergency, both for their underground action against Greek Cypriots and their controversial participation in the security forces of the colonial administration that, at the end, became depended on their cooperation, in its struggle for the extermination of EOKA. In 1959, TMT members serving in the Cyprus Police were photocopying the secret security reports prepared for Governor Foot, that were also sent to Whitehall. The leaders of the underground TMT groups in the colonial security forces delivered the photocopies to the Bozkurt, and were then redirected weekly to the Ankara TMT Headquarters.

By 1960, parallel to the invisible operation of TMT, an underground network was established among Turkish members of the security forces – initially in the colonial police force and later in the police and the gendarmerie of the Republic of Cyprus – under the initials TPMT, that possibly stand for Türk Polis Mukavemet Teskilati [Turkish police resistance organization]. The TPMT leader was in Nicosia, and branches of the organization were operating in all six districts. The organization, for security reasons, used in its internal written communication a code. TPMT was the Fabrikatoruk [Factory] and its leader

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18 TMT proclamation signed by TMT Leader, (20 February 1959), 48/59, CO 928/942, TNA.
19 Tansu, Aslinda, p. 218.
59 The only source about the organization, is a series of secret documents discovered in the house of a Turkish police officer in Limassol during the February 1964 operations, twenty of which were later (March 1965) published in daily Agon.
was the *Fabrikator* [Factory owner], while 'agencies' were the district branches of the organization, the code-names of which derived from provinces in Turkey; *Sivas, Kars, Matatya, Mersin* (Limassol), *Mugla* (Paphos). Each district was under the command of the 'agency director'. The members of TPMT were known as 'the workers' and the Turkish members of the security forces were the 'white whips', while the Greek members were the 'black whips'. Each district branch organized an intelligence section, a recruiting and training section, an arms production and storage section, and an operational groups section.91

The earliest document, dated 10 May 1960, was addressed to the district 'agency directors' and ordered the preparation of catalogues of Turkish policemen serving in the colonial police, where each name would be accompanied by a code representing the ideological beliefs of each member; OM was for the avarage nationalist, AM for the passionate nationalist, KM for the superficial nationalist that presented himself as a real nationalist, L was for the indifferent who was not interested in the national cause, and KU was for the anti-nationalist, who was acting against nationalists through insinuation and treachery. On the following day, a new order was sent to the districts for the preparation of similar catalogues regarding Greek members of the colonial security forces; CA would designate former EOKA members in the force, while FCA was for the ultra-active former members of EOKA.92 An 11 June 1960 directive to the districts, ordered the investigation of information according to which the 'black grapes' [Greek members of underground groups] were sent to 'Hell' [Greece]. Another directive informed the district intelligence sections of TPMT that 'a Simca car, W569, is used by a black grape for the transportation of fruits [arms and explosives]', and requested the surveillance of the vehicle.93 In another directive to the 'agency director' in *Mersin*, the *Fabrikator* remarked that 'the dimensions of the fruit [explosives and ammunition] warehouse that

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you are building for the agency [Limassol district branch] does not need to exceed two meters', he was obviously referring to an underground facility.

On 22 September 1960 the *Fabrikator* sent the following letter to the agency in *Mersin*.

Please establish in groups, the workers of the factory in your agency, in the form of a camping. In every tent there will be six workers, one of whom will be responsible, while in every three tents there will be a director. You are requested to carry out the order within one week and report back.

It is obvious that TPMT was following an underground structure, based on the camping/tent code, similar to the one used by TMT. On 16 November 1960, the *Fabrikator* ordered the *Mersin* ‘agency director’ to arrange, ‘away from the agents of the enemy’ a secret meeting with Zia Rizki and the *Bas Yayla* [the TMT district commander], in order to establish a contact between the two underground organizations.

By January 1961 the *Fabrikator* informed the ‘agency’ in *Mersin*, that ‘according to existing information the sailing boats Agios Georgios and Ieris in the *Mersin* port’ were covertly used for arms smuggling. The boxes were unloaded during the night by ‘rat herds’ and were secretly taken away. ‘During that night, they had not assigned any duties to the emerald birds, in order to carry out their work smoothly.’ On 8 August 1961, the *Fabrikator* informed the *Mersin* agency that ‘it is expected that as of 10-20 August 1961 the political situation will be full of undesirable surprises’. The directive stated that the *Bozkurt* [Major Sefik Karakurt] of TMT requested the collection of information about the movements and acts of the cadres and supporters of the Makarios government, about the anti-Makarios party of *Demokratiki Enosis*, the supporters of the Kyrenia Bishop, the former EOKA fighters in Limassol, as well as the acts of individuals with close contacts to EOKA.

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55 Agon, 17 March 1965, pp. 1/5.
56 Agon, 14 March 1965, pp. 1/7.
57 Agon, 14 March 1965, pp. 1/5.
58 Agon, 16 March 1965, pp. 1/5.
developed into a well organized underground network within the security forces of the Republic, that not only collected valuable information, about the underground activities of the Greek Cypriots, that were forwarded to the *Bayraktarlık*, but organized its own underground armed groups, that in case of need, would support the operations of TMT.

**The coup d'éetat and the end of Turkish Cypriot domination over TMT**

The infant TMT of Denktash (November 1957-July 1958), adopted by the Government of Menderes and Zorlu, had progressively grown in the military hands of Vuruskan, a mature officer with war experience in Korea and an honest patriot. In spite of his military expertise, the *Bozkurt* – dependant on local support since he was completely unfamiliar with Cypriot affairs – allowed the infiltration, around him, of a circle of Turkish Cypriot cadres. Although this support was vital for the establishment and growth of TMT, there were times where internal intrigues and extremist attitudes among his local advisers, led to many outrages. In one occasion, the *Bozkurt*, influenced by a local leader – probably Nalbantoglu – ordered the execution of progressive Turkish Cypriot leader Dr Ihsan Ali, who was in favour of the coexistence of the two communities, and against extremist acts. The execution, accidentally revealed to Denktash, was eventually cancelled.

While TMT was considered, within the minority, as an important move towards the protection of Turkish Cypriot rights, the competition between the local leaders – Kutchuk, fearing the decline of his political influence, was skeptical about the political ambitions of Denktash; Nalbantoglu was hated by Kutchuk and mistrusted by Denktash, particularly after the death of his son Munir during a surgical operation by Nalbantoglu; Denktash, an intelligent and

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59 Vuruskan did not hesitate to return covertly to Cyprus in 1964 where he undertook the command of the endangered Kokkina enclave; a position that was inferior to his military experience and his former position as *Bozkurt*.

100 Denktash in Gurkan, *Zirvedeki Yalnizlik Kulesi*, pp. 127-129.
manipulative individual, disregarded the political leadership of Kutchuk and invisibly imposed his hard-line, nationalist agenda – and the oppression within the community for the defence of the national causes, did not allow the progressive development of the already under-privileged and poor minority.101

By 1959, Naibantoglu, Denktash’s sole political opponent in the control of TMT, was expelled from the organization,102 allowing the absolute domination of Denktash and his trusted circle over Bozkurt and TMT affairs. Toros, collected and analyzed information from the whole island, which he then presented in a report to Bozkurt; Denktash reveals that he had meetings with Vuruskan about TMT affairs once or twice every week.103 But Denktash’s role extended far beyond his duties as a political adviser to Bozkurt. In reality he dominated not only the internal affairs of the Turkish Community, but to a great extent, with the blessings of Menderes and Zorlu, the internal affairs of TMT as well. Elite TMT cadre A.A. remarks that ‘in reality Denktash held Vuruskan in his palm’.104 This monopoly of power justifiably caused great concern to Dr Kutchuk, that ‘the excessive power of the organization would induce undesirable acts’. These fears eventually reached Menderes. In a meeting requested by the Turkish Prime Minister, on 6 September 1959, Cankurt, Dogan and Bozkurt listened carefully to the rumours: ‘I have been informed that Rauf Denktash, with the help and support of Lieutenant Colonel Vuruskan, will remove Kutchuk from the leadership of the Turkish community and succeed him’.105

But suddenly, this sense of Turkish Cypriot power over TMT crashed. The overthrow of the corrupt Menderes regime, during the military coup of 27 May 1960, signaled not only the decline of Denktash’s domination over TMT affairs, but also the beginning of an internal crisis within the organization, both

101 Letter by the first Turkish Ambassador in Nicosia, Emin Dirvana, published in Milliyet (15 May 1964) and republished in Phileleftheros, 23 May 1964, pp. 1/8.
102 Personal interview with Arif Hasan Tahsin, 4 October 2006.
103 Denktash in Gurkan, Zirvedeki Yalnizlik Kulasi, p. 124.
105 Tansu, Astinda, pp. 181-186.
in Ankara and Nicosia, as well as the alienation of Turkey from Cypriot affairs. The military officers involved in the coup d'état were deeply doubtful about TMT, and believed that the Seferberlik Tektik Kurulu and its officers, whom they called 'Menderes' Gestapo', were involved in a pro-Menderes underground organization. Tansu’s explanations about the role of TMT to the powerful man of the military regime, Cypriot-born Colonel Alparslan Turkes, had temporarily reduced the ambiguity about the organization. Tansu asserts that, until his forced removal by the military regime (13 November 1960), Turkes fulfilled all TMT needs, including the continuation of arms transfer to the island, the posting of ten officers to Cyprus, as well as the provision of more funds from the Foreign Ministry. 'The protagonists of the revolution [coup d'état]' remarks Tansu, 'had the mistaken conviction that with the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the Cyprus issue was solved'. The KIP ‘was shelved’, Lieutenant General Danis Karabelen was discharged, Lieutenant Colonel Riza Vuruskan, under controversial circumstances, was transferred to irrelevant duties, while Major Ismail Tansu, accused for being a pro-Menderes/Zorlu man, eventually resigned, before being discharged, on 2 September 1960.

The arrival, on Independence Day, of the first Turkish Ambassador, Emin Dirvana, a Cypriot-born retired Turkish Army Colonel, produced excitement to the Turkish Cypriot leadership that lasted less than twenty four hours. On the following day, Denktash’s comment, 'I hope that, having come to Cyprus as an ambassador, when Makarios destroys the agreements, you will leave as a governor', caused the furious reaction of Dirvana who declared: I came as an ambassador and I will leave as an ambassador. Anyone who dares to destroy the agreements, under which Turkey had signed their guarantee, will be punished. 'It was a very bad start with Dirvana' Denktash remarks, 'that never improved'.

The military regime in Turkey, unable to handle the serious internal and political

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106 Ibid., p. 232.
107 Ibid., pp. 233-234.
108 Ibid., p. 258.
109 Personal interview with Rauf Denktash, 6 September 2006.
problems as well as the economic crisis plaguing the country, considered – at least in theory – that the establishment of the new Republic had solved the Cyprus question. Dirvana representing this policy, begun realizing that the nationalist character of the local Turkish leadership – that was fond of the previous (Menderes) regime for its critical military infiltration in Cyprus – expressed aggressively by Denktash, tended to disrupt the political tranquility on the island, pursued by the motherland.

The abrupt removal of Vuruskan from Cyprus was not due to a normal reassignment, but the outcome of the manipulative and corrosive action of one of Vuruskan’s TMT officers. Major Safik Karakurt codenamed Dagli, came to Cyprus in July 1958 under the name Mustapha Kaya, and was assigned, by the Bozkurt, duties as the Sancactor of Famagusta. Dagli, as was eventually proven, was an ambitious – arrogant, according to Denktash – officer that developed an antipathy for his commanding officer Vuruskan. Tansu says that ‘Karakurt did not appreciate the trust shown to him by Vuruskan’. In his May 1960 visit to Cyprus, Tansu was surprised when he realized that Karakurt had kept in a warehouse five hundred TMT arms, without delivering them to the appropriate cells for underground storage. During their meeting, Dagli criticised the way Bozkurt exercised his command duties in TMT, and tried to manipulate Tansu’s opinion for Vuruskan. On his return to Nicosia, Tansu’s suspicions were verified by Vuruskan, who did not wish to report him to Ankara, since he was the one who selected him in 1958.110 Eventually, the connections of Karakurt with the military regime in Ankara, enforced the ostracism of Vuruskan and his self-imposition as the Bayraktar.111

From the very beginning, Karakurt, realizing the close relationship between the local leadership, particularly of Denktash, and the former Bayraktar, tried to diminish the influence of the Turkish Cypriot leadership on TMT. Karakurt, acknowledging the friction between Dirvana and Denktash, immediately sided himself with Dirvana, and begun exercising pressure on

110 Tansu, Aslinda, pp. 237-239.
111 Denktash in Gurkan, Zirvedeki Yalnizlik Kulesi, p. 133.
Denktash regarding his TMT role. For some weeks the reports prepared by Denktash, contrary to the previous procedure followed by Vuruskan, were not collected by TMT. The visit of Denktash to Karakurt, requested by the new Bayraktar, turned hostile between the two men when Karakurt ironically asked if Denktash belonged to Riza Vuruskan or the organization. The Bayraktar questioned whether, by not sending the weekly reports, Denktash was not recognizing his authority and left unfounded insinuations about the financial dealings of TMT between Denktash and Vuruskan.¹¹²

It seems that Karakurt was determined to take TMT under his full control, by any means; even murder. In 1962, Nalbantoglu, under the directions of Karakurt, was isolated in a room and was beaten up by TMT members and threatened with death. Tansu and Vuruskan, hearing the rumours about his maltreatment, arranged for the arrival of Nalbantoglu to Ankara. He was scared and shocked; he believed that the reason for the threats against his life was his close relation with former TMT leader Vuruskan. Nalbantoglu eventually saw through Mehmet Ertugruloglu – the Ambassador of Cyprus in Ankara – the Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Cevdet Sunay, that assured him that he would solve the problem.¹¹³ Aydin Samioglu asserted that an execution order was issued for seven individuals, including Rauf Denktash, Burhan Nalbantoglu, Orhan Muderrisoglu and Aydin Sami. The planning came into the knowledge of Ertugruloglu and General Memduh Tarmac in Ankara, and was aborted.¹¹⁴ The friction between Karakurt and Denktash continued, when Denktash decided to make three copies of his weekly reports, one delivered to the Bayraktar, and the other two to the Turkish Embassy and the Kibris Turk Alay Komutanligi (KTAK) [Cyprus Turkish regiment command]. Karakurt became furious with Denktash and the disagreement ended with a quarrel.¹¹⁵

¹¹² Denktash in Gurkan, Zirvedeki Yalintik Kulesi, p. 134.
¹¹³ Tansu, Aslinda, pp. 222-227.
¹¹⁵ Denktash in Gurkan, Zirvedeki Yalintik Kulesi, p. 135.
On 1 February 1961 former PC 321 Kemal Dervis disappeared from Nicosia; although the incident spread in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, strangely the Turkish press did not report the disappearance. He was executed by TMT for being a traitor. A few days later, the disappearance of an elite TMT member, Unal Raif, ended with another execution. The complicated incident begun with a dispute between the local TMT leader, Jemal Hamza, and Remzi, both of Mari. Hamza offered one thousand Pounds to Unal Raif to murder Remzi; Raif not only refused the assignment but reacted against Hamza, who, scared, arranged for the execution of Raif (27 January 1961), the body of whom was found on 15 February in a well. The revenge for the murder of Raif came from his TMT comrades on the following day, 16 February, when two men – M. and M. – of the three-member execution team, shot and killed him instantly in his Nicosia office. The incident did not end, since both Unal Raif and Jemal Hamza were TMT cadres. An army officer was sent from Turkey to investigate the incident. Under investigation was A.A. – he went to the meeting visibly armed – who admitted that ‘I ordered the execution of Hamza, but I will not tell you who shot him. If it is a TMT order to kill me, I prefer to shoot myself on my own’. The case from that moment was considered closed.

Various mysterious incidents against Greek Cypriots during the period, were intended – according to police officer-investigator Theophanis Demetriou – to ‘create tension, confusion, instability, and suspicion among the Greeks, as well as disturb the economy and the society’. In January 1962, Giangos Andrea and his girlfriend were shot at, without being injured, during the night, near the Turkish village of Kanli. According to a Turkish informer, the three young Turks involved in the incident were TMT members and had orders to

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115 Demetriou, Politika Englimata, pp. 89-99.
check and harass Greeks that were entering the Turkish quarters. In the beginning of February, a Greek couple, threatened with guns, was robbed and raped in a remote road near the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, by four young Turks. On 7 April 1961, police sergeant Petros Solomou and sixteen-year Andreas Giannouris were shot and killed during the night. On 17 December 1961, Giangos Eracleous was murdered with a pistol that was used in the murder of Solomou and Giannouris. A few days later, on 26 December 1961 Sadi Zigia, the headmaster of the Kornokepos Turkish elementary school and a supporter of progressive Turkish Cypriot leader Dr Ihsan Ali, was shot by a masked-man that was recognized by Zigia. The pistol used against the Turkish schoolmaster was also used in the murders of Solomou, and Giannouris. On 22 December 1962, Pola Poleou was murdered and Andonis Nikolaides was left paralyzed, after a night attack against them in the Athalassa Park. The pistols used, were also used in the murders of Solomou, Giannouris, Eracleous and the attempted murder of schoolmaster Zigia. Karakurt remained Bayraktar for sixteens months until February 1962 when he was reassigned back to the motherland. Tansu thinks that 'their representations to General Sunay' about the Nalbantoglu case may have contributed, towards the removal of Karakurt from TMT leadership.

The Cypriot mutiny within TMT and the countdown to armed confrontation

The officer assigned to substitute the Bayraktar was Captain Ahmet Gocmez, who arrived secretly on the island in August 1960 — under the name of Mehmet Yilmaz Pars — with another five officers, and undertook command duties in the six Yayla districts of TMT. Between 1958-1969, Gocmez served as assistant

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122 Demetriou, Politika Engilimata, pp. 90-91.
124 Demetriou, Politika Engilimata, pp. 95-96.
125 Ibid., pp. 96-99.
126 Tansu, Aslinda, pp. 222-227.
coordinator to Ismail Tansu, responsible for training, in the TMT Ankara Headquarters. Indicative of the internal crisis within TMT, arising from the reservations and hesitation – about TMT and its mission – of the military regime of Cemal Gursel (30 May 1960-27 October 1961) and the new Republican People's Party government of Ismet Inonu (from 20 November 1961), is the raw fact that a new Bayraktar was sent to Cyprus in October 1962, almost seven months after the removal of Karakurt.

Denktash found the golden opportunity to regain TMT control. Kemal Shemi, the Nicosia Serdar, – who was deeply against the control of TMT by Turkish army officers acting under the directions of Denktash, called a secret meeting of the Nicosia sector commanders, with the intention of removing Gomez from the leadership of TMT, 'in order not to receive orders from him'. The Turkish Cypriot mutiny led to a petition, signed by all the participants except two, for the removal of Gomez and the enforcement of Turkish Cypriot control over TMT. A few weeks later, General Shapan Karakurt arrived from Ankara to handle the situation. He held a meeting with all those who signed the petition and furiously talked to them in disparaging vocabulary; 'we should have executed you all ... this is the first and last time'. The Nicosia Serdar, Kemal Shemi, was strongly against the presence of Turkish army officers in Cyprus. 'What is the business of Turkey here?' he asked Arif Hasan Tahsin. 'The problem of a Cypriot, only a Cypriot can understand. These are dogs [Turkish officers]. A dog does not bite the other dog.' After the 1964 crisis he was removed from TMT.

Captain Gomez was an honest, mature officer – had served in Korea – that worked very hard, 'sometimes even until morning hours', travelling in the remote Turkish villages all over the island, to organize TMT. It was during his leadership that he assigned to Mehmet Ali Tremeseli the formation of an elite

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127 Tansu, Arslinda, pp. 61-62.
128 Personal interview with Arif Hasan Tahsin, 4 October 2006.
130 Personal interview with Arif Hasan Tahsin, 4 October 2006.
"Ozel Grup" [special group] which would operate as a reserve force under the command of the Bayraktar. Its men were armed – the equipment was stored, according to TMT procedures, in underground hideouts – with Thomson and Sterling sub-machine guns, as well as grenades.  

During the period, two critical incidents aggravated the already burdened inter-communal environment. In the early hours of 25 March 1962 – the anniversary of the 1821 Greek revolution – a number of time bombs exploded in the Omerie and Bayraktar mosques, in the Greek quarters of Nicosia, causing severe damages to the interior of the sacred buildings and the tomb of the Bayraktar, the unknown Ottoman flag-bearer who fell during the besiege of Nicosia in 1571. Dr Kutchuk and Denktash immediately assigned the responsibility to Greek elements, while Interior Minister Akritas declared that the bombs were placed by Turks. Until today, the motives and the individuals – Greeks or Turks – behind the provocation, that intended to encourage suspicion and hatred between the two communities, have not been revealed. Following are some peculiarities about the incident: a) In the Turkish community rumours threw the responsibility to Turks; b) The saboteurs knew quite well the interior of both mosques. In Omerle, where there was no electrical supply, they used batteries to cause the explosions, while in the Bayraktar they used the electrical circuit of the building. Experts established that the perpetrators, must have known quite well the interior electrical circuits of the building, and spent no less that two-three hours for the installation of the bombs. The Turkish mosque keeper stated that there were no Greek visitors during the last months. c) The internal damages in both mosques, and particularly in the tomb of the Bayraktar, were extensive and catastrophic. If the perpetrators were Turkish, it would have been more logical to use explosive devises – similar to the 6 September 1955 incident in Salonica and the 7 June...

133 Personal interview with Arif Hasan Tahsin, 4 October 2006.
1958 in Nicosia – that would create noise rather than severe destruction. d) Cadres of the Greek underground paramilitary life avoided or even refused to express their opinion about the incidents, indirectly implying that any reference to the matter would be manipulated by the Turks today.\cite{135}

On 29 March 1962, a fire that burned a few pieces of furniture in a classroom that was used as a warehouse in the Agios Kassianos branch of the (Greek) Pancyprian Gymnasium, near the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, created more agitation, when hundreds of Greek students, incited by the men of Samson – that were ordered from the previous night to arouse the students\cite{136} – to march towards the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, were eventually diverted to the offices of Samson's Machi, where Promitheas delivered a self-praising patriotic speech.\cite{137}

The second incident that caused speculation and friction between the two communities, was the murder of lawyers – editors of the weekly Cumhuriyet [Democracy] – Muzaffer Gurkan and Ayhan Hikmet on the night of 23/24 April 1962.\cite{138} The execution order did not come from Turkey; some indications allegedly turned the finger towards Denktash.\cite{139} Tahsin remarks that when some elite TMT members complained about the murders to the Serdar, Kemal Shemi told them to close their mouth and leave; ‘he must have known’ says Tahsin. Later the Sancaktar told Tahsin that ‘it is from this dog [Denktash] that everything happened, he planned them’.\cite{140} Hasan Demirag, reassures that the execution order did not come from the TMT leadership in Ankara or Nicosia, but men from two TMT cells were used during that night for the executions. ‘The order was given by the individual who was responsible for those two cells; the end of the cord touches Denktash’\cite{141} Toros on the other hand declares that

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The matter was discussed privately thus it is not possible to reveal the sources.
\item Personal Interview with T.I., 24 January 2006.
\item Machi, 30 March 1962, pp. 1/6.
\item Personal Interviews with A.A., 2 July 2007, and Arif Hasan Tahsin, 4 October 2006.
\item Personal Interview with Arif Hasan Tahsin, 4 October 2006.
\item Personal Interview with Hasan Demirag, 5 September 2006.
\end{enumerate}
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'the journalists were killed by Giorkadjis' who had – according to Denktash – three reasons to kill them: ‘they were his agents and he was paying them uselessly because they were not effective; they were also hand in hand with AKEL that Giorkadjis was against; they have implied who has done it [the bombs], then I would be accused, and I was accused’.

The situation was further perplexed when Giorkadjis presented to the investigation committee an audio tape where Gurkan was heard revealing information to Giorkadjis about TMT, Denktash, and the explosion of the bombs at the mosques.

The new Bayraktar, Lieutenant Colonel Kenan Coygun, arrived in Nicosia on 3 October 1962 under the name of Kemal Coskun, disguised as a Turkish Embassy attache – Diplomatic Identity Card No. 405. He remained in Cyprus until 25 July 1967, when he was removed from the island after allegedly executing, in the Nicosia police station, TMT member Alpay Mustapha; the tragedy begun when Alpay, in a quarrel with two other TMT members, shot and injured them. Between 1962 and 1963 he travelled five times to Turkey; his last trip was on 6 October 1963. The relations between the new Bayraktar and Denktash were not smooth. According to Tahsin, one night Coygun kidnapped lawyer Mentesh Aziz and took him to Agios llarionas mountain range, where he forced him to dig his own grave. Aziz was left free when he admitted that he transferred information to Giorkadjis about the Bayraktar, on the advice of Denktash. In the meantime, the command structure of TMT was further strengthened by five Lieutenant Colonels – Orhan Ozatay as a tabacco expert, Remzi Guven as a charity organization official, as well as Eftal Akca, Turgut Sokmen, and Turgut Giray Budak as school inspectors – that arrived between November 1962 and October 1963, in the critical period before the

142 Personal interview with Reuf Denktash, 22 August 2006.
144 Turkish Embassy to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 945/344, 4 October 1962, FA 1/968, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Turkish Embassy, E371/DE.1/18, FA 1/968, SA.
146 Agon, 10 March 1965, p. 1.
147 Personal interview with Arif Hasan Tahsin, 4 October 2006.
eruption of conflict, and undertook the district command of the Sancaktarlık. It seems that gradually the two-year freeze of TMT begun to melt.

1963 turned out to be a critical year. On 31 December 1962, the 1962 (Amendment No. 9) Law for the Extension of the Effect of the Municipalities Laws — after the continuous rejections of Greek Cypriot proposals by the Turkish side — was eventually rejected by the Greek members of the House, causing the collapse of the municipalities, that ceased to exist. A meeting between the Turkish leadership and Prime Minister İnönü in Ankara, in the beginning of January 1963, turned into a shock for Denktash, when he found out that his detailed reports about Greek Cypriot preparations, had never reached the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister. The Turkish Government was completely unaware of the Cyprus situation and advised the Turkish Cypriot leadership to take the municipality issue to the Higher Constitutional Court. 'Their advice' says Denktash was 'no drastic action, no counter-move'. 'Turkey's position was restrain, do not do something which will involve Turkey'. On 25 January 1963, a new provocation poured more oil into the fire that was invisibly burning. Peculiarly, a new bomb explosion in the Bayraktar mosque and the arrest of three Turks — one of whom was armed — in the area, had passed almost unnoticed. The reaction of both communities was frozen, as if the people subconsciously felt that the inter-communal friction mechanism was set into the confrontational mode.

The underground leaderships of the two communities begun preparing their strategic plans of action. Akritas prepared a four-stage Top Secret plan that envisaged: the amendment of the negative aspects of the agreements and the diminish of the actual value of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance; the deactivation of the Treaty of Guarantee and particularly of the right of unilateral

150 Phileleftheros, 1 January 1963, p. 1.
151 Personal interview with Rauf Denktash, 6 September 2006.
action by the guarantor powers (Turkey); the exercise of the right of self-determination – implying Enosis; the 'lawful confrontation' of any internal [by the Turkish Cypriots] or external [by Turkey] intervention by the forces of the state. Similarly Kutchuk and Denktash prepared an eight-point plan that envisaged that the Turkish community would ‘take its destinies in its own hands and establish a [Turkish] Cyprus Republic outside the Zurich Agreements’. Vice President Dr Kutchuk would form a Turkish Cypriot government that would be immediately recognized by motherland Turkey which would intervene [militarily] on the island. Cypriots in Turkey would be infiltrated into the island and the Turkish members of the House and the Communal Chamber would form a purely Turkish parliament. Point six clearly stated that ‘a struggle will start between the two communities which will determine the outcome’. ‘When the struggle begins’ point seven stated, ‘the Turkish community, dispersed throughout the Island, should be forcibly concentrated in an area and be compelled to defend it’; the civil servants would be reassigned to the new Turkish Cypriot ‘administrative machinery’.

The proposals of Makarios for the amendment of the constitution turned into a coup de grace. Despite the fact that the underground forces of the two communities were not ready for a violent confrontation, their political leaderships failed completely to assess the excessive hazard behind their political manoeuvres. A noise bomb against the statue of EOKA hero Markos

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153 'Ai Prosfatal Politikal Exelixis' [The recent political developments], Top Secret, signed by Akritas [Akritas Plan, 1983]. The plan (some parts were omitted) was initially published in Patris, 21 April 1966, pp. 1/4; its full version was published in Krisima Dokumenta, edited by Papageorgiou, vol. 1, pp. 250-257, and in Giaffkos Clerides, Η Κατάθεσι μου [My deposition], 4 vols (Nicosia: Aelthia, 1988), vol. 1, pp. 227-235.

154 A cursory glance on the general policy of the Turkish community as regards the future of the Republic on the occasion of the completion of three years since the establishment of the Republic, 14 September 1963, signed by Dr Fazil Kutchuk and Rauf Denktash; published in Clerides, My Deposition, vol. 1, pp. 203-207.

Drakos, on 3 December 1963, did not matter any more. The situation was so explosive that the slightest spark would detonate the inflammable fuel that had been accumulating underground during the previous years. The morning hours of 21 December 1963 signalled the beginning of the end of the Republic of Cyprus.

156 *Phileleftheros*, 4 December 1963, pp. 1/6.
DIAGRAM 6
The Underground Structure of TMT in Turkey and Cyprus in 1958-1959

TMT TURKEY
- Ankara HQ
- TMT HQ STAFF
  - Ankara
- TMT TRAINING CENTERS
  - Zir Ankara
  - Antalya
- TMT SUPPLY CENTERS
  - Antalya
  - Mersin
  - Anamur

TMT CYPRUS
- Nicosia HQ
- TMT HQ STAFF
  - Nicosia
- TMT COMMANDER
  - Lt. Col. R. Vuruskan
- TMT POLITICAL ADVIS.
  - Rauf R. Denktash
  - (TURKISH LEADER)
    - Dr Fazil Kutchuk
- YAYLA [mountain range]
  - Nicosia
  - Famagusta
  - Larnaca
  - Limassol
  - Paphos
  - Lefka
- OTAG [Great Tent]
- OBA [Camp]
- CADIR [Tent]
  - Hucre [Cell]
  - Kurt [Wolves]

Roles:
- PRIME MINISTER
  - Adnan Menderes
- FOREIGN MINISTER
  - Fatin Rustu Zorlu
- DEP. DEFENCE MINIST.
  - Gen. Salih Coskun
- DEPUTY HEAD
  - TURK. ARMED FORCES
    - Gen. Cevdet Sunay
- TMT TURKEY
  - COORDINATOR
    - Major Ismail Tansu
- TMT CYPRUS
  - HEAD TURK. ARMED FORCES
    - Gen. Cavdat Sunay
  - TMT TRAINING CENTERS
    - Nicosia
  - TMT SUPPLY CENTERS
    - Anamur
Conclusion

The de facto imposition of military division on the island of Cyprus today – a bitter consequence of the crude 1963-64 inter-communal conflict and the catastrophic 1974 Turkish invasion – has its roots in the last years of colonial rule and the first years of the young Republic. The three thousand-year old Hellenic population of the island, traumatized by the slaughters of Ottoman occupation, perceived the formation of an independent Greek state as a sheet anchor for its salvation, for the fulfillment of its national aspiration for Enosis. The exhaustive Cypriot Greek appeals to London were continually rejected, and were indifferently undermined by Greece, the geopolitical priorities of which did not touch Cyprus. The ambiguous relationship between Cypriot Hellenism and the motherland was shaken when, young and ambitious, Archbishop Makarios III imposed, on Greece, the internationalization of the Cyprus question. Greek appeal to the United Nations – after Hopkinson's traumatic 'never' – turned eventually into a diplomatic blunder for Greece and a strategic disaster for Cypriot Greeks, when the embarrassed colonial power revived innate Turkish interest for Cyprus.

The dubious relations between Makarios, Grivas and the Greek Government, during the long preparatory period, were rather prophetic for the eventual outcome of the underground campaign that, even before its outbreak, was burdened with four strategic factors: firstly, the naive insensitivity of Makarios towards the geopolitical realities in the region, and secondly, the manipulation by Makarios of the fragile post-war Greek political stability and the de facto imposition of Cypriot ambitions on Greece; thirdly, the failure of the Greek Government to resist effectively Cypriot Greek pressure, as well as the erroneous assumption of Grivas that the underground campaign would be a local confrontation between the Cypriot guerillas and the colonial administration. Neither of the three parties involved – Makarios, Grivas, Greek Government – ever envisaged the possible repercussions of their political-
underground maneuvers; the colonial reaction, the involvement of Turkey – presumed pacified under the Treaty of Lausanne, and the interference of Cypriot Turks – considered the temporary minority remains of the Ottoman invasion.

The underground campaign – despite a few controversial elements relating to the political murders of leftists and the occasional abuse of the organization's power for the settlement of personal accounts – under the charismatic military leadership of Digenis, that utilized imaginative guerrilla techniques and advanced unorthodox warfare tactics – founded on the dedication and self-sacrifice of some of its members for the ideal of Enosis, and the almost catholic participation of the population – turned into a tactical triumph that brought deep embarrassment to the British Army and the colonial security forces, which failed to inflict the destruction of EOKA.

But strategically the campaign failed since – beyond the four strategic mistakes of the preparatory period – the complete lack of proper understanding between the military and political leadership, and the dramatic deviation of Greek and Cypriot Greek strategic objectives, determined the terminal outcome of the struggle. Additionally, the Cypriot audacity to challenge the colonial rule and the EOKA 'prickle', deeply injured British pride. The inability of the local colonial administration to face the crisis, obliged Whitehall to resort to its doctrine of divide et impera. The re-emergence – with British encouragement – of Turkish interest for Cyprus, accompanied by the rise of acute Pan-Turkism, led the Turkish Government from its initial pro-British, continuation-of-colonial-rule position to the aggressive Kibris Turktur, and eventually to the Averof-inspired, Lenox Boyd-imposed, Menderes-aggravated Taksim.

The anti-colonial passion of Digenis against the British, and his absolute underestimation of the Cypriot Turk element, led on one hand to strict orders forbidding any action against the minority, but on the other, to a full scale terrorizing campaign against the police, that, in the meantime, was flooded with huge numbers of mostly unqualified Turkish policemen, that served as a buffer between the colonial forces and EOKA, absorbing part of the fatal blows. The
minority, alarmed by the dynamic action of EOKA, began its underground organization, initially with KITEMB and later with VOLKAN – the counter-action of which was limited to arson, bomb explosions, destruction of Greek property and attacks against innocent Greeks. The indiscriminate strikes of EOKA against the police and the cause of Turkish fatalities encouraged the first racially motivated attacks against Greek property, and later against Greek soft targets. The death pattern in the following two years remained unaltered: EOKA continued the murders of Turkish policemen while VOLKAN, through the Turkish policemen, carried on the murders of innocent Greeks. The ineffectiveness – softness – of VOLKAN to counter-balance EOKA, initiated an effort of establishing a new organization named 9 Eylül Cephesi, the operation of which was tragically disrupted during its formation.

The establishment of Turk Mukavemet Teskilati, under the hard-line leadership of Rauf Denktash, despite its short life, succeeded to attract the attention of motherland Turkey, as well as to enforce the derailment of Enosis under the threat of Taksim. The heavy Greek casualties suffered during the first weeks of the sixty-day Taksim offensive, under the competent, aggressive, and nothing-to-lose leadership of Denktash, shocked the Greek community. The initial silence of EOKA aggravated Turkish aggression against innocent Greeks, forcing Digenis to enter the conflict. The underground confrontation of TMT and EOKA that followed – in the colonial shadow of pro-Turk discrimination – was devastating, both in the number of victims and the violence used against Greek victims, most of who were stabbed and butchered to death.

The signing of the controversial Zurich and London Agreements brought a temporary suspension of inter-communal strife, but it did not succeed in erasing the deep scars of fear and aversion engraved during the Taksim offensive. The Greek side, completely disappointed for the abandonment of the strategic objective of Enosis, saw the luxuriant Turkish privileges offered by the Constitution, and the transformation of a minority into an equal political partner of the Greek majority, as a raw provocation. The Turkish side, realizing the vast potentials offered for the financial and political growth of the minority, insisted
on the detailed and full implementation of the agreements. In the meantime, the covert military infiltration of Turkey into Cyprus through the re-establishment of TMT by Turkish Army officers — under the *Kibris Istirdat Projesi* secretly prepared by the *Seferberlik Tektik Kurulu* — and the secret training of men in Turkey, as well as the covert importation of serious quantities of arms and ammunition, dramatically undermined the chances of a peaceful implementation of such complicated and perplexed agreements.

The distribution of post-colonial power among former EOKA members, accompanied by the failure to organize them under a unified political identity (EDMA) — under the invisible control of Makarios and his *protege*-protector Giorkadjis, turned out as a serious destabilizing element in internal Greek Cypriot affairs that eventually developed into a hazardous ideological chasm. The pro-Grivas supporters, opposing independence in favor of *Enosis*, were socially and politically marginalized, while pro-Makarios supporters, in favor of the *Zurich-London Agreements*, were offered influential government positions and were rewarded with social recognition. While the Turkish motherland and the minority worked silently to strengthen their underground paramilitary organization, the former members of EOKA turned into predators of social and political power, where personal rivalries, frequently led into abuse of power and occasionally to murder. The multipolar internal Greek Cypriot armed antagonism — between pro-Makarios Giorkadjis (personal armed and intelligent groups), pro-Grivas Papaphotis-Kyriakides (initially KEM and later PSA), as well as pro-Makarios/Grivas Samson (OPEK) — during the first Independence years, did not serve the best interests of the Cypriots (Greeks and Turks). Similarly the continuation of underground preparations by TMT and the establishment of EOK to counter-balance the Turkish underground movement, dramatically reduced the chances for a peaceful future. The accumulation of inflammable fuel (underground movements) in both communities would only need a single spark to cause an explosive combustion. The continual friction arising from the perplexed nature of the Constitution, re-enforced by growing suspicion between the two communities, as well as the year-after-year
deterioration of the inter-communal environment, evaporated the opportunity for a prosperous common future. The countdown, which began with the internationalization of 1954, was hazardously leading towards an inter-communal armed confrontation with indeterminate implications. The peculiar attitudes of the two motherlands—political hesitation but underground support of the paramilitary forces of the two communities—accompanied by strange provocations such as the Omerie-Bayraktar bomb explosions, the Agios Kassianos arson attempt, the Gurkan-Hikmet murders, the second Bayraktar bomb explosion, and the Markos Drakos noise bomb, created a suffocating environment, where the critical question was not if an inter-communal confrontation would erupt, but when. The accidental incident in the early hours of 21 December 1963, between Greek policemen and Turkish Cypriots, that almost caused the collapse of the cripple Republic—initiated the geographical separation of the two communities and the beginning of the end of Cypriot trust and co-existence.
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