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Environmental themes in French literature and politics of the 1930s

by

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.
Abstract

The politicisation of environmentalism (the founding of green parties and permanent national and international campaigning organisations) was quickly followed by an attempt to identify the roots of the movement. In France, this search has had a comparatively narrow focus. That is, the origins of French green politics have generally been identified in either the science of ecology, or events of the late 1960s, when 'green' movements began to become more obviously political. This thesis will argue that, as Anglo-Saxon authors have already claimed, the origins of modern environmental politics are in fact more diverse. There is a remarkable degree of shared ground between modern environmental politics and certain points in the history of France, particularly the 1930s. In order to demonstrate the links between the two, the politics, literature and ideas prominent in the 1930s in France will be examined and contrasted to key themes now stressed by green political movements, both in France and elsewhere.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Why consider French history, specifically that of the 1930s, in relation to modern green politics\(^1\)? This introduction will explain the approach taken in the thesis, and some problems it raises.

The direct origins of the political ecology movement have already been widely studied. In France, the development of the movement has been amply catalogued, particularly since the 1980s. Politicians who established the first green parties in France, notably Brice Lalonde and Antoine Waechter have written accounts, as have prominent members of the new movements (Didier Anger, Yves Cochet, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, René Dumont, among others).\(^2\) Recent sociological and political studies also emphasise the development of green politics.

All the above argue it is important to establish exactly when and how the modern political ecology movement began, and offer suggestions as to where these origins might be found. Many argue with Lalonde, for example, that the events of May 1968 were the catalyst for the movement which finally assumed permanent structures in the 1980s in France.\(^3\) Indeed, they further claim that modern environmental politics were therefore a French invention:

Nous avons inventé l'écologie politique par rapport à l'Amérique ou à l'Angleterre où il y a une attitude d'association, de syndicat de la nature parce que nous pensions en soixante-huitards que cela avait une grande influence sociétale. (1, p.39)
Others have highlighted the effect of various doom-laden warnings of impending ecological disaster, usually written by scientists. The effects of these texts in France were slightly different than in English-speaking countries, as they were sometimes translated some time after the original versions appeared; and their titles often became more sensational or emotive in ‘translation’. Carson’s Silent spring was the first such text to be widely-read in France, in 1962. The title refers to a future spring without the noises of birds, insects and other wildlife, annihilated by use of artificial pesticides. Others followed several years later, notably Commoner’s Science and survival (Quelle terre laisserons-nous à nos enfants?, translated in 1969, 3 years after the American edition); Dubos’ Man adapting (translated in 1973, 8 years after the U.S. edition); The Ecologist magazine’s Blueprint for survival (Changer ou disparaître, 1972); the report funded by the Club of Rome, the Limits to growth (Halte à la croissance!, 1972); and Taylor’s The Doomsday book (Le jugement dernier, 1970). French authors also published similar warnings around this time, for example Bonnefous’ L’Homme ou la Nature! (1970), Dorst’s Avant que Nature meure (1969), Dumont’s L’Utopie ou la mort! (1973), Heim’s L’angoisse de l’an 2000: quand la nature aura passé, l’homme la suivra (1973), and Skrotzky’s La nature n’en peut plus (1971).^5

Others still underline the role of modern media in the development of public awareness. Discussion in the media of ideas expressed in texts such as those listed above led to their popularisation, and awareness of their arguments thus spread far beyond those who had actually read the texts. As well as the spread of ideas and theories, television in particular enabled viewers to witness key images which would be seized on by the nascent green movements. Waechter is one of many who describe the impact of television footage of the earth from space in sentimental terms:

Certes, depuis Copernic, on sait que la planète est ronde, mais les images envoyés par les satellites, et les premiers hommes dans l’espace, vont peut-être marquer bien davantage l’esprit humain. Parce qu’ils indiquent très
concrètement les limites de cette petite boule bleue et verte dans l'immensité de l'univers.  

Television footage of environmental disasters (both natural and man-made) is also seen by environmentalists as a key factor in raising awareness. In France, this was particularly true after the Torrey Canyon disaster in 1967. Media coverage of early environmental protests in France (e.g., at the Larzac plateau) is again represented as motivating later groups. Specialist publications, such as Sauvage, La gueule ouverte and Nature et progrès appeared for the first time during the late 1960s and early 1970s, often as a way of organising and mobilising support for these direct protests, or in response to them.

Of course, the diversity of the recent origins of the political ecology movement is usually acknowledged, and most of these studies accept that a combination of the events which influenced them with other factors was necessary for its development.

In tracing these direct origins of the modern political ecology movement, French environmentalists and authors are no different to those in other countries. Most British or American texts on modern green politics also give some account of such direct origins. However, these studies have also consistently argued that an examination of the less recent 'roots' of political ecology is equally necessary. Perhaps surprisingly, there have been few, if any, serious sustained attempts by their French counterparts to link the political ecology movement with its more distant past in this way. Outside France, even as early as the 1970s, the American environmentalist Roszak expressed his surprise at this omission. The evident similarities between the example of the French Personalist movement in particular and the ideas of modern green thinkers were commented upon in English-language texts like Roszak's Person/Planet much earlier than in French studies. Others, notably Bramwell (8) have looked further back and demonstrated the influence of the
ideas of Rousseau and the French Enlightenment philosophers on Anglo-Saxon political ecology.

The attempt to trace the more distant roots of green politics is one which has been attempted in Anglo-Saxon countries rather than in France thus far, then. The two principal studies in English have been by Coates and Pepper. Their approaches will be outlined in the next section.

1.1 The roots of modern environmentalism

Coates disagrees that environmentalism is a comparatively recent phenomenon. Focussing on the inter-war period in Great Britain, he catalogues growing concern for the environment, and concludes that ‘many of the environmental concerns expressed today are hardly new’ (9, p.1). As evidence, he points out that many key ‘environmental’ acts were discussed in Parliament or became law during this period.

The rise in number and increasing membership of various broadly-environmental social movements during this period are also cited as evidence for his position. Some of the groups which were founded in Britain in the 1920s and 1930s and which Coates argues had similar concerns to modern environmentalists are the Forestry Commission, the Council for the Protection of Rural England, the Youth Hostels Association, the Ramblers’ Association, and the Soil Association.

Similar developments can be traced to France in the period identified as important by Coates, both in the law and the development of new associations. The law of 2 May 1930, for example, aimed to ensure ‘la protection des monuments naturels et des sites de caractère historique, scientifique, légendaire ou pittoresque’; it created the first French nature reserves and covered more than 7,500 sites. By 1936, there was official governmental support for a national network of Auberges de jeunesse.
The first auberge had been founded by Sangnier in 1929; by 1935, 90 auberges had been established, and following Lagrange's encouragement, there were 229 only a year later (11, p.158). We can see evident links between these developments in France and the founding of Coates' 'green' organisations in Britain, such as the Youth Hostels' Association and the Ramblers' Association.

Other similarly 'environmentally-concerned' organisations were also founded in France during the inter-war period. Many groups were established to help or protect the interests of rural workers, for instance - the Office National du Crédit Agricole (1920), the first Chambres d'Agriculture (1924), the Conseil Paysan Français (1925), the Comités de Défense Paysanne (1928), the Jeunesse Agricole Catholique (1929), the Confédération Nationale Paysanne (1933). Animal protection organisations were founded (eg. the Société Centrale Féline, 1933).

However, some important distinctions between France and Britain of the 1930s must also be borne in mind here. First, a higher proportion of French people still lived in a rural environment in the inter-war period. Over a third of the active population of France were considered to be paysans on the eve of the Second World War (13, p.139); the urbanisation process had been slowed down by the economic crisis and was not to take off again until the Occupation was over. It could be argued that the growth of the kinds of 'environmental' and conservationist associations which Coates notes in the case of Britain was less necessary or likely in France as long as the majority were still in close contact with rural traditions. Second, certain 'environmental' laws and protection measures date back much further in France than in Britain. The legal framework for protection of the French forests, for instance, dates back to Colbert and the Code Forestier - though, as Mathieu points out, the existence of laws does not always lead to the actual protection of the environment (10, p.76). Even if some of the legal framework already existed in France by the 1930s, it is clear that many of the same 'green' issues were being identified as important. It is these issues which will be studied in more depth in subsequent chapters.
So what does Coates’ approach bring to the study of modern green politics? At its weakest, it ‘allows us to demonstrate striking parallels between environmental concern in the past and that of the present’ (9, p.1). Coates argues that it also shows that the range of modern environmental concerns can be attributed to the past:

Looking back at the diversity of forms taken by environmental concern in the inter-war period, it can be seen that this is paralleled by a comparable diversity in the present. (9, p.15)

A second British author makes stronger claims for the historical approach. Pepper argues, in his study The roots of modern environmentalism, that, without such an approach, and the awareness it brings, political ecology movements will fail in their attempts to change our attitudes and ultimately society itself. His starting point is that evidence of environmental problems alone has not been enough to bring about the changes greens feel are needed. He sees the attempts to amass proof of the extent of global environmental damage in the 1960s and 1970s by groups such as the Club of Rome as necessary, but mistakenly idealistic in their belief that, if only the extent of environmental damage were known, people would change. He concludes:

The spread of detailed knowledge about how man degrades and threatens his own planet has not of itself produced the likelihood of serious or permanent remedial action. (14, pp.1-3)

Indeed, he argues that the attempt to raise awareness has had negative rather than positive effects: a common reaction to cataloguing of environmental problems is to dismiss it as ‘yet more gloom and doom’ (ibid., p.3). Pepper holds that if the aim of green political groups is to achieve change, they must first take account of the ideas, perceptions and attitudes on which our actions are based. Thus what is needed is a study both of the attitudes which led to environmental problems and resulted in our
present 'predicament', and of the history of environmental ideas themselves. In his view, such a study of the history of environmental ideas will provide 'an invaluable perspective to those who are attempting to find a way out of our predicament' (ibid., p.3).

This thesis will address both these aspects. As the ideas of modern environmentalists are contrasted to the ideas of the 1930s, we will see evidence of some of the former attitudes which led to our current 'predicament', to use Pepper's term, but also how modern environmental ideas and key aspects of French society in the 1930s actually have much in common. What is striking is how many French writers, politicians and philosophers in the 1930s were making the same points that modern environmentalists do today, only to have their ideas and warnings ignored, perhaps for the same reasons as we would later decline to act on the evidence presented in reports like the Limits to Growth.

While Coates' study is limited to associations and social movements, and Pepper concentrates on science, philosophy and politics throughout modern history to trace the roots of modern anglo-saxon green politics, this study will focus on some different sources and a much narrower period for the case of France.

Why, then, can 1930s France be considered especially suitable for tracing the history of green ideas?

1.2 The 1930s in France

Coates' main reason for studying the inter-war period is that it was a period of 'structural change which had a profound effect on the environment and on attitudes towards it' (9, p.1). The changes which affected the environment during this period
were matched in France by change, fear and uncertainty in almost every other field. For Borne, the entire decade is best described as a ‘crise’\textsuperscript{12} (the same term now used for the idea we are living through ecological crisis). The most radical changes in the 1930s relevant for this study will now be summarised.

Some of these changes and fears were inevitable. The effects of World War 1 would continue to be felt in France throughout the 1930s. The war, fought on French soil, had long-lasting consequences for the population, in particular. Although the figure for the total percentage of the French population killed during the war was below 4%, a quarter of all males under 40 had died, and estimates of the number killed who were from rural or paysan backgrounds go as high as 80% of the total figure (13, p.142). Thousands more had been severely injured and could not return to work on the land. While the destruction caused to the infrastructure had not reached the levels of WW2, France was to have less outside help (no Marshall Aid), lacked a strong, unifying leader (due both to the lack of a clear figurehead able to mobilise the majority, as de Gaulle would in the aftermath of WW2, and to the nature of the regime of the 3rd Republic, which discouraged such individual leadership) and overall had less time to recover from the effects of WW1. Just over a decade after the war ended, the Wall Street Crash and subsequent world economic crisis made their mark, notably on levels of unemployment in France. Along with the economic crisis came the realisation that France no longer had the same level of independence and power in the modern world.

International developments led to further uncertainty for many French people. The effects of the economic crisis on national self-esteem were followed by (albeit tentative) demands from some of her colonies and dependencies for greater freedom, and even independence (it is often forgotten that Syria and the Lebanon, though they were not full colonies, were promised independence before the invasion of France in 1940). The influence of both the USA and USSR was also growing. Totalitarianism was feared, with rising support for fascism and communism. By 1933, Hitler was in
power in Germany, and her economy and population were being rebuilt much more quickly from WWI than was the case inside France.

By the outbreak of the Civil War in Spain in July 1936, a major source of fear and uncertainty was the acknowledgement that further wars involving the French were possible, and indeed likely. The one clearly positive reaction to WWI inside France had been that the war at least represented ‘la der des ders’. Horrific though the experience had been, many felt that its horrors would at least serve to prevent French involvement in any future conflict. With the debate over Popular Front intervention in support of the Spanish Republicans came the realisation that war remained likely, a realisation made more chilling by concerns over the rise of the extreme left and the extreme right in Europe.

Extremism was on the rise inside France too. Following the split of the left at the Congress of Tours in 1920, the SFIC (later the PCF) became one of the most radical left-wing parties in Europe and was to remain a Stalinist party throughout the 1930s (and indeed beyond). The apparent strength of the extreme-right leagues added to fears by February 1934.

Although the war and economic crisis were to slow down the move to the towns during the 1930s, the process had already gathered momentum before WWI, and the urbanisation and industrialisation of the French population became a focus for fear of change during the inter-war period. Related to this new way of life were fears over the future. Whereas other European powers, particularly Germany had rebuilt quickly after WWI, the French population had been so severely affected that both her demographic weaknesses (‘un comportement démographique malthusien’) (11, p.7) and the health of French youth were questioned. For many in France, both on the left and on the right, their country’s ‘décadence’, symbolised by the low birth-rate and poor physical fitness of their young people was a source of fear, confirmed
by the poor performance of French athletes on the world stage at the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin.

A clear result of this degree of change in their society over a short period was that French people from a huge range of fields - literature, intellectual or academic life, journalism, youth groups, cinema, politics, philosophy - seriously posed the question: what is wrong with modern society, and particularly with modern France? As environmentalists would also do later, they examined the recent past and dominant attitudes to try to establish where a wrong turn had been taken. And like their modern counterparts, the answers they seized on would be diverse, indeed contradictory depending on ideology, beliefs, background, class and many other factors. Despite this diversity, and once again like modern environmentalists, they tended to focus on the same areas and themes when attempting to define criticisms of their society.

One effect of this degree of change, however, was that, as well as provoking fear and uncertainty, the atmosphere in the 1930s was often one of great hope. The destruction of WW1, the birth of new movements and ideologies, the belief that nothing was unchangeable meant, for many, that a new and better society could be built, one which would start from scratch and learn from the mistakes of the past. The degree of wide-ranging debate, the feeling that real positive change could be achieved and that all could contribute and be involved in building a new world led many, particularly in the early 1930s to agree with Malraux that the result of the disasters of the recent past would be a rebirth of hope.

Long-accepted assumptions about the nature of society, human relations, traditional ways of living and working, politics could be challenged. If the spread of relatively new political ideologies led to uncertainty and fear for many French people, for others they represented a new chance, new freedoms, and a collective strength they had never before thought possible. The mobilisation of French workers into
collective organisations gave them new bargaining power. 'Engagement',
commitment to a political cause was not as tarnished with revelations of corruption
or totalitarianism as it would be after WW2 and many young people, in particular,
felt they had the chance to be involved in the birth of a new and better society
through such commitment. Both on the left and the right, images of the New Man
influenced many in France. Youth organisations flourished. Secondary education
was more widespread, meaning the young were more often qualified to discuss and
react to political events and ideas. The development of modern technologies and
ways of working led many to fear for their future, but others saw these developments
as exciting possibilities, leaving human beings more free to take advantage of the
new 'loisirs de masse'.

The 1930s in France also saw a cultural renaissance. The role of intellectuals was
emphasised in the rebirth of the society. New art forms - cinema, radio - took off;
the publishing industry expanded massively, with hundreds of new reviews and
journals; works by key thinkers of the 20th Century were published; famous artists
from all over Europe were drawn to Paris, and inspired by contemporary events and
politics (cf works like Picasso's Guernica, first presented at the 1937 Exposition
internationale de Paris).

The seeming contradiction of the presence of hope in such extreme circumstances is
another factor the 1930s share with modern environmental thought. If all were
asking what was wrong with modern society, many were also asking what could be
changed to rescue it. There was an awareness of being present at the birth of a new
way of life. Another parallel between the 1930s and modern green movements was
the level of public debate, and the prominence given to ideas and intellectuals at this
key moment.

The main reason for focussing on the 1930s in this study then, is the coming together
of three factors: mounting fears about the present, new ideas about how to change
society and, crucially, the willingness to accept commitment, an involvement in such change. This last factor in particular differentiates the 1930s from previous points in 20th-century French history, and we can see the obvious similarities with the points in the late 1960s and 1970s when modern green politics were to begin to gain strength. For Loubet del Bayle,

Le fait nouveau, dans les années 1930, c'est que cette idée de crise de civilisation débouchait avec [de nouveaux] mouvements sur le forum [qui] avaient la ferme volonté de réagir et de reconstruire un 'ordre'. (15, pp.267-9)

Loubet del Bayle based his study of the 1930s on organised youth movements, and the traditional hunting ground for the roots of modern green politics has also been organised, broadly-political groups, such as the 1970s anti-nuclear movements.

While this thesis will consider such groups for the 1930s to some extent, it will also focus on quite different sources, which will now be outlined.

1.3 Sources

One aim of this study will be to demonstrate that the roots of modern green politics can be traced in sources other than the traditional ones of organised political action. Anglo-saxon studies have already made similar attempts, notably those of Pepper and Bramwell. Some have implied links between non-political sources and modern green thought by compiling anthologies of 'green' literature, dating back as far as Ancient Roman and Greek fables and myths. Taplin even argues that most literary depictions of trees can be considered 'green' (16, p.2).

In France too, the anthology is considered an appropriate approach. Antoine goes as far back as 1548 in his search for 'ceux qui ont pensé l'environnement et tenu sa plume, même lorsqu'ils n'en ont pas prononcé le mot' (17, p.19), reproducing
extracts from Rabelais and Baudelaire, among others. However, a sustained
c omparative study is lacking. These anthologies stress the importance of looking for
environmental views in non-traditional sources, then simply present these sources
without comment. Readers are left to note the similarities (and frequently, the
contradictions) themselves.

Unlike such anthologies, this study will both look for evidence that some of the
same themes were seen as important in the 1930s, and will attempt a detailed
contrast between 1930s and 1990s attitudes. Were there many in France in the
1930s who came to the same conclusions as modern environmentalists when they
asked what was wrong with their society? Did they believe that the answer to such
problems was to change society in ways similar to those now urged by
environmentalists?

There will therefore be two sets of sources for this study. First, the ideas and
position(s) of the modern green movement (covering the period from the end of the
1960s to the 1990s), and second, 1930s sources which will enable us to make a
comparison between the two. Which sources are used to trace the ideas of the 1990s
and 1930s, then?

The ideas of the modern green movement are comparatively easy to catalogue.
Polls, the documents of political groups and parties, speeches, manifestos abound.
Yet herein lies an obvious difficulty. Often this abundance of material presents
ambiguous, if not openly contradictory opinions. There is generally no single, united
green stance, just as there is no one body (and this is particularly true of the
dominant French green party, Les Verts) which can claim to represent the views of
all environmentalists. Some argue that this diversity is the strength of the modern
green movement, just as biodiversity is the strength of any ecological system. This
means that it will usually be necessary to detail a variety of green positions for each
issue under discussion. Where possible, the dominant view will be made clear.
A comparable diversity of views is found in 1930s sources. However, whereas 1990s views are found easily in political sources, those of the 1930s will be sought in selected works of literature and contemporary ideas as well as in the political domain. The relevance of each of these three sources will now be summarised briefly.

First, the politics and history of the 1930s. The period known with hindsight as the entre-deux-guerres, and the 1930s in particular, has fascinated political scientists as a kind of hothouse for new political theories and action for over fifty years. Many, as we have already noted, see the period as one of interest because it was a time of extreme crisis (with Touchard referring to the resulting ‘esprit des années 30’). For Loubet del Bayle, the exchange of ideas and political actions based on new theories by youth groups made the period worthy of detailed attention. Winock goes one step further, and points out some comparisons between the 1990s and 1930s (‘chômage, déclin démographique, usure politique, franc fort, montée de l’extrême droite...’) because ‘les leçons de l’histoire sont toujours bonnes à prendre’ (18, p.54).

Winock sees the 1930s in France in three distinct phases, based on political and economic developments. The distinctions he makes are useful for this study, as the politics and events of the 1930s will be one of the key sources consulted:

Il y a les premières années, jusqu’à la journée du 6 février 1934, dominées par le choc de la crise économique qui frappe, avec un peu de retard, [la France] après le krach de Wall Street de 1929; l’émeute du 6 février place soudainement les Français face au danger fasciste [...]. La France se scinde de nouveaux en deux camps, les communistes rompant leur isolationnisme après que Staline eut enfin aperçu le danger hitlérien, d’où s’ensuivent la formation du Front populaire et sa victoire en 1936; enfin, à partir de 1937-
1938, une nouvelle redistribution des cartes face au danger imminent que font courir à la paix les entreprises de l’Allemagne nazie. (18, p.54)

As well as these aspects mentioned by Winock, and the historical developments already noted in Section 1.2, the politics of the 1930s provide interesting source material for this study because of the degree of political debate and the extreme or groundbreaking positions taken. This was exacerbated by the political system of the 3rd Republic, with its short-lived governments, diversity of political groups and coalitions. The first French Socialist premier (in Blum), the new strength of the left in the Popular Front and the degree of influence now held by the communists also led to new hopes, fears and debates (for instance, how would a revolutionary, international political movement work inside a national democratic system?).

The clash between new and established political groups led to an unusual emphasis on intellectuals and ideas, the second source chosen for this study. As with modern green politics, groundbreaking theories were being outlined and debated for the first time. New philosophical movements, in particular the Personalists, were forwarding ideas which would find parallels in environmental political theory decades later. Parallels between 1930s and later groups are also found in their willingness to act on new ideas, since they saw the need to change society as an urgent one. Here, sources such as Loubet del Bayle’s seminal study of youth groups, Les non-conformistes des années 30, and various accounts of the key left- and right-wing groups will be important. The ideas and influence of contemporary figures such as Mounier will also be examined.

The final source used for this comparison of 1930s and 1990s ideas on ‘green’ issues will be selected literature of the period. The growing sense of crisis, and the simultaneous presence of hopeful attitudes were the background for an extraordinary degree of politically-inspired artistic creativity in France during the entre-deux-guerres, with Winock (who presents an exhaustive list of politically-inspired creative
figures from the 1930s) concluding ‘Je souhaite aux autres décennies à venir, à celle que nous vivons, autant de créativité et de talents multiples’ (ibid., p.58). 1930s literature is a particularly rich source of ideas for this study because of the emphasis on criticisms of society and hope for the future, and its ability to present alternative, even utopian visions. In Taplin’s view,

It is only art [...] that can bring terrible things home to us without causing us to despair. Its consoling power lies in its affirmation of the possibility of rebirth and regeneration. (16, p.20)

Unlike the political and philosophical movements, which, no matter how ambitious or hopeful for the future, had to emphasise practical considerations, the authors of the period faced no such constraints. And if the importance of imagination was stressed by 1930s authors, the modern green movement would also note its key role, seen for example in the enthusiasm during the 1970s and 1980s for utopian ‘green’ fiction like Callenbach’s Ecotopia (1975).

Which 1930s French authors represent the most useful sources of ideas on ‘green’ issues? The most important source will be the 1930s works of the novelist Jean Giono. Born in Provence in 1895, he spent his entire life there apart from the years when he was called up to the army in World War 1, an experience which deeply marked his beliefs and his work. By 1930, Giono was sufficiently successful to make his living as a writer. It was during the 1930s that he developed the themes and attitudes his works would later become known for, and which will be most relevant for this study: the effects of war, the power of nature, the importance of a more natural way of life and work, criticisms of modern society, a certain anarchism, pacifism, relationships between men and women, and between human beings and the natural world. Giono’s works were widely-read throughout the decade, as indeed they are today. Importantly, during the 1930s he also agreed on the need for some degree of ‘engagement’ (though with many reservations, as we shall see), notably in the infamous Contadour experiment. This was an attempt actually to recreate the
‘conditions for peace and joy’, as portrayed in Giono’s 1935 novel, *Que ma joie demeure*.

The second author whose 1930s work is a useful source for this study is Louis-Ferdinand Céline. Born in 1894, Céline lived through and was marked by the same events as Giono. From a modest background, he fought and was injured in WW1. Unlike Giono, however, he had travelled abroad (to the United States, Cameroon, Germany, the USSR and Great Britain) by the 1930s, and was medically-trained. These factors were clearly to influence the content and approach of his works of literature, resulting in a groundbreaking (though now-familiar) analysis of the problems of contemporary French society. His first success and best-known work, *Voyage au bout de la nuit* (published in 1932) addressed many themes which would later be adopted by environmentalists: the stress of modern life, particularly in cities; the effects of urbanisation and industrialisation on society and on individuals’ health; work; poverty; politics; war; the role of women, among others. Céline’s collaboration during World War Two, and particularly the anti-semitism of his later works led many to re-assess his work; but it is important for this study to note that during the 1930s, (and particularly the early 1930s) his ideas and criticisms of French society were not clearly identified with any political tendency.

Other 1930s works and authors will also be referred to in this study, a notable example being Saint-Exupéry. However, the works of Giono and Céline will be the most important source, for several reasons. First, this study takes as its focus the 1930s in France; consequently, some works which might be considered relevant (for example, Giono’s pre-1930s and post-war writings, or the works of Ramuz) fall outside its scope, though they may be referred to on occasion. Second, by choosing two sources in particular, a more detailed analysis of the views they present, and comparison with contemporary positions is possible. Finally, the range of themes these two authors chose to address in their 1930s works is the most relevant for this study. Other writers clearly also made relevant criticisms of their society at the time,
but few were to make their positions as clear as did Giono and Céline, and none addressed as many of the ‘green’ themes studied here in a more sustained manner.

The decision to focus on these sets of sources will allow a demonstration that modern green attitudes are based not only on the scientific analyses made public in the 1960s and 1970s, but also on long-established positions and ways of looking at modern society, ones found not only in the political sphere. Contemporary environmentalists have stressed the importance for green politics today of visionary or utopian thinkers, not just scientists and politicians. This study will suggest that such thinkers can be traced further back in the history of France than many present-day environmentalists might imagine.

1.4 Approach

Common ground is found in the questioning by greens and 1930s sources of their society, and in their attempts to build a different one:

De [leur] critique du désordre établi, ces mouvements concluaient à la nécessité d'une révolution dont ils s'attachaient à préciser les modalités avant de définir des propositions constructives destinées à permettre de bâtir un ordre nouveau. (15, p.181)

While many of the sources chosen for this study would not go so far as to demand a revolution in the traditional political sense, it is clear that the desire for a revolution in attitudes and lifestyles would be another example of common ground between them. This study will attempt to demonstrate the extent of this common ground by focussing throughout on three points, that is: how similar were the criticisms made
in the 1930s and 1990s, the proposed alternatives and the approved methods for achieving change?

In each chapter, one theme which is important for both groups will be examined. The 1990s green criticisms with regard to this chosen theme will be presented first; and the views presented in the 1930s sources will then be explained, and contrasted with 1990s positions. The remaining two questions (how should society be changed for the better?; and what methods should be used to achieve change?) will finally be examined in sections on 1990s and 1930s solutions. The next section will now explain the themes which will be studied in this way.

1.5 Environmental themes

The themes on which this study is based are of necessity broad in scope. One reason for this breadth is that certain specific issues now automatically identified with the green movement cannot be discussed in the context of the 1930s because it was simply not possible to be aware of them then. An obvious example of such a theme might be nuclear power. The broader approach taken in this study allows comparisons between modern attitudes to nuclear power and 1930s attitudes to comparable or related issues - new technology in general, and the fears it raises, pollution, new ways of living, human dependance on machines, for instance. A second reason for breadth of scope is that it enables a wider range of comparisons to be drawn between 1930s and 1990s views. This will show how 1930s and 1990s views are similar across many areas - we will thus see that we are not simply considering a coincidental shared view on a selected topic; rather, the similarities across a wide range of themes imply their entire outlook ('worldviews') are similar.
The chosen themes are identified as important for green politics by political groups themselves, and by environmental philosophers and political scientists. An understanding of the distinction between different kinds of ‘green’ politics is essential here, and is addressed in the next section; for the moment, it is sufficient to note that, even if we might be tempted to see green politics as limited to environmental concern, their scope is in fact much wider. As Porritt puts it, whereas a concern for the environment is an essential part of being green, ‘it is by no means the same thing as being green’ (19, p.5). Green politics addresses a vast, and perhaps surprising range of themes. Those which have been selected as chapters for this study are:

- Work
- Ni droite, ni gauche (the left-right divide)
- War
- The city

Other possible themes (nature, agriculture, resource depletion, spirituality, political strategies etc) cross over various areas and will be studied in relation to the chosen themes (for example, agriculture is considered to some extent in virtually all chapters).

Again, one difficulty which must be borne in mind is that there is often no single (or even dominant) view on these issues, either in the 1990s or the 1930s sources. We will therefore be looking for parallels within these selected themes across a range of diverse positions. The final section of this introduction will now consider the other main difficulties or problems involved in the approach taken for this study.
1.6 Problems

The first problem is raised by the selection of themes for study. As already mentioned in Section 1.5, it would have been possible to adopt the same approach, but to focus on other themes important for environmentalism. This is due in part to the focussed nature of any such study: not all relevant themes can be discussed in sufficient detail, therefore it is necessary to select the ones which are seen as most important or which lead to the most fruitful comparisons. As already noted, a second explanation for the need for selection is the (perhaps unexpectedly) comprehensive nature of green politics. Although green politics are popularly seen as restricted to concern for the environment, or even ‘single-issue politics’, such a restrictive description is inappropriate.

The comprehensive nature of green politics also leads to the second key problem for this study, that of definition. What are we to understand by key terms such as ‘green’? We have already noted that this term refers to a range of positions, rather than one clear, widely-accepted view. Most political theorists have reacted to this diversity by categorising ‘green’ approaches into two broad camps, using a variety of terms to do so. The most common distinctions are those made between:

- dark green \( \rightarrow \) light green
- ecologism \( \rightarrow \) environmentalism
- deep ecology \( \rightarrow \) shallow ecology
- Green \( \rightarrow \) green

What is meant by both sets of terms, and why has this distinction been considered important? First, the two approaches do start from the same analysis of what is wrong with modern society, differing principally in reaction to the perceived problems. Generally, light green, environmentalist or green (small ‘g’) approaches
argue for relatively minor changes to society. Darker greens, ecologists or Greens (capital ‘G’) argue for more radical changes to society and in attitudes. For Dobson, light greens can be described as ‘managerial’ in their response to environmental problems, whereas

ecologism argues that care for the environment presupposes radical changes in our relationship with it, and thus in our mode of social and political life. (20, p.13)

However, the final terms, ‘deep’ and ‘shallow’ green, have somewhat different connotations. The term ‘Deep Ecology’ was first used by Naess in 1973 (21), and the distinction he made (and made popular) has been criticised within the green movement. Some argue it has had a disproportionate influence, leading to ‘the undermining of green politics, [...] creating a major ideological schism within green political theory and hampering its political effectiveness’ (22, p.41). Goodin believes that the very choice of the terms ‘deep’ and ‘shallow’ has distorted popular views of green politics:

Implicit in the shallow/deep dichotomy is, in effect, an assertion that the deeper view of the matter contains all the truths of the shallower view, plus some additional ones as well. The truth of the matter is, of course, otherwise. (23, p.45)

Naess’ starting point in 1973 was to criticise the contemporary green movement as ‘shallow’, as for him it was concerned with only one central objective: ‘the health and affluence of people in the developed countries’ (21, p.95). Naess’ alternative was to be far more extreme than the ‘dark’ or ‘Green’ positions defined by Dobson, Goodin and others. Instead, Deep Ecology is based on a rethinking of the human-nature relationship. The key idea is that of ‘reenchancing’ the natural world and anthropocentrism is severely criticised:
[Humans] are but ‘a plain member’ of the biotic community and our arrogance with respect to this community threatens not only ourselves but all of life. (24, pp.9-10)

For Deep Ecologists, the environmental crisis is attributed to human actions, and in particular to modern ways of looking at the world, based on Enlightenment philosophy, rationalism and attempts to dominate nature. If these have led to our current predicament, Deep Ecologists argue that we should reject such approaches. To this end, they propose ‘a completely new weltanschauung’ (22, p.44) to replace the Western rationalist one. They suggest replacing political strategies and rational scientific approaches with a direct return to a more natural way of life, in societies apparently based on a pre-industrial age. Instead of persuading people through rational debate, they emphasise spiritual awareness, a change in attitudes which will apparently follow inevitably from embeddedness in nature.15

The distinction between different green positions is an important one for modern green politics because it leads to very different strategies and policies. For Deep Ecologists, for instance, political parties or democratic elections are not suitable methods of achieving change. As well as the distinction between two broad types of green politics (dark/light etc) - or arguably three, with Deep Ecology as a separate ‘type’ in its own right - many green theorists have therefore presented the green movement as a broad church, an ‘umbrella’ or ‘rainbow’ movement that is both willing and able to accommodate a broad scope of different stances. Interestingly, many 1930s movements used similar arguments, and like modern greens, claimed that diversity was a strength of their movements:

Tout en parlant, pour la commodité, du personnalisme, préférons-nous dire qu’il y a des personnalismes, et respecter leurs démarches diverses (26, p.6).
To what extent is the distinction between these different green approaches relevant for this study? The often radical nature of modern green political theory and its vast scope need to be understood when we consider the themes selected for this study; as already noted, we will often be contrasting a range of modern political attitudes to a similar range of 1930s views.

Which of the terms defined above are most appropriate for this study? When discussing modern green ideas, it will be possible to differentiate between the different types of green politics by using the range of terms. However, when discussing the 1930s, some of the terms are inappropriate. Dobson points out that before 1972, it was impossible to be truly 'Green', as there was no coming together of the preconditions for dark/Green politics before the report to the Club of Rome. When referring to the 1930s, then, it will be most appropriate to refer to nascent attitudes which would later be identified with green politics by using the terms 'environmental' rather than 'ecologist'. This term will also be used as a sort of 'catch-all' phrase to cover the range of green positions, when distinctions are unnecessary or unwieldy.

The terms 'environmental' or 'green' (small 'g') are arguably also more appropriate when discussing the specific case of France. As we have seen, many argue that France was the birthplace of political ecology. While a range of green positions undeniably exists inside France, the dominant view has been that political parties and election campaigns are appropriate methods of changing society, and the debate over 'deep' and 'dark' green positions has not had the same influence as in the United States, for instance.

The third problem with the approach taken in this study is related to that of the necessary conditions for modern green political analyses. Dobson acknowledges the contribution made by the ideas of pre-Limits to growth thinkers by seeing them as
‘green’ rather than ‘Green’ (in the same way that precursors of socialism, before the Industrial and French Revolutions can be seen as ‘socialistic’ rather than socialist). Similarly, the aim here is to draw parallels and trace the roots of modern green politics.

A fourth problem, that of hindsight, involves two main dangers. First, there is a temptation to judge others living through extreme times. While we now know that a second World War and the invasion of France by Nazi Germany was to end the 1930s, for those living through the period there was no such knowledge, even if the dominant mood was one of uncertainty and fear. A second problem relating to hindsight is the temptation to associate 1930s authors and thinkers with a future movement they could not even have imagined. While we can see their ideas as linked to or influencing modern environmentalism, we cannot assume that, if they were alive today, they would choose to be associated with green political movements. Indeed, both Giono and Céline (and many Personalists) actually made clear at various points their distrust of all political organisations - ‘Il ne faut y entrer sous aucun prétexte’ (27, p.261). Of course, we could say the same of many modern greens, who argue that permanent political parties and organised groups are inappropriate or insufficient ways to achieve the sort of drastic change they desire.

A fifth problem involved in this approach relates to the sources chosen for study. Unlike modern political movements, 1930s authors of fiction and philosophers were not generally offering concrete, detailed prescriptions for change. We are not always comparing like with like. This will sometimes mean that concrete suggestions made by modern environmentalists will be compared to ideas contained in fictional accounts. However, at times the authors studied did make more concrete criticisms and suggestions, particularly in the later years of the 1930s (when, for instance, Giono wrote only non-fiction).
A final difficulty involved in this approach is the reliability of some of the chosen sources. Whereas political movements must be broadly consistent, novelists do not face the same constraints. At times, their positions will change during the period studied, or there will be inconsistencies. Céline criticised his own *Voyage au bout de la nuit* after WW2, (‘Le seul livre vraiment méchant de tous mes livres’) (28, p.14) though, as is always the case with Céline, we might be wary of taking his views at face value. Giono too repeatedly expressed his amazement that anyone would expect a writer, whose job is invention, not to embellish the truth. A degree of caution will sometimes be necessary. However, the imaginative nature of the sources consulted can also be seen in a positive light. Without their imagined versions of better or alternative societies, or the ability of fiction to exaggerate real life for comic or dramatic effect, the comparisons drawn in this study between modern green ideas and those of the 1930s would be more restricted.

To summarise, then, we must bear in mind certain difficulties relating to the chosen approach and sources. Where they are important, these difficulties will be mentioned in the body of the thesis. However, even with such an awareness, there are many fruitful comparisons to be drawn between the two sets of ideas.

The first theme considered in the way outlined above will be that of work.

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1 The term ‘modern green politics’, though ambiguous, has been used throughout this thesis to refer to French and international green campaigning organisations and political parties. The formation of such organisations in France is frequently described (e.g. by Sainteny (3, p.13)) in three clear stages, which will be briefly outlined here for sake of clarity. Initial green campaigns and movements, which were to become visible in the aftermath of the ‘events’ of May 68, are often referred to as ‘la nébuleuse écologiste’, as they were short-lived, mostly local or regional in scale, often refused permanent structures or leaders, and frequently mobilised support around single-issue campaigns, notably nuclear power. This early stage in the development of political ecology soon led to a second period, during which several key figures began to argue that a national political presence for green ideas was essential in the political system of the French Fifth Republic. Such figures, and many local grassroots organisations were to support René Dumont’s candidacy for the Presidency in 1974, though an overwhelming distrust of permanent political structures was still apparent: Dumont would only agree to stand at all if his campaign group promised to disband as soon as the election was over. By the early 1980s, however, frustrated at the lack of progress and lack of publicity for green ideas, some greens decided that a permanent political party would better achieve the aims of political ecologists, and by 1983, two green ‘parties’, *Les Verts-Confédération écologiste* and *Les Verts-Parti écologiste* had been formed. These two groups were to merge one year later to form the party...
currently known as Les Verts. While the acceptance and establishment of a permanent party clearly marked the third and final stage in the development of French green organisations, we should note, however, that a consensus on the most appropriate forms for expression of green ideas has by no means been found even today, with a multitude of smaller green groups, and even national parties such as Génération Écologie and the Mouvement Écologiste Indépendant, currently existing alongside Les Verts and often arguing for different approaches.

Brice Lalonde was one of the first to be involved in the French political ecology movement, for example as a member of the Comité de soutien à René Dumont (for the presidential elections) in 1974, as first leader of the French branch of Friends of the Earth, Les Amis de la Terre, and as a green presidential candidate in 1981. He was the first (and until Dominique Voynet’s appointment in June 1997, the only) ‘green’ Minister (as Ministre de l’Environnement in the Socialist government under Michel Rocard, from 1988 until 1989) and became the founder/leader of the second French ecology party, Génération Écologie in 1990.

Antoine Waechter was also an early member of the French political ecology movement, becoming particularly associated with Les Verts as the most prominent of their four ‘porte-paroles’ in the 1980s. He was head of Les Verts’ electoral lists until the mid-1990s and presidential candidate in 1988. Associated with their ‘ni droite, ni gauche’ stance, he left the party in 1996 after his defeat in a key debate by Dominique Voynet and others, who have since taken the party from Waechter’s position (‘L’écologie n’est pas à marier’) to a more cooperative one, collaborating with the PS and the PCF from 1996 and gaining seven seats in the Assemblée Nationale in the 1997 legislative elections following an electoral alliance with the left.

Didier Anger and Yves Cochet were both ‘porte-paroles’ who argued within Les Verts for over a decade that a more collaborative stance was necessary. For example in May 1985, they published their Appel à la convergence des forces alternatives et écologistes with Jean Brière, and in November 1986, they presented a motion (Construire) to Les Verts’ Assemblée Générale, arguing the party should break away from Waechter’s position.

Daniel Cohn-Bendit was the best-known student leader of the ‘events’ of May 1968. He was an early member of the German green party, die Griinen, for whom he was elected to the Bundestag. He has since applied for full French citizenship, following the success of the list he led for les Verts in the 1999 European elections.

René Dumont worked as an agronomist in developing countries, an experience which led him to publish key texts for modern French environmentalists, such as L’Utopie ou la mort! He was the first ‘green’ presidential candidate, in 1974, gaining 1.32% of the vote in the first round, but was opposed to the idea of a permanent ecology party.

By 1982, the idea of a permanent political ecology party was being seriously discussed. In November 1982, the Mouvement d’écologie politique, formed in November 1979, changed their name to Les Verts parti écologiste, thus creating the first permanent French green political party. Les Verts-confédération écologiste, agreed to cooperate with the new party at their Congrès National in May 1983. Finally, at Clichy in January 1984, both organisations merged to become a permanent green political party, Les Verts.
dans l'espace... et elle ressemble à sa manière à un vaisseau spatial avec son équipage de six milliards d'hommes", (ibid., pp.16-17).

7 120,000 tonnes of oil were split, affecting 400 km of French and British coastlines (4, p.9640).

8 Dobson's Green Political Thought, pp.37-72 would be one example.

9 That the attempt to trace the history of political ecology has not been made in France is especially surprising, since the science of ecology and its philosophical origins have been closely studied. See, for example, such texts as J.-P. Delage, Histoire de l'écologie - une science de l'homme et de la nature or J.-M. Drouin, L'écologie et son histoire, réinventer la nature.

10 See, for example, pp.206-211.

11 For further details, see (10, pp.93-4).

12 Cf the title of his study of the 1930s, La Crise des années 30.

13 Albeit a democracy which still denied the vote to women.

14 Two other terms which are used in a similar manner when referring to European green politics are 'fundu' and 'realo'. Many of the early debates on dark/light green politics took place in the German context, as this was the first country where green political parties gained any real power.

15 Deep ecology gained publicity, particularly in the USA through the direct action campaigns of Earth First! and incendiary statements by leaders like Foreman - notoriously, in 1984 'the worst thing we could do in Ethiopia is to give aid - the best thing would be to just let nature seek its own balance, to let the people there just starve' (25, p.108).

16 When there was the first 'description of the limits to growth, the prescription of a fundamental change of political and social direction in response to this description, and the ready availability of the message to a wide audience' (20, pp.23-24).
Chapter 2

Work

2.1 Introduction

Beyond the simple connection between industrial production and environmental degradation, the relevance of work for green politics is not immediately apparent. However, greens' attempted remise en cause of the very concept of production, and their consistent focus on the individual or person have combined to make this a key area of concern. Indeed, the focus on work is a defining feature of modern green politics. A 'reconceptualisation of the nature and value of work' is a principal element of green policy, and Dobson even argues that it is what distinguishes green politics: 'ecologism can be marked off from most other modern political ideologies by its attitude to the subject' (20, pp.107-8). For greens, the effects of current production and working patterns on both the environment and the person are wholly negative; this means they question very basic assumptions upon which modern industrialised societies are founded. They aim for 'not only a redistribution of work tasks but also a thorough redefinition of work itself' (29, p.88).

This debate has had particular impact in France, where green theorists such as Gorz have taken work as their central theme. The rise of French green parties has coincided with a more general debate about working conditions, working hours, and worker self-management (autogestion). In exploring this debate and the criticisms made by modern French environmentalists, we will note clear parallels between modern green positions and the forward-thinking criticisms and solutions discussed in our 1930s sources. However, one interesting distinction can be made between the clear emphasis on positive portrayals of work by Giono and Ramuz, and in
contemporary political life, and the more negative focus of other selected sources (particularly Céline). This distinction will be highlighted at various points.

2.1 Green criticisms

Modern green criticisms of work will be addressed in two key areas - the environment and the person. It will become apparent that their criticisms focus more on the effects of work on the individual or on society than on environmental degradation, the area most would perhaps expect modern green theorists to stress.

2.1.1. Work and the environment

Basic green criticisms do focus on the immediate or direct effects of work in industrialised societies on the planet’s resources, and of course, are widespread in green critiques. Their relevance for green theory is made strikingly clear in the Limits to Growth report:

If the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food production and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next 100 years. (30, p.24)

Work, of course, is implicated in all of these critical areas - populations grow or move to meet demands for labour; this necessitates a rise in food production; and industrialization involves pollution and depletion of world resources. French sources discuss such ‘contraintes écologiques’ to work and production, particularly those of natural resources (‘raretés, nuisances, encombrements et impasses de la
civilisation industrielle') (31, p.43). Gorz points out that certain limits are already being reached, and industry is now ‘obligée de filtrer ses fumées et ses effluents’, in other words to ‘reproduire des conditions et des ressources qui, jusqu’ici, passaient pour “naturelles” et gratuites’ (32, p.11).

However, while virtually all green analyses of work in industrial societies will mention direct effects of production on the environment (effects on both ‘sources’ and ‘sinks’), it would be difficult to find even one which does so in isolation, as is evident in the sources quoted above. Green criticisms of the effects of work on the environment are mostly based on or included in a more wide-ranging critique of capitalist/industrial societies - societies termed ‘productivistes’, that is, ones which ‘poussent à “produire pour produire” sans souci des besoins réels des populations et de la “soutenabilité”’ (34, p.35). For Prendiville, the extent of their ‘critique globale de la société de consommation’ is what sets greens apart from all other political groups (35, p.139).

Of course, the left would point out they too emphasise work and production. Both greens and the left do indeed start from the same basic analysis of capitalism, of the ‘disponibilité de “la terre et le travail”, “conditions de production”’ (36, p.64). However, the different analyses by the greens and the left of the use of these ‘conditions of production’ represent one of the most striking distinctions between the two.

Rouges et verts se focalisent sur un secteur bien précis du réel: le rapport humanité/nature [...] Bien sûr, les rouges et les verts vont s’opposer radicalement sur l’appréciation globale de ce rapport: positive pour les premiers, négative pour les seconds. (34, p.33)

A clear distinction can therefore be made between left and green analyses of production - while the left has traditionally seen increases in production as positive
(growth as the answer to unemployment, for instance), greens reject this view, arguing that answers need to be found without increasing pollution levels or demands on natural resources. There are several other important green criticisms of work which are based on its effects on the environment. First, there is a consistent focus in green political theory on the unequal distribution and use of finite resources. The possible problems of unequal development in terms of sustainability are particularly apparent in the field of work. Developed countries' unsustainable use of resources, whether in the past or today, is criticised not only for its direct effects on the environment, but also for the indirect negative effects it has on work and the availability of resources in developing countries. Sustainability is behind such green criticisms of work with reference to the environment. Greens commonly point out that in modern industrialised nations, it is logical for individual companies to (mis)use resources like air and water as these currently have no direct cost.

Another central area of concern for the green movement with regard to work and the environment has been that of agriculture. This sector attracts the attention of the greens for obvious reasons - the green focus on pollution, sustainability, food resources, population size and distribution, health and so on all make this a key field where change can be effective in their terms; and given the size of the French agricultural 'industry', and its importance to the French economy, it has always been at the heart of French green critiques.

Green criticisms of agriculture and the environment focus on three areas: first, current methods of agricultural production are damaging and unsustainable. 'Une production maximale sur le minimum de terrain' is, secondly, illogical, developed for a period and a growing French population which no longer exist (38, p.216). Instead, 'les nouvelles raretés, ce sont l'eau potable, le capital, la variété des paysages, certaines ressources naturelles et l'énergie' (ibid., p.217). Third, greens argue that what they see as the 'agrobusiness industry' has too much power, particularly in France, meaning that more logical and sustainable practices cannot easily be introduced.
Work in industrialised countries is also criticised for its effects on the environment because it is seen as having forced millions to move away from an essentially sustainable self-reliant (if not self-sufficient) way of life. The need to live in cities in order to find work results in environmental problems in itself, as instead of producing their own food and so on, city-dwellers need to have supplies imported. The experience of industrialisation itself attracts special criticism from the greens, as they see it as having been badly planned, particularly in the France of the trente glorieuses. The inattention to social and particularly environmental factors during this key period of French development is often attacked by modern greens as having resulted in many of today’s intractable problems: ‘Les pouvoirs publics, dans leur ambition de transformer la France en une puissance industrielle de premier ordre’ completely ignored ‘les problèmes de l’environnement et de la pollution’ (39, p.47).

Technological developments leading to discussion of a ‘workless future’, where machines would carry out unpleasant tasks, leaving human beings free to enjoy a new leisure society have also been widely discussed, in particular by Gorz. Modern greens are virtually all firmly in the sceptics’ camp. In Dobson’s words, ‘Greens have peered into this future and they do not like what they see’ (20, p.108). The effects on the environment of such a future are criticised in particular - the reliance on a ‘technological fix’ to enable us to carry on an unsustainable way of life is seen as not only short-sighted but impossible, due to the planet’s limited resources. A related area of concern for the greens is the so-called ‘leisure industry’, which has ‘degraded soil and vegetation and caused air, water, noise and aesthetic pollution’ (37, p.69).

The final focus of these green criticisms may seem comparatively trivial, but has actually been a pillar of the French green movement - that of ‘aesthetic pollution’. While it is undeniable that such factors mobilise principally those living in the
vicinity of new developments (the famous NIMBY\footnote{Not In My Back Yard} factor), many leading ecologists, including Waechter, attribute their politicisation to such campaigns. In France, green criticism has focussed particularly on industry and on new kinds of work, and once again the failure adequately to plan the location of new industrial sites is attacked (39, p.8).

These green criticisms of the effects of modern work on the environment are no doubt ones which would be expected. However, green criticisms of work have another, perhaps more surprising focus: the person. Indeed, this type of criticism, as we shall see, is actually the main focus of the greens in this area.

2.1.2. Work and the person

Greens begin from an outright rejection of a 'work ethic that no longer works' (19, p.77). Criticisms abound, not only of the effects of modern work on the employed - the dehumanising effect of industrial work, monotony, lack of autonomy, distance from a more natural or healthy environment, the lack of free time; but also of our current work structures and the effects these have on the unemployed, retired people and those who cannot or choose not to work. Greens urge the individual to 'éviter de perdre sa vie à la gagner' (40, p.2). Yet this does not imply a move towards the 'workless future' or leisure society for the greens, since this would lead to the 'corrosion of the human spirit', in their view (37, p.69). This is an idea we will later see paralleled in our 1930s sources: there is no questioning of the basic need to work. Perhaps surprisingly for a movement commonly caricatured as relaxed hippies, the green emphasis on joy in work is an aspect of environmental theory which links them to a long-standing tradition:
[Greens] insert themselves in the tradition that has it that work is a noble occupation; that it uplifts the spirit and helps create and reproduce ties with one’s community - even helps to create oneself. (20, p.109)

Greens agree with More’s stress on the fundamental principle of the need for work for all (avoiding the scourge for society of the ‘frelons oisifs’) (41, p.103). If a work-free future is not attractive to the greens, however, current working practices (and ways of thinking about work itself) are certainly not seen as desirable.

Clearly, the experience of May 1968 is important in French green analyses of the effects of work on the person. The wide-ranging debates on the concept of work, criticisms made of contemporary working conditions, and awareness of the need to find alternatives have parallels in modern green attitudes, an unsurprising phenomenon given that many greens attribute their politicisation to their experiences during the events of May 1968. Green analyses here have two main themes; first, they criticise the kind of work done, and the direct effects this has on the individual; second, they criticise the more wide-ranging effects modern working practices and ways of thinking about work have on society in general. Both types of criticism emphasise the idea of alienation. Marx’s original theory of alienation isolated four main areas in which human nature is ‘made other than, alien to, what man is really capable of being’ (42, p.12) under capitalism: people can be alienated from ‘their own selves’, other people, their ‘working life’ or the ‘product of their labour’ (ibid., p.12).

Greens would criticise the basis of this marxist definition, arguing that it is the division of labour in all technologically-advanced industrialised societies (“bad work”) that creates the feeling of alienation in its citizens, rather than the particular system of ownership which exists in capitalist economies; thus alienation is (or would be) just as present in communist and socialist societies. Nevertheless, the idea of alienation through work is certainly accepted in green critiques, defined as
the ‘estrangement’ people experience ‘between themselves and their work, their own health, their environment and the workings of their democracy’ (19, p.77).

Perhaps the most basic criticism relating to alienation is of modern working conditions. Problems relating to health and safety are seen as inherent in the ‘logic’ of any productivist society. If productivity and economic competitiveness are stressed, safety standards are likely to be ignored: ‘le fonctionnement parfait des machines, qui sont rares et chères’ is more important than ‘la santé physique et psychique des travailleurs qui sont rapidement remplacables’ (32, p.11). Work-related health problems are particularly criticised because they are seen as avoidable, and green attitudes to health generally emphasise prevention of illness and responsibility for one’s own health, as a response to what they see as the regrettable ‘professionalisation’ of modern medicine.

A second focus of green criticisms is on the common association of work with paid employment. Gorz argues that this association arose from the Keynesian confusion of the right to work with the right to paid employment (44, p.134); indeed, it would be absurd to claim that the unemployed or the retired do not work. Most greens start from the position that ‘le plein emploi est devenu une expression vide de sens dans une société robotisée en crise’ (35, p.139); the conclusion they reach is that work-sharing, a reappraisal of what work consists of, and a reduction in consumption are needed to escape the unemployment ‘problem’.

Greens criticise the assumption that work means a paid full-time job on several levels. First, the implications of such a connection are seen as divisive - leading to a class of skilled machine operators and employed and a vast underclass of those without paid work, simply because the logic of productivist societies is to use technology to reduce working hours while increasing productivity. This leads to a smaller workforce, even though people are available and willing to do the necessary work. Thus Gorz points out that over the last fifty years, while the total number of
working hours has fallen, productivity levels have actually increased. Second, instead of reducing the number of people in work, greens tend to argue that a reduction in working hours is the appropriate strategy, hence the stress in les Verts' manifesto on ‘le droit de travailler moins pour travailler tous et vivre mieux’ (46, Point II(1)).

A final reason for criticising the assumption that work is equivalent to paid employment is that the person’s identity and sense of self-worth are consequently connected to the holding of a job. Greens criticise the impact this has for two reasons. First, it results in the view that virtually any job is ‘good work’, as a salaried job is more valued than even sustainable and fulfilling unpaid work; second, it results in negative effects on the health of those who do not have access to paid work. Greens frequently point out that a disproportionate number of people die shortly after retirement (19, p.78).

A third focus for green criticisms of the effects of work on the person is consumerism, which greens hold responsible for the view that work is a necessary evil, something to be endured because it is essential if one is to participate in or have access to society, rather than a freely-chosen and fulfilling way to spend time. Greens would agree with Morris’ attacks on ‘mere toiling to live that we may live to toil’ (47, p.381). We can see why greens would criticise such attitudes, as the impact of such jobs on the environment becomes irrelevant in the eyes of the job-holder.

The nature of modern paid employment attracts criticism. Greens focus on the idea of ‘deskilling’, which they see as inherent in the Industrial Revolution, and which is for them at the root of modern workers’ sense of alienation; the industrial division of labour is ‘the cause of much of the alienation of modern life’ (19, p.79). Creativity and inventiveness are seen as having been sacrificed to efficiency. Greens criticise the repetitive tasks and boredom of modern work on two levels: they are damaging
for the person, who loses a sense of fulfilment in his or her work; and they are
damaging for society as a whole and for the environment, as individuals no longer
have any awareness of the effects of their production, and therefore feel less
responsible for such effects. Attempts to modify such industrial practices are seen as
futile:

While it might be more fulfilling to be involved in the construction of a
product from start to finish, real progress depends upon its social and
environmental value. (37, p.68)

A final focus for green criticisms of modern work is based on scale. Such criticisms
emphasise the impersonal size of modern workplaces; and the industrial ‘logic’ of
growth, based on economies of scale. This industrial ‘mass logic’ or ‘insensitive
colossalism’ (48, p.126) is at the heart of virtually all environmental criticisms, as it
is seen as having led to many of today’s other problems. ‘All the elements of society
begin to change their dimensions’ following industrialisation, with ‘civic and
political gigantism paralleling industrial and commercial gigantism’ (49, p.146).
Finally, the lack of a spiritual fulfilment in modern work is stressed by critics such as
Spretnak and Capra (29, p.90).

While modern work is certainly seen as having negative implications for the
environment, and as alienating for the individual, the greens also focus their
criticism on its implications for communities and for society as a whole. One focus
for such criticisms is again related to scale. For greens, modern industrialised
countries create a general atmosphere of hopelessness and fear, and an awareness of
feeling powerless to change society. These effects of modern work are general, and
not limited to the employed alone, since even industrial architecture is alienating:
‘before such gigantic, undefinable, bureaucratic entities, the urban dweller feels
psychically as well as physically dwarfed’ (49, p.146).
Green critiques in this area also arise from the observation that full employment as it is presently understood is no longer a possibility. The first such criticism greens would make is that society as a whole (and specifically political parties) is refusing to accept the inevitability of changing work patterns, and to plan accordingly. Greens are particularly vehement in their criticism of inequalities (which they hold to be the result of this refusal to accept the need to find new ways of working and living), and of the alienation and other effects they believe such inequalities have on communities and on society. Perhaps the most evident of such criticisms is seen in the emphasis greens place on women. Greens particularly criticise the common and long-established separation of women’s work from paid work as having led to the impoverishment and continued lower status of women. They denounce ‘le temps partiel imposé’, and ‘la flexibilisation des horaires de travail qui les touchent particulièrement’ (46, Point IIIa). However, this does not mean that greens necessarily want to change the kind of work done by women - in fact, many see the sort of unpaid work traditionally performed by women as potentially positive and fulfilling. Instead, they criticise the long-standing assumption that ‘le domaine privé’ should be associated only with women, and argue that women’s traditional work could be a possible starting point to revalue unpaid, unofficial types of work for all - such work is seen as worthy of being reappraised and extended, rather than restricted to women.

A second kind of inequality relating to work which is highlighted by the greens in their criticisms is between those who are employed in modern industrialised societies and those who choose not to work or who cannot find paid employment. The effects of unemployment for society are of course criticised by other political groups, but perhaps not principally on the grounds that they see work as a good and fulfilling thing to do for all. Greens criticise the refusal to accept the ‘informal economy’ by other political tendencies, who emphasise the need for work to be paid and taxed.
The final kind of inequality criticised by the greens relates to resources. The unequal use of finite resources by industry in the developed world is seen as having both actual and future negative effects for society, particularly in developing countries. Such inequality is seen as unsustainable; firstly, due to its over-rapid consumption of resources; secondly, because of fears that those denied development to industrialised societies' level will not tolerate such inequality. Political instability is presented as an inevitable consequence of such protectionist attitudes. Instead of appealing to liberal guilt about a colonial past, greens instead emphasise fear and the need to change through enlightened self-interest.

Greens criticise not only the industrial sector, but also what they see as the industrialisation of our leisure activities. Instead of a diverse range of locally-sensitive, generally creative and easily accessible pastimes, leisure is seen to be increasingly controlled by large service industries, so that access to leisure now requires a disposable income. Bookchin has attacked the resulting 'banalisation and impoverishment of experience' (49, p. 140), a leisure society controlled by the 'disabling professions' (37, p. 69).

2.2 1930s criticisms

As we looked at 1990s criticisms of work in relation to both its effects on the environment and its effects on the person, so we can see the same focus in our selected 1930s sources. We should also note a similar concentration of 1930s criticisms on the effects of work on the individual and on society, rather than simply on the environment.
2.2.1. Work and the environment

Even if there was no scientific proof of natural limits in the 1930s, we may still find striking parallels in our sources’ criticisms of the effects of changing work patterns on the environment. Understandably, we can note a more marked tendency to focus on direct, visible effects of modern work on the environment, rather than modern greens’ criticisms of potential future problems; this is particularly true of our 1930s political sources. However, such potential future difficulties do attract some criticisms, particularly in the literary sources consulted, where imagination can be given free rein with less need for evidence to substantiate what might then have been seen as extreme predictions.

One explanation for the early awareness of the environmental impact of modern industrialised working methods might of course be the long-standing agricultural heritage of France. An awareness of the power of nature, fear of nature, or the possibility of natural retribution for human arrogance are dominant themes in most of the sources consulted. Ideas about work and the environment which are commonplace in today’s green critiques were also prevalent in the 1930s, arguably because this was a period when the effects of changing work methods were really becoming visible for the first time. Indeed, it was during the 1930s in France that virtually all of the focal points of modern green criticisms took hold (‘la production de masse’, ‘l’entraînement de l’usine dans le paysage français’) (11, p.289).

Between the beginning of the century and 1930, the number of industrial workers rose from 4.3 to 6.3 million, and the kind of industry which employed these workers also changed, from the traditional dominance of textiles, for example, to the electrical, motor, chemical and steel industries (ibid., p.237). Thus, in the 1930s, many were questioning the kind of work being done, and the effects this work would have, just as the soixante-huitards and the greens would later.
Work was also clearly a key focus in the 1930s due to the economic crisis. Whereas the later industrial expansion of the post-war years would take place against a background of virtually full employment, with the population arguably eager to contribute to the restoration of French 'grandeur', industrial development in the 1930s was accompanied by high unemployment and precariousness for the majority of workers, leading to the imposition of new types of work and worker. The world of work was "profondément transformé: déqualification de nombreux ouvriers professionnels, mobilité considérable, à la mesure des bouleversements" (ibid., p.237). The massive industrial expansion during the 1920s had actually led to a shortage of workers, and immigrant workers had been called on by the French 'patronat'. When the crisis hit, it therefore hit a new working class. Arguably, the economic crisis and the new kinds of work were analysed by a new intellectual class, too, one dominated by youth movements (the post-World War I generation) who were united in their questioning of the 'désordre établi', if not in the solutions they proposed. The tone of most 1930s sources on the subject of work is one of fear of the effects of (generally undesired) change, and a clear sense of loss. There is a sense of helplessness in the face of rapid change:

Le triomphe de l'usine, c'est une sorte de révolution dans un pays qui a toujours répugné à la production de masse et aux grandes concentrations ouvrières. L'usine s'impose malgré les politiques, elle s'impose malgré les mentalités radicales dominantes. (ibid., p.294)

Even those ostensibly in power, then, could only 'accept' change ('l'Etat reconnaît le triomphe de l'usine') (ibid., p.295) (my italics). It is not surprising, therefore, that we can find evidence of fear, impotence, awareness of loss, and a range of criticisms of work in the 1930s which would not be as clearly or as consistently stated again until the arrival of political ecologists. Such criticisms are omnipresent, particularly in the literary sources consulted for this study. Céline, Saint-Exupéry, Giono (indeed, virtually all the literary figures prominent during the 1930s: Nizan, Bernanos, Malraux,...) were preoccupied with the theme of work in their fiction, and
in the case of Céline and Giono, in their non-fiction too. Their focus was often particularly on changes in the kind of work being done in the 1930s, and these were virtually always presented as negative — ‘le travail est devenu une puante saloperie’, in Giono’s words (51, p.607).

The kinds of activity these writers chose to examine were extremely varied. Céline, in his mammoth Voyage gives no doubt the most wide-ranging consideration of different kinds of work (in the French colonies, the army, prostitution, an American factory, as a teacher, doctor, tourist guide...). Giono and Saint-Exupéry in contrast focus on particular milieux: the first on rural work and the artisanat (indeed, during the 1930s Giono’s images are ‘drawn almost exclusively from nature, the equipment of work, and details of home life in the countryside’) (52, p.127); the second on modern flight.

A clear focus in the literary accounts studied is the need to respect, indeed to fear nature, seen nowhere as compellingly as in the works of Giono. Nature is a vengeful, living character in his novels, personified in the form of hills, trees, rivers, the wind. Indeed, at times, Giono seems to predict the Gaia hypothesis (‘La Terre est un être vivant’), nearly fifty years before Lovelock would influence modern green thought:

Cette terre qui s’étend [...] avec sa charge d’arbres et d’eau, ses fleuves, ses ruisseaux, ses forêts, ses monts et ses collines, et ses villes rondes qui tournent au milieu des éclairs, ses hordes d’hommes cramponnés à ses poils, si c’était une créature vivante, un corps? [...] Mais, sûr! (54, pp.51-2)

Even those characters who are close to the earth, the mysterious half-(wo)men, half-beasts like Zulma and Bobi have no choice but to respect and fear nature. When they fail to, or become too proud and ambitious, as Bobi does in Que ma joie demeure, nature wreaks her revenge. This is particularly apparent in human attempts
to control nature, often through work on the land. Logic can't be applied, and human attempts to do so merely demonstrate our arrogance. Even in less romantic or free accounts, such as *Voyage*, we are reminded of the need to be aware of our place in nature, and nature's power, for example when Bardamu and Robinson end up working in the unsuitable climate of the tropics—‘On aura beau dire, ça sera toujours un pays pour les moustiques et les panthères. Chacun sa place’ (53, p.221).

The importance of natural resources, and human arrogance in assuming they are dependable is a recurrent theme in French literature of the period. Accounts of rural farming work in particular focus on the essential and capricious resource of water. The first step the living hill takes to punish the central characters in *Colline* is to stop the water source—‘la méchanceté des collines’ (54, p.172). The attempted ‘colonisation’ of nature, through farming and exploitation of natural resources is evidence of man’s arrogance, stupidity and lack of sensitivity. In nature, we see only ‘les espaces vides encore d’une colonisation certaine. C’est une vue très froide de l’univers’ (57, p.125). It is perhaps in what Lipietz later termed the ‘dénonciation de ce saccage’ that we can demonstrate the most striking parallels between earlier ideas and those of modern greens. Ramuz, in particular stresses the abuse of natural resources by ‘l’homme pirate’, for whom ‘la nature ne serait plus alors que l’ensemble des réserves d’énergie’ (57, p.102). Work is the sphere where such abuses are most evident;

le matérialisme communiste s’emploiera à supprimer le plus possible chez l’homme tout ce qui le met en contact étroit avec la nature, et c’est ses mains et l’outil. (57, pp.115-6)

Similar denunciations of human abuse of natural resources are frequent in Giono’s work. In *Colline*, he writes that ‘La terre c’est pas fait pour toi, unique, à ton usance, sans fin’ (54, p.111); in *Le serpent d’étoiles*, ‘Si l’homme devient le chef des bêtes,
elle, la terre, est perdue' (58, p. 156). In his non-fiction too, he warns of the effects of such abuses: 'L'air, ça va devenir un luxe formidable' (59, p. 71).

In *Voyage*, we find a clear depiction of industry's exploitation of the natural resources of undeveloped countries or colonies, when Bardamu escapes the war and flees to Africa; this is true of human beings just as it is true of natural resources like rubber exploited in the colony — 'Pour des prix très raisonnables, on pouvait s'envoyer une famille entière pendant une heure ou deux' (53, p. 168). Of course, Céline's pessimistic view of human nature means he might well argue that such plundering of others' resources is the obvious, logical outcome of our character: 'L'homme pratique toute fraternité avec ennui et le pillage et l'assassinat seulement avec passion et frénésie' (61, p. 188).

Perhaps the most recurrent theme in the 1930s sources' discussion of work, however, is the constant questioning of the idea of 'progress'. This is also, arguably, the subject which most clearly differentiates the views of the left in the 1930s from non-conformist movements such as the Personalists. Positive marxist views of 'le progrès continu' are criticised in terms which would be familiar to modern greens:

Comment ne pas voir que dans la vie on ne gagne rien qu'on ne perd, qu'un gain est compensé sans cesse par une perte, c'est-à-dire que tout se paie? (57, p. 128)

Similarly, the new emphasis on productivity is strongly criticised; indeed, the term the 1930s youth movements preferred is the one we have previously seen used by the greens. In their critique of 'productivisme', the non-conformists questioned an economy directed towards 'le seul développement de la production, la seule croissance des rendements, le tout dans une perspective essentiellement quantitative' (15, p. 221). Of course, the symbol par excellence of such unrestrained and damaging productivism was the arrival in France of the factory organised according
to taylorist principles. Its introduction was widely seen as 'une atteinte à l'humanisme' (63, p.247), and led to widespread questioning of the very notion of progress in industrialised societies.

Although such questioning and criticisms can be seen in the political discourse of the 1930s, or in the ideas of movements like the Personalists, they are certainly more apparent in the literature of the period. Steel offers a possible explanation for this: a writer 'peut donner libre cours à ses réactions viscérales, à ses inquiétudes, à sa révolte devant l'absurde industriel' (63, p.249), in a way that a politician could not. This view is borne out by a comparison of Céline's presentations of his experience of the Ford factory in Detroit in his non-fiction (he visited the factory as an official observer, in his capacity as a doctor), then later in his fictional account (Voyage). In the first, his overall assessment is far more nuanced; he even appears to argue that France must emulate such an approach if she is to be a major industrial force when he presents an unfavourable comparison of the number of French man-hours needed to produce a car, and the corresponding figure for Ford employees. In his literary account, however, he presents an unforgettable account of the absurdity and cruelty of such an environment.

As in the 1990s, the urbanisation needed by modern industry is criticised. Criticisms which modern greens would relate to the issue of sustainability can be found in 1930s critiques, although they would not of course use this term. That self-sufficiency is no longer possible in the city is criticised, for example (60, pp.64-5). There are repeated references to the obsession with speed, 'la maladie moderne de la vitesse' (64, p.123). Céline too presents a vivid description of the energy and speed of life in New York, and we see the feeling of loneliness and need for human contact this inspires in Bardamu.

Of course, the rapid increase in the demand for industrial workers in France, and the dominance of Paris during the period, meant that the city itself was changing rapidly,
and here we find further similarities between contemporary 1930s criticisms and those of today. The effects of industrialisation were clearly visible to those living in Paris, particularly the new factories 'qui sentent toutes les odeurs, les une à peine croyables et où l'air d'alentour se refuse à puer davantage' (53, pp.124-5). The consequences of rapid unplanned industrial expansion were felt by many villages and suburbs surrounding Paris, and we see an awareness of the negative impact this had in fictional accounts (ibid., p.531).

An awareness of the effects of bad planning of the industrial expansion of the 1930s is also demonstrated in political sources during the period. Indeed, surprisingly perhaps, members of the Popular Front coalition (with the exception of the communists) were openly against what was often termed 'le triomphe de l'usine'; there was a common dislike of the move away from 'l'échoppe, la boutique ou l'usine sur le modèle social artisanal' (11, p.294). Some (the 'neo-socialists' and the non-conformists) were attracted to de Man's 'plan du travail' as a potential alternative (65, p.183).

Technical progress is also a key focus for 1930s sources. The use made by industry of technical advances (to increase profits or to reduce the number of workers rather than making work less onerous) was criticised by the Personalists, and Ordre Nouveau, for instance (50, p.176), for whom modern urban-based industry was 'absurde, car tous les perfectionnements techniques aboutissent aujourd'hui [1934] au chômage' (15, p.219).

Finally, 1930s sources questioned the 'progress' represented by the nascent consumer society in France. Awareness of the impact of taylorism, with its high wages and use of advertising to encourage consumer spending, was at its apogée during this period. It could be argued that consumerism was questioned despite its apparent benefits precisely because dramatic changes were happening so rapidly; the impact of such changes was thus clearly visible. The Personalists argued that the
excesses of a consumer society should be avoided: ‘A Personalist economy begins with an ethics of human needs’ (50, p.190).

As well as the focus on consumerism, many 1930s work-related criticisms were of modern agriculture. The first kind of criticism made of agriculture in relation to the environment during the 1930s was based on the very visible changes being made to farming methods. Just as in industry, new mechanical developments were being encouraged, and successive governments were trying to rationalise traditional French farming methods. The traditional small size of French farms, in particular, was being challenged by the 1930s; and large-scale agricultural administration was steadily being introduced, as for example in August 1936, when the Office national interprofessionel du blé was founded.  

Giono shows the most sustained awareness of the potential impact of such changes in scale and farming methods, both in his fiction and non-fiction. In his non-fiction, he restricts himself to dire warnings about the effects such modern developments will have for the earth: ‘La machine tuera l’homme, la joie, l’équilibre, la civilisation même’ (60, p.108); or to disturbing depictions of large-scale agribusinesses, and the ‘monstres’ who run them, who are ‘enveloppés de champs mille fois plus grands que ceux que nous cultivons’ (60, p.179). Another aspect stressed in Giono’s non-fiction is the need to warn those who might be tempted to accept such agricultural developments of the dangers involved. He does so in terms which would be familiar to modern greens: he criticises the move towards single-crop farms; he indicates the precarious nature of such choices; and he effectively predicts the development of French agriculture from self-sufficient small farms to the large-scale businesses criticised by greens today for their effects on the environment: 

Spécialise-toi, fabrique-toi ta carte à jouer et fais-la la plus grosse possible pour gagner le plus possible. Arrache de tes champs la nourriture de ta famille. Il n’est plus question de nourriture, il est question de jeu. Avec ce
Giono would agree with the traditional paysan motto: 'Un bon domaine doit tout produire, sauf le sel et le fer', (69, p.57) as this is the only way to guarantee the paysan's independence, and also because this is the most environmentally-sound or 'natural' method, proved over centuries. While he certainly exaggerates or romanticises his case at times in his non-fiction and polemics, in his fiction he demonstrates even more passionately his disapproval of such developments. In Lanceurs de graine, a farmer attempts to introduce industrial machinery and more 'rational' methods to his farm (trees are uprooted to make way for more crops); his greed is seen to lead to his death through natural retribution. Modern farming methods are represented by 'pitiless machinery of the new destructive age' (52, p.63).

The second focus for 1930s criticisms in this field is the potentially negative effects on the environment of the loss of the traditional paysans, who are

ceux qui ont de l'herbe dans le sang, de grandes poitrines en prairies et en vergers, des bras comme la branche des chênes, la peau comme de l'écorce de l'arbre, et le chatouillis du vent dessus. (70, p.120)

'Le respect de la vie' (54, p.175) is an inherent characteristic of such beings, in Giono's view. They are therefore aware of the effects on the earth of apparent progress, and are presented as less likely to damage the environment. They would never attempt to rationalise production, for example, 'combiner les mathématiques et les chimies en une machine qui fera pousser et mûrir [le blé] brusquement en une heure', since they understand that 'la terre serait contre' (64, p.123). In contrast, both Giono and Céline portray the inability of the city-dweller even to comprehend a
more natural kind of work. Thus Bardamu’s mother, on her Sunday visit, sees the last paysans near Paris as a kind of alien species: “Ça doit être bien dur la terre!” qu’elle remarquait chaque fois en les regardant ma mère bien perplexe” (53, p.126). Giono’s depiction of those who work in the city bears some resemblance to the modern green criticism of ‘bad work’, of the tendency for those in paid employment not to care about (or to be powerless to change) the potential effects of their work on the environment. They are ‘hommes mécaniques, incapables de sentir’ (60, p.197), unaware of ‘l’aboutissement logique de leur travail’ (ibid., p.113).

Finally, as in the 1990s, the idea of aesthetic damage to the environment was current in the 1930s. Indeed, if anything, criticisms were more virulent, perhaps because dramatic new changes to the traditional landscape were particularly visible, and there was a widespread awareness of what was being lost or disfigured. Special criticism was reserved for the appearance of new, large-scale industrial developments and factories foreign to the traditional French landscape: factories were ‘ces monstrueuses constructions de métal machiné’ (64, p.218). Born and Dubief point out that the first large-scale factory in Giono’s home of Haute-Provence had to be staffed by a majority of foreign workers, such was local resistance to this new form of work (11, p.16). The city was seen as suffering from the visual impact of industry (Giono called the city ‘l’usine de notre mort’) (60, p.186), and criticisms of the changing appearance of the countryside were also to be found. Just as modern greens criticise ‘la friche’, the regimented appearance of modern large-scale farms and the negative effects on the environment of today’s single-crop ‘logic’, Giono was saddened by ‘des immensités couvertes de vignes à perte de vue, des plaines chargées de betteraves, ou de blé’ (ibid., p.179). He gives a clear and critical account of the impact on the traditional rural landscape of modern agriculture: ‘l’emploi de la technique industrielle à la recherche du profit modifia complètement le visage de la terre’ with depopulation leading to ‘de grands flots déserts d’herbes sauvages et d’hommes solitaires’ (64, pp.137-8).
Surprisingly, given the political climate of the period, with the economic crisis of the early 1930s and the growing fear of war with productive countries such as Germany during the decade, the emphasis in political debates of the period was not chiefly on increasing agricultural production. Even though it was clear at the time that, compared to her neighbours, 'les rendements français progressent avec une lenteur telle qu'ils paraissent ridicules' (11, p.216), it seems that the slow evolution of French farming was actually generally supported by those in authority: 'L'État, et plus particulièrement le Sénat, protège les paysans plus qu'il ne cherche à les faire évoluer' (ibid., p.217). There was some attempt to encourage paysans to expand, through favourable loan rates; but this measure had been introduced as a post-war development, in 1918, and did not lead quickly to much larger farms. If anything, the literary criticisms we have observed were in advance of their time: fewer than 1% of farms owned a tractor in the 1930s, for example (ibid., p.221).

Some political groups too stressed the need to safeguard the paysan tradition, however, even if this tradition was changing less quickly than some feared. Local groups such as l'Office Central de Landerneau also encouraged paysans to mobilise against the threat of urbanisation, and offered correspondence courses in agricultural methods to enable paysans to stay on the land (ibid., p.226). The Jeunesse Agricole Catholique took similar measures after its foundation in 1929, and the notorious 'chemises vertes' of Dorgères, though badly-organised, poorly-supported and short-lived, also attempted to defend this traditional kind of work. Overall, 'agricultural protection was considered a more pressing matter than the promotion of industrial growth' (72, p.450) in the 1930s.

Personalist criticisms here are usually based on a critique of capitalism or modernity rather than fears of environmental damage, however. Capitalism was seen as the 'enemy of the person' - indeed, this was the title of one chapter of their manifesto; industrialism was 'like a cancer' (50, p.165). Their criticisms of industrialisation refer to 'the whole heritage of the capitalistic disorder: intensive centralization, scientific rationalism, over-industrialization, etc.' (50, p.171). Others attribute
Personalist criticisms in the field of modern work to the ‘avowed anti-Americanism of Mounier’ (74, p.266). The most likely explanation would, however, be the Personalist emphasis on the individual, and it is to this type of criticism we shall now turn.

2.2.2. Work and the person

We have seen that the effects of work on the person and, more broadly, on society are given more attention in modern green thought than effects on the environment. Dramatic changes in the kind of work being done during the 1930s led to a similar questioning of new types of activity. Just as in modern green sources, the effects of changing work patterns on both those who were employed and those who did not have access to paid employment were examined. These dramatic changes in the kind of activities being performed, along with the economic crisis which affected France at the beginning of the decade, encouraged many to rethink the very notion of the word ‘travail’ in an industrial age, just as greens would in the aftermath of the trente glorieuses. Thus some 1930s sources argued that ‘le travail socialement rémunéré et déterminé’ should be abandoned as the most important ‘facteur de socialisation’ (76, p.4).

However, just as modern greens do not question the need to work, many 1930s sources saw work as an essential part of life. Thus the Personalists placed the need to work at the centre of their manifesto, with their ‘Four Laws of Work’. The first states plainly: ‘Labour is a universal obligation. He who can work and does not do so should not eat’ (50, p.199). If labour can be presented as an obligation, however, it is also a right, and ‘not a commodity, but a personal activity’ (ibid., p.199). This is not to say, of course, that non-conformists did not distinguish between different
kinds of work: they would agree with modern greens that not all work is ‘good work’; an attitude which seems to set them apart from communist contemporaries, who still described industrial work as ‘une affaire de dignité, d’héroïsme, et de gloire’ (77, p.301).

One apparent exception here might be Céline. His portrayal of work is certainly more negative than that of contemporaries like Giono: it is a ‘tare honteuse, véritable fléau’ (63, p.247). Yet even Céline never seriously questions the need to work – it is an unavoidable part of life. Indeed, it is the quest for fulfilling work which drives the action of Voyage. Céline’s bleak view of human nature no doubt colours his fictional portrayal; but in his private life, he chose, of course, to continue working as a doctor and writer long after he could have abandoned this ‘fléau’.

The clearest resemblance to modern greens’ insistence on the joy of work is seen in Giono’s writing of the period. He would agree with modern greens that work is an (even the) essential element of a fulfilled life, and like them, views visions of the future in which the individual would not need to work with scepticism.

Qu’est-ce qu’il [‘l’homme socialement technique’] fera le reste du temps, lui demandons-nous? Et il nous répond: il se cultivera; quand ce pauvre homme a oublié, ne sait pas, ne peut pas savoir, dans sa position antinaturelle, que la vraie culture de l’homme c’est précisément son travail. (68, p.151)

So the concept of work is a valued one for modern greens and for our 1930s sources; similarly, both criticise actual work in industrialised societies for its effects on both the person, and, more broadly, on society in general. Once again, the concept of alienation is central to the criticisms made. A clear similarity between most of our 1930s sources and modern greens here would be their basic criticism of Marxist attempts to associate alienation purely with a capitalist system of ownership. Both
capitalism and communism/socialism are seen as alienating in their attachment to industrialism. Industrial work per se, whether managed by the State or by private owners, is alienating.

There were two reasons for such a view. First, industrialism requires mass populations to move away from the land, and this was seen as having negative effects for the individual, just as for the environment. Industrialism has created 'une planète nouvelle'; ‘Les hommes ont déserté la terre. Ils ne veulent plus fruits, ni blé, ni liberté, ni joie’ (60, pp.19-20). Many wrote of the temptations of urban industrial work for the rural young in particular. Abandoning the traditional pleasures of the ‘terre natale’ would mean disaster in their working lives: ‘Leur métier ne sera qu’un gagne-pain subi maussadement’ (78, p.40). Second, the kind of activity required by industry was rejected. The ownership of the means of production was irrelevant, as the activity remained the same. Thus, just as the greens do today, Giono argued that ‘ce n’est pas le capitalisme qui avilit, c’est l’usine qui avilit’ (79, p.120). We can now turn to the criticisms made in the 1930s of such ‘avilissement’ or alienation.

The most obvious focus in the 1930s was on the very visible changes to working conditions which industrialism required, and the effects these had on the health and safety of industrial workers. Céline offered a similar argument to that of modern greens, with typically black humour and a sense of absurdity. At the Ford factory, where employing handicapped, blind or ill workers alongside dangerous machinery is profitable, and therefore ‘logical’, he paints a chaotic picture of working conditions, with ‘[des] individus instables, dangereux, parfois incontrôlables’ working beside ‘[des] machines incisives, martelantes et coupantes qui sont de véritables tentations pour des demi-fous’ (80, p.125). Not surprisingly, accidents were ‘très fréquents chez Ford’ (ibid., p.143). Film-makers of the period also memorably represented the noise, speed and danger of factory conditions, in works such as Les temps modernes or A nous la liberté. 1930s criticisms of new taylorist approaches to work and the effects these had on health were not restricted to workplace accidents, however. The long-term physical and psychological effects of
industrial work were also regularly denounced. There are direct physical effects of industrial work, with workers' lungs becoming 'une sorte de monstre anatomique', 'le poumon-usine' (60, p.23).

Fatigue too is constantly stressed (63, pp.253-5). Alcoholism is seen to result from such working conditions (67, p.238), as is depression. The personal sacrifice involved in such work is also deplored. Giono describes the tears of a young worker due to return to his 'tôlerie automobile' after a break in the mountains (60, p.107) in a pitiful scene. Indeed, the psychological effects of such work are generally more vehemently criticised than the obvious physical impact, perhaps because, for writers like Céline and Giono, the most depressing aspect of such working conditions is the inability to think. The noise in the Ford factory ('le vacarme infernal'), industrial employers' desire for a lack of intelligence in their workers ('des candidats complètement dépourvus d'imagination, dénués de sens critique, des crétins'), 'la plus grande monotonie industrielle connue' (80, p.125), are all shocking to Céline on his first visit to the factory set up by 'le tzar de la voiture à bon marché' (ibid., p.119); but he seems most appalled by Ford's director of 'le Service Social' who stresses the now-infamous view, that 'l'ouvrier rêvé, c'est le chimpanzé' (ibid., p.123).

These changes to modern work also attracted the attention of politicians and youth groups. By the mid-1930s, there was a growing sense that recent industrial attempts to introduce such practices to France could be halted, that working conditions were a necessary focus for improvement through advanced legislation. There was a widespread hope that the Popular Front would be able to achieve this, and that changes to working methods were not yet sufficiently entrenched to be beyond challenge. Measures included in the Accords Matignon, such as the shortest working week in Europe, and of course, the first congés payés, for industrial and agricultural workers alike represented 'une législation sociale avancée' (18, p.56), in a country where there was not even any official unemployment protection yet.
Broader attempts to tackle alcoholism, a stress on the need for physical fitness, even encouraging urban workers to leave the city were radical new measures in this area.

No matter how radical such measures were, though, modern greens would not see them as sufficient, and indeed, most of our 1930s sources were disillusioned by these reforms. First, given the rise of fascism and continuing economic problems, even those measures which had been introduced in law were not in fact fully implemented until decades later. Second, for many of our 1930s sources, even if such measures had been fully implemented, they did not go far enough to the root of the problem, and left industrialism itself unchallenged: they were reforming rather than eradicating the problem. Thus, just as in modern green critiques, many of our 1930s sources challenged the common assumption that work should be equated with paid employment in an industrialised society. Once again, the fact that this new development was closely linked to industrialisation was clear during the 1930s: the paysan tradition was still strong, and in many areas of the country, paid employment was still the exception.

Both Giono and Céline focus on the precariousness of paid work, though Giono does so more explicitly. Céline does memorably illustrate workers’ misery and inability to question employers’ or managers’ whims, even when these are quite obviously ludicrous (as in the colonial episode in Voyage); the threat of unemployment and ruin haunts Bardamu throughout his epic journey. Even when Bardamu finds a job as a doctor, an apparently desirable position, his life is more miserable than that of his patients in a poor suburb of Paris, as he is dependent on their goodwill in order to survive.

For Giono, the assumption that work means paid employment is both incorrect (as the paysan or artisan is not paid in this way); and dangerous, as it leads to war. Indeed, Giono builds a whole pacifist strategy on the need to refuse to accept paid employment; he repeatedly calls on the paysan not to move from traditional self-
sufficient, multi-crop farming to more ‘productive’ methods which Giono sees as destroying his freedom. This is a theme to which Giono returns throughout the 1930s, through both fictional characters (Bobi warning the paysans in *Que ma joie demeure* that, ‘Il y a une partie de ton travail qui est perdue. C’est celle qui s’est transformée en papier’ (60, p.459)), and polemics, such as his *Lettre aux paysans*, where he makes his reasoning clear (if simplistic and open to criticism): if paysans produce a wide range of crops, they are self-sufficient, and can choose to ignore the demands of government in times of war. If they only produce one kind of crop, then they are industrial workers like any others, and dependent on the state; they therefore have no choice but to accept war (68, p.173).

In keeping with the positive tone of Giono’s work, many of his criticisms of paid employment are implied: he contrasts the stresses and lack of fulfilment of paid employment with other types of less ‘logical’ or financially rewarding freely-chosen work. It is often left to the reader to compare the respective levels of happiness of each type of worker and draw his or her own conclusions as to which is best.

Perhaps the most striking picture painted by Giono of a perfectly-fulfilled (and perfectly green...) worker is in *L’homme qui plantait des arbres*, which recounts the life of a completely independent shepherd, living high in the mountains, who spends his days planting acorns. When a government official next maps the area, he finds a forest, unexpectedly: ‘c’était la première fois, lui dit cet homme naïf, qu’on voyait une forêt pousser toute seule’ (83, p.763). Giono presents Bouffier’s as the good life, simple, natural, and at one with the earth. He is ‘un modèle, qui propose visiblement une leçon, - une leçon sans paroles, car le vieux berger est un silencieux’ (84, p.1403): the reader is left to appreciate the outcome of Bouffier’s life work, the joyful renaissance of the hamlet near his ‘forêt naturelle’.

The final reason for an emphasis during the 1930s on paid employment is also to be found in the 1990s; that is, a critique of consumerism. This was viewed as having negative effects for society as a whole; but it was on the individual that our 1930s sources generally focussed their attention. Some argued that it was the acceptance of
a 'quantitative' view of the world which led to discontent for the individual: 'les mêmes vues toutes quantitatives qu'il a portées sur l'univers, il les porte maintenant sur lui-même', leading to an unresolvable jealousy and class tensions (57, p.84). Many sources in the 1930s stress the comparative poverty of earlier, more content generations (the paysan in Giono, the earliest Christians in Ramuz) and argue that happiness is therefore not to be found in acquiring possessions. Ramuz takes the development of a consumer society as his focus in Taille de l'homme, for example. This development has a corrupting influence on the individual: 'Il n'est plus, il veut avoir' (57, p.75). One of the key modern texts which greens see as influential even takes a similar phrase as its title: "To have or to be."

Above all, our 1930s sources were conscious of the immediate attractions of consumerism, and aimed to warn of the hidden dangers they believed were unavoidably linked to these attractions. Giono warns of the apparent attractions of consumerism in his Lettre aux paysans. Even he does not deny that such attractions exist; but he claims that for the 10% of 'bonheurs extraordinaires entièrement nouveaux' (68, p.135), there are also 90% of added and hidden disadvantages.

The nature of work in modern industrial societies is the next main focus of 1930s criticisms. Creativity and inventiveness were believed to be sacrificed to efficiency; and the principal effect of such changes for the individual is the loss of freedom. A worker or artisan with a true 'métier' was 'sûr de manger et de vivre n'importe où' (ibid., p.190). However, the modern employee could only perform one task; others completed the product. Thus 'l'ouvrier ne peut pas quitter sa chaise chez Bata. S'il s'en allait de là, il ne pourrait pas vivre' (ibid., p.191). The loss of freedom of the modern industrial worker due to deskilling is a constant focus. The Personalists talked of 'une révolution machiniste' attacking human liberty (15, p.227). Giono's fear of a 'machine age', where 'soulless' (52, p.96) machines dictate the pace of work is contrasted with his use of the repeated image of the plough, a tool rather than a machine. Whereas he saw such tools as extensions of the human hand,
meaning the worker was still in direct contact with earth, Giono viewed modern machinery as inhuman in scale.

Even Saint-Exupéry, despite the apparent contradiction of his love affair with modern flight, saw the introduction of most machinery as enslaving. He argued, in Terre des hommes, that the plane was an exception to this rule, as it was more a tool than a machine: ‘Cet instrument nous a fait découvrir le vrai visage de la terre’ (86, p.54). Even if planes could be seen as an exception by Saint-Exupéry, as liberating, and ‘bringing out the contemplative side of one’s nature’ (87, p.35), machines were generally seen to have precisely the opposite effect. First, the very noise involved in industrial production limited thought:

On cède au bruit comme on cède à la guerre. On se laisse aller aux machines avec les trois idées qui restent à vaciller tout en haut derrière le front de la tête. (53, p.288)

The inhuman scale of modern industry is also addressed in the 1930s as in modern green critiques. First of all, the modern workplace was criticised as being no longer ‘à la mesure de l’homme’ (60, p.38). This phrase, and others such as ‘taille humaine’, are repeated constantly. Second, the need to live in the rapidly-growing city in order to find work was seen as leading to problems for the individual, as we shall see in Chapter 5.

Lack of joy in work was another result of deskilling which was widely criticised. Maulnier wrote that modern industrial work involved ‘ni joie, ni fierté’. Again, ‘le travail en miettes’ is blamed. Céline vividly describes the effects on the person of the monotony of endlessly-repeated gestures on the assembly line (‘une sorte d’hésitation entre l’hébétude et le délire’) (53, p.289). There was a widespread view that more freedom and joy were essential. The strikes of 1936 were interpreted as joyful attempts to reclaim liberty and lost camaraderie, with vivid images of ‘des
lieux de travail transformés en lieux de fête au son de l'accordéon' (18, p.56).
Winock even argues that the aim of the strikes was less ‘l'exigence de
revendications précises’ than ‘un formidable désir collectif de libération’ (ibid.,
p.56). That the strikes were ‘an assertion of human dignity’ (72, p.452) is stressed in
contemporary accounts. Weil saw the strikes as ‘une joie. Un peu de fierté au
coeur, un peu de chaleur humaine’ (88, p.91). Of course, such joy and freedom were
portrayed as the exception; workers' camaraderie had to be represented during
strikes, as it was rarely seen to exist in the noise and impersonal environment of the
modern factory; or if it was, it was not evident in French literature of the period.

The speed of change was seen as happening on an inhuman scale too. New types of
work or working environment were encountered suddenly; and for those used to
working on the land, or in smaller workshops, the move to large industries was
‘ressenti comme épouvantable par ceux qui avaient connu l’avant-Taylor’ (11, pp.237-
8). Even Saint-Exupéry, one of the earliest pilots, criticised the speed and scale of
change as inhuman: ‘Tout a changé si vite autour de nous: rapports humains,
conditions de travail, coutumes’ (86, p.168); ‘Nous avions un peu oublié que nous
dressions ces constructions [voies ferrées, usines] pour servir les hommes’ (ibid.,
p.169).

Overall, the emphasis was on the lack of fulfilment of modern industrial work.
Indeed, the constant expectation in the 1930s that joy should be the right of workers,
and clear belief that this is possible are striking for the modern reader. This
emphasis on joy in work is echoed today by the more utopian wing of the modern
green movement. It was found in both political attitudes and the art of the period;
indeed, one seems to have influenced the other:

La fraternité, la solidarité, l'espoir, la grande illusion du bonheur et de la
paix: tous ces sentiments qu'éprouvent avec une violence confuse les
centaines de milliers d'hommes et de femmes11 qui ont porté au pouvoir le
s'élargira à sa vie entière' (90, p.427). This could lead either to the acceptance of totalitarianism ('Il sera mûr pour devenir le citoyen d'une république totalitaire') (ibid., p.427), or to the attempt to rebel, probably violently:

Industrial work's effects on society were seen as dangerous for two, perhaps contradictory reasons. First, the outcome of banal repetitive gestures performed daily was believed to lead to unquestioning docility. The 'dépersonnalisation' of the worker, 'dépassant l'usine où il fait ses huit heures quotidiennes, s'élargira à sa vie entière' (90, p.427). This could lead either to the acceptance of totalitarianism ('Il sera mûr pour devenir le citoyen d'une république totalitaire') (ibid., p.427), or to the attempt to rebel, probably violently:
The breaking down of industrial production into the endlessly repeated mindless gesture further dehumanised factory work, and intensified the tendency of the unskilled worker to seek a way out through political revolution. (72, p.450)

Giono felt rather that modern work led to a lack of rebellion, which he felt was also dangerous for society. He painted an horrific picture of a day in the life of an industrial worker in the modern city, noting the worker's lack of awareness of his condition:

Si tu n'es pas révolté en toi-même, soit que le travail ait tué toutes tes facultés de révolte, soit que tu aies pris goût à tes vices, je suis révolté pour toi malgré tout pour t'obliger à l'être (60, pp.42-3).

Unemployment and the social and political instability it involved were greatly feared. This was again seen as a problem as a result of industrialisation. Previously, the larger population of paysans were generally self-sufficient. The move to the city and modern industrial work had not been adequately planned, and France still had a very poor level of social protection in cases of unemployment (private unemployment insurance was only held by 1 in 10 workers – see (85, pp.12-13)); divisions in society were therefore marked, and real destitution a clear possibility. Insecurity was also feared to result from 'parcellisation' – workers could be made redundant in times of hardship as they were easily replaced, because the work they performed was unskilled.

Female workers were singled out in some 1930s criticisms just as in modern green critiques, particularly because of the impact the type of work they did could have on society. They tended to figure in suggestions for change: many sources, as we shall see, held that women represented hope for the future in the field of work. However, the Personalists were one group who also prepared a wide-ranging analysis and
criticism of women’s traditional roles. The failure to include women was argued to have negative effects not only for their sex, but also for society as a whole, which lost a potentially valuable contribution.

One type of female work which attracted comment and criticism in the 1930s was prostitution. Brothels were still legal in France, and Richard’s post-war account of the average ‘workload’ gives some idea of the cruelty of the system:

J’ai demandé à une fille, combien as-tu fait de clients aujourd’hui? Elle m’a répondu: quatre-vingt-deux!... C’est pire que l’esclavage – le bagne. (66, p.3)

Giono describes the misery of one girl (and the shame of her paysan family) when she becomes pregnant after enforced prostitution in Un de Baumugnes; Céline, however, paints a more nuanced picture. When Molly’s work is juxtaposed with the hell of the Ford factory, we wonder which is the worse kind of work:

Elle se faisait dans les cent dollars par jour en maison, tandis que moi, chez Ford, j’en gagnais à peine six. (53, p.291)

Céline does however portray Molly’s ultimate aim of leaving her current job sympathetically. Neither he nor Giono seem to see prostitution as causing problems for society; rather, it is society’s attitude to the women involved which is criticised. Céline introduces Molly as Bardamu’s way of escaping after the horrors of industrial work: ‘le cinéma ne me suffisait plus, antidote bénin, sans effet réel contre l’atrocité matérielle de l’usine’ (53, p.290); and, just as in modern green critiques, leisure time in general attracted the attention, and criticisms, of our 1930s sources. The emphasis in the 1930s on leisure had a slightly different tone than modern criticisms, however. The emphasis was on criticisms of the existing problem — summed up in the idea of
décadence - and on encouragement to citizens to address this, rather than criticisms of the ‘leisure industry’ that we find today. Ultimately, however, as we shall see in the final section, this meant that both the 1930s sources and modern greens recommended similar changes.

In the 1930s, there was also a high-profile debate over reductions in working hours, attributable both to the Popular Front and to the ideas of de Man, who along with Walther wanted a shorter working day, though not in order to increase time for leisure; rather education and worthy self-development pursuits should replace paid employment (90, p.425). The key difference when leisure was discussed in the 1930s, however, was a generally more positive tone. The emphasis, as in literature, was on the ‘right’ of workers to joy and freedom. While the Popular Front arguably failed to deliver ‘le pain’ or ‘la paix’ during their term of office, ‘la liberté’ was achieved to some degree by the measures taken to grant workers more free time; indeed, Léon Blum saw the congés payés as his greatest achievement:

Par l’organisation du travail et du loisir, j’avais malgré tout apporté une espèce d’embellie, d’éclaircie dans des vies difficiles, obscures.\textsuperscript{13}

The congés payés were not the only step taken in this field. Criticisms of unfit French young people in particular were attributed to the ‘class divisions’ of sport in France. The Popular Front demonstrated an awareness of this problem by their attempted ‘democratisation’ of sport, commissioning 235 stadiums in 1936 (11, p.158).

Of course, many of these themes stressed in our 1930s sources – unequal distribution of resources and focus on the ‘masses’, unemployment, the need for a healthy, fit population (the New Man), and so on – would have been emphasised in communist (or fascist) critiques of society too. However, for the non-conformists, neither of these was seen as the answer. Perhaps the most striking similarity between our
1930s sources and the views of modern greens in this field was the widespread conviction that productivism or industrialism was the root of the problem, rather than the ownership of the means of production. Writers like Giono and Ramuz, too, while agreeing with communist criticisms of capitalist societies, were simultaneously overtly anti-communist; and Ramuz' justification for this position resembles that of many modern greens: 'le communisme nie le mystère de la terre' (57, p.99).

The Personalists’ analysis was that modern industrial practices and uses of technology had negative effects for the person, and, just as greens would today, they criticised all who hoped to build a new world or civilisation on the worst excesses of industrialism. 1930s Personalists were particularly disappointed by

l'apparente incapacité de la gauche institutionnalisée à imaginer autre chose que les outils utilitaires et consuméristes du capitalisme comme modèle pour une société socialiste future. A cet égard, les écologistes ont adopté des idées vieilles de soixante ans. (35, p.134)

2.3 Green solutions

If we consider the solutions proposed in this field by modern green thinkers, we will notice, first of all, a utopian or idealist emphasis. Gorz succinctly expresses the general green emphasis when discussing possible alternatives - 'Changer d'utopie' (92, p.40). Although all greens would agree that a society of producers in full-time paid employment is an ‘utopie passéeiste’ (ibid., p.41), they would be divided over what changes should be made to the world of work. There are two main types of approach, both of which are flavoured by the 'mixture of idealism and pragmatism' (91, p.163) which Prendiville feels characterises the movement.
The first (minority) approach accepts that full-time paid employment is no longer an achievable goal; they are confident that the use of industrial equipment and machinery to reduce human input in production will continue; they stress human ingenuity and the ‘technological fix’ as positive characteristics; and they therefore focus on how society and our attitudes should be changed in order to make sure that the future is not an ‘avenir à deux vitesses’. They ask broad questions about what the ‘leisure society’ will look like, and discuss uses of free time:

Comment vivre dans une société qui offre de moins en moins de travail alors que la distribution du revenu est en principe liée à l’occupation d’un emploi? (93, p.423)

The second broad approach (with which most greens would identify) also accepts that current levels of production and consumerism are environmentally unsustainable, and that this will affect the kind of work done in our society. However, they further argue that simply relying on human ingenuity or new technological discoveries is misguided, and they reject the very idea of a ‘leisure society’. Instead, they focus on a revaluing of unpaid work; work-sharing; a revaluing of labour-intensive work (rather than labour-saving devices and techniques); the question of financial security if paid employment is no longer the aim; and more sustainable ways of living (usually not in large cities). We might categorise the two approaches as ‘forward-looking’ (the first, which assumes answers will be found in new developments in the future); and ‘backward-looking’ (the second approach, which argues that new discoveries are not the answer, and that we should instead examine previous, more sustainable ways of living and working in order to avoid environmental disaster). Indeed, most greens accept that their solutions aim to draw on the past: ‘we must invent a new work-ethic - or rather, rediscover a much older one’ (19, p.79).
We will now consider briefly the ‘forward-looking’ approach; we will then summarise the more widely-accepted green solutions, before moving on to a comparison of modern green approaches and the views expressed in our 1930s sources.

The first group of greens base their proposals on acceptance of the principle that the number of hours spent in the kind of paid employment which has existed since the Industrial Revolution will continue to decline. They sometimes talk of a ‘post-work’ society. Their acceptance of the widespread use of technology and industrial practices (even if they want these to be made ‘cleaner’ or more environmentally-friendly) sets them apart from the majority of greens.

However, they do not argue that the acceptance of technology will automatically mean a more enjoyable future. Instead, they argue that, in fact, the future for the majority will be even more insecure than the present, unless the use of technology is accepted and its impact carefully planned. First of all, the impact of technology on the kind of work which will still need to be carried out must be considered. Even if the amount of time spent ‘at work’ is reduced, working conditions must be safeguarded or improved: it is not enough to ‘limiter la durée pendant laquelle un homme est esclave pour en faire un homme libre’ (93, p.429). The acceptance that working time will continue to be reduced leads to a strong focus on both the balance between working life and ‘free’ time; and on how such ‘free’ time should be spent. First, such greens have proposed a wholesale reorganisation of working life: they suggest a right to life-long education for all; that the working week be shortened, or that citizens be able to choose to work full-time for a certain number of years in order to have ‘years off’ later. Indeed, a key debate among this first group of greens has been how to achieve a balance between choice and constraint: most do not want society to be based on ‘un temps de travail contraint et un temps de loisir, simple compensation du travail’ (ibid., p.422).
Since these greens rely on human ingenuity to avoid future problems, their solutions are even more tentative and utopian than those of mainstream greens. Thus they state clearly that: 'We must dare to ask questions we cannot answer and to raise problems whose solution remains to be found' (95, p.13). In their discussions of how new-found free time should be organised, they are at their most idealistic. Gorz even calls his suggested changes 'Une utopie possible parmi d’autres' (32, pp.53-60). Lipietz, too, recognises (and embraces) the utopian approach; indeed, this utopian emphasis in the sphere of work and leisure was the main reason for his move from left-wing politics (which he sees as having rejected this approach) to green politics:

Le rêve des communistes utopiques du siècle dernier, cette communauté d’individus librement associés et délivrés de la division du travail, pêcheurs le matin, artisans l’après-midi, et le soir critiques littéraires, ce rêve-là restera le mien (34, p.8).

Interestingly, even this first group of greens do seem to see work as a ‘good thing to do’, to use Porritt’s term: their descriptions of leisure time in the future in fact portray the population engaging in wholesome activities such as DIY, growing their own food, making their own clothes and shoes in communally-owned ‘ateliers’. Gorz even suggests that television might not be available on certain evenings, ‘pour favoriser l’imagination et les échanges d’idées’ (32, p.60).

The final emphasis in the first sort of green solutions is on the new technologies of the computer age. The possibilities of home computers, the Internet and telecommunications reply to many earlier green fears about isolation or the impossibility of life-long education of a decentralised population with less work to occupy their time. De Rosnay sums up this brave new world of our ‘forward-looking’ greens: ‘L’écosociété, c’est la convivialité plus les télécommunications!’ (97, p.273).
Of course, this emphasis on technology is the very reason why most greens reject the 
'forward-looking' approach: at the most basic level, they argue that technology 
needs energy for its production and use, and it leads to pollution. They argue that 
faith in technology and new developments is inappropriate on other grounds too. 
First, there are insufficient resources to ensure such developments on a planet-wide 
scale, and second, they point out the uneven distribution of those resources which do 
remain. For greens, many of our current social problems were actually caused by 
technological advances (they mention loneliness, isolation, uneven development); 
therefore, to look to technology for an answer to these problems is misguided. 
Finally, the bête noire of most ecologists – particularly in France – is of course the 
modern technology of nuclear power. Many greens activists first became involved 
in anti-nuclear campaigns. They remember the early official promises of safe, cheap 
and clean electricity, and this experience has influenced their attitudes to other 
technological developments: 'le discours écologiste est très critique à l'égard de la 
science et de la technique' (3, p.56).

This (partial or total, depending on how 'dark' green the view) rejection of 
technology leaves the second group of greens open to criticism, particularly since 
they openly state that they look to the past and to decentralised rural communities for 
more sustainable models of living. Toffler dismisses such critics of industrialism, 
arguing that they see the rural past as 'warm, communal, stable, organic, and with 
spiritual rather than purely materialistic values', whereas the reality in his view was 
'cesspools of malnutrition, disease, poverty, homelessness and tyranny' (98, p.135). 
Greens might of course reply that, if anything, 'malnutrition, disease, poverty, 
homelessness and tyranny' are far more widespread in the modern industrialised city 
or developing countries. More seriously, greens are sometimes accused of 'le 
poujadisme vert', or of sympathy for the Vichy régime or far-right authoritarian 
policies, on the basis of their desire to return to a more rural population.
Such criticisms seem largely unjustified, given the liberal nature of modern green movements. In France, where memories of the occupation and the Vichy régime remain strong, and where the Front National now have significant support, there is a particular awareness of the dangers of looking to the past or to rural communities for solutions, and this is especially true of solutions in the field of work, given its importance under Vichy: ‘Travail, famille, patrie...’ Some have argued that green political parties have suffered such criticisms because they arrived on the political stage too early, ‘une génération seulement après la Seconde Guerre mondiale et une également avant l’effondrement des systèmes totalitaires en Europe de l’Est’ (99, p.168).

French greens do repeatedly show a clear awareness that looking to the past is not without dangers. Thus Caniou stresses the importance of rejecting far-right or authoritarian examples when looking to the past, and implies that an awareness of such dangers is sufficient to avoid them: ‘Il s’agit de bien savoir ce que l’on fait; Pétain prônait aussi le retour à la terre’ (ibid., p.7).

A key focus for this second group of greens, then, is how to modernise or reformulate older, more sustainable ways of living and working, while emphasising the central green ideals of democracy, participation, freedom and diversity. As Alphandéry puts it: ‘Comment faire du sol, de l’attachement à la terre et du désir d’enracinement des éléments contemporains?’ (100, p.3). Most conclude that the answer lies in combining social aspects of the present and backward-looking, more environmentally sound ways of working. Vollmer argues that greens are faced with a double problem: correcting the mistakes of the previous century, when industrialism was allowed to develop unchecked; and dealing with the present and future environmental consequences of such unchecked industrialism, ‘réussir le tour de force de répondre à la fois aux questions du XIXe et du XXIe siècle’.
So what sort of solutions does this second group of greens propose in the field of work? They would first of all argue that their emphasis is on more realistic and quickly achievable measures than those of the first group. Indeed, they are often pessimistic about what can be achieved, particularly in the field of unemployment: ‘la solution miracle n’existe pas’ (96, p.226). They therefore tend to suggest a combination of strategies, involving work-sharing, ‘voluntary simplicity’ or a move away from consumerism, more sustainable and labour-intensive types of work, and broader changes to society itself. Their aim is avowedly pessimistic:

On revient toujours à la véritable raison d’être du mouvement écologique: non pas établir le paradis sur terre, mais y éviter l’enfer. (102, p.101)

Their first suggestion is that the creation of more jobs, or waiting for improvement in the economy is not a possible answer: ‘la création indéfinie d’emplois n’est ni souhaitable, ni possible’ (103, p.136). The environmental impact of ever-increasing production is one reason for this stance, but greens would also argue that such increases in production simply will not be possible anyhow, due to the planet’s limited resources. A corresponding suggestion is therefore on reducing consumption. ‘An attitude of “enough” must replace an attitude of “more”’ (37, p.15).

Even if these greens do not want an increase in the number of paid jobs, they do believe that more work will need to be done in a more ecological society. Green theory could be seen as the converse of taylorism: instead of rationalising production and labour-saving approaches, they suggest looking to the past for more labour-intensive ways of working, particularly in socially and environmentally useful sectors: ‘With more people and fewer resources, the capital/labour ratio must start shifting back towards labour-intensive production’ (19, p.129). This is because, as resources become more scarce, as greens believe they will, ‘the amount of capital available for reinvestment in labour-saving machinery will go down’ (20, p.109).
Overall, the kind of work done should change, and the working practices currently favoured should be abandoned, with ‘le choix de techniques plus intensives en travail, mais moins prédatrices contre l'environnement’ the way forward (34, p.57).

Given the description of ‘greener’ work above, we can see why this second group often stress the paysan as a role model. The kind of work done by the paysan farmer is autonomous, takes place in a rural setting, and is labour-intensive. Some greens stress not only the kind of work the paysan does, but also his assumed traditional character traits as positive for the environment:

Halte au gaspillage, sous toutes ses formes, et elles sont multiples; en retrouvant les racines de la morale paysanne: austère, prévoyante, prudente et pleine de dignité. (2, p.150)

A population which included more paysan farmers would necessarily be less centralised, responding, in some greens’ view, to problems of déracinement. It is not sufficient to encourage more farmers, however: the kind of modern farming practices deplored by greens are also attacked. The emphasis is on the paysan because of his use of older farming methods which are seen as less damaging for the environment and more logical in times of resource scarcity. It is on these grounds that greens criticise the use of modern farming machinery: ‘Si l'essence venait à manquer, nos agriculteurs seraient incapables de labourer, de semeur et de moissonner’ (96, p.58).

The suggested partial return to paysan lifestyles is not only found in the more extreme reaches of green theory. The 1997 manifesto of les Verts, while not openly calling on the population to move back to the land, stresses the need to move away from 'productivist' methods to those of the paysan: ‘Encourager l'agriculture paysanne et biologique et convertir les activités productivistes et polluantes’ (46, p.1). The effect of such policies would of course be a higher proportion of the population living and working in rural environments, as a far higher number of
workers would be needed to produce sufficient crops. Greens also argue that old methods of farming should be reintroduced, with less reliance on machinery for instance. These are not only less damaging for the environment; they create employment in a natural setting; and even protect the land with 'investissements cachés', such as 'un autre rapport avec la nature et les paysages' (38, p.218).

Greens stress the need for diversity in particular. They aim to safeguard and improve 'la diversité des productions de terroir, les races locales et les variétés régionales' (46, p.1). They focus also on moving away from the European Union's traditional post-war emphasis on increasing production and protectionism, policies which have led to financial aid for freezing land and exports. Finally, a recent campaign has focussed on developments in genetically-modified crops. Greens are sceptical of their supposed advantages, and tend to emphasise the need to rely on agricultural practices which have been proven over centuries not to harm the environment (ibid., p.2).

The stress on the paysan as a possible way forward is generally seen as a potential future development, however. Given current levels of unemployment and the need to address the criticisms they make of industrial work, greens also emphasise the need for work-sharing in the meantime:

La seule solution viable, d'après les écologistes, resterait celle du partage de l'emploi, accompagnée d'une modification des modes de consommation. (35, p.139)

They argue that protection for workers is an essential component of such a strategy, partly to safeguard their standard of living, but also in an attempt to address their criticism of workplace hierarchies, where workers have little autonomy or control over the work they do (ibid., p.6). It is perhaps in their focus on work-sharing and reducing the number of hours worked that this second group of greens appear most
idealistic. Thus, Voynet sees the impact of a reduction in working hours as wholly positive, as it would allow everyone more time – ‘Du temps pour rêver, réfléchir et agir. Du temps pour les enfants, les amours et les amis’ (104, p.1).

While most of the greens’ strategies focus on structural changes to society and to the world of work, they do also pay some attention to how workplace experiences could be improved. Indeed, this is the most important element of policy in this area for some greens:

It is not alienation from the means of production or even from the fruits of production that really matters, but alienation from the process of production. (19, p.81)

Such greens tend to propose some measure of worker autonomy or autogestion. They often argue that more autonomous workers will be more likely to consider the environmental impact of the work they do (since, for example, they live with their families in the vicinity of their workplace). Others argue that this hope is ill-founded, pointing out the strong protests by nuclear industry workers when jobs at their power plants are threatened. However, they tend still to support the green stance on worker autonomy, as this is seen as leading to greater worker satisfaction and involvement. Greens’ descriptions of the joys of autonomous work (‘La réalisation de ce but autant que l’action qui le réalise sont source de satisfaction’) (105, p.206) closely resemble 1930s sources insistence on the right to joy in work.

The focus on changing working conditions is also stressed when greens discuss women and work. Throughout, greens underline the need to introduce greater equality for working women. They suggest changes to working hours and conditions to ensure greater equality and justice. More flexibility and greater legal protection are demanded (46, p.10). A final emphasis is on the infamous ‘double journée’, whereby women work both outside the home, and at home (household tasks,
childcare etc). Again, shorter working hours are seen as a potential answer to this problem (ibid., p.10).

There are two reasons for this focus on women by modern greens. First, they are concerned as a movement with social justice, and most greens would identify themselves as feminists. The second reason is more controversial, and by no means accepted by all greens. That is, certain members of the green movement would argue that faith in women is the best way to move forward. They argue that,

women are closer than men to nature and are therefore potentially in the vanguard as far as developing sustainable ways of relating to the environment is concerned. (20, p.193)

This group, the ecofeminists, tend to argue that the main focus should be to revalue traditional forms of women’s work (caring for others, and so on). Many greens have argued that this represents a ‘dangerous strategy’, with women risking ‘being sacrificed to the environment’ (20, p.202); however, it is a strategy which finds echoes in our 1930s sources.

If less paid work is done in the green society, this does not mean that less work will be done. Greens stress the need to decriminalise activities in the ‘informal economy’, and to recognise that the unemployed still work, for example. However, such changes mean that fewer people will receive a steady income from their employment. Greens have sometimes suggested that the answer here is some form of minimum guaranteed income, to be paid to all citizens whether they have paid work or not. This idealistic policy places them in a long-standing tradition, which holds that freedom depends on access to basic rights. Other greens have criticised the idea of an ‘allocation universelle’ (on the grounds that it would do nothing to discourage present levels of consumption, that it would be too expensive, that it would require a massive administrative body, something which goes against green
ideas about scale and decentralised political structures, and so on), but most agree at least that the independence it would offer each citizen is a desirable goal.

The final emphasis in green solutions is on leisure. In a society that operated according to ‘an ecologist work ethic’, ‘the distinction between work and leisure would obviously be reduced’ (19, p.128). Green ideas on leisure stress the need to use such free time profitably; at times, their pronouncements on the subject of how people should enjoy themselves even appear hectoring. The first use of free time which they support is education. This may perhaps be attributed to the high proportion of members of green parties who are highly-educated (58% have a higher degree; the figure for the French population is 10%) (107, p.120) and who work in the education sector (30% of green party members in France). Les Verts have been termed ‘le parti des intellectuels’ (ibid., p.121). The second focus is on the need for fitness and healthy leisure activities. Les Verts aim immediately to ‘encourager les loisirs et les pratiques sportives en réorientant et en augmentant les budgets des ministères concernés’ (46, p.9). They often stress that such activities should take place in a more rural setting, and for this reason tourism is a central concern of the greens. Modern tourism is seen as hindering the kinds of activities greens would prefer citizens to engage in, which would bring ‘des perspectives de libération et d'épanouissement individuelles’ (96, p.98). Indeed, some modern leisure uses of the countryside are seen as ‘usages pervers’ by the greens, and are even bracketed with far more dangerous facilities: ‘golfs, cimetières à déchets industriels et nucléaires, résidences secondaires...’ (38, p.218). Instead, greens would prefer the population to engage in more self-reliant types of leisure activities (20, p.108).

Having summarised the solutions which greens stress, we can now consider how far the themes in our 1930s sources correspond to the green ‘Good Life'. 
2.4 1930s solutions

Even if the 1930s sources selected for this study make detailed criticisms in the field of work which can readily be compared to those of modern environmentalists, when we come to consider solutions, more care is needed. 1990s green parties have to produce detailed political programmes and manifestos, detailing the precise changes they wish to make to society in the short and the long term. Some of the sources we have examined for the 1930s had very different aims and formats. However, although we are not always comparing two similar sets of sources, similar approaches and themes can certainly be found.

We can also distinguish between the kind of detail offered in the various sources consulted. Some are far more explicit and concrete in their suggestions than others. Thus, unsurprisingly, political movements of the period generally make their proposed solutions relatively clear. Youth movements of the 1930s even saw the need to ‘définir les bases sur lesquelles devait se faire la révolution qu’ils souhaitaient’ as a ‘devoir’ (15, p.327). Even if the youth movements recognised the need to suggest solutions, however, they too varied in their explicitness. ‘Les projets ne brillaient pas par leur extrême précision’ (ibid., p.386). The Personalists, in particular ‘se montraient très prudents, préférant définir “l’esprit” des institutions qu’en préciser le contenu’ (ibid., p.336); ‘Il n’y a pas de doctrine personnaliste, mais des aspirations personnaliste’.

As for the literary sources consulted, a wide variety of approaches and levels of precision can be observed. Levi sums up the dilemma in using literary sources to seek solutions or proposals: ‘Giono was a moralist, not a sage, a seer and not a planner’ (108, p.266). Of course, we cannot expect the sort of detail a political party might provide in a literary text. However, Giono’s 1930s works arguably took as their main theme the search for, or enjoyment of ‘la belle vie’ (70, p.108), and not simply on an individual level: ‘Ma joie ne demeurera que si elle est la joie de tous’.
There is certainly a reluctance to offer prescriptive or universal solutions, however: Giono instead preferred to lead by example, whether practically, through the Contadour experiment, or in the (generally consistent) stance he took in his novels, in his non-fiction and in the polemics he favoured by the end of the entre-deux-guerres:

On ne peut pas faire pour tout le monde, mais on va faire pour nous. On servira peut-être d'exemple. (51, p.479)

Whereas Giono was ‘warning his generation’ (108, p.266) in the 1930s and describing alternatives, Céline seemed to believe that human nature meant they were inevitably doomed, and certainly did not suggest that life for the majority could be much better. Anderson lists the faults and character defects of both children and adults in Mort à crédit, and concludes: ‘Can a happy society be built from such stuff?’ (109, p.232). In the field of work, though, Céline does make some relevant points for this discussion, though sometimes this is by implication rather than explicit.

Saint-Exupéry seems to fall somewhere between Céline and Giono. His emphasis, on the whole, is no doubt more positive than that of Céline, but his attempts to formulate possible alternatives or solutions are more frustratingly inexact than those of Giono. Work is certainly a key focus in his writings, however. D’Astier de la Vigerie even seems to see Saint-Exupéry’s chosen career as the principal reason behind his attempts to devise alternatives:

Il a une expérience particulière, un beau métier, qui lui ont donné une éthique personnelle. Peut-on en tirer une philosophie? Peut-elle s'appliquer au commun des mortels, lui permettre de passer du particulier à l'universel? (110, p.107)
He concludes that, at least to some extent, Saint-Exupéry does achieve this 'universal philosophy', particularly in Terre des hommes, though to a somewhat unsatisfactory degree: 'Terre des hommes, le seul ouvrage philosophique achevé [...] vous laisse l'esprit confus et parfois irrité' (ibid., p.110).

Ramuz had earlier addressed the question of the writer's responsibility to propose alternatives in some detail, and argued that this posed a difficult dilemma:

Le poète est condamné à se taire ou à devenir médecin, [...] alors qu'il est si malade lui-même: et qu'il n'est poète que précisément parce qu'il est malade, et qu'il n'y a plus de poésie quand tout va bien. (111, p.152)

Bearing in mind these diverse aims, and less precise nature of our chosen sources, we can now consider the actual proposals made in the 1930s, and how far these stress the same themes and approaches. We have already noted that a minority of modern greens stressed a forward-looking approach; usually this meant a reliance on technology or human ingenuity to solve the problems currently caused by modern work. There are instances of such an approach in the 1930s, too.

In the 1930s, the 'bénéfices du machinisme' were sometimes mentioned in glowing terms. Although most of the sources consulted were critical of then-current uses of technology, it was often argued that, if differently controlled or used for the benefit of workers rather than employers, technology could be liberating, whether in terms increasing French economic power, or in improved conditions for workers. Such views are particularly evident in the political sources of the period. Many felt that, with the arrival of the Popular Front, its 'défense des petits contre les gros' and greater equality, new forms of work could be made joyful, and hope remained possible. Guéhenno seemed to see the election of the Popular Front as the logical continuation of humankind's positive development, and presumably many saw no
reason for this positive development to stop: ‘La révolution [de 1936] n’est que l’accomplissement de la raison et la dernière exigence de la sagesse’ (65, p.231).

In France, it could be argued that such views were the inheritance of the 1789 Revolution and the Enlightenment belief that, through logic, human rationalism, and the application of scientific techniques and discoveries, progress was inevitable. Blum seemed also to subscribe to such a belief in human progress through technology. He felt that ‘la condition humaine’ could be improved through economic growth and new ways of working (89, p.168).

The Personalists, as we have seen, have been criticised by modern greens for their apparent hope in industrial technology as a way of improving living standards generally. Mounier indeed did seem to see (a differently-managed and owned) industrialised work and technology as potential benefits for society, indeed as the only way forward.

Personlism does not look for its economic structures to a pre-technical civilization, but to the future. To enlarge and diversify technique to the stature of man, to liberate technique from the economic and social organization of capitalism, and to see finally that it neither absorbs nor deforms personal life – that is the only reasonable way to proceed. (50, p.178)

His emphasis was certainly on the ability of humankind in future somehow to overcome current abuses of technology. Just as ‘forward-looking’ greens criticise actual uses of technology rather than technology itself, so Mounier’s emphasis was also on improving conditions in the modern workplace. He talked of workers making their factories ‘handsome’ (112, p.82), of smaller communities of workers with greater freedom than in the taylorist workplace. Much as Gorz and others suggest today, Mounier felt that it was important to hope that in future, humankind
would be able to find answers that were as yet 'beyond grasp': 'We risk more by restricting ambitions than by seeking to reach out a bit beyond our grasp' (50, p.10).

Human ingenuity and a faith in human ability are the keystones of such an approach, just as they are for forward-looking greens today. Mounier stressed both the benefits of technological progress for society and for the individual: 'technical progress is for man a powerful means of liberation provided he dominates it' (my italics). (ibid., pp.173-4). Even the positive Personalists, then, did see some problems related to technical progress: it had to be 'dominated', or 'humanized' (ibid., p.175). This sort of double-edged view is identified by Touchard as representative of the general atmosphere of the 1930s: 'd'une part l'espoir, d'autre part la peur' (65, p.230). Most sources in the 1930s, just as in the 1990s, tended towards 'la peur' rather than 'l'espoir' when discussing technology. The awareness that technology or future solutions were not sufficient answers is as widespread in our 1930s sources as it is in modern green thought.

Giono, in particular, was a techno-sceptic. Indeed, the industrial society needs to be destroyed before human happiness can be achieved, in his view (60, p.207). Instead, nature should be the model on which we organise human society -- and changing the way we work would seem to be the most important step. When Giono depicts joy in his 1930s works, it is invariably related to work: 'on est tranquille, puisqu'un beau travail se fait paisiblement tout seul' (ibid., p.128). Such joy is to be found in the work done by his characters, or in festivals and celebrations of natural cycles. Again, these festivals are closely related to the seasons of agricultural work (such as the 'Mère du blé' ceremony in Le chant de monde); they are a deserved reward for work accomplished. Indeed, joy in work is not only a possibility in Giono's view; it is a right. Giono's scepticism about faith in technology as the way forward is also based on traditional forms of work: faith in technology is misplaced, as technology will simply never be able to carry out human work: 'On n'a pas encore inventé de machine à garder les moutons et [on] n'en inventera jamais' (51, p.760).
Céline is equally sceptical. Voyage has even been described as 'le roman de l’homme malade de civilisation' (113, p.19). Science and technology are seen to be fallible, and human faith in them misplaced. Bardamu’s eminent medical colleagues fail to save Dédére in Voyage; and in Mort à crédit, Céline scathingly describes the ludicrous attempt to revolutionise agriculture through ‘scientific’ principles (exposure to electromagnetic fields) in Blême-le-Petit. For Céline, Revolutionary faith in continual progress fails to take account of human nature; and attempts to control or ‘humanise’ technology would presumably be seen as misguided for the same reason:

L’homme est naturellement méchant, et la civilisation elle-même ne ferait qu’entretenir cette méchanceté naturelle. Car la civilisation [...] ne tend qu’à développer chez tous les humains le goût de la destruction. (114, p.133)

Perhaps surprisingly, Saint-Exupéry would not seem to be on the side of those who believe faith in human ingenuity and technology represents the way forward either, expressing his ‘angoisse devant la machine’ (110, p.112).

The second emphasis of most modern greens is on worksharing. If insufficient work is available for all, greens believe a reduction in working hours represents part of the solution. Such views are also found in the 1930s, particularly because most of our sources saw work as a right, rather than a privilege or duty. ‘Chaque ouvrier avait un “droit au travail”’ (15, p.384) for non-conformist movements like Jeune Droite or the Personalists. Some of these movements formulated theories based on what they termed ‘la propriété de métier’ (ibid., p.383). Even if an individual owned no land or property, it was argued that he owned his skills, and just as land-owners were entitled to sell their property, workers had the right to sell their learned skills. Attempts to make modern work more humane, even joyful, also led many to conclude that a shorter working day, through worksharing, was at least part of the
answer: de Man (in his investigation of ‘la joie au travail’), and Werther were two famous sources of such suggestions. Fourier’s preferred solution of giving workers a variety of tasks (a different type of ‘worksharing’) was also seen as a route to joy in work, though a long-term one (72, p.425).

An emphasis on challenging consumerism is another central element in modern green solutions. The consumer society is to be challenged because of its effects on the environment, and the unhappiness and inequality it creates in society. Giono too states clearly and repeatedly his opposition to material riches. ‘La richesse de l’homme est dans son coeur. [...] Vivre n’exige pas la possession de tant de choses’ (60, p.193). He even argues that the consumer society and real happiness are mutually exclusive, since people are encouraged not to be satisfied by simple pleasures: ‘les hommes sont bien malheureux de vouloir, vouloir et toujours vouloir’ (51, p.459).

Nor is it only in fictional accounts that we find an emphasis on individual happiness and fulfilment, opposed to consumerism: youth movements made similar points. The economy should not be based on encouraging wants; rather it should be focused on needs, ‘au service de l’homme’, and on emphasising alternative kinds of fulfilment, ‘la primauté du spirituel’ being one of their favourite motifs (15, 381).

There was a clear parallel between the Personalist approach and the later green focus on needs rather than wants. They even used similar terms: ‘we believe that a certain type of poverty is the ideal economic rule of personal life’; ‘contempt for the material attachments that enslave, a desire for simplicity’ (50, p.192) (greens favour ‘voluntary poverty’ and ‘simplicity’). Imposing a different type of economic organisation was certainly seen as one part of the answer to consumerism by the youth movements. They called for ‘la naissance d’une économe organisée’, une économie respectueuse des exigences du bien commun et de ses finalités humaines’ (15, p.392). Modern greens have also proposed similar sorts of ‘organisation’ of the
economy as necessary to move away from consumerism. A further parallel is in the generally idealistic and imprecise approach of both the 1930s sources and the modern greens. One of the main criticisms made of modern green policy in this area has been of their failure to resolve the paradox between desiring small decentralised independent communities and simultaneously suggesting fairly authoritarian centralised economic controls (20, pp.114-6). 1930s claims, such as ‘A Personalist economy will regulate production according to an estimate of the real needs of consumers as persons’ (50, p.194), prove just as simplistic and frustrating as their green descendants (who is to determine what these ‘real needs’ are? How reliable or flexible will the ‘estimate’ be? How will the economy be ‘regulated’?)

However, if both green and 1930s solutions at the broader economic level leave much to be desired, their discussions of practical changes to work are more precise. For example, the fairly detailed discussion of favouring more labour-intensive work practices in modern green sources is also paralleled in the 1930s. Thus the artisan’s way of life is presented as more logical (if less efficient) than that of the modern industrial worker. Giono in particular returns frequently to this theme, usually offering his cobbler father as an example of a fulfilled, independent worker and valued member of the community. Whereas the Bata shoe factory employee might make more economic sense, the price to the individual worker of such efficient methods is high: ‘Il est prisonnier et sa famille est prisonnière’ (68, p.191). Labour-intensive, small-scale production is portrayed in glowing terms, and is seen as the solution here: ‘[Mon père] se servait de tous les outils dans leur diversité. Il était entièrement maître de sa vie’ (ibid., p.190).

Just as in the 1990s, agriculture is once again the sector which attracts the most attention when labour-intensive solutions are discussed, however. There seem to be two reasons for this focus in the 1930s. First, to attempt to change traditional agricultural work, particularly that of the paysan, is seen as particularly misguided and damaging. Giono, again, presents an entire analysis of the ills of modern society based on such changes. The attempt to introduce technology (even the simple
tractor) is criticised as unnatural; and the effects on the individual are also catastrophic. The dominant view is that such traditional labour-intensive work represents the best or most fulfilling type of employment (‘l'idéal, c'est le travail dans le champs ou fait avec l'outil’ (57, p.134)), so to attempt to alter it is heresy.

The second reason for the focus on agriculture, and particularly the work of the paysan or artisan, is that such work is seen as the absolute opposite of modern industrialised work, with all its faults and dangers. It is therefore presented as one type of work which simply cannot be changed or 'modernised', 'la négation même du système Taylor', an aspect the 1930s sources see as positive:

L'exploitant agricole est à la fois travailleur manuel, ingénieur, commerçant et chef d’entreprise. Cette confusion des rôles empêche toute organisation scientifique du travail. (115, p.366)

The paysan himself is indeed a role model, and the kind of work he does a favoured solution of our 1930s sources, in just the same way as modern greens stress his potential benefits. First of all, the kind of work he does is described in glowing terms, as fulfilling and rewarding, in a vivid contrast to the industrial work criticised earlier:

On ne peut pas savoir quel est le vrai travail du paysan; si c'est labourer, semer, faucher, ou bien si c'est en même temps manger et boire des aliments frais, faire des enfants et respirer librement; car tout est intimement mélangé, et quand il fait une chose, il complète l'autre. (68, p.152)

Ramuz agrees with Giono’s description of the paysan’s work as a state or his life, rather than a job, and implies, somewhat menacingly, that such work is inevitable in the future: the paysan is ‘l'homme tel qu’il a été et il est l’homme tel qu’il sera forcé
peut-être un jour de redevenir' (111, p.197). One difference, however, is the generally more positive emphasis which was still possible in the 1930s. Just as Touchard characterised the political atmosphere of the 1930s as simultaneously one of hope and fear, so most sources from the 1930s balanced:

simultaneous warnings of disaster, and an emphasis on a generalised religion of hope and joy, the satisfactions of complete involvement in independent work and love. (52, p.71)

While they made vociferous criticisms of their society, and of work in particular, the 1930s sources could be more positive about the possibility of finding alternatives in the (far more recent) past. Giono placed particular emphasis on such hope, whether in the practical example of the Contadour experiment (an attempt to recreate 'the conditions of peace and joy' portrayed in his 1935 novel Que ma joie demeure), or in fictional accounts. For example, Giono describes an anarchic paysan community who decide to rediscover an older approach, and to refuse modern society.

Interestingly, it is through work that they achieve this:

Nous étions malheureux de voir que le produit de notre travail était tenu en mésestime. Et c'est justement lui qui nous sauve et sauvera tout le monde. (60, p.143)

This is not to say that our 1930s sources see a return to an identical older paysan way of life as a sufficient answer. They, like our 1990s green sources, are also critical of some aspects of this way of life, particularly the social environment of rural communities. Giono repeatedly criticises the narrow-mindedness of certain communities. The harsh treatment of the former prostitute who becomes pregnant in Un de Baumugnes, and the shame of her parents, are roundly condemned, for example. The need to accept all members of the community, outsiders, foreigners, even mythical half-(wo)men, half-beasts is stressed. The individual paysan is rarely
criticised, however. Instead, he is generally portrayed as a heroic figure: ‘notre dernier espoir’ (68, p.149). Saint-Exupéry, in a typical attempt to represent flight as a noble occupation rooted in a long tradition, even claims that the heroic pilot is a ‘paysan des escales’ (86, p.150).

The character traits of the paysan are also seen as positive. ‘Dignité’ through his work, independence, prudence and a justified respect for natural forces are repeatedly underlined (68, p.192). His determination in the face of adversity is particularly stressed: ‘Rien n’est têtu comme un paysan. Tout est détruit, il recommence, tout s’effondre, il reconstruit’ (60, p.125). Together, paysans represent an impressive force for change, in Giono’s opinion, since ‘les Etats sont faits de plus de champs que de villes’ (ibid., p.96). The paysan’s desire to be part of an active community is also commended. This is particularly important as it is seen as a general solution to modern déracinement. This is seen as a crucial element in any attempt to redesign society, as the sense of powerlessness it inspires will pose problems for such attempts. Thus Ramuz sees the task of redesigning working practices as a daunting one, since modern man must achieve this ‘au milieu même du bouleversement que les progrès techniques ont introduit dans l’univers’ (57, p.83).

Saint-Exupéry also implies that enracinement is part of the solution. Ideal forms of work tend to take place in a rural setting, or small community, and in a society which is ‘organicist, rooted in rurality and natural hierarchies’, where the key values are ‘creativity, nature, disinterestedness’ (87, p.91). Work and comradeship also represent a key element of any better society for Saint-Exupéry, but only certain forms of work. He refers repeatedly to the importance of a ‘métier’, rather than industrial work which he sees as dehumanising. Fraternity and comradeship are key elements in the fight against déracinement – ‘la grandeur d’un métier est peut-être, avant tout, d’unir des hommes’ (86, p.35).
Refinding a sense of place and the importance of the terre natale are repeatedly stressed as solution. Barrès, Giono, Ramuz are of course renowned for their sense of place (Lorraine, Provence, the Alps respectively). However, this emphasis is found not only in literature. Ordre Nouveau have been accused of ‘une fervente et quelque peu sentimentale apologie du régionalisme... “Amour de la petite patrie; instinct indérinemable, centre de vie”’ (15, p.358). The Personalist Izard also criticised ‘la camaraderie perdue entre les vivants et la terre’ (ibid., p.358) in Esprit in 1933, and implied that such a relationship would have to be rediscovered if current problems were to be addressed. This wasn’t mere nationalism, however. Indeed, some, including the Personalists saw local attachment or enracinement as a way of avoiding nationalism (Giono too stressed the absurdity of nationalism, borders and nation states by pointing out that paysans from all countries had more in common with each other than they did with aristocrats or even urban industrial workers from their own nation). For the Personalists,

*L’amour du pays natal ne s’épanouit jamais en amour de la patrie. Au contraire, [...] il en devient un fureux adversaire. (ibid., p.259)*

The final aspect where 1930s and 1990s views of agriculture and the paysan as the way forward concur is in the need for diversity, whether this relates to crops grown or the kinds of communities in which people live. Here, Giono is particularly prescient. He talks of the dangers of single-crop plantations for profit at length (68, pp.183-4), and argues that diversity is important for society as well as for agriculture. He repeatedly refuses to offer prescriptive answers, preferring to lead by example or through depictions of the good life in his fiction. ‘On fait son bonheur soit-même’ (116, p.9), and the freedom to do so is a key part of 1930s solutions.

Moving from agriculture to modern industrial work, we also find parallels between the emphases of modern greens and those of our 1930s sources. The main stress is on greater autonomy or self-management – Esprit argued it was necessary to ‘faire participer étroitement les travailleurs aux activités et à la gestion de l’entreprise’ (15,
p.390). However, Personalist solutions were typically vague and idealistic: in their Manifesto, they demanded 'the elevation [of workers] from the status of instruments to that of associates in the enterprise’, so that:

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every worker be placed in a position where he can exercise to the maximum his personal prerogatives of responsibility, initiative, mastery, creation and liberty, in whatever role is assigned him by his capacities and by the collective organisation. (50, p.203)
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Autonomy might be a long-term, vaguely-defined aim, but the right to joy or at the very least improved working conditions was seen as more readily attainable: ‘It is indispensable that the conditions which surround [labour] be human’ (ibid., p.198). Nostalgia is present in some suggestions, with Saint-Exupéry apparently longing for some sort of ‘pre-industrial world, in which the skills and dedication of craftsmen themselves represent a morally satisfying way of life’ (87, p.45).

We have already seen that women represent a central focus for modern green discussions of work. We might expect that our 1930s sources would be less likely to offer such a focus: women’s suffrage was not granted until 1944 in France, and the atmosphere of the entre-deux-guerres could hardly be described as feminist, on the whole. However, there are some precocious suggestions in our 1930s sources in this area. The special difficulties faced by the paysanne are recognised, for instance – she is a ‘saint’, ‘usé[e] par la terre et par l’homme’ (70, p.15). The Personalists’ attempt to question women’s traditional roles even led to an early attempt to revalue women’s traditional work. Their objections to modern industrial work meant that they did not see this as a potential solution:

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We do not side with Engels’ view that her ‘emancipation’ demands ‘as a primary condition the entry of all women into public industry’. (50, p.142)
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Instead, they were early proponents of an independent income for women who chose to remain at home to bring up children or look after the household: ‘We do not hold either that there is any special indignity attached to household tasks’ (ibid., p.142). Such work should be recognised as proper employment. In this suggestion, the Personalist view resembles modern green calls for a guaranteed minimum income for all citizens, especially since they are similarly vague about how such a scheme would be administered or financed.

Of course, such analyses of women and work are generally vague and would be criticised as insufficient by modern greens. One aspect of 1930s solutions which is closer to those of the 1990s is their focus on women as the way forward, as more likely to resolve the present crisis. The Personalists do this in typically imprecise and undefined style:

One loves to dream of a society where [women] will collaborate with all the richness of a power that has never been used [...] thus assuring perhaps the recovery of man, who has failed. (ibid., pp.133-4)

If the Personalists could only ‘dream’ of such a solution, Giono was more precise (if impractical as ever) as to how the changes he desired would be better achieved by women. First of all, his pictures of ideal, harmonious communities are invariably based around small family units, often older couples. A recurrent theme is the arrival of a woman in the life of a former bachelor paysan, and the positive changes this involves. For example, Giono attributes eventual positive changes to the kind of activity pursued to the arrival of a female character:

- Il m’a pris l’envie [de] faire du blé.
- C’est drôle que ça t’ait pris juste maintenant.
C’est que je ne suis plus seul: j’ai une femme. Un ménage, ça ne peut pas vivre de chasse. Depuis qu’elle est là, j’ai besoin de pain, et elle aussi. Alors...
C’est naturel et c’est bon signe. (117, p.123)

Giono’s emphasis is on women as the way forward; they will eventually be ‘heroic women leaders of the future, after our present revolution’ (118, p.19) in the epic novels. His focus in such discussions of women as representing hope for the future is on work. Of course, Giono could certainly not be described as feminist, and in this, his views are different from those of most modern greens. He does not want to challenge the traditional division of labour in paysan communities, for example. In his ideal community, in Les vraies richesses, this is made clear: ‘Les hommes labourent. [...] Des femmes lavent au ruisseau. Des femmes font la soupe. Des hommes aiguisent les faux’ (60, p.190).

Giono would seem to agree that women have an essential character which makes them closer to nature and better able to lead the way to a more joyful way of working than men. Thus Mme. Bertrand’s decision to use the ‘surplus’ wheat to make her own bread is the first step towards a better society in Les vraies richesses (ibid., p.112): freedom and joy follow. Women are seen as more practical than male characters, who merely talk about how change is needed; women act. They understand the importance of the individual gesture - ‘les bases du nouvel édifice’ (ibid., p.96) are invariably built from ‘un geste fait par un homme seul – ou une femme’ (ibid., p.95). Women’s character means stability, too, which is important in any attempt to rebuild a paysan society:

[Women] are the hubs around which tumults revolve, and the safe point of return when frenzy droops. The number of Earth Mother figures in Giono’s work stems from this respect for women’s stability. (52, p.64)

Finally, many modern ecofeminists would argue that women are closer to the earth (16, p.21), and many of Giono’s female characters certainly share this tendency
(Zulma and Mlle. Amandine are obvious examples, but even the ‘ordinary’ paysannes are represented as closer to nature than their male counterparts), and this is an aspect which makes them more likely to find better ways of living and working in his view. Marthe, watching the wild birds in Que ma joie demeure exclaims: ‘Ah! Comme il y a des choses qui parlent bien à la femme!’ (51, p.467), and similar direct links are frequently made. Female sexuality is also presented as an important link to nature. Women represent part of nature’s cycles in Giono’s view, and this makes them particularly at home in his ideal paysan communities, as in this way they are intimately connected to the elements (eg. the wind (117, pp.60-1)), and to the farm and wild animals too (119, pp.45-7).

Giono’s frank depictions of female sexuality are striking for the freedom and independence they attribute to women. Indeed, freedom is an important element in both green and 1930s solutions. One way of ensuring greater freedom is through a basic level of financial security for all citizens, just as greens argue for a minimum income scheme today. Of course, Giono would argue that security could never be based on money; but his proposals for self-sufficient, independent communities of paysans and artisans imply the same point: that a basic standard of living (food, shelter) is necessary for freedom.

Others did promote minimum income schemes similar to those of the 1990s greens. Youth movements in particular described such developments positively. Ordre Nouveau proposed such a scheme, which they felt should be organised at the European level in order to promote peace, freedom and security. They proposed creating:

un organisme supra-national ayant pour tâche de coordonner la production et la répartition des ‘produits nécessaires à la vie. (15, p.366)
The Personalists also proposed a basic minimum income scheme, and in typically imprecise terms; the method of calculating such an income should be based not only on a ‘salaire vital’, ensuring basic subsistence, but also a ‘salaire culturel’ (ibid., p.386).

The final focus of our modern greens was on leisure. The idea that in a better society, work and leisure would be part of the same life is of course also present in the 1930s – for Giono, the paysan way of life meets such aims (we are reminded here of his description, cited earlier, of the paysan’s work). Ramuz had earlier categorised the paysan as ‘pas un métier, un état’ (111, p.208), and this is a view which was frequently expressed in the 1930s. There was also a similar focus in the 1930s on what constituted a suitable use of new-found or future leisure time. This was often presented as a potential ‘compensation à la dépersonnalisation que le travail lui fait subir’ [à l’ouvrier] (90, p.426), and suitable activities were therefore widely discussed.

First, a lost sense of camaraderie at work should be solved by workers’ involvement in groups outside the workplace which would enable ‘leur repersonnalisation’ by

\[
\text{créant un milieu humain où se développent naturellement les qualités étouffées dans le travail automatisé: liberté d'esprit, initiative et responsabilité. (ibid., p.426)}
\]

Some argued that smaller rural communities were the answer to ensure a solution to déracinement through time spent outside work:

\[
\text{Nous avons remarqué que le manoeuvre le plus déraciné, pour qui le travail n'a pas d'autre sens que la perte de quelques heures quotidiennes en}
\]
A shared emphasis in the 1990s and 1930s discussions of leisure is on tourism, though their analyses are somewhat different. Most 1930s sources saw this as a positive way of enabling city-dwellers and industrial workers to rediscover a more natural way of life. The Auberges de la jeunesse were also seen as positive solutions (89, p.154), for their pacifist emphasis and encouragement of young city-dwellers who wished to return to a more rural environment, albeit only temporarily. Giono lent one of the Ligues des AdJ his patronage for these very reasons. The young people who patronised the auberges seemed to agree that they solved the sorts of problems mentioned in the previous section. One young aubergiste lists a litany of complaints from her week as a member of 'cette jeunesse laborieuse', concluding: 'Et puis, j'ai connu les auberges qui répondiren à mon désir d'évasion, de vie au grand air' (ibid., p.156).

Of course, the modern leisure industry did not yet exist in the 1930s; the differing emphasis on tourism can be attributed to the completely different scale and kind of activities of the period. Nevertheless, a few early criticisms can be found in French sources, particularly of the possibility of leisure time being abused: 'l'homme se sent devenir petit à cause de la passivité engendrée by 'la TSF, le cinéma, les images, les bruits, les voix...' (57, p.137).

Giono foresaw other potential dangers in the emphasis on organised leisure. In a discussion at the Contadour retreat, referring to his daughter Aline, he stated his view that such pursuits were to be avoided, since they might lead to military activities. Gymnastics was no more than a 'prétèxe à marche en rangs, demi-tours en principe, préparation militaire...' (120, p.35). Overall, the kinds of pastime favoured as leisure activities tended to highlight qualities of self-improvement and autonomy. Education and intellectual pursuits were favoured, particularly through
the official attempts to popularise cultural activities (89, p.161). Giono implies that such activities are a natural component of the artisan’s or paysan’s life. He describes his artisan father as ‘mille fois plus cultivé que toutes les maisons de la culture’ (68, p.191). It is not, of course, surprising that intellectuals’ focus was on such issues. The Personalists too focussed on culture as inspiring and autonomous: ‘The aim of culture is active engagement and service, not suspension of judgement and isolation from action’ (50, p.156). Other leisure activities which received widespread support in the 1930s similarly emphasised ‘active engagement’ and self-reliance. Gardening or growing food was officially supported by the Popular Front, particularly as this was seen as a healthy, outdoor activity (89, p.152).

Giono too describes his ideal paysans as devoting a significant part of their day to growing non-food crops. In Que ma joie demeure, Jouordan plants an entire field of periwinkles and narcissus; Mme. Hélène exclaims, ‘Vous ne pouvez pas savoir la joie que vous me faites’ (51, p.476). Joy depends on beauty and distraction as well as satisfying work. The title phrase ‘que ma joie demeure’ is used only once in the novel, and it is when Bobi explains the importance to the community of the apparently useless deer: ‘C’est fait, mon vieux, pour que notre joie demeure’ (ibid., p.559).

Maulnier summed up the 1930s focus when he called for ‘un droit au loisir’; only this could achieve ‘les fondements d’un humanisme nouveau’ (15, p.348) in his view. The self-reliant and improving practices recommended by our 1930s sources as solutions to the depersonalisation of modern work were seen as a right. Furthermore, they were seen as inspiring hope and a feeling that change was possible in the face of the inhuman scale of modern institutions.
2.5 Conclusion

In the field of work, views prevalent in green politics today are certainly paralleled in 1930s sources. Themes which are stressed in both include the emphasis on inhuman scale; the speed of change; the effects of new kinds of work on the individual and a condemnation of monotonous deskillled work; the importance of leisure; the key role of the paysan, the small decentralised community and active participation in society at a local level.

While some clear differences do remain (for example, the ability of modern greens to discuss the environmental impact of work in precise, even scientific terms, or the reliance of some greens on information technology to provide at least a partial solution), these can generally be explained by the impossibility of 1930s sources having any awareness of such future developments; and, in any case, we do nonetheless find parallels in the 1930s views of their own technology. There is a parallel willingness by some to embrace such developments and see them as the way forward, while the majority remain sceptical of 'quick fix' solutions which might in themselves involve new problems.

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1 These are systems terms, adopted by the Limits to Growth team. 'Source: A point of origin of material or energy flows used by a system. Coal deposits under the ground are the sources of coal in the short term; in the very long term forests are the sources of coal [and forests themselves, of course, have other sources]. Sink: The ultimate destination of material or energy flows used by a system. The atmosphere is the sink for carbon dioxide generated by burning coal.' (33, p.278).
2 Prendiville lists the names of many greens who attribute their politicisation to the May events; (35, p.21).
3 The influence of Illich has been particularly strong in this debate. See for example (43, pp.124-30).
4 (44, p.135).
5 This is the title of (56) in its French translation.
6 Now the Office National Interprofessionel des Céréales; (12, p.1726).
7 For an account of their impact, see (11, p.238).
8 Giono's desire to group the artisan with the paysan in his ideal money-free community means he describes a society apparently based on bartering where the artisan (and intellectuals like the doctor and teacher) seem not to be paid; instead, when bread is baked in Les vraies richesses, for instance, the doctor (who lends his mill to the paysans) is rewarded by sharing the bread.
9 Fromm, To have or to be, 1976/1981. For details of this text's influence on green attitudes to spirituality, see (29, p.51).
Writing in the Revue Française, 1932, quoted in (15, p.228).

Presumably the authors mean that the support of women helped the Popular Front rally voters, because, of course, French women still did not have the vote in 1936.

The low birth rate was seen as result of prosperity and consumerism: see the explanation in the official report to the President in 1939, the 'Code de la famille', reproduced in E. Calm, (72, pp.484-5).

Blum talking at the Procès de Riom in 1942, quoted in (11, pp.157-8).

Quoted in (15, p.82).

J. Maritain, cited in (15, p.338).
Chapter 3
Ni droite, ni gauche

3.1 Introduction

*Ni droite, ni gauche, mais devant!* Waechter’s anti-alliance tendency dominated green politics in France until the early 1990s. Even though some degree of cooperation with the left has been accepted recently, criticisms of both the left and the right remain central to green political theory. Such criticisms can be explained as a reaction against older political parties and ideologies which are seen as having caused the current environmental crisis. To solve this, greens argue that new structures and ways of thinking are needed.

Today, les Verts remain split on the grounds of cooperation with other parties. Both sides agree, however, that political ecology is a distinct movement, which does not fit into the traditional span of political ideologies from left to right. Both also vociferously criticise traditional left- and right-wing ideology and ideas. In the 1930s too, a rejection of the traditional left and right flourished. Indeed, the omnipresent phrase ‘ni droite, ni gauche’ is one of the most evident resemblances between greens and the 1930s. Modern greens see traditional politics as having led to environmental disaster, while 1930s sources saw traditional politics as having led to the first World War, economic depression and the general ‘désordre établi’ of their society.

Once again, the approach in this chapter will be to outline modern green views on this issue; 1930s opinions will then be contrasted with these views. The first section
105 of this chapter will therefore consider green arguments for refusing the traditional left-right divide, and their criticisms of the traditional left and right.

3.2 Green criticisms of the left-right divide

Traditional classifications are rejected because green parties do not feel they can be categorised in this way. They use vivid analogies to illustrate that they represent ‘une troisième voie’. The image of the traditional left and right merely ‘rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic’ is common (e.g. 20, p.187; 19, p.43); and Porritt uses a surprisingly unenvironmental metaphor to make the same point: politics is

a three-lane motorway, with different vehicles in different lanes, but all heading in the same direction. [...] The motorway of industrialism inevitably leads to the abyss – hence our decision to get off it, and seek an entirely different direction. (19, p.43)

Greens address themselves to disillusioned citizens who feel neglected by ‘la classe politique’. However, they emphasise the need to differentiate between the political strategies of cooperation within the system of the Fifth Republic, and ideals. So, even if les Verts cooperate with other parties on certain issues, or join a government, the ‘ni droite, ni gauche’ stance is still valid: it describes a general criticism of the ideologies or approaches of these other parties rather than a practical refusal to work with them at times. Waechter explains: ‘le ni droite-ni gauche n’est pas une attitude tactique, mais le constat de divergences conceptuelles sans doute irréductibles’ (96, p.17).

Greens argue that the term ‘left-right divide’ is inexact, since the similarities between right and left are greater than their differences. First, both are inescapably
corrupt. In France, ecologists reel off a litany of recent and past scandals: collaboration during the Second World War, Giscard and the Bokassa diamonds, the Socialists and the Urba scandal, the affaire du sang contaminé, or, of course, the Rainbow Warrior affair. Greens aim to offer an alternative to old movements, tainted with political scandal, being newcomers who want to keep their reputation clean. The policies of the left and right wing parties are also criticised as having led to the current crisis. Greens distance themselves from mistakes made by the 'classe politique', and claim to stand outside this class:

Les écologistes ne portent aucune responsabilité dans les politiques menées au cours des dernières années. Leur crédibilité est de ce fait intacte quand ils dénoncent la politique [des autres partis]. (122, p.10)

Voynet highlights the need to ‘moraliser la vie publique’, and adopts a tactic many greens favour: instead of highlighting one political party, or the government of the time, she criticises all parties – except, of course, les Verts. A whole political class is at fault: ‘Les affaires, les trafics d’influence, les délits d’initiés, les écoutes téléphoniques, la corruption: trop de dérapages pourrissent notre vie publique’ (123, point 10, p.3). All established parties are accused of attempting to steal the popularity of green politics, without actually addressing the issues the greens see as important. Statements such as that of Socialist Prime Minister Rocard in 1989 ('C’est dans tous les partis qu’il faut une pensée verte') (124, p.12) provoke a cynical reaction in the green camp. Attempts to ‘récupérer’ green politics are widespread, in their view. Even the Front National has made such attempts (125, p.5).

As well as their attempts to swallow political ecology, left and right have in common their responsibility for the current environmental crisis. Both are productivist, pro-growth, industrialist; both, particularly today, work within a capitalist economy. Economic growth is the issue which links left and right particularly for the greens, who argue that ‘the global obsession with growth has led to a remarkable
resemblance between capitalist and communist economies' (29, p.78). Growth is an objective in each type of economy, one the greens see as disastrous: 'Present-day economists, whether neoclassical, marxist, keynesian, or of the many post-keynesian schools generally lack an ecological perspective' (ibid., p.76).

Left and right have also failed sufficiently to address the urgency of the environmental crisis. It is 'a crisis which political organizations of left, right and centre seem unwilling to acknowledge' (37, p.1), even while they try to swallow the green parties. Worse, they continue to propose the same 'remedies' that caused the present crisis (126, p.2). Greens criticize 'la suffisance du monde politique' here (127, p.10), rather than any single party. The dominance of one age-group and sex attracts more attention from the greens than their party allegiances: 'ce Sénat consternant par sa sur-représentation d'hommes du troisième âge' (ibid., p.10).

The effects of both left and right-wing administrations on the individual or the person are seen as very similar by the greens. They often point out that 'la personne se trouve opprimée dans les républiques populaires de l'Est tout autant que dans les sociétés capitalistes' (73, p.41). Greens hold that both right and left-wing parties base their policies on 'des idéologies nées sur les bancs d'une autre époque' (35, p.136) which must be rejected if the current crisis is to be solved. The fact that left and right have much in common and are rooted in an industrialist worldview means that neither is able to solve current problems: 'they and their ideologies are part of the problem' (128, p.x).

Some greens go further, arguing that it is ideology per se which must be rejected. This rejection is based on the argument that the ecological crisis is so grave as to 'transcend ideology'; 'pollution, overpopulation and resource shortages [will] get us all, regardless of whether we [are] left or right' (129, p.117). That neither left nor right wing worldviews have been different in practice is illustrated by a slogan used by greens in various countries: 'the socialist atom is as radioactive as the capitalist
atom’ (130, p.165). There is also a desire to keep the diversity, the *arc-en-ciel* quality of the green movement. A clearly-defined ideology might discourage some members or supporters. Greens comment that ‘il est impossible de parler de l’écologie au singulier’ (131, p.54); instead, they often refer to ‘écologismes’, or to the green ‘umbrella’, arguing that ‘les idéologies sont, par essence, à la fois réductrices et sources de division’ (35, p.126).

Such greens believe their movement is more than the representative of a political ideology: ‘l’écologie est à la fois une science et une philosophie’ (132, p.12). Waechter points out that, in theoretical terms, this means that the green approach resembles either left or right at times (96, pp.243-4). The stress on diversity also leads them to attack the bipolarisation of political life which they see as too simplistic, damaging - and dangerous, because, in their view, it has led to the appearance of the FN: ‘Le Front National – l’aboutissement de la politique bipolaire’ (38, p.289). Bipolarisation is also criticised because it hinders movements like the greens who wish to ‘faire la politique autrement’. Gaining power is not the only (or even the main) focus of the greens, and this affects their credibility in a bipolar system.

Perhaps surprisingly, green fears that bipolarisation affects their credibility might be unfounded. Indeed, the greens’ often independent stance in a climate where bargains and deals are the norm has been seen as an ‘atout’: ‘le vote vert bénéficie de la volonté des Français d’échapper aux clivages gauche-droite’ (133, p.3). A final reason for rejecting bipolarisation, then, might be simple self-interest.

As we have seen, Greens reject the left-right divide, but they also criticise the policies of traditional left and right-wing parties, and the ideologies on which these are based. Their principal criticisms of first the left, then the right will now be outlined.
While there is common ground between the greens and both left and right, it is nonetheless undeniable that they have more sympathy with the left. Jaffré describes the ‘sympathie des électeurs verts pour les idées et les partis de gauche’ (134, p.12), and repeated analyses of les Verts’ membership find that a far higher proportion are prepared to vote for the left than for the right in second ballots (107, pp.142-3). It would seem to be true that the strongest criticism is reserved for those closest to you. Whereas greens have low expectations of the right, they see the left as betraying their potential.

Que la droite cache et se cache [...] la fin d’un monde, cela peut se comprendre. Que la gauche [...] n’imagine d’autre issue de la crise qu’une gestion étatique du capitalisme et continue d’aller chercher chez Keynes des remèdes qui, déjà inopérants sous Roosevelt, sont devenus inapplicables, dénote qu’elle est sur le point de mourir faute d’imagination. (94, p.15)

The first criticism greens make is, understandably, of the attempt to categorise green politics as a subset of left-wing politics. When asked why les Verts did not ‘admit’ to being left-wing, Lipietz replied: ‘Les Verts ne sont pas de gauche parce que la gauche n’est plus de gauche’ (135, pp.64-5). Bennahmias and Roche argue that ‘les valeurs de justice, de solidarité et de partage qui sont celles de la gauche, d’un point de vue philosophique’ (107, p.141) are now more evident in green policies than in those of the left. Voynet’s rhetoric supports this analysis – in 1995, she was arguing that ‘redistribuer les richesses’ (123, Point IX, p.3) was essential (a phrase now hardly used by the left). Greens criticise modern socialists for simply ‘managing capitalism’ (136, p.30). For Brière, les Verts are ‘plus rouges que rouges, c’est-à-dire, verts’ (137, n.p.). Certainly, in terms of social issues and values, ‘l’électorat écologiste est, depuis plus de dix ans, celui qui, presque constamment, affiche les positions les plus libertaires’ (138, p.64). Greens also argue that the left is to be criticised as it is overly optimistic about what can be achieved in time of ecological crisis: ‘il revendique le Meilleur des Mondes alors qu’il s’agit d’éviter le pire’ (102, p.96).
With regard to particular policies, the left is particularly criticised in France for its pro-nuclear stance. The PS view that ‘les dangers du nucléaire sont maîtrisables grâce au progrès scientifique’ (132, p.134) is rejected, while the PCF is seen as worse still due to its combination of ‘jacobinisme, foi dans “le progrès scientifique”, glorification de la technologie, nationalism et chauvinisme’ (ibid., p.136). The traditional centralism of the left is strongly criticised here. The left’s starting point of the economic sphere is also attacked. The stress on economic growth and ownership of the means of production on the left as an answer to unemployment and precariousness is one major difference between green and left approaches: ‘a filthy smokestack is still a filthy smokestack whether it is owned by the state or by a private corporation’ (19, p.48). The left-wing emphasis on the economic sphere as a way of increasing the general standard of living or ‘happiness’ is criticised by the greens: ‘une conception matérialiste du bonheur’ (96, p.17) can only fail, and leave the majority resentful. As early as 1974, greens made the point that an emphasis on the economic sphere to increase happiness is absurd: ‘The French consume twice as much energy as in 1963. Are we twice as happy?’

Alliances with the left were long rejected by greens, aware of the danger of being swallowed by the bigger partner. Duchêne, a green councillor explained their position in 1989: ‘Je me sens plus proche des gens de gauche. Mais si on fait alliance avec eux, on disparaîtra’ (139, p.3). Sainteny holds that such green fears are justified, if PS strategies are examined in relation to the level of the greens’ success, as ‘les stratégies de récupération et de réaction du Parti Socialiste envers l’écologisme’ vary according to the greens’ success rate (140, p.45).

The experience of the left in power in the 1980s is also frequently cited in green criticisms. The promised referendum on nuclear power never materialised. Nor was the Socialist policy of a reduction in the working week implemented. Of course, the Socialists were the party of the Rainbow Warrior, too – ‘un véritable défi aux écologistes du monde entier’ (35, p.53). Finally, the experience of Chernobyl in
April 1986, when 'the French public, Greens included, were subject to one of the most successful state exercises in misinformation in Western Europe' (141, p.181) confirmed green scepticism about the possibility of information in the nuclear field, no matter which party was in power.

Greens criticise the left's specific policies; indeed, an exhaustive list of green criticisms of left-wing parties' policies and conduct in government is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, to conclude, we can note that such green criticisms are based on the left's unwillingness to accept sustainability as a guiding principle. Murray Bookchin explains:

The most unbridgeable difference between [political ecology] and the traditional left is that the traditional left assumes, consciously or unconsciously, that the 'domination of nature' is an objective, historical imperative. (25, p.56)

If the greens can be said to share certain views with the left, they also have policies and views in common with the right: the belief that the human being has a 'proper place' in the natural order is clearly 'right-wing' (20, pp.30-1). The left would also accuse the greens of adopting classic right-wing strategies on 'natural' limits to human achievement, on the denial that class divisions are fundamental, and on the Romantic view of nature (ibid., p.31). However, even in these areas, green policies leading from these views are different, as they are also influenced by their far more libertarian stance on social and cultural issues; and it is undeniable that green politics and the right have far fewer points of agreement than of disagreement. Even if positions occasionally coincide, 'understanding the political and intellectual nature of Green politics means seeing that its political prescriptions are fundamentally left-liberal' (ibid., p.84).
If we compare the actual policies of the main right-wing parties\(^2\) in France and les Verts, it is certainly a lack of common ground which is most striking. There is basic disagreement on virtually all the issues they see as important, and particularly on social issues. With regard to public spending and taxation, their approaches are opposed. Les Verts want to increase both, whether by introducing new taxes (e.g. ‘des “pollutaxes” pour l’industrie’) (46, p.9) or by using public spending to increase the number of people working in environmentally ‘useful’ spheres. The parties of the right, however take the opposite approach: ‘les impôts et les charges étouffent l’économie, nous les baisserons’ (142, p.2).

Les Verts want to reinforce protective measures for workers (46, p.5), while the UDF’s emphasis is on employers rather than their employees (142, p.3). The greens are also interventionist in terms of consumer protection (46, p.4), unlike the classic parties of the right. Feminism is at the heart of the approach of les Verts, who focus particularly on encouraging female participation in political and public life (143, n.p.). They have also, unlike any other French political party, installed \textit{parité} within their own party. The right, however, have been strongly criticised by les Verts for their attempts to block such measures over the last three years (142, p.2). Both les Verts and the right see ‘la politique familiale’ as a central issue, but offer completely opposite suggestions, with les Verts aiming to replace it by a ‘politique de l’enfant’ (46, p.10), while the UDF aim for a ‘politique familiale encore plus globale, concrète et ambitieuse’ (142, p.4).

The right-wing parties’ continuing faith in technology and growth to solve the problems of the environment and unemployment is another key policy area where greens would argue the right’s aims are unsustainable. The right are to be criticised even more than the left on the nuclear issue, in particular, since they actually introduced the nuclear programme as it exists today in 1974. Worse still, they did so without consulting French citizens via a referendum. In terms of social or cultural policies, the difference is also marked. On issues such as education, immigration or
drugs policy, the right and the greens are diametrically opposed (46, p.8 and 142, p.2).

Overall, the institutions and emphasis of the gaullist 5th Republic are criticised by the greens. They focus especially on centralised power, hierarchy (particularly the powers given to the President), the concentration of power in the hands of what they see as a political élite or class of professional politicians, and a general lack of openness and citizen participation. Les Verts want ‘le double refus du libéra lisme et de l’Étatisme’ (46, p.7). The right relies instead on ‘centralisation and large-scale bureaucratic control’ (20, p.29).

The most consistent focus for green criticisms, in terms of both policy and approach, is the Front National. This emphasis has been particularly apparent since the late 1980s when the FN began to claim it was a ‘green’ party, an approach they still adopt today. In their 1997 legislative programme, for example, they devote one of their 16 sections to ‘ecology’, though it is not an ecology most greens would recognise: ‘Mieux vivre en France; [...] Défense du patrimoine naturel, architectural et culturel français’ (145, p.3) [my italics]. The greens state the distinctions between the two movements and their abhorrence of the far right unambiguously:

A la violence, la haine, la démagogie et le repliement égoïste des thèses léninistes, les Verts répondent par le respect de la personne, la solidarité supranationale et la non-violence. (146, n.p.)

Moving on now to the second kind of green criticism of the right (that is, of their general approach or worldviews), it is here that the Greens generally formulate their more direct criticisms. The main criticisms are of capitalism, and particularly capitalist industrialism. The right still see growth or increased production as the way forward: ‘la bataille pour la croissance et l’emploi’ (142, p.1) is mentioned positively in the very first sentence of the UDF programme in 1997, for example;
and the RPR even argue that Chirac’s decision to dissolve the Assemblée Nationale in 1997 was based on a view that an increase in economic growth was desirable and possible (144, p.1).

Of course, for greens growth is a longstanding bête noire. In their view, the logic of capitalist economics compounds industrialism’s worst vices. They argue that ‘capitalism permeates the whole globe’ (147, p.4) since, even in former communist states, increasing production rather than the satisfying of basic needs was the guiding principle (148, pp.37-8). Greens particularly criticise the encouragement of consumerism and the attitude that ‘après nous le déluge, et tant pis pour nos enfants’. Finally, the effects on the person of capitalism are attacked. The belief in trickle-down economics is attacked because the process cannot work in times of resource scarcity (19, p.45).

Given the lack of common ground between the greens and the right, it is hardly surprising that les Verts see the right’s attempts to ‘acaparer’ ecology as even more dangerous than those of the left. ‘Greening’ industry simply delays the problem and further depletes resources; it is not, despite its apparent environmental improvements, compatible with a more green society (20, p.178).

Having considered modern green views of the left-right divide, and criticisms of the left and right, we can now ask how far the analysis presented in our 1930s sources is similar.

3.3 1930s Criticisms

Seldom is the issue of hindsight more relevant than in a comparison of 1930s and 1990s views on the possibility of a ‘Third Way’ in politics. In France, discussions of
a 'Third Way' in the years following the Second World War were virtually inexistent, due to its association in people's minds with fascism. The Poujadists first attempted to use the rhetoric of a new third way in politics in the mid-1950s, a short-lived extremist attempt which further discredited any such stance. Not until the much later arrival of the greens, a new and clearly liberal movement, born in a period when the Third Way no longer sounded so dangerous, could such an approach realistically be discussed again (though the greens are still careful to acknowledge possible dangers).

In the 1930s, however, the 'Third Way' approach was widespread, and was certainly not limited to extreme-right groups. When we consider 1930s attitudes to the Third Way, we will therefore find striking parallels between these and later views of the greens, parallels which cannot easily be made between the 1930s and political movements in the interim period. Reynolds reckons that historians' accounts of the 1930s have failed to acknowledge the diversity of political opinion during the period. As she puts it, 'The clash between left and right is the main plot of the opera' (149, p.225) which means that groups, movements or ideas which situated themselves outside the traditional left or right (she mentions pacifists and groups dominated by women, but the statement holds true for many others) are less studied. This focus on left and right is increasingly seen as too narrow -- it takes into account 'the realities of the period only very partially, and it often fails to take them into account at all' (150, p.x).

The second part of this chapter attempts to incorporate these two points -- that of similarities between modern greens' and 1930s approaches to the left-right divide, and that of historians' tendency to overlook the widespread nature of the 'ni-ni' stance in the 1930s. In doing so, one caveat must be mentioned from the outset. While at the start of the 1930s, 'le régime parlementaire paraissait à bout de souffle' (151, p.145), and the ni-ni stance was emphasised, by the time of the events of 6th February 1934, the danger of fascism led many to accept political commitment on the left. This was the case for Giono, for example. Indeed, whether or not
individuals supported the Popular Front, its immediate effect was to encourage a ‘prise de position’: ‘Le renouvellement des pratiques militantes marqua profondément les années du Front populaire’ (152, p.102). However, by the time of the failure of the Front populaire, disillusionment led many to return to their initial ni-ni stance. Discussions of the ni-ni approach in the 1930s must bear such changing positions in mind.

As for the greens, we will consider first 1930s criticisms of the left-right divide itself; then their main criticisms of each ‘side’ of this political spectrum.

3.4 1930s criticisms of the left-right divide

Hoffman offers a double explanation for the willingness to begin to question long-established political divisions in the climate of 1930s France, that is the collapse of the WWI Union Sacrée, and the growing internationalism of politics: ‘La rupture du consensus interne, dû à la guerre, portait au sein du pays le conflit idéologique externe’ (153, p.15). To question the left-right divide was not a brand-new reaction of course. By the 1930s, such questioning had been apparent for over a century (65, p.14). What was new was the ‘ampleur’ of this reaction. Its importance is found first in the number of groups who used ‘ni-ni’ rhetoric, as we shall see; and second in the particularly vehement stress they placed on this stance. Some used their group’s very name to underline their commitment – Ordre Nouveau provided a reminder of their ‘Third Way’ ambitions through their choice (65, p.36). Others, Ésprit notably, highlighted the absurdity of the arbitrary nature of the left-right division:

A interroger le contenu rationnel des mots, aucune opposition n’est plus décevante, même sur le seul plan politique, que l’opposition gauche-droite.
Like modern greens, 1930s groups were keen to stress that their vision of a ‘Third Way’ did not simply mean a political centrist. Many thus used the vocabulary of revolution, or extremes, not always entirely convincingly. Interestingly, they even used similar metaphors as those chosen by modern environmentalists, emphasising the need for a total change of steam, of direction. For *Esprit*, for example what was needed was ‘un renversement de vapeur, une révision profonde des valeurs’ (26, p.119). In terms which recall Porritt’s earlier description of greens’ refusal of the traditional left-right divide, Aron and Dandieu were already explaining in the early 1930s that:

> S’il faut absolument nous situer en termes parlementaires, nous répétons que nous sommes à mi-chemin entre l’extrême-droite et l’extrême-gauche, par-derrière le président, tournant le dos à l’assemblée. (15, p.213)

Nor was the desire for a new ‘Third Way’ confined to groups who could not be linked to one or other side of the political spectrum. Just as the greens’ policies and ideas are often broadly associated with the left, so many of the groups using the ‘ni-ni’ rhetoric popular in the 1930s can clearly be associated with one or other tendency (154, p.184). What is striking is that similar views were present, in similar terms across the political spectrum and outside it. The criticisms of the established left and right and the desire for a new Third Way meant that apparently opposite extremes actually agreed on basic issues. Borne and Dubief make this point clearly:

> Un commun refus de l’ordre établi, la volonté que cela change conduisait l’extrême gauche et l’extrême droite à s’entendre, non dans le domaine de l’action, où les coups s’échangeaient, mais dans celui des idées’. (11, p.101)
In the 1930s, as today, the rejection of traditional left and right meant that seeing those in power as an unchanging ‘classe politique’ rather than distinguishable parties based on very different ideas was common currency, perhaps even more so than in modern green circles. Parties were presented as cynical, stressing their differences or resemblances according to political convenience:

Dès que les circonstances, et notamment les nécessités électorales, semblent imposer un système d’alliances, les malheureux [= les partis] oublient instantanément les distinctions qu’ils n’avaient d’ailleurs jamais faites qu’à grand-peine. (155, pp.16-7)

Mayeur described the atmosphere of the early 1930s as one of ‘exaspération générale’ with the ‘classe politique’ (149, p.205); the groups studied frequently used stronger terms - ‘l’intolérable tyrannie des partis’, for example. As evidence that democracy was but an ‘illusion’ and that the existence of the ‘classe politique’ was more significant than the left-right divide, some 1930s groups cited the ease with which voters transferred their allegiance from one supposed extreme to its opposite. Discussing the 1930s, Liithy quotes the example of whole groups of electors, particularly in the ‘word-intoxicated South’ who switched their allegiance from the Radicals to the Communists ‘apparently without noticing the difference’ (85, p.46).

Generalised criticisms of the ‘classe politique’ do not, however, imply an outright refusal to work with it. Just as the greens have had a somewhat confusing strategy here, many 1930s groups took a perhaps contradictory stance as regards cooperation with the ‘classe politique’ they so vehemently criticised. The Personalists expressed this stance in concrete terms at least. Beginning from the acceptance of political commitment (‘le Personnalisme ne doit jamais se laisser tenter par le luxe moral d’une pureté isolée’), they defined their strategy in terms which might have served as a blueprint to modern greens:
Du moins au départ, l'indépendance à l'égard des partis et des groupements constitués est nécessaire à une nouvelle mesure des perspectives. Elle n'affirme pas un anarchisme ou un apolitisme de principe. (26, p.118)

Just as we noted with modern greens, we can observe a (perhaps wilful) confusion in the terms used - it is frequently unclear whether parties, movements or ideologies are being criticised. Milza argues that such ambiguity is understandable during the 1930s, particularly when discussing fascism - 'Le mot recouvre des réalités bien différentes' (154, p.172) from self-declared fascist leagues to those who would claim not to be fascist, but who shared virtually all the same goals. But this ambiguity is also partly because the extremes of both right and left in particular DID share some approaches or values, including

- a common devotion to the ideas of a single-party, totalitarian dictatorship;
- and a common hatred of liberal democracy which made such freakish events as the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939 seem not unnatural. (156, p.15)

Saint-Exupéry represents a good example of a writer who made just this point, and did so repeatedly in the latter half of the 1930s (157, p.74); he of course found himself in the position of a first-hand observer of both extremes, through his other role as an early pilot. In terms which recall the language of his Personalist contemporaries and the later greens, this experience led him

au nom de l'homme, (de prendre) parti contre toute civilisation totalitaire, qu'elle l'asservisse à un tyran ou à une masse anonyme. (ibid., p.74)

When discussing Saint-Exupéry, critics frequently highlight his assimilation of regimes, extremes, ideas, ideologies, political systems. All are suspect and lumped
together: 'Saint-Exupéry refuse le fascisme, il refuse le communisme, il renvoie dos à dos capitalisme et socialisme' (110, p.109). Giono's favoured method of making this connection between such apparently diverse groups and ideas was simply to refer to them as one of a kind, frequently doing so implicitly - for example, by referring to the USSR as just another fascist state. In a typical passage, he sketches the similarities between not only fascism and communism, but between these two and parliamentary democracies as well:

Dans les Etats démocratiques comme la France, (...) l'organisation sociale prévoit la place de grosses fourmis au ventre blanc qui sont des reines qu'on nourrit et qu'on soigne. Dans les Etats autoritaires fascistes: Russie, Allemagne, Italie, l'ordre social ne prévoit plus que la place d'un nombre très restreint de ces grosses reines et tend vers une reine unique au ventre énorme. Toute la différence entre les deux systèmes est là. (68, p.194)

The second explanation for the (deliberate) confusion of supposedly opposed extremes was arguably the apparent ease with which prominent figures crossed from one to the other during the period studied. The willingness of intellectuals, in particular, to move from right to left and vice versa ('Des intellectuels communistes sont passés au fascisme; des étudiants d'Action Française en 1930 étaient communistes en 1936') (11, p.101) seemed to confirm that the ideas of both could not be entirely dissimilar. Sternhell (150, pp.111-2) has catalogued the attempts to capitalise on these crossovers, and underlines that, even if they were in fact relatively rare occurrences, their impact should not be underestimated. Thus such high-profile conversions as that of Doriot at the very least created a certain confusion.

Overall, our 1930s sources generally based their criticisms of the left-right divide on the premise that both right and left, whether extreme or mainstream, had more in common than they realised. The shared qualities of left and right are examined and
criticised at length, and fall into broadly the same categories as the criticisms made of both by greens today.

First, both left and right are corrupt. Such an emphasis is hardly surprising for two reasons. First, perhaps the most serious, and certainly one of the most divisive ‘scandales politiques’ in France, the Dreyfus affair, was still in living memory and marked many, who feared that the apparent explosion of scandals would again lead to momentous divisions. The affair is mentioned frequently in the literature of the period, even (perhaps especially) in that of young writers, often as a kind of shorthand. To describe a character as ‘dreyfusard’ served to imply many other qualities or opinions. Thus Drieu could sum up a character by explaining that ‘M. Falkenberg avait fait catholiques ses enfants au temps de l’Affaire; ce qui ne l’avait pas empêché d’être dreyfusard’ (158, p.169).

Second, particularly in the early years of the decade, scandals seemed to be accumulating as never before. Between 1928 and 1932, in particular, the impression was of ‘scandales accumulés, particulièrement nombreux, à répétition pourrait-on dire’ (11, pp.108-9). Political corruption was if anything more widespread and of a more serious nature in the 1930s than in the 1990s. Even the riots of February 1934 were ostensibly a reaction to ‘the corruption of the government’ (85, p.50). Often, a passing reference to ‘les affaires’ (65, p.212) was sufficient to explain a disgust with politics and politicians of all colours. The perceived corruption of French political life led to vituperative criticism, in terms that even modern greens might avoid as too extreme. Once again, parliamentary democracy per se was often targeted, standing as a general symbol of political life, in terms such as ‘pourriture parlementaire’ (11, p.110); but others were more specific or detailed in their criticisms of political corruption.

‘Les hommes politiques’ were particularly attacked, whether by literary or non-conformist figures. Saint-Exupéry’s ‘répugnance à l’égard de l’homme politique’
Non-conformist movements of the period were ‘volontiers “proudhoniens”’ (65, p.36). Admiration was also reserved, across the spectrum of non-conformist groups for the ideas of Comte, who had argued earlier that left and right wing politics were unlikely to provide answers to rampant ‘individualisme’. Given the scornful view of politics of both Proudhon (‘Faire de la politique, c’est se laver les mains dans la crotte’), and Comte (politics being ‘un agent délétère minant la société’) (15, p.127), it was hardly surprising that their self-declared disciples used them as inspiration in their criticisms of the left-right divide.

Sternhell has catalogued how the stress on human ‘materialism’ or ‘individualism’ (terms which are used incessantly in virtually all 1930s sources), coupled with a contemporary stress on French decadence and the corruption of her political parties and system represented a prevailing political ‘climate’, which would eventually lead, in his view, to an easy acceptance of fascism after the débâcle. For Sternhell, these factors are evidence that French people were ‘prepared’ by the end of the 1930s for fascism, he does, however, recognises that identical critiques could be found in the 1930s across the political spectrum, on the extremes, and in the ideas of those who entirely refused politics.

Another way in which 1930s sources join modern greens is in explaining the shared corruption of left and right is by stressing that these ‘old’ movements or ideologies were equally responsible for the current crisis. Unlike the new movements, whose hands were clean, they had been in power when the crisis began. This old ‘classe
politique' is condemned for its willingness to commit the young to war, seen as particularly damning. Given the youthful membership of many of these new groups, and recent memories of wartime, this would be unsurprising merely in terms of self-interest. The extremist groups, the non-conformists and many writers and intellectuals used similar rhetoric to condemn ‘des ministres, le président qui signa les affiches, (...) tous ceux qui avaient un intérêt quelconque à se servir du sang des enfants de vingt ans’ (160, p.15).

All the groups were united in condemning, as greens repeatedly do, the lack of morality in public life, seen as present both on the traditional left and right (and indeed in western societies generally - ‘le déclin des valeurs occidentales’ (161, p.9) was an oft-repeated criticism in the 1930s). Such criticisms took two forms. Either the new movement would take a somewhat threatening stance, offering to rid France of such immorality, or it would simply stress its difference - its very basis being supposedly ‘moral’.

The first form was of course more frequent on the extreme right and left. Thus the Jeunesses Patriotes had a poster campaign in the 1930s linking politics and a lack of moral behaviour: ‘SFIO, démagogie, dictatures, sale finance, les Jeunesses Patriotes balayeront tout ça!’ (11, p.106), and the Action Française’s stated aim during the riots of February 1934 was ‘s’opposer à une politique d’immoralité’ (154, p.161). Of course the problem of defining what was meant by ‘morality’ in public life was more difficult (immorality was easily conjured up by references to ‘les affaires’, or hints at financial impropriety - the ‘sale finance’ of the JP poster); but this did not stop the new groups claiming that they would bring about such a moral atmosphere. There was, at least, some awareness of the need to start from a self-critical attitude, particularly among the extreme-right intellectuals of the period:
A cause de mon idée de décadence, l'introspection prenait une signification morale. Ayant à démasquer et à dénoncer, je pensais qu'il était juste que je commençasse par moi-même. (162, p.12)

Others set up their movements with the express intention (or even the sole aim) of providing a new more moral alternative and just as the greens have more recently, spent years in the attempt to finetune an organisation which could guarantee moral conduct, usually basing their attempts, again as the greens do, on some appeal to 'spirituality', religion or key, defined moral principles. Such a new approach was felt to be necessary in the face of the lack of morality in current movements and political life generally. So Mounier 'aimed to create a movement, based on a doctrine of social and moral humanism, which would herald a new civilization' (141, p.192).

The idea of moral influence being exerted on public life was not a new one in France (Sangnier’s ‘Sillon’ movement had earlier attempted a fusion of religious and political principles, and was condemned by Rome for the attempt11), but the number of new groups claiming this as their prime motivation, and thus implicitly criticising the existing order, was. Often, as greens do today, youth, health and moral commitment would be linked, as in the Auberges movements. Indeed, a further criticism made in several 1930s sources was of the established political parties’ attempts to ‘récupérer‘ new movements focussing on youth and moral commitment, like the Auberges, which had been set up with the express intention of being neither left nor right, of uniting young people from city and country in a non-party-political atmosphere. Giono saw the encouragement of the Auberges by the Front Populaire as little more than a Communist ploy to hamper the effectiveness and water down the high moral principles of a new movement, based on pacifist, non-party sentiments (27, p.248).

This was a danger stressed by most youth and non-conformist movements in the 1930s - ‘On pose des questions morales et tout se termine en cuisine électorale’.12
Their fear was similar to that of the early green parties in France: that the established parliamentary parties, once aware of public pressure for change and the new movements' radical plans to bring it about without them, would attempt to water down these movements' ideas and policies by pretending to take them on board, in the knowledge that through parliamentary procedure or the lack of familiarity of the new movements with the political system, their radical aims would go unmet. New ideas and approaches faced becoming 'broyés, dénaturés par un impitoyable mécanisme' - parliament and the existing political system, dominated by the old parties (15, p.201). There was no difference between left and right here: both were viewed as unscrupulous, accepting of damaging political traditions and concerned above all with their own survival within those traditions. Just as Greens today criticise the established parties' attempts to 'récupérer' the success of their movement by watering down its ideas via parliamentary committees and long, drawn-out legislative processes, Ordre Nouveau warned (though in terms the greens would probably avoid) in October 1933 that:

Les députés et sénateurs stérilisent les idées et les sentiments par des méthodes aussi parfaitement taylorisées que le geste des Nègres, chargés à Chicago de saigner les cochons à leur entrée dans la chaîne. (ibid., p.201)

The rejection of capitalism could also be linked to the rejection of the left-right divide in the 1930s because the economic policy of both supposed opposites was rarely different:

Il est très difficile, dans les années trente, de distinguer nettement une politique économique de droite et une politique économique de gauche. (65, p.221)

Even apparently radical changes under the Popular Front led to little improvement in the day-to-day lives of the majority, as prices increased as fast, or faster, than their
incomes did. Many of the non-conformist groups saw liberal economic policies as omnipresent, whether in democratic states run by centre-right elected governments, or in the supposed alternative of communist states. Reports of the fate of peasants in the USSR during the drive to collectivise farming were used as illustrations that human beings were being sacrificed at the altar of economic growth in communist states just as they were in capitalist ones (73, p.207).

Not until the arrival of modern greens were the apparently accepted ‘benefits’ of economic growth questioned to the same extent as in the 1930s. First, criticisms of ‘le matérialisme grossier’ \(^{13}\) abounded. Materialism was seen to be the inevitable result of the emphasis on economic growth in capitalist societies, and was often seen as negative on spiritual grounds. Again, communist regimes were as dangerous as those traditionally perceived as capitalist here: ‘La politique personnaliste rejetait le matérialisme individualiste ou collectiviste’ (11, p.99). The idea was that capitalism (including state capitalism) was dangerous because the individual or ‘person’ was seen as a mere ‘ustensile de la société capitaliste’ (160, p.19): ‘L’état capitaliste considère la vie humaine comme la matière véritablement première de la production du capital’ (ibid., p.21).

The policies in favour of economic growth of right and left were notably criticised by Giono, in terms familiar to modern greens. Like greens, Giono attempts to persuade that a different conception of the good life is necessary; that fulfilment is not related to wealth. He argues that ‘la conception moderne de la richesse’ (68, p.157) is a relatively recent and misguided development, resulting in fact in a poorer society. Just as greens base many arguments on supposed loss of quality in the pursuit of quantity, Giono draws a similar conclusion: ‘On croit augmenter, on diminue’ (ibid., p.186). Again, all parties are indistinguishable and equally responsible – ‘les partis politiques modernes ont donné [des sens nouveaux] à ces mots d’aisance et d’abondance’ (ibid., p.154).
In the criticisms of capitalism and of the drive for economic growth in particular, one aspect of 1930s criticisms does set them apart from modern greens, however. 1930s sources, with some notable exceptions like Giono, frequently relied on blatantly anti-Semitic attacks and caricatures. Such arguments, while clearly widely used on the extreme right, can also be found across the political spectrum. References before and during the Popular Front to the '200 families' often contained anti-Semitic undertones, for example. Some extreme-right groups implicitly referred to Jews, through attacks on 'la “ploutocratie” et la “finance cosmopolite”' (151, p.143); others explicitly presented Jews as unfaithful citizens, more committed to 'la finance internationale' (154, p.173) than to France. Nor were such views confined to those now notorious for their extreme-right views, such as the far-right youth movements and writers like Céline. Whole sections in Bernanos' *Les grands cimetières sous la lune*, a work remembered as humanist, if perhaps conservative, to take but one example, are difficult even to read today owing to their anti-Semitism: Jews are attacked for their supposed dedication to capitalism, are presented as a danger to France for this reason, and compared in now-shocking terms to a boil which should be lanced (155, p.40, for example).

Moving on to the political system, identical criticisms are found in 1930s and green sources of the 'déséquilibre' (68, p.168) which is again seen as resulting from a political system in which too much power is concentrated in the hands of only a few. In the 1930s as today, the state was represented as faceless, and discouraging of change or the direct participation of citizens:

> Le but de l'Etat moderne n'est pas de donner la joie; la joie libère et il a besoin de contrôler constamment l'existence des hommes. (ibid., p.193)

While it would not be attempted until over a decade later, drastic reform of the Third Republic was widely seen as necessary by 1930 (65, p.222) and was a mobilising factor for many of the new movements, just as issues such as parité and participative
democracy are today for the greens. If too much power was seen to be in the hands of the few, those few were therefore vulnerable to greater criticism when they were perceived to have failed, as the consequences of such failure were greater. Many of the youth groups of the 1930s pointed out that those still in power in the 1930s had been there before and during the first World War, for example. Indeed, Winock partly attributes the widespread engagement of young people in particular in new movements in the 1930s to the failure of leadership under the 3rd Republic. ‘La génération des Brasillach’, he argues, felt let down by their leaders’ failure to take action, and often contrasted this failure in France with Hitler’s Germany by 1933.

Another point made frequently (with the possible exception of the Popular Front hiatus) in the 1930s sources is that, for the ordinary person, there is little if any practical difference between governments of left and right. In Giono’s novels, for example, political leaders and governments remain a sinister, unnamed presence – male characters go to fight in futile wars, on the orders of faceless politicians, referred to vaguely if at all. Political allegiances were irrelevant, since the effects of right and left on individuals were the same.

While they were criticised on such practical grounds, the right and left (particularly the extremes of fascism and communism) were also targeted in many 1930s sources on a more theoretical basis, something which can be seen as linking them to modern greens. One relatively widespread reaction to politics in the 1930s was a wholesale rejection of ideologies. Just as many greens today argue that ideologies are dangerous because they exclude potential sympathisers, so many in the 1930s made the same point.

However 1930s critics often went further and talked of ideologies as inherently dangerous. Thus, for Alain, ‘rien n’est plus dangereux qu’une idée, quand un homme n’a qu’une seule idée’ (161, p.13). Rigid beliefs were depicted as dangerous in vivid images – Saint-Exupéry referred to ‘la folie sanguinaire des idées’, for example.
Given the post-war context and the growth of mass movements based on ideology in neighbouring countries, it is hardly surprising that such dangers were stressed in the 1930s, particularly by intellectuals. The lack of freedom of expression which Giono denounced in the USSR (27, p.250) found a frightening parallel in the 'fascisme brûleur des livres' of Hitler’s Germany.

The rigidity of doctrine and ideology was also criticised for its failure to allow for dissent or alternative solutions, whether or not they might work. Mounier thus attacked ‘impérialisme spirituel de l’homme collectif,’ (73, p.207) while Giono raged that the best solutions were inevitably rejected because they were neither of the left nor right, but ‘vécu en dehors de leur doctrine et comme malgré elle’ (68, p.155):

[Les communistes] préfèrent le triomphe de leur orthodoxie à la vie des autres. Que tout le monde meure mais que mon parti gagne. (27, p.238)

Ideologies were also rejected on the same grounds as modern greens - due to a desire to be inclusive, rather than a fear of potential dangers. Just as today’s greens talk of ‘écologismes’, so 1930s sources discussed ‘personnalismes’ (and of course, ‘la nébuleuse fasciste’ (154, p.171)). Historians discussing the period agree that the movements were diverse and difficult to classify - ‘Les “non-conformistes” sont loin de constituer une famille homogène, aisément classable à l’extrême droite du champ politique’ (ibid., p.184). Of course one problem of an arc en ciel, inclusive approach, as French greens found out during the Brière affair, is that accusations of sympathies with extreme right views in the movement are difficult to combat. 1930s movements faced similar difficulties and ambiguities – Milza (154, p.185) discusses resemblances (and underlines the far greater differences) between the non-conformists and extreme-right groups in depth precisely because attempts were made by critics to link the two.
The rejection by some of ideology in the 1930s meant that they claimed a different basis or justification for their beliefs or programmes, leading perhaps to a further resemblance between 1930s movements and the greens. That is, their movements or ideas are based on appeals to some greater authority, be it religion/spirituality or science. The Personalists are an obvious case in point, basing their analysis of the 'désordre établi' on a combination of religious faith and philosophy and stressing 'la primauté du spirituel'. The desire to found a new more moral style of politics explains this attempt to mix spirituality and politics to some extent; the intellectual character of French political debate during the entre deux guerres might also go some way to explaining the early willingness to introduce appeals to science.

Another potential explanation for the search for less usual sources of inspiration for political movements might have been the desire to find a way to move away from the bipolarisation of French political life, seen as damaging by 1930s groups just as it is today by modern greens. The effects of the opposition of left and right were seen as detrimental, even if many considered it an opposition based on a false premise (the very existence of a left-right divide). Mounier denounced the effects of such a 'dualisme pernicieux' in politics (35, p.133). Particularly towards the end of the 1930s, when war began to seem inevitable and unity was sought, such disunity was criticised. Perhaps in an attempt to move beyond the bipolar nature of political life, many of the 1930s sources rejected the idea of forming a permanent traditional political party, just as many greens do. Such views are found across the political spectrum and in the attitudes of intellectuals and writers of the period. ‘Mounier ne voulait pas être le chef ou l’adhérent d’un parti’ (11, p.99). ‘Pas de manifeste, pas de programme, pas de nouveau parti’ is the demand in Gilles (162, p.599).

No doubt the most fervent proponent of this view, however, was Giono, particularly by the end of the 1930s. Indeed the Contadour experiment was precisely an attempt to attain some sort of group commitment (or ‘communion’) while avoiding a party: Giono declared he felt comfortable in ‘un parti qui n’a pas encore de nom, et qui n’en aura jamais, parce qu’il n’est pas un parti’ (120, p.29). In his writing as well as
in the example he gave in life, Giono argued, in didactic terms, that parties should be rejected ‘en bloc’: ‘Se libérer de tout’ (27, p.261).

Having detailed the shared criticisms between 1930s sources and the greens of the left-right divide, we shall now consider the more specific criticisms made in 1930s sources of first the left then the right.

‘Frères ennemis’ seems an appropriate description of the difficult relationship between the left-wing parties and many of the movements and individuals studied in this thesis. A similar analysis of specific themes (the working environment, for example) is shared at times, but for the new groups, the traditional left did not understand the extent of the crisis or act morally in its attempts to deal with it (and moreover, they did so in only a piecemeal fashion). The 1930s, especially after February 1934, were characterised by a desire for ‘engagement’ by intellectuals and youth. Thus historians have argued that the importance of Mounier’s Personalist philosophy and doctrine was not its originality or coherence but its ‘implication politique’, its ability to inspire ‘l’engagement à gauche de jeunes intellectuels chrétiens’ in France (89, p.275). However, once many had accepted the idea of engagement and looked to the left, the French left-wing parties of the 1930s were found wanting.

This is hardly surprising. Little was expected of the traditional right by most of the groups and individuals studied here, whereas the left seemed to be promising ‘des lendemains qui chantent’, at least in 1936. Before 1934, the left was seen as too divided to offer any hope to the new groups. Following the split at Tours in 1920, divisions were emphasised across the left. At the start of 1934, the CGT declared that: ‘Entre les communistes et nous, il ne peut y avoir rien de commun’ (88, p.86); in this at least they agreed with Thorez: ‘On ne marie pas l’eau et le feu’. The Communists accused the SFIO of being a ‘parti bourgeois’ (72, p.220), or even ‘social-fasciste’ in the 1930s (65, p.15). Relations between the socialists and
radicals seemed little better. 'On ne peut pas oublier les batailles violentes entre radicaux et socialistes à partir de 1906' (ibid., p.15). In the early 1930s, the non-conformists attacked the ‘impossibilité de servir l’intérêt général au milieu des querelles partisanes’ (15, p.199).

Credibility was a problem for the traditional left when discussing revolution too. The PCF veered between contradictory positions, making a very public volte-face regarding its revolutionary stance between 1934 and 1939. The SFIO’s ‘uneasy balance between revolution and reformism’ in the 1920s and 1930s was equally confusing (72, p.254). By the 1930s, Jaurès’ strategy of waiting for ‘la croissance du prolétariat’, devised at the start of the century, was seen to be inappropriate, but there was no consensus on an alternative.

The very idea of a proletarian revolution was seen as fundamentally misguided by most 1930s groups and writers. The strategy of preparing (or waiting) for revolution was seen as a betrayal; indeed betrayal was an accusation frequently levelled at the left in the 1930s. Above all, the left was seen as having betrayed certain values. Just as greens today argue that their liberal views on subjects such as feminism do not make them left-wing (since they are if anything more radical than the left), so many in the 1930s felt that their values actually differentiated them from a left which had abandoned them. There were two contradictory fears when discussing values on the left.

First, there was the fear that the left was too radical or extreme. This was a fear of the Communist party especially – the fact it was not just a ‘parti comme les autres’ was stressed. What made it different in kind from the other parties was, of course, its ‘special relationship with Moscow and the Comintern’ (165, p.147). The PCF’s acceptance of the 21 conditions of the 3rd international, and more recently the purges in 1931 of members judged not to be adhering to these provoked the fear that France would be a European battleground for the two extremes of communism and fascism.
For the Personalists, communism was to be feared as much as fascism because its main emphasis was economic – this was not a ‘person-centred’ movement. After the failure of the Popular Front, this was extended to a fear of the traditional left in general. In 1938, Mounier published a short pamphlet, *De la mythique de gauche*, ‘un livre très dense et très critique à l'égard de l'idéologie de la gauche’ (65, p.215).

The second fear in the 1930s, which often existed in a clear contradiction within the same movement, was that the left was not radical *enough*, part of a ‘classe politique sans imagination’ (11, p.290). The fear that the left was not sufficiently radical was best seen in 1930s criticisms of the economic basis of left-wing politics. ‘Homo oeconomicus’ was at the centre of their argument – instead of refusing monetary values point blank, the left argued on these grounds. There was particular criticism of the traditional left’s aim being simply to manage capitalism by the mid-1930s. Socialist economic policies were seen as far from left-wing, a point with which historians seem to agree:

La doctrine économique de L. Blum n’était pas socialiste dans son essence, elle tendait seulement à mieux faire fonctionner une économie où l’initiative privée conservait une importance primordiale. (152, p.113)

This was viewed with particular disappointment by most of the non-conformists, who had been drawn to the platonism of the Belgian De Man, whose ideas were debated at the 1934 SFIO congress and rejected, following Blum’s vehement opposition. Once in office, Blum was seen as betraying even basic socialist principles as well as such more daring economic alternatives:

Although planism was probably not the economic panacea that its advocates believed, it did at least offer, at the theoretical level, a more logical position than that of Blum, who was in 1936 to take on the task of
applying what he believed to be palliatives to a system he believed to be
doomed. (166, p.165)

Even on the level of general values, the newer movements are critical of a traditional
left which is seen to have abandoned or ignored the libertarian approach it might
have been expected to take. Here again, we will note similarities between 1930s
criticisms of the left and modern green criticisms of the Mitterrand years in
particular. When considering such values, as opposed to policies, 1930s sources
generally argue that the left has betrayed its original principles, which are now better
defended or discussed in newer movements. Why did they argue this? First, the left
is seen to have watered down its original beliefs (as in the confused stance over the
possibility of a revolution, for example).

Second, some groups in the 1930s took as their starting-point an attempt to
incorporate religion or spirituality into politics, and this led them to adopt values
which they saw as logical and moral, but which established political parties were
likely to dismiss as utopian or naïve, if not dangerous in a relatively newly-secular
state. So Mounier could describe Esprit’s stance on social issues as ‘au nom du
spirituel, en tête des Marxistes, plus loin qu’eux’ (15, p.239). Non-conformist
groups were also wary of open identification with the radical left following the
earlier reaction of the Catholic Church to Sangnier’s Sillon movement, and after
Pope Pius XI’s statement on the Church and socialism in 1931 – ‘un fondement
antichrétien caractérise le socialisme’. 19

Finally, certain key themes, which were deeply important to intellectuals and to new
movements were the ones the left was seen to have abandoned. The most important
ones will now be briefly considered. First, the traditional left is seen as having a
limited analysis of key problems. Its attachment to the worker means the left has not
been able to see the extent of the crisis facing all groups in French society.
However, even their analysis of the worker’s condition is seen as only partial by both
intellectuals and new movements, whose sympathy for the industrial worker meant that the left was criticised for not going far enough, since it seemed to want only to guarantee higher incomes or improved working conditions until an eventual revolution, after which industrial work would not apparently be much different anyway. In contrast, ‘la pratique américaine des hauts salaires’ was not seen as positive by the non-conformists. They viewed it as based not on social justice nor an attempt to improve workers’ lives, but rather on a cynical

asservissement de l’homme aux exigences de l’économie [...]. Ainsi l’ouvrier sert deux fois la machine productrice à laquelle il est deux fois enchaîné: il la sert en tant que main-d’œuvre et en tant que débouché.20

Giono’s sympathy for the ‘ouvrier communiste’ led him to a similar standpoint. Workers were ‘le grand peuple’, ‘comme toujours, trahis par leurs chefs’ (27, pp.254-5), i.e. the Communist party. Discussing the worker’s condition, he argued that the Popular Front had missed the point: ‘J’estime que c’est mettre un emplâtre sur une jambe de bois que de donner un congé payé’ (27, p.256). Writers and intellectuals were perhaps most open regarding their disappointment at the Popular Front’s perceived lack of radicalism. Despite his clear distance from the left by that point, Céline outlined in Bagatelles pour un massacre:

on une utopie non dépourvue de tendresse, ce que le Front populaire aurait dù faire: rendre au prolétariat ‘l’eau claire, le vent, les poumons, les fleurs’. (164, p.232)

On broad principles, particularly in the social field, the traditional left was found wanting. While radical ideas were surprisingly conspicuous by their absence in the Popular Front programme, the high initial hopes of some that ‘Tout est possible!’ in 1936 and the atmosphere of the June/July strikes and demonstrations meant that many had believed radical changes would soon take place. A particular parallel
between the Personalists and modern greens, now involved in a difficult collaboration with a less radical left, can be noted here.

The Personalists, under the influence of Mounier were unusually advanced on social issues in the 1930s, often on issues now important for the greens such as feminism. Over a decade before the publication of Beauvoir’s *Le deuxième sexe*, Mounier was already analysing ‘le vaste problème de la condition de la femme’ (26, p.124) in some detail, and drawing radical conclusions with which the greens would agree over fifty years later: ‘Notre monde social est un monde fait par l’homme et pour l’homme’ (ibid., p.125). Mounier chose the key date of June 1936 to publish a numéro spécial of *Esprit* entitled ‘La femme aussi est une personne’, with the clear aim of drawing attention to issues such as female suffrage and equal rights in employment right at the beginning of the Popular Front’s term of office. France’s colonial history and racism were similarly denounced and the Personalists went further than most in calling for retrospective ‘justice’ for countries colonised by France; for them, colonial peoples had been ‘parfois arrachés à un équilibre politique’ (ibid., p.125) only to be corrupted by the morally bankrupt French system. The left’s failure on social issues like women’s rights (the failure to introduce equal pay legislation, for example) attracted special condemnation from the Personalists.

Just as certain trades unions (notably the CFDT) have been quicker than political parties to react to the ideas of the modern greens, so their 1930s equivalents seemed to take on board the influence of the new movements like the Personalists sooner and to a greater extent than parties of the left did. The ‘Manifeste des douze’ contained an entire section entitled ‘Respect de la Personne humaine’, in which then-radical statements of principle were made. They too joined the criticisms of left-wing parties for being insufficiently radical.

The emphasis on the ‘lutte des classes’ by parties of the left was also criticised. This emphasis was old-fashioned in the view of newer groups and writers and led to a
misplaced focus, in their opinion. First, groups whose inspiration was religious or moral simply did not agree that class antagonism was the problem. For Esprit and Jeune République, merely discussing class struggle was divisive and ignored the need for all groups affected by the crisis to work together. The emphasis on the worker by the left also attracted criticism from new groups on the grounds that it led to their neglect of the peasants, the most important group for many 1930s sources. Marx had earlier used the case of France to illustrate his argument that peasants were hopelessly disunited:

Their mode of production isolates them from one another. [...] The isolation is increased by France’s bad means of communication and by the poverty of the peasants. [...] They do not form a class. (168, p.414)

Many in the 1930s felt, like Giono, that Marx’s analysis was incorrect. The dismissal of this group by the established left-wing parties ("The Socialist and Communist parties, whose doctrines related to urban societies, never effectively adapted themselves to the peasants") (72, p.361) was therefore a serious stumbling block for many, precisely because they saw the peasantry (or some unified peasant-worker mass - this was Giono’s suggestion) as the way forward.

Like modern greens, another problematic area for 1930s sources was often the centralism favoured by the left, particularly the communists. This was true of both the centralised French political system (attacked by the Personalists at some length) and of the centralised structure of the Communist party itself. The 21 Conditions of the Third International which the French Communist party had accepted in 1920 were indeed a blueprint for a very centralised party structure, with their requirement for ‘acceptation obligatoire des décisions des organes supérieures du parti, sévère discipline’ (Statute 6)22 and so on. Political centralisation was particularly attacked by new youth movements on three basic grounds which resemble the arguments of modern greens. First, it was seen as leading to a lack of accountability and an
inability to respond to important issues within parties. Mounier, for example, commented on the PCF’s party structure in scathing terms: ‘La compagnie de Jésus est un jardin d’enfants à côté de l’organisation du parti communiste’ (65, p.212).

Second, centralised structures meant that parties were run by old men, and young people with new ideas thus took longer to make their mark. In contrast was the youthful leadership of newer non-conformist movements. Third, a lack of citizen participation in politics was perceived to be a negative result of centralised parties in a centralised system.

Probably the most sustained criticism of the left was its contention that the key to happiness was to be found in the economic sphere. This criticism can be found both in literary and political sources. Thus Giono argued that the left had a mistaken conception of the ‘good life’, one based on financial riches, and the non-conformists attacked the left specifically in their critique of ‘productivisme’. This term was widely used, by non-conformist groups as well as by Giono, to describe the focus on increasing and sharing financial wealth rather than on increasing happiness, something our sources saw as unrelated to wealth. The term would of course be adopted later by the green movement, and the definitions both sets of sources give of ‘productivisme’ were strikingly similar (15, p.220).

An interesting parallel can be drawn here between 1930s movements which were attempting to blend christianity and politics and the greens. Greens start from an awareness of scarcity which leads them to call for a ‘return to poverty’, voluntary simplicity and the more equitable sharing of resources. Some of the 1930s groups based their criticisms of society (and of the left in particular) on an analysis of poverty in christian terms: ‘Le bourgeois ignore la Croix que le moindre misèreux, le moindre révolté expérimente chaque jour’ (ibid., p.241). The positive aspects of suffering and poverty in christian terms led these groups to a glorification of simple life which, though based on a different starting point, reached many of the same conclusions as modern greens. Both sets of sources thus criticise the left for wanting to increase production and wealth to lead to a better life. It was in such terms that:
movements such as Jeune République criticised the left’s ‘acceptance’ of capitalism from a Christian standpoint (72, p.295).

Another reason for fearing and criticising the left which is agreed upon by modern greens and the 1930s youth groups was that the left was seen as the most likely to be able to capitalise on the success of these newer groups. 1930s groups were wary of the Popular Front, and in particular of the youthful Sous-secrétaire à la Santé publique in charge of ‘organisation des loisirs et des sports’23, Lagrange, who was relatively open regarding his attempts to win over or ‘récupérer’ those attracted by the non-conformists and youth movements:

‘Joy’, ‘youth’, ‘health’, ‘happiness’ are recurrent themes in Lagrange’s speeches. The emphasis on the young was to demonstrate that democracy also was capable of harnessing the revolt of youth. (169, p.229)

The actual experience of the left in power during the Popular Front was to disappoint those in the 1930s who had been influenced by the rhetoric of ‘rassemblement’, much as the greens were disappointed by the experience of a left-wing president and government in the early 1980s. The Popular Front experience also led to disappointment as its eventual effect was seen to be divisive – and after the initial unity it had seemed to offer, this disappointment was greater than it might otherwise have been, much as the eventual failure of the first Mauroy government (with its inclusion of a wider left) was doubly disappointing for future greens. Many previously non-political (or even anti-politics) sources had accepted political commitment in the early days of the Rassemblement populaire (this was true of youth groups – Esprit in November 1935, Sangnier’s Jeune République in July 1935; and of artists and intellectuals – Giono being one example), and its failure left many even more disillusioned with traditional left-wing politics than before. The failure of the left in office has been presented as the turning point for Céline, for example. ‘L’image péjorative donnée de 1936, quantitativement très mince dans le texte, mais d’une extrême aggressivité’ (164, p.226), in Mort à crédit, and ‘tous les stéréotypes
du "mauvais ouvrier", [...] une image violemment hostile du "peuple" de 1936' (ibid., p.227) marked the first real gulf between this writer who had been welcomed by the left and his previous supporters. 'Plutôt Hitler que le Front populaire' was to be Céline's attitude by the end of the Popular Front experience, according to Roche and Leroy (164, p.231).

Most subsequent commentators have agreed with hindsight that the experience of the Popular Front represents a mixed picture overall, with achievements in the cultural field but failure economically, for example; but what we should note here is that the key policy areas focussed on by many newer groups and intellectuals were to be the focal point for major disappointments. As we have observed, progressive social ideas were mixed in these groups with an emphasis on new economic theories like planism and an attempt to moralize politics. Yet 'le bilan financier du Front populaire est assurément décevant. [...] Il l'est aussi sur le plan de la justice sociale' (152, pp.107-8). The failure of the Popular Front to live up to expectations in areas such as equal political and employment rights for women or unemployment was seen as just as immoral as the conduct of previous governments.

Overall, however, the main criticism leveled at the left in the 1930s was that it failed, like all the others in the 'classe politique' to realise the extent of the 'désordre établi'. As modern greens criticise the left for not taking the extent of the environmental crisis as their starting point, so the 1930s sources felt the left's approach to a grave crisis of society was piecemeal at best. At worst, it was seen as too busy with internal squabbles to notice the crisis at all, morally corrupt and dominated by the old, who were closed to exciting new ideas like planism which might have gone some way to providing solutions, in the views of newer groups. This meant that by the end of the decade, a more strict return to a 'ni-ni' approach was seen as a appropriate response. 'Un esprit de révolte' was to mark both Giono and the non-conformists by the end of the decade, much as it had at the start (11, p.279).
If the 1930s sources considered here shared certain qualities with the left, they also resembled the right in some ways. This was the case for both individuals and movements during the 1930s. Indeed, Coston has argued that this was true of early ‘environmentalists’ in the 1930s, like Geffroy, who can be seen as sharing characteristics with the right:

Geffroy était ‘de droite’, comme on l’était dans la première moitié du XXe siècle, c’est-à-dire fermement attaché à notre sol et à nos traditions. (170, p.6)

Greens are also frequently reminded that one of the best-known early environmentalists in France, Jacques-Yves Cousteau was the brother of the notorious journalist of the right and editor in the 1930s of Je suis partout, Pierre-Antoine Cousteau (ibid., p.24). Many have commented on the ‘right-wing’ themes and approaches shared by some 1930s sources as well as on the perceived right-wing qualities of early environmentalists. Sternhell points out, for example, that what sets Mounier and the Personalists apart from the extreme right is not their analysis of what was wrong with French society (which was similar on most key points), but the solutions they proposed (150, p.274). There was also a shared emphasis on Christianity (at least in the rhetoric of both). There was sympathy, for example, for ‘l’importance attachée [par la droite] à la religion chrétienne, à la primauté du spirituel et aux valeurs morales’ (154, p.168) (though the right’s ‘valeurs morales’ tended to be more traditional than those of new groups or iconoclastic individuals like Giono). A romantic view of (and political concern for) the paysan was arguably common to both too.

Others make the point that there was common ground between many of those proclaiming their ‘ni-nisme’ and the right by referring to how the groups would later react to the Occupation and the Vichy regime, and imply shared views by underlining their willingness to work with the regime in 1940. The ‘termes et thèmes qui constituent les fondements du régime de Vichy’ according to Ferro (‘la
culpabilité de la Troisième République', 'la faiblesse du régime', 'la nécessité de régénérer la nation') (171, p.35) were clearly shared by 1930s groups, and Mounier did indeed work with the Ecole d'Uriage on the basis of shared criticisms of the previous regime.

What is clear, however is that a ni-ni stance was frequently seen as playing into the hands of the right. This accusation was made particularly by the left and the Radicals, and in terms which are similar to Lalonde's present-day criticisms of Waechter's preference for a ni-ni approach. Thus Alain famously commented in 1930 that

Lorsque quelqu'un me dit que l'opposition droite-gauche est dépassée, je sais qu'il ne s'agit pas d'un homme de gauche. (65, p. 14)

Indeed, many of the groups who took a ni-ni stance were careful to acknowledge such dangers, and it was arguably in order publicly to distance themselves from the right that they were so detailed in the criticisms they made. Mounier actually denounced Ordre Nouveau, a group for which he had previously shown some sympathy, for this reason in April 1934:

We [Esprit] have also written 'Neither Left nor Right'. But not in the usual sense, not to conceal, under a seeming serenity, secret inclinations and alliances. (81, p.270)

Overall, although areas of broad agreement can be found, there were far fewer points on which our 1930s sources and the right were in agreement than there were points on which they were diametrically opposed to one another. The right were globally criticised for having refused to keep up with a changing world by newer groups in the 1930s. The lack of common ground between the newer groups and the right was
perhaps particularly evident because criticisms of the ‘ruling class’ in the period
generally meant, in effect, the parties of the right and centre. While the left spent
most of the period in opposition, in the twenty years between the Treaty of Versailles
and the German invasion of Poland, the right-wing parties participated in
government for fourteen of those years (172, p.507).

The first and most obvious area of difference was in the right’s acceptance of
capitalism. Generalised criticisms of capitalism are so widespread in the 1930s
sources that they seem simplistic to the modern reader. Virtually every page of Les
vraies richesses, for example, contains a despairing comment on ‘l’argent’; ‘Dans
notre société, l’argent est la seule valeur, l’argent est la seule richesse’ (ibid., p.103);
‘La civilisation de l’argent est en train de tout engloutir sous son déluge’, (ibid.,
p.141).

More specific criticisms, of the effects of capitalism in particular, also abound. The
absurdity and cruelty of the capitalist ‘logic’ is denounced first of all. Giono sees the
destruction of wheat crops in France when ‘les sept dixièmes des hommes de la
Terre ne mangent pas à leur faim’ as an indictment of capitalism’s logic (ibid.,
p.108). Economic liberalism was principally attacked. Loubet del Bayle quotes La
Tour du Pin to sum up the sentiments of the non-conformist groups on the subject;
‘Le libéralisme, c’est le renard libre dans le poulailler libre’ (15, p.220). In contrast,
the traditional right-wing parties in 1930s France have been described as classic
liberalsists, a stance which Larkin attributes to their reliance on the political support
of the paysan, renowned for his hatred of direct taxation. The ‘big business
connections’ of the right would also have influenced their liberalism in economic
matters, an influence the new groups deplored (85, p.40).

Again, there was often a religious basis for such differences between new groups and
the traditional right. Jeune Droite represents one example of a new group which
stressed its rejection of traditional right economic policies on the grounds that these
were anti-Christian and thus immoral. Mounier publicly supported the group, at least in its early days, for precisely this reason. Such criticisms of the right tended to focus on inequality, Christian views on poverty, and of course 'l'usure', a word which Loubet del Bayle even credits the non-conformists with 'resurrecting' in the 1930s; and along with references to 'le prêt à intérêt' and the works of Thomas Aquinas, such criticisms are very evident in Esprit in particular in the early 1930s:

Quelques-uns se sont fatigués à définir le système capitaliste actuel, il n'était pas besoin de tant chercher, c'est l'usure érigée en loi générale. ²⁴

The emphasis of the traditional right on its supporters among the peasants and the bourgeoisie also contradicted the emphasis of the newer groups on other sections of society, and notably their concern for the industrial worker, whose life they found intolerable. Some, with Jeune Droite, attributed the very existence of any 'lutte des classes' to the capitalist system which they saw the traditional right maintaining (15, p.226).

The second main area of disagreement between the right and our sources was the state and its political institutions. This clash was unsurprising given that the right was self-avowedly conservative and resistant to change, whereas the one thing all the new groups and newly-committed intellectuals had in common was their desire radically to change virtually every aspect of the 'established disorder', especially in the political domain. The right of the 1930s has been described as based on 'défense'—whether of the 'patrie', 'armée', 'religion', 'l'ordre social', 'la propriété', or a basic 'défense fiscale' (172, p.408), the right had a group to promote the defence of tradition. Such defence of the old order automatically distanced them from the newer groups more than the left, who at least claimed to want change. The right was seen as hampering the introduction of a better society to a greater extent than the left for this reason.
The institutions of the Third Republic were also inherently conservative - 'The Third Republic sought to stabilize rather than to transform society' (85, p.39) - and the fact that it was dominated by the right through most of the period studied tended to mean that the regime's conservatism and that of its politicians, particularly those on the right, were assimilated in the criticisms of the newer groups. The traditional right in the 1930s wanted a combination of a powerful, centrally-controlled state and a rather extreme version of economic liberalism. The views on the state of the new right caused even more alarm among the sources studied here: an example might be the Croix-de-Feu which aimed for a state based more firmly on 'un modèle traditionnel et paternaliste' (154, p.169).

Such state paternalism was a key criticism of the right for newer, youth-led movements. Their desire for citizen participation, a move away from capitalism and the introduction of economic planning meant that they were campaigning for the precise opposite of the right-wing prescription on the two key areas of organisation of the state and the economy. The paternalism of the civil service was criticised too, particularly as it was seen as dominated by the same sort of conservative bourgeois as found in parliament. The nationalism of the right was a final contentious area for many of the newer groups in the 1930s. Memories of the first World War and fears of a second, coupled with the stress on the need for internationalism among youth movements (influenced in their methods if not their policies by communism and fascism) meant another gulf between them and the right.

If we take merely one example of a 1930s non-conformist group, the Personalists, we will note a clearly-stated contrast on all the key areas so far identified as important for the right - i.e., economic liberalism, conservatism, the role of the state and nationalism. Personalists' criticisms of capitalism have been described briefly above; they worried at length about the possibility of a radically new participative democracy too:
Le problème crucial pour le personnalisme est celui de la légitimité du pouvoir exercé par l'homme sur l'homme, qui semble contradictoire avec le rapport interpersonnel. (26, p.126)

Finally, they stated clearly and repeatedly their opposition to nationalism and its inherent dangers - ‘L’État, répétons-le, n’est pas la nation. [...] Seuls les fascistes proclament leur identité au profit de l’État’ (ibid., p.126). This is not to say that they resorted to a ‘stateless anarchy’ along the same lines as Giono, however: instead, they outlined their preferred alternatives in direct contradiction to the ideas of the traditional right.

The overall reason for the gulf between the traditional right and most of the sources studied here, then, would be the effects on the individual or person of the right’s policies, whether in political or economic terms. In political terms, the refusal of a more participative and inclusive regime by the right was seen to result in a dangerous level of political disaffection at a critical time. On economic grounds, the right was seen as the standard-bearer for a dehumanising (or to use the more common 1930s term, ‘immoral’) approach. This was seen as particularly disappointing and hypocritical by those groups who based their proposals for society, as indeed the right claimed to, on Christian beliefs:

For Mounier, the flagrant collusion of Catholics with the reactionary politics and economic oppression of the ‘established disorder’ was morally intolerable and confessionally suicidal. (81, p.267)

The fourth main area of criticism we should consider is that of the extreme right. The extreme right represented a special focus for many of our 1930s sources in their criticisms of the right, just as the Front National represents the same special case for the greens today. Of course, just as the FN and the green parties in France appeared at the same time, so many of the movements discussed here grew up in the same
period as the extreme right in France. The need to differentiate themselves from the extremes and from fascism explains to some extent the clearly-stated criticisms of the extreme right of most of the sources used here. This need was acute because many of the new groups had collaborated with the new right groups in their early days, usually because, as we saw earlier, they made virtually identical criticisms of the ‘désordre établi’. They felt the need, therefore, to stress their different solutions to the problems facing French society, and their unambiguous criticisms of the extremes. Such criticisms took three basic forms: attacks on the presence of fascist groups in France; on the content of their political programmes; and on their methods.

The presence of fascism was widely feared in France, especially after 1934. There was an ‘exaggerated but understandable’ (85, p.48) fear of the revolutionary right following the events of 6th February. The very raison d’être of the Rassemblement populaire, which marked the entry into official politics of so many of our sources, was the reaction to this evident fascist presence (153, p.29). The fear of a French fascism was what prompted the political commitment of many intellectuals, who reacted faster than traditional political parties did, according to Touchard, when they formed their anti-fascist Vigilance Committees (65, pp.217-8).

Fascist ideas and the content of their political programmes were the second main focus for criticisms. Their key themes (‘l’État tout-puissant, le corporatisme, le culte du chef charismatique’) (154, p.176) were anathema to the non-conformists and to intellectuals and artists. Giono’s plaintive defence of the individual forgotten in mass regimes and attack on the damaging scale of fascist states (68, p.195) were agreed upon by the non-conformists too, and represent a clear parallel to modern green criticisms of the extreme right’s programme.

Finally, the methods of the extreme right provoked a notably fearful response. They were seen as powerful due to their wealthy supporters, such as Coty. Doriot’s PPF received ‘10 million francs from big business in 1937’ (85, p.50). Many assumed
they were prepared to use their support directly, with 'the streets rather than parliament as their road to power' (this perception was perhaps why so many reacted firmly to the threat of the French far right in the 1930s, even though most historians now agree that direct action was the last thing the leaders of the extreme right wanted at the time) (ibid., p.48). However, their declared aims (the revolutionary right wanted to 'harness modern technology and methods of state control to new expressions of national sentiment' (ibid., p.49)), combined with apparently extreme tactics nonetheless provoked a strong reaction by the mid-1930s.

It has often been argued, of course, that this reaction was not, however, strong enough. The eventual defeat of France in 1940 and subsequent implementation of some of the ideas prevalent in the 1930s under Vichy are offered as evidence that the reaction of 1930s groups was insufficient, and that they played into the hands of the right. What is clear is that the eventual adoption by Pétain of some widely-shared ideas from the 1930s confirmed the earlier fears of many of our sources, who had frequently stressed the dangers of fascist or right-wing 'récupération' of key themes. An emphasis on the need for 'travail dans la nature, éducation physique, éducation morale' (171, p.272) might have been shared by 1930s groups across the political spectrum and implemented by Vichy in the Chantiers de Jeunesse programme, but they would certainly not have agreed on what the content or purpose of that 'education morale' was. In summary, then, the more critical attitude to the right than to the left, despite the avowed ni-ni stance of many groups, was to be confirmed as appropriate by the end of the decade, if not, perhaps, sufficiently radical or widespread.

3.5 Green solutions

The first line of the party statutes of Les Verts indicates their main suggestion for achieving change: 'L'engagement politique est une étape capitale dans la lutte
Les Verts claim to have been the first greens to accept the need for political commitment, rather than a social movement or lobbying organisation, a strategy which has been variously attributed to the lack of an effective civil society in France, to the politicisation of young people during May 1968, and to the disillusionment of environmentalists following the election of Mitterrand and the left-wing government of 1981, after which green parties accepted party structures and a permanent commitment to the political sphere.

However, if the idea of engagement was accepted very early as a necessary solution to the perceived crisis, the tactics this would involve were not so easily decided upon, and still provoke disagreement in green circles. Various strategies have been chosen — the refusal of a traditional party; the refusal of a permanent structured party, but participation in specific elections (Dumont’s 1974 campaign being one example of this strategy); the choice of local activism rather than national politics; and, of course, the acceptance of a permanent party, but one which attempts to be a new kind of party. The question of alliances provokes further splits — some, such as Génération Ecologie have always adopted ‘une politique de la main tendue’ towards other parties, allowing ‘double appartenance’ (simultaneous membership of more than one political party), for example. Les Verts, as we have seen, have adopted various strategies, usually in reaction to events — no alliance with left seemed possible during the 1980s, following their reaction to Chernobyl, and involvement in the Rainbow Warrior affair.

If the greens accept engagement as the starting point of any solution, yet insist they are neither of the left nor the right, what kind of politics do they aim to commit to? Their absolute rejection of traditional political approaches have led some to accuse them of being too idealistic and utopian in their strategy: ‘Neither left nor right, but somewhere over the rainbow’, as Barry puts it. This is a somewhat simplistic picture, however. In effect, there is a wide range of possible green solutions, which tend to fall into two broad camps.
First, there are ‘reformist’ strategies, commonly found in the manifestos of the green parties, which commonly propose specific, detailed changes to the political system and the economic sphere. Second, there are more general, less defined attempts to ‘urge’ change in society or human beings rather than taking the political system as the point of departure. The second type of solution often highlights spirituality and the need to ‘reclaim utopia’ (29, p.14).

Greens can claim to be neither of the left nor the right in their unique assortment of criticisms of traditional right and left, but in the solutions they propose, they have to ‘borrow from pre-existing traditions’ (20, p.182): ‘ecological limits may limit political choices, but they do not determine them’ (136, p.7). This means that in some solutions, it seems more accurate to talk of an ‘et de droite et de gauche’ stance. Sainteny (3, pp.62-3) points out that one such contradiction can be seen in their preference for massive decentralisation of power, coupled with their desire for a strong state-level (or even international) authority to implement environmental protection measures.

Bearing in mind this range of approaches, both broad sets of suggestions (reformist and revolutionary) will now be considered.

### 3.5.1 Green reformism

While the society they would eventually like to see is radically different than the current one, most greens aim not for imminent revolution, but for the no less idealistic ‘painless birth of a new civilisation which respects the human person and the biosphere’ (141, p.192). In practice, this means accepting a political party of some sort, with a programme of policies. The key changes in the political domain proposed in such programmes will now be summarised.
The organisation of the state and the political system is the first area in which greens propose radical solutions to their perceived 'crisis of representation'. Their solutions mainly address the redistribution of power within the political system and increasing the participation of the citizen. Their proposals are summed up in their calls to 'réinventer la démocratie et la citoyenneté' by moving to a Sixth Republic;²⁹ the institutions of the Fifth are seen as beyond repair. Specific changes they want to see would be based first on decentralisation of power. Greens want to see most decisions being taken at local or regional level (46, p.10). Their Sixth Republic would also involve moving away from bipolarisation 'qui enferme la réflexion dans un clivage gauche-droite' (35, p.257), to a more plural multi-party system, for which a change to an electoral system based on proportional representation is seen as a prerequisite (46, p.12). The executive's power would be strictly limited, and Parliament's increased (ibid., p.12). In sum, many of their proposals would recall the institutions of the Third Republic, were it not for their insistence on their second solution -- citizen participation.

They propose to involve the citizen more in day-to-day decision making. 'Accentuer la participation aux décisions' (126, p.2) is a recurrent theme, one which they intend to achieve by such measures as the introduction of a 'référendum d'initiative citoyenne à tous les niveaux de la vie publique' (46, p.12), as well as extending voting rights to all who live in France for more than five years, allowing citizens to address the Conseil Constitutionnel and reforming the Senate so it would be composed of regional representatives (46, pp.11-12).

In one of the clearest contradictions to their desire to decentralise decision making, however, the greens are virtually unanimous that in the economic sphere, the opposite approach should be adopted. The focus on natural limits leads them to call for the resurrection of interventionist economic strategies, now virtually ignored by most political parties, but common, of course, in the 1930s. Attempts simply to modify capitalism (the greening of industry, catalytic convertors) are attacked as insufficient: instead, the whole economic system must be abandoned.
should be directed, presumably at state level, for need rather than profit (20, p.176).
Such radical, top-down strategies are surprisingly widespread, even in basic reformist documents such as manifestos – les Verts stated in 1997, for example, that their economic strategy would be based on ‘le double refus du libéralisme et de l’étatisme, l’affirmation d’une logique non-marchande’, which seemed to involve the state taking over where private enterprise was seen to have failed, by the ‘massive’ creation of socially- and environmentally-useful jobs – ‘une politique de type “grands travaux”’, but in the field of employment (46, pp.6-7).

Another key area where the greens present clear reformist solutions is in the desire to introduce a more ‘moral’ public life. These include a more independent judicial system; ‘la transparence entre finances publiques et privées’ (123, Point x, p.3); and measures to avoid the corruption of politicians such as ensuring accountability, ‘une rémunération correcte’, ‘le droit à une réinsertion professionnelle’, more “transparence”, and ‘l’évaluation des politiques publiques’ (46, pp.11-12).

Political parties’ structures are also the focus for reforms, with les Verts in particular keen to lead by example. Decentralisation of power within the party is strictly adhered to through ‘structures démocratiques’, and the ‘prééminence des régions’, with a locally-elected body (the Conseil National Inter-Régional) to ensure this (91, p.201). The atmosphere of party meetings is supposed to be one of ‘convivialité’, in an attempt to encourage all to participate, particularly women and the young who are seen as disadvantaged in traditional party structures. Leaders are rejected by les Verts (if not by GE), who prefer to have four ‘porte-paroles’, two of each sex, to avoid the ‘cult’ of the leader they criticise in other political movements (‘des partis de présidentiables’). 30

Finally, they stress policies aimed at increasing the participation of women and the young in public life, whether through obvious changes like parité (46, p.10) or, in an approach reminiscent of the Popular Front, through ‘une politique d’incitations
fiscales et législatives’ for youth groups, particularly to ‘encourager les loisirs et les pratiques sportives’ (ibid., p.9).

3.5.2 Green revolution

Many of the reforms listed above are of course found in the programmes of other parties (though no doubt none would accept all of the greens’ reforms together). Where the green solutions are undoubtedly more original is in the second group, that of less practical, often revolutionary proposals. We should note here, however, that to divide the kinds of solution proposed by greens in this way does not mean that they do not frequently combine some reformist solutions with an emphasis on the second sort too.

The second sort of attempt to urge change, usually in human nature rather than in the voting system, is understandably less specific or clear, particularly when greens attempt to define how such change will be arrived at. Tellingly, the most detailed account of this sort of revolutionary change was described in a work of fiction, Callenbach’s infamous Ecotopia.

The first area in which green solutions tend to be at the very least idealistic is in their refusal of ‘les solutions duales’. Their economic aim is to involve all in their project for a new society, and to address the problems caused by capitalist productivism at the root, not by treating the symptoms (unemployment, precariousness) (38, p.96). How they actually plan to achieve this complete rejection of capitalism is less well documented, and the occasional reference which can be found tends to involve some appeal to principle, or, more often, a vague implication that mass spiritual enlightenment will do the trick.
This emphasis on 'the holistic sense of spirituality' and its ability to achieve political change is where the greens are at their most utopian:

The general point about the religious approach is that the changes that need to take place are too profound to be dealt with in the political arena, and that the proper territory for action is the psyche rather than the parliamentary chamber. (22, p.11)

This represents a convenient answer (if not a particularly convincing one) when greens are asked how they propose to get from the political institutions they criticise so strongly to their future decentralised, non-dualist, environmentally-friendly society. Of course, it is an approach based on a long-established tradition. Quite apart from the Personalists' attempts to mix politics and faith, the early greens of the 1970s were on the whole avowedly Christian, if non-practising,^{31} and works stressing spirituality such as Fromm's To have or to be (published in France and Germany in 1976) were highly influential in the European movement's formative period.

This approach is perhaps surprisingly widespread within the green movement today. 'The "re-enchantment" of the world is the defining feature of contemporary deep ecology' (22, p.45) for Barry; and even mainstream environmentalists like Porritt agree: 'To the enduring challenge of social justice we must now add the challenge of spiritual enlightenment' (19, p.233). Indeed, some see the emphasis on spirituality as explaining the greens' appeal to a great extent: 'Green politics is a filling of the spiritual vacuum at the centre of late industrial society' (20, p.121).

Greens frequently appeal to 'holism' or 'embeddedness', the idea that human beings are part of nature and that a 'new cosmology, a re-spiritualization and/or "rediscovery" of the mythic importance of nature' (22, p.45) will lead us naturally to change on a deep level. Women are often portrayed as more open to such 'enlightenment', especially in the works of ecofeminists (174, p.x). Some argue
that, in fact, women have always had a 'spiritual sense of nature' ('Women have always thought like mountains' [sic]) (175, p. 41), and that it is their absence from the exercise of power which has led to the current environmental crisis. Many critics have stressed dangers and disadvantages in this approach. First, it leaves greens open to accusations of utopianism, as we have seen. Second, it leads to a degree of exclusivity, with those who dislike the emphasis on spirituality (or simply men in general, in the eyes of many ecofeminists) portrayed as less than fully green:

With the holistic sense of spirituality, one's personal life is truly political and one's political life is truly personal. Anyone who does not comprehend within him- or herself this essential unity cannot achieve political change on a deep level and cannot strive for the true ideals of the Greens. (29, p. 52)

A final revolutionary or extreme solution in the political domain should be mentioned. Some sources, sceptical about both the likelihood of change in the established party system and about the possibility of changing human nature through vague appeals to spiritual enlightenment have concluded that the environmental crisis is likely to be solved only by imposing severe change from above. O'Riordan's\(^\text{32}\) classic definition of the four broad types of political response to the environmental crisis accepts that an 'authoritarian' response is possible (though many greens refute this, arguing that authoritarianism of any sort is not truly 'green'). What is clear is that, whether truly green or not, an awareness of the environmental crisis 'has the potential for the creation of a profoundly anti-democratic politics' (22, p. 47). Such approaches seem to have been more common in the early years of the green movement, with issues such as population leading individuals like Ehrlich\(^\text{33}\) to call for imposed change.

Faced with a choice between working slowly in the established party system (without much chance of success, in France) and hoping Gaia will intervene, the frustration of such greens is perhaps understandable. We might now consider
whether a similar combination of reformist and radical change, and resulting frustration are to be found in the 1930s sources.

### 3.6 1930s solutions

The first clear parallel between the new environmental movement at the end of the century and the sources studied from the 1930s is in their (at first reluctant, then full) acceptance of engagement. So Personalism was described by its founding figures as ‘une philosophie engagée dans les grandes luttes du siècle’ (75, p. 62), which recognised that an ‘effort collectif’ (26, p. 103) was the only possible solution to the political crisis they analysed. One essential factor in this acceptance of engagement was of course the reaction to the events of 1934: ‘Les événements de février 1934 provoquèrent un reclassement qui mit fin progressivement aux ambiguïtés. Chacun doit choisir son camp’ (11, p. 102). ‘La solidarité du péril’ (15, p. 171) was the dominant reaction by the mid-1930s.

Some unexpected figures joined in this general reaction. Giono, renowned for his individualism, was prepared by 1935 to make the only party political commitment of his life.

> Entre le Giono qui en février 1934 adhère à l’AEAR, (‘Pour cesser d’être inutile. Pour avoir des camarades. Pour pouvoir concerter l’action. Pour sentir cette action dirigée par un parti’, Commune 1934) et celui qui, au moment de Munich, stigmatise les communistes fauteurs de guerre, le contraste est net. (164, p. 174)

1 Association des Ecrivains et Artistes Révolutionnaires.
Giono was quickly disillusioned, then, by the Rassemblement populaire, but maintained his public commitment to non-party groups such as the Auberges and the Contadour experiment until the occupation. In intellectual circles generally, engagement was seen as the most appropriate reaction. Notably, the Comité de Vigilance des Intellectuels Anti-Fascistes (with Giono joining Langevin and Alain as founders) aimed to place intellectuals ‘à la disposition des organisations ouvrières’ (177, p.57). The Amsterdam-Pleyel movement had been founded with similar aims in 1932 (its key members being Barbusse and Rolland).

Nor was this seen as an inappropriate reaction by political movements of the period. Indeed, the young non-conformists called publicly on writers to move away from the ‘brillante mais superficielle’ literature of 1920s and respond to ‘le besoin profond d’une littérature plus engagée dans la condition humaine’.

The PCF made similar calls – in July 1931, Thorez recognised that ‘one vital way of reforming links with the mass of working-class people was through cultural activities of various kinds’, and fellow-travellers (who would eventually be ‘rejected as bourgeois’) were welcomed (178, p.98). In a widespread contradiction of Benda’s previous warning in La trahison des clercs that intellectuals should go back to ‘idées pures’ and leave ‘l’événement’ to politicians, intellectuals and artists accepted political commitment on such a scale in the 1930s that this is one of the most discussed aspects of the contemporary political climate.

‘La solidarité de l’intellectuel, de l’écrivain avec les masses souffrantes’ (179, p.20), and general political commitment by leading figures was the first element of solutions proposed in the 1930s, then. Such intellectual involvement did bring problems, however. One Comintern official in Paris saw the PCF as a lost cause in the 1930s, precisely because it was “too obsessed with its own “philosophical crises” to be able to respond to the political realities of the day” (180, p.262).
On the right, too, a public engagement was seen as a necessary step, as Céline (to his later regret) demonstrated, at least in his work. Indeed, it has been argued that intellectuals and writers who opted for the extreme right were often attracted precisely by the idea of engagement rather than the extreme right's actual policies: 'ces intellectuels attirés par le fascisme étaient plus sensibles à son activisme qu'à son idéologie' (11, p.98).

Once the idea of engagement was accepted, the question of what that commitment should mean was raised in the 1930s, and in the same terms in which the greens would raise it half a century later. The answers they arrived at were also similar. There was an initial rejection of political parties: the non-conformists favoured a 'refus du parti en tant que tel' (15, p.203) at the start of the decade. The 'règles de stratégie personnaliste' stated clearly that: 'Du moins au départ, l'indépendance à l'égard des partis et des groupements constitués est nécessaire' (26, p.118).

This stance was to change for some by the time of the Rassemblement, later the Front Populaire, when 'the impossible became realisable' (166, p.133) – although such high hopes were always going to be disappointed. The different atmosphere of politics under the Popular Front offers one explanation for its ability to win over previously non-party-political figures: 'Politics became a pageant' (ibid., p.114), 'both celebration and political protest' (169, p.227). Its encouragement of family outings at political demonstrations, and of women's politicisation (181, pp.185-90) are reminiscent of modern green tactics. The Popular Front's emphasis on the cultural might also have helped – it was not 'une simple coalition électorale', but the union of over a hundred organisations 'parmi lesquelles plusieurs [avaient] des objectifs principalement culturaux, [ce qui] multipliait les occasions d’engagement' (182, p.100).

The willingness of previously ni-ni groups like the Personalists to give some support to the Popular Front was not a permanent commitment, needless to say. Mounier's
engagement is best described as "a revocable "engagement à gauche"" (81, p.287), and his varying position through the 1930s (no specific commitment to left or right until 1935, then some degree of support for the left until 1938, when he penned an obituary for the Popular Front in Esprit, and returned to a general ni-ni stance, combined with some sympathy for the left) is representative of the political evolution of many of our sources. By 1938, the ni-ni approach was very much in evidence again – "Pour beaucoup il devenait difficile de choisir entre "les crimes de Staline" et "les crimes de Hitler"" (183, p.152).

Once again, contradictions are quickly apparent, since the 1930s sources mixed policies traditionally associated with both left and right in much the same way as modern greens do. One example would be the Personalists, who strove to find a balance between their belief in a ‘révolution nécessaire’ (with its left-wing connotations) and traditionally conservative catholicism. Again like the greens, such conservatism and revolutionary change were frequently present within the same movement or individual. To divide 1930s solutions into two broad categories is not to say that groups did not favour aspects from both at once, then.

3.6.1 1930s reformism

If the 1930s sources were virtually unanimous in their hatred of capitalism, many were less than clear about what should replace it. This was understandably true of writers in particular. For Céline, criticism of the existing order was sufficient; for Giono, it was enough to ‘destroy’ capitalism (and he did give – somewhat romantic – indications as to how this destruction might be achieved by the paysan) (60, pp.95-6), and allow some organic development of a better alternative – ‘Cette société bâtie sur l’argent, il te [= le paysan] faut la détruire avant d’être heureux’ (ibid., p.207).
Many looked to marxist economic theory, at least as a starting point. However, for most of our ni-ni groups, this too had inherent dangers. For the Personalists, the marxist analysis of capitalism had many positive elements but these had to be combined with a new emphasis on the person and clearer indications of how a new economic system would place the person at its centre. To this end, one of Mounier's study groups debated the issue at some length, eventually publishing a special issue of *Esprit* in April 1934, entitled *De la propriété capitaliste à la propriété humaine*. This carefully explained the Personalist position and described key aspects of a better economy, if remaining somewhat elusive as to how French society might actually get there ('par fragments ou en bloc, vite ou lentement, directement ou par détours, c'est le secret de l'avenir') (26, p.122). The Personalists' solutions resembled those of other non-conformist groups in their stress on finding a 'third way' between capitalism and 'state capitalism' ('ni capitalisme sauvage, ni étatsisme') (64, p.143), but were generally more explicit regarding the detail of their eventual aims. These included, among many others, 'la substitution à l'économie anarchique, fondée sur le profit, d'une économie organisée sur les perspectives totales de la personne', which resembled green solutions in its desire to replace production for 'want' with production based on 'need'; and the 'abolition des classes formées sur la division du travail ou de la fortune'. Industries which led to 'l'aliénation économique' were to be nationalised, but this was to be done (somehow) 'sans étatisation' (26, p.120).

The Personalists were careful to link their economic aims to their political ones. The main reason for economic reform was that it was necessary in political terms - democracy could not work under capitalism: 'La démocratie capitaliste est une démocratie qui donne à l'homme des libertés dont le capitalisme lui retire l'usage'. A 'démocratie économique effective, adaptée aux structures modernes de la production' (26, p.128) (i.e., able to control them for the person’s benefit) was to take its place.
What these ideas meant in practice was an emphasis on economic planning as a solution between communism and capitalism, particularly the 'Planisme' of De Man. Another contradictory attempt to balance central or state-level control with decentralisation of power can therefore be observed here, since most of the new groups did want political decentralisation except in the economic sphere. This contradictory emphasis was shared by the non-conformists, but also by some on the left (the neo-socialists). The new right were more consistent, if more threatening, since unlike the Personalists, they married the rejection of capitalism and acceptance of planning to an outright rejection of democracy – 'le capitalisme n’est pas autre chose que la forme sociale de la démocratie' (184, p.128).

For most of our 1930s sources, though, the rejection of capitalism meant looking for new, third-way structures in politics and economics - 'Ils semblaient rechercher [...] dans le domaine des institutions une voie médiane entre mollesse supposée des démocraties et rouages totalitaires des dictatures naissantes' (182, p.90). This led them to make relatively concrete proposals for reform of the state.

The need to reform the state and its institutions was one practical change agreed on by all. Even the traditional parties of right and left were discussing what reforms should be made in the 1930s. By 1933, ‘to talk of a reform of the state had become respectable; the executive had more or less ceased to function’ (166, p.22). Esprit called for a new ‘démocratie organique’ (15, p.212) to be allowed to grow. The non-conformists generally wanted an ‘état minimum’, except in the economic realm. The state ‘by degrees limits itself to a role of exceptional mediation and defense’ in Mounier’s ideal Personalist community (81, p.274). This was based on their attempt to place the person at the heart of any alternative state, since ‘tout pouvoir non-contrôlé tend à l’abus’ (26, p.126). The Personalists’ proposed practical reforms were therefore based on:
une limitation constitutionnelle des pouvoirs de l'État; équilibre du pouvoir central par les pouvoirs locaux, organisation du recours des citoyens contre l'État, habeas corpus, limitation des pouvoirs de police, indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire. (ibid., p.126)

We might note here that all these points are still stressed in the current manifesto of Les Verts. A particular parallel can be drawn between the emphasis in the 1930s on the ‘problème de la représentation’ (the title of an issue of Esprit in March 1939) and green support for decentralisation and citizen participation. The non-conformists all wanted to encourage more citizen participation in decision-making. ‘Une représentation aussi sincère, intégrale et efficace que possible des volontés des citoyens’ (ibid., p.127) should be introduced, but this, it was felt, did not go far enough, since representation per se was not absolutely democratic – the citizen still suffered from ‘l'inévitable aliénation que lui impose la condition du gouverné’ (ibid., p.127) in the most ideal democracy.

Locally-based power was seen, by the Personalists as by the greens, as the best solution to this problem. An ‘État pluraliste’ was called for in 1935, with ‘pouvoirs divisés et affrontés pour se garantir mutuellement de l'abus’ (ibid., p.128), and federalism and decentralisation were to be the ‘utopie directrice’ (ibid., p.125). There was also a widespread emphasis on mass or ‘bottom-up’ change – ‘On ne refera pas la France par les élites, on la refera par la base’ (155, p.56). Proportional representation was also emphasised in the attempt to guarantee accurate representation, with support for this measure coming even from the far-right:

[Le chef des Croix-de-Feu, le 'Colonel' de la Rocque] se prononce même pour un mode de scrutin “sincère”, incluant la proportionnelle et le vote des femmes. (154, p.167)
By the 1930s, virtually all movements identifying their engagement as a political one were clear that French women should be afforded political rights (50, p.251). The emphasis on the role of women and young people in changing society and in a more participative political system is of course shared by modern greens. Both groups were seen as significant in the 1930s for their generally favourable views on pacifism in particular (as we shall see in Chapter 4), young men because they would be called upon to enlist, and women, especially war widows, who were organising campaigns with slogans such as 'Ils ne nous prendront pas nos fils!'26

Of course, the youthful membership and leaders of many of the new movements may have played a role in their emphasis on youth as a potential solution to many of the problems they identified in French society. The co-directors of Combat, to take but one of many examples, were thirty and twenty-seven years old respectively in 1936 (184, p.123). Intellectuals and writers also looked to youth to reconstruct society, often in very optimistic terms. Giono could write as late as 1938, for example, that he was

bouleversé de joie devant tout le travail lucide et courageux qu’ont fait les jeunes gens des Auberges de la Jeunesse. Bouleversé parce qu’ils sont l’espoir, qu’avec eux tout est possible; que sans eux rien n’est possible. (27, p.247)

### 3.6.2 1930s revolution

This idea that ‘tout est possible’ was a recurrent one in 1930s France and perhaps contributed to the prevalence of demands for impractical or utopian change, especially during the middle of the decade. There were grandiose calls to ‘refaire la renaissance’ (112, p.84) for example. Such solutions tended to be dramatic but not clearly defined, again especially those of intellectuals and writers. Giono could
write in his non-fiction that 'Il n'y a qu'un seul remède: notre force. Il n'y a qu'un seul moyen de l'utiliser: la révolte' (160, p.25), but then describe his version of the better society only in a work of fiction, where his imagination could be exercised freely and details of how change might be achieved could be attributed to mystical natural forces or superhuman newcomers, like Bobi in *Que ma joie demeure*. Saint-Exupéry also stated vaguely that what was needed was to emphasise qualities such as 'Humanisme, Homme, Fraternité' against individualism, doctrine and ideology, though how this might achieve change was left unstated (185, p.60). Of course, artists need not define change in concrete terms political movements are expected to adopt: 'Giono never seriously concocts an organized utopia, a more perfect future state' (52, p.98).

For political movements, though, such definitions were expected. However, groups who offered definite critiques of the existing order generally favoured 'le rêve moins précis d'un ordre nouveau' (11, p.98) when it came to offering solutions:

Mounier fait remarquer que si le cri "A bas les voleurs!" est en transversalité de la droite à la gauche, aucune "formule positive" n'a émergé d'un côté ou d'un autre. (164, p.144)

- nor indeed from newer groups on the whole, whether non-conformist or of the extremes:

Lorsqu'il s'agit de définir le régime politique de son choix, le chef des Croix-de-feu se montre peu enclin à la précision. (154, p.167)

In some cases, this is an unfair accusation, however. We might certainly accuse the Personalists of utopianism, but they were at least relatively precise in their descriptions of this utopia, since Mounier believed his movement should avoid the
failings of other groups. Personalism was even described by one of its founders, Domenach as ‘a method for thinking and living’ (112, p.4). As we have seen in the previous section, Mounier did try to define elements of practical change. This is not to say that he was not also tempted by relatively utopian idealistic pronouncements. In the October 1933 *Esprit*,

Mounier envisaged his ideal future society as one vast monastery in which the rule of money and the material would come to an end. (ibid., p.80)

Mounier’s strategy appears to have been to combine his global utopian vision with practical reforms in the short-term which were to make the ideal state attainable in the longer term. He set about trying to form a network of ‘communes à la taille de l’homme’, inspired by Proudhon, (81, p.271) which he described as ‘collective persons inspired by a living poverty or generous simplicity’ (112, p.82). These were to be the basis of an eventual ‘spiritual revolution in Europe’ (ibid., p.87) but this would only be possible under a combination of this network with ‘time, a pluralistic state, and a decentralized economy’ (ibid., p.87).

For the non-conformists, famously, revolution was ‘nécessaire’ even though they recognised that any revolution is ‘une crise morbide [qui] n’apporte point de solution automatique’ (26, p.119). They frequently argued that calls for a revolution were neither impractical nor utopian, however, basing their defence on their faith in human revolutionary potential was closely linked to their religious faith and emphasis on spirituality as a way to achieve radical change. ‘La révolution sera spirituelle ou elle ne sera pas’. Personalists argued that philosophy and spirituality had to be combined with political commitment in order to harness ‘the revolutionary power of Christianity’ (112, p.80). Mounier’s dogmatic statements on the necessity of a spiritual element in political change recall those of Capra and Spretnak discussing the greens:
This was Mounier's explanation for the failure of the Popular Front - the 'obituary' he wrote for the coalition in March 1938 noted that it had lacked 'a strong spirituality which could have improved men, articulated doctrines, and formed characters' (112, p.131). Terre Nouvelle used the same argument, describing themselves as 'communistes spiritualistes' and making their point strikingly through their use of a white hammer and sickle imposed on a red cross (81, p.279).

A final parallel can be drawn in this section between modern ecofeminists and the emphasis on women's special role in achieving a sort of spiritual or 'felt' change in some 1930s sources, notably the Personalist stress on women as the way forward or the female characters in the novels of Giono. Female characters are rarely the main protagonists in his fiction, but where they almost invariably play a central role is in bringing about radical change through the 'petit geste'. Such change is depicted as radical and effective, but arising from an artless 'felt' reaction, usually to the women's natural surroundings. 'Les bases du nouvel édifice' (60, p.95) which leads to the community finding itself on a 'nouvelle arche de Noé' (ibid., p.141) arise not from a rational reaction to political crisis, rather from a natural quasi-spiritual reaction to an absurd 'civilisation'.

To those desperate for urgent and radical change in the 1930s, however, such utopian visions or the widespread combination of reform and revolution led to a frustration even more understandable than that of modern environmentalists. Those who felt change then had to be imposed were, with hindsight, to prove more dangerous by the end of the decade - working with Vichy tempted even figures diametrically opposed to most of its views like Mounier because, despite their disagreements, even Vichy seemed more likely to allow change than the previous
regime. The early acceptance of the Vichy regime also meant, of course, that France would no longer be at war, the focus of the next chapter.

1 Dumont, in an interview in 1974, reproduced in (130, p.152).
2 The gaullist RPR will be included in the right for the purposes of this chapter, as, despite a long-running debate on whether gaullism can easily be classed as 'right-wing', this is where most political scientists situate them; and, more importantly, where the greens believe them to belong. When greens refer to 'la droite' today, they certainly include the RPR in their criticisms.
3 Green slogan, used on a poster in Amis de la Terre, Recueil de documents, held in the Bibliothèque nationale, Paris.
4 Mounier, 'Court traité de la mythique de gauche', reproduced in (65, p.211).
5 L'Union Nationale des Combattants (UNC) in 1933, quoted in (154, p.161).
6 Mounier, quoted in (73, p.208).
7 For an account of how Doriot switched from being a Communist Party leader to his position of 'chef de parti de masse' in the PPF, see (154, pp.178-82).
8 See (151) for a discussion of Comte's influence.
9 Speaking in March 1852, quoted in (65, p.35).
10 See (150, 'Preface') for details.
11 See (151, p.13) for details.
12 Amo, Dixir Nouveau, No. 4, October 1933, quoted in (15, p.203).
13 An oft-used term, here employed by Bucard's 'Francistes', quoted in (154, p.175).
14 In Clandestine, quoted in (163, p.87).
15 Jean Brière, one of the founding members of Les Verts and a 'porte-parole' during the 1980s made a speech reported as anti-semitic in the French press during the Gulf War. Lalonde accused Les Verts of reacting too slowly in their eventual condemnation of Brière, though the party countered that their internal democracy meant that exclusion, even on racist grounds, was a long process in order to allow the accused member to mount a proper defence.
16 Mounier's term, repeated widely in the 1930s. See, for example (164, p.143).
17 Lackin, for example, offers the intellectual nature of French politicians, drawn from the professions and dominated by intellectuals as an explanation for the different style of debate in France and Anglo-saxon countries; see (85, p.40).
18 Thorez in 1931; quoted in (88, p.87).
19 Reprinted in (72, p.643).
20 Aron & Dandieu, Le cancer américain, quoted in (15, p.229).
21 The syndicalisme français ne peut admétre, entre les personnes, des distinctions fondées sur la race, la religion, la naissance, les opinions ou l'argent' for example. The 'Manifeste', published in 1940 is reproduced in (72, p.489).
22 The 21 Conditions of the Third International are reproduced in (ibid., p.233).
23 See (152, p.45). Lagrange was thirty-five when appointed.
24 Vianne, Esprit, no.13, November 1933, p.29, quoted in (15, p.223).
25 See (85, p.42) for an account of why this was so in the 1930s.
26 Remba repeatedly uses this phrase to describe Giono's political views.
27 By Hoffmann, for example; cited in (91, p.163).
28 Title of paper published in IRNES Perspectives on the environment, pp.43-57.
31 One study of European green movements found that 'most' of the activists in the early groups were christian – see (29, p.50).
32 (176), published in 1981.
An American academic best known for *The population bomb*, who later renounced his 1960s views as dangerous and unworkable.

'Dieu vivant', no 15, quoted in (15, p.237).

Mounier in a letter to Archambault, reproduced in (15, p.211).

Bonnaud-Lamotte in the discussion following Winock’s paper, reproduced in (183, p.158).

Mounier, quoted in (141, p.266).
Chapter 4
War

4.1 Introduction

There are three broad parallels accounting for shared attitudes to war by modern greens and 1930s sources. First, both have recent memories or ongoing experience of actual conflict (WW1, war in Ethiopia, civil war in Spain for 1930s sources; the Vietnam War at the formative period of the green movement, and more recently, war in the Gulf and in former Yugoslavia). They therefore have a shared experience of living through war, albeit on quite a different scale. This shared experience also came during the formative period of both sets of sources. Those who joined the youth movements of the 1930s were born before or during WW1, and many of them would have lost close relatives in the conflict; many, including Giono and Céline had actual experience of combat at a young age. The greens, too, were marked by war during the formative period of their movement. The Vietnam war was one of the most-debated issues during May 1968, the My Lai massacre having taken place in March of the same year; and as we noted in Chapter 1, the green movement had its direct origins in both the May events and the anti-military and anti-nuclear protests of the Cold War. Campaigns at Fessenheim and against the extension of the military base at the Larzac plateau in 1973 were the first experience of political commitment for many greens, including high-profile figures like Solange Fernex (186, p.205).

Second, they share a fear of likely future conflict involving France, a fear confirmed by WW2 for the 1930s sources, and the wars already mentioned in the 1990s. Such fears vary in intensity during the periods studied. Third, the two sets of sources
share the belief that these likely future wars are to be feared more than any previous conflict. In the 1930s, this was because new weapons technology (including chemical weapons) and the prospect of the first effective use of air strikes, combined with the unheard-of military might of Germany and the USSR, meant that the next war’s effects were impossible to predict and clearly far more devastating than those of any previous war. For modern greens, this is because of a comparable fear of the potential use of new technology in future conflicts, notably nuclear weapons and modern germ warfare.

These three shared experiences and fears lead, unsurprisingly, to broadly similar criticisms, ones which set both greens and 1930s sources apart from dominant attitudes in the interim period. After WW2, the memory of the Occupation and the Holocaust meant extreme pacifism was discredited in France. Not until 1970s anti-military campaigns (campaigns which were led by nascent greens) did organised pacifism make an impact again. Indeed, critics of modern greens already make the connection between them and the 1930s in this context: ‘Au cours de la guerre du Golfe, les écologistes furent [...] à de nombreuses reprises étiquetés comme “munichois”’ (31, p.18).

In the 1930s, absolute (or ‘integral’) pacifism was a common reaction to the horrors of WW1, especially since there was not yet the awareness of the Holocaust and consequences of refusing war against Nazi Germany. The extent of pacifist attitudes in 1930s French society was to be played down in the aftermath of WW2. As late as 1991, Ingram demonstrated that ‘the dearth of historical writing on the French peace movement of this century is almost complete’ (187, p.1).1 Ingram attributes this in part to the number and diversity of 1930s pacifist groups, which makes their study complicated. Reynolds (149, p.201) further argues that, because pacifism had an ‘awkward tendency to ignore left/right distinctions or to switch between them’, it has been ignored by historians interested in ‘the main plot of the opera’ (ibid., p.225). A final plausible explanation is given by Walter. If pacifist movements are forgotten, it is because they represent a painful memory:
C’est l’histoire d’un désastre. Nous nous étions réunis pour combattre le fascisme et la guerre, et nous avons eu les deux, avec la défaite en prime. (188, 69)

No matter how the failure to remember 1930s pacifism is explained, what is of interest for this study is that virulent criticisms of the effects of war are to be found across the entire range of green movements and 1930s sources; and, as we shall see in the final two sections of this chapter, that an extreme form of pacifism is widely seen as an appropriate response.

4.2 Green criticisms

Both the effects of an actual war or the potential effects of a future conflict are criticised by greens. These can be considered in two broad categories: the effects of war on society in general, and on the individual or person.

4.2.1 War and society

Any green analysis takes as its starting point that there is no such thing as a ‘glorious’ war (19, p.162), no matter how justified it might be. Whether a ‘just’ war or not (and many greens still argue this is a contradiction in terms), the effects of any combat on the environment are the same. Criticisms are made of the direct effects of war on human lives, the abuse of limited natural resources and damage to the environment caused by war. War is ‘the ultimate pollutant’ (37, p.114), and the military in wartime represents ‘la plus grande source de gaspillage’, wasting all the resources most important to the green analysis: ‘du travail, de l’espace, de l’énergie, des minéraux rares,’ and polluting ‘les airs et les eaux’ (189, p.88). War is also
attacked for its effects on society in the long-term. Greens have studied the effects of toxic chemicals and radiation released into the environment, and campaign in favour of communities still affected by mines, birth defects, and other long-term effects. The funding of conflicts around the world also 'precludes any possibility of a peaceful transition to a sustainable society' (19, p.161), the greens' ultimate goal.

When greens criticise the cost of war, they especially invoke the nuclear industry. The anti-nuclear campaign was of course the 'fer de lance des écologistes en France' (35, p.26), and for greens, civil and military uses of the atom are interrelated, because of the common effects they have on society. First, both involve a strong state: protection against terrorism is needed for both nuclear installations and the force de frappe, regardless of their different uses. Next, two key demands of the greens are citizen participation and freedom of information. Both are impossible in an 'état nucléaire', in the greens' view. The dominance of the nuclear debate by the 'technocracy' (19, p.59) or 'savants' means citizens feel unqualified to participate; and secrecy rather than freedom of information is the hallmark of a nuclear power for the greens. They see this as true of both nuclear energy (eg. the French government's attempt to cover up the extent of fallout from Chernobyl) and weapons (secrecy regarding the extent and effects of French nuclear testing, for example).

Greens further criticise the complicity of the media and the use of propaganda during wartime, which mean those who oppose a war are marginalised, if not demonised. Secrecy and the managing of information are attacked for their long-term effects on democracy, rather than their use during actual wars alone. Indeed, the greens frequently make the point that the effects of actual conflicts are only a small part of the problem. Instead, the possibility of war and the effects of a militarized society are argued to have the most damaging effects, and it is these effects we will now consider.
First of all, greens argue a 'war culture' exists, even outside wartime, and that this adversely affects democracy. The decision-making process of foreign and defence policy is 'wholly unaccountable' (37, p.114), especially in France, where both domains are the special reserve of the President. Chirac's decision to resume nuclear testing in 1995 is cited as an example of the lack of democracy: no mention was made of this decision in his pre-election programme, and public opposition did not prevent the tests being carried out. The war 'culture' is seen as particularly dangerous because particularly difficult to define and to challenge. Some greens have attacked the use of violent images, 'jouets guerriers' and so on (eg. 190, p.5) as an important part of this 'culture'.

Second, greens criticise the costs to society of remaining prepared for possible conflict. These costs are both economic and environmental. Greens typically compare military spending with what they see as more deserving or pressing concerns. 'Dix heures de dépenses militaires, c'est des moyens contraceptifs pour toutes les femmes' (189, p.82); or they contrast the expenditure of the Ministère de l'environnement and that of the Ministère de la défense nationale '300 fois plus faibles!' 2 The military also consumes limited resources; the example of the US military is frequently cited (10% of the country's oil consumption is used by the military (37, p.114)). Finally, military requirements are prioritised to the detriment of more environmentally sound ones. In France, the development of the Larzac plateau for military training, and the eviction of hundreds of paysans whose families had worked the land for centuries was one of the first campaigns to mobilise French environmentalists.

Greens oppose the costs of being prepared for possible future wars as immoral, when the 'real danger' is elsewhere, in their view:
The threats we face today are less likely to arise from a breakdown between nations than from the breakdown between humanity and the Earth (19, p.160).

Most immoral of all, though, in the greens’ view are the arms industries which profit from war. Not only are these exactly the type of industrial productivist concerns the greens reject, but in liberal capitalist economies, ‘logic’ dictates they should encourage further wars in the drive for profit. As Porritt puts it, ‘industrialism begets belligerency’ (ibid., p.161). Greens offer several specific examples of wars which they see as having been encouraged or continued for economic reasons rather than any ‘raison d’état’, notably the superpowers’ involvement in the Iran-Iraq conflict (191, p.43). Greens in France argued the Gulf War, too was being fought principally for economic reasons; les Verts’ slogan at the time was ‘Pas de guerre pour le pétrole’ (107, p.160). Especially cynical is the arms industry’s exploitation of patriotic sentiment for profit in the view of the French greens, who quote Anatole France to illustrate the point: ‘On croit mourir pour la patrie, on meurt pour les industriels’ (189, p.84).

An aspect by which greens are particularly concerned here is how developing countries are affected by war. The ‘culture’ of war means French attitudes are ‘plus conquérants que solidaires’ (96, p.198). This in turn means that the effects of the environmental crisis will be worse than they need be: as more and more people compete for fewer resources, ‘we can anticipate a period of disputes and armed conflicts’.

Greens attribute colonialist attitudes to what they see as the French attachment to the nation state (they particularly dislike the term ‘patrie’) and heroic leaders. In France,
la conscience collective est marquée par le mythe du chef glorieux [et par] des ambitions impériales. [...] La réalité ne correspond plus à ces rêves. (96, p.183)

This attachment is criticised as dangerous, since it prevents new ways of addressing the environmental crisis, encourages war, and even leads to anti-democratic or extreme politics outwith wartime: the Front National is ‘l’héritier extrême de cette logique qui pousse à la confrontation plus qu’au partage’ (ibid., p.189).

The final broad criticism greens make of the effects the ‘war culture’ has on society relates to power and hierarchy. As we have seen in Chapter 3, the greens want devolved power and an ‘état minimum’. Neither can be achieved while the attachment to the nation-state and dominance of the army continue. Moscovici explains the green view:

État et militarisation vont de pair, non seulement sur le plan économique, mais également sur le plan de la pensée (192, p.48).

The military is presented as the antithesis of the green movement: ‘Défenseur de la vie, il se veut d’emblée à l’antipode de l’organisation de la mort’ (ibid., p.48). Its ideas and principles (key themes being self sacrifice, membership of a mass organisation, obeying orders, top-down decisions) all contradict green hopes for society. In France, such ideas are seen as particularly damaging, since military service means young citizens may be influenced, making them less likely to become the sort of active citizenry the greens would like. Dumont, for example, argues that the effect of military service is to prevent questioning attitudes: ‘L’armée m’a fait savoir qu’il fallait obéir d’abord, quitte à protester ensuite’ (189, p.83).
The effects of actual or potential war are thus dangerous for participative democracy. The effects for the individual or person are seen as just as damaging as those for democracy, however, and it is to these effects we will now turn.

4.2.2 War and the person

In their criticisms of the effects of war on the person, greens generally refer to the effects of actual conflicts rather than potential effects of future war. One exception is their emphasis of the potential effects of new technology, which will be considered at the end of this section.

Greens are first critical of war as it affects two groups disproportionately – the young and the poor. These are two groups which already have the special sympathy and attention of the greens. Both groups are seen to be affected disproportionately during actual times of war and because of the potential for future conflict.

The young, firstly, attract special sympathy from the greens for three main reasons. They, like the green movement, were not yet born when the environmental crisis was caused. They have no real political power (politicians are ‘ces hommes du troisième âge’) (123, p.3), nor do they run the industries which greens attack: their hands are cleaner. Second, as they will live longer, they are more likely to suffer the extreme effects of an environmental crisis than their elders, who caused it. Finally, the young are the group most likely to support the greens, and hence, the best hope for the future: almost 50% of those who vote for les Verts are under 35 years of age (107, p.168).

Why do greens argue that the young are disproportionately affected? In time of war, they are of course most likely to be called on to fight. Even outwith war time, young French men are required to complete military service of one year or civil
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'coopération' of two years. The experience of military service (and the virtual impossibility of conscientious objection in France) marked many greens—it led Dumont to adopt 'une véritable guerre individuelle contre l'armée' (189, p.83), for example. That they are more likely to be called on to fight in wars is seen as particularly unjust because of the loss of potential involved in the mass deaths of the young; and, more importantly, because the young have no influence when the decision is made to go to war. Politicians who will not themselves have to fight have unfair power over them. Some greens even argue that one danger of military impact on the young is that a general culture of violence ensues. Levene sees little difference between football hooligans, conscripts and officers who choose to serve (an 'upper-class gang') (191, p.48).

The second group identified by the greens as disproportionately affected is that of the disadvantaged or the poor, particularly those in developing countries. Why do greens feel this group deserves special attention? Again, they are not implicated in the environmental crisis to the same extent, but will suffer unduly as a result of it. Second, such people are more likely to have a sustainable way of life, particularly in developing countries, than those who send them to war. Finally, greens argue that those who have not benefited from modern industrial use of scarce resources must be given special consideration, as the planet's limited resources mean they will never enjoy the standard of living current in industrialised countries.

Why do greens argue that such groups are disproportionately affected by war? Again the 'economically deprived, socially confined and politically coerced' are the most likely to have to do military service or sign up for the military (ibid., p.49)—those from more influential groups can frequently avoid service. Second, they too have little political power, so will be forced to fight in wars begun by others. Their lack of political weight also means that they suffer unduly even outwith times of war. The cause of inhabitants of French Polynesia, where nuclear testing was carried out for several decades, was one the greens were quick to adopt, for example. Those who join the military through economic necessity are generally viewed
sympathetically by the greens, too. One of the effects of possible nuclear war which
the greens frequently highlight is the 'extraordinarily high incidence' of
psychological disorders, drug abuse and alcoholism at missile bases such as Strategic
Air Force Command - 'the stress of carrying out mass murder' (19, p.149).

The main argument against actual war is of course its potential effect on the
individual who has to fight. Futile loss of life and the absurdity of many wars are
stressed by greens, who frequently provide chilling statistics to explain their position
- 'Since 1960 at least 10,700,000 people have died in 65 wars' (ibid., pp.62-3).
Greens see this as a particular tragedy because such wars typically involve the
annihilation of a more sustainable way of life, especially in developing countries.
The agronomist Dumont defined himself as a 'pacifiste intégral’ for precisely this
reason:

ceux qui vont mourir un fusil à la main sont ceux qui ne pourront plus
manier la faux ou pousser la charrue. (189, p.81)

Nor are such effects limited to those who actually fight or to times of war. In many
countries under military occupation or during war, a relatively sustainable way of
life is abandoned, with, for example 'self-sufficiency [giving] way to prostitution as
the only relevant way to make a living' (191, p.41). The effects of war on
populations and on the land on which they are dependent are a key focus for
criticisms: in Vietnam, for example, people still die from the effects of dioxin
poisoning, suffer cancers, go blind, and give birth to seriously ill or malformed
children (ibid., p.42). The disproportionate after-effects of war on women are
another focus of green criticisms. ‘Patriarchal culture is founded on sacrifice, crime,
war'; women typically have less power and are less implicated in the decision to go
to war, yet their health and livelihoods will be disproportionately affected.
The prioritising of military needs has negative effects for individuals as well as for society in general. First, military spending (along with debt) means even basic necessities such as safe drinking water are unavailable in many developing countries. Second, inspirational groups for the greens such as the remaining native American Indians have been dispossessed of their lands and traditional way of life in order to allow for military exercises (see 193, pp.136-40).

The final broad criticism made by greens of the effects of war on the person are of the potential effects of new weapons. The potential 'human consequences of modern technology' (19, p.51), particularly nuclear weapons, have been spelt out in frightening detail in accounts such as Schell's The fate of the earth. French greens in particular have been

intarissables sur le descriptif de l'hiver nucléaire, ne ratant pas une occasion d'aller se coucher sur la chaussée pour simuler les conséquences d'une attaque nucléaire (189, p.82),

and have been accused of scaremongering as a result. The greens may contribute to the atmosphere of fear which the possibility of war and potential effects of new weapons create, but they would argue this is necessary if the 'culture' of war is to be destroyed, as we shall see later. We will look first, however, at 1930s criticisms of war.

4.3 1930s criticisms of war

In the 1930s too, criticisms of war focussed on both the effects of actual conflict and the possibility of future wars. Again, these can be considered in terms of society in general, and the person.
4.3.1 War and society

Like modern greens, those living in post-WW1 France were aware that war was never 'glorious'. Horrific accounts of the reality of trench warfare had been widely published during the 1920s, and the efforts of influential *anciens combattants* like Emile-Auguste Chartier ('Alain', professeur de khâgne at the Lycée Henri-IV throughout the 1930s) meant that the 'scandale de la guerre' was communicated to the younger generation (65, p.123). There was a corresponding belief that 'la guerre juste, qu'on appelle aussi la dernière des guerres' was an illusion, since no matter what the cause, its effects were the same.

Accounts of direct effects of war on the land where it was fought were widespread in the 1930s and emphasised the same aspects which greens stress today. Criticisms of 'gaspillage' recur in both sources, though in the 1930s, the word 'matériel' rather than 'environnemental' is used. War always involves 'gaspillage des hommes, des matériaux'; 'ruines matérielles' (194, p.101). The absurdly wasteful effects of actual conflicts on the environment were present in fictional accounts as well as in the 'témoignages' of former soldiers - 'Les forêts, on a tiré dessus aussi, au canon' (53, p.44).

Criticisms of the effects of actual conflicts were not limited merely to the 'matériel', though. The significance of equal citizens for French republicanism meant that the hierarchy of command necessary in wartime was particularly resented - it was 'un pouvoir absolu et humiliant, indigne d'hommes libres' (194, p.92). Decisions are taken by an officer 'qui connaît et décide par trois bureaux, [qui] n'a pas vu la guerre', who is 'hors de la boue, de la faim, de la soif, du froid et des éclatements volcaniques' (195, p.44) in what was presented as a direct contradiction of the republican principles of fraternity and equality.
The third criticism, based on actual conflicts related to the use of wartime propaganda, 'Par la musique, par les discours, l'excès de la violence est relevé jusqu'au niveau de la beauté' (ibid., p. 174). Those who had fought in WW1 found this particularly deplorable and cynical: wartime broadcasts were 'mensonges destinés à tuer [...] qu'on vous donnait à la TSF' (27, p. 243) and were attacked for their effects during the war.

However, as with modern greens, very few critics in the 1930s restricted their attacks to the past effects on society of actual wars. Instead, they felt a duty to describe and explain the effects of war on society generally, even outwith wartime. With regard to propaganda, for example, most critics focussed on its growing use and effects during the 1930s rather than simply explaining how it had been used during WW1. This is less than surprising given the 'remarkable essor des nouvelles méthodes de propagande' (152, p. 103), such as radio and cinema during the decade. Ownership of radios in France rose from 2,625,000 in 1935, to more than 5,500,000 in 1939, and by the middle of the decade they played 'un rôle politique capital' (ibid., p. 98). Criticisms of the effects of what was seen as pro-war propaganda were therefore continued long after WW1 had ended. The press, which had been complicit with the military during WW1 in the view of former soldiers, was seen as encouraging a war 'culture' generally. Thus Mounier attacked L'Humanité during the 1930s as a 'chronique militaire' (65, p. 212).

Nor were such preoccupations evident only in the latter part of the decade, when we might have expected to find them. The entire decade was characterised by fear of war, in a way that the 1920s had not been. If the 1920s were 'l'après-guerre', marked by optimism and the conviction that WW1 had been 'la der des ders', then by the early 1930s, there was a clear sense that France was again living through an 'avant-guerre' (196, p. 6). Weber catalogues a plethora of intellectuals and individuals predicting war 'pour demain' even in 1930 and 1931 (ibid., pp. 242-3), and Mounier described 1930s society as suffused by a 'culture' of war - 'une guerilla
Giono was by no means unusual in his cynical view in February 1934 that war was ‘un moyen de la politique’ (197, p.6) in 1930s France.

Like greens today, 1930s sources saw the extent of this ‘culture’ as difficult to define and dangerous for society. First, everyday life was ‘impregnated’ by a general fear of the ‘next last war’ (196, p.243), which meant that attempts to change society for the better were likely to be met with a less enthusiastic response. Touchard, for example, describes the negative effects of ‘le poids fondamental de la guerre dans les années trente [...] non seulement sur la société, mais sur les mentalités’ (65, p.98). Such fears were just as present on the right of the political spectrum, though often for different reasons. Maulnier argued in 1938 that the right’s fear of a possible war was based on the perception that France was not sufficiently prepared for conflict, and that, if Nazi Germany were defeated, ‘la bolchévisation immédiate de l’Europe’ would probably follow (183, p.150).

For Giono, the danger of the war ‘culture’ was that it permeated all aspects of French society and meant the young, in particular, would be more likely to accept the eventuality of war. In his view, the greatest threat facing France was not invasion, nor communism or fascism, but a general lack of hope and resulting perception that change was impossible - the country was ‘affamé de paix’ (159, p.170).

Many argued that the emphasis on war meant that the true crisis facing French society was not being addressed. As well as a general ‘culture’ of war, they argued France had an ‘économie de guerre’ even outwith wartime (198, p.565). Expenditure on the military was viewed as a particular misuse of valuable resources. Larkin describes ‘taxpayers’ objections that a third of the government’s revenue was now earmarked for armaments’, in 1938 (85, pp.67-8). With hindsight, these criticisms may seem misguided - historians generally attribute the débâcle at least in part to the comparatively low level of military expenditure in France during the inter-war period, seeing the Popular Front’s decision to increase spending as ‘too
little, too late'. Nevertheless, criticisms of spending on the military were abundant, even as late as July 1939, when Vigilance was attacking spending on the 'militarisation du pays' as unnecessary (183, p.154). Also in 1939, Mounier drew the classic comparison between spending on education and spending on arms, one now employed by greens: had a French leader during the 1930s invested in education rather than the 'sinkhole of armaments', he would have 'saved' France (112, p.149).

The arms industry itself was a marked focus for criticism, combining as it did three key 1930s hates - industrialism, capitalism and frequently, acceptance of taylorist practices. 1930s sources agreed with modern greens that the industry actually caused wars. Along with their 'political agents', 'capitalist arms-dealers callously, almost nonchalantly, sent [young idealists] to their deaths' (165, p.150). A second focus for criticism was that the industry (indeed, all industries) made a profit from war: 'L'industrie n'est jamais aussi prospère que dans la guerre' (68, p.131). Even outwith wartime, the arms industry swallowed valuable resources which should have been spent on more deserving causes, in the view of many 1930s sources. In 1938, for example, the Radicals summarised the 1930s as 'la belle époque des marchands de canons' (65, p.129). A final resemblance between 1930s and green criticisms of the arms industry was the view that those fighting in wars were doing so not for a noble principle or 'la patrie', but for 'les intérêts de l'industrie'.

Moving on to the effects of the possibility of war on developing countries, we can demonstrate a surprising parallel between the attitudes of the Personalists and those of the greens today. Of course, it is undeniable that the most common attitudes in the 1930s were far from 'green' (though this is presumably true of common attitudes today as well). 'Une France gallocentrique' (65, 220) is no doubt an accurate summary of prevailing views and attitudes to the colonies and dependencies, in particular. As evidence, we might cite the six million visitors to the 1931 Exposition Coloniale de Vincennes, or the publicly-stated view of even the Popular Front Minister of Colonies, Moutet, that the reason for addressing the agricultural crisis in Indo-China was a military one - 'France's vulnerable international position dictated
that she exploit the colonies more fully’ (166, p.155). Even the supposedly anti-colonialist communists adopted a pragmatic position, with Thorez famously explaining to the 1937 party congress that ‘le droit au divorce ne signifie pas l’obligation de divorcer’.

The candidly exploitative attitudes of the majority in the 1930s make the position of the Personalists seem particularly radical, especially if we consider the close links between the catholic church (the Personalists were virtually all catholics) and French colonialism. The Personalists devoted a section in their Manifesto to ‘The interracial community’ (50, pp.263-266), in which they called for the church to distance itself from colonialism, and for the staged independence of all French overseas territories and dependencies, criticising misconceived notions of ‘la dualité civilisation-barbarie’ (11, p.62). They also highlighted the military exploitation of ‘more ancient and more spiritual’ civilisations, attacking the “blessings” of forced labour and military service’ France had introduced (50, p.264).

Again like modern greens, the Personalists also linked their criticisms of French attitudes to dependent territories and war to nationalism and the nation-state ("ruineux et régressif" (26, 124)). The linking of the nation state and pro-war sentiment was in fact commonplace in the 1930s, in both political and literary sources. Saint-Exupéry even used a metaphor which would be enthusiastically adopted by greens four decades later in his impassioned plea to move beyond nationalism and the ‘haine et divisions’ he believed it caused: ‘Pourquoi nous hait? Nous sommes solidaires, emportes par la même planète, équipage d’un même navire’ (86, pp.242-3).13

Along with nationalism the emphasis on the nation state was frequently rejected in 1930s sources, particularly since the emphasis on the nation and on the state was believed by many sources to lead to fascism (15, pp.305-6). Ordre Nouveau even wrote a spectacularly naïve open letter to Hitler in November 1933, warning him:
Vous voilà condamné à descendre la pente qui mène du nationalisme à l'étatisme, de l'étatisme à l'autarchie, de l'autarchie à la guerre' (15, p.310).

The ‘myths’ of patrie and leader were equally attacked by many sources. ‘Une certaine exaltation cocardière’ (65, p.217) was still common in the 1930s, on the left as well as on the right, and anciens combattants sometimes reacted negatively to such glorification of the patrie, with Prost pointing out that, to present the ‘cérémonies de onze novembre’ as ‘une fête à la gloire de la patrie’ would be entirely wrong (194, pp.61-2). Esprit attacked the inappropriate glorification of the nation: ‘Nous avons condamné la Nation, la Patrie faite Dieu’ (15, p.191). In literature, too, the patrie was presented as a dangerous myth. Giono emphasised ‘Quand je vois un arbre, je dis arbre, je ne dis jamais ‘France’. Ça n’existe pas’ (199, p.302).

While ‘la vénération à l’égard des grands chefs militaires (Joffre, Foch, Pétain, Gallieni, Gouraud)’ (65, p.98) was still common in 1930s France, many of our sources also identified this as a dangerous trend. Mounier warned of the effect of such ‘myths’ as ‘l’honneur’, ‘le chef’ in 1934 (164, p.144). In literature, Giono, Céline and Saint-Exupéry all portrayed military leaders in a less than flattering light, typically emphasising their distance from actual combat and lack of sympathy for the ‘poilus’ they commanded; and both Giono and Saint-Exupéry also stressed that the glorification of such figures had damaging effects in the long term, since they were ‘des idoles carnivores’ (86, p.241).

Finally, a long-term effect of the military emphasis in society was felt to be a concentration of power, with 1930s France being described as ‘une société très hiérarchisée’ (65, p.137). This seemed to many sources a contradiction of republican principles, and its causes were discussed critically. As in modern green critiques, the key concepts on which the military is based are presented as the
antithesis of many of the new movements of the 1930s. The army in particular was ‘l'école de l'abnégation, du sacrifice et de l'honneur’ (194, p.100) whereas movements like the Personalists saw the individual and personal responsibility as the keystone of their proposals for change. Even outwith wartime, the military influence was seen as damaging to society through military service. Alain described how military service prevents questioning attitudes, and how military hierarchical structures were incompatible with the republican ‘regard’ for equal citizens - ‘On n'a pas assez souligné à quel point le pouvoir militaire est absolu et humiliant’ (195, p.135). Many of the individuals studied here were profoundly marked by their experiences of military service. As one ex-serviceman put it, ‘rien ne rend plus antimilitaire que la fréquentation des militaires’ (194, 92).

These effects of actual or potential war were therefore seen as damaging for society in 1930s sources, just as they are today in green accounts. Further resemblances can be demonstrated in 1930s criticisms of the effects of war on the person.

4.3.2 War and the person

As well as accounts of the effects of actual war on the person, including vivid descriptions of the reality of life in the trenches, 1930s sources also concentrate on potential effects of new technology, which will be considered at the end of this section.

The first resemblance with the greens can be observed in their mutual identification of the young and the poor as two groups who suffer unduly from the effects of actual or potential wars. Again, these are two groups which already have the special sympathy and attention of 1930s sources.
The young, firstly, attract particular sympathy as 'les fils de la génération du charnier' (182, p.90). Ingram has demonstrated how war widows played an important role in French pacifist groups in the entre-deux-guerres (187, pp.249-285), and Bonnaud-Lamotte recalls the 'leitmotiv' of the contemporary women's press as 'Ils ne nous prendront pas nos fils!' (200, p.158). There was a special emphasis on the young, then, as they were seen to have suffered the consequences of WW1 without in any way having responsibility for causing or prolonging the war, and because they were felt to be at particular risk in the event of any future conflict - 'C’est parce que les jeunes seraient appelés à faire la guerre future qu’ils reçoivent une attention particulière' in the 1930s (194, p.103). They were also a particular focus for many 1930s sources as the best hope of avoiding future wars, as young French people were apparently more pacifist than their elders. This perception has subsequently been corroborated to some extent in studies such as Ingram's, in which the 'equation of youth and pacifist radicalism' during the 1930s is seen as 'perhaps a valid one' (187, p.276). Pacifist youth movements like the Auberges are cited in illustration of this link.

The young would be unfairly affected by future conflict in the eyes of many in the 1930s for reasons similar to those identified by greens today. 1930s sources first criticised the 'vieille dégoûtante baliverne' that the loss of a 'generation' to war was ever justified (160, p.11). Giono in particular denounced the idea that 'la génération présente doit se sacrifier pour la génération future' (ibid., p.11). The young are also presented as specially vulnerable to myths, propaganda and the encouragement of leaders. This point is made frequently, both in political or philosophical discussions of war and in literary accounts, on the right as on the left. After the Anschluss, for example, Combat stressed the potential effects on the young in particular, in typically vitriolic terms:

On n’a rien vu d’aussi perfide que cette propagande d’honneur nationale faite par des étrangers suspects dans les bureaux du Quai d’Orsay pour
précipiter les jeunes Français, au nom de Moscou ou au nom d'Israël, dans un conflit immédiat.\textsuperscript{14}

Politicians and military leaders were also widely criticised, first because "ces vieillards grisâtres et gras" (201, p.304) did not actually have to fight in wars, yet decided the fate of the young — "[ils] nous ont envoyés à la guerre, restant eux-mêmes au chaud".\textsuperscript{15} Secondly, they were attacked for their experience and cynical manipulation of the more gullible young: they were old "politiciens,"\textsuperscript{16}

connaissant la vie et les roulburdises et sachant parfaitement ce qu'il faut dire aux jeunes hommes de vingt ans pour leur faire accepter la saignée (160, p.15).

Literary accounts of young men at war, such as Giono's \textit{Batailles dans la montagne} or the war chapters in \textit{Voyage} often portray their gradual realisation that they have been 'duped' by old politicians or military leaders. Bardamu, for example, initially impressed by "le colonel et sa musique", "encouragements", "fleurs", the parade of soldiers on horseback and "patriotes" soon notices that "la musique s'est arrêtée. [...] On était faits comme des rats" (53, pp.18-19). Céline implies the young soldiers' innocence and gullibility in a telling phrase: "On est puceau de l'horreur comme on l'est de la volupté" (ibid., p.24).

Outwith wartime, the young were also disproportionately affected. In the 1930s, military service attracted particular attention and criticism on several grounds. First, conscientious objection was all but impossible, and for an apparently more pro-pacifist youth, this created a difficult moral dilemma. Second, given the fear that war was imminent throughout the thirties, there was the real fear among young conscripts that service might mean actual combat relatively quickly. Third, military service was a particular focus since by 1935, because of the demographic "gap" caused by WW1 and the low birthrate, it was extended to two full years. For the
Personalists, this was the last straw. They immediately devoted a full issue of *Esprit* to the contradictions between personal moral principles, religion and militarism in April 1935, in which Mounier denounced various aspects of military service in 'one of the most significant polemical documents of the thirties' (81, p.275), *Les catholiques et la défense nationale.*

One group which attracted great sympathy in the 1930s was the paysan youth. Whether they were called away from the land to fight in a war or to perform military service, they suffered more than perhaps any other group. First, their absence frequently meant the collapse of small farms and loss of livelihood, since especially after WW1, they were difficult to replace (85, p.73). Second, they were perceived as particularly unsuited to the regimented atmosphere of the military. An anecdote Besset recounts about René Dumont's military service between 1924 and 1926 illustrates this second point. When asked by Lieutenant de Luppel what his reaction would be if he saw an enemy sniper on the hill opposite,

> Dumont le paysan n'hésite pas: 'Je mets les chevaux à l'abri.' Fureur du lieutenant, qui voulait une réponse style change de la brigade légère, et quinze jours de salle de police pour impertinence. (189, p.83)

The second group identified as disproportionately affected by war in the 1930s were the poor, particularly those living in rural communities. This is unsurprising, given the large numbers still living on the land in 1930s France, and the special affection for the stereotypical paysan. There was sympathy for the paysan particularly because of the history of his sacrifice in war. For example, during WW1, estimates of the number killed who were from rural or paysan backgrounds have been as high as 80% of the total (13, p.142). For authors like Giono who saw the paysan as an ideal, this was an especially shocking waste. He constantly emphasised that paysans were 'les soldats de toutes les guerres': 'on n’a jamais tué que des paysans dans les batailles' (68, p.134).
As with the special focus on the young, the rural poor also attracted the attention of 1930s sources because they were believed to be more pacifist than other groups, and thus potentially more likely to resist war. This belief was closely linked to republicanism. As the rural poor and the paysans were the group most likely to support the pro-republic Radical Party, they appeared to many to be ‘le rempart le plus solide de la République et de la paix’ (65, p.131), against the perceived threat of a communist revolution or fascism.

What were the reasons for these groups being disproportionately affected by war? First, many 1930s sources argued, often with some bitterness, that politicians and military leaders saw them as more dispensable than other groups. For ‘des gouvernements guerriers’ (201, p.306), war was ‘un instrument politique’; industrial workers were useful for the arms industry, therefore ‘la guerre, ça n’est des morts que pour nous [les paysans]’ (197, p.6). For Céline, the poor generally suffer in wartime: ‘On ne les intéresse que saignants, les salauds!’ (53, p.109). Indeed, politicians in the 1930s were quite open about their intention to use paysans rather than other groups in the event of war. Thus the ‘revigoration’ of the peasantry in the colonies was desirable purely because ‘our army will not be able to find reliable troops from a sickly peasantry’ (166, p.155).

The result was that war meant the poor from different countries, and paysans more than any other group, fighting one another when they had no quarrel with their counterparts, but were acting on the orders of politicians and military leaders who caused the conflict. Giono stressed the absurdity of paysans of different countries hurling shells at one another when ‘si vous étiez là les mains vides [... vous seriez tentés de] vous serrer la main’ (68, p.226). Céline too argued that the poor of one nation fighting the poor of another was absurd, even if they were more than prepared to do so:
Il existe pour le pauvre en ce monde deux grandes manières de crever, soit par l'indifférence absolu de vos semblables en temps de paix, ou par la passion homicide des mêmes en la guerre venue. (53, p.109)

The absurdity of war for the individual called on to fight is repeatedly stressed. No matter what the aim of the war, nor its eventual outcome, its effects for individuals are just as cruelly absurd. Such attacks on war were generally based on personal experience of WWI – Giono, for example, stressed the ridiculous waste of ‘des morts qui n’ont jamais vu un Allemand’ (59, p.67). The experience of the huge loss of life during ‘les absurdes attaques et contre-attaques pour quelques mètres de terrain’ (194, p.92) meant many saw actual war as pointless, whatever the outcome, and this pointlessness became the focus of their criticisms. Giono summed up the reactions of many anciens combattants when he wrote ‘ce qui me dégoûte dans la guerre, c’est son imbécillité’ (160, p.15), while for Céline experience of actual war was invariably ‘une immense universelle moquerie’ (53, p.22). By the 1930s, there was a widespread impression that wars which were originally presented as just or necessary soon proved to be pointless or absurd; many thus reacted with frustration at the prospect of another war at the decade’s end by the question ‘Mourir pour Dantzig?’ (85, p.73).

The loss of life during any war, no matter how just, was also a recurrent theme in the works of Saint-Exupéry. Already in 1931, in Vol de nuit he had demonstrated an instinctive pacifism, with individuals’ lives as the most important consideration, ‘Nous agissons [...] comme si quelque chose dépassait en valeur la vie humaine... Mais quoi?’ (202, p.66). Following his visit to Spain in the middle of the decade, he was even more marked by ‘les affres et les absurdités d’une guerre civile’ according to D’Astier de la Vigerie (110, p.109). By the late 1930s, he ‘almost seemed to believe’ that ‘il n’existe pas de cause qui vaille qu’on lui sacrifie une seule existence humaine’ (203, p.48).
Unsurprisingly, the Personalists were also to take the effects of war on the person as their main focus as the decade progressed. They were particularly disappointed by the Popular Front decision to increase military spending, since they saw this as a contradiction of the purely defensive role for the military the Rassemblement had earlier seemed to suggest, a role the Personalists favoured. They argued that the increase in military spending was an overreaction to the German reintroduction of military service in 1935 and occupation of the Rhineland in March 1936. There were numerous, unusually polemical attacks in Esprit during 1936 and subsequent years, notoriously Mounier’s questioning of Général de Castelnau on what he argued were Personalist moral grounds: ‘Général, trois fils, n’est-ce pas assez?’.

Indeed, low morale in the military during the 1930s has since been attributed to the widespread nature of such antimilitarist focus on the effects of war on the person. While there was sympathy for those who had fought in WW1, particularly the rank and file troops, and an undeniable admiration for certain military leaders, by the 1930s, low public opinion of the military, bitter inter-service competition for funds and a longstanding failure to modernise meant that ‘senior officers were depressed; other ranks depressing’ (196, p.247).

The criticisms made by our 1930s sources of the effects war had on the person were not limited to those who actually fought in wars. As greens do today, the fate of women left behind was discussed at length, arguably for two reasons. First, women were often seen as more sympathetic figures, and were to offer a poignant illustration of the devastating long-term effects of war on the person in the aftermath of WW1. Their suffering was to remain highly visible long after the war had ended, with France ‘a country of elderly and often single women, [...] submerged by the dark weeds of mourning’ for a generation (ibid., p.14). An understandable cynicism or bitterness pervaded 1930s female accounts of their own perceived role in relation to war, ‘sacrificing sons and lovers without complaint, [...] bearing and nurturing cannon fodder for future wars’ (204, p.106).
Of course, the focus on women was by no means limited to the long-term effects of loss of life during war. In literary accounts such as Giono’s Le Grand Troupeau, the direct effects of war on paysan communities were described, with moving depictions of women, the old and children left to struggle against the elements to survive. An account of brutal requisitioning, added to the hardship of war is given, with the female characters responding in despair ‘Vous nous laissez les yeux pour pleurer?’ (119, p.120).

The second reason for the focus on women in the 1930s was arguably in an attempt to dissuade young men from accepting service in the military during wartime. Giono in particular favoured this approach. One effect of war described by many 1930s sources is the sexual availability of women left behind. Giono gives an account of a paysanne, in love with a young man who has been called up to fight, having sex with a deserter (ibid., p.178). Céline too describes the sexual availability of women in Paris, in a galling contrast to life on the front; and he makes clear that the ordinary soldier has little chance of enjoying a hero’s welcome after war is over:

Voilà vous serez vite oubliés, petits soldats... Soyez gentils, crevez bien vite... Et que la guerre finisse et qu’on puisse se marier avec un de vos aimables officiers. (53, p.117)

Women are also used as literary symbols of life continuing through the obvious metaphor of pregnancy. Giono contrasts the pointless sacrifice and death of war with the hope of new life among those left behind, when, for example sixteen-year-old Madeleine finds out she is carrying the child of Olivier, dead in battle (119, p.209). The futility of lost life is also demonstrated and criticised by comparing the reality of war with the more natural way of life soldiers have left behind. The consequences of their absence are also highlighted, both by literary and non-literary sources. Thus, instead of a small paysan community working in harmony with nature, Personalists argued ‘war, barbarism and disease, [...] alcohol, drugs, syphilis and depopulation’ would take hold (50, p.263).
The final resemblance between 1930s and green criticisms of the effects of war on the person is found in their focus on the potential effects of any future war. Here, French women are again argued to have played a particular role. It was female pacifist organisations such as the LICP which really brought home 'the message that the next war would be the last. An apocalypse' (196, p.239). Vivid depictions in the 1930s of previous conflicts were associated with the implication that the effects of any future war would be far worse.

In part, this was a reaction to developments during WW1, when Ypres had seen the first-ever use of chemical warfare, with German troops releasing liquid chlorine downwind on 22 April 1915. Fifteen thousand French and Algerian soldiers were killed or injured on that day alone, with an estimated total of 90,000 dead and 1,300,000 injured during the rest of the conflict (205, p.207), yet the chemist who had masterminded the use of the gas, Fritz Haber was awarded the 1919 Nobel Prize for Chemistry. And by 1937, the Germans had moved on, discovering a more deadly chemical weapon, the first nerve gas, 'Tabun'.

This greater danger of future conflicts was the focus of many works of art and literature in the 1930s, particularly in the cinema. The visual impact of films depicting the future fate of humanity after another war was particularly effective. Again, such accounts were clearly scaremongering in intent at times. For Weber, widespread fear that war was imminent as early as 1930 was due to 'the impact of events [being] bolstered by a rash of pacifist war films and alarmist publications'.

Saint-Exupéry was one author who emphasised the potential effects of new technology, after seeing war in Spain at close hand: 'Une guerre, depuis qu’elle se traite avec l’avion et l’ypérite, n’est plus qu’une chirurgie sanglante' (86, p.242). Bernanos repeated his warning that such future conflict was imminent in the
conclusions of both *La grande peur des bien-pensants* and *Les grands cimetières sous la lune*: ‘Vous ne vivrez pas vieux, jeunes gens français!’ (155, p. 275)

Even if they contributed to a climate of fear, such warnings were felt to be necessary in works of art during the 1930s in order to ensure that WW1 was truly ‘la der des ders’. One ancien combattant explained the role of warnings in art: ‘Cela [‘montrer à la masse la réalité tragique de la guerre’] impressionnera les foules, les déconcertera? Tant mieux’ (194, p. 104). Artistic depictions of the reality of war were by no means seen as sufficient in the attempt to prevent future war, however. The wide-ranging proposals of greens and 1930s sources will now be examined.

### 4.4 Green solutions

War represents an exceptional theme in the green critique, since their proposed solutions are perhaps more widely debated and more detailed than their account of the problem and its causes. If reminders of the horrors of war or nuclear winter are seen as essential, there is nonetheless a stronger emphasis on how best to avoid war in future or move away from the ‘culture’ of war.

The first essential element of all proposed green solutions is the acceptance of a personal engagement or commitment, something which is viewed as more necessary in this field than in any other. A primary element of this commitment is the acceptance of the responsibility to educate others as to the dangers of war and the steps greens feel are needed to avoid all future conflicts. While some have argued that this emphasis is mistaken and doomed to failure, most greens seem to agree with Waechter that ‘les idées sont plus redoutables qu’une armée!’ (96, p. 188).

Such commitment can take many forms. Some greens have emphasised the educational role of art in portraying the effects of future conflicts and spurring
viewers or readers to action (16, p.20). Films such as Kubrick's Dr Strangelove have been cited by certain greens as useful in the attempt to raise awareness (20, p.127). Others have preferred the more traditional commitment of personal involvement in direct action campaigns, or demonstrations to raise awareness and express the strength of public opposition to militarism. Indeed, the first political commitment of any sort for many French greens was in anti-military public campaigns such as that at Larzac (31, p.105). The special responsibility of intellectuals, particularly scientists, in the attempt to raise awareness is frequently emphasised, partly because they have helped cause the current situation\(^{24}\) and partly because they can speak out with authority against technocrats who try to stifle debate. Anti-nuclear and anti-military groups such as Survivre et Vivre, led by scientists like Pierre Samuel are felt to give credibility to the green stance (192, p.100).

The strategy of leading by example is frequently raised as the most appropriate form of personal commitment. Greens prefer to convince than to coerce: 'the force of example has produced more lasting change in the world than the force of threat' (37, p.118). Both on a personal and on a national level, this is seen as an appropriate form of commitment. Dumont has explained his motivation in such terms—he has argued that it was the horrors of war which gave him 'le virus de la responsabilité' (189, p.79). Waechter too mentions his own conscientious objection as evidence of his commitment (31, p.105).

The need for engagement and this attempt to lead by example are combined in a commitment to pacifism as the generally preferred green solution. However, green pacifism takes many forms; and, confusingly, many greens reject even the term 'pacifist'. They dislike the connotations pacifism still has, especially in France. Thus some greens claim to be 'not pacifist (though we admire their stance)' (31, p.116). Few use the term at all, preferring 'nonviolent' (141, p.201).
Nevertheless, if we consider the meaning of the term, it seems at the very least disingenuous for greens to claim not to be pacifist. Pacifism has been basically defined as the '(support of) policy of avoiding or abolishing war by use of arbitration in settling international disputes' (206, p.603). Perhaps the best known definition, though, arises from A.J.P. Taylor's distinction between 'pacificism' ('the assumption that war, though sometimes necessary, is always an irrational and inhumane way to solve disputes, and that its prevention should always be an overriding political priority') and wholesale pacifism ('the belief that all war is always wrong and should never be resorted to'). In the case of France, however, Ingram argues this to be an 'artificial' definition (187, p.7), since there, both positions would be described as 'pacifiste', with the term 'intégral' occasionally employed to distinguish between the pacifists and the potentially less inflexible pacificists.

Ingram concludes that pacifism should be used to describe those 'for whom peace was a primary, consistent, and overriding concern and goal' (ibid., p.8).

What is evident is that under any of these definitions, the stance of most greens can comfortably be defined as pacifist even if they themselves prefer the terms 'nonviolent' or 'non-aggressive'. To take but one example, les Verts have never since the foundation of their party supported French involvement in an armed conflict, and their 1997 Programme closely reflects the key elements of the pacifist approach, demanding

une nouvelle politique de sécurité axée sur la prévention des conflits armés, l'éradication des causes profondes de la guerre et la promotion des modes de résolution pacifiques des conflits. (46, p.15, point 6)

Their stance could perhaps best be summed up, then, as pacificist in the short-term, but pacifist in its ultimate ambition to eradicate war, and in its firm commitment to work towards this goal. It is clear too that, while this would be an accurate summary of the majority green view, exceptions do exist, and as with most issues, a range of green positions can be observed. First, some French greens do readily embrace the
term ‘pacifiste’ or ‘pacifiste intégral’ to describe their stance, one example being Dumont (207, p.53). Second, a minority of French greens, notably the leader of Génération Ecologie, Lalonde, would clearly best be described as ‘pacifist’.

Indeed, it was Lalonde’s different view of defence policy which led to the original split between him and the new party of les Verts in 1984, when he described their ‘extremist’ attitude on the subject as ‘naïve et dangereuse’ (208, p.101). Once again, then, we can observe various shades of green on this question, the lightest green stance being pacifist and the darkest fully pacifist, with the clear majority of French greens tending towards pacifism, even if they are willing to accept the idea of a ‘transition period’ (19, p.156) during which a less absolute approach is allowed.

This majority approach has led to accusations of a potentially ‘contradictory pacifism’, given the clear green commitment to human rights. Such greens are sometimes asked under what conditions they would accept intervention in an armed conflict. The answer seems to be none. Even during any transition period, only ‘defensive weapons’ are to be allowed (though, typically, greens fail to explain what they mean by this apparent contradiction in terms), with society quickly moving to ‘a weapons-free zone protected by social defence’ (29, p.58).

Another (admittedly less troubling) contradiction is also to be observed in the terms favoured by greens to discuss their pacifist stance. Greens invariably talk of ‘struggles’, ‘battles’, even ‘wars’ against war (‘La lutte contre le nucléaire, leurs positions antimilitaristes, autant de batailles qui portent leurs fruits’ — (31, p.293)), apparently without irony.

Once a commitment to a pacifist or pacifist stance is accepted, the second emphasis of green solutions is on forming movements or broad-based coalitions in order more effectively to achieve peace. Indeed, Simonnet has argued that without the anti-military and anti-nuclear campaigns of the 1970s, the greens might never have come into existence, since it was commitment in these areas which brought
about ‘la première fusion entre ces différents courants sociaux jusque-là éparpillés’ (192, p.106), which were eventually to become the basis of the modern green movement. The acceptance of commitment in organised movements or campaigns was to lead to wide-ranging discussions within the nascent green movement as to which reforms would best achieve their goal of peace, and it is these specific approaches or policies which will now be summarised.

The first recurrent factor in green proposals is their habit of making impractical, idealistic or reckless declarations on the subject of avoiding war. Already in the 1970s, left-wing anti-nuclear campaigners were describing their green counterparts as ‘ces doux rêveurs écolo-baba’ (31, p.53), unsurprisingly given such uncompromising green views as that of Porritt at the height of the Cold War:

"to combat [the spread of communism and the Soviet 'threat'] we'd be better off investing in bread and Bibles than nuclear weapons." (19, p.57)

At times, the inflammatory nature of modern green pronouncements resembles now-notorious statements from the 1930s. ‘A well-managed defence is often much more productive than a costly victory’, 26 recalls the sort of desperate statements made by 1930s pacifists (‘rather a foreign occupation than war’ 27) at the end of the decade. Such views are typically expressed in the debate about the possibility of aggression. Once a pacifist stance is adopted, opponents will generally ask what reaction is proposed in the case of invasion or occupation by a hostile power.

Greens sometimes reject the question as an invalid or unimportant one. Pacifism itself is presented as sufficient to avoid aggressive tactics from others: ‘We are threatened because we threaten others’ (209, p.31), as Bahro would have it, therefore by openly adopting a non-aggressive stance, others will react in kind. This optimistic assumption belies the serious green focus on specific tactics to adopt in
the event of attack, an issue to which most green movements have devoted a great deal of thought.

Greens begin from the clearly pacifist view that violence is never appropriate, even as a form of resistance. For Waechter, 'nonviolence active' is only way to resolve conflicts 'avec le respect de la personne humaine' (96, p.189). Kelly identifies what she sees as a contradiction in the tactics of the left, accepting violent means (the possibility of war, use of weapons) to achieve a nonviolent end, a strategy she sees as doomed to failure. In contrast, for greens, 'both our methods and our goals must be nonviolent' (29, p.67). This translates firstly as the adoption of nonviolent direct action outside wartime to achieve the ultimate goal of eradicating war completely. Such tactics have long been adopted by the greens in France. Solange Fernex describes typical green tactics at an early anti-nuclear demonstration in Alsace:

> Should the military intervene, a plan was devised whereby a group of small girls would run towards the soldiers crying 'papa, papa'. (210, p.378)

Greens also praise the Kanaks' use of 'l'action de désobéissance civile' (3, p.73) as a model for a successful strategy in any attempt to change society. Such tactics are the long-term proposal for moving towards peace. Similar tactics are advocated in the event of an actual invasion by a hostile power. During such an invasion, greens favour a strategy known as the 'hedgehog' defence, the idea being that if occupation is made as 'prickly' or uncomfortable as possible for an occupying power, they will eventually abandon the attempt.

Les Verts' official defence policy is based on such tactics. In 1991, they called for the immediate preparation of 'une défense civile non violente: non-armée, économiquement et politiquement dissuasive' (211, p.6) across France, with the traditional military being phased out as citizens accepted responsibility for their own defence. Reaction to an invader would be based on 'active, nonviolent resistance
and noncooperation', including 'large-scale symbolic actions, economic boycotts, social and political boycotts, strikes, overloading of facilities and administrative systems, deliberate inefficiency' (29, p.58). Greens recognise that such tactics would not be an easy option, however:

The need for people to die for their country would not disappear merely because we had done away with our weapons. (19, p.158)

Greens therefore insist that, in fact, preparation for the event of invasion is only a very minor part of the solution to the problem of war. The main focus has to be on how to create the conditions for peace, rather than on reactions in the event of future war. Instead of the dominant 'war culture' which exists at present, 'violent cultural values' need to be abandoned and 'a permanent worldwide peace' established (37, p.113). In creating such peace, greens focus on the need for change in various areas (economic, political, social), and suggest key groups which might show the way forward. Both these aspects of the green solution to the problem of war will now be considered.

As for the other themes considered in this study, the first consistent focus for the greens in their attempt to find solutions is the capitalist economy. At the most basic level, reformist greens argue that 'to avoid war,' 'different economic structures in which enterprises were nonmonopolistic, appropriately-scaled and self-organised,' 'the minimal use of resources' and 'production for need not profit' would need to be introduced as a first step away from the 'culture' of war (29, p.76). Most greens go further and agree with Petra Kelly that capitalism ('state capitalism as well as private capitalism') 'needs to go' if war is to be avoided in future.

The first argument the greens use to explain the need to abandon capitalism is based on self-sufficiency, which is seen as unlikely if not impossible in a capitalist world economy. Greens hold that, if populations are to resist involvement in war, they
must first be self-sufficient. This point is made firstly in relatively utopian green
texts. In Gorz's 'utopie possible,' for instance, the population of a break-away green
society recognises that 'la souveraineté nationale dépend d'abord de notre capacité à
savoir nous nourrir nous-mêmes' (32, p.60). Callenbach conveniently situates his
Ecotopia, too, in California, a state where self-sufficiency provides a more
interesting diet than that of, say, a self-sufficient Scotland.

The argument that self-sufficiency is necessary to avoid war is found not only in
utopian green visions of future states, though. In 1988, les Verts' electoral
programme was claiming in similar terms that:

le meilleur moyen pour l'Europe d'accroître sa sécurité résiderait dans le
développement de son autonomie économique et sa capacité à produire sur
place ce dont elle a besoin. (3, pp.74-5).

The next main explanation for the need to abandon capitalism if war is to be avoided
is based on the existence of private arms industries in the capitalist economy. There
are two reasons for abolishing such industries. First, in the drive for profit, they
produce the ultimate unnecessary goods; and it is logical for these industries to
encourage war. Greens thus call for the nationalisation of these industries as an
immediate step. While capitalism still exists, individual governments should ensure
that they do not operate for profit. The second step would be to stop arms sales
altogether and convert the arms industries to production in more 'socially useful'
sectors: 'pour un monde solidaire et pacifique,' 'la reconversion programmée de
l'industrie d'armement et la renonciation au commerce des armes' are essential.
This strategy is agreed on by both reformist greens and fully pacifist darker greens –
the above policies were stressed in the 'Entente' between the reformist Génération
Ecologie and the darker green Verts, for instance. The second reason for abandoning
capitalist arms production is that it attracts investment that might otherwise be
devoted to more green priorities:
Il ne sera pas possible d’accroître ‘l’aide’ aux pays démunis, de financer la protection de l’environnement national et mondial sans une très substantielle réduction des dépenses militaires. (207, p.53)

The abolition of capitalism is believed by greens to go hand in hand with reform of the state, their next focus in finding a solution to the problem of war. Greens start from the observation that the ‘politics of peace’ (29, p.54) cannot be developed in the type of state which has never existed without the possibility of war, and in which political parties have always been, in Lalonde’s view, ‘machines de guerre, appendices de l’État’. "Rêviver le rôle de l’état" is thus the first step in moving away from war (38, p.271).

For the greens, the current state structure is at the same time ‘trop grande et trop petite’ to enable societies to move away from the constant possibility of war (3, p.56). Indeed, there are only two areas in which greens accept that their ideal model of highly-devolved power is not sufficient, those being environmental protection and avoidance of war, or ‘peace and the ecological balance of the planet’ as Spretnak and Capra put it (29, p.59). Greens thus accept the existence of international authorities in these two areas. Current states are first ‘trop petits’ because in the event of any region or nation attempting invasion of another sovereign area, only a supranational body (greens suggest the UN could adopt this role) would be able to impose effective sanctions. Current states are simultaneously ‘trop grands’ because in the event of war, large nations are ‘inherently dangerous,’ (ibid., p.57) given their greater resources.

The nation state is the next focus of the greens in the attempt to move away from war. The reason for the scale of most modern wars, in the greens’ view is ‘the sheer size of nation-states’ (37, p.117). Greens frequently cite the example of Germany here. Whereas in the past, conflicts ‘used to plague the German principalities or the
Balkans', these were more easily settled, since 'their small size was a virtue, not a vice' (ibid., p.117). Regions rather than nations are thus seen as a potential answer to large-scale conflict. For this reason, die Grünen and les Verts were against German reunification (29, p.57).

Nation states are not simply rejected because of their scale, however. Their typical characteristics (they are 'egotistic, chauvinistic, and competitive') are seen as leading to an inevitable emphasis on war, and greens believe that it is only by moving to smaller structures, in which individual citizens have more involvement, that such characteristics will be left behind. The final reason for rejecting the nation state is that smaller structures would be less able to afford nuclear weapons, an important concern for the greens. 'The national state,' therefore 'should not be defended because its defence can only lead to the destruction of us all'.

The rejection of the nation state means greens look for potential solutions to both smaller structures (particularly regions, in which citizens have more direct participation through measures such as the 'référendum d'initiative citoyenne'), and international cooperation in the effort to abolish war. The Austrian ecologist Jungle's call for 'une nouvelle Internationale, dont les buts seraient différents de ceux poursuivis par l'Internationale socialiste' (31, p.321) has been welcomed by green parties across the world, for example.

One aspect of this approach is based on avoiding future conflict between developed countries and those countries which are 'en voie de développement'. Greens argue that 'solidarity with the peoples of the Third World' is an essential element of any strategy designed to avoid future conflict (209, p.31). Joint campaigns with pacifists in developing countries and a more equal distribution of resources are emphasised. If war or conflict is to be avoided in future, economic 'solidarité nationale et internationale' with disadvantaged groups will be essential, in the greens' view (46, p.7, point 3d).
The next focus of green solutions is reform of the military. Most greens accept the idea of some sort of 'transition period' in the move towards a fully green defence policy, as we have already observed. Les Verts summarise the green position as follows: 'Maintenir une défense armée restera un impératif tant que la défense civile ne sera pas opérationnelle' (211, p.6). This 'défense armée' will immediately undergo a process of democratisation, however, even in such a transition period. One strategy greens favour is the initial retention of some form of military or civil service, in order to ensure an army which is 'démocratisée' until it can be abolished completely. Thus 'les jeunes auront à choisir entre le service national classique et un service civil de même durée' until civil defence strategies are fully in place (ibid., p.6), even though greens are in principle opposed to military service.

Ultimately, unilateral disarmament will follow (37, p.118), 'creating peace without weapons, swords to ploughshares in East and West. Beginning at home' (209, p.31). The greens' emphasis on the special dangers of modern weapons technology leads them to call for international regulation, and is a cornerstone of their campaign against civil use of nuclear power. For greens, civil and military uses of atomic energy are closely linked: they are both 'war technologies': 'Chernobyl made clear there is no “peaceful” use of atomic energy' (213, p.95). Disarmament should therefore be linked to a ban on civil uses of atomic energy and the regulation, and eventual banning, of modern weapons.

Another aspect of the 'war culture' widely identified by greens as dangerous is the role of the media in encouraging or supporting war. Green solutions here are determined by their commitment to freedom of information and liberal values. Instead of an attempt to ban what they see as propaganda or disinformation in the mainstream media, greens have traditionally reacted by attempting to offer different points of view. One of the earliest forms of green commitment can be observed in their rapid founding of alternative sources of information. Two important examples
are Le Sauvage, formed in 1973 with the declared aim of 'expulser le débat nucléaire de son ghetto' (192, p.108) and La Gueule ouverte.

Green solutions, finally, focus on support for two groups they see as most likely to move society away from war, that is the young and women. The focus on the younger generation and 'les générations futures' means greens emphasise the role of education in any solution to the problem of war. A ban on producing and selling war toys (209, p.32) would be one example of a green policy adopted in the attempt to help future generations move away from war. The 'denystification' of war, the 'patrie' and the 'myth' of the strong leader is also identified as an essential component of the move towards a 'postpatriarchal generation of men who were no longer willing to “prove their manhood” in “patriotic” foreign wars' (29, p.76).

The need to move away from what greens see as a patriarchal society brings us to the final ingredient of the green recipe for avoiding war, that is, the stress on women as the way forward. Even reformist greens tend to argue, along with their more extremist counterparts the ecofeminists, that there is some link (whether natural or socially-induced) between women and peace. Lalonde, for example, agrees with his darker green colleagues that, in the green anti-military stance, ‘nous avons suivi les femmes dans leur désobéissance’ in a 'société de plus en plus mortifère' (214, p.63). At the least, women are seen as less accepting of war, with the example of greater female participation in anti-nuclear campaigns cited as evidence of this view. Ecofeminists go further, arguing that:

men seem to be experts for technology, women for life, men make war,
women are supposed to restore life after the wars. (213, p.93)

The two sorts of greens reach slightly different conclusions. As a minimum, most greens would stress the need for women to have a more active role in society and more power (through measures such as ‘parité’), since they argue that this would
mean a more widespread anti-war focus in society. Ecofeminists tend to believe this would not be sufficient, and argue instead that ‘modern machine-men’ (ibid., p.95) must adopt traditionally ‘female’ characteristics if war is to be eradicated (though they are characteristically vague as to how this might be achieved).

4.5 1930s solutions

As we observed with modern greens, the emphasis during the 1930s was clearly on how to prevent future conflicts and move towards a permanent peace, rather than on remembering or criticising previous wars. The horrors of WWI were of course stressed, but, as we shall see, this was almost always in an attempt to prevent such horrors ever taking place again.

As for greens today, the first step for our 1930s sources was the recognition that, if ‘empêcher une guerre nouvelle’ was their aim, a personal acceptance of engagement or commitment was essential. The extraordinary number of intellectuals accepting a public political commitment of some sort in the 1930s has indeed been attributed above all to their desire to prevent another war. Ory and Sirinelli, for example, argue that many intellectuals and public figures were ‘pushed’ to action by the threat of war, particularly by 1935-6 with wars in Ethiopia and in Spain. Massis’ Pour la défense de l’Occident, Pour la paix en Europe was signed by intellectuals not previously (nor indeed, later) known for their political commitment, among them Marcel Aymé and Pierre Mac Orlan, who signed ‘par pacifisme’ (182, p.111). In France, by the middle of the 1930s, Ory and Sirinelli conclude that ‘il n’y eut pas de “non-intervention” intellectuelle’ (ibid., p.112).

Again, such commitment was to take many forms in the 1930s. The responsibility to educate others, particularly the younger generations, was perhaps the form of commitment which was most widely accepted. Such attempts tended to underline
the horrors of war, as we have seen, and to focus on how future wars might be prevented. Those who had experienced WWI were particularly committed to this approach, arguing that the strength of public opinion was the best way to prevent future conflicts, in much the same way as modern greens argue that educating the majority about the extent of the environmental crisis will be sufficient to provoke a change in behaviour. Thus anciens combattants' groups argued in 1930 that what was needed was for them to

prendre une part toujours plus active à l'éducation de l'opinion publique afin que celle-ci puisse toujours exiger la solution des conflits internationaux par la voie pacifique. (194, p.107)

The emphasis on education was also highly visible in the names chosen for many of the anti-war movements of the 1930s. Groups like the Ligue des Mères et Educatrices pour la Paix, founded in 1928, increased their activities as the 1930s wore on, with 65,000 members in 1932, increasing to over 100,000 by 1938. Reynolds points out that in their work, too, they 'laid special emphasis on the education of children' (149, p.192). Of course, a commitment to educate and debate solutions could also be observed in the inevitable foundation of a publication to disseminate the views of new groups, particularly the reviews founded by the youth and non-conformist movements.

The potential for education through works of art, literature and films seemed to be recognised during the 1930s too. As well as the literary depictions of the effects of war which we have already considered, Weber argues that a 'rash' of pacifist war films appeared in the early years of the decade, A l'Ouest, rien de nouveau in 1930 being only one of the best-remembered (196, p.242). The particular effectiveness of artistic representations of the effects of war was widely recognised, with anciens combattants' groups calling for 'l'éducation par l'image, dans toutes les nations' (194, p.104). The Sangnier-influenced Jeune République even took a 'mobile
museum' across France in 1931, with works devoted to educating audiences on 'la guerre et la paix' (187, p.82).

A more widespread form of commitment was participation in anti-war movements, demonstrations and campaigns. Reynolds has argued that such commitment was a particular hallmark of the 1930s, rather than the earlier years of the entre-deux-guerres, since until the end of the 1920s, 'legalistic' measures and bodies such as the League of Nations were seen as the best hope of ending war (149, p.189). The Briand-Kellogg pact's claim to 'outlaw war' in 1928 could be seen as the logical conclusion of such legalistic attempts to avoid war (ibid., p.270). By the 1930s, hope in such attempts had waned, and France witnesses a burgeoning of anti-war groups. By 1936, more than 200 such groups could be catalogued (ibid., p.183).

The acceptance of engagement led first to mass support for anti-war demonstrations such as the Rassemblement pour la Paix at St. Cloud in August 1936. Jackson describes this as a typical Popular Front 'pageant', its characteristics being not the traditional confrontation of political demonstrations, but rather a friendly atmosphere, participation by women and families and an emphasis on enjoyment as much as on protest (166, p.189). Such 'rassemblements' placed an emphasis on new tactics as well as new aims, just as anti-nuclear demonstrations would decades later.

The emphasis on acceptance of engagement in anti-war campaigns led to some surprising collaborations in the 1930s. Beyond their shared commitment to avoiding war, it is difficult to find much to link groups such as Jeune République and the mothers' or feminist pacifist groups who worked together in the middle of the decade (187, p.262). Individuals too accepted engagement in groups they had previously attacked (as indeed they would again later). Perhaps the most surprising example was that of Giono, whose convinced anti-party rhetoric was abandoned for a brief period in the middle of the decade when he worked with the communists. Citron explains that the threat of war alone could lead Giono to accept working with
the PCF by 1933, for the simple reason that they were 'la plus importante des masses pacifistes à être organisée' (215, p.xv). Even after the attempt to work with the communists foundered, Giono directed his efforts to avoiding war, abandoning works of fiction because 'il va vouer jusqu'à la guerre l'essentiel de son énergie à prêcher la paix à tout prix' (182, p.117), notably through the Auberges de Jeunesse network, for which he travelled across the South of France giving anti-war lectures.

The 'ampleur' of anti-war propaganda was remarkable in the 1930s (194, p.113), and commitment was unusually visible. Propaganda, demonstrations, signed declarations, and public calls on leaders to avoid war such as those signed by Dumont and Giono at the end of the 1930s (189, p.85), along with publicity following the first prison sentences for French conscientious objectors in the late 1920s (187, p.131) all meant that a wide-ranging debate about the best course of action and the level of personal responsibility continued throughout the period.

A pacifist stance was undoubtedly a common conclusion reached by those involved in this debate. Just as we observed for modern greens today, however, the term pacifist had 'several shades of meaning in the inter-war years' (ibid., p.7). If we recall the distinction between the terms pacificist and pacifist we noted earlier, it is clear that during the 1930s, many groups combined the two approaches, much as greens do today. Many took a pacifist view in the long term (or at the start of the decade, when the threat of fascism was not so pronounced), but were prepared to move towards a more pacificist view as a short-term step towards full pacifism, or as the decade wore on and events led them to moderate their initially optimistic positions. The extent of the pacifism of various groups and individuals has been closely examined in recent years, as has the motivation of certain groups for adopting a pacifist stance. The most important will now be outlined.

The first, and possibly most visible group frequently taking at least a pacificist stance during the 1930s was that of the anciens combattants who had fought in
WW1. One in two of those who survived the war joined an association for anciens combattants, such as the Union fédérale or the Union nationale des combattants (194, p.1), most of which were active in educating civilians and the younger generation as to the realities of war. Prost has described their stance as ‘pacifisme patriotique’ (ibid., p.114), though his definition implies rather a pacifist stance for most groups. That is, anciens combattants were virtually all prepared to accept the responsibility to fight again if need be; their emphasis, however, was on ensuring that war would never take place.

The position of most Personalists is also best described as pacifist rather than fully pacifist, particularly towards the end of the decade. Mounier was careful to distinguish between an ‘utopie directrice’ of pacifism (26, p.125), towards which Personalists must work, and the short-term acceptance of participation in wars which might take place while this better society was being worked for. Even so, the Personalists certainly displayed a repeated reluctance to commit to support for armed struggle. Lewis describes Esprit’s reaction to the Ethiopian crisis as ‘oddly muted, [... counselling] moderation until Catholics were better informed about the war’s causes,’ though the journal did eventually condemn Mussolini’s ‘coup vilain’ (81, p.277). Later, their views on intervention in Spain was similarly muted and divided (112, p.118). Even Mounier’s eventual strong lead in attacking the Munich agreement certainly did not mean that a range of positions was not always present within the Personalist movement. Many Personalists could clearly be described as fully pacifist in the 1930s and the review’s tone was one which had, in Loubet del Bayle’s view, ‘de claires résonances pacifistes’ (15, p.196). Mounier himself continued to call for European disarmament, even after the Munich agreement (ibid., p.123).

Indeed, the characteristic of French anti-war groups most frequently discussed in recent studies has been the remarkable presence of extreme pacifism during the decade. If the anciens combattants’ official movements were eager to stress their patriotism and willingness to fight if necessary, it was often to distinguish their
pacifist sympathies from the more hard-line views of the ‘new-style’ pacifists of the 1930s, as Ingram terms them (187, p.121). Such ‘new-style’ or integral pacifists ‘rejected and condemned all foreign wars’ (ibid., p.121), with notorious slogans such as ‘Plutôt la servitude que la guerre’ (194, p.107) meaning their views were highly visible throughout the decade.

These pacifists often based their stance on religious conviction (149, p.201) or on their experience of WW1. Of this second group, Giono is one of the best-known examples. Whereas, as we shall see, most pacifists were to water down their stance as the threat of fascism grew, Giono’s views seemed to evolve in the opposite direction, with extreme statements of his position more and more common as war approached. In 1938, he wrote ‘Je n’ai honte d’aucune paix’ (27, p.275), arguing that, no matter what the circumstances, ‘il vaut mieux être vivant que mort’ (ibid., p.253).

A final group of apparently integral pacifists are those identified by Ingram as ‘opportunistic in inspiration’ (187, p.9), that is those whose political convictions led them to support an extreme pacifist stance out of expediency at various points during the decade. This led to some strange companions being found in French pacifist movements. Until the mid-1930s, the PCF adopted an apparently committed pacifist stance, based on the best interests of the USSR, while the extreme right too adopted a conveniently contradictory pacifism as soon as the possibility of ‘la guerre impie contre nos compagnons d’armes italiens’ or Hitler’s Germany loomed (65, p.234).

As we might have expected, such unusual bedfellows helped ensure bitter disagreements within inter-war pacifism. Far from unity against a common enemy, the widespread nature of pacifist commitment in France meant divisions characterised the hundreds of movements. Those who accepted reluctantly the possibility of involvement in war, even if their ultimate aim was to end all wars, were attacked almost as virulently as those who made no commitment at all to
preventing future conflicts. In November 1931, Challaye bitterly denounced as ‘belli-pacifistes’ those who took what we would term a pacifist stance (187, p.71). Pichot described the divisions between the two types of French pacifist in 1935:

L’un défend la paix dans la prophétie passionnée de la guerre fatale et réclame la force, tandis que l’autre chante la paix comme il ferait d’une idylle et maudit la guerre, si bien que l’un paraît aux yeux de l’autre vouloir la guerre, et l’autre aux yeux du premier offrir son pays sans défense aux coups de l’adversaire.  

Such disagreements were if anything exacerbated by the evolving views of many one-time pacifists as the decade wore on. Examples abound of those who followed Barbusse’s earlier development from an extreme pacifism to the ‘reluctant acceptance of war as a necessary evil’ (178, p.32). From the Rassemblement populaire’s initial emphasis on peace, many in the Front populaire majority and government changed their demand to that of ‘des canons pour l’Espagne’. Similarly, the ‘considerable’ pacifism of Alain’s young rue d’Ulm ‘disciples’ at the start of the decade was ‘peu à peu fondu,’ especially by 1936 (198, p.603). After the comparative unity of 1935, peace campaigners thus turned on each other. Many joined Maublanc from 1936 in his ‘inlassable’ attacks on ‘l’aveuglement des pacifistes intégraux,’ whose committed stance was seen as unwittingly encouraging ‘les desseins d’agression [des pays fascistes]’ (177, p.62).

Of course, any discussion of 1930s pacifism must be placed in the context of the mounting threat of fascism. Most historians point out the growing contradictions between the committed pacifism and equally committed anti-fascism of 1930s groups, for whom ‘l’impérialisme nazi prend de court leur “Plus jamais ça!”’ (183, p.153). The Personalists were but one example among many who were eventually obliged to choose ‘entre deux impératifs qui semblaient contradictoires: défendre la
paix et se défendre contre le fascisme extérieur' (ibid., p.155), concluding that ‘la paix n’est aujourd’hui possible que par un coup d’arrêt aux fascismes’.

Such ‘contradictory pacifism’ (149, p.194) was probably the most widespread attitude on the left. The communists moved from the pacifist stance of the early 1930s to accepting war as ‘a potential necessity in an ideological crusade to protect the revolution and its home in the Soviet Motherland’ (187, p.9). On the non-communist left too, statements such as ‘l’antifascisme ne saurait être le prétexte d’aucune guerre’ in 1934 (177, p.61) gave way to what Reynolds has described as ‘politicized’ pacifism for many groups (149, p.194), with the Popular Front doing more than any other government of the entre-deux-guerres to rearm France and modernise the military –

Malgré le pacifisme de certains de ses membres, la gravité de la situation extérieure obligea le Front populaire à mettre en œuvre un très coûteux programme de réarmement. (152, pp.121-2)

As we observed in the case of the greens, another apparent contradiction (though again, a far less serious one) is seen in the choice of terms used to discuss pacifism. In titles such as Rolland’s Le Combat pour la paix in 1932, and Méric’s Pour tuer la guerre in 1933, or in the stated aim of the pacifist LICP (‘la guerre contre toutes les guerres’) (187, p.155), pacifists of the 1930s were willing to seem very warlike.

A further similarity between greens and 1930s groups is that, once some degree of pacifism or pacificism was accepted, the emphasis was clearly on forming broad-based coalitions or movements to prevent war or achieve peace. The number of French pacifist groups in the 1930s was bewildering, as we have noted. Brunet also points out that it is frequently forgotten that the Rassemblement, later the Front populaire actually began as an attempt to build a broad-based movement against war, and included many non-political or non-party peace groups (152, p.33). Unusually,
after the split of the left at Tours, the communists too began working in groups more open to fellow-travellers in order to avoid war. Thus after 1932 the Amsterdam-Pleyel movement, of communist sympathy, was nonetheless 'an attempt to win over a broad spectrum of support around the theme of opposition to war and fascism' (166, p.26).

Outside party politics, broad-based groups were also accepted as the most effective form of commitment. The Auberges de Jeunesse groups founded by Giono (ibid., pp.134-5) took peace as their main goal and saw the international atmosphere of hostelling as one way to avoid war between the youth of different nations, explaining in 1938 'nous ne voulons pas tuer demain nos camarades de route des vacances d’hier' (27, p.249). Giono also advised paysans of different countries to unite, arguing in his Lettre aux paysans that such unity was a potential solution to the problem of war (68, p.142).

An exception to the general emphasis on public commitment, unity and forming movements in the 1930s we should mention here is Céline. The only course of action when faced with the prospect of war which is even vaguely recommended is a kind of anarchistic self-preservation. Bardamu feigns madness (or truly is made insane by his experience of war) to escape combat, arguing 'La meilleure des choses à faire, n’est-ce pas, quand on est dans ce monde, c’est d’en sortir?’ (53, p.81). However, to a certain extent, we might argue that even Céline does accept some commitment and the responsibility to educate others. His very decision to write and publish Voyage, with its effective depiction of the horrors of war for the individual, and the evident conclusion of Bardamu that any alternative is better than war surely represents a public commitment against war of some basic sort.

Even if Céline did not accept commitment in quite the same way as many other authors and intellectuals of the period, sufficient numbers did to result in an extraordinary level of debate during the 1930s as to how the goal of peace might best
be achieved. As modern greens have, 1930s groups and individuals proposed a huge range of specific reforms and varying approaches in their attempts to find solutions to the problem of war. These reforms and approaches will now be considered.

The first similarity we will note between 1930s sources and modern greens is in their tendency towards relatively idealistic and at times reckless approaches or pronouncements. We have already seen that statements such as ‘rather foreign occupation than war’ were widespread in the 1930s as they are in some green solutions. A further similarity can be observed in the frequently utopian visions of many 1930s sources. Chickering has detailed the rejection of all aspects of modern society which was involved in the relatively widespread ‘utopian pacifism’ of 1930s France, with its calls for the outright destruction of ‘a social and political order that is utterly corrupt and beyond rehabilitation’.^5

Literary sources too tended towards utopian solutions, as do writers of ‘green fiction’ today. Giono’s calls for paysans to abandon money and end war in the late 1930s seem hopelessly idealistic to the modern reader, as do Saint-Exupéry’s generally naïve appeals to peace and love: after the outbreak of war in Spain, he was still stressing ‘[des] solutions généreuses et convaincantes (l’amour des hommes, la paix), sans apprécier les données du problème’, as D’Astier de la Vigerie put it (110, p.109).

More practical reforms were also proposed, however. As today, there was a relatively widespread focus on the problem of aggression, for example. If a pacifist stance was accepted, what reactions did our 1930s sources suggest in the event of invasion by an aggressive power? Here, 1930s solutions are remarkably similar both in focus and detail to those proposed by modern greens. Even in the face of the growing threat of fascism, the Personalists argued that violence was generally inappropriate (though as we have seen, Mounier and a majority of the Personalists were to modify their views as the decade wore on). Thus they argued that ‘fascism
should be confronted by an effort to encourage its evolution towards more human forms, not with violence’ (112, p.140). Other pacifist groups agreed with the LICP that if ‘some lunatic’ invaded France or called on the French to fight,

it would be up to the peoples to resist the fact of war by all possible means: general strikes, individual or collective revolt, passive or violent. (187, p.146).

Such civil disobedience tactics bear a striking resemblance to the ‘hedgehog’ defence advocated by modern greens, even if 1930s sources were more willing to accept the use of violent tactics in achieving their ultimate aim of nonviolence and an end to war (ibid., p.14). Some 1930s sources did go further towards the green position, notably Giono, who argued (though in somewhat of a contradiction) that both pacifist tactics and aims had to be nonviolent:

La violence ne donne pas de victoires éternelles. [...] Le jour où vous [les paysans] serez les maîtres, serez-vous toujours dignes d’être les maîtres? (68, p.146)

Giono also resembled the greens in his view that such tactics did not represent a ‘paix facile’, concluding that ‘il faut beaucoup de courage pour être pacifiste déclaré, plus que pour être guerrier timide’ (27, p.264). Others also pointed out the contradiction of those who wanted peace being willing to risk war to achieve it, notably Ordre Nouveau, who warned that the French government ‘serait bien capable, au nom de la paix, de faire la guerre’ (15, p.190).

However, in the 1930s as today, the question asked most frequently was not how to cope in the event of aggression or invasion, but rather how to ‘organiser une paix durable’ (15, p.185) in the first place. As Méric explained, when the next war arrived it would all be too late, thus ‘for the pacifists of the thirties especially, all
energies were directed at avoiding a recurrence of war' (187, p.16), and at putting in place ‘the conditions for peace and joy’.38 As modern greens do, suggestions as to how to ensure peace focussed on various key areas (the economy, the state and so on) and the role of certain groups. The most important will now be outlined.

Unsurprisingly, the first emphasis in 1930s solutions was on abandoning capitalism. The non-conformist and youth movements generally based their rejection of capitalism on political grounds as we have seen in Chapter 3, but they also rejected capitalism on the grounds that it led to war. The first element of their solution here was a commitment to analysing and making public the links between capitalism and war. The ‘big capitalists who would profit from the carnage would never have the silence of Esprit’ in the face of ‘their enterprise of public deception’.39 The Personalists aimed to educate their compatriots as to the extent of capitalist involvement in encouraging war (‘Dans ce régime capitaliste, nous savons pourquoi la guerre’ [sic])40 and offered suggestions as to how to move away from the capitalist system as an urgent step to avoid future wars (they particularly favoured the immediate nationalisation of arms industries within a planned economy).

A more persistent focus on the responsibility of capitalism in causing and prolonging war, though, is to be found in the 1930s works of Giono. Since ‘l’état capitaliste considère la vie humaine comme la matière véritablement première de la production du capital,’ (160, p.21), ‘on ne peut pas tuer la guerre sans tuer l’état capitaliste’ (ibid., p.23). The main reason for getting rid of capitalism is that self-sufficiency, which is essential if war is to be avoided, is not possible for the majority under capitalism. While workers cannot produce enough food for themselves and their families, they remain ‘les ustensiles de la société capitaliste’ (ibid., p.18), and have no choice but to accept war.

For Giono, the solution must come from the paysans, the only group in society which still has the ability to ‘kill’ capitalism. He gives an unusually detailed and
typically impassioned account of how the paysan must abandon ‘paper money’, refuse to cultivate single crops for financial profit and remain entirely self-sufficient, while only growing enough to feed his family, and no more. If paysans across the world accepted this (admittedly idealistic) strategy, there could be no war, since there would not be enough food to supply the city-based workers in the armaments industry, nor the military itself (68, pp.172-3).

For the 1930s non-conformist groups, self-sufficiency was also a possible solution to prevent war, though like the greens today, they felt this should be organised at a Europe-wide level. Ordre Nouveau, for example, called for a ‘zone d’échanges plans,’ [sic] to be managed by an ‘organisme supra-national’ in Europe, its aim being to provide ‘à chaque Européen une sorte de minimum vital,’ something which would represent ‘un gage de paix pour le continent’ (15, p.366).

Capitalism is not, of course, targeted in the search for solutions simply because self-sufficiency is seen as impossible in such an economic system. Other proposed solutions to the problem of war which would necessitate a move away from liberal capitalism included the view that arms industries should not be privately-owned and operated for profit, and the view that spending on the military and on arms ought to be redirected to creating a more equal society, since ‘without social justice, war is perpetual’. Tempête, a ‘pacificiste intégral’ whose ideas are discussed at some length by Ingram, made similar points and concluded that pacifists had ‘a Bastille to storm and destroy: it is Capitalism which creates wars’ (187, p.153). Nor were such views restricted to minority groups in 1930s France. At the World Disarmament Conference of 1932, the official French delegation’s proposals included international-level controls on arms production and sales, particularly those of the newer more dangerous chemical weapons, which should ultimately be banned (196, p.238).
The view that capitalism created wars was not based simply on the idea that arms industries encouraged them for profit, however, and this meant that 1930s solutions went further than simple control or abolition of the arms industries. Ordre Nouveau argued that ‘les raisons de la guerre qui vient’ (in 1932) lay in a capitalist regime which accepted ‘trente millions de chômeurs,’ and once again suggested a planned economy with wide-ranging reforms of private property was needed as a solution (15, p.310). The Personalists too argued that only by abolishing ‘le capitalisme matérieliste’ entirely could the ‘antagonismes artificiels et destructeurs’ which it created be left behind (ibid., p.447).

For our 1930s sources, the abolition of the capitalist economic system also went hand in hand with reform of the state. (Indeed, for many the two were indivisible: Giono was far from alone in directing his criticisms at ‘l’état capitaliste’.) Here again, we can distinguish between practical, reformist proposals and more utopian visions in discussing 1930s solutions.

In terms of reformist proposals, 1930s sources arrived at many of the short-term solutions favoured by greens today. Political parties and governments under the system of the 3rd Republic were seen as too influential and likely to lead to war, and there were calls from various groups for pacifism to be ‘placed above the political parties and governments’. Practical reform of the state to achieve this aim was a common focus for 1930s anti-war groups. Prost’s study of anciens combattants in the entre-deux-guerres devotes an entire chapter to ‘les idées des combattants sur la réforme de l’État’, which included many ‘mesures qui moraliseraien le scrutin’ now identified with the French greens, such as such as PR for all elections, strict controls on corruption, and political equality for women (194, p.197). Ultimately, virtually all pro-peace groups had ‘une conception élevée du rôle du citoyen’ (ibid., p.101) as a key aspect of any solution.
In their more ‘utopian’ suggestions (or often, mere hints) as to how the state might be changed to avoid war in future, many 1930s sources were accused of anarchism. Céline, for example has been described as having pacifist sympathies, with ‘d’indéniables résonances anarchistes’ (164, p.230); and Redfern argues that the logical conclusion of Giono’s pacifism would be a similar sort of ‘stateless anarchy’ (52, p.21). Particularly after his split with the Communist-dominated AEAR, Giono stated repeatedly his rejection of all governments and all political parties, particularly at the end of the decade, and he made clear that the basis for this rejection was his pacifism: ‘Dès qu’on entre en lutte contre la guerre, on entre en lutte contre le gouvernement’ (160, p.20). Giono’s preferred solution, insofar as it can be defined, seemed to be small, self-sufficient paysan communities, no political parties, and a complete rejection of the ‘patrie’ or nation state.

Overall, the nation-state was rejected in favour of an emphasis on internationalism and cooperation, a key element of many 1930s solutions to the problem of war. Whereas by the 1930s, many ‘legalistic’ attempts to ensure peace on an international stage were already seen to have failed (Esprit analysed in some detail ‘l’échec dans la Société des Nations du parlementarisme international’ by 1932), many continued to place their faith in pacifist coalitions and mass movements of ordinary citizens. ‘A coalition of people across borders, across the nations’ (187, p.150) was called for in 1932 to prevent war, and many argued that the only way to achieve peace was ‘par le rapprochement international’ of ordinary people (198, p.563).

Of course, some pacifists did still stress the importance of the patrie, notably the anciens combattants’ groups; but most saw a potential solution in international strength in numbers (27, p.249), particularly for those who would be called upon to fight in any future war. Thus Giono based his appeals for the union of ‘les paysans de toutes les nations’ on the idea that, if paysans refused to fight one another, war would not be possible (since war is inevitably fought only by ‘les paysans de tous les pays’) (68, p.142). Interestingly, the Personalists came very close to the preferred green solution of some combination of internationalism and regional devolution as a
solution to war. In the first issue of *Esprit*, they called for ‘une organisation supranationale de l’humanité’ to move away from ‘l’égoïsme national et l’isolement qui provoquent les inimitiés et les guerres’ (15, p. 178), but argued that this must be combined with decentralisation, just as greens proposed (any civilised society would have to be ‘anti-étatiste et décentralisée’) (ibid., p. 448).

Nor were attempts at international union or rassemblement restricted to European neighbours. If this solution was to be effective, most 1930s groups argued it had to be introduced on a world-wide scale. French pacifist groups aimed to build coalitions, particularly in Algeria, where the ‘indigenous population’ was seen as a particular target for education campaigns against war and links to metropolitan pacifist groups (187, p. 140), since Algerian people too would be called upon to fight for France in a future conflict. A speaking tour by French pacifists in 1932 took as its aim ‘building the pacifist movement’ and spreading the ‘education message’ (ibid., p. 141).

Such an international emphasis was also considered by the Personalists to be a potential solution to future conflict since it would be linked to ‘a redistribution of the world’s wealth and particularly of raw basic materials’ (50, p. 265). War would not be ended until there was a greater level of equality, with colonialism in particular attacked as ‘un jeu à fins capitalistes et belliqueuses’. The international emphasis was essential for most non-conformists if war was to be avoided in future, since there was no point in avoiding a ‘guerre nationale’ if it were simply replaced by a ‘guerre coloniale’ (216, p. 442). Giono made much the same point, though more lyrically: ‘Ma joie ne demeurera que si elle est la joie de tous’.

The next focus of 1930s solutions was reform of the military. Again, some solutions were more revolutionary than others, with Giono calling on his readers to ‘se libérer de l’armée nationale’ (27, p. 261) – though, as usual, giving no practical indication as to how they might actually do this. The principal focus of most 1930s sources was
actually relatively similar to that of Giono, however. Most seemed to see the abolition or at least the dramatic scaling-down of the armed forces as an eventual aim, even if they were somewhat more realistic than Giono in accepting a ‘transition period’ during which the military would take a purely defensive role (187, p.67). That such ideas were influential in the 1930s is symbolised, in Weber’s view, by the French decision to rename the Ministry of War the Ministry of Defence in 1932.

Another aspect of solutions proposed in relation to the military in the 1930s was disarmament. The relatively simplistic formulae favoured by many (‘le désarmement, ce sera la paix’) are perhaps misleading, since many groups debated the issue at length, usually concluding that a transition period with the acceptance of ‘national defence’ was appropriate in the short term, but only if allied with a ‘commitment to working towards total, rapid and, if need be, unilateral disarmament’ (187, p.146). Others argued that a parallel ‘désarmement des esprits’ (194, p.106) would be an essential component of this strategy. Even so, it is difficult to look back at 1930s calls for disarmament without judging them in the context of German military spending. The Berlin correspondent of Esprit who argued in 1935 that the ‘only efficacious weapon’ against Hitler was ‘integral disarmament’ (112, p.96) appears dangerously naïve, no matter that his view was shared by many in France.

The final aspect of the 1930s approach to the problem of war was to emphasise certain key groups as the most likely to offer solutions. As we have seen, Giono based his solutions in part on an appeal to the paysan. While this solution was a fairly unusual one, the second group on whom he focussed, the young, was felt to provide a potential answer by many 1930s sources.

Giono’s stress on the young as particularly likely to end war was based mainly on his experience of working with his pacifist Auberges de Jeunesse. His ‘jeunes camarades’, who had accepted membership of non-partisan hostelling organisations
were seen as particularly likely to accept a pacifist commitment. Inaugurating a new hostelling centre in 1937, Giono stressed this potential: ‘Unissez-vous pour un seul but: LA PAIX’.

Young people were also seen as less tainted by the past errors of French society (they were ‘pus, pacifiques et libres’, ‘de l’humain tout frais et tout neuf’) and therefore able to build a better world; by the end of the decade, Giono was claiming they were the only hope: ‘C’est en [votre jeunesse] seule que j’ai confiance au milieu de l’effondrement’.

Another reason for seeing the young as particularly likely to work to avoid war was that they would be called on to fight. Giono stresses this aspect in all his addresses to the Auberges at the end of the 1930s. The non-conformist youth movements were particularly aware of the ‘responsibility’ they had, since ‘ils représentaient la génération sur laquelle aurait pesé en premier le poids d’une guerre éventuelle’ (15, p.186).

If the young represented a special source of hope, their education was clearly an important part of 1930s solutions. This focus is seen first in the work of individuals who had a certain ‘influence morale’ with the young (177, p.65) such as Giono and Alain. Alain explained his Mars ou la guerre jugée was ‘une tentative de démystification des vertus guerrières,’ for example (ibid., p.65). The second focus is on the next generation, with many 1930s groups working to educate them differently, in order to encourage their pacifist development. Thus the Ligue Internationale des Mères et des Educatrices pour la Paix ‘issued tracts against war toys and directed anti-war propaganda at children’ throughout the 1930s (149, p.192). Indeed, this quite common emphasis on women educating the next generation, and what has been termed ‘maternal pacifism’ brings us to the final hope of avoiding war for many in the 1930s, that is a focus on women.

As we find today in the ecofeminist arguments of some greens, certain 1930s sources held that women were ‘natural’ pacifists, or that there was a ‘natural’ link between
women, particularly mothers, and peace (ibid., p.190). Others (the ‘feminist pacifists’, as Ingram terms them (187, p.249)) saw the two movements based on women’s rights and pacifism as having similar goals for society, which would explain the clear connection between female campaigners and peace more than any ‘essential’ female trait. Whatever the explanation, however, what was important for many 1930s sources was that women, like the young, seemed to offer particular hope of moving away from war.

Again, the very visible participation of otherwise uncommitted women in groups such as the Ligue Internationale des Femmes pour la Paix et la Liberté or in demonstrations such as the ‘mothers’ procession’ at the 1936 Rassemblement pour la paix meant that for many, encouraging women might offer a non-party alternative strategy to ending war (166, p.189). And, since women had had no political voice (and would not do so until 1944), they, like the young, were sometimes seen as less implicated in the current crisis, and thus a source of fresh ideas as to how better to organise society. The reformist element of such solutions was therefore to demand equal political rights for French women, the argument being that due to ‘the supposedly natural links between women and peace’ (149, p.190), a society in which women had more power would be less likely to accept participation in a future war and would work more energetically to avoid war in the first place.

We might end this chapter, however, on a typically utopian note, since such an emphasis certainly characterises many of the solutions to the problem of war suggested both by green and 1930s sources. If we return to Giono’s views on ending war, we also find a particular emphasis on women. For Giono, the principal group in 1930s France with the ability to end war, as we have seen was that of the paysans. Within this group, however, the paysanne had a key role, in that she could best put a stop to war. The paysan could refuse to fight in the first place, of course; but Giono argued that this would be more difficult and more dangerous than if his female counterpart were to react to his absence by destroying all stocks not necessary to feed the family left behind, hiding what was kept, then refusing to be his
‘remplaçante’ in the fields (68, p.227). The ouvrier would not be able to replace the paysan in sufficient numbers, since his presence was needed in the arms factories, and there would not in any case be enough food to feed the military. War could thus be ended, since as Giono told the paysannes, ‘Vous avez la famine à votre disposition’ (ibid., p.228).

1 Ingram himself identifies the 1930s as the decade when French pacifism was at its most radical and most widespread: ‘There had been “integral” pacifists before 1930, but what is new at the end of the twenties is that these isolated instances of absolute “integral” pacifism began to coalesce into a proper movement [...] which became a force in French politics’ (187, p.14).
2 This example is of the respective budgets under Mauroy in 1981, seen as particularly disappointing by the greens, since Mitterrand had pledged to increase spending on the environment (96, p.185).
3 Myers, quoted in (19, p.160).
4 Military service is due to be phased out in France, but the process has been delayed since the election of the left-wing majority in 1997 and young men are still currently required to enrol.
5 Irigaray, quoted in (193, p.134).
6 Alain, writing in Vigilance in April 1938, quoted in (183, p.154).
8 An oft-cited example is the 1936 Popular Front electoral propaganda film, La vie est à nous. See (152, p.103) for a discussion.
9 Brunet also points out that these figures are certainly underestimates, since many did not declare their ownership of radios to avoid the licence fee (ibid., p.98).
10 He repeatedly explained his decision not to allow his daughter to participate in physical education drills at school on these grounds, for example.
11 See (85, pp.66-69) for a more detailed discussion of this point.
12 This was the view of the Comité national du centre syndical d’action contre la guerre, cited in (183, p.154).
13 The greens refer to the ‘équipage du même vaisseau spatial’ (7, p.17).
14 Quoted in (183, p.156).
15 The quote is from one of the ‘pollu’ publications cited in Prost (194, p.135).
16 Prost gives a detailed account of the pejorative terms used by anciens combattants to describe ‘les hommes politiques’—‘politiciens’, ‘pillards’, ‘politicaillé’, ‘les loques de la politique’, ‘les vieux routiers parlementaires’ among them. ‘Politicien’ was invariably used in its pejorative sense, in Prost’s view, and was far more frequent than ‘homme politique’. See (ibid., pp.133-135).
17 Dumont is an interesting figure for this study since he lived through both the 1930s and foundation of the French green movement. After his military service, he became a ‘pacifiste intégral’ for life, even signing joint anti-war declarations with 1930s figures like Giono (189, pp.79-88). He later attributed his ‘dévouement sacré à la cause écologique’ specifically to its pacifism (ibid., Préface).
18 Of course, the paysan cannot automatically be considered ‘poor’ (Giono, for example, refused the association of poverty with a simple lack of money in his ‘Lettre aux paysans sur la pauvreté et la paix’). Modern greens also dislike the term ‘poor’ when discussing groups commonly associated with the term (the unemployed of modern cités, for example), since they point out that even the poorest citizen of a developed country has a greater income and greater access to material goods than the vast majority of those in developing countries. The term is perhaps blunt, but is used here because it can cover a wide range of sub-groups without unnecessary repetition of such distinctions as independent smallholders, their families, the rural unemployed, unemployed workers in new towns and cities, and even the native populations of 1930s French colonies and dependencies.
See Heilman (112, p.96) for a discussion of Mounier’s motives in writing this article, and of the outraged reaction and wide-ranging debate which followed its publication.

Larkin points out that in 1934-5, the French army was spending four times as much on horse fodder as on petrol, for example (85, p.68).

For details of the development of chemical weapons during the 1930s, and the impact they had, see (205, pp.206-208).

Weber lists several films which had such an effect in the early 1930s. See (196, pp.242-3).

Notably Pepper (14, p.3) – see Introduction for his explanation of this position.

Irvine and Ponton make a point many greens stress, that almost half of all research physicists and engineers work ‘on weapons and war’ (37, p.114).

Cited in (187, p.7).

Boulding (cited as ‘inspirational’ to the greens) in (37, p.118).

Cited in (149, p.189), for example.

Kelly is quoted in (29, p.62).

The ‘defence’ section of the programme agreed on by GE and les Verts is reproduced in (212, p.149).

From his Court traité imagé sur les écologies, cited in (3, p.56).

Kelly’s view, quoted in (29, p.57).

Boulding’s conclusion in (37, p.116).

Raymond Aron’s description of the aim of the majority in the 1930s, in (198, p.591).

Reproduced in (194, p.107).

Mounier in the first edition of Le Voltigeur, quoted in (183, p.155).

Cited in (187, p.13).

Giono swerved between relatively threatening pronouncements such as ‘Il n’y a qu’un remède; notre force’ and the nonviolent position, often within the space of a single text (eg. 68)

The expression is Giono’s, from Que ma joie demeure: the Contadour ‘experiment’ of the 1930s was a practical attempt to create such conditions on a small scale. See (120, p.4) for further details.

Mounier in March 1935, quoted in (112, p.96).

Esprit, 1932, quoted in (15, p.278).

Romain Rolland, quoted in (187, p.156).

The LICP demanded this in 1932. See (ibid., p.146).

See discussion in (15, p.451) for details.

Dalbon writing in Esprit in 1933, quoted in (ibid., p.368).

In the Préface to Les vraies richesses.

Srinelli quotes Chateau using this slogan in 1935 (198, p.605).

Giono’s address is reproduced in (27, p.269).

Chapter 5
The city

5.1 Introduction

An apparent paradox for modern green politics is that, while reserving some of their most extreme criticisms for modern urban environments, most green activists and voters nonetheless choose to live there. Greens do at least show a preference in France for smaller towns rather than cities, with nearly 70% of green militants living in towns of fewer than 50,000 inhabitants in 1990 (35, pp. 168-9). However, the corresponding figure for the Parti Socialiste, with its history of urban support and organisation, is almost as high, at 64% (no doubt reflecting the relatively small number, even today, of French cities and towns of over 50,000 inhabitants). Of PS and Verts activists, similar proportions also choose to live in larger cities (of more than 100,000 inhabitants) - 25% and 22% respectively in 1990 (218, p. 49). Voters for French green parties or candidates are even more likely to live in large towns and cities than party members and activists. Since their first organised political and electoral campaigns, the green vote has been strongest in the same few towns and cities, that is, in Paris and the surrounding region, in Brittany (Quimper, St-Brieuc) and in the east of France (Strasbourg, Mulhouse, Colmar). There is a corresponding lack of support for the greens among rural dwellers. Agriculteurs in particular demonstrate ‘le moins de sympathie pour le parti vert: 6% pour une moyenne de 12%’ (219, p. 162).

The high proportion of green activists and sympathisers who are urban-dwellers made French cities a natural focus for green political protest in the early days of the movement. Given the green strategy of thinking globally and acting locally, it was
unsurprising that some of the first public signs of green feeling in France were events such as the Parisian Amis de la Terre-organised ‘manifs à vélo’ or protests against the building of the expressway beside the Seine. Mamère points out that many environmental and related problems are seen at their worst in modern cities, and that city-dwellers are thus more likely to be spurred into action. He concludes that the problems seen in modern cities are a natural focus for environmentalists:

Parce que l'écologisme est un humanisme, il doit prendre la défense de tous les ‘sans-voix’, qu'ils se nomment arbres, mer, montagne, chômeurs, défavorisés, exclus. [C'est dans] la ville [que] se trouvent concentrés le plus de chômeurs, le plus de pauvres, le plus de ‘laissés-pour-compte. (220, p.60)

Indeed, some green theorists have argued that environmentalists did not emphasise publicly the important role played by the city in green theory clearly enough in the early days of the movement, with damaging results. They claim that the early concentration of ‘not inconsiderable resources upon protecting hedgerows, butterflies and bunny rabbits’ (221, p.12) was unwise, if not immoral when many people were living in threatening and unsustainable environments. In contrast to early environmentalism, most green political activists would now agree with Weston’s conclusion that the environment of the inner cities is ‘of as much concern as the protection of trees - and the one is not possible without the other’ (ibid., p.12).

5.2 Green criticisms of the city

Green criticisms of the city can be divided into two main fields of concern: effects on the environment, and effects on the person. These will now be outlined.
5.2.1 Effects on the environment

The first focus for green criticisms is a retrospective one. Greens, particularly in France, criticise the manner in which the process of urbanisation took place. Bookchin explains that the ‘real urban crisis’ has resulted,

not from the emergence of the city as such; rather it results from the emergence of a relatively new and cancerous phenomenon that poses a deadly threat to the city and the countryside alike: urbanization. (222, p.x)

The term urbanisation usually refers to the period following the Industrial Revolution. Before this period, people did of course move to the towns (223, p.88). The important difference between this ‘émigration rurale’ and post-industrial urbanisation for greens is the much greater size and permanence of the later movement, and the resulting change of balance between the numbers living in rural communities and those in towns.

The urbanisation process gathered momentum much later in France. As Duhamel explains, ‘la France s'est urbanisée trop lentement au départ, trop rapidement à l'arrivée’ (224, p.132). This is explained by various interruptions to the urbanisation process, including the two World Wars and the economic crisis of the 1930s. These interruptions meant that following the Liberation, the rural exodus was to involve vast numbers over a comparatively short period, on a scale far greater than that experienced in Britain for example. The speed and scale of urbanisation were exacerbated because the French population, which had been unusually stable for over 50 years, now grew rapidly. Between the end of the 19th century and WW2, the population of France increased by only 0.5 million, partly due to the large loss of life in both wars (226, p.102). Increases in the birth rate and in immigration in post-war France meant that the population then grew by more than 40% over a similar period (1945-1990). Within this increased overall population, the balance between urban
and rural populations changed dramatically. In 1851, only 6.5% of the population lived in urban areas with more than 20,000 inhabitants. By 1975, 41.6% of the much larger French population lived in such areas (12, p.818).

With hindsight, the understandable desire of much of the French rural population to move to the towns in this way is criticised as having caused various problems. If urbanisation has proved to be ‘le phénomène sociologique majeur de la société française durant la seconde moitié du XXe siècle’, it was ‘mal conçue, mal conduite, et donc mal vécue’ (224, p.77). The resulting unplanned or badly planned change in balance between French urban and rural populations has been criticised by environmentalists in terms of its effects on the environment since urban populations are less self-sufficient, less sustainable and produce more waste and pollution than those in rural environments.

The scale of the rural exodus over such a short period placed unanticipated strain on housing stock, already affected by the destruction of WW2 and inadequate in terms of hygiene and amenities. Attempts at improving the situation in towns were initially uncoordinated, leading to the ‘tache d’huile’ outward spread of the city, and often only making matters worse. The idea, expressed by the French Ministre de l’Equipement Albin Chalandon, that it was the ‘vocation’ of all land to be built upon (225, p.27) encapsulated the official approach to planning the urban environment for much of the post-war period. The more recent development of ‘rurbanisation’ (the spread of populations out of the city itself) has also been strongly criticised by greens:

L’urbanisation s’étend comme les cellules cancéreuses, par métastases, s’insinuant dans les champs et les forêts avant de les absorber complètement, dans un tissu bâti en permanente expansion. (96, p.36)
Greens conclude that the initial failure to plan means that future attempts to manage the cities are likely to fail ('On peut se demander si une telle concentration est gérable, dans l’absolu'). In France, the failure to encourage people to move to smaller cities and towns, rather than automatically heading for Paris, meant that the capital suffered disproportionately during the mass move to the towns. Of course, this is not simply a 20th century development in France, where the tradition of centralisation was ‘strengthened with each major shift of regime’ until the 3rd Republic (227, p.217).

This legacy of political and administrative centralisation meant that when French society began to become industrialised during the 3rd Republic, the only obvious location for any industry or business which needed access to decision-makers was to be Paris. This in turn meant that those leaving rural areas to find work would be attracted to Paris, where opportunities were concentrated. As well as the broad reasons already noted for the centralisation of French society, other more specific decisions influenced the concentration of the population in Paris. It is probable that many such decisions were taken with the deliberate aim of reinforcing the centralisation of French society. Lepetit and Pinol see two key forms of regional development (roads and administration) as jointly affecting the centralisation of the population before and during urbanisation in this deliberate fashion. They conclude that the centralisation of France influenced the course of urbanisation, as both a cause and an effect, resulting in a sort of ‘vicious circle’, under which centralisation leads to further centralisation (228, p.127).

Although the figures for the population of Paris itself have been in decline since their highest point in the 1920s and 1930s (because housing space has been taken over by business and office premises), the Ile de France region has continued to expand.
Table 1: Population of Paris and Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>City of Paris</th>
<th>Paris Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>2,906,472</td>
<td>5,683,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>2,829,753</td>
<td>6,785,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2,590,771</td>
<td>9,250,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2,152,423</td>
<td>10,660,554</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Such urbanisation and the centralisation of politics, administration and population are jointly criticised for the direct effects they have on the environment. The first broad focus for such green criticisms is the unsustainable nature of the French city, and particularly Paris. The idea of sustainability is one of the cornerstones of green political theory, and what makes their analysis of this issue distinct from that of the left, for example. Modern cities are 'the most unsustainable feature of an unsustainable system', posing a particular challenge to green politics (19, p. 172).

What are the effects of the city on the environment that make it unsustainable in the view of green political theory? First, the effects of cities on the planet's natural resources are unsustainable. The concentration of huge, non-self-sufficient populations in urban centres creates 'supply streams' - that is, clean water, food and virtually all other goods must be transported there, wasting natural resources, especially fuel. Current urban environments are criticised in particular by environmentalists because their concentration of such populations leads to unsustainable pressure on both renewable and non-renewable resources (33, p. 46). Care in present use of these resources is necessary according to green theory because of the need to take into account 'les besoins des générations futures' (3, p. 79).
The greater use of natural resources by urbanised populations occurs both directly, as a consequence of large populations in one spot (e.g., the effort needed to provide urban populations with water (229, p.21)) and indirectly, as a consequence of a combination of various factors, including population size. For example, the outward spread of cities, increased population size and the French policy of ‘urban zoning’ mean that it is now unlikely that urban workers will live within walking distance of their workplace, leading to greater pressure on resources.

Second, the concentration of population also leads to unsustainable levels of pollution. The OECD has termed cities a threat to sustainable global development because they produce huge amounts of non-recyclable waste and pollution which must be absorbed back into the ecosystem, causing problems which range from local to global in scale. (229, p.21)

Some degree of human pollution of the environment is unavoidable— even the most primitive society would cause pollution through burning wood, for example. Greens argue, however, that levels of pollution are compounded by urban environments, i.e. that the concentration of population, the increased size of cities and official policy have combined to make their effects more extreme and unsustainable. They also focus on certain types or causes of pollution which are seen as particularly harmful for the environment.

The cause of pollution which attracts the most criticism from environmentalists is the private car. The acceptance by successive French governments of the need for cities to accommodate the private car (notoriously, Pompidou’s statement that ‘Paris doit s’adapter à l’automobile’), and consequent failure sufficiently to encourage the use of public transport in cities has been one of the key points of green criticism since the birth of the movement. An early Amis de la Terre poster campaign
("Bagnoles ras-le-bol") clearly linked the negative effects of cars and city life, asking:

HEUREUX? embouteillages - bruits - deux heures de trajet - pas d'espaces verts - air vicié... HEUREUX? on s'asphyxie dans les villes, des tours Montparnasse, des voies express... HEUREUX? on en a marre de la vie où on est esclave, de la ville où le profit de quelques-uns étouffe la vie de tous (profit des pétroliers, des constructeurs d'automobile).

Third, the scale of modern cities is seen as unsustainable. The effects of urbanisation, as we have seen, have been compounded by increases in population size. Not only are more of the world's population choosing to live in urban centres, but the world's population itself is far bigger than at any other time in history, and still growing exponentially. The size of modern cities exacerbates further the problems relating to resources and pollution, and 'le gigantisme des choses' means that achieving radical change is very complex, if not impossible.

The next consequence of the modern city which is criticised by modern greens is the rural decline which has accompanied the urbanisation of the population. While Marx and Engels saw the urbanisation which followed industrial capitalism in a positive light (the move to the towns 'rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life') (231, p.60), greens argue that negative aspects have outweighed such positive effects. The rural environment has also suffered: 'The city and the country are under siege today; both are being subverted by urbanisation' (222, p.3). Decisions on rural life are taken by those with power who tend not to live in the rural environments they will be affecting, and who are seen to have little awareness of local conditions and problems. The European Union has also attracted much attention from greens in this field, as its role is viewed as a missed opportunity. Whereas certain decisions could usefully be made at European level in greens' views (through 'Politiques communes de protection du patrimoine naturel et
de la bio-diversité', for example) (46, p.15), the EU’s uniform policies, particularly on agriculture, are seen as inappropriate.

Uniformity of policy resulting from centralised decisions is also criticised by greens for failing to take account of regional diversity. Finally, the decisions which have been taken by the centre are seen as misguided, since they have led to further depopulation of rural areas:

Over the last thirty-five years, governments have paid out billions in subsidies and grants to promote a way of farming that has caused millions to move away from the countryside. (19, p.172)

These criticisms of the effects of the city on the environment are ones we would have expected from the green movement. As we have seen in previous chapters, however, they also focus their criticisms on the effects on the person, and it is to such criticisms we will now turn.

5.2.2 Effects on the person

Here, many of the points important for environmentalists could be identified just as easily with the left. They share a common emphasis on poverty, unemployment, powerlessness, isolation, marginalisation, inadequate housing, illness and depression, and would both identify similar factors as some of the most important causes of these negative aspects of cities. However, for environmentalists, these factors make the city an important focus for different reasons than for those of the left. Whereas left-wing groups might see these problems as able to be solved individually (by reducing the unemployment rate or building better public housing, for example), or by socialist reform or revolution (abandoning capitalism), for green
politics, they are evidence of an illogical and unsustainable industrial society, whose effects would be no or little different under communism or socialism. For the greens, these problems will not be solved except by rethinking very basic assumptions about the way we live, taking into account the effects we have on the environment. For the greens, these two aspects (effects on the environment and effects on the person) are thus closely linked.

Some green ideas on the effects of the city on the person are not, however, typically associated with the left. One such idea would be the view that life away from rural or more ‘natural’ environments leads to a lack of what some greens call ‘embeddedness’ (‘enracinement’). Deep greens have always argued that physical distance from a more ‘natural’ environment leads to a negative change in mentality. Indeed, such criticisms are found even in relatively shallow green views of the modern city, based on a general emphasis on quality of life, ‘une préoccupation qui apparaît dès les premières manifestations du mouvement’ (232, p.63).

The next main focus for green criticism is the social exclusion seen in the modern city. The economic expansion of the ‘trente glorieuses’ is now seen to have been accompanied by a neglect of the social sphere. Debray has described France during this period as a ‘société à deux vitesses’ (233, p.8), with economic aspects cruising in high gear while social aspects were stuck in a low gear. While this uneven development was criticised in the 1970s, environmentalists have pointed out that it now seems ‘un panorama enviiable pour notre regard actuel’, because of ‘la progression régulière et soutenue du pouvoir d’achat dans un contexte de chômage quasi-nul’ (103, p.23).

Undoubtedly the most important aspect of social exclusion for environmentalists and other politicians alike is unemployment, though some of the greens’ criticism are made on slightly different grounds. Since 1982, unemployment has never fallen below two million in France, and levels are at their highest in cities. Greens agree
with other politicians on the negative effects of unemployment - 'social, personal, economic', leading to 'a high correlation between unemployment and rates of early mortality, disease, alcoholism, mental illness and crime' (19, p.64). However, greens also criticise unemployment because of the context of the environmental crisis:

At a time when other resources are becoming scarce, [unemployment] represents a serious and totally irrational waste of our most valuable productive resource. (ibid., pp.64-5)

Greens criticise the 'social marginalisation' of the unemployed in 'unsatisfactory living environments' (234, p.31), with few facilities, high unemployment, and the 'ghetto-isation' of poor and immigrants. Such segregation means that the city is disproportionately affected. Health problems, social exclusion and unemployment are all at their worst in the British inner city or French banlieue and have more pronounced effects because of their interaction (19, p.86). Seabrook adds 'crime, violence, psychiatric and emotional illness, loneliness, more people on drugs, more people bereft of marketable skills' (235, p.105) to this list, and makes an important point for green criticisms in his conclusion. Far from being a 'vestigial problem', poverty in cities is 'structural, a necessary, precise concomitant of the patterns of growth and development of the economy' (ibid., p.111).

The marginalisation and segregation of vulnerable groups - the poor, old, immigrants as well as the unemployed - is one of the most important obstacles to individual 'development and autonomy' (ibid., p.109) in cities and this is therefore one of the strongest criticisms made by greens. Waechter takes the car as an example of such marginalisation, pointing out that in 1989, one quarter of French families had no access to a car, 'tout en étant condamnées à vivre dans un espace organisé pour la voiture' (96, p.50). Green criticisms of racism and the 'ghettoisation' of immigrant communities usually stress the city too:
Les cités d’urgence des années 60 sont un peu les bidonvilles des villes riches du Nord, occupées par les immigrés, elles ont parfois pris l'aspect de ghettos, où une triple marginalité, économique, géographique et linguistique, favorise la xénophobie, voire le racisme. (ibid., p.85)

A final aspect of social exclusion severely criticised by environmentalists is its effects on health. Illich and Gorz in particular have stressed that ‘Les facteurs de santé et de maladie sont avant tout sociaux’ (32, p.213). Those who live in cities, particularly centralised urban environments like Paris, suffer negative effects on health disproportionately. While Paris is the home of less than 4% of the French population, it has 16% of deaths from bronchitis and 8% of deaths from lung cancer (86, p.79). Such negative effects of city life on the health of the individual are criticised by greens as they are impossible to avoid. This example of individual powerlessness brings us to the next criticism made by greens, that is of the effects of the scale of the modern city.

The scale of modern cities is criticised not only for its compounded effects on the environment, but also for its extreme negative effects on the person, and particularly its effects on the ability of individuals to control or change their environment. Greens have argued that this ability, or even ‘droit’ (34, p.124) should be the determining factor in deciding the appropriate size of cities:

A partir de quel seuil démographique la ville cesse-t-elle d’être désirable?
Sans doute à partir du moment où le désir de ses habitants ne détermine plus son évolution. (86, p.82)

The scale of modern cities, and particularly Paris has led to the exacerbation of already existing problems relating to social exclusion, just as it magnified environmental degradation and pollution. Kofman has described how urban zoning
policies, still encouraged in France after they had been abandoned in other European
countries, resulted in tension in the banlieue and its eventual development into a
'simplified shorthand for a cluster of social ills and problematic inhabitants, [...] a
place of exclusions' (236, p.382).

The scale of modern urban environments is particularly criticised for its effects on
the autonomy and way of life of individuals. Its compounded environmental
problems affect their health disproportionately. Other negative effects of the scale of
the city on the person criticised in green accounts include the lengthening of the
working day (through increased journey times to and from work, for example), the
inaccessibility of cultural facilities (cost and distance from home are again
criticised), the increased cost of accommodation, and the lack (or destruction) of
community ('esprit de quartier'). The scale of the city is also criticised for its
encouragement of defeatist attitudes. Environmentalists believe that all citizens
should be involved in decisions about their environment, and their main criticism of
scale is thus that 'le gigantisme urbain étouffe la démocratie' (86, p.81).

Currently, then, centralised, urbanised societies are criticised for replacing the
desired 'civic autonomy and active citizenry' with a 'passive constituency' of urban-
dwellers and the 'civic supremacy' of centralised cities over rural societies (222,
p.146). This development, combined with the poor quality of life, social exclusion
and problems of scale we have already described, is summed up by greens in the
idea of alienation. As we have noted in previous chapters, greens use the term
alienation in a different way than marxists do, focussing particularly on health and
the environment.

In terms of health and alienation, Gorz, Illich and Dumont have all focussed on the
negative effects of the 'professionalisation' of medicine on individuals, effects
which have compounded the physical and mental consequences of large-scale urban
living environments. High rates of alcoholism, depression, even prostitution have
been volunteered as the results of city life and the impression that urban dwellers have no power to manage their own health. As well as criticisms of the effects on physical health, mental health is seen to be affected by isolation and loneliness, among other factors.

Dans la ville, la solitude est devenue un phénomène de masse, mal vécu et mal soigné. [...] Plus de 10% des Français souffrent de dépression nerveuse. [...] La peur de la ville n'y est pas pour rien. (224, p.140)

The urban environment is important with regard to avoiding a sense of alienation (something greens often term 'convivialité') in two ways - first, city environments themselves are not sufficiently natural, and this leads to further alienation of their inhabitants: 'Pas d'enracinement dans le béton', as a green slogan has it (86, p.132). The green emphasis on the need for espaces verts has been present since the earliest days of the movement. The alienation of the population is often linked to aesthetic objections to the modern city. For Waechter, 'la nature expulsée, la ville [devient] un univers anonyme et parfois hostile' (ibid., p.37).

Second, the scale of the modern city means its citizens live too far from more natural rural environments. Deep ecologists in particular have stressed the human 'need' for wilderness, but non-deep greens also see more natural (though less extreme) environments as necessary. For greens, the distance from nature inherent in large urban environments involves a loss of freedom:

[Lorsqu'il] ne subsiste plus ni champ ni forêt à portée de bicyclette, la respiration n'est plus possible et la liberté n'est qu'une illusion. (ibid., pp.35-6)
If environmentalists criticise the alienation produced by separation from natural environments, it is usually because, like the scale of modern cities, it can affect our ability or desire to change society. Bookchin warns us to be wary of 'the changes urbanization has produced in our sensibility toward society and toward the natural world' (222, p.ix). Indeed, this final criticism, that urbanisation has had negative effects for democracy and citizen participation is perhaps the most consistent made by greens. We might now consider how far 1930s sources share such critical views of the effects of the city.

5.3 1930s criticisms of the city

The green criticisms detailed above take as their main focus post-war urbanisation and conditions in late-20th century urban environments. Before WW2, however, a much greater proportion of the French population still lived in rural communities than is the case today, and the urban environments of 1930s France were clearly very different to their contemporary equivalents. It might seem unlikely, therefore, that we would find many comparable criticisms in 1930s sources.

However, the essential elements of the urbanisation process which greens criticise today were already becoming apparent in 1930s France. For example, as noted in Table 1, the population of Paris itself (as opposed to the Paris region) reached its highest level between the wars. The economic crisis France experienced at the beginning of the 1930s was the first to affect a population based mainly in the towns, even if the proportion living there was not as high as it is today. The effects of town and city on their new inhabitants were therefore highly visible and attracted attention and comment, notably in the relatively novel cinematic focus on the city, in films such as Carné's Hôtel du Nord. For Borne and Dubief, one difference between 1920s and 1930s France is that by the time of the economic crisis, 'la ville est au
bout d'un cycle' (11, p.230), with uncertainty about its effects and its future a key feature of the period.

The apparent paradox we noted in the case of modern greens (that while reserving their strongest criticisms for cities and towns, they nonetheless choose to live there) is also paralleled in the 1930s. Citron points out that Giono always lived in the (albeit small) Provence town Manosque, and never adopted the kind of paysan life he lauded (he was only an infrequent visitor to the Contadour 'experiment') (215, p.xiii), and the youth groups of the 1930s were invariably 'des Français très "urbanisés,"' even if some, like the Personalists had 'une qualité de prise de conscience qu'on ne s'attendrait guère à voir survivre dans nos cités désolées' (73, p.209).

These broad resemblances mean we can consider 1930s criticisms of the city's effects on the person and the environment as we did for green criticisms, since 1930s sources did indeed focus on both sorts of effects, even if they would not have used the term 'environmental impact'.

5.3.1 Effects on the environment

As with modern greens, 1930s sources base their criticisms not on the existence of the town or city per se, but on recent urbanisation and the speed and extent of unplanned change. The post-WW1 years had witnessed urban building on a massive scale, 'une rage de mortier, de ciment et d'acier' (159, p.169). Given that French towns and cities had only been growing for a relatively short time (and hardly at all during the war), such sudden changes were striking. In 1938, Giono noted that in only fifty years 'le jeu industriel' had taken over towns, 'transforming' their size and functions beyond recognition (68, p.135).
The speed and extent of unplanned change, on which greens would later focus, were already attracting criticism in the 1930s. The new demands of capitalist industry were blamed to a great extent for such change: most had moved to towns and cities because large concentrations of workers were now required, and when the economic crisis arrived, the impact on 'cette nouvelle classe ouvrière,' 'le prolétariat déraciné de la banlieue autour de Paris' (11, p.17) was feared. The demands of industry meant that the move to the towns had happened quickly, and that foreign workers had also been widely employed. This led to widespread criticisms of 'déracinement' and badly-planned, segregated living environments too, with examples such as Vénissieux (80% of its inhabitants were from outwith the Lyon area in 1930, with almost half of them coming from outside France)^13 meaning that examples of the urban developments greens would later criticise were already visible in France.

Perhaps the most vocal critic of the unplanned nature of urbanisation cited here was Céline. He repeatedly commented on the incredibly rapid spread of Paris, focusing on the effects of urbanisation on both the city itself and the countryside. Unsurprisingly, given his medical training, he also denounced the effects of unplanned urbanisation on health, as we shall see in the next section. In terms of environmental damage, he focuses on very similar areas as do modern greens: pollution ('la Seine, ce gros égout') (53, p.305), the use of natural resources ('tou le monde en veut, tout le monde en réclame')^14 and the effects of concentrated populations on both.

The unplanned and swift nature of post-WW1 urbanisation was also seen as having led to an unfortunate imbalance between urban and rural populations. Between 1921 and 1931, 600 000 people had left the countryside in the move to French towns and cities (11, p.217) leading many to fear 'le dépépement absolu' of rural areas by the 1930s (238, p.77). An important factor in fears of this rapid urbanisation was that it was 'selective'.
Du point de vue démographique, le plus grave est que l'émigration étant sélective – ce sont les jeunes et les jeunes adultes qui partent [...] – il s'ensuit un dangereux vieillissement de la population in situ et une baisse parfois catastrophique de la natalité. (ibid., pp.79-80)

The imbalance between urban and rural populations was not criticised in terms of population size alone, then, but also because it was widely feared that the departure of young people would lead to a vicious circle, with those left behind unable to replace them. Of course, ‘l'équilibre global des générations’ had already been destroyed by WW1 (172, p.516), meaning fears of such imbalance were particularly acute in the entre-deux-guerres. If there was criticism in the 1930s of the urbanisation process, however, there was an even greater focus on the environmental effects of urban populations once they were established in the towns and cities, in terms similar to those employed by modern greens. These criticisms will now be outlined.

The first such criticism, that urban populations are unable to be self-sufficient, creating problems of supply and waste is identified particularly by Giono in Les vraies richesses. Giono describes at length the effects on both urban dwellers and the environment of concentrated populations. During a visit to Paris, his narrator concludes that those who live there are numb to the absurdity of

les trains incessants alimentent les loyers, [...déchargeant] les étoffes, les viandes, les poissons, les légumes, les épices, pour la consommation [...] du travail, du désir et de la bataille, (60, p.64)

whereas his visitor is shocked by the waste involved in such incessant efforts to supply ‘les esclaves de l'artificiel’ (ibid., p.68). The ferrying of provisions to Paris is summed up as ‘une chaîne sans fin d'esclavage où ce qui se produit se détruit sans créer ni joie ni liberté’ (ibid., p.65). The idea of urban waste being unnatural and
difficult for the rural visitor to comprehend or accept is also a focus in the text. In
the city:

Rien n’est vierge. Rien n’arrive neuf jusqu’à vous. Tout a été fatigué,
utilisé, tripoté, par des millions de bras, de mains, de jambes, de cuisses, de
fesses, de poumons... (ibid., p.45)

‘Cette absence totale de la pureté’ in the city and the absurdity of transporting
provisions are vividly contrasted with the self-sufficient independence of Giono’s
idealised version of the paysan community, producing everything necessary
themselves. Members of the community such as the mayor, musicians or artisans,
who do not produce their own food are portrayed as offering valuable services to the
community in order to be supplied, while the representative of bureaucratic
administration, the Préfet is dismissed: ‘Celui-là, s’il veut manger, qu’il travaille’
(ibid., p.150).

The second focus for criticism is one of the effects of unplanned or badly planned
urbanisation, that is, the rapid and uncontrolled spread of the city. Such effects on
the environment were particularly visible by the early 1930s, after the Loi Loucheur
of 1928 had allowed massive, public-financed building ‘aux portes de Paris’, with
40,000 ‘logements HBM’ following between 1928 and 1939 in the Seine region (11,
p.231). Other precursors of later problems included the modern housing
development at Drancy, in 1934 ‘qui [annonçait] – tours et barres, ciment armé –
les ‘grands ensembles’ des années 1950’, (ibid., p.231). Housing spread in the
1930s has since been described as ‘anarchique’, with ‘les lotissements sauvages non
viabilisés’ multiplying, ‘au hasard au milieu des usines et des voies ferrées’ (ibid.,
p.229).

The extent of such spread was presented as terrifying in the works of both Céline
and Giono. Céline described the inevitability of the disappearance of Vigny-sur-
Seine (‘Paris va le prendre. Il perd un jardin par mois’) (53, p.531) and the equally inevitable effects on both society and the environment the process would have. ‘La Seine a tué ses poissons’, ‘la dernière boule de jardin a disparu’, and those behind the developments are less than inspiring (‘trois lotisseurs viennent d’entrer en prison’) (ibid., p.531).

For Giono, the growth of the cities was absurd, and the desire to live in such conditions (‘s’entasser les uns et les autres sur les fondations même de l’industrie’) (68, p.138) incomprehensible. The upward and outward spread of the city was frequently denounced as particularly unnatural in his works; in his view, cities and their inhabitants represented

\[\text{[L’agglomération] dans des proportions considérables sur de petits espaces de terre, tout restreints, et qu’ils envisageaient même dans leurs moments de plus grand délire d’augmenter en hauteur, en épaisseur.} \text{(ibid., p.137)}\]

The concentration of population in Paris was matched, even more so than is the case today, by the concentration of power and decision-making in the capital. Just as greens today criticise the effects of decisions being taken in Paris by governments or ministers with little awareness of the diversity of approaches needed for different regions and rural areas, so 1930s sources were highly critical of centralised decision-making. Under the centralised system of the Third Republic, local politicians could wield great influence at national level, and since many issues which would be dealt with by county and municipal authorities in England were in France ‘the direct responsibility of the central government’ (85, p.37), decisions which might have been appropriate in a minority of regions were frequently applied to the entire country, regardless of their suitability to the local climate, farming, economy and so on.
Le Populaire made this point in 1936, arguing that 'des milliards de francs' had been wasted, which might have been used to 'contribuer au bien-être rural' (89, p.57) under a less centralised system. Literary sources agreed. Giono in particular criticised what he saw as the tendency of governments and politicians to ignore those who were not city-dwellers. 'On a trop l'habitude de croire qu'il n'y a du peuple qu'à Belleville', whereas 'le peuple ne s'arrête pas aux barrières de Paris' (239, p.24). Denouncing politicians as 'ces hommes faux,' he bemoans their power over the paysan especially:

Partout ils font les lois, les lois qui régissent votre vie. [...] Ils font comme si vous n'existiez pas, vous, les paysans. (68, pp.141-2)

However, the concentration of population and power in Paris was not seen as beneficial to the capital, either. Indeed, the unplanned and rapid nature of post-WW1 urbanisation meant that Paris of the 1930s was witnessing problems that would not be found in other French towns and cities until at least the 1950s, in the view of Borne and Dubief (inhabitants of 'les vieux centres' being forced out by offices, the traditional social mix of the city being lost, with factories and their workers leaving for the suburbs, 'l'entassement dans un parc immobilier vétuste et sans confort', the higher proportion of unemployment in the Paris region and so on) (11, p.231).

The intensified environmental impact of this centralised population also reached a level in 1930s Paris that would arguably not be seen until much later in other French towns and cities. The earlier 'haussmannisation' of Paris meant that its streets had been able to 'accueillir la circulation automobile' very quickly (ibid., p.230), and along with the new factory developments in the Paris region, this meant that the effects of pollution were very apparent, attracting criticism from both Céline and Giono. 'Les volutes de mille usines, de cent mille voitures en trafic' meant that Paris had become 'un pot d'échappement sans échappement' (67, p.237). Céline also describes the physical effects of pollution - at Place Clichy, 'la chaleur des
autos, juin venu, celle qui vous brûle la gorge et le fond du nez' reminds him of the Ford factory (53, p.303). Visiting Paris, the narrator of Les vraies richesses is also struck by the heightened effects of pollution in the capital: 'Ce ciel ne fait pas respirer. Il noie d'un seul coup les poumons' (60, p.36).

Again, it is the scale of the modern city, and particularly Paris which is presented as exacerbating environmental impact, not least because of the 'aesthetic pollution' it entails. Criticisms of scale abound in French literature of the period, whether of the sheer numbers grouped together in cities or of architectural developments. At a time when most were bemoaning the 'hollow years' of the post-WW1 period and French 'Malthusianism' (196, p.78), authors like Céline and Giono were instead attacking the 'extrême multiplication des générations que la technique industrielle a entassées dans les villes' (68, p.141). The terms generally chosen to describe cities were 'termitières' (110, p.109); 'cette fourmilière' (53, p.261); Paris was 'cette ville où les hommes sont entassés comme si on avait râtelé une fourmilière' (60, p.36). The visual impact of cities on such a scale was presented as terrifying: 'New York, c'est une ville debout [..] raide à faire peur' (53, p.237, with some attacking the 'décadence du génie urbain français' for replacing the ancient fortification of Paris with 'des casernes de brique' (11, p.230).

Nor were criticisms of the effects of urbanisation limited to changes in cities and towns. Both rural decline and the loss of regional diversity were criticised for their effects on the environment in the 1930s as they are now by greens. The official support for farming on a larger scale, with paysans encouraged to acquire land by a 1918 law on credit (11, p.220), together with the 'selective' urbanisation mentioned earlier had led by the 1930s to criticisms of rural 'dépeuplement'. The very recent adoption of 'monoculture' farming in certain regions of France was also feared, particularly since 'l'esprit commercial' was felt to be behind the specialisation in wine and fruit production.
There were violent criticisms of the potential effects on the environment of such developments in journals such as Raquet’s *Progrès Agricole* between 1919 and 1939, which attacked ‘ces “vampires de la finance” (les fabricants de “fertilisants”)’ and ‘les technocrates’ whose emphasis on large-scale production was already argued to be leading French farming ‘à la ruine et à la mort’ (170, p.3). Giono also denounced the effects on the environment of such developments in surprisingly ‘green’ terms in the 1930s, arguing that polyculture was essential, and that regional diversity in crops must be maintained if the land and quality of produce were not to suffer. Whereas appropriate crops would flourish, ‘industrial’ farming was doomed —

Ce qui se faisait naturellement est devenu une vraie bataille et il faut des centaines de litres de jus de nicotine pour lutter contre le mal. (68, p.184)

A common focus in the 1930s was on the perceived official encouragement of uniformity, and criticisms of the loss of regional or local traditions were frequent. This was true not only of agricultural production, but also of the rural way of life. The influence of radio and travelling cinemas had brought ‘l’air de la ville’, with rural dress codes and eating habits soon similar to those in towns (11, p.221). For Daniel-Rops, ‘le péril est le gigantisme’, which was closely linked to the centralisation of French society, denied fundamental, natural differences and led to the loss of regional diversity and long-established traditions. Thus

le Breton et le Provençal mêlés dans l’anonymat faubourien, fondus peu à peu dans le creuset d’où sort le misérable métal du citoyen prolétaire (15, p.206)

were the inevitable and regrettable result of state centralisation. Indeed, as with other themes, it was effects on the person that attracted the majority of 1930s criticisms. These will now be outlined.
5.3.2 Effects on the person

The criticisms made of the effects on the person of urbanisation and the city in 1930s sources are again similar to those made by their left-wing contemporaries. The socialists, communists and radicals also denounced living conditions of the urban poor and the effects of urban unemployment, for example. However, many in the 1930s argued, as modern greens do, that neither a socialist revolution nor specific piecemeal reforms would be sufficient to address such problems. Instead, they saw the effects of urban environments on the person as one part of 'une crise totale de civilisation', 'une crise du monde moderne, 'une crise globale' (15, pp.248-9). This 'faux monde' would have to be rejected entirely, since human 'misère physique et spirituelle' was its inevitable outcome (159, p.172): 'Nous n'avons pas été créés pour le bureau, pour l'usine, pour le métro, pour l'autobus' (ibid., p.173).

The idea of a lack of 'enracinement' is again at the centre of such criticisms of the effects on the person of urban environments. 1930s sources even used the same terms as greens - the Personalists criticised 'le déracinement, conséquence de la concentration industrielle et urbaine' (15, p.228). Quality of life was central to such critiques. The distance from a more 'natural' environment and way of life was seen to lead to physical and psychological health problems. The city was believed to exacerbate problems relating to new kinds of work, for example. The 'dépersonnalisation' of industrial work could be overcome by the worker returning to a small village community:

le manoeuvre le plus déraciné, pour qui le travail n'a pas d'autre sens que la perte de quelques heures quotidiennes en échange d'une somme d'argent est un citoyen de son village. La compensation s'opère, l'enracinement a lieu dans le milieu rural. (90, p.426)
In contrast, the urban industrial worker is ‘perdu dans la grande ville’, the ‘mutilation’ he undergoes at work is not recompensed, and his ‘liberté d’esprit, initiative et responsabilité’ remain ‘étouffées dans le travail automatisé’ (ibid., p.426).

The next main focus of 1930s criticisms is on social exclusion, seen as exacerbated by the concentration of populations in the towns and cities. Once again, the primary criticism here is of the effects on the person of unemployment. In the 1930s, awareness of such effects was acute, as the economic crisis of the beginning of the decade had struck urban workers in a manner new to France. As Borne and Dubief point out, ‘les racines rurales permettent de survivre en cas de perte d’emploi ou de sous-emploi’ (11, p.37). The rural French population had thus been protected at a very basic level in times of economic crisis, but in the 1930s, a new group of urban-based workers, most of whom had no unemployment insurance, faced an extreme struggle to survive (85, p.35).

The non-conformist groups took the effects of urban unemployment on the person as a central focus in the 1930s. For the non-conformists, unemployment was closely linked to capitalist industrialism, and was the logical outcome of a system which represented for Esprit ‘une sorte de péché social’ (15, p.219), since it destroyed human dignity. The sudden presence of unemployed workers begging on the streets of Paris was particularly shocking when contrasted with the burning of ‘surplus’ wheat to maintain price levels (both Giono and the Personalists made this comparison) (68, p.181 and ibid., p.217). The effects of unemployment on the person were criticised as immoral and absurd,

absurde, car tous les perfectionnements techniques aboutissent aujourd’hui au chômage, l’abondance à la misère [...] Nous refusons une civilisation qui affame trente millions d’hommes. (ibid., p.219)
Such criticisms of unemployment were linked to fears of ‘les haines, les guerres, les désordres’ (ibid., p.218), seen as the inevitable result of such absurdity and injustice, particularly in a society in which the gap between rich and poor was as wide as that of France in the 1930s. Ordre Nouveau attacked the divisive effects of a society in which ‘une minorité de “pourvus”’ existed alongside ‘d’innombrables démunis’ (ibid., p.225). The disparity in income between the two groups was more apparent by the 1930s, in the view of Cahm, since industry had expanded, and because workers in the cities could observe the conspicuous wealth of some urban-dwellers in a way that would not previously have been possible in smaller rural communities:

The factory-owner, because of the large size of his concern was proportionately much wealthier and more powerful in relation to his workers than the owner of the small artisanal concern, whose way of life and social status were not so different from those of his employees. (72, p.410)

The gulf between ‘pourvus’ and ‘démunis’ was widened by the segregation of urban workers. The term ‘ghetto’ was employed in the 1930s as today to describe the grouping of urban workers in the banlieue, which was ‘vétuste et sans confort’ (11, p.230). The ugliness and isolation of such new living environments in comparison to the rural backgrounds from which their inhabitants had been ‘arrachés’ (86, p.240) was frequently remarked upon – it was former paysans who had been

enfermés dans ces ghettos énormes qui ressemblent à des gares de triage encombrées de wagons noirs. (ibid., p.240)

Again, the feared result was conflict – and indeed, ‘les années 1930 voient se multiplier les affrontements dont la ville est l’enjeu’ (11, pp.229-30). Racial conflict was already feared in the 1930s too – ‘la xénophobie se déchaînait, alors même que diminuait le nombre des étrangers’ (ibid., p.231).
The effects on health of such living environments were also feared. 1930s critics attacked the same aspects of urban life as greens do today. First, the crowding in modern cities was viewed as particularly damaging, particularly in literary accounts. Giono lists examples of crowding at length ('chambres où ils sont trois, quatre, cinq, la famille') before his narrator turns his back on Paris in disgust (60, pp.66-9). Céline describes Bardamu’s horror of commuters ‘comprimés comme des ordures dans la caisse en fer’ of the tramway (53, p.305). The incessant noise of the city is seen as detrimental: ‘dans ma chambre toujours les mêmes tonnerres’ (ibid., p.267).

Indeed, Céline returns throughout Voyage to the effects on physical health of the urban environment, commenting repeatedly on aspects highlighted today by greens. As well as Bardamu’s hatred of noise and crowding, the episode where he practices as a doctor stresses the connections between the urban poor and ill health, particularly through the pathetic Bébert. Pollution is directly blamed for illness: ‘tout le monde toussait dans ma rue’, hardly surprising when to see the sun it was necessary to climb ‘au moins jusqu’au Sacré-Cœur’ (ibid., p.308). Giono also reaches the conclusion that modern life causes illness: ‘Je crois que, si nous savions vivre, nous ne serions peut-être pas malades’ (51, p.62).

Such effects of the urban environment are seen by all our sources as compounded by the scale of the modern city, just as greens argue today. Already in 1932, there was widespread nostalgia for the ‘Paris des artisans, de la sociabilité des quartiers’ (11, p.230). De Rougemont offered the new urban environment as evidence for his view that ‘l’homme moderne a perdu la mesure de l’humain’. By the mid-1930s, when he wrote Bagatelles pour un massacre, Céline had reached the conclusion that the scale of the modern city meant change was impossible:
[Paris] est une ville qu'on ne peut plus reconstruire, même plus aménager, d'une façon d'une autre. [...] C'est une ville qu'est devenue maintenant toute nuisible, mortelle pour ceux qui l'habitent. (67, pp.236-7)

This idea that change is not possible is a key element of the final broad criticism made of the city's effects on the person, that is that it leads to widespread alienation for its inhabitants. Some 1930s sources even arrived at a very similar (non-Marxist) definition of alienation as modern greens do. Mounier argued that Marxists did not go far enough in their definition, and that communism would not end alienation, as greens do now:

Le marxisme a raison de penser que la fin de la misère matérielle est la fin d'une aliénation, et une étape nécessaire au développement de l'humanité. Mais elle n'est pas la fin de toute aliénation. (26, p.21)

Instead, life in modern urban environments and industrial work would cause alienation even under a non-capitalist system. A key aspect of such alienation was the effect on psychological health of life in the city. Just as pollution, poverty or crowding affected the physical health of 'citadins', so depression and loneliness were portrayed as the inevitable result for many in the city. For the Personalists, loneliness was not 'une donnée de la condition humaine', but rather the result of the modern way of life: 'on se fait seul', by the rejection of 'les petites communautés' in favour of 'le gigantisme social' (ibid., pp.43-4). Few accounts of the loneliness of the city-dweller are as vivid as that of Bardamu when he finally reaches the United States. The speed and inhuman scale of New York are clearly linked to Bardamu's isolation:

En Afrique, j'avais certes connu un genre de solitude assez brutale, mais l'isolement dans cette fourmilière américaine prenait une tournure plus accablante encore. (53, p.261)
After only a few days in New York, Bardamu explodes: 'J’en avais assez d’être seul! [...] De la sympathie! Du contact!' (ibid., p.267). Elsewhere, it is not simply the scale of the modern city which leads to such problems, but also its inhabitants’ unnatural surroundings. Cities lack ‘les fleurs, les espaces, les jardins’ (67, p.239), a point emphasised in Voyage when Bardamu suggests pathetically that the ill child Bébert be taken to the cemetery, the only uncrowded green space in the area. ‘La cruelle matière de leur habitat’ (60, p.37) leads to illness for city-dwellers in Giono’s view, too.

Unlike Céline, however, Giono argues that a key aspect of such alienation is the distance of city-dwellers from the more natural rural environment. (While Céline criticises the lack of ‘espaces verts’ in the city, the countryside is hardly presented as a superior alternative) For Giono, the heart of the problem is that there are people who have no first-hand knowledge of ‘ce qu’est un arbre, une feuille, une herbe, le vent de printemps, le galop d’un cheval, le pas des boeufs’ (60, p.18).

The eventual result of all of the above problems, and of general alienation is seen as an overwhelming defeatism, and this represents the final broad criticism made in 1930s sources of the effects of the city on the person. Both literary sources and the non-conformists argued despondency was the eventual effect of modern urban life. The scale of the urban environment is implicated, as always: ‘Plus la ville est grande et plus elle est haute et plus ils s’en foutent’ (53, p.268). The city-dweller is not even conscious of the effects his surroundings are having:

Quand on habite à Rancy on se rend même plus compte qu’on est devenu triste. On a plus envie de faire grand-chose, voilà tout. (ibid., p.308)
Giono agrees with Céline that such effects take hold without the city-dweller being aware that he has developed "un autre sens de la liberté, un autre sens de la grandeur, un autre sens de la vie" (68, p.139). Such alienation was seen by Giono as particularly dangerous, because it would lead to "l'éternité de la prison" (ibid., p.139). If the city dweller was not conscious of how restricted his vision was, there was no potential to change society for the better. Such despondency was also viewed as dangerous, somewhat paradoxically, in the 1930s because "l'homme déraciné, prolétarisé, coupé de toutes ses attaches familiales, régionales" by the industrial urban environment was seen as particularly likely to be attracted to extreme alternatives – this was the view of Ordre Nouveau and the Personalists, for example (15, p.224). If his work or his community did not provide a sense of belonging, the urban dweller was believed to transfer "son besoin d'encracinement dans un homme, un parti, un mythe" (90, p.427).

Many concluded with Giono that "nul ne peut vivre séparé de son milieu" (60, p.73). Having reached this conclusion, as indeed greens would decades later, what alternatives to the city did they propose as potential solutions to the problems they identified as critical?

5.4 Green solutions

As in previous chapters, greens propose solutions to the problems they identify in modern cities which vary in practicality from reformist proposals, such as those found in the manifesto of les Verts for instance, to outright utopian visions of new kinds of society. The reformist proposals will be outlined first.

Such solutions stress that it is not necessarily the city which must be abandoned, but rather our "old industrial heartlands" (37, p.76) in their current form. They hold that
this is not an utopian solution, pointing out that 'history is littered with cities that rose to power and then fell into decline', usually because 'they abused the environment on which they depended' (ibid., p.75). ‘Reconstituer la ville,’ or finding new kinds of city is therefore essential if the city is to survive at all, and is the basis for their proposals. Perhaps surprisingly, given their virulent criticisms of the city, the survival of urban environments is something most greens want to see.

There may be a ‘crise de la condition urbaine’, but this should not lead to a desire for ‘une nouvelle ruralisation de la population,’ in Wacchter’s view, as ‘la ville remplit une fonction d’échange et de service que nulle autre structure ne saurait remplir’ (96, pp.85-6). The aim is rather to find a balance between city life and ‘convivialité’.

While this aim does lead reformist greens to stress the need for new controls or curbs on certain activities, their solutions are based particularly on a new citizenship, with community involvement an apparent panacea for most of the city’s ills (‘carrots rather than sticks’, in Dobson’s words) (20, p.155). In terms of controls, first, they emphasise the need for tax changes and stronger laws on pollution (‘le principe pollueur-payeur’) (46, p.4), transport (ibid., p.3) and waste (ibid., p.4). This is a relatively minor element of their proposals, however. Their focus is primarily on addressing the effects on the person of the city. Problems such as loneliness, alienation and racism which are associated in their view with urban environments are to be addressed by a new kind of community, with ‘urban villages’ suggested as the ideal (19, p.171). The abolition of urban planning permission, or at least of ‘le zonage’ (46, p.3), to allow a ‘hotchpotch’ of services, housing, ‘espaces verts’ and leisure facilities to grow ‘organically’ and according to the needs of each community is proposed (ibid., p.171). The aim is to ‘revivifier les communautés (quartier, commune, famille, association)’ (3, pp.55-6). A key element for greens here is ‘participation à la vie locale’, with ‘conseils d’insertion, de dialogue interculturel dans les villes de plus de 10.000 habitants’ proposed (211, p.10). Such measures would, they argue, address problems of racism at a local level and allow each community to determine its character and priorities.
Decentralisation of power to citizens is again an important ingredient in reformist solutions. ‘Une régionalisation, voire une municipalisation du pouvoir politique’ (34, p.66) is a starting point, but greens argue that further devolution of power and decision-making is essential in cities, with power transferred ‘vers les bassins de vie et de travail’ as much as possible (46, p.13). Greens repeatedly highlight the need for autonomy, not simply because humans are seen as having the right to influence and determine their own lifestyles, but because it is felt that this will actually lead to greater environmental awareness on the part of the individual, who will be able to see the effects of his/her chosen way of life: autonomy ‘dans l’atelier, la campagne ou le bureau pour chaque individu, dans son territoire pour chaque communauté’ means ‘la possibilité de “voir le bout de ses propres actes”, de maîtriser les conséquences’ (34, p.18). A key element of green reforms is encouraging individuals to accept responsibility for their community, and indeed for their own health. While state-level controls on pollution are one step which might address health problems in cities, the emphasis for the citizen is on ‘neighbourhood healthcare schemes’: ‘we must keep ourselves healthy’ (19, p.169), in the greens’ view.

Even if the green movement has very urban roots, as we saw at the beginning of this chapter, this does not mean that reformist proposals focus only on the city when looking for potential solutions. ‘La notion d’espace rural de qualité’ (240, p.95) is also important for green political theory, particularly in terms of agriculture, ‘the problem of how we feed ourselves’ being ‘arguably the most vital component of a Green ecological strategy’ (241, p.60). The reformist green emphasis here is therefore usually on more sustainable agricultural methods, with les Verts aiming to ‘encourager l’agriculture paysanne et biologique et convertir les activités productivistes et polluantes’ (46, p.3). Protection of forests and other natural environments are also stressed in the reformist green approach (ibid., p.5). Even greens who see the city as potentially positive do also stress the need for a higher proportion of the total population living in rural environments. This brings us to the second main focus for reform, that is, an emphasis on the scale of the modern city.
For Buchmann, ‘un modèle de société urbain’ dominates in France (240, p.95) and must be challenged. The scale of the modern city is damaging for all citizens, whether they live there or not. Greens emphasise the need to address the size of cities through a ‘rééquilibrage du territoire’ – ‘l’exigence de parité’ (217, p.132) between town and country with ‘l’accès aux services publics sur tout le territoire’ (46, p.3) is seen as an important element of achieving such reforms, since few will want to move to a rural environment where long journeys to work, poor leisure facilities, schools, hospitals, and so on are the norm. The balance of the urban and rural populations is a central focus for reformist greens. Waechter, despite his acceptance of the city as necessary, albeit in a smaller form, concurs that, ‘la commune et notamment la petite commune rurale est le lieu privilégié de la société que nous souhaitons’.¹⁹

A different balance between urban and rural populations would also lead to remaining cities existing on a smaller scale. Les Verts indeed argue the need to ‘déconcentrer la région parisienne et les grandes métropoles régionales au profit des villes moyennes et des zones rurales’ (46, p.3). Instead of growth, greens call for development of the city, just as they want to replace economic growth with sustainable development:

La croissance est la caractéristique de l’état jeune. À l’âge adulte, on n’a plus besoin de croître (quand on continue à le faire, cela s’appelle cancer), mais on se développe. (240, pp.98-9)

Smaller cities would mean their inhabitants would more easily be able to reach the countryside, with straightforward access to ‘un patrimoine naturel suffisant pour la santé et le bien-être’ to become a constitutional right (46, p.5). Smaller cities would also mean the self-reliance of their inhabitants could be increased, and the volume of waste reduced, alleviating the pressure on land elsewhere. Greens have seriously
proposed ‘allotments and rooftop gardens’ as a key element of change to the modern city, pointing out that in the Far East, ‘cities produce much of their own food within their boundaries’ through such measures (37, p.47).

A further example of the green emphasis on ‘acting locally’ is their support for regional diversity, which should again be safeguarded in the constitution, in their view (46, p.10). Greens have long supported the Breton and Occitan campaigns for greater independence, as such diversity and the sense of place they believe is associated with regional attachment might represent the possibility of greater ‘enracinement’, with the environmental benefits greens believe this would imply (242, p.182).

The idea of ‘enracinement’ is, however, more frequently stressed in the second, revolutionary or utopian type of green solution, to which we shall now turn. This second type of solution has two guiding principles – sustainability and what greens see as a human ‘need’ for enracinement. It is because of their stress on both that deep greens in particular are more likely to question the existence of the city, or to call for a mass return to the land: we must ‘live as close to the land as possible. [...] We must make its rhythms our patterns, its laws our guide.120 The idea of basing human societies on patterns apparently observable in the natural world is one many deep ecologists favour, emphasising qualities they see as prevalent in nature (diversity, symbiosis and so on) to argue that human beings should adopt small, highly decentralised rural communities (22, p.49).

In their calls to return to the land, such greens are inserted in a long tradition which believes that ‘whereas the town corrupts, country life preserves and encourages virtue’ (243, p.183). Greens would interpret this ‘virtue’ as a greater awareness and acceptance of sustainable practices. Secondly, and relatedly, rural life ‘brings happiness, whereas the town brings misery and destroys tranquility of spirit’ (ibid., p.183).
If cities are to be abandoned, these more utopian greens do at least address how the alternative might be made more attractive to those who might not immediately accept its advantages. Thus they have stressed the benefits (to health, for example) of rural environments. Green theory has also concentrated on how to avoid negative effects for individuals of a more sustainable way of life, asking, for example, how such communities can be sufficiently diverse for all individuals to accept them, and how personal freedoms might be protected.

A ‘rééquilibrage du territoire’ (46, p.3), with the redistribution of services and amenities from towns and cities to the countryside, so these environments become more viable and attractive environments is again seen as a first step. An emphasis on self-development and education is particularly common, with Gorz stressing that his ‘utopie possible’ would ensure access to ‘centres pluridisciplinaires d’auto-enseignement et d’auto-apprentissage, ouverts à tous jour et nuit, à la portée de ceux des villages reculés’ (32, pp.59-60), for example. Such proposals are also aimed at avoiding isolation in future rural communities.

This more idealistic solution to the problems of the city places special emphasis on the paysan as a role model for the future – whereas the 20th Century has witnessed the development of ‘peasants into Frenchmen’ such greens imply a return to the paysan way of life would be a step forward, both in terms of sustainability and ‘enracinement’. The paysan has a special role in green thought. As a self-reliant, and commonly even self-sufficient producer, he was a model of sustainable living. He is also seen as having a greater awareness of the earth, because of the need to work in harmony with natural cycles. The desire to pass on the farmed land to the next generation also led to care for the environment. ‘L’économie des ressources et le respect du pain quotidien, de la nature et de la vie’ are cited by greens today as elements of the ‘culture paysanne’ which should be re-embraced (189, p.45).
As well as the paysan’s superior awareness of his environmental impact, green critiques often imply a quasi-spiritual relationship between the paysan and the earth, something they see as providing a potential way forward to a more sustainable balance between human beings and the planet. Lovelock has argued that paysans make more ‘natural’ greens in their willingness to accept ideas such as his Gaïa theory (that ‘la Terre est un être vivant’), which are dismissed by most scientists (apparently because ‘les scientifiques sont en général condamnés à mener une vie de citadins’) (244, p.30). Those who live and work on the land are ‘souvent stupéfaits d’apprendre que quelqu’un doive établir une proposition formelle pour une idée aussi évidente que l’hypothèse Gaïa’, since ‘pour ces gens de la campagne, cette hypothèse est vraie et l’a été de tout temps. (ibid., p.31).

The next reason for proposing some form of return to the land is based on the advantages for the person of more ‘natural’ surroundings. ‘The difference is aesthetic’, as ‘the country surrounds us with pure air and quietness and all the healing beauties of the natural scene’ (243, p.183). A key emphasis for deep green political theory here is the idea of wilderness, generally taken to mean nature unaffected by human interference. Interestingly, for a political theory which aims to be non-anthropocentric, Deep Ecology nonetheless seems to see wilderness in terms of its value for human beings and the effects it can have on the person. ‘Wilderness experiences’ are described in countless Deep Green accounts, and their authors often state that such experiences as ‘contemplating a mountain’ initially inspired them to become Deep Ecologists. Exposure to a rural, and ideally a wild environment is therefore recommended as a natural, or spiritual way to convert others to the green cause. Such greens argue that access to wild rural environments should be a ‘right for all’, leading Barry to accuse them of recommending a sort of ‘deep green consumerism’ which could be just as damaging and elitist as the light green kind they deplore (22, p.50).

Again, such greens argue that women have a key role to play in moving towards their sustainable society. If men’s ‘Mastery of nature’ has led to the current
unsustainable human-nature relationship, they argue that one way to stop current patterns of exploitation, particularly in the rural environments to which they hope we will return, might be to look to women. For Davion, ‘there is an important link between the domination of nature and the domination of women’ and an understanding of one is aided by an understanding of the other (246, p.8). This understanding would enable us to ‘go beyond colonisation’ of the countryside, ‘liberate nature’, and establish ‘a more balanced human-nature relationship’ (245, p.158).

Qualities traditionally associated with women such as ‘desire, caring, love, conservation, nurturing’ (ibid., p.5) are highlighted by ecofeminists as the way forward (leading critics to accuse them of being anything but feminist) (246, p.10). They argue that such qualities should be adopted more widely, with women already living in the countryside as some kind of role model. Of course, such solutions are open to the criticism that they merely want to revert to the past, to backward rural communities. Indeed, some ecofeminists accept this point, and argue that prehistoric societies which ‘worshipped the Goddess of nature and spirituality, our great Mother, the giver of life and creator of us all’ were in fact sustainable as modern urban societies are not; they were even ‘structured very much like the peaceful and more just society we are now trying to construct’.24

In fact, this emphasis on goddess figures is startlingly widespread in the more extreme green solutions which emphasise a return to the land. Lovelock of course chose Gaïa (the Greek goddess of nature) as the illustration of his view that the earth is neither a ‘force primitive à dominer et à conquérir’ nor ‘un vaisseau spatial fou, voyageant à jamais privé de commandant de bord et d’objectif’ (244, p.32), but rather a living organism, capable of revolt and of rejecting its despoilers. This final point is repeatedly stressed in deep green solutions: if we fail to accept their suggestions, they imply somewhat menacingly, nature will force us to change our ways. Lovelock, for example, points out that the most deadly poisons are to be found in nature, and argues that if we carry on in our current urbanised,
industrialised societies, Gaia will use these against us. 'Des surprises déplaisantes risquent de surgir' (ibid., p. 143): 'la Nature n'hésite pas à recourir à la guerre chimique si des armes moins conventionnelles s'avèrent insuffisantes' (ibid., p. 129).

We can now conclude by asking how far 1930s sources identified such extreme solutions, and the less radical reforms proposed by greens today as an answer to the urban problems they criticised.

5.5 1930s solutions

Although there was evidence of a desire to reform aspects of the city, particularly under the Popular Front, the emphasis in the 1930s sources consulted here was clearly on more radical, if not utopian solutions. This is true of virtually all the sources, with the immediately conspicuous exception of Céline, who 'criticises urban life but never goes so far as to glorify its alternative' (109, p. 833). Drieu's description of the approach taken in Voyage ('Cracher, seulement cracher, mais mettre au moins tout le Niagara dans cette salivation') (162, p. 18) certainly seems apt when we consider Céline's equally negative portraits of the rural environment ('triste avec ses bourbiers qui n'en finissent pas') (53, p. 23).

In this section, as for green solutions, the reformist suggestions which were made in the 1930s will be outlined before concluding with an account of the more radical suggestions made.

There was a similar focus on the potential of the city in the 1930s as today. Criticisms were of the city in its current form, but many argued that it could be improved through reforms, usually addressing its size. The Personalists were keen,
for example, to point out that there was no ‘modèle uniforme aux sociétés humaines’ (26, p.44) and that a different type of city could just as well serve the person as the rural environment would. Their belief in the potential of the person meant that when they called for ‘communes “à la mesure de l’homme,’” Mounier stressed that by this they meant not only ‘des jardins de banlieue et des voisinages de quartier’, though these were essential elements of their reformist proposals, but also ‘l’univers’ (ibid., p.43) - as well as their need for a sense of community, human beings were capable of greatness.

Reforms of the city were proposed to increase the ‘convivialité’ of the urban environment, particularly under the Popular Front. ‘Un phénomène essentiellement urbain’ (89, p.147), the Popular Front made concerted attempts to improve the urban environment, notably under the influence of the mayor of Suresnes, Henri Sellier, who had earlier been a French ‘pionnier des cités-jardins’ (11, p.231). An emphasis on the ‘greening’ of the city, aesthetic improvements and easy access for all to green spaces was widespread – in 1937, Giraudoux ‘rêvait d’une ceinture verte autour de la grande ville, d’un Marais restauré’ (11, p.230).

The stress on ‘loisirs’ as one way to address the negative effects of the city in its current form (particularly the effects on health) was a key aspect of reformist solutions. The Popular Front, again, with Lagrange saw temporary escape from urban conditions as one reformist step, supporting the development of the Auberges de jeunesse and arranging ‘accommodation for holidaying workers in peasant households’ (169, p.232), for example. Mounier wanted to address urban alienation by ‘guarantee[ing] to the individual sport, leisure, cultural amusements,’ something which would best be achieved through ‘administrative and economic decentralization’ (81, p.273).

Indeed, decentralisation was a pillar of such reformist solutions. The non-conformist groups all proposed this as a virtual panacea to the ‘crise de civilisation’ they
observed in their society. Ordre Nouveau called in their Manifesto for ‘une
décentralisation assez parfaite’ (15, p.443), ‘la petite patrie décentralisée’ being seen
as the answer to problems associated with both ‘déracinement’ and nationalism
(ibid., p.444), as it would lead to an attachment less to the nation than to the region.
For Esprit, extreme decentralisation was essential – ‘toute communauté doit être
décentralisée jusqu’à la personne’ (ibid., p.452), even if it was not exactly clear how
this might best be achieved.

As today, reformist proposals focussed on changes to the countryside as well as to
the city. Even the ‘urban phenomenon’ of the Popular Front demonstrated a
continued ‘sollicitude à l’égard des agriculteurs’ (89, p.147), with measures such as
the introduction of the Office National du Blé attempting to guarantee better living
conditions for agriculteurs. While their intentions might have been admirable,
however, the potential consequences of this move were widely feared among
agriculteurs, with a rearguard action against the officially-recommended crop
specialisation gaining momentum by the 1930s. The widely-read 1930s journal
Progrès Agricole has subsequently been praised by modern ecologists for its early
attempt to ‘défendre l’agriculture traditionnelle, exempte de produits chimiques’
(170, p.3) during the 1930s. Giono too attacked the modernisation of farming with
particular vehemence (68, p.148), though the solutions he proposed could hardly be
considered reformist.

Overall, as greens do today, 1930s reformists based their solutions above all on a
reaction to the scale of the modern city. The first aim was to find a better balance
between urban and rural populations, and between Paris and regional towns and
cities. The Personalists, for example, stressed the need to ‘garder la notion d’échelle
ou d’optimum en matière de groupement humain’ (26, p.44), with their preferred
solution seemingly the small town, while Ordre Nouveau based their solution on the
highly-decentralised commune, seen as being ‘à la taille de l’homme’ (81, p.271).
Even Giono claimed not to be recommending ‘des édons campagnards’ as the only
solution (though, as we shall see later, his proposals could be contradictory to say the
least) (79, p.254). Again, there was a stress on providing amenities for rural populations if villages and towns were to become popular living environments. For Giono, ‘il s’agit surtout de laisser entrer la vie dans ce qui est devenu machinal et mécanique’ (60, p.121), generally by facilities (he uses the example of Grasset, his publishers) being relocated to smaller rural towns and villages – urban concerns should have ‘le courage de tout entasser dans des charrettes et de s’en aller à la campagne’ (ibid., p.120).

A new balance between cities, towns and countryside would mean that those cities and towns which remained would exist on a smaller scale, the chief advantage of this development being that rural environments would be close-at-hand. 1930s reformists clearly stressed the benefits for the person (in terms of avoiding alienation and ill health) of access to rural environments. Access to the French ‘patrimoine’ was beginning to be seen as a right for all by the 1930s, with *Le cri des auberges*, the hostelling journal calling on young people in particular to ‘leave the city and give yourself up to the joy of breathing fresh air’ (169, p.231). The only town Giono presents in a vaguely positive light in his 1930s fiction, Villevieille in *Le chant du monde*, is such a small, rural concern, not ‘une ville véritable’ (215, p.xxiii), but part of the countryside which surrounds it: ‘au-dessus des toits le ciel gardait le vert mouvant des forêts’, while ‘de chaque côté de la rue les ruisseaux roulaient’ and the gardens were ‘pleins de foin sauvages’ (79, pp.118-121).

Smaller towns are also emphasised by modern greens for their greater self-reliance. Indeed, even the green suggestion that urban populations take to gardening in the drive towards sustainability had a 1930s predecessor. Lagrange was author of a report, published in the *Journal officiel* in July 1936, which called on workers to ‘consacrer à la culture des jardins floraux et maraîchers une partie de leurs heures de loisirs’, the aim being improvements to health, greater self-sufficiency in times of economic crisis, and even arguably aesthetic improvements to the urban environment (89, p.156).
Smaller, decentralised towns and cities were also emphasised in an attempt to find a solution to the perceived loss of regional diversity affecting 1930s France. The proposed emphasis on sense of place and regional attachment sometimes took a more sinister form during the 1930s, however, with some groups, such as Ordre Nouveau praising aspects of regional identity ('régionalisme terrien, racial et culturel') which greens would reject outright. For the Personalists, however, as for the greens today, 'la fidélité naturelle qui attache l'homme à son pays' ('pays' meaning local area or region rather than nation here) is rather a way to avoid the 'exaltation raciste, passion nationale' (15, p.451), since the attachment to the patrie is forsaken in favour of the commune. Giono's fictional rural communities are the perfect literary illustration of this theory, with foreigners repeatedly chosen as central characters and portrayed as integrated completely, and even strange, mythological half-human, half-animals welcomed as enriching community life.

It was in fiction too that the more radical kind of solution, to which we shall now turn, was usually suggested in the 1930s. As Citron points out when discussing Giono's works, this was 'son droit comme romancier' (84, p.xxxiii). Whereas the non-conformists recognised the need to outline specific reforms which might move society towards a different way of life, the novelists could call on their compatriots, as Giono did, simply to 'vous débarrasser de votre ville!' (60, pp.46-7). It was also the artist's prerogative to change or even contradict earlier views. From Giono's calls for the end of the city, to praising 'les paysans des petites villes' (ibid, p.137) and implying rural towns were a possible alternative, to his later adamant insistence that he had not in fact recommended any solution ('Je n'ai pas utilisé le mot “Retour à la terre” ou qu'on me coupe les oreilles') (120, p.99), any account of Giono's alternatives to the problems of the city must acknowledge a range of positions, though his emphasis was at least consistently on highly-decentralised rural paysan communities, both in his fiction and non-fiction.

By the mid-1930s, Céline too was calling for extreme (and extremely negative) solutions, insofar as he did propose any at all: 'la banlieue faut pas l'arranger, faut la
crever, la dissoudre' in order to 'guérir l'humanité de son vice infect: la ville' (67, p.238). What should be put in its place is typically vague and bleak, because obviously impossible ('Tout le monde, toute la ville à la mer!... [...] pour se refaire du sang généreux') (ibid., p.238).

There was also a radical bias in the solutions proposed by the non-conformists. While they did outline possible reforms to the city, their long-term 'utopie directrice' seemed to imply it should be drastically scaled-down, if not abandoned altogether. Daniel-Rops, for example, called for 'un enracinement plus grand de l'homme dans la région' (15, p.454), while closeness to the earth was repeatedly stressed as the way forward. The first issue of Réaction propounded a solution based on a more natural way of life: 'Retournons aux sources de la vie pour nous guérir'.26 Ordre Nouveau too argued that a new emphasis on 'le rapport indispensable et fécond de l'homme à la terre' (ibid., p.443) might represent a solution to the problems associated with urban life.

Giono argued more explicitly that nature offered patterns on which human society should be based – 'le social ne doit être que le naturel' (60, p.106). The small, rural communities he saw as most 'natural' are depicted as close to the earth, both physically and in their reliance on natural cycles and the seasons. Giono frequently depicts harvest celebrations or festivals marking natural cycles, such as the 'Mère du blé' ceremony in Le chant du monde. Such communities are seen to be aware of the effect humans can have on nature, and indeed, of their debt to nature. Borne and Dubief point out that in much of the French countryside during the 1930s, such ceremonies were still common and reminded agriculteurs, in particular, of their dependence on nature for survival (11, p.225).

If country life was believed to remind rural dwellers of their reliance on nature and of the effects they had on the environment, it was also widely seen as bringing happiness and joy; the countryside was 'le terrain de ta joie' (60, p.71). The view
that humankind would be more content if based in rural communities led many to ask how the population, and particularly the young, could be persuaded of the advantages of country life. A popular American song during the entre-deux-guerres asked ‘How can you keep them down on the farm after they’ve seen Par-ee!’ (222, p.229), and many felt that convincing urban-dwellers of the advantages of country life would be an uphill struggle, given the prevalence of negative images of ‘country bumpkins and village idiots’ in the literature, cinema and jokes of the period (ibid., pp.229-230).

For Giono, vividly depicting the joys of his idealised paysan communities (‘la belle vie!’) (70, p.171), and directly contrasting these with the ‘malheurs’ of the modern city seemed to be the answer (68, p.154). Indeed, many in the 1930s seemed to agree that ‘it was sufficient to educate man in order to transform the world’ (81, p.279), as Lewis describes the Personalist approach. Thus, after a long account of the horrors of the city in Les vraies richesses, Giono simply implies that rural life is the answer by describing immediately afterwards the contentment of waking up on the first morning in the countryside – ‘Voilà que tu te sens déjà mêlé au ciel qui s’éclaire, à l’oiseau qui vole’; ‘Tu vas apprendre peu à peu à être un homme’ (60, p.72).

The most frequently-suggested solution is a return to a way of life based on the role model of the paysan. First, this would solve problems of ‘déracinement’: ‘Le paysan incarne pour les citadins la stabilité, l’enracinement’ (223, p.9). The paysan is closer to the earth than any other figure - ‘il connaît sa terre comme sa poche’ (117, p.88), a characteristic which is sometimes depicted in a quasi-spiritual fashion. For Giono, for example, the paysan’s mysterious ‘liaison directe terre-corps’ (68, p.157) would be destroyed and the paysan would become no more than an agriculteur by the introduction of machines of any sort, even a simple tractor (79, pp.215-7). Second, a higher proportion of paysans would mean more fulfilling work in natural surroundings, instead of the dehumanising industry of the modern city – the non-conformists believed an emphasis on the paysan way of life would ‘rendre à la
personnalité sa valeur créatrice' (15, 454). The kind of creative work done by the paysan was described in glowing terms: 'l'usage de la terre', often described using De Rougemont’s phrase, ‘penser avec ses mains’ was for Mounier ‘a cultural act’ (26, p.130).

Third, a return to the paysan lifestyle was depicted as ensuring care for future generations, just as greens today imply it could. In a moving passage at the end of Terre des hommes, Saint-Exupéry explicitly states that such care for future generations is also the best guarantee of happiness. Contrasting his search (and that of his ‘camarades’) for excitement and fulfilment with the deathbed scene of an old paysan, he is clear which man has had the most successful life:

ila mort] est si douce quand le vieux paysan de Provence, au terme de son règne, remet en dépôt à ses fils son lot de chèvres et d’oliviers, afin qu’ils le transmettent, à leur tour, aux fils de leurs fils. [...] Ce qui se transmettait ainsi de génération en génération, avec le lent progrès d’une croissance d’arbre, c’était la vie, mais c’était aussi la conscience. (86, pp.244-7)

Finally, the emphasis is on the paysan because his traditional qualities are felt to represent the best hope for changing modern society. While, as we have seen in the first two sections of this chapter, urban life was believed to affect city-dwellers’ ability to react and desire to change their society, the paysan is depicted as stubborn and committed: ‘Rien n’est têtu comme un paysan. Tout est détruit, il recommence’ (60, p.25). Given the extent of the ‘crise de civilisation’ identified by many in the 1930s, there was a not-infrequent implication that ‘le soulèvement paysan’ was the best hope (215, p.xxiv).

The next reason for proposing a rural-based society was founded on the aesthetic advantages this was felt to confer. Again, Giono frequently juxtaposes sordid depictions of urban surroundings with the wild beauty of the countryside. His
emphasis on the need for beauty (a ‘passion pour l’inutile’ representing salvation) (51, p.90) is closely linked to the need not only for a rural environment, but for a wild one, an emphasis which recalls the modern deep green stress on the role of wilderness in raising awareness. In Que ma joie demeure, the paysan life alone is not sufficient for joy. Bobi’s first suggestions are based on the need for wild creatures and flowers for human happiness: ‘Tu n’as jamais semé des... des... des pâquerettes?’ (ibid., p.35). The community of the Plateau Grémone first attains such happiness with the arrival of the wild deer. Here, the artist has a special role (‘la mission du poète’) in reminding those who have lost joy in life, probably without realising it, that happiness is not only possible, but a right: ‘Je chante le balancement des arbres...’ (159, p.173).

Another group with a key role to play in finding solutions are women. First, perhaps due to their ability to give birth, they are depicted as being more in touch with natural cycles than even the paysans (51, p.80), sometimes even ‘becoming’ part of the earth – ‘Je suis printemps, je suis envieuse comme tout ça autour, comme le monde’, as Clara exclaims in Le chant du monde (55, p.266). Second, traditionally ‘feminine’ qualities are presented as a potential way to improve society. This was argued by both the Personalists, whose emphasis on women has already been noted (26, pp.122-4), and in Giono’s fictional accounts of more joyful societies. He repeatedly depicted female characters transforming society and bringing joy through ‘le petit geste’ (117, p.123), almost invariably that of baking bread. From such small beginnings, whole communities are regenerated, with women the catalyst for change every time. The bread-making which revigorates the village community of Les vraies richesses, for example, is ‘bien un travail de femme, un travail pour lequel il faut de la maternité, [...] de la séduction’ (60, p.104).

Just as greens today face accusations they wish to return to more backwards societies on the basis of the solutions they propose, so similar criticisms of Giono’s vision of paysan societies were frequent:
Exalter la vie des bergers, des cultivateurs, des artisans aux dépens de celle des ouvriers, c'était, même sans le vouloir, inciter ceux-ci à revenir à l'existence de leurs ancêtres. (215, p.xxviii)

Giono himself acknowledged such criticisms – ‘Les politiques vont encore m’accuser de vouloir revenir au moyen âge’ (68, p.154). Again like some greens, he did not attempt to refute them, arguing instead that ‘l’aisance et l’abondance de ces temps passés’ meant they should indeed be reembraced (ibid., p.155).

The final resemblance we should note between the solutions suggested by greens and in 1930s sources is an emphasis on nature as conscious and potentially vengeful, frequently involving images of a goddess figure. The paysans depicted in works by Giono and Ramuz frequently worship or give thanks to nature in some way, as in the Mère du blé ceremony or Ramuz’ short story Salutation paysanne, which describes a solitary paysan’s journey through a forest, hailing all the natural phenomena surrounding him, from insects to trees (247, p.71). Hills, rivers and the earth are all frequently personified, often in order to provide warnings to human characters regarding their arrogance (‘la montagne se charge de parler aux hommes’) (248, p.39). In fiction, of course, authors can give free rein to their wildest visions of natural apocalyptic retribution for human folly. Giono had a project between 1936 and 1938, Fêtes de la mort, never completed, in which he planned to depict ‘la fin du monde moderne’ following a natural revolt (215, p.xix). One such vision he did depict in fiction was his wishful account of nature reclaiming the streets of Paris, ‘[une ville] parcourue d’industriels froids’ in Les vraies richesses (60, p.184).

Soudain, toute la ville éclate d’arbres. [...] Tes Louvres éclatent, tes cathédrales s’effondrent, [...] un bouillonnement de sève soulève tes murs et les écoute. [...] Puis, c’est le silence et la paix gorgée de richesses. (Ibid., pp.184-192)
INSEE terms any 'agglomération' of 2,000 inhabitants or more an urban environment (217, p.22).

For further detailed analysis of the green vote, see (218, pp.47-66).

For an examination of urbanisation in the period between 1945 and 1980, see (225, pp.33-41).

Buchmann, quoted in (96, p.96).

Statistics from (12, pp.844-5).

For details of why this was official policy in France, and how such zoning was achieved through the use of 'Plans d'Occupation des Solos' and the 'permis de construire', see (230, pp.42-3).

Poster in a collection of Amis de la Terre publications held at the Bibliothèque nationale, Paris.

See (12, p.1497) for details of the percentage of the active population unemployed in each region of France, and a comparison of urban and rural unemployment figures.

Gorz, quoted in (20, p.165).

Illich and Gorz both attack the reservation of education and medicine to specialised groups, in La Convivialité or Ecologie et politique for example (chapters on health in each). Dumont has also talked of the need to 'deprofessionalises' healthcare, pointing out that the vast majority of illnesses could be prevented or diagnosed by trained lay-people. He calls for a network of Chinese-style 'barefoot doctors' to this end, in L'Utopie ou la mort! for example.

One study showed that urbanisation led to higher levels of prostitution in France, and that the recruitment of prostitutes focussed as a matter of course on 'newly-arrived country girls in Paris railroad stations' (237, p.22).

This is the title of a key green work, Illich's La convivialité, for example.

Figures from (11, pp.16-7).

Here he is criticising the abuse of rivers ('Elles souffrent qu'on dirait, elles sont toujours en train de sécher', because of the demands made on them), but he makes similar criticisms in other areas (53, p.502).

La Muette would be used during WW2 as an internment camp for refugees, then to hold French Jews prior to deportation. It is still in use as low-cost public housing today.

Such specialisation happened particularly in the Bas-Languedoc, Val de Loire, and the Bas-Rhône regions between 1930 and 1940 (11, p.221).

His analysis, from 1953, is explained in (15, p.266).

This is the title of a chapter in Waechter's Dessine-moi une planète.

Speaking in 1986, quoted in (35, p.169).

Deep Ecologist Kirkpatrick Sale, quoted in (22, p.45).

This is the title of Weber's authoritative study of the French move from a peasant-based society to a modern industrial power.

See (22, p.49) for a list of such accounts.

One of the first ecofeminist texts argued that the choice facing humankind was between Feminism and the Mastery of nature (245, n.p.).

K. Eisler, quoted in (246, p.23).

Manifeste de l'Ordre Nouveau, reproduced in (15, p.442).

The text of the first issue is reproduced in (ibid., pp.440-1).
Chapter 6

Conclusion

Both sets of sources examined in this thesis were reacting to the extent of the crisis they felt their society must urgently address, the environmental crisis for modern greens and the ‘crise du désordre établi’ for 1930s sources. For all four themes considered here, we can also observe a common emphasis on radical or utopian solutions, whether because extreme solutions were seen as necessary to the extreme crisis they had identified, or because wide-ranging criticisms led them to ask what a better world might look like. What might such parallels between 1930s sources and greens today lead us to conclude?

First, we can agree with French greens that the origins of their movement are diverse and certainly not as recent as the first attempts to develop political parties or social movements in the 1970s and 1980s. Even if the first pictures of the Earth from space or the events of May 1968 determined the development of green politics, ‘many of the environmental concerns expressed today are hardly new’ (9, p.1), as Coates has argued. A concern for what we would now label the environment is evident in both politics (for example, the Popular Front emphasis on a popular ‘right’ to experience natural surroundings) and, strikingly, in the literature of the 1930s (for example, Giono’s attacks on the potential effects of monoculture in agricultural production).

Second, we might agree with Reynolds’ conclusion that important aspects of 1930s life have been underemphasised, if not entirely ignored, by the major historical accounts of the entre-deux-guerres. The relatively widespread focus on potential environmental problems such as pollution, clearly present before WW2, is generally
ignored in the traditional focus on the 'main plot of the opera', the left-right divide, and, of course, on the 'inexorable march to war' of France (196, p.6).

Third, Coates' view that the diversity of forms of environmental concern in the 1930s is paralleled by the diverse forms of modern green politics apparently holds true in the case of France. As Jaffré points out, there is still no 'écologie politique d'appellation contrôlée' in France (249, p.11). The debates on approach and whether to accept 'engagement', which continue to dominate the French green movement, reproduce many of the discussions on tactics which could already be observed during the 1930s, in movements such as the non-conformists, for example.

Fourth, we might agree with Pepper that modern green movements are failing to learn from earlier lessons and debates, a key example here being that, already in the 1930s, as we have seen, many were arguing that simply demonstrating the extent of a crisis would not be sufficient to achieve change. The green movement's emphasis throughout the 1970s and 1980s on educating people about the extent of the environmental crisis, in the belief that this would automatically inspire positive change, could be seen as a damaging waste of time and energy (14, pp.1-3), given that this strategy was already demonstrably insufficient.

Finally, it is tempting to speculate that awareness of the environmental crisis might have prompted our 1930s sources to react as modern greens have, although it is, of course, impossible to predict how such diverse figures as Giono, Céline and the Personalists would have reacted. One interesting example does imply that some, at least, might have been sympathetic to the aims of the greens, however. René Dumont, the first green presidential candidate was born at the start of the century and first became known in France during the 1930s as a committed pacifist, even signing public anti-war declarations alongside Giono at the end of the decade. He attributes his later sympathy for the green movement in part to formative experiences such as military service during the entre-deux-guerres, and anger at injustice during
trips to French colonies (189, p.97). Perhaps some of our sources would have followed a similar evolution.

What is clear is that, while the French greens might represent a new political movement, they are firmly attached to much deeper roots in French culture and society. The themes they identify as essential elements of the green approach, their acceptance of political commitment, the criticisms they make of society and the type of solutions they propose all link them to more distant predecessors than we typically imagine.
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