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To the Faculty of Divinity, Glasgow University

REVOLUTION AND THE THEOLOGY OF F. D. MAURICE
by
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A dissertation presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

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The 1960's vibrated with the fears and hopes of revolution. No area of human studies escaped demands to declare its sympathy for "the revolution." Every area of humane studies examined itself for the degree to which it could cooperate. Religion gained no exemption. In fact, theological literature of the late sixties abounds with direct references to the issues raised for Christians by revolution in both journals and monographs. This literary and theological effort represents the most significant attempt in its history on the part of the church to come to terms with revolution. It is perhaps most cogently likened to the ongoing theological discussion of the "just war."

In spite of the literary deluge, however, the church's voice is equivocal. For some, revolution is anathema. For others, it is the future of the church and its most significant missionary enterprise. Between, one discovers a variety of positions more and less approving of revolution upon theological grounds.

The desire naturally springs up for some clear, prophetic word of the Lord, some "authoritative theological literature." But such seems unlikely to appear.
Instead, the church must turn to an examination and an implementation of the social convictions born of her faith. Only then can revolution as a social issue be evaluated. If not for answers, certainly for the model, Frederick Denison Maurice is a useful mentor. He was a well-known and controversial Anglican theologian whose published words approached two million and whose working life continued from about 1830 until he died in 1872.

Maurice, the conservative who despises democracy and rejoices in class distinctions, is also Maurice, the Christian socialist whose involved sympathy with the workers and whose radical complaints against competition as the rule of society and atomism as its structure gained him deathless loyalty from his friends and virtually endless attack from his enemies.

His utility for the modern meditation upon revolution is his apparent ambivalence. He reflects what is actually happening in the modern church vis-a-vis revolution. Drawing upon the experience of man as member of a family, a nation, and a universal society, Maurice examines his own era as one of confrontation. There is a confrontation between order and disorder. There is a confrontation between the spirit of sacrifice and the spirit of empire. Order, in particular the "divine order," will appear where society is developed and protected by the law of sacrifice. Disorder is the inevitable effect of the imperial drive for acquisition and dominion. With these principles in mind, three comprehensive problems confronting the potential Christian revolutionary are examined.
The first is the problem of violence. Coercion is inevitable in human experience. Even the theological category of grace exhibits overtones of coercion. Coercion in a large social setting must, sooner or later, issue in violence, even when non-violence is the prevailing spirit. The issue for the Christian, therefore, is not violence or no violence. It is the responsible use of violence. Violence that betrays the spirit of its ultimate goal is ineffective and counter-productive. According to Maurice, sacrifice is therefore the only effective force. Sacrifice, understood as submission to the will of God, may become resistance to man. Revolution cannot therefore be precluded a priori because of its measure of violence.

Nor can revolution be precluded for the Christian on the simple grounds that revolution is chaotic and disordering. As much as any man, Maurice appreciated order. But he could see and approve the function of true revolution (i.e., the making of a new constitution), as a possible witness to an order long violated by an imperial establishment. In such a distorted society, men would choose to honor elective affinities more than the relations of family, nation and universal society. They would hallow their contrived institutions over-much. They would teach men to value possessions more than persons, and clubs more than communities. There is no essential reason why revolution should not be the chosen instrument of God for the overthrow of such disorder. Did not God use the armies of Israel to cleanse the land of the disorder of idolatry?
But the decision to join the revolution cannot be precipitated automatically upon the above considerations. According to Maurice, it is left to the person, but not in subjective solitude. He has a conscience. That informs him of relations and reminds him that there is an ethos appropriate to each relation. The same conscience reveals to him God. God is the source of information for the conscience. God through the same spirit of sacrifice is calling men to conform their relations with others to the divine order and thus manifest the kingdom of God. The conscience is the "personhood" of man. To violate its divinely-appointed prerogatives is to violate the person and thus to inhibit truly human community.

We are not, therefore, free to prescribe or proscribe revolution in abstracto. Conscience and context, not casuistry, are the guides. Neither the nostalgia of conservatism nor the chiliasm of revolution must shake us from the calm assessment of present order and present responsibility within the present Kingdom of God.
"Revolution and the Theology of F. D. Maurice" attempts to apply the salient features of the "social theology" of F. D. Maurice to the contemporary experience of revolution. The book is neither a call to arms nor to armchairs. Rather, it suggests the ways in which a Christian, following the model Maurice provides, ought to assess his responsibility from within a revolutionary situation.

Interest in the "theology of revolution" was inescapable for American seminarians in the late nineteen-sixties. In this case, that interest was generated and fostered in the classes and counseling of Professor J. Kenneth Grider of Nazarene Theological Seminary in Kansas City, Missouri.

From his first suggestion of the place that F. D. Maurice might be brought to fill in a theology of revolution, the assistance of the Reverend Professor Alan D. Galloway of the Faculty of Divinity of Glasgow University has been invaluable. His learning, his articulate criticism, his bursts of intellectual excitement have been the stimulants for the rewarding drudgery of digging deeper on the one hand and the exhilaration of insight on the other.

To libraries and librarians at the Universities of Glasgow and Cambridge, at Nazarene Theological Seminary, and Northwest Nazarene College, I owe a debt of thanks. Likewise to
Mr. Jack Gamble, personal friend and antiquarian book dealer, I owe thanks for my rather unusually thorough personal collection of works by F. D. Maurice.

And finally, as firstly, to Doris, my wife, whose hands and heart are also in this book, I am warmly grateful.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

To read objectively a book about revolution is certainly as hard as to write one objectively. The very word "revolution" is evocative. One feels its meaning and its implications before the rational function even engages. Revolution is one of those subjects which provides irrefutable documentation of the ambiguity of the most critical decisions humans are called to make. Witness, for example, the highly-paid after dinner speaker who in the late nineteen-sixties spent the first forty-five minutes of his eloquent address decrying the demonstrations and the civil disobedience of those years. The final forty-five minutes was a paean to "our revolutionary forefathers."

If the ultimate impossibility of objectivity in any philosophical enterprise is a truism, then a writer ought to discover the likely hindrances to objectivity and disclose them in candor. Whatever follows in this discourse cannot but be conditioned by the writer's experience which includes: 1) the long imprisonment of a missionary brother-in-law upon no charges and without trial by a revolutionary regime; and 2) knowledge of the terror produced for close personal friends held at gunpoint to listen for the bomb to explode that lamed their livelihood and, for a time, shattered their lives.
Even so, the pages to follow reveal that such experiences have not so much determined the writer's response to revolution as they have simply given substance to what otherwise might be of purely theoretical interest.

Objectivity on the part of one who reads this, or any other presentation of the subject of revolution is also difficult to maintain. In the first place, any thoughtful observer of the contemporary human condition could hardly avoid assuming some position on the matter. The treatment accorded revolution by others might inform him. He will not likely find another's precisely his own.

When the reader has strong commitments in the matter, objectivity is even harder to maintain. Examiners of revolution tend to be shunted like boxcars onto pre-laid tracks of "revolutionary" or "counter-revolutionary." One ought to keep in mind here the complaint of Jean Baechler whose attempt to deal with the phenomenon of revolution from a sociologist's perspective parallels virtually every perspective of serious scholarship.

The very word "revolution" is charged with such passion (be it a repulsive or attractive charge) that a serious attempt to discuss it like any other social problem is inevitably greeted with loud accusations of blasphemy or of complacency. I am, to a limited extent, in the same situation as the early scientists who dared to treat religious phenomena as social facts, without references to any orthodoxy except scientific orthodoxy.¹

The reading in the literature of revolution required for

this thesis has demonstrated to this writer also with what facility human emotion can dismiss serious writing on the subject as simply "radical" or "counter-revolutionary."

Even when the designations are appropriate, one must allow serious literature on revolution a correspondingly serious "freedom of speech." The best literature of revolution (and there is a great deal of it) is not merely pamphleteering.

A further obstacle to objectivity in the examination of revolution is the sheer humane breadth of the subject. Every area of the humanities and social sciences have appropriate interests in the topic. For sheer literary bulk, the historians of our world have so far claimed revolution as peculiarly belonging to them. The progress of revolutions, anatomies of revolution, examinations of the social, economic, and political circumstances of revolution--these are the modern historian's stock in trade. But others, too, have a legitimate interest in revolution. Literature and the fine arts reflect the influences of revolution. Certainly, since Karl Marx, philosophy is interested in revolution, and its interest has become epistemological and metaphysical as much as political. Economists, sociologists and political scientists obviously have interests. With the provincialism of discipline that always threatens academic inquiry, it is possible to dismiss revolutionary literature simply because its approach is not one's own. One is not only free, but also responsible to criticize the literature of revolution from the points of view of his own discipline. But the breadth of humane interest in revolution insures that more disciplines than
just his own will be able to comment with pertinence and enthusiasm.

It was inevitable, therefore, that Christian theology, too, should wish not only to consider, but also to comment upon the phenomenon and literature of revolution. As we will show in the following chapter, its voice has varied as it has attempted to tune its conclusions to its presuppositions. Theologians, too, must win their objectivity.

This thesis is presented as a contribution to that objectivity. It discovers that the fundamental theological issues of revolution are akin to the fundamental political issues, i.e., stability and change. In this thesis they are dealt with as "the divine order" and "effective force," and are raised for the Christian by the prospects of challenge to the establishment and involvement in violence.

The object of the thesis is to discover what one can say about the responsibility of the Christian in a revolutionary situation. To define that responsibility, we will reach back to the middle of the last century for help in casting, interpreting, and resolving these problems. Frederick Denison Maurice, dead a century, lives, by his immense thought and labor, in the context of current social issues. The protectionist cast of utilitarian thought applied to the social and political facts of nineteenth-century Britain spurred him to "dig" for the true principles of social order. His theological excavations convinced him that the great task was to demonstrate by precept and example that the social implications of the Christian faith were absolutely indispensable to
truly humane society. We will see that the "socialism" with which Maurice responded to the prevailing social atomism was fundamentally theological and not economic. Most important, we will see that his oracle of the divine order is responsible and not reactionary, not because it has settled the question of the givenness of certain social structures, but because it reminds us that neither establishment nor revolution can justify its existence without referring to some such vision.

And finally he reminds the theological mind that one's relations to his fellowmen are engendered by his relation to God. In the conscience, Maurice sees, therefore, the control center of human relations both with God and man. The conscience is the most articulate witness to personality because it is the most articulate witness to personal responsibility. Neither the establishment nor the revolution is good which seeks to bind the conscience.

Since, according to Maurice, the function of conscience is set essentially in context rather than casuistry, attempts to define abstractly Christian responsibility in a revolutionary setting must fail. And thus is achieved the thesis that revolutionary participation of a Christian must be determined contextually. Establishments and revolutions are neither divine nor demonic per se. The legitimacy of either is specific to its existence in reality. One must assess a particular revolution, a particular establishment within its own context upon the grounds of Christian values, i.e., conscience. To establish this thesis is the task ahead.
The procedure is straightforward. The following chapter expresses the uncertain voice of Christian theology vis-à-vis revolution. The lack of and longing for some "authoritative theological literature" is explicit.

In chapter three we will examine descriptions and definitions of revolution. The aim of the chapter is, quite simply, to establish that there is a specie of change that is revolutionary. To do this, we will suggest a number of definitive features of revolutionary change such as deliberateness, speed, and profundity. Such change is markedly different from the change of society under normal conditions, usually designated progress, or even evolution.

Chapter four details the influences upon, and events in, the life of F. D. Maurice from a perspective, that, so far as I can discover, no one else has undertaken to do. The purpose is to ascertain his credentials to speak to the issues raised by revolution. We will argue that the ambivalence in Maurice concerning revolutionary issues, far from disqualifying him to speak, constitutes the model most needed of the Christian striving for responsibility in a revolutionary setting.

Chapter five is an exposition of Maurice's concept of the divine order. While he is firmly convinced of the givenness of the family, the nation and the universal society, he clearly leaves room for a variety of forms that these may take. So long as they serve to oppose the spirit of empire, so long as they operate on the principle of sacrifice, the actual forms of the family, nation or universal society
signify little. It must also be emphasized that Maurice's concept of the divine order does not include hierarchical considerations. There is, for example, no notion of subordinating the church to the state or vice-versa. Thus, the divine order is not the rich source for the conservatism charged to Maurice that one, at first glance, might suppose it to be. On the contrary, the divine order is the source of Maurice's reformist enthusiasms.

The following three chapters—six, seven, and eight—comprise attempts to apply Maurice's concept of the divine order, including especially the principle of sacrifice to the three problems associated with a revolutionary era. Chapter six examines the problem of violence. Violence cannot be avoided in a revolutionary situation. The problem is to justify violent actions in the service of the establishment or in the service of the revolution. Violence is an effective force only as it secures and does not undermine the ends desired. If the end desired is the kingdom of God (or, what is the same for Maurice, the divine order), then the only effective force is sacrifice. The principle of sacrifice is revealed in scripture and experience to be more than passive submission. Submission to God can mean resistance to man. Such resistance in a revolutionary situation is ultimately violent.

Chapter seven proceeds upon the assumption that revolutionary violence is not, therefore, precluded in an a priori manner for the responsible Christian. It raises the
question, "then for which cause shall I yield consent for acts of violence, for the cause of the establishment or for the cause of the revolution?" Maurice is helpful in answering this question because he distinguishes between those societies to which we must belong and those to which we might belong. The former are essential and constructive. The latter are subordinate and must be assayed for their value alongside family and nation and universal society. They can, in fact, become the partisan expressions of a spirit of empire. Such societies of choice are features of both establishment and revolution. The Christian's loyalty lies with the side that protects the home, that values nationhood and senses most keenly the universal bonds of human society. Elective affinities must never subordinate relations.

Chapter eight examines the implications of Maurice's notion of the divine order from a more contemporary perspective. Man, the individual, in his communities is the topic. The divine order founded upon given relations is the only protection for either the individual or the community. The fulfilling of relational obligations is accomplished through heeding one's divinely-informed conscience. For Maurice, therefore, the conscience mediates the revelation of individuality, of human societies and of God. It is the security against subjectivity in an otherwise ambivalent situation. The conscience is the last line of resistance against the spirit of empire and the prime guarantor of a truly humane
society in which I and Thou value the other as surpassing every lesser consideration.

Chapter nine will draw the evidence together and conclude the thesis that the Christian facing revolution enjoys no automatic exemption from participation among either of the belligerents—the establishment or the revolution. The Christian is charged to act responsibly. Responsibility implies ambivalence. Thus the ambivalence found in Maurice must be such as is common to every Christian confronting revolution. We cannot, perhaps, conclude that there is a divine order objectified as simply as family, nation and universal society. But there must be some vision of order. We might find the spirit of sacrifice to be a weak virtue. But what, then, is the effective force, the dynamism able to produce real change? We might be unwilling to concede the multifunction conscience of Maurice's theology. But we are left with a lingering assent to the view that the mark of a truly humane community is its capacity to tolerate the conscientious dissident.

Maurice, the "conservative," when brought to speak on the "radical" elements of revolution, reminds us that neither the conservative past nor the radical future is the theater of our Christian service. Freed from both of these, we are thrust into the present with a decision to make about the establishment and about the revolution. There is no relieving casuistry. Revolution is a Christian responsibility. The Christian, too, must find the unity of state and dynamic, the concourse of order with change.
CHAPTER 2

REVOLUTION AND THE CHURCH

Now that we have inherited a revolutionary world we are not quite sure what to make of it. That we have inherited a revolutionary world at least since the time of the French revolution would be ridiculous to dispute.

One hesitates to begin the catalog of evidences because he cannot end it, and one knows that after he lays down his pen and submits his writing for publication, many new events of revolt, rebellion, revolution—and certainly reaction and repression—will have begun to make his listing out of date.¹

Since to list the evidences of the revolutionary character of our world would be gratuitous, we will defer in favor of suggesting why we live in a revolutionary era.

The first suggestion bears a practical stamp. If success in a revolutionary context may be defined as the expelling of colonial powers and the achievement of national self-determination, then revolution has, on occasion, proven its effectiveness for achieving success. One may argue that neo-colonialism and malignant national governments (e.g. Uganda) mitigate success but even these factors cannot obliterate the efficacy of revolution for nations less free,

The second suggestion is more philosophical. It derives from the diffusion of Marxian thought among the intelligentsia of the nations. Far from shunning the less glorious aspects of revolution, Marxism insists that a titanic struggle is demanded to wrest the power from the bourgeoisie in the name of the proletariat. Its prognosis bears hope for the distraught and may imply vengeance for the oppressed. Revolution in a Marxian schema is not one option among others. It is the expression of the historically inevitable.

A more esoteric reason for the prominence of revolution in our world has to do with the balance of power among the major nations of the world. The prospect of a nuclear holocaust has rendered outbroken war a counsel of insanity. Actual war has been replaced with "cold war" and the arms race and saber-rattling. A fragile nuclear stalemate serves as a thoroughly negative motivation to divest our world of war. Intolerable conditions in such a static world become the focus of political innovators. And revolution becomes their stock-in-trade.

In the contest that divides the world today and in which so much is at stake, those will probably win who understand revolution, while those who still put their faith in power politics in the traditional sense of the term and, therefore, in war as the last resort of all foreign policy may well discover in a not too distant future that they have become masters in a rather useless and obsolete trade.\(^2\)

Assuming that Hannah Arendt is accurate in this forecast, and assuming that revolution will continue to exert a

pragmatic and philosophical appeal, the future will see revolution becoming more, and not less, thematic.

As such a pertinent category for interpreting the human situation, revolution properly demands the attention of Christian theology. However, the attempt of the church to set revolution in a theological context has not got very far. Christian nationals of any country will find the prospect of revolution bewildering and fraught with peril for the Christian witness he is constrained to bear. In the moment of his need for guidance, however, he will look in vain to the church, for, as J. M. Lochman bewails:

There is no authoritative theological literature in this field at all. The way in which the theme is handled is "stepmotherly," as if it were an unwanted illegitimate child who presents a menace to the legitimate children (the traditional Christian orders of the West). . . . The conservative view of the theme has therefore helped to "daemonize" the phenomenon of "revolution" rather than to cast light on the concept and challenge. 3

The paucity of the conceptual response in theology to the phenomenon of revolution has spawned predictably ambiguous responses to the demand for Christian action. Richard Shaull's judgement is that

In the past, the Christian churches have not done a very creative job of responding to the challenge of revolution. In some instances, they have been among the main bulwarks of the old order; in others, they have simply stood on the sidelines and watched the struggle. Usually, some decades after the success of a revolution, the churches have reluctantly entered into

dialog or established a modus vivendi with the revolutionaries.\textsuperscript{4}

Jacques Ellul somewhat unwittingly demonstrates the substance of the complaint of Lochman and Shaull. In his book \textit{Violence}, he writes:

From all quarters nowadays we are told that the "theology of revolution" is one of the most remarkable developments in modern theological thought and that, thanks to it, we shall get rid of the conformism that has long marked the churches. Not so. At most, this theology represents a return to traditional currents of thought. I do not disparage it, but I should like to see its partisans moderate their enthusiasm.\textsuperscript{5}

The fact is, however, that while Ellul cites examples of revolutionary enthusiasm from out of the broader context of church history, he does not show that revolutionary sympathy has ever been discoverable within the established churches, that is, those churches which have worked out a successful modus vivendi with the prevailing political order. Every example he cites\textsuperscript{6} was considered to be a threat not only to the political status quo, but to the ecclesiastical status quo as well.

The revolutionary stance of these movements was worked out, says Ellul, "primarily by 'political' men."


\textsuperscript{6}They include Anchorites, Joachimites (Illuminati), Thomas Müntzer, Jan of Leyden, Boucher, Cromwell and the Levellers (John Lilburne).
Faith and theology had small part in it and in any case were not the point of departure, the deep motivators. Rather, Christianity served as the justification, the legitimization of this position, as a complementary argument. What interested these people was political or social action. They held that faith or theological arguments might be means, instruments, but never decisive factors. And that such was the case is proved by the fact that no biblical or theological reasoning, no appeal to the community of the faith, ever induced them to change their position.  

So, in fact, Ellul is confessing that faith and theology have never come to terms with revolution. And one is left with the question, what appeal to biblical or theological reason or to the community of faith is possible when all such arguments are preempted to support the prerogatives of the establishment? How can one justify by such appeal any revolutionary action when the decision has already been taken that violence used by the establishment, even unjustly, is force; whereas violence used by its enemies, no matter how justified, is simply violence? This is a fine example of the medieval reasoning that still drives the comfortable church. And it gives substance to the complaint voiced by Lochman and Shaull.

Perhaps the only credible exception (and it is a limited one) to the complaint are the writings of Augustine and the subsequent development of the "just war" theory. Augustine, writing amidst the cataclysmic events that would mark the end of the Roman Empire, attempted to come to terms with war from a Christian perspective. "Peace should be the object of your

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desire; war should be waged only as a necessity, and waged only that God may by it deliver men from the necessity and preserve them in peace." Here is perhaps the only ecclesiastical model for the Christian consideration of circumstances similar to revolutionary ones. But war can differ from revolution as a congress differs from a cabal.

As has been suggested by Ellul, the revolutionary character of the apocalyptic movements of the Middle Ages appears at first glance clearly to bridge the gap between revolution and church. In fact, the repudiation of these movements on the part of the Medieval church serves better to vindicate Lochman and Shaull. Revolutionary sympathies are consistently more frequent in the sect than in the church.⁸

In fact, the church has largely formed its conceptual approach to revolution in the forge of its opposition to the revolutionary tendencies of some of its constituents. The result, according to Johannes Verkuyl, has been not a theology of revolution (which Verkuyl euphemizes with the presumably more acceptably "Christian" word "transformation") but a theology of restoration. In other words, according to Verkuyl, the best that the church has been able to do amounts to a theology of liberal reformism. As a consequence, Christianity is quickly (perhaps too quickly) identified as a theology of counter- or anti-revolution and forfeits credibility with the restive oppressed.

In the Roman Catholic church the model of restoration theology is natural law. Verkuyl says:

Roman Catholic theology has through the centuries defended the existing orders, and sought somehow to preserve intact the bond between throne and altar. . . . Catholic theologians are still trying to find their way along the path of natural law and natural theology.  

Verkuyl faults Protestantism for relying too heavily upon Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms and the reformed notion of created orders. The effect of each of these has been counter-revolutionary and protective of the establishment. Attempts to move along these well-established lines to a more empathic position has met with little success.

Finally, the church has responded to the problem of revolution with a pietistic answer that avoids consideration of the needs of the "body and brains" and concentrates on saving the soul. Verkuyl mentions that:

New Christian intellectuals in developing countries often complain that the Western missionary is too pietistic. . . . Pietism, unconsciously for the most part, makes a private agreement with the powers of the world: "We will concentrate on the hereafter and the personal, and you may occupy the arena of political and social affairs." The powers promise in return: "We will support you as long as you limit yourself to the arena of the private spiritual life of individuals."  

Verkuyl's assessment suggests that what is needed is a transformation in the approach which the church takes toward the political and social upheavals of our day. Before it

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will be able to speak with relevance to the revolutionary situations of our world, the church must first overcome its own tendency to conservatism.

This task will not be done easily. Perhaps it ought not to be done at all. The identification of the vested interest of the church with the vested interests of the establishment may serve to caricature. It does not always accurately reflect the bases of the ecclesiastical tendency to conservatism. Other more legitimate reasons for the conservatism of the church can also be offered.

For example, the church is conservative because it is understandably protective of an environment that yields success for the church in its mission to encourage conversion. "The fact that conversion had been experienced within a certain social framework served to sanctify that framework as 'the' framework within which conversions were possible."\(^1\)

Furthermore, the church is conservative because among the immediate fruits of conversion is an improvement in the primary social movements of the converts. The very improvement betrays a wider vision of social betterment. Instead of pursuing social change on a wider scale, the church tends to turn inward. It maintains work in the interest of social improvement within the perimeters of its immediate influence

only, that is, upon its own constituents. Revolution demands a wider vision.\textsuperscript{12}

With reference to revolution especially, the church is conservative because, as Gabriel Bowe puts it, the church "has a long memory."\textsuperscript{13} Verkuyl makes the content of that memory explicit:

Bloody revolutions are usually mad adventures that lead to anarchy and sadistic aggressiveness. They exchange one group of scoundrels for another group of scoundrels. Instead of introducing a new era of justice, they give birth to anarchy. They can function as an alibi for sheer lust, murder, and brutal, generalized inhumanity. Despising the route of patient progress toward necessary reforms, men can be so intoxicated by the passion of revolution that they destroy what chances there are of real social achievement.\textsuperscript{14}

With these reasons as samples of a larger rationale that can be marshalled to defend the conservatism of the church it becomes apparent that "vested interests" are hardly adequate to explain all the facts, especially when those vested interests are gratuitously identified with those of the political and economic establishment. The church cannot divest itself of conservatism at a trice. Even to scrutinize the bases of ecclesiastical conservatism is too excruciating for some members of the church.

When that conservatism has political overtones it is even more troublesome. For to separate one's politics from

\textsuperscript{12}Castro, \textit{loc. cit.}


\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Op. cit.}, p. 34.
the purview of one's religion is a difficult feat. Both emerge from a world view more or less consistent. Perhaps this is especially true in the United States where, says Paul Ramsey,

. . . conservative and liberal religious opinion is the same thing as conservative and liberal secular opinion—with a sharper edge. In short, the polarization of public debate on most issues is simply aided and abetted by the polarization of the religious forces.\(^{15}\)

Consequently, the quest for a common Christian appraisal of the church's stance in a changing world is frustrated by the predispositions of the very groups, whether right or left, that are required for fruitful dialogue.

Few would really want a major effort to be put forward to see whether there are not better ways to be or try to be the church speaking. That might threaten some cherished particular policy we most urgently want to be sure is spoken to the church and to the world. So we say that these others have "dropped out of the dialogue."\(^{16}\)

In light of a defensible conservatism of the church and an explicable reticence on the part of its members, the production of Lochman's aim of an ecumenical theology of revolution seems unlikely at best. Yet modern experience in Russia and Red China and secular opinion akin to Hannah Arendt's conspire to warn the church that she will ignore the phenomenon of revolution at the peril of her continued relevance. So the church is caught between guilty silence and uncertain speech. Those who presume to speak about


\(^{16}\) Ibid.
revolution for the church do so with such a diversity of opinion that the problem is exacerbated rather than settled.

That diversity may be quickly discovered and extensively illustrated. From the nineteenth century, heavily influenced by the thought of created orders, come clearly anti-revolutionary sentiments. Lochman cites typical conclusions.

To Julius Stahl revolution was simply "the rule of sin" and "the opposite pole" to Christianity. And in the view of Fr. Vilmar the Church is the last stronghold of legality and of divinely-appointed authority, it is therefore anti-revolution incarnate and will victoriously outlive democracy and despotism, with which it has nothing to do. 17

This same appraisal of revolution is available today in German Lutheranism. Otto Dibelius responded to the Geneva Conference of 1966 by juxtaposing in opposition the "church's spiritual life" and revolution.

May God preserve us from a "theology of revolution" as advocated in Geneva. During the twentieth century the clearance-sale of the church's spiritual life has gone so far that this final suggestion is really not necessary. 18

No doubt Dibelius speaks here for a large number of Christians. Lochman, on the other hand, complains about Dibelius' "almost consistently maintaining the view of the nineteenth century"—in other words, the principle of order in opposition to the principle of revolution. 19

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17 Lochman, op. cit., n. 182.

18 Ibid.

19 In the view of this writer, this is a faulty dichotomy. The "principle of order" is surely distinct from a particular doctrine of orders. This thesis depends upon and demonstrates the assumption that some notion of order is as
But Dibelius is not alone. Lochman also mentions W. Trillhaas, who contends that revolution has come to mean "the release of egoism, the falsification of truth, the breakdown of all respect; the lowest come up on top and the upper classes (the nobility) are forced down."20

What Lochman complains of in German pietism is duplicated in American evangelicalism. In consecutive issues Christianity Today carries two articles equally explicit in the condemnation of revolution as anti-Christian.

Joel H. Nederhood in an article entitled "Christians and Revolution" argues that the "revolutionary model" is incompatible with the Christian faith. It is closely allied with the spirit of atheism. It produces totalitarianism and has had a devastating effect upon Western culture allowing whim and fantasy of the Andy Warhol type to dominate the spirit of the arts. Consequently, while the Christian is not disinterested in promoting needed change— and ought himself to be at work to produce that change— the Christian theory of change "should include a repudiation of the spirit of revolution on the grounds that the revolutionary posture is incompatible with biblical Christianity."21

Nederhood, the radio voice for the Christian Reformed Church, recommends the "Christian alternative" as it is essential to revolution as to conservatism. The real dichotomy is between the principles of justice and order.

20 Ibid.
expressed and intended in the New Testament phrase "new creation." Even the radical change therein conveyed ought not to be referred to as revolution, according to him.

It would be a mistake to call the Christian alternatives simply a Christian revolution, for the term revolution is not really usable for Christians anymore, nor does it do the Christian vision justice. Christians can speak of a new order and a new life through the operation of Christ's Spirit. These possibilities suggest that we may expect radical renewal of both social and individual life through Christ. And those who understand the dynamic of this majestic Christian possibility will not easily use revolutionary terminology to describe their goals. The possibilities for change comprehended in the concept "new life in Christ" are in fact anti-revolutionary.22

A similar position is taken in the other article by Vernon C. Grounds, who is the president of the Conservative Baptist Theological Seminary in Denver, Colorado. Once again, social transformation is made to depend upon an individualistic redemption. Although Grounds is not sensitized to the word "revolution" to describe the radical transformation effected by Christian conversion and its side effects, understood politically and socially it has no real place in a Christian context.

In God's Name, the God of peace and order who ordains government as the antidote against anarchy, the Church must keep enunciating the principle asserted by Jesus Christ, "They who take the sword will perish by the sword." It must declare that, while human society is in crying need

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22Ibid. One cannot help but think however, of the work of another evangelical, Bill Bright, of the Campus Crusade for Christ. One of his books speaks of the "new life" Nederhood is describing with the bold title Revolution Now!
of reform, a better world of liberty and equality and fraternity cannot be achieved through bombs and bullets, sabotage and guerrilla warfare. All these tactics can do is destroy. The Church must tell the radicals on the left that revolution has always been a brutal, bloody, barbaric business; revolution has always been a reign of terror that has its end in the rise of a dictatorship like that of Joseph Stalin, a totalitarianism far worse than the society that has been smashed. The Church must preach in season and out of season that unless individuals are radically changed by the sin-forgiving grace of God, there is no possibility of any radical change in institutions.23

Obviously, the notion that the gospel is counter-revolutionary or anti-revolutionary is not shared by all Christians. Even where revolutionary sympathies are greater, however, there is no uniformity of opinion. John Carey, writing in the Anglican Theological Review, distinguishes between what he calls hard and soft theologies of revolution. What he in fact accomplishes, is to show that much which passes for a theology of revolution is so only to a degree. There is still suspicion of the classical idea of revolution with its overtones of violence and disruption and its more recent association with Marxist doctrines of historical inevitability and economism. Carey's summarization of the views of the hard theologians of revolution suggests that they are not, after all, that hard.

Some would allow that given the diversity of contexts, a revolutionary political stance is not the only valid response to the Gospel in our day, and certainly their Christian orientation keeps them from assuming that every

movement for political revolution is worthy of Christian endorsement.24

Carey's conclusion is reaffirmed in an article which appeared in Theology Today with the title, "How Revolutionary is Revolutionary Theology?" The author, Robert Banks, examines the positions of a number of Christian writers on revolution and concludes that only one, Neil Middleton, "is a genuine prophet of revolution."25 In other words, Banks, using Carey's designations, would say that all the rest propound a soft theology of revolution.

Banks, more than Carey, fails to see that the theology of revolution is still tentative and basically dialogical. He gives the impression that any theology of revolution worthy of the name must be, when fully articulated, identical with a philosophy or program of revolution. In other words, theology must do all the moving and adaptation. When theology rightly resists, Banks concludes that it is "for the most part, not revolutionary at all."26

Nevertheless, these articles are useful because they suggest the diversity of theological viewpoints sympathetic to the phenomenon of revolution. Furthermore, they remind one of a fact, almost unique in the history of the church. That is, the church is spending serious thought to gain a

26 Ibid.
sympathetic understanding of revolution at last. It would be most unlikely that a multiplicity of voices should speak as one, especially about a subject so recently encountered with fervent interest.

Among those voices, that of Richard Shaull speaks with an authority uniting academic enterprise with experience as a missionary to a developing nation (Brazil). Shaull recognizes social revolution as the primary fact with which we have to do in our time. He is convinced that revolutionary potential is a worldwide phenomenon and that its only future is to augment. The church betrays itself when it denies the revolutionary struggle because

... it will be on the frontiers of revolution that many of the major issues of humanization and dehumanization will be decided in our modern world; it will be on these frontiers that those most concerned for the well-being and for the future of man will find themselves involved. ... If we hope to preserve the most important elements of our cultural, moral and religious heritage and to contribute to the shaping of the future, we cannot remain outside the revolutionary struggle or withdraw from it. The path of responsibility is the one that passes through it toward whatever may lie ahead.27

On the face of things, it appears that only Marxism has made an "attempt to understand revolution as essential to the creation of a more stable and just society." However, as small groups of Christians become involved in revolutionary struggles, they discover in the Christian heritage resources for thought and action of which they were not

previously aware." What they are discovering is a new perspective upon both the Bible and revolution. For, says Shaull, "If we look at our history in the light of biblical history, we may feel quite at home in the midst of revolution."\(^{28}\)

Shaull does not identify the Christian position with that of the revolution. But he does assert that ordinary categories of Christian doctrine are compatible with revolutionary philosophy and action.\(^{29}\) Thus, for Shaull, in the midst of the revolution Christian theology belongs. It recognizes that change as well as stability are ruled over by God. Divine sovereignty guarantees that God works through the revolutionary efforts of men to accomplish his own purposes. Indeed, it is only God's working in these efforts that accounts for any improvement from them at all.

The God who is tearing down old structures in order to create the conditions for a more human existence is himself in the midst of the struggle. It is his presence in the world and his pressure upon those structures which stand in his way that constitute the dynamics of this process. God has taken human form in the concreteness of historical life and has called us to follow this path if we are to be the salt of the earth and the light of the world (Matthew 5:13-14). In this context, the Christian is called to be fully involved in the revolution as it develops. It is only at its center that we can perceive what God is doing, understand how the struggle

\(^{28}\)Ibid.

\(^{29}\)These categories include: 1, the fact that God is both the Creator and Ruler of all spheres of nature and of society; 2, the revolutionary character of biblical messianism; and 3, the dynamic historical character of God's action. (Ibid., pp. 31-33).
for humanization is being defined and serve as agents of reconciliation. 30

From within the revolution the primary role of the church is that of a servant-critic demythologizing the establishment in its intransigence and revolution in its demonic excesses. The church assumes its position alongside St. Augustine. "As Augustine interpreted history in the light of God's sovereignty over an order of causes, so the Christian understands events in a revolutionary situation." The Christian does not deny or discount the real liberation effected through revolution. He does, however, attribute the dynamics of liberation to the work of God and not to the determination of some inevitable law of history. 31

If one could say that Shaull's focus is upon providing theological perspective for revolution, then it would probably be true that Richard Neuhaus focuses upon the revolution itself. Neuhaus clearly finds in favor of revolution as a possible Christian imperative. His essay, "The Thorough Revolutionary" 32 seems to assume that there is no reason essential to the gospel which precludes the Christian from actively seeking revolution. What makes Neuhaus's essay identifiably Christian is the knowledge that the author is

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30 Ibid., p. 37
31 Ibid., p. 38.
a Lutheran pastor, and the attempt of the author to set revolution into the context of the "just war." 33

Neuhaus directs his essay to those whom he calls the members of the "movement." He admits that the movement is amorphous but contends that its members can be identified by their affinity with clusters of opinions about four major issues: 1) the repressive use of American power in world affairs; 2) the bankruptcy of the American political system at home; 3) the hopelessness of the plight of the American black man under prevailing conditions; and 4) appropriate strategies for effecting change. In spite of variations, members of the "movement" solidify their unity about these issues to contrast themselves with the liberal establishments. Thus, Neuhaus can identify himself with the "we" of the "movement" when he verbalizes its revolutionary posture,

"We" are for revolution. A revolution of consciousness, no doubt. A cultural revolution, certainly. A non-violent revolution, perhaps. An armed overthrow of the existing order, it may be necessary. Revolution for the hell of it or revolution for a new world, but revolution, yes. 34

Lest one interpret these strong words as carte blanche for the making of revolution the balance must be quickly adjusted with Neuhaus's insistence upon evaluating the revolution with the same criteria as are used to

33 Neuhaus has served, for several years, a predominantly black and Spanish parish in the Williamsburg Bedford-Stuyvesant sections of Brooklyn.

34 Berger and Neuhaus, op. cit., p. 127.
evaluate the "just war." He is critical of "some enthusiasts presently auditioning for the revolution (who) talk about the 'amorality' of the revolution, or about 'revolutionary ethics' or about 'the ethical reversal' required for revolutionary action." Neuhaus makes it clear in the ensuing discussion that revolution is not amoral, but comes under the same ethical scrutiny as war. His words of encouragement and sympathy with the revolution are explicitly directed only to those who are willing to acknowledge this fact, and to consider accordingly.

I have written for such men as are prepared to consider a just revolution legitimately declared and in response to real injury, as a last resort and prosecuted with good intention, in which the damage incurred is not greater than the injury suffered, employing moral means and with a reasonable hope for success.

The sympathy of Neuhaus toward revolution is shared by Gonzalo Castillo-Cardenas of Colombia. Lochman records that at the Geneva Conference the division about the use of revolutionary force, i.e., violence, sometimes approximated the division between the developing and the advanced nations. The basis for the position of the developing nations was set in a Christian context by Castillo-Cardenas. According to Lochman:

He said that if Christians are coming more and more to realise that the present order is "an affront to God because it is an affront to man" . . . and when they realise how many forms of force are employed in order to protect this

35 Ibid., p. 162.
36 Ibid., p. 236.
unjust order against the under-privileged and oppressed, the poor and the weak, then (if they really love their neighbour) they cannot content themselves with "certain isolated reforms equivalent to social anesthesia." What is required is "to take power away from the privileged minorities and give it to the poor majorities." 37

The conclusion drawn by Castillo-Cardenas is logical, if radical. "Therefore, revolution is not only permitted, but is obligatory for those Christians who see it as the only effective way of fulfilling love to one's neighbour." 38

Thus, one may define the extremes of the continuum of theological appraisals of revolution and at the same time give some suggestion of the more moderate positions in between. What we have demonstrated in these few pages is the paucity of "authoritative literature in the field." Upon apparently thoroughly Christian grounds one may either prescribe or proscribe revolution. Is revolution the betrayal or the expression of Christian faith?

The literature surveyed in these pages indicates that the answer to that question is, of necessity, as complex as it is varied. At either end of the spectrum, problems emerge for the Christian confronted with the prospect of involvement in revolution. He may ignore the problems at one end or the other in favor of his own opinion, but he does so at the peril of sacrificing either the relevance of the Christian faith or the relevance of the human situation.

37 Lochman, op. cit., p. 177.
38 Ibid.
The research herein presented will establish that any decision about revolution based upon Christian presuppositions may issue in either revolutionary or counter-revolutionary sympathies when that decision is taken \textit{vis-a-vis} an actual situation with revolutionary potential. In negative terms, judgments about the Christian validity of "revolution" \textit{in abstracto} are illegitimately drawn. If the Christian faith has any relevance for the human social situation, it does for revolution.

The thesis to be defended, then, is that revolutionary participation on the part of the Christian is decided contextually. Revolution might or might not be legitimate for the Christian. Christian theology and revolutionary philosophy, inasmuch as either can be isolated and identified, have not been the same and may collide. But that is not an adequate rationale to preclude automatically the alignment of Christian aims with those of a revolutionary movement. The decision depends upon the responsible assessment of the issues of force, establishment and community as they become problematic within the context of a particular revolution.

These three issues are major, interlocking and inevitable. They are able to subsume every conflict of the Christian conscience in a revolutionary situation. Thus, they guarantee that the ethical position of the conscientious Christian in a revolutionary situation is not immunity, but responsibility.

The examination of these three issues is the "work"
to come. But first one needs to understand what is meant by revolution and what credentials F. D. Maurice brings to his speaking "for the church" about revolution.
CHAPTER 3

WHAT IS REVOLUTION?

Ironically, "revolution" is one of the most stable facts with which we have to do. Where nationalistic interests are so intricately balanced and intervention of "foreign powers" on one side or the other is predictable (because inevitable), "all revolution is now, in a way never before so, world revolution."\(^1\)

The thematic impact of revolution upon the contemporary world is easily demonstrated: One hears of a sexual revolution or of a revolution in education. Wherever there is a novelty in any degree, there seems to arise the temptation to attach the appellative "revolution." Garbled meaning is the product. Thus, we assimilate uncritically the words of the newscaster who reports the establishment of a "revolutionary government" in Mozambique and follows his report with a commercial declaiming the remarkable cleansing powers of a "revolutionary" soap powder, complete with secret (not to say "clandestine") ingredients.

Most of the confusion surrounding the concept of revolution stems from the notion which constitutes its tap root,

\(^1\)Krishan Kumar, Revolution: The Theory and Practice of a European Idea (Brooklyn Heights, N.Y.: Beekman, 1971), p. 82.
i.e., change. Whatever else revolution means—however it might be further qualified—the primordial meaning of revolution is change. Yet change on its own is absurdly insufficient to define revolution. Not every change is revolutionary. Change which is revolutionary is deliberate, accelerated and fundamental change pursued by means of unusual force with human happiness as its objective.

This description of revolutionary change employs a number of qualifiers which, by themselves, are inadequate to distinguish revolutionary change. Only when these qualifiers are themselves explicated and their meanings conjoined will this definition of revolutionary change become functional. With that purpose in view, let us examine each qualifying term on its own.

First, revolutionary change is deliberate change. Not always has this been understood to be the case. Historically speaking, the deliberate element in revolutionary change is a novel idea. Krishan Kumar asserts that it was only in the eighteenth century, in the course of the French Revolution, that the word acquired its modern meaning. It was only then that "revolution" ceased to be a phenomenon of the natural or divine order, made by non-human, elemental forces, and became part of a man-made, conscious purpose to create a new order based upon reason and freedom.²

The history of the use of the term "revolution" can illustrate the importance of the deliberate element demanded

²Ibid., p. 29.
by our description. Kumar cites Rosenstock-Huessey, who discovers a threefold usage of the word "revolution" in history.

The earliest phase and the lengthiest (extending from classical antiquity to the French Revolution) Rosenstock-Huessey calls the naturalistic phase. Revolution is used as it applies to astronomy. In politics this implies an objective, elemental, non-human force. Revolution is subsumed as an alternative description of the cycle of history.3

Stasis (civil disturbance) in the Greek city states was inoperable to effect change because change was inconceivable. Although sometimes translated "revolution" its opposite is the real meaning.4 Revolution in the city state was, in fact, a periodic upheaval prompted by entrenched and established factions seeking to wrest political control with its attendant power. No deliberation of any more creative end than the seizure of power characterized revolution in classical antiquity for none was conceived as possible. Revolution had little to do with revising

3Ibid., p. 35.

4There is an irony in the use of the word stasis to speak of revolution that approximates an historical Freudian slip. Derived from the verb histeimi, "I stand," stasis literally means "a standing" or "a state." On the face of things, therefore, there is no connection whatever with the dynamism of revolution. But when political revolution is understood naturalistically, on the astronomical model, then its function is to complete the cycle of political change and refound the state.
the constitutional basis of power and more to do with whose hands wielded it.\footnote{Ibid., p. 30ff. On the understanding of stasis in Aristotle, see W. L. Newman. The more basic terminology is \textit{metabolei politeiais} and refers to any change in constitution, including changes only in part or degree. It also refers to changes in who holds power, even when such change is not accompanied by stasis, "civil disturbance." For this reason, "our word 'revolution' does not exactly correspond to stasis or \textit{metabolei politeiais}." The Politics of Aristotle, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1887-1902), Vol. I, p. 522.}

The naturalistic understanding of revolution prevailed much later, too. In England, when "Clarendon and the monarchists designated the Restoration of 1660 a 'revolution' they used the word in its older sense of the turning of a wheel or a cycle."\footnote{Kumar, p. 17.}

The Whigs, in 1688, used the word in precisely the same sense, but this time to expel a king, declaring that he had broken the social contract by flouting the laws. In other words, revolution implied the according with a cycle, not the attempt to modify or ignore the cycle. Whether the word was used to justify the expelling of a king or his ascendance, it was taken in the sense of the turning of a wheel or cycle. In fact, it was used with the express purpose of denying that any novel precedent was being set.\footnote{Ibid., p. 17.}

The second stage delineated by Rosenstock-Huessy comprises the reaction to such an understanding of revolution. He calls it the "romantic phase." Born in renaissance
optimism, this phase asserts man's freedom to choose his own destiny against the more deterministic features of the naturalistic phase. Revolution becomes the expression of man's subjectivity as he strikes out upon the trail of history with the vision of himself as master. This phase is best illustrated by the era of the French Revolution and its hopes, grounded as they were upon the twin assertions of reason and freedom.

The third phase Rosenstock-Huesssey calls the realist phase. Under the influence of Marxism, revolution comes to be understood through a dialectical synthesis of the two preceding phases. Naturalism was preserved in the insistence that revolutions are not simply the products of human will, but depend upon objective conditions which make society ripe for revolution. Lenin himself recognized this. Only a matter of weeks before the February revolution, while playing the role of elder prophet to a young audience in Switzerland he reflected that "we," the old, may not live to see the decisive battles of the coming revolution. But romanticism also was preserved in this realist view. For the doctrine prevails that nevertheless, revolution is a human, not a superhuman, phenomenon, and objective conditions are not sufficient on their own to bring about revolution.

The debate about whether revolutions are spontaneous or caused is set in motion by the estimation of the significance of the element of deliberateness integral to the definition of revolution. Brinton shows that the side one
takes in the debate may be determined less by objective facts than by one's bias for or against the revolution.\textsuperscript{8} His conclusion, as might therefore be expected, accords with the realist phase of understanding revolution. While certain objective conditions are indispensable, revolution occurs only when there is a deliberate attempt to capitalize upon such conditions with a view toward political change. In other words, change that occurs upon purely naturalistic lines is some other form of change. It may be evolution. It cannot be revolution.

The second qualifier in our definition of revolution is the word "accelerated." This term, like the former one, serves to distinguish revolutionary from evolutionary change. If we use a dialectical model the point of this qualifier becomes obvious. Change inevitably occurs as thesis and antithesis move toward synthesis. This we might call process, or even evolutionary change. It is change that is less than extraordinary either for its velocity or for its effects upon fundamental elements. Revolutionary change occurs at the nexus between the thesis and the antithesis. Agitation compounds as the point of synthesis nears. Demands for change increase, and the fulfillment of those demands looms suddenly as unavoidable. The heretofore intransigent elite who hold the reins of power set about to make changes which they evaluate as adequate and done in good

faith. "Nothing can be more erroneous than the picture of the old regime as an unregenerate tyranny, sweeping to its end in a climax of despotic indifference to the clamor of its abused subjects."^ The potential to ease the crisis is mitigated by the appearance of incipient weakness^ and the tacit admission of inefficiency inferred by the opponents of the government from attempts at reform.

This tendency of change to accelerate as movement toward the nexus of synthesis progresses provides the theoretical basis for Alexis deTocqueville's practical observation that the most dangerous moment for the ancien regime is the moment it sets about reform.^11

The implication in Tocqueville's statement is that revolution is ignited by an unbearably low standard of living, which the government proceeds to set aright. Kumar suggests that Tocqueville be amended.

He is basically saying that men do not make radically new and sweeping demands, however miserable their conditions of life, until these conditions change in some significant way. The point is, those conditions do not have to change for the better, as he assumed; they may change for the worse, and yet still have the effect of precipitating radical demands. What matters is that something should happen to shake men out of the habitual pattern of action, their traditional ways of life with its traditional level of expectations.12

^Ibid., p. 39.

^Infra, p. 42.


That "something" which happens and shakes men out of their traditional ways of life Chalmers Johnson calls an "accelerator." In his analysis of the causes of revolution, the accelerator is the third and final element.\(^3\) This "accelerator" Johnson defines as "particularly intense sources of dysfunction that make their effects felt suddenly and powerfully and that typically constitute the final aggregate in a growing burden of dysfunctional conditions."\(^4\)

An important analysis of the source of dysfunction is offered by James C. Davies. Like Kumar, Davies sees revolution growing out of a change for the worse, but only after a period of change for the better.

Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. The all-important effect on the minds of people in a particular society is to produce, during the former period, an expectation of continued ability to satisfy needs—which continue to rise—and, during the latter, a mental state of anxiety and frustration when manifest reality breaks away from anticipated reality. The actual state of socio-economic development is less significant than the expectation that past progress, now blocked, can and must continue in the future.\(^5\)

Davies shows that the change for the better is essential

\(^3\) The first two are 1: social dysfunction, and 2: the intransigence of the elite.

\(^4\) Revolution and the Social System (Published by the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, 1964), p. 12.

to the revolutionary mentality inasmuch as survival needs will preclude interest in political and social abrasions.

... Revolutions ordinarily do not occur when a society is generally impoverished—when, as deTocqueville put it, evils that seem inevitable are patiently endured. They are endured in the extreme case because the physical and mental energies of people are totally employed in the process of merely staying alive.\(^{16}\)

Johnson's description of the Millenarian rebellion makes it clear that, unlike Tocqueville and Davies, he does not think of the accelerator as deprivation. Such a rebellion, distinguished by its peculiar ideology, depends upon the appearance of a "Messiah." While there might be widespread discontent the sources of social dysfunction might also be obscure and so, in themselves, inadequate to touch off the flames of rebellion. What is required is the positive impulse of a prophet conjuring for the disenchanted a vision of the millenium.

The point is that accelerated change may be negatively or positively motivated. "... What provokes a group to attack a government is not simply deprivation or misery, but 'an intolerable gap between what people want and what they get',"\(^{17}\) And one cannot begin to speak properly of revolution until change accelerates.

Whether this acceleration is planned or spontaneous is a subject of debate.\(^{18}\) Less debatable is the uniform

\(^{16}\)Loc. cit.
\(^{17}\)James C. Davies, loc. cit.
\(^{18}\)Brinton, op.cit., p. 40.
appearance of one factor that coincides historically with the acceleration of change. Plato speaks of it in the eighth book of the Republic. "Is it not a simple fact that in any form of government, revolution always starts from the outbreak of internal dissension in the ruling class?" Louis Namier enlarges the theme.

Discontent with government there will always be; still, even when grievous and well-founded, it seldom engenders revolution till the moral bases of government have rotted away: the feeling of community between the masses and their rulers, and in the rulers a consciousness of their right and capacity to rule.19

The intent of "moral" has less to do with "ethical" than with "morale." Brinton elucidates this.

When numerous and influential members of such a class begin to believe that they hold power unjustly, or that all men are brothers, equal in the eyes of eternal justice, or that the beliefs they were brought up on are silly, or that "after us the deluge," they are not likely to resist successfully any serious attacks on their social, economic and political position.20

Thus emerges, according to Louis Gottschalk

"... the last and the most important of the ... causes of the revolution--the weakness of the conservative forces. This is the necessary immediate cause of revolution. Despite the universal demand for revolutionary change, despite intense hopefulness of success, unless those who wish to maintain the status quo are so weak that they cannot maintain themselves, there is little likelihood of a successful revolution.21

Accelerated change, then, is change that proceeds

19Kumar, op. cit., p. 50.

20Brinton, op. cit., p. 52.

pace motivated by a gap between expectation and fulfillment and encouraged by apparent decadence in the ruling structure.

The third qualifier in our definition of revolution is the word "fundamental." With this qualifier functioning, the contemporary understanding of revolution separates itself again from revolution as it would have been understood in naturalistic or romantic contexts. Revolution understood as fundamental change implies that wherever its influence is felt, the sanctions for society as formerly structured are challenged and changed. Whether the structures themselves are changed is not so important as that the means of legitimating those structures are changed. In the terminology of Chalmers Johnson, revolution means the destruction of one "integrative myth" and its eventual replacement by another. About this we will have more to say. The point to be made here is that revolution understood in contemporary terms produces more than a handing over of the reins of power, or even a change of social structures. Revolution is marked by a rethinking and a refounding of community.

Refounding community, (it goes without saying), is not accomplished with a snap of the fingers.

"Community" is a concept of a different order from those of "government" and "regime"; and a sense of community never comes into being at a given instant, . . . The old order, including the old integrative myth, collapses everywhere at once. But it is not strictly necessary to our definition to insist that a new sense of community emerges at once.22

22C. Johnson, op. cit., p. 46.
"In fact," Johnson says, "it is doubtful that there ever was a community-changing revolution." By this he means that revolution cannot destroy all sense of community and survive. Revolution re-founds the community on bases fundamentally different from the former foundations. Thus, revolution might emphasize national consciousness, or, as in Marxism, class consciousness. The sense of community is in no wise completely destroyed. Only the sanctions for its existence are redefined and its integrative myth replaced, or reinterpreted (e.g., Holy Russia or the Third Reich).

"Fundamental change" is more specifically defined by Hannah Arendt. For her it means the "constitution of freedom." Accordingly, revolution has as its aim freedom, while rebellion more properly pursues the liberation from oppression. The discovery of the capacity for humans to constitute freedom was the great discovery of the eighteenth century revolutions. The reclamation of civil rights paled into relative insignificance as the new experience of creating something new dawned anew upon European man with a corona of implications. Specifically, that "something new" was a new body politic which afforded apparently greater guarantee for the constitution of freedom. This, according to Arendt, is revolution properly so-called. "Only where this pathos of novelty is present and where novelty is connected with the idea of freedom are we entitled to speak of revolution."24

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23 Ibid.
Thus, not every political change or outbreak of civil violence is revolutionary.

Only where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is used to constitute an altogether different form of government, to bring about the formation of a new body politic, where the liberation from oppression aims at least at the constitution of freedom can we speak of revolution.25

The constituting of freedom, therefore, is descriptive of a truly revolutionary epoch and implies, of necessity fundamental change. As was mentioned, Chalmers Johnson refers to the change as affecting the "integrative myth" of a society. Hannah Arendt alludes to similar quasi-religious sanctions by citing Rousseau as a typical representative of an inevitable dilemma for the constitutors of freedom. "The great problem in politics, which I compare to the problem of squaring the circle in geometry ... (is): how to find a form of government which puts the law above man."26 In France, the solution was to cease talk about the transcendent, divine right of kings and to begin, instead, to speak of the equally transcendent "general will." The shift was not subtle. It was, however, fundamental. The integrative myth had undergone fundamental change.

Sigmund Neumann suggests that such fundamental change may sweep through political organization, social structure, economic property control or the predominant myth of social

25Ibid., p. 28.
26Ibid., p. 184.
order. The requisite identifier of revolution remains: the change must be fundamental.

The next qualifier in the definition of revolution delimits the effective cause of revolutionary change. Change that is truly revolutionary must be pursued by means of "unusual force." The thrust of this qualifier, like that of "deliberate" and accelerated," is partly to distinguish revolutionary change from evolutionary change. But it accomplishes more than just this distinction.

Ordinarily the term "violence" is automatically employed to describe revolutionary activity. Violence, however, as the descriptive term, suffers from one serious limitation. A revolutionary mentality is usually well-formed before a stage of violence is reached. Until that time, revolutionary activity is non-violent. Still, it functions to promote the revolution. Because of this limitation, the term "unusual force" is preferable.

In the first place, "unusual force" suggests at least as clearly as "violence" the paradox of all revolutionaries who, in the name of law, step outside of law, ostensibly to accomplish the establishment of law. This terminology subsumes not only illegal acts of violence, but also acts of non-violence which may also be illegal.

However, it should be observed that the word "unusual" is not necessarily synonymous with illegal. Unusual force may still be within the bounds of strict legality. What makes the force unusual is that, while in the strictest sense
it is within legal bounds, its conscious tendency is to undermine the structure (including the juridical structure) against which, on the face of things, it is not offending. In other words, while it may not be an illegal display of force, in terms of the change it seeks to effect, the force exerted does not follow the conventional channels. Revolutionary change can be promoted by work to rule, boycott, demonstrations, etc.

Revolutionary change, then, is change effected by force alternative to conventional political channels. What makes this force unusual is not its content of violence or even its generation of maximum coercive power. Nor is it that if the force is successfully exercised the ordinary political channels will be done away. What makes the force of revolution unusual is its grasp and use of sources of power alternative to constitutional and conventional channels of public determinacy. What is important is that the ordinary channels are repudiated and alternatives sought to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the former to precipitate change.

The final qualifier of our definition of revolution has to do with the objective of revolutionary force. Only the objective of human happiness is adequate to define true revolution and to maintain the distinction we have consistently made between revolutionary and other types of change.

By asserting that human happiness is the true and only objective of genuine revolution, we may beg the question, "What is human happiness?" Any attempt to answer that question, however, must be left to the work of others. At
this point, our only interest is to identify a characteristic common to all revolutionary movements. Diverse though the definitions of human happiness may be from one revolutionary movement to another, each is convinced that its objective, once accomplished, will produce happiness for man from a society heretofore barren of that power.27 "Human happiness" implies the ideological element common to revolutionary movements. Thus, the Marxist prosecutes revolution in the hope of a classless society; the Frenchman with the vision of liberty, equality, and fraternity; the American for political freedom; the Maoist to preserve the process of change.

But all authentic revolution seeks more or less implicitly to achieve what the American Declaration of Independence makes explicit, i.e., that men by nature and by inalienable right will "pursue happiness."

The question, then, "What makes human happiness?" may become the grounds for criticism of a particular revolution. This is not the same, however, as to deny that a movement of

27Herbert Marcuse also uses the term "happiness" to describe the "good" revolution. He speaks of "a basic concept of classical political philosophy which has been all too often repressed, namely, that the end of government is not only the greatest possible freedom, but also the greatest possible happiness of man, that is to say, a life without fear and misery, and a life in peace. "Ethics and Revolution," Revolution and the Rule of Law, Edited by Edward Kent. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), p. 46. Marcuse distinguishes between freedom and happiness, then proceeds to justify revolution with an historical calculus reminiscent of Jeremy Bentham and social hedonism. "Happiness" as we will use it, however, is to be construed in its simplest sense as a broad term, comprehending all specific, legitimate aims of the political enterprise, including, for example, whatever Marcuse means by freedom.
which one is critical on eudaemonic grounds is not therefore truly revolutionary.

The significance of the qualifiers for our concept of revolution must not be subsequently overlooked. If they function successfully, the problems raised for the Christian conscience by potential revolution will not lightly be cast off. Authentic revolution means more than historic inevitability, more than a mere exchange of the reins of power. Authentic revolution is an expression of more than frustration. It entails an affirmation of values, hopes, fears and all things most essentially human and, therefore, essentially religious.

We will nowhere argue the relative effectiveness of revolution to attain its own ends. Such arguments are readily available from historians and sociologists. The problem for the Christian conscience is not raised and cannot finally be alleviated by pragmatism alone.

We will continue to argue, however, that certain revolutions might be more acceptable to a Christian conscience than others. The Christian, therefore, is responsible to assess his situation vis-a-vis the revolutionary potential and react accordingly. If the authentic revolution is as we have described it by the attached qualifiers, it becomes apparent that the more revolutionary the situation the more acutely arises the problem of revolutionary versus counter-revolutionary for the Christian. The function of "authoritative theological literature" would not be so much to prescribe a course of action that is "Christian." Rather, it
would provide guidance for the assessing of genuinely revo-
lationary potential and leave the course of action to one's
own conscience.

This is exactly the way in which one can profitably
read F. D. Maurice. The following chapters will detail that
fact.
CHAPTER 4

WHY MAURICE?

To suggest that F. D. Maurice can be a guide in the creation of a theology of revolution evokes immediate incredulity from a number of people. Maurice, the revolutionary, creates a strange image to those who have made a study of his life and work. Torben Christensen, for example, documents in his volume *The Origins and History of Christian Socialism, 1848-1854* the precision with which Maurice could frustrate the plans of the Christian Socialists and exasperate its leadership. The impression that remains from reading Christensen on Maurice is an *a fortiori* argument against Maurice's conversance with revolution, i.e., since Maurice was a drag on such mild, nineteenth-century reformism, how much more so on twentieth-century revolution.

A second reason why Maurice seems an unlikely guide through the windings of revolution as a theological problem is that he really knew nothing of the twentieth century's experience. Maurice is strikingly nineteenth-century. His capacity for prognostication is limited. He is aware of Colenso and the beginnings of biblical literary criticism.¹ He is

¹See his response to the storm created by the publication of the Essays and Reviews in "The Mote and the Beam," *Tracts For Priests and People*, No. 2 (Cambridge: Macmillan and Co., 1861).
aware of Darwin and even of the approaching evolution-creation storm. In spite of this awareness, he fails to appreciate the capacity for upheaval that biblical criticism and evolutionary hypotheses will manifest even before his life ends in 1872. Their influence in the twentieth century goes entirely unapprehended by Maurice. Revolutionary considerations reveal the same incapacity. Maurice says nothing of Karl Marx or his writings. He did know of Hegel. But, like Kierkegaard, Maurice resented the rationalism of the Prussian philosopher. The extent of his critical appreciation of Hegel was that the notion of the dialectic ought to confirm in their fears those who "knew from history what attempts had been made in other ages to bring heaven and earth within the terms of the intellect, and what had come of those attempts." The potency of Hegelian dynamism to change radically the world of Maurice's purview eludes him. The result is that Maurice seems to have lived, written, and thought in a social and political context quaintly foreign to his intellectual posterity of a century later. The question of the relevance of Maurice's thought to the twentieth-century experience of revolution is, therefore, legitimate.

Then there are specific instances to be found in the writings of Maurice that sound anything but "revolutionary." Maurice, the royalist, the aristocrat, the implacable opponent

\[\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\text{Cf, the dialogue in his preface to Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy (2 vols.; London: Macmillan, 1872).}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{3}\text{Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 657-658.}\]
of democracy in Britain, the nationalist, could hardly pro-
claim his arch-conservatism (not to say, "counter-revolu-
tionary bias") better with banners.

Nevertheless, there is in Maurice a degree of ambiva-
 lance that ought not to be overlooked. If one cannot say
that Maurice was a revolutionary by principle, neither can
one say that Maurice was a counterrevolutionist by principle.
For there is evidence that Maurice discovers occasional sym-
pathy with certain revolutions and with revolutionary causes.

Doubtless, this ambivalence can be traced to the home
of his boyhood. And primarily, it can be traced to the in-
fluence of Frederick's father, Michael. Michael Maurice,
at the wish of his father, who was a dissenting, although
"orthodox" minister, had been sent for educating to Hoxton
Academy, a Presbyterian stronghold. The liberal atmosphere
of the school accounts for the avowed Unitarianism of its
professors. But more important a consideration for our pur-
poses is that

. . . before and beyond all things, the most pow-
erful minds among them were political Liberals.
The aspirations of the time were far more politi-
cal than religious, and Michael Maurice issued

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4(Frank M. McClain, Maurice, Man and Moralist, (London:
SPCK, 1972) and Olive Brose, Frederick Denison Maurice: Re-
bellious Conformist 1805-1872, (______: Ohio University
Press, 1971) have produced detailed works concerning the na-
ture and influence of Maurice's unusual boyhood home. A host
of other authors have felt constrained to sketch Maurice's
early life in less interpretive biographical introductions
to his life and work. For that reason, the biographical ref-
erences here and throughout this paper will be selective
rather than comprehensive. Be it noted, however, that such
selectivity is done with care not to wrench or contrive the
larger biographical context.)
from Hoxton Academy, or rather from Hackney College, which was in connection with it, and to which he removed in 1786, a Unitarian in opinion, but heart, soul, and spirit an enthusiastic political Liberal. Michael Maurice would later in life become a member of the pacifistic Peace Society, a fact that led F. D. Maurice to surmise that by 1805 his father had a dislike for all fighting. Yet as late as 1823, Michael Maurice wrote to a former student: "The taking of the Bastille is still one of the Dies Fasti in my calendar." He was associated with those suspected of French sympathies by Pitt's government. And Maurice puzzles that his father never came to distinguish accurately between the first French war, fought to preserve the revolution, and the second French war, fought to preserve the integrity of European nations against Napoleonic designs. It can be concluded, therefore, that Michael Maurice retained all his life a fervent appreciation for the French Revolution.

Partly to this appreciation must be attributed his later support for the Constitutionalist Party in Spain. The principles upon which they were prosecuting attempts at reform were certainly as important to him as the hope of earning a respectable return from the bonds he owned which were issued


by the party. When the Constitutionalist cause failed and its proponents were exiled, the bonds became instantly valueless. The loss, joined with other financial failures about the same time left the Maurice home of 1828 with insufficient income even to maintain the large Southampton house where they lived. The sacrifice left the family spiritually unaffected, except as it rallied to relieve the inconvenience caused by the diminution of income.\(^9\) As to Frederick's reaction there can be no question. The support of the Spanish exiles was a political duty.

There never was an error in which the grossness of the ignorance it displayed was more suitable to the malignity of the motive which produced it than the pretence that the Spanish exiles were bloodthirsty and anarchical innovators. They are the heirs, representatives, and champions of the old liberty of Spain. Their antagonist is an anarchy compounded of despotism and democracy. Their only object was the establishment of legal and constituted order. The Spanish exiles were driven from their homes because they opposed what all Englishmen, Tory and Whig alike, must consider as a tremendous evil, the license, namely, of arbitrary power.\(^10\)

And if political duty were not enough to enlist the support of the English for the needs of the banished Spaniards, considerations of humanity should suffice to accomplish the same end. Thus, with enthusiasm, the young Athenaeum editor identified himself with the cause as well as the plight of the Spanish patriots.

It is, of course, impossible to determine with


precision the degree of influence the political biases of the father exerted upon the political interests of the son. On the other hand, it is incredible that a father so politically enthusiastic should rear a son who remained unaffected. Whether his political interests sprang from heredity or environment F. D. Maurice never speculates. He does confess, however, to a political selectivity even of his boyhood attention.

... anything social or political took a hold of me such as no objects in nature, beautiful or useful, had. My sister Emma said to me, when we were both grown up, that the scent of some violets which we gathered together as children at Normanstone had never passed out of her soul. How I envied her the freshness and freedom of heart which that experience implied!11

Reason accords with the judgment that such selectivity, perpetuated throughout the lifetime of F. D. Maurice could only have felt nurtured in the home of Michael Maurice. So we are not surprised to discover in the description by a boyhood friend of F. D. Maurice, a Dr. Goodeve, that

... his chief ambition was to become a leading barrister and a member of parliament for some distinguished constituency. He had two or three idols in the latter class—Brougham, Sir Francis Burdett and Joseph Hume were amongst them.12

Not even the avowed utilitarianism, with its materialistic overtones, of these radical reformers could diminish

11Life, Vol. I, p. 16; (cf. also pp. 19-20, where F.D.M. recounts his disinterest in any reading except "such history as I could connect with the events which I heard of as passing in our time, or with some party feeling that had been awakened in me.")

the admiration of the critical boy. For Maurice, the purpose of his life was determined before his fifteenth year and set in the following pledge which Maurice composed and to which he and Goodeve both subscribed.

"We pledge each other to endeavour to distinguish ourselves in after life, and to promote as far as lies in our power the good of mankind."¹³

While, therefore, the influence of the liberal sentiments of Maurice's father upon him must remain indeterminate, it is strongly suggested in Maurice's own words about himself and his childhood.

Allusion has already been made to Maurice as the editor of the Athenæum. He opposed, through this organ, the ascending star of utilitarianism as the "radical" solution to the problems of social ills. He wrote, under the influence of Coleridge, that the nation is not an atomistic collection of individuals, but an invisible entity. Solutions to problems are not to be gained by the contemplation of the outer world only; but by using such contemplation to adduce hints of the invisible reality, man can come at last to perceive directly the eternal world.

It is usual to pass off such a point of view as philosophically idealistic and, therefore, unlikely to produce much understanding or change in men's circumstances. Such is not the case with Maurice. During the same period he was attacking utilitarianism through the pages of the Athenæum,

he was contributing to the Westminster Review, the organ of philosophical radicalism. Maurice's idealism was the source of political sympathies quite in line with the philosophic radicals. Although he did not "wear the proper Liberal livery, ... on practical questions I shouted with them."  

A case in point is Maurice's article on the Memoirs of the Irish independence leader, Theobald Wolfe Tone. Tone had sought to secure Irish independence from English rule by entering into negotiations with the French. The Napoleonic wars were the backdrop of the negotiations and Tone was seized by the English, convicted of high treason, and sentenced to death. Maurice's sympathies for Tone stemmed from his sense of the national entity. Unlike the political liberals amongst the Whigs who felt for the people, Tone had felt with them. In other words, Tone had entered into the life of the nation. He was no external observer but rather a voice raised from the heart of Ireland. He should, therefore, be listened to.

Most particularly should those listen who were then in positions of power and whose reactionary opposition to beneficent reform was born of a steady conviction that "a superstitious veneration for ancient institutions will induce men patiently to endure practical grievances."  

In Maurician terms, what Wolfe Tone cried out for was not a cosmetic reorganization of Irish political structure.

It was for a social fabric that would constitute a distinct expression of the spiritual life of the nation. Particulars aside, such a drive could not help but win the support of Maurice. And in spite of opposition from church and conservative circles that would be engendered by the Act of Catholic Emancipation of 1829, Maurice seized upon Tone as an exemplar of genuine national concern.

So far, all the evidence adduced to support the political ambivalence of F. D. Maurice has been drawn from his earlier years. Occasional radical posturing is thoroughly consistent with youth. Therefore, one might conclude that Maurice had yet to "grow up."

Apparently, this conclusion would be bolstered by the elderly Maurice's confessions to his son that a period of personal crisis commenced in 1828. There were sufficient reasons for such a crisis: the financial plight of the family, the financial plight of the Athenaeum, and the terminal illness of his sister, Emma. But over and above them all was a spiritual searching precipitated long before by the religious controversies that tore at the unity of Maurice's family. These culminated in his conscientious refusal to declare himself a bona fide member of the Church of England.

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16 Much of what follows in this and the next paragraph is extracted from "An Autobiographical Letter Written in 1870 to Explain the Origin of 'Subscription No Bondage.'" "Subscription No Bondage" was a pamphlet published in 1835 by Maurice in which he defended his subscribing the Thirty-Nine Articles upon entry to Oxford after refusing to declare himself an Anglican at Cambridge. The Letter appears in Life, Vol. I, pp. 173-184.
even though such a declaration would have allowed him to re-
ceive the LL.B. already earned at Cambridge. Through the
pages of his novel, Eustace Conway, produced during the next
year and a half, Maurice projected his own spiritual quest.

In essence, the spiritual crisis accomplished a sever-
ance of Maurice from a "sham creed and pretentious tolera-
tion." Maurice was beginning to suspect himself guilty of
intellectual philanderings. His sense of condemnation grew
not so much out of holding wrong opinions but out of holding
opinions wrongly. Like Eustace Conway, "he saw, with amaze-
ment and shame, that instead of having a right to boast that
he had really tried many faiths, he had never fairly tried
any." This period of spiritual crisis was sparked by the
growing realization that Maurice was the victim of an in-
tellectualizing mood that could only detach one from truth.
The thorough objectivity of pompous tolerance was sterile
spiritually. God and oneself remained alike secluded. The
desire for a personal immersion in divine truth now emerged
from the suppression that had kept it bound from the days of
bitter religious controversy in Maurice's boyhood home. The
result of this crisis period was an experience and apprehen-
sion of God that would give form to his theology, and thus
to the whole of Maurice's life-work.

Henceforth, Maurice would think of man as totally de-
pendent upon God. Christ is the "Head and King of the Race."
Only as Christ bestows upon man the power to live a life of
self-sacrifice can man approach his capacity for a truly human
life. Only then can he manifest that he is made in the image of God, and thus become what he is.

Society, too, is constituted by God. The purpose of society in all of its institutions is to promote life that is truly human. The family and the nation are ordained of God, in part, as pedagogical institutions to teach man the truth about himself.

The social implications of such a theology are enormous. There is doubtless a built-in conservatism. Suggesting alternatives to the family or the nation as structures is to deny their quality as divine givens, and thus to suggest heresy. Nevertheless, Maurice himself provides evidence of his toleration for a variety of familial or national structures so long as they fulfill the purpose for which they have been ordained. Thus, he can be quite intolerant of either family or national structures that pervert themselves into instruments of domination, in the case of the family, or imperialism, in the case of the nation. If there is a built-in conservatism, then, there is also a built-in radicalism. Maurice, as much as any sincere man, is driven by a teleology.

In later chapters, then, we will assess the impetus Maurice's mature theology provided for his endeavors on behalf of the social needs of his day. All that needs to be accomplished here is to assert again that the ambivalence found in Maurice is predictable on the ground of his childhood and his theology. Later chapters will show the more radical side of Maurice's convictions which was capable of
stirring him to unpopular actions. In fact, controversy was a constant companion of Maurice.

The ambivalence which we have portrayed and which was to be a lifelong characteristic of Maurice could be considered problematic in applying his thought to the issue of revolution. Some would judge him disqualified for dialogue in a theology of revolution. This judgement would be strengthened by the clear conservatism discoverable even to the casual reader of Maurice. Such a judgement, however, concludes less about Maurice and more about the Christian interest in revolution. That is to conclude that a theology of revolution is limited in an exclusive way to those who are predisposed to nod approvingly of revolution as a specie. Dialogue thus slips into monologue. Far from being a disadvantage, the ambivalence in Maurice is indicative of the genuine contribution he can be brought to make to current theological dialogue about revolution. In that sense his ambivalence is a great advantage.

Furthermore, the ambivalence in Maurice reflects an ambivalence not unfamiliar to contemporary ponderers of revolution as a theological problem. The legitimacy of any theology of revolution depends upon its correspondence to the actual information of the Christian conscience. If ambivalence is a possibility for the Christian considering revolution, that possibility requires to be disclosed in a legitimate theology of revolution.

Finally, Maurice is useful to the Christian considering
revolution on principle because Maurice knows no other way to consider any problem. Maurice is not an opportunist. That is, Maurice does not oscillate in principle from issue to issue. He can follow Burke in condemning the French revolution while condoning the revolution of the American colonists. But these two, differing positions are squarely based on the same principles of national life. There is, therefore, a remarkable consistency about Maurice's ambivalence.

What allows revolution to be a problem for Maurice is that it does not always accord with his understanding of the principles he felt to be at work in the world, i.e., the Divine Order.

In times when a popular revolutionary mentality prevails, the notion of a divine order is declared to be old-fashioned and regressive. Upon it is laid serious responsibility for class divisions, for oppressive societal superstructures, for exploitation of some people by other people. Thus, Alec Vidler hedges his admiration for Maurice by confessing the uncertainty of the modern mind of a divine ground for undergirding the social and universal arrangements by which men live. In calmer times, however, it must confessed not only that the notion of a divine order is more appealing, but that revolutionary pretensions are discovered to manifest a parallel. For they too have a vision, a mythical substructure for their ideologies.

17 F. D. Maurice and Co. (London: SCM, 1966), p. 178, "For us the future is inevitably much more open and much more uncertain than it was for him, since few Christians, whatever they may say, are now really confident about their anchorage in the Divine Order."
What we will discover in Maurice is that he is a theologian. As such, he does not busy himself defending the principles of hallowed structures. Rather, he describes the structure of hallowed principles. On the grounds of those principles, he achieves a perspective from which to judge an establishment or a revolution. And when he feels it necessary he is sparing of neither. Consequently, he is critically aware of the problems which both lead to, and stem from, revolution. For the Christian conscience, therefore, he is both current and relevant. And to him we now turn.
CHAPTER 5

THE DIVINE ORDER

In subsequent material the position will be defended that the exponents, as much as the opponents, of revolution require a vision of society as it "ought to be." Both the establishment and the revolution depend for their lives upon the ability to maintain the conviction that their particular social "mythology" is the good or true or real one. Thus, the thoughtful person cannot responsibly escape the difficulties associated with the emotive term "establishment" simply by opting for a revolution. The constituting of order is as critical for the achievement of revolutionary aims as it is for stability in the establishment.

In the theology of F. D. Maurice, the notion of order is the central one. Other aspects of his theology are derivations of this principle one, for upon the idea of the divine order or the kingdom of God, every other idea pivots. Furthermore, Maurice's concept of the divine order is alluring. So systematically is it stated in Maurice's works, and so liberating it is for his life and practice! Above all, it is beguilingly simple.

In brief, Maurice is convinced that the human development of the individual is conditioned by the legitimacy of
the society of which he is a part. The legitimacy of that society, in turn, is conditioned by its correspondence to the divine will. The divine will has manifested itself particularly in three elements which constitute truly human order. These elements are the family, the nation, and the universal society (or church).

The idea of created orders enjoys long theological credence. So Maurice's notion of the divine order was not unprecedented. In fact, in general ways, it is like Calvin's before, and Emil Brunner's after him. The point of all such thinking is that society that is genuinely humane has no purely economic or political basis, but rather a theological basis. Human society has an ultimate reference to God.

An important distinction between Calvin's doctrine of created orders and Maurice's notion of the divine order, however, is that Maurice does not assign the elements to a formal hierarchy. There is no attempt to subordinate church to state or state to church. Even Maurice's own aristocratic biases are subdued in his description of the divine order. Thus, he cannot, on the grounds of his conviction of a divine order, set forth a repressive class structure. Nor does he. The importance of this distinctive absence of hierarchical considerations must be stressed. Its application will be obvious and explicit in the conclusion. The following pages of this chapter are devoted to a more detailed exposition of Maurice's doctrine of the divine order.
The Family

Although it is assumed in all his writings, the most thorough exposition of Maurice's doctrine of the divine order is to be found in his lectures on Social Morality. The basic element of human society is the family. The drive toward thoughtless individualism, toward social fragmentation or atomism, is first encountered and rebuffed by the unavoidable relationships of the family.

At my birth I am already in a Society. I am related, at all events, to a father and mother. This relation is the primary fact of my existence. I can contemplate no other facts apart from it.

... If you determine not to take notice of this fact, not to give it precedence of every other, the effect is, that instead of contemplating the world at large you will only contemplate yourself. You will be the unit about which all events and persons will revolve. Each man will regard himself as the centre of the universe. You will at last come to an understanding—a very imperfect understanding—that each must occupy this place in his own estimation; you will be forced to construct a Society on that hypothesis.

As well as to undermine this practical solipsism, the family functions to precipitate a clear distinction between things and persons, and thereby lays the groundwork for humane society.

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1 Social Morality: Twenty-one Lectures Delivered in the University of Cambridge (2d edition; London: Macmillan, 1872. Cit. Social Morality). These lectures constitute the second in a series of three courses of lectures on moral philosophy. They were first published in 1869. The first course was published the previous year under the title The Conscience: Lectures on Casuistry Delivered in the University of Cambridge. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1868. Cit. The Conscience).

2 Social Morality, pp. 21-22.
The family order and constitution is the first great bulwark which God has provided against the dominion of the senses and of the outward world, the feeling, "I am a member of a family, I am the son and brother of such a person," is the great balancing power against the feeling, that there are certain pleasant objects which my eye sees, and my ear hears, and my palate tastes, it is the great influence which redeems the affections from things, and gives them a direction towards persons, it is the commencement of all society, it is the first step towards the acknowledgement of God.

The family is a training ground for the broader relationships of human society. Each familial relationship is, therefore, characterized by a peculiar ethos. And, since each ethos is capable of distortion, each familial bond is also capable of distortion. Maurice commits to five lectures the analysis of these family bonds and their ethics under the general heading of "Domestic Morality."

The first examines the relationship of father and son. It is characterized by the ethos of authority on the part of the father and obedience on the part of the son. The paternal ethos can be distorted into dominion. According to Maurice, "authority" is a personal term. "Dominion," on the other hand, has reference to things. Dominion refuses to recognize relation on humane grounds. It is to assert one's nature as separate. "If the separate Nature prevails over this relation, there will in all cases be dominion, but no

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authority; subjection, no obedience; brutality, no manners." The filial ethos of obedience, on the other hand, can be distorted into subjection. Thus, authority is not synonymous with punishment, and its aim is emphatically not the identity of the child with the parent.

The obedience of a son is shown in receiving those influences and impressions from a father's authority which most tend to quicken his own activity. No true father wishes his son to present an image of his opinions. He knows that the copy will be probably a caricature; that an echo conveys the sound not the sense of the original voice.

In the next lecture, Maurice turns his attention to the relationship of husband and wife. Marriage, he suggests, is sometimes forced to bear two faulty interpretations. The first is that of the sentimentalist who recognizes that marriage is a result of choice. Two persons, drawn by affections, choose to enter into marriage. 'So long as the affection lives the marriage lives. There is no real marriage where there is no affection. On the other hand, the legalist announces that marriage is a result of decree. What he has pronounced to be married cannot be dissolved at will. He alone can dissolve the marriage by the setting forth of another decree.

Neither of these points of view gets to the real heart of marriage. Marriage is a relation.

For this relation, like the paternal relation, is not the creation of formal Law; but is implied in it, lies beneath it, must be recognised and adopted by it so soon as it comes into existence. It is a Relation; therefore neither is it the

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4 Social Morality, p. 23.
5 Ibid., p. 27.
creation of the persons who enter into it. This phrase truly expresses the fact. They enter into it. All the inward feelings which attract them to it do not determine its nature; that is determined before.  

The attraction which draws persons toward marriage is born out of the sense of incompleteness without the other. The result is an interdependence not only of the weak upon the strong but of the strong upon the weak. Such interdependence can only thrive in an atmosphere of trust. Thus, we arrive at trust as the ethos of the conjugal relation. Trust belies the weak view of the sentimentalist.

... the choice and affection are not, as in the creed of the sentimentalist, the gratification of a separate instinct; choice meaning a mere passive submission to an overpowering impulse; affection having very little respect to its object, being chiefly prized for its reflex operation upon the person who cherishes it.

On the other hand, "Trust is not impatient of law as a restraint. It welcomes Law as a check upon the vagrant inclinations which would undermine it."  

Marriage, therefore, is the creation of neither sentiment nor law. For Maurice, marriage is a given, a state definitive of the legitimate relationship of husband and wife. As such it is the wellspring of trust.

... fostered by the conjugal relation. ... it diffuses itself from that through all the household; ... From the family it goes forth into the nation. ... It enters into all the

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6Ibid., pp. 43-44.
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
intercourse of life; where it is wanting, society becomes an intolerable lie.\textsuperscript{9}

The succeeding lecture focuses upon the relationship of brothers and sisters. Despite distinctions traditional in certain areas based upon sex or primogeniture, Maurice apprehends an ethos characteristic of the sibling relationship essentially considered. This ethos he names consanguinity. Although he consents to complaints that the term may be legal and technical, he maintains that "the physical fact is connected with a fixed relation." The relation is defined by common origin. The acknowledgment of that relation brings to birth the ethos of consanguinity. The physical fact, by extension, yields a harvest of more spiritual implications. It demands the recognition of equality. But since equality can never mean absolute similarity, the demands of equality must be checked and softened by the recognition also of fraternity. Where the demands of equality and fraternity are in balance, consanguinity is at work and the relation of siblings is actualized to the gain of the whole society. Consanguinity emerges as the great foe of the spirit of rivalry.

The competition of interest is checked as the sense of the relationship is strengthened; with the sense of the relationship comes also the feeling of distinct powers which each may put forth for the help not the overthrow of the other, of distinct vocations to which each may devote himself, and so may make the destiny of the whole family more complete.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{9}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{10}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 71.
If the negative aspects of competition are ever to be checked, consanguinity is the only real hope. Artificial expedients will never avail.

If the desire of possession and rule is stronger in any man than the sense of brotherhood, he may be a tyrant or a slave; or both in one. He in whom the sense of brotherhood is uppermost may be a sufferer and a victim, but he will help to preserve Society from destruction.\textsuperscript{11}

The final relationship with which Maurice deals under the general heading of domestic morality is that of master and servant. The ethos of this relationship, whether the subordinate be a servant or a slave can be subverted by its origin. "I have won him with my sword. I have purchased him with my money." With such words, reasonable as they may sound, the master reduces a relation to a simple consideration of chattel. As a consequence he introduces an "adder into the breast of the family."

\ldots the language which is applied to one part of the family will gradually be applied to the whole of it. The belief in Property will become the absorbing belief in the mind of the Father; it will convert his authority over his Son into mere Dominion. It will be a question between the husband and the wife which shall have dominion over the other; notions of Property will regulate their union. Brothers will view their relation in the same aspect; it will be a struggle which shall possess most of that which the father leaves. \ldots If he admits the principle of Property in any case to be the ground of his connexion with one of his own race, that principle becomes predominant in his whole life; if the domestic feeling is stronger in him than the feeling of possession, that will work itself out in him till it leavens his thoughts of every one with whom he is brought into contact.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 73; cf. also pp. 353-354.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 78; cf. Maurice's defense of the working men's associations on the grounds of reasserting the real
Obviously, conditions in which one man serves another will never disappear entirely. But do pecuniary rights provide the only way to understand those conditions? Maurice answers in the negative. To answer positively is both popular and devastating.

That is, in other words, "Between me and him there is no relation; the only bond between us is that which money has created." That is the feeling on the master's side. And the servant's of necessity corresponds to it. "I owe him nothing; he has had my work out of me. What more have I to do with him?" 13

To focus upon the property aspects of the servant-master relation is to destroy the relation. And relation is the primary fact. To focus upon the relation, whether one is servant or master, is to escape brutalizing and to avow commonality and awaken the sense of community. Interdependency springs to consciousness and the honorable ethos of reverence for service arises with vitality. 14

I am sure that unless they learn that reverence for each other which neither feudal bonds nor legal securities can create, they will become more and more enemies to each other, and the enmity will spread from that relation to all others till the entire household is infected with it. 15

Maurice has already made explicit the divinely appointed order which supports every true domestic relation and its relation of master and servant against its pecuniary distortion, in "Reasons for Co-operation" (London: John W. Parker, 1851), p. 17.

13 Social Morality, p. 84.
14 Ibid., pp. 85f.
15 Ibid., p. 86.
correlative ethos. For example, in describing the relationship of brothers and sister he says:

What I affirm is, that in human beings this physical fact is connected with a fixed relation, and that in this relation a certain habit or manner is implied. It is implied in the relation, not artificially attached to it by certain later conventions. Where it is lost the relation is denied; Society if it is more than a collection of brutes is subverted.16

The mystery of domestic relations, inexplicable on naturalistic grounds, is the source of religious consciousness. The experience of the true family is a worship experience because it leads to the divine ground on which the family stands. This family worship is the subject of his fifth lecture.

Familial bonds are the sources and verifiers of man's religious "suspicions." We shall see Maurice defending the proposition that true worship with its overtones of grace and sacrifice stands as the only adequate guarantor of familial relations first, and subsequently national and universal human society.17

Thus, Maurice brings to a formal close the discussion of the ethics of the family. In fact, it is not the end of his understanding of familial relevance to society. Again and again Maurice returns to the family as the basic model for his understanding of man in all his relationships. The nation may be illustrated using the family. But the family

16Ibid., p. 63.
17Infra, Chapter five.
is never illustrated using the nation. Likewise with the universal society, Maurice speaks of the authority of a Father and the obedience of a Son in sacrifice. The roots of all that is bad and all that is good in society trail back to the soil of the family, according to Maurice.

The abolition of the family as Maurice views it, can precede by no more than a generation the destruction of the nation and the loss of the universal society in the spirit of empire. For the child emerges from the family with a sense of values crucial to man in his larger social groupings. The child learns the meaning of authority, of obedience, of trust, of equality, of reverence for service. The ultimate reference of all of man's social groupings, God himself, is first discovered within the family and owned through the exercise of family worship. "I believe this institution lies beneath all others and that all others are strong as it is strong, or weak as it is weak."¹⁸ What the establishment does with the family, therefore, and what the revolution might do with it are the gravest of questions.

The Nation

About a fourth of the lectures on Social Morality are devoted to domestic morality. Another fourth deal with

¹⁸"A Lecture at the Opening of the Lower Norwood Working Men's Institute" (London: W. Kent and Co., 1860), pp. 8-9. "The existence of this family feeling has been the ground of national life, and the preservation of it. All wise moralists and legislators have desired to cultivate it: in any causes which threatened its destruction, they have seen the sure presages of ruin to laws, manners, individual greatness, social order. The Church a Family (London: John W. Parker, 1850), pp. 2-3.
national morality, and nearly half of the lectures are given to morality in the universal society.¹⁹

The transition to national morality is accompanied by a change in method. Whereas in the discussion of domestic morality Maurice focused upon the inter-personal relation of the family, e.g., parent/child, sibling, etc.; in the lectures on national morality, the focus is upon the phenomena of national identity. These he identifies as law, language, government, war, and worship. In the lectures on domestic morality, Maurice discovers an ethos bound up in each relationship. The only relationship Maurice recognizes in the context of the nation is "citizen." Thus, there is only one ethos, viz., my neighbor and myself.

... these are the factors which I must take account of, if I want to know what I mean when I claim to be the member of a City or State. Supposing I forget either, I forget the other. I cease to recognise the distinctness or worth of my neighbour, if I do not recognise my own; I cease to recognise my own distinctness and worth, if I do not recognise his.²⁰

The phenomena of national identity, then, function only to support this ethos. They do not evoke some special ethics of their own. Maurice has in mind something more closely approximating virtues that should spring from each of these phenomena. These virtues are indispensable to realising the ethos born out of a relationship characterized by "contiguity of place and individual distinctness," i.e., "my neighbour and myself."

¹⁹This clearly reflects Maurice's profound theological commitment to the notion of the kingdom of God.

²⁰Social Morality, p. 111.
Among the phenomena of national identity, law is the most fundamental. However, it becomes clear that Maurice cannot maintain the structure of morality as he presents it in these lectures without implying two laws, one particular and national, the other general and divinely ordained. This provides a rich source of ambivalence as Maurice surveys and prescribes for his society as he found it.

One's most immediate sense is of this latter general law. Generically this is true. The emergence of domestic society into national society depends upon the apprehension of a law prior to the law of the nation and broader than the law of the clan. The sense of such a law accounts for the truly stupendous changes that create a nation out of a group of clans. In particular, it accounts for the broadening of the spectrum of obligation. In the clan, obligation ceases with the boundaries of the membership. In the nation, one discovers the "neighbour." In the clan each member is obliged for the actions of any other member. But in the nation, each man is responsible as an individual for his own actions. 21

Experientially, the discovery of a general, rather undefined sense of obligation as an individual to a person other than family comes at the time when one is thrust out from the home or clan. Maurice writes from the experience of the Britain of his time, where the child's first move out of the home is into the school. The "school is the preparation for

21 Ibid., p. 119.
This preparation includes introducing us to those laws which are particular and national. Maurice follows George Herbert: "Then the schoolmasters deliver us to Laws."²³

By "Laws" is meant the law of a particular nation. Thus, Maurice turns to the subject of his second lecture on national morality. National law is the first of the phenomena of national identity. It is first because of its primacy. Each of the other phenomena are meaningful inasmuch as they render service to law. One must bear in mind, however, that all of the phenomena of national identity, including the particular law of a nation, serve the ethos of the nation best when they best serve the law that is divinely ordained.²⁴

The law of a particular nation, when it functions in accord with the higher, general law, will discover and enforce the sense of individual obligation. It will reveal the individual tendency to covetousness. It will secure against that individual tendency the rights of life,

²²Ibid., p. 119.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Although Maurice does not make this distinction explicit in his lectures on national morality, they are hopelessly contradictory unless one assumes it. This is especially apparent in his discussion of loyalty where he relates loyalty to law but suggests that loyalty demands recognition of a law which might cause Parliamentary forces to fight against the king in the name of the king. And why? Because "they beheld the majesty of law in him." The distinction is explicit in Maurice's "Lecture at the Opening of the Lower Norwood Working Men's Institute," pp. 11-13.
character, and property. To accomplish this, law demands and prizes individual distinctness. But it reminds the man that he cannot be taken on his own altogether because he is enmeshed in a variety of personal relationships. The main function of law, then, is not to protect property, but persons. "The law takes under its care not only me and my neighbour, but all the conditions under which it finds me and my neighbour... It cannot call forth an affection which does not exist. But it stamps an obligation upon the relation."25

The second phenomenon of national identity which Maurice treats is language. Language operates in the life of the nation to promote veracity. "A covenant not to lie is implied in the language of every people under heaven."26 Only when the words mean the same thing to both parties of a contract or contest will the transaction be regarded as just. Still, words represent not things, but purposes. Language witnesses to the right of every individual to be heard and understood within his community. Words are the purposive extensions of person. Words are more "sacred" than things because "they express bonds between persons, which there cannot be between things or between persons and things... A nation— I am not speaking too strongly— is held together by words."27

From this brief analysis, one could conclude that for

25Social Morality, p. 124.
26Ibid., p. 138.
27Ibid., pp. 140f.
Maurice language is a mystical category. With a kind of uncanny prescience, however, he has divulged one of the most abrasive issues of the modern experience of revolution. Just as the Assyrian Rabshakeh taunted the inhabitants of Jerusalem in the Hebrew tongue in order to demoralize them (II Kings 18:26-27), so the modern revolutionary has added language to his armory with stunning effect.

Language is an effective reinforcement for the fomenting of revolutionary zeal. Canada, South Africa, India, and Great Britain all know from experience the bracing effect upon separatist movements applied by the merest sounds of the movement's "national" tongue, e.g., French in Quebec. The anti-nationalism of pure Marxism has given way to the promoting of revolution on the strength of "national fronts." The right of a people to its own language is a revolutionary issue.

Furthermore, language is an effective preservative for the values of a revolution. The "success" of the cultural revolution in the People's Republic of China is attributable to some significant degree to the introduction of a new script. Although the spoken language is unchanged, access to the documents of China's past is available only to the diminishing few who can read the old script. Universal literacy may be one of the outcomes of the cultural revolution. Spatially, it is surely possible. But it will be temporally tethered to no date earlier than the date of the revolution.28

The specter of a world illiterate among the documents of its own history, even recent history, is morally terrifying. Thus, certainly on the basis of modern experience anyway, one should conclude that the interest of Maurice in language is moral rather than mystical.

Next, Maurice deals with government. Government functions to evoke loyalty. Loyalty is related etymologically and actually to law. Thus, the form of government is not so important a consideration as the success of the government to lead and inspire every citizen, ruler and ruled, to acknowledge the primacy of law over position and privilege. Neither monarchy nor democracy is essentially better at eliciting loyalty since loyalty is directed ultimately neither to the king nor to the people, but to the law. Thus arises the possibility of fighting against the king in the name of the king.

Loyalty therefore must be in the King, if it is to be shewn to the King. He must confess a law which binds him; a law which does not bend to his self-will, which will assert its dominion over him and punish him if he sets it at nought. It is all very well to claim his people's obedience. It will not be rendered to him if he is not an obedient man.29

the Maoist powers to do at one stroke and for good what a hundred cultural revolutions with all their autos-da-fe could not do; make all that had been thought, felt and written in China from antiquity until the present day uncommunicable and unreadable for all future generations of Chinese—with the exception of literature that, having found grace in the eyes of the Chinese government, will be adapted as the authorities wish for transposition and publication in alphabetic writing.

29Social Morality, p. 199.
What Maurice says of the king would be true of all rulers. In the Tract for Priests and People entitled "Do Kings Reign by the Grace of God?" Maurice distinguishes between reigning by the grace of God and reigning by divine right, with the latter conveying the notion of privilege attaching to the person rather than to the office. Having defended the position that privilege corresponds to office rather than person, then, Maurice freely owns that all heads of state (sovereigns, kaliphs, presidents), are legitimate on similar grounds. In so doing, the implication is clear that the form of government is not the primary phenomenon of national identity, but the fact of government itself. Legitimacy is not confined to monarchy or to democracy. The legitimacy of a government is determined by its foundation, not its form. And we have already said that true revolution is a thrust at the fundamentum.

The fourth phenomenon of national identity Maurice treats in a chapter on war. In fact, the chapter deals with the place of the military establishment in the life of the nation and asserts that from the soldier's discipline, the nation is inspired to obedience to law. Maurice denies that wars are always fought from materialistic motives. Instead,

30 "I thank Him (God) for the demonstration which the Revolution (French) furnished, that kings do reign by His grace, and not by their own self-will, and that if they become either tyrants or rois faineants, He will arise to judge the earth, and requite the proud according to their deservings." No. 10 (Cambridge: Macmillan and Co., 1862), p. 43.

31 "All are legitimate whom God owns as legitimate. They lose their legitimacy by not confessing the law under which they live." Ibid., p. 56.
individual nations are always threatened by the perverted spir-
it of authentic universal morality—the spirit of empire. War
is the nation's surety against the encroachments of this spirit.
War defends the law and language and government of a nation and
thereby protects its identity. The soldier, therefore, is not
a brute. The nobility of his profession lies in his disci-
\-plined willingness to bear, rather than to inflict, misery. He
yields proof to the nation that obedience to law permits one
to live with courage and to die as a sacrifice. We will con-
tend further on that what Maurice says of the soldier is appli-
cable as well to the revolutionary. The ultimate question is
still the question of law. Who is struggling as a witness to the
law and who is struggling to bring it to serve his own purposes?
He who fights for law makes war. He fights for the nation.

Finally, Maurice turns to the worship of a nation. In
an analysis oft-repeated in Maurice's works, worship springs
not from the uncanny or exalting experiences of natural phe-
nomena, but from the experiences of interpersonal relation-
ships. Primarily, the worship of a nation testifies to the
existence of an underlying and upholding order and, therefore,
to a person who administers that order. Thus, the desire
to worship does not dim with the growth of civil societies

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32 Social Morality, p. 192, cf. also, pp. 90ff; The King-
dom of Christ: or Hints on the Principles, Ordinances, and
Constitution of the Catholic Church, in Letters to a Member of
the Society of Friends (2 vols.; 2d ed.; London: Macmillan,
1842. Cit. The Kingdom of Christ), Vol. I, pp. 232-233; Dia-
logues Between a Clergyman and a Layman on Family Worship

33 Social Morality, p. 194.
(as if the state of nature were the only state conducive to the religious impulse). Instead, "thoughts about divine powers... grow with the growth and development of Societies; become complicated with their complications." In particular, national worship is the movement of religious consciousness testifying that all of the phenomena of national identity--law, language, government, and military endeavors--along with their corresponding virtues--obligation, veracity, loyalty and obedience to law--depend upon their correspondence to the higher, general law, i.e., the divine order.

This profoundest conviction about the nation is inevitable, and inseparably binds politics to faith. Two alternatives present themselves as responses to this conviction. The first is to acknowledge as fact the divine ground of the nation. National worship then takes the form of submitting the law of the nation for trial before the bar of divine order. A Nation's worship is the witness in humility to the source and ground of its life. The second alternative is to recognize as fact only the conviction of a divine ground. The conviction may then be manipulated to serve the interests of the manipulators with the appearance of profoundest piety for sanction. Maurice describes this alternative.

There must be a divine ground of Law, said the inner conscience of the Nation and of the patriot. How necessary it is to assume such a ground that Law may be upheld, that men generally may respect it, said the lower nature of the man justifying itself by the calculations of a sordid expediency. We must make men observers of their words by feigning to recognize a God of truth! We must

34Ibid., p. 194.
cheat men into loyalty, seeing how little there is to awaken it in self-seeking rulers, by threatening them with the vengeance of the Gods if they are disloyal! We must ask the augurs, scarcely able to refrain from laughing at each other as they meet, to invent supernatural reasons for rushing into wars or avoiding them; else how shall the soldier keep his oath to his commander, or not forget his discipline, or not shrink from the enemy when he should face him? Here was the hateful and accursed side of the worship, that which made it incredible to such men as Lucretius, who were sure that there must be in nature if there was not among men some order which was not based upon trickery and lies.35

The worship of a nation determines the destiny of that nation. If its worship is true it will preserve its own nationhood through reverence for the national existence of others. Various forms of law, language, etc. will be valued as forms essential for the existence of nations. True worship will lead the nation to look beyond itself to the One who is the source and protector of the life of every nation. True worship will lead to the sense of a universal society comprised of men living in families and nation.

On the other hand, fallacious worship will undermine the life of the nation. The protector of the nation is identified with the person or body who is responsible for the decision-making within the nation. The will of that person or body is esteemed to be the will of the entire nation. Such a finite will would be incapable of discerning among the apparent best interests of national existence. The desire for dominance is inevitable. Social morality is subverted. The spirit of empire is born.

The Universal Society

Whether men will live in a universal society or under the dominance of the spirit of empire is the final and critical question raised in Social Morality. To an analysis of this question Maurice devotes the final half of his lecture. His aim, although never made explicit, is to establish self-sacrifice as the ethos of the universal society. Getting to that point, however, takes him through theoretical considerations and through the experiences of history.

Theoretical considerations are dealt with in the first two lectures on universal morality. The spirit of empire stands upon the conviction that religion is an instrument of manipulation. Following Gibbon's dictum concerning Rome that "to the magistrates all religions were equally useful," Maurice describes the place of religion in the empire:

The Emperor was the standard of Godhead. His power was the image of the highest, of the universal, Power. He did homage to heavenly powers no doubt. He wanted their aid. But he was to all intents and purposes the God of the earth. If the gods above protected him, he also protected them. They retained their authority by his permission. It would be a fair exercise of his prerogative that he should increase their number. He could not permit any of them, more than any mortals within his dominion, to encroach upon his supremacy.36

In this way a polity of manipulation is transposed and protected by a theology of manipulation. Even the gods are subject to the manipulation of the emperor. Maurice condemns such a theology as "religious unbelief."37

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36 Ibid., p. 223.
37 Ibid., p. 400.
The counter to the universal empire Maurice calls the universal family. This designation is intended to suggest that the ethos of authority and obedience discovered on the domestic level operates in all of man's legitimate social structures. It also serves to remind us that "according to the Christian Creed the authority of a Father, the Obedience of a Son, lies at the root of the Universe, is implied in its constitution."\(^{38}\) "I have endeavoured," says Maurice, to shew you, that the deadly opposition between the Empire and the Church had its root in the fact, that the latter preached to the world of a Will which was not arbitrary, of a Will which was essentially righteous, of a Will to make men righteous. Because the image of such a Will was before the Christian Martyrs they could not do sacrifice to the image of the Emperor.\(^{39}\)

Such a righteous will manifestly cannot be manipulated in the better interests of anyone. Such a will can only be submitted to and obeyed.

Lectures fifteen through twenty trace the repetitions of imperialism through history. The thrust of these lectures is that "World Empires are overthrown by the arms of Nations."\(^{40}\) The conviction of a will more absolute and more righteous than the will of the emperor is the basis of national life and the bane of imperial existence.

The ultimate foe, however, of universal empire is universal worship. Imperial mentality is inevitably self-centered.

\(^{38}\)Ibid., p. 246.

\(^{39}\)Ibid., p. 247.

\(^{40}\)Ibid., p. 249.
It revels in selfishness and self-importance. It does recognize the importance of sacrifice. But the only sacrifice it knows is the sacrifice intended to coerce or manipulate the will of the deity so honored to conform to the will of the empire.

Universal worship is judgment upon the empire. There, the notions of sacrifice correspond to the goodness of the will of God. The true sacrifice is the sacrifice of self. Nothing could be more opposed to the selfish spirit of empire. Sacrifice is not a tool for manipulation of the deity but a witness to his grace operating in the life of a person. Sacrifice truly perceived suggests a change not in God but in man. This the empire could not abide.

And so Maurice comes down to his final lecture, "Human Worship." Apart from his book, The Doctrine of Sacrifice there is no more thorough development of his high concept of sacrifice in any other of his writings. Maurice changes his pattern of searching for an individual ethos. Instead, he speaks of self-sacrifice as a cardinal virtue, i.e., "the hinge on which other virtues turn, without which they would have no coherence, no vitality." Nevertheless, in the sense of "a rule governing a relationship," self-sacrifice is the ethos of the divine/human relationship.

Wherever the gloom of imperialism arises, there the

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41The Doctrine of Sacrifice Deduced From the Scriptures (London: Macmillan, 1893. Cit. The Doctrine of Sacrifice).

42Social Morality, p. 395.
witness of self-sacrifice gleams through. "If there is at the root of all human Society, of Humanity itself," says Maurice,

that divine Sacrifice which our Worship sets before us, the Spirit of which it teaches may go with us wherever we go, whatever we are doing or thinking or purposing; there must be a light penetrating the gloom.43

A fuller discussion of Maurice's doctrine of sacrifice awaits our treatment of dynamic, or effective force, as a problem for the prospective Christian revolutionary. What we have needed to show here is that, for Maurice, the spirit of empire and the spirit of self-sacrifice are implacably opposed. The only hope of a universal morality ever being actualized depends upon commitment to self-sacrifice. And self-sacrifice depends upon unwavering faith in the absolute righteousness of the will of God.

Although we have pursued the examination of Maurice's understanding of the elements of the divine order in the same sequence as he treats them, it would be an error to let the assumption that each element and its ethos is unconnected go unchallenged. The connection among them is first, but not primarily, chronological. According to Maurice, man has come to comprehend the nature of the societies he shares. This is true for the individual as for man generically. But the significant connections are more subtle than chronology alone can explain. There is an interaction amongst the elements. The ethos of one depends upon the ethos of another. A good

43Ibid., p. 413.
example is trust. This ethos, born in the relationship between a man and wife, has implications for all the daily life of society at large. A better example is authority and obedience. Maurice first speaks of this ethos in relation to the father-son relationship. But he cannot speak of the life of the nation or of the universal society without frequent references to it.

Social Morality reveals the appreciation Maurice had for the fragile complexity of truly human societies. Pursuing his self-proclaimed work as a "digger," Maurice here uncovers the foundation of society. And it is a theological one.

Truly human society is ordered by the beneficent will of God. The structures fundamental to society—those which man cannot do without—are not the creation of the will of man, but are given by God. Nor is society made possible by secular efforts to maintain the composite of ethics which Maurice himself suggests accompany each social relation. The family, nation, and universal society, with their attendant ethics, constitute the "divine order." They are, therefore, not ours to choose among other equally relevant options. They are ours to come to terms with, or we will forfeit our humanity.

Likewise, the dynamic of social progress is discovered within the will of God. Progress is not simply a function of economics or political theory or culture. Each of these may promote or violate truly human society. They are tools useful equally to either the nation or the empire. The dynamic of the truly human society is the will to sacrifice. That will is found primarily in God. But it is also visible in the
lives and communities of men being made truly individual, truly social, truly human.

Maurice insists that the foundation of society is theological. He calls men to recognize the divine order and, through the spirit of sacrifice, bring themselves and their communities to conform to it. He is convinced that this foundation cannot be finally displaced—that it will manifest itself, if need be through war and revolution, even where it seems most obscured. Such a foundation constitutes an intersection of nature and grace, of creation and redemption.44

Two questions arise that appear to mitigate any attempt to construct a theology of revolution from Maurice's point of view. Can a society so grounded endure fundamental change without violating the divine order? We shall see that the conservatism justly charged against Maurice stems from the reservations this question must suggest. But more important, we shall see that change can be necessary to move a society toward the divine order. Therefore, Maurice's conservatism is not bound to any particular status quo, and actually opposes any that distort or violate the elements of the divine

44Maurice would not likely approve this attribution to him of the idea of the unity of nature and grace. In his sermon "Nature and Grace," in The Church a Family, Maurice objects to the naturism of Rousseau and his followers. He defends Paul's statement that men are "by nature, children of wrath" (Eph. 2:3). And in other writings he criticizes the natural theology of Joseph Butler. But in the sermon mentioned, Maurice is at pains to describe without using the word "nature," those societies in which men find themselves which are not contrived and artificial. Bearing in mind, therefore, Maurice's objections to the term, this author finds it still useful to explicate what Maurice cannot otherwise tidily say.
order through a spirit of empire. The other question is this: can the ultimate social value of self-sacrifice, so passive in itself, be turned to the necessarily active service of revolution? We will show in the next chapter that, indeed, it can, even according to Maurice.

Maurice's social theory (theology) can support a vigorously critical theology of revolution. The implicit fact assumed in every part of this writing is that the personal conservatism of Maurice which seems at times to border on quietism was a reflection of his character and sense of calling more than his social theory. Alec Vidler expresses well this assumption. His words bridge the gap between the prologomena and the propositions of this thesis. They are fitting as both preface and conclusion to a theology of revolution drawn from the life and writings of Frederick Denison Maurice.

He was more successful as an educationalist than as an active politician. For he was a man of thought rather than a man of action, made more for uttering prophecies than for framing policies. His determination to look for and cleave to principles—to principles of which his collaborators seldom had so firm a grasp as he had—made him a difficult man to work with. Yet he was personally so humble and his insights were so profound that his fellow-workers were never happy unless they could carry him with them.  

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Hardly anything comes to mind so quickly at the mention of revolution as the prospect of violence. So closely linked with revolution is violence that it seems to be a term essential to the definition of revolution. Conservative elements exploit the horrific aspect of revolutionary violence to make more secure their own interests. Radical elements, on the other hand, anxious to exploit the revolutionary motif for its heroic overtones of justice and progress, make careful use of propaganda to justify the violent aspect of the revolution by highlighting the oppressive violence of the establishment. The efforts of both elements confirm that violence is inevitable with revolution.¹

Violence must certainly, therefore, be taken into consideration by the prospective Christian revolutionary. And

¹If violence is defined as the "avoidable injury suffered by a person," then the forms of violence can be distinguished: "Violence can be usefully classified into four different kinds based on two criteria, whether the violence is personal or institutionalized and whether the violence is overt or a kind of covert or quiet violence." Cf, N. Garver, "What Violence Is," in Philosophy for a New Generation, Arthur K. Bierman and James A. Gould (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 356. Overt personal violence is physical. Covert personal violence is psychological, the manipulation of another that produces psychological injury and may eventuate in more than that. Overt institutionalized violence is seen in warfare, in revolutions and riots, or in the way police
here arises a most immediate and straightforward dilemma. Shall we become involved in such violence, and if so, how is his involvement to be justified in a Christian context?

This issue cannot be avoided by assuming a pacifist posture. Pacificism resists only killing. Revolutionary violence may be of many shades other than the destruction of human life. Nor does it make it any easier to insist upon non-violence. As will be shown, there is always a degree of violence implicit in ostensibly non-violent activity.

The only way to come to terms with this question is to retrogress by analysis to its fundamental sources. This task, undertaken here, is not the first or only attempt to derive the underlying issues involved in a Christian contextualizing of violence. However, this effort is worthwhile if it reveals how far Christian theology and revolutionary aims and methods can unite. Subsequent divergencies ought then to be sufficient to put off the prospective Christian revolutionary, or better, to cause him to refocus his revolutionary impulse.

In dealing with the issue of violence first, we are approximating the sequence in which one becomes sensitive to a revolutionary potential. In the introductory chapters and in the conclusion, we employ the opposite sequence. There we deal with the nature of order first, and with the nature of dynamism second. This is a logical order inasmuch as (as we

or national guardsmen injure protesters. Covert institutional violence is found in all the social, psychological, and physical deprivations that ghetto dwellers or prisoners or Indians or sweat-shop workers suffer at the hands of institutions they cannot control. Peter W. Macky, Violence Right or Wrong? (Waco, Texas: Word, Inc., 1973), pp. 15-17.
will argue in this chapter) the nature of effective force (dynamism) is determined by the end it pursues (order). But the psychological sequence, the raising of revolutionary consciousness, corresponds more closely to the sequence employed in this and the following two chapters. The person first awakens to the revolutionary potential for violence. The violence raises questions about the legitimacy of the establishment by throwing the counterviolence of establishment oppression into relief. And finally, the issues of constituting a new social order emerge with complex questions about the ultimate values of persons and their communities.

Drawing upon the analysis produced in the previous chapter, then, we will show how the principle of sacrifice operates, even in war, for the establishment of the divine order against the spirit of empire. The implication, which will be strengthened through the remaining chapters, is that what Maurice cannot condemn in war, he cannot logically condemn in revolution. The violence needed for a nation to cast off the imperial enemy is not unlike the violence needed for a revolution to oppose an imperial state. Just as either establishment or revolution can turn into a distortion of the divine order by proceeding upon the imperial spirit of domination and self-centeredness, so either can manifest the divine order inasmuch as either operates on the principle of sacrifice. And here we will find in Maurice a Christian context for the justification of an active participation in revolution.

The nature of revolutionary change as deliberate, fundamental and rapid has already been established. What requires
emphasis is that on the conceptual level, revolution and Christianity coincide inasmuch as deliberate, fundamental, and rapid change is basic to both.

Deliberate change refers to alterations actively sought. In the church, this is understood as mission. Fundamental change refers to the amendment of one's mythic structures and the corresponding change in life style. In the church this is called repentance, conversion, and sanctification. Rapid change is insisted upon by both revolutionary philosophy and the church, who share a vocabulary of crisis, founded in each case upon the notion of transformation.

Perhaps the church itself is at fault if its biblical and historical mission to change and alter has been obscured by a reputation for conservatism. On the other hand, perhaps that reputation is a slander ill-deserved. In either case, it is high time to reaffirm that basic to all other Christian concepts is the concept of deliberate, fundamental, and rapid change.

In the haste to distinguish Christian change from revolutionary change, certain precipitant judgements must be avoided. In particular, the idea that revolution wants to change society while Christianity wants to change the individual is without logical foundation, and proponents of either would be loathe to wear such garments.  

Evangelistic Christians, in particular, have followed

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2 On this subject, see Emilio Castro, "Conversion and Social Transformation," The Church Amid Revolution, Edited by Harvey Cox (New York: Association Press, 1967).
this line, and have, at times, so individualized the Chris-
tian dynamic for change that they have obscured its social
implications. Happily, their deeds have frequently belied
their words and provided significant practical testimony, if
at times mute, to the social aspects of Christian faith.\(^3\)
On the other hand, liberal theology has sometimes championed
the social dimensions of the Christian faith to the obscuring
of its individualized application and relevance.

Any change, whether in a person or in society, as though
one excluded the other, is clearly shunned as an example of
Christian change by Maurice.

\[\text{\ldots My Lord, I believe that the religion of the}
\text{Bible is one--one entire whole--not a mere frag-
ment. I believe of this whole, the social reli-
gion I have described is a fragment, the individ-
ual religion I have described is a fragment; frag-
ments which are ever trying to be united, and the}
\text{actual union and fellowship of which will explain}
\text{to us the Bible better than all the commentators}
\text{have ever explained it.}^4\]

Such dichotomous thinking about Christian change must be chal-
genged, he says, but whoever challenges it

\[\text{\ldots will displease those who say that you must}
\text{reform the individual before you reform Society,}
\text{for he declares that Christ is the reformer of}
\text{both, and that the individual who claims any}
\text{relation to Him must own himself the member of a}
\text{society. (And) he must displease those who talk}
\text{of reforming Society as the only way of reforming}
\text{the individual, because they understand by the}
\text{Reformation of Society the alteration of its}\]

\(^3\text{Cf. Timothy L. Smith, Revivalism and Social Reform}
\text{(New York: Harper and Row, 1957).}\)

\(^4\text{F. D. Maurice, "On Right and Wrong Methods of Support-
ing Protestantism: A Letter to Lord Ashley, Respecting a}
\text{Certain Proposed Measure for Stifling the Expression of Opin-
ion in the University of Oxford," (London: J. W. Parker, 1843),}
\text{p. 14.}\)
circumstances, not the assertion of a spiritual ground and root of it.  

Equally fruitless is the attempt to delimit the influence of revolutionary philosophy to social change. In the first place, the very first aim of revolutionary philosophy must be to win adherents, an especially individualized task. Besides that, while the current experience of revolutionary philosophy is socialistic, its theme in the French Revolution and nineteenth-century history up to the time of Marxian influence is extremely atomistic.

Considered revolutionary philosophy, just as considered Christianity, may oscillate between individual and society as the poles of emphasis for whom or what is to be changed. The similar oscillation is one more evidence of a basic coincidence upon the fundamental matter of change.

If the call of the Christian church to effect change, whether individual or social, has stilled, revolutionary philosophy bears no blame for rejecting the Christian faith as a straw man stuck in the soil of the status quo. If, however, the fundamental Christian vocation to effect change is clearly sensed, the prospective Christian revolutionary has taken a first halting step toward resolving the dilemma of violence implicit in revolution. He will have discovered that at least the concept of change is as basic to Christianity as it is to revolutionary philosophy.

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But that is not to say that the change pursued by the Christian is automatically identical with the change sought by the revolution. For change to be justified on Christian grounds, it must reflect the attainment of Christian purposes. And when we enquire about what those Christian purposes might be, we encounter another formal similarity between Christian faith and revolutionary philosophy. In both cases, the reality of common experience is believed to be reality distorted. Appearances becloud reality. For a vision of reality, one requires, in the case of revolutionary philosophy, the exercise of the reason, and in the case of Christian theology, the entrance of revelation. Divergence, then, first occurs in the conception of reality held by each.

Reality in Christian theology cannot be separated from God. It is understood as the kingdom of God. Millenial theologies conceive of the kingdom as future. Its present reality is perceived only in the hope which springs from faith.

But Maurice, while not rejecting the idea of a final summation of the kingdom, insists upon its immediate presence. For him it is no shadowy parallel sharing reality alongside the kingdoms of men. It is the only real kingdom, the only possibility for human participation in reality. It is the divine order.

God has established a real kingdom upon earth and it is a real kingdom, based upon principles which cannot be effected or undermined by the inconsistencies of those who belong to it, or the unwillingness of any to partake of its privileges.⁶

Our sin consists in the attempt to live apart from the kingdom in one of our own devising. Such "contrived" kingdoms are the shadowy parallels. Their ground is idolatrous because unreality substitutes for reality which has its ground in God. The manward consequences of sin produce isolation for the individual and thereby undermine the only real society for men, i.e. society in which the divine order is fully established and fully operational.\(^7\) The purpose of change in Christian theology, then, is the transformation of men and societies to conform to the reality expressed with the phrase "the kingdom of God."

In the same manner, revolutionary philosophy rejects appearances as reality. Real society, for example, is found first in the reason, and not in the world. Alienation is most precisely alienation from reality.

In certain cases, normalizing a society may include only a few immediate aims, for example, the overthrow of an oppressive monarch or social group. Beneath these aims, however, lies an elaborate conceptualizing of reality. This governs the revolution. This constitutes the "myth" upon which the revolution intends to prosecute its immediate and specific aims. Reality, however violated and distorted just now, can be actualized as revolutionary activity functions, by the guidance of reason, to provoke change.

For this much at least, an exposition of Hegel is, at the same time, an elucidation of the philosophy of

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\(^7\) Theological Essays, pp. 20-30.
revolution. Herbert Marcuse, interpreting Hegel in *Reason and Revolution*, writes:

As long as there is any gap between real and potential, the former must be acted upon and changed until it is brought into line with reason. As long as reality is not shaped by reason, it remains no reality at all, in the emphatic sense of the word. Thus reality changes its meaning within the conceptual structure of Hegel's system. "Real" comes to mean not everything that actually exists (this should rather be called appearance), but that which exists in a form concordant with the standards of reason. "Real" is the reasonable (rational), and that alone. For example, the state becomes a reality only when it corresponds to the given potentialities of men and permits their full development. Any preliminary form of the state is not yet reasonable, and, therefore, not yet real.8

Uniform notional reality is a factor in all revolutionary philosophy. By its presence a distinction can be drawn between revolution and anarchy. Anarchy is reactionary and negative in essence, striving to escape the impositions of any social uniformity. The Marxist prospect of the withering away of the state, on the other hand, only applies in a society where centralization is not so much resented as unnecessary. Revolution in its move toward decentralization, is progressive and positive in essence, governed by a liberal view of human social potential.

Similarity between Christian faith and revolutionary philosophy still prevails, then, in that both accept that reality may be unsensed and unseen except in the spiritual data of human experience. Both systems, therefore, affirm that fundamental change is understood as movement toward reality.9

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9 "For no mere change can ever be reformation: reformation
The divergence between Christian faith and revolutionary philosophy appears in apprehensions of reality, and thus, in terms of the purposes pursued. Christian theology holds that fundamental change is movement toward the realization of the kingdom of God, whether the presence of that kingdom is anticipated or proclaimed. Revolutionary philosophy, on the other hand, understands fundamental change to be anything that furthers the emergence of a society made thoroughly humane through the exercise of man's rational power.

Here the crux of the issue raised for the prospective Christian revolutionary by the possibility of violence can begin to emerge. It is simply that we know nothing of change apart from force. Evolutionary change, which we have distinguished from revolutionary change in terms of the lack of deliberation, is yet seen retrospectively as progressing in nature through the influence of cosmic radiation, environmental trauma or some other force effective for change. If force is obviously a factor in non-deliberate change, it can only be more so in change pursued with deliberation.

With regard to revolution, force is so obviously a factor that it would be judged gratuitous to say much more about its consistent presence. It is mentioned in passing, however, as complying with the method of this chapter, i.e., to establish always has meant, always must mean the recovery of a form which has been lost, the pursuit of ends which are marked out for us and which we have forgotten--the return to a real belief of that which we profess in words." Maurice, "Baron Bunsen," Macmillan's Magazine, Vol. III, No. 17 (March, 1961), pp. 372-382.

\(^{10}\)Supra, p. 25.
the coincidence of Christian faith and revolutionary philosophy in order to throw into clearer relief what there might be of divergence.

And there is, in fact, a coincidence between the two, even as regards the element of force. While it seems quite at home in a discussion of revolution, force as a means of giving birth to Christian faith and practice appears at first a strange midwife indeed. If that force is renamed coercion, it seems stranger still. However, Reinhold Niebuhr presumably includes the church when he insists that "all social co-operation on a larger scale than the most intimate social group requires a measure of coercion."  

But force is more readily admitted into a Christian context when it is understood as grace. Its coercive edge is thus sublimated in the orthodox admission that the fundamental changes necessary for the birth and revival of Christian faith are inconceivable apart from grace.

Theologically interpreted, grace is always more than the dictionary definition of "unmerited favor." Its most general synonym in theological literature is "power." Paul Tillich says that grace is the infusion of love, and describes it thus as "the power which overcomes estrangement."  

Reinhold Niebuhr follows a similar line, defining grace as God's power in man "completing his incompleteness" and over man

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"whereby sin is overcome by God's mercy, but not by human goodness."\textsuperscript{13} Karl Barth says that "Grace is and remains always the Power of God."\textsuperscript{14} He follows this basic understanding with a wide variety of amplifications. Luther's dictum that "grace is opposed to sin and devours it," Barth complements with his own graphic description: "Grace digs up sin by its roots." Then comes, "grace is the royal and sovereign power of God... the real freedom of the will of God in men... Grace is the power of obedience... and grace is the power of the resurrection."\textsuperscript{15} And finally, grace appears in Barth's \textit{Romans}, as the "freedom of God by which men are seized."\textsuperscript{16}

These proof texts are provided in no way to exude a precise definition of grace. Rather, they show that Christian change is commonly understood to require extraordinary power. There is a proper element of force. To call it grace does nothing to render it passive. For change in Christian faith, like change in revolutionary philosophy, requires an \textit{effective force}, i.e., the exercise of power in the spirit and by the principles of the end to be obtained.\textsuperscript{17}


\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p. 213.

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., p. 240.

\textsuperscript{17}"It is not compulsion which is bad, but a compulsion which does not express the power of being in the name of which it is applied." Paul Tillich, \textit{Love, Power, and Justice: Ontological Analyses and Ethical Application} (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 48.
The human experience of the world, usually described in static terms, encompasses change as well as stability. And the experience of change suggests to secular and religious consciousness alike that reality is, therefore, dynamic as well as static. That is to say, reality is itself generative of change. Perhaps because language is static in contemporaneity, the attempt to include the dynamic factor in philosophical systems from Heraclitus to Hegel achieves at best, paradox, and at worst, incredulity. The most cogent impulse of genuine revolutionary philosophy is its maintenance of this dynamic quality of reality.

If change constitutes a real constant, and if change cannot be divested of some degree of force, it must follow that force constitutes a real constant also. Our experience of force, however, makes us cautious because not all force leads to real change. Sometimes the change achieved through the application of force proves to be apparent change only. That is, such change may obscure rather than elucidate reality. The form of the force itself may be to blame for this state of affairs. When it is, it cannot be regarded as effective force at all, for effective force implies change in favor of reality.

The principle here may be illustrated by the parent who beats big brother for bullying little sister. His purpose may be to change the boy's juvenile notion that superior strength yields the right to rule. But the force chosen to effect the change might easily reinforce rather than undermine that notion. Any change accruing from such force is
bound to be more apparent than real. The basic issue remains unchallenged and unchanged. A common social application of the direct dependence of effective force and real change may be seen in the sociological maxim that a society maintained by violence cannot at the same time absorb a true sense of tranquility and a love for peace.

Harry Eckstein confirms the maxim.

In some societies, the most manifest cause of internal war seems to be internal war itself, one instance following another, often without a recurrence of the conditions that led to the original event. This means that political disorientation may be followed by the formation of a new set of orientations, establishing a predisposition toward violence that is inculcated by the experience of violence itself. In such cases, internal wars result not from specifiable objective conditions, and not even from the loss of legitimacy by a particular regime, but from a general lack of receptivity to legitimacy of any kind. Violence becomes a political style that is self-perpetuating, unless itself "disoriented."  

It should be plain by now that the dilemma posed for the Christian conscience by the prospect of violence resolves itself into the question of effective force. It can never be a debate between force and no force, nor, as we shall see, is it a search for non-violent force. For, as Reinhold Niebuhr notes:

Once we admit the factor of coercion as ethically justified, though we concede that it is always...
morally dangerous, we cannot draw any absolute line of demarcation between violent and non-violent coercion.19

The substance for this resolution of the problem becomes still more visible if one analyzes the unmanageable relativity of violence as it may be present in the whole of the revolutionary context.

Generally, revolutionary violence is of a degree destructive of human life. While destruction of human life is certainly no truly revolutionary objective, it only occasionally escapes being a consequence of the revolution. Involvement in revolution, therefore, generally implies involvement in the destruction of human life.

Less radical is violence which stops short of actual killing. Rigorous intimidation is an example of this kind of violence. At this point the arguments of pacifism are already beginning to dim into irrelevance. The inevitability of violence seems more firmly established.

It continues when one considers passive resistance. To speak of this as non-violent protest may obscure the fact that passive resistance may be experienced as violence, sometimes by those against whom it is not specifically directed, i.e., the innocent. Reinhold Niebuhr argues that the only mitigating circumstances for the violence caused by non-violent

19Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 172. Cf. Maurice's comments on the state of tension between capital and labor in England. "It was clear that the war had begun, and was becoming a war of extermination. Whether the mere money force, or the physical force of numbers prevailed in it, the result must be equally terrible." "Reasons for Cooperation," p. 12.
methods is determined by intent, and not effect. Even in intent, however, passive resistance is not altogether non-violent inasmuch as it aims at the development of stress and anxiety to a point which may be politically exploited.  

According to this analysis of violence, then, involvement in revolution implies on one level or another, involvement in violence. Chalmers Johnson would be correct when he insists that change brought about without violence is some

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20 "The chief distinction in the problem of coercion, usually made by moralists, is that between violent and non-violent coercion. The impossibility of making this distinction absolute has been previously considered. It is nevertheless important to make a more careful analysis of the issues involved in the choice of methods of coercion in the social process. The distinguishing marks of violent coercion and conflict are usually held to be its intent to destroy either life or property. This distinction is correct if consequences are not confused with intent. Non-violent conflict and coercion may also result in the destruction of life or property and they usually do. The difference is that destruction is not the intended but the inevitable consequence of non-violent coercion. The chief difference between violence and non-violence is not in the degree of destruction which they cause, though the difference is usually considerable, but in the aggressive character of the one and the negative character of the other. Non-violence is essentially non-co-operation. It expresses itself in the refusal to participate in the ordinary processes of society. It may mean the refusal to pay taxes to the government (civil disobedience), or to trade with the social group which is to be coerced (boycott) or to render customary services (strike). While it represents a passive and negative form of resistance, its consequences may be very positive. It certainly places restraints upon the freedom of the objects of its discipline and prevents them from doing what they desire to do. Furthermore it destroys property values, and it may destroy life; though it is not generally as destructive of life as violence. Yet a boycott may rob a whole community of its livelihood and, if maintained long enough, it will certainly destroy life. A strike may destroy the property values inherent in the industrial process which it brings to a halt, and it may imperil the life of a whole community which depends upon some vital service with which the strike interferes. Nor can it be maintained that it isolates the guilty from the innocent more successfully than violent coercion. The innocent are involved with the guilty in conflicts between groups, not
other form of change than revolutionary change.\textsuperscript{21} It is possible so to extend the continuum of violence that it includes almost any form of agitation for change, (a fact readily seized upon by establishment interests for propaganda purposes).

Further consideration reveals that it is not possible to reject categorically involvement in violence anyway. Even if one is successful in avoiding entanglement in violence in any of its revolutionary manifestations, his imagined passivity may itself be tacit approval of violence. From at least the time of Augustine, Christians have justified involvement in violent activities when that involvement is aimed at diminishing oppression. The cogency of this thinking comes in the identification of oppression itself as a form of violence. The ability to alleviate oppressive conditions willfully kept because of any particular type of coercion used in the conflict but by the very group character of the conflict. No community can be disciplined without affecting all its members who are dependent upon, even though they are not responsible for, its policies. The cotton spinners of Lancashire are impoverished by Gandhi's boycott of English cotton, though they can hardly be regarded as the authors of British imperialism. If the League of Nations should use economic sanctions against Japan, or any other nation, workmen who have the least to do with Japanese imperialism would be bound to suffer most from such a discipline.\textsuperscript{5} (Moral Man and Immoral Society, pp. 240-241). A more contemporary consideration is that any strike by medical personnel, firemen, or police would only shortly be considered a non-violent action.

\textsuperscript{21}Op. cit., p. 6. And Philip Berrigan could be accused of holding forth a false hope by maintaining a facile distinction between "the revolution of blood" and nonviolent revolution. For example—"The people who say that it (the revolution of blood) is not inevitable are the only ones who, to my mind, understand revolution. In other words, the only ones who understand revolution are the ones who say that a non-violent revolution is possible." "A Priest in the Resistance: An Interview," Revolution and the Rule of Law.
in check through fear or selfish conservatism, is tantamount to the approbation of those conditions. On this basis, Karl Rahner argues that

... blanket renunciation of any kind of physical force is not merely impracticable but also immoral, because it is, in effect, an abdication of responsibility under God.22

Such silent partners share in the guilt of the more active oppressors. To become involved, therefore, in securing the end of oppression, even through violence, has more to do with expunging guilt than with incurring it.

To set the problems raised by violence as the choice between violence and no violence is nonsense. It is to ignore completely the prior question about the place and use of force and constitutes an attempt to escape the responsible use of power against its perverted use. Even the sincere pacifist considers his particular form of passivity not as an escape from coercing, but as the strongest and only effective force, the most responsible use of power.23 The fact remains that the only relevant question has to do with the discovery and utilization of effective force, i.e., force which effects change in favor of reality.


23"... in recent years nonviolence has become selective, that is, politicized. In France, for instance, pacifists have taken a stand in relation to political affairs. They protested nonviolently against the French war in Algeria, but ignored the violences committed by the National Liberation Front... In other words, if the pacifist becomes involved without being partisan, his nonviolence remains authentic; in the contrary case, nonviolence becomes a means of propaganda." Jacques Ellul, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
If we speak of violence, non-violence and pacifism all as manifestations of coercion formed differently, the false hope may arise that the problem of violence is simply one of degrees. A person sets for himself a level or degree of violence beyond which he will not go. But this is not the solution for the problem of violence. It is rather to despair of that solution. It is to capitulate to violence as not only the form but the principle of effective force.

This would mean that any change achieved by violence, of whatever degree, so long as it did not exceed the self-imposed limit of a particular person, should be considered real change. Such a situation is analogous to determining ahead of time that one will limit the service to his automobile to keeping the radiator topped up. Commendable and necessary as that service may be, the limit does not accord with reality, as shall most surely be demonstrated when the engine sputters to a halt with an empty petrol tank. Although violence, however limited, may be unavoidable, it cannot possibly be itself the principle of effective force. Upon the discovery of that principle the proper limitation of violence depends.

Defining the principle of effective force makes most manifest the potential divergence between Christian faith and revolutionary philosophy. And it is upon this point that the question of violence must finally devolve for the prospective Christian revolutionary. He is bound to ask what principle governs the form and extent of the force employed.

Since the concept of effective force draws its
significance from the reality toward which it moves, it is necessary to describe generally both the revolutionary and Christian concepts of reality. For the latter we will draw chiefly from Maurice.

According to Marxist philosophy, the broad outlines of which are characteristic of most current revolutionary philosophy, the goal of history is the achievement of a universal society maintained by individual consent in which all class distinctions are submerged in an all-consuming humanistic consciousness. To this vision attaches a chiliastic fervor. It is the consummation of human history. It is anticipated not as a possible end (telos), but as the only possible end of human history. This destiny is perceptible now to human reason. As reason is brought to bear upon the course of human events, all appearances will gradually be exposed and the genuinely historical will emerge as only that which had contributed and does contribute to the achievement of this ultimate reality.

But there is first much to be done. Human society must be completely reconditioned. Chiefly, it must be purged from the vestiges of feudalism and degenerative capitalism. This requires social surgery of a radical kind. Sources of production must pass from private hands to become public property. In so doing, the bourgeois concepts and values will disappear and the bourgeoisie along with them. Imperialism, which is the only form of capitalist internationalism, will fade, along with the feelings of nationalism. Family life
will be redefined so that it will receive its true significance for humanity and be liberated from its constitution as an economic unit subject to exploitation.

Marxism does nothing to obscure the convulsive effects of these changes. They are received as the welcome evidences of history's healing from the long fever of class exploitations. Sensing the course of history, the revolutionary feels specifically charged to induce these convulsions by applying the poultice of revolution. The Communist Manifesto avows that, "They (the communists) declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions."²⁴

Happily, for our purposes, the Manifesto also specifies the principle of that force by discounting its contemporary champions. Onto the index go reactionary socialism, conservative socialism, and critical-utopian socialism. The first of these is rejected as manipulated by the aristocracy, the second as manipulated by the bourgeoisie, and the third as the product of well-meaning and critically-aware socialists who are misguided as to the conclusions which will finally stand upon their premises. Overall, the objection is that these forms of socialism are, in fact, capitulations to a faulty view of reality in which capitalism remains a factor. They evidence all the marks of the cardinal error of taking appearance for reality. Even the critical-utopian socialism

of St. Simon, Fourier and Owen fails to grasp the dynamic process of history so that its appreciation of the working class is confined to its sufferings, and its active intention is the production, not of a universal proletariat, but of the social conditions in which the working class can be fit to care for its own needs inside the existing economic system, with its class-ridden superstructure.

The fault with these systems, according to the Manifesto, is that, although they are sincerely intent upon easing the lot of the working class, they are ignorant of the inevitable processes of history. Working-class power is virtually unknown to them, at least on the scale that Marx envisions it. Although they seek the liberation of the working class to a degree, they have so limited themselves conceptually as to rule out the very rôle, mighty in prospect, toward which history unerringly impels the very people they champion. Perhaps their political sway will produce occasional sops of sympathy and stop-gap consideration for the workers. But that is not enough.

The interim condition for the eventual advent of society on the Marxist model is the establishment of proletarian rule. Reality declares this to be the rightful place and function of the worker. The dawn of socialism awaits the beaming of this morning star. Once grasp this tremendous truth rationally and the future opens to receive the enlightened. Reason will proceed through appearances directly to reality. Nothing then will stop the determined march of an increasingly self-conscious proletariat. When that happens, hostile
political maneuver, however astute, will most certainly prove impotent. Classes possessing power will refuse to relinquish their hold on it without a struggle. And the revolution will be forced to proceed through blood and smoke until the old appearances, like bleached bones, are calcined to dust in the chemical purity of a socialist society.

The feature which distinguished effective force as it was envisioned by the earlier socialists from that which is called for by the Manifesto centers upon the concept of the ruling proletariat. It has nothing to do with the radical nature of the Manifesto's immediate and subordinate aims (the overthrow of the Bourgeoisie, the abolition of private property, etc.). These had all appeared before. Nor is it to be found in the forthrightness with which the Manifesto exhorts the workers to radical force. We have already argued that change of any kind involves the employment of force which is bound to seem radical (violent) to some. The real distinction comes with the conviction that "the proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains, They have a world to win."\(^{25}\)

The emergence of a universal proletariat makes possible the exposure of reality. Class is the distortion of that reality, and will be exposed as such with the enlarged activity of the proletariat. Whatever action the proletariat pursues that purges class consciousness from human experience conforms with reality. That such action will often be violent is due to the fact that the existence of class consciousness implies

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\(^{25}\text{Ibid., p. 44.}\)
the inevitability of class antagonisms. But, so long as the thrust of human history is toward the greater prominence of the proletariat in power, no conflict or struggle is to be avoided. Whatever degree of force must be brought to bear in the "forceful overthrow" of antagonistic elements must be engaged as not only necessary, but proper.

Amidst the paragraphs of much that is clearly propaganda, the important Maoist article "Long Live Leninism" includes a definitive expression of this Marxist fact.

Lenin tells us that we must draw a distinction between two types of states different in nature, the state of bourgeois dictatorship and the state of proletarian dictatorship, and between two types of violence different in nature, counterrevolutionary violence and revolutionary violence; as long as there is counterrevolutionary violence, there is bound to revolutionary violence to oppose it. It would be impossible to wipe out counterrevolutionary violence without revolutionary violence. The state in which the exploiting classes are in power is counterrevolutionary violence, a special force for suppressing the exploited classes in the interest of the exploiting classes. Both before the imperialists had atomic bombs and rocket weapons, and since they have had these new weapons, the imperialist state has always been a special force for suppressing the proletariat at home and the people of its colonies and semi-colonies abroad, has always been such an institution of violence; even if it is compelled not to use these new weapons, the imperialist state will of course still remain an imperialist institution of violence until it is overthrown and replaced by the people's state, the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat of that country.26

From this ground, the writers of the article go on to criticize the "revisionists of Yugoslavia who", . . , deny the inherent class character of violence and thereby

26Ibid., p. 535.
obliterate the fundamental difference between revolutionary violence and counterrevolutionary violence."  

The significance of this judgment is that the "fundamental difference" spoken of is obliterated by the denial of the "class character of violence." That is to say, violence cannot be condemned by reference to the number of heads that may roll, but by the principle for which those heads are set arolling. If the principle is the establishment of a universal proletariat, violence may be justified. Then it is revolutionary violence. Any other principle must be inadequate and is most likely a manifestation of counterrevolution. No other principle will produce the changes necessary for the exposure of reality than the principle of proletarian rule. For the revolution, this is the principle of effective force.

Changed circumstances since the days of the early Marx have not sufficed to create a need for change in the form of this system although the contents have been altered to correspond to more recent conditions. This may be illustrated from the modern experience of how industrial workers are increasingly integrated into the capitalist system. Robert C. Tucker describes how Marxist theory has to be restated.

Classical Marxism envisaged the communist revolution as a revolution of capitalist breakdown occurring in the most advanced stage of development of the capitalist system. . . (however) capitalist societies, instead of suffering self-destruction in a proletarian upheaval, have gone through a process of self-modification that Marx would not

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27Ibid., p. 541.
have thought possible and for which his theory in any event made no provision.

The result has been that

... the industrial worker has won improved conditions and has tended to grow more integrated into the society rather than more alienated from it. Capitalist economies have evolved into post-capitalist mixed economies with self-stabilising tools of fiscal regulation and planning.28

Whether one would agree with Tucker that these developments are not provided for in Marxist theory might depend upon the discernment that what is at stake is not the whole of Marxist theory, but only the identity of the proletariat. If the incorporation into bourgeois society of industrial workers is thorough, then either there is no longer any proletariat, or else one must look for another group, similarly alienated. If, on the other hand, one argues that this incorporation is only apparent, he will probably find himself agreeing with Herbert Marcuse.

Marcuse argues that the incorporation of industrial workers is a superficial one, created by the abundance of a plastic, materialistic society in which "former luxuries become basic needs, a normal development which, under corporate capitalism, extends the competitive business of living to newly created needs and satisfactions."29 Thus, technocracy, no matter how "pure," sustains and streamlines the continuation of domination. The revolution required then, is one

28Kumar, op. cit., pp. 313-314.
29Ibid., p. 321.
"which makes technology and technique subservient to the needs and goals of free men."\textsuperscript{30}

According to Marcuse, this revolution is not likely to spring from the traditional working class whose number and power are diminishing and being replaced by the "instrumentalist intelligentsia" i.e., the white-collared operators of the machinery of technology. These latter workers, in turn, are not likely to precipitate a revolution because they are well-integrated and well-rewarded. They now have a great deal more to lose than their chains. This is not to disown them as members of the working class. But the extent and subtlety of their materialistic bondage incapacitates them to serve as the activist basis required for the revolution.

For this basis (and it must be recalled that Marcuse is here referring to the United States in the late nineteen-sixties), Marcuse looks to a combination of the black population—"the 'most natural' force for rebellion"—and the young middle-class opposition constitutive of the student movement. For the time being, however, Marcuse admits that this combination is unlikely. "The common ground: the total rejection of the existing society, of its entire value system, is obscured by the obvious class difference."\textsuperscript{31}

Notwithstanding the difficulty encountered in identifying the contemporary proletariat and creating a proletarian

\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., p. 325.
\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., pp. 326-327.
consciousness, Marcuse is convinced that the element of conflict is no whit diminished as essential to the revolution.

The powers that be will not tolerate a repetition of the Cuban example; they will employ ever more effective means and weapons of suppression, and the indigenous dictatorships will be strengthened with the ever more active aid from the imperialist metropoles. It would be romanticism to underrate the strength of this deadly alliance and its resolution to contain subversion.32

He suggests that nuclear stalemate, and not humanitarian considerations, lie behind the present prohibition of the employment of nuclear force by the oppressors. Against this veiled threat, and against an increasing strength on the part of the oppressors, the revolution proceeds. Small bands of guerrillas practice a sort of military jiujitsu, directing their maximum strength at the enemy's maximum weakness. In Cuba and Viet Nam, the effectiveness of these groups, according to Marcuse, is demonstrated by the changes effected, ideologically as well as materially. These changes have been paid for in the currency of violence. But far from condemning it, Marcuse extols "... this violent solidarity in defense, this socialism in action" as more than anything else, giving "form and substance to the radicalism of the New Left."33

This brief account of the contemporary philosophy of Marcuse ought to be sufficient to suggest that, in spite of inaccurate historical predictions, the general outlines of Marxist theory have not been changed significantly. Throughout, socio-politico facts as they are in capitalist societies,
are held to be distortions of reality. They are remnants preserved and protected by classes possessing power. Only force directed by reason is adequate for the shattering of appearances and the emergence of reality. And this force is the prerogative of the proletariat.

In the name of proletarian rule, therefore, modern revolutionary movements have prosecuted the intermediate and subordinate aims of the revolution. When these aims imply violence, the principle of proletarian rule both permits and limits the violence. Revolutionary philosophy, therefore, still considers the rule of the proletariat to be the principle of effective force. Whatever action contributes to the seizure of power by the proletariat is proper, irrespective of violence.

For Maurice, as for revolutionary philosophy, the question of effective force is crucial. He is quite aware that the kingdom of God can be obscured as easily as it can be exposed, conditional upon the force employed. For the revolutionary, the principle of force is the seizure of power by the proletariat. Any activities must be justified in the light of that principle. If they cannot be, they are declared counterrevolutionary, proscribed, and possibly punished. Just so, the Christian activist requires some principle by which he can justify his activities. It is a consistent theme in Maurice that there is only one effective force at the disposal of the Christian, indeed at the disposal of anyone. That is sacrifice.
When St. Paul preached Jesus Christ, and Him crucified, he preached that in obedience, humiliation, sacrifice, dwelt the mighty conquering power—that power against which no other in earth or heaven could measure itself.\(^{34}\)

Isaiah, with every prophet and apostle, comes at last . . . not only to reconcile the characters of the sufferers, the despised and rejected, with the warrior and the conqueror, but to feel that every great battle must be fought by self-sacrifice, that the greatest conquest must come through the greatest humiliation. . .\(^{35}\)

In the Dialogues on Family Worship Maurice testifies,

I have found that the Spirit of sacrifice who proceeds from the Father and the Son, must come to men that they may be able to fulfil their duties one towards another, each in his own place; none interfering with the other more than the earth interferes with the sun.

He continues further on:

Sacrifice was the power in the old world as it is the power in the new that struggled with indolence, cowardice, tyranny, that made families and nations civilized and free.\(^{36}\)

This principle is not passive. Neither is it pacifistic. In 1857, Maurice took for a sermon text the words from Psalm 144, "Blessed is the Lord God of Israel, Who teacheth my hands to war, and my fingers to fight." He makes it clear that the wars to which a man may be moved by the principle of sacrifice are not just spiritual struggles.

I am far from thinking that this sentence applies exclusively to what we designate spiritual conflicts. I should suppose that David, or whoever the writer of the Psalm was, gave thanks that he had been able to fight with the Philistines, and

\(^{34}\)The Doctrine of Sacrifice, p. 219.
\(^{35}\)Prophets and Kings, p. 315.
Ammonites. Nay, I should think he gave thanks that he had been obliged to fight with them; that he had not been allowed to rust in the ease which he would have chosen for himself. It was in strict harmony with all the teachings he had been most familiar with to speak thus. 37

Sacrifice and not slaughter is the touchstone of the true soldier. "There is a brutal appetite for slaughter," writes Maurice, "which is in the nature of every soldier because of every man... (But) it will in all cases be the readiness to endure, not the wish to inflict misery which will extort from us either sympathy or honour." 38

Because Maurice understands sacrifice as an active principle, he is constantly using it to imply not the repudiation of force, but its proper appropriation. Only this way of understanding sacrifice makes the Apocalypse intelligible. That is a book, says Maurice, "full of trumpets of doom, Vials of Wrath, of earthquakes and revolution." Yet it bears the instruction that "they who followed Christ must conquer as he did, by giving up themselves to die, not by seeking power to kill." 39

If, as this interpretation of the Apocalypse seems to imply, the judgment is to be between seizure of power and self-sacrifice, the Christian cannot help but sense that the verdict has already been sealed in favor of self-sacrifice. The basis for this verdict is the cross.

38 Social Morality, p. 186.
39 Ibid., p. 249.
The will that rules the universe, the Will that has triumphed and does triumph, is all expressed and gathered up in the Lamb that was slain. Beholding Him, you see whence come the peace and order of the world, whence comes its confusion. The principle of sacrifice has been ascertained once and forever to be the principle, the divine principle, that in which God can alone fully manifest His own eternal Being, His inmost character, the order which He has appointed all creatures voluntary and involuntary to obey. 40

By drawing the contrast between the death of Abel and the death of Christ, Maurice is able to suggest powerfully the vindication of sacrifice as the only principle of effective force.

The taking away of the life of a brother was proved, by the earliest experience of the world, to be the result of departure from the law on which God had formed his world. The laying down a life for others is proved by the latest experience in the history of the world, to be the principle, the essence of that law. 41

To emphasize the critical significance Maurice discovers in sacrifice makes it necessary to expose, as precisely as possible, what he means by sacrifice. It is relatively easy to justify much that is exploitation in the name of sacrifice. Furthermore, sacrifice is not a concept known to the Christian faith alone since it is quite as often revered and called for by purely secular and even revolutionary movements. Finally, undefined sacrifice is of little use for putting into a Christian context the possible involvement in violence faced by the prospective Christian revolutionary. What Maurice must

40The Doctrine of Sacrifice, pp. 220-221.

do, then, is provide a definition for sacrifice that is relevant to situations in which moral evil is at work, and, at the same time, capable of differentiation from sacrifice as it might occur in a non-Christian context.

This latter usage of the word "sacrifice" we may refer to as general, or non-specific. A little observation will reveal that such sacrifice is closely related to calculation. Sacrifice is the foregoing of some benefit in the interest of obtaining another and greater. A child, for example, learns that by "sacrificing" sweeties for a few weeks he can accumulate the price of a football. Workingmen discover that by "sacrificing" the remuneration for their labour during a short strike, they can secure a larger remuneration over a long period.

Sacrifice as calculation is dressed in "Sunday clothes" by Paul Tillich:

For the sake of my present reality, I must keep many possibilities outside of my centred self, or I must give up something of what I now am for the sake of something possible which may enlarge and strengthen my centred self. So my life process oscillates between the possible and the real, and requires the surrender of the one for the other--the sacrificial character of all life.

The trouble with a notion of sacrifice which implies calculation is that it is basically self-centered (as Tillich makes so abundantly clear) and, therefore, open to all the distortions of selfishness. For example, a mother works her fingers to the bone, ostensibly in the interests of her children. Whenever disagreement arises, she defends herself by

reference to her "sacrifices" on their behalf. While genuine sacrifice is certainly possible--indeed, requisite--to genuine motherhood, it would be incredibly obscurantist to deny the character of such maternal "sacrifices" as moral truncheons.

Maurice persistently tracks down and exposes the insinuation of the calculating self into sacrifice.

He (the Christian) cannot permit it (self-sacrifice) to assume a self-conscious and therefore contradictory character by regarding it as a means of procuring a blessing, when it is in fact the fruit and fruition of a blessing already procured. He must consider every Christian obliged to mortify his selfish nature, in order that he may offer an acceptable sacrifice to God.43

In theory, the Christian ought to be better able to grasp sacrifice in this sense than other men. Unhappily, the evidence of history will not so attest. The sublimation of self has not always characterized the sacrifices of Christians. Indeed, according to Maurice

... the fearful contradictions which have gathered about the idea of Sacrifice, and have made the giving up of Self the plea for the most intense and calculating Selfishness, have received their fullest illustration from the acts and conceptions of Christian men.44

For this state of affairs Maurice blames a faulty doctrine of atonement. The half-lights of sacrifice as calculation, when applied to the death of Christ, produce a hideous anomaly. The atonement

is changed into a cold formal arrangement for delivering certain men from the punishment of a sin which


44_Theological Essays_, p. 315.
has itself not been purged away. Nay, the cross of Christ—of Him who gave up Himself—is actually so presented to men, that they suppose it is the instrument by which self-seeking men may secure the greatest amount of selfish rewards.\(^{45}\)

When men set about to pattern their own sacrifices after the atonement so understood, the result is equally calculating, equally self-interested. In the preface to the **Doctrine of Sacrifice** Maurice protests that

Instead of giving himself up to God, man seeks to make his God or gods, give up to him; he offers sacrifices, that he may persuade the power which he thinks he has wronged, to exempt him from the punishment of this wrong. This is man's theology; this is what has produced all the hateful superstitions under which the world groans.\(^{46}\)

For the propagation of the calculating notion of sacrifice, Maurice calls theologians and the clergy to account,

Whenever we represent the great atoning Sacrifice in the language of heathenism, and not in the language of the Gospel,—as an offering to make God loving, and not as the fruit of His love, as an effort of Christ to obtain that which the Father was unwilling to grant, not as the perfect surrender and submission to the Will of the Father,—we make the very principle of sacrifice to be abhorred; we destroy all apprehension of its true nature in the creature, because we have denied the ground and original of it in the Creator.\(^{47}\)

Little wonder that Robert S. Candlish, James H. Rigg,\(^{48}\) and a host of reviewers took great offense at such outspoken


\(^{46}\) Pp. xliii-xliv.


criticism of their own attempts to do the very thing Maurice set himself to undermine. Proponents of propitiatory concepts of the atonement, which represented God more as raw power under the Calvinistic emphasis upon sovereignty than as either justice or love, could not help but feel the sting. Happily, the debate with Candlish resulted in the literary preservation of much of Maurice's often unique insight into the meaning of sacrifice. His answers to the charges brought against him by Candlish are gathered together in the lectures and sermons which constitute his book titled *The Doctrine of Sacrifice*. The chief ideas defended there are that the ritual sacrifices of the Old Testament were not in themselves expiatory, but rather, educational. They served to remind man of his sin and to point him to the One against whom he sins. They also lead him to enquire after the perfect sacrifice and to expect it to be a filial one. Reconciliation figures as secondary to revelation. Sacrifice is the revelation of God. As such, it is the revelation of the existing relation of man to God. Through the revelation of that relation by sacrifice, man is called from his alienation and isolation in sin. He is reminded that he alone is responsible for his isolation inasmuch as he alone has refused to acknowledge his relation to God.

Finally, and most important, this book scuttles the most persistent vestige of self-interest in sacrifice by insisting that sacrifice, if it is truly sacrifice, always has its origin in the will of God. Thus, the aim of sacrifice can never be the bending of that will, but only its fulfillment.
Maurice is rightly adamant in demarcating sacrifice and self. Self-consciousness is not in the spirit of sacrifice. Self-interest cannot be the motive. Self-indulgence cannot be the end. In a letter dated 1861, Maurice writes, commending some letters of Thomas Erskine, "all that he says of sacrifice as the antagonist principle and power to selfishness, I inwardly recognise as true and most scriptural." About the same time, criticizing popular theology, he wrote:

The secret that the self-will is itself the burden that is separating us from each other and from God, that it must be taken away before we can offer ourselves, and all our energies of mind and body, as sacrifices to God, dawns upon us at times; but how that burden can be thrown off, how the free heart can be won--this we are not told, or told in language the most perplexing and contradictory.50

The contradistinction of sacrifice and self-will makes the positive content of Maurice's concept of sacrifice obvious. Since it cannot be the bending of the will of God to correspond with the will of man, it must be the bending of the will of man to correspond to the will of God. Maurice says,.

Sacrifices must express the submission of the lower will to the true divine absolute will, they cannot be the means of bringing the higher will into consent with the lower.51

"Submission to the will of God" then constitutes what Maurice intends by the word "sacrifice."


51The Epistle to the Hebrews (London: John W. Parker, 1866), p. 62.
How this principle may be illustrated in the cross has already been suggested. But the rest of the life of Christ is illumined by the same understanding of sacrifice. The commemoration of the passion of Christ

...is the most awful protest which human acts or divine acts can make against the notion so natural to us all, that Sacrifice consists in bringing something to God, not in giving up all to Him, as the source of every right thought and every right act. 52

In fact, the passion and the cross are the culmination of a whole life of self-denial, of submission to the will of God. What had begun in the wilderness and continued throughout his life was gathered up in the cross. As "... the consummate surrender to the will of His Father... it expressed the meaning of His life." 53

The result is that men, through the Gospel, are moved to view sacrifice in a radically new light. The fact that "sacrifice has been a part of the institutions of every people under heaven" stands for proof of the universal seeking for this light. 54 Ritual sacrifices of the Jews are shown to be symbols. The real victim is always he who brings the offering. 55 Even then, sacrifices are graspings after this light. The sacrifice of Iphigenia to save the fleet at Aulis is the manifestation of a lurking suspicion that real sacrifice

54The Doctrine of Sacrifice, p. 61.
55Ibid., pp. 42-43.
is always human. But men wait for the cross for the interpretation of all this. Only then is it visible that "the cross was to be taken up each day, not as a meritorious service, but as submission to a law which it was monstrous to violate."  

Understanding sacrifice as submission to the will of God makes its connection with force considerably more comprehensible. To follow Maurice in his thinking, one must admit that sacrifice is not divested of its dynamic character. It is submission. But it is submission to God and, as such, may not appear submissive to men. To be sure, Canaanite idolaters would hardly have considered the Hebrew hordes submissive. Yet Maurice implies that the Israelite wars were indeed acts of sacrifice inasmuch as they were the subjugation of the self-will to the will of God.

The Israelite was not merely to be tenacious of the true worship, and watchful against any intrusion of the false; he was to go forth against any intrusion of the false; he was to go forth against the idolatrous people of Canaan, to break in pieces their gods, to destroy their altars and high places . . . He was to feel that he had a commission to fight, not chiefly for his own borders, though these would be extended, but mainly as the soldier of God, to put down that which exalted itself against Him. And not only the idol or the idol-temple was to be destroyed; the inhabitants of the idolatrous country, their wives, their children, their sheep, and their oxen, were to be put to death. The leader of the hosts was to set his foot upon the necks of their kings.  

The wars of the Israelites are characterized by their


57 Patriarchs and Lawgivers of the Old Testament, p. 258.
indifference to dividing the spoils, a sure mark of the imperial mentality. So long as they fought with the sense of divine commission the booty was of small interest, the battle was everything, for they knew themselves to be the instruments of the living God. But,

whenever these instruments of His become self-seekers, --and aim at turning the commission which He has given them to their own personal ends--that moment they are punished upon the same principles as all other people, and with greater severity.  

The advent of Christ means that the proclamation of Him and not punishment of the idolater is now the better means of combatting idolatry. Still, idolatry is a fruitful source of wrong-doing and, as such, must come at last to the attention of outraged responsibility. When that happens

the evil fruits of selfishness must meet with their own appropriate recompense. The sword of justice, not words or acts of tenderness, must cut off these. He who being entrusted with it, fails to use it through any weakness or faintness of heart, yields to selfishness, --refuses to be God's minister, allows that which is hateful to God and destructive to his fellow creatures, to live and multiply. He who is seized with a sudden fancy that he is to forgive enemies when he is called upon to punish wrong, will not forgive them when they injure him. The judge who is too tender-hearted to sign a warrant for the execution of a criminal, will very probably end by being the head of a committee of safety, and will defile the land with the blood of innocent men.

If the sense of this duty is the inspiration for the warrior's deeds, we should be taught by them the meaning of self-sacrifice as the only effective force.

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58 Ibid., p. 264.
59 Ibid., p. 266.
It will be regarded as the true ground of all action; that on which all the blessed relations of life stand; that upon which all the charities and sympathies of life depend; that which is at the same time the only impulse to and security for the hard and rough work of the world— for the reluctant but necessary blows which are inflicted upon the miscreants who abuse God-given power to the service of the devil, and the injury of their fellows— for the wrongs which are endured by those who testify to the world that the works thereof are evil. Sacrifice is the common root and uniting bond and reasonable explanation of all those acts which seem in the eyes of men, often in the eyes of those who perform them, most hostile to each other, but which in due time justify themselves as proceeding from the same children of wisdom, though one may be said to have a devil because he wears camel's hair, and a mightier than he be called a gluttonous man and a wine-bibber, because he eats and drinks with publicans and sinners.\(^\text{60}\)

The lines of the dilemma with which we set out ought now to be retraced and bound together. Whether the presuppositions be Marxist or Christian, the prospects of violence are dealt with in a remarkably similar manner. At the heart of each lies the recognition of the necessity for change. Change is understood for both as movement toward reality. Change always depends upon an effective force. Effective force is always of the same essence as reality. Any other force obscures reality and reinforces appearance. Thus, for both, what is effective force becomes the critical issue. Having traced the general outlines first of revolutionary philosophy, and then of the Christian faith of F. D. Maurice, we have arrived at certain relevant conclusions.

First, it has become apparent that the connection between force and violence is unavoidable. Violent activities, 

\(^{60}\text{The Doctrine of Sacrifice, pp. 64-65.}\)
whether intentionally so or only perceived as such, are not alien to either system. Any attempt to resolve the dilemma in terms of a choice between violence or no violence begs the question.

We have seen in both systems that the real issue is the establishment of a ground upon which the justification of violence is to stand. This follows the thinking of Roger Garaudy, who has claimed that "the choice is not between violence and non-violence, but between two different kinds of violence." It is echoed in the citation above from the article "Long Live Leninism," where the Yugoslav "revisionists" are criticized for obscuring Lenin's distinction between capitalist violence and revolutionary violence in terms of class struggle. It is implied in all that Maurice says about the Hebrew-Christian protest against imperialist motions.

For revolutionary philosophy, this ground is established by the concept of the inevitable emergence of a self-conscious proletariat. Class-consciousness creates an unreal condition in which the proletariat is alienated from, and therefore reluctant to contemplate, the role history now thrusts upon it. To seize power, in the interest of the proletariat, is the revolutionary mission. Whatever action abets the seizure of power by the proletariat is to be allowed. It is effective force.

We have tried, through the works of Maurice, to describe the Christian conviction that the mere seizure of power is inadequate, and not an effective force at all. One must, instead,

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61 According to Gabriel Bowe, op. cit., p. 181.
turn to power as it is manifested in the revelation of God. It is discovered throughout all the history of that revelation to be none other power than the power of sacrifice. Defined as "submission to the will of God," sacrifice retains an active and dynamic character. And in that character, it represents a choice made between two kinds of violence.

How sacrifice functions as the principle of effective force is paralleled in Gandhi's description of "ahimsa," which "requires deliberate self-suffering, not a deliberate injuring of the supposed wrong-doer." But it does not share Gandhi's pacifism. For, as Reinhold Neibuhr points out, this is not to empty sacrifice of its aggressive content of power. If we were to replace Niebuhr's term "non-violence" with Maurice's term "sacrifice," the place of sacrifice as the principle of effective change would become more apparent, Niebuhr writes,

If justice should be achieved by social conflicts which lack the spiritual elements of non-violence (sacrifice), something will be lacking in the character of the society so constructed.

This is not to admit that the idea of sacrifice as the principle of effective force implies a purely subjective investigation into motives and intent. Against such subjectivity the Christian no less than the revolutionary is bound to object. The revolutionary will point out the movement of history, the inevitable emergence of the universal proletariat

63 Ibid., p. 256.
and the obscured reality to which present appearances are both thesis and antithesis.

The Christian, challenged to designate the objectivity of the principle of sacrifice points to the will of God as the only source of sacrifice. His will is not only separate from man, it is in the truest sense distinct. Indeed, it is often the very opposite. And as such, it delivers the one who submits to it from the tyranny of simple subjectivity.

The question may fairly be put, therefore, whether discerning the will of God is any less subjective than discerning the movement of history, and conversely, whether discerning the movement of history is any more objective than discerning the will of God? Fresh memories of oppression in the name of the revolution cast shadows of doubt every bit as gloomy as the stale memories of oppression in the name of the church. One could think of the despair of one N. S. Rubashov, the main character in Arthur Koestler's novel, Darkness at Noon, who, from his Stalinist death cell concludes on behalf of the revolutionary cause to which his life had been devoted, "We are doing the work of prophets without their gifts."

Here, then, are the outlines of the not inconsiderable dilemma posed by violence for the prospective Christian revolutionary. He cannot, in good faith, join in prosecuting change upon an interim principle of seizure of power. On the other hand, he cannot, in good faith, avoid any activities, even violent ones, toward which he is activated in the spirit
of sacrifice. Where the mutual obligations cross, he is still free to engage himself with revolutionaries only to the extent and in a manner urged upon him by the will of God to whom he submits. To refuse to submit is to lapse into self-will, the most certain precursor of greater violence, of no real change, and of impossible situations for the exposure of the only real society, men united in the divine order, the kingdom of God.
CHAPTER 7

REVOLUTION AND REBELLION--
ORDER AND THE ESTABLISHMENT

How the church is to be related to the establishment is a controversial issue at all times. When a revolutionary potential is introduced into such considerations, an already complex problem becomes still more acute. It raises the issue of state or order. And the answer must be correct and it must be immediate.

Richard Shaull, whose critique of the churches was cited earlier, bears a second hearing. "Usually, some decades after the success of the revolution, the churches have reluctantly entered into dialog or established a modus vivendi with the revolutionaries." ¹

This indictment is useful because it reveals clearly that the problem of the response of the Christian to revolution involves, at its root, the problem of the response of the Christian to the establishment. As Shaull points out, a modus vivendi for the church and establishment is of paramount importance whether the particular establishment is the "old order" or that of the "revolutionaries."

"Deliberate" change, characteristic of true revolution,

¹Loc. cit.
is change that can be criticized and evaluated. The apparent "givenness" of the establishment and the deliberate challenge to it by the revolution make such criticism imperative and urgent. What is the legitimate link between order and the establishment? A creative job of responding to the challenge of revolution requires something more virile than a mute acquiescence to the establishment because it is the establishment, or to whichever side emerges victorious (which is even more irresponsible, according to Shaull).

The concept of "the establishment" suggests a complex of social, political, and economic structures that gives the appearance of a menacing monolith to its opponents even though interaction within the establishment may enjoy a large degree of freedom. The stability of an establishment depends upon a balancing of inter-dependencies among these structures. Thus an establishment produces order.

This order, required for any establishment to thrive, can contain also the seeds of its own destruction. As the framework of the establishment becomes more complex, the sense of balance with regard to just which structures are necessary and what shall be their privileges becomes impaired. Conflicts of status and privilege are bound to occur. When, through the efforts of some group with elite standing within the establishment, these conflicts are resolved unsatisfactorily, social dysfunction is the result. Alienation produces a devaluing of all social ties so that they may, whether in fact, or in perception, become the links of oppression. The
disorder of society thus gives occasion for the disorder of revolution.

It may be that the church is guilty of settling its loyalties on purely pragmatic grounds. Then the church merely chooses the likely victor and sides with it. And that is a serious accusation not only for its face value, but also because for the church to do so, it must turn its back on a long and productive tradition of thought about its relation to the establishment. For there is a long history of the theological interest in the structures of societies and the way they function.

Buried within the ancient soil of Judeo-Christian sources the roots of this history are still vital. They may be dormant. They are not dead. Stir the dust of the creation account and they may be seen as Emil Brunner demonstrates.

Men may be commanded to love, but institutions, according to Brunner, are regarded in terms of justice. The question of justice, says Brunner, is the question of giving every man his due. This implies equality and the ground of equality in Christian thought is creation in the imago dei. But, says Brunner,

In the biblical story of creation, the same passage, the very same sentence, which speaks of man as God's image expressly includes one of the most cardinal of inequalities, the difference of sex, in the act of creation.²

That fact, disastrous for consistent attempts to consider justice in terms of equality, is just the fact that makes

community, and therefore, justice, possible. For inequality as it springs from creation is inequality that requires complement and thus (as in marriage, the most primordial of human communities), leads to community. Thus, Brunner is convinced that justice relates more closely to creation than to the moral commands of God and, therefore, more closely to the structure of society as divinely given.

The later history of the Old Testament makes the religious significance of social structures explicit. The timeliness of the prophetic ‹daber Elohim› was conditioned by a number of facts. Most important for our purposes was the dissolution of the theocratic ideal. This was inevitable as the compass of the sovereignty of Jahweh was increased by the proclamation of an universal dominion, and a greater emphasis upon the responsibility of the individual instead of the nation. The idea of foreign kings as the chastening instrument of Israel's God was a radical departure. That even the most wicked of them receive their thrones from the God of Israel came very late indeed, to find a place in the religious thought of the Jew (Daniel 4:17). But it did come. Thus, the post-exilic Jewish establishment was markedly different from what had gone before. And the ideas which precipitated that difference—the universal authority of God, the responsibility of the individual, the "divine right" of all kings—still bear close scrutiny in our evaluations of an "establishment."

New Testament history reveals a very different situation from that complained of by Shaull. Many commentators agree
that the writings of Luke had a primary interest in asserting that the church was not of necessity inimical to the State, Romans 13 presses for the loyalty of citizens to their state. But history records how the state failed to get the message. Its oppression of the young movement occurred with a dreadful inconsistency almost from Pentecost, of Acts, chapter two. As the oppressed, Christians gave serious attention to the relationship of the church to the establishment, particularly the state. If today the church shares apathetically with an oppressive state, it has indeed a great deal to answer for.

The close of the New Testament era and the ante-Nicene age did not mark the end of theological interpretation of the place and privileges of the establishment. Since the Edict of Milan, when the church first found a place within the establishment, a quantity of literature has appeared, inspired by Christian experience and indispensable for understanding the advance of social thinking in the western world. Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Arminius are names in themselves suggestive of the fruitfulness of Christian thought about social structures, and the meaning of social order.

To complete this sketchy and intentionally suggestive survey of theological concern with social structures, mention ought to be made of the chiliastic movements that spanned the history and geography of medieval Europe. A quasi-Christian eschatology gave substance to the discontent and daydreams of the peasant populations of entire villages and even regions. Large bands of people, charged with enthusiasm by leaders
characterized by imagination as much as charisma, kicked over the traces of the establishment and set about the creation of a new order. Names such as "Cathari," "Diggers" or "Levelers" are familiar because certain of their revolutionary eccentricities have been incorporated as normal facts of contemporary establishments.

Thus it emerges that if modern Christianity adopts a posture of indifference toward social structures it does so only by turning its back on a precedent of great antiquity and potential fruitfulness.

But tradition is neither the only nor the most important means of legitimating Christian concern for the social structures of the establishment. To abide faithful to the Christian revelation, faith and experience demand a critical appreciation of the structures of society. How one conceives of his relations to other men is both determined by, and determinative of, the kind of social structures one is willing to advance, or at least to tolerate. Given this appreciation, the stress one senses when social structures are contrived or prostituted for dubious ends is a legitimate area for Christian concern.

The element of human relationship implicit in any social structure, therefore, guarantees that its significance for Christian consideration always obtains. This is so even when the particular structure is allowed only a negative value. In the Thomistic notion of the state, for example, its existence was meaningful only because of man's inherited sinful nature.
The state was charged with keeping depravity in check. This negative evaluation of the state retains currency. Geneva enforced it among Protestants. Thus it is not surprising that the American clergyman-constitutionalist, James Madison, held that if people were virtuous there would be no need for governments. Even so, this position must surely be brought at last to the admission that although the state itself may be an artificially constituted relationship, its existence is justified inasmuch as it safeguards whatever real relationships there are among men which ought to be protected. For Madison, as for other framers of the American constitution, this was a matter primarily of securing individual rights not only against capricious monarchs, but also against the graspings of depraved humanity. Thus, the state is a product of grace rather than nature, of redemption rather than creation.

Concern for the structures of a society can only be enhanced, therefore, when it is based upon a theological appreciation of those structures which yields to them a positive function. And this is unreservedly the position taken by F. D. Maurice toward the structures which he deemed necessary to social existence which include the family, the nation, and the universal society.

No attempt can finally succeed, and therefore none should be made, to sublimate such necessary social structures to the whim or disposal of men, according to Maurice. They exist for the benefit and development of true humanity. They comprise the order of the world as created by God. Apart from them,
human life as God has willed it becomes impossible. Furthermore, the revelation of God himself is most manifest in the human relationships which these structures are ordained to guarantee. Thus, to tamper with the structures ordained by God befogs the revelation.

It is the twofold benefit of truly human life and the knowledge of God that gives to Maurice's estimation of the divine order its immense positive value. Not for him are any ideas of the state as primarily the check against depravity. A man dwells in a state not just for purposes of safety and protection, "but in order that his moral and spiritual being may be properly developed." (Maurice never attempts to separate the banality of the state from the glory of the "nation.")

So it is with the family. Perhaps because of his own family relationships, Maurice projected on the family an importance bordering on the sacred. To the relations within the family, Maurice ascribes the first stirrings toward God. Not the thaumaturgia of the natural world, but the wonderful feeling of relationship within the family accounts for the earliest rays of religious light. Thus, the earliest sense of


4 On this point, see F. M. McClain, op. cit., where the thesis is defended that "The principal formative influence on Maurice's ethical teaching came from his own personal relationships. More subtle perhaps than the intellectual sources of his thought, they were far more important for a man for whom theology and ethics were primarily a matter of relations, essentially personal." McClain's exposition of much unpublished material, especially Maurice's letters, provides substantial documentation for his thesis alongside a perceptive definition of each of the familial relations according to Maurice's analysis in his lectures on Social Morality.
natural and revealed religion is bonded in a fundamental unity, a unity of surpassing positive significance to human society. And thus the family is shown to be the basic repository of human relations as well as the source of much of the divine revelation.

The same twofold benefit is most obvious in Maurice's exposition of the nature and significance of the universal society. The choice between two kinds of societies, which might aptly be called universal, comes at last to be between that society represented by the church and that pursued in the spirit of empire. The empire is idolatrous in worship and acquisitive and selfish in dealings with men. Only the church, dependent upon God, and sacrificial in spirit, can provide a basis for a truly universal society. Only the church's message of man's unity in Christ, "the head and king of the race," is adequate to found a universal society in which are preserved the full scope of human relations with heaven and on earth.

In speaking of Maurice's great respect for social structures however, it must be stressed that this reverential attitude extends only to the three institutions just mentioned, the family, the nation, and the universal society. These Maurice considered to be necessary social structures. As evidence, Maurice points to two facts. The first is that in the sequence listed, these three institutions trace the progress of the development of every individual human life in terms of one's growing consciousness of relationships.5

5Social Morality, p, 37.
The other fact is that the biblical record of human society in general, traces its development as springing first from a family, then emerging into a nation, and finally pointing to the realization of a universal society.\(^6\)

Against these necessary, elemental social institutions, Maurice ranges the artificial and concocted structures of men's wills. To the former we must belong. To the latter we may belong. Joseph, for example, outcast and maligned, had both reason and opportunity to sever the family ties that bound him to his brothers. But to have done so, argues Maurice, would have been to act upon another principle than that which directed the Patriarchs. In spite of his brother's actions, Joseph could not feel free before God, in the light of the covenant that in Abraham's family all the world would be blessed,

to separate himself from his godless brethren and establish a new and distinct fellowship. Had he done so . . . he would have founded a society which was built upon choice not upon relationship.\(^7\)

Societies built upon choice must suffer to some degree from their artificiality. An opposing choice is sufficient cause to call into question the right of any "elected" society to existence. If the challenge is strong, the alternatives are dissolution, or resort to force. "Hobbes," says Maurice,

has convinced me that if Society is a merely

\(^6\)Ibid., p. 20.  
artificial institution it must be what he supposed it to be, dependent altogether upon Force, disturbed and shaken whenever the thought of right mingles with that of Force.8

Resort to force is only one, and perhaps a more remote, danger implied in societies of choice. More immediate and certainly more insidious for the preservation of the bonds of human society are two other dangers related as two sides of the same coin. The first is that an inappropriate loyalty may be committed to an artificial social structure. The second is that social structures, will come to be the victims of an unworthy indifference or even cynicism. That state of affairs portends a sad day for social order.

It is a sad day for churches, yes, and for nations, when men begin to regard themselves chiefly as sent forth by some central government to do its jobs, and not as men who are bound by sacred affinities and actual relations to those whom they preside over.9

Genuine human relations are thus submerged beneath relations that are concocted and artificial. Granted that a certain amount of artificial relations is inevitable in even a relatively simple society, it must not therefore be to the existence of these relations that genuine human society is referred. The cash nexus, for example, is an inevitable relation in money economies, but left to itself, it will shortly consume the true relations for which it can never provide more in a positive way than a convenience. The case is the same with affinity groups. Interests and opinions may play a large and positive role in a society. An agreed

8Social Morality, p. 329.

9The Epistles of St. John, p. 54.
ideology may achieve the similitude of a deep social relation. But, Maurice, insists, "Men are not united in opinions; they are not bound together under sophistries." Hence, Maurice protests in the fourth of his lectures on social morality, "It is of relations as the core of human society that I speak, as implied not only in its well-being but in its very being." He follows this with a warning that is definitive for virtually all of his social analysis:

If we do not take account of those societies in which we must exist, we shall attach a very disproportionate value to those in which we may exist. The Class and the Club will be superlatively precious and dear as the Family is lost out of sight. Men will recognise themselves more and more by their badges and colours when they cease to care about ties of blood. 11

The distinction between social structures to which we must belong and those to which we may belong is not frequently explicit in Maurice. But it is implicit everywhere. To overlook this distinction which is basic to all of Maurice's social analysis is to invite a host of exegetical problems in

10 The Conflict of Good and Evil in Our Day; Twelve Letters to a Missionary (London: Smith, Elder, and Co., 1865. Cit. Conflict of Good and Evil), p. 132. Cf. "A Society merely united in opinion had, it seemed to me, no real cohesion; it must exalt that which a man or a multitude troweth, above the truth, or must suppose them to be identical. It will be very positive, yet it will have no permanent resting-place. It will be always changing; never growing. It will be alternately persecuting and latitudinarian; it will be equally far from steady belief and genuine tolerance." "Address of Congratulation to the Rev. F. D. Maurice, on His Nomination to St. Peter's, Vere Street; with His Reply Thereto," (________: ________, 1860), p. 4.

11 Social Morality, p. 59. Cf. The Conscience, p. 49--"As long as we like a person we shall suppose we are bound to him; our dislike will dissolve the tie. We shall live in a circle of what are called in the cant of our day elective
the interpretation of not only Maurice's writings, but his life work as well.

In the interest of interpreting Maurice's confidence in the divine order, it is possible to paint his portrait as that of a social quietist, one who fears to interfere in the affairs of men lest he upset the order of God. But this is caricature and not a portrait. It overdraws the lines of Maurice's idealism and emphasizes the obvious conservative shading in his political thought.

What it cannot show is the reason for Maurice's involvement (however reluctant) in radical approaches to the problems of the society of which he was cognizant. The conservative idealist commonly scorns the world of sense and sorrow for the loftier ethers of some reality not immediately perceptible to other men. Not even his confidence in the divine order, however, turned Maurice's eyes away from the world known to every man. One did not, according to him, see the Kingdom of Christ better by withdrawing from the world but by immersing oneself in it. Real human relations were not to be shunned in search of ideal and heavenly ones. They were to be entered into and cherished as the evidences and exemplifications of the relation between man and God.

But here was the vital point. Societies to which one

affinities; the grand old name of Relations will be treated as obsolete. That you may escape this danger, I dwell upon this fact—that we are in an order; that relations abide whether we are faithful to them or neglect them; and that the Conscience in each of us affirms "I am in this order, I ought to act consistently with it, let my fancies say what they please."
might belong do not share the ultimacy accorded to societies to which we must belong.

Only a firm grasp on this fact can explain Maurice's activism. And it is easy to overlook because it is seldom explicit. The magnificent study of Professor Torben Christensen on the Origins and History of Christian Socialism is weakest just at this point. From a perfectly acceptable premise Professor Christensen is forced to draw a faulty conclusion. He cannot logically account for Maurice's activism without the distinction Maurice makes between societies of choice and the divine order with its necessary structures.

To Maurice the Divine Order, or synonymously with it "The Kingdom of Christ," was an existing reality in which man was already living. Therefore it was not the task of man to create forms of organization in which true brotherhood of love and fellowship could be expressed. God Himself had already placed man in a "Human Order" with "human relationships."\(^{12}\)

Granted that for Maurice the divine order is a present reality. Granted that God had placed man within it. That certainly does not rule out for Maurice the responsibility "to create forms of organization in which true brotherhood of love and fellowship could be expressed." When Maurice cast about for a definition of Christian socialism he settled upon words remarkably similar to the very one Professor Christensen implies he could not have used with consistency. Socialism, says Maurice, means the "acknowledgement of brotherhood of heart

and fellowship in work." To the forming of workers' cooperatives, Maurice committed himself because he was finally convinced that such an acknowledgement was forthcoming in no other way. It is entirely consistent, therefore, to insist that Maurice's concept of the divine order was not such an one as would preclude in practice the creation of forms of organization, i.e., social structures to promote the sense of relationships and thus of the divine order itself.  

Nor, on the other hand does it preclude the destruction of social structures when those structures obscure the relationships of the divine order within which men are placed. Again, Professor Christensen succumbs to the social quietist interpretation of Maurice's concept of the social structures. "He did not deny that political and social anomalies did exist, but this did not entail the doing away with the existing society and its institutions and substituting it with a new order of society." Rather, continues Christensen, "the only concern of the church in respect to the nation and the anomalies of its political and social life must be education."

That is surely to beg the question, "Education for what?"

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14 Martin Buber perceives this well. "As distinct from the latter (proper political movements such as Chartism), which wanted to alter the whole hierarchy of power, the Cooperative Movements wanted to begin with the creation of social reality, without which no amount of tinkering with legal relationships can ever lead to socialism." Paths in Utopia, Translated by R. F. C. Hull. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949), p. 58.

Education is defined, finally, by a change of behavior and of attitude. In social terms this implies an amended appreciation of society in general and of its various social structures in particular. Such conceptual changes will inevitably entail the doing away with certain institutions of any society. And Maurice, neither in theory nor practice, held himself aloof from that.

Wonderful as the prophetic institution of Israel was, for example, it had its false prophets, its utter hypocrites and blasphemers. Which goes to show, according to Maurice, that

There is no charm in any ordinance whatever, in the succession of son to father, or of pupil to teacher, to prevent such results as these. If there were, we should fall down and worship institutions and arrangements instead of God. He pours contempt upon the best devices, upon those which bear most of the stamp of His own wisdom, when they exalt themselves against Him.\(^{16}\)

Because the interpretation of Maurice as conservative to the point of quietism prevails generally, it will be instructive to see how Maurice's appreciation of the divine order, as opposed to the artificial structures of man's designing, led him

\(^{16}\text{Prophets and Kings, p. 13. Of Robert Southey, Maurice mourned that he has succumbed to the belief that "political perfection was confined to our own Constitution, and that Christianity was identical with the English Church Establishment. He is, indeed, a mournful example of the ruin which may be wrought upon the fairest minds, by attaching universal feeling to particular institutions, and by professing to find all truth in the creed of one establishment." Cited in Olive Brose, op.cit., pp. 19-20. Cf, Maurice's words, "I must repeat the warning I have given you already, that all Institutions--the very best that have ever existed in nations--the very best that can exist in particular neighbourhoods--are liable to decay, and to be turned to other purposes than those for which they are founded. The best arrangements give no sufficient security for their continuance; no, not even the best principles. There is a proverb, and a true one, which says 'that the}
both to create and to destroy in the interests of its proclamation. No area with which he concerned himself escaped these two pans of his balance.

Such was the case with regard to the economic system. Prevailing as it did upon a basis of competition, Maurice was not in the least hesitant to express his misgivings about that institution in word and deed.

To Kingsley he wrote,

> Competition is put forth as the law of the universe. That is a lie. The time is come for us to declare that it is a lie by word and deed. I see no way but associating for work instead of for strikes.¹⁷

To a Mrs. Rich, he wrote in the same vein,

> At present it (competition) boasts to be the one governing motive of human beings. Reason declares, the most painful experience proves, that if it does govern it is destructive of Society—that it sets every individual against his neighbor.¹⁸

The whole motive of Maurice's involvement with the Christian Socialists was the creation of a social structure by which cooperation and association could be declared by acts and deeds to be the antagonist principle to that of competition. Socialism for Maurice was no superior system of economics, no abolition of private property, no complex vision

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¹⁷ _Life_, Vol. II, p. 32.

¹⁸ _Life_, II, p. 47. For the most lucid and comprehensive complaint by Maurice against the principle of competition, see his lecture "Reasons for Cooperation" (London: John W. Parker, 1851).
of a well-managed balance between production and consumption. That kind of socialism Maurice was content to leave to the likes of Robert Owen, whose efforts he criticized as leading finally not to the reassertion and revaluing of human relationships but "to the doctrine that men are mere creatures of circumstances, and that by a readjustment of circumstances their condition may be completely reformed." 19 Socialism, said Maurice, "... means nothing of itself but the science of making men partners, the science of partnership." 20 Thus, anyone who recognises the principle of co-operation as a stronger and truer principle than that of competition has a right to the honour or the disgrace of being called a socialist. 21

It is apparent, then, that however cautiously Maurice moved, however reticent he sometimes was to cast his lot with the decisions of the other Christian Socialists, however obscure and forced his "principled" reasons for abstaining on occasions from joining with them, there was nothing in his view of the divine order that precluded active interference with particular structures whether to create or to destroy.

Indeed, there were the highest and best reasons for just such interference if at last it appeared the only course. In other words, attitudes are not the only paints for Maurice's portrait. Actions are on the pallett, too. Other issues substantiate the claim that Maurice was far from being a quietist. They reveal a propensity toward activism when

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he could feel his immediate duty correspond to his voca-
tion of proclaiming the divine order. In regard to the Working Men's College and Queen's College, it was a creative activism. In regard to newspapers and party interests and loyalties it was earnestly destructive.

Newspapers provide an especially good example. Because Maurice felt his vocation to be the proclamation of the divine order he was immediately faced with a problem. By its very nature, the proclamation implies the urgency of the widest possible dissemination. It is to Maurice's credit that he early recognized the value of extra-ecclesiastical institutions for this purpose. The formation of the Working Men's College and Queen's College provide substantial evidence of this recognition. In the case of the latter, Maurice viewed its value as indirect as well as direct. Governesses would themselves profit inasmuch as they would be better equipped for their teaching duties. But they doubtlessly would pass on the message of the divine order as they had imbibed it from their own sympathetic instructors. Thus, to instruct the governesses was to instruct the generations that should fall to their charge. This was the indirect benefit.

But these institutions, though simple enough, were

22I am joined on this position by Frank M. McClain. "Some critics maintain that Maurice was reluctant to take a decided stand on social issues lest he tamper with the underlying divine order. On the contrary, his belief in an order founded upon relations between persons frequently compelled him to break with his conservative support of the status quo." Maurice, Man and Moralist, p. 113.
yet too elaborate and localized to create the broadest possi-
ble dissemination. The most obvious alternative was something
in printed form. Why not a religious newspaper? Less to his
credit, Maurice, who so frequently entered the lists for ver-
bal battle in Macmillan's and other periodicals as well as
in series of tracts and letters, let his own personal pique
toward newspapers blind him to their potential for doing the
very thing he professed to be called to do.

When in 1848, Ludlow, one of Maurice's associates in
Christian Socialism, suggested the establishment of a Chris-
tian newspaper along the lines of Cobbett's "Political Reg-
ister" addressed to the working classes, Maurice countered
with his own suggestion of a series of tracts meant for the
"higher orders." In the end Maurice gave his assent to the
newspaper project only because, according to Torben Christensen,
his associates had declared as a body in favor of it. In the
light of their united conviction, Maurice felt that the news-
paper must be right.23

When the newspaper, "Politics for the People," failed
after only seventeen numbers, newspapers found no new part
in the plans of the associates until two years later. By
the time the Society for Promoting Working Men's Association
was established, Ludlow had visions again of another newspaper.

... Ludlow felt convinced that the right thing
to do would be to publish a newspaper which should
address the whole nation, presumably in order to
discuss all topical questions in the light of
Christian Socialism. Connected with it, he thought

23 Origin and History of Christian Socialism, p. 73,
a penny periodical should be issued with the workers and their problems especially in mind.\textsuperscript{24}

The response of Maurice to this plan reveals more clearly how basic was his mistrust and antipathy toward newspapers. He rejected the plan out of hand. Ludlow wrote to Kingsley:

However, here is a terrible hitch. The Master objects in toto to the Newspaper, very in toto to a Journal, tho' at a penny. He says that the newspaper is the "great idol-temple of the day;" that the theatre will be reformed sooner than journalism; that all societies have gone down from the moment they have had journals.\textsuperscript{25}

That Maurice himself had been the unwilling victim of newspapers from time to time must explain part of his low regard for them. But Maurice's son makes it clear that victimization was not the major explanation. "The war on his part was distinctly one of aggression. None of them had attacked him at the moment when he denounced them."\textsuperscript{26} But his denunciation was unabated throughout his lifetime. In his Letter to Lord Ashley, Maurice wrote,

Now your Lordship is well aware that the great aim of the religious newspapers is to keep the evangelical clergy from co-operating with their brethren; to bring all persons of their body into suspicion who think that they are not to dwell alone upon the earth, but are to contribute their quota of wisdom to the good of it.

Maurice thought of himself as "one who should set himself to oppose not this or that religious newspaper or

\textsuperscript{24}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 151.

\textsuperscript{25}\textit{Ibid.}, n. p. 152.

\textsuperscript{26}\textit{Life}, Vol. I, p. 244.

\textsuperscript{27}"On Right and Wrong Methods of Supporting Protestantism," p. 17.
party, but the whole scheme and system of religious newspapers as a whole."28

Here, then, is an apparent inconsistency in Maurice. Convinced that his task and the task of the Church was to provide that education in the divine order necessary to the conforming of society to it, Maurice rejected altogether what might have proved to be the most useful form of that education, so far as saturation was concerned. One would have thought that he would have leapt at the opportunities raised by newspapers for informing the masses. A deeper probe is required to find out why he did not.

What appears inconsistent from one direction reveals a clear consistency from another. Whether out of personal experience of their venom, or whether out of principle, Maurice could think of newspapers in no way except as organs of party lines and interests. First, the parties are formed. "Immediately after that, their Newspapers and Reviews are seen generously striving that no other party shall have the stigma of being more unfair and libellous than their own."29

Now "the party" epitomizes for Maurice everything that is bad and nothing that is good about societies of choice. In a day when parties within the church enjoyed a larger strength and prominence than in our own, Maurice denounced


ecclesiastical parties as "in principle as well as in practice, incompatible" with the life of the church.  

He was equally suspicious of parties in political endeavors. Even his admiration for Burke was moderated by Burke's enthusiasm for the practical necessity of political parties. To argue for their necessity was to negate their true character as artificial societies. Only the consideration that Burke, "who could justify it (the party) best in writing, was obliged to abandon it in fact" served to reinstate Burke in Maurice's favor.  

The most disdain, Maurice reserved for the "anti-party" party. "Above all we must never be tempted to that greatest of all sins, the forming of a party for the sake of displacing or overcoming existing parties." "I would rather be the most vehement and mad partisan," he said, "than one of those cold contemners of all parties and of all men." 

On the other hand, Maurice would not allow one to occupy a seat above the battle after the manner of eclecticism. Eclecticism is, in Maurice's opinion "emasculating." "He who endeavours to substitute a Church for systems must regard with

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30 "Reasons for Not Joining a Party in the Church," pp. 7f, cited in Vidler, F. D. Maurice and Co., p. 82.
33 Cited in Vidler, F. D. Maurice and Co., p. 83.
most dread and suspicion the attempt at a complete all-comprehending system.  

The only consistent position toward parties was implacable opposition.

No, brethren! in this sense of attempting to compete with parties, or imitate them, or supersede them, we must let them wholly alone. In another sense, we must never let them alone; we must be continually tormenting them.

And as for himself, Maurice wrote, "I feel that I am to be a man of war against all parties, that I may be a peacemaker between all men."

War against parties, therefore, implied war against the organs of parties, newspapers. To give his consent to the establishment of a newspaper was, therefore, for Maurice, a matter of principle. And the principles required for such consent were those he most utterly and consistently repudiated. It amounted to investing the social structures of human choice with a disproportionate significance. It implied the danger of making the party everything, and real society, the divine order, of little value.

In each of these examples, Maurice's distinction between societies of choice and the divine order is the operative principle. It serves him in determining what will be his relationship to any establishment structure. It is the most reasonable explanation for the combination of regard for the status quo,

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on the one hand, and a desire to see change of a radical nature, on the other.

With equal candor Maurice therefore can decry the folly of either the rebel or the reactionary. For the benefit of the former, Maurice warns:

. . . the custom of breaking through customs, becomes the cruellest of all necessities; it involves the loss of power, weariness, poor results or none, till the proud libertine is ready to accept any ruler, provided he is formal enough, minute enough in his exactions; provided he will save his servant from the fearful privilege of deciding, in any matter whatsoever, for himself.38

Passing judgement on the reactionary, Maurice shows that defending the establishment is not the same thing as defending the divine order. The true defender of the divine order probably had no fiercer antagonists than those who said they were not of the world, but of the Church. But they knew that the profession was false. They knew that all who worship Customs and Traditions instead of God must be of the world, and that the church against which the gates of Hell shall not prevail exists to withdraw men from the one worship and to fix them in the other.39

The implication of this distinction as it exists among the structures of society cannot help but bear upon one's attitude toward revolution. It is evidence that at its basis, the response to revolution is, in fact, a response to a particular establishment. The distinction Maurice draws between societies of choice, and social structures as part of the divine order, insures that even for him, the ethical response to revolution, whether one joins it or opposes it, is not

38Lincoln Inn Sermons, Vol. VI, p. 177.
predictable on dogmatic grounds. Maurice's position demands Christian responsibility for every situation with revolutionary potential. The Christian's response is not conditioned by the mere fact of revolutionary potential, but by his appreciation of what is at stake in terms of social structures with real social value.40

When one examines Maurice's attitude to revolution, it is precisely this feeling of responsibility that emerges. What gave form to the concept of revolution throughout Europe in the mid-nineteenth century was the French Revolution. This was especially true in England where Karl Marx was only a singularly attentive scholar in the library of the British Museum. As to Hegelian thought, notwithstanding the efforts of Maurice's father-in-law, Julius Hare, it was little known.

Maurice's view of the French Revolution had apparently been most influenced by two sources, Carlyle's Reflections on the French Revolution, and the parliamentary speeches of Edmund Burke. Maurice's own words confirm the guess as to which he felt the greater congeniality.

Although Maurice knew Carlyle personally and could speak

40 This element of responsibility is characteristic of Maurice's ethics and serves to increase its maneuverability by its implied contextualism. Certainly it distinguishes him from the casuistry which constituted the popular ethical methodology in his day. On this see especially The Conscience, lecture nine. It is noteworthy that H. Richard Niebuhr has acknowledged a compatibility with Maurice. James M. Gustafson in the introduction to Niebuhr's The Responsible Self records that Niebuhr "found Maurice's stance toward his work to be a congenial one." (London: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 14.
of his Reflections as uniting a "vivid sense of locality" with "much higher qualities" to produce a "magnificent epic of the French Revolution," he nevertheless considered that a great discrepancy existed between Carlyle and himself. In recounting an episode when the two men had come into open confrontation at a dinner party, Maurice shields Carlyle's identity by referring to him as "the best growler of the day." Maurice's references to Carlyle taken in toto produce the figure of a gloomy genius, one whose significance is chiefly negative.

I do not find that Carlyle leads us directly to a centre (for human society); but I do find that he makes us despair for want of one, and that he expresses the indistinct wailings of men in search of it better than all the other writers of our day.

And again, twenty years later:

The infinite wail for a real and not a nominal father, for a real and not an imaginary king, comes out in Carlyle more than in any man I know. . .

The problem with Carlyle's politics, as Maurice explains to Ludlow, is that he starts from the wrong ground. Confronted by a despotic constitution of arbitrary power, Carlyle intends to counter it by declaring the popular sovereignty of the people.

But the sovereignty of the people, in any sense or form, I not only repudiate as at once the

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silliest and most blasphemous of all contradic-
tions, but I look upon it as the same contradic-
tion, the same blasphemy in its fullest expan-
sion of which the kings have been guilty.45

The context of this statement will reveal that it is
no more a criticism of democracy than it is of monarchy. It
is aimed at affirming the office of the king as ordained by
the grace of God and constitutional government as its natural
outgrowth. Its target is the idea that either the king or
the people is sovereign. It is a prefiguring of Brunner's
declaration that "soverignty belongs to God alone."46 "Start-
ing then, from the primary theocratic doctrine," Maurice
writes, "from the proclamation of Christ the everlasting Word
as King of Kings and Lord of Lords, I am prepared for judgments
which shall assert the truth and bring it into Light."47

And this theocratic center, as we have seen, is what
Maurice most missed in Carlyle. Thus, for Maurice, Carlyle's
interpretation of the French Revolution, "magnificent epic"
notwithstanding, was only useful for the wail it raised over
what it was afraid to mention.

Much more to his liking was what Maurice found in Edmund
Burke. Unlike the majority of his contemporaries, Burke came
out in opposition to the French Revolution immediately and
consistently. Those with capitalist interests at first hailed
the events in France as sounding the knell over the French

46Justice and the Social Order, p. 71.
commercial empire. Idealists, early on, dreamed of the revo-
lution as the long-awaited cure for the ancient social ills
of France and ultimately of all Europe. Each was destined
for disillusionment.

Not so with Burke, whose opposition Maurice felt safe
in ascribing to principles, perhaps because they were prin-
ciples of which Maurice highly approved. Burke, like Maurice,
understood the perfection of human life to be contingent upon
human relationships.

Rousseau typified for Burke the disregard of all revo-

tionaries for human relationships as he deduced that disre-
gard. Had not Rousseau flaunted his illicit affairs with a
succession of mistresses? Had he not abandoned his illegiti-
mate progeny as they were born, on the steps of a church? This
story, horrifying to the ears of much of Britain, has since
been largely discredited on the earthy skepticism about
Rousseau's physical capability to father a child. But it
served Burke as an effective _argumentum ad hominem_ against,
by implication, all French revolutionaries. He was convinced
that no human relations were safe from such men. And, for
Burke, as for Maurice, human perfection depends upon the per-
fection of relationships.

The fear of threatened human relationships permits Burke,
according to Maurice, to attack the French Revolution on the
same principles he had used to countenance the American Revo-

tution. Maurice says

... anyone who observes that characteristic of his
speeches respecting America which I have dwelt upon--
I mean his assertion that there are actual relations existing between nations and between all orders in a particular nation, and that the whole happiness of society depends upon the acknowledgment of these relations and upon the fulfillment of the mutual duties which they involve—will not wonder or think him inconsistent if he complained of a revolution which seemed to him to set aside all relations, to reduce society into its original elements, and to rebuild it upon the assertion of individual rights, not of obligations.

We have seen how his high regard for human relations inevitably loads the structures of society, including the state, with positive significance for Maurice. The case is the same for Edmund Burke, whose emphasis in the Reflections is, of course, upon the structure of the state.

without... civil society man could not by any possibility arrive at the perfection of which his nature is capable, nor even make a remote and faint approach to it. He who gave our nature to be perfected by our virtue gave also the necessary means of its perfection—He willed therefore, the state...

The destruction and creation of social structures are therefore tasks pregnant with significance. Even as their most primary function, social structures exist not so much to protect a man's rights as to safeguard his relationships. Instant and wholesale innovation Burke felt sure would be most destructive. Caution was the better counsel. "It is with infinite caution," he wrote, "that any man should venture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society, or on building it

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again without having model patterns of approved utility before his eyes."50

Instead of wholesale renovation, Burke recommends the processes of trial and error in the structuring of society. The politics of reform for him are not ideological, but wholly practical. In a "Letter to a noble Lord," he writes,

Reform is not change in the substance or in the primary modification of the object, but a direct application of a remedy to the grievance complained of.51

Burke's cautionary approach, as Raymond Williams points out, does not make reform, even radical reform, impossible. It does make it difficult.

But it is not for this that Maurice separates from Burke. Rather, Maurice felt that Burke failed to provide any criterion for determining the relative worthiness of any social structure to exist. Burke had insisted upon art as man's nature. Society, he held to be "wholly artificial; and made, like all other legal fictions, by common agreement."52 Burke had managed to divest his thought of the influence of talk regarding the rights of man in the state of nature. But he never quite succeeded in avoiding all the implications of social contract thinking.53 And it is for this that Maurice


52"Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs," cited in Raymond Williams, op. cit., p. 28.

53Charles Parkin argues that far from rejecting contract theory, Burke accepts it as basically correct but in need of
faults him. Burke's problem is obvious. If, at its founda-
tions, human society is a construction of human artifice, an
act of human will, what is to hinder that same art or will a
few generations later from arising to overthrow and supplant
the inherited society? Upon what ground can its structure
be legitimated? For this question, so far as Maurice was
concerned, Burke had no suitable answer.

The trouble is, according to Maurice, Burke does not
go far enough. "He cannot push his own argument to its con-
sequences."54 When Maurice wrote that Burke "... is the in-
dex to all modern thoughts and speculations on political sub-
jects," he followed with this advice:

... never read him or any of the moderns without
keeping your mind steady and hopeful by the study
of St. Paul's and St. John's Epistles and the Apoca-
lypse. There we learn the sure triumph of order,
unity, and love over confusion, division and hatred,—
learn to expect that we shall pass through all these
in their most dreadful manifestations,—learn to
understand the grounds of our safety and of the
Church's safety when all is wreck and ruin.55

It seemed to Maurice that while Burke is eloquent in
has assertion of an ordered world, he is reluctant to identify
the ground of that order beyond human artifice. "Burke died
in the year 1797; he belongs emphatically to the last age,"56

interpretation. Thus his uses of "contract" terminology are
not accidental but critical to Burke's interests. The Moral
Basis of Burke's Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1956.)

That is Maurice's way of saying that Burke is a victim of purely natural theology.\textsuperscript{57} Burke had departed from that meaning of the word "revelation" which imports the showing forth that which is deepest in the constitution of things "to the identification of the revealed with the adventitious."\textsuperscript{58}

This provides for Maurice an explanation of why Burke fails to produce a satisfactory substitute for the abstraction of a "social contract." It illumines the failure of Burke to ever admit an actual dominion of God over Britain. It drives Burke to describe the Act of Settlement as a clever religious device to bridge an embarrassing hiatus, an interpretation which prompts Maurice to accuse him of grounding the English constitution upon a fiction. He cannot escape the evil tares among the good grain of his own consistency.

Burke was not inconsistent. The germ of all that was weak and insincere in him lay in his first book. He abandoned neither the good nor the evil which discovers itself there. He was stedfast throughout in his assertion that men cannot ignore their relations to each other, and try to build society upon an abstract foundation, without committing suicide. He was throughout unable to see what is the real substitute for abstract notions—what is that absolute foundation which upholds relations, and which can preserve them even through the tempest of a popular revolution—even when priests, philosophers, and mobs, are each in their own way destroying them.\textsuperscript{59}

In his attempt to render political philosophy morally

\textsuperscript{57}Maurice's own opinion was "I am sure that Nature is a teacher, and a great teacher, if so be we have been in another school first." \textit{Life}, Vol. I, p. 284.

\textsuperscript{58}\textit{Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy}, Vol. II, p. 587.

\textsuperscript{59}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 594.
responsible, Burke had succumbed to a Lockian reluctance upon nearing the ocean of Being. His determination to observe nothing but by induction was, alas, maintained too stringently and he found that the firm earth was not firm but rocked and reeled. "There must be something above it, or beneath it, or around it." What it was Burke never said.

While Burke recognised more than did Carlyle what was at stake in the French Revolution in terms of human relations and social order, neither was able to declare the ground of those relations and the foundations of that order to Maurice's satisfaction. Neither one felt as Maurice did, the presence of those structures of society rendered necessary by divine ordination, and hence neither could declare how one goes about living responsibly within it.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find a quite different attitude in Maurice toward revolution than is to be found in either Carlyle, or Burke. He is neither so approving of revolution as Carlyle, nor so fearful of revolution as Burke. This more moderate position can be elucidated by an examination of the more direct references by Maurice to revolution.

In the Preface to the third edition of the Life, Maurice's son speaks of his father's well-known "dread of social revolution." And Maurice himself in a letter defending his association with the Christian Socialists comments, "I had the strongest convictions, from my intimate knowledge of them. . .

60Ibid., p. 595.
that they abhorred revolutions as much as I did." 62 Nevertheless, Maurice's abhorrence of revolution was not unequivocal. When he thought of a revolution in the ecclesiastical establishment, he was quite in favor. "I do not think... any man can prevent an ecclesiastical revolution, or ought to prevent it, unless by being the instrument of a religious reformation." 63 And to Ludlow, Maurice enlarged upon the value of such a reformation:

The necessity of an English theological reformation, as the means of averting an English political revolution and of bringing what is good in foreign revolutions to know itself, has been more and more pressing itself upon my mind. 64

What Maurice is bold to call "the good in foreign revolutions" will be dealt with below.

It should be pointed out here, that, at least on one occasion, Maurice's activities earned for him some small notoriety for being himself a revolutionary. Together with some works by Kingsley, one government report, and a number of French works, Maurice found two of his own contributions to the "Politics for the People" series included in a list of "Revolutionary Literature" drawn up and published by a Mr. J. Wilson Croker in the Quarterly Review for September, 1851. This list was followed by a vituperative attack aimed at inflaming even the weakest establishment sympathy against Maurice and Kingsley and charging them with producing and promoting

systems the most destructive of the peace, the happiness, and the virtue of society. . . the wildest and most anarchical doctrines, . . in which religion and morality are perverted and scoffed at and every rule of conduct which experience has sanctioned, and on which the very existence of society depends, openly assailed; while in their place are sought to be established doctrines as outrageous as the maddest ravings of furious insanity. 65

Further on, the same article identifies the "outrageous doctrines" as

. . . not, indeed open, undisguised Jacobinism and jacquerie but, under the name of Christian Socialism! the same doctrines in a form not the less dangerous for being less honest. 66

That these charges, themselves of a raving nature, were taken by some with great seriousness may be seen from events subsequent to the publication of the article in the Quarterly Review. Refutation of Croker's charges might have appeared readily to anyone taking time to read "Politics for the People." By this time the series had been collected into a single volume. Happily for Croker, his article appeared at a time when, because of assumptions similar to Croker's, most booksellers steadfastly refused to keep copies. What is more, newspapers turned away advertisements proffered by the Christian Socialists.

In November of the same year, the storm winds were at gale force. Concerned by the controversy aroused by Croker's article, Dr. Jelf, Principal of King's College wrote to Maurice with the implicit ultimatum that he disavow openly any connection with Kingsley or else relinquish his chair.


66Ibid.
As it turned out, Maurice refused to disavow Kingsley or to resign his chair. But the letter of ultimatum conveys the revolutionary impression created by the work in which Maurice was engaged. In it, Dr. Jelf felt constrained to draw Maurice's attention to his guilt by association. Kingsley is accused of using language that is "occasionally almost insurrectionary." And by becoming identified with Kingsley in the mind of the interested public, Maurice had brought himself and King's College to share as links in a chain of infidelity, socialism, and communism that thus separates them by only three links from the author of The Rights of Man.

It is noteworthy that Maurice's abhorrence of revolution was not so strong as to make him disavow either his associations or his activities, even when those associations and activities earned him a reputation as a revolutionary, albeit undeserved.

Still, this fact alone cannot bear the weight of evidence to suggest that Maurice's abhorrence of revolution was not unequivocal. Stronger evidence is forthcoming from the interpretation of the significance of revolution which he projects upon all instances of revolution. There is a consistency about this interpretation that marks it out as one of the signal positions of Maurice and therefore one that ought not to be overlooked.

In brief, his interpretation of the significance of revolution is this: revolution is the manifestation of the

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67 It was two years later that Maurice was discharged, and then it was over his understanding of the word "eternal"—with reference to punishment in the Theological Essays.
divine order asserting its reality in order to accomplish the
destruction of its violations to secure its own reinstatement
as an objective of the conscience.

The light of this interpretation shows that revolution
may, indeed, have good in it. For confirmation of this good,
Maurice calls to his side the Apostles.

They regarded every judgment upon their own na-
tion or upon any nation in that age, or any age,
as a manifestation or appearing of Jesus Christ.
They believed Him to be the King of the World;
they could not doubt that what we describe as
crisis or revolutions in the conditions of so-
ciety were, in very deed, discoveries of His
purposes, the destruction of something which had
interfered with them.68

In the Lectures on the Apocalypse Maurice declares that
the purpose of the sealed book of the fifth chapter of
Revelation

... is to interpret those puzzling passages in
human history which exhibit periods of revolution
and anarchy. It shows them to be the necessary
results of previous tyranny and defiance of the
law; it shows that there is a Divine purpose in
them, and a Divine blessing to come out of them.69

The blessing of which Maurice speaks is self-evident.
Since the structures of human society must ultimately be
grounded upon the structures of the divine order, men can only
count it a blessing when their false and oppressive structures
are done away—when the firm ground of real society is brought
to the light of conscience.

One of the Dialogues on Family Worship makes this point

68The Epistles of St. John, p. 172.

clearly. The discussion is focused upon the clause from the Lord's Prayer, "Give us this day our daily bread." The clergyman testifies to his sense of the inequalities of society and the attempts to remedy them, including agrarian reform and revolution. In themselves, neither provides the panacea for distributive injustice. The clergyman continues:

Yet I see that agrarian experiments and revolution for equality must be and will be the effect of this state of things; nay that great overthrows of a fictitious civilization have been the means by which men have been taught that they cannot make laws their own way, that there are laws that bind them and to which they must submit. 

Because in the final analysis, human society is not secular, revolution cannot be of purely secular interest or benefit.

There has never been one that did not try the faith and worship of men as well as their policy and government; there never has been one which has not proved how inseparably these are connected. And I believe there never has been one which has not demonstrated the falsehood of self-will, or arbitrary will, and the truth that all power is centred in Him who gave up all power and took on Him the form of a servant.

Revolution is a terror to rulers because it illuminates the contingent nature of their sovereignty. According to Maurice, the Apostle John speaks of all the terrors which the rulers of the earth experience at such seasons as testimonies.

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70P. 193.

71On the sense given "secular" by Maurice, see Vidler, F.D. Maurice and Co., p. 164.

72Lectures on the Apocalypse, p. 92.
of their conscience that God and the Lamb are come forth to judge them as cries of deliverance from their wrath.

By this comprehension of the significance of revolution, Maurice gains the position which is consistent with the rest of his thought. Revolution is not, of necessity, against the divine order. It can be against the artificial, contrived structures. Revolution does not undermine the divine order because it cannot. It can only assert it inasmuch as it is the manifestation of the divine order asserting itself.

On a negative ground, Maurice wants to insist that revolution is impotent to accomplish anything against the divine order of society. Even its role as a direct means of changing social conditions is limited and probably nil. He cannot accept that, by itself, a period of rebellion is in any way adequate to achieve real social change.

Things can only be worsened when the intent of revolution becomes solely the amelioration of oppressive social conditions. This is to proceed superficially. It is to follow in the path marked out by Robert Owen and Maurice's objections to his approach have already been cited. For Maurice, the social problem has not to do with rights but with relations. To raise the level of consciousness of these relations is the only valid aim, the only genuine accomplishment of revolution.

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In other words, revolution is impotent as a direct social cure-all, the direct function is political, i.e., the re-ordering of the state. But when the re-ordering of the state conforms it more fully to the divine order the effect upon the conditions of a society is salutary. 74

In our own time, Hannah Arendt has affirmed Maurice's point of view. She too has detailed the function of revolution as freedom more than food.

The revolution, when it turned from the foundation of freedom to the liberation of man from suffering, broke down the barriers of endurance and liberated, as it were the devastating forces of misfortune and misery instead. . . No revolution has ever solved the "social question" and liberated men from want. 75

Except for the implication that revolution actually founds freedom instead of disclosing its permanent foundations, Maurice would agree with this.

For if revolution is really to reform, it must judge aright the urgency of the deepest demands of human society. A revolution that does not do this is as successful as an attempt to clear a muddy windscreen with a dry towel It only relocates the obscurities. Maurice writes:

It may sound very absurd to say that calculations of profit and loss do not affect people who are

74 Thus Maurice appreciates politics as bearing directly upon one's spiritual life. In a letter to Lytton Strachey he speaks of politics as "the mighty impulse" to which he finally yielded as a deeper service to God. "I never was happier than when I discovered that God did not design me to overcome it, and that on the contrary my personal and spiritual life was deeply interested in my yielding to it." Life, Vol. I, p. 216.

75 On Revolution, p. 108.
poor, and may starve, as much as appeals to their conscience and their sympathy. Young gentlemen who know the world are struck at once with the folly of such as assertion. But I suspect that these young gentlemen fall into the fallacy of confounding the stomach with reasonings about the stomach, which address themselves not to it, but to the brain. The bakers' shops had a voice for the hungry crowds who poured out of St. Antoine, which might drown discourses about liberty and the rights of man. But discourses about liberty and the rights of man were more effective upon those crowds, than arguments respecting the price of the luxuries or even the necessaries of life. In times of revolution, as well as in times of quiet, the same lesson is forced upon us. Working men—yes, even if they are also suffering men—demand that you should do homage to something in them which is not material, which is not selfish. When they claim to be adopted as part of the nation, not be regarded as standing outside of it, phantoms of pecuniary advantage or pecuniary exemption may float before their eyes. You may possibly be able to persuade them that those phantoms are all that they are pursuing, can pursue, ought to pursue. But before you bring them to that conviction, you will have quite established another in their minds. You will have left them in no doubt that those are the objects you are following after; that you identify the privilege of belonging to a nation—of being a living and governing part of it—with the outward good things which it procures for you. And they will despise and hate you for that baseness; will despise and hate you the more because you give them credit for sharing in it.  

The simple fact that Maurice was not faced with a full-scale revolution must bear some of the blame for his lack of explicit reference to the topic. He did, however, work at a time when revolution was a European experience, albeit to a mild degree. The threat of revolution was stronger. Hence, it represented a fact from which he could not easily turn away.

Here then, are the pertinent references to revolution Maurice did make. Set against his convictions of the existence of a divine order incorporating the family, the state, and the universal society, a clear and consistent pattern of thought emerges in regard to revolution vis a vis the establishment.

He did not think of revolution as able to create the basis of society. That has been divinely done. But revolution can protect the basis of society by overthrowing the artificial combines of men and exposing the true foundations upon which such combines must be built for the good of mankind. Thus, in spite of his professed "abhorrence of revolution," Maurice's position will not permit him to rule it out altogether. If revolution is aimed at the securing of social structures to the divine order, and if there is no less radical means for its accomplishment, revolution, according to Maurice's position, must be indicated.

This may be established by the words of Maurice, too. When pressed as to where the soldier's duty lay in time of civil war, Maurice, referring to the Neapolitan revolution replied:

When the question is presented to the Neapolitan soldier, "Is the service of your country the service of the man who upholds this state of things, or the service of a man who comes to protest in the name of justice, law, and God, against this state of things?"—I can but see one answer.77

Once again, therefore, the prospects of Christian

involvement in revolution gives rise to a valid tension. Maurice, whose estimation of the establishment was a high one, proves that revolution may sometimes be not so much a devaluing of the establishment as a revaluing of it. Revolution can be the assertion of order against disorder in the interest of the establishment of order where chaos had previously been enforced. It is, of course, true that there may be no prior guarantees that such is the case with a particular revolution. But what Maurice proves is that such a possibility cannot be automatically ruled out.
CHAPTER 8

REVOLUTION AND HUMAN HAPPINESS—PERSONAL AND COMMUNITY VALUES

The final definitive of revolution according to both reason and history is the establishment of an order conducive to human happiness. The presence of violence on its own is no more characteristic of revolution than is constitution on its own. Mass activities of a socio-political nature that fail to come to grips with the challenge of constituting the new order may be described as insurrectionary or rebellious. They may not be called revolutionary.

Heinz Lubasz says

The distinction between revolution and rebellion is an important one. The two processes are not unrelated, but they differ in crucial respects... Rebellion turns into revolution when the demand for particular and limited changes is replaced by a demand for general and fundamental conditions; and when scattered rebellious elements join to form a more or less united revolutionary force... When the fall of the Bastille was reported to the royal court at Versailles, Louis asked the Duke de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt: "Is this a rebellion?" "No, Sire," replied the duke, "it is a revolution."¹

Hannah Arendt draws a proper distinction between the function of rebellion as liberation from the oppression of the

old order and the function of revolution as the foundation of freedom. She adds, significantly, "... there is nothing more futile than rebellion and liberation unless they are followed by the constitution of the newly-won freedom."^2

Emphasis upon constitution as the final definitive of what is revolutionary and what is something else is gaining recognition. Alfred Meyer describes revolution as (1) the destruction of an older order, (2) a time of chaos, and (3) the creation of a new order.^3 Warren Molton defines it as a condition of radical socio-political change, often with violence resulting in a new order and a new hope.^4

Whether one ought to participate in any action which boasts intentions to constitute a new order is the issue raised by revolution vis-a-vis the establishment. Here the question is, what sort of order ought to be constituted? If constituting is one element in the definition of revolution, then the validity of any revolution depends upon the kind of order projected to emerge from the turmoil. Since not all constitutions can be of equal merit, and since various revolutions may be prosecuted with the intent of securing an equal variety of constitutions, each revolutionary movement must be called to account for its own particular aim in terms of constitution.

By our definition, the aim of revolution is the securing

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^4"The Church as Servant-Critic to Revolution," Part One.
of human happiness understood in a broad sense. It is intentionally gratuitous. Obviously there would be no revolutionary movement ever or anywhere that would admit to a lesser aim, if it took itself seriously. Generally speaking, all modern revolutions have aimed at one of two conceptions of the kind of society necessary for human happiness. The cause célèbre has been either the guaranteeing of individual rights, as in the revolution of France and America, or else it has been the renovation of society, as in the Communist revolutions. Jacques Maritain observes that the nineteenth century experienced the consequences of individualism, while the twentieth century is facing the consequences of a socialistic, totalitarian revolution. Unhappily, neither cause has proved itself indistinguishable from human happiness. Literature a century old (e.g., Charles Dickens' novels) abounds with images of a world careless of the relevance of social, i.e., interpersonal relationships. On the other hand, Ayn Rand's novel Anthem, and George Orwell's 1984 are chilly with the terror of a socialist constitution absolutely successful. Upon some constitution which mediates between these two traditional aims of revolution, depends the securing of human happiness.

In other words, worthy revolutionary movements are not any longer to be identified by the traditional appeals to either the protection of individual rights or the vision of some placid social sea. Our understanding of the situation has changed. And the change is clearly reflected in a

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5 The Person and the Common Good (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1948).
corresponding change in the terms of reference. For the notion of the *individual*, the *person* has come as an enlargement. Likewise the notion of a *holistic society* has been replaced by the demand for *community*.

What has emerged more clearly through the experience of two centuries is the appreciation of the dialectical relation which links a man and his society(ies). The only clamor now recognized as valid in a revolutionary sense is that which calls for an injection of the personal into all aspects of human life. Against modern egalitarians with their atomistic analyses of society it is imperative to insist that individualism will no longer serve. As a corrective, one must approve Jacques Maritain's judgment that "the social unit is the person" (i.e., the individual, but in the context of his societies). For the schemes of socialistic zealots one must counter with the wisdom of Dietrich Bonhoeffer that

> every concept of community is related to a concept of the person. The question about what constitutes a community can only be answered by asking what constitutes a person.

To this question, Maurice was deeply engaged in supplying an answer. For this reason his appreciation of the person is pursued as relevant to the issue of community as it is likely to confront the prospective Christian revolutionary under circumstances now a century more modern. Maurice's description of the dialectic of man and society

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is not unpolished. It ought not any longer to be unrecognizable.

One would hardly be likely to mistake Maurice for an exponent of individualism. His opposition to the Utilitarians was early and consistent. His complaints of their reducing society to a group of warring atoms are frequent and explicit. As we have seen in his evaluation of Burke, not even the individualism of the French revolution meant anything better to him than the "dissolution of society into its constituent elements."

On the other hand, there is hardly an exception to an exegesis of Maurice that subjects him to the charge of holistic prejudices. In the dying number of The Church Quarterly, Hubert Cunliffe-Jones demonstrates with what facility Maurice can be so interpreted. Calling for a critical evaluation of The Kingdom of Christ, Cunliffe-Jones lists two assumptions with which he faults Maurice,

The first is clear, just, exasperating and, incidentally, widely recognized and winked at.

On the one hand, he affirms and insists on the utter inadequacy of his own notions and opinions, but, on the other hand, also that what he affirms to be the very voice in which God speaks to his creatures, what he affirms to be a Church universal, not built upon human inventions or human faith but upon the very nature of God himself, what he affirms to be that harmony which God created is without question or argument, God's very voice, the sign of God's very nature, and God's harmony, Maurice's own opinions are quite unimportant, but what he declares to be God's truth is above the clash of opinion and notions; it is very truth itself. Now this will not do.8

The second assumption with which Cunliffe-Jones charges Maurice is the more pertinent one. He admits that it is less easy to pin down. Nevertheless, he says of Maurice,

His emphasis on the social nature of man, which is so valuable in his thinking, has done away with independence, which he regards as something bad. He does not know how to draw a distinction between true independence which is not antagonistic to the social group but a source of its vitality, and false independence which is a parasite on social life.\(^9\)

A closer examination of Maurice, however, just will not bear the weight of this kind of criticism. The truth is that this is just the distinction which Maurice draws most carefully.

There is a form of individualism which must not be destroyed—a form of society that must not be tolerated. As an example, Maurice cites the early organization of the Jesuits. Loyola, he contends, understood his task as that of creating a courageous, if mistaken psychology among his followers wherein "the individual being slain the society became all in all."\(^{10}\)

It was indeed a Society which Ignatius Loyola had called into existence. If a Society reaches its perfection when the life of the individual is crushed it may be called the Society of the Universe.\(^{11}\)

Whether Maurice's judgment of the Jesuits is more caricature than fact is beside the point here. What matters is that

\(^9\)Ibid.

\(^{10}\)Social Morality, p. 306.

\(^{11}\)Ibid., p. 307.
for Maurice a holism which extinguished the individual is socialism turned sour.

He is certain that individuality is easily obscured, but most often by some form of individualism. Society thus constituted is lethal to genuinely individual life. This Maurice felt was the case in his own day. In the interest of genuine individuality, therefore, Maurice wrote to R. C. Trench:

I am more and more convinced that we must not use personal and individual as synonymous words; but in fact we shall have most sense and lively realization of our distinct personality when we cease to be individual and delight to contemplate ourselves as members of one body in one Head.\(^2\)

His quarrel, then, was not with independence, but with solipsism; not with individuality, but with individualism. If his protest seems at times to be too fervent, one must appreciate his concern with the sway exercised by movements for individual rights and egalitarianism. Jeremy Bentham, Maurice complains, was taken in the most simplistic and materialistic manner when he wrote, "It is vain to talk of the interest of the community without understanding what is the interest of the individual."\(^3\) Added to that, the influential "charm" of the noble savage of eighteenth-century egalitarianism lent a romantic credibility to the whimsical notion that man in solitude was somehow man fulfilled.\(^4\)


\(^3\)The Conscience, p. 58f.

\(^4\)Maurice reacts to this idea in his sermon "Nature and Grace," The Church a Family, pp. 18-33.
Such reductionism was only naturalism. Maurice argued that appreciation of the individual could in no real way be achieved by depreciating the divinely-ordered relationships of society. In their fuller sense neither "social" nor "individual" would detract from the other. Upon the appreciation of men as individuals society depends. Upon the appreciation of human society, the esteem of persons depends. According to Maurice, the cant of individualism was to blame for the devaluing of society and could have no better result than a corresponding devaluation of the individual, too. In the three letters to William Palmer, this social criticism becomes explicit. "I believe," he wrote, "... that individual life must perish, if we do not discover the true law of social life, and are not ready be it what it may, to submit to it."¹⁵

That his aim was not the destruction of the individual but the discovery of the person may be seen in one of Maurice's most fervent anti-democratic statements. In 1860 he published in Macmillan's Magazine an article entitled "The Suffrage Considered in Reference to the Working Class, and to the Professional Class." The thesis of this article is that suffrage must be extended on the basis of "manhood." "To get that—to get all the manhood we can into our constituencies, and into our representatives—this must be

¹⁵"Three Letters to the Rev. W. Palmer, on the Name 'Protestant'; on the Seemingly Ambiguous Character of the English Church; and on the Bishopric at Jerusalem (First published by G. Rivington and Co., 1843), p. 13."
our common object." Suffrage based upon property Maurice objected to. At the same time, he reveals his suspicion that much of the impetus for a wider suffrage is motivated not out of respect for manhood but by the slavish desire for property but now demonstrated by the working class. For democracy to work, it must be based upon a sense of true individuality. And true individuality is not a function of property but of manhood. And that is precisely what is missing from the popular calls to establish a wider suffrage.

Let there be three 000's following a 1; you call that a thousand votes; let there be six 000,000's following a 1; you call that a million votes. But this is not manhood suffrage. Let 1 be a large proprietor, they are his votes. Let 1 be a priest, they are his votes. The agitator, perhaps, cries, "Oh no! They will be mine." Yes, till the next agitator comes. But there will be no manhood in any of these cases.

It is pointless to deny that the bias in Maurice is generally away from understanding human life in terms of the individual and toward understanding human life in terms of society. To that extent the criticism of Cunliffe-Jones is correct. But that admission must be tempered with an appreciation of the horror with which Maurice regarded the individualistic vogue that had turned the industrial revolution into a feast of human flesh for the "enlightened self-interest" of capitalistic exploitation and threatened to do the same for the popular movements emerging almost everywhere. Furthermore, that admission must be allowed only in the light

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17 Ibid.
of the great interest Maurice did take in exposing the meaning of what he called manhood. If he was suspicious of the individual, of independence, it was because he was aware of the facility with which these terms could be twisted in the interest of only certain individuals and special liberties.

But his suspicions of false forms did nothing to abate his interest to discover true ones. Thus he set about preparing his lectures on the conscience with an epistolary confession to Thomas Erskine of Linlathen which explicitly unites the significance of both the individual and the society, properly understood. "I think," he wrote,

I have dwelt too exclusively on the social aspect of truth. I have been so much startled at some prevalent denials, especially by Bain, of individual responsibilities and freedom, that I have gone to that and made it the starting-point of my moral instruction. At the same time I know you will, more than ever, recognise with me the permanence and divinity of all human relations.  

These Lectures on the Conscience, are collected under the subtitle Lectures on Casuistry Delivered in the University of Cambridge. They constitute the first of a series of courses on moral philosophy. They represent the first classroom productions for Maurice in his post as Knightbridge Professor of Casuistry and Moral Philosophy. And they are the most comprehensive expression of his concept of the person--of manhood.

He begins the series with a discussion of methodology.

He criticizes the four approaches traditionally used for the study of moral philosophy. The first two approaches--declaiming on the blessing of virtue and the mischief of vice, and comparative studies in moral philosophy--are of purely theoretical interest and generally devoid of any practical results. Maurice mutters his agreement with Macaulay who had said that "the most brilliant writer upon them did not deserve half the gratitude from mankind which is due to the maker of a substantial pair of shoes,"¹⁹

The third approach is to treat ethical studies as the describing of how things ought to be. However, complains Maurice,

If the moral teacher, . . . says that his business is what ought to be, that of other students with what is--can there be a clearer or fuller confession that he means to leave the actual world for some other world which he has imagined?²⁰

By this objection Maurice asserts that the prescriptive function of ethics is grounded firmly in an a priori descriptive function. The coinage of the casuist is minted in reality. If it is not, it is counterfeit.

But that is not to make the pursuit of the person a positivistic one such as locating an undiscovered planet. Collecting "data" in order to secure for casuistry a place among the sciences Maurice rejects as the fourth and futile approach of traditional ethical methodologies. Positivistic ethics presumes that persons will stand treatment as things.

²⁰Ibid., p. 2.
And whatever personhood may be shown to mean, it will not be that a person is a thing,

What then, one must ask, is to be the method which Maurice chooses for himself and his students? His answer is beguiling. There is an objective approach to uncovering the meaning of the person through investigating the implications in reality expressed by the word "I."

Maurice's validation of this method is straightforward. Although there is no area of study where "I" is not presupposed, there is no academic discipline especially devoted to its interpretation. In the exact sciences the I is recognized to be an intruder. In language and literature, sensitivity to the I distinguishes the exalted from the drivel, In history the presence of a world of I's is perplexing for its variety as much as for its uniformity. Yet not one of these academic pursuits chooses for its special subject what I means.

It is to this question, which is left with such testimonies to its significance, as a waif or estray, by all those who are not afraid to face other questions, that I believe the student of Morals must address himself. He ought to explain why this I is so troublesome to the physical student, why it casts its shadow over all his enquiries into the order of the outward world, He ought to show why it has struck its roots so deeply into language. He ought to assist the historian in casting off some of those vague generalities which obscure the facts which he is describing and yet offer themselves to him as such convenient modes of accounting for them. I do not think that the moralist can advance a step, can make out any reason for his existence, unless he girds himself to this task.21

21The Conscience, p. 6.
This portal into ethical studies, Maurice names "the egotistical method," Back and forth through it he leads his Cambridge students to pursue the I. Indeed, after Maurice's first lecture at Cambridge, another Cambridge man was heard to comment, "I am quite sure the undergraduates thought they had been listening to a lecture on the eye."²² Nevertheless, Maurice used this method to advantage. So far as the subject/object problem is concerned, the egotistical method was for him a portcullis with equal battlements on either side. The egotistical method posed the question in this way: "who am I?" There is no chance that any serious challenge can be raised against the objective reality expressed by the word I. So the castle of objectivity is rendered secure. On the other side--the stronghold of subjectivity--no one will object to his refusal to pursue the meaning of I as if it were a thing, especially when the question "who am I" resounds with such undeniable subjectivity.

But the castle is not his pride. It is thrown up to defend the unity of the person as both known and knower. It reminds the casuist that personality cannot be extrapolated in the general terms of academia, that a moral question requires a moral approach and leads to a moral conclusion. Thus to regard morality as external and imposed is not to storm the castle built around the egotistical method. It

is to ignore it. It is to set students of morals to the investigation of something other than the person and therefore something else than the only question which, according to Maurice, moral studies can either legitimately ask or answer.

"What do I mean by the word Morals? , , , I understand by it the manners and habits which belong to us as human beings." A better word than "morals" however, is "ethics," It expresses, I think a little more delicately and accurately than the other word that the manners are not outside manners, no mere deportment. It answers more nearly to what we call character.23

This usage of "character" reappears in Social Morality where he defends his interest in the ethos of human relations. That Greek word implies that morality "consists in habits, in a character, not in outward acts, still less in formal maxims."24

This is the moral interest Maurice brings to his search for the person in his Lectures on the Conscience, Relations and their corresponding character (ethos) constitute his conception of what is to be studied and impel him to plead for "egotism," A true ethos will evade strictly rational procedures. The egotistical approach helps to assure the personal involvement of whomever sets out to discover the meaning of the person.

It is not surprising, therefore, to discover material

\[23\text{The Epistles of St. John, p. 11.}\]
\[24\text{Social Morality, p. 18.}\]
in these lectures with clearly emotional content. Its effectiveness is documented by the record of an enthusiastic outburst that shattered the decorum of the lecture hall on a day when Maurice illustrated devotion to duty with a sentimental poem. The lecture was on "The Conscience and its Masters." A former student in later years recalled that lecture.

The strain upon our feeling had been growing more and more tense as verse after verse was read, in that voice that was almost broken with earnestness, and yet so clear; as the last verses came you might have heard here and there, from young men not used to the melting mood, distinct sobs of emotion. For my own part I could not pretend that I was not really crying. As the last word fell from your father's lips (this account is recorded in a letter to Frederick Barton Maurice), a hush came over us; we almost seemed to be in the presence of the noble dead. A pause of a few seconds, and then, all in a body, we leapt up, some even on the forms and cheered.25

Maurice, far from being disturbed by an outburst so patently unobjective, could have felt nothing but satisfaction. He was convinced that the egotistical approach was not less, but more scholarly. Asks Maurice,

Must not the scholar's vocation be to give as many as he could the sense of their rights to be men; their right not to be lost in a crowd; their right to be verily and indeed an I?26

The advantage of the egotistical method is that it strengthens the appreciation for reality over against the temptation to speculate and theorize.

It is that each of us may reverence his own life and the life of his fellowman above all theories.

26The Conscience, p. 20.
that any have formed about him or them. It is that we may study the problems of life seriously and truthfully, whether we can make out a theory about them or not.\textsuperscript{27}

To answer the question "Who am I?" is therefore the course upon which Maurice sets himself in order to discover the true law of individual life. But, says Maurice, as soon as one speaks of himself, another word springs to mind. It is the word "ought."\textsuperscript{28} None of the things I see or handle suggest the word; the moment I speak of myself it starts forth full armed.\textsuperscript{28} How this close affinity between I and ought has come to be for every person, Maurice is satisfied to leave to more speculative minds. He counsels his students frankly to own it is so with them.

And steadily remember that the I and the ought are twin words. Like the Siamese Twins, they are not without violence or risk of death to be severed from each other.\textsuperscript{29}

Two other words are also inseparably linked with the word I, one of which bears also a distinct relation to the word "ought." These words are "consciousness" and "conscience."

Take away the I from language, and they must disappear also. There is no demand for them in any of the things which I see or taste or handle. They come into existence only because there is an I who sees, tastes, handles.\textsuperscript{30}

Within the wider term of consciousness the function of the conscience is specific. There is, for Maurice, a

\textsuperscript{27} The Conscience, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 44.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., p. 28.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
distinction to be drawn between the whole of consciousness, and the part of conscience within that whole.

This distinction Maurice announced as accounting for the division of the subjects set for him to teach, as Knightbridge Professor his courses of lectures were to include casuistry, moral philosophy and moral theology. He recognized besides, a responsibility for lectures on "intellectual philosophy" and logic. To all of these, the ego is inevitably related. But it is related to each of the former three in a different way from either of the latter two. That difference he describes with the words conscience and consciousness. "As the name conscience was the watchword of the strictly casuistical course (moral philosophy), the word consciousness will be the watchword of this (intellectual philosophy)."31

The specific function of the conscience he identifies in the early part of the Epistles of St. John.

When any of us is born into this world, he is surrounded by objects which he is by degrees to get acquainted with through his senses. But he has also human relations; a mother at all events, a father; perhaps brothers and sisters. He sees their faces, he hears their voices, sees the curtains of the bed and hears the noise in the streets. But his relation to them must be something different from this. We are all sure that it is. All the seeing and hearing in the world do not fulfil that relation. We speak of affections. Evidently a man's relation to his fellow-men fails utterly, is not fulfilled, unless he has these affections. They are as necessary

to it as seeing and hearing are to his intercourse with anything that is not human.\textsuperscript{32}

There is a repudiation of Lockian epistemology implicit here. Such is to be expected from Maurice,\textsuperscript{33} In dealing with personal relationships it is even more inevitable.

Consciousness, therefore, means the cognizance of relationship. Insofar as a relationship can be described as being between oneself and a thing, the act of consciousness is adequate for relation. Sensation is sufficient to describe the relation of the person who sees bed curtains or hears street sounds to the curtains or sounds \textit{per se}.

As soon, however, as an interpersonal content constitutes a part of the conscious moment—as soon as social relationships are involved—sheer cognition is no longer adequate to determine the relationship. Affections are required and affections imply considerations of "oughtness." The specific function of conscience has to do with this oughtness. "I am not sure whether there is a more exact description of the Conscience than this, It is that in me which says, I ought or I ought not."\textsuperscript{34}

Just how the conscience should be described further, Maurice is not prepared to say. That it directs the person with the instructions "I ought" or "I ought not" is a fairly ordinary description of its operation. Whether it is identified as a separate faculty or a distinctive exercise of the

\textsuperscript{32}The Epistles of St. John, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{33}See \textit{passim} Brose, \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{34}The Conscience, p. 27.
reason does not detain his enquiry. The pertinent obser-
vation is that, for Maurice, conscience is definitive of
personhood. Whatever else may be said about conscience can
be interesting and even useful to a man, "But after all he
must be reminded that the Conscience in him is the man in him;
he cannot divide himself from it. , "35

This is the critical point to be made. For the per-
spective attained at the outset of this chapter was that
the revolutionary achievement of human happiness requires
an appreciation for the meaning of persons. Community without
such an appreciation is an impossibility— an artificial
imposition. Likewise, persons do not exist apart from com-
munity. To speak of the person then is to speak of an in-
dividual-social complex.

What has been demonstrated then (and will continue to
be demonstrated), is that in just this way Maurice recognized
and valued both the individual and social dimension of per-
sonhood. He recognized that the person consists in both
individuation and participation. In an age as impoverished
as our own for both conceptual and terminological tools to
describe inter-personal relations, we would do well to ap-
preciate this not unfamiliar groping on the part of an
earlier toiler with the issue. Maurice's vision of the
person requires a continuous tension between social and in-
dividual elements. To resolve the tension in favor of

35Ibid., p. 169,
either annihilates the person. This is no scholastic conclusion, according to Maurice, but the embossing of our sensitivities with the image of reality itself.

To verbalize this dialectic of person and community Maurice describes the functioning of the conscience. The conscience brings into a critical juxtaposition the individual and social dimension of the person and thus becomes the impulse of creation for both the person and the community.

First, make it clear what you mean by a Person; that you will do when you make it clear what you mean by a conscience; then treat these Persons as if they did form real bodies, and tell us out of history, not out of your own fancy, what these bodies are.36

Since we have already stated the importance of the conscience as that specific consciousness which deals with interpersonal relations—that it, the social function of the conscience—we should also suggest its individuating function. For Maurice, conscience is also the most authentic expression of individuality.

The conscience is that which tells each man he is a person, making him feel that which he has done in past time to be his own, giving him an awful assurance of identity, responsibility, permanence.37

Conscience is individuating also because there is an inwardness about its function which renders it inviolable.

The act of conscience is an act in me. It means "I ought or I ought not." I may pass judgment on other men's acts; but that is another process; I

36Ibid., p. 174.

am abusing terms and what the terms represent if I identify it with Conscience.\textsuperscript{38}

One's conscience may be aroused on behalf of another's actions. But one cannot effect any alteration of that action without first arousing the other's conscience. And conscience will not be coerced, even into activity, and still be conscience. The very formulae of conscience testify to this inviolability, I ought and I ought not are "a self-assertion, a denial of the claim of external powers to rule over me."\textsuperscript{39}

There is therefore, as Maurice understands the conscience, besides the social focus implied in its relational function, a focus too of a radically individual nature implied in the particularity of its obligatory function. It is emphatically I who ought or ought not. Maurice recognizes this double focus as corresponding to the double focus of personhood, and early in the lectures on the conscience remarks upon the word I, with its property of being demanded by a whole community and yet being only capable of denoting a single unit.\textsuperscript{40} Conscience, therefore, serves Maurice to express the social-individual complex that constitutes the reality of personhood. It is the enigmatic answer to the question, "who am I."

One says "enigmatic" because this does not yet tell

\textsuperscript{38}The Conscience, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{39}Ibid., p. 48.
\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., p. 14.
The whole story of the conscience as Maurice would have it. The sense of ought or ought not remains to be explained. By what means does this sense arise? That the conscience exercises a legitimate control over one's actions and attitudes is not disputed. The knotty problem is what shall exercise control over the conscience? Anything so completely inviolable poses a constant threat of individual tyranny through the ordinary subjective processes of human psychology.

Philology sheds light on this question. Con as the prefix of scientia indicates that the knowledge of conscience is not taken in isolation. That is, it is knowledge with something. The question must arise, what is that something?

Alternative answers with currency in Maurice's day prepare the way for him to raise this question in the lecture on "The Conscience and Its Master." Three courses toward answering the question are represented by the names of Joseph Butler, Jeremy Bentham and Alex Bain.

From Butler's sermons on human nature, Maurice draws the conclusion that Butler's 'interest in the conscience springs from his interest in the natural order.

He seeks to find out what human nature is, not what it might be or ought to be. Though a preacher, he is anxious to exclude all notions of divinity which would interfere with this design. And therefore, the office which he assigns to the Conscience is primarily that of warning us that we should not do acts which disturb the harmony of the Nature. — what Shakespeare calls "unproportioned acts." 41

41 Ibid., p. 46.
As we shall see, this tenet, which holds order to be in some way a determinant for the conscience occurs in Maurice as well as in Butler. In fact, Maurice in *What Is Revelation?* avows indebtedness to Butler at this very point.

... What I owe more than anything else to Butler, and to Butler, so far as I can trace and define obligations, more than to almost any other man, is the sense of being in such a Constitution,—one that I did not create, and have no power to alter, but with which I must be in conformity, or suffer the penalty of being at war with it.42

But he objects to Butler's use of the word "nature" in regard to the conscience. In the first place, it smacks too much of naturalism to suit Maurice. A stricture later to appear against Alex Bain is applicable here, too.

I have contended that the words "I" and "Ought" do not belong to the vocabulary of savages as they belong to the vocabulary of civilized men. ... The distinction of the civilized man from the savage is, as it seems to me, that he is not to the same extent the victim of external influences, that he rises above them and tries to rule them.43

Here Maurice is maintaining with consistency his conviction that no facts, however natural, are so fundamental to human existence as is the fact of relationship.

Maurice also objects to Butler's attempt to exclude the divine from his examination into the conscience.

Butler we have seen, did his utmost to confine the Conscience within the limits of human nature. The experiment was an interesting one,


43 *The Conscience*, pp. 56f.
most ably conducted. But it involved him in evident perplexities.  

Butler, according to Maurice, found himself obliged to invest the idea of human nature with a superhuman significance. Conscience defined in a collective way as human nature, leads to the manufacture of an ideal conscience. When it is thus defined individualistically it makes "every man a judge in his own case" (Bain's words)—subjectivism. Referring again to the obvious fact of relationships Maurice says:

"My position is that instead of conjuring with "a law of nature" which is itself either a theological or metaphysical phrase--and a very treacherous one whichever it is—we may understand from an obvious condition of our existence how we are led to look beyond ourselves that we may account for what we are."  

The "obvious condition of our existence" is the condition of relationship, a condition which presupposes a determination of origins, and hence points truly and directly to God. Butler, says Maurice, omits God in the premise and is forced to substitute for Him with "human nature" in the conclusions. 

Maurice's opposition to Benthamism was one of long-standing. It first appeared in print in the Metropolitan Quarterly Magazine which Maurice co-edited through its three editions in 1825-26. The article, "A Supplementary Sheet to Bentham's Book of Fallacies" was an outright attack on Benthamism. Maurice's biographer notes that

"It must have been at this time a very great relief to him to be able to speak out strongly on a subject on which his mother and father were fully

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44 The Conscience, p. 63.

45 Social Morality, p. 92.
agreed, namely, that it is well to do right because conscience commands it, and not because it answers, or because it tends to the greatest happiness of the greatest number.46

The rather simplistic criticisms of utilitarian philosophy found there were the reflections of a simplistic interpretation of the same.

Maurice was capable of a more profound critique of Bentham as he proves in his lecture on "The Conscience and Its Masters". Referring back to the original question of the entire series of lectures on the conscience—i.e., what am I—Maurice insists that personal being is prior to considerations of pain and pleasure. Conscience, since it is implied in personal being may be cognizant of pain or pleasure. It is not mastered by considerations of pain and pleasure. "If I were not they would not be. They have no business therefore to set themselves above me."47

In a social setting pain and pleasure are not to be trusted as masters of the conscience. Society negotiated under their guidance is the epitome of disorder.

... When we speak of persons we cannot forget the affections which we have for them. How precious these are, how closely they are intertwined with the roots of our social existence... But there is a danger of treating those affections as if they created the Order which calls for them. If we fall into that mistake, the affections will become merely a part of our pleasure or pains. As long as we like a person we shall suppose we are bound to him; our dislike will dissolve the tie. We shall live in a circle of what is called

47The Conscience, p. 48.
elective affinities; the grand old name of Relations will be treated as obsolete.\textsuperscript{48}

Conscience, then, when it is held to be subject to the decrees of pain and pleasure, is not only incompatible with the notion of personal being, it also makes the appreciation of community, as anything more than an adventitious imposition, impossible. Maurice again--

When Mr. Bentham speaks of a Community he says that "it is a fictitious body composed of the individuals who are considered as constituting as it were its members." A man who abhorred fictions and figures of speech falls into these strange expressions, because he cannot quite divest himself of the old belief that a community is a body, real and not fictitious, consisting of individuals who are its actual members. There is in his phraseology the after-glow of a sun which has set.\textsuperscript{49}

In Maurice's estimation, Bentham has achieved no better result than the elevation of pain and pleasure "into two superhuman powers, to which man must needs be in subjection." As in Butler, these powers were in turn subjected to nature. However, the nature to which pleasure and pain "do homage" is not human nature as in Butler, but some nature more mystical yet--"A very awful, mysterious, 'unproducible' deity."\textsuperscript{50}

Alex Bain, who was to become professor of logic and, later, the rector of the University of Aberdeen, had startled Maurice with what Maurice took to be "denials. . . of individual responsibilities and freedom."\textsuperscript{51} What Bentham had taught was

\textsuperscript{48}The Conscience, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{49}Ibid., p. 62.
\textsuperscript{50}Ibid., p. 63.
pushed nearer its logical limits by Bain, according to Maurice. An unusually lengthy excerpt from Bain's work *Emotion and Will* constitutes a part of the lecture on "The Conscience and Its Masters." A critical exegesis of the passage follows. In it Maurice condemns Bain with his own words showing how pain and pleasure as governing principles are reduced by Bain to punishment and its avoidance.

Bentham, Maurice says, may be confused by the contradiction between the claims of individuals and the claims of society as it is constituted. But Bentham, at least, achieves something of a safeguard for the claims of individuals. Indeed, according to Maurice, Bentham "puts those claims higher than anyone who recognises a conscience would dare to put them." 52

Not so with Bain:

Mr. Bain is free from any such perplexity. The work of the community is deliberately to coerce the individual by punishment (which Mr. Bain identifies with authority), till in the maturity of a well-disposed mind he enters into the company of the majority. Mr. Bain has therefore not the slightest objection to a Conscience. So far from disliking it, he values the Conscience as that in each man which leads him to tremble at the decrees of a majority. It has nothing to do indeed with "the primitive cast of our mental constitution." But by cultivating "a strong ideal avoidance" "of the pains imposed by the persons about us, not unaccompanied perhaps with the perturbation of fear," the "newly introduced member of society is indoctrinated with the sentiment of the forbidden." And thus having his own Conscience properly corrected and shaped under this discipline, "he joins with the other members of the community in imposing

52 *The Conscience*, p. 56.
and enforcing the prohibitions that have been stamped and branded in his own education."^53

The result of Bain's defense of conscience is the loss of both realities, community and individual. "Whether the Community be fictitious or real signifies little to him. It serves equally, in either character to extinguish the individual."^54 What emerges instead of either is something called Society. The effect of Bain's idea of conscience is to reduce it to little more than the reflection of majority opinion. But majority opinion may raise qualms of conscience in opposition;

I say there are moments when such qualms come over every one; and further that those individual men in whom they become most strong are not those who find their luxury in arrogant independence, but are those who have the liveliest sense of their obligations to their fellowman, the greatest desire that the laws of the Nation to which they belong may not be violated, but maintained.^55

Like Butler, and Bentham before him, Bain with his notion of "Society" is brought to an admission of some abstract reality upon which to base his notion of conscience. "Therefore," says Maurice, "we should face the question whether the Conscience bears witness of any actual living superhuman power to which it owes homage."^56 Having completed his critique of these three, Maurice concludes

Such opinions, which are specially the opinions of our day, leave one who is discussing the question of Conscience no choice. He is hemmed in by

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^53 Ibid.
^54 Ibid., p. 62.
^55 Ibid., pp. 75f.
^56 Ibid., p. 63.
superhuman influences of some kind. If those which
great philosophers bid us tremble at appear to him
of a very oppressive kind, ministering to weakness,
to superstition, to slavery, he must ask if there
is no other which may be stronger than these, which
may be a deliverer from them.

The superhuman is not banished, as we have seen,
from the speculations of its most approved sages;
it is certainly not banished from the entertain­
ments of its most refined and most skeptical
triflers. That which is not allowed a place in
our inmost conviction will float about us in fan­
tastic shapes, which we dare not ask whether they
bring with them airs from Heaven or blasts from
Hell. The Conscience will make cowards of us all,
if it does not lead us to the source of courage. 57

What source, then, does Maurice propose to provide in­
formation for the conscience? There is, of course, the possi­
bility of two rather mundane sources for the conscience. One
is the notion that the conscience is informed in automaton
fashion by rules. This idea is presuppositional for the work
of the strict casuist. Yet Maurice confesses of rules to set­
tle cases of conscience that "none such ever have been found,
or will be found." 58 Cases of conscience arise out of rela­
tionships. It is possible to "plead a law to hide a crime."
Thus, "the relations must be closer to the man than the rules
can ever be; if he makes them dependent upon rules he renounces
them." 59

The other possibility is that in some way, the conscience
itself is its own source of information. In other words, one
simply denies any significance to the con-prefix. Supremacy

57 Ibid., pp. 63f.
58 Ibid., p. 90.
59 Ibid., p. 99.
in that case belongs to the conscience. But Maurice insists that the function of conscience is not the assertion of its own right—its own supremacy. "The Conscience is that in a man which points to what is above him, which declares the supremacy of a right that he did not mould and cannot alter." The implication of this understanding of conscience is clear: "the Conscience in itself has no authority; its authority begins when it goes out of itself, its supremacy consists in its abdication of supremacy." "A Conscience," writes Maurice, in The Commandments, "which does not own a ruler and a Judge has lost its meaning and definition." Three other, more sophisticated sources are suggested by his work. But in the end only one of these will do for him.

The first source is the relation itself. As was seen earlier, the singular function of the conscience is the cognizance of a personal element in the context of conscious relation. The question "What am I?" is answered by describing what one is in his social contexts. "I am certainly a son, I am a brother, I am a citizen. Perhaps I am a husband, perhaps I am a father." The protest of conscience is against acts which violate these relationships and others to which conscience bears its witness.

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60 Ibid., p. 138.
61 Ibid.
63 The Conscience, p. 47.
But from where, one must insist, does the conscience draw its sense of an order violated? The conscience may be sensitive to the bare fact of relationships without any appreciation of the content of that relationship. Because the residents of Mizituni in Chile are human beings, I can recognise with all conscience that I stand with them in a personal context. But conscience does not tell me what content ought to fulfil that relationship. Whether they need shoes or missionaries or privacy from invading American tourists, conscience has no means of informing me. Remoteness, doubtless, bears much of the responsibility for my ignorance. But when a few years ago, I paid a hasty visit to the settlement, high on the altiplano, proximity in no way enlightened my conscience, I was aware more distinctly that I was related as a human being to them and they to me, But how that relationship would best be fulfilled I left, as I had come, still not knowing.

For the content of human relations, the conscience is not altogether self-sufficient. We are driven back upon the con-prefix. With the aid of what or whom is my conscience more fully informed and activated?

A second source, Maurice suggests, might be found in the collective judgment of conscientious men. Although he speaks of a nation's conscience, the conscience of a people, etc., the notion of a collective conscience is for him no more than a rhetorical device. Even so, he does not
hesitate to emphasize the importance of collective judgment in the case of duty.\textsuperscript{64}

In the Macmillan's Magazine article, "The Neopolitan Revolution and the Fugitive Slave Law," the issue enjoys some prominence. Having, in the previous number of the magazine commented on Froude's History, Volumes V and VI, Maurice felt constrained in this latest article to buttress his previous attempt at vindicating what he had perceived to be the spirit of Froude's work and to free it from possible misconstructions. In particular, he was concerned with the determination of duty.

The question was how to determine where a soldier's duty lay in time of civil war. Maurice felt of Froude's work that by too hastily adopting a prevalent confusion between the claims of conscience and the claims of private judgment, the writer had suggested the thought that the duties of a citizen, and especially of a soldier, must be tried by a different law from that which we apply to the highest questions of all.

In the case of the English Civil War, Parliament came at last to invoke the name of the King against the King for doubts about legitimate authority abounded. But, says Maurice,

That question was not settled by private judgments, A conscience of law, of its unutterable sacredness, of the obligation which it imposes--a conscience rising out of that of an actual personal Lawgiver and King to whom all rulers must bow--gives that period its unspeakable interest for all generations of Englishmen. When that conscience gave place,

\textsuperscript{64}Consider Maurice's own willingness to submit to the Christian Socialists' desire to publish a newspaper because of the unity of the others on the matter.
after the deposition of Richard, to an anarchy of private judgments, the interest ceases. . .65

Although Maurice is at pains to distinguish the issues in the English Civil War from those of the Neapolitan revolution he finds the blurring of private judgment with the claims of conscience just as threatening.

His response is emphatic.

It is the conscience of the people and of each man that has decided in favour of Garibaldi and against the King. All evidence appears to show that if the patriot leader forgets that fact,—if he suffers private judgment about forms of government to interfere with the verdict of that conscience,—if he is not prepared to sacrifice his own private judgment—the great cause for which he has fought and suffered so magnificently may be utterly marred. Modern revolutions, then, like those of other days, bear witness to the permanence of that distinction which we in our ease and carelessness are continually tempted to obliterate.66

Thus he emphasizes the relevance of the collective judgments of conscientious men. When weighed against a private judgment this concurrence of consciences must count for a great deal.

But one must notice also, the concurrence of conscience is not, as it were, automatic. Maurice is insisting not upon some collective conscience. He is saying that the information of the conscience is communicable in a public way. But it is not communicable directly from conscience to conscience. As the center of individuality the conscience

66Ibid., p. 67.
is inviolable. One is forced back upon trying to rouse the conscience of another. But one cannot coerce it into activity. Concurrence of conscience is always coincidental.

Thus again, the information of the conscience is left to another source. Its barriers are moral ones, impregnable even to the information of another's conscience. For Maurice, in spite of his words about "public conscience," and other similar expressions, there can be no such entity as a collective conscience. For example, in his defense of a national conscience in Lectures on the Conscience he makes it clear that the whole idea depends upon the protection of the premise that "the nation is composed of I's." The validity of the uniform judgment of a number of consciences is not in the number involved nor even so much in the unanimity of their judgment. Rather it is to be credited to the source of their information.

Since, therefore, the conscience is not informed by the mere relationship itself, and since the "collective conscience" of men is a mathematical rather than a moral value, the real source of the conscientious information must be something else. That "something" else is God, He is the third and acceptable informer of the conscience for Maurice,

Thus Maurice attributes to conscience a function beyond the bare recognition of personal relationships,

67 The Conscience, p. 59.
68 Ibid., p. 40.
Now he tells us that its fuller function implies the reception of revelation. Conscience, according to Maurice, is the mediator between those relations in which one stands, and by which both the individual and the society are constituted, and the purpose and order to which those relations are intended to conform. In the *Doctrine of Sacrifice* Maurice writes:

The Conscience is that thing which is set in contrast with the flesh. This is that in man which is related to heaven, to the invisible, to God the Judge of all; as the hands and feet are related to the earth on which we tread.\(^{69}\)

Referring to the words of John, "God is greater than our hearts and knoweth all things," Maurice stresses the meaning of conscience thus conceived.

He knows what has set me wrong, as I do not know it. He can set me right, though I cannot set myself right. This is the comfort of not merely believing in a conscience, but in a God who speaks through my conscience; this is the comfort of not thinking that it is my lawgiver, but that He is my lawgiver. \(^{70}\)

This, according to Maurice, is the belief and comfort without which human life is depreciated. It is a confession of the deepest personal need toward which the human heart in all of its gropings is questing,

We have not recognised the cry for liberty of conscience as a genuine divine cry; as a cry to Him who has inspired it; as the cry of a spirit which feels that it cannot be tied and bound by rules which we have imposed upon it; and that it has


\(^{70}\) *The Epistles of St. John*, p. 212.
an unseen Ruler whom it must feel after till it finds Him. 71

With the concept of the conscience free before God, Maurice describes the quality of life essential to human happiness. The conscience is not free in an absolute sense. But it is free as it responds to the urgings of its true Master. Only when this is the case is true manhood possible and, alongside, true community.

Maurice's thought, therefore, aligns with the modern revolutionary objective of freedom. His divergence from it arises from the point of asserting the substance of freedom. Political liberty was the primary characteristic of revolutionary freedom associated with the French revolution. Its meaning was individual liberty or self-determination in the political sphere. Marx convinced the revolutionary mind that individual liberty was a political mirage on a desert of whole societies oppressed through the manipulations of economic exploitation. The proper revolutionary task was social liberation. Social self-determination in the economic sphere would be the meaning of freedom.

The realization of both of these aims has at some time been declared keys to unlock the vaults wherein are hidden the precious treasures of person and community. Their promise is appealing. Their objectives are noble and right.

But Maurice would not be convinced by either. Freedom is freedom of conscience. That the person is politically
self-determining does not necessarily mean that he enjoys a free conscience. Such freedom may be purchased with money or force of arms. Nor must one necessarily wait for oppressive economic and social systems to be removed before one can be free. The very challenge to such systems may well constitute the substantial freedom that one could reasonably expect even if there were no such systems to challenge.

The willingness of the person to bear witness to the divine order is the evidence and presence of freedom. In bearing that witness, true community is revealed and the witnesser manifests his own personhood. For Maurice, therefore, the categories of person and community supersede, but do not deny, the relevance of materialistic considerations for legitimating the revolution. They do affirm that freedom is a more truly revolutionary objective than food.

But, as with the issues raised in the previous two chapters, they do not easily solve the dilemma of participation in revolution for the Christian. Whether the objective of freedom, as Maurice understands it, is better served by joining the revolution or opposing it is a question set to prove every other thing that one affirms about the conscience and therefore, about the meaning of persons and their communities. Prospects of violence and of the subversion of an establishment certainly must be added to the scales of one's decision. But without the pursuit of the happiness of persons in communities in the other pan, there would
be nothing for them to weigh against. Involvement in violence, the disordering of a settled society, become irrelevant at best and positively iniquitous at worst.

Whether, in the end, the Christian casts his lot with the revolution or against it, must be determined therefore, in the humanizing arena of context and conscience. Context is demanded because the conscience that is free to obey God is free both of the security and the bondage of rules. Such prescriptive casuistry Maurice terms "quackery." 72

Whatever the Christian decides, he will betray himself and the best of his cause if he ever repudiates as sacred to God and man, the inviolability of the processes of the conscience. By it, he has arrived at his decision and through the exercise of it he has proved the meaning and dignity of being truly a person.

72 The Conscience, p. 168.
CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION—
CONFLICT, CONTEXT, AND CONSCIENCE

The ordering of the last three chapters has been practical and psychological in the sense that one would likely encounter the issues dealt with in the order they have appeared. The most obvious problem is the issue of violence. The next is the question of law and order. Finally come the more sophisticated questions of personal and community values. This is the reverse of the logical order. The ultimate consideration has to do with persons and communities. Violence and order are important as they effect the lives of persons and the fortunes of their communities.

What we have discovered in dealing with each of the issues is the tension imbedded in the deceptively simple command of Jesus to "render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's" (Mark 12:17). The problem is with Caesar who is representative of all of man's communities. Inasmuch as communities are essential to the development of persons, Caesar is essential. If Caesar is essential, then he is bound up in what God has created and called "man." And thus to render to Caesar is apparently to render to God, and to render to God demands that one render to Caesar.
And yet the sad experience of mankind is that Caesars are sometimes treacherous. Persons are made the victims of their communities. And communities are exploited to the destruction of persons. Then one senses that he can in no wise render to God while doing obeisance to such a Caesar. The potential of revolution to install a new Caesar (perhaps named Julius, or Charles I, or "the sovereignty of the people," or "all power to the workers") rises like the sun. And the Christian, desiring to render to Caesar is faced with a dilemma. He finds two Caesars, a community that is, and a community that might be. To which Caesar is he bound to render?

When comes the cry to arms he is torn still more. For he remembers that the Lord has said "all who take the sword will perish by the sword" (Matt. 26:52). But he also remembers that the blessing is pronounced not upon the peace-lover but upon the peacemaker. And if the Christ can so divide men that one's enemies become even those of his own household, how can one escape the plain truth that Christ's coming has brought a sword to the earth (Matt. 10:34)? How can the peacemaker avoid the clash of strife and the din of battle? Then he would become one of those who ". . . have healed the wound of my people lightly saying, 'Peace, peace,' when there is no peace." (Jer. 8:11)

The tension in the command to render to Caesar what is his is the tension of human responsibility. The instant desire is for a sure word of prophecy, for some "authoritative
theological literature." The concordance should show the resolution. Look under V. for "violence," or E for "establishment," or even R for "revolution." But the Bible is not a political pharmacopeia. There is no prescription. There is, however, a demand for responsible thought and action.

And responsible it must be, for the case is that both the Caesar of the establishment and the Caesar of the revolution can be demonic. Each can be a beast bearing wounds but boasting of resurrection. The problem for the Christian conscience is to avoid the demonic, and still render to Caesar as if rendering to God. Just how the two caesars can be demonic is never more clear than in the account of the temptation of Jesus in the wilderness.

The real issue thrust upon Jesus by the tempter is the manner in which the kingdom of God is to be revealed. Food for the famished recluse and fulfillment of the messianic expectation of an earlier divine are only the symbols. They are the bread and wine. The substance is the real presence of the Christ, and in him, the Kingdom of God. Shall the kingdom make its way along a social shortcut? Bread for the am haaretz—would that not set in motion forces that could overthrow in a moment an oppressive system, that, in fact, is still not absent among men? Messianic charisma—give the people heart and hope. Boldly challenge to the point of personal dangers and thus expose the weakness of the society that is, and the potency of the society that you are to bring. Cast yourself down from pinnacles.
These are calls to revolution. They were demonic in the wilderness of temptation. They are still demonic.

The third temptation is the wooing voice of the demonic establishment. The deceitful folly of the third temptation is that the tempter assumes the capacity to dispose of the kingdoms of the world. They should, in exchange for a simple act of worship, become nominally, the kingdom of Christ. But there are no true kingdoms among men that are not received from the hand of God. No society that we can create is so important as the society which is given. Men relate to each other in true communities only by the grace of God.¹

Just so, the establishment asserts the prerogatives attached to the originating and mediating community among men. It assumes to itself the power to dispense "community" among its devotees and artfully commands men, in the name of the establishment, to love one another in the vain hope that the precept will pass for the practice. This is demonic.

The sickness of modern theology as it attempts to prove its relevance to revolution is a demonic sickness. To opt for the establishment on the grounds that the Christian ought not to have to do with revolution with its disorder; or for the the revolution on the grounds that what is, is to come, and it is the end of oppression,

¹See D. Bonhoeffer's discussion of "immediacy" in The Cost of Discipleship. It is both eloquent and accurate.
is a facile solution and irresponsible. Such a decision is bound to be driven more by the demonic solicitation to escape the ambiguity of human existence than by the desire to let what really is, be.

That is to say that such a decision incapacitates the Christian for living responsibly in the present. The temptation to the church of the revolutionary movement is to discount the present in favor of some amorphous future reality--some set of ideal conditions inevitably wound in the threads of future history. To transmogrify, for example, the rule of the proletariat into the concrete expression of the Kingdom of God might not be an inconceivable task. And if the backlog of chiliastic fervor within the church could be set to serve such a concrete expression of the Kingdom of God, the task might be soon finished, and the Kingdom, thus perceived, fully realized. Thus the church is drawn to a present radicalism, whether responsible or not. It is the price of reality yet to come.

On the other hand the church is drawn through uncritical loyalty to the establishment to a position of conservative quietism. She is led to believe that while the present condition of man is hampered by immediate circumstances, in fact, the foundations for realizing the best interests of

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2Pascal lamented, "We do not rest satisfied with the present. We anticipate the future as too slow in coming, as if in order to hasten its course; or we recall the past, to stop its too rapid flight. So imprudent are we that we wander in times which are not ours, and do not think of the only one which belongs to us." Cited in Jurgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope, Translated by James W. Leitch. (Edinburgh: SCM Press, 1967), p. 26f.
man have already been laid. They are clearly visible in the political and economic assumptions of the establishment itself. The task for the church is to encourage her members to build upon those foundations. Thus the church is lulled to sleep with the melodic myths of the world's political and economic superstructures. The present is forfeit to the past.

In each of these temptations the church is called to focus her vision anew. The revolution bids her hail the future. The establishment enjoins her veneration for some bygone, mythical past.

The commission of the church, however, is plain. She is called to bear witness neither to the peace of Eden nor to the triumphant glory of the millenium. She is, as Maurice so enthusiastically reminds us in virtually every one of his books and sermons, commissioned to bear witness to the presence of the Kingdom of God in the world and in the lives of persons. She is committed to witness to this order and promote its establishment everywhere. Her proclamation to the world is that it belongs to God now. His is its past and its future, its origins and destinies. Thus, the world, as it is, is also his. And He is lovingly manifesting his claims to it through the worship of persons in their families, nations and in their transcendent brotherhoods under his own fatherhood.

But this is not yet the place to stop. The purpose of this paper is not simply to reassert the truism that Caesar can be demonic whether he embodies the establishment or the
revolution. Except for the most fervent zealot, that goes without saying. Our task is more difficult and more important. We must attempt a theology of revolution. That is to say that we must move about without the emotive language of either side to drive us. And we must discover and elucidate the correspondence in principle of Christian theology to issues raised by revolution. For the fact is, whatever the demonic potential of the establishment or the revolution, Christian theology has a positive interest in each. To express that positive interest is to utter a theology of revolution and to bring this thesis to a conclusion, and the writing to an end. With the examination of Maurice's social theology such a conclusion is now possible.

The fundamental categories for considering revolutionary issues are state, or order, as in chapter seven, and dynamic, or change, as in chapter six. Generally one thinks of the establishment as concerned primarily with state, and the revolution with dynamism or change. Obviously a clear dichotomy is unrealistic and misleading. A major concern of the establishment is proportioned change. None could survive without it. Likewise, the true revolution dreams of and drives for a state wherein men are happy because they are fulfilled. Nevertheless, the revolutionary dispute inevitably centers around what state is desirable and what dynamic process is required to achieve it.

With the correlative terms of order and sacrifice, Maurice has provided the Christian with a conceptual framework for
dealing with the categories of state and dynamic. These are concepts integral to Christian theology that correspond to revolutionary contentions.

Maurice's doctrine of the divine order wrestles with the issue of state. It is sometimes regarded with the curiosity of the theological antiquary as a relic of quainter times. This is inappropriate because it is inaccurate. Such an interpretation can be arrived at only by mingling Maurice's personal prejudices with the explicit statements of his doctrine of the divine order. The result is an injustice to him and a loss to our own social theology. For example, because Maurice speaks of an order, and because he defends the place of the English aristocracy from time to time in his writings, one can casually assume that order, as Maurice uses it, implies a hierarchically-structured society, a most regressive idea indeed! Such an assumption we have shown to be false. He does not speak of hierarchies within the divine order. To account for his sympathy for the aristocracy, or his defense of monarchy, or his understanding that kings reign by the grace of God, one will find no help in the explicit doctrine of the divine order. In the subcategory of government, under the heading of "the nation," one can begin to account for these. They are of concern to Maurice not because they are given by God as is the nation. They are of interest to him because as an Englishman, these are the givenss of his governmental structure. While he bends every effort to show the good uses to which these considerations of class can be put, he is careful not to prescribe
these as the essential ingredients of every other government, and thus of every other nation. The point is that the category of nation is a given in the divine order. Subcategories of government, language, law, defense, and worship are inevitable national identifiers, but they are not given in the same sense as the nation, inasmuch as the forms these take can and should vary to express the distinctive qualities of the life of each nation. Thus, Maurice can defend the existence of an aristocracy in England, or the democratic government of the United States. These are idiosyncratic. He can appreciate them genuinely because his fundamental appreciation is of the nation, and the nation is characterized by distinctiveness.

So it is with each of the elements of the divine order. The family described by Maurice is clearly the Victorian family. But he had first-hand experience of the divided family, and writes of familial relations with insight and tenderness that can still breathe a flame out of the embers of family ideals. Dominion and subjection would have served many a Victorian father to describe the relation of father and son. But Maurice rejects that for an ethos of authority and obedience. And one suspects that real fathers and sons in every age will understand why.

Again, with the concept of the universal society, Maurice is careful to limit his prescriptive prejudices. He could not see how the catholic or universal principle would escape an imperial spirit without the operation of the protestant principle of individual and national distinctiveness.
In every expression of the doctrine of the divine order, Maurice is affirming a most cordial pluralism. He asserts only that the family, the nation, and the universal society are the givens of man's true social order.

Of particular interest to revolutionary issues is the place of the nation. The governmental function of the nation has sometimes been regarded in theology as a gracious expedient for keeping the depravity of man in check. This is emphatically not Maurice's view of the nation, including its government. The nation, with each of its identifiers (law, language, government, war, and worship) is ordained of God not to keep sin in check, but as a part of the kingdom of God wherein righteousness can abound. The nation is a social dimension required for the process of bringing men to live together within the kingdom of God. One cannot, therefore, opt out of the revolutionary ferment by abandoning all politics in exchange for a pious interest in the kingdom of God. The two are not distinguishable.

There is nothing archaic or irrelevant in this doctrine of divine order. If anything is true about interest in the essential place of the family, the nation, or the universal society, it is that it is on the upswing. We are certainly members of families. And although libertarians complain that for 6,000 years man has been demonstrating that he cannot live with the state, upon the same evidence one could adduce that men cannot live without it. Third world nationalism is rife and recalls the modern history of Western nations. We are members of nations. And to the fact that we are members of a universal
society, man needs no more distinguished witness than the conscience. Furthermore, both the pluralism and the positive role that Maurice anticipates from the nation are in greater demand than ever as our global community shrinks its perimeters. Here then is a serviceable starting point for relating the Christian faith to the issue of state or order raised in a revolution.

But as Maurice describes the divine order he also describes its distortion. The family, the nation and the universal society are each subject to the imperialistic temptation, to a will to dominate others for their own purposes. One cannot deny another’s distinctiveness without denying the same opportunity to himself. And therein lies the destruction of society for it is the erosion of the divine order. The imperial spirit is demonic.

The questions that follow then, are these. What are the forces at work for the protection of the family, the distinctiveness of nations, the sense of a universal bond among men? What are the forces undermining such protection? What does one do to serve the cause of the divine order? How does one identify its foes and oppose them effectively? These questions inquire after the dynamic of society. They express the need for an effective force, i.e., a force capable of effecting conformity with the divine order.

The call to violence in the name of order is common to both revolution and establishment. So the Christian cannot avoid involvement in violence simply by opting for one or
the other (usually for the "order" of the establishment over against the "violent" revolution). Even a commitment to non-violent tactics, so-called, can hardly be guaranteed to issue in an absolute exemption from involvement in violence in a revolutionary setting. The choice open to the Christian confronting revolution is not a choice of violence or no violence. It is the choice to attempt to think and act responsibly in situations replete with the potential of violence.

The major concern is that living by the sword yields dying by the sword. Violence is a prolific fountain filling beds of myth and memory's streams and splashing out upon another generation a hundred years downstream. Violence can itself become a political style that is self-perpetuating. How to keep that from happening must temper the understanding one has of the place, use and legitimacy of violence. In other words, violence must be used responsibly or it will destroy the very aims toward which it is employed.

Violence used responsibly is effective force. That is to say that violence used responsibly will actualize the end toward which it is employed. Then violence is simply the abrasion created by the rub of distortion against reality. That does not make violence good. But if it is responsibly used, one assumes that the user has perceived it to be the inevitable (i.e., the only viable), option.

If the divine order is the static description acceptable to the Christian, then it follows that any truly effective force must be able to actualize the divine order. Then, and
only then, could the use of violence be considered responsible. What is needed is some effective force capable of comprehending violence in such a way that in the end it is absorbed. The description of effective force acceptable to the Christian is sacrifice. This is Maurice's term. It is his understanding of the dynamic that preserves the divine order and produces its benefits.

Maurice understands sacrifice to mean submission of one's will. But to submit to an imperial power, he would not call sacrifice. To submit to sheer power is no sacrifice. To submit to a higher will that is all-good and all-righteous is. To submit out of a sense of slavish dominion of the higher will over one's own is no sacrifice. To submit in obedience is.

As the submission of the will of the eternal Son to the Father has conquered the rebel spirit of man before God, so the submission of the will of men to God will overwhelm the hostility and imperial designs of other men. The law of sacrifice is the true law of human existence both individual and social. Sacrifice is not calculation. The death of Christ did not obtain from God something he was not otherwise willing to do. Rather it exposed in a violent vividness what He was already doing. It exposed a will, all-loving, all-righteous, and altogether trustworthy. It revealed an omnipotence that will conquer but with no carnal force. Omnipotence is shown to be sacrifice.

Thus the Christian is called to follow his Master. He
must deny self through sacrifice. Indeed, he will come to see ever more clearly that he has no self to save. He is a self only as he conforms to the divine order and responds in the uncalculating sacrifice of obedience.

But submission to the will of God is not always the same as submission to the will of men. Consequently, while the call for a man to sacrifice may send one man to lay down his life, it may shake another out of a comfortable torpor of self-indulgence with a call to arms. Submission to the will of God may lead a man to exclaim, "Blessed is the Lord God of Israel, who teacheth my hands to war, and my fingers to fight" (Ps. 144:1). The only disarmament absolutely demanded by the law of sacrifice is the putting off of self. Self is the fundamental armament of the imperial spirit. Sacrifice is its antagonist and its vanquisher. Sacrifice is effective force. It is the dynamic that corresponds to order.

Still, a significant question remains to be answered. That order and sacrifice are thoroughly Christian categories cannot be denied. That they correspond well to the revolutionary contentions around state and dynamic is obvious. But how does one determine that the cause in dispute will issue in a closer conformity to the divine order if one side wins instead of the other?

What we have done in the discussion of state and dynamic in this paper is to lay the theological groundwork for the ethical issue that must emerge. The revolution is before me. The establishment is behind. What ought I to do? Ought I to
join the revolution? Ought I to defend the establishment? How do I escape the hubris that can, and probably does, drive either of them?

We have shown that the decision cannot follow the simplicism that one is obligated to one or the other just because it is the establishment or just because it is the revolution. A number of other, more sophisticated decisions must be made. These must condition a responsible loyalty to one or the other. But there are two other factors that will condition one's response as well. The first is context and the other is conscience.

The plethora of objections to any attempt to establish an abstract ethical norm for the Christian response to revolution has been documented in this paper with the work of F. D. Maurice and others. Not even appeals to the presence of chaos or violence constitute an adequate casuistry. There is no responsible determining in abstracto what one's response ought to be to a real and particular revolution. The responsible Christian, whether conservative or radical, requires the context of a particular revolution to determine his stance toward it.

The reason is that it is only in that context that the conscience can function. Maurice sees conscience as the only reliable guide to the ethics of human relationships. The sense of oughtness that it brings to each relation derives first from the sheer consciousness of relationship. Conscience is inviolable. While, therefore, the norms arrived at by others
may find approval in one's own conscience and application in his practice, external norms cannot, and should not, if they could, be imposed directly upon one's conscience. The conscience testifies to the categorical impotency of external forces over the moral being of the individual. The conscience affirms that guilt and obligation are unmistakably his. Thus, the conscience is the strongest witness to a human being of his individuality.

But context produces not only the social sense of relationship and the inward conviction of individuality. Context is the arena for the voice of God to the conscience. The mere phenomenon of relationship is not sufficient to inform the conscience fully. The phenomenon of relationship raises the ethical conundrum, "what ought I to be or to do to affirm and fulfill this relationship?" For the answer to that, the voice of God is required. He is the source of the information of the conscience. His voice speaking is both, therefore, the source of one's sense of individuality and of social responsibility. He commands us, and by commanding, calls us to live as persons, and shows us the path to community with others.

Now, manifestly, the issue of the divine order must be men as persons, alive with other persons in the fellowship of genuine communities. Persons cannot be, where true moral responsibility is forfeited to anything. Abstract radicalism and abstract conservatism will not do. For example, is the position of the Christian toward oppression always to be open defiance? Then the First Epistle of Peter must
be expunged from the Christian scripture. Or shall we affirm the givenness of establishment no matter what kind? But in the crunch (i.e., the context), "we ought to obey God rather than men." There are obviously two legitimately Christian approaches to oppression. Both are enjoined. Neither is forbidden. To us is left the decision.

We are left responsible to discern in any situation which best characterizes our task as Christians. Maurice invites us to examine his convictions. We are asked reasonably if we would not like to escape the rhetoric of revolution and counter-revolution. We are led to sense the present kingdom of God as the concrete expression of the union of state or order, and dynamic or change. But to the Christian, he leaves the dilemma of immediate discernment. Casuistry will not do, context will not do either, on its own. The operation of the conscience is absolutely essential to the eventual issue of person and community within the divine order.

The conscience recognizes that Christian participation in revolution is a problem. It reveals that the real choice belongs to the Christian vis-a-vis a particular revolution. Such liberty to choose is a fearful freedom. But it is the only freedom for which such an excruciating decision, and consequent action, is worth the taking.
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