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Regeneration-Led Culture: 
Cultural Policy in Glasgow 1970-1989

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Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the University of Glasgow

AHRC Collaborative Doctoral Award with Glasgow Life, conducted through the Centre for Cultural Policy Research, School of Culture and Creative Arts, College of Arts, University of Glasgow

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ABSTRACT

1990 is significant as the year in which Glasgow hosted the European City of Culture (ECOC), the first UK city and first ‘post-industrial’ city to do so. Glasgow has subsequently been regarded as constituting a ‘model’ of culture-led regeneration. While much has been written about the impacts of ECOC 1990, comparatively little is known about the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow in the decades leading to 1990. With reference to new archival research and oral history interviews conducted with some of the key decision-makers, this thesis will trace the development of cultural policy in Glasgow during the period 1970 to 1989. It will examine the key actors, the prompting and facilitating factors, critical events and obstacles encountered in the ‘cultural turn’ in Glasgow’s policy making during these two decades. Viewing 1986 as a turning point, it will investigate in particular the strategies employed by Glasgow in developing its ECOC 1990 bid that year. It will examine the decision-making process and consider the roles played by key actors in central government which resulted in Glasgow winning the competition to be the UK’s nomination for ECOC 1990. Taking into account developments such as the concept of the cultural industries, this thesis will discuss the extent to which an explicit cultural policy emerged which encompassed the production and consumption of culture. It will also investigate the extent to which a replicable model of culture-led regeneration developed in Glasgow during the years leading to 1990. The thesis will show that that in 1970, at the start of the period of study, Glasgow did not have a formal cultural policy, nor were the arts and culture explicitly or formally connected to aspirations to regenerate the city. Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, while the city faced severe socio-economic problems, a thriving cultural infrastructure emerged in Glasgow without an explicit, overarching cultural policy to direct its development. In 1986, when the opportunity to bid to host ECOC 1990 arose, the lack of an explicit cultural policy in Glasgow created a strategic vacuum in Glasgow’s bid, which was filled by the increasingly coherent economic development strategies developed for the city in the preceding years. The development of cultural policy in Glasgow was led by the development of the city economy: rather than culture leading regeneration, regeneration led culture.
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AUTHOR’S DECLARATION

This thesis represents the original work of Clare Edwards unless explicitly stated otherwise in the text. The research upon which it is based was carried out at the University of Glasgow during the period October 2013 to July 2018 under the supervision of Professor Philip Schlesinger, Professor Adrienne Scullion and Dr Mark O’Neill.
ABBREVIATIONS

ACGB  The Arts Council of Great Britain
AMA  Association of Metropolitan Authorities
BAAA  British American Arts Association
CEMA  Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts
CVRPAC  Clyde Valley Regional Planning Advisory Committee
DCMS  Department for Culture, Media and Sport
EC  European Community or Communities
EEC  European Economic Community (one of three communities that constituted the European Community or Communities during the period 1970-1989, the others being the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and Euratom, the European Atomic Agency). The ECOC was an EEC programme.
ECOC  European City of Culture (or European Capital of Culture from 2005 onwards)
EDC  Edinburgh District Council
GDC  Glasgow District Council
GEAR  The Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal project
GGTB  Greater Glasgow Tourist Board
GLC  Greater London Council
GLEB  Greater London Enterprise Board
HIDB  Highlands and Islands Development Board
NUM  National Union of Miners
OAL  Office of Arts and Libraries
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PSI  Policy Studies Institute
SAC  Scottish Arts Council
SDA  Scottish Development Agency
SNP  Scottish National Party
SRC  Strathclyde Regional Council
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims to contribute towards a better understanding of the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow in the decades leading to 1990, based on documentary research and on oral history interviews with the key surviving decision-makers.

In 1990, Glasgow was the first UK city to host the prestigious European City of Culture (ECOC) event. As the first post-industrial city in Europe to hold the title, following Athens, Florence, Amsterdam, Berlin and Paris, Glasgow was a remarkable - and somewhat incongruous - choice. ECOC 1990 has since been established as a turning point for Glasgow: a catalyst for a regenerative transformation. It marks what is now viewed as the cultural turn in Glasgow’s policy-making, a key moment in the city’s use of culture for economic and social development. As a result, Glasgow now occupies a prominent position in the culture-led regeneration orthodoxy.

Prior to 1990, the ECOC was a fairly modest event and was not associated with any aspirations to regenerate the host city. The ECOC was established by the European Community (EC) with the first event held in Athens in 1985. The ECOC began during the 1980s as an annual title awarded to a city from an EC member state, as a means of showcasing the host city’s cultural assets and presenting performances and exhibitions from elsewhere in Europe, usually through a summer festival. The ECOC has since grown into a collection of annual year-long programmes involving multiple host cities and a perception described by Garcia (2007: 1) as ‘an attractive catalyst for cultural regeneration, generating enormous expectations’.

As will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, Glasgow’s approach to ECOC 1990 is regarded both in policy and academic literature as pivotal in the direction subsequently taken by the ECOC programme (Garcia, 2004b, 2005, 2007; Gold and Gold, 2005; Sassatelli, 2009). Sassatelli (2009: 95) has stated that Glasgow 1990 prompted a shift in the ECOC programme from being a celebration of the cultural excellence of major capitals towards becoming an instrument for the
regeneration of marginal cities in Europe. Both Sassatelli and Garcia (2005) have commented on the influence of Glasgow 1990 on the subsequent ECOC events held in Rotterdam, Porto, Genoa, Lille and Liverpool, all of which connected the event to regeneration plans.

Glasgow’s approach to ECOC 1990 is also significant in UK policy terms in the emergence of culture-led regeneration. In the years since 1990, the idea of culture-led regeneration has gained credibility in policy at both a national and local government level (Vickery, 2007: 22). It emerged within a cultural policy context of growing social and economic instrumentalism, where public expenditure in the arts and culture became increasingly justified on the basis of its ability to solve entrenched socio-economic problems. This was exemplified through such reports as *The Creative City* (Landry and Bianchini, 1995), *The Art of Regeneration: Urban Renewal Through Cultural Activity* (Landry et al., 1996) and *Use or Ornament? The Social Impact of the Arts* (Matarasso, 1997), later followed by the DCMS (Department for Culture, Media and Sport) publication *Culture at the Heart of Regeneration* (2004). Culture-led regeneration subsequently became regarded by commentators such as Miles and Paddison as a new orthodoxy ‘by which cities seek to enhance their competitive position’ (2005: 833).

As Chapter 3 will demonstrate, there are now two established - yet contradictory - narratives, both in media and policy terms, which characterise Glasgow’s approach to ECOC 1990 and culture-led regeneration as exemplary and divisive. The first narrative characterises Glasgow’s culture-led regeneration approach to ECOC 1990 as an unmitigated triumph: pioneering, pivotal in the history of the ECOC and socially and economically transformative to the city. Glasgow is viewed not only as a remarkable success story but also a model to be adopted by other cities. The ‘Glasgow model’ is one in which the ability of culture to lead social and economic transformation can be transferred and replicated to other cities through such vehicles as the ECOC. For example, Glasgow has been held as a model for Liverpool’s approach to ECOC 2008 by the proponents of Liverpool’s bid (Garcia, 2005: 4844-4846; Garcia, 2007: 4-6; Garcia, 2017: 2 and 4).
A contrasting narrative is of ECOC 1990 and culture-led regeneration in Glasgow as socially and economically divisive and disastrous for some sections of the city. This has been particularly prevalent in some media narratives, which have reduced complex geographies to a binary ‘dual city’ narrative in which ECOC 1990 and culture-led regeneration exacerbated the divide between rich and poor in Glasgow (Hall, 2008; Reason and Garcia, 2007), as will be discussed in Chapter 3. However, Glasgow’s approach to ECOC 1990 also met with academic criticism from such critics as Mooney (2004) who has argued that the event did little but ‘gloss over’ and divert attention away from the city’s major structural problems.

Much has been written about the impacts and legacies of ECOC 1990 on Glasgow, other cities - often in relation to attempts to replicate Glasgow’s perceived success - and the ECOC initiative itself (Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993; Cox and O’Brien, 2012; Crossick and Kaszynska, 2016; Evans and Shaw, 2004; Garcia, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2007, 2017; Gold and Gold, 2005; Gomez, 1998; Johnson, 2009; Miles and Paddison, 2005; Mittag, 2013; Mooney, 2004; Mooney and Danson, 1997; Myerscough, 1991, 1994; Palmer et al. 2004; Reason, 2006; Reason and Garcia, 2007; Sassatelli, 2009; Vickery, 2007). However, despite all this academic focus on the legacy, comparatively little is known about the emergence of cultural policy in the city in the decades leading to 1990. This thesis therefore addresses a major gap in our knowledge and understanding of the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow in the years leading to 1990. In doing so, it necessarily questions the perpetuation of what have become established mythologies, most notably the idea that Glasgow strategically developed an explicit blueprint for culture-led regeneration. As will be shown, it is questionable that a model of this kind was actually developed but as noted, this has not dented the assumption that there is a kind of tool-kit that makes the Glasgow experience replicable. However, this thesis is not concerned with the uses later made of Glasgow’s approach to the ECOC and it restricts its focus to the period 1970 to 1989. Consequently, it does not investigate the subsequent impact of the cultural policy that emerged during this period in Glasgow in the years following 1990.

This thesis investigates what and where Glasgow’s cultural policy was during the period 1970 to 1989, through six research questions:
1. What factors prompted the ‘cultural turn’ in Glasgow’s policy making?
2. What factors facilitated the new policy drive?
3. Who were the key actors involved?
4. What were the obstacles encountered?
5. To what extent can the period from 1979-89 be periodised in terms of critical events and how are we to understand the significance and influence of these events?
6. What strategies were employed by Glasgow District Council (GDC) in developing its bid to become the ECOC? How did it mobilise the requisite expertise? How did it assess the challenge represented by its rivals and counter that challenge?

These research questions will be investigated through two main methodological strands: archival and documentary research and oral history interviews with the key surviving decision-makers.

There is a particular focus in this thesis on GDC and, before local government reorganisation in 1975, Glasgow Corporation, as the local authority responsible for the city and its (cultural) development. ‘Glasgow’ is therefore used throughout the thesis, depending on its context, to mean either the city or its local authority.

The thesis will show that in 1970, at the start of the period of study, Glasgow did not have a formal cultural policy, nor were the arts and culture explicitly or formally connected to aspirations to regenerate the city. Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, a thriving cultural infrastructure emerged in Glasgow without an explicit, overarching cultural policy to direct its development. This cultural infrastructure also developed despite Glasgow facing severe socio-economic problems. There had been a sharp decline in manufacturing, which was the base of the city economy, with accompanying sharp rises in unemployment. Related to this were problems of depopulation, deprivation and urban decay.
In the early 1980s, Glasgow was in decline - yet was also in the midst of a cultural expansion. Several large-scale capital projects, such as The Burrell Collection, were completed or underway. National arts organisations, such as Scottish Opera and Scottish Ballet, had become based in the city, alongside major companies such as Citizens Theatre and a growing number of smaller arts organisations and festivals. Whilst formal plans and policies were developed around the city’s top priority of economic development, decision-making on the arts and culture within GDC during this period remained largely informal and can be described as idiosyncratic. Over the course of the 1980s, the arts and culture gradually became incorporated into the city’s economic development plans, moving from a peripheral to a more prominent, but by no means central, position.

Critical in this process of the arts and culture being absorbed into economic development activity was the recognition of the connection between the city’s image and its changing economy. Amongst various attempts made to regenerate the city economy and create employment in the early to mid-1980s was a new focus on the service sector. Glasgow’s service sector was also in decline, but to a lesser extent that manufacturing, and it was seen as an area of potential growth. The change that was to occur may be illustrated by an excerpt from the interview with Michael Kelly, who, between 1980 and 1984 was Lord Provost of Glasgow. Discussing Glasgow’s image in 1980, Kelly commented:

It’s difficult to believe how bad it was. Glasgow had a reputation for being a very dirty and dismal, dank place plagued by razor gangs and hooliganism, multiple deprivation. [...] It was a very problematic image for Glasgow because it did inhibit economic growth, it inhibited the visitor industry, it inhibited attracting key workers to come to Glasgow, and generally it was holding Glasgow back, especially as in the 1980s the old industries really had disappeared, the old heavy industries, and Glasgow was looking for other industries to try and create employment and those industries were mainly service-based. [...] For service-based industries image was very, very important. It didn’t matter so much if it was a coal mine or a steelworks or an engineering works, image wasn’t necessarily important to make those things happen. But when you’re trying to sell much softer services image was vital, and therefore, before we could start doing anything on those fronts we really had to try and change the image. (Michael Kelly, interview, 23 June 2014)
As Michael Kelly commented, it became clear that Glasgow needed to change its image to rebuild its economy.

One aspect of the service sector targeted for development was tourism. This was accompanied by assertive public relations activity aiming to attract people to the city. In the early 1980s, Glasgow was not viewed as a major tourist destination in the UK; the Scottish Tourist Board promoted Edinburgh and the Highlands but not Glasgow. In 1983, the Greater Glasgow Tourist Board (GGTB) was established. As theatres had previously closed over the main tourist seasons, GGTB began to work with arts organisations to establish a year-round programme of events so that tourists had something to do when they visited the city. This was particularly significant with regards to business tourism. The aim was for visiting businessmen to see a different side to Glasgow than its entrenched *No Mean City* image and tell their influential contacts elsewhere about how the city was changing.

Events began to play a more prominent role. The launch of Mayfest and opening of The Burrell Collection in 1983 coincided with the launch of the *Glasgow’s Miles Better* public relations campaign and a ‘homecoming’ campaign called *Welcome Home to Glasgow*, to encourage people living overseas with connections to the city to visit. Glasgow followed Liverpool and Stoke, both similarly suffering from deindustrialisation, in being awarded the 1988 National Garden Festival. This provided Glasgow with a major event to act as a focal point for urban regeneration.

In the early 1980s, Glasgow’s arts organisations, museums and venues, festivals and events were not regarded in terms of their economic impact or contribution to the city economy in the way that they are now. However, towards the mid-1980s this began to change. Glasgow became a case study for John Myerscough’s seminal report, *The Economic Importance of the Arts in Britain* (1988a). A particular focus of the Glasgow case study (Myerscough, 1988b) was the economic impact of the arts as a consumption activity in the service economy. The research for this began in 1985 and was published in 1988.

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In 1986, while Myerscough’s research was at an early stage, the opportunity arose for Glasgow to bid to become the UK’s nomination for ECOC 1990. Whilst the first ECOC event was held in 1985, by 1986 the ECOCs for the first five years had been selected. The UK decided to take a different approach by selecting its nomination via a competition between cities and initially deciding not to provide any additional central government funding for its event.

Why, therefore, did Glasgow want to host the event, given there would be no central government funding for it and it would consume a large proportion of the city’s resources at a time when the city faced severe socio-economic problems?

The ECOC presented Glasgow with the opportunity to align itself with the prestigious cities that had previously held the title: Athens, Florence, Amsterdam, Berlin and Paris, none of which were seen as declining post-industrial cities all of which were undisputed European centres of culture. It was the prestige of the ECOC which would allow Glasgow to reposition its image and thereby support the development of the city’s service sector economy.

However, Glasgow faced the dilemma that, due to the lack of alignment between its existing image and that of the previous title holders, it was not in a position to win the nomination on reputation alone, and it was competing with cities that were. Furthermore, some in Glasgow’s bid coalition anticipated that their bid may be met with prejudice on the basis of the city’s entrenched image problems. These concerns were proven to be justified, with some ministers in the Scottish Office, such as Secretary of State for Scotland, Malcolm Rifkind, promoting Edinburgh’s much weaker bid over Glasgow’s. Glasgow being awarded the ECOC title was far from inevitable.

In order to compete, Glasgow needed a robust strategy. The strategic vacuum presented at this stage by the lack of an explicit cultural policy was filled with the city’s increasingly coherent economic development strategies that had emerged in the preceding years. The strategy that emerged was based on the consumption of culture as a means of supporting existing plans to develop the city’s service industries and consumer services. This provided a connecting point
between the priorities of GDC, the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) and Glasgow Action, a new agency tasked with regenerating the city centre, alongside the city’s business community led by Norman Macfarlane.\(^2\) Glasgow’s bid pragmatically promoted such vehicles as public-private partnerships to show how the ECOC could meet the agendas and priorities of both the Labour-led local authority and the second Thatcher government. Glasgow’s arts organisations, libraries and museums - the cultural constituents of the bid - were not the drivers of the bid strategy but rather, the cultural ‘content providers’ that would be required for the strategy to succeed.

The period between Glasgow being ratified by the EC as the ECOC 1990 title holder in November 1986 and the event taking place, saw a further increase in arts and cultural activity in the city. However, by 1990 the arts and culture remained strategically fragmented and lacked a co-ordinated approach within GDC.

The decades leading to 1990 were a period in which great steps forward were made in the growth and development of the city’s arts and cultural infrastructure, in connecting the arts and culture to the development of the city economy, not least in attempts to use culture to transform the city’s image in order to reposition the city and support its economic development - yet in which an explicit cultural policy did not quite emerge.

The research findings provide new insights into how Glasgow came to be awarded the ECOC title, against expectations, and the nature of the cultural policy that emerged in the city in the years leading to 1990. They challenge some of the established narratives surrounding Glasgow, the ECOC, culture and regeneration. They also challenge the idea that a ‘Glasgow model’ of culture-led regeneration, which could be transferred and replicated in other cities, emerged in the years leading to 1990. As the thesis will show, developments were based mainly on a characteristic pragmatic improvisation and tactical opportunism, and relied heavily on the specificity of Glasgow’s context and assets, including

\(^2\) As well as being chairman of Glasgow Action and a board member of the SDA, Norman Macfarlane was, in 1986, both chairman of Guinness (inter alia) and an art enthusiast and collector.
its key protagonists. A further, perhaps surprising finding is that the ECOC acted as an obstacle, as well as a facilitating factor, in the development of a cultural policy that encompassed the production of culture as well as its consumption.

Chapter 2 will discuss the city of Glasgow in a range of historical, political and socio-economic contexts pertinent to the development of cultural policy in the city in the 1970s and 1980s. It will set out Glasgow’s contexts as a Labour-led, industrial city; a city facing decline yet with an established cultural infrastructure; and a European, British and Scottish city. This broad historical framework will be extended in Chapter 3 to encompass the dominant theoretical and ideological developments and established narratives framing the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow during the period 1970 to 1989. These include: the post-industrial city; neoliberalism; the rise of public relations; the development of the concept of the cultural industries; and finally, the culture-led regeneration orthodoxy, outlining the established narratives surrounding Glasgow, the ECOC and culture-led regeneration, and the idea of cities as models of culture-led regeneration, concluding with an overview of current debates on the topic.

Chapter 4 will discuss the research methodology for this qualitative study. It will set out the theoretical framework, guiding principles and approaches taken to archival research and oral history interviews. It will explain a methodological approach based on an understanding of cultural policy as potentially implicit or explicit, relational and territorial, and intersecting with a broad range of other policy areas, such as urban policy and economic policy. It will discuss the public and privately-held archive material accessed and the approach taken to the available archival material and any unexpected gaps in the archives. It will also outline the practical and theoretical factors that shaped the approach taken to oral history as a research methodology. It will show that both methodological strands have their strength and limitations; that the oral history interviews provided valuable qualitative data in some of the areas where the established written archives are ‘silent’; and the insights presented by combining archival and interview material.
The research findings will then be arranged in three chapters. Chapter 5 will discuss the key actors, prompting and facilitating factors and obstacles encountered in the ‘cultural turn’ in Glasgow’s policy making during the period 1970-85. It will also examine the critical events, their significance and influence, in the period leading up to the turning point of Glasgow’s 1986 ECOC bid, at which point a range of emerging strategies began to converge. Chapter 6 will examine events in 1985 and 1986 that led to Glasgow being awarded the ECOC 1990 title. Chapter 7 will consider developments during the period 1987 to 1989: the years between Glasgow being awarded the ECOC 1990 title and the event taking place. With regards to the development of a cultural policy which encompassed both consumption and production, Chapter 7 will compare the role of John Myerscough as an expert advisor to Glasgow with that of Nicholas Garnham as an advisor to the Greater London Council (GLC) and Greater London Enterprise Board (GLEB) on the development of the cultural industries in London earlier in the 1980s. Then, within an emerging ‘dual city’ context of increasing socio-economic polarisation, Chapter 7 will compare the approaches of GDC and the city’s regional authority, Strathclyde Regional Council (SRC), to the arts and culture in Glasgow. Finally, Chapter 7 will examine the extent to which an emerging model of culture-led regeneration developed in Glasgow during this period, including such vehicles as ‘pacing devices’.

Ultimately, this thesis will argue that Glasgow’s approach was not one of culture-led regeneration but regeneration-led culture: the development of Glasgow’s cultural policy was led by the development of the city’s economy, rather than vice versa.

The research presented in this thesis is the result of an AHRC Collaborative Doctoral Award project with the University of Glasgow and Glasgow Life, the arms-length external organisation established in 2007 to deliver cultural, sporting and learning activities on behalf of Glasgow City Council. This thesis aims to act as a resource for Glasgow Life, providing it, as well as a broader audience of cultural policy makers and researchers, with a better understanding of cultural policy formation in Glasgow in the years preceding 1990. In so doing, it provides the opportunity to re-assess established narratives and mythologies to have developed since 1990, regarding, for example, Glasgow’s position in the
culture-led regeneration orthodoxy and the instrumental uses of culture, particularly large-scale events. In contributing new historical data and providing new perspectives on the recent past, this research aims to help Glasgow Life and others shape the cultural policy of the future. It also has implications for a broader range of audiences, including academics, policy-makers and practitioners working in such fields as the arts and culture, festivals and events, cities and urban studies, social and economic development and regeneration, urban tourism, destination marketing and public relations.

This research project was driven in part by the opportunity presented by one of the main methodological strands: to establish a new archive of oral history interviews with the key surviving decision-makers (who are now in their sixties, seventies and eighties) in the development of Glasgow’s cultural policy during the 1970s and 1980s. Oral history interviews were undertaken with thirteen participants, listed in Appendix A, who worked during this period in a broad range of fields, including local and central government, the arts and culture, economic development, tourism and public relations. The interviews provided an opportunity for the key protagonists involved in shaping Glasgow’s emerging cultural policy at a significant point in the city’s history to tell their story, which will be preserved as a public resource. This thesis is therefore intended to act as an entry point to the new oral history archive, which, as allowed by interviewees, will be made publicly accessible.
CHAPTER 2  GLASGOW: THE CITY AND ITS CONTEXTS

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will discuss the city of Glasgow in a range of historical, political and socio-economic contexts pertinent to the development of cultural policy in the city in the 1970s and 1980s.

It will begin by discussing the relationship between the city’s local authorities\(^3\) and the Labour Party, the dominant political force at a local and regional level in Glasgow during the 1970s and 1980s. It will then discuss Glasgow’s history and identity as an industrial city in the years leading to the 1980s. In connection to this, it will then examine Glasgow as a city facing socio-economic decline. This will be followed by a discussion of the development of Glasgow’s cultural infrastructure in the decades leading to the 1970s, and the role of Glasgow Corporation and other key figures in constructing this cultural landscape.

This chapter will then examine Glasgow’s context as a European, British and Scottish city during the 1970s and 1980s. As a European city, this chapter will discuss this history of the European Economic Community (EEC) in the period prior to Glasgow’s year as ECOC 1990. In its context as a British city, this chapter will examine the broad political context surrounding Glasgow as a predominantly Labour-led city in the UK and the central government policy process and the development of cultural policy in the UK during the 1970s and 1980s. In a final section on Glasgow’s context as a Scottish city, this chapter will discuss concepts of Scotland as a ‘stateless nation’, as both a region of the UK and a nation in its own right, and of ‘Scotland’s culture’. It will also discuss the political context in Scotland during the 1970s and 1980s with two specific foci: the decline of the Conservative Party in Scotland and the rise and fall of the Scottish National Party (SNP). Finally, it will discuss regional and national policy in Scotland, examining the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) and Scottish Arts Council (SAC) during this period.

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\(^3\) This includes Glasgow Corporation, then from 1975, Glasgow District Council and Strathclyde Regional Council. The 1975 local government reorganisation in which Glasgow Corporation was abolished will be discussed in Chapter 5.
2.2 Glasgow as a Labour-led city

This section will discuss the nature of the relationship between municipal Glasgow - namely Glasgow Corporation, Glasgow District Council (GDC) and Strathclyde Regional Council (SRC) - and the Labour Party during the 1970s and 1980s, with reference to the years leading to these decades.

The Labour Party was a dominant political force in Glasgow during the 1970s and 1980s, and for much of the twentieth century.\(^4\) Political opposition in the decades prior to 1970 came largely from the Progressives, who occasionally won control of Glasgow Corporation for short periods. Writing in 1990, Damer (1990: 212) described the Labour Party as ‘having a stranglehold on power in both Strathclyde Region and Glasgow District’ Councils.

The 1980s were a particularly stable period throughout which Labour led both authorities in Glasgow, without being subject to serious challenge from parties outwith or entryism within. Unlike Liverpool District Council, and the attempts of its Deputy Leader, Derek Hatton, to draw the Labour-led authority further to the left,\(^5\) the leaderships of neither GDC nor SRC were infiltrated by the Trotskyist Militant Tendency.

Research undertaken by Keating (1988) in the late 1980s found the typical Glasgow Labour councillor to be ‘a more traditional figure’ than in some English cities where the ‘new urban left’ had grown in influence. Only 11% of Glasgow Labour councillors were women and fewer than 20% were under 40 years of age. Keating concluded from the preliminary findings that ‘Labour councillors in Glasgow have succeeded by sticking to traditional Labour values in a city less affected by social change than some of its English counterparts’ (1988: 62-63).\(^6\) Traditional Labour values in Glasgow were closely related to trade union values:

\(^4\) The Labour Party here also refers to the Independent Labour Party (ILP), its predecessor organisation in Glasgow earlier in the twentieth century.

\(^5\) This debacle resulted in Hatton being expelled from the Labour Party and destabilised Liverpool District Council between 1983 and 1987.

\(^6\) Keating described the ‘new urban left’ of some English cities as having ‘brought in more radical policies, a campaigning style including confrontation with central government, decentralisation and a break with the bureaucratic style of municipal labourism as well as issues such as opportunities for women and minorities, often neglected by Labour in the past’ (1988: 62).
finding practical solutions to such problems as poverty and disenfranchisement, with a strong focus on jobs, wages and housing. This approach was not one of ideologically-driven Marxism.

During the period between 1945 and 1970, a specific relationship had developed between Glasgow Corporation and the dominant Labour Party administration. Keating has argued:

The ideology of the Labour Party on Glasgow corporation can best be summed up as ‘municipal labourism’, a concern with a limited range of policy issues with an immediate impact on their constituents – notably housing matters – but little consideration of wider policy issues. (Keating, 1988: 12)

Carmichael (1995: 203) has argued that Glasgow Corporation ‘pioneered municipal involvement in regulating and providing social infrastructure, especially housing’, quoting Adams to argue that Glasgow ‘became socialised not from any specific political ideology but through the need to rectify urban injustices created in the nineteenth century’.

Keating (1988: 59) has recognised that during the 1970s and 1980s, with electoral competition relatively unimportant, most of the political conflict occurred within the Glasgow Labour Group, in a variety of ways: territorial, in the wake of the 1975 transition from a singular Glasgow Corporation to the two regional and district tiers; between right and left wings of the party; between the group leadership and so-called ‘backbenchers’; between elected councillors and the mass party organisation; and regarding the balance of power and influence between elected members and permanent paid officials.

Although both GDC and SRC began their existence as Labour-led authorities, each followed a different course. SRC remained a stable Labour-controlled authority throughout the period between its establishment in 1975 and abolition in 1996. Initially, leadership was shared between Geoff Shaw – a Church of Scotland minister, highly respected for his community work in Glasgow – and Dick Stewart, a Lanarkshire politician. Following Shaw’s death in 1978, Stewart
retained the leadership until 1986, when Stewart was succeeded by another Lanarkshire councillor, Charles Gray.

In GDC, Dick Dynes’ reign as Leader of the council was short-lived, when in 1977 he was amongst 25 Labour councillors to be ousted from power by voters following a housing allocation scandal. At this point, Jean McFadden, first elected to the council in 1971, was promoted to Leader of the Glasgow Labour Group and Labour moved into opposition. During the period 1977 to 1979, GDC was under no overall control, the Conservative Leader of the council, John Young, working in coalition with the SNP through the somewhat chaotic period.

In the years between the Labour Group’s return to power in GDC in 1979 and further local government reorganisation in 1996, in which GDC and SRC were abolished and Glasgow City Council (GCC) established, Jean McFadden and Pat Lally vied for leadership. On the right wing of the party, McFadden led GDC from 1979 to 1986, and again between 1992 and 1994, taking the role of City Treasurer in the intervening period. On the left, and more closely aligned with long-serving ‘backbenchers’, having been first elected to Glasgow Corporation in 1966, Pat Lally led GDC from 1986 to 1992, then acted as Deputy Leader until becoming Lord Provost of the new GCC in 1996.

Overall, Labour dominated local government in Glasgow during the 1970s and 1980s. As will be discussed in section 2.7, Glasgow was one of a number of Labour-led cities in the UK during this period, which included the three Thatcher governments. However, despite the election of GDC’s first female Leader, the city’s councillors remained, on the whole, a more traditional figure than their new urban left counterparts in other cities.

2.3 Glasgow as an industrial city

This section will discuss Glasgow’s history and identity as an industrial city in the years leading to the 1980s. It will argue that industry acted as a connecting factor between the city’s economy and its culture, and that this connection was historically rooted in the city well before the 1980s.
By 1970, heavy industry, and manufacturing more broadly, occupied a fundamental position in Glasgow’s economy. Heavy industry - shipbuilding in particular - was also fundamental to historical narratives and myths surrounding the city’s contemporary identity.

The rapid growth of industry and population in Glasgow during the eighteenth and nineteenth century was directly connected to Britain’s global position as a burgeoning power. Glasgow’s self-proclaimed status as the ‘Workshop of the World’ and the ‘Second City of the Empire’ emerged during this period (Devine, 2012: 623). By the mid-eighteenth century, Glasgow had become ‘the leading tobacco entrepôt in the United Kingdom’ (Devine, 2012: 105), its status as an international port city established. Manufacturing developed in the city over the course of the following century, the textiles industry, chemical industry and iron trade emerging as major sources of employment (Devine, 2012: 105-109; Damer, 1990: 73). The establishment of shipbuilding in Glasgow was a Victorian development. By the end of the nineteenth century, heavy industry formed Glasgow’s economic base.

In the years leading to the turn of the century, Glasgow’s industrial prowess and its implications for the status of the city were manifested in the architecture built and events staged. Devine has commented upon the ‘overwhelming civic confidence’ visible at the 1883 foundation ceremony of Glasgow’s City Chambers, which were opened by Queen Victoria in 1888:

> About 100,000 spectators in George Square watched a ceremonial trades march by the skilled workers drawn from the heavy industries which by the later nineteenth century had made Glasgow one of the great cities of the world. (Devine, 2012: 249)

At a cost of £0.5m, the City Chambers reflected, as Kinchin and Kinchin (1988: 18) have stated, that ‘the public building of this period aimed to enhance Glasgow’s status as a great industrial power rather than to rehouse her poor’.

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7 Tom Devine (2012: 623) has commented that the term ‘Second City of the Empire’ was first used as early as 1824.
In his influential, *The Upas Tree*, charting the history of the city through this period of growth and prosperity followed by post-war decline, Checkland (1981) drew on the international exhibitions of 1888 and 1901 - two internationally significant events - as indicators of the ‘great apogee of Glasgow prosperity’. In the thirteen-year interval between the exhibitions, Checkland argued, ‘Glasgow stood at the peak of her confidence and achievement’ (1981: 9).

Both the 1888 and 1901 exhibitions were founded upon a connection between industry, culture and civic pride. The 1888 exhibition, organised by Glasgow’s business and professional elite who raised the financial backing, was, Kinchin and Kinchin (1988: 18–20) have argued, a ‘bid for a cultural status to match the city’s industrial strength’. The exhibition, in which manufacturers displayed their latest products alongside a fine art section, raised profits of £43,000 (Kinchin and Kinchin, 1988: 55). This, combined with public subscription, funded the initial building of the Kelvingrove Museum and Art Gallery, Glasgow Corporation providing the site and completing the build when it exceeded its original budget. The opening of the Museum and Art Gallery was celebrated in the 1901 international exhibition, which again, displayed the latest in industrial developments alongside ‘high art’.

Following the ‘great exhibitions’ of 1888 and 1901, Glasgow hosted the Scottish National Exhibition in 1911 and the 1938 Empire Exhibition. The latter, was hosted when the British Empire was already a diminished force, and as Kinchin and Kinchin (1988: 291) have remarked, was conceived ‘in 1931 at the height of the depression in a conscious effort to promote employment and to advertise the industries of Scotland’.

The 1888 and 1901 exhibitions, with the opening of the new museum, were significant not only as a public display of the city’s confidence and prosperity but, as an act of partnership between the city’s professional elite and civic authorities. From a twenty-first century perspective, O’Neill (2006: 37 and 31)

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8 Kinchin and Kinchin (1988: 19) stated that 1888 exhibition’s official aims were ‘to promote and foster Science and Art, by exciting the inventive genius of our people’ and ‘to stimulate commercial enterprise by inviting all nations to exhibit their products both in the raw and finished state’, while unofficially, it aimed to outshine Edinburgh and Manchester’s international exhibitions of 1886 and 1887.
has commented on both Glasgow’s ‘tradition of expressing civic pride and competitiveness through museums’ and the long-standing history of the city council ‘working with the private sector to benefit the city’.

These events also reflect the significant position of industrialists in the cultural heritage accrued by the city by latter half of the twentieth century. As Nenadic has commented, during the Victorian era,

In contrast with some cities, Glasgow had no resident aristocracy and businessmen had long commanded most positions of power and prestige. (Nenadic, 1991: 72)

Collecting art and donating it to the city offered a means of consolidating such power and prestige in posterity. Industrialists such as Archibald McLellan, who died in 1854, and William MclInnes, who died in 1944 bequeathed their considerable art collections to the city. William Burrell, who built his fortune through shipping during the Victorian era, bequeathed his extensive collection to the City of Glasgow on his death in 1958. The Burrell Collection, built to house the bequest, opened some 25 years later in 1983.

O’Neill (2006: 37) has connected the opening of The Burrell Collection in 1983 to the great exhibition of 1888, arguing that it ‘drew on a long tradition of the city using high culture to project itself onto the UK and the world stages’.

By the opening of The Burrell Collection, Glasgow was no longer ‘Second City of the Empire’ but, rather, a city in decline, in the midst of deindustrialisation. However, the series of great exhibitions and building of prestigious museums through the peaks and troughs in prosperity over the preceding century were connected by partnerships between the city’s authorities and its professional elite, and by the use of culture to promote Glasgow’s identity as one defined by its industrial confidence.
2.4 Glasgow as a city in decline

By 1970, Glasgow was a city facing socio-economic decline. Indeed, this period in Glasgow has been described by some commentators as an ‘urban crisis’ (Keating, 1988: 25). Glasgow’s decline encompassed a range of factors, such as deindustrialisation, depopulation, deprivation and urban decay, compounded by the perpetuation of its reputation as a city afflicted with gang violence and sectarianism.

Deindustrialisation took hold in the city during the 1970s and 1980s, the sharp decline in heavy industry mirrored by a sharp rise in unemployment. This is often attributed to major global change and the decline of the British Empire following the Second World War. However, some commentators argue that Glasgow’s decline began long before the 1970s or the post-war period. Both Gibb (1983: 147) and Checkland (1981: 9-12) have argued that Glasgow’s economic decline began before 1914, but was temporarily halted by the ‘artificial’ stimuli accompanying both the First and Second World Wars and the interwar and post-war reconstruction boom.⁹

Many of the socio-economic problems Glasgow faced by 1970 were entrenched rather than a recent development. Checkland has commented on how the wealth generated by heavy industry was not spread evenly across the city, even at its industrial peak: ‘high prosperity before 1914 did not purge dereliction and slums, but left a painful residuum’ (1981: preface).

Whilst the 1919 Addison Act was a watershed in outlining the responsibilities of both government and municipal authorities - including Glasgow Corporation - to provide decent minimum standards of accommodation, overcrowding persisted in Glasgow during the first half of the twentieth century (Gibb, 1983: 154-155). By 1945, Glasgow faced a housing crisis; one which remained unresolved due to a lack of consensus between authorities on the solution (Keating, 1988: 18). A

⁹ Gibb (1983: 147) has commented: ‘Just as the Great War provided a major stimulus to the traditional industries of Clydeside in its demands for wartime supplies, and in the short-lived reconstruction boom which followed it, so the Second World War intervened to mask a picture of steady decline in industry, and in the fortunes of the people dependent upon it’. 
1946 report of the Clyde Valley Regional Planning Advisory Committee (CVRPAC) involving eighteen local authorities and central government, noted:

Civic pride, so conspicuous in other directions, has lamentably failed to maintain even a tolerable standard of town planning. (Keating, 1988: 18)

During this post-war period, the CVRPAC and Glasgow’s city engineer, Robert Bruce, proposed opposing solutions, neither of which was fully realised in practice. In the resultant approach, Keating has argued, ‘Glasgow got the worst of both worlds’ (1988: 21).

By the early 1970s, the dominant policy of comprehensive redevelopment - with the purpose of demolishing and rebuilding everything within a designated space - had extended to 29 areas of the city. This including dispersing entire communities out of decaying Victorian tenements earmarked for demolition in such areas as Anderston in the centre of the city, to new estates on the periphery.

However, by the early 1970s, it had also become evident that comprehensive redevelopment had not had the desired effect of improving the city’s social and economic fortunes. The 1974 West Central Scotland Plan, produced by a consortium of local authorities and the Scottish Development Department, not only highlighted the severe environmental decay that existed within Glasgow but recognised that it extended beyond the old inner city slum areas to the newer housing schemes (Keating, 1988: 26-28).

Not unconnected to deindustrialisation and urban deprivation and decay was the additional problem of depopulation. Having peaked in 1951 at 1,090,000, Glasgow’s population continued to decline throughout the decades leading to 1990. Outmigration, both voluntary and planned, persisted, with former Glasgow residents relocating overseas to countries such as Canada and more locally to suburban areas beyond the city boundary and to New Towns in the West of Scotland as a result of slum housing clearance (Paddison, 2002: 13). That

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10 For example, the high-rise housing Hutchesonstown/Gorbals comprehensive redevelopment area, designed to replace slum housing, gained notoriety during the 1970s for its poor quality, notably problems with damp. The towers were eventually demolished after much political wrangling in 1993.
outmigration was most prevalent among the professional and skilled working classes (Keating, 1988: 27) presented a particular problem to the city. Recent research by Walsh et al. (2016: 3) has highlighted the longer-term problems caused by the ‘socially selective New Town programme’ in Scottish Office regional policy from the late 1950s, which was ‘extended and expedited over the ensuing decades despite awareness of the negative consequences (both socio-economic and also ultimately health-related) for Glasgow’.

In addition to problems related to deindustrialisation and poor housing conditions, Glasgow began the 1970s with an unshakeable association with violence and bigotry. The ‘new wave of Glasgow hooliganism’ during the mid to late 1960s was connected, as Bartie (2010) has noted, to an induced rise of ‘moral panic’ in the city, with one particular peripheral estate acting as a focal point. Bartie has commented that, ‘between 1965 and 1970, Easterhouse became - and significantly, remains - a place that has become a byword for the so-called “problem community”’, not least due to its connection to the rise of youth gang violence in Glasgow (2010: 402). This episode built upon the growing folklore of Glasgow gang violence popularised in such novels as McArthur’s 1935 No Mean City, which was based in the Gorbals and featured ‘Razor King’ Johnnie Stark. Glasgow’s violent reputation provided a rich seam to be mined in literature emanating from the city throughout the 1970s and 1980s.\footnote{William McIlvanney’s Laidlaw trilogy (1977, 1983, 1991) is one example of the emerging ‘tartan noir’ genre.}

In conclusion, by the 1970s and into the 1980s, Glasgow faced a range of socio-economic problems, which had arisen due to a range of interconnected factors, such as: major global change; the consequences of central and local government policy decisions, such as the promotion of New Towns and comprehensive redevelopment; and entrenched problems - stretching back to the Victorian era and earlier - which stubbornly remained unresolved.
2.5 Glasgow as a cultural city

This section will provide a brief overview of Glasgow’s cultural infrastructure in the decades leading to the 1970s, and the role of Glasgow Corporation and other key figures in constructing this cultural landscape. The difficulties of defining what does and does not constitute ‘culture’ are discussed later in this thesis, notably in Chapter 7. In this contextual discussion of Glasgow as a ‘cultural city’, this section takes a relatively narrow definition of ‘culture’ to mean primarily the arts, museums, libraries and film, in connection to discussion of cultural policy in section 2.7, rather than a broader, more sociological definition of the kind to be discussed in Chapter 7.

Section 2.3 discussed the role of industrialists and partnerships between businessmen and Glasgow Corporation in promoting Glasgow’s status as a great city of the world through the great exhibitions of 1888, 1901, 1911 and 1938 and the building of the Kelvingrove Museum and Art Gallery. This promotion of civic confidence through cultural venues and events was also aimed inwards, at the population of the city. At Glasgow’s peak of prosperity during the Victorian era, museums and galleries, libraries and parks were viewed as municipal services and a matter of civic pride. This ethos of civic pride as a basis for Corporation support extended throughout the authority’s lifespan from Victorian prosperity, through two World Wars and the intervening Depression of the 1930s, over the course of the twentieth century into the 1970s. As embodied in the example of Kelvingrove Museum and Art Gallery, this ethos saw Glasgow Corporation invest in cultural venues on a grand scale. For example, the magnificent Victorian venue St Andrew’s Halls was acquired by the Corporation for the city in 1890 and hosted large-scale concerts and events before being gutted by fire in 1962. Following the fire, the site was eventually incorporated into an extension of the equally grand Mitchell Library. First built in the 1870s following tobacco merchant Stephen Mitchell’s £70,000 bequest for a large public library for the city (and as such another example of the significance of industrialists in the construction of Glasgow’s cultural infrastructure), the Mitchell Library moved sites twice to accommodate the rapid expansion of its stock, its current building dating from 1911. Following extensions during the 1950s and 1970s, the Mitchell Library became one of the largest reference libraries in Europe (University of
Glasgow, 2017). Other such venues include the People’s Palace Museum and Winter Gardens, founded in the predominantly working class East End of the city in 1898 and, by 1990, associated with social history and working class culture.

The People’s Palace was built on Glasgow Green, common land which was designated a public park in 1857, the first in a series of parks to be constructed in what became a Victorian municipal drive (Reed, 1993: 72 and 78). Glasgow’s larger parks also hosted many of the city’s significant cultural events and buildings in the years during and since the Victorian era: Kelvingrove Park hosted the 1888, 1901 and 1911 exhibitions as well as the museum and art gallery; Bellahouston Park hosted the 1938 Empire Exhibition and the resultant Palace of Art; Pollok Country Park became the site of The Burrell Collection as well as Pollok House, the William Adam mansion gifted to the city by the Maxwell Macdonald family.

However, Glasgow’s municipal investment in the arts and culture was not just driven by an ethos of civic pride but also by the agency of key individuals, Tom Honeyman being a particularly prominent example. Dr Honeyman, Director of the Kelvingrove Museum and Art Gallery between 1939 and 1954, has been credited not only with building what are regarded as considerable strengths in the city’s collection of French art but, significantly, with persuading Sir William Burrell to donate his collection to the city, and negotiating the purchase for the city of Salvador Dali’s 1951 painting, Christ of St John of the Cross, for £8,200, a price which Webster (1997: 171) has noted is ‘viewed as an incredible bargain in the light of history but [was] by no means regarded as such at the time’.

While Glasgow Corporation (including employees such as Honeyman) and Victorian industrialists played an important role in the development of Glasgow’s cultural infrastructure, by no means were they the sole drivers of its development in the years prior to 1970. Nor did the Corporation fund the entirety of the city’s cultural venues. Indeed, many of the theatres and cinemas that began to proliferate in the city flourished without Corporation support.12

The popularity of Britannia Panopticon Music Hall from the nineteenth century to

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12 Coveney (1990: 7) has noted that between 1862 and 1914, eighteen major theatres were built in Glasgow.
the 1930s and the Pavilion Theatre, which thrived mid-century with a variety-based programme, are two such examples whose work provided a contrast to the ‘high culture’ of, for example, the Corporation-funded Theatre Royal.

In addition, the developmental factor of the individual agency of key actors in Glasgow’s growing cultural landscape during the decades leading to the 1970s can be found largely outside the Corporation. For example, although the Citizens Theatre in the Gorbals received funding from the Corporation at various points in its history and is housed in a building owned by the City, it was - and remains - an independent company. Founded in 1943 by playwright James Bridie, in its initial decades, according to Coveney (1990: 5), Scottish ‘Nationalist idealism vied with grass roots political and artistic aspiration’ within the company. A 1960s slump followed by renewal under the artistic leadership of Giles Havergal from 1970 resulted in the theatre being ‘proved profoundly and insidiously influential’ in the following decades.

Glasgow developed a strong literary culture, enabled not least during the late 1960s and 1970s by the agency of Philip Hobsbaum, who, as lecturer in English Literature at the University of Glasgow, established a writers’ group which included such authors as James Kelman, Alastair Gray and Liz Lochhead.

In the years leading to 1970s, and into the 1970s themselves, a counter-culture ethos emerged in Glasgow (as in other UK cities), detached from Corporation involvement and in reaction against the ‘establishment’ in general. For example, writer and performer Tom McGrath played an important role within Glasgow’s counter-culture, founding the Third Eye Centre in 1974 and bringing performers such as Allan Ginsberg to Glasgow.

In addition to these three examples concerning theatre, literature and the performing and visual arts, Glasgow was no less a part of what might be termed ‘popular culture’ than other cities in the UK. For example, the music halls of the early twentieth century gave way to independent music venues (such as Glasgow institution, the Barrowland Ballroom) as a locus of the city’s music scene.
McCulloch (2013: 191) has argued that the 1960s were a ‘crucial transition decade in the city’s cultural renaissance’ which demonstrated Glasgow ‘could be a source of immediate and future innovative artistic achievement in poetry, painting and music’. The examples given by McCulloch – conductor Alexander Gibson who was ‘at the heart of 1960s reforms’ in revitalising the Scottish National Orchestra and driving the establishment of Scottish Opera in 1962; William MacLellan, ‘the kind of adventurous cultural publisher Scotland had long needed’; Edwin Morgan, a ‘radical and transforming figure in Scottish poetry in the second half of the twentieth century’; and painters John Knox and Ian McCulloch, two of a group of ‘recent Glasgow School of Art graduates who were rebelling against what seemed then to be the dead hand of the city’s arts institutions’ (2013: 176-177 and 184) - underline the significance of the role of individual key actors in the development of the city’s cultural landscape despite, and in reaction against, the Corporation.

By 1970, Glasgow Corporation occupied an important position in the historical development of Glasgow’s cultural infrastructure, its investment in the arts, museums and libraries a matter of civic pride. However, the agency of key actors, many of whom worked outwith the Corporation, was a crucial factor in the cultural ecology generated in the city as it moved into the 1970s.

2.6 Glasgow as a European city

As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the connection of Glasgow to the European Economic Community’s (EEC) ECOC programme in 1986, when the city competed for the UK’s nomination for the 1990 event, was a critical event in the development of Glasgow’s emerging cultural policy. The distinctive approaches taken by the UK and Glasgow to the ECOC – which will be discussed in Chapter 6 - had broader ramifications, not only for the future direction of cultural policy in Glasgow but also for that of the ECOC programme itself.

This section will provide a brief overview of the rise of the ECOC in the EEC during the 1980s, prior to Glasgow’s year to host the event in 1990, as a means of establishing the broader EEC context for this critical event.
The period of study, 1970 to 1989, encompasses a period of European history that saw the end of the Cold War, with the sudden collapse of communism in Europe. 1989, the end of the period of study, saw the fall of the Berlin Wall. 1990, the year Glasgow hosted the ECOC, saw the reunification of Germany.

During the period of study, the EEC was one of three communities that constituted the European Community or Communities (EC), the others being the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and Euratom, the European Atomic Agency. The period of study also falls into the years before the formal establishment of the European Union, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union coming into force in 1993, having been signed in 1992. With the Maastricht Treaty, the EC became one of the EU’s three pillars, the others being Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters. The 1970s and 1980s, therefore, was a period before the ‘ever-closer union’ of European integration formally extended to European citizenship, economic and monetary union and – in legal terms – cultural policy.

1970 to 1989 was also a period in which the number of EC member states doubled from six to twelve. The six countries to have signed the 1957 Treaty of Rome on which the EEC was founded – Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany – were joined in 1973 by the UK, Ireland and Denmark. Greece joined in 1981, followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. While the EC saw an expansion in member states it also saw a rise in the position of ‘culture’ within the Community, despite, in the years before the Maastricht Treaty, maintaining no formal legal competency for culture throughout this period. The frequently quoted line attributed to Jean Monnet, one of the ‘Founding Fathers’ of the EC, that if he could begin European integration anew, he would commence with culture, has been revealed by several commentators to be something of a myth (Patel, 2013: 1; Sassatelli, 2009: 46). The main vehicle for the shifting position of culture in the EC was the initiation of the ECOC programme during the 1980s.

That the first informal meeting of EEC Culture Ministers was held in 1983 under the Greek Presidency of the European Council is not insignificant, given that the ECOC concept was proposed by Greek Culture Minister, Melina Mercouri, and the
first ECOC event held in Athens in 1985. Mercouri was the driving force behind the establishment of the ECOC, supported by French Culture Minister, Jack Lang. In the first official research report to evaluate the European Cities of Culture programme, *European Cities of Culture and Cultural Months*, produced by the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) for the Network of Cultural Cities in Europe in 1994, John Myerscough has recorded Mercouri as having argued at this meeting:

> It is time for our (the Culture Ministers) voice to be heard as loud as that of the technocrats. Culture, art and creativity are not less important than technology, commerce and the economy. (Myerscough, 1994: 1)

For those Culture Ministers that drove the establishment of the ECOC programme, ‘culture, art and creativity’ could be deployed to make political gains that could not be achieved by ‘technology, commerce and the economy’ alone, including, in part, the project of European integration. Gold and Gold have argued that ‘the European Community approached culture in terms of “the compatibility of contrasting identities”’, commenting that:

> The rise of culture on the political agenda resonated with the belief that closer European economic and political integration required associated measures to show the cultural affinities between the peoples of Europe. (Gold and Gold, 2005: 222)

Furthermore, Gold and Gold have commented on the role and timing of the establishment of the ECOC:

> Tactically it combined community-level cooperation with the participation of regional and local authorities, thereby involving ordinary people in a European project at a time when few such projects seemed to have relevance for the lives of the public. (Gold and Gold, 2005: 223)

As Calligaro (2013: 109) remarked, the ECOC provided ‘a European space in which the diversity of the cultural Europe can be represented in contrast to the bureaucratic centre Brussels’. The diversity and contrasting approaches and identities of member states were recast through the ECOC not only as a strength but as a defining characteristic of an ultimately European identity. Sassatelli (2009: 81) has discussed how the ECOC confers a European identity on host cities, arguing that the ECOC was ‘a reconceptualization of the cities as
European’, the diversity of approaches by cities ‘seen as what makes them typically “European”’.

As will be discussed in Chapter 3, Glasgow 1990 is widely regarded as a ‘turning point’ in the ECOC programme, particularly in its connecting the ECOC to regeneration aims (Sassatelli, 2009: 96; Gold and Gold, 2005: 225; Mittag, 2013: 43; Garcia, 2007: 4). However, Garcia (2007: 1) has described the ECOC prior to its being ‘transformed into what is perceived as an attractive catalyst for cultural regeneration, generating enormous expectations in cities’ as ‘a rather sanguine EU initiative’. Gold and Gold (2005: 224) have commented that, ‘the early events made little impact on the European scene’ and were ‘primarily summer events staged for domestic audiences, with little international marketing’.

Sassetelli (2009: 95-96) has described the first ECOCs, particularly Athens and Florence, as both ‘limited in scope’, connected to an urban cultural policy concerned predominantly with ‘the promotion of high culture and of access to it’. Calligaro (2013: 96) has argued however, that the ‘centralised yet impulsive’ approach Athens took to their event contrasted with that of Florence, in which local actors had a real stake. These were followed by the equally divergent festivals of Amsterdam 1987, Berlin 1988 and Paris 1989 (the latter being overshadowed by the commemoration of the bicentennial of the French Revolution).

In the early years of the programme prior to 1990, there was no established model for the ECOC, with each city and member state taking their own distinctive approach at a time when the arts and culture began to occupy an increasingly conspicuous, though by no means dominant or indeed formal, position within the EEC.

2.7 Glasgow as a British City

This section will discuss Glasgow’s context as a city in the UK during the 1970s and 1980s, providing an outline of the broad political and policy context in Britain during an era with a singular central government, prior to Scottish
devolution and the establishment of the Scottish Parliament. As a British city, Glasgow was subject, until 1975, to the two tiers of local and central government, and following local government reorganisation in 1975, to the three tiers of local, regional and central government. This section will therefore provide an overview of the Heath, Wilson, Callaghan and Thatcher governments, touching upon the evolving policy process during this period before briefly discussing the development of cultural policy in the UK between 1940 and 1989. One significant aspect of Glasgow’s context as a British city - its position within the Scottish political landscape - will be discussed in section 2.8.

2.7.1 The Heath, Wilson, Callaghan and Thatcher governments, 1970 to 1989

Politically, the period 1970 to 1989 saw a succession of Labour and Conservative governments in the UK led by four prime ministers. Harold Wilson and Labour lost the June 1970 general election to the Conservatives, led by Edward Heath, only to be returned to power as the Leader of a minority government in the aftermath of the February 1974 general election, following Heath’s failed attempts to establish a coalition with Jeremy Thorpe and the Liberals. A further general election in October 1974 gave Wilson’s Labour Party a slim majority. Wilson resigned in office in April 1976, James Callaghan succeeding him as Prime Minister. The May 1979 general election brought the first of three Conservative governments led by Margaret Thatcher between that year and November 1990, when Thatcher was ousted by her party and replaced by John Major as Leader and Prime Minister.

The Heath government of the early 1970s is significant for this study in two regards: as a time of economic decline and as the point at which the UK joined the EEC. As a vocal advocate of the European integration project, Ted Heath pushed through the UK’s application to join the Common Market, after the first two applications were vetoed by President de Gaulle of France. After joining on 1 January 1973, the UK’s position within the EEC was subsequently reinforced in a UK referendum in 1975.

The UK joined the EEC at a time when its position in the world was changing. Britain had long lost its empire and significant global change was a prompting
factor in the process of deindustrialisation affecting many British towns and cities. This period also began with disputes between trade unions - notably the National Union of Miners (NUM) - and the government, which continued without definitive resolution into the 1980s. The early 1970s brought strikes, power cuts and the three-day week.

With industrial relations a weakness of the Heath government and the country in deficit, the Wilson government of 1974 promised a change of direction. Rogers has commented that:

> The Labour government was elected in 1974 on the basis of manifesto commitments that were firmly rooted in the Social Contract, which emerged out of the meetings of the TUC/Labour Party Liaison Committee. (Rogers, 2009: 638)

The Social Contract promised a redistribution of income and wealth (Rogers, 2009: 634). However, the Wilson government was dominated by economic problems related to ‘stagflation’ - inflation combined with recession - and the destabilising influence of the 1973 oil crisis as well as the commitment to public spending.

The economic crisis continued throughout the Callaghan era, leading to the ‘winter of discontent’ in 1979, which saw a series trade union strikes over public sector pay. In March 1979, Callaghan, already in the weakened position of leading a minority government, lost a vote of no confidence in parliament - the SNP aligning with the Conservatives to provide what was the casting vote. The early general election that followed in May 1979 resulted in the installation of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister.

The three Thatcher governments can be characterised, amongst other things, by the Prime Minister’s preoccupation with ‘the enemy without’ and ‘the enemy within’. This was a period which saw the Falklands War; escalation of the Troubles in Northern Ireland and IRA attacks on mainland UK; and the Miners’ Strike, in which the NUM, led by Arthur Scargill aimed, and failed, to prevent colliery closures in the wake of the government’s attempts at trade union reform.
At an international level, the Thatcher era coincided with the final years of the Cold War. On economic policy, Thatcher’s monetarist approach was in tune with the contemporary ‘Reaganomics’ of the USA. Both Thatcher and Reagan found inspiration in the economics of Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, which veered away from the Keynesian policies of the past. Thatcher led the UK through a period of widening inequality, one in which deindustrialisation took hold in many towns and cities across the country, with ‘managed decline’ considered as a policy option, yet which also saw the financial ‘Big Bang’ with the deregulation of the stock exchange, a cornerstone of Thatcherite economic reform.

At a national level, the 1980s were a low point for the Labour Party led by Neil Kinnock, as it lost the general elections of 1983 and 1987 by considerable margins. However, the Labour Party was a dominant force at local government level within the major urban areas of the UK. For example, Labour held control of Manchester and Sheffield District Councils and the Greater London Council (GLC) alongside Strathclyde Regional Council and Glasgow District Council throughout the decade. Here the new urban left was an influential factor on Labour-led authorities, as opposed to the influence of the new suburban right on Conservative local government (Gray, 2000: 168).

The Labour Party’s dominance of major city councils did not go unchallenged, from several quarters. In Liverpool, as touched upon in section 2.2, the dominance and stability of the Labour Party was undermined by the infiltration of the Militant Tendency enabled by the District Council’s Deputy Leader, Derek Hatton from 1983. In London, the challenge to the advancement of Thatcherism presented by Ken Livingstone’s GLC was brought to an abrupt end in 1986 when

13 Dorling (2012) has commented on how the early 1980s government policy of managed decline was only made public in 2012 due to the thirty year rule governing the release of Cabinet papers. Managed decline was proposed by Chancellor, Geoffrey Howe, as a regional policy option for Liverpool following the 1981 Toxteth riots. Cabinet papers state Howe argued the government should not ‘waste money’ on regenerating Liverpool, that Liverpool’s decline could not be prevented by the government, and that Secretary of State for the Environment, Michael Heseltine’s request for a ‘massive injection of additional public spending’ to stabilise the inner cities should be rejected. Howe proposed ‘a sustained effort to absorb Liverpool manpower elsewhere - for example in nearby towns of which some are developing quite promisingly’ (Travis, 2011).
the GLC was abolished by central government, alongside six (predominantly Labour-led) metropolitan county councils in the Midlands and North of England.\footnote{During this period, however, the two tier system of local and regional government in Glasgow remained intact, GDC and SRC remaining in place until SRC was abolished in 1996, when the new Glasgow City Council was created.}

Thus, politically, Glasgow was one of a number of comparable British cities, reliant on heavy industry, undergoing severe socio-economic decline, to be led by a Labour Group during the Thatcher era.

It was within this political context that the ‘inner cities’ became a national policy concern which grew over the course of the Thatcher era. By the third Thatcher government, which began in 1987, the inner city was becoming a byword for a multitude of social and economic problems, as the British American Arts Association described in a 1988 symposium document:

The term inner city describes not so much a location as a state of economic and social decline. It consists of a deadly combination of ills: unemployment, poor housing, crime, dereliction, all of which lead to a loss of confidence and identity; in short, to a death of the local community. (Keans \textit{et al.}, 1989: 9-10)

The 1970s and 1980s in the UK was also a time when the policy process itself began to change. The UK during this period has been conceptualised by various commentators as both a ‘post-parliamentary democracy’ and a ‘new managerialist state’ (Ham and Hill, 1993; Hill, 1997; Saint-Martin, 2004). Ham and Hill (1993: 27-28) have charted the evolution of the policy process in Britain during this period, noting the arguments of Jordan and Richardson that by the late 1980s, Britain had become a ‘“post-parliamentary democracy” in which policies are developed in negotiation between government agencies and pressure groups organised into policy communities’, with pressure groups influencing public policy ‘from the point at which issues emerge on to the agenda to the stage of implementation’.

This reflects the growing significance over the course of the late 1970s and 1980s of government agencies and advisors in policy development as well as implementation. As will be discussed in section 2.8, the growing role of agencies
coincided with the development of regionalism in policy development in the UK, with the SDA combining both factors.

The rise and influence of expert policy advisors in cultural governance in Britain has been investigated by Schlesinger (2009a, 2013), who has concluded that:

a small number of actors may act as the effective protagonists of a policy. At any one time, there are preferred suppliers of ideas and evidence. (Schlesinger, 2009a: 17)

This resonates with the influence of two expert advisors, Nicholas Garnham and John Myerscough, regarding emerging cultural policies in London and Glasgow respectively, which will be discussed in Chapter 7.

The development of the post-parliamentary democracy coincides with the rise of the new managerialist state in the UK. The ‘new managerialism’ is also known in the literature as ‘corporate management’, ‘new public management’ or just plain ‘managerialism’ (Saint-Martin, 2004: 18-40; Dollery, 2009: 21). Pollitt has defined it as:

a set of beliefs and practices, at the core of which burns the seldom-tested assumption that better management will prove an effective solvent for a wide range of economic and social ills. (Pollitt, 1990: 1)

Writing in 1990, Pollitt (1990: 7) argued that this ‘belief in the potential of better management’ arose from ‘the favourable analysis of the achievements of the corporate sector during the last half century’. During that period, the traditional state bureaucracy was characterised as chronically inefficient, insulated from competition and expanding in size and cost without evidence of a corresponding growth in productivity (Pollitt, 1990: 7-8). Therefore the new managerialism, as Dollery (2009: 21) has argued, represented ‘an attempt to distil the principles of management that have evolved in the private sector and transplant these principles into a public sector context’.

The new managerialism as an ideology originated in business administration the US (Saint-Martin, 2004: 1; McConnell, 2004: 74). Whilst bureaucratic reform was a characteristic Thatcherite development during the 1980s, new managerialism
was imported into the UK by the first Wilson Labour government in the late 1960s. Heath subsequently brought in a ‘Businessman Team’ to run the government in a more strategic ‘businesslike’ manner with ‘less opportunism and short-termism and more rational decision-making’ (Pollitt, 2013: 903). Whilst Thatcher’s new ‘Efficiency Unit’ equally positioned private sector allies and consultants in a more prominent, advisory role in central government, it aimed to ‘roll back the state’, save money and reduce civil service numbers (Pollitt, 2013: 906).

The introduction of the new managerialism to central government was, as Saint-Martin (2004: 1) has stated, ‘not simply a matter of minor transformation of management style’ but a ‘paradigm shift’. This had profound implications for local and regional government during the 1970s and 1980s.

The introduction of the new managerialism into a Scottish local government context will be discussed in Chapter 5, in relation to its integration into the new GDC during the late 1970s and early-to-mid 1980s. The extent to which the emerging cultural policies in both GDC and SRC were influenced by the new managerialism during the 1970s and 1980s will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 7.

2.7.2 Cultural policy in the UK, 1940 to 1989

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the UK was a state without an explicit cultural policy. Unlike some other European states, such as France, the UK did not take a centralised approach to the administration and governance of ‘culture’. Conversely, any formal attempt to define the state’s culture was resisted and areas which might be considered to constitute culture were scattered between a variety of different government departments. For example, the arts, museums and libraries fell within the remit of the Office of Arts and Libraries (OAL), a small office within the Department for Education and Science; historic sites and natural heritage, the built environment and local government were the responsibility of the Department for the Environment; the Foreign Office was concerned with the cultural diplomacy work of the British Council; and the Scottish and Welsh Offices concerned with issues affecting their respective nations - the one department with a broad overview being the Treasury. This
was a period before the establishment of the Department of National Heritage, which took place during the John Major era, and which preceded the Department for Culture, Media and Sport of the New Labour era.

During this period, decision-making on a variety of cultural areas was devolved to a collection of non-departmental public bodies at ‘arms-length’ from government, such as: the Arts Council of Great Britain (ACGB) and its associated body the Scottish Arts Council (SAC); the Crafts Council, established as the Crafts Advisory Council in 1971; the British Film Institute (BFI) and the associated Scottish Film Council. The BBC, funded by the licence fee, fell within the Home Office during the 1980s. In addition, England and Wales had a network of Regional Arts Associations, distinct from both central government and the Arts Council, heavily supported by local government. This system was described in a 1984 Policy Studies Institute report by John Myerscough (1984: 68) as ‘fragmented’, with a ‘lack of any firm central coordination’.

However, that culture had any position at all in central government was a relatively recent development, the reluctance of the state to intervene in cultural matters historically entrenched. If the post-war period saw the arts, museums and libraries move into the political firmament, 1965 brought political changes in which they were given a voice in government and began to emerge as a policy arena (Gray, 2000: 47-51). That year, Jennie Lee was appointed as the first Minister for the Arts and the White Paper, *A Policy for the Arts* - the first of its kind in the UK - was published. Over the course of the late 1960s and into the early 1970s, both central and local government spent increasing sums of money on the arts and culture, (Gray, 2000: 50-51) affording them an increasingly prominent, if still peripheral, position.

Gray (2000: 51) has described the period between 1972 and 1979 as an ‘interregnum for British public administration’, with the collapse of the post-war

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15 In his analysis of state management of the arts during the latter half of the twentieth century, Gray (2000) commented on the minimal state involvement in the arts prior to 1940 and the development of state patronage brought about by the post-war welfare state settlement. The Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA) was created in 1940 ‘to defend British culture and the arts against the threat of fascism through financial support for music, opera, ballet and drama, and for the purchase of works of art’, whilst ACGB was established in 1946 as a last act of the wartime coalition government to continue CEMA’s work (2000: 39 and 41).
consensus. Whilst the first Thatcher government from 1979 marked a change of direction for the arts and culture, as for public policy more broadly, there was also some continuity. The period 1970 to 1989 was one in which successive Arts Ministers attempted to increase private support for the arts and culture. While the 1980s saw the ‘rebalancing’ of public and private funding for the arts and culture, with the initiatives to encourage philanthropy, this built upon developments in the previous decade.\textsuperscript{16} This increasing emphasis on philanthropy over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, however, had by no means a rebalancing effect on the persistent inequity in public funding between London and the regions.\textsuperscript{17}

The period 1970 to 1989 saw the development of the role of local government in the arts and culture in the UK. During this period, as today, local authorities in the UK were locally-accountable organisations with responsibility for a wide range of services. This is described by Gray as resulting in a:

\begin{quote}
policy mosaic, where a wide range of linkages between discrete policy areas serve to establish both intended and unintended consequences for the totality that create distinctly different patterns of service provision between areas with each local authority forming a distinct political system within the overall structure of British politics and administration. (Gray, 2000: 159)
\end{quote}

Not only did there lie within this ‘policy mosaic’ a tension between the priorities of locally-elected representatives and those of central government, but also between statutory and non-statutory services. That the arts and culture were a non-statutory aspect of local government activity meant that the approaches taken by local authorities towards supporting the arts and culture – and their

\textsuperscript{16} The Association of Business Sponsorship of the Arts (ABSA), far from being a Thatcherite development, was founded in 1976 during Hugh Jenkins’ stint as Minister for the Arts. Lord Redcliffe-Maud, in his report, \textit{Support for the Arts in England and Wales}, for the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, went as far as to promote private patronage of the arts as moral necessity, arguing that it offered a ‘powerful safeguard’ against a potential ‘state monopoly’ of arts patronage, which, should it arise, would ‘mean the loss of individual freedom, both for the artist and for us as audiences’ (Redcliffe-Maud, 1976: 26).

\textsuperscript{17} This funding imbalance was noted in UNESCO reports on \textit{Cultural Policy in Great Britain/the United Kingdom} in 1970 and 1982, as well as the Arts Council’s 1984 report, \textit{The Glory of the Garden: the development of the arts in England}. In this pre-devolutionary era – as will be discussed in section 2.8 – Scotland was regarded in policy terms as both a nation and a region of Britain, as London was regarded as both a region and a city.
reasons for supporting the arts and culture in the first place - varied considerably.

The general position of the arts and culture in local government at the end of the 1970s has been described by Gray (2000: 162) as ‘weak’, being perceived as a ‘minor service area’, something which was exacerbated by central government cuts to local authority budgets during the economic crisis of that decade. Despite this, the arts and culture gained a new significance as a policy area within some local authorities - notably in major urban areas - during the 1980s.

For some though not all local authorities, the arts and culture were included in tourism development activity. Murphy and Boyle (2006: 114) have noted the failure of Bristol and Liverpool city councils to support tourism development - to the extent that ‘Bristol council closed down the Bristol Marketing Bureau since it would not support tourism policy’ - in comparison with Glasgow, Bradford and Birmingham as cities where strong public support was generated.

Other cities, such as London, developed a focus on the cultural industries, whilst cities such as Sheffield designated specific areas of the city as ‘cultural quarters’. Sheffield’s pioneering approach to cultural quarters during the early 1980s was particularly significant in its challenging the role of local government. Moss has noted that:

At the time it was a radical shift from traditional servicing roles of local government, based on a belief that social and economic change at a local level is a process that can be steered, rather than merely observed. (Moss, 2002: 212)

This was an approach, Moss (2002: 212) has noted, ‘sufficiently unusual to earn Sheffield the epithet “the Socialist Republic of South Yorkshire”.

Glasgow was therefore one of a number of Labour-dominated cities facing severe problems of socio-economic decline to examine the arts and culture as an area for development rather than an area to be cut from local government expenditure.
In conclusion, this section has discussed the political and, specifically, cultural policy context surrounding Glasgow as a city in the UK between 1970 and 1989. It is a context which is predicated on a number of tensions between central and local government during a period of global political and economic change. At central government level, the UK was a state without a formal cultural policy, where the arts and culture occupied a marginalised position in government. At a local government level, approaches to the arts and culture varied between authorities, with some commonalities, as well as differences, between major urban centres.

The political parties leading Glasgow and the UK rarely aligned between 1970 and 1989. When the UK was led by Conservative governments, Glasgow was dominated by Labour administrations. In the short period in which Labour were in opposition in Glasgow District Council - between 1977 and 1979 - James Callaghan’s Labour government led the country. However, Glasgow was by no means alone as a Labour-led city undergoing deindustrialisation during the Thatcher era to invest in the arts and culture.

2.8 Glasgow as a Scottish city

This section will consider the most pertinent aspects of Glasgow’s context as a Scottish city during the 1970s and 1980s. It will begin by discussing concepts of Scotland’s status as a ‘stateless nation’, of Scotland as both a region of the UK and a nation in its own right, and of ‘Scotland’s culture’. It will then discuss the political context in Scotland during the 1970s and 1980s, with two specific foci: the decline of the Conservative party in Scotland despite the Tories being in government for three quarters of this period, and the rise and fall of the Scottish National Party (SNP). The 1979 referendum on Scottish devolution will also be discussed within this context. Finally, this section will discuss regional policy in Scotland, the SDA and SAC during these two decades.

The concept of Scotland as a stateless nation has been debated during and since the period 1970 to 1989. David McCrone (2005: 65) has described Scotland as a nation with a ‘distinctive national identity’ yet a ‘constitutionally subordinate position within the UK’. Scotland’s position as both a nation and a region within
a considerably more populous state has been examined by commentators such as Murray Pittock (2013), who has discussed the tendency for Scotland to be described in UK-wide media as a region of the UK, rather than a distinct nation with a collection of regions of its own.\textsuperscript{18}

McCrone (2005: 65) has also argued that Scotland’s position within the UK has produced the contradictory assumptions that Scotland is both ‘culture-lite’ and ‘culture-heavy’: culture-lite being ‘insufficiently different from the rest of the UK in terms of cultural markers such as language, religion etc to be “national”’; and culture-heavy meaning ‘its cultural iconography is so hegemonic and distorted that it generates deformed narratives and discourses’.

Connected to the concept of Scotland as ‘culture-heavy’ is the concept of Scotland as an imaginative construct, something which owes much to Sir Walter Scott’s romanticised depictions of rural Scotland, which provided a foundation for the promotion of Scotland as a tourist destination during the 1970s and 1980s.\textsuperscript{19}

However, an important argument is that, despite the apparent distinctiveness of Scotland as a nation, ‘in modern, pluralistic societies no single “national” culture is to be found’ (Meech and Kilborn, 1992: 247). Craig Richardson has argued that ‘Scotland’s culture’ is not homogenous, but fragmented and subject to distinct regional variations:

Scottland’s internationally received cultural identity is better understood as a form of fragments or a palimpsest, a federation of geographic regions

\textsuperscript{18}Pittock (2013: 14) has stated: ‘While events in England are still frequently located in a county, “Scotland” and “Wales” are usually used as terms equivalent to English counties: “in Yorkshire... in Scotland” is a not infrequent collocation. Seldom, indeed, are events identified as occurring in Ceredigion or Stirlingshire on networked news: subliminally, countries are identified with counties, or at best regions, of England’.

\textsuperscript{19}Gold and Gold (1995) have examined Scotland both as a place and as an imaginative construct with particular reference to tourism. In their analysis of materials promoting Scotland as a tourist destination, Gold and Gold highlighted the significance of the role played by Sir Walter Scott in ‘the invention of modern Scotland’, whose poems and plays ‘created a largely imaginary world of chivalrous deeds and noble intent taking place against a backdrop of spectacular, but readily identifiable, highland and border settings’, and exerted an influence over audiences across western Europe and North America. Gold and Gold found that during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the ‘standard representation of Scotland and Scottish life remained centred around sentimental and romanticized notions of the Highlands’ (Gold and Gold, 1995: 195-196).
with varied landscapes, cultural and political priorities, and languages. (Richardson, 2011: 2)

This is significant in positioning Glasgow during the 1970s and 1980s within the broader context of Scotland which, as a nation, was by no means homogenous in its cultural, social and political priorities. Yet despite the lack of cultural and political homogeneity in Scotland, as a nation, Scotland has been described as distinctive in its political divergence from the rest of the UK, as discussed above (McCrone, 1992: 198). That the political parties leading Glasgow - both at district and regional government levels - and the UK at central government level rarely aligned between 1970 and 1989 was discussed in section 2.7. A similar disconnect extended beyond Glasgow to Scotland during the same period. The Labour Party consistently won the most seats in Scotland as a whole in general elections throughout these two decades, despite the Conservatives being in government for three quarters of this period: something which came to be described as the democratic deficit.

2.8.1 The decline of the Conservatives in Scotland, 1970 to 1989

The 1980s in particular are considered to be a period in which support for the Conservatives collapsed in Scotland. However, the decline of the Tories as a political force in Scotland began in the preceding decades. Hutchison (2001: 98) has noted that the trend for electoral politics in Scotland to deviate from the UK as a whole began in 1959 and continued for the remainder of the twentieth century. Scottish support for the Conservatives peaked in 1955, when they won more than 50% of the vote.20 By the 1970 general election, which brought Ted Heath to power, the Conservatives won just 23 seats in Scotland to Labour’s 44. During the 1970s, the number of Scottish seats held by Labour remained in the forties while the Tories lost and regained seats with the rise and fall of the SNP. In the 1987 general election - which marked the start of Thatcher’s third term as Prime Minister - only ten of Scotland’s 72 constituencies were won by the Conservatives.

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20 Hutchison (2001: 71) noted this was ‘the only occasion this century that a party has gained an absolute majority of the Scottish popular vote’.
In some commentaries, the electoral decline of the Conservatives in Scotland is explained via the establishment of a dichotomy between Scotland and England, in which Scotland is presented as left-wing and England as right-wing. For example, Hutchison (2001: 140) has stated that during the 1980s, ‘the social and economic doctrines so ardently espoused in England ran into incomprehension and hostility in Scotland’, as if there was no resistance at all to the Thatcher governments’ social and economic policies in England. David Stewart (2009: 1) has summarised the narrative of the Thatcher years in ‘Scottish popular mythology’ as presenting ‘Thatcher as an undemocratic, English nationalist, antagonistic towards Scotland’s distinctive collectivist culture, who destroyed the nation’s industrial heritage’ and as a result, the mythology goes, ‘Scotland suffered economic and social hardship while England prospered’. Whilst during the 1980s, the Conservative Party thrived in some areas of England, in other areas, such as large sections of the Midlands and the North of England - and in England’s capital - it met with strong opposition. As discussed in section 2.7, Thatcherism was by no means a welcome development in many large centres of population in England, such as Liverpool (for whom ‘managed decline’ was considered as a central government policy option), Sheffield and London.

In addition, far from being universally left-wing, Scotland was a nation with regional and sub-regional political variations. During the 1980s the Conservatives became increasingly unpopular in Glasgow, the direction of travel marked in the 1979 general election when prominent Tory MP Teddy Taylor lost his Cathcart seat and became one of a number of MPs to head south to revive their careers in safer seats, the Scottish Tories being ‘stripped of their high-flyers’ as a result (Hutchison, 2001: 141). However, Tory strongholds remained in the Scottish Borders, and in Central and North East Scotland. A direct outcome of the decline of the Conservatives in Glasgow was the Scottish Office being populated during the 1980s by ministers representing Scottish constituencies outwith the city. This shifting political landscape left Glasgow - as other comparable cities in the UK - with a diminishing voice in central government during the 1980s.

21 Stewart (2009: 1) has challenged the perception of Thatcher as anti-Scottish or an English nationalist and interpreted Thatcherism as ‘a post-imperial mission to restore British greatness by removing the preconditions of socialism throughout Britain’.

22 The Scottish Office was a multi-functioning government department, which during the 1980s included departments for Development, Education, Home and Health, Industry, and Agriculture and Fisheries.
2.8.2 The rise and fall of the SNP

The period 1970 to 1989 also saw the rise and fall of the SNP, within a context in which Scotland’s position in the UK was publicly debated. The SNP was formed in 1934, when the moderate right-wing Scottish Party joined forces with the predominantly left-wing National Party of Scotland, taking the economic crisis of the Depression as evidence of the redundancy of the union in Scotland and promoting the establishment of a Scottish parliament as the solution (Devine, 2012: 325). In the period between formation and the 1960s, the SNP were largely a weak and marginalised party, encompassing dissonant perspectives from left and right wings, ‘gradualists’ and ‘fundamentalists’, with a minority of cultural nationalists, the ‘Gaelic revolutionary wing’, sitting uneasily alongside moderates, a small group of whom, under John MacCormick in 1942, split from the SNP to pursue an agenda of Home Rule in a federal UK (Pittock, 2013: 72-73).

The electoral rise of the SNP is marked by two by-elections in which the party won safe Labour seats: Winnie Ewing’s victory in Hamilton in November 1967 and Margo Macdonald’s winning Govan in November 1973. Although Macdonald held her seat for only a few months before losing it to Labour, the February 1974 general election saw the SNP gain seven new seats to offset this loss. The SNP’s electoral fortunes peaked in the October 1974 general election, where it gained eleven seats.

One significant reason for the ascendance of the SNP during the early 1970s was the success of the party’s 1973 campaign, It’s Scotland’s Oil, following realisation of the scale of North Sea oil reserves (Pittock, 2013: 76). The SNP argued that oil revenues should be retained by Scotland, rather than the UK as a whole, as a solution to Scotland’s severe structural socio-economic problems, thus making Scotland a prosperous nation. The sophistication of this campaign was built upon in propaganda and electioneering techniques newly imported from the US in the lead up to the 1974 elections (Hutchison, 2001: 123). This period also saw the production of a number of publications and journals ‘exploring progressive issues about Scotland’s politics, culture and place in the
world’, which contrasted with what Hassan (2009: 8-9) has termed the historical ‘lack of intellectual activity and thinking within the SNP’.

However, the SNP’s 1974 peak was followed by a period of electoral decline, the failure of the 1979 referendum to lead to Scottish devolution by no means a minor factor. During the years leading to 1979, the SNP suffered from a lack of cohesion as a party encompassing both left- and right-wing supporters and without long-term institutional support, unlike the unions’ support for Labour and business support for the Conservatives. While the SNP campaigned for a ‘yes’ vote in the 1979 referendum on devolution, it was a party beset by disagreements on the subject of independence: as earlier in the century, not all SNP supporters agreed with Scottish independence and some, though not all, argued Home Rule should be pursued (Hutchison, 2001: 124).

The referendum on Scottish devolution took place on 1 March 1979. While the parallel referendum on Welsh devolution resulted in a clear majority of 80% against, the Scottish results were less decisive. A narrow margin of 51.6% of voters were in favour of Scottish devolution. However, the 1978 Scotland Act stipulated that 40% of the electorate had to vote ‘yes’ for the Act to be implemented, a symptom of the issue of devolution having split the Labour Party. As only 32.5% of the electorate as a whole voted in favour of devolution, the 1978 Scotland Act was not implemented (Dewdney, 1997: 8-9).

Later in March 1979, the SNP backed the Conservative’s no confidence motion, which removed the Callaghan government and led not only to the May 1979 general election but also to the advent of Thatcherism. It also led to the repeal of the Scotland Act in June 1979, one Thatcher’s first actions as Prime Minister (Devine, 2012: 600).

The 1979 general election reduced the SNP from eleven to two MPs. The 1980s saw a period of regrouping (as well as internal feuding), with the decision driven by the 79 Group for the SNP to shift towards socialist policies in an attempt to move into Labour’s central belt territory (Devine, 2012: 600; Hutchison, 2001: 145). However, the SNP would retain no more than three seats in Westminster
until the general election of 1997, that brought an end to eighteen years of Tory
governments, when the SNP doubled its MPs to six.

2.8.3 Regional and national policy, the Scottish Development Agency and the
Scottish Arts Council

Tensions between Scotland’s status as both a distinct nation and a region of the
UK were reflected during the period 1970 to 1989 in the use of agencies or
quangos\(^\text{23}\) to administer elements of regional policy. The seventies and eighties
saw the rise of regional economic development in Scotland with the
establishment of the SDA. In the arts, while ACGB’s remit included Britain as a
whole, Scotland was also subject to the additional administrative layer of the
SAC.

In the period between the 1930s and 1970s, economic development provided the
main focus of regional policy concerning Scotland, as Scotland’s economic
growth lagged behind that of the UK more broadly (Devine, 2012: 272, 557 and
570). However, a driving factor of the development of regional policy was also to
bolster the political position of either Labour or the Conservatives in Scotland
and, consequently, nationally in the UK - either from the threat each posed to
the other or posed to both by the SNP. The establishment of the SDA in 1975 had
a similar dual purpose. With the aim to address the economic development of
Scotland at a time of severe economic decline, the SDA was a Labour manifesto
promise in the October 1974 general election. However, Keating (1988: 47) has
argued that a driving factor was political pressure on the Labour Party from the
advance of the SNP.

The SDA absorbed a number of pre-existing bodies on its establishment,
undergoing a series of phases of development before being merged with the
Scottish Training Agency in 1991 to form Scottish Enterprise. While in name it
was designated an agency for Scotland, it was effectively responsible for
economic development outwith the area covered by the Highlands and Islands
Development Board (HIDB), which had been established in 1965 aiming to
reverse depopulation and economic decline (Lloyd, 1987: 105). During its sixteen

\(^{23}\) Quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations.
year existence, the SDA led a number of sectoral and area-based projects, its largest area project being GEAR, the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal project which ran from 1976 to 1987.

While in practice the SDA was subject to occasional intervention by the Scottish Office (for example, the Secretary of State for Scotland directed the SDA to take control of the GEAR project (Boyle, 1989a: 71), which also involved GDC) as a quango the agency was intended to operate without direct government control (Keating and Midwinter, 1983: 29). By the late 1980s there had been a considerable shift in the SDA’s economic strategy in the years since 1975, which despite the SDA’s official detachment from central government revealed an alignment with its current urban policy (Lloyd, 1987: 107).

The relationship of the SAC to both Scotland and central government provides a contrast to that of the SDA. The SAC was first established in 1942 as the Scottish Committee of CEMA, becoming in 1947 the Scottish Committee of ACGB, finally being renamed ‘Scottish Arts Council’ in 1967. The SAC remained a committee of ACGB until 1994, when ACGB was divided into the three individual Arts Councils for England, Scotland and Wales. By 1994, although still a sub-committee of ACGB, the SAC was effectively operating as an independent agency (Gray, 2000: 65).

During the 1940s, ACGB agreed firstly that the SAC should have territorial autonomy over the arts in Scotland, based on the argument that Scotland is a nation ‘with its own sense of national consciousness and cultural heritage’, and secondly, to a funding formula with a fixed share of ACGB’s grant-in-aid allocated to the SAC (Galloway and Jones, 2010: 29). Galloway and Jones (2010: 27) have argued that ‘the specific national dimension of the arm’s length relationship allowed the organisation complete autonomy over arts policy in Scotland’, with the effect of the SAC being at ‘double arm’s length’ from government. Whilst the Scottish Education Department, housed within the Scottish Office, had an interest in the SAC’s work, the Scottish Office had no formal power over SAC’s activities and played a largely ‘benign role’ (2010: 32). However, the relationship between the SAC and ACGB was not without its
tensions, primarily over matters concerning funding and policy (Galloway and Jones, 2010: 32-33; Harvie, 2016: 190).

Both the SDA and SAC were non-departmental public bodies at arms-length from government. Unlike the SAC, the SDA was not a committee of a broader Britain-wide agency, but established solely for Scotland, a time before comparable agencies were established in England and Wales. The SAC, however, not only in its ‘double arm’s length’ position, but also in its focus on the arts - a considerably more marginal aspect of central government activity than economic development - in a state which had no official cultural policy, can be viewed as the agency with greater autonomy from government.

2.9 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed Glasgow’s contexts as a Labour-dominated city during the 1970s and 1980s; as an industrial city and a city that by 1970 faced socio-economic decline; as a cultural city; and as a European, British and Scottish city.

Glasgow was one of a number of Labour-led cities in the UK during the three Thatcher governments of the 1980s. However, despite the election of GDC’s first female leader, the city’s councillors largely remained a more traditional figure than their new urban left counterparts in other cities.

By 1970 Glasgow faced a broad range of socio-economic problems, such as deindustrialisation, depopulation, deprivation and an unshakeable reputation for gang violence and sectarianism. It was no longer ‘Second City of the Empire’ or the ‘Workshop of the World’. The prosperity generated in the city at its Victorian peak had by no means been equitably shared. Some of the more entrenched problems the city faced in 1970, such as housing, stretched back to the Victorian era and earlier, exacerbated in the intervening decades by such factors as major global change and the consequences of central and local government policy decisions, such as the promotion of New Towns and comprehensive redevelopment.
Glasgow’s industrial history, however, provided a cultural legacy for the city. The bequests of industrialists such as Archibald McLellan and William Burrell provided the city with art collections which were of national and international significance. Glasgow Corporation, and its partnerships with the city’s business sector, occupied an important position in the development of Glasgow’s museums and galleries, halls and theatres, parks and libraries from the Victorian era, civic pride being a driving factor. However, Glasgow’s cultural infrastructure by 1970 was also constructed in no small part by the individual agency of key actors, many of whom worked unconnected to the Corporation or business community.

Glasgow’s status as a European, British and Scottish city was also pertinent to the development of cultural policy in the city between 1970 and 1989. The UK being one of the twelve EC member states in 1985 when the ECOC programme was initiated, having joined only twelve years earlier, certainly in hindsight had major implications for the development of cultural policy in Glasgow. As a British city, Glasgow was situated in a country which, unlike comparable European countries such as France, was without a centrally-directed cultural policy. As a Scottish city, Glasgow was subject not to the ACGB but to the SAC, a quango at ‘double-arm’s length’ from government.

Politically, the City of Glasgow occupied a rather dissonant position: the party leading Glasgow at local government level rarely aligned with that in central government during the 1970s and 1980s. For three quarters of this period, the Conservatives were in government at a time when the party was in decline, not only in Glasgow but in Scotland more broadly. This was also an era which saw the rise and fall of the SNP in Scotland, followed by the dramatic reshaping not only of Scotland but the UK more broadly during the Thatcher era. The outcome of the 1979 referendum on devolution meant that the 1980s was not to be the decade in which a Scottish parliament would be established.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Glasgow was a city facing severe socio-economic problems, within a political context predicted on tensions between central and local government, and within a period of significant global change.
CHAPTER 3  CULTURE, REGENERATION AND THE POST-INDUSTRIAL CITY

3.1 Introduction

In setting out Glasgow’s contexts as a Labour-led, industrial city; a city facing decline yet with an established cultural infrastructure; and a European, British and Scottish city, Chapter 2 established a broad historical framework for the thesis.

This chapter will extend this conceptual framework to encompass the dominant theoretical and ideological developments and established narratives framing the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow during the period 1970 to 1989.

Firstly, this chapter will examine the advent of the ‘post-industrial city’; a discussion of the theoretical social forecasting of Touraine and Bell during the 1970s will be followed by a consideration of media narratives of the post-industrial city in Britain, with particular reference to Glasgow. It will then discuss the emergence of neoliberalism and its relationship to culture and the post-industrial city during the 1970s and 1980s. Following a discussion of the rise of public relations in central and local government during the period 1970 to 1989, this chapter will then outline the development of the concept of the cultural industries in Britain by 1989. Finally, this chapter will discuss ‘culture-led regeneration’ as an orthodoxy, examining the established narratives surrounding Glasgow, the ECOC and culture-led regeneration, and the idea of cities as models of culture-led regeneration, concluding with an overview of current debates on the topic.

3.2 The post-industrial city

This section will discuss Glasgow’s context as a post-industrial city. With particular reference to the work of Alain Touraine and Daniel Bell during the late 1960s and early 1970s, this section will discuss concepts of the post-industrial society as a form of social forecasting. It will then consider media narratives of
the post-industrial city regarding British provincial cities during the 1980s and 1990s, with particular reference to Glasgow.

‘The post-industrial city’ - like the overlapping concepts of ‘the post-Fordist city’ and ‘the post-modern city’ - is more difficult to define than the era or movement it nominally follows. This is because it is a term defined primarily by its difference to that which preceded it, rather than by that which it actually constitutes.

Douglas V Shaw noted in 2001 that while ‘the post-industrial city is an emerging set of urban forms and functions that appears to be sufficiently different from the industrial city of the past two centuries to warrant a separate definition’, the use of the ‘post-industrial’ term,

represents both a sense on the part of observers that we have crossed a significant development boundary, and that the precise nature of the terrain on the other side is still largely unknown. (Shaw, 2001: 284)

The ‘post-industrial city’ is not coterminous with the city undergoing a process of ‘deindustrialisation’, as discussed in the context of Glasgow in Chapter 2. It is part of the ‘post-industrial society’ and therefore sociologically broader in scope: rather than describing a process already underway or in the past, it looks predominantly to the future.

An early proponent of the term post-industrial society was French sociologist Alain Touraine, notably his 1969 work, La Société Post-industrielle.\(^{24}\) The concept was subsequently developed by American sociologist, Daniel Bell, in his 1973 work, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting.

Bell (1973: 9) described his idea of the post-industrial society, the premise of his book, as ‘a social forecast about a change in the social framework of Western society’, social frameworks being ‘not “reflections” of social reality but conceptual schemata’. Arguing that ‘analytically, society can be divided into three parts: the social structure, the polity and the culture’ (1973: 12), Bell

\(^{24}\) This work was translated into English in 1971.
stated his concept of the post-industrial society ‘deals primarily with changes in the social structure, the way in which the economy is being transformed and the occupational system reworked, and with the new relations between theory and empiricism, particularly science and technology’ (Bell, 1973: 13, original emphasis).

In contrast, in Touraine’s analysis (1971), the social and cultural were not separated but enmeshed and framed in Marxist terms of alienation, class struggle, conflict, power and social crisis. Written in the wake of the 1968 May Movement, with a particular focus on France and its youth, and declaring that ‘a new kind of society is being born’ (Touraine, 1971: 27), Touraine’s work veered between the present and the future. Indeed, Kivisto (1980: 31) has noted that in Touraine’s work ‘the boundaries between present and future are not always clear’.

While Touraine’s work was nominally titled The Post-Industrial Society, the terms ‘technocratic society’ - in which Touraine identified a ‘new ruling class’ of ‘technocrats’ as the dominant power (1971: 47-49) - and ‘programmed society’ - according to ‘the nature of their production methods and economic organization’ (1971: 3) - were used more frequently by the author to describe the new type of society under discussion.

Bell (1973: 9) identified the move from industrial to post-industrial society as being as significant as previous ‘major changes in social frameworks’, such as ‘the change from a rural to an urban society, from an agrarian to an industrial economy’, highlighting that ‘because such frameworks are structural, invariably they are cresive and difficult to reverse’.

Recognising that the ‘the concept of the post-industrial society is a large generalization’, Bell divided it into five components:
1. Economic sector: the change from a goods-producing to a service economy;
2. Occupational distribution: the pre-eminence of the professional and technical class;
3. Axial principle: the centrality of theoretical knowledge as the source of innovation and of policy formulation for the society;
4. Future orientation: the control of technology and technological assessment;
5. Decision-making: the creation of a new ‘intellectual technology.’

(Bell, 1973: 14)

Here, Bell engaged in theoretical forecasting (which, he argued, differed from the prediction of events) (Bell, 1973: 3), in which he described the future trajectory of Western society from the industrial society - defined as ‘the coordination of machines and men for the production of goods’ - to the post-industrial society, which would be ‘organized around knowledge, for the purpose of social control and the directing of innovation and change; and this in turn given rise to new social relationships and new structures which have to be managed politically’ (Bell, 1973: 20).

While Touraine was the first to formally identify the post-industrial city, it can be argued that Bell’s concept of post-industrial society was of greater influence in the US and UK in the following decades.

As a form of social forecasting, such attempts to define the post-industrial society or city have not passed without criticism. Kristoffer Chelsom Vogt (2016: 367) commented in 2016 that whilst theories of post-industrial society have been met with ‘sustained scholarly criticism’ since their initial formulations ‘for presenting a seriously misleading understanding of social change’, they ‘continue to be of influence’.

One particular arena of influence pertinent to the topic of this thesis is the UK national media in which narratives of the post-industrial city have been constructed and perpetuated. Glasgow’s status as a post-industrial city, its deindustrialisation and so-called ‘urban renaissance’, has generated a great deal of national media coverage in the decades since the 1980s, notably in relation to ECOC 1990 (Reason and Garcia, 2007). Tim Hall (2008: 152) has noted a shift in media narratives of British provincial post-industrial cities, from such cities
being ‘defined through discourses of decline, redundancy and militancy’ during the early 1980s, to reports that they ‘were changing in ways that appeared to challenge their prescribed identities’ during the late 1980s, to a ‘more critical take on urban regeneration’ during the mid-1990s.

Hall has emphasised the binary nature of media narratives of the British provincial post-industrial city, in which Glasgow was no exception. Following a ‘basic motif of conflict’, a dual city narrative has developed which reduces the complex geographies of the post-industrial city to ‘an assumption about the city as being sharply divided’. Where resident populations feature in such journalism, it is to reinforce these binary narratives:

They are present in the articles in order to highlight problems with, or the failures of, urban regeneration, to act as signifiers of that failure, and for no other purpose. Consequently they are only represented as poor, dependent, excluded or victims. Such constructions provide a striking opposition to the ‘glamorous’ new developments. Here the populations of the inner city are homogenised, presented only as exemplars of exclusion. (Hall, 2008: 152-154)

In Glasgow’s case, this description touches upon two concepts that will be discussed elsewhere in this chapter: firstly, the ‘dual city’ concept, which will be discussed in relation to neoliberalism in section 3.3; and secondly, in relation to the aforementioned ‘glamorous new developments’, the concept of ‘culture-led regeneration’, which will be discussed in section 3.6.

To conclude, in academic terms the ‘post-industrial’ label is problematic. Although Daniel Bell described the concept of the post-industrial society with distinct clarity, as a venture in social forecasting this was describing a future which was yet to take place. In the intervening years since Touraine and Bell’s initial works, attempts to define both the post-industrial society and post-industrial city have been met with ‘sustained scholarly criticism’. However, distinct narratives of the post-industrial city have been constructed and perpetuated in the UK’s national media in relation to British provincial cities, with Glasgow, not least in relation to ECOC 1990, being a prominent example.
3.3 Neoliberalism, culture and the post-industrial city

This section will provide a brief overview of neoliberalism and its relationship to culture and the post-industrial city during the 1970s and 1980s, as significant aspects of the broader political, historical and socio-economic context surrounding the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow during these two decades.

Following a discussion of definitions and perspectives of neoliberalism, this section will examine the rise of city marketing during the 1980s. Finally, this section will discuss the ‘dual city’ concept and debates surrounding neoliberal ideology and ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ with particular reference to Glasgow during the 1980s and into the 1990s.

3.3.1 Defining neoliberalism

Although some commentators have identified neoliberalism as having emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s - Harvey (2005: 1) pinpointing its origins to the period 1978 to 1980 - what neoliberalism constitutes continues to be contested well into the twenty-first century. This is due in no small part to its considerable overlap with a number of other related concepts, such as Thatcherism, market liberalism and economic rationalism (Berry, 2014: 2). In addition, while commentators such as Harvey consider neoliberalism to be a political economy or ideology, others consider it a process (Brenner and Theodore, 2005: 102; Miles, 2012: 217). Significantly, neoliberalism has been characterised as being articulated through ‘contextually specific strategies’. Brenner and Theodore have argued:

25 Harvey (2005: 1) stated: ‘future historians may well look upon the years 1978-80 as a revolutionary turning-point in the world’s social and economic history’ citing as epicentres of ‘revolutionary impulses’ the four key events of Deng Xiaoping making, in 1978 the first steps towards liberalisation of communist-ruled China; Paul Volcker taking command of the US Federal Reserve in July 1979 and ‘within a few months dramatically changed monetary policy’; the 1979 election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister; and the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan as President.

26 Brenner and Theodore (2005: 102) have argued: ‘Neoliberalism is not a fixed end-state or condition; rather, it represents a process of market-driven social and spatial transformation’. 
Neoliberalism does not exist in a single, ‘pure’ form, but is always articulated through historically and geographically specific strategies of institutional transformation and ideological rearticulation. (Brenner and Theodore, 2005: 102, original emphasis)

Despite these disparities, commentators such as Harvey (2005: 2), Brenner and Theodore (2002a: 350) and Berry (2014: 2) have all cited a belief in open, competitive and deregulated free markets as the foremost defining characteristic of neoliberalism. This is accompanied by a significant shift in the institutional role of the state, whereby the role of the public sector is comparatively reduced or weakened - Berry (2014: 2) goes as far as describing this as a ‘belief in the unnecessary and malign impact of government interventions in the economy’ - while the roles of the private sector and entrepreneurial individuals are bolstered by such measures as the privatisation of public services and spaces.

Thirty to forty years after the emergence of neoliberalism in the western world and notably following the 2008 economic crisis, a dominant perspective in current academic literature on neoliberalism, particularly that emanating from a Marxist perspective, is of neoliberalism as a failed ideology, dangerously all-pervasive and needing to be replaced by alternatives (Harvey, 2005; Apeldoorn and Overbeek, 2012; Berry, 2014). At city level, the ‘neoliberal city’ is now, according to Steven Miles (2012: 216), ‘increasingly defined by elites through and by consumption’ and hence ‘by disparities of wealth’ and related social divisions.

However, neoliberalism itself emerged during the early 1980s as a means of addressing significant economic problems: a ‘strategic political response to the sustained global recession of the preceding decade’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002a: 350). In the UK, the neoliberal tendencies of privatisation and deregulation, competition, public-private partnership and the commodification of culture and cities were absorbed to varying degrees in central and/or local government policies and strategies over the course of the 1980s as solutions to

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27 Brenner and Theodore, for example, have stated: ‘The linchpin of neoliberal ideology is the belief that open, competitive, and unregulated markets, liberated from all forms of state interference, represent the optimal mechanism for economic development’ (2002a: 350).
the socio-economic problems arising as industrial cities became post-industrial cities.

3.3.2 Commodification and the rise of city marketing

A significant aspect of the relationship between neoliberalism, culture and the post-industrial city is the neoliberal tendency of commodification: the idea that anything, even entire cities and their ‘culture’, can become a commodity to be marketed, sold and consumed. The rise of city marketing - marketing entire cities, rather than their constituent parts, as ‘products’ - during the 1980s is an example of neoliberalism in action. Mark Goodwin (1993: 145) has argued that ‘the selling of cities is as old as commodification itself’; far from beginning during the 1980s its origins were some centuries earlier. However, several factors combined during the 1980s to make city marketing a characteristically neoliberal development.

During the 1980s and into the 1990s, city marketing in the US and UK became both professionalised and competitive, with ‘place marketing’ becoming an industry in its own right (Holcomb, 1993: 133). Sadler (1993: 175) has noted that, at a time of intensified global restructuring, place-marketing grew increasingly significant within what became a competitive and burgeoning ‘place-market’, in which cities began to compete with each other for investment and jobs. The rise of place-marketing during the 1980s and 1990s is thus inherently connected to repositioning the city and restructuring its economy at a time of global change.

Holcomb has defined the aim of place marketing during this period thus:

The primary goal of the place marketer is to construct a new image of the place to replace either vague or negative images previously held by current or potential residents, investors and visitors. (Holcomb, 1993: 133)

However, this goal proved inherently problematic in marketing the post-industrial city. As Paddison has stated,
cities are unlike the products which advertising and marketing seek to promote within the commercial market-place, precisely because they are not new: recasting a post-industrial image for a city such as Glasgow needs to come to terms with its previous existence as an industrial city. (Paddison, 1993: 348)

This highlights the potential social divisiveness inherent in marketing the post-industrial city during this era.

3.3.3 The dual city, neoliberal ideology and ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ in Glasgow

The ‘dual city’ concept became popular in academic circles towards the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s as a means of describing emerging socio-spatial divisions in cities in the western world, initially in North America (Keating, 1989; Marcuse, 1989; Pacione, 1990; Van Kempen, 1994).

The dual city was characterised by a polarisation between the rich and the poor, with inhabitants increasingly socially segregated and spatially disconnected along these lines. It was applied in particular to the post-industrial city as it underwent a process of economic restructuring (Van Kempen, 1994: 997-998).

Michael Keating (1989) was one of the first academic commentators to identify Glasgow as a dual city by the late 1980s. Examining the publicity surrounding the ‘transformation’ of Glasgow during the 1980s, which portrayed its economy as ‘restructuring, undergoing a successful transition to the post-industrial era with a healthy service-based economy to match an improved environment’, Keating concluded that such interpretations were ‘selective and misleading’: on the contrary, Glasgow’s economy was stagnating (1989: 515). Keating identified that a conflict between growth and distribution was emerging in urban policy in Glasgow: the ‘remarkable improvement in conditions in central Glasgow’ contrasted with the ‘highly damaging’ spatial impact of government policies in the peripheral estates, with ‘no linking mechanism, beyond a vague filtration theory,’ to redistribute the state-subsidised benefits of the former to the latter (1989: 515 and 531). Keating observed:
Glasgow emerges as a dual city, with subsidization of downtown business and amenities but widespread deprivation, especially on the periphery. (Keating, 1989: 513)

As discussed in section 3.2 in the context of the post-industrial city, ideas of Glasgow as a dual city also developed in media narratives during the late 1980s and early 1990s, with considerable overlap between the two concepts. Mooney and Danson (1997) found accounts of Glasgow as a polarised dual city to be widespread in local and national newspapers and television by the late 1980s. This study found Glasgow’s peripheral estates to be widely portrayed as ‘uniformly depressed and welfare-dependent’, with media accounts dominated by ‘ideas of dependency, exclusion, marginalisation, hopelessness and despair’ (Mooney and Danson, 1997: 81). These ideas were reinforced in the early 1990s by media publicity of a Glasgow gangland murder trial, and provided a stark contrast to the ‘new Glasgow’ represented by Merchant City, a recently-developed renewal area in the city centre (Mooney and Danson, 1997: 77).

Such accounts reveal the dual city concept to be less than nuanced. Common criticisms of the dual city concept to emerge during this period were that, like the post-industrial city concept, it was vague, ambiguous and lacked clear definition; that it assumed a deep social divide between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, which ignored the vast majority of the population in the middle; and that it focused on results but not causes (Marcuse, 1989: 698; Van Kempen, 1994: 997 and 1011).

However, rather than being the sole preserve of Glasgow or the post-industrial city in the UK, the dual city concept was a global phenomenon. Marcuse observed in 1989:

The one advantage of the dual city metaphor is that it points to a real phenomenon. Polarization is indeed increasing in almost all western private market societies, in most of the third world, and perhaps in some socialist societies as well. (Marcuse, 1989: 698)

By the early 2000s, the dual city concept became connected by commentators such as Brenner and Theodore (2002a, 2005) - and subsequently in the case of
Glasgow, Boyle, McWilliams and Rice (2008) - to ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ in academic debates on neoliberalism and the city.

Brenner and Theodore highlighted the ‘blatant disjuncture’ between neoliberalism as an ideology and ‘actually existing neoliberalism’:

whereas neoliberal ideology implies that self-regulating markets will generate an optimal allocation of investments and resources, neoliberal political practice has generated pervasive market failures, new forms of social polarization, and a dramatic intensification of uneven development at all spatial scales. (Brenner and Theodore, 2002a: 352)

In examining neoliberalism as a process rather than ideology, they argued that a ‘marked urbanization’ of neoliberalism had occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, with cities acting as laboratories for such neoliberal policy experiments as:

Place-marketing, enterprise and empowerment zones, local tax abatements, urban development corporations, public-private partnerships, and new forms of local boosterism to workfare policies, property-redevelopment schemes, business-incubator projects, new strategies of social control, policing, and surveillance.... (Brenner and Theodore, 2002a: 368)

In their examination of ‘the spatialities of actually existing neoliberalism in Glasgow’ since 1977, Boyle, McWilliams and Rice argued in 2008 that Glasgow was ‘an early pioneer of proto-neoliberalism in the British context’ (2008: 314). However, they noted that during the 1980s,

Glasgow City Council had more of an orientation towards neoliberalism than a coherent neoliberal agenda as such. Exposed to Thatcher’s implementation of full-fledged roll-back neoliberal reform at the national level, and constrained by the rules of ultra vires, the local council had only limited options available to it to counter deindustrialization. (Boyle, McWilliams and Rice, 2008: 316)

As will be discussed in later chapters, whilst Glasgow arguably became one of the first cities in the UK during the 1980s to experiment with what have since been termed ‘neoliberal doctrines’, GDC proceeding without a formal commitment to neoliberal ideology, its approach both restricted and enabled by
a broader context in which ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ was becoming embedded within increasingly spatially-polarised cities, nationally and globally.

In conclusion, this section has discussed definitions and perspectives of neoliberalism as an emerging concept during the late 1970s and 1980s. It has also discussed the rise of city marketing - and the problems of marketing the post-industrial city - and the dual city concept within this context. It has shown that by the end of the 1980s, within a broader context of increasing polarisation in the western world, Glasgow was regarded by commentators such as Keating as a dual city, and that by the early 2000s, Glasgow during the 1980s was viewed retrospectively by commentators such as Boyle, McWilliams and Rice as a site of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’.

3.4 The rise of public relations

This section will discuss the rise of public relations (PR) in central and local government during the period 1970 to 1989. Following a brief outline of critical debates on the roles of PR in the mass media and government, this section will discuss the growth and professionalisation of PR in central and local government during this period, with specific reference to the use of PR specialists and to the reaction of the Thatcher governments to the use of PR techniques by Labour-led municipal authorities to launch attacks on government policies.

Public relations has been defined by L’Etang as:

the practice of presenting the public face of an organisation [...] or individual, the articulation of its aims and objectives, and the official organisational view on issues of relevance to it. (L’Etang, 2009: 2)

It entails, L’Etang has argued, ‘meaning management’ and relies on a symbiotic relationship with the media (2009: 3).

The period 1970 to 1989 saw an expansion and increased professionalisation of PR as an industry in the UK, accompanied by a burgeoning of media outlets, notably in radio and television (Franklin, 1994: 5). It was a period in which the use of PR became increasingly prevalent in both central and local government. It
was also a period in which the relationship between government and the mass media and its hegemonic effects were subject to Marxist academic scrutiny on both sides of the Atlantic.

During the 1970s, as Director of the recently-established Centre for Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham, Stuart Hall led research in the new academic discipline of media studies in the direction of political communications. This was prompted by a perceived ‘crisis in the media’, which emerged from the late 1960s, and focused on the ideological role played by media in society, including questions of ‘credibility, access, bias and distortion in the way political and social events of a problematic nature were represented in the media’ and regarding the relationship between broadcasting, politics and the state (Hall, 1980: 119).

In America by the late 1980s, Herman and Chomsky (1988) identified what they termed a ‘propaganda model’: a systematic and structural means by which a dominant elite, comprising both the government and private interests, manipulate the mass media to communicate their messages to the general populace, thereby perpetuating inequality, marginalising dissent and ‘manufacturing consent’, not least in the electorate. Herman and Chomsky argued that the propaganda model operated despite a media that appeared not to be censored and that, conversely,

actively compete, periodically attack and expose corporate and governmental malfeasance, and aggressively portray themselves as spokesmen for free speech and the general community interests. (Herman and Chomsky, 1988: 1)

The attempts of governments to manage the media was not a new development in the 1970s, either in the US or UK. Commentators such as Davis (2003: 32) have remarked upon the well-established tendency for governments to use public relations as a means of managing the public during times of difficult social transition.

However, the considerable expansion of PR activity in central and local government in the UK during late 1970s and 1980s - undoubtedly a period of
difficult social transition – culminated in a paradigmatic shift towards the end of this period. Corner and Schlesinger (1993: 339, original emphasis) commented in the early 1990s on the ‘rapidly changing character of public communication’, in which the scope of PR management in the ‘source-media-public relationship’ was particularly significant – notably the move from a ‘reactive’ to ‘an aggressively proactive’ model ‘in which the media are identified as providing key opportunities for publicity within a broader campaign of public persuasion’. In her 2007 study of the evolution of political campaign communications, Norris (2007) identified a shift from modern to postmodern campaigning having taken place in the late 1980s, in which government moved to ‘permanent campaign’ mode and professional communications consultants became co-equal actors with politicians.

The Thatcher era - and the immediate period leading to it - was significant in this respect in the growing influence of PR specialists, both in election campaigns and the day to day business of government. The roles of three of these experts: Gordon Reece, advertising agency Saatchi and Saatchi, and Bernard Ingham, will now be discussed.

From 1975 to 1979, ex-television producer, Gordon Reece, acted as an advisor to Margaret Thatcher on her image, with the goal of her becoming firstly Leader of the Conservatives, then Prime Minister. Reece’s influence extended to improving Thatcher’s performance on television and radio by such techniques as lowering the tone of her voice and changing her hairstyle to soften her image; drawing up an ‘enemies list’ of hostile interviewers to be avoided; and arranging for Thatcher to appear on such popular television and radio programmes as Aspel and The Jimmy Young Show, rather than established political programmes such as Today on Radio 4, in order to broaden her appeal to target voters (Cockerell, Hennessy and Walker, 1984: 191-193; Franklin, 1994: 6 and 148-150). In 1978, leadership of the Conservatives having been secured, Thatcher appointed Reece as the party’s Director of Communications. Reece in turn brought in Saatchi and Saatchi to run the party’s 1979 election campaign (Cockerell, Hennessy and Walker, 1984: 193).
The Tories’ 1979 election campaign marked a turning point in the use of political marketing in electioneering in the UK. Launched in 1978, months before a general election was called, Saatchi and Saatchi’s ‘Labour Isn’t Working’ posters, which showed a dole queue snaking into the distance, were a memorable example of the ‘attack campaign’ (Bruce, 1992: 100). The poster drew forceful complaints from the Labour Party that the queue had been posed by actors (and Conservative Party members) and was therefore fraudulent, which succeeded only in generating free publicity for the campaign and its underlying message (Scammel and Langer, 2006: 73).

Bernard Ingham was appointed by Thatcher to the initially minor role of Press Secretary, which grew in prominence over the course of the 1980s, with Ingham becoming Head of the Central Office of Information in 1988. Though a civil servant and therefore, in theory, politically neutral, Ingham nonetheless presented the messages of Thatcher and Thatcherism through daily briefings to a ‘relatively pliant Lobby drawn from a mostly one-party press’ (Morgan, 1991: 257-258), navigating ‘problems of presentation’ that arose during this era, such as unemployment or the government’s privatisation policies (Cockerell, Hennessy and Walker, 1984: 71-74). The extent of Ingham’s influence over policy-making as well as policy presentation has been debated, some arguing that Ingham was ‘the sewer rather than the sewage’, others, such as Morgan (1991: 257), arguing that Ingham may have had ‘an extraordinary capacity to help mould policy as well as determine its presentation’.

The growth of the PR function in central government over the course of the 1980s was matched by that in local government. Franklin commented that by 1994, following rapid expansion in the mid-1980s, 90 per cent of metropolitan authorities had established PR departments, typically staffed by ex-journalists with extensive knowledge of the local and national political and media scene (Franklin, 1994: 7).

Glasgow Corporation was one of a small proportion of local authorities to have established a PR function some decades prior to this boom. At the start of the period 1970 to 1989, Harry Dutch led public relations activity in Glasgow Corporation, moving to a Head of Public Relations role at the new SRC; Harry
Diamond, an ex-journalist who acted as Harry Dutch’s assistant in the Corporation, became Head of Public Relations in the new GDC, building an expanding PR empire within the new authority over the course of the late 1970s and 1980s (Diamond, 1996: 66-67).

Local government officials had been instrumental in the professionalisation of PR in the decades preceding the 1980s, for example, acting as the driving force in the establishment of the Institute of Public Relations in 1948 (L’Etang, 2009: 62). The National Association for Local Government Officers argued in the mid-1940s that a better appreciation of local government services would lead to greater involvement of local people in their community (Franklin, 1994: 113). PR therefore was connected by local authorities in the decades preceding the 1980s to ideas of enriching local democracy.

However, during the 1980s, the use of PR by local authorities - particularly Labour-led metropolitan councils - attracted new central government scrutiny. The Widdicombe Committee was established in 1985 to inquire into ‘the conduct of local authority business’ following what were regarded by the government as increasing abuses of political power in Labour-controlled councils (Leach, 1989: 101). The Widdicombe Committee’s focus on public relations activity was prompted by Ken Livingstone’s use of the Greater London Council’s PR department to launch attacks on the Conservative government’s policies - not least a campaign opposing the abolition of the GLC, which was successful in realigning public opinion in the GLC’s favour if not preventing abolition itself - in the years before the council’s eventual demise. The scope of the Widdicombe inquiry also extended to so-called ‘propaganda on the rates’: municipal newspapers containing content critical of central government policies, created by such Labour-led authorities as Merseyside County Council and distributed to local residents (Franklin, 1994: 118-119).

In conclusion, the 1980s saw a rapid expansion and professionalisation of PR in central and local government. It was an era in which the potential power of PR activity to influence the general public - notably the electorate - was recognised by both the Thatcher governments and Labour-led municipal authorities, the former resorting to establishing an inquiry in part to attempt to curb the PR
activity of the latter and thus marginalise dissenting voices. It was also an era that saw an increasing reliance on specialist PR advisors to ‘sell politics like soap powder’, both in the form of external agencies such as Saatchi and Saatchi on election campaigns from 1978 onwards and communications staff such as Gordon Reece and Bernard Ingham, who managed the media in the day to day business of government in a context in which the line between policy presentation and policy-making became increasingly blurred.

3.5 The cultural industries

This section will discuss the concept of ‘the cultural industries’ during the 1970s and 1980s and its theoretical predecessor, ‘the culture industry’. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the cultural industries as a framework for the production and consumption of culture gained traction within some areas of the UK over the course of the 1980s, notably in some post-industrial cities as a means of countering the economic decline brought by deindustrialisation. However, the cultural industries concept was also a developing phenomenon in the broader western world during this period. The idea of the cultural industries developed in the UK, as in some other western countries, in a context in which established distinctions between the value of ‘high’ and ‘popular’ culture were slowly shifting. It became inherently connected to social and economic change.

During the 1980s - as now, in its current incarnation of ‘the creative industries’ - the cultural industries was a contested term (Hesmondhalgh, 2013: 22). As UNESCO noted in 1982, there was ‘still some doubt as to the type of activities it is supposed to cover’ (UNESCO, 1982: 21). However, despite this lack of clarity, the cultural industries concept was adopted in some quarters during this period with enthusiasm and optimism, notably for its economic development potential, whilst being met with concern in relation to its implications for the future of ‘culture’ in others.

The term ‘the culture industry’ originated in Adorno and Horkheimer’s 1944 publication *Dialectic of the Enlightenment* (Mattelart and Piemme, 1982: 51-52; O’Connor, 2010: 11; Hesmondhalgh, 2013: 23). It was not framed in optimistic
terms as a welcome means of improving a city’s economy; for Adorno and Horkheimer, the culture industry was no less than a form of ‘mass deception’.

In *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944), the culture industry was described as an all-encompassing system through which the entirety of an individual’s needs were both fabricated and met, and in which everyone was complicit as a consumer, despite being able to see through it. Film and radio, cartoons and music (with jazz a focus of particularly strong criticism), language, advertising and magazines were all brought under the ‘single false denominator’ of the totality of the culture industry, which in presenting the world through a filter, ‘endlessly cheats consumers out of what it endlessly promises’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944: 108 and 111). The culture industry was a system in which entertainment was ‘the prolongation of work under late capitalism’. Entertainment and amusement moved ‘strictly along the well-worn grooves of association’, and through signals mechanically prescribed the spectator’s reactions, requiring of the spectator ‘no thoughts of his own’. It was sought out by the off-duty worker as a means of temporarily escaping the mechanised labour process, ‘so that they can cope with it again’, but at the same time, they can experience ‘nothing but after-images of the work process itself’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944: 109).

Adorno and Horkheimer’s work on the culture industry was produced at what was a juncture of two significant historical events. Firstly, it was written in exile from Nazi Germany, the two members of the Frankfurt School having escaped to California. Secondly, it was written in the wake of ‘the collapse of the classical Marxist evolutionary schema for historical development,’ as JM Bernstein (1991: 3) described it, which for Adorno, meant, ‘the Marxist belief that capitalist forces of production when unfettered from capitalist relations of production will generate a free society is illusory’.

Peppered with references to Nazi Germany, Hitler and Goebbels, Adorno and Horkheimer’s work drew parallels between the oppressive regimes of the fascism they had only recently escaped and of the culture industry they identified as existing within liberal industrial societies, particularly America. The culture industry, however, presented a model with which consumers were willingly
coerced into conformity, a ‘freedom to be the same’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944: 136).

Furthermore, Adorno and Horkheimer’s thesis developed during a time of technological change. It followed Walter Benjamin’s Marxist critique, *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*, which was similarly written in exile from Nazi Germany, and in which Benjamin discussed the concept of the ‘aura’ of a unique work of art becoming lost through technical reproduction. Benjamin viewed mechanical reproduction as changing ‘the reaction of the masses toward art’; in such developments as film, ‘the unconventional is uncritically enjoyed, and the truly new is criticized with aversion’ (Benjamin, 1968: 227).

In Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis, however, art at all its levels ‘from Hemingway to Emil Ludwig, from Mrs Miniver to the Lone Ranger, from Toscanini to Guy Lombardo’ was ‘infected with untruth’ through its being absorbed into the culture industry, not least through advertising in which ‘everything is directed at overpowering a consumer conceived as distracted or resistant’. The ‘triumph of advertising’ at the heart of the culture industry, Adorno and Horkheimer argued, was ‘the compulsive imitation by consumers of cultural commodities which, at the same time, they recognise as false’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944: 114, 133 and 136).

Adorno and Horkheimer’s concept of the culture industry has been criticised for overstating its powers of manipulation and its homogeneity (Bernstein, 1991: 21 and 26; O’Connor, 2010: 24-25). Hesmondhalgh (2013: 24) has described how during the 1970s, French sociologists such as Huet, Miège and Morin converted the culture industry term into ‘cultural industries’, as a means of showing its complexity, rather than presenting it as a ‘unified field’.

The cultural industries also attracted the attention of policy makers during this period. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, UNESCO undertook research into *The Place and Role of Cultural Industries in the Cultural Development of Societies* (UNESCO, 1982). This was prompted by a perception that the cultural industries had become increasingly important, and that the new technological
developments and new sectors of activity to have emerged since the Second
World War were ‘decisively setting the future of culture at stake throughout the
world’ (UNESCO, 1982: 9). This research encompassed a diversity of views within
UNESCO member states and experts on whether the cultural industries presented
a threat or an opportunity for such concepts as ‘cultural development’ and
‘cultural democracy’. Concern was voiced about the ‘marginalization of cultural
messages that did not take the form of goods, primarily of value as marketable
commodities, or that could not be used as a more or less sophisticated means of
exerting pressure on public opinion’, (UNESCO, 1982: 10) and that cultural
development could not be ‘reduced to “economic growth accompanied by social

As will be discussed in Chapter 7, during the 1980s some British metropolitan
authorities developed a specific policy focus on the cultural industries, the
premise of which was indeed ‘economic growth accompanied by social change’.
The most prominent example is the cultural industries strategies of the Greater
London Council (GLC) and Greater London Enterprise Board (GLEB), which
although influential in the UK, were not implemented due to the abolition of the
GLC. The GLC’s approach involved shifting policy away from ideas of subsidising
the artist or creator towards a new focus on the distribution of culture to the
audience or consumers. It was also connected to the distinctly separate issue of
regenerating the city economy (O’Connor, 2010: 27-28; Hesmondhalgh, 2013:
167).

The idea of the cultural industries became a vehicle for an emerging policy
concern - within authorities such as the GLC, if not central government - which
focused on commercial production in contemporary culture and dismantling the
dichotomy between ‘high’ and ‘low’ or ‘popular’ culture. This was reflected in
the 1986 publication, Saturday Night or Sunday Morning: From Arts to Industry -
New Forms of Cultural Policy, produced by consultants Comedia, and written by
Geoff Mulgan and Ken Warpole, both of whom worked in the Cultural Industries
Unit of the GLEB, which began:
Who is doing most to shape British culture in the late 1980s? Next Shops, Virgin, W. H. Smith’s, News International, Benetton, Channel 4, Saatchi and Saatchi, the Notting Hill Carnival and Virago, or the Wigmore Hall, Arts Council, National Theatre, Tate Gallery and Royal Opera House? Most people know the answer, and live it every day in the clothes they wear, the newspapers they read, the music they listen to and the television they watch. (Mulgan and Warpole, 1986: 9)

The late 1980s brought debates about the extent to which the cultural industries were different to any other form of industry (Hesmondhalgh, 2013: 9). Padioleau argued, in 1987, that the cultural industries, notably media and communications, were losing their peculiarity and undergoing a ‘normalization’ process in which, according to the management practice of ‘speculative financierism’, they became ‘not only firms just like any other but they have also lost any identity other than that of being a commodity traded in a particular market’ (Padioleau, 1987: 295).

The culture industry/cultural industries concept was also adapted during the late 1980s to form the permutation of the ‘heritage industry’. In his 1987 book, The Heritage Industry, Robert Hewison discussed the relationship between heritage and the economy in less than optimistic terms, bemoaning the growth in museums in the UK during a period of deindustrialisation. Complaining that ‘instead of manufacturing goods, we are manufacturing heritage’, Hewison defined the heritage industry as not only ‘an attempt to dispel this climate of decline by exploiting the economic potential of our culture’, but also as the growth of a ‘new cultural force’ which ‘is expected more and more to replace the real industry upon which the country’s economy depends’ (Hewison, 1987: 9).

In conclusion, during the 1970s and 1980s, the concept of the culture industry became detached from the overtly pessimistic moorings provided by the critical dialectics of Adorno and Horkheimer to become, in its plural form, a developing area of public policy, viewed by authorities such as the GLC not as an all-pervasive structural problem but an opportunity. Although a contested term, lacking in a shared definition of what it did and did not encompass, the cultural industries became viewed during the 1980s as arguably no different to other forms of industry; culture became viewed by some as a commodity, no different
to other commodities being traded; distinctions between ‘high art’ and ‘popular culture’ began to change with the shift from high modernism to postmodernism. The GLC’s enthusiastic adoption of the cultural industries as part of a solution to London’s socio-economic problems contrasted not only with the downright pessimism of Hewison’s idea of the heritage industry, but also with the cautious approach of UNESCO, which was concerned with the international implications for the future of cultural development in an approach premised upon economic growth accompanied by social change.

3.6 Culture-led regeneration

This section will discuss, firstly, the rise of ‘culture-led regeneration’ as an orthodoxy in the years since 1990 and Glasgow’s position within these developing and established narratives. It will then consider specifically, with particular reference to Glasgow and Liverpool, the idea of cities as replicable models of culture-led regeneration. Finally, it will examine current academic debates related to the problems of measuring and evidencing culture-led regeneration.

Whilst little research has been undertaken in the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow in the years preceding 1990, a significant amount has been written about the relationship between Glasgow and culture-led regeneration in the years since ECOC 1990. A mythology has developed about Glasgow’s approach to the ECOC as being one of culture-led regeneration: a fully-formed model which had a socially and economically transformative effect on Glasgow and which can be transferred to and replicated by other cities.

However, as subsequent chapters of this thesis will demonstrate, culture-led regeneration was not a term or concept adopted in Glasgow during the 1980s and Glasgow’s regeneration cannot be described as ‘culture-led’. The term culture-led regeneration gained common currency in the decades following 1990 and has been applied retrospectively to describe Glasgow’s approach to ECOC 1990.
3.6.1 The culture-led regeneration orthodoxy

‘Culture-led regeneration’ is, as Miles and Paddison recognised in 2005, ‘part of the new orthodoxy by which cities seek to enhance their competitive position’ (2005: 833). Garcia (2007: 1) has argued that ‘the phrase “culture-led regeneration” has grown from an interesting alternative to urban development policy into a core strategy in an increasing number of cities and regions worldwide’. Vickery, however, has identified that culture-led regeneration is ‘not a single coherent term, but has multiple meanings and applications’ (Vickery, 2007: 2).

The scope of culture-led regeneration in existing literature is broad. It has been connected, flexibly, to a range of components: cultural quarters, cultural tourism and the cultural industries, which have their roots in the 1980s; the urban cultural economy and creative industries, which are largely post-1997 conceptions.

What is within and beyond the scope of the ‘culture’ of culture-led regeneration is no nearer a widely accepted resolution now than when Raymond Williams recognised in his 1976 Keywords that ‘culture’ was ‘the original difficult word’ (Williams, 1976: 14). This is further complicated by the idea that culture can ‘lead’ urban regeneration having formed a central tenet in ‘creative city’ narratives to develop since the mid-1990s. Within such narratives, ‘culture-led regeneration’ is intrinsically connected to the equally problematic term, ‘creativity’.

Much of the research into the phenomenon of culture-led regeneration dates from the mid-2000s onwards. This reflects not only the growth in cultural policy research more broadly in the twenty-first century, but also that one of the more enthusiastic proponents of culture-led regeneration in the UK has been a prime

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28 As well as the 1995 Comedia/Demos publication, The Creative City by Landry and Bianchini, which will be discussed in this section, the work of Richard Florida, such as The Rise of the Creative Class, first published in 2002, is a prime example of a creative city narrative. Jim McGuigan argued in 2009 that: ‘The work of Richard Florida has proven extremely influential in cultural policy circles in recent years’ (McGuigan, 2009: 291).
object of cultural policy research: the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) during the New Labour era.

Vickery (2007) has argued that the concept of culture-led regeneration gained credibility in national policies and policy frameworks in the UK during the New Labour era, and in particular, the period 1999 to 2004. During this period, as part of its work ‘to increase awareness within other Government departments of the potential contribution of cultural activity to their regeneration programmes’ - undoubtedly in order to draw in increased resources for the new department’s work - the DCMS commissioned a review of evidence of ‘the contribution of culture to regeneration in the UK’, which defined culture-led regeneration as a model in which ‘cultural activity is seen as the catalyst and engine of regeneration’ (Vickery, 2007: 2 and 5). This is also a period which ended with the DCMS publication, Culture at the Heart of Regeneration (2004), an example of the department’s promotion of culture-led regeneration, despite, as Miles and Paddison (2005: 835) have stated, its acknowledgement of the ‘limited evidential basis’ for proving its benefits.

This was also a period which was preceded by a growing instrumentalisation of culture in policy terms in the UK, as public expenditure on the arts and culture became increasingly justified on the basis of its anticipated ability to solve entrenched economic and social problems.

Bianchini and Parkinson’s 1993 publication, Cultural policy and urban regeneration: The Western European experience, recognised the ‘growing importance of cultural policy as a strategy contributing to the regeneration of cities’, following a series of influential conferences on the topic in Glasgow and Liverpool, involving policy-makers from the UK and USA (Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993: foreword).

Later in the 1990s, consultants and think tanks, such as Comedia and Demos, produced influential reports advocating the economic and social benefits of

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Eleanor Belfiore has demonstrated how the DCMS’s first Secretary of State, Chris Smith, became ‘the champion of the socio-economic impacts of the arts’, despite ‘paltry’ evidence to support his claims, and how Smith justified his approach thus: ‘If it helped to get more funds flowing into the arts, the argument was worth deploying’ (Belfiore, 2009: 348-349).
culture. The purpose of Landry (the Director of Comedia) and Bianchini’s 1995 publication, *The Creative City*, published by Demos, was to set out ‘why [creativity] is important for economic success - and how creativity can be mobilised to help solve the myriad problems of the city’ (Landry and Bianchini, 1995: 1). Comedia’s 1996 report, *The Art of Regeneration: Urban Renewal Through Cultural Activity*, by Landry, Greene, Matarasso and Bianchini provided case studies of ‘city examples’ and proposals for the development of ‘culture-driven regeneration’. Matarasso’s 1997 report, *Use or Ornament? The Social Impact of Participation in the Arts*, published by Comedia, was written on the cusp of the New Labour era on the following premise:

The election of a Government committed to tackling problems like youth unemployment, fear of crime and social exclusion is the right moment to start talking about what the arts can do for society, rather than what society can do for the arts. Unfettered by ideology, the new pragmatism can extend its principle of inclusiveness to the arts by embracing their creative approaches to problem-solving. Britain deserves better than the exhausted prejudices of post-war debates over state support for the arts. (Matarasso, 1997: foreword)

These reports followed an earlier form of research-as-advocacy: the 1988 PSI report by John Myerscough *et al.*, *The Economic Importance of the Arts in Britain* (1988a), and its case studies of Glasgow (1988b), Ipswich and Liverpool, which, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, was ground-breaking in UK cultural policy in its articulation of the economic value of the arts in economic terms, notably with regard to the city economy.

In the years since 1990, the culture-led regeneration orthodoxy emerged within this broader rhetorical context, in which the economic and social value of the arts and culture superseded its cultural value.

### 3.6.2 The established narratives: Glasgow, the European City of Culture and culture-led regeneration

Contrasting narratives have become established, both in the media and in policy terms, which reflect Glasgow, ECOC 1990 and the city’s approach to culture-led regeneration, as exemplary and as divisive.
The first established narrative characterises Glasgow’s culture-led regeneration based approach to ECOC 1990 as an unmitigated triumph: pioneering, pivotal in the history of the ECOC and socially and economically transformative to the city. Within this narrative, Glasgow has been repositioned within a league of international ‘Cultural Capitals’, defined by Louise C. Johnson (2009: 6) as ‘a city which has recently and consciously made the arts (and often related Cultural Industries) central to its society, economy, urban form and place identity’. As will be discussed below, Glasgow is viewed as a ‘benchmark’, exemplifying what can be achieved through culture-led regeneration. In this narrative overall, culture-led regeneration in Glasgow is portrayed as a remarkable success story and, as will be discussed below, a model other cities want to replicate. This narrative is perpetuated in current policy terms (Crossick and Kaszynska, 2016: 75).

In contrast to this dominant success story narrative is one of ECOC 1990 and culture-led regeneration in Glasgow as divisive, and socially and economically disastrous for some sections of the city. This has been particularly prevalent in some media narratives, which, as discussed in section 3.2 above, have reduced complex geographies to a binary ‘dual city’ narrative, in which culture-led regeneration and ECOC 1990 exacerbated the divide between rich and poor in the city. Reason and Garcia (2007: 322-323) have examined press coverage of ECOC 1990, finding it to be divided between positive coverage of Glasgow’s transformation from ‘No Mean City’ to ‘City of Culture’ and associated improvements to quality of life, and two strands of negative coverage firstly describing Glasgow as divided into two cities of haves and have nots, and secondly describing the city’s transformation as false, ‘undermining the “real” character and identity of Glasgow’. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the latter narrative was promoted by Workers City, a group of writers and self-appointed representatives of the ‘real Glasgow’, who viewed ECOC 1990 as no less than a ‘betrayal’ of the working class (McLay, 1988). This formed a backlash against the messages of transformation and renewal promoted by the city’s authorities.

The ‘culture-led regeneration as divisive’ narrative has been reinforced more recently (and credibly) in the AHRC Cultural Value Project, which commented on
the potential for culture-led regeneration to lead to gentrification and thus increase inequality in the city.\textsuperscript{30}

The established narratives about ECOC 1990 and culture-led regeneration in Glasgow are polarised and somewhat contradictory, in portraying them simultaneously as transformative and divisive, having solved severe structural socio-economic problems as well as exacerbating them, an imposition as well as a replicable model.

3.6.3 Cities as models of culture-led regeneration

Firmly rooted within the established narratives of culture-led regeneration is the idea of the ‘Glasgow model’, in which the ability of culture to lead social and economic transformation can be transferred and replicated in other cities through such vehicles as the ECOC and the UK City of Culture initiative.

Glasgow has been held as a model for Liverpool, the subsequent British city to host the ECOC event in 2008 - which in turn has been described as the ‘Liverpool model’. As Garcia (2017: 2) has noted, ‘the champions of the Liverpool 2008 bid mentioned Glasgow 1990 extensively as a key point of reference and a model to replicate’. In a comparison of Glasgow and Liverpool, Garcia stated that:

These two cities are widely perceived to be paradigmatic not only of successful culture-led regeneration but also of the power of the ECOC title to transform city image. (Garcia, 2017: 1)

As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the idea of cities as constituting transferable models of regeneration - and the position of the arts within this - is rooted in the 1980s. Here, the direction of travel was from the US to the UK, with some American ‘rustbelt’ cities viewed as models of economic renewal at both central and local government level in the UK: for example, the latter Thatcher governments viewed the ‘Pittsburgh model’ as having potential for replication

\textsuperscript{30} The AHRC Cultural Value Project research report, \textit{Creating Space: A re-evaluation of the role of culture in regeneration}, by Kate Oakley (2016) questioned why city governments have not yet been ‘weaned off’ the idea of culture-led regeneration or the ‘creative city’ narratives by the global literature on gentrification and uneven developments.
within deindustrialised cities in the UK; Baltimore was viewed as a model for Glasgow’s regeneration.

The idea of cities as models of culture-led regeneration is also connected, more recently, to broader debates about ‘urban policy mobilities’ to have emerged during the twenty-first century. A burgeoning area of academic research, urban policy mobilities is defined by Baker and Temenos (2015: 825) as exploring ‘the processes, practices and resources brought together to construct, mobilize and territorialize policy knowledge’.

However, to return to Glasgow and Liverpool as models of culture-led regeneration: both have been described as inherently problematic. In his 2004 critical reflections on Glasgow’s reign as ECOC 1990, Mooney recognised that “Doing a Glasgow” has now become a recurring theme in discussions of urban cultural policy and place marketing in many of Europe’s older industrial cities’, and argued that ‘the so-called “Glasgow Model” for urban regeneration is essentially sustaining a myth, as opposed to celebrating a reality’ (Mooney, 2004: 327-328). Cox and O’Brien (2012) have highlighted the specificity of the context surrounding Liverpool’s perceived success, and questioned the transferability of Liverpool’s culture-led regeneration model from one city to another.

3.6.4 Current debates surrounding culture-led regeneration: problems with measurement and evidence

As outlined above, culture-led regeneration as a policy concept is inherently problematic. This is due, not least, to difficulties in measuring and evidencing culture-led regeneration.

Miles and Paddison noted as early as 2005 that ‘the ability of [culture-led regeneration] policy to deliver beyond the rhetoric is already being questioned’ (2005: 834). Over a decade later, in the AHRC Cultural Value Project report, *Evidence of Things that Appear Not?* which reviewed the evidence and evaluation methods concerning the role of arts and culture in the regeneration of urban places and communities in the UK, Campbell *et al.* (2016) commented
on the lack of progress made in these areas. Campbell et al. identified a short-termist approach to gathering evidence, with a lack of longitudinal data due in no small part to a lack of requisite resources (2016: 46-47). They also identified problems with transparency of methods and propositions, in addition to a ‘deficit in clarity’ around what the research is attempting to achieve, accompanied by an over-emphasis on economic impact, which the effect that ‘social impacts are either taken for granted, or expected to naturally “trickle down”’ (Campbell et al., 2016: 48, 50-51). Furthermore, Campbell et al. argued that even when methods are clear, ‘measurement is not always feasible’ (2016: 55). ‘Nevertheless’, the report concluded, ‘there are continued assertions that culture is playing a regenerative role, regardless of evidence, or in opposition to evidence, in the current decade’ (Campbell et al., 2016: 45).

The difficulties of gathering robust evidence for culture-led regeneration have been further complicated by the rise of research as advocacy, an approach to research and policy-making which extends beyond cultural policy in other areas such as social policy. This can be summarised as organisations using research to draw attention to issues of specific interest to them, with the aim of increasing resources, particularly public funding, to address the issue. McLaughlin (2015: 240) has summarised the problems of ‘advocacy research’ as the potential for organisations to inflate the extent of their particular issue and the effectiveness of their interventions, with the consequence that ‘instead of improving knowledge, they can distort our understanding of the real scale of social problems and adversely affect social policy, for example, by public funds and services being allocated disproportionately’. Thus research becomes a form of marketing.

To conclude, the rise of culture-led regeneration as a policy concept has been proven to be based on less than robust evidence, but has gained traction in the UK, and elsewhere in the world, nonetheless.

Ultimately, culture-led regeneration is a concept which has been promoted in the UK by influential consultants and policy-makers for pragmatic purposes. The particularly selective approach taken by Chris Smith during his tenure at the DCMS to the use of evidence to reinforce developing narratives around the
socially and economically transformative powers of culture, in order to advocate for increased resources from other departments is one example of this pragmatism in action.

The culture-led regeneration orthodoxy developed post-1990, within this broader rhetorical context in which economic and social value superseded cultural value as a justification for public funding for the arts and culture.

Glasgow and ECOC 1990 occupy a prominent position within the culture-led regeneration orthodoxy, not least as a replicable model. However, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters of this thesis, this idea was applied retrospectively and is ultimately flawed.

3.7 Conclusion

Building on Chapter 2, this chapter has discussed the dominant theoretical and ideological developments and established narratives framing the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow during the period 1970 to 1989.

The period 1970 to 1989 saw the emergence of the somewhat contested concepts of the post-industrial city and neoliberalism. It was a period in which many cities in the western world became increasingly polarised, Glasgow being no exception. By the end of the 1980s, Glasgow began to be viewed as a dual city, with a widening gulf between rich and poor. By the early 2000s, Glasgow during the 1980s became viewed retrospectively as a site of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’.

This was also a period in which political marketing became increasingly sophisticated and prevalent within central and local government in the UK, as public relations became increasingly professionalised.

During this period, the concept of the cultural industries shifted from its Frankfurt School origins as an all-pervasive structural problem to being enthusiastically perceived as a solution to socio-economic problems in London, whilst being treated with caution by UNESCO on the basis of the international
implications for the future of cultural development in an approach premised upon economic growth accompanied by social change. Distinctions between the value of ‘high’ and ‘popular’ culture began to be reappraised, as modernism merged into postmodernism and the value of culture began to be articulated in economic terms. This was a period in which both cities and culture were marketed as commodities, and in which culture, some argued, became no different from other commodities being traded.

The period 1970 to 1989 was an era before the term ‘culture-led regeneration’ was coined. However, Glasgow’s approach to ECOC 1990 currently occupies a prominent position within the culture-led regeneration orthodoxy, not least as a fully-formed model which had a socially and economically transformative effect on Glasgow and which can be transferred to and replicated by other cities. This narrative has developed over the past two decades in particular, within a broader rhetorical context in which the instrumental power of culture - its economic and social value - has superseded cultural value as a justification for public funding of the arts and culture in the UK.

As will be discussed in subsequent chapters of this thesis, Glasgow’s approach to ECOC 1990 does not constitute a replicable model of culture-led regeneration but provides a different kind of example to other cities, one which resonates with developing narratives around the transformative powers of the arts and culture being based more on advocacy than incontrovertible evidence: an approach based on public relations and pragmatic improvisation.
CHAPTER 4  METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will discuss the research methodology, highlighting a theoretical framework that involves both cultural policy research and historiography, followed by the particular nature of pursuing this research via a Collaborative Doctoral Award that involved Glasgow Life and the University of Glasgow. It will then focus on the two main methodological strands of archival and documentary research and oral history interviews that the project used.

This is a qualitative research project, which aims to gain a better understanding of the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow in the decades leading up to 1990. It is based on documentary research and on interviews with the key surviving decision makers. The research project is shaped by six research questions, examining what happened and why:

1. What factors prompted the ‘cultural turn’ in Glasgow’s policy making?
2. What factors facilitated the new policy drive?
3. Who were the key actors involved?
4. What were the obstacles encountered?
5. To what extent can the period from 1979-89 be periodised in terms of critical events and how are we to understand the significance and influence of these events?
6. What strategies were employed by Glasgow District Council in developing its bid to become the European City of Culture? How did it mobilise the requisite expertise? How did it assess the challenge represented by its rivals and counter that challenge?

These research questions were prompted by a gap in existing research: a significant amount of research has been undertaken into the various impacts of the ECOC on Glasgow and other cities that have held the title, and on the subsequent direction of the programme itself, but there is a lack of research
into the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow itself in the decades leading up to 1990.

4.2 Cultural policy research: theoretical framework and guiding principles

This section will set out the theoretical framework and guiding principles for the research methodology deployed to address the research questions. It will explain an approach based on an understanding of cultural policy as potentially implicit and explicit, relational and territorial, and as intersecting with a broad range of other policy areas, such as urban policy and economic policy.

As well as being focused on cultural policy research, this research project also presents historiographical concerns. While the 1970s and 1980s can be described as a period of ‘contemporary history’, it is history nonetheless, and to be necessarily understood as a different era from the 2010s in which the research project has been undertaken. A theoretical framework related specifically to the methodology of oral history will be discussed in section 4.5 (below), whilst some of the broader guiding principles related to this as an historically-focused cultural policy research project will be addressed in this section.

Cultural policy studies is a relatively new academic field, yet there already exists a variety of ideas of what constitutes cultural policy research. Clive Gray (2010) has argued that cultural policy is not actually a ‘distinct discipline’ but ‘incorrigibly plural’. Gray has gone so far as to question whether the development of a specific ‘cultural policy’ discipline is necessary:

The strengths of the current plurality of disciplines and methodologies that are employed in the analysis of cultural policy include the development of forms of analysis that build on the essentially contested nature of the core concept - ‘culture’ - that is involved, allowing the potential to capture at least the multiple forms and dynamics of policy that are contained within it, rather than closing analysis down into more restrictive boundaries. (Gray, 2010: 227)

Other commentators have attempted to define approaches to cultural policy and cultural policy research, often framed around the ‘applied’ and the ‘critical’. An
example of a current applied approach is Mulcahy’s definition of cultural policy, which quotes Schuster:

Cultural policy can be most usefully considered as the totality of a government’s activities ‘with respect to the arts (including the for-profit cultural industries), the humanities, and the heritage’. (Mulcahy, 2017: xiii)

However, Scullion and Garcia (2005) and Bennett (2004) have recognised the limitations of the applied approach taken by Schuster. Scullion and Garcia have described Schuster’s approach as focused on ‘cultural policy as public policy and as a policy goal of government’ which ‘excludes the conceptual engagement with issues of governance and of identity’ (2005: 118). Bennett has compared Schuster’s approach to cultural policy research with the ‘critical’ approach of Jim McGuigan in Culture and the Public Sphere, in which McGuigan warns against ‘reducing the meaning of cultural policy [...] “to an ostensibly apolitical set of practical operations that are merely administered and policed by government officials”’ (Bennett, 2004: 242).

This project draws on both applied and critical approaches to cultural policy research. I seek to conceptualise ‘cultural policy’ not simply in terms of local and/or central government’s operational activities with respect to culture – however defined – in Glasgow during the 1970s and 1980s, but to expand that basis to take into account the broader ideological and political context in which it emerged.31 This approach is based on an understanding of the potential for cultural policy to be explicit and implicit, territorial and relational.

Jeremy Ahearne (2009: 143) has distinguished between explicit or ‘nominal’ cultural policy and implicit or ‘effective’ cultural policy, defining the former as ‘any cultural policy that a government labels as such’, and the latter as ‘any political strategy that looks to work on the culture of the territory over which it presides (or on that of its adversary’). Ahearne has commented on this distinction:

31 This includes, for example, the emergence of the ‘new managerialism’ within public administration, the early years of neoliberalism in the UK and the centrality of traditional Labour values to GDC.
‘Explicit’ cultural policies will often identify ‘culture’ quite simply with certain consecrated forms of artistic expression, thereby deflecting attention from other forms of policy action upon culture. Within the domain of ‘implicit’ cultural policies, one might also distinguish between the unintended side effects of various kinds of policy and those deliberate courses of action intended to shape cultures but which are not expressly thematised as such. (Ahearne, 2009: 144)

David Throsby (2009: 179) has considered the explicit/implicit cultural policy distinction from an economic perspective, suggesting that ‘some economic policies have a hidden cultural purpose, and therefore qualify as implicit cultural policy’. Both these conceptions of cultural policy - as explicit and implicit - have influenced investigation into the location and nature of Glasgow’s emerging cultural policy during the period of study. They remain useful whether or not one perceives in the actions of GDC a formal overarching ‘cultural policy’ through which its action on ‘culture’ was co-ordinated or whether implicit strategies (whether political or economic) for culture in the city developed elsewhere without being explicitly labelled ‘cultural policy’.

Connected to this is the conception of policy-making as territorial and relational. Urban geographers McCann and Ward have argued that:

urban policy-making must be understood as both relational and territorial; as both in motion and simultaneously fixed, or embedded in place. The contradictory nature of policy should not, however, be seen as detrimental to its operation. Rather, the tension between policy as relational and dynamic, on the one hand, and fixed and territorial, on the other, is a productive one. (McCann and Ward, 2010: 176)

Although McCann and Ward applied these terms to the contemporary twenty-first century context in which they were writing, the concepts of policy-making as territorial and relational can also be applied to the investigative approach taken in this research project to cultural policy in Glasgow during the 1970s and 1980s: that is, the extent to which a cultural policy emerged which was restricted to the city of Glasgow (territorial) and the extent to which it connected to policy areas other than ‘culture’, to policy development in other cities or countries and to specific key actors (relational), this latter point also relating to the contemporaneous emergence of ‘urban cultural policy’.
Bell and Oakley (2015) have discussed the idea of a specifically ‘urban cultural policy’, focused on the city. With reference to Grodach and Silver, they have argued that ‘urban cultural policy is a relatively new concept, dating back around thirty years, before which culture was largely a matter for the nation-state’ (Bell and Oakley, 2015: 78). Discussing how cities are ‘the traditional location of our grandest cultural inheritances – from the Gothic cathedral to the contemporary art gallery’ as well as the locus of much of the support infrastructure surrounding cultural activities, Bell and Oakley concluded:

The trouble for policymakers is that these deep and interlinking assets are only occasionally the results of deliberate cultural policy. They are much more often the legacy of education policy, transport policy, planning and licencing laws, migration and housing policy, of philanthropy and commercial hard sell - mixed together with a variety of cultural assets, public and private. (Bell and Oakley, 2015: 80)

In investigating what and where Glasgow’s cultural policy was during the 1970s and 1980s - and examining the extent to which a deliberate cultural policy focused on the city also emerged during this period - in line with current thinking about the scope of cultural policy such as that outlined above, the methodological scope broadened to include other policy areas in the city, such as economic development policy. This influenced (and was influenced by) both the archival research and oral history interviews with key actors.

As well as drawing on a range of academic disciplines, such as urban geography and (cultural) economics, the methodology draws on historiographical approaches. Whilst the study focuses on the period 1970 to 1989, it is positioned within a broader historical context, taking into consideration histories of the city of Glasgow, of Scotland, the UK and the European Community over previous decades and even centuries. Furthermore, this research was undertaken during the 2010s, more than 25 years since the end of the period of study. As a researcher I was unavoidably aware of events post-1989, notably including some of the consequences of decisions or actions taken - or not taken - during the 1970s and 1980s.

This presents the research with a methodological concern when approaching oral history interviewing, where the past is viewed from a distance through the lens
of the present and interviewees may - consciously or subconsciously - attempt to describe or justify their actions or inaction based on their knowledge of subsequent events. Hindsight bias will be discussed below in section 4.5.

This research project has taken place not only some decades after the period of study, but also after Lyotard described the ‘postmodern condition’ as being ‘characterised by incredulity toward “grands récits”’ (Carr, 2016: 133). This research project proceeded following the guiding principles that it is exploring and presenting not a singular ‘universal history’ but, rather, a conception of history as pluralistic, as based on an understanding of the future being unpredictable, not least to the key actors in the topic of study, on there being no inevitability to the course of events, and on the premise that the development of Glasgow’s cultural policy is likely to have involved the unintended consequences of a range of planned and improvised actions.

4.3 The Collaborative Doctoral Award process

This research project was established as an AHRC-funded Collaborative Doctoral Award (CDA) by Glasgow Life and the University of Glasgow. Glasgow Life is the arms-length external organisation established in 2007 to deliver cultural, sporting and learning activities on behalf of Glasgow City Council. It is responsible for museums such as The Burrell Collection and Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum; performing arts venues such as the City Halls and the Glasgow Royal Concert Hall (which opened as part of ECOC 1990 celebrations); arts centres and galleries such as Tramway and the Gallery of Modern Art; libraries in the city; and facilities for sport, as well as a range of festivals. Over the course of this research project, Glasgow Life has been responsible for the delivery of such large-scale events as the venue design and build and the Cultural Programme for the 2014 Commonwealth Games (something that was referred to in oral history interviews undertaken during the summer of 2014).

The research topic is intrinsically connected to the history of Glasgow Life itself, particularly in the infrastructure and festivals the organisation maintains today.

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32 This is particularly the case with the use of oral history as a research methodology, which often involves recording contrasting and contradictory accounts of past events, sometimes within the same interview as well as between different interviewees. This will be discussed further in section 4.5.
and which may be understood as part of the legacy provided by ECOC 1990. Recognising this, the general area for the research project - a pre-history to the ECOC - was established with the potential to deliver to Glasgow Life a better understanding of the factors affecting the historical direction taken by Glasgow cultural policy, and whether these factors continue to play out in the present.

An expected outcome for the Glasgow Life sponsors was historical research conducted in partnership with today’s policy-makers that would provide them with exposure to new historical information, demonstrate robust research methodologies and provide policy-relevant knowledge for the organisation, in order to ensure it remains an influential leader in the field of cultural policy, driving agendas and approaches. To this end, the general shape of my project, the research aim, objectives, research questions and broad research methodologies were devised collaboratively by Glasgow Life and the University of Glasgow, prior to my recruitment as the doctoral researcher. However, my role has been that of an independent doctoral researcher rather than a consultant or advisor to Glasgow Life. I was charged with shaping the project afresh once appointed and I have been able to capitalise on Glasgow Life’s involvement to access key data, including key interviewees. 33

I have also been able to draw on knowledge held within Glasgow Life which has enabled me to refine initial research findings in an important way. An event to share initial research findings with over forty Glasgow Life staff generated additional insights from responses from members of staff, some of whom worked in Glasgow’s cultural sector during the 1980s. Dr Mark O’Neill, Director of Policy and Research and my supervisor at Glasgow Life worked in Glasgow museums during the late 1980s and has been uniquely placed to provide insights and guidance on the period of study.

As the topic of study covers a period of recent history, well within living memory, the consequences of policy decisions made during the 1970s and 1980s continue to play out directly today. I have been in the extremely beneficial position of being able to talk not only to some of the key actors that directly

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33 For example, City Archivist, Dr Irene O’Brien, and her team at Glasgow City Archives have provided a great deal of support in locating crucial archive documents.
shaped Glasgow’s cultural policy but also some of those who influenced its development in a more supporting role - as well as some of those directly affected by decisions made during this period.

The collaborative involvement of Glasgow Life in the research project, therefore, has enabled me to gain a better understanding of the significance and influence of events and developments during the 1970s and 1980s in Glasgow’s cultural policy today.

4.4 Archival and documentary research

This section will discuss the public archives accessed and the approach taken to the available archival material. It will discuss the significance and value of the archival material accessed as well as unexpected gaps in the archives. It will also discuss the archival material privately held by some of the key actors that I was able to access as a result of my programme of interviews.

4.4.1 Local and regional government archival material

Archival research concerning the City of Glasgow focused largely on the records of GDC and SRC, with some reference to the records of Glasgow Corporation, held in Glasgow City Archives and Special Collections at the Mitchell Library in Glasgow.

GDC and SRC were both created in 1975 when the responsibilities of Glasgow Corporation were divided between the two new authorities. Whilst GDC’s responsibilities were geographically confined to the city boundaries, SRC’s geographical boundaries extended beyond the city to encompass the rural farmlands and islands, towns and coalfields of the Strathclyde region as a whole. Whilst GDC was allocated such aspects of ‘culture’ as museums and galleries, libraries, halls and theatres, and parks, municipal responsibility for the development of culture in the city was not clear cut. During its existence, SRC provided significant amounts of money and resources for the arts, museums and libraries in the city, particularly in relation to education and social work, as well
as aspects of economic development. The remit of GDC and SRC overlapped, geographically as well as in (cultural) policy terms.

My searches of local authority archival records were, therefore, not restricted to the files of GDC’s Festivals Unit, nor to the culture-focused departments listed above, though these were important. My investigation into the extent to which Glasgow’s emerging cultural policy was explicit or implicit, relational and territorial drew in a wider scope of local and regional authority departments, not least of which were economic development, public relations and the Chief Executives’ offices, as well as the committee minutes of both councils.

Many of the boxes searched – particularly containing the records of GDC – were uncatalogued and contained a huge range of documents: meeting minutes; memos; press cuttings; handwritten notes; formal reports; policy and strategy documents; drafts and redrafts of bid documents; promotional material; and a broad range of correspondence, both written and received by the authority. From studying these documents, various ‘narratives’ began to emerge. However, some considerations when assessing documents were the reliability of these narratives and what the archives revealed about the key actors who had originally compiled them.

The documents contained in each of the uncatalogued boxes were not mediated by an archivist but determined by the depositor. They were there as a result of the depositor’s highly subjective filtering process, through which material had either been discarded or retained for posterity in the archives. For example, the documents contained in the largely uncatalogued boxes of archival material formerly belonging to GDC Public Relations department included the handwritten notes of Head of Public Relations, Harry Diamond, alongside meeting minutes. What is retained and preserved in these particular boxes suggests the PR department approached archiving based on a keen awareness of how archival material can shape a legacy. In short, the archives are not ‘neutral’.

There were some gaps in the archive with regard to the research aim and questions. Not all reports referred to in oral history interviews or archival material have been retained. In these cases, council committee meeting minutes
from the period of study were systematically searched for references to the reports and indications - or otherwise - of their significance. I concluded that reports that were considered important by the council committees would be referenced in the meeting minutes (in some cases, a précis of a particularly significant report was recorded in the minutes), and those that were not would not feature in the minutes.

Furthermore, the fact that GDC and SRC were two different organisations is also manifest in their respective approaches to record keeping. These differences provide an insight into the differences in managerial styles between the two councils, which proved to be pertinent in the research findings: I found that SRC embraced the ‘new managerialism’ - which will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 7 - to an extent that GDC did not.

4.4.2 Central government archival material

Central government archives were accessed both online and in person. The research involved accessing the pre-devolution records of the Scottish Office held in the National Records of Scotland in Edinburgh. The Scottish Office files accessed in Edinburgh were not digitised and many were classed as containing sensitive information. Recent changes in practice in Scotland, where such files were released after fifteen, rather than thirty, years, meant that I was able to access crucial Scottish Office files produced in 1986, at an early rather than late stage in the research process. Scottish Office files contained meeting minutes; reports; bid documents (notably Glasgow’s and Edinburgh’s 1986 submissions and supplementary submissions as part of the competition to win the UK’s nomination for the ECOC); and correspondence with local authorities, agencies such as the SDA and Glasgow Action, and other government departments including the Office of Arts and Libraries within the Department for Education and Science, the Treasury, the Foreign Office and the Department for the Environment (which was concerned with local government and some aspects of heritage). There also included correspondence from the various departments within the Scottish Office, often in the form of a ‘PS Note’ or ‘PS Minute’ (discussed below). As such, the Scottish Office files provide the perspectives of
both ministers and civil servants within the Scottish Office and the tension
between the two.

Further central government records, such as the Hansard, have been digitised
and are available online. These records provided a broader central government
context and perspectives beyond those of the Scottish Office.

The archive documents studied are from a pre-digital era, in the years before
ministers and civil servants - and any of the key actors in this research project -
communicated by mobile phones, email or social media. The internal Scottish
Office PS Notes/Minutes are particularly valuable in recording something of the
robust informal debates between private and permanent secretaries, ministers
and other civil servants prior to reaching a formal decision. Handwritten
comments, initialled by the civil servant - or occasionally minister - concerned,
were added to the typed note as it was passed between key protagonists in the
decision-making process. Often, a series of handwritten comments were added
to PS Notes over a period of days, or even weeks, before a formal decision was
reached by the minister concerned. Such traces provide an insight into the pace
as well as the process of decision-making within central government during this
pre-digital era.

4.4.3 Privately-held archival material

Like the publicly-held archival material, privately-held material was not treated
as ‘neutral’. For example, Glasgow Action’s annual reports were originally
produced during the 1980s with an advocacy function to generate support for the
organisation and thus are particularly selective with the information they
present. However, this particular material was particularly valuable in gaining an
understanding of the ways in which key actors had presented the agency to
those they wished to influence.

This additional privately-held material addressed some archival gaps,
particularly around agencies such as Glasgow Action, and provided new
perspectives beyond those within local, regional and central government.
4.5 Oral history interviews

In planning and executing my oral history interviews I encountered practical and theoretical factors that reflected a particular turning point in the development of oral history as a research methodology.

4.5.1 Theoretical framework

As a research method, oral history has its limitations, not least in its reliance on memory - which can be unreliable - to reconstruct the past. The psychological concept of hindsight bias, an associated component of which is memory distortion, has been defined by Calvillo (2012: 891) as occurring ‘when outcome knowledge influences judgements of what individuals had known prior to the outcome’. Gross and Bayen (2015: 253) have described hindsight bias as ‘a hard-to-avoid and ubiquitous bias in memory and judgement’, which may ‘narrow the search for potential explanations for an event’. They have also stated that hindsight bias is stronger in older than young adults.

During the early 1970s, the unreliability of memory was a central factor in criticism of oral history as a methodology for reconstructing the past. Alistair Thomson has summarised this criticism as:

the assertion that memory was distorted by physical deterioration and nostalgia in old age, by the personal bias of both interviewer and interviewee, and by the influence of collective and retrospective versions of the past. (Thomson, 2011: 79)

Later in the 1970s, oral history changed direction. Bartie and McIvor (2013: 108), who have charted the history of oral history in Scotland, have recognised this shift, in Scotland as elsewhere in the UK and Europe, from ‘reconstructive mode’ to ‘interpretive mode’. That is: attempting to reconstruct the events of the past through direct eye witness testimony to turning the perceived weakness of oral history - the subjectivity of memory - into its strength.

Oral historians Paul Thompson and Alessandro Portelli were instrumental in this shift. In his 1978 text, The Voice of the Past: Oral History, Thompson defended
the validity of oral sources as alongside written sources. He argued that subjectivity of memory should not be viewed as a problem restricted to oral sources, but that ‘all historical sources are suffused by subjectivity right from the start’ (Thompson, 1978: 172). Tackling the issue of the comparable reliability of oral and written sources of evidence, Thompson (1978: 118) asserted that as subjective, spoken testimony, oral sources have a special value as historical evidence. Thompson contended that the due to the distinctive qualities of oral rather than written communication - the verbal social clues or the nuances of uncertainty - a recording of an oral source ‘is a far more reliable and accurate account of an encounter than a purely written record’ (1978: 126).

Furthermore, Thompson afforded a position to the conveying of individual and collective memory and imagination through oral sources equal to other aspects of history:

History, in short, is not just about events, or structures, or patterns of behaviour, but also about how these are experienced and remembered in the imagination. And one part of history, what people imagined happened, and also what they believe might have happened - their imagination of an alternative past, and so an alternative present - may be as crucial as what did happen. (Thompson, 1978: 162)

In his 1979 article, What Makes Oral History Different? Portelli also set out the case for the validity of oral history. In this article, Portelli directly tackled the inherent non-objectivity and subjectivity of oral history, the credibility of oral sources compared to ‘the holiness of writing’, and the relationship between memory and history.

Portelli, crucially, stated that: ‘Oral sources are not objective… they are artificial, variable and partial’ (Portelli, 1979: 38). Portelli argued that this lack of objectivity applied to all sources, whether oral or written; however, artificiality, variability and partiality were ‘specific intrinsic characteristics’ of oral sources.

On subjectivity, he argued that oral history ‘tells us less about events than about their meaning [...] Subjectivity is as much the business of history as are the more visible “facts”’ (Portelli, 1979: 36). Portelli argued, however, that its subjective
nature did not ‘imply that oral history has no factual validity’. Indeed, he contended that:

> What informants believe is indeed a historical fact (that is, the fact that they believe it), as much as what really happened. (Portelli, 1979: 36)

On credibility, Portelli argued that ‘there are no “false” oral sources’, as:

> Oral sources are credible but with a different credibility. The importance of oral testimony may lie not in its adherence to fact, but rather in its departure from it, as imagination, symbolism, and desire emerge. (Portelli, 1979: 37)

On the relationship between memory and history, he went on to claim that:

> Memory is not a passive depository of facts, but an active process of creation of meanings. Thus, the specific utility of oral sources for the historian lies, not so much in their ability to preserve the past, as in the very changes wrought by memory. These changes reveal the narrators’ effort to make sense of the past and to give a form to their lives, and set the interview and the narrative in their historical context. (Portelli, 1979: 37-38)

What has come to be known as hindsight bias is now framed not as a weakness but as a strength of oral history. Acknowledging that changes to the interviewee’s life, such as, for example, their socio-economic standing, their political opinions or personal circumstances, may affect the valuation or colouring of the story recounted, may mean that ‘the most precious information may lie in what the informants hide, and in the fact that they do hide it, rather than in what they tell’ (Portelli, 1979: 38).

Thompson (1978: 172) viewed ‘the reflective insights of retrospection’ brought by the ‘living humanity’ of oral sources as one of the strengths on which the historical value of the remembered past rests. He argued that, ‘it is precisely this historical perspective which allows us to assess long-term meaning in history’. Thompson also argued that:
the living presence of those subjective voices from the past also constrains us in our interpretations, allows us, indeed obliges us, to test them against the opinion of those who will always, in essential ways, know more than ourselves. We simply do not have the liberty to invent which is possible for archaeologists of earlier epochs. (Thompson, 1978: 172)

The approach to interviewing and interpretation of the resultant data generated in my research resonated strongly with many of Thompson and Portelli’s findings and their influential approach to oral history. But there were differences and divergences.

Portelli argued against the use of transcripts in oral history, stating:

Oral sources are oral sources. Scholars are willing to admit that the actual document is the recorded tape; but almost all go on to work on the transcripts, and it is only transcripts that are published. [...] The transcript turns aural objects into visual ones, which inevitably implies changes and interpretation. (Portelli, 1979: 33)

He has discussed the traits which may be lost in translation from an oral recording to a written transcript: the velocity of speech as its changes during the interview, the narrator’s emotions and the way the story affected them. In so doing, he argued that,

By abolishing these traits, we flatten the emotional content of speech down to the supposed equanimity and objectivity of the written document. (Portelli, 1979: 35)

In this research project, the production of oral history transcripts was unavoidable as I wanted to quote directly from interviewees in my thesis. As such, my oral history interview material has been ‘reduced’ to a visual form alongside the written archival material collected, with the primary source remaining the audio recording rather than the written transcript of the recording.

Working from a socialist perspective, Thompson pioneered the use of oral history as a valuable methodology for including those that might otherwise be ‘hidden from history’ or voiceless in the construction of history (Thompson, 1978; Thomson, 2011: 79). This has been a dominant strand of oral history. For this
study, the research questions demanded not an engagement with ECOC 1990 audiences but with interviewees who were generally not hidden from history. This methodological focus on the key decision-makers, rather than those affected by the decisions they made, reflects the focus of the research aim and questions on the *emergence* of Glasgow’s cultural policy rather than its impact. Indeed, the majority of interview participants held prominent positions in society in Glasgow and the UK, albeit some holding ‘behind the scenes’ roles as civil servants, for example. All are what Antony Seldon (Seldon and Pappworth, 1983) has termed the ‘elite’ in that they are eminent in their field. However, whilst some participants have been interviewed frequently in the past, others have not. For all, the interview-based methodology provided participants with the opportunity to tell their story, their version of events, their testimony, wherein its value lies.

4.5.2 Selection of and access to interviewees

Some of those interviewed were well known as significant figures in the political, cultural and/or economic life of Glasgow during the 1970s and 1980s - and working through Glasgow Life often facilitated access to them. Others - such as those who worked as civil servants during the 1980s - were identified through their appearance in archive documents and contacted via other routes. Some interviewees suggested the names of other people that should be interviewed for the research project.

The voices of a number of people involved in the development of Glasgow’s cultural policy are absent from this study. The number of people involved in the development of Glasgow’s cultural policy during the 1970s and 1980s far outweighs the number of people interviewed for this project: I had to make choices based on what I considered their significance to my research questions.

There is, perhaps, a general lack of diversity in that of the thirteen interviewees, ten were men and three were women. This reflects the fact that it was less common for women to be promoted to senior leadership roles than men during the 1970s and 1980s in areas related to the topic of study. This was particularly prevalent, for example, in the Glasgow Labour Group during this era.
when Glasgow was led by the ‘City Fathers’, Jean McFadden being one notable exception.

Access to interviewees was generally very good. Pat Lally and Harry Diamond - both formidable characters in 1970s and 1980s Glasgow - were unable to be interviewed due to illness. Several other key protagonists declined to be interviewed. One figure that proved to be elusive declined to be interviewed on the basis that he might be asked the wrong questions. Where key actors have played an integral role in the development of Glasgow’s cultural policy in the years leading to 1990, but have not had the opportunity - or have declined the opportunity - to present their own version of events and reflections on the subject, I have written about them and the roles they played nonetheless, based on available data.

One notable key actor who declined an invitation to be interviewed was Malcolm Rifkind, MP for Edinburgh Pentlands and Secretary of State for Scotland in 1986, when decisions were made on which city should be awarded the ECOC title. I wrote to him to request an interview in February 2015, shortly before he appeared in the news for having various second jobs whilst also being a Member of Parliament. His personal assistant replied to my letter in March 2015, just after he resigned as an MP, declining to be interviewed on the grounds that: ‘Sir Malcolm was not involved in the decisions that were made at that time and, therefore, does not feel he can assist’.34

Whilst it might be understandable that, at the particular moment of my request, Rifkind might not wish to be interviewed by a researcher, the reason given for declining the interview was odd: archival evidence shows that he was very closely involved in the decisions that were made at that time, going so far as to advocate for Edinburgh to be added to the government’s shortlist of UK cities bidding for the ECOC nomination and leading Scottish Office support for Edinburgh’s bid over that of Glasgow’s, despite Glasgow’s stronger bid.35 This archival evidence is reinforced by the testimony provided by Richard Luce

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34 Letter to Clare Edwards from Christine Shaylor, PA to Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP, 5 March 2015.
35 As will be discussed in Chapter 6, Edinburgh’s bid to host the ECOC was extremely poor in comparison to Glasgow’s. Edinburgh’s submission was restricted to a rather incoherent list of venues and arts organisations that did not meet the selection criteria.
(interview, 24 March 2015), the Minister for the Arts responsible for selecting the UK’s ECOC.³⁶

This demonstrates the value of oral history in illuminating archival evidence. Rifkind’s declining the opportunity to contribute his personal perspective in the form of an oral history interview arguably shows the desire of some key actors not to revisit, publicly, events which could be described as ‘delicate’ and which might be open to reinterpretation given the events that actually followed.

4.5.3 Interview preparation

Interviews followed the Oral History Society and British Library guidelines. This meant that prior to the interviews, interviewees were given written information on the broad scope of the project. This included details of the project partnership, background and aim or the project, oral history archive, plans for dissemination of research, expected outcomes and oral history interviews themselves. Interviewees were informed that the oral history interviews would be topical, on the subject of the interviewee’s role and work during the 1970s and 1980s, with particular reference to the development of Glasgow’s cultural policy. They were also informed that the interviews would provide an opportunity for the key protagonists involved in shaping Glasgow’s cultural policy at a significant point in the city’s history to tell their story, and in so doing contribute to new, original research, which would be used as a public resource, for scholars, policy-makers and residents of Glasgow and beyond.

Interviewees were also sent in advance of their interviews a copy of the appropriate ‘Consent to use of data’ form, facilitating their consent for the

³⁶ In his testimony, Richard Luce (interview, 24 March 2015) described the roles other members of the government played in influencing his decision in the selection process, stating: ‘The person in the end I had to consult careful was, I think, Malcolm Rifkind, Secretary of State for Scotland, because we were homing in on Scottish matters.’ Discussing the decision to add Edinburgh to the shortlist, Luce stated: ‘I think I may be right in saying that Malcolm Rifkind actually pressed me or whoever then was Secretary of State.’ CE (interviewer): ‘Yes that was Malcolm Rifkind.’ RL: ‘It was Malcolm Rifkind. He may have... yes because I remember talking to him on the telephone about it actually. That was almost near to the final decision and I said, “Look Malcolm I’m minded to go for Glasgow, I want you to tell me how Edinburgh’s going to react, not because I want to choose them at all because I don’t, but I want you to be alerted so that you know how to handle it, and advise me too.” And it was delicate.’
researcher to collect data in the form of a digital audio recording of an oral history interview for use in this academic research project.

As part of this consent process, interviewees were informed in writing before the interview that the digital audio recordings and transcripts of the interviews would be used in accordance with the wishes of the contributor. They were also informed that interviewees will be named and not anonymised, as the naming of interviewees was essential in pursuit of the research in question.

Interviewees signed the consent form prior to the start of the interview, after an opportunity to discuss any queries about the project and the use of data.

A flexible framework of semi-structured interview questions was prepared in advance of the interviews and differed between interviewees, with some commonalities, as shall be discussed below. Whilst interviewees were intentionally not given the fine detail of questions prepared for their specific interview in advance, some brought to the interview notes of topics they wished to discuss as prompts. None read from a prepared script, although occasionally responses included ‘rehearsed’ material, as discussed below.

4.5.4 The interviews

Formal oral history interviews were recorded with thirteen interviewees between March 2014 and June 2015.

Each interview was held at a venue agreed with the interviewees, where they might feel most comfortable speaking frankly, such as at their homes or at meeting rooms in the University of Glasgow or elsewhere. The duration of interviews depended predominantly upon interviewees’ availability or when the conversation reached a natural conclusion. My audio recordings vary between 25 minutes and 1 hour 48 minutes.

For each interview I produced a brief biography of the interviewee, including their roles or job titles and key dates. I then checked this biographical timeline
with each interviewee, to ensure that all the information was correct and to complete any gaps.\(^{37}\)

The interviews were generally thematic rather than full life interviews. They were generally semi-structured, with questions tailored to each individual. Topics and themes of interview questions were broadly guided by my research questions, adapted for each interviewee and their respective roles. There were some commonalities in lines of enquiry for some of the interviewees, particularly where their roles had overlapped. In the case of those who had worked in Glasgow during the 1970s and 1980s, topics included, for example, the challenges facing the city, Glasgow’s image and Glasgow’s strategic approach to the ECOC and the roles the interviewee and their associates played within it. Those who had worked at the Office of Arts and Libraries were questioned on the government’s approach to the ECOC initiative and to selecting the UK’s nominated city for the title.

The interviews often took a broadly chronological approach, for example, starting with pertinent background information, generally including a brief overview of the interviewee’s career prior to the main topic focus. With some interviewees, their testimonies began at the point at which they left school with their motivations for going into their chosen field, some decades before the 1980s. For others the interviews began at the height of their careers in relation to the topic. For example, the interview with Richard Luce (24 March 2015) began with the background to his becoming Minister for the Arts and the media reaction to his appointment, before going on to discuss the European Economic Community, then the European City of Culture initiative and specific details on the UK’s approach.

Ultimately the direction each interview took was determined by listening and responding to the interviewee. In some cases, I took the approach advocated by George Ewart Evans to ‘let the interview run [...] never attempt to dominate it. The least one can do is to guide it’ (Thompson, 1978: 227), providing prompts and probing questions where necessary to glean further information. Other interviewees, however, responded to a more direct and structured question-and-

\(^{37}\) An illustrative example of a biographical timeline produced is provided in Appendix B.
answer approach addressing a series of topics, particularly where their time was short and a faster pace was required.

In addition to the biographical information discussed above, I also prepared specific prompts, such as timelines, for each interview, should access to specific dates of historical events be required. For example, for the interview with Richard Luce (24 March 2015), I produced a list of European Cities of Culture between 1985 and 1998, and a list of cities to submit bids and to be shortlisted during 1986 by the Office of Arts and Libraries for the UK nomination for European City of Culture 1990. These prompts proved extremely useful during the interview, for example when discussing the ECOC selection process. These were added as appendices to the final written summary and transcript. In other cases, I brought publications, such as *The 1990 Story*, Glasgow’s ECOC 1990 catalogue, which contained pictures, details of events and lists of committee members, which interviewees were able to view and reflect on during their interview, if required.

Over the course of the interviews, I asked reflective questions, as well as anchoring questions in order to connect dates to specific aspects of the testimony. Each interview started with the interviewer and interviewee confirming their name and date of birth, with confirmation of the date of the interview. The biographical and historical timelines discussed above were referred to from this anchoring perspective. Towards the end of the interview I asked each interviewee whether there was anything else they wished to discuss that had not been covered.

4.5.5 After the interviews

I produced written summaries and verbatim transcripts after each interview which followed the standard template used by the British Library. However, the interviews follow the principle that the audio recording is the primary source, with the written summaries and transcripts a guide to the audio recording.

Following the interview, each interviewee was sent a copy of the full audio recording and written summary and transcript, resulting in some minor editing to
remove small amounts of material. As the data is to be used in accordance with the wishes of the contributor, where the interviewee has requested information remain confidential it remains so.

4.5.6 Reflections on interviews

I encountered many examples of what Portelli (1979: 38) described as the ‘artificial, variable and partial’ nature of oral sources.

The oral history archive is partial in that it privileges the voices of those who are alive and well over those who are not. Several participants in the events being described declined to be interviewed. Some interviewees - and some potential interviewees - referred in their testimonies to other people, crediting them with certain achievements or roles in Glasgow’s emerging cultural policy, whilst in some interviews, other figures appear to have been ‘written out’ of the story. I have attempted to redress this balance in the thesis by including those figures who were integral to the emergence of Glasgow’s cultural policy, whether or not they participated in an interview.

Interviewees participating were all in their sixties, seventies and eighties and were being asked to recall events from thirty or forty years ago. In some cases, this covered events which they had not recalled for some time and/or which they found difficult to recall fully, and/or which had been differently recalled with other interviewers. This variability means that the oral history interviews cannot be described as replicable. However, this does not reduce their validity as a research methodology.

The oral history interviews present a partial - and to some extent artificial - version of events in that some interviewees have been particularly selective with the facts, unintentionally or otherwise.

More concerning than the variability of testimonies - that is, that in other circumstances an interviewee’s version of events might be recalled in a different way - was, conversely, the lack of variability in one interview in particular, where the account was identical to some newspaper articles. The challenge for
me was to conduct a research-driven interview with a public figure who was particularly adept at public relations. I found that the historical events recalled were woven together in a series of ‘key messages’, with the interviewee appearing to be permanently ‘on message’. The interviewee’s parting comment, once the digital recorder had been switched off, was, ‘Don’t tell them about the weather!’ I felt that the inference was that I should be complicit with him in constructing a particular history and narrative of Glasgow, in which unfavourable facts have been omitted.

Here, I have drawn the conclusion that changing Glasgow’s image is, for some, a lifetime’s work and this is period of history which continues to have repercussions in the present. Given the context of this particular interview - that it is part of a history that concerns not only the rise of public relations but also the use of the arts and culture as a public relations tool - attempting to control the message through public relations techniques is the story. As Portelli commented:

> In these cases, the most precious information may lie in what the informants hide, and in the fact that they do hide it, rather than in what they tell. (Portelli, 1979: 38)

The value of oral history as a research methodology here is, as Portelli (1979: 36) has it, that it tells us ‘less about events than their meaning’.

### 4.6 Conclusion

Both of the main methodological strands that I have used in this qualitative study have their strengths and limitations. Oral history has been attacked as a research methodology due to the unreliability of memory. However, ‘all historical sources are suffused with subjectivity’ (Thompson, 1978: 172) and it is the job of the historian to navigate that path carefully and robustly.

The written archival material available provides records of a variety of decisions made and to varying degrees, the decision-making processes - not least intimating some of the influential factors in those decisions. Just like the oral interview evidence, the written archival material accessed is not ‘neutral’ but
equally reliant on the subjective decisions of depositors of what to discard and what to retain for posterity. I have found that my oral history interviews have provided valuable qualitative data in some of the areas in which the established written archives are ‘silent’ - or in which some voices dominate. They have also provided new data which has variously corroborated and contradicted archival material, as well as secondary source material examined in the literature review. Combining archival and interview material offered me an insight into the converging and contrasting perspectives of some of the key protagonists, the multi-faceted combination of unity and dissent, improvised and constructed narratives, which were defining characteristics of Glasgow’s emerging cultural policy during the 1970s and 1980s.
CHAPTER 5  1970 TO 1985: SHIFTING LANDSCAPES

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will discuss the key actors, prompting and facilitating factors and obstacles encountered in the ‘cultural turn’ in Glasgow’s policy making during the period 1970-85. It will also examine the critical events, their significance and influence, in the period leading up to the turning point of Glasgow’s 1986 ECOC bid, at which point a range of emerging strategies began to converge.

Between 1970 and 1985, Glasgow faced three significant structural socio-economic problems: deindustrialisation; depopulation; and urban deprivation and decay (Keating, 1988: 26-28). This period saw the emergence of an implicit or effective cultural policy in Glasgow within a shifting landscape which encompassed these socio-economic problems alongside political changes and a burgeoning cultural infrastructure.

The chapter will begin by outlining, firstly, the political changes in local government and then Glasgow’s shifting arts and cultural landscape. It will argue that the severe socio-economic problems and political challenges facing the city did not present an obstacle to the growth of Glasgow’s cultural infrastructure, which expanded throughout this period without an explicit cultural policy to direct its development.

It will then discuss how the two significant and inter-related structural changes of local government reorganisation and the introduction of corporate management in the new GDC, when combined with a new emphasis on economic development, acted as significant prompting and facilitating factors in the cultural turn in Glasgow’s policy making.

The city’s strategic focus on economic development will then be examined as the most prominent of these factors, as the city’s cultural assets moved from the margins of policy and planning, as key public bodies began to recognise their

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38 What constitutes an explicit or nominal cultural policy, as opposed to an implicit or effective cultural policy was discussed in section 4.2 of Chapter 4.
potential as a consumption activity within the developing service sector economy.

The recognition of the increasing importance of Glasgow’s image to its changing economy, as it became a post-industrial city, as well as the approach taken by Glasgow’s leadership to change the city’s image during the early 1980s will then be discussed. Finally, the chapter will examine the rise of public-private partnerships as a key facilitating factor in the city’s emerging cultural policy.

It is notable that attempts to develop a formal, explicit cultural policy for the city followed rather than preceded Glasgow being awarded the ECOC title through a national competition in 1986 and became intrinsically connected to the city’s planning for the event. Whilst the city’s 1986 ECOC bid was based on a coherent strategy, it was not a strategy which stemmed from a coherent, explicit or nominal cultural policy. Rather, the development of Glasgow’s ECOC strategy - and the city’s subsequent cultural policy - was prompted and facilitated by a range of factors and key actors.

5.2 Political change in local government in Glasgow, 1970 to 1985

The 1970s was, characteristically, a period of upheaval in local government in Glasgow, with the administrative restructure of local government reorganisation followed by a period of instability at political level within the council.

Local government reorganisation in Scotland took place during the mid-1970s as a result of the recommendation of the 1969 Wheatley report, with changes coming into effect in May 1975. The responsibilities of Glasgow Corporation were divided between two new tiers of local and regional government: Glasgow District Council and Strathclyde Regional Council. Geographically, the former Corporation’s boundaries in the east were extended to include Rutherglen in the new GDC, whilst GDC was situated at the centre of the new regional authority, which stretched from Argyll and Bute in the north to Ayrshire in the south. Despite these apparent geographical advantages, this process of local
government reorganisation in Glasgow has been described as disempowering\textsuperscript{39} for the city by Steven Hamilton, who joined the Corporation in 1948 and became Town Clerk and Chief Executive of GDC in 1979.

Steven Hamilton (interview, 19 August 2014) characterised Glasgow Corporation as the ‘all-purpose authority’, its remit including electricity, gas, water, health, social work, probation, children’s homes, education, traffic, sewerage, the police and fire services. Hamilton has reflected on the consequences of local government reorganisation in Glasgow:

\textit{First of all, all the major services, all the high spending services except housing went to the Regional Council, and so Glasgow lost that. And Glasgow didn’t have nearly as much influence in the Regional Council as you might have expected. Strathclyde didn’t, to my mind, regard Glasgow as being the core of the Regional Council, they tended to regard Glasgow as a rival organisation. And politically they were run by representatives elected in Lanarkshire and Ayrshire who joined together and they were able to out-vote the Glasgow representatives.} (Steven Hamilton, interview, 3 July 2014)

The division of responsibilities between the two tiers of local government resulted in a number of grey areas where both authorities developed their own activities and plans for the city which - as will be discussed in section 5.5 in the case of economic development - did not always align.\textsuperscript{40}

This restructuring process did not result in the establishment of a department for culture in either authority. Departments such as museums, libraries and halls and theatres, which to a large extent constituted ‘culture’, were allocated to

\textsuperscript{39} For Steven Hamilton, the Thatcher era also saw an escalation in the central government disempowerment of local authorities. Commenting on the changes to the city and the council by the time he retired in 1991, Steven Hamilton (interview, 3 July 2014) stated: ‘The most significant thing to change in the city over these years was that the city had been disempowered. That’s the most important thing. I was working in an organisation which had relatively little powers and not very much money. And we made the best of it. [...] My feeling was a slight feeling of regret that we had so few powers, some satisfaction that I think we used these powers as well as we could possibly have done in the circumstances of the time. The circumstances of the time were very... they were bad. I mean the Thatcher years were bad for us, bad for Glasgow in every respect.’

\textsuperscript{40} Keating (1988: 43) has highlighted the interdependence of SRC and GDC’s responsibilities, listing the responsibilities of the new regional council as follows: ‘strategic planning, structure plan, industrial development, highways, transport, water and sewage, education, social work, police, fire, registration of births, deaths and marriages, registration of electors and consumer protection’; and the district council as follows: ‘local plans and development control, building control, housing, leisure and recreation, libraries, environmental health and licencing’.
the District Council. However, the development of the arts and culture in Glasgow was one such overlapping area of responsibility between GDC and SRC, not least because this was an era when arts and culture was a non-statutory and therefore entirely discretionary aspect of local government activity in Scotland. Over the course of its 21 year existence, SRC provided significant amounts of funding and support for the arts and culture in Glasgow. However, during the 1970s this support was not connected to that of GDC in formal policy terms.

These structural administrative changes were implemented as GDC entered a period of political instability. The 1977 local elections brought an abrupt end to the Labour Group’s domination of the District Council, as the longest-serving of its ‘City Fathers’ lost their seats. As outlined in Chapter 2, two years of a hung council ensued, with a minority Conservative administration reliant on the SNP, followed in 1979 by the return of Labour as a minority administration. Jean McFadden, Leader of the Glasgow Labour Group from 1977 and of the council between 1979 and 1986, has described the events surrounding the ‘massacre of 1977’:

In 1977 there was a council election and that election was held at a time when the Labour Party’s fortunes were very low. Jim Callaghan was Prime Minister. There had been the oil crisis, there were cuts, and there were also arguments between the then Leader and the Housing Convener, which hit the front pages of the local papers and as a result the Labour Party lost 25 members in the election of 1977. And I, having been there for six years, became one of the most senior members. And that led to changes, because the Labour Group decided to go into opposition and a hung council was

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41 Gray (2000: 174) has commented on the Local Government Scotland Act 1994 which brought a statutory duty for local authorities in Scotland to make provision for the arts. This was the first Act ‘to force local authorities in Britain to undertake such activities, implying a commitment to spend money on the arts by law’. This statutory duty did not exist in the 1970s or 1980s.

42 It should be noted that GDC and SRC’s financial contributions to the arts in Glasgow were connected in one aspect, through the new funding formula for the national arts companies (Scottish National Orchestra, Scottish Opera, Scottish Theatre Ballet and Scottish Chamber Orchestra) agreed between COSLA, the Convention for Scottish Local Authorities, and the Scottish Arts Council in 1979 (Jones and Galloway, 2011: 231-232), as three of these companies were Glasgow-based. However, this funding formula only applied to this specific aspect of arts funding and did not constitute an explicit, overarching cultural policy for Glasgow. The COSLA formula also appears to have caused some confusion within GDC in the subsequent years on its role in funding the three Glasgow-based organisations in relation to SRC (as the GDC Finance Committee’s difficulty in reaching a decision on a 1980 Scottish Ballet grant application demonstrates (GDC, 1980c)) and the COSLA agreement was still under negotiation with local and regional authorities in March 1983 (GDC, 1983b).
formed between the Conservatives and the SNP members, and I became Leader of the Opposition. (Jean McFadden, interview, 24 March 2014)

These events led to a difficult period in local government, in which little progress was made in tackling the city’s severe socio-economic problems. Jean McFadden has commented that:

The three years between 1977 and 1980 were very difficult for the Council because no party had overall control. It just lurched from one thing to another and it was impossible for any long term planning. (Jean McFadden, interview, 24 March 2014)

During this period, GDC did not have a formal, explicit cultural policy and did not make it a priority to develop one.\(^{43}\) As Leader of the Opposition, Jean McFadden decided the Labour Group should ‘take a close look at our policies, draft some new policies and just come back at the next election’ (Jean McFadden, interview, 24 March 2014). This process of policy development did not extend, either within the Labour Group or within the council, to policies for the arts and culture.

Jean McFadden has reflected on the emphasis of the city’s policy concerns during the late 1970s and into the 1980s:

I must say I think cultural policy took a back seat in that period. What we were most concerned about at that time was housing, because there were still slum houses, houses without adequate facilities that had to be either refurbished or demolished and replaced. After the general election of 1979, unemployment became a huge issue. It was to become an even bigger issue during the 1980s, when Glasgow had lost most of its major industries. Shipbuilding was not what it had been, people were leaving the city as well, that was a huge problem, trying to stem the flow of population. So there wasn’t really much thinking about arts at the time.

\(^{43}\) This is reflected in a review of GDC council and committee meeting minutes from this period (see boxes GDC 1-2 1976/77-1980/81 in Glasgow City Archives, The Mitchell Library, Glasgow). The arts and culture were not a top priority for the council during the late 1970s. While decisions on some arts and cultural grants were discussed at GDC’s Finance Committee, the remit for culture was held by a sub-committee of a relatively minor committee: the Civic Amenities Committee’s Sub-committee on Cultural Matters. This sub-committee concerned libraries, museums, halls and theatres, discussing mainly operational and maintenance matters as they arose as well as agreeing museum loans. This sub-committee did not make any plans to develop a formal, explicit cultural policy for the city during this period. It did, however, plan for some cultural projects that were eventually realised during the 1980s, such as the expansion of library provision across the city, the acquisition of the Provand’s Lordship Museum and the development of the Concert Hall (which opened in 1990).
The political and administrative turbulence of the 1970s was short-lived. 1979 was a critical year in heralding the beginning of a new period of political stability in Glasgow, albeit one which encompassed a polarisation of left and right wings in local and central government respectively, bringing accompanying challenges. As GDC entered a new period of Labour leadership – albeit as a minority administration – Margaret Thatcher entered 10 Downing Street, bringing new political challenges to the city. In 1980, the Glasgow Labour Group gained a majority and a return to its dominance of the council, which continued throughout the eleven years of the Thatcher governments and into the 1990s.

This new period of political stability brought with it changes to decision-making processes and a prioritisation of economic development which, as will be discussed in sections 5.4 and 5.5, would subsequently act as facilitating factors in the development of cultural policy in Glasgow.

5.3 The shifting arts and culture landscape in Glasgow, 1970 to 1985

Contrary to the image of a city in decline, several large-scale capital projects were underway, completed or planned in Glasgow during the 1970s and early 1980s. A £10m extension to the Mitchell Library was completed in 1981. The Burrell Collection, built to house the bequest of Sir William Burrell opened to critical acclaim in 1983. Also in 1983, Tron Church became Tron Theatre, one of a number of buildings to be subsequently converted into new arts venues the city. A new venue was planned to house the Royal Scottish Academy of Music and Drama (now the Royal Conservatoire of Scotland), opening in 1988, and initial plans were underway for a new Royal Concert Hall, which opened in 1990.

Developments in Glasgow’s built environment during the early 1980s followed recognition in the early 1970s of the significance of Glasgow’s Victorian architecture, marking a policy shift away from comprehensive redevelopment and demolition towards conservation of architectural assets. Lord Esher’s 1971 report for Glasgow Corporation, Conservation in Glasgow, stated ‘Glasgow is now the finest surviving example of a great Victorian city’ despite a history of
neglect and the fact that ‘it has been a point of pride in the city to destroy and build better’ (Esher, 1971: 1). In 1981, The Mackintosh House opened in the new Hunterian Art Gallery, the reassembled interiors of Charles Rennie Mackintosh’s previously demolished house reflecting a growing appreciation and rediscovery of the Glaswegian architect.

During this period, national arts organisations, such as the Royal Scottish National Orchestra, Scottish Opera and Scottish Ballet, had become based in Glasgow alongside other major companies such as Citizens Theatre. There were a growing number of smaller arts organisations and festivals, such as 7:84 Theatre Company and Mayfest.

However, these capital projects - and the expansion of the city’s arts organisations and events - were not connected by any kind of formal, overarching cultural policy during this period. Rather, they were part of ‘a series of individual projects and events’ that ‘matured at the same time, producing an important critical mass of cultural activity’ (Boyle, 1989a: 78).

Between 1963 and 1983, the number of museums in the control of the local authority trebled from three to nine. However, this considerable increase was due more to opportunism than coherent and interconnected strategic planning. For example, Pollok House was gifted to the city in 1967 by the Maxwell Macdonald family. Rutherglen Museum became part of Glasgow’s department of museums and art galleries following the extension of the city’s boundaries to include the Burgh of Rutherglen as part of the 1975 local government reorganisation. The Burrell Collection eventually opened in 1983 after several decades of stalled planning following the 1944 bequest and Sir William Burrell’s death in 1958.

Whilst the Burrell bequest was the most substantial, comprising over 8,000 objects including works by Rodin and Cézanne alongside Chinese and Islamic art, it was by no means unique as a gift to the city from a prominent industrialist collector. As discussed in Chapter 2, over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Glasgow benefitted significantly from bequests of coachbuilder Archibald McLellan (who died in 1854) and shipping magnate
William McInnes (who died in 1944), amongst others, their collections forming the basis of that of Glasgow Museums and Art Galleries. Indeed, that Glasgow was in a position to benefit from such bequests was in no small part connected to its standing as Second City of the Empire, a status which diminished with the post-war decline of the British Empire and the advent of Glasgow’s post-industrial era. Here, a dominant prompting and facilitating factor in the construction of Glasgow’s cultural infrastructure is an historical one: the civic pride of prominent businessmen, their bequests reinforcing the stature of the city - as well as themselves being key actors in its rise to distinction - for posterity.

Despite a lack of formal, explicit policy for museums and galleries, however, GDC benefitted during this era from the individual strategies developed in previous decades by such key actors as Tom Honeyman, Director of Glasgow Museums and Art Galleries between 1939 and 1954, who, as discussed in Chapter 2, has been credited with persuading Sir William Burrell to bequeath his collection to the city (Webster, 1997: 166-174).

Thus, in the years preceding Glasgow’s 1986 ECOC bid, a critical mass of cultural activity developed in the city. However, the development of this cultural infrastructure was not driven by a formal or coherent overarching cultural policy for the city. Nor was it driven - despite a considerable investment of its public funds - entirely by the local or regional authorities. A number of key actors within the field of the arts and culture in Glasgow were instrumental in its expansion during this period. As discussed in Chapter 2, Tom McGrath founded the Third Eye Centre in 1974. This was followed by the establishment of WASPS (Workshop and Artists Studio Provision Scotland), and Transmission, the city’s

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44 Alasdair Auld began working for Glasgow Corporation’s Museums department as an Assistant Curator in 1956, remaining with the department through local government reorganisation and succeeding Trevor Walden in the post of Director of Museums and Art Galleries in 1979, retiring in 1988. Alasdair Auld (interview, 25 February 2015) has reflected that there was no formal plan during his time at the museums service but that he felt the department worked well without one. He commented that the large increase in museums over the 20 year period from 1963 was ‘just opportunity’.
first artist-run gallery, established in 1983 by a group of Glasgow School of Art graduates.45

Erika King worked as Administrative Director at the Third Eye Centre between 1979 and 1990. Describing Kelvingrove Museum and Art Gallery and The Glasgow School of Art as ‘quite tired brands’, and organisations like Scottish Ballet, Scottish Opera, the RSNO and the Citizens Theatre as working individually at ‘world level’ in their own fields, King has commented that McGrath and the founders of the Third Eye Centre as aiming to achieve something different:

They had this drive and vision about a massive explosion of energy and activity and that by bringing various artforms together in a synergy you’re going to change the world. (Erika King, interview, 3 June 2015)

King (interview, 3 June 2015) has described how under McGrath, and subsequently Chris Carrell, the organisation’s scale of ambition was greater than the resources at their disposal. She has characterised the organisation’s political ethos of collaboration and partnership as a ‘philosophical point of view [...] we’re all going to be better if we work on a bigger level and we can achieve more’, as much as a practical necessity.

By no means did the city’s lack of an explicit cultural policy present an obstacle to this approach. To the contrary, the freedom afforded by this lack of formal direction can be seen as something of a facilitating factor in the development of Glasgow’s cultural ecology.

5.4 Culture, decision-making and the new managerialism

Thus far, this chapter has shown that Glasgow Corporation and subsequently GDC played an important role in the development of the city’s cultural infrastructure, though by no means was the local authority the sole driving force behind its expansion. The decisions made in relation to the arts and culture by the council were not, during the 1970s, guided by a formal corporate strategic

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45 Transmission was run by a committee rather than led by an individual. Committee members in 1983 were Alastair Magee, Lesley Raeside, John Rogan, Michelle Baucke and Alastair Strachan (Transmission: Committee for the Visual Arts, 2001).
approach but were reliant, conversely, on strategies pursued by individual key actors. However, in the early 1980s, corporate management began to be established within GDC. This acted as a significant prompting and facilitating factor in the cultural turn in Glasgow’s policy-making over the course of the 1980s. As the arts and culture rose to a more prominent position in council policy from what was a rather marginal base, GDC’s support for culture became subject to tensions between old and new managerial approaches.

This section will discuss the establishment of corporate management as a new framework for decision-making and its implications for the development of cultural policy. Economic development will then be explored in section 5.5 as the most significant prompting factor – facilitated by the ‘new managerialism’ – in the new policy drive.

The 1969 Wheatley report, which prompted the mid-1970s local government reorganisation, was followed in 1975 by the Paterson report, *The New Scottish Local Authorities* (and the Bains report, its equivalent in England). The Paterson committee was established to consider management arrangements for the new authorities, recommending the introduction of corporate management (Keating, 1988: 66).

Corporate management is otherwise known as the new managerialism, the introduction of which into central government was discussed in Chapter 2. A definition of corporate management as it applied to local authorities in Scotland has been provided by McConnell, who has chronicled its introduction:

> Corporate management is an integrated approach to the management of local authority affairs. It aims to transcend all the various departmental, political and public interests in order to bring order, priorities, strategy, planning and suitable resource allocations to the decision-making and governance of local communities. (McConnell, 2004: 74)

This new corporate approach involved a major shift in working practices for council workers, particularly departmental managers, who would be expected to work cross-departmentally through strategic planning towards achieving common
strategic priorities, which may not have originated in their particular department’s nominal area of expertise (as will be discussed below in the example of GDC’s department of museums and art galleries).

This differed from the ‘traditional approach’ preceding corporate management in local authorities, which McConnell (2004: 75) has characterised as ‘based very much on bottom-up “incrementalism”’ and lacking ‘any fundamental examination of services or costs [...] Typical developments were for services and costs to expand “incrementally” on an annual basis’. In contrast, McConnell has characterised corporate management as ‘based much more on a top-down “rational” approach which its proponents see as apolitical’.

By 1978, 90 per cent of Scottish councils had adopted a corporate approach in principle and 80 per cent had changed their departmental structures in line with Paterson principles (McConnell, 2004: 78). However, the degree to which it was implemented varied between councils over the course of the 1970s and 1980s. According to McConnell (2004: 79) and to Rhodes and Midwinter (1980: 97), corporate management was adopted as a ‘coping strategy’ and a ‘quick solution to problems’. It appeared to offer a unifying force following the upheaval of local government reorganisation, and a means of coping with a difficult economic climate.

In Glasgow’s case, whilst corporate management was introduced into the new GDC from the organisation’s advent in 1975, it did not begin to become established until 1980. This was due to a period of instability during the late 1970s at both political and officer levels of GDC’s leadership.

On the officer side, the Corporation’s administrative head, the Town Clerk, was replaced in the new District authority by a Town Clerk and Chief Executive, an attempt to reconcile the traditional approach of the past with the corporate structure of the future, creating a contradictory clash of old and new. GDC’s first Town Clerk and Chief Executive, Charlie Murdoch, spent much of the early years of the District Council’s existence absent from work due to illness. This

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46 The foremost corporate priority in GDC’s case during the early 1980s was economic development, as shall be discussed below.
leadership void was eventually filled by Steven Hamilton, who became Acting Town Clerk and Chief Executive in 1978, subsequently being appointed Town Clerk and Chief Executive in the following year.

The insecurity in administrative leadership during this period was mirrored by the instability in political leadership - discussed in section 5.2 - which presented a major obstacle to the establishment of corporate management in the 1970s.

1980 marked the start of a new period of political stability with the Labour Group being returned to a majority administration. This - combined with Steven Hamilton’s background as a member of the Paterson committee - was a turning point for the establishment of corporate management in GDC.

One of the key consequences for working practices was the centralising approach to decision-making brought by corporate management, whereby major decisions on the strategic direction to be taken by GDC were often not taken by the elected members but rather, a small core group of members and officers.\(^{47}\)

Jean McFadden, Leader of GDC between 1979 and 1986, has described what was the emergence of this approach:

> Very soon after the election in 1980, the Chief Executive organised what we call an away day, where we went, I think, to the Mitchell Library, and thrashed out what we saw as the policies for the city for the next I think it would have been four years, because by that time we had a four-year term. And it was quite invigorating; it was a new start. It was out with the old and in with the new. (Jean McFadden, interview, 24 March 2014)

\(^{47}\) This approach was not without its tensions. Michael Keating (1988) has written about the tensions between the left/traditional and right/centralising wings of the Glasgow Labour Group and their leaders: Pat Lally and Jean McFadden. In the example of the GDC revenue budget, Keating (1988: 71) has outlined this approach, its tension with the ‘traditional’ approach and the eventual political consequences: ‘The revenue budget has been put together by the leader, deputy leader, treasurer and deputy treasurer (the gang of four) sitting with the chief executive and director of finance. As in the region, the system is regarded as not sufficiently corporate by those at the centre and as too centralising by those on the periphery.’ In Keating’s analysis, this centralising approach was to prove the downfall of Jean McFadden’s first tenure as GDC Leader, as she came to be challenged for the leadership in 1986 by Pat Lally, who promised to restore power to backbench councillors and service committees.
The core group attending the away day described by Jean McFadden provided the basis of the new policy and resources committee, which Steven Hamilton has described thus:

The Finance Director and myself and sometimes the Director of Planning would be closely involved with the leaders of the Council in policy planning matters. And it was on occasions such as these where we really exercised genuine corporate management. (Steven Hamilton, interview, 3 July 2014)

Hamilton considers the policy and resources committee to have been ‘a very successful thing’ as a means of countering the process of disempowerment the authority faced:

That was where we got down to analysing what the council could still do in spite of having so few statutory powers, and that boiled down to doing our best to grow tourism in the city, which we saw as being a potential job creator, and then doing our best to support what industries existed and what businesses existed. (Steven Hamilton, interview, 3 July 2014)

The policies for the city referenced above by Jean McFadden and Steven Hamilton not only became some of the main priorities in GDC’s first corporate plan, but also became intrinsically connected to the new strategic emphasis on economic development and ultimately, the subsequent emergence of an implicit cultural policy in Glasgow.

However, in the early 1980s, corporate management strategies and approaches did not always successfully extend to GDC’s administration of the arts and

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48 The policy and resources committee was established by GDC in May 1980 (See Minutes of Policy and Resources Committee Meeting, 15th May 1980, Box GDC 1-2 1980/81, print no. 2, in Glasgow City Archives, The Mitchell Library, Glasgow). GDC council minutes from this period show that attempts to develop corporate planning at council level were driven by Steven Hamilton through the new policy and resources committee during 1980 and 1981 in particular. Indeed, this began at the committee’s first meeting, where Hamilton presented proposals to implement a system of area management and area committees (GDC, 1980a) and to formulate a corporate plan (GDC, 1980b).

49 GDC’s first corporate plan was produced by the end of 1981. Its development is referred to in the minutes of the policy and resources committee between May 1980 and December 1981 (see in particular the minutes of the policy and resources committee from 15th May 1980 (GDC, 1980b) to 3rd December 1981 (GDC, 1981b) held in Glasgow City Archives) and the corporate plan was agreed at a full council meeting on 17th December 1981 (GDC, 1981c). The corporate plan was devised through a series of employment and economic regeneration conferences in 1980 and 1981, with further additions contributed to the plan from other departments – reflecting the ascendency of economic development within the council’s strategic priorities.
culture. One such area, introduced with mixed results, were programme area committees, as Steven Hamilton has outlined:

I set up a programme area committee structure that tried to gather together chief officers who were involved in similar kinds of activities and I don’t think they were very successful. They certainly weren’t very popular amongst the heads of department who much preferred managing their own departments to attending long and uninteresting meetings as many of them seemed to be, where they discussed things that were supposed to be of mutual interest but often weren’t. So that wasn’t a success.  
(Steven Hamilton, interview, 3 July 2014)

The new managerial approach of ‘top-down’ joint strategic planning was not universally embraced across all departments of the council, and not all departments changed their approaches accordingly. One such aspect of GDC’s work not to be overtly affected by the introduction of such corporate management structures as programme area committees during the early to mid-1980s was the department of museums and art galleries. Alasdair Auld joined the museums service in 1956, becoming Director in 1979 before retiring in 1988. Auld has reflected that ‘nothing very much’ changed during his time at the museums service, and that his directorship did not mark a tremendous shift from that of previous directors:

From ’56, apart from the increase in staff, the system, and the change of name from Curators, as they were, to Keepers, in line with all other big institutions [...] the system worked exactly the same and we were lucky enough eventually to get more staff and some departments [of the museums service] got more than others [...] But it worked very well.  
(Alasdair Auld, interview, 25 February 2015)

During the period leading to the mid-1980s, GDC did not have an explicit cultural policy shaped by the new managerialism because the council did not make it a priority to develop one. Whilst it continued to support the city’s libraries and museums through core revenue funding and independent arts organisations through grant funding, the structures for decision-making remained closer to the incremental approach of the traditional council structure that corporate management was intended to replace than the top-down rational approach
associated with corporate management itself.\textsuperscript{50} As Jean McFadden has commented:

\begin{quote}
In the very early ’80s there wasn’t what you could call an arts or culture policy which was coherent. Things were done on an ad hoc basis. (Jean McFadden, interview, 24 March 2014)
\end{quote}

Within the council, support for the arts and culture was facilitated by the patronage of individual key actors. For example, the catalyst for GDC support for the establishment of Mayfest, which from 1983 became an annual festival of popular music and theatre involving international performers, was Jean McFadden’s support of a proposal from the trade unions. McFadden has stated:

\begin{quote}
I remember the day when Jane McKay, who was very much involved with Glasgow Trades Council and the trade union movement, came to visit me and suggested that there should be a festival which coincided with Labour Day, the first of May, and I thought it sounded like an excellent idea. And again it was one of these festivals that could draw together a number of things: theatre, dance, poetry, etc., etc., and so I was very keen, and I went to discuss it with certainly the Director of Finance [Bill English], and persuaded him that it was worth supporting, and it took off very quickly. (Jean McFadden, interview, 24 March 2014)
\end{quote}

Mayfest initially developed as an ad hoc project, though GDC support was not provided without strategic intent. Amongst other things, Mayfest reasserted the significance of the Labour movement to the city, an example of how additional, often idiosyncratic, prompting factors for GDC support were at play.

In addition, a key actor in is revealed to be Bill English, Director of Finance, who often played a more significant role than the directors of museums, libraries and halls and theatres - or indeed, the elected members on the arts and culture

\textsuperscript{50} Decisions on the arts and culture continued to be made in the same way through the Committee Civic Amenities Committee’s Sub-committee on Cultural Matters and the Finance Committee throughout the early 1980s as in the late 1970s and at no point was the development of an explicit formal cultural policy discussed. The Sub-committee on Cultural Matters was ‘upgraded’ to become an Arts and Culture Committee in its own right in September 1982 (GDC, 1982b). This can be interpreted as the as an indication of the upward trajectory of arts and culture in the council agenda in the years leading to 1990. However, in practice this upgrade appears to have been in title only, the new committee functioning in the same way during its early years as the previous sub-committee. The major preoccupation of the policy and resources committee, which drove policy decisions, during the early 1980s was not the arts and culture but economic development.
committee - in directing decision-making on GDC’s financial support for the arts and culture during this period.

Despite the inherent tensions between old and new structures, which continued throughout the 1980s, the introduction of corporate management in GDC brought several consequences for working practices. The most significant of these, as a prompting and facilitating factor in what became the cultural turn in Glasgow’s policy-making, was the establishment of formal structures around economic development, as shall be discussed in the next section.

5.5 Culture and economic development

The new strategic emphasis on economic development within public sector bodies - GDC, SRC and the SDA - was the most prominent prompting and facilitating factor in the development of Glasgow’s cultural policy. Whilst the city’s 1986 ECOC bid was based on a coherent strategy, it was not a strategy which stemmed from a coherent, explicit cultural policy, but from the city’s rapidly-developing economic development policies, plans and strategies.

This section will, therefore, discuss the major public sector bodies - the SDA, GDC and SRC - involved in the economic development of Glasgow and their initially misaligned strategic approaches. It will then focus in detail on GDC’s approach to economic development during the early to mid-1980s, which was facilitated by the establishment of corporate management. It will discuss, in particular, the shifting position of culture from a peripheral position in GDC’s formal Economic Development Plans, as it emerged as a tool for economic development. It will conclude that culture emerged in GDC’s Economic Development Plans as a consumption and image-boosting activity within the service sector economy, rather than being conceived as an industry in its own right. This section will argue that GDC’s early Economic Development Plans brought a new coherence to economic development work in the city more broadly that - alongside the development of public-private partnerships for economic development purposes (to be discussed in section 5.7) - provided a foundation for the strategic direction of Glasgow’s 1986 ECOC bid and subsequent cultural policy.
Economic development in Scotland presumes the existence of a Scottish economy. Some academics have disputed whether the Scottish economy existed during the 1980s. Writing in 1983, Keating and Midwinter stated:

It is a matter of debate whether there is nowadays such a thing as a Scottish economy. In the nineteenth century, the heyday of Scottish private enterprise, there clearly was a distinct economic system and industrial network, albeit one which was closely linked to England. (Keating and Midwinter, 1983: 169)

Keating and Midwinter (1983: 169) argued that, following the decline of prosperity in Scotland since the First World War, Scotland no longer had a distinct economy of its own: ‘the main instruments of economic policy [...] are a UK responsibility’ and ‘the responsibilities of the Treasury, the Inland Revenue and the Bank of England are identical in England and Scotland’.

However, for the Labour Party to promise the establishment of a Scottish Development Agency as ‘the main instrument for the regeneration of the Scottish economy’ (Keating, 1988: 47-48) in its October 1974 election manifesto, and then to establish it once in government, suggests a political recognition of the need to address the shortcomings of a specifically Scottish economy.

The SDA’s remit was not entirely coherent when the organisation was first founded in 1975/76. Its establishment involved the merging of several bodies in Scotland with disparate purposes - such as derelict land clearance, industrial estates and the development of rural areas - into a new non-departmental public body at ‘arms-length’ from central government (Hood, 1991: 3; Gulliver, 1984).

Stuart Gulliver (interview, 28 August 2014), Regional Director at the SDA between 1978 and 1990, has commented that although the SDA was ‘setting the pace and inventing the agenda’ in the days before the establishment of its

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51 Gulliver (1984: 322) has written about the ‘unique powers’ conferred upon the SDA, which brought together what he termed the ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ components of economic development within a single organisation for the first time. Gulliver described the hardware components as: ‘essentially physical works including land assembly, infrastructure provision, factory and commercial building, environmental works and land renewal’. He describes the software elements as ‘the facility to make loans, give guarantees, take equity participation and provide a wide range of business development services’.
equivalent agencies in England, its agenda ‘wasn’t formed in great detail’ during the 1970s. Gulliver has reflected that a turning point was the appointment of Chief Executive, George Matheson in 1980:

He was there for ten years and it was really good to have a leader like him, who gave us a lot of space to identify the future for the Scottish economy, to recognise that even though we had powers which were unprecedented at the sub-national level, nevertheless these were quite small levers which we could pull to affect the future performance of the Scottish economy. (Stuart Gulliver, interview, 28 August 2014)

If the scale of the agency’s powers was unprecedented, so was the scale of the challenge the agency faced in Glasgow and Scotland more broadly. However, over the course of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the SDA’s work often did not cohere with GDC’s work to regenerate Glasgow’s economy. Unlike the contemporary GLC and GLEB in London, GDC and the SDA did not spend four years working together on a joint overarching industrial strategy for the city. One reason for this was that - unlike the GLC and GLEB - the geographical boundaries of the SDA’s and GDC’s economic development activity did not correspond. This was further complicated by the economic development approach of SRC, whose boundaries extended far beyond Glasgow.

As the SDA covered Scotland as a whole (apart from the area covered by the HIDB) its remit included, for example, developing industrial activity in New Towns in the West of Scotland, a priority reinforced by SRC. This involved the relocation of businesses and employees from Glasgow, undermining GDC’s efforts to retain industry and population within the city boundaries.

Within GDC, the establishment of corporate management and formal structures to support the council’s identified corporate priority of economic development resulted in the establishment of the Economic Development Unit, headed by

52 Gulliver (interview, 28 August 2014) has described ‘responding to the massive change that’s taken place in Scotland’s economy’ as ‘a very exciting but also very difficult period’: ‘When announcements are made almost daily that another company has gone down the tubes employing 20,000 people, or there’s another one employing 15,000 people, and there’s a very difficult situation involving 40,000 people involved in a whole sector that’s disappearing. These were almost daily occurrences, and therefore what you do in the teeth of that… [It was] extremely difficult and inventing and developing a response to that was tough.’

53 The social and economic impacts of this approach are well documented in such studies of the ‘Glasgow Effect’ as the 2016 report, History, Politics and Vulnerability: explaining excess mortality in Scotland and Glasgow by Walsh et al.
Town Clerk Depute, Theo Crombie.\textsuperscript{54} Steve Inch worked as a Planning Officer at GDC’s new Economic Development Unit between 1981 and 1986 before becoming Head of the new Regeneration Unit in 1986. Commenting on the link between corporate management and economic development, Steve Inch stated:

> The intention was that no single department would be given the job of regenerating the economy. (Steve Inch, interview, 6 August 2014)

Each department was expected to participate, through programme area teams, in this shared council priority. In practice, planners such as Steve Inch, enabled by the new corporate approach and priority of economic development, were in fact one of a select group of individual officers and elected members within GDC - such as the Chief Executive, Leader, Director of Finance and Head of Public Relations - to have a strategic overview of the entirety of GDC’s remit and activity, including the arts and culture.

As there was no department or director of culture within GDC during the 1980s, those leading the separate departments of halls and theatres, libraries and museums were not amongst those to have a strategic overview of GDC’s cultural activity as a whole. Whilst these departments continued to be led in the traditional way with some resistance to new managerial approaches, planning for the city’s cultural infrastructure gradually became subsumed into the Economic Development Plans produced by the Economic Development Unit over the course of the 1980s.

The focus of GDC’s first Economic Development Plan (GDC, 1981a), dated September 1981, was a full review of the city’s economic, accompanied by chapters on potential solutions to the economic challenges identified, principally

\textsuperscript{54} The Economic Development Bureau, as it was initially known, was established by the policy and resources committee in December 1980, as a result of Steven Hamilton’s recommendations arising from a Corporate Plan Conference on Employment and Economic Regeneration held in November 1980 (GDC, 1980d). In establishing the Economic Development Bureau, the committee agreed to Steven Hamilton’s proposal that ‘the Chief Executive be made directly responsible for the control and co-ordination of all the Council’s activities in the field of economic regeneration’ - reflecting the importance of economic regeneration and placing the new Economic Development Bureau in a powerful position in the council’s structure.
the significant rise in unemployment. Describing the Economic Development Unit's approach to the first plan, Steve Inch has stated:

We looked at what we should be doing as a council in terms of land development, in terms of joint ventures with the private sector, in terms of working with Scottish Development Agency as it was at the time, in terms of joint working with Strathclyde Regional Council, because we quickly cottoned on to the fact that economic development had to look at much wider issues than the council itself had responsibility for, particularly education and training, workforce development and some of the social work issues about dealing with disadvantaged groups, poverty, quite a complicated system all of these things tied together. (Steve Inch, interview, 6 August 2014)

At no point in the main body of the plan was culture seen as a solution to these complex economic challenges. However, ‘improving Glasgow’s attractiveness to tourists and other visitors’ was seen as a contributing factor in economic development and an appendix listed potential initiatives to support this. In this appendix, amongst the suggestions to ‘improve signposting’ and ‘better litter collection’ were suggestions for ‘a visitors centre/exhibition hall giving an audio visual presentation of the City’s history, culture and architecture’ and ‘promotion of the industrial heritage of the city by appropriate publicity and a “living museum”’ (GDC, 1981a: 75-76). From this peripheral position, culture began to emerge as a tool for economic development.

In GDC’s second Economic Development Plan (GDC, 1983a), produced in March 1983, tourism shifted from the appendices to a chapter in its own right, alongside chapters on ‘retail employment’, ‘industrial promotion’ and ‘training and job creation’. GDC identified three problems with the city’s tourism industry:

1. How can the District Council improve the poor image of the City?
2. How can Glasgow attract more visitors?
3. How can the City improve provision for the visitor? (GDC, 1983a: 32)

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55 GDC’s first Economic Development Plan (GDC, 1981a: 3) recognised that: ‘Between 1971 and 1980 employment in Glasgow declined by an estimated 54,500 (-10.9%). This compares with a 1.8% employment growth in Great Britain as a whole during the same period. Since 1977, job losses in the City have accelerated with some 33,000 redundancies officially recorded between June 1977 and May 1980.’
As solutions, this second Economic Development Plan identified the development of festivals and events as well as museums as ‘visitor magnets’ (GDC, 1983a: 38) and recognised the importance of promoting the city’s existing cultural facilities, stating:

there is also a need for an officer to market and promote the Council’s own leisure facilities (eg halls, museums and art galleries) as tourist assets and promote further projects. (GDC, 1983a: 36)

1983 became a turning point for the development of Glasgow’s tourism industry and the position of the city’s cultural assets within it. As will be discussed in section 5.6, the launch of the ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ public relations campaign, which aimed to transform the city’s image, was combined with the launch of Greater Glasgow Tourist Board (GGTB) and a ‘homecoming’ campaign, ‘Welcome Home to Glasgow’, aiming to draw people from around the world with a connection to Glasgow into the city. Significantly, that year also saw the first Mayfest arts festival and the opening of The Burrell Collection by HM The Queen, accompanied by assertive promotional activity.

GDC’s early Economic Development Plans brought a new coherence to economic development work in the city more broadly, acknowledging the duplication of efforts and lack of strategic connection between GDC’s and the SDA’s economic development activity and beginning to develop solutions. In the years preceding Glasgow’s 1986 ECOC bid, GDC and the SDA worked together on joint projects, such as the building of the Scottish Exhibition and Conference Centre (opened 1985) and the 1988 Garden Festival (awarded to the city in 1983).

GDC’s subsequent Economic Development Plans produced during the mid-1980s (GDC, 1984a, 1984b) planned for the development of cultural facilities - such as festivals, events, heritage trails and tourist attractions in general - and activity to promote them as an integrated part of activity to strengthen tourist facilities in the city (GDC, 1984b: 28). However, at no stage in these plans did the development of culture go beyond this. The cultural industries were not identified as a sector of the city economy to be developed in its own right; conversely, culture became an increasingly integrated part of the city’s developing tourist industry.
The SDA and GDC’s approaches to the economic development of Glasgow show that neither was alone in initially lacking obvious solutions to the city’s severe socio-economic problems, though both nonetheless invested resources in a range of endeavours in an attempt to halt the decline. The position of the arts and culture was marginal in the initial work of both the SDA and GDC Economic Development Unit. However, over the course of the 1980s, GDC began to recognise the potential of the city’s cultural assets as a consumption activity within the developing service sector economy, particularly as a means of changing the city’s image and attracting more visitors and their accompanying spending power.

It was this - alongside the development of public-private partnerships for economic development purposes - that provided a foundation for the strategic direction of Glasgow’s 1986 ECOC bid. As such, the new emphasis on economic development, combined with the new managerialism, reveals a slow burn towards a coherent, yet implicit and effective rather than explicit and nominal, cultural policy for the city.

5.6 Re-representing the city: Glasgow’s image and the rise of public relations

With the realisation in the early to mid-1980s that Glasgow was becoming a post-industrial city came the recognition of the increasing importance of the city’s image to its changing economy.

This section will discuss the reasons why Glasgow’s image gained a new significance in efforts to regenerate the city economy. Within the broader context of the rise of public relations, it will outline the approach taken by Glasgow’s leadership to changing the city’s image in the early 1980s, with specific reference to events in 1983.
As will be discussed in section 5.7, the 1985 McKinsey report, *The Potential of Glasgow City Centre* (Cullen, 1985)\(^{56}\), presented a clear economic development strategy for the city centre which incorporated image building initiatives, into which the city's selected cultural assets, such as its architecture and events, were subsumed. The report’s proposals built upon developments in the city in the preceding years, including recognition of the importance of the city’s image to the service sector economy.

Michael Kelly, Glasgow’s Lord Provost between 1980 and 1984 who, significantly, had trained as an economist and subsequently established his own public relations company, has reflected on Glasgow’s image in 1980 and why it had to change:

> It’s difficult to believe how bad it was. Glasgow had a reputation for being a very dirty and dismal, dank place plagued by razor gangs and hooliganism, multiple deprivation. These problems are very similar to other cities in the United Kingdom but Glasgow unfortunately just got the reputation for that and that persisted because people continued to focus on those problems rather than on the positive side of Glasgow. It was a very problematic image for Glasgow because it did inhibit economic growth, it inhibited the visitor industry, it inhibited attracting key workers to come to Glasgow, and generally it was holding Glasgow back, especially as in the 1980s the old industries really had disappeared, the old heavy industries, and Glasgow was looking for other industries to try and create employment and investment and those industries were mainly service-based. (Michael Kelly, interview, 23 June 2014)

The reason Kelly argued that Glasgow’s poor image was holding the city back was that it had been irrelevant to the success of heavy industry but was integral to the viability and success of the service industries. Although in the early 1980s the service sector was, as GDC’s initial economic development plan identified, also in decline, it was beginning to be identified by the city as the main potential area for economic growth, in the wake of heavy industry’s decline. Kelly has commented:

> Particularly for service-based industries image was very, very important. It didn’t matter so much if it was a coal mine or a steelworks or an

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\(^{56}\) Whilst this key report is often referred to as ‘the McKinsey report’ in this thesis, I have followed the example of The Mitchell Library, Glasgow and The University of Glasgow Library in listing it in the bibliography under the name of its author, Gordon Cullen.
engineering works, image wasn’t necessarily important to make those things happen but when you’re trying to sell much softer services, particularly in the visitor industry image was vital, and therefore, before we could start doing anything on those fronts we really had to try and change the image. (Michael Kelly, interview, 23 June 2014)

As Glasgow needed to change its image to rebuild its economy, key actors such as Kelly contended that public relations could provide the solution.

The growing professionalisation of the PR industry, including recognition within political parties of the potential potency of PR and marketing activity, was discussed in Chapter 3. The rise of city marketing - marketing the city as a whole, rather than its constituent parts, as a product - during the 1980s and 1990s was also discussed in Chapter 3. As discussed in Chapter 3, as with many significant developments in Glasgow during the 1980s, public relations activity was not new to the local authority but rooted in previous decades, Harry Dutch having worked as Glasgow Corporation’s PR Officer. Dutch’s assistant, Harry Diamond, became Head of Public Relations from GDC’s establishment in 1975 until his retirement in 1991, and built a growing department during his time there, driving forward such image-boosting publicity campaigns as that attached to the opening of The Burrell Collection in 1983.

However, whilst Glasgow Corporation and GDC may have been ahead of the national curve in establishing public relations departments, Michael Kelly has claimed that the council itself was an obstacle in efforts to transform Glasgow’s image.

There were a lot of obstacles [in developing the ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ campaign] particularly within the council because councillors focused very

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57 GDC archive documents show that by the end of the 1980s, Harry Diamond had built something of a public relations empire within GDC. Diamond drove the establishment and growth of what became a particularly well-resourced press and PR department within the Festivals Unit, focused on ECOC 1990, in addition to his own broader PR department. Archive documents show that by July 1989 this department had 14 members of staff (with Harry Diamond retaining control as ‘task force leader’) (see uncatalogued documents in GDC committee papers box 126 held at Glasgow City Archives, The Mitchell Library, Glasgow). This was considerably well-staffed for a sub-department of GDC’s broader PR department - and particularly significant given that, according to Diamond’s autobiography (1996: 68), there were just 3 members of staff (the Head of PR, the Head of PR’s assistant and a secretary) in the entire GDC public relations department when GDC was established in 1975. This also shows the significant role the arts and culture played in the growth of public relations capacity and activity in GDC over the course of the 1980s.
narrow budgets on trying to make physical improvements. They were mending roofs and looking after houses and wanting to spend money on the normal council services, and they didn’t see that an advertising campaign, as they called it, was going to help in any way at all.\textsuperscript{58} (Michael Kelly, interview, 23 June 2014)

Indeed, Kelly has asserted that changing Glasgow’s image was not a priority in terms of council expenditure.

The public relations department was there to promote council services. It wasn’t there to promote Glasgow. (Michael Kelly, interview, 23 June 2014)\textsuperscript{59}

This reflects an obstacle with city marketing in Glasgow at this nascent stage: that in the years before ‘destination marketing’, there was no designated organisation or individual responsible for marketing the city as a whole.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{58} It should be noted, however, that while Kelly claims the council initially failed to support the Glasgow’s Miles Better campaign, archival records show that GDC was supportive of the 1983 ‘Welcome Home to Glasgow’ promotional campaign headed by Kelly, which ran concurrently to Glasgow’s Miles Better. This was a campaign to promote Glasgow to people living overseas with connections to the city, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter. In March 1982, GDC Policy and Resources Committee Sub-committee on Employment earmarked £80,000 towards the campaign after hearing from the then Lord Provost Kelly on ‘the aims of the promotion and the opportunities for partnership arrangements with the private sector’ (GDC, 1982a).

\textsuperscript{59} The relationship between Michael Kelly and GDC public relations department appears not to have run entirely smoothly during the 1980s, judging from Kelly’s interview and Harry Diamond’s autobiography (Diamond, 1996). In the broader section of Kelly’s interview from which the quotation above is taken, Kelly took a rather dim view of GDC’s PR department, stating: ‘The public relations department got in the way [of the Glasgow’s Miles Better campaign] really, I didn’t use the public relations department at all. The public relations department in my opinion was very poorly run. And erm… It… The public relations department was there to promote council services. It wasn’t there to promote Glasgow. That is the crucial distinction, really. To say we had a public relations department, we were not promoting the city really we were promoting what the council was doing in the city. My campaign was promoting Glasgow as a whole. And… I wasn’t impressed by the personnel in the public relations department so I just left them to get on with their own thing and… the [Glasgow’s Miles Better] campaign did not run at any time through them when I was there.’ In his autobiography, meanwhile, Diamond stated that Kelly ‘carefully avoids contradicting any interviewer who mistakenly implies that he invented the miles better campaign and was solely responsible for telling the world about everything good that ever happened in the city’ (Diamond, 1996: 148). Kelly and Diamond were clearly both key protagonists in the rise of PR in GDC and GDC’s attempts to change the city’s image (bearing in mind both were GDC actors, Kelly as Lord Provost and Diamond as Head of Public Relations). As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the later development of ECOC 1990 was connected to GDC’s attempts to change the image of the city, with GDC’s understanding of PR extending well beyond promoting council services (during a period in which Diamond was Head of PR). However, the early 1980s were a period when, despite assertive PR campaigns such as that accompanying the opening of The Burrell Collection, which did much to promote Glasgow, neither GDC nor any other agency was officially responsible for marketing the city as a whole, as this chapter goes on to discuss.

\textsuperscript{60} Indeed, some interviewees reported the Scottish Tourist Board’s lack of interest or willingness to promote Glasgow as a tourist destination during the 1980s.
A further challenge was the disconnect between the city’s socio-economic problems and the image of the city Kelly and his associates wished to project. In 1993, Paddison discussed the ‘image-reality gap’ emerging from ECOC 1990, where:

the projection of the new Glasgow bore little relevance to the realities of social deprivation and poverty concentrated in the city’s peripheral estates. (Paddison, 1993: 348)

That attempts to change Glasgow’s image a decade earlier were based on distracting attention away from the city’s severe socio-economic problems is not denied by key actors such as Michael Kelly. Indeed, this was central to the construction of the ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ campaign during the early 1980s, as Kelly has reflected:

What Glasgow had to do was to focus on these positive aspects and just ignore the social problems. Blatantly ignoring them really because as a Lord Provost and as a council we couldn’t solve those problems. It needed massive government help, it needed outside investment. It needed a whole lot of things that the council couldn’t do, particularly when Thatcher was in power. Remember this was the era where the public sector was really being hit very hard so we had no funds to tackle these kind of problems. So I decided, well we can’t cure them, just ignore them, let’s concentrate on promoting the positive aspects of Glasgow as New York had done and see if we could change the image in that way.

(Michael Kelly, interview, 23 June 2014)

The ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ campaign, featuring Mr Happy and involving advertising trailblazer John Struthers, was inspired by ‘I Love New York’ at a time when, as Kelly has reflected in his interview, ‘social problems were really, really deep in New York and yet that didn’t seem to bother visitors because they concentrated on the positive aspects’ of the city.

The ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ campaign was launched in 1983, the same year as the first Mayfest was held, The Burrell Collection opened in the midst of a surge of publicity and the ‘Welcome Home to Glasgow’ campaign was launched, as well as the launch of the new GGTB. GGTB figures state that this period saw a massive increase in both visitors to Glasgow and their associated spending

61 These figures were provided by GGTB in Glasgow’s European City of Culture submission to The Office of Arts and Libraries in April 1986 (GDC, 1986b).
power, rising from 700,000 visitors spending £68m in 1982 to 2,000,000 visitors spending £165m in 1984.

This series of events resembles, at first glance, a strategically co-ordinated approach across a variety of business and cultural sectors. Indeed, connections were made by such key actors as Eddie Friel - who worked in marketing at Glasgow’s Theatre Royal before becoming Chief Executive of the new GGTB in August 1983 - between the city’s cultural infrastructure and its developing tourism industry by, for example, attempting to establish a year-round programme of events, as theatres had previously closed over the main tourist seasons. However, this culmination of events in 1983 was due as much to opportunism and coincidence as strategic planning.

While culture was beginning to shift from its peripheral position in the appendices to the latter sections of GDC’s economic development plans, McKinsey and Co. had yet to make their observations and recommendations on the interconnected role image, culture and events had to play in regenerating the city economy.

The opening of The Burrell Collection was the culmination of decades of stalled planning. That it became part of a critical mass that emerged in the early 1980s was, as outlined earlier, more due to coincidence than formal, coherent and overarching strategic planning.

Michael Kelly has stated that in the development of the ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ campaign ‘there was no strategy at the beginning [...] very much for me it was seeing an opportunity and seizing that’ (interview, 23 June 2014). This reflects the pragmatic opportunism that became a defining characteristic of the city during the 1980s.

5.7 Public-private partnership

In 1986, a partnership between public and private sectors would form the lynchpin of Glasgow’s bid to host the ECOC event in 1990. This partnership has been credited by those directly involved in the decision-making process to select
the UK’s ECOC nomination as one of the reasons Glasgow’s bid outshone the competition (Richard Luce, interview, 24 March 2015; Patrick Fallon, interview, 11 March 2015; Joy Parry, interview, 11 December 2014). This public-private partnership approach is also central to the strategic trajectory of Glasgow’s emerging cultural policy more broadly over the course of the 1980s and into the 1990s.

This key facilitating factor in the development of Glasgow’s cultural policy developed as a result of partnerships between public and private sectors rising to a new prominence in economic development planning and policy in the city over the course of the 1980s.

Public-private partnerships have been theoretically framed by various commentators as both Thatcherite and an intrinsic characteristic of the neoliberal state (Harvey, 2005; Brenner and Theodore, 2005; Berry, 2014). During the Thatcher governments of the 1980s, public-private partnerships were one of a number of urban policy tools in which the weighting of responsibility for the regeneration of the ‘inner cities’ was increasingly shifted away from the public to the private sector. It was also one of a number of means of privileging private sector interests over those of the public sector.

In his Marxist political economy account of neoliberalism, Harvey has dissected public-private partnerships in the context of Margaret Thatcher’s approach to economic development:

Businesses and corporations not only collaborate intimately with state actors but even acquire a strong role in writing legislation, determining public policies, and setting regulatory frameworks (which are mainly advantageous to themselves). (Harvey, 2005: 76-77)

In the twenty-first century, public-private partnerships have come to be associated with such projects as the building of new hospitals and schools through private finance initiatives, in which infrastructure formerly managed by the public sector is developed and managed by private sector companies as a means of efficiently improving public services, often resulting, conversely, in poor value for money to the taxpayer. In the 1980s, whilst public-private
partnerships were not yet established on such formal and extensive terms in the UK, the phrase began to gain political and academic currency. For example, writing in 1989 Robin Boyle (1989a: 73-74) used the term to describe a shift, emerging in 1985, in the SDA’s financial and administrative involvement in urban policy in Glasgow and Scotland more broadly, in which the role of the private sector was elevated.

In the mid-1980s public-private partnerships were one of a number of emerging tendencies, now characterised as both neoliberal and Thatcherite, which affected local authorities such as GDC. The central government promotion of privatisation, another such tendency, met with vocal opposition from GDC as well as many other Labour-led metropolitan authorities, where it was seen as a force intended to undermine and weaken local government. However, despite the underlying premise of privileging private sector interests, the central government promotion of public-private partnerships did not meet with the same level of resistance in Glasgow.

Steven Hamilton has noted that partnerships between public and private sectors in Glasgow became stronger during the 1980s, as private sector leaders appeared to have more influence than GDC with central government:

There was nothing like the close relationship [between the council and business community] that was developed during the Thatcher years, but it was necessary. We couldn’t get things through that should have been put through, without the imprimatur of approval as it were, of the private sector people. (Steven Hamilton, interview, 3 July 2014)

In the approach that developed in Glasgow over the course of the 1980s, pragmatism superseded any ideological opposition. Hamilton has stated:

It became obvious during the Thatcher years that she [Margaret Thatcher] was totally opposed to anything that smacked of local authority or indeed public enterprise, because she thought that you couldn’t possibly have enterprise in the public sector, enterprise was something for the private sector. So, a whole lot of the things that we achieved at that time were

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62 For example, GDC established an anti-privatisation sub-committee of the council. See, for example, Minutes of the Council and Committees, 1988-89 print no. 3 (May, June, July 1988) held in GDC council minutes box: GDC 1/2, 1988/89, in Glasgow City Archives, The Mitchell Library, Glasgow.
achieved by partnership arrangements and there were plenty of people in the city, businessmen in the city, who could see through what was happening and although they were Tory supporters, they were quite pleased to put their name to things, to be members of the board of this, that or the other. I think the concert hall was one of these but there were other companies, other things where they were heavily involved and given prominent positions so that this could be presented to the government, as a private/public combination. It was all financed by the council as a rule. (Steven Hamilton, interview, 3 July 2014)

One significant reason for this lack of resistance within GDC to the central government ‘imposition’ of public-private partnerships was that it was no imposition at all: such partnerships were already historically-rooted in Glasgow.

It was within this context that the two critical developments of the 1985 report by management consultants McKinsey and Co., *The Potential of Glasgow City Centre* (Cullen, 1985), and the establishment of the public-private partnership, Glasgow Action, as a result of that report, provided a point of convergence between GDC’s economic development activity and that of the SDA.

David Macdonald, Head of Service Industries Division at the SDA between 1983 and 1985 and subsequently Director of Glasgow Action from 1985, has described how this marked a shift in the SDA’s approach to economic development:

> McKinsey and Company were commissioned to look at Glasgow. That was a bit of a departure for the SDA because up to that point the SDA had, to the extent that it focused its area initiatives, they tended to be in what they’d call problem areas, areas of real need for economic regeneration having sunk to quite a serious low point. So whether that be Clydebank or Coatbridge or wherever there were special initiatives in those areas. It was a departure that Edward [Cunningham, Director at the SDA] then commissioned McKinseys to look at Glasgow city centre, which wasn’t necessarily a problem area, but it was perceived that it could become a problem area or alternatively the potential of Glasgow city centre could be

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63 Hamilton’s reflections on Glasgow’s approach during this period align with Carmichael’s comments that the council’s approach during this era was ‘designed to enable construction of a consensus between the public and private sectors to advance Glasgow’s case on a unified front’ given that confrontation with central government held ‘little prospect of success’. In comparison with Liverpool during this period, Carmichael has described Glasgow’s greater capacity ‘to join battle in combined formation’ and work towards a shared, coherent strategy ‘rather than charging headlong into oblivion’ (1995: 135).

64 For example, as discussed in Chapter 2, partnerships between Glasgow Corporation and businessmen were the foundation of the city’s approach to the exhibitions of 1888 and 1901 and the building of the Kelvingrove Museum and Art Gallery.
realised and it could help launch the rest of Glasgow and indeed the West of Scotland to create an area of economic strength. (David Macdonald, interview, 8 September 2014)

McKinsey and Co. were commissioned by the SDA to examine Glasgow city centre as if it were a business, then produce a ‘business plan’ for it. Their report (Cullen, 1985: 3) recognised the irreversible decline in heavy industry and that ‘service industries provide the only realistic opportunity for employment growth in Glasgow’. Stating that Glasgow faced ‘a spiral of decline’ (Cullen, 1985: 5), the report noted:

Glasgow can avoid this possible spiral of decline by building a new and stronger economic role, based on a revitalised city centre, strong in services and fuelled by the talent and energy of its people. (Cullen, 1985: 10)

The report set out the aim ‘to achieve fundamental, self-sustaining change in service industry performance’ through four objectives: ‘make Glasgow more attractive as a business base’; ‘make Glasgow more attractive to people’; ‘create an entrepreneurial environment’; and ‘promote Glasgow’ (Cullen, 1986: 3-4).

The report’s key recommendation was the establishment of a small leadership group to act as a focus for these efforts. This group, named Glasgow Action, led by industrialist Sir Norman Macfarlane, predominantly comprised businessmen such as Forbes Macpherson, then Deputy Chairman of TSB Scotland and Sir Eric Yarrow, then Chairman of Clydesdale Bank, alongside leaders of both GDC and SRC, supported by a small administrative team. Notably, it was Macfarlane who drew together the board, persuading both council leaders as well as his business leader peers to become involved.

Whereas the arts and culture occupied a marginal position in GDC’s early economic development plans, in the McKinsey report they are clearly articulated as critical assets in a process of economic development. Recognising that:

Glasgow’s present image deters visitors and discourages people from considering Glasgow as a place to live and work, (Cullen, 1985: 10)
the report connected the arts and culture to its proposed solution of increased public relations activity. It proposed extending ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ to ‘target audiences outside Glasgow’ as ‘a sustained campaign to build a clear, positive image of Glasgow as a place to visit, as an attractive location for businesses, and as the centre of an area offering an outstandingly attractive quality of life’ (Cullen, 1985: 33).

Stating that ‘advertising alone - no matter how evocative or how well targeted - will not change negative perceptions of the city’ (Cullen, 1985: 34), the report identified a vital and unique role for the arts and culture in this campaign of image transformation and its messages about the quality of life in the city:

Publicity needs to be given to the city’s new image. The wide publicity given to the Burrell Collection, which has obviously been highly effective, should set the standard for the future. The impact and cost effectiveness of specially staged events would be substantial and Glasgow Action should promote a programme to complement and sustain the impact of the 1988 National Garden Festival, this might include a technology World Fair, a motor racing Grand Prix, world premieres of major cultural events and a film or television series set in Glasgow, reflecting the positive qualities of the city. (Cullen, 1985: 34)

Thus, the McKinsey report articulated the potential of ‘major cultural events’ as a vehicle in the city’s economic renewal; predominantly a high impact, cost effective vehicle for changing the city’s image to support the shift away from manufacturing to the service industries.

This emphasis on the transformative power of cultural events is reinforced in the proposed physical transformation to the city centre. The report proposed the development of a new square - ‘Caledonia Square’ - at the top of Buchanan Street to ‘form the cultural focus of the city’ (Cullen, 1985: 51). In an example of the uneven approach to the spatial development of the city and the focus of investment on the city centre - rather than more deprived areas - as the main

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65 Glasgow’s Miles Better was originally aimed at audiences outside Glasgow in general but the McKinsey strategy recommended a more strategic approach targeting specific groups, such as business leaders and middle managers. Michael Kelly has commented on the original audience for Glasgow’s Miles Better: ‘I wasn’t particularly interested in what Glaswegians thought of the city because they weren’t going to influence jobs and investment here. So it was targeted outside Glasgow. And it was really just an unexpected by-product that it caught on so well in Glasgow and it really revived confidence.’ (Michael Kelly, interview, 23 June 2014)
catalyst for economic development, the McKinsey report proposed relocating the Caledonia Road Church, designed by Alexander ‘Greek’ Thomson, from the Gorbals to this new site as ‘a flamboyant gesture to Glasgow’s Victorian heritage’ (Cullen, 1985: 51). Whilst this particular proposal remains unrealised, McKinsey’s reframing of the city’s cultural events and architecture as assets in a process of economic development laid the foundations for the subsequent development of cultural policy in Glasgow.

A further role for the arts and culture emerged: promoting confidence in Glasgow within the city’s leadership as well as within target audiences beyond. This confidence is projected in the foreword to the McKinsey report, written by SDA Chief Executive, George Matheson:

Glasgow’s willingness and ability to succeed are clearly indicated by the number and breadth of initiatives already taken or planned, signalling a renewed self-confidence and pride - for example, the Scottish Exhibition Centre, the opening of the Burrell Collection, its new hotels, the ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ campaign, the successful hosting of the CBI Conference, the proposed redevelopment at the top of Buchanan Street and at St Enoch’s and the 1988 Garden Festival. (Cullen, 1985: 3)

David Macdonald has reflected on the advantage his new insider knowledge of Glasgow’s cultural assets gave him as director of Glasgow Action during the organisation’s five-year lifespan, as he worked to attract new business to the city:

It was an eye opener to people like me, you know, to get told, hang on a minute, the SNO, as it was then, is in Glasgow, it’s not in Edinburgh. Scottish Opera’s in Glasgow it’s not in Edinburgh, so there were lots of things like that, that made me even prouder of Glasgow, but also strengthened my pitch when I was talking to other people about it. (David Macdonald, interview, 8 September 2014)

For Sir Norman Macfarlane, the Chairman of Glasgow Action, Glasgow’s cultural assets provided a means of advocating the strengths of the city to his peers. Writing in Britoil Magazine 1987/88, in an article which is both celebratory in tone and clearly aimed at senior business sector managers, Norman Macfarlane discussed the relationship between industrialist art collectors, the developmental role of independent arts organisations such as Glasgow Art Club
and the Royal Glasgow Institute over the past century and Glasgow’s current municipal art collections, which make Glasgow ‘the most exciting and stimulating artistic environment in Britain today’ (Macfarlane, 1990: 50).

A dedicated art collector, Norman Macfarlane was knighted in 1982 for services not only to Industry but also to the Arts. Macfarlane brought credibility to his message about Glasgow’s established connection between the arts and industry - which aligned clearly with the objectives of the McKinsey strategy to promote Glasgow and its quality of life, and making the city more attractive as a business base by improving its image. As such, the arts and culture gave the city credibility for business.

Leaders such as Macfarlane valued the arts and culture as a genuine asset to the city, a reflection of the city’s capabilities rather than a hollow marketing ploy. The city’s historical cultural achievements were viewed as intrinsically connected to its past industrial achievements and as such were a source of civic pride and belief that the city could be restored to greatness.

Over the course of the 1980s and into the 1990s, against the backdrop of the Thatcher government’s promotion of the role of the private sector in urban regeneration, Norman Macfarlane was a key actor in a public-private partnership that connected Labour councillors with Tory peers and which viewed culture as a credible vehicle for the city’s economic development.

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66 Norman Macfarlane was invited to be interviewed for this research project though declined and a formal interview did not take place. This thesis therefore relies on available public accounts to include Macfarlane’s voice.

67 In his maiden speech in the House of Lords in 1992, in a debate on the Scottish Economy, and introducing himself as ‘a businessman and a lover of things artistic, unreservedly so in both respects’, Norman Macfarlane’s speech focused on Glasgow: the scale of the economic challenges facing the city and how ‘partnership has been the crucial factor in the regeneration of Glasgow’ (Macfarlane, 1992). He called for greater public and private sector investment in Glasgow, which he presented as a city of untapped cultural and economic assets of national and European significance: ‘Glasgow now stands on the threshold of once again becoming one of Europe’s great cities: great in the sense not only of prosperity but of completeness as a city, a city of opportunity, a city of environment, a city of culture and a city of real community. [...] Investment is required from both Government and business, but that investment will reap substantial rewards because Glasgow is not only a city of great need but also a city of great opportunity. It has the potential to become a major asset and contributor to the economic and cultural base of our country’.
In conclusion, although Glasgow’s approach to public-private partnerships undoubtedly developed as a pragmatic response to the approach of the Thatcher government, such partnerships were already historically rooted in the city. However, the two key critical events in 1985 of the McKinsey report’s strategic reframing of the city’s cultural events and infrastructure as economic development assets and the establishment of Glasgow Action to implement the strategy were significant and influential factors in the subsequent direction of Glasgow’s emerging cultural policy. This is epitomised in the city’s approach, in 1986, to its bid to win the ECOC nomination - another critical event which resolutely established this strategic trajectory.

At this turning point, Glasgow’s cultural achievements provided the city’s leaders with confidence that the city could be restored to its former economic standing. However, the key actors in this process of turning cultural assets into economic ones over the course of the 1980s were not the city’s artists or arts institutions - those that produced the city’s culture - but its civic and business leaders, planners, development agency leaders and, ultimately, management consultants. Public-private partnerships were a key facilitating factor in the cultural policy to emerge subsequently in Glasgow.

5.8 Conclusion

Despite facing a variety of severe socio-economic problems throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, Glasgow had a thriving cultural infrastructure which continued to expand without a formal cultural policy being developed for the city.

The period 1970 to 1979 saw a dramatic restructuring of the local authority landscape in Glasgow, with the 1975 local government reorganisation followed by a period of political turmoil in GDC in which corporate management failed to thrive. 1980 marked a new period of political stability which, when combined with the centralising approach of Jean McFadden’s leadership and the corporate approach of the recently appointed Chief Executive, Steven Hamilton, enabled corporate management to become embedded within GDC. However, tensions
between corporate management and the traditional structures it was intended to replace remained throughout the period.

Despite the inherent tensions between old and new structures, the introduction of corporate management brought several consequences for working practices. The most significant of these, as a prompting and facilitating factor in what became the cultural turn in Glasgow’s policy making, was the establishment of formal structures focused on economic development.

From a peripheral position in GDC’s economic development plans, culture began to emerge as a tool for economic development, as a consumption activity within the developing service sector, though not as an industry in its own right. While economic development was prioritised by the three public sector bodies GDC, SRC and the SDA, the strategies developed by each did not always align.

The recommendations of the 1985 McKinsey report, *The Potential of Glasgow City Centre*, and key actors in its instigation, such as Sir Norman Macfarlane, acted as a critical focal point, drawing together the key public sector leaders with those of the city’s business community, with a clear strategy for the economic development of the city centre.

Following a period in which the city’s cultural events and infrastructure - such as the 1983 opening of The Burrell Collection - were absorbed into its public relations strategies, the McKinsey strategy reinforced the importance of the city’s arts and cultural assets as a means of changing the city’s image, thereby supporting the shift in the base of the city economy from manufacturing to the service industries and consumer services. However, despite these strategic developments, the city remained, to a large extent, reliant on its established approach of pragmatic opportunism.

In early 1986, several months after the production of the McKinsey report and the establishment of Glasgow Action, and having already secured the 1988 National Garden Festival title, Glasgow was presented with the opportunity to bid to become the UK’s nominee for the ECOC in 1990.
At this point, Glasgow did not have an explicit or nominal cultural policy to form the basis of its bid. It did, however, have a newly established, powerful public-private partnership and a rapidly developing - and converging - collection of economic development policies, strategies and plans, in which a range of the city’s burgeoning cultural institutions and events had been reframed as vehicles.

As will now be discussed in Chapter 6, it was this that formed the strategic basis of Glasgow’s ECOC bid and the subsequent strategic trajectory of Glasgow’s emerging cultural policy. It was this that provided the foundation of the emerging approach of not culture-led regeneration, but regeneration-led culture.
CHAPTER 6  1985 TO 1986: GLASGOW BECOMES A EUROPEAN CITY OF CULTURE

6.1 Introduction

This chapter will argue that the construction and reception of Glasgow’s bid for the UK nomination for ECOC 1990 was shaped by a combination of prestige, prejudice and public relations. It will examine the strategies employed by GDC and its coalition partners in developing Glasgow’s ECOC bid. It will examine how the city mobilised the requisite expertise, and how it assessed the challenge represented by its rivals and countered that challenge. It will also examine the decision-making process and consider the roles played by key actors in central government which resulted in Glasgow winning the nomination.

1986 was the year in which the critical events of Glasgow bidding to host the ECOC 1990 event and subsequently being awarded the title set the strategic trajectory for the city’s emerging cultural policy. This was a strategic trajectory intrinsically connected to economic development, specifically the city’s service sector, an approach which privileged the consumption over the production of culture.

Both the UK and Glasgow took distinctive approaches to the ECOC which subsequently had broader ramifications for the future of not only cultural policy in Glasgow, but also the initiative itself. However, in 1986, when the opportunity arose for a UK city to host the event, Glasgow’s selection as ECOC 1990 was far from inevitable. Nor was the announcement in October 1986 of Glasgow as the UK’s nominated city universally popular. Edinburgh’s Lord Provost John MacKay is reported to have claimed that the selection of Glasgow rather than Edinburgh was ‘political and vindictive’ (McGhee, 1986).

This chapter will begin by establishing the broader national and European context and parameters which shaped Glasgow’s approach to the ECOC. It will conclude by reflecting on how the ECOC began to emerge as a facilitating factor
- as well as an obstacle - in the subsequent development of cultural policy in Glasgow; issues which will be discussed in further detail in subsequent chapters.

6.2 The EC and the UK: the opportunities presented by the ECOC and the parameters set

The UK’s approach to the ECOC marked a departure from those of its predecessor host states at a relatively early stage before the conventions and expectations of the event were firmly established.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the ECOC was conceived by Greek Culture Minister, Melina Mercouri, ‘to celebrate European culture as a means of drawing the [European] community closer’ (Garcia, 2007: 3). The first event was held in Athens in 1985, followed between 1986 and 1989 by events in Florence, Amsterdam, Berlin and Paris. In 1986 the UK was allocated as the EC member state to host the 1990 event.

The UK was the first state to select its ECOC through a competition between cities (Garcia, 2007: 4); to nominate a post-industrial city with a very different reputation to its predecessors; to select a city which had connected the ECOC programme to broader economic development aims; and to decide initially not to provide any additional central government funding for its ECOC event.

For Glasgow, the competition to be nominated as the UK’s ECOC 1990 presented both opportunities and challenges. Glasgow’s bid developed in response to these opportunities and challenges, as well as the competition parameters that were developed by the UK government in response to its own identified set of opportunities and challenges presented by the ECOC event.

This section will establish the reasons for the UK’s distinctive approach; the challenges and opportunities the ECOC presented to the government and the parameters set in response; and the broader EC context and framework in which it developed.
The establishment in 1985 of the ECOC programme by the EC was not an entirely welcome event for the UK government. The UK’s position was that the EC was established as purely an economic community with no remit for arts and culture. Patrick Fallon (interview, 11 March 2015), who as a civil servant led on the ECOC programme, inter alia, at the Office of Arts and Libraries (OAL), has explained the government’s view that ‘there was no justification for cultural activity in the Treaty of Rome’ on which the EC was founded.

Unlike many of the eleven other EC member states, the UK did not, during the 1980s, have a department for culture. Arts and culture held a fairly marginal position within the government. It was not in receipt of a large budget from the Treasury. The sole Minster for the Arts was not a cabinet position and the OAL was a small office in the considerably more substantial Department for Education and Science.

Patrick Fallon has described the UK’s concerns and how it aimed to influence the development of the ECOC framework before it became an established - and expensive - commitment beyond the government’s control:

The British, I think, had thought this was a potentially expensive form of European window-dressing which would divert money away from the basic spending on culture in Britain. But once European Ministers of Culture had agreed it, we decided that we would support it wholeheartedly, but with a certain amount of regard for the public economy and resources and that we would propose a British city candidate fairly soon, because we thought in our own civil service discussions that it was something that was likely to grow, escalate and become a bit of a ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ or the Schmidtts or the Duponts. So we thought, we’ll get in early before the framework has been established and do it our way, which was exactly what happened. (Patrick Fallon, interview, 11 March 2015)

Whilst nominated cities had to be ratified by all twelve member states in order to be awarded the title, the EC’s approach to the ECOC was - at this early stage - inherently flexible, subject to a resolution rather than a directive, resulting in comparatively little central direction. In proposing, in 1986, its nominated city according to its own distinctive approach to selection, the UK was facilitated rather than blocked by this system.
The resolution ‘concerning the annual event “European City of Culture”’ agreed by the ‘Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs’ within the Council of the European Communities in Brussels shortly before the first ECOC event in Athens, set out the ‘aims and content’, ‘selection criteria’ and ‘organisation and finance’ for future ECOCs with distinct brevity. Its approach to defining ‘culture’ was open, flexible and not a little vague:

The Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs consider that the European City of Culture event should be the expression of a culture which, in its historical emergence and contemporary development, is characterised by having both common elements and a richness born of diversity.

(European Communities, The Council, 1985: 1)

The sparsity of information provided here about what EC member states in 1985 understood culture to be was undoubtedly intentional. As Raymond Williams (1976) highlighted in his seminal inquiry into vocabulary, ‘culture’ is a slippery term. This era saw increasing complexity in the developing structures connecting culture and Europe, including the Council of Europe and the European Commission as well as the European Economic Community’s changing remit, and a diversity of approaches to the administration of culture within the twelve EC member states. The resolution provided only the information sufficient to enable the programme to begin, with each member state bringing its own interpretation of what constitutes their City of Culture’s culture.

Joy Parry, Senior Executive Officer at the OAL in 1985 when the resolution was written, has described the defining parameters set within the document:

The key thing was that in each case it would be the member state that made the running and paid for it. It gave them a lot of freedom to decide what was important to them to showcase within a European context. So the interest from a European point of view was to make the link between Europe and culture. And the interest from the national point of view was to showcase local and national culture, and regional to an extent. So that within those sort of parameters gave a lot of room to interpret it the way that it suited each member state.

(Joy Parry, interview, 11 December 2014)

Analysis of the UK’s interpretation reveals the connection of the ECOC’s parameters to a variety of government agendas, some within the scope of the
OAL’s remit, some beyond, as well as an interest in diverging from the precedent set by other EC member states to host the event.

Had the UK followed the precedent set by other EC member states, a logical choice of ECOC might have been London, as the UK’s largest city, renowned as an international tourist destination and home to a prestigious and unparalleled collection of cultural assets. However, London was not invited to apply by the OAL.

In February 1986, the left-wing Greater London Council was in the process of being abolished by the Thatcher government. London was precluded from bidding for the nomination as the regional local government tier which connected the numerous district councils was in the process of being dismantled. However, the then Arts Minister and civil servants interviewed for this research project stressed that the government was keen that London should not be the UK’s ECOC. In the words of Richard Luce:

I did weekly tours of the arts round the country. So really this concept that all arts is in London was something that actually I reacted rather strongly against, partly because I thought all the moaning and complaining from some arts people like Peter Hall was coming from London and every week when I went round the country I could see that people weren’t moaning, they were actually doing an extraordinary job. They were getting on with things without having a great deal of money and one needed to do something to help fuel it, to encourage it and I therefore, I have to admit I probably had a slight psychological feeling against London almost, because London was spoilt. And not only were they spoilt but they were moaning about their lives the whole time and people outside weren’t moaning and all these wonderful cities needed a new light.

(Richard Luce, interview, 24 March 2015)

This approach reflects the broader contemporary issue of inequitable levels of public funding for the arts and culture between London and the nations and regions of the UK, highlighted by such reports as the Arts Council’s 1984 *The Glory of the Garden: the development of the arts in England*, as well as earlier reports by UNESCO (Green and Wilding, 1970; Abercrombie, 1982).

Richard Luce has explained the decision to take a different approach to previous EC member states and select its nominated city through a competition:
Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam, Florence, Athens are so... they’re unsurprising in a way. But I know we felt that we’ve got to give everyone who wants an opportunity to put in a bid. I definitely recall it was my excellent Permanent Secretary Richard Wilding, outstandingly good, he helped me a great deal and I think that was in the earlier days, that’s right. And we agreed we must have a really even competition and it would be exciting because it would galvanise certain cities to try and get their act together. (Richard Luce, interview, 24 March 2015)

In February 1986, the OAL invited a selection of UK cities, identified through the Local Authority Associations - including two Scottish cities, Edinburgh and Glasgow - to make a formal submission to be considered for the UK nomination to hold the ECOC title in 1990. In choosing to select its ECOC through a competition between cities, the OAL’s invitation letter (Fallon, 1986) provided some brief guidance for applicants, the content of which was in keeping with its ‘arms-length’ approach to the arts and culture. The government’s expectations of the event were described as follows:

The intention is that the designated city would be responsible for a programme of art exhibitions [...] and other cultural events such as dance, theatre and music. The scope of these activities is not in any way pre-determined: they can range from popular culture to specialised events; and would involve artists, directors, performers and others. (Fallon, 1986)

Here, although the OAL made no attempt to define culture beyond ‘the arts’, it very clearly steered competitors towards proposing an arts festival. Whilst some attempt was made to encompass ‘high’ arts and ‘popular culture’, the guidance was otherwise open to interpretation by competing cities. One thing, however, was made very clear:

The Government’s view is that responsibility for the organisation and for raising finance should lie with the nominated City of Culture; and it does not envisage providing any additional funding for this purpose. (Fallon, 1986)

Having underlined this point, the OAL provided four criteria as ‘guidance on the information we require’ and on which applications were to be judged:
1. Existing cultural status;
2. Proposed programme;
3. Finance: details of how you propose to finance the project with estimates of proposed expenditure and revenue;
4. Accommodation, facilities and accessibility.

(Office of Arts and Libraries, 1986a)

Reflecting on the criteria, Joy Parry, one of the civil servants leading on the ECOC selection process at the OAL, commented:

It was left very open, so that each city could see if there was something in it for them. It was also the time when the Garden Festivals had been done. So the idea of actually making a big regional show, that link had been made through these Garden Festivals. [...] So that precedent was there but it was unspoken rather than in the rules.

(Joy Parry, interview, 11 December 2014)

The Garden Festivals concept, like that of the ECOC, originated in a European country other than the UK. Unlike the ECOC, however, the Garden Festivals was not a programme pioneered by EC Culture Ministers. The raison d’être of the Garden Festival concept was not culture but urban regeneration, its stated aim being to reclaim contaminated former industrial brownfield land for redevelopment. Conversely, the purpose of the ECOC was not urban regeneration but culture.

Richard Luce has described the broader political context in which the OAL developed its approach to the ECOC:

The concept of rejuvenating cities was beginning to get embedded. And there were some very critical reports of the government Mrs Thatcher didn’t like. The Church of England did a report which she didn’t like at all, but she put Heseltine into the job of Liverpool and giving them new leases of life. So now, it was that sort of background, it was an opportunity.68

(Richard Luce, interview, 24 March 2015)

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68 The Church of England’s critical report referred to here was Faith in the City: A Call for Action by Church and Nation, produced by the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Commission on Urban Priority Areas and published in 1985. This report was highly critical of the government’s approach to urban policy and its effects of increasing deprivation within cities (Smith, 1990). As Secretary of State for the Environment during the first Thatcher government, and despite representing the constituency of Henley, Michael Heseltine was instrumental in the economic renewal of Liverpool following the 1981 Toxteth riots, including the establishment of the Merseyside Development
By 1986, Liverpool had hosted the first UK Garden Festival, with the involvement of the Merseyside Development Corporation, and Glasgow was confirmed as the host city for the 1988 National Garden Festival.

Within this broader context, given the OAL’s setting of formal criteria for the ECOC competition, which were open to interpretation, competitors were expected to make the link to such unspoken agendas in their bids. A result anticipated by the OAL may have been that competitors would go beyond the precedent set by Athens and, informed by the experience of the Garden Festivals, identify new opportunities for the city which supported other current government agendas in a UK context.

The ECOC presented opportunities which were distinct to each EC member state to host the event. For Greece, the ECOC was a vehicle for Melina Mercouri’s own political ambitions: her aim of securing the return of the Elgin/Parthenon Marbles from the UK to Greece, as well as her aim of becoming President of Greece. The UK’s distinctive approach to the ECOC reflected a broader set of opportunities which contrasted with those seized upon by previous EC member states to host the event. Taking a characteristic arms-length approach, leaving the formal criteria open, whilst steering competitors towards an unspoken set of criteria on which the competition would be judged, the UK government constructed parameters for the ECOC which implicitly promoted its own agendas.

In the government’s deciding not to provide any additional central government funding and that the ECOC would be self-financed by the host city, the successful city would be required to secure philanthropic funding and private sector support to stage its event. In deciding to select its City of Culture through

Corporation (despite ‘managed decline’ being considered by others within the government as a policy option for the city), earning him the epithet ‘Minister for Merseyside’.

69 The Liverpool International Garden Festival was held in 1984, followed by the Stoke-on-Trent National Garden Festival in 1986.

70 In his interview on 24 March 2015, Richard Luce discussed the EC Culture Ministers, stating: ‘And then there was the famous Melina Mercouri. Now I’m bringing her in last but she’s really the significant one. You have to remember she wanted the Elgin Marbles back in Greece. She was wanting to be President. She was Minister for Culture but she wanted to be President. That was part of her campaign, to stand up for Greece.’
a competition between cities, the government believed it would ‘galvanise certain cities to try and get their act together’ (Richard Luce, interview, 24 March 2015), connecting the event to broader agendas. Rather than risking the ECOC being perceived as a financial burden imposed upon a city of the government’s choosing, it was presented as a prestigious opportunity that the city had won.

6.3 The opportunity and the challenge the ECOC presented to Glasgow

Why did Glasgow want to host the ECOC, given that there would be no central government funding for it and it would consume a large amount of the city’s resources at a time when the city faced severe socio-economic problems?

The ECOC presented Glasgow with the opportunity to align itself with the prestigious cities that had previously held the title: Athens, Florence, Amsterdam, Berlin and Paris, none of which was seen as a declining post-industrial city, all of which were undisputed European centres of culture. It was the prestige of the ECOC which would allow Glasgow to reposition its image and thereby support the development of the city’s service sector economy.

However, Glasgow faced a dilemma. Winning the ECOC title and joining a new group of prestigious peers could transform Glasgow’s image - but it was not in a position to win the title on reputation alone because its existing image did not align with that of the prestigious group of existing ECOC title holders.

In 1986, GDC led a coalition of organisations in its bid for the UK ECOC nomination. David Macdonald, Director at Glasgow Action and a member of Glasgow’s bid coalition, has discussed how the approach taken by Glasgow Action to encourage businesses to relocate to the city from elsewhere in the UK influenced Glasgow’s pitch for ECOC 1990:

It was a bit like pitching Glasgow for some of the business location stuff which I was leading on. You had to get people to agree to at least put Glasgow on the long list, you know and a lot of these things it was ‘Glasgow? Are you sure?’ And the response had to be, ‘You know that’s OK just make it a long shot and assess it on merit.’ And that’s sort of what the
Glasgow pitch was for City of Culture. It was, you know this isn’t London, it isn’t Paris, but you’ll be surprised what’s here already, and you’ll be even more surprised what we lay on, if we have a special year. (David Macdonald, interview, 8 September 2014)

GDC and some of its bid coalition partners realised early on that a coherent strategy was needed to underpin the bid, because the city was not in a position to be awarded the title on reputation alone and it would be competing with cities that were. Indeed, some in the coalition anticipated Glasgow’s bid being met with prejudice on the basis of its entrenched reputation preceding it.

Glasgow’s bid had to be outstandingly good to compete with cities that did not share its challenge of a poor image. The next section will outline how Glasgow responded to this opportunity and challenge and central government parameters in order to outshine the competition.

6.4 Glasgow’s response

Glasgow’s ECOC submission (GDC, 1986b) was presented to the OAL in April 1986 by GDC on behalf of the city’s coalition of cultural (predominantly, arts) organisations and representatives of the tourism and broader business communities, not least the GGTB and Glasgow Action. Despite the bid being presented as the work of a unified partnership of the city’s public and private sector constituents, one organisation notably absent was Strathclyde Regional Council (SRC). This absence was made all the more conspicuous by the stated purpose of the ECOC initiative being ‘to celebrate each year the individual cultural of a city and its region’ (Office of Arts and Libraries, 1986b). Furthermore, in its 21 years of existence (between 1975 and 1996), SRC provided a significant amount of revenue and capital funding and resources for the arts and culture in Glasgow, supporting such projects as the Royal Concert Hall and arts in education. Glasgow’s bid documents do not refer to SRC as an organisation involved in the event’s delivery. However, based on the integral role SRC played in the city’s existing cultural infrastructure, once Glasgow had been awarded the title it would have been difficult for SRC not to support the ECOC 1990 event, financially or otherwise.
The bid was co-ordinated by planners in GDC’s Chief Executive’s Office, notably David Ferguson, working with Head of Public Relations, Harry Diamond. The heads of the separate museums and libraries departments were asked to provide information though were not the key actors driving the bid strategy. A group of the city’s arts organisations, brought in at short notice before the submission deadline, also supported the bid though did not drive the bid strategy.\(^7\)

In 1986, Glasgow did not have a formal or coherent cultural policy to provide the strategic underpinning of its ECOC bid. However, GDC did have a rapidly developing and increasingly coherent economic development policy and strategy, which was its main priority and focus. In addition, other public agencies working in Glasgow, notably the SDA and Glasgow Action, also had their own economic development strategies for the city. These economic development strategies converged in Glasgow’s ECOC bid.

The strategic direction underpinning Glasgow’s ECOC bid was largely provided by the 1985 McKinsey report, *The Potential of Glasgow City Centre* (Cullen, 1985). Figure 1 sums up the key ideas:

![McKinsey strategy diagram](image)

**Figure 1: McKinsey and Co. strategy diagram for the economic development of Glasgow city centre, 1985.**

\(^7\) GDC archive documents show that whilst the city’s arts organisations were not involved in the development of the bid strategy, Chris Carrell, Director of the Third Eye Centre played a more influential role as a member of a ‘core group’ that GDC consulted. The core group included Eddie Friel (GGTB), David Macdonald (Glasgow Action), Michael Dale (Glasgow Garden Festival) and Iwan Williams (SDA Tourist Division) as well as Chris Carrell. The core group developed after the bid was submitted in April 1986 and was used by GDC to gather external support for Glasgow’s bid (Ferguson, 1986).
David Macdonald, Director of Glasgow Action from its establishment in late 1985 to its demise in 1990, has commented on the opportunity presented by the competition for the ECOC nomination and its potential alignment with Glasgow Action’s purpose:

I had McKinsey’s strategy, it was a simple diagram sitting on my wall, it was in front of me every single day I was doing it, and the first thing, if anything arose I could just have a quick look at that and think, ‘Does it fit?’ And this thing fitted a treat. Because it addressed the image of Glasgow, it played to what was in a sense a surprising strength of Glasgow already that people didn’t know about and it would attract visitors. ²²

(David Macdonald, interview, 8 September 2014)

This approach to economic development was emerging within a broader context in which, as discussed earlier, Glasgow’s cultural infrastructure - events in particular - was positioned in an increasingly prominent role in the city’s burgeoning tourist industry. With plans underway for the impending 1988 Garden Festival, the key actors in the development of Glasgow’s ECOC bid strategy recognised the potential unspoken link - also perceived by the OAL - between the two events. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, learning from the experience in Liverpool, securing ECOC 1990 would be a means of maintaining the momentum of the 1988 Glasgow Garden Festival’s regeneration efforts. This revealed a combination of strategic planning and opportunism, which to varying degrees characterised much of the work that took place during the 1980s to change Glasgow’s image and improve the city’s economic fortunes.

The broad economic development purpose underpinning Glasgow’s bid - specifically, to use the ECOC to support the city’s main priority to strengthen its service sector economy - was reinforced by the deployment of a collection of strategies, the foremost of which was to approach the bid as an exercise in public relations.

²² Notably, David Macdonald has described the McKinsey diagram in Figure 1 as a series of ‘virtuous cycles’ in which continual improvements are made to the city’s service industries and consumer services through various interventions such as making Glasgow more attractive for business and living, promoting the city and image building activity.
In its bid, Glasgow developed a series of ‘key messages’ to convey that the city would meet the stated criteria exceptionally well through the adoption of other central government agendas. These messages were deployed through a variety of tactics. One of the most significant tactics was for these messages to be voiced by credible representatives of each of the city’s relevant sectors; representatives selected to act as advocates on the city’s behalf to those in central government that would be judging the bids, providing a more effective influence on decision-making than the Labour-led local authority alone.

Two of the selected advocates were the journalist and arts critic, Cordelia Oliver, and Sir Norman Macfarlane, both of whom were Glasgow residents. Cordelia Oliver provided what is presented as an ‘independent assessment’ of Glasgow’s cultural standing, included in Glasgow’s bid documents. Sir Norman Macfarlane provided letters of support for Glasgow’s bid documents, but also played an important role in securing the support of the city’s business community as well as ensuring that the bid aligned with the private sector’s priorities.73

One of the main key messages reiterated in the bid and asserted by both Oliver and Macfarlane was that Glasgow is already an established European city of culture. There was no mention in Glasgow’s submission of the persistent problems remaining from deindustrialisation, depopulation, urban deprivation and decay nor the accompanying challenges regarding the city’s reputation. Glasgow’s submission presented its transformation from No Mean City to European City of Culture as complete, whilst stating that a benefit of the ECOC would be to ‘maintain momentum already generated by the image building initiatives which have played a key role in the City’s revitalised character’ (GDC, 1986b: 2). In Oliver’s assessment, deindustrialisation was transformed into a positive factor in the bid, as Glasgow’s ‘past industrial history’. Glasgow was presented as a ‘leader in the field’ of social and industrial history. Despite Glasgow undergoing a painful process resulting from the decline of heavy industry, through the historical detachment of its setting in a museums context,

73 In her interview on 24 March 2014, Jean McFadden, Leader of GDC when the bid was submitted in April 1986, mentioned that Norman Macfarlane was an influential figure in the bid and had the submission rewritten.
the city’s recent social and industrial past was preserved as ‘heritage’, a valuable cultural asset.

At various points, the submission attempted to bolster the image of Glasgow’s physical appearance, highlighting its natural beauty and architectural assets. Oliver stated that Glasgow ‘remains the finest and most complete example of Victorian urban planning in the UK’ (GDC, 1986b: 34). The Burrell Collection ‘now to be seen in its entirety in a deservedly famous custom-built gallery, is sited in the grounds of Pollok House, a William Adam mansion, still with its parkland completely unspoiled (there is even a herd of highland cattle on the home farm) and all within the city boundary’ (GDC, 1986b: 33). In his letter of support, Sir Norman Macfarlane even stated:

Last week I was in Vienna for a holiday with the family, and we were agreed that the journey from Vienna airport to the city centre was much less attractive than the journey nowadays from Glasgow airport to the city centre. Who would have thought this even 10 years ago? (GDC, 1986b: 15)

This reiterated the message in the main submission:

Less than 10 years ago, the prevailing image of Glasgow was that of a declining industrial city. Today Glasgow has cast off the grime of its past industrial history. Its traditional beauty has been restored to reveal the most magnificent Victorian city in Europe. (GDC, 1986b: 1)

Central government decision-makers were presented with an image of an idyllic Glasgow, with its fine architecture, significant art collections and an international airport more attractive than Vienna; in short the most magnificent Victorian city in Europe. Here, the bid addressed criteria regarding the city’s cultural standing and facilities, in addition to an issue not mentioned in the criteria, which could be perceived as a weakness: the city’s image. The message here was that Glasgow had changed; it was not the place it was ten years ago; it was as much a European city of culture as Vienna and by extension, those cities previously awarded the ECOC title: Athens, Florence, Amsterdam, Berlin and Paris.
Another key message emphasised throughout Glasgow’s bid was the city’s established relationship between the public and private sectors. This is significant as a link between the strategic economic development activity underway in Glasgow - as exemplified by the McKinsey strategy - and the urban renewal strategies that were being promoted by the Tory government contemporaneously.

Glasgow’s public and private sector partnerships were highlighted as a vehicle for the delivery of the proposed ECOC event, addressing the OAL’s criteria related to facilities and finance. On the criterion of ‘accommodation, facilities and accessibility’, Glasgow went beyond detailing its tourism infrastructure, facilities and transport links to outline its track-record of staging large-scale events through public-private sector collaboration:

The City’s public and private institutions have demonstrated their ability to combine in major co-operative ventures. The Scottish Exhibition and Conference Centre was developed and financed by a consortium comprising the Scottish Development Agency, Glasgow District and Strathclyde Regional Councils and the private sector. The Glasgow Marathon is the third largest in the world. The Garden Festival, which will attract over 4 million visitors to the City in 1988, will be operated by an independent company set up for the purposes, advised by a board comprising representatives of the Scottish Development Agency, Strathclyde Regional and Glasgow District Councils and the Scottish Tourist Board. (GDC, 1986b: 2)

The submission asserts that there existed a strong link between Glasgow’s cultural assets and the city’s burgeoning tourist industry, following a period of intensive development involving public and private sector partners. In so doing, Glasgow challenged the assumed position of its ECOC competitor Edinburgh as Scotland’s prime tourist destination and ‘cultural capital’, stating:

Massive investment by the public and private sectors has produced a tourism infrastructure second to none. No fewer than eight of the Scottish top 20 tourist attractions are located here, including the Burrell Collection which, in its first full year of operation, established itself as Scotland’s number one tourist attraction. (GDC, 1986b: 1)

And:
Glasgow’s dramatic success as a tourist centre has been based largely on the promotion of its cultural attractions. In 1982, 700,000 people visited Glasgow. By 1984 there were an estimated two million visitors, making Glasgow Scotland’s primary tourist centre. (GDC, 1986b: 9)

In relation to the criterion of ‘finance’, the city’s commitment to developing its cultural and tourism sectors, as a combined strategy, was expressed in relevant terms. The submission inferred an anticipated causal link between its levels of financial investment and the return to the city in increased visitor numbers:

There has been considerable public and private investment in cultural and tourist facilities in the past few years and much more is planned. A new extension to the Mitchell Library was completed in 1981 at a cost of £10m. The Burrell Gallery, which cost £21m, was opened in 1983. The £36m Scottish Exhibition and Conference Centre opened last year. (GDC, 1986b: 3)

Crucially - and in line with the OAL’s stated criteria - it was asserted that Glasgow’s ECOC event would be ‘largely self-financing’ (GDC, 1986b: 10), as an ambitious extension of this existing strategy. It was proposed that funding would be contributed by public authorities and private sources including visitor income and business sponsorship, generated through ‘the prestige attached to European City of Culture’ (GDC, 1986b: 10). Here, the submission tapped into the current OAL agenda of ‘rebalancing’ public and private funding for the arts through increasing philanthropy. Key supporting figures and advocates here were Eddie Friel, Chief Executive of the GGTB, and Sir Norman Macfarlane, Chairman of Glasgow Action. Both reiterated their commitment in letters of support, Macfarlane stating:

The Glasgow business community has an outstanding record of active support for the arts in general. (GDC, 1986b: 15)

The clear message here, given credibility through the voices of the city’s business leaders, was that private sector support of the kind promoted by the Thatcher government, for major urban renewal projects as well as the arts, was already well-established in Glasgow and would be guaranteed for 1990.

Glasgow was presented, then, not only as a city of sufficient cultural standing, but also, through its well-established partnerships, infrastructure and business-
leaders’ support, as an option with a reduced risk to central government, reflecting the OAL’s stated intention that ‘it would be desirable to build on an existing and proven programme of activities and facilities’ (Fallon, 1986).

Glasgow’s submission was an excellent work of public relations. Key messages ran consistently throughout the different voices in the main text of the submission, the supporting letters and the ‘independent assessment’, to form a unified bid, reflecting the city’s ‘united front’. These messages were not only voiced by prominent figures and credible representatives of each of the city’s relevant sectors, but supported by the selective inclusion of facts - all of which reflected the city in a positive light. Key messages were selected not only to demonstrate that the city more than met the OAL’s stated criteria and requirements for hosting the UK ECOC 1990 event, but that the city had a broader, ambitious strategy of economic development and urban renewal - aligned with the agendas of the Conservative government - in which the ECOC 1990 event would play a key enabling role. The bid followed the OAL’s steer in not burdening itself with too fixed a definition of ‘culture’, but proposing what was largely an arts festival, which would be sufficiently flexible to allow the Labour-led city - and the Conservative government - to achieve their broader strategic aims through the instrument of ‘culture’.

The emphasis in Glasgow’s bid was on the arts and culture as a consumption activity within the service sector, rather than the development of culture as an industry in its own right. The strategy underlying the bid had at its core the strategy for the regeneration of Glasgow city centre, imported from America by management consultants McKinsey and Co. and aligned with the contemporary Conservative government’s agendas of public-private partnership and the rebalancing of public and private funding for the arts.

It was not a coherent cultural policy which drew together the collection of cultural organisations in support of Glasgow’s ECOC bid. Although many of the city’s major arts organisations were involved in the preparation of the submission, they were not brought in by the lead bodies - GDC, Glasgow Action and the GGTB - until a very late stage, as the deadline approached in April 1986. The arts organisations - the cultural constituent of the bid - were not the drivers
of the strategy, but rather the cultural ‘content providers’ that would be required for the strategy to succeed.

As with the need to attract business more broadly, Glasgow had to meet both stated criteria and unspoken, hidden criteria in order to be given serious consideration. The city’s ECOC submission reflected how, in Thatcher’s Britain, Glasgow was becoming competitive.

6.5 The decision-making process

Following a brief outline of the key events in the timeframe in which the decision was made by Richard Luce and the OAL to nominate Glasgow as the UK’s ECOC 1990, this section will examine the key influential factors in the decision-making process and the additional challenges faced by Glasgow’s bid - namely, the instances of prejudice the bid encountered in some quarters, notably in relation to a competing bid from Edinburgh. It will demonstrate why Glasgow’s bid coalition leadership were justified in their approach of basing the city’s bid on a coherent strategy of economic development, in order to counter the challenge represented by its rivals and win the nomination.

In April 1986, the OAL received bids for the UK’s ECOC nomination from nine cities: Bath, Bristol, Cambridge, Cardiff, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds, Liverpool and Swansea. The OAL’s civil servants and Arts Minister made initial assessments of the bids, before drawing up a shortlist regarding which the Minister consulted, in June 1986, a number of his colleagues. These were: the Secretaries of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Geoffrey Howe), Employment (David Young), Scotland (Malcolm Rifkind), Wales (Nicholas Edwards) and the Environment (Nicholas Ridley); the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, John MacGregor, and the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. As a result of this consultation, Richard Luce’s initial shortlist of four cities - Bath, Bristol, Leeds and Glasgow - was expanded to include Edinburgh. Furthermore, the decision was made not to publish the shortlist publicly, contrary to original plans.

The Arts Minister and OAL officials then made visits to shortlisted cities, who were subsequently asked to provide supplementary submissions addressing any
specific issues which had arisen. These were submitted to the OAL in September 1986. Following further consideration, Richard Luce announced on 20 October 1986 that Glasgow had won the UK’s nomination. This proposal was then ratified by EC Ministers responsible for culture on 13 November 1986.

As mentioned earlier, Glasgow’s winning the nomination and subsequently, the title was by no means inevitable. However, at an early stage in the shortlisting process, the decision-making parameters appear to have shifted in Glasgow’s favour. Writing to consult his ministerial colleagues in June 1986 on his proposed shortlist, Richard Luce proffered his own opinions as guidance on the requirements of the UK’s nominated city:

My belief is that the chosen city (and by extension the UK) need not feel obliged to compete directly with the major cities already selected, which have very large public spending programmes for this sort of activity. Of course, it does need to have plausible credentials in this area but the most important thing is that it should present its own distinctive contribution. This means that the city does have to be committed and enthusiastic. It is also important that the authorities of the city chosen should understand that the full responsibility for organising and financing its programme of events would rest with them. The benefits to the city would lie in the tourism, employment and publicity which would be generated, and the high profile that the city would enjoy during the period of the festivities. (Luce, 1986a)

The belief set out here can be interpreted as constituting a honing of the open criteria sent to cities with the original invitation to bid. Indeed, it can be read as additional, informal selection criteria retrospectively-imposed on bids after the submission deadline - unbeknownst to the competing cities - informed by the cases proposed. Furthermore, it aligned very clearly with the basis of the case made by Glasgow in its submission, in which the benefits of tourism, employment and publicity generated by the ECOC were very clearly articulated, alongside clear proposals for organising and financing the programme, and a tone which can be described as committed and enthusiastic.

However, despite this apparently beneficial development, Glasgow faced a number of unique challenges in securing support for its bid across the government, emanating not least from the Scottish Office.
The response of Malcolm Rifkind, Secretary of State for Scotland, to Richard Luce’s letter consulting ministers on the initial shortlist resulted in the expansion of the group from four to five with the addition of Edinburgh. The events within the Scottish Office surrounding Malcolm Rifkind’s response reveal a tension between the bias of certain Scottish Office ministers, who were also Edinburgh MPs, towards Edinburgh at the expense of Glasgow’s bid, and the tempering influence of civil servants, whose goal was to secure a Scottish nomination.

The reason for Edinburgh’s initial exclusion from the shortlist was the poor quality of its submission (Edinburgh District Council, 1986a). Indeed, it appears that Edinburgh District Council (EDC) was well aware of the weakness of its bid, as it attempted to block its circulation within central government. On receiving Luce’s consultation letter, Scottish Office civil servants attempted with some difficulty to acquire a copy of Edinburgh’s submission from EDC, the council’s response being, ‘this was a highly confidential paper which was not for general circulation as they did not want anyone to know the basis of their case’.74

In contrast, GDC and its allies had already been circulating copies of Glasgow’s submission widely amongst organisations and individuals that might have some influence on the nomination decision. This reflected the building of a broader, co-ordinated campaign of support for Glasgow’s nomination which also involved Glasgow MPs and MEPs, another mechanism adopted by GDC in order to influence the outcome of the competition.

One reason for this assertive approach to communicating the messages in its bid was that in Glasgow the fortunes of the Conservative party were on a downward trajectory, whereas several of Edinburgh’s MPs were in government at the time. In comparison to those of Glasgow, Edinburgh’s constituencies were over-represented at a senior level in the Scottish Office, not least by the Secretary of State Malcolm Rifkind, who represented Edinburgh Pentlands. The closest to a representative Glasgow had within the Scottish Office coterie of senior MPs was

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Allan Stewart, Minister for Industry and Education, who represented Eastwood, one of the very few Conservative constituencies in the Greater Glasgow conurbation (though not in Glasgow itself). Indeed, EDC’s approach of relying not on the contents of its submission but instead on its image as a European city of culture, and senior Scottish Office MPs viewing the city in a favourable light worked, temporarily, to its advantage.

The period between the Scottish Office’s receipt of Richard Luce’s consultation letter and its response saw positions shift on which Scottish city to back, as following pressure from other Edinburgh MPs such as Michael Ancram, Malcolm Rifkind disregarded civil servants’ advice to support Glasgow as the stronger bid.

The Scottish Office’s initial position - recommended by David A. Campbell, Permanent Secretary in the Scottish Education Department which co-ordinated the Office’s ECOC work - was that the best hope of a Scottish nomination would be for the Secretary of State to lend strong support to Glasgow, recognising that Edinburgh had failed to make its case.

This recommendation was challenged by Michael Ancram, MP for Edinburgh South, whose Private Secretary, Ian Howie, wrote:

Mr Ancram [...] feels that we should put in a strong supporting bid for Edinburgh, which he feels has rightly always been regarded as Scotland’s cultural centre and capital. The Minister thinks that to give it to Glasgow, who already have SEC and the Garden Festival, is overdoing it. (Howie, 1986)

Further internal communications show David A. Campbell disregarding Michael Ancram’s intervention and applying further pressure to the Secretary of State to provide a Scottish Office response in support of Glasgow, stating, for example:

We have just heard that Lord Young is to be advised to support Glasgow’s bid. This further reinforces our expectation that Glasgow offers the best hope of obtaining a Scottish nomination. (Campbell, 1986a)

Disregarding support from Allan Stewart for Glasgow, Michael Ancram continued to argue Edinburgh’s case until it gained traction at a meeting of Scottish Office
ministers on 25 June 1986. Minutes of this meeting offer an extraordinary insight into how pressure might produce a perverse result:

Summing up a brief discussion the Secretary of State [Malcolm Rifkind] said that at the end of the day, the quality of the nominations by the competing cities was unlikely to be the determining factor and that Edinburgh was likely to be regarded - rightly or wrongly - as a more credible candidate. Ministers had, therefore, decided that the Scottish Office should back Edinburgh’s nomination. (Scottish Ministers, 1986: 2)

Those in Glasgow’s bid coalition who suspected their bid would be met with prejudice were indeed right to do so. However, due to the strength of Glasgow’s submission, the civil service ensured that the Scottish Office and its Secretary of State supported Glasgow’s bid, alongside the appearance of support for Edinburgh. A ‘PS Minute’ sent by David A. Campbell to Robert Gordon, Malcolm Rifkind’s Private Secretary, stated:

There is no reason why the short list should not include two Scottish cities and, as a matter of tactics, this would appear to be a safer aim than asking for a substitution of Edinburgh for Glasgow. Edinburgh may well be able to tighten up their bid: but a weak Edinburgh bid would almost certainly let in Bath or Bristol, over both of whom Glasgow probably has a slight edge. OAL officials, to whom we have spoken, have indicated that it would help obtain a concession in Edinburgh’s favour if we indicated a readiness to compromise if Edinburgh fail to substantiate their bid more convincingly. (Campbell, 1986b)

In his response to Richard Luce, drafted by David A. Campbell, Malcolm Rifkind stated that he agreed ‘that Glasgow has produced an impressive submission and am sure they would provide strong contenders for the nomination’ (Rifkind, 1986). Rifkind pressed for Edinburgh to be added to the shortlist alongside Glasgow as, ‘[t]heir case is relatively weak but this is only a question of presentation.’ Furthermore,

In a European context however, Edinburgh would probably have a stronger chance of success than Glasgow or, indeed, any of the other cities you have short-listed. If we are to stand the best chance of a British nomination it would therefore make sense to examine Edinburgh’s case more seriously. (Rifkind, 1986)

75 ‘Nominations’ in this context meant submissions.
This reflects a concern held by some Scottish Office ministers which went beyond political bias: their belief that Glasgow would be unlikely to be awarded the title by EC ministers due to the misalignment of its image with that of the ECOC predecessors.

Scottish Office ministers were not the only government ministers consulted to demonstrate in their responses preconceived ideas of what an ECOC should be: an idea that was based entirely on the image and reputation of the previous cities to hold the ECOC title. In his response to Richard Luce’s letter of 10 June 1986, which asked for views on the proposed shortlist of four cities, Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stated:

> From a European point of view we would have to support Bath. It is an old and attractive city with an established reputation in the arts. More than the other shortlisted candidates it ranks with the European cities which have already been selected. (Howe, 1986)

Howe appears to have placed Glasgow and Leeds in an entirely different league:

> The efforts of Leeds and Glasgow to improve the cultural life of their cities will no doubt be borne in mind. Any gesture in their direction would be well received as recognition of a commitment to the regeneration of the inner cities. (Howe, 1986)

In his response to Richard Luce, David Young, Secretary of State for Employment, did not support a Glasgow nomination. Instead he joined Geoffrey Howe in opting for Bath, citing almost identical reasons:

> I should very much like to see Bath nominated as the UK candidate for 1990. It is an old and attractive city with an established image of heritage and culture. (Young, 1986)

The idea that in order to rank as an ECOC, candidates should be an ‘old and attractive city with an established image of heritage and culture’ was not based on any EC parameters nor government guidance. At no point is the image or reputation of a city stated as grounds for its selection in the EC resolution on which the ECOC programme was founded. However, foremost in ministers’ consultation responses was likely to have been a perception that the proposed
city’s image would be the determining factor at a European level, given the ratification process. In breaking with tradition there was - to reiterate the Scottish Office ministers’ argument in prioritising Edinburgh over Glasgow - ‘no guarantee that in competition with the other European countries the UK could secure the nomination’. Indeed, such concerns were not entirely without foundation.\(^{76}\)

In addition, it is possible that the only government office to give any extended consideration to the potential opportunities presented by a break in tradition was the OAL. Archive documents and interviews with key actors suggest that the OAL was the only government office to advocate for Glasgow’s place as a UK ECOC candidate during this period in the selection process. It was also the office that recognised the opportunity to promote an alternative idea of what an ECOC could be to other EC member states: a post-industrial city going through a rapid period of socio-economic change, and which until recently had not been promoted as a major tourist destination, but which was equally a European city of culture.

Ultimately, Edinburgh was added to the shortlist, not on the basis of the quality of its case but for political reasons, as Richard Luce subsequently reflected:

> If they hadn’t been considered and I appointed Glasgow then that would have been wrong, or that would have caused a storm and it wasn’t necessary to have a storm, it could be avoided.
> (Richard Luce, interview, 24 March 2015)

By September 1986, officials from the OAL had visited each of the five shortlisted cities to discuss their ECOC bids, and had received supplementary

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\(^{76}\) Melina Mercouri was reportedly in favour of Edinburgh rather than Glasgow being awarded the ECOC title. Richard Luce stated in his interview on 24 March 2015: ‘Now when I told Melina Mercouri, she said, “Who’ve you chosen?” I said, “I’ve chosen Glasgow.” She said, “You don’t mean Glasgow, darling.”’ - she always said “darling” like Dickie Attenborough - “You don’t mean Glasgow, darling.” “I do.” And I said, “You think I mean Edinburgh don’t you?” [laughter] She said, “Of course I do!” I said, “Look, you come to the opening.” That’s why she came. “You come to the opening, which the Queen will do, and you’ll see why, ok?” She was dying of cancer and she had her nurse with her and she came to the opening and in the line up I introduced the Queen to her, and I said, “This is Melina Mercouri, the Greek Minister who invented the concept.” And she just said to her, “He’s right you know!” And she looked rather startled, and I said, “Oh thank you very much!” [laughter] She realised.’
submissions requested from Edinburgh and Glasgow to address areas of discussion.

Glasgow’s supplementary submission (GDC, 1986c) reinforced its already-strong case. It focused on issues of business, financial investment, image and regeneration. It dispensed with the voice of the city’s arts organisations and raised those of its business leaders, suggesting the city felt these were its most persuasive advocates to central government. Where Glasgow’s submission intimated that the ECOC would form an element in the completion of a broader process of urban renewal, the supplementary submission articulated it boldly. It established the distance travelled in transforming the city’s economic fortunes - and image - over the preceding five years, and how the ECOC could further this trajectory of economic development through public-private partnerships.

Edinburgh’s supplementary submission (Edinburgh District Council, 1986b) was an improvement on the city’s original submission, in that it proposed, albeit sketchily, ‘the kind of events under consideration’ that might constitute its ECOC programme - something overlooked in the first bid document. However, its case remained reliant on its long-established self-stated reputation as ‘The Athens of the North’, quoting Robert Louis Stephenson’s description of Edinburgh as ‘the dream of masonry and living rock, a city in the world of everyday reality’. The fact that Louis Stephenson had died almost a century prior to the writing of the supplementary submission reflected a broader weakness in Edinburgh’s ECOC bid strategy: the emphasis was on the past, with no coherent case for how the ECOC title and event would shape the city’s future.

By late September 1986, support for Edinburgh’s nomination within the Scottish Office was losing traction. Scottish Office documents reported that Richard Luce’s ‘idea of a joint nomination of Edinburgh and Glasgow’ was ‘floated’ then ‘quickly dropped’ following his visit to Scotland in August 1986 (Campbell, 1986c) and after meetings with the Scottish Arts Council.⁷⁷ Crucially, Edinburgh’s

⁷⁷ Scottish Office documents show that Richard Luce met the Scottish Arts Council (SAC) on 13 August 1986 prior to attending an Edinburgh Festival reception the following day. They note that the SAC responded to Luce’s suggestion of a joint Glasgow/Edinburgh nomination thus: ‘SAC were unhappy with this compromise, which they felt would be undermined by civic rivalries. The unanimous SAC view was in favour of Glasgow’ (Campbell, 1986d). This contrasts with the SAC’s
mismanagement of the 1986 Commonwealth Games, during July and August, was viewed by the Scottish Office as having exposed the ‘weaknesses in the recreation department’ on which ‘support for the arts amongst Edinburgh Councillors and officials is centred’ and ‘which is not in the forefront of that ruling group’s priorities’ (Campbell, 1986c).

Glasgow succeeded in being awarded the nomination not only because of the strengths of its case, but also due to the comparative weaknesses of competing bids. One of the determining factors in Glasgow being awarded the nomination - a factor in which it outshone the competition - was the dynamism of its approach. Reflecting in 2015 on the shortlisted cities, Richard Luce stated:

We looked and I think Bristol, Bath and Leeds all had something to offer. Leeds of course had the piano competition, Bristol the theatres, Bath the theatres too, but it wasn’t broad enough, wasn’t dynamic enough. It was good, that was why they were on the shortlist, but none of them were quite as dynamic as Glasgow. (Richard Luce, interview, 24 March 2015)

This dynamism hinged upon the partnerships between the public and private sector leaders driving the bid. Luce (interview, 24 March 2015) singled out Norman Macfarlane and Pat Lally as ‘dynamic chaps who played a leading role in it’. He remarked on finding Pat Lally ‘very persuasive’ and Norman Macfarlane as,

leading the business sector, with enthusiasm, and I think in a study of this his contribution ought to be noted because it was that sort of support that enthused me. Everyone was getting together, forgetting about their differences and getting on with things and I thought that was just splendid. (Richard Luce, interview, 24 March 2015)

This is particularly striking given that politically, Macfarlane was a Tory, knighted by Thatcher, and Lally was a Labour council leader orientated towards the left wing of his party.

The dynamism of Glasgow’s bid and the pragmatic partnerships driving it were characteristic facilitating factors in the process of change in the city outlined formal opinion, expressed in a letter from its Chair Alan Peacock to Malcolm Rifkind, that ‘The Scottish Arts Council is naturally warmly supportive of both Scottish bids and recognises the strength in each of these two very good candidates.’ (Peacock, 1986: 1)
thus far in this thesis. The severe socio-economic problems and associated image issues faced by Glasgow - which rendered its cultural assets invisible to many outside the city - as well as the opportunities presented by the ECOC and the challenge represented by Glasgow’s rivals to the nomination, acted as prompting factors in the development of the city’s coherent, strategic approach to the ECOC competition.

This approach was unique amongst competing cities facing similar socio-economic challenges, such as Liverpool, whose local authority had not developed a similarly dynamic partnership approach to working with the private sector at a time when the council had been infiltrated by the Militant Tendency. Richard Luce commented:

> Because Michael Heseltine was really trying to do something about Liverpool I was keen on them but they didn’t produce a good enough bid at that stage. (Richard Luce, interview, 24 March 2015)

Edinburgh, in comparison, whose cultural assets were not overshadowed by its socio-economic problems, had not been presented with such spurs as those facing Glasgow to act as a driving force for its bid. Consequently, Edinburgh’s bid was wholly reliant on the city’s image aligning with the previous ECOC incumbents.

Glasgow’s bid coalition leadership were justified in their approach of basing the city’s bid on a coherent strategy of economic development, in order to appeal to the policies of the Thatcher government and to counter the challenge represented by its rivals and win the nomination. By reinforcing its cultural status in Europe through association with the prestigious ECOC initiative, Glasgow was the first ECOC to use the title to make its cultural assets visible to its home nation.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the strategies employed by GDC and its coalition partners in developing its ECOC bid; how the city of Glasgow mobilised the requisite expertise; and how it assessed the challenge represented by its rivals
and countered that challenge. It has also examined the decision-making process and considered the roles played by key actors in central government which resulted in Glasgow winning the nomination.

This chapter has argued that the construction and reception of Glasgow’s ECOC bid was shaped by a combination of prestige, prejudice and public relations. It was the prestige of the ECOC which would enable Glasgow to reposition its image and thereby support the development of the city’s service sector economy, which was reliant the city’s image for success. Glasgow’s bid was an excellent work of public relations, developed in response to the anticipation of potential prejudice based on the fact that the city’s image did not align with the prestigious centres of culture and established international tourist destinations to have previously held the title. As Rifkind, Howe and Young’s respective responses to Glasgow’s submission demonstrated, this approach was entirely justified. The key actors within Glasgow’s bid coalition realised a coherent strategy was required to underpin its bid in order to compete with UK cities that did not share its challenges around image.

Despite the severe socio-economic problems facing the city - and the lack of formal cultural policy - Glasgow had a well-established cultural infrastructure that continued to thrive during the 1970s and 1980s. However, the economic development planning activity that took place in the city between the mid-late 1970s and 1986 was clearly not ‘culture-led’. Rather, culture was a peripheral aspect of the city’s service sector economy, a means of improving the city’s image, of drawing into the city residents, visitors and their associated spending power. Between 1981 and 1986, economic development policy and strategy in Glasgow developed at a rapid pace - without culture as a central pillar - whilst a formal and coherent cultural policy for the city did not.

When the opportunity arose to bid for the ECOC 1990 nomination in early 1986, the lack of formal, coherent cultural policy in Glasgow created a vacuum that could be filled by the formal and increasingly coherent economic development strategies developed for the city in the preceding years, into which culture was being incorporated. The bid being based on economic, rather than cultural, goals ensured that, when formal strategies for culture were developed for the
delivery of the Year of Culture following Glasgow’s nomination, the economic became embedded as the foundation of Glasgow’s emerging cultural policy. It could therefore be argued that rather than culture leading regeneration, regeneration led culture. The development of Glasgow’s cultural policy was led by the development of the city’s economy.
CHAPTER 7  1987 TO 1989: TOWARDS A FORMAL CULTURAL POLICY

7.1 Introduction

This chapter will consider developments during the period 1987 to 1989 - the years between Glasgow being awarded the ECOC 1990 title and the event taking place - as Glasgow moved towards a formal cultural policy. Two contrasting political axes shape the period: 1987 marked the commencement of the third term of the Thatcher government; whilst at local government level, Labour led both GDC and SRC - a situation that was far from unique in metropolitan authorities in the UK. It was a period which saw the development of a national political and economic climate in which public policies related to the ‘inner cities’ and culture became increasingly connected. It was also a period in which some commentators observed Glasgow was becoming a ‘dual city’.

Glasgow bidding for and winning the ECOC title in 1986 was undoubtedly both a critical event and a facilitating factor in the cultural turn in the city’s policy making. The ECOC 1990 event dominated the cultural landscape in Glasgow, prompting and absorbing a significant increase in public funding for the arts and culture in the city in the years between 1987 and 1990. In addition to an increase in programme activity funding, the ECOC acted as a focal point for the development of infrastructure for the consumption of culture in the city - including both the completion of major capital projects already underway, such as the Royal Concert Hall, in time for 1990, as well as the development of new venues such as Tramway and The Arches. As a consequence of this approach, there was also a significant increase in participation in the arts and culture during this period.

However, as well as acting as a prompting and facilitating factor for the emergence of Glasgow’s cultural policy, the ECOC can also be interpreted as an obstacle to its development. Whereas several other UK cities (largely Labour-led metropolitan authorities comparable to Glasgow) were concurrently developing arts and culture strategies encompassing both the consumption and production
of culture in the latter half of the 1980s, Glasgow was not. It was set on a strategic trajectory resulting from its approach to its ECOC bid which privileged the consumption of the arts and culture over its production, as a means of supporting the shift of the base of the city economy towards the service industries and consumer services. It was not until the catalytic events of the 1990s to follow the ECOC – such as the 1999 Year of Architecture and Design – that Glasgow shifted its strategic focus towards the development of infrastructure to support the production of culture alongside its consumption.

Within this context, this chapter will compare the roles of John Myerscough and Nicholas Garnham as key advisors in shaping emergent cultural policy in Glasgow and London respectively, with particular reference to the 1988 report, *The Economic Importance of the Arts in Britain* (Myerscough, 1988a), and its Glasgow case study (Myerscough, 1988b). It will then examine the contrasting strategic approaches to the ECOC that developed within Glasgow’s district and regional authorities and how the economic and social value of ‘Glasgow’s culture’ was articulated within those responses. Finally, it will discuss the position of the arts and culture in GDC’s economic development activity and examine to what extent a ‘Glasgow model’ of culture-led regeneration emerged during the years leading up to 1990.

The research findings challenge the idea that such a model emerged in Glasgow during this period. However, the developments discussed in this chapter are connected by an emerging tendency, articulated in the city during this period to varying degrees of formality, which valued the city’s culture in instrumental terms. This tendency conforms to Belfiore and Bennett’s interpretation of M. H. Abrams’ ‘pragmatic’ theories of art, which view:

> the work of art as a means to an end, an instrument to get something done, and [...] judge its value according to its success in achieving that aim. (Belfiore and Bennett, 2010: 146)

The dominance of the ECOC and the strategic trajectory established in Glasgow’s 1986 bid to host the event reflected the way in which the city’s authorities predominantly valued the arts and culture for their economic – and to a lesser extent, social – potential in an emerging implicit cultural policy.
7.2 The production and consumption of culture: cities and their advisors

During the 1980s, two expert advisors played influential roles in the development of emerging cultural policies in two UK cities: Nicholas Garnham in London and John Myerscough in Glasgow. After establishing the wider context and Garnham’s role as an advisor in the development of the GLC and GLEB’s cultural industries strategy in London during the early to mid-1980s, this section will examine the role played by Myerscough in Glasgow later in the decade. It will discuss Myerscough’s influential 1988 report, *The Economic Importance of the Arts in Britain*, and, in particular, its Glasgow case study. In arguing that the dominance of the strategic direction set in Glasgow’s ECOC bid - that is, developing culture as a consumption activity within the service sector economy - initially acted as an obstacle to the development of the cultural industries in Glasgow, this section will examine how Myerscough’s 1988 report both reinforced Glasgow’s strategic trajectory and established recommendations to broaden its scope beyond consumption alone to a balance between production and consumption of culture.

In comparing the relationships between the two advisors and their respective local authorities, this section will ultimately argue that while Garnham was concerned with creating a new democratic cultural policy, Myerscough and GDC were not. Myerscough’s pragmatic approach, based on measuring the economic impact of the arts and recommending ways in which it could be exploited by the city’s authorities, aligned with the broader economic development aims of GDC and its partners, laying the foundations of a longer-term advisory relationship between Myerscough and the City of Glasgow, which has continued. This provides a marked contrast to Garnham’s ideologically-driven advice to the GLC and GLEB, which, although ground-breaking, was severely modified in the authorities’ resultant strategy which, although influential, was not realised in practice.

As discussed in Chapter 2, over the course of the 1980s, local authorities played an increasingly significant role in the UK arts and culture funding landscape. During this period, the arts and culture at a local level were subject to an
increasingly politicised approach to local government from the left and the right. Gray has discussed the influence on Labour-led local councils of the new urban left and the influence of the new suburban right on Conservative-led councils, with the result that:

*Major Labour-dominated urban authorities began to utilise the arts for political purposes and to understand the arts as tools for political ends; Conservative authorities continued to question the role of the state in producing arts policies and tended to support market-led solutions to issues of arts provision. (Gray, 2000: 168)*

In addition, for Labour-led councils the opportunity presented by the comparative lack of central government regulation of the arts and culture enabled them to use its development as a tool for countering perceived central government disempowerment (O’Neill, 2006: 32).

As the 1980s progressed, local authorities - and particularly Labour-led urban councils - increasingly developed formal arts and cultural policies, to the extent that by 1990, the Association of Metropolitan Authorities (AMA) produced guidelines ‘within a broad framework which may be adapted as appropriate to local circumstances and priorities’, which discussed ‘issues such as access to arts and culture, equal opportunities, education and training, economic importance of the arts, and the reasons for having an arts and culture policy’ (LEDIS, 1992a).

This period saw the development and promotion of local authority cultural policy ‘models’, which were inherently instrumental. Glasgow was far from alone in positioning the economic importance of the arts in an increasingly strategic role in its provision of public funding for culture.

Over the course of the 1980s, the increasingly formal arts and cultural policies of metropolitan authorities were premised upon a strategic balance - which varied between authorities - of the production and consumption of culture. This was reflected in such vehicles as the cultural industries, cultural quarters and cultural tourism. Sheffield’s pioneering approach during the early 1980s in
developing its cultural quarter - which focused entirely on the production of
culture without facilitating its consumption - is one influential example.

Despite the GLC having been abolished in 1986 by the ‘hostile Tory government’
(Garnham, 1990: 154), its work with Nicholas Garnham and the GLEB - notably
the cultural industries strategy in the 1985 London Industrial Strategy - is widely
regarded as ground-breaking. It is significant not only, as Justin O’Connor (2010:
27) has commented, as ‘the first cultural industries strategy at a local level’, but
also as ‘a series of sketches for a contemporary democratic cultural policy’.
O’Connor has remarked that the impact of the GLC’s cultural industries strategy
on subsequent local and cultural strategies was ‘very high’, as:

> It represented an attempt to break out of a cultural policy centred on the
> ‘arts’; and on subsidies to artists and producing institutions as the
> foundation of that policy. (O’Connor, 2010: 28)

The underlying premise of Garnham’s account of the cultural industries, which
to a great extent provided a theoretical base for the GLC and GLEB’s strategy, is
summarised in a paper titled Concepts of Culture: Public Policy and the Cultural
Industries (Garnham, 1987). In his analysis of the evolution of contemporary
public cultural policies, and promotion of an alternative approach, Garnham
declared:

> To mobilize the concept of the cultural industries as central to an analysis
> of cultural activity and of public cultural policy is to take a stand against a
> whole tradition of idealist cultural analysis. (Garnham, 1987: 24)

Garnham rejected Raymond Williams’ definition in Culture and Society of
culture ‘as a realm separate from, and often actively opposed to, the realm of
material production and economic activity’, which he interpreted as the
tradition from which current cultural policies had evolved. Garnham was critical

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78 Moss (2002: 215) has described the emphasis of Sheffield’s cultural quarter as being on ‘job
creation in cultural production’ with ‘little attention paid to consumption, the form of café
culture, retail outlets for cultural goods, or even cultural institutions open to the public’. The
socialist approach of Sheffield’s local authority towards the development of its cultural quarter
as a means of challenging the role of local government during the early 1980s was discussed in
Chapter 2.

79 Garnham has noted this paper was ‘originally written for a conference on the cultural
industries in London in December 1983 and published as a pamphlet by the GLC’ (Garnham,
of the three grounds he identified on which ‘public intervention, in the form of subsidy, is justified’:

(1) that culture possesses inherent values, of life enhancement or whatever, which are fundamentally opposed to and in danger of damage by commercial forces; (2) that the need for these values is universal, uncontaminated by questions of class, gender and ethnic origin; and (3) that the market cannot satisfy this need. (Garnham, 1987: 24)

Garnham’s paper promoting a new democratic cultural policy acted as a starting point for the development of the GLC and GLEB’s cultural industries strategy, which formed a chapter of their joint 1985 London Industrial Strategy (GLC and GLEB, 1985). Like Garnham’s paper, this document set out a ‘wider definition of culture, including particularly the electronic forms of cultural production and distribution - radio, television, records and video - and the diverse range of popular culture which exist in London today’ (GLC and GLEB, 1985: 169). It was critical of state intervention since the Second World War, which, it stated,

has largely taken the form of subsidy to the traditional art forms - dance, classical music, opera, the visual arts, theatre, and literature. It has also tended to serve elite rather than popular cultures. (GLC and GLEB, 1985: 169)

This was an explicit, coherent strategy in which both the production and consumption of culture were addressed.

However, Garnham’s theoretical input was severely modified by the GLC and GLEB to the extent that the resultant strategy became detached from the underlying premise of the theory. Rather than being driven by an intention to democratise culture, the GLC and GLEB’s cultural industries strategy aimed primarily to alleviate the interconnected problems of unemployment and deindustrialisation in the city. It became subsumed as but one component in the city’s industrial strategy, culture being utilised first and foremost for economic development purposes, not least job creation.

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80 In the London Industrial Strategy, the GLC and GLEB connected Garnham’s theories of the cultural industries to the severe challenges presented to London by the ‘three great issues’ of deindustrialisation, the economic collapse of Britain’s major cities, and the conditions of life and labour of Britain’s working people’ (GLC and GLEB, 1985: 3).
The GLC and GLEB’s strategy also differed to Garnham’s theory in the type of intervention that was deemed to be required. The London Industrial Strategy recognised that ‘the market is a very inadequate means of meeting cultural needs or of guaranteeing opportunities for people to work in this area’ (GLC and GLEB, 1985: 184). However, its proposed solution was ‘to work both in and against the market’ (GLC and GLEB, 1985: 184), using ‘new forms of intervention - investment and loan finance - in addition to traditional forms of subsidy and grant-aid’ (GLC and GLEB, 1985: 169). O’Connor has highlighted how Garnham’s theoretical focus was not on local economic production strategy but on developing a democratic cultural policy based on an educated and informed audience demand to which publicly-owned distribution companies and cultural producers alike could respond. It was explicitly not about that support for local cultural producers with which the GLC is most identified and which he associates with encouraging supply for which there is no demand. (O’Connor, 2010: 27)

The nature of the advisory role played by John Myerscough to GDC in Glasgow provides a contrast to that of Garnham and the GLC and GLEB in London. In 1988, the Policy Studies Institute published The Economic Importance of the Arts in Britain by John Myerscough (1988a). Glasgow was one of three case studies which formed the basis of this report, the others being Liverpool and Ipswich. Each of these three case studies was also published as its own separate report, in Glasgow’s case under the title, The Economic Importance of the Arts in Glasgow (Myerscough, 1988b). Much as its title suggests, the report focused entirely on the economic impact of the arts and, to an extent, culture more broadly, at a time when such an approach had not yet been universally established as the bedrock of cultural policy and a primary justification for public funding for the arts across the UK. The Economic Importance of the Arts in Britain was seminal in the development of cultural policy, not only in Glasgow but across the UK more broadly. Although not uncontroversial when it was first published, it has since set a long-term agenda, stretching into creative industries policy.

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81 Myerscough’s methodological approach and findings attracted criticism from economist Gordon Hughes in a 1989 Policy Studies article (Hughes, 1989). Hughes was critical of Myerscough’s broad interpretation of the arts sector, the inclusion of ancillary expenditure (such as refreshments and hotels) and related use of multiplier analysis to estimate the indirect employment impact of
The 1988 report is also significant in initiating what became a longer-term advisory relationship between Myerscough and Glasgow, particularly the city council. *The Economic Importance of the Arts in Glasgow* was followed in 1991 by Myerscough’s report for GDC, *Monitoring Glasgow 1990* (Myerscough, 1991), which studied the socio-economic impact of the ECOC in the city. A series of influential reports have since been produced by Myerscough for the city. The late 1980s were a critical time in establishing Myerscough’s éminence grise role as he became an influential actor in the development of Glasgow’s cultural policy in the decades that followed.83

Unlike Garnham, Myerscough did not attempt to ‘take a stand against a whole tradition of cultural analysis’, nor did he set out to establish a new democratic cultural policy for Glasgow. Myerscough’s concern with supply and demand was fact-based rather than ideologically-focused. Myerscough’s 1988 report reinforced the strategic approach Glasgow was already taking in its implementation of the McKinsey strategy and its absorbing the arts into economic development activity. This is exemplified not least in the report’s empirical research focus on the middle managers and senior executives Glasgow was aiming to attract – an aspect of research that was unique to the Glasgow case study.

Two facilitating factors in this complementary development of *The Economic Importance of the Arts in Glasgow* alongside strategic developments in the city were the report’s timing and the involvement of key actors in the leadership of arts expenditure and contribution of the arts to the economy more broadly. Hughes also highlighted a limitation of the study that it did not acknowledge the problem that additional jobs created through arts-related activities may be offset by jobs lost elsewhere in the economy. (Hughes, 1989: 35-38)

82 Sara Selwood (2012) has noted that the study was ‘enormously influential’ as ‘the first serious attempt to address economic impact in the UK’. Part of Myerscough’s agenda, argued Selwood, ‘was to persuade the Treasury to increase funding to the arts’. In a central government funding context in which ‘traditional arguments were losing their potency […] Myerscough arguably established economic impact assessment as a form of advocacy in the UK’ (Selwood, 2012: 85-86).

83 John Myerscough was invited to be interviewed as part of this research project though proved elusive and a formal interview did not take place. Maintaining an éminence grise position may not be compatible with contributing an interview to an oral history archive. While there are no records of speeches made by Myerscough, as there are with other key actors such as Norman Macfarlane, Myerscough is afforded a voice in the key documents (*The Economic Importance of the Arts in Britain/Glasgow*) that are the basis of this discussion.
the city. Although the final PSI report was published in 1988, GDC’s Director of Finance, Bill English, proposed as early as 1985 that ‘the Council commission a research study into the economic importance of the Arts in the Glasgow area’ (GDC, 1986a). Research began in Glasgow in 1985/86 (Myerscough, 1988b: 8), shortly after McKinsey and Co. reported its recommendations to the SDA, and was undertaken concurrently with Glasgow developing its ECOC bid strategy in 1986. While the national report was initiated by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation with funding from the OAL, Museums and Galleries Commission, ACGB and the Crafts Council, the Glasgow case study developed with strong support from key actors within GDC, SRC and Glasgow Action, as well as the SDA, the SAC and the GGTB, amongst others, in the form of a Glasgow Advisory Group (Myerscough, 1988b: v). The Glasgow case study not only developed in alignment with the strategic trajectory the city was already following with regard to the arts and its impact on the city economy, but provided a post hoc rationalisation for it - a justification for decisions and directions already taken.

As well as providing evidence of the existing economic impact of the arts, Myerscough’s report recommended a connected ‘strategy for growth’ in Glasgow. This comprised four specific areas: building up the cultural industries; increasing attendance at arts events and attractions; expanding cultural tourism; and developing extra elements in Glasgow’s cultural programme (Myerscough, 1988b: 170). Of these four areas, three were an extension of strategic developments already underway in the city, not least the McKinsey strategy and the ECOC. Indeed, Myerscough highlighted the way in which extra opportunities for the arts related to the existing targets within the McKinsey report, such as improving the image of Glasgow and building the tourist industry. Only proposals related to the cultural industries reached into new territory.

Myerscough’s report was written at a time when the development of the cultural industries was at an embryonic stage in Glasgow. Archival evidence reveals that initial thinking and discussion of the cultural industries took place in Glasgow.

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84 At this early stage, there was some discussion in the GDC Finance committee as to whether ‘the Director of Planning be asked to report on the feasibility of his department carrying out the survey, in preference to carrying out the survey in conjunction with the Policy Studies Institute’ (GDC, 1986a). Bill English became GDC’s representative on the Glasgow Advisory Group for the 1988 Myerscough/PSI report (Myerscough, 1988b: v). The significance of the role played by Bill English in the development of Glasgow’s cultural policy will be discussed in section 7.3.
after the city was awarded the ECOC title in 1986 but prior to the 1988 report. This thinking was heavily influenced by the dominant left-wing ideology of Garnham and the GLC.

The marginal role of ‘public subsidised’ culture compared to ‘commercial’ was discussed in a paper on ‘the cultural industries in Glasgow’ in the summer of 1987 by Robert Palmer, Director of the newly-established GDC Festivals Unit, for discussion with the SDA. This paper defined ‘cultural industries’ as:

> those organisations which produce and disseminate cultural goods and services, generally as commodities. Periodical and book publishing, music publishing, video production and film-making are examples. (Palmer, 1987: 1)

‘Culture’ here was conceived in entirely economic terms.\(^85\) Whereas - as shall be discussed in section 7.3 - GDC Festivals Unit was in the process of developing, concurrently, a broad definition of Glasgow’s ‘culture’ as ‘everything that makes the city what it is’ (GDC, 1992: 8), in this paper, ‘cultural activities’ were described as being ‘produced and distributed within a market by large scale organisations which are subject to many of the same structural and economic pressures that exist in other sectors of the economy’ (Palmer, 1987: 1).

This understanding of the cultural industries - of culture as a commodity; of the primary influence of the market on cultural fields; the marginal role of public subsidised culture in relation to commercial culture; and, as the paper later proposes, the potential for public sector agencies to develop ‘strategic interventions’ - strongly reflects the influence of Garnham, the GLEB and the GLC.\(^86\)

However, as shall be discussed in section 7.3, GDC’s approach during the period leading up to ECOC 1990 remained rooted in the tradition that Garnham was aiming to escape. It was largely focused on the arts and subsidies to artists and

\(^{85}\) Although in this paper Palmer stated, ‘There appear to be compelling cultural as well as economic reasons for increased investment in the industries of culture’, there was no discussion of any ‘cultural’ reasons for investment.

\(^{86}\) The influence of Garnham, the GLC and the London Industrial Strategy was articulated directly, as well as indirectly, in the discussion paper.
producing institutions, though GDC did not, in 1987, have a formal overarching cultural policy or strategy through which this approach was articulated.

The discussion paper is significant, however, in its attempt at a formal ‘strategic intervention to strengthen what exists and avoid what is sometimes a rather piecemeal and idiosyncratic application of public funds’ with regard to the cultural industries, even though this was not developed in practice during the 1980s.

Whilst Myerscough’s Glasgow case study was primarily focused on the arts, it extended to what the report recognised as ‘a relatively narrow view of the cultural industries’ (Myerscough, 1988b: 37). Myerscough defined ‘the arts sector’ as constituting three parts. Firstly, ‘what might be termed the “core” of the arts industry, the theatres and concerts, museums and galleries, which were the principal providers of arts events and attractions’. Secondly, ‘a world of small, often ad hoc companies, community organisations (which may include the arts in their activities) and individuals who make a living as visual artists, writers or performers.’ And finally, ‘some consideration of the cultural industries, sectors which supply artistic products and experiences to the public, but are often ignored in any discussion of the arts because they are essentially commercial in nature’ (Myerscough, 1988b: 10-11, original emphasis). Recognising that ‘the scope of the cultural industries is potentially enormous’, it was ‘restricted in this study to independent film and video production, cinema, broadcasting, publishing, the music industry and the art trade’ (Myerscough, 1988b: 11).

Myerscough’s approach to defining the cultural industries reflects a wider - and as yet, unresolved - challenge inherent in the use of the term to describe a sector of the UK economy. Even at this relatively nascent stage in its development and application in cultural policy, ‘the cultural industries’ was a slippery term, inherently flexible, with no singular shared definition of what aspects of ‘culture’ or ‘industry’ it included and excluded. The restricted scope of the cultural industries listed in the PSI study overlaps with, though does not entirely duplicate, the definition provided by Garnham or the list drawn up by Robert Palmer for discussion with the SDA in 1987.
In his analysis, Garnham employed a broader definition:

as a descriptive term, ‘cultural industries’ refers to those institutions in our society which employ the characteristic modes of production and organization of industrial corporations to produce and disseminate symbols in the form of cultural goods and services, generally, although not exclusively, as commodities. (Garnham, 1987: 25)

However, despite its comparatively narrow definition of the cultural industries, the PSI report’s proposals brought a new breadth to Glasgow’s established strategic focus on the arts and culture as a consumption activity. Proposed initiatives under the reports recommendation to build the cultural industries included, for example,

Developing a Designer Quarter in the Merchant City, with workshops, studios, retail space and resource centres, together with other attractions (including the proposed Costume Museum as a catalyst and focus). This would act as a showcase and a stimulus to retailing; it would also stimulate tourist activity, by bringing the market to the maker.⁸⁷ (Myerscough, 1988b: 171)

This recommendation built on the cultural quarters model tested elsewhere in the UK, recontextualised for Glasgow in its focus on stimulating tourism as well as providing a means of extending the city’s existing strategy of economic development through the consumption of culture into its production.

In conclusion, Myerscough is revealed to be a very different kind of advisor to Glasgow than Garnham to London. Both cities were interested in the economic potential of the arts and culture, specifically as a tool for countering deindustrialisation and the accompanying rise in unemployment. While this became the main focus of the GLC and GLEB’s cultural industries strategy, it was not the focus of Garnham’s theoretical input, from which the strategy became detached.

⁸⁷ This recommendation was well-received by GDC and although the designer quarter in the Merchant City was not realised until the 1990s, it was, characteristically, promoted in a 1988 GDC press release to publicise the publication of the PSI report as a ‘good news’ story (GDC, 1988a: 4).
Myerscough, however, built on economic development strategies already emerging in Glasgow to bring a new coherence to cultural planning, at a time when, as shall be discussed in 7.3, cultural planning was not approached in an entirely coherent way within GDC. Myerscough’s collaboration with the Glasgow Advisory Group ensured his report reinforced the strategic trajectory Glasgow was following in its approach to the ECOC. The report also proposed a shift away from an over-reliance on consumption without production towards a more balanced approach in its conception of the cultural industries, albeit it one not realised by GDC in the years leading to 1990. Myerscough’s dissection of the economic impact of the arts provided external evidence of the validity of the instrumental approach to culture emerging in Glasgow, positioning it as a pioneer in a national context. That Myerscough’s approach was not theorised in Marxist terms but pragmatic – based on identifying facts and new opportunities for economic growth – aligned well with a city driven by traditional Labour values and without a coherent neoliberal agenda, yet which has retrospectively been identified as a site of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’.

7.3 Glasgow’s culture and its value in the dual city

Following a brief discussion of the emerging dual city context, this section will compare the strategic structures put in place in GDC and SRC to support the delivery of the ECOC and the arts and culture more broadly during the period 1987 to 1989. It will examine, specifically, the dual approaches taken by the local and regional councils to articulating Glasgow’s culture and its value in their cultural planning documents during this period.

This section will argue that from 1987, two contrasting strategic approaches emerged within Glasgow’s local and regional authorities as each established its own mechanisms for delivering the impending ECOC event, which dominated both councils’ arts and cultural planning activity in the years leading to 1990.

In GDC, this is significant as the point at which a formal cultural policy began to emerge, in that formal objectives, which connected culture to social and economic development purposes, were first produced by GDC from a cultural planning - rather than economic development planning - perspective. Both GDC
and SRC took an inherently instrumental approach to culture in their planning for the ECOC event. However, whereas SRC’s emerging cultural policy was formally directed and strategically shaped by its pre-existing corporate social and economic strategies, GDC’s approach reflects an organisation not entirely at ease with the new managerialism.

This section will conclude that despite this initial development - and the new coherence brought by Myerscough’s 1988 report - there was no coherent, deliberate, explicit and formal cultural policy for the city as a whole, in which the cultural planning activities of both the local and regional authorities were combined, in the years leading to 1990. By 1990, Glasgow was a dual city not only in terms of its social and spatial polarisation, but also in the polarised approaches of the local and regional councils to the same cultural event and to cultural planning in the city.

7.3.1 Defining culture and the dual city

Whilst an early task of GDC’s newly-established Festivals Unit was to produce a definition of ‘Glasgow’s culture’ for the ECOC, SRC’s was an approach which made no attempt to define what constituted ‘culture’, but which, in contrast, very clearly articulated the social and economic value of the arts and culture to the council.

As discussed in Chapter 6, culture is a notoriously slippery term and the challenges of attempting to define ‘culture’, in and beyond its administration are well documented, not least by Raymond Williams (1976: 14 and 87). As will be discussed in the context of GDC and SRC’s approaches to articulating the social and economic value of Glasgow’s culture, attempting to distinguish between the cultural and the social in policy terms can be equally as problematic as defining culture itself. Terry Eagleton’s discussion of EB Tyler’s definition of culture illustrates the tension between definitions of the cultural and the social which were at play in both GDC and SRC’s emerging policy approaches:
Culture can be loosely summarized as the complex of values, customs, beliefs and practices which constitute the way of life of a specific group. It is ‘that complex whole’, as the anthropologist E.B. Tyler famously puts it in his *Primitive Culture*, ‘which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society’. But ‘any other capabilities’ is rather recklessly open-minded: the cultural and the social then become effectively identical. Culture is just everything which is not genetically transmissible’. (Eagleton, 2000: 34)

During this period leading to ECOC 1990, GDC’s attempts to define the city’s culture - and both councils’ production of documents articulating the social and economic value of the city’s culture - were further complicated by disagreements between the city’s elected and self-appointed representatives of ‘the people of Glasgow’ about the ECOC.

Workers City, a group of writers (and as such, a cultural elite) who claimed to defend Glasgow’s ‘authentic voice’ and represent the ‘long-standing tradition of struggle’ that constituted its culture, declared that ‘Glasgow - the working class city par excellence’ was ‘under attack’. Stating that ‘is it difficult to see the “culture” tag as being anything other than a sham accolade to help grease the wheels of capitalist enterprise and smooth the path for politicians’, Farquhar McLay, poet and editor of Workers City’s collected writings, decried the ECOC as ‘just another EEC/Tory con trick’ that had:

nothing whatever to do with working- or the workless-class poor of Glasgow but everything to do with big business and money: to pull in investment for inner-city developments which, in the obsessive drive to make the centre of the city attractive to tourists, can only work to the further disadvantage of the people in the poverty ghettos on the outskirts. (McLay, 1988: 1)

The Workers City’s backlash was dismissed, not only by GDC Leader Pat Lally - a target of the writers’ ire, expressed not least in their renaming Glasgow ‘Lallygrad’, viewing his leadership style as authoritarian - but also by journalist Ruth Wishart. Identifying the core of what was becoming a polarised debate around the ECOC as: ‘are the arts, “culture”, and participation in the hype of a 1990-style promotion a vital tool in urban regeneration and civic rebirth or have they very little meaning to those many thousands still disenfranchised by
unemployment, poor housing and the lack of any obvious escape route from endemic poverty?’ (Wishart, 1991: 44), Wishart commented on:

an inherent arrogance in the collective assertion of the Workers City group that only they are qualified to be keepers of the city’s socialist conscience and working-class tradition. There is arrogance too in their becoming the self-appointed voice of the people in Glasgow on whom, they argue, the regeneration of Glasgow and its refurbished image have never truly impinged. (Wishart, 1991: 46)

Furthermore, these strategic developments and debates about Glasgow’s culture and its value emerged at a time when academic critics began to observe that Glasgow was becoming a dual city.

The dual city metaphor, as discussed in Chapter 3, describes an increasing social and spatial segregation between rich and poor. In 1989, Keating (1989: 516) applied the term to Glasgow, commenting that the authorities’ approach to urban restructuring, focused on the city centre and waterfront, was ‘heightening both social and spatial inequalities in a city already characterized by marked social segregation’. More recent evidence, such as the 2016 publication of research by Walsh et al. into excess mortality in Glasgow, suggests Glasgow was undeniably becoming a dual city at this point in its history, due to complex factors such as Scottish Office regional policy from the 1950s, local government responses to UK government economic policy in the 1980s and the negative impact of the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ on an already vulnerable population (Walsh et al, 2016: 3-4). 88

As discussed in Chapter 3, as much as it points to a real phenomenon - and one not restricted to Glasgow but prevalent across the Western world - the dual city concept is less than nuanced when used to reduce complex geographies into binary narratives. This is reflected in what is now an established narrative of culture-led regeneration in Glasgow, in which the city’s approach to ECOC 1990 is viewed as divisive.

88 This research summarises all research that has been undertaken into the phenomenon of Scotland - and specifically Glasgow - experiencing higher mortality over and above that explained by the country’s socio-economic profile.
Ideas that the arts and culture, specifically the ECOC, could contribute to what were deeply entrenched, structural socio-economic problems - either by exacerbating them or ‘solving’ them - began to gain traction just as Glasgow became formally identified as a dual city. Concurrently, a duality of approaches to the ECOC - both of which were based on the socio-economic instrumentalisation of culture - emerged in local and regional government in Glasgow.

7.3.2 Glasgow’s culture and its value in GDC and SRC, 1987 to 1989

Glasgow began the period 1987 to 1989 having been awarded the ECOC 1990 title by the EC, but without the structures in place in the city to deliver the event. This period also began with discussions between GDC and SRC on the role the regional authority might take in Glasgow’s ECOC event and ended with SRC’s announcement of its contribution of ‘around £20m to confirm the success of the 1990 celebrations’ (SRC, 1989: 1).

The voice of SRC is notably absent from Glasgow’s ECOC bid documents, which were presented as the united front of the city. This absence is made all the more conspicuous by the stated purpose of the ECOC initiative being ‘to celebrate each year the individual culture of a city and its region’ (Office of Arts and Libraries, 1986b). Furthermore, in its 21 year existence (between 1975 and 1996), SRC provided a significant amount of revenue and capital funding and resources for the arts and culture in Glasgow. Whilst in its ECOC submission, GDC did not explicitly state that SRC would be expected to fund its ECOC 1990 proposals, it would require SRC’s financial support, not least in the proposal that ECOC 1990 would be self-financing, based on the city’s existing infrastructure and programme, which was supported by SRC. GDC would also need SRC’s support for the event to extend beyond the city boundaries into the

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89 A GDC internal memo for the Town Clerk from the Town Clerk Depute, Mr Fraser, dated 29 Dec 1986, produced at the apparent request of Steven Hamilton following a letter he received from David Macdonald at Glasgow Action regarding SRC’s involvement, suggests that SRC were excluded from the bid, though Mr Fraser stated there was ‘no deliberate intention to exclude SRC’ rather it was impractical to involve them given the timescale (Fraser, 1986).

90 Glasgow’s ECOC submission stated that additional finance would come from GDC, Glasgow Action, Scottish Arts Council, and, importantly, commercial sponsorship, with approaches to be made to the Scottish Office and the British Council.
broader Clyde Valley and Strathclyde region as a whole. However, once Glasgow had been nominated, and the nomination ratified, it would have been difficult for SRC not to support the Glasgow ECOC 1990 project, financially or otherwise.\footnote{In addition, as SRC’s involvement at an early stage in the bid process would have led to GDC losing some control over the contents of the submission, once Glasgow had been nominated, GDC was in a position to direct the ECOC largely on its own terms.}

In 1987, GDC established the Festivals Unit as a means of delivering the ECOC event, alongside overseeing the development of other smaller festivals, recruiting Robert Palmer and Neil Wallace as its Director and Depute Director respectively. As SRC’s plans for the ECOC, and the structures within the council to support it, became formalised, so too did SRC’s processes for decision-making on support for arts and cultural activity more broadly, interconnected to the ECOC. In GDC, however, decision-making on the arts and culture remained largely reliant on the individual agency of key actors in the years leading up to 1990.

The Festivals Unit was established to organise Glasgow’s Year of Culture without an agreed formal definition of what the city’s culture constituted. In the city’s ECOC bid, Glasgow followed the Office of Arts and Libraries’ steer in conflating ‘culture’ with ‘the arts, museums and libraries’ by proposing what is essentially an arts festival.\footnote{As discussed in Chapter 6, very little direction on how the ECOCs should define culture was provided in the 1985 EC resolution that founded the programme.}

Early tasks of the new GDC Festivals Unit included establishing for ECOC 1990 a definition of ‘Glasgow’s culture’ and objectives, which were categorised as cultural, economic and social.

Cultural objectives were:

a) to develop the work of existing organisations in Glasgow in relation to quality, innovation and distinctiveness;

b) to provide incentives and encouragement for artists which help improve and enhance their work;

c) to increase exposure to outside cultural influences and work of excellence;
d) to develop a more co-operative and collaborative approach to cultural provision on a city-wide basis;
e) to extend cultural initiatives on an international basis which may be of advantage to Glasgow;
f) to identify and then fill important gaps which currently exist in cultural provision in Glasgow, in relation to specific interests, geography and demography. (Palmer, 1988)

Economic objectives were:

a) to create employment opportunities;
b) to increase the number of visitors to the city;
c) to expand the number of spectators and participants for cultural activities;
d) to improve the image and perception of Glasgow. This will influence the attractiveness of the city as a place to live and work, helping to attract new business to the city and to maintain a quality workforce that wants to remain in Glasgow. (Palmer, 1988)

Social objectives were:

a) to widen the social base of audiences for cultural activities and improve access;
b) to provide increased opportunities for participation in and understanding of cultural activities, with an emphasis on groups which are often ignored by the mainstream cultural institutions;
c) to increase civic pride in Glasgow and Glasgow's individual and broadly based culture, by Glaswegians;
d) to provide entertainment and fun for the people of Glasgow;
e) to ensure adequate consideration is given to particular problems, interests or needs of special groups, such as the elderly, disabled, children and youth, or cultural or social minorities. (Palmer, 1988)

Of the three sets of objectives, it is the economic - rather than the cultural or social - group which relates closest to Glasgow’s original ECOC strategy as set out in the city’s 1986 bid. In this respect, this establishment of formal economic, cultural and social objectives with an implicitly equal weighting can be seen as a rebalancing of the private sector and broader civic interests in the city’s approach to the ECOC - a ‘revaluing’ of culture.

In its definition of Glasgow’s culture, the Festivals Unit took an inclusive approach, which seems at pains to avoid excluding any particular type of culture:
Culture is individual, collective and diverse, and reflects the particular experiences of all of us, including children, youth, the elderly, ethnic minorities, the disabled and other groups which may have special needs. Accordingly, cultural events and activities will be diverse, covering most aspects of our lives. Various fields will be represented in the lead up to 1990. Some of these are suggested in the following list: Archaeology, Architecture, Broadcasting, Crafts, Dance, Design, Education, Environment, Fashion, Film, Food, Heritage, History, Housing, Industry, Literature, Museums, Music, Opera, Performance, Play, Politics, Publishing, Science, Sport, Technology, Theatre, Transport, Video, Visual arts.  

This list was to be expanded with later additions including engineering, shipbuilding, religion and ‘everything that makes the city what it is’ (GDC, 1992:8). This anthropological approach - akin to Eagleton’s analysis of EB Tyler’s definition of culture in which the social and cultural are conflated - is problematic when used as the basis of a festival or, indeed, as a founding element in an emerging cultural policy.

The city’s definition of its culture was not entirely connected to its objectives for the ECOC, which were separated into the three distinct cultural, social and economic categories. Whilst at one point the objectives referred to Glasgow’s ‘broadly based culture’, the ‘cultural’ in the objectives’ terms ‘cultural activities’, ‘cultural provision’, ‘cultural initiatives’ and ‘cultural institutions’ no longer referred to ‘everything that makes the city what it is’. It is clear that the ‘cultural activities’ were predominantly arts events and the ‘cultural institutions’ referred to arts organisations such as Scottish Opera and the Citizens Theatre and not Ferguson Shipbuilders or the Scottish Special Housing Association which were equally cultural institutions that made the city what it was.

Thus, in practice the city reverted to a conception of culture as the arts, which it was seeking to avoid in its definition. The social and economic were distinctly separate from the cultural rather than forming constituent parts of it. This revealed an inherent tension between Glasgow’s official definition of culture.

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93 This was listed in a document produced by GDC Festivals Unit titled: ‘Glasgow: European City of Culture 1990’, which publicised the establishment of the Festivals Office and invited proposals for inclusion in its three-year programme leading to 1990. This document is held in GDC committee papers box 127 in Glasgow City Archives at the Mitchell Library, Glasgow.
and its cultural objectives. Furthermore, GDC’s approach perpetuated the tradition that Nicholas Garnham aimed to escape: focusing predominantly on the arts, subsidising artists and producing institutions and finding audiences for their work.  

However, the strategic significance of the early work of the Festivals Unit in the development of cultural policy in Glasgow was the point at which formal objectives, which connected culture to social and economic development purposes, were first produced by GDC from a cultural planning - rather than economic development planning - perspective. They were produced by a GDC unit responsible for the development of the arts and culture, rather than the city economy. Rather than absorbing the arts and culture into economic development plans, the objectives absorbed social and economic development activity into arts and cultural development planning.

This can be seen as the point at which a deliberate cultural policy began to emerge in GDC, distinct from economic development policy, though to some extent informed by it in the inherent instrumentalisation of culture for anticipated social and economic outcomes, which broadly followed the strategic trajectory set by the city’s 1986 ECOC bid.

However, in contrast to SRC’s cultural policy approach to the ECOC, which was formally connected to and strategically shaped by its pre-existing corporate social and economic strategies, there is no direct reference in GDC archive documents formally and symbiotically connecting the Festival Unit’s objectives for the ECOC to any pre-existing formal strategies or policies. Conversely, as shall be discussed below, GDC continued to rely heavily on the individual agency

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94 For example, GDC’s cultural objectives, such as, ‘to provide incentives and encouragement for artists which help improve and enhance their work’, reinforced the concept, rejected by Garnham, of, ‘the special and central status attributed to the ‘creative artist’ whose aspirations and values, seen as stemming from some unfathomable and unquestionable source of genius, inspiration or talent, are the source of cultural value’ (Garnham, 1987: 24). Other cultural objectives, such as, ‘to identify and then fill important gaps which currently exist in cultural provision in Glasgow, in relation to specific interests, geography and demography’, combined with economic objectives, such as, ‘to expand the number of spectators and participants for cultural activities’, reinforced the problem of the ‘traditional’ approach to cultural policy characterised by Garnham thus: ‘When audiences cannot be found, at least at a price and in a quantity which will support the creative activity, the market is blamed and the gap is filled by subsidy’ (Garnham, 1987: 24).
of key actors. Despite this critical event, GDC’s approach to setting objectives for the ECOC reflects an organisation not fully at ease with the new managerialism. This contrast between GDC and SRC’s approaches is significant not least as it led to contrasting outcomes in the nature of activities each council supported.

Critical events in SRC show the new managerialism being more readily adopted than in GDC. In the period between 1987 and 1989, SRC developed both for the ECOC and the arts and culture more broadly: formal criteria; strategies; procedures ‘to ensure that the organisations in receipt of grant assistance reflected the council’s policies’; policy guidelines ‘against which requests for financial assistance from cultural organisations should be’ - and, crucially, were consistently - ‘assessed’; and formal processes to develop ‘the necessary establishment to service the policy of the Council’ to support SRC’s ECOC activity (Calderwood, 1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1989a, 1989b; SRC, 1987a, 1987b, 1987c, 1987d, 1988). Through this corporate management practice, SRC did not define what constituted ‘culture’ but clearly articulated the social and economic value of the arts and culture to the council.\(^{95}\)

An outcome of this well-embedded new managerial approach was that in order to receive financial support from SRC, arts organisations were steered towards producing art with social outcomes, specifically social outcomes related to the regional authority’s Social Strategy.

SRC’s emerging cultural policy was clearly defined, connected directly to the council’s Social Strategy as a ‘master’ document. SRC’s approach to the ECOC therefore aligned with its broader arts and cultural strategy and policy, one which privileged social value and economic value through a ‘social’ lens, whilst marginalising cultural value, directing arts organisations towards producing art with social outcomes. Once SRC’s policies and formal strategies were put in place, decisions were made on that basis, apparently unhindered by any reversion to patronage of the kind found in GDC during this period.

\(^{95}\) SRC took this approach not least because it was responsible for social work and education in Glasgow and its surrounding region.
Despite efforts to establish a more formal strategic approach to arts and culture within GDC, such as developing a shared definition of Glasgow’s culture and formal written objectives for the ECOC, in the late 1980s Glasgow’s cultural policy did not exist formally on paper, but largely in the heads of key actors. In contrast to SRC, GDC did not, during this period, develop and adhere to any comparable formal policy guidelines in its decision-making on culture. Conversely, the consistent factor in decision-making was the reliance on key individuals, such as Director of Finance, Bill English, and Council Leader, Pat Lally. Reflecting on GDC’s approach to the financing of the arts and culture during this period, Jimmy Andrews, then Senior Depute Director of Finance, stated that there was ‘no written policy - Pat Lally and Bill English drove it forward’ (Jimmy Andrews, interview, 18 August 2014).

This is evident in the way in which some key developments in Glasgow’s cultural infrastructure were realised during this period. For example, Pat Lally ensured that the building of Glasgow Royal Concert Hall - or ‘Lally’s Palais’ as it became known colloquially - was completed in time for it to be opened as a centrepiece of the 1990 celebrations. This was not an inconsiderable achievement given that in 1987 the project faced a budget deficit of £10m and significant issues related to the redevelopment of the Buchanan Street site were unresolved.

In addition, as Director of Finance, Bill English continued in his informal proxy role as ‘head of culture’ during this period, maintaining a strategic overview of GDC’s expenditure on the arts and culture and directing the council’s decision-making on it. Throughout this period, the various GDC committees at which arts and culture grants were presented continued to operate without any formal guiding principles to direct decision-making, of the kind adopted by SRC. Instead, decisions were reliant on the personally-held guiding principles of the individuals within the committee, following the recommendations of the Director of Finance. That this decision-making process relied upon the key actor of Bill English, rather than formal policy principles, is underlined in the decision taken by one council committee in November 1988 to agree with English’s recommendation that, in order to address the problem of the lack of coordination between grant-making committees,
no grant or subsidy application from any artistic body or for any artistic or cultural purpose should be submitted to any committee of the Council, or determined under delegated powers, without having previously been drawn to the attention of the Director of Finance.\textsuperscript{96} (GDC, 1988b)

The reliance on the individual agency of key actors within the city’s leadership at both councillor and officer levels reflects the tension between established approaches and the new managerialism in GDC, which was not apparent in the corporate approach of SRC.

Although this period saw GDC and SRC develop diverging strategic approaches to the ECOC, and the arts and culture more broadly, area-specific projects in Glasgow were one area in which their work converged around the instrumental use of the arts. For example, in 1988 a community arts strategy, which involved both authorities, was developed for Easterhouse by the Greater Easterhouse Initiative. Here, the arts were deployed in anticipation of social outcomes, at a time when the considerable economic investment in the city centre had bypassed peripheral estates such as Easterhouse, which were a locus of a range of socio-economic problems.

The deployment of community arts in Easterhouse contrasts sharply with Glasgow Action’s commissioning, in 1987, of a public art strategy for the city centre,\textsuperscript{97} driven overtly by the economic development objectives of the McKinsey strategy: to make the city centre more attractive for living and for business, and to improve its image, in order to build the services industries and consumer services.

During the period leading to 1990, a patchwork of arts strategies was pursued across the city. Some, as Glasgow became an increasingly spatially- and socio-economically-divided dual city, were formal and area-specific; others were more informal or even nebulous. A connecting factor between these strategies was the instrumentalisation of the arts and culture for their social and economic value.

\textsuperscript{96} This decision arose following an application from the West End Theatre for £100 to purchase a typewriter being presented at the finance sub-committee on grants - an incident which exposed one aspect in which GDC’s systems for funding the arts lacked strategic coherence, given the range of funding applications appearing at different committees and sub-committees.

\textsuperscript{97} Glasgow Action was, of course, another area where SRC and GDC worked together jointly. A Public Art Strategy for Glasgow City Centre: a report by Peter Booth and David Harding was published by Glasgow Action in December 1987.
However, by the end of the decade, the city still lacked a co-ordinated approach to arts and culture. GDC’s policy position was neatly summarised in a paper titled *Cultural Development After 1990*, produced in 1990 by the Director of Festivals for the Town Clerk, Depute Town Clerk and Director of Finance:

> At the present time, the city’s policy on arts, culture, festivals, media, and economic development related to cultural initiatives is implicit, rather than explicit. Currently there is no single focus within the Council for cultural activities. The Arts and Culture Committee deals with grant-aid to Glasgow’s arts organisations; the Economic Development Committee is concerned with media developments and tourism; the Area Management Committees assume part-responsibilities for local and community arts initiatives. Over the past four years, the Festivals Committee has concentrated on arts development projects and special events. The Council does not have a co-ordinated approach to planning, to the support of initiatives, or to the City’s relative role as a direct arts provider, as against the role of Glasgow’s flourishing independent arts sector. (Palmer, 1990)

Ultimately, the increase in cultural planning activity - and burgeoning arts sector - did not bring with it a coherent, explicit cultural policy for the city as a whole in the years leading to 1990 - or indeed, during 1990 itself.

### 7.4 An emerging model of culture-led regeneration?

Thus far, this chapter has discussed the inherent instrumentality in the city’s approach to the ECOC and the development of arts and culture more broadly - how its value was articulated in predominantly economic but also social, and to a lesser extent, cultural terms during the late 1980s. It has also demonstrated that a formal, explicit cultural policy for Glasgow as a whole did not emerge in the years leading to 1990. This section will examine the extent to which a replicable ‘Glasgow model’ of culture-led regeneration emerged in the period leading to 1990.

As discussed in Chapter 3, in the decades that have followed 1990, the idea of culture-led urban regeneration has become established as what Paddison and

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98 In this paper, The Director of Festivals, Robert Palmer, set out proposals for the future of cultural development from 1991/92, for consideration by the Town Clerk, Depute Town Clerk and Director of Finance, in relation to GDC’s imminent budget setting process for that year.
Miles (2007) have termed a ‘new orthodoxy’. Glasgow has been viewed as highly influential in the establishment of this orthodoxy, its approach to ECOC 1990 having been characterised a model of culture-led regeneration which could be replicated in other cities, for example in relation to Liverpool (Garcia, 2005: 4844-846; Garcia, 2007: 4-6; Garcia, 2017: 2 and 14).

This section will discuss, in particular, the position of the arts and culture in GDC’s economic development activity during the late 1980s, within the context of growing national and transnational narratives of cities as models of arts-led urban regeneration. It will argue that the arts and culture were not the main drivers of Glasgow’s economic development activity at this time, despite the increased visibility and public funding afforded by the ECOC and the well-received publication of The Economic Importance of the Arts in Glasgow.

This section will also examine the conception of major cultural events, such as the 1988 Glasgow Garden Festival and the ECOC, as ‘pacing devices’ in a long-term process of regeneration. It will discuss how during the mid to late-1980s, a strategic approach emerged that relied on suitable opportunities arising at the right time in order to maintain the momentum generated by the previous major cultural event, and that this was an extension of the strategic trajectory of culture as a consumption activity within the developing service sector economy.

Ultimately, this section will argue that the shift in Glasgow’s economy since the 1980s was not led by the arts and culture, and that the research findings challenge the idea that a replicable formula or model of culture-led regeneration was emerging in the city.

7.4.1 Glasgow’s position in emerging national and transnational narratives of models of arts-led urban regeneration

A decade before the establishment of the DCMS, when its inaugural Secretary of State, Chris Smith, made bold claims for the transformative powers of culture

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99 The phrase ‘culture-led regeneration’ developed during the 1990s and was applied retrospectively to Glasgow’s approach to ECOC 1990.
(Belfiore, 2009), rhetoric surrounding the position of the arts in urban regeneration was gaining currency at a national level in cultural policy in the UK.

The impact of Myerscough's 1988 PSI report, *The Economic Importance of the Arts in Britain*, was bolstered in the same year in the Arts Council of Great Britain inner-city policy document: *An Urban Renaissance: The Role of the Arts in Urban Regeneration* (1988a), which called on politicians, planners and developers to consider the arts in their regeneration plans.

The Arts Council’s 1987/88 annual report (1988b) positioned Glasgow and its approach to the ECOC firmly at the centre of the UK ‘urban renaissance’ narrative, stating:

> The most dramatic transformation yet to occur is, of course, Glasgow [...] In a few years it has moved from being considered Europe’s blackspot to being European City of Culture 1990. (The Arts Council of Great Britain, 1988b: 29)

The late 1980s also saw an increase in national and transnational knowledge-sharing on the position of the arts and culture in the regeneration of the inner cities, through, for example, a proliferation of conferences, such as *The Arts and the Changing City* British American Arts Association (BAAA) symposium held in Glasgow. Such conferences promoted the idea of cities as replicable models for urban regeneration - such as the ‘Pittsburgh model’. However, as documentation of the BAAA symposium reveals, at that stage, rather than constituting a transferable model, Glasgow was a city without a masterplan, but which ‘proceeded with a willingness for pragmatic improvisation’ (Keans *et al.*, 1989: 10).

At this symposium in 1988, GDC Leader, Pat Lally, commented:

> At the outset there was no cultural policy, but the city now plans ahead to seek out new opportunities for economic development. (Keans *et al.*, 1989: 10)

He revealed that the council’s decisions on the arts and culture had not been made as a result of masterplanning based on community consultation but,
conversely, opportunistically, driven by the instrumental aim of economic development.

During the late 1980s, economic development planning continued to be a high priority for GDC. This period saw a shift in the strategic position of the arts and culture from a reference in the appendices of the Economic Development Plans of the early 1980s to a more prominent role. However, despite increasing prominence, the arts and culture were by no means central to the city’s economic development activity. Minutes of the meetings of the GDC Economic Development and Employment Committee overseeing economic development activity during this period show that the arts and culture were very rarely discussed and decisions remained largely unconnected to the Arts and Culture Committee or the Festivals Committee.¹⁰⁰

GDC archive documents show that by the end of 1988, the arts and culture featured in two main aspects of economic development planning activity, both strongly connected to tourism development. Firstly, in order to support business promotion:

‘image promotion’ through highly selective trade advertising, populist campaigns such as ‘Miles Better’, and intensive promotion of Glasgow as an arts/cultural centre. (LEDIS, 1989a)

Secondly, as part of its ‘service sector strategy’, GDC developed ‘an arts and culture strategy intended to maximise the economic benefits from these activities’, these activities being the ‘improvement of visitor attractions and of the marketing and promotion of City attractions’ (LEDIS, 1989a).

Here we see in GDC’s economic development planning activity of the mid to late 1980s, the arts and culture retained a supporting - rather than leading - role in shifting the base of the city economy away from manufacturing towards the service industries and consumer services. The arts and culture were utilised as promotional tools, to change the city’s image and generate revenue from tourism. This did not constitute a strategy for the cultural industries - of the

¹⁰⁰Minutes of these GDC committee meetings can be found in boxes GDC 1/2 1985/86-1988/89 in Glasgow City Archives.
kind discussed earlier in this chapter, which balanced consumption with the production of culture - but, conversely, a continuation of the strategy set in Glasgow’s 1986 ECOC bid.

Despite the case made by *The Economic Importance of the Arts in Glasgow* report, Glasgow being positioned as a leader in a growing national and transnational narrative of cities as models of arts-led urban regeneration, and the impending ECOC event prompting greater visibility and a large increase in public funding for the arts and culture, the arts and culture were not the main drivers of Glasgow’s economic development activity at that time.

### 7.4.2 Pacing devices, major events and opportunism

One way in which the arts and culture played a supporting role in the city’s process of regeneration was through the conception of major events as ‘pacing devices’. Pacing devices have been defined by Stuart Gulliver (interview, 9 July 2014) as periodic events which provide intermittent ‘highs’ to those in the city, where they can jointly celebrate civic progress and achievements over a 25 year process of transformation. Pacing devices provided a means of building confidence in the city, necessary to support the shift in the economy towards the service industries and consumer services.

Gulliver (interview, 28 August 2014) has argued that Glasgow used the ECOC as a pacing device, because it would enable authorities concerned with economic development, such as the SDA, to ‘take stock of where we were, would people still like to come here, do investors still want to come here?’.

Retrospectively, the major cultural events of 1983, discussed in Chapter 5, can be viewed as the first of these pacing events in the city. However, the extent to which they were planned as such in 1983 is debatable: no evidence has emerged to suggest the events of 1983 were intended to be the first of a series of subsequent pacing devices in a deliberate longer-term plan. However, the 1988 Glasgow Garden Festival and ECOC 1990 cemented Glasgow’s subsequent
strategic course, begun in 1983, which connected high profile events to the city’s economic development.  

The 1988 Glasgow Garden Festival acted as a precursor to ECOC 1990 as a major cultural event intended to change perceptions of the city.  

Glasgow’s approach to using its Garden Festival to reclaim derelict land for redevelopment – the original purpose of the British Garden Festivals – was not the most rational.  

However, in Glasgow, the PR opportunities presented by the festival were thoroughly exploited. The timing of the Glasgow Garden Festival was changed from 1989 to 1988 to align with the anniversaries of the 1888 Glasgow International Exhibition and 1938 Empire Exhibition. Glasgow’s maximising civic promotion from the Garden Festival extended to rebranding it altogether from its original title of the National Garden Festival. This opportunistic, somewhat bullish, approach was repeated in 1990: the awarded title of ‘European City of Culture’ not being sufficiently prestigious, Glasgow rebranded itself ‘Cultural Capital of Europe’.

This opportunism was an inherent driving force in the city’s 1986 bid to host ECOC 1990. David Macdonald, Director of Glasgow Action, has described how learning from Garden Festivals held in Liverpool and Stoke led to some in leadership roles in Glasgow to conclude that another large-scale event would be required to maintain the momentum anticipated to be generated by the forthcoming 1988 Glasgow Garden Festival:

We went and had a look at Stoke and we went and had a look at Liverpool, and the festivals were great, they were really good, but there was a sense of anti-climax at the end of it. So you had this big high point and then... there’s a hangover after it. Is that it, you know? And we felt that Glasgow...
should not suffer that. So then we wanted something in the bag before the Garden Festival took place, so something that would happen in a few years after that. So it was tactical. We did not want there to be a dip after the Garden Festival. So let’s look around for something else. Now we didn’t find it by looking around, I think it sort of... appeared out of the ether. (David Macdonald, interview, 8 September 2014)

Thus, Glasgow avoided the ‘dip’ after its 1988 Garden Festival by becoming a European City of Culture in 1990. However tactical it may have been, the aim to maintain the momentum generated by one prestigious, large-scale event by hosting another prestigious, large-scale event did not, at that stage, amount to a formal event strategy or policy in Glasgow. Indeed, this approach only postponed the inevitable dip from 1989 to 1991 rather than avoiding it entirely.

Gulliver has acknowledged the inherent opportunism in the approach to using major events as pacing devices:

We deliberately sought out to try and pace our way through these 25 years, things that we thought were important for the city that we could do well but would draw attention or continue to stimulate and keep the momentum up. So there was a degree of opportunism there. (Stuart Gulliver, interview, 28 August 2014)

While this period saw the emergence of a strategic approach which relied on suitable opportunities arising at the right time in order to maintain momentum in the city, it was also a point at which a pattern emerged which saw major events play a catalytic role in the development of cultural policy (whether implicit or explicit) in the city.

Although the connection of pacing devices to major events involves the application of an economic development tool to the arts and culture, this does not constitute a model of culture-led regeneration. Ultimately, the shift in Glasgow’s economy since the 1980s was not led by the arts and culture. As Stuart Gulliver has argued:

People say, and I’ve read it, that Glasgow’s transformation was a culture-led transformation. Well that’s wrong. I think that’s, if you like, the tip of the iceberg. You can’t change a city in the profound way that this city has been changed without it being a much deeper transformational history. Glasgow changed its economy. There were a lot of aspects of financial
Gulliver’s analysis is reflected in the 2002 OECD report, *Urban Renaissance Glasgow: Lessons for Innovation and Implementation*. This report noted the dramatic change in Glasgow’s economy, the continued decline in manufacturing and the service sector becoming dominant (OECD, 2002: 40 and 45). It stated:

> call centres are important to the Glasgow economy, just as they are proving to be across Europe and are expected to increase in the city over the next 8 years. [...] The city employs some 30,000 people in financial services sector directly, more than in Edinburgh and ranks tenth in Europe. Overall the finance/banking/insurance and business services sector now employs some 91,600 people. High value knowledge based industries are growing in the city reflecting national and regional trends. The Bioscience sector, for example, grew by 25 per cent during this period. (OECD, 2002: 45)

Whilst a detailed examination of the factors that determined the changes in Glasgow’s economy post-1990 is beyond the scope of this research project, there is no doubt that the reasons for these changes are multifarious and complex, and cannot be attributed predominantly to the arts and culture.

In broad terms, the economies of Glasgow and other cities have been affected by significant global developments in the period since 1990. For example, the 2002 OECD report highlighted the rise of globalisation - a process it characterised by ‘the increasing integration of markets for goods and services and markets of production factors such as capital, labour, technology and information which has a profound impact at the territorial level’ (OECD, 2002: 26).

Because the 1980s and 1990s saw a major global economic shift which was not restricted to Glasgow, similar changes to Glasgow - the protracted decline in manufacturing and growth in the service sector, the rise of financial services, call centres and bioscience - also took place in the economies of cities across the UK and Europe; cities which had not been hailed as constituting models of
culture-led regeneration. In this regard the capability of arts and culture to lead Glasgow’s dramatic economic change on this scale has been overstated.

The development of the myth of Glasgow as a model of culture-led regeneration can be partially attributed to the arts and culture having a visibility not afforded to other factors that have been more influential in the development of the city economy, as Gulliver has argued:

If there’s a healthcare company that’s made a breakthrough on a drug or a bit of pharmacology or whatever you don’t see that. If it’s exporting a drug - which indeed some companies did, based in Glasgow - around the world it has an invisibility about it, whereas the arts and culture, you can see it. You can see it on the street and you can see it in the galleries and you can see it in the concert halls and you can see it on the billboards, and people talk about it much more. So that whole kind of grouping of culture, leisure became an important image-breaker for Glasgow. (Stuart Gulliver, interview, 28 August 2014)

Indeed, substantial steps were made through ECOC 1990 in changing Glasgow’s image. While changing Glasgow’s image was cited as an important factor in the city’s plans to develop the service sector economy during the 1980s (for example in the McKinsey strategy), the arts and culture were but one tool in this drive. Changing Glasgow’s image was but one aspect of a myriad of economic development planning foci and initiatives involving the city during this period. The correlation of a highly visible arts and culture festival with a structural shift in the city economy does not imply one caused the other.

The change in Glasgow’s economy since the 1980s can therefore be viewed as the result of a combination of complex factors, some of which can be connected to deliberate economic planning activity, others of which, including major global developments, emanated from elsewhere and were beyond the city’s control.

Furthermore, the idea of a Glasgow model is undermined by the fact that no easily definable, explicit cultural policy emerged in Glasgow in the years leading

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104 For example, John Myerscough’s Monitoring Glasgow 1990 report produced in 1991 for GDC, SRC and Scottish Enterprise (the public body to have replaced the SDA and Glasgow Action in 1991) noted: ‘Glasgow 1990 substantially improved perceptions of the City at home and abroad. There was a 15 percentage point increase in belief (in London & the South East) that Glasgow was “rapidly changing for the better”. But there remains scope for further improvement’ (Myerscough, 1991: iv).
to 1990. As such, the research findings challenge the idea that a replicable formula or model of culture-led regeneration was emerging in the city.

7.5 Conclusion

Earlier chapters discussed how Glasgow being awarded the ECOC title was not preceded by the development of a formal cultural policy. This chapter has demonstrated how in the period between Glasgow being awarded the title and the event taking place in 1990, despite an increase in cultural planning activity and the arts and culture being afforded increased visibility due to the impending ECOC event, a deliberate, explicit, coherent cultural policy for the city as a whole did not quite emerge.

During this period, a patchwork of strategies for the arts and culture - often prompted by ECOC 1990 - developed across the city, some of which were connected to joint area-specific projects, some of which were connected (as in SRC’s case) to pre-existing corporate social and economic strategies, some of which (as in GDC’s case) were confined to the imaginations of key actors according to their own guiding principles. A significant characteristic of the more formal strategies to develop during this period was the articulation of the social and economic value of the arts and culture - the pragmatic instrumentalisation of culture in social and economic agendas.

A critical event in the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow, with the ECOC as a facilitating factor, was economic development activity becoming incorporated into cultural planning, the arts and culture having been incorporated into economic development planning earlier in the decade. Myerscough’s 1988 report, *The Economic Importance of the Arts in Glasgow*, brought a new coherence to cultural planning in the city, comparable to the coherence McKinsey and Co. had brought to economic development planning earlier in the 1980s.

However, the dominance of the ECOC in Glasgow during this period, predominantly conceived as an occasion for cultural consumption, also acted as an obstacle to the development of a broader cultural policy which encompassed
the production of culture as well as its consumption. During the period 1987 to 1989, GDC and its partners largely followed the strategic trajectory established in its 1986 ECOC bid: based on the McKinsey strategy, this approach privileged the consumption of culture over its production, as attempts were made to shift the base of the city economy from manufacturing to the service sector.

Work on the cultural industries in GDC did not initially develop - before Myerscough’s recommendations - beyond thinking and discussion. Myerscough’s 1988 report both reinforced the strategic trajectory the city was following and recommended the cultural industries as an area for development: recommendations which relied on the catalytic events of the 1990s for their subsequent realisation.

Unlike Garnham’s approach in London, no attempts were made in Glasgow during the 1980s to establish a new democratic cultural policy. A comparison of Myerscough’s approach in Glasgow with that of Garnham in London has revealed an underlying characteristic pragmatism rather than a theorised Marxist approach.

The late 1980s saw the emergence of a national and transnational narrative of cities as models of ‘arts-led urban regeneration’ (as a precursor to ‘culture-led regeneration’) in which Glasgow was positioned, following its designation as ECOC 1990, as evidence of the transformative powers of culture. However, despite increasing prominence, the arts and culture were not central to Glasgow’s economic development activity during the late 1980s. The subsequent shift in Glasgow’s economy cannot decisively or solely be attributed to culture.

There is much for other cities to learn from Glasgow’s experience. For example, some of the principles within strategies developed in Glasgow - such as the McKinsey strategy’s intention to create ‘virtuous cycles’\(^\text{105}\) of regeneration, and the supporting, rather than leading, role that might be played by the arts and culture with those cycles, not least in its image-changing potential - may provide useful learning for other towns and cities. However, Glasgow as a whole does not constitute a replicable model. As much as some of the problems experienced by

\(^{105}\) This virtuous cycles strategy is illustrated in the diagram shown on page 159 (Figure 1).
Glasgow during the 1980s may be shared by other cities, the cultural (and regeneration) policy approach that emerged in Glasgow in the years leading to 1990 was unique to the city and not replicable elsewhere. It relied heavily on Glasgow's specific historical context and the agency of individual key actors within it; on a characteristic tactical opportunism and pragmatic improvisation.
CHAPTER 8    CONCLUSION: CULTURE-LED REGENERATION OR REGENERATION-LED CULTURE?

8.1    Introduction

The research presented in this thesis has aimed to contribute towards a better understanding of the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow in the period 1970 to 1989, based on new documentary research and oral history interviews with the key surviving decision-makers. The period of study was chosen as the two decades leading to 1990, when Glasgow hosted the ECOC. This qualitative study was prompted by a gap in existing research, previous literature having focused predominantly on the impacts of the ECOC rather than the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow in the years preceding 1990.

This thesis has examined what happened and why, through six research questions:

1. What factors prompted the ‘cultural turn’ in Glasgow’s policy making?
2. What factors facilitated the new policy drive?
3. Who were the key actors involved?
4. What were the obstacles encountered?
5. To what extent can the period from 1979-89 be periodised in terms of critical events and how are we to understand the significance and influence of these events?
6. What strategies were employed by Glasgow District Council in developing its bid to become the European City of Culture? How did it mobilise the requisite expertise? How did it assess the challenge represented by its rivals and counter that challenge?

The research findings shed new light on the nature of the cultural policy to have emerged in Glasgow in the two decades leading to 1990: that is, not an explicit ‘nominal’ cultural but an implicit, ‘effective’ cultural policy dominated by
economic development at a time when the city faced severe socio-economic problems.

It has provided new insights into how in 1986, Glasgow came to be awarded the prestigious ECOC 1990 title, despite the fundamental obstacle of the lack of alignment between the images of the city and the previous title holders. This thesis has argued that the construction and reception of Glasgow’s ECOC bid was shaped by a combination of prestige, prejudice and public relations.

This thesis has also revealed ECOC 1990 to have been an obstacle as well as an enabler in the development of a cultural policy in Glasgow which encompassed both the production and consumption of culture.

Furthermore, this thesis challenges the established idea that a replicable model of culture-led regeneration emerged in Glasgow in the years leading to 1990.

These points will be discussed below, followed by an outline of the limitations and implications of the research and concluding thoughts.

8.2 An implicit, ‘effective’ cultural policy

The research presented in this thesis has established what and where cultural policy in Glasgow was between 1970 and 1989.

Chapter 4 discussed the potential for cultural policy to be explicit or implicit. It outlined Ahearne’s (2009: 143) distinction between explicit or ‘nominal’ cultural policy (‘any cultural policy that a government labels as such’) and implicit or ‘effective’ cultural policy (‘any political strategy that looks to work on the culture of the territory over which it presides (or that of its adversary)’). It discussed the further distinction made by Ahearne between the ‘unintended side effects of various kinds of policy’ and ‘deliberate courses of action intended to shape cultures but which are not expressly thematised as such’ (2009: 144), as falling within the realm of implicit or effective cultural policies. Chapter 4 also discussed Throsby’s view that ‘some economic policies have a hidden cultural purpose and therefore qualify as implicit cultural policy’ (2009: 179).
Furthermore, it highlighted Bell and Oakley’s view that the ‘deep and interlinking assets’ to be found in cities are ‘only occasionally the results of deliberate cultural policy’; conversely, they are much more often the legacy of education policy, transport policy, planning and licencing laws, migration and housing policy, of philanthropy and commercial hard sell - mixed together with a variety of cultural assets, public and private. (Bell and Oakley, 2015: 80)

This thesis has revealed the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow during the years leading to 1990 to have been more implicit or ‘effective’ than explicit or ‘nominal’. It has also demonstrated that the extent to which this implicit cultural policy was a deliberate cultural policy to be complex and not easily identifiable.

Whereas SRC produced a number of nominal cultural policy documents, which were the product of an embedded new managerialism, GDC took a divergent, idiosyncratic approach, which relied heavily on the agency, imaginations and individually-held guiding principles of key actors.

By 1990, there was no explicit cultural policy for the city as a whole; however, significant steps forward had been made in the twenty years since 1970 through a series of critical events. The foremost critical event was the city’s successful 1986 bid to host ECOC 1990. This was, as will be discussed below, both an enabler and an obstacle in the development of cultural policy in Glasgow. Glasgow’s ECOC bid connected the earlier critical events that decade of the city’s burgeoning arts and cultural infrastructure and its emergent economic development plans, policies and strategies in which aspects of the arts and culture had been subsumed and gradually repositioned from a peripheral to a more prominent - but by no means central - position. In this respect, the ‘hidden cultural purpose’ of Glasgow’s economic development policies developed prior to the city’s 1986 ECOC bid reflect Throsby’s definition of implicit cultural policy.

Despite developments post-1986, with the establishment of new structures such as the Festivals Unit to deliver ECOC 1990 and other events, and an increase in
cultural planning, the arts and culture remained strategically fragmented within GDC by 1990.

However, as discussed in Chapter 7, John Myerscough’s 1988 report, *The Economic Importance of the Arts in Glasgow*, brought a new coherence to cultural planning in the city, comparable to some extent with the coherence McKinsey and Co. brought to economic development planning earlier in the 1980s. Myerscough as the city’s choice of key external adviser on arts and culture is significant not only as a reflection of the city’s approach being based on a characteristic pragmatism rather than theorised Marxism – it was not driven by an aim to develop a new democratic cultural policy, as had been Nicholas Garnham’s motivation in his work with the GLC. It also set a longer-term agenda in which the arts and culture emerged from the ‘hidden cultural purpose’ of economic development policy to become explicitly valued for their potential economic impact from a cultural planning perspective: a growing and shifting instrumentalisation.

That an implicit cultural policy emerged in Glasgow over the course of the 1980s within the broader context of the city facing severe socio-economic problems at a time of major global change is, as has been emphasised throughout this thesis, significant.

During the 1980s, the city authorities in Glasgow produced explicit economic development plans, policies and strategies because the consequences for the city of not doing so were dire. There was no comparable urgency or motivating force driving the development of cultural policy in the city: the arts would happen anyway, driven by defining characteristics of the city, shared as much by the city’s elected leadership as the arts and cultural community (including the constituency identifying themselves as Workers City, who were so opposed to the city’s approach to the ECOC): tactical opportunism, pragmatic improvisation and the ability to make things happen. One may therefore conclude that during the period 1970 to 1989, Glasgow did not develop an explicit, nominal cultural policy because it did not need to.
8.3 Prestige, prejudice and public relations

This thesis has shed new light on how Glasgow came to be the UK’s city of choice to host ECOC 1990.

As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, Glasgow’s year as ECOC 1990 is viewed in existing literature on the subject as pivotal, the point at which the ECOC became a catalyst for culture-led regeneration. It is well-established that following Athens, Florence, Amsterdam, Berlin and Paris, Glasgow, as a post-industrial city without an established international reputation for tourism, was an unconventional choice for the title. The research findings in this thesis contribute to this body of knowledge in revealing how and why Glasgow was selected to be the UK’s nominated city for the ECOC title, based on new primary source data generated from some of the key protagonists involved in Glasgow’s bid as well as those in central government, alongside new archival research.

This thesis has examined the strategies employed by GDC and its coalition partners in developing Glasgow’s ECOC bid; how the city mobilised the requisite expertise; and how it assessed the challenge represented by its rivals and countered that challenge. It has also examined the decision-making process and considered the roles played by key actors in central government which resulted in Glasgow winning the nomination. In so doing, this thesis has argued that the construction and reception of Glasgow’s ECOC bid was shaped by a combination of prestige, prejudice and public relations.

In the years preceding Glasgow’s 1986 ECOC bid came the recognition of how crucial the city’s image was to the future of its economy. Glasgow’s entrenched poor image was inhibiting the growth of the service industries and consumer services. This was significant as by the mid-1980s the service sector had been identified as the primary means of rebuilding the city’s economy with the recognition that manufacturing, its economic base, was in terminal decline. Glasgow needed to change its image to rebuild its economy. By the time the opportunity arose to bid to host the ECOC, various image-boosting initiatives, such as the 1983 PR campaign, Glasgow’s Miles Better, were already underway.
Glasgow’s ECOC bid was therefore driven by prestige. The ECOC presented Glasgow with the opportunity to align itself with the prestigious cities that had previously held the title: Athens, Florence, Amsterdam, Berlin and Paris, none of which were seen as declining post-industrial cities, all of which were undisputed European centres of culture. It was the prestige of the ECOC which would allow Glasgow to reposition its image and thereby support the development of the city’s service sector economy.

However, the existing lack of alignment between Glasgow’s image and that of the prestigious group of ECOC title holders presented a problem: Glasgow was not in a position to win the title on reputation alone, and it was competing with cities in the UK that were. Furthermore, some in Glasgow’s bid coalition anticipated (justifiably) their submission being met with prejudice in some quarters on the basis of the city’s poor reputation preceding it.

Realising that a coherent strategy was therefore needed to underpin their submission to the central government decision-makers, the leaders of Glasgow’s bid coalition drew not on a formal, explicit cultural policy – which in 1986 did not exist – but on the city’s rapidly developing and increasingly coherent economic development plans, policies and strategies.

As a solution, in its bid for the UK’s ECOC nomination, key actors in Glasgow worked together to produce an excellent work of public relations. Glasgow’s submission demonstrated that it more than met central government’s stated criteria and requirements for hosting the event, but also had a broader ambitious strategy of economic development and urban renewal, aligned with the Conservative government’s agendas, in which the ECOC would play a key enabling role. It did so by developing key messages, supported by the selective inclusion of facts – all of which reflected the city in a positive light – voiced by prominent and credible representatives of each of the city’s relevant sectors. Not least of these was influential businessman, Sir Norman Macfarlane, who led the involvement of the city’s business community in support of the bid. The cultural constituents of the bid – the city’s arts organisations – were brought into the bid coalition at short notice as the deadline approached. They did not drive
the bid strategy; they were the cultural ‘content providers’ required for the strategy to succeed.

The research presented in this thesis has uncovered the prejudice faced by Glasgow’s bid that emanated from certain government ministers consulted in the decision-making process, notably some in the Scottish Office whose support, based on the strength of Glasgow’s case, should have been forthcoming. This prejudice was based on a preconceived idea of what an ECOC should be - an archetype that Glasgow did not fit based on its image - and a concern that the EC may not ratify a UK proposal that veered from this ideal. This preconceived idea, which had no basis in the 1985 EC resolution on which the ECOC was founded, resulted in government ministers including Malcolm Rifkind, Geoffrey Howe and David Young recommending the UK’s ECOC should be Edinburgh or Bath - cities whose bids were weaker than Glasgow’s. The research has shown how, significantly, based on the case made by Glasgow, the Minister for the Arts and civil servants in the OAL promoted to the EC - and to other government departments - an alternative idea of what an ECOC could be. It was this that subsequently changed the direction of the ECOC.

Glasgow’s response to the opportunity presented by the competition to host the ECOC was that of a city in no position to be complacent about its future (or present, for that matter) - and a city well aware that in order to secure the nomination, it would have to overcome obstacles not encountered by competitors such as Edinburgh, which did not share its ‘image issue’. There was no inevitability to Glasgow being awarded the ECOC title.

Through Glasgow’s approach to the ECOC, culture acted as a connecting factor between the city’s image and its economy. The research has shown how the ECOC became a fundamental driver of Glasgow’s implicit, effective cultural policy - an economic development policy with a ‘hidden’ cultural purpose. In prioritising the development of the service sector economy, Glasgow’s 1986

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106 As discussed in Chapter 6, the OAL was the government department to select the UK’s nomination for the ECOC - and, crucially, a department which did not view Glasgow’s bid with prejudice on the basis of the city’s image, but nominated Glasgow on the basis of the strength of its bid.
ECOC bid also set the city on a strategic trajectory which, as shall be discussed in section 8.4, prioritised the consumption of culture over its production.

8.4 ECOC 1990 as both enabler and obstacle

A perhaps surprising finding of this study is that ECOC 1990 acted as an obstacle as well as a facilitating factor in the development of cultural policy in Glasgow.

As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, ECOC 1990 is widely regarded in the literature as a turning point for the city and the programme. However, that ECOC 1990 acted as an obstacle as well as a facilitating factor in the development of cultural policy in Glasgow has not been identified in the extant literature.

This thesis has shown that Glasgow’s 1986 bid to host ECOC 1990 was clearly a turning point for the emergence of cultural policy in the city. It was only when the opportunity to bid to host the ECOC arose in 1986 that a cultural policy vacuum became evident: the city required a coherent strategy to underpin its bid, as it was not in a position to win the ECOC nomination on reputation alone; however, the lack of an explicit, nominal cultural policy to provide this direction resulted in this strategic vacuum being filled by the city’s increasingly coherent economic development plans and strategies. The focus of Glasgow’s ECOC strategy was the consumption of culture, reinforcing the aim to shift the base of the city’s economy from manufacturing to service industries and consumer services.

The scale of the ECOC meant that it dominated the city’s cultural planning between 1986 and 1990, facilitating a significant increase in the scale and scope of arts and cultural activity and the development of venues for its consumption in the city. However, during this period, whilst Glasgow followed the strategic trajectory established in its ECOC bid based on the consumption of culture, other comparable UK cities concurrently developed their own policies, strategies and plans for the arts and culture. These were premised to varying degrees on a balance of consumption and production.
The GLC and GLEB’s cultural industries strategy for London, though unrealised in practice due to the 1986 abolition of the GLC, proved influential in other cities in the UK. In this far-reaching strategy, Nicholas Garnham’s theoretical input was adapted by the GLC and GLEB as a solution to the problem of deindustrialisation and balanced the production of culture with its consumption.

In the years leading to 1990, as discussed in Chapter 7, interest was shown by both GDC Festivals Unit and the SDA in how Glasgow might adapt the GLC’s cultural industries idea, and Myerscough included recommendations for the development of the cultural industries in Glasgow as part of his 1988 report, *The Economic Importance of the Arts in Glasgow*. However, in the years leading to 1990, the dominance of the ECOC meant that the city’s work on the cultural industries - balancing the consumption of culture with its production - was not realised in practice until enabled by the catalytic events of the 1990s. These included a festival of visual arts held in 1996 - Glasgow having lost the competition to host the official Year of the Visual Arts to North East England, but deciding to realise its plans nonetheless - and the 1999 Year of Architecture and Design.

Thus, as well as acting as a facilitating factor both for the development of the arts and culture in the city and for the development of an implicit, effective cultural policy, the ECOC acted as an obstacle to the development of an explicit cultural policy which balanced the consumption of culture with its production. Whilst work to develop the cultural industries progressed in other UK cities during the years leading to 1990, the dominance of the ECOC during this period prevented Glasgow from broadening its focus to encompass the production of culture until the subsequent decade.

8.5 A replicable model of culture-led regeneration?

The research challenges the idea that a replicable model of culture-led regeneration emerged in Glasgow in the years leading to 1990.

Chapter 3 outlined the culture-led regeneration orthodoxy and Glasgow’s position within it. It discussed the mythology surrounding Glasgow’s approach to
ECOC 1990 as being a fully-formed model which can be transferred to and replicated by other cities. It also outlined the somewhat contradictory established narratives about ECOC 1990 and culture-led regeneration. In the first, Glasgow’s culture-led regeneration approach to the ECOC was pioneering, pivotal in the history of the ECOC, and socially and economically transformative to the city, with cities subsequently wanting the ECOC title in order to replicate Glasgow’s success. In the second, ECOC 1990 was divisive and socially and economically disastrous for some sections of the city, reinforcing binary dual city narratives of a growing polarisation between rich and poor in the city. Chapter 3 also highlighted problems with measurement and evidence raised in current academic debates on culture-led regeneration. It noted the rise of ‘research as advocacy’ and that culture-led regeneration as a policy concept has been proven to be based on less than robust evidence, but has gained traction nonetheless.

Whilst this research was a Collaborative Doctoral Award project with Glasgow Life, Glasgow City Council’s arms-length external organisation responsible for the development of culture and sport in the city, this thesis has not taken a research as advocacy approach. Its findings reinforce the view that the prominent position currently occupied by Glasgow in the culture-led regeneration orthodoxy as a fully-formed, transferable and replicable model is based more on mythology than evidence.

This thesis has shown that economic development was central to the implicit cultural policy to emerge in the city in the years leading to 1990. However, whilst highly visible, the arts and culture were not the sole or even dominant vehicle for economic development activity in the city.

Whilst the base of Glasgow’s economy has undoubtedly shifted since the 1980s from manufacturing to the service sector, as discussed in Chapter 7 this transition cannot be described as a culture-led. The correlation of a highly visible arts and culture festival with a structural shift in the city economy at a time of major global socio-economic change does not imply the former caused the latter.
Glasgow’s approach to the arts and culture during the 1970s and 1980s did not constitute a replicable model which could be transferred to other cities. While strategies of varying degrees of formality were developed, there was no masterplan or indeed, explicit cultural policy; Glasgow’s approach was largely improvised, opportunistic and reliant on the individual agency of key actors.

The 1980s was significant as the decade in which high profile festivals and events emerged as a prominent feature in Glasgow’s cultural landscape. From ad hoc beginnings in 1983 - which saw arts events becoming connected to public relations activity intended to change the city’s image, for example in the opening of The Burrell Collection, amongst other festivals, events and launches - the scale of ambition grew alongside the city’s infrastructure over the course of the 1980s to hosting firstly the 1988 Garden Festival then ECOC 1990. Whilst the connection between image and cultural events was highlighted in such strategic reports as The Potential of Glasgow City Centre (the McKinsey strategy for the economic development of the city centre), in practice the opportunistic and somewhat uneven attempts to maintain the momentum of the previous major events by hosting further events did not, during the 1980s, constitute an explicit, deliberate events strategy. Indeed, the momentum generated by ECOC 1990 was temporarily lost in the early 1990s.

The idea that a replicable, transferable model emerged in Glasgow is further undermined by the specificity of Glasgow’s approach to the arts and culture, as well as economic development, in the 1970s and 1980s. Strategies - whether formal or informal, explicit or implicit - were developed by key actors in response to what were specific problems as well as specific strengths in the city at a specific point of major structural change in the city’s history.

Despite Glasgow being labelled as one of a number of post-industrial cities by 1990, and being one of a number of Labour-led cities facing broadly similar socio-economic problems during the Thatcher era, in many ways its approach to the arts, culture and economic development was unique to the city and as a result, not replicable in what may seem to be comparable cities. One such example is Glasgow’s long-established history of partnerships between public and private sectors that re-emerged during the Thatcher years - in retrospect an
example of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ at a time before neoliberalism became ingrained in cities in the western world. Glasgow’s partnership approach was heavily reliant on the individuals involved, a pragmatic rather than idealistic local authority and influential businessmen such as Sir Norman Macfarlane. This approach could not be packaged as a model to be replicated in other post-industrial cities that did not have such pre-existing assets or propensities, such as Liverpool even after its era of Militant infiltration.

As discussed in Chapter 6, Glasgow was the first ECOC to use the title to make its cultural assets visible to its home nation; Glasgow was a surprising choice for the prestigious title in some quarters based on the misalignment of the city’s image with that of its predecessors, accompanied by a general lack of awareness of the strength of its arts and cultural infrastructure. The growing visibility of the arts and culture in Glasgow during a major economic shift may perhaps be the connecting factor in the established contradictory culture-led regeneration narratives that ECOC 1990 was simultaneously a socio-economic saviour and disaster for the city. The arts, culture and ECOC 1990 can be viewed as a very visible reflection rather than driver of socio-economic change, a symptom rather than a cause, more influential developments passing unseen and therefore uncredited or uncriticised. This suggests that, regarding Glasgow’s position in the culture-led regeneration orthodoxy, the ability of the arts and culture to lead significant, large-scale socio-economic change - and for Glasgow’s specific experience to be replicated elsewhere - has been overstated.

8.6 Limitations of this study

This study has a number of limitations connected to research design and methodology.

A primary limitation has been connected to the choice of a topic and period of study which is well within living memory, being viewed several decades in retrospect, yet which continues to have repercussions in the present. Hindsight bias, discussed in Chapter 4, has been an unavoidable feature of oral history interviews. Oral history as a methodology has been attacked due to the unreliability of memory, yet, as was also discussed in Chapter 4, ‘all historical
sources are suffused with subjectivity’ (Thompson, 1978: 172), whether oral or written.

This lack of ‘neutrality’ also extended beyond the interviews to the archival material studied. As discussed in Chapter 4, there were a number of gaps in the archives: not all documents have been retained in local government archives, not all documents had been catalogued and many of the documents viewed had been preserved as the result of the depositor’s subjective filtering process.

While access to interviewees was generally good, the oral history interviews included in this project have been subject to practical limitations, and not all key actors are included for a variety of reasons. In both archival material and interviews, some voices dominated over others.

Chapter 4 has outlined the steps taken and conclusions drawn in response to these methodological limitations, noting for example that perceived weaknesses such as the subjectivity of memory can also be strengths.

A further limitation of this study has been my own inevitably normative approach as a researcher to what is a qualitative study. My previous experience as an arts bureaucrat has shaped my analysis of the machinations of local and central government and agencies outlined in this thesis. However, that I was new to Glasgow at the start of the research project meant I brought an ‘outsider’ perspective not only to the research topic but, crucially, to the interviews. That others are likely to have taken different approaches to the research project renders, I would hope, the findings no less valid.

8.7 Implications and concluding thoughts

This research has implications for a variety of audiences, including academics, policy-makers and practitioners working in such fields as the arts and culture, festivals and events, cities and urban studies, cultural economics, social and economic development and regeneration, urban tourism, destination marketing and public relations.
Various avenues for further research stem from this project. This section will discuss the implications for such work deriving from the methodological approach taken here, followed by those arising from the research findings.

There is a considerable potential for the combination of oral history interviews and archival research effected in the present research to provide a methodological model for further research into the development of cultural policy in other cities during the latter decades of the twentieth century. As discussed in Chapter 7, as the 1980s progressed, local authorities in the UK increasingly developed formal arts and cultural policies, predicated to varying degrees on the consumption and/or production of culture, and on its perceived instrumental benefits. In the final decade of the twentieth century, this development coincided with the emergence of cultural policy as an academic discipline. From a comparative point of view, much could be learned from the collection and analysis of new data involving key actors in the development of other cities’ cultural policy.

The involvement of an external organisation with connections to some of the key actors in the shaping of Glasgow’s cultural development through the ECOC together with access to a substantial archival collection has been an enormous advantage in shaping the methodological approach taken to this research project. It may provide a valuable basis for other studies, particularly of the development of cultural policy in local government, towns and cities in the UK.

There are also opportunities to learn from the methodological approach taken to the structure of this collaborative project with Glasgow Life as a partner. A potential pitfall of the Collaborative Doctoral Award (CDA) approach to PhD research, where the external partner organisation is also the object of study, is that the research findings may not always be complementary to the organisation and may challenge existing institutionally-held beliefs and ways of working – something that may be resisted by the organisation and may compromise the progression of the project. This is not a pitfall that I experienced during my research with Glasgow Life. Throughout my experience in undertaking the CDA, Glasgow Life has been nothing but supportive towards my research. This may have been due to the involvement of a CDA partner organisation and supervisor.
that values and understands the nature of research - the pitfalls as well as the benefits. The historical distance may also have been beneficial here: GDC was a different organisation to the current Glasgow City Council and its arms-length body, Glasgow Life; this research project provides one means for Glasgow Life as a contemporary organisation to understand its pre-history.

A further benefit may have been the methodological approach taken to Glasgow Life’s involvement in the research. It may be thought that the CDA would lead to my being embedded within Glasgow Life. This was not the case. Whilst the role was never intended to be that of an embedded researcher, I worked in close cooperation and liaison with Glasgow Life staff as the research developed. While it was clear throughout that this was my research project to undertake, I found it particularly valuable to have a supervisor at Glasgow Life with unique insights into the period and topic of study, Dr Mark O’Neill having begun his career in Glasgow Museums during the 1980s. The involvement of Glasgow Life brought privileged access to some of the key actors in the period of study, which may not have otherwise been available. Glasgow Life has provided suitable venues for interviews and support from City Archivist, Dr Irene O’Brien, and teams of archivists and librarians at Glasgow City Archives and The Mitchell Library Special Collections in locating archival documents. Glasgow Life was keen to disseminate what could be learned from my research within the organisation and therefore hosted an event at the City Halls in Glasgow for me to discuss my findings with a broad range of staff. The presentation was enthusiastically received. Feedback from discussion with Glasgow Life staff present at this event prompted further research, which fed into my thesis writing. The iterative aspects of Glasgow Life’s involvement, such as this, proved to be invaluable for the development of my research. It was also clearly understood by Glasgow Life’s staff that this was my thesis to write.

107 For example, a member of Glasgow Life staff who had worked at the Citizens Theatre during the 1980s told me about the important role played in decision-making on the theatre’s funding by GDC Finance Director, Bill English, who made visits to the theatre with councillors. I undertook further archival research which provided written evidence of the key role played by English in maintaining a strategic overview of GDC’s expenditure on the arts and culture and directing the council’s decision-making on it in the years leading to 1990, as discussed in Chapter 7 of this thesis.
This research project was limited to the 1970s and 1980s, and much research into cultural policy in Glasgow post-1990 has focused on the impacts of Glasgow’s year as the ECOC, 1990 being viewed as a watershed. There is therefore the opportunity for further research into the extent to which the characteristics of the implicit, effective cultural policy outlined in the findings of this research project have continued to play out in the decades since 1990 and the related implications for the future of cultural policy in Glasgow.

Furthermore, the research findings have broader implications for extant literature on Glasgow and ECOC 1990 - and in particular the idea of a ‘Glasgow model’ of culture-led regeneration connected to the city’s approach to ECOC 1990 - notably that such academic accounts should be revisited and perhaps revised. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, Garcia has demonstrated the influence and impact the idea of a Glasgow model of culture-led regeneration connected to the ECOC has had on other cities, notably Liverpool (Garcia, 2005: 4844-846; Garcia, 2007: 4-6; Garcia, 2017: 2 and 4). This avenue for further research may also extend into the growth in the early twenty-first century of toolkits offering solutions to beleaguered cities based on creative city models, such as Landry’s influential publication, *The Creative City: A Toolkit for Urban Innovators* (2000), in which Glasgow features. As discussed in section 8.5, this thesis challenges the idea that a strategically devised, explicit model of culture-led regeneration emerged in Glasgow in the years leading to 1990. The research findings show that no simple formula developed in Glasgow in the years leading to 1990 that could be transferred to other cities and other contexts. But this has not stopped others from reading the Glasgow experience in that way.

As discussed in Chapter 4, Bell and Oakley determined in 2015 that urban cultural policy was a relatively new concept, dating back around thirty years (2015: 78). In the decades since 1990, policy mobility has become a growing area of academic study. As discussed in Chapter 4, drawing on McCann and Ward (2010), the concepts of policy-making as territorial and relational were applied to the investigative approach taken in this research project to cultural policy in Glasgow during the 1970s and 1980s - that is, the extent to which a cultural policy emerged which was restricted to the city of Glasgow (territorial) and the
extent to which it connected to policy areas other than ‘culture’, to policy
development in other cities or countries and to specific key actors (relational).

As the research presented in this thesis has shown, the 1980s were a time when
policy ideas were moving between cities. For Glasgow in the years leading to
1990, policy inspiration often came from cities in America. Boyle, McWilliams
and Rice (2008: 316) have highlighted how in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
local councillors from Glasgow visited US ‘rustbelt’ cities such as Minneapolis,
Baltimore and Pittsburgh, to learn about these cities’ experiences of
regeneration during a period of deindustrialisation. Michael Kelly’s testimony,
discussed in Chapter 5, highlighted the influence of New York in Glasgow’s
attempts to change its image during the early 1980s. Taking as inspiration the ‘I
Love New York’ campaign - and the recognition that ‘social problems were
really, really deep in New York and yet that didn’t seem to bother visitors
because they concentrated on the positive aspects’ of the city (Michael Kelly,
interview, 23 June 2014) - key actors in Glasgow imported new public relations
tactics in order to transform the city’s image and hence its economy. As Kelly
stated, these distraction-based tactics involved focusing on the positive aspects
of the city and ‘blatantly ignoring’ the social problems. Glasgow’s approach to
economic development drew heavily on the experience of other cities, not least
through the involvement of McKinsey and Co., an American company which by
the 1980s was developing a growing global presence. The McKinsey strategy
discussed in this thesis took ideas from cities such as Baltimore in its proposals
for Glasgow.108

As discussed in Chapter 7, by the late 1980s, Glasgow was positioning itself
within a growing context of national and transnational narratives of cities as

108 For example, the McKinsey strategy proposed Glasgow follow Baltimore in building an
aquarium in the city centre (something that was not, however, realised), stating: ‘Although
Glasgow has a number of internationally renowned attractions, such as the Burrell Collection,
they appeal to a narrow segment of the tourist market. To capture a larger segment of the
tourist market, Glasgow needs an outstanding tourist attraction with a broad-based appeal. A
review of tourist attractions worldwide to identify suitable opportunities for Glasgow selected
three that merit detailed evaluation. 1. A world class aquarium: Baltimore’s new aquarium has
undoubtedly done more than anything else to bring tourists to the city. In its first year of
operation upwards of 1.5 million people - more than twice the projected number - came to see
it. It has succeeded magnificently because it appeals to all sorts of people, it is a striking
building and there has been no compromise on quality. Europe has no world-class aquarium, so
Glasgow has the chance to get in first. An aquarium is an attractive option for Glasgow: it would
require very little space; it would be an all-weather, all-seasons attraction; and its breadth of
appeal would be particularly important in an area with a low population.’ (Cullen, 1985: 29)
models of arts-led urban regeneration. The new proliferation of international conferences and symposia on arts-led urban renewal during the late 1980s - such as the BAAA Arts and the Changing City symposium hosted in Glasgow in 1988 - were driven by the British interest in US success stories as well as the gathering pace of regeneration projects in major UK cities (Keans et al, 1989: 9).

However, it was already apparent in the late 1980s that even when comparable approaches are taken between cities - such as the use of cultural districts as a means of regeneration - the results were by no means replicable.109

There continues to be much for cities to learn from each other, in the field of cultural policy as in other disciplines. Cities can be testbeds for policy ideas - indeed it is standard practice for government to pilot new policies before they are rolled out in other areas. However, it is inherently risky for cities to attempt to transfer and replicate what may be perceived to be successful models, when the conditions that created the model’s perceived success may not exist elsewhere - particularly when the ‘model’ itself is essentially a myth.

The extant lack of robust evidence and difficulties in measurement in relation to culture-led regeneration, combined with the rise of advocacy research and continued assertions that culture is playing a regenerative role regardless or in opposition to evidence (Campbell et al., 2016), were highlighted in Chapter 3.

Within this broad policy context, the research presented in this thesis shows the importance of building robust methods of research and evaluation into culture-led regeneration initiatives and strategies, particularly those reliant on policy mobility. There is a particular need for longitudinal studies providing more robust evidence on the place-based relationship between culture and regeneration. There is a particular opportunity for policy-makers and civic leaders to build and invest in academic relationships which may enable this to happen, and provide a greater understanding of the role culture can (and cannot) play in regenerating their towns and cities.

109 The BAAA Arts and the Changing City symposium included a comparison of Liverpool and Pittsburgh as cities in which ‘redevelopment has been spearheaded with the capital-intensive redevelopment of a cultural district’ (in Liverpool’s case, the Albert Dock and Tate Gallery) yet with stark contrasts (Keans et al., 1989: 9-10).
Finally, the findings of this research project also have implications for current debates concerning the economic, social and cultural value of the arts and culture.

In the thirty years that have passed since the publication of *The Economic Importance of the Arts in Britain/Glasgow*, Glasgow has become situated in a national (in both senses of Scotland and the UK) climate in which economic impact has become a primary or default justification for public ‘investment’ in the arts and culture. Notably, the changing rhetoric surrounding the public funding of the arts and culture reflects the growing instrumentalism of culture to have taken place: the ‘subsidy’ of the 1970s and 1980s has been replaced with the contemporary ‘investment’, the implication being the anticipation of a return, financial or otherwise. While economic impact arguments may generate funding for culture which might otherwise not be readily available, they have also led to those working in the arts and culture becoming accountable for economic outcomes. As we enter a new era of uncertainty brought about by the impending Brexit, facing the confirmed consequence that UK cities will be precluded from hosting the ECOC in the future, the culture-led regeneration orthodoxy and its perceived economic benefits remains a basis for the UK government’s support of high profile cultural events, particularly in towns and cities deemed ‘left behind’.  

Recently, there has been something of a backlash against the dominance of the economic value of culture in arguments for its public funding and support and a shift towards articulating the cultural value of culture. The 2016 AHRC Cultural Value Project (Crossick and Kaszynska, 2016) attempted to define and provide

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110 In November 2017, the European Commission confirmed that despite five UK cities having submitted their final bids to host ECOC 2023 in October 2017, the UK would not be eligible to host the ECOC as a result of its impending exit from the EU. In response to a parliamentary question on the subject at Prime Ministers Questions on 29 November 2017, Damian Green MP, standing in for Theresa May, stated: ‘After British cities, including some in Scotland, were invited to be part of the process, it is extremely disappointing that the Commission has decided that they cannot apply. We are in urgent talks with the Commission about that, and we are ensuring that all the cities that applied can continue with their cultural development, which has been shown to be an extremely good basis for the regeneration of cities and towns across the United Kingdom’ (Green, 2017). This response reflects the ingrained culture-led regeneration orthodoxy within the government: that cultural development in its own right is an insufficient reason to host the ECOC without acting as the basis of regeneration of the host city. This orthodoxy can also be found in the government’s UK City of Culture initiative, designed in anticipation of predominantly social and economic outcomes based on the perceived success of Glasgow 1990 and Liverpool 2008.
evidence of the components of cultural value, distinct from economic value; whilst the 2015 Warwick Commission on the Future of Cultural Value aimed to produce a ‘blueprint’ for the future development of the cultural and creative industries in which growth is not defined solely in terms of economic impact.

In this current climate, in which the dominance of the economic impact of culture is concurrently entrenched, promoted and contested, this thesis challenges aspects of the established narratives on which policy decisions are made. Ultimately, this thesis has shown that the term ‘culture-led regeneration’ is not helpful or accurate in describing the development of cultural policy in Glasgow between 1970 and 1989. Glasgow’s approach was not one of culture-led regeneration but regeneration-led culture: an implicit, effective cultural policy emerged in which the development of the arts and culture was led by the development of the city economy, rather than vice versa. A further potential area for research is therefore the extent to which the culture-led regeneration orthodoxy more broadly should be viewed, conversely, as regeneration-led culture.
### APPENDIX A  LIST OF ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of interviewee</th>
<th>Position during the period of study: 1970-1989</th>
<th>Date and location of interview</th>
<th>Comments on interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jimmy Andrews</td>
<td>Depute Director of Finance, 1976-86, then Senior Depute Finance Director 1986-94, at Glasgow District Council.</td>
<td>18 August 2014, Kelvingrove Museum and Art Gallery, Glasgow.</td>
<td>The interview covers the period 1970-2003. Duration of interview [00:42:24]. Interview obtained via Jean McFadden. Jimmy Andrews referred at one point in the interview to a short list he’d prepared, though his responses to my questions did not appear to be scripted or rehearsed. Andrews willingly answered my questions and did not appear evasive in his responses. The interview mainly concerned the finances and roles of key councillors and officers within Glasgow District Council. Some of the key figures named by Andrews were other interviewees, such as Jean McFadden and Steve Inch, whilst others I was unable to interview, such as Bill English (GDC Director of Finance during the 1980s, whom Andrews worked alongside) and Pat Lally (GDC Council Leader). Andrews did not appear to intentionally omit any key figures from his testimony. The interview also extended to the period following local government reorganisation in the 1990s, when Andrews was Finance Director then Chief Executive of the new Glasgow City Council, and covered topics such as GCC’s approach to education and housing, which were beyond the direct scope of the research project but provided the interviewee’s personal perspective on the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alasdair Auld</td>
<td>Assistant Curator, Glasgow Museums and Art Galleries (Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum), 1956-68; Curator at Pollock House, 1968-72; Keeper of Fine Art at Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum, 1972-76; Depute Director Glasgow Museums and Art Galleries Department, 1976-79; Acting Director, Glasgow Museums and Art Galleries Dept, 1979; Director of Glasgow Museums and Art Galleries, 1979-88.</td>
<td>25 February 2015, interviewee’s home.</td>
<td>The interview covers the period 1956-1988. Duration of interview [00:37:00]. Interview obtained via Dr Mark O’Neill (Glasgow Life). Alasdair Auld discussed most topics in general terms and often did not go into a great amount of detail. I got the impression that there was much Auld was not saying on some topics, either due to it not being at the forefront of his memory (given it covered events that took place 30-50 years ago) or for diplomatic reasons. Alasdair Auld did not refer to any notes. A theme that ran through the interview was the lack of a formal plan during his time at the museums service, though his confidence that things worked well without one, the lack of change in the museums service and an opportunistic approach. The 200% increase in the number of local authority museums between 1963-83 was described as ‘just opportunity’ – this is something that is reflected in individual cases (such as Pollok House being gifted to the city). Alasdair Auld’s response to questions on museum collections and acquisitions also described an approach that was more opportunistic than strategic but not unguided.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patrick Fallon</td>
<td>Civil servant (working on international relations, including the ECOC) in the Office of Arts and Libraries, London, during the 1980s; Head of Museums Policy Branch,</td>
<td>11 March 2015, interviewee’s home.</td>
<td>The interview covers the period 1985-1990. Duration of interview [00:57:11]. Interview obtained via Joy Parry. I identified Patrick Fallon as a potential interviewee through letters he wrote from the OAL to Glasgow, held in Glasgow City Archives (see Chapter 6). Patrick Fallon and Joy Parry were the two officials to visit</td>
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</table>
Department of National Heritage 1992-97.

Glasgow in 1986 as part of the ECOC selection process, and made recommendations to the Arts Minister, Richard Luce. Similarly to Joy Parry, Patrick Fallon agreed to be interviewed on the basis that the interview would be used for this research project only and not included in the public archive. During the interview, Fallon answered my questions directly. He described his role and areas of work at the OAL, the differences between the approaches of the UK and other EC member states towards the arts and culture (such as the arms-length approach). He also discussed the OAL’s view of the EC as a purely economic community (eg. stating there was no justification for cultural activities in the Treaty of Rome – see Chapter 6), the government’s initial resistance to the ECOC and subsequent decision to support it. Other themes covered by Fallon in the interview included the ECOC bidding process, other cities in the UK, Glasgow’s image and the ECOC 1990 event itself. During the interview Fallon referred to the list of cities that submitted bids in April 1986 for the UK nomination for ECOC 1990 that I had brought to the interview (see Appendix D) and reflected upon it. He did not otherwise refer to any notes in his responses.

Following the interview, Patrick Fallon approved the resultant transcript for use in this research project only.

**Eddie Friel**


The interview mainly covers the period 1982-1991 when the interviewee worked at Scottish Opera and Greater Glasgow Tourist Board. Duration of
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Interview Details</th>
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<tr>
<td>Stuart Gulliver</td>
<td>Joined Scottish Development Agency (SDA) in 1978; Regional Director for Glasgow and Strathclyde North, SDA, 1979-90.</td>
<td>The interview focuses on the period 1978-1990 with reference to the broader timescale of the 1960s to 2014. Duration of interview [01:35:26]. Interview obtained via Dr Mark O’Neill (Glasgow Life). The interview followed an initial meeting, where we discussed the possibility of a formal, recorded interview and Gulliver suggested some reading on the cultural industries. The interview itself is broad in scope, beginning with Gulliver’s own education and career prior to his joining the SDA, before focusing mainly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing and Public Relations, Scottish Opera, 1982-83; Chief Executive, Greater Glasgow Tourist Board, 1983-1991; Member of the board of Directors, Scottish Opera, 1985-91; Chairman of the board of Directors, Theatre Royal Glasgow, 1985-91; Visiting Professor, University of Strathclyde, 1988-2005</td>
<td>Interview [01:48:04]. Interview obtained via Dr Mark O’Neill (Glasgow Life). This was the longest interview undertaken for the project. It was one of the less structured interviews, though broadly chronological, covering a range of topics in the interviewee’s life in Glasgow from his move to the city in 1982 to 1991 when he left Glasgow to work in Northern Ireland. Friel did not refer to any notes and provided general reflections and opinions on topics such as post-industrial decline and poverty in Glasgow, the development of tourism and partnerships in the city, Glasgow’s ECOC bid, Scottish Opera and rivalry between Glasgow and Edinburgh. Some of Friel’s recollections of events that took place approximately thirty years before the interview did not fully align with archival records. However, archival records and other interviews show that Friel was a significant figure in Glasgow’s ECOC bid and the development of tourism.</td>
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Gulliver reflected on the broader national political and economic development context, specific events in Glasgow during the 1970s and 1980s, key individuals within central and local government, Glasgow Action, the McKinsey strategy, the SDA and the GLEB, as well as concepts such as pacing devices and competitive advantage. Whilst Gulliver answered my questions directly and did not appear evasive, as with other interviewees his position was not that of the detached observer: Gulliver highlighted and advocated for achievements made by Glasgow over the course of the 1980s and into the 1990s and the strengthening of Glasgow’s competitive position in comparison to other UK cities, though also willingly commented on some of the limitations of the idea of a culture-led approach to regeneration. Following the interview, as well as putting me in touch with David Macdonald, Gulliver also provided contact with Robert Palmer (Director of GDC’s Festivals Unit and ECOC 1990). Palmer agreed to be interviewed but unfortunately we were unable to schedule a suitable appointment due to Palmer’s work commitments abroad. As Palmer was a key figure in this research topic, I ensured this was acknowledged and his voice was included in the thesis via archival material from the period.
Steven Hamilton

Senior Solicitor, Principal Solicitor then Town Clerk Depute, Glasgow Corporation in the years leading to 1975; Director of Administration and Legal Services, Glasgow District Council, 1975-78; Acting Town Clerk and Chief Executive, Glasgow District Council, 1978-79; Town Clerk and Chief Executive, Glasgow District Council, 1979-1991.

Interview 3 July 2014 and follow-up discussion on 19 August 2014, University of Glasgow.

The interview covers the period 1948-1991. This covers Steven Hamilton’s working life at Glasgow Corporation, then GDC, having joined straight from school in 1948. Duration of interview [01:20:45]. Interview obtained via Jean McFadden. The interview covered a great deal of ground, from his personal history at the council, to the scope of the council’s remit, structural changes from Glasgow Corporation to GDC and SRC, corporate management and committees, key reports, the relationship with the Scottish Office, partnerships, ECOC 1990 etc. At one point Steven Hamilton referred to a list of cultural venues and assets as an aide memoire (St Andrews Hall, the Mitchell Library, the universities, Kelvingrove Museum and Art Gallery, The Burrell Collection, St Mungo’s Museum, The Transport Museum) though he did not have a prepared script. A further discussion took place following the interview, after Steven Hamilton had read the transcript and provided further contextual information to the main interview. This further information was added as footnotes to the transcript and where elaborated on, as a postscript to the transcript. Themes for further information included the idea that changes in the 1970s and 1980s had their roots in previous decades, the idea of Glasgow Corporation as the ‘all purpose’ authority, building of motorways and parking legislation, pedestrianisation of Buchanan Street, Glasgow Airport, Glasgow Action and links between the business
community and council, planning applications, the Building Works Department, Glasgow Corporation/GDC as a social landlord, GDC Estates Department, the SECC and SDA, House for an Art Lover, Cathedral, St Mungo’s Museum and Martha Street, City Halls, schools, and finding legal ways to get things done. Steven Hamilton provided a broad picture of the remit and roles and responsibilities of the council and the Chief Executive, and the context from which Glasgow’s cultural policy emerged.

<p>| Steve Inch | Researcher, Strategic Policy Unit, Scottish Development Agency, 1977-78; Planning Officer, Cumbria County Council, 1978-81; Planning Officer, Glasgow District Council (GDC), 1981-86; Head of Regeneration Unit, GDC, 1986-95. | 6 August 2014, University of Glasgow. | The interview covers the period 1976-2014. Duration of interview [01:16:54]. Interview obtained via Dr Mark O’Neill (Glasgow Life). Whilst the interview mainly focused on the 1980s, it also included Inch’s reflections on the XX Commonwealth Games, which took place in Glasgow between 23 July-3 August 2014, prior to the interview on 6 August 2014. Inch worked at GDC and subsequently Glasgow City Council from 1981 until his retirement as Executive Director of Development and Regeneration Services in 2010, the Commonwealth Games being a key project in his area of work. The interview focused on the emergence of economic development as a council-wide programme priority and how GDC’s economic development policy and strategy shifted between 1981 and 1991. Inch emphasised the collaborative approach taken during the 1980s, naming and crediting other key actors. Inch’s responses to my questions did not appear rehearsed or |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Institution/Position</th>
<th>Date/Location</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Michael Kelly</td>
<td>Lecturer in Economics, University of Strathclyde, 1967-80; Labour councillor in Glasgow Corporation, 1971-75 and Glasgow District Council, 1979-84; Magistrate in Glasgow, 1972-75; Lord Provost of Glasgow and ex-officio Lord Lieutenant, 1980-84; Managing Director of PR company Michael Kelly Associates, 1984-present.</td>
<td>23 June 2014, interviewee’s home.</td>
<td>The interview focuses on the period 1980-1984 when Michael Kelly was Lord Provost of Glasgow. Duration of interview [00:25:08]. The interview lasted 25 minutes because Michael Kelly had 30 minutes available. Interview obtained via Jean McFadden. During the interview, Kelly talked quickly and covered a good deal of ground in the limited time available. Although Kelly did not refer to any notes, his responses appeared rehearsed. Where Jean McFadden had emphasised achievements were a team effort and gave credit to a list of her contemporaries, Kelly did not. Kelly was the central character in his responses, on occasions correcting ‘we’ to ‘I’ to assert his role in achievements. The only other people named in the interview were Margaret Thatcher, theatre director Peter Hall and Edward Koch the Mayor of New York, which may reflect who he regards as his contemporaries and the significant figures in framing his story during this period. Kelly had some strong opinions on GDC PR department and the staff there. As it was not possible for me to interview the ex-Head of PR at GDC, I undertook documentary research to gain other perspectives on the subject (see Chapter 5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erika King</td>
<td>Subsidies Officer, Arts Council of Great Britain, London during</td>
<td>3 June 2015, University of Glasgow.</td>
<td>The interview covers the period 1975-1990. Duration of interview [00:50:03]. Interview obtained via Dr Mark O’Neill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s; Administrative Director, Third Eye Centre Glasgow, 1979-1990.</td>
<td>(Glasgow Life). The interview mainly covered Erika King’s time working at the Third Eye Centre and the broader arts context in Glasgow during the 1980s. It also touched upon King’s time at the Arts Council of Great Britain and the relationship between ACBG and the Scottish Arts Council. King gave a great deal of credit to Chris Carrell (Director) and Tom McGrath, founder of the Third Eye Centre, describing the ethos of partnership and collaboration and the scale of ambitions of the centre during the 1980s (see Chapter 5). King was not evasive and responses to my questions did not appear rehearsed or scripted.</td>
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</table>

| Richard Luce | Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1981-82 and 1983-85; Minister of State for the Arts and Minister of State (Privy Council Office) responsible for the Civil Service, 1985-90; inter alia. | The interview mainly covers the period 1985-1990 when the interviewee was Minister for the Arts. Duration of interview [00:36:10]. Interview obtained by writing to Lord Luce at the House of Lords. I found that Richard Luce answered questions directly and was at times very frank in his responses to questions during the interview. He did not bring any notes to the interview. He did discuss a list of cities that submitted bids in April 1986 for the UK nomination for ECOC 1990, and a list of cities shortlisted in July 1986 (now in Appendices D and E of this thesis) which I had brought to the interview, in his reflections on the ECOC nomination selection process (see Chapter 6). He discussed his background as Arts Minister, the relationship with the EC and Melina Mercouri in particular, the ECOC programme in the 1980s, the strengths of Glasgow’s ECOC bid (describing |
| David Macdonald | Various posts including Head of the Services Industries Division, Scottish Development Agency, 1983-85; Director, Glasgow Action, 1985-91. | 8 September 2014, interviewee’s home. | The interview covers the period 1983-1991. Duration of interview [00:51:46]. Interview obtained via Stuart Gulliver. I identified David Macdonald as a potential interviewee through archival research - as the Director of Glasgow Action, Macdonald featured in archival material held in both Glasgow City Archives and the National Records of Scotland - as well as through conversations with other interviewees such as Gulliver. David Macdonald did not refer to any written notes during his interview. Based on Macdonald’s responses to initial questions I took the approach advocated by oral historian George Ewart Evans (discussed in Chapter 4) to ‘let the interview run [...] never attempt to dominate it. The least one can do is to guide it’ (Thompson, 1978: 227), asking probing questions where required to glean further information. The interview covered topics including Glasgow’s ECOC 1990 bid, the McKinsey strategy, the work of the SDA and Glasgow Action and the role of Norman Macfarlane. Macdonald provided me with copies of Glasgow Action documents from his own archive, which are |
Jean McFadden | Glasgow District Council Leader, 1979-86 (and 1992-94); City Treasurer, Glasgow District Council, 1986-92; Vice Lord Lieutenant, City of Glasgow, 1981-92. (Also: Teacher in Glasgow and Lanarkshire; Senior Lecturer in Law at University of Strathclyde). | 24 March 2014, interviewee’s home. | The interview covers the period 1971-1990. Duration of interview [00:41:32]. Interview obtained via Dr Mark O’Neill (Glasgow Life). The interview covered Jean McFadden’s background as a teacher and motivation for becoming a councillor (to change schools policy), local government reorganisation in the 1970s, the 1977 local election and becoming Leader of the Labour group and the period in opposition, the lack of arts or cultural policy, the priorities for the council (housing, unemployment), becoming Leader of the council and the change of direction in 1980 when Labour restored their majority, Glasgow’s changing image, Mayfest, the relationship between local and central government, and the influence of Norman Macfarlane in Glasgow’s ECOC bid. I was struck by how much credit Jean McFadden gave to others (eg Michael Kelly, Norman Macfarlane, Jane MacKay) and how frequently she described advances as having happened through a team effort, rather than positioning herself front and centre as the key instigator. Responses did not appear scripted but carefully worded. There was notably no mention of Pat Lally in any of Jean McFadden’s responses - a referenced in the thesis bibliography. In reviewing the interview transcript I found that Macdonald’s recollections both aligned with and illuminated GDC and National Records of Scotland archival material from the 1980s and showed Macdonald to be a reliable witness.
key figure in Glasgow during this period (Jean McFadden lost the GDC leadership to Lally, for example) with whom Jean McFadden had some well documented disagreements. It could be interpreted that McFadden made a concerted effort not to include Pat Lally in her story, despite his historical prominence in other sources. Following the interview, Jean McFadden provided me with copies of her own private archival material, which included a draft chapter of her autobiography, correspondence and copies of council meeting minutes. She also put me in touch with some of her colleagues from the period of study for further interviews (Michael Kelly, Steven Hamilton etc). It should be noted that I requested an interview with Pat Lally, which he willingly agreed to, but was unable to undertake due to his being ill. I therefore ensured his voice was included in the thesis through other records.

Joy Parry

Joy Parry was named as a contact in correspondence between the OAL and GDC (see Chapter 6). Joy Parry and Patrick Fallon were the two officials to visit Glasgow in 1986 as part of the ECOC selection process, and made recommendations to the Arts Minister, Richard Luce. Through research I discovered that Joy Parry had worked as a Lecturer in Cultural Policy at the University of Warwick. I
obtained the interview via Prof Jeremy Ahearne and Prof Oliver Bennett at the University of Warwick. Joy Parry gave permission for the recorded material to be used for this research project only and not to be included in the public archive. Parry explained the government’s position on the EC and the ECOC during the 1980s. When asked about the Foreign Office, Treasury and Scottish Office, Parry was careful not to say much at all. However, Joy Parry answered questions about the OAL’s approach to cultural policy, the EC and how Glasgow came to be awarded the ECOC nomination by the OAL directly. She did not refer to any written notes or script as a prompt, though referred to a copy of the 1985 EC resolution on the ECOC. Following this interview, Joy Parry approved the transcript for use in this research project only.
APPENDIX B  INTERVIEWEES’ BIOGRAPHICAL TIMELINES: ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE

As outlined in Chapter 4, for each interview I produced a brief biographical timeline, which included the interviewee’s roles or job titles and key dates. Before the interview, I checked this biographical information with each interviewee to ensure that all the information was correct and to complete any gaps. This ensured that during the interview, questions related to the interviewees’ occupations could be anchored to specific dates. It also formed the basis of the ‘Occupation’ section of the cover page of the written interview transcript and summary (which was based on a template from The British Library/Oral History Society).

This appendix provides the biographical timeline produced for the Michael Kelly interview and the cover page of the interview transcript and summary as an illustrative example. In this example, I researched the information compiled in the timeline prior to the interview, discussed it with Michael Kelly prior to the start of the interview to confirm whether the details were correct, and following the interview, added the list of Dr Kelly’s occupations during the period covered by the interview to the ‘Occupation’ section of the transcript cover page. I then sent the completed transcript (along with the audio recording) to Michael Kelly, who re-confirmed his consent for it to be used for this research project and shared in a public archive. The amount of publicly-available information on interviewees’ occupations varied between interviewees; there was usually more information available for more visible public figures, such as Kelly, than those, such as civil servants, who worked mainly ‘behind the scenes’. The timeline prepared for the Michael Kelly interview therefore contained more information than those prepared for most of the other interviewees.
Dr Michael Kelly timeline

Dr Michael Kelly, CBE, DL (Deputy Lieutenant)

Born 1940

| Dates? | Studies Economics at University of London (BSc) and University of Strathclyde (PhD) |
| Dates? | Assistant Lecturer in Economics at University of Aberdeen |
| 1967-80 | Lecturer in Economics at University of Strathclyde |
| 1971-75 and 1979-84 | Labour councillor in Glasgow |
| 1972-75 | Magistrate in Glasgow |
| 1980-1984 | Lord Provost of Glasgow (and ex-officio Lord Lieutenant) |
| 1983 | CBE |
| 1983 | Honorary Mayor of Tombstone Arizona; Kentucky Colonel. |
| 1983 | Scot of the Year Award |
| 1984-1987 | Lord Rector of Glasgow University. Becomes first Lord Provost to become rector of the University of Glasgow |
| 1984 | Awarded Honorary LLB University of Glasgow |
| 1984- | Managing Director of the PR company Michael Kelly Associates |
| 1984 | Order of St John |
| 1984 | British Tourism Authority Medal for Services to Tourism |
| 1984 | Robert Burns Award from University of Old Dominion, Virginia, for services to Scottish culture. |
| 1986-1989 | President of Strathclyde Branch Institute of Marketing |
| 1986-90 | Member: Scottish ABSA (Association of Business Sponsorship and the Arts, rebranded Arts and Business 1999) |
| 1987-96 | Chairman RSSPCC (Royal Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, now Children 1st) |
| 1990-94 | Director of Celtic FC |
| 1990-94 | Member: Scottish Committee National Art Collections Fund |
| 1995-2000 | Secretary, Scottish Industry Forum |
| 1998 | Knight’s Cross Order of Merit (Poland) |
| 2000- | Columnist for The Scotsman |
| 2001-05 | Member: External Relations Advisory Group ESRC |
| 2002- | Scottish convenor, Socialist Civil Liberties Association |
| 2004- | Chairman Glasgow Central CLP (Constituency Labour Party) |
**PhD CULTURAL POLICY IN GLASGOW 1970-1989**
Collaborative Doctoral Award with Glasgow Life
University of Glasgow

**INTERVIEW SUMMARY AND TRANSCRIPT**

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<tr>
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<td>Kelly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee's forenames:</td>
<td>Michael</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title:</td>
<td>Dr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex:</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation:</strong> Lecturer in Economics, University of Strathclyde 1967-80; Labour councillor in Glasgow Corporation 1971-75 and in Glasgow District Council 1979-84; Magistrate in Glasgow 1972-75; Lord Provost of Glasgow and ex-officio Lord Lieutenant 1980-84; Managing Director of PR company Michael Kelly Associates 1984-present.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of recording:</strong></td>
<td>23 June 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location of interview:</strong></td>
<td>Interviewee's home, Glasgow</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Total duration [HH:MM:SS]:</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Additional material:</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interviewer's name:</strong></td>
<td>Clare Edwards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interviewer's comments:</strong></td>
<td>The interview focuses on the period 1980-1984, when Michael Kelly was Lord Provost of Glasgow.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C  LIST OF EUROPEAN CITIES/CAPITALS OF CULTURE, 1985 TO 2018

1985  Athens (Greece)
1986  Florence (Italy)
1987  Amsterdam (Netherlands)
1988  Berlin (West Germany)
1989  Paris (France)
1990  Glasgow (UK)
1991  Dublin (Ireland)
1992  Madrid (Spain)
1993  Antwerp (Belgium)
1994  Lisbon (Portugal)
1995  Luxembourg (Luxembourg)
1996  Copenhagen (Denmark)
1997  Thessalonika (Greece)
1998  Stockholm (Sweden)
1999  Weimar (Germany)
2000  Avignon (France), Bergen (Norway), Bologna (Italy), Brussels (Belgium),
      Helsinki (Finland), Krakow (Poland), Prague (Czech Republic), Santiago de
      Compostela (Spain), Reykjavik (Iceland)
2001  Porto (Portugal), Rotterdam (Netherlands)
2002  Bruges (Belgium), Salamanca (Spain)
2003  Graz (Austria)
2004  Genoa (Italy), Lille (France)
2005  Cork (Ireland)
2006  Patras (Greece)
2007  Luxembourg (Luxembourg), Sibui (Romania)
2008  Liverpool (UK, Stavanger (Norway)
2009  Linz (Austria), Vilnius (Lithuania)
2010  Essen (Germany), Istanbul (Turkey), Pécs (Hungary)
2011  Tallinn (Estonia), Turku (Finland)
2012  Guimarães (Portugal), Maribor (Slovenia)
2013  Kosice (Slovenia), Marseille (France)
2014  Riga (Latvia), Umea (Sweden)
2015  Mons (Belgium), Plzen (Czech Republic)
2016  Donostia-San Sebastián (Spain), Wroclaw (Poland)
2017  Aarhus (Denmark), Paphos (Cyprus)
2018  Leeuwarden (Netherlands), Valetta (Malta)
APPENDIX D  LIST OF CITIES THAT SUBMITTED BIDS IN APRIL 1986 FOR THE UK NOMINATION FOR ECOC 1990

Bath
Bristol
Cambridge
Cardiff
Edinburgh
Glasgow
Leeds
Liverpool
Swansea
APPENDIX E  LIST OF CITIES SHORTLISTED IN JULY 1986
FOR THE UK NOMINATION FOR ECOC 1990

Bath

Bristol

Edinburgh

Glasgow

Leeds
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LEDIS (1984c) *Leeds City Council Economic Development Strategy*. September,
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