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Russia's Foreign Policy Towards the Korean Peninsula Under Yeltsin (1991-96)

Ik Joong Youn

Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Department of Politics
The University of Glasgow
Scotland, UK

July 2000
To the memory of my Grandparents
Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during Yeltsin’s first presidential term (Dec. 91-Jul. 96) was one that would have been unthinkable during the Soviet period. Russia, as a successor state to the former Soviet Union, had to make a fundamental re-evaluation of its policies towards the Korean peninsula in accordance with a newly emerging post-Soviet system and with rapid domestic changes during this transitional period. Ultimately, this led Russia to a policy towards the Korean peninsula that, rather than remaining firm, was in constant flux.

The thesis seeks to provide a better understanding of Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during Yeltsin’s first presidential term based on a systematic and analytic approach. For this purpose, on the one hand, the thesis discusses how Russia has attempted to build up its new bilateral relations with the two states on the Korean peninsula to maximise its national interests in the post-Soviet era. On the other hand, the thesis discusses how Russia has attempted to maintain its role and influence in relation to Korean issues among other major powers in Northeast Asia. To this end, special attention is given to an examination of Russia’s major concerns regarding the Korean peninsula, both at the bilateral and regional levels.

The thesis also argues that Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula can be divided into the following three stages: (1) Still New Political Thinking towards the Korean Peninsula (Dec. 91-Dec. 93); (2) Reformulating Russia’s New Foreign Policy Consensus towards the Korean Peninsula (Dec. 93-Dec. 95); and (3) Towards a Full-Scale Balanced Korean Policy (Dec. 95-Jul. 96).

This periodisation of Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula is mainly based on Yeltsin’s power consolidation in Russian politics.
in several Russian elections, which had a formative role in developing its new foreign policy direction as well as its domestic policies.

The thesis draws the conclusion that Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during Yeltsin's first presidential term gradually became 'reactive' in several distinct stages while not having a solid consensus within its own leadership both at the bilateral and regional levels, although Russia did attempt to pursue an 'active' policy towards the Korea peninsula.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Last, but not least, I have to express my gratitude to my parents (Jun Byeong Youn and Rey Ja Jeon) for many years of unqualified support for my research.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFTA  ASEAN Free Trade Area
ANZCERTA  Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement
APLC  Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
APR  Asia Pacific Region
ARF  Asia Regional Forum
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CC  Central Committee
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States
CMEA  Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPSU  Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DLP  Democratic Liberty Party
DMZ  Demilitarised Zone
DPRK  Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
EU  European Union
FEER  Far Eastern Economic Region
FEZ  Free Economic Zone
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency
IMEMO  Institute of World Economy and International Relations
IMF  International Monetary Fund
JSA  Joint Security Area
KEIDO  Korean Energy Development Organisation
LWRs  Light Water Reactors
MNCs  Multinational Corporations
Mwe  Megawatt-electric
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NPT  Non-proliferation treaty
PBEC  Pacific Basin Economic Council
PECC  Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
PLO  Palestine Liberation Organisation
PMC  Post-Ministerial Conference
PRC  People’s Republic of China
RDP  Reunification Democratic Party
ROK  Republic of Korea
RSFSR  Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist Republics
SOM  Senior Officials’ Meeting
SOVNAPEC  Soviet National Committee for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
TRADP  Tumen River Area Development Project
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPK</td>
<td>Workers' Party of Korea</td>
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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1. The Aims and Importance of the Present Study

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, transformative changes in Russian foreign policy took place during Yeltsin's first presidential term (Dec. 91-Jul. 96). The questions of Russia's new foreign policy concept and national interests were raised as the main foreign policy agenda in Russian politics.¹ At the same

¹ In analysing Russian foreign policy, a number of definitional issues need first to be clarified. Russian foreign policy began taking shape in the Soviet period, following the Russian Federation's declaration of sovereignty on 12 June 1990. Thus, technically, Russian foreign policy began with the declaration of sovereignty within the Soviet order. According to Suzanne Crow, "the Russian Federation's first decisive move to exert its influence over all Union foreign policy came with Boris Yeltsin's decree of 18 December 1991 on the diplomatic service of the Russian Federation. Based on this decree, the Russian Federation took over the leadership of the Soviet foreign ministry and assumed control over its daily operations. The decree also gave Russian control over the USSR foreign ministry's staff, assets and structures, including its central apparatus in Moscow and missions abroad. It envisaged the complete reorganisation of these structures by the Russian Federation and was even optimistic enough to call for the completion of this reorganisation within one month (Suzanne Crow, "Personnel Changes in the Russian Foreign Ministry", RFE/RL, vol. 1, no. 16, 17 April 1992, p. 18). It should be also noted that Gorbachev and Yeltsin agreed at a two-hour meeting on 17 December 1991 that the Soviet Union would cease to exist on 1 January 1992. On 25 December 1991, Yeltsin informed the UN secretary-general of Russia's assumption of the Soviet Union's seat in the UN. On 26 December 1991, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet voted to change the official name of the RSFSR to the Russian Federation (or Russia). Russia took over all USSR embassies in early January 1992. South Korea immediately recognised the independent Russia on 27 December 1991, and Soviet-South Korean relations were transformed into Russian-South Korean relations. On 18 March 1992, Russia confirmed that it would be responsible for all economic agreements made between the former Soviet Union and South Korea, with the exception of an agreement on double taxation (In-sung Lee, "Changing Patterns in Russian-Korean Relations", Transition, vol. 1, no. 17, 1995, p. 29). Thus, the author sees the starting point of Russian foreign policy on 27 December 1991. For a more detailed account of the starting point of Russian foreign policy, see Mark Webber, 'The Emergence of the Foreign Policy of Russian Federation', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 26, no. 3, 1993, pp. 243-263; and Dmitrii Rutikov, "How It All Began: an Essay on New Russia's Foreign Policy", in Teresa P. Johnson and Steven E. Miller, eds., Russian Security after the Cold War: Seven Views from Moscow (Washington: Brassey’s, 1994), pp. 125-163.
time, Russia inevitably had to struggle to find a new place in world affairs in
the ‘post-Soviet era’.2

In these circumstances, Russia, as a ‘successor’3 state to the former Soviet
Union, had to make a fundamental re-evaluation of its policies towards the
Korean peninsula in accordance with a newly emerging post-Soviet system and
with rapid domestic changes. Thus, in many respects, Russia’s foreign policy
towards the Korean peninsula was one that would have been unthinkable during
the Soviet period based on Russia’s new post-Soviet views in the region during
this period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96). Ultimately, this led Russia to a policy towards the
Korean peninsula that, rather than remaining firm, was in constant flux.4

The thesis seeks to provide a better understanding of Russia’s foreign
policy towards the Korean peninsula during Yeltsin’s first presidential term.
The main aim of the present study is to examine and analyse the development
of Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula based on a systematic
and analytic approach in order to contribute towards a better understanding of
Russia’s policy towards the Korean peninsula in the post-Soviet era. For this
purpose, the main question of the thesis is that how Russia’s foreign policy
towards the Korean peninsula developed and changed during Yeltsin’s first
presidential term, and why. Especially, this study aims to answer two main
questions: (1) how Russia has attempted to build up its new bilateral relations

2 The author will use the term of ‘the post-Soviet era’ instead of ‘the end of the Cold War era’
throughout this thesis because the basic situation in the Korean peninsula, which divided into two
nations on the basis of the Cold War system remained unchanged since the collapse of the Soviet
Union.
3 It should be noted that on the issue of ‘Russia as a successor state to the former Soviet Union’,
Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev stated that ‘we formulated the concept of a continue-state
[gosudarstvo-prodolzhatel]. It is not a successor state [gosudarstvo-preyemnik]. Strictly speaking, all
the states that have emerged in the place of the former Soviet Union are its successors. While a
continue-state means that the thread of communication with the outside world has passed to Russia.
Thus, Russia inherited the Soviet Union’s seat on the Security Council - that demonstrates our role as a
great power’ (Rossiiskaia gazeta, 21 January 1991, p. 5).
4 The changing Russian perceptions and definitions of security and economic interests constituted a
fundamental reason for the changes in Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula. This shift
reflected inevitable changes in Russia’s foreign policy goals and priorities towards the Korean
peninsula.
with the two Koreas; and (2) how Russia has attempted to maintain its influence and role in relation to Korean issues in Northeast Asia.

The study covers the transformative years 1991-96 in Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula for the following reasons. First, it was a period of fundamental change in international relations from the end of the Cold War system towards new post-Soviet one. The Cold War international system was over and a new international period, the post-Soviet era, had begun. In this respect, Russian foreign policy had to fundamentally adjust to the new international environment.\(^5\)

Secondly, it was also a period of profound domestic change during which Russia developed its new political system, pursuing democratic and market-oriented policies and departing from previous Soviet totalitarian and ideological structures.\(^6\) In particular, it should be noted that by holding the first fully competitive Russian presidential election in the middle of 1996,\(^7\) the period of

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\(^5\) For a detailed account of new order in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) in the post-Soviet era, see James C. Hsiung, ed., \textit{Asia Pacific in the New World Politics} (Boulder, Colorado: L. Rieimer, 1993).


Yeltsin’s first “presidency” ended while demonstrating two significant aspects of Russian domestic circumstances.

On the one hand, despite many difficulties in the democratisation of Russia, considerable progress was made towards the consolidation of a post-Soviet system with distinct channels of power and authority and a means of assuring checks and balances during this period. On the other hand, there emerged a new consensus on Russian foreign policy, characterised by a firmer pragmatic and nationalistic trend within the Russian leadership by the end of Yeltsin’s first presidency.

There are two primary reasons for the importance of the present study: (1) the fundamental change from Soviet foreign policy to Russian foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula; and (2) the existence of two still divided Koreas on the Korean peninsula in the post-Soviet era.

Russian foreign policy was basically different from that of the Soviet Union. One of the central challenges facing Russian foreign policy during this transitional period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96) was how to make new relations with the outside world and how to define Russia’s national interests in the international arena. The most pressing task in Russian foreign policy, therefore, was the

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10 These were based on new priorities of Russia’s foreign policy: (1) entry into the civilised community; and (2) economic development. See Heinz Timmermann, ‘Russian Foreign Policy under Yeltsin: Priority for Integration into the Community of Civilised States’, *The Journal of Communist Studies*, vol. 8, no. 4, 1992, pp. 163-185. For the details of Russia’s new national interests in the post-Soviet era, see Li Jen Kvon, *Vneshniaia politika Rossii v 1990-e gody: problemy i tendentsii* (Moscow: Instituti rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 1999).

development of new policies towards specific countries and regions based on this new 'Russian foreign policy concept', which could replace Gorbachev's New Political Thinking or previous Soviet ideology. However, Yeltsin's Russian foreign policy was increasingly overtaken by events at home and abroad, and the new Russian foreign policy concept became obsolete as a guide for Russian foreign policy. Simultaneously, there emerged many problems in Russian foreign policy.\

In these circumstances, on the one hand, Russia started developing totally new approaches towards the Korean peninsula, as it did for relations with other countries in the post-Soviet era. However, it proved soon that it was a very difficult and unprecedented task for Russia to establish and develop such a new

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12 Russia's foreign policy concept was debated in academic and scientific circles and government quarters as well as among experts. In the end, by order of President Yeltsin, the 'Basic Provisions of the Russian Federation's Foreign Policy Concept' were approved as the basis for the foreign economic activities of executive government bodies by the Security Council in April 1993. See Nezavisimata gazeta, 29 April 1993, pp. 1-3; *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation* (Washington, DC: Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, 1993); 'Russian Foreign Policy Concept', *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 1, 1993, pp. 14-16; and Milton Kovner, 'Russia in Search of a Foreign Policy', *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 12, no. 3, 1993, pp. 314-316. The ultimate goals of this new foreign policy concept was to maximise Russia's national interests while making a peaceful international environment for Russia's domestic reform. Yeltsin's new policy towards the Korean peninsula unravelled in the broad context of this new concept (Olga Alexandrova, 'Divergent Russian Foreign Policy Concepts', *Ausseppolitik*, vol. 44, no. 4, 1993, pp. 363-373). In the process of establishing a new identity and filling the vacuum left by Marxism, a number of 'concepts' and 'doctrines' were articulated in Russia, for example, the foreign policy concept in April 1993, the military doctrine in November 1993, and the national security blueprint in December 1997. These statements of principle fulfilled substantial roles. However, they did not have the attributes of an ideology - they included neither a description of the past, nor a blueprint of an ideal future and they were vague about the means to be used to achieve Russia's foreign policy goals (Margot Light, 'In Search of an Identity: Russian Foreign Policy and the End of Ideology', BASEES conference paper, March 1998, p. 2).

and mutually beneficial relations with each of the Koreas in new circumstances because its relationship with them had to be something basically different and new that would have been unthinkable during the Soviet period. As is well known, for instance, the ideological factor no longer figured in Russia's policy towards the Korean peninsula in the post-Soviet era.

On the other hand, the question of Russia's capacity to be a real power in relation to Korean issues in Northeast Asia was seriously raised during this period in Russian foreign policy. This meant that Russia suffered a serious weakening of its claim to Great Power status on the Korean peninsula where the former Soviet Union had exercised its superpower role during the Cold War era. Therefore, Russia struggled to maintain its power status against other major powers in the region during this period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96). As a result, Russia's new status in the post-Soviet era was reflected when the new order in Northeast Asia was emerging in association with other major powers such as China, Japan and the US. Simultaneously, however, this also demonstrated that Russia's policy and its relations with the two Koreas in Northeast Asia was of importance not only to themselves, but also to other major powers that were seeking to play a major role in this region with the vacuum that had been created by the collapse of Soviet power in 1991.

During Yeltsin's first presidential term, unlike other regions, Russia had to develop its new policies and relations with each Korea on the Korean peninsula, which was still divided into the two Koreas because the end of the Cold War had little impact on the Korean peninsula, which had long been described as a symbol of the Cold War system in Northeast Asia. The Korean...
peninsula still remained the principal source of instability challenging peace and security in Northeast Asia during this period. In other words, unlike other regions, the basic structure of the Cold War system elaborated in the wake of World War Two still governed the Korean peninsula in the post-Soviet era.¹⁷

These continuing conflicts in the Korean peninsula during this period affected the general trends and goals in Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula. In fact, any state’s policy with regard to the Korean peninsula even in the post-Soviet era had to take account of these unique circumstances. The case of Russian foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula was no exception. Russia had no more allied relations with North Korea while having a normal diplomatic relationship with South Korea, although South Korea had still an allied relationship with the US based on the Cold War system in the post-Soviet era. In short, Russia faced an unprecedented relationship building from the previous Soviet ideological basis to the de-ideological post-Soviet realities regarding Korean issues in Northeast Asia during this period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96).

These two primary reasons for the importance of the present study greatly affected not only Russia’s primary perceptions and attitudes, but also its basic foreign policy conceptions, interests and implementation towards the Korean peninsula.

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¹⁷ As Bruce Cumings points out, ‘the legacy of the Cold War still persisted on the Korean peninsula after the collapse of the Soviet Union... It is a Museum of that [Cold War] awful conflict’ (Bruce Cumings, ‘The Wicked of the West is Dead. Long Live the Wicked Witch of the East’, in Michael J. Hogart, ed., The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992], p. 98).
1.2. Literature Review

A considerable amount of research has been conducted concerning Russian-Korean relations in the post-Soviet era. But in spite of the number of much works, no systematic and comprehensive study of Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during the period of Yeltsin's first full presidential term (Dec. 91-Jul. 96) has yet been undertaken. In other words, a review of the literature on the subject revealed little research on Russian foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during this period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96).

Substantial problems in understanding Russia's policy towards the Korean peninsula and their relations include the following. First, much of this work has been descriptive and narrative rather than analytical and systematic in its

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approach. This problem led to a lack of more scientific and systematic approach to the study of Soviet/Russian foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula.

Secondly, most analysts in this field tend to examine key political, security and economic issues separately in explaining Russia's Korean policy and their relations. This indicates that no in-depth examination and analysis of the most crucial aspect of Russia's Korean policy, which can embrace all the key political, economic and security issues, has yet been undertaken in the academic literature, although there have always been such important issues among them. In this respect, the development of relations between Russia and the two Koreas requires further study to focus on the most important issues, which can integrate other issues in their relations.

Thirdly, it is not sufficient to explain the development and change in Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula by reference to Russia's policy alone. This 'great power approach', which traditionally viewed Soviet/Russian-Korean relations as a by-product of the power politics of four major powers (China, Japan, Russia and the US) surrounding the Korean peninsula cannot fully explain the development of Russia's new Korean policy and their relations in the post-Soviet era. Although this power approach still

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has some relevance, it has serious shortcomings in explaining the dramatic changes in Russia’s policy towards the Korean peninsula. This is primarily because of its overestimation of external factors, i.e. the influence of the major powers’ power politics on the peninsula, rather than the dynamic of Russian-Korean relations. It means that changes in relations were primarily motivated by Russian-Korean relationships rather than by the influence of major powers.  

Another defect of the major power approach is its underestimation of the importance of internal determinants in the Russian and Korean policy-making process. Furthermore, it underestimated each Korea’s role in analysing the development of their relations. Only rare attempts were made to review the two Koreas’ foreign policies towards Russia as a conditioning factor in analysing

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It should be noted that this is not to deny totally the utility of the great power approach. But, the great power approach is too simplistic to provide adequate explanations for the many questions about Soviet policy towards the two Koreas, especially during the Gorbachev era. The studies of Soviet policy towards the Korean peninsula had to be diversified by adopting various innovative new approaches that were emerging in the study of foreign policy and Soviet foreign policy during the Gorbachev era. Most obviously, the rational actor model, by assuming foreign policy-making as rational process in which governmental officials respond to stimuli from the international environment, could not explain fully why Gorbachev’s Soviet foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula was so different from that of his predecessors. For instance, in Tae-kang Choi’s thesis (*Linkage between Domestic and Foreign Policies under Gorbachev: the Case of Korea* [PhD Thesis: University of Glasgow, 1993]), he examined Seoul-Moscow relations, focusing on the linkages between Soviet domestic and foreign policies. His approach was, however, exclusively based on the great power approach and it largely ignored the political bargaining factor and Korean factors as well.

The changes of Russia’s foreign policy perceptions were direct result of their internal determinants. Since a close connection between Russian domestic politics and foreign policy has become more visible, this connection should be systematically analysed. Seeking an explanation of foreign policy behaviour in a variety of externally determined variables has largely ignored the decision-making process which provides practical insights into the core of the motivation of states’ external behaviours. In this respect, as Margot Light pointed out, the rational actor models are not favoured by modern student of foreign policy (Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom, eds., *International Relations: a Handbook of Current Theory* [London: Pinter, 1985], p. 157).
Russian foreign policy towards the peninsula. More precisely speaking, some previous studies have not ignored these issues, but they have usually addressed them implicitly rather than explicitly, and rarely in the rigorous manner that such questions deserve.

Another problem in the previous studies in this field is a lack of balance in attention towards the Korean peninsula. Few researchers in this area attempted to view the two Koreas as equally important in Russian foreign policy. And almost no one has treated the two Koreas as independent and determinant variables in their own right. Especially, it should be noted here that the existing literature on Russia’s foreign policy towards the two Koreas during the early years of post-Soviet period (1992-93) has comprised mostly articles which emphasised economic more than any other factors in Russian foreign policy. Their focus was on Russia’s urgent economic need for co-operation with South Korea. By contrast, the literature on Russian-North Korean relations started to

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23 The Korean factor in the bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union had been largely ignored. In fact, the Korean peninsula in itself was not a significant factor in Soviet foreign policy. The Korean states assumed significance only in the context of Soviet relations with other major powers. As a result, in the pre-Gorbachev’s era, Soviet foreign policy towards the two Koreas was largely determined by the Soviet Union’s overall geo-strategic and ideological considerations tilted towards North Korea. However, the Korean peninsula became more independent factor for the Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev and Yeltsin. See James W. Ranken, ‘Korea-Soviet Union Relations: the Seoul Olympics as Catalyst and Stimulator of Political Change’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 12, no. 4, 1988, pp. 754-779; Byung-joon Ahn, ‘South Korea’s New Nordpolitik’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 12, no. 4, 1988, pp. 693-705; Sung-joon Han, ‘Russia in South Korean Policy in an Age of Transition’, Sino-Soviet Affairs (Seoul), vol. 16, no. 3, 1992, pp. 25-40; Seung-ho Joo, ‘South Korea’s Nordpolitik and the Soviet Union (Russia)’, The Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 7, no. 2, 1993, pp. 404-450; and Kook-chin Kim, ‘South Korea’s Policy toward Russia: a South Korean View’, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, vol. 13, no. 3, 1994, pp. 3-12.

24 On Russian-North Korean relations, for example, see Zabrovskaia, Rossiia i KNDR; Zhabin, ‘Russia and North Korea’, pp. 726-739; and Lan’kov, Severnata Koreia. On Russian-South Korean relations, for example, see Arusova and Matveeva, Izhishata Koreia; and Miasnikov, ‘Russian-South Korean Security Cooperation’, pp. 313-341. However, there were some articles which attempted to examine in balanced ways. See Moltz, ‘Russia and the Two Koreas’, pp. 380-395. During the Soviet era, see Meyer, ‘Gorbachev and Post-Gorbachev Policy toward the Korean Peninsula’, pp. 757-772; Tae-hwan Kwak, ‘Recent Soviet Policy toward the Two Koreas: Trends and Prospects’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 3, no. 2, 1979, pp. 197-208; and Jae-kyu Park and Joseph M. Ha, eds., The Soviet Union and the East Asia in the 1980s (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1983), pp. 3-62.

25 Since the late 1980s, Korean affairs in Soviet/Russian literature have more frequently appeared compared to the previous times, especially concerning South Korea’s economic achievements as an appropriate economic partner. See Oleg Davydov, ‘South Korea: Capitalist “Modernisation” and Some Aspects of Its Political Development’, Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no. 2, 1988, pp. 72-84; Soo-byun Chon, ‘South Korea-Soviet Trade Relations’, Asian Survey, vol. 29, no. 12, 1989, pp. 1177-1187; Yuri Ognev, ‘Doing Business with South Korea: a Bit too Late?’, International Affairs (Moscow), no. 1.
be relatively neglected while emphasising Russian-South Korean relations. This study attempts to weigh more equally Russia's relations with each of the two Koreas.

In sum, we suggest there is room for a new approach to correct the problems mentioned above to better understand Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula in the post-Soviet era.

1.3. The Analytical Framework for the Present Study

The central premise of the thesis attempts to explain the basic nature of Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during Yeltsin's first presidential term as 'reactive' in several distinct stages as compared with Gorbachev's much more 'active' policy, although it did attempt to undertake an active policy towards this region. In order to explain this, the present study challenges many dominant assumptions regarding Russia's policy towards the Korean peninsula and provides alternative interpretations of particular policies and events.


'Active' means marked by action in this thesis. Gorbachev actively led both domestic and international policies. By contrast, 'passive' means not acting but acted upon subject to or produced by
Basically, this thesis contends that changes in the Russian domestic environment rather than changes in the external environment were the primary factors that brought about the changes in Russia's reactive Korean policy, although this study recognises both internal and external factors are key to an explanation of changes of Russian foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula.

In this author's view, the appropriate way to analyse Russia's foreign policy towards the two Koreas during this period is not through any single mode of analysis, but rather through an explanation of trends and specific policy actions through several distinct stages. Thus, in an attempt to analyse
Russian foreign policy towards the two Koreas, a systematic explanatory method is employed, with an emphasis on the interaction of multiple factors in a chronological and inductive framework.

In this respect, first, a case study approach will be useful to better understand Russia's policy towards the Korean peninsula. These case studies have been carried out to get a clearer picture of the larger extent - to see whether the miniature gives the same understanding of the broader phenomenon. For this purpose, four special cases are considered in connection with the changes in Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula: (1) Russia and the development of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which was signed in Moscow on 6 July 1961 (henceforth, the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty); (2) Russia and the development of the Russian-South Korean Bilateral Treaties; (3) Russia and the North Korea's Nuclear Crisis; and (4) Russia and the issues of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Tumen River Area Development Project (TRADP).

Secondly, the multi-level approach employed here provides a more in-depth and comprehensive understanding of changes and developments in Russian foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during Yeltsin's first presidential term. For this purpose, the present study attempts to explain Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula at both the bilateral and regional levels.

Thirdly, by employing a chronological approach, the development of Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula can be explained in several stages.

So far, no similar approach to understanding Russia's policy towards the Korean peninsula has been conducted. The advantages of these approaches in

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my opinion outweigh their limitations. Based on these new approaches, the author attempts to answer the two main questions of this study: (1) how Russia has built up its new relations with the two Koreas; and (2) how Russia has attempted to maintain its influence and role in relation to Korean issues in Northeast Asia.

A. At the Bilateral Level of Understanding

The thesis will argue that by focusing on the issue of bilateral treaties between Russia and the two Koreas we will be able to see more clearly the development of Russia’s Korean policy, which became gradually reactive during Yeltsin’s first presidential term (Dec. 91-Jul. 96). Simultaneously, through this analysis, the thesis attempts to reveal a certain ‘political bargaining’ and ‘power struggle’ over Korean issues in Russian domestic politics.

One of the main reasons for this approach is that a comprehensive understanding of the development of major bilateral treaty issues, which can embrace the most important political, economic and security aspects between the sides, can be the best way to a better understanding of how Russia’s policy towards the Korean peninsula developed and changed in the post-Soviet era.

In fact, bilateral treaties between states can be an important means of establishing relations between them. These treaties and agreements, as they were called by the participants following their own legal traditions, were the

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23 ‘Treaty’ means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two more related instruments and whatever its particular designation (Louis Henkin, et al., *Basic Documents Supplement to International
most concrete elements in the process because they were in black and white and often marked the culmination of other cooperative actions, such as meetings and negotiation sessions. Consequently, bilateral treaties and summit meetings can be regarded as the highest level of diplomatic relations between states. They are instruments of stability as well as change in international relations, catalysts and moderators of political forces in the international arena, decentralising, and at the same time assimilating tools of progress. Indeed, treaties normalise and order relations among several kinds of states and can be adapted to general as well as particular situations.

By focusing on bilateral treaty issues, the beginning of Russian-Korean relations can be traced back to the middle of the 19th century. Imperial Russia and the Korean Kingdom officially started to develop their relations on the basis of a Treaty of Trade and Commerce concluded on 7 July 1884. Soon, however, as a result of the Russian-Japanese War (1904-05), Imperial Russia and its successor state, the Soviet Union, did not have any kind of official relations with Korea based on bilateral treaties up to the end of World War Two.

During the Cold War era, the former Soviet Union mainly developed its relations with North Korea on the basis of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean

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It should be noted here that the treaty of Amity and Commerce between Korea and the US was concluded on 22 May 1882. See Chu-jin Kang, 'Diplomatic Relations between Korea and the Soviet Union', in Chu-jin Kang, ed., *Hankuk Kwa Soryon* [Korea and the USSR] (Seoul: Chungang Chulpam Inswe, 1979), pp. 14-45.

Friendship Treaty. By contrast, the former Soviet Union and South Korea had no official relations until the second half of the 1980s. This indicated that there had been no equally important bilateral issues between the Soviet Union and the two Koreas by the end of the 1980s.

From the 1980s onwards, however, Gorbachev’s new active policy towards the Korean peninsula started to concentrate on building good relations with South Korea on the basis of his ‘New Political Thinking’, although the Soviet Union still tried to maintain its influence over North Korea based on the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. This demonstrated that, to a certain extent, and for the first time, Gorbachev was attempting to make an effort to establish bilateral relations with the two Koreas simultaneously, and there were also parallel bilateral issues between the Soviet Union and the two Koreas.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia had to begin developing its new bilateral relations with the two Koreas for the first time. There were equally important bilateral treaty issues between Russia and the two Koreas, which were qualitatively different from those of the late Soviet years. Finally, the development of each of the bilateral treaties between Russia and the two Koreas became the centre of their relations because new treaties attempted to define their new relations in the post-Soviet era.

For Russian-North Korean relations, it is worth focusing on the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, which could be seen as an example of the new relations between the two sides in the post-Soviet era. In other words, the re-examination of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, one of the last relics of the Cold War in Northeast Asia, raised the question of how previous Soviet-allied relations based on the Cold War system changed into new relations based on the post-Soviet system. Thus, the expiration of the Treaty in September 1996 was the key bilateral issue in their relations during the whole period of Yeltsin’s first presidential term.
By contrast, for Russian-South Korean relations, it is worth focusing on the development of bilateral treaties between the two sides such as the treaty on basic relations between Russia and South Korea signed in 1992 (henceforth, the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty), and subsequently their military treaties, which demonstrated how further their previous relations based on the Soviet system could develop into new relations based on the post-Soviet system.

At the level of bilateral analysis, the thesis argues that Russia, as a successor state to the former Soviet Union, had to start building up fundamentally new bilateral relations with the two Koreas in an entirely new environment, which implied yesterday's ally to North Korea and enemy to South Korea on the basis of the Cold War system, but did not succeed in developing new relations with the two Koreas during this period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96) as the Russian side expected, thus demonstrating its reactive policy towards the Korean peninsula, although it attempted to do actively. This emphasis upon treaty issues will help us understand how and why Russia's new interests and views towards the Korean peninsula developed and changed in the post-Soviet era.

B. At the Regional Level of Understanding

The thesis will argue that by focusing on the regional issues regarding Russia and the two Koreas, we will be able to see more clearly the development of Russia's Korean policy, which became gradually reactive during Yeltsin's first presidential term. Simultaneously, through this analysis, the thesis also attempts to consider other major powers' interests and their responses to Russia's regional policies and interests in the Korean peninsula.

While Russia struggled to develop its new relations with the two Koreas on the Korean peninsula, one must also come to grips with a larger complex of interlocking relations, which was closely related to Russia's new role among other major powers (China, Japan and the US) in Northeast Asia. In other
words, in order to fully understand Russia’s reactive Korean policy, we must also examine some important Northeast Asian regional issues, which can reflect Russia’s new role in the Korean peninsula in the region. This clearly shows that Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula was still a function of its broader Asian strategy aimed at creating international stability, although the Korean factor was still an important one in Russian foreign policy.

For this reason, to understand more comprehensively Russia’s policy towards the Korean peninsula, the present study will consider how and why Russia’s regional security/economic policy developed and changed, whilst also focusing on how Russia has attempted to maintain its influence and role in the Korean peninsula by participating in regional security/economic cooperation and its organisation in the post-Soviet era.

Especially, it should be noted here that in relation to its new role in Northeast Asia, Russia’s loss of superpower status in the post-Soviet era entailed a painful effort to identify its new status as an ‘Eurasian’ power, which was related to its ‘isolation’ in the international arena. This led Russia


38 Soviet Union has been isolated from regional contact and exchanges. First, its capitals were located far from the region. Secondly, during the Cold War era, under military-strategic purposes, it was difficult to have normal development and participate in the regional integration as a Pacific country. Thirdly, Russia culturally shares with European countries, not Asian countries, Christian civilisation. See F. G. Safronov, *Russkie na severo-vostoke Azii v XVII - seredine XIX v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1978); and Alan Wood, ed., *The History of Siberia from Russian Conquest to Revolution* (London: Routledge, 1991).

39 For four hundred years, Russia has been a great power in the international arena—sometimes a regional power, sometimes a great European power, and sometimes a superpower, but always a great power. The collapse of the Soviet Union as a Eurasian superpower cannot but affect the development of the situation in Asia. In all likelihood, it will lead to a serious regrouping of forces in that part of the world and to the transformation of old and the development of new centres of influence, with individual parts of the former Union drawn into them. For the place of Asia in the Russian mind and about the Soviet position in the Asian space, see Milan Hauner, *What Is Asia to Us?: Russia’s Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990). Despite the Soviet Union’s effort to present itself as an Asian as well as an European power, as Gerald Segal has observed, the Soviet Union, during the early 1980s, still remained as a ‘power in East Asia, and not an East Asian power’, although geography and history exerted a pervasive influence over Russian/Soviet relations with Northeast Asian countries (Gerald Segal, ed., *The Soviet Union in East Asia: Predicaments of Power* [Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983], p. 1). According to Thomas
desperately to search for a new role in world affairs while revealing its identity crisis in the post-Soviet era. In other words, Russia suffered a serious weakening of its claim to 'Great Power' status on the Korean peninsula by contrast with the superpower status that the Soviet Union exercised during the Soviet era.

In these circumstances, consequently, Russia attempted to take several significant initiatives towards multilateral cooperation in its international relations. As a result, unlike the Soviet period, Russia's foreign policy became increasingly multilateral, based on associations with other powers. Indeed, it was a period of transition not only from the Soviet Union to Russia, but also from a superpower to a regional power and from bilateral relations to multilateral cooperation. In this respect, the post-Soviet era can be characterised as an 'era of multilateralism'.

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'Who are we?' is a question that has haunted Russians for centuries. The crisis of identity that underlies Russia's efforts to answer that question and the country's attempts to grapple with modernity - the inventions of an alien civilization - are explored in this book. See Wayne Allensworth, The Russian Question: Nationalism, Modernisation and Post-Communist Russia (Tulsa, Boulder, New York and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998). For a brief explanation of general Russia's identity crisis, see Iain Elliot, 'Russia in Search of an Identity', RFE/RL, vol. 2, no. 20, 14 May 1993, pp. 1-3.

Yeltsin stated that 'Russia is rightfully a great power by virtue of its history, of its place in the world, and of its material and spiritual potential' (Rossiiskaia gazeta, 8 April 1992, p. 3). On the evolution of Russia's perceptions of its role in world affairs, see Hannes Adomeit, 'Russia as a 'Great Power' in World Affairs: Images and Reality', International Affairs (London), vol. 71, no. 1, 1995, pp. 35-68.

In this respect, the view that the demonstration of great military power in war is either a necessary or a sufficient condition of being a great power. A great power is one whose reputation for existing or latent military strength may be equalled, but not significantly surpassed by that of any other power. See G. R. Berridge and John W. Young, 'What is a Great Power?', Political Studies, vol. 36, no. 2, 1988, pp. 224-234.

Georgiy Kunadze, Russian deputy foreign minister and ambassador-designate to South Korea, supported this trend as saying that 'Russia's principled position is that Russia is not unconditionally against the international community even though it supports a certain country, unlike its past position. The age of such confrontation is gone' ("Ambassador-Designate to ROK Views Korean Issues", Radio Moscow, 29 December 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-249, 30 December 1993, p. 17).

Multilateralism is characterised by the increasing need for collective action in the management of world affairs in the post-Soviet era. The term multilateralism is 'a brief' or ideology rather than a straightforward state of affairs.' As an ordering mode, multilateralism has three properties: (1) individuality; (2) generalised principles of conduct; and (3) diffuse reciprocity (James A. Caporaso, 'International Relations Theory and Multilateralism; the Search for Foundation', International Organisation, vol. 46, no. 3, 1992, pp. 601-602).
Northeast Asia’s security and economic context have largely shifted from the management of superpower competition to a greater emphasis on regional cooperation among the major powers in the region in the post-Soviet era, theoretically at least. This was no exception in the case of Russia’s relations with other major powers, including the two Koreas in Northeast Asia. There were two major reasons for this. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union transformed the world order from superpower rivalry to multilateral cooperation. Thus, the end of the Cold War signalled the start of a new era and was greeted with the hope that it would pave the way for greater world integration and a new level of international cooperation. The absence of superpower rivalry in Northeast Asia in the post-Soviet era led to a multipolar relationship among the major powers in the region.

Secondly, Russia, as a successor state to the former Soviet Union, had not become one of the most influential powers where the former Soviet Union exercised superpower status in the region. This led Russia to lose much of its influence and political leverage in countries such as North Korea, Vietnam and Mongolia in Northeast Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By contrast, during this period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96), China and Japan sought to enhance their political power as much as possible in the absence of Soviet influence in the region.

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44 In particular, there is the strong tendency among its Asian neighbours to view China as a regional hegemonic power. The United States also views China as a country that needs to be watched in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. For an overview of power competition among the powers in the region in the post-Soviet era, see Suisheng Zhao, Dynamics of Power Competition in East Asia: from the Old Chinese World Order to Post-Cold War Regional Multipolarity (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997).
In this situation, Russia was not able to implement its regional interests in the region without other powers’ support (or cooperation).48 Russia inevitably attempted to expand its multilateral dialogue with other states and was actively willing to engage in multilateral cooperation with regional states in the name of common prosperity and peace in the region. In this respect, the issue of the North Korean nuclear crisis and some regional economic issues (APEC and TRADP) in the APR clearly demonstrated how seriously Russia’s role in the region had been undermined and the degree to which this had affected its influence over the Korean peninsula in the post-Soviet era.

At the level of regional analysis, the thesis argues that Russia had yet to find a solid place in Northeast Asia as one of the major political and economic powers during this period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96), thus demonstrating its reactive policy towards the Korean peninsula, although it sought to maintain and solidify its position as a key regional player in new circumstances. This emphasis upon regional issues will help us understand how and why Russia’s new role towards the Korean peninsula developed and changed in the post-Soviet era.

C. The Periodisation of Russia’s Foreign Policy Towards the Korean Peninsula

Another proposition of this thesis is that Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula can best be examined through a series of chronological stages

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in order to see more clearly the development of Russia's Korean policy, which became gradually reactive during Yeltsin's first presidential term.49

As a matter of fact, foreign policies of any country at any time are rarely static. Normally they are in constant flux and sometimes experience profound change. This was especially true of Russian foreign policy during Yeltsin's first presidential term. In reality, Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula constantly changed during each period based on its changing perceptions of national interests and foreign policy conceptions, together with the external environment.

By way of this chronological analysis, the thesis argues that Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula can be divided into the following three stages: (1) Still New Political Thinking towards the Korean Peninsula (Dec. 91-Dec. 93); (2) Reformulating Russia's New Foreign Policy Consensus towards the Korean Peninsula (Dec. 93-Dec. 95), and (3) Towards a Full-Scale Balanced Korean Policy (Dec. 95-Jul. 96).

It should be mentioned that these three distinct stages were mainly based on Russian elections, which had a formative role in developing Russia's new foreign policy direction, not to mention its domestic policies:50 (1) the Collapse

49 There were few studies attempted to focus gradual change in Russia's Korean policy based on several stages. Moltz divided into the three periods when explaining Russia's Korean policy: (1) moving from an exclusive alliance with North Korea (1985-89); (2) a singular focus on relations with South Korea (1990-94); and (3) a policy of so-called dual engagement (1995-98), but it did not cover the full period of Yeltsin's first presidential term (See Moltz, 'Russia and the Two Koreas', pp. 380-395. For an account of Soviet Korean policy, Zhebin dealt with the Soviet-North Korean relations during the period 1980-91 as follows: (1) 1980-82; (2) 1983-89; and (3) 1990-91 (See Zhebin, 'Russia and North Korea', pp. 726-739). Seung-ho Joo attempted to explain Gorbachev's Korean policy by dividing three stages: (1) March 1985-Summer 1988; (2) Fall 1988-Summer 1990; and (3) Fall 1990-December 1991 (See Seung-ho Joo, 'Soviet Policy toward the Two Koreas, 1985-1991: the New Political Thinking And Power', Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, vol. 14, no. 2, 1995, pp. 23-46).

of the Soviet Union and Russian Reformers (Dec. 91-Dec. 93); (2) the December 1993 Russian Parliamentary Election and Anti-Reformers (Dec. 93-Dec. 95); and (3) the December 1995 Russian Parliamentary Election and Primakov (Dec. 95-Jul. 96).

In other words, to get to grips with the changing momentum of Russian foreign policy that helped shape Yeltsin’s policy towards the Korean peninsula, the present study emphasises the significant role of several Russian elections—where key elements of the new policy were hammered out and approved.51

Furthermore, it should be emphasised that these three stages of Russian foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula indicated that there were several stages of Yeltsin’s ‘power consolidation’ in Russian politics. In other words, to a certain extent, Russia’s policy towards the Korean peninsula became reactive as a result of a power consolidation within the Russian leadership. Consequently, Yeltsin’s new Russian foreign policy led to the ‘polarisation’52

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51 By contrast, to get to grips with the changing momentum of Gorbachev’s Korean Policy that helped shape his active policy towards the Korean peninsula, this study emphasises to examine in detail the CPSU Party Congresses and Party Conference. Gorbachev’s Korean policy can be divided into the followings: (1) the 27th Party Congress and the Evolution of New Political Thinking (Spring 1985-Summer 1988); (2) the 19th Party Conference and the Activation of Soviet Korean Policy (Summer 1988-Autumn 1990); and (3) the Continuation of New Political Thinking towards the Korean Peninsula (Winter 1990-Winter 1991).

52 This led the polarisation of Russian foreign policy. Three main groups have emerged: (1) the radical liberals; (2) eurasians (close to the Centrists); and (3) neo-communist and an extremist right-wing (Jean-Francois Thibault and Jacques Levesque, ‘The Soviet Union/Russia: Which Past for Which Future?’, in Philippe G. Le Prestre, ed., Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition [Montreal & Kingston, London, Buffalo: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997], pp. 21-22). Olga Alexandrova divided Russian foreign policy as follows: (1) the westerners; (2) the Russian-nationalistic conceptional frame; (3) eurasianism; and (4) the geopolitical realism school of thought (Alexandrova, ‘Divergent Russian Foreign Policy Concepts’, pp. 363-372). Vladimir Lukin identified as follows: (1) ideological democratic internationalism; (2) arithmetical to A and amounts to crude Russian chauvinism (more traditional); and (3) the third school searches for an enlightened understanding of Russia’s national interest based on the notion of ‘self-interest properly understood’ (Vladimir Lukin, ‘Our Security Predicament’, Foreign Policy, no. 88, 1992, p. 65). Arbatov divided Russian foreign policy as follows: (1) pro-western; (2) moderate liberal; (3) centrist and moderate-conservative; and (4) neo-communist and nationalist (Alexei Arbatov, ‘Russia’s Foreign Policy Alternatives’, International Security, vol. 18, no. 2, 1993, pp. 5-43). Zimmerman categorised four Russian foreign policy elites as follows: (1) market democrats; (2) market authoritarians; (3) social democrats; and (4) socialist authoritarians (William Zimmerman, ‘Markets, Democracy and Russian Foreign Policy’, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 10, no. 2, 1994, pp. 103-126). Russian scholars Sergei
of the Russian leadership into reformers and conservatives while demonstrating internal ‘power struggles’ between them. The reformers consisted of his inner circle, reform-minded academics and intelligentsia, while the conservatives came primarily from the past Soviet-military-industry-party apparatus complex. The conservatives’ interests were adversely affected by Yeltsin’s reform policies, causing them to line up against Yeltsin and his policies. As a result, their different opinions and interests and the changes helped to bring about a new Russian policy towards the Korean peninsula.

Based on these new approaches to Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during Yeltsin’s first presidential term, this study hopes to enable the existing fragmentary knowledge to become more substantive. It is believed that the contribution of this study is significant, since there are still few major works on this particular subject and period. These new approaches of Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during Yeltsin’s first presidential term (1991-96) will help us better understand how and why

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Kortunov and Andrei Kortunov divided into two forces: (1) reds (red-browns); and (2) anti-communists (Sergei Kortunov and Andrei Kortunov, ‘From Moralism to Pragmatism: New Dimensions of Russian Foreign Policy’, *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 13, no. 3, 1994, pp. 261-276). Paul Marantz divided as follows: (1) eurasianists; (2) ultranationalist; and (3) political moderates (Paul Marantz, ‘Neither Enemies nor Partners: Russia and the West Search for a New Relationship’, *International Journal*, vol. 49, no. 4, 1994, pp. 730-752). Leszek Buszynski categorised four Russian foreign policy groups: (1) pro-western group; (2) the geopoliticians and geostrategists; (3) eurasianists; and (4) nationalists, neo-Bolsheviks and communists (Leszek Buszynski, *Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War* [Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, 1996], pp. 4-15).

For the domestic power struggle among Russian elite, see Gordon M. Hahn, ‘Russia’s Polarised Political Spectrum,’ *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 43, no. 3, 1996, pp. 11-22; Glenn Chafetz, ‘The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia’, *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 111, no. 4, 1996-97, pp. 661-688; and Virginie Coulloudon, ‘Elite Groups in Russia,’ *Demokratizatsiya*, vol. 6, no. 3, 1998, pp. 535-549. For example, for the power struggle in Russian government and the resulting changes in Russian foreign policy towards Moldova periodically, see Kate Litvak, ‘The Role of Political Competition and Bargaining in Russian Foreign Policy: the Case of Russian Policy toward Moldova’, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol. 29, no. 2, 1996, pp. 213-229. It should be mentioned that there was the power struggle between the ministry of foreign affairs (Andrei Kozyrev) and the Security Council (Yuri Skokov) for the making of this Russian Foreign Policy Concept. The struggle between the Security Council’s Foreign Policy Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for authorship was a struggle for real and effective influence on the formation of foreign policy. For an account of behind-the-scenes battle for power between the Security Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see *Moskovskie novosti*, 16 May 1993, pp. A8-A9.


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Russia's new role towards the Korean peninsula developed and changed in the post-Soviet era.

Those new approaches to Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during Yeltsin's first presidential term ultimately support the central premise of this thesis: 'Russia's policy towards the Korean peninsula became gradually reactive, although it did attempt to pursue an active Korean policy in the post-Soviet era'.

1.4. Chapter Overview and Sources

This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 presents an overview of the study as a whole. It examines the importance of the present study setting out the questions on the study, and provides the research aims, literature review and the analytical framework.

Chapter 2 attempts to define the basic nature of each periodic Soviet/Russian foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula based on power and policy changes in Soviet/Russian foreign policy-making. First, this chapter defines Russian/Soviet policy towards the Korean peninsula up to the Cold War era (1860-1984) as 'status quo' (or 'passive'). Secondly, this chapter describes Gorbachev's Korean policy (1985-91) as an 'active' Soviet policy towards the Korean peninsula based on his power consolidation and policy changes in Soviet politics. Thirdly, this chapter attempts to explain the development of Yeltsin's policy towards the Korean peninsula (1991-96) as a 'reactive' one based on his power consolidation and policy changes in Russian politics. This chapter provides a general overview of how Soviet/Russian policy towards the Korean peninsula developed.

Chapters 3 to 6 begin with brief historical reviews, before moving on to analyse each development during the Yeltsin's first presidential term.
Chapter 3 analyses how Russia’s new relations with North Korea developed and changed focusing on the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty in the post-Soviet era. The re-examination of the Treaty, one of the last relics of the Cold War in Northeast Asia, raised the question of how previous Soviet-allied relations based on the Cold War system changed into the new relations based on the post-Soviet system. It is argued that Russia’s policy towards North Korea during this period had to be reactive through several periodic stages, although it increasingly tried to establish a new and mutually beneficial relationship (from party-to-party relations to a normal state-to-state relations) whilst looking for a new legal foundation for their relations in the post-Soviet era.

Chapter 4 examines how Russia’s new relations with South Korea developed and changed, focusing on bilateral treaties between the two sides. In this respect, the conclusion of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty in 1992 demonstrated a new example of relations between the two sides during this transitional time. Furthermore, the conclusion of military related treaties between the two sides also demonstrated how far their relations could develop in the post-Soviet era. It is argued that Russia’s policy towards South Korea had to be reactive in several periodic stages, although Russia did emphasise its relations with South Korea on the Korean peninsula whilst looking for partnership-level relations in the post-Soviet era.

Chapter 5 examines how Russia’s regional security policy developed and changed, whilst focusing on the North Korean nuclear issue, which reflected its role and status in Northeast Asia in the post-Soviet era. The main focus of this chapter is to demonstrate how Russia has attempted to maintain its influence and role in the Korean peninsula. In addition, this chapter considers other major powers’ interests and their responses to Russia’s regional security policies and interests in the Korean peninsula. The chapter argues that Russia has yet to find a solid place in Northeast Asia as one of the major political powers during this period, thus demonstrating its reactive policy towards the Korean peninsula.
Chapter 6 examines how Russia's regional economic policy changed and developed, whilst focusing on the regional economic organisation (APEC) and the regional economic cooperation (TRADP), which reflected its economic role and status in the Korean peninsula in the post-Soviet era. The main focus of this chapter is how Russia has attempted to participate in regional economic cooperation and its organisation in the post-Soviet era. In addition, this chapter considers other major powers' interests and their responses to those issues regarding Russia's regional economic policies and interests in the Korean peninsula. The chapter argues that Russia has yet to find a solid place in Northeast Asia as one of the major economic powers during this period, thus proving its reactive policy towards the Korean peninsula although it sought to maintain and solidify its position as a key regional player under new circumstances in the post-Soviet era.

A brief summary of these chapters and a list of findings as well as some limitations of this study can be found in Chapter 7.

The present study employs materials from Russian, Japanese and Korean journals and newspapers, as well as the relevant Western literature. This thesis draws upon a variety of sources, both primary and secondary, including some historical archives, personal memoirs, military and economic data, treaties and other official documents and published statements and speeches by governmental officials in the West, North Korea, South Korea and Russia.

The principal sources of this study are statements of Soviet/Russian political, economic and military leaders, analysts and commentators. Daily newspapers from both Russia and Korea have been very important information sources for the purposes of my research. In addition, the following were very useful information sources: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-Daily Soviet Union and Russia and the Current Digest of the Soviet/Post-Soviet Press (CDSP). Especially, the FBIS-Soviet Union (and later Russia) have provided me with a useful
comprehensive chronological understanding of the development of Russia's foreign policy and domestic policy as well.

These primary sources are also supplemented by information from the various journals and newspapers that have been published in the Korean, Russian and English languages.

To approach more closely the core of Russia's intentions to the Korean peninsula, the author conducted a couple of interviews with senior academicians: Vyacheslav Amirov, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Japanese and Pacific Studies at IMEMO and Chris Coward, Director of APEC Edunet at the University of Washington, Seattle. However, it must be noted that it was very difficult for me to have more direct contacts with Russian officials as a postgraduate. Consequently, many Soviet/Russian officials were not available. In addition, this study suffers from the limited availability of government documents for the most recent period.

Most of the information used for this research was collected in several places: (1) the University of Glasgow, UK; (2) the University of Melbourne, Australia; (3) the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, the Institute of Far Eastern Affairs and the Korean National Congress Library, Seoul, Korea; and (4) the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (University College London) and School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London) collection of Russian, Korean and Japanese newspapers and journals.

During the course of my research, I gave several papers about Soviet/Russian foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula including: (1) 'Gorbachev and the Korean Peninsula (1985-91)' at the Department of Political Science at the University of Melbourne, Australia on 5 December 1995; (2) 'The Study of Soviet/Russian Policies towards the Korean Peninsula' at the Politics Departmental Seminar at the University of Glasgow, UK on 9 March 1998; and (3) 'Russia and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis' at the British Association for Slavonic and Eastern European Studies Annual Conference at Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge on 4 April 1998. The author will also be giving
a paper, entitled 'Russia’s Foreign Policy towards the Korean Peninsula under Yeltsin (1991-96)', at the ICCEES VI World Congress in Tampere, Finland, on 30 July 2000.
Chapter 2

The Development of Soviet/Russian Foreign Policy
Towards the Korean Peninsula:
From a Status Quo to Reactive Policy?

2.1. The Development of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union's 'Status Quo' Korean Policy (1860-1985)

Imperial Russia's policies towards the Korean Kingdom were based on 'imperialism'¹, but did not seek greater influence on the Korean peninsula.² This meant that instead of an aggressive imperialistic policy, Imperial Russia pursued a 'wait and see' policy towards the Korean peninsula.³ There were several reasons for this. First, of primary importance to Russian foreign policy in the Far East was the defence of Siberia and Manchuria against Japan and other Great Powers. Secondly, Imperial Russia's policy towards the Korean

¹ Imperial Russia became part of Asia as a result of its eastward expansion from the 17th century. The most distinctive characteristic of Russian Imperialism in Asia was that it did not benefit from either capitalism or nationalism, the two elements that were widely held to be responsible for modern imperialism. On the whole, therefore, Russian activities in this region were not related to the search for a monopoly of markets. It did not fit the type of the Age of Imperialism (Sung-hwan Chang, 'Russian Designs on the Far East', in Taras Hunczak, ed., Russian Imperialism from the Ivan the Great to the Revolution [New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974], p. 321).

² Russia did not show any significant interest in the Korean peninsula (Seung-kwon Synn, 'Imperial Russia's Strategy and the Korean Peninsula', Il-ying Chung, ed., Korea and Russia toward the 21st Century [Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1992], pp. 26-27).

³ Formal diplomatic relations and a Korea-Russian Treaty of Friendship and Commerce were concluded on 7 July 1884 in Seoul, Korea. Eight years behind Japan (1876) and only after such countries as the US (1882), Britain and Germany had established diplomatic relations with Korea (Boris Pak, Rossiia i Koreia [Moscow: Glavnaia redaktsia vostochnoi literatury, 1979], pp. 58-60).
peninsula could be attributed to its military and financial weaknesses and the sheer distance of Russia from the Far East.

Imperial Russia's interests in the Korean peninsula mainly derived from the latter's geo-strategic importance rather than from any other factors in Russian foreign policy agenda. Russia's need for a passage through the Korean Straits was the prime motive for its actions on the Korean peninsula. By contrast, economic penetration into the Korean peninsula was not as important as a strategic consideration. As a market, the Korean peninsula was all but ignored. In the meantime, Korea's policy regarding Imperial Russia involved a desperate struggle to protect that country's sovereignty through the maintenance of a balance of power among the Great Powers.

However, as a result of victories in both the Sino-Japanese (1894-95) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), Imperial Japan gained the dominant position on the Korean peninsula. The Korean peninsula was forced under

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4 According to David Dallin, three fundamental factors made up the framework of Russian policy in Asia during this period: (1) the great political vacuum in the vicinity of Russia's eastern borders; (2) the peculiar configuration of Russia proper; and (3) the basic divergence in the recent evolution of China and Japan (David Dallin, The Rise of Russia in Asia [London: The World Affairs Book Club, 1950], p. 2).

5 Imperial Russia was interested in obtaining warm ports on the Korean peninsula. As Nicholas II wrote, 'it is absolutely necessary that Russia should have a warm port which is free and open during the entire year. This port must be on the mainland (south-eastern Korea) and must be connected with our existing possessions by a strip of land' (Krasnyi Arkhiv, 52 [1931], cited in Robert M. Slusser, 'Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1945-50: Stalin's Goals in Korea', in Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye, eds., The Origins of the Cold War in Asia [Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977], p. 143).

6 In the history of other empires, colonisation often proceeded from an economic to a political basis. But, in the history of the Russian Far East, the reverse was true. The region was first occupied and annexed for political reasons: economic development occurred later (Dallin, The Rise of Russia in Asia, p. 24).

7 Korea was forced to open by the Japanese power in 1876 and exposed to the storm of international rivalry that raged around it. For a detailed account of international struggle for control of Korea in late 19th century, see H. F. MacNair and D. F. Lach, Modern Far Eastern International Relations, 2nd ed. (Toronto, New York and London: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1955).


9 According to Sung-hwan Chang, Imperial Russian-Korean relations can be roughly divided into three period: (1) the geographical neighbouring and an establishment of Russian-Korean diplomatic Relations [1860-84]; (2) Russian policy towards Korea up to the Sino-Japanese War [1885-95]; and (3) Russian-Japanese rivalry over Korea and Russian-Japanese War [1896-1905] (Chang, 'Russian Designs on the Far East', pp. 299-302).
Japanese colonial rule (1910-45) until the end of the Second World War. In short, the pattern of Russian involvement in the Korean peninsula prior to 1917 was marked by an attempt to maintain influence on the Korean peninsula while denying any one power complete control over the Korean peninsula due to its geo-strategic importance.

After the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union supported North Korea's position on the Korean question and refrained from any official contacts with South Korea. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union did not have a clear policy towards the Korean peninsula, attempting to maintain some influence over the region based on the Cold War system, while denying complete control over the peninsula to any one Great Power - especially the US. In other words, the Soviet Union aimed to maintain the status quo against US power in Northeast Asia during the Cold War era. This also demonstrated that the Korean peninsula was of relatively minor importance to the Soviet leaders as a principal area of Soviet foreign policy in the region. Even Soviet interests in North Korea were not a central concern for the Soviet leadership in its foreign policy agenda in Northeast Asia.

The Soviet Union considered North Korea's position as a key variable in this region mainly in terms of its geo-strategic importance with an ideological aspect. On the one hand, with the beginning of the Cold War and the establishment of a communist regime in the northern part of the Korean peninsula, ideological ties with North Korea became a crucial concern of Soviet

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11 Soviet policy towards the Korean peninsula was rather subordinate to its policies towards China, Japan and the US. Soviet strategies on the Korean peninsula should be viewed in the context of other Soviet commitments and concerns, whilst emphasising China, Japan and the US powers in Northeast Asia. According to Harold C. Hinton, 'if the account stresses China in Northeast Asia, that is because it has been the most important of the three countries to Soviet policy-makers' (Harold C. Hinton, 'East Asia', in Kurt L. London, ed., The Soviet Impact on World Politics [New York: Hawthorn Books, 1974], p. 114).
foreign policy in Northeast Asia. Consequently, since the establishment of the North Korean communist regime in 1948 with the help of the Soviet Union, the survival of the Kim Il-sung’s regime had been of great concern to the world communist movement, especially to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, in this connection, wanted to form a satellite government that would faithfully execute its policies in Northeast Asia as did the puppet governments in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the Soviet Union regarded Northeast Asia primarily in the context of the worldwide confrontation with the US during the Cold War era. Accordingly, the highest priority of Soviet foreign policy in the region had been placed on searching for strategic allies and reducing threats to Soviet security interests that originated from the rivalry with the US. In this respect, the development of the Sino-Soviet conflict from the late 1950s onwards further enhanced North Korea's strategic importance. The Soviet Union continued to view the Korean peninsula as of geo-strategic importance as Imperial Russia had done in the late 19th century.

Nonetheless, it must be noted that Soviet-North Korean relations during the Cold War era changed constantly, reflecting Soviet domestic political

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12 For the details of history of communism in Korea, see Suh, *The Korean Communist Movement*.

13 Because of its location, historically the Korean peninsula has become an arena for an international competition. The Korean peninsula is located in the heart of the Northeast Asia, bordered by both the Soviet Union and China along the north and Japan 120 miles across the sea to the Southeast (Kyung-cho Chung, *Korea Tomorrow: Land of the Morning Calm* [New York: Macmillan, 1961], p. 5). Basil Dmytryshyn lists five reasons for Soviet interest in the Korean peninsula from the geo-strategic perspective as follows: (1) in Soviet hands the area could serve to extend a Soviet semi-circle around Manchuria to intimidate or neutralise China as a great power; (2) Soviet domination of the peninsula would effectively remove American presence from the mainland of Asia; (3) such a development would give the Soviet Union powerful leverage (military, economic, diplomatic and psychological) to compel Japan to cooperate with Soviet designs in the Far East; (4) in their hands, Korea would provide many excellent warm-water ports to the Soviet fleet, thus giving the Soviet Union a nearly complete monopoly in the North Pacific; and (5) Soviet control of the entire Korean peninsula would place at their disposal rich human and natural resources to assist the economic development of the Soviet Far East—from Lake Baikal to the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk (Basil Dmytryshyn, *Soviet Perceptions of South Korea*, *Asian Perspective* [Seoul], vol. 6, no. 2, 1982, p. 73).

14 Another important reason for the strategic importance of North Korea to the Soviet Union was China’s challenge Soviet hegemony in the world’s ‘Socialist Camp’ and its emergence as a major regional power in Northeast Asia, North Korea’s value was greatly enhanced in terms of Soviet security interests in the region. The Soviet perception of China became the dominant factor influencing its policies towards North Korea (Joseph M. Ha, *Soviet Perceptions of North Korea*, *Asian Perspective* [Seoul], vol. 6, no. 2, 1982, pp. 120-121).
situation, together with the external input of the Cold War. In this respect, two important domestic factors which influenced changes in Soviet policy towards the Korean peninsula should be considered: (1) the characteristics of Soviet foreign policy under successive leaders; and (2) the positions taken by CPSU Party Congresses and by the 19th Party Conference on Soviet foreign policy.

A. Stalin’s ‘Status Quo’ Korean Policy (1945-53)

Up to the middle of 1953, Soviet influence over North Korea was greater than that of any other power in the region, primarily because of Stalin. It was Stalin who put Kim Il-sung in power in North Korea. Stalin was both a mentor and model for Kim Il-sung. Apart from Lenin, no other leader received the acclaim that Stalin did in North Korea.

Nevertheless, Stalin’s Korean policy was neither active nor well-designed. There were two good examples of his status quo policy towards the Korean peninsula. First, when Stalin defined his demands for Soviet gains in the Far
East following the defeat of Japan in 1945 as a return to Imperial Russia's position prior to 1905, with regard to the Korean peninsula that meant not annexation of the peninsula but rather the establishment of some sort of influence among the competing Great Powers. Stalin postponed his long-term goal of communising the entire Korean peninsula and shifted his focus to a short-term goal, the establishment of a firm base in northern Korea, when he accepted Truman's proposal to divide the Korean peninsula along the 38th parallel in August 1945. This meant that Stalin accepted the US proposal for the division of Korea rather than taking control of the entire peninsula in order to maintain good relations with Truman and to gain an equal voice in determining Japan's future development.

The Korean War (1950-53) also provides another good example of Soviet status quo policy towards the Korean peninsula. In many respects, the Korean War could be described as the combination of 'Kim Il-sung's active initiative, Stalin's reluctant support, and Mao's agreement'. During the Korean War, Stalin died in March 1953. The height of Soviet influence in North Korea began and ended with Stalin.

B. Khrushchev's 'Status Quo' Korean Policy (1954-64)

After Stalin's death in 1953, the new Soviet leadership made certain adjustments to doctrines and strategies including its policy towards the Korean peninsula. While adhering to its former vision of the world based on a two-dimensional conflict between socialism and capitalism and the notion of

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20 According to Sang-cho Lee, who was North Korea's deputy chief of general staff at that time, 'Kim Il-sung was the actual mastermind behind the war of National Liberation and he did his best to convince Stalin of the plan's guaranteed success and received the latter's go-ahead despite Stalin's concern about the possibility of the US getting involved' (*Moscow News*, no. 6, 6-12 July 1990, p. 13).
21 Nikita Khrushchev also stressed that 'the Korean War was started by North Koreans, upon Kim Il-sung's initiative, and Stalin gave him support' (N. S. Khrushchev, *Pospominaniia: Vremia, ludi, vlasti*, vol. 4 [Moscow: Moskovskie novosti, 1999], p. 164).

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unavoidable ideological struggle in international relations, Khrushchev started to emphasise 'peaceful coexistence' with the West. On the Korean peninsula, this translated into a desire on the part of the Soviet Union to maintain the status quo against the US in Northeast Asia.

At this point, it should be noted that the 20th CPSU Party Congress in 1956 greatly affected Soviet foreign as well as domestic policy, even towards the Korean peninsula. For instance, the aftermath of the 20th CPSU Party Congress and 'de-Stalinisation' gave Kim Il-sung the opportunity to purge those who were hostile or neutral and to build a political network loyal only to him. In many respects, the 20th CPSU Party Congress became a great turning point for Soviet-North Korean relations.

These ideological differences and Kim Il-sung's disapproval of what was going on in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev did not help both countries develop close allied relations. For example, the abrupt cancellation of Khrushchev's plan to visit North Korea in 1960 suggested that all was not well in Pyongyang-Moscow relations. Furthermore, ideological and political

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22 On Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence, see N. S. Khrushchev, Mir bez oruzhiia - mir bez voiny (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1960), pp. 44-63.
23 It should be noted that there were two more CPSU Party Congresses during the Khrushchev era. The 21st Party Congress in 1959 was an 'extraordinary' congress, because it took place only three years after the spectacular 20th Party Congress (for a detailed account, see Seweryn Bialer, 'The 21st Congress and Soviet Policy', Problems of Communism, vol. 8, no. 2, 1959, pp. 1-9). There was also the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961, which demonstrated growing discord and even a tug-of-war within the communist camp. For a more detailed account, see Richard Lowenthal, 'The Congress and Its Aftermath', Problems of Communism, vol. 11, no. 1, 1962, pp. 1-14). For the report of the CC of the CPSU to the 20th Party Congress, see Pravda, 15 February 1956, pp. 1-11.
25 There were several factions in North Korean politics up to the late 1950s known such as Soviet faction, Yenan faction, Seoul faction and Marxist-Leninist group and so on. For a detailed account of factionalism in North Korea, see Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea.
contradictions developed between Moscow and Pyongyang, the latter eventually siding with China in the worsening Sino-Soviet dispute.27

In return, in 1962 Khrushchev cut off all economic aid to North Korea in an effort to blackmail that country into supporting the Soviet Union against Beijing in the early days of the Sino-Soviet conflict.28 This meant that in the Kremlin’s eyes, North Korea’s policies and plans looked quite adventurous. Finally, North Korea’s relations with the Soviet Union ebbed to their lowest point at the end of the Khrushchev era in 1964.29

Soviet policy towards the Korean peninsula under Khrushchev was not elaborated in a detailed and explicit doctrine. Nevertheless, North Korea still played a crucial role in Soviet strategic considerations. In other words, because of the strategic importance of North Korea, the Soviet Union did not expel North Korea from the socialist camp, and continued to provide the country with economic and military assistance. The Soviet Union could not afford to lose North Korea to its main rival in Northeast Asia, China.30 By contrast, Khrushchev continued to demonstrate a completely hostile attitude towards South Korea in spite of the relative cooling of relations with North Korea.

In general, the Soviet Union was in a difficult position in Northeast Asia in relation to the Sino-Soviet disputes during the Khrushchev era. But the Soviet Union would have been in a more difficult position in Northeast Asia if it had lost North Korea altogether.

29 In September 1963, Rodong Shinmun was openly criticising the Soviet Union, accusing the latter of having exploited North Korea economically and of practising ‘big power chauvinism’ and ‘xenophobia’ (Rodong Shinmun [Pyongyang], 30 January 1963, p. 2).
C. Brezhnev’s ‘Status Quo’ Korean Policy (1964-82)

Relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea changed rapidly after October 1964 when Khrushchev was succeeded by Brezhnev and Kosygin as, respectively, first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR’s Council of Ministers. This marked the beginning of a move to improve the badly deteriorated relationship between the two sides. As early as September 1965, Brezhnev, in his speech at a CPSU Central Committee Plenum, was able to report that ‘interstate and inter-party contacts and ties between the Soviet Union and North Korea [had] been considerably strengthened’. A change in Soviet-North Korean relations was also signalled by the visit of a high-level Soviet delegation led by Premier Kosygin to Pyongyang in February 1965. As regards improved Soviet-North Korean relations during this period, it should be also mentioned here that Brezhnev, in his report to the 23rd CPSU Party Congress in 1966, declared that ‘the CPSU and the Soviet people fully support the fraternal Korean people, who are struggling against US imperialism for the unification of Korea’.

Nonetheless, Soviet-North Korean relations once again deteriorated in the second half of the 1960s, with the hijacking of the Pueblo (a US Navy ship) in January 1968 and the shooting down of a US EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft in April 1969. The Soviet leadership did not support North Korea’s aggressive actions against the US because peace and stability in the Korean peninsula remained key themes of Soviet foreign policy pronouncements in the second half of the decade.

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31 Pravda, 30 September 1965, p. 2.
32 During his visit, Kosygin emphasised that his purpose was to seek strengthen the relationship between the two countries through ‘an exchange of opinions on the question of the international situation and other problems of concern to our Parties and our countries’ (Izvestiia, 13 February 1965, p. 1).
33 On the 23rd CPSU Party Congress, see XXIII sobr Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza: Stenograficheskii otchet, 2 volumes (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1966); and Materialy XXIII sobr KPSS (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1960).
34 Pravda, 30 March 1966, p. 2.
35 For a more detailed account of this, see Chapter 3.1.
Brezhnev did not want another war on the Korean peninsula, but attempted to bring North Korea back from its new-found relationship with China. This meant that North Korea was still perceived in primarily strategic rather than ideological terms: as a Far Eastern outpost in the overall picture of the Soviet Union's confrontation with the US in the region. Indeed, North Korea's strategic importance in the region was of primary importance to the Soviet Union, overriding the ideological conflicts between them. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership did not accept North Korea's *Juche* (self-reliance) doctrine.\

It should be noted that there were three more CPSU Party Congresses that led to changes in Soviet foreign policy during the Brezhnev era. The 24th CPSU Party Congress in 1971 set forth a 'Peace Programme' in the field of Soviet foreign policy. In these circumstances, notably in the 1970s, for the first time, the Soviet Union and South Korea made personal contact at the unofficial and non-political level. In a sense, the Soviet Union was attempting to use the 'South Korean Card' against North Korea as a hedge against closer ties.

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36 In the middle of the Sino-Soviet conflict, North Korea concluded that there was no more utility in Marxism-Leninism and began to formulate its own ideology. North Korea, however, had no deep theoretical tradition of socialist thought. This lack of solid foundation in philosophy resulted in the emergence of the *Juche* idea (self-reliance), a distorted version of Marxism. There were certain elements of *Juche* idea that run counter to the Marxist-Leninist tradition, with the element of nationalism being particularly problematic. For a detailed account of North Korea's *Juche* idea, see Kim Il-sung, *On Juche in Our Revolution: Selection from the author's writings, speeches and reports, 1931-1966* vol. 1 (New York: Weekly Guardian Associates, 1977); and Song-jun Yi, *The Philosophical Principle of the Juche Idea* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Language Pub. House., 1986).

37 Its main purpose was, relying on the might, solidarity and activeness of world socialism and on its strengthening alliance with all progressive and peace-loving forces, to bring about a change of direction in the development of international relations. On the 24th CPSU Party Congress, see *XXIV s"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza: Stenograficheskii otchet*, 2 volumes (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1971); and *Materialy XXIV s"ezda KPSS* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1971).

38 *Détente* between the US and the Soviet Union and rapprochement between the US and China in the early 1970s provided favourable circumstances for Soviet-South Korean contacts. By the same token, South Korean President Park Chung-hee's Peace initiative on 23 June 1973 towards all Communist countries including North Korea also contributed to the process of reconciliation between Seoul and Moscow. This declaration was a turning point in the diplomatic policy of South Korea. Though South Korea did not abandon its anti-communist policy, it would nevertheless establish diplomatic relations with communist countries. It seemed that the time for *détente* had finally arrived on the Korean peninsula. In this respect, the author would like to divide the development of Soviet-South Korean relations roughly into three stages: (1) hostile relations (1945-71); (2) restricted unofficial non-
between North Korea and China. However, the mood of détente between the Soviet Union and South Korea ended when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 after the 25th CPSU Party Congress in 1976, at which Brezhnev had addressed such strains in US-Soviet relations as the Cuban intervention in the Angolan civil war and the apparent US role in the overthrow of Chile’s elected Marxist President Salvador Allende. As a result, the Soviet Union reverted to a pro-North Korean policy on the Korean peninsula. During the 26th CPSU Party Congress in 1981 Brezhnev reshuffled his programme, but it remained largely a conservative one.

D. Andropov and Chernenko’s ‘Status Quo’ Korean Policy (1982-85)

As compared with Brezhnev’s late pro-North Korean policy, no substantial changes in Soviet policy towards the Korean peninsula were made under either Yuri Andropov or his successor Konstantin Chernenko during the first half of the 1980s. Rather, it was a period of the new Cold War and the importance of North Korea to the Soviet Union was enhanced.

Kim Il-sung’s visit to the Soviet Union in May 1984 reinforced Soviet-North Korean relations. As a result, for example, the Soviet Union began to

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On the 26th Party Congress, see XXV съезд Коммунистической партии Советского Союза: Стенографический отчет, 3 volumes (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1976); and Materialy XXV съезда КПСС (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1975). The 26th Party Congress convened at a time of change in the Soviet Union’s domestic and international situation. Richard Coffman and Michael Klecheski described this congress as ‘the Soviet Union in a time of uncertainty’ (Seweryn Bialer and Thane Gustafson, eds., Russia at the Crossroads: the 26th Congress of the CPSU [London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982], pp. 192-219). While the 26th Party Congress showed some recognition of the changing international and domestic environment, its attempt to grapple with the resulting issues was minimal. For a more detailed discussion of the changing circumstances under which the 26th Party Congress was held, see Bialer and Gustafson, Russia at the Crossroads; Boris Meissner, ‘The 26th Party Congress in February 1981 and Soviet Domestic Politics’, Problems of Communism, vol. 30, no. 3, 1981, pp. 1-23; and Aleksandr Tomashevskii, XXVI съезд КПСС о развитии социалистического общесте: в помощь избранцу (Leningrad: ‘Znanie’, 1982).
provide North Korea with advanced weapons and military equipment, as well as economic and technological assistance.:

Nevertheless, it should be noted that a growing understanding of the need to reconsider policies regarding Korean affairs began to be detected in academic and political circles in the Soviet Union during this period. People began to speak (albeit only behind closed doors) in favour of more open, non-official ties with South Korea. Advocates of this policy argued that non-official ties would loosen the linkages between Seoul and Washington, ease tension on the Korean peninsula, and satisfy Soviet economic needs. Improved relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea, however, were not apparent during this period (Andropov and Chernenko), mainly as a result of the 'KAL 007' incident in late 1983.:

2.2. The Development of Gorbachev's Active Korean Policy (1985-91):

Power and Policy Changes within the Context of the New Political Thinking

Under Gorbachev's leadership (1985-91) Soviet policy towards the Korean peninsula underwent a profound change, gradually evolving from a

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42 In this respect, the Soviet Union increasingly acknowledged South Korea's remarkable economic achievements. For example, an article dealing with MNCs (Multinational Corporations) in Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea was published in the Soviet Union. The author stated that the dynamic expansion of operations by these MNCs had resulted in the emergence of a fresh centre of economic power in the Far East (See A. Bereznoy, 'Multinational Companies of Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea', *Far Eastern Affairs* [Moscow], no. 1, 1983, pp. 180-189).

conventional pro-North Korean policy towards one centred more on South Korea, finally establishing diplomatic relations with that country in 1990. This demonstrated that for the first time the Soviet Union under Gorbachev took an ‘active’ policy towards the Korean peninsula, and became the first major power to recognise the two Koreas on the Korean peninsula.

From the late 1980s onwards, South Korea became one of the major Asian countries in Gorbachev’s ‘New Political Thinking’. Indeed, building up diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1990 became one of the priorities of the Soviet Union’s APR policy, together with the normalisation of relations with China. In this respect, the Korean peninsula became a more ‘independent factor’ in Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev, although the impact of his ‘New Political Thinking’ on Soviet policy on the Korean peninsula was still largely a function of intricate and shifting relationships between the Soviet Union and the three major powers in Northeast Asia.

Gorbachev’s Asian policy should be seen in the context of an effort to create a regional environment suited to the central goals of perestroika. The


45 However, it should be noted that the outcome of Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking towards Northeast Asia was not, as Gorbachev had expected, successful in the whole region. In contrast to the Korean case, the New Political Thinking did not make any remarkable achievements towards Japan due to deep-rooted, unresolved bilateral problems such as the Northern (Kurile) Islands dispute between the two countries. See Suzanne Crow, ‘The Soviet-Japanese Summit: Expectations Unfulfilled’, RFE/RL, vol. 3, no. 17, 26 April 1991, pp. 1-4. It should be even noted that there were domestic struggle over Kurile Islands, see Stephen Foye, ‘The Struggle over Russia’s Kurile Islands Policy’, RFE/RL, vol. 1, no. 36, 11 September 1992, pp. 34-40; and V. K. Zilanov, et al., Russkie Kurily: Istoria i sovremennost’ (Moscow: Sampo, 1995).

declining economic capability of the Soviet Union was perceived by Gorbachev as the most serious threat to its long-term security, and this perception forced him to adopt economic reform as his top priority. This led to a tendency in Soviet foreign policy to emphasise the APR with a decreasing ideological and strategic role, whilst simultaneously emphasising economic factors. Consequently, the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations and détente with the US led the Soviet Union to diminish North Korea’s strategic and ideological value to its foreign policy.

In these circumstances, Gorbachev’s leadership adopted a more ‘pragmatic’ (or ‘active’) approach that would be more beneficial to the Soviet Union’s economic interests in the Korean peninsula. South Korea, in this connection, appeared to be one of the most attractive economic partners for the Soviet economy. As a result, the Soviet Union began to show more interest in South Korea than North Korea for the first time in its history.

However, it should be noted here that Gorbachev’s active policy towards the Korean peninsula developed according to the power consolidation between conservatives and reformers in Soviet politics. The reformers consisted of Gorbachev, his inner circle, reform-minded academics and members of the intelligentsia, while the conservatives came primarily from the Soviet-military-industry-party complex. The conservatives were ideologically opposed to his reform policies, causing them to line up against him and his policies. They resisted and obstructed his reform policies, including new foreign policy, in

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48 The idea of building economic relations with South Korea had been considered by the Soviet leadership. As Shipayev, senior scientific associate in the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute, stated, ‘it must be admitted that this question of the possibility of economic relations with South Korea has been coming to a head for a long time. The overwhelming majority of European Socialist countries have now built economic relations with South Korea... I have absolutely no doubt that the Soviet Union could also derive considerable benefit from this kind of cooperation’ (*Komsomolskaia pravda*, 25 October 1988, p. 3).
order to protect their vested interests, interests that had long been nurtured under the old Soviet system.°

As a result, Gorbachev's Korean policy was also made in the context of shifting, overlapping coalitions of leaders bargaining with one another for mutual advantage.° This in turn led to changes in both domestic and foreign policy. The reformers needed to establish a firm power base and maintain widespread support within the Kremlin leadership before initiating new policies such as Soviet-South Korean normalisation. They wanted to remove the ideological mist which shrouded relations between the two Koreas for many decades. Their views implied that North Korea was one of the last remnants of Stalinism on the globe. By contrast, the conservatives insisted on fully supporting North Korea as an ally, and recognising South Korea as a puppet of 'US imperialism' in Northeast Asia. This indicated that the Soviet-South Korean normalisation in 1990 reflected the reformers' view that this was an integral component in the overall restructuring of Soviet domestic policy. It was also a key element in Gorbachev's successful consolidation of power, the establishment of New Political Thinking over the conservatives, and the re-establishment of its role in the international community.

Gorbachev's Korean policy can be divided into the following three stages.°

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° Under Gorbachev, political power and reform policy were intrinsically intertwined because power was a prerequisite for the implementation of reforms whose success or failure in turn could enhance or erode his power. Perestroika's opponents resisted Gorbachev and his reforms. The basic problem of the struggle against perestroika came down to the issue of power. For a more detailed account of the power struggle between Gorbachev and his opponents, see Baruch A. Hazan, *Gorbachev and His Enemies: the Struggle for Perestroika* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990); G. Kh. Shakhunazarov, *Tsena svobody: reformatsiya Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnika* (Moscow: Rossika Zevs, 1993); and Mikhail Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reformy*, vol. 2 (Moscow: Novost, 1995).

° For instance, the Soviet-South Korean normalisation in 1990 could be explained by the outcome of 'political bargaining' or 'power struggling' between conservatives and reformers in Soviet foreign policy over the Korean issue, linked to Gorbachev enhancing his power position within the leadership.

° By contrast, to get to grips with the changing momentum of Gorbachev's Korean policy that helped shape his active policy towards the Korean peninsula, this study emphasises to examine in detail the CPSU Party Congresses and Party Conference - where key elements of the new policy were hammered out. Especially, the 27th CPSU Party Congress in 1986 and the 19th Party Conference in 1988 had a
A. Still Old Thinking Towards the Korean Peninsula? (Spring 1985-Summer 1988): The 27th Party Congress and the Evolution of New Political Thinking

During this period, Soviet policy on the Korean issue was formed in a conventional framework, with a tilt towards North Korea. This indicated that the time for the implementation of New Political Thinking towards the Korean peninsula in Northeast Asia had not yet arrived. Rather, it was a period of the evolution of New Political Thinking after the 27th Congress of the CPSU in February 1986.\(^5\)

The basic message of Gorbachev’s speech upon his election to the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was the ‘continuity’\(^5\) of previous Soviet policy. Thus, neither the internal and external conditions required for a new policy towards the Korean peninsula were in place. Internally, the conservative communist-dominated faction of ‘old thinkers’ remained largely intact. Externally, a Cold War atmosphere still prevailed on...
the Korean peninsula in Northeast Asia. Gorbachev continued to pursue his predecessor's policy of improving relations with North Korea as a means of boosting the Soviet presence in the region with the signing of a bilateral agreement with North Korea in December 1985.55

Gorbachev's early Korean policy, with its tilt towards North Korea, was quite understandable if three points are taken into account. First, the Korean peninsula was not still the central focus of Gorbachev's Asian policy. The re-establishment of relations with China, Japan and the US were more urgent problems. Secondly, from the late 1970s onwards, a new strategic environment began to develop in Northeast Asia. China concluded a peace and friendship treaty with Japan in 1978 and normalised its relations with the US in 1979. In this situation, the Soviet Union perceived that the strategic balance was rapidly shifting against it, and sought to improve relations with North Korea. Thirdly, and more significantly, the Soviet conservatives' attitude towards the Korean peninsula was not modified.

Soviet reform policies had not yet influenced its relations with the Korean peninsula. As a result, the Soviet Union continued to support North Korea's stance due to its strategic and ideological importance, and political, military and economic co-operation were intensified.56 In contrast to the strengthening of

government policies, will continue to firmly follow the Leninist course of peace and peaceful coexistence' (Pravda, 13 March 1985, p. 5).

Gorbachev's early Korean policy was characterised by the intensification of established commitments to North Korea which were set in the final communique issued at the end of Kim Il-sung's 1984 visit to Moscow. In the communique, both sides agreed on the necessity of strengthening economic ties and security in the Far East and pacific zone in the light of 'US militarist tendencies and rearmament policies in Japan' (Michael William, 'North Korea: Tilting towards Moscow', World Today, vol. 40, no. 10, 1984, p. 403). For details of good Soviet-North Korean relations during this period, see Doo-sook Suh, 'North Korea in 1986: Strengthening the Soviet Connection', Asian Survey, vol. 27, no. 1, 1987, pp. 56-63. According to Gelman, the relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea during this period was 'the heritage of the past' (Harry Gelman, 'Gorbachev's Policies in East Asia after Two Years', Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, 1988, pp. 47-49).

Soviet Asian strategy in the first three years of Gorbachev's rule reflected five principal objectives: (1) maintaining and strengthening traditional close relations with friends and allies; (2) accelerating the process of political rapprochement with China, with the ultimate aim of bringing China back into the socialist fold on Moscow's terms; (3) pursuing broader ties with the non-socialist countries of the region, leading with steps in the economic sphere; (4) downplaying the military factor; and (5) continuing to challenge US pre-eminence in the region (Stephen M. Young, 'Gorbachev's Asian Policy: Balancing the New and the Old', Asian Survey, vol. 28, no. 3, 1988, pp. 318).
relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea, there was still no change in official relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea. In other words, despite South Korea’s many efforts to attract the Soviet Union’s attention, the Soviet Union did not respond with any positive signals.  

Nevertheless, in some respects, it was a transitional period in Soviet policy towards the Korean peninsula as the conservatives and reformers were gradually vying for influence over foreign policy after the 27th Congress of the CPSU. Gorbachev and his reformers gradually started to view South Korea as a potential economic partner in Northeast Asia that could facilitate domestic economic reform. This indicated that Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking vis-à-vis South Korea, being formulated at a new ‘conceptual level’, mainly originated from Soviet domestic economic needs. Soviet policy towards South Korea was shifting in this reason from non-recognition to de facto recognition while demonstrating a flexible and pragmatic attitude, especially in the field of trade and economic co-operation. However, it should be noted that supporters of the two contradictory positions co-existed, adding confusion and ambiguity to Soviet policy towards Northeast Asia, particularly towards the Korean peninsula during the early years of Gorbachev’s rule.

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57 For example, in the speech delivered at the Kwanhoon Club in Seoul in March 1987, South Korea’s foreign minister Kwang-soo Choi stated that ‘we have steadily pursued an open-door policy towards the Soviet Union’ (Kwang-soo Choi, ‘The Situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the Surrounding Region and Korea’s Foreign Policy Direction’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 11, no. 2, 1987, p. 227).

58 The Soviet Union’s willingness to establish economic ties with South Korea was expressed by many Soviet officials and academics before the Krasnoyarsk declaration, which was delivered in the summer of 1988. For example, amid reports of increasing indirect trade between Moscow and Seoul, Ernest Obminsky, the head of the Soviet foreign ministry’s directorate for international economic relations, stated on 25 March 1988 that ‘the flow of goods and services is much internationalised at present, so it would be impossible to exclude the South Korean element’ (Sophie Quinn-Judge, ‘Olympic Overtures: Relations between Soviets and South Korea Improve’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 April 1988, p. 38).

During this period, Soviet Korean policy was no longer based solely upon North Korea's own stance. Instead, for the first time throughout the whole history of Soviet-Korean relations, the Soviet Union started to emphasise relations with South Korea based on New Political Thinking. As a result, Soviet-South Korean relations rapidly developed from non-political to political relations. Yet, Soviet-North Korean relations deteriorated as Gorbachev's new policy placed less emphasis on traditional ideological, strategic and military ties with North Korea.59

It was a period of implementation of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking towards the Korean peninsula on the basis of his successful power consolidation in Soviet domestic politics through the 19th Party Conference.60 After the Conference in the middle of 1988, which was used to create a climate of opinion favourable to political reform, to authorise institutional changes and

59 Soviet-North Korean relations deteriorated rapidly after the 19th Party Conference in the summer of 1988. There were several signs of worsening relations between the two sides. The main reasons for this deterioration were: (1) diverging Soviet foreign policy orientations after the 19th Party Conference; (2) the successful 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and South Korea's Northern Policy; (3) events in Eastern Europe in 1989; (4) democratisation of Soviet society; and (5) Soviet-South Korean normalisation in 1990.


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to dislodge conservatives from the Central Committee apparatus,\textsuperscript{61} the Soviet Union officially pursued a 'two Korean'\textsuperscript{62} policy or an 'active even-handed approach'\textsuperscript{63} aimed at maintaining good relations with both Koreas on the Korean peninsula.

Thus, Soviet-Korean relations during this period should be understood as incorporating the following assumptions: 'the Soviet Union vigorously emphasised economic ties with South Korea with remarkable speed, as well as maintaining good security relations with North Korea'. Nevertheless, by early 1990, the Soviet Union showed no sign of seeking a full diplomatic normalisation with South Korea. As regards its relations with South Korea, the Soviet Union continued to express the view that economic relations should develop first and that political relations would naturally follow. In other words, the Soviet Union still continued to 'separate politics and economics' to avoid provoking North Korea.\textsuperscript{64}

Finally, in New York in September 1990, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met his South Korean counterpart and signed a diplomatic accord between the two sides.\textsuperscript{65} In doing so, the Soviet Union became the first major power to recognise the two Koreas on the Korean peninsula. Diplomatic

\textsuperscript{61} For example, the personnel shake-up of the CPSU apparatus greatly influenced Soviet foreign policy-making in September 1988. Most of the 22 Central Committee departments were abolished, and six new CPSU Commissions were created to supervise key domestic and foreign matters (See Pravda, 29 November 1988, pp. 1-2).

\textsuperscript{62} It should be noted here that the Soviet Union did not choose to totally alienate North Korea. Instead it sought to maintain political influence through diplomatic persuasion and military/economic assistance. Thus, during this period, Soviet policy towards North Korea was remarkable in two respects: (1) the efforts to persuade North Korea's hard-line was to adopt Soviet-style reform; and (2) the continued consultation with North Korean leaders in an effort to ally their anxiety and misgivings with regard to the Soviet-South Korean normalisation.

\textsuperscript{63} For example, deputy foreign minister Igor Rogachev stated on several occasions that 'Moscow's expanding contacts with Seoul do not mean that it is about to officially recognise the South Korean government or establish diplomatic relations' (Izvestia, 5 January 1989, p. 5).

\textsuperscript{64} According to Vladimir Ivanov, the Kremlin had three options for its relations with South Korea: (1) establishment of non-official contacts and development of economic ties with Seoul (China's model); (2) promotion of economic and full-scale political relations with Seoul while downgrading relations with North Korea (Hungary's model); and (3) the development of comprehensive ties with Seoul and pursuit of an active role in the resolution of the Korean problem, including the maintenance of the balance on the Korean peninsula and the encouragement of an inter-Korean dialogue (Vladimir I. Ivanov, 'The Soviet Union and the Asia-Pacific Region in the 1990s: Evolution or Radical Changes?', The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, vol. 2, no. 2, 1990, pp. 57-58).
normalisation between the two sides in 1990 was significant in two different ways. First, the Soviet Union was in a better position to play a mediator role in the inter-Korean dialogue and in the emerging contacts between North Korea and other states of the APR, particularly the US. Secondly, Gorbachev and his supporters had sufficient power to implement New Political Thinking towards the Korean peninsula against the conservatives through both structural and personnel changes in the Soviet foreign policy-making system, especially after the 19th Party Conference in the summer of 1988.

C. The Continuation of New Political Thinking Towards the Korean Peninsula? (Autumn 1990-Winter 1991): Pro-South Korean Soviet policy

The third period of Gorbachev's Korean policy was characterised by a continuous Soviet effort to implement the New Political Thinking towards the Korean peninsula, although there were serious domestic instabilities.

Gorbachev's Korean policy was during this period characterised by an inexorable shift towards South Korea, at the expense of North Korea. New Political Thinking towards the Korean peninsula continued, despite the August coup and Gorbachev's fall in 1991. After the abortive coup, Soviet-North Korean relations became further strained. When the coup was announced, North Korea showed its immediate support for the coup leaders. On the

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62 See Izvestiia, 1 October 1990, p. 4.
66 The trend toward decentralisation of Soviet foreign policy became more clear after the August coup. Each of the Soviet republics became more actively involved in dealing directly with South Korea. On the August coup,见In S. Sidorenko, Tri dni, kotorye oprokudili bol'sheviku: izpoved svyreteli, pokazhnika ochekidiuma (Rostov na Donu: Periodyka Domu, 1991); A. G. Tuleev, Dolgos ekho putcha: kak zhit' dal'she? (Moscow: Palitra, 1992); G. A. Belousova and V. A. Lebedev, Partokratia i putch (Moscow: Reapublik, 1992); and Joseph Whelan, Gorbachev's Decline and Fall: from Failed Coup to Collapse of Empire, August-December 1991 (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Research Slavic, 1992). On Soviet foreign policy after the August coup, see Vernon Aspaturian, 'Farewell to Soviet Foreign Policy', Problems of Communism, vol. 40, no. 6, 1991, pp. 53-62. The attempted coup in Moscow revealed the USSR ministry of foreign affairs to be adrift without leadership. Gorbachev dismissed Soviet foreign minister Bessmertnykh for his passivity during the putsch, but Bessmertnykh denied allegations that he collaborated with the Emergency Committee. Foreign Policy initiative effectively passed to the RSFSR and President Yeltsin together with his foreign minister Andrei
contrary, the South Korean government quickly expressed support for Gorbachev and Yeltsin. 67

Two historic Soviet-South Korean summits took place in Moscow and in Cheju Island, South Korea during this period. The first summit took place in San Francisco in June 1990. South Korean President Roh Tae-woo paid an official visit to Moscow in December 1990, to hold the second summit with Gorbachev. Roh Tae-woo was the first South Korean President to visit the Soviet Union. In April 1991, the third summit meeting between Gorbachev and Roh Tae-woo on Cheju Island marked the climax of the improvement in relations between the two sides. 68 This showed that Gorbachev increasingly believed that South Korea could serve as a vital economic link between the Soviet Union and the APR. Finally, Soviet relations with South Korea became a priority in the Soviet Union's Asian-Pacific regional foreign policy.

In the meantime, Soviet-North Korean relations became increasingly fragile as the ideological and military ties that had bound the two sides became strained. De-ideologisation of Soviet foreign policy meant de-emphasising ideological ties with its traditional ally, North Korea, and emphasising economic and political ties with capitalist South Korea. Gorbachev's policy towards North Korea centred around two themes during this period (autumn 1990-winter 1991): (1) adjusting relations with North Korea from a military alliance to a normal state-to-state relationship; and (2) diplomatic efforts for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and the political settlement of the Korean problem. 69 Accordingly, it should be noted that in the latter part of the

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67 See Seoul Shinmun (Seoul), 31 August 1990, pp. 2-5.
68 Gorbachev became the first Soviet leader to visit the Korean peninsula. Gorbachev, in his speech in Cheju, stated that "there are no obstacles, objective or subjective between the two countries... Soviet-South Korean relations can be a model of bilateral relations for the APR..." (See Izvestia, 20 April 1991, p. 1; and Pravda, 20 April 1991, p. 6).
Gorbachev period the Soviet Union began to lose its great influence on North Korea.

2.3. The Development of Yeltsin’s ‘Reactive’ Korean Policy (1991-96):
Power and Policy Changes within the Context of Russian Foreign Policy
Concept in Russian Politics

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, not only Russia’s attitudes towards the Korean peninsula, but also its basic foreign policy interests and assumptions towards the region had to be changed during Yeltsin’s first presidential term (Dec. 91-Jul. 96). This indicated that Russia needed to restructure its foreign policy towards the two Koreas in accordance with a newly emerging world order and its new domestic situation. Finally, Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during this period became ‘reactive’, although Russia did attempt to develop a more active policy towards the region at this time.

Russia had a relatively clear-cut set of objectives towards the Korean peninsula based on Yeltsin’s new reform policies. Those objectives were no longer imperial, ideological and strategic, but primarily economic in character. Russia’s interests in the Korean peninsula fell into three broad categories: (1) expanding economic and trade ties; (2) maintaining its political role; and (3) participating in discussions on regional issues.¹⁰

¹⁰ Mikhail Titarenko stated that ‘the Korean subject is turned to Russia with its two major facets; (1) the settlement on the Korean peninsula; and (2) Russia’s bilateral relations with the DPRK and the ROK’ (Mikhail Titarenko, ‘Russia in the Far East after the Disintegration of the USSR’, Sino-Soviet Affairs [Seoul], vol. 16, no. 3, 1992, p. 21). According to Zhebin, the new Russia’s priorities on the Korean peninsula were: (1) to strengthen political and military stability, to prevent the crisis situations—to say nothing of the armed conflict on Korea; (2) to maintain de-ideologised, normal and well-balanced relations and to develop the mutually beneficial economic cooperation with North and South Korea; (3) to contribute to the North-South rapprochement in view of their future reunification into a single friendly Korean state; and (4) to seek understanding with the US, China and Japan in order to find the mutually acceptable solution of the international aspects of the Korean problem (Alexander Z. Zhebin, ‘Russian-North Korean Relations: the States and Prospects’, Sino-Soviet Affairs [Seoul], vol. 16, no. 3, 1992, p. 141).
Russia’s economic interests on the Korean peninsula were continuously emphasised by its leadership in the post-Soviet era. According to one Russian scholar, ‘business cooperation between Russia and South Korea was given the top priority in our country’. A number of Russian experts even suggested that South Korea’s experience was more appropriate for Russia than America’s or Europe’s. Russia continued to view South Korea as a substitute economic partner for Japan in the post-Soviet era. Russia regarded South Korea, to a large extent, as a country which, either in relation to other major powers in Northeast Asia such as China, Japan and the US, or on its own, could play a significant role in Russia’s regional relations and its interests in the region in the post-Soviet era. In this respect, South Korea had become of primary concern to Russia’s Asian policy in the post-Soviet era.

To maintain its political role on the Korean peninsula, Russia concluded a historic political treaty with South Korea signed in 1992 (see Chapter 4), while pursuing a new friendship treaty with North Korea, which was intended to replace the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty (see Chapter 3). By being the first major power to establish bilateral political relations with both South and North Korea, Russia was able to assert its influence in the region. Russian officials, however, were aware of the limitations of South Korea as a substitute for Japan. South Korea lacked the same level of financial resources and regional and international influence as Japan.

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72 Rossiiskie vesti, 26 May 1994, p. 3.
73 In the APR, South Korea seemed to be the most promising partner for Russia. Partnership with Japan was ruled out because of the Kurile Islands problem. China’s official ideology represented a major barrier to closer economic cooperation with Russia (Izvestiia, 1 August 1992, p. 5). Later Russian officials realised that South Korea could not be a substitute for Japan. Russia found that South Korea was attractive as an economic partner given the possibility of complementarity in the Russian and South Korean economies, but Seoul did not have the same level of financial resources as Japan and lacked Tokyo’s regional and international influence.
74 Vyacheslav Amirov, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Japanese and Pacific Studies at IMEMO, stated that ‘South Korea can be a Middle Power in the region’ (Interviewed with Vyacheslav B. Amirov, Research Fellow at the Centre for Japanese and Pacific Studies at IMEMO by Ik Jaung Youn at the University of Melbourne, Australia, 26 April 1996). According to Bazhanov, South Korea was regarded as a ‘bright spot’ in Russia’s interactions with the APR nations (Eugene Bazhanov and Natasha Bazhanov, ‘The Evolution of Russian-Korean Relations: External and Internal Factors’, Asian Survey, vol. 34, no. 9, 1994, p. 789).
75 Yeltsin stressed South Korea’s importance in a speech to the National Assembly of South Korea (November 1992) which, in his eyes, had to be no less significant than the message delivered by Gorbachev in Vladivostok (1986). He argued that ‘nowadays, our policy is being transferred from West European and American lines to the Asia-Pacific region, and my visit to here [South Korea] is the first move in this process’ (Rossiiskaiia gazeta, 20 November 1992, p. 2). Georgiy Toloraya, chief of the Korean department in the Russian foreign ministry stated, ‘we regard relations with South Korea as one of the priorities in our Asian policy’ (Rossiiskaiia gazeta, 28 August 1992, p. 7).
Koreas, Russia hoped to put itself into a good position to play a mediating role for the Korean peninsula and to maximise its national interests in the region.\footnote{According to Valentin Moiseev, Russia’s foreign policy concept was aimed at creating a belt of ‘good neighbours’ along its borders, and called for friendly, mutually advantageous, and equal relations to be forged with all its neighbouring states (Valentin Moiseev, ‘Russia and the Korean Peninsula’, \textit{International Affairs} [Moscow], vol. 42, no. 1, 1996, p. 106).}

Russia’s other intention in the Korean peninsula was to become actively involved in Korean issues as one of the major powers in Northeast Asia, both in terms of regional economic and security interests (see Chapters 5 and 6.) These were closely related to Russia’s new status in this region after the collapse of the Soviet Union. At this point, it should be noted that historically, any state that has been able to exercise strong influence over the Korean peninsula has come to be a dominating power in the region.

All of these Russian interests in the Korean peninsula gradually evolved from an emphasis on economic relations to politico-security relations. In other words, Russia’s pro-South Korean policy in the early stage of Russian foreign policy emphasised its economic interests in the Korean peninsula. From the end of 1993 onwards, however, Russia started to give greater emphasis to its politico-security interests in the Korean peninsula, together with its continuous economic interests.

Nonetheless, the Korean peninsula was not a top priority on the Russian foreign policy agenda. Even by comparison with the late Gorbachev years, the importance of the South Korean factor in Russian foreign policy agenda gradually became less significant under Yeltsin.\footnote{For example, Alexei Zagorsky, the head of section for political studies at the Centre for Asian and Pacific Studies at the IMEMO, stated that ‘Asia Pacific in general and Korea in particular occupied a rather low priority in Russian foreign policy goal setting in the initial period’ (Alexei Zagorsky, ‘Russian Policy on Korean Peninsula in Search of Identity’, \textit{Korean Peninsula in Northeast Asian Regional Affairs} [Moscow: IMEMO and Korea Foundation, 1997], p. 73).} The main reason for this was that Yeltsin’s Russian foreign policy during his first presidential term was dominated by a focus on two predominating areas: (1) a continuous emphasis on relations with the West;\footnote{Yeltsin’s main aim was to link Russia with the West, which was broadly defined in terms of the whole Atlantic-European region together with Japan. For an account of Russia’s policy towards the West, see Heinz Timmermann, ‘Russian Foreign Policy under Yeltsin: Priority for Integration into the} and (2) a strong emphasis on relations with the

\footnote{Yeltsin’s main aim was to link Russia with the West, which was broadly defined in terms of the whole Atlantic-European region together with Japan. For an account of Russia’s policy towards the West, see Heinz Timmermann, ‘Russian Foreign Policy under Yeltsin: Priority for Integration into the
Near Abroad. Some Russian scholars’ comments on Yeltsin’s Russian foreign policy clearly support this assessment as Titarenko and Kulik put it, ‘if we now call for more attention to “the Eastern Vector” of Russia’s foreign policy, this is not to mean we opt for it at the expense of the “the Western Vector”: we want to rectify the pro-Western tilt and bring Russia’s foreign policy course in line with the country’s national interests’.

Although Yeltsin’s leadership attempted to pursue an ‘active partnership approach’ that would be more beneficial to Russia’s economic and security interests on the Korean peninsula, Russia’s policy towards the Korean peninsula during this period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96) gradually became reactive as compared with Gorbachev’s more active one. In addition, it should be noted that this reactive policy towards the Korean peninsula developed in parallel with the consolidation of Yeltsin’s own position in Russian politics. In other words, the reformers needed to establish a firm power base and maintain widespread support within the leadership in the Kremlin before initiating new policies for the Korean peninsula. Their views implied that North Korea was one of the last remnants of Stalinism on the globe. By contrast, the conservatives (or nationalists) still insisted on maintaining support for North Korea as an ally, while recognising South Korea in Northeast Asia.
Reflecting Yeltsin's gradual power consolidation in Russian politics, Russia's Korean policy can be divided into the following three stages. In this respect, especially, the December 1993 and the December 1995 Russian parliamentary elections played an important role in changing the momentum of Russia's domestic and foreign policy.

A. Still New Political Thinking Towards the Korean Peninsula? (Dec. 91-Dec. 93): Yeltsin and Russian Reformers After the Collapse of the Soviet Union

During this period, Yeltsin attempted to consolidate his political power based on reform policies and at the same time he delineated a pro-South Korean policy towards the Korean peninsula, together with his pro-Western stance in Russian foreign policy. In this respect, Russia followed the same principles as Gorbachev's late Korean policy.

In these circumstances, Russia tried to move from diplomatic normalisation (1990) to 'partnership' relations with South Korea. As a result, high level politico-economic contacts between the two sides, which included Yeltsin's visit to South Korea in 1992, were frequent during this period. In the field of economic relations, Russia strongly emphasised economic relations...
with South Korea, and called for 'economic partnership'. Furthermore, there were significant advances in the field of military cooperation between the two sides, which would have been unthinkable during the Soviet era.

Nonetheless, not everything was rosy between the two sides, and in 1993 the atmosphere in their relations deteriorated to a certain degree. Several key disputes dating back to the Cold War era were not fully resolved as South Korea had expected. One of the best examples of this was Russia's handling of the 'empty' black box of the Korean Airline (KAL) 007, which had been shot down by Soviet fighters in 1983, during Yeltsin's visit to Seoul in November 1992. South Koreans were disappointed with the conclusion of a special state committee in Russia that Russia could not be held responsible for the shooting down of the KAL 007. Economic cooperation between the two sides was also constrained by Russia's inability to repay its debts to South Korea. More importantly, South Korea was not as concerned to improve its relations with Russia as it had been to improve relations with the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. In the meantime, the Russian side was also dissatisfied with South Korea's economic involvement in Russia.

On the other hand, Russian-North Korean relations moved from 'allied' to 'just old friend' relations, which was an estranged and complicated stage.

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86 Georgiy Kunadze, Russian deputy foreign minister and ambassador-designate to South Korea at the time, stated that '... the three-year-long diplomatic relations with South Korea have been based on stable experiences. We can say that these three years have been a period of getting out of a certain 'vain dream' and excessive expectations.' ('Ambassador-Designate to ROK Views Korean Issues', Radio Moscow, 29 December 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-249, 30 December 1993, p. 16).

87 On 14 October 1992 Russian President Yeltsin turned over previously secret documents about the incident to the KAL-007. For detailed account of this, see John Lepingwell, 'Opening the KAL-007 Black Box: New Documents and Old Questions', RFE/RL, vol. 1, no. 44, 6 November 1992, pp. 20-26.

88 Major problems for Russian-South Korean economic cooperation were: (1) the lack of a basic framework for economic cooperation between the two sides; (2) South Korea's lack of knowledge regarding the Soviet Union and Russia (no previous experience of doing business in a socialist countries); and (3) the immaturity of Russia's economic environment for international economic cooperation. For an account of Russia's major economic problems with South Korea, see L. A. Anosova and G. S. Matveeva, Iuzhnaia Koreia: vzgliad iz Rossii (Moscow: Nauka, 1994).

89 Eugene and Natasha Bazhanov described relations between the Soviet/Russia and North Korea as a 'stormy alliance' from the diplomatic normalisation between the former Soviet Union and South Korea.
Russia had to limit to a minimum its relations with North Korea, although it was unwilling to sever relations entirely during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93). The main factors behind this position were: (1) a policy of distancing Russia from North Korea for ideological reasons; (2) the question of North Korea's non-compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and Russia's pressure for North Korea to do so; (3) the reinterpretation of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty; and (4) the question of North Korea's debts to Russia.

Consequently, high-level political contacts between Russia and North Korea were effectively halted, inter-parliamentary ties were broken, and exchanges of people were minimised. In the field of economic relations, trade between the two sides declined sharply, while contacts and exchange in all other economic areas were of a rather limited and formal character. Furthermore, North Korea together with other former socialist countries did not enter the circle of Russia's possible good friends in the outside world during the early years of post-Soviet foreign policy.

However, from the beginning of 1993 Russia gradually started to reopen its contacts with North Korea and exchange opinions about bilateral and international issues. In economic terms, despite the sharp decline in the trade turnover in 1992, Russia and North Korea retained their interests in some respects. Yeltsin appeared to have been aware that the conservatives were a threat to his political power and reform policies at this time and that he did not


Georgiy Toloknya, chief of the Korean department in the Russian foreign ministry, stated that 'relations between Russia and North Korea have developed in a complicated manner in 1992' ('Foreign Ministry Official Discusses ROK, DPRK', Radio Moscow, 1 January 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-002, 2 January 1993, p. 13). Russian deputy foreign minister also stated that 'the relations between Russia and North Korea have been complex and painful in 1993' ('Deputy Foreign Minister, [Yakovlev, in charge of Korean affairs], Interviewed on Ties to Korea', Radio Moscow, 20 January 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-014, 21 January 1994, p. 20).

In February 1993, Russian deputy foreign minister visited North Korea. The purpose of both these visits was to discuss important bilateral issues between the two sides, especially the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, together with the issue of North Korean nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
have the political clout to push through a pro-South Korean policy. In the face of resistance and obstruction from the conservatives, Yeltsin sometimes had to forge compromises with his adversaries so as to build a coalition in support of his reform policies.

B. Reformulating Russia’s New Foreign Policy Consensus Towards the Korean Peninsula? (Dec. 93-Dec. 95): Yeltsin Associated with More Conservatives After the December 1993 Russian Election

Foreign policy problems as much played a very limited in Russia’s 1993 pre-election campaign, but the election results created a problem for the West’s foreign-policy practitioners and analysts. In the elections, the majority of Russian citizens, broadly speaking, rejected the option of moving Russia toward democracy and a market economy that had been suggested by the Gaidar government’s American advisors and by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Rejecting, on the basis of the first two years’ results, the Western model for Russia’s development, one-fourth of the electorate in effect swung toward a nationalistic, neo-imperial model that existed mainly at the emotional level.\(^{92}\)

Ultimately, this strong showing of the former communists and ultranationalists in the December 1993 parliamentary elections pushed Yeltsin’s government in a more assertive and nationalistic foreign policy direction.\(^{93}\) This

\(^{92}\) Izvestia, 30 December 1993, p. 4. However, Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev described the December 1993 parliamentary election results as a ‘success’ - not a ‘victory’ for Zhirinovsky. According to Kozyrev, the election result could not fundamentally alter Russia’s foreign policy (Nezavisimaja gazeta, 17 December 1993, p.1).

meant, in many respects, that election issues provided the Yeltsin leadership with the basis for a reconsideration of Russia's foreign policy agenda because the opposition used the foreign policy issue to attack President's reform-minded administration and its pro-Western and pro-South Korean policy. Thus, after the December 1993 election, which was a success for nationalists and communists, they had to compromise to a greater extent with the demands of the opposition.94

From this perspective, a new Russian foreign policy began to be implemented that was in line with the combined views of reformers and conservatives. As a result, Yeltsin's new policy towards the Korean peninsula also became a function of the delicate balance between the need to survive as a politician and the desire to implement reform policies. In general, the two groups (reformers and conservatives) within the Russian leadership had incompatible views and interests in the Korean peninsula. On the one hand, the reformers viewed Russian-South Korean relations in the context of the search for a new partnership relationship in the post-Soviet era. On the other hand, the conservatives emphasised the need to revive the country's relations with North Korea. Nevertheless, the two groups had common views and goals in relations to the Korean peninsula, particularly the wish to maximise national interests in the region (both in South and North Korea).

A new consensus on Russia's Korean policy started to emerge in favour of a more 'balanced' stance. This demonstrated that Russia attempted to reformulate its Korean policy in line with its new domestic environment and in

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94 The re-emergence of Russian nationalistic and revisionist attitudes must be seen against background of the 'crisis of identity' of the Russian nation up to and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. While the lack of democratic tradition should not be exaggerated, Russian political culture was still more than capable of preventing a consolidation of the foreign policy of modernisation and moderation represented by the wing of Kozyrev (Matte Skak, 'Post-Communist Foreign Policies: Initial Observations', Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 27, no. 3, 1992, p. 295).
the context of the new world order after the December 1993 elections.\textsuperscript{95} Thus, the restoration of relations with North Korea, including economic ties, started to fit into the political views of the people who played a key role in Russia.\textsuperscript{96}

In these circumstances, Russia resumed its attempt to improve relations with North Korea whilst abandoning a pro-South Korean policy. This indicated that Yeltsin could not succeed in isolating the conservatives’ influence in foreign policy by radically restructuring the Russian foreign policy-making process in the post-Soviet era. Yet, Yeltsin had not successfully consolidated his power by October 1993 and began to lose control of his reform-minded policy.\textsuperscript{97} Thereafter, the President had to accommodate the policies of conservatives, not only for domestic policy reasons, but also for foreign policy reasons.

The principal reason for this trend was that the Russian leadership started to re-realise the importance of the North Korean factor in its foreign policy. Indeed, it should be noted that during the years of the pro-South Korean stance (Dec. 91-Dec. 93) some factions within the Russian leadership had maintained the view that there was no need to tilt towards South Korea at the expense of North Korea.\textsuperscript{98} As a result, for example, by the end of 1993 and 1994, as international tension over North Korea’s nuclear developments mounted, As Charles Ziegler pointed out, ‘Russia now must balance not only North and South Korea, but also the liberal and conservative forces within Russia’ (Charles E. Ziegler, ‘Russia and the Korean Peninsula: New Directions in Moscow’s Asia Policy?’, Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 43, no. 6, 1996, p. 5).

For instance, the Russian-North Korea Friendship and Cultural Cooperation Association, set up in April 1993, supported Pyongyang’s domestic and foreign policy line (North Korea News, no. 680, 26 April 1993, p. 6).


For example, at the end of summer 1992, just before Yeltsin’s scheduled visit to South Korea, the Russian foreign ministry had started to advance the thesis that ‘Moscow should seek more balanced relations with South and North Korea as saying that: ‘Russia will carry out an “active” and “well-balanced” policy toward South and North Korea, that is, the Korean peninsula. From now on these relations will be maintained on a non-ideological basis and on the basis of normal contacts between
Russia clearly attempted to adopt a more balanced dual policy towards the Korean peninsula.99

Russia was searching for constructive and mutually complementary partnership relations with South Korea during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). By and large, Russia and South Korea during this period involved frequent contacts in most fields. There were frequent high-ranking political, military and economic contacts between the two sides, which included the second Russian-South Korean summit in Moscow in June 1994. In the field of economic relations, despite several unsettled problems, the two sides continued to show an interest in developing trade and economic cooperation and concluded many economic agreements. As regards military cooperation, there were remarkable developments between the two sides.

Nevertheless, relations between the two sides were not entirely stable during this period. One good example of this was the sudden postponement of the Russian side's visit to South Korea in May 1994.100 Moreover, it should be also noted that this was a time of acute crisis in North Korea and Russia's proposal for an international conference was rejected immediately. (See Chapter 5.)

For the South Korean side, the political value of Russia had been decreasing given the latter's internal instability and weakening international position, especially over the North Korean nuclear issue. In the meantime, for the Russian side, the rejection of its proposed international conference by South Korea greatly affected its Korean policy direction. Furthermore, Russia was

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99 For example, in July 1994, Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev stated that 'it is absolutely clear that our neighbours, North Korea, need a certain amount of time, and we are hoping for the continuation and development of the same `smooth and balanced' relationship [with North Korea] which we had before and which, I am confident, we will continue to have with that country' ('Kozyrev Has Confidence in Continued DPRK Relations', Itar-Tass, 11 July 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-132, 11 July 1994, p. 11).

100 In May 1994, the first session of the joint intergovernmental Russian-South Korean economic, scientific and technical commission session, planned to open in Seoul, was postponed at the very last moment. See Izvestiia, 24 May 1994, p. 4; and 'ROK-Russian Economic Commission Session Postponed', Itar-Tass, 19 May 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-098, 20 May 1994, p. 8.
very uncooperative when asked to abrogate the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty by the South Korean side during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). The most problematic issue for economic relations was still Russia's inability to repay loans made by South Korea to the former Soviet Union and to Russia. In the field of military cooperation, there was obviously a limited boundary to progress, although the two sides made significant advances in their military relations.

By contrast, Russia was searching for a normalisation with North Korea and the Russian leadership tried to establish a consensus towards North Korea during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). As a result, there were certain signs of an improvement in Russian-North Korean relations including some significant political and economic contacts between the two sides.101 This demonstrated that a new component of bilateral relations was added with the establishment of contacts between some Russian communist and nationalist groups and the North Korean ruling party (WPK), especially after the death of Kim Il-sung in the middle of 1994. Russia also tried to re-establish economic ties with North Korea during this period. In military relations, to a certain degree, the two sides sought to revive relations. In this respect, Russia started to sell its defensive weapons to North Korea.

Nevertheless, there were no concrete results in Russian-North Korean relations during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). The two sides could not eliminate their fundamental differences of approach to key issues such as the North Korean nuclear problem and the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty issue. Moreover, the official visit to Russia by the South Korean President in June 1994 drew further attention to the problem of Russia's

101 In particular, it should be noted that after the death of Kim Il-sung in July 1994, Russia tried to rebuild its previously good relations with Kim Jong-il's regime. For instance, in July 1995, Russian deputy foreign minister Aleksandr Panov stated that 'relations were normal in the period after the death of North Korean President Kim Il-sung' ('Spokesman: DPRK Intervention Clause under Discussion', Itar-Tass, 25 July 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-142, 25 July 1995, p. 11).
relations with North Korea. In trade relations with the two sides, there was still the question of North Korea’s debts to Russia.


The results of the December 1995 parliamentary election did have foreign policy consequences, although the elections (as before) mainly revolved around domestic economic and social issues. To a large extent, the results of the December 1995 parliamentary election confirmed the continuing strength of the conservative-nationalists who had constantly rebuked the Yeltsin administration for its emasculated foreign policy.

In particular, the appointment of Primakov and Lebed as Russian foreign minister and Security Council Secretary, respectively, in early 1996 were indicative of a more pragmatic and assertive Russian foreign policy direction. Kozyrev’s replacement by former director of the Foreign Intelligence Service Yevgeny Primakov as foreign minister was a sign of the new Russian foreign policy consensus, which had reconciled the competing arguments of Atlanticist and Eurasianists. Primakov’s consensus foreign policy held that Russia should cooperate with the West where appropriate, while seeking a selective,...

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103 The December 1995 election represented a collective decision as to whether to continue on the path of gradual moves towards a market economy and at least a partially democratic political system, or whether to move toward aggressive imperialism as desired by the more extreme nationalist elements within Russian politics, or to attempt to return to the past, as represented by one of the communist successor parties. Although the results of the elections did not lead to any dramatic change of political direction for Russia, the very fact that the campaign took place at all had some important political consequences. In particular, there was a change in the ‘political balance’ of the executive branch. For an account of December 1995 parliamentary election, see Stephen White, “The 1995 Elections to the Russian State Duma”, The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 13, no. 1, 1997, pp. 107-114; Matthew Wyman, “The Russian Elections of 1995 and 1996”, Electoral Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, 1997, pp. 79-86; and Stephen White, Matthew Wyman and Sarah Oates, ‘Parties and Voters in the 1995 Russian Duma Elections’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 49, no. 5, 1997, pp. 767-798.

104 For example, the Chechen crisis which began in early December 1994 had a major role in reformulating its foreign policy. The costs of Chechnya invasion weigh heavily on an already-fragile Russian political and economic system, and foreign policy as well. For the background necessary to understand the reasons for the Russian military invasion of Chechnya in December 1994, see John Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
pragmatic and 'equal' partnership. Yeltsin's decision to appoint Primakov to the post of Russian foreign minister was equally a symbol of the foreign-policy shift away from the heady idealism of the early 1990s toward a stance rooted in the Russian great-power tradition.

This consensus was a result of the internal power consolidation and a reassessment of Russia's relationship with other countries, especially with the West. Indeed, through the December 1995 parliamentary election, a firmer consensus had emerged among foreign policy cognoscenti that Russia should no longer tailor its behaviour to US preferences and that Russia's status as a great power also had to be restored on the Korean peninsula.

In these circumstances, the Russian leadership made a more concerted effort to improve relations with North Korea. Pro-North Korean forces came to the fore after the December 1995 parliamentary election. Indeed, across a broad spectrum of society, there was a feeling that improved relations with North Korea would serve to restore Russia's weakened position on the Korean peninsula. These changes led to a more open and active implementation of Russia's relations with North Korea. Furthermore, for the forthcoming Russian presidential election in the middle of 1996, the Russian leadership also needed to demonstrate its good relations with previous allies such as North

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105 For the debate of the need of more assertive foreign policy in Russia, for example, see Pravda, 5 March 1996, p. 3.
106 Primakov's views to the current [international] issues, see Izvestiia, 6 March 1996, p. 3.
108 It should be noted that the pro-North Korean lobby had existed in Russia even in the heyday of Russia-South Korean relations (1991-93). They just became more effective and vociferous after the election.
Korea to maintain its major power status in Northeast Asia. In other words, to win the presidential election each Russian candidate had among other things to emphasise good relations with countries where the former Soviet Union had exercised its superpower status during the Soviet era. Finally, Russia started to undertake a full-scale ‘pragmatic’ Korean policy, which led to a more activist approach to the restoration of relations with North Korea without imperilling Russia’s successfully developing relationship with South Korea.109

Russia attempted to unfold a ‘new page’ of relations with North Korea during this period (Dec. 95-Jul. 96). Russian-North Korean relations involved more active high-level political contacts. For the economic relations between the two sides, one of the main reasons for Russia’s decision to expand economic cooperation with North Korea was related to the progress being made by China in developing its own economic relations with North Korea.110 Unlike previous years, ideological concerns no longer presented an insurmountable barrier to relations.

Nevertheless, it was not likely that Russia and North Korea could restore their relations to the level they had attained during the Soviet era. This demonstrated that the basic linkage between the two sides ended with the collapse of former Soviet Union (from this time forward Russia was pursuing a market economy and North Korea was not). Moreover, the nature of the political system and worldview in each country was very different in the post-Soviet era. The two sides also had different positions on South Korea and the

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109 Valentin Moiseev, deputy director of the first Asian department of the Russian foreign ministry, stated that ‘the tendency for a complete restoration of ties [Russian-North Korean] has been bolstered since the December 1995 Russian parliamentary election and the appointment of Primakov as a Russian foreign minister in early 1996’ (Valentin Moiseev, ‘On the Korean Settlement’, International Affairs [Moscow], vol. 43, no. 3, 1997, p. 67).

110 Whereas trade with Russia accounted for 50% of Pyongyang’s foreign trade before 1990, in 1995 it dropped to a minimum, amounting for just SUS 100 million. Outmanoeuvring Russia, China became North Korea’s main trading partner. China accounted for 45% of North Korean trade (Moskovskie novosti, no. 14, 7-14 April, 1996, p. 13).
US in Northeast Asia. Most importantly, the North Korean nuclear issue, the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty issue and North Korea’s economic debts to Russia, which were the most important pending issues in their relations, were still the biggest obstacles to enhancing their relations.

In the meantime, Russian-South Korean relations proved to be an ‘uneasy partnership’ during this period (Dec. 95-Jul. 96). Rather, relations between Russia and South Korea were undergoing an endurance test during this period. South Korea displayed its dissatisfaction with Russia’s policy of expanding and raising the level of political, military, economic and cultural ties with North Korea. Their relations were greatly constrained by Russia’s exclusion from an international conference by the US and South Korean-led ‘four-party talks’.

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11 For example, theoretically, at least, South Korea and the US were not regarded as ‘enemies’ of Russia in the post-Soviet era. But, North Korea still regarded them as their first imaginary enemies.
12 Kim Young-sam and Bill Clinton put forward a four-party (two Koreas, China and the US) peace proposal on 16 April 1996. For the details of this, see Chapter 6.4.
Chapter 3


3.1. In Search of a Strategic/Military Alliance? (1961-91)

The 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, which included only six articles and a preamble, referring both to the ‘principles of socialist internationalism’ and to the ‘aims and principles of the United Nations Organisation’, was signed in Moscow on 6 July 1961 and came into force on 10 September 1961.¹

For the background to the conclusion of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty three significant factors, at least, should be considered. First, the Treaty was mainly designed to act against both the US and South Korea on the Korean peninsula in Northeast Asia. By concluding the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, the Soviet Union and North Korea officially strengthened their ties based on a political friendship treaty in order to oppose

the US and South Korea, which themselves had concluded a Mutual Defence Treaty on 1 October 1953.2

Secondly, the Soviet Union attempted to make North Korea remain in a neutral position between the Soviet Union and China in Northeast Asia. This indicated that, for the Soviet side, the conclusion of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty aimed at strengthening not only Soviet-North Korean relations, but also at increasing the Soviet Union’s influence over China.3

Thirdly, one of the important motives for the North Korean side to conclude the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty was to secure Soviet aid in case the war (or warlike) situation in order to communise South Korea by force. In this context, two important events which provoked North Korea’s need to ensure a continual inflow of Soviet aid from the late 1950s to the early 1960s should be mentioned: (1) South Korea’s 5.16 (16 May 1961) Revolution;4 and (2) the Sino-Soviet dispute.5

The conclusion of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty had an additional significance in the politics of Northeast Asia, not to mention Soviet-

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2 The Mutual Defence Treaty between the US and South Korea came into force on 17 November 1954 with the exchange of the instruments of ratification at Washington, D.C, in accordance with Article 5. The US ratified the above-mentioned treaty subject to the following understanding: ‘it is the understanding of the US that neither party is obligated, under Article 3 of the above Treaty, to come to the aid of the other except in case of an external armed attack against such party; nor shall anything in the present Treaty be construed as requiring the US to give assistance to South Korea except in the event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognised by the US as lawfully brought under the administrative control of South Korea’. See Appendix 2.

3 The Soviet Union’s hegemonic position was unchallenged in North Korea until the middle of the 1950s. However, after the 20th Party Congress (1956) and de-Stalinisation in the second half of 1950s, North Korea gradually started to tilt towards China. For the details of this, see Chapter 2.

4 On the Korean peninsula, the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty was also largely influenced by the South Korean situation at that time, namely, by ‘the seizure of power by the military’ headed by the General Park Chung-hee on 16 May 1961. Kim Il-sung found himself in need of assurances by the Soviet Union in his confrontation with South Korea.

5 North Korea was also influenced by the Sino-Soviet dispute over the conclusion of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. By concluding the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, North Korea was able to keep on receiving both Soviet and Chinese aid and at the same time, to a certain extent, free itself both from Soviet and Chinese control. In other words, this treaty gave Kim Il-sung a certain amount of autonomy to manoeuvre between the Soviet Union and China. It must be noted that the treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between China and North Korea was also signed several days after the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. For a more detailed explanation of North Korea’s position in the Sino-Soviet disputes, see Chin O. Chung, Pyongyang between Peking and Moscow: North Korea’s Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958-
North Korean bilateral relations. The Korean peninsula had finally become the centre of the Cold War in Northeast Asia. In other words, the separation of the Korean peninsula into the two states (South and North) by the US and the Soviet Union in late 1940s was the initial ‘symbol’ of the spreading of the Cold War to Northeast Asia. In the subsequent ten years, the conclusion of military friendship treaties with both the US and the Soviet Union, respectively in 1953 and 1961, made the Korean peninsula a ‘hot bed’ of the Cold War in Northeast Asia.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that the conclusion of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty did not entirely change the previous Soviet ‘status quo’ (or defensive) policy towards the Korean peninsula. Rather, the conclusion of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty could be described as Soviet’s ‘less status quo’ policy towards the Korean peninsula mainly due to a re-evaluation of North Korea’s strategic and ideological importance in the region.

In this point, it should be mentioned that Soviet relations with North Korea had not always been good, although the Soviet Union mainly supported North Korea’s position against the US and South Korea based on the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty during the Cold War period (up to 1985). Rather, the state of the relationship fluctuated always during the Soviet period, reaching its lowest point after the Soviet Union normalised its relations with South Korea in 1990. Ultimately, this represented a rather ‘passive’

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6 For the details of this, see Chapter 2.

7 The Soviet Union had shown little interest in the Korean peninsula. Instead, the Soviet Union devoted more attention to China and Japan in the context of Northeast Asian affairs. Thus, Soviet policy towards the Korean peninsula was rather subordinate to its policies toward China, Japan and the US until the late 1980s. The Soviet strategies on the Korean peninsula should be viewed in the context of other Soviet commitments and concerns in Northeast Asia, whilst emphasising China, Japan and the US powers in Northeast Asia. Even Soviet interests in North Korea were secondary for the Soviet leadership in its foreign policy agenda. Accordingly, the Soviet Union seemed to have no clear design (or idea) for the Korean peninsula. Instead, it pursued an ill-defined ‘defensive’ policy (or ‘wait and see’ policy), attempting to keep some influence over Korea while denying complete control over the peninsula to any one Great Power and particular, the US.
involvement on the Soviet Union’s part on the Korean peninsula against the US and South Korea.

It is important to identify four issues when explaining the lack of activity in Soviet-North Korean relations during this period (1945-85). First, in the early 1960s, the effects of ideological differences between the two sides and the de-Stalinisation that took place after the 20th CPSU Party Congress did not help either country promote friendly allied relations. As a result, instead, the North Korean leadership started to draw closer to the Chinese and expressed solidarity with China.

Secondly, the Soviet Union pursued a ‘limited’ military involvement strategy in the face of the unexpected situation in relation to the US on the Korean peninsula in the second half of 1960s. The Soviet Union attempted to make it clear that the only possible cause for military involvement on the Korea peninsula would be all-out and unprovoked armed aggression against North Korea. Such an explicit interpretation was unilaterally given by the Soviet Union to North Korea in 1968 after North Korea had seized the US ship ‘Pueblo’. That incident clearly proved to the Soviet leadership that it could not rely on North Korea in politically delicate situations and prompted it to work out contingency plans for several scenarios in relation to the possible emergence of armed hostilities on the Korean peninsula, all of which would exclude the automatic involvement of the Soviet Union on the basis of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty.

North Korea reconsidered its relations with the Soviet Union at the end of 1964 after Khrushchev’s demise because North Korea’s open rebellion immediately made the Soviet Union cut its economic and military aid to North Korea.


At the time of the Pueblo incident, the Soviet Union was engaged in developing a dialogue with the US on various questions of mutual concern— nota billy, Vietnam, the Middle East and arms limitations. The meeting was held between Soviet Premier Kosygin and the US President Johnson at New Jersey in June 1967. Plans were being developed for a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. These steps undoubtedly raised the hopes of Soviet leaders that they might be able to divert some of their limited resources into non-military areas and move forward with economic development (Donald Zagoria and Janet Zagoria,
Thirdly, there was North Korea's serious challenge to the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty (or to the Soviet Union itself) after the announcement that it had joined the 'non-aligned movement' in the first half of the 1970s. To a large extent, this could be understood as a measure of North Korea's discontent with the Soviet policy because the latter did not actively support North Korea's position against the US and South Korea on the Korean peninsula in the second half of the 1960s. Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union took a negative view of North Korea's intention to join the non-aligned movement.

Fourthly, there was a further disagreement over Korean unification between the Soviet Union and North Korea in the middle of the 1970s. The Soviet Union was strongly against the idea of a 'Vietnam-style' solution to Korean unification, which was pushed by Kim Il-sung after the fall of Saigon in the middle of the 1970s. The 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty implied the desirability of unification under North Korea's guidance and covertly implied that there would be no objections on the Soviet part should events take this course. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union preferred peaceful methods based on Article 5 of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty.

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11 It should be also noted that, after the signing of the North-South Korean Joint Statement on 4 July 1972, North Korea made pronouncements about the need to reenounce the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty as unnecessary considering the new situation on the Korean peninsula and the international environment. The Soviet Union was lukewarm about the proposal, suggesting official discussions should be held (Alexander Zhebin, 'Russia and North Korea: an Emerging Uneasy Partnership', Asian Survey, vol. 35, no. 8, 1995, p. 727).

12 North Korea, Vietnam, Angola and the PLO were all admitted to the non-aligned movement at the 1976 Colombo summit. The Soviet Union has traditionally been critical of links between Western states/political groups and the non-aligned movement, fearing that such links might dilute the anti-Western, anti-colonial thrust of the non-aligned and suggest or support alternative developmental patterns to those of the 'non-capitalist path' or 'socialist orientation'. Soviet officials had supported neutralism as a foreign policy course since the late 1950s, but initially they were ambivalent in their responses to the non-aligned movement. In early 1960s the meetings of the non-aligned states had to compete with the Afro-Asian movement for legitimacy in representing Third World views. Another factor which contributed to Soviet reluctance to encourage multilateral diplomacy based on non-alignment was the association of this concept or policy with Yugoslavia (Roy Allison, The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment in the Third World [Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988] pp. 32, 53 and 56).
Those examples clearly indicated that the Soviet Union was reluctant to support any kind of ‘active’ military operation by North Korea on the basis of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty.14

At this point, it is worth noting that ‘Soviet aid’15 to North Korea had become the barometer of Soviet-North Korean relations.16 In other words, the Soviet Union gradually cut its aid to North Korea when the North Korean leadership did not have good relations with their Soviet counterparts. Simultaneously, the cutting of Soviet aid was one of the most important factors that prompted North Korea to reconsider its relations with the Soviet Union.

As Figure 3.1 indicates, Soviet trade with North Korea had been increasing after the conclusion of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty.

Entering the 1980s, however, relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea were notably improving on the basis of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. Indeed, it could be argued that relations in the early 1980s - including the initial period of Gorbachev’s leadership - were at their closest since the 1945-53 period.\footnote{Some scholars define this period (early 1980s) as the end of the détente (or New Cold War), see Stephen Goode, \textit{The End of Détente?: US-Soviet Relations} (New York: Watts, 1981).}

As regards the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, Gorbachev’s North Korean policy could be divided into the following three stages. Relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea were tightened in the search for a ‘new higher level’ of cooperation on the basis of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty during the early period of Gorbachev’s rule (1985-86). As a result, there were numerous celebratory events and high-ranking political contacts between the Soviet Union and North Korea to mark the 24\textsuperscript{th} (1985) and 25\textsuperscript{th} (1986) anniversaries of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty.\footnote{For example, around the 25\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, Andrei Gromyko, member of the CPSU CC Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidency and L. N. Zaykov, member of the CPSU CC Politburo and secretary of the CPSU CC stated that ‘the Soviet Union, guided by the 27th CPSU Congress (1986) decision, would continue to do everything necessary for the strengthening of friendship and cooperation with North Korea’.}
In particular, it should be noted that the goodwill visits of military ships and aircraft on this occasion were designed to underline the significance of the military component of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty.

During the late 1980s (1988-89) the Soviet Union started to look for 'new reciprocal' forms of cooperation with North Korea, although it still emphasised its ties with North Korea on the basis of 'socialist internationalism'. Ironically, the 19th Party Conference, which heralded a new stage of the Soviet reform process and became the guiding direction of de-ideologisation [de-militarisation and humanisation of international relations] of Soviet foreign policy, was held around the 27th anniversary of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty in July 1988. This soon resulted in rapidly deteriorating relations between the two sides on the basis of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking, which emphasised relations with South Korea. As a result, there were no particularly high-level political contacts between the two sides on the occasion of the 27th anniversary, although there were still a number of celebratory events.

During the period of 1990-91, the Soviet Union tried to make an effort to look for a 'responsible' stage of relations with North Korea concerning the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. In reality, New Political Thinking and rapprochement with South Korea ruled out any kind of 'strategic
alliance with North Korea on the basis of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. Furthermore, a re-examination of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty was inevitable following the Soviet Union’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea in September 1990, theoretically at least. This meant that the Soviet Union had to start seriously reviewing the contents of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, shifting the emphasis from socialist internationalism to national interests based on its reform policies and New Political Thinking. Nevertheless, Gorbachev’s North Korean policy during the period of 1990-91 attempted to maintain Soviet influence over that country while retaining the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, which was based on ideological ties.

Changes in Soviet aid to North Korea during the Gorbachev era should also be considered when understanding their relations. For instance, following Kim Il-sung’s 1984 and 1986 visits to Moscow, the Soviet Union provided North Korea with advanced fighter aircraft, gunships and nuclear technology for power generation. In return for this, the Soviet Union received access to North Korean ports and the right to use North Korean airspace for reconnaissance between the Far East and Vietnam.

The Soviet Union also increased its economic aid to North Korea during the early period of Gorbachev’s leadership. For example, the Soviet Union built 70 industrial projects that produced about 25 per cent of North Korea’s gross output, and the volume of trade also increased from 1987 to 1988. The Soviet Union also accounted for about 60 per cent of North Korea’s foreign trade in 1990.

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22 North Korea emphasised the fulfilment of its responsibilities as stipulated by the treaty, while the Soviet Union pointed out that the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty was based on the existence of the two states on the Korean peninsula (Joachim Glaubitz, ‘The Soviet Union and the Korean peninsula’, Aussenpolitik, vol. 43, no. 1, 1992, pp. 90-91).


However, as Figure 3.2 indicates, trade between the Soviet Union and North Korea was decreasing rapidly and Soviet aid to North Korea nearly stopped after the diplomatic normalisation with South Korea in September 1990.

![Figure 3.2 Soviet Exports to North Korea, 1985-91](image)

*Source: Derived from *Vneshniaia Torgovlia*, various issues.*

As seen above, during the Cold War era (from the end of World War Two up to 1984), the Soviet Union emphasised its relations with North Korea based on the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. Nevertheless, Soviet policy towards the Korean peninsula had never been active because the Soviet Union did not seem to have active goals towards the region. Rather, it had been passive or defensive because of the external factors, especially the US factor.  

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By contrast, during the Gorbachev era, although Soviet-North Korean relations still developed on the basis of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty as the legal foundation of their relations, Soviet policy towards the Korean peninsula had been changed into an active one towards South Korea for the first time on the basis of Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking. Notably, Gorbachev’s new reform policies led to a greater emphasis upon relations with South Korea due to the latter’s expected economic benefits for the Soviet economy. Furthermore, it should be noted that the politics of Northeast Asia had been eventually led by Gorbachev’s active initiatives such as New Political Thinking rather than any other great powers’ initiatives in this region.

3.2. From ‘Special Character’ to ‘Commercial’ Relations Based on Post-Soviet Existing Realities? (Dec. 91-Dec. 93)

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian President Boris Yeltsin attempted to consolidate his political power based on reform policies and at the same time he delineated a pro-South Korean policy towards the Korean peninsula, which was a part of a more generally pro-Western stance in Russian foreign policy.

As a result, high-level political contacts between Russia and North Korea were effectively halted, inter-parliamentary ties were broken, and the exchange of people was minimised except for two important high-ranking Russian officials’ visits to North Korea during the early period of Russian foreign policy (Dec. 91-Dec. 93).\(^{26}\) These were as follows. In January 1992, Igor Rogachev,
special envoy of the President of the Russian Federation, visited North Korea.\textsuperscript{27} Then, in February 1993, Russian deputy foreign minister Georgiy Kunadze visited North Korea.\textsuperscript{28} Not surprisingly, the purpose of these visits was to discuss important bilateral issues between the two sides, especially the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, together with the issue of North Korean nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Russia had to begin re-examining the contents of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93).\textsuperscript{29} Soon, the re-examination of the Treaty became the key issue between the two countries because it embraced all the major political, economic and security aspects of their relations. For this reason, relations between Russia and North Korea were heavily dependent upon a re-examination of the Treaty in the new political and economic circumstances. In other words, this indicated that previous Soviet-allied relations based on the Cold War system had changed into the new relations in the post-Soviet era.\textsuperscript{30}

As a matter of fact, the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty had already become obsolete when the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with South Korea in September 1990. Thus, theoretically, at least, a re-examination of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty was

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\textsuperscript{28} Russia has a unique position and is the successor state to the USSR as a state. A prominent diplomat said that while agreements with North Korea, Iraq and Cuba did not conform to ‘the criteria of expediency’ by which Russia was guided, as the successor state to the USSR, Russia was nonetheless bound to observe existing agreements and treaties with these and other countries (RFE/RL, vol. 1, no. 3, 17 January 1992, p. 63).

\textsuperscript{29} In the post-Soviet era, Russia encountered a quite unprecedented situation in Northeast Asia regarding the Korean issue. Russia had no more allied relations with North Korea while normalising its relationship with South Korea, although the latter still had a close relationship with the US based on the Cold War system in the post-Soviet era. This meant that Russia had to upgrade its relations with the
inevitable before the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 because the Treaty was mainly directed against South Korea and the US on the Korean peninsula. In other words, it was contradictory for the former Soviet Union to normalise its diplomatic relations with South Korea while still adhering to Article 1 of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, which provided for military cooperation in the event of war on the Korean peninsula.

According to Article 6 of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, the former Soviet Union should have informed North Korea of its intention to reconsider the Treaty by July 1990 if it wanted to change its content. However, during the late Soviet period, due to the lack of a declared intention by the Soviet side to reconsider the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty by this date (July 1990), it was renewed automatically up to 1995, when it had to be abrogated or extended for a further five years.

There appear to be two main reasons for the Russian leadership's decision to re-examine the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93). First, Russia was no longer interested in maintaining an alliance relationship with North Korea in the post-Soviet era because it sought to maximise its basic national interests which harnessed democratic means to its foreign policy objectives: (1) to ensure the external conditions for reform; and (2) to gain entry into the world community, both of which were contradictory to the contents of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. In some respects, this also meant that Russia was no longer able to supply any kind of bilateral aid to North Korea in an allied relationship on the

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two Koreas while the two countries were still caught up in the Cold War atmosphere in the post-Soviet era.

31 The contents of Article 6 of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty are as follows: 'The Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which shall take place at Pyongyang. This Treaty shall remain in force for ten years. If neither of the Contracting Parties gives notice one year before the expiration of the said period that it wishes to denounce the Treaty, it shall remain in force for the succeeding five years and shall thereafter continue in force in accordance with this provision' (Pravda, 7 July 1961, p. 1).


Secondly, the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty became a serious obstacle to improved relations with South Korea in the post-Soviet era. Indeed, Russia had to re-examine the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty not only in terms of its relations with North Korea, but also its relations with South Korea, which had become one of the most important states in Northeast Asia. In this regard, Russia even had faced sustained South Korean pressure, which demanded that Russia renounce the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty as a pre-condition for the conclusion of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty that was signed in 1992, together with expansion of the economic relationship which included Russia’s debts to South Korea. (See Chapter 4.)

In particular, it should be emphasised that Article 1 of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, which stated that ‘should either of the Contracting Parties suffer armed attack by any State or coalition of States and thus find itself in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal’, became a crucial disputed point for reinterpretation among the Russian leadership.

In this respect, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the reform-minded Russian leadership tried to abrogate or revise parts of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, stating that they would not renew it and would only support North Korea against an unprovoked attack, which was a most unlikely scenario. Instead, they proposed a softening of security obligations to North Korea, limiting them to the case of an unprovoked attack from outside. Simultaneously, they argued that military relations (both cooperation and assistance) with North Korea which were previously of a ‘special character’ would come to an end with the move to a ‘commercial basis’ in the post-Soviet

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For a more detailed analysis of Russia’s debts to South Korea, see Sang-moon Hahn and Joon-hwan Im, Debt Management and the Russian Debt Problem (Seoul: Korea Institute of Finance, 1996).
In November 1992, Yeltsin, on a visit to Seoul, clearly expressed the view that the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty needed to be either cancelled completely or drastically revised. In February 1993, Russian deputy foreign minister Georgiy Kunadze also stated that "...Russia and North Korea agreed that the 1961 Treaty should be changed according to existing realities".

One of the main reasons for Yeltsin and the reform-minded Russian leadership to support the abrogation or modification of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty was that they desperately needed to receive economic assistance from South Korea in order to support their own domestic reform programmes. As a matter of fact, this was the basic conception of the early Russian foreign policy direction not only towards the Korean peninsula, but also towards other regions of the world.

In general, their basic view of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty was as follows: "Today's Russian-North Korean relations are passing through a complicated stage. Russia is trying to develop Russian-North Korean relations so they can be maintained on the basis of the freedom of selection and complete equality, in conformity with the national interests of each side, and on the basis of the principle of mutual interests of both sides". In this point, surprisingly, it should be mentioned here that even the Russian parliament would reject clauses in the Moscow-Pyongyang alliance treaty that contradicted

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34 For example, on 19 May 1992, speaking about Russian-North Korean relations in South Korea, the Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev stated that "... as a legal successor to the former Soviet Union, Russia recognises all international treaties. However, it is perfectly obvious that the present [1961] treaty with North Korea was signed in somewhat different conditions and is overloaded with ideological terminology and at present, naturally, should be perceived in line with the current state of affairs" ("Kozyrev Gives News Conference on ROK Trip", Tass, 19 March 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-055, 20 March 1992, p. 31). Regarding military cooperation on the basis of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, foreign minister Kozyrev declared in the spring of 1992 that Russia would stop all military cooperation with the North and put pressure on it to drop its nuclear plans. Furthermore, asked about military deliveries to North Korea by the CIS Chief of Staff Viktor Samsonov stated that "till 1990 deliveries were made either gratis or in return for Korean raw materials and goods. Such deliveries are now made only along the state line in the framework of the conversion of the military-industrial complex and only on a "commercial basis"" ("Chief of Staff Samsonov Meets Kim Il-sung", Tass, 3 March 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-043, 4 March 1992, p. 17).


Moscow-Seoul amity. Meeting Kim Dae-jung, leader of South Korea’s main opposition Democratic Party, parliament chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov stated that he had told the parliament’s intention to the North Korean ambassador to Moscow shortly after he returned from a visit to South Korea the previous year (1991). The Russian parliament, which was responsible for setting foreign policies and implementing them, had already ordered the Russian foreign ministry to look into clauses apt to cause trouble in Seoul-Moscow relations, Khasbulatov said.\(^3\) Khasbulatov’s remarks clearly implied that the Russian parliament would abrogate or revise parts of its 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. In the meantime, for the South Korean side, the abrogation of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty would have meant that South Korea would predominate over North Korea on the Korean peninsula in the post-Soviet era.\(^3\)

However, the reform-minded Russian leadership’s view of the new interpretation of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty was not easy to put into practice immediately. Under the terms of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty it could be renounced, for all practical purposes, only at the end of a regular five-year extension - i.e., in 1995. Furthermore, those members of the Russian leadership that supported the North Korean side opposed a pro-South Korean stance in the revision of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty.

For example, in an interview an official from the Far Eastern department of the Russian foreign ministry was reported to have stated that ‘as a legal successor of the Soviet Union, Russia would observe the provisions of all formerly signed treaties, including the Soviet-North Korean Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of 1961. Such was the official


\(^3\) In particular, South Korea was concerned about Article 1 of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, which contained the military involvement while growing tension of the North Korea’s nuclear crisis during this period. For a more detailed account of this, see Chapter 5.
position of the Russian government... of course, the Treaty was signed over 30 years ago and was out of date, having clauses which had to be made more specific... negotiations were needed to sort it out. Nobody seemed to be in a hurry, however, which meant the Treaty would not be revised in the near future'. On 7 July 1992, on the 31st anniversary of the conclusion of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi was in the North Korean embassy to confirm the Russian pledges in respect of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. On 10 July 1992, at a reception on the anniversary of the conclusion of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty in the North Korean embassy, Rutskoi and Russian deputy foreign minister Kunadze assured the ambassador that the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, which had been concluded at a time when both states belonged to the same 'peace camp' and adhered to the principles of 'socialist internationalism', remained in force for present-day Russia. Kunadze, added that 'the 1961 Treaty contains certain wording that is archaic from today's position, but the main thing for us is not this wording but the essence. A selective approach to this legacy is not possible. We have accepted it the way it was, and we intend to fulfil the commitments stemming from it. This applies also to the treaty with North Korea... We believe that the treaty makes an effective contribution to the cause of stability. Consequently, it benefits not only our two countries but also all states which seek to eliminate the hotbed of tension which still exists in this region even after the end of the Cold War. I believe that the Treaty must be regarded as a constituent part of the legal context which also includes the treaties concluded by South Korea'. On 28 July 1992, the Russian foreign ministry even stated that 'Russia is observing all the Soviet Union's obligations as regards international treaties and agreements.'

Needless to say, this also applies to the said treaty with North Korea, which retains all its force and is still an important element in the military and economic stability on the Korean peninsula. On 5 January 1993, Russian ambassador to South Korea Aleksandr Panov stated that ‘there will be no revisions in the interpretation of the treaty for the time being. There will be no additional revisions in the interpretation of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty for the time being to become a partner. I believe this treaty to some extent helps to stabilise the situation in this region’.

Those who tried to defend the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty wanted to maintain its advantages in North Korea mainly because of the latter’s strategic importance to Russia’s security (rather than economic interests). For this reason, many figures among the Russian leadership seemed to resent pressure from South Korea which demanded that Russia renounce its treaty with North Korea. Nevertheless, it was true that the Russian leadership (even those who wished to keep the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty) unilaterally renounced the defence [military] assistance clauses of the Treaty.

In the meantime, North Korea even accused Russia of violating the Treaty while insisting on an alternative consideration of this treaty. This implied that

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43 **The Korea Herald** (Seoul), 5 January 1993, pp. 2 and 5.
44 For example, already in July 1992, within the Russian foreign ministry the view was expressed that Russia as a great power should not bow to South Korean demands concerning its relationship with North Korea (**Izvestia**, 31 July 1992, p. 6). On 1 August 1992, a Russian foreign ministry diplomat stated that ‘attempts from whatever quarter to dictate to Russia how to organise its relations with other countries are unacceptable to us...we did it ourselves, deliberately; nobody pressured us’ (**Izvestia**, 1 August 1992, p. 6). On 14 August 1992, Russian deputy foreign minister Georgiy Kunadze stated that ‘...we must strive to preserve and strengthen the good-neighbourliness which is the basis of the 1961 inter-state treaty... as we see, it is a question of unacceptable attempts by certain circles in South Korea to pressure Russia ahead of the Russian president’s visit on the question of our relations with a third country... Russia intends to fulfill the provisions of this important interstate agreement’ (**Izvestia**, 14 August 1992, p. 6).
45 For example, with reference to military cooperation between the two countries, Russian deputy foreign minister Georgiy Kunadze stated that ‘Moscow would not supply Pyongyang with military equipment and special property on credit’ (**Kunadze Comment on DPRK and Japan Ties**, **Interfax**, 3 February 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-023, 4 February 1993, p. 9).
46 However, it should be noted here that North Korea has officially expressed its position on the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty signed between the former Soviet Union and North Korea,
North Korea had a good excuse to observe what was going on over this issue on the Russian side while concealing its intentions about the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty issue in the post-Soviet era. As a matter of fact, for the North Korean side, the existence of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty in the post-Soviet era could be a substantial factor when dealing with other major powers such as China, Japan and the US.47

In any case, nevertheless, it should be noted that the two sides reserved the right to interpret the scope of obligations imposed by it because the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty existed and was in force during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93).

As a result, the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty during this period proved to be a very difficult one for the Russian leadership, which struggled to satisfy the interests of both states. Especially domestically, there was little consensus on the future of the Treaty. There were even very obviously conflicting opinions within the foreign ministry itself about how to develop the Treaty. For example, in July 1992, the Russian foreign ministry continued to regard the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty as active, despite Yeltsin’s and Kozyrev’s intention to abrogate it.48 Furthermore, it should be noted that even several important Russian high-ranking officials often changed their opinions about the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. For example, in August 1992, deputy foreign minister Kunadze stated that ‘Moscow and Pyongyang are long-standing partners in various spheres of human activity. And, we believe that there is no need to saying the treaty is inappropriate under today’s circumstances (‘DPRK Official Says Treaty “Inappropriate”’, Radio Moscow, 21 December: 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-246, 22 December 1992, p. 16.)

47 North Korea’s accommodation to pressures from other major powers has never resulted in passive acquiescence to their demands. In every instance, North Korea has resorted to a policy of positive accommodation in its relations with the two countries. For analysis of North Korea’s accommodation during the Cold War era, see Wayne S. Kiyosaki, North Korea’s Foreign Relations: the Politics of Accommodation, 1945-75 (New York, Washington and London: Praeger Publishers, 1975).

48 The Russian foreign ministry stated that ‘Russia is observing all the USSR’s obligations as regards international treaties and agreements. Needless to say, this also applies to the said treaty with North Korea, which retains all its force and is still an important element in the military and economic stability on the Korean peninsula’ (Izvestia, 28 July 1992, p. 4).
break off our relationship [with North Korea]... we must strive to preserve and strengthen the good-neighbourliness which is the basis of the 1961 inter-state treaty... the treaty corresponds to the UN Charter'. However, in Pyongyang in February 1993 Kunadze as a special representative of the Russia’s president demonstrated his changed views to the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. He stated that ‘Russia has proposed to North Korea that they revise the 1961 treaty in accordance with the UN Charter, and North Korea has not objected to this proposal’.

To a certain extent, such conflicts and contradictions were indicative of a power struggle taking place at the top level of the Russian government over the issue of the Treaty. Ultimately, this lack of consensus, together with the inconsistency within the Russian leadership on the issue of the Treaty, led to Yeltsin’s last minute cancellation (or postponement) of a visit to South Korea scheduled for September 1992.

Other significant bilateral treaties between the two sides during this period were few and less important. In terms of economic relations between the two sides, for example, nine timber production locations in Khabarovsk Krai and four in the Amur Oblast belonging to North Korea would be closed. The decision terminated the agreement between North Korea and the Soviet Union for the procurement and joint processing of timber, and the rehabilitation of

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forests on the territory of the Soviet Union. In the field of military relations, Colonel-General Viktor Samsonov, chief of the general staff of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, signed a military cooperation between the two sides in North Korea in March 1992. A plan for the development of ties between the command of the CIS Armed Forces and North Korea was signed in the course of his visit as well.

As regards Russia's aid to North Korea during this period, Yeltsin intended to cut off all defence assistance and all arms sales to North Korea. As Figure 3.3 indicates, Russia's arms sales to North Korea in the early 1990s were less than 1 per cent of its total sales.

**Figure 3.3 Russian Arms Deliveries, Cumulative Value, 1992-94**


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54 In Seoul in November 1992, Yeltsin stated that 'Russia will discontinue any military assistance to North Korea. We are ready for cooperation in the military-technical field with South Korea' ('No More Military Aid to DPRK', *Itar-Tass*, 19 November 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-224, 19 November 1992, p. 10).
Russian-North Korean trade dropped to roughly $US 500-600 million in 1992 (which was almost the same level as in the 1970s) from $US 2.4 billion in 1990. In 1993, Russian-North Korean trade dropped to $US 130 million. In 1992, Russian Far East trade volume with North Korea was only $US 2.3 million, constituting about 0.1% of the total volume of Russian Far East trade. Furthermore, the problem of North Korea's debt, which was estimated by about $US 3.5 billion, had a major impact on relations between the two countries. In the field of military cooperation, there had been few contacts between the two countries during this period. In effect, military relations with North Korea of a 'special' character came to an end in the post-Soviet era.

One serious question arises at this point. As we have seen, aid was actually the main instrument used to influence North Korea during the Soviet period. In the post-Soviet era, without giving any aid to North Korea, how could Russia, for example, persuade (or influence) it to reconsider its withdrawal from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT)?

Russia had limited resources with which to assist and influence North Korea after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result, North Korea naturally started to focus its attention on the US and other major powers instead of Russia as a source of support and aid in the post-Soviet era. In other words, North Korea started to look to improve relations with other major powers such

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56 The Korea Times (Seoul), 16 March 1995, p. 3.
58 For the discussion about how to return the money that other countries owed Russia including North Korea, see L. Zevia and V. Karpuhin, 'Vseshchënnâ zadolžennost' razvivaushchikhsia stran: finansovyi rezerv dlia rossiiskoi ekonomiki?', Mirovâia ekonomika i mezhunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 8, 1992, pp. 18-26.
59 The head of the first division of the Asia-Pacific department A. Belo argued that 'cooperation in the military field has been completely transferred to a "commercial" basis and North Korea no longer enjoyed preferential terms in acquiring arms. Russia did not transfer offensive weapons to North Korea' (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 9 September 1992, p. 2).
60 It should be noted that Russia has rather been a country that has received substantial economic assistance from the IMF in the post-Soviet era. See Nigel Gould-Davies and Ngaire Woods, Russia and the IMF, International Affairs (London), vol. 75, no. 1, 1999, pp. 1-22. For more detailed account
as the US, Japan and China, although North Korea simultaneously provoked a serious international dispute by withdrawing from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in the first half of the 1990s.

As seen above, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia began seriously re-examining the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty based on the new circumstances of the post-Soviet era. However, on the one hand, there was a lack of consensus, together with the disagreements within the top Russian leadership on the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. On the other hand, unlike the Soviet years, even Russia’s intentions about the conclusion of the new treaty as the basis of the new legal foundation in the post-Soviet era had to be postponed by North Korea. Those [internal and external] reasons eventually hindered Russia from developing new good bilateral relations with North Korea during this early stage of Russian foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula. In other words, those reasons finally led Russia’s foreign policy towards North Korea to be reactive despite its considerable efforts.

3.3. In Search of a New Legal Foundation? (Dec. 93-Dec. 95)
After the December 1993 parliamentary elections, there were certain signs that Russia had vigorously started to restore its previously good bilateral relationship with North Korea.\(^6\) Especially, the Russian leadership intended to

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\(^6\) For example, a goodwill gathering was held at the North Korean embassy in Moscow on 12 January 1994. Members of the Central Committee of the Russia-North Korean Friendship Association, Korean diplomats and reporters were present at the gathering. Polshchekov, chairman of the Russian Association of Veterans of the Korean Liberation War, summed up the association’s work for last year (1993) and explained the schedule of main events for 1994. A work plan for the association was approved (“Goodwill Gathering Held at DPRK Embassy in Moscow”, Radio Moscow, 13 January 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-010, 14 January 1994, p. 40). In the second half of 1994, a delegation of the LDPR by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy arrived in the North Korea. “Zhirinovskiy declared for the strengthening and development of relations between Russia and North Korea (See 'Zhirinovskiy Meets Korean Party Representatives', Itar-Tass, 3 October 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-192, 4 October 1994, p. 4).
establish a dialogue with the new North Korean leader, Kim Jeong-il, after the death of Kim II-sung in the middle of 1994.62

In many respects, this indicated that after the December 1993 parliamentary election, the Russian leadership had to more actively re-examine the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, which became the core issue of their relations, in a bid to safeguard its interests in the Korean peninsula in the post-Soviet era. In other words, the Russian leadership seemed rather passively to re-examine the issue of the Treaty in the light of changes in both internal and external circumstances in the early stage of Russian foreign policy (Dec. 91-Dec. 93).

In these circumstances, the Russian leadership strongly emphasised that the existing 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty was outdated and did not conform with the new reality of Northeast Asia in the post-Soviet era. It hoped to find a ‘new legal foundation’ for its bilateral relations to uphold its interests and strengthen its position on the Korean peninsula.63

There were several important motives for the Russian leadership to take the above position on the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. First, tensions grew over the North Korean nuclear crisis, especially in the first half of 1994 (see Chapter 5), and Article 1 of the Treaty had become an increasingly disputed issue between Russia and the two Koreas. In fact, the

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62 Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev expressed confidence that Russia and North Korea would continue to have ‘smooth and balanced relationship’ and that they would develop it. Asked at a meeting with journalists how the deal of Kim Il-sung might change the situation on the Korean peninsula and bilateral relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, he recalled that Yeltsin ‘has expressed condolences and the wish that the continuity of political dialogue should be preserved... it is absolutely clear that our neighbors, North Korea need a certain amount of time, and we are hoping for the continuation and development of the same smooth and balanced relationship which we had before and which, I am confident, we will continue to have with that country’ (‘Kozyrev Has “Confidence” in Continued DPRK Relations’,itar-Tass, 11 July 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-132, 11 July 1994, p. 11).

63 For example, on 15 September 1995, Segodnja reported that ‘we must start from reality. Russia is not extending the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, while China is preserving a similar treaty with North Korea, and the US, one with South Korea. At the same time, Moscow is preparing to conclude a legal document with North Korea, one which should help lay a new legal foundation for bilateral relations which would help resolve the Korean peninsula’s problems on the basis of a peaceful democratic process. The new treaty, it seems, must fix such basic principles of inter-states relations as mutual respect of sovereignty, non-intervention in one another’s internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit and so forth’ (Segodnja, 15 September 1995, p. 9).

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existing Treaty still provided that in the event of either of the two parties coming under armed attack from outside forces, the other would promptly provide military and other support. For this reason, Russia urgently needed to have grounds for the decision not to help North Korea in the event of war on the Korean peninsula because it strongly wanted to have a peaceful external environment for its domestic reform programmes in Northeast Asia.

Secondly, Russia was no longer indifferent to North Korea’s increasingly improving relations with other major powers in Northeast Asia in the post-Soviet era while it had a reduced role on the Korean peninsula. In other words, basically Russia could not oppose North Korea’s decisions to establish relations with other powers in the region in the post-Soviet era, but at the same time it realised that it needed to maintain its role and influence over North Korea, in whatever form. This clearly indicated that a new international order in Northeast Asia was taking shape after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Thirdly, the Russian leadership had to adopt a firm position on the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95) because of the deadline for renewal or denunciation in early September 1995 on the basis of Article 6 of this treaty. The Treaty would expire in September 1996, and the two sides had to give notice of their intention either to continue or to revise or not to denounce it by early

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64 The leading powers of Northeast Asia were quick to take advantage of the pause in Russian-North Korean relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union. North Korea also has changed its trade, economic and foreign policies towards the major powers in Northeast Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. For example, the US, despite its loud anti-Korean rhetoric, stepped up both economic relations and political contacts with North Korea during this period. See S. M. Shuja, ‘Pyongyang’s Adjustment in the post-Cold War: Modifying the United States’ North Korean Policy’, *Issues and Studies*, vol. 32, no. 4, 1996, pp. 89-103. China forged full-scale relations with North Korea and, to a considerable extent, took over the key place in North Korea’s commercial and economic relations that the former Soviet Union had occupied during the Cold War era. Japan initiated a dialogue on establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea. Thus, Russia urgently needed to re-define its relations with North Korea by concluding the new [bilateral] treaty replacing the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty because the case for Russia’s retaining some kind of treaty relationship rests on the assumption that its ability to play an effective role will depend greatly on maintaining normal relations with both South and North (*Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 17 February 1993, p. 4).

65 For the details of account of new international order in Northeast Asia, see, for example, Man-woo Lee and Richard Mansbach, eds., *The Changing Order in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula* (Seoul: The Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University Press, 1993).
September 1995. Ultimately, this led the Russian leadership desperately to attempt to achieve a consensus on the issue during this period.

Those factors led Russia to consider having some kind of new bilateral treaty as the legal foundation of its relations with North Korea, which would allow it to maintain its influence over the Korean peninsula in the post-Soviet era.

In this respect, it should be noted that some of the Russian leadership were still considering the possibility of 'military assistance' to North Korea, which had nearly ceased after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some Russian leadership also intended to resume selling defensive weapons to North Korea. On the one hand, this indicated that Russia was seriously considering a dual Korean policy to maintain its influence over North Korea rather than its previous pro-South Korean stance. Especially, there was the fact that Russia never appeared to be as satisfied with its relations with South Korea during the early stage of Russian foreign policy (Dec. 91-Dec. 93) as it had expected. This naturally resulted in a new recognition of the importance of its relations with North Korea, especially the latter's 'potential' in promoting Russia's interests.

66 For example, when offered the UN sanction against the North Korea's nuclear issue by the UN Security Council in March 1994, the Russian foreign ministry stated that 'despite the fact that the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty is still in force, just like the article providing for military aid in the case of aggression against North Korea. But if the matter does get as far as a discussion of sanctions by the Security Council, our experts believe that Russian diplomats' main task will be not to back the North Koreans into a corner' (Izvestia, 22 March 1994, p. 3). In March 1994, Russian deputy foreign minister (the former Russian ambassador to South Korea) Alexandr Panov stated that 'Moscow will render assistance to North Korea in the event of unprovoked aggression against it because Russia, as successor to the Soviet Union, is linked with North Korea by a corresponding treaty of 1961, according to the Russian foreign ministry officials distorts the essence of Russian position' (Segodnia, 31 March 1994, p. 2).

67 Some members of government who argued for more active support of domestic industry turned their attention to the possibility of reviving certain aspects of military cooperation with North Korea. They found supporters in military circles who had special interests in keeping contacts open with North Korea. In the Russian academic world, there were also expectations that certain types of military cooperation with North Korea (Vladimir B. Yakubovsky, 'Economic Relations between Russia and DPRK: Problems and Perspectives', Korea and World Affairs, vol. 20, no. 3, 1996, p. 463). Valentin Moiseev, head of the Korean office of the Asian department of the Russian foreign ministry, told the TASS commenting on South Korean reports about possible MiG-29 production in North Korea 'North Korea is an equal member of international community and has the right to purchase weapons and the necessary defence means wherever it believes it necessary' ('Foreign Ministry Official on Ties with DPRK and ROK', Itar-Tass, 5 October 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-193, 5 October 1995, p. 22).
on the Korean peninsula. On the other hand, this also indicated that the Russian leadership still could not achieve a solid consensus in its policy towards the Korean peninsula.

By September 1995 (the deadline for renewal of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty) several significant steps in the development of bilateral relations between Russia and the two Koreas had been taken, especially focusing on a new draft treaty to replace the Treaty. During his visit to North Korea as a special envoy of the Russian president in January 1994, Russian deputy foreign minister Georgiy Kunadze was reported to have stated that ‘Russia and North Korea had agreed to amend the treaties and the legal grounds of relations between the two countries, including the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, and to resume active contacts between the two countries’ foreign ministries, including contacts in the UN’.

The issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty was also seriously discussed at the second Russian-South Korean summit in Moscow in June 1994. During the talks, according to Chung Jong-uk, chief foreign policy advisor to the South Korean president, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated that ‘article 1 of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty stipulating Russia’s military intervention [could] be regarded as defunct’. In September 1994, Russian deputy foreign minister Aleksandr Panov arrived in North Korea as a special envoy with a view to the development of bilateral relations, which was to include direct dialogue between the two countries. Panov stated that ‘the

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68 Although North Korea had not always been a subservient ally to the Soviet Union, especially since the late 1950s, it still played a crucial role in Russian strategic considerations. One must realise that previously North Korea often acted against Soviet wishes and sometimes openly attacked Soviet policies. Because of the strategic importance of North Korea, however, the Soviet Union did not expel North Korea from the Socialist camp, and continued to provide the country with economic and military assistance (Ralph N. Clough, ‘The Soviet Union and the Two Koreas’, in Donald S. Zagoria, ed., Soviet Policy in East Asia [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982], p. 187).

69 It should be noted that Georgiy Kunadze’s visit to North Korea was originally scheduled for the second half of 1992 but has been postponed three times (‘Kunadze to Visit DPRK to Realign Bilateral Relations’, Kyodo, 26 January 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-015, 26 January 1993, p. 25).

1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty remains in force until 1996, and
measures will be taken one year before it expires, so there is still time to think
things through.\textsuperscript{72}

In Seoul in May 1995, Russian defence minister Pavel Grachev also
claimed that 'we are giving the [1961 Soviet-North Korean] Treaty
comprehensive consideration and analysis. We have repeatedly stated at
governmental level that some provisions of the treaty have become outdated.
Thus, the Russian side will inform its partner in the treaty before August, or in
August 1995, a year before the treaty expires'.\textsuperscript{73} Finally, on 7 September 1995,
the Russian foreign ministry officially announced that Russia had proposed to
North Korea to replace the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty with a
'New Friendship Agreement'.\textsuperscript{74}

What kind of new friendship treaty did Russia expect to have with North
Korea in the post-Soviet era?

According to sources in the Russian foreign policy, the draft of the new
treaty sought to put greater emphasis on developing bilateral economic
cooperation rather than military ties. Furthermore, unlike the 1961 Soviet-North
Korean Friendship Treaty, it would not contain an automatic military
intervention clause which had been the core of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean
Friendship Treaty, and would be basically similar in content to the goodwill
treaty signed between South Korea and Russia as part of Russia's dual Korean
policy.\textsuperscript{75} The Russian side also hoped that the new treaty would establish a

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item[{\textsuperscript{71}}] 'Yeltsin Pledged Pressure on North Korea: Military Treaty with North Korea a Dead Letter', \textit{Korea Newsreview}, vol. 23, no. 23, 4 June 1994, p. 4.
\item[{\textsuperscript{74}}] Nikita Maltkovsky, spokesman of the Russian foreign ministry, stated that 'the text of the new treaty had been handed over to the North Korean side. The Russian side informed the North Korean side that the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, which had played its role in the history of relations between the two countries, has become outdated because of well-known objective circumstances and does not correspond to new realities' ('Moscow Proposes Scrapping Defence Treaty with DPRK', \textit{Itar-Tass}, 7 September 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-173, 7 September 1995, p. 26).
\item[{\textsuperscript{75}}] \textit{Chosun Ilbo} (Seoul), 10 September 1996, p. 2.
\end{thebibliography}
mechanism for regular contact between Russia and North Korea, something that would make it possible to prevent any headlong rush to unification that could destabilise the Korean peninsula. At the same time, by renouncing North Korea's status as a military ally, even if only a pro forma one, Russia was now eliminating any ambiguity on this [the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty] issue.

Russia's proposal for negotiations to sign a new treaty with North Korea, which was put forward a year before the expiration of the existing treaty, was also aimed at demonstrating its commitment to improving relations with South Korea. The latter had sought to abrogate the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty while simultaneously maintaining relations with North Korea by concluding a new treaty after replacing the old one a year before its expiration date.

This Russian proposal for a new treaty with North Korea had a potentially significant impact on the international politics of Northeast Asia in the post-Soviet era. In reality, the expiration of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, one of the last relics of the Cold War in Northeast Asia, could be seen as a symbol of the end of the Soviet era on the basis of Russia's new perceptions and interests in the region in the post-Soviet era.

Nonetheless, it should be emphasised here that there still seemed to be no firm consensus on the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty among the Russian leadership during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). For example, in March 1994, amidst rising tensions between the US and North Korea over that country's refusal to permit IAEA inspectors to implement inspection of its nuclear facilities, Russian deputy foreign minister Panov stated

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76 The Russian side proceeded from the position that the signing of such a treaty would allow the upgrading of relations between Russian and North Korea to a 'new level', promoting their development in all directions, as well as making a considerable contribution to ensuring the solution of the Korean peninsula problem on the path of a peaceful, democratic process ('Moscow Proposes Scraping Defence Treaty with DPRK', Itar-Tass, 7 September 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-173, 7 September 1995, p. 26).

77 Moskovskie novosti, no. 61, 10-17 September 1995. p. 7.
that ‘in accordance with the existing Treaty between the Soviet Union and North Korea Russia will provide North Korea with assistance in the event of unprovoked aggression against it, but it will decide this solely on the basis of its own analysis’. However, the Russian foreign ministry took a somewhat different view. A Russian foreign ministry spokesman stressed that ‘the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty is valid today, albeit pro forma, and this means that Russia will provide North Korea with the requisite assistance if it decides that North Korea is the victim of aggression. What is more, under existing legislation the North Koreans will only receive military assistance once parliament has adopted a corresponding decision’.

Another contradictory remark on the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty by the Russian leadership was made in May 1995 during defence minister Grachev’s visit to South Korea. In Seoul, he was reported to have stated that ‘South Korea had been notified that the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty would be scrapped’. Russia’s embassy in North Korea immediately denied the report, stating that ‘options regarding the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty were under consideration and that North Korea would be informed of Russia’s decision first’. Even when the Russian foreign ministry officially announced that Russia had proposed to North Korea to scrap the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty on 7 September 1995, a senior member of Russia’s foreign ministry told Interfax that ‘Russia has no intention of cancelling the treaty on friendship and cooperation signed between the Soviet Union and North Korea. The [1961 Soviet-North Korean] treaty expires in the near future, and if none of the signatories proclaims the desire to cancel it, the treaty will be automatically prolonged for another five years’.

78 Izvestia, 31 March 1994, p. 3.
79 Ibid.
80 The Korea Times (Seoul), 2 June 1995, pp. 3-4.
In November 1995, again in separate statements, two Russian foreign ministry officials gave sharply differing interpretations of the treaty which still governed relations between Russia and North Korea. 'The treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and North Korea of 1961 as a result of well-known objective circumstances has become outdated and does not correspond to the new realities established in Russia, in the Russian-Korean relations and in the Northeast Asia...this treaty does not work', Grigoriy Karasin, Russian foreign ministry official spokesman, declared. According to him, 'the Russian side has proposed to North Korea to sign a new treaty on the principles of friendly relations between the two countries which meet the interests of both countries and nations, and handed over to the Korean side a draft treaty which is being studied'. However, deputy foreign minister Panov noted that 'the Russian side believes that the treaty of friendship with North Korea in its updated version continues to operate... in 1993 the Russian side unilaterally annulled Article 1 of the Soviet-North Korean treaty of friendship... we said that the automatic involvement is out of the question and that we ourselves will decide whether to take part or not on the side of North Korea if the latter is unprovoked attacked'.

In the meantime, the North Korean side rejected the offer when the Russian foreign ministry proposed revising the agreement to eliminate the military assistance clause while not replying to Russia's proposals for the new treaty promptly.

We can suggest several reasons for the North Korean side's reluctance to reply its official position on the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty and the new draft treaty replacing the latter as the Russian side expected: (1) Russia's reduced role in relation to Korean issues in Northeast Asia; (2) the official visit to Russia by the South Korean President

81 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
84 On the Russia's reduced role in the post-Soviet era, see Chapters 5 and 6.
in June 1994; (3) North Korea's 'Russian Card' against other major powers; and (4) Russia's inconsistent consensus on the issue of new draft treaty. In other words, faced with the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, the North Korean side tried to take advantage of the uncertainty surrounding the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty while refusing to immediately demonstrate its real intentions about the new bilateral treaty with Russia.

Other significant bilateral treaties between the two sides during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95) were few and less important. One of the important economic agreements between the two sides during this period was that Yi Song-tae, chairman of the North Korean Committee for the Promotion of External Economic Cooperation, and a governor of the Russian Maritime Territory, signed a memorandum on trade. The memorandum called for expanded cooperation in 'fishery, agriculture, construction and machinery production.' But it should be noted that in the first half of 1994 Russia and North Korea had talks on the logging, nuclear and other pending issues but failed reach any substantial accord on key matters.

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85 With regard to President Kim Young-sam's visit to Russia, North Korea was worried that it might 'pour cold water' on Russia-North Korean relations, which have been warming up of late ('Russia, DPRK Discusses Visit by ROK President', Yonhap, 9 May 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-089, 9 May 1994, p. 17).

86 In the post-Soviet era, North Korea found itself increasingly isolated diplomatically. Moreover, confronted with a contemporary world that was on the march towards openness and reform, North Korea has changed its trade, economic and foreign policies. While maintaining the policy of deterrence, the US and Japan were increasingly able to utilise political engagement, and offered North Korea inducements and economic assistance to create an external environment that increased the chances of the gradual evolution of reform in North Korea and reduced tensions on the Korean peninsula. Even though it was isolated and was enduring an economic crisis, the nuclear crisis demonstrated that North Korea was capable of exerting significant pressure on the international community. In this respect, the author argues that the West's perception that North Korea was developing an atomic bomb in fact strengthened North Korea's hand in international negotiations in general. Thus, fear of North Korea's future nuclear weaponry allowed North Korea to accomplish multiple objectives, such as the enhancement of its prestige vis-à-vis South Korea and the attainment of an advantageous bargaining position in dealing with South Korea.


In the field of economic relations, Russia made considerable efforts to re-establish economic ties with North Korea due to the opportunities the latter offered for the Russian economy. To this end, especially, in late September 1994 Russian and North Korean foreign trade experts held a number of three-day consultations to agree an agenda to be discussed at a forthcoming meeting of their joint intergovernmental commission for trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation in North Korea.\textsuperscript{89}

As for trade and economic relations between Russia and North Korea during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95), they still tended to show signs of contracting, as Figure 3.4 illustrates. In 1995 a North Korean trade mission in Russia opened an office in Khabarovsk. Cross-border trade with Maritime and Khabarovsk krais developed along with those in Kamchatka and Sakhalin. The port of Rajin was actively engaged in the trans-shipment of Russian export and import cargo.\textsuperscript{90}

Figure 3.4 Trend in Russian-North Korean Trade, 1992-95


\textsuperscript{90} Valentin Moiseev, 'Russia and the Korean Peninsula', International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 42, no. 1, 1996, p. 111.
One of the persuasive reasons for Russia’s efforts to attempt to expand its economic cooperation with North Korea based on a new treaty was closely related to Chinese expansion of its economic relations with North Korea in the post-Soviet era. Whereas trade with Russia accounted for 50% of North Korea’s foreign trade before 1990, by 1995 it had dropped to just $US 100 million. Outmanoeuvring Russia, China became North Korea’s main trading partner, accounting for 45% of North Korea’s foreign trade in the middle of the 1990s. Thus, by early 1996 Russia had every reason to seek some of the North Korean market it had lost to China. This was one of the main reasons for the rebuilding of economic ties between the two sides, although neither side had high expectations.

During this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95), Russia’s efforts over the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty did not produce any meaningful results for relations between the two countries, although Russia did display a new activism in its bid to take new initiatives to build up its relations with North Korea. Russia itself urgently increased the pressure for a new treaty as a new legal foundation with North Korea to replace the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. This clearly indicated that fundamental differences between the two sides remained in their approaches to the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. Russia’s intentions about the conclusion of the new treaty as the basis of the new legal foundation in the post-Soviet era continued to be postponed by the North Korean side. Furthermore, there continued to be a lack of consensus, together with the differences among the top Russian leadership on the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. In short, Russia’s policy towards North Korea inevitably became reactive as a result of the internal and external factors mentioned above.

3.4. A Fulfilled Historic Role? (Dec. 95-Jul. 96)

After the December 1995 parliamentary elections, Russia’s policy towards the Korean peninsula adjusted towards a more balanced two Korean policy on the peninsula. Valentin Moiseev, deputy director of the first Asian department of the Russian foreign ministry, supported this changed position on the peninsula, observing that ‘the trend of a constructive restoration of bilateral ties with the former Soviet Union’s allies was more actively bolstered after the December 1995 parliamentary election, together with the appointment of Primakov as Russian foreign minister at an early date in 1996’.

These changes led Russia more openly and actively to implement its decision to emphasise its relations with North Korea on the Korean peninsula.

In these circumstances, Russia’s proposal for a new treaty with North Korea assumed greater importance for its leadership. On the one hand, there was the forthcoming Russian presidential election, which was scheduled to be held in the middle of 1996, and the Russian leadership needed to demonstrate its good relations with old allies such as North Korea to keep its major power status in Northeast Asia. In other words, to win the Russia’s first presidential election each candidate had to stress Russia’s good relations with old allies and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) over which the Soviet Union had formerly exerted a dominant influence. In this respect, by agreeing a new draft treaty with North Korea, which could indicate their good relations, the Russian leadership would be in a stronger position to win the forthcoming presidential election.

On the other hand, externally, Russia desperately needed to have any kind of relations with North Korea based on a bilateral treaty so as not to be

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10 The December 1995 parliamentary election confirmed the continuing strength of the conservative-nationalists who had constantly rebuked the Yeltsin administration for its emasculated foreign policy. On the Korean peninsula, pro-North Korean forces came to the fore after the December 1995 parliamentary election. Indeed, across a broad spectrum of society, the assumption existed that one could trace a feeling that improved relations with North Korea would enhance Russia’s undermined position on the Korean peninsula.
excluded from the circle of the Northeast Asian power group in the post-Soviet era. In this respect, especially, 'four-party talks' in April 1996, which marginalised Russia once again in relation to the security issue of the Korean peninsula in Northeast Asia, made the Russian government more aware of the importance of its continuing relations with North Korea. (See Chapter 5.)

Faced with this unexpected situation (the four-party talks), Russia again even considered resuming military assistance to North Korea to regain its influence on the peninsula. In April 1996, for example, Georgiy Kunadze, now Russian ambassador to South Korea and formerly deputy foreign minister, stated that 'Russia has a powerful economic potential for providing massive assistance to North Korea, even though Russia itself is undergoing economic difficulties of its own. The assistance may be major to North Korea, which is undergoing economic difficulties, but is not that major to Russia...'. During his visit to Pyongyang in April 1996, Russian deputy prime minister Vitaliy Ignatenko also mentioned assistance to North Korea in eight areas, including the renovation of the Kim Chaek Steel Mill and the supply of oil, although the promise of this massive assistance was not easy for Russia to fulfil because it faced severe economic difficulties. Nevertheless, it should be noted that concerning Russia’s military involvement in the Korean peninsula deputy foreign minister Panov stated that 'we declared that automatic involvement is out of question, and we shall decide in accordance with internal procedures whether to take or not take part in the conflict on the side of North Korea if it is subjected to an unprovoked attack'.

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94 Kim Young-sam and Bill Clinton put forward a four-party peace proposal (the two Koreas, China and the US) on 16 April 1996. Responding to the 'four-party talks', Georgiy Kunadze, Russian ambassador to South Korea, stated that 'Russia supports all realistic proposals that can ease tensions on the Korean peninsula... we supported the proposal for six-party talks in principle. I cannot understand why South Korea advanced the proposal for four-party talks' (Hangyore Shinmun [Seoul], 25 April 1996, p. 18).

95 Ibid., 3 June 1996, p. 4.

With only about six months left for the two sides to agree a new bilateral treaty before the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty expired during this period (Dec. 95-Jul. 96), the Russian leadership informed North Korea that it was not interested in extending the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. To a certain extent, the Russian leadership had to achieve a consensus that it had no plan to extend the Treaty for another five years by September 1995 on the basis of Article 6 of the treaty, but eagerly looked for a new legal foundation that could replace the Treaty in the post-Soviet era.

With regard to the issue of a new draft treaty, it should be mentioned that there were two important Russian-North Korean high-ranking official contacts during this period (Dec. 95-Jul. 96). In April 1996, a Russian delegation led by deputy prime minister Ignatenko visited North Korea for the first session of the Intergovernmental Russian and Korean Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation. During the talks, particular concern was expressed about the need to agree a treaty and a strong legal basis for relations.98

During a visit to North Korea by a Russian State Duma delegation in May 1996, the two sides also discussed the status of preparations for a new Russia-North Korean treaty. When the State Duma delegation spoke to Hong Song-nam, deputy premier of the North Korean administrative council, the deputies discussed the need to conclude a new treaty between Russia and North Korea as soon as possible, and handed the country's leaders a draft entitled 'On the Fundamental Principles of Friendly Relations'.99 Gennadii Seleznev, Russian Duma Speaker, also stated 'it is time for Russia to see North Korea through different eyes. It is time for the two countries to promote bilateral cooperation.'

98 In an exclusive interview on 13 April 1996 with Chosun Ilbo, Ignatenko stated that '... of course, a military alliance like the one that existed in the past is impossible. However, it is necessary to upgrade the extent of our cooperation in the economic, cultural, scientific and technological fields to the same level of cooperation between the Soviet Union and North Korea. Russia and North Korea discussed the signing of a Russia-North Korea basic agreement that will replace the Soviet-DPRK friendship treaty, the abolition of which Moscow declared last September' (Chosun Ilbo [Seoul], 15 April 1996, p. 8).  
Today, we have again begun turning our attention to Pyongyang. Russia has mapped out a new treaty with North Korea, which North Korea is now reviewing.\footnote{State Duma Speaker Interviewed about Visit to DPRK, Moscow Voice of Russia World Service, 3 June 1996 in FBIS-SOV 96-109, 5 June 1996, p. 23.}

At this point, it should be noted that although the Russian foreign ministry did not reveal the details of the new friendship treaty that was then under negotiation, according to one high-ranking official, ‘the Russia-Vietnam Basic Treaty would be a model for the new treaty between Russia and North Korea’.\footnote{Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 10 September 1996, p. 7.} In the meantime, North Korea continued to delay revealing its intentions about Russia’s proposal for a new treaty during this period.\footnote{In May 1996, meeting with visiting Seleznev, North Korean foreign minister Kim Young-nam stated that ‘North Korea is carefully studying a new draft treaty, which Russia sent it last (1995) August’. At the same time, however, he also complained that ‘tactless’ reporting on North Korea by the Russian media was hampering the development of bilateral ties (‘North Korea Wants New Treaty with Russia’, RFE/RL Daily Report, 29 May 1996).} North Korea had postponed the negotiations for over a year, so it was almost impossible for the sides to conclude a new treaty prior to 10 September 1996 (the date of expiry of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty).

Did North Korea ignore a Russian offer to draft and sign a new treaty to replace the existing 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty?

North Korea attempted to read more carefully Russia’s real intentions and interests in the proposed new draft treaty. It would not hasten to sign a bilateral treaty with Russia to maximise its national interests, but would enter into negotiations in earnest before seeing the results of the Russian presidential election scheduled for June 1996. According to a Korean newspaper, ‘it was clear that the improvement in relations between Russia and North Korea would be hastened if Zyuganov, President of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, was elected Russian president’.\footnote{Hangyore Shinmun (Seoul), June 1996, p. 4.}

As seen above, before having the first historic Russian presidential election, there had been a continuous questions of relations between Russia and
North Korea. Even after 10 September 1996, would the existing 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty remain valid until a new treaty was signed? Was this Russia’s position or North Korea’s position? Or had the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty just fulfilled its historic role without being replaced by a new treaty in the post-Soviet era?

By the time of the first Russian presidential election, which was held on schedule in the middle of 1996, Russia was desperately attempting to improve its relations with North Korea while looking for a new legal foundation which could replace the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. Nevertheless, Russia continued not to succeed in accomplishing its goals towards North Korea, in spite of its considerable efforts. Finally, Russia’s policy towards North Korea proved reactive.
Chapter 4

Russia and the Development of the Russian-South Korean Relations Under Yeltsin: A Relationship Based on Treaties?

4.1. In Search of an Economic Relationship? (1985-91)

The beginning of Russian-Korean relations can be traced back to the middle of the 19th century, when Imperial Russia and the Korean Kingdom officially started to develop their relations on the basis of a Treaty of Trade and Commerce concluded on 7 July 1884. However, as a result of the Russian-Japanese War (1904-05), Imperial Russia and its successor state, the Soviet Union, could not have any kind of official relations with Korea on the basis of treaties up to the end of the World War Two.

During the Cold War era (from 1945 up to 1984), the Soviet Union principally developed its relations with North Korea on the basis of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. In the meantime, there were no official relations on the basis of a treaty between the Soviet Union and South Korea.

During the Gorbachev era (1985-91), however, Soviet Korean policy increasingly started to concentrate on building good bilateral relations with

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2 During this period, the Soviet Union and South Korea only made personal contacts and exchanges at the unofficial level.
South Korea on the basis of the New Political Thinking, although Gorbachev's Korean policy still sought to maintain its influence on North Korea based on the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. In other words, Gorbachev was actively attempting to establish bilateral relations with each of the two Koreas for the first time. Gorbachev's active development of Soviet relations with South Korea finally resulted in diplomatic normalisation between the two sides in 1990 when the former Soviet Union became the first major power to recognise the two Koreas on the Korean peninsula. Thereafter, there were significant developments between the two sides that ultimately looked for the conclusion of a political treaty (the so-called 'Treaty of Good Neighbourhood, Partnership and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and South Korea' or 'Treaty on Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and South Korea') up to the end of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The development of Soviet-South Korean relations evolved from economic agreements towards political ones during the Gorbachev era in the context of the bilateral treaties. Ultimately, these treaties provided the basis of the Treaty on Basic Relations between Russia and South Korea signed in 1992 (hereafter, the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty), one of the most important bilateral treaties between the two sides in the post-Soviet era. For this reason, it can be said that a solid foundation for the forthcoming Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty was created during the late Gorbachev period, although the conclusion of this political treaty between the two sides was not realised during these years due to the attempted coup of August 1991.

There were three main stages in the development of relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea during the Gorbachev era: (1) towards closer economic relations; (2) towards diplomatic normalisation; and (3) towards a political treaty.

There were noticeable developments between the two sides in the field of economics and non-governmental issues as a precondition for diplomatic normalisation during the period from spring 1985 to summer 1988. It should
especially be noted that the first Soviet programme for promoting peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) was set out in detail by Gorbachev during his speeches in Vladivostok in July 1986. Nevertheless, in contrast to the strengthening of relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea, there was still no change in official relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea. In other words, despite South Korea’s many efforts to attract the Soviet Union’s attention, as a whole, the Soviet Union did not respond with any positive signals, although Gorbachev and his reformers gradually started to view South Korea as a potential economic partner in Northeast Asia that could facilitate domestic economic reform.

Pre-diplomatic normalisation efforts after the 19th Party Conference in the summer of 1988 still were mainly designed to establish formal economic relations based on the economic agreements and quasi-political relations. To a large extent, this meant that, from the autumn of 1988 onwards, the Soviet Union granted de facto recognition to South Korea on the Korean peninsula.

The following two significant factors should be considered when understanding Soviet-South Korean economic developments during this period. First, in a speech delivered in Krasnoyarsk in September 1988, Gorbachev for the first time officially expressed the Soviet Union’s willingness to establish economic

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3 In his Vladivostok speech in July 1986, Gorbachev declared the Soviet Union’s willingness to develop relations with every state in the APR, but fell short of specifically mentioning South Korea. For the details of Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech, see *Izvestiia*, 29 July 1986, p. 2.

4 For example, in the speech delivered at the Kwanhoon Club in Seoul in March 1987, South Korea’s foreign minister Kwang-soo Choi stated that ‘we have steadily pursued an open-door policy toward the Soviet Union’ (Kwang-soo Choi, ‘The Situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the Surrounding Region and Korea’s Foreign Policy Direction’, *Korea and World Affairs*, vol. 11, no. 2, 1987, p. 227).

5 The Soviet Union’s willingness to establish economic ties with South Korea was expressed by many Soviet officials and academics before the Krasnoyarsk declaration, which was delivered in summer 1988. For example, amid reports of increasing indirect trade between Moscow and Seoul, Ernest Obminsky, the head of the Soviet foreign ministry’s directorate for international economic relations, stated on 25 March 1988 that ‘the flow of goods and services is much internationalised at present, so it would be impossible to exclude the South Korean element’ (Sophie Quinn-Judge, ‘Olympic Overtures: Relations between Soviets and South Korea Improve’, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 April 1988, p. 38).

6 For the details of Gorbachev’s Krasnoyarsk speech, see *Izvestiia*, 18 September 1988, p. 2.
relations with South Korea. Secondly, the Seoul Olympic Games, which were held on from 17 September to 3 October 1988, also provided a broader justification for the Soviet Union to establish formal economic relations and 'quasi-official' political contacts with South Korea. However, it should be noted that the Soviet Union continued to state that it did not recognise South Korea politically.

In particular, in connection with the attempt to achieve diplomatic normalisation after the Seoul Olympic games, Kim Young-sam’s visits to the Soviet Union should be examined. By the middle of 1989, the Soviet Union had hinted at its intention to upgrade relations with South Korea to a political level by inviting South Korean opposition leader Kim Young-sam, chairman of the opposition Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), to Moscow from 2 to 10 June 1989 at the invitation of IMEMO (Institute of the World Economy and International Relations). During his visit, the two sides agreed in principle to normalise relations with South Korea. This marked the beginning of the normalisation process between the two sides, which meant that the Soviet

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7 Gorbachev stated that 'I think that in the context of the general improvement of the situation on the Korean peninsula, possibilities may open up for establishing economic ties with South Korea', (Izvestia, 18 September 1988, p. 2).

8 On 11 January 1988, the Soviet Union officially announced its intention to participate in the 24th Olympic in Seoul. The Soviet decision was reportedly made by the Communist Party’s ruling Politburo after Gorbachev’s visit to Washington in December 1987 (The Christian Science Monitor, 13 January 1988, p. 8). For more detailed analysis of Soviet participation in the Seoul Olympic Games, see James W. Riordan, ‘Korea-Soviet Union Relations: the Seoul Olympics as Catalyst and Stimulator of Political Change’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 12, no. 4, 1988, pp. 754-779. In August 1988, the Soviet Union and South Korea agreed to exchange a note verbal allowing the Soviet consular corps to perform ‘consular’ functions during the Olympic period. An agreement for an exchange of trade offices with consular functions was signed on 2 December 1988, in Moscow between Sun-ki Lee, the president of Korean Trade Association (KOTRA) and V. I. Malikovich, chairman of the Soviet CCI (The Korea Times [Seoul], 3 October 1988, p. 1). South Korea’s KOTRA opened its office in Moscow on 7 July 1989, and the USSR CCI opened its office in Seoul on 3 April 1989.

9 For example, Gennadii Genusimov, the USSR Government spokesman and chief of the Soviet foreign ministry information department, stated in 1989 that ‘We do not have political or diplomatic relations with South Korea and we have no intention to have them. But, South Korea is also one of the newcomers to the international economic market, so to say, so we can not really ignore that. Thus, on a non-political level, non-diplomatic, commercial level we are ready to develop relations with South Korea (Tokyo NHK General TV Network, 4 January 1989 in FBIS-SOV 89-003, 5 January 1989, p. 11).

10 For the details of background of Kim Young-sam’s Moscow visit, see Tongil Minchi Dang [Reunification Democratic Party] (Seoul: 1989); and Pyongwha wa tongil ui yomnwoed ango [With the Wish for a Peace and Unification of Koreas] (Seoul: n. p., 1989), p. 16.
Union began to connect the issue of a political relationship with that of economic cooperation with South Korea. Moreover, Kim’s visit resulted in a joint statement by IMEMO and RDP that contained an understanding that regular contacts would take place between the two bodies to promote mutual understanding.11 Immediately after Kim Young-sam’s first visit to Moscow, there was another important step towards political normalisation between the two countries - the exchange of ‘consular’ departments. The two sides signed a ‘protocol of agreement’ in Singapore on 17 November 1989 to upgrade their relationship by converting trade missions into consular departments.12

Kim Young-sam’s second visit to Moscow, in March 1990, was another significant step forward in their relations. In contrast to his first visit, he was invited to Moscow as the chairman of South Korea’s ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP). This time Kim Young-sam also led a working-level delegation of South Korean officials, including cabinet-level ministers, who were involved in practical negotiations for normalisation and economic cooperation between the two countries. During the meeting, the Soviet Union demonstrated its willingness to embark on a formal political relationship with South Korea, which had been basically agreed during Kim Young-sam’s first Moscow visit in 1989. Notably, Gorbachev expressed his belief that no obstacle existed to diplomatic relations between the two sides. The Joint Communiqué drafted during Kim Young-sam’s second visit to Moscow stated that the Soviet Union and South Korea had reached an understanding to establish contacts at governmental level in the near future.13 Nevertheless, the Soviet Union did not provide a clear schedule for the diplomatic normalisation process. This

11 In return, in October 1989, the IMEMO delegation visited Seoul at the invitation of the RDP and reaffirmed the agreement contained in the IMEMO-RDP joint statement.
12 However, it should be noted that the exchange of consular departments did not imply the establishment of official consular relations with South Korea. Although the exchange of consular departments clearly indicated the existence of political relations between the two countries, bilateral relations remained at the non-official level as long as the Kremlin insisted on the non-official nature of the relationship (‘Upgraded ROK-USSR Consular Offices Planned’, Yonhap, 23 March 1990 in FBIS-SOV 90-057, 23 March 1990, pp. 10-11).
13 For a more detailed account of Kim Young-sam’s second visit to Moscow, see ‘ROK’s Kim Young-sam Urges Diplomatic Ties in Visit’ in FBIS-SOV 90-058, 26 March 1990, pp. 19-21.
indicated that the Soviet leadership was basically attempting to move towards diplomatic normalisation with South Korea in the near future, but had to consider the North Korean factor continuously and seriously.

Kim Young-sam's second visit to Moscow in March 1990 was followed by the first historic Soviet-South Korean summit meeting between Gorbachev and the South Korean President Roh Tae-woo in San Francisco in June 1990, which was held between the leaders of two states that did not yet have diplomatic relations. The vital step toward full and normal diplomatic relations between the two sides was taken during this summit, which could be described as a 'political sensation'. The San Francisco summit in June 1990 indicated that the Soviet Union had started to pursue a more 'active' role in the resolution of the Korean problem, including maintenance of the balance of power on the Korean peninsula and the encouragement of an inter-Korean dialogue. This summit was a decisive event for the forthcoming diplomatic normalisation between the two sides, and many bilateral accords were also agreed. As a result, Soviet-South Korean relations rapidly developed from non-political to political relations. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Soviet Union still continued to 'separate politics and economics' to avoid provoking North Korea.

At this point, it should be noted that, as Table 4.1 and 4.2 indicate, trade and investment between the Soviet Union and South Korea was increasing rapidly.

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14 However, this was not well-arranged summit. Gorbachev met briefly with Roh in San Francisco before leaving for the Soviet Union (after the Soviet-US summit in the US) in June 1990.

15 At the summit, speaking about the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries, Gorbachev stated that 'this issue may arise as bilateral ties develop and in the context of the general improvement of the political situation in the region and on the Korean peninsula' (Itar-Tass, 5 June 1990). After the summit, Roh Tae-woo also stated that 'the meeting itself indicates the beginning of the normalising process' ('Commentary on Meeting', Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia, 5 June 1990 in FBIS-SOV 90-111, 8 June 1990, p. 24).
Table 4.1 South Korea's Trade Volume with the Soviet Union

(million $US)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Import</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>133 (30.4)</td>
<td>65 (8.3)</td>
<td>68 (61.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>200 (50.4)</td>
<td>67 (3.1)</td>
<td>133 (95.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>290 (45.0)</td>
<td>112 (67.2)</td>
<td>178 (33.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>600 (106.9)</td>
<td>208 (85.7)</td>
<td>392 (120.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>889 (48.2)</td>
<td>519 (149.5)</td>
<td>370 (-5.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This information was compiled by the author from the following materials: 'Pukbang Tonggye', Pukbang Kyungche (Seoul), June 1991, p. 154; and Lim Yang-taek, 'Pukbang Chunchaek ui hyunwhang kwa palchunhanghyang', Minchok Chisong (Seoul), August 1989, p. 45. Figures in parentheses indicate the year-on-year rate of increase, in percentages.

Table 4.2 South Korea's Investment in the Soviet Union

(1,000 $US)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1985-88</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>Accumulative Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>11,181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Soviet Union formalised its diplomatic normalisation with South Korea on 30 September 1990 in New York. At last, relations between the two sides were upgraded from the 'economic' level to the full-scale 'political' level. For the Soviet side, the Soviet Union became the first major power recognising the two Koreas, which gave it a better position on the Korean peninsula than other major powers in the region. This meant that Gorbachev's New Political

\[\text{Reference for more detailed account:} \text{Chosun Ilbo [New York edition], 21 January 1992, p. 3.}\]
Thinking on the APR was being implemented successfully. For the South Korean side, this was regarded as a positive effect from the change in its foreign policy direction, the so-called ‘Northern Policy’. Thereafter, the two sides made several major steps towards the conclusion of a political treaty. In other words, the two sides attempted to seek a ‘legal basis’ and a new model of bilateral relations in the APR, intended to result in the conclusion of a political treaty between the two sides.

First, Gorbachev and Roh Tae-woo, meeting in Moscow on 14 December 1990 in the second Soviet-South Korean summit, discussed the state of bilateral relations and the prospects for their development, as well as a broad range of current international problems. During the summit, the two sides established a legal and institutional framework for their relations by signing inter-governmental documents that contained provisions for a range of new bilateral ties. The end product was a declaration of ‘General Principles on Relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea’ (the so-called ‘Moscow Declaration’), which encouraged the further development of cooperation between the two countries. Notably, the document included an agreement to hold periodic meetings and negotiations at various levels on the development of political dialogue on current issues of bilateral relations and other international issues. The joint communiqué issued at the Moscow summit covered the basic

17 Two of the biggest achievements of Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking in the APR were the diplomatic normalisation process with South Korea, together with the political rapprochement with China in 1989.
18 South Korea first expressed interest in establishing relations with ‘non-hostile’ communist states, including the Soviet Union, in January 1971 with the declaration of President Park Chung-hee. This became an important cornerstone for the northern policy of South Korea. For a comprehensive analysis of South Korea’s Northern Policy, see Byung-joon Ahn, ‘South Korea’s New Norpdpolitik’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 12, no. 4, 1988, pp. 693-705; and Seung-ho Jo, ‘South Korea’s Norpdpolitik and the Soviet Union (Russia)’, The Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 7, no. 2, 1993, pp. 404-450.
19 The South Korean President’s visit to Moscow, the first in the history of relations between the two countries, was realised in the middle of December 1990. The Soviet media described this summit as ‘opening a new page in the history of bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea’ (events, 15 December 1990, p. 7).
20 Gorbachev stated that ‘the Moscow Declaration will make it possible for relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea to rest on a reliable legal basis and these relations have favourable and prospects’ (‘Gorbachev Sees Good Prospects’, Moscow Tass, 17 December 1990 in FBIS-SOV 90-241, 14 December 1990, pp. 12-13).
principles of future bilateral relations. The conclusion of the 'Moscow Declaration' clearly indicated the further developed relations between the two sides after the diplomatic normalisation. Nevertheless, the communiqué still contained a passage expressing the Soviet Union's intention to maintain a normal state-to-state relationship with North Korea. It stated that Moscow's opening of diplomatic ties with South Korea should in no way be seen as an abandonment of its 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty obligations.

Secondly, on 19 April 1991, Gorbachev arrived on the Cheju Islands (by the southern coast of South Korea) on a brief official visit at the invitation of the South Korean President while returning from his visit to Japan. This was the third Soviet-South Korean summit between Roh and Gorbachev, and the first visit by a Soviet head of state to the Korean peninsula. The Soviet media reported that the third summit marked a 'new level' in relations and symbolised the 'beginning of a new stage' of political dialogue and economic cooperation. During the summit, Gorbachev proposed a 'Treaty of Good Neighbourhood, Partnership and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and South Korea', which would codify and develop the ideas contained in the 1990 'Moscow Declaration' and create a secure legal basis for the further development of relations between the two sides. An agreement to start

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21 For the full text of the joint communiqué, see Appendix 3.
22 The Soviet-South Korean summit meetings, which were held three times only in ten months (from June 1990 to April 1991), greatly contributed to these rapid developments between the two countries during the late Gorbachev period. It must be also noted that Kim Il-sung invited Gorbachev to visit North Korea on numerous occasions. But, Gorbachev avoided (or postponed) visiting North Korea. At the summit, the Soviet Union promised to support South Korea's bid for UN entry and to cut off supplies of plutonium and other nuclear materials to North Korea until the latter agreed to international inspection of its nuclear facilities. In return, South Korea promised to carry out previous agreements on economic assistance to the Soviet Union and to participate more actively in the development of the Russian Far East (Chosun Ilbo [Seoul], 15 April 1991, p. 23).
24 When offered this proposal by the Soviet side, the South Korean President Roh Tae-woo replied that the proposal was basically good and should be discussed between the foreign ministers of the two countries. Commenting on Gorbachev's proposal for a new treaty, South Korean foreign minister Lee Sang-ok stated that 'Seoul would not sign it if it contained any clauses with military implications. Understandably, South Koreans were suspicious that the proposal might be intended to neutralise the US military presence in South Korea' (Yonhap, 23 April 1991 in FBIS-EAS 91-078, 23 April 1991, p. 25). South Korea hoped that the pact could be modelled after the treaty signed between West Germany and the Soviet Union shortly before German unification in 1990. The Bonn-Moscow treaty, called the
drafting this treaty, designed to provide a secure legal basis for further developing their relations in the future, was reached during a meeting between the two heads of state.\textsuperscript{25} Progress towards the conclusion of the Soviet-South Korean Partnership Treaty was advancing more rapidly than anyone (even the South Koreans) had expected. The Cheju summit could be regarded as the culmination of improved relations between the two countries during the late Gorbachev era.

Thirdly, the two sides continued to make more rapid progress towards the conclusion of the Soviet-South Korean Partnership Treaty after the Cheju summit. In the middle of August 1991, for instance, the Soviet foreign ministry stated that "the agreement would be essentially similar to arrangements recently signed by the Soviet Union with many European countries, such as Germany, Italy, Romania and France. The treaty was based on the new political situation in both Europe and Asia. If South Korea was prepared to accept the treaty in its present form then it would embody the essence of both the Helsinki Agreement and the Paris Charter for a New Europe, but extended to Asia."\textsuperscript{26} However, suddenly, no further progress towards the conclusion of the 'Treaty on Good Neighbourhood, Partnership and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and South Korea' could be made after the August coup in the Soviet Union, which made the Soviet leadership more focused on its domestic situation rather than on foreign issues such as the conclusion of a political treaty. Nevertheless, it is obvious that all of the above steps offered a solid foundation for the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty that was concluded in the post-Soviet era (1992).

\textsuperscript{1} 'Treaty on Good Neighbourhood, Partnership and Cooperation', also contains clauses on the restraint of military force for purposes other than self-defence (Yonhap, 24 April 1991 in FBIS-RAS 91-079, 23 April 1991, p. 19).
\textsuperscript{25} Vitaliy Ignatenko, spokesman for the Soviet Union, stated that 'what Gorbachev's plan [Gorbachev's proposal on the treaty purports] is to "quicken the speed" of developing relations between the two countries and lay a more solid legal foundation for these relations' ('Ignatenko Briefing Reviews Summit', KBS TV Network [Seoul], 20 April 1991 in FBIS-SOV 91-078, 23 April 1991, p. 8).
As seen above, during the Cold War era (from 1945 up to 1984), Soviet policy towards South Korea was confined to limited and unofficial economic relations. In many respects, this indicated that the Soviet Union did not adopt an active policy towards South Korea. Rather, it was passive as a result of external factors, especially the US and the North Korean factors, concerning South Korea.

By contrast, during the Gorbachev era, Soviet-South Korean relations rapidly developed even towards the political treaty as the legal basis of their new relations. In other words, Gorbachev's Korean policy had clear and active goals towards South Korea during this period (1985-91).

4.2. In Search of an Economic Partnership Based on Political and Military Treaties? (Dec. 91-Dec. 93)

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia's policy towards the Korean peninsula lost momentum. Russia was too preoccupied with its domestic problems, which left little room for diplomacy with other countries.

Given these circumstances, Russia followed Gorbachev's late Korean policy, which was mainly based on economic interests on the Korean peninsula. To this end, Russia obviously put priority on the development of relations with South Korea. Ultimately, Russia sought to evaluate its relations with South Korea from diplomatic normalisation to 'partnership' relations in the post-Soviet era. This can be separated into the following two steps: (1) the conclusion of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty; and (2) the development of bilateral agreements in the field of military cooperation.

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According to Georgiy Toloraya, the head of the department for Korea at the Russian foreign ministry, 'relations with South Korea are developing in accordance with principles of friendly partnership... since the USSR-South Korean relations normalised in 1990 we are stepping up a new higher stage' ("South Korean Foreign Minister Arrives in Moscow for Talks", Itar-Tass, 26 June 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-126, 30 June 1992, p. 17).
The Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty was finally concluded during Yeltsin’s visit to Seoul in November 1992. To do so, their relations were in the course of full arrangements to prepare and conclude this political treaty by the time of Yeltsin’s visit to South Korea in late 1992. Consequently, high level politico-economic contacts between the two sides were frequent and mainly designed to discuss and coordinate positions over the contents of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty, which was scheduled to be signed in the autumn (September) of 1992. For example, in March 1992, Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev paid an official visit to South Korea, which marked the first serious phase of the preparation of Yeltsin’s official visit. By the time of Kozyrev’s visit to South Korea, the two countries seemed to have agreed on the basic principles.

There were further discussions about the draft on the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty when the South Korean foreign minister visited Russia in June 1992. During the meeting, the two foreign ministers finalised almost all the text of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty.

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28 Yeltsin’s visit to South Korea was scheduled for September 1992, together with his visit to Japan, one of the President’s aides Yuri Petrov said in an interview to the independent South Korean TV company SBS (‘Yeltsin to Visit South Korea in September 1992’, Radio Moscow World Service, 5 March 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-045, 5 March 1992, p. 14). However, this schedule was cancelled at the very last moment, and Yeltsin only visited South Korea in November 1992.

29 For details of his visit to South Korea, see V. V. Vinogradov, ‘Vizit A. V. Kozyreva v respubliku Korein’, Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 7, 15 April, 1992, pp. 20-21.

30 In Seoul, Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev stated that “the main result of this trip is the creation of a solid foundation for a visit to South Korea by the Russian President Yeltsin... the forthcoming summit will lead to friendly, neighbourly and regular relations of new quality between democratic Russia and South Korea, which will be consolidated in the form of a political treaty. This treaty will be called to bring our relations to the level which we have now with Western countries” (‘Kozyrev Gives News Conference on ROK Trip’, Tass International Service, 19 March 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-055, 20 March 1992, p. 31). He also stated that “the period of the normalisation of our relations with South Korea is over... we are entering a new era—an era of full-fledged cooperation” (Izvestiia, 20 March 1992, p. 3).

31 The text of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty consisted of a preamble and 14 clauses, and stated that the two countries would continuously develop their cooperative relations as friendly nations. Russia and South Korea would work together to overcome the results of shared unfortunate past, and to jointly pursue freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and market economies as common values. The treaty prohibited the use of military force or threats between the two countries and stated that they would resolve all conflicts by peaceful means, official said (‘Text of Relations Pact Approved’, Yonhap, 29 June 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-126, 30 June 1992, pp. 18-19).
On 18-20 November 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin paid an official visit to South Korea to formalise and strengthen ties that had developed in the later Gorbachev years, and also to try to resolve several remaining issues between the two countries. As scheduled, on 19 November 1992, the two sides signed the historic Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty, which it was hoped would provide a framework of 'partnership' relations in the post-Soviet era.

As regards the contents of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty, the two sides pledged to refrain from using force and to settle all disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the UN Charter and agreed to hold regular meetings between the heads of state and members of the government to discuss bilateral relations and international issues of mutual concern. The two sides also signed an agreement on cultural cooperation and an agreement eliminating double taxation of incomes. A Memorandum of Mutual Understanding for 1993, which for the first time in history provided for direct exchanges between the defence ministries of Russia and South Korea, was also signed.

The conclusion of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty demonstrated that there had been fundamental changes in Russia's perceptions and goals in its foreign policy, not only towards the Korean peninsula, but also to the international environment of Northeast Asia in the post-Soviet era. First of all, it clearly indicated Russia's pro-South Korean stance towards the Korean peninsula because this treaty was concluded within a year of the collapse of the

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32 This was the first visit to Seoul, the capital of South Korea, by a head of the Russian Federation. Even no Soviet leader visited North Korea during the Soviet era. It should be emphasised that South Korea also became the first Northeast Asian country that Yeltsin visited in the post-Soviet era.

33 In late April 1993, the Russian Parliament ratified that 'the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty'. In presenting the document, Russian deputy foreign minister Boris Kolokolov stressed that the treaty laid down the foundations for qualitatively new relations between the two countries, not only good-neighbourly, but those of partners as well ('ROK Treaty Ratified', Radio Rossii Network, 29 April 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-082, 30 April 1993, p. 39).

34 For the full text of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty, see Appendix 4. See also 'Vizit B. N. El'tsina v respubliku Koreia', Diplomaticheski vestnik, no. 23-24, 15-31 December 1992, pp. 41-46.

35 Pravda, 24 November 1992, p. 3.
Soviet Union. In other words, the process of this political treaty initiated by Gorbachev and Roh during the late Soviet era was continued by the Russian leadership after the collapse of the Soviet Union and resulted in a kind of full-scale friendship and political treaty which, to a certain extent, could be compared with the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty during the early period of Russian foreign policy (Dec. 91-Dec. 93).

Secondly, Russia became the first major power to have full-scale political agreements with both North (the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty) and South Korea (the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty) on the Korean peninsula. This meant that Russia began to develop parallel bilateral relations based on the political treaties with the two Koreas for the first time throughout the whole history of their relations. This put Russia in a better position on the Korean peninsula than other major powers such as China, Japan and the US in Northeast Asia. In other words, Russia became the only country with diplomatic relations with both North and South Korea giving it a unique opportunity to maintain a position of influence. In part, this may also explain recent movements towards upgraded bilateral relations among other major powers with the two Koreas (such as US-North Korean relations and Chinese-South Korean relations) since the conclusion of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty in 1992. In this respect, the conclusion of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty became the symbol of the end of the Cold War atmosphere in the region in the post-Soviet era.

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36 Yeltsin stated that ‘This [his visit to Seoul] was the right step, and the country was chosen correctly since it sets an example, particularly in reforms, and we can learn from it’ (‘Yeltsin Sums up ROK Trip’, Itar-Tass, 20 November 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-226, 23 November 1992, p. 14). Komsomol’skaya pravda reported that Yeltsin’s recent visit to South Korea made it possible to demonstrate in practice Russian foreign policy’s new approach in the Far East and the partial lifting of the veil concealing Russia’s true interests and our part in the Korean problem (Komsomol’skaya pravda, 10 December 1992, p. 3). For the South Korean side, Roh Tae-woo’s government seemed eager to pursue the final achievement of its foreign policy, the so-called the Northern Policy, before the end of his regime (by early 1992).

37 Alexei Bogaturov stated that ‘the treaty signed in November 1992, is an effective political balance to the Soviet and North Korean treaty of 1961 that is subject to renegotiation and alteration as is stipulated by its provisions’ (Alexei Bogaturov, ‘Russia in Northeast Asia: Setting a New Agenda’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 17, no. 2, 1993, p. 308).
However, it should be noted that, in spite of the historic conclusion of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty at the first Russian-South Korean summit in Seoul in 1992, neither side was completely satisfied with the results of the summit.\(^8\) Even the process for the preparation of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty, together with Yeltsin’s visit to South Korea, had not run smoothly due to several unresolved differences between the two sides.\(^9\)

Especially, the existing 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty had become a serious obstacle to concluding the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty. As a matter of fact, from the beginning of 1992, the South Korean side had demanded that Russia renounce the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty as a pre-condition for the expansion of the economic relationship. South Korea asked Russia to break its bond with North Korea, which, on paper at least, retained the character of a military alliance.\(^40\)

Moreover, faced with South Korea’s request on the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, the Russian leadership even was still divided roughly into two groups: pro-South Korean and pro-North Korean supporters. Especially, the sudden cancellation at the very last moment of Yeltsin’s visit to South Korea (and Japan), scheduled for the middle of September 1992, proved that there were serious disagreements over Yeltsin’s visit to Japan and South Korea and the forthcoming political treaty with South Korea (and also the dispute over the Northern Islands between Russia and

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\(^8\) However, Vyacheslav Kostikov, the presidential press secretary, sharply criticised the attempt to diminish the productivity of the president’s visits to South Korea and China. He told that ‘the president’s circles assess the results of these visit as very fruitful... the conceptual principles of the Russian policy in this region (APR), presented by the Russian President during his visits to the ROK and the PRC, are based on the strategic course to achieve balance in the world and separate regions and on the national interests of Russia... the settlement of Russia’s relations with the countries of this region can not be based upon the infringement of the interests of the participants of this general political process’ ("Kostikov Defends Results of Yeltsin’s ROK, PRC Visit", Interfax, 28 December 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-250, 29 December 1992, p. 9).

\(^9\) For example, a high-ranking official from the Russian foreign ministry described the South Korean foreign minister’s visit to Moscow (in June 1992) as ‘basically for nothing’ (Rossiiskaia gazeta, 4 July 1992, p. 6).

\(^40\) For example, one of main reasons for the South Korean foreign minister’s visit to Moscow in June 1992 was to obtain Russia’s assent to the abolition of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. See Izvestia, 1 August 1992, p. 6.
within the Russian leadership. In other words, by the middle of September 1992 the Russian leadership had still not arrived at a consensus over the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty while pursuing the political treaty with South Korea. This indicated that the Russian government needed more time to reach a solid consensus on the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty before concluding the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty, evidence of the domestic power struggle over the foreign policy issue. As a matter of fact, together with the Kurile Islands problems, the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty had been exploited by conservative forces as a means of increasing their influence within Russian politics and over the domestic political agenda. Indeed, the battle for control of policy concerning these issues demonstrated the extent to which domestic and foreign policy in Russia were inextricably linked.41

Given the uncertainties of the Russian domestic scene in the post-Soviet era, it was not surprising that there was a lack of consensus over the conclusion of the Russian-South Korean Treaty. These problems among the Russian leadership arose basically from their different views of the Korean peninsula. Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his reform-minded associates generally continued to support the de facto abrogation of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. In the middle of August 1992, for example, deputy foreign minister Kunadze stated that ‘the treaty that has been prepared for signing is a document drawn up in full accordance with the present-day requirements of international law. In terms of format it is not a treaty of alliance - that is, it is

41 Regarding the postponement of this trip to South Korea and Japan, most Western analysts on Russian-Asian affairs raised the question of Russia’s domestic constraints for its official position on the Northern territorial dispute with Japan (for example, see Stephen Foye, ‘The Struggle over Russia’s Kurile Islands Policy’, RFE/RL, vol. 1, no. 36, 11 September 1992, pp. 34-40; Peggy F. Meyer, ‘Moscow’s Relations with Tokyo: Domestic Obstacles to a Territorial Agreement’, Asian Survey, vol. 33, no. 10, 1993, pp. 953-967; and Yakov Zinberg and Reinhard Drifte, ‘Chaos in Russia and the Territorial Dispute with Japan’, The Pacific Review, vol. 6, no. 3, 1993, pp. 277-284). Little attention was paid to the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty (and also other Korean issues) when explaining Yeltsin’s sudden postponement of this trip. Thus, the author would like to put the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty as equally important as the Russian-Japanese Northern territory dispute as one of the main reasons of Yeltsin’s sudden cancellation of his scheduled visits to Japan and South Korea.
not aimed against any third party. Russia and South Korea pledge to consider each other as friendly states. We are convinced that the treaty will pave the way still further for mutually advantageous cooperation'. 42 Georgiy Toloraya, chief of the Russian foreign ministry Korean department, also stated that 'the treaty which is intended to crown the Russian President’s stay in Seoul will consolidate the process of gravitation between our two countries, which in three years has travelled the path from mutual non-recognition and hostility to friendly partnership'. 43 For those who had this pro-South Korean stance, the conclusion of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty would help Russian's domestic economic programmes.

On the contrary, however, the Russian foreign ministry continued to regard the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty as active, despite the President's words. 44 Furthermore, in response to South Korea's demands, the view was expressed within the Russian foreign ministry that Russia as a great power should not bow to South Korean demands concerning its relationship with North Korea. 45 Their basic position was, for the Russian interests, the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty should be existed in any form in the post-Soviet era. In other words, Russia should have pursued a balanced dual policy towards the Korean peninsula for maximising its national interests in the region in the post-Soviet era.

Furthermore, the two sides (Russia and South Korea) had fundamentally different aims for the outcome of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty. Russia's main aims in concluding the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty were based on its economic interests. On the other hand, one of South Korea's main aims in concluding the treaty with Russia was primarily of political origin -
Russia's positive influence on North Korea, in particular, regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. (See Chapter 5.)

These opposite interests gradually led to a growing scepticism among South Koreans over relations with Russia. For the Russians, the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty had already generated many difficulties for relations between Russia and North Korea at the expense of its relations with South Korea, although at first sight the Yeltsin trip to South Korea was quite successful, especially in terms of economic cooperation. Based on these different positions and interests, the results of the conclusion of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty and the first Russian-South Korean summit were inevitably limited.

Despite several problems between Russia and South Korea, after the conclusion of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty their relations gradually expanded even towards the conclusion of agreements in the military field. Indeed, there were extensive military contacts between the two sides during this period of a kind that would have been unthinkable during the Soviet era. For example, in early October 1992, an official Russian delegation headed by Andrei Kokoshin, Russian first deputy defence minister, arrived in Seoul. This was the first visit by a Russian military leader to South Korea in the history of their military relations. General Yi Yang-ho, chairman of the South Korean Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Russia in September 1993.

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46 Yeltsin stated that 'in my view, this visit has at least a 99 per cent chance of success'. In particular, he emphasised the result of economic cooperation with South Korea. He stated that 'major projects worth a total of about $US 20 billion to $US 30 billion have been considered, for example, the construction of a gas pipeline from the Republic of Sakha [Yakutia] to South Korea'. Since we don't have the appropriate dock facilities, it is planned to lay this gas pipeline across North Korea, which for 20 years would not give permission for this. The President made the following statement in connection with this development: 'a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was in Moscow. We obtained only verbal agreement for laying the gas pipeline' (Izvestiia, 19 November 1992, pp. 1 and 4).

47 At the intergovernmental Russian-South Korean Committee for Scientific and Technical Cooperation met in Seoul, Russian science and education minister Boris Saltykov stated that 'bilateral cooperation which began between the two countries a couple of years ago is developing normally despite the pains of growing' ('Scientific, Technical Cooperation Discussed with ROK', Itar-Tass, 29 May 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-103, 1 June 1993, p. 18).
in order to strengthen mutual understanding and organise a military exchange between the two countries. The possibility of selling Russian arms to South Korea during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93) was even on the agenda.

Notably, during the first Russian-South Korean summit in Seoul in November 1992, the two ministers of defence signed a Memorandum of Understanding and Measures to Develop Ties between the Defence Ministries of Russia and South Korea in 1993. Under this memorandum, the two sides were to start direct military contacts for the first time in the history of their relations. The military memorandum also envisaged exchanges at the level of defence ministers, deputy ministers and heads of the General Staffs, visits of representatives of military schools and naval vessels.

More importantly, during the first summit in November 1992, Yeltsin assured South Korea that Russia would discontinue provision of military assistance to North Korea, and supported South Korea's demand to the effect that North Korea should permit the inspection of its nuclear facilities. These guarantees could be described as the fundamentals of Russian-South Korean military relations in the post-Soviet era.

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48 *Krasnata zvezda*, 31 August 1993, p. 3.
46 When Russian Vice Premier Alexander Shokhin visited Seoul in August 1993, he told South Korean officials that Russia was ready to offer South Korea its most advanced weapons and related systems as a way to pay off debts. Alexander Shokhin felt that it would be a mistake for South Korea to buy US-made Patriot missiles instead of Russia's S-300 anti-missile system. He also stated that Russia hoped to supply South Korea with defensive weapons to pay the principal and interest on $US 1.56 billion of soft loans extended by the state. However, the South Korean government reacted negatively to the Russian offer to provide weapons to South Korea to repay the principal and overdue interest on its loans (Japan Times [Tokyo], 29 August 1993, p. 5).
42 According to Grachev, the two defence ministers agreed to extend exchanges to the military-technical sphere. He pointed to the possibility of joint participation by Russian and South Korean representatives in the two countries' military exercises as observers ('Defence Ministers Sign Memorandum', *Itar-Tass*, 20 November 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-225, 20 November 1992, p. 12).
37 Russia called on North Korea to join an international convention on non-proliferation of chemical weapons and agree to inter-Korean inspections of nuclear facilities ('Kozyrev Urges DPRK to Agree to Nuclear Inspections', *Itar-Tass*, 21 November 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-226, 23 November 1992, p. 15).
Military cooperation between the two sides on the basis of the memorandum of understanding had two significant effects. First, the tense atmosphere of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula seemed to be fading away as cooperation developed between the former enemies even in the military field. In other words, in the post-Soviet era, by concluding the series of bilateral political and military treaties, the two sides (Russia and South Korea) attempted to adhere to the basic principles of the UN Charter and adopt similar approaches to the problems of peace, disarmament and the building a new structure of multipolar international relations as a friendly and cooperative alliance of nations.  

Secondly, the beginning of military cooperation on the basis of the memorandum of understanding would inevitably lead to a focus on the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, which defined relations between the former Soviet Union and North Korea as allies in the context of the Cold War system. Russia was about to conclude the military treaty with South Korea in the near future, and had to redefine relations with North Korea regarding the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. (See Chapter 3.)

In 1993, Russian-South Korean military cooperation was gaining momentum. In May of that year, the signing of a Memorandum on Cooperation in the Defence Industry between the South Korean Ministry of Trade, Industry and Power Engineering and the Russian Committee for the Defence Sectors of Industry signalled a specific step towards the involvement

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54 According to Georgiy Toloraya, head of the department for Korea at the Russian foreign ministry, 'Yeltsin's visit would help bring the relations between the two countries on a "higher level, similar to those of allies"' (‘South Korean Foreign Minister Arrives in Moscow for Talks’, Itar-Tass, 26 June 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-126, 30 June 1992, p. 17).

55 Russian deputy foreign minister Aleksandr Panov stated that 'Seoul and Moscow will be starting full-scale exchange visits between military personnel this year (1993) in order to get acquainted with each other and explore possibilities for future cooperation under an agreement signed between their defence ministers in Seoul in November 1992' (The Korea Herald [Seoul], 5 January 1993, pp. 2 and 5).
of South Korean businessmen in the transition of Russia factories from military-oriented to peacetime production.\textsuperscript{56}

Based on Russian-South Korean military cooperation, the 'Team Spirit' exercises (joint US-South Korean military exercises) of 1993 were even attended by a Russian observer for the first time. Russian defence minister Pavel Grachev stressed that in order to make practical steps in the military field, it was necessary to set up working groups in the two defence ministries to plan events for the following year. His counterpart, General Lee, noted that South Korea regarded Russia as a guarantor of stability in the Asia Pacific Region (APR). The two sides agreed to hold joint naval exercises.\textsuperscript{57}

What were Russia's aims and interests in expanding its bilateral ties with South Korea in the field of military cooperation and looking for military agreement? Two important factors should be considered here: (1) arms sales; and (2) conversion of the defence industry.

Especially, when the Russian Vice Premier Alexander Shokhin visited Seoul in August 1993, he revealed its official intentions about arms sales\textsuperscript{58} to South Korea because Russia was not able to repay its loans from South Korea.\textsuperscript{59} With the Russian economy in a weak position, the government sought to pay back its economic debts to South Korea in the form of arms transfers to South Korea instead of money. To this end, by concluding the military treaty with South Korea, there would be no practical (or real) barriers to deliveries of Russian arms to South Korea. As a result, in June 1993, for instance, South Korea stated its intention to purchase around 40 Russian high technologies, a

\textsuperscript{56}This document envisages cooperation between the two countries' business communities in the aerospace industry, electronics, the development of precise machine-building and new materials technologies. The two sides agreed to open information centres and forge direct links between the Korean Institute of Scientific-Technical Information and the All-Russian Institute of Inter-Sectoral Information ('Defence Industry Signs Cooperation Accords with ROK', Itar-Tass, 24 May 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-099, 25 May 1993, p. 18).


\textsuperscript{58}For details of Russia's arms sales in the post-Soviet era, see Igor Khripunov, 'Russia's Arms Trade in the Post-Cold War Period', Washington Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 4, 1994, pp. 79-94.

South Korean official declared at the third session of Russian-Korean Committee for Scientific and Technical Cooperation.\(^6^0\)

Russia's interests in expanding its bilateral ties with South Korea were also closely related to the conversion of its defence industry in the post-Soviet era.\(^6^1\) In this respect, Russia seemed to regard South Korea as the best possible partner.\(^6^2\) In fact, in 1992, the South Korean government, having considered Russian proposals for military cooperation, selected a number of projects in six fields: astronautics and outer-space research, communications; transport and ground-based equipment, ship-building and maritime equipment; chemical production and chemical materials, and products of general designation. These spheres of cooperation include the production of aircraft, avionics, testing equipment, small engines for pilot-less aircraft, the development of super-solid materials, ground-to-ship and ship-to-ship missiles, computer software and communication facilities.\(^6^3\)

By contrast, South Korea's interest in expanding its bilateral ties with Russia in the field of military cooperation was mainly based on the political question concerning the North Korean factor. In other words, South Korea started to be interested in concluding military treaties with Russia when the North Korean nuclear issue became an increasingly salient issue in the first half


\(^{62}\) For example, in September 1992, Aleksandr Titkin, the Russian industry minister, explained that 'South Korea has sophisticated technology in the field of consumer goods production, while in Russia vast capacities are being freed during conversion of the defence industry. At the same time, Russia has high technology in military production of a defensive character in which Seoul is interested' ('Industry Minister Visit ROK, Signed Memorandum', \textit{Itar-Tass}, 1 September 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-171, 2 September 1992, p. 8). In October 1992, Andrei Kokoshin, Russian first deputy defence minister, also stated that 'there are favourable opportunities for the development of industrial and commercial cooperation between Moscow and Seoul, including implementation of Russian defence industry conversion programmes' ('Russian Military Delegation Arrives in ROK for Talks', \textit{Itar-Tass}, 4 October 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-194, 6 October 1992, p. 13).

of the 1990s. At the same time, South Korea attempted to expand its military relations in the post-Soviet era, in order not to depend on the US totally.

Although there were some mutual advantages in the field of military cooperation, such cooperation was just in its initial stages, and remained largely dependent on US factors like the Cold War era.\textsuperscript{*4} Moreover, as regards the conversion of Russia's defence industry, South Korean minister for Science and Engineering, Kim Si-chung, at the third session of Russian-Korean Committee for Scientific and Technical Cooperation in June 1993, also stated that South Korea badly needed scientific information on research carried out in Russia. He pointed out that there was a serious information exchange gap.\textsuperscript{*5}

This clearly demonstrated that although Russian-South Korean relations had on the whole remained friendly and cooperative during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93), not everything was rosy between the two sides. Rather, in 1993, the atmosphere in their relations started to deteriorate.\textsuperscript{*6} The reasons for the problems between the two sides during this period can be summed up as follows. First, although there had been frequent high-level political contacts and the conclusion of political and military treaties between the two sides including the first Russian-South Korean summit, several key issues over which the former Soviet Union had confronted South Korea during the Soviet era had not been resolved as satisfactorily as South Korea had expected. One of the best examples of this was Russia's handling of the issues surrounding the 'empty' black box of the Korean Airline flight 007, shot down by a Soviet fighter in

\textsuperscript{*4} For example, in August 1992, Russian Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin in Seoul explicitly referred to the US factor in military cooperation between the two sides, stating that 'since South Korea has a close political ally the US, and it is evidently difficult for the South Korean leaders to take such decisions without consultations with the US... this deal [arms sales] should not upset the balance in Northeast Asia and in the APR' ('Shokhin Discusses Possible Russian Arms Deal with ROK', \textit{Itar-Tass}, 28 August 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-166, 30 August 1993, p. 19).


\textsuperscript{*6} Georgiy Kunadze, deputy foreign minister and ambassador-designate to South Korea (in December 1993), stated that '... the three-year-long diplomatic relations with South Korea have been based on stable experiences. We can say that these three years have been a period of getting out of a certain 'vain dream' and excessive expectations...' ('Ambassador-Designate to ROK Views Korean Issues', \textit{Radio Moscow}, 29 December 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-249, 30 December 1993, p. 16).
1983. Afterwards, there was increasingly growing scepticism among the Korean public about Russia's stance and its intentions.

Secondly, Russia appeared to be dissatisfied with its economic cooperation with South Korea. Russian-South Korean trade had continued to expand steadily, from $US 1.2 billion in 1992 to $US 1.57 billion in 1993. However, as Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1 indicate, South Korea's economic trade and investment in Russia during this period was insignificant.

Table 4.3 South Korea's Share in the Total Volume of Russia's Foreign Trade (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Korean Exports</strong></td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Korean Imports</strong></td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from data of Goskomstat of Russia; and Korea Foreign Trade Association.

South Koreans were also bitterly disappointed with the conclusion of a special state committee in Russia that Russia could not be held responsible for the shooting down of the KAL 007. For more detailed analysis of the KAL 007 incident, see Alexander Dallin, *Blackbox: KAL 007 and the Superpowers* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985); John Leppingwell, 'New Soviet Revelations about KAL 007', *RFE/RL*, vol. 3, no. 17, 26 April 1991, pp. 9-15; and G. M. Kornienko, *Kholodnaya voyna: Svidetel'stvie nekhotitnika* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994), pp. 210-233. A source in the Russian foreign ministry admitted that "the "black box" from the KAL 007 shot down in 1983 over Sakhalin Island, given by Yeltsin to South Korean President Roh, was not able to contain all of the cassettes with the parameters of the plane's flight. Only the "black box" itself and copies of tapes made in the plane's cockpit were handed over to Korean authorities ('Ministry Says ROK Not Given All '83 Plane Crash Tapes', *Itar-Tass*, 1 December 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-232, 2 December 1992, pp. 5-6).

In the field of economic and trade relations, Russia continued to put strong emphasis on its economic relations with South Korea. In particular, during the first Russian-South Korean summit in Seoul in November 1992, Yeltsin called for 'economic partnership' with South Korea ('Calls for Economic Partnership', *Itar-Tass*, 19 November 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-224, 19 November 1992, pp. 10-11).

1992 and 1993 data are from the Korean Trade Centre.
In the meantime, for the South Korean side, the major problems in its economic relationship with Russia are shown in Table 4.4.\textsuperscript{70}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Factor} & \textbf{Percentage} \\
\hline
Lack of Foreign Currency & 12.4\% \\
Bureaucratic Inefficiency & 8.8\% \\
Lack of Experience & 6.5\% \\
Lack of Information & 6.3\% \\
Difference in Trading Ways & 6.0\% \\
Possibility of Breaking Contract & 5.9\% \\
Difficulty in Selecting Partners & 5.3\% \\
Difficulty in Solving Problems & 5.3\% \\
Inefficient Communicating Means & 5.0\% \\
Difficulty in Communications & 4.1\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Difficulties in Trading with Russia (for South Korea)}
\end{table}

Source: Survey by the Korean Economic Association for Russia and published by Central Economic News (Seoul), 19 April 1992.

Problems over Russia's interest payment on Soviet loan put further strain on their relations. Table 4.5 gives the details of South Korea's loans to the former Soviet Union.71

Table 4.5 South Korea's Economic Assistance Loan to the Former Soviet Union (billion $US)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Terms of Contract</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bank Loan</td>
<td>principal: 1 billion US dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>maturity: 8 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>grace period: 3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>payment method: equal semi-annual payments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>interest: Libor + 1.25, 1.375%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade-related Loan</td>
<td>principal: 0.47 billion US dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>maturity: 2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>payment method: equal semi-annual payments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>interest: Libor + 1.375%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>principal: 1.47 billion US dollars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Another significant problem between the two sides during this period was that South Korea was less interested in improving relations with Russia than it had been with improving relations with the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. There were two important factors behind this position: (1) South Korea's New Diplomacy; and (2) Russia's loss of influence in the international arena.

With the advent of President Kim Young-sam's administration in South Korea, in early 1993, South Korea shifted its towards its strategic interests vis-

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à-vis Russia, although the latter still was and will be much more in a mid and long-term perspective a crucially important actor for South Korea and Northeast Asia. This policy was under the slogan of ‘globalisation’ (Segyewha in Korean), which placed relatively less emphasis on the ‘Russian factor’ in replacing the previous ‘Northern Policy’.

Russia, as a successor state to the former Soviet Union, did not exert as much political influence on North Korea to reduce the tension on the Korean peninsula as South Korea had expected. For instance, Russia was unable to put great deal of pressure on the North Korean government over the nuclear issue, and did not play any significant role in terms of economic issues on the security agenda in Northeast Asia. (See Chapter 5 and 6.) As a result, South Korea began to seek an improvement in its relations with China, which became the second major power to recognise the two Koreas in August 1992.

Besides, it should be noted here that there was an embassy property dispute between the two sides during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93). As part of the consultations which began with the establishment of official relations between Seoul and Moscow in 1990, Russia recently called for appropriate compensation. Especially, during the round of official bilateral consultations which ended in Seoul on 3 June 1993, Russia presented South Korea with proof of its ownership rights to the plot of land of the former Russian mission in Seoul. For the Russian side, the aim was to settle the issue of Russia’s rights to property seized from it by the Seoul government during the years when there were no official relations between the two countries. In fact, a discussion of this problem had been under way since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Seoul and Moscow in 1990. However, in December 1993, South

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72 In May 1993, President Kim Young-sam made a speech on the ‘Pacific Era and South Korea’s New Diplomacy’ at the Pacific Basin Economic Councils (PSEC) International General Meeting in Seoul, South Korea. In his speech, he laid down a general direction for South Korea’s new diplomacy including its new world and future outlooks as well as a new approach to unification. There were five fundamentals for South Korea’s new diplomacy: (1) globalism; (2) diversification; (3) multidimensionalism; (4) regional cooperation; and (5) future orientation (See Sung-joo Han, ‘Fundamentals of Korea’s New Diplomacy: New Korea’s Diplomacy toward the World and the Future’, Korea and World Affairs, vol. 17, no. 2, 1993, pp. 229-243).
Korea turned down Russia's proposals on ways for the Seoul government to pay compensation for Russian-owned land in Seoul which was appropriated in the 1870s.⁷³

As seen above, during this early stage of its foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula, Russia made considerable active efforts to develop relations with South Korea whilst concluding several important political and military treaties which would be the new legal foundation for their further relations in the post-Soviet era. Nevertheless, in general, Russia did not succeed in accomplishing its goals in relation to South Korea, which only proved its incapability to conduct an effective foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula. Internally, there were continually contradictory and inconsistent views on the issue of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty within the upper echelons of the Russian leadership. Moreover, as regards the Russian-South Korean military treaties, the post-Soviet international system had never been favourable for both sides.⁷⁴ In other words, Russia was not able to have partnership relations with South Korea based on political and military treaties while having still relations with North Korea based on the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. Furthermore, it should be also noted that South Korea had still an allied relationship with the US, which was based on the Cold War system in the post-Soviet era. This was an extraordinary example of relationship building from the previous ideological basis to the post-Soviet realities. Russia's policy towards South Korea had begun to be reactive as the result of both internal and external factors.

⁷⁴ Although the Cold War was over, Russian-Korean relations were still governed by the basic structure of the Cold War system. This meant that Russia should have an appropriate dual policy towards the two Koreas like the Soviet era.
4.3. In Search of a Mutually Constructive and Complementary Partnership? (Dec. 93-Dec. 95)

The remarkable success of the former communists and ultra-nationalists in the December 1993 parliamentary elections forced Yeltsin's pro-Western government toward a more nationalistic foreign policy direction. As a result, a new consensus on Russia's Korean policy emerged in favor of a more balanced stance towards the Korean peninsula during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). In other words, Russia attempted to reformulate its Korean policy in line with its new domestic political forces and institutions and within a new international order after the December 1993 parliamentary elections.

In these circumstances, there were still significant developments for political and military cooperation on the basis of treaties between Russia and South Korea during this period. Especially, several important bilateral treaties were concluded between the two sides during this period. First, a memorandum on mutual understanding between the Defence Ministries of Russia and South Korea and a declaration on Military Cooperation between the two countries were signed when South Korean defence minister Yi Yang-ho visited Moscow in April 1994. In the words of Russian defence minister Pavel Grachev, these documents reflected the intention of the two sides to develop broader cooperation and determine the main military events within the framework of formal links between the two countries' military departments in 1994-95.

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75 According to Roald Savel'ev, acting director of the Centre for Korean Studies, 'life shows that mutual relations with Seoul cannot be built without taking into account Pyongyang's opinion... bias in favor of one of the partners could weaken our position in the region as a whole... observing balance in mutual relations with the two Koreas is especially important for Russia' ('Problems of Ties with ROK, DPRK Viewed', Rossiiskie vesti, 26 May 1994, p. 3 in FBIS-SOV 94-103, 27 May 1994, p. 12).

76 According to Eugene and Natasha Bazhanov, 'If ultra-nationalists should grab power, the picture could become one-sided again, this time in North Korea's favor: Ultranationalists would certainly drive a worldwide confrontation within the US, with predictable consequences for Moscow's relations with South Korea and North Korea. The Korean peninsula would again become a front of Cold War' (Eugene and Natasha Bazhanov, 'The Evolution of Russian-Korean Relations: External and Internal Factors' Asian Survey, vol. 34, no. 9, 1994, p. 796).

At the meeting with the South Korean defence minister, Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev also stressed that 'not only do we no longer look at each other down the barrel of a gun, we are ready to cooperate in setting up these relations for the joint security of friendly states and to have full-scale military cooperation'. This reflected the Russian government's commitment to establishing active military cooperation with South Korea, whilst proposing the creation of a new collective security system in the APR.

Secondly, the two sides signed a Joint Russian-Korean Declaration and Protocol on Consultations between foreign ministries at the second Russian-South Korean summit, held in Moscow in June 1994. In fact, the highest point of Russian-South Korean political relations during this period was South Korean President Kim Young-sam's visit to Moscow in June 1994 where he and Russian President Yeltsin issued a joint declaration stating that relations between the two countries were developing into a 'constructive mutually complementary partnership based on the common values of freedom, democracy, legality, respect for human rights and a market economy'. His two sessions with Yeltsin produced major results that were summed up in a 13-point joint communiqué. The two sides also agreed to set up a joint committee to promote cooperation in trade, investment and technological exchange. Trade ministers from the two countries exchanged memoranda of understanding on the establishment of the Korea-Russia Trade Committee during their talks in Moscow. A special place in the talks was reserved for analysis of the situation on the Korean peninsula in connection with the issue of nuclear non-

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80 Highlighting the results were Russia's agreement to take part in international sanctions against North Korea in connection with the nuclear issue, Russia's assurance that its military alliance with North Korea has, in effect, become invalid and an agreement to establish a hot-line between Chong Wa Dae [the Korean presidential office] and the Kremlin (Hankuk Ilbo [Seoul], 3 June 1994, pp. 1-2). For more details of the full text, see Appendix 5.
proliferation. In fact, North Korea’s nuclear programme overshadowed Kim Young-sam’s visit to Moscow in June 1994. Yeltsin also told his South Korean counterpart that his government gave a new interpretation to the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty regarding its obligation to help North Korea in case of war involving North Korea.\(^2\) (See Chapter 3.)

Thirdly, a Memorandum on Mutual Understanding with Regard to Military Contacts Between the Defence Ministries of the Russian Federation and South Korea was signed when Russian defence minister Pavel Grachev visited South Korea in May 1995. The memorandum provided for the exchange of military experts and personnel, sharing military intelligence and the purchase by South Korea of Russian military equipment.\(^3\) Based on those military agreements between the two sides, there were frequent contacts in the military arena. For instance, just after Grachev’s visit to Seoul in May 1995, the chief of staff of the South Korean Air Forces Kim Hong-nae arrived in Moscow. As a source in the Russian defence minister told the Interfax news agency, he was primarily interested in MiG-29 fighters.\(^4\)

What were Russia’s aims in concluding these political and military treaties with South Korea during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95)?

Faced with the North Korean nuclear issue, Russia continuously advocated the creation of a multilateral conference for an Asian security system and looked for support for its proposal from other major powers in the APR (at least, in Northeast Asia). In these circumstances, by concluding more political and military treaties with South Korea, Russia sought ‘treaty-based support’ from South Korea to implement its regional [security and economic] policy in

\(^2\) During the talks, Yeltsin stated that ‘Article 1 of the 1961 Treaty between the Soviet Union and North Korea stipulating Moscow’s military intervention can be regarded as dead now’ (*Ibid.*, p. 4).

\(^3\) ‘Grachev Signs Military Memorandum’, *Itar-Tass*, 19 May 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-097, 19 May 1995, p. 13. Russian defence minister Pavel Grachev even stated in Seoul that ‘Russia has raised the question of a regional security system in Northeast Asia and, especially, a sub-regional system at the Seoul negotiations. In the words of the minister, the sub-regional system could involve Russia, China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea and the US’ (*Quoted on Regional Security System*, *Itar-Tass*, 20 May 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-098, 22 May 1995, p. 14).

the region. Nonetheless, it was obvious that Russia was still more interested in expanding its economic relations with South Korea through these political and military agreements. In other words, Russia’s real purpose in founding good relations with South Korea still mainly originated from its economic interests.

Russia’s arms sales and debts to South Korea were still closely related to the new agreements between the two sides. Russia continued to promote arms sales to South Korea and to seek South Korean assistance with the conversion of its defence industry as before (Dec. 91-Dec. 93). In August 1994, for instance, South Korea agreed to accept from Russia, in lieu of repayment of part of its $US 1.47 billion debt, high-tech arms such as jet fighter planes and rockets. A Russian military-industrial complex spokesman advised that the proposed contract was estimated to be worth at least $US 100 million.85

Also, when defence minister Grachev visited South Korea in May 1995, the two sides signed an agreement on the supply of modern weaponry - primarily T-80U tanks, BMP-3 infantry combat vehicles, AT-7 anti-tank and SA-16 anti-aircraft missiles, ammunition and parts - as payment in kind of its debt.86 A Russian military official reportedly said in May 1995 that ‘this document (A Memorandum on Mutual Understanding with Regard to Military Contacts Between the Defence Ministries of the Russian Federation and South Korea) gives the go-ahead for supplies to Russian military equipment to South Korea’.87

As regards the problem of Russian debts to South Korea, the two sides dealt with the repayment problem by rescheduling the outstanding debt in July 1995. Under this arrangement, payments of $US 450.7 million in arrears ($US 391.8 million, the amount in arrears through 1993, plus $US 58.9 million in interest accrued through 1995) were rescheduled. This amount was repackaged into a new loan with a principal (amortisation) payment for the period between

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85 Nezavisimaja gazeta, 5 August 1994, p. 4.
86 Jane’s Defence Weekly, 13 May 1995, p. 3.
1995 and 1998. At the same time, some other contractual terms such as interest rates were also changed. Details of the rescheduled payment plan are shown in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6 Payment Schedule for South Korean Loan to Russia
(million $US)

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principal and Interest</td>
<td>391.8</td>
<td>405.2</td>
<td>243.4</td>
<td>230.1</td>
<td>216.3</td>
<td>202.3</td>
<td>143.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$1.83 billion: Principal ($1.47 billion) + Interest ($0.36 billion)</td>
<td></td>
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Source: Sang-moon Hahn and Joon-hwan Im, Debt Management and the Russian Debt Problem (Seoul: Korea Institute of Finance, 1996), p. 64.

In the meantime, South Korea was also interested in developing and concluding other bilateral treaties with Russia. For example, during the Russian-South Korea summit in Moscow in June 1994, a number of other documents were signed, including intergovernmental agreements on cooperation in protection of the environment, on preventing incidents at sea outside territorial waters, and on the protection of migratory birds, and also a protocol on consultations between the Russian foreign ministry and the South Korean foreign ministry. In the field of economic agreements, South Korea and Russia agreed to jointly develop a natural gas field in Yakutia autonomous republic in eastern Siberia to supply gas through a pipeline to Seoul. When Vladimir Shumeiko, chairman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, visited South Korea in November 1994, he proposed that there should be documents setting out the principles of cooperation between the two parliaments, and put forward the idea of signing a joint statement on cooperation. A programme of cultural cooperation between

South Korea and Russia for 1995-96 was signed in Seoul.\textsuperscript{90} Russia and South Korea signed a memorandum in Seoul on cooperation between the two countries in postal and electronic communications, which immediately came into force for an unlimited period.\textsuperscript{91}

In late February 1995, Moscow and Seoul signed a five-year agreement on economic cooperation in Seoul.\textsuperscript{92} In July 1995, an agreement between the government of the Russian Federation and South Korea on settling part of the Foreign Economic Bank’s debt was signed in Seoul by Oleg Davydov, deputy Chairman of the Russian government, and Hong Chae-young, deputy prime minister of South Korea.\textsuperscript{93} In September 1995, Russian and South Korean prime ministers (Chernomyrdin and Yi Hong-ku) signed a declaration on the encouragement of bilateral trade and economic, scientific and technical cooperation.\textsuperscript{94} In November 1995, a draft ‘Memorandum on Mutual Understanding Between the Russian Government and South Korean Government on Industrial Cooperation’ was approved.\textsuperscript{95}

It should be emphasised that South Korea’s main interest in concluding such political, economic and military treaties with Russia was fundamentally aimed at providing a legal basis to undermine Russia’s assistance to North Korea. For example, when the tensions of the North Korean nuclear crisis became acute in 1994, the South Korean side strongly insisted that Russia stop supporting North Korea on the basis of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty and that it should even consider abolishing it. (See Chapter 3.)

\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Rossiiskie vesti}, 22 November 1995, p. 3.
Another reason for South Korea's interest in expanding its ties with Russia in the field of political and military cooperation related to South Korea's policy of diversifying its politico-military relations with other major powers such as Russia and China in Northeast Asia in the post-Soviet era. For this purpose, in early 1996, for example, South Korea attempted to conclude military logistics and procurement agreements with Canada, Russia and Romania. A South Korean official of the defence ministry stated that 'it was moving to establish agreements with as many countries as possible on a selective basis to diversify its sources of military hardware and software, heavily concentrated on the United States'. This was part of a deliberate attempt by South Korea to avoid tilting towards the US in the post-Soviet era.

As mentioned above, there were remarkable bilateral developments on the basis of their interests and the conclusion of political and military agreements between the two sides, although they still had fundamentally different interests during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). This meant that there were obvious limitations to the development of further relations between the two sides both in terms of political and military cooperation. First, the US factor in the Russian-South Korean relations should be still considered when examining their relations. This demonstrated that the US factor inevitably affected Russia's arms sale to South Korea. Rather, the South Korean defence ministry discussed the possibility of using Russian armaments for training and in experimental programmes. South Korea's use of US arms was seen as incompatible with the Russian system. Moreover, it should be emphasised that the South Korean side could not agree any further military relations with Russia without US consent. As Krasnaia zvezda noted, the talks on weapon deals were abruptly

96 The Korea Times (Seoul), 4 February 1996, p. 3.
97 According to a high-ranking South Korean military official, 'it was difficult to include Russian military hardware in the arsenal of the South Korean armed forces, because the latter were organised and equipped according to the American system' ("South Korea May Use Russian Weapons for Training", Itar-Tass, 27 January 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-019, 28 January 1994, p. 9). For the debate of this matter [US factor in Russian-South Korean relations] by the Russian side, see Izvestia, 24 February 1996, p. 3.
put on hold because of pressure from the US. The US government was concerned that MiG-29s and S-300 tactical missile interceptors might compete against US F-16Ms and Patriots.\(^{28}\)

Secondly, there were still different approaches to the issue of arms sales and debt between the two sides. For example, in August 1994, the South Korean government partly agreed with Moscow’s proposals to repay a portion of its debt in the form of deliveries of Russian armaments. However, according to the Yonhap news agency, the South Korean government did not agree that Moscow delivered armaments costing almost half of the debt which amounted to $US 650 million.\(^{29}\) South Korea hoped to base these relations on licensing, supplies of spares and production of Russian-designed material at South Korean plants. Russia did not reject this form of cooperation, but favoured greater cooperation on military-technical issues and the delivery of material made in Russia.\(^{100}\) As Figure 3.3 shows (See Chapter 3: p. 88.), Russian arms sales to South Korea accounted for a very small proportion of its total worldwide arms sales.

Thirdly, for the South Korean side, the political value of Russia was diminishing rapidly due to its internal instability and weakening international position, especially its diminishing ability to influence North Korea’s nuclear policy. In the meantime, the Russian side, especially in the rejection of its proposed international conference by South Korea, was deeply affected in its Korean policy direction. (See Chapters 3 and 5.) This indicated that Russia was not able to demonstrate its capacity to influence North Korea when faced with the North Korean nuclear crisis and the abolition of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty. In other words, Russia failed to persuade North Korea to rejoin the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and the abolition of

\(^{28}\) Krasnaiia zvezda, 18 September 1993, p. 4.


reinterpretation of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty, which was an essential prerequisite for military cooperation between Russia and South Korea was not clearly resolved between them during this period. This restricted South Korea's more active consideration of its cooperation with Russia. This clearly demonstrated that the theory of military cooperation between Russia and South Korea differed from the reality of such cooperation in Northeast Asia in the post-Soviet era.

As a result, relations between the two sides were not very satisfactory for either side. One of the best examples of this dissatisfaction was the postponement of a high-level Russian official's visit to South Korea. In May 1994, for instance, the first session of the joint intergovernmental Russian-South Korean economic, scientific and technical commission session, planned to open in Seoul, was put off at the very last moment.\(^{101}\) Russian Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin had been scheduled to visit Seoul at this time to discuss a wide range of trade and economic relations before the South Korean President's visit to Russia.\(^{102}\) It should be noted that this situation occurred at a time of acute crisis in North Korea. Russia's proposal for the international conference was also rejected immediately prior to his scheduled visit.\(^{103}\)

As regards economic relations between the two sides, the most problematic matter was still Russia's inability to repay loans made by South Korea to the former Soviet Union and to Russia. In turn, Russia did not receive as much economic benefit from South Korea as it had expected. For example, at the end of 1995, the overall amount of South Korean investment was about $US 50 million spread over 59 projects, most of which related to the trade and

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services sector.\textsuperscript{104} The steady expansion of trade and economic cooperation (see Figure 4.2) had not been accompanied by a commensurate growth in direct investment in Russia (as Figure 4.3 indicates, South Korea was not one of the top 10 investors in Russia).\textsuperscript{105} Only thirty Russian-South Korean joint ventures had been established by early 1995. Overall, South Korean investment in Russia was still very modest, standing at only about $US 50 million.\textsuperscript{106}

\textbf{Figure 4.2} South Korea’s Trade with Russia, 1991-96

\begin{center}
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\end{center}


\textsuperscript{105} For the details of foreign investment in Russia, see B. Pichugin, ‘\textit{Inostranye chastanye investitsii v Rossii}’, \textit{Mirovaja ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia}, no. 12, 1994, pp. 15-25.

\textsuperscript{106} Valery Denissov, ‘Russia in the APR: Problems of Security and Cooperation’, \textit{International Affairs} (Moscow), no. 4-5, 1995, p. 75.
As regards compensation for Russian property in Seoul, in January 1995, after more than four years of negotiations, South Korea agreed to a Russian demand to pay compensation for confiscating Russian real estate in the 1870s in the centre of Seoul, at one time the location of the Russian mission and later the USSR General Consulate.\textsuperscript{107}

During this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95), Russia attempted to build up new relations with South Korea based on a mutually constructive and complementary partnership by concluding several important political and military treaties which would be the legal foundation for their relations in the post-Soviet era. Nevertheless, Russia did not succeed in establishing its relations with South Korea as the Russian side had expected. Rather, their relations showed an estimation of how much further their relations could develop after the conclusion of the Russian-South Korea Basic Treaty.

\textsuperscript{107} At first the Koreans expressed their desire not to return the land parcel to the Russians. They based this on the fact that the land had been nationalised and Moscow's claims had no legal validity. South Korea preferred to resolve the dispute based on an exchange of land parcels. Incidentally, the value of our "former" land parcel in Seoul is assessed today by specialists as amounting to close to SUS 400 million (\textit{Izvestiia}, 17 January 1995, p. 3).
especially concerning military relations, as the result of both internal and external factors.

Internally, there obviously existed some contradictory and inconsistent views on the issue of the Russian-South Korean economic and military treaties within the upper echelons of the Russian leadership. For example, in May 1994 at the very last moment there was the cancellation of a high-ranking Russian official’s visit to South Korea (led by Vice Premier Shokhin) for the first session of the joint intergovernmental Russian-South Korean economic, scientific and technical commission session. This cancellation of the visit can be also understood as follows. The visit was mainly designed to enhance Russia’s economic interests in the Korean peninsula. However, those who were more interested in Russia’s great power status than in its economic interests in the Russian leadership did not seem to consent to the scheduled visit to South Korea. As mentioned earlier, this situation occurred immediately after Russia’s proposal for an international conference was rejected. Externally, the post-Soviet international system continued to be unfavourable for the Russian side. (See Chapters 5 and 6.)

Russia’s policy towards South Korea had become more reactive for these reasons, despite its active efforts.

4.4. A Shaky Partnership? (Dec. 95-Jul. 96)

Unlike previous years, fewer significant bilateral treaties between the two sides were concluded during this period (Dec. 95-Jul. 96). For example, on the one hand, a number of Russian experts believed that South Korea’s experience was more appropriate for Russia than America’s or Europe’s. However, on the other hand, Roal’d Savel’ev, acting director of the Centre for Korean Studies, believed that ‘Life shows that mutual relations with Seoul cannot be built without taking into account Pyongyang’s opinion... Bias in favour of one of the partners could weaken our position in the region as a whole’ (Rossiskie vesti, 26 May 1994, p. 3).

However, it should be noted that Russia and South Korea planned to improve the bilateral treaty governing legal relations between the two sides, according to consultations between director of the
In February 1996, Russia and South Korea concluded a protocol to promote further economic cooperation, strengthen business contacts and boost mutual trust between the business communities of the two countries. Under the accord, the two sides would provide active channels for bilateral cooperation on, information exchange and materials pertaining to economic development policies. In March 1996, Russia and South Korea signed a Memorandum of Understanding to crack down on the illegal trafficking of narcotics and psychotropic substances between the two countries. In June 1996, Russia and South Korea held talks about signing a mutual legal assistance treaty involving criminal matters such as drug and arms trafficking.

The reasons why there were no significant political and military treaties concluded between the two sides during this period (Dec. 95-Jul. 96) were as follows. First and foremost, after the December 1995 parliamentary election, the Russian leadership attempted more vigorously to improve bilateral relations with North Korea. Indeed, the looming Russian presidential election meant that the Russian leadership needed to demonstrate its good relations with former allies such as North Korea in order to sustain its major power status in Northeast Asia. In other words, to gain ground in the presidential election, each Russian candidate had to emphasise good relations with countries over which

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**Notes:**
- In February 1996, Russia and South Korea concluded a protocol to promote further economic cooperation, strengthen business contacts and boost mutual trust between the business communities of the two countries. Under the accord, the two sides would provide active channels for bilateral cooperation on, information exchange and materials pertaining to economic development policies.
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**References:**
- The Korea Times (Seoul), 22 March 1996, p. 9.

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13. The December 1995 parliamentary election confirmed the continuing strength of the conservative-nationalists who constantly rebuked the Yeltsin administration for its emasculated foreign policy. On the Korean peninsula, pro-North Korean forces came up to the front after the December 1995 parliamentary election in full. Indeed, across a broad spectrum of society one found the feeling that improved relations with North Korea would enhance Russia's position on the Korean peninsula. As Valentin Moiseev, deputy director of the first Asian department of the ministry of foreign affairs of Russia, believed that the trend of a constructive restoration of bilateral ties with the former Soviet Union's allies was more actively bolstered after the December 1995 parliamentary election, together
the former Soviet Union had exercised its superpower status during the Soviet era.

Another significant reason for the limitation of the political and military relations between the two sides during this period was the US and South Korean-led 'four-party talks',\(^\text{114}\) in which South Korea and the US set a new rule for dealing with North Korea while excluding again Russia (and Japan) in the building of a new peace regime on the Korean peninsula.\(^\text{115}\) This repeatedly demonstrated the limitations of Russian-South Korean cooperation in both the political and military arenas while the US and South Korea solidified their military alliance once again on the basis of the 1953 US-South Korean Treaty.\(^\text{116}\) In turn, South Korea displayed its dissatisfaction with Russia’s policy of expanding and raising the level of political, economic and cultural ties between Russia and North Korea.

Relations between Russia and South Korea were undergoing an endurance test during this period. Russia only proved its incapability to conduct an effective foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula. The partnership with South Korea was still extremely shaky.

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with the appointment of Primakov as a Russian foreign minister at an early date in 1996 (Valentin Moiseev, ‘On the Korean Settlement’, *International Affairs* [Moscow], vol. 43, no. 3, 1997, p. 67).

\(^\text{114}\) Kim Young-sam and Bill Clinton put forward a four-party (two Koreas, China and the US) peace proposal on 16 April 1996. For the details of this, see Chapter 6.

\(^\text{115}\) In the middle of April 1996, North Korea sent forces into the Joint Security Area (JSA) in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in violation of the armistice treaty which has maintained peace and stability on the Korean peninsula for the past four decades. To maximise the effects of the provocation, the North violated the DMZ just days before the parliamentary elections in the South. As regards the ‘four-party talks’, Yevgeniy Primakov stated that ‘relations between Moscow and Seoul are “growing pains”’ (*Primakov Comments on Talks with South Korean Counterpart*, *Itar-Tass*, 7 May 1996 in FBIS-SOV 96-090, 7 May 1996). At the inauguration evening of the Korea-Russia Culture Council in March 1996, Kunadze also stated that ‘it is important for Koreans to know that Russia is one of the greatest countries in the world... Problems are temporary: Russia is forever’ (*MNU Minister, Russian Envoy Inaugurate Culture Council*, *Yonhap*, 25 March 1996 in FBIS-EAS 96-038, 25 March 1996).

\(^\text{116}\) During an interview with *Seoul Shinmun*, South Korean defence minister Yi Yang-ho stated that ‘our military has established a firm defense posture by maintaining a perfect posture for an all-out war and by developing the ROK-US combined defense posture’. He went on argue that ‘following the end of the Cold War, international relations have become more complicated. The situation in neighboring countries is changeable, and conflicts have become diverse, amplifying uncertainty. Based on the ROK-US alliance, we will diversify military diplomacy and increase cooperation with neighboring countries, including Japan, the PRC and Russia, in order to guarantee national interests’ (*Seoul Shinmun* [Seoul], 12 February 1996 p. 5).
5.1. From a Principal Player to a Major Mediator? (1985-91)

The Soviet Union demonstrated little interest in creating or participating in regional security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) during the Cold War era. Instead, it seemed to focus on concluding bilateral treaties such as the Soviet-North Korean Treaty, the Soviet-Chinese Treaty and the Soviet-Mongolian Treaty in order to maintain its politico-security influence against the US in Northeast Asia.¹ This meant that, although the Soviet Union was reluctant to extend a multilateral alliance comprising pro-American countries of the region (the so-called ‘triangular Washington-Tokyo-Seoul’ relationship),² it did not seem to have a pressing reason to develop regional security cooperation with other communist countries in this region. In reality, the Soviet Union was an absolute superpower based on its military [nuclear] capabilities directed


² During the Cold War era, security in the entire Northeast Asian region was maintained on the basis of a network of bilateral security arrangements with the US playing the central role. Unlike Europe, no region-wide security regime was created in Northeast Asia. The security dimension was worse than the economic dimension. There was nothing like an Northeast Asian-region equivalent of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE: formerly CSCE). See Dong-yoon Shin, Korea-US-Japan Security Cooperation (Maxwell AFB, Ala: Air War College, Air University, 1983).
towards the Korean peninsula and its provision of military equipment to North Korea during the Cold War era.

As regards the nuclear issue in Northeast Asia, the Soviet Union primarily regarded the Korean peninsula as a potential nuclear threat to its security interests in the Soviet Far East due to both its geographical proximity to the Korean peninsula as the Map 5.1 shows and its ideological struggle against the US in the region.

**Map 5.1 Russia’s Geographical Proximity to the Korean Peninsula**

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This led the Soviet Union to view the nuclear challenge as emanating not from North Korea's secret activities, but rather from the presence of the US nuclear weapons in South Korea.4

For this reason, the Soviet Union helped North Korea to create a solid base for a coincidence of their mutual interests in both the strategic and ideological spheres on the Korean peninsula. On the one hand, the Soviet Union became a principal supplier of the North Korean nuclear programmes from the 1950s onwards.5 For example, under the cooperation agreement concluded between the Soviet Union and North Korea, a nuclear research centre was constructed near the small town of Yongbyon. In 1965 a Soviet IRT-2M research reactor was assembled for this centre. From 1965 through to 1973 fuel enriched to 10 per cent was supplied to North Korea for this reactor. In early 1980s, with Soviet assistance, North Korea was able to construct a 5 megawatt-electric (Mwe) gas-cooled, graphite moderated nuclear reactor. Fuelled with natural uranium, this reactor became operational in 1986.6 North Korea had a total of 250 researchers trained at the Dubna Institute.7 As a result, all the nuclear facilities in North Korea were built primarily with technological assistance from the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. On the other hand,


6 Komsomol’skaia pravda, 13 July 1994, p. 3.

the Soviet Union and North Korea often demanded that the US withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea.

This clearly demonstrated that the Soviet Union was the sole leading power which could influence North Korea's nuclear programmes within the framework of its regional security policy in Northeast Asia. In a word, the Soviet Union had an absolute dominance over the Korean peninsula in terms of security/nuclear matters against the US in Northeast Asia during the Cold War era (from 1945 up to 1984).

However, Soviet security policy and the North Korean nuclear issue began to change with Gorbachev's coming to power in 1985. Gorbachev attempted to define a new Soviet role in the APR and launched a new approach to the problems of regional security and bilateral relations with the USSR's Asian neighbours. In this context, the Soviet Union began to seek to cooperate with Western powers in international affairs on the basis of his New Political Thinking.

It should be emphasised that Gorbachev's regional security policy in the APR centred around his proposals for a collective security system in Asia. By

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11 For example, the cooperation of the two superpowers during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91 confirmed how far they had moved from rivalry to reconciliation. See Alvin Rubinstein, 'Moscow and the Gulf War: Decisions and Consequences', International Journal, vol. 49, no. 2, 1994, pp. 301-327.

For the first time in the speech in which Gorbachev welcomed Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi to Moscow on 21 May 1985, and for the second time in his Vladivostok address on 28 July 1986,
returning to the basic idea of Brezhnev’s Asian collective security system, Gorbachev sought to bring stability and predictability to international relations in the region and to play a significant role in determining the future security architecture of the region. Indeed, Gorbachev attempted to take the initiative on regional security cooperation, although his attempts at policy change on the regional security front were eventually aimed at developing domestic reforms. For instance, Gorbachev proposed massive disarmament measures including unilateral military cuts, and actively sought détente with the US in Europe as well as in the APR. This approach formed the core of New Political Thinking and provided a fundamental reason for changing Soviet external behaviour. This redefinition in turn brought about revisions in the traditional Soviet concept of security (absolute security) and produced new concepts such as ‘common security’, ‘reasonable security’ and ‘defensive defence’.

As regards the North Korean nuclear issue, there were inevitably gradual changes of Soviet position during the Gorbachev era on the basis of New Political Thinking. For example, upon discovering that North Korea was building a reactor, the US asked the Soviet Union to urge North Korea to join

12 Gorbachev proposed to hold an all-Asian (and Pacific) forum on security. For the details of his proposals, see In. V. Yanin, ed., SSSR i Koreia (Moscow: Glavnaia redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury, 1988), pp. 320-224.
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (henceforth, NPT).\footnote{By 1984, a US reconnaissance satellite had detected the construction of a second and larger Soviet-style reactor at Yongbyon (Joseph Bermudez, 'North Korea's Nuclear Programme', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, September 1991, p. 409). For a more detailed explanation of the origins of the non-proliferation treaty, see John Simpson, 'Global non-proliferation Policies: Retrospect and Prospect', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 8, no. 2, 1982, pp. 69-72.} North Korea finally joined the NPT in December 1985, persuaded to do so by the Soviet Union.\footnote{North Korea joined the IAEA in September 1974, but did not accede to the 'NPT' until December 1985. The NPT has strengthened the IAEA safeguard system. The NPT entered in force from March 1970. The treaty obliges all parties to refrain from facilitating the acquisition of nuclear explosives. For more detailed explanation of the origins of the NPT, see Georges Fischer, *The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon* (London: Europa Publications, 1971), pp. 3-18.} The US also requested the Soviet Union to urge North Korea to allow a comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)\footnote{The IAEA was founded in 1957 as an international agency attached to the UN as a result of the 'Atomic for Peace' proposal initiated by US President Eisenhower in 1953. This UN agency, with headquarters in Vienna, has two main objectives. It is designed to promote the civilian uses of nuclear energy and work to prevent the use of nuclear technology or fuels for arms production. For a more detailed account of the IAEA non-proliferation and safeguards, see *IAEA Safeguards: Anns, Limitation, Achievements* (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1983).} safeguards inspection in 1984.\footnote{Mazarr, 'North Korea's Nuclear Programme', p. 295.}

When requested by the US, Soviet officials seemed to have two tactics to persuade North Korea to accept their demands. First, the Soviet Union warned that four light-water reactors promised by party leader Konstantin Chernenko a year earlier would not be forthcoming unless North Korea complied. Secondly, the Soviet Union noticed that North Korea's acceptance of an IAEA safeguards inspection would help to persuade the US to withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea.\footnote{Selig S. Harrison, 'The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: from Stalemate to Breakthrough', *Arms Control Today*, vol. 24, no. 9, 1994, p. 19.} Furthermore, the Soviet Union also attempted to use economic pressure to force North Korea to comply with the proposed IAEA inspection.

Suspicions of North Korea's nuclear weapon programme became a thorny issue in the international arena from the late 1980s.\footnote{Jin-hyun Park divided North Korea's nuclear development into four periods as follows: (1) first phase: nuclear issue emerged (February 1989-August 1991); (2) second phase: basic framework agreed (September 1991-February 1992); (3) third phase: implementation and exposure (March 1992-February 1993); and (4) fourth phase: crisis and the impasse (March 1993-) (Jin-hyun Park, 'Nuclear Conundrum: Analysis and Assessment of Two Korea's Policy Regarding the Nuclear Issue', *Korea and World Affairs*, vol. 17, no. 4, 1993, pp. 629-635).} North Korea was suspected of having removed fuel containing enough plutonium for one or two
bombs for its nuclear-weapons programme. However, North Korea vigorously denied any plan to build nuclear weapons, saying it was seeking only to build a peaceful power industry to generate electricity. Consequently, in February 1989, North Korea’s nuclear programme started to emerge as an important policy issue facing South Korea, as well as the international community, when the Board of Governors of the IAEA raised the issue of North Korea’s delay in endorsing a ‘safeguards agreement’.21

Faced with this situation, the Soviet Union redoubled its efforts to persuade North Korea to renounce its nuclear programme. For example, the Soviet Union stopped supplying nuclear fuels to North Korea in September 1990.22 Thereafter, North Korea sought to accelerate its nuclear programme independently.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that during Gorbachev’s early period (at least, up to the 19th Party Conference in the middle of 1988) the Soviet leadership basically still supported the North Korean side over its nuclear programme, although they did not want either North Korea or South Korea to become a nuclear power.23 Gorbachev’s position on the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula in the period from 1985 up to the middle of 1988 can be summed up as follows: (1) US nuclear weapons had to be immediately

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21 It should be mentioned that North Korea did not enter into an NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA until 1992, more than 6 years after joining the NPT. Furthermore, North Korea had placed several political conditions on its acceptance of safeguards agreement, including a demand that US nuclear weapons be withdrawn from South Korea and a request that the annual joint US-South Korea military exercise [Team Spirit] be cancelled. See Park, ‘Nuclear Conundrum’, pp. 627-647.
22 Seoul Shinmun (Seoul), 11 July 1991, p. 5.
23 For example, in January 1986, Gorbachev put forward an ambitious programme to eliminate the weapons of mass destruction including nuclear armaments all over the world before the year 2000. However, in the same month, Eduard Shevardnadze, Soviet foreign minister, paid an official visit to North Korea and emphasised the necessity for wide cooperation between all socialist countries, including North Korea, in the international arena aimed at nuclear disarmament and counteraction to ‘imperialist policies’ in that sphere. Those appeals met with a favourable response on the part of North Korean leaders. In the course of negotiations in North Korea, Kim Il-sung stressed his full support for the Soviet programme and proposed to launch a joint struggle for its full and early implementation (Pravda, 22 January 1986, p. 3). Having visited Moscow in October 1986, Kim Il-sung also reaffirmed his position and also welcomed the Soviet idea on converting the APR into a nuclear-free zone. Commenting on the result of Kim Il-sung’s tour of the Soviet Union, Rodong Shinmun stated that ‘the Soviet side fully supported the efforts of North Korea aimed at the withdrawal of the US troops and
withdrawn from the Korean peninsula as demanded by North Korea; (2) North Korea’s proposal on the setting up of a nuclear-free zone fully coincided with Soviet policy goals and was seen as a potentially valuable contribution to setting up an Asian security system; and (3) the Soviet Union in its status as a nuclear power was ready to become the guarantor of a nuclear-free zone.

With the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea in 1990, the search for a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem entered a new phase. At last, South Korea established a 'direct' negotiation channel with the Soviet Union and the subject of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula assumed a prominent place on the agenda of bilateral and regional discussions as one of the most pressing issues. For example, in December 1990, when South Korean President Roh Tae-woo paid an official visit to the Soviet Union, the two sides for the first time found themselves able to exchange opinions on North Korea’s nuclear problem at the highest level. Nevertheless, this did not mean that Soviet Union had started to support the South Korean side fully regarding the development of nuclear weapons while entirely neglecting the North Korean factor.

During the very last stages of the Soviet era (1991), Soviet policy with respect to the North Korean nuclear issue underwent fundamental changes, in the direction of support for the policies of South Korea and a rather indifferent attitude towards North Korea’s clandestine nuclear activities. In the course of

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nuclear armaments from South Korea and the transition of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone' (Rodong Shinmun [Pyongyang], 28 October 1986, p. 3).

24 At the summit, the Soviet Union agreed not to cooperate in North Korea’s atomic power projects as a retaliation for the latter’s refusal to comply with the full-scope safeguard agreement of the IAEA (The Korea Herald [Seoul], 16 December 1990, p. 3).

25 For example, Gorbachev expressed the view that it would be incorrect to regard the North Korean nuclear issue as the sole problem, arguing that it should be dealt with in a broader context, as a part of efforts aimed at making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone, as proposed by North Korea. Accordingly, Gorbachev expressed his full support for the initiative to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and raised the question of the US military presence in Korea (Izvestiia, 16 December 1990, p. 5). Also, in September 1990, Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze after persuading North Korea to accept IAEA inspections at its nuclear facilities, still assured North Korean leaders that the Soviet Union would continue to support North Korea’s basic ideas about setting up a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula and would raise the question of the US nuclear presence in his contacts with the US (Izvestiia, 12 September 1990, p. 5).
Gorbachev’s visit to Japan, in April 1991, for instance, Gorbachev for the first time explicitly expressed his dissatisfaction with North Korea’s non-compliance with its international obligations in the nuclear sphere. Boris Pankin, who had succeeded Shevardnadze as Soviet foreign minister, also revealed on 1 October 1991 that the Soviet Union had urged North Korea to sign the nuclear safeguards accord at an early date and stated that it would continue to urge North Korea to do so.

In summary, the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev era was the only superpower which could exercise a continuous and significant influence over the North Korean nuclear issue, although its position had gradually changed from a pro-North Korean to a pro-South Korean policy on the basis of the Soviet leader’s New Political Thinking. That was Gorbachev’s active Korean policy within the framework of Soviet regional security policy based on his reform policies. It is notable that the regional security agenda was led and changed by Gorbachev’s policies rather than those of others.

5.2. In Search of a Regional Security Partnership Relations? (Dec. 91-Dec. 93)

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s basic regional security policy in Northeast Asia emphasised cooperation with the West and its neighbour states in the region as Gorbachev had done during the late Soviet era. Based on this assumption, for example, in early 1992 the Russian foreign ministry

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26 See Yomiuri Shinbun (Tokyo), 20 April 1991, p. 3.
27 Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 3 October 1991, p. 5.
submitted to the parliament a document which contained the statement that ‘Russia sees no state as hostile to it and will not use force for any purpose other than defence. Russia will seek partnership with the civilised world’.29

Despite these pro-Western principles, however, the security situation in the APR was still characterised by a substantial number of elements of uncertainty. Especially, there was a continuation of the danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and of a new arms race in the region.30 In this context, the problem of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula continued to be a serious challenge to the regional security interests of neighbouring states, including Russia, during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93).31

Finally, the confrontation between North Korea and the IAEA over the nuclear issue raised the spectre of war in Northeast Asia and posed an unprecedented challenge to the NPT.

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29 "Committees Reviewing Foreign Policy Priorities", Interfax, 21 February 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-037, 25 February 1992, p. 51. However, the views expressed in the Russian foreign ministry’s document were apparently too moderate for the Russian parliament’s increasingly vocal national-patriotic faction. Finally, at the middle of June 1992, the document was rejected by Russian parliamentarians as being insufficiently ‘concrete’ and ignoring the question of with which countries Russia enjoyed good or bad relations. Reacting to this, the Russian foreign ministry denied the allegations it has no concept. Addressing Russian parliamentarians, deputy foreign minister Kudadze said that he wanted to contradict the statement and continued to say that Russian foreign policy was composed of the ministry’s daily efforts and long-term diplomatic practice (‘Foreign Ministry Denies Having No Concept’, Itar-Tass, 17 June 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-119, 19 June 1992, p. 51).

30 In fact, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought more uncertainty to the APR because of the presence of historical tensions in Northeast Asia. The inability of Russia to play a significant role in the post-Soviet era meant that the APR was left with the US. Thus, given the deep uncertainties about the reform and the current leadership, there could be little optimism about Russia in the APR. See Gerald Segal, ‘Russia as an Asian-Pacific Power’, in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, eds., Reshaping Regional Relations: Asia-Pacific and the Former Soviet Union (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 65-83.

31 North Korea seemed to have three nuclear reactor facilities. The first reactor facility was built in 1965 with the help of the Soviet Union. This was a science-oriented facility. The remaining two were built with North Korea’s own resources. No foreigner has ever discovered the functions of these reactor facilities. Belaviev, reporter of the radio station who has lived in North Korea for nearly 10 years, wrote that in view of this nation’s technology level, it was hard to believe that nuclear weapons had been developed at these facilities (‘DPRK’s Ability to Make Nuclear Arms Viewed’, Radio Moscow, 8 January 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-006, 9 January 1992, p. 4). Russia’s external intelligence service, in its first such expose, disclosed that North Korea was developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The former KGB made the disclosure in a 130-page intelligence report, entitled ‘A Proliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons Is a New Challenge in the Post-Cold War Era’. North Korea had been working for many years on the development of nuclear as well as chemical and biological weapons. The purpose of their development was military application, the report said, Yevgeniy Primakov, director of the external intelligence service told a press conference he did not
The crisis of the North Korean nuclear issue during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93) developed in the following way. On 30 January 1992, North Korea finally signed and subsequently ratified the safeguards agreement for IAEA inspections as provided for in the NPT. This set the wheels in motion for six official inspections of Yongbyon facilities. (See Map 5.2.)

Map 5.2 Yongbyon in the Korean Peninsula

believe North Korea 'currently possesses' a nuclear bomb though it had the 'potential' to develop one ('DPRK Weapons Plan', Yonhap, 29 January 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-018, 29 January 1993, pp. 13-14).

In February 1992, North Korean representatives meeting with the IAEA in Vienna initialled an inspections agreement. The director of the IAEA, Hans Blix, visited Yongbyon and the first IAEA inspection team arrived in May 1992. But, in the first half of 1992, the process collapsed. North Korea's decision to stall was a result of it having received few benefits for its cooperation once inspections were underway. Alternatively conceived, the North Korean government might also have sought to buy time to complete work on one or more nuclear weapons. In June 1992, the first inspections under this agreement commenced. The IAEA analysed plutonium samples in July 1992 and test results from the North Korean 'hot cells' (laboratory-scale reprocessing units). The IAEA then concluded that North Korea must have reprocessed on at least three separate occasions in 1989, 1990 and 1991, but North Korea denied this charge. In February 1993, during its sixth visit to North Korea, the IAEA was refused permission to inspect two sites at the Yongbyon facility. North Korea rejected the IAEA's intention to carry out a special inspection of two military installations on its territory. On 25 February 1993, the IAEA Board of Governors formally demanded that North Korea permit a 'Special Inspection' - a visit to a site where the presence of undeclared or diverted fissile material was suspected.

Nonetheless, on 12 March 1993, North Korea made a decision to withdraw from the NPT 'as a measure to defend its national interests'. On 1 April 1993, the IAEA referred the dispute to the UN Secretary Council, which was charged with dealing with violations of IAEA safeguards. On 10 May 1993, the Security Council passed a resolution calling for North Korea to stay

34 According to the North Korean ambassador in Moscow, Son Song-pil, 'if such a decision is nonetheless taken, Pyongyang reserves the right to take corresponding countermeasures' ('DPRK Ambassador Rejects IAEA Plan to Monitor Sites', *Itar-Tass*, 15 February 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-029, 16 February 1993, p. 14).
35 North Korea insisted that it was not in position to accept the demands of the IAEA for special inspections as the IAEA put forward on the basis of intelligence data obtained from 'a third party' which above all was hostile to North Korea.
36 See *North Korea News*, no. 675, 22 March 1993, pp. 3-4; and *Izvestiia*, 13 March 1993, p. 3.
in the NPT and comply with IAEA safeguards, though no penalties for non-compliance were specified. The resolution passed with no votes against (though China and Pakistan abstained). North Korea rejected the resolution as interference in its internal affairs. The Korean peninsula was in nuclear crisis.

On 11 June 1993, one day before the three-month notice period ended, North Korea announced that it would suspend its withdrawal from the NPT for as long as was necessary. Thereafter, the Korean peninsula remained under the shadow of imminent war between November 1993 and June 1994 before the preliminary framework agreement between the US and North Korea was put on the negotiating table in June 1994.

Faced with the North Korean nuclear issue, Russian officials basically regarded it as a threat not only to South Korea and the US, but also to Russia itself because Russia’s primary objective during the early period of its foreign policy was to avoid an international confrontation, and to preserve regional stability in the region.37

Thus, on 12 March 1993 when North Korea announced that it would withdraw from the NPT, Russia immediately urged North Korea to commit itself again to the NPT and to accept the IAEA request for a special inspection of the two suspected nuclear facilities near Yongbyon within the framework of cooperation with the West and South Korea.38 The Russian media even labelled North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT an ‘unacceptable act of

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37 Russian first deputy minister for nuclear energy Vitaliy Konovalov stated that ‘North Korea recently (1992) offered Russia to resume cooperation in nuclear engineering, suspended in the second half of the eighties... To resume such cooperation with North Korea, it is necessary to observe two preconditions - it must yield commercial benefit to Russia, and Pyongyang must scrupulously observe all the rules and standards of the IAEA. If such cooperation is resumed, it will include Russia’s participation in the construction of several atomic power plants in North Korea’ (‘Official Considers Conditions for Resuming Nuclear Cooperation with DPRK’, Itar-Tass, 27 November 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-229, 27 November 1992, p. 7).

38 The same day (North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT) Russian ministry of foreign affairs issued a statement expressing deep concern about the decision. Maintaining that Russia was not in a position to remain indifferent to any step undermining the global NPT regime, Moscow called upon Pyongyang to thoroughly weigh up the possible consequences of its action and reconsider its decision to withdraw from the NPT (Izvestiia, 13 March 1993, p. 3). Furthermore, Russia made a decision to stop its nuclear support to North Korea during this period. For example, Russia made eight Russian scientists working
adventurism'. Russian foreign minister Kozyrev stated that 'Russia is using all its channels of influence to convince North Korea to revise its decision to withdraw from the nuclear NPT'. Also, according to Russian deputy foreign minister Grigoriy Berdennikov, 'North Korea's declaration of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is the first precedent of this kind, which threatens to undermine the very regime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This decision complicates the situation not only in the Far East also in the world as a whole'.

In this respect, it should be noted that some Russian conservatives even supported the IAEA's position on North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. For example, already in September 1992, the Russian parliamentary chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov stated that he had also explained to the North Korean ambassador his firm position that nuclear weapons should be eradicated from the Korean peninsula. The Russian parliament, which was responsible for setting foreign policies and implementing them, had already ordered the Russian foreign ministry to look into clauses likely to cause trouble in Seoul-Moscow relations.

There were two main features of Russia's actions to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93). First, at the regional level, Russia supported the IAEA's decisions and revealed its intention to do all it could to prevent such a development on the basis of a key assumption of the...
pro-Western approach. In doing so, Russia especially attempted to cooperate with the US and other Western countries concerned, which included the exchange of information and closer interaction aimed at elaborating joint steps and strategies to cope with the challenge.\(^43\) For example, in his special statement on problems of non-proliferation issued in January 1992, President Yeltsin offered his full support for the activities of the IAEA and stressed the need for its guarantees to be more effective.\(^44\) In a similar vein, the "Camp David" declaration signed by Yeltsin and Bush on 1 February 1992, which was one of the first really political significant agreements between Russia and the US, implied that the two countries would work together to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as technologies for their production.\(^45\) Yeltsin also held talks on the North Korean nuclear issue with Clinton at their summit in Vancouver, Canada, in early April 1993. Both leaders urged North Korea to return to NPT membership.\(^46\) A couple of weeks after North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT in March 1993, Russia, the US and the UK issued a trilateral statement in which they declared that North Korea's intention to leave the NPT might have grave consequences not only for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, but also for security in the Far East.\(^47\)

Secondly, at the bilateral level, the Russian leadership made several attempts to influence North Korea in order to persuade it to open up its nuclear

\(^{43}\) As regards Russia's role in the North Korean nuclear crisis, Alvin Rubinstein has argued that 'although the US has been in the forefront of mobilising international pressure to compel North Korea's adherence to the NPT and to IAEA inspections, Russia's tacit support has been important', (Alvin Z. Rubinstein, 'Russia and North Korea: the End of Alliance?', Korea and World Affairs, vol. 18, no. 3, 1994, p. 507).


\(^{45}\) Rossiiskaia gazeta, 3 February 1992, p. 3. That clause was reaffirmed in the Charter of Russian-US Partnership and Friendship adopted during Yeltsin's visit to the US in June 1992.

\(^{46}\) North Korea's Efforts at Better Relations with Russia Fruitless', Vintage Point, vol. 16, no. 10, 1993, p. 18. See also Izvestiia, 6 April 1993, p. 3.

\(^{47}\) We [Russia, the US and the UK] urge North Korea to retract its statement and to fulfill its obligations toward the Treaty, and its obligations on the guarantees which remain in force. In this connection, we firmly support the efforts of the international agency on nuclear energy, aimed at
development programme based on a key assumption of Russia's pro-South Korean approach towards the Korean peninsula. At the first Russian-South Korean summit in Seoul in November 1992, for instance, Yeltsin stated that 'Russia fully supports South Korea's position on the North Korean nuclear question'. There were also more direct Russian efforts to avoid an international confrontation with North Korea. In January 1992, Igor Rogachev, the special envoy of the Russian president, visited North Korea and expressed deep concern over its refusal to sign the safeguards accord. He called for the earliest possible settlement of North Korea's relations with the IAEA through the signing and implementation of an agreement on nuclear guarantees.

The visit to North Korea of Russian deputy foreign minister Georgiy Kunadze in January 1993 was another major attempt to apply direct pressure and to convey Russia's stance on the issue. At the meeting, Kunadze stated that 'We have made it clear to North Korea that we expect it to fully comply with its commitments envisaged by the nuclear NPT in particular, concerning the agreement with the IAEA on inspections of nuclear objects, and expressed concern over possible aggravation of relations between North Korea and the IAEA'. He went on to say that 'we are naturally extremely interested in, and anxious about, the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with reference to the Korean peninsula, and this becomes especially topical since the signing of the historic START II treaty. While the Great Powers are making the decision to cut their nuclear weapons, it is especially important that other countries should not begin developing them'.

implementing its agreement on guarantees with the DPRK' ('Statement on DPRK Non-Proliferation Treaty Withdrawal', Itar-Tass, 1 April 1993 in FBIS-SOV 93-002, 2 April 1993, pp. 9-10).

Kyunghyang Shinmun (Seoul), 22 November 1992, p. 3.


Nevertheless, it should be noted here that there seemed no real consensus among the Russian leadership regarding the North Korean issue, although Russian reformers and conservatives generally supported the IAEA’s position as mentioned above. For example, since Yeltsin declared his interest in US-Russian joint development of a global system of protection against limited nuclear strikes (GPALS) in January 1992, it had become evident that there was significant opposition to the concept in Russia. In general, opponents of Russian reformers believed that such a system was a ploy to obtain Russian agreement to abandon the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. They feared also that the US would exploit Russian science, that a GPALS system would reduce strategic stability, and that it could lead to another arms race. This necessarily hindered Russia from pursuing a more consistent [pro-Western] regional security policy towards the Korean peninsula in Northeast Asia.

In spite of Russia’s diplomatic overtures, both at the regional and bilateral level, the situation over the North Korean nuclear issue continued to deteriorate. In February 1993, the IAEA intensified the pressure on North Korea with the purpose of gaining access to the two suspicious facilities in Yongbyon. Reacting to the IAEA initiative, North Korea took the unprecedented step of withdrawing from the NPT on 12 March 1993. Then, surprisingly (at least, to the Russian side), North Korea started to negotiate over the nuclear issue with the US directly.

This meant that in spite of all the former Soviet Union’s traditional ties with North Korea and its position as a power which had profound and diversified interests in the Korean peninsula, Russia’s real capacity to influence developments fell short of all expectations in the post-Soviet era. Rather, a number of the above attempts made by the Russian side to exert its influence on North Korea to induce it to take a more constructive stand only resulted in the worsening of relations between the two former allies, weakening Russia’s role

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on the Korean peninsula. According to a Russian newspaper, 'other powers are less willing to view Russia as "an autonomous player" whose interests have to be taken into account, although Russia is the only country today to have established diplomatic relations with both North and South Korea provides us with a unique chance to maintain a constructive and tangible presence on the Korean peninsula, which would be in keeping with both our national interests and the tasks of achieving a Korean settlement'.

In other words, Russia had to move away from its previous position of being a principal actor in the North Korean nuclear issue to that of a subordinate player during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93). It can also be said that Russia's cooperation with the West during the early years of Russian foreign policy proved to be inefficient, and despite the rosy expectations of the Russian side in terms of international security cooperation. Instead, Russia had to be engaged in a more constructive way in a US-led regional system after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, it was obvious that high-level bilateral contacts between Russia and North Korea did not create an atmosphere for finding ways out of the nuclear deadlock. Rather, Russia's bilateral contacts with North Korea revealed the depth of contradiction between the two sides, which made it difficult for them to continue a productive political dialogue on the issue during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93).

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53 For the discussion of Russia's role in Northeast Asia, see 'Interesy Rossii i ee novaja rol' v Severo-vostochnoi Azii', in M. L. Titarenko, ed., Russia i Vostochnaia Azia: Voprosy mezhdunarodnykh i mezhdivilisatsionnykh otmoshenii (Moscow: Fabula-Kuchkovo pole, 1994), pp. 96-118.
54 Krasnaja zvezda, 29 July 1992, p. 3.
56 It should be noted that the US continued to pursue the same security posture in the APR that it adopted at the outset of the Cold War. For example, existing bilateral collective defence arrangements with Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines allowed it sufficient the flexibility to apply a classical balance-of-power strategy in the region in lieu of its Cold War strategy of containment.
In the meantime, it should be also noted that North Korea increasingly attempted to use its nuclear programme as a ‘bargaining chip’ to remove US tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea, to end US-South Korean military exercises, to elicit a non-nuclear pledge from South Korea, to win upgraded talks with the US, and to gain important economic and technical aid from South Korea, Japan and the US. In this sense, to a large extent, North Korea attempted to utilise its nuclear programme to escape from its international isolation and to reduce its reliance on Russia in the post-Soviet era.

Despite Russia’s efforts over the North Korean nuclear issue based on a pro-Western and pro-South Korean stance, Russia only proved its ineffectiveness in seeking a foreign policy that would influence the North Korean nuclear crisis as a regional security issue during the early years of Russian foreign policy. Russia was no longer one of the major powers in the region, able to pursue an active and consistent policy towards the Korean peninsula to maximise its national interests, although it did attempt to do so. Indeed, the collapse of the Cold War system reduced Russia’s influence on the Korean peninsula to one of the major leading powers in terms of the regional security issue. Russia started to be isolated and under pressure in the region.

In these circumstances, how could Russia maintain its influence on the North Korean nuclear issue? Was there any substitute for the Russian side in any new regional security architecture? This naturally led Russia to attempt to look for other ways to become involved in the regional security issue.

37 According to Michael J. Mazarr, it refers to ‘an ubiquitous tool of diplomacy’ (Mazarr, ‘Going Just a Little Nuclear’, p. 100).
39 It should be mentioned that even foreign minister Kozyrev stressed that Russia did not wish to be a military superpower, but rather a ‘normal great power’ (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 April 1992, p. 3).
5.3. In Search of a Meaningful Role? (Dec. 93-Dec. 95)

Although Russia had abandoned its pro-Western and pro-South Korean stance by the end of 1993, its basic policy on the North Korean nuclear issue remained generally consistent for the time being: to keep North Korea in the NPT and to force it to carry out its obligations vis-à-vis IAEA inspections during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). For example, foreign minister Kozyrev urged North Korea on 21 March 1994 to abide by controls on nuclear facilities as imposed under the international nuclear safeguard agreement. In March 1994, the Russian foreign ministry issued a statement that ‘We are prepared to support the resolution now under discussion in the UN Security Council appealing to North Korea to meet its commitments to the IAEA under the NPT. We will also seek decisive action by the Security Council in all other instances where threats of nuclear proliferation emerge, without double standards’. Also, according to Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, ‘Russia should increase pressure on North Korea to observe the nuclear NPT regime’.

However, unlike previous years (Dec. 91-Dec. 93), Russia could entrust its security and place in the international community only to itself, which resulted in marked changes in its regional security policy in the APR. This indicated that, despite Russia’s cooperation with the West and South Korea during the early years of Russian foreign policy (Dec. 91-Dec. 93), Russia gradually realised that it was being excluded from arrangements made to

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63 It must be noted that during this period the principal challenges to Northeast Asian security arose from: (1) the stand-off on the Korean peninsula, which threatened to initiate regional nuclear proliferation; (2) China’s refusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, particularly if the latter appeared about to declare de jure independence; and (3) the continued dispute between Russia and Japan over the ownership of the Northern Territories, which obstructed Japanese fiscal assistance to Russia’s ailing economy. For more detailed analysis of Russia’s post-cold war security agenda and
monitor the North Korean nuclear issue and took this as a sign of US and, to a lesser degree, South Korean, Chinese and Japanese neglect of Russia’s interests on the Korean peninsula.

In these circumstances, after the December 1993 Russian parliamentary election, Russia more actively attempted to find a meaningful role in solving the North Korean nuclear issue. To this end, Russia took two major steps: (1) it advocated a multilateral conference; and (2) it declared its intention to participate in the Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO).

Since March 1994, Russia has actively proposed on many occasions that the North Korean nuclear crisis should be resolved within the framework of a multilateral international conference in accordance with the ‘six plus two’ formula (attended by China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, the US, representatives of the UN Secretary General and the IAEA Director General). In this context, in March 1994, the Russian foreign ministry issued a statement to the effect that ‘We propose using a multilateral approach, which could be centred on an international conference attended by China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, the US and representatives of the UN Secretary General and the IAEA director general’.\(^{54}\) Also, in April 1994, during the South Korean defence minister’s visit to Moscow, the Russian side issued a new proposal concerning the creation of a cooperative security system in the APR.\(^{55}\) More importantly, in June 1994, at the second Russian-South Korean summit in Moscow, the Russian side also pronounced itself strongly in favour of the proposed multilateral conference. At the summit, President Yeltsin stated that Moscow was ‘ready to play and would play an active part in creating

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international mechanisms aimed at strengthening a climate of trust, security and cooperation in relations between the states of the APR.66

According to Vladimir Miasnikov, three important issues stood out in Russia’s proposal for a multilateral conference: (1) the nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula; (2) normalisation of North Korea relations with the participant countries, i.e. Japan, South Korea and the US; and (3) confidence-building measures and improvements in relations between North and South Korea.67 According to foreign minister Kozyrev, Russia’s interests in the North Korea’s NPT threat were as following: ‘First, the Korean peninsula is the near abroad of Russia. Secondly, if even one country refuses to observe the nonproliferation regime and gets away with it, then a chain reaction can be expected’.68

However, it should be emphasised that the ultimate purpose of the Russian scheme was to create an overall Asian-Pacific security mechanism for the comprehensive settlement of nuclear and other problems on the Korean peninsula in order to allow Russia to participate as one of the leading powers in the post-Soviet era.69 This involved creating what Yeltsin had called ‘a new mechanism of international power’ under the aegis of the UN. Ideally, for the Russian side, this new structure ought to replace the bipolar structures established during the Cold War in the Far East. In other words, based on this new structure, Russia wanted itself to be forced to opt for an indirect engagement with the US via a rapprochement with America’s allies in the region such as South Korea and Japan, as well as China in the post-Soviet era.70

69 According to Vladimir Lukin, ‘the political crisis on the Korean peninsula, which could assume a military-strategic and even a nuclear dimension, is capable of affecting Russia’s national interests to a considerably greater degree than the conflict in Yugoslavia... I criticised the US policy only for the sequence of moves’ (Izvestia, 11 June 1994, p. 3).
In this connection, it should be added that the Russian side had already made its intention to create a multilateral dialogue for APR security clearly before the North Korean nuclear issue became 'hot' in 1993-94. For example, at the first Russian-South Korean summit in Seoul in November 1992, Yeltsin had already stated that ‘... I think that at the present time it is necessary to undertake a number of measures that will give a strong, new impetus to cooperation and the political climate in the APR. First, we must begin to set up a mechanism for multilateral talks without delaying in the APR as a whole and throughout the sub-region. The first step could include multilateral consultations by experts on issues of strengthening security in Northeast Asia, primarily, on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons...’.

In fact, to a great extent, Russia was increasingly afraid of being excluded from the consolidation process in the APR in the post-Soviet era. This obviously demonstrated that Russia had viewed its proposal of multilateral international conference as a vehicle for a broader Asian cooperative security process, which might afford it ‘another opportunity’ to be a leading power in the region. This meant that Russia still sought a significant, and not secondary role for the Korean issue in the name of common prosperity and peace. To this end, Russia took a clear position on the following three issues: (1) against the US-North Korean bilateral talks; (2) against UN sanctions; and (3) against a pro-South Korean stance.

As far as managing the North Korean nuclear crisis was concerned, the talks between the IAEA and North Korea gradually switched to talks between the US and North Korea since March 1993. There were, for instance, talks between them during the first round of high-level US-North Korean dialogue in New York in June 1993 and the second meeting between the two sides in July.

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1993 in Geneva. As a result, the preliminary agreement between the two sides was reached in Geneva during the third round of US-North Korea talks in June 1994. Finally, on 21 October 1994, the US and North Korea signed a landmark accord (the so-called 'the Geneva Nuclear Accord' or 'the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework') hailed as a means of easing nuclear tension on the Korean peninsula. This clearly indicated that US-led efforts to persuade North Korea to renounce its nuclear ambitions had developed into an intensified bilateral dialogue which became the principal channel for the solution of the nuclear problem. For those talks between the US and North Korea over North Korea’s nuclear issue, however, the Russian side had increasingly become dissatisfied with the process and the results of the US-North Korean dialogue because Russia was excluded from the negotiations, although the Russian foreign ministry welcomed the results of the US-North Korean talks that ended in New York on 11 June 1993 and which focused on the problem of nuclear safety on the Korean peninsula. It was obvious that the US began to grasp the initiative as the leading negotiator with North Korea over the nuclear issue in place of Russia. Reacting to this, Russia finally concluded that the US-North Korea talks were an inadequate attempt to tackle the problem within a bilateral framework.

The agreement was a by-product of the tug of war at high-level talks in Geneva between the two sides, which had started more than a year before. It committed North Korea to freezing all current nuclear activities and allowing general inspections of its eight declared nuclear sites by the IAEA. Up until the Kuala Lumpur agreement on 13 June 1995, the two sides more or less kept their words in the Geneva Nuclear Accord, except on the question of which model of LWRs would be supplied to North Korea. For more detailed explanation of the Geneva Nuclear Accord, see Kyoung-soo Kim, 'The Geneva Nuclear Accord: Problems and Prospects', The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 7, no. 2, 1995, pp. 141-165. For the full context of the Geneva Nuclear Accord between the US and North Korea, see Appendix 6.

For example, in April 1994, Russian deputy foreign minister Aleksandr Panov stated that 'One cannot say that this is a bilateral problem only. It concerns the whole world community once at issue is North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear NPT' ('Russian Take Flexible Stance on Korean Nuclear Problem', Itar-Tass, 13 April 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-072, 14 April 1994, p. 14). The Russian foreign ministry’s spokesman Mikhail Dormitin also stated that 'Russia has asked the US to inform it on the situation regarding the US-North Korean talks on nuclear issues and their perspectives in more detail. But, Russia was not satisfied with information on them [the US-North Korean talks] which was
As regards UN sanctions applied from the second half of 1993, Russia gradually decided not to fully support UN sanctions against North Korea, measures led by the US and South Korea. Although Russia declared that it would support sanctions against North Korea, it seemed to regard sanctions as an undesirable way to settle the North Korean nuclear problem. In December 1993, for example, deputy foreign minister Kunadze stated that ‘discussing military or economic sanctions at the current stage is not helpful to the settlement of the North Korean nuclear problem’. In June 1994, the US, Japan and South Korea also suggested that the UN Security Council hold urgent discussions over the issue of imposing sanctions against North Korea. But, Russia did not support fully (or oppose) the adoption of UN sanctions against North Korea which were being sought by the US to punish the North Koreans for refusing to permit international inspection of their nuclear facilities. Yeltsin stated that ‘if things reach the point where North Korea digs in its heels and moves toward withdrawing from the non-proliferation Treaty, we will first warn North Korea, and then impose sanctions’. Similarly, foreign minister Kozyrev stated that ‘the time is not yet ripe for international sanctions against North Korea’ and also pointed out that ‘the sanctions must be imposed gradually and be considered a last resort’. In a word, the Russian leadership preferred ‘phased sanctions’ to the US-led sanction plan.
Furthermore, it should be emphasised that in advocating a multilateral international conference, Russia had to abandon its previous pro-South Korean stance. This meant that Russia attempted to reformulate its Korean policy in line with its new domestic political forces and institutions and within the context of a new international world order after the December 1993 parliamentary elections. This new trend in Russia’s Korean policy was deeply affected by its domestic situation which in turn was closely related to its growing isolation from great power negotiations on a general Korean nuclear settlement. In this respect, conservatives in the Russian Duma began to believe that the Russian foreign ministry - especially foreign minister Kozyrev - should not moved too close towards South Korea. In other words, opposition pressure, combined with Moscow’s own frustration at its inability to influence events on the Korean peninsula, led the Yeltsin government to modify its South Korea-oriented foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula and to attempt to develop its relations with North Korea. In these situations, from 1994 onwards, the Yeltsin government began to move back towards the middle, in an effort to ‘balance’ Russia’s policy towards the Korean peninsula.

If Russia succeeded in holding a multilateral conference, it would achieve influence and leverage upon both Koreas in Northeast Asia in the post-Soviet era. If not, it risked further marginalisation. However, responding to the Russian conference proposal, which became an international security issue involving other major powers (China, Japan and the US) and the two Koreas, none of the major powers in the region accepted Russia’s plan (or initiative).

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52 Even foreign minister Kozyrev sharply criticised the US for preparing the draft Security Council resolution on sanctions without consulting the Russians, describing the move as ‘perplexing’ and ‘complicating the matter’ and pledging that ‘Russia would not in any event support the range of sanctions which is being put forward without previous agreement with us’ (BBC, SWB, SU/2024, 17 June 1994, B/9-10).

53 According to Eugene and Natasha Bazhanov, ‘If ultra-nationalists should grab power, the picture could become one-sided again, this time in North Korea’s favour. Ultranationalists would certainly drive into a world-wide confrontation within the US, with predictable consequences for Moscow’s relations with South Korea and North Korea. The Korean peninsula would again become a front of Cold War’ (Eugene and Natasha Bazhanov, ‘The Evolution of Russian-Korean Relations: External and Internal Factors’, Asian Survey, vol. 34, no. 9, 1994, p. 796).

Rather, Russia’s attempts to push ahead with its initiative received a lukewarm response.

A South Korean official in the ministry of foreign affairs observed that this proposal could only delay the process further and complicate negotiations.

Son Song-pil, North Korean ambassador to Russia, also made a negative assessment of Russia’s proposal to apply a multilateral approach in discussing the North Korean nuclear issue. According to a representative of the North Korean foreign ministry, ‘we are concerned that Russia’s proposal for multilateral negotiations may complicate the problem’. The North Korean foreign minister Kim Young-nam also stated that ‘It is too early to talk about an international conference on the subject of the North Korean nuclear programme. We are still studying the Russian initiative’.

Japan was also reluctant to support Russia’s proposal on the multilateral conference mainly as a result of its anxiety to follow the US-approach based on the US-Japanese security treaty. Japan’s position on the nuclear crisis had also been conditioned by its knowledge of the destructive effect that North Korean pressure might be exerting on the US-dominated security system in Northeast Asia.

China similarly opposed Russia’s proposal to hold a multilateral conference concerning the North Korean nuclear issue. For its part, China suggested that the North Korean nuclear issue should be resolved through talks among China, North Korea, South Korea, the US and the IAEA. Furthermore,
it should be mentioned that, in autumn 1994, South Korea and China had initialled a nuclear cooperation pact which included the means to work together in nuclear technology and facility construction and opened the way for South Korean exports to China. It laid down safety measures in the event of nuclear accidents, joint research areas and exchanges of nuclear experts, and was signed during Premier Li Peng’s visit to Seoul in late October 1994.91

The US played a leading role in rejecting Russia’s proposal of multilateral conference. As South Korean scholars have argued, the US role in the APR in the post-Soviet era was more likely to be one that Great Britain assumed in Europe in the 19th century balance of power system.92 Indeed, US-led diplomacy had by now effectively removed Russia from the group of major players in the region. Oleg Davydov has argued in this connection that ‘Russia lost much of its influence and political leverage in countries such as North Korea, Vietnam and Mongolia. Russia’s hasty withdrawal from these countries, her traditional partners and the breaking off of well-formed cooperation created a kind of political vacuum which was quickly filled by the US as it began to pursue an assertive diplomacy vis-à-vis the former Soviet allies’.93

Russia was virtually ignored by its neighbouring powers in Northeast Asia in the post-Soviet era and it was forced to follow rather than lead.94

Nonetheless, Russia continuously attempted to take another step to guarantee its involvement in any structure designed to reorientate North Korea’s nuclear programme, which was based on the the Geneva Nuclear Accord. To this end, Russia was keenly interested in participating in the framework of the international consortium known as the KEDO,95 which was a

95 KEDO is a multinational consortium led by the three executive members (Japan, South Korea and the US) connected to the construction of LWRs in North Korea. The main purpose of its formation concerned the division of the cost of the reactor project among them. KEDO and North Korea were to
From July 1994 onwards, Russian officials repeatedly offered to supply one or both of the reactors, and to provide components for the project. Russian officials were particularly insistent that its previous experience, cooperation and advantages in development of the North Korean nuclear programme would be well suited for North Korea's 'Light Water Reactors' (LWRs) programme. For example, in August 1994, deputy foreign minister Aleksandr Panov stated that 'Russia is ready to help settle North Korea's nuclear problem by supplying equipment and technology to Pyongyang to replace graphite moderated reactors for light water ones'. The Russian side even insisted that the Soviet Union had signed an agreement with North Korea in 1985 to supply a LWR. In January 1995, Panov still stressed that 'Russia can supply LWRs to North Korea itself. We used to maintain an active cooperation with North Korea, their experts were trained in Russia, know our equipment, speak the Russian language. The Russian equipment is reliable and cheap'. What was more, the Russian side insisted that North Korea was willing to take the Russian-made LWRs.

Hold a series of further discussion on the details of the reactor project. One of major problems of KEDO was how to share the cost of the reactor project among its members. For the detailed discussion of the KEDO process, see Michael J. Mazarr, 'The US-DPRK Nuclear Deal', Korea and World Affairs, vol. 9, no. 3, 1995, pp. 482-509.

In October 1994 in Geneva, the US and North Korea signed an agreement in which North Korea pledged to freeze its present nuclear programme in return for two LWRs to replace its graphite-moderated reactors (heavy-water units). Under this agreement, the US agreed to supply crude oil to North Korea to compensate for energy losses and North Korea agreed to allow the IAEA full access to all nuclear facilities when the first of the light water reactors had been constructed.


The Soviet government conducted a feasibility study on installing LWRs at Sinpo on the east coast, and a deal to deliver three 660-megawatt units was signed in 1991. However, Yeltsin suspended the project in 1993 after North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT (Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 December 1994-95 January 1995, pp. 14-15).


Russia’s main reason for seeking to participate in the LWR programme was clearly to mitigate its further deteriorating role on the Korean peninsula, together with some economic reasons. In other words, after the rejection by other powers of the multilateral conference initiative, Russia again made a fresh effort to look for another meaningful role in the Korean issue in Northeast Asia.

In this respect, it should be noted that, after the Geneva Nuclear Accord in October 1994, Russia gradually changed its position, speaking now of ‘equal status’ on the LWR programme among the major powers rather than insisting on its ‘significant’ role by the end of 1994. This inevitably led Russia to abandon its privileged position in North Korea if only KEDO allowed it to participate in the LWR programme. An additional powerful motive for Russia’s persistence on the issue was that the LWR programme was closely associated with economic benefits for the Russian economy. In reality, Russia was in a position that it would be completely excluded from the North Korean nuclear programme both politically and economically if it could not participate in KEDO.

A final agreement was reached between the US and North Korea at talks in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur in June 1995 which centred on replacing North Korea’s graphite-moderated nuclear reactor with US-made LWRs. This agreement was preceded by a whole series of intensive negotiations, the first round of which was held back in June 1993. The US and North Korean joint statement noted that the type of LWRs would be determined by an international consortium called the KEDO, in which, incidentally, the leading role would be played by the US. It had already made its choice - for a renewed reactor type based on a US design and US equipment. Thus, North

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101 According to Viktor Mikhailov, Russian minister of nuclear power engineering, "Russia is ready to consider the issue of its participation in modernisation of North Korea nuclear programme, provided it enjoys an equal status in the international consortium" ('Participation in North Korea's Nuclear Programme Considered', Itar-Tass, 6 February 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-025, 7 February 1995, p. 7).

102 At that time, the total cost of LWRs for North Korea was about $US 4.5 billion.
Korea preferred the reactors imposed on it by KEDO - and effectively Washington - to the Russian reactors it had planned to acquire.\(^{103}\)

Subsequently, on 15 December 1995 in New York, North Korea and KEDO signed a contract for the supply of two 1000-megawatt LWRs.\(^{104}\) Once again, this indicated that Russia's proposal to supply Russian-made LWRs to North Korea was totally rejected by KEDO at the end of 1995.

The following remarks by Russian officials and newspapers clearly showed its weakening position on the North Korean nuclear programme and KEDO. Russia's atomic energy minister Viktor Mikhailov stated that 'Russia lost a partner after North Korea signed a contract for the delivery of US-type LWRs for its nuclear facility'.\(^{105}\) As \textit{Pravda} reported, 'judging by everything, as a result of this knockdown [Russia's exclusion from KEDO] Russia will not be able to retrieve its own enormous influence in the Korean peninsula any time soon'.\(^{106}\) Deputy foreign minister Panov also stated that 'we have not joined it [KEDO] yet, because we do not know what we are expected to do there'.\(^{107}\)

In addition, it should be noted that the Russian leadership also continued to make several attempts to influence North Korea in order to persuade it to open up its nuclear development programme based on a balanced dual approach towards the Korean peninsula during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). For example, one of the main purposes of Panov's visit to North Korea in September 1994 was about Russia's bilateral efforts over the North Korean nuclear issue, together with the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty.\(^{108}\) (See Chapter 3.) Nevertheless, Russia's bilateral efforts over the issue did not make any progress. Instead, the failure to influence North

\(^{103}\) \textit{Pravda}, 16 June 1995, p. 3.
\(^{104}\) \textit{Kommersant-daily}, 16 December 1995, p. 4.
\(^{106}\) \textit{Pravda}, 16 June 1995, p. 3
\(^{107}\) 'Panov Comment on Supplying Reactors to DPRK', \textit{Itar-Tass}, 5 April 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-066, 6 April 1995, p. 12.
Korea directly led Russia to continue to advocate an international conference. Deputy foreign minister Panov stated that ‘since the dialogue failed at the bilateral level, it must be resolved on the multilateral level’.109

All of Russia’s intentions and proposals about the North Korean nuclear issue were rejected at a time of acute crisis (1993-94) in the North Korean nuclear issue. Russia’s position on the Korean peninsula was seriously undermined and it remained outside the circle of influential participants in the conflict. Russia’s influence on the Korean peninsula was limited, and so, consequently, was its influence in the APR.

There were four important reasons for the failure of Russia’s proposals for a multilateral conference and KEDO over the North Korean nuclear issue: (1) its lack of internal stability as a leading power; (2) the lack of a security mechanism for multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia; (3) the lack of a firm Korean policy in the post-Soviet era; and (4) the lack of consensus among the top Russian leadership.

Russia’s position in the region was continuously undermined by its weak economic condition and endemic political and social crises during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). Furthermore, economic and technical factors have become increasingly important elements for Great Power Politics in the post-Soviet era. In this respect, could Russia match Chinese, Japanese, or the US influence in Northeast Asia in the post-Soviet era?

Regional security cooperation in Northeast Asia could hardly be seen as successful, although the end of the Cold War signalled the start of a new era and was greeted with the hope that it would pave the way for greater integration at the global level and a new basis for international cooperation.116 In this context, however, it should be mentioned that the Southeast Asian subregion

116 Problems for the cooperative security system in this region include: (1) the diversity of the region; (2) the absence of channels of dialogue; (3) mutual suspicions of intentions; (4) difficulty in formulating an acceptable agenda; (5) secrecy and sovereignty; and (6) the fear of eroding other security arrangements (Harry Harding, ‘Prospects for Cooperative Security Arrangements in the Asia-Pacific Region’, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, vol. 13, no. 3, 1994, pp. 33-34).
has experienced some progress and embraced some positive region-wide security initiatives. For example, the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) first held in 1991 was an approved forum for official dialogue, involving not only the six ASEAN member states, but also the so-called seven dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the EC and the US). In the middle of 1993, ASEAN announced the formation of a Regional Forum (ARF) to discuss security issues in Pacific Asia, a tentative first step towards the creation of a multilateral security architecture for the region. Because of the need to develop an Asian mechanism for the control and settlement of disputes and for the prevention of armed conflicts throughout the region, the first ministerial conference on the issue of peace in Northeast Asia, the ARF, was held in 1994. It included nineteen member countries (the six ASEAN countries, their seven dialogue partners and other individual countries including Cambodia, China, Laos, Papua New Guinea, Russia and Vietnam). The ARF was regarded by the Clinton administration as the security equivalent of APEC, the premier institutional framework in the region. (See Table 5.1 for the structure of the ARF.)

However, the 'ASEAN way' of conflict management and security was unstructured, informal and based on consensus. In other words, in the Northeast Asia subregion, where the interests of four major powers - China,
Japan, Russia and the US - intersect, attempts to build meaningful subregional security institutions have failed, in spite of various proposals made by Russia, two Koreas, Canadians and others. Given these circumstances, to a large extent, pressure from the IAEA to open undeclared sites to special inspection must surely have prompted North Korea to take the extreme step, in March 1993, of giving notice that it intended to withdraw from the NPT.

Russia did not seem to play 'two Korean cards' effectively enough to maintain its influence on the North Korean nuclear issue during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). In other words, Russia did not efficiently manage its relations with the two Koreas to maximise its national interests on the Korean peninsula, despite being in a better position than other powers to exercise influence over the region through its intense to its formal diplomatic relations with the two Korean states. In this situation, even South Korea no longer regarded Russia as a great power which could influence North Korea. In turn, North Korea no longer followed Russia's lead in the international arena. Russia

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113 It should be noted that since 1992 when Russia was first invited as a guest state to ASEAN-PMC, it has made various proposals for both region-wide and Northeast Asia sub-regional CBMs. For example, in July 1992, Kozyrev spoke at the 25th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Manila as a special guest and declared that Russia intended to be 'constructively engaged' in the East Asian region. He proposed a series of confidence and security building measures to limit naval exercises in designated zones of peace and suggested security cooperation with the ASEAN states. He also proposed to establish a security regime in the East Asian region. In July 1994, when Russia was invited to the first region-wide security forum (ARF), Kozyrev proposed that a centre for the study of conflict be established and called for greater transparency in arms sales and military doctrines. Russia has made a proposal to ASEAN ministers to establish cooperation between the CIS and ASEAN. Kozyrev, speaking at the ASEAN-Russia consultative meeting in his capacity as the chairman of the committee of CIS foreign ministers, said the proposal should be discussed in detail at the level of heads of state and heads of government ('Brokers ASEAN, CIS Cooperation', Itar-Tass, 30 July 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-147, 1 August 1995, p. 9). Kozyrev called for holding an international conference on the non-nuclear status of the Korean peninsula in his speech at the regional forum of the Association of South East Asian Nations in Brunei ('Urge Conference on Korean Status', Itar-Tass, 1 August 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-148, 2 August 1995, p. 11). In May 1995, when Russian defence minister Pavel Grachev visited South Korea, he raised the question of a regional security system [sub-regional system] in Northeast Asia. According to him, the sub-regional system could involve China, Japan, North and South Korea, Russia and the US ('Quoted on Regional Security System', 20 May 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-098, 22 May 1995, p. 14).

114 For example, China became the second great power to recognise the two Koreas in the Korean peninsula in August 1992, but had more influence on the North Korean nuclear issue in the post-Soviet era.
should have had a more consistent new 'Russian foreign policy concept' towards the Korean peninsula, which was genuinely capable of replacing Gorbachev's New Political Thinking or previous Soviet ideology. Accordingly, Russia failed to play a meaningful role as a mediator between the two Koreas, having ceded its position mainly to the US in the region.

Table 5.1 Structure of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formation</th>
<th>July 1994</th>
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| **Members** | - ASEAN: Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam  
- ASEAN's dialogue partners: Australia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, United States  
- ASEAN's observers: Cambodia, Papua New Guinea |
| **Primary Objectives** | - To promote confidence-building measures  
- To develop preventive diplomacy  
- To develop approaches to conflict resolution |
| **Organisation** | - Annual ministerial meeting  
- Senior official meeting (SOM)  
- Three intercessional support groups (ISG)  
  (a) on CBM  
  (b) on Disaster Relief  
  (c) on Search and Rescue  
  (d) on PKO  
- No permanent secretariat |


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Finally, there still seemed to be no firm consensus on the issue of the North Korean nuclear problem in the region during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). For example, as regards UN sanctions against North Korea, in December 1993, deputy foreign minister Kunadze stated that ‘Moscow’s basic position is that sanctions are an undesirable way to settle the North Korean nuclear problem’.\textsuperscript{116} In June 1994, Mikhail Beliy, director of the first Asian department in the Russian foreign ministry, declared that ‘Russia believes that tough UN sanctions against North Korea is an extreme measure’.\textsuperscript{117} Also, Duma factions of communists, agrarians and the LDPR led by Zhirinovskiy expressed ‘disapproval’ of Russia’s decision to join in the economic sanctions against North Korea.\textsuperscript{118} However, foreign minister Kozyrev took a somewhat different view from that of those mentioned above. In June 1994, he stated that ‘Russia and the US agreed to submit to the UN Security Council’s consideration the joint resolution on sanctions against North Korea linked with the nuclear programme of this country and hold an international conference on security and nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula’.\textsuperscript{119}

Furthermore, it should be emphasised here that Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, even changed his views on the issue of UN sanctions against North Korea as follows. In early June 1994, he stated that ‘Surely, it is better to reach an agreement than impose sanctions, but the non-proliferation regime should be maintained very strictly’.\textsuperscript{120} But, in late June 1994, he stated that ‘Russia should “more closely coordinate” its action with Washington on the issue of a possible introduction of sanctions against North Korea. This was discussed today at a closed session.

of the Duma Committee for International Affairs.\textsuperscript{121} Foreign minister Kozyrev also changed his previous pro-US stance on the UN sanction as follows: ‘the time is not yet ripe for international sanctions against North Korea. Sanctions can be introduced in stages but only after all other possibilities have been exhausted’.\textsuperscript{122} One of the important reasons for such inconsistent views was closely related to the issue of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty because the Treaty remained in force until 1996, and measures would be taken one year before it expired, so there was still time to think things through. (See Chapter 3.)

In sum, during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95), Russia’s several active efforts over the issue of North Korean nuclear crisis within the framework of the regional security cooperation did not find any meaningful role in the region. Russia was no longer one of the major powers.\textsuperscript{123} In other words, Russia’s policy towards the region became reactive as a result of the internal and external factors mentioned above. Russia continued to be isolated and under pressure in the region during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95).

5.4. An Uninvited Guest? (Dec. 95-Jul. 96)
After the December 1995 election, there were few striking changes in Russia’s basic stance on the North Korean nuclear issue and its regional security policy in the region. The appointment of Primakov and Lebed as Russian foreign minister and Security Council Secretary, respectively, indicated a more pragmatic and professional Russian foreign policy direction, which included its

\textsuperscript{121} "Duma Discusses North Korea behind Closed Doors", \textit{Itar-Tass}, 20 June 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-119, 21 June 1994, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{123} So far Moscow has remained 'outside the circle of active participants' in the conflict because it lacks any opportunities to influence the North Koreans' position (\textit{Izvestia}, 22 March 1994, p. 3).
security policy over the North Korean nuclear issue. In other words, following the December 1995 parliamentary election, a firmer consensus had emerged among its foreign policy community that Russia should no longer tailor its behaviour to US preferences and that its status as a respected great power had to be restored on the Korean peninsula.

Surprisingly, Russia repeatedly proposed the convening of a multilateral conference during this period (Dec. 95-Jul. 96). For example, in January 1996, a Russian foreign ministry official stated that ‘Russia will join KEDO if its major role in the body is guaranteed and interests of the Russian nuclear industry are accounted for’. Yevgeniy Afanasiyev, heading a foreign ministry department in charge of Asia stated that ‘we are prepared to discuss specific proposals on Russia’s joining KEDO which was established, in particular, to ensure substituting graphite-modulated nuclear reactors using light waters’. Nevertheless, Russia was once again bitterly disappointed with the fact that it was continuously excluded from international talks regarding security on the Korean peninsula, thus further damaging its status and weakening its role in the region.

In April 1996, South Korea and the US devised new rules for dealing with North Korea when they proposed a ‘four-party talks’ among China, South

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124 Russia tried to participate in the APR security forum more actively during this period (Dec. 95-Jul. 96). For example, in July 1996, at the third session of the Regional Forum of ASEAN on the problems of security and at the ASEAN conference that took place in Jakarta, Russia for the first time participated as a dialogue partner. Russia’s delegation, led by minister of foreign affairs Primakov, participated in a discussion that focused attention on the issues of strengthening stability and security in the region, developing cooperation and deepening integration processes (Abazov, ‘Dialogue between Russia and ASEAN’, pp. 87-91).
125 As regards the regional security cooperation with the West, for example, Russia attempted to oppose the issues of NATO and START II.
Korea, North Korea and the US in order to establish a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula to replace the existing armistice treaty signed in 1953.

On the one hand, in deciding to propose a ‘four-party talks’, South Korean officials seemed to judge that more participants would complicate the process and weaken Seoul’s leading role, although Russia’s negative attitude certainly became a burden for them in promoting their strategy of creating a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula. Simultaneously, on the other hand, South Korea also tried to soothe Russia’s discontent over its exclusion from a framework for building a new peace regime on the Korean peninsula. For instance, the South Korean foreign minister visited Russia to explain the latter’s ‘four-party talks’, excluding Japan, Russia and the United Nations. Responding to the ‘four-party talks’, however, Russian foreign minister Primakov clearly stated that ‘relations between Russia and South Korea [were] experiencing growing pains’. In many respects, the proposal for ‘four-party talks’, from which Russia was excluded, seemed to be strengthening the feeling that it had been improperly treated by South Korea.

Russia’s continual insistence on the multilateral conference proposal should be seen as part of a strategy to maintain a strong presence in the region. In April 1996, for instance, Georgiy Kunadze, Russian ambassador to South Korea and former deputy foreign minister, pledged that ‘Russia supports all realistic proposals that can ease tensions on the Korean peninsula... We supported the proposal for six-party talks in principle. I cannot understand why South Korea advanced the proposal for four-party talks’. In May 1996, a senior Russian diplomat also proposed that Russia’s participation be guaranteed.

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128 The Korean Herald (Seoul), 21 April 1996, pp. 1, 4. The White House reaffirmed the US’s commitments to Seoul as an ally and categorically rejected the possibility of any talks on a ‘separate peace agreement with North Korea’ (Segodnia, 17 April 1996, p. 9).


130 A statement by a Russian foreign ministry spokesman indicated that ‘Russia could play a more positive role than the one envisioned by this initiative’ in efforts to settle the situation on the Korean peninsula. The role assigned to Moscow is a modest one - to ‘support’ the President’s initiative (Kommersant-daily, 18 April 1996, p. 4).

131 Hangyore Shinmun (Seoul), 25 April 1996, p. 18.
At a multilateral meeting for a permanent peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula, insisting that the ‘four-party talks’ suggested by South Korea and the US could not guarantee Russia’s interests in the peninsula.\(^{123}\)

In part, Russia was also knocking on ARF’s door and sought to play a more active, positive role on the Korean peninsula.\(^{133}\) Russia hosted in April 1996 two ARF conferences in Moscow aimed at developing a Statement of Basic Principles for Security and Stability for the ARF.\(^{124}\) In a speech in Jakarta in July 1996, foreign minister Primakov emphasised that Russia was ready to develop active ‘partnership’ relations with both the Association (ASEAN) as a whole and with each of its member countries. Besides the meetings and speeches within the framework of the Forum and ASEAN’s dialogue structure, Primakov conducted a full series of meetings with his colleagues from other countries. The separate discussions alone numbered fourteen. Russia’s intention to broaden cooperation with the largest state in South East Asia was also emphasised.\(^{135}\)

The more active participation of the Russian delegation in the session of the ARF and at the conference of ministers of foreign affairs demonstrated Russia’s desire not to fall behind the dynamically changing situation and to develop an effective approach to the ‘Pacific Ocean Challenge’ with a subsequent strengthening of positions in the APR.\(^{136}\)

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\(^{123}\) I hope that we will soon get the understanding of all parties concerned with the Korean issue about the Russia-proposed multination talks for establishment of a new peace regime on the Korean peninsula... We will continue to make efforts to materialise the proposal’, said deputy director general Valeriy Denisov of the Russian foreign ministry’s Asian affairs bureau (‘Russia’s Need to Participate in Talks on Korea Stressed’, Yonhap, 22 May 1996 in FBIS-EAS 96-102, 22 May 1996).

\(^{133}\) In May 1996, at a meeting of ARF where Russia was invited for the first time as a dialogue partner of ASEAN, Russia, together with China, offered joint proposals on principles ensuring security in the region.

\(^{124}\) ‘Track Two’ refers to unofficial meetings, normally hosted by independent research institutes, that bring together independent scholars, security specialists, former and current defence and foreign ministry officials and serving officials, participating in their ‘private capacities’.


\(^{136}\) It should be mentioned here that China already participated in a number of multilateral regional dialogues, including the APEC and ARF, see Jürgen Haacke, ‘China’s Participation in Multilateral Pacific Cooperation Forums’, Aussenpolitik, vol. 48, no. 2, 1997, pp. 166-176.
During this period (Dec. 95-Jul. 96), Russia increasingly could not be indifferent to the emerging peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula, which was closely related to its security interests in the region. However, despite Russia's continuous efforts over the Korean peninsula as the regional security issue, Russia did not succeed in achieving its aims in the region. Rather, Russia was kept out of the game by other major powers. In other words, although Russia sought to be a key regional player in new circumstances in the post-Soviet era, especially through regional multilateral cooperation, it had yet to find a solid place in Northeast Asia as one of the major political [security and military] powers during this period, thus demonstrating its reactive policy towards the Korean peninsula.
Chapter 6

Russia and Regional Economic Cooperation
in Northeast Asia:
Focusing on APEC and TRADP Issues

6.1. A Partner in Regional Economic Cooperation? (1985-91)

The Soviet Union showed little interest in participating in regional economic cooperation based on the concept of self-produced Soviet-type economies during the Cold War era. Thus, there was little effort by the Soviet Union to create a regional economic organisation and cooperation among the Asia Pacific Region (APR) countries during the Cold War era (from 1945 up to 1984). Instead, the Soviet Union showed greater interest in the creation of a zone of Soviet economies such as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in Europe and became an important source of economic aid to communist countries such as North Korea, Vietnam and Cambodia.


In these circumstances, the Soviet Union emphasised its bilateral economic relations with North Korea on the Korean peninsula to create a solid base for the coincidence of their mutual interests both in the strategic and the ideological spheres in Northeast Asia. This meant that the Soviet Union did not generally seem to regard the Korean peninsula as of potential economic advantage to its national interests. For this reason, through economic aid, the Soviet Union was able to maintain its enormous economic, military and political influence in North Korea from the late 1940s onwards.¹

At any rate, even in the economic field the Soviet Union was generally regarded as a superpower in the context of the Korean peninsula during the Cold War era.² In other words, the Soviet Union was the sole power which could influence North Korea’s economic programmes within the framework of its regional economic policy in Northeast Asia during the Cold War era, although it did not pursue an active economic policy towards North Korea in the region.

However, the emergence of the APR as the fastest-rising economic power and Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking led to a fundamental change in Soviet economic interests in the APR in terms of regional economic cooperation and also bilateral economic cooperation with the two Koreas. This meant that Gorbachev attempted to take an initiative on regional economic cooperation, although his attempts at policy change on the regional economic front were actually aimed at developing domestic economic reforms. Then, the Soviet Union sought to play a significant economic role in determining in the region as well. This approach shaped the basic nature of Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking. In turn, as regards economic relations with North Korea, there were

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² For an overview of Soviet economic power during the Cold War period, see G. I. Khanin, Dinamika ekonomicheskogo razvitiia SSSR (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1991).
inevitably gradual changes of Soviet position during the Gorbachev era (1985-91), especially concerning economic and military aid. (See Chapter 3.)

The primary driving force to weave the APR into a region was the dynamic economic growth of the countries of Northeast Asia, which had taken place over the course of the previous three decades: Japan from 1960-70, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong in the 1980s. In these circumstances, one of the main goals of Soviet policy towards Northeast Asia and the APR during the Gorbachev era was to establish more organic links with the dynamic regional economic order, in order to accelerate the reform process within the Soviet Union. In other words, Gorbachev and his reformers shifted Moscow's focus towards the importance of economic strength in international affairs and recognised Asia’s growing prominence in world affairs. As Table 6.1 shows, the major economies of the APR have ranked among the world's most impressive in terms of economic growth from the 1970s to the 1990s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>1971-80</th>
<th>1981-90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>5.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>3.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>9.26</td>
<td>9.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>9.07</td>
<td>7.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>8.01</td>
<td>6.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>9.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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The implications of this dynamic economic development for intra-regional relations were profound. In particular, the experience of economic growth based upon a network of mutual interdependence and cooperation led the countries involved to realise the importance of regional economic cooperation.

In this respect, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation organisation (APEC) was established in Canberra, Australia in November 1989 with the aim of coordinating trade and promoting investment cooperation. Since then, APEC has attempted to become the primary organisation for the promotion of free trade and economic cooperation in the APR based upon the concept of 'open regionalism'. The Seoul APEC Declaration in November 1991 set forth a commitment among APEC ministers to meet annually and hold informal discussions to strengthen and reaffirm agreed objectives, and to realise the goals of free and open trade and investment in the region. Notably, the meeting in Seoul also confirmed new members of APEC (China, Taiwan and Hong Kong), which marked a significant development of the APEC process.

Given these circumstances, Gorbachev's regional economic policy towards the APR shifted from its previous focus on economic aid to allied countries into a policy of active involvement regional economic cooperation.

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8 For the details of the evolution of the APEC process and its basic principles and objectives, see Andrew Elek, 'The Challenge of Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation', *The Pacific Review*, vol. 4, no. 4, 1991, pp. 322-333. According to Peter Drysdale, the central ideas of the APEC were: (1) openness in international economic policy and diplomatic approach; (2) evolution in the practice of high-level consultation and cooperation; and (3) equality in managing a growing economic partnership (Peter Drysdale, 'Soviet Prospects and the Pacific Economy', in Peter Drysdale, ed., *The Soviets and the Pacific Challenge* [North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1991], p. 11). There were two crucial reasons to be set up the APEC. First, APEC was established to compete with other regional economic organisations such as the European Union. Secondly, each of the twelve original members (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines and the US) had fears about what was seen as a rise in protectionist tendencies.


and participation in regional economic organisation. The new Soviet approach to the APR economies became apparent from Gorbachev's speeches during the second half of the 1980s. Gorbachev, in speeches at Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk in 1986 and in 1988 respectively, signified Soviet interests in promoting the development of regional economic cooperation through Soviet integration with the APR economies. This also meant that Soviet reformers were convinced that full participation in the global economy generally, and the APR economies more specifically, was needed for the Soviet Union to overcome its technological backwardness and attain true superpower status, based on factors other than military power.

These fundamental changes in Soviet economic interests towards the APR resulted in two main developments. First, the Soviet Union attempted to project a new attitude towards regional economic cooperation and expressed its interests in joining the activities of regional economic cooperation organisations such as the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), which were the most

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11 For the details account of Gorbachev's regional economic policy towards the APR, see Mikhail Gorbachev, *Zhizni i reformy*, vol. 2 (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), pp. 430-470.

12 In Vladivostok, Gorbachev announced a new regional policy for the Soviet Far East, noting that economic development there had lagged behind that of the national economy. He specifically mentioned the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC). Vladivostok could be opened to foreigners, and in time might become an international centre of trade, culture and tourism. For the details of Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech, see *Izvestiia*, 29 July 1986, pp. 1-3.

13 In Krasnoyarsk in September 1988, Gorbachev reiterated Soviet Union's willingness to join the PECC, and proposed invigorating the role of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific and the Economic Commission for West Asia. Gorbachev also expressed interest in the possibility of forming a 'zone of joint enterprise' in the Soviet Far East [Nakhodka]. For the details of Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk speech, see *Izvestiia*, 18 September 1988, pp. 1-3.


16 The PECC, which was an informal group that brings together representatives of government, business and academia, was founded in Canberra in 1980. PECC's essential features were: (1) support for the enhancement of information about policy practices and economic data to assess policy interests;
comprehensive vehicles for consultations on economic cooperation in Northeast Asia and the APR up to the end of the 1980s. Finally, the Soviet National Committee for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (SOVNAPEC), established in 1988 to facilitate interaction with PECC, became actively involved in efforts to open up the Soviet Union’s Pacific areas for trade and economic cooperation. This meant, in contrast to Gorbachev’s new regional economic policy, during the Soviet era (up to the time of Gorbachev’s coming to power in the middle of 1980s), that the Soviet Union was generally hostile to all regional organisations and that its economic relations with the APR were almost exclusively bilateral and limited. However, during the Gorbachev era, this hostility towards APR regional organisations was replaced by a willingness to recognise and cooperate with organisations such as ASEAN, PECC, APEC, and the Asian Development Bank.

(2) the opportunity for interchange on policy matters among officials of Pacific countries; and (3) encouragement to seek policy convergence through the exploration of common interests and problems (Vladimir Ivanov, ‘Soviet Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region and Economic Reforms’, in Peter Drysdale, ed., The Soviets and the Pacific Challenge, pp. 140-141).

The Soviet Union was among the non-member economies invited to send observers as guests to the sixth PECC plenary meeting held in Osaka in May 1988. On the debate over Soviet observer status for the membership of PECC, see Woods, ‘Delicate Diplomatic Debuts’, pp. 210-227.

Yevgeniy Primakov, then Chairman of the newly formed SOVNAPEC, made a brief and effective presentation in which he explained the Soviet Union’s interests in participating in the specialist working group meetings or task forces of PECC in the context of restructuring the Soviet economy, and the need to develop new approaches to international economic relations, especially with the economies of the APR. SOVNAPEC established working groups to deal with various PECC task forces and forums. In 1989, SOVNAPEC delegations participated in the workshops on fishing and trade policies held in Canada, on agricultural policies in South Korea, on transport, telecommunications and tourism in Thailand, and the forum on minerals and energy in the Philippines. In May 1989, a SOVNAPEC delegation attended the 22nd General Meeting of the PBEC in Taipei in an observer capacity. In May 1988 and November 1989, SOVNAPEC delegations attended the PECC conferences in Osaka and Auckland. In July 1988 and December 1989, representatives of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), took part in the proceedings of the 17th and 18th sessions of the Pacific Conference on Trade and Development (PAFTAD) held in Indonesia and Malaysia respectively (Ivanov, ‘Soviet Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region and Economic Reforms’, pp. 140-141).

In earlier years, organisations such as the ASEAN and the PECC were criticised as anti-Soviet, having the potential to become the Asian equivalent of an EC or NATO alliance. The Soviets feared US, Chinese or Japanese participation in or manipulation of these groupings against Soviet interests. Under Gorbachev, and in conjunction with improvements in the Sino-Soviet and US-Soviet relationships, this apprehension gave way to the recognition that ASEAN, the PECC and other regional organisations could be useful in achieving Soviet goals in the APR. In November 1986, the Soviet Union sent observers for the first time to the 5th annual meeting of the PECC in Vancouver, Canada. In March 1988, a SOVNAPEC was formed in an attempt to gain entry into the PECC. However, the
Secondly, it should be emphasised that Soviet regional economic interests and cooperation activities in the APR were ultimately designed to develop the Soviet Far East on the basis of Gorbachev's reform policies. Gorbachev's speeches at Vladivostok in 1986 and Krasnoyarsk in 1988 directly aimed at developing the Soviet Far East through its integration with the APR economies. In fact, up to the mid 1980s, the Soviet Far East, with its core maritime province, which in terms of geographical location was an integral part of the APR, had remained a closed zone, mainly for the use of its military base. In other words, not until the 1980s did the APR in general, and Siberia in particular, rank high on the Kremlin's agenda. It was then that the Soviet government began to pay attention to the economic dynamism of the APR and even more to the international isolation that Moscow had created for itself by its previously misguided policies. In particular, in his speech to the 27th CPSU Party Congress on 25 February 1986, Gorbachev started to call attention to the growing importance of the Asian and Pacific sectors of Soviet foreign policy.

In this context, Gorbachev clearly stressed political rather than military means, paying more attention to economic cooperation than to political relations. In short, Gorbachev's new regional economic policy towards the region was actually aimed at overall economic development in the Soviet Far East and Siberia by integrating the Soviet economy into the structure of the rapidly developing the APR.

PECC adopted a moratorium on accepting new members, and was willing to act on the Soviet application.


In many respects, Gorbachev's new approaches towards the APR economies were strongly related to the Soviet Union's gradual 'isolation' from the world economy since the middle of the 1980s. The relative isolation of the Soviet economy from trade with Western economies and the extremely limited relationships between the Soviet Union and Northeast Asian and Pacific market economies was a product of the politics of the Cold War and the closed nature of the Soviet economic system, rather than any lack of complementarity in economic structures. As a result, the scale of the Soviet Union's involvement in the regional network of economic relations was necessarily limited and isolated. For example, the Soviet Union did not become a member of the PECC and the APEC during the Gorbachev era. As regards the development of the Soviet Far East, there were also many problems which hindered it from developing as Gorbachev had apparently expected.

Given those problems, Gorbachev turned to relations with South Korea to implement his economic aims for the Soviet Far East in the APR. Economic cooperation with South Korea became one of the most important elements of

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33 See Mikhail Gorbachev, Politicheskii doklad Tsentral'negom komiteta KPSS XVII s'ezdu Komunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza (Moscow: Novosti, 1986), pp. 80-96.
34 Russia has traditionally regarded itself as an Eurasian power, uniquely able to project power and influence on both the European and Asian continents. That was somewhat obscured during the Cold War era, when the standoff with the US in Central Europe dominated thinking about Soviet foreign policy both in the West and in Moscow itself. However, since the end of the Cold War, the Eurasian strain in Russian foreign policy has slowly been reassessing itself. However, Russia faces a daunting geopolitical challenge in maintaining its status as an Asian power. Only 8 million of Russia's 150 million inhabitants live in the Far East, and they are vastly outnumbered by China's population of 1.3 billion. Russia's Far Eastern provinces are connected to Moscow, 6,000 km and six time zones away, only by the thin umbilical cord of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and the vagaries of the post-Soviet air services (Peter Rutland and Ustina Markus, 'Russia as a Pacific Power', Transition, vol. 1, no. 17, 1995, p. 4).
35 It should be noted that China has already participated in a number of multilateral regional dialogues, including the APEC and ASEAN Regional Forum. China has been a member of the PECC since 1986 and of the APEC since 1991. See Jürgen Haacke, 'China's Participation in Multilateral Pacific Cooperation Forums', Aussenpolitik, vol. 48, no. 2, 1997, pp. 165-176.
New Political Thinking in Northeast Asia, together with Sino-Soviet political rapprochement, especially after the 19th Party Conference in 1988.\textsuperscript{27}

Finally, with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea in 1990, the two sides entered a new phase of economic relations. For example, Gorbachev's visit to Cheju Islands (on the southern coast of South Korea) while returning from his visit to Japan in April 1991 showed his strong desire to strengthen the Soviet Union's economic cooperation with South Korea.\textsuperscript{28} At the summit, for example, as regards the APEC, South Korean President Roh Tae-woo invited the Soviet Union to participate in a new international economic forum.\textsuperscript{29}

The Soviet Union seemed to gain increasingly significant economic benefits and supports from South Korea during the Gorbachev era. On the contrary, for economic relations with North Korea during this period, trade between the Soviet Union and North Korea was decreasing rapidly and Soviet aid to North Korea nearly stopped after the diplomatic normalisation with South Korea in September 1990. (See Chapters 3 and 4.)

This obviously indicated that Gorbachev's new regional economic policy in Northeast Asia started to emphasise relations with South Korea rather with North Korea. Simultaneously, however, this also indicated that the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev era had begun to lose its enormous economic influence over the Korean peninsula.

The Soviet Union during the Gorbachev era still very much retained its superpower status, exercising a continuous and significant influence over regional economic issues. As has been already discussed, its focus gradually

\textsuperscript{27} For the details of Soviet economic cooperation under Gorbachev, see 'Iuzhnaya Koreia - potencial'nyi partner', \textit{Ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo stran - chlenov SEV}, no. 4, 1990, pp. 106-109.

\textsuperscript{28} This was the third Soviet-South Korean summit between Roh and Gorbachev and was the historic first visit by the Soviet head of state to the Korean peninsula. The Soviet media reported that the third summit marked a 'new level' in relations and symbolised the 'beginning of a new stage' of political dialogue and economic cooperation (\textit{Izvestiia}, 22 April 1991, p. 4; and \textit{Pravda}, 23 April 1991, p. 5). For a detailed account of Soviet economic interests in South Korea, see Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Pravda}, 23 April 1991, p. 5.
moved from North Korea towards South Korea. Indeed, Gorbachev actively sought economic cooperation with South Korea in line with the Soviet Union’s own economic agenda in the region.

6.2. In Search of Regional Economic Benefits? (Dec. 91-Dec. 93)

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, new concepts for Russia’s foreign policy and doctrine were exemplified by a strong emphasis on the economic aspects of its international relations with the West (and South Korea).\(^{30}\) Russia pursued a strategy of seeking full participation in international financial and economic institutions in order to obtain loans to assist in rebuilding its economy and to integrate into the global economy.\(^{31}\)

Given these circumstances, Russia vigorously advocated engagement in the emerging regional economic organisation and cooperation in the APR (especially in Northeast Asia), thus extending the Asian zone of economic dynamism to the Russian Far East as Gorbachev had done during the late Soviet era.\(^{32}\) For this purpose, Russia continued to stress political rather than military means, paying more attention to economic cooperation than to political relations in the APR. In the post-Soviet era, the military factor has become less decisive, whereas the economic factor has assumed increasing importance in

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\(^{30}\) On the essence of a foreign economic strategy for Russia, see Stepan Sitarian and Leonid Krasnov, 'Russia’s Integration into the World Economy: Paths of Further Development of Russia’s Foreign Economic Activity', *International Affairs* (Moscow), vol. 42, no. 5/6, 1996, pp. 179-190.

\(^{31}\) However, these economic loans from the West and South Korea led eventually to Russia’s debt problems. As of September 1994, the contractual amount of Russia’s debt outstanding totalled some $US 86 billion in principal and interest, most of which was carried over from the former Soviet Union. The Russian debt is composed of the following three parts: (1) Paris Club debt with official lenders (about $US 49 billion); (2) London Club debt with commercial banks (about $US 31 billion); and (3) Tokyo Club non-bank debt, supplier credits and other debt (about $US 6 billion). Since the normalisation of diplomatic relations with the former Soviet Union in September 1990, South Korea agreed to grant economic assistance loan to the former Soviet Union. The principal of the external outstanding loan to Russia totalled $US 1.47 billion (Sang-moon Hahn and Joon-hwan Im, *Debt Management and the Russian Debt Problem* [Seoul: Korea Institute of Finance, 1996], pp. 7-8 and 63).
the course of building as well as maintaining a new global order. As a result, Russia's military presence in the APR diminished substantially from the Soviet period. For example, from 1991 through to 1996, the number of combat vessels decreased by 60 per cent: from 333 to 100 ships. This inevitably led to a reduction in Russia's military presence in the Far East, as Table 6.2 shows.

Table 6.2 Soviet/Russian Forces in the Far Eastern Military District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tank Divisions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Rifle Divisions</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal Surface Combatants</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


12 For the details of Russia's regional economic interests in the APR such as the APEC, see E. Grobenschikov, 'Tikhookeanskia regional'naia integratsii?'. Mirovaiia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosieniya, no. 1, 1993, pp. 86-96.


By and large, by decreasing its military presence in the Far East, Russia expected to achieve two clearly objectives with the APR economies: (1) to develop the Russian Far East, and (2) to be engaged actively in a regional economic cooperation organisation in the APR.

Russia urgently needed to revitalise its national economy and develop the Russian Far East instead of building up its military power in the region. Its leaders appeared to believe that this objective could be most effectively achieved through full-scale involvement of the Siberian and Far Eastern regions of Russia in economic cooperation with countries of the APR on the principles of open regionalism as well as through the use of its huge industrial, scientific, technical and natural potential. In other words, Russia realised that the success of its modernisation programme, especially in the less developed Russian Far East, depended on cooperation with neighbouring states in the APR.

In these circumstances, Russia continued to emphasise its economic relations with South Korea as Gorbachev had done during the late Soviet era. In a speech in Seoul, for instance, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated that 'Russia is boldly opening its Far Eastern frontiers. It is pursuing a moral, open and honest foreign policy, in order to strengthen the zone of intensive partnership in what is perhaps one of the most promising regions of the world. I think that at the present time it is necessary to undertake a number of measures that will give a strong, new impetus to cooperation and the political climate in the APR'.

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36 The Russian Far East covers an area of 6.2 million sq. km, an area that comprises 36.4 per cent of the territory of the Russian Federation. This vast region houses 8.16 million people, 5.4 per cent of Russia's population, and its economy contributes 5 per cent of Russia's industrial output (P. Minakir, ed., Dal'nii Vostok Rossii: ekonomicheskoe obozrenie [Moscow: Progress-Kompleks Ekopress, 1993], pp. 11-13).


Another pressing motive for Russia’s economy in the APR was to be engaged in a region which had recently experienced the fastest economic growth in the world, as Table 6.3 shows.\textsuperscript{39}

**Table 6.3 Average Annual Rate of Growth of Real GDP in Selected Countries, 1991-95 (% per annum)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>1991-95</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>3.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed economies</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing economies</td>
<td>5.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>7.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>8.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>8.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>8.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>7.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>12.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As regards APEC and regional economic cooperation in the APR, Russian officials basically regarded them as vital elements for its post-Soviet economy.\textsuperscript{40} In this context, in September 1992, for example, Russia, in the shape of the Russian National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation (RNCPEC), was admitted to the Council of Pacific Economic Cooperation.\textsuperscript{41}

It should be emphasised here that the Russian leadership made continuous attempts to look for South Korea’s help in order to pursue its economic programmes based on a key assumption of its pro-South Korean approach.

\textsuperscript{39} For a discussion of Russia’s possible integration in APR’s economy, see Round Table, ‘Osobennosti integratsii Rossii i stran Vostochnoi Azii v sovremennoe mirovoe khozialstvo’, *Mirovaja ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 12, 1997, pp. 53-71.

\textsuperscript{40} For an account of Russia and APEC in the APR, see O. Mal’tseva and E. Semenov, ‘Ekonomicheskaiia integratsiia v aziatsko-tikhookeanskom regione’, *Mirovaja ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 9, 1995, pp. 75-85; and R. Abazov, ‘Politika Rossii v ATR: smena paradigmu’, *Mirovaja ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 2, 1997, pp. 23-34.
towards the Korean peninsula during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93). At the first Russian-South Korean summit in November 1992, for instance, President Yeltsin called for an ‘economic partnership’ with South Korea and viewed South Korea as a substitute economic partner for Japan in the region.\textsuperscript{42} This indicated that Russia seemed to regard South Korea as a country which, either in relationship with other major powers in Northeast Asia such as China, Japan and the US, or on its own, could play a significant role in advancing Russia’s regional economic interests in the region in the post-Soviet era. According to a Russian scholar, Mikhail Titarenko, ‘business cooperation between Russia and South Korea is given the top priority in our country’.\textsuperscript{43} A number of Russian experts even believed that South Korea’s experience was more appropriate for Russia than America’s or Europe’s.\textsuperscript{44}

As regards Russia’s involvement in regional economic cooperation, Russia needed to have South Korea’s support to become a member of regional economic organisations such as APEC because South Korea had a leading role in its creation. South Korea had greater involvement in regional mechanisms in the APR including the APEC and ASEAN-PMC from the mid-1980s onwards. In this context, at the first Russian-South Korean summit in 1992, the Yeltsin government expressed an interest in joining the APEC.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{41} Oleg Ivanov, ‘Russia - APEC: a New Stage of Cooperation’, \textit{International Affairs} (Moscow), vol. 43, no. 4, 1997, p. 172.
\textsuperscript{42} ‘Calls for Economic Partnership’, \textit{Itar-Tass}, 19 November 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-224, 19 November 1992, pp. 10-11. See also \textit{Izvestia}, 19 November 1992, p. 4. In the summer of 1992, already a high-ranking Russian official mentioned that in the APR, South Korea was the most promising partner for Russia rather than Japan, because of the Kurile Islands problem, or China, with its tremendously blinkered ideological attitudes (\textit{Izvestia}, 1 August 1992, p. 6). But, later Russia realised that South Korea could not be a substitute for Japan. Russia may find Seoul attractive as an economic partner given the possibility of complementarity in the Russian and South Korean economies, but Seoul did not have the same level of financial resources as Japan and lacked Tokyo’s regional and international influence. Indeed, the Kremlin still played ‘the South Korean Card’ to put pressure on Japan in terms of economic relations.
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Rossiskie vesti}, 26 May 1994, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{45} Yeltsin stated that ‘declaring our desire to become a full member of the community of APR countries, we are following - I am not hiding this - our national interests. At the same time, they in no way contradict the interests of the APR region’s states’ (‘First Round of Yeltsin-Roh Talks [Addresses
However, it should be noted that other members of APEC appeared determined to limit membership to the more highly developed and stronger regional economies. In this situation, Russia was only rewarded with 'pre-membership' of APEC. APEC imposed a three-year moratorium on the admission of Russia in Seattle in 1993.46

Here, it must be emphasised that the ultimate reason for Russia’s efforts in relation to APEC was to maintain its economic influence as one of the major powers in this region in the post-Soviet era. Nevertheless, Russia’s regional economic activities were quite limited although it attempted to make good results based on its pro-Western (and pro-South Korean) stance in its foreign policy during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93). There were several difficulties for the Russian side to achieve these goals in the APR economies during this period. First, world trade was becoming increasingly competitive47 and there was a severe lack of internal economic stability.48 (See Tables 6.4.)


46 Mexico and Papua New Guinea were admitted at the Seattle meeting in 1993. More importantly, at the Seattle meeting, members recognised that APEC needed to develop a 'more systematic means of addressing the issue of new members' and imposed a moratorium on future membership while senior officials were asked to conduct a study of membership policy and provide recommendations to the ministers on the criteria for the admittance of future members. (Nicole Gallant and Richard Stubbs, 'APEC’s Dilemmas: Institution-Building around the Pacific Rim’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 70, no. 2, 1997, p. 207)


Table 6.4 Annual Economic Indicators of Russia, 1991-93 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Growth in GDP</th>
<th>Inflation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>1353%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>-9%</td>
<td>896%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Secondly, the formation of APEC presented another obstacle to Russia, which was closely related to its new ‘identity’ in the APR in the post-Soviet era. The Soviet authorities did not view themselves as part of the APR and tended to define national interests in Asia in global rather than region-specific terms. The Soviet leadership, while pushing ahead with numerous propagandistic initiatives and strengthening their military presence, did little develop diversified practical ties with Asian countries and failed to participate in the economic life of the region. Thus, Russia inherited from the Soviet Union neither an elaborate Asian policy nor a particularly impressive list of achievements in terms of the country’s participation in APR affairs.

Thirdly, the general conditions of the Russian Far East held little attraction for other major economic powers in the post-Soviet era. The widening gap between the Russian Far East and other capitalist APR countries represented a major stumbling block for Russia’s smooth engagement into the region’s affairs.

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69 The loss of superpower status has also entailed a painful effort to identify a new role as an Eurasian power, which was closely related to Russia’s isolation in international relations in the post-Soviet era. For a discussion of Russian identity during the early years of Russian foreign policy, for example, see Peter Ferdinand, ‘Russia and Russians after Communism: Western or Eurasian?’, The World Today, vol. 48, no. 12, 1992, pp. 225-229. For a comment on Russian identity in the Tsarist and Soviet eras, see Franklyn Griffiths, Arctic and North in the Russian Identity, Working Paper 8 (Toronto: Centre for Russian East European Studies, University of Toronto, 1990).


71 For a discussion of economic relations between the Russian Far East and the APR countries, see Michael J. Bradshaw, ‘Economic Relations of the Russian Far East with the Asia-Pacific States’, Post-Soviet Geography, vol. 35, no. 4, 1994, pp. 234-246. For details of economic problems in the Russian Far East during the early years of Russian foreign policy, see Valery K. Zaitsev, ‘Problems of Russian....'.
Fourthly, it was clear that high-level bilateral contacts between Russia and North and South Korea did not create a congenial atmosphere for finding ways out of Russian economic difficulties. Especially, Russia's intention to engage more deeply in economic contacts with South Korea was hindered by Russia's debts to South Korea. In the meantime, South Korea increasingly attempted to use its economic help to Russia as a 'bargaining chip' to reduce or even eliminate Russia's cooperation with North Korea for the issues of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty and the North Korean nuclear crisis. (See Chapters 3 and 5.) Furthermore, although Russia emphasised its economic relations with South Korea, the latter started to put more stress on its relations with China.

In these circumstances, Russia's economic role on the Korean peninsula became less and less influential during this period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93). Instead, Russia asked South Korea to help Russia's economic aims such as joining APEC and the development of the Russian Far East. In the meantime, Russia could no longer give economic assistance to North Korea in the post-Soviet era. Russia actually became a net recipient of economic aid after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as Table 6.5 indicates.

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For the details of Russia's debts to South Korea, see Chapter 4. For a general account of Russia's foreign debts, see B. Pichugin, 'Vneshnii dolg Rossi: Stat'ia pervaya', *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 6, 1995, pp. 21-31; and B. Pichugin, 'Vneshnii dolg Rossi: Stat'ia vtoraya', *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 7, 1995, pp. 65-75.

For the details of Russia's debts to South Korea, see Chapter 4. For a general account of Russia's foreign debts, see B. Pichugin, 'Vneshnii dolg Rossi: Stat'ia pervaya', *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 6, 1995, pp. 21-31; and B. Pichugin, 'Vneshnii dolg Rossi: Stat'ia vtoraya', *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 7, 1995, pp. 65-75.

South Korea normalised its diplomatic relations with China in August 1992, and China became the second major power to recognise the two Koreas on the Korean peninsula. For a detailed political and economic development of Sino-South Korean relations after their normalisation, see, for example, H. Liu, 'The Sino-South Korean Normalisation - a Triangular Explanation', *Asian Survey*, vol. 33, no. 11, 1993, pp. 1082-1094; C. J. Zhao, 'Impact of Sino-South Korean Diplomatic Relations on Trade and Economic Relations in Northeast Asia', *Chinese Economic Studies*, vol. 27, no. 4, 1994, pp. 61-70; and Hyeon Kim, 'Normalisation and after: Prospects for the Sino-South Korean Relations', *Korea and World Affairs*, vol. 20, no. 4, 1996, pp. 572-589.

As regards Russia's aid to North Korea, Yeltsin intended to cut off all defence assistance and all arms sales to North Korea. In Seoul in November 1992, Yeltsin stated that 'Russia will discontinue any military assistance to North Korea. We are ready for cooperation in the military-technical field with South Korea' ('No More Military Aid to DPRK', *Itar-Tass*, 19 November 1992 in FBIS-SOV 92-224, 19 November 1992, p. 10).
Table 6.5 International Aid to Russia, 1992-95

($US million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pledged</th>
<th>Disbursements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>23,530</td>
<td>10,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>16,330</td>
<td>6,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3,820</td>
<td>5,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3,360</td>
<td>4,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>123,500</td>
<td>74,000*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Russia had to move away from its previous position of being a principal helper to the North Korean economy to that of a subordinate player after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ultimately, this led Russia to be engaged in a more constructive way in a US-led regional economic system in the post-Soviet era. According to a Russian scholar, 'Russia has not been able to implement the concept of compensating abilities which would give Russian an increased economic and political presence in exchange for a decreased military presence in the region. Consequently, Russia has chosen indirect engagement with the US via rapprochement with America's allies in the region such as South Korea and Japan'.

Nevertheless, it should be mentioned here that unlike other agenda (Chapters 3, 4 and 5), virtually all Russian reformers and conservatives among the Russian leadership seemed to be no serious conflict views concerning the mentioned two regional economic issues in the APR in the post-Soviet era.

In spite of all Russia's active efforts to develop regional economic cooperation based on its new pro-Western and pro-South Korean stance,

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56 In this respect, Russian conservatives [pro-North Korean forces] even supported Yeltsin's pro-South Korean stance due to Russia's economic interests in the region.
Russia's real capacity to influence developments concerning fell short of all its expectations in the early years of Russia. Rather, a number of the attempts made by the Russian side to be involved in regional economic issues, together with economic help from other countries, only resulted in the worsening of relations between the two former allies (Russia and North Korea), weakening Russia's role on the Korean peninsula. In other words, Russia only proved its ineffectiveness in seeking a foreign policy that would help its own economy. As a result, Russia was no longer one of the major economic powers in the region, able to pursue an active and consistent policy towards the Korean peninsula in order to maximise its economic national interests. This led Russia more seriously to attempt to look for other ways to be involved in regional economic issues in the coming years.

6.3. In Search of a Legal Framework for Regional Economic Cooperation? (Dec. 93-Dec. 95)

Russia's basic regional economic policy in Northeast Asia after the December 1993 parliamentary election continued to emphasise involvement in regional economic organisations and multilateral economic cooperation with its neighbour states. This indicated that the characteristic feature of Russian economic diplomacy after the December 1993 parliamentary election was the taking of more purposeful and active steps towards diversification of the geographical structure of its economic exchange with other countries in Northeast Asia.

Unlike previous years (Dec. 91-Dec. 93), however, Russia's approach to the APR economies changed from its previously passive expectations to a more serious active and sensible policy of step-by-step engagement during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). This indicated that despite Russia's cooperation with the West and South Korea based on its pro-Western (and pro-South Korean)
stance during the first years of the change of regime, it was not satisfied with the results it was obtaining in the region as a successor state to the former Soviet Union. For example, South Korea's economic investment in the Russian economy during that period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93) had not been as substantial as the Russian side had expected. (See Chapter 4.)

In these circumstances, by the end of 1993, Russia started to reorient its regional economic policy in the APR from its previous passive stance and its search for economic assistance from the West and South Korea towards a more positive engagement in the region. To this end, two major active steps were taken to maintain Russia's economic influence in the APR during this period: (1) to apply for full membership for the APEC; and (2) to conclude a contract for Tumen River Area Development Project (TRADP).

As mentioned earlier, APEC had already imposed a three-year moratorium on the admission of Russia in Seattle in 1993. Since the imposition of APEC's moratorium, Russian officials repeatedly expressed their government's wish to be accepted as a full member of APEC. In November 1994, for example, deputy foreign minister Aleksandr Panov stated that 'We hope that Russia will become a fully fledged member of APEC after the moratorium expires, the more so since the members of that organisation recognise the fact that Russia is part and parcel of the APR and is able to contribute to the work of APEC'.

In the end, in March 1995, Russia officially applied for full membership of APEC. The message by foreign minister Kozyrev that was attached to the application stressed that Russia, which was consistently implementing economic reforms and which fully shared the principles of this influential organisation, was interested in its earliest and full-fledged inclusion in the Asia-Pacific economic space, which would primarily involve tapping of the huge

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potential of its Siberian and Far Eastern regions. As regards Russia's applying for full membership of APEC, deputy foreign minister Panov stated that 'we hope to be the first country admitted to APEC once the moratorium ends'. The application for full membership of APEC clearly demonstrated that groups such as APEC, PECC and other economic organisations had become a focus of Russia's 'economic diplomacy' in the APR in the post-Soviet era.

To a certain extent, Russia seemed to regard APEC as a worthy 'alternative' to the European Union (EU) which Russia, as an European state, could theoretically join but where in practice it had no prospects. As a Russian scholar had observed, 'the Asia-Pacific direction remains in the zone of priority attention of Russian economic diplomacy... the initiation of action in it was devoted not just to opening impressive potentials of foreign economic ties for Russia with the dynamically developing countries of the APR, but also to partially counterbalance the apparent tilt towards Western Europe and to lower the dependence of the domestic economy on relations with the EU, which increased during recent years'. In fact, in the Europeans' opinion, Russia was generally too backward and too large for the EU in the post-Soviet era. This indicated that, to a large extent, Russia was considerably threatened with remaining isolated, surrounded by the numerous blocs and unions which took shape after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

However, it should be noted that APEC was not a political process [and organisation] in the broadest context. Rather, APEC has evolved towards a

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60 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 22 March 1995, p. 6.
64 It should be noted that the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the CMEA had been dismantled with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
65 For example, according to Helmut Schmidt, the European Union was a political process. It can be seen as a political process in at least two fundamental senses. First, the Union, which started as the EEC, was devised as a long-term safety device to prevent any further outbreak of major military

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central intergovernmental organisation for policy coordination and cooperation in the 1990s. In this respect, the issue of membership of APEC has been one of the central problems of the 1990s.

More importantly, the decisive reason for Russia's attempt to apply for full membership of APEC was that it expected to be recognised by neighbour states as one of the major powers which could influence regional economic matters, as it was afraid of being excluded from the consolidation of the economic integration process in the APR after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In other words, by becoming a full member of APEC, Russia could claim to be an APR economic power and could reap more benefits from full-scale economic cooperation with other countries in the region (especially, concerning the Russian Far East). In this respect, Russia had viewed APEC as an useful multilateral vehicle for a broader Asian cooperative economic process, which might afford it 'another opportunity' for its economy. To a certain extent, Russia preferred indirect engagement in regional economy through the multilateral economic organisation because it had not been able to enter the Asia-Pacific economic system directly due to mainly the weakness of its economic power in the post-Soviet era.

Conflict between its member nations. Secondly, the device was installed as an initial step toward the long-term eventual goal of political union between the member nations of Western Europe. The union started with economic integration at the initial stage out of economic and social necessity, as well as expediency. It is a far easier task than political integration (Jungah K. Park, 'The Impact of APEC: a Private Sector View', Korea and World Affairs, vol. 19, no. 4, 1995, p. 635).

The evolution of APEC from a 'talking shop' in its earlier stage (1985-95) toward a vehicle for the implementation of trade and investment liberalisation and facilitation (from 1995 onwards) made APEC potentially more controversial (Chung H. Lee and Charles E. Morrison, 'APEC and Two Koreas', Pacific Focus, vol. 11, no. 1, 1996, p. 33).

APEC's membership reflects great diversity: from the most advanced industrial countries, such as the US and Japan, to countries whose industrialisation has not seriously taken off as yet, such as Papua New Guinea. It includes the model cases of capitalist market economies such as Singapore and Hong Kong, as well as China which has yet to experience the fundamental transformation from a basic communist economy, partially modified with elements of market economy, toward a full-fledged free market economy. Such heterogeneity of APEC's membership is generally regarded as the greatest obstacles to achieving any meaningful degree of trade and investment liberalisation in the region. For the detailed explanation of APEC problems including membership, see, for example, Gallant and Stubbs, 'APEC's Dilemmas', pp. 203-218.
In these circumstances, Russia stressed the following two factors when applying to become a full member of APEC: (1) its geographical proximity to the APR; and (2) the potential of the Russian Far East for the APR economies.

Russia had a strong claim by virtue of its 18,000 km Pacific coastline, although being a geographic part of the region did not provide sufficient grounds for a claim to membership in APEC. Furthermore, it also had the massive economic potential of Siberia and the Russian Far East, which would provide not only support for its internal economic reforms, but would also be in line with the interests of all the countries of the region.68

In some sense, however, it should be also noted that Russia’s intention to become a full member of APEC seemed to be ‘symbolic’, which was closely related to ‘Eurasianism’, together with its practical, economic reasons in the post-Soviet era. In other words, if Russia succeeded in becoming a member of the APR economic organisation, it also implied that Russia could be recognised as a ‘Eurasian’ power by other members (rather than practical economic advantage) in the post-Soviet era.69

However, there were differing reactions to Russia’s intention to become a full member of APEC among other members of this economic organisation.

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69 According to Dmitry Shlapentokh, Eurasianism is a quasi-political and intellectual movement. Its representatives state that Russia is a unique blend of Slavic and non-Slavic cultures and ethnic groups. Eurasianists emphasised the historical links of Russia with the East (Dmitry V. Shlapentokh, 'Eurasianism: Past and Present', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 30, no. 2, 1997, pp. 129-151). Initially, the paradigm of Eurasianism was created in the 1920s by Russian emigrants in Sophia, Prague, Belgrade and Berlin—primarily by Nikolai Trubetskov, Pyotr Savitsky and Georgy Vernadsky. The major proposal emphasised that the territory of the former Russian empire or the Soviet Union was a specific historical and geographical universe, belonging neither to Europe nor to Asia, being a specific unique phenomenon (S. B. Lavrov, 'L.N. Gumilev i evrazisty' [L. N. Gumilev and Eurasianism], in L. N. Gumilev, ed., Ritmy Evrazii (Moscow: Ekopress, 1993), p. 9). For an
Although some APEC members expressed concern about whether Russia would be an honest partner - that was, would it be fully open to free trade, would dirty tricks be played by state structures, or would it be a politically stable country?\textsuperscript{20}

South Korea, in principle, supported Russia's admission into APEC. For example, during the South Korean President's visit to Moscow in June 1994, Kim Young-sam expressed support for Russia's candidacy.\textsuperscript{71} In November 1994, according to the South Korean foreign minister, the main criteria for APEC membership were geographic location and regional economic ties.\textsuperscript{72} In September 1995, Kim Sok-kyu, ambassador of South Korea to the Russian Federation, stated that 'based on Russia's possibilities and potential, its participation in APEC seems completely justified. Although Russia's entry into APEC is delayed because of the moratorium which will be in effect until the end of 1996, it has already secured the strong support of South Korea... South Korea was the first country to announce support for Russia's joining APEC in a joint statement by the presidents of the two countries'.\textsuperscript{73} Even a Russian high-ranking official confirmed that 'the South Korean side [had reiterated] its support of the Russian claim for joining APEC'.\textsuperscript{74}

To a considerable extent, South Korea was in a position to play its unique role as a mediator between developed and developing economies in the region.


\textsuperscript{71} For this reason, for example, at the APEC summit in Bogor (Indonesia) in November 1994, Russia inexplicably neglected to participate even as an observer.

\textsuperscript{72} Kim welcomed Russia's intention to participate actively and constructively in all areas of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and... Would give favourable consideration to the candidacy of the Russian Federation for APEC membership when the matter is taken up at future APEC fora' ('Joint Communiqué Declares New Bilateral Ties', \textit{Yonhap}, 2 June 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-106, 2 June 1994, p. 6).

\textsuperscript{73} In connection with geographic location and regional economic ties, Seung-joo Han discussed the possibility of future membership for Russia, Vietnam and North Korea. 'Because Russia, a Pacific Rim country, is a big military power and has good economic potential, it is time to think about involving Russia in APEC', the South Korean foreign minister said ('Articles Examine Challenges Facing APEC - Views of ROK Foreign Minister', \textit{Suara Karya}, 15 November 1994, pp. 1, 8 in FBIS-EAS 95-003, 15 November 1994).

\textsuperscript{74} See \textit{Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka}, no. 6, 15 November 1995, pp. 3-9.
Above all, South Korea could claim with some legitimacy to be an originator of the APEC concept. While notions of intergovernmental APR cooperation dated back in the academic literature to the late 1960s and entered into governmental discussions in the late 1970s, the specific proposal that led to the creation of APEC came in a January 1989 Australian-South Korean joint communiqué. For the South Korean side, APEC also became a vehicle for association with other Asia-Pacific nations, an opportunity for maintaining but diversifying its relations with the US and a venue for maximising its influence and bargaining leverage. Moreover, APEC also provided South Korea with some guarantee of being in the same economic grouping as the US, its single most important market. South Korea had been concerned about the direction of US trade policy indicated by NAFTA, a preferential arrangement from which South Korea had been excluded.

In other words, South Korea's interest in the APEC was based less on the projected benefits of economic cooperation itself, but more on the value to the South Korean government of its diplomatic and political association with other APR countries. There were several reasons for these benefits: (1) by associating South Korea with other regional Asian states, it conferred legitimacy on the South Korean state. This was regarded as very important to South Korea, which for many decades had seen its foreign policy primarily in terms of a struggle with North Korea; (2) There was a potential in regional cooperation for developing associations with Asian governments with which South Korea did not yet have diplomatic relations. In fact, South Korea took the lead in negotiating China’s entry into APEC (along with Taiwan and Hong Kong) prior to the second APEC ministerial meeting in Seoul in 1991 and in the process augmented its contacts with the mainland government; (3) The

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76 Lee and Morrison, ‘APEC and Two Koreas’, p. 27.
77 Funabashi, *Asia Pacific Fusion*, pp. 73-76.
association with the APR countries represented a diversification of South Korea's foreign policy, which had been characterised by an asymmetrical relationship with the US; and (4) South Korea could gain leverage vis-à-vis larger neighbours or trading partners through association with other medium-sized or smaller countries with similar interests.

In the meantime, in May 1994, Russian first deputy defence minister Andrei Kokoshin stated that Russia's relations with South Korea were a major factor helping Russia enter what he called the 'APR integration system'. When Russian Vice Premier Oleg Davydov visited South Korea in July 1995, he handed the South Korean President a personal message from Russian President Yeltsin, expressing a desire to promote relations between the two sides. Notably, the talks also touched on Russia's integration into the world economic community and on Russia's membership of the World Trade Organisation.

The US seemed to have an ambiguous attitude towards Russia's entry into APEC. The issue of APEC had been the centrepiece of US regional economic policy since the Seattle meeting in 1993. There was widespread concern at the possibility of increasing hegemonic direction by the US and APEC was viewed as a forum for attempting to influence US behaviour. In this respect, from the perspective of Washington, APEC was another instrument to be used in its attempts to force open the markets of Northeastern Asia. Furthermore, it was true that APEC certainly had done little so far to prevent the US resorting to bilateralism in its economic relations with other states of the region.

A Japanese Foreign Ministry official expressed little enthusiasm over Russia's application for entry into the APEC forum as follows: 'I don't think

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78 'Deputy Defence Minister Meet His ROK Counterpart', Interfax, 4 May 1994 in FBIS-SOV 94-087, 5 May 1994, p. 17.
Russia is a country that ought to join', the Japanese official said. 'APEC comprises economies in the APR, and although Russia partially belongs to the region, it seems somewhat different'.

In principle, China did not seem to oppose Russia's intention to become a member of APEC. For example, a Chinese diplomat argued that neighbouring Russia and China possessed a great economic potential and that they should actively develop bilateral ties which contributed to the development of the whole APR. However, it did not mean that China supported Russia's intention to be a member of APEC as Russia had expected.

In general, Russia was regarded as an economically backward country which urgently needed more economic assistance from the West and South Korea while waiting passively for a positive response. As Izvestiia reported, 'Russia is not yet in Europe, but no longer in Asia. Russia will not be represented at a major Asia-Pacific forum whose participants will discuss the region's economic future in the 21st century. This seems like just deserts for a country that, instead of making a breakthrough into Asia, has on its hands a dying Trans-Siberian Railroad and moribund business activity in the Russian Far East'.

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81 Official Negative on Russia's APEC Bid', Kyodo, 23 March 1995 in FBIS-EAS 95-057, 23 March 1995. Japan along with Australia, took the initiative in establishing the economic institutions such as PAFTAD, PBEC, PECC and APEC in the APR. For an analysis of Japan's role in the APEC, see Kazuo Takahashi, 'Japan and the APEC: in Search of Leadership', in APEC and a New Pacific Community: Issues and Prospects (Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1995), pp. 139-160; and Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC.


83 For the details of Chinese relations with APEC, see, for example, Gary Klintworth, 'China's Evolving Relationship with APEC', International Journal, vol. 50, no. 3, 1995, pp. 488-515; and L. Wu, 'The PRC and APEC: a Planned Excursion for Conciliation', Issues and Studies, vol. 33, no. 11, 1997, pp. 95-111. Furthermore, it should be noted that there was serious cooperation between China and South Korea in the APR concerning APEC. See Lu. Tsiganov, 'Respublika Koreia i Kitai v integratsionnykh protsessakh mirovoi ekonomiki', Mirovaja ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otношения, no. 5, 1995, pp. 112-121.

84 Izvestiia, 9 November 1994, p. 3. APEC's members were cool towards the entry of new members into its ranks. So Russia was still outside this organisation, even though, at different times, representatives of Australia, South Korea, the US and the ASEAN countries evaluated the prospects for its joining favourably. The fact was that there exist within the organisation itself contradictions both with respect to the actual problems of trade, economic and investment policies in the APR and with respect to the mutual suspicions in connection with the attempts to set up within the APEC a dictate of
This inevitably continued to undermine Russia’s role and influence towards the Korean peninsula during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). On the one hand, Russia could no longer be a state which gave economic assistance to North Korea. On the other hand, Russia continuously needed to have firmer support from South Korea for its economic aims in this region that was the case in previous years (Dec. 91-Dec. 93).\(^5\)

In the meanwhile, in the 1990s, many APEC member economies promoted sub-regional free trade arrangements, such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) among Asian countries, the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA) among Oceanic countries and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among North American countries. (See Table 6.6.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Total Exports</th>
<th>Exports to APR</th>
<th>Exports to APR/Total Exports (%)</th>
<th>GDP (SUS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>1,918,369</td>
<td>1,405,020</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>730,617</td>
<td>347,826</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFTA</td>
<td>256,540</td>
<td>57,590</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZCER</td>
<td>59,394</td>
<td>56,787</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Such ‘sub-regionalism’\(^6\) was, by definition, directed against broad-based trade liberalisation and as such not only raised anxieties among non-members the developed countries. The Americans were not concealing their yearning to increase American exporting and capital investment in the region and, at the same time, they were placing obstacles in the way of the drawing together of Japan and China in the economic sphere to counterbalance the US (‘Russian Desire to Join APEC Viewed’, *Moscow Delovoy Mir*, 14 July 1995, p. 7 in FBIS-SOV 95-154-S, 10 August 1995, p. 7).

\(^5\) For the details of Russia’s economic relations with the two Koreas, see Chapters 3 and 4.

\(^6\) For a discussion of sub-regionalism in Asia, for example, see John Ingleton, ed., *Regionalism, Subregionalism and APEC* (Clayton, Vic.: Monash Asia Institute, 1998); and Sergei Medvedev,
of sub-regional groupings, but demanded adequate harmonisation between these two concepts. This sub-regionalism in the APR was a quite natural tendency because the APR covers a vast area and diverse economies exist here for geographical and historical reasons. Moreover, differences in political views and social systems played a part in the resulting political, economic and social disparity among the countries concerned. Hence, it was very difficult to form a close entity dedicated to economic cooperation.

For this reason, various ideas have been advanced by scholars and government organisations with regard to the setting up of economic spheres, including a 'Northeast Asian economic sphere' (or an 'East Asian Economic Circle [EAEC]', or an 'East Asian economic sphere', or a Sea of Japan rim economic sphere, or a Yellow Sea rim economic sphere) in the APR. Northeast Asia, being the centre of the APR economies, embraces China, Japan, the eastern part of Russia (the Russian Far East), the Korean peninsula and Mongolia. Some favourable conditions existed for establishing such a 'Northeast Asian economic sphere': (1) the economies in this area are highly complementary; and (2) the normalisation of relations between Russia and China and the development of their economic and commercial ties have not only created an important political pre-condition, but have also provided an important basis for cooperation among the Northeast Asian economies.

In these circumstances, Russia attempted to become involved in the Tumen River Area Development Project (TRADP), which was one of the

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Park, 'The Impact of APEC', p. 634.


The TRADP is a plan for a multi-billion dollar trade and transport mega-complex in the Tumen River delta. It is one of the most far-reaching strategic economic ventures ever proposed for Northeast Asia and has been widely discussed both at UN sponsored meetings and in the public press. For further details, see Andrew Marton, Terry McGee and Donald G. Paterson, 'Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation and the Tumen River Area Development Project', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 68, no. 1, 1995, pp. 8-33. For a more detailed account of the origins of the TRADP scheme, see Mark J. Valencia,
central elements in multinational economic developmental projects designed to bring together former political and ideological adversaries, such as China, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea and Russia in the post-Soviet era. The main aim of the project was to transform an area adjoining North Korea, southern Primorski krai in Russia and China's Jilin province into a major commercial hub and trade centre like Hong Kong or Singapore in Northeast Asia, utilising South Korean and Japanese investment, capital and technology. North Korean and Chinese manpower was available, together with Russian and Mongolian untapped natural resources. The five Northeast Asian countries would all benefit from the programme.

As Map 6.1 shows, the TRADP is a geographically specific, transnational development project conceived as a symbol of Northeast Asian cooperation and dedicated to the ideal of forming a global landbridge hub for the 21st century.

Map 6.1 Tumen River Delta Area


9 Of the three regional cooperation schemes in which Russia is involved - the Baltic Sea cooperation, the Black Sea cooperation and the Northeast Asian cooperation - Northeast Asian cooperation has been considered the most critical by both federal and Far East local governments. This assessment is supported by two important speeches delivered by Gorbachev in Vladivostok (1986) and Krasnoyarsk (1988), which declared the Soviet Union a part of the Asia-Pacific region and endorsed a full commitment to establishing the Union as a member of that community.

97 It should be noted that Son Sung-pil, North Korean ambassador to Russia, stated that 'North Korea is interested in the participation of Russian business circles in creating a free trade and economic zone on its territory' ('DPRK Seeks Russia's Participation in Trade Zones', Itar-Tass, 20 July 1995 in FBIS-SOV 95-140, 21 July 1995, p. 10).
The significance of the TRADP lies in the fact that it has been driven by a political commitment to a restoration and rebuilding of regional identity as well as to exploiting economic complementarities, often the principal rationale for other regional economic amalgamations around the world. The TRADP, as an outcome, can be understood as a reflection of inter-state negotiations mediated by local initiatives largely defined by local government and private business interests. The TRADP also can be understood as a 'sub-regional' economic phenomenon, which involves ‘cross-border’ development of neighbouring territories, thus providing the platform for wider and expanded multilateral cooperation in the Northeast Asian region.

In other words, impelled by the growing trend towards economic regionalism in the global economy and to the consequent need to create some sort of suitable regional structure in the APR, these five countries also tried to promote regional cooperation from the late Soviet era onwards. The evolving market of the region, especially between Northeast China and Pacific Russia, has been an effective driving force of regional economic integration in the area of the Tumen River. Indeed, if the joint development of the area proved successful, it would represent a breakthrough in the formation of a Northeast Asian economic sphere in the post-Soviet era. The TRADP has since been an effective driving force for economic integration in the region.

In May 1995, five states - Russia, China, North and South Korea and Mongolia - initiated a formal agreement for the TRADP, with Japan abstaining. Finally, in December 1995, five countries signed an agreement of the Consultative Committee for Developing Northeast Asia aimed at promoting the economic development of the Tumen River and an memorandum of understanding on environmental issues.

The signing of this agreement demonstrated the commitment of five Northeast Asian countries to the construction of a sub-regional multilateral economic development cooperation system for the first time since they originally agreed to develop Northeast Asia at the Northeast Asian Conference of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) during the final year of Soviet rule (1991). The agreement of the Consultative Committee for Developing Northeast Asia made provision for further assistance for developing the Tumen River region and the establishment of a committee for expanding investment. The cost of the project, which would be implemented under the auspices of the UNDP, was estimated at $US 30 billion. Indeed, to large extent, by signing the documents, the five Northeast Asian countries set up a ‘legal framework’ for international co-operation, creating a ‘Rotterdam of Northeast Asia’ with the backing of the United Nations.

As regards Russia’s efforts over this sub-regional economic programme, it should be mentioned here that already, in late 1992, Yuri Fadeyev, the Russian ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to North Korea, stated that ‘We are planning to establish the Tumen River trade and economic zone on the Russia-North Korea-China border and push ahead with large-scale projects if there is mutual advantage in doing so, such as building and repairing ships at North Korea shipyards based on orders from Russia’. Also, in September 1995, Russian prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin stated that ‘It could be possible to think about a tri-partite model of economic cooperation among Russia, South Korea and North Korea. We could use the production capacities we created in the North Korea, North Korean work force, the Russian market and South Korean “know-how”’.

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From Russia's perspective, the TRADP basically offered the promise of economic development in the Russian Far East. Thus, Russia worked out a detailed plan for the development of the region, including the building of a large international port and a free trade zone in the Tumen River area. Nevertheless, Russia's main reason for seeking to participate in the TRADP was clearly to mitigate its further deteriorating economic role in the region, together with some political reasons. In reality, Russia was in a position that it would be completely excluded from the regional economic cooperation both politically and economically if it could not participate in the TRADP.

As regards participating in the TRADP, Russia also required South Korea's interest and support for the Russian Far East, together with the latter's technology and investment. In other words, with regard to Russia's economic policy towards the Russian Far East region (e.g. the TRADP), the Yeltsin government continued to expect to use South Korea's growing economic power to develop the area. Simultaneously, however, it should be noted that the Russian Far East itself became increasingly interested in developing economic relations with North Korea during this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95). For example, in September 1994, Russia's participation in the international plan (the TRADP) resulted in the creation of the Najin special economic zone of North Korea.

South Korea's perceptions of the TRADP carried a geopolitical sensitivity in both physical and economic terms - given that South Korea is between the

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100 For example, one of the priorities in Russia's economic relationship with North Korea was the preservation of the timber agreement. Local officials were attracted by cheap North Korean manpower, especially in the timber industry. However, in early 1990s the issue of North Koreans working in logging camps in the Russian Far East received international attention when human rights violations in the camps became widely known. Several hundred of these people, who had been specially selected by Pyongyang's special services, unable to endure their mistreatment at the hands of local guards and appalling working conditions, had tried to escape and obtain political asylum in either South Korea or Russia (The Korea Times [Seoul], 24 May 1995, p. 3).

101 Izvestiia, 18 September 1994, p. 3.
major powers, on the one hand, and it was the intermediary between North and South in the region. In other words, what encouraged South Korean planners most was their expectation that Northeast Asian regional cooperation would yield favourable conditions for Korean unification. In this case, regional economic cooperation was considered to be a stimulant to political improvement, not vice versa. Apart from this political consideration, South Korean conceptions of Northeast Asian regional cooperation could be summed up as follows. First, there was a belief that cooperation in the region required a quite different approach from that which had been or could have been applied elsewhere. This reflected a recognition of the distinctive mixture of states in the region. Japan commanded unprecedented economic power in the region. China was emerging as a major power after transforming its centrally-planned economy to a more profit-driven system. Russia, despite current turmoil in its economic transition, remained a major military power with nuclear capability. Mongolia, with the long-lost splendour of a former world empire, was struggling to promote its economy by abandoning the socialist system and seeking a full-scale incorporation with the capitalist states of the world. The presence of superpowers with different economic systems and practices, and above all with different levels of economic development, made it more urgent for Koreans to promote a distinctive approach to regional cooperation. Secondly, there was a tendency to regard Northeast Asian regional cooperation as the symbolisation of globalism among the South Korean leadership. Thirdly, Northeast Asian regional cooperation was considered as a mechanism for curbing the dominance of the one nation, in both political and economic

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103 See Y. Kim, *Dongbuga singyongjeilsowa hangugul yokkal* [South Korea's Role for New Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia] (Taegu: Kyungbuk National University, 1992), pp. 141-173.
terms, thereby overcoming obstacles derived from Japanese bilateral relations.\textsuperscript{104}

Despite Russia's two main objectives (APEC and TRADP) for its engagement in the APR economies, there were still several important difficulties for both Russia and its partners in the region. First, one of the biggest obstacles remained the lack of confidence and the significant perception gap among APEC countries (Northeast Asian countries as well) on the feasibility of regional economic cooperation, which had led the controversial membership of the APEC since its inception. In this respect, APEC had become an arena of 'competition for influence' among the major powers in the region in the post-Soviet era.

Secondly, there was the lack of an economic mechanism for multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia. For example, the TRADP had been heavily dependent upon the establishment of institutional frameworks from the beginning. This reflected a lack of existing economic linkages, except for bilateral cross-border trade between China and North Korea and between China and Russia on a barter basis. The 'institutional framework first' approach was most effective once the institutions needed were in full operation. But this took a lot of time and negotiations between governments. For example, the TRADP has agreed to establish the Tumen River Area Development Corporation, the Inter-Governmental Coordination and Consultative Commission, and the Tumen River Area Development Coordinating Committee. None of them was operational yet, however.\textsuperscript{105} As Tsuneo Akaha argues, 'if the Russian Far East is to be integrated into the APR economy, not only must the region's market forces be allowed to grow, but also institutionalised mechanisms of cooperation must be developed to link the fledgling market forces in the Russian Far East to

\textsuperscript{104} Son, \textit{Dongbuge gyeongjebyopnyokkwon}, p. 15.
those of the dynamic APR countries, particularly China, Japan, South Korea and the US.\textsuperscript{108}

Thirdly, there were still the problems associated with making the Russian Far East a more attractive region for regional economic cooperation and development. Several key problems for regional cooperation in the Russian Far East could be summed up as follows: (1) differences in the stage of economic reform; (2) varying legal, social and economic standards; (3) financial instability; (4) policy differences and arbitrage; (5) lack of infrastructure; and (6) structural adjustment costs.\textsuperscript{107} All of the above difficulties obviously indicated that Russia was not in a position to implement properly its aims as one of the major economic powers in the region in the post-Soviet era.

Based on the above reasons, Russia did not effectively manage its relations with the two Koreas to maximise its economic interests on the Korean peninsula, despite being in a better position than other powers to exercise influence over the region. As a result, Russia's economic role towards the Korean peninsula was seriously undermined. Rather, Russia tried to maintain its influence with the Koreas' assistance in the APR. In this situation, even South Korea ignored Russia as a not genuine economic power in the region. In turn, North Korea no longer followed Russia's lead in international economic cooperation in the region.

During this period (Dec. 93-Dec. 95), Russia's several active efforts over the issue of the Northeast Asian regional economic cooperation did not help to identify a meaningful role in the region.\textsuperscript{108} Russia's policy towards the Korean peninsula in terms of regional economic issues inevitably became reactive.

\textsuperscript{108} So far Moscow had remained 'outside the circle of active participants' in the conflict because it lacks any opportunities to influence the North Koreans' position (\textit{Izvestiia}, 22 March 1994, p. 3).
6.4. Nothing but Economic Engagement in the Region? (Dec. 95-Jul. 96)

After the December 1995 Russian parliamentary election, there seemed to be no fundamental changes in Russia's regional economic policy in the APR. The appointment of Yevgeniy Primakov and Aleksandr Lebed as foreign minister and Security Council secretary, respectively, in early 1996 continued to demonstrate a more activist approach to economic diplomacy in Russian foreign policy. As a result, the objectives of Russian economic revival, which had assumed top priority since the presidential election, required an increased effort to participate in the APR economies as compared with previous years.

As regards the membership of APEC, Russia continuously made an effort to become a full member of this regional economic organisation. In February 1996, for example, deputy foreign minister Panov stated that 'Russia already now fully meets all criteria for being admitted to the APEC Forum... Russia's non-involvement in APEC activities may have negative consequences for our future participation in the Forum and for APEC activities as a whole... Russia favours joining APEC as a full member and does not regard as convincing the argument that the Forum structure has not yet been finally fixed'. In February-April 1996, Russia's official applications were presented to join the activities of seven of the forum's working groups (regional energy cooperation, preservation of sea resources, fishing, trade and investment statistics, human resources, industrial science and technology, and telecommunications). It should be noted that in Manila in 1996 (the fourth APEC summit at Subic Bay), ten more countries (Colombia, India, Macao, Mongolia, Pakistan,

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109 At the third session of ASEAN Regional Forum, foreign minister Primakov put the priorities of Russia's policy in the APR as follows: (1) to develop mutually advantageous or even partnership relations with regional countries; (2) to provide stability and security on the Russian Far Eastern borders; and (3) to create favourable environment for economic reforms in Russia, with special focus on accelerating the economic development in the Far East ('Rech' E. M. Primakova na postministerskoj konferenci ASAM s partnerei po dialogu, 24 iulja', Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 8, August 1996, p. 38).


111 Hangyore Shinmun (Seoul), 17 April 1996, p. 2.
Panama, Peru, Russia, Sri Lanka and Vietnam) formally signified their desire to join the APEC, regarded as the most dynamic economic grouping worldwide.\footnote{112}{In Manila in 1996 (the fourth APEC summit at Subic Bay), ministers adopted the MAPA (Manila Action Plan for APEC), which called for the creation of a free economic zone, including the elimination of customs barriers, visas, etc. in the region by 2020.}

In February 1996, South Korea still continued to give off positive signals for moves by Russia to participate in APEC’s Energy Working Group as an informal member.\footnote{113}{Kyunghyang Shinmun (Seoul), 27 February 1996, p. 3.} Russia’s proposed participation in APEC’s working group activities required the consent of all member countries, as well as approval at APEC’s Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM).\footnote{114}{The Korea Herald (Seoul), 15 February 1996, p. 8.} In some respects, by allowing resource-rich Russia into the energy group, South Korea hoped to secure easier access to Russia’s energy and resource-related information and technology.

In May 1996, at a meeting of representatives of member countries of the ASEAN regional forum on security held in Jakarta, Indonesia, Winston Lord, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated that ‘... It is no secret that it was the US that previously opposed Russia’s admission to APEC, which was founded on the United States’ initiative, and it was the US that, in order to prevent Russia from joining, managed to secure a moratorium on the admission of new members almost immediately after APEC was formed. The moratorium expires this year, and in light of the changed situation, Russia will have a realistic chance of becoming a member of APEC - an influential organisation that includes all the leading countries of the Asian-Pacific region’.\footnote{115}{Segodnia, 12 May 1996, p. 2.} But, according to Chris Coward, Director of APEC Edunet (at the University of Washington, Seattle), ‘APEC has had a moratorium on new members for three years and is opening up the discussion on membership at this coming summit in Vancouver, Canada. Russia, I believe, has expressed interest in joining but my hunch is that the first to gain admittance will be Vietnam’.\footnote{116}{Email-Inquiry, 7 October 1997 (personal correspondence).}
This indicated that the US still did not fully support Russia's intentions in the regional economic issue.

Russia was also participating in the TRADP and sought to play a more active, positive role in its programme. Basically, South Korea supported Russia's position on the TRADP while signing a memorandum of understanding with the UNDP to establish a SUS 1 million trust fund for the TRADP in April 1996.117

It was obvious that Russia's continuous efforts to be fully engaged in regional economic organisations and economic cooperation meant that Russia's economic development in the APR and towards the Korean peninsula was far more dependent upon its neighbouring states including the two Koreas than had been the case in previous years (Dec. 91-Dec. 95). In other words, Russia's active participation in regional economic cooperation in the APR as a whole demonstrated the country's desire not to fall behind a dynamically changing situation and to develop an effective approach to the 'Pacific Ocean Challenge' with a subsequent strengthening of positions in the APR.

During this period (Dec. 95-Jul. 96), despite its continuous efforts to be involved in regional economic cooperation, Russia did not satisfactorily succeed in achieving its aims in the region. In other words, although it sought to be a key regional player in new circumstances in the post-Soviet era, especially through regional economic multilateral cooperation, it had yet to find a solid place in Northeast Asia as one of the major economic powers, thus demonstrating its reactive policy towards the Korean peninsula.

117 The Korea Herald (Seoul), 5 April 1996, p. 8.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

This thesis has attempted to examine and analyse the two main aspects of Russia’s policy towards the Korean peninsula: (1) how Russia has tried to build up its new relations with the two Koreas in the post-Soviet era; and (2) how Russia has attempted to maintain its role and influence in relation to Korean issues in the post-Soviet era.

As argued in preceding chapters, Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula constantly changed and developed according to several periodic stages and evidently without a firm and consistent consensus within the top leadership during Yeltsin’s first presidential term (Dec. 91-Jul. 96). Despite Russia’s continuous initiatives towards the Korean peninsula at both bilateral and regional levels, Russia, as a successor state to the former Soviet Union, only proved its ineffectiveness in seeking a foreign policy that would achieve its aims in the Korean peninsula. It was a period of truly transitional Russian foreign policy under new circumstances both in terms of its domestic and international aspects.

As discussed in preceding chapters, two significant characteristics of Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during this period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96) can be summed up as follows. First, in spite of Russia’s active efforts, especially after the December 1993 parliamentary election, its policy towards the Korean peninsula had to be 'reactive' as a result of both internal and external factors. This made clear that Russia was no longer one of the major powers, able to pursue an active and consistent policy towards the
Korean peninsula to maximise its national interests both at the bilateral and regional levels in the region, although it attempted to do so continuously.

On the one hand, at the bilateral level, Russia's intention to establish solid legal bases based on treaties with each of the two Koreas did not proceed as its government would have wished. Rather, to a large extent, Russia's intentions had constantly to be subject to the two Koreas' objectives. On the other hand, at the regional level, despite Russia's considerable efforts to be more actively involved in relation to Korean issues, Russia did not prove an influential [political and economic] power that could replace the former Soviet Union in Northeast Asia. This led Russia to attempt to maintain only some minimum influence over the Korean peninsula while trying to participate in regional organisations such as the APEC and to advocate a multilateral security conference.

This reactive tendency in Russian foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula eventually led Russia to adjust its gradual 'balanced' policy towards the Korean peninsula. This meant that Russia's foreign policy direction and behaviour vis-à-vis the two Koreas during this transitional period moved from a pro-South Korean policy, which looked for partnership relations with South Korea and a limited official relationship with North Korea to a more balanced policy that demanded the establishment of revived relations with North Korea to maintain Russia's national interests.\(^1\) Russia's approach to a gradual balanced policy during this period was due to three factors: (1) disappointment with South Korea; (2) reviving interests in North Korea; and (3) Russia's loss of importance.

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1 Russian foreign policy during Yeltsin's first presidential term was influenced by the economic importance of South Korea. Russia's emphasis on its 'entry into the civilised [world] community' enhanced South Korea's economic importance. In other words, North Korea's strategic value to Russia became marginalised. At the same time, South Korea, with its economic prowess and vitality, became increasingly valuable to Yeltsin's reform programme at home.

2 In the beginning of the post-Soviet era, Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula centred on relations with South Korea. As a result, Russia-North Korean relations greatly deteriorated. However, gradually there was a growing emphasis on the balance of Russia's dual Korean policy on the Korean peninsula.
of its status in the region. Russia's more balanced policy towards the Korean peninsula also reflected changes in Russian foreign policy goals and priorities. In this respect, as discussed, the end of the Cold War atmosphere (an external factor) and the continuing post-Soviet domestic conflicts in Russian politics (an internal factor) largely directed the general trends and goals in Russian foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula.

Thus, the preceding analysis supports the main hypothesis: Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during this period had to be reactive in its several successive stages, although Russia did try to conduct an active policy towards the Korean peninsula.

Another significant characteristic of Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during this period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96) was that Russia was not able to establish a solid 'consensus' within its own leadership regarding Korean issues both at the bilateral and regional levels (except on regional economic issues). In fact, given the uncertainties on the domestic situation in Russia, the lack of consensus - one of Russian foreign policy's problems - within the top leadership regarding Korean issues was not surprising. In other words, the Russian leadership had to maintain relations not only with North and South Korea, but also satisfy the liberal and conservative forces within its own country during this transitional period because Russian foreign policy under Yeltsin was also closely related to his power position and the ongoing group/factional conflict between the reformers and the conservatives. This

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According to Vladimir Miasnikov, "to maintain well-balanced relations with both South and North Korea appears important for the following reasons. First, Russia's influence on the Korean peninsula and in the whole of Northeast Asian region, as well as its regional weight in relations with China, Japan, South Korea and the US proportionally depended on the extent to which Russia managed to maintain well-balanced relations with South and North Korea. Secondly, Russia, as the successor to the former Soviet Union, has inherited broad economic interests in North Korea, which was a well-familiar market of partners who, too, for various reasons [technology links in industry, geographical proximity, etc.] were interested in maintaining and developing traditional ties with the Northern neighbour. Thirdly, maintenance and improvement of Russia's military, political and economic positions in North Korea would enable Russia to have more solid position in Korea after the reunification. So, for political, military-strategic, and economic considerations, Russia's national interests required to maintain smooth and skillfully balanced relations with both Korean states" (Vladimir S. Miasnikov,
necessarily hindered Russia from pursuing a more consistent policy towards the Korean peninsula in Northeast Asia.

As a matter of fact, behind the scenes a tough 'domestic struggle' was going on over Korean issues, characterised by rivalry between two incompatible viewpoints: a militarising viewpoint and an economic one. Indeed, there were different views between reformers and conservatives within the Russian leadership and their relative power position was largely responsible for the contradictory and inconsistent trend of Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula. This made it difficult to develop a new Russian foreign policy concept that could replace Gorbachev's New Political Thinking, only proving its contradictory and discrepant policy towards the Korean peninsula during this period (Dec. 91-Jul. 96). As a result, Yeltsin's foreign policy was increasingly overtaken by events at home and abroad, and the new Russian foreign policy conception became obsolete as a guide for Russian foreign policy. Indeed, under Yeltsin, foreign policy served largely as an instrument for domestic reform efforts. Thus, the examination of Yeltsin's foreign policy towards the two Koreas largely confirms the proposition that: 'domestic needs and group/factional conflict within the Russian leadership are a useful way of explaining Russian foreign policy behaviour'.

The main findings of this study can be summed up as follows. First, as discussed in chapters 3 and 4, it was obvious that 'bilateral treaty' issues became the central aspect of understanding how Russia attempted to build up its new relations with each of the Koreas during Yeltsin's first presidential term. In other words, by focusing on the issue of bilateral treaties between Russia and each Korea, we were able to see more clearly the changes that took place in Russia's reactive Korean policy during Yeltsin's first presidential term.

On the one hand, Russia attempted to develop its new relations with North Korea whilst looking for a new legal foundation that could replace the 1961

Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty in the post-Soviet era. In other words, Russia looked for new relations with North Korea: from party-to-party relations to a normal state-to-state relationship. In this respect, the expiration of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Friendship Treaty in September 1996 was the key bilateral issue in understanding their relations during this period. The re-examination of the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Treaty, one of the last relics of the Cold War in Northeast Asia, raised the question of how previous Soviet-allied relations based on the Cold War system could change into new relations based on the post-Soviet system.

On the other hand, Russia basically tried to develop its relations with South Korea whilst looking for [economic] ‘partnership’ relations based on political, economic and military treaties in the post-Soviet era. This meant that Russia more vigorously looked for a mutually beneficial partnership with South Korea both in terms of economic and political relations. In this respect, several important bilateral treaties between Russia and South Korea demonstrated how far their previous relations based on the Soviet system had changed into new relations based on the post-Soviet system. Especially, the conclusion of the Russian-South Korean Basic Treaty signed in 1992 demonstrated a new example of relations between the two sides during this transient time. Furthermore, the conclusion of military related treaties between the two sides also demonstrated how far their relations could develop in the post-Soviet era.

Nonetheless, despite Russia’s efforts, South Korea, as a rising power in the region, no longer conceded Russia’s ability to dominate their new relations, which only proved the latter’s incapability to conduct an effective foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula. Also, despite Russia’s revived interests towards North Korea, North Korea equally did not accept Russia’s understanding of the way in which their new relations should develop in the post-Soviet era.

Secondly, as argued in chapters 5 and 6, it was apparent that the two ‘regional’ issues had become central to an understanding of how Russia
attempted to maintain its influence on the Korean peninsula during Yeltsin's first presidential term. In other words, by focusing on regional issues in relation to Korean affairs in Northeast Asia, we were able to see more clearly the changes that took place in Russia's policy towards the Korean peninsula and its international role in the post-Soviet era.

On the one hand, Russia's security policy in Northeast Asia focusing on the North Korean nuclear issue clearly reflected its new security role in the peninsula in the post-Soviet era. On the other hand, Russia's economic policy in Northeast Asia focusing on regional economic organisation (APEC) and regional economic cooperation (TRADP) obviously reflected its new economic status in the Korean peninsula in the post-Soviet era.

Russia's role in the international community had been greatly weakened especially after the several proposals rejected by the US and the two Koreas during the 1993-96 period (especially, after the December 1993 Russian parliamentary election). This meant that although Russia sought to be a key regional player in new circumstances in the post-Soviet era, especially through regional multilateral cooperation, it had yet to find a solid place in Northeast Asia as one of the major political and economic powers during this period, thus demonstrating its reactive policy towards the Korean peninsula. Consequently, Russia was increasingly isolated and under pressure in the post-Soviet era.

Thirdly, as examined in the preceding chapters, another significant finding of this study is that Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula developed according to a distinctive 'sequence of stages'. In this respect, the thesis attempted to identify a period within which a new consensus on Russian foreign policy emerged within the country's leadership. We found that the results of several Russian elections became a turning point in Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula. To a large extent, there emerged a certain basic agreement on what Russia's national interests were and how they should be pursued after the elections. This also implied that Russia's policy towards the two Koreas had been greatly changed by the effect of Russian internal
factors, although external factors had also some significant effects on Russia’s Korean policy. Indeed, there was an interaction between internal power struggles between reformers and conservatives and the various other actors and institutions involved in foreign policy decision-making and in the development of Russia’s new bilateral approach towards the two Koreas. For those reasons, the thesis demonstrated that the domestic situation in Russia had a profound impact on the nature of its foreign policy and, similarly, the impact of the latter determined significant aspects of domestic policy-making.

Nonetheless, it is necessary to note that there are some limitations in the research presented in this thesis. First, there is a certain difficulty in establishing an exact ‘periodisation’ in Russian foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula during the early post-communist years. In other words, although periodisation of Russia’s foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula can be a useful way to explain the development of Russia’s reactive Korean policy and relations between the two countries, there are some limitations in any exercise of this kind. For instance, although the first period (Dec. 91-Dec. 93) of Russia’s Korean policy based on this analysis has been described as a pro-South Korean stance in Russian foreign policy, it should be noted that at the end of summer of 1992, the Russian minister of foreign affairs had already started to advance the view that Moscow should seek more balanced relations with South and North Korea. As regard this, especially, it should be noted that there were certain disagreements about Yeltsin’s visit to South Korea and Japan in September 1992 within the top Russian leadership. To a certain extent, from

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6 According to Hannes Adomeit, to a certain extent, nationalists and Eurasianists started to emerge in the second half of 1992 and made an impact on foreign policy (Hannes Adomeit, ‘Russia as a Great Power in World Affairs: Images and Reality’, International Affairs [London], vol. 71, no. 1, 1995, p. 58). According to Rahr, Yeltsin was under siege from all political sides from the middle of 1992. The Civic Union was demanding increased participation in government decision-making; local leaders were calling for more autonomy from Moscow; and leaders of Central Asian states were putting pressure on him not to abandon them economically and to support the establishment of close ties between their states and Russia. Yeltsin balancing between left and right began in the middle of 1992. See Alexander Rahr, ‘Liberal-Cenrist Coalition Takes over in Russia’, RFE/RL, vol. 1, no. 29, 17 July 1992, pp. 22-25; and Alexander Rahr, ‘Yeltsin Faces New Political Challenges’, RFE/RL, vol. 1, no. 42, 23 October 1992, pp. 1-3.
the beginning of 1993 Russia gradually started to reopen its contacts with North Korea and exchanged opinions about bilateral and international issues. In some sense, it can be argued that Russia's pro-South Korean stance had essentially come to an end by the second half of 1992. In this respect, from some perspectives, it can be said that there had been a continuation of Russia's 'Two Korean Policy' towards the Korean peninsula.6

Secondly, there is a certain difficulty in 'grouping' the Russian top leadership based on their views of Russia's policy towards the Korean peninsula throughout the successive stages in relations between the two countries, although Yeltsin's policy towards the Korean peninsula generally led to the polarisation of the Russian leadership into reformers and conservatives. The reformers (Kozyrev, Yeltsin and in this connection Chernomyrdin) generally viewed Russian-Korean relations in the context of looking for a new partnership relationship in the post-Soviet era. A promise of economic benefits from the Korean peninsula together with the guarantee of peace and security in the region were valued. On the other hand, the conservatives (Khasbulatov, Rutskoi and Grachev) emphasised the need to revive Russia's relations with North Korea. These groups began increasingly to emphasise Russia's relations with North Korea when Russia did not achieve its aims with South Korea as it had expected, especially in the field of economic relations. However, it was quite obvious that both Russian reformers and conservatives shared a certain consensus to pursue Russia's national interests in the Korean peninsula after the December 1993 Russian parliamentary election such as the proposal of the multilateral regional security conference and the regional economic interests. In this respect, the two groups did not have completely incompatible views of the

6 There had been pro-North Korean groups or factions in Russian politics from the beginning of Russian foreign policy, although Russia's Korean policy seemed to pursue pro-South Korean trend during the early stage of Russian foreign policy. Russia tried to make efforts to balance the two Korean policy on the Korean peninsula which maximise its national interests in the post-Soviet era. In other words, Russia has never been given up one part of Korea during this period. A powerful pro-North lobby, consisting of military men, diplomats, scholars, and former technical advisers to Pyongyang, advances such theses, but it is more than matched by an influential pro-South lobby.
two Koreas. Furthermore, it should be noted that some high-ranking Russian officials often altered their position towards the Korean peninsula by changing their remarks or comments on Korean issues.

Thirdly, due to the reliance we have necessarily placed upon the analysis of documents and the remarks of Russian high-ranking officials, there is a difficulty in finding 'clear evidence' of the real and not simply declared aims of Russia's Korean policy. In other words, although this thesis employs a variety of sources, both primary and secondary (materials from Russian, Japanese and Korean journals and newspapers, as well as the relevant Western literature), including historical archives, personal memoirs, interviews conducted by the author, military and economic data, treaties and other official documents, and published statements and speeches by governmental officials in the West, Russia, North Korea and South Korea, it is still true that this research suffers from the limited availability of government-level documents because most of the relevant documents from Russia and the two Koreas for this recent period are not yet accessible to academic researchers. Nonetheless, the advantage of the present approach in my opinion outweighs its limitations.

The last, but by no means least important, implication of the present study is that studies of Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula and their relations need to be diversified by creating various innovative approaches even that are not yet emerging in the study of foreign policy in general and Russian foreign policy in particular. In this connection, the author hopes that the present study provides a stimulus for applying diverse approaches to the study of Russia's foreign policy towards the Korean peninsula. It is believed that the contribution of this study is significant, since there are still few major works on this particular subject and period.
Appendix 1


The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Presidium of the Supreme National Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
Anxious to develop and strengthen the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea based on the principle of socialist internationalism,
Desiring to promote the maintenance and strengthening of peace and security in the Far East and throughout the world in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,
Resolved to extend assistance and support to one another in the event of military attack upon either of the Contracting Parties by any State or coalition of States,
Convinced that the strengthening of friendship, good-neighborliness and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is in accordance with the vital interests of the people of both States and will best serve to promote their further economic and cultural development,
Have decided for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Nikita Sergeevich Khruschev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR;
The two plenipotentiary representatives, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1: The Contracting Parties declare that they will continue to participate in all international action designed to safeguard peace and security in the Far East and throughout the world and will contribute to the realisation of these lofty aims. Should either of the Contracting Parties suffer armed attack by any State or coalition of States and thus find itself in a state of war, the other

Contracting Party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.

Article 2: Each Contracting Party undertakes not to enter into any alliance or to participate in any coalition, or in any action or measure, directed against the other Contracting Party.

Article 3: The Contracting Parties shall consult together on all important international questions involving the interests of both States, in an effort to strengthen peace and universal security.

Article 4: The two Contracting Parties undertake, in a spirit of friendship and cooperation in accordance with the principles of equal rights, mutual respect for State sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-intervention in each other's domestic affairs, to develop and strengthen the economic and cultural ties between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to render each other all possible assistance and to effect the necessary cooperation in the economic and cultural fields.

Article 5: The two Contracting Parties consider that the unification of Korea should be brought about on a peaceful and democratic basis and that such a solution is in keeping both with the national interests of the Korean people and with the cause of maintaining peace in the Far East.

Article 6: The Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which shall take place at Pyongyang. This Treaty shall remain in force for ten years. If neither of the Contracting Parties gives notice one year before the expiration of the said period that it wishes to denounce the Treaty, it shall remain in force for the succeeding five years and shall thereafter continue in force in accordance with this provision.
Appendix 2

Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea. Signed at Washington on 1 October 1953.²

The Parties to this Treaty,
Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,
and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area,
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area,
Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defence for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area,
Have agreed as follows:

Article 1: The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any Party toward the United Nations.

Article 2: The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes.

Article 3: Each Party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognised by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace

² United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 238, no. 3363, pp. 199-205. This treaty came into force on 17 November 1954 by the exchange of the instruments of ratification at Washington, in accordance with Article 5. The US ratified the above-mentioned treaty subject to the following understanding: 'It is the understanding of the US that neither party is obligated, under Article 3 of the above Treaty, to come to the aid of the other except in case of an external armed attack against such party; nor shall anything in the present Treaty be construed as requiring the US to give assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognised by the US as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the ROK'.
and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Article 4: The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.

Article 5: This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of Korea in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

Article 6: This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.
Appendix 3

Full Text of Joint Declaration Signed by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Korean President Roh Tae Woo in Moscow on 14 December 1990.\(^3\)

M.S. Gorbachev, president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Roh Tae Woo, president of the Republic of Korea, having met in Moscow on 14 December 1990, and having discussed the state of, and prospects for, the development of bilateral relations, as well as a wide range of current international problems: expressing mutual interest in the development of all-round cooperation between the two countries; acknowledging the importance of peace in the Korean peninsula to Northeast Asia to the whole world; recognising the Korean nation’s desire for unification and welcoming the expansion of contacts between the South and the North, including the latest talks between the prime ministers of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and being steadfastly devoted to the cause of building a new, more just, humane, peaceful and democratic international order, declare that the Soviet Union and the Republic of Korea will be guided in their relations by the following basic principles:

- respect for each other’s sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence, non-interference in the internal affairs of both states, recognition of every people’s right to a free choice of their own path of political and socio-economic development;
- observance of the norms of international law, respect for the aims and principles of the United Nations set out in its charter;
- impermissibility of the use of force or the threat of force and of maintaining one’s own security at the expense of other states, and also the resolving of disputed international problems and regional conflicts by any means other than by reaching political accords on the basis of the reasonable agreement of all the interested sides;
- development of broad mutually advantageous cooperation between states and peoples, leading to their drawing together and the deepening of mutual understanding;
- uniting of the efforts of the world community for the priority resolution of global problems; The abatement of the arms race, whether nuclear of conventional; the prevention of the ecological catastrophe threatening mankind; overcoming poverty, hunger, illiteracy; reducing the dramatic gap in the level of development of various countries and peoples;

\(^3\) Vestiik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR, no. 1, 1991, pp. 3-4.
-creation of a secure and just world in which mankind will be ensured of progress and all peoples will be ensured a worthy life in the coming millennium.

Proceeding from the above principles and opening a new page in the history of their relations, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Korea are filled with resolve to build these relations in a spirit of neighborliness, trust, and cooperation in the interests of the peoples of both states. With these aims various interstate agreements will be concluded aimed at establishing and improving relations and contacts between the two countries in the political, economic, trade, cultural, scientific, human and other spheres. The USSR and the Republic of Korea will ensure the priority of generally accepted norms of international law in their internal and foreign policies and will conscientiously fulfil their treaty obligations.

The presidents support the aspiration of business circles in both countries toward deepening fruitful and mutually advantageous cooperation in the sphere of economics, trade, industry, transport, the exchange of advanced technology and scientific achievements, and the development of joint entrepreneurship and new forms of cooperation, and they welcome the drawing up of and the investing in of mutual advantageous projects. The exchange of ideas, information, and spiritual and cultural values, the widening of contacts between people in culture, the art, science, education, sports, the mass media and tourism, and reciprocal trips by citizens of both countries will be encouraged. The sides will coordinate their efforts in combating international terrorism, organised crime and illegal drug trafficking, and also in environmental protection, and to this end they will cooperate in global and regional international organisations.

The USSR and the Republic of Korea are devoted to the ideas of the establishment in the Asia-Pacific region of equal and mutually beneficial relations, based on a balance of interests and the self-determination of peoples, and the transformation of Asia and the Pacific into a region of peace and constructive cooperation through the process of bilateral and multilateral consultations.

The presidents confirm their conviction that the development of relations between the USSR and the Republic of Korea facilitates a strengthening of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, is in line with the positive changes taking place there, deepens the processes leading to overcoming confrontational thinking and eliminating the cold war in Asia, contributes to regional cooperation and helps ease tension and form a climate of trust for the sake of the future reunification of South and North Korea.

The USSR favours a continuation of the productive inter-Korean dialogue designed to eliminate political and military confrontation between the two Korean sides and a just settlement of the Korean problem by peaceful democratic means in accordance with the will of the whole Korean people.
The Republic of Korea, welcoming the whole world's turn away from the age of confrontation and toward reconciliation and cooperation on the basis of common human values, freedom, democracy and justice, stresses that the success of the Soviet policy of reform is an important factor in future international relations as also in the improvement of the situation in Northeast Asia and in progress in relations between the two countries.

The presidents proceed from the general understanding that the development of ties and contacts between the USSR and the Republic of Korea must in no way affect their relations with third countries or the commitments undertaken by them in accordance with both multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Korea have agreed to develop a political dialogue at the highest level, and also to hold regular meetings and consultations at various other levels on questions of the deepening of bilateral relations and on topical international problems.
The Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation,
Desirous of strengthening the bonds of peace and friendship between the two
countries and of promoting close economic and cultural cooperation between
their peoples,
Conscious of the traditional relations between their two peoples and determined
to overcome the consequences of the adverse period of their common history,
Convinced that future relations between the two countries should be guided by
the common values of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and
market economics,
Affirming their conviction that the development of friendly relations and
cooperation between the two countries and their peoples will contribute not
only to their mutual benefit but also to the peace, security and prosperity of the
Asian Pacific region and throughout the world,
Reaffirming their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations,
Recognising that the Moscow Declaration of 14 December 1990 shall continue
to govern relations between the two countries,
Have agreed as follows:

Article 1
The Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation shall develop friendly
relations in accordance with the principles of sovereignty, equality, respect for
territorial integrity and political independence, non-intervention in internal
affairs and other generally accepted principles of international law.

Article 2
1. The Contracting Parties shall refrain in their mutual relations from the threat
   or use of force and shall settle all their disputes by peaceful means in
   accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
2. The Contracting Parties shall use, to the maximum extent possible, United
   Nations mechanisms to settle international conflict and shall cooperate and
   endeavor to enhance the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of the
   international peace and security.

Article 3

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1. The Contracting Parties shall develop cooperation for the promotion of stability and prosperity in the Asian and Pacific region.

2. The Contracting Parties shall strengthen their cooperation, including exchanges of information, within the framework of international and regional organisations.

Article 4

1. The Contracting Parties shall hold consultations on a regular basis between their Heads of State, Foreign Minister and other members of their Governments, or their representatives to discuss matters concerning bilateral relations as well as international and regional issues of mutual interest.

2. The consultations shall normally be held in the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation alternately.

Article 5

1. The Contracting Parties shall promote the development of broad contacts and ties between their nationals and social organisation.

2. The Contracting Parties shall support contacts and exchanges between the parliaments of the two countries.

3. The Contracting Parties shall encourage direct contacts between their regional and local governments.

Article 6

1. The nationals of either Contracting Party shall, subject to the laws and regulations relating to the entry and sojourn of aliens, be permitted to enter or leave, to travel or stay in the territory of other Contracting Party.

2. The nationals and juridical persons of either Contracting Party shall, within the territory of the other Contracting Party, enjoy full protection and security in accordance with relevant laws and regulations.

Article 7

1. The Contracting Parties shall promote and develop extensive cooperation between the two countries in the economic, industrial, trade and other fields to their mutual benefit and on the basis of principles generally recognised in international practice.

2. The Contracting Parties shall promote and develop cooperation in the fields of, inter alia, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, energy, mining, communication, transport and construction.

3. The Contracting Parties shall also promote and develop, on the basis of their mutual interest, cooperation in the areas of protecting the environment and the rational use of natural resources.

Article 8
1. The Contracting Parties, recognising that scientific and technological cooperation will be of great value in advancing the well-being of their peoples, shall develop broad cooperation in the fields of science and technology for peaceful purposes.

2. In the scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries, special attention shall be devoted to promoting exchanges of scientists and the results of scientific and technological research, and encouraging joint research projects.

Article 9
The Contracting Parties shall encourage and facilitate diverse and close contacts and cooperation between the business communities of the two countries.

Article 10
1. In recognition of their respective centuries-old cultural heritages, the Contracting Parties shall promote the development of exchanges and cooperation in the fields of the arts, culture and education.

2. The Contracting Parties shall promote the development of exchanges and cooperation in the fields of the mass media, tourism and sports, and encourage the exchange of young people.

3. The Contracting Parties consider it a matter of special interest to increase the knowledge of each other's languages and cultures in the two countries. Each Contracting Party shall encourage and promote the establishment and activities of cultural and educational institutions for the purpose of providing all persons concerned with broad access to the language and culture of the other Contracting Party.

Article 11
Each Contracting Party shall, within its territory, recognise the rights of its nationals or citizens originating from the Republic of Korea or the Russian Federation to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, and to use their own language.

Article 12
The Contracting Parties, deeply concerned about the growing internationalisation of crime, shall promote effective cooperation in their efforts to combat organised crime, international terrorism, illegal traffic in drugs and psychotropic substances, illegal acts aimed against the security of maritime navigation and civil aviation, counterfeiting, smuggling including illicit transboundary traffic in articles of national, artistic, historical or archeological value as well as in animal or plant species under threat of extinction, or parts or derivatives thereof.
Article 13
This Treaty shall not affect the rights and obligations assumed by either Contracting Party under any international treaties and agreements currently in force and shall not be invoked against any third State.

Article 14
The Contracting Parties shall conclude treaties and agreements, wherever necessary, for the implementation of the purposes of this Treaty.

Article 15
1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force thirty days after the day of exchange of the instruments of ratification.
2. This Treaty shall remain in force for ten years and shall continue to be in force thereafter until terminated as provided herein.
3. Either Contracting Party may, by giving one year’s written notice to the other Contracting Party, terminate this Treaty at the end of the initial ten-year period or at any time thereafter.

1. On 1-3 June 1994 in Moscow, B. N. Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation, and Kim Young-Sam, president of the Republic of Korea, held a detailed exchange of views on the state of and prospects for bilateral relations, as well as on a wide range of international problems. The presidents noted with satisfaction the stable development of Russian-Korean relations in the political, economic, cultural and other areas on the basis of the 20 November 1992 Treaty on the Basic Principles of Relations Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea. The presidents stated that relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea are shifting to a constructive, complementary partnership based on the common values of freedom, democracy, legality, respect for human rights, and a market economy.

2. Sharing the view that the development and prosperity of states in the modern era can be achieved through reforms, the presidents exchanged views on the prospects for change in the Russian Federation and Republic of Korea. The presidents expressed agreement that the success of political and economic reforms in Russia is a fundamental factor of peace and prosperity in the world as a whole, and of stability in Northeast Asia and the Pacific basin, in particular. President Kim Young-Sam assured President B. N. Yeltsin of the Republic of Korea's cooperation in and support for the reforms being carried out in Russia.

3. The presidents noted with satisfaction that the international political system characterized by enmity and confrontation is a thing of the past and that a foundation is being laid for a world order based on nonconfrontation, openness, partnership and the desire for cooperation in surmounting the new challenges of international security and stability. The presidents reached agreement that both states would cooperate closely in dealing with global issues. Hailing the growing recognition in the international community of the principle of the universality of human rights, the presidents agreed to make common efforts for the observance and guaranteeing of the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the norms of fundamental agreements on human rights to which both states are parties, and also to expand bilateral cooperation in the area of human rights.

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4. The presidents expressed satisfaction at the steps being taken to make the work of the United Nations more responsive and efficient, and to involve it more actively in dealing with important current problems of the international community. The presidents were united in the belief that greater attention must be given to the United Nations' peacekeeping and humanitarian diplomacy, which are coming to the center of world politics. The Russian Federation president expressed and the president of the Republic of Korea responded with understanding to Russia's interest in cooperating with the United Nation in the context of settling conflicts on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States. President Kim Young-Sam stated that the Republic of Korea intends to advance its candidacy to be a nonpermanent member of the U.N. Security Council in 1996-1997 in order to participate more actively in U.N. activities. President B. N. Yeltsin promised to take a positive view of that.

5. The presidents gave a high assessment to the possibility of the dynamic growth of the Asian-Pacific region and agreed to cooperate in turning it into a region of peace and prosperity. The presidents expressed the desire that the first regional expanded ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] forum on security issues that is coming up in Bangkok this July would open the way toward the formation in the Asian-Pacific region, through collective efforts and on the basis of regard for all participants' interests, a structure of dependable security, mutual trust and mutually advantageous cooperation. President Kim Young-Sam welcomed Russia's desire to participate actively and constructively in all spheres of Asian-Pacific cooperation and noted that the Republic of Korea would appropriately consider the Russian Federation's candidacy to participate in the APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation].

6. The presidents share the opinion that dialogue and cooperation among the states of Northeast Asia on security issues are essential to the development of bilateral and multilateral relations, as well as to ensuring the region's stability and prosperity. The presidents agreed to hold bilateral consultations on security issues in Northeast Asia.

7. In discussing the situation on the Korean Peninsula, the presidents noted the need to continue the dialogue between South and North Korea for the purposes of easing tension and strengthening peace, security and stability, and they expressed agreement that the unification of Korea should be achieved through peaceful, democratic means, on the basis of direct dialogue between the two sides. President B. N. Yeltsin, expressing the hope that progress in the dialogue between the South and North would help restore mutual trust and promote economic, cultural and humanitarian exchanges between South and North Korea, spoke in favor of the observance of the 13 December 1991 Agreement Between South and North on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation. The presidents agreed that the existing system of truce in Korea
should be preserved until a new peace structure is worked out in accordance with the Agreement Between South and North on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation.

8. The presidents agreed that any attempt to produce nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula represented a serious threat to peace and security not only in Korea but in Northeast Asia and the whole world. The presidents, sharing the opinion that it is necessary to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and important that the Joint Declaration of South and North on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula be implemented, called on the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, as a party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to strictly and consistently fulfill its commitments under the treaty and the control agreement with the IAEA. President B. N. Yeltsin reaffirmed that Russia, together with other states, would continue to take an active part in efforts of the international community to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. President Kim Young-Sam gave a high assessment to Russia's proposal to convene a Multilateral Conference on the Security and Nuclear-Free Status of the Korean Peninsula.

9. President Kim Young-Sam hailed the steps that have been taken by the government of Russia at President B. N. Yeltsin's initiative to overcome the legacy of the past in relations between the two states: the restoration of the dignity of ethnic Koreans in Russia, the publication of the documents pertaining to the 1983 incident involving the South Korean airliner, and the turning over of copies of Russian archival documents on the Korean War.

10. The presidents expressed satisfaction at the fundamental expansion of bilateral relations in the areas of science, technology, power engineering, fishing and construction, and at the steady strengthening of the basis for the expansion of those relations. Both presidents particularly noted the importance of cooperation in the area of environmental protection.

11. The presidents agreed to make joint efforts to combine the Russian Federation's high technologies with the Republic of Korea's potential for application and industrial production, and to encourage investments in the joint development of Russia's natural resources. In this connection, the presidents expressed support for direct business contacts between the Russian Far East and the Republic of Korea. The presidents noted the steady growth in bilateral trade with satisfaction, and they agreed to continue efforts to strengthen legal and organizational foundations in such spheres as transportation, customs and industrial standards in order to foster bilateral trade and investments.

12. In order to advance toward constructive and complementary partnership between the two countries, the presidents decided to step up political dialogue
on various levels, including meetings between heads of state and government, parliamentary leaders and ministers. The presidents also decided to actively encourage exchanges in the sphere of culture, science and tourism.

13. The presidents agreed to establish a "hot line" between the Kremlin and the Blue House in order to maintain close contacts between the heads of the two states.

For the Russian Federation
[Signed] B. Yeltsin
For the Republic of Korea
[Signed] Kim Young-Sam
Moscow, the Kremlin
2 June 1994

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea (hereafter referred to as 'the Sides'), proceeding from the accords reached in talks at the highest level in Seoul in November 1992 and Moscow in June 1994, relying on the 19 November 1992 Treaty on the Basic Principles of Relations Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea, striving to deepen mutual understanding on questions of bilateral relations and on international problems of a global and regional nature, and considering the importance of regular consultations between the Sides and their exchange of views and information on key events in the world in the context of international organizations and forums, agree to the following:

Article 1: The Sides will hold consultations and exchanges of views on questions of bilateral relations, as well as on international problems that are of mutual interest.

Article 2: The Sides' consultations will be regular in nature and will be held on various levels. In order to consider urgent issues, working or expert groups may be considered by agreement of the Sides.

Article 3: The Sides will support and develop regular working relations between corresponding subdivisions and embassies of the two countries for the purpose of improving the exchange of information and its more effective utilization in their practical activities.

Article 4: The Sides will hold consultations and cooperate in international organizations and international forums, and promote the development of contacts between the two countries' representatives in third countries and in international organizations.
Article 5: The agenda, time and place of consultations, as well as the makeup of
delегations, will be agreed upon through diplomatic channels. The Sides shall
independently bear expenses for travel to and from places of meeting, as well
as for stays in the other country, and the receiving Side shall provide premises
for holding consultations and necessary transportation.

Article 6: This Protocol shall enter into force as of the date of its signing and
shall remain in effect for five years and be automatically extended for one-year
periods unless one of the Sides notifies the other Side in writing six months
prior to the expiration of the current period of its intention to terminate it.

Done in Moscow, 2 June 1994, in two copies, each in Russian,
Korean and English, with all texts having equal force.
For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Of the Russian Federation
A. Kozyrev
For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Of the Republic of Korea
Han Sung-Joo
Appendix 6


Delegations of the Governments of the United States of America (US) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) held talks in Geneva from September 23 to October 17, 1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained in the August 12, 1994 Agreed Statement between the US and the DPRK and upholding the principles of the June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the US and the DPRK to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The US and the DPRK decided to take the following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue:

I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderate reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.

(1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the US President, the US will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW(e) by a target date of 2003. The US will organise under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project to be provided to the DPRK. The US, representing the international consortium, will serve as the principal point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project.

- The US, representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of this document for the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin as soon as possible after the date of this document.

- As necessary, the US and the DPRK will conclude a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

(2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the US President, the US, representing the consortium, will make arrangements to offset the energy foregone due to the freeze of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit.

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- Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and electricity production.

- Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of the date of this document and will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually, in accordance with an agreed schedule of deliveries.

(3) Upon receipt of US assurances for the provision of LWR's and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and related facilities.

- The freeze on the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this document. During this one-month period, and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose.

- Dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be completed when the LWR project is completed.

- The US and the DPRK will cooperate in finding a method to store safely the spent fuel from the 5 MW(e) experimental reactor during the construction of the LWR project, and to dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK.

(4) As soon as possible after the date of this document, the US and the DPRK experts will hold two sets of expert talks.

- At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to alternative energy and the replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor programme with the LWR project.

- At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific arrangements for spent fuel storage and ultimate disposition.

II. The two sides will move toward full normalisation of political and economic relations.

(1) Within three months of the date of this document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.
(2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other’s capital following resolution of consular and other technical issues through expert level discussions.

(3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the US and the DPRK will upgrade bilateral relations to the Ambassadorial level.

III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

(1) The US will provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the US.

(2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.

(3) The DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.

IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

(1) The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.

(2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the freeze. Pending conclusion of the supply contract, inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will continue at the facilities not subject to the freeze.

(3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK’s initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.
Kang Sok Ju - Head of the Delegation for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Robert L. Gallucci - Head of the Delegation of the United States of America, Ambassador at Large of the United States of America
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